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From International Viewpoint, No. 8, 7 June 1982, pp. 4–7.
Marked up by Einde O’Callaghan for the Encyclopaedia of Trotskyism On-Line (ETOL).
The decisive defeat of the Iraqi army by Iranian forces in the second battle of Khorramshahr (May 23–24) has opened the way for explosive upsurges throughout the region. It was an effect of the momentum of the mass mobilization unleashed by the Iranian revolution.
The Iranian victory would not have been possible without the unity of the entire population of Iran in defense of the hopes represented by the revolution and their readiness to make heroic sacrifices to defend it.
Even sections of the population at war with the Khomeini regime, such as the Kurds, refused to cooperate with the Iraqi invaders.
For the imperialists, it is now essential to stop the conflict as quickly as possible and try to slow down the political processes inevitably generated by the Iraqi defeat. That explains the combination of threats and blandishments directed at the Iranian government by U.S. imperialism and its allies. It also means that direct imperialist intervention has now become a danger once again in the Persian Gulf area.
In an editorial May 28, the New York Times tried to cover up the defeat suffered by U.S. policy and present an argument that all the forces in the area interested in preserving the social status quo should now get together.
“Much as Margaret Thatcher’s Britain is slowly reversing the land grab by Argentina, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran has been heaving back an invasion by Iraq at vastly greater cost. You don’t have to like the ayatollah to welcome his military good fortune or the rebuff to the effort of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein to shatter Iran.
“Like the war in the Falklands, the Iraq-Iran conflict left the United States with no happy choices. Its interest in preserving Iran as a buffer between the Soviet Union and the Gulf justified rooting for Iran. But the United States should be just as intent that Iran not mount a revolutionary crusade against the surrounding Arab monarchies.
“Stability is a tough hand to play in an unstable region, but so far so good. The first requirement was that Iran, beastly government and all, survive the Iraqi onslaught. Its once-Americanized armed forces rose to the challenge; the Russians supplied weapons through Syria and North Korea, and the United States quietly sent its share, with the help of Israel and other unlikely allies ...
“For all the resentments that Americans and Iranians bear toward each other, they were thrown to the same side by overlapping interests. But their joint interests stop at the Iraqi border, which is where diplomacy should now make sure that the war ends.”
The claim that the U.S. was “rooting for Iran” during the war was really laying it on thick. Washington clearly hoped that Iraq would deal the Iranian revolution crippling blows, and did everything in its power to assure that.
However, it is also true that Washington also gave clear notice to the Iraqi regime that it would not tolerate any major annexations that would undermine the stability of the area or of Iran as a national state.
The detachment of the Arab-inhabited area along the Persian Gulf, where nearly all Iran’s oil is located, would obviously have made the country as it is now constituted unviable.
The U.S. imperialists did not want that; it clearly did not accord with their basic interests or what they could hope to gain from the Iran-Iraq war.
The principal historic strategy followed by Washington in dealing with revolutions, especially in countries the size of Iran, is to isolate them, wear them out, and promote the tendencies within them that are heading in a conservative direction. Such a strategy is particularly recommended when the leadership of a national revolution is socially conservative, which the Khomeini regime clearly is.
This strategy requires a double game, such as the one the New York Times cheerfully admits.
There have been a number of examples of two-faced operations by the U.S. in the Near East in particular. One example is the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq in the 1970s, in which the CIA and the shah encouraged the insurgent leader, Mullah Barzani to believe he had their support.
Statements of officials that have come to light since then make it clear that Washington’s interest was that “neither side win a clear victory.” Barzani was eventually sold for a deal with the Iraqi regime.
In the Iran-Iraq war also, a decisive victory for either side was not in the U.S. interest. The breakup of the Iranian state would have released processes whose development could not be predicted. Now Washington faces such a prospect in Iraq and the Gulf emirates. The momentum of the Iranian revolution produced a decisive defeat of the Iraqi army, which is a disaster for Washington’s policy in the area.
The Iranian government’s claims that the Iraqis counted on the support of the Kurds and a broad spectrum of opposition forces in Iran to overthrow the Islamic republic are clearly designed to serve their needs of maintaining control over the Iranian masses. Neither U.S. imperialism, nor much less the Iraqis, are capable of such revolutionary adventures. The Iraqis, for example, face a bigger Kurdish problem than the Iranian rulers.
The imperialists and their allies may make maneuvers with such forces, but they remain limited by their nature. And sometimes, it’s mostly hot air.
For example, New York Times columnist William Safire, close to powerful right-wing circles, wrote on March 16:
“Logic also suggests that America should encourage support of the valiant Kurds, as well as the leftist but non-Communist Mujahadin on the ramparts of the counter-revolution.”
The fact of the matter is that the left Kurdish nationalist forces formed the first stumbling block to the Khomeini leadership’s attempt to restabilize the neo-colonial capitalist state in Iran. They defeated the military forces of the Islamic republic in a three-month combined mass struggle and guerrilla war that culminated in August-September 1979 with uprisings in the major Kurdish towns.
At that time, U.S. officials and authoritative commentators in the U.S. capitalist press made it quite clear that Washington was far from favorable to a victory of the “valiant Kurds,” but rather regarded the success of the Kurdish struggle as a major destabilizing factor in the region.
And they were right, the victory of the Kurds defeated the Khomeini regime’s first attempt to restabilize the state in the face of the Iranian masses of all nationalities set in motion by the revolution. After that, the Khomeini regime was forced to step up its anti-imperialist demagogy in order to retain control of the masses, and that brought it into sharper confrontation in fact with imperialism.
Moreover, it was the Mujahadin and Fedayan, the revolutionary guerrilla groups, that played a leading role in the mass uprising in Teheran that resulted in a clear victory of the people over the dictatorship, severely damaging the state repressive apparatus.
What the Khomeini leadership wanted, and what U.S. policy at the time was designed to achieve, was a cold transfer of authority from the old regime to the bourgeois group around the ayatollah.
Moreover, in the decisive battle in the first stage of the Iran-Iraq war, the heroic defense of Khorramshahr that broke the momentum of the Iraqi victories, activists in and around the Mujahadin and Fedayan were in the forefront.
Now that the neo-colonial Iraqi state is faltering under the impact of its defeats, the first forces that have launched attempts to bring it down are the left Kurdish nationalists led by Jelal Talabani, who made a significant contribution to the struggle of the Iranian Kurds fighting the Khomeini forces.
Agence France-Press reported May 15:
“Conflicts have been growing in Iraqi Kurdistan for three weeks. On April 24 in Qala-Diza the forces of order opened fire on a march of several thousand persons who wanted to com- menorate the massacre perpetrated here in 1974 ...
“After the attack on this march, strikes and demonstrations have spread to several towns in Kurdistan ...
“The Voice of the Iraqi Revolution, the radio run by Jelal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, is continuing to call on both the Arab and Kurdish population to stage a general uprising ...
“Since the recent Iraqi defeats, a two-sided phenomenon has appeared. The security forces, thinking about their future, have appeared to make tacit compromises with the Kurdish resistance. On the other hand, there has been growing activity by the population, which seems no longer to fear the wrath of the Baathist government.”
At the same time, signs are appearing that another Near Eastern neo-colonial regime is moving in to keep things from getting out of hand and maybe grab some advantages for itself in the bargain. In the May 28 International Herald Tribune, Claudia Wright reported:
“... crack Turkish forces are moving steadily into bases within range of northern Iraq and there is a strong view among nationalist Turkish commanders that for the first time since World War I they have a chance to recover the ‘lost’ provinces – Iraq’s oil rich governorates of D’hok, Arbil and Sulaimaniya – taken from the defeated Ottoman empire by the British and the League of Nations.
“As surprising as a Turkish move into northern Iraq might seem to Iraq’s current Arab allies ... this might be preferred to the possibility of a realignment of political forces in Baghdad.”
Ankara also has reasons to fear the victory of a Kurdish revolt near its borders.
In its report on the Iraqi defeats, Hemmat, a fortnightly magazine published in Tehran that reflects the views of the Hezbe Vehdete Kargare (HVK – Workers Unity Party), stressed the uprising of the Iraqi Kurds against the Saddam Hussein government. This was in the context of the Khomeini government’s constant attempt to portray the Kurds as allies of the Iraqis.
There are two sides to the Iranian victory. One is the encouragement it gives to the masses. The other will be attempts to reinforce the Iranian bourgeois state and leadership.
The Khomeini regime made a certain progress in re-consolidating the capitalist state during the twenty-month war, and is now moving to make sure that this is not endangered after the end of the hostilities.
For example, the mid-May issue of Hemmat refers to a circular from the Ministry of Labor banning the organization or reorganization of workers councils (shoras) in factories.
The fact is that over the past two years, repression has grown steadily more extensive in Iran. It spread from the Fedayan, who were involved in the struggles against the new regime in Kurdistan and Turkmenistan; to the Mujahadin, who were connected to liberal and left elements in the clergy, represented by Ayatollah Teleghani; to include even those groups on the left that support the regime, such as the Tudeh Party and the “Central Committee Majority” faction of the Fedayan.
Attacks by the right-wing Khomeini forces on the Mujahadin began as early as May 1979, with the kidnapping of Teleghani’s children. They intensified until the middle of 1981, when the Mujahadin became involved in a guerrilla campaign against the regime, with apparently the usual disastrous results of such private wars by left groups against the para-police forces of neo-colonial regimes.
That is, the effect was the strengthening of the state repressive forces, and the isolation and slaughter of large numbers of revolutionary activists.
The Khomeini regime moved against the democratic gains of the revolution almost immediately after the insurrection. The Shiite clergy dismantled and broke the factory and neighborhood committees. The newly freed mass circulation press became the target of mob attacks directed by the clergy.
Massive censorship was imposed when the first Kurdish war was launched by the new regime in June 1979. But even then the left papers that did not criticize the regime were not closed down and their street sellers were not attacked. That is no longer the case, as shown by the attacks on the Tudeh party and its publications.
In mid-March, Kargar, the weekly paper of the Hezbe Kargarane Enqelabi (HKE, Revolutionary Workers Party), was shut down after it published an interview with Bahram Atai, one of its leaders released not long before from Evin prison. Atai told of witnessing mass executions and torture of anti-imperialist militants. He was rearrested and jailed along with the printer of Kargar on charges of slandering the regime.
According to the mid-May Hemmat, both Atai and the printer were still in jail.
Now, the fact that the Iraqi invasion is obviously no longer a threat creates a new political situation in Iran. The defeat of Iraq weakens the regime’s pretext for repression and it encourages the masses to press forward.
It will now be tested how politically cohesive a force the new army is that was forged in the heat of war.
Le Monde’s correspondent Jean Gueyras described the situation in the military forces in the May 3 issue of the Paris daily:
“The quite recent introduction of bassijs (members of the Mobilization of the Disinherited) onto the battlefield has enabled the Teheran leaders, who have tight control over them, to play another card to ease the rivalry of the army and the revolutionary guards....
“Another element favoring better cooperation among the elements of the armed forces is the thoroughgoing purge of the officer corps ...
“Paradoxically, the clergy in Teheran seem more mistrustful of the revolutionary guards than the officers ... A half dozen representatives of the clergy have recently been nominated to the supreme council of the guards ...
“Colonel Shirazi, commander in chief of the land forces, a captain before the revolution and – rumor has it – the real victor at Dezful (which opened the Iraqi rout), is the prototype of the young officer loyal to the Islamic regime. He waged a pitiless war against the Kurdish guerrillas and is a strong partisan of a new homogeneous army, whose backbone would be the revolutionary guards. This idea seems to have been rejected by both the military hierarchy and the clergy who fear that a united army might succumb to the temptation of bonapartism.”
Gueyras’ report indicates that while progress has been made in rebuilding an effective bourgeois army, it is not enough to assure success in restabilizing the neo-colonial state.
What happens in Iran now will depend on the emergence of a new leadership. Past experience has shown that it is not automatic that the regime will lose control of the masses in an upsurge or period of renewed confidence. After the Teheran insurrection itself, the conservative Khomeini forces quickly housebroke the mass organizations, except among the minority nationalities, which had, to one degree or another, independent leaderships. The best conditions for the emergence of such a leadership are a minimum of imperialist pressure and a strong fight for democratic rights.
The Iranian victory was clearly as a result of the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses, and in turn will reinforce that. The test of the political effectiveness of this pressure will be whether Teheran makes a settlement of the war designed to stabilize the region.
But this does not depend only on the relationship of forces in Iran. The most immediate question is what the Iraqi masses will do now that their neo-colonial state and demagogic leadership have been weakened. If there is an explosion, the Kurdish revolutionary organizations will likely play a major role. This would have important effects in Iran.
By the victory that they have won by their courage and sacrifice, the Iranian masses have deepened the crisis of neo-colonial rule in the Near East. As a result, they have improved their chances to gain control of their own struggle and achieve the hopes for a better life that have inspired their sacrifices. It is the task now of all forces throughout the world that support such a fight against imperialism, and for democracy and an end to exploitation, to provide aid for that struggle. The only way to do that is to oppose all attempts of U.S. imperialism and its Turkish ally to intervene against the Iranian revolution.
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Last updated: 22 January 2020