POLITICS

The Economic Boom and the International Labor Movement
by Leon Trotsky.

Throughout Europe the labor movement is showing signs of a new period of revolutionary development. Though it cannot definitely be stated whether or not we are approaching the decisive conflict, there can be no doubt that the revolutionary curve is steadily going upward.

Capitalism in Europe passed its most critical period in the year immediately following the war. The acme definitely be stated whether or not bourgeois society was nearing its end. The bourgeois warded off these attacks. Partly by means of persuasion and compromise, partly by employing force. That first proletarian onslaught was rather chaotic, devoid of any definite political aims and ideas, without a well defined plan, devoid of leadership. Its development and its outcome proved to Labor that a change of its position within bourgeois society is rather more difficult to achieve than it appeared to be during the first months of the post-war period.

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The trade and industiral crisis in Spring and Summer 1920 broke out, as mentioned before, at a time when both political and psychological reaction had gained a foothold among the workers. The crisis has undoubtedly increased the discontent of large sections of Labor, it has even at some places resulted in stormy manifestations of that discontent. But after the defeat in 1919 and the internal differences resulting from that defeat, the economic crisis in itself was no longer able to give the movement the necessary unity and make of it a decisive revolutionary onslaught.

From this we see that the crisis does not influence the labor movement in as regular a manner as it appears to some people. The political effects of a crisis (not its depth only, but its tendency as well) are determined by the entire political situation and the events preceding and accompanying the crisis, and above all by the previous successes and failures of Labor itself. In some cases a crisis can be instrumental in rousing the revolutionary activity of the workers, in others it is apt to deaden the militant spirits of the proletariat and, if it lasts very long and demands too many sacrifices of Labor, to weaken not only the offensive energies of the workers, but the defensive as well, and that in an extraordinary degree.

Now, if this line of thought be following and completed, the following opinion can be arrived at:

If the economic crisis with its wide-spread unemployment and general insecurity had set in immediately after the war, the revolutionary crisis within bourgeois society would have assumed a decidedly more powerful and fundamental character. In order to prevent this, the bourgeois governments endeavored, by means of an artificial boom, to weaken the revolutionary crisis. That means that the inevitable has been postponed for a year and half at the expense of the still further destruction of both the financial and economic apparatus of capitalism. Though the crisis gained thus in depth and intensity, it did not coincide with the stormy wave caused by demobilization, but with a time of
defeat, of a settling of accounts, when in one camp the masses have by now learned that the other are always disappointed—all of which was the cause of many splits. The revolutionary energies of Labor were directed inward and found expression in the formation of Communist parties which have become powerful factors in Germany and France. Capitalism, which had been accorded a periodical boom, once the immediate danger was avoided, the resulting crisis in order to deprive Labor of its gains (the 8-hour day, increases in wages) which it had already granted during the preceding period. Labor, though it had gained its positions, had to yield in the end. The ideas of conquest of power, of the Soviet system, of a Socialist revolution, naturally reeled at a time when Labor was compelled to fight against a reduction of wages, and not always successfully at that.

The leading theories of the economic crisis did not assume the forms of overproduction and wide-spread unemployment, but another, even more serious form, that of selling out the assets of the country and lowering the standard of living of the workers (as for instance in Germany), the energy of Labor expended in increasing wages (while the buying power of the currency was steadily decreasing) can be likened to a man chasing his own shadow. The German capitalists, together with their brothers in other countries, went over to the offensive. The workers retreated in disarray.

In a situation such as that, the March occurrences took place in Germany. The explanation of those events is that the young Communist Party, alarmed at the apparent retreat of the labor movement, made a desperate attempt at utilizing, at the head of a group of militant proletarians to "electrify" Labor, and, if possible, to develop the action into a decisive battle. The Third Congress of the Communist International met with the impressions of the March action still fresh in the minds of the delegates. After careful examination the Congress realized the danger and adopted a "Offensive Theory" and that of revolution "electrification" and those deeper processes going on within Labor in connection with both the economic and political changes.

The situation had been in Germany as strong a Communist Party as in March 1921; it is very possible that the proletariat would have already been victorious in January or March 1919. But a Party such as that did not exist—and theóreticians suffered defeat. Out of the experience gained in that defeat there grew the Communist Party. If in 1921 it had acted as a Comunist Party would have been obliged to act in 1919, it would have perished. That was stated by the last Congress.

The discussions on the "Offensive Theory" are closely connected with the problem of how to appraise the economic boom and depression. The spokesmen of that theory developed the following theorem: The whole world is dominated by a crisis—the crisis of the decay of bourgeois society—which is bound to grow in intensity and thus revolutionize the workers. Hence a Communist Party must make every effort to work on its reserves; its task is to attack capitalist society. Under the pressure of the economic decay the proletariat must sooner or later fulfill that task. That point of view could not maintain itself in so unpainted a form till the time of the Congress. Its crudest points were eliminated by the Commission on the Economic Situation. The mere thought that the crisis could be succeeded by a relative economic boom, seemed to the conscious and half-conscious followers of the "Offensive Theory" as something akin to Centrism. Regarding the opinion that a revival of trade and industry would not only act as a brake upon the revolution, but could on the contrary imbue it with fresh power—that point of view was found to be the badly needed radicalism of the "Left" found an innocent reflection in a resolution adopted by the last convention of the German Party which leveled a personal attack against me. This in spite of the fact that I had been merely repeating the opinion held by the Executive of 1921 Artificially prolonged the unreal boom, exploited of the "Left" since the lessons of the Third Congress have gone home everywhere and most of all in the German Party.

II.

Clear signs of a change in the economic situation are noticeable everywhere. Plaititudes about the present crisis being the crisis of decay and the basis of a pre-revolutionary epoch, which can only end with a victory of the proletariat, are not likely to stand the test of actual experience. The very word "crisis" and all tactical conclusions resulting therefrom. The world crisis really and truly came to a standstill in May last. The branches of industry manufacturing necessities of life first of all showed signs of a boom. Then came large industry. At present there are undeniable facts which can be proved by figures.

Does that mean the decay of industry has been brought to a stop? That the balance has been regained? That the revolutionary epoch has come to an end? Not at all! The industrial boom simply means that the decay of the capitalist system and the development of the revolutionary movement are merely somewhat more complicated than they appear to some people who always like to simplify matters.

The trend of economic development is characterized by two curves: The basic one—determinates the general growth of the forces of production, buying and selling, import and export, banking operations, etc., the general direction of this curve throughout the entire period of capitalist development is upward. It expresses the fact that under Capitalism the forces of production grow and the general wealth of society have increased. But this basic curve does not rise steadily. There have been crises when it remained stationary, and others when it soared upward only in order to remain at the same level for a long time. In other words in the history of Capitalism there have been epochs when the forces of production developed rapidly, and others when they grew very slowly. Thus for instance, considering the curve of Great Britain's export trade, we can see that from the beginning of the 18th century till the middle of the 19th century it developed very slowly, but then, however, it grew very quickly within two decades (1851-73).

In the following epoch (1873-1894) it remained nearly stationary, only in order to go steadily upward again until the outbreak of the war.

If we were to draw this curve, its unequal course upward would be a schematic representation of the development of Capitalism or of one of its parts.

We know, however, that capitalist development moves within the industrial limits given by a few successive phases of the magic boom-standstill period. The oscillations of a crisis, improvement, boom, standstill, crisis, standstill of the economy, periods of depressions and of booms, etc., etc., prove that to think of the development of the revolutionary movement are merely somewhat more complicated than they appear to some people who always like to simplify matters.

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A crisis is succeeded by a boom which is again followed by a crisis. Generally speaking of course, the curve of capitalism has gone upward during the last few centuries. Hence it follows that the total development exceeded the total of the crises. The curve has, however, a different aspect in the various epochs. There have been periods of standstill. The oscillations continued. But as the capitalist development was generally slowly upward, it could not be doubted however, that in every boom industry has gone forward to an extent than could not altogether be destroyed by a succeeding depression. The oscillations of the rate of capitalist economy can be likened to the alternation of booms and crises prove that to think of the development of the economy, periods of depressions and of booms, etc., etc., prove that to think of the development of the revolutionary movement are merely somewhat more complicated than they appear to some people who always like to simplify matters.

These inner workings of capitalist development, this continuous oscillation of boom and crisis prove that to think of the present crisis as continuing and intensifying until it is ended by the dictatorship of the proletariat, no matter if that dictatorship will set in within one, two or even three years, is wrong. The oscillations continued through the Third Congress—and are accompanying capitalist development in its youth, maturity and decay, just as the heart beat is always present in a human being, even in a state of agony. No matter what the general trend of economic development, there is always a crisis when a crisis does away with overproduction and the forces of production, it regulates supply and demand and thus tends to enliven industry. The tempo, the extent, the firmness and the duration of the revival depend upon the conditions characterizing the vitality of capitalism.

It can now be declared definitely (it was already stated at the Third Congress) that as soon as the crisis has broken out, the first wave of the industrial revival will within the limits given by the present
system be confronted with other obstacles—the destruction of the economic balance between America and Europe, the impoverishment of Central and Eastern Europe, the lasting and thorough ruin of the financial apparatus. The next industrial boom, no matter how long it will not be able to put industry on its present level; it is even possible that this boom once the first obstacles are overcome will come to grief in an economic blind alley.

Nevertheless, a boom remains a boom; it means an increase in the demand of goods and consequentially an increase in profits, an expansion of capital, and a consequent possibility of increasing wages. Under these given historic conditions a boom will not weaken Labor but strengthen it. That follows from past events. In all countries the labor movement reached its highest point after the war. At this time Labor had but a month's time to consolidate, was compelled to retreat, which resulted in many splits occurring within it. Though a lasting crisis would under conditions such as these increase the bitterness of the workers (especially the unemployed and part-time workers) it would at the same time seriously weaken the activity of Labor which is bound up with the knowledge that without it the wheels of production would not revolve. Lasting unemployment after a period of revolutionary political attacks and defeats is under no circumstances favorable for the Communist Parties. On the contrary! The longer a crisis lasts the more conducive it is both for anarchist and reformist tendencies. This fact finds expression in the splitting away of the syndicalist groups from the Third International, in Amsterdam, that is, in the 21st Congress of the Serrati group, in the splitting off of the Levi group, etc. An industrial revival is apt to strengthen Labor’s self-reliance, weakened by many defeats and dissipations within its ranks; it is furthermore apt to weld the workers in member states more firmly together and strengthen their attempts at unified action.

We are already noticing the first signs of this process. Labor, beginning to feel solid ground under its feet, strives for unity. It feels that splits are obstacles on the way to action. The workers endeavor not only to present a united front to the capita­list attempting to take advantage of the crisis conditions, they even prepare for a counterattack and rely in this on the conditions created by the boom. The crisis represented for Labor a period of consolidation, and not only the working class, but Labor’s self-reliance, weakened by many defeats and dissolutions within its ranks; it is furthermore apt to weld the workers in member states more firmly together and strengthen their attempts at unified action.

If the development should slow down, and the present crisis is, in some countries succeeded by a period of boom, this would not mean the ushering in of the “organic” epoch. Oscillations are inevitable as long as Capitalism continues to exist; they will be with it in its time of agonies just as they accompanied it during its youth and maturity.

For this one can say with assurance that whatever the political condition, in whatever form the proletariat is over-run by Capitalism, it will surely attempt the offensive once a period of boom has set in. An economic attack such as that which must be carried out under the slogan of revenge for the decade of wars and the cumulative influx of productive forces during the crisis, would thus show just as much tendency to become a civil war as the present defensive...”

III.

The capitalist press shed tears of joy over the economic improvement and the possibility of a new epoch of capitalist stability. There is a little cause for that joy as for the sup­plementary page of the “Left”, who held the opinion that the Revolution would be the outcome of an uninterrupted series of ever-intensifying crisis. Politically speaking, it would in practice be only favorable for us, if the next trade and industrial boom means increased riches for the big capitalists. The tendencies for unity among the former will be stronger, especially if they only suffer during the crisis, would thus show just as much tendency to become a civil war as the present defensive...”

Ob­li­gation of the “Offensive Theory”, that not a crisis but the industrial revival will lead to the victory of the proletariat? Such a cate­gorical statement has no foundation. We have shown that the connection between a boom and the character of the class-struggle is not mechanical, but complicated and dialectic. In order to understand the tasks of the immediate future, it is sufficient to know that we are better prepared for a boom period than we were for the crisis. There exist strong Communist Parties in the more important countries on the Continent. These parties are undoubtedly presented by the boom with the opportunity of both a great propaganda and a political offensive.

It would be useful to keep in mind and press to-day how far this offensive can go. It has only commenced, or rather, the very first signs of it have put in their appearance. Some dialectic theoreticians will maintain that if the next industrial revival does not immediately help Labor to carry out a new period of industrial stability, then probably it will not surpass the one of the war period. The revolution might not follow, and the new period of industrial stability would probably result in a new period of stability. But that does not involve the danger of a fresh epoch of capitalist reconstruction? To this we can reply as follows: If the proletariat will not be ready for a new period of industrial stability but still, the proletariat would not gain more and more experience and join with the bourgeoisie in always more serious and bitter battles, if it would not endeavor to assume the offensive on the first occasion presenting itself—if all this would not be the case, capitalist development would, assisted by the manoeuvres of the bourgeois governments, surely attain its goal. Whole countries would then once more be forced back into a state of economic barbarism; millions would perish through hunger and despair, and upon their bones would be built some new equilibrium of the capitalist world. A perspective such as that is a mere abstraction; however. Many obstacles lie in that road: chaos in the world’s market, collapse of currency, militarism, dangers of war etc. Even the annexation of the 21 elements to the German Empire, the economic blocs, the economic pressure, the economic forces of capitalism groping for a way out of these entanglements affect Labor and spur it to attack. Development of the labor movement goes on even if Labor be compelled to retreat. Because eventen defeat provides experience and strengthens its party. Labor moves on. The working class is itself its most important moving factor, the incarnation of its future.

It is true that the movement is impeded by the oscillations of Capitalism, which in a period immediately following a war assume abrupt forms. But no matter in what stage of development the union of objective and subjective conditions will take place—resulting in Revolution—we are satisfied with the knowledge that the tempo of the development depends to great extent upon us, our parties, and our tactics. It is of utmost importance that the possibility of the movement should be maintained in its present infructuous condition, and not be even interfered with. By means of the forces of capitalism, the movement of the working class, the movement of the workers, will, perhaps, prove to be a fresh stage in the consolidation of our ranks for a victorious attack. A clear and profound knowledge of the prevailing situation means for a revolutionary party a shortening of the long road of suffering, an approach toward its aim.

Roumanian Politics

by Al Badulescu (Bukarest).

At last! The government of the bloody Averescu, the cynical Argentarianu and of the comedian Take Jonescu has been given the coup de grace. The news is long overdue. He made every possible attempt to remain at the rudder. For this noble purpose he changed his opinion twice daily... out of love for his country and his party-followers, but all in vain.

The economic and financial crisis, for which no remedy was found, was supplemented by a moral crisis and gave birth to the political crisis. As to the economic and financial crisis, the minister of finance Tibulescu could be sent to Paris to hear of the news of the economic, financial, and moral crisis. Twice or thrice, the government would listen to their advice, but the crisis was far too great. The people do not want this to be postponed. The announced capital and property tax could be postponed indefinitely, and so on. But even at this rate, there was no end to trouble, because the “Banca Nationala”, which is the capital of Roumania, roundly refused to lend a hand, since it was totally dependent upon the Liberal Party, refused to advance the Government 800,000,000 lei, long ago necessary.

Besides this the government suffered a defeat on the moral field. There is one instance where a colonel made crooked deals in the name of a general; another, where revelations were made of a country villa built by a general with materials and men belonging to the community and government; the embezzle­ment of millions by higher officials; the appointment of generals and colonels as “Controllers of Speculation” (or as “Speculation of the Generals”); the court's decision in the case of the colonel R. etc.

On the political field the “People’s” Party was no more successful. Rerors came from all sides that leaders as well as entire local organizations were leaving the party. The representa­tives of the bourgeois opposition in Parliament boycotted it. The terror practised against the great masses weakened the former popularity of the general, i.e., of the party. The leaders of the
People's Party felt that the ground was becoming unsteady; but who wanted to give up the budget? Who wanted to get through with politics so quickly?

The general attempted to fortify himself politically. He had to resolve the fight against the Liberal Party and at one time even succeeded in winning the neutrality of the Peasants' Party (the Tzaranists) which is now the bitterest enemy of the Bratianu Party. The Tzaranist representatives returned to Parliament. For their neutrality they were given the following places in the government (as it then performed in all provinces; a new election and the calling of the Constituent Assembly. These political concessions for the Peasants' Party were necessary for the future existence of the People's Party, but they also led to an immediate solution of the government crisis. For such election reforms and new elections would necessarily result in immense gains for the left parties, i.e. the Peasants' and Socialist parties, and for the National minorities. It would also have meant the defeat of the Liberal Party for many years. (The failure of the Peasants' Party would also have meant the defeat of the Liberal Party.)

He is known the world over. He is the great European who formed the Small Entente! He is the man who can not point out a single honest hour in his whole life! He will rule 2 or 3 months, in which he will steal more than was stolen in the 2 years of Csarism. It is known in all the press that in the present government of Take Jonescu (who in 8 days succeeded in finding 12 men for the cabinet) was formed at the recommendations of Bratianu; and that it serves as a curtain for the Liberal Party which is trying to gain time before it can form an independent government. Even the price is known. If the next Parliament, the "Takists" will get 10 seats! Because without the open support of the other parties the "great European" would never get a single seat. But 10 seats will suffice for his non-European to make himself a European and to do business for his country... as a Roumanian!

The Liberals will therefore form the next Government. Perhaps even before the Spring. This project is supported by the numerous large dailies: "Adevarul", "Dimineta", "Dacia", "Izvoare", the take over of the Press of the Liberals", "Universul" (the largest circulation) and "Lupta" (the new organ of the former democratic war-provocator—C. Mille—as the property of Take Jonescu), and the numerous official organs of the Liberal Party in all the provinces of greater Roumania. The "Banca Nationala", the "Bancas Romaneasca" and hundreds of other banking houses are also still influential.

In the last analysis, a Take Jonescu government signifies the following:

a) No democratic election reform.
b) War indemnity from Soviet Russia.
c) The indefinite delay of the trial of the hundred Communists who have been languishing in prison for years.

A Take Jonescu government means open, lawful reaction.

The brutal dissolution of the Averescu Government saved the People's Party from a complete breakdown. The greatest disappointment is felt by the new revolutionaries... the Tzaranists. By threatening with a very radical program (the capitalist press calls it a copy of Zinoviev's phrases) and through a love-declaration to the dynasty the General's followers hoped to be the successors of the general; but the king and queen do not seem to be as childish as Dr. Luru, Mihalake, and Stepe are.

The general situation is again favorable for a revival of the Socialist and Communist parties. But we lack forces of leadership for carrying out the organization of the masses (these are in prison) and particularly a daily newspaper.

"Bolshevik Atrocities" Against Polish Prisoners of War

by L. Domski (Warsaw).

Ever since reciprocal repatriation of refugees and former prisoners of war between Soviet Russia and Poland commenced, the press of the latter country is publishing reports alleging that the Bolsheviks are committing atrocities upon the miserable Polish deportees (which allegations are, by the way, usually based on 70% of the transients arriving from Russia are Jews who import into Poland Bolshevik ideas). The Chairman of the Polish Committee for the Repatriation of Prisoners of War, Korsak, had even the eifrormy to dispatch an official mission to the frontiers in which he dealt with the latter of "inhumanity" and "barbarous treatment" of the returning Poles.

Since, however, Poland has already received 400,000 refugees and prisoners of war and the winesses of "Bolshevik atrocities" have been numerous in number and large industries.) In other words it would have meant a blow to reaction.

The king over whose "constitutionality" much was written could look upon the sad example. The Liberals gave him the impetus to act. General Averescu had to get out, in spite of the fact that he had announced several times at mass-meetings and in Parliament that his rule was based upon definite principles (Censorship, martial law, long-term sentences for strikers, raising prices, etc.) and that the king was the person in him, he had no desire to surrender power to the bloody rule of the Liberals!

The moral position of the Liberal Party did not yet warrant a taking away of power. In spite of the consistent Peasants' Party could not win the confidence of the king, the queen and their clique. The other bourgeois parties are too insignificant to be able to form a government by themselves. The hero of the situation was at this moment the energetic king.

In the last analysis, a Take Jonescu government signifies that his rule was based upon definite principles (Censorship, martial law, long-term sentences for strikers, raising prices, etc.) and that as long as the people's representatives had faith in him he had no desire to surrender power to the bloody rule of the Liberals!

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his astonishment that Poland receives her returning com-
patronage in such a fashionable fashion."

And so on and so forth. What hurts those patriots most
is that the comparison is all in favor of Soviet Russia. All
patriotic lies are of little avail if there are 400,000 witnesses
to testify against them.

A certain Lipinski laments in the social-patriotic sheet
"Robotic":

"Our Polish Bolsheviki are shamelessly exploiting all
such occurrences, in their anti-Polish agitation among our
patriotic youth. The trouble is that in your dear beloved
country greets and receives you."

Unfortunately, under these circumstances, this propaganda is falling
upon very favorable ground . . . ."

The barrister Zielinski said at a refugee meeting in War-
saw on November 15: "On the Eastern frontier, where
Polish authority and Bolshevistic conditions meet, lives a irresistible
population which does not know whom it should decide for. And
before the eyes of that population, where two worlds meet and
our national prestige hangs in the balance, there can be observed
cold, uncomfortable Polish trains, people passing the night upon
the snow-covered ground . . . . perishing on Polish soil—
victims of our shameful neglect."

Quite recently it was rumored that Mr. Korsak "would
leave" the Communist Party for the Gazeta Poarana "said that
"Korsak is responsible for the dead who are daily being carried
out of the barracks in Rovno and Baranovitchi and for those
barracks which are brought on to Warsaw."

Meanwhile Mr. Korsak has been promoted—no doubt be-
cause of his gifted notes against the "Bolshevik atrocities".

ECONOMICS

The So-Called Denomination of the Currency

by E. Preobrashenski.

At first a few words on the idea of denomination. By
denomination is meant a new issue of paper money whose
nominal value is to approach the buying power of a metal ruble and
which is to take the place of the old depreciated paper money. The
difference between denomination and devolution is as fol-

In the International

On the Eve of the Second Congress of the Italian Communist Party

by Umberto Terracini.

Sometime next month, that is, in February, the Italian
Communist Party will hold its Second Congress since its
charter at Livorno immediately after the withdrawal of the Communists from the
Socialist Party. The large and unpretentious auditorium of the S. Mark's
Theatre was used for one day by the representatives of the
Congress. The First Congress met at Livorno imme-
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The advantage is that a big transaction will not
require so many rouble certificates. The buying power of a
million old rubles is very small, but the payment of a million
rubles requires 10,000 thousand-ruble notes. This leads to many
technical difficulties.

The other important fact must be taken into consideration.
The Council of People's Commissaries decreed that the 1922
issue of paper money is to be limited to a certain definite sum
based upon gold. In other words the new issue is not to exceed
this sum. This opens the possibility of a gradual limitation of the
issue of paper money by the Council of People's Commissaries. The
capacity of People's Commissaries has already decided that in case the
tax-yield should exceed expectations, the 1922 issue will be con-
siderably reduced.

The barrister Zielinski said at a refugee meeting in War-
saw on November 15: "On the Eastern frontier, where
Polish authority and Bolshevistic conditions meet, lives a irresistible
population which does not know whom it should decide for. And
before the eyes of that population, where two worlds meet and
our national prestige hangs in the balance, there can be observed
cold, uncomfortable Polish trains, people passing the night upon
the snow-covered ground . . . . perishing on Polish soil—
victims of our shameful neglect."

Quite recently it was rumored that Mr. Korsak "would
leave" the Communist Party for the Gazeta Poarana "said that
"Korsak is responsible for the dead who are daily being carried
out of the barracks in Rovno and Baranovitchi and for those
barracks which are brought on to Warsaw."

Meanwhile Mr. Korsak has been promoted—no doubt be-
cause of his gifted notes against the "Bolshevik atrocities".

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siderably reduced.

Many citizens fear that the issue of new rubles may ruin
the possessors of the old ones. This fear has no foundation
whatever. The new money will circulate together with the old
one, and it will make no difference whatever to the buyer as well
as to the seller whether he give or take one new rouble or
ten old ones for 10 pounds of potatoes, particularly when the
new certificates are technically of better quality than the old
ones and permit of counterfeiting.

The old money is to circulate as small change. An old
1000 rouble not will have the value of 10 kopecks, a 500 rouble
note, 5 kopecks, and according to the market-price standard a new
ruble will have only one half the value of apre-war gold ruble.
and to stir the general hopelessness and desolation into a belief in the certainty of the events which were to follow.

The Second Congress will start three sessions under quite different conditions. There is as yet in Italy only a young and small party; but it is constantly growing and promises to develop into a well-organized power. It is a party forming a network of 1403 groups and embracing the entire country; it is a party whose strength is centralized organization enables it to give a unified direction to all its actions and whose press consists of three dailies, twenty provincial weeklies, a young people's weekly, a trade-union paper, a newspaper correspondence and a publishing-house. The instructions of the party are observed by about one-third of newspapers of the Liberal press, by a small dailies, by a smaller militant vanguard within the Italian Syndicalist Union.

The Italian proletariat can no longer be in doubt or uncertainty as to the program and tactics of the Communist Party, because the questions of principle are laid down in Moscow, and the questions of tactics must incorporate the results of the investigation, in order not to contradict the basic principles laid down in Moscow, but they have been committed to the party and the instructions of the Executive Committee serves as a good proof of its faithfulness, and it is therefore very unlikely that it will be severely reproached or criticized.

That is why the report of the Executive Committee does not satisfy the readers' expectations. Neither is there any personal quarrel or disagreement which can in any way disturb the coming Congress in its work, a thing not altogether unknown in many parties and at many congresses. However, the Congress will give its instructions to the party. The program of which are proposed by certain delegates of the Communist Party into hundreds of confusing partial actions.

Since the fundamental principles on the trade-union and agrarian questions were already defined by the Third Congress of the Communist International, the corresponding tactics to be proposed by certain delegates of the Communist Party, the agrarian question, whose solutions form the prerequisite for all questions of principle as they are laid down in the party program, cannot and should not altered.

And since the conquest of the trade-unions and the agrarian question, whose solutions form the prerequisite for all revolutionary action, are the two main objectives upon which the actions of the Bulgarian Communist Party are to be directed, they are assigned two special sections of the agenda.

When examined, these questions, the agrarian questions as well as the trade-union questions, which are laid down in the program cannot and should not altered.

The labor organizations and the agrarian question, whose solutions form the prerequisite for all revolutionary action, are the two main objectives upon which the actions of the Bulgarian Communist Party are to be directed and are assigned two special sections of the agenda.

When examined, these questions exhibit deviations, not contradicts the basic principles laid down in Moscow, but they are sought to adopt them to the conditions and circumstances which are peculiar to the Italian milieu.

Since the fundamental principles on the trade-union and agrarian questions were already defined by the Third Congress of the Communist International, the corresponding tactics to be proposed by certain delegates of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

When examined, these questions exhibit deviations, not the party itself and started an outrageous campaign against the relief action of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

In response to the appeal of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, in which the collection of contributions was suggested, the Bulgarian Communist Party issued a special appeal to the working masses of Bulgaria, in which they were summoned to do the following: first of all, to contribute a day's wages for the starving; secondly, to demand of the government the resumption of political and economic relations with Soviet Russia; and thirdly, to protect the proletarian revolution with all possible means against the newly organized advance of international capitalist reaction. This appeal sufficed to rouse the enthusiasm of the Bulgarian working masses of Bulgaria and Russia and to bring about a considerable sacrifices on their part.

Under the auspices of the Bulgarian Communist Party great mass-meetings were everywhere organized, the miserable condition of the Volga population was laid bare and the significance of the Russian Revolution and of Soviet Russia for the working masses was brought to light. At these meetings the first public collections were made. Later, the party organized workers' committees which went from house to house and from store to store and collected contributions either in money or in goods. The labor organizations pledged themselves to take off a day's wages from their members. Besides this, many other means were resorted to. In spite of their own poverty, the workers responded with great willingness and sacrifice to the appeal of the party and during the last few weeks Party's activities, many members of the bourgeois class were also willing to help. The relief campaign thus assumed a national character. Only isolated villagers, mostly of the rich peasantry who are the sworn enemies of the Communists, refused to aid. But the Communist Party was not satisfied with one appeal. It concentrated all its energy and the generosity of the masses and transformed the relief action into a permanent campaign.

The 3rd and 4th of September were fixed as international relief-days. On these days, great mass-meetings were again arranged together with the Communist Youth. The Communist faction in Parliament demanded of the government the reestablishment of political and economic relations with Soviet Russia. Outside of this, they made a motion to grant 500,000,000 leva for the purchase of relief goods. On the 3rd, a resolution of 200 Town Councils which are controlled by the Communists granted money, and in those controlled by the bourgeoisie the Communists made motions to that effect.

**RELIEF FOR RUSSIA**

**What the Bulgarian Workers did for the Famine Sufferers in Soviet Russia**

*by Kolarov (Soitia)*

The news of the great misfortune that has befallen the millions of inhabitants of the Volga region, and the call for help which came from Soviet Russia and the Communist International, met with a great response among the inhabitants and the bourgeoisie of Bulgaria. At first the bourgeoisie also shed a few crocodile tears over the starving millions, but later the first of all to be seen was the reaction of the Bulgarian Communist Party. Moreover, the corresponding tactics to be proposed by certain delegates of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

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Under the auspices of the Bulgarian Communist Party, great mass-meetings were everywhere organized, the miserable condition of the Volga population was laid bare and the significance of the Russian Revolution and of Soviet Russia for the working masses was brought to light. At these meetings, the first public collections were made. Later, the party organized workers' committees which went from house to house and from store to store and collected contributions either in money or in goods. The labor organizations pledged themselves to take off a day's wages from their members. Besides this, many other means were resorted to. In spite of their own poverty, the workers responded with great willingness and sacrifice to the appeal of the party and during the last few weeks, Party's activities, many members of the bourgeois class were also willing to help. The relief campaign thus assumed a national character. Only isolated villagers, mostly of the rich peasantry who are the sworn enemies of the Communists, refused to aid. But the Communist Party was not satisfied with one appeal. It concentrated all its energy and the generosity of the masses and transformed the relief action into a permanent campaign.

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The time between the 20th and the 30th of October was set by the Executive Committee of the party as the Red Week for Russian Relief. During these 10 days all the energy of the party was concentrated upon the relief campaign.

On this occasion the "Workers' Journal" issued a special number dealing exclusively with the struggle against the famine. The net income, consisting of 50,000 copies at 5 leva, was turned over to the relief fund. The local committees intensified their activities and the party arranged an artistic evening for the benefit of the famine sufferers. On the 7th of November, the day of the fourth anniversary of the October Revolution, the party renewed its appeal not to forget the famine sufferers.

The greatest support which the Communist Party received in its action came from the trade-unions, from all the other Communist organizations and its press. The trade-unions have contributed large sums out of their treasuries and are doing everything to the power of the day's owners from the organized as well as from the unorganized workers.

The Young People's Communist League has contributed all its energy to this action. Particular mention is deserved by the Workers' Cooperative, "Osvobodienye", which, with its branches in all the cities of the country, provided great aid to the party, inasmuch as they pledged themselves to store the collected goods, hold them, and to send them on. Besides all this, the Workers' Cooperative printed the special issue of the workers' paper for the Russian famine-sufferers free of charge and pledged every unit of the entire organization and its personnel at the service of the cause.

The results of all these exertions of the Bulgarian Communist Party are already to be seen. It made the first shipment to the Soviet Russia on the 3rd of November, consisting of 2,000,000 leva, and it will continue to make collections until Soviet Russia has overcome the famine.

What stand was taken by the government towards the famine-sufferers of Soviet Russia? What stand was taken by the Bulgarian bourgeoisie? The government expressed its sympathy for the famine-sufferers and declared that Bulgaria should aid them. The cabinet even decided to feed 20,000 children from the famine-region in Bulgaria at the Government's expense. The Red Cross, which is also combined with all the bourgeoisie, pressed the government, requesting the latter to confiscate the food gathered by the Bulgarian capitalists, and announced its willingness to help the Russian people. But all this proved to be a shameless hypocrisy.

The resolution of the cabinet to feed 20,000 Russian children remained on paper only. All the other declarations of the willingness and readiness to aid the famine-sufferers in every possible way shared the same fate. When the delegation of the Ukrainian-Russian Red Cross arrived in Bulgaria on its mission for the starving children, they were met with opposition and on the 40th day after their confinement they were sent back to Odessa. There were many cases where the local officials forbade the relief-activity of the Communists and it very often happened that the collected goods were appropriated by the bourgeoisie and the "Socialists", carried on propaganda for the Russian Soviet Republic and for the Bulgarian Communist Party, and promised to use a strong arm against the provocators. The meetings of the Bulgarian "Socialists" ended in a fiasco. Their entire campaign came to naught.

Up to the present, the Workers' Cooperative has sent three ships of grain to the starving Russia.

Soviet Russia's Relief for its Starving

By Willy Munzenberg.

In the hunger campaign Soviet Russia, bleeding from the wounds of six years' war, with its industry and agriculture ruined by these wars, by an iron blockade and by innumerable acts of counter-revolutionary sabotage, has accomplished more than all the foreign relief committees and organizations together. The Russian workers and peasants collected in 1920 (approximately 150,000 tons) of seed grain for the winter sowing in addition to large quantities of grain to feed the starving workers and peasants and their children. Only 1,601,000 pounds were obtained in foreign countries—mostly purchased by the Soviet government.

These figures are sufficient proof of the successful activity of our Russian comrades in the campaign against the famine. After the arrival of the seed all efforts were turned to the sowing. In many places they worked day and night—when daylight failed, they lit the light of their next day's work. The following table gives an indication of the degree to which they accomplished the objective set beforehand.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>seed arrived</th>
<th>area planned</th>
<th>area actually sown</th>
<th>percent</th>
<th>area percentage distributed</th>
<th>exports</th>
<th>trade deficit</th>
<th>exchange rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Samara</td>
<td>1,909,743</td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
<td>728,931</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>954,580</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krombien</td>
<td>1,537,889</td>
<td>7,000,000</td>
<td>593,425</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>975,464</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saratov</td>
<td>2,008,820</td>
<td>9,000,000</td>
<td>900,098</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>167,600</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mari District</td>
<td>329,000</td>
<td>1,393,959</td>
<td>71,774</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tchuvash</td>
<td>537,985</td>
<td>174,850</td>
<td>11,458</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>138,400</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tartar Republic</td>
<td>2,210,141</td>
<td>902,990</td>
<td>554,161</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>146,800</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ufa</td>
<td>880,000</td>
<td>460,000</td>
<td>233,481</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>160.0</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volsk</td>
<td>49,956</td>
<td>296,870</td>
<td>41,532</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>520.0</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viatka</td>
<td>55,671</td>
<td>727,237</td>
<td>454,500</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>684,900</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astarhkan</td>
<td>76,500</td>
<td>47,820</td>
<td>48,500</td>
<td>101.4</td>
<td>101.4</td>
<td>190.0</td>
<td>101.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsaritsyn</td>
<td>406,948</td>
<td>280,210</td>
<td>282,171</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td>287,700</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Colony</td>
<td>510,000</td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>138,000</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bashkir Republic</td>
<td>185,642</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>34,720</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>151,000</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ural</td>
<td>238,481</td>
<td>46,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thus, thanks to the intensive labor of our Russian comrades, the winter sowing was accomplished. The prospects for the spring sowing are, however, not very favorable since the governments which were still able to contribute rather large quantities of seed for the autumn sowing have today only little grain left. According to the figures of the Central Relief Commission the following quantities of grain are urgently needed for the spring sowing:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grains</th>
<th>Area to be sowed (dresses)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oats</td>
<td>13,440,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
<td>1,956,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>12,470,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckwheat</td>
<td>1,420,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet</td>
<td>1,479,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lentils</td>
<td>4,280,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peas</td>
<td>474,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flax</td>
<td>4,215,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hemp</td>
<td>479,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustard</td>
<td>7,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunflower</td>
<td>416,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spelt</td>
<td>440,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>304,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 38,012,000

Russia itself can provide only a small portion of the necessary quantity, at most 15,000,000 poods. All the rest must be imported.

Workers and Comrades! Our relief campaign will be only patchwork if we only send food for the immediately necessary need, for the temporary alleviation of the famine. The furnishing of sufficient grain and of machines for an improved cultivation of the soil, which will enable a better crop in the future, is just as important, if not even more important for the future and for the economic restoration of Soviet Russia. These are the greatest problems of the relief campaign which are of the greatest importance and which must be neither overlooked nor underestimated. We must do all in our power in order to help here as well and to ship the grain necessary for the spring sowing to Russia as soon as possible.

The White Terror

From Jugoslavian Jails.

Three of the former prisoners of war returning from Russia were recently arrested on their arrival in Subotica. Amongst these was Spasoje Stojanovic who, though his papers were in perfect order, was alleged to be a certain Nicola Spasojevic, the commander of a mysterious Jugoslavian Legion of the Russian Red Army. Stojanovic protested vehemently and repeatedly told his captors that he was nothing but a common laborer. "No," he was told, "you have commanded an army at Kharkoff, Kiew, Odessa and Archangelsk." Then Stojanovic was cruelly maltreated and compelled to sign what was dictated to him. This being done, he was asked to confess that Sima Makovic had sent him from Russia to assassinate the king (and his two fellow travelers to murder Premier Pashitch). On declaring this to be another untruth, Stojanovic was again manhandled and forced to sign a confession to the effect that these accusations were true.

The "Politika" and the "Balkan" both of which papers are receiving large subsidies from the government contingent fund made these attempts at assassination the starting point of a new and even more rabid anti-Communist campaign. Meanwhile Stojanovic together with the documents signed by him had been transferred to the notorious headquarters of the Belgrade police where he was detained for seven days in a chimney flue without even being allowed bread and water. On the eighth day Stojanovic was brought before magistrate Vujich and withdrew all his "confessions." He showed the magistrate his wounds and the black and blue marks on his body. The magistrate then led the prisoner through a number of offices where he showed the clerks the proofs of the brutality of his treatment, and they handed him 20 dinars. Stojanovic was discharged, and the judges had a good laugh at the "examination methods" of the police and at the "commander." And there the matter ended. Nobody has been held responsible for the brutality and cruelty of the police.

The second repatriated prisoner of war was detained for three weeks and then released. The third, Djoka, was also released after a few days detention. Neither of them was brought before a court.

In Negotin seven Communists were arrested during the night at their homes and brought to the police station. They were accused of maintaining unlawful connection with Communists for which terrible crime one may be sentenced either to death or to 20 years at hard labor in Jugoslavia. Through the magistrate declined to institute proceedings against them, the police did not release them immediately, but meted out corporal punishment (sixty blows with a club), and compelled them to cry: "Long live Premier Pashitch." Some of the "suspects" died a few days after this from the effects of the treatment.

When comrade Josipovic Nikola on being arrested because he had been a delegate to the Third Congress of the Comintern, was asked his name he gave it and—was struck twice in the face by the gendarme because he had not arranged first and family name in the Serbian fashion. This occurrence is characteristic of the treatment generally meted out to prisoners in Jugoslavia. Comrade Josipovic has been in arrested now for four months without having been granted a trial.

Nikola Novakovic has suffered a similar fate. After having been under arrest for four months, the court declared its incompetence and referred the case to a higher court where the prisoner will have to go over again from the very beginning.

The teacher Ratko Zunic, a Communist deputy, has been arrested several times, the magistrate having every time annulled the warrant issued by the Monarchist police. Then the police accused Zunic of having sent a pamphlet and several Communist newspapers. After he was acquitted the accused of that "crime" is liable to very severe punishment according to the "law for the defense of the state". Nor was the fact that the "crime" was committed in July, four weeks before the anti-Communist law was passed, sufficient reason to despair from persecution.

The student Rakotovic was arrested in Milanovac and transported to Negotin on 8th August because a pamphlet criticising Communism was found upon him. He was kept in a dark cell and repeatedly manhandled and suspended from the bars of his cell. He was cut down by two prison guards after having been detained for 112 days he was released as innocent.

The Communist deputy Sima Miljus was arrested in connection with the attempt to assassinate Pashitch. As the case was founded on thin air, he had to be released and was banished from Belgrade to Zagreb. Here he was re-arrested a few months later for the same reason and again released and deported, this time to the village where he had been born.

Another Communist deputy, Doncevic from Strumica, was arrested there and in chains transported to the Belgrade jail where he was cruelly maltreated. When brought before the magistrate, that personage did not know what to do with the prisoner. The accused was never offered a trial; the magistrate having every time annulled his acquittal. He had been accused of that "crime" is liable to very severe punishment according to the "law for the defense of the state". Nor was the fact that the "crime" was committed in July, four weeks before the anti-Communist law was passed, sufficient reason to despair from persecution.

On his return from the Moscow Congress Milivoje Kaljevic was arrested, transported to Nish and cruelly treated by the police, the corporal punishment being meted out by the captain of the gendarmes himself. From Nish Kaljevic was transported to Belgrade and accused under a law which did not exist when he left for Moscow. Kaljevic has been in jail now for four months.

A few months ago the farmhand Stevan Obradovic was arrested in a mysterious manner and has not been heard of since. His family has been refused all information.

When the Communist deputy Nikola Kovacevic was arrested six months ago he was put into a cell the size of which does not allow the prisoner to lie down. When complaining, Kovacevic was told: "If you escape, Sir Deputy, you will have sufficient room." During the whole time Kovacevic was compelled to squat on the cold concrete floor.

Laza Petrovic and Nikola Rafailovic were in jail for five months in connection with the attempt on the Premier's life, before they were released by order of the court as innocent. After they were released for the first time the police arrested them again. On the second day of his detention the police accused him of vagabonding, because they had not succeeded in finding work. Rafailovic was told, "You will stay in jail for the rest of your life". Petrovic is a Communist deputy from Belgrade.