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The Session of the Enlarged Executive Committee, Moscow, June 6th - 13th

Second Session June 7th.

Comrade Bohumir Jilek outlined the history of development of the Czecho-Slovakian Communist Party and proceeded to deal with the present situation.

At the instance of the right wing of the Czecho-Slovakian Social Democratic Party, the Government started in the Summer of 1920 a campaign against the newly formed Communist Party; the campaign began with an attack upon the Party building in Prague. The workers replied with a protest strike which was suppressed with much bloodshed: 7 were killed, and over 5000 arrested. Over 3,000 of those arrested had to serve a total sentence of a 152 years and 52 days on remand. Against 754 comrades charges were brought; 432 were acquitted, the remaining 322 were sentenced to a total of 245 years imprisonment. The statistics are not complete.

At present the Party is on the eve of a great political fight. The general elections are taking place in July and the social patriots headed by the Social Democrats fear their complete downfall, as they clearly see that the mass of the voters are on the side of the Communist Party. At the instance of these bourgeois parties the Government has introduced a bill in Parliament postponing the elections for one year.

The Party, however, has decided that all deputies shall lay down their mandates on the 15th of June and in this manner compel the Government to hold new elections.

Comrade Jilek spoke of the metal workers' fight and emphasized the militant and sacrificial spirit displayed by the working masses. Of the 54 trade unions affiliated with the General Commission, the farm-workers', builders', chemical and shoemakers' unions are in our hands, i. e., the majority of Executives are Communists.

The speaker pointed out however, that the Party's influence over the working masses did not yet correspond to its strength. Propaganda work by means of the press is the main need. The circulation of the Party press does not show a third of the strength of the party membership. This shows the lack of a firm Communist nucleus which could serve as a lever for Party work. As already laid down by the Third Congress, a mass party can fulfill its tasks only when Communist cells have been introduced into all workers' organizations. This has not yet been done to a satisfactory degree; no illegal work is being carried on, nor agitation among the troops. The decisions of the First Congress have not been carried out with sufficient energy. Under the influence of the concessions which the Communists had to make in Russia the tendency in the Party which estimates the beginning of the Social Revolution at 15 to 30 years from now, has found an echo. These comrades are of the opinion that in the next few years the Party work should be

confined to organization and propaganda. These comrades state that owing to a lack of funds the agitation among the troops is impossible.

In view of this condition of the Party, the situation may become very serious, especially in case of a new war. At the end of the speech Comrade Jilek emphasized the financial difficulties of the Party. In his opinion these were the result of organizational defects. The speaker informed the Communist International that it was necessary to aid the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia financially.

Comrade Smeral's Report.

Comrade Smeral stated that there was within the party a certain oppositional tendency in whose name Comrade Jilek spoke. Comrade Smeral opposed Jilek's contention that the Party has no influence over the working masses and that there is a tendency against agitation among the troops. He denied the statement that financial difficulties were the cause of the Party's crisis. In Smeral's opinion there was not really a crisis in the Party, but merely a difficult situation. All three tendencies of the Czecho-Slovakian Party which were represented at the Third Congress by Smeral, Muna and Zapotzki have united. Nevertheless the leading Party circles are nervous. We had overestimated our victories and in the first half year we have not done enough energetic organization work. But we are pursuing an active policy and are taking part in all strikes. In the trade union elections, we received 40% of all the votes. Comrade Smeral is of the opinion that this nervousness is really unfounded, and recalls the fact that at the Easter Conference of the Party all resolutions on the united front, the trade unions, etc., were unanimously adopted and that no oppositional programs were presented. What then was the cause of the Left opposition of Comrade Jilek? Comrade Smeral could not understand it. He is of the opinion that the masses are not touched by the opposition.

Comrade Smeral pointed out the growth of the unions after the war, and that they now have a membership of 800,000 as against 200,000 before the war. In consequence of the slow development of the revolution in Europe about 600,000 of these are more or less indifferent. The tendency to leave the unions is very strong among them. All these elements take up our slogans against the trade union bureaucrats with great enthusiasm.

In proportion to the size of our country and the strength of our bourgeoisie our party is very strong. The country possesses very important industries. The industrial apparatus is capable of manufacturing for 70 million people. Czecho-Slovakia however, has only 14 million inhabitants. The German bourgeoisie controls over 70% of the total capital. The power, however, lies in the hands of the Czech bourgeoisie.

To insure its further existence, the Czecho-Slovakian State must control over a certain military power. This it does with the aid of the French. This help is conditional upon an anti-Russian policy. This anti-Russian policy means however, the ruin of the Czecho-Slovakian state for economic reasons. For this reason the Czech bourgeoisie cannot take over governmental responsibility. At the head of the Government are two puppets, two intellectuals, Masaryk and Benesch. There is an important national conflict between the German and the Czech bourgeoisies. In view of this chaotic situation even some of our enemies would have nothing against the formation of a Workers' Government. The representatives of industry told us that they would prefer such a Government as exists in Saxony, where the Communists hold the balance of power. (This passage which is taken from the *Pravda*, is probably an incorrect citation from Comrade Smeral's actual speech. The Editors.)

Comrade Kreibich's Speech.

In 1919 Comrade Smeral was a hesitator. Since then, however, he has changed his views. The Left opposition disliked Smeral because of his past and because of his unsatisfactory execution of the decisions of the Third Congress. The causes that led to the formation of this group lie deeper. It represents the uncertainty and nervousness of the left elements in the Party. At the Easter Conference this group was not represented at all. Hence, they could neither reject the theses nor appear as a definite group. What does this Left opposition do now? Its oppositional views having nothing to do with questions of principle, the opposition confines itself to sabotaging Party work. For instance, the journey of Comrades Smeral and Muna to take part in the Social Revolutionary trial in Moscow was sabotaged for a long time, although the S. R. trial is of extreme importance to Czecho-Slovakia. The Czech Legionaries were the comrades of the S. R.'s. The S. R.'s still continue their activities in Czecho-Slovakia.

For the recovery of the Party we merely need the calling of a Party Convention which is to elect a new Central Committee.

The Enlarged Executive Committee on the Czecho-Slovakian Party.

The Enlarged E. C. of the C. I. has carefully examined the written and oral reports of the Delegation and has reached the following conclusions:—

I

The Enlarged E. C. of the C. I. finds that there are no differences of opinion on the political conduct of the Party which aims at the formation of the United Front of the whole Czecho-Slovakian proletariat.

The Enlarged E. C. of the C. I. answers the criticism expressed by the Jilek-Hauser Group on the organizational defects of the Party, as follows: The Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia is a young Communist Party, which in spite of the thorough and essentially correct work of the party organizations has not yet overcome all the defects of its Social-Democratic past. The Party is not yet organized solidly enough, to carry out all assigned tasks quickly and decisively.

II

As regards the work in the unions, it is as yet very weak. Communist Party instruction and Party work is only beginning. It must be carried out more regularly, more intensively and in a far more organized manner than hitherto. The Enlarged E. C. of the C. I. is of the opinion that the Party has not done everything, that up to the present could have been done. This criticism does not apply to those leaders of the Party Executive who are responsible for the work carried on in the unions and in the Czech and German speaking districts, but to the Party in general and the Executive in particular. The unsatisfactory activities for the conquest of the trade unions has strengthened the tendencies which despair of victory in the trade unions, thus encouraging splitting. If on the one hand, the inadequate Communist work in the unions resulted in strengthening those tendencies which practice sabotage in the attempt to split the unions, it must be confirmed, on the other hand, that the tendencies of the Jilek-Hauser group, though vaguely expressed, have hampered the methodical conquest of the trade unions and helped to split them. The Party must carry on Communist work within the unions, more energetically than ever; it must try to conquer them; it must form fractions everywhere, also in unions where a Communist leadership already exists; it must strengthen the Communist influence in one and

win over the majority in the other. Only if the Party realizes the conditions of this work in all their seriousness, and puts forward all its energy to carry it out consciously and methodically, will it be able to oppose its whole authority to all disruptive efforts. The Party must with all emphasis and, when necessary, with greatest severity oppose all attempts to split the unions. As a strategic line of action for Communist trade union work in Czecho-Slovakia, the welding into one organization of the German and Czech unions must be put in the foreground.

The Enlarged E. C. of the C. I. considers it an immediate necessity for the carrying on of systematic Communist union work, to issue a weekly paper in Czechish, as decided by the Easter Conference, thus providing the Communists employed in the unions with the method and material for this work. In the unions, where the Communists are in the majority, the union newspapers are to start a systematic and well-informed service of Communist union work.

III

The completion of the party organization must be carried out in the spirit of strong centralization. The methodical introduction of working sections corresponding to the needs of the workers in the shop and shop councils, trade unions and cooperatives, gymnast and sport clubs, communal politics and small peasant agitation, in women and youth work, and the promulgation of the ten-group system, are to be carried on with all energy for the solidifying and raising of the attacking powers of the Party. The whole Party must be informed of the course of all political events. With the help of the sections and the ten-groups we must carry on a systematic political conversion of the non-political working masses, unions, cooperatives, and sport associations. The entire Party must be developed into an active organism, able in the shortest time to influence and control large masses of workers, in order to lead them at the proper time and after thorough preparation into the struggle against the capitalist offensive, for the elimination of daily want and towards the conquest of power.

The Party must also devote much attention to the agitation in the army. The Party has not done all it could to exploit all legal opportunities for the propaganda of Communism among the soldiers. The Party must systematically prepare the ground for the Party press in the army, publish comprehensive leaflets for the soldiers, in which the Communist viewpoint upon concrete questions is communicated to them. These legal opportunities must unconditionally be utilized because it is the most advantageous way of preparing the ground for the necessary illegal measures. The Czecho-Slovakian Army which has the right of universal suffrage, offers the best opportunities for such legal propaganda. If this work is cleverly carried on, the Party can take a stand upon all questions even in cases where it will have to renounce the direct conclusion from this legal propaganda. In this case the decisive propaganda activity should be linked up with the work within the army.

In order to obtain information on the strength of the enemy and the measures secretly prepared against the working class, the union of all the Communists in the army, in the government offices and in the enemy organizations must be arranged, and the centralization of this information service must be effected.

The courier service must be organized in order to maintain the connection of the Party Headquarters with the Party organizations and communication among these latter in the eventuality that railway, post, and telegraph service be employed for this purpose.

The Party organization must be obliged to take steps to ensure the possibility of printing illegally in the period of acute struggle when legal printing is impossible.

The work of the Party Headquarters must be made more uniform and must be freed from querulous criticism and details. The various departments are to-day working to too great a degree parallel to instead of together with one another. The political and organizational questions of all departments must be jointly discussed in the Central Committee and decided upon under the responsibility of all Committee members. The departments must be assured the necessary freedom of movement within the limits of the decisions of the Central Committee. A member of the Central Committee must be appointed to control the departments in their execution of these decisions, in order to be informed upon everything taking place in the various departments and thus be able to arrange for the mutual information of the departments by one another.

Naturally this control is the opposite of petty criticism on minor matters. It must rather assist and strengthen the intellectual bond of the departments with one another together with joint discussion and decision by expert initiative.

The Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia is a large mass party which already contains the majority of the active section of the proletariat in Czecho-Slovakia. The political united front for the winning of the majority of the Czecho-Slovakian proletariat is correct. Remedying of the defects mentioned and the putting of this advice into practise will enable the Party decisively to intervene with greater activity and strength in order to influence the fate of the population of the Czecho-Slovakian State in the Communist direction. The crisis of the collapse of world capitalism has brought about conditions in Czecho-Slovakia, which are untenable for the proletariat and the propertyless population. The quicker and the more thoroughly the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia will be able to consolidate and extend its organization, the sooner will it be in a position to organize the fighting strength of the Czecho-Slovakian working-class in order to gain for it the victory over the bourgeoisie.

Moscow, May 11th, 1922.

*The Enlarged Executive Committee
of the Communist International.*

The French Question before the Executive.

The Executive of the Comintern commenced an examination into the situation of the French Communist Party in its plenary session of June 8th. Comrade Frossard spoke in the capacity of reporter, Boris Souvarine followed with a second brief report, then Comrade Trotzky took the floor.

Frossard realized the crisis in the French Party, above all in its relations with the International. This manifests itself in a certain distrust of the party, perhaps caused by its slowness in the accomplishment of various tactical tasks. Absolute frankness is necessary in order to examine these questions in the spirit of *camaraderie*. Frossard indicated a certain decline in the membership of the Party since the Marseilles Congress. The causes are various. The course of revolutionary events and the necessity of a new policy on the part of the Soviets has provoked a feeling of coolness among the workers, although an almost mystical enthusiasm carried them towards the Third International. The split of the C. G. T. had also lost us some good militants who did not wish to leave the old C. G. T. and are awaiting the moment to return to us. Our internal dissensions and the increase of cliques have also been of some importance, but lately the position has improved. In March we had 60,000 members, in May 80,000. The provincial elections were for us an appreciable success. The Party ran 400 candidates in the 2500 cantons and obtained 30 victories in the General Councils. But in the North our hopes have not been justified. Generally speaking the development of our influence seems to be weakening in the towns whilst it grows in the country. The elections have shown us the tendency towards the formation of a "Bloc of the Left" in which the Socialists are participating and against which we shall have to take our stand. Our partial check in the Northern towns is a direct result of the split in the C. G. T. Our successes in the country are due to an intensive propaganda based on anti-militarism. The dissidents have worked less than we, and their relative successes are due to the "Bloc of the Left" which they will not fail to renew at the parliamentary election and which contribute once more to the more complete discrediting of the social reformists.

Several federations of the party such as those of the Seine and Oise, Seine and Marne, and the Loire are solid organizations and are a credit to the Party. Most of the others have excellent prospects and we have every reason to be confident. We must realize meanwhile that in several cases we underestimated the influence of the dissidents. But none the less our Party is the strongest political organization in the country. Frossard then showed that the Central Committee is bound to apply resolutions of the Executive. The reporter dealt with the Fabre case, recalling that the Marseilles Congress had already condemned opportunism and that the Fabre case had been referred to the Dispute Commission. This Commission has no doubt been very slow in deciding the case, but the statutes of the Party did not allow it to be dealt with in any other way. The Executive, applying Article 9 of the statutes of the Comintern, had pronounced the exclusion of Fabre and the Party had carried out this decision. Frossard hoped that in the future the Executive would allow the French Party to deal with questions of internal discipline itself.

The four who had resigned from the Central Committee were reinstated on the 25th of April with a great majority by the National Council of the Party: but the tendency which they represent continues to grow and is not without danger to the unity of the Party.

Frossard recalled the success of the Communists in the trade unions. The militant Communists have assumed or share the direction of the unions in the most important industries (railways, textiles, mines, chemicals, etc.); in 80 departmental unions nearly 50 are under the Party's influence. Frossard thought that the legitimate influence of the party in the C. G. T. U. is assured.

Speaking of the united front the General Secretary of the French Party showed that the majority of the Party had declared itself against the united front because they were not prepared for this new tactic and found themselves still laboring under the influence of internal party difficulties. On the other hand, the splitting of the C. G. T. had given them the choice between a united front with the revolutionary C. G. T. U. and an united front with those from whom they wished to separate. They had taken the former alternative. Insufficiently prepared for the tactic of the united front the Party had expressed its fears as to the application of this tactic. The question is on the agenda of its next congress. Frossard concluded by saying that the French Party recognizes the revolutionary significance of the united front, but counts on the Executive to allow it to elaborate itself the method of applying the united front in France. The question of principle should be distinguished from the question of opportunity. In any case the Party would submit to the decision of the International and would apply it. The Party is not yet completely purged of its old Socialist traditions: it has only been able to amputate the most gangrened limb of social patriotism: it is not yet tempered in the fight but the Marseilles Congress shows its efforts and its evolution. The next congress will definitely decide our Communist program of action, principally in the unions.

Boris Souvarine said that the party was passing through a great crisis because of the non-fulfilment of the obligations it had assumed at Tours. The Party has not been militant enough. It had broken with the bourgeoisie, but not with bourgeois ideology. It is occupied mostly with oral and verbal propaganda; it has not a firm line of conduct in the trade union question. One often sees Communists at the head of the unions without the spirit of Communism guiding them. Souvarine did not share the optimism of Frossard in the matter, because he saw no link between the union, the Party, the factory, and the workshop. The speaker pointed out the lack of discipline in the Party and its indifference toward the economic struggle which it left to the tradeunions. The Party affected to consider the struggle for small immediate needs as having a reformist character. Its press did not deal with actual pressing questions of the day, thus leaving the field free to the demagogues and Anarchists. The leaders of the Party interested themselves more in a policy of equilibrium within the Party than with the Communist policy. Souvarine here produced a series of quotations taken from the Party daily. The resignation of several members from the Central Committee at the Marseilles Congress had been a protest against the attitude of the Party Executive. Considering the existence of fractions in a party as inadmissible we should point out that there are in the French party three tendencies: one Right, one Left, one Center; we should point out that we need a new Tours, that energetic measures must be taken to rid the party of its irresponsible demagogic elements, to conquer the reformists and to bind together the good revolutionary elements of whom Frossard has spoken. Souvarine did not formulate any concrete proposition, but proposed referring this to a Commission.

Comrade Trotzky's Speech

Both, the clever report of Frossard and the entirely contradictory minority report of Comrade Souvarine prove that the French Party is at present in a very grave situation. In the past, at the International Socialist Congresses, the Party's representatives pictured everything in rosy colors and scarcely touched the negative side. Now, at the congresses and conferences of the Communist International we picture the truth, we must picture things as they are. It is necessary to adopt a very definite resolution on the situation in the French Party. We must settle this conflict with the Communist International. The representatives of the French Party gave the Enlarged Executive Committee in February solemn promises in the matter of the united front, but they did not keep them. That is no accident and no individual occurrence. This lies deeply rooted in the development of the Communist movement in France.

The Party press does not speak the language of Communism; it has in fact no definite policy, not to speak of a Communist one. In the Central Committee of the Party we have three or four different tendencies. The voice of the Party is not heard in the most important questions. The organization of the Party is extremely out of the ordinary and resembles a particolored rag carpet. Everyone does what he pleases. The

Federation of the Seine is completely autonomous. Comrade Sellier believes that these are only isolated mistakes and a few exaggerations. Comrade Renoult, who took part in the last session of the Enlarged Executive as a delegate of the French Party and solemnly promised to execute its decisions, writes an article in the central organ of the Party under the heading, "Against Revolutionary Disarmament through the United Front". Renoult says: "The abscess must burst. We must once and for all liquidate this painful question, frankly and openly liquidate it!" Very good, Comrade Renoult! We shall see however, who is going to howl with pain when this takes place! The abscess is not at all as unimportant as Comrade Rappoport believes. The exclusion of Fabre is the only case in which the Party subordinated itself to the Communist International. But after he had been expelled the French Comrades immediately began to write against the expulsion. If that is as unimportant as Comrade Rappoport believes, why don't you make this little sacrifice for the Communist International? "You are shooting at flies", writes Comrade Rappoport, "but the death of the opportunist fly, Fabre, will only serve the elephants of opportunism". Dear Comrade Rappoport! Who are these elephants? Name them! I give you two minutes time. (Comrade Rappoport: "I have asked for the floor and will deal in detail with the different tendencies in our Party in the course of the debate. To do this in a few minutes, is, I believe, inexpedient".) My political experience teaches me that it is more difficult to attack a definite fly than to attack an indefinite elephant which may come from some distant country. The members of the Central Committee of the Party, Verfeuil, Méric etc., continue to write in Fabre's paper after his expulsion. These are no insignificant flies; you must count with them. If all that is a fly, we then lose every standard or political criterion! Toward the end of May, Verfeuil wrote in the *Journal du Peuple*: "Frossard was the first to bring up the question of the regrouping of social forces after Tours". As for Frossard, that does not happen to be true. But what does that mean? That Verfeuil stands for unity with the old Social Democracy with which we broke at the Congress of Tours. How will the workers understand that?

It is vain to look in the *Humanité* for a refutation of this nonsense. What confusion must these invectives by members of the Central Committee cause in the heads of the Party comrades.

An honest and convinced worker will not believe that, but he cannot prove the contrary because the *Humanité* is silent. This case is characteristic of the situation in the French Party.

Comrade Renaud Jean, who is chiefly active among the peasants, writes that the united front is unacceptable for us because the fight for the eight hour day and against the reduction of wages does not interest the peasantry. Another young comrade, Auclair, who because of his youth speaks frankly, agrees with him. Four-sevenths of the population of France are, he says, peasants. "We must always keep them in mind; the so-called daily demands of the proletariat are only reformism". But comrades, that is exactly the theory of the Social Revolutionaries of the first water. That is a very dangerous view. We must not forget that the French peasants are agrarian petty bourgeois, often declassed and impoverished, but that in general they can only be drawn into the social revolution through the proletariat; they can only follow the proletariat. The theory so carelessly expressed by Auclair betrays the proletariat. The phrase: "For the integral revolution we must first win the peasantry", is only a revolutionary phrase. In fact the results of the recent cantonal elections prove that we are losing workers' votes and winning the votes of the peasantry. That is a very dangerous symptom. Although the decision of the Executive Committee on the united front was adopted after joint deliberation with the French delegation, Méric is carrying on a campaign in the *Humanité* proclaiming that the Executive is badly informed on French matters. According to him, Zinoviev and Trotzky are too busy with other matters and content themselves with clippings and quotations, with isolated passages taken from the articles of French comrades. And Auclair expresses himself even more decisively: "the information of the Executive Committee is based on chatter". Comrades, in this case I can only marvel at the patience of the French workers. I ask you, my French friends, tell them that they are being deceived; we read the entire French press, in spite of the risk we run of finding nothing in it, as is often the case with Méric's articles. You will say that the newspapers do not express actual life sufficiently (Sellier nods approval). But we know the French movement from our own experience and can reconstruct it from the newspaper articles just as Cuvier, having obtained only one bone of a certain animal, described the whole of it. And when your Communist press poorly reproduces reality, that is also characteristic. Furthermore, the reports of the Central Committee of the Party are at our disposal; we sent Comrades

the Central Committees cause in the heads of the Party comrades. Humbert-Droz, Bordiga and Valetzki to France and we have representatives of the French Party here in Moscow.

It is about time that this propaganda against Moscow cease. It is time to stop the misleading of the French workers. The authority of the Communist International must be re-established to correspond with its importance.

Comrade Trotzky quoted an article from the *Internationale* edited by Comrade Renoult, in which he pointed out that the Russian comrades had also made mistakes in their governmental activities. Comrade Trotzky admits that the Soviet Government has made mistakes. He would gladly expose these mistakes to the proletariat of other countries as a lesson. There is, however, a difference between a Party which is Communist through and through and which was the first to begin the establishment of a proletarian state, and the French Party.

Besides, we recognized and admitted our mistakes, while the mistakes of Comrade Rappoport and of others is just that they do not notice the errors committed.

Comrade Trotzky points out the existence of three tendencies in the French Party; one which completely rejects the tactics of the united front; one which agrees with the united front and a third, centrist group. The opponents of the united front have stated that it is not necessary to reckon with the Longuetists because they have no support. The united front however, must not be established according to the formula of the number of organized workers, who constitute the advance guard, the active army; the reserves, those dark masses to whom the nonsense of the Longuetists is more accessible and understandable than our clear policy, are also important. Therefore the united front must not be rejected by referring to the fact that we have the majority of the organized workers behind us anyhow. Comrade Renaud declared at the last Session of the Enlarged Executive Committee that he would submit to the decisions of the Executive Committee as a "disciplined soldier of the revolution". But to-day he almost daily cites in the *Internationale*, articles from Fabre's paper against the united front and continuously calls their authors "comrades". I must admit that discipline is a hard thing; — but only when there is no inner agreement. As for the Berlin Conference, the Party was against the sending of Comrade Frossard to Berlin and only agreed to it "as an exceptional case". Comrade Renaud himself voted against sending Comrade Frossard. In the question of the united front they tried to raise loud protests against it in the meetings, by representing it as a union with Vandervelde and the like. In the French Party there is a definite "anti-Moscow" policy. It is charged that we change our policy too abruptly and too rapidly. They thus attempt to explain the retardation in the growth of the French Party. In reality the exact contrary is true. It is just this retardation of growth—and not in the French Party alone), which caused the Communist International to adopt the tactics of the united front. We also hear the following arguments: "Your republic is built up federatively. Why can we not retain our federative organization?" But comrades, look at the organization statutes of the French Party. The Federation of the Seine comprises almost one hundred districts each of which is represented by one delegate, regardless of its strength and regardless of whether it is a Paris district or a rural district. That is complete chaos. There is no definite policy, there is no definite line of tactics; everything is topsy-turvy. Yes, we make concessions to petty bourgeois psychology and to its prejudices.

The Ukraine, Georgia, and Aserbeidshan are entirely independent of us. But Communism is everywhere the same; it is centralized. You want to federalize the Party! The French comrades tell us that they are "against the united front but for the Soviets". But comrades! At the beginning we, the Russian Bolsheviks, were only an insignificant minority in the Soviets, and the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries were in control. We were a small group in the Soviets, strong because of our convictions. We were endeavouring to conquer them from within. The Soviets were the most adequate form of the united front; they were demanded by the masses and we agreed to it. "We are in the same situation as the Russians in 1905 and in 1917", say the French comrades. But where are you; in 1905 or in 1917? You are between them both and sooner or later you will be compelled to arrive at the united front. But is it no better to be its conscious herald than to arrive at it mechanically? The idea of the Soviets cannot be more compromised than by the arguments of the French comrades. The *Humanité* and the others revive the tradition of Jaurès who drew a line between the Party and the trade-unions. In the past the Party concluded election compromises with the social patriots while in the trade unions the revolutionary and Anarchistically-inclined elements of the working class fortified themselves. Such genial achievements are unacceptable to us

Communists. We are everywhere ourselves; we never hide our banner, neither in politics nor in the factory nor in the trade unions. In the present situation in France there exists the serious danger that instead of the Communists conquering the trade unions from within, the trade unions will conquer the Communist Party. In many cases Communist comrades throw away their membership card of the Party after entering the union. On the 26th of June the Trade Union Congress takes place in St. Etienne. It is necessary to register the Communist members of the trade unions, to call them together for a provisional discussion and to give them Communist instructions. Those who do not agree with these instructions must be unconditionally expelled. Tell me, French comrades, do you agree to that? The political development in present day France is tending towards a Left Bloc. The workers' masses are disappointed. They have been too often deceived and there are today ashes of scepticism in the revolutionary fire of the French workers. We must oppose the idea of the Workers' Bloc to the idea of the Bloc of the Left. The idea of the Workers' Government can enthuse the Syndicalists and Anarchists. The French Party is formulating its program for the next Party Congress. It is necessary that the Executive Committee decide together with the French delegation upon the policies of the Party. It is necessary that the Party condemn the pacifism, centrism and reformism in its ranks in the most decisive way. It is necessary to draw up Party statutes which really enable the Central Committee to lead the Party. It is necessary to transform the Party Press and to free it from mandarinism (to-day practically no one writes in the press but members of the Central Committee—leaders. (Méric is indignant that the *Humanité* printed an article by Rosmer "who is not even a member of the Central Committee".) It is necessary that articles appear without signatures and that the editors share the responsibility for them. If the Communist International in the near future will have to choose between the Right and the Left in the French Party (the Center tendency, will, we believe, very soon disappear) it will choose the Left. At the Congress of the Italian Party in Livorno, the Left split off and the Communist International went with the Left though it was numerically weaker. The Communist International calls the attention of the French Comrades to this occurrence in Italy. It is the duty of the Communist International, as it were, to distribute the results of its international experiences. The speaker ended with the statement that not so very long ago he had been optimistic about the situation in France but that the optimism is continually waning and that the tactics of the French Party bear the blame therefor.

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In the evening session on June 9th, Comrade Bordiga took the floor. The French Party, he said, did not represent entirely the link between the daily tasks and the final goal. The revolution is perhaps a little further away, as Frossard has said, but the activity of the party should not cease on this account. Otherwise the Communists in the C. G. T. U. would receive no instructions from the Party. Influence in the unions could only be gained by the formation of Communist groups in the unions directed and controlled by the Party. The Party should take the initiative in the trade union field. The statutes should also be modified so as to provide for the exclusion of undesirable members without excessive formalities. The speaker, referring to the united front, remarked that the party has shown a lack of activity in the unions. Bordiga, on the union question, was in accord with Trotzky.

Kreibich (Czecho-Slovakia) impressed the importance of party discipline, for the French Party as for Czecho-Slovakia and the Little Entente, which countries were closely dependent upon French imperialism. In Czecho-Slovakia there also were intellectual sympathizers, but they were not allowed access to posts of leadership in the Party or the press, but were allowed to disorganize the bourgeoisie. Kreibich pointed out that the lack of reasoned Communist activity in the unions allowed the trade union bureaucracy to overcome our influence even in the organizations directed by our own militants. On the question of the united front the speaker thought that not enough importance was attached in France to the difference between the actual economic conditions of today and those before the war. The economic struggle of today had an entirely different significance from that before the war. When the French comrades spoke of the aversion which the dissidents inspired in them they should remember that the German and Czecho-Slovakian Communists whose blood has been shed by the Social Democrats, have still more reason to detest them, but have been able to overcome their legitimate sentiments.

Trotzky said that much had been spoken about the past and that it had been well explained in the Marxist manner. But the French comrades had acted in an opportunist manner and it would be unjust to blame it all on petty bourgeois traditions. The past history of the French proletariat would not allow it. Had it not in the days of the First International inscribed the Commune on the pages of history? In the Second International the French Party was opportunist with the others, but without the Marxist phraseology. Why should French Communism not have a most glorious future? Its accumulated experiences permit of such a hope. Rappoport had said that 4/7 of the population were peasants: but the important thing is not the numerical strength of the proletariat but in its degree of cohesion and Communist organization. The French Communist Party has everything necessary for becoming a great and powerful party. If certain leaders do not work for this they can be replaced by others—by workers. Among the leaders of the party there are too many intellectuals, journalists and lawyers; there must be more workers. Trotzky replied to Rappoport that personalities have had a great importance in this occurrence. To Brandler he replied that we can not wait any longer, but must say precisely what we want from one another. The essential thing is that the French Communists be Communists in the trade unions: it was the Communist fraction at the St. Etienne Congress which deliberated over details and stopped a common tactical line at this congress. Brandler was wrong in thinking that the Communist and revolutionary forces necessary are lacking in France; the split of the C.G.T. was only caused because the workers, seeing in the unions an arm of the revolution, wished to rid them of their reformist leaders. If we had a proper organization we could have made a bloc with Monatte and Monmousseau. The necessary forces exist in France. Trotzky then reviewed the question of the Seine Federation in which he again condemned its federal structure: he pointed out that one cannot dream of revolution in France without Paris and the Seine. A precise attitude should be adopted in this question as well which would be at the same time an attitude of friendship and of counsel.

Frossard did not entirely agree with Rappoport who has only spoken in his own name. Replying to Souvarine, Frossard said that if the situation were just as serious as before Tours, such measures would be put into effect, but it was not. The French Party has accomplished good work which the Executive had acknowledged in one of its letters. (Souvarine: "But what of the future?") Souvarine painted too gloomy a picture. Frossard found the censure of Renaud Jean unjustified. This comrade had an admirable knowledge of the agrarian question and had accomplished important and difficult work. Frossard realized, after having outlined the usefulness of the provincial elections, which had allowed them to measure their forces with those of the dissidents, that the party should take part in the daily struggle of the working class. Replying to Trotzky, on the subject of the Left Bloc, Frossard showed that this Bloc would inevitably lead to a Government Bloc for which the Communists would have to be thankful as it would more rapidly discredit the Socialists. As for the united front it would form itself, but one would be wrong to force its formation. The history of the French labor movement showed that after a split a new *rapprochement* is difficult. The party could exclude those who did not execute its instructions: but in the trade union question the great number of various points of view do not allow recourse to such radical measures as exclusion. The French Delegation will return on the eve of the St. Etienne Congress and Frossard thought that time would be lacking to put through the measures demanded by Trotzky. There is a crisis in the French Party, but it is a crisis of faith, from which the party will emerge strengthened. Frossard assumed the responsibility for the engagements which the French Delegation make. The Central Committee should be formed organized workers. Frossard also considered that the Communist press is in need of great changes. He showed that 15 militants of the party every year were detailed to furnish leading articles to the press—articles which could not be revised.

Zinoviev declared that the result of this discussion could not be a new delay, but a resolution. To hesitate again would be to render the French Party the contrary of a service. If we speak rudely now, it is because we have grown strong. A year ago we could temporize; our Party was then young. But the French Communist Party has already been in existence for two years which count for twenty. We should speak of it as an adult Party. It has earned the right to be criticized as much as the others. The French Delegation have and should have mandates permitting them to adopt the resolution. Frossard has said that we reserve all our criticism for the majority of the Party; but this is precisely because it is the majority of the Party. We

are always opposed to the formation of sections in the Party. We dissolved the "Committee of the Third International" in spite of some opposition. The Executive censured those who resigned at the Marseille Congress and has not yet censured the majority of the French Party, even if grounds therefor have not been lacking. It would be wrong to believe that we are in full agreement with Souvarine although he was right politically in the course of the last few months. The representatives of the French minority have shown us that they have profited by Marxist instructions but sections in the Party cannot be tolerated. The Left of the French Party, with which the Executive is far from being in agreement, should be dissolved into the Party.

Frossard has indicated that the crisis in the French Party is a crisis of growth, that is, of recruiting. We think that the crisis is rather due to the social composition of the Party, which has not the sentiment of a working class party and for this reason is accustomed to consider the Syndicalists from top to bottom as the true representatives of the working class. In the trade union question, Brandler has advised a waiting attitude. We have maintained this attitude for a long time and we have had no good results. Last year the French Communists told us that they have a majority of three-quarters or nine-tenths in the unions. What do we see today? We have a powerful Party, a daily *Humanité* with a circulation of 200,000—and adventurers lead the C. G. T. Why? Because we have not been strong enough to insist upon the formation of Communist groups in the unions. They say that Monmousseau is a good militant and is nearly ours. But is it sufficient to count on the good qualities of one militant at the St. Etienne Congress? The Party will be strong in the unions only when it will be backed by a network of its groups. They object, citing the tradition of union autonomy; but the longer the latter is the more energetically must it be fought. As long as our French comrades have not their groups in the unions they will not have a real Party. Let us proclaim this loudly! The future is ours, do not fear to speak plainly to the Anarchists and reformists. Frossard tells us that certain delegates will come to St. Etienne with cast-iron mandates. We cannot be stopped by this. We should know who is with us in the working class movement; on whom we are able to count. We have already lost a year. That is enough. There are Communists in France capable of applying the tactics of the International in the unions. Let us remember that our weakness in the French unions allowed our adversaries to clear the field for a campaign for the liquidation of the Red Trade Union International. Beware! Rosmer's small group is more precious to us than Monmousseau's "nearly Communist" group. We must ourselves be a force, if we are to ally ourselves with somebody.

In the question of the press Frossard has recognized the great difficulties. We must end those survivals of the past such as the annual detailing of fifteen Party journalists whose articles could not be revised. Today the *Internationale* risks becoming a second *Journal du Peuple*. The *Humanité* is, from a Communist point of view, colorless. All this must be changed. There must be an end of these discussions on the united front. All discussions concerning the policy of the Comintern must be pursued in a special organ of the Communist International but not in the Party press whose object is the fight against the bourgeoisie.

Zinoviev said that the exclusion of Fabre is politically insufficient and that all its logical consequences have not been carried out. To clear the Party atmosphere they should also rid themselves of Brizon. Zinoviev recalled the Levi case. Last year it was thought that Levi had only committed a fault of secondary importance. Levi is now writing that the Social Revolutionaries constitute a real workers' party, etc. In France where the Left Socialists oscillate between Anarchism and reformism, a similar danger is very great, and we must form a solid group to fight both reformism and Anarchism. Zinoviev said that the Comintern intervened most usefully last year in the affairs of the German Party, which, as Frossard stated in Berlin, is making progress. All our Parties are young and it is true that the Comintern is also young, but it has benefited by the experience of the world movement and the experience of Russian Communism. The speaker was not satisfied with Frossard's speech in which he did not find a clear program. The Party should not fear the departure of elements in sympathy with Fabre. As in Germany, these elements could fight against our groups. It is necessary that the Central Committee be composed of Party veterans and above all of working class elements. We do not doubt that the Party delegation represents the majority and its best elements. We certainly do not encourage the formation of tendencies in France but we demand of our French comrades that they begin to initiate a new policy which will not give the slightest liberty to the reformists. For we all realize the extreme

importance of the French Communist Party. This Party is adult. It can execute our resolutions and become a fighting working class party.

Session of June 9th.

The Morning Session was occupied by the report of Comrade Friis of the Norwegian Workers' Party. In his opinion the party was passing through a serious crisis. The country is small, but the percentage of the population who are members of the party is higher than almost anywhere else. The political experiences of the party are of international significance; in Parliament there are 29 Communists and 47 other Radical deputies. The Left Radicals, the Right Socialists and the Communists have a total of 76, that is two more than the Government Bloc of 74 deputies. The Government is dependent to a certain degree upon the attitude of the Communists. We could have overthrown them, but have not done so. Comrade Scheffló, the leader of the Parliamentary group, stated that our most important task is to weaken the Right parties. He said therefore that he would not fight all the bourgeois parties with the same bitterness. A certain indecision was thus expressed. The position of the trade unions is also difficult. 120,000 workers took part in last year's great strike, which lasted five weeks. During the strike the Government used all means against it, including armed force. Now that the strike is over, the unions are in a serious situation; the treasuries are empty. The Government has presented a bill for compulsory arbitration in important strikes. At first the Central Committee of the Party declared itself against this measure. The Party Conference however, under the pressure of the trade unions approved it, especially in view of the fact that the measure was to be in effect only one year and had a series of restrictions. One of the motives for accepting this measure was the fear that in case the Communists did not vote for it, the Social Democrats would pass the measure and then parade themselves as the true representatives of the workers' interests. After the acceptance of the measure however, this step was criticized within the Party. This added to the crisis.

Neither is the Party's attitude on the question of the united front undivided. The tactics of the united front were criticized by certain elements on the ground that it is a reformist measure and contrary to the decisions of the Second Congress. The party as a whole has not made use of the united front tactics. It has not taken the initiative. Consequently there are many differences of opinion in the party on this question. The situation in the French Party has influenced our attitude towards the united front. Our indecision has been taken advantage of by the Social Democrats in Sweden. In the general elections of last year we had 200,000 votes and 29 mandates, the Social Democrats receiving only 83,000 votes and 9 mandates. Now the Swedish Socialists declare; the Norwegian Communists do not desire the united front because they are in the majority. The situation in Norway is such that the question of the Workers' Government and our participation therein may soon become an actuality. It is therefore necessary that we study this question and help the Norwegian Party with its problems.

Comrade Friis, at the close of his report, dealt with the case of Lian who was sent by the Norwegian Government to the Genoa Conference as Government expert and was expelled from the Communist International. He had also taken part for a few days in the Rome Congress of the Amsterdam Trade Union International. After his return he came out decisively against the Amsterdam International. His position and activities in the Norwegian unions very greatly influenced the decisions of the Congresses of the three Norwegian unions to adhere to the Red Trade Union International. Consequently Lian's expulsion was followed by serious difficulties as the matter is not clear to the workers.

Comrade Kuusinen took part in the debate. He was astonished at the purely academic talk of the comrades on the question of overthrowing the Government. In his opinion the Compulsory Arbitration Bill is inimical to the interests of the workers. In its acceptance by the Communists he saw the influence of parliamentary cretinism. This acceptance was undoubtedly a mistake. The Communists will be compelled to fight against this measure some day. The fears of the Communists that the workers would be discontented with the rejection of the bill, were ungrounded. On the contrary, they will be discontented with the acceptance of the measure. Comrade Kuusinen then pointed out the lack of fighting spirit in the Communist Party. Comrade Kuusinen expressed his regret over

the lack of unity on the question of the united front. He said, it was not only a question of the slogan, but also of its application and the corresponding preparations of the conditions, whose natural consequences would be the united front. The speaker condemned the play of the Communists with the Government.

The Government pays a trivial price for this game, a still more trivial price than the one paid by the Swedish Government to its Social Democrats. In regard to Lian's expulsion it must be admitted that he was really influential in the unions. He is however, without doubt an opportunist like several others in the Norwegian Party.

In the course of the debate Comrade Friis again spoke. He attacked Comrade Kuusinen and proved that the bourgeois bloc in the Norwegian Parliament which mainly represented the small peasantry, would give more than a Right Socialist Government. In Norway there is no strong Right Socialist Party. Therefore the question is more complex than in many other countries. The Compulsory Arbitration Bill is to be in effect for one year only and contains a series of limitations and clauses. Were the Government overthrown, nothing would be altered. The main thing is the confidence of the masses.

The Enlarged Executive Committee on the Norwegian Party

The Enlarged Executive of the Comintern has examined the situation of the Norwegian Workers' Party and adopted the following resolution:

1.—In its efforts to begin Parliamentary activity according to its actual needs, the Norwegian Workers' Party has been led to give conditional support to the Liberal Government. This policy led to such occurrences as the journey of Comrade Lian, a member of the Party Executive, as Government expert to the Genoa Conference, the acceptance of a provisory Compulsory Arbitration Bill, and the support of the Government in a few other cases.

These phenomena can scarcely be distinguished from the old reformist policy. They have indeed been motivated with regard to certain working class interests; yet in the end they have led to the abandonment of other more important working class interests. The Norwegian comrades responsible for this policy, no doubt have tried to bear in mind the interests of the revolutionary class-struggle, but the mistakes made in its application, have contradicted these interests. The Enlarged Executive has with great satisfaction taken cognizance of the assurance that the Norwegian Party has from its own experience and conviction recognized the necessity of a revision of its former Parliamentary policy. The Enlarged Executive expresses the hope that this will be done in the shortest possible time.

2.—The case of Lian is to be judged in connection with the above-related facts concerning the former policy of the Norwegian Workers' Party. It is clearly stated that his journey to Genoa raised no protest within the party. Therefore the whole Party was in accordance with this step. In the opinion of the Enlarged Executive Committee this step was a mistake and injurious. But in view of the circumstance that Comrade Lian cannot be alone held responsible, the Enlarged Executive annuls its former decision that Lian be personally disciplined and therewith considers this personal case as liquidated.

3.—The acceptance of the Compulsory Arbitration Law in the Norwegian Parliament was a mistake. It had not the effect, as the Norwegian comrades thought, of strengthening the fighting position of the Party against the capitalist class; it rather produced differences of opinion within the Party's ranks. In view of the great difficulties in the present situation of the Norwegian working class movement, it must be understood that the Enlarged Executive appreciates the efforts of the responsible Norwegian comrades who have protected the workers from premature, too severe fighting by legal measures. An irresponsible "Leftism", which attempts to weaken the fighting strength of the workers' organizations by daily participation in thoughtless struggles and therefore opposes all legal measures protecting working conditions cannot count upon any support from the Communist International. But defense of the workers' freedom to struggle against the legal restrictions of the bourgeois State is quite another thing; this defense is the duty of the Communists and in this connection the Com-

pulsory Arbitration Law is unthinkable. Experience hitherto with compulsory arbitration has shown that it is futile to hope that the advantages of protection through this law would be greater for the workers than the disadvantage in shackling their freedom of action. The Norwegian comrades have now also gained this experience and come to this opinion. This is now generally recognized on the part of the former defenders of the bill, and none of them have recommended an extension of this provisory measure. In consequence of this the Enlarged Executive sees no more reason for dealing with this case.

4.—The support of a bourgeois government contradicts the tactics of the proletarian united front, because on the one hand it arouses mistrust of the Communist Party in the revolutionary workers and on the other hand it strengthens the confidence of the remaining working class in the bourgeoisie and thus is not likely to assist the gathering of the working class into a united anti-bourgeois front. The tactics of the united front is in Norway, as everywhere, a fight against all bourgeois parties and against all capitalist circles. In this class struggle there must be gathered the broadest masses of the proletariat and for this reason we must bring the Social Democrats of the Second and 2½ Internationals as well as the Syndicalists together with us in the fight for joint slogans and for the most important interests of the working class.

There are in Norway no doubt great prospects for success for the revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat through this tactic; of course, not in the sense that the conscious Right Socialists and Syndicalists would change themselves to real revolutionary class fighters. We need not labor under such an illusion. On the contrary, sooner or later, many of their leaders are sure to unmask themselves in the proletarian united front as deserters, traitors or cowards. But the great majority of their adherents can be won as true and worthy comrades for the proletarian revolution through our earnest demand for the common fight. On the other hand, the ruling position of our Norwegian brother party in the workers' movement in its country gives more guarantee than in any other country that its application of the tactic of the united front will neither endanger the independence of the Communist Party nor its role as the leader of the revolution.

In spite of this, there have appeared in Norway, as in a few other countries, "left radical" fears and confused opposition to the tactic of the united front. The opposition sees in the official addressing of the proposals of our party to the Social Democratic Party or to the Syndicalist organizations, an unchaste "organic contact". But that need not be the case. If important interests of the proletariat require the common action of all workers' organizations, the successful execution of the tactic of the united front demands of the Communist Party, the political courage to turn to rival workers' organizations, to confer with their leading organs or representatives, at times even to form a bloc, to enter into an alliance for the carrying out of a joint action, without prejudicing in the least the organic or political independence of the Party. Pursuing this further, our Party should be ready under certain conditions to form even a Government Bloc with the representatives of the workers' parties and other workers' organizations, to participate in a Workers' Government and then from this half-way step in the further development of the revolutionary class struggle to lead to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Through a courageous carrying out of this tactic, thoroughly conscious of its aim, our Party has, without abandoning its steady revolutionary leadership or moderating its criticism of the non-revolutionary leaders, the best opportunity of thoroughly unmasking their inconstancy and treachery and to deprive them of the leadership of the workers. A Communist opposition that through its confused Left Wing fears, disavows the real tactics of revolutionary Marxism and shakes the confidence of the workers in such party leadership, does the proletariat an unpardonable misservice in the successful fighting of the class struggle.

5.—The Enlarged Executive Committee binds all Norwegian Communists to work for immediate adherence to the R.T.U.I. at the approaching Trade Union Congress.

6.—The Enlarged Executive Committee expects that the decision already made on the altering of the names of the central organs and several other papers of the Norwegian Workers' Party will be carried out without delay.

The Executive Committee of the Communist International.

G. Zinoviev, N. Bukharin, B. Smeral,
O. Kuusinen, Secretary.

The Enlarged Executive Committee on the Tactics of the Italian Party

The Executive Committee of the Communist International takes cognizance of the explanation of the majority of the Italian Communist Party according to which "the tactical thesis discussed in the Rome Congress of the Italian Communist Party was not a decision on the party action, but merely taken in course of preparation for the Party Congress to portray its view". This view must be brought into harmony with the decisions of the Communist International. The Italian Communist Party is informed that the Executive Committee of the Communist International finds this thesis incorrect. The Executive desires that the Italian Communist Party in its next congress make decisions that will be in accord with the tactical line of the Communist International?

Resolution of the Enlarged Executive Committee on the French Party

Session of June 11th.

The principal task of the next Party Congress is to adopt a program, regulations and tactics that should correspond perfectly to the role of the party in the actual epoch of preparation for the social revolution. The elaboration of corresponding projects and their publication in the organs, not only of the French Party, but also of the whole International, should be taken up immediately, so that the thoughts and experiences of all Communist Parties and of the Executive Committee may be employed in the examination and the elaboration of the fundamental documents destined to give a maximum of cohesion and combative strength to the French working class.

Structure of the Party. The Central Committee.

The creation of a homogeneous Central Committee capable of assuring the conduct of the party in conformity with the decisions of the International and National Congresses should at once be made the object of careful preparation to be realized at the next Party congress.

It must be recognized as absolutely necessary that more than one-half of the members of the Central Committee should be devoted to Party and union work; that they be workers who by their occupation form part of the life of the working masses. The choice of candidates fulfilling these conditions, the examination of their past and their political stability, to make them known in some way or another to the federation, is an essential part of the preparatory work which is incumbent on all members of the Central Committee accepting integrally the resolutions of the Communist International, and determined to have them put into practice by the organization.

In a Central Committee thus composed, the majority of its members would realize the bonds existing between the Committee and the local federations, the unions, the press, etc. ~ At the same time the Central Committee should form a political bureau permanently resident in Paris. This bureau is to concentrate into its own hands the entire conduct of the Party, making all necessary preparation to allow the Central Committee in its meetings to take most important decisions and watching over the putting into practice of these decisions by the intermediary, the General Secretariat of the Central Committee.

Discipline

The Central Committee should have the right to exclude from the party such members or groups of members at any time this is necessitated by considerations of a political nature.

In cases requiring a detailed inquiry into a violation of discipline or other delinquencies and crimes against the best interests of the party, the Central Committee may refer the question to the Controlling Committee. But any time that the political factors in question do not leave any doubt that the exclusion is necessitated by the elementary interest of the party, the Directing Committee itself has the power of exclusion. The only appeal against this decision can be made before the Party Congress.

The Seine Federation

The Federation of the Seine is of exceptional importance to the destiny of French Communism and consequently of Inter-

national Communism. For this reason the International considers it necessary to ask the Communists of this Federation as well as those of the French Party to modify radically the actual basis of organization of the Seine Federation.

The principle of federalism is absolutely incompatible with the interests of a revolutionary organization. All reference to the federative constitution of the Soviet Republic is utterly erroneous. The structure of the Communist Party is in no case identical with the structure of the Soviet State. The Communist Party in all the federative republics is strictly centralized. The Communists of the Ukraine, of Georgia and Azerbaidjan, etc. are linked up with the Communists of Moscow and Petrograd, etc. not only by federal ties, but by the most severe democratic centralization. Only the unity of the central organization of the Russian working class has enabled it to make such a glorious defense against its innumerable enemies. The International condemns in a most categorical manner the application of the principles of federalism and autonomy to a revolutionary party which should be the most powerful lever of revolutionary action.

To put at the head of an organization a committee of one hundred members would be to deprive it of all firm and consistent action.

In conformity with the principles guiding the structure of the Communist International, there should be at the head of the Seine Federation a committee composed of a small number of members, elected on the basis of democratic centralism and absolutely responsible for the political conduct and the interior organization of the Federation.

At the same time, in view of the exceptional importance of the Seine Federation it must be recognized as absolutely indispensable that two or three members of the Central Committee should also be members of the Seine Committee, (be it by election to the Central Committee of the Seine militants or by the introduction of members of the Central Committee into the Seine committee by virtue of a special decision of the former.) Thus the necessary connection between the Headquarters of the Party and its principal federation will be assured.

The Union Question.

The International takes cognizance of the immense danger caused to the workers' movement, to the French trade union movement in particular by the petty bourgeois, individualist elements that are hostile to the spirit of proletarian discipline and evade all control by the organization over their personal activities. In the persons of Verdier, Quinton and others, we see men who under cover of phrases about trade union autonomy, organize small cliques inside the unions in the attempt to gain control of the movement without giving the working class any organic guarantees, not only of right guidance, but even of simple fidelity to the interests of the proletariat. These petty bourgeois individualists are more dangerous when, like Verdier, Quinton and others, they penetrate into the ranks of our Party and, robbing themselves with its authority without submitting to its control, carry on a profoundly demoralizing activity, opposing the unions to the Party, and embittering their mutual relations.

Exploiting for their own ends the hospitality of the Party these men are ready to leave its ranks because a control of ideas, of discipline and responsibility, that is to say the rule of the Party, is intolerable to the spirit of these adventurers of the workers' movement.

The International deems it the absolute duty of all conscious elements and of the vanguard of the working class and above all of the central organs of the Communist Party, to fight mercilessly against this phenomenon and its initiators. The Communist Party must be integrally and completely purged of the co-spirits of Verdier and Quinton, if they are still in their ranks.

At the St. Etienne Congress therefore, the Communist Section and its Bureau must help disclose and unmask the pseudo-Communists who consider the party and the trade-unions a free field for irresponsible coteries. These pseudo-Communists should be hunted down from our ranks without pity, that in the future they will not be able to cause to the working-class the incalculable harm which they have caused in the past, and which they are even now causing.

In case there are members of the Communist Party in the trade unions which are still affiliated to the C.G.T., the party has the absolute duty of maintaining the normal organic connections with these comrades.

The Communists in the reformist unions should organize Communist groups functioning regularly and in close contact with the corresponding organs of the party.

Whatever relations may develop between the C.G.T. and the C.G.T.U., which latter is and will be helped by the party in its fight against the reformists, the Communist action should be directed towards the conquest of all C.G.T. organs from within.

The United Front

The International takes cognizance of the fact that the press and the directing organs of the French Communist Party have most erroneously interpreted the sense and significance of the united front tactics. The International simply rejects the superficial judgment of journalists who see a renaissance of reformism, where there is nothing less than an intensification of the methods of struggle against reformism.

To represent the Commission of Nine as a directing organ which is superior to the three Internationals, is to have completely missed the character and spirit of the Communist International; it is to confuse the Communist International with those purely parliamentary and reformist organizations in which the delegates and representatives place themselves above the mass of organized workers and impose their will upon them. In view of the character of the Communist International and the spirit of proletarian discipline, the three delegates sent to the Commission of Nine, were only temporary executors of a definite end, and under the absolute control of the Communist International.

The most glorious page in the history of the French proletariat, the Paris Commune, was nothing else than a bloc of all the organizations and working class tendencies grouped against the bourgeoisie. If, despite the realization of the united front, the Commune was quickly crushed, it was above all because there did not exist in the left wing of this front an organization truly revolutionary, disciplined and determined, capable of taking quick control in the fire of events.

It is in this sense that the Commune was a Workers' Government, a bloc of parties and workers' groups opposed to the bourgeoisie. As a Workers' Government the Commune was a step towards the Socialist regime. The conscious proletarians of France must study the example of the Commune to find in its own heroic past the necessary arguments in favor of the truly revolutionary tactics of the united front.

The idea of a Left Bloc, under present circumstances, may attract a great number of workers who are politically inexperienced. The French Communist Party however, should regard this as a very serious danger. In its daily propaganda it should systematically oppose the idea of a Left Bloc, with the idea of a Workers' Bloc against the bourgeoisie. It goes without saying that when the elections set in, the Communist Party should come forward with lists of independent Communist candidates. These are the only tactics which, if applied spiritedly in every domain (economic, political, etc.) will reduce to a minimum the number of workers who are still under the influence of the Left Bloc, and extend the influence of the Party to the workers whom it has not yet reached.

The Press.

To raise the political and doctrinal niveau of the mass of Party members, it is absolutely indispensable that the press directed by the Party abandon the manners and customs of bourgeois journalism for good, and put its columns not only at the disposal of journalists who are developing their personal tendencies, but also at the disposal of the Party itself, in order that it be given an opportunity to express its thoughts and wishes through the pens of its journalists. For this we must have daily articles, besides actual editorials, explaining from a strict point of view the principal events of the economic and political life at home or abroad; moreover, they are to appear without signature, not as the expression of this or that individual, but as the voice of the Party. The Central Committee should, through its competent organs exercise a permanent control and inspection of the press giving it missions determined by political events, assuring thereby complete accord between the action of the press and its own, be it within the Party or in the political struggle as a whole. In no case should articles be published as leaders, even if they bear the signatures of their authors, criticising decisions already made and executed by the Communist International or by the French Party. If the publication of articles of this sort is judged useful by the directing organs of the Party, as definite explanations of some questions, they should only be printed as articles for discus-

sion, with clear editorial notes indicating the decision already made by the party and with leading articles defending energetically the decision in question.

Party Fractions.

Besides other symptoms bespeaking a crisis in the French Party, the International also takes cognizance of the revival of fractions. The extreme right wing of the Party whose stamping ground is the *Journal du Peuple*, has assumed in the party and in the press an importance absolutely out of proportion with its doctrinal and theoretical worth. The absence of decisive measures on the part of the Central Committee, against this right wing has led inevitably to an attempt at reviving the left wing. The fight between these two fractions would inevitably sap the fighting strength of the party and may endanger its unity.

The International expresses its profound conviction that only a perfect cohesion of the overwhelming majority of the party against its right wing and an energetic execution of all the decisions taken by the present conference will clear the ground of all fractional groupings.

At the same time the International urges the left wing to continue the defense of the principles of Revolutionary Communism, and never to break off into a separate section, but to exercise its action within the institutions and organizations of the Party, and to collaborate actively with the central group of the party in all practical work, particularly in the fight against the reformists, pacifists and Anarcho-Syndicalists.

The Internationale and its Director, Comrade Daniel Renoult,

Comrade Daniel Renoult, member of the Central Committee and Director of the evening paper *l'Internationale* took a very active part in the work of the February Session of the Enlarged Executive. In all questions, except that of the united front, the Executive was in perfect accord with all members of the French delegation, including Comrade Renoult.

On the question of the united front, Comrade Renoult who voted with the majority of the French Delegation against the tactics of the united front, declared most solemnly and categorically that the French Communists, as faithful soldiers of the revolution, would submit without reserve to the resolution that was passed after ample and loyal discussion.

The pledges made by the Delegation of the Central Committee have remained unexecuted in their most essential parts, because of a lack of activity and decision on the part of the Central Committee in applying them. The Conference attributes the non-execution of the decisions made, and the strained relations existing between the International and its French Section, to the conduct of *l'Internationale* and its director.

In complete contradiction to his solemn promise and pledge, Comrade Daniel Renoult, instead of explaining the decision and demanding its unconditional execution, launched a bitter campaign against the united front and against the policy of the Communist International in general. Not content with this press polemic, Comrade Daniel Renoult, speaking in assemblies as influential as the Congress of the Seine Federation, has asked them to give a decisive vote against the policy of the united front.

In view of the fact that Comrade Daniel Renoult has violated his duty as a member of the Communist International and has trampled under foot the pledge he himself made and solemnly proclaimed, the Conference hereby reprimands Comrade Daniel Renoult as member of the Delegation of the French Party, and as Director of *l'Internationale*. At the same time the International requests the Central Committee and its General Secretary to take all steps to assure that, in the months remaining before the Party Congress, *l'Internationale* become a serviceable instrument for putting into practical effect the decisions of the Communist International.

The Fabre Case.

The exclusion of Fabre and his paper is a step forward in the fight against that spirit of Bohemian intellectual anarcho-journalism which, particularly in France, takes on all the forms of Anarchism and opportunism and ends inevitably by stabbing the working class in the back. From this quarter have come the Briands, the Hervés and hundreds of others. The International relies firmly upon the Central Committee and the Party press to explain to the working masses the political significance of Fabre's exclusion. Only under these conditions will the measure taken be a death sentence to Fabrism in the party and will assure Communist opinion the necessary revolutionary elasticity for the easy expulsion of journalist adventurers from the ranks of the Party.

The Next Party Congress.

The preparations for the next Party Congress should be a campaign for the doctrinal and organic consolidation of the French party against all tendencies of petty bourgeois pacifism, Anarcho-Syndicalism and verbal revolution; against theories which subordinate the action of the proletariat to the will or to the maturity of the peasant class and falsify thereby the class character of the party. As these various tendencies have already brought extreme trouble into the party, the Communist press should clarify all these questions by recalling to the minds of its members the corresponding resolutions of the Communist International, in particular the 21 conditions of admission to the International. All these decisions should be illumined by the experiences of last year and the incompatibility of the literary and political exploits of some of our responsible militants with the resolutions passed, should be clearly pointed out. The date of the congress should be fixed by agreement between the Central Committee and the Executive.

Manifesto of the Central Committee.

In view of the necessity of a radical modification of the interior policy of the French Party, a result which can be obtained only through the conscious collaboration of the majority of its members, the International deems it desirable that the Central Committee address a solemn manifesto to the whole Party, making known the nature of the decisions taken by the present conference in order to open a new era in the life of the French Communist Party.

Notice

Owing to the strike in the Berlin printing trades the publication of this issue has been subjected to a delay of over two weeks

The Editors.