

SPECIAL NUMBER

English Edition.

Unpublished Manuscripts - Please reprint.

- INTERNATIONAL -

Vol. 4 No. 37

PRESS

26th June 1924

CORRESPONDENCE

Editorial Offices: Langedasse 26/12, Vienna VIII. — Central Despatching Department: Berggasse 31, Vienna IX.
— Postal Address, to which all remittances should be sent by registered mail: Postamt 64, Schliessfach 29. Vienna VIII.
— Telegraphic Address: Inprecorr, Vienna.

Results of the 13th Congress of the Russian Communist Party.

(Report by Comrade Zinoviev at the town meeting of the Leningrad branches of the Party organisations.)

The Congress as the Mirror of the Party.

Comrades, no report can take the place of a study of the Congress itself. You should bear this in mind. Under no circumstances must you consider my report as a substitute for independent study of the results of the Congress. We were told by Lenin after the Second Congress of the Party, that the work of the Congress must be studied with the same thoroughness that we apply to the study of any science; because that is the only way to appreciate all the shades of political thought that were revealed and to enable the Congress to play the part which it should for the whole of the Party. I take it that the majority of the comrades assembled here will work independently at the study of the more important resolutions, reports and speeches. My task can only consist of lending some assistance in this study.

The work of the Congress was divided into two parts, and in this sense, its work was of two-fold significance. Fully one half, and may be more, of the Congress, was devoted to summing up the results of the recent discussion. This showed us the state of the Party as it was after the death of Lenin and after recent events,

To a certain extent, the Congress is the mirror of the Party. The Party has to look into this mirror, and see how it stands, after the loss of its universally acknowledged leader, and after the discussion.

The second half of the work of the Congress was devoted to finding replies to a number of questions, which do not relate to our own internal party life, but to our relations with the outside world. For instance, the Party had to determine its attitude on the question of our relations with the peasantry, on our appreciation of the economic situation, on our proposed manoeuvres in the international arena, and so on.

There is no doubt that the second half of the work of the Congress is more important than the first. The whole world was most interested in the question of the present state of the Party after the death of Lenin, and after the discussion. I think

that the Party itself, in its innermost depths, was most interested in this question.

White Guards' Futile Dreams.

Our enemies looked forward with the greatest hope to our Congress. During the world discussion, and immediately afterwards, their press was brimful of news, rumours and guesses as to the likely course of our congress. The occurrences within our Party have long since ceased to be merely matters of internal Party interest. Events in our Party, even the slightest quarrel, immediately attain national importance, and, very frequently, international importance.

All the white-guardists papers were full of dissertations on the subjects of the crisis of the dictatorship, the crisis in the Party, and soon. It stands to reason that they looked forward to the 13th Congress with the utmost impatience, thinking, as they did, that it would result in a general melee, and in the break-up of our Party. They lacked the intelligence to conceal their disappointment when their hopes were not fulfilled.

I have before me the newspaper "Ruhl" (The Rudder), the organ of the right-wing Cadets, published by Hassen in Berlin. On the 27th of May this paper devoted a whole leading article to our Congress. Among other things they say: "The 13th Congress of the Communist Party at Moscow did not fulfil the hopes that were entertained of it.

"One might have surmised" — continues the "Ruhl" — that the opposition, which had made such a brilliant start on the eve of Lenin's death, and which was entirely dissolved in the commotion caused by that death, would now take advantage of the Congress to defend and consolidate its position. But, in accordance with the established tradition of Sovietdom, the very opposite has happened." (Laughter.)

They look for an explanation, and they soon find it. "Efficient and well-tried measures were taken", — continues the editorial writer. "A general cleaning was carried out. But the fact remains: the Congress has worked with unusual smoothness, without a hitch of any kind."

What Makes our Enemies so Interested in the Fortunes of our Party?

This impatience on the part of our enemies was only natural. For, if there be any serious menace to us at this juncture, it could only be caused by a mishap in our own midst. Of course, our economic affairs are not yet progressing brilliantly, and there are certain difficulties ahead. Difficulties will arise also in the international arena. But all these are trifles in comparison with the question of the internal condition of our Party. If our Party became lopsided, our State would become lopsided too, and we should then meet with a host of difficulties in all spheres of State activity. This accounts for the unusual interest shown by all our opponents with regard to our international Party affairs. It is for this reason that they lurk around the Party, eavesdropping and peeping into every hole, hoping to hear or to see something that would suggest a split.

The enemy could not possibly conjure up a more piquant and attractive picture than the beginning of a process of disintegration in our ranks. A most interesting spectacle would be afforded them, if our Party, after we have overcome a whole series of difficulties, after we have revived economically and won de jure recognition, after the successful launching of currency reform, should begin to deteriorate from within, and to head for collapse. Giving rein to their imagination, they see the collapse of the Party culminating in the collapse of the State, in civil war and in the ruin of the revolution.

There is no blinking the fact that history records revolutions, which were ruined as a result of civil war. Of course, those civil wars were caused by conflicts between different groups of class-interests. The outside world could only see something like the following picture: the revolution is in the ascendant, it becomes victorious, and finally it begins to break up and to result in internecine strife among the revolutionary forces, among the ranks of the Party. This internecine strife leads to the ruin of the revolution. Such was the case at the time of the Great French Revolution. And now our opponents dream of just such an alluring picture.

The Party felt instinctively this interest, this malignant expectancy, this intense eagerness on the part of the enemy, and at the Congress it gave the proper reply.

The Bolshevik Wall.

The Party reviewed the questions with which it was confronted before the Congress. The last (13th) conference of our Party was in the nature of a congress, and the 13th Congress was to a considerable degree a repetition of the 13th Federal Conference of our Party. We knew that the Central Committee of the Party, the fundamental Leninist nucleus, would have behind it the great majority. Nevertheless, comrades, even the most optimistic of us did not expect such solidarity, such unity as we obtained. The fundamental resolution upon the report of the Central Committee, the most militant, as is always the case at our Congresses, was adopted unanimously.

The Congress created the impression that the front-ranks of the working class had formed something like an impenetrable fence around the Central Committee, around the fundamental nucleus of the Party. This was the Bolshevik wall. Not for a long time have we seen at our Congresses such calm and iron-clad unity, such absolute determination. It was the kind of solidarity which could not be pierced in any spot. It soon became quite obvious that any attempts at a revision of Leninism, at a smuggling in of the views of the opposition, were foredoomed to abject failure.

The Opposition Trinity.

Nevertheless, on those occasions the opposition did cross swords with us. The first to speak was Comrade Trotsky, who defended in a somewhat diffuse manner, his old views on the bureaucratic machine, and on systematic management. The second spokesman was Comrade Preobrazhensky, who defended the views of the opposition on economic questions. He added only one new plank to the opposition platform, viz., the plea for those expelled from the Party. We congratulated him on this acquisition, which I think will not gain any particular popularity among the working class for the comrades of the opposition. The third spokesman was Comrade Radek, who dealt with the policy of the Comintern. Comrade Radek, as you know from the press, published a few weeks before the Congress, a series of articles

on the "epoch of revolution", in which he stated, in vague and incoherent terms, that the world revolution had called a halt, that the "epoch of revolution" would be delayed for several decades, and so on.

Such a statement is nothing less than revision of one of the fundamental views of Bolshevism upon the course of the revolution. These were the three manifestations of the opposition. But, comrades, their speeches sounded rather sepulchral. What had become of that aggressiveness which we had previously known; what had become of their self-confidence? The Congress treated them with good-natured indulgence, because the struggle was clearly finished. Nevertheless, we should not underestimate the fact that the opposition continued to fight in defence of their errors, even after it had become perfectly clear that the great majority of the Party was against them.

Of course, the greatest importance attaches to the speech made by Comrade Trotsky, in view of the authority which he possessed. Comrade Trotsky delivered a speech which sounded extremely out of place at a Bolshevik Congress. I hope you have read this speech, and that you will study it, as you have studied the Congress documents. He declared in one and the same breath that the Party cannot be wrong; and that the Party nevertheless was wrong, and that he, Comrade Trotsky, was right. But Comrade Trotsky, adopting the English maximum, declared "My Party, right or wrong!" In adopting this military maxim — "My country, right or wrong!", Comrade Trotsky did not find a happy simile. But, in defending false ideas, even the most experienced orator will have to make use of inapt similes.

As regards the substance of our dispute, Comrade Trotsky continued to insist that he was right and the Party was wrong. The Party rejected the compliment as to the alleged impossibility for it to be wrong. This is not true. It is possible that the Party will adopt erroneous decisions, which will have to be amended. It is useless for Trotsky to treat the Party to compliments about its infallibility, while he himself thinks that the Party was wrong in this discussion. That is not what Lenin taught us. He did not say that the Party would never make a mistake. On the contrary, for the least mistake he would give us all a sound thrashing. If the Party could make no mistakes, our work would be quite easy. One should endeavor to rectify the mistakes of the Party, but one should not use such language when talking to the Party. If the Russian Communist Party does never make a mistake, do the other communist parties, the German Communist Party, for instance, never make any mistakes? Comrades Trotsky himself admitted that the German Communist Party has made mistakes. A serious Bolshevik Party brought up by Lenin, needs no compliments. Trotsky was attempting to mollify the party. But such attempts miss their aim with the Bolshevik party, and the very opposite effect is obtained. This is what actually happened.

The Convention Needs no Parliamentary Speeches. But a Clear Statement of the Question.

The first word in reply to Comrade Trotsky's speech was said by our noted Leningrad comrade, Uglanov, now the Secretary of the Nijni-Novgorod Provincial Committee and a member of the Central Committee of the Party. Comrade Uglanov, voicing the feeling of the whole Congress, described Comrade Trotsky's utterances as a "parliamentary speech". "At our Congresses," he said, "we have no use for parliamentary speeches; give us plain talk." The attempt to come to terms with the Party was highly praiseworthy in itself, but it should not be attempted in this manner. One cannot come to terms with the Party by offering it a large dose of sweetened water, but one may come to terms by stating the question plainly, by finding out where the mistakes were made and how they are to be rectified.

I must add that Comrade Trotsky declared that he was not in favour of factions and groups. Comrade Trotsky was told by subsequent speakers that he was rather late in making this declaration. If he had made this statement some five months ago, when his name was used for the formation of definite factions and groups, it would have been in time. But now, after the collapse of all these groups, to speak against them is merely to pass the mustard when the meal is over. It betokens unwillingness to clear up the question of factions, because the whole Party knows that the group of 46, and the whole opposition, did fight for the freedom to set up factions and groups, and these declarations are now belated.

Comrade Trotsky's speech had rather a mixed reception. When I asked the Congress in my concluding speech: "Has this

declaration re-assured you, has it satisfied you?" the Convention replied in one voice. "No!" The reason was that it was just a parliamentary speech, which leaves any representative of the opposition a free hand to start the whole thing over again, whenever there seems to be an opportunity.

The second spokesmen of the opposition, as I have already said, was Comrade Preobrajensky. His speech was an even greater failure. He spoke with the air of a care-free man who has won the battle, but the others are not yet aware as yet of his victory. He told the Congress that it had failed as yet to learn a number of things, but that he was going to write one or two pamphlets to educate us. These assertions were a source of mirth to the Congress. On economic questions, Comrade Preobrajensky tried to get his own back by declaring that we were now resorting to the policy of „commodity intervention“*) which had once been emphatically rejected by the Central Committee of the Party. He pointed out that we have begun to import some products from abroad, including meat. As a matter of fact, we never said that we would not do it. Comrade Preobrajensky tried to make capital at the Convention out of this meat: "You are importing meat; ergo the opposition has won." This was such clumsy claptrap that we thought it quite enough to treat it as a simple joke. We said that we had never been vegetarians, and for this reason we did not object to the importation of meat, particularly when this meat happens to be cheap, and we can make a profit on it. But this had nothing to do with the fundamental controversy about the question of commodity intervention, which they tried to smuggle in, and which the Party quite properly rejected.

In conclusion, Comrade Preobrajensky pleaded for the expelled members, saying that it was exceedingly tactless on the part of the Party to start the cleaning before the Convention, that he knew of a whole number of cases where members of the opposition were wrongly expelled, and so on. His assertions were promptly repudiated. Comrades from the Central Control Committee furnished evidence to the effect that they had sent members of the opposition into the opposition nuclei and groups, to carry out the cleansing. Not a single case was cited of any harsh treatment of members of the opposition, and consequently Comrade Preobrajensky's plea for the expelled throws the clearest possible light on the petty-bourgeois complexion of our opposition. That incidental mistakes have occurred, and will occur, in the course of the Party purge, is a matter that cannot be gainsaid. But, on the whole, you know what a salutary operation the cleansing is.

Our first general purge was carried out on the initiative of Lenin, and it was in connection with this very discussion. We must not forget that the first general cleansing of the Party occurred on the day after the general discussion on the trade-unions; yet no one had the timidity to say that revenge was being wrought on any person. The purge was directed against a definite category of people, who are unworthy to be members of our Party. And we are amazed to find the opposition taking up the plea on their behalf.

Finally, the third and most unsuccessful speech of the opposition was delivered by Comrade Radek, who delivered the counter-report on the question of the Comintern. He vainly tried to prove that Brandler was right, and that the Executive of the Comintern had acted wrongly when it combatted the right-wing elements of the German Communist Party. The Convention listened to Comrade Radek's statements, in good humour, and proceeded to adopt a unanimous resolution, stating that Comrade Radek's views "have nothing in common with the political line of the Russian Communist Party". I believe that the forthcoming congress of the Communist International will give the same reply.

Such, comrades, were the statements of the case for the opposition, and they met with emphatic repudiation at the Convention.

We Are not a Patchwork Party, but a Party of Leninist Bolshevism

We were asked by the opposition to revise the resolution of the 13th Federal Conference of our Party, in which the views of the opposition were characterised as a petty-bourgeois departure from Bolshevism. The principal passage of this resolution reads as follows: "It is beyond doubt that this 'opposition' is a reflec-

*) By "commodity intervention" is meant the deliberate importation of commodities from abroad in order to lower the prices in the home market... Translator's note.

tion of the incursion of petty-bourgeois elements into the proletarian party, and their effect, upon its policy. The principles of internal Party-democracy are already being widely interpreted outside of our Party ranks, in the sense of a relaxation of the proletarian dictatorship, and of an extension of the political rights of the new bourgeoisie."

On behalf of the Central Committee, we asked for a direct confirmation of the decisions of the 13th Conference with a resolution by the Congress adopting the Conference resolution as its own. The opposition leaders at the Congress insisted on the opposite course. They asked that this verdict should be quashed, or at least attenuated. Comrade Trotzky made the ironical remark that it was a big exaggeration "when you call us a petty-bourgeois deviation". Others demanded that the resolution should be annulled. Far from doing so, the Congress confirmed the resolution fully and entirely and resolved to incorporate it in the decisions of the 13th Congress of the Russian Communist Party.

A question of tremendous importance was at issue — whether we are to be a patchwork party, a party of sloppy, diluted bolshevism, or a homogenous party of real Leninist Bolshevism. In his pamphlet, "The New Course", with which all of you are probably familiar, Comrade Trotzky advocated the views which would tend to transform our Party into a bloc of tendencies and groups, into a patchwork party. We declared in our report on behalf of the Central Committee of our Party that "The New Course" is the most considerable literary production of the opposition, but that at same time this literary production does not contain a single grain of Bolshevism.

New Mistakes on top of old Mistakes.

Comrade Trotzky recently published a book on Lenin. A part of this book is to a certain extent a continuation of his book "The New Course". Side by side with interesting reminiscences and clever character sketches, which are of course most welcome to all of us, attempts are made in some parts of this book at a political revision of Bolshevism.

I will give an example. Trotzky tries to draw a comparison between two things: the errors committed by him at the time of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, and our march on Warsaw. He says that there is not much difference between the two. Here is surely an attempt to revise Leninism. Is it indeed possible to compare these two things: Comrade Trotzky's Brest-Litovsk error and the advance on Warsaw which we undertook under the guidance of Lenin? I do not think it is. When the Brest-Litovsk question had to be decided, the proletarian dictatorship itself was in a most precarious position; the Soviet power was not yet firmly established, it was only in the process of formation, the old army was falling to pieces and the peasantry had no inclination to fight. In this instance, the fate of the revolution was at stake. We had to get put of the war at all costs, and therefore comrade Trotzky's error at that time was a very big error based on a wrong conception of the peasantry and its psychology.

Our country and our party were in an entirely different position at the time of the advance on Warsaw, when war had been forced on us by Poland. After that incident, comrade Lenin said at the Party Congress: "This was a case of a strategical and perhaps also of a political error, or even a combination of both." But comrades, can we really compare our rash advance on Warsaw with the Brest-Litovsk affair? At the time of our march on Warsaw, the Soviet power was already firmly established, and had been in existence for several years. The war, which was forced on us, was already in full swing, and our international position was improving. Were we in that case risking our existence and running the risk of alienating the peasantry, as at the time of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations? Certainly not. By this time we had in the Red Army a powerful alliance of the workers and peasants. We are justified in saying that the army was determined "to have Warsaw", we know that our bare-footed peasant soldiers of the Red Army fought with the courage of lions. Unfortunately we were not strong enough. One can only marvel at any one drawing a comparison between these two things. How is it possible to weight on the same scales comrade Trotzky's Brest-Litovsk error and the other "error" committed by Lenin. It is not true to facts, neither is it politically correct. This is our reason for saying that some pages of comrade Trotzky's new work are, unfortunately, a continuation of the "New Course", and that in this book also comrade Trotzky persists in his errors.

There have been times when mistakes committed by comrade Trotzky were something like a catastrophe for the Party, when the Party was very much concerned about such mistakes. For is he not one of the foremost leaders of his Party? It is but natural that the Party should be disturbed even by the smallest of comrade Trotzky's mistakes or those of other leaders! But here I think the Thirteenth Party Congress marked a new orientation. The days are past when the mistakes of any one of us, including comrade Trotzky, can be a catastrophe for the Party. Now the Party is too grown up for this kind of thing. It has a head on its shoulders and thinks for itself. It no longer becomes perturbed when one of us, even if it be comrade Trotzky, makes some mistake or other. Conditions are reversed now, and the tragedy is for those who make the mistakes. This was very evident at our congress.

There is nothing tragical for the Party in errors made even by the most prominent leaders. In this respect we can say that good can come out of evil. The good which has resulted from all this is — that no errors whatever, even if they be made by prominent leaders, can take the Party unawares. The question whether the Party should be monolithic or split up into fractions has been definitely settled. If any one were to attempt to lead our Party into discussions similar to those of last December and January, and to try to prove that democracy is impossible without fractions, he or she would be laughed to scorn by the Party. What was possible a few months ago (Party members sitting up all night in discussion) is out of the question today. The Party has stood its trial, it has now definite views on everything and no one can turn it back again. It would be a good thing if those comrades who made such an unfortunate debut at the Congress, were to realise this fact. But the speeches of the leaders of the opposition were all of them in the other direction. They were trying, so to speak, to address their constituents through the window of the Congress. They looked upon the Congress as if it were a parliament where hostile intentions can be concealed by loyal speeches. They still think that the Congress did not reflect the opinions and mood of the Party, that it was merely an expression of the opinions of the leaders and gubernia committees, and that the time will come when they will be able to prove to the Party that they were right.

An Ideological Fight for Leninism is still in store for the Party.

The Leningrad organisation must be aware of this even more than any other organization, because of the part it has played already in the fight for Leninism — a part which, I think, it is bound to play again in the future, whenever the establishment of Leninism is in question (applause). Ideological struggles for Leninism are inevitable in our country because it is largely a petty bourgeois country in which the working class is in a minority. The petty bourgeoisie is bound to make attempts to permeate our Party. I believe that during the last twelve months we have fought and won several decisive battles for Leninism. Nevertheless I do not think that this victory is a good reason for ceasing the struggle. New attempts are bound to be made within our Party to renew the dispute whenever the time seems opportune to our opponents. Therefore we must be ready for all emergencies.

As you know, our Congress sanctioned, at the proposal of the Central Committee, the bestowal of a decisive vote on the Lenin recruits in the ranks of our Party.

The Lenin Recruits and the Opposition.

That the enrolment of the Lenin recruits is a big step forward was not disputed at the Congress. But, of course, those who have an intimate knowledge of the opposition and know its mood are convinced that at least some of its representatives have very little enthusiasm for the idea of increasing the working class element in the ranks of our Party. But at present they make a virtue of necessity so far as this question is concerned. Now that the Party is already proletarianised, they almost pretend that the Lenin recruits were "their idea". We know the actual state of affairs. We know that our Leningrad gubernia conference was among the first (prior to the December resolution of the Central Committee) to raise the question of enrolling workers from the factory and the workshop ranks into the Party. Even before Lenin's funeral there had appeared the article "Lenin and the Workers", which advocated the inclusion of more industrial workers into the Party. After the funeral the Central Committees of the Party passed a resolution on the Lenin recruits. The entire work was done without the least

assistance from the opposition. Otherwise, it would be difficult to understand comrade Preobrajzhensky's opposition to the cleansing of the Party.

What is this Party purge? Is it not the other side of the medal as far as the Lenin recruits are concerned?

If you treat the question of the purge apart from its place in our whole policy, it loses its meaning. If on the other hand we clear out those who are not wanted, and on the other hand open wide the doors to the best class of workers, this may be called a well thought out and definite policy. But when people come to us and say: The Lenin recruits are all right, but why the purge? — our only reply can be that this question alone betrays the real frame of mind of the questioner. Comrade Trotzky was well advised when he said in the "New Course", at the time when our Party discussion was at its height, that the Party must for a long time depend on the support of nuclei of a mixed composition, and also when he said that it will take a considerable time for the workers to enter into our Party in large numbers. This only shows that comrades of the opposition did not understand the mind of the workers. Nor had they a correct knowledge of the inner conditions of the Party, or of what is going on now. It all seems to come as a revelation to them; they regard it as something artificial, hence their scepticism concerning the idea of proletarianising our Party.

However, this is all but accomplished, and no one can undo what has been already done. We have in our Party about 50% of members from the factory and the workshop, and in agreement with the report of the Central Committee, the Congress resolved that efforts must be directed towards making the Party in the near future a Party in which the majority of members are workers from the factory and the workshop.

Comrades, this is what I have to say about the first part of our Congress work. The Party consulted the lookingglass and saw in it not the reflection of a bureaucracy, with which it was confronted at the time of the discussion, not a confirmed and rabid "apparadchik" (a strickler to routine) but a fully grown up and active man in the prime of his manhood, a confirmed Leninist — a real Bolshevik who is not afraid even of Comrade Trotzky's darts. In looking into the glass, the Party saw that it has reached its manhood, that it realises enormous responsibilities, that it has grown strong and is determined not to allow anyone to tamper with its unity. I was greeted with tempestuous applause at the Congress when I said: "There is not in the whole world a man or a group capable of splitting our Russian Communist Party." (Applause.) Comrades, these were not empty words. I would not have dared to say this a few months ago; besides, it is almost impossible to foretell such things. Hasn't it happened before that even very strong workers' parties were split by centrifugal force? Such cases have been. We had lost Lenin, we were in a very difficult position, and owing to various circumstances the working class element in the Party was numerically weak. Therefore, the danger was great. But after the 13th Congress, when the Party had got over its fever, we were justified in making such a statement to the Congress.

Thus, the first part of the Congress work was in the nature of a confession on the part of the Party. It had to declare if it were a monolithic party or a party split up into fractions; if its leadership was in the hands of the essential Lenin cadre plus the young revolutionary elements seasoned by civil war, or if our Party consists of Lenin cadres, young elements, groups of former mensheviks etc. etc. This was the question which confronted the Party, and the Party has answered it.

There was also the question of the existence or non-existence of antagonism between the old and the new generations. This question, too, was definitely settled by the Congress. There was a time when the "neutrality" theory was flourishing in the Young Communist League; namely, the idea that the Young Communist League must stand aloof from all disputes within the Party. Those days are no more. And I can say, without exaggeration, that our Young Communist League as at present constituted, is heart and soul for Leninist tactics and the fundamental cadres of the Party. It is also against the opposition whatever form it may take. (Applause.) This is our greatest gain from the discussion.

This was a case of good coming out of evil, and you must be grateful to our opposition for having given us an opportunity to show to the Party, and especially to its young elements, what real Bolshevism is. It was a good opportunity before Bolshevism, those sections of our Party which, although inclining to Bolshevism, lacked Bolshevik stamina.

All Parties of the Comintern behind the Central Committee.

Furthermore, they found occasion to bring up this matter in the Comintern. They had no doubt of their success there. "Very well", they declared, "If we cannot win out in Russia, we will take our revenge in the Comintern, where we have connections and support."

At the very first meeting of the Congress we heard the declarations of the German, French, Bulgarian, Polish, American, Czecho-Slovakian parties, and the Young Communist International — in a word of all the main groups in the Comintern, who have followed in recent months the feverish internal struggle which agitated our ranks, and who, having studied the speeches and analysed the matters under dispute, have unanimously come to the conclusion that they support the view point of the Central Committee of the Party.

We shall probably hear similar declarations at the Comintern Congress. All of the most mature and experienced parties have completely and unreservedly taken our side against the opposition in this dispute. Thus we may state boldly that the time taken up by the discussion was not spent in vain. Much energy was expended in this discussion, but considerable advantage will accrue to us as a result. The Party has made its position clear to the whole world.

The Bolsheviki Defend the Peasants from Foreign Capital.

In what did the second part of the work of the Congress consist? As I have already stated, the second part of the Congress was concerned not with the internal condition of the Party, but with our relations to other classes, to the economic situation, etc. The Party examined a mass of questions at the Congress. We considered in detail questions concerning foreign policy, economics, cooperation, trade, the village, the youth, the Lenin enrollment, the Comintern, etc. I cannot take the time to review all these questions, and will only touch upon the most important ones.

In the realm of our foreign policy we are faced with an entirely unique situation. On the one hand we have been recognised *de jure* by one country after another, which ostensibly put us in a very favourable situation; but on the other hand we must reckon with a series of new difficulties arising from these very recognitions. One by one the capitalist countries send us their bouquets. "Here," they say, "is your *de jure* recognition!" They send these bouquets by their elegant flunkies, but as soon as we bend over to smell the bouquet, we discover appended thereto, a bill, and a long one, at that — for the nationalised factories and mines, for the war debts, for the pre-war debts, for the interest on the debts, for the interest on the interest, etc. Thus we have a situation which is externally very favourable, but which at the same time is fraught with new difficulties. Here is our friend Herriot, who loves us so much, coming into power. But what is the actual situation? Formerly we had to deal with the open enemies as Poincaré, the misanthrope, who would not even negotiate with us. "We'll show you, you gang of robbers," he threatened us. "We'll buy up the Roumanians, we'll buy up the Poles, and one way or nother we'll smash you!" And now instead of the misanthrope Poincaré, we have dear old uncle Herriot. And what does he say? "We will recognise you, we are good folks, we are not like Poincaré, but all the same you'd better pay up your debts." It is in this sense that new difficulties confront us.

We declared at the Congress that the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs should become the most popular commissariat in the village. Just as the moujiks realised formerly that the Bolsheviki protected them from the Russian landlords, so they must realise now that the Bolsheviki will protect them from foreign capital. This will be one of the most burning questions for the next few years. It is essential for us that the peasants understand the situation clearly.

Our Battle Cry — Metal.

As regards the economic conflict, metal will be our battle cry for the immediate future. Now that the Central Committee with the support of the whole Party, has solved the questions of coal, oil, transport and finally finance, with the consummation of the financial reform and the establishment of a stable currency — we turn to the next problem, which is metal. During the next five years the Soviet Government must expend from 150 to 200 million gold roubles in order to reestablish the metallurgical industry which is at the basis of our whole economic structure. This is a matter which vitally effects our cities. Comrade Dzer-

zhinski is working on this question at the head of a commission on the metal industry. In the Central Committee of the Party, it has already been decided that during the next few years, any surplus that we may have, all the means that we can earn and accumulate or divert from electrification, will be devoted to metallurgy. This was the most important matter in the realm of economics discussed at the Congress.

We demonstrated the growth of our industry. At the 12th Congress of the Party we had already attained from 25 to 26 per cent of pre-war production in our city industry. At the time of the present Congress, production had increased to from 40 to 45 and even 48 per cent of pre-war. And for the first time the Central Committee launched the slogan through its speakers that the time has come to begin to think of surpassing the pre-war level. This has always been our aim, and an aim of course, it will have to remain for some years to come. But it was definitely stated for the first time at this Congress, in the name of the Central Committee, that we should accomplish this aim not in the distant future, but within a short period, that the time had already come to consider passing the milestone of the pre-war level.

It was pointed out at the Congress, and quite rightly, that not every prosperous peasant should be regarded as an exploiter. We are likely at times, to indulge in wholesale denunciation as an exploiter of every one who has enough to eat. This is not right. Indeed, if in our workers' and peasants' country there are good industrious peasants who manage to raise a good crop, to pay their taxes regularly, and to save money to give a dowry to their daughters, should we therefore describe them as exploiters? This would be an erroneous view. We were taught by the late Vladimir Ilyitch to discriminate between different kinds of peasants. A peasant in Siberia is quite different from a peasant in the Ukraine or on the Volga. A peasant in Siberia may have five horses, without being an exploiter. If we denounce every thrifty peasant as an exploiter, we can never hope to bring about a revival of our agriculture. For this reason we have launched the slogan that our work in the village does not consist so much in hampering the exploiter, as in helping the poorer and moderately prosperous peasant, in helping those whom the new economic policy has somewhat put back.

The Congress discussed the question of mutual aid committees, of religion, of sectarians, of aid to teachers and agronomists, and a number of other questions pertaining to the village. But I repeat, comrades, these questions were merely discussed; they have not yet been properly settled. Of course, the decisions adopted by the Congress are a step forward, but we are just beginning to make a proper study of the village.

We must distinguish between those who were formerly known as exploiters, and are now considered merely as thrifty peasants, and against the real exploiters, the illicit distillers, the wealthy usurers, the rich shop-keepers, the real spiders, we must unite the whole of the country-side.

We have again seen the emergence of ten thousand agricultural labourers. We must organise the All Russian Agricultural Labourers Union, we must establish a contact with the rural teachers, who will help us penetrate into the depths of the villages. For the first time we have closely approached the work in the village. The Party has decided that a permanent committee shall be maintained in the centre for village work, and that every provincial committee shall carry on this work. But the main work will have to be done by the rank and file members who are connected with the village.

Education of the Lenin Recruits in the Fundamental Tasks of the Party.

The Congress went on to discuss a number of points in connection with the question of the Lenin recruits and of Party organisation. That the Lenin enrollment was of tremendous importance I pointed out at the Congress. Before the Lenin enrollment we existed chiefly on the forces that we obtained before the October revolution, from those workers who either joined before October or early in the revolution and during "Party Week". It was on this capital that the Party existed in the main, spending it on the various fronts. We have now for the first time obtained a new fund of proletarian energy, we have achieved solidarity with the post-revolutionary proletariat, with all its strong and weak sides. In this sense the Lenin enrollment marks the beginning of an entirely new epoch. It means recruiting from the proletarian black soil, and it needs a good deal of cultivation. This we must see clearly. We were told by comrades at the Congress, that a

certain amount of Communist conceit was observed among some of the Lenin recruits. They have not yet become Communists, but they are already affected by Communist conceit, and they bear themselves as though they had come to teach us, or to control us, on behalf of the masses. I know not, comrades, how wide spread this phenomenon may be, but it was observed in some places. We must politely but firmly indicate to these Comrades that they have more to learn than to teach in our Party. We do not say that we are going to put them on the school bench. We shall give them work in the State. Let them learn at work, and we shall give them the work that they can tackle. If Communist conceit is harmful to us old Party members, it cannot be particularly useful to the new comrades of the Lenin enrollment.

Here, comrades, we still have a great task before us. The Lenin enrollment has its weak sides, but it has also its tremendously strong side, which out-weighs all the rest. The Lenin recruiting will become the militant base of the Party. It has doubled its ranks. It is the fundamental stratum upon which we shall have work in plenty in years to come.

Are we Abolishing Nep?

At the head of all economic problems were those of cooperation and internal trade. Both of these questions were closely connected with the question as to whether we should abandon the principles of Nep or not. You have probably heard that the Mensheviks and SR's attempted to interpret the policy adopted by the Central Committee in regard to cooperation and internal trade as a renunciation of Nep. Since we are squeezing out private capital, therefore according to these people, we are giving up Nep. And indeed, this situation should be made quite clear. There is no doubt that free trade, especially with regard to the peasants grain surplus, is the basis of Nep. And here plain speaking is necessary. May we and should we revise the principle of Nep in the sense of giving up free trade?

The Central Committee of the Party, and with them the whole Congress held to the position that Nep should remain in force. If we were to relinquish Nep, what other system would remain for us — that of war communism? There is no use playing hide and seek. We are not in a position to give up Nep at the present time. You remember what Vladimir Ilyich said when we adopted Nep: — “seriously and for a long time, but not for ever”. Now that we have attained considerable successes in consequence of Nep, some comrades, particularly comrade Larin suddenly came forward, eager to abolish Nep. There is hope, of course, that Comrade Larin may think better of many of his mistakes, and then he will be a valuable co-worker. But however, that may be, now that we are beginning to talk about crowding out private capital, Comrade Larin interprets this as involving the abolition of Nep, and with that he is entirely in agreement. After leaving the Congress he made the statement that it was by no means necessary, to speak of Nep conditionally, but of a conditional Nep. And our answer to him was that in speaking of a conditional Nep, he was unconditionally mistaken.

Where did Comrade Larin get this idea of a “conditional Nep?” In my political report for the Central Committee I said that we could compress our entire policy into two formulas — the New Trade Policy, which in abbreviated form we may call the N. T. P., and the New Cooperative Policy (the N. C. P.) To be sure, we use the word now only in a relative sense. We have stated these questions theoretically many times. We now find ourselves in an entirely new position, due to certain positive successes in the economic field. Comrade Larin considers that it is possible to speak of a conditional Nep. We protest against this. The International bourgeoisie and the Mensheviks have naturally seized upon this statement of Larin's. The “Socialisticheski Vestnik” published a long article warning MacDonald if you please, against us, saying “You had better be careful of the people to whom you are giving loans, with whom you are discussing debts — do you not realise that they are about to repudiate the Nep?” The French newspapers adopted the same attitude. It was reported that there was some kind of a “secret order” from Lenin with regard to the Nep. The “Socialisticheski Vestnik” even gave the details of this abrogation of Nep. According to them few concessions are to be given, mixed joint stock companies will not be encouraged, there will be little trade with foreign capital, the Nepmen will be banished (the Mensheviks will hardly be able to restrain their tears over this), more Kiev trials will be staged etc. And on the other hand, the members of cooperative housing associations are now being selected along class lines. Is not this a calamity, is not this a repudiation of

Nep? How can we live in a world where the very holy of holies is broken into, where distinguished people can find no place in the housing associations, and must give way to the workers, not knowing what the morrow will bring them? The extreme lefts are on top, Nep will be abolished!

The Party must clear up this muddled situation. We do not conceal the fact that sometime we shall abolish Nep. I have already referred to Lenin's remark on this question — “seriously and for a long time, but not for ever. He said this publicly. The time will come when we shall be able to relinquish Nep. But it is impossible to tell exactly within how many years this will be. And it will probably not be MacDonald or the Mensheviks who will decide this question, but congresses of our Party and the Soviets. At the present moment we have no reason for giving up the principle of Nep, because the only alternative for us would be a return to war Communism. We know that no matter what disadvantages the Nep may have, the fact remains that the dispersal of the workers has stopped, that industry has been raised to an average of 40% of pre-war level, that agriculture has attained almost 90% of its pre-war production, and that little by little we are increasing wages. To be sure, there is also a dark side to the picture — unemployment, etc. But nevertheless, we can boast of a series of definite successes, which have been attained as a result of Nep. We have therefore no reason to turn aside from this road at the present time. On the other hand, this by no means implies that we must allow complete freedom of trade.

We presented certain figures at the Congress. At the present moment, if we consider all branches of trade — retail, wholesale, and wholesale-retail, we find that 36% of all trade is in the hands of the co-operatives, and 64% in the hands of private capital. In other words, the government and the co-operatives together control one-third of the trade, and private capital two-thirds. Where and when, pray, have we given any undertaking that under Nep we should only have one-third and private capital two-thirds? Why should it not be the other way around, so that we should have two-thirds, and private capital one-third? Is that too little for them? Or why not divide it evenly? It was in this sense that we proposed the regulation of private trade. On the basis of the economic successes which we have already achieved, we came to the conclusion that it was possible to crowd out private capital, and force it to occupy a subsidiary position. “Take a back seat!” we said to private capital “you have grown too fat on two-thirds of the trade — one-third will do for you”.

One of the most important enterprises in the country is the purchasing of grain. Whoever controls the grain market at the present time, controls everything. Private capital has begun to grab even this out of our hands. We have done a great deal to rectify this situation, and to ensure that the initial purchase of grain should be in the hands of the government and co-operative organs. It was in this sense that the Party congress, and before that, the Central Committee, decided to squeeze out private capital. This is certainly far from abolishing Nep. If we were to abolish freedom of trade entirely we should be removing the foundation from under Nep. But this cannot be done, because the peasants would be the first to oppose such a move. Our main task is to concentrate trade in the hands of the government organs and the co-operatives.

The Co-operatives must become Nuclei of Socialism.

Co-operation now becomes the main question. Co-operation must make a bloodless struggle to conquer the market. We have sufficient political power to crush private capital by decrees and orders alone. But in order that the co-operatives should gain control of the market by economic methods, their prices must be lowered, and we must organise real workers co-operatives. We have plenty of examples of how things should not be done. Here is what our comrades did in a certain city, an important centre. When the Central Committee decided to begin crowding out private capital, they not only crowded out private capital, but annihilated it utterly — and what was the result? They sent a comrade to us, who announces: “See what successes we have had! We have lowered prices by 45% in the co-operatives, and as a result all private firms have closed down, including even the very oldest firms which had carried on business for dozens of years before the war — we have destroyed them all. The co-operatives have won a great victory over private capital. “Yes, and what then?” It seems that the co-operatives were also ruined as a result. “We have lowered our prices 45%” they tell us. “Now we should like to receive a small subsidy of, say three or four millions.” This is an example of what should not be done. It is

no victory, if we artificially lower prices by 45%, and private stores close down as a result, for that means that we shall have to shut down ourselves, and beg for assistance. That is not the way to do things.

We must help the co-operatives to whatever extent possible in order to assist their normal, steady, and economic development, granting them small subsidies from the government in order to make it possible for them to lower their prices and crowd out private capital, not from all its strongholds, but from those where it has seized too much. We declare war on private capital not to extermination, but within certain limits. It is for this reason that the question of co-operatives now occupies such an important position in our deliberations. We have talked a great deal of co-operation in general. We must now proceed to a practical consideration of the problem. We can and must grant credit to the co-operatives on easy terms, we will give them our best workers, we will make it possible for them to cater for the masses. The co-operatives must understand the necessity of organizing the wide masses of consumers.

They must create a type of co-operative which will be a living cell of socialism.

Study the New Village!

The next question of great importance taken up by our Congress was that of the village. In my concluding words, in the name of the Central Committee at the Congress I pointed out that the question of the village had not been solved, but merely discussed. Recently pamphlets and monographs containing special information regarding particular villages and countries have begun to appear. In this respect we must go a step further. In my opinion it would be very useful if students during their vacation, especially if they are intelligent and well educated Communists, should utilise their spare time by carrying on investigations in the village or county where they may be, and writing them up. This may be done either by a student, an educated Red Soldier, or an intelligent worker Communist. We must build up our knowledge of the village brick by brick. We cannot depend merely on our official statistics, for statistics may lie. We must admit this frankly. And we cannot depend merely on scientists who are acquainted with the village only through books. At the present time an entirely new process is taking place in the village, and we will value as pure gold every detailed description, even though it may concern only one village or county, that is written by some dependable person, a Communist who will gloss nothing over, but write of things as they actually are. If you happen to be on vacation in a village, form a group of say five people, for the whole volost, collect all the information possible on illicit distilleries, on the class divisions in the villages, the number of poor and middle peasants, how the "kulaks" (rich peasants) are living, what forms of usury, what security is demanded by the money lenders, how much the taxes amount to, whether they are too heavy or not, the state of education, agriculture, forests and dozens of other questions with which the new village is concerned. What kind of teachers, doctors, assistant doctors, and agricultural specialists there are in this county? Such facts and detailed descriptions of the real life of the village are of the utmost necessity to us, and we can obtain them only with the help of the entire party apparatus. If a number of communist workers would carry on work of this kind we should obtain the most valuable material both for the Central Committee and for our general literature. Little by little we are beginning to gather material of this kind.

The village is becoming stratified. In years gone by Vladimir Ilyitch was wont to remark that the classes in the villages were tending to become more equalised, that the kulaks were being pushed out, and that the condition of the poorest peasants was improving.

Recently, especially in the last three years of Nep, a different phenomena is to be observed. Nep could not but have its reflection in the village. There the process of stratification has commenced, and the question arises as to how we are going to adjust it. The main decision made by the Congress in this connection was that we should strive to unite the poor and the best part of the middle peasantry in order, as far as possible, to oppose all the rest of the village to the kulaks.

Deeper into the Masses.

It seems to me, comrades, that the whole of the second part of the Congress, if we consider it closely, may be summed up in one formula: "Deeper into the masses!" Excepting the purely economic questions, all the other matters such as the questions of the village, of the youth, of the Lenin recruits, are

reducible to this formula. The Party, summing up the experience of the whole of the Union of Republics, has pointed out a whole series of channels through which the influence of communism should trickle down deeper into the masses. Through the Lenin recruits, through the factory correspondents, through village correspondents, through the cultural patronage organisations, through the Young Communist Leagues and the rural schools run by them, through the Young Pioneer organisations, through co-operation put on a new basis, through the increased influence of Communists among red soldiers and sailors, through the mutual aid committees, through the All Russian Union of Agricultural Labourers, through the teachers, of whom much was said at the Congress (a resolution was adopted to support the first federal convention of teachers) through the peasants' and workers' women delegates, and through the expansion of the central organs, — **get deeper into the masses.** The Central Committee of the Party has been enlarged, and new workers have been brought in. The Central Committee has been enlarged to 150 members of whom the majority will consist of working people, including a large number of workers from the bench and peasants from the plough. Through all these channels the Convention has endeavoured to get deeper and deeper into the masses. It was to this end that the Central Committee was enlarged, that workers from the bench were included in the Central Control Committee, that the new organization of Young Pioneers was formed, that the mutual aid committees were organized in the villages, that the call was made for Lenin recruits, that the mighty machinery of factory correspondents and village correspondents was set in motion. In a word, the Convention was tireless in seeking new ways for penetration into the masses, deeper than hitherto. I think that in this respect we have acted as we should, as Leninists, because one of the foundations of Leninism consists of the formula: "Deeper into the masses".

The second half of the Congress may be summed up in the following slogans: More attention to the metal industry, and new co-operation. These are the two fundamental slogans in the economic sphere. They are to be followed by the use of means, which the Party is preparing for arousing new elements among the town workers. Particular attention will have to be given to the villages, because they are backward.

We have every reason to say that besides the economic "shears", which have bothered us for a long time and which we have finally shut up for good or evil, we have also the cultural "shears" in the backwardness of the village. We have yet to tackle these cultural shears and close their blades at all costs. And in this respect we are rather badly situated.

We have carried out an investigation of the village, which has revealed a terrible state of affairs. The children of the poor do not go to school because their parents are poor, because they have no clothes, while peasant girls are kept out of schools, even if their parents have the means. The village teacher sits on the stove in winter, in a cold hut, dressed in rage, while instructing her pupils. The male teacher, instead of engaging as he should in anti-religious propaganda, is compelled by poverty to read psalms over the dead, because there is nothing to eat, because we do not pay him, owing to lack of funds. These cultural shears are one of our greatest calamities. The Party must close these scissors at all costs, the Party must get at the village, and I think that the decision adopted by the Thirteenth Congress will greatly assist this work.

Needless to say the question of internal party-democracy has been settled once and for all. The presence of the Lenin recruits makes it more necessary for us than ever to carry out our decisions on the subject of internal Party-democracy; otherwise we shall be unable to educate the new and tremendous influx of workers, and to raise the status of these splendid young forces in our Party. Internal party democracy remains in force. It has been fully endorsed by the Thirteenth Congress, and the Party has outlined a whole number of ways for the real carrying out of the principles of internal party-democracy.

The Thirteenth Congress as the Consolidation of Leninism.

These comrades, are the net results of the work of the second part of our Congress. Everybody could see clearly that the opposition was wrong. It had predicted an economic catastrophe, and the reply was the currency reform: it had predicted the doom of the Party, and the reply was the successful Leninist recruiting; it had advocated the necessity for larger concessions to foreign capital, and the reply was our recognition **de jure.**

The Congress has imbued all the local organizations with a sense of complete self-confidence. The Congress saw that the Party, in spite of the incomparably heavy blow dealt to us by the death of Lenin, is still firmly on its feet. Already last year, Lenin was ill, and unable to address the Party Congress. The Central Committee came before the Party for the first time without Lenin, and it was accorded a vote of confidence, although this was given in advance, on credit. This year the Party, after the discussions, after the attacks on the Central Committee has deliberately entrusted it with a management of affairs, has deliberately given it its confidence. And I am firmly convinced, that our new Central Committee, which includes more than a dozen new workers promoted from the ranks and intimately connected with the masses, will vindicate the confidence of our Party. (Cheers.) Always provided, of course, that the whole Party remains active, that it is watchful, that it bears in mind that there are yet struggles for Leninism ahead of us.

Leninism is not a simple thing that can be easily assimilated. An old working woman, speaking on behalf of the young Leninites, has expressed a very proper thought. She said that there are more Leninites than there are members of the Party, there are a great many Leninites outside the Party.

This is true, Outside the Party there are a great many

Leninites, but within the Party there are sometimes people who call themselves Leninites, but are Leninites only in a certain sense — in the sense that they have a reverence for the memory of Vladimir Ilyitch, which is shared by scores of millions of people. We need more, we want to see in our Party a 100% of real Leninites who are ready to fight for Leninism. In my concluding speech I said that our Congress will go down in the history of our Party as the Congress which has consolidated Leninism in all its aspects, which has brought about exceptional unity and solidarity. This I did not say as a mere piece of rhetoric, it is so indeed. And if there are any future attempts to dilute our Leninist Party, we as old soliders of the revolution, shall wage a battle of ideas against anyone attempting to disturb the foundations of Leninism. (Cheers.) And I think, comrades, that the Central Committee of the Party can count in this respect upon the Leningrad organization. (Cheers.) On a motion made by a whole number of delegations, the Congress has decided to hold its next meeting at Leningrad. (Cheers.) The resolution declares that the next Congress of the Party must take place in the first proletarian capital, in Leningrad. I believe, that it is the great joy and pride of the Leningrad workers and Communists to be not only the first proletarian capital of the revolution, but also the first city of Leninism. (Prolonged cheers.)

Resolution.

The town meeting of the Leningrad branches, having listened to the report by comrade Zinoviev on the Thirteenth Congress of our Party, unanimously welcomed all the decisions of the Party Congress. The Bolshevik firmness and steadfastness in defending the foundations of Leninism against the opposition with its petty-bourgeois deviations is the best guarantee of the unity and solidarity of the Party around its fundamental nucleus, the Central Committee.

This meeting feels assured that the new Central Committee, without comrade Lenin, will just as decisively and firmly safe-

guard the solidarity of the party as it did under comrade Lenin, and that it will pursue a consistently Bolshevik line of policy.

This meeting, on behalf of the Leningrad organization, one of the oldest Bolshevik organizations of the Party, declares that it will continue to combat the least manifestation of sectionalism, the least deviation from the unalterable principles of Leninism. The firmness and homogeneity of our Party will ensure the successes of the working class. Unbounded devotion to Leninism will speed the complete triumph of communism.

Long live the Russian Communist Party!
Long live communism!