THE SISSON DOCUMENTS

By

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THE SISSON DOCUMENTS

The so-called Sisson documents, which pretend to prove that the Russian Soviet leaders have been in the pay of the German Government, and that their actions were directed from Berlin, are not convincing. There is both external and internal evidence that they are mainly forgeries.

The facts are these. Some of the documents were in the hands of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Provisional Government early in the summer of 1917. On their authority Madame Kollontai, who is implicated in the series, was arrested as a German agent when she entered Russia. The case against her was dismissed. Minister of Justice Halpern used the documents as the basis for his case against the Bolshevik leaders arrested after the July, 1917, uprising, among whom were Trotzky, Kameniev, Kollontai and others; but M. Halpern himself became convinced that the documents were spurious, and let his prisoners go on nominal bail, or without bail at all.

The documents were submitted next to the French and British Governments, and there examined and rejected as too doubtful.

When Colonel Raymond Robbins was made chief of the American Red Cross Mission in Petrograd, the papers were brought to him, investigated very carefully, and again turned down. It was Colonel Robbins, I understand, who first brought the documents to the attention of Mr. Sisson as examples of the kind of forgeries it would be well to avoid.

The greater part of this material has been in the possession of our government for more than six months. If authentic, it would have justified military intervention in Russia long ago. But, even when intervention was decided
upon, the announcement of the United States Government did not hint that the Soviet leaders were German agents. On the contrary, it was “publicly and solemnly” proclaimed that we had no intention of interfering in the slightest degree in the internal affairs of Russia.

The actions of the Soviet Government themselves tend to throw doubt on these charges. We know that the Soviets appealed to the American Government for aid which would make it unnecessary to ratify the Brest-Litovsk peace. We know that Great Britain was asked to assist in saving the Black Sea fleet from the Germans. We know that France was appealed to for officers to reorganize the Red Army into an effective fighting force against Germany. America was invited to send technicians into the Commissariat which controlled the railroads. And at the time the documents allege that these Soviet leaders were planning to transport supplies from Archangel and Vladivostok into German hands, and to ship overland three German submarines to the Pacific, according to Major Thacher of the Red Cross, these same men were proposing “informally to give to America the exclusive right to purchase ore and other raw materials vitally needed by Germany in exchange for shipments of American goods to Russia. American co-operation in the reorganization of the whole process of commercial distribution has been asked by the Soviet Government.”

In an article in The Liberator for November I have further described the actions and attitude of the Soviet leaders.

As to internal evidence, the New York Evening Post and the New York Call have both pointed out very obvious grounds for suspicion.

The first two papers deal with the famous “order 7,433” of the German Imperial Bank. These documents were pub-
lished last spring in the *Petit Parisien*, a French "boulevard" newspaper, republished and categorically denied in the Petrograd press, and thoroughly discredited because, in the first place, they were dated March 2, 1917, while the Revolution did not occur until March 11, European calendar, or February 27, Russian calendar. The Russian Government had these papers, Colonel Robbins had these papers, the French and British Governments had them; they were found to be baseless. Moreover, the director of the Nya Bank in Stockholm not only denied their authenticity, but offered the Allied embassies every facility to investigate the books—an opportunity of which neither they nor Mr. Sisson availed themselves.

Document 1 is an alleged report to the Council of People's Commissars describing the removal of the German Imperial Bank order from the archives of the Russian Ministry of Justice, and the "auditing" of the books of the Nya Bank. The purpose of this was to destroy all evidence of the transaction between the German Government and the Soviet leaders. But in reporting the act, Messrs. Zalkind and Polivanov minutely describe what was in the documents destroyed.

In Document 2, Herr Bauer does the same thing, telling of the arrest of a certain person having in his possession the original of the Imperial Bank order, "with notations and stamps of the Petrograd-Secret Police (Okhrana)." But we know that the headquarters of the Okhrana were stormed by the mob on March 11, 1917, and a huge bonfire made of all the papers in the place. Moreover, the Imperial Bank circular is dated March 2, 1917, addressed to bankers in Sweden, and could not very well have reached Petrograd and passed through the Okhrana in nine days.
Document 5, a letter from the German General Staff to the Soviet Government, is dated "October, 1917," and Document 21, from the same source to the Council of People's Commissars, is dated "November 1, 1917." Now according to the German calendar, by which all known communications from the German General Staff are dated, the Bolshevik Revolution did not occur until November 6-7, and there was no such institution as the Council of People's Commissars or the Soviet Government in existence until November 8.

Document 7 is a letter from the German General Staff to the Commissary of Foreign Affairs, ordering the election of a large number of Bolsheviks to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets—the parliament of the Workers' and Peasants' Government. The Congress opened January 25, and the letter, in German, is dated January 12, which is January 25 in the Russian calendar—very remarkable, considering that the letter was sent from Berlin.

Most of the list of names given I can identify as Bolshevik or Left Socialist Revolutionaries. But there also appears the name of Martov, leader of the Menshevik-Internationalists, who was at that time bitterly against the Bolsheviks because of the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly.

Moreover, Mr. Sisson himself was present at the Congress as well as I, Colonel Robbins, and other Americans. He knows well that the number of Bolsheviks elected to the Central Executive Committee were in exact accordance with the voting strength of the Bolshevik party upon all questions. He also knows that an order of the German General Staff was not needed to reelect the triumphant leaders of the revolutionary parties, whose constituents in the Congress outnumbered all other parties four to one.
This document has the quality possessed by almost all the documents which are specific about the names of persons in situations historically recorded; it came into Mr. Sisson's hands after the event, and may very well have been written then.

But in the documents themselves there are mistakes. For instance, in Document I, Volodarsky is described as being in a "conference of People's Commissars"; but Volodarsky was not at that time a member of the People's Commissars. In Document 5, Muraviev is spoken of as one of those in the inner circle of the Military Revolutionary Committee; as a matter of fact, Muraviev, an ambitious officer of the old Russian army (not a Socialist), was in charge of the defense of Petrograd against Kerensky, but was never trusted by the Soviet leaders, and given no responsibility, and soon replaced. Joffe, spoken of as Chairman of the Military-Revolutionary Committee, had no connection with it. Document 20 asks to send to the disposal of the German Staff ten "reliable officers of the revolutionary army," and suggests Volodarsky—who was never connected with the "revolutionary army" in any way up to the time when I left Russia. Document 25, giving the names of German and Russian spies watching the Allied Embassies, mentions Tarasov as a watcher of the U. S. A. Embassy. By this is meant Tarasov-Radionov, who at one time was special commissar in charge of Peter-and-Paul Fortress. Tarasov-Radionov is also mentioned in Document 51, where he is called "Tarasov and Rodionov," as being a "Russo-German agent-informer" stationed at Tomsk, Siberia. The date of this document is January 23, at which time Tarasov-Radionov was a member of the Investigation Commission, and lived at the Hotel Astoria, in Petrograd. Choudnovsky, men-
tioned in Document 36 as being one of "the revolutionaries . . . under full direction of the Austro-Hungarian High Command," was one of the splendid, youthful idealists who stood out above the mass. Wounded time after time in a year of fighting against the Austrians in the Southwest, left for dead on the battle-field, he came to Petrograd as a delegate of the Fifth Army just before the Bolshevik revolution. He led the attack on the Winter Palace, was made Commissar of the Palace, and in the defense of Petrograd against Kerensky's Cossacks he was badly wounded again. He took part in the fighting against the Germans after Brest-Litovsk, and against the Ukrainians and Kalédine. He was assassinated on the streets of Moscow, I am informed. In Document 49, which is supposed to be a list of persons of Russian origin in the service of Germany, appear the names of Zhuk and Yarchuk. Both are anarchists from Cronstadt, friends of mine, and at the date of the document engaged in organizing the factories so that production should not cease. One lived for years in America.

So much for the personalities mentioned by the documents themselves. In a note to Document 54, Mr. Sisson says, "The material in this and all notes is independent and accurate." I shall now proceed to correct some of the information about individuals which is given in Mr. Sisson's notes.

In the note to Document 1 he speaks of the Council of People's Commissars as being dominated by Lenin, Trotsky and A. Joffe, the Russian Ambassador to Germany. But Joffe was never a People's Commissar. In Document 4 he speaks of Fuerstenberg as being, in "January, in Petrograd, at Smolney, trying to help Scheidemann in covering up old trails." It is not worth while here to emphasize the detes-
tation in which Scheidemann is held by the Bolsheviki, or to show the ridiculousness of Scheidemann's in any way assisting Bolshevik propaganda. As for Fuerstenberg, he was anxiously awaited by Smolney all through the month of January, but could not get across Finland. I saw him in Stockholm early in February.

"Cronstadt," says Mr. Sisson, "was the midsummer headquarters of Lenin." But everybody knows that Lenin's summer quarters were in the abandoned palace of a former ballet-dancer, mistress of the Tsar, just across the Troitsky Bridge. After he had gone into hiding, in July, he lived in the city, except for a trip to South Russia.

Mr. Sisson says that a German, Major Erich, took the Russian name of Egorov. I knew Egorov. There was no sign that he was a German; everybody knew him as a revolutionist of many years' activity.

In document 7 Mr. Sisson says that Martov was "the leader of the Mensheviks." Martov was leader of a small faction which opposed the great Menshevik party in many things; Dan, Lieber, Gotz, Tseretelli, Tcheidze and Avksentiev were leaders of the Mensheviks. Martov, says Mr. Sisson, "was supposed to have split with him (Trotsky) in Russia." No supposition about it; in Paris they belonged to the same party—in Russia, Trotsky went over to the Bolsheviki. Kameniev did not "go out of Russia with Kollontai"; he went out with Zalkind, as Russian ambassador to France. Kollontai left some weeks later.

These details may not seem important. All they prove is that Mr. Sisson was not very intimately acquainted with the doings of the Soviet leaders.

In document 4 Mr. Sisson notes that "Red Guards were paid from 12 to 16 rubles a day." Whatever may have hap-
pened after I left in February, before that time the wages of Red Guards were exactly what they had been receiving in their jobs; and if they were sent out of the city, their wives and families received free rent and a small allowance, about twenty rubles per month. Besides, at that time the ruble was equivalent to about eight cents. I wish it had been true! In No. 15 Mr. Sisson attempts to prove that the truth about "what Trotsky intended to do at Brest-Litovsk" was concealed by the Bolsheviks, but gotten out by some "daring and skilful Russians" who "found a means to get information from Brest-Litovsk." Of course they did—from the Germans. The anti-Bolshevik "revelations," published in Petrograd were, however, all false.

In documents 27 and 46 are references to Markin, who is described as "one of Trotsky's secretaries." Having myself worked in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs for more than two months, in which time I saw Markin every day, I am amused at the characterization. Markin is a common sailor, a fanatical Bolshevik, who can read and write with the most painful difficulty, if at all. Instead of being "one of Trotsky's secretaries," he was, in fact, a kind of super-janitor and watch-dog of the building, on the keen hunt for spies and traitors, and always having bitter disputes with the Doormen's Union. It is absurd to think of Markin's having anything to do with such important papers.

"Peters," notes Mr. Sisson, "is a Lettish sailor." Peters worked in an importing and exporting firm in London for years, and before that, he told me, in a factory.

In the note to document 30 Mr. Sisson says that Skripnik is the first secretary of the Government, personally reporting to Lenin. As a matter of fact, I defy anybody to find any decree published by the Council of People's Commissars
signed by Skripnik as "first secretary." The secretaries signing decrees were two—Gorbunov and Bonch-Bruevitch. Skripnik was general secretary of the All-Russian Council of Factory Shop Committees, intensely concerned with the organization of industry. Also after document 30 is a note to the effect that "Pskov was taken by the Germans (after Brest-Litovsk) without a fight." As a matter of fact the defense of Pskov was the only real fighting that the Bolsheviks and the German prisoners did against the Teutonic invaders.

Among other personalities mentioned in the documents are those of Dybenko, Commissar of the Navy; General Bonch-Bruevitch, one of the commanders of the Northern front; General Kaledine, the Cossack leader, and two Englishmen, Lockhart and Arthur Ransome.

Dybenko, who is described by Sisson as "a driving man and keen-witted," is mentioned in one of those extraordinarily explicit German documents as having been one of the Russian leaders who held a conference with members of the German General Staff at Cronstadt in July, 1917. This is the famous document addressed to the Council of People's Commissars and dated October, 1917. If that latter date is according to the Russian calendar, then the former must be also. But the Petrograd Soviet was in session, with Lenin and Trotsky present, all through the night of July 1-2, and until about midnight on July 2, when the first Bolshevik insurrection broke out. Lenin and Trotsky and Dybenko were in action until the morning of the sixth, when Trotsky and Dybenko were arrested, and Trotsky was kept in prison all through the month of July. Therefore the only day on which the meeting could have taken place was on the morn-
ing of July 1, and that is most improbable, because too much was going on in Petrograd.

Dybenko was a sailor, ranking as a boatswain. He became chief of the Navy in the Bolshevik Government. In spite of the warning of the other leaders, he insisted upon trusting in command several officers of the old regime, who professed to sympathize with the Bolsheviks. When the German advance began after Brest-Litovsk, these officers treacherously gave up the city of Narva and surrendered their vessels to the Germans. For this Dybenko was recalled from the Ministry and imprisoned.

Several documents mention General Bonch-Bruevitch as being watched by the Bolsheviks because he was suspected by the German General Staff of wishing “to defend Russia against Germany.” General Bonch-Bruevitch was in truth suspected of wanting to surrender to the Germans.

Mr. Sisson's note to document 50 naively attributes General Kaledine's suicide to German-Bolshevik-inspired betrayals. But as a matter of history, the reasons for the failure of the Kaledine movement and the suicide of the General are fully recorded. Bolshevik treatment of the reactionary Cossacks was extremely clever. In the Land Decree passed by the Council of People's Commissars, Cossack lands were exempt from confiscation. The Cossack masses under the command of Kaledine, Dutov and other great land-holders saw the Russian peasants taking the land away from their barins. After conducting a violent counter-revolutionary movement against the Bolsheviks for several months, the Cossacks, skilfully worked upon by agitators, began to ask questions. They sent a delegation to Smolney to ask Lenin why the great Cossack land-holdings had not been expropriated. He responded that it was up to the Cossacks to
take their own land. From that moment the Cossack masses began to drift away from Kaledine; they sent their representatives to the Soviet—they elected Soviets of their own. A committee of these Cossacks waited upon General Kaledine, and asked him if the Cossack landlords were going to divide their estates. Kaledine replied: "Only over my dead body." It was a prophetic remark.

As for the faithful Cossacks, attended by the thirty thousand old regime officers who gathered around the Cossack princes, they, who are described by Mr. Sisson as so anti-German, as soon as they found that the Allies were not going to help them get back their property, joined with the Germans, or the Tchecho-Slovaks, or any other counter-revolutionary force nearest to them, and followed Dutov, Krasnov and Semionov.

And at this point there enters a peculiar complication. In both documents 35 and 38 are statements that the "American mission" was financing the Kaledine movement. In January there was more than a suspicion of this in the minds of the Bolshevik leaders at Petrograd. Trotsky published at that time a series of documents—letters and telegrams between Ambassador Francis, the American Red Cross Mission in Roumania, and several shady characters implicated in counter-revolutionary activities, concerning the sending of a train of automobiles and supplies to Rostov-on-Don, then the headquarters of Kaledine, instead of to Roumania, where they were supposed to be going.

The documents were authentic. On their face they were much more incriminating than the Sisson documents are. Of course the American Embassy had no such underhanded plans, nor had the Red Cross Mission to Roumania. It all turned out to be a case of certain romantic young blades in
the Red Cross wanting to save the Roumanian royal family from the Bolsheviks; and certain Russian plotters taking advantage of their youth by telling them that there was a good automobile road from Rostov-on-Don, around the Caspian Sea, over Mt. Ararat into Mesopotamia, where they could join the British troops.

But still, the rumor was widespread. And the fact that a great American corporation doing business in the south of Russia did finance the Kaledine movement, and was caught at it by the Soviet Government, and fined heavily, only supported suspicions otherwise groundless.

The last document purports to be a conversation over the telephone wire between Chicherin at Petrograd and Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk. As far as the main part of the document is concerned, there is no reason to believe that it could not have been true. The last sentence, however, is not only out of character of the speakers, but absolutely out of character with the rest of the conversation. I quote the last two sentences:

“. . . He (Lockhart) said that our method of fighting militarism was the most effective. We listened to this and laughed up our sleeves.”

It is hardly probable that at this time (while the Brest-Litovsk negotiations were on) that Trotsky would have “laughed up his sleeve” at a method of warfare on which he had staked Russia and his whole soul, and the results of which were plainly evident from the angry protests of General Hoffmann every day against the “revolutionary propaganda being spread among our troops by the Russian soldiers.” Further results of this propaganda, in which I had an official part, are noted in a later article.

I consider this document as a deliberate attempt to slander
Mr. Lockhart and Arthur Ransome, the only two Englishmen in Russia who understood the situation, and who were trying, as the document shows, to persuade the Soviet Government to be moderate.

Of course this document is published in order to show that the Bolsheviki were trying to stir up revolution in England. They have, I believe, never denied that their object was world-wide social revolution. But while they tried to send one man, Petrov, to England, they sent hundreds into Germany and Austria.

I was present in the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs one January morning at 3 o'clock when news of the great German strikes arrived. Immediately all was hilarious excitement. Commissars were to be sent all over Europe immediately. Petrov was to go to England; Platten and a young student, whose name escapes me, to Germany; Zalkind to Italy, Lozovsky to France. Orders were given to distribute in the German trenches thousands of circulars which said, in substance:

"German Brothers!

"Go home and upset your own tyrants. We will protect your rear. Do not fear attack from us. We will help you, if you desire."

Examine document 4, both as a literary curiosity and as an example of the credulity of Mr. Sisson. In this the Intelligence Bureau of the German General Staff address the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, telling him that the "leaders of the socialist party now ruling in Russia" (i.e., the Bolsheviki, of whom the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Trotsky, was one of the leaders), were in correspondence with Scheidemann "regarding the destruction of traces of the
business relations of the party with the Imperial Government.” The cause of Scheidemann’s anxiety is given. It was “the demand of leading groups of German Socialists, who saw in said communications a danger to the cause of world socialism.” (!) Documents 10, 11; 28 and 54 deal with commercial questions, and there are some very curious points in them. In document 10, addressed to the Council of People’s Commissars, occurs the famous phrase, so often quoted, “You can destroy the Russian capitalists as far as you please, but it would by no means be possible to permit the destruction of Russian enterprises.” Any business man will realize that this is childish. And as for the preservation of Russian business property, for, I suppose, its ultimate acquisition by German capitalists, that is disposed of by the supplementary treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which permits the socialization of all business enterprises. Document 11 calls for the reestablishment of the shares of all private concerns of a certain sort; banishes English, French and American capital from certain fields in Russia for five years; puts in charge of the development of Russian natural resources a German-Russian commission, and regulates the private banking business according to the plans of the Deutsche Bank. Shares of private concerns in Russia have not been reestablished; American capital, anyway, has been invited to Russia by the Council of People’s Commissars; the development of Russian natural resources is in charge of the Council of Public Economy, which is described in a later article, and which does not include Germans; there are few, if any, private banks in Russia today. Document 28 asks for a list of ships in the Pacific, which can be formed into a powerful commercial fleet, really German but ostensibly Russian, to compete with
Japanese and American trade. It also mentions selling the Baltic battle fleet to the Germans. The fact is that by this date all ships in the Pacific had been handed over to the sailors' organizations, to run on their own account. Besides, the Japanese were at Vladivostok. And the Baltic fleet was not sold, even after Brest-Litovsk. Document 54 is remarkable chiefly because, emanating from the Austrian Kreditanstalt, it advises all German banks transacting business abroad to open "very close and absolutely secret relations with Finnish and American banks."

I could comment on these documents for many pages more, but there is neither the space nor the time.

Among the many spurious documents are a few which have a basis of fact, and even several which might be perfectly genuine. In the first category I place documents 14, 24, 25, 26, 27, 38, 40, 41, 42, and 50. For instance, document 14 purports to be a request from the German Intelligence Department to the Council of People's Commissars to stop allowing socialistic agitational literature to be circulated among the German troops. This was unnecessary because General Hoffmann was publicly and furiously demanding the same thing every day. Numbers 24 and 25 tell of the watch set upon the Allied Embassies, and hint at the reasons: because counter-revolutionists were visiting the Allied Embassies at that time, trying to get support for their various causes. But the allegation that German agents had anything to do in all this is pure fabrication, and ridiculous, because many of these counter-revolutionists were trying to do business with the Germans at the same time. Numbers 26 and 27 refer to the hold-up of the Italian Ambassador, which had no German angle to it at all, but was dictated by the suspicion that Allied diplomatic representatives leaving

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Russia were taking with them Russian counter-revolutionists and written counter-revolutionary proposals. Document 38, alleging that English officers and Finnish bourgeois organizations were in communication, and that there was some connection between General Kaledine and the American mission, sounds as if Zalkind might have written it—except for the address. Documents 40, 41 and 42 are chiefly valuable because at this time the counter-revolutionary Polish troops were giving a great deal of trouble, and had to be dealt with—but not because they were anti-German. Now the process of Bolshevizing troops was this: propaganda was spread among them, they began to be restless, to get contaminated, and then their officers clamped discipline hard down on them and set them to fighting with the nearest Bolsheviki, thus creating a hostile sentiment. This happened in the Roumanian army, the Polish troops, and, more lately, in the ranks of the Tchecho-Slovaks. Many Polish officers were pro-Ally; many were pro-German; but all were united against the Bolsheviki. The Polish regiments marched upon Minsk and occupied it; they were disorganized just as the Cossacks had been. But the "German" part of these reports is perfectly false. I have seen many real reports of action projected and taken against the Poles. Document 50 is supposed to be a communication from the German General Staff to Lenin about the Kaledine and Alexiev movement in the Don. There was such a movement at that time, and the Bolsheviki were against it, but that is all there is to the matter.

Documents which I should be inclined to believe authentic are numbers 27, 34, 48, and 52. Number 27 describes the search of the Italian Ambassador for "documents regarding relations with German diplomats." Number 34 tells of the
imminent signing of a separate peace with Germany by the Ukraine and Roumania. Number 48 describes how the counter-revolutionary Poles, Cossacks and French officers communicate with each other. Number 52 relates the method of enlisting agents, in the conventional Russian revolutionary way, to assassinate counter-revolutionists. This kind of thing is common, of course, to both sides.

The letters and circulars which remain, numbers 22, 55, 56, 59, and 60, are referred to in a letter by Mr. George Creel to a friend in this city:

"These documents are issued with the full approval of the Government after a very careful investigation by the Government, and the Government stands squarely behind their authenticity. Aside from the circulars that declared Germany's war-plans prior to August, 1914, which might easily have been forged, every other document carries proof on its face, for no human being could have 'faked' so enormous a mass of matter, dovetailing at every point, cluttered up at every point by a mass of inconsequential detail, and borne out at every point by things that have happened since. . . ."

All in all the documents prove nothing except that Mr. Sisson believed in what more experienced men pronounced to be unworthy of credence.

The best comment possible upon the whole series is a sentence in unknown handwriting on the back of document 19, "signed illegibly," as Mr. Sisson Says. It is, "an accusation of silly accusation for personal benefit."

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NOTE—In this article I have adopted the spelling of the documents themselves.
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