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## THE U. S. S. R. AND THE ANGLO-SOVIET-AMERICAN FIGHTING ALLIANCE

JOSEPH STALIN

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# THE COMMUNIST

A MAGAZINE OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MARXISM-LENINISM

EDITOR: EARL BROWDER



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# THE U.S.S.R. AND THE ANGLO-SOVIET-AMERICAN FIGHTING ALLIANCE

BY JOSEPH STALIN

ADDRESS BEFORE THE MOSCOW SOVIET OF WORKING PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES, ON NOVEMBER 6, 1942, ON THE OCCASION OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION.

**C**OMRADES: We are today celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the victory of the Soviet Revolution in our country. Twenty-five years have elapsed since the Soviet system was established in our country. We are now on the threshold of the next, the twenty-sixth, year of the existence of the Soviet system.

At meetings in celebration of anniversaries of the October Soviet Revolution it is customary to pass in review the results of the work of government and party organs for the past year. It is on these results for the past year—from November of last year to November of the current year—that I have been authorized to make this report to you. The activities of our government and party organs during the past period have proceeded in two directions: In the direction of peaceful construction and the organization of a strong rear for our front, on the one hand, and in the direction of carrying out defensive and offensive operations of the Red Army on the other.

## *I. Organizational Work in the Rear*

The peaceful, constructive work of our directing organs in this period consisted in shifting the base of our industry, both war and civilian, to the Eastern regions of our country, in the evacuation and establishment in their new places of industrial workers and the equipment of plants, in extending crop areas and increasing the winter crop area in the East, and lastly, in the radical improvement of the work of our industries producing for the front, and in strengthening labor discipline in the rear, both in the factories and in collective and state farms.

It should be said that this was a most difficult and complex work of organization on a large scale, on the part of all our economic and administrative people's commissariats, including our railways. However, we managed to overcome the difficulties. And now our factories, collective farms and state farms are indisputably, in spite of all difficulties of wartime, working satisfactorily.

Our munitions factories and allied enterprises are conscientiously and punctually supplying the Red Army with guns, trench mortars, aircraft, tanks, machine-guns, rifles and ammunition. Our collective farms and state farms are likewise conscientiously and punctually supplying the population and Red Army with foodstuffs, and our industry with raw materials.

It must be admitted that never before has our country had such a strong and well-organized rear. As a result of all this complex organization and constructive effort not only our country but also the people in the rear have themselves been transformed. They have become more efficient, less slipshod, more disciplined, they have learned to work in wartime fashion and have come to realize their duty to the Motherland and her defenders at the front—to the Red Army. Bunglers and slackers with no sense of civic duty are growing fewer and fewer in the rear. Organized and disciplined people, imbued with a sense of civic duty, are becoming more and more numerous.

But, as I have said, the past year was not only one of peaceful construction. It was at the same time a year of patriotic war against the German invaders who vilely and treacherously attacked our peaceful country.

## *II. Hostilities on the Soviet-German Front*

As regards the military activities of our directing organs in the past year, they consisted in providing for offensive and defensive operations

of the Red Army against the German-fascist troops.

Hostilities on the Soviet-German Front in the past year may be divided into two periods: The first period was chiefly the winter period, when the Red Army, having beaten off the Germans' attack on Moscow, took the initiative into its own hands, passed to the offensive, drove back the German fascist troops, and in the space of four months advanced in places over 400 kilometers; and the second period, the summer period, when the German fascist troops, taking advantage of the absence of a second front in Europe, mustered all their available reserves, pierced the front in the southwestern direction and, taking the initiative into their own hands, in the space of five months advanced in places as much as 500 kilometers.

The hostilities in the first period, especially the successful operations of the Red Army in the Rostov, Tula and Kaluga areas, at Moscow and at Tikhvin and Leningrad, disclosed two significant facts. They showed, firstly, that the Red Army and its combatant cadres have grown to become an effective force capable not only of withstanding the onslaught of the German-fascist troops, but also of defeating them in open battle and driving them back.

They showed, secondly, that with all their staunchness, the German fascist troops have serious organic defects which, given certain favorable conditions for the Red Army, may lead to the defeat of the German troops.

It cannot be regarded as mere chance that the German troops,

having marched in triumph through all Europe and having smashed the French troops, which had been considered a first-class army, met with effective military rebuff only in our country, and not only met with rebuff but were compelled under the blows of the Red Army to retreat more than 400 kilometers from positions they had occupied, abandoning on their road of retreat an immense quantity of guns, machines and ammunition. This fact cannot be explained by winter conditions of warfare alone.

The second period of hostilities on the Soviet-German Front was marked by a turn in favor of the Germans, by the passing of the initiative into the hands of the Germans, by the piercing of our front in the southwestern direction, by the advance of German troops and their reaching the areas of Voronezh, Stalingrad, Novorossiysk, Pyatigorsk and Mozdok.

Taking advantage of the absence of a second front in Europe, the Germans and their allies hurled all their available reserves to the front, and, massing them in one direction, created a great superiority.

Apparently the Germans are already not strong enough to conduct an offensive simultaneously in all three directions, in the south, north and center, as was the case in the early months of the German offensive in the summer of last year, but they are still strong enough to organize a serious offensive in some one direction.

What was the principal objective pursued by the German fascist strategists when they started their

summer offensive on our front?

To judge by the comments of the foreign press, including the German, one might think that the principal objective of the offensive was to capture the oil districts of Grozny and Baku. But the facts decidedly refute this assumption.

The facts show that the German advance toward the oil districts of the U.S.S.R. is not their principal objective but an auxiliary one.

What, then, was the principal objective of the German offensive?

It was to outflank Moscow from the east, to cut it off from the Volga and our rear in the Urals, and then to strike at Moscow.

The advance of the Germans southward toward the oil districts had an auxiliary purpose, which was not only, and not so much, to capture the oil districts as to divert our main reserves to the south and to weaken the Moscow front, so as to make it easier to achieve success when striking at Moscow.

That, in fact, explains why the main group of German troops is now to be found not in the south but in the Orel and Stalingrad areas.

Recently a German officer of the German General Staff fell into the hands of our men. A map was found on the officer showing the plans and schedule of the German advance.

From this document it transpires that the Germans intended to be in Borisoglybsk on July 10, 1942, in Stalingrad on July 25, in Saratov on August 10, in Kuibyshev on August 15, in Arzamas on September 10, and in Baku on September 25.

This document completely confirms our information to the effect

that the principal aim of the German summer offensive was to outflank Moscow from the east, to strike at Moscow, while the purpose of the advance to the south was, apart from everything else, to divert our reserves as far as possible from Moscow and to weaken the Moscow front so as to make it easier to strike at Moscow.

In short, the principal objective of the German summer offensive was to surround Moscow and end the war this year.

In November of last year the Germans reckoned on capturing Moscow by striking a frontal blow, compelling the Red Army to capitulate and thus achieve the termination of the war in the east. They fed their soldiers with these illusions.

But these calculations of the Germans, as we know, miscarried.

Having burned their fingers last year in attempting a frontal blow at Moscow, the Germans conceived the intention of capturing Moscow this year, this time by an outflanking movement, and thus ending the war in the east. It is with these illusions that they are now feeding their duped soldiers.

As we know, these calculations of the Germans also miscarried.

As a result of hunting after two hares—after oil and after the encirclement of Moscow—the German fascist strategists have landed in a difficult situation.

Thus the tactical objectives of the German summer offensive were not consummated, owing to the obvious unfeasibility of their strategical plans.

### *III. The Question of the Second Front in Europe*

How are we to explain the fact that the Germans this year were still able to take the initiative of operations into their hands and achieve substantial tactical successes on our front? It is to be explained by the fact that the Germans and their allies succeeded in mustering all their available reserves, hurling them onto the eastern front and creating a big superiority of forces in one of the directions.

There can be no doubt that, but for these measures, the Germans could not have achieved any success on our front.

But why were they able to muster all their reserves and hurl them onto the eastern front? Because the absence of the second front in Europe enabled them to carry out this operation without any risk to themselves. Hence, the chief reason for the tactical successes of the Germans on our front this year is that the absence of the second front in Europe enabled them to hurl onto our front all their available reserves and to create a big superiority of forces in the southwestern direction.

Let us assume that a second front existed in Europe as it existed in the first World War, and that the second front diverted, let us say, sixty German divisions and twenty divisions of Germany's allies.

What would have been the position of the German troops on our front then? It is not difficult to guess that their position would be deplorable. More, it would have been the beginning of the end of the German

fascist troops; for in that case the Red Army would not be where it is now but somewhere near Pskov, Minsk, Zhitomir and Odessa. That means that already in the summer of this year, the German fascist army would have been on the verge of disaster, and if that has not occurred, it is because the Germans were saved by the absence of a second front in Europe.

Let us examine the question of a second front in Europe in its historical aspect.

In the first World War Germany had to fight on two fronts, in the west chiefly against Great Britain and France, and in the east against the Russian troops.

Thus, in the first World War there existed a second front against Germany. Of 220 divisions which Germany then had, not more than 85 German divisions were stationed on the Russian front. If to this we add the troops of Germany's allies then facing the Russian front, namely 37 Austro-Hungarian divisions, two Bulgarian divisions, and three Turkish divisions, we get a total of 127 divisions facing the Russian troops.

The rest of the divisions of Germany and her allies chiefly held the front against the Anglo-French troops while part of them performed garrison service in the occupied territories of Europe.

Such was the position in the first World War.

What is the position now, in the second World War, in September of this year, let us say?

According to authenticated information which is beyond all doubt, of the 256 divisions which

Germany now has, not less than 179 German divisions are on our front.

If to this we add twenty-two Rumanian divisions, fourteen Finnish divisions, ten Italian divisions, thirteen Hungarian divisions, one Slovak division and one Spanish division, we get a total of 240 divisions which are now fighting on our front.

The remaining divisions of Germany and her allies are performing garrison service in the occupied countries (France, Belgium, Norway, Holland, Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc.) while part of them are fighting in Lybia for Egypt against Great Britain, the Lybian front diverting in all four German divisions and eleven Italian divisions.

Hence, instead of 127 divisions in the first World War, we are now facing on our front no less than 240 divisions, and instead of 85 German divisions we now have 179 German divisions fighting the Red Army.

There you have the chief reason and foundation for the tactical successes of the German fascist troops on our front in the summer of this year.

The German invasion of our country is often compared to Napoleon's invasion of Russia. But this comparison will not bear criticism. Of the 600,000 troops which began the campaign against Russia, Napoleon scarcely brought 130,000 or 140,000 troops as far as Borodino. That was all he had at his disposal at Moscow. Well, we now have over 3,000,000 troops facing the front of the Red Army and armed with all

the implements of modern warfare. What comparison can there be here?

The German invasion of our country is also sometimes compared to the German invasion of Russia at the time of the first World War.

But neither will this comparison bear criticism. First, in the first World War there was a second front in Europe which rendered the Germans' position very difficult, whereas in this war there is no second front in Europe.

Secondly, in this war twice as many troops are facing our front as in the first World War.

Obviously, the comparison is not appropriate.

You can now conceive how serious and extraordinary are the difficulties confronting the Red Army and how great is the heroism displayed by the Red Army in its war of liberation against the German fascist invaders.

I think that no other country and no other army could have withstood such an onslaught of the bestial bands of German fascist brigands and their allies.

Only our Soviet country and only our Red Army are capable of withstanding such an onslaught—and not only withstanding it but also overpowering it.

It is often asked: But will there be a second front in Europe after all? Yes, there will be; sooner or later, there will be one.

And it will be not only because we need it, but, and above all, because our allies need it no less than we do.

Our allies cannot fail to realize that since France has been put out

of action, the absence of a second front against fascist Germany may end badly for all freedom-loving countries, including the allies themselves.

#### *IV. The Fighting Alliance of the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the United States Against Hitler-Germany and Her Allies in Europe*

It may now be considered indisputable that in the course of the war imposed upon the nations by Hitlerite-Germany, a radical demarcation of forces and the formation of two opposite camps have taken place, the camp of the Italo-German coalition, and the camp of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. It is equally indisputable that these two opposite coalitions are guided by two different and opposite programs of action.

The program of action of the Italo-German coalition may be described by the following points: racial hatred, domination by the "chosen" nations, subjugation of other nations and seizure of their territories, economic enslavement of the subjugated nations and the spoliation of their national wealth, destruction of democratic liberties, and the institution of the Hitlerite regime everywhere.

The program of action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition is: abolition of racial exclusiveness, equality of nations and the integrity of their territories, liberation of enslaved nations and the restoration of their sovereign rights; the right of every nation to arrange its affairs

as it wishes, economic aid to nations that have suffered and assistance to them in attaining their material welfare, restoration of democratic liberties, destruction of the Hitlerite regime.

The effect of the program of action of the Italo-German coalition has been that all the occupied countries of Europe—Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Holland, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece and the occupied regions of the U.S.S.R.—are burning with hatred for the Italo-German tyrants, are causing all the damage they can to the Germans and their allies, and are waiting for a favorable opportunity to take revenge on their conquerors for the humiliations and violence they are suffering.

In this connection, one of the characteristic features of the present moment is the progressively growing isolation of the Italo-German coalition and the depletion of its moral and political reserves in Europe, its growing weakness and disintegration.

The effect of the program of action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition has been that all the occupied countries in Europe are full of sympathy for the members of this coalition and are prepared to render them all the help of which they are capable.

In this connection, another characteristic feature of the present moment is that the moral and political reserves of this coalition are growing from day to day in Europe—and not only in Europe—and that this coalition is progressively winning millions of sympathizers

ready to join it in fighting against Hitler's tyranny.

If the relative strength of these two coalitions is examined from the standpoint of human and material resources, one cannot help reaching the conclusion that the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition has an indisputable advantage. But the question is: Is this advantage alone sufficient for victory?

There are occasions, as we know, when resources are abundant but are expended so incompetently that the advantage is nullified. Obviously, what is needed in addition to the resources is the capacity to mobilize these resources and the ability to expend them properly.

Is there any reason for doubting the existence of such ability and such capacity on the part of the men of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition?

There are people who doubt this. But what grounds have they for their doubts?

There was a time when the men of this coalition displayed their ability and capacity to mobilize the resources of their countries and to expend them properly for the purpose of economic, cultural and political development.

One asks: What grounds are there for doubting that the men who have displayed capacity and ability in mobilizing and distributing resources for economic, cultural and political purposes will prove incapable of doing the same things for the purposes of war?

I think there are no such grounds.

It is said that the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition has every chance

of winning and would certainly win if it did not have one organic defect which is capable of weakening and disintegrating it.

This defect, in the opinion of these people, is that this coalition consists of heterogeneous elements with different ideologies and that this circumstance will prevent their organizing joint action against the common enemy.

I think that this assertion is wrong. It would be ridiculous to deny the difference in ideologies and social systems of the countries composing the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. But does this preclude the possibility and expediency of joint action on the part of the members of this coalition against the common enemy who holds out the threat of enslavement for them? It certainly does not.

More than that, the existence of this threat imperatively imposes the necessity of joint action upon members of the coalition in order to save mankind from reversion to savagery and medieval brutality.

Is not the program of action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition a sufficient basis for the organization of joint struggle against the Hitlerite tyranny and for the achievement of victory over it? I think that it is quite sufficient.

The assumption of these people is also wrong because of the fact that it is completely refuted by the events of the past year. And, indeed, if these people were right we should be observing a progressive mutual alienation of members of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition.

Yet, far from observing this, we

have facts and events pointing to a progressive rapprochement between members of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition and their uniting into a single fighting alliance.

The events of the past year supply direct proof of this.

In July, 1941, several weeks after Germany attacked the U.S.S.R., Great Britain concluded with us an agreement "for joint action in the war against Germany." At that time we had not yet any agreement with the United States of America on this subject. Ten months later, on May 26, 1942, during Comrade Molotov's visit to Great Britain, the latter concluded with us the "Treaty of Alliance in the War Against Hitlerite Germany and her Associates in Europe and on Collaboration and Mutual Aid Thereafter." This treaty was concluded for a period of twenty years. It marks a historic turning point in the relations between our country and Great Britain.

In June, 1942, during Comrade Molotov's visit to the U.S.A., the United States of America concluded with us an "Agreement, in Principle, Applying to Mutual Aid in the Conduct of the War Against Aggression," the agreement representing a substantial advance in the relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.

Lastly, one should mention so important a fact as the visit to Moscow of the British Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, which established complete mutual understanding between the leaders of the two countries.

There can be no doubt that all these facts point to a progressive rapprochement between the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the

United States of America and to their uniting in a fighting alliance against the Italo-German coalition.

It follows that the logic of things is stronger than any other logic. There can be only one conclusion, namely, that the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition has every chance of vanquishing the Italo-German coalition and certainly will vanquish it.

### V. Our Tasks

The war has torn off all veils and laid bare all relationships. The situation has become so clear that nothing is easier than to define our tasks in this war.

In an interview with the Turkish General Erkilet, published in the Turkish newspaper *Cumhuriyet*, the cannibal Hitler said: "We shall destroy Russia so that she will never be able to rise again."

That would appear clear although rather silly.

It is not our aim to destroy Germany, for it is impossible to destroy Germany, just as it is impossible to destroy Russia.

But the Hitlerite state can and should be destroyed. And our first task in fact is to destroy the Hitlerite state and its inspirers.

In the same interview with the same General, that cannibal Hitler went on to say: "We shall continue war until Russia ceases to have an organized military force."

That would appear clear although illiterate.

It is not our aim to destroy all the organized military force in Germany, for every literate person will under-

stand that that is not only impossible in regard to Germany, as it is in regard to Russia, but also inadvisable from the point of view of victory.

But Hitler's army can and should be destroyed. Our second task is in fact to destroy Hitler's army and its leaders.

The Hitlerite scoundrels have made it a rule to torture the Soviet war prisoners, to slay them by the hundreds and to condemn thousands of them to death by starvation. They outrage and slaughter the civilian population of the occupied territories of our country, men and women, children and old folk, our brothers and sisters. They have made it their aim to enslave or exterminate the population of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Baltic Republics, Moldavia, the Crimea and the Caucasus. Only villians and scoundrels bereft of all honor and fallen to the state of beasts can permit themselves such outrages toward innocent, unarmed peoples.

But that is not all. They have covered Europe with gallows and concentration camps; they have introduced a vile "system of hostages." They shoot and hang absolutely innocent citizens taken as "hostages" because some German beast was prevented from violating women or robbing citizens.

They have converted Europe into a prison of nations. And this they call the "new order in Europe." We know who are the men guilty of these outrages, the builders of the "new order in Europe," all those newly-baked governor-generals or just ordinary governors, comman-

dants and sub-commandants. Their names are known to tens of thousands of tormented people. Let these butchers know that they will not escape the responsibility for their crimes or elude the avenging hand of the tormented nations.

Our third task is to destroy the hated "new order in Europe" and to punish its builders.

Such are our tasks.

Comrades, we are waging a great war of liberation. We are not waging it alone but in conjunction with our allies. It will end in our victory over the vile foes of mankind, over the German fascist im-

perialists. On its standard is inscribed:

*Hail the victory of the Anglo-Soviet-American fighting alliance!*

*Hail the liberation of the nations of Europe from Hitler's tyranny!*

*Hail the liberty and independence of our glorious Soviet motherland!*

*Execration and death to the German fascist invaders, to their state, their army, their "new order in Europe"!*

*Glory to our Red Army!*

*Glory to our Navy!*

*Glory to our men and women guerrillas!*

ORDER OF THE DAY TO THE RED ARMY AND THE SOVIET PEOPLE, ON THE OCCASION OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION, NOVEMBER 7, 1942

**C**OMRADES, men of the Red Army, commanders and political workers, men and women guerrillas! Working people of the Soviet Union! I greet you on behalf of the Soviet Government and our Bolshevik Party and congratulate you on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the victory of the great October Socialist Revolution.

A quarter of a century ago the workers and peasants under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party and the great Lenin established the power of the Soviets in our country. During this period the peoples of the Soviet Union have traversed a glorious path. In twenty-five years our country has become a mighty socialist, industrial and collective farm power.

Having won freedom and inde-

pendence, the peoples of the Soviet State are united in inviolable fraternal friendship. The Soviet people freed themselves from all oppression and by persistent labor secured for themselves a prosperous and cultured life.

The present twenty-fifth anniversary of the great October Socialist Revolution finds the peoples of our country at the height of the severe battle against the German fascist invaders and their associates in Europe. At the beginning of this year, during the winter period, the Red Army inflicted serious blows upon the German fascist troops. Having beaten off the Germans' attack on Moscow, it took the initiative into its own hands, passed to the offensive and drove the German troops back to the west, delivering

a number of regions of our country from German slavery.

The Red Army has thus shown that, given certain favorable conditions, it can overcome the German fascist troops.

During the summer, however, the situation on the front changed for the worse. Taking advantage of the absence of a second front in Europe, the Germans and their allies swept clear all of their available reserves, hurled them upon our Ukrainian front and pierced it. At the cost of tremendous losses, the German fascist troops succeeded in advancing in the south and imperiling Stalingrad, the Black Sea coast, the Grozny approaches to the Transcaucasus.

True, the fortitude and courage of the Red Army upset the German plans of outflanking Moscow from the east and striking a blow at the capital of our country from the rear. The enemy was checked at Stalingrad. But, although checked at Stalingrad, where he has already lost tens of thousands of his soldiers and officers, the enemy continues to throw new divisions into the battle, straining his last efforts.

The fighting on the Soviet-German front is becoming ever more tense. On the outcome of this struggle depends the fate of the Soviet State, the freedom and independence of our Motherland. Our Soviet people have stood with honor the trials which have fallen to their lot, and are filled with an unwavering faith in victory.

The war has been a severe test of the strength and stability of the Soviet system. The calculations of

the German imperialists on the disintegration of the Soviet State have completely failed. Socialist industry, the collective farm system, the friendship of the people of our country and the Soviet State have shown their strength and invincibility. The workers and peasants and the whole intelligentsia of our country, the whole of our rear, are conscientiously and selflessly working to satisfy the needs of our front.

The Red Army is bearing the full brunt of the war against Hitler-Germany and her associates. By its selfless struggle against the fascist armies, it has won the love and esteem of all the freedom-loving peoples of the world. The men and commanders of the Red Army, who formerly lacked adequate military experience, learned to beat the enemy for a certainty, to destroy his manpower and equipment, to frustrate the enemy designs and firmly to defend our cities and villages against the foreign enslavers.

The heroic defenders of Moscow and Tula, Odessa and Sevastopol, Leningrad and Stalingrad have shown examples of supreme courage, iron discipline and fortitude and the ability to win victory. The example of these heroes is being emulated by the whole of our Red Army. The enemy has already felt on his own skin the capacity of the Red Army's resistance. He will yet feel the strength of the crushing blows of the Red Army.

There can be no doubt that the German invaders will yet embark upon new adventures. However, the enemy's strength is already undermined and has reached its limit.

During the war the Red Army has put out of commission over 8,000,000 enemy soldiers and officers. Today the Hitler army is adulterated by Rumanians, Hungarians, Italians and Finns and has become far weaker than in the summer and autumn of 1941.

Comrades, Red Army men, commanders, political workers, men and women guerrillas! It rests on your persistence and fortitude, on your military skill and readiness to fulfill your duty before your country, to rout the German fascist army and to clear the Soviet land of the Hitler invaders! *We can and must clear our Soviet land of this Hitler scum.* To this end it is necessary, first, staunchly and stubbornly to defend our front line, to prevent the enemy from advancing any farther, to do the utmost to wear down the enemy, to exterminate his manpower and to destroy his equipment. Secondly, to strengthen in every way the iron discipline, the strictest order and the principle of single authority in

our army, to perfect the training of troops and to prepare stubbornly and persistently to strike a crushing blow at the enemy. Thirdly, to fan the flames of the people's guerrilla movement in the enemy rear, to wreck the enemy rear, to exterminate the German fascist scoundrels.

Comrades! The enemy has already felt the strength of the Red Army's blows at Rostov, Moscow, Tikhvin. The day is not far off when the enemy will learn the strength of new blows of the Red Army. Our sun will yet shine!

*Long live the twenty-fifth anniversary of the great October Socialist Revolution!*

*Long live our Red Army!*

*Long live our Navy!*

*Long live our glorious men and women guerrillas!*

*Death to the German fascist invaders!*

JOSEPH STALIN,  
People's Commissar  
of Defense

LETTER OF PREMIER STALIN TO ASSOCIATED PRESS REPRESENTATIVE HENRY C. CASSIDY, NOVEMBER 14, 1942

**D**EAR MR. CASSIDY: I am answering your questions which reached me on November 12.

First, "What is the Soviet view of the Allied campaign in Africa?"

The Soviet view of this campaign is that it represents an outstanding fact of major importance, demonstrating the growing might of the armed forces of the Allies and opening the prospect of the disintegration of the Italo-German coalition

in the nearest future. The campaign in Africa refutes once more the skeptics who affirm that the Anglo-American leaders are not capable of organizing a serious war campaign. There can be no doubt that no one but first-rate organizers could carry out such serious war operations as the successful landings in North Africa across the ocean, as the quick occupation of harbors and wide territories from Casablanca to Bougie,

and as the smashing of the Italo-German armies in the Western desert which is being effected with such mastery.

Second, "How effective has this campaign been in relieving pressure on the Soviet Union and what further aid does the Soviet Union await?"

Answer: It is yet too soon to say to what extent this campaign has been effective in relieving immediate pressure on the Soviet Union. But it may be confidently said that the effect will not be a small one and that a certain relief in pressure on the Soviet Union will result in the nearest future.

But that is not the only thing that matters. What matters first of all is that since the campaign in Africa means that the initiative has passed into the hands of our Allies the campaign changes radically the political and war situation in Europe in favor of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition, that that campaign undermines the prestige of Hitlerite

Germany as a leading force in the system of the Axis powers and demoralizes Hitler's allies in Europe, that the campaign released France from her state of lethargy, mobilizes the anti-Hitler forces of France, and provides a basis for building up an anti-Hitler French army. That campaign creates the conditions for putting Italy out of commission and for isolating Hitlerite Germany. Finally that campaign creates the prerequisites for the establishment of a second front in Europe nearer to Germany's vital centers, which will be of decisive importance for organizing the victory over Hitlerite tyranny.

Third, "What possibility is there of Soviet offensive power in the east joining the Allies in the west to hasten the final victory?"

Answer: There need be no doubt that the Red Army will fulfill its task with honor as it has been fulfilling it throughout the war.

With respect,

(Signed) J. STALIN

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# ONE YEAR SINCE PEARL HARBOR \*

BY EARL BROWDER

**WE** ARE approaching the anniversary of Pearl Harbor. Our country has been fully in the war for almost a year. At last we have taken the initiative with the blow in Africa. It is a convenient time for stock-taking, for adding up our accounts, to see where we stand.

In the Pacific, after many catastrophes, we have established a line of defense which holds over months, and have even given a sample of magnificent counter-offensive action in the Solomons. The total military score for the year, however, remains a staggering loss. We have but a relative handful of land forces in contact with the enemy, and naval action remains essentially in the phase of defense and protection of communication routes.

On the main front, Western Europe, we have as yet engaged the enemy only in the air, and in naval safeguarding of the sea routes. We have now secured French Africa from the Axis. In the course of the first year of war, however, we have not yet been able to establish that Western European front which is the key to the whole war, the obviously

essential measure for victory. The great significance of our move into Africa is that it obviously prepares the Second Front—perhaps very soon.

Our first year of active war, in short, has been a year of improvised defense, and of *preparations for war*. Now we move toward offensive war.

One great achievement alone stands out in this first year, a political and diplomatic achievement which laid a firm foundation for victory—the cementing of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition and the formation on that basis of the United Nations.

It is clear that our country entered the war appallingly unprepared. It is further clear that we are not yet more than partially mobilized for the war.

Our lack of preparation was only incidentally a lack of the materiel of war. It was first of all moral and political unpreparedness. Our national mind, heart, and character were unprepared and ill-prepared for this Armageddon which decides the future of all mankind.

Let us remind ourselves, for a moment, how ill-prepared was our

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\*Address delivered in Detroit, November 12, 1942.

national mind. We did not, as a nation, know the most important facts about the dangerous world in which we lived. We did not even know the most simple facts of the relative strength of the various governments of the world. We did not even know that we were ignorant. We thought we knew, but our opinion was illusion compounded of misinformation, prejudice, and wishful thinking. It collapsed into dust at the first blows of war. We found ourselves in war-to-the-death in a world hitherto completely hidden from our eyes by clouds of illusion. We had to begin, painfully and step by step, to reconstruct completely our understanding of the world.

We had thought of France, in alliance with Britain, as the preponderant military power of Europe. But France, rotten with treason at the head of the state, collapsed even more swiftly and miserably than had semi-feudal Poland; the British army was driven from the continent without its arms. Hitler conquered all Europe west of the Soviet Union at lightning speed and nominal cost. Our "experts" had misled us. The true relation of forces was the opposite of our opinion.

We had been taught to consider the Soviet Union a weak and minor power in the European constellation. When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, even after our Government and Britain had taken their stand in her support, our "experts" told us he would conquer that country in a few weeks or months at most. But the Soviet Union has alone held

up the full military power of Hitlerized Europe for almost seventeen months now, has killed or incapacitated 3,000,000 of Hitler's murderous hordes, and has presented us and our Allies with the possibility of victory. Once again our "experts'" opinions were proved wrong, but this time we can be happy that they were wrong.

We had been taught to sneer at Japan as a military power, and to look upon the British-Dutch Empire as our stronghold in the Pacific. But after Pearl Harbor, Midway, the Philippines, we were astounded to witness a few hundred thousand Japanese soldiers sweep that centuries-old structure away in a few weeks and occupy the whole South Pacific from India to the gates of Australia. Once more our "experts'" opinions turned out to be but silly illusions, disastrously silly.

More disastrous, however, even than these illusions about relative power, was our confusion as to who were our enemies and who our friends. We Americans as a nation helped Hitler's puppet, Franco, destroy the Spanish Republic, the same Franco whose network of spies, the Falange, works freely for Hitler throughout the United States and Latin America. We supported the traitors at the head of France, and continued to do business with them until last Saturday; we went delirious in our glorification of Hitler's ally, Baron Mannerheim of "poor little Finland," and give his agents the freedom of Washington even to this moment; and we took this course because, as a nation, we had swallowed entire the gigantic

Hitler lie that the Soviet Union was our enemy. We had been morally "prepared" for war against the Soviet Union, but we had been systematically "unprepared" for the coalition with the Soviet Union by which alone we could defeat Hitler. We even trusted Japan up to the very hour her planes bombed Pearl Harbor!

Some persons will say: "Why speak of the past? That is all changed now. Why raise dead issues?"

It is necessary to speak of the past, however, because it is not yet dead. We have, as a nation, revised our wrong opinions, but only very incompletely. We have not yet fully learned the lessons of this past. The slogan "Remember Pearl Harbor" is important precisely because we must still learn the full lessons of those events.

Allow me to cite a few examples of current continuation of this pre-war thinking in illusions instead of reality, which leads to disaster for our nation. In a recent meeting of big industrialists in New York to consider war policy, the Government's efforts to organize and plan the war economy were denounced as "socialism," and the chairman summed up the sentiment of those present by saying:

"If we're going to come out of this war with a Marxist brand of national socialism then I say negotiate the peace now and bring Adolf over here to run the show. He knows how. He's efficient. He can do a better job than any of us and a damned sight better job than Roose-

velt, who is nothing but a Left-wing bungling amateur."

Here we have a simon-pure American example of the same treason that destroyed France. And it is deeply imbedded among the big industrialists who control our war economy. This is not representative of all American industrialists (for example, at the meeting mentioned, the direct Morgan and Rockefeller interests did not join in these treasonable expressions) but it does represent the business-as-usual capitalists who are fighting against the essential planning of the war, and who are responsible for the present economic chaos. If they must submit to Governmental authority for the war, they call that "socialism," and prefer the defeat of the United States and its conquest by Hitler.

Clearly, all such talk about the "danger of socialism" is merely a cover for defeatism bordering on treason. The recent Report of the Tolan Committee to the House of Representatives, on October 20, proposes a completely centralized national administration of industry and manpower, working upon a single plan for victory in the war. Its proposals are embodied in the Kilgore-Pepper Bill in the Senate and the Tolan Bill in the House. The committee bluntly declares that "our war effort is in jeopardy," that "this war can be lost in Washington," if such a central administration is not established. The committee is composed of conservative Democrats and Republicans, with not a "Left-winger" among them.

Indeed, Congressman Bender of Ohio, supporting the report, complains that "some points are not made strong enough." And Mr. Bender, leader of the old-line Republican Party of his state, is a confirmed anti-New Dealer, but clearly moved by one single consideration—patriotism, the will to victory in the war, which he sees is in grave danger unless the Tolan Committee proposals are adopted and carried out energetically.

Indeed, the Tolan Committee proposals are truly national, and deserve the support of capital equally with that of labor, of the farmers equally with that of the small industrialists, businessmen and middle classes. It shows the only way in which our economy can be mobilized to meet the strains of all-out war without a breakdown. But our business-as-usual industrialists, who cannot abandon their old pre-war prejudices, fight these proposals to the death, and are ready to surrender our country to Hitler rather than see them adopted.

The patriotic men and women of all classes must unite to save our country from such influences, and thereby save it from destruction at the hands of Hitlerism. Victory in the war is the single over-riding consideration that must govern everyone alike, regardless of what sacrifices may be demanded to that end. Such proposals as those in the Kilgore-Pepper and Tolan Bills must be supported by all, whether they are adopted by the Executive or by Congress.

Another example of this pre-war thinking which damages our war

effort is the campaign of certain newspapers about a supposed "menace of communism" in the United States. This campaign takes the form of saying: "Yes, we are allies of the Communist-led Soviet Union, and that is all right; but we must all the more suppress the Communists here at home, for they are not allies, but dangerous enemies."

Now, it is unfortunately still true that most persons do not see how dangerous this argument is, they do not see where it leads; they see that American Communists are a very small minority in the country, and think it makes little difference one way or the other if the Communists are suppressed. But this argument is equally as dangerous for our war effort as the openly pro-Hitler arguments before quoted. This danger is not only in that it endorses Hitler's central slogan that he is the savior of the world from the "Communist menace." It has immediate, concrete results that help Hitler in a military way. Allow me to show a few of these results to you.

Look at China. The Chinese Republic is greatly weakened today in face of the Japanese invaders by the fact that its unity is incomplete. There are two powerful parties, the Kuomintang or government party headed by Chiang Kai-shek, and the Chinese Communist Party, which leads two powerful armies in semi-autonomous regions; these two parties, after years of civil war, patched up a truce in 1937, a kind of national unity, in face of the Japanese invasion, but their relations remain very much strained.

The Kuomintang has, on at least one occasion, deliberately prevented the Communist-led armies from inflicting a heavy defeat on the Japanese, because they were more afraid of "communism" than of the Japanese invaders. Today two of the strongest Chinese Kuomintang armies are occupied in blockading the Communist-led armies instead of being used against the Japanese.

All this injures not only China, but also the United States; our Government, helping China, does not like to see its help wasted in internal strife between Kuomintang and Communists. But when Americans speak to Chinese leaders about this, and propose to end this senseless quarrel within China, they are answered: "But you also, in your own country, take exactly the same position against the Communists that we take in our country. We are only following your example. If it is necessary for you to fight the Communists so strongly, where the Communists are weak, how much more necessary is it for us to fight the Communists here where they are strong?"

Our Government has but recently made a serious effort to influence the Kuomintang to make a real peace with the Communists, so that the war can be strengthened against Japan by a million or two of the best soldiers in Asia; but it is greatly to be feared that this appeal will not be successful, because the Chinese do not take it seriously when over the same wires they get news that the U. S. Government is trying to deprive American Communists of their citizenship on the ar-

gument that it is impossible for them sincerely to swear allegiance to any government except a communist one, and when American newspapers continually shriek about the "menace of communism."

Thus, by our own example at home, we are directly contributing to the situation in China, where two groups of Chinese armies are watching each other suspiciously and taken away from the struggle against Japan. In the further course of the war, if this is not changed, hundreds of thousands of American boys will pay with their lives for this stupidity.

Or let us take another example, Yugoslavia. Two armies have been fighting against the German and Italian invaders, the Partisan Volunteers led by a united front of all popular parties, including the Communists, and the Chetniks headed by General Mikhailovich and supported by the Yugoslavian Cabinet in London. Recently we learned that Mikhailovich was fighting against the Partisan Volunteers, on the pretext that he had to "suppress the Communists," and had entered into treasonable relations with the Italians for that purpose.

This is a terrific blow against the United Nations, and for the Axis, and the Yugoslavian Cabinet is itself sharply divided on the issue. But American newspapers, trained in the necessity for "suppression of the Communists," unquestioningly support Mikhailovich and deny his treason. The American Government is seriously disturbed by this development, but not our newspapers, who know, without investigation,

that anyone suppressing Communists must be in the right. And when American representatives fly into Yugoslavia to ask Mikhailovich to stop fighting the Communists and to fight Germans and Italians instead, the wily general will probably read to them a copy of Attorney-General Biddle's decision on the Bridges case. Thus Hitler continues to be strengthened militarily in Europe by the "anti-Communists" in the United States.

Now let us take a look at France. Sooner or later, and we must hope sooner, Britain and America are going to open up the Second Front, and hundreds of thousands of American boys will be fighting to the death with German troops on French soil. We are already calling upon Frenchmen to rise and help throw out the Germans. Conservative correspondents have united in the judgment that the only political party in France that has maintained its organization and extended its influence despite German and Vichy suppressions is the Communist Party of France. When our boys go into France are we going to issue the slogan to the French people: "Arise to throw out the Germans and suppress the French Communists"? If we do we are simply going to help Hitler again as we have stupidly been doing ever since he emerged from his Munich *bierstube*. For the French Communists are an essential and invaluable sector of the coming French Army of Liberation. They will be as good fighters on our side as are the Russian Communists.

If we really want to smash Hit-

ler's Axis, and do it as quickly and efficiently as possible, we need the Communists of China, of Yugoslavia, of France as our allies, even as we need the Communists of the Soviet Union. Yes, we need the Communists of the United States also for victory, and the Communists of all lands, not least within Germany itself, where the Communists are hard at work preparing to blow up the Hitler regime from within.

Let's see how Hitler's slogan of the "menace of communism" works close at home. I have a memorandum dated July 23, 1942, circulated in Detroit among management and labor circles by an important official, which contains the following paragraph:

"There are many Communists in the plants and they cannot be trusted since their attitude is likely to be guided by whether Russia remains in the war on the side of the United States, or not. Russia may or may not remain an ally of the United States. She deserted the Allies in the last war and may do it again in this war."

Here we have the clearest example of the political significance of the "anti-Communist crusade" as it is carried on in the United States. This is the sort of stuff Radio Berlin spreads to Britain and America, and against which our Government has warned us many times. It spreads suspicion and distrust against our most powerful ally, the very one which restored to us the perspective of victory by single-handedly stopping the Hitlerite hordes. It sows disunity and suspicion among the

war workers, and throws doubt upon the patriotism and loyalty of every one who expresses friendship and admiration for the Soviet Union. It strikes directly against the most zealous guardians of our war production in the plants. In every way this kind of thing is doing Hitler's work in America, just as surely as his agents who landed from U-boats with explosives not one half so dangerous as this.

We are in this war as a part of the United Nations, at the head of which stands the coalition of Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. We can only win this war if we fight it as a United Nations' war.

We are now entering the stage of active fighting in which American boys will be giving their lives to smash the enemy, not in the hundreds but in the tens of thousands. We must unite the entire country behind them, we must produce everything they and our allies need, we must stop all arguments which are not directed to the one question—how to win this war as quickly as possible.

Unity to win the war requires that we rise above all differences of political opinion. Democrats, Republicans, Communists, Socialists, Prohibitionists, all must work together without regard to their particular "ism," and stop fighting one another over the old labels. The only test is what one is doing to win the war. Any one who places private interests, his class prejudices, or his political opinions, in a position of higher importance than the winning of the war, is thereby moving to-

ward treason to his country and to humanity.

The Communist Party of the United States meets this test. It has proclaimed its policy, and carries out this policy, to subordinate its own program of socialism to the needs of national unity that includes all classes. It actively mobilizes the workers for complete support to the war effort. It helps to work out democratic solutions for the problems of the war. It offers its cooperation to all sincere supporters of the war to victory. It works for the extension of American national unity, and of the United Nations, for the orderly solution of post-war problems. The Communist Party is entirely and without reservation a party of national unity for victory. And we have a contribution to make which no other group can substitute, a contribution at home and a contribution in strengthening our country's position abroad.

This fact is being recognized broadly in our country and throughout the world. Thus, in India, the British authorities have recently legalized the Communist Party and released all its leaders from prison even though it supports the independence movement, because the Government learned from experience that the Indian Communists were the best mobilizers of the population against Japan. In Canada the Government has recently released all the Communist leaders who had been held in concentration camps, because it learned that it needed them for the war effort. In Latin-American countries the Communists are in the forefront of the

fight for alignment with the United Nations, and in Chile the Communists, who are part of the coalition supporting the government, lead in the fight for declaring war on the Axis. In Cuba the Communists are part of the governmental coalition, which supports the United Nations. And so it goes in country after country.

This trend of development toward all-embracing unity which includes also the Communists is a part of the general awakening to the tasks of the war. Wherever persons and groups and nations come to the realization of the gravity, dangers, and difficulties of the war they want all the help that is available for victory. And nowhere can they find better helpers than the Communists. Only in the United States is this fact not so generally recognized, at least not by all the departments of the Government, for some of them work at cross purposes.

Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles, who has faced some of these problems concretely in his work, has recently made an important pronouncement of policy on this question. On October 12 he declared that continuation of the strife between Kuomintang and Communists in China would be unfortunate; he indicated that the United States wished to see such problems settled by processes of conciliation; that the United States would be pleased to see complete unity accomplished; that the so-called menace of communism was looked upon with skepticism, as a pretext of the Axis; that our Government "regards unity within China, unity within the

United States, unity within each of the countries of the United Nations group, and unity among the United Nations as utterly desirable toward effectively carrying on war against the Axis powers."

That is a policy to which we can declare our unconditional support. It is a policy which should be made known throughout the whole of our population and over the world. It is a policy which needs to be carried out fully by all departments of the Government and in the armed forces. For it is a policy designed to bring victory at the earliest possible moment, to reduce the costs of the war, and to insure a just peace when victory has been attained.

It is not my intention to paint for you a bright picture of the situation, nor to pretend that the problems of the war have been solved or that victory will come easily. No, the Axis will be crushed only at terrible cost, and with the full exertion of all our powers. Every step in the development of policy adequate to victory must itself be fought for, it does not come automatically, heavy obstacles must be overcome. Correct policies when established must still be fought for in practical application. And finally when we have mobilized all possible resources they must be thrown into battle against the enemy, and the enemy must be crushed in deadly struggle. Africa is a first step in that direction.

There is no other way.

But Americans do not look for an easy way. They are ready for the full tasks which alone bring

victory. No burden is too heavy, no sacrifice too great, which is necessary for victory. We will never be Hitler's slaves nor try to find a corner for ourselves in a Hitler-

dominated world. The Axis must be destroyed. That is the only goal which means victory. And for free men everywhere in the world the issue is victory or death!

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# THE C.I.O. CONVENTION

BY ROY HUDSON

## I

**T**HE Boston convention of the C.I.O. will stand out in the years to come as the *win-the-war* convention. It was the C.I.O.'s first convention since our country's full entrance into the war. The delegates, representing 5,000,000 organized workers under the leadership of President Murray, fully met the test. From beginning to end it was a war convention with *victory over Hitler and the Axis* as its watchword. All the speeches, all the resolutions adopted breathe the spirit of offensive action against our nation's enemies abroad and at home. There was no other business before the convention than that of girding the C.I.O., the entire labor movement, and the whole nation for winning the war.

The Boston convention was living proof that the American labor movement more clearly understands and more adequately meets its great and new responsibilities to the nation. In not a single act of the convention is there to be found any desire for partisan gain, or championship of exclusive labor considerations. Every action, every resolution was conceived and brought forward

only as it met the test of whether or not it was essential to the nation's war effort, and contributed to the most speedy victory of our nation's arms in common with the other United Nations, over the forces of fascist aggression and slavery. The convention gave expression to its profound realization that the welfare and the future of the working class can today be safeguarded and advanced only by the united struggle of the whole of the American people against the threat to our nation's freedom and independence by the Hitler Axis and its agents or dupes at home.

One of the outstanding developments that came to light at this convention was the growing understanding on the part of the Government of the role that labor is playing in the war effort and in the affairs of the nation generally. This was evidenced, not only by the letter addressed by President Roosevelt to the convention, but also by the significant speeches of Under Secretary of War Robert V. Patterson and Assistant Secretary of the Navy Ralph A. Bard. These speeches are but a reflection of the place that the labor movement has already won in the nation and in the hearts

and minds of most patriotic Americans irrespective of their class position, as a result of its growth and its role in the war effort. This attitude toward the labor movement shows that the people expect labor to take the initiative in furthering those policies and measures essential for winning the war.

It is in this sense that we can view the great contribution made by Senator Pepper, who came to the convention to urge support for the Pepper-Kilgore Bill, for a unified and centralized all-out war economy based on the recommendations of the Tolan report.

The decisions of the convention on all measures related to war economy show that the labor movement is taking up its new responsibilities in the interests of the nation and that to the extent that labor fulfills these responsibilities it will grow in strength and political influence despite all the attacks of the defeatists, and of the open-shopper and business-as-usual elements among the capitalists.

The brilliant and successful offensive of our armed forces in North Africa which began less than forty-eight hours prior to the opening of the C.I.O. convention did much to heighten and deepen the understanding, enthusiasm, and unity of the convention behind the win-the-war program submitted to the convention in the Officers' Report and in the resolutions of the various delegations. The African offensive, which the convention recognized as the prelude to the early opening of the Western Front in Europe, the

heroic stand of our boys in the Solomons, the victory of the British forces against Rommel, a full recognition of the significance of the epic struggle at Stalingrad and the inability of Hitler to break through on the decisive Eastern Front—all this permeated the deliberations of the convention and helped to shape its decisions. All this combined to give the convention the perspective of victory and the method of achieving it, yet without any illusions that victory can be achieved without a full mobilization of all our resources, human and material, and only after a bitter struggle to realize the nation's victory policies. This offensive spirit of the convention dominated all its deliberations and determined its decisions. The impact of these events and the realization of the big and decisive struggles ahead helped to cement even further the unity of the C.I.O.; resulted in the sincere and responsible attitude toward the existing and developing cooperation between the A. F. of L. and C.I.O. and the coming negotiations to unify the American trade union movement; made this convention of labor one of the most important contributions to *national unity*; brought about the unprecedented advance in the promotion of international labor cooperation and in the relations of the C.I.O. with the Soviet trade unions through official exchange of greetings, and helped the C.I.O. convention to adopt unanimously measures that will be instrumental in the strengthening of the fighting alliance of the United Nations headed by the great American-Soviet-British coalition.

## II

The affiliates of the C.I.O. through their national conventions, state and city councils, through their local unions and shop meetings, were throughout the recent period in the forefront of the fight for offensive military action, for the early opening of the Second Front in Europe. This policy, which was fully supported by the C.I.O. leadership, headed by President Murray, was embodied in the Officers' Report to the convention submitted prior to the electrifying news that our armed forces carried through the significant operation in North Africa. This report in part declared:

"To mobilize the full resources of the nation is essential, but it is only part of the story. We must have clear in mind the objectives for which we are mobilizing. *Labor must assume the role of leadership for this task as well.* Labor and the common people desire total mobilization in order to hasten the day of victory by translating our full effort into *immediate and striking offensive action.*

"The actual initiation of offensive action by the United Nations against the Axis forces presents a dual problem—military and *political.*

"There are appeasers and agents of Hitler who seek to challenge the decisions of our leaders to put into effect the people's earnest desire for the supreme offensive—the *Second Front*—which must carry the United Nations to victory. The reasons offered are couched in terms of hesitation, weakness, and defeatism. The motivating force of these appeasers is one of defeat for the United Nations.

". . . There is an absolute necessity to divert the enemy forces from Russia by an offensive against Germany in order to assure victory for the United Nations. The obvious reason for this is that the overwhelming numbers of the German military forces are concentrated against Russia. . . The United Nations are determined that the mainspring of the Axis forces must and will be smashed and destroyed through the combined military offensive of the Russians, the English and the Americans.

"We call upon our Commander-in-Chief to make any demand and any request of labor and we pledge ourselves to give *everything* we can in fighting men, in production, in money and in patriotism to enable the United Nations to grasp the *offensive* and smash forward to an *immediate* military destruction of the fascist Axis." (*Emphasis ours throughout—R.H.*)

These sections from the Officers' Report emphasize that the C.I.O. convention action on the offensive and Second Front in Europe was not determined merely by the African offensive, which it greeted with the greatest enthusiasm, but that the C.I.O. and its affiliates were in fact pressing for, and thus contributed toward making possible, the beginning of the offensive actions now in progress. This stand on the part of the C.I.O. and President Murray also, by the way, exposes those elements in and out of the labor movement who, like the "Social-Democratic" editors of the *New Leader*, thought that they could use the issue of the Second Front as a means to disrupt the unity of the C.I.O. be-

hind the leadership of President Murray. It is also an answer to those who opposed the people's movement for the Second Front which was and is directed against the appeasers and defeatists, and to realize the policy which is the key to victory. It is further an answer to those who, in the light of the recent developments, wish to make us believe that this movement of the people for the Second Front was unnecessary and did not have the most positive effect in strengthening the unity of the United Nations and in strengthening the hand of our Commander-in-Chief in the unfolding and development of offensive action.

The Second Front resolution adopted by the convention, taking into account the American offensive in North Africa, retains fully the analysis of the report and declares in part:

"... The common people, under the leadership of organized labor, *now more than ever* must place all their strength and fighting spirit in support of the decisions of the leaders of the United Nations to carry the fight to our enemies until their complete military destruction and to expose the appeasers and disrupters.

"... We hail with great pride the offensive of our American forces in Africa which, in combination with the attack of the British 8th Army, is delivering a mortal blow to the fascist forces of Rommel. This successful two-front attack against the Axis armies in Africa, in the words of General Montgomery's Order of the Day '... is only the beginning of our task,' and must lead to a

speedy *two-front attack and complete destruction of the main Nazi forces on the European continent by the combined and overwhelming concentration of the armed might of the U.S., Great Britain and the Soviet Union. . .*" (*Emphasis ours throughout—R.H.*)

It is clear from the report, as well as from the resolution adopted, that the C.I.O. is not only conscious of the role that labor has played in the movement for the offensive and for the Second Front in Europe, but that it is also conscious of the great responsibilities that it now faces to uphold the hand of President Roosevelt in the further development of the offensive action in which we are now engaged.

The convention realized, not only the necessity to do everything possible to strengthen our armed forces (as witness the action taken on the first day of the convention in calling upon Congress to pass the 'teen-age draft amendment without any restrictions), not only to bring about the maximum war production through the measures that it adopted on centralized national production, manpower, etc., but also the necessity to continue and sharpen the struggle against the appeasers and defeatists. That this task remains an urgent one and that national unity can only be strengthened through isolating and defeating these forces can already be seen by some of the acts and utterances of these forces since the beginning of the African offensive.

The new outburst of sniping against the President by the Wheelers and Nyes; the new anti-Soviet

incitements by the Ham Fishes and the Peglers; the shameful attitude to the African offensive by the Patterson-McCormack newspapers; the vicious attack on our war effort by Congressman Melvin Maas, Senior Republican member of the House Naval Affairs Committee, and his opposition to our war against Hitler on the pretense that it is endangering our position in the Pacific—all this shows that, precisely as we develop offensive action and the appeasers see their policies exposed and defeated, they will become even more desperate and try to do everything to undermine our war effort. And it is necessary for the labor movement and the whole people to rally as never before around the President in support of the nation's war policies for the annihilation of the Hitler Axis.

The convention resolution for the independence of India, so that the Indian people can be fully mobilized as part of the United Nations in defense of their homeland and for the victory of all the United Nations; the demand that Mannerheim Finland be treated as an enemy of all the United Nations—these and other actions of a similar nature provide the labor movement with the policies which will strengthen the unity of the United Nations and the fighting alliance of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain. That this alliance is becoming stronger, despite ideological differences and differences in the past on questions regarding military operations, is obvious from the recent speeches and statements of President Roosevelt, Premier Stalin,

and Prime Minister Churchill. But it is also obvious, as disclosed in some of these speeches, that one of the essential elements necessary to strengthen still further this fighting alliance is the creation of a unified strategy and common fighting action of the three great powers—the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and Britain.

### III

The C.I.O. convention gave the most serious attention to the problem of all-out war economy. Every phase of this problem was examined in the most constructive and critical manner. The proposals adopted are bold and far-reaching. The C.I.O. program on this question is expressed in four major resolutions—*Total War Mobilization, Manpower, Labor - Management - Production Committees, and Stabilization of National Economy.*

This program, which is fully in line with the recent findings of the Tolan Report and which confirms the correctness of Comrade Browder's position in his important contribution, "The Economics of All-Out War,"\* not only gives the answer to many problems facing our nation in the total war mobilization, especially urgent now as we develop the offensive phase of the war, but also gives concrete answers to many questions that are facing the labor movement in its day-to-day work.

The resolution on *Total War Mobilization* declares:

\**The Communist*, October, 1942, a chapter from *Victory—and After*, International Publishers, New York, 1942, pp 236-249.

"National mobilization demands a nationwide planning and utilization of all the material and manpower resources of the nation. Such a national mobilization requires a *centralized administrative control of all the resources and the economic policies of the nation*. . . . A single administrative body should be established incorporating the activities of war supply, war manpower, and economic stabilization. The recommendations . . . must be put into effect with the utmost speed *which can be done through Executive action*."

This declaration by the C.I.O. that this program for an all-out war economy which is now embodied in the Tolan-Pepper Bills can be put into effect through Executive action is of the greatest importance to the labor movement and the whole people. It means that labor must rally the greatest support for a centralized war economy, which can be achieved either by legislation by Congress or by Executive action, in which the President stands assured that it is the urgent desire of the people and that he will be fully supported in such action.

The C.I.O. gives new emphasis to a wage policy in line with war economy, an emphasis on real wages rather than money wages, and a fuller explanation of the confusion between wage "freezing" and wage stabilization when it declares:

" . . . labor must concentrate on obtaining a wage program which will assure the most efficient workers for production consistent with the supply of consumer goods that can be made available under a war-

time economy. Food, clothing and shelter must be rationed on a universal basis and their prices controlled so as to protect first those who actually produce for war. Wages must be adjusted so as to guarantee the workers that they will obtain the goods and services to meet their essential needs."

At the same time the C.I.O. makes clear that every demand of labor for a full representation and participation in the government and all its agencies is made only for the purpose of assuring the success of the war effort when it says:

"Total mobilization cannot operate or be organized except through the direct and fullest participation of labor—not through any advisory committees but with labor given the highest responsibility in the formulation and execution of all the policies and activities. This full and equal representation of labor has not been achieved."

Knowing full well that the manpower problem can be fully solved only on the basis of the all-out war economy which it proposes in the resolution on Total War Mobilization, the C.I.O. nevertheless dealt separately with this problem as a means of immediately solving some of the problems pending the adoption of the proposals of the Tolan-Pepper Bill. This resolution goes into great detail on how to mobilize our manpower on the basis of taking into account all factors of our "over-all military and industrial picture." These proposals are based on the principle that such a manpower mobilization "does not in-

volve the issue of compulsory or voluntary operation but rather the formulation of a national mobilization plan." In general the concrete proposals are in line with the various suggestions of the labor-management sub-committee of the War Manpower Commission and the Tolan and Truman reports. The C.I.O. lays special emphasis on the necessity to overcome all obstacles in the fullest utilization of the Negro workers and through a special resolution for provisions to make possible the maximum utilization of women workers.

In its resolution on *Stabilization of National Economy* the C.I.O. reaffirms its support of the President's Seven-Point Program, but also points out that this program has thus far been applied too one-sidedly. It points out that while wages have been stabilized, the cost of living has not been controlled. Over-all democratic rationing has not been accomplished as yet. It is very critical of the 1942 tax legislation, which placed the greatest burdens on the low income groups. It calls for immediate remedy of this situation. It calls upon the National Economic Stabilization Board "to initiate policies which will immediately carry into effect this economic stabilization as an integral part of the total war mobilization program."

In its special resolution on the *Labor-Management-Production Committees* the convention gave the lie to all those employers who resist the setting up of these committees for one reason or another. It exposed these forces as being guilty

of preventing the development of the maximum possible production. It laid great emphasis on these committees when it says:

"Our labor-management-production committees must spare no effort in organizing concrete programs for increased production, and all steps must be taken by labor, management and the government to actually make these committees work and function."

Of the greatest importance to the war effort, to the promotion of national unity, to the development of maximum production in industry and agriculture, to the solution of the manpower problem are the decisions of the Boston convention dealing with the Negro people, the women and the farmers and agricultural workers. On these questions the C.I.O. did not engage in generalities and platitudes, but instead worked out concrete programs of action that will bring results if put into operation by labor, industry and the government.

Thus, the resolution on *Manpower* states:

"Employers must be directed and compelled to utilize in full the service of Negro workers, aliens and women workers available in large numbers. Every restriction on the utilization of this manpower must be broken down and immediately eliminated. The C.I.O. has not tolerated any such restrictions in its own ranks and now insists that the government see to it that the employers utilize this available manpower for the total war mobilization."

The resolution on *Women Workers* declared:

"All discrimination against the employment of women must be stopped. Women must receive equal pay for equal work. Training courses must be open to women to fit them for jobs in all needed skills."

The resolution on *Agriculture and the War* state:

"We pledge ourselves to join in cooperative action with the working farmers of America and their bona fide organizations to secure sound and effective operation of our farm lands, and adequate mobilization of farm man power as a part of our entire national productive machine for ultimate victory."

The resolution on *Farm Workers and the War* declares itself in support of:

"1. The Agricultural Employment Stabilization Act, designed to achieve a utilization of wage labor in agriculture that will minimize the evil of under-employment, unnecessary migration, job insecurity and disorganized hiring and recruiting, by extending the Social Security Act to cover agricultural labor in 'industrialized agriculture,' by expanding the functions of the Federal Farm Placement Division of the United States Employment Service.

"2. The Agricultural Labor Recruiting Act.

"3. The Act to Amend the National Labor Relations Act by extending its benefits to agricultural labor on large industrial farms.

"4. Act to Amend the Fair Labor Standard Law, by extending its benefits to workers on large industrial farms.

"5. The Agricultural Wage Board Act, which would establish a system of agricultural wage boards designed to bring farm wages more nearly in line with industrial wages under the authority and subject to approval by the War Labor Board."

All these decisions of the C. I. O. convention for achieving a centralized war economy will meet, not only with approval on the part of the five million members of the C. I. O., but will be greeted by the entire labor movement and the people as a whole. The C. I. O. has shown the way. Every C. I. O. union, every state and city organization of the C. I. O., as well as the local unions, should now in the speediest manner, jointly with the A. F. of L. and the people's organizations in the communities, put into operation all those measures which they can put into operation, pending, or even in the absence of, further action by the Government. All those decisions requiring Executive action or legislation by Congress should receive immediate support through the workers' and people's voice to the President and to Congress.

#### IV

One of the greatest achievements of the convention is to be found in the measures adopted exposing the appeasement and defeatist elements in our nation and the program mapped out to isolate and defeat

them. In these measures the C. I. O. has performed a great service not only to the labor movement but has contributed much to strengthen the war effort by strengthening national unity.

While the exposure of the appeasers, defeatists and enemies of national unity is to be found in almost every act and resolution, a number of resolutions adopted deal specifically with this urgent task. These are the resolution on the results of the elections, war information, for the repeal of the poll tax, as well as the resolution in behalf of Harry Bridges and against any form of discrimination because of race or religion.

The delegates to the C. I. O. convention clearly showed that they were disturbed by the results of the elections and put their finger on the causes for the setback that labor and all other win-the-war forces suffered in the elections. They realized that:

“Candidates of disunity, of labor baiting, of appeasement, took advantage of the dissatisfaction of the people with the insufficiently aggressive mobilization of the people for the war, with the division of counsel in our war leadership. These candidates took advantage of the dissatisfaction despite the fact that they themselves or the groups which they represent have been the sources and the causes for the indecisiveness and failure to complete the total war mobilization....”

In a similar vein the convention branded and condemned the disruptive and “appeaser line pursued by

certain sections of the press and the radio, most notoriously in the McCormick *Chicago Tribune*, Patterson *New York Daily News*, and the *Washington Times-Herald* and the Hearst newspapers.” The convention called upon labor, the people, and the Government to take measures against the appeasers and defeatists. It called upon the people and labor especially to be more alert and vigilant against these defeatist and disruptive forces in Congress and in the nation generally. It called for unity, “regardless of political affiliations, behind our Commander in Chief in the aggressive prosecution of the war to a speedy and successful conclusion.”

The repeal of the poll tax was urged “not merely as a political but a military necessity.” The C. I. O. membership was called upon to take every possible measure to prevail upon Congress to pass the repeal of the poll tax in this session of Congress. The filibuster by the reactionary Senators of some of the Southern States shows that only the maximum action by labor and the people in both the North and South can defeat the design of the poll-tax Senators.

While the actions of the convention strongly emphasized the struggle against the defeatists, appeasers, and labor baiters, and called for greater attention by labor to Congress and legislation generally, it must be said that only by implication did the convention call to the attention of the labor movement labor’s own weaknesses which contributed in many places to the defeat of win-the-war forces in the

elections. It must be admitted that in many states and localities the labor movement, including even the C. I. O. unions, did not play their full role in the elections. In most cases the trade unions entered the election struggle too late, and in many places they did too little. They did not sufficiently bring out the central issues. Nor was there full unity of the entire labor movement—C. I. O., A. F. of L. and the Railroad Brotherhoods—in all cases. Thus, for example, while the C. I. O. and most of the A. F. of L. unions campaigned against the defeatist Congressman Day in Illinois, he had the personal endorsement of President William Green. In Michigan the President of the Ford local endorsed the Republican candidates against the Democratic candidates, who had the support of the official C. I. O. and A. F. of L. bodies. In both of these cases the New Deal-Win-the-War Democratic candidates lost to their Republican rivals by small margins. Clearly, in these cases as in many others, had the labor movement been more united, had the labor movement more fully participated in the campaign, had the central issues been brought out, had a larger number of workers who stayed away from the polls been roused to political understanding as to the importance of the elections, the results would have been quite different. In this connection, the convention resolution calling for greater cooperation between the labor movement and the working farmers is of great importance, since the greatest shift to the Republican Party took place among

the farmers and the middle classes in the rural areas.

The labor movement must also draw the lessons from the appreciable vote received by the American Labor Party's independent candidate for Governor running against both the Farley-picked Democrat Bennett and the Hoover-Republican, Thomas E. Dewey. The relatively large vote for former Governor Benson in Minnesota and the election of the Progressive Party candidate for Governor Loomis in Wisconsin, as in the case of the American Labor Party vote in New York, shows that a large section of the voters where they could effectively vote their dissatisfaction outside the two old parties did not make the traditional switch.

Without attempting to chart a complete course of action, it is already clear that labor must become more active politically and act more unitedly and independently. Only in this way will it be possible to assure the broadest majority coalition of labor, the farmers, the Negro people and all the win-the-war and progressive forces of our nation behind the war effort, behind our Commander in Chief, and to make the influence of labor and the people fully felt in the coming Congress in which the defeatist and appeaser influence in both parties, the Hoover-Republicans and the anti-Roosevelt Democrats, will attempt to form a coalition against the President and the people.

Such a broad coalition of labor and all the win-the-war forces will not only be able to isolate the defeatists and appeasers, assure the

speedy and maximum mobilization of the entire nation for an all-out war effort in support of offensive action on the battlefronts, but will at the same time provide the instrument through which the people will be able to block the conspiracy of the defeatists, appeasers, reactionaries and poll-taxers to control both major parties and rob the people of a voice in determining the elections of 1944. It will strengthen the labor and win-the-war forces within the Democratic Party around the leadership of President Roosevelt and sharpen the struggle against the Hoover-Taft-Vandenberg forces within the Republican Party. It will make possible a growing influence of labor and the people in the affairs of the nation. It will enable labor to bring about the closer collaboration of the Roosevelt-Democrats and the win-the-war Republicans. In this connection, it will also make possible labor's effective electoral participation, either through the Democratic Party under the leadership of President Roosevelt, or through a new realignment in the political structure in our country, if this becomes necessary.

"Unity of program and action on the part of the entire labor movement is indispensable for an all-out war effort to defeat Hitlerism."

The spirit contained in these words from the *Labor Unity* resolution adopted by the convention dominated the discussion on this all-important question of labor unity and was reflected in every reference at the convention to the A. F. of L.

The burning desire to carry the war to Hitler, the need for an all-out war economy, the struggle against the appeasers, the lessons of the elections, the present situation in Congress, new attempts of the open-shoppers to undermine the trade unions, the new threat of company unionism promoted by reactionaries and defeatists, the defeatist and disruptive role of John L. Lewis, which the convention unanimously condemned—all these were compelling reasons for the sincere and urgent desire expressed by President Murray and the convention to achieve the fullest unity between the C. I. O. and the A. F. of L.

The different emphasis on the various problems that still face the labor movement in its goal of achieving organic unity, made by President Murray and Sidney Hillman of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, is being used by some newspapers and others in and out of the labor movement to try to create the impression that one is more desirous of unity than the other and that there are differences on this issue within the C. I. O. But the fact is that the resolution on labor unity was unanimously adopted and contains a basis for unity which will find a ready response not only on the part of the C. I. O. membership but among the membership of the A. F. of L. as well. And if the leadership of the A. F. of L. will enter into the unity negotiations in the spirit expressed in this resolution, and with the same feeling of urgency expressed by the C. I. O. every obstacle in the way of organic unity can be overcome.

Taking note of the achievements toward united labor action already made by the C. I. O. and the A. F. of L. through the *Combined Labor Victory Committee*, as well as through other means, the C. I. O. resolution establishes three basic principles to govern the efforts to establish labor unity that will be made by the joint A. F. of L.-C. I. O. negotiations committee. These principles are:

"1. Unity requires the maintenance and extension of the gains that the C. I. O. has won for the workers through industrial organization in the basic war production industries. Sacrifice of these gains would aid the enemy, since victory depends on the strength of organized labor. All members in all unions shall be protected and any steps taken must receive the democratic approval of the membership involved. Unity should assure that all forms and practices of racial discrimination within unions be abolished.

"2. Unity need not wait the solution of jurisdictional disputes between the various affiliates of the American labor movement. These are matters that can be resolved within a unified national labor movement.

"3. Nothing shall be permitted to weaken or destroy the present working unity that we have achieved on all measures necessary to wage an offensive war against our enemies by mobilizing all our resources for all-out prosecution of the war."

Here indeed is a sincere and responsible position to which no

worker, no trade unionist, no sincere labor leader can object. It assures that nothing shall interfere with existing joint action. It does not make the settlement of any jurisdictional problem a condition for unity. It only insists that gains made be safeguarded, that any adjustment for any groups of workers in both the A. F. of L. and the C. I. O. be submitted to the democratic decision of the membership, and that all racial barriers be abolished.

It is to be hoped that this position of the C. I. O. convention will be made known to every member of the C. I. O., to the membership of the A. F. of L. as well as to the public generally, which is also most vitally concerned. The popularization of this unity proposal will help to expose those forces in the labor movement that are opposed to the unification of the labor movement. In this connection the C. I. O. membership will do well to bring this proposal, as well as the call for their reaffiliation to the C. I. O., to the miners. It will expose the Lewis argument that the C. I. O. is opposed to labor unity and will further expose Lewis' attempts to block C. I. O.-A. F. of L. unity in the name of his so-called "accouplement."

Despite all rumors to the contrary, rumors which actually had the aim of creating disunity within the C. I. O., the convention was marked by the greatest degree of unity in program and spirit around the effective leadership of President Phil Murray and the Executive Council. Except for a certain attempt on the part of Walter Reuther to play an

"independent" role, not dissimilar to that he played at the last convention of the United Automobile Workers of America, the convention showed a higher form of unity than ever before. It was a unity based on principle, on understanding, on greater political clarity.

The return of President Hillman of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America to active work in his organization, the constructive and important role that he played at the C. I. O. convention, undoubtedly brought disappointment to many who looked and hoped for differences in the C. I. O. Hillman's nomination of President Murray for re-election to a third term and the unanimous and enthusiastic manner in which the delegates acclaimed his re-election left no doubt as to the unity of the C. I. O. and the leadership of Murray. Similarly the unanimous re-election of all the six Vice-Presidents, as well as the unanimous addition of three new Vice Presidents, was a recognition by the convention of the great gains by the United Electrical Workers and the Shipbuilding and Marine Workers Unions, whose Presidents, Fitzgerald and Green, were two of the new Vice-Presidents. The election of Haywood to the third new Vice-Presidency was a recognition of his work as head of the organization department of the C. I. O. and was undoubtedly also meant to emphasize the importance of the new organizing drive decided upon by the convention.

There can be no doubt that the prospects for the organization of new millions of workers into the

trade union movement are now possible and necessary, as new millions of workers, including Negro workers, women workers, and people from the farms and offices are being drawn into the war production industries. Certainly, a united labor movement could more quickly and more effectively organize these new millions. But, even pending the time when a unified trade union movement will be achieved, the C. I. O. unions, especially in the basic war production industries, can make big headway in organizing the unorganized. But they will do this only to the extent that they understand how to approach and win the new workers and on the basis of energetically applying the war policies of the C. I. O. Old methods and old approaches that were suited to the prewar period will not be effective. The convention disclosed that this lesson has not yet been fully learned by a number of C. I. O. organizations.

Failure to organize these new workers will open the way to company unions, and will make it possible for the defeatist forces in the country to pit many of these workers against the war effort and against the trade union movement. The program of the C. I. O. provides the basis for the organization of these new millions. In the words of the C. I. O. resolution: "... strong industrial unions... will mobilize the nation's total effort for war production."

This great C. I. O. convention, which will stand out for many accomplishments, will always be remembered as the convention in

which history was made in the advancement of international trade union cooperation and above all in the establishment of fraternal relations between the American labor movement and the great trade union movement of the Soviet Union. We are certain that in the not too distant future a united trade union movement will be proud to claim that the C. I. O. in this act was speaking for the entire labor movement. The overwhelming majority of the A. F. of L. membership will wholeheartedly support the position of the C. I. O. as they will be enraged and ashamed at the Woll-Hutcheson policy, toward the trade union movement of a people which the whole democratic world recognizes has held the bastions of civilization against the forces of barbarism and slavery.

The appearance of the British trade union delegates Tanner and Roberts before the C. I. O. Executive Board and the convention, the splendid speech of delegate Roberts, urging all-inclusive international trade union cooperation and unity of action and explaining to the delegates the role of the Soviet trade unions, the unprecedented exchange of greetings between the C. I. O. and the Soviet trade unions, are moments which the delegates to the Boston convention will long remember.

These acts also showed that the A. F. of L. reactionaries, headed by Woll and Hutcheson, who are responsible above all for the A. F. of L. policy toward the Soviet trade unions, cannot hold back the tide of international labor solidarity and

will not be able much longer to keep the A. F. of L. from cooperating with the trade union movement of the U. S. S. R.—not if the A. F. of L. membership, encouraged by what happened at the C. I. O. convention, expresses itself fully and immediately.

It is of the greatest significance that the C. I. O. convention not only affirmed the Executive Board's rejection of the action of the A. F. of L. and came out for all-inclusive international trade union cooperation by declaring that:

"The A. F. of L. proposal for British labor to act as liaison between the American labor movement and the Soviet labor movement and the A. F. of L. to act as the liaison between the British labor and the C. I. O. and the Railway labor unions falls far short of labor's responsibilities in this crucial hour and must be rejected."

and:

"That the C. I. O. continue to take all necessary steps to establish international labor cooperation with direct participation by the British and Soviet unions, the A. F. of L., the C. I. O. and Railway labor, and the unions of the other United Nations, including our Latin American allies."

but above all that the C. I. O. declared that :

"... pending the accomplishment of this objective, the C. I. O. should arrange immediately for an exchange of information with such trade union bodies of the United Nations with respect to production and all other activities which would

strengthen our common war effort through the *exchange of committees, delegations* and such other channels as may be feasible." (*Emphasis ours*—R. H.)

There can be no doubt that this great step on the part of the C. I. O. opens up a new chapter in the history of the American labor movement. Both President Murray and Chairman Shvernik of the Soviet unions in their exchange of greetings emphasized the great importance of the C. I. O.-Soviet trade union relations both in the winning of the war and in helping to determine the post-war world. The carrying through of the immediate exchange of committees and delegations between the C. I. O. and the Soviet trade unions as well as between the C. I. O. and the British and other trade unions of the United Nations, will be a tremendous factor in the winning of the war, will hasten the full realization of international labor cooperation and unity of action, and will help mobilize the A. F. of L. organizations for a reversal of the policy of the A. F. of L. Council.

The truly democratic character of the C. I. O. convention, the genuine patriotism of the delegates and the leadership, the growing political understanding of the problems of today, were emphasized at the convention by the harmonious working together of all elements of various political persuasion, united around the policies of the C. I. O. and the leadership of President Murray. Naturally, under such conditions, in such an atmosphere, there was a complete absence of the poison of red-baiting, which is the weapon of Hitler in his war against nations and peoples for the destruction of their freedom and independence. The labor movement is learning that this is the weapon of our nation's enemies at home. Communists, like others, contributed to the work of the convention as loyal and disciplined members of their trade union organizations affiliated to the great Congress of Industrial Organizations. And they will be in the forefront to help realize in the speediest manner the important decisions of this truly historic convention.

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# STALIN AND THE PATRIOTIC WAR

BY MIKHAIL KALININ

*Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R.*

[On the occasion of Comrade Stalin's sixty-third birthday, which falls on December 21, the editors of "The Communist" take pleasure in presenting the penetrating analysis by the President of the Soviet Republics of Stalin's history-making reports and speeches delivered in the course of the Soviet Union's war of national liberation. Kalinin's article was written prior to the twenty-fifth anniversary of the October Revolution; Stalin's historic speeches delivered on that occasion are published elsewhere in this issue.—The Editors.]

**I**N HIS speeches on the war Stalin has outlined with perfect clarity the paths of struggle against German fascism. We call these historic speeches not only in the sense that they are documents but because of their influence on our people and on our army. They are speeches that make history.

He who wants to struggle with the utmost effect against the German invaders should make a thorough study of Stalin's speeches. Only then can he understand and correctly estimate the great responsibility which history has placed on the contemporary generation.

Stalin's speech on July 3, 1941,\* contains guiding directives and ex-

planations with regard to the basic questions connected with the war against the German fascists. In answer to the question raised by millions of people—what is needed to remove the danger hanging over the Soviet country and what measures are necessary to defeat the enemy?—Stalin has outlined an extensive program of action.

In the first place, he pointed out that it is necessary to realize that the enemy is cruel and ruthless. Stalin called upon the Soviet people to mobilize and reorganize their work on a war footing, to do away with any easygoing attitude; he urged the people to clear their ranks of whimperers and cowards, panic-mongers and deserters; to be dauntless in struggle and to fight selflessly in the patriotic war for liberation.

In order to realize the extent to which Stalin's words have revealed to the popular masses the meaning of the events then taking place, it suffices to recall that they were uttered only eleven days after the outbreak of the war. Stalin's statement to the effect that "a grave danger hangs over our country," that the enemy is preparing to enslave our people, compelled everyone to ponder over what had happened and to determine accordingly his particular place in the war.

At the very beginning of the war,

\* *The War of National Liberation*, International Publishers, New York, 1942, pp. 9-17.—Editor.

when the enemy's crimes were to a considerable extent perpetrated under cover, when it was still not clear to all that the enemy was waging a war for the extermination of Soviet culture and of the Soviet people, Stalin exposed the enemy's aims, his method of waging war; and in that part of his speech containing practical suggestions he pointed out that it was necessary to organize guerrilla detachments and sabotage groups in the enemy-occupied areas for the struggle against the fascist army units, and to make unbearable conditions for the enemy and all his associates.

And today, when the atrocities being perpetrated by the enemy on the civil population reveal in its true light the bestial face of the enemy, the ranks of the guerrilla columns are swelled by new thousands of the people's avengers, ready for any sacrifice to destroy the invaders. At the same time Stalin's speech contains a profound analysis of military and political events.

Stalin pointed out that the withdrawal of the Red Army was the outcome of advantages accruing from the sudden and treacherous attack by fascist Germany in violation of the 1939 pact with the U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, during its withdrawal the Red Army succeeded in smashing up a number of crack German divisions, proving thereby that the Hitlerite army can and will be smashed, notwithstanding the fascist propaganda about the "invincibility" of German arms.

The section in Stalin's speech in which he gives an appraisal of the international situation arising from

the Soviet people's patriotic war against Hitlerite Germany is a source of rich material as regards the precision of the questions raised and the definite and clear-cut character of the explanation and their meaning. His explanation of the reasons which led to the conclusion of the non-aggression pact between the U.S.S.R. and fascist Germany; his estimate of German aggression and the idea that in this great war of liberation the Soviet people would merge their struggle with those of the peoples of Europe and America, for their independence and for their democratic liberties, against enslavement and the threat of enslavement on the part of Hitler's fascist armies; his idea of the influence which the political factor would exert on military operations, rest on profoundly Marxist-Leninist principles which will be included in textbooks for the study of Marxian tactics in world politics.

On November 6, 1941, when Stalin spoke on the occasion of the twenty-fourth anniversary of the October Revolution,\* the danger to our country, far from having diminished, had increased. The German command was preparing to drive against Moscow. As a matter of fact, so great was the confidence of the fascists in their victory that Hitler had already fixed the date for the conference of his vassals in Moscow. At that moment Stalin's vigorous speech, filled with confidence in the strength of the U.S.S.R. and calling for the defeat of the Hitler hordes, had the effect of doubling the energy of the people, of immeasurably strengthening the

\* *Ibid.*, pp. 18-23.—*Editor.*

fortitude of the Red Army, of increasing its offensive ardor. The fascist army was badly battered near Moscow and Hitler had to convene his conference with his vassals in Vienna.

In his anniversary speech Stalin made a brilliant analysis of the basic reasons for the failure of Germany's Blitzkrieg against the U.S.S.R.: first, the fascists had anticipated that following their numerous deceptions they would again succeed in using the bogey of revolution to frighten the European and American countries into a coalition directed against the U.S.S.R. Furthermore, the Germans had calculated on the instability of the Soviet system, thinking that the blows of the German army would lead to a conflict between the working class and the peasantry, would give rise to strife among the peoples of the U.S.S.R., to the disintegration of the country, and thus facilitate the advance of the German army, which according to their expectations would push as far as the Urals.

But once again the Germans miscalculated. The reverses suffered by the Red Army resulted in the still greater unity of the workers and the peasants and have still further cemented the friendship of the peoples of the U.S.S.R.

Stalin correctly concluded his thought with the words: the fact that the Soviet system has so easily withstood these trials and has consolidated still more its rear proves that the Soviet system is today a strong system.

Lastly, the German invaders, obviously basing their calculations on the information of their secret service agents and wishful thinking,

counted on the weakness of the Red Army and Navy. But there, too, the Germans miscalculated. Retreating, the Red Army fought furiously for every line and inflicted serious blows on the enemy. Moreover, the characteristic feature was that while retreating the Red Army gained in strength, improved its organization and enhanced its fortitude.

The morale of the Red Army, its sense of responsibility before the country, grew stronger with the development of military operations; whereas the morale of the German army was deteriorating even during its successes in offensive action.

This unjust, predatory war of the fascists, which calls for enormous sacrifice and which has aroused the hatred of the population in the occupied regions, cannot but accelerate the deterioration of the Hitler army regardless of the brutal enforcement of discipline in it.

Summing up, Stalin said: there can be no doubt that all these factors taken together predetermined the inevitable collapse of the Blitzkrieg in the east.

Dwelling on the temporary setbacks of the Red Army, Stalin singled out two basic reasons for these; first, the absence of a second front in Europe against the German fascist armies. The fact that the German command was not obliged to divide its forces, and had no fear of the prospect of a two-front war, enabled it to concentrate all of its own troops and the armies of its allies against the U.S.S.R. We were waging a war of liberation single-handed, without military help from anyone against the forces of fascist Germany and her vassals—Finns, Rumanians, Italians, Hungarians.

The second reason for the temporary failures of the Red Army, said Stalin, is the shortage in tanks and partly also in aircraft.

In that part of his speech where he deals with the question of "who are the National Socialists," Stalin, in laconic and striking words, strips the fascist gang of its cloak of nationalism and socialism. While the Hitlerites were engaged in uniting the German territories, they could to some extent be called nationalists. Today, however, when German fascism has enslaved the majority of the peoples of Europe and is reaching out for world domination, the Hitler party is a party of imperialists, the most rapacious and predatory imperialists in the world.

Further, Stalin proved the inevitability of the defeat of the German imperialists and their armies, of the failure of the fascist adventure against the U.S.S.R.

Hitlerism denies the influence of the moral factor in war. The fascists aim at demoralizing the enemy forces and at cutting short every active manifestation of protest or sabotage in their own country. These measures are effective in their initial stage. But under conditions of a protracted, bloody war, when the opposing side does not merely limit itself to defense, but counter-attacks and delivers strong blows at the enemy, the influence of the principle of intimidation begins to lose its effectiveness and is finally transformed into an active hatred of fascism.

Today it gives rise to furious hatred and leads to a vigorous armed struggle against the invaders, not

only in our own country, but in all the German-occupied countries. The morale of our army and people is a factor of great importance in the war.

Despite the temporary setbacks suffered by the Red Army, the Soviet people, far from wavering, are urged on by an ever-growing thirst to avenge the enemy's barbarism and by a growing confidence in final victory. To the black, reactionary force of fascism, we counterpose our unbending will for victory, our ardor, skill and heroism.

Stalin indicated three more fundamental reasons which are bound to lead to the inevitable defeat of predatory Hitler imperialism. First, the instability of the European hinterland, of the "New Order" instituted by the Germans in the occupied countries. Secondly, the instability of the German rear in Germany proper. And lastly, the existence of a coalition of the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the United States, having the aim of routing the German aggressors. Herein lies one of the decisive conditions for victory over Hitler Germany.

Stalin further raised the question of war aims. Our aim, he said, is liberation from the fascist yoke of the occupied Soviet territories and of the Soviet people. We are not out to conquer foreign peoples and force our will upon them. Our aim is to aid them in their struggle for liberation against fascist tyranny.

We regard Stalin's speech of July 3 and his report of November 6 not merely as the point of view of the government and party leadership, but also as the expression of the accumulated popular sentiment and

the popular energy for the struggle against the fascist invaders. History hardly knows another example of such close, mutual cooperation and mutual influence, such confidence of the masses in their leadership and the leaderships' confidence of full support for all their undertakings on the part of the people as is the case in the U.S.S.R.

Stalin's words, while grim, and disclosing as they did the full extent of the danger threatening our country and people, were at the same time filled with confidence in victory. In his May Day, 1942, Order of the Day,\* on the occasion of the twenty-fourth anniversary of the Red Army, in which he gave an estimate of the previous period of the war, Stalin pointed to the very important features and peculiarities of this war. As a result of the losses and defeats suffered by it, the fascist German army was deprived of the very important advantage accruing from the element of surprise.

Turning to the successes gained by the Red Army during its winter offensive, Stalin resolutely warned the Red Army men and commanders against the "rest on your laurels" mentality. We must not forget, he said, that many difficulties are still ahead of us. The enemy is suffering setbacks, but he has not yet been defeated and still less completely routed. The enemy is still strong. He will strain his last strength to achieve success. The greater defeats he suffers, the greater will be his fury.

Stalin's May Day order was addressed primarily to the Red Army and Navy. The political part of the

order is based on previous speeches, while the practical tasks placed by the People's Commissar of Defense contain directives for the Red Army and Navy.

Stalin demanded of the men persistent study of military matters and complete mastery of their arms in their respective specialties in order to deliver well-aimed blows at the enemy. Only thus can one learn the art of defeating the enemy, he emphasized.

Despite the number of setbacks, the Red Army nevertheless accomplished that which amazed the whole world—it checked the victorious, triumphal march through Europe of Hitler's hordes. Although the Germans managed to penetrate deeply into Soviet territory, every mile was paid for at a high price.

Comparing last year's German offensive with their present campaign, we see that this year's offensive is waged on a narrower front. This is the result of the selfless struggle of the Red Army man who, during the first year of war, succeeded in considerably sapping the strength of the fascist army and in curbing the appetites of the German aggressors. But, with its restricted aims, this year's German offensive required such an enormous expenditure of men and equipment that we are fully justified in the belief that the German command will not succeed in these aims.

Stalin's Leninist policy has enabled us to withstand the tremendous onslaught of German imperialism's war machine, has enabled us to hold out and inflict a number of serious defeats on the fascist army. Stalin's leadership and practical directives will bring us victory.

\**Ibid.*, pp. 47-55.—*Editor.*

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## THE 1942 ELECTIONS—AND AFTER

BY MILTON HOWARD

**T**HE announcement of America's first land offensive, against the Axis in North Africa, which thrilled the country immediately after the November 3 elections, immediately affected the political atmosphere of the nation.

The Congress which allowed Copperheads to flout the wishes of the Government and the armed forces on the matter of the 18-19-year-old draft quickly dropped its opposition on the news of the African operation. Military offensives provide stimulus to political offensives against the Fifth Column disruption of the appeasers in this country.

That brilliant offensive, which the country ardently welcomed as the forerunner of real coalition warfare and a large-scale invasion of Europe, only added new weight to the Communist Party's preliminary analysis of the election returns.

The main points of that analysis, made amid the din of superficial newspaper jubilation over a "Republican landslide," can be briefly summarized, aside from important tactical details, as follows:

*The Republican Party, which is not a united party, containing a win-the-war wing and an appeaser wing, succeeded in winning new electoral positions from which they*

*can do harm to the war effort, though they did not by any means achieve the sweep which commentators say they did.*

*They were able to do this in the first mid-war election since 1862 only by the practice of wholesale deception, cloaking their defeatism behind fervent pledges of support for the war, and appearing in many cases even as the proponents of a "tougher war."*

The country, casting one of the lightest votes in more than twenty years, far from expressing opposition to the war (as the Axis radios distortedly explained), was expressing dissatisfaction with the delay in opening the military offensive, and discontent with conditions arising out of slowness in solving the problems of an efficient war economy.

This dissatisfaction, it is true, was voiced in distorted forms. In most places, it found itself unable to break through to the real issue, and was compelled to speak through the limitations of the traditional two-party system. Where possibilities existed to speak outside the two-party line-up, where alternatives were genuinely offered, the people in many places voted for true fighters for victory.

Only the crudest wing of the

American Quisling forces, typified by the *New York Daily News*, tried to interpret the setbacks suffered by the Administration and labor in the same manner as the Berlin-Rome radios—that is, as a rebuke to the policy of anti-Hitler war. (The *New York Daily News* analysis was welcomed on the Berlin radio.)

The calculating leader of the Hoover defeatists in the U.S. Senate, Senator Vandenberg of Michigan, thought it wise, knowing the temper of the people, to view the Republican Party victories as a mandate for more, not less, warfare against the Axis—"The war effort had not proceeded as satisfactorily as the people wanted it," he explained cautiously in public.

Yet without minimizing the losses which the win-the-war forces suffered in many places, it would be politically superficial to ignore the fact that within the Republican Party vote there existed the same kind of differentiations as exist between Willkie pro-victory candidates and pro-Hoover defeatist candidates.

Many voters voted Republican out of a sincere desire to hasten the offensive, and out of a mistaken belief that indiscriminate support for all G.O.P. candidates would speed that result. The pro-Second Front speeches of Wendell Willkie, who appears to the public as Republican Party leader, led many to mistake many a Republican defeatist for a true supporter of victory policies, especially in the absence of sharp exposure of defeatist groups from within the Republican and also within the Democratic Party.

There is a contradiction between the numerical victories of the Republican Party as such and the hidden Quislingism of its Hoover-Taft-Vandenberg groups. There is a contradiction between the Republican vote and the pro-war will of the masses who gave them that vote. There is no common basis for the electoral victory of a Stassen or Saltonstall, both backed by labor, and the victory of a Ham Fish.

This contradiction will increase in direct ratio as the Government takes the nation deeper into offensive action, and seizes the horns of the dilemma which is delaying a centralized war economy.

The defeatist forces in the Republican Party now possess greater machinery with which to sabotage the war and prepare conditions for "negotiated peace." Pro-fascist reactionaries like Pettingill, Frank Gannett, acting for Herbert Hoover, are seizing control of the national Republican Party apparatus; in states like Pennsylvania, California, New York, Connecticut, and Michigan, Hoover-Republican Governors have the opportunity to strengthen their machinery.

But these newly won positions of the defeatists can be made precarious and ineffective by application of offensive military tactics abroad, by elimination of confusion in the war economy through bold use of centralized planning and control. More vigorous forging of true, non-partisan, national unity, and the determination to reveal the face of American Copperheadism to the masses, regardless of the party in which it operates, will bring an

antidote to the Republican advances.

A politically defective policy and needless tactical errors contributed to the losses suffered by the Roosevelt and other victory forces in New York, California, Connecticut and Michigan, when such losses could easily have been victories. We can reject with contempt the un-historic and mechanical "pendulum" theories of periodic "swings" from "ins" to "outs" by which certain writers dully explain the alleged Republican landslide, and on the basis of which they predict a new wave of Hooverism.

*It is essential that the win-the-war forces, and above all the pro-Roosevelt leaders in the Democratic Party and in the Administration itself, quickly grasp the truth that the November defeats were not at all inevitable, and could have been avoided by the proper tactics applied vigorously and in time. Objective study of these errors, and the application of their object lessons, can provide the means for turning the Republican Party numerical victory into a rout for the defeatists.*

Lack of effective unity within the win-the-war camp, on the one hand, and an inability to reveal the election struggle as a vital, integral part of crushing the enemy—these were the political errors which provided the Republican Party defeatist and political-as-usual forces with partisan opportunity. For this the Administration, as well as the organized labor movement, must take the blame, and they must assume the greatest duties in overcoming this weakness.

The Administration not only made

the error of delaying the offensive and the centralization of war control, but it compounded this error with the failure to expose to the nation the Copperhead sabotage of the Republican Quislings and their allies in the Democratic Party in Congress.

Hesitation in fighting the appeaser elements, fear of calling a spade a spade, not only in the Republican but in the President's party, enabled these groups to delay the offensive and create social, economic and political conditions on which they could capitalize.

In this manner the Republican Party made skillful use of unsolved farm problems, whose solution they themselves prevented, winning their greatest gains in the rural areas, and creating a serious danger to the national unity forces which needs speedy remedying.

There was a failure to show the country the destructive effect of the ten months' sabotage waged in Congress by a coalition of Hoover-Republicans and poll-tax Bourbons of the Democratic Party. Necessary war-time measures proposed by President Roosevelt, such as the Seven-Point Economic Plan, of April, the anti-inflation tax program, and the anti-profiteering price proposals, were blocked until September, when the President compelled action only by drastic warnings and an appeal to the nation. The Government's proposals for increasing farm output through Farm Security loans were killed by the same coalition of Hoover-Republicans and anti-Roosevelt Democrats. Sabotage by Senator Taft of the Government's suggestions for aiding

the small businessmen added to the economic dislocations. Sniping at all war efforts; hostility to taking the offensive; complete non-support for a Western Front against Nazi Germany; endorsement of the morale-wrecking and splitting Dies Committee; and the wildest labor-baiting in the midst of the nation's war production drive—all this has marked the activities of the Republican defeatists and their Democratic Party political allies in Congress since Pearl Harbor.

Yet the Administration forces—affected also by the disunity and insufficient consciousness of war duties of sections of the labor movement—failed to make the real situation clear, and allowed themselves to become the target of indiscriminate attack. *The Government thus failed, actually, to make clear what was really the one, basic issue in the election—genuine support for national unity and all necessary war measures*—by failing to point an accusing finger at the systematic political sabotage which was balking the Government's constructive, if preliminary, war proposals, and creating the conditions arousing popular dissatisfaction.

Successfully, then, was the Hoover-Taft-Vandenberg group able to apply its main tactic of creating confusion, delay, and "hardship," while simultaneously appearing as the "champion" of the people's discontent with this same delay, confusion and "hardship." This was the outstanding tactical situation of the 1942 elections. It can and must be changed—in fact it is on the way to being changed.

The proper and unified utilization of the win-the-war forces behind the proper political tactic could have given emphatically different results.

*All the conditions exist for a rapid repairing of the damage done and for a new advance of the win-the-war coalition.* This is proved by the significant counter-trends which broke through the Republican Party victories in a number of key states where the correct tactics of fighting Copperheadism and of win-the-war, non-partisan, unity were even partially employed. The "landslide" theory is not only refuted by the close votes by which the Republicans won in many instances, but also by the positive achievements of win-the-war forces and certain significant electoral victories. It is well to review these briefly, for they can become typical, not exceptional, in the coming struggles.

In Wisconsin, four pro-war Congressmen were returned, with the nationally important ousting of Wisconsin's "Ham Fish," Representative Thill, by the united people's and labor action behind the victory candidate, McMurray. The Republican isolationist Governor, Heil, was defeated, while Berquist, running mate of the winning Progressive Party candidate for Governor, ran as much as 50,000 votes ahead of his ticket to win on an outspoken Second Front campaign. In California, there is the outstanding success of pro-war Democrat Kenny, who as a Second Front and aid-the-farmer campaigner, ran far ahead of his ticket, winning the Attorney-Generalship, while his running-

mate, Governor Olson, lost to the reactionary Republican Warren.

In New York, there is not only the notable success of Representative Marcantonio, who swept all three primaries—Democratic, Republican and American Labor Party—on a staunch anti-Munich, Second Front record, but also the peak vote of Democratic Lieutenant-Gubernatorial candidate Poletti, whose united labor support brought him within a few thousand votes of victory, despite the large lead of the Republican Gubernatorial winner, Dewey (a lead resulting from special causes in New York).

There should be mentioned also the victory of Feighan in Ohio over the Coughlinite Sweeney, in the primaries, and in the elections; the victory of Sadowski in Michigan over the appeaser and Negro-baiter Tenerowicz, in the primaries, and in the elections; the re-election of such militant pro-war candidates as Coffee and Magnusson in Washington; the notable victory in California of Will Rogers, Jr., ousting the appeaser Leland Ford.

There are other instances of a similar character. They are the basis of the next developments, because they demonstrate that a bold struggle for the military offensive and against Copperheadism, backed by Roosevelt Democrats, Willkie Republicans, and a united labor movement, can win.

An outstanding development nationally was the emergence of a powerful American Labor Party vote in New York State, despite President Roosevelt's party-regularity endorsement of Farley's man,

Bennett, and Willkie's endorsement of Dewey. This powerful independent vote indicates that a large group understood the need for voting for victory policies by voting for Governor outside the columns of the two old parties, and that this section of voters wanted to maintain and develop the American Labor Party as an effective instrument for labor and progressive independent political action.

In the elections, the Communist Party contributed its sharply defined policy of unity behind win-the-war candidates, without seeking partisan advantage; it waged the clearest fight against the Copperheadism and pointed to the appeaser forces existing in both parties; it helped to cut through all secondary issues by fastening attention on the basic war issues. Its placing of the Second Front as a central campaign issue provided a basic guide and was confirmed as being in the forefront of the nation's interest by the post-election announcement of the African offensive, prelude to the Western Front.

In New York State, the Communist Party pursued the tactic designed to cut down the voting strength of the two appeaser-influenced gubernatorial candidates, Bennett and Dewey, and to strengthen the American Labor Party as a more effective expression of the win-the-war forces. In New York, for these tactical reasons, the Communist Party could not muster its full electoral strength. However, in several states, notably in Minnesota, Washington and California, the Communist vote was impressive.

At the same time, it should be realized that the elections show the need for strengthening and consolidating the steadily advancing mass political influence of the party.

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It is now the duty of all patriotic groups, in all classes and parties, to face the responsibility for changing the political situation in favor of the victory forces. It is the special duty of the labor movement to act in such a manner as will strengthen the win-the-war coalition, which includes helping to unite Roosevelt Democrats and Willkie Republicans.

What needs to be done? What are the developments which should be looked for?

1. The labor movement needs to establish its own unity, and develop its own independent political activity for rallying all victory forces and uniting the win-the-war camp.

It would be unfortunate if there were repeated the situation which prevailed in the New York elections, for example, where President Roosevelt supported one candidate, Willkie another, one trade union Bennett, another Dewey, with the A. F. of L. and C.I.O. divided in their support. Such disunity within the win-the-war forces provided the Hooverites with their opportunity.

*Irrespective of developments in the current unity negotiations between the A. F. of L. and C.I.O., there is a great need and every practical opportunity for labor to exert its united influence behind the nation's war policies in Congress without any waiting for the con-*

*clusion of organic unity negotiations.*

The entire labor movement, through its local bodies, and through its national leadership of William Green and Philip Murray, is united in support of a whole series of Government war measures. This includes support for the abolition of the poll-tax system; the extension of centralized planning to the manpower and production problems; the opposition to the labor-baiters; the extension of the African offensive; the United Nations policy of alliance with Britain, the Soviet Union and China; the application of rationing, price control, taxation on corporations, etc., etc.

These matters are subject to immediate Congressional and Governmental action; labor must enter the fight in a united manner, acting jointly, displaying bold statesmanlike, independent political initiative.

2. It is urgent that labor exert its united strength for the extension of the African offensive to an invasion of Europe; to see that the appeasers do not succeed in delaying such an extension of our offensive, or the unfolding of true coalition warfare in Europe, by calling for "pauses" in our attack.

The Wheeler-Nye-Taft appeasers were not prevented from returning to their disruptions soon after Pearl Harbor; they will not hesitate to knife the African offensive if they can by one method or another. This is a *real danger* which labor must combat, against which vigilance is needed. An effective weapon against this danger is pressure upon all Congressmen and Senators for such

a centralized war economy as outlined in the Tolan-Kilgore-Pepper Bill to back the military offensive.

3. The dangerous antagonism which the Republican-Copperhead press has fostered between the cities and the countryside, between labor and the farm population, is fraught with peril to the entire nation. (Defeatists made their biggest gains in rural areas.) Initiative by labor in overcoming this Fifth Column tactic is essential.

Practical attention must be given to the problems of the farmer and small business man, in accord with an over-all economic plan which will treat the economic problems of various groups, not onesidedly and piecemeal, but as part of an organic plan.

Labor, in fighting for centralized war planning, should learn to present this proposition, not as a narrow "labor matter" involving only the trade unions, but as a *truly national matter* vitally affecting the economic and patriotic interests of all classes, of industry, farmers, small business men and others. *Only by such a plan can these groups find a solution to their economic problems consistent with victory in the war.*

4. By its united pressure upon Congress immediately, labor can balk the plan to form an appeaser coalition between Hoover Republicans and Martin Dies Democrats, and help to create conditions favor-

able to the pro-war coalition of the Roosevelt Democrats, the Willkie Republicans and the labor and farm groups.

The labor movement helped the President within his own party by defeating the Farley insurrection in New York State. But, though suffering a setback, these forces are not yet routed. The conspiracies of the Farleys and Vandenberges within the Democratic and Republican Parties create dangers which labor cannot ignore.

Labor's economic and political initiative, expressing itself in common activity for the enactment of immediately necessary war measures, both in Washington and in the several states, will enable it to influence the course of political events and realignments.

The 1942 elections should have been, and could have been, a war mobilization, led by the Government and its allies in the camp of national unity. Instead, the Copperheads were allowed to seize the advantage needlessly. With the unfolding of a "Lincoln policy" by the President—that is, of offensive on all fronts—the labor movement has the duty of guaranteeing that this will be the last election in which defeatists will be permitted to operate openly in American politics. The fight for national unity behind the program of victory must now be waged more resolutely and energetically than ever before.

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# THE PACIFIC FRONT IN THE GLOBAL WAR

BY JAMES S. ALLEN

**T**HE extension of the war to the Pacific Front a year ago presented the United States and its Allies with a series of new problems. The first and key problem was to establish the correct relationship of the new front to the global war as a whole, in the first place to the decisive front in Europe. The second important problem was to work out, within the framework of the requirements of world strategy, the correct policy for defeating Japan on the Pacific Front. Now that we have turned the first year of our active participation in the war it is well to examine to what extent we have progressed in the solution of these problems.

The immediate effect of Japan's attack beginning with Pearl Harbor was to cause a serious diversion of Anglo-American forces away from the central task of defeating Hitler in Europe, to bring about a dispersal of Allied forces over extensive battlelines which reached around the world, and to complicate still further the problem of a unified Allied strategy.

That the Axis could not take full advantage of these initial benefits to deliver heavy and perhaps fatal

blows at the Allies in the West, was due above all to the Soviet counter-offensive on the Central Eastern Front which was already under way at Moscow when Japanese bombs fell on Pearl Harbor. Hitler was suffering the heaviest defeat he had yet taken in the war. During the period from December, 1941, to March, 1942, when Japan was winning its cheap successes in the colonies of the South Pacific, Hitler was retreating on the Eastern Front, suffering tremendous losses and therefore unable to undertake any important, even subsidiary, offensive action elsewhere.

But the United States had been catapulted into the anti-Axis war as a full-fledged belligerent, thereby accelerating the mobilization of overwhelming resources and power on the side of the United Nations. Three weeks after Pearl Harbor the Pact of the United Nations was signed in Washington by twenty-six countries, symbolizing the potentialities of coalition warfare on a global scale. Now, one year after the Nipponese attack, the gathering power of the anti-Hitler coalition is beginning to make itself felt not only on the decisive Soviet front but

in the Anglo-American offensive in North Africa, which marks the turn from the defensive to the offensive stage of the war. The Western Allies are beginning to take advantage of the opportunities created by the great devastation inflicted upon Hitler's armies on the Eastern Front and the growing weakening and disintegration of the Berlin-Rome Axis caused by the successes of the Red Army. New possibilities have emerged for a coordinated offensive against Hitler by the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition in a two-front war on the European continent.

As important as the immediate objectives of the North African campaign are, the main significance of that action is that it still further weakens the Axis in Europe, places it on the defensive, causes it to disperse its forces more thinly over extended and unfriendly areas, brings closer the rift in the Italo-German alliance and among the Axis satellites, isolates the Vichy regime still more completely from the French people, arouses a new wave of resistance within France and all of subjugated Europe and, therefore, improves the conditions for the immediate opening of the second front in Europe.

As Stalin pointed out in his November 7 speech, the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition has become progressively stronger, while the Italo-German coalition has become weaker. The beginning of offensive operations in Africa, occurring simultaneously with the epic struggles of the Red Army, accelerates the progress of unity among the Allies and brings closer the realization of a

single strategy for defeating Hitler.

It is now a question of how to extend and develop offensive operations already under way so that the objective of the two-front war against Hitler in Europe can be speedily obtained.

The new possibilities opened by the African offensive are in themselves the best answer to the problem of the relation of the Pacific Front to the European battlefield. After twelve months of valiant struggle on the Pacific we have not been able to alter basically the situation on that front, although we have made some improvements in our position. But on the *European* front, through the magnificent assistance and counter-offensive of the Red Army, the possibilities have been opened for a final crushing drive of the United Nations upon Hitler, whose defeat is a prerequisite for the isolation and destruction of Japanese imperialism.

The real relationship between the Pacific and the European fronts is also demonstrated by the immediate practical effects of the Mediterranean campaign. By gaining complete control of the Mediterranean it will be possible to cut down by many thousands of miles the supply routes to Iran, India and China, thus strengthening the Allied position in the Far East. At Stalingrad, where the Nazi objective of cutting off Central Russia from the Urals and outflanking Moscow was defeated, the subsidiary aim of driving into the Caucasus and toward the Middle East was also frustrated. Now the defeat of Rommel's Afrika Korps has annihilated the other end of the

pincers upon the Middle East, successfully defended that strategic area and prevented a possible juncture of the Nazi and Japanese forces. The Berlin and Tokio ends of the Axis are in a less favorable position to coordinate their strategy, while the Allies have improved their position for over-all coordination of the global war.

Another important effect upon the Pacific Front is that the turn in the war on the European front restrains Japanese military-fascism from further adventures, whether in the direction of Soviet Siberia, India, Australia or the United States. The growing disintegration of the Berlin-Rome Axis also results in the weakening of the Berlin-Tokio connection and tends to isolate Japan from the Axis as a whole. For, in launching their attack last December, the Japanese military-fascists counted heavily upon Hitler being able to continue offensive operations in Europe, particularly against the Soviet Union. They joined in Hitler's gamble upon trying to disunite the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition and thus preventing the emergence of a two-front war. But just the opposite is happening. And with the growing strength and cohesion of the anti-Hitler coalition, Japan's position in the Far East is weakened and the day is coming closer when the full force of the United Nations, after having disposed of Hitler in the West, will be brought to bear upon defeating Japan in the East. Therefore, Japan is forced to adopt greater caution and tends to concentrate upon defending her newly-won empire, even though

offensive moves and efforts to extend its domination are not excluded.

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One of the main tactics of the appeasers and defeatists is to try to create disunity and dissension around the question of the "priority" of the fronts. Thus, under cover of a false "patriotism," the Hearst press, the *New York Daily News* and the *Chicago Tribune* accuse the Administration of betraying the country by carrying the war to Hitler instead of concentrating on "our first front" in the Pacific. After the launching of the African offensive, which was a heavy blow to defeatism, the pro-fascist press continued and even intensified the same line of propaganda. The outrightly defeatist cabal among the Republicans openly opposed the new offensive. Thus, Rep. Maas, ranking Republican member of the House Naval Affairs Committee and a colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve, in a nationwide broadcast defied the Government and the High Command by virtually demanding that the war against Hitler be called off to save us from "defeat" on the Pacific.

But the defeatist and Munichite forces, the main body of whom is interested primarily in preventing the defeat of Hitler and arranging a "negotiated peace," are not alone in propagating this line. They are joined by other forces, some of them in the win-the-war camp, who waver dangerously on the borderline of defeatism under the influence of imperialist impulses.

Among the most active spokesmen representing this tendency is Joseph C. Grew, former ambassador to Japan, who speaks almost daily to business and civil groups and over the radio. His speeches are given official status by the State Department, which reprints them faithfully in its official bulletin. The main burden of his numerous addresses is to impress his audience with the great power, efficiency, fanaticism and implacability of the Japanese. It is remarkable that in his laudable effort to impress the American people with the seriousness and immensity of the war task before them he always manages to evade any serious discussion of the European fronts, and he paints Japan as even more difficult to defeat than Germany. The logic of his remarks is that Japan is the main enemy, demanding our major concentration, and he is meticulously careful to leave no other impression. Although of late he has begun to mention some of our Allies in the war, his main emphasis is that the United States single-handed will have to win the war on the Pacific. For example, this is what he urged leading publicists to tell the people in a speech before the Books and Authors Luncheon in New York October 27:

"We shall have to cross the seas and defeat Japan. . . . They will not break of themselves. We shall have to do what no one has ever done before. We shall have to defeat the Japanese in Japan. . . .

"When we, by our own efforts, are adequately prepared we can and will strike for final victory."

It is to be noted that insistence upon the "priority" of the Pacific front develops side by side with two other points of emphasis. The first is that we must win the war largely by our own efforts, and not as the result of coalition warfare. The other main point closely linked with this is that we must win in the Pacific mainly with our navy and principally by reconquering the Pacific stepping-stones leading to Japan. These ideas are planks of a single platform erected on the premise that America's "Manifest Destiny" and future hegemony must rest on the Far East. Accordingly, no advantages are to be gained by winning the war as the result of coalition with other Western powers, such as Great Britain, or with the Far Eastern nations, such as China.

The rejection of coalition warfare would lead not only to defeat in Europe but to defeat on the Pacific front as well. For victory can be obtained on the Pacific front only as a result of a global strategy which leads to the concentration of the major power of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition in Europe against Nazi Germany. Within this framework, we can win in the Pacific only if our war effort there, largely naval and air, is fully coordinated with the war effort of China which holds the main land front against Japan. Allied naval action in the Pacific is of great importance to defend the approaches to Australia and other existing Allied bases, and to protect and extend our lines of communications to the Asiatic mainland. In addition to this, to the

extent that our naval arm drains Japanese strength and forces her to fight over vast expanses do we contribute to winning the war in the Pacific. But we cannot win the war there by grand naval battles alone. These have to be coordinated with and contribute to the development of the land front in China, the key front of the Pacific war.

The correct approach to the problem of Pacific military policy is given by Admiral H. E. Yarnell, now retired but having behind him long years of service in the Far East. He says:

"In the war against Japan the main effort must come from the mainland of Asia, which means China. Principally from that area must be given the blows that will bring Japan to her knees. The manpower and air bases are ready. All that are lacking are planes, guns and munitions.

"The naval operations in the Pacific are contributory, of course, to her final defeat. But a campaign from that direction alone is a long and costly affair, with success doubtful. The early defeat of Japan hinges mainly on operations from China." (Letter to *The New York Times*, Nov. 14, 1942.)

Unfortunately, this view is not shared by our Navy High Command as a whole, although there are notable exceptions, nor is it yet our guiding policy for the Pacific front. It is because they do not recognize the great anti-Japanese power available among the peoples of the Far East, that some of the high naval commanders on that front paint so stark and pessimistic a pic-

ture of our prospects and orientate toward a long and protracted war against Japan.

But unhappy experience, such as we have had at Pearl Harbor and at Singapore, Burma, and Indonesia, provide lessons which have to be learned and which the United Nations will be forced to apply out of military necessity. Only as these are applied will the splendid victories of Midway, the Coral Sea and the Solomons bear full fruit in the unfolding of a victorious coalition policy on the Pacific front.

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Still another important component of the "America First" approach to the Pacific front is opposition to the political and practical mobilization of the Far Eastern peoples as our allies in the anti-Axis war. It is no accident that the President and other national leaders like Wallace, Welles and Willkie, who understand that the main front is against Hitler Germany and that the war must be won as a United Nations war, have at the same time understood the importance of American-Soviet friendship and the need for a progressive program of co-operation with the colonial and semi-colonial peoples of the Far East. Much is still to be desired here, especially with respect to China and India, but a beginning has been made in the surrender of extra-territorial rights in China, in stepping up supplies to her and in starting the first phases of military cooperation. But the Pacific-front-first groups decry such steps, for

anything is to be fought which aids and stimulates the self-activity of the Far East peoples and, according to their narrow views, endangers the position of domination which they imagine the United States can win for itself in the Far East.

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Like freedom, the word imperialism is subject to varied interpretations. One of the main obstacles to the further development of friendship and common action between our country and China is the slowness with which our nation's spokesmen are defining more concretely what is meant by the "end of imperialism." The best definition, and one that means most, is supplied by deeds, such as the surrender of special privileges in China. That was immediately understood throughout the Far East and was the cause for great jubilation in China.

In the meantime, others formulate programs and present views which may be misunderstood at home and abroad as representing the actual aims of our national policy. One such program drawn up by the editors of *Fortune*, a not inconsequential group in American public and political life, deserves special attention. They have published Part II in their general project defining the role which they envision for the United States in a post-war world. Part I, it will be recalled, dealt with Anglo-American relations and projected an Anglo-Saxon domination of the world, in which the United States would play the role of a distinctly

senior partner. The section now published deals with Pacific relations. These reports are considerably more than schemes for a post-war world. They are a statement of aims and program by the "American Century" group of Henry R. Luce.

An examination of the proposals of this group makes it clear that the progressive forces must engage more and more in polemics against sectors who seek to make their own imperialist ambitions predominant in the conduct and objectives of the war. The report in question starts out by declaring that the Western powers must surrender all their exclusive rights or preferential positions in Asia after the war. This looks like the "end of imperialism"—but further reading reveals that what is meant is the end of Britain's imperialist positions in the Far East and the inauguration of a new era of American hegemony. This is the pivot of this piece of "post-war planning." At the end of the war, says the report, "the function of British imperialism in the Orient will have been fulfilled. It must be replaced, not by a retreat to isolationism—British, American, or Asiatic—but by a new international framework in which the creative spirit of East and West can work dynamically together for a better world."

The international authority established as some extension of the United Nations after the war, according to the editors of *Fortune*, "must derive its power from existing power—from those nations powerful at any existing time. For example, we recognize the possibil-

ity that, at some given time, the U.S. may possess predominant power in the Pacific—military, industrial and financial." And it is on the supposition that the U.S. will become the principal "trustee" of United Nations' interests in the Pacific, that the report bases its recommendations.

There is no need to enter upon a detailed discussion of the specific proposals. It is sufficient to outline them briefly to see that what is envisioned is U.S. imperialist domination of the Far East, in crude contradiction to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, or, as Henry A. Wallace more correctly termed it, the United Nations Charter, with respect to the self-determination of peoples.

A new "international republic" is to be established, according to these American Centuryites, consisting of Thailand, British Malaya, all the British and Dutch islands in Indonesia and Portuguese Timor. This vast aggregation of 90,000,000 people is to be ruled by a Governor appointed by a supreme council which in turn is appointed by nations having interests in the area. All the private and public property taken over by the Japanese is to be restored to the pre-December 7, 1941, owners. Burma and Indo-China are to be ruled as separate entities by international commissions appointed chiefly by Great Britain, India, China and the United States. The Philippines are to become independent, with the U.S. assisting in their rehabilitation.

A key role in the proposed "New Order" is assigned to a "Trans-

Pacific Highway," from our West Coast across the Pacific islands, including all Japanese-held islands, "which we shall take," on to the Eastern terminal of Formosa. It would be "impolitic" to restore Formosa to China or to make it independent because of its strategic position. The poetic editors of *Fortune* paint a glowing picture:

"Based on our Pacific Coast, Hawaii and Formosa, the great planes of the near future, with their easy ten-thousand-mile striking range, can dominate the entire Pacific. Off the vast runways, out of the cavernous and bombproof underground hangars, they will rise at a word from any of our strong points in an umbrella of air power not merely over a single harbor or island, but over the whole vital trade route of the greatest ocean in the world. Under their bombsights no aggressive move will get very far in the Pacific of the future."

Having thus presented the Far Eastern peoples with the promise of a new type of umbrella, the worthy planners foresee an era of good-will between Japan and the United States, after Japan, of course, has had her due punishment. They do not propose to force the abdication of the Emperor or any other constitutional changes in Japan, for they foresee that the "honored" position of the throne may be of use to the United Nations.

With respect to China, they view her as the center, the "Middle Kingdom" of the new Asia. As a concession to the new strength which China has acquired in the course of her long resistance to

Japanese aggression, they think that she should be made into a "free and strong nation," working, naturally, in close harmony with and dependent upon the United States. The great era of industrialization and reconstruction which lies ahead for China will be carried out with the aid of the U.S., and preferably, they do not hesitate to admit, through private investment and monopoly control.

This is the general picture of what the Luce wing of finance capital is fighting for in this war. While it is true that the Luce wing is anti-Hitler and is working for the defeat of the Axis, it must not be overlooked that their position with regard to the colonies is not in keeping with the objectives of the liberation war of the United Nations and is not conducive to promoting unity of the people of the United Nations. Nowhere in the discussion does the Soviet Union enter into the scheme of things on the Pacific, except with respect to Korea—the matter being left for further consideration in a special report on American-Soviet relations. To the editors of *Fortune* it does not appear at all incongruous that they "settle" the fate of China without the Chinese people and without the co-operation of the Soviet Union, which has long Asiatic borders with her and which has been her most consistent friend for the past quarter century, and the staunchest champion of her national sovereignty and independence. Nor does it appear contradictory to them that they take special care not to tread on the toes of an Emperor with whom they are

at war while they politely dismiss from their discussion one of the biggest of the Pacific nations and our greatest ally in the war.

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We are not interested in arguing with Luce about the post-war world. And we would have only a passing interest in the scheme if it were not for the fact that the promulgation of such views has a harmful effect and could play a dangerous and detrimental role in relations with our allies and the prosecution of the war. Any group which places such considerations as advanced by the *Fortune* report to the forefront by that act alone renders itself inimical to the whole war effort. They create great obstacles from within to the unfolding of a correct war policy not only for the Pacific Front but for the decisive phase of the war against Hitlerism.

How can we hope to win allies among the Far Eastern peoples—China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Formosa, Indo-China, Burma, Malaya—if we do nothing to allay their suspicions, sharpened by a Luce report, that for certain influential groups in the United States the "end of imperialism" means American domination? And yet, we must take special steps to win them as allies if the United Nations are to win the war on the Pacific front. We do not expect morals (morals will be found to fit the circumstances), but the real and vital interests of the American people, which coincide with the interests of all the peoples of the United Nations, to be the guide to our Pacific policy. And as

we turn, better voluntarily than by force of events, to a correct military policy for defeating Japan we will have to adopt those policies which will assure us the great land allies which America and the other United Nations need for victory.

In his book *Victory—and After*, Earl Browder shows that the “iron necessities” of war are leading to the dismantling of the colonial system. “It is not any supposed disappearance of . . . innate imperialist tendencies from the United States and Britain that makes it possible to characterize this war as a People’s War of National Liberation, but the fact that the war, breaking out of the bounds of imperialism, has presented all nations, even the imperialist powers, no alternative between destruction at the hands of the Axis or victory on the condition of alliance with the Soviet Union

and the liberation of nations, the abolition of the colonial system. Thus have even conscious imperialists been conscripted by history for a war which is essential anti-imperialist.” (p. 173)

Primarily because the United States has developed closer ties with the Soviet Union, thereby strengthening the whole Anglo-Soviet-American coalition, and because we have finally entered upon the offensive phase of the war which is bringing closer the second front in Europe, the end of our first year finds us much closer to victory. The progressive forces, including the Communists, by sharpening up their struggle against the appeasers and defeatists, by strengthening the unity of the nation and the United Nations, can remove and subdue those forces which stand in the way of victory.

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# THE STUDY OF MARXISM-LENINISM AND THE ROLE OF THE PARTY IN PROMOTING NATIONAL UNITY

BY SAM DON

## I

**P**ROFESSOR LYMAN BRYSON of Teachers College, at the Third Annual Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, deplored the separation of thought and action, declaring:

"One of the most astonishing discoveries I have ever made in my own life is that in all the long history of relations of policy makers in action and men of thought, no one has ever studied the methods of connecting thought with action.

"Or if there is a treatise on the subject I find no one who knows of it. I think you ought better get busy on the problem. It is a scientific problem." \*

We can assert at the outset that there is more than one treatise on the subject of "connecting thought with action." In fact, there is a tested school of thought on this subject. It is the Marxist-Leninist school of dialectical materialism; and the very essence and heart of that philosophy is the unity of thought and action, the unity of theory and prac-

tice. The second point we wish to establish is that the reason the Communist Party has proved to be so correct in the past on all the vital issues facing the nation and the labor movement is that its policies are based on the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the closest unity of theory and action.

The source of the separation of thought from action, and the need and means for overcoming it, were succinctly stated by Earl Browder when he declared in 1938:

"Marxist-Leninist theory is overcoming that long-standing split between thought and action, between theory and practice, which is one of the chief characteristics of bourgeois society. . . . Only Marxism-Leninism again restores the human mind to its throne, creates a unified individual and unified society, restores the tools to the workers, and reunites thought and action, theory and practice." \*

We have been able to serve our nation and the labor movement, in

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\* Earl Browder, *Theory as a Guide to Action*, Workers Library Publishers, New York, 1938, p. 8.

\* *New York Times*, Aug 31, 1942.

these crucial days, when we are battling for the very survival of our nation from the menace of fascism, because the policies we invite our fellow-citizens to examine and adopt are well grounded in our science. As Browder declared:

"Our theory is the understanding of the laws that govern history in its development, the laws of social change. We are interested in these laws, not from idle curiosity, but because we find ourselves in a rapidly changing world, torn between forces of reaction and retrogression on the one hand, and of progress on the other; we find ourselves on the whole helpless victims of reaction except to the degree that we arm ourselves with fundamental understanding, with theory. We find that if our action is based upon our own experience, if it is not illuminated with theory, then it is self-defeating, it runs into blind alleys, it loses its way. But with theory as our guide, theory which summarizes the experiences of history, which is the accumulation of working-class experience over the generations, then our action draws into its support the deepest forces among the masses, it strikes out upon the broad highway of progress, it is inspired by the confidence of sure knowledge." \*

Professor Bryson's statement and the resolution adopted by the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion are signs of the times. The conference deplores the separation of thought from action; complains of "confusion" in the ranks of the scientists. The scientists cannot but be affected by the heroism of a peo-

ple's war. The cannibal monster let loose by fascism is wiping out the noblest achievements of the human mind and universal culture. The scientists of the Soviet Union, of France and the other invaded countries are becoming one with the people in their heroism to crush the Nazi barbarians. How could the American scientists stand aside? Their conference shows that they are groping, searching. They feel that their immense, accumulated fund of knowledge stands somehow idle. They would like to get together with the men of action. This is all to the good. Unfortunately, they have not abandoned certain old prejudices. Fortunately, what they are searching for, the science of the unity of thought with action, is available, is at hand.

The scientists have learned the *universal validity* of the natural sciences, of physics, etc. But the same universal validity exists in the sphere of social science. There can be no "isolationism" in the field of social science; there is no Chinese wall between the progress of the natural and the social sciences, the fundamental laws of each (without, however, mechanical lumping together) are unified in Marxism, in dialectical materialism.

"Hence the science of the history of society, despite all the complexity of the phenomena of social life, can become as precise a science as, let us say, biology, and capable of making use of the laws of development of society for practical purposes.

"Hence the party of the proletariat should not guide itself in its practical activity by casual motives,

\* *Ibid.*, p. 3.

but by the laws of development of society, and by practical deductions from these laws. . . .

"Hence the bond between science and practical activity, between theory and practice, their unity, should be the guiding star of the party of the proletariat." \*

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Today all the activities, all the policies of the Communist Party have but one aim—to which all else is subordinated, namely, winning the war for our nation's survival. But is it not worth while to consider that the Communist Party, though small, could project policies corresponding with the national interests of the country and the class needs of the labor movement, because its leaders are well versed in an ideology which has resolved the conflict between "relations of policy makers in action and men of thought"? Is it not a fact that in the long history of the Party and especially for the past decade, on every major issue affecting the welfare of the nation, our Party and its leader Browder have proved to be so correct? Let us enumerate and consider a few of the outstanding cases. The annihilation of fascism is the outstanding issue today. Is it not an incontrovertible fact that of all the political parties in the United States, the Communist Party was the first party which, more than a decade ago, pointed to the danger of fascism and constantly explained its brutal imperialist nature, and

that fascism is war. Understanding the political-economic content of fascism in its drive for world conquest, we pointed to its direct menace to the United States and consequently, years back, raised the slogan of national security.

The "era of the end of imperialism" as an expression of deep stirrings of the broadest popular democratic forces is being discussed at the present time in the widest circles of the population. The scientific understanding of imperialism, of the colonial-national problem, of post-war developments since 1918, enabled us to arouse the people and sound the alarm of the menace of fascism. We understood the connection between the inner and foreign policies of fascism in the Axis countries, and its menace in all other countries.

Our analysis had as its purpose to shape policies that would halt the rise of fascism and prevent it from reaching its objective of total war for world conquest. Who would today deny that the realization of the policy of collective security would have prevented the disasters of fascism? Compare the records of the political parties in the United States and they will show, beyond question, that the Communist Party championed and invited all anti-fascist forces to join in the realization of the policy of collective security. Is it not a fact that our Party, of all parties, first stood alone in exposing and combatting the danger of Munichism? We were vilified because we championed collaboration between the United States and the Soviet Union, an ally upon whom the very sur-

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\* Joseph Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, International Publishers, New York, p. 20.

vival of our nation and its democratic future depend.

Have we not for years championed labor unity, and in our own modest way suggested policies which assisted in the development of the powerful eleven-million-strong trade union movement in the United States?

German fascism, the barbarous "maturing" of German robber imperialism, learned these essential lessons from its defeat in the first imperialist war: (a) avoid at all costs a two-front war; (b) prevent by means of a political fifth column the establishment of a world front against German imperialism; (c) form the fifth column by finding allies among an anti-national camp based on socially decrepit class-groupings, with Red-baiting as the main weapon. For those reasons, therefore, from the very beginning of the people's war, we advocated a policy of strengthening national unity, and the creation of a world front of United Nations—and the opening up of a Second Front as the political-military guarantee for the winning of the war.

Issue by issue, policy by policy, one could show how right we were for the past decade. We know that we are guided by a tested science, we always have the interests of labor at heart, and therefore we feel confident that our policies, tested by life itself, will in the course of time win the agreement and confidence of the majority of the people. We do not seek to impose our views. At the same time, as the party of the working class, we feel keenly our responsibilities in initiating policies

that will avoid repetition of disasters, speed the advance of the working class, and serve the real interests of our nation.

The heart of Marxist-Leninist science is constant re-creation, based on its continuous, inseparable relations with the masses. Our science therefore does not stand still. Our high respect for the actual viewpoint of the masses, as well as those with whom we collaborate for common immediate aims, admits of correctives in our policies, and encourages an attitude of self-criticism. Armed with a science based on accumulated experience, distilled experience, and our sense of responsibility as a working class party, imbues us with a spirit of modesty in our relations with the masses and all anti-fascist groupings; we strive to maintain such relationships in the "give-and-take" spirit. Marxism, as is the case with all sciences, is an arch-enemy of adventurism and dilettantism.

The Communist Party is not a conspiratorial group; it does not live on foreign orders. Its policies are a matter of public record. Tested science, working-class ideology, devotion to the country, are back of a decade of incessant championing of policies which history has proved to be correct. No other modern political movement in the United States has been faced with such a barrage of attempts at ideological terrorization as that to which the Communist Party has been subjected. But we have survived it all; we have become tempered and steeled because there is sound ideology behind our correct policies.

The American Communist Party is as indestructible as our nation and the American working class.

All progressive, anti-fascist mankind stands in admiration before the heroic Soviet people and their leaders. What is the source of their unsurpassed heroism? No matter what one's political opinion may be, surely this question deserves sympathetic study and not a Dies-like medieval inquisition. Are not the achievements of the Red Army made possible because it is an army of a working-class state, the first socialist state in history, which functions on the basis of a science, the science of Marxism-Leninism? And, indeed, the inspiring genius of Stalin stands out as the very embodiment, the happy unity of the "policy maker in action and man of thought."

At the beginning of this war many journalists and commentators, in reporting the heroic stand of the Red Army, spoke of the "surprising" resistance of the Red Army. This unwittingly reflected the poison of Munichism in our ideological life. Indeed, what makes the Red Army tick? To be sure, it is an army that knows what it is fighting for, conscious of its place in the United Nations. What makes it possible for the Red Army to fight so long alone? It is a fact that it is armed with tanks, dive-bombers. It is a mechanized army. What policy made it possible for the Red Army to have these tanks and war materials? It was the policy of industrialization, of *Stalin's Five-Year Plans*.

It is now admitted that the only

country in which Hitler failed to find a fifth column is the Soviet Union. In every other country Hitler's fifth column is based on treacherous social groupings, die-hard Munichmen, and the like. When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, he hoped to find a disunited, non-monolithic nation, a divided peasantry that would become his fifth columnists. But, instead, a united peasantry scorched its earth and became heroic guerrilla fighters. What made this possible? *Stalin's policy of collectivization*.

Who but an outright defeatist would, at this moment, dare to repeat the slanders against the Soviet Government for bringing to trial, and purging from the land of the Soviets, the Trotskyite-Bucharinite fascist agents?

Hitler and the Axis, the ruthless destroyers of nations, with their cannibal racist theories, have played one nation against the other in their drive for world conquest. But the Red Army, which is made up of a fraternity of nationalities, fights in perfect unity. What made this possible? *Stalin's national policy*.

All these policies go back to the sharp ideological battle waged by Lenin and Stalin against counter-revolutionary Trotskyism. They go back to the theoretical question of building socialism in one country; they go back to the question of the relationship between imperialist war and national-liberation war, to the possibility of liberation wars in the course of an imperialist war.

What makes the Red Army tick? It is that ideology which defeated all the counter-revolutionary theories

and policies of Trotskyism and world Munichism.

The heroic feats of the Red Army, and the Soviet people have awakened widespread realization of the need for better understanding of the Soviet Union and the structure of the Soviet system. In England, in response to public demand, the schools have begun to present courses in Soviet history and in the structure of Soviet society. America too might well profit from the example of our British ally. Surely, the American labor movement would do well to study and become acquainted with the history, life, and heroism of the trade unions in the Soviet Union. The twenty-fifth anniversary of the Soviet Union's existence should stimulate the widest study of the principles upon which the Soviet Union is based.

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Agreement with, or acceptance of, Communist philosophy is certainly not a condition for unity in the winning of the war. But it is high time that the public ideologists and scientists, who are keenly aware of the issues facing mankind today, should objectively, without the Red-baiting virus, examine, as students, the theory, program and policies of the Communist Party, and to reject Dies and his social misfits as authorities on Communism. A party whose policies have been proved by life itself to be correct deserves scientific examination.

May we suggest that had the recent conference of scientists invited a representative of the Communist Party to present its scientific viewpoint of Marxism, the deliberations

of the conference would have been enriched, not necessarily with full agreement, but by reason of the wealth of highly pertinent social observation and experience which are otherwise neglected.

There can be no doubt that the Rapp-Coudert Committee, with its findings based on ignorance, prejudice and Hitler-like policies, and not on impartial scientific investigation, tended to stultify American scientific thinking.

The crusading history of American thought is rich in the clash of ideas, in the free discussion of various social theories. Beginning with the Town Hall meetings, through the famous New England Forums, symposia and debates are all important forerunners of policy and the shaping of social thought in the United States. On the common ground of winning the war, and everything else subordinated to it, it would help to clear the Dies' storm-troop atmosphere to engage in friendly discussions on Communist policies and Marxian ideology.

The early days of the bourgeois revolutions and the times produced giants of thought and action. Paine, Jefferson, Franklin were such giants. The Fathers of our republic were at the same time world citizens. Engels paid tribute to the early founders of the bourgeois rule "who had anything but bourgeois limitations." And today American scientists and educators, by associating themselves with the modern advanced class, the working class, by strengthening national unity, by actively participating in the anti-fascist people's war, can solve their

conflicts arising from separation of thought from action.

We cannot think of a better and a more dialectical, historical approach to the question of policy makers and men of thought than Engels' statement in appreciation of the men of both action and thought who led the battle against feudalism.

"It was the greatest progressive revolution that mankind has so far experienced, a time which called for giants and produced giants—giants in power of thought, passion, and character, in universality and learning. The men who founded the modern rule of the bourgeoisie had anything but bourgeois limitations. On the contrary, the adventurous character of the time inspired them to a greater or less degree. There was hardly any man of importance then living who had not traveled extensively, who did not command four or five languages, who did not shine in a number of fields. Leonardo da Vinci was not only a great painter, but also a great mathematician, mechanic and engineer, to whom the most diverse branches of physics are indebted for important discoveries. Albrecht Dürer was painter, engraver, sculptor, and architect, and in addition invented a system of fortification embodying many of the ideas that much later were again taken up by Montalembert and the modern German science of fortification. Machiavelli was statesman, historian, poet, and at the same time the first notable military author of modern times. Luther not only cleaned the Augean stable of the Church, but also that of the German language; he created modern German prose and composed the text and melody of that triumphal hymn which became the Marseil-

laise of the sixteenth century. The heroes of that time had not yet come under the servitude of the division of labor, the restricting effects of which, with its production of one-sidedness, we so often notice in their successors. But what is especially characteristic of them is that they almost all pursue their lives and activities in the midst of the contemporary movements, in the practical struggle; they take sides and join in the fight, one by speaking and writing, another with the sword, many with both. Hence the fullness and force of character that makes them complete men. Men of the study are the exception—either persons of second or third rank or cautious philistines who do not want to burn their fingers."\*

## II

Life has justified the correctness of our policies because they are rooted in the history of our country. The very essence of Marxian methodology is concreteness—such as the application of the rich worldwide thought and experience to the specific conditions of the United States. It is not an accident that Browder has rediscovered American history, putting it in its proper perspective and interpreting it for application in the shaping of present-day policies.

A recent survey has established that the study of American history is not a required subject in 80 per cent of American colleges. But it is a required subject in the studies and thought of the Communist Party of the United States. It is not an acci-

\* Frederick Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, International Publishers, New York, pp. 2-3.

dent that of all the political parties in the United States, the preamble of the Constitution of our Party alone refers to the names of Jefferson, Paine, Jackson and Lincoln.

Could anyone picture Marxism-Leninism without the experience of such an important country as the United States? Marx and Lenin could not have perfected and enriched their theories without the benefit of the revolutionary and social experiences which founded and shaped our Republic. Marx expressly gave credit to Benjamin Franklin for his contributions in the sphere of political economy, which Marx took into account in the formulation of his economic teachings. Thus, he wrote:

"The first sensible analysis of exchange value as labor-time, made so clear as to seem almost commonplace, is to be found in the work of a man of the New World where the bourgeois relations of production imported together with their representatives sprouted rapidly in a soil which made up its lack of historical traditions with a surplus of humus. That man was Benjamin Franklin, who formulated the fundamental law of modern political economy in his first work which he wrote when a mere youth and published in 1721." \*

The first modern revolution, that of 1776, could not but serve Marx for his studies of social changes. The Civil War, both for Marx and Lenin, was an inexhaustible reservoir of inspiration in their study of revolutionary social changes. Marx

and Engels have contributed to the study of American history as well as to international experience by their work, "The Civil War in the United States."\* The exchange of letters between the First Communist International and Lincoln are part of our scientific working-class treasure. Lenin's *Letter to the American Working Class*\*\* not only threw light on American history but also enabled Lenin to enrich further his revolutionary methodology.

Lenin's special contribution to the work begun in Marx's *Capital* was his work, *Imperialism*. Lenin was able to write his monumental work, in great part, because of his special study of the development of American capitalism.

As the determination of fighting humanity, and of the United Nations, grows to smash German fascist robber imperialism, there is coming to be a more sensitive appreciation everywhere of the national and colonial problem. One need not be an adherent of Marxism-Leninism to appreciate the contribution which Lenin and Stalin have made to the study of imperialism, and to the struggle for freedom on the part of the colonial peoples; the profound insight of Lenin and Stalin in regard to the political-social developments of nations and states has contributed to the present heroic national-liberation struggles of the enslaved countries against Hitler's rapacious "New

\* A compilation of their writings in *Civil War in the United States*, International Publishers, New York, 1940.

\*\* Dated Aug. 20, 1918. Published by International Publishers, New York, 1934.

\* Karl Marx, *Critique of Political Economy*, p. 62.

Order," and has contributed as well to the present struggle for national survival of such great countries as the United States and England. And, today, as the Soviet Union will enter the twenty-sixth year of its existence, the peoples of the United Nations will draw inspiration from the moral and political unity of the brotherhood of the nations and peoples of the U.S.S.R.

The world has learned, not only from the fall of France, but also from the fall of Singapore. Communists, who have for decades championed the cause of freedom of the colonial peoples, are deeply concerned with the necessity of granting independence to the Indian people, of making them a sovereign nation; with the necessity of guaranteeing the defense of India against Axis aggression, through establishing a provisional national government representative of the entire Indian people and allied with the United Nations. For the very same reason, the Communist Party, now, as in the past, champions the rights of the Negro people, and works to achieve their full integration in the national unity and America's win-the-war drive.

Marxism does not rest content with a mere statement of its general principles. It has a high regard for the peculiarities of each country. Without considering at the moment the relationship of revolutionary social changes to the possibility of integration with peaceful transformations, we quote from Marx to show his concern for the peculiarities of each country. Marx, writing in 1872, for his day, said:

"... We know that special regard must be paid to the institutions, customs, and traditions of various lands, and we do not deny that there are certain countries such as the United States and England in which the workers may hope to secure their needs by peaceful means."\*

Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin deeply appreciated America. They made a profound study of American revolutionary traditions, the special American democratic problems, and the promise of a growing American labor movement.

The titans, the fathers of our country and the world citizens of yesterday meet the titans and world citizens of today. In the preamble to the Constitution of the Communist Party of the U.S.A., along with the names of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, there shine the names of Jefferson, Paine, Jackson and Lincoln.

Without the United States there could be no expanding Marxism-Leninism. American soil, its institutions, its people, especially the American working class, have given birth to the American Communist Party. We belong. We have already made contributions to the nation, to the rise of the new giant, the American working class. The majority of the people do not yet agree with our program, our policies may at first not be appreciated; but, surely, any sincere democratic American, any worker can reason: "I may not quite see eye to eye with the Communist Party, but I am glad that America produced a Commu-

\* Steklov, *History of the First International*, p. 240.

nist Party and that it is functioning.”

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The scientific Marxian relationship between thought and action, between ideology and policy is studied in order to influence the course of events and not for mere analysis alone.

Let us consider a most recent, a most important example. When we opposed the war as an imperialist war (the 1939-40 phase of Chamberlain-Hitler Munichism and fascist imperialism), and fought against U.S. participation in it, we were also fighting for policies that *would change the character of the war*. Our decade-long struggle against fascism to check fascist aggression, our battles against the super-Munichism of the imperialist war, made possible the changing of the character of the war, rendered possible its transformation into a people's war. In the very course of the second imperialist war we were the first in the United States to condemn Vichyism, the Munich-like surrender to the Hitler invaders. We supported the heroic national-liberation battles of the Yugoslav and Greek peoples against Hitler and Mussolini and the glorious fight of the Chinese nation against the Tokio invaders. (These national-liberation struggles could not yet change the imperialist character of the war. There were still the Chamberlain and Daladier policies. The war of Finland against the Soviet Union dramatized the imperialist super-Munich features of the war.)

How was it possible for us so

quickly to reorientate ourselves when the war decisively changed its character—on June 22, 1941? For many years we have actively taken issue with those who would deny the possibility of an imperialist war changing its character, of the development of national-liberation wars. Take the recently published Volume XIX of Lenin's works. This book was written at the very height of the first world imperialist war. Lenin then took sharp issue with those who denied the imperialist character of the war. But, at the same time, in his own ranks, he carried on an ideological struggle with those who would deny the outbreak of national-liberation wars in the course of an imperialist war.

In that volume we find the following thought-provoking statement:

“National wars must not be ‘prohibited’ (as Radek wants to) for fear that fools or scoundrels will *once again* palm off an imperialist war as a national war! It is ridiculous, but it is what Radek's arguments amount to.”\*

What superb richness of thought and foresight we find in Lenin's sharp polemic on the Junius pamphlet in which he demonstrates the historical dialectical interconnection between imperialist and national-liberation wars! To quote but an excerpt:

“A national war can be transformed into an imperialist war, and *vice versa*. For example, the wars of the Great French Revolution

\* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, International Publishers, New York, 1942, Vol. XIX, p. 266.

started as national wars and were such. They were revolutionary wars because they were waged in the defense of the great revolution against a coalition of counter-revolutionary monarchies. But after Napoleon had created the French Empire by subjugating a number of large, virile, long established national states of Europe, the French national wars became imperialist wars, which *in their turn* engendered wars for national liberation *against* Napoleon's imperialism. . . . The repudiation of national wars in general may either be an oversight or a fortuitous over-emphasis of the perfectly correct idea that the *present* war is an imperialist war and not a national war. But as the opposite may be true, as various Social-Democrats mistakenly repudiate *all* national wars because the *present* war is falsely represented to be a national war, we are obliged to deal with this mistake. . . . National wars must not be regarded as impossible in the epoch of imperialism, even in Europe."\*

For years, the Communist Party waged a struggle on the ideological front against Trotskyite counter-revolutionary and kindred ideas, which deny the possibility of such national-liberation wars, people's wars. Our reorientation on June 22 (objectively prepared by the national-liberation features in the course of the imperialist war) was necessarily quick; it was made possible in a general way because our Party was equipped with historical international experience and scientific methodology.

But not by international experiences alone. We knew well the his-

tory of our own country. It is a fact that a series of great wars in which the United States has been engaged since the founding of the Republic were just and progressive wars. We drew on the knowledge of our own history to show that every progressive war, on the one hand, brings forth national unity, and at the same time is confronted with a stubborn, treacherous ideology and policy on the part of sections of social classes that make common cause with the external enemy. Such were the Tories of 1776, the New England secessionists (Hartford convention) during the Madison Administration and of the Jackson era, which essentially dates back before his Presidency, and the Copperheads of the Civil War days, just as we have the present-day Munichmen, the appeasers of the 1942 variety.

Since the outbreak of this national-liberation war we have held firmly to its people's character: from the very start we have advocated policies of national unity, policies to deepen the people's character of the war. *Firmness of perspective* on the people's character of the war, and *conscious political intervention* to deepen the people's character are the key to Communist policies.

This people's war does not develop automatically. Its deepening depends a great deal on the conscious political role of the working class. In national unity—a coalition of classes—the working class by its historic position is the most consistent anti-fascist class, a class without a "split personality." The trade union movement, by voluntarily giving up its exercise of the right

\* *Ibid.*, p. 199.

to strike for the duration, has demonstrated its political responsibility and growing maturity in promoting national unity to win the war. Because of the issues of deepening the people's character of the war, and the enraged, increased activities of the appeasers, a great deal depends on the political firmness and ideological clarity of the American labor movement. Rich, varied and fruitful ideological educational life in the unions would increase a thousand-fold the latent power of the 11,000,000 trade unionists in solving such burning issues as the securing of the opening of the Second Front, international trade union unity, the fight for an all-out war economy and against inflation.

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The soundness and consistency of Communist Party policies are based on the laws of Marxism. Communist Party policies are as flexible as life itself, and enriched by science. In the Communist Party, as a working class Party, there can be no such discrepancy between word and deed as is typical of reactionary political parties. The slogans issued by a Communist Party can never be demagogic or deceptive, because they always spring from working-class needs and national interests, because they are always based on scientific analysis of social relations and changing social conditions. The Communist Party, which has nothing to conceal from the people, considers its sharpest weapon for its constant improvement and growth the honest practice of self-criticism.

It would be well for earnest men of science and letters, for civic and working-class leaders, who would like to make an impartial study of Marxism, honestly to find out what makes the Communist alert and clear-visioned, to turn to authoritative studies of Communist policy and theory and help to cleanse from our body politic the Munich poison and headline mentality created by the Dies Committee. An impartial study of the authoritative works on Communism will establish that its guiding principle is, "*Our theory is not a dogma, but a guide to action.*" An example of this principle is this statement from an authoritative Marxist classic:

"It may seem that all that is required for mastering the Marxist-Leninist theory is diligently to learn by heart isolated conclusions and propositions from the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, learn to quote them at opportune times and rest at that, in the hope that the conclusions and propositions thus memorized will suit each and every situation and occasion. But such an approach to the Marxist-Leninist theory is altogether wrong. The Marxist-Leninist theory must not be regarded as a collection of dogmas, as a catechism, as a symbol of faith, and the Marxists themselves as pedants and dogmatists. The Marxist-Leninist theory is the science of the development of society, the science of the working-class movement, the science of the proletarian revolution, the science of the building of the Communist society. And as a science it does not and cannot stand still, but develops and perfects itself. Clearly,

in its development it is bound to become enriched by new experience and new knowledge, and some of its propositions and conclusions are bound to change in the course of time, are bound to be replaced by new conclusions and propositions corresponding to the new historical conditions.”\*

### III

As the American party of socialism, the highest form of democracy, the Communist Party itself functions on a democratic basis—on the basis of democratic centralism. The high principle of our Party is based on the volition of its members in joining it and on their enlightened acceptance of the Party’s program. (There is no room for careerism, patronage or egotistic ambitions as an incentive for joining.) The democracy in the Communist Party is based on the fact that, as a working-class party, the bulk of its membership comes from the most democratic class in society, the working class.

The principle and high morale of the Party have their source in the most advanced science—the science of Marxism-Leninism. The leadership of our Party shapes its policies by constantly asking itself what the welfare of the country, of the working class demands. It constantly verifies the exact facts, the actual moods, desires and yearnings of the masses, and ties them up with the trend, the direction, the course of

events and historical perspective. Scientific exactness, close contact with the masses and sensitivity to their needs enable the Party to forecast and to contribute its share to the leadership of the country and the working class.

Those who slander our Party are confounded by the fact that neither physical nor ideological terrorism can shake its unity, that at every turn the membership is at one with the leadership. The answer is that perhaps there is no other party whose membership joins it with such motives of high principle, that both the membership and the leadership spring from the people and are united by the same ties with the working class, are inspired and seasoned by the same ideology and science.

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The contribution of the Communist Party to promoting national unity and to enhancing the leading role of the working class depends, to a large extent, on how its policies reach down into the heart of the communities; not merely on how its policies are enunciated from the top through its national and state organizations, but also how it influences the pulsating life of every community, of every factory, and meets with the understanding of the labor movement and of civic organizations. A great deal, therefore, depends upon the branch of the Communist Party—the Mother Earth of the Communist Party.

Education must begin with the Party branch and the very purpose

\* *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, International Publishers, New York, 1939, p. 335.

of this education is to enable the branch to function in its own way—as an independent American working class political party. The political initiative of the branch will be enhanced by its strong ideological life.

Let us consider how some branches function at the present time. No one can deny that as political organizations go, the Communist Party branch is, as a rule, one of the most active political organizations in the community. Yet we find that quite often the branch is burdened with assignments, or rather chores, which smother its real purpose—namely, to function as a political organization making and applying policies for mass work, for mass influence. It happens quite often that, let us say, at a State Plenum, there are important reports which usually are of a deep political ideological content, giving a “lift” to those who are present. And as the various active members listen to the reports and the discussion, their imagination is stirred, they become full of enthusiasm, already shaping in their minds various concrete tasks in order to realize in double-quick time the line and the various policies of the meeting. But by the time the results of the Plenum reach the branch, all that is “handed down” are practical tasks in the form of chores minus all the conviction, enthusiasm and thrill that was generated at the State meeting, minus the very policies that are the basis for the assignments and practical tasks given to the branch. Is it any wonder that at times these tasks don't click—that they become bur-

dens rather than crusade activities springing from inner conviction and enthusiasm? The branch must not be a mere clearing house for assignments. The very issues and problems discussed in higher committees must be discussed with the same political earnestness at the branch meeting. These issues should be discussed regularly and not put off to the time of an “educational.”

We have made headway in the life and work of the branches in so far as having our eyes turned toward the communities. We know that in many instances the Party branch is the most active organization in the community for civic war activities and in the battle for a war economy. Yet the community as such does not always warm up to the activities of a Party branch. It seems to us that the main reason for this is that the civic and war activities of the Party are divorced from the general ideological political activities of the branch.

The very purpose of all our education is constantly to develop initiative and self-reliance in Party branches. This will help to overcome the habit of waiting for instructions from above. To wait and procrastinate is to give the enemy time. The branch which learns, on the basis of the general policies of the Party under the guidance of Party leadership, to “work on its own” will increase and multiply the effectiveness and efficiency of the general policies and its contributions toward national unity and win-the-war policies.

The life of a Communist Party branch should have that political

educational quality that every member will feel that attendance raises one's stature as a citizen, as a member of the working class. If the membership will feel that presence at a meeting increases one's knowledge, the attendance will become regular and the manpower of the branch will increase for the carrying out of the manifold tasks.

The constitutional guarantee of the Communist Party for every member and his own duty is "to participate in the making of the policies of the Party" (Article 6, Section 2). To emphasize we shall repeat: our education should aid every member to participate in the making of Party policies for mass leadership; in the very process of making Party policies he will become educated.

Our Party is in a fortunate position today in equipping every Party branch and every member with the weapon that will enable them to function as a political party; that weapon is Comrade Browder's book *Victory—and After*. Our policies must become public issues; and to make them public issues we must battle it out ideologically on all issues affecting the course of the war and the winning of the war. The book sets out to accomplish precisely that which is lacking in the political activities of many of the branches and is insufficiently developed in our mass propaganda—namely, in the words of Comrade Browder, "the systematic presentation of the point of view of the Communist Party of the United States."

What is the very heart of the

book? First, that policy, correct policy will determine whether the United Nations win the war or whether a Hitler victory will enslave the world and cancel out the achievements of civilization. Secondly, the realization of correct policy depends on routing the fifth column, especially on the political-ideological front, since the most sinister and most effective form of fifth column sabotage is the "sabotage of the mind." The fascinating quality of Comrade Browder's book is that of constantly appealing to the mind and heart of the people, battling throughout the fifth column's "sabotage of the mind" of the people.

One is thrilled in following the presentation of the Communist viewpoint of the Party line in Browder's book. Browder's analyses are not mere assertions; they are the shaping and developing of the Party position. His presentation of the Communist viewpoint and the Party line has the heroic qualities of the men who know what they are fighting for at the gates at Stalingrad and in the Solomon Islands. It is in this spirit that we can make the Browder book a public issue in the country, a best seller; it is in this spirit that we must adopt *Victory—and After* as the textbook in all of our education, on the ideological front; it is in this spirit that the Party branches must learn systematically to present the Communist viewpoint.

Events since its publication make the book ever more up to date. The fight for all-out war economy, the election results, the fight to repeal

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the Poll Tax, the offensive in North Africa, bear witness, not only to the deep truth and wisdom of Browder's new work, but to the influence it already has begun to exert on the course of events and in shaping public opinion. It is the public document and Party text for the duration. It should be used as such, studied and applied in carrying out and shaping Party policy.

There is a deep emotional quality in the book because the scientific Marxist-Leninist exactness is enlivened and nourished by deep patriotism and implacable hatred for fascism, scorn and contempt for everything that is indecent in our body politic. The book aims to educate and elevate the working class, to strengthen its position in the nation's affairs, in the anti-fascist people's war. The book deepens the national consciousness of America. It imbues the working class with vision and faith; it gives the working class that Marxian knowledge to sustain it in all the trials to realize its destiny as the most consistent anti-fascist force in the camp of national unity.

The national democratic heritage of our country, the rich annals of the American labor movement, the laws of the most advanced science—Marxism - Leninism—the worldwide revolutionary experiences and worldwide cultural heritage embodied in Marxism-Leninism, embodied in our Party, are eloquently and sagely expressed and developed by Comrade Browder in his book—a book which is a decisive weapon in winning the war, in *Victory—and After*.

The training of Communist Party personnel must have a war-time tempo. The education therefore must be of a nature that would make them immediately fit for battle—to understand and learn to display initiative in the application of the win-the-war policies. The selection of personnel for training should correspond to the present personnel policies of the Party—namely, the promotion for leadership of shop workers, Negroes and women.

War-time tempo means rapid political training. The character of the education must consist of the closest knitting-together of ideology and policy—the ability of successful immediate application of Party policy. Such education should lay the foundation for self-study—reading, to become well-informed, to become keen working class leaders. It should impart the qualities and habits of working class statesmen and tribunes of the people. It was always a "sin" to have an academic approach in the training of personnel. Nowadays, it is more than a sin.

We know that without women-power on the assembly-line we cannot win the battle of production. Nor can we win on the home front—in the civic war effort—without the participation of the women. Despite the slanders emanating from the appeaser press, the women are learning fast, and discharging nobly and efficiently their duties on the assembly line and on the civic war front. And the women have the right to expect and demand more—to participate actively, and become

leaders as well, in the social and political life of the country; this is especially true of the labor movement.

From the recent experiences in the Party, women comrades quickly, efficiently and patriotically replaced men functionaries who have been called to serve their country on the battlefield. In many instances the women comrades display better administrative ability. But use in administrative positions is not enough. Women comrades should be assisted politically, through training, to occupy the highest political posts in the Party and not merely relegated to administrative posts. Opportunities for political training should be extended, especially to working class women.

Frequent, systematic discussions between State leaderships and their personnel is the very heart of political training. At such meetings there should not only be a presentation of policy as of today, but as much as possible a historical treatment and unfolding of policies should be introduced. Such meetings should be well prepared in advance by advising the comrades what to read in preparation for the meeting. Reading material on the issues which will come up and preparatory thinking would encourage and facilitate enterprising discussions on the part of all comrades present.

When new comrades are drawn into leadership of various committees, special attention should be paid to them. Might it not be advisable to establish a rule that when a new comrade is brought into lead-

ership, an older, more experienced comrade be assigned to him for *personal tutoring*? It would be advisable to acquaint in advance new members of leading committees with the order of business, to give them the background of problems that will be discussed. Such an approach will help the new committee member to tie up his own valuable mass experience with the problems under discussion, enabling him quickly to orient himself in the discussion and actively to participate in it. Personal attention, personal tutoring, would avoid some sad experiences of the past, where new members fell out because they did not get such systematic personal guidance.

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There never was a time in the history of mankind when entire nations embracing whole populations brought forward all their energy for national survival, for their future, for their democratic liberties, as we see today. Split seconds, in the literal sense, in which decisions are made by nations and millions of people are decisive. Under such circumstances, the maximum release of mental energy, clarity of thinking, passion and devotion to the cause of annihilating Hitlerism is required. In this sense, education for policy in which split seconds count and nations and millions participate is the only test of education as expressed in the proper relationship between ideology and policy.

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Ideology is the forerunner of

policy; ideology is the pace-setter for policy; policy in turn tested by the living response and experiences of millions further enriches and enlivens ideology. The life-blood of Marxian methodology is the unity between theory and practice—Marxism is not a dogma but a guide

to action. The unity between theory and practice is not a mere matter of unity between theory and organization. It is rather the unity between ideology and the living application of policy. Such is the foundation upon which education in the Communist Party rests.

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# WHAT ABOUT HITLER'S FINNISH ALLY?

BY JESSICA MATTSO

## I

**F**OR over sixteen months the Finns have fought as allies of the Nazi cutthroats. These sixteen months have had many surprises in store for the Finns. Today the Finnish army is in Karelia, they have the Aunus and Viena provinces of Soviet Karelia in their hands, they have changed the name of Petrozavodsk into Aunuslinna, and yet their victory and their dream of a "Greater Finland" seem further away than ever. A realization is growing in Finland that they have lost the war together with their independence and are in a "tenant's position," with Nazi Germany the supreme lord and master. Widespread disappointment and grumbling are growing and have spread to all strata of the population.

When the Nazi-minded leaders of Finland, the Mannerheim-Tanner-Ryti clique, hastened to make a secret alliance with Hitler immediately after the 1939-40 war, they were not only inspired by their mutual hatred of the Soviet Union, but also by their belief in the invincibility of Nazi arms. General Wallenius of the Finnish army had been an observer with the Nazi forces

when they overran Poland. The Nazi-minded regime allowed Hitler to re-equip the Finnish army and to re-establish the new Mannerheim Line in preparation for the anti-Soviet war, and Premier Risto Ryti even boasted, in his Diet speech on June 26, 1941, that Finland's army was better equipped than in the war of 1939-40.

The myth about the invincibility of the German army dominated Finland even before the Nazis came to power in Germany. The ruling circles upheld this myth with their "glorification" of the deeds of Von der Goltz's army that had helped the Mannerheim White Guards to defeat the Finnish Workers' Socialist Republic in 1918 and initiate a regime of terror, wholesale murder and concentration camps, such as Hitler is trying to impose on the world today.

The rapid conquest of Norway, the Lowlands and France strengthened this myth of invincibility of the German arms. When President Risto Ryti, in his speech to the Finnish Diet, officially acknowledged on June 26, 1941, what Hitler had announced a few days earlier, that Finland was in the war with Germany against the So-

viet Union, most of the people of Finland believed it would be a short war. Hitler had promised the defeat of the Red Army in six weeks. At most, they were assured, it would take three or four months. The majority of the Finnish people did not want the war and an alliance with Hitler even under the label of a defensive struggle. But active opposition came almost wholly from the ranks of the workers. The Finnish trade unions, regardless of their pro-Tanner leadership, voiced their concern a few days before the Nazis attacked the Soviet Union, pointing out that the Finnish government's adventurous policy would plunge the country into war, and demanded an end to such a policy. When it became known that the Social-Democratic chieftain, Vaino Tanner, had secretly given his support to the Finnish fascist war alliance with Hitler, he lost support among the workers. A meeting in Toijala in the summer of 1941 attended by 800 people, of whom over 350 were Social-Democrats, unanimously demanded Tanner's expulsion from the Social-Democratic Party.

The Finnish Quislings thought they could suppress the workers' demand for peace by wholesale arrests of the Social-Democrats, who were critical of the government's policy. Six Social-Democratic members of the Diet, including K. H. Wiik, the Social-Democratic Party's former secretary, and the leading Finnish newspaper columnist, Yrjo Rasanen, were arrested and sentenced to a long term of imprisonment for "treason." But the rank and file of the Social-Democratic

Party, and the trade unions have not been won to support of the war, and today a revolt is smoldering within the Social-Democratic Party, which officially is following Tanner.

The war did not find support among the peasantry as a whole. To an extent the countryside was passive at first. The peasantry did not feel the same degree of hostility toward the Nazis as the Finnish workers, because the White Guardists have continuously spread the fable that the Germans helped to save Finland and the peasants' land from the Reds in 1918. The peasants were also taken in somewhat by the chauvinistic propaganda about taking back the territory ceded in the peace of 1940; they were especially irked because the forcibly evacuated inhabitants of the Karelian Isthmus area had been sent by the Finnish government to the countryside to live at the expense of the peasants, who were anxious to be rid of the burden caused by these evacuees. They believed that war would end when the former border was reached. But as the war dragged on, demanding greater and greater sacrifices from the masses in the countryside, their war-weariness grew and demands for peace have grown louder.

When the government decreed the confiscation of horses for the armed forces, over 20 per cent of the peasants refused to obey the decree. In the registration for military service, over 25 per cent of the men in the given class failed to show up in many townships in the provinces of Turku-Pori. In August, 1941, at Hyvinkaa, a group of Schutzguards-

men refused to leave for the front. The opposition to the war has since increased with the heavy casualties suffered. Villages are becoming depleted of men, horses and cattle.

The Finnish industrialists, financiers and great landlords were the principal group in Finland that supported the war. To a great extent they also had the support of the middle class in the urban communities. The Finnish bourgeoisie has long been rabidly anti-Soviet. The specter of the 1918 revolution has always haunted them. The growth and development of the Soviet Union have been their nightmare; they feared it would become a beacon for the low-paid and debt-ridden workers and peasants. Ever since their independence in 1918, they have lavishly appropriated funds to finance all kinds of agencies for anti-Soviet propaganda and launched numerous expeditions to capture the rich timberlands of Soviet Karelia. Even during the intervals when some measure of democracy prevailed in pre-war Finland, anti-Soviet societies were encouraged. The Academic Karelian Society held sway among the professionals and the students, and the notorious Lappo movement was fostered among the landowning class and the middle class in the urban communities. Both these movements were fascist, avowedly admiring Nazism even before it came to power, and wielding great influence in the leading circles of the government parties, the press and the army.

Anti-Sovietism has also been economically profitable for the business

circles of Finland. It fetched loans easily in Paris, London and New York in the days when Chamberlain-Bonnet appeasement held sway, and it helped to find markets for Finnish lumber and pulp products. Anti-Sovietism was linked with the dream of a "Greater Finland," which to the Finnish lumber barons has always been a "patriotic" slogan for the coveted great timberlands of Soviet Karelia.

Therefore it was not surprising that the Finnish bourgeoisie and its hangers-on should greet the joint war with Hitler against the Soviet Union. Not all of them were supporters of Nazism, but they were sure they were on the winning side. They believed that the Soviet Union would be defeated and they would be able to achieve their dream of a "Greater Finland," and retain this "Greater Finland," even should the Nazis later suffer a defeat at the hands of Britain and the United States.

The policy of Britain and the United States in the 1939-40 war had led them to believe that an alliance between these two countries and the Soviet Union would never be possible. After the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, they were further encouraged by the loud anti-Soviet editorials in the American and British press urging a "hands off" policy encouraging Hitler to defeat the Soviet Union, in the course of which Nazi Germany would itself be exhausted. Above all, they were encouraged by American official expressions of sympathy for Finland. Failure of the United States Government to condemn the alliance of

Finland with Nazi Germany until very late in the war encouraged these sentiments.

But today a change is taking place in the ranks of the Finnish bourgeoisie and the middle class. Part of them are beginning to question the policy of Mannerheim-Ryti-Tanner and Walden. They are beginning to express concern about their future, as indicated by the recent editorial in the newspaper *Helsingin Sanomat* written by the former foreign minister, Eljas Erkko, which emphasized the importance of Finland's independence, as its "most prized possession" and said it must not be traded for the "protection of a tenant's position." In September, 1941, when the Swedish Government had criticized Finland's policy of dependence on Hitler and its aspirations for a "Greater Finland" and advised the Finns to stay within their own borders, the *Helsingin Sanomat*, on September 22, 1941, arrogantly replied: "We have a sacred right to Soviet Karelia and the Province of Aunus," telling the Swedes to mind their own business.

Why this sudden concern for the future of Finland, as expressed by the organ of Risto Ryti's own party? Certainly, it was these gentlemen who took part in making the secret alliance with Hitler and inviting the Nazi troops into Finland. This sudden concern for the future of Finland was voiced by *Helsingin Sanomat* because great sections of the Finnish bourgeoisie and the middle class are worried about the outcome of this war. Their faith in the invincibility of the German army is

shattered. They see defeat staring them in the face.

During the sixteen months of war Finland has deteriorated economically, until today it is on the verge of catastrophe. The textile industry is practically at a standstill for lack of raw materials. The lumber and timber industry that employed 200,000 workers before the war has only 60,000 left. Germany monopolizes all of Finland's exports—timber, copper, nickel, celluloid and butter—and gives her nothing in return but promises of foodstuff from the other Nazi-occupied and plundered countries.

The colossal war budget has brought Finland to the brink of financial collapse. The cost of war for Finland every month is about two billion marks. The national debt has grown from \$80,000,000 in August, 1939, to \$560,000,000 in March, 1942. Gold reserves which before the war had amounted to 1,177,900,000 marks, had sunk by the end of the winter of 1941-42 to 171,000,000 marks. By March, 1942, the Finnish mark had depreciated almost 40 per cent of its value.

The war has cost Finland a huge toll in men. Eighteen per cent of the population has been mobilized to keep the fourteen divisions in the field. Three hundred thousand have been killed or wounded. Desertions from the army are growing. The labor situation is critical. The latest labor decree has prohibited any male from holding a clerical job if he is under 65 years of age.

By last winter and spring the food situation was hopeless. The meager rations in the urban communities

were "purely theoretical," as acknowledged by the Finnish Minister in Washington, Hjalmar Procope. The situation has improved slightly with this fall's harvest, but last year's harvest sufficed only through December, and in January and February even the seed grain was consumed. The much promised shipments of grain from Germany were "held up" by ice on the Baltic that never melted, as one of the Helsinki newspapers phrased it.

In face of this almost catastrophic economic situation at home and with Nazi victory further away than ever, the sections of the Finnish industrialists and professionals that did not wholeheartedly support the alliance with the Nazis but aided it passively are becoming panicky. With the Nazi failure to capture the Caucasus and Leningrad, as Hitler promised them this spring when he asked for additional troops from Finland, their impatience has grown. They are not certain of the defeat of the Soviet Union. With the continuation of the war, the Soviet Union is emerging as a decisive factor in the war and in the post-war peace. They see that the necessity of waging war to defeat the Axis is forging a greater unity among the United Nations. They no longer believe they will win in the event of victory of the United Nations and therefore feel that Finland should get out of her partnership with Hitler, if she expects not to be treated as an Axis ally.

On the other hand, they see that their country has come more and more under the domination of the Nazis and that they are no longer

masters in their own house, as was shown only recently when the Gestapo-dominated government police banned the issue of the *Sosialidemokraatti*, organ of the largest party, for an editorial voicing concern over Nazi domination in Finland. The great majority of the Finnish people today want peace and a break with the Nazis. As their demand grows louder, the Mannerheim-Ryti-Tanner clique depends more and more on Hitler to retain their power and keep Finland in the war.

## II

One of the least creditable phases of American foreign policy has been the position of our State Department in regard to Finland. This policy has been a source of confusion to the win-the-war elements and of comfort to the defeatists and proponents of negotiated peace, while serving as an obstacle to complete confidence among the United Nations. Nor has this vacillation aided in the encouragement and rallying of the anti-Hitler forces in Finland.

Our State Department waited until August 13, 1941, before it made its first move to approach the Finnish Government with the possibility of making a separate peace. The Finnish Government saw fit to ignore this advance, and again we waited until October 3, before we called the matter to the attention of Mr. Procope. But it was not until November 3 that State Secretary Hull sent his note to Finland demanding an answer to the proposals made in August. The Man-

nerheim Government in Helsinki answered Hull's note, as Berlin had indicated earlier that it would, by continuing its war. Although Mr. Hull had stated in his note that should the Finnish Government continue its war, we would consider her no longer a free agent but a puppet of Hitler, we failed to follow up this warning with action. Hitler's visit to Helsinki in June, 1942, to strengthen the hands of his Finnish Quislings in the suppression of the rising peace sentiments of the people and to demand a more active participation in the Nazi offensive against our Soviet ally, again woke up our State Department on this issue. Mr. Hull astounded and dismayed the victory forces by a very lame statement, which whitewashed the Finnish Government and Mannerheim and thereby repulsed the anti-war elements in Finland who had looked forward to American aid to get out of the war. Fortunately, Mannerheim's return visit to Hitler and pronouncements from Berlin dispelled any illusion that arose as to Mannerheim's and the Finnish Government's real stand.

On August 1, 1942, our State Department was finally forced to close the Finnish Consulates in the United States which had been functioning freely in leading war industrial centers for eight months after we were at war with the Axis. Even at that late date our State Department did not find it necessary to voice its condemnation of the Finnish Nazi puppets, but explained that the closing of the consulates was a result of technical differences, which it had taken over a year to dis-

cover. The Finnish rulers only ridiculed this action. The conservative and fascist-minded *Uusi Suomi* ironically remarked that "we have received from the United States frequent advice as to how we should make our war and how far our armies should advance"; the American decision about the consulates "is most probably a similar admonition."

Three and a half months have passed since the action to close the consulates. The Finnish pro-Nazi rulers have not heeded this new warning any more than the previous ones. Their Minister in Washington issues the same hypocritical statements as were put out a year ago, and the Finnish army continues to fight side by side with the Nazis on the United Nation's most important front, the Eastern Front. They have participated in Hitler's push on the Don and the Caucasus, and recently on Lake Ladoga, in the Nazi-Finnish attempt to cut off Leningrad completely. Nazi submarines and planes continue to operate from Finnish bases and to make the Arctic route the most dangerous to our convoys.

We sing loud praises for the valiant defenders of Stalingrad, and our Office of War Information keeps reminding us that the gallant fight of the Red Army has given us invaluable time to arm for safeguarding our security. We are told, "We are the United Nations; together we stand or together we fall." We all agree that the defeat of the Soviet Union would be catastrophic for the United Nations. Yet we have failed to take effective measures to remove

the burden of the Finnish Army on the Eastern Front and to clear our Northern supply route to the Soviet Union. How are we to retain the confidence of our allies and of the anti-Hitler and liberty-loving peoples of Europe and of Finland with a policy that gives comfort only to Hitler and his henchmen and by our refusal to break off relations with Hitler's puppets, even though this is dictated by the requirements for victory?

The Finnish Mannerheimites have spurned every advance made by our State Department. Yet we continue to apologize for them and go out of our way in a effort to uphold the lie of Hitler's Finnish puppets, that they are fighting an independent war. With this policy we are helping the Finnish Nazis to keep the Finnish Army in the field against our ally and are not contributing to the crystallization of an anti-Hitler front in Finland. Only a clear break and a declaration of war on Finland now would serve the cause of victory of the United Nations.

Our State Department policy has been guided by the wishful thought that it will be able to entice the Finnish Mannerheim regime out of the Nazi orbit. Any such expectations are illusory. The Finnish Mannerheim regime can no more leave the folds of Nazism than the leopard can change its spots. Mannerheim, Tanner and the other Finnish pro-Nazis have staked all on the victory of Nazism. Hitler's victory would establish the order that they want to see realized even though it would mean the enslavement of Finland. The security of America

will not permit us to offer what they want, a victorious Hitler in Europe.

Herr Tanner, the acknowledged spokesman for the Finnish Quislings, while in Berlin on September 20, 1941, spoke of the necessity of establishing a United States of Europe, based on economic and political unification. He said such a United States of Europe could not be established without the complete destruction of Bolshevism.

Is there any difference between Herr Hitler's and Herr Tanner's plan for the future of Europe? It is the "new order" which the "genial leader of Great Germany" is trying to establish.

Finnish rulers have stated time and time again that they will not make a separate peace. Mannerheim, in his Order of the Day in September, 1941, stated that he would not sheathe his sword until the whole of Soviet Karelia would be in Finnish hands. Tanner, in his speech at Viipuri on May 13, 1942, ridiculed the British and American claims that they are fighting for democracy, stating that "we in Finland despise that kind of artificial devotion to democracy . . . we don't even dream of a separate peace . . . we don't hope for lasting peace until the present Soviet Union is defeated. . . ."

Some claim, in the face of everything Finnish leaders themselves have stated, that Finland would make a separate peace, if the United States and Britain would guarantee the provisions of the Atlantic Charter to her. These people think that the Finnish Government accepts and

respects the Atlantic Charter. The Finnish newspapers have not anything complimentary to say about the Atlantic Charter, unquestionably expressing thereby the official government position, in view of the strict press censorship. They have stated that the Atlantic Charter has "nice words and promises that have been over-used and are out-worn" on which the people cannot rely. This caused the pro-Mannerheim *New Yorkin Uutiset*, on November 14, 1941, to lament the fact that the Finnish newspapers give cause for misunderstanding in America when they write statements like the following:

"After the present great changes and hard experiences the permanent peace on the European continent at least must be placed on new and different foundations than those that have been tried and proved greatly disappointing."

Columnist "Vaasan Jaakko," in *Ilkka*, organ of the Agrarian Party, was even more outspoken and extravagant:

"While the war leaders of America and England are conferring, figuring and planning a great thrust and speak of all the nations of the world joining the war, Germany doesn't say a word. It strikes down the millions of the Russian army and advances like a steamroller.

"Others jump and are frantic, the most panicky already speak of peace. And yet it is Germany that will decide that question."

Would our guarantees on the basis of the Atlantic Charter satisfy those who believe and hope that

Hitler will decide the peace and have founded their policy on Nazi conquest and domination? As we have seen, these pro-Nazi ruling elements do not even represent the sentiments of the main classes in Finland, and the continued recognition of these elements will never help us achieve the only objective which might, by any stretch of imagination, justify our current policy, that is, get Finland out of the war.

Some newspaper columnists cite the fact that Finland has not declared war on the United States as a sign of weakness in the Finnish-Nazi ties and as a proof of the independent role of the Finnish Government. However, the whole question of Finnish relations with the United States, as far as the Mannerheim forces are concerned, will be guided by Hitler, who will continue to use the Finnish issue to weaken the United Nations war effort and to strengthen the pro-Axis Munich forces who cling to our Finnish policy as one of the avenues of a negotiated peace with Hitler. The time has come when we must also stop dilly-dallying with Finland and bring our Finnish policy in line with our new offensive spirit, policy, and action. Our position of leadership and prestige in the United Nations struggle cannot be founded on a refusal to meet these problems energetically and decisively and on slovenly capitulation to disruptive elements. It is about time that our policy and actions reflect the position of President Roosevelt, who has linked Finland with Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and Italy

in submitting to Hitler and doing his bidding.

### III

Despite the aforementioned weaknesses of our Finnish policy, which have given encouragement to the myth about Finland's "independent war," a good portion of the American public has evaluated the role Finland is playing in this war in its correct light. They condemn the Finnish Government for giving aid to our enemy Hitler, and the sentiment is ever increasing toward an open declaration of war against Finland. The 365 outstanding Americans who signed an Open Letter to the President last June urging a declaration of war on the Finnish Mannerheim regime, have brought this question to the attention of the American people and have received wide support.\* Numerous commentators, newspaper columnists and newspapers have supported this demand. The National Maritime Union, many of whose members have lost their lives near the coast of Finland, has demanded action to safeguard the Northern supply route to the Soviet Union.

The recent C.I.O. Convention adopted a resolution calling "upon the government of the United States treat the Axis-dominated government of Finland as the enemy of all the United Nations."

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\* It is regrettable that the impressive statement of the 911 Protestant ministers issued on October 27, calling upon the governments of the United States and the British Commonwealth to make war upon Vichy France, Franco Spain and all fascist states, failed to include by name Mannerheim Finland.

The failure of our government to place Finland in the same category as the other Axis vassals has been utilized by the Finnish Mannerheim agents as a source of confusion and indecision. Despite this, the majority of the Finnish-Americans are supporting the United Nations war effort. The "Finnish issue" has aroused little interest among the majority, that is, the second generation of Finnish-Americans. They are an integral part of their community and its war effort. Finnish national chauvinism has not succeeded in getting a foothold among them.

The Committee of Finnish-American Trade Union Leaders, organized in December, 1941, has made a substantial contribution, not only by helping to rally the Finnish-American workers to support the Administration's win-the-war policy, but by raising the issue of Finland in the American labor movement. Due to the efforts of this committee and its members, those C.I.O. locals, Central and State Councils, and some A. F. of L. locals, in territories inhabited by Finnish-American workers, have gone on record urging a declaration of war on Finland.

The immigrant Finnish-Americans are divided into three main groups: those that actively defend the Mannerheim policy in Finland, those who have not taken a definite stand, and the progressives who have always condemned Mannerheim ever since the 1918 experiences.

Realizing that they are losing the support of the Finnish-Americans which they had during the first

Finnish-Soviet War, the Mannerheim agents are trying to make the most of the opportunity that our indecisive policy gives them. They immediately label those who question Finland's participation in the war on the side of the Nazis as "supporters of Russia and the Reds." Their argument is that the United States recognized the "dilemma" of "poor little Finland" and that only the interests of the Soviet Union demand a break with Finland. But these agents do not confine their effort to anti-Soviet propaganda and Red-baiting; they slander our British ally, our President, and our war policy, and attempt to arouse hopes for an ultimate Nazi victory.

A certain section of the Finnish-American press is actively engaged in spreading this Finnish-Nazi propaganda. Lately it has been more covert, because of exposure by the progressive press. In the East the nationalist *New Yorkin Uutiset*, a Mannerheim supporter of long standing, and the *Raivaaja*, which supports the Tannerite wing of the Finnish fascists, are spokesmen for Finnish Minister Procope. In the Middle West, among them are the *Paivalehti* (*Raivaaja's* Mid-West edition) and the *Amerikan Suometar* in Hancock, Michigan, organ of the Finnish Lutheran Synod, whose politics are colored by a Finnish fascist-minded Reverend Kyllonen. A unique situation exists on the West Coast, where a Tanner supporter, Eero Pulli, member of the Finnish Diet, a representative sent here with the aid of the Finnish Government to whip the Finnish-Americans into line in 1939-40, edits

the *Lannen Suometar* in Astoria, Ore. It has not been chance that the *Lannen Suometar* has no different occasions published articles by a certain John I. Kolehmainen, of Heidelberg College, Tiflis, Ohio, which have been reprinted in New York under the supervision of Minister Hjalmar Procope himself and mailed to the American press and columnists, and the Catholic circles close to Reverend Curran of Brooklyn. The same Mr. Pulli attacked the Open Letter to the President that was signed by the 365 leading Americans urging a declaration of war on Finland as insignificant because many of the signers "were Jews and Negroes."

The main task of these papers is to "prove" that "Finland is fighting an independent war to safeguard her independence against the Russian attack" and that she is not an ally of Hitler. On November 21, 1941, in this effort to vindicate Mannerheim Finland, *New Yorkin Uutiset* was even ready to attack our government's war policy. It wrote: "Finland is the only country that really honestly fights for humanity, justice and democracy. Regardless of that the United States sent a warning to Finland to stay within its own borders. . . . It seems that America is not defending democracy but British hegemony, not justice but something else."

These gentlemen, of course, ignore the facts that the Soviet Union is not only responsible for the original independence of Finland, but has always sought to establish and maintain friendly relations with its little neighbor. After the 1939-40

war, the Soviet Union made special efforts in this direction, but the Mannerheim Government replied with the arrest and persecution of Finnish citizens who, under the leadership of Dr. Mauri Ryoma, were attempting to improve relations between the two countries. The Mannerheim clique, intent on pursuing a pro-Nazi policy, even made an agreement to open Finland to the Nazis, who proved to be helpful in keeping down the Finnish masses. The friendly attitude of the Soviet Union was shown in the fact that, a short time before the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union, a large shipment of grain arrived from the U.S.S.R. to help feed the Finnish people. Even after the Nazis launched their attack against the Soviet Union from Finnish bases, the Soviet air force bombed only these Finnish air fields and ports used by the Nazis. Full-fledged warfare between Finland and the Soviet Union developed only after the Finns openly joined with the Nazis in war upon the Soviet Union. This was recognized even by neutral observers in Stockholm, who ridiculed the Finnish claims of Soviet aggression, reminding them of the Finnish Government's own official admission that there were five Nazi divisions stationed on Finnish soil. By its brazen alignment with Nazi Germany, the Mannerheim clique revealed the real culprits in the 1939-40 Finnish-Soviet war. In the light of the present war the whole world can now see that the position of the Soviet Union in that war was completely misrepresented.

The pro-Mannerheim Finnish

press in the United States would like their readers to forget what they wrote about pro-Nazi tendencies in Finland and about Nazi cooperation before the Finnish Government considered it expedient to deny it. In a long editorial on October 25, 1940, *Raivaaja* wrote: "Hitler has prepared to give another blow through Finland. Latest reports state that German soldiers are at Finnish strategic positions. Organization of an attack against Leningrad is only a question of a few days." Later when the Finnish Minister in Washington "denied" that there were any German soldiers in Finland, *Raivaaja* tried to "prove" that all talk of Germans being in Finland was malicious propaganda spread by the progressive Finnish-American dailies, *Eteenpain* and *Tyomies*. Yet when the attack was launched against the Soviet Union, *Raivaaja* had to report that, as the Finnish Government officially acknowledged, there were five divisions of Nazi troops in Finland.

In an editorial "Is Finland going toward totalitarianism?" on November 24, 1940, the *New Yorkin Uutiset* quotes an editorial of a Finnish newspaper *Itsenainen Suomi* and states that "in Finland they look at German Nazism with a different eye than here in America. Here it is considered a danger to culture, in Finland according to the *Itsenainen Suomi* as a defender of culture. . . ." It goes on to quote *Itsenainen Suomi*: "The German uprising and awakening has affected all of the European countries, in its particular way also Finland. We

have the same aspirations to achieve as the new Germany. We have of our own accord and on our own national basis traveled along the same road as the German people. Unconditional national defense, placing serious responsibilities and self-denial upon our youth, and a Hellenic glorification of physical fitness have unified both of these nations." Editor Rafael Sederholm of the *Itsenainen Suomi* goes on to classify Hitler's war as a war for independence as the first Soviet-Finnish war was supposed to have been. The *New Yorkin Uutiset* was worried that this sort of open, brazen comparison would not go so well in the United States. And yet today they claim that Finland, where they glorify the Nazi war of conquest, is the "only country that is really fighting for democracy."

An ever greater number of the Finnish-Americans are beginning to condemn the role that Finland is playing in this present war. The large membership of the Central Cooperative Wholesale in the Middle West, which gave support to Finland during the 1939-40 war,

does not support it today, although it has not yet made a complete break. Its leadership and its weekly organ, *Tyovaen Osuustoimintalehti*, have not gone further than to express hope that Finland would get out of this war. Its weakness is but a reflection of our indecisive policy. A break with Finland would rally most of the Finnish-Americans for total war effort.

Our policy must once and for all cleanse itself of all remnants that encourage the dreams of the anti-Soviet circles in America, the Hoovers and Vandenberges, the Reynoldses and Dieses, of keeping Finland in reserve as a jumping off place for intrigue and possible future attacks against the Soviet Union. This is an indispensable requirement for the maintenance of mutual confidence and for the fullest cooperation of all the United Nations, not only for victory over Hitler, but for the post-war peace. Now that our country has definitely gone over to the offensive, the speedy readjustment of our Finnish policy should be possible without serious difficulty.

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# THE FREE GERMANS TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE \*

BY PAUL MERKER

*German anti-fascist leader and former Reichstag member, for years one of the leaders of the underground struggle within Hitler Germany.*

**T**HERE are decisions in politics which put character, morale, faith of convictions and patriotism to the highest test. German history has produced many men who, expelled by reaction from their fatherland, had to make the hardest of decisions.

To gain freedom for their country they were compelled to fight Germany's governing regime and—to all outward appearances—the country itself. It was in England that Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote their immortal contributions to the liberation of mankind. Heinrich Heine composed his deadly accusations against German reaction, his glowing declarations for the German revolution, in Paris. Carl Schurz, a hero of the German democratic revolution of 1848, fought under the liberating banner of Abraham Lincoln.

When reaction pushed Hitler into

power by way of the backstairs of the President's Palace, we free Germans, too, were faced with a similar decision. And again, we were put to the test when Nazi plutocracy led the German people into the imperialist war of plunder.

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As a German Deputy I have sworn to serve my people to the best of my knowledge and conscience. To defend the eternal principles of freedom and progress was my rule of conduct in Parliament, in the hideouts of illegality, in the underground struggle within Germany and in the concentration camps of Vichy France. And I act in accordance with these principles when today I greet this conference against the Hitler terror, a conference which I consider a great contribution to the struggle against criminal Hitler fascism.

The trenches of the struggle for freedom cut across all continents of the earth. Mexican democracy and independence, therefore, are as precious to us free Germans as to

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\* Speech delivered at the third session of the Assembly Against Nazi-Fascist Terror, at the Fine Arts Palace, Mexico City, October 15, 1942. The speech was delivered in German and as here given is a translation from the Spanish text.)

every Mexican citizen. We are duty-bound and determined to defend them with the same devotion and the same enthusiasm. In the name of all free Germans, I wish to express again from this platform our thanks for the generous help which the Mexican government has extended to our comrades interned in France and for the great hospitality accorded us. Asylum in Mexico was, for us, salvation from the hands of the Gestapo and opportunity to continue our more than ten-year-old struggle against our deadly enemy, Hitler fascism.

Every free German abroad and every enemy of Hitler within Germany is filled with deadly hate against Hitler fascism, which wiped out all political rights of the masses, established a regime of terror within the country and plunged the people into the war. This deadly hate is accompanied by a deep shame for the countless crimes and atrocities committed by the Hitler forces in the occupied countries and in the Soviet Union.

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The Soviet Union has never been Germany's enemy. She did not sign the Versailles Treaty. She was the first big country which, after the last World War, signed a pact of friendship with the German people. It was the Soviet Union which, during the time of the economic crisis, secured work and bread for the German working masses through large orders on German industry. Through her policy of collective security the Soviet Union tried to save the world and with it the German

people from the tremendous sacrifices of a new world war. Never had the Soviet Union any intention of attacking any people, and certainly not the German people.

Despite this, Hitler basely attacked the Soviet Union. He knew that his criminal plans to conquer the world were bound to fail as long as the Soviet Union, her mighty economy and her brave Red Army remained in existence. For this reason he sent his panzer divisions against Leningrad, Moscow, and Stalingrad, destroyed the countryside, murdered millions of its peaceful inhabitants, and forced men, women and children—Russians, White Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Lithuanians, Latvians, Karelians, Esthonians and Don Cossacks—by way of his Gestapo agents into slave labor against their own bleeding fatherland.

Humanity's worst enemies, Hitler and his gangster accomplices, his Gestapo and his hordes of S.S.-Elite Guards are to blame for the indescribable atrocities committed throughout Europe and the Soviet Union. As much to blame are his employers, the rulers of the monopolist German economy, the large landowners, the generals and high state officials who largely belong to the same class.

\* \* \*

Also responsible for these atrocities is the entire German people—until it frankly breaks with Hitler fascism and in one front, together with the Allies, rises against the regime in armed struggle.

I am a representative of the Ger-

man workers, and I know them too well to believe for one moment that in the majority they are for Hitler fascism. But during the last ten years the German working class has left to a heroic minority the task of carrying on an active struggle against the Nazi regime, its terror and its war.

Hitler was able to murder thousands of revolutionary German workers and progressive middle-class people, to throw hundreds of thousands into concentration camps, to drive the Jewish population into death, and to ruin the peasants and the middle classes. With the fire of Nazi bombs, Hitler was able to wipe out the old city of Guernica; to crush the independence of Austria with his tanks; with his Gestapo hordes to take the national freedom of Czechoslovakia; to murder 200,000 men, women and children in Poland; and to shoot thousands of hostages in France, Belgium, Norway, and the Balkans. But, with the exception of the illegal fighters, the masses of the German working class remained practically silent throughout.

When Hitler began his malicious assault upon the Soviet Union, the eyes of all the world were directed upon the German workers. Would they also let themselves be ordered to fight on this field of battle? Would they continue in the same manner to build guns and airplanes? Would they serve this war machine in order to destroy the socialist industry, built with the sweat and blood of the Russian workers? To set fire to the fields of the collective farms, the harvests of which were

the property of the Russian peasants? To destroy the homes of Russian culture?

When the German-Russian war began, it should have been the historic moment for the German working class to increase its struggle of resistance a hundredfold. Slowly and hesitatingly, this struggle has increased during the last fifteen months. Mass movements against Hitler fascism have not yet occurred. On the other hand, the German people's responsibility has grown much more terribly with each succeeding month.

Certainly, the terror machine in Germany is strong. A closely-knit Gestapo net enmeshes the entire country and covers the Nazi army. But it is exactly because the German working class is only slowly growing conscious of its responsibility and its revolutionary traditions, because it has not gone over to mass action against Hitler fascism, that the growing Gestapo terror against the heroic minority (though their number is growing continuously), becomes so terribly effective. The number of shootings of revolutionary workers is increasing daily in Germany. And the fear of this revolutionary minority has caused Hitler, with the aid of the Pétain-Laval regime, to take into his power the political refugees in France, including former Reichstag members Dahlem, Raedel, Rau, Auerbach, Wagner and others.

The free Germans are working to mobilize the masses of German workers, of German soldiers, of peasants and artisans, of Catholic and Protestant Christians and the

masses of women against the war and against Hitler fascism. They fight for the defeat of Hitler fascism and for the defeat of the entire Axis. They fight for the offensive conduct of the war, for launching the Western Front that will aid the Red Army in drawing out the Hitler hordes and that will bring speedy victory to Britain, the United States and all the United Nations.

In the Nazi fascist armies that have assaulted the Soviet Union and other peoples, the free Germans see nothing but bandits. They are for the destruction of the Hitlerites and of every member of these invading hordes as long as they carry arms against the peoples of the invaded countries and do not surrender.

The free Germans fight against Hitler's fifth column; they are opposed to Hitler's infamous race theory, directed against the great majority of the peoples of the earth. They condemn Hitler's anti-Semitism.

The free Germans are deadly enemies of Hitler's plans to conquer the world, and they fight for the liberation of all the nations oppressed by Hitler and for the reparation of the damage caused them.

The free Germans in the Soviet Union, in England, in occupied France and on the American continent, try to convince the masses of the German people and soldiers, through radio and leaflets distributed over Germany and the occupied countries, that their future is threatened only by Hitler fascism and that every passing day

of war further threatens the future of the German people and threatens its unity; that the overthrow and destruction of the Hitler regime and of the hundreds of thousands of Nazi criminals, and the elimination of the hidden masters of so-called National-Socialism, are the conditions for the liberation of the subjugated peoples and for a free Germany. We do not keep it from the German masses that the world demands of them actions against Hitler and that these actions must come before it is too late.

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The Anglo-Soviet and U.S.-Soviet mutual assistance pacts and the Atlantic Charter constitute a powerful weapon to be used by all free Germans. The free Germans are opposed to such concepts as that Hitler fascism and the German people are one. Such a conception is wrong, as is shown by the ten years of illegal struggle of the revolutionary minority in Nazi Germany, by the great dissatisfaction and the steadily sinking war morale of the German people. We are against such a conception because its propagation is useful only to Hitler and not to the anti-Hitler coalition of the United Nations.

We are for the reparation of the tremendous damages which the Nazi-fascist bandits caused in the Soviet Union and in the subjugated countries, and for the punishment of all those who are guilty, beginning with the immediate bringing to book of Nazi No. 3, Rudolf Hess. We do not keep it from the German people that it will have to shoulder

such economic retribution and all other reparations made necessary by the depredations of the Axis marauders against any and all members of the United Nations. On the other hand, we are for the right of self-determination of the German people and of all peoples in the regulation of their internal affairs after the war. For this self-determination will lead in Germany above all things to a real settlement of accounts with the Nazi regime, its accomplices and its beneficiaries.

The free Germans are for the timely formation of the second front, which is as longingly awaited by the German anti-fascists as by the peoples of the Soviet Union, her allies and by the peoples of the countries oppressed by Hitler fascism. Before the Munich compromise, a strong anti-fascist movement developed in Germany in opposition to the robber war planned by Hitler. The compromise of Munich gave Hitler the possibility of suppressing this growing movement, of inciting sections of the people against the Western powers, and of executing the bloody Jewish pogroms. Today, under the influence of the heroic resistance of the Red Army and the guerrilla fighters, the anti-fascist movement grows again in Germany and will continue to grow. However, this movement will be impeded if the expectations of the German anti-fascists for a second front, which will divide the forces of Hitler fascism and make possible the crushing pincer-offensive from east and west, are disappointed.

The fate of the German people

is related to that of the peoples of the Soviet Union, of Britain, of the Americas, of China, of all liberty-loving nations of the earth.

\* \* \*

We free Germans also use this platform to appeal to you, the masses of the German people.

German workers, soldiers, women! Rise up against the Hitler bandits. Turn your guns against them, their Gestapo agents, their Elite Guard. Shoot down the murderers, plunderers and executioners like mad dogs that are persecuting and exterminating the masses of people in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union and in the other occupied countries. Use every opportunity to surrender to the Red Army. Sabotage Hitler's war production and communications; work more slowly; leave your places of work during air attacks; organize protest demonstrations and strikes. Fraternize with your foreign fellow-workers!

German workers, soldiers, women! Realize that the terror of the Gestapo and the S.S.-Elite Guard exists not only in Germany. It is as sharp and even sharper in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union, in occupied France, in Holland, Belgium, Norway, Poland, Yugoslavia, and Greece. But in all these countries the patriots successfully resist the invaders and cause them immeasurable damage. Even the brave working class of tiny Luxembourg has attempted a general strike against the Nazi barbarians.

German workers, soldiers, wom-

en! Realize that great sacrifices are necessary to free yourselves in the struggle from responsibility for the infamous crimes of Hitler fascism, and to become free. But these sacrifices are much less in comparison to the sacrifices which Hitler's predatory war in the Soviet Union

causes to the masses of the German people.

Rise to the battle on the side of the Soviet Union and all the United Nations for the final destruction of Hitler fascism and for the triumph of humanity and progress in this world!

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STATEMENT OF THE OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, CIRCULATION, ETC.,  
REQUIRED BY THE ACTS OF CONGRESS OF AUGUST 24, 1912, AND  
MARCH 3, 1933, OF THE COMMUNIST, published monthly at New York,  
N. Y., for October, 1942.

State of New York            }  
County of New York        } ss.

Before me, a Notary Public in and for the State and county aforesaid, personally appeared Wallace Douglas, who, having been duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is the Business Manager of THE COMMUNIST and that the following is, to the best of his knowledge and belief, a true statement of the ownership, management (and if a daily paper, the circulation), etc., of the aforesaid publication for the date shown in the above caption, required by the Act of August 24, 1912, as amended by the Act of March 3, 1933, embodied in Section 537, Postal Laws and Regulations, printed on the reverse of this form, to wit:

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