WORLD LABOR AND THE SECOND FRONT

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EARL BROWDER

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V. J. JEROME

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THE FUTURE OF THE ANGLO-SOVIET-AMERICAN COALITION*

BY EARL BROWDER

WE HAVE been informed that the decisions taken at the Quebec Anglo-American conference will be revealed on the field of action. Authoritative information therefore awaits the turn of events. But it is not too soon for us to get clearly before us the fact that the world stands at a crossroad, and the next events will show which fork of the road our own country is taking.

It is the peculiarity of the present moment that, because great victories have been won by the United Nations against Hitler-Germany, the relations between our country, Britain, and the Soviet Union are undergoing a crisis. It is clear that decisive questions are placed on the order of the day for an answer. Either the leading coalition of the United Nations is going to be consolidated for victory and the post-war reorganization of the world, or it is going to deteriorate sharply and thus place dark question marks over both victory and the perspectives of the post-war world. The events which unfold from the Quebec decisions will soon show us which way we have taken.

A military decision over Hitlerism in Europe is within our grasp this year. That is the great fact which emerges from the smashing of Hitler's summer offensive in the Soviet Union and the passing over to counter-offensive by the Red Army along the whole Eastern Front.

Before our country and Britain is raised the question: Do we want victory now, when it is clearly possible if we throw our military weight into the scales, or shall we wait longer, say until the Spring of 1944, in the hopes that victory then will be bought much more cheaply?

That was the most important question before the Quebec Conference. Upon the answer given to that question depends to no small extent the future of the world.

* * *

A year ago we faced the same question. After the London and Washington conferences, participated in by Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov, had declared full agreement had been reached "on the ur-

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*A speech delivered at Manhattan Center, New York City, September 2, 1943.
gent task of opening the second front in Europe in 1942," that decision was not carried out. A multitude of reasons were found why it was impossible or undesirable to execute that urgent task in 1942. Instead of the second front, Britain and the United States undertook to establish a number of secondary fronts, that is, to engage in peripheral warfare. We were told that it would require much time, at least until the Spring of 1943, before adequate preparations could be made to open the second front in Europe. And finally it was explained that the agreement of June, 1942, was only on the "urgency" of the second front, and not an agreement to open such a front. Now it is already September, 1943, and before the end of this month we should know whether Quebec finally decided to honor the agreement of June, 1942, or to repeat the reconsideration of 1942.

I wish I could give you positive assurance that the postponement of last year is not being repeated this year. It seems unthinkable, from every realistic point of view, that Quebec could have failed to seize the opportunity for victory this year in Europe, that it could have made any other decision but that of landing in full force in Western Europe before the Summer is ended. Since, however, it is impossible to give such an assurance, it has become unavoidably necessary to face and answer the question: What are the consequences that must flow from another postponement of the Second Front?

Unquestionably such an eventuality would result in a profound deterioration of the relationships between Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The failure to realize the second front even during the beginning of the third year of coalition inevitably changes the relations between the leading powers, for it poses the alternative: Either Britain and the United States are unwilling to carry any proportionate share of the fighting, or they are unable to do so. And either of these alternatives is fatal to the concept of full coalition between the three leading great powers. Coalition, partnership, is equally impossible in its full sense, whether the default of obligations arises from weakness or from bad faith.

The argument that the Anglo-American armed forces are too weak to open the second front is an insult to our soldiers, to our General Staff, and to the intelligence. America alone is producing more war material than Germany; we are delivering those materials in England in enormous quantities, and the British themselves are producing at least half as much as Germany; we have millions of soldiers in training for one or two years, who are rusting from lack of action; we have proved in Africa and Sicily our ability to solve all technical problems with brilliance; we have proved everywhere any fighting has taken place that our soldiers are second to none in the world; the U-boats have been mastered in the Atlantic so that there are no longer even serious losses of our overwhelming superiority of materials.
—In short, it must be said that the last semblance of an excuse of inability to open the second front has disappeared. We are able to do it in overwhelming force any time our leaders give the word.

The New York Times has been conducting an intensive campaign to convince its readers—and perhaps itself also—that our country and the British, by peripheral warfare and by air-bombing carried to the vital centers of Germany, have found a full substitute for the second front, are carrying our proportionate share of the fighting, and are even mainly responsible for the victories of the Red Army. This argument has significance mainly as the product of an uneasy conscience. It collapses of its own weight the moment it faces the question of how to bring a victorious ending of the war as quickly as possible, the question of whether it is not possible to shorten the war. The moment the question of time is dealt with as a vital one, which means life for millions of the population of the occupied lands, not to mention our own costs of war, then it is no longer possible to argue against the second front. There is no substitute, there is no ersatz which is "cheaper and just as good." Nothing ends Nazism except military occupation by fighting armies. All else is auxiliary, is peripheral warfare.

How little Britain and our own country have engaged in the fighting tasks of this war as yet is interestingly revealed, without any conclusion being drawn, by an editorial in the Times of August 28.

Deploring the high accident rate in our country, the Times compares it with our war casualties and concludes: "In a period of greatly reduced operation of motor vehicles, traffic accidents in a single year cost 9,000 more lives than action on the fighting fronts in a year and a half of war." In other words the kind of warfare we are making is safer than the highways of the United States, it is peripheral war, the war of limited commitments, the type of war that is not directed to crushing the enemy in the shortest possible time.

There is no real economy of life and blood in this type of war, and the appearance of it is illusory. It is illusion of the same type as that of the Munich betrayal which Chamberlain boasted had brought "peace in our time." We cannot shift the burdens of this war to other shoulders, and any attempt to do so can only bring misfortune to our own country.

Dark and sinister forces in our country find freedom for their work in the atmosphere of this type of war in which we avoid the fighting of the decisive front. They reveal what they aim at, when they accuse the Soviet Union of preparing a separate and negotiated peace with Hitlerite Germany. They accuse others of what they have in mind to do themselves. Particularly odious is this accusation against the Soviet Union at the moment her Red Army is killing millions of the enemy, at enormous cost to herself, while American casualties are still less than our traffic accidents!

As far as the actual struggle for
possession of Europe is concerned, the Yugoslav Partisan Army has engaged in greater direct military struggle against the Hitler hordes than the combined millions of America and Britain have so far done. On the other side, the Finland of the fascist Mannerheim has thrown more armed forces directly onto the side of Hitler than the great Anglo-Saxon powers have thrown against him.

It is humiliating for an American to face these facts and to admit them. But they are facts, they are inescapable, and the sooner we recognize them and draw the necessary conclusions, the closer we will be to victory.

The facts are bad enough. But the talk of most of our newspapers and public commentators is much worse than the facts! It seems calculated to convince the rest of the world that Americans are either irresponsible fools or hopeless rogues! For example, there is all this chatter, in the attempt to cover up the glaring absence of the second front, about the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh fronts. Behind this nonsense there is either complete ignorance of the nature of war, or there is a malicious attempt to cover up the real issue at stake. The second front is made to appear the special invention and interest of the Soviet Union. In fact, of course, as every intelligent and informed person must know, the very basis of all strategy directed toward victory in a great war has been, for over a hundred years, based upon the concept of the second front—the engagement of the main forces of the enemy from two directions. No one knows this better than the British and the American General Staffs, and if they do not act upon this knowledge it can only be because as military experts they have been overruled by themselves in the capacity of politicians subject to reactionary influence. It is insulting to the intelligence to be asked to listen respectfully to the nonsense of the many fronts as the explanation why the second front, in the classical sense of military strategy, has not been opened.

Without the second front in Western Europe that will engage a considerable fraction of Hitler’s total armed forces, there does not exist serious coalition warfare.

* * *

If the Anglo-American coalition does not conduct serious coalition warfare, what is left of the coalition?

There is left the enormous fact that the three great powers are still at war against a common enemy. And I think it is safe to declare that never again, in the foreseeable future, will the United States and Britain be as close to joining a war against the Soviet Union as our nations were in the Winter of 1939-40, when our country financed Mannerheim and when Chamberlain and Daladier were feverishly organizing a military expedition to go to Mannerheim’s rescue. The fact that Rudolph Hess failed in his mission, and that no new Hess can come upon the scene with greater prospects of success, leaves a cer-
tain solid substance, even if the form is negative, to the coalition even after it has failed to develop fully in active form of coalition warfare.

It will be a coalition, however, in which the relationships between the great powers are regulated on the “principle” advocated by William C. Bullitt of the “carrot and the club.” We should have no illusions that Mr. Bullitt’s “principle” can be adopted by our country and Britain in dealing with the Soviet Union without that country taking measures to protect itself. And we should have no illusions that we can leave the Red Army to destroy Hitler practically alone in the field, while we, the Anglo-Saxon powers, come into the finish with our strength unimpaired, dictating the peace to all and sundry including the victorious Soviet Union. That may be a beautiful Tory dream, but it simply does not correspond to the cold realities of the modern world. Mr. Bullitt’s “carrot and club” may turn out to be something different than it was conceived, something resembling a two-edged sword.

Such a relationship within the coalition would be unfortunate for all concerned, for all humanity. It would delay victory and enormously increase its cost. It would cast a deep shadow over the post-war world. It is a relationship that is tolerable only as something not so bad as the complete dissolution of the coalition.

I submit, however, the serious suggestion that the unfortunate consequences of such a deterioration of the coalition would injure most of all the United States. Only a shallow and vulgar conception of American national interest can ignore the supreme interest which the United States has in orderly world relationships which depend, in the last analysis, upon close friendship and collaboration between the two most powerful countries in the world, our own country and the Soviet Union. Both countries have a common positive interest in friendship and cooperation—but the United States is much less prepared to solve its problems in the absence of a close alliance with the Soviet Union than is that country. We should finally understand that we must meet the Soviet Union halfway, as equals, if we want such a close and enduring alliance. We should understand that words carry weight in international relationships only to the degree that they are backed up by deeds. If it is not clear from the well-known facts revealed by the war that the United States has the most to lose from a weakening of the coalition, that fact will be beyond doubt in the further developments of events.

The Bullitt school of thought says we must not open the second front until after we have defeated Japan in the Far East, that the victories of the Red Army therefore are a menace to us, since we “need” Hitler as a “club” to force the Soviet Union to give us a “second front” against Japan. Let us examine that thought a little more closely in the light of cold reality. It is a product of twisted minds like those which conceived Munich.

A decisive factor of Japan’s strength in the Far East is the rise
of Hitlerism in Europe. Now that Hitler's back is being broken by the Red Army, Japan is losing that factor in her favor—except to the degree that this is offset by the loosening of the anti-Hitler alliance. If Hitler would be finished off this year, which is quite possible, by the concerted blows of the entire coalition, that would shatter the very basis of Japan's position in the Far East. Therefore, the postponement of the second front in Europe is at the same time postponement of the heaviest blow that could be delivered against Japan's strategic position in the world; the weakening of the anti-Hitler coalition is a strengthening of Japan's position.

The assumption that we can "trade" a second front in Europe to the Soviet Union for the quid pro quo of a second front against Japan, is such an imbecility that it is a shame it must be answered. Yet this thought operates in American politics, and must be dealt with openly. It amounts, in substance, to an effort to get the Soviet Union to fight the war for us in both Asia and Europe. If the Soviet leaders could conceivably be influenced by such cheap politics they would be incapable of leading a great nation, and would be poor allies for us. It ignores the facts, that the Soviet Union long protected our American interests in the Far East without our assistance and even against our hostile attitude, and still is, as a neutral, our greatest support in Asia. It forgets that such a cynical attitude toward the Soviet Union has the effect of driving her further away from the United States, not to bring any kind of closer collaboration. And above all, it forgets the long-time problem of reconstruction of order in the Far East, in which Soviet collaboration can be secured if and when we adopt a clear line of policy which is also democratic enough to be consistent with Soviet interests.

Our relations with the Soviet Union are intimately tied up with Anglo-American relations. It is an illusion to think that we can come closer to Britain by weakening our relations with the Soviet Union. The opposite is true. The weakening of one part of the Anglo-Soviet-American alliance weakens the whole structure; the strengthening of one part of it helps to strengthen the other. When we take a course which tends to separate us from the Soviet ally, we are at the same time destroying the foundations for all world order, we are taking the path of a new isolationism. Those are harsh and unpleasant facts, but it is better that we face them in all their nakedness.

* * *

I have projected only a few illustrative lines of the probable consequences of a failure to open the second front in Europe this year. It is not necessary to attempt now to complete the picture. Our task now is limited to getting some clear idea of the possible directions which are being chosen at this critical moment in world history. Since there is a mounting volume of evidence which points to the possibility of another postponement of the second front, it has been our unavoidable
duty to point out the general char-
acter of the unfortunate conse-
quences for our own country which
must flow from such a course.

It is certainly not too late for
decisive steps to seal the coalition
which can bring a victorious peace
to the world. It is entirely within
the realm of possibility that tomor-
row or the next day we may receive
the news of this great event. Above
all we should understand we are all
taking part in this decision—by
what we do and say, or by our
passively leaving the decision to
others.

It is in the nature of a moment
of crisis that it contains within it-
self the potentialities of a great
turn for the better or a decisive
turn for the worse. We can be cer-
tain of only one thing, that the An-
glo-Soviet-American coalition is go-
ing to be much more consolidated
soon, or it is going to deteriorate
most seriously, that it cannot drift
along as at present, and that each
one of us has a duty to perform in
participating in that decision.

A big effort is being made by the
reactionary camp to saddle respon-
sibility upon President Roosevelt
for all the waverings and retreats
that mar our war policy, both at
the battle front and the home front.
In this they are being joined by
too many liberals who confuse lib-
eralism with instability. It would
indeed be a catastrophic situation
for our country if our Commander-
in-Chief had surrendered to the re-
actionaries. But it is my considered
judgment that this is not the case.
It is my opinion that the President
is fighting for a correct policy, and
that he is fighting much better than
most of his liberal critics who are
so ready to cry out that he is bet-
raying them. He is fighting in his
own way, of course, and it is not
the way of the Communists, nor
is it the way of Labor as a whole.
The greatest weaknesses displayed
in his leadership are weaknesses
that could be remedied by more
solid and consistent and energetic
support from Labor and all who put
victory above all. Now as so many
times in the past it is fatal to de-
mand that the President must de-
feat the reactionaries single-handed,
without participation of the masses
in the fight, and to make the Presi-
dent responsible for failures which
are really the shortcomings of his
necessary support. We are in this
war to the end with the present
Commander-in-Chief, we have no
prospect of getting a better one,
but could easily get a worse one.
The sooner we adjust ourselves to
this reality the better it will be for
the prospects of victory.

Now more than ever it is neces-
sary to hold the home front firm,
to defeat all the diversionists and
fifth columnists, to speed produc-
tion and improve the organization
of our economic life, and to combat
all panic-mongers and political jitter-bugs. And it is necessary for
all men of good will to speak ‘up
on this foundation, with the loud
and unequivocal demand for the
immediate opening of the long-
awaited major invasion of Western
Europe, the second front, and the
smashing of Hitlerism finally and
forever in the next months ahead.
This is the only possible road to
victory and a tolerable post-war
world.
WORLD LABOR AND THE SECOND FRONT*

BY N. SHVERNIK

(Secretary of the All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions, U.S.S.R.)

JUNE 22, 1941, marked a turning point in the Second World War. There is no doubt that, had Hitler-Germany succeeded in winning a victory over the U.S.S.R., this would have meant the triumph of German fascism in all of Europe and the conquest of a springboard for world domination by Hitlerite tyranny. But Hitler and his associates overestimated their own strength and underestimated the strength of the U.S.S.R. and the great spirit of the Soviet people.

Hitler delivered his criminal attack with tremendous military advantages on his side. During the initial period the Soviet Union could not fully utilize its powerful forces to rebuff the enemy. A certain time was required to mobilize these forces.

At that time our Allies, Great Britain and the United States, could render us merely moral support. Prime Minister Churchill’s declaration is of historic significance and will always be highly appreciated by the Soviet people. President Roosevelt’s speech had shown that the Soviet people were not alone in the struggle against the fascist aggressor. But the Allies were not in a position at that time to render material aid quickly and on a considerable scale, for they themselves were just beginning the mass production of armaments.

During the first summer campaign of 1941 the Red Army suffered a serious setback. But this setback by no means implied the defeat of the Red Army. Carrying out the plans of the Supreme High Command, the Red Army withstood the tremendous onslaught and in stubborn defense battled, wore down, and destroyed considerable enemy forces. By the winter of 1941-42 the Red Army had won the initiative and inflicted severe defeats upon the enemy.

The rout of the German fascist troops on the approaches to Moscow was the first major defeat of the Germans in the Second World War. Nevertheless, the Soviet peo-

* A speech delivered on September 8, at the 75th British Trade Union Congress held at Southport, September 6-10, 1943.
ple by no means drew the conclusion that all was over with Hitlerite arms and that victory would be easily won. They realistically estimated the strength of the enemy. They realized that the enemy was still strong, and that fighting only in the east, without fear for his fate in the west, he could still muster sufficient strength to embark upon new adventures. Precisely this happened in the summer of 1942.

Taking advantage of the absence of a second front in Europe, the Germans transferred dozens of picked divisions from the west to the Soviet-German front, thus creating a considerable preponderance in strength on the southwestern direction. As a result, they succeeded in gaining certain tactical successes. But on the approaches to the Volga stronghold of Stalingrad the Red Army inflicted upon the German fascist troops a defeat never before experienced by the German army in all its history.

The Stalingrad epic will forever shine from the pages of history as a matchless example of the heroism and tenacity of the Soviet people and as the triumph of the brilliant strategy of our Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin. Thus, the second year of the war brought Hitler Germany new tremendous losses in men and equipment without any gain in territory.

In the course of the winter campaign, as a result of the Red Army's blows, the Hitlerite war machine began to crack and stagger. Hitler had to exert desperate efforts to avert a catastrophe for his army. Taking advantage of the absence of the second front in Europe, he transferred from western Europe more than thirty divisions to reinforce his battered troops in the Kharkov area, thereby saving himself from disaster.

Thanks to the brilliant successes of the Red Army the winter campaign of 1942-43 marked a turning point in the entire course of the war and strikingly revealed the change in the correlation of forces on the Soviet-German front. Whatever Hitler did, whatever "total" mobilizations he conducted, he could not make up for the losses suffered by his brigand army on the Soviet-German Front.

This year's German offensive, on which he placed so much hope, also failed. The Soviet troops were ready, not only to repulse the German offensive, but to strike powerful counterblows. At present the Soviet troops are conducting an offensive, clearing Soviet cities and villages of the fascist scum and liberating from fascist tyranny Soviet citizens exhausted by starvation and slave labor and robbed to the last shred. The roar of the Soviet artillery already reaches the banks of the Dnieper.

The Red Army's successes and the failure of the German offensive are of importance, not only for the Soviet-German Front; they are exerting a tremendous influence on the entire course of the war. They show once more in whose favor a change in the correlation of forces has taken place. Such are the results of the twenty-six months of struggle and victories of the So-
viet people and their valiant Red Army over Hitler's army of plunder.

* * *

But the successes of the Soviet people on the vast Soviet-German Front are merely one part of their unparalleled heroic struggle. In addition to the front there is the rear, whose strength decides the successes at the front. Only backed by the selfless labor and all-out support of the rear could the Red Army have achieved the victories now known to the whole world.

The Soviet trade unions reorganized all their activities to ensure the front with everything necessary for victory over Hitler-Germany. To begin with, they undertook to organize the workers and engineers in the struggle for an uninterrupted increase of labor productivity as a basis for stepping up production. Taking up the initiative of the workers and engineers with regard to the organization of all-Union socialist emulation, they assumed leadership of this nationwide movement.

Soviet industry gained splendid achievements in the increase of labor productivity and output. Suffice it to point out the fact that Soviet plants are now producing planes, tanks, guns, machine guns, mortars, and ammunition many times more than ever before. During last year alone labor productivity in the aircraft industry increased by 30 per cent; in the armaments industry by 15 per cent; heavy machine building by 11 per cent; the tank industry by 38 per cent; the electric power industry by 27 per cent; clothing, footwear, etc., by up to 50 per cent.

Along with facilitating an improvement in the work of industry and an increase in the output of armaments, we had the task, especially during the first year of the war, of carrying through a tremendous undertaking in connection with the evacuation of enterprises from the front areas to the interior. Citrine, Harrison, and Conley had some insight into this evacuation when they visited the Soviet Union in 1941. During their last visit they saw the evacuated enterprises working in the rear. The Soviet trade unions devoted no small effort to this extremely important task.

Our country was also faced with the difficult problem of providing industry with labor power and training new workers who, although eager to give all their strength for the front, were unskilled. The trade unions took an active part in the solution of this problem.

The Soviet trade unions are also taking a direct and important part in strengthening the fighting power of the Red Army. For example, in the wide network of rest-homes and sanatoria at their disposal the trade unions organized hospitals for thousands of Red Army men and officers. In this connection I want to take the opportunity to express sincere appreciation to the British working class and the British trade unions for the medical supplies, surgical and other instruments and objects sent to the Soviet Union through the Central Council of Soviet Trade Unions.
During their visit to a hospital, Harrison and Feather could see the use being made of them. They had the full possibility of inspecting everything and of conversing with the medical personnel and wounded fighters. The most characteristic work of the hospitals and trade unions is shown by the following figure: 86 per cent of the men and officers are restored to the ranks as fully valid soldiers.

The trade unions have patronage over some Red Army and Red Navy units. At their own expense the trade unions built air formations and tank columns. This year alone they contributed 125,000,000 rubles for the building of planes and tanks.

Of great importance in the work of the trade unions is the physical training of future Red Army fighters. For example, some nine million took part in the summer cross-country events sponsored by the trade unions this year. During the past winter alone the trade union sports societies trained a million skiers.

I shall not dwell in detail on the work of the trade unions in facilitating workers' inventions and rationalization proposals in production; on production conferences; in trade union administration of state social insurance; in the field of labor safety and child health protection, where the trade unions accommodate hundreds of thousands of children in camps, playgrounds, rest homes, etc.; or in the sphere of cultural and educational work conducted by the trade unions through their clubs, radio, press, etc. The activities of the trade unions are directed toward one main aim—to speed up the defeat of Hitler-Germany and her associates.

* * *

What conclusions must be drawn from the results of the twenty-six-month struggle of the Soviet Union against Hitler-Germany? As a result of the battles on the Soviet-German Front the gambling plans of the German imperialists calculated on enslaving the peoples of the Soviet Union completely failed. The extent to which the armed forces of Hitler-Germany have been seriously weakened can be seen from the fact that during last year the German fascist army failed to achieve any military successes, but, on the contrary, suffered major military reverses on the Soviet-German Front, in Egypt, Libya, Tripolitania, Tunisia, Sicily, and now also in Italy.

Moreover, the failure of the German summer offensive on the Soviet-German Front this year is a direct result of the defeats of the German fascist troops in the winter of 1941, '42, and '43, evidence that the military might of Hitler-Germany is substantially undermined and that the German fascist army is now experiencing a grave crisis.

The political situation of fascist Germany has sharply deteriorated; the Hitlerite rear is considerably weakened and undermined. Inside Germany the Germans are ceasing to believe the Hitlerite fables, and in the occupied countries of Europe the people's war against the fascist enslavers gains scope with every day.
The war has seen the growing isolation of fascist Germany on the international arena, the failure of the German calculations and dissension within the Hitler coalition. The alliance of fascist states is on the brink of collapse.

The war has given rise to the powerful anti-Hitler coalition of the three greatest nations in the world—the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and the United States.

For more than two years the Soviet Union has been diverting upon itself the main forces of Hitler-Germany, tying down in the East more than 200 German divisions and 30 divisions of Germany’s allies, thereby giving Great Britain and the United States the possibility of developing the production of their armaments and mobilizing millions of their people to build powerful armies.

Thus, during the past two years of war radical changes have taken place in the military, political and international situation. The German fascist army is now going through a grave crisis, and it is up to us, the peoples and governments of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition, to transfer this crisis into catastrophe.

The Red Army’s successful operations today have tied down all the main forces of the Hitler army on the Soviet-German Front, creating conditions even more favorable than last spring for active military operations by our allies on the European continent.

The question now stands as follows: Victory over Hitler and the duration of the war depend on how soon Allied offensive operations will be developed on the European mainland. In other words, the sooner the second front is opened on the continent of Europe the sooner will the war end and the smaller will be the sacrifices of the anti-Hitler coalition. No one can prove the contrary, for only absence of the second front in Europe saved Hitler-Germany from defeat in 1942.

Only owing to the fact that Hitler had no fear for his rear in the west could he in the winter at the beginning of 1943 transfer thirty picked divisions to the Kharkov area to reinforce his battered troops, thereby averting disaster. Unless the second front on the European continent is opened in 1943, the war will be prolonged and Hitler-Germany’s doom postponed.

Perhaps some people are puzzled by the insistent demand of the Soviet people for a second front in Europe this year? The demand is quite explicable and well founded. The Soviet people ardently greeted the formation of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition and regarded the formation of the powerful anti-Hitler coalition of the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the United States as a formation of a fighting alliance whose joint blows from east and west would break the backbone of the fascist beast.

The Soviet people, who for more than two years have been shoulder-ering the full brunt of the struggle against the main forces of fascist Germany and who for the sake of victory of the Anglo-Soviet-
American coalition and the liberation of the oppressed peoples of Europe have sacrificed millions of lives of their finest sons, cannot be indifferent to the question of the second front on the European continent.

But another thing must be borne in mind as well. For two years millions of Soviet citizens in the occupied regions have been suffering under the unbearable yoke of the German invaders, who are sapping the Ukraine and other occupied territories of all strength for continuing the war. That is why, incidentally, when Citrine, Harrison, and Conley were in the Soviet Union literally everywhere they heard the question of the second front.

The question of opening the second front this year was discussed at the third session of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee recently held in Moscow. When the Soviet delegation raised the question as urgent it proceeded from the belief that the most favorable conditions now exist for a second front on the European continent and that the opening of the second front is in the interests, not only of the Soviet people, but also of the millions of people of Europe suffering under the Hitler yoke in the occupied countries. Without a second front on the European continent victory over Hitler-Germany is impossible.

The Soviet people highly appreciate the Allied offensive operations in North Africa, Sicily, and now in southern Italy. They are watching with great attention the operations of the valiant Allied air forces whose bombs cause no small amount of damage to the industrial districts of Germany. They accept with sincere appreciation the Allied aid to the Soviet Union in armaments, materials and food.

But the Soviet people cannot regard these isolated offensive operations or the raids on the industrial districts of Germany as a second front. The creation of a second front, in the estimation of the Soviet people, means joint blows at Hitlerite Germany; for she alone and none of her vassals is the principal lair of fascism whose debacle will mean our victory.

In addition, I must emphasize that when we say a second front we imply the concrete concept of which Stalin spoke with utmost clarity as far back as the autumn of 1942 when he specified that a second front in the West would divert some sixty German divisions and some of Germany's "allies."

Consequently, in speaking of the second front we have in mind, not each of the offensive operations by the Allies which divert say eight to ten enemy divisions, but such as would divert from the East one-third or at least one-fourth of the German fascist troops.

The third session of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee also discussed the question of the necessity for intensifying its activities. The Soviet trade unions consider that the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee must intensify its activities especially as regards the unification of the working class in the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition to bring about the speediest
The Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee must develop activities to draw into the committee the trade unions of North and South America and the trade unions of those countries whose people are fighting on the side of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition for liberation from the Hitler yoke—Yugoslavia, Poland, France, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Greece, and other countries.

The question of expanding the composition of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee has been raised by trade union leaders in a number of countries who consider it necessary not only for speeding victory over the common enemy of mankind, Hitlerism, but equally important also for active participation of the trade unions in the solution of post-war problems.

In wartime the need for mutual understanding and unification of the forces of the working class makes itself felt to the utmost, and already during the war important prerequisites are being created for post-war relations. The workers of the freedom-loving countries have had occasion time and again to see to what extent in their own interests it is necessary to work uninterruptedly for consolidating their forces for the speediest defeat of the common enemy and creating favorable conditions for wide and friendly post-war collaboration. The trade unions and their leaders must satisfy this desire.

During wartime the trade unions of all countries and the trade unions of Great Britain and the Soviet Union in particular have accumulated vast political experience which must be fully utilized for speeding up victory over the enemy. Active participation by the trade unions of the Allied countries in a united trade union committee will enable the further mobilization of the working class of our countries for carrying out the war tasks along the line of increasing war production, and enable the activation of the struggle against fascist tyranny in the countries enslaved by Hitler-Germany. The experience of joint work of the trade unions in the Allied countries will yield fruit in the period when the problems of world organization and post-war reconstruction will loom in full stature.

Permit me to conclude by expressing confidence that the trade unions and the working class of our countries will fight shoulder to shoulder in the decisive struggle against our common enemy and for the liberation of millions of people from all the horrors and suffering which they are experiencing under Hitlerite tyranny. May our joint struggle bring about a daily increase in the ranks of the active fighters against Hitlerism.
WHEN Georgi Dimitroff rose in the courtroom at Leipzig, he rose, not only to expose the Nazi incendiaries; he rose to give warning that war had been declared on mankind.

The Nazis had blazed their declaration of war on civilization by putting the torch to the Reichstag. Dimitroff in that Leipzig courtroom, hurling his shattering truths at the Nazi arsonists, called the peoples and nations of the world to urgent unity, to action against the fascist warmakers.

Dimitroff in the Nazi courtroom, the accused towering as accuser, gave heart to millions. Symbol of the principle of the peoples' unity and offensive which alone can vanquish fascism, he inspired the world of decency and honor with his courage and his truth.

That truth has since been confirmed in the indelible blood of millions.

Two years after Dimitroff challenged Nazidom in its hangmen's court, he rose from the Presidium of the Communist International at its Seventh Congress to give a historic report that charted for the peoples of the world the alternative to the disastrous course of Munich.

Profoundly, incisively, and passionately he cut through the disguises of fascism to expose its bestial reality. He stripped from it the flag of "Socialism" and tore aside the pretense of nationalism, to bare its imperialist hideousness. The Communists, the class-conscious workers, and all consistent anti-fascists eagerly absorbed his classic analysis of the essence and appearance of fascism. If only all spokesmen of labor, all liberal spokesmen, all who influence and will influence the destiny of the embattled peoples, all the political and military leaders in our war effort today, and all the representatives at the peace table of tomorrow—if only they, too, might absorb that scientific analysis of the fascist tyranny which the United Nations have pledged to burn out from the international body politic!

Today, complete destruction of
fascism is the aim of progressive mankind. This aim is expressed in the anti-fascist coalition of states and peoples, built on the basis of national unity. Against the anti-fascist forces in each land are ranged, not only the Hitlerian Axis, but tenacious and pro-fascist enemies at home. Their influence, as we see in our own country, is strong and insidious. The defeatist camp—the Pew-du Pont clique in the National Association of Manufacturers, the Hearsts and McCormicks, are pressing their policies through Congress, through certain diplomatic and administration circles, through the press, and through certain elements operating within the ranks of labor.

Whom do these defeatists, these anti-democratic forces, these foes of labor represent? What are their objectives? How do they operate? How can they be overcome? What are the tasks that devolve upon the labor movement, in particular the Communists, for strengthening unity and hastening victory?

The key to these crucial questions is to be found in the analysis of fascism as given by Dimitroff, the Marxist-Leninist.

What is the essence of this analysis?

* * *

Reaffirming the characterization of fascism by the Communist International in 1933, Dimitroff declared fascism in power to be "the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic and most imperialistic elements of finance capital."

The essence of fascism can be understood only when this characterization is taken in its entirety — a truth that history has abundantly proved.

Attempts have been made to explain fascism as a racial question, as terror solely, or as social-demagoguery and national chauvinism solely. Attempts have been made to confound fascism with Bonapartism, Caesarism, and other historical examples of state terror. All such explanations are abstract; they are not based on the concrete historical conditions that ushered in the terrorist fascist dictatorships of Italy and Germany. They fail to take into account the factor of collusion by international imperialists that aided and abetted the fascist offensive, that helped bring fascism to power and increase that power. They fail to take into account the fascist-minded monopolists who today are endeavoring to prevent the military defeat and political annihilation of fascism. All such interpretations that do not proceed from the class basis and class role of fascism fail to provide the proper weapons for fighting the encroachments of fascism. Such interpretations foster the dangerous illusion that to end fascism we need but eliminate the most visible symbols of the state terror—i.e., a Führer or a Duce. Events have shown that the deposing of a Mussolini does not in itself mean the end of fascism, though the Vesuvian rumblings of the fascist-hating people announce that it is the beginning of the end. The most imperialistic elements of finance capital, dictating for two decades through King and Musso-
lini, sought to keep Italy linked in the Axis enslavement chain through King and Badoglio. It was only the military defeats of fascist Italy on the Eastern and Mediterranean Fronts, together with the strong will of the people for peace, that struck this weakest link from the Hitlerite chain. It was only the utter hopelessness of their situation that forced King and Badoglio to surrender, after having given Hitler forty valuable days to strengthen his positions on the Italian mainland and in the Balkans—a stratagem for which brave American and British soldiers and the Italian people are already paying a heavy price.

Dimitroff gave to fascist terror its historical frame of reference. He showed the naked-sword regimes of Germany and Italy to be a phenomenon historically produced and contained: the terrorist dictatorship to which the ruling class in these countries resorted had its roots in the post-war stage of the general crisis of capitalism. He who understands this can see the Achilles' heel of fascism. He can see the truth of Stalin's assertion that the victory of fascism denotes, not only the weakness of the working class divided and disarmed by Social-Democracy, but simultaneously the desperate weakness of the very forces of finance capital that launched the fascist offensive. In resorting to fascism, these forces admitted that they could neither carry through their domestic reactionary policies by means of parliamentarism and bourgeois democracy nor extricate themselves from their crisis without declaring war against their own people and against the entire world. The tyrannical, bellicose and piratical fascist dictatorship reveals itself "a ferocious power, but an unstable one" (Dimitroff). Fascist terror is desperado-rule to which ultra-reaction resorts with fire and sword to maintain its moribund power. Dimitroff laid bare the hopelessness of the Nazi claim to invincibility—claim and claimants not long after blasted by the guns of the Red Army.

Dimitroff attacked the panicky theorists who held that fascism is inevitable, a historically necessary political stage in the life of capitalism. He taught that fascism comes only by default, by default of the forces of the people, especially the working class, when they are disorganized and their action is paralyzed. Fascism is not the progress of history but the penalty for failing history.

Had the people of France, who beat back the fascist tide in 1934 through the People's Front, fully profited from the lesson of Germany and not become divided in the face of the fascist offensive, it would not have happened there! Had the French people, consolidated in a powerful anti-fascist National Front, not permitted the Bonnets to remain in high office and the Darlans in high command, not allowed the annulling of the formidable Franco-Soviet Pact and the reducing of France to a servitor of Chamberlain-England, not tolerated Blum's treacherous "non-intervention" policy toward the Spanish Republic
nor the presenting of Czechoslovakia's head on a silver charger to Hitler, not let the gains of the People's Front be blotted out, and not permitted the persecution and outlawry of the Communist Party—actions preliminary to the persecution and outlawry of the entire labor movement: had these things been halted in time, the France of the Rights of Man would not have been delivered by the Men of Vichy as a captive concubine to the Nazi imperator!

The British and American counterparts of the Brownshirts and the Blackshirts tried for years to force England and the United States into the fascist orbit. Had they succeeded, it would not have been because fascism was inevitable in these two countries, but because the British and American democratic forces would have failed in their struggle. Likewise, if fascism has not forced itself upon England and the United States, it is not because "it can't happen here"—the other side of the inevitability medal. It is not because, as the argument has been advanced, "the lands of traditional democracy" are armor-plated against fascism. (In Germany, too, let us remember, the assurance was once advanced: "Germany is not Italy"!) Indeed, Dimitroff specifically warned in his historic Report that in the United States fascism, always trying to play on the prevailing mass sentiments, would "portray itself as the custodian of the Constitution and 'American democracy,'" and would even pose "in the guise of an opposition to fascism."

How well this is currently borne out in the demagogic charge, made in official resolution by the recent Mackinac Republican conclave dominated by the Hoover-Vandenberg-Taft junta of defeatists and pro-fascists, that our war-time governmental controls are "the instruments of fascism," and that these "are the inevitable result of the policies of the New Deal"! Recently, too, one-time Republican presidential candidate Alfreld M. Landon broadcast:

"The shadow of a notably bitter election that will mean either the eclipse of the fascist New Dealers—or the American republic—is already appearing over the land.

"The Republican Party and real Democrats are the only representatives of the great liberal principles of Jefferson, as they are being given force and vitality under the Republican leadership."

As Dimitroff predicted, the most reactionary section of American finance capital surrounds itself with the aura of that name which, more than any other, belongs to the heritage of American democracy! Cabal of Tory Republicans and Poll Tax Democrats ("real" Democrats!)—these twentieth-century Hamiltonians prepare for the crucial wartime election of 1944, parading as "the only representatives of the . . . principles of Jefferson"! With shouts of "fascist New Dealers!" they will seek to set up a pro-fascist government.

The failure of fascism until now to gain ascendancy in Britain and the United States should not lessen our alertness to the danger of ef-
forts by fascist-minded monopolists to establish an "Anglo-Saxon" brand of fascism. The greatest threat to American democracy comes today from the would-be negotiators of "peace" with Hitler.

Dimitroff analyzed the class content of fascism as finance capital. But he showed likewise that fascism derives its political essence, not from the class of finance-capital as a whole, but from a section of that class, the most reactionary, chauvinistic and imperialistic. This teaching is of tremendous import today to the nations battling to destroy fascism. For it is the theoretical basis of the broad All-Nation Front which unites in the anti-Axis war, not only the workers, farmers and city middle classes, but also the main sections of the bourgeoisie. These capitalists, who are non-fascist, recognizing that without their country's independent national existence they too would be subjugated under Nazism, participate, despite hesitancies and vacillations, in the defense of national independence. The teaching of Dimitroff is the theoretical foundation of the United Nations, who, on the basis of national unity, have brought into one vast anti-fascist alliance bourgeois-democratic states, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and colonial countries.

Dimitroff's analysis inherently refutes the conception of fascism as the "revolution of the petty bourgeoisie"—a conception that floats around Social-Democratic and liberal spheres. The rise of Nazism to power, Dimitroff pointed out, is counter-revolution, not revolution. In answer to Ribbentrop's "National-Socialist revolution," he declared in a press interview, in February, 1936:

"It is well known that every genuine revolution means the passing of power from one class into the hands of another class. But in Germany the bourgeoisie as a class were in power and have remained in power. The capitalist system has remained untouched. All that has changed is that the most reactionary, the most chauvinistic, and most imperialistic circles of finance-capital have become the complete masters and have extremely intensified capitalist exploitation and oppression."

Dimitroff's analysis exposes fascist rule as the counter-revolution of the ultra-reactionary sections of Big Capital, against the democratic masses led by the most advanced section of the working class. The analysis differentiates between fascism's political content, which expresses imperialist domination, and its social base, which includes those strata of the population seduced by demagogic promises. While the political content is financial-oligarchist, the social base is predominantly petty-bourgeois, agrarian and urban, including also the most backward and degraded workers.

The social base of fascism can, however, under certain circumstances, temporarily become strengthened, as happened in Germany.

Coming to power when the great economic crisis had reached its lowest point, Nazism could credit itself
with overcoming the crisis. With total rearmament and the creation of a tremendous Wehrmacht and bureaucracy, the Hitler regime ended unemployment—at the cost of terrific exploitation of the masses, of barbaric oppression and social degradation. The fiendish terror, demagogy, and corruption at home were bolstered by Hitler's encroachments and depredation abroad, made possible through systematic encouragement and "appeasing" by the Western Powers. The utter bankruptcy of pseudo-Marxist Social-Democracy and its discredit among the masses were craftily used by the Nazis to identify that bankrupt Social-Democracy with Marxism. Thereby Nazism created for itself most favorable conditions for winning the decisive masses of the petty bourgeoisie, rural and urban, and certain strata of professionals, white-collar workers, and government employees, as well as backward industrial and agricultural workers, especially among those who had been chronically unemployed. On this basis Hitler carried through the isolation and persecution of the advanced workers and the destruction of all working class organizations—all democratic organizations.

In a decade of the "Third Reich" the poisonous ideology of Hitlerism corrupted the young generation and affected newer sections of the middle classes and even considerable sections of the working class. The function of deception exercised by Social-Democracy in the First Imperialist World War among the working masses was taken over directly by the German imperialist state under National "Socialism." The Nazi Führerschaft, playing on the anti-Versailles moods of the German people and on their fears of a future super-Versailles, fostered through skillful organization the kind of brutalizing chauvinism that reduced German officers and men to beasts in uniform.

But the relatively broadened social base of fascism is temporary and uncertain, as the formation of the National Committee for a Free Germany and the Union of Generals and Officers of the Sixth German Stalingrad Army indicate, and as current events in Italy attest. After twenty-one years of fascist despotism and deception, the toppling of the Duce revealed a cauldron of discontent and hatred of fascism among the masses. In Nazi Germany, all the deceit and bribery could not destroy the fear of war among the German people throughout the pre-Munich years. This state of affairs brought Pinchovius, member of the Psychological Laboratory of the German War Ministry, to declare in 1936 that "the weakest point in all the preparations for war is the development of a firm morale of the working masses of the people."*

But then came Munich and the long series of easy victories. The negotiated "peace" policy of the Municheers was a process of strengthening Nazism's social base. Reversal of this process began with the Nazi setbacks on the Eastern

Front. And we are already witnessing the social base of Nazism weakening under the impact of the terrific blows of the Red Army, of the Anglo-American victories in North Africa and Italy coupled with the devastating air bombardments of German cities, and the rising rebelliousness in occupied Europe. The guileful weapon of demagoguery must now even more than before be reinforced by the weapon of brute force. Gestapo's head becomes head of Internal Affairs. Himmler is moved closer to Hitler.

The social base of fascism is not static and solidified. It does not consist of an undifferentiated mass. Built on falsehood and coercion, it is subject to rapid undermining and dissolution. Everything depends on the ability of the coalition war to defeat the Hitlerite armies with the least delay. Everything depends on the speedy coordination of the Western Front with the great Red Army offensive. Everything depends on the defeat of the plottings for a negotiated "peace," which, if allowed their course, would again broaden Nazism's social base, as did the "peace" negotiated at Munich. Everything depends on the pursuit of a consistently democratic, anti-fascist policy with regard to the peoples struggling to free themselves from fascist oppression; on giving the yoked peoples a clear perspective for a way out of fascism—in the manner of the Manifesto of the National Committee for a Free Germany—for a democratic, independent life for each nation by its own choosing.

Dimitroff branded fascism as war: "Fascism is unbridled chauvinism and annexationist war."

Amid the fury of the fascist onslaught on the Spanish Republic, when the swastikaed hand that had set fire to the Reichstag was setting fire to the world, Dimitroff spoke:

"Coming to power against the will and the interests of its own countrymen, fascism seeks a way out of its growing domestic difficulties in aggression against other countries and peoples, in a new redivision of the globe by unleashing world war."

It was a reminder to the peoples that in that bible of banditry, Mein Kampf, Hitler had threatened the world that "life will not allot to our people new soil as a national favor, but only through the power of a victorious sword," that "the humanitarian and pacifist idea will perhaps be excellent on that day when the man superior to all others [read: German Herrenvolk imperialism] will have conquered and subjugated the world first of all in such a measure that he becomes the sole master of this earth."

Fascism and peace are mutually exclusive—and for the one to exist, the other must be destroyed. This is the first lesson that Dimitroff sought to bring home to the peoples.

It was the lesson that fascism cannot be appeased but must be met with the offensive of peoples and nations united for collective security; that war upon fascism cannot achieve peace through negotiation, but through military destruction and political uprooting.
It was the lesson symbolized by Dimitroff contra Goering in the Leipzig court—antithesis to Chamberlain and Daladier standing bowed in the court of Munich with the globe in their hands: The anti-fascist summoning to unity and struggle, opening the way to victory; the appeasers, sowing confusion, falsehood, defeatism, and panic, bringing disunity within each nation and among the nations, helping Hitler unleash his Axis war. The one, Bolshevik stalwart, champion of the working class and all progressive people, speaking with their strength, defying with their will—portent of their victory; the others, traffickers in nations, fearing the onward movement of the people, conniving with the aggressors—ravens of peace!

"The most reactionary variety of fascism is the German type of fascism," Dimitroff declared. Nazism, he warned, "is acting as the spearhead of international counter-revolution, as the chief incendiary of imperialist war, as the initiator of a crusade against the Soviet Union." The truth of that warning, learned through blood and tears, has become the acknowledged basis of the great anti-Hitler coalition for national liberation. German fascism, in distinctness from any other type, is based upon a mighty industrial development, upon a traditionally powerful military potential, upon a Prussian-inculcated chauvinism of long duration, upon a national history in which the normal bourgeois-democratic revolution remained unachieved through the cowardice of a bourgeoisie that continuously compromised with Junkerdom, and upon the systematic betrayals of the working class by the most powerful Social-Democracy in the world. That Prusso-fascism is logically the backbone of every fascist state or camp—the central power of the Axis. It is, therefore, unthinkable to conduct the war against the enemy fascist states without directing the concentrated striking power of the anti-Hitler coalition to break the backbone of fascism. This is the political foundation of the military necessity for the direct Western Front in coordination with the mighty Red Army offensive. The Anglo-Soviet-American Coalition, by every principle of military science, as of scientific politics, must direct its concentrated striking-power, East-West, against the Hitlerite mainstay of the Axis.

* * *

The lesson enunciated by Dimitroff is the lesson of coalition warfare. Nazism, "the chief incendiary of imperialist war," is the enemy of no single nation alone. The Nazi "initiator of a crusade against the Soviet Union" is the same "man superior to all others" who set out to become "the sole master of this earth."

Victory in this war would not be possible without the anti-Hitler coalition of nations.

As this coalition faces the problems of winning the war in the shortest time, it is confronted by the danger of new forms of appeasement.

Munichism has still to be utterly destroyed. The act of Munich is in
the past; but the Men of Munich lurk in their ornate underground. The camp of the Hearsts and Bul­litts, aiming at a reactionary victory in our country in 1944, is insidiously plotting a negotiated “peace” to save Hitlerism.

Well do we remember the unctuous concern for human lives on the part of Hitler’s appeasers when they were preparing to betray Czechoslovakia: Isn’t it better to sacrifice a little country of fifteen million than to drown the whole world in blood? Bereft by factske of any logical contention against the second front, the defeatist camp falls back demagogically on the “human lives” argument. In this, unfortunately, it draws support from the “cautious calculators” in the win-the-war camp. That supermanikin of journalism, West­brook Pegler, bellows, “What is the hurry?” and answers sanctimoni­ously that “by prolonging the con­test for another year or even two, Roosevelt and Churchill can save a million or more American and Brit­ish casualties.” A second front? It would have “no greater result than to draw off some of the divi­sions that are opposing the Russians in the East” (World-Telegram, Sep­tember 8).

This serves Hitler’s well-known strategy of single-front warfare. It helps his policy of atomizing his opponents, of posing as the warrior against the “Bolshevist menace,” to prevent the realization of full coali­tion warfare. How reminiscent of the words of Dimitroff!

“The Leipzig Trial . . . was framed by the fascist authorities for the purpose of proving to the whole world that . . . the fascist heads­men ‘saved Europe from Bolshe­vism.’”

It is important to remember that fundamental of military science of which Earl Browder reminded our nation shortly after the Quebec Conference:

“The second front is made to appear the special invention and in­terest of the Soviet Union. In fact, of course, as every intelligent and informed person must know, the very basis of all strategy directed toward victory in a great war has been, for over a hundred years, based upon the concept of the sec­ond front—the engagement of the main forces of the enemy from two directions. . . . Without the second front in Western Europe that will engage a considerable fraction of Hitler’s total armed forces, there does not exist serious coalition war­fare.”

Sincere concern for saving Amer­ican and British lives (and why only these among our coalition ar­mies?) demands the course of shortening, not prolonging, the war. It demands an end to contentment with peripheral war, important though that may be, but which, without concerted knock-out blows directed at the Axis heart itself, cannot bring decisive, speedy vic­tory, though it must entail increas­ingly tremendous American and British casualties.

Salerno would have cost fewer American and British lives, had we not delayed the invasion of Italy for
more than a month. We waited "to save lives"; but the Nazis did not wait. They used our waiting to entrench themselves.

The invasion of the continent from the West would have cost fewer lives in 1942 than it would this year. It will cost many more lives if we wait till 1944, instead of striking now. Limited warfare makes the collapse of Nazism more difficult of accomplishment. It allows the Nazis time to concentrate their military forces on one front and to resort to political maneuvers attempting to divide the United Nations.

Concern for saving British and American lives demands real, synchronized coalition war, the absence of which in the beginning of 1943 permitted Hitler to shunt thirty crack divisions from the West to bolster his defenses threatened with destruction in the vital Kharkov region, thus delaying his total collapse—at the expense of countless lives, Russian, British, and American.

Behind the Peglers' professed concern for human lives and their asking "What is the hurry?" lurk their fear of the destruction of fascism, their dread of the peoples' victory—freedom, the self-determining of nations, enhanced democracy. Hence their efforts to split the United Nations. Hence their agitation against full coalition warfare. Hence their cry, We're not fighting for Russia! A cry subversive of the United Nations war; a cry disloyal to America allied to the Soviet Union in this war upon whose victorious outcome the continued national survival of all the Allies depends. This same camp which today wants to "save lives" was only yesterday eager to spend American and British lives in a "holy war" for fascist Finland against our most powerful and dependable ally today. We're not going to fight for Stalin!—so, too, once read the fiery placards of fascist Doriot in the France that was still free: Doriot who soon thereafter sent from enslaved France his volunteer legion to the Eastern Front to fight—for Hitler!

We know the gentlemen who are opposed to having one soldier fight in a war of liberation, but who are at all times ready to squander millions of lives in imperialist and counter-revolutionary wars!

It is therefore to be regretted that the Premier of England, in his post-Quebec speech, uttered an unfortunate phrase that has been grasped by this Munich-minded camp which seeks to conceal its profligacy of human blood with profession of concern for "human lives."

Dimitroff urged upon the working class the need for labor unity—national and international.

"It is impossible to carry on a serious struggle for the maintenance of international peace unless first and foremost all necessary steps are taken to establish a united front of the working class in each country and united action by the international workers' organizations."

This statement, made in 1937, when the anti-fascist forces of the world were struggling to halt fascist
aggression, applies with the greatest potency today.

Labor will enhance its contributions and exert a greater influence as energizing and welding force of national unity when it establishes a closer unity of action on a world scale with labor of the United Nations. If today the Anglo-Soviet-American Coalition has not yet developed a uniform strategy and full coalition warfare, this reality cannot be dissociated from the absence to date of an Anglo-Soviet-American trade union coalition. The labor component of the coalition, to strengthen the alliance of the three nuclear United Nations powers, both for speedy victory and for post-war reconstruction, has still to be solidified. The sabotaging of this imperative need by the A. F. of L. top leadership defies the desire for international labor unity officially registered by the C.I.O. and the Railroad Brotherhoods, and shared overwhelmingly by the A. F. of L. membership, as indicated especially by the State Federations of Labor in the key states of Ohio and Pennsylvania. The blocking tactics of the A. F. of L. Executive Council in essence sabotage the victory drive of the United Nations. In slandering the Soviet trade unions as "not free," as unions with which, it must follow, American labor can associate only at its peril, the leaders dominating the Executive Council of the A. F. of L. are trying to put a union label on Hitler's claim that he is fighting to save the world from the "peril of Bolshevism." This is advanced as a "labor" policy and practice toward the twenty-six million Soviet trade unionists, upon whose unity, strength, initiative, and self-sacrifice the fate of the entire world trade union movement has especially in the past two years depended!

Profoundly true are the words of Dimitroff:

"The attitude toward the Soviet Union is in essence the touchstone testing the devotion of every individual active in the working class movement."

Not until the Executive Council shakes off the Woll-Hutcheson-Dubinsky incubus of anti-Sovietism and in unison with the C.I.O. and the Railroad Brotherhoods brings American labor into closer solidarity and common action with the trade unions of all our Allies, will it exercise its full power as a force for victory. Such positive action on the part of American labor, extended to include the trade unions of the Western Hemisphere and of the European countries struggling to overthrow Hitlerite oppression, can lead to the establishment of world trade union unity so that the international working class may contribute most effectively to the achievement of victory and toward the solution of the post-war problems.

Labor faces the task of rousing the nation as a whole to the full realization of the great military opportunities before it, of uniting and rallying the people for the fullest support to the Commander-in-Chief and for influencing the policies of the Government. Labor faces the task of mobilizing the democratic and progressive forces for intensify-
ing the fight against the defeatists, the appeasers, the "negotiated peace"-mongers. Labor must lead the nation in the struggle against all who overtly or covertly are working to undermine the war program of our country, against the fascist-minded monopolists who are working to betray this great war of the people and impose a reactionary and unstable peace. Labor faces the task of urging that the Administration end its policy of hesitation and delay in regard to the Second Front; that it strengthen the Coalition, so that the term "Allies" will cease to be, either now or after victory, the exclusive appropriation of two Anglo-Saxon powers; and that it put a stop to the State Department's policy of temporizing and compromising with Darlans and Francois, with Hapsburgs and Eckhardts, with Baltic "ministers" that do not minister.

Labor needs to see the post-war problems in their full implications and not only in relation to domestic social security. The cardinal question is the hastening of victory, the destruction of fascist tyranny. Labor must realize that the question which is key to all questions of post-war reconstruction is that of strengthening and maintaining the Anglo-Soviet-American Coalition and achieving international working class unity for a victorious outcome of the war and the attainment of a just and enduring peace, the prevention of future imperialist adventures under new forms, and the democratic reconstruction of the post-war world. The task is the task of the United Nations, in which labor must fully play its vital role. Meeting this task demands strengthening labor unity and anti-fascist national unity; it demands forging the solidarity of international labor.

The courage of Dimitroff was not accidental. It was personal courage rooted in the historic qualities of a class. It was a fortitude that rose out of the labor movement, in which, for a quarter of a century, Dimitroff had worked and struggled and become steeled in battle. Against the Nazi inquisitors stood a man of the people—leader, organizer, teacher. Against the Nazi inquisitors stood a Communist, a great Bolshevik, a man who fought for the advance and freedom of his people and who embodied the steadfast militancy of the working class throughout the world in the struggle for immediate needs and for the ultimate goal—Socialism.

The Reichstag Fire Trial has a major significance in the fact that the first challenge to the fascist dictatorship in Germany and the first political defeat it sustained were at the hands of a Communist—a Communist, whose farsightedness, heroism, and qualities of high leadership caused him to be chosen General Secretary of the Communist International.

The Communists everywhere are in the forefront of the struggle against fascism, because they are armed with the Marxist understanding of the historical movement of society, because "they have come to understand the determinants of the proletarian movement, and how to foresee its course and
its general results." (Communist Manifesto.)

This understanding enables them to defend the gains of the past and to be the advance guard in the struggle to overcome all obstacles to the forward movement of the working class and the entire people.

The teachings of scientific socialism give the Communists the clearest perspective of the course of the national-liberation war for the destruction of fascism, making them the most consistent fighters for maintaining and strengthening the National Front and hastening victory.

The Communists have not in the past made the acceptance of their ultimate objective, Socialism, the condition for their participation in the day-to-day struggles of the masses. Certainly today they do not make that a condition for their participation in the anti-fascist national unity, nor do they raise it as an issue.

The American Communist Party's position, expressed in all of its policies, is that all special class and group considerations must be subordinated to the over-riding necessities of the war.

The interests of the Communist Party are the permanent historical interests of the working class. The American Communist Party is an organic part of the American working class and of the American people. The Communist Party, in this great war of national liberation, shares the responsibilities of all labor, of all anti-fascist and democratic forces embraced in the National Front. It devotes itself with all its energies and capacities to the task of helping solidify labor and national unity, to speed the achievement of victory over fascism and of a just and lasting peace.

Its ties with the people, above all with the working class and the trade unions; its tested devotion to the fight for the destruction of fascism; its Marxist-Leninist principles, from which Dimitroff drew his strength, are the solid bases upon which the Communist Party will fulfill its tasks in this historic struggle of the working class and of the nation.
LABOR'S GENERAL STAFFS MEET

BY WILLIAM Z. FOSTER

THE recent meetings of the C.I.O. National Board and the A. F. of L. Executive Council, in Washington and Chicago respectively, prior to their coming conventions in Philadelphia (November) and Boston (October), faced a series of major problems. These center in the situation created by the opposition confronting the Federal Administration in its conduct of the war, and relate to every major sphere of war policy: the home front, the military front, the diplomatic front. The great task before both committees is to mobilize the vast potential strength of the workers to break down this defeatist opposition and to see to it that the war is carried on militantly, with our full national power, and determination to win a decisive victory over the Axis and fascism. Above all, this would mean the establishment of a second front in France immediately.

The opposition against the Roosevelt policies, and with it against organized labor, is indeed a formidable one. Made up of various elements, including profiteers, labor baiters, poll-taxers, politics-as-usual hacks, and outright friends of Hitlerism, many of which elements have wormed their way into various government departments, it presents a real menace to our war objectives and to American democracy. The fact that such organizations as the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Bankers Association and the United Chambers of Commerce, as well as the bulk of the Republican Party and the reactionary wing of the Democratic Party, not to mention such influential names as Hoover, Taft, Vandenberg, Hearst, McCormick, etc., are linked up with the opposition, makes it clear that a very substantial section of the American capitalist class is opposed to many of the most important war policies of the Roosevelt Administration.

Defeatist War Sabotage

On the home front this powerful opposition, controlling great chains of newspapers and dominating the majority in both houses of Congress on many vital issues, is systematically undermining the authority and prestige of President Roosevelt as our national war leader. It has been able to torpedo the President's seven-point stabilization program, having largely prevented the stabilization of prices and the limitation of profits, thereby threatening the
country with the grave danger of inflation. It is assailing national unity by its attack upon the trade unions, notably by its passage of the Smith-Connally law. It is creating a reactionary atmosphere in the country, the natural consequences of which are such outrages as the "zoot suit" riots in Los Angeles and the pogrom against the Negroes in Detroit. It is purging or destroying the influence of the best war elements in various Government departments. And now these reactionary forces, skillfully mobilizing their resources, are preparing to grab full control of the country in the 1944 elections.

On the military front, this strong defeatist opposition is also making its detrimental influence felt. This has been a very big factor, if not the decisive one, in preventing the Government from making good its agreement of June 11, 1942, with the U.S.S.R. for a second front, by, together with the British, invading France. Had this agreement been carried out, it would have won the war a year ago. Political opposition has so far prevented the second front—for it is absurd to say that we lack the necessary men, ships, guns and planes. Although the recent military victories are dampening its hopes, the opposition to Roosevelt is undoubtedly trying to stalemate the war against Hitler, by limiting our military action in Europe and by switching our main attack against Japan.

On the diplomatic front the pernicious pressure of the anti-Roosevelt opposition is likewise being exerted. These people go all out for the appeasement of Franco and Mannerheim, for active support to the Darlans and Badoglios, and they lose no opportunity to cultivate misunderstandings with the U.S.S.R. They oppose every democratic development in Europe. Undoubtedly, the more consciously defeatist elements in the opposition are definitely aiming at a negotiated peace with a reactionary, or even quasi-fascist, government set up by German big business interests to save what they can from the wreckage in their coming defeat.

A dangerous angle in this whole situation is the tendency of President Roosevelt to yield in the face of the defeatist opposition rather than to come to head-on grips with it. This is primarily due to the lack of powerful, well-organized backing on the part of organized labor. Although Roosevelt took a courageous stand by vetoing the Smith-Connally Bill and by insisting upon farm price subsidies, nevertheless, in many instances, he is following a dangerous line of appeasing the reactionaries. This is exemplified by his failure to go to the people with his seven-point stabilization program and thus force the present reactionary Congress into line, by his refusal to blast ahead with the second front in spite of all resistance, by his permitting the State Department to coddle various European fascist Quislings, by his chastisement of such win-the-war leaders as Wallace and Welles.

United Political Action

The key to the whole war situation, as far as the United States is
concerned, is for the trade unions to mobilize thoroughly the masses of the American people to back up the President and to insist upon a second front policy, smashing through the defeatist opposition. The people have shown by many polls and in various other ways that they are ready to support an all-out effort for victory in the shortest possible time. The increasingly favorable military situation of the United Nations, especially the great Red Army offensive and the surrender of Italy, shows that such a vigorous war policy is both timely and necessary.

The C.I.O. and A. F. of L. Boards put in the forefront of their attention the all-important question of united political action to back a militant policy to win the war. As usual, however, the C.I.O., under the progressive leadership of Philip Murray, proved itself the more sensitive to the war situation and more productive of fruitful policies. Properly rejecting as a move that would divide the workers the Social-Democratic project of launching an immediate labor party, the C.I.O. struck out correctly with a detailed plan of united action between the C.I.O., A. F. of L., Railroad Unions and their friends throughout the country. The C.I.O. resolution says:

"(a) The heads of these organizations should immediately meet for the purpose of establishing a program of joint action on all issues directed towards an intensified prosecution of the war, the protection of organized labor against its enemies, a fuller participation of labor in the war effort and for a complete mobilization of the people in support of the war program of our Commander-in-Chief, Franklin D. Roosevelt.

"(b) The heads of the organizations should seek to create joint committees on a local and state-wide basis throughout the nation to encourage joint action between labor and all other groups and organizations that desire to give their whole and complete support to the war program."

The C.I.O. National Board, in Washington, put teeth into this correct program by setting up the national 5-man Political Action Committee, with Sidney Hillman at its head. Hillman promptly proposed joint action to the A. F. of L. Executive Council. He also proceeded to hold very successful political action conferences in the East and Middle West and is now stimulating organized political activity throughout the labor movement.

The A. F. of L. Executive Council, at its meeting in Chicago, while expressing alarm at the offensive of the defeatist reactionaries, particularly their attacks upon the trade unions, failed to make the necessary vigorous political response, such as the C.I.O. did. With typical conservatism, loaded up as it is with Woll-Hutcheson Republican defeatists and hamstrung by a lot of antediluvian bureaucrats, the Executive Council saw no reason to adopt appropriate measures to meet the new and urgent situation. It rejected what it called the "entangling alliance" proposed by Hillman and
harked back to the old Gompers line:

"The Council," said Wm. Green (Associated Press, Aug. 12) "decided to reaffirm our traditional non-partisan policy—to oppose our enemies and support our friends, regardless of political affiliation. In order to do this we will again form our own non-partisan political committee."

The refusal of the A. F. of L. Executive Council to accept the C.I.O. proffer of political cooperation does not, however, exclude all joint action between the two organizations. As the Daily Worker of August 16 pointed out, undoubtedly many A. F. of L. organizations will work closely politically with C.I.O. and Railroad organizations. In fact, they are already doing this in various parts of the country. The tendency will increase rapidly, undoubtedly, as the election fight develops.

Wages and the High Cost of Living

Another prime question that occupied central attention at the meeting of the two labor executives is that of maintaining the workers’ living standards in the face of rising prices. In this respect organized labor may be said to have three general tasks: (a) to force a roll-back of prices to the September, 1942, levels, as pledged by President Roosevelt, (b) to see to it that basic wage and piece rates, in the event of a failure to secure a roll-back of prices, are raised in accordance with the increase in the cost of living, (c) to establish incentive wages as a means of stimulating our somewhat lagging production.

On the first two of these points both national committees of organized labor found themselves in substantial agreement with, as usual, the C.I.O. speaking out more clearly and correctly. It supported strict enforcement of price ceilings and the President’s program of subsidies to farmers to keep food prices down, and it added:

"In the event Congress prevents the use of subsidies and thereby prevents the rolling back of prices, then the national officers of the C.I.O. are hereby authorized and directed, on behalf of all the affiliated C.I.O. unions to call upon President Roosevelt, Mr. Byrnes, the Director of the Office of War Mobilization, and the National War Labor Board to revise the ‘Little Steel’ formula so that wage adjustments may be made to bring wages up to the present level of prices."

On the third point, that of incentive wages, the A. F. of L. leadership showed itself to be sound asleep, drugged by traditional trade union fears of the speed-up. Meanwhile, in every industry in the country the productivity of the workers is rapidly on the increase (in many cases as much as 50 per cent to 75 per cent in the past year); yet the workers have received no advantage from it in the shape of increased wages, except in the relatively few cases where incentive wage plans are in effect. The C.I.O., although its board meeting did not specifically endorse the incentive wage, is alert
to its significance. In the steel, electrical, auto, and other industries this system is spreading. At a recent meeting of the War Labor Board, President Murray stated the general opinion of the C.I.O. leadership regarding incentive wages as follows:

"Encouragement should be given to all wage policies which result in increased production with corresponding increased earnings for the workers. Such a policy requires, however, the most careful protection of the workers so that their efforts for increased production to further the war effort will not result in merely inflated profits to industry, or in lack of employment because of poor scheduling or shortage of materials."

**Labor's No-Strike Pledge**

Organized labor's pledge not to strike during wartime came in for much consideration at the meeting of both labor and executive committees. This was because, (a) the cost of living was steadily climbing, (b) the wages of war workers were virtually frozen, and (c) John L. Lewis, with his three national strikes of coal miners, was trying desperately to have the labor movement repudiate its no-strike pledge and to embark upon a strike policy. Altogether the situation amounted to a real crisis. Labor's loyalty to its own and the nation's basic interests in the war were at stake. Lewis' policy would have led labor into a deadly trap, disastrous both to itself and the war. In his drive to get labor to pull out of the War Labor Board and to embark upon a course of tying up the industries and grabbing what it can, Lewis, an old-time Republican, was acting in direct concert with the defeatist opposition in Congress.

The two labor executive boards took active steps to resolve this serious crisis, by reiterating their no-strike pledge as being in the fundamental interest of labor and our whole people. The Executive Council of the A. F. of L., with certain circumlocutions and evasions of the Lewis issue, condemned the Smith-Connolly Act as provocative of strikes. The C.I.O. National Board, however, categorically condemned John L. Lewis for having provoked the passage of the Smith-Connolly Act and militantly restated its no-strike pledge.

Lewis failed in his efforts to stampede the labor movement into a strike policy in the midst of this war of national liberation. It would be folly, however, to believe that the battle is over on this crucial issue. With victory in the war looming closer, with the employers intensifying their profiteering, and with the workers increasingly demanding relief from excessive living costs, the only way that serious wartime strikes can be avoided is for organized labor to put a drastic halt to rising prices by the exercise of its united political power.

**Trade Union Unity**

In the urgent need of organized labor to exercise its full power the question of organizational trade union unity, national and interna-
tional, remains a vital issue. On both angles of this question the position of the C.I.O. is clear and correct—it is for immediate unity, by its present unions becoming part of that body as they are, with the A. F. of L., and it stands unequivocally for the unity of all the trade unions of the United Nations. Hence, it evidently did not feel called upon at its Board meeting to restate its position.

On the question of national trade union unity, the A. F. of L. Executive Council, however, reiterated its 1938 stand, which amounts to a demand for an "unconditional surrender" of the C.I.O. Said Mr. Green (N. Y. Times, Aug. 16):

"At that time and at intervals since then we proposed that the C.I.O. unions once chartered by the A. F. of L. should again come back to us, that then a joint committee be named to adjust the jurisdiction disputes between the rival unions. After these have been adjusted all of the former A. F. of L. unions would come back into the Federation at the same time."

This virtual ultimatum means that the A. F. of L. moguls have no real desire for labor unity, unless the C.I.O. should decide to commit hara-kiri and let them select what they please of what was left. Such united action as has developed between the A. F. of L., and the C.I.O., at the top, chiefly in the combined Labor Victory Board, was directly urged by the Roosevelt Administration. Animated by antiquated craft prejudices and narrow personal interests, the A. F. of L. Council leaders are following a line which makes organized labor go through this most crucial period in its history split in the middle and gravely weakened by division. Characteristically, Mr. Green said that organic unity in the next six months was "not within the realm of possibility."

The A. F. of L. Council's failure to accept John L. Lewis' application for the re-affiliation of the United Mine Workers, however, was a service to labor, and it came as a blow in the face of that defeatist, Lewis, insolent and autocratic, who hoped to dominate and use the A. F. of L. Council as an instrument against the war and to split the workers away from President Roosevelt. It would have been a step away from labor unity to welcome Lewis back into the Federation. Although the Council was largely motivated by craft industries and personal ambitions in by-passing Lewis' application and referring it to the Boston convention for final action, the pressure of the A. F. of L. masses against Lewis was also not without its effect in their action. Anyway, it was a good job to keep Lewis out.

The A. F. of L. Executive Council failed to reverse its previous position of refusing to cooperate with the Soviet trade unions. Its policy of joining up with the British unions and leaving the Soviet unions and the C.I.O. on one side as untouchables is becoming more and more untenable. It is a policy of weakening the labor base of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. It also flaunts the will of the millions of
organized workers in the C.I.O., the Railroad Brotherhoods, the Latin American unions, many British unions, and various sections of the A. F. of L. itself who are more and more insistently demanding real international trade union unity. It is indeed a political absurdity when Secretary-Treasurer George Meany, speaking the sentiments of the A. F. of L. Executive Council, tells our Government and people that "An enduring peace cannot be achieved and maintained except through international cooperation," while he and his colleagues of the Executive Council at the same time refuse to cooperate with the Soviet trade unions. It is a bad situation that will eventually be liquidated by mass worker pressure, generated by the urgency of the war.

Labor and Post-War Problems

Questions of the post-war period occupied a great deal of attention at the meetings of both labor boards, and no doubt they will also be in the forefront at the coming A. F. of L. and C.I.O. conventions. Now that the peoples of the United Nations are definitely convinced that they are going to smash Nazi Germany and Japan, it is natural that they should begin to think ahead about the post-war world. In this respect organized labor cannot stand mute in the rear, but must let its voice be heard. In this whole matter the question of international cooperation between the labor unions is one of major importance. Only if the trade unions of all the United Nations are acting in concert can they hope to exert their maximum influence on the shaping of the post-war world.

Both the A. F. of L. and the C.I.O. national boards have committees on post-war problems. These should get together and work jointly. As things now stand, the C.I.O., by previous actions as well as by this Board meeting's decisions, tends to go along, with criticisms, in the general direction of President Roosevelt's proposed post-war economic plans, at least on the domestic field. Whereas, in the proposals of the recent A. F. of L. Executive Council, said to have been drafted by Matthew Woll, there is in their solicitude for the capitalist profit and for "free enterprise" a suspicious scent of the National Association of Manufacturers. The time is ripe for labor to study systematically and in a united manner the complex national and international problems that the workers will not only have to confront once the war comes to an end but which are already becoming urgent practical war issues.

An Estimate of the Two Meetings

From the foregoing it is obvious that the C.I.O. National Board meeting sounded a much clearer and more militant labor and patriotic note than did the A. F. of L. Executive Council. On every issue dealt with by the boards—political action, the wage question, the no-strike pledge, trade union unity, post-war problems, etc.—the C.I.O. top leadership showed itself to be far in advance of that of the A. F. of L.
This is not to say that there were no weaknesses in the C.I.O. Board meeting. The most serious shortcoming was its failure to take up more concretely American military and diplomatic policy, such as the urgent question of the second front and the relations to the peoples of the occupied and liberated countries. These questions must be given much more attention by all of organized labor. Above all, now, the question of the second front, with which is bound up the whole matter of shortening the war, must be made a living question throughout the millions of organized workers.

The more progressive character of the C.I.O. board meeting as against that of the A. F. of L. indicates the difference in the make-up and functioning of the two committees. The C.I.O. National Board is a democratic, progressive body which reflects and responds to the attitudes and opinions of its great mass of followers. It is in actuality a leading committee for the millions of workers it represents. But the A. F. of L. Executive Council is none of this. It is unrepresentative and undemocratic, the rank and file having virtually no say in its proceedings. It continually drags after the labor movement, usually acting as a brake upon it. How far behind the A. F. of L. membership the Council lags was well illustrated by the recent progressive state conventions in Ohio and New York, which adopted war policies much superior to those of the national A. F. of L. leaders.

Part of the explanation for the unprogressive character of the A. F. of L. leadership is to be found in the presence in the Executive Council of such defeatists as Woll, Hutcheson and Dubinsky, who fight against all militant war policies. But this is not by any means the whole story. The Council is also loaded up with antiquated bureaucrats who, even while subscribing to a correct general win-the-war line, are too conservative to do much to apply it. So it has been for many years in top A. F. of L. circles. It is a leadership which, in principle, is against initiating or enforcing any new policies itself. It can be budged only by rank-and-file pressure.

Although the C.I.O. National Board is manifestly far more progressive and is carrying out a much more militant war policy than the A. F. of L. Executive Council, this does not mean that the gap between them is as great as to exclude organizational unity and political cooperation. On the contrary, there is a basic political unity between them in that they are both supporting the war and backing up the President. The difficulty is that the A. F. of L. Council leadership is crippled by the presence in its ranks of confirmed defeatists and by long-time bureaucratic conservatism. The cure for this situation is for the great rank and file of the A. F. of L. membership to speak out on policy and to exercise mass democratic pressure upon the high officialdom to have their will translated into A. F. of L. policy. More and more this is taking place locally—on questions of the second front, labor unity, Negro rights, and
many other issues. A renaissance of the A. F. of L. is under way, and it is welling up from the bottom. Many state and city A. F. of L. bodies are in direct conflict with the ultra-conservative policies of the Executive Council. That the coming convention of the C.I.O. in Philadelphia will be of a militant win-the-war character is assured; but to what extent the A. F. of L. convention in Boston responds to the war needs of the workers and the nation will depend primarily upon the degree to which the more alert lower bodies and rank-and-file forces make their democratic will felt on their leaders.

**The Task Ahead**

In order to overcome the dangerous forces of reaction and defeatism now raising their head in this country, it is absolutely necessary that organized labor—the A. F. of L., C.I.O., and Railroad Brotherhoods, and the miners—unite their forces politically, along the general lines proposed by the National Board meeting of the C.I.O. Only by labor throwing this vast force behind the President and by insisting that he stop all appeasement of reactionary elements at home and abroad, can our country be kept on a path that, together with the rest of the United Nations, will ensure the smashing of Hitlerism and effective post-war reconstruction. Organized labor, united politically, must take up in dead earnest the fight to establish a great Anglo-American second front in Europe, to stabilize our economy, to develop a national diplomacy directed toward destroying fascism in Europe, not protecting its decaying structure; to keep our country from being captured by the reactionaries in the 1944 elections. Failure of labor to unite politically to do these things would bring the most serious consequences to the outcome of the war, to the shape-up of the post-war world, to the very existence of the trade union movement itself.

In every city, state and Congressional district in the country all the forces of organized labor and other win-the-war elements should come together and set up joint committees. These should take up the urgent task of politically registering the millions of uprooted war workers and also develop other active political work in support of the war. Preparations must be made for labor to cast a solid win-the-war vote in 1944. From every section come reports indicating a great political awakening among the toiling masses. It is shared in by all the branches of the labor movement—C.I.O., A. F. of L., etc. This mass movement must be encouraged and stimulated in every possible way. To help do this is also the main task of the Communist Party. American organized labor is moving toward united political action, on a far broader basis than ever before in its history. That it shall reach this goal of political unity quickly and in overwhelming masses is imperative for the future of our country.
THE WAR IN ITALY

BY A. LANDY

THE unconditional surrender of Italy struck a powerful blow at Hitler's Axis and his hopes of victory in the war. Irrespective of the final peace terms to be submitted later, the armistice, whose provisions were approved in advance by England, the Soviet Union and the United States, and which was signed by the Badoglio Government on September 3, deprived Hitler of his most important European ally and accelerated the disintegration of the entire Hitler camp. The defection of Italy, both a reflection and extension of the crisis overwhelming the Axis, has given additional heart and courage to the United Nations fighters on all war fronts. It has provided new possibilities and incentives to the magnificent Yugoslav Army of Liberation and the strong and determined Liberation Army of Greece. Above all, it has added materially to the ability of England and the United States to deliver a crushing blow right to the heart of the Axis, Nazi Germany itself.

At this moment major attention in the American press is focused on the fighting in Italy, and may continue to be so for some time. Even the unprecedented progress of the Soviet offensive on the Eastern front, the main and most decisive front of the war, with its far-reaching significance for the course, tempo and outcome of the whole struggle, has been given second place in the news.

The reason for this is not because of the size of the forces engaged in battle; for highest estimates to date do not credit the Nazis with more than eighteen to twenty divisions in all Italy, and the first major engagement on the Italian mainland, the battle for Salerno, which is still in progress at this writing, has involved no more than two and a half Nazi divisions. Nor is the reason for this because Italy is a decisive theater of the war, for even though the Nazis are fighting savagely to keep Italy out of Anglo-American hands, at least as long as possible, and both sides are said to be rushing in reinforcements, there is no evidence that the Nazis regard the battle for Italy as more than the battle for an outpost on the European continent, although one of the most important outposts in the whole European scheme. And nothing has happened as yet to indicate that the Anglo-American Allies plan or will be able to get the Nazis to commit such large forces in Italy as to transform
the war there into a really decisive theater of action.

If the war in Italy occupies the center of American attention today, it is because our troops, many of them getting their first battle experience after close to two years of war, have for the first time engaged the forces of the main enemy, Nazi Germany, directly on the European continent on a scale and under conditions which leave no doubt that henceforth we shall have to put forth a major effort in the war and be prepared to pay dearly for every victory. The American press, of course, is doing its share to enlarge the events in Italy out of all proportion to their real place in the total picture of the war. But we cannot forget that so far Anglo-American military plans, strategy and contributions in Europe have revolved largely around the Mediterranean and Italy, providing a focus of attention which was only augmented by the dramatic role Italy has played in the unfolding of the war during the past two months.

Preoccupation with the theater of war in which American armies are putting forth their biggest and most important effort to date is entirely natural. What is not "natural" or justifiable and is highly dangerous to the war as a whole is the refusal to see the Italian picture in its true perspectives, thereby distorting its relation to the decisive struggle on the Eastern front. It would be folly to underestimate the significance of the war in Italy; but it would be even greater folly to give it a significance which it does not have. And yet, this is the kind of folly to which a large part of the American press is striving to commit us. The same press which hailed the Sicilian campaign as the long-awaited second front, despite the fact that there were only three Nazi divisions in all Sicily; the press which two months later again hailed the invasion of the Italian mainland as that same long-awaited second front, despite the denials by General Eisenhower and Prime Minister Churchill for reasons that quickly became apparent with Italy's unconditional surrender and the possible elimination of an Italian front altogether—that press is now once more proclaiming the war against the Nazis in Italy as the true and only second front, indeed, the front which promises to become the decisive theater of the whole war.

The New York Times, for example, in its editorial of September 15, commenting on our landing at Salerno, declared that "the second front is now ablaze, not in France but in Italy, and the developments in Russia are proof of its effectiveness." On September 9, the Times had hailed the surrender of Italy as the triumph of the Roosevelt-Churchill "Mediterranean strategy" and the direct result of the Sicilian campaign, although it conceded "the enormous contribution made by the Red Army to the weakening of the Axis power." In its editorial of September 15 the Times not only identified the "Mediterranean strategy" as the strategy of the second front, but credited it with making possible the victories
of the Soviet summer offensive on the Eastern front.

Such a presentation of the events in Italy and the Italian war is folly, first, because it does not accord with the facts, and secondly, because it makes it impossible to draw the necessary and urgent conclusions for the further conduct of the war. Irrespective of differences regarding the possibility of a second front or where it should be launched, there is general agreement that a real second front must compel the Nazis to withdraw at least fifty divisions from the Eastern front. But there is absolutely no evidence to show that the Nazis have withdrawn any divisions from the Eastern front, despite the vague and unconfirmed rumors that seventy Nazi divisions have been rushed to Italy. On the contrary, the Russians continue to insist, and even claimed as late as September 15, that new Nazi divisions have again been dispatched from the West to the Soviet front. Furthermore, a close examination of the Italian events which culminated in Italy’s unconditional surrender will show that it was precisely what the Times called “the enormous contribution made by the Red Army” which was the decisive factor in the collapse of Hitler’s Italian ally.

If we follow the presentation of the Times and those circles for which it speaks, the conclusion we must draw is that it is not the Allies whose task has been facilitated by the Red Army, but the Red Army whose task has been facilitated by the “Mediterranean strategy” of the Allies. If we follow the facts and the real relationships, the conclusion we must draw is that the Nazis are so tied down and so irrevocably committed, so desperate in face of the Red Army’s victories on the Eastern front that it is now infinitely easier for the Anglo-American Allies to open the second front, and together with the Soviet Union to defeat the Nazis in Europe.

II

There can be no question that the conquest of Sicily, the overthrow of Mussolini, the invasion of Italy, then its unconditional surrender, and now the war to expel the Nazis—all crowded into a little more than two months—represent a dramatic sequence and tempo of events which are highly significant for the war as a whole. But the precise character of this significance will never be clear unless we understand that the developments in Italy were made possible primarily because of Hitler’s crisis on the Eastern front. The establishment of this fact is not a matter of seeing that historical justice is done to our Soviet ally by recording its full contribution to the victories in the Mediterranean. We can leave that safely to future historians. But it is necessary in order to appreciate the real opportunities for a two-front war and the limitations of the “Mediterranean strategy” in exploiting these tremendous opportunities provided by Hitler’s crisis on the Eastern Front for the speedy defeat of Nazi Germany. And after all that is the chief consideration
to which all other are subordinate.

It is true that the sudden collapse of Hitler's chief Axis partner in Europe was prepared long before by the whole series of defeats suffered by Italy under Mussolini's leadership. The record of these defeats in the service of Nazi Germany constitutes a shameful chronology of disaster. First, Mussolini's divisions were smashed on the Eastern front; then the British took Libya; later, the Italians were driven completely out of the African continent; this was followed by the loss of Pantelleria, Italy's "Gibraltar," and finally, by the invasion of Sicily. This precipitated the final crisis of Italian fascism, but only because Hitler, busy saving his own skin in the Eastern Front, could not respond to Mussolini's pleas for help. This was the overwhelmingly decisive link in the entire chain of developments.

To see this decisive relation of the Eastern front to the developments in Italy, it is necessary to take into account the chronology of events. On July 5 the Nazis began their 1943 summer offensive. By July 15 the Nazi offensive had been completely smashed and the Red Army launched its counter-offensive which has been continuing successfully up to this day. Meanwhile, on July 10, the Anglo-American Allies began the invasion of Sicily, completing its conquest thirty-eight days later, on August 17. Rushing to Hitler for help, Mussolini came back empty handed, and was ousted by the King and Marshal Badoglio on July 25. On August 5 the Red Army garnered the first fruits of its counter-offensive with the recapture of Orel and Belgorod. In the meantime, Mussolini's overthrow was followed immediately by the public emergence of the Five-Party Coalition and National Front inside Italy, which began to organize the fight for peace. This fight continued throughout August and the first days of September. On September 3 the Anglo-American forces launched their invasion of the Italian mainland. Five days later came the dramatic proclamation of unconditional surrender signed by Marshal Badoglio's government.

With the revelations following the surrender, the full interdependence of these events emerged. Not only the decisive role of the Soviet Union became clear, but also the reason for the Nazi's ability to seize the key Italian centers and positions in Italy thirty-six hours after the announcement of the surrender, in spite of the fact that it evidently came to them as a complete surprise. Mussolini, as we saw, was overthrown on July 25; but the Anglo-American invasion of Italy did not come until September 3, nearly forty days later. The failure of the Allies to strike at the Italian mainland right after Mussolini's power was smashed, when the masses, under the leadership of the Five-Party Coalition, were clamoring in the streets for peace, the army totally unwilling to fight, the Nazis caught completely by surprise and in no position to interfere with determined landings, gave the latter time to prepare positions in North
Italy and the opportunity to maneuver when further reliance on the Badoglio government was impossible.

Had the Allies struck promptly, a minimum of forces would have been required to take over Italy. They did not do this because they pursued a policy of protracted negotiations with Badoglio and the House of Savoy. The error here was not that negotiations with Badoglio were undertaken, but that they were protracted beyond the dictates of military requirements.

For the first five days after Mussolini’s ouster the National Front in Italy also gave Badoglio the benefit of the doubt and the chance to give expression to the will of the Italian people for peace by surrendering to the Allies. But after that, on July 30, they recognized that it was useless to expect the Badoglio government to fulfill the will of the people. That was the time when the Anglo-American Allies should have acted in unison with the National Front in Italy. That they did not give the Badoglio government a new lease on life, despite the fact that it was a government which at first had actually attempted to continue the war on the side of Hitler. Although it was ultimately forced to maneuver against Hitler and submit to unconditional surrender, the Badoglio government did not voluntarily turn to the Allies for that purpose as demanded by the people of Italy.

It is a matter of record that on July 30 the Five-Party National Front addressed itself to Badoglio and warned him that they would not tolerate a continuation of the war on the side of Hitler and called upon him to prove that he had really broken with treacherous fascism by asking for an armistice and immediately starting peace negotiations with the Allies. Despite this and the turnout of the masses in the streets to demand peace, Badoglio did not move. On August 2 the National Front called upon the whole nation to rise once again “and demand the resignation of Marshal Badoglio and the abdication of the King” for their refusal to make an immediate peace.

“Hitherto,” they declared, “we refrained from addressing such words to the people, hoping that the Badoglio government would not dare to defy the will so clearly expressed by the army and nation. We must wait no more.”

Three days later Badoglio’s Cabinet met for three and a half hours. The press reported that it was only a meeting over domestic questions. It is clear from what we know now that the “domestic” questions under discussion at that meeting were undoubtedly the demand of the Italian people for peace. The negotiations culminating in the Armistice of September 3 had been going on for about a month prior to that, although kept secret at the time. In other words, the August 5 meeting of the Badoglio Cabinet was already occupying itself with the question of these negotiations.

What actually prompted the inauguration of such negotiations, especially after the National Front’s call of August 2 for the overthrow of the Badoglio government, can
be seen from the date of the Cabinet meeting—August 5. That was the day on which Orel and Belgorod were taken by the Red Army! If Hitler's cause became so clearly hopeless after July 15 that he was unable to come to Mussolini's aid, thereby precipitating the Duce's overthrow by the King-Badoglio group, in the eyes of this group his cause became irrevocably so on August 5 when Orel and Belgorod were taken, opening a brilliant succession of victories at Kharkov, Taganrog, Mariupol and other centers in the Donets and the Ukraine.

Clearly, without support from the people and the army, with the growing power of the National Front, with the Anglo-American Allies entering the last lap of their Sicilian campaign, the defeat of the Nazis' mightiest concentration of forces for a summer offensive and the irresistible success of the Soviet summer counter-offensive convinced the Badoglio government that there was no other way of saving itself except by beginning negotiations for peace.

That Badoglio and the King expected the Anglo-American Allies to help keep them in power is self-evident. What is not immediately evident is why the Allies behaved as if living up to this expectation was their first concern. The result of this was that, though September 8 was to mark the conclusion of peace with the Italians, it actually marked the beginning of war with the Nazis for possession of Italy.

Why did the United States agree to drag out the negotiations when from a military point of view such protraction was inadvisable and played into the hands of the Nazis? It is true that the Anglo-American forces were still tied up in Sicily and did not clean up there until August 17. But the sum total of Allied and opposing forces involved there was relatively small. Moreover, since Allied strategy was so overwhelmingly a Mediterranean strategy orientated toward securing the unconditional surrender of Italy before undertaking other military moves, why were not additional Anglo-American forces immediately committed to take advantage of the new opportunities opened up by the overthrow of Mussolini, the virtual withdrawal of the Italian people and army from the war after that event, and the utter inability of Hitler to intervene as a result of his colossal failure on the Eastern front? Surely Badoglio and the King had no real power to offer resistance to the Allies; unable to continue collaboration with Hitler, they were entirely at the mercy of the Anglo-American Allies.

The answer can only be found in the nature of Anglo-American policy in relation to Italy, a policy characterized in its purely military aspects by a superabundance of caution, an almost superstitious overestimation of Nazi strength, and a stubborn underestimation of Soviet power, all operating in an atmosphere of near-neglect of the coalition and the needs of coalition warfare. This policy not only militated against a second front in Western Europe, but, because of its nature,
even hampered the realization of its most important military objectives in Italy itself.

The chief features of this policy were threefold: (1) Maneuver to take Italy out of the war without having to fight in great force; hence deal with the monarchist-military elements; (2) Destroy the fascist regime but avoid encouraging the democratic revolution; hence lean heavily on the Vatican, while keeping contact with the Five-Party coalition without doing business with it; (3) Administer the country through an Anglo-American military government—AMG, but with a minimum of political disturbance; hence, maintain the basic fascist governing apparatus and arrangements, keeping anti-fascist prisoners locked up while releasing ordinary criminals, and refraining from restoring democratic liberties, especially freedom of assembly.

There is obviously a deep contradiction inherent in such a policy. On the one hand there is the desire and the need to destroy the fascist regime; and yet, on the other, there is a reluctance and even an evident fear to involve the democratic masses in the solution of this task. This is tantamount to promoting what in effect has to be an anti-fascist democratic revolution but without democratic results—a preposterous paradox, to say the least.

On the face of it, therefore, this contradiction appears to stem from a purely "military," non-political conduct of the war in pursuit of the military objective of unconditional surrender. But it is impossible to review the development of Anglo-American policy toward Italy, especially since the invasion of Sicily, without noting the unmistakable political inspiration and significance of the measures used to achieve the ultimate military objective of surrender.

It is an illusion to think that we can avoid involving and relying on the masses, except perhaps in a highly limited and strictly controlled fashion, and yet get a cheap military victory. Undemocratic policies and practices quickly translate themselves into military costs. This is exactly what happened as a result of our protracted negotiations with Badoglio. The time lost by us because of the fear of the people was time gained by the Nazis, time to entrench themselves and maneuver and utilize the fascist connections left standing by the Badoglio government.

III

Despite these serious weaknesses of Anglo-American policy in relation to Italy, historic advances have been achieved which should make it possible to speed up the final blow against Hitler-Germany. Mussolini has been overthrown, and all the clowning antics of Hitler in “restoring” the Duce will never restore the power of fascism or save the Nazis from complete defeat in Italy. Badoglio has been forced to submit to unconditional surrender to the Allies, and now Anglo-American armies are in the process of completely liberating Italy. The Italian people, headed by the five-
party National Front, have welcomed the Anglo-American Allies from the start. They have fought for policies proclaimed by the Allies; they had to fight for them against Badoglio and even against our own half-measures and hesitations; and now they are calling upon the Italian people to seize arms and join us in the war against the German invaders. That the Italian people are ready to wage such a fight is shown by the fact that, despite Nazi occupation of Italy’s northern industrial areas, most factories there have been shut down by strikes; communications have been interrupted by railway strikes in Milan, Turin, Genoa and Bologna; and thousands of Italian troops are still battling the Nazis.

The main task now is to concentrate all forces for the defeat of the Nazis in Italy. The National Front showed that it understands this thoroughly by calling for the establishment of a national government capable of rallying the people for this task. In the interests of victory it undertook to eliminate any possible differences with the Anglo-American Allies over the question of the Badoglio government by agreeing to support the Badoglio government if it acts as a government of war against the Nazis. The five-party coalition is plainly not motivated by doctrinaire considerations; it is evidently ready to take into account Anglo-American wishes and facilitate Anglo-American policy in Italy in order to concentrate all energies on the main task of defeating the Nazis. In a proclamation of September 16 the five-party coalition, which had indicated its readiness to back up the Badoglio government right after Mussolini’s ouster, provided it carried out the will of the people for peace, declared:

“Italy today needs a government which will openly and unhesitatingly take up the standard of the defense of Italy against the foul Hitlerite aggressor to save the sacred heritage of our nation. If the Badoglio government follows this political line of defense of our nation the people will support it. But we have the right to demand that the government rely on the people, that it trust the people and that it unite around it all the free and healthy forces of the nation.”

This development is all to the good and should make it easier for the Anglo-American Allies to enter into and extend active collaboration with the democratic forces of Italy. This would unquestionably have a salutary effect on the relations of the whole anti-Hitler coalition and the course of the war. But we must understand that this is a two-sided process. It is not enough for us to call upon the Italian people to welcome the Anglo-American forces; we must also welcome their active cooperation with us. True, General Eisenhower has called upon the Italian people to extend military help to our forces by sabotaging and disrupting the Nazi enemy; and the people are answering. But we must make sure that this call is part of an all-out democratic policy of cooperation with the popular, anti-fascist
forces. We must make sure that this policy is translated into actual democratic liberties in order to make such collaboration practically possible for the Italian people. In short, the process of driving the Nazis out of Italy must be a process which will at the same time completely destroy Italian fascism, Hitler's sole source of support inside Italy. It must be a process involving the masses of people in the solution of the military and political tasks facing the Allies in Italy.

IV

The fight for Italy is far from won. We still have a hard war ahead, as President Roosevelt declared in his message to Congress September 17. While our victory in Italy is certain, it must be gained in a manner that will promote rather than hamper our main strategic opportunities and objectives in the war as a whole. Indeed, the best assurance of speedy victory in Italy would be the opening of a second front in Western Europe, an operation greatly facilitated by the surrender of Italy, the acquisition of the Italian fleet and even by possible withdrawals of Nazi troops from the West for reinforcement of Hitler's war in Italy.

The extent to which our Mediterranean victories have facilitated and provided us with additional means for opening and sustaining a second front in Europe is indicated by a dispatch from London on September 14 which declared that "naval success in the Mediterranean appeared today to have put the Allies in a position to realize by November their goal of 10,000,000 tons of shipping to support a new front in western Europe." President Roosevelt's latest message to Congress provided the most authoritative confirmation that we now have the material and military resources necessary for such an undertaking.

The main thing now is to assure that the war in Italy is not viewed as an obstacle to the immediate opening of a western front; that we stop counting on our fingers what additional help Italy represents to the Soviet Union, and think instead of what new opportunities it provides the entire anti-Hitler coalition for realizing the strategic benefits of a two-front war and the early victory which such coalition warfare would bring.

The main thing is to understand that Italy never was nor is the center of the struggle against the Axis, nor the chief road to its speedy defeat. It is noteworthy that this has been emphasized almost simultaneously by important British and American military authorities. On September 5, for example, Major General Lewis H. Brereton, Commanding General of the United States Forces in the Middle East, declared: "Speaking strictly from a military viewpoint and not taking in political or humanitarian considerations, I believe that we must continue driving straight at the center of Germany without deviation. Lopping off the arms, such as Italy and the Balkan Peninsula, would be a process which in itself would serve to protract the war effort and delay getting at the other
job, because of the immense amount of shipping and manpower required." (New York Times dispatch from Cairo, Sept. 5.) On September 17 the New York Times reported the prominence that was given in the Soviet press of September 16 to Major General J. F. C. Fuller's article in the London Sunday Pictorial which declared that the English Channel was still "our best road," that the war in Italy does not represent substantial aid to Russia, that Balkan landings were inadvisable because they would have no close objectives of vital importance, and that a landing in France was preferable.

To complete the liberation of Italy the concentration of all forces is needed. The readiness of the five-party coalition in Italy to cooperate with the Badoglio government as long as it rallies the people in the war against the Nazis helps to remove a possible source of conflict and disunity on the Italian mainland; it clears the way for the full integration of the Anglo-American forces and policy with the people of Italy for the war against the Nazis; it makes it possible to clarify the confusion created in America by the administrative and economic practices of AMG, and provides a new basis for rallying labor and the people here to new levels of national unity and production for speedy victory in the war. What is needed to make this an immediate reality is the whole-hearted application in Italy of a truly democratic policy, as assured us by President Roose-velt in his message to Congress, backed up by a second front in Western Europe. We must not forget the fact, whose implications are so ominous and so disturbing to national and coalition unity, that those who do not want a second front, hence do not want to coordinate their fight in the war with that of the Soviet Union in the interest of a common and speedy victory, also refuse to encourage or cooperate with the democratic and national front forces in Italy.

The intervention of labor and the people can help dispel all misgivings regarding our policies and practices in Italy and their bearing on the functioning of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. They can do this by insisting on the pursuit of a policy of collaboration with the popular democratic forces of Italy coupled with the opening of a second front in Europe this year. Only such a policy is in complete harmony with the handling of the Italian question as a coalition question, and not only as the private concern of Britain and America. So far, only the first steps were taken toward handling the question that way, namely, the joint Anglo-Soviet-American approval of the armistice terms as required by the Anglo-Soviet treaty of alliance, not to speak of the interests of cordial coalition relations. But it is a self-evident axiom that only through a democratic, coalition policy can the war in Italy become a contribution to a common victory and to Anglo-Soviet-American cooperation in the peace.
WHAT IS HIDDEN BEHIND THE PLAN FOR AN EAST EUROPEAN FEDERATION OR CONFEDERATION?*

Every logically thinking person understands that to the U.S.S.R.—the biggest power on the continent, which in the course of the war has revealed its state and military strength—will belong one of the leading roles in the organization of the post-war reconstruction of Europe and of the whole world. Nevertheless, anti-democratic and semi-fascist elements are trying to prevent the participation of the U.S.S.R. in the organization of the post-war world and are building the most fantastic plans in this direction, clearly hostile to the Soviet Union.

Particularly active in the discussion of the problems of the post-war world organization are precisely such bankrupt political groups as the offshoots of the Munich clique in Britain; the isolationists and various compromised politicians in the United States, as Hoover and Bullitt; and the anti-democratic groupings among the political emigrés from Poland, Hungary, Austria, the Baltic and other countries.

These groups and their press, as, for example, The Nineteenth Century and After, and The Fortnightly Review, in Britain; the Hearst press in the United States; and the various sheets of the émigré cliques certainly do not reflect the opinions of broad public circles in England and the United States and the democratic circles among the political emigrés.

These groups are exerting themselves to stir up trouble and are playing into the hands of Hitler and his associates, who hope for a split in the camp of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. They have developed many activities, putting into play such outworn bugbears as the menace of "Bolshevization," and inventing and treating the reader to scores of anti-Soviet plans for the "reconstruction" of Europe.

There are many such projects, beginning with that of forming a United States of Europe, a "Pan-Europe," and ending with the organization of a Europe broken up into various federations and confederations and regional blocs of states.

One of the most typical projects for a federation is the Federation of East European countries. The most energetic advocates of the East European Federation are the reactionary groups of Polish emigrés, from disguised Beck supporters to

* Press Review in Issue No. 4 of The War and the Working Class, Moscow.
the Social-Democrats, as well as representatives of the Polish Government in London.

A careful analysis of their plans for the organization of post-war Europe completely betrays the imperialist aspirations of the Polish gentry, although they are trying to disguise them by talk about the security of the central European states, the political equilibrium in Europe, and the ensuring of a lasting and stable peace.

The foundation of the European Federation, according to the Polish project, must be Polish-Czechoslovak and Greek-Yugoslav Federations. The resolution of the Polish National Council adopted in April, 1942, states that the necessary condition for ensuring lasting peace in Europe after the destruction of Germany's military might is closely knit federative unions of the central European nations between the Baltic, Aegean, and Adriatic Seas.

This resolution and other statements of Polish public figures clearly bear the imprint of a sort of idée fixe of the Polish politicians, who claim a dominating position for Poland in central Europe. It is no accident that the Polish ministers who came out with these statements, together with the many official publicists, in their cynical frankness go so far as to say that Poland must become the “center of attraction” for the other countries.

We shall not dwell here on the fact that the Polish imperialist plans contain aggressive claims to Soviet territory, to Lithuania and to all of the Soviet Baltic in general, a claim worthy perhaps only of fascist aggressors. Despite all this, these Polish plans find support among certain organs of the British press, which lend their pages to the propaganda ideas of the Polish reactionaries.

The authors of the plans for the creation of an East European Federation readily discuss the necessity of ensuring “European equilibrium,” and with this in view the small and medium states in eastern Europe “must create a bloc of states with 100,000,000 or 125,000,000 population.”

But the plans of all these project builders are clearly built on sand. It is not difficult to understand in the first place that such a federation contains almost insurmountable internal contradictions. Is it possible to ignore the fact that an East European Federation must be a political union of democratic Czechoslovakia and feudal Hungary, of republican Poland and monarchist Rumania? Is it possible to count on the stability of such a politically heterogeneous federation?

Or take, for example, the question of relations between states within the East European Federation. Who does not know the irreconcilable territorial contradictions between Hungary and Rumania on the question of Transylvania, or the differences between Czechoslovakia and Poland with regard to the question of the Teschen region, on which for several years now the Polish and Czechoslovak governments have failed to reach an agreement?

Consequently the internal instability of such a federation is beyond a doubt; such a shaky, clearly un-
stable federation as extolled by the Polish politicians cannot afford a reliable foundation for the freedom, independence, and very security of the states involved in the project of this federation, to say nothing of the experience with the Little and Balkan Ententes.

Both of these blocs of states in eastern Europe set themselves the aim of ensuring the security of the states from outside interference. But what has experience shown? The Little Entente in no way helped Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in the struggle against Hitlerite aggression. When the war came the members of the Balkan Entente split into three camps. Rumania perfidiously violated her obligations. Turkey has done nothing to fulfill her obligations with regard to Yugoslavia and Greece, which were subjected to aggression.

On the other hand, it is not difficult to see that the plans for this federation, allegedly to be formed with the aim of struggle against potential German aggression in the future, are in the last analysis directed against the Soviet Union.

The champions of the idea of a European Federation, as the Fortnightly Review, for example, speak without embarrassment of the fact that the plans for a federation "between the Baltic and Black Seas" imply security from outside aggression "from the west and east," that is, from Germany as well as seemingly from the Soviet Union.

Thus, they advocate the same attitude to the "west," in other words toward Germany, as to the "east," in other words toward the Soviet Union. And this is done at a moment when the Soviet Union, as recognized by honest people the world over, is heading the liberation struggle against the monstrous aggression of fascist Germany, not only in the interests of its own people, but in the interests of the liberation of those countries of whose union into a federation so much is being written at present, but which will not regain their freedom and independence without a Soviet victory over Germany.

The anti-Soviet character of the East European Federation is revealed also by the following fact: in 1940 Czechoslovakia and Poland reached an agreement on a Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation which is to serve as the basis for an East European Federation. Since 1942 Czechoslovakian statesmen have repeatedly declared that the formation of the Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation must be carried out in agreement with the Soviet Union, which borders both on Czechoslovakia and Poland.

President Benes indicated the pointblank necessity for reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union on the question of a Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation. Time and again he persistently defended this idea, but met with no support from the Polish statesmen, who are the most energetic advocates of the idea of confederation.

From this it must follow that these Polish statesmen do not deem it necessary to decide such questions on the basis of friendly collaboration with the U.S.S.R. In this
one cannot but see one more proof that the above-mentioned Polish statesmen, nurturing their plans for confederation, are guided by intentions by no means friendly with regard to the Soviet Union.

No wonder that already at the end of last year the American journalist Harold Callender, writing in the New York Times, pointed openly to the fact that the reactionary Polish press in the United States was painting the Polish-Czecho-slovakian Confederation as a buffer bloc between Russia and Germany.

Lastly, speaking of the plans for an East European Federation, it would not be amiss to recall such no mean fact as the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition formed in the course of this war. The plans for post-war Europe and plans for European federations in particular must not ignore such an important historical fact as the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and post-war collaboration in Europe.

But how can recognition of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty be compatible with a policy of struggle against “danger” from “west and east”? How indeed can support of this agreement, designed to ensure collaboration and mutual aid between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain in averting aggression on the part of Germany in the post-war period, be compatible with the aims of the formation of an East European Federation directed against aggressive Germany and against the U.S.S.R., which in the future is to be one of the decisive forces in the struggle against the possibility of new aggression by Germany?

To build plans for the creation of an East European Federation hostile to the Soviet Union is possible only by proceeding from the negation of the necessity for friendship and collaboration between the U.S.S.R. and its Allies in the post-war period, by proceeding only from the negation of the Anglo-Soviet Agreement.

Honest supporters of the Anglo-Soviet Agreement cannot defend post-war plans hostile to the Soviet Union and Great Britain, or to either one of these countries.
THE SOVIET UNION'S STRUGGLE FOR PEACE IN THE PERIOD BEFORE WORLD WAR II

BY VLADIMIR POTEMKIN *

THE Second World War is not yet over but attempts are already being made to write its history, reveal the causes of the war, depict its preparation and determine those responsible for it. Regretably, these digressions into history frequently lack the necessary knowledge of the facts and are clearly biased. This bias is manifest particularly in the attempts to justify the policy of "appeasement" of the aggressors, which in practice is direct tolerance with regard to the war incendiaries.

On the other hand attempts are made to shuffle the facts and give a distorted picture of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union during the period preceding the Second World War. Yet no one will succeed in hiding such glaring facts of that period as the numerous and persistent attempts of the Soviet Union to induce the governments of Britain and France to organize a common anti-Hitler front at that time. Nevertheless this was not achieved solely because the leaders of European policy at that time of the Chamberlain and Daladier type and of the Beck type in Poland, contrary to the genuine national interest of their countries, did not want the creation of such a common front, but on the contrary wanted to isolate the Soviet Union and give Germany a free hand in the east.

The biased distortions of historic truth cannot hold out before the irrefutable testimony of the facts showing how the Second World War was really prepared and how throughout its existence the Soviet Union persistently and tirelessly fought for peace between the nations.

Soviet foreign policy has always pursued peace aims. Nevertheless our state leaders clearly realized that following the first imperialist war mankind was being led toward a new world catastrophe. Not peace but hostility saturated the atmosphere at the Paris conference where Britain, France, the United States and Italy divided the spoils.

Deep contradictions were revealed between the former allies. The British feared the excessive strengthening of their French partner. Contrary to Clemenceau and
Foch they were opposed to the dismemberment of Germany, to the wresting of the Rhineland and the Saar from her, or to forcing her to pay three billion pounds for the restoration of the northeastern departments of France alone.

The reactionaries guiding Britain's foreign policy needed Germany to counter the French desire for hegemony in Europe and as a force which might prove useful for the rout of Bolshevik Russia. The severe onslaught of the French imperialists against Germany was also opposed by the United States which was concerned with one thing—preventing new international upheavals in Europe in order to collect her war debts from her former allies. Several years will pass and the same Americans will think of how to preserve intact their capital investment in Germany.

The business circles of the transatlantic republic were disturbed by the thought lest Clemenceau and Lloyd George were bringing pressure on Germany to strangle the hen which lays the golden eggs. At the peace conference President Wilson pictured his mission in the noblest form. Acutely the new savior of mankind pursued very mundane aims—world hegemony of the United States, superiority of the American navy over the British and territorial dismemberment of Russia.

Alive to the rumblings of the struggle flaring up among the victors, the Germans missed no opportunity to utilize it in their interests. Shirking the terms of the Versailles Treaty, their secretly preserved and increased their armed forces, delayed the reparations payments and conducted secret negotiations now with the British, now with the French, calculated on inciting one against the other.

Operating now with flattering promises, now with crude blackmail, pacifist camouflage or brazen threats of Germany's bankruptcy which would allegedly result in a Bolshevik revolution, German diplomacy ceaselessly fanned the hostility between the victors in an effort to gain the time necessary for the designs of German imperialism for the purpose of revenge.

The jackal which did not succeed in wresting the promised spoils from the conqueror—Italy—cast a greedy eye around, seeking for means to replace this loss. The entente of the Allies, who during the redivision of Europe bit off more than they could chew, trembled over these unstable acquisitions for fear of not being able to hold them.

The punished accomplices of Germany, chained by the post-war agreements, cherished the impatient dream of the restoration of their former borders and national sovereignty. Europe was in a state of extreme tension, aggravated by the economic ruin into which the nations were plunged by the World War.

Something in the nature of a war or an uprising of masses brought to desperation was in the air. German diplomacy did its utmost to add to the general uneasiness. Frightening the bourgeois world with the specter of social revolution she tried to win for Germany recogni-
tion as a bulwark against the Bolshevik menace, to secure help and the possibility for strengthening and arming herself for struggle against the forces of destruction—invented by herself—allegedly menacing the capitalist world.

Defeated but unyielding, the enemy lured his victors into the dangerous trap. Under cover of an olive branch the knife was sharpened against the western democracies. But the reactionary circles of the victorious powers seemingly did not notice this German treachery. They sacrificed the national interests of their peoples for narrow class interests.

They saw as their main danger not imperialist Germany which persistently prepared for military revenge under the guise of a struggle against Bolshevism. They regarded as their main enemy the land of the Soviets, which in reality wanted nothing but peace and directed all of its efforts toward the restoration of its national economy.

This anti-Soviet policy of the western powers had truly fatal consequences. It favored Germany's desires; it strove to isolate such a powerful peace force as Soviet Russia.

Armed intervention of the capitalist powers, an economic blockade against Russia in accordance with the Clemenceau plan, incitement of Poland, Rumania and Turkey against the Soviet country, counter-revolutionary governments in Georgia, Azerbaidjan and Armenia, aid to the White Guard rebel generals, attempts to form a united anti-Soviet front at diplomatic conferences in Cannes, Genoa, the Hague—such were the initial stages of anti-Soviet policy pursued by the reactionary elements of the victorious powers.

The Soviet-German agreement at Rapallo meant a crushing breach in the anti-Soviet front. It gave Germany the hope of emerging from her political and economic isolation. As regards Soviet Russia, at that period Germany confronted it as the first of the west European countries which, following the border lands and Russia's eastern neighbors, entered into normal diplomatic relations with her.

* * *

[After citing the steps taken by the Soviet Government in the years preceding the Genoa Conference to secure peace and to establish trading relations with the various big and small powers, the author continues:]

At the Genoa Conference the Soviet delegation presented an extensive program for the peaceful collaboration of the new Russia with the capitalist countries. But the hand stretched out by Soviet Russia remained in the air. The governments of the victor countries still calculated on bringing the Bolsheviks to their knees!

The Rapallo agreement between Soviet Russia and Germany caused dismay in the camp of the victor powers. They already envisaged a political alliance of the two most powerful countries in central and eastern Europe; they envisaged a
Germany in control of the trade with the rich Russian market.

Could the British and French merchants reconcile themselves to such a situation, that is, could they deny themselves the profits promised by trade with the Soviet country? And so 1923 saw the beginning of wholesale desertion from the anti-Soviet front. 1924 was a year marked by recognition of the Soviet state. A number of bourgeois countries, Britain, France, Italy and China included, hastened to establish normal diplomatic and trading relations with the U.S.S.R.

But it is one thing to profit by agreements with the Soviet country and another to establish honest political collaboration in the interests of peace. The near-sighted diplomacy of the reactionary capitalist circles persisted in its former attempts to isolate the Soviet Union from participation in deciding important international problems. As before, it flirted with Germany, calculating on making her the tool of their anti-Soviet designs.

In its turn German diplomacy, too, manifested an interest in an agreement with Britain and France. The motives guiding such a German policy were revealed by Stresemann in a secret letter to the former German Crown Prince on September 7, 1925, wherein he frankly admitted that rapprochement with the victor countries was necessary to Germany, firstly, for favorable settlement of the reparations problem "under the foreign yoke," secondly, for "connecting Germany's eastern frontiers." . . . Thus already in 1925 the designs of German diplomacy contained the beginnings of the future Hitler program—the abolition of the Versailles obligations, the reunion of the "German world" by armed force, the German conquest of "Lebensraum" in eastern Europe.

Like Hitler, Stresemann was capable of blackmail. In a conversation with the British Ambassador to Berlin, Deabernon, on March 1, 1925, he threatened that if Poincare continued to persist in his policy of crude pressure on Germany, the latter would form a coalition with Russia; together these two countries would dominate Europe.

The bogey of a Soviet-German alliance had its effect. On October 6, 1925, the Rhineland guarantee pact was signed between Germany, France, Belgium, Britain and Italy. The London Times dedicated an editorial to this pact under the pathetic title "Peace Is Achieved and Our Honor Preserved."

However, just as the Versailles Treaty, the Rhineland Pact was far from providing a genuine guarantee of peace. True, it confirmed the territorial status quo established in western Europe after the war. But firstly, German diplomacy paid little regard to such facts—it is sufficient to recall her attitude toward reparations and the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty. Secondly, and by far the more important thing for Germany, was the fact that it joined the Locarno Pact as a fully equal partner along with the victors, Britain, France, Italy and Belgium. Most important, however, was the third factor—to please the Germans the guarantees of the pact were not extended to the eastern
borders of Germany. Thus Germany was given full freedom for "correction" of these borders.

It is not difficult to understand what this meant for Germany's eastern neighbors, and above all for the Soviet country. Naturally alarm was created in Czechoslovakia and Poland; all the more the Soviet Union had to be on guard. It was easy to understand why less than a year later Germany was ceremoniously accepted into the League of Nations, why she was freed from military control and the international control commission withdrawn from the country.

Under pressure of the reactionary circles, the Entente diplomacy continued to make further concessions to Germany. In June, 1932, the Lausanne Conference actually canceled Germany's reparation debts. In this way the beast was nurtured with the intention of unleashing it against the Soviet country at an appropriate moment.

But history was preparing a cruel punishment for the bloodthirsty reactionaries. From Versailles and Locarno they were fated to come down to the disgrace of Munich and to the military defeat of western Europe by the Hitler hordes. In their class narrowness and blinded by their hatred for the Soviet Union, they themselves nurtured the mortal enemy of their peoples.
THE ORGANIZATIONAL AND EDUCATIONAL TASKS OF OUR PARTY

PREPARE FOR A CAMPAIGN OF CONSOLIDATION AND REGISTRATION!

BY JOHN WILLIAMSON

THE war against Hitler has reached a new stage with the great victories of the Red Army on the entire Eastern front and with the surrender of Italy, following the success of the Sicilian campaign. With proper military measures, supported by a united home front—with the immediate invasion of Europe from the West—it is possible to go forward to the complete smashing of Hitler in 1943. The urgency of the tasks connected with such objectives places great responsibilities on our party. New standards will be set. What was previously considered satisfactory will no longer receive such acclaim. Old goals will be surpassed and new ones set. But all this demands a Communist Party politically more alert and effective, and organizationally stronger and more disciplined. We can no longer be satisfied with only 75 per cent active. Every member of the party must be a leader of non-party masses.

* * *

The last meeting of the National Committee (June, 1943) adopted a number of important decision affecting the organizational functioning of our party. These were the outgrowth of a series of discussions and decisions at previous meetings of the National Committee, which recognized the new role of the trade union movement and our new relationship to it, and the need of our party’s fulfilling its role under these new circumstances. When these decisions were made, two additional factors entered into our thinking: (1) the liquidation of the Comintern and the lessons it raised for the American Communist Party; and (2) the successful recruiting of 15,000 new members in three months, which demonstrated deep changes in the attitude of increasing sections of American workers toward our party and the fact that ever larger numbers of them associated our policies and program with their own thinking.

What were the most important of these decisions?

1. Liquidation of shop and industrial branches, which would bring
all members to be affiliated to, and working as part of, the community clubs or branches. This was aimed at removing all organizational forms that had outlived their original usefulness and whose present existence sometimes tended to impede our relations with trade union leaders or tended, locally, to substitute the party shop or industrial branch for a local union with its own democratic life.

2. Full political integration and activation of the new members.

3. Mastery of the ability to base our educational work and our school curricula on the concrete conditions of our country while making use of all international experiences and contributions and at all times being guided by the science of Marxism-Leninism.

4. Deepening and extending of the democratic processes of our party and the normalizing and regularizing of the election of officers and issuance of financial reports.

5. Successful completion of the campaign to increase The Worker circulation by 35,000 copies.

6. Securing a party membership of 100,000 by the end of the year, through continued recruiting during the summer followed by a winter recruiting drive for 30,000 new members.

These decisions of an organizational-educational character recognized that the political tasks of our party, in contributing its central effort toward the annihilation of the Axis, urgently demand a better functioning party among the people, especially the workers.

Comrade Browder, in his report, stated: “The task that we have before us is the most revolutionary task of history, the task of extirpating the Axis from the face of the earth.” He further emphasized: “Our task today is . . . to weld unbreakably the home front, in order to guarantee that the blows delivered against the enemy by our armed forces shall have the full force of the nation behind them.” And he concluded: “While giving complete and full leadership and energy to the main task which we share with the broadest democratic camp, our special task is, at the same time, to guarantee the political education of the working class and toiling masses of our country, preparing them for their future historical role.” (My emphasis.—J.W.)

In approaching these decisions at the National Committee meeting we correctly declared:

“To guarantee our maximum and most effective contribution to the victory of our nation and the United Nations over the Axis, our party should secure a full and equal place in the democratic war camp. The securing of such a position will mean that there is a firmer integration of our party in American democratic life and the removal of all barriers to our full political citizenship. This is primarily a political task and all questions of organizational expression can and will only confront us to the extent that there is an understanding and agreement of all win-the-war forces as to our role and place in that camp. However, there are a number of things we can and should do now that will contribute toward making easier the
attainment of the objectives necessitated by the present situation. . . ."

The decisions we made were absolutely correct. There has not been everywhere full clarity or maximum effort in fulfilling these decisions, so that today we are confronted with certain obstacles to the maximum development of our political policies. This necessitates the full mobilization of the entire party leadership and actives, speedily to fulfill the organizational-educational decisions of the June Plenum of the National Committee.

The Problem of Integrating the New Members

This problem requires more sustained attention; for without its solution the recruiting effort is valueless. There is an uneven development in this respect, according to different districts, although there are certain common problems. The following information gives a crosssection view of the status of the problem:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Received Membership Books..</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visited — Received Literature</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>91</td>
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<tr>
<td>D. W. Club Subscriber ..........</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>38*</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attended at Least One Branch Meeting .........................</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended More Than One Branch Meeting .........................</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paying Dues ..........................</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>79</td>
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<tr>
<td>Active in Mass Work Under Party Guidance .....................</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>78</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attended Classes .....................</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
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While the above analysis covers only 30 to 60 per cent of the new members in the respective districts, it suffices to indicate that we face a serious problem and that today no more than 50 per cent of the new members have been made to "feel at home" in the party through integration into party life and activity. Obviously, the task of activating the remaining 50 per cent of the new members is a central task that the entire party must direct itself to solve.

There are three aspects of this problem that must be tackled simultaneously.

1. The party, and this means the branch primarily, must help the new member become a more effective mass worker—whether in a union, in a shop, in civilian defense work, in community activity, etc. We must reject the idea, which is occasion-

* In the Seattle district these are subscribers to *The Worker.*
ally projected, that the quality of the recruits was "bad." These 15,000 new members—62 per cent of whom were industrial workers, 56 per cent trade unionists, and 32 per cent Negroes who all belonged to some mass organization—joined the party, agreeing with its program and activities as they understood them. Above all, these new members expect through membership in the party to become more effective workers and leaders in their mass activities and organizations.

The decisive thing is for the party—primarily the branch—to give to the new member what he needs and wants. What can we give that no other organization—no other force—can give? We can equip the new member with political understanding of the present stage in history: the character of the war, the United Nations, the Anglo-Soviet-American Coalition, and the basis of the immediate need of full coalition warfare through a major land invasion of Western Europe; the relationship of forces within the country and the urgency of solid national unity behind the war effort and for exposing and defeating all reactionary, defeatist forces and the specific role of the working class and the trade union movement as the most consistent anti-fascist force, backbone of the nation. And in promoting this understanding, we must equip the party—especially the party branch and section—to fulfill the responsibility which this understanding carries with it.

2. The party—particularly the branch—should establish an "ideological lifeline" with the new members. One can explain away the low attendance of new members at classes; but branch discussions, induction meetings, lectures, literature, and effective branch membership committees, should provide this ideological link with the party. The most elementary method of providing the ideological assistance that the new member (also the old member) is groping for, is through the columns and editorials of the Daily Worker. With this in mind, the Daily Worker (or People's World) club subscription was made available to all members outside of New York City. As of August 23, 2,210 new members had become club subscribers. This is 28 per cent of the new members in those districts that agreed to use the club subscription (excluding New York, Washington, and a few small districts). Every district should consider it a challenge to follow the example of the Ohio District, which has handled this problem systematically and can report the press status of the majority of its 860 new members. Thus, as of August 10, there are reports from 550. Of these, 350 were reading the Daily Worker, 79 were reading Left-wing language daily papers, 15 were satisfied to read only the Worker, 38 had left for the army or moved to war industries in other states, and the remaining 68 give a variety of excuses—which meant they hadn't yet been convinced of the need to read the Daily Worker steadily. A splendid record was achieved regarding club subscriptions: of the 253 Daily Worker club subscriptions received from new members, Ohio has suspended only
four for non-payment in four months. This is an example for all other districts to follow (especially Michigan, Alabama, Philadelphia, and Maryland); it shows that when there are political understanding and district guidance the branch apparatus can handle this problem adequately.

3. Equally important with the ideological link is an “organizational lifeline” with the new member. While this must be centered in the branch, it is not enough to depend upon the branch in general. The key to the solution of this problem in any branch is a functioning membership committee. The membership committee must receive greater status in the party and receive the constant political guidance of the entire party leadership, especially of its Organizational-Educational Departments. The membership committee should not be reduced to a “nagging” committee, asking or complaining, “Why don’t you come to branch meetings?” It should be the human link between the party and the member, substituting for the branch—with all its political explanations and discussions, guidance in mass work, mobilizing for campaigns, advice on reading literature and special editorials in the *Daily Worker*, collection of dues, etc.—as long as the member does not or cannot come to branch meetings.

Every district should master the techniques of establishing functioning membership committees in every branch. How serious this problem is can be seen from the following data gathered from the same branches and districts, as the above information on new members:

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<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>20 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>New England</td>
<td>23 13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>11 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>37 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>57 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>24 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seattle</td>
<td>21 17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>20 9</td>
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There remains the special problem of utilizing the great confidence that the Negro workers have expressed in our party. They numbered approximately 50 per cent of the total new members in Michigan, New Jersey, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, and totaled 32 per cent nationally. Previously, we indicated the need for our branches in Negro territory finding organizational forms and practices that correspond to the average Negro people's organization, while retaining our political content in their activities. We also emphasized the need of giving the new Negro member the maximum possibility for individual initiative and contribution. This entire problem has not approached a satisfactory solution, although it has received special attention in New York, Illinois, and New Jersey.

**Transfer of Members from Industrial to Community Branches**

The carrying through of this task,
THE TASKS OF OUR PARTY

with full understanding of all the members, both those in the industrial and the present community branches, is urgent from two viewpoints:

First, the relationship between our party and the trade unions is a political one, in which there is no interest or desire on our part to interfere organizationally in trade union affairs; our political objective is solely to strengthen the role and effectiveness of the working class through its trade unions in the life of the nation and the nation's victory drive behind the war program of our Commander-in-Chief.

Second, these thousands of Communist trade unionists, with their tremendous mass contacts, experience, and leadership abilities, constitute an invaluable force to help the entire party, especially in communities and city life, to function as a full-fledged political party endowed with full rights of political citizenship for its maximum contribution to the war effort. Such activity will in turn be of assistance to them in their daily trade union activities.

During the last three months there has been an intensive ideological campaign aimed at creating full clarity as a prerequisite for this organizational process.

However, the members in the shop and industrial branches have expressed hesitation and, in some cases, even resistance, to the transfer recommendation. While the great majority have voted approval, they have reflected confidence in the National Committee, rather than full understanding of the recommendation. This is an indirect criticism of the party leadership, our ability to present convincing arguments and more than anything else, our failure to carry out fully previous decisions concerning the establishment of community branches as real political factors in their wards or assembly districts.

The hesitation from the average trade union member arises because he does not see clearly how and from where he will get leadership and guidance on trade union problems. He still does not have full confidence that he will get adequate leadership from the community branch. He also wonders what type of activity the community branch will assign him. The resistance has varying sources. From a minority it comes from fear of exposure. In plants still being unionized or in a local where there is a bitter inner union quarrel, there is a feeling that liquidation of the shop or industrial branch will weaken the organizing drive or the effectiveness of the struggle for correct policy in the inner union fight with whom the Communists are associated. To all of these hesitations or doubts we must give convincing arguments.

One question has persisted in many localities. It can be summarized as follows: "Are we Communists going to be less active in our local unions and transfer all our activity to the communities?" The answer is an emphatic no. We expect the quality and effectiveness of the work of Communist trade unionists to be much higher since the entire trade union movement is
learning that it must engage in mass political work—involving members' own families, their neighbors, their storekeepers, their doctors and dentists. The reports at the last National Committee meeting answered all of these problems. Comrade Browder, for instance, declared:

"Communists can and must work in a most free and democratic manner in trade unions . . . with all other honest, patriotic forces under the one main banner which unites us all, of unity to win the war and to hold the home front firm. There is not and there must not be any special discipline amongst Communists in the trade unions. The party, of course, will continue to demand of its members their complete adherence to trade union decisions and policies democratically arrived at. . . ." 

In the sub-report on Party Organization the following was said:

"This doesn't mean that we are not interested in the role and the contributions of the trade unions. It doesn't mean that we shall not concern ourselves with problems that affect the working class and the trade unions. But in any such discussions we want our trade union comrades to consider how they, with their Communist understanding, as trade unionists, can help the trade union movement within its framework, without replacing the normal and democratic functioning of the union. Within the party, our main consideration should be politically to equip our trade union comrades to use their own initiative and react to and find answers to all specific problems." (Williamson.)

We must answer more convincingly the question of guidance on general political problems that affect the trade unionists. The community branch will not be able, and should not be expected, to answer the minute problems of inner trade union life, that are today too often dealt with exclusively by the shop or industrial branch. The branch must function in such a way as to be able to bring clarity and understanding on the main policy questions, after which the individual member, whether he be in a trade union or any other mass organization, must use his own initiative and understanding in conjunction with his fellow members, to face and solve the specific problems that may arise.

In addition to that basic approach, it may be advisable within the party, in accordance with other political parties, in each of its main sub-divisions, to establish a labor committee. The chairmen of the ward branch labor committees can constitute the labor committee of the section or county committee. Special discussions can be held with these labor committees that will equip them to answer some of the more specialized problems that may arise. Still greater use of the Daily Worker, through articles and editorials, dealing with the main problems affecting specific industries or unions, will be of great value in furthering clarity and understanding.

The main danger is the slowness with which the decisions concerning the establishment of community branches as real living political fac-
tors in their communities is being carried out. For instance, New England reports that in the twenty-five cities and towns where there are party organizations there are still only five in which the party appears publicly, with its own open address and publicly-announced officials. Ohio reports that, "as yet, with few exceptions, the majority of the community branches do not function as a public political community force. Such activities in the community as civilian defense, roll-back of prices, blood donor work, electoral work, etc., are still largely in the realm of discussion." Too many other districts are in about the same situation.

The speedy solution of this problem is imperative. Without it, the liquidation of the shop and industrial branches will bring chaos and lessen the political effectiveness of our party precisely at a moment when our contributions are so decisive. Furthermore, it must be made clear that we do not propose to transfer the members of the shop and industrial branches into the present type of community branches with their limited and many times routine type of activity. We must guarantee a new type of community branch, which becomes an influential public political force in the community. The trade union comrades must be incorporated into its leadership to help guarantee this transformation. Such a type of community branch must also be able to guarantee political guidance to all its members, including the trade unionists, on all the major political issues of the day—and explain the application of these policies to its members in every mass organization. This means a higher type of branch leadership—new and more effective forms and methods of educational work of the branch—much more attention to the press and particularly the Daily Worker. It also necessitates guarantees that these branch leaders will get adequate political guidance from the state and district committees.

Decisiveness of Party Propaganda Work Today

While the party is more active today than ever and influences ever larger sections of the organized working class and people's movements, there is still a gap between the decisions and resultant actions of leading committees and the ability of the party organizations below to carry out these decisions. Actually some of the greatest contributions of the party, in influencing mass movements to initiate or join in mass actions or policies, do not involve a majority of our party members.

This results in insufficient consistency and depth for the policy and action. It contributes toward a feeling on the part of some branches of impotency as far as mass work is concerned and the consequent separation of so-called organizational tasks and campaigns (recruiting, press circulation, literature, finances, etc.) from mass work. We must cultivate the understanding and prove by example, that we can only approach success in these types
of activities in the light of new political developments and in the midst of mass political activities, whether it be organizing the unorganized, increasing war production, community activity, electoral work or any one of the many other phases of mass work.

While there is a growing understanding that party organizational activities should not be separated from mass work, there is not an adequate appreciation of the key role of political propaganda, the mass distribution of literature and training of cadres to advance the work and influence of our party.

Today the overwhelming majority of our section and branch functionaries are new. Our old cadres, who are now mainly on leave, being in the armed forces, had received some semblance of organized political training, whatever its shortcomings. Nearly every one of them had attended some kind of full-time training school. Today this is not true of the new functionaries. It was necessary to suspend temporarily the old type of full-time training schools. However, we have not found a satisfactory substitute for them. Consequently, the branch, which was always the weakest political link in party structure, although it is the foundation of the party and the key to the development of the new member, is today at an even greater disadvantage.

How do we fulfill our leading role as a working class political party while part of the camp of national unity? Obviously our independent activities do not consist in organizing the unorganized; in leading the activities of the trade unions through fractions; or in organizing demonstrations on issues affecting mass movements. We are concerned with these and help initiate, guide and participate in them, but always as a part of the mass movement.

We fulfill our leading (vanguard) role by the important political contributions we make (notably, clarifying the urgent need for a Second Front to hasten victory, and for strengthening and consolidating the Anglo-Soviet-American Alliance; urging the establishment of United Nations labor unity; stimulating the establishing of a centralized war economy; exposing the role of the defeatists; of John L. Lewis, as insurrectionist; working toward effective united labor political action committees; participating as a win-the-war force in the New Jersey political developments, etc.).

We raise these issues, sometimes independently and sometimes indirectly, according to circumstances. They are dealt with in a few editorials or articles in the Daily Worker, but too often it stops there. This is the weakness. We should a hundred times more effectively clarify and educate our own members to a full understanding of our policies. But, above all, we must find effective and dramatic means of convincing the masses of our policies so that they will accept them completely as their own. Thus we will win mass movements for particular policies about which they are unclear or which they even may resist. And, what is equally important, where
the mass movement or the camp of national unity has already committed itself to a correct policy, our effective propaganda work will bring depth and consistency to this policy and its resultant actions.

Our press, particularly the Daily Worker and The Worker, is a decisive instrument in improving our political propaganda work and raising the understanding of our cadres. The 100,000 circulation figure of The Worker, reached at the end of 1942, proves that our party, when it is politically and organizationally mobilized, can properly utilize our press. The still unsatisfactory circulation of both papers is a challenge to the entire party leadership, and especially to the New York district, which has underestimated and consequently neglected the role of our press.

The "political education of the millions," upon which Comrade Browder sharply focused attention, cannot be realized without boldly bringing our rich and growing political and theoretical literature to ever wider masses, involving all of our party forces in reaching the workers with the vital policies and proposals of our party for hastening victory.

The entire party, from top to bottom, must review, strengthen and guarantee leadership to the problem of political education and propaganda, in every respect. There can no longer be a situation where such a large district as Pennsylvania does not even have a member of their state executive committee responsible for educational work.

A Campaign of Consolidation and Registration During October, November and December

The unsolved problems outlined in this article are obvious obstacles to the party's contributing its maximum to the solution of the urgent tasks of the moment. This makes necessary an organized effort, on a campaign basis, to complete all of these and the related tasks, before the beginning of the New Year. With this in mind, the party is launching a campaign of consolidation and registration, during the last three months of the year:

(a) To get the maximum advantages out of the achievements of the party to date, especially the recruiting campaign, which gained for the party 15,000 new members;
(b) to prepare the party for a new party recruiting campaign for 30,000 new members;

This is necessary in order:

to arouse the labor movement and the people generally to the urgent war tasks of the moment; and

to prepare for the crucial political year 1944, in the war and in the Presidential elections, remembering that the year 1944 marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the birth of our party and the twentieth anniversary of the launching of the Daily Worker.

What are the main features of this three-month campaign that the entire party must immediately throw itself into? They are:

1. The extension and strengthening of our entire system of political propaganda — educational work
throughout the party, with special attention to the training of new cadres;

2. The 100 per cent registration and dues payment of every member, new and old, in the party;

3. The political integration and activation of every new member, with special attention to the 50 per cent who are today in danger of being lost.

4. The transference of all members to the community branches and establishment of properly functioning new types of community branches with an able leadership, including trade union members transferred.

5. The consideration of a system of labor committees in all sub-divisions within the party, and the carrying out of the previous decision to establish Membership Committees in every branch.

6. Completion of the unfilled decisions with reference to the Daily Worker and The Worker. Outside of New York City this means guaranteeing a system of renewals for The Worker expirations, a system of branch bundles and completion of the Daily Worker club subscriptions for as near to all members as possible. Within New York City, the leadership must meet the challenge of the rest of the party and regain their losses in The Worker circulation and increase the Daily Worker sales at the newsstands and on street corners.

This campaign should be completed with branch elections in every branch during the first week in January. (This does not exclude immediate elections in the community branches into which large numbers of trade unionists have been transferred, although there should be re-elections in January.)

Special attention to party registration is necessary, starting now. While this has the specialized aspect of collecting dues and exchanging books, it is in actuality a political roll call of the membership. It is the final judgment of the success of the party recruiting drive, and such districts as Michigan, New Jersey, Illinois, Ohio, and New York will be testing the ability of their leadership to keep and activate men and women that want to be members of the Communist Party.

If the registration and consolidation campaign is carried through effectively, it is possible to have such improvements in composition as approximately the following:

Industrial Workers ........... an increase from 43% (1942) to 55% (1943)
Basic Industry Workers .. an increase from 23% (1942) to 30% (1943)
Trade Union Members .... an increase from 52% (1942) to 60% (1943)
Negro Members ................ an increase from 10% (1942) to 20% (1943)

It is especially important that sustained attention be given to 100 per cent registration in specific industries. As a result of the recruiting drive we nearly doubled our membership in the auto-aircraft industry (Michigan, Illinois, Ohio, New York, California, Wisconsin);
increased our membership in the shipbuilding industry by 70 per cent (California, Seattle, Pennsylvania, Baltimore); increased our membership among the railroad workers by 60 per cent (New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania); increased our membership in the steel industry by 50 per cent (Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin), and increased our membership among the metal workers by 45 per cent (New York, Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New England). We have indicated the districts with major responsibility in each of these industries, based upon their membership figures in them.

Launch A Party Recruiting Drive on Lincoln's Birthday

With the campaign of consolidation and registration successfully completed, with the growing influence of our party among the people, especially the trade unionists, and the general recognition of our party's contributions to the war effort, we will then be in a position to aim at 100,000 party members in the spring of 1944. In mobilizing the party for this campaign, special attention should be given to explaining the full significance of the Supreme Court decision on the Schneiderman case, in helping to remove the remaining obstacles to full political citizenship for the party.

The consolidation and registration campaign should be accompanied by laying a solid foundation for launching a new party recruiting campaign for 30,000 new members on Lincoln's Birthday—February 12. It should be clear that a party of 100,000 means thinking in terms of district organizations having an approximate membership of, for instance, New York, 35,000; Illinois, California, and Pennsylvania, 10,000 each; Ohio, Michigan and Seattle, 5,000 each; and New Jersey, Maryland, and New England, 2,500 each.

Let us master the method and understanding whereby we can guarantee successful fulfillment of these difficult but urgent tasks. Let us enter the twenty-fifth year of our party history strengthened by our Marxist-Leninist theory, by our experience and, above all, by our contact with the workers. Let us better understand the teachings of Comrade Browder who, in dealing with precisely these problems, wrote:

"We can do greater things than we have ever done before. We must be confident in our abilities, and bold and tireless in our work among the masses. We must constantly think and discuss with them, transmitting to them the political line of our party, which brings us into step with the great march of history. In this momentous hour of world history we are optimistic because we are not idle, because we are part of the forces that are going to win the war and that are going to ensure a better world after the war."
"... National unity in the U. S. is above all a problem of adjusting class interests without the severe struggles by which this has usually been accomplished. ... In the U. S., national unity can be achieved only through compromise between the conflicting interests, demands, and aspirations of various class groupings...." (Earl Browder, Victory—and After, p. 83.)

In the staunch patriotism of the people, in the nation's desire for victory over the fascist enemy, in the general policies of our President, and more specifically in his seven-point program of April 27, 1942, we have the broad foundations for national unity in this people's war for national liberation. The organized trade union movement has accepted the President's program. It made and lives up to its no-strike pledge. Of labor's economic position in the war:

"... it appears that the real basic wage rates have remained substantially unchanged or have perhaps even declined in the course of the war. This means that the dollar changes in the basic wage rates were offset by the rise in the cost of living over the period. Thus the relatively substantial improvement in the real income position of the average non-agricultural employee was essentially the result of the increased number of hours worked per week and the shift to higher paid occupations and industries rather than of any increase in the real basic wage rates." (Economic Highlights, No. 2, O.P.A.)

In fact, 70 per cent of all non-agricultural workers have taken a cut of 3 per cent in their real weekly earnings from January, 1941, to March, 1943, and a drop of 7 per cent in real hourly earnings. The workers are fighting this war on the production line and are willing to bear heavy burdens as long as it is part of the national mobilization for victory.

Middle class groups in industry, trade, and the "professions" have also been hard hit by war strains and dislocations; their complaints have been, not of economic difficulties alone, but also that they are not fully utilized in the war effort.

The basic principles of the President's program for national unity have been accepted by the people in general, of all classes, including in the main the large financial and industrial corporations. Many industries have been entirely converted to war production. War controls and regulations have had
to be imposed and accepted in order to meet war needs.

But is all well and unanimous in the whole population? Are there no opponents of the policy of all-out war to victory, and are there no confused victims of the enormously powerful influences that seek to prevent the measures necessary to the war, who seek a disruption of our country’s relations with its allies and a negotiated peace?

Have the American farmers no enemies to fear among the nation’s enemies and no weak friends who dare not speak of the dangers they see?

While the process of building an all-out war economy and the integration of the various social strata within it has been very slow, there have nevertheless been progress and achievement.

The lowest rate and smallest progress in war adjustment have been in agriculture and in the farm population of our country.

And yet there is no field in which prompt, far-reaching and long-range solutions are more feasible for old and sore problems, or more urgent or more consistent with war necessity, than the field of American agriculture.

Food has been and continues to be headline news. The sky has become the limit for disposable farm production of virtually all commodities. In spite of unprecedented bumper crops, there are now scarcity and dislocations and threats of greater scarcity and dislocations in the future.

Yet there is a National Food for Victory Program only in speeches and on paper. Agricultural resources have not been mobilized to meet the vast war and post-war requirements. The farmers are not fully integrated in the over-all war program. As a result, the farm population is the target of defeatist demagogues. The entrenchment of the defeatist Congressmen is not so strong in the cities as in the countryside.

Among nation-wide political and economic organizations it is only in agriculture that official spokesmen publicly oppose the development of a war economy. In more than one of the great national farm organizations the opponents of the adjustment to war economy, which alone can solve the sore problems for the farmers as well, have been successful in a substantial way. They are thereby not only creating and accentuating difficulties in agricultural war economy, but this also results in dislocations in the national war economy as a whole. The most extreme of these leaders deny the need of, and fight against, any government planning or guidance whatsoever in relation to agriculture. H. E. Babcock, Chairman of the New York State Emergency Food Commission, declared as follows on June 16, 1943:

“The second essential is to remove the blight of governmental control and planning from our agriculture and challenge the resourcefulness and ingenuity of farmers to produce any food which in their judgment will pay them most. This means letting every farmer decide his own food production program on the basis of what he knows from
experience with his own land he can do best."

The agitation against "Washington," "bureaucrats," "O.P.A.," and the page advertisements by the Dairymen's League of New York State for the "Fifth Freedom—to live and manage our own lives in the good old American way" because "as farmers we deal with nature, not with man-made governments" is more cleverly disguised propaganda than Babcock's blunt statement; but essentially it aims at the same result—to hinder all-out planning and mobilization of our war economy.

The attitude of some of the officials of farm organizations to the question of alignment with the other of the two main masses of American democracy is as false to the true interests of the farmers as their alignment on the question of national planning. After attacking Murray, Green and especially Thomas of the United Automobile Workers, the August 10, 1943 issue of the Official News Letter, American Farm Bureau Federation, makes the following interpretation of certain O.P.A. figures: "... wages rather than prices should be rolled back and it is the uninterrupted climb of wages that is shattering the stabilization line." Albert S. Goss, Master of the National Grange, makes the same point in a more restrained fashion in the September, 1943, issue of the National Grange monthly. It seems to be true that it is only among the organized farmers that the official leadership of the largest organizations deluge their membership with arguments and mobilize their organizations against national war-time planning and national unity, and thus against the patriotic as well as long-range economic interest of their membership.

There are many immediate reasons, some of which will here be discussed, for this state of affairs in agriculture today—almost two years after Pearl Harbor. There are also operating certain long range causes. Agriculture even in the most advanced capitalist countries was not and is not on a par with industry. The backwardness of agriculture compared to industry, the economic and social survivals of slavery, the sharpening of the contradictions between industry and agriculture, the "yoke of capital," the absorbing by industry of the best labor forces of agriculture, "the superfluous intermediaries who make agriculture something like the 'sweated' industries," are long-range historic causes that have made the countryside a happy hunting ground for reactionary demagogues.

The Abundance Program

The need of our country at war, as well as for the peace to follow, is for all-out production in agriculture. It is in the farmer's interest to help the government carry through its policy of abundance and be adequately recompensed for his effort. The policy of planned scarcity and rewards for plowing under is over. Secretary of Agriculture Wickard and Food Adminis-
trator Jones have made this policy clear. On August 15, 1943, Judge Marvin Jones declared: “The cold fact is that no matter how much we increase production, the requirement for foods by our allies, our soldiers and ourselves will out-run the supply.”

The abundance policy is thereby fully established for the war. But we add what Mr. Jones did not say, that the peculiarity of this particular war is that the victory itself and the continuation of the foreign policy of wartime, with its alliance and its world-wide use of our farm production, require a continuation of the economy of abundance into the post-war period; and this is conceivable only with a greater degree of government intervention than the Administration has dared propose.

Mr. Jones continued, “I know that the nation’s farmers and ranchmen will produce an abundance if they have the necessary tools, equipment, and repairs, fertilizer, credit, labor and a price to cover the extra costs and hazards of increased production.” He expressed his opinion as Food Administrator that “the best method of securing production of essential war crops is to have a support, or definite price that would last throughout the production and harvesting season . . . sufficient to cover not only normal costs but also added equipment that is closely linked to the increased production . . .” He said further:

“In such a program it will be necessary for the government to stand ready to purchase any surplus of the commodities that might not flow at the time into the regular channels of production. In some instances it may be necessary for the government to absorb a loss.”

This national program of abundance to meet war and peace needs, of technical aid to production, of price stabilization and price incentives for increased production and “in some instances . . . to absorb a loss” (subsidies) is a program that meets the needs of the farmers and the country. It is as necessary for the farmer as for the war. The necessary planning for the successful organization and achievement of this program is a firm foundation for the full participation of the farmer in national unity. It supplies a solid base for the farmer as a supporter of our national Administration and its agricultural program. The Administration, however, must translate words into deeds and, on the other hand, a full war program must be brought to the farmers, their cooperation secured and their support mobilized behind the President for the realization of this program.

This program of abundance must continue after the war, if the farmer is not to face ruin. If it were to be allowed to collapse after the war is won, leaving the farmer with an expanded production plant, increased acreage and equipment and increased financial obligations, the farmer would then be faced with a ruined home market and no possibility of disposal in the world market. The United Nations Food Conference, among its many historic contributions, made clear that “a great increase in the production of
food would be needed if progress is to be made toward freedom from want." Indeed, so great will be the need after the war for food that the Conference declared that the goal of the United Nations after complete victory in arms is won, will be to bring food to the starving. But there is no possibility of United States participation in this without the strengthening of an Administration foreign policy of fullest United Nations coalition, and the active support by the people of such a policy.

The need to reach freedom from hunger before seeking freedom from want was understood. Resolutions covered both the planning of agricultural production and the adoption of means to prevent violent fluctuation in prices. Thus the abundance program, now and after the war, is the policy to which our nation and the United Nations are committed. The planning and achieving of maximum production in America now are not only a war measure for victory, for security for the farmers now, but are the best preparation to meet the post-war needs of the world and post-war agricultural adjustments in the United States. The fate of the farmer in the post-war world is entwined in a most practical manner with the common destiny of the whole anti-fascist United Nations coalition and in the historic tasks of cooperation and unity of the United Nations after the war. The farmer, in supporting the worldwide planned abundance program of the United Nations, as set forth at the Conference, also removes any present fear of the abundance program because of possible post-war collapse and agricultural crisis.

Thus, the patriotism of the farmer; the abundance program of the Administration, which includes technical aids, price stabilization, price incentives, and subsidies; and the plans for continued post-war maximum production, make it possible to get wholehearted farmer support for the over-all planning generally and in agriculture, that is necessary to achieve this program.

Congress and the Farmers

The last session of Congress highlighted the activity of the misnamed "farm bloc" and "farm lobby." The reactionary-defeatist majority in Congress claimed farm support in their attempt to knife the Administration program of economic stabilization, effective price control, roll-back of prices, adequate wartime taxation, maximum food production and conversion to war crops. They claimed farmer support for their struggle against incentive payments for increased production and the crucial subsidy program in the food production plan. Price stabilization and the O.P.A. were attacked. Instead, the inflationary Bankhead Bill to increase prices was presented as the farm measure.

The farmers were used as the front behind which the 78th Congress centered its opposition to the "domestic" program of the Administration. At the same time, even some well established pre-war federal farm agencies and practices, now more necessary than ever be-
fore, were either entirely eliminated or curtailed. Farm Security Administration funds were cut by one-third. The crop insurance program was wiped out. The position and activities of the national leadership of the Grange, Farm Bureau and the cooperatives made it possible for the Congress reactionaries to claim farm support and to carry through to a substantial degree the program of the duPont-Pew clique of the National Association of Manufacturers. The protective coat of the "farm bloc" made it possible for the defeatist minority to cover their own tracks and to build that coalition with politics-as-usual Congressmen which is necessary to get a working reactionary majority. Even well-meaning, sincere Congressmen were on many occasions inveigled into voting along with the proposals of this coalition because they assumed that these proposals were "farm" measures.

In order to meet the growing grass roots opposition to these policies of the national leadership of the Farm Bureau and Grange, a national advertising campaign in county papers throughout the country has been initiated. Men who are allowed to appear as the spokesmen of the Grange and Farm Bureau claim that they "fought to continue the A.A.A. program and the farm loan program of the F.S.A." The fight to hold the line is falsely presented to the farmers as an elaborate selfish plot by labor to enrich itself out of the war. Fantastic figures are hurled at the farmers to prove that labor is getting rich and increasing its income by as much as 700 per cent. The campaign against a centralized planned war economy, including agriculture, is presented to the farmers in terms of fighting bureaucracy, inefficiency and for real local and national democracy and states' rights.

The farmers are not supporting the defeatist Hoover-Vandenburgh-Taft program. They are not opponents of national unity or of a centralized planned national war economy. But the membership and certain sections of the leadership of the major national farm organizations have not expressed themselves with such strength and clarity as to change the approach of their official national spokesmen or to make their activities impossible or ineffective. There has not been brought forcefully to the farmers the interdependent relationship between winning the war, national unity, over-all centralized planning of our entire economy, including agriculture, and actual improvement of their own conditions as farmers.

Inside the major farm organizations there has not as yet developed that clear-thinking, decisive voice of national statesmanship and leadership such as we have in labor, as, for example, in the voice and activity of Philip Murray. The trade unions are finding a leadership through which they can contribute their enormous share in cementing the national unity of all classes and groups. Such clarity of leadership must now also be available among the farmers. The overtures already made by some trade unions for joint action with the
farmers are a signal of opportunity to the farmers. The concepts which implement and make patriotism operative in the war, and which labor leadership has done so much to explain most carefully within its own ranks should also be brought to the farmers. These concepts are the nature of the war and the consequent need and basis for national unity, and the unavoidable necessity for over-all planned war economy which includes planned agricultural economy for maximum war production. The "farm problems" are equally "consumer problems," and labor will be unable to perform its full duty in the national unity front without the closest attention to the farm sector of this front.

Just as incentive wages for increased production are the key to maximum production, wage stabilization, and the fullest integration of labor in national unity, so is the subsidy program in farm production the key to increased farm production, stabilized farm prices, and the fullest integration of the farmer in national unity. Farm subsidies are necessary to assure long-term price support to the farmers and to make possible conversion to high-risk war crops, as well as to cover the additional cost of increased war production. The failure to stabilize farm prices necessarily means non-stabilization for the whole war economy. In the fight over the subsidy roll-back program at the last session of Congress, labor and the entire people succeeded in getting a majority vote on the subsidy roll-back program. But the false argument raised by the inflationists that a roll back of prices means a roll-back on the farmers has not been met with sufficient forcefulness. The position of the "Fighting Forty" that "in no instance should the effect of the roll-back be that of lowering the price to any farmers or of cutting the income of any farmer" should become the position of labor generally, and that position brought to the attention of all farmers. Moreover, labor and the farmers should jointly act upon the truth that subsidies will make it possible to avoid inflation (which the farmers fear) to increase the income of the farmers who expand production, and lay the basis for a realistic over-all program for maximum farm production.

Before the country are the crucial problems of non-partisan support to the Commander-in-Chief, of winning the war in the shortest possible time through the opening of the Second Front, of organizing and mobilizing the people for effective influence on Congress and for the all important 1944 elections. The farmers must be reached by labor in relation to these problems which are truly national problems and can only be solved by a united nation. Sporadic and local activity is not sufficient. Proposals for program and action can be placed formally and publicly by the national centers of labor before the national organizations of the farmers. The initiative and leadership for this at the present time can only come from labor. Aid to the farmers by labor on the more specific farm problems such as farm labor short-
ages, rural housing, health and schooling, marketing and transportation problems, and farmer-consumer cooperative enterprises will aid in the achievement of united action on broader national issues.

The progressive movement generally tends to neglect both in its thinking and its activity the farmers and their organizations. Consumer movements and organizations cannot allow themselves to be regarded in the slightest degree as bodies whose activity and interests are not in harmony with the interests of the farmers. Increased farm production, a stabilized price structure, incentive payments and subsidies to farmers are in the interests of both consumers and farmers. The consumer movement as well as the farmers and the entire country would benefit if consumer organizations had adequate contact and joint activities with the farmers. Other progressive movements, such as for the repeal of the poll tax, for adequate war-time housing and health, against anti-Semitism, for full Negro equality as a blow to the fifth column and as a prerequisite for full national unity, dare not ignore the farmers. In those few instances when the farmers were approached on these issues, the response was most heartening. The progressive movement, by going to the farmers with its campaigns, can contribute much in bringing to them a deeper understanding of the nature of the war, helping to integrate them in national unity, and at the same time tremendously strengthening its own influence and effectiveness.

The Administration and the Farmers

Increased contact, cooperation and united action of the labor and progressive movement with the farmers will also help the Administration in its approach to and dealings with the farmers, and their organizations and leaders. In vetoing the anti-subsidy measure passed in the last session of Congress, the President declared, "I do not believe that the Congress has had an opportunity to know or to consider how seriously it may cripple our entire food program." Pointing out that the farmers must be asked "to change their farming methods and to grow new crops to which they are unaccustomed," the President said, "the way to protect the farmer is to authorize the Commodity Credit Corporation to pay the farmer what he should get for his products at a loss if need be... That may be a subsidy, but that is the only way to avoid inflation."

War Food Administrator Jones has taken the first step to implement the President's proposal by formulating a government purchase-and-resale program. But there is already stiff opposition to this program. After conferences between Mr. Jones and the leaders of the major national farm organizations, it seems that Mr. O'Neal of the Farm Bureau, Mr. Goss of the Grange, and Mr. Benson of the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives did not agree with Mr. Jones on the purchase and resale program. There is the danger that the Administration may yield to
this opposition. Unless the necessary support is forthcoming from the farmers as well as from labor and the country as a whole, the program may be postponed and not put into effect on the scale necessary to realize the abundance program. It is the lack of this necessary support that is responsible in great measure for the slowness of the Administration in formulating and putting into effect an overall program for agriculture. The execution of whatever policies were adopted was hindered by the lack of a centralized planned national war production plan, by the dispersal of authority in the War Food Administration, Agricultural Adjustment Administration, U. S. Department of Agriculture, and other governmental agencies. The Administration was hindered by essential disagreements among those responsible to carry its plans into effect. But the general outlines of policy and administration for the solution of agricultural problems are now at hand. What is needed is national support for the correct national farm policies enunciated by the President and his food administrator. Only through the cooperation of labor, farmers and all other victory-minded groups can the stabilization program be successfully achieved and the vast production resources of agriculture be mobilized for victory and after.

Steps Toward Unity

Some beginnings toward this broad cooperation and unity are already evident. The program and membership of the National Agricultural Mobilization Committee shows that wide sentiment does exist among broad strata of influential farmers in support of the general line of the Government program.

The joint statement of the American Country Life Conference, signed by more than forty rural leaders, including representatives of the National Grange, National Farmers Union and the Farm Bureau, indicates the possibility of united farmer action. The united labor and progressive support in behalf of the Farm Security Administration, and the growing united farmer-labor local action, as evidence, for instance, in the attendance of the secretary of the Ohio State Grange at the Ohio State Federation of Labor Convention, shows that farmer-labor cooperation can be developed on a greater scale and on all issues of common interest.

The road to unity for victory on the farm front lies in a broad approach by all win-the-war forces to the farmers. This approach cannot be limited to those farm organizations and leaders with whom friendly contact has already been established or whose views seem to be closest to those of labor. The war has to be won and unity achieved now with the farmers. The majority of the farmers have to be won in support of a victory program for agriculture, and not only a minority or an advanced section of the farmers. With a broad and sympathetic approach to the major farm organizations and leaders around the correct policy of
the Administration, under the initiative of labor and the progressive forces, unity for victory on the farm front around the nation's Commander-in-Chief can be achieved.

The main immediate task for labor, the progressive forces generally, and the Administration, is to win the farmers, their organizations, and their leaders to agreement on the crucial subsidy issue. Production subsidies are the immediate key to the full mobilization of our agricultural resources, and to the realization of an effective farm program that will gear agriculture to the rest of the war economy and in doing so also improve the farmers' economic status. By taking the initiative and aiding the farmers to understand the importance of production subsidies to the achievement of full farm production, labor and the win-the-war forces can most quickly win a decisive victory in the fight to stabilize all prices. At the same time, national unity can most effectively be strengthened and broadened.

The fate of the American farmer is bound up with those solutions which can be found only in the all-out war, the victory, and a foreign policy of our country of full United Nations coalition, successful in the war, continued in the peace.
THE STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL UNITY IN NEW JERSEY

BY WILLIAM NORMAN

COINCIDENT with the nomination of Vincent J. Murphy, Mayor of Newark and the New Jersey Secretary of the American Federation of Labor, as Democratic Party candidate for Governor in the November elections, the relationship of forces in the state of New Jersey between the anti-Hitler camp and the camp of appeasement and defeatism underwent a change in favor of the pro-Roosevelt win-the-war forces. The camp of national disruption and chaos, though not yet defeated, was routed. The maturity of labor, seen as the guardian of the national interests and not of labor alone, took a leap forward. National unity was thereby strengthened and provides the possibility for delivering the knockout blow to the Republican defeatists in November. This was and is a key issue in New Jersey as in the nation.

The November elections are crucial, not alone for New Jersey, but for the nation. Under the conditions of the war we are waging, every election—federal, state, or municipal—has national significance. The gravity of the New Jersey elections this year is accentuated by the fact that it is one of three states, including New York and Kentucky, which will provide a proving ground for the 1944 elections. This will not be the usual "off-year" election. The Newark Evening News, for instance, sees that "1943 is not an ordinary political year. It is a weathervane for 1944 and the fourth term."

This does not tell the whole story, however. A critical turning point in the war has been reached, now, in 1943.

The magnificent Red Army counter-offensive, killing and otherwise putting out of commission 1,500,000 Hitlerites in less than two months, driving the fascist invaders back along the entire line of the Eastern Front, has created the most favorable opportunity for crushing Hitlerism in 1943. Together with the matchless bravery and heroism of our ally at Stalingrad and subsequent Red Army victories, the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain were able to oust the fascists from Tunisia and to execute the brilliant landings at Sicily and Italy. Even with this min-
imum of coalition warfare, Italy began to totter, culminating in the unconditional surrender of the Italian armed forces and paving the way for the complete freedom of the Italian masses from the internal fascist regime and the fascist invader.

It is precisely at this moment of greatest opportunity for shortening the war by full coalition warfare, by striking at the vitals of fascist Germany through the opening of the immediate Western land front in Europe, that the defeatists of all shades, the exponents of negotiated peace and the cautious calculators will exert utmost pressure to undermine and weaken the United Nations coalition. They will attempt, by exploiting class prejudices and reviving the fake issue of the "menace of Communism," to cause a rift in the front of national unity and within the United Nations. The Mackinac Republican conference, in which the New Jersey Congressional delegation played a role, particularly through the Hoover defeatist U. S. Senator Hawkes, gives a fair indication of this strategy of confusion which the Republican defeatists hope to employ now and in 1944. Their attack on centralized control of the war effort as "fascism" and "socialism" is an echo of the Edge (Republican Gubernatorial candidate) cry for "state sovereignty" to demobilize the war effort.

The stake in the elections is therefore no less than the future of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition and the future of our country. As Earl Browder has said in connection with the absence of the Western Front:

"The relations between our country, Britain and the Soviet Union are undergoing a crisis. . . . Only a shallow and a vulgar conception of American national interest can ignore the supreme test which the United States has in orderly world relations which depend, in the last analysis, upon close friendship and collaboration between the two most powerful countries in the world, our own country and the Soviet Union. Both countries have a common positive interest in friendship and cooperation—but the United States is much less prepared to solve its problems in the absence of a close alliance with the Soviet Union than is that country."

Stated in this way, it is clear that the win-the-war coalition must be committed to a far-seeing resolute stand on the question of strengthening the United Nations coalition and the immediate opening of the Western Front, as the heart of a rounded-out program covering domestic and foreign policy. It would be fatal to Mayor Murphy's candidacy to confine the campaign merely to state issues isolated from the war or to sidetrack it to secondary issues. Nothing would please the Republican defeatists more. This is what the Democratic Party campaign suffered from in great part last year. To lift the campaign from a primitive state of politics as usual to a high level of win-the-war political statesmanship is the basic guarantee for Murphy's victory.
With the nomination of Murphy, the first stage in the struggle for the broadest win-the-war coalition to defeat Edge has been achieved. Included in this coalition is labor, that faction of the Democratic Party led by Frank Hague of Jersey City, and the other faction led by Governor Edison. Fundamentally, this is a tribute to all the forces within the coalition who in time saw the compelling need to unite in face of common danger, the Hoover-Hawkes-Edge defeatist camp in New Jersey. Only a keen realization of this danger in 1943 and its consequences for 1944 enabled the participants to submerge their individual differences and to overcome all obstacles to furthering unity. Once the real issues were clearly understood by all, unity was a foregone conclusion. At the same time, no one will question the decisive role of labor as a unifying force in this accomplishment. To become that, however, labor itself first had to be united.

Labor, both A. F. of L. and C.I.O., succeeded in uniting their own ranks as a result of three main factors. First, the Lewis and Trotskyite-fascist forces, while not yet eliminated have been exposed and routed. Their hatred for the Commander-in-Chief and the anti-Hitler war has been intensified. They are only waiting in their holes for an opportunity to sabotage the campaign of the win-the-war coalition. This can be seen in the action of the Norman Thomas Socialist Party clique who have nominated their own candidate for Governor and demagogically bewail the "perfidy" of Murphy playing "into the hands of that strange alliance—the Hague-Communist combine." (We shall deal with this demagogy later in the article.) Encouraged by wavering elements, the Lewis-Dubinsky-Woll-Hutcheson forces and the Trotskyites succeeded for a time in exploiting the honest sentiments for a Labor Party by picturing the Labor Party as the only means by which labor can carry through independent political activity at this time. It must be understood that except for those who oppose independent labor political action of any kind, there has never been any disagreement in principle in the labor movement of New Jersey on the desirability of forming a Labor Party where it does not hamper the objectives of furthering labor and national unity. In New Jersey, aside from the negative factor of the election laws, which prevent a candidate from running on two party tickets, the Labor Party idea was projected at this time to make impossible precisely what has since been achieved, a win-the-war coalition united behind a win-the-war candidate. This would have given the victory to the Edge defeatists by default. The Labor Party idea at this time was conceived with the thought that it would demobilize the labor movement and prevent it, at all costs, from even seeking to create unity within its own ranks and between labor and other win-the-war forces. Moreover, the Labor Party idea at this time had in mind setting the stage for an anti-Roose-
velt movement in 1944, in addition to weaning labor away from its patriotic support of the anti-Hitler war. Unquestionably, a number of honest leaders, in addition to many of the rank and file, even though for a short time, fell prey to these Trotskyite maneuvers. The more far-seeing labor leaders, however, were able to see through them at once and thus were able to give their maximum contribution to the cause of labor and national unity, while rallying the workers for these objectives. In addition, the C.I.O. Political Action Committee and Sidney Hillman played no small role in bringing complete clarity to the labor movement on this vital question.

The second reason labor was able to unite its own ranks was the overwhelming desire of the rank and file for such unity and for united labor independent political action. This has been expressed in the various United Labor Victory Committees throughout the state functioning with some degree of regularity but mainly in elections. Such committees played a role in the 1942 elections, notably in Essex (Newark), Camden, Union (Elizabeth), and a few other counties in the state. This year, the higher level of unity is reflected in the formation on a state scale of the ABC Labor Federation (the initials standing for the A. F. of L., C.I.O. and Railroad Brotherhoods). This Federation is pledged to continue as a permanent body and plans to play a prominent role in the whole period, including the 1944 elections. The basic unions of the state which contribute toward making New Jersey the sixth ranking state in war production are represented in the Federation, shipyard, auto, electric, steel, building trades, teamsters, I.L.G.W.U., railroad—all pledged to the defeat of Edge and the election of Murphy. Labor in alliance with the Democratic Party has placed at least eleven Assembly and Freeholder candidates on the Democratic Party ticket. Among them are two shipyard workers' leaders, (John Grogan and Harry Deith), three United Electrical (James McLeish, Giles Frazier, and Hurley Middleton), one steel (Anthony Zoppi), one Gas, Coke and Chemical (Earl Dillard), in addition to four A. F. of L. leaders (John Walsak, Jacob Friedland, James Fit-ten, and Robert Kirkpatrick). At least one, Grogan, is certain of election as Assemblyman from Hudson County, while two others, Frazier and Deith, have more than an even chance of election from Camden County. With greater alertness, labor might have placed additional candidates in the field in other counties of the state with the prospect of certain election in Middlesex County (New Brunswick).

In the face of unanimous trade-union support behind Murphy, the Republican defeatists are scouring the ranks of labor to place labor candidates on their ticket to attract the working class vote. Such candidates can be supported only if they run on a program acceptable to labor and the people and if they are not committed to the support of Edge. This, however, seems most unlikely. In that event labor has
no alternative but to call for their defeat as disrupters of labor and national unity.

The third basic reason that labor was able to unite its own ranks is due to the enhanced understanding of the meaning of national unity. With this greater clarity, labor successfully barred the attempt of the Republican defeatists to make Hague or Hagueism the election issue. It understood that secondary issues which tend to detract from the main issue, winning the war in the shortest possible time and support of the President's win-the-war policies, could serve no other purpose but to guarantee the victory of the defeatist Edge. It understood that the creation of a win-the-war coalition which depended on healing the split in the Democratic Party could be achieved only by subordinating secondary issues to the main issue. Furthermore, labor understood more clearly than others through its experience with the Lewis insurrectionists that, given a more powerful and united labor movement conscious of its role and responsibility, the submerging of secondary and group interests to the cause of the national interest leads, not to a diminution of the democratic processes, but, on the contrary, to their extension. Thus, an alliance with the Hague wing of the Democratic Party, on the principal issue of winning the war, with a stronger united labor movement playing a pre-eminent role, does not in the least presuppose condoning Mayor Hague's past practices. On the contrary, it presupposes an elimination of injurious practices. This will be so whether Mayor Frank Hague wills it or not. Thus, such an alliance in New Jersey for the defeat of the Republican copperheads and defeatists who betray the national interest, far from being unprincipled, is in fact the only principled road for the crushing of Hitlerism and his fifth column.

Labor in New Jersey has emerged from the pre-election struggle with a heightened prestige as an independent political force, more conscious of its responsibility as the backbone of national unity and with greater clarity on the fundamental issues of the war. United labor action has given new inspiration to the entire membership of the ABC Federation. It will demand a more resolute leadership on such principal vital issues as the Western Front, international labor solidarity, the Lewis insurrection against the war, incentive wage plan, integration of the Negro people into the war effort and routing the fifth columnists; in short, a principled, resolute stand on all key questions affecting foreign and domestic policy. Thus, labor has new and added responsibilities, flowing from the fact that it has reached greater political maturity.

Labor's role in the win-the-war coalition will be felt more deeply to the extent that it is able to hammer out a program for the election in harmony with the interests of all people in the state. This program must meet the needs of all the forces in the win-the-war camp in New Jersey, employers, labor, the
The struggle for unity in New Jersey

city middle class and the farmers. It must make its appeal to the Italian-Americans, the German-Americans, the Polish-Americans, and other national groups in support of the democratic national front movements in their respective countries of origin. It cannot be a program of Old Deal versus New Deal. As Earl Browder has so clearly said: "Labor advances its own position in every way, by proving in life that it is most devoted to, and most clearly understands, the national interests." It is necessary that this program be brought to the masses at once, at the same time that the registration campaign is conducted. The partial program posed to the electorate to induce it to register, centering mainly on the repeal of the Smith-Connally Act and the instituting of effective price control, does not suffice to meet the needs of the day. Registration must be made a political weapon of education of the people on the major issues of the day.

A rounded-out program taken hold of by the masses would have a determining bearing on the character of this year's Democratic Party convention in the latter part of September. It would be ruinous to the prospects of Murphy's victory, if the Democratic Party convention set itself as the main task the stand to be taken on the railroad tax compromise and constitutional revision, which are secondary to the main issues of the war. Labor, which does not agree with Mr. Hague's views on constitutional revision nor with Governor Edison's views on the Railroad Tax compromise, must not allow divergent views on these secondary issues to obscure the main goal of both the Hague and Edison forces, victory for Murphy and the win-the-war coalition in November. Labor as a whole, and particularly through its candidates, can and must play a positive and decisive role in the Democratic Party convention.

The absence of a full win-the-war election program up to the present time (mid-September) either by labor, Murphy or the Democratic Party is already adding grist to the mill of Edge and all shades of reaction. The defeatists, while themselves playing on the narrowest class prejudices, are charging Murphy with being a candidate exclusively concerned with labor and as representing the slogan "class against class." While this is sheer falsification and hypocrisy, it cannot be combated too strenuously. Mere denial is not enough. Mayor Murphy, of course, can disprove this by his record as Commissioner in the City of Newark.

In addition, Edge can be smoked out if his plan for waging the campaign on his own terms is exposed. It is to be expected that Mayor Murphy will not permit himself to engage in extended discussions on patronage and such narrow issues. Conceivably, Mayor Murphy will hit out against the Edge strategy of posing post-war panaceas and issues of the past while ignoring the present. The present position of Edge on the war, the Western Front, wage policy, price control, subsidies, etc., is the most vulnerable spot in
his armor. Unquestionably the people are concerned with post-war problems but recognize that their solution depends, first of all, on correct policies for victory pursued today. To offer post-war solutions while obstructing the war itself, is dangerous defeatist deception. Mayor Murphy, as a candidate, is in a key position to expose this fraud.

Labor, on the other hand, must explain by its own record in the war that it has most consistently subordinated its class interest to the national interest and that a candidate from the ranks of labor, far from being a threat, is a guarantee of the security of the national interest. The strategy of the copperheads to pervert the true meaning of the win-the-war coalition including the broadest sections of the population, into an exclusively labor campaign must be resolutely fought.

The prospects for victory will be considerably increased if the passivity of November, 1942, within the ranks of the Democratic Party is fully overcome. This passivity reflected lack of faith in the victory of the Roosevelt Democrat Smathers to the U. S. Senate, engendered by the split within the Democratic Party. The ABC Federation on its part must more fully involve the membership down below in the wards and blocks. The plan to break down the membership of the locals, to set up block and ward committees, must not remain on paper. Labor must more energetically supplement the work of the Democratic Party, particularly in those areas where it is comparatively weak, as in the suburban areas. Labor and the Democratic Party must strengthen their ties with the farmers. A broad conference of farm organizations in South Jersey, including the organizations of the National Farmers Union, under the initiative of the win-the-war coalition is a prime necessity. The record will show that it is the vote of the farm areas and suburbs that mainly contributed to the defeat of Smathers in 1942. It would be fatal to rely only on the industrial areas and to leave the so-called traditional Republican Party voters to the mercy of the defeatists by default, without waging a struggle to win them over on the basis of their own interests in the war. Governor Edison can play a key and decisive role by speaking out clearly and sharply to the middle class, explaining why it is necessary for it to become identified with the win-the-war forces. A similar role could be played by Representative Elmer Wene in respect to the farmers. Closer bonds, through various committees, must be forged with the youth, the Negro people, the national groups, and the professionals. Finally, the coalition has a tremendous responsibility in getting out the vote, in the primaries as in November, in addition to intensifying the campaign for registration. It must be remembered that while over 2,000,000 were registered last year, only about one and one-quarter million voted. The road to victory will be hard and difficult; but victory it must be.

* * *
The role of the Communist Party, which in common with all labor, helped to contribute to the formation of the win-the-war coalition, has received some reams of attention by the press. Today it is easy to see that the manufactured ridicule was motivated by some very "sane" considerations. On the theory that Communists are still fair game for the gullible, the defeatist newspapers conspired, and they hoped by ridicule, to block precisely that which has come into being—unity of action of labor and unity of all win-the-war forces behind a single win-the-war candidate. They did not succeed because of one fatal miscalculation. The number of the gullible is rapidly dwindling and because correct policies have a way of swaying the masses, no matter by whom projected.

Conceivably, the New York Tribune and the New York Times were induced to twist the issues by reason of narrow partisan politics and by reasons other than concern for strengthening national and United Nations unity. But what is to be said of the liberal press such as the Nation, the New Republic, PM, and the New York Post? In a moment of bacchanalian orgy, drunk with the supposed opportunity to blast the Communists, they were ready to throw overboard all concept of national unity, of support to the President's win-the-war policies, of routing the defeatists, and to revive the atmosphere of the "Commu-Nazi" hoax. If victory and support of the President's win-the-war policies be considered their motive, there was not a rational sentence in a single one of the diatribes directed against the Communist Party by the liberal press. The fact is that not a single mention of the war or support of the President was allowed to creep into the editorials, and this was the Achilles' heel of all their "arguments." For to discuss these prime issues is to have their "arguments" fall of their own weight. Events have confirmed again that it is not the Communist Party which is unprincipled.

The active role played by the Communist Party in mobilizing labor and the people as a whole for a correct pro-war policy is today more widely understood. At all times, when faced with a complicated situation, it is necessary to understand the main obstacle in order to overcome it. In order to break the log-jam which clogged and prevented the unfolding and development of a pro-war coalition, in New Jersey, it was necessary, first, to see through the strategy of the defeatists to undermine national unity and, secondly, to remove the misconceptions engendered by these defeatists—two sides of the same question. The sinister aim of the Republican defeatists to prevent unity of all pro-war, pro-Roosevelt forces took the form of making Hagueism the main issue. When their motive was fully understood, the barriers to state labor unity were lifted practically overnight and a coalition of all anti-Hitler forces including labor and the Hague and Edison wings of the Democratic Party, became a reality. The aim
of the Communist Party, in speaking out boldly for the only correct policy, was and remains the strengthening of national unity.

Undoubtedly, these developments will facilitate proper and improved relations between the Communists and the trade unions and their leaders. Collaboration with all win-the-war forces is thus made possible on a higher level. These developments should serve in judging the contributions of the Communists to the win-the-war coalition on their merits, not on prejudices. Together with the correct conclusions labor is undoubtedly drawing from the Schneiderman case decision, it should treat as enemies of unity those who still persist in the practice of Red-baiting and do not recognize it for what it is, Hitler's secret weapon.

The Communist Party in common with all labor will contribute all its power to the victory of the win-the-war coalition behind Mayor Murphy. Where it enters some Assembly and Freeholders candidates in the field, it will do so only where it does not endanger the victory of a resolute win-the-war candidate. The sole objective of candidates of the Communist Party will be to strengthen national and United Nations' unity by bringing greater clarity to, and deepening the understanding of, the people on the major, vital issues of the war and speed victory over Hitlerism.
UNITY, VICTORY, PROSPERITY!

MANIFESTO OF THE LABOR-PROGRESSIVE PARTY OF CANADA,
ADOPTED AT ITS FIRST NATIONAL CONVENTION

FELLOW CANADIANS!

We, workers, farmers, and middle class people, men and women of Canada, gathered in Toronto on August 21 and 22 to form a new Canadian party, the Labor-Progressive Party.

Believing in the inalienable right of Canadians to form their own political associations, we at our convention laid the foundations of what will be a strong party of socialist-minded Canadians, pledged to victory, democracy, peace and progress.

We call upon all those who agree with our aims to enroll in our ranks so that we can become a great force for victory, prosperity in the peace, and democratic progress toward a socialist Canada.

Invasion Now!

While we delegates from industry and farming are meeting in Toronto, fateful decisions are being made by the Conference of Allied war leaders in ancient Quebec City. The decisions of the Quebec Conference will be momentous for the outcome of the people's war against fascism.

Those decisions can meet the urgent desires of the people only if they chart a course for the immediate invasion of the European mainland by the armies of liberation.

No other decisions will meet the needs of the hour. This is the moment for action!

The logic of the war demands that our armies attack the Nazi legions in the West in order to force them to withdraw fifty or sixty divisions from the East, to enable the Red Army to smash Hitler's Eastern army. If this is done now, the war in Europe can be decided in 1943 and we can hasten to smash the power of Japan.

Attack upon the enemy in Europe will cut through the present fog of uncertainty and doubt like a bright light. It will arouse the peoples of occupied Europe to heroic combat and to the formation of people's democratic governments in Western and Central Europe.

The Italian people are now in revolt because of the invasion of Sicily. Surely the anti-Nazi people of Germany will seize the opportunity of full-scale invasion to overthrow their Nazi overlords.

The invasion of Europe will release our Russian ally of the awful burden of fighting 211 Nazi divisions as against six our armies have engaged. The people of Canada will back the attack with an energy not yet seen in this war. Our soldiers, sailors, and airmen, the heroes of Sicily, await their next battle orders.
These are the duties of the Quebec conference. The people must assert themselves to assure the policy of attack, attack and again attack. Only in this way will the war be shortened. Only in this way will those elements be defeated who want a negotiated, partial peace to frustrate the coming of a liberated, democratic Europe because they fear democracy.

National Unity for Victory!

The Labor-Progressive Party calls for greater national unity. It calls on war workers to produce more, on farmers to grow more for victory.

We take our part in the mighty labor-farmer movement for independent parliamentary action now springing up as the symbol and instrument of a greater people’s wartime democracy, for sweeping national reforms, for a happy post-war Canada and permanent peace.

We call on the trade unions and farm groups to build their organizations and to come forward as part of this rising movement.

We urge the Canadian Commonwealth Federation to broaden its vision and cooperate in a great federation of Canadian democrats, embracing unions and farm groups as affiliated sections and including the Labor-Progressive Party as an affiliated detachment.

We call upon the Dominion Government to strengthen the war effort on all fronts. It must regard the recent elections as a public rebuke of its weaknesses and as a demand to accede to the unanimous resolve of the labor movement to win those reforms, such as a Code of Labor, which will set down the right to collective bargaining, raise sub-standard wages especially in Quebec, and permit labor to carry out its full war program of production and no strikes.

We urge the Dominion Government to plan a Wartime Agricultural Policy which will take the farmers into full partnership, correct abuses and build Win-the-War Production Committees in every farm community.

The government must prepare now for the post-war years, by laying the basis for the maintenance of production, the enactment of great national reforms such as: higher purchasing power, a national minimum wage, a shorter working day, economic and social equality for Quebec, free higher education, constitutional reform and a national agricultural policy to protect the family farm.

We can look to a glorious future if the rising labor and democratic movement is united. We look forward to the election of labor-farmer governments which will carry through these great reforms, and which will oppose to the monopolies who hinder our country’s development the organized will of the Canadian people. We hail the electoral victories in Ontario, Quebec and the West as the forerunners of such governments.

We will fight for the unity of French and English Canadians. We pledge to our French compatriots our complete support for their cause of full economic and social equality with the rest of Canada. We appeal to them to unite, regardless of party, to defeat the traitorous policies of the anti-war, pro-fascist Bloc Popu-
laire, which tries to mislead Quebec by taking cheap advantage of these inequalities. We call on our Quebec brothers to join hands with the labor and democratic forces of all other provinces for the freedom of Canada and social progress.

A Socialist Future

We are a party of socialism. We have undying faith in the ability of Canadians to achieve our true destiny of becoming a mighty industrial nation, affording its citizens the highest living standards in the world, living in harmony with all other peoples, and having strong democratic liberties and institutions.

Socialism is the collective ownership of the means of production and distribution, organized by a government of workers and farmers. We believe Canadians will find their way to socialism through their experiences and by exercise of their majority opinion. We have set ourselves the task of helping this process by education, parliamentary activity, organization and leadership.

At this grave moment in mankind's history, victory over the Axis is the supreme task. Without victory we have nothing, there can be no peace, no liberty, no progress.

We call on all Canadians to rid themselves of any complacent feeling about this terrible war, and follow up their splendid record as producers and armed fighters by backing the attack upon Nazi-held Europe with all their might.

Our Platform

1. Invade Europe Now — for Speedy Victory—Strengthen United Nations Unity—Establish fully military and political teamwork of the British Commonwealth, the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R.

2. Active Canadian leadership in helping shape United Nations policies, and in laying secure foundation for people's peace—democratic rebuilding of Europe, application of Atlantic Charter freedoms in the colonies, world organization for true collective security.

3. Jobs for All—Enactment now of Dominion legislation providing for full employment at productive work and adequate wages for every able-bodied Canadian.

4. Stand by Our Fighting Men — Enactment now of guarantees by Dominion Government pledging to men and women in Canada's armed forces: a job upon demobilization with pay and allowances until employment begins; generous discharge gratuity; training with pay in new trades or professions; first class medical care and hospitalization; generous pensions for the disabled and for bereaved families.

5. Federal Social Security legislation providing all who labor by hand or brain with non-contributory unemployment insurance, adequate national health insurance, medical care and maternity benefits, old age pensions at 60. All pensions to be tax exempt.

6. Housing—Slum Clearance — a billion-dollar federal housing program for post-war slum clearance and low rental dwelling construction.

7. A democratic national labor code effectively guaranteeing the right of every worker to join the union of his choice and the obli-
gation of the employer to recognize and bargain collectively with the agency designated by democratic procedure; outlaw company unions; establish genuine labor-management-government partnership in production committees and on all government boards and agencies.

8. **Raise Sub-Standard Wages** — Wage equality for Quebec's workers with those of other provinces, equal pay for equal work for women and young people. Establish a national minimum wage of $25 weekly for all workers.

9. **Protect the Family Farm** — Legislation to establish prices of farm products in stable relation to those of industrial goods; long-term low-interest federal credits to farmers, crop insurance and guaranteed farm tenure. For a national agricultural policy to protect the family farm.

10. **Canada's Youth—Builders of Post-War Canada**—Set up a National Youth Administration to work out measures in cooperation with youth leaders, for training of young people and enabling them to play their full part in the work of reconstruction, in making Canada a land they will be happy to inherit. Extension of the franchise to all who reach the age of 18.

11. **Curb the Monopolies**—Maintain government ownership and operation of wartime plants built with public funds, converting them to peace-time service; nationalize monopolies which flout the national interest and interfere with democratic reconstruction. Protect the interests and rights of small business people.

12. **Democratic Tax Reform** — Base taxation on ability to pay; exempt all sub-standard incomes. Increased corporation income tax, a surtax on undistributed profits, and graduated inheritance tax. Abolish the sales tax.


14. **Establish federal responsibility** for social services, powers to control monopolies anywhere in the Dominion, a national standard of education.

The Labor-Progressive Party advances this platform as its contribution to a better Canada. It will cooperate with all Canadians to achieve these great national reforms and to institute these national policies. **Through Unity to Victory for Progress!**
FOR UNITY AND VICTORY

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GREAT BRITAIN,
HELD IN JULY, 1943

THE 16th Congress of the Communist Party, meeting at the moment when the armed forces of the United Nations are entering the decisive battles of the war, declares that all the efforts of the whole Labour Movement and people of Britain should now be directed to the paramount aim of organising the speediest victory over Fascism.

The Second Front

Everything now depends upon how quickly the United Nations are able to take full advantage of the new favourable situation that has developed as a result of the recent victories of the British, American and Soviet Armies by the organisation of the Second Front in Europe.

To miss the present opportunities would be to incur a grave risk of prolonging the war and greatly increasing the sacrifices that the defeat of Fascism will entail. On the other hand, the organization of the Second Front in Europe this year could lead to an early victory, and consequently a reduction of the sacrifices on the part of all the United Nations.

The Communist Party places on record its determination to intensify every sphere of its activity devoted to the speediest winning of the war. It will support every measure introduced by the Government that is considered necessary to win the war.

Unity of the United Nations

Victory over Fascism requires the closest unity of all the peoples of the United Nations, and especially of the four leading Powers, Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and China. Congress welcomes and supports all measures designed to strengthen this unity, expressed in the British-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, the Atlantic Charter and other agreements now being reached between the United Nations.

Victory over Fascism requires a resolute democratic anti-Fascist policy in the diplomatic sphere and in the sphere of propaganda, which will be capable of inspiring the confidence and enthusiasm of all the people of Europe struggling for liberation against Nazi tyranny. Congress especially stresses the importance of the closest cooperation with the French people and their Committee of Liberation with a view to organising the total re-
sources of all Fighting France at the side of the United Nations.

The cause of victory of the United Nations requires the winning of the free co-operation of the Indian people under a Government of their own national leaders. It requires the extension of a Charter of Rights, covering the most elementary democratic rights and social and economic reforms, to the colonial peoples. It must be made clear that the Atlantic Charter applies equally to all the peoples of the world, without distinction of race or color.

Strengthen National Unity

This policy demands an immediate strengthening of the Government so that it is composed solely of the most capable leaders from all parties, who have the full confidence of the people. In particular, it calls for an increase of Labor representatives in key positions in the Government as the guarantee that Britain's resources will be fully mobilized for victory, regardless of privilege and vested interest.

The main hope of the Fascist Powers, to avoid unconditional defeat, lies in creating political diversions and prejudices to bring about disunity between the anti-Fascist nations. This Congress therefore declares it to be essential and urgent for the Government to take a stronger stand against all pro-Fascist and anti-Soviet elements, whether in the British Government or in Allied Governments resident in Britain.

The Home Front

Congress regards as an indispensable part of the organization of victory over Fascism the strengthening of the democratic mobilization of the nation and the protection of the social and economic conditions of the people.

The Communist Party demands the strengthening of State Control in war industries and agriculture, and the ruthless overriding of all vested interests which stand in the way, in order to ensure the maintenance and increase of war production and of the home production of food supplies.

The Communist Party fights for the principle of equality of sacrifice in every sphere of the war effort. It fights for the protection of the social and economic conditions of the people; for the improvement of service pay, allowances and pensions; and for the necessary emergency measures in respect of housing, health, education and the care of young children, which can be carried through and need to be carried through now as part of the war effort.

Special attention is called to three emergency issues which now demand immediate action by the Government.

Coal

This Congress warns the country that the coal situation presents the most urgent problem for solution on the Home Front. It demands that the Government shall intensify the campaign for all forms of economy in fuel consumption, and also immediately ration coal supplies, placing the needs of war industry and
the domestic requirements of the war workers as first claims on priority; to organize better food supplies for the miners by extra rations; and to provide the extra clothing and equipment necessary for their work.

It demands that the Government adopt the Miners' Compensation demands of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain; organize, in connection with the District Miners' Association, the most effective carrying out of concentration and mechanization, with all the safeguards considered essential by the miners. It demands that an end be made to the present form of dual control, and that all colliery managers be directly responsible to the Ministry of Fuel and Power; that the Interim Report of the Foster Committee shall be operated, together with the wage demands of the Miners' Federation, so that young workers can be attracted to the industry.

These measures would go far to removing existing hindrances to increased production, and to enabling the work of the Pit Production Committees to be made more effective.

The Harvest

This Congress calls for a wide mobilization of voluntary labor for the gathering of this year's harvest. Unless emergency measures are taken in this connection, much of the tireless work of the farmers and agricultural workers will be lost because of a shortage of man-power at the most critical time of the year.

The Trades Dispute and Trade Union Act

This Congress calls for the repeal of the Trades Dispute and Trade Union Act of 1927, and as an immediate measure, the removal of disabilities on the Civil Service Trade Unions by the cancellation of Clauses 5 and 6 of this Act.

Unity of the Labor Movement

The recent conference of the Labor Party struck a blow against all those who sought to break National Unity and the electoral truce.

In rejecting the affiliation of the Communist Party to the Labor Party an opportunity was lost of unifying and strengthening the whole Labor Movement.

This Congress pledges itself to continue the fight for working-class unity and the affiliation of the Communist Party to the Labor Party, in pursuance of genuine anti-Fascist, democratic and progressive aims.

The Communist Party expresses its readiness to meet the Executive Committee of the Labor Party at any time they so desire, to discuss immediate forms of co-operation; and hopes that an end will now be made to actions that seek to prevent local co-operation between all sections of the Labor Movement on issues of common concern.

The Communist Party

The Communist Party is an integral part of the British Labor Movement, born out of British conditions.

It works to maintain and extend
all existing democratic rights—Parliamentary, local government, freedom of organization, of the press, of speech and meeting—through which the immediate and future interests of British working people can be advanced, while never disguising from the people the fact that reactionaries will resort to every form of resistance to prevent the popular will from prevailing.

This 16th Congress of the Communist Party calls upon the new Executive Committee of the Party to organize a nation-wide campaign for the winning of the war in the shortest space of time, for the making of a peace that will guarantee that the dark forces of reaction shall never again foment war, for strengthening working-class unity and national unity. Confident that the strength of the working-class movement is the only guarantee of victory in the war and of democratic and social advance after the war, Congress declares that this campaign must also be directed to increasing the membership and strengthening the unity of the Trade Unions, Co-operatives, and Labor Parties, and to drawing into the Communist Party tens of thousands of new members so that the Party can more adequately undertake the vital tasks of the coming period.

The Communist Party declares that only Socialism can finally solve the problems of present day society, can abolish poverty, unemployment and war, class inequalities and privileges, and can enable mankind to realize the full dreams of the pioneers and thinkers for human progress. Only through the defeat of Fascism can the opportunities be realized for developing towards Socialism and the brotherhood of man.
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