THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE

EARL BROWDER

EUGENE DENNIS

THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS

GILBERT GREEN

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THE THREE-POWER CONFERENCE
AT MOSCOW

BY EARL BROWDER

I.

WHEN the Anglo-Soviet-American Conference, headed by the respective chiefs of the Foreign Office of each country, issued the historic declarations which embodied their unanimous agreement on the most pressing questions of the war, a new high stage had been achieved in cementing the Coalition which leads the United Nations.

The joint communiqué issued by the Conference established that:

"In the first place there were frank and exhaustive discussions of the measures to be taken to shorten the war against Germany and her satellites in Europe. Advantage was taken of the presence of military advisers representing the respective Chiefs of Staff in order to discuss definite military operations with regard to which decisions had been taken and which are already being prepared in order to create a basis for the closest military cooperation in the future between the three countries."

It must be assumed that this formulation covers definite military plans for the full unfolding of a two-front war against Hitlerite Germany. Details of such an agreement will become public knowledge, of course, only with the progress of the actions agreed upon. We can, however, feel confident that on this point we are not witnessing a repetition of the agreement of June, 1942, on "the urgency of the opening of the second front in 1942" which seemed to promise what was not forthcoming. Here we have a pledge "for the closest military cooperation in the future," and the whole world understands this to forecast simultaneous blows upon the enemy main forces from East and West with the full strength at the command of all three Powers. It must be assumed that a calendar-plan has been agreed upon which guarantees the gearing of Eastern and Western Fronts into one mighty offensive.

This decision is the cornerstone of the structure of agreements raised by the Moscow Conference. It was due to the absence of coalition warfare, as now envisaged, that the Anglo-Soviet-American Coalition was for many months undergoing sharp strains, and all divisionist influences were working desperately to disrupt it, exploiting the absence
of a joint plan of war. The Moscow Conference, creating the basis for the closest military cooperation, administered the heaviest political defeat to Hitler and his satellites, and to the adherents of negotiated peace within the Allied countries.

The joint communique further declared:

"Second only to the importance of hastening the end of the war was the recognition by the three Governments that it was essential in their own national interests and in the interests of all peace-loving nations to continue the present close collaboration and cooperation in the conduct of the war into the period following the end of hostilities, and that only in this way could peace be maintained and the political, economic and social welfare of their peoples fully promoted."

This second main agreement of the Moscow Conference is embodied in the Joint Four-Nation Declaration, in which the three main Powers are joined by China. Upon the basis of "their determination . . . to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender," this declaration sets forth seven points of general agreement. They are: (1) that the united action pledged for the war will be continued for the organization of peace; (2) that those "at war with a common enemy" will act together in all matters of ending the war; (3) that they will "provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy"; (4) the necessity of establishing a general international organization of all peace-loving states, large and small, "based on the principle of sovereign equality"; (5) consultation between the four Powers, and with other of the United Nations, pending a general organization, "with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations"; (6) that they will not employ military forces within the territory of other states except in joint consultation for the purposes envisaged in this declaration; (7) to bring about a general regulation of armaments in the post-war period.

This historic declaration puts an end to a multitude of confusions in the United States, which were being exploited by the divisionists. (Incidentally, may I note that it fully confirms the correctness of my speech in Chicago, September 26, around which the newspapers raised such a furore?) It indicates with a high degree of precision those methods and forms whereby the common problems of the war shall be decided, and the post-war ordering of the world arrived at. It also brings China directly into the concert of chief powers, without altering the relations now existing between the Soviet Union and Japan. It fixes, without blueprints, the main line of approach whereby through the common prosecution of the war the collaboration of the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and Britain will be continued in the post-war world.

There follows the Declaration Regarding Italy. It fixes Allied policy "that fascism and all its evil influence and configuration shall be com-
pletely destroyed and that the Italian people shall be given every opportunity to establish governmental and other institutions based upon democratic principles." It records the declaration of the United States and Great Britain that their actions in Italy have been based upon this policy "insofar as paramount military requirements have permitted."

Seven points of application of this policy are laid down: (1) inclusion in the Italian Government of representatives of those Italians who have always opposed fascism (this refers, without naming them, to the six parties in the Italian Liberation Front); (2) restoration "in full measure" of freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of press and public meetings, and the right to form anti-fascist political groups; (3) suppression of all institutions of the fascist regime; (4) removal of all fascists and pro-fascists from all public positions; (5) full amnesty for all political prisoners of the fascist regime; (6) democratic organs for local government; (7) arrest of fascist chiefs and army generals charged with war crimes.

These seven points are conditioned, for their full application, upon the decision of the supreme military command in Italy, so long as active military operations are proceeding; and do not prejudice the right of the Italian people ultimately to choose their own form of government.

Thus the Declaration on Italy settles all the most disputed problems in this relation—except the delicate one of how far the application of these points would help, not hinder, the prosecution of the war. The promptness with which these points are applied will be a measure of the democratic faith of our military command on the spot, plus the influence of this general directive of basic intention of the three Governments. The Declaration's influence upon the course of events in Italy should be expected to grow stronger from week to week.

The fourth document, the Declaration on Austria, sets an important line for all the Nazi-subjugated countries. It declares that "Austria, the first free country to fall victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German domination." It envisages a free and independent Austria which, with its neighbors faced with similar problems, will thereby "find that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace." Austria, and by implication all other subjugated countries, is reminded of her responsibility for collaboration with Hitlerite Germany, and that her own contribution to her liberation will inevitably enter into the final settlement.

The fifth and final document of the Conference is the Statement on Atrocities. This is signed by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin, whereas all the other documents are issued in the name of the Foreign Ministers (with the Four-Nation Declaration also signed by the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow). This records the "monstrous crimes" of "German officers and men and members of the Nazi party," against
the peoples of the Nazi-occupied territories, and promises that "they will be brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged." Those criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical localization will be punished by joint decision of the governments of the Allies.

II.

Three days before the documents of the Moscow Conference were released to the public, President Roosevelt had already anticipated the successful outcome. He informed his press conference that the Moscow meeting was progressing beyond all expectations and expressed his own jubilation over the results achieved. Leading American newspapers warned that the actual results might come as an anti-climax, and that disillusionment was to be feared. But the publication of the documents on November 1 proved that President Roosevelt was correct again, as he has been so many times when he has had to take issue with the press. It is not too much to say that the Moscow Conference decisions were received with joy by the peoples of all Allied and conquered countries.

In the United States a wave of enthusiastic approval swept over the country. Indeed, this was so strong that it even penetrated the United States Senate, where a dreary debate had been dragging along for weeks for and against a rather innocuous expression of support for the idea of a general international organization for the maintenance of peace after the war. The Moscow Conference results brought a halt to that rather confused debate, which ended with the adoption of a specific approval for the Moscow Conference Declaration, through the addition to the original resolution of the decisive paragraph from the Moscow Four-Nation Declaration. Only five die-hard appeasers of Hitlerism stood up to vote against it!

The Congress of Industrial Organizations was meeting in convention when the good news came. It immediately adopted a ringing resolution of approval of the Moscow decisions, which set the tone of labor declarations which came from all over the country, and from all varieties of labor unions.

From London came simultaneously the news that the British Trades Union Congress had at last decided to call an international congress of labor of the United Nations (including from America the A. F. of L., C.I.O., and Railway Unions, and from Latin America the Confederation of Workers), to meet in London next June, and bring about in the ranks of labor that unity which had already been achieved between the Governments.

III.

Approval of the Moscow Conference decisions of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition has been overwhelming—but not unanimous in the United States.

It is rather important to notice the exceptions, the dissenters who
stand out against the joyous approval of the great mass of the people and their representatives.

The Hearst press brazenly echoed the Berlin propaganda line — Mr. Cordell Hull and Mr. Anthony Eden had sold out Europe to the Bolsheviks! Likewise spoke the Chicago Tribune, the New York Daily News, and the Washington Times-Herald, of the notorious McCormick-Patterson newspaper Axis.

The Trotskyites supplemented this line with its converse—Molotov had sold out the workers of Europe to Hull, Eden, and the international capitalists!

The Social - Democratic New Leader took the double-line of praising Cordell Hull to the skies as the Daniel who had tamed the Soviet lions in their den, and at the same time dolefully warning of the disastrous consequences of the concessions made to Stalin!

The Socialist Call compromised the issue by giving one column to the pure Trotskyite line, while another column by Norman Thomas was an approximation of the New Leader double-talk.

William C. Bullitt, of “carrot and club” notoriety, issued a doleful lament that in Moscow there had not been heard “the voice of Europe.” Mr. Bullitt still yearns for his old friend, Pétain, on whose behalf he surrendered Paris to the Nazis, and whose voice is still, for him, “the voice of Europe.”

Ten Bishops and Archbishops, acting as the Administrative Board of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, issued a statement on the Declarations of the Moscow Conference, the key sentence of which reads: “They do not, however, dispel the fear that compromises on the ideal of the Atlantic Charter are in prospect. Some things these documents imply by statement and more significantly still by omission leave an uneasiness in minds intent on peace and justice to all.” Within a few hours of the issuance of the statement in America this quotation was being broadcast to the world by the Berlin radio, and featured in the Hearst press.

The Catholic dignitaries are vague in identifying those things which leave uneasiness in their minds. But, fortunately, since we need to know precisely what is in their minds, we can find it clearly stated by them elsewhere. One of the signers is the Archbishop of Chicago; under his spiritual guidance is published The New World, which carries the sub-title “Chicago’s Official Catholic Paper.” In the October 1 issue of this paper, on the front page, is printed the political thought which moved the Bishops to their statement against the Moscow Conference. It is a brief and pointed description of what they see as the desirable outcome of the war. It says:

“What if Germany starts to really crack on the Eastern front? The military leaders of the Reich have reason to fear the invasion of the Soviet much more than domination of Anglo-American forces. The direct possibility within the next few months is that the trapped Germans will let down the gates on their Western front for the easy conquest of their territory by a more benign foe.”
There we have it! In placing themselves against the Moscow Declaration, as they did against the opening of the Second Front, these gentlemen of the Church are lending their voices to sinister political forces. These political forces whose hopes of splitting the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition and making a soft peace with Hitlerism, whose hopes that our country and England can be made to unite with Germany as the "more benign foe" of Hitlerism, for a new war against the Soviet Union, are cancelled out by the Moscow agreements.

Truly, the Moscow Declarations are a death-blow to such hopes. The Reverend gentlemen who expressed their "uneasiness" at the results of the Moscow Conference were guilty of understatement, for their feelings must be of dismay. They have lost their perspective of uniting the world against the Soviet Union. And they have taken a position contrary to the desires and interests of the vast majority of all Catholics who are deeply anti-fascist.

IV.

The Moscow Conference of Foreign Secretaries came together as an exploratory conference, to pave the way for a future meeting of President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin. Before the Conference care was taken not to arouse high hopes in the immediate results of its work, for it was generally expected that the most significant agreements could only be arrived at later in the meeting of principals.

Contrary to such expectations, the Moscow Conference itself formulated the basic agreements which already establish the line of march for the Coalition leading the United Nations. Its success was beyond all expectations.

The projected meeting of the chiefs of the Coalition is not, however, rendered unnecessary by this success, nor is it likely to be postponed. Just as the gigantic victories of the Red Army, with Anglo-American advances in Africa and Italy and the air war over Germany, enlarged the successes of the Moscow Conference, so now the accelerated military victories, reinforced by the political blows of the Moscow Conference against the Axis and the appeasers, serve all the more to set the stage of history for the Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin meeting to take further steps in the same direction.

It is quite likely, in fact, that before this article is in print and circulated, we may already have received in the daily press the news of the Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin Conference and its history-making results.

The world has opened a new epoch in its history.

It is our practical task to carry to the broadest masses a full understanding of this great turn in history, and to gather its full fruits for our country in a mighty strengthening of national unity to complete the war with honor and despatch, and thus to reach the post-war reconstruction of the world under happier auspices than had hitherto seemed possible.
THE THREE-POWER CONFERENCE
DOCUMENTS

JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF THE TRI-PARTITE CONFERENCE

THE conference of Foreign Secretaries of the United States of America, Mr. Cordell Hull; of the United Kingdom, Mr. Anthony Eden; and of the Soviet Union, Mr. V. M. Molotoff, took place at Moscow from the nineteenth to the thirtieth of October, 1943. There were twelve meetings. In addition to the Foreign Secretaries, the following took part in the conference:

For the United States of America: Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador of the United States; Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, United States Army; Mr. H. Hackworth, Mr. James C. Dunn and experts.

For the United Kingdom: Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, Ambassador; Mr. William Strang; Lieut. Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay and experts.

For the Soviet Union: Marshal K. E. Voroshiloff, Marshal of the Soviet Union; Mr. A. Y. Vyshinski and Mr. M. Litvinoff, Deputy People's Commissars for Foreign Affairs; Mr. V. A. Sergeyeff, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade; Maj. Gen. A. A. Gryzloff of the General Staff, Mr. G. F. Saksin, senior official for People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and experts.

The agenda included all questions submitted for discussion by the three Governments. Some of the questions called for final decisions, and these were taken. On other questions, after discussion, decisions of principle were taken. These questions were referred for detailed consideration to commissions specially set up for the purpose, or reserved for treatment through diplomatic channels. Other questions again were disposed of by an exchange of views. The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have been in close cooperation in all matters concerning the common war effort, but this is the first time that the Foreign Secretaries of the three Governments have been able to meet together in conference.

In the first place there were frank and exhaustive discussions of the measures to be taken to shorten the war against Germany and her satellites in Europe. Advantage was taken of the presence of military advisers representing the respective Chiefs of Staff in order to discuss definite military operations with regard to which decisions had been taken and which are already being prepared in order to create a basis for the closest military cooperation.
in the future between the three countries.

Second only to the importance of hastening the end of the war was the recognition by the three Governments that it was essential in their own national interests and in the interests of all peace-loving nations to continue the present close collaboration and cooperation in the conduct of the war into the period following the end of hostilities, and that only in this way could peace be maintained and the political, economic and social welfare of their peoples fully promoted.

This conviction is expressed in a declaration in which the Chinese Government joined during the conference and which was signed by the three Foreign Secretaries and the Chinese Ambassador at Moscow on behalf of their Governments. This declaration published today provides for even closer collaboration in the prosecution of the war and in all matters pertaining to the surrender and disarmament of the enemies with which the four countries are, respectively, at war. It sets forth the principles upon which the four Governments agree that a broad system of international cooperation and security should be based. Provision is made for the inclusion of all other peace-loving nations, great and small, in this system.

The conference agreed to set up machinery for ensuring the closest cooperation between the three Governments in the examination of European questions arising as the war develops. For this purpose the conference decided to establish in London a European advisory commission to study these questions and to make joint recommendations to the three Governments.

Provision was made for continuing, when necessary, the tripartite consultations of representatives of the three Governments in the respective capitals through the existing diplomatic channels.

The conference also agreed to establish an advisory council for matters relating to Italy, to be composed in the first instance of representatives of their three Governments and of the French Committee of National Liberation. Provision is made for addition to this council of representatives of Greece and Yugoslavia in view of their special interests arising out of aggressions of fascist Italy upon their territory during the present war. This council will deal with day-to-day questions other than military preparations and will make recommendations designed to coordinate Allied policy with regard to Italy.

The three Foreign Secretaries considered it appropriate to reaffirm, by a declaration published today, the attitude of the Allied Governments in favor of the restoration of democracy in Italy.

The three Foreign Secretaries declared it to be the purpose of their Governments to restore the independence of Austria. At the same time they reminded Austria that in the final settlement account will be taken of efforts that Austria may make toward its own liberation. The declaration on Austria is published today.

The Foreign Secretaries issued at
the conference a declaration by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin containing a solemn warning that at the time of granting any armistice to any German Government, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have had any connection with atrocities and executions in countries overrun by German forces will be taken back to the countries in which their abominable crimes were committed to be charged and punished according to the laws of those countries.

In an atmosphere of mutual confidence and understanding which characterized all the work of the conference, consideration was also given to other important questions. These included not only questions of a current nature but also questions concerning treatment of Hitlerite Germany and its satellites, economic cooperation and assurance of general peace.

JOINT FOUR-NATION DECLARATION

THE Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China:

United in their determination, in accordance with the declaration by the United Nations of Jan. 1, 1942, and subsequent declarations, to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender;

Conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the peoples allied with them from the menace of aggression;

Recognizing the necessity of ensuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments;

Jointly declare:

1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security.

2. That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy.

3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy.

4. That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the re-establishment
of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.

6. That after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation.

7. That they will confer and cooperate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period.

DECLARATION REGARDING ITALY

THE Foreign Secretaries of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have established that their three Governments are in complete agreement that Allied policy toward Italy must be based upon the fundamental principle that fascism and all its evil influence and configuration shall be completely destroyed and that the Italian people shall be given every opportunity to establish governmental and other institutions based upon democratic principles.

The Foreign Secretaries of the United States and United Kingdom declare that the action of their Governments from the inception of the invasion of Italian territory, in so far as paramount military requirements have permitted, has been based upon this policy.

In furtherance of this policy in the future the Foreign Secretaries of the three Governments are agreed that the following measures are important and should be put into effect:

1. It is essential that the Italian Government should be made more democratic by inclusion of representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always opposed fascism.

2. Freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of press and of public meeting shall be restored in full measure to the Italian people, who shall also be entitled to form anti-fascist political groups.

3. All institutions and organizations created by the fascist regime shall be suppressed.

4. All fascist or pro-fascist elements shall be removed from the administration and from institutions and organizations of a public character.

5. All political prisoners of the fascist regime shall be released and accorded full amnesty.

6. Democratic organs of local government shall be created.

7. Fascist chiefs and army generals known or suspected to be war criminals shall be arrested and handed over to justice.

In making this declaration the three Foreign Secretaries recognize that so long as active military operations continue in Italy the time at
which it is possible to give full effect to the principles stated above will be determined by the Commander-in-Chief on the basis of instructions received through the combined chiefs of staff.

The three Governments, parties to this declaration, will, at the request of any one of them, consult on this matter. It is further understood that nothing in this resolution is to operate against the right of the Italian people ultimately to choose their own form of government.

DECLARATION ON AUSTRIA

THE Governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America are agreed that Austria, the first free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German domination.

They regard the annexation imposed on Austria by Germany on March 15, 1938, as null and void. They consider themselves as in no way bound by any changes effected in Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to see re-established a free and independent Austria and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves, as well as their neighboring states which will be faced with similar problems, to find that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace.

Austria is reminded, however, that she has a responsibility, which she cannot evade, for participation in the war at the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final settlement account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation.

STATEMENT ON ATROCITIES — SIGNED BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL AND PREMIER STALIN

THE United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union have received from many quarters evidence of atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by Hitlerite forces in many of the countries they have overrun and from which they are now being steadily expelled. The brutalities of Nazi domination are no new thing, and all peoples or territories in their grip have suffered from the worst form of government by terror. What is new is that many of these territories are now being redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating powers and that in their desperation the recoiling Hitlerites and Huns are redoubling their ruthless cruelties. This is now evidenced with particular clearness by monstrous crimes on the territory of the Soviet Union which is being liberated from Hitlerites and on French and Italian territory.

Accordingly, the aforesaid three Allied powers, speaking in the in-
terests of the thirty-two United Na-
tions, hereby solemnly declare and
give full warning of their declara-
tion as follows:

At the time of granting of any
armistice to any government which
may be set up in Germany, those
German officers and men and mem-
bers of the Nazi party who have
been responsible for or have taken
a consenting part in the above
atrocities, massacres and executions
will be sent back to the countries
in which their abominable deeds
were done in order that they may
be judged and punished according
to the laws of these liberated coun-
tries and of the free governments
which will be erected therein. Lists
will be compiled in all possible de-
tail from all these countries, having
regard especially to invaded parts
of the Soviet Union, to Poland and
Czechoslovakia, to Yugoslavia and
Greece, including Crete and other
islands; to Norway, Denmark, the
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg,
France and Italy.

Thus, Germans who take part in
 wholesale shooting of Italian officers
or in the execution of French,
Dutch, Belgian or Norwegian hos-
tages or of Cretean peasants, or who
have shared in slaughters inflicted
on the people of Poland or in terri-
tories of the Soviet Union which are
now being swept clear of the en-
emy, will know they will be brought
back to the scene of their crimes
and judged on the spot by the peo-
bles whom they have outraged. Let
those who have hitherto not imbued
their hands with innocent blood be-
ware lest they join the ranks of the
guilty, for most assuredly the three
Allied powers will pursue them to
the uttermost ends of the earth and
will deliver them to their accusers
in order that justice may be done.

The above declaration is without
prejudice to the case of German
criminals whose offenses have no
particular geographical localization
and who will be punished by joint
decision of the Governments of the
Allies.
SPEED THE DAY OF VICTORY

BY JOSEPH STALIN

(Report before the Moscow Soviet, November 6, 1943, on the occasion of the twenty-sixth anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution)

COMRADES, today the peoples of the Soviet Union are celebrating the twenty-sixth anniversary of the great October Socialist Revolution. For the third time, our country is marking the anniversary of her peoples' revolution in the conditions of this patriotic war.

In October, 1941, our motherland lived through hard days. The enemy approached our capital. He surrounded Leningrad from the land. Our troops were compelled to retreat. It demanded the enormous efforts of the army and the action of all of the forces of the people to check the enemy and to strike a serious blow at him at Moscow.

By October, 1942, the danger to our motherland became even greater. The enemy stood then barely 120 kilometers away from Moscow, he had broken into Stalingrad and entered the foothills of the Caucasus. But, even in those grave days, the army and people did not lose heart but staunchly bore all trials. They found the strength to check the enemy and deal him a retaliating blow.

True to the behests of our great Lenin, they defended the achievements of the October Revolution without sparing their strength or their lives. As is well known, these efforts of the army and people were not in vain.

Shortly after the October days last year, our troops passed over to the offensive and struck a fresh, powerful barrage of blows at the Germans, first at Stalingrad, in the Caucasus, and in the area of the middle reaches of the Don, and then at the beginning of 1943 at Velikye Luki, at Leningrad and in the Rzhev and Vyazma area.

Since then, the Red Army never let the initiative out of its hands. Its blows throughout the summer of this year have become increasingly stronger, its military skill has grown with every month. Since then our troops won big victories and the Germans suffered one defeat after another. No matter how hard the enemy tried, he failed to score any success on the Soviet-German front that was of the least importance.

I. A Year of a Radical Turn in the Course of the War

The past year, between the twen-
ty-fifth and twenty-sixth anniversaries of the October Revolution, was a year marking the turn in the patriotic war. This year marked a turn in the first place because in this year the Red Army for the first time during the course of the war succeeded in carrying through a big summer offensive against the German troops and, under the blows of our forces, the German fascist troops were compelled to abandon hurriedly the territory they had seized, not infrequently saving themselves from encirclement by flight and abandoning on the battlefield huge quantities of equipment, stores of arms and ammunition, and large numbers of wounded officers and men.

Thus, the successes of our summer campaign in the second half of this year followed up and completed the successes of our winter campaign at the beginning of this year.

Now, when the Red Army, developing the successes of the winter campaign, has dealt a powerful blow at the German troops in the summer, it is possible to consider finally dead and buried the fairy tale that the Red Army is allegedly incapable of conducting a successful offensive in the summer time. The past year has shown that the Red Army can carry through an offensive in summer just as well as in the winter.

As a result of these offensive operations, our troops in the course of the past year have been able to fight their way forward from 500 kilometers in the central part of the front up to 1,300 kilometers in the south and to liberate nearly one million square kilometers of territory, that is, almost two-thirds of the Soviet land temporarily seized by the enemy.

Along with this, the enemy troops have been hurled back from Vladikavkaz to Kherson, from Elista to Krivoi Rog, from Stalingrad to Kiev, from Voronezh to Gomel, from Vyazma and Rzhev to the approaches of Orsha and Vitebsk.

Having no faith in the stability of their earlier successes on the Soviet-German front, the Germans for a long time beforehand built powerful defense lines, especially along the big rivers. But in this year's battles neither rivers nor powerful fortifications saved the Germans.

Our troops shattered the Germans' defenses and in only three months of the summer of 1943 skillfully forced four very serious water barriers—the North Donets, the Desna, the Sozh and the Dnieper. I do not speak even of such barriers as the German defense in the area of the river Mius, west of Rostov, and their defenses in the area of the river Molochnaya near Melitopol. At present the Red Army is battering the enemy successfully on the other side of the Dnieper.

This year is marking a turn also because the Red Army within a comparatively short time was able to annihilate and grind down the most experienced of the old cadres of the German fascist troops, and at the same time to steel and multiply its own cadres in successful offensive battles in the course of the year.

In the battles on the Soviet-German front during the past year, the
German fascist army lost more than 4,000,000 officers and men, including not less than 1,800,000 killed. Besides, the Germans also lost during that year more than 14,000 aircraft, over 25,000 tanks and not less than 40,000 guns.

The German fascist army now is not what it was at the outbreak of the war. While at the outbreak of the war it had sufficient numbers of experienced cadres, now it has been diluted with fresh-baked, young, inexperienced officers whom the Germans are hurriedly throwing into the front, since they had neither the necessary reserves of officers nor the time to train them.

Quite another picture is presented today by the Red Army. Its cadres have grown and been tempered in the successful offensive battles in the course of the past year. The numbers of its fighting cadres are growing and will grow as the existence of an officer reserve gives it time and opportunity to train young officer cadres and promote them to responsible posts.

It is characteristic that instead of the 240 divisions which faced our front last year, 179 of them being German divisions, this year the Red Army front is faced with 257 divisions of which 207 are German. The Germans evidently count on compensating for the lower quality of their divisions by increasing their numbers. However, the defeat of the Germans in the past year shows that it is impossible to compensate for the deterioration in the quality of the divisions by increasing their numbers.

From the purely military point of view, the defeat of the German troops on our front by the close of this year was predetermined by two major events—the battle of Stalingrad and the battle of Kursk.

The battle of Stalingrad ended in the encirclement of a German army 300,000 strong, in its rout and the capture of about one-third of the surrounded troops.

To form an idea of the scale of the slaughter, unparalleled in history, which took place on the fields of Stalingrad, one should note that after the battle of Stalingrad was over, there were found and buried 147,200 dead German officers and men and 46,700 dead Soviet officers and men. Stalingrad signified a decline for the German fascist army. As is well known, the Germans, after the Stalingrad slaughter, were unable to recover.

As to the battle of Kursk, it ended in the rout of the two main advancing groups of the German fascist forces and in our troops launching a counter-offensive which turned subsequently into a powerful summer offensive of the Red Army.

The battle of Kursk began with the German offensive against Kursk from the north and south. That was the last attempt of the Germans to carry out a big summer offensive and in the event of its success redeem their losses. As is well known, the offensive ended in failure.

The Red Army not only repulsed the German offensive but passed over to the offensive itself and by a series of consecutive blows in the
course of the summer period hurled back the German fascist troops beyond the Dnieper.

If the battle of Stalingrad foreshadowed the decline of the German fascist army, the battle of Kursk confronted it with disaster.

Finally, this year was the year marking a turn because the successful offensive of the Red Army radically aggravated the economic and military-political situation of fascist Germany and confronted her with the most profound crisis.

The Germans counted on carrying out a successful offensive on the Soviet-German front in the summer of this year to redeem their losses and bolster up their shaken prestige in Europe. But the Red Army upset the Germans' calculations; it repulsed their offensive, launched an offensive itself, and proceeded to drive the Germans westward, thereby crushing the prestige of German arms.

The Germans counted on taking a line prolonging the war; they started building defense lines and "walls" and proclaimed for all to hear that their new positions were impregnable. But the Red Army again upset the Germans' calculations; it broke through their defense lines and "walls" and continues to advance successfully, giving them no time to drag out the war.

The Germans counted on rectifying the situation at the front by "total" mobilization. But here, too, events have upset the Germans' calculations. The summer campaign already has consumed two-thirds of the "totally" mobilized men, but it does not look as if this circumstance has brought about any improvement in the position of the German fascist army. It may prove necessary to proclaim another "total" mobilization and there is no reason why the repetition of such a measure should not result in the "total" collapse of a certain state.

The Germans counted on retaining a firm hold on the Ukraine in order to avail themselves of Ukrainian agricultural produce for their army and population and of Donbas coal for the factories and railways serving the German army. But here, too, they miscalculated. As a result of the successes of the offensive of the Red Army, the Germans lost not only the Donbas coal, but also the richest grain growing regions of the Ukraine, and there is no reason to think that they will not lose the rest of the Ukraine too in the nearest future.

Naturally, all these miscalculations could not but impair and in fact did radically impair the economic and military-political situation of fascist Germany. Fascist Germany is experiencing a profound crisis. She faces disaster.

II. Nationwide Assistance to the Front

The successes of the Red Army would have been impossible without the support of the people, without the selfless work of the Soviet people in the factories and plants, collieries and mines, in transport and agriculture.

In the hard conditions of wartime,
the Soviet people proved able to ensure its army everything that was most necessary and have constantly perfected its fighting equipment. Never during the whole course of the war has the enemy been able to surpass our army as regards quality of arms. At the same time our industry supplied the front with ever increasing quantities of fighting equipment.

The past year was a year marking a turn not only in the progress of hostilities, but also in the work of our rear. We were no longer confronted with such tasks as evacuating enterprises to the east and switching over industry to the production of munitions. The Soviet state now has an efficient, rapidly expanding war economy.

Thus, all the efforts of the people could be concentrated on increasing production and on further improving armaments, especially tanks, aircraft guns, and self-propelling artillery. In this we have gained big successes. Supported by the entire people, the Red Army received uninterrupted supplies of fighting equipment; it rained millions of bombs, mortar and artillery shells upon the enemy and brought thousands of tanks and aircraft into battle.

There is every ground to say that the selfless labor of the Soviet people in the rear will go down in history along with the heroic struggle of the Red Army as an unexampled feat of the people in defense of their motherland.

The workers of the Soviet Union, who in the years of peaceful construction built up a highly developed and powerful socialist industry, have been working during this patriotic war with a real fury of energy to help the front, displaying true labor heroism.

Everyone knows that in the war against the U.S.S.R. the Hitlerites had at their disposal not only the highly developed industry of Germany but also the fairly powerful industries of the vassal and occupied countries. And yet the Hitlerites failed to maintain the quantitative superiority in military equipment which they had at the outbreak of the war against the Soviet Union. If the former superiority of the enemy in regard to the number of tanks, aircraft, mortars and automatic rifles has now been eliminated, if our army now experiences no serious shortage of arms, ammunition and equipment, the credit for this goes, in the first place, to our working class.

The peasants of the Soviet Union, who during the years of peaceful construction, on the basis of the collective farm system, transformed backward farming into up-to-date agriculture, have displayed during this patriotic war a high degree of understanding of the common national interest without parallel in the history of the countryside.

By their selfless labor to help the front, they have shown that the Soviet peasantry considers this war against the Germans its own cause, a war for its life and liberty.

It is well known that as a result of the invasion by the fascist hordes our country was deprived tempo-
rarily of important agricultural districts of the Ukraine, Don and Kuba
ban. Nevertheless, our collective and state farms supplied the army and country with food without any serious interruptions. Naturally, without the collective farming system, without the selfless labor of the men and women collective farmers, we could not have coped with this most difficult task.

If in the third year of the war our army experiences no shortage of food, if the population is supplied with food and industry with raw materials, it shows the strength and vitality of the collective farm system and the patriotism of the collective farm peasantry.

A great part in helping the front has been played by our transport—by rail transport in the first place and also by river, sea and motor transport. As is known, transport is a vital means of communication between the rear and the front. One may manufacture great quantities of arms and ammunition but if transport does not deliver them to the front in time, they may remain a dead weight as far as the front is concerned. It must be said that transport plays a decisive part in the timely delivery to the front of arms, ammunition, food, clothing and so on; and if in spite of wartime difficulties and the shortage of fuel we have been able to supply the front with everything necessary, credit should be given in the first place to our transport workers and employees.

Nor does the intelligentsia lag behind the working class and peasantry in helping the front. The Soviet intelligentsia is working with devotion for the defense of our country, constantly improving the armaments of the Red Army and the technology and organization of production.

For helping the workers and collective farmers to expand industry and agriculture and for promoting Soviet science and culture under conditions of war, the credit goes to our intelligentsia.

All the peoples of the Soviet Union have risen as one to defend their motherland, rightly considering the present patriotic war the common cause of all working people, irrespective of nationality or religion. By now the Hitlerite politicians themselves see how hopelessly stupid were their hopes of discord and strife among the peoples of the Soviet Union. The friendship of the peoples of our country has stood the strain of all the hardships and trials of war and has become tempered still further in the common struggle of all Soviet people against the fascist invader.

This is the source of the strength of the Soviet Union.

As in the years of peaceful construction so in the days of war the leading and guiding force of the Soviet people has been the party of Lenin, the party of Bolsheviks. No other party ever enjoyed or now enjoys such prestige among the masses of people as our Bolshevik Party. And this is understandable. Under the leadership of the party of Bolsheviks, the workers, peasants
and intelligentsia of our country won their freedom and built a socialist society. In this patriotic war the party stood before us as inspirer and organizer of the nationwide struggle against the fascist invader. The organizational work of the party united and directed all the efforts of the Soviet people toward the common goal, subordinating all our forces and means to the cause of the enemy's defeat. During the war the party cemented still further its kinship with the people, has established still closer ties with the broad masses of working people.

This is the source of the strength of our state.

The present war has forcefully confirmed Lenin's well known statement that war is the all-round test of a nation's material and spiritual forces. The history of war teaches that only those states stood this test which proved stronger than their adversaries as regards the development and organization of their economy, as regards the experience, skill and fighting spirit of their troops, and as regards the fortitude and unity of their people throughout the war. Ours is just such a state.

The Soviet state was never so stable and solid as now in the third year of the patriotic war. The lessons of the war show that the Soviet system has proved not only the best form of organizing the economic and cultural development of the country in the years of peaceful construction, but also the best form of mobilizing all the forces of the people for resistance to the enemy in time of war. The Soviet Power set up twenty-six years ago has transformed our country within a short historical period into an impregnable fortress. The Red Army has the most stable and reliable rear of all the armies in the world.

This is the source of the strength of the Soviet Union.

There is no doubt that the Soviet state will emerge from the war even stronger and more consolidated. The German invaders are desolating and devastating our lands in an endeavor to undermine the power of our state. To an even greater extent than before the offensive of the Red Army has exposed the barbarous bandit nature of the Hitlerite army. In the districts they seized the Germans exterminated hundreds of thousands of our civilians. Like medieval barbarians or the hordes of Attila, the German fiends trample the fields, burn down villages and towns and demolish industrial enterprises and cultural institutions. The Germans' crimes are evidence of the weakness of the fascist invaders, for it is only usurpers who themselves don't believe in their victory who act in this way. And the more hopeless the position of the Hitlerites becomes, the more viciously they rage in their atrocities and plunder.

Our people will not forgive the German fiends for these crimes. We shall make the German criminals answer for all their misdeeds.

In areas where the fascist cutthroats are for the time being masters we shall have to restore demolished towns and villages, industry, transport, agriculture and cul-
tural institutions, we shall have to create normal living conditions for the Soviet people delivered from fascist slavery. The work of restoration of economy and culture is already going full blast in the districts liberated from the enemy. But this is only the beginning. We must completely eliminate the consequences of German domination in the districts liberated from German occupation.

This is a great national task. We can and must cope with this difficult task within a short time.

III. Consolidation of the Anti-Hitler Coalition—Disintegration of the Fascist Bloc

The past year marked the turn, not only in the patriotic war of the Soviet Union but in the whole world war.

Changes which have taken place during this year in the military and international situation have been favorable to the U.S.S.R. and the Allied countries friendly to it, and detrimental to Germany and her accomplices in brigandage in Europe.

The victories of the Red Army have had results and consequences far beyond the limits of the Soviet-German Front; they have changed the whole further course of the world war and acquired great international significance. The victory of the Allied countries over the common enemy has come nearer while relations among the Allies, the fighting partnership of their armies, far from weakening, have, contrary to the expectations of the enemy, grown stronger and more enduring. Eloquent evidence of this are the historic decisions of the Moscow Conference of representatives of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States of America, recently published in the press. Now our united countries are filled with determination to deal the enemy joint blows which will result in final victory over him.

This year the Red Army’s blows at the German fascist troops were supported by fighting operations of our Allies in North Africa, in the Mediterranean basin and in Southern Italy. At the same time the Allies subjected and are still subjecting important industrial centers of Germany to substantial bombing and are thus considerably weakening the enemy’s military power. If to all this is added the fact that the Allies are regularly supplying us with various munitions and raw materials then it can be said without exaggeration that by all this they facilitated considerably the successes of our summer campaign. Of course the present actions of Allied armies in South Europe cannot as yet be regarded as the second front, but still this is something like a second front. Obviously the opening of the real second front in Europe, which is not so distant, will considerably hasten victory over Hitlerite Germany and will consolidate even more the fighting partnership of the Allied countries.

Thus events of the past year show that the anti-Hitlerite coalition is a firm association of peoples and rests on a solid foundation.
By now it is obvious to everybody that by unleashing their war the Hitlerite clique led Germany and her flunkeys into a hopeless impasse. Defeats of the fascist troops on the Soviet-German front and the blows of our allies at the Italo-German troops have shaken the whole edifice of the fascist bloc, which is crumbling now before our very eyes.

Italy has dropped out of the Hitlerite coalition never to return. Mussolini can change nothing because he is in fact prisoner of the Germans. Next in line are the other partners in the coalition. Finland, Hungary, Rumania and the other vassals of Hitler, discouraged by Germany's military defeats, have now finally lost faith in the outcome of the war being favorable for them and are anxious to find a way out of the bog into which Hitler has dragged them. Now that the time has come to answer for their brigandage, Hitlerite Germany's accomplices in plunder, but recently so obedient to their master, are looking around searching for an opportune moment to slip out of the bandit gang unnoticed.

In entering the war the partners in the Hitlerite bloc counted on a quick victory. They had already allotted beforehand who would get what: who would get buns and pies and who bumps and black eyes. They naturally meant bumps and black eyes for their adversaries and buns and pies for themselves. But now it is obvious that Germany and her flunkeys will get no buns and pies but will have to share the bumps and black eyes instead. Anticipating this unattractive prospect Hitler's accomplices are now racking their brains for a way to get out of the war with as few bumps and black eyes as possible.

Italy's example shows the Hitler vassals that the longer they postpone their inevitable break with the Germans and permit them to lord it in their states the greater is the devastation in store for their countries, the more suffering their peoples will have to bear. Italy's example also shows that Hitlerite Germany has no intention of defending her vassal countries but means to convert them into a scene of devastating war if only she can stave off the hour of her own defeat.

The cause of German fascism is lost and the sanguinary "New Order" it has set up is on the way to collapse. The outburst of the peoples' wrath against the fascist enslavers is brewing in the occupied countries of Europe. Germany's former prestige in the countries of her allies and in neutral countries is lost beyond recovery and her economic and political ties with neutral states have been undermined.

The time is long past when the Hitlerite clique clamored boisterously about the Germans winning world domination. Now, as is well known, the Germans have other matters than world domination to worry about; they have to think about keeping body and soul together.

Thus the course of the war has shown that the alliance of fascist states did not and does not rest on a
reliable foundation. The Hitlerite coalition was formed on the basis of predatory rapacious ambitions of its members. As long as the Hitlerites were scoring military successes the fascist coalition seemed to be a stable association. But the very first defeat of the fascist troops resulted in the actual disintegration of the bandit bloc. Hitlerite Germany and her vassals stand on the verge of disaster.

The victory of the Allied countries over Hitlerite Germany will put on the agenda important questions of organizing and rebuilding the state, economic and cultural life of the European peoples. The policy of our government in these questions remains unchanged. Together with our Allies we shall have to:

1. Liberate the peoples of Europe from the fascist invaders and help them rebuild their national states dismembered by the fascist invaders; the peoples of France, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Greece and other states now under the German yoke must again become free and independent.

2. Grant the liberated people of Europe full rights and freedom to decided for themselves the question of their form of government.

3. Take measures so that all fascists who are to blame for this war and the suffering of peoples bear stern punishment and retribution for all the crimes they have committed no matter in what country they may hide;

4. Establish such order in Europe as will completely preclude the possibility of new aggression on the part of Germany, and

5. Establish lasting economic, political and cultural collaboration among the peoples of Europe based on mutual confidence and mutual assistance for the purpose of rehabilitating the economic and cultural life destroyed by the Germans.

During the past year, the Red Army and the Soviet people achieved great successes in the struggle against the German invaders. We have achieved a radical turning point in the war in favor of our country and now the war is heading for its final outcome. But it is not like the Soviet people to rest on their achievements, to exult in their successes. Victory may elude us if complacency appears in our ranks. Victory cannot be won without struggle and strain. It is won in battle. Victory is near now but to win it fresh exertion of strength is needed, selfless work throughout our rear and skillful and resolute actions by the Red Army at the front. It would be a crime against our motherland, against the Soviet people who have fallen temporarily under the fascist yoke, against the peoples of Europe languishing under German oppression, if we failed to use all opportunities to hasten the enemy's defeat. The enemy must not be given any respite. That is why we must exert all our strength to finish off the enemy.

The Soviet people and the Red Army clearly see the difficulties of the coming struggle. But already now it is clear that the day of our
victory is approaching. The war has entered a stage when it is a question of driving the invaders completely from Soviet soil and liquidating the fascist "New Order in Europe." The time is not far distant when we shall completely clear the enemy from the Ukraine and Byelorussia, from Leningrad and the Kalinin Region, and shall liberate from the German invaders the peoples of Crimea, Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia, Moldavia, and the Karelo-Finnish Republic.

Comrades! For the victory of the Anglo-Soviet-American fighting alliance! For the liberation of the peoples of Europe from the fascist yoke! For the complete expulsion of the German fiends from our land!

Long live our Red Army! Long live our Navy! Long live our gallant men and women partisans! Long live our great Motherland!

Death to the German invader!
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S GREETINGS TO PRESIDENT KALININ

(On the occasion of the twenty-sixth anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution, November 7, 1943)

The anniversary of the founding twenty-six years ago of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics falls this year at a time when freedom-loving peoples everywhere are dealing fateful blows at the enemy who dared attempt to enslave and oppress them. On the battlefields and by the growth of cooperation and single-minded purpose, the members of the United Nations are driving the forces of aggression toward irreparable defeat.

Allow me, on this day, to congratulate you, the people and the leaders of the Soviet Union, and to express the deep admiration of myself and my countrymen, for the magnificent manner in which the Red Army has hurled back the invader. To the Red Army and people of the Soviet Union belong eternal honor and glory. They have written deathless pages of history in the struggle against tyranny and oppression. Their example and sacrifice are an inspiration to all the forces joined in the common struggle for victory.

In a spirit of unity, made even more evident in the agreements recently concluded at Moscow, and with the strength derived from mutual understanding, confidence and active collaboration, the United Nations will overthrow the forces of aggression and establish and maintain a just, enduring peace.
THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE, NATIONAL UNITY, AND THE ELECTIONS*

BY EUGENE DENNIS

IT IS generally recognized in practically all sections of American public opinion that the recent Tri-Power Conference held at Moscow was a historic event, and that its decisions constitute a powerful blow against Hitler Germany and its satellites, and against the negotiated peace forces in the United States and Great Britain. Furthermore, it is almost universally understood that the accords arrived at between Hull, Molotov and Eden signalize that the relations between the United States, England, and the Soviet Union have become closer, and that a firmer basis has been laid for post-war collaboration.

Yet, what most observers and spokesmen fail to understand fully is the main feature of the conference decisions, namely: that the chief decisions of the Conference, including those directly affecting post-war questions, were a series of military-political and economic agreements calculated, in the first place, to shorten the war, to hasten by joint action the military destruction of Hitlerite Germany.

The measures and accords adopted by the Conference are designed, in the first place, to expedite victory, as well as post-war collaboration. This is evidenced by the very nature of the decisions and agreements.

This is obviously so in respect to the military discussions which serve to better coordinate present military operations of the three powers, and which create the basis for the closest military cooperation in the future.

This is true, further, in regard to the establishment of the permanent Advisory Commissions on European problems and on Italy, as well as in the assignment to Moscow of au-

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* Abridged text of a report delivered at a Midwest conference of Communist Party leaders in Chicago on November 10.
Authoritative representatives of the Anglo-American combined chiefs of staff.

This is also the case in connection with the agreements dealing with Italy—decisions that will promote the complete liberation of Italy from Nazi domination and in that process facilitate the liquidation of fascism and the establishment of a democratic, anti-fascist regime within that country.

This is similarly true as regards the accord on Austria, which aims at spurring on the Austrian national liberation movement and creating further division and disintegration within the Hitler camp; and which likewise serves to promote all movements and tendencies, not only within Austria, but also within Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, to take these countries out of the war.

Again, if we take the declaration on war guilt and the punishment of the fascist war instigators and terrorists, we find that this is not merely an agreement to secure retribution in the future; it is also a political act to speed the process of demoralization and disension in the Hitlerite camp and to strengthen the anti-Hitler opposition within the Reich, particularly within the German army, as well as to heighten the popular upsurge in the Nazi-occupied countries.

Insofar as the highly important Four-Power Declaration is concerned, including the agreement concerning unconditional surrender, armistice terms, military occupation, as well as the establishment of an international post-war organization to maintain peace and security—this too should be understood, not only in terms of solving certain vital post-war problems, but of decisions to hasten victory. For, precisely now, as victory draws nearer, this agreement of the leading powers of the anti-Hitler coalition, by establishing a concrete approach and guiding principles affecting mutual cooperation and the organization of post-war security and reconstruction, has removed a number of political obstacles which till now have impeded closer military collaboration and concerted action.

In emphasizing the prime importance of the Conference decisions to accelerate the unconditional surrender of Hitler Germany and its vassals, no one should minimize the far-reaching significance of the pacts for continuing the collaboration of the three powers in the post-war world and for facilitating the solution of many key post-war questions.

For these pacts are substantial and vital contributions toward guaranteeing a just and stable peace. These pacts and declarations are no nebulous promises or pious pledges. They are helping give, as in the case of the agreement on Italy, flesh and blood to the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of the United Nations. These agreements are effectuating the solution of a series of immediate post-war problems now, in the very course of the war.

These agreements on post-war questions constitute a further development and extension of the principles set forth in the Anglo-Soviet twenty-year treaty for mutual assistance. They mark the de facto alignment of the United States in
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that war and post-war treaty of alliance, which, to all effects and purposes, is now a concordance of the three most powerful states, joined by China, leading the coalition of freedom-loving peoples.

But in seeing this, we must not lose sight of the fact that the great significance of the Moscow Conference is its contribution to the intensification and the increased coordination of the combined military efforts of the anti-Hitler coalition for hastening victory, thereby helping create the firmest basis for the continuation of the Anglo-Soviet-American alliance in the post-war period.

It is especially necessary to emphasize this because, while victory is approaching, the war is not yet won. Hard and costly fighting lies ahead. To obtain an early victory, the prerequisites for which now exist, the Moscow agreements must be implemented to bring about immediately the greatest combined war effort and concerted military action of the three powers.

It is necessary to emphasize this because, in mobilizing the broadest and most active support of labor and all patriotic forces behind the Moscow agreements, maximum attention must be focused on solving the most pressing win-the-war tasks, of securing the speediest fulfillment of the Moscow decisions. Foremost among these tasks are: supporting the decision to speed the opening of the Second Front; strengthening national unity in support of the Commander-in-Chief and the war program of the government; routing the defeatists and obstructionists; expanding war production; achieving international trade union unity of action. In short, everything must be done to make the Moscow agreements an occasion for a new patriotic upsurge and a redoubled national war effort on the military, political, and production fronts.

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In analyzing the successful outcome of the Conference, the question naturally arises as to how it was possible in so short a space of time to achieve such basic accords on so many vital problems. This question has been raised, with some justification, especially in view of the well-known difficulties and differences preceding the Conference, which were adversely affecting the relations between the three powers, particularly the tension and strains that inevitably arose within the coalition over the prolonged absence of Anglo-American military operations in Western Europe.

Two main factors can be noted as having pre-determined the favorable outcome of the Conference:

First, the decisions of the Conference were based upon and were influenced by a new military and political situation, by a profoundly new relation of forces on the Soviet-German front, and hence, internationally. They were influenced by the changed relation of forces created by the Soviet Union and its Red Army, as well as by a changed relation of forces in a number of the Nazi-occupied countries, and by changes effected by American and British military operations in Africa and Italy—changes which signify that the fighting alliance and col-
laboration of the anti-Hitler coalition has been strengthened in the common struggle, and that the United Nations’ war against Hitler Germany is now entering its final phase.

Further, the Soviet Union has been strengthened during the course of the war and has attained a stronger position in international affairs and within the anti-Hitler coalition. It has demonstrated its ability, not only to liberate its own territory from the Nazis, but to smash the Hitlerites and their war machine. Its glorious military achievements have upset, not only Hitler’s plans for world domination, but also some Anglo-American concepts of waging a long and protracted war. The might of the Red Army and the Soviet system has rendered decisive and devastating blows against Hitler Germany, not only helping to break the Rome-Berlin Axis, but shattering German army morale and power and aggravating the unstable relations between Berlin, Helsinki, Budapest, Sofia and Bucharest.

The national-liberation army of Yugoslavia, the powerful partisan movements and resistance centers in Poland and France, and the influential national front in Italy, are dealing heavy blows at the Nazis and their “New Order.” They have brought about a new political anti-fascist alignment within these countries, which must be reckoned with.

The British and American air offensives over Europe and military operations in Italy and the Mediterranean area not only have enhanced the cooperation and bonds between the Three Powers, but also have produced effects beyond those originally planned, merging as they have with the offensive of the Red Army toward real coalition warfare. Now those operations can be more rapidly extended and concluded together with new Allied blows, especially from the British Isles.

Since the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition, both within the United States as well as Britain, the forces favoring the strengthening of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition and the establishment of a unified military strategy and concerted military action have grown in strength, notwithstanding their very inadequate unity and the noise of the appeasers. And here we might note in passing that this situation within our country, the changed attitude of millions and the growing movement for increased cooperation and a firm alliance with the Soviet Union and our other allies, is due, in no small part, to the influential role of key sections of labor, including the political influence and the patriotic activity of the Communist Party.

Thus, it is clear that the Moscow Conference decisions were fundamentally influenced by, and partially reflected, the new military-political situation. The Conference accords reflect particularly the changed relation of forces on the decisive Eastern Front, changes which, as Joseph Stalin analyzed in his historic November 6 address, have greatly altered world relations.

Moreover, the great success of the Conference is a result of the common interests of the leading members of the anti-Hitler coalition. These joint and natural interests,
which came forcibly into play immediately after June 22, 1941, still operate and will continue to function and to influence events in the next period.

Suffice it to point to the following: The anti-Hitler coalition of freedom-loving peoples headed by the U.S.S.R.—a Socialist State—and Great Britain and the United States—the two most powerful capitalist countries in the world—came into being to cope with a common danger. It arose as a fighting coalition to frustrate and defeat the plans of Hitlerite Germany to enslave the world. Therefore, unlike all previous coalitions in world history, this is a coalition representing no special class interest nor the single interest of any one particular state or ruling circle. It is a coalition representing the basic state and national interests of the three great powers of the coalition, of their peoples, and of all liberty-loving peoples.

It is true that since the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition, as a consequence of the decisive victories of the Red Army and the achievements of the Anglo-American armies, the danger of fascist invasion and enslavement to Great Britain and the United States has now become less acute. However, it is also clear that Hitler fascism, while deeply wounded, is not yet smashed and is still capable of resistance and of ferocious struggles. Without the closest unity and solidarity of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition, this mortal danger which is not yet over, could and would quickly reappear. This factor for maintaining the anti-Hitler coalition, and for further consolidating it, exercised an important influence on the outcome of the Moscow Conference.

Furthermore, it should be recognized that the common national interests of the anti-Hitler coalition are neither accidental nor transitory. As Comrade Browder has repeatedly stressed, the common interests of the coalition powers and of their peoples are of such a nature as to necessitate, not only concerted military action to destroy Nazism-fascism, but long-term collaboration in the post-war period to preserve peace and promote economic security. This is demonstrated by the critical problems created for all the three powers by the rise of fascism and fascist aggression, by the course of the anti-Hitler war, and by the common need to prevent the recurrence of aggression in the post-war period.

All three leading anti-Hitler powers require mutual understanding and cooperation to cope with the vast problems of establishing world order and security, rehabilitation, trade and commerce in the post-war period. The United States and Great Britain, certainly no less than the Soviet Union, require a post-war state of affairs marked, not only by peaceful co-existence of the great powers, with their different social systems, but by firm collaboration to organize peace, collective security, and economic reconstruction.

These, then, are some of the basic and permanent factors that determined the results of the Conference and that influence the developments for promoting long-term collaboration of the three most powerful world states.
In the few weeks that have elapsed since the Moscow Conference, indications have abounded to show how rapid and far-reaching its results will be. As for the decisive military actions, these will increasingly be unfolded on the battlefronts through closer military cooperation. Already Allied military operations are on the way to being more effectively coordinated and extended. The establishment of the vital Second Front in Western Europe draws closer, new Anglo-American offensives in the Balkans are being prepared.

The Moscow Conference has already sharply registered in Germany and among its satellites, as well as among the so-called neutral states. This is attested by the panic expressed by Hitler in his Munich speech on November 8. It is attested by the fact that Finland, Hungary, and Rumania have been further shaken by the Conference, and, above all, by the advance of the Red Army, and are now on the verge of being knocked out of the war. And there are signs that Turkey may soon modify its former status of neutrality.

Moreover, the Conference has already had pronounced favorable repercussions within Great Britain and the United States.

This is seen in the decision of the British Trade Union Congress finally to issue a call for an international conference of the trade unions of the United Nations. This is a conference which can play a vital role in cementing further the anti-Hitler coalition and in unifying and enabling the world labor movement to play a more influential role in the conduct of the war and in shaping the post-war world. It is a conference which should be convened even earlier than June 5, and which needs to be welcomed, energetically supported, and participated in by all sections of the American labor movement.

In the United States the Three-Power Conference has secured the endorsement of the majority of Congress, the decisive sections of the labor movement, and majority of the press, and the dominant circles of both major parties. This is especially noticeable in the outcome of the character and vote on the Connally Resolution in the Senate.

The contributions and the commitments of the representatives of the U.S.A. to the Three-Power Conference have helped to clarify and develop America's foreign and military policies in the interest of the American nation and of all peoples. They have brought new strength and vision to our national war effort, enabling our country to effect a greater measure of national unity and a fuller mobilization of our manpower, resources and political influence for strengthening the coalition, for hastening victory and a just peace.

However, it would be dangerously naive to conclude that the Moscow Conference has resolved all war and post-war questions, as well as all differences within the coalition, not to speak of the problems within our own country. New difficulties and differences can and probably will develop within the
anti-Hitler coalition as victory comes even closer and as additional post-war problems arise for solution. The alliance and collaboration of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition, which have been strengthened in the course of the war and as a result of the Moscow accords, need to and can be consolidated still further.

However, the new and closer relations now established within the anti-Hitler coalition indicate that present and future problems can be resolved more rapidly and favorably than heretofore — notwithstanding the existence of differences in the ideology and social systems of the members of the coalition. And these can be resolved far more speedily in the interests of the freedom-loving peoples, if the Moscow Conference decisions, especially regarding the attainment of full coalition warfare, are promptly realized, and if the anti-fascist unity of our nation is strengthened and consolidated around the Commander-in-Chief.

* * *

There can be no doubt that the Moscow Conference and its decisions will have an increasingly profound effect on the political situation within our country. The passage of, and the line-up on, the Fullbright and the Connally Resolutions evidenced this in part. And the future effects of the Tri-Power Agreements can and probably will favorably affect all political alignments for 1944, as well as the outcome of the Presidential elections.

However, it is also clear that the positive results of the Moscow Conference will not have their effect on our national unity and our elections uniformly; nor will their influence be brought to bear without the direct and most active intervention of the masses, especially the most energetic and resolute struggle on the part of labor. For, it should not be forgotten that the financial interests served by the appeasers in Congress, by the defeatist press, and by John L. Lewis forces, are very powerful. They are still capable of causing serious damage to our national war effort and they will exert every effort to try and frustrate the application of the Moscow decisions, particularly in regard to the opening of the Second Front.

It is true, of course, that the Conference, accompanying the great victories of the Red Army, has dealt new and heavy blows against the defeatists and appeasers, undermining their positions and weakening them. Yet it is also evident that these pro-fascist forces within our country will not abandon their pro-fascist aims and activities. These forces of appeasement and extreme reaction now will become even more desperate and bold, and will maneuver in new ways to achieve their reactionary ends.

The defeatists now are frantically and demagogically trying to present the Tri-Power Conference as a conference in which Roosevelt and Churchill "capitulated" to Stalin and allegedly agreed to the "Bolshevization" of Europe. The defeatists are coming forward as "champions" of the "small" nations, especially of the Soviet Baltic republics, and once again, as "guardians" of the Pacific. These aggressive and
reactionary imperialist forces are especially preparing to utilize the 1944 election campaign as a means of disrupting national unity and, above all, of establishing a pro-fascist regime within the country, with all its consequences internationally.

The defeatists and extreme reactionaries are counting on impeding the realization of the Conference decisions, not so much by a frontal attack on the Moscow pacts as such, as the votes of Taft and Vandenberg in the Senate on the Connally resolution showed. These forces are renewing their efforts to delay and obstruct the achievement of full coalition warfare and collaboration. They are striving to promote, now and during the 1944 election campaign, new and acute class, group and partisan conflicts. They are planning to aggravate all economic grievances of the workers, farmers, and middle classes by continuing to prevent economic stabilization. They are seeking to place responsibility for all unsolved economic problems on the Roosevelt Administration. They are engendering further division within the labor movement, and among America’s national groups, so as to advance their reactionary appeasement aims. They are fostering confusion, division, and complacency, counting on these as their trump cards in their efforts to convert the United States into the center of world reaction.

II

There is to be seen within the country, as we have noted, a deep-going trend of realization that America must further consolidate and strengthen its friendship and cooperative relations with the Soviet Union as well as with Great Britain and China, for the purposes of winning the war, assuring a just and stable peace, and achieving post-war reconstruction in which the United States can ensure greater economic security and democratic liberties to all of its citizens.

So far, however, this trend has not yet fully asserted itself or become crystallized on a broad scale in new political alignments. This was apparent particularly in the recent elections; it is strikingly evident in the anti-Administration position and actions of the majority of the Republicans and Southern Democrats in Congress on most vital issues.

It would be well to examine somewhat closely the results of the November 2 mayoralty and gubernatorial elections, inasmuch as this would reveal many important lessons for the political tasks ahead, especially for 1944.

The outcome of the elections was generally unfavorable to the win-the-war camp. The majority of the candidates for leading offices, supported by the Democratic and labor coalition, were defeated. Such was the case in the campaign to elect the Lieutenant Governor in New York, the gubernatorial elections in New Jersey, the mayoralty elections in Detroit and San Francisco, and the state-wide elections in Kentucky. The noteworthy exceptions were the significant Cleveland Mayoralty and New York City councilmanic elections.

But despite the set-backs to labor
and the win-the-war forces in the Democratic Party, it would be wrong to estimate the election results as signalizing a national trend against the President and the Administration; above all, it would be a mistake to interpret the results as an anti-war vote.

True, the results will affect certain national policies. They will encourage the defeatists and obstructionists in Congress, all the appeasement forces in the Republican Party, as well as the Copperhead Farley politicos in the Democratic Party. Yet it is indisputably clear that the vote on November 2 was neither a clear-cut vote on vital war issues nor a vote of non-confidence in the President. Indeed, the Republican Party strategy was calculated to avoid a vote on these issues, and unfortunately most of the Democratic Party forces acquiesced in this.

This is not to say that certain national factors did not play a role in the elections. One cannot discount the effect of the relatively limited military fighting that our country has so far engaged in during the war, coupled with the mounting economic burdens upon the mass of the people which affected sections of the workers, and especially the farmers and the city middle class. Nor can one dismiss the harmful effects of the absence of joint political action between the A. F. of L. and the C.I.O. nationally, a situation which, if not quickly changed, at least locally and in the states, can have the most serious consequences for the fate of national unity and the outcome of the 1944 elections.

It should be recalled, too, that there was a miners' strike on the day of election, which in Kentucky served to turn the tables; for here the Lewis machine was working with and for the Republicans. Further, the stoppage in coal production was exploited to develop hostility toward the Administration and the Democratic Party.

Another phenomenon of national import in regard to the elections was the defeatists' instigation of anti-Negro and anti-Semitic prejudices and activities, as in Detroit, which were used by the anti-labor and anti-Roosevelt forces to create disunity and confusion. This problem is going to loom far larger from now on, particularly in the course of the 1944 elections. And this will be affected to no small degree by the scope of the struggle waged to abolish the Poll Tax, to enforce the decisions of the F.E.P.C. and to counteract and combat all forms and manifestations of red-baiting, and of racial, national and religious discrimination.

While these national considerations affected to a certain extent and in some cases very markedly the results of the November elections, it is also true that a big role was played by local factors, such as the new scandal around Tammany Hall in the Aurelio case, the antagonism toward the Hague machine in New Jersey, and the candidacy of Bullitt for Mayor on the Democratic Party ticket in Philadelphia.

A very important factor in affecting the elections was the disunity, demoralization, and growing disintegration within certain local and state Democratic Party organiza-
tions. This was expressed, for instance, by the struggle within the Democratic Party in New Jersey and the weakened position of the Hague machine; by the fact that in San Francisco, where one of the leading mayoralty candidates was the Vice-Chairman of the Democratic Party, the Chairman of the Democratic Party of the San Francisco county organization supported the Republican Lapham; and, in New York, by the sabotaging role of the Farley forces in demobilizing the Democratic Party through working to keep down the registration within, and the vote by, that party.

These and other manifestations of demoralization and disunity within the Democratic Party are important to study for 1944. They are also important for labor to help overcome and circumvent. Especially is this true in regard to the responsibility of labor and other win-the-war forces for helping insure the election of consistent win-the-war delegates to the National Nominating Conventions of the two major parties.

* * *

As regards labor’s role in the elections, the press generally sought to have it appear that labor had made a great effort to elect its own candidates and had sustained a great and irreparable setback.

A sober approach to this question will show that important sections of labor, particularly the C.I.O., and in some cases the A. F. of L. played a most responsible, active and influential role in raising the key war issues and in displaying a high degree of political activity and organization, perhaps more so than in any other previous election.

For instance, in Cleveland, the C.I.O. and the majority of the A. F. of L. organizations played an extremely important role in helping determine the outcome of these highly important elections in which Mayor Lausche, the progressive anti-fascist Roosevelt Democrat, was re-elected by an unprecedented vote; in New Jersey the A. F. of L., C.I.O. and Railroad Brotherhoods formed the A.B.C. Federation and not only mustered a large labor vote, but in Camden elected for the first time three labor candidates to the legislature; while in New York a new relationship of forces has taken place within the City of New York with the election of an influential group of Laborite and Communist Councilmen. (In some respects the New York City elections were practically won in one week in October, when the C.I.O. Council did a vital week’s job of registering the labor and progressive vote. This substantially determined the elections.) As to Detroit, with all the weaknesses and mistakes on the part of labor’s political activity as well as our party’s, organized labor was the single win-the-war force significantly and actively supporting the mayoralty candidacy of Fitzgerald.

However, in respect to labor’s role in these elections, we have to record the following: first, there was the serious and injurious effect of labor’s disunity. For instance, in New York the State A. F. of L. for the first time in its history supported a Republican, Hanley, for
Lieutenant Governor. In San Francisco, labor, especially the A. F. of L., split many ways. And in Detroit, while there was formally a common position of the C.I.O. and most of the A. F. of L., the Teamsters' support of Jeffries played no small role in the outcome.

Secondly, labor's political campaign was in most places narrow and sectarian. Thus, in Detroit, in New Jersey, and in San Francisco labor waged a most narrow campaign for labor's candidates per se, for labor's interest per se, without sufficiently coming forth as the champion of the nation, as an integral part of the broadest coalition of all patriotic forces.

Further, even in many cities where the C.I.O. was very active and where there was a measure of C.I.O.-A. F. of L. unity at the top, there was by and large a serious lack of political organization below, especially in the precincts. Indeed, if this situation is not remedied in the coming spring primaries and in the November elections of 1944, labor's strength will be extremely weakened.

Lastly, as was evidenced especially in New York, New Jersey, Detroit, and San Francisco, labor's ties with the non-labor sections of the population are extremely weak. This is so, not only in respect to the farmers and the middle-class groups generally, but even in regard to civil servants and the professional and white collar workers. And when we take into account the fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there was a decline in labor's pre-election registration and a relatively higher percentage of middle-class votes, certainly this is something that labor has seriously to consider.

An outstanding feature of the recent elections was the positive role of the Negro people, who demonstrated that something new is happening among the Negro population. The elections showed by and large an increased national consciousness, alertness, and political activity on the part of the Negro people. Generally, the Negro people and their organizations played a most progressive and intelligent role.

Thus, in New York, in Harlem, a large percentage of the Negro vote was a conscious progressive vote that was cast for Ben Davis, the Communist, for Councilman; for Judge Rivers, a progressive, win-the-war Republican, for judge; and for Haskell, a Roosevelt Democrat, for Lieutenant Governor. No other section of the population demonstrated such a consistency in splitting the ticket to vote for various win-the-war candidates. There is also much to be learned in regard to the very important role of the Detroit Negro electorate. True, not everywhere was the situation the same. For instance, in Philadelphia, according to rough estimates, 85% of the Negro vote was Republican, which, while helping defeat Bullitt, was not canalized in the progressive direction of voting for the rest of the labor-endorsed candidates.

It is clear that the Negro people and their organizations, particularly in the main industrial centers, are going to exercise an extremely vital role in the 1944 elections, and our party's responsibilities here are great. Also our obligations are...
bound up with new opportunities, because a new political relationship is being forged, not only between the Negro people and progressive labor generally, but likewise between the Negro people and the Communists.

Furthermore, there is the question of the national groups, most of whom played a very important role. For instance, an examination of the Cleveland vote will show that the Czech, the Hungarian, a substantial part of the Polish vote, and the German-American vote were lined up behind the win-the-war camp. In New York, for the first time, there were important regroupings among the Irish voters, as demonstrated particularly in the voting for Quill, who ran on an independent ticket. There was evident a marked growth of anti-fascist unity among the Jewish people, everywhere. Similar progressive trends were evidenced by the Italian voters. All these trends are bound to play a key part in determining the outcome of the 1944 elections.

* * *

Finally, as to the party's role in the November 2 elections. Generally, it can be said, the party came forward as the most consistent win-the-war force, helping to clarify the most vital issues and working for the achievement of the broadest anti-fascist unity. In particular, tribute should be paid to the excellent work and leadership of the New York and Ohio party organizations which, notwithstanding a number of shortcomings and mistakes in the course of the campaign, really gave evidence of exemplary mass leadership.

However, with few exceptions, the party organizations were slow in entering into the election campaigns, in playing that role which was possible both in the selection of candidates acceptable to the broadest alliance of the win-the-war forces and in influencing the key issues on which the elections would be fought on the part of all patriotic forces. This shortcoming was particularly marked in Michigan.

Further, we have to recognize that in Detroit, New Jersey and San Francisco, the party inadvertently contributed to the one-sided nature of labor's campaign. It did not help sufficiently to develop labor's campaign as an organic part of the campaign of national unity and as a broad community effort.

In Philadelphia the party, in some respects, waged a very effective fight against Bullitt, the Municheer, and really contributed to his defeat. But in so doing, it displayed a serious weakness. It waged a one-sided campaign against Bullitt, failing simultaneously to develop a sharp enough struggle against the defeatist forces in the Republican Party, against the Grundy-Pew forces.

In New York, notwithstanding the magnificent and really exemplary work in the Councilmanic elections, the party was very slow in reacting to the Lieutenant Gubernatorial campaign, and played a very unsatisfactory part in the state-wide election. In San Francisco, the party was extremely late in utilizing its maximum influence to stimulate the necessary moves for achieving in time the broadest unity of action of the C.I.O. and the A. F. of L., together with other patriotic forces.
And in Ohio the party gave too little attention to the important elections outside of Cleveland.

Notwithstanding these weaknesses, it must be said that our party was the most clear-sighted force in the elections. It brought forth the most crucial war issues and waged an effective fight against the defeatists. In most cities the party gave a good example of how to combine the struggle around both national and local war issues. This was one of the keys in determining the outcome of the Councilmanic elections in New York, where our candidates not only raised the chief national issues, such as support for the Commander-in-Chief, for the Second Front, for economic stabilization, etc., but combined this with the fight against discrimination in Harlem, for the solution of juvenile delinquency, for price and rent control, for the five-cent fare, etc.

In a number of instances, particularly in New York City and to some extent in the campaign around Arnold Johnson's candidacy in Cleveland, our party not only exhibited its ability to understand and formulate policies, but equally demonstrated its ability to organize shop and house-to-house election work, registration, canvassing, and neighborhood campaigning.

It was not accidental that as a result of its growing mass political influence and its expanding win-the-war activities, our party everywhere multiplied its vote and strengthened its ties with the broad camp of victory.

This is evidenced in the re-election, in Brooklyn, of Peter Caccione, who received the highest first choice vote of any candidate in the entire City of New York, and in the great victory registered in the election of Benjamin J. Davis, Jr. It is seen, too, in Cleveland, where one of the barometers of the effectiveness of the party's mass work was the fact that out of three to be elected Arnold Johnson came in fifth in the elections for Board of Education, with the extremely significant vote of 47,000. New York and Cleveland were not isolated instances in showing in terms of votes the increased strength and influence of the party.

In San Francisco the party vote increased about 25 percent. In Boston it doubled relatively, in comparison with the last elections. While in Detroit the vote for Comrade Beiswenger was a new high point for Michigan, and a real indication of what would have been the result had we organized and conducted a more effective campaign, both as regards the vote of our own candidate and of the entire labor-endorsed slate.

We have to also take into account that more or less everywhere the party candidates in these elections had the support, open and direct, of important sections of labor, C.I.O. and A.F. of L., of certain broad citizens' groups, and particularly of the Negro people and their organizations.

As a result of its increased influence and broader ties, as demonstrated in the elections, new possibilities have now been created to widen the party's influence and its organized base, to enhance the citizenship of the party openly and directly in the trade union move-
ament and in the communities. New opportunities have arisen enabling the party to become fully integrated within the victory coalition and for the party directly to play a more important role in affecting the course of political developments.

These and other lessons of the November 2 elections must be examined further and the conclusions drawn by the party, by the labor movement, and by all progressive forces, especially now as the country becomes more deeply involved in preparing for the crucial 1944 Presidential and Congressional elections.

III

Clearly the Nov. 2 elections must serve as a timely signal and warning to labor and the win-the-war forces in both major parties as to the enormousness of the tasks ahead. They signalize some of the complex problems requiring bold leadership and new efforts on the part of all responsible leaders and patriotic groups in order to achieve broader and firmer national unity. They emphasize the need for developing the widest unity of action on the part of labor, for checking and ending narrow and unprincipled politics-as-usual, all partisan strife. Everything, including the conduct of the election campaign, should be geared to ensure the most vigorous prosecution of the war, and, hence, speediest fulfillment of the Moscow Conference decisions.

At the same time, the uneven and generally unfavorable results of the November 2 elections, as well as the seriousness and the severe nature of the struggle against the defeatists and appeasers, should not be allowed to obscure the favorable factors in the present situation. Existing difficulties must not be allowed to blur the main trends and new realignments which are now unfolding and which are bringing new strength and creating new opportunities for the anti-Hitler coalition within the country, for solving the current win-the-war tasks, for hastening military victory over Hitler and the Axis, and for ensuring victory for the anti-fascist camp in the 1944 elections.

Among these events, factors and forces are the following:

First, of course, are the profound effects of the course of the war and the successful outcome of the Moscow Conference, which is strengthening the camp of national unity, creating a new political consciousness among millions, and weakening the position of the defeatists both within the Republican and Democratic Parties.

Secondly, the strengthened position of the Roosevelt Administration as a result of its anti-Hitler war program and its contributions to the Moscow Conference.

Thirdly, the growing political maturity of labor and its increased political strength, as exemplified in the outcome of the national C.I.O. Convention, as well as in the growth of labor's independent and united political strength and activities in a whole series of states and cities.

Fourthly, the trend toward improved relations between the Roosevelt Administration and labor, arising from the progressive policy of the C.I.O., which in turn is augmented by the strengthened posi-
tion of labor within the Roosevelt-Democratic-labor coalition; as well as from the latest moves of the Administration to fight more energetically for its economic stabilization program and its apparent inclination now to overhaul its wage policy.

Fifthly, the increased political consciousness and activities of the Negro people, and the firmer relations now being established between the Negro people and the C.I.O., as well as with the Communists.

Furthermore, with the prospects of heavier fighting in which our armed forces will shortly engage, there is bound to mature rapidly a heightened patriotism and war consciousness. There will be greater clarity as to the damaging and treasonable role of the defeatists and obstructionists, as well as greater resistance to their disastrous policies. Inevitably, increased opposition will be developed to partisan conflicts, just as a new spirit of national unity will unfold to accelerate victory and help guarantee a just and durable peace.

All of this of course will not take place spontaneously. Firm and resolute leadership, unity and organization are required from labor and our party, as well as from all other patriotic leaders and groups.

What, then, are some of the key tasks confronting labor and the Communists in order to consolidate national unity to prosecute the war more effectively and to secure victory in the 1944 elections?

Foremost among these are the following: New efforts and a fresh and bolder approach must now be made to broadening and solidifying national unity around the Commander-in-Chief and the government's war policies, as well as to its progressive approach to many post-war problems concerning international collaboration, soldier rehabilitation, and social security.

This means to enlist the widest and most active public backing everywhere, including the A. F. of L. and in the Republican Party, in active support of the Moscow agreements and the policies and commitments of our government in helping to effect and to carry out these historic decisions. This support requires, not formal endorsements of the Moscow declarations, but concrete support for all the government's win-the-war measures, especially for speeding the fulfillment of its decision to hasten the opening of the Second Front.

This means to open and conduct a renewed and more skillful fight against the defeatists and all conciliators of appeasement and reaction within Congress, within the government apparatus, within both major parties, and within the labor movement.

Here, the lead given by Ickes on November 8 in his speech at the Madison Square Garden meeting, in sharpening the fight against the Hearst-Patterson-McCormick Axis press, and against all other saboteurs of Soviet-American friendship and collaboration, should be resolutely taken up throughout the country.

This also means that it is necessary to give a stern rebuff to all those who are jockeying for partisan advantage, to those who are try-
ing to use the strains in our war economy for gain and who are trying to exploit internal and external difficulties in an attempt to undermine and eliminate our Commander-in-Chief and his governmental supporters.

Such unprincipled attacks against the President as launched even by Wendell Willkie in St. Louis must be sharply rejected. Willkie must be influenced to use his talents and prestige to wage a more consistent struggle against the defeatists, particularly within the Republican Party, and to cooperate with the Commander-in-Chief on those issues of foreign policy and international relations on which they both agree.

This means further that it is necessary to organize a more effective political-military and economic questions, particularly on the pressing problems of the home front. And here, greater attention must now be given to effect economic stabilization on a new and realistic basis by influencing the government and by compelling Congress to adopt a more flexible and equitable wage policy, and to enact a progressive tax and subsidy program.

Moreover, the whole problem of strengthening national unity also means that it is necessary to work to extend and weld still more strongly the cooperation between Roosevelt and labor, to augment labor's support for the Commander-in-Chief and its activities for constructively influencing governmental policy.

In this new stage of the war, with the problems of forging greater and firmer national unity, the cardinal task, the need to develop still further the common action of labor, of Communists and non-Communists, of the A. F. of L., the C.I.O., and the Railroad Brotherhoods, this becomes ever more urgent and decisive. It is not necessary here to enumerate the many experiences, the new opportunities and a host of tasks which this entails, particularly in relation to achieving far greater labor cooperation around key Congressional and other political issues, since these questions are pretty well established in our thinking, in our orientation and in our work.

However, a few points need to be emphasized. Serious attention must now be given to popularize widely the actions and the program of the great national C.I.O. Convention in both labor and non-labor circles, especially its decisions on labor's political action. Together with this it is necessary to effect a mobilization of all of the C.I.O. affiliates, of the entire C.I.O. membership and the friends of the C.I.O., to speed the realization of the highly significant win-the-war program which was adopted. In so doing, it is essential to achieve a still higher degree of unity within the C.I.O. and within the labor movement around the main points of the C.I.O.'s program.

Secondly, in regard to the A. F. of L., it is necessary to state that, in a number of respects, what happens in the A. F. of L., what the A. F. of L. organizations and members do in the coming months, will be extraordinarily important in deter-
mining the outcome of the 1944 elections and in attaining a new stage of national unity. What is now required is a more persistent effort to organize the progressive and the broad win-the-war forces within the A. F. of L., and to speed the establishment of united labor political and legislative action in the states and localities.

In this conjunction, it is essential to give far more consideration to organizing progressive political action within and through the A. F. of L. For the establishment of joint labor action, while advancing, is moving far too slowly, and much can be done to accelerate the process of united action with the C.I.O., and to effect a new realignment within the A. F. of L., by stimulating and organizing political activities by and around the A. F. of L., parallel with and along common lines with the C.I.O.

What is especially required in regard to the A. F. of L. is a fresh and bold effort in the light of the new political developments, so as to reach, influence and activate the majority of the national, state and local leaders and organizations of the A. F. of L. It is essential to work with the orientation of trying to change the course, yes, of the A. F. of L. Executive Council itself, as well as the national executives of most of the unions. This means to work to change the course of the A. F. of L. on the basis of mustering more active support for the Commander-in-Chief, of reacting to vital legislative issues, of securing wide endorsement and energetic support for the Moscow decisions, of working for the participation of the A. F. of L. in the forthcoming International Trade Union Conference in London, and of giving concrete leadership to solving the economic problems confronting the A. F. of L. workers.

We on our part must not let previous attitudes, former relations, prejudices or old obstacles stand in the way of facilitating and helping crystallize the process of regrouping that is maturing in the A. F. of L. For this is a process which will now move faster on the basis of the results of the Moscow Agreements and the firmer unity established within the American-Soviet-British coalition.

In developing labor's independent and united political action, obviously this must be approached from the viewpoint of strengthening labor's political role and influence within the entire anti-Hitler camp, and from the angle of labor's coming forward ever more as the champion of the national war effort and the national interests of the American people. Working in this way, approaching, for instance, all problems of wage and economic stabilization as problems of the national welfare, of war production and of expediting victory, labor can and will quickly bring about a new and more favorable relationship between the trade union movement and all other patriotic forces.

This is especially urgent in connection with the need of effecting a rapid and decisive change in the approach of the trade unions to the special demands and problems of the farmers, and for bringing about far greater farmer-labor political cooperation in the coming elections.
The inroads which the reactionaries, especially Republicans, have made in the rural areas in demagogically confusing issues, in stirring up anti-labor and anti-Administration sentiment, is a challenge to labor and the Roosevelt forces. It is really imperative for labor to systematically work to alter this situation, to finally reach and mobilize all patriotic farm leaders and groups on common national win-the-war issues and on the basis of actively supporting specific demands of the farmers, especially those relating to promoting expanded food production and economic security.

Furthermore, in promoting labor's political action, far greater concern must be given to organizing labor's political strength, not only directly through the unions and the shop steward system, but particularly in the communities and the wards. For, without such organization for registration, for campaigning, for house-to-house canvassing, for bringing out the vote, labor's political influence and activities will be restricted; its ties with its fellow-citizens, with the non-labor sectors of the population, will be limited, and its political activity will inevitably tend to develop narrowly and one-sidedly.

* * *

Finally, it is necessary for labor to review and to reinforce the popular movement for a fourth term. It is especially necessary to do this because, first, it is high time to understand that it is by no means certain that the President will run for re-election. Secondly, because in some progressive and labor circles, among certain forces and leaders who basically support the President and the Administration, and without question will do so in 1944, an attitude is developing that it may be "smart politics" to withhold a fourth term endorsement at this stage, on the assumption of bringing more pressure on the Administration, especially at this particular moment, in relation to certain domestic policies.

As to the first question, it should be realized that the President may not run for re-election if there is not overwhelming support from the ranks of labor and elsewhere throughout the nation. And those win-the-war liberal and labor leaders who are hesitant to speak out on this vital issue should begin to ask themselves what would happen if Roosevelt were not re-nominated. Aside from the possible serious effect on our foreign policy and relations, what would the alternative be?

In the Democratic Party, the alternative would not be a Wallace, but some candidate acceptable to all sections of the Democratic Party, including the Southern Bourbons. In other words, a compromise candidate, a candidate who would be destined most probably to carry the Democratic Party and labor to electoral defeat.

Within the Republican Party, if Roosevelt were not renominated, the Presidential nominee would not be Mr. Willkie. It would be a Dewey or a Bricker. For Willkie's chance of securing the Republican nomination rests solely on the possibility of the President being the candidate of the Democratic Party.
And within the labor movement, if the President were not renominated, it is quite possible that there would quickly develop greater division than exists today, with all the harmful consequences.

These are very serious questions that should enter into our thinking, and into the thinking of all responsible labor and progressive leaders.

As to the second question, namely, the idea of withholding support for a fourth term in order to pressure the Administration for the purpose of rectifying some of its weaknesses as well as mistakes. This is a specious and a dangerous course. Generally speaking, it is inadvisable to threaten an ally, a collaborator, even though it often may be necessary to influence one's ally so as to affect or to change some aspects of his policy. But in the given situation, a tactic of threatening the President with the club of withholding the fourth term endorsement could be very harmful, for it plays into the hands of the defeatists and reactionaries who are attacking our Commander-in-Chief. Such a tactic, as pursued, for instance, by the Reuthers at the recent U.A.W. convention, tends to sow confusion in labor's ranks and feeds the demagogy and the activity of the John L. Lewis crowd.

Moreover, it does not contribute to convincing Roosevelt that he should and must run as the foremost and most acceptable anti-Axis candidate around whom the broadest national unity can be achieved. Labor's and the people's support for a fourth term for the President must now become firmer, more insistent, and widespread. It must be developed as an organic part of labor's support for the Commander-in-Chief, for a continuation of the Roosevelt Government's war program, its anti-Hitlerite orientation and policies.

That criticism which labor must and should make of specific weaknesses and shortcomings in the actions of the President, and especially of his Administration, should be made from the viewpoint of constructively criticizing, influencing and implementing the government's victory and anti-Axis policies, of overcoming its vacillations and delays, and of strengthening its hand against the appeasers and reactionaries. Justified criticism of our war government must not be confused with making threats or conditional endorsements on the fourth term question. The post of President and Commander-in-Chief of the United States in this people's war of national liberation is too vital and fateful to the course of victory and the future of America and the world to permit any error or light-mindedness on the fourth term issue.

Therefore, as this country enters this, the most decisive and final stage of the war, labor in its majority considers that it becomes more and and not less urgent to expand the fourth term movement within the ranks of labor, within the Democratic Party, in farm groups, among the organizations of the Negro people, among civic leaders, everywhere. But in doing this, it is necessary to explain the issues at stake; to overcome, patiently yet firmly, any tendencies of honest and progressive forces to waver on this question, and not let this issue
weaken the unity of the progressive labor movement.

In this connection, all of labor should now give the most careful attention to, and in collaboration with other win-the-war forces, really organize to participate in the forthcoming Presidential primaries for the selection of delegates to the national nominating conventions. Likewise, in unison with all other win-the-war forces, it should participate in and take up in time the selection and nomination of Senatorial, Gubernatorial, and Congressional candidates, pledged to unequivocal support of the Commander-in-Chief and the nation’s war policies.

Undoubtedly, to the extent that the fourth term movement will continue to unfold and be strengthened, it will be easier to rally new strength behind the government’s war program, to hasten the realization of the Moscow Conference decisions, to further consolidate national unity, to strengthen the coalition between labor and the Roosevelt Administration, and at the same time to further unify labor’s ranks and enhance its own independent role and activities.

* * *

Unquestionably we Communists have a special role to perform, now as always, in realizing the objectives and tasks here outlined. We are particularly called upon to continue to raise and clarify more concretely and widely, all vital war and post-war issues, and to help show the way ahead.

We are called upon to display increasing political alertness and initiative, and to further strengthen our party politically and organizationally. As Comrade Browder has counseled, we must come forward ever more effectively as the most resolute organizers of national unity especially in our mass work, in the 1944 election campaign, nationally and in the communities, neighborhoods, and the precincts.

We Communists are further called upon in this situation, as victory draws nearer, vigilantly to combat all tendencies toward complacency in the labor and people’s movements. For now, as the anti-Hitler coalition enters the final but severe stage of the war against Nazi Germany, as American and British troops will soon participate in their most costly and crucial battles, we must rouse labor and the nation to new feats of war endeavor. Particularly we must furnish to the American working class and the people as a whole an example of tempo and speed by the way we measure up to the situation, by the way we help solve all tasks confronting labor and the nation.

For now, what the attainment of victory particularly requires, what our nation requires, what the anti-Hitler coalition requires, is tempo, speed. Speed in carrying through the Moscow Conference agreements, especially for effectuating immediately and fully, in the words of the Tri-Power communiqué, “closest military cooperation.” Tempo in fortifying the anti-fascist unity of our nation, in redoubling every phase of our national war effort.
THE NEW YORK CITY ELECTIONS

BY GILBERT GREEN

(A speech delivered to party workers at Manhattan Center, New York, November 15, 1943.)

COMRADES: The November 2 elections hold great lessons for our party, for the labor movement and for all who place victory in the war above all other considerations.

November 2 was a day of great achievement for the patriotic forces of New York City. But our exhilaration over the outcome of the Councilmanic race must not lead to intoxication. We must not forget that the 320,000 plurality given General Haskell in the City of New York was insufficient to stem the Republican avalanche that rolled down from the upstate counties, electing Dewey’s man Hanley as the Lieutenant-Governor of the Empire State.

Both the victories and the defeats must be examined soberly if we are to extract from them those lessons that will make possible a victory for the policies and candidates supporting our Commander-in-Chief in the crucial Presidential and Congressional elections of 1944.

The lesson that Haskell could have been elected and that the Republican victories scored this year can be reversed next year is to be drawn from the results of the Councilmanic elections in this city.

In these elections the voters generally showed a high degree of political awareness. They consciously supported those candidates, irrespective of party label, who symbolized the fight for unity and victory. Of course, not a few old party wheelhorses were returned to the Council. But in the main the machine-picked candidates were roundly rebuffed. Even those who were re-elected were returned to office with the smallest popular vote of their careers.

The new mood of the electorate can be seen in the great popular tribute paid Stanley Isaacs by the voters of Manhattan. Two years ago Isaacs was dumped by the leadership of the Republican Party because of his consistent and courageous defense of democracy during the days of the anti-Gerson witch-hunt. This year Isaacs received 83,000 votes, the largest total popular vote of any candidate in the city.

In Manhattan this rising political awareness is especially expressed in the victory of our own Benjamin
J. Davis, Jr., as successor to that fighting progressive, Rev. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., who will seek a Congressional seat from Harlem in 1944. The election of Ben Davis is a great victory for national unity. It is a tribute in the first place to the growing political consciousness and unity of the great Negro people. It is a tribute also to the large numbers of white progressives without whom this victory could not have been possible. The election of Ben Davis this year, following the election of Powell two years ago, bids fair that there will never again be a City Council in New York that does not contain at least one representative of the Negro people.

Brooklyn two years ago made history when it elected the first Communist Councilman, Peter V. Caccione. This year Brooklyn did more than merely repeat history. It gave Pete the largest first choice vote of any candidate in the city—53,545, and a total, with second choices, of 68,836. This compares with 34,657 first choice votes two years ago and a total final vote of 48,536.

The same trend was apparent in the Bronx. Michael J. Quill, fighting leader of the transport workers, received 47,600 first choice votes—more than any other candidate in his borough. In the Bronx, the two reactionary Red-baiting Democrats, Joseph Kinsley and Louis Cohen, went down to defeat.

In the Councilmanic elections our party scored a great advance of far-reaching consequence. If correctly appraised and followed up, it may well mark the turning point in the relationship of our party to the main forces in American political life—the beginning of full integration of our party in the camp of national unity.

The candidates of our party polled the largest vote in our history in New York City—a total of 106,438 first choice votes. This, despite the fact that in the Bronx our candidate, Isidore Begun, did not register his full strength, much of his vote being absorbed by candidate Quill.

In Queens, even though we did not elect a Councilman, our candidate Paul Crosbie increased his vote by more than 33 per cent, from 3,948 in 1941 to 5,249 in 1943.

It is important to note that the larger party vote was not obtained at the expense of the American Labor Party. In Manhattan, A.L.P.-er Eugene Connolly increased his first-choice vote from 17,967 two years ago to 29,850 this year. The combined party and Left-wing labor candidates polled a total of 211,371 first choice votes. When to this are added the Queens and the Right-wing labor candidates in Brooklyn, Manhattan and the Bronx, there is a grand total of 329,714 first choice votes cast for labor candidates throughout the city.

If the official A.L.P. representation in the new Council has been reduced, it is not therefore due to the fact that too few votes were cast for labor candidates, nor is it the fault of Proportional Representation. It is only due to the failure to achieve unity in the ranks of the A.L.P. Had there been such unity, at least two more A.L.P. candidates would have been elected on the
basis of the actual votes cast. This was obviously the case in Brooklyn.

Think, comrades, what the political situation in New York City would be if there were unity in the ranks of the American Labor Party. This would not represent a mere arithmetical addition of so-called Right and Left votes. It would represent a qualitative change and like an irresistible magnet would draw to the A.L.P. tens of thousands of new voters who today remain repulsed by the internecine warfare in labor's political camp.

The need for unity in the A.L.P. is therefore one of the main lessons to be drawn from this election, especially in view of the bigger political battle looming for 1944. Let us hope that the gentlemen at the helm of the state A.L.P. will draw this lesson, will not permit their factional bias and blindness to stand in the way of building this great political arm of labor.

For some time now the state leadership of the A.L.P. has rejected the Hillman proposals for the unification of the New York labor party. They have argued that labor unions cannot deliver votes on election day and that the Left Wing is a negligible factor in New York politics. Victor Riesel, Labor Editor of the New York Post and one of Dubinsky's sidekicks, wrote before the final returns were in that the A.L.P. state leaders were looking to the Council elections to confirm their claims. These are the exact words he used. I quote from the New York Post of November 5:

"A.L.P. men are now waiting for the City Council vote tabulation to indicate the votes the local C.I.O. Council was able to deliver to energetic campaigners such as Mike Quill, and the Brooklyn Left-wing nominees. If these candidates are elected or roll up sizable votes the A.L.P. leaders will be proven wrong in their estimate of their opposition's strength."

That they have been proven wrong goes without saying; but I am afraid these gentlemen do not have the courage to admit it. For suddenly this afternoon the New York Post blossomed forth with a special editorial and a feature article by Mr. Riesel—calling for unity in the A.L.P.? Oh, no! They call for the abolition of Proportional Representation!

Ten days ago Mr. Riesel admitted that a large vote for the C.I.O.-endorsed candidates would prove the A.L.P. leadership wrong in its estimate. Now that the large vote has been recorded, Proportional Representation is to blame—for how could David Dubinsky ever be wrong! Such is the integrity of these people.

* * *

To what can the victories in the Councilmanic elections be credited?

First, they must be credited to the impact of world events, which like a huge juggernaut are smashing through the long-erected Chinese wall of lies and prejudices. The old machine politicians and their Red-baiting Social-Democratic cronies can only explain what happened in mumbo-jumbo double-talk. They
conveniently forget that New York is still part of the world and is still influenced by the logic of world events. Like the old Kansas farmer, they asked the cyclone to go around their barn. But it didn't! The Red bogey is not yet dead; but it is rapidly dying, and on our part we wish it godspeed.

A second factor of great importance in this victory is the quality of the candidates put forth, their records and the crusading fashion in which they brought the major issues of the day to the people. These candidates came out of their corners swinging both fists, landing uppercuts to the jaw of their opponent instead of gentle slaps on the wrist. They minced no words as to where they stood on the war and the President's program. They fought against every form of discrimination and race prejudice, against high prices and war profiteering. They pointed to the record of the present City Council and exposed those Councilmen who have been doing everything in their power to weaken the foreign and domestic policies of the Commander-in-Chief.

Compare this with the artful dodging of issues that typified the official Democratic Party campaign for Haskell. One would think they were participating in a Viennese waltz instead of a political battle of first magnitude.

Our enemies have in recent days paid high tribute to our ability to organize. Yes, our success is indeed greatly due to good organization. But one cannot separate politics from organization. It was the kind of political fight that the progressive labor movement conducted that made possible the highest degree of organization, because it aroused the voters, mobilized their most advanced sections and raised the whole campaign to the level of a crusade.

The third reason for these victories is that the progressive candidates did not place their dependence upon the old corrupt political machines. They placed their reliance in the first place on the people and built their own special electoral machinery. Stanley Isaacs received the Republican designation this year, but to the Republican Party does not go the credit for his victory. The same is true of Genevieve Earle in Brooklyn. As for Michael Quill, the progressive labor movement built its own election machinery for him. Our party candidates, of course, had the party behind them at all times, but, in addition to our party, very effective non-partisan committees were established that did heroic work. Likewise, our party campaigned, not exclusively for its own candidates, but for the victory of all win-the-war candidates.

Compare this with the position that Haskell was in. A novice at politics, poor soul, he placed himself at the tender mercy of James Aloysius Farley. Jim, on the other hand, reciprocated by conducting the kind of campaign that would not have elected a dog-catcher in Kalamazoo, let alone a Lieutenant-Governor in the State of New York.

But Jim is not only guilty of omission; for whatever may be said about him, no one has ever called
him slovenly or lazy. Jim had an objective. It was to defeat Haskell—and he succeeded. Haskell was betrayed by the Democratic Party machine at every turn. This can be seen in Queens. The Democrats there piled up a lead of about 25,000 for their Councilmanic candidates, and yet Hanley, the Republican, carried the borough by 23,500! That is how the Queens Democratic machine got out the vote for Haskell—in reverse.

Between Jim Farley's stiletto and Mike Kennedy's Costello, Haskell didn't have a chance.

An important lesson from the third reason for the victories therefore emerges: the need for a complete regeneration of the Democratic Party in the state. The time has come for all the true Roosevelt supporters in the Democratic Party to clean house. The paralyzing grip of Jim Farley must be broken! The corrupt machines must be smashed! Without these there is grave danger that the President will be betrayed in his own party next year.

Side by side with the need for cleansing the Democratic Party, is that of labor building its own independent political machinery. What the New York City C.I.O. Council and unions so brilliantly accomplished this year must become the property of the entire labor movement. The C.I.O. Council by its work has once and for all belied the claim that trade unions cannot enter the political arena with success. Imagine what can be done next year if all sections of the C.I.O. and all sections of the labor movement in our city and state participate in the elections in the same way!

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What, comrades, is the special meaning of the large party vote?

We must answer this question soberly, modestly and objectively. Failure to do so will only lay us open to new dangers. It will repulse and drive away the thousands who voted for our candidates precisely because they saw in them not petty partisans, but champions and symbols of unity. It will frighten many of our friends. It will feed the reactionaries, who are swiftly recovering from their state of shellshock and opening their big guns to destroy Proportional Representation and to weaken and damage the growing prestige of our party in the eyes of the people of this city.

To understand why we got the large vote and what it represents, let me take a few moments to trace the background of our most dramatic victory, that of Ben Davis.

Two years ago we were among the first to support the Rev. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., for the City Council. This year we favored the unity of all the Negro people and white progressives around another unity representative of the Negro people. We did not rush to nominate Ben Davis. We were ready and anxious to support the Negro candidate who could best achieve the broadest unity of the win-the-war forces around his personality. Powell was urged to run. When he declined, we were ready to support Channing Tobias, who had been
given the nomination by the Republican Party. But at the eleventh hour he too, withdrew. It was then that the white Communist candidate, Carl Brodsky, breaking all tradition, withdrew in order to enable Ben Davis to make the race.

It is obvious, therefore, that when Ben Davis became the candidate it was already apparent to all that this was no attempt on the part of the Communist Party to seek partisan advantage. With no other prominent Negro leader in the field, Ben Davis carried the ball, plunging through to a touchdown. But Ben and our party made the run as part of a unity team. Ben's victory is therefore a victory of that team as a whole.

Without this consistent record of fighting for unity, Ben Davis, the Communist, could not have become the candidate that united the Negro people and a good portion of labor and white progressives.

The same could be said of the other candidates. The people saw in our candidates the best fighters for victory and for the unity necessary to achieve victory. It is in this field of struggle for anti-fascist peoples' unity that our party has made the greatest name for itself in the past year. We helped to forge the unity of the great Negro people which found its high expression in the outpouring of Negro and white masses to the historic June 7 Madison Square Garden Rally. We helped to build the unity of the Jewish people and contributed to the success of that great outpouring to greet Mikhoels and Feffer at the Polo Grounds. We have consistently fought for Italian-American unity. We have consistently fought for labor unity and for a united American Labor Party. All these great struggles left their imprint on the people of this city. They all played their part in making our victory possible.

That is why our candidates were endorsed by dozens of labor and people's organizations. Comrades Cacchione and Davis received the unanimous endorsement of the C.I.O. Council. They were also endorsed by A. F. of L. unions, by church organizations, by fraternal societies, by women's clubs and even by small-businessmen's groups.

We can therefore summarize this point by saying that the large vote given our candidates was not a vote for the party, per se. It was not a vote of Communists for Communism. It was a vote of the most progressive section of the electorate for anti-fascist unity—for the Communist policy and fight for unity—and for the inclusion of Communists as equal members in the camp of national unity.

This is the special meaning of our vote. Let us be sure that in the days ahead we do nothing to mar the record of our party as the selfless champion of the anti-fascist unity of the American people.

Of course, the vote did not come of itself. You comrades know that. It had to be fought for, organized, delivered on election day and protected after election day. Our party did a magnificent job. I want to take this opportunity—in the name of our State Committee, to pay tribute to each and every one of you,
and to the thousands and thousands of our comrades who are not here tonight. I want to pay tribute to those comrades who helped guarantee the registration, to those who climbed stairs every evening after long hours of work, to those who unstintingly gave of their Saturdays and Sundays, to those who worked among their fellow workers on the job and in their unions, to those who did the thankless clerical work—the addressing of envelopes and the licking of postage stamps.

To you comrades, and to our splendid candidates, belongs the real credit for this victory.

This year we learned from our mistakes of a year ago. We were better organized. We concentrated our efforts. We were closer to the people. Our literature was concrete, simple and interesting.

Our enemies cannot understand our party. They do not know what it means to have thousands of workers give freely of their time and energy without expecting monetary remuneration. One Manhattan politician told a comrade in the armory at which the vote was being counted, that Ben Davis must have spent $10,000 on election day alone. Little did he realize that it is highly possible that not $10 was spent on that day because our watchers gave of their time for a noble cause and not for a few paltry dollars.

I want to pay special tribute to the *Daily Worker* and *The Worker*, without which we could not have mobilized our own forces, let alone others. The *Daily Worker* was not only an agitator and propagandist; it was an organizer of the highest quality; and it is only fitting that we should let the editorial staff of the *Daily Worker* know how much we appreciate the job done.

* * *

Comrades, the electoral victory has altered the relationship of political forces in our city. It has opened up new perspectives and opportunities for our party; it has also brought in its wake added responsibilities and dangers.

The eyes of the city will be upon us—also the eyes of the nation. This is the only city in the country in which two Communists hold elected public posts.

We must not only continue but intensify our efforts for the unity of the American people behind our Commander-in-Chief. We must press for international trade union unity to parallel the unity of the United Nations. We must press for the adoption of the Marcantonio Anti-Poll Tax Bill, which the reactionaries in the Senate intend either to filibuster or to emasculate. We must rally the people for the subsidy program of the President as the means by which to establish the unity of the workers, middle classes and farmers against the price boosting monopolies and war profiteers. We must in everything we do realize that the 1944 election struggle has already begun and that the labor and progressive forces cannot wait a single day before they organize and prepare for that showdown.

For our party this means raising our sights all along the line. We must aim at greater objectives and
score better hits. But we must do this without being ostentatious; without crowing. We must work more modestly than ever before. We must not forget that while we have left the bush league, we are not yet in the major league.

There is a new spirit in the party; a renewed confidence in its policies and leadership; a greater confidence in the masses. Our party must not rest on its laurels. It must throw aside all slovenly methods of work. It must rise to new heights, comparable with its new responsibilities.

Comrades, these are some of the conclusions that can be drawn from the November 2 elections in our city. You have proven that it can be done. Let us make November 2 only a beginning. Let us fulfill our new great responsibilities in the spirit of the decisions of the historic Moscow Conference whose speedy execution will hasten victory in the war and a better day for world mankind.
SOME LESSONS OF THE CLEVELAND ELECTIONS

BY ARNOLD JOHNSON

“WHAT do we gain if we save the city’s peacetime services and lose the nation in war? Unity to win the war quickly is the issue in this election.” This was the central theme emphasized by Mayor Frank Lausche in the Cleveland election campaign. He won 71 percent of the votes on November 2, the greatest proportion of the vote ever received by a Cleveland mayoralty candidate. Lausche received 113,032 votes and his Republican opponent, Edward Stanton, 49,954. Lausche won in thirty-two of the thirty-three wards. The Democrats won eighteen Council seats, and for the first time in thirty years they have the majority. Republicans have fifteen seats.

Every Lausche speech was dedicated to victory. Acknowledging his victory over the radio, he advanced the call for unity of all Clevelanders, regardless of race, color, class, nationality or political belief, to make Cleveland the outstanding city in the nation’s war effort. His discussion of local services was always in relation to the war. Health, housing, recreation, transportation, the need of greater price control, the smashing of black markets, and the overcoming of juvenile delinquency were related to the solution of manpower, production, civilian defense, war bonds, and war activities. Lausche discussed Cleveland, the nation, and the United Nations. He spoke about our boys in Italy and the South Pacific, about Stalingrad and the glorious Soviet Army offensive. His main campaign slogan was: “He serves his party best who serves his country best.”

Stanton campaigned on sewage, garbage, and peacetime services; he played on prejudices and tried to attack Lausche personally. He used the old tricks which made him known as a candidate that never lost an election. Lausche refused to be provoked or to lower the level of his campaign. He held that the greatest service to the people of Cleveland was the contribution to the nation’s war effort. He put first things first. In many speeches he never even talked about himself or his opponent. He praised the city labor-management war production committee which changed Cleveland from most strikes to the fewest. He called for unity of Negro and white voters to elect Republican Judge Perry Jackson, the only Negro
judge in Ohio. He spoke out against all forms of anti-Semitism. He received the support of the twenty-eight nationality newspapers of Cleveland, as well as of the three main city newspapers. While he had the formal endorsement of the Democratic Party machine, he did not depend on it. The Mayor had his own independent organization which united and worked with all win-the-war forces, including Democrats, Republicans, Communists and independents. Among these forces, he placed his main reliance on labor and the nationality groups, uniting them with all other sections of the population. Thus, the first lesson from this campaign was the tie-up of the mayor's job to the war effort in support of President Roosevelt. Lausche used his campaign to help mobilize the voters of Cleveland for the war.

In its content and conduct it was a unifying campaign. Stanton's campaign in content and conduct followed the national Republican policy of placing narrow partisan interests above national and war interests. Such a campaign disrupts national unity and hampers the war effort, giving a base for the defeatists and strength to the pro-Hitlerites. Had Stanton made open declarations against the Administration in Washington, he would have received even fewer votes. Every criticism which he made against Lausche's war activities brought condemnation and sent honest Republican votes to Lausche. More and more people began to see that the greatest unity around the Roosevelt win-the-war program as expressed locally by Lausche is the road to victory.

The Cleveland elections immediately point to 1944, not only in their results, but also in the lessons. Certainly, the policies of Taft and Bricker were decisively defeated. Republicans had urged Governor Bricker to come to Cleveland to help Stanton. The Governor did not want to put himself to the test and stayed out of Cleveland. With Bricker throwing his hat into the Presidential ring, the Republican Cleveland News greets this by comparing his chances to Warren G. Harding! Taft also stayed out and did not dare to put his defeatist program to a test. By fully learning the lessons of the Cleveland elections, the prospects are not only to give Ohio's support to Roosevelt, but also to get rid of Taft and Bricker.

Labor's Decisive Role

A second feature of the campaign was the mobilization of labor for the Mayor, especially in the last days when trade unions issued special leaflets, made radio broadcasts, and began to be active. Originally there was the prospect of united labor political action. As long as this possibility existed, labor marked time with unofficial discussions. Then a minority of A. F. of L. leaders, particularly of the building trades, who were supporters of Stanton, succeeded in keeping the A. F. of L. central body from making any indorsement and thus kept the joint committee of A. F. of L., C.I.O. and Railroad Brotherhoods from acting.

Without jeopardizing the unity of
the joint committee, which was organized mainly for 1944 elections in support of Roosevelt, the C.I.O. central body unanimously endorsed Lausche. When the Building Trades business agents openly endorsed Stanton and thus tried to pit the A. F. of L. against the C.I.O. and split the joint committee, then the powerful Machinists District Council, the Painters District Council, and the Joint Board of the I.L.G.W.U. immediately endorsed Lausche, and other A. F. of L. leaders became active in his behalf. Thus, the main forces of labor campaigned for Lausche. A small group of A. F. of L. leaders hindered joint political action by utilizing the fact that the Mayor had refused certain wage increases and had made a hurried and unfortunate decision on transit fares. However, labor saw the main issues on November 2 and was not diverted by those who tried to create confusion.

Defeatist forces outside labor's ranks sought to neutralize labor and thus keep the vote down and increase Stanton's chances. Only when the labor forces became aware of this tactic did they mobilize the vote for Lausche. Complacency and over-confidence in even the more limited and politically advanced circles had to be overcome. Labor increased its activity as it became evident that the regular Democratic machine was giving only nominal support. Had labor fully realized its responsibility earlier in the campaign, the actual vote could have been greatly increased and the Lausche majority would have been even more impressive. Only 49 percent of the registered voters went to the polls, and only 65 percent of the possible voters registered. Had the Mayor spoken out more concretely on the Federal tax program and mobilized the electorate against Taft's sales tax, had he strengthened his position for the roll-back in prices, as well as other war economy issues, larger sections of the population would have voted.

Actually, labor's joint political action committees in its campaigns on issues such as roll-back of prices, a correct tax program, and passage of the Anti-Poll Tax Bill, as well as its campaign for registration, during the previous months, had so strengthened the political thinking of labor that the trade union members were alert to the issues and went to the polls and voted for the win-the-war mayor. Unfortunately, labor's joint committee failed to function organizationally in the Mayor's campaign. Had it done so, it could have established in many new wards and precincts the joint political action committees. The present ward committees could have been greatly strengthened. Thus, labor would now have been in a far better position for the crucial 1944 elections. Fortunately, labor's joint committee did not break up, despite various newspaper provocations, and is now proceeding with activities and organizational work.

From this campaign, labor must learn the lesson that the elections are part of the war effort. Elections determine the course of the war and the future of labor and the nation. On this basis, labor unity is imperative. Labor must not only unite its
own ranks, but must exercise its unifying role in relation to all other win-the-war forces, and undertake concrete practical work to this end.

In making preparations for 1944, labor cannot afford to lose time or to pursue any narrow organizational policies. In Ohio registration is now on the order of the day. Every union would do well to establish special registration committees and undertake methods to dramatize the registration of members. Every union could well set an early date by which time the entire membership is registered and broken down into wards and precincts. The joint political action committees should be fully established so as to function on a mass scale in the wards and precincts and, together with other win-the-war forces, conduct campaigns on war issues in the wards or on a Congressional or city basis. Only then will labor avoid confusion on minor issues and put first things first for 1944. The May primaries, which involve every post from precinct committeeman to the President, will soon be here. Everything is at stake on the outcome of the 1944 elections.

**New Trends Among the Negro People**

A third important feature of the elections is the development among the Negro people. While Cleveland re-elected three Negro Republican Councilmen and elected a Negro to the Board of Education, it was most regrettable and unfortunate that Judge Perry Jackson, an outstanding Negro Republican, who received 52,024 votes, was not returned to office. The campaign of Perry Jackson was one of the broadest in the city and united all sections of the population in endorsements. Judge Jackson publicly expressed his appreciation of the support of Republicans, Democrats, Communists and all others.

Why was he defeated?

The vast number of endorsements gave a certain overconfidence to the Jackson campaign. An analysis of the voting for Jackson in Cleveland will show that he was knifed by the Republican Party. While Jackson was a Bricker appointee, so also was John Sweeney—the former Democrat Secretary of State—who was the only Democrat given a major appointment by Bricker. Defeatist Bricker Republicans therefore gave undercover support to Sweeney. Furthermore, while the C.I.O. campaigned aggressively for Jackson, the A. F. of L. endorsed both Jackson and a white candidate—Gleason—thus negating its Jackson endorsement. Also, the regular Democratic machine campaigned against Jackson, and although divided among the three other candidates, the machine Democrats partially destroyed the good effects of the Lausche endorsement. A deep change is occurring in the ranks of the Negro people and a heightened political understanding is evident. The very type of a campaign conducted by Judge Jackson was evidence of this, where the main issues of the Negro people in the war were brought forward. Outstanding evidence of this new thinking among the Negro people is the fact that Mayor Lausche, a Democrat, car—
ried every ward which elected Negro Republicans to the City Council. Likewise, we must record the extremely favorable attitude of the Negro people and leadership toward the Board of Education program proposed by the Communist Party.

All these factors reflect a political development of the Negro people, their thinking in terms of the main war issues in a positive sense for victory, which is turning them against the defeatist forces of the Republican Party. It must also be said that the Negro people will not join with the old politicians of the Democratic Party. They want to work with the win-the-war forces of the labor movement, of the Democratic and Republican Parties. Throughout the campaign vast new sections of the Negro people demonstrated a desire and willingness to work with the Communist Party. The only white candidate who received editorial endorsement of the largest Ohio Negro newspaper was a Communist. Because of their advanced political understanding, the Negro people play an increasing role in helping to determine policies of the camp of national unity in Cleveland. In preparation for 1944, it is imperative that Negroes be brought forward into policy-making bodies and that an intensive fight be made against all forms of discrimination.

The Jewish People and Other National Groups for War Mayor

Those Jewish people who are in Cleveland normally Republican remained as such in their voting on Councilmanic candidates, when neither Republican nor Democratic candidates brought forward the war and the fight against anti-Semitism as the main issue. But as soon as the war and support to the Administration became the issue in the Mayor's campaign, political-parties-as-usual were cast aside and the Jewish people voted for Lausche by three or four to one in the very wards where they voted for Republican Councilmen by two or three to one. This was true also among the Italians and other normally Republican wards. Defeatists tried to keep the war out of the elections so as to get into office and then use their new positions against the win-the-war desires of the people.

While Mayor Lausche is Slovenian and has strongest support from all the Slav peoples of Cleveland, yet the Germans, Hungarians, Italians, Finns, and other national groups also voted overwhelmingly for him. Every national group wants to demonstrate loyalty to America in the war and the desire that the native land of their forefathers shall be free from Hitler's barbaric fascism. Public officials must meet this demand of their fellow citizens regardless of national origin. Mayor Lausche's program met this challenge. That is why they voted for him.

Of special significance indicating developments among the Polish people was the defeat of Republican Councilman John Lewandowski by Democrat Leonard P. Franks. Both are Polish, but Lewandowski had openly attacked the Soviet Union in a recent speech. The Polish steel
workers remembered it on November 2.

Repeated recognition of the role of the Soviet Union, and loyal support for President Roosevelt, together with the fact that the Moscow Conference was reaching a successful conclusion, undoubtedly had a marked influence for Franks' outstanding victory.

The first official act following his election was the issuance of a proclamation commemorating the tenth anniversary of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and the twenty-sixth anniversary of the founding of the Soviet state. That proclamation placed first emphasis on the Moscow Pact as "an epoch-making agreement of amity and collective security," it praised the Soviet Union for "waging a magnificent struggle against our common enemy, Nazi Germany"; and called for "the cooperative assistance of all citizens, the press, the schools and civic organizations" to use the period of November 6 to November 16 "that we may strengthen even to a greater degree the ties of friendship and understanding between ourselves and our great Soviet Ally."

Lausche's first major speech following the elections was to a rally of 3,000 united German-Americans in support of the United Nations' war against Nazi Germany. This is of special significance in that it was a recognition of the deep anti-Nazi movement developing among the German people in Cleveland which gives strength to the smashing of Hitlerism in Europe and especially in Germany itself. Likewise, it is significant that on November 14 he spoke with Louis Adamic at an American-Soviet Friendship Rally. Thus, he continues his campaign program to make Cleveland the best war city. Mayor Lausche's total war program won the election.

The lesson of the people's victory at the polls in Cleveland is of the highest national importance as we approach the crucial elections of 1944. The victory of the win-the-war forces in Cleveland is not accidental. It was achieved because the war was made the central issue of the campaign; because it was an energetic, fighting campaign; because the Lausche campaign was not made dependent on his party machine, but on the firm unity of labor, the Negro people, the national groups, and other win-the-war forces.

The Board of Education and the Independent Role of the Communist Party

Mayor Lausche's program had the full support of the Communist Party, which became an active force in the campaign on a city-wide scale as well as in the wards. With our own candidate for the Board of Education, Communist speakers were welcomed everywhere. This indicated the great changes which had developed in the thinking of the people and reflected the deep influences which the war had created. We did not fully appreciate this fact early enough and really began to understand the development in the thinking of the people when Arnold Johnson, Ohio State Secretary of the Communist Party,
received 47,335 votes. It is significant that no candidate indulged in Red-baiting during the campaign.

Forty-three per cent of those who voted for candidates to the Board of Education cast their votes for a Communist.

Our campaign contributed to the thinking of the people of Cleveland in regard to our school system. Under the title of "Education for Victory" many immediate as well as fundamental problems were tackled, such as: The use of our schools for war activities, juvenile delinquency, recreation, health, education against fascism, improving the study of American history, the elimination of anti-Negro discrimination and anti-Semitism, education toward a positive attitude to the labor movement, and strengthening the ideological bases of democracy. The program called for a worthy attitude toward our youth and the future of America in collaboration with the United Nations and all peoples in the post-war world. The program which we advanced helped to stimulate developing changes in the attitudes and relationships of others toward Communists.

These changes were most evident among the Negro people in the course of the campaign, when the candidate of the Communist Party received the endorsement of the two Negro newspapers, a non-partisan Citizens Committee of seventy Negroes including a number of ministers and trade unionists; when some of the largest Negro churches welcomed our party campaigners as speakers at their church services; when Negro candidates for the City Council urged their workers at the booths to handle our cards on election day; and a whole series of other events. The Communists were also largely responsible for the election of John Morning, a Negro, to the Board of Education.

As fully significant was the new attitude in the ranks of labor when I appeared before the Legislative and Scanning Committee of the Cleveland Federation of Labor in an appeal for endorsement. Not only was our program well received, but the committee discussed it for over an hour with five speaking for endorsement and only one against. In the voting, five were in favor, ten were against, because of publicity, and about twelve abstained. At the Cleveland Federation of Labor meeting where the report was made, the committee decided to report the matter of endorsement as referred back to the committee, thus avoiding public rejection of endorsement. However, the doors of local unions in both the A. F. of L. and C.I.O. were open for speakers, who were well received, a number of locals giving endorsement and others participating in the campaign without extending official endorsements.

Within the Democratic Party similar developments are taking place, which we appreciated rather late in the campaign. Spokesmen for our campaign were given the opportunity to speak at that party's main mass meetings in the wards at which the Mayor was the main speaker. On Election Day workers at the booths gladly handled our material as well as that of other
candidates. We were not fully prepared for such favorable developments.

Within the wards, both Republicans and Democrats sought the endorsement and support of Communist Party clubs. Recommendations or endorsements were made for most wards, and these made always public through leaflets. In no case was there any Red-baiting by those who were denied support. In one ward, where both Councilmanic candidates were denied endorsement, Election Day found both party machines cooperating in handling our material in an effort to get last-day favorable consideration. Our party clubs had the most favorable relationships with Councilman Krizek in Ward 30, the ward with the largest voting population in the State of Ohio, and after his victory he made a special point publicly to thank the Communist Party for its work in the campaign.

The very conduct of the campaign reflected, not only an effort to fulfill a responsibility in an election, but to meet the expectations and desires of our membership, especially the new members who think of political parties in terms of such activity.

One lesson that stands out for the Communist Party is the vast importance of the functioning of the ward clubs, which can influence the entire election campaign in a ward.

The election campaign provided an immediate basis for the activation of trade unionists who had been transferred from former shop branches to ward clubs. Not only did they become effective leaders in the wards, but they found answers to many of the questions of their work in the unions and shops, particularly in the field of political action. New members helped develop forms of political activity, particularly in precincts and neighborhoods. Steps are now being taken in some ward clubs to establish precinct committee members who are taking the place of former “group leaders” and who will compose the membership committee of the club. Ward clubs issued their own leaflets in addition to city material. They contacted organizations in the neighborhoods and arranged speak-
ing engagements. They took responsibility for distributing leaflets at specified shops. They organized their own mass meetings as well as holding club meetings where the elections were connected with all other events and developments, particularly in the trade union movement. These ward clubs became political centers in every phase of the campaign—for the Mayor, the Judge, the Board of Education, and the Councilmen.

It should of course be realized that the vote of 43 percent of the electorate for Arnold Johnson should not be interpreted as a vote for Communism. Rather it should be seen as an expression of opinion favoring inclusion of the Communists in the win-the-war coalition and recognizing their signal contribution to the war effort. Secondly, it reflects broad agreement with the Board of Education program proposed by Arnold Johnson.

The development of the political thinking of the people is of such a character that old methods and approaches to problems and people do not apply. We must see that a change has occurred, and that the change among the people is one of politically stronger support for the war, of a better quality in the unity of the people. This change has been tremendously strengthened and developed by the successful Moscow Conference. It will be advanced even further by the opening of the Second Front in Europe and the smashing of fascism. On the basis of appreciating these changes, the Communist Party in Cleveland—its leadership and the main bulk of its membership—was able to do good work. Had we fully appreciated the developments and reacted quickly in relation to all of them, our work would have been far more effective. Every club could have been fully mobilized and its members activated.

Had the Communists, and particularly the state leadership, given more concrete attention to every development in other cities in Ohio, where in most cases the war was kept out of the elections, and had the labor movement been properly involved, the situation could have been greatly improved, and the whole state would have advanced.

If the powerful labor movement in Ohio had acted on the basis of the new situation and fulfilled its political role to the membership and the people as a whole, the vote would have turned out, and not only Cleveland, but the entire state including the rural areas could now be on the road to making Ohio the best win-the-war state in the union. That job must yet be done before the primaries in May of 1944.

Certainly, the vote in Cleveland places new responsibilities in the building of the party and the circulation of The Worker and the Daily Worker. The first need is to see the changes that are occurring and on the basis of the new situation to begin tackling the task of building a mass Communist Party. What is true for Cleveland applies to other Ohio cities. The events of the election campaign only reflect the further rapid advancement of changes among the masses which made possible the united win-the-
war campaign that defeated the pro-Hitlerite Martin Sweeney a year ago and was followed by the successful party building campaign of six months ago when the Ohio party increased its membership by 40 percent in a three-month recruiting drive.

The election campaign shows not only that the conditions exist for building a mass party, but even more—that the existence of a strong Communist Party, acting in collaboration with all other win-the-war forces, is vital to a heightened war effort; that party building gives political and organizational strength to win-the-war forces in the crucial 1944 elections. This must be our approach to the immediate tasks arising from an analysis of the 1943 elections in Cleveland.
THE ELECTIONS IN PHILADELPHIA

BY SAMUEL ADAMS DARCY

The defeat of William C. Bullitt, candidate for Mayor of Philadelphia, is one of the signal victories of this election campaign for the forces of victory and progress.

An Associated Press dispatch dated November 3 reported:

"At a testimonial lunch in honor of James Farley given by the Kiwanis Club, he said that results of Tuesday's voting indicated that the American people are dissatisfied. He recalled that a year ago in Omaha he said the people 'were a bit tired of being kicked around.' 'It is apparent that they are still dissatisfied,' Farley continued, saying that 1944 will be 'the most important election year we have ever had' and expressed the hope that yesterday's voting 'will have a very salutary effect on those who guide the destinies of the nation.'"

Mr. Farley, it seems, lost no time in launching his campaign against Roosevelt, on the assumption that the people were turning against the President.

But for Pennsylvania the election results show no general trend toward the Republican Party, and (as for Philadelphia in particular) defeat of the Democrats took place where the Farleyites and their local anti-Administration allies were standard-bearers.

In Allegheny County, of which Pittsburgh is the center, the Democratic ticket, with a leadership completely pro-Roosevelt, won a smashing majority, exceeding previous records. One of the few Republicans to survive this sweep was judiciary candidate Blair Gunther, who is head of the progressive Slav Congress.

In the anthracite region, despite John L. Lewis' conniving, the Democratic candidate for Mayor of Wilkes-Barre, Cornelius McCole, defeated the Republican incumbent, Mayor Charles Loveland.

In York County, in a strategic election for State Senator, the known progressive, win-the-war Democrat, Guy A. Leader, defeated his Republican opponent. This county's election constitutes a pointed refutation of Farley's pessimistic anti-Administration position, because while Leader won his Senate seat by several thousand votes, the Farley-Democratic Boyd, who had captured the nomination for Mayor of York in the Democratic primaries, was defeated by about 500 votes.
Relation of Forces in Philadelphia

In contrast to the pro-Roosevelt leadership of the state Democrats headed by David Lawrence and the Breslin-Ross forces, the Philadelphia Democratic Party has been controlled by a Farley type of leadership headed by the Kelly-Clark-Donoghue-Flanigan group. The candidates of this group have hardly been distinguishable from the Republicans, and frequently they have nominated so-called "independent Republicans," while denying labor adequate candidacies. Each time their candidates met defeat. But at each year of Presidential elections, the Roosevelt national ticket, whose progressivism was clear, won by overwhelming majorities. The following figures of the Philadelphia vote are illuminating:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Democratic Vote Compared with Republican Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>-19,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>-49,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>+209,876</td>
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<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>+10,359</td>
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<td>1938</td>
<td>-12,448</td>
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<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>-29,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>+177,271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>-4,962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that in 1936 and 1940 Roosevelt gained majorities of about 200,000 over his Republican opponent. But, as the local Democrats veered further from the President's policies, the Republicans scored higher majorities. Last year (1942) the Democratic candidate for Governor was Clair Ross, nearest to an F.D.R., win-the-war state candidate that Pennsylvania has had. He refused to red-bait, and some of his speeches were excellent win-the-war addresses. He lost Philadelphia by only 139 votes, in the final count, out of 635,000 cast.

All signs pointed to the need for a strong, progressive, win-the-war Democratic candidate in the 1943 mayoralty elections. Had they nominated such a man, and several were available, the Democrats would have swept the elections.

Bullitt's Nomination and Its Support

Philadelphia has a small but powerful and wealthy aristocracy, known after the section of the city in which they live, as the "Main Line" people. The Democratic wing of this Main Line, headed by Attorney-General Biddle and William C. Bullitt, is that dangerous group which parades as liberals while doing reaction's dirtiest work. Biddle joined with Farley to cook up a deal whereby Bullitt was nominated for Mayor of Philadelphia. Their plan was a cunning one: The Mayor of Philadelphia controls 19,000 jobs; if the Biddle-Bullitt group could acquire that patronage, they would dominate Pennsylvania's delegation to the National Convention in 1944, which is second only to New York's. This delegation would then unite with the Farley forces, the Southern Poll Tax Democrats, and other anti-Roosevelt elements in an effort to seize control of the Administration to carry through their reactionary program. They aim to change the country's foreign policy particular-
ly in line with Bullitt’s Soviet-hating “carrot and club” speech; to change the Administration’s attitude toward labor in line with Biddle’s persecutions of progressive labor leaders; and to change all other domestic policies in line with Farley’s reactionary views.

The nomination of Bullitt for mayor did seem at first like a master stroke for the Farley-Biddle combination. It appeared for a while as if Bullitt would become a coalition candidate of the Democrats and a great section of the Republican Party. State Senator George Woodward, one of the most reactionary Republicans in the State, representing the rich Germantown-Chestnut Hill district of Philadelphia, hailed Bullitt’s nomination in glowing terms. So did the well-known Republican industrialist R. P. Brown, and many others.

The Republican Philadelphia Inquirer described the city as “elated” at the nomination and termed it a “success” for the Democratic Party. The Republican Bulletin (largest evening newspaper in the country) declared:

“Citizens who want Philadelphia to press forward . . . will welcome the sight of William C. Bullitt’s hat in the mayoralty ring.

“Mr. Bullitt’s first obligation as candidate will be to make it clear that his aim is to serve Philadelphia rather than the national Democratic Party and that he does not wish to ride into the campaign on President Roosevelt’s coat-tails.”

Throughout his campaign, Bullitt was guided by this advice not to make support of President Roosevelt a plank of his platform.

After Acting Mayor Bernard Samuel was nominated as Republican mayoralty candidate, a group of independent Republicans, resenting him as a “ward-upstart,” acclaimed and supported the Main Line aristocrat Bullitt. Some of these, however, such as the Evening Bulletin, changed their minds as the campaign progressed and they saw the swing of sentiment against Bullitt.

A further ally that Bullitt had was in the concern of some pro-Roosevelt forces as to the effect of a Democratic Party defeat upon the President’s chances of carrying Pennsylvania in 1944. The Bullitt forces argued demagogically that without the benefit of the 19,000 patronage jobs (which Bullitt intended to use against him!) F.D.R.’s chances would be jeopardized. But for the past ten years, as the figures show, the President has received overwhelming majorities without benefit of the 19,000 patronage jobs and despite the consistent defeats of the local Democratic tickets.

A still further ally that Bullitt had was a section of the Catholic hierarchy, particularly the group headed by Brother Alfred, who directs Catholic trade union action. This seemed a substantial asset, since Bullitt had the use of Catholic halls throughout the city, with the parochial schools and church influence on his behalf.

Where Did Labor Stand?

Throughout the campaign the Bullitt forces claimed that labor was
united behind him; but on the day after elections all admitted that this was a childish illusion. The Social-Democratic Dubinsky forces pledged to "deliver" labor over to Bullitt, but they failed completely.

Philadelphia labor took a great step forward this year by forming a United Labor Committee for progressive independent political action and rallying one-third of organized labor in the city to active participation. However, the leadership of the United Labor Committee was seized by the Dubinsky forces, represented by Otto in the International Ladies Garment Workers Union and Charles Weinstein of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union. Unfortunately, Jim McDevitt, President of the State A. F. of L., permitted himself to be used as a front by these elements. They refused to lift a finger to intercede in the Democratic Party in the pre-primary period for the selection of progressive candidates. After Bullitt was nominated, they tried to ram that nomination down the throats of the labor movement. The Social-Democratic leaders of the needle trades unions, pretending to speak for all of labor, issued fawning statements as soon as Bullitt's nomination was announced, declaring that "Bullitt will make the best candidate for Mayor the city could have," and pledging that "organized labor will support him." This "independent labor political action" did not succeed! After a heated debate, over twenty locals voted against endorsement of Bullitt, declaring themselves also against Samuel. Through manipulation of votes, the Otto-Weinstein group appeared to get a great majority for Bullitt, but actually achieved their majority by silencing the minority opposition in a number of large delegations through invoking the unity rule.

After this fight in the United Labor Council, about fifteen other A. F. of L. local unions, led by William Green's representative, Mallen, voted to endorse Samuel. In the rest of the unions, including I.L.G. W.U., and Amalgamated Clothing Workers, the membership and lesser officials refused to help Bullitt's candidacy during the entire campaign and on election day. Despite the distribution of a vast amount of Social-Democratic literature supporting Bullitt, including special editions of the Jewish Daily Forward and the New Leader, Weinstein, who had promised the Bullitt Committee 5,000 election workers, was able to deliver less than 300!

The Weinstein-Otto leadership did succeed in frustrating the United Labor Committee's declared purpose of independent, progressive political action, and narrowed that organization's activity to a handful of Social-Democrats. Jim McDevitt could be the center of a great movement for united labor political action in Philadelphia. He has played a positive role, and has done the labor movement much good. He will not accomplish that on the political field, however, as long as he defers to the Weinstein-Otto leadership.

The Progressive Ticket

Even before the nomination the anti-Bullitt forces had been rallied.
A bitter pre-primary struggle had been carried on by the more progressive labor leaders, some Democratic Party progressives, and the Communist Party. Bullitt’s nomination was accompanied by a terrific Red-baiting campaign launched by the *Philadelphia Record*, which announced in front-page cartoons and leading editorials that only the Communists were opposed to Bullitt. His nomination was hailed as our defeat; he did appear as a formidable, almost irresistible candidate.

Immediately upon his nomination, trade union progressives circulated letters exposing Bullitt’s record to Democratic committee-men, ward leaders and city officials, to all trade union officials, etc. In support of this action, *The Worker* published an expose of Bullitt’s anti-labor, anti-Semitic, reactionary writings, and created a sensation in the city, temporarily staying the tide of Bullitt sentiment. This was followed by a campaign of enlightenment, exposing Bullitt’s betrayal of Spain, betrayal of France, responsibility for Munich, and giving his anti-Soviet connivings from the time of the Bullitt-Steffens mission to Moscow in 1919. In this campaign *The Worker* played a leading part and gained thereby a substantial increase in subscription circulation. Over one million pieces of literature were distributed in the city by the progressive forces against Bullitt, in addition to newspaper advertisements, radio programs, mass meetings, etc.

The progressives and Communists worked out the following line of action: to make victory and the war the main issue; to reject Bullitt as unacceptable by his record on this issue; to endorse the remainder of the Democratic ticket; to reject the entire Republican ticket as constituting a front for Pew, the anti-Roosevelt America Firster; and to effect the formation of an Independent Voters League for Philadelphia. This committee, under the chairmanship of a prominent Roosevelt Democrat, Dr. Daniel Longaker, nominated a member of the A. F. of L. Central Labor Union, Jules C. Abercauph, as candidate for Mayor.

**How Did the Struggle Develop?**

The Bullitt forces tried to limit the campaign to "local issues" from the beginning. No questions concerning the war or President Roosevelt were to be discussed and all references to Bullitt’s political history were to be excluded as “personalities.” In announcing discussion of the Democratic platform, the Bullitt Committee said, “Absolute freedom of expression is guaranteed to each organization except that personalities will not be permitted and the discussion must be confined to Philadelphia problems.” At the end of September, the platform committee leaders announced that they must “put pure water first in the platform” and “the construction of a sewage disposal system.”

This policy was given substantial support by a large section of the Republican Party, including the two biggest newspapers, the *Bulletin* and the *Inquirer*, and all of the “re-
spectable” Main Line Republicans. Some of the Republican ward leaders, however, were influenced by, and made a good deal of the exposures circulated by the progressives with regard to Bullitt’s Munich record. Their chief spokesman was County Commissioner Morton Witkin, who declared:

“Mr. Bullitt has not yet been able to deny his own statements as printed in the leading newspapers of America at the time of the fall of Paris. Nor has he been able to deny the charges against him by leading Americans.

“Now, Mr. Bullitt, isn’t it true that the leader of Russia, Mr. Stalin, asked for your removal from Russia? Why? Wasn’t it because of your infamous intrigue with the Trotskyites whose leader he also banished? Mr. Bullitt, didn’t you side with the Japanese at the end of 1935 with regard to the peninsula at Vladivostok?”

The Main Line Republicans, the Pew forces, the Inquirer, and the Bulletin, publicly denounced Witkin for “following the Communists,” and to the end of the campaign there was a running public controversy in the Republican Party on this issue. The Bulletin, for example, after denouncing Witkin in one editorial, declared in a follow-up:

“If either Acting-Mayor Samuel or Mr. Bullitt is at a loss for an issue of genuine concern to Philadelphians, one might be found . . . the matter of sewage disposal is of prime importance. . . . It could be discussed without defaming any individual or the city. Let’s have enlightenment.”

In issuing the Republican election platform, the win-the-war group won out, and the opening sentence declared for “full support to the Federal Government and the armed forces and the achievement of final victory.” Acting-Mayor Samuel pledged “unqualified support to President Roosevelt on the conduct of the war.”

Of course, these good words should be remembered in the light of previous and similar Republican demagogy. In the 1942 elections, the Republican campaign circulars for Governor Martin demanded the “Second Front.” Nevertheless, the state organization of the Republican Party is going through an increasingly severe struggle to determine its course for 1944. At the last State Committee meeting held in Philadelphia, in the second week of October, three groups, all anti-Roosevelt, were evident, all showing considerable strength: one headed by Pew and Grundy, another by Governor Martin, and the third by Senator Davis, who has expressed sympathy with Willkie.

The progressives’ fight to make the winning of the war the main issue of these elections also affected the Democrats. Bullitt’s “carrot and club” speech is by now notorious, having been so brilliantly exposed by Comrade Browder. On September 13, after he was nominated and despite his own announced restriction of the campaign to “local issues,” Bullitt made an even more vicious speech before the organization calling itself the Polish Relief Society. He not only declared him-
self on the side of the Polish fascists who were conniving and arming against the Soviet Union; he not only demanded fulfillment of all claims against the Soviet Union by the Polish feudal landlords and their London Government-In-Exile; he also rattled the sabre, threatening that if this were not granted, "the sons and daughters of American soldiers and sailors and marines and aviators who are now facing death will have to go out again to fight."

As the campaign continued and it became increasingly evident that the electorate was hostile to Bullitt's anti-Sovietism, he began to change his tune. He later protested that he was a friend of the Soviet Union and opposed to Japanese claims at Vladivostok. On October 21, realizing the tremendous effect on Philadelphia voters of Browder's recent statement that support of Bullitt would be a slap at the Soviet Union, Bullitt issued a press release urging that "Americans pray for the success of the Soviet parley."

The Democratic election platform which had begun with sewage and water as the main issue, in its final draft had as point number one, a mild declaration for "cooperation in carrying on the war." This was weakened by a mass of verbiage concerning post-war adjustments, which made the Democratic platform on the war issue weaker than the pro-war declarations of the Republicans. Philadelphia did not miss the significance of Bullitt's maneuvering with the question of support to the war.

In the post-election summaries, some Republicans claimed that the anti-Bullitt vote was an anti-Roosevelt vote. There is not one fact to sustain this contention. Although Samuel declared for "unqualified support" to Roosevelt's conduct of the war, Bullitt never approached such a declaration. He brought the President into the campaign only to shift the blame for the betrayal of Paris from himself, saying that what he did in Paris for the Nazis was done because the President had ordered him to stay there. When Harrison Spangler, National Republican Chairman, delivered a speech in Philadelphia, stupidly calling Bullitt a "pawn of the White House," it was repudiated by Democrats and Republicans alike. The Inquirer declared in a headline, "New Deal is not issue in Mayoralty campaign," and the Evening News, staunchest of Republican papers, declared, "F.D.R. keeps out of Philadelphia fight. . . ." The progressives were able, however, to repudiate Bullitt's policies insofar as they differed from President Roosevelt's.

The Activity of the Communist Party

As the campaign progressed, "local issues" were pushed into the background, and finally the election was fought on the issues of Bullitt's war record. Our party was a leading factor in this process, and in the entire campaign. It should be noted, however, that we were less successful in exposing the menace of the reactionary Pew's operations behind the innocent-appearing front of Acting-Mayor Samuel. Bullitt's pa-
per, the Record, tried to evade the war issue with a long-winded series of articles attacking the Communists. Involuntarily they paid tribute to the vigor of the Communist Party's role in the fight, stating that "for the first time in Philadelphia's history, the American Communist Party has jumped into a mayoralty campaign with both feet."

Frank R. Kent, a vicious, Westbrook Pegler type of anti-Roosevelt columnist, wrote:

"In no other place and at no other time have the Communists in the country made a fight of this character. . . . [They] assailed the Democratic candidate with a violence and fury of which no previous indication has been given. . . . Earl Browder, head of the Communist Party in America, recently made a virulent attack against Mr. Bullitt in a Town Hall speech. Other Communist orators have followed suit and the full weight of the Communist Party is being used to encompass his defeat."

Then follows a detailed defense of Bullitt's anti-Sovietism, closing:

"This is a new development in American politics. Nothing quite like it has been done before. . . . Obviously their idea is to prevent any man openly unfriendly to the Soviet system rising in American politics and if they can to penalize such men for holding such views. . . . [The Communist attack] ought to help Mr. Bullitt."

In this attack against our party, several things were significant: (1) no other Democratic candidate, no spokesman for the Democratic Party joined in any part of the Bullitt-Stern-Kent attack upon our party. The contrary happened. In the lower ranks, the fiercer the election struggle became, the larger the numbers of the Democratic Party officialdom that became friendlier to our party and expressed resentment at Bullitt's having been put over on them. To the end of the campaign, Red-baiting was limited to Stern-Bullitt and the Social-Democrats. At one point of the campaign, some of Bullitt's closest co-workers, including Kelly, his campaign manager, publicly expressed disgust at the line of his speeches. Within the labor movement, the handful of Social-Democrats carried this Red-baiting policy both in the speeches of Weinstein and Otto, as well as through the New Leader and the Forward and miscellaneous pamphlets which were distributed by commercial agencies at enormous expenditure of funds. But Red-baiting was never less effective and union officials in their own unions showed their attitude by boycotting meetings of election workers called by Weinstein and Otto. In no election in the past ten years have Weinstein and Otto been able to turn out so few election workers from their own unions as in this election.

The Meaning of the Results

What did the final election result show? Bullitt, who began his campaign with the expectation of sweeping the city, sustained a defeat by a larger margin than any Democrat has suffered since the Democratic
Party became a serious organization in Pennsylvania this century. He lost by over 65,000 votes.

More significant than that, however, Bullitt ran behind his own entire ticket. He ran over 8,000 votes behind his running mate, Judge Bok, the well-known Roosevelt progressive. The campaign of the progressives in the trade unions and of the Communist Party to support the Democratic Councilmanic candidates while defeating Bullitt, bore fruit, so that, despite the Bullitt defeat, the Democratic Councilmen have increased their vote. At this moment, with the official count not completed, it seems certain that they will retain the seats they had in the previous council and that they may increase their number.

The Social-Democrats have circulated preposterous excuses for Bullitt's defeat. One such excuse is that rain cut the vote. Another excuse, voiced in PM and other newspapers under varying degrees of Social-Democratic influence, is that the anti-Bullitt forces, particularly the Communists, organized a bus tie-up. That the bus tie-up on election day cut the total vote and that a small total vote operates in favor of the Republicans, whereas a larger vote operates in favor of the Democrats. Every item of these excuses is false.

The baselessness of the excuse that a smaller vote operates in favor of the Republicans is shown, for example, by a study of the polls in previous years:

In 1939, 750,000 votes were cast. The Democrats were beaten by 30,000 votes.

In 1942, 630,000 votes were cast (120,000 less than in 1939). The Democrats lost by only 139.

Thus, if these statistics are important, they would seem to indicate that a smaller vote operates in favor of the Democrats. Of course, all such mechanical explanations are nonsense. Bullitt was defeated by political factors. Bullitt's war record, his anti-Sovieteering, his collusive role in relation to Munich, Spain and the betrayal of France, his avoidance of giving President Roosevelt all-out endorsement, his Red-baiting and his fronting for the Social-Democrats in Philadelphia—these are the factors that defeated him.

The Effect of Abercauph's Candidacy

There were more split tickets in Philadelphia this year than in any other year. About 5,000 voted for Abercauph for Mayor and the rest of the Democratic ticket. Another 6,100 voted for Samuel for Mayor and the rest of the Democratic ticket on the theory that voting for Abercauph is "throwing away the vote," in that it might not suffice to defeat Bullitt, whereas voting for Samuel would insure Bullitt's defeat. This indicates a weakness in the campaign to expose the menace of Pew in the situation. For, although Samuel was originally not Pew's candidate and Samuel's speeches and platform were not characteristic Pew speeches, there could be no check to date refuting the fact that Pew put considerable money into the Republican campaign and together with Grundy dominates and controls the Republi-
can Party for anti-Roosevelt, and, as recent events have shown, even anti-Willkie, purposes. Estimates based on the unofficial count indicate that from 15,000 to 20,000 voters failed to vote for any mayoralty candidate, although voting for the other offices. The total of all these is 25,000 to 30,000. This does not count the many tens of thousands of Democrats who simply stayed away from the polling places altogether. There were 10,000 fewer total votes cast in the entire election as compared to 1942, but the fall-off in the vote for the Democratic candidate for mayor was 37,000. It should be noted that there were also a considerable—as yet uncounted—number of votes cast for Bullitt for mayor and for the balance of the Republican ticket. These were largely upper class Republicans. Their number early in the campaign threatened to be larger.

Among the Negro people a fair estimate shows as high as 70 per cent voted for Samuel. The Republicans and Pew himself had made special efforts to win the Negro vote. Pew was one of the first employers to yield to the pressure for hiring Negroes for skilled jobs, and now employs 18,000 Negroes in the Sun Shipyards. He interceded with Governor Martin of Pennsylvania against extraditing Negroes to the South, and sent his personal attorneys to aid Buckanon, the Negro whose extradition was sought at Trenton, N. J. Republican Governor Martin appointed a Governor's Inter-Racial Commission under the leadership of the Negro progressive E. Washington Rhodes, in which those who wish to fight for equal rights for the Negro people are admitted without regard to political creed.

As against this determined effort of the Republicans to win the favor of the Negro people, the local Democrats have consistently ignored the problem. Bullitt was particularly offensive in his attitude. He cynically tried to trick the Negro people. In connivance with the Social-Democrats he announced a conference for "Inter-Racial cooperation" to take place on October 20 at the Academy of Music in Philadelphia. When people arrived there they discovered it was a cheap stunt to get them to a Bullitt election rally. Deep resentment resulted and the Negroes present demonstrated by walking out en masse.

Unfortunately, a great many of them were not convinced of the usefulness of Abercauph’s candidacy as an alternative, and instead voted for Samuel.

Considerable progress has been made in advancing the struggle for Negro rights, but the above-given facts clearly indicate how much more has to be done for Negro and white unity. Especially the trade unions must awaken to the fact that if they do not act, Pew will—and not for good purposes.

In explaining the final vote the Philadelphia Record turns in wrath upon the labor movement. Its analysis of the labor vote (published November 4) reads as follows:

"Union labor leaders with the best intentions could not deliver ‘the labor vote.’ It is doubtful if there is a
THE ELECTIONS IN PHILADELPHIA

‘labor vote.’ Union members are human beings like all of us. In America they are not class conscious as in England and on the continent. They don’t like to be told how to vote by their union officials any more than they like to be bossed by their wives or union leader.”

Considering that the Record made the chief feature of its campaign the claim that Bullitt’s election was assured by the united labor vote, this sudden reversal of judgment can be attributed only to pique. It is nonsense to say there is no labor vote. One need only point to the fact that President Roosevelt gets a united labor vote in Philadelphia each time he runs and thereby carries the city by majorities of 200,000.

The Tasks for 1944

The essential nature of the Philadelphia election was, from the point of view of the win-the-war forces, an action to fight off a flank attack made on the war effort by the tactic of uniting the Bullitt-Biddle-Farley elements into a bloc which wanted to seize the Pennsylvania Democratic Party for anti-United Nations purposes. In this sense the pro-Roosevelt progressives of Philadelphia were victorious. It, however, left the Republicans in office. That is an unfinished task.

All progressive-thinking people should learn the lesson for 1944:

1. It re-emphasizes the lesson learned in so many other elections, that the Democratic Party cannot win with Republican types of platforms or reactionary Republican types of candidates.

2. The Democrats cannot win if they permit special groups to seize leadership in the Roosevelt camp with special axes to grind such as Red-baiting or anti-Sovieteering or Bullitt’s new post-election activity of advocating Federal Union, Inc., i.e., Anglo-American imperialist domination of the rest of the world.

3. For 1944 all win-the-war forces without any limitation but without ulterior partisan motives must be united behind candidates who support the Commander-in-Chief and the government’s war program.

4. Labor unity for political action must be achieved. The error of permitting the Social-Democrats to seize leadership and setting aside the movement for independent political action to their own purposes and control is certainly evident in Philadelphia. On a state scale the movement for united labor political action which has already taken practical form in the 33rd Congressional District (East Pittsburgh and McKeesport) and in the 29th Congressional District (Erie), in Reading and in Philadelphia, and in many other parts of the state, must be united into a single state-wide movement.

5. One of the gains of the election is that the Communist Party has had restored to it its place on the ballot as a legal party. This breaks down the ruling to remove us made by ex-Governor James’ reactionary commission of two years ago. The party must carefully utilize this opportunity to promote the general unity along progressive lines.

6. Special efforts must be made to strengthen the progressive work in the coal areas, where John L.
Lewis will no doubt play his usual disruptive role; and in Reading, where the Social-Democrats will try to carry through their policies disruptive of the war effort around Mayor Stump, who succeeded in gaining office, even though the rest of the Socialist Party ticket met defeat.

7. Finally, the entire state is discussing the lessons which this recent election has to teach. Every effort must be made to help in those discussions to promote clarity, so that all groups will be able to draw the proper conclusions from the events and work out an effective program for 1944.
THE SAN FRANCISCO ELECTIONS

BY WILLIAM SCHNEIDERMAN

The San Francisco municipal elections, in which the Big Business Republican Roger Lapham was elected Mayor over the labor-backed candidate George Reilly, were an object lesson to the labor and progressive forces of California. They revealed the serious weaknesses of the win-the-war camp, but also showed its potential strength, which can change the relation of forces in 1944, if the labor movement and the Democratic Party draw the proper conclusions in time.

The election of Lapham was made possible only because of the continued divisions in the ranks of labor and the factional splits in the Democratic Party, which handed the election to Lapham almost by default. The election turned into a landslide against the reactionary Republican Rossi, which could have resulted in a progressive victory, had the pro-Roosevelt forces been united, and had they fought the election campaign on war issues and identified themselves with the President's war policies.

The reactionary camp succeeded in its strategy of putting up a candidate with a liberal front who avoided all discussion of war issues and posed as a "non-partisan," repeating Governor Warren's successful subterfuge in the 1942 elections. Lapham even claimed the support of President Roosevelt, basing his claim on a letter of praise from the President at the time of the former's resignation from the National War Labor Board to run for mayor.

Although the elections were non-partisan, the Republican Party saw the possibility of using them as a springboard for the Presidential campaign next year. Faced with the certainty that the discredited Rossi Administration would meet defeat in the election, the anti-Roosevelt forces abandoned Mayor Rossi for a more effective candidate who was not so vulnerable, and the four major newspapers which had always supported the Mayor now united behind Lapham and built him up by demagogically exploiting the widespread anti-Rossi sentiment in the city.

In this they were aided by the confusion in the labor movement and especially in the Democratic Party. The three most prominent Democratic leaders each backed a different mayoralty candidate, and most of the Democratic organization was thrown behind Lapham by its County Chairman. Although all
these Democratic leaders are pro-Roosevelt, the split among them strengthened the anti-Roosevelt forces for the Republican Party's campaign in 1944.

The factional fight which paralyzed the Democratic Party was carried over into the A. F. of L., which did not make an endorsement for mayor until four weeks before the election. One faction of the A. F. of L., led by State Senator Shelley, President of the Central Labor Council, supported Chester MacPhee, who also had the support of the C.I.O. Another faction, controlling the Building Trades Council, backed George Reilly, state vice-chairman of the Democratic Party. Reilly finally won the official endorsement of the A. F. of L. Union Labor Party convention.

Faced with the prospect of a split in labor's vote between two candidates, the C.I.O., in the interest of labor unity against Lapham, withdrew its support of MacPhee and joined the A. F. of L. in endorsing Reilly. As a result, three weeks before the election a United Labor Committee for Reilly was formed, representing the A. F. of L., C.I.O., and Railway Brotherhoods, which conducted a joint campaign against Lapham.

But this unity of labor came so late in the campaign that it had very little time to penetrate down below among the rank and file of the trade union membership. Although the C.I.O. and the United Labor Committee conducted the campaign on the basis of war issues and influenced Reilly to do likewise, it was too late in the campaign to have an appreciable effect on the outcome. Labor unity was "too little and too late."

Furthermore, labor tended to conduct its campaign in a narrow way, concentrating mainly on Lapham's anti-labor record, and insufficiently on his connection with defeatist Republicans in the anti-Roosevelt camp and on his failure to develop a municipal war platform. Little or no effort was made to appeal to the middle-class voters and to the Roosevelt Democrats, among whom Lapham was successful in making considerable inroads.

As a result, the pro-Lapham newspapers tried to make it appear that the labor movement was campaigning to elect a "labor mayor" and inciting a struggle between labor and capital; they contrasted this to Lapham's pretensions to being a unifying force, above partisan or class divisions, for the community. This was not effectively answered by the labor movement, and the middle-class districts voted heavily for Lapham, while Reilly carried only the three districts that were overwhelmingly working-class in composition.

Nevertheless, despite these handicaps and mistakes, Lapham could have been defeated if the labor movement had been successful in getting out the labor vote. The registration of eligible voters in 1943 was 83,000 less than in 1942. In the 1939 mayoralty election, 293,000 voted, compared to only 220,000 on Nov. 2, 1943; and this decrease came despite the fact that the San Francisco population is estimated to have increased 20 per cent since 1940 be-
cause of the influx of workers to war industries. Large numbers of shipyard workers were not registered, and of those who were a considerable number failed to go to the polls.

Lapham failed to get a majority of the votes, polling 90,000 out of 220,000, or 42 per cent; Reilly polled 57,000; Rossi 47,000; MacPhee 20,000. Reilly and MacPhee together polled 77,000 votes. Had there been greater labor unity achieved earlier in the campaign, and had labor been able to turn out a greater proportion of its potential vote at the polls, the results would have been different. Furthermore, a united labor movement with a clear-cut win-the-war platform could have attracted to itself large sections of Roosevelt Democrats and middle-class voters, who were alienated by the confusion and division in the Democratic Party and in the ranks of labor.

* * *

The election results have been a jolt to the labor movement, whose leaders are beginning to realize that continued disunity will have disastrous consequences in 1944. There are good prospects that the A. F. of L. will begin to develop a political action program as the C.I.O. has done, and that joint A. F. of L.-C.I.O. action will continue on local and national issues. Labor has not yet been able to influence the Democratic Party leadership sufficiently to bring about any serious improvement in the party’s approach to the 1944 elections. It will be a difficult task to bring unity in the Democratic Party in its present demoralized state, but unless the Roosevelt Democratic leaders want to commit political suicide, they must take alarm from the recent election results, and come to realize that petty factional feuds must be submerged if the Democratic Party is to be revived as a powerful force in support of the President and the war effort.

The C.I.O. played the most effective role in the election campaign in bringing forward the war issues, in working for unity of all pro-Roosevelt forces, and in precinct organization for getting out the labor vote. For the first time, large sections of the city were covered by a system of precinct captains who had a complete list of C.I.O. trade unionists in their respective precincts, and who reached them by personal contact. Unfortunately, this system was not set up soon enough to get a larger registration, while a check-up showed large numbers of trade unionists in each precinct ineligible to vote. Nevertheless, the precinct captaincy system enabled the C.I.O. to get a large proportion of its eligible membership to vote. The bulk of the trade unionists in San Francisco, however, are affiliated with the A. F. of L., which made no effort to reach its membership beyond the usual forms of publicity and mailing-lists; this proved to be inadequate to get out the A. F. of L. vote.

The C.I.O. has also taken the initiative to bring together Democratic Party and labor leaders to discuss the preparations for the 1944 elections. Such a conference took place in Los Angeles during Sidney Hillman’s visit to California, in the course of which he addressed a
THE SAN FRANCISCO ELECTIONS

group of A. F. of L. and C.I.O. officials and Democratic Party leaders on the need to organize support for the President now and to prepare for 1944. Similar conferences are now being called in various Congressional districts throughout the state, for the purpose of reaching agreement on supporting a single candidate by all pro-Roosevelt forces against reactionary Republicans or Democrats. This kind of unity had a potent influence on the election of a Roosevelt Democrat, Clair Engle, to Congress from a Republican district in a special election held in September. If the same unity can be extended on a state-wide scale, the Democratic Party, in alliance with the labor movement, can make a comeback in the 1944 elections and elect progressive majorities to the State Legislature and to Congress, and keep California in the Roosevelt column.

* * *

The Communist Party's role in the municipal elections gained wide recognition in labor and political circles as a constructive, unifying win-the-war force. It was the only organization, besides the C.I.O., which formulated a comprehensive municipal war program and related it to national issues and the war situation as a whole. Its platform won favorable comment from many labor, political, and civic organizations, and a number of candidates were influenced by sections of it for their own campaigns.

The platform dealt concretely with measures to solve manpower problems, with housing, transportation, and child-care. It proposed a program which would halt discrimination against the Negro people and make possible their fullest contribution to the war effort. The platform made proposals to improve civilian defense, to deal with juvenile delinquency and with soldiers' and sailors' welfare. The popularization of this platform during the campaign will strengthen the fight for these measures, and undoubtedly will force the new city administration to yield to mass pressure and adopt certain of them.

The party analyzed the danger of Lapham's candidacy, and conducted a campaign for the unity of all labor and win-the-war forces behind a single candidate to defeat both Lapham and Rossi. This campaign had considerable influence in clarifying issues, and in effecting the unity of the A. F. of L. and the C.I.O. in the elections.

The party's candidate for the Board of Supervisors, Oleta O'Connor Yates, San Francisco County secretary of the party, conducted the most effective campaign in its history, gaining entrance and a friendly reception to an unprecedented number of labor, political and civic organizations. Comrade Yates and other members of her campaign committee spoke before 114 organizations, including 59 trade unions (39 A. F. of L., 19 C.I.O., and 1 independent); 24 civic clubs; 6 Negro organizations; 8 foreign-language groups; and a number of others which included Democratic women's clubs, the Building Trades Council, the policemen's organization, and
neighborhood improvement clubs. Her candidacy received 22 organization endorsements, including the Longshoremen and Warehousemen’s locals, and her list of sponsors included 22 trade-union officials, 242 trade unionists, and a few prominent Democrats and Republicans.

Comrade Yates received 39,925 votes, running tenth in a list of seventeen candidates for six vacancies on the Board of Supervisors. This was nearly 10,000 more than the previous high Communist vote, or a 33 per cent increase. It totaled 18 per cent of the total vote, as compared to a previous high vote of 11 per cent. Comrade Yates received a heavy vote in working-class and Negro neighborhoods, but also an unusually good vote in middle-class districts, especially where precinct work had been carried on.

The party’s campaign did much to establish its full citizenship in the community. But it revealed that the party branches are not yet rooted in the community and neighborhoods. During the campaign, the party campaign committee discovered scores of neighborhood organizations that meet all year round and that are alive to community issues, consumers’ problems, price control, and war activities. These clubs are often of working-class composition, with trade-unionists active in their leadership. In the main, even the best party branches have no contact with these clubs and often are not aware of their existence. The party members are not yet orientated to joining these clubs and participating with their neighbors in community activity.

The friendly and enthusiastic reception which these organizations gave to the party’s candidate, in probably the first time they had seen or heard a Communist, should convince the party branches that a larger number of Communists should become active in these community organizations, become known to their neighbors, and thus be in a better position to influence them in a progressive political direction for greater support to the war effort. This is one of the most important of the many lessons the party has learned from the elections.

The party’s main task in the coming period must be to hasten the process of building a coalition of win-the-war forces against the Hoover-Warren defeatists, that are already opening their anti-Roosevelt campaign in California with a Warren-instructed Republican delegation to run in the May Presidential primaries. The key to this coalition is labor unity, and the alliance of labor and the Democratic Party. Labor must adopt a broad policy which will bring into the coalition the Negro people, the middle-class and professional groups, and the farmers, as essential sections of the camp of national unity.

To accomplish this task, we must have the perspective of a more rapid building of the party and extension of its influence. The party’s campaign and vote in San Francisco lay a good basis for mass recruiting and for making the party a more effective force for national unity, which will strengthen the nation’s war effort for victory.
LESSONS OF THE NEW JERSEY ELECTIONS

BY WILLIAM NORMAN

On November 2 Mayor Vincent J. Murphy, Democratic candidate, was defeated by Republican Governor-elect Walter E. Edge by a plurality of nearly 128,000. The unofficial poll of 1,136,295 gives Murphy 504,345 votes and Edge 631,950. The vote for Murphy is equal to 44 percent of the votes cast.

In the November, 1942, Senatorial election, William H. Smathers, Democratic candidate, polled 559,851 out of 1,208,706 votes cast, losing by a plurality of 89,004. Smathers' vote was equal to 46 percent of the votes cast.

On the basis of these comparative figures, the press of New Jersey, about 95 percent of which campaigned for Edge, has drawn two major conclusions, both of which are intended to create moods of despondency in the ranks of labor, particularly, which could only have the effect of undermining the morale of the people as a whole. The first conclusion is that the people repudiated the President's win-the-war policies; the second, that labor is politically impotent to wield decisive influence in effecting election changes.

The Newark Evening News, the Jersey Journal, Asbury Park News, Elizabeth Daily Journal, Paterson Evening News, the Perth Amboy Evening News—all hail the defeat of Murphy with one single refrain—"a trend away from the New Deal-Democratic combination" and "a setback for the political ambitions of organized labor."

The cause of labor and the people will not be served by minimizing the seriousness of Murphy's defeat. On the contrary, labor must critically examine and ruthlessly eradicate those weaknesses which resulted in a Republican victory and a temporary setback for the win-the-war coalition. It will, however, completely reject the conclusions concerning the election results reached by the reactionaries and the forces of partisan politics-as-usual.

These conclusions are not based on the real facts and have the further aim of undermining labor's confidence in its own political strength and its capacity to strengthen its alliance with other sections of the resolute win-the-war coalition. It is no accident that the strategy of Edge and the Republican board of strategy was, above all, a concentrated attack on labor. More than anything, it evi-
denced the deathly fear of the developing role of united labor political action in this campaign and in the coming 1944 elections. This fear is ill-concealed by the Jersey Journal, spokesman for Edge, when it says, "Mr. Murphy's drive to regiment labor and deliver it in a bloc in order to bring about his own election was not in harmony with the traditions of great labor leaders who warned against such unwise tactics."

These words, lifted bodily from a speech made by U. S. Senator Barbour during the campaign, may be taken as the attitude of the highest Republican council in New Jersey toward labor and labor unity. If the Republicans were not so concerned and alarmed about labor's role, independently and as a unifying force in the recent elections, they would not so eagerly vouchsafe this gratuitous advice.

The fact is that the policy of labor in this campaign was based on the realization of the need for defeating the enemy of labor and the people, Walter Edge, and electing the win-the-war candidate, Vincent Murphy. Barbour's main objection, therefore, is to labor's taking the advanced step to independent political action and organization, and to labor unity. He is terrified at the prospect of labor delivering its vote "in a bloc." He would prefer to have labor divided and disunited.

Back of this demagogic advice from the camp of reaction and defeatism is the recognition on their part that labor, even though it was only in its initial stages of perfecting unity, even though it had not sufficient time to develop its organization more fully for the last election, was still able to convert a potential rout of the win-the-war forces into a real threat and challenge to reaction.

Similarly, there is no truth to the statement that the New Jersey elections show a "trend away from the New Deal-Democratic combination." Such a statement is usually distorted by the Republicans to mean that the people of New Jersey are opposed to the war policies of the President. The fact is that these policies were never in the whole course of the campaign made the real issues. In the last two weeks of the campaign Edge's speeches were wholly taken up with the fake issue of Hagueism, with Red-baiting and attacks on the trade unions. His other chief issue was so-called "states' rights." Although from time to time Edge raised the vague cry of "New Deal bungling," he never touched on specific issues such as subsidies, rollback of prices or wage stabilization, which would have exposed Republican responsibility for undermining the war effort. On the other hand, Murphy unfortunately also avoided raising the issue of the war policies of the President. He assumed the people understood that he supported these policies. In all of the material issued by Murphy there is rare mention of the war effort or of the role of the Republican delegation in Congress to undermine it. Thus, the predominating issue, policies for winning the war, was really sidetracked to secondary issues.
A careful analysis of the election results reveals conclusions far different from those ground out by the Republican propaganda mill and provides significant lessons for labor and the people.

A major lesson to be drawn from this analysis is that in New Jersey’s industrial cities, where labor is strongly organized or where its influence is in any way felt, the people were least confused on the real issues and gave a plurality for Murphy. This is to be seen in the voting in the ten largest cities: Jersey City, Newark, Paterson, Camden, Trenton, Bayonne, Elizabeth, Perth Amboy, Passaic, and New Brunswick. These cities, comprising a population of close to a million and a half, or about one-third of the state’s population, accounted for 351,397 out of 1,136,295 votes cast. In these ten cities Murphy received 64 percent of the vote. While this constitutes a 2 percent decline from 1942, it still represents a substantial plurality for those areas which labor was able to reach with its pro-Roosevelt, win-the-war policies. In only two of these cities, Paterson and Passaic, did the vote for Murphy go below 50 percent. Despite the fact that labor here is strongly organized in the auto, rubber, and textile industries, political organization is at a low ebb. An indication of this is that no C.I.O. Industrial Union Council functions in this area.

Labor’s influence was felt most strongly in the cities of Camden, Newark, and Bayonne. Here, because of its strong organization prior to the elections, labor was able in the ABC Federation (A. F. of L., R. R. Brotherhoods, C.I.O.) to develop united political action with the least strain, and to wage a comparatively strong campaign with effective results. In Bayonne, where political action was carried over from last year’s municipal campaign, Murphy’s percentage of the vote increased 2 percent, from 74 to 76 percent. In Newark, it increased 4 percent, from 52 to 56; in Camden, 5 percent, from 65 to 70.

A realistic appraisal of labor’s role in this election must take into account the fact that nowhere did labor have enough time to set up the ABC Federation on a block, district and ward basis. The worst mistake labor can make is to exaggerate the extent of its political organization in this campaign. Conclusions reached on overstated claims can lead only to pessimism. It is no surprise to see the press deliberately exaggerate the degree of labor’s political organization in this campaign, for the aim of this press from the start was to find a method subsequently of deflating or nullifying labor’s role entirely. Labor, on its part, must recognize that it made only a modest beginning on the road to united, independent political action. It is a start which has terrified the reactionaries and defeatists and which provides the possibilities for routing them in 1944.

In this respect, labor can wholeheartedly endorse Murphy’s post-election statement when he declared that, “In the short space of time afforded the Democratic Party workers—to the members of the trade unions and to the thousands of other
supporters of a progressive policy, a magnificent task of organization was accomplished. Let me say to all of them that their work has not been in vain . . . the cause of democracy cannot fail if it retains the everlasting vigilance of its true advocates."

Inherent in this statement is an understanding of what labor and the people had to cope with in order to lay the groundwork for a win-the-war coalition in New Jersey. Labor must never forget the situation existing in New Jersey as late as two and a half months prior to the elections. It must recall it, if only to prevent in the future a reversion to that condition. The situation was such that, had labor not quickly overcome, even partially, its disunited ranks and its confusion, Edge would have been victorious practically by default and he would have had the several hundred thousand plurality which he asked as the price to doom Roosevelt's chance to run for a fourth term.

At that time, the C.I.O. in New Jersey was plagued with Trotskyites and Lewis influence, making many honest trade unionists waver and vacillate. In this election campaign the Trotskyite-Lewis forces feared to expose themselves openly. That did not prevent them, however, from sabotaging the campaign quietly.

At that time, too, confusion reigned in the ranks of labor in regard to the main issues of the election—the war and support of the President's war policies. A. F. of L.-C.I.O.-R. R. Brotherhood unity seemed remote. Boycott of the elections and the putting forward of a Labor Party ticket were still being considered.

The overcoming of these odds within the short span of two months and the initiation of a win-the-war coalition can be registered as an important positive outcome of the New Jersey election campaign. It devolves now on labor to make certain that it continues and develops the ABC Federation, that it broadens and strengthens the win-the-war coalition and thus provides the guarantee for victory of the people in 1944.

* * *

The second lesson to be drawn from the elections is that unity must be fought for and strengthened once it is achieved. This unity can be maintained only on the basis of agreement on the main issue. In the present juncture of history, this main issue is the winning of the war and support of the President's win-the-war policies. A coalition based on such unity and agreement is most effective when its members refuse to be deflected from its course by secondary or spurious issues. This is especially so when the remaining hope of the enemy is to cause a split in the coalition by means of bogus propaganda.

In the course of the elections, labor leaders and those responsible for leading Murphy's campaign recognized this in words, but not in deeds. They had agreed that the win-the-war coalition in New Jersey, based on unity on the main issue, must include the Hague wing
of the Democratic Party. Privately, they worked for a tremendous plurality in Hudson County and counted on Hague's Democratic Party machine to pull out the victory. They were willing, so to speak, to be blessed with Hague's votes, but never to take the offensive on this question against the real enemy who was raising the bogus issue of Hagueism in order to sidetrack the voters from the main issue.

That the fake issue of Hagueism played a decided role in this election cannot be doubted for a moment. The paean of victory sung by the *Newark Evening News* on November 3 that "Bossism and political fakery were handsomely and effectively rebuked by the people of New Jersey yesterday," was but a small echo of the hue and cry raised by Edge and by the press in the state during and following the campaign. This is what gives the lie to any attempt to picture the election issues as having been waged on the President's war policies.

In this situation, it was not enough for labor to keep silent and permit the most reactionary forces in the state to become the "champions" of honest, unbossed politics. The results have shown the incorrectness of that attitude. Ensnconced in the driver's seat more firmly than ever today and ruling the destinies of our state in Trenton are Boss Marsh, Vanderbilt, and their satellites together with the most sinister boss of them all, Walter E. Edge, the man who hates Roosevelt more than he hates Hitler. If it were a question of machine politics, it is not the Democratic Party but the Republican Party that has in New Jersey the best greased machine. Labor should have made it clear also that, though Hague opposed revision of the Constitution, it was the Republican majority, not Hague, which for several years blocked this revision. Labor should have made much clearer the pro-war records of Mary Norton, Wene, Hart, all Hague supporters, and contrasted these with the infamous record of the Republican delegation, supporters of Edge, to prove that Hagueism was raised by Edge to conceal his reactionary and defeatist aims.

Labor certainly cannot wish for the support of the Hague forces on the one hand, while on the other hand fearing to explain their win-the-war stand. This position was and is a principled one, so long as it rests on agreement on the main issue of support of the war and the President's war policies. It is as principled as labor's voluntary no-strike pledge and opposition to all strike measures, no matter what the provocation. It stems from the same premise—unconditional support of the people's war. Such a stand does not mean that labor in any way condones Hague's past labor record, which is well known. Nor does it commit labor to acceptance of policies opposed to the welfare of the people.

In 1944, reaction will again trot out these fake issues. If one of these issues should lose its power to confuse, it will invent a new one. Labor can ill afford to be on the defensive in regard to such issues. While waging a resolute campaign on the major issues, it must know
how to combat the fake issues raised by the enemy.

* * *

The third lesson provided by the election is that a win-the-war coalition is not something that can exist on paper. It must be organized. Such a coalition based on action was possible but never fully materialized. Unity within the Democratic Party, established only formally, was allowed to deteriorate. Main responsibility for this rests on the shoulders of Governor Edison. Throughout the campaign he directed his main fire on Hague, a strange way of giving support to Murphy! This did incalculable harm among the farmers and middle classes, to whom he was counted upon to make the strongest appeal. Whether he realized it or not, Edison objectively was the tool of Edge and the Republicans throughout the campaign. It is no accident that the same press which is hailing Edge's victory is hailing Edison on parallel terms.

With all of Edison's talk of rebuilding the Democratic Party, he has not lifted a finger to build it in areas where leaders are presumably supporting him.

Edison's lukewarm endorsement of Murphy was more than offset by his subsequent knifing of Murphy through the Hague issue. It is yet to be determined whether his meeting with Farley at the height of the campaign was just a chance social meeting as he claimed.

Labor's hesitation to deal sharply with Edison and his maneuvers prevented it from taking a more decided hand in helping to unify the Democratic Party.

Secondly, in connection with building the win-the-war coalition, labor became victim to the propaganda that Murphy was exclusively a "labor candidate." It did not sufficiently combat this in its own appeal to the voters, nor did it strongly combat the tendency on the part of the Democratic Party to place sole responsibility for the campaign at labor's door. A major weakness in this connection was the neglect and failure to organize citizens' committees from the various sections of the population in support of Murphy. With the exception of a strong committee representative of the Negro people and a minor independent Republican committee, no other committees, such as churchmen, women, national groups, or professionals, were organized. This election showed that labor and the win-the-war coalition cannot hope to win without rallying strong support of the middle class and the suburban elements.

A third weakness in the campaign which prevented broadening of the pro-war coalition was the failure to approach the farmers. With Elmer Wene, influential among farmers in South Jersey, as Murphy's campaign manager, the situation was ideal for organizing farm support for Murphy. Wene's hesitation on this score proved to be disastrous. Labor, on its part, failed to make a direct approach to the farmers, because it was fearful of alarming them. There was a failure all around to recognize that never was the opportunity more ripe to convince the
farmers of an identity of interests between them and labor.

* * *

The fourth lesson provided by the election results is that the main issues of the war cannot be sidetracked without resulting in defeat. The issues raised by Edge were: States’ Rights, Post-War Employment Through Private Enterprise, “Communist-Labor-Hague Alliance,” New Deal “Bungling,” and Opposition to Fourth Term. Most of these issues had as their motive an attack on national and United Nations’ unity. This was evidenced descriptively by newspaper advertisements throughout the state inserted by the Republican State Committee attacking Murphy as a “Communist-Labor-Hague candidate.”

How did the anti-Hitler camp meet this attack? Murphy, while assailing Edge’s past isolationist record, did not link it with his reactionary record of today, nor did he show that Edge’s attack on national and United Nations’ unity was a continuation of the path to appeasement. Because he refused to identify himself more openly with President Roosevelt’s war policies, Murphy hesitated to attack the anti-war record of the Republican delegation in Congress, with which Edge is associated. An indication of this hesitation to identify Murphy’s campaign with the Roosevelt war policies was the refusal to allow a high Administration spokesman to come in to refute Willkie’s endorsement of Edge. It was clear that Willkie was as much interested in attacking the President as in championing Edge’s candidacy.

The result of all this is that the responsibility for undermining the war effort was not placed squarely on the shoulders of Edge and his associates, who took full advantage of the dissatisfaction caused by these very reactionaries and defeatists. A decided change in the election results could have been effected if Murphy had been more resolute in projecting the full win-the-war program of labor which serves the best interests of the entire nation.

True, labor, by written and spoken word, tried to correct Murphy’s hesitations in this regard. It came forward as the staunch supporter of Roosevelt and his war policies; but since labor did not reach out in the main beyond its own organizations, it could neither produce the maximum effect, nor counterbalance the waverings of Murphy’s campaign managers.

The anti-Hitler camp did not effectively combat Edge’s reactionary theory of States’ Rights, with its demagogic appeal to the middle class. It failed to show that the middle class has nothing to gain materially from such a policy, that this would shatter any possibility of a centralized war policy today and, moreover, that it is in direct conflict with Edge’s promises of peace-time conversion with least economic dislocation.

Furthermore, the pro-war coalition did not sufficiently answer the Red-baiting of Edge, feeling that it would have no effect on the electorate. This is underrating the ability
of reaction to confuse the people. The only guarantee against this divisive Hitler technique is a firm, resolute stand, in defense of the democratic rights of all the people.

* * *

Among the positive features of the campaign is the fact that unity of the people in New Jersey is today cemented far beyond the pre-election period.

In addition, an embryo of the ABC labor organization, instrument for independent labor action, is today a potentially powerful force.

Three new labor-Democratic Party candidates have been elected to the Assembly, two in Camden and one in Hudson. Also newly elected are two labor-Democratic Party freeholders, shipyard workers, in Camden. Camden is the key example of the state, demonstrating the possibility of welding the anti-Hitler coalition, for building the alliance of labor and the Democratic Party, for strengthening the ABC Federation on the basis of real united action between the three arms of labor. The splendid work of the A. F. of L. in the Camden elections has been correctly hailed as a tremendous boost for labor unity everywhere. Though an analysis cannot be undertaken here, it should be noted that the Negro, Italian and Polish vote was favorable to the Democratic Party, while the Jewish vote, though in the majority for Murphy, showed a comparative decline from 1942.

The election results have demonstrated to Edge that he must deal with a potent force that will challenge and defeat any reactionary measures he may expect to undertake.

Labor, if it critically examines the experiences of this campaign, if it is able to overcome the major weaknesses, can look forward with real confidence to 1944 and victory.

* * *

The Communist Party, in the election struggle of the anti-Hitler coalition, did all in its power to help clarify the real issues in the campaign. The efforts of the Communist Party were devoted to overcoming the ideological and organizational weaknesses existing in the anti-Hitler camp and to mobilize labor and the people for the defeat of Edge. The party distributed hundreds of thousands of leaflets and literature. It arranged a series of ten broadcasts. In addition, it bought newspaper space to bring its program of unity for victory to the people.

The Communist Party, independently, and through its membership in the trade unions, exposed the strategy of reaction to divide the win-the-war coalition by means of fake issues, such as Hagueism. It consistently made clear that Murphy, stemming from the ranks of labor, represented the best interests of the people as a whole. It contributed forces to the building of the ABC Federation and stressed the significance of continuing the independent political action of labor in the period ahead. Throughout the
campaign, it stressed the need of broadening and strengthening the win-the-war coalition.

However, the Communist Party did not sufficiently recognize the need of advancing its own candidates more resolutely before the people. While advancing its own program of unity behind the war effort, it erroneously hesitated to stress the role of its own candidates. This is a weakness that resulted in a small vote, not in excess of 3,500, for the Communist candidates, who mainly ran for State Assembly offices. Nevertheless, in actual day-to-day political life and activities, the role and influence of the Communist Party in New Jersey are today more widely recognized than ever before. It has been accepted as an acknowledged force in the win-the-war coalition. This is made more clear by the fact that, though the Republican-led reactionaries tried to provoke Murphy and the anti-Hitler camp, there was not a single Red-baiting attack on the Communist Party from a single win-the-war force in the anti-Hitler coalition.

The Communist Party, working in unison with all the forces in the win-the-war coalition, is doing all in its power to help assure victory of the people in the 1944 elections.
THE C.I.O. NATIONAL CONVENTION

BY WILLIAM Z. FOSTER

THE sixth national convention of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, held in Philadelphia beginning November 1 and speaking in the name of its 5,285,000 affiliated members, was a win-the-war convention in the most literal sense of the word. The 600 delegates, capably led by Philip Murray, by their decisions greatly strengthened our national war effort and gave a correct lead to the labor movement as a whole. The C.I.O. convention spoke, not alone in the interest of its own members and of the great mass of the A. F. of L., but of the whole nation. Its decisions were on a far higher plane than those of the A. F. of L. convention held a few weeks before in Boston.

The C.I.O. convention met in a critical moment of the war. In the sphere of military action the offensive of the United Nations was growing—the great advance of the Red Army was tearing the vitals out of the Nazi army, the big air offensive was shattering Hitler's home cities, the anti-submarine campaign was succeeding, the attack in Italy was progressing, and the pressure against Japan increasing. Meanwhile, in Moscow, the three Foreign Secretaries, Hull, Eden and Molotov, were holding their fateful conference, upon the success of which depended victory in the war and the hopes for a democratic peace. On the American home front, however, the situation was critical. In Congress the defeatists and profiteers, insolent after many months of successful opposition to the Administration's domestic policies, were busily carrying on their fight against all measures of economic stabilization and were chattering away endlessly about the toothless Connally resolution on foreign policy. In the industries the workers were displaying widespread discontent at the rising costs of living, and the whole body of coal miners were on strike.

The C.I.O. and the War

The C.I.O. convention, faced by this complicated and difficult situation, whipped out a clear and sharp line of all-out support of the war. Every problem was considered and every policy worked out upon the basis of whether and how much it would contribute toward a United Nations victory. In Philadelphia, as was not the case in Boston, there was no mere formal endorsement of some war policies and opposition to many others of vital character,
but a whole-hearted expression of the workers' patriotic will. In this respect the convention displayed a high degree of unity.

It was in the spirit of the war offensive that the convention carried on its work. It gave ringing support to the closest cooperation among the anti-Hitler allies, stating that "coalition warfare of the United Nations is the key to our victory," and that "the issue before the United Nations is the decisive, full-scale invasion of Europe." In the very midst of its sessions, public announcement was made of the content of the pacts signed at the Moscow Conference. This great world event, which indicated, among other vital matters, that some definite agreement had been arrived at regarding the second front, was hailed enthusiastically by the C.I.O. delegates in session.

The convention gave a strong endorsement to the Administration's conduct of the war, although there was considerable criticism of its failure to stabilize our economy and thus prevent the present rise in living costs. In this general respect Philip Murray, in his report, clearly expressed the stand of the delegation:

"We pledge our continued and unqualified support to our Commander-in-Chief, in fighting men, in production, and in patriotism to enable the United Nations to smash forward with the coalition offensive that has been initiated to an immediate destruction of the fascist Axis."

One of the sharpest expressions of the C.I.O. convention's win-the-war spirit was its ringing re-endorsement of labor's no-strike pledge and its sharply implied condemnation of John L. Lewis. The convention stated clearly and definitely:

"The C.I.O. hereby reaffirms its solemn pledge without any qualifications or conditions that for the duration of the war there must not be any strike or stoppage of work. Each member and each leader of organized labor must make it his responsibility to discharge with scrupulous care this sacred obligation. Any leader of organized labor who deliberately flouts this obligation and any employer who seeks to provoke or exploit labor are playing into the hands of our enemies."

Walter Reuther, still smarting from his failure to capture the recent Buffalo convention of the United Auto Workers with his defeatist-tainted factionalism, was unable to bring his harmful policies into the C.I.O. convention on any issue.

This categoric restatement of the no-strike pledge is very necessary at this time. There is grave discontent among the workers, due to the failure of the Administration to keep living costs pegged at equivalent levels with wages. Big wage movements are afoot in the steel, railroad and other industries. Determined no-strike policies will be necessary in order to prevent these movements from culminating in industrial stoppages that may injure the production of vital war materials, not to mention their provoking anti-labor legislation and anti-union sentiment among the armed forces.
and the broad public. To guard against strikes is doubly necessary now, because, with the prospect of victory looming in the near future, there are tendencies of the Government to relax its economic controls, of employers to intensify their profiteering and anti-labor policies, and of many sections of workers, not feeling as acutely as before the urgency of the war crisis, to try to solve their wage problems by strikes, especially when instigated by irresponsibles of the Lewis type.

The C.I.O.'s Wage Policy

It was no contradiction that the C.I.O. convention, while taking a strong stand against strikes, also adopted a vigorous wage policy. The various speeches, reports and resolutions made it quite clear that the delegates felt that Congress had misapplied the President's seven-point program of economic stabilization, at the expense of the workers. While the farm bloc, dominated by rich agricultural elements, fought to prevent the stabilization of farm prices, and Big Business interests combated every attempt to work out a sound program of taxes and profits control, the anti-Roosevelt Congress refused to legislate against the insatiable demands of these elements. Nor did the Administration fight these forces vigorously enough. Only the wages of the workers have been held stationary, under the strictly enforced Little Steel formula. The general consequence has been that not only has the Administration not succeeded in pushing through its pledged roll-back of prices to the levels of September, 1942, but living costs are steadily on the rise and inflation threatens, while wages remain frozen.

In view of this obviously impossible situation, the C.I.O. convention, while continuing its fight to roll back prices and to establish a more equitable tax and profits control system, correctly demanded the scrapping of the Little Steel formula and the adoption of a flexible wage formula, one that will take into consideration increased living costs, lift the restrictions from the N.W.L.B., and will thus provide a sound basis for economic stabilization. In this connection, Philip Murray pointed out the fact that further to keep labor's wages tied to the Little Steel formula would be provocative of strikes. The convention endorsed as justified the wage demands of the 530,000 coal miners and the 1,500,000 railroad workers, and shortly afterward the 900,000 C.I.O. steel workers also submitted their wage demands to the companies.

Although the letter of President Roosevelt and the speech of Vice-President Wallace to the convention deprecated the placing of new wage demands, and although Mr. Davis, head of the War Labor Board, has publicly stated that the Little Steel formula will be maintained, there are indications in Government circles of a growing conviction that a new wage formula will have to be found. Thus, Mrs. Roosevelt, who often foreshadows Government policy, recently stated that she believed the workers have borne a disproportionate share of the war's economic burdens. Moreover, the Presi-
dent has appointed a committee to restudy the cost of living. In the same strain, Mr. Davis himself wrote a letter to Vice-President Wallace (cited in the *New York Times* of November 6), in which he stated:

"As the months flow by and the Board continues to hold wages to the general level of Sept. 15, 1942, we become increasingly conscious of the fact that we are asking one segment of our society to do its part to protect all Americans from the ravages of inflation, while, at the same time, a similar obligation has not been placed as heavily upon the shoulders of some of the other segments of this society."

**The Question of Political Action**

In the very center of the work of this progressive convention was the matter of united political action of labor and other win-the-war forces. This emphasis was a true reflection of the awakening political alertness of the American working class in the face of the dangerous threat of organized reaction. The delegates were quite aware of the fact that if organized labor is to give maximum backing to the war effort, to protect its living standards, to prevent the Government from falling into the hands of reactionaries in the 1944 elections, and to play a vital role in the post-war period, it must organize itself politically without delay.

In a brilliant speech Sidney Hillman, head of the C.I.O. Political Action Committee, reported on the developing campaign of political organization and activity. Hillman showed that the political movement of labor must proceed jointly with other win-the-war forces. He said, "We must organize our own forces; we must bring all of the other progressive groups into cooperation and collaboration. This is no C.I.O. program or A. F. of L. program. What affects labor affects all of us."

The plan Hillman outlined and which the C.I.O. has already been working upon for several months past, is to mobilize the labor masses through political action committees, either jointly with the A. F. of L. or in parallel action with that body. Mr. Hillman said, "We are opposed to the organization of a third party, surely at this time, because it would divide the forces of the progressives throughout the nation."

Hillman pointed out that the victory scored by the reactionaries in the 1942 Congressional elections was largely due to the inertia and politically unorganized state of the labor movement. He reviewed the major steps that have been taken by the C.I.O. in recent months to remedy these dangerous weaknesses and to prevent an even worse defeat in 1944. Since July 7, he said, conferences have been held in forty states. In many of these conferences A. F. of L. as well as Railroad Brotherhood representatives attended. The comprehensive national plan of organization, unfolded by Hillman, provides for the setting up of fourteen regional offices, and for the establishment of a vast network of labor political committees in states, cities and Congressional districts. Hillman also reported that a fund of
$700,000 is being raised to finance this broad movement.

The convention responded enthusiastically to Hillman's report, and, beyond question, within the coming months, the C.I.O. will be giving a lead to the most far-reaching political movement ever carried on by the workers in this country. The delegates showed that they were determined to prosecute this great new campaign to build a broad mass political movement in the spirit of the tremendous organizing movements of a few years ago which built the C.I.O.

While the convention, for what it considered to be tactical reasons, did not specifically endorse President Roosevelt for a fourth term, it is clear that the main C.I.O. trend is in that direction. While there was much criticism of the Roosevelt Administration for not paying closer attention to labor's economic demands and for not giving the workers more representation in the war administration, this criticism should not be construed as signifying anti-Roosevelt sentiment. It can and will be so exploited, however, by anti-Roosevelt forces. Significant of the convention's attitude toward Roosevelt, the "Statement on Political Action" says, "More consistently than any other man in public life, President Roosevelt, our Commander-in-Chief, has voiced the objectives of this program and fought for their achievement." The failure of the A. F. of L. in its Boston convention to endorse Roosevelt for another term probably signifies that that ultra-conservative body will not endorse any specific candidate for President, unless strong rank-and-file pressure is brought to bear upon the leadership. But this is not the case with the C.I.O. Hillman indicated that the C.I.O., either in special convention in 1944 or in a general "convention of all the groups organized politically," would meet and make the necessary commitments on candidates.

It is the job of the progressive forces throughout the labor movement to give the utmost support to the timely and well-planned united political action movement being led by the C.I.O. Special attention must be given to organizing parallel movements among A. F. of L. unions and to bringing these into the closest cooperation with the C.I.O. organizations. As the convention resolution says, "No more important task confronts us today," than the development of united labor political action. This great movement signifies that the American working class is now taking its first decisive steps into independent political activity. It is pregnant with meaning, not only for the workers, but our whole nation. It must succeed, for only when it does can the 13,-000,000 trade unionists and their families and friends begin to make their political strength count.

National Labor Unity

The C.I.O. convention, realizing the vast importance of united action generally by the workers in these critical times, took a sound position on the vital issue of national trade union unity. The resolution on the
question put the matter briefly as follows:

"Labor unity must encompass first and foremost united action in regard to such measures as total war mobilization, economic stabilization, manpower, anti-labor legislation, and other economic, legislative and political problems.

"The C.I.O. has consistently urged upon the representatives of the A. F. of L. and the Railroad Brotherhoods that the scope of the work of the Combined Labor Victory Committee be expanded and the creation of joint committees on a statewide and local basis be encouraged to establish labor's leadership in rallying the people behind our Commander-in-Chief and our nation's victory."

This intelligent program of united labor action, leading toward eventual organic trade union unity, contrasts sharply with the reactionary line now being followed by the top A. F. of L. leadership. Their idea of arriving at "unity" is by pulling unions, or chunks of unions, out of the C.I.O., by inviting the arch-splitter John L. Lewis back into their own ranks, and by sabotaging united political action. The strength of the C.I.O.'s real unity position lies in the fact that it has the solid backing, not only of that organization's own big membership but also of great sections, probably a majority, of the A. F. of L. membership and lower officialdom. The A. F. of L. top leaders, saturated with ultra-conservatism and hamstrung by defeatism of the Woll-Hutcheson type, may succeed in slowing down the movement for national labor unity, but they cannot possibly halt it.

International Labor Unity

The question of international labor cooperation and organization played a big role at the C.I.O. convention. This question has been a burning necessity ever since the war began. It is becoming still more urgent with the improving prospect of victory and the emergence of a whole new series of vital international labor problems connected with the freeing of the occupied countries and preparations for the post-war period. Accordingly, the convention went on record for international unity of the trade unions in all the United Nations. This will undoubtedly involve sending a strong C.I.O. delegation to the world conference of organized labor, called by the British Trade Union Congress, to open in London on June 5, 1944.

The A. F. of L. Executive Council's policy regarding international trade union unity has been completely repudiated by events. The attempt to isolate the Soviet trade unions through the Anglo-American Trade Union Committee has proved a failure. The conservative British labor leader Walter Citrine lent his support to this contemptible project, but Will Lawther, head of the British Miners Union, spoke the opinion of the British working class when he recently denounced the A. F. of L.'s action as "sheer treason to the working class movement." The successful outcome of the Moscow Tri-Power Conference, by strengthening the unity of the United Nations, has sentenced to death the A. F. of L. attempt to surround the Soviet trade
unions with a labor "cordon sanitaire." In the best interests of the workers of all countries, the labor movement of the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, Latin America, the C.I.O., the Railroad Brotherhoods, etc., repudiating the Wolls, Greens and Hutchesons, are moving toward the holding of a world trade union conference. This conference will very probably lay the foundations of a new international labor movement. It will signify the beginning of the healing, in the trade union field at least, of the long-time split in the international labor movement. The A. F. of L. leaders, confronted with this development, now have the choice either of reversing their ridiculous decision of non-cooperation with the Soviet trade unions or of finding themselves isolated internationally. It is to be hoped that many individual A. F. of L. unions, in accordance with their autonomous right, will disregard their leading body's stupid refusal to join hands with Soviet labor and will, like the C.I.O. and Railroad Brotherhoods, send delegates to London.

The Question of Negro Rights

On the burning issue of the rights of the Negro people the C.I.O. convention took a forthright stand. It reiterated "its firm opposition to any form of racial or religious discrimination," commended the work of the Fair Employment Practices Committee, endorsed the C.I.O. Committee to Abolish Racial Discrimination, called for prosecution of the Negro-baiters, demanded the abolition of Jim Crow in the armed forces, and pledged itself to fight for the removal of all economic factors discriminating against the Negro. In line with this policy, the National Maritime Union, upon the motion of Frederick Myers, the union's former representative on the C.I.O. Executive Board, nominated Ferdinand Smith, a Negro, as its new representative.

All this was in refreshing contrast to the evasions and dodgings of the top A. F. of L. leaders at their Boston convention in dealing with the Negro question, the general effect of which was to shield Jim Crow in their unions. It also contrasts with the shamefaced attitude of the railroad union leaders who failed to come before the recent sessions of the Fair Employment Practices Committee and to explain to the country why many of their unions deny Negroes membership, segregate them in Jim-Crow locals, push them out of the railroad industry, and engage in various other discriminatory practices.

In line with its generally progressive stand on national minority questions, the C.I.O. convention condemned anti-Semitism as "treason to America," and outlined a program of relief for Jewish refugees and of punishment for fomenters of race hatred. The convention also demanded the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act, whereas the Boston A. F. of L. convention actually insisted upon the retention of this ultra-reactionary legislation.

The Organization of the Unorganized

The convention also paid much attention to the important question of organizing the unorganized mil-
lions of workers into trade unions. For this task there is now a very favorable opportunity. Never was the need of trade union organization more manifest to the workers than it is at present. The great new armies of Negro workers, women workers, workers from the countryside, as well as the vast masses of white collar workers, all see the cost of living going up and in consequence feel more and more the necessity of organizing their strength for securing more favorable wage conditions. To bring these new millions into the ranks of trade unionism will be of the most profound consequence to the labor movement and to American democracy. The reported additions of 1,135,386 members to the C.I.O. and 1,081,560 to the A.F. of L. during the past year are proof positive of the readiness of the workers to organize. In view of the C.I.O.'s splendid record in organizing the workers, it may be accepted as practically a foregone conclusion that the enthusiasm and planning generated at the convention will result, during the coming months, in substantial increases in the C.I.O. membership.

**Post-War Problems**

The convention devoted considerable attention to various domestic problems connected with the post-war period. For, as victory in the war grows more certain and nearer, questions as to how the peacetime economy in this country will be organized become constantly more urgent. In view of the possibilities of victory within the near future, questions now viewed as domestic post-war problems may well be among the central issues of the 1944 election campaign, not as issues of the future but of the immediate present. The matter of preparing to furnish jobs to displaced war workers and the returning soldiers, once victory has been achieved, already constitutes an issue of acute importance. The C.I.O. is doubly concerned in this entire matter, because the industries in which it functions principally—steel, automobile and aircraft, ship-building, machine, electric, etc.—are precisely the ones that will face the biggest problems in the conversion from wartime to peacetime production. The Post-War Planning Committee, headed by John Brophy, submitted an extensive report to the convention. One of the most important phases of this general problem acted upon by the convention related to provisions for protecting the interests of returning soldiers and sailors, including an endorsement of President Roosevelt's recent proposal for the expenditure of a billion dollars for a well-planned educational plan for veterans and members of the merchant fleet.

In the matter of domestic post-war plans there is need for a common program and for joint action between the A.F. of L. and the C.I.O. With the workers everywhere deeply concerned about what will happen to our economy at the end of the war, with vast numbers of men of our armed forces placing the question of post-war jobs in the forefront of their thinking, and with both industry and the Government busy with innumerable economic
plans for the post-war period, organized labor must not be caught short on the question. It must have definite plans of its own and stand united to secure favorable consideration for them, once the enemy throws up his hands in surrender. In the developing political movement of the workers the questions of our post-war economy, especially the matter of jobs, must be given increasing attention.

In Conclusion

Besides the matters enumerated above, this fine convention of the C.I.O. dealt with many other issues of major importance, which can only be listed here. Among these were, (a) endorsement of the Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill, providing for repeal of the Frey Amendment to more adequate social security; (b) the Appropriations Act to the National War Labor Board; (c) a program of national food production; (d) independence for India; (e) adequate labor representation in the war administrative agencies; (f) appointment of labor attachés to the staffs of American Ambassadors; (g) repeal of state anti-labor legislation; (h) strengthened relations with the workers of Latin America; (i) improved care of working women's children; (j) strengthening of the women's auxiliaries to C.I.O. unions; (k) a centralized war economy, without "any national service legislation"; (l) extension of the right of suffrage to all American citizens over 18 years of age; (m) abolition of the poll tax; (n) an end to the persecution of Harry Bridges; (o) repeal of the Smith-Connally Act; etc.

The convention unanimously elected, with demonstrations of approval, Philip Murray and the previous body of officers, with the addition, already noted, of Ferdinand Smith to the Executive Board. The convention, having accomplished its purpose of more thoroughly uniting its forces to win the war and the peace, closed amid scenes of enthusiasm.

The sixth convention of the C.I.O. marks a new high stage in the growth of the American labor movement. The A. F. of L. at its Boston convention gave general support to the war, but its political level was far below that of the C.I.O. convention. The latter was an authentic expression of the progressive, win-the-war determination now animating the American working class. And its splendid spirit is not confined to the C.I.O. alone. Much of this same progressive trend is also being shown by various city and state federations and international unions of the A. F. of L., which are increasingly coming into conflict with the conservative and often reactionary policies of the A. F. of L.'s Executive Council. The C.I.O. convention will give a stimulus to progressivism throughout the labor movement. Especially will it spur the movement toward national labor unity, which is so essential for the victory of the win-the-war forces in the crucial 1944 elections.
THE A. F. OF L. CONVENTION

BY J. K. MORTON

The sixty-third Annual Convention of the A. F. of L., held in Boston on October 4-14, coincided with events of utmost importance both at home and abroad. It preceded by a few weeks the historic Tri-Power Conference in Moscow and the important November elections. The ominous threat of another coal strike was again hanging over the nation. The situation demanded foresight, statesmanship, leadership.

The convention faced heavy responsibilities and great opportunities. It had to estimate its policies and decisions in accordance with the rapid developments of the war, to exert its great influence to help bring victory at the earliest possible moment, to strengthen national unity and the United Nations coalition, to provide clear answers to labor's urgent problems on the home front, and to guarantee labor's increasing role in the war and in the making of the peace to follow.

The Moscow Conference, the November elections and the recent coal strike already provide the basis for estimating the A. F. of L. convention on the scale of living reality. These events demonstrate how rapidly today the policies and practices of labor are tested in the fire of practical application; how impossible it is to adhere to a stand-pat approach, and to outworn policies; to avoid bold, progressive thinking; to cling to old tempos; and to attempt to place a brake upon the course of history.

The Moscow conference, which shattered the conspiratorial hopes of the Axis reactionary camp everywhere, and marks a new stage in the development of the war and the United Nations coalition, could not but exert a profound effect upon the world of labor. The action of the British Trade Union Congress, paralleled by the position of the recent C.I.O. convention, in calling a world congress of trade unions more than upsets the Citrine-Nagler machinations against the Soviet trade unions and international trade union unity.

It confronts the A. F. of L. with a new situation which demands urgent re-examination of the convention's decisions on the question of international trade union unity. The A. F. of L. and its leadership must now decide whether they shall become a partner—important and influential—in a world coalition of labor, or whether they shall become
isolated from the labor movement of the world, including their own affiliates in Canada. This issue is inevitably bound up with deep-going repercussions among the membership of the A. F. of L., including local unions, city and state bodies, and even some international unions. Conceivably, also, the more responsible members of the A. F. of L. Executive Council of the Green-Tobin-Brown type may find it necessary to differentiate themselves more sharply from the reactionary-Republican gang of Woll-Hutcheson-Ryan. All the more so since the position of the reactionary Taft-Wheeler forces on the Connally Senate Resolution spotlights more clearly the political objectives of the Hutcheson-Lewis combination in the A. F. of L.

The November elections likewise present new lessons and problems to the membership and leadership of the A. F. of L.

While manifesting great concern over reactionary legislative trends in Congress and various state legislatures, as exemplified in the report of Judge Padway, the convention failed to draw the practical conclusions with regard to the urgent need of joint labor action. Nor did it take any action toward a clear, unified policy for the November elections. As a consequence, two trends were apparent: on the one hand, the growing movement below for joint political action with the C.I.O., and the Railroad Brotherhoods, as seen in New Jersey, Ohio and other localities; on the other, emboldened operations by reactionary Republican elements demonstrated in the endorsement of Republican Hanley by the New York State Executive of the A. F. of L. The two conflicting trends are moving toward inevitable conflict. They will be brought into direct collision over the major question—the position of the A. F. of L. toward the win-the-war leadership and policies of President Roosevelt in the 1944 elections. This question cannot be evaded. It will be fought out in every local, city, and state body, and in the national leadership of the A. F. of L.

Nor is it possible for labor to pass over vital issues in silence without paying the corresponding price politically. The issue of John L. Lewis and the disruption of coal production on the very eve of the elections affected the results adversely for labor as a whole. While displaying greater political maturity, activity and organization in the last elections, it is equally obvious that labor has not yet sufficiently won in the eyes of the population the position of champion of the best interests of the nation as a whole, as well as its own interests. It is necessary for labor to win such a position. All narrow craft or union considerations that conflict with the broader interests must be discarded as incompatible with the further security and progress of the labor movement itself.

In this respect, too, the action of the convention on the John L. Lewis application for affiliation and the silence of the A. F. of L. leadership during the last coal strike did not help to disassociate the labor movement, particularly the A.
F. of L., from the actions of Lewis, which the nation as a whole and the armed forces regard as treasonous.

With regard to the problem of united labor political action and the question of John L. Lewis, therefore, the A. F. of L. is confronted with a revaluation of its convention decisions.

There is reason to believe that such revaluation will meet with considerable response in the ranks of the A. F. of L.

The membership of the A. F. of L., which has reached the record figure of 6,000,000, is overwhelmingly behind the war effort and the Commander-in-Chief. In all phases of the war effort, as well as directly in the line of production, this membership has established a high standard. No small measure of the A. F. of L. membership's contribution to the war effort is to be found in the casualty list on the production front. According to President Green, 80,000 members have been killed and 7,000,000 injured on and off the job, "serving as soldiers of production." The no-strike pledge, according to President Roosevelt, has been kept 99.9 per cent in the United States of America.

Consequently, the action of the convention in pledging increased support for the war effort and the Commander-in-Chief and reaffirming its no-strike pledge cannot be regarded as a mere formality.

These facts must not obscure or minimize the harmful and highly dangerous role which the reactionary Republican Woll-Hutcheson-Ryan and the Social-Democratic Dubinsky forces played at the convention. Because of the very limited strength of the progressive win-the-war forces on the one hand, and the vacillating, inconsistent and at times reactionary position of such win-the-war leaders as Green and Tobin, on the other, it was possible for the defeatists to make a bold bid for leadership, to score important advances, and even to throw the convention backward on vital issues.

But the defeatist forces were unable to derail the convention from its win-the-war position and to foist upon it their complete defeatist program. They were unable to do this because of the overwhelming win-the-war position of the membership, the irresistible trend of the nation as a whole, and the pressure of outside forces, developments, and events. These considerations are of utmost importance in estimating future perspectives inside the A. F. of L. They also go to explain the specific devious and dishonest tactics employed by the defeatist forces at the convention.

Defeatist Tactics

The defeatist clique could not and did not dare to come out in the open with their real program. Open presentation of their objectives would have led them to sharp attack upon the Commander-in-Chief, support for the reactionary negotiated-peace elements of the Republican Party, repudiation of the no-strike pledge, etc. This they did not dare do. They were compelled to use the tactics of flank attack. As the ground for their main battles they chose two questions:

1. The application of John L.
Lewis for reaffiliation to the A. F. of L.

2. International trade union unity.

The Issue of John L. Lewis

Confronted with the possibility of another coal strike at the end of October, and the indefensible war record of John L. Lewis, his proponents attempted to conceal the basic questions involved. They resorted, instead, to false arguments and slogans. The Woll-Hutcheson-Ryan elements suddenly displayed an all-consuming passion for labor unity. Bring back the 600,000 miners, they argued. Lewis is but a personality. Why permit personalities to obstruct the cause of labor unity? (How different things would have been in the labor movement today if these people had displayed the same concern for unity in 1936, when they expelled one-third of the A. F. of L. membership for the “crime” of advocating industrial unionism and the organization of the unorganized!)

The demagogy of this argument, however, was clearly exposed in the attitude of the convention toward the C.I.O. The logic of the convention’s position on the question of the war called for unity with the C.I.O. and its win-the-war policies. The same logic demanded the rejection of Lewis and his policies as incompatible with the basic declarations of the convention. Yet in relation to unity or cooperation with the C.I.O., the A. F. of L. leadership employed the most pessimistic terms. Obviously the false slogan of “unity” concealed other objectives, the true objectives of the Hutcheson forces, who pushed the convention in the direction of unprincipled alliance with Lewis for unrestrained warfare against the C.I.O.

The actual “unity” envisaged by the defeatist forces was expressed by delegate Martel of Detroit (a city whose population he contemptuously described as being “made up of the bottom of the barrel from the four corners of the earth.”)

Martel drew a glowing picture of imminent disintegration within the C.I.O. (Disappointingly for him, unconfirmed either by the Automobile Workers Convention or the Philadelphia Convention of the C.I.O.) As for the special role of Lewis, he stated:

“... the leader of the United Mine Workers of America has a score to settle with some of the world savers that he made in the C.I.O., and there is nothing that would be more to our advantage than to take John and his miners back into the American Federation of Labor and give him the task of driving these boys back into their holes. I am sure he knows how to do it.” (My emphasis —J. K.)

This brazenly reactionary program for the destruction of the C.I.O. and for war against everything progressive in the labor movement crudely submerged the pious pleadings of William Green, who explained Lewis’ request for reaffiliation by saying:

“Well, it is my opinion that the years have mellowed his judgment. He has admitted he is wrong. The fact that he is coming home must be interpreted as an admission that a mistake was made.”
Notwithstanding all efforts to conceal the defeatist, anti-Administration, pro-strike and insurrectionary character of the Hutcheson-Lewis-Republican conspiracy, these basic issues were voiced in the convention.

Delegates Lazzari of the Pittsburgh Central Labor Union and Fletcher of the Building Service Employees forcefully and ably voiced these issues.

Lazzari made clear his point, that "Behind this smokescreen we can see the Lewis-Smith-Connally Axis . . . the 'Hate-Roosevelt' gang of America Firsters."

Fletcher made it clear that "District 50 is not the issue. . . . The issue is whether we are going to have unity in America to defeat Nazism and fascism, and I see nothing but chaos if John L. Lewis is brought back into the Federation."

Nor were these delegates alone. In addition to the Progressive Miners, such delegates as Harvey Brown of the Machinists, and Lynch of the Pattern Makers expressed their opposition on grounds of procedure, while others who did not speak can yet be drawn into the struggle against John L. Lewis.

Hutcheson and his supporters tried to bring Lewis into this convention. It is of great significance that they did not succeed. While the defeatist forces made advances in the direction of bringing Lewis' re-admission closer, their schedule was upset and serious obstacles and forces were revealed which furnish the basis for successful struggle to keep Lewis out of the A. F. of L. One of these obstacles was expressed in the unmistakable reluctance of the Executive Council to readmit Lewis in the face of the embarrassing prospects of a coal strike. While the silence of the Council during the strike is inexcusable, the issues revived by the strike make it still more difficult for the Council to take favorable action on Lewis without subjecting to doubt every positive, patriotic decision taken by the convention.

The labor movement and the progressive forces within the U.M.W.A. have the urgent duty to enlighten the miners on the dangerous and ruinous course of the Lewis leadership. The indisputable fact that the present settlement of the mine dispute could have been realized last May without strike action, and the Smith-Connally Bill, with the general harm to labor, avoided, were it not for Lewis' sinister manipulation of miners' justified grievances, must be made clear to the miners and the entire labor movement.

The miners' problems are by no means solved by the wage agreement finally concluded. The problems of effective wage policy, stabilization, and price roll-backs still await fundamental solution. This solution, which rests primarily on the degree of unity in labor's ranks, on united labor political and legislative action, and on labor's ability to win the support of the nation behind its justified demands, has been most seriously retarded and obstructed by the policies and leadership of Lewis. Only through repudiation of such policies and leadership can the miners move forward unitedly with the rest of the labor
movement toward the most effective solution of their common problems. This is the lesson of the November elections. This is the lesson of labor's entire experience in this war.

**International Trade Union Unity**

The tactic of submerging basic issues employed in relation to Lewis was reversed by the Woll-Hutcheson-Republican and the Social-Democratic-Dubinsky forces on the question of international labor unity. God forbid any "political" considerations in relation to John L. Lewis. But in relation to the Soviet trade unions the discussion became intensely "political."

Under cover of anti-Soviet, anti-Communist outbursts, the defeatist forces sought to realize objectives which they did not dare openly to place before the convention. The efforts to undermine the United Nations Coalition, to sabotage the Moscow Conference, to convert the A. F. of L. into a center of anti-Soviet intrigue, to advance the political objectives of the Hutcheson-Lewis-Woll conspiracy on the home front, to disrupt national unity and the growing political unity of labor—all these objectives became concentrated in the attack upon international labor unity.

Blinded by anti-Soviet prejudices and senseless fear of the Communists, the leadership of the A. F. of L. fell victim to this defeatist strategy. By so doing, the convention placed the A. F. of L. into an untenable position. If on the question of the Oriental Exclusion Law the convention found it necessary, under pressure of events, to shift to some degree from the original position of the Executive Council, then on the question of world labor unity the A. F. of L. is faced with the necessity of a drastic readjustment of policy. Failure in this regard bids fair to produce disastrous consequences for the prestige of the A. F. of L. leadership and to do incalculable damage to the standing and future development of the A. F. of L. This is not to mention the inestimable damage to labor's role and influence in the further conduct of the war, the shaping of the peace and the whole course of post-war economic and political readjustment. This question involves the very future of the labor movement, its growth and security.

Important signs are not lacking that prominent leaders and growing sections of the A. F. of L. are beginning to see the full import of this problem in the light of the new situation created by the Moscow Conference and the calling of the World Labor Congress by the British trade unions. This issue may yet prove a Waterloo for the wrecking, defeatist elements in the A. F. of L. whose disruption now becomes so glaringly apparent.

The greetings of Green, Tobin, Brown, Lindeloff and others to the November 7 Congress of Soviet-American Friendship, as well as the direct participation of McFetridge in the Congress—may well prove to be indications of the most constructive developments within the A. F. of L. on this question.

The task of all constructive, win-the-war forces in the A. F. of L. is to aid with utmost energy all de-
developments in the direction of world trade union unity. Such actions as exchange of delegations between international and national unions and corresponding unions in Britain and the Soviet Union, to take place well before the World Congress of Trade Unions; establishment of contact, correspondence, and exchange of information, would be of utmost importance. Alongside with this is the desirability of widespread endorsement of the Moscow Conference, widespread clarification of its meaning and significance, and the popularization of the decisions of the Soviet-American Friendship Congress.

The question of world trade union unity is the paramount issue now confronting the A. F. of L.

Rights of Negro Members

The discussion on the Negro question reflected with special forcefulness the pressure of outside forces, particularly the C.I.O., the Negro communities, and the Administration, upon the A. F. of L. This pressure, together with that of the growing Negro membership inside the A. F. of L., impelled the convention to adopt a high-sounding declaration, in many ways a very advanced document. But the convention refused to take a single practical step toward eliminating Jim Crow, discrimination, the organization of the odious auxiliary locals, and other intolerable practices against the Negro members.

Father Haas, of the F.E.P.C., in moving and irrefutable terms laid before the convention its clear duty on this question, as indicated in the following passage from his remarkable address:

"The interests of this nation at war coincide with the desire of minority group members to be a part of the trade union movement. . . . The duty of organized labor to itself is to keep strong and maintain its democratic structure against all opposition. That there might be welded now a unity which in the post-war period can withstand any possible disintegrating influences, is the part of patriotism and clear duty of good trade unionism. I am confident that the A. F. of L. will meet this challenge."

This challenge, unfortunately, was not met by the convention. The failure to do so is all the more glaring through the unwitting but nonetheless telling indictment of the A. F. of L. by William Green when he admitted:

"I know not why . . . we are boycotted by representatives of the prominent Negro organizations of America . . . outstanding artists like Mr. Robeson, who entertains audiences on the stage throughout the country, the representatives of the Urban League, the representatives of the organization known as the National Association of Colored People, colored preachers representing the colored churches of the country all united and every one of them were against the A. F. of L."

Green, upon closer scrutiny, could well have found much of the answer to his perplexity in the convention itself. For, of a claimed membership of 500,000 Negro workers in the A. F. of L., only two Ne-
groes sat as delegates or took part in the convention.

The ganging up against A. Philip Randolph by a number of international officials served with each word further to indict the A. F. of L. on this issue, and to emphasize the defensive position of the leadership.

It is to be hoped that McGowan’s hint that some action may be taken by the coming convention of the Boilermakers in January may result in the elimination of the auxiliary local in that international union. Such action becomes a matter of honor for the entire membership of this union. Moreover, this issue serves as a test of the entire win-the-war position and effectiveness of the A. F. of L. Failure of the A. F. of L. to meet the test on this issue is a matter of grave concern to the nation as well as to its own membership.

Nor can the progressive forces at the convention be absolved of responsibility or criticism on this question. The fact that not a single white delegate rose in defense of the rights of Negro members and in condemnation of the discriminatory practices is highly inexcusable and can only be explained by a lack of understanding of the Negro question.

Sole championship of this issue fell to the lot of Randolph, whose handling of the Negro question is gravely jeopardized by his ideological kinship to the defeatist Norman Thomas; by his anti-Soviet attacks against the only nation that has won the love and devotion of all oppressed and minority peoples for its magnificent solution of the problem of nationalities; by his slanderous attacks against the Daily Worker and the Communists, whose outstanding contributions to the struggle for the rights of the Negro people are a matter of indisputable public knowledge.

In his partisan handling of this problem, Randolph goes so far as to defend the failure of the Dubinsky forces within the A. F. of L. convention (witness Nagler’s anti-Soviet outburst) and attending the convention in considerable numbers: Randolph’s defense of Dubinsky rests on the claim that the latter never walked out of an A. F. of L. convention while Randolph was speaking. As though mere willingness to listen to a Negro defending the rights of his people is proof of a labor leader’s integrity on this question or an excuse for his failure to fight uncompromisingly alongside his Negro brother. The Communists, whom Randolph attacks, have always acted on the premise that it is first of all the duty of every white worker to lead in the fight for Negro rights and equality.

What is needed above all is for the white membership of the A. F. of L. to recognize more fully its duty in this matter. Resolutions coming before the convention, as well as the records of numerous local, city and state bodies, indicate that the membership is far from indifferent or inactive on this question. But these efforts are still too inadequate and fall short of the possibilities of the Negro and progressive white membership of the A. F. of L.
Conflicting Forces

The convention as a whole presented a picture of contradictions and conflicting forces.

On the one hand, the convention evidenced deep and genuine concern over the Padway report, and the problems of post-war reconstruction, while, on the other, it refused to draw the logical conclusions of joint labor political action and international trade union unity.

The convention endorsed the F.E.P.C., but refused all practical measures to apply the requirements of the F.E.P.C. in the A. F. of L. It adopted high-sounding resolutions and laid claim to being the most advanced and progressive organization, but at the same time endorsed the Dies Committee and refused to bring deeds in conformity with words. It reaffirmed the no-strike pledge, but took thoroughly inconsistent action on the issue of John L. Lewis.

These and similar inconsistencies are the expression of deep-going developments in and outside the organization. The convention widened still further the gap between the Executive Council, the leadership of the A. F. of L., and its lower organizations and membership. Immediately following the convention, broad conferences of A. F. of L., C.I.O., and Railroad Brotherhoods took place in Texas and Arizona, going on record for the Fourth Term and other progressive measures. These significant actions in the South are but a continuation of similar trends expressed in the A. F. of L. by such actions as endorsements of the Fourth Term by the Illinois and Ohio State Federations, countless actions against readmission of Lewis, the favoring of joint labor action and world labor unity, and many other progressive commitments. Unfortunately, this trend was not strong enough to determine the course of the convention.

The absence of consistent, courageous, progressive leadership and insufficient strength on the part of the progressive win-the-war forces made it possible for the Woll-Hutcheson-Republican and the Dubinsky-Social-Democratic forces to seize the initiative, to make advances in the promotion of the Lewis conspiracy and the wrecking activities on the issue of world labor unity. The defeatist forces will unquestionably try to press their advantage organizationally and politically.

These forces cannot remain unchallenged. The A. F. of L. stands at the cross-roads. One road leads along the line of the Hutcheson-Lewis-Woll clique straight to the reactionary Republican camp, to war upon President Roosevelt in 1944, to isolation from world labor, and to all the other reactionary consequences. It is inconceivable that the defeatist forces will have their way. Rather it is to be hoped that their disruptive activities reached the peak at the convention and will soon meet with repudiation on the part of the membership and important sections of the leadership. Conflicting trends reflected in the A. F. of L. are well on the way toward a climax. Their solution will either move the A. F. of L. very far backwards or very far ahead.
What happens in this respect to an organization of 6,000,000 is a matter of the greatest consequences for labor and the entire nation. Nor will the issue resolve itself automatically. It can and will be influenced decisively by the win-the-war, progressive forces within the A. F. of L., upon whom falls the first and foremost responsibility.

The outcome will also be greatly influenced by the C.I.O., whose understanding of the problem of winning the A. F. of L. membership for united action will play a growing role, together with the role of Negro organizations and other progressive forces whose impact is felt by the membership of the A. F. of L.

As never before, it is necessary to eradicate all tendencies of fatalism, of a "no-use" approach and underestimation with regard to developments taking place in the A. F. of L. Failure to see the A. F. of L. and its 6,000,000 as a decisive political factor and negligence with regard to its problems are fraught with the most serious consequences.

Hence, the progressive forces in the A. F. of L., in close alliance with the membership and the more responsible sections of the leadership, aided by most favorable historical developments, have the great task and responsibility of winning the A. F. of L decisively for victory and progress.
RESULTS OF THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE*

The Moscow Conference of Foreign Secretaries of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union attracted the attention of the world to a far greater degree than many other meetings of leaders of foreign policy. This is natural. The Moscow Conference was the first meeting of authoritative representatives of the three leading Allied countries which head the anti-Hitler coalition of freedom-loving peoples. This meeting was held at a stage in the struggle against Hitler Germany and her allies when, as a result of the Red Army's splendid victories and the successful operations of Anglo-American troops, the full possibility has been created for the quickest defeat of the common enemy by the joint efforts of the Allies.

Undoubtedly, the success of the Moscow Conference is a considerable contribution to the cause of struggle against Hitler Germany and her satellites as well as to securing a long and durable peace after the war.

The significance of the positive results of the Moscow Conference is all the greater since the tasks confronting it were by no means simple and easy. The present stage of the war demands clear and unambiguous decisions, both as regards the further conduct of the war and the establishment of a stable post-war order, protecting the peace-loving peoples from the danger of aggression.

That there are many difficulties in the way of the achievement of such decisions was obvious to everybody. Soviet public opinion and press, just as the public opinion and press in the countries of our Allies, were fully aware of the complex nature of the tasks before the conference. On the other hand, the Hitlerites banked on the difficulty of these tasks in their calculations and forecast the failure of the conference. It is no secret either that isolated voices of "skepticism" with regard to the prospects of the Moscow conference were also raised in the pages of some organs of the Anglo-American press which present an unfavorable attitude toward the Soviet Union.

Having coped with the difficulties of the tasks facing it, the Moscow Conference upset the calculations of the enemies and their associates. Naturally, the conference concentrated its attention above all on the urgent tasks of the conduct of the war and also on the more immediate problems of the post-war period.

The documents published as a result of the work of the conference fully reveal the firm determination...
RESULTS OF THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE

of the peoples of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States to collaborate in the solution of the problems of the war and the post-war problems facing them.

As we already pointed out before the conference, the main foundation for further strengthening the friendly collaboration of the three powers during as well as after the war is the combining of their war efforts to shorten the protracted war. The problem of shortening the war, raised by the Soviet public with understandable persistence, has as a result of the work of the Moscow Conference now received official recognition on the part of the governments of the Allied countries. Expressing the will of their peoples, the governments of the three countries represented at the Moscow Conference unanimously recognized the shortening of the war as their paramount aim. It is to be expected that “definite military operations with regard to which decisions have been taken and which are already in preparation,” mentioned in the communiqué on the conference, will upset Hitler’s last calculations, his banking on prolonging the war. It is now a question of the practical realization of measures recognized as the most important and urgent. It is now a matter of realizing the decisions taken, whose significance and value will be determined precisely by the extent to which and the speed with which these decisions will be carried into practice.

This is well realized by the peoples of all countries who have drained the bitter cup of suffering and humiliation caused them by the hated Hitlerite tyranny.

It is extremely important that the obligations undertaken by the Allies and now confirmed by the Moscow Conference be carried out in time. Of great importance in this connection will be the position of some states which have hitherto pursued a policy of neutrality, as, for example, Turkey. A change on the part of such neutral states to a policy of direct support of the anti-Hitler coalition in its struggle against the already weakened German fascism, the enemy of all freedom-loving peoples, will be very important for the solution of the task of shortening the war.

The Moscow Conference demonstrated the unanimous desire of the peoples of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States to continue the present close collaboration also after the war with the aim of ensuring lasting peace and security for all freedom-loving peoples.

The declaration on universal security, in which the Chinese Government joined during the conference, outlines ways for the solution of the world problem of security. This declaration of four states, representing the further development of a number of similar international documents during the war, is at the same time distinguished from them in that it gives, for the first time, concrete expression to the idea of a leading international nucleus represented by the four leading world powers, which is of great importance both for the defeat of the common en-
emy of the freedom-loving nations and for the entire subsequent international development and especially for uniting all peace-loving states, large and small, in the interest of their national security and universal peace.

Special note must be made of the decision to form, after the war, an international organization, membership in which is accessible to all peace-loving states, large and small alike. This organization must undoubtedly draw lessons from the history of the pre-war decades when the League of Nations was unable to fulfill its role as an instrument of peace and security due to the lack of agreement in policy of the largest peace-loving powers which opened the door to fascist aggression. The historic experience of the period between the First and Second World Wars testifies to the great difficulties of securing lasting peace in Europe. On the other hand, the experience of the present war and the creation of the anti-Hitlerite coalition show that there is ground for broad collaboration of the great democratic powers, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

The consideration of European problems at the Moscow Conference revealed the full importance of broad collaboration of the three great powers. Such a negative feature of the past period as the standing aside from participation in European affairs has already receded to the realm of the past.

The joint decisions of the three Allied powers revealed that these powers fully realized their responsibility for the establishment of a stable post-war order which the entire course of history has placed upon these countries. The proclamation by the declaration of the principle of sovereign equality of all freedom-loving states which will take part in the international organization frustrates the ill-intentioned attempts to sow distrust for the great freedom-loving powers among the small and medium states — attempts originating with the Hitlerites and their "yes-men." Special zeal, in this respect, as is known, is displayed by the reactionary circles of Polish émigrés, who more and more are manifesting their obvious isolation from their people. It is precisely these circles which constitute the source of all sorts of artificial plans for the creation of federations of the states of Central and Eastern Europe.

These plans presuppose the formation of some sort or another of permanent groups of states by émigré governments which, in the majority of cases, lack sufficiently strong ties with the people. Furthermore these plans provide for the unification in one federation of countries which suffered from the Hitlerite brigands as well as those which helped the Hitlerites in their brigandage. It is equally clear that it is proposed to revive, in the form of federations, the policy of the notorious "cordon sanitaire" directed against the Soviet Union.

The harm resulting from the artificial encouragement of such projects, which may lead to the violation of the real will of sovereign peoples by forcing upon them all
a political combination, is obvious. As regards the Soviet Union and its relations with other European states, a definite step forward may be noted in this direction. It is known that in recent months preparations have been under way for the conclusion of a Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of mutual assistance on the model of the Anglo-Soviet agreement. The obstacles in the way of the conclusion of this agreement, known to our readers, have now vanished and in the near future the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, Edouard Benes, is expected to arrive in Moscow for the purpose of signing a treaty with the Soviet Union.

The success of the Moscow Conference increased the dismay and confusion in the enemy camp. On the eve of the conference the Hitlerites, with dull monotony, predicted its inevitable failure, discussing all sorts of differences in the camp of the Allies. Now, after the success of the conference, they are screaming that in Moscow the Allies handed over almost all of Europe to the Bolsheviks.

This invention is not only stupid—it is outworn to the limit and cannot serve even for covering up the retreat before facts in the face of which the stupid Hitlerite propaganda has proved helpless.

Apparently the Hitlerites have lost their heads to such an extent that they are incapable of inventing anything new.

The conference of the three Foreign Secretaries was held in Moscow, capital of the Soviet Union, which is shouldering the brunt of the struggle against the German fascist brigands and their satellites. The Moscow Conference was held on the eve of the twenty-sixth anniversary of Soviet power. Even though this coincidence be accidental, nevertheless it is profoundly symbolic. Ever since the birth of Soviet power, all the forces of international brigandage and aggression, as well as the associates of these forces in the countries destined subsequently to become the victims of the aggressor, pursued a policy directed toward the international isolation of the Soviet Union.

The fascist highway robbers, and all sorts of "appeasers" abetting these brigands, tried not only to isolate the Soviet Union but also to shift onto its shoulders the "guilt" for this isolation.

Today, in the light of the events of the past few years, it has become clear to everybody that the attempts to keep the Soviet Union from participation in the solution of the most important problems of international policy can be of benefit only to the forces inimical to the most vital interests of the peace-loving peoples.

Ever since its origin, the great Soviet power has become the firm bulwark of peace among the peoples. Following Hitler Germany's treacherous attack, the Soviet Union has become the steel wall against which the Hitlerite imperialist vulture has already broken its teeth. Our country has already withstood ordeals which no other country in the world could have endured. Our country was able to inflict on the enemy blows which have already undermined the Hitlerite war ma-
machine built by Germany for conquest of world domination and which render the defeat of the enemy by the combined Allied forces within a short time fully possible.

The strength and significance of these blows have again received eloquent confirmation in the results of the Red Army's summer campaign. The Red Army's victories during the summer and autumn of 1943 have laid a firm foundation for the quick and complete rout of Hitler Germany.

The scope of the contribution made by the Soviet people to the common cause of the Allies is now especially clear. The Moscow Conference, coming as a natural result of all the preceding development of collaboration of the three great powers heading the anti-Hitlerite coalition, at the same time heralds a new stage in the relations among these powers.

Now that the outlines of the forthcoming victory loom clear, special significance is acquired by the efforts of the principal Allied states to ensure a coordinated policy in the solution of the most important problems of the war in Europe, above all, the problem of shortening the war and also of working out definite guiding principles of policy with regard to the post-war period in the interests of preparation of lasting peace and general security.

It would be a mistake to minimize the difficulties inevitably arising in the way of the solution of these problems. But these difficulties can be overcome and the guarantee of this is the successful work of the Moscow Conference of representatives of the three leading world powers.

ERRATUM

Due to a technical oversight an error occurred in the sentence beginning the eleventh line from the bottom of the first column of page 1019 in the November issue of The Communist. The sentence should read:

"The British Trades Union Congress, while failing to act favorably in support of the Communist Party's application for affiliation to the Labour Party, rescinded the 'black circular' which banned Communists from holding posts in the trade union movement. . . ."
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STATEMENT OF THE OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, CIRCULATION, ETC.,
REQUIRED BY THE ACTS OF CONGRESS OF AUGUST 24, 1912, AND
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N. Y., for October 1, 1943.

State of New York }  
County of New York  }  

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