

The Communist

20c

JUNE

1944

UNITY FOR VICTORY, FOR THE ELECTIONS AND FOR POST-WAR SECURITY

Report to the National Convention, Communist Political Association

EARL BROWDER

•

THREE YEARS OF THE SOVIET NATIONAL-LIBERATION WAR

A. LANDY

•

PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE COMMUNIST POLITICAL ASSOCIATION

JOHN WILLIAMSON

•

SOME RECONVERSION PROBLEMS IN THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY

PAT TOOHEY

•

THE A. F. of L. EXECUTIVE COUNCIL MEETING

J. K. MORTON

A New Book of American History:

The Struggle for American Freedom

The First Two Hundred Years

By HERBERT M. MORAIS

Herbert Morais' new study of the first two hundred years of America's history is a first-rate contribution to the growing arsenal of literature on this subject.

The first part, dealing with a century and half of struggle and growth toward nationhood, provides an insight into the English and American background, starting with the economic revolution of 1350-1600, the rise of the Tudor monarchy and the growth of merchant capital seeking new sources of raw materials and wealth. It describes the era of colonization in the New World, the development of tobacco colonies in the South and the rapid growth of commerce in the New England colonies of the Atlantic seaboard. It shows the influence of the English mercantile system on imperial-colonial relations and the unfolding struggle between the merchants of Old England and New England culminating in the revolution of 1688-89 which gave powerful impetus to immigration and economic expansion and which led to a sharpened struggle for control in America.

The second part of Morais' book covers the vitally important years from 1763 to 1801, the growing conflict of interests between Britain and the colonies, the revolutionary upsurge and broad movement for separation leading up to the revolutionary War of Independence and the founding of the American Republic. The book is enriched with copious reference notes, a bibliography, index and several maps.

Price \$2.25



WORKERS LIBRARY PUBLISHERS

P.O. Box 148, Station D (832 Broadway), New York 3, N. Y.

THE COMMUNIST

A MAGAZINE OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MARXISM-LENINISM

EDITOR: EARL BROWDER

CONTENTS

National Convention, Communist Political Association

Greetings to General Eisenhower, Marshal Stalin and Marshal Tito	483
Unity for Victory, for the Elections and for Post-War Security	<i>Earl Browder</i> 485
National Unity for Victory, Security and a Durable Peace	<i>Resolution</i> 501
Preamble to the Constitution of the Communist Political Association	506
<hr/>	
Three Years of the Soviet National-Liberation War	<i>A. Landy</i> 507
Perspectives on the Functioning of the Communist Political Association	<i>John Williamson</i> 521
The May Meeting of the A. F. of L. Executive Council	<i>J. K. Morton</i> 533
Some Reconversion Problems in the Automotive Industry	<i>Pat Toohey</i> 541
The Communist Vanguard	<i>V. J. Jerome</i> 558
Historic Documents (Stalin's Order of the Day, May 1, 1944)	573

Entered as second class matter November 2, 1927, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. THE COMMUNIST is published Monthly by Workers Library Publishers, Inc., at 832 Broadway, New York 3, N. Y. (mail address, P. O. Box 148, Station D), to whom subscriptions, payments and correspondence should be sent. Subscription rate: \$2.00 a year; \$1.00 for six months; foreign and Canada, \$2.50 a year. Single copies 20 cents.

New Books on American History

The Rise of the American Nation

1793 - 1824

By Francis Franklin

A major new study of the formative years of America's rise to nationhood, the development of events and forces leading to the War of Independence, the democratic victory over Federalist reaction under Jefferson's leadership and the national victory over foreign aggression culminating in the War of 1812. Franklin also describes the beginnings of the rise of industrial capitalism and the political realignments of 1824.

Price \$2.00

"Builders of the Nation" Series

Edited by Dr. Philip Foner

Abraham Lincoln: Selections From His Writings

Lincoln's writings on democracy, slavery, the Civil War, and labor, arranged and with an introductory essay by Dr. Foner.

Thomas Jefferson: Selections From His Writings

Jefferson's writings on democracy, slavery, education, world affairs, etc., arranged and with an essay on his life and work by Dr. Foner.

George Washington: Selection From His Writings

Washington's speeches and letters on national unity and the revolutionary War of Independence, on education, religious freedom, etc., arranged and with an essay by Dr. Foner. Ready next month.

Paper 25¢ — Cloth 85¢

WORKERS LIBRARY PUBLISHERS
P. O. Box 148, Station D (832 Broadway), New York 3, N. Y.

GREETINGS TO GENERAL EISENHOWER, MARSHAL STALIN, AND MARSHAL TITO

*(Extended by the National Convention of the Communist Political
Association, held in New York City, May 20-22, 1944)*

TO GENERAL EISENHOWER

THE hour of decision is here. Upon you, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Invasion Forces in Western Europe, rests the heavy responsibility of leading to victory the valiant armies of America and Britain, which, together with the great Red Army of our Soviet Ally, face history's greatest test which will decide in battle the destiny of our nation and of the world.

Together with the whole American people, we, like the soldiers under your direct command, take our battle stations. Our every thought is for you and your men,

our every effort directed toward hastening decisive victory.

We will not waver nor turn back. We will help reinforce the unity of the home front around our Commander-in-Chief, President Roosevelt, in maximum service to the battlefield. We will help solidify the fighting alliance of our country and its allies to win the war and secure the peace.

However long and hard the road, however dear the price of complete victory, we are with you until the fascist enemy is routed and destroyed.

TO MARSHAL STALIN AND THE RED ARMY

IN EVERY American city and village, every factory and farm of our great land, men and women and children of all classes speak with wonder and deep gratitude of the heroic achievements of the Soviet Union and its valiant Red Army. Every day since the brutal and treacherous common fascist enemy violated your borders on June 22, 1941, more of the American people have come to know and love your leaders and your people.

The political and military leadership of the U.S.S.R. and its mighty Red Army is applauded not only by our great political and military leaders, but by our workers, farmers, business men, professional people, artists, scientists, and youth. The appeasers of the Hitlerites and the enemies of our common victory, who have been trying to frighten us with Hitler's "Soviet bogey," have not succeeded in blinding our people to the realities. Your deeds

daily speak with an authority that drowns their poisonous words.

As the relentless offensives of your mighty forces drive the Nazis from your soil, bringing nearer the day of our common and final victory over the fascist enemy, we grow ever more conscious of our enormous debt to you, the leaders and fighters and peoples of the great Soviet land. The names of your liberated towns and villages are daily on our lips, the name of Stalin and the names of your countless heroes enshrined in our hearts.

Daily more and more of our people understand why it is that yours, the world's first socialist state, has given the world such an

unparalleled example of unity, heroism, individual initiative, and a new discipline in the art and science of warfare.

All patriotic Americans are determined to strengthen still further the concerted action of the United Nations, and its leading coalition of our country, the Soviet Union and England on which our assurance of victory rests. They are determined to continue and deepen this coalition in the peace to come and to extend the friendship among our peoples which will cement the alliance of our two powerful nations as the mainstay of victory, national freedom, and an enduring peace.

TO MARSHAL TITO

AS THE armed forces of America and Britain, together with the great Red Army, join in the final crushing offensive for the utter destruction of the Nazis, we greet you, Marshal Tito, and through you the brave men, women and youth of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia for its heroic and exemplary fight in the cause of freedom. When the honor roll is called of those who have made the most glorious contribution to the defeat of Hitlerism, the people of Yugoslavia, under your leadership, will be among the first to be hailed.

The growing unity of all the peoples of Yugoslavia in the relentless fight against the Nazi and satellite invaders and their domestic quislings has been a source of great inspiration to the millions of American Slavs and to all patriotic

Americans. We are glad that an American military mission, working jointly with a British and Soviet Mission, is cooperating with your General Staff, and we feel confident that the American people, if given the opportunity, will be more than generous in their aid to your heroic army and stern in their condemnation of all those helping the Nazi enslavers.

We look forward to still closer friendship and cooperation between America and the other United Nations with the Yugoslav Liberation forces, representing the genuine unity of all classes and freedom-loving peoples in Yugoslavia. Under the joint blows of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition, helped by the great contribution of your magnificent people to the common triumph, victory will not be far off.

UNITY FOR VICTORY, FOR THE ELECTIONS AND FOR POST-WAR SECURITY

BY EARL BROWDER

*(Report to the National Convention of the Communist Political Association,
New York City, May 20, 1944)*

Teheran

ROOSEVELT, Churchill and Stalin, meeting in Teheran last December, shaped and confirmed the common policy of the great alliance leading the United Nations. This common policy is to work together in the war and in the peace that will follow; complete agreement on the scope and timing of military operations from east, west and south, to guarantee victory; to make a peace which will command good will from the overwhelming masses of the peoples, and banish the scourge of war for many generations; to establish a world family of democratic nations.

Hitler's New Year speech laid down the Axis antithesis to Teheran. No longer attempting to deny that the Anglo-Soviet-American alliance holds the power to destroy him and his works, Hitler told the world that the alliance cannot hold together; that his defeat will result in a social and economic catastrophe of unimaginable scope, fol-

lowed by a new war either between Britain and America or between the two and the Soviet Union.

America and the world must choose between Teheran and Hitler. Only the firm, energetic, unhesitating unfoldment of the Teheran program in action by all parties to it can defeat and cancel the threats and perspectives of Hitler. Every one who casts doubt upon Teheran, or weakens its execution in any way, is working for Hitler, whether he knows it or not.

A Binding Common Interest

I have full confidence that the complete agreement of Teheran will be executed. It is obviously essential to the national interest of each of the contracting great powers. The key question of the opening of the Western Front can no longer be considered by anyone as a question of "helping the Soviet Union." Today it is clearly a supreme necessity to help ourselves.

It is an elementary fact of life that the character of the post-war

world will be largely influenced by those who win the war on the battlefield. The question of full coalition warfare has become, for the Soviet Union, a question of shortening the war. For Britain and America it is still a question of winning the war. Therefore the Anglo-Saxon powers have reasons fully as urgent as those of the Soviet Union for pressing the Teheran program to complete and early fulfillment.

American Opponents of Teheran

The concord of Teheran does not automatically execute itself. It does not relieve us of our worries and tasks. On the contrary, it demands a maximum of national and individual effort, materially and intellectually, to realize it. Teheran has many enemies to overcome in America.

Teheran demands firm unity with our allies. Every one in America who holds some special idea and interest higher than the consideration of such unity is an enemy of Teheran.

Teheran requires the full unity of all democratic forces within each country. Everyone in America who wants to exclude one or another group or category from such national unity, on any grounds not entirely based on the consideration of winning the war, is an enemy of Teheran.

For every American who places victory and a lasting peace as the highest and all-determining consideration, all his fellow Americans who agree on this are his friends, and his only enemies are those who, for whatever reason of preju-

dice, special interest, defeatism, or simple business-as-usual, allow other considerations to disturb the national and international unity.

We must fight against and defeat all the enemies of Teheran; we must unite all who support Teheran by word and deed.

The Teheran Concord at Work in Europe

In the months since the Teheran meeting we have been witnessing the concord at work in Europe, dissolving one after another the knotty problems which had been threatening the solidity of the alliance. What more precise definition of the concord can we find, then, than that given by its practical results? We may summarize a few outstanding examples.

In Yugoslavia there was a sharp cleavage of policy within the Anglo-Soviet-American alliance up to Teheran. Britain and America were supporting King Peter's government-in-exile, which included as its Minister of War the figure of General Mikhailovich, who plays an ambiguous role within Yugoslavia itself heavily entangled in collaboration with the Nazis; the Soviet Union supported Marshal Tito and the Government of National Liberation that arose in battle against the Nazis on the soil of that country. Since Teheran this sharp cleavage has been softened and largely abridged, with the three great powers jointly giving military support to Marshal Tito, with a sharp warning having been given to the Mikhailovich forces to cut off their relations with the enemy, and heavy

pressure being exerted on the government-in-exile to purge itself of dubious and treacherous elements as the price of any consideration in the post-war world. There is little doubt now that the government-in-exile must either drastically reconcile itself to the new regime within Yugoslavia or soon pass from the stage of history.

In Italy under Anglo-American occupation, the sharp cleavage between the Badoglio-Savoy regime backed by Britain with the acquiescence of America, and the six-party democratic coalition in the National Liberation Committee which had the sympathy of the Soviet Union and most advanced democratic forces elsewhere, threatened to degenerate into a stubborn deadlock, and was poisoning the relations between the great powers themselves. But a bold initiative in the spirit of Teheran succeeded, in a few weeks time, in bringing into existence a government which is substantially one of the democratic coalition, while it preserves the formal claims of "legitimacy" for post-war consideration by the Italian people themselves. The new situation thus created has obviously been pleasing to all concerned, except the trouble-makers who had speculated on creating a division among the great powers. It has strengthened the war, the Italian people, and the three-power alliance, in all respects.

In Poland, center of very stubborn controversies, the spirit of Teheran is also effectively at work. So much so that very little of the old controversy remains to disturb

the relations of the three great powers, but the remaining difficulties are chiefly those between the Big Three and the diehard reactionaries still holding on to control of the government-in-exile. There is a general belief that the recent visit to the Soviet Union of two prominent Polish Americans, Professor Oscar Lange and Father Orlemanski, signifies among other things the opening of a final opportunity for the government-in-exile to purge itself of its anti-Soviet personnel and policies, and merge into the new Polish government which will undoubtedly arise as Polish territory is liberated by the victorious advance of the Red Army.

Teheran removed the last obstacles that had delayed the formal signing of agreement between the Czechoslovak government-in-exile and the Soviet Union for the installation of civil government in that country in the wake of the advancing Red Army. The Czechoslovak government-in-exile had long been a pioneer of the Teheran spirit; it was the first to base itself upon the broadest democratic coalition extending from Catholics to Communists; it has long fully understood that its destiny was bound up with the closest friendship with the Soviet Union. Its agreement with the Soviet Union, now completed with the full approbation of London and Washington, is a model of what would be most desirable for all European countries in the coming liberation.

We must express our agreement with Lucien Midol, member of the French Assembly in Algiers now in

this country, that a definite agreement with the Committee headed by de Gaulle is in order on the part of Washington and London, on the model of the Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement. The consolidation of patriotic Frenchmen around the Committee, inside and outside of France, has progressed so far as definitely to require this step. Such recognition will further the unification and democratization of the Fighting French organization everywhere, and will greatly strengthen the Allied forces going into France.

The policy of Teheran, thus sharply defined in actual political events, may be generalized as a process of giving to Europe a unified Anglo-Soviet-American leadership to dissolve the old contradictory orientations toward one or the other of the three great powers. It is a policy of releasing the democratic people's revolution, the sweeping away of absolutism and feudal remnants, the mobilization of the united people's forces for their own liberation. It includes the postponement of final decisions on the economic and political system for each country until after liberation, when each will be free to determine its own destiny without any outside intervention whatever. It requires support to groupings and leaders within each country entirely upon the basis of their effective contribution to war against the common enemy, and not at all upon ideological considerations or any desire to predetermine that country's post-war destiny.

For the full effectiveness of this policy within each country, a broad

coalition of all democratic forces is required, within which the recourse to armed struggle to settle disputes is abolished, and all relations are determined through free discussion, free political association, and universal suffrage. Such a democratic national coalition within each country must include all who will fight the Nazis and submit to a common discipline, under the general world leadership of the Anglo-Soviet-American alliance, without any discrimination on the basis of conflicting ideologies or past prejudices.

Such is the policy of Teheran, the only road to quick and complete victory and a lasting and prosperous peace.

The Cairo Conference and Teheran

The Cairo Conference of Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek set forth the minimum program of expulsion of Japan from all territories she has seized, return to China of those parts formerly hers, and independence for Korea.

"With these objects in view, the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan."

Background to this agreement is the cancellation of the unequal treaties with China, with renunciation of all extra-territorial rights, and the U.S. policy of independence for the Philippine Islands.

Unanswered are the questions of the future status of India, Burma,

Indonesia, the Malay States, and Indo-China, with a population well over five hundred million. Also unanswered is the problem of Chinese unity against the common enemy.

For the quickest and least costly victory over Japan, we need the extension of the principles of Teheran to the Pacific. There are two great obstacles to this aim, still to be overcome. First is the resistance in the Kuomintang regime to unity with the Chinese Communists; second is the continuing lack of agreement between Britain and the United States on long-term policy toward problems of world trade, which is a difficulty that extends not only to Asia, but to Europe, Africa, Latin America, and the whole world.

The *New York Times* of May 14, editorially taking note of the new Japanese offensive under the title "China in Distress," after years of urging Chungking not to make any concessions to the Chinese Communists, at last recognizes that "the greatest aid which China can furnish to herself is to compose the differences between Chungking and the Communists." The *Times* sees finally the disaster threatening China and the United States because, in the area of the greatest Japanese threat, the Eighth Route Army and the ten divisions of Chungking's best troops "have been facing one another in an armed truce and have thus neutralized one another." The *Times* does not recognize its own errors in having, for years, thrown its influence against any settlement between Kuomintang and Communists in China, and

even in the present desperate moment it carefully limits its suggestion for unity "until the war is over," when presumably it will again insist that the Chinese Communists must be exterminated. Thus does the fatal policy of "too little and too late" continue to express itself among some of the most influential circles in America and China.

In October, 1942, Mr. Sumner Welles, then Under Secretary of State, gave me a statement on American policy toward China, which urged that unity should be achieved by conciliation. Doubtless, as I then recognized, this was a correct statement of American desires. But now it must be said openly that very little indeed has been done by our country to secure the application of that policy. And if nothing is done about it, declarations of policy have very little effect upon the development of events. The *Times* editorials of 1941 and 1942 urging the suppression of the Communists had more influence in Chungking than did Mr. Welles' statement, which was suppressed by the Chungking censorship. Now, at the eleventh hour, with the Japanese advance seriously threatening Chungking itself, the time is more than ripe for the United States to insist that the Chungking government shall put its house in order with a real, not a formal, unification of all Chinese fighting forces, and their fullest utilization against the common enemy. We must once and for all put an end to the playing with the "Red scare," which, in China as everywhere, works for the

enemy and against the United Nations.

In the rest of Asia, outside China and the Philippines, we have done nothing to mobilize the hundreds of millions of the population to fight on our side. It is clearly in the interest of America that this be done, with an unequivocal promise to all the great Asiatic peoples of their independence as a result of victory over the Japanese. We cannot, however, secure British agreement to such a policy, unless their fears of American post-war trade competition can be allayed. The British-American trade rivalry is today the greatest obstacle to establishing the grand strategy for victory over Japan in the Pacific.

How Can We Dissolve the Anglo-American Antagonism?

The main reason why the British cling so stubbornly to their obsolete colonial system is not to be found in the supposed innate conservatism or incapacity for change in the British character. Rather it must be seen in the fact that the British can see available no other instrument to avoid being overwhelmed by the gigantic forces of American capitalism. In a world of free markets as between nations, and bereft of their colonial monopoly, British capitalists cannot envisage successful competition with their American rivals. This is an old fear of the British, but it has been multiplied a hundredfold by the spectacular expansion of the American productive plant during the war. Unless this well-founded fear of British capital can in some

way be allayed there is not the slightest prospect to dissolve the Anglo-American rivalry that is impeding the war effort, that blocks a common strategy in Asia, that prevents the formulation of any concrete long-time policy common to both countries.

Mr. Eric Johnston, in his new book, *America Unlimited*, tells us of his recent "Mission to Britain." He says "I am fully convinced that there are no insurmountable obstacles to British-American cooperation." Yet he himself put forth a policy to the British which, if it is followed by our country, does constitute such an insurmountable obstacle, even if Mr. Johnston is unconscious of that fact. He told the British that Americans were "not persuaded" by Churchill's refusal to "preside over the liquidation" of the Empire, that America is anti-imperialist. Then he told them that America is going out for markets, that they insist on "free competition," and will have no part of any system of division of markets by agreement; he insisted that the American "regards all powers, in government or in business, as subject to constant revision—by himself. . . . What this American is in America, he will also be in international affairs." In short, Mr. Johnston told the British that what share they would have in the world markets of the future would be what they could hold in unrestricted competition with America, or what they can maintain with their colonial monopoly.

With all due respect to Mr. Johnston's subjective good intentions, I

maintain that this policy toward Britain is a disastrous one, which will continue to create enormous difficulties in the prosecution of the war, and which threatens to bring a great economic crisis upon the world after the war. It is shortsighted in respect to America's true national interests. It will prove impossible to maintain. Yet there can be no doubt that Mr. Johnston was accurately reflecting today's dominant opinion of ruling capitalist circles in this country.

I venture to suggest that Britain and America must arrive at an agreed economic policy for the joint development of the world markets on a huge scale, ten times the size of the pre-war markets, based upon the rehabilitation of devastated lands and the industrialization of the undeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, the Near East, Latin America, and Europe. Since this requires free and independent peoples everywhere, the colonial system must be dismantled as quickly as possible; but as the colonial system is Britain's main reliance for a "place in the sun," Britain must receive compensation by being guaranteed a proportionate share in these markets, and the play of free competition must be limited by this agreement, which cannot be "subject to constant revision—by [the American] himself." Without such a guarantee Britain, as the economically weaker power, will under no circumstances surrender or relax her historical claims to colonial monopoly. And that would mean for America and for a large part of the world that the perspective for a

vast increase of economic cooperation would vanish. Failure to arrive at some such agreement must eventually result in defeating the hopes of Teheran.

Post-War National Unity

The most disturbing influence against our national unity for victory in the war is the expectation that peace between nations will be the signal for the outbreak of great class struggles within the nation.

War needs, therefore, dictate that we shall already now begin to lay the foundations for post-war national unity, so that this disturbing influence may be checked and if possible eliminated.

Our post-war plan is directed to achieve national unity for the realization of the perspectives laid down at Teheran.

That means, first of all, that we must find a program that will unite the democratic, progressive majority of the American people, from all classes, and that we shall not permit that majority to be split up and thus give the opportunity for the anti-Teheran forces to rise to power.

Such a program for America cannot be a socialist program, because there does not exist now in our country an actual or potential majority support for such a program.

Adherents of socialism, therefore, in order to be effective workers for unity within the broad democratic majority, must make it clear that they do not raise the issue of socialism in a form and manner which can endanger or weaken the national unity. They must subor-

dinate their socialist convictions, in all practical issues, to the common program of the majority.

The United States is the only capitalist country in the world today in which the great majority rejects any proposal for fundamental changes in the existing economic and social system. It not only rejects socialism in any form, but it also sets itself against the trend toward state capitalism. Even the labor movement, C.I.O. as well as A. F. of L., adopts the defense of "free enterprise," and demands governmental intervention in economic life only to the degree that it is demonstratedly required to make up for gaps left by the operation of private enterprise.

Eric Johnston has revealed in his recent book how he was astonished to find British capitalists indifferent to this American concept of "free enterprise," and how they even grew "angry" with some of his propagandizing efforts. He finds "the most formidable of the barriers" to cooperation between the two countries in "the difference in our respective approach to post-war economy—ours from free enterprise assumptions, theirs from either government participation or monopoly bases." He records Lloyd George's admission that his "great mistake" as Prime Minister was to try to go back to "free enterprise in England" after World War I. "The English people do not want it," said Lloyd George.

It would be well, therefore, for Americans to rid themselves of the notion that our country is the model for all the world with its economic

system. All the world wants to copy our industrial technique, but no other country agrees to our economic system, not even England. On this question, America is much more isolated than is the Soviet Union. Our country stands literally alone on the question of "free enterprise."

As a matter of cold fact, however, as distinguished from ideology, "free enterprise" today is merely a synonym for capitalism as it exists; and the present stage of capitalist development is that of a high degree of trustification and monopoly, not only of the basic economy but even of the channels of retail distribution, far exceeding in its specific gravity in the total national economy that of other countries with a higher degree of formal state capitalism. "Free enterprise" means in practice the freedom of capital to concentrate and centralize itself in ever larger units, with a minimum of public regulation and control; while in relation to the world market it signifies opposition to all measures taken by trade rivals to offset the competitive advantages of American mass production.

It must be clear, however, that while we cannot adopt the ideology of "free enterprise" into our method of thinking, neither can we put forth its repudiation as a program for the democratic progressive majority of the nation. It is an ideology that is shared by the progressives with the reactionaries. It must be accepted as one of the political facts of life that the program of the democratic progressive majority to

which we adhere includes the defense of "free enterprise," and that we do not challenge this program.

We must, however, seek to bring the program of the democratic majority to face more squarely the practical problems that must be solved, and to deepen that program, in such a form and manner which will secure a maximum of agreement and a minimum of opposition from both capital and labor, from business circles and the working classes. That can best be accomplished by concentrating attention upon specific problems rather than general ones, upon the concrete rather than the abstract, upon action rather than philosophy. And, in the final analysis, national unity must be built on the foundation of an economic program which does not contradict the prevailing ideology, yet which is workable in the world of reality, and in which conflicting class and national interests can be reconciled.

*An Economic Program for National
Unity and International
Collaboration*

The starting point for an economic program that meets the requirements we have noted is to be found in the general agreement that American economy must operate at approximate full capacity in the post-war period, that approximate full employment of all workers must be maintained. To accomplish this aim, markets must be found for peacetime commodities equal to the war market for military goods, and the war market for consumption goods must also be re-

placed by a civilian peace market of equivalent volume. The total war market for which a substitute must be found is, if we take the figures of 1944 as our measure, around ninety billion dollars per annum.

It must be noted that under war conditions American economy has demonstrated such capacity for expansion that, despite all restrictions upon consumption (such as the almost complete cessation of production of consumers' durable goods), the civilian market is still about as large as any previous year of peace, if not larger. Since this is so clearly a response to war conditions, it seems to me that it is not sound to speculate that any considerable proportion of the replacement for the war market will occur spontaneously or automatically with the beginning of reconversion. The only sound course is to plan for new markets, which did not before exist, equal in volume to the war market which will come to an end.

Foreign markets demand first attention for many reasons. Politically they come first, as a necessary instrument for our foreign policy of reconciling conflicting interests and maintaining peace (although it must be noted that, improperly managed, our foreign trade may cause a severe intensification of these conflicts). Economically they take a primary place on account of foreign needs, since the rest of the world has been impoverished by the war that has enriched our country with a tremendously expanded economy; and because our own first need will be a market for machinery and

other capital goods of which there already will exist a surplus here.

I have estimated that we require new foreign markets of about forty billions per annum, above what we would obtain in the course of business-as-usual, in order to guarantee with any seriousness the continued full operation of our economy. Orthodox economists have assured me that it is quite impossible to realize foreign markets of such magnitude, but I am unable to accept their verdict, since I refuse to accept the perspective of mass unemployment and economic crisis in the post-war period. If such markets are necessary to keep our industries in operation, then it is nonsense to say they cannot be realized.

The champions of "free enterprise" in its extreme form, which denies any economic function to government, are put to the test on this question of foreign markets. They must find and organize such markets, in time to prevent a great post-war economic crisis. If they cannot do it by their methods, then they must agree to governmental intervention which obviously can do it. All that is required is the same determination with which we carry the war to victory.

America's extraordinary achievements in war production are universally cited by business circles as a triumph of "the American way of life," of the system of private initiative, of our traditional capitalism. Very well, the argument is granted. But these achievements were on the basis of a *governmentally-organized market*, with the

government itself as customer for most of the goods produced. Upon what grounds, then, can we say that the governmental organization of the necessary foreign market for the post-war period would not also be a triumph for "the American way of life," for the "free enterprise" system?

Our government can, in agreement with its great allies, and drawing into partnership the governments of each territory directly involved, set up a series of giant industrial development corporations, for the various devastated and undeveloped regions of the world, Europe, Africa, Asia, Latin America. The long-term credits that will be required will be no burden on America, but on the contrary will be an economic relief to us, as one of our greatest needs is for profitable fields of investment to put our vast sums of idle money to work. Such projects, underwritten by governments, would be the most secure of investments; the genius of American industrial engineering could guarantee their technical success; they would quickly start new streams of wealth flowing that would greatly exceed the original investments, which could be made self-liquidating within a generation if desired.

Only America has the potential ability to initiate and carry through such a program of international economic collaboration, which could furnish the medium of reconciliation of clashing special interests, of realizing the political program of Teheran for liberation of all peoples and a long-time peace.

Only American initiative on such lines can realize the free collaboration of nations on the scale needed.

The necessary expansion of our domestic markets on an equal scale is more complicated and difficult. Yet it is equally necessary if we are to avoid a devastating economic crisis within a few years after the war ends.

There is never any lack of purchasing power in the country, as some persons mistakenly think, to provide a market for everything our economy can produce. What brings economic crisis is not lack of purchasing power in general, but its lack at particular points where it could be effectively used. The problem is not one of creating purchasing power, but of mobilizing that which already exists.

In the final analysis the needed domestic market expansion can only be realized by increasing the consumption of the masses of the population, who are in great majority wage workers. That requires the raising of wage standards to the degree that we need a larger domestic market for maintaining full employment and production.

Higher wage standards, therefore, will be a national aim, a goal of public policy, and not merely a special interest of the labor union movement as heretofore. Labor unions, in forwarding their special aims, will be serving the whole society, and will command a broader cooperation of all classes than ever before. This cannot, however, be reached through the accumulated decisions of individual enterprises, but only through the simultaneous

enforcement of such higher standards upon all individual enterprises; i.e., by stronger trade unions, by higher legal minimum wage levels, by guaranteed annual wages, by applying the rule of equal wages to equal work, by increased earnings commensurate to increase of production. Such problems must be removed from the field of separate individual decisions and be regulated as questions of public policy.

Let it be quite clear that such an expansion of the domestic market has in it nothing whatever of socialism. There is not the slightest suggestion of confiscation of wealth, nor even of the wartime proposals for a limitation upon private incomes of the wealthy classes. On the contrary, this policy is consistent with the fullest possible expansion of consumption by the wealthy, and the accumulation of their private incomes above their consumption level in whatever form they see fit—just so long as it is not accumulated in the form of unused commodities that would fill the warehouses and result in halting further production. The economic policy we are proposing has only one *must*, one categorical imperative, in it: That is the unconditional demand that we must keep all workers employed and all industries producing at approximate capacity, which means that the goods produced must be consumed by someone to make way for the new production. Strictly speaking, this policy could even be operated through the systematic destruction of surplus goods, replacing war-

time destruction with a peacetime equivalent, but that is a variant against which I would most strongly argue on political grounds.

The essential outline of the economic problem is this: That full American production will furnish a stream of commodities which, after satisfying the existing standard of living, selling as much abroad as possible, providing the wealthy classes with everything they can possibly consume, and making all practical new investments—will still provide a large and growing surplus which can only be disposed of by expanding the consumption (purchasing power) of the masses of the people who still have unsatisfied needs, which are mainly the working people.

This expansion of the domestic markets must become even greater when our huge exports to the foreign market begin, with the expiration of the terms of credit, to be amortized, and with the flow back to America of earned profits on the investments. Eventually all our exports will flow back to America in augmented volume, in the form of a flood of goods which must also be consumed in one way or another.

Finally and over a period of years, therefore, the problem of replacing the war market is entirely one of expanding America's consumption until it is equivalent to our entire production.

America has such tremendous productive powers that we will surely choke to death with our surplus goods unless we learn how to consume them. The national gullet

of consumption must be enlarged until it equals our scale of production. If we cannot learn how to do it under our existing system, then there will be no choice but to find another system that will balance the books.

We are proposing a policy which, if energetically carried out, will meet and solve all the most pressing problems of the immediate period, will give a basis for international peace and collaboration, will make possible an effective degree of unity within the nation with the expansion of well-being for all.

Democracy and National Unity

Many conflicting views and interests must learn how to come together on the basis of compromise in order to build and maintain national unity. But there is a line beyond which compromise is not permissible. We cannot compromise basic democratic principles without seriously damaging our national unity and helping Hitler.

The shameful spectacle of the U.S. Senate blocking the Marcantonio anti-poll tax bill from coming to a vote is a typical case in point. The unholy alliance of poll-tax Senators, Dewey Republicans, and log-rolling politics-as-usual Northern Democrats excused their crime under the plea that to abolish the poll-tax would harm national unity because it would anger the Southern Bourbons to the point where they would refuse to support the war. Ten million white and Negro workers and farmers are to continue to be denied the ballot,

because this little gang of political blackmailers threatens otherwise to sabotage the entire nation. Men who could not be elected otherwise are thus continued in office with power of veto against the overwhelming majority of the nation. Such compromise with democratic principles is the deadliest enemy of American national unity.

So also with the whole Jim Crow system, the systematic violation of the U.S. Constitution by denial of equal citizenship to Negro Americans, their segregation in the Army, the housing and public places; the denial of equal economic opportunity; their special exploitation and oppression. The Jim Crow system is the outgrowth of the ideology of "white supremacy" which is just as shameful and dangerous for America as Hitler's identical racialism proved to be for Germany and the world. Jim Crow must go if America is to stand.

A direct importation from Nazi Germany is the spreading poison of anti-Semitism in America. Everyone who spreads anti-Semitism is enlisted in Hitler's fifth column. Anti-Semitism is a crime that must be outlawed as a measure of American national security.

Anti-Communism, the doctrine of Hitler's "Antikomintern" organization, is the most deadly of all Hitler's poisons because it has penetrated American society most deeply. We have the extraordinary spectacle of Americans who call themselves liberal, who would consider it outrageous to be called upon to be either Catholic or anti-Catholic, to be either Semitic or anti-Semitic,

to be either Negro or anti-Negro, but who still consider it the most natural thing in the world that they and everyone else must be classified either as Communist or anti-Communist—and by anti-Communist understand the support of the public boycott of all even suspected of Communist opinions, their exclusion from public employment and even from private industry, the dealing with Communist opinions as a kind of crime.

The anti-Communist doctrine is justified by those who claim to be liberals by analogy to the question of the Nazis. All decent persons must be anti-Nazi, and anyone who is not must be considered an enemy of mankind, to be exterminated or at least locked up indefinitely. That is why we are making war, to cleanse the earth of Nazis and all their friends. But it is very dangerous for anyone to extend this to justify being anti-Catholic, or anti-Semitic, or anti-Negro, or anti-Communist. For that would lead toward the conclusion that America must also exterminate the Catholics, the Jews, the colored races, and the Communists from the world. That is somewhat too big an order even for America!

Catholics are an important minority in America, and a majority of several countries we very much need as friends; the Jews have always made important contributions to human progress, and gave the western world its chief religion; the colored races happen to be a considerable majority of the human race, and the Communists just "happen" to be our most important

allies in this war. Even considered from the most narrowly practical viewpoint, all these anti-ideologies, whether anti-Catholic, anti-Semitic, anti-colored races, or anti-Communist, are the most dangerous and stupid mistakes for Americans. And they violate our best American tradition and philosophy as well as our basic law; they violate Christian ethics, as well as all other ethical principles that recognize the brotherhood of man. They are immoral as well as unprofitable.

If America wants to play a leading role in the world, we must defeat all these anti-democratic doctrines and practices; and we must retire from public life, and especially from all dealings with our partners in the United Nations, all persons who are incurably afflicted with these divisive ideologies.

The 1944 Elections—for Unity or Disunity?

Our country is entering the crucial hours of the war, our soldiers entering decisive battles for the first time, with a national election on our hands.

We are the only great nation with such a rigid Constitution that elections come at set intervals without regard to the actual problems with which the nation is confronted.

In this, as in so many other matters, we must take our world as we find it and do the best we can. Certainly we cannot take time out from the war to amend our Constitution, which would be more difficult than handling the election.

It is no use pretending, however, that the necessity to conduct elec-

tions this year is anything less than a dangerous strain on the national unity required for victory.

If the 1944 elections are carried through in the usual American spirit of recklessness, abandon, and irresponsibility, as a wild scramble for power, then indeed the result may be fatal to our hopes for early victory and a lasting peace.

The spirit of partisanship is today a most costly luxury which America cannot afford. Our problem is how to subdue and control the spirit of partisanship, how to conduct a national election in the spirit of national unity. It is not an easy task.

Our country faced a similar problem in 1864. Lincoln then decided, against his personal inclination and the demand of his enemies, to accept the Presidential nomination and to transform the electoral struggle from a source of disunity in the nation into a means for reuniting the nation. He rose above party lines without conceding an inch to his opponents in matters of principle. He braved the anger of his own partisan supporters, to substitute the Union coalition for the Republican ticket and take the Union Southerner, Johnson, as his running mate. He subordinated everything to national unity and the national interest.

Roosevelt today faces a situation extraordinarily similar to that which was faced by Lincoln eighty years ago.

Can Roosevelt help the nation to unity and victory by conceding the demands of Republicans and the disloyal Democrats that he announce his retirement?

A moment's thought reveals that such a step would be a disaster for our country. Our enemies in the war would be encouraged to new efforts, our allies in the war would have deep misgivings, and our own country would be launched upon an uncharted sea of uncontrolled factionalism.

That is why the demand for Roosevelt to succeed himself has swept the Democratic Party so completely as to silence even most of the disloyal Democrats who have sabotaged the President's program. That is why the labor movement is almost unanimously demanding Roosevelt as candidate. That is why "Republicans for Roosevelt" clubs are springing up all over the country. That is why this convention will support Roosevelt.

This election must not be left in the hands of the old party machines of professional politicians. The extraordinary emergency in which our country finds itself calls for an extraordinary manner of handling the election, that it may be transformed from a threat against national unity into a means of uniting the nation on a higher level.

We must learn how to rise above and dissolve old divisions and prejudices, we must achieve fraternization of former enemies, we must cross the old party lines, we must subdue the class antagonisms, we must dissolve the ancient feud between New Dealers and Old Dealers, we must weld a deeper unity of patriotic Americans than has been seen for generations. We must demonstrate that it is unprofitable for any candidate to display extreme

partisanship; we must slap down the loud-mouthed demagogue, expose the wily maneuverer, retire the old machine politicians to the background, and begin to bring forward a new type of people's leadership.

The people, and especially the largest part of the people, which is "labor," must build their own organizations for political action, beginning in the neighborhoods and wards, extending to districts, towns, and cities, to the states and the nation as a whole. These organizations should be nonpartisan, taking their stand on issues and judging candidates on their merits without regard to party labels.

That is the road to victory in the war and a people's victory in the election. The program of Teheran, the prospects for victory and a lasting peace, are at stake. Never has there been a greater challenge to the American people or a greater opportunity.

The Position of the Communists

This Convention of American Communists, in confirmation of the deep seriousness of our program and perspective for national unity, renounces all aims of partisan advancement for ourselves. We have dissolved the Communist Party, and we are now forming a new non-party organization through which we expect to contribute to the common cause of the progressive majority of the American people. We will participate in political life as independents, through the established party organizations of our progressive associates, without com-

mitting ourselves to any party label. We will judge issues and men on their merits.

We remain an organization of Communists, of American men and women who hold that the principles of scientific socialism, of Marxism, have an indispensable contribution to make to our own nation. We will not permit, however, that any struggle over the question of socialism, for or against, shall be allowed to divide the progressive majority of the American people, who must be kept united on the road of democracy and progress at all costs.

We are not retreating, we are advancing. We are advancing with the great majority of humanity to the cleansing of Hitlerism and its allies from the face of the earth. We are advancing with the majority of Americans to a more democratic

and progressive America. We are advancing closer to the majority of the American people by bringing them a new and better understanding of our role as a sector in their ranks. We are advancing a clearer understanding of what is socialism by the very act of removing the issue as the center of political struggles today. We are advancing in the strength of our own ranks, as witnessed by the successful recruiting of more than 22,000 new members in the very weeks of most intense political discussion leading to the historic decision to dissolve the Communist Party, and by this present convention to set up a new organization that will grow much stronger in the time ahead. We stand firmly on the program of Teheran, which is America's program for war and peace.

NATIONAL UNITY FOR VICTORY, SECURITY AND A DURABLE PEACE

(Resolution adopted by the National Convention of the Communist Political Association on the Report of Earl Browder)

1. AMERICA now enters the most decisive phase of the war. The crucial Anglo-American invasion of Western Europe is under way. Hitlerite Germany and its satellites can be quickly crushed as the mighty onslaught of blows now being organized from the West and South are fully developed and coordinated with those from the East. For the historic offensives of the Red Army, together with the powerful blows of the British and American airmen, the successes of the Mediterranean campaigns, and the heroic struggles of the partisans in Yugoslavia, Greece, France, and Poland have brought the Nazi monster to the verge of catastrophe. While in the Pacific area the important advances of the Anglo-American forces, coupled with the valiant struggles of the Chinese people, have brought about a favorable turn in the war against militarist Japan. However, heavy and decisive battles still lie ahead. Fascism is severely wounded, but not yet destroyed. Unity and the supreme military effort of all the United Nations, emulating the epic role of the Soviet Union, are necessary to shorten the war and to guarantee victory.

2. The attainment of full coalition warfare by the Allies will hasten victory and pave the way now for the close and friendly coopera-

tion of the anti-Hitlerite coalition to secure a lasting peace and orderly post-war reconstruction. Therefore, the road ahead toward the complete military destruction of Hitlerism and the Axis, toward the security of America and all of the United Nations, the way to abolish the "scourge and terror of war for many generations," lies in the timely realization of the historic concords of Moscow and Teheran. It depends on the rapid fulfillment of the military decisions of these epic conferences, as well as the Cairo agreement. It rests upon the progressive unfoldment of the political accords to advance the liberation of Nazi-occupied Europe and to bring about a democratic family of nations. Above all, it rests upon the continued, firmer, and long-range collaboration of the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., and Britain as the leading coalition of the United Nations. And this, too, is the way to enhance America's great and constructive role in world affairs, its progressive destiny.

3. To hasten victory and to realize the objectives of Teheran it is essential to strengthen national unity on the home front now and for after the war. The broadest unity and cooperative relations must be established among all patriotic forces ranging from Communists, laborites, and independents

to Democrats and Republicans. All ideological, political, and religious differences must be subordinated to welding a stronger national unity for the common national interest, for victory over fascism and a durable peace. Everything must be done now to rally wider nationwide support around our Commander-in-Chief in behalf of our nation's war policies, and to unmask and rout the appeasers and pro-fascists. Greater cooperation and the mobilization of all forces must be achieved on the political and production fronts to aid in carrying through the Allied invasion of Europe, to speed the defeat of the Hitlerite and Japanese imperialists. Everything, including the national election campaign, must be geared to winning the war. Everything, including post-war planning, must be directed toward advancing victory and consolidating the unity within and among the United Nations now and for the post-war.

4. The 1944 elections are the most important Presidential and Congressional elections since those of 1864. The course of the war, the unity and fate of the nation are at stake in its outcome. The decisive issues in these fateful elections are: the victory program of our Government and Commander-in-Chief; Teheran and the firmest unity of the American-Soviet-British Coalition; the national unity and security of the United States; full production and maximum employment; safeguarding the welfare and democratic liberties of the American people, of the veterans, the workers, the farmers, the Negro people, the youth, and small business.

All alignments are taking place around these interrelated issues, around the cardinal question of winning the war and securing a durable peace. The majority of the American people support the President and the nation's victory policy. The most consistent win-the-war forces are to be found in the ranks of labor and in the broad democratic and people's movement. And labor, especially, is displaying growing activity and political influence. These progressive forces, together with the win-the-war pro-Roosevelt forces in the Democratic Party, form the most dependable and widest base of the supporters of the Government and victory in the 1944 elections.

However, the camp of national unity is not yet a single and a united coalition. An important section of the win-the-war camp are members and followers of the Republican Party, while millions of other American citizens are independent in their party affiliation and vote. These forces have not yet been fully and effectively brought into the national victory coalition. But most serious is the inadequate unity of action between the C.I.O. and the A. F. of L., the continued division within the labor movement brought about and fostered by Woll, Hutcheson, Dubinsky and John L. Lewis. This is the single greatest obstacle toward more solidly uniting the nation and securing victory for the win-the-war forces in the 1944 elections.

The appeasers and defeatists are endeavoring to use the elections to prolong the war, to bring about a compromise peace with Nazism-fascism and to establish a pro-fas-

cist government within the United States. These un-American forces are a minority, but they are powerful and bold. They threaten victory in the elections and the war. Led by du Pont-Hearst-McCormick and Patterson, they are operating on the electoral field primarily through the reactionary Hoover-Taft-Vandenberg-Dewey machine of the Republican Party, and the Reynolds-Wheeler wing of the Democratic Party. They are likewise using such treacherous fifth-column groups as the America First Party, Peace Now and the Coughlinites, and Trotskyites, as well as the reactionary anti-Soviet circles among the Social Democrats.

These obstructionist and defeatist elements dominate and influence a powerful bi-partisan bloc in Congress which impedes the government's war program. They mask their treasonable activities and have acquired considerable strength through their skillful manipulation of partisan and sectional interests, through fostering disunity in the labor movement and the nation, through their appeals to religious, national and racial prejudices, through violent anti-Communist, anti-Soviet and anti-British baiting, and through their demagogic play upon existing wartime economic strains and difficulties which they themselves have accentuated by their obstruction of the Administration's economic stabilization program.

To guarantee victory in the 1944 elections it is necessary for all patriotic Americans to steer a firm course of national unity, of common action, to speed the prosecution of

the war, to ensure the continuance of Roosevelt's leadership and anti-Axis policies, and to secure the election of a victory Congress, supporting the President, dedicated to the program of Teheran and representative of the entire coalition of national unity. It is necessary for the people to insist that an end shall be put to all partisan policies and conflicts and that a resolute struggle shall be waged against all defeatist and negotiated peace groups and activities. And it is supremely imperative to advance labor's political organization, its united activity and its active collaboration with all other patriotic forces, irrespective of party labels.

5. To reinforce national unity in the approaching climax of the war and to create the internal conditions for establishing national unity in the post-war period it is necessary to secure maximum production, jobs and social security, and to strengthen American democracy.

(a) For this purpose, it is essential to adopt a post-war economic program to approximate the levels of wartime production and full employment. Such a program should embrace the President's Bill of Economic Rights which, if adopted and carried into life, could provide the basis for economic well-being and a prolonged period of national unity under our present system of private enterprise. Whereas the bulk of the American people are not yet convinced of the need for a more radical solution of our social and economic problems through large-scale nationalization of industries or through the establishment of socialism, all patriotic forces, in-

cluding the adherents of socialism, can and must bend every effort to promote the maximum of economic security, production and employment that can and must be achieved under capitalism.

The nation can and must be united to bring about the expansion of domestic and foreign markets, and of production and employment, now made possible through realizing the great prospects of security and economic welfare opened up by Teheran. Private enterprise should be given full opportunity to cope with the problems of production and jobs. But to attain maximum employment and production in the post-war, it will be necessary to bring about a rapid and substantial increase in the purchasing power of the American people. It will require government and industry planning for the extension of foreign trade and the granting of extensive long-term credits, advanced or underwritten by the government for the economic reconstruction of Europe, Asia, Latin America and Africa. It will also require that those policies and practices of the monopolies and international cartels which stand in the way of expanding production and world markets, which oppose the national interest and endanger world peace, shall be fought and curbed.

(b) Furthermore, it is necessary to adopt a special program which, on the basis of fully meeting the vital needs of war production, can adequately cope with the rising problems involved in changes in war schedules and in the process of reconversion. During this period, subject to military requirements, the

government should follow a policy enabling private enterprise to rapidly reconvert, with special aid to agriculture and small business. But private industry must accept the goal of approximate full employment and the national policy that where and when it fails to attain this, to that extent the government must assume the responsibility to do so. Without such a positive and responsible approach on the part of government, industry and labor, national unity cannot be established or maintained in the post-war. In order to meet the difficulties and hardships that will inevitably arise as a result of dislocations during the period of reconversion, it is essential to protect the interests of labor and the veterans, Negro and white, women and men. Toward this end it is necessary to improve and extend the system of federal social insurance, veterans' aid and rehabilitation; enforce trade union standards in all industries; establish effective price control and rationing; develop an adequate public works and housing program; and give labor full and adequate representation in the Government and all agencies responsible for reconversion and production.

(c) To consolidate the unity of the nation now and in the post-war, to preserve American democracy, it is equally urgent and necessary to rally and unite the American people to safeguard the Bill of Rights from reaction and fascism, and to defend and extend all democratic liberties. Toward this end it is necessary to counteract and wipe out all forms and manifestations of anti-Semitism, Jim Crow, anti-Catholicism and Red-baiting. It is imperative to abol-

ish the poll tax and all restrictions on the right of franchise of American servicemen and civilians. It is essential to guarantee that all servicemen are assured full opportunity to vote in the 1944 elections. It is vital to liquidate all discrimination against the Negro people. It is essential to defend the rights of labor, particularly the right to organize and bargain collectively. Above all, it is necessary to vigilantly combat and rout the pro-fascists and defeatists, to outlaw the fifth column and to prohibit all negotiated peace and other treasonable propaganda and activity.

6. To further strengthen the national war effort, the unity of the nation and orderly progress in the post-war, it is essential to build a stronger labor and democratic mass movement. For the camp of national unity, which is composed of the patriotic forces of all classes, from the working people to the capitalist, rests and depends upon the working class, the backbone and driving force of the nation and its win-the-war coalition. Therefore, the consolidation of national unity now and after the war requires the strengthening of the nation's most consistent and democratic bulwark. It requires the further organization of the unorganized and the building of the trade unions into still more powerful defenders of the nation and the democratic liberties and economic rights of the working class and people. It requires the extension of labor's united action on the political and economic fronts, particularly the unity of action of the A. F. of L., the C.I.O. and Railroad Brotherhoods. It requires the most

resolute development of labor's political initiative and influence, with labor's full and adequate participation in the Government. Likewise, it makes most urgent the task of forging the common action of all anti-fascists, including the Communists, of strengthening the ties between labor and the other sectors of the democratic population. Further, it makes necessary the building of all the mass organizations of the people, not only of the workers but also of the veterans, the women, the Negroes, the farmers, the youth and the nationality groups.

7. At this fateful moment in the history of our country and the world, we Communists, as patriotic Americans, renew our sacred pledge to the nation to subordinate everything to win the war and to destroy fascism. We dedicate all of our efforts and resources to help realize the promises and perspectives of Teheran, to speed victory over Hitlerism and the Axis, to forge a durable peace, to promote democracy, security and social progress. Toward this end we shall redouble our activity to forge national and labor unity, and to advance the unity of the anti-Hitlerite states and peoples, including the international cooperation of labor. And to enhance our contributions to our country and people, we shall resolutely endeavor to strengthen the patriotic and vanguard role, influence and base of our organization; further master the advanced science of the working class, scientific socialism, and steadfastly carry forward the great democratic traditions of Washington, Jefferson and Lincoln.

PREAMBLE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMUNIST POLITICAL ASSOCIATION

(Adopted by the National Convention, May 21, 1944)

THE Communist Political Association is a non-party organization of Americans which, basing itself upon the working class, carries forward the traditions of Washington, Jefferson, Paine, Jackson and Lincoln, under the changed conditions of modern industrial society.

It seeks effective application of democratic principles to the solution of the problems of today, as an advanced sector of the democratic majority of the American people.

It upholds the Declaration of Independence, the United States Constitution and its Bill of Rights, and the achievements of American democracy, against all the enemies of popular liberties.

It is shaped by the needs of the nation at war, being formed in the midst of the greatest struggle of all history; it recognizes that victory for the free peoples over fascism will open up new and more favorable conditions for progress; it looks to the family of free nations, led by the great coalition of democratic capitalist and socialist states,

to inaugurate an era of world peace, expanding production and economic well-being, and the liberation and equality of all peoples regardless of race, creed or color.

It adheres to the principles of scientific socialism, Marxism, the heritage of the best thought of humanity and of a hundred years experience of the labor movement, principles which have proved to be indispensable to the national existence and independence of every nation; it looks forward to a future in which, by democratic choice of the American people, our own country will solve the problems arising out of the contradiction between the social character of production and its private ownership, incorporating the lessons of the most fruitful achievements of all mankind in a form and manner consistent with American tradition and character.

For the advancement of these aims, the Communist Political Association establishes the basic laws of its organization in the following Constitution.

THREE YEARS OF THE SOVIET NATIONAL-LIBERATION WAR

BY A. LANDY

I

THE third anniversary of the Soviet-German hostilities occurs at the beginning of the final stage of clearing the Nazis from Soviet soil and the full merging of the blows against Hitler from East, West and South. Three years ago, when Hitler's legions treacherously fell upon the Soviet Union, they opened a stage in the Nazi drive for world conquest which, by virtue of the scale of operations, the size and strength of the opposing forces and the quantity and quality of the military equipment involved, made the Soviet-German conflict the most titanic war in all history. From the first day of the attack, Hitler threw the main forces of the military might available to him into this struggle, and they have been tied down on the Eastern Front ever since. Together with his vassals, Hitler had mustered at least 260 divisions against the Soviet Union, twice as large an army as the Germans and their allies had had on the Russo-German front in the First World War.

After three years, the struggle has now entered its final stage under

conditions that make possible the complete rout and defeat of Hitler this year. These conditions were created by the succession of Soviet victories which began in the immortal ruins of Stalingrad and, resuming in the summer of 1943, rose to a joyous crescendo for ten straight months until April of this year. Without regard for the seasons, the Red Army smashed ahead in a continuous offensive which finally brought it to the Rumanian and Czechoslovak frontiers and even carried it into Rumania in pursuit of the fascist enemy. During this time, it advanced westward from 500 to 688 miles, recapturing more than 65,000 localities and liberating more than 310,000 square miles—all but a quarter of the Soviet territory seized by Hitler. In the concluding phase alone of this offensive, which finally cleared the Nazis out of the vital Ukraine, the Red Army inflicted on Hitler's armies the greatest debacle in men and material ever suffered by the Wehrmacht.

There could be no mistake about the far-reaching significance of these victories for the further development of the whole war. The entire world could see that they provided

the opportunities for the complete defeat of Hitler this year. Reflecting the general American reaction to these sensational achievements, Marquis Childs wrote from Washington in the *New York Post* of April 18:

"The extent of the sweep has been far greater than military planners had foreseen. It has, in fact, renewed the hope that the war in Europe can be brought to an end in 1944, thereby offsetting the pessimism of six weeks ago when Churchill, Roosevelt and others gloomily talked of 'some time in 1945. . . .' At the Teheran Conference Marshal Stalin gave his allies a preview of his plans for the coming year. They were most impressive. The performance, however, has far exceeded the promise. The hard-pressed Nazis have had to draw on military manpower from Western Europe although they have made every effort to conceal that fact from their own people."

Even the *New York World-Telegram*, in a generally anti-Soviet editorial of April 19, declared that the Red Armies had now "opened the way to final allied victory."

This was also the opinion of the Soviet press. The Soviet journal *The War and the Working Class*, for example, wrote on April 20:

"It is hardly possible to imagine a more favorable combination of conditions for striking the final blow at Germany than the situation which now exists as a result of the victorious operations of the Red Army."

These operations also eliminated the circumstances which hitherto

have made it possible to obscure and misrepresent the real strategic nature of this final and necessarily combined blow. They made it possible for all to see clearly that it was not just an urgent means of saving the Soviet Union but the indispensable strategy of all the Allies for crushing their common enemy. Driving the Nazis out of Soviet territory still in Hitler's hands is a problem which, as Stalin stated so clearly in his last May Day Order, the Red Army is solving effectively by itself, with all due acknowledgment for the aid given by the Anglo-American Allies. But to deliver the final blow, it is necessary to crush the "wounded German beast in its own lair." The solution of this problem, however, is more difficult than driving Hitler out of the Soviet Union and can only be achieved by the coordinated efforts of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union striking a combined blow.

By May 3, the Nazis themselves conceded that this blow was just about ready to fall. The Nazi radio, which throughout April had been speculating on the date of the invasion, finally announced that all their hopes for splitting the coalition were now at an end.

According to a May 3 London dispatch by United Press correspondent Robert Dowson: "The German transoceanic news agency declared in a broadcast to the continent that there no longer is any prospect of a break in the Anglo-American-Russian Alliance and that Germany is braced for climactic land battles in the East and West. The invasion

and the final battle in the East will take place shortly. . . . Nobody in Berlin has the slightest illusions about a compromise peace." The same day, Prime Minister Churchill, welcoming Empire Premiers to their conference in London, told them they were here "in the most deadly climax in the conflict of the nations." And *Pravda* on May 2, editorializing on Stalin's May Day Order, spoke of the "historical Order . . . published on the eve of decisive battles in which blows from the East, West and South will merge into one mortal blow at the fascist beast. . . ."

And in fact, the expectation of invasion in England and America reached such a high degree of tension during the months of April and May that the *New York Herald Tribune* of May 2, commenting on this, wrote: "No one can escape this concentration of mood on the single instant for which all are waiting. The invasion is a great fact in all our lives."

During the latter part of April the press and radio in England and America engaged in continuous speculation on the probable date of D-Day. April and May also saw the most intense and sustained air offense against Nazi-held western Europe and the Reich in the history of the war, with the attacks passing from strategic bombing of industries to operational bombing of railways, generally understood to be a preliminary to land assault. In addition, measures were taken restricting diplomatic mail, as well as telegrams and travel from England, still further strengthening the im-

pression that the invasion of the Continent was imminent.

At the same time, the Red Army utilized the lull following the end of its continuous advance on April 12 to prepare for its final and greatest offensive of the war which will clear the Nazis entirely out of the Soviet Union and merge with the Anglo-American blows from the West and South to crush Hitler once and for all. The whole experience of three years of war had demonstrated that the main thing for victory is not to give Hitler a chance to recover from the blows suffered at the hands of the Red Army. The Red Army has been winning because it always struck at the enemy in good time and at the right moment, taking advantage of his weakened condition, giving him no time to recover. This happened in the Soviet counter-offensive at Moscow in the winter of 1941, the rout of the Germans at Stalingrad between September, 1942, and February 2, 1943, and the offensive of July, 1943, which continued without respite for ten whole months. This is also the prerequisite for the success of the combined blow of the Anglo-Soviet-American Allies.

II

The third anniversary of the Soviet-German conflict registers the fact that Germany has lost the war, although the final and most difficult stage in the destruction of the mortally wounded Nazi beast is still ahead. The whole course of the Red Army's three-year struggle has prepared this historic fact on which

hinges the democratic and progressive future of all peoples and states. What was this course? What problems did it raise? And what changes and new relations did it produce?

The Nazis invaded the Soviet Union and advanced in three successive waves, in the summer of 1941, the summer of 1942 and the summer of 1943. By December 6, 1941, they had reached the outskirts of Moscow, where the Red Army struck back and forced the Germans to begin their retreat. By July, 1942, the Nazis regained the initiative, reaching the high-water mark of their advance in August before the gates of Stalingrad. The Battle of Stalingrad, which began in September, 1942, and continued to February 2, 1943, ended with the historic victory of the Red Army which marked the turning point of the whole war. On July 5, 1943, the Nazis launched their final and short-lived summer offensive which was smashed by the Red Army within one week, following which the Red Army entered upon its own continuous, ten-month-long advance.

During the year 1942, the Soviet Union's epic resistance gave England the chance to recover and rearm. And in 1943, by smashing Hitler's last and most ambitious summer offensive, the Red Army facilitated the collapse of Italy and its unconditional surrender, having made it impossible for Hitler to answer Mussolini's call for help following the Anglo-American invasion of Sicily of that year.

The common struggle against Hitler brought England, America and the Soviet Union together. On July

12, 1941, an Anglo-Soviet Agreement was signed which, as Molotov said "frustrated Hitler's plans of dividing his adversaries and Hitler's hopes of combating each one of them separately." The Three Power Conference which followed in Moscow arranged for armaments and war materials to be sent to the Soviet Union by England and America. In April, 1942, a full Twenty-Year Treaty was signed between Great Britain and the Soviet Union. And on June 11 of that year, an American-Soviet Master Lend-Lease Agreement was concluded by Roosevelt and Molotov in Washington.

Thus, the foundations for the coalition were laid with the purpose of waging coalition warfare for the earliest defeat of the common enemy. On the same day that Roosevelt and Molotov signed the Lend-Lease Agreement, they also agreed on "the urgent tasks of creating a Second Front in Europe in 1942." The fulfillment of these tasks was plainly the key to the common victory. But four months later when the Nazi armies had already advanced 900 miles into Russia and, with the wheat of the Ukraine and the mineral resources of the Don Basin in their hands, were hammering at Stalingrad and threatening the Caucasian oil fields, these tasks had still not been taken in hand.

On October 4, 1942, Stalin was compelled to declare that "the aid of the Allies to the Soviet Union has so far been little effective. In order to amplify and improve this aid, only one thing is required; that the Allies fulfill their obligations fully and on time." And a month later,

on November 6, estimating the state of the war, Stalin insisted that had a Second Front existed, the advances of the German army in 1942 would have been impossible and that, instead of being able to hurl all their reserves onto the Eastern Front without risk to themselves, the Nazis would have been on the verge of disaster in the summer of that year. In other words, had full coalition warfare been carried out, compelling the Nazis to fight on two fronts, they could have been smashed one year after Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union.

The invasion of Africa by the Anglo-American forces in November, 1942, while fully welcomed by the Soviet Union, was clearly not the Second Front. Three months later, therefore, on February 22, 1943, Stalin still insisted that "in view of the absence of a Second Front in Europe the Red Army alone is bearing the full weight of the war."

The insistence of the Soviet Union that the Anglo-American Allies fulfill their obligations by opening a Second Front met with no greater success in 1943. The only answer to Stalin's declaration that the Soviet Union alone was bearing the full weight of the war, was a public announcement by U. S. Ambassador to Moscow, Wm. H. Standley, on March 9, that the Soviet Government was not informing its people of important American aid. The appeasers and defeatists immediately tried to capitalize on this statement. On March 11, Wm. C. Bullitt, notorious Munichman, in a speech before the United Nations Forum in Philadelphia, attacked the

Soviet Union for not being at war with Japan, advancing the shameless "carrot and club" thesis with the declaration that if the Soviet Union wants our help now, it must join in the war on Japan, thus answering the Soviet Union's demand for a Second Front against Hitler with the demand for a second front by Japan against the Soviet Union.

The reactionary Polish Government-in-Exile, in collusion with the Nazis, also regarded this as an auspicious moment to drive a wedge in the coalition by accepting Nazi charges made in a propaganda broadcast of April 16 that the Red Army had murdered 10,000 Polish officers and buried them in Katyn Forest near Smolensk. The Soviet Government answered this outrageous action, which violated all standards of relations between allied governments, by severing diplomatic relations with the Polish Government-in-Exile on April 26.

Ever since their defeat at Stalingrad, the Nazis had sought to save themselves from total catastrophe by attempting to divide the Allies politically. And from the spring of 1943 on, they had intensified their propaganda against the so-called danger of Bolshevism, which was echoed by the defeatist circles in England and America.

In June, Senator Chandler launched a "Beat Japan First" campaign in the Senate, supported by seven other Senators. The object of this campaign was indicated in a speech by Senator Wheeler in Chicago in which he attacked the Soviet Union and suggested that we penalize her by substituting an

offensive in the Pacific for one in Europe.

By August, 1943, the coalition had clearly reached a crisis in its relations. This crisis was due to the failure of the Anglo-American Allies to open a Second Front, thereby protracting the war and vastly increasing the cost of final victory. The question was whether Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States were capable of waging full coalition warfare or whether the coalition itself could endure. The Allies had to clarify these political and military problems and unify their policy. They had to make clear that the alliance could not and would not be broken up and that England and America were not just playing with the idea of a Second Front.

The stage had also been reached in the war when it was necessary to establish a general policy on post-war aims and to create the framework for the solution of many questions. The fears of a number of states, stirred up by German propaganda, that Central, Southern and Western Europe was to be "Sovietized" had to be dispelled.

As a result, a Conference of the Foreign Ministers of England, the United States, and the Soviet Union was held in Moscow on October 30, 1943, preparing the way for the Teheran Conference of Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill in December, which marked a historic consolidation of the coalition and laid the basis for the final blow against Hitler and his satellites, setting the exact time and scope of the invasion of Europe.

In fact, by January, 1944, the American press reported that final preparations for the invasion had been completed. The Nazis were now convinced that the Allied blow from the West and South was inevitable. They therefore adopted the strategy of trying to delay its execution, attempting to keep the Allies from seizing the new, unprecedented opportunity for joint action provided by the sensational Soviet victories. In this way they hoped to achieve a stalemate in the South and West while exhausting the Soviet Union in the East, with the expectation that "at the given hour the initiative in the East will pass once more to the Germans."

In the execution of this strategy, the Nazis again looked for help from the defeatist and appeasement circles in England and America who had opposed the Second Front in Europe in 1942 and 1943. In January, these elements actually began a campaign to postpone the invasion of Europe from the West, parroting all the "arguments" of Hitler and Goebbels. They exaggerated Nazi strength and raised alarms about huge and futile losses which invasion would entail. They dragged out the old Soviet bogey in typical Nazi fashion, proclaiming that the only result of the invasion would be to deliver Europe up to Bolshevism. They seized on the Polish question and on the Italian developments as vehicles for their efforts to prevent full coalition warfare and to disrupt the Anglo-Soviet-American Alliance. And in the same breath they warned that once the Nazis were

driven out of Russia, the Red Army would drop out of the fight.

The continuous Soviet victories, of course, quickly smashed all these "arguments." They destroyed the last possible excuse for underestimating the Soviet Union's military might and overestimating Hitler's. The Red Army's advance beyond the Soviet borders exploded the defeatist lie that it would stop fighting once it had reached its own frontiers. And Molotov's statement that the Soviet Union had no designs on Rumanian territory and no desire to change the existing social order there, as well as the generous Soviet terms offered Finland to encourage its withdrawal from the war, blasted the lie that the Soviet Union planned to Bolshevize Europe.

Nevertheless, during the first four months of this year, Hitler's campaign to delay the Second Front did not fail to impress even some conservative circles, especially in England, who, as *The War and the Working Class* of April 21 said, were not opposed to adopting good decisions, while fighting against their execution. Then, too, some of these "Right conservatives," who agreed to a Second Front, conceived of it as a prologue to a protracted war, a conception which could not possibly constitute a final blow in accord with the opportunities opened up by the Soviet victories, Anglo-American strength and the Teheran decisions. This is how Lord Halifax, Britain's Ambassador to the United States, presented the coming invasion in a speech on March 1, and his views were echoed in part of the American press.

To be a final blow which will finish Hitler this year, the Second Front must clearly be of such strength as really to crush the enemy quickly. It cannot be approached as an introduction to a prolonged war of attrition with the object of exhausting Germany. An invasion along these lines would be tantamount to giving the Nazis the protracted war they want. It would be a strategic victory for Hitler. It was such a strategy of exhaustion which kept the Anglo-American Allies from opening a Second Front before, on the ground that they needed time to build up and deploy their armed forces. But if such a strategy may have been dictated by the need for time during the early period of Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, this reason can hardly operate today.

As a result of all this, while the Anglo-American press in April was full of rumors of the impending invasion, the Soviet press was moved to emphasize the distinction between agreement and fulfillment. *The War and the Working Class* of April 21, for example, declared: "It should be noted that even the best decisions do not spell complete policy. Everything depends on their fulfillment. The decisions of the Teheran Conference are still waiting to be realized."

As late as April 30, *Pravda*, commenting on the intensive preparations for the invasion of Europe, recorded the fact that many people in England and America had for a long time been asking with amazement what was delaying the launching of the invasion. "The Soviet

Union," *Pravda* wrote, "is fulfilling its obligations fully. The German army is receiving blow after blow—one more devastating than the other. The time has arrived to inflict devastating blows from the West as well."

III

What are the sources of Soviet strength and its victory over Nazi Germany? The answer to this has been given in the valiant deeds of the Soviet people and the epic performance of the Red Army, which have evoked the never-ending wonder and acclaim of all anti-Hitler peoples and states. It is an answer which has been repeatedly put into proud but modest words by the leaders of the Soviet Union and especially by Stalin.

Soviet strength has its source in a planned socialist economy which has grown steadily in the course of the war in contrast to the deterioration of German fascist economy based on slavery. It has its source in a gigantic socialist industry and large-scale agriculture equipped with modern machinery, providing the material and technical base for the military successes of the Red Army; in the existence of a technically and scientifically trained personnel in every field relating to the conduct of the war; in a Soviet state characterized by the absence of exploiting classes, which has assured the greatest moral and political unity of the population; in a national policy of friendship between its peoples, ensuring their fraternal collaboration and patriotic

devotion to their common homeland; in a Red Army conscious of the solicitude and care lavished on their families by the Government and the Communist Party; and, above all, in a steeled and confident Bolshevik Party led by Stalin in the triumphant spirit of Lenin's heritage.

The great victories of the Soviet Union have been made possible by the will and the fortitude of the Soviet people, by the fact that even in the most trying days they never lost confidence in the strength and power of their socialist state and their ultimate victory over the fascist invaders. They were made possible by the superiority of Soviet strategy and tactics, by the military skill and morale of its troops, by the excellence of its armaments and the Red Army's ability to continuously perfect its military art.

In face of these deep wellsprings of Soviet strength created by twenty-six years of socialism and tested in three years of devastating war, only incredible ignorance or malicious misrepresentation or both can explain the sudden "discovery" by the *New York Times* of April 2, and repeated by other papers, that the Soviet Union really owes its strength to the re-introduction of capitalism. Could anything be more ludicrous than the spectacle of American correspondents in the Soviet Union, pressed in all seriousness by their editors to scour around for evidence of this "return to capitalism," cabling back, just as seriously, that "Russian Communists are not embracing capitalism"?

Capitalism has unquestionably been of help to the Soviet Union in its war with Germany but not the way some American editors imagined. That help has come in the form of aid from England and America, as Stalin so explicitly acknowledged in his last May Day Order.

An important source of Soviet strength has been its consistent foreign policy. Its aim throughout has been to strengthen the Anglo-Soviet-American Alliance and realize full coalition warfare in order to assure the complete defeat and annihilation of Hitlerism in the shortest possible time and at the least possible cost. It has been a policy seeking the collaboration of all democratic countries, great and small, for the defeat of the common enemy and for defense of peace in the post-war world.

The Soviet Union's relations to Czechoslovakia are a model of its policy toward small nations. The Soviet Union had never recognized the decisions adopted at Munich in 1938, nor did it recognize the piratical seizure of that country and its transformation into Hitler's "Czech region." When, therefore, on December 12, 1943, the Soviet Union signed a treaty of amity and mutual assistance and post-war cooperation with the Czechoslovak Republic, it was continuing its policy of friendly and peaceful relations with its neighbors which was first embodied in the Mutual Assistance Treaty of May 16, 1935, and continued in the Treaty of Joint Struggle against Germany of July 18, 1941.

The Czechoslovak - Soviet Friend-

ship Treaty of December 12, 1943, laid a stable foundation for post-war cooperation and was followed in April of this year by the Soviet-Czechoslovak Agreement for the administration of Czech territory after the entry of the Red Army, providing for the administration of liberated territory by the Czech Government as soon as this territory ceases to be a zone of immediate military operation. Like the Treaty of December 12, this latest agreement has been ratified by the governments of the United States and Great Britain. The historic Treaty of December 12 expressed the desire of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union to "help support the peace after the war and to prevent further aggression by Germany and to ensure a lasting friendship and post-war peaceful cooperation between the two nations."

In line with this, both the Czechoslovak Republic and the Soviet Union were anxious to have an independent and democratic Poland adhere to this treaty, an act which, as Benes declared in his February 3 report, "could represent a definite solution of all the disputes between us and pave the way for a secure future for these three Slavonic states as well as safeguarding peace in Eastern and Central Europe and maybe in Europe as a whole. . . . In Moscow we agreed that we should not cease to strive for such an understanding."

In breaking relations with the Polish Government-in-Exile, the Soviet Union acted in the interests of assuring victory over Hitler. Because of blind hostility to the Soviet

Union, the Polish Government-in-Exile not only failed to act as an ally in the war against Hitler but actually acted in collusion with the Nazis against the Soviet Union. Instead of pursuing a policy of closest collaboration and friendship with the Soviet Union, which alone could assure Poland of the necessary strength against the German *Drang nach Osten*, the Polish Government-in-Exile continued the notorious policy of a greater Poland pursued by the reactionary Polish ruling circles for two decades following the Versailles Treaty, a policy which turned Poland into a breeding ground of anti-Soviet intrigue and a source of war.

That is why it rejected the Soviet Government's efforts to solve the whole border question on the basis of the Curzon line, despite the fact that Prime Minister Churchill and American official and public opinion generally recognized the reasonableness of this proposal. That is why it never permitted the Polish army, formed and equipped on Soviet soil with the help of the Soviet Government, to fight on the Eastern Front and withdrew it to the Middle East, the Polish government leaders never having had any faith in, nor desire for, a Soviet victory over the Nazis. In fact, according to a London dispatch of May 4 to the *New York Times* by Raymond Daniell, "The Poles, like the Yugoslavs [King Peter's Government-in-Exile], are laboring under the impression that if they can just hold out until the Allies have established a Front in Western Europe, they can depend upon a stronger British-American

support of their position vis-a-vis Russia."

With this in view, the Polish Government-in-Exile has been spending huge sums for propoganda purposes in the United States and has sought to blackmail our Government by threatening to swing the "Polish vote" against the President in the coming election should he fail to support its pro-Nazi maneuvers against the Soviet Union. As part of this plan they organized a national Polish congress in Buffalo on May 28 in cooperation with the openly pro-fascist Knapp for the purpose of creating a Polish-American concentration to be used, not in the solution of the Polish question, which history has taken out of their hands, but in blackjacking the President and forcing a rift between the United States and the Soviet Union.

All these activities have been conducted in close partnership with the American defeatists and pro-fascists, who have seized upon the Polish question with its "small nation appeal" as a blessing from heaven to disrupt the coalition, just as they seized upon "poor little Finland" in the Munich days of 1939-1940.

Thus, on the eve of the invasion of Europe and the final launching of the two-front war to crush Hitler, the press of America and practically the entire *Congressional Record* of May 3 were filled with speeches and slanderous attacks by defeatist Congressmen and Senators like Hamilton Fish, Wheeler, Luce, and others, assailing the Soviet Union and threatening a new anti-Soviet war following this one, on

behalf of "poor little Poland." They even succeeded in getting Polish-American supporters of the President to lend their voices, despite the fact that the whole campaign is directed against President Roosevelt and his foreign policy as embodied in the Teheran Agreement.

This scandalous spectacle climaxed almost a week of hysterical outbursts in the press and on the radio against Father Orlemanski, a Roman Catholic priest from Massachusetts, and Professor Oscar Lange of the University of Chicago for having accepted an invitation to visit the Polish divisions in the Soviet Union.

Despite the extensive and frantic efforts of the Government-in-Exile to stampede the British and Washington Governments into an anti-Soviet stand, disruptive of the coalition, their efforts are entirely futile.

As far as American public opinion is concerned, it was pretty well summarized by the *Magazine of Wall Street* which, on February 5, wrote:

"It is extremely doubtful whether the people of either Britain or the United States would be willing to pay the price to bring about a restoration of pre-war Poland, which was never a democratic state but a backward and feudal one—a land in which the masses lived in the greatest poverty, and where social caste and religious intolerance existed to a high degree. . . . At the moment there is considerable resentment in this country over the threat to use the five million Polish-American votes as a stick with which to chastise that party in our country which

does not meet Polish demands for her 1939 status quo. This seems like the tactics of Josef Beck all over again."

Consistent with its anti-fascist foreign policy, the Soviet Union has systematically sought to rally all the Slav peoples against Hitler Germany and its attempts to reduce them to serf populations slaving for the German "master race." It has encouraged the organization of strong partisan movements among them and has facilitated the formation of Polish, Czech and Yugoslav fighting divisions under their own command to fight side by side with the Red Army for the defeat and destruction of the Nazi armies on the Eastern Front and for the liberation of their homelands. Indeed, the magnificent struggle of the Yugoslav Liberation Army, under the leadership of Marshal Tito, has been an invaluable contribution to the common war of all the United Nations.

This fighting unity of the Slav peoples, who unquestionably occupy the vanguard position among the peoples of the world in the struggle against savage Hitler fascism, forged in the fire of the great patriotic war, will continue to be a powerful force for world peace and progress after the war is over.

The democratic role and initiative of the Soviet Union in strengthening the anti-Hitler fighting capacity of all peoples and states have been demonstrated also in relation to Italy and France. It gave great moral and political assistance to the French Liberation forces united

around de Gaulle, and took the lead in recognizing the de Gaulle Committee, encouraging the anti-Hitler national unity of all sections and classes of the French people. The Free French, in turn, have indicated their acknowledgment of the Soviet Union's role by assigning the Normandie air squadron to the Eastern Front. It is no accident that an Algiers dispatch of April 3 to the *New York Times*, describing the sentiment of the masses inside France, reported "the turn of French emotions to the Soviet Union," and that General de Gaulle, in a speech on May 8, declared that France wants a permanent alliance with "dear, powerful Russia."

In the case of Italy also, the Soviet Union has played a highly constructive, democratic role, thereby strengthening the fighting power of all the United Nations and helping them to adhere to the central task of defeating Hitler Germany and establishing a lasting peace. The Soviet Union made its first major contribution to Italy in the summer of 1943, when its counter-offensive contributed substantially to the collapse of Mussolini. Again, in October, 1943, at the Moscow Conference of American, Soviet and British Foreign Ministers, the Soviet Union took the initiative in projecting a Seven-Point Program, for the destruction of fascism and the democratic reconstruction of Italy. Finally, in March, 1944, the Soviet Union undertook to accelerate the application of this program by exchanging representatives with the Badoglio Government.

Despite the slanders and insinuations of the Anglo-American appeasers against this action of the Soviet Union, the recognition of the real constructive significance of this act was not long in coming. "In private, if not in public," according to a May 2 dispatch from Algiers to the *New York Post*, "Allied officials in the Mediterranean area freely credit Moscow with breaking the log-jam in the violent dispute over Italian politics which existed until recently. In fact, Britons and Americans in posts of authority . . . admit that . . . the Russians . . . helped the situation all around. . . . Without Moscow's surprise play, the stalemate of two or three months ago might still be in effect, with the Allies definitely not gaining popularity."

That the policy of the Soviet Union has pursued the single purpose of building and strengthening its coalition with England and America as the vanguard of the United Nations with the aim of winning the war and ensuring a lasting peace is reflected even in its policy toward Hitler's European satellites.

It cooperated fully with England and America in attempting to facilitate the withdrawal of these satellites from the war as Hitler's puppet allies.

Its peace terms to Finland and the declaration of its intention to respect Rumania's state independence and social system were clear evidence of its consistent policy of doing everything in its power to accelerate the defeat and collapse of the common Hitlerite foe.

IV

The outbreak of the Soviet-German war transformed the whole world picture. Before the second year of the war was out, the question of who would emerge the victor was settled. The third year of the war determined whether it would be victory by coalition warfare and, at Teheran, established the possibility of a peaceful type of world development for generations after. At the beginning of the fourth year of this war, this possible course is being forged in the furnace of the combined Anglo-Soviet-American blows into the inevitable path of development which the peoples and states of the whole world will pursue in the next historical epoch.

At no time during the course of the war has it been so overwhelmingly decisive, particularly for the United States, to understand the role and significance of the Soviet Union's immortal fight in relation to our own struggle and our own national security. It was a great American triumph when the Nazis attacking the Soviet Union found that socialism had been a huge success and that it had made the U.S.S.R. strong and invincible. The final victory of the Soviet Union, jointly with its Allies, over Hitler Germany, will be an even greater triumph for us, and for our future security, because the existence of the powerful Soviet Union will clearly be a mighty force for the peace, prosperity and progress of the whole world.

Everything that has happened during the three years of the Soviet-

German hostilities, the relentless manner in which the Soviet Union has conducted the struggle against fascism, the untiring efforts to secure full collaboration with its Allies, demonstrates this. The events of these three years have given a new answer to the great historical question concerning the ability of capitalist and socialist states to cooperate. They have not only shown that they can cooperate on the basis of common national interests, democracy and material progress, but that the Soviet Union, because it is a socialist state and a great power, is the most consistent and conscious force in the achievement and maintenance of such cooperation. For world peace, and for the security of the United States particularly, this is of the highest importance.

American-Soviet relations have unquestionably been strengthened in the course of the past three years. The American and Soviet Governments have increasingly seen eye to eye on the most important questions arising in connection with the war. The American people's admiration for the Soviet Union has reached unprecedented levels. The very people who in the summer of 1941 believed in the inferiority and weakness of the Soviet Union have now learned "to grasp the overwhelming significance of Russian military power in the development of contemporary history" and to appreciate "the tremendous dynamics of Russian diplomatic and social policy in the Europe of today," as the *New York Herald Tribune* phrased it recently. President Roosevelt spoke for the whole camp of national

unity in the United States when he congratulated the people and leaders of the Soviet Union last November 7 and declared that "they have written deathless pages of history in the struggle against tyranny and oppression." There can be no doubt that America's understanding of the historical significance of the socialist Soviet Union has matured and has finally been freed from the historical astigmatism which threatened to distort its vision and endangered its national existence.

In establishing this fact, we cannot afford to ignore the strength and activities of those powerful defeatist forces who, aspiring to government power in the 1944 Presidential elections, are seeking to disrupt the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition and prevent the Teheran path of development. In fact, the time has come when we must make it utterly impossible for the anti-Soviet elements to undermine the foundations of our national welfare and security which lie in waging full coalition warfare now, in fulfilling the Teheran agreement, and strengthening the friendship and collaboration between the peoples and governments of our two countries.

No doubt, there are also win-the-war forces who, the closer we come to final victory, hesitate over their own course and lend themselves to perpetuating the anti-Soviet virus which poisoned the life of the whole world for so many years. But in these historical times a sense of history is the greatest asset. It teaches that the march of progress cannot be canceled out. In the 16th cen-

tury, when capitalism made its first appearance in the Western World, the efforts of Holland and England to establish republican governments proved to be short-lived. The new capitalist social forces, as in England, were frightened by the democratic consequences and they crushed the British Republican Revolution of 1648 and restored the monarchy, under Constitutional guarantees, in the "glorious" Whig Revolution of 1698, and, incidentally, established the Bank of England a year later.

But by the 18th century, despite these fears, the republican democratic path of development was resumed with even greater sweep and force in the American and French Revolutions, which opened a new era of world history, and all the efforts to restrict democracy and restore monarchic feudalism proved futile. The monarchic restoration of 1815 and the Metternichian effort to wipe out the democratic liberating effects of the French Revolution lasted only fifteen short years and the march of democracy was once more resumed, spurred on by the overriding force of economic development. The new advance of democracy in the present century, registered by the Russian Revolution, called forth similar reactionary efforts to hold up human progress. No attempt to force it into an outmoded path of development can succeed. Fascism has tried frantically to halt history altogether. But the vast plains of the Soviet Union have proved to be an effective cemetery for all its rapacious hopes of world conquest.

PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE COMMUNIST POLITICAL ASSOCIATION

BY JOHN WILLIAMSON

ON MAY 1, 1944, over 20,000 Americans had been enrolled in the Communist recruiting campaign initiated on Lincoln's Birthday, February 12. This figure represented 90 per cent of the goal of 22,000, while the full goal will be achieved by the time of the National Convention. Nine large districts overfulfilled their objectives. While Ohio, one of these districts, was pace-setter in the early stages of the campaign, Michigan, Western Pennsylvania and New Jersey scored highest in results. Other quota-filling districts on May 1 were Wisconsin, Illinois-Indiana, the Northwest, Eastern Pennsylvania and Connecticut.

There were those who thought that this goal could not be reached. They predicated their thinking on the idea that a political-educational association as distinct from a political party would not be able to attract new members in large numbers. The success of the Campaign has dispelled these fears and the thousands of new members will be an additional effective force in election activities in the coming months. We have the largest re-

cruiting results in the history of the American Communist movement, precisely when we have been participating in the most intensive political mass work. We see the great possibilities opening for the building of the Communist Political Association, when with only a fraction of our strength mobilized, we have such results.

This considerable increase in Communist membership in the opening months of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary year strengthens substantially the national war effort, to which the Communists have consistently subordinated everything. Every individual Communist is contributing to the war effort in some capacity. Even prior to this recruiting campaign, nearly 10,000 Communists were on leave in the armed forces. Fifty per cent of the membership were war production soldiers, pace-setters in strengthening their unions and increasing production. Nearly 15 per cent were Negroes, attracted to our ranks by the uncompromising struggle of the Communists for full equality of the Negro people.

This successful recruiting cam-

paign has many lessons, positive and also negative, that must be mastered in connection with the new role and tasks of the Communist Association as distinct from a political party. The main lessons are:

1. The drive for enrollment in our organization at the moment when new major developments in Communist policy were causing animated, widespread discussion throughout the nation, reflected confidence in the growing political maturity of democratic and progressive America. The response to this call for new recruits evidenced the understanding and support of Communist policies by large numbers of non-Communists—although only the most conscious of these have joined the organization.

2. Likewise, the campaign demonstrated the understanding and unity of American Communists, who in unprecedented numbers—from 15 per cent to 35 per cent in the various districts—were involved in recruiting. This greater participation was achieved in the midst of an intense Enlightenment Campaign to promote understanding that we are “solving problems for which there are no precedents in history and no formulas from the classics which give us the answer” (Browder). Further, this increase in the number of recruiters took place in the course of active participation by the membership in political struggles of the people and their organizations.

3. Although we made only the first beginnings in adopting new methods of recruiting and reaching into new strata of workers, the re-

cruiting did bring about a further improvement in the social composition of the party. A comparison of the new recruits with those registered as of January, 1944 and 1943 indicates this:

Category	Per cent in Re- cruiting Drive	Per cent in Regis- tration Jan. '44	Per cent in Regis- tration Jan. '43
*Industrial Workers....	58	46	42
*Basic Indust. Workers.	38	27	23
*Trade Unionists	49	52	51
Negroes	37	14	10
Women	43	46	43
Housewives	44	43	43
Professional and White Collar	17	25	29

A critical analysis of these figures reveals certain weak aspects.

The decrease in the percentage of trade unionists recruited can be traced to:

a. Failure to establish satisfactory political and organizational ties with all members formerly in shop and industrial branches, and as part of this problem, less systematically organized political discussion and press activity among non-Communist but progressive shop workers and trade unionists.

b. Very unsatisfactory recruiting among women shop workers; of the women recruited, 23 per cent are shop workers, 43 per cent housewives, and the remainder white-collar workers, professionals, and service trades employees.

c. The unfinished job of the entire labor movement in unionizing the Negro workers who have entered industry in large numbers.

Of particular significance is the

* The nearly 10,000 Communists in the armed services were not included in the analysis of membership registration; otherwise these categories would be substantially increased.

continued substantial increase in basic industry workers, now reaching an all-time high level of 38 per cent. In many basic industries the new recruits in this campaign equal half or more of the total Communist membership in that industry as of January 1, as the following will show: auto-aviation, 70 per cent; coal mining, 55 per cent; aluminum, 90 per cent; steel, 55 per cent; packing, 50 per cent; shipyard, 49 per cent; and railroad, 60 per cent.

Indicative of the thinking of the coal miners, despite the efforts of John L. Lewis to confuse and mislead them, is the fact that in this year's recruiting campaign nearly three times as many coal miners as last year joined the Communist Party. This fact shows the possibilities of reaching out with our influence among the miners in the coming months. The following table, using 100 as the 1942 basis, indicates the trend of Communist recruiting in the most important mining areas:

	— January 1 —		4 mos. of 1944
	1942	1943	
W. Pa.-W. Va....	100	95	263
Eastern Pa.	100	124	202
Illinois	100	89	88
Ohio	100	71	84
National	100	99	147

This increase in recruiting among basic industry workers was common to many districts, such as:

Ill.-Ind.—10 per cent of the recruits were steel workers; 11 per cent automotive, and 12 per cent metal.

Michigan—65 per cent were auto-aircraft workers.

Ohio—11 per cent were steel workers, 15 per cent auto-aircraft, and 4 per cent aluminum.

Calif.—17 per cent were shipyard workers and 11 per cent aircraft.

W. Pa.-W. Va.—16 per cent were coal miners, 14 per cent steel workers, and 8 per cent metal.

E. Pa.—15 per cent were shipyard workers, 8 per cent metal, and 5 per cent steel.

N. J.—10 per cent were metal workers, 14 per cent shipyard, and 8 per cent automotive.

The most significant feature of the composition of the new recruits is the fact that one-third were Negroes, and in some districts over one-half. To a greater extent than ever before, these were Negro workers in industry. This is a reflection of the tremendous prestige the Communist Party has won among the Negro people through its consistent struggle for Negro rights. It highlights the nationwide influence of the election of Benjamin J. Davis, Jr., to the New York City Council. It signifies that the Negro people have in their great majority rejected anti-Communist prejudices and misconceptions, that they recognize and accept the participation—and often the leadership—of Communists in the common fight to wipe out Jim Crowism and all forms of discrimination in our national life.

4. Compared with past years, the growing national scope of the Communist organization was demonstrated by recruiting activity which reached into every part of our country. No longer does New York State overshadow all other districts,

although it proudly remains the largest state organization. The splendid recruiting achievements of Michigan, Western Pennsylvania-West Virginia, and New Jersey present new perspectives to many of our district and state organizations.

The prerequisites for organizational strengthening of the Communist movement are exemplified in the recruiting campaign. Various districts can point to one or a combination of some of the following as the reasons for success:

a. Effective participation in electoral or other mass political activities and struggles of the workers in the shops and communities, as in Ohio and Illinois;

b. Consistent and bold championing of the struggle for Negro rights in the factories and trade unions as part of the general community struggle for full democratic rights for all minorities, particularly evidenced in Detroit and Eastern Pennsylvania;

c. Connecting recruiting with systematic and extended mass educational activities, especially increased circulation of *The Worker*, as in Western Pennsylvania, West Virginia, New Jersey, and Wisconsin.

Clearly, we are not in the stage of large-scale recruiting at public mass meetings. The role of the individual Communist in recruiting is decisive. To the extent that an ever-larger number of individual Communists personally contacted their co-workers in the shop or local union, or at gatherings in house meetings, or in community work, or among those to whom they had sold

literature or a subscription for *The Worker*, in that measure recruiting was eminently successful. The best results were attained when the member was known to his co-workers as a Communist. To the extent that the Club becomes a real community force, and its leaders are known as community leaders of mass movements, it will be possible to increase the recruiting of local key personalities. Similarly, to the extent that the Club concerns itself with the main problems confronting the labor movement, and the County Committees find supplementary methods of clarifying Communist trade unionists and increasing educational-press activity among all trade unionists, will we finally include among our recruits a substantial majority of trade unionists. The unsatisfactory recruitment of women shop workers reflects the fact that the key political importance of this problem, as it relates to the 1944 elections and the post-war status of economic conditions and labor unionism, has not been discussed and appreciated within the Party Clubs and Committees.

The overwhelming success of the Recruiting Campaign emphasizes the lesson that with a minimum of effort, and the fact of political consciousness, recruiting in substantial numbers can be a normal activity of Communist Clubs and members. Ohio, which set the original pace in the campaign, closed its campaign on February 12. During the campaign it had a weekly average of 86, but since February 12 the average has dropped to six. Clearly, the workers in Ohio were just as ready

to respond in March as in January. The Ohio Communists were in contact with masses of workers in March as they had been in January. The almost complete stoppage of recruiting in Ohio would leave the impression that recruiting is a campaign job instead of a normal activity every month in the year. This experience should make the rest of the Clubs and Districts alert to this danger.

The change of name from Party to "Association" is a means of facilitating and strengthening unity, understanding, and activity of the broad democratic current in American political life. If we adapt our functioning and methods of activity accordingly, this change opens up the possibility for the Communist Association to reach this year the much-coveted goal of 100,000 members and thus further strengthen the democratic camp in the midst of a most bitterly fought election struggle.

To realize this goal we need clarity on the role and functioning of the Association as distinct from a political party. The need for this enlightenment is further emphasized in view of the fact that there are 33,000 members who have been less than a year in the Communist organization.

* * *

The specific programmatic character of the Communist organization was explained by Earl Browder as follows:

"Our party is something more

than just another organization. It has many features similar to those of other organizations, but it is a special kind of organization. It is this first of all because, as a Marxist party of the working class, its policies are based on science and are the product of science. It is this because it strives to free the material and intellectual forces of production from all obstacles to their unlimited development in the service of mankind, because it strives to keep the path of progress open and, as such, is the champion and transmitter of all that is best and enduring in human culture, thought and knowledge."*

Those who have speculated that this change of name means fewer responsibilities or activities are incorrect. The solution of particular problems will be facilitated, but we are going to have many more problems. The fundamental role of the Communist organization described above by Earl Browder are permanent features of a Marxist organization.

Some people have mistakenly reduced the significance of the change of name to a belief that the Communists will not have their own independent candidates in elections. Such people have failed to think through the entire significance of the change as it will express itself in new methods of work and different relationships with other organizations.

Two particular questions have been raised in the pre-Convention discussion:

* *A Talk About the Communist Party*, Workers Library Publishers, pp. 15-16.

1. What did Earl Browder mean in his Detroit speech of April 7 when he referred to us as a "non-partisan political-educational association"?

2. How will we function as an association, both nationally and especially in the Club? What is new and different in our functioning as an association, as distinct from a political party?

The general answers to all such questions were given in the report of Earl Browder and the speeches of Gene Dennis, Roy Hudson, and John Williamson at the National Committee Plenum. In providing an orientation to the more specific aspects of the questions, we recognize that certain answers will be found in the course of the work of the Association itself.

However, we must warn against an oversimplification and certain vulgarizations, which would lead to any one of three dangerous tendencies:

1. To have the Association continue to function as in the past, with only a change of name.

2. To reduce the Association exclusively to an educational association.

3. To fall into the tendency, common to many members, especially new members who do not yet understand the Marxist program of the Association, to see in the activity and program of a mass political organization the answers to their immediate desires for mass political work and, hence, to see little use in also belonging to the Communist Association. If such ideas took hold,

we would face many serious problems interfering with our growth and effectiveness.

Because these dangers are present we must bring clearness on all these questions.

* * *

Today, on the political field we shall begin to experience problems similar to those faced and solved years ago on the field of economic organization and struggle. For some years, with a mass trade union movement, which has developed its own leadership cadre, issues its own newspapers, conducts education, etc., we have not had the same type of responsibilities and therefore we do not have the same organizational relationships with the trade unions. We are not jealous of this development. On the contrary, we are proud that we contributed to it.

Of course, this does not mean that we are no longer interested in problems of the labor and trade union movements. In fulfilling our vanguard role today, in the course of normal political activity, we are contributing toward political clarification—sometimes through struggles where we stood almost alone in the beginning—on the following issues which are still on the order of the day:

1. Labor's voluntary relinquishment of its strike weapon, in the interest of the nation's stake in the present war of national liberation. This meant struggle against the ef-

fort of John L. Lewis, the Trotskyites and Social-Democrats to exploit the legitimate grievances of many workers and manipulate them for defeatist and anti-national unity aims.

2. The need of a positive attitude toward the entire question of reconversion and post-war planning, in the interest of labor and the nation. Instead of a perspective of "slugging it out," the policies of Teheran, if realized, make it possible for the labor unions to strengthen themselves and their influence through active collaboration with government and business in the maintenance of wartime production and national income levels in peacetime.

3. The growing sentiments within the A. F. of L. membership and leadership for a policy of joint labor action and active partnership in the national win-the-war coalition behind the Commander-in-Chief and the consequent defeat of the reactionary policies of Hutcheson, Woll and Dubinsky.

4. The all-decisive character of the "Draft Roosevelt for a Fourth Term" movement which has its origin and roots in the masses of the people. Some labor leaders, however, think support of Roosevelt should become a bargaining question. As if the danger to our nation from Hitler-fascism and its native American Fuehrers were a bargaining question! While the Republican Party is the main vehicle for reaction in the elections, it does not hesitate, as in Michigan, to operate through a "Left" third party—the Michigan Commonwealth Party—in

its design to help the Deweys and Hoovers defeat Roosevelt. Yet, some labor leaders fail to adopt a clear-cut policy of struggle against these divisive elements.

Thus, under present-day circumstances, which differ from years ago, we continue to fulfill our normal responsibilities toward the working class and its organizations.

Our approach today is that of politically equipping our own members with an understanding of the main issues of the day. In this way, they within their trade unions and the Communist organization through its general propaganda among workers will be able to contribute to the strengthening of the membership, leadership and unity of the trade unions and to help labor achieve independence from those influences which interfere with its full participation in the war, with fulfillment of its responsibilities to the nation, while adequately defending its economic and political interests.

On the political field we see the beginnings of a process of mass political activity and organization. Here also the Communists have pioneered over the years, raising the flag of independent labor political action. Today, under the specific conditions of the war, they emphasize the fact that not only must labor organize itself politically, but it should become the organizer of a firm coalition of all pro-Teheran forces in preparation for the crucial November elections. This development of mass political organization takes on various forms—A.L.P., Democratic-Farmer Labor Party, C.I.O. Political Action Committee,

Joint Labor Committee, Democratic Party Clubs, etc.—and after the fall elections may assume proportions of a further large-scale political realignment.

It must be clear that the changing of our electoral status does *not* mean either of the following, as has been mistakenly stated in some pre-Convention discussion:

1. That we are merging with any other organization and losing our independent role as a Marxist political-educational organization.

2. That we are going to operate exclusively through one of the major parties.

While it is absolutely correct to change from party to association in order to collaborate more effectively with all other democratic forces within the political life and structure of our nation, this does *not* mean our liquidation as a separate Marxist organization.

The Association is the form of our adaptation to the two-party system, under the specific American conditions of the organization and political maturing of the working class and other democratic sections of the population. But, as a non-party association, we are by no means neutral. Because we are a Marxist organization, we contribute to the strengthening and broadening of the democratic camp, by waging a political struggle on every vital issue in the interest of the workers and the nation.

Similarly, our status as an association does not mean that we are joining or merging with either the Democratic or Republican Party. As Earl Browder states, "We are

taking the line of issues and not of parties and of choosing men as they stand for or against issues, without regard to party labels."* We aim at creating conditions *whereby we can collaborate most freely and effectively with any and all win-the-war groupings*, irrespective of what party they may be working through at the moment. The emphasis is on the strengthened collaboration with broader sections of the labor movement, the Negro people, middle class, professionals, etc., who are developing greater political understanding and activity. The majority of labor will undoubtedly still operate nationally through the Democratic Party, but that in itself is secondary. Large numbers, belonging to other parties or to no party, will vote as independents in favor of the re-election of President Roosevelt. Understanding these developments, one will see clearly why Earl Browder emphasized in Detroit that the Communist organization would be a "non-partisan political-educational association."

* * *

As regards the functioning of the Association, we emphasize that this means manifold increase and improvement in every aspect of political-educational activity, on a national, state and local Club basis. We must become known as an organization whose grasp of Marxism enables us to be correct all the time, if we apply our Marxist under-

* *Teheran and America*, Workers Library Publishers, 1944, p. 47.

standing. While the members belong to, and are active in, every type of mass organization — political, economic, cultural, fraternal, etc.—the Association in its own name will speak out boldly and with initiative on all issues and policies. We will bring political clarity to the masses of America on all issues and developments, such as:

1. The realization of the Teheran policies in America.

2. The post-war possibilities of full production and employment for all America.

3. The unmasking and crushing of the fifth column.

4. The urgency of labor's unity of action and the effective exposure of Lewis, Woll and Dubinsky in the labor movement.

However, the Communist Association, as a Marxist political-educational organization, will not stand on the sidelines merely as educator or propagandist. All its political-educational activities must lead to further organization and action of labor and the people. With greater effectiveness, the Communist Association will strive to react and contribute to the development of mass activity involving the maximum masses around all vital issues, whether in a neighborhood, a shop, an industry or in the nation itself.

Nationally and on a state scale, the extension and improvement of our mass agitation and propaganda work will include:

1. Greater appreciation, utilization and increased circulation of the *Daily Worker*, with its immediate editorial reaction to all new devel-

opments and problems. Similarly, as regards *The Worker*, except that, as an ever-more popular paper, it must become a mass organ of over 100,000 circulation during the first year of the Association. The content and circulation of organs like the *People's World*, *Morning Freiheit* and *New Masses*, etc., must become a chief concern to leading Association committees.

2. A well-planned and controlled publication program — pamphlets, leaflets, books, etc. *The Communist* should receive special attention as a guide to the political development of all cadres, and its circulation and study should be the concern of all committees.

3. The Association should develop on a national and state basis an entire program of lectures, forums, debates, mass meetings and radio programs.

4. Association committees should issue and publicize widely official statements on each new development of importance, whether international, domestic or local.

5. The Association should collaborate and help in the development and growth of all labor and progressive schools of a Marxist-Leninist character.

Within the Association, increased attention should be given to Marxist educational study to equip the members to wage an effective struggle on the ideological front, especially against Social-Democratism. This should take on various forms, including Club activities, memoranda to the actives on new questions (such as the realization of the

Teheran program, the Baruch Report, the President's second Bill of Rights), as well as cadre training, with special attention to Association members in trade unions and other mass organizations.

All this type of activity must become the direct responsibility of the leading committees of the Association. The responsible leadership, education, press, literature and school work of the National and State Committees will call for the assignment of one of the most able comrades. At the same time, in each district, the entire Executive Committee and the State Secretary shall be intimately connected with all of this work.

In the Communist Clubs the problem becomes more concrete. The great majority of Association members will belong not only to trade unions but to other political organizations (A.L.P., Democratic-Farmer Labor Party, C.I.O. Political Action Committees, Joint Labor Committees, etc.). The contribution of the Communists as members of these mass organizations will be of a worthwhile quality only if they have intimate political connections with the Association and an understanding of its policies. This will be attained in a variety of ways—reading the *Daily Worker*, *The Communist*, and other literature, and participation in activity committees or regular meetings of Clubs, etc.

It is clear that with our members belonging to, and active in, other community political organizations, as well as trade unions, they will

not have time for the same activities of their Communist Club as in the past. The primary task of the Club is to promote political clarity and fellowship on all issues in the light of Marxist-Leninist understanding, and thus equip our members to be more effective workers and leaders wherever they are—in shops, trade unions, political parties or community organizations. The Communist Association, through its educational activities, press, literature, etc., will speak directly to the workers and influence them. It will be the task of the individual Communist to spread the press and literature of the Association among the workers and the people among whom he or she is active, and at all times to help create conditions for the full and free acceptance of Communists in all mass organizations.

The Club should carry on systematic and extensive political-educational work in its community in line with the policies of the National and State Committees. It may issue its own community paper.

However, this should not be misunderstood as reducing our function to classroom education. Our political-educational work must always result in activity among labor and the people—and their organizations. Changing from Party to Association does not liquidate the vanguard role of our Marxist organization, although new forms of work must be adopted. Fulfilling our vanguard role today means creating such clarity and understanding and developing such activities as will influence millions of Americans—first of all, working people and their

organizations—to strengthen and extend the coalition of all Americans who favor the policies outlined in the Teheran Declaration for the winning of the war against fascism and the perspectives of economic well-being and enduring peace for the post-war epoch. *Through such mass political-educational work, on a scale and in forms never before engaged in, rather than in isolated or competitive independent activities organized by the Clubs in their own names, will the Communists influence and actively participate in the broad mass movements of the people—and first of all, the labor movement.*

The Communist Club may include additional forms of activity whereby we shall fulfill our vanguard role:

1. Simultaneously with full support to progressive activities of existing organizations or helping to organize broad community movements, the Communist Club should strive to become an officially accepted part of all the mass movements that unite the community organizations around specific issues (various war activities, subsidy-price control, anti-poll tax or veterans' legislation, support of candidates, minority and democratic rights) and should contribute its maximum efforts through the Club activities as well as through the work of individual Communists belonging to mass community organizations. In certain activities or in connection with specific issues where other mass organizations or movements do not take them up or deal with them inadequately, the Communist

Club may develop its own activities.

2. In a normal and natural way, the definite orientation should be for the Communists in the community organization to be known as members of the Communist Association. Precisely that membership will equip them with political understanding, will make them sensitive to issues, and help them develop mass activity and organization.

3. Communist Clubs should react in their own name to every event and should issue public statements—their own on local issues and those of State and National Committees on broader issues. In regard to such issues, we should make serious efforts to bring together leaders of organizations or representative leaders from shops to exchange opinions and to discuss with them the Communist point of view, in order to work out a joint approach to such questions.

The political-educational work of the Club must be of such a caliber that it provides the average active Communist with the political understanding and clarity which they seek; otherwise the Club will not be fulfilling its function. The work of the Club must be organized with this firmly in mind.

* * *

With this understanding of the Communist Association, it is clear that while maintaining a structure and minimum organizational requirements compatible with the character of a Marxist political-

educational association, we must grant greater autonomy to the lower organizations, emphasize that democracy is a "two-way street" from top to bottom and bottom to top, and eliminate all rigidity of organization.

The yardstick of effective work should be the participation—whether as a member or leader—in mass organizations and movements on the basis of a program that represents the best interests of the organization and its members. The work of the Communist will be complete only when he, in the course of his mass work, wins readers for the Communist press, distributes or sells literature, talks to his co-workers about the policy of the Communists, and recruits to the Association.

Within the Association there must be a drastic cutting down of administrative detail that involves a large

body of members. Simple and minimum records must be the order of the day. Political-educational work should be the essential content of all organizational work. Greater initiative and responsibility by Clubs and County Committees must be encouraged. The *Daily Worker* must be appreciated by every Communist as the daily voice of the Association leadership reacting to events and explaining policies that concern all labor and the nation.

The concept of leadership in all committees of the Association is to have represented, in addition to the minimum of functionaries, those who are leaders in all phases of mass work—predicated, of course, on their meriting election to Communist Association committees—as a result of Marxist understanding, ability, and devotion to the working class and the nation.

THE MAY MEETING OF THE A. F. OF L. EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

BY J. K. MORTON

THE meeting of the A. F. of L. Executive Council, held on May 1-9, marks a new stage in the struggle between the pro-victory, Roosevelt majority headed by Daniel Tobin and the defeatist, Hooverite, Woll-Hutcheson minority clique. It marks serious beginnings of initiative and aggressiveness on the part of the win-the-war forces. By inflicting a number of heavy defeats on the Hutcheson group, particularly through the positive stand taken in support of the President on the Montgomery Ward issue, the meeting marked the open crystallization of alignments on top, and began to reflect more accurately the overwhelming pro-Roosevelt, win-the-war sentiment of the membership.

The meeting of the Council shows that developments have matured sufficiently for at least the beginnings of a showdown between the conflicting forces in the A. F. of L. top leadership. The Council's action on Montgomery Ward and the decisive rebuff to John L. Lewis served to pose the basic issues more squarely and to express more clearly the regrouping of forces taking

place on the Council. Whereas, previously, differences were known to exist, the Council consistently failed to take a decisive stand on any issue in opposition to the Hutcheson defeatists. This time the Woll-Hutcheson reactionaries were not only challenged but decisively beaten. The significance of this defeat is not diminished but enhanced by the charges of John L. Lewis that the considerations for keeping him out are primarily political. In this Lewis is right, though he conceals the other half of the picture, the fact that his own considerations in fighting to get back into the A. F. of L., and Hutcheson's considerations, were also political, aiming to use the A. F. of L. as an anti-Roosevelt base in 1944. No doubt, the rebuff to Lewis is a heavy blow to the whole Lewis-Hutcheson-defeatist conspiracy so brilliantly exposed by Earl Browder, to the Woll-Hutcheson pro-Hoover bloc in the A. F. of L., and a victory for the forces favoring the re-election of Roosevelt.

It is to be expected that these defeats should greatly weaken the domination of the Council by the

Woll - Hutcheson bloc. Under pressure of this bloc, the Council, after its meeting of January, 1944, abandoned its more or less hands-off policy toward movements down below especially in the matter of joint political action. It began to exert increasing pressure on the lower organizations in the effort to impose policies directed toward promoting friction with the Roosevelt Administration, sharpening relations with the C.I.O. and dispersing the unity movement behind the win-the-war coalition.

These destructive policies found their expression in President Green's letter forbidding political collaboration with the C.I.O.; rejection of sharing A. F. of L. - C.I.O. representation at the I.L.O.; a fraudulent application of the so-called "non-partisan" policy resulting in endorsements of the defeatists Nye, Dies, and Day; and publication of Hutcheson's attack upon Roosevelt, while denying Hugo Ernest, Secretary-Treasurer of the Hotel and Restaurant Workers International, the right to answer. The extent to which narrow, partisan considerations served to promote these policies was sharply demonstrated when A. F. of L. representatives bolted the W.L.B. hearings on the demands of the steel workers, to the jeopardy of labor's entire case on the wage issue.

President Green's participation in the Woll - Hutcheson efforts to stop or reverse the progressive trend in the lower organizations greatly increased the danger to the progressive forces. Green's activities and

their negative results constituted a measure of victory for the reactionaries, who also held the initiative on the Council's foreign and post-war policies. Having blocked A. F. of L. participation in the proposed international labor unity congress and having imposed on the organization a ruinous anti-Soviet policy, they had hoped to achieve similar success in imposing their will upon the restive membership and lower organizations. This, however, they were unable to do. In most cases there was resistance to Green's injunction against joint political action, even where it was carried. In localities where a movement on the political field exists, his letter was either rejected or was not permitted to bring any change in relations. In place of compliance, Green's letter and his "non-partisan" endorsements of known enemies of labor and the President called forth indignation, rejection and a movement of open defiance. The victories of the reactionaries on the Council tended to have the opposite effect, especially to the extent that they exposed their true objectives. The reverses suffered by the reactionaries on the Montgomery Ward and the Lewis issues in the Council are greatly aggravated by the resounding collapse of their endorsed darling Dies. These developments may be expected, not only to weaken their pressure in the Council and on the lower organizations, but to provide tremendous impetus to the movement for the Fourth Term, joint labor political action, international labor unity, and all other

progressive issues, and to the organization and activities of the win-the-war forces.

The Fourth-Term Movement

The violent eruption of differences in the Council is the result of several factors, of which the most powerful and impelling is the tempestuous development of the fourth-term movement nationally and in the A. F. of L. By the time of the Council meeting a stand for the fourth term had been taken by the international unions of Teamsters, Hotel and Restaurant, Textile, and Hatters. State organizations on record for Roosevelt included Illinois, Ohio, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, California, Louisiana, and Arizona. Endorsements had also been made by a number of important national and statewide conferences, as well as by hundreds of local and city organizations. Among the most significant of these is the fourth-term endorsement by Carpenters Local 1149, the largest in the international, in direct violation of Hutcheson's policies. The extent of the fourth-term movement in the locals of the A. F. of L. can be gauged by the Pennsylvania State Convention, which received scores of fourth-term resolutions from local bodies.

Of significance, too, is the fact that the Woll-Hutcheson crowd has been unable to show a single resolution by any A. F. of L. body endorsing any of the Republican Presidential candidates.

The fourth-term movement is expressive of the growing political understanding of the issues of the

war by the A. F. of L. membership, the crucial character of the 1944 elections, and the relationship of the President and his policies to the problems of victory and post-war reconstruction. Consequently, this movement has influenced and stimulated the trend on all related basic issues and is closely related to the accumulated specific experiences, local as well as national, of the labor movement in the course of the war. It demonstrates labor's growing ability to recognize the relation of the smaller to the fundamental problems confronting labor and the nation. A case in point may be cited from the report of Phil Hannah, Legislative Agent for the Ohio A. F. of L., who drew the following conclusions from experiences before the Ohio State Legislature:

"If labor had failed to cooperate in the manner which it did, there is no doubt in the mind of your Legislative Agent that Ohio unions would have been greatly hampered in carrying out legitimate activities and striving for worthwhile goals, for the temper of the Ninety-fifth General Assembly was definitely anti-labor, and *only labor's magnificent display of unified strength saved the situation.*" (*My emphasis* —J.K.M.)

It is not surprising that the conclusions expressed by Hannah were soon followed by action of the Ohio A. F. of L. endorsing the fourth term, international labor unity, and other points which together comprise a fairly rounded win-the-war program—together with emphatic rejection of Green's "cease and desist" order and establishment of

broad, solid unity of political action with the C.I.O. and Railroad Brotherhoods.

The broader implications of the fourth-term movement are reflected in the position of Tobin, the outstanding leader of the A. F. of L. fourth-term movement, in regard to major related issues. He has declared himself for a drastic change of the A. F. of L.'s traditional anti-Soviet policy, has led the successful struggle to keep Lewis out of the A. F. of L., has repudiated Green's so-called "non-partisan" endorsement of Nye, Dies and Day, and has expressed basically correct ideas on the all-important question of labor unity. The May issue of the *International Teamster*, reflecting Tobin's attitude, also characterizes the same trend throughout the A. F. of L. membership. Obviously, the fourth-term issue, far from obscuring or retarding other progressive issues, serves rather to bring forward and help in the clarification of related issues. It does so precisely because it is the outstanding issue representing the broadest and most powerful trend in the A. F. of L. This trend now embraces major forces and is taking the shape of a major national movement.

A. F. of L. Foreign Policy

The Woll - Hutcheson - Dubinsky policies on post-war and international questions, while still on record as representing official A. F. of L. policy, are nevertheless headed for the rocks of utter bankruptcy. Within the A. F. of L., it is true, the inevitable showdown over these policies is still to come. But they

have already had their serious practical test in the I.L.O. Conference, and have brought the A. F. of L. nothing but discredit.

With the prestige of the A. F. of L. as a lever, the Woll-Hutcheson-Dubinsky clique had hoped to establish domination of the I.L.O. and to use it against the foreign policy of President Roosevelt and the collaboration of the United Nations. In this, as well as other objectives, they failed. Their henchman, Robert J. Watt, suffered one humiliating defeat after another, culminating in a public spanking on the issue of post-war policy toward Germany. Far from allowing itself to be used as an instrument of anti-Soviet policy and intrigue, the I.L.O. Conference, by the very logic of wartime necessity, opened on the note of the indispensable role of the Soviet Union, and has given grounds for expectation that it may take the necessary measures to reconstitute itself as an instrumentality of the United Nations. Such readjustment will also make impossible exclusion of such important bodies as the C.I.O., just as surely as it will guarantee exclusion of fascist agents and representatives so disgracefully embraced by Watt. As for the Latin American Confederation of Labor (C.T.A.L.), so consistently fought by the A. F. of L. reactionaries, one needs but compare the sorry figure of Watt with the enhanced prestige, influence and standing of Toledano in the I.L.O. and the public opinion outside of it.

Watt's behavior at the I.L.O. is but a partial expression of the Woll-Hutcheson-Dubinsky policies and

activities. Their objective is to make the A. F. of L. an instrument of Hoover-Republicanism at home, and anti-Soviet intrigue internationally.

The fountainhead of the Woll-Hutcheson-Dubinsky policies is to be found in the so-called American Labor Conference on International Affairs and its official fortnightly organ, the A.L.C. *News Letter*. As far back as June, 1943, the *News Letter* announced:

"The convention of the A.L.C. on International Affairs, which met in New York early this month, marks the first time that American and European labor leaders have come together. . . .

"The speakers included President Green of the A. F. of L., Emil Rieve, Vice President of the C.I.O. . . .

"Green and Rieve united in calling for a permanent world organization with sufficient power to enforce peace after this war and both warned American labor to be ready for world-wide responsibilities when hostilities cease."

The May 2, 1944, issue of the A.L.C. letter is more modest in tone. It describes the A.L.C.I.A. as "a research and study group of the American labor movement. William Green is chairman and David Dubinsky vice-chairman. Members of the Executive Committee include officers of both A. F. of L. and C.I.O. unions."

The full composition of the A.L.C.I.A. Executive Committee as listed on the masthead of the *News Letter* is as follows: Raphael Abramovich, David Dubinsky, Clinton S. Golden, John Green, George M. Harrison, Louis Hollander, James

T. Shotwell, Matthew Woll. The Executive Secretary is one Varian Fry, whose writings appear in the *New Leader*.

Bereft of its camouflage, the A.L.C.I.A. is not the pretentious meeting ground of "American and European labor leaders." Nor is it the less pretentious "research and study group." It is a tricky device cooked up by Woll, Dubinsky and Abramovich, which provides the services of the discredited Social-Democratic dregs of the European labor movements, for divisive and disruptive purpose now and for potential "use" in post-war Europe and America.

The intrinsic nature of the A.L.C.I.A. finds precise expression in that typically Goebbels propaganda stunt—the Alter-Ehrlich campaign.

The destructive sorcery of anti-Soviet bias alone can explain the partnership of the staid, conservative William Green and the conspiratorial Menshevik Abramovich. How else shall we explain Green's ready collaboration in this instance with representatives of the "rebel, rival, dual" C.I.O.—a practice which he expressly proscribed to his membership in the field of joint political action?

But still more bewildering is the presence of important C.I.O. officials on the A.L.C. Executive Committee. For this organization stands diametrically opposed to the pro-Roosevelt, pro-Teheran policies of the C.I.O. and can, therefore, serve only as a wedge of disunity for undermining the C.I.O. The Wolls, Dubinskys, and Abramoviches with

whom so staunch a supporter of C.I.O. win-the-war policies as John Green, President of the C.I.O. Shipyard Workers, holds title on the A.L.C. are the same arch-enemies of labor unity whose followers are gnawing at the foundations of the Shipyard Workers Union, and the C.I.O. as a whole. The destructive effects of yielding to Social-Democratic, anti-Soviet influence need no better example.

The Post-War Program adopted by the A. F. of L. Forum held in New York is known to be the product of the A.L.C. Naturally enough, this program is loaded with poorly concealed time-bombs intended to "blast" the policies of the Moscow and Teheran conferences. The following quotation is an example:

"Unilateral action and regional understandings are only valid when in accord with the measures taken by the General International Organization and conform to the basic principles of the Atlantic Charter which bind the United Nations to 'respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they live,' and to make 'no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned.' . . .

" . . . the A. F. of L. pledges its full support in any steps to *supplant tendencies toward unilateralism with genuine cooperative action* which will broaden and deepen the mutual relations already achieved by the United Nations." (*My emphasis—J.K.M.*)

This tricky formulation attempts to conceal its true purpose by professing support of United Nations collaboration.

Counterposing the Atlantic Charter to the Moscow and Teheran Agreements and charging unilateralism against the Soviet Union mark the speeches of Woll and Dubinsky and the writings of Abramovich, as well as their motley refugee collaborators. The central target of their attacks is Teheran and the Soviet Union. An integral part of that target, unmentioned, but implied, is President Roosevelt and his foreign policy.

As pointed out above, the A. F. of L. has suffered a humiliating setback at the I.L.O. Conference by following the Woll-Dubinsky-A.L.C. policies. By now, the disastrous consequences of this policy should be clear to all responsible people in the A. F. of L. With the destruction of Hitlerism and the liberation of the occupied countries, the fake issue of unilateralism will also collapse together with the shoddy stock-in-trade of the discredited Abramovich elements. Continued association with these elements and their policies can achieve nothing but the complete undermining of A. F. of L. influence and prestige throughout the world labor movement.

The alternative to this disastrous course lies in the acceptance of Tobin's proposal for reversal of the A. F. of L.'s attitude toward the Soviet Union, reversal of the Executive Council stand on international labor unity and participation in such undertakings as the World Labor Congress, and cooperation in the task of transforming the I.L.O. into an effective factor of the United Nations for victory and the

realization of the Teheran program. Such a course, together with forthright support for the re-election of President Roosevelt, and the policy of labor's maximum unity of political action, would eliminate the present grave inconsistencies of A. F. of L. policy, establish identity of purpose between the leadership and the membership, and enable the A. F. of L. to have the influence and prestige as a mighty organization of 6,000,000 organized workers for meeting the tasks labor is called upon to fulfill in this great national war.

The pre-condition for achieving these objectives is to smash the insidious obstructionism of the Woll-Dubinsky-Hutcheson-Lewis bloc.

The May meeting of the Executive Council represents an important, but only a preliminary, skirmish with the enemy. The defeatist camp in the A. F. of L. top leadership has suffered a serious setback; but it has not yet been smashed. The decisive battle is still ahead. The scope and tempo of the movement for the fourth term and joint political activities, together with the developments in the Council itself, are creating the conditions for rallying a decisive section of the A. F. of L. With proper organization, the Woll-Hutcheson-Dubinsky forces can be isolated, not only on single issues, but in a manner that would win the Executive Council toward a full, consistent progressive policy. Failing effective and timely organization, the gravest danger exists that the initiative taken by the progressive Tobin forces in the Council may be lost and a new breathing

space afforded for the disruptive activities of the reactionaries. The progressive forces cannot afford to underestimate either the dangers or the favorable possibilities.

Full mobilization of the fourth-term, political unity movement in the A. F. of L. is hindered by an underestimation of the non-partisan scope and depth of the win-the-war sentiment. Roosevelt supporters at times hesitate to approach Republicans in the A. F. of L. because they fail to see that support behind the President and his policies cuts across partisan lines, that, in the choice of Congressional candidates as well, this support disregards party affiliations in favor of those who solidly support the President and his policies.

Another obstacle to full mobilization of win-the-war forces is the timidity toward full-fledged collaboration. This hesitancy is a hangover from the obsolete divisions of Right and Left, which no longer exist and have been replaced with entirely new alignments on the paramount issue of the war. Such hangovers produce lack of confidence in the readiness and ability of all forces within the win-the-war coalition to work effectively together. In this respect, the *Ohio Teamsters Journal* rendered a signal service by boldly taking the stand that the war against fascism calls for the unity of all anti-fascists, including the Communists. But, it must be said, there are certain Communists who, in their work, have not taken sufficiently into account the new alignments, the extent to which the desire for

unity has matured among broad sections of A. F. of L. leadership and membership.

The efforts of the win-the-war forces in the A. F. of L. are also hampered by moods of futility. These feelings persist because of a traditionally Leftist-sectarian attitude on the part of many in the past, and even today, to the A. F. of L., resulting in an underestimation of that great center of organized labor. Now particularly, this wrong attitude obstructs the proper appreciation of the new situation, of the new alignments and the crucial role being played by the A. F. of L. in relation to the war effort and the 1944 elections, and of labor unity itself.

The membership and wide strata of A. F. of L. officialdom consist by and large of the same kind of workers as the rest of the labor movement. It includes large numbers of forward-looking men and women who are eager to contribute their best to the labor movement and the

nation, and have been subject to the deep-going influences of the war period. Significant advances are being made and still greater ones are fully realizable, despite the obstructive efforts of the reactionary bloc on top. The struggle now taking place in the A. F. of L. is of national and international import. Within the A. F. of L. the enemies of President Roosevelt, Teheran, and labor unity still hold their strongest positions as far as the labor movement is concerned. While the program and direction of the C.I.O. are pretty much established, the direction which the A. F. of L. will take is still in the process of being fought out. The outcome will affect relations throughout the labor movement and will be felt in every aspect of national life. The struggle and its progressive outcome in the interest of all labor and the nation place a great responsibility on every member and leader in the A. F. of L. and constitute a vital concern of the entire labor movement.

SOME RECONVERSION PROBLEMS IN THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY

BY PAT TOOHEY

AT PRESENT there is quite a discussion developing in the automotive and aircraft industries and engaging the attention of important circles of management and a large section of workers.

It has to do with proposals for the post-war future of the industry, on issues relating to reconversion to peacetime production, on the disposition, future ownership and utilization of the government-owned war plants, and similar questions.

Although the war is far from won and many gigantic battles have yet to be fought, the discussion is actuated by the favorable turn in the war, by amassing of big stocks of certain items of war production, and a diminishing need for other stocks due to shifts in the models and types of other production.

Due to these circumstances there is evident a considerable cutback in some types of war orders and the commencement of a certain amount of layoffs. These cutbacks, and the effects of some other essential readjustments, are undeniably fostering moods of uneasiness among workers over jobs, seniority, wages, retransfer to civilian production, and their post-war future.

It is possible that these cutbacks and resultant lay-offs may continue and even become more acute. There is the greatest need for a practical and realistic program to deal with the situation in order to prevent enemies of the war effort from creating confusion, lowering morale and seriously injuring the prosecution of the war.

Even now some irresponsible demagogues are attempting to capitalize upon the lay-offs and other maladjustments in an effort to demoralize the workers.

A multitude of plans are appearing. Some have positive merit but fall short of meeting the overall need. Others are dangerous and capricious concoctions which would imperil the present and future position of the workers and the nation.

This article makes no pretense of definitely answering the many serious and complex issues now arising. These can only be answered by the most cooperative relationship and serious approach by labor, management and government and on the basis of the victory policies of the Commander-in-Chief. However, any program advanced would be useless

and empty unless it recognized the following essential facts:

The primary fact to remember is that an economic collapse at the end of the war is not inevitable. Full employment and full production, desired by both labor and management, can be realized in the post-war future. It will require the practical realization of the Teheran principles and their application to our national life. This accord reached between the mighty anti-Hitler nations provides the path and establishes the guarantee of jobs, the attainment of post-war security, and elevation of our standards of life in the post-war world.

The second fact to remember is that the automotive and aircraft workers cannot look forward to the attainment of democratic progress with full employment and establishment of the President's "Second Bill of Rights" unless we win a decisive and unconditional victory over the forces of fascism abroad and reaction at home. It is how we fight and win the war that will really establish what kind of a post-war world we shall work and live in.

The third fact to remember is that the automotive and aircraft industries and their dependent peoples can rise to a new height of prosperity and service to our nation and to all mankind if the Teheran principles are realized—principles which, if applied, will create a firm foundation for a peaceful and democratic world, and will allow the free and democratic development of a national and a world economy, with post-war cooperation by the anti-Hitler coalition. Mr. Baruch, in his recent

report on reconversion problems, had this to say:

"There is no need for a post-war depression. Handled with competence, our adjustment, after the war is won, should be an adventure in prosperity. In the reconversion and readjustment will come improvements in our standards of life—better houses, better clothes, better food, better safeguards for children, better health protection, and wider educational opportunities. These bring hope for the future instead of fear; they give security instead of unrest."

The fourth fact to remember is that auto labor need have no fear of its position in the post-war world if its strength and influence are channeled in the correct and most effective direction; for it has today the strength and power to contribute effectively to the shaping of the post-war future. That future can be determined by action of the people now—by the armed forces on the battlefield and by the workers, farmers, middle classes and management, working in unison behind the win-the-war policies of our government. The course which our nation will take as a result of the 1944 elections will fix its path for a long period of years to come. Reconversion from maximum war production to an orderly resumption of peacetime production, and creating the markets large enough to absorb the gigantic output, are not essentially a problem of the technological and engineering difficulties which have to be mastered. They mainly depend on what policy the government and the nation will follow in outlining and di-

recting the process, what forces will establish this policy, and what forces will be charged with carrying it out.

The automotive and aircraft workers have a great responsibility, and the strength and power to help determine the result in 1944.

The problems of reconversion are genuinely difficult and complex, but they are not insuperable. Only the apostles of defeatism are interested in painting a dismal picture of the future. Indicative of the sober and responsible thinking of auto union officials on this matter is the following remark by Mr. Frankenstein:

"The spectre of post-war unemployment which already haunts the aircraft worker is an agent of the Axis. . . . We must start to work out a program which will lay this ghost once and for all. . . .

"Whether we have only 300,000 aircraft workers in the post-war period, or whether we have 1,000,000, depends upon what we all do meanwhile, and what our country does. The result depends upon the outcome of the war, upon the outcome of the elections in November, upon technical and economic developments in the industry, and upon our planning for a cooperative approach to the problem—labor working with the industry and with the government." (Report to Aircraft Conference, Feb. 28, 1944.)

Continuing levels of national economy and gross national production, with the objective of full employment, are not alone the concern of the automotive workers. Recently a large number of prominent auto industry officials have spoken out on the matter, and the issue is also rap-

idly becoming the concern of the nation as well. In his report on reconversion problems made on behalf of the Administration, Mr. Baruch said:

"It is our conviction that we will emerge from the war with the greatest opportunities any people ever had. A post-war depression is not inevitable. One half the world will need re-building. Enormous demands, put aside during the war, and added to pre-war demands, await satisfaction. Much depends on the settlement of the peace. If it be one under which men and women can look forward with hope—not fear—there will not be enough hands to do what needs to be done."

The basic proposals advanced by the Baruch-Hancock report are fully applicable to the problems of reconversion in the automotive and aircraft industries.

This report establishes full production as the primary objective of the nation and calls for a national income large enough to replace a declining war production with an organized introduction of civilian goods; by a *balancing* of declining war goods with a substantially increasing civilian production. Its objective is to maintain an economy allowing full employment and output during the transition to the full resumption of normal industrial activity.

Its proposals for a planned and orderly termination of war contracts; contract placement; even gearing of wartime and peacetime output on the basis of a regulated introduction of civilian production; equitable and controlled allocation

of available reconversion materials; prevention of dumping monopoly goods and stocks at the end of the war; encouragement for capital investment—these are the basic approach to most of the main reconversion problems of the automotive and aircraft industries. If implemented (as discussed later) and applied, the proposals of this report can help create a firm basis economically for the maintenance and extension of national unity, for creating industrial stability, for speeding reconversion and cushioning its expected shocks.

When Should Reconversion Commence?

It has been assumed that the automotive and aircraft industries will be among the last of the civilian industries to reconvert to peacetime production. This is due to the relatively small need for additional passenger cars in preference to the big bite which such resumed civilian production would take out of essential war output.

A large part of management and some circles of workers are today favoring and arguing for measures to allow an immediate reconversion of a substantial segment of the industry for civilian passenger car and general "gadget" production.

Some employers appear to believe that the war is on its last legs and consider as their primary task that of preparing seriously for a resumption of civilian production and maneuvering for post-war advantage.

Some workers erroneously believe that such immediate reconversion is

the answer to the increasing volume of lay-offs.

Though nearly all industry leaders strongly affirm that the primary task is to win the war, many are energetically pressuring the government for permits to undertake an abrupt and extensive reconversion at once. They do not insist so much on grounds of any desperate civilian need for such goods, but on the contention that delays will create extensive unemployment, create serious economic dislocation, and retard the orderly restoration of peacetime economy.

However, Army officials and such figures in the war production set-up as C. E. Wilson (of G.E.) have consistently refused to give serious consideration to these demands. Their stand deserves complete support.

The official position of the War Production Board calls for resuming passenger car production only after the defeat of the Axis in Europe. After that, even though the Pacific war continues, it is assumed that an adequate supply of manpower, materials and machines will be available for passenger car production, upon a restricted and, possibly, quota basis. To take off the limitations on production and material supply even then would be to invite a disastrous competition for the available materials, skilled labor and machinery.

An Office of War Information statement on March 19 declared that the only new items of civilian goods to be resumed this year are those using small quantities of manpower and materials, not interfering with war production, and not

requiring an extensive conversion of facilities. "Plant facilities as well as certain component parts and raw materials to make these items (autos, washing machines, refrigerators, vacuums, radios) continue to be needed for war production."

Were the government to allow manufacturers to undertake a substantial reconversion program before the victorious outcome of the war in Europe—which would likely be on an unregulated and unrestrained competitive basis—it would surely clog the whole reconversion program and seriously threaten essential war production, for these reasons:

1. All passenger car production centers, without exception, are vital war production centers where the sharpest kind of manpower shortages exist. WMC and WPB have been compelled to designate these centers as "critical areas" in an effort to meet the manpower issue. A resumed passenger car or other civilian automotive production would divert hundreds of thousands of war workers from their wartime tasks. It would create vast confusion and demoralization in manpower and morale.

2. Such resumed car production would tighten certain of the most serious material and supply bottlenecks, which even now lag behind and hold back full attainment of military output. Anti-friction bearings and castings, for example, are far behind scheduled quotas, with the result that planes, landing craft, tanks and military trucks have in many instances fallen behind pro-

jected schedules. A diversion of bearings and castings to civilian car production would cripple these key phases of the whole war production effort. And, it is useful to remember, the war must yet be won!

3. An increased number of passenger cars would not, as claimed, help solve the nation's transportation problem. It is almost impossible to secure an adequate stock of tires to equip such production. Manufacture of synthetic tires has lapsed far behind schedule and up to the present no really satisfactory quality output has been obtained.

Influence of Immediate Reconversion on Competitive Relations

An immediate and substantial reconversion does not contribute toward victory and to an orderly transition to a peacetime economy, even though a certain amount of reconversion is necessary and can be undertaken.

The proposals now being made would impede essential wartime production and complicate the possibility of an organized reconversion. In addition, it would aggravate certain competitive relations within the industry, create serious problems for independent firms and sub-contractors, and eventually lead to a greater unemployment.

A large number of independents—like Hudson, Packard, and Nash—could not maintain war production and simultaneously undertake reconversion steps. Their limited plant capacity has been totally converted to war production. Lacking additional plants, they would either have to halt their present war production

before reestablishing automotive output, or find space in other plants to do both simultaneously.

Consider the Packard plant, with a pre-war employment of 10,000. It was literally dismantled to produce the Rolls-Royce aircraft engine and its own marine engine. Today it has 40,000 workers. As the war will demand maximum output of these engines till victory is actually at hand, Packard is in no position to reconvert. And if it does not, under these proposals, it will suffer a squeeze-out in the post-war set-up.

The situation is altogether different with General Motors and Chrysler, with their many plants. They can easily pull all war production out of, say, Flint, and concentrate it into their other plants. Flint would then be free to proceed 100 per cent on resumed car production, with G.M. getting a head start on the immediate post-war market.

The Baruch proposals, relating to termination of contracts and contract placement, together with an organized balancing of tapering off war production with a systematic establishment of civilian production, would help meet this situation, give protection to independent companies, and limit the flare-up of sharp competitive relations.

The Demand for Immediate Machine Tool Production

It is also clear that a certain allocation of the available reconversion facilities should be made for the whole industry, as essential to an organized and equitable reconversion, with all interests protected.

Automotive manufacturers, look-

ing toward reconversion, have requested recently that they be permitted to place orders with machine tool firms to produce a quantity of the machine tools necessary for a resumption of passenger car production. This problem is not as catastrophic in its dimensions as industry spokesmen would have us believe, but from another angle it is somewhat dangerous.

Despite the poverty-stricken claims of some manufacturers that they sacrificed all these precious tools when the industry was first converted, the fact is that most corporations today have from 85 to 100 per cent of the machine tools required for civilian output. On the whole, they are new, and have an unparalleled cutting capacity. For every tool scrapped or displaced they have been doubly replaced with new and even better tools. For example, in 1940, 75 per cent of all machine tools were over ten years old. Today, 75 per cent are new. Since then, General Motors increased its machine tools from 75,000 to 143,774; Chrysler from 20,665 to 39,942; and other firms correspondingly.

It is true that, where a few machine tools may be absent, their lack can hold up a whole production line. Serious consideration may well be given to allowing a percentage of the machine tool industry (now in a period of decline with the main burden of war tooling completed) to produce a minimum and regulated number of such key machine tools.

This process should be carried out under the closest scrutiny, and, as

Mr. Baruch says, "as in a goldfish bowl." This would insure against a mishandling or perversion of basic objectives.

Even now G.M. is placing orders for machine tools with tool, die and engineering firms nationally, and insisting that the government permit the purchase or manufacture of \$25,000,000 to \$50,000,000 worth of these "bottleneck" tools. Were such permission to be granted and an unregulated manufacture of these tool to take place, G.M. would have a head start over all others, could blanket the industry and make it almost impossible for any other firm to secure a toehold or similar position of advantage in the reconversion process and access to immediate post-war markets.

Disposition of Government Inventory Before Reconversion

Industry spokesmen, in press statements and in speeches before government committees, are predicting dire consequences over the problem of disposing of government-owned machines and materials, and their clearance from the plants, before reconversion can proceed. While this issue is not the sacred cow it is made out to be, yet, as the Baruch report has so clearly recognized, there does exist a certain danger that, unless it is handled effectively, the delays which can be caused by interminable red tape in the auditing and clearance of government inventories and equipment may seriously delay the reconversion process.

We know of a number of plants which, having recently terminated

their war contracts and seeking reconversion to produce other types of war production, have experienced the arrival of a long line of Army procurement and other governmental agencies insisting upon and undertaking a whole series of audits and re-audits and multiple taking of inventories. Months were wasted in such fruitless, detail work, and meantime the plant was unable to start on any other type of production.

On the other hand, it is also known that some manufacturers are threatening reconversion unemployment as a club to blackjack the most favorable terms from the government in connection with this clearance and disposition of government equipment and machinery.

Such an objective of any manufacturer should not be allowed to obscure the very real problem which does exist and the urgent need for application of such measures as recommended in the Baruch report.

C. E. Wilson (G.M.) believes that the engineering processes of reconversion can be accomplished in a sixty-day period, but pessimistically estimates that the disposition and clearance of the government property will require six months or more.

Senator Vandenberg gloomily predicts "an interim depression after the war lasting from nine to eighteen months," but that "the length depends on what success Congress has in creating an effective formula on the two primary problems of war contract termination and surplus property disposal."

Auto labor has, therefore, the

strongest interest in seeing an immediate and full implementation given to the proposals of the Baruch report, which aims at a coordinated, speedy and simplified solution of this problem.

It is evident that auto labor must be exceptionally interested in all measures approaching these questions. For example, the War Contracts Committee has begun active consideration of the two principal reconversion bills in Congress, the George-Murray-Kefauver Bill, and the Kilgore Bill. Both bills are quite alike in creating the reconversion agencies recommended in the Baruch report, which require implementation in regard to labor participation, but they differ as to where to place administrative authority.

The Scope of the Problem in the Automotive Industry

The scope of the problem may be seen when it is indicated that since 1940 the aircraft and automotive industries are totally new and larger, with almost *trebled* employment, output and productivity.

In 1939-40 there were approximately 500,000 workers in the auto industry and some 50,000 in aircraft. Today, in both, there is a total of 2,300,000, exclusive of 300,000 in the armed services. In 1943 total production of the converted auto industry was valued at nine billion dollars. This was three times the 1940 figure. Today the industry produces at a rate of close to twelve billion annually, as compared to three billion in 1940. Labor productivity has increased by 20 per cent. Today, two

out of every seventeen workers in manufacturing industries are employed in aircraft. Airplane and engine production increased from \$200,000,000 in 1939 to fifteen billion today. The composition of the workers has tremendously changed. Women compose 45 per cent employment in aircraft, as against less than 1 per cent in 1939. Negro workers have increased from 7 per cent to 12.

The automotive and aircraft industries now possess the most trained and skilled body of workers on earth capable of turning out anything, able to operate any machine.

Labor productivity is unsurpassed. Girdler of Consolidated-Vultee has said his company is producing fourteen Liberators for the same direct labor that built only one three years ago. Flying Fortresses are turned out with one-third the man-hours required three years ago. The Douglas A-20's required only nine workers this year for each 100 required in 1940. Five workers produce an interceptor today instead of 100 in 1940. Ten workers put out a medium-sized bomber which required 100 three years ago. C. E. Wilson of the W.P.B. declares that total man-hours required to produce a 4-engine bomber have been reduced from 200,000 to 13,000; to produce a fighter, from 157,000 to 7,800.

It is clear that in the process of reconversion at the end of the war there will be a certain unemployment and dislocation. To keep the plants in operation and the workers in employment, an effective pro-

gram must be provided. Jobs can and must be had for the more than two million aircraft and automotive workers. It is clear there can be no return to the 1940 levels.

There are, however, some leaders in the industry who hesitate to come forward with such a program.

In his speech to the N.A.M. Convention, Alfred P. Sloan of G.M. saw no other course but to reduce the national income from its present 143 billion dollars to around 100 billion, and be reconciled to an increase in unemployment from its present 700,000 to ten or fifteen million. A representative of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, speaking to a U.A.W.-C.I.O. Executive Board meeting, figured that auto production in peacetime would employ no more than 500,000. Some auto executives talk of a post-war production of five to six million cars and trucks. This would give employment to about 550,000, but would mean unemployment for at least 400,000 now working and for all of the 300,000 absent on military leave.

To continue employment for the normal automobile working force, and to find in the reconversion process other jobs for the hundreds of thousands of others who have entered the wartime industry, means that total American production must be increased above any peacetime level in history.

It is generally recognized that if they can be built—which depends upon the reconversion process, nine or ten million cars could be sold after the war. General Knudsen has said it could be twelve million.

This would mean jobs for 800,000 auto workers, and if the gross national production were maintained at present levels, the other workers would find jobs in expanding industries.

In the past few months Mr. Sloan has changed his mind. In a statement to stockholders on March 26, 1944, he said that "an opportunity is presented to the nation in the post-war period to attain new high levels of production and new standards of national income."

Says George W. Romney, Manager of the Automotive Council for War Production:

"The industry which has mastered the principles of mass production, can apply it to anything the people want. If they desire six million cars a year for several years after the war, Detroit can make them, and, at the same time, pay the highest wages, return the highest taxes, and give the greatest value for a dollar. If there is a problem for the future, it is but the nation's, which must grow up to the productive capacity created in the war." (*Detroit News*, Mar. 28, 1944)

And labor, through R. T. Frankenstein, expresses the conviction that although the problem is difficult the nation is strong enough to meet it:

"I am convinced that such a dismal forecast overlooks the vitality of the American labor movement, and the dynamic productive forces which have been let loose by the war. I do not believe that we must accept any assumption that the hundreds of thousands of workers, the Negroes, the women, the older workers—who are doing so mag-

nificent a job on the assembly lines—must be rewarded by breadlines and continuing insecurity. Such an assumption of renewed unemployment for millions in the post-war world is an assumption of national defeat and chaos which I shall never be prepared to make.”

Proceeding upon this belief the U.A.W.-C.I.O. set itself the goal of helping to establish the employment of one million workers in the aircraft industry—engaged in various types of civilian and military aeronautical production, with two to three million more in servicing and other auxiliary lines.

What Employers Are Thinking

There is beginning a positive development on the part of a large number of manufacturers who recognize their responsibility in helping to achieve full production and the need of collaborating with labor to do the job.

Henry Kaiser and the U.A.W.-C.I.O. announced that they had agreed “immediately to start cooperative efforts” to prevent a collapse of post-war employment in the aircraft industry. “We expect to finance jointly the necessary research and planning. We agreed to immediately start cooperative efforts between ourselves and hope the government will join us.” (*Detroit News*, March 16, 1944.)

Mr. Donald Douglas of Douglas Aircraft, who has of late changed his former hardboiled attitude to the union, has declared himself in favor of cooperation of all classes with the government for a constructive post-war program. In a

published interview with an employee, Mr. Douglas stated:

“We have been giving a great deal of thought to post-war planning but that is a problem in which industry alone cannot play the deciding role. The government, with its vast powers and controls, necessarily must play a part in any post-war program for the nation. But we are ready and anxious to do our part. . . .

“The company has a group of experts studying these things. Whenever the government permits us to do so, we will try to provide information and assistance to local communities which may want to keep their plants in operation.”

Earle M. Scott, President of Scott Aviation Company, has said:

“If the country is to avoid confusion, recrimination and want during the immediate post-war period, we must have nationwide plans right now. . . .”

La Motte T. Cohu, Chairman of Northrup Aircraft, says:

“It would, of course, be easy to cut-back our organizations to a size commensurate with the volume of business we will be able to secure after the war. But that does not answer the question of the individual worker who must find a place in the productive work if American freedom is to survive. It seems to us that all industries—not alone aircraft—should consider themselves obligated to see jobs for those who cannot be employed, and just as energetically as the employees themselves were sought in the first place.” (*Aviation*, March, 1944.)

Mr Sloan now argues that the nation can never again risk the

stability of its institutions by allowing a "50 per cent utilization of our economic resources, with millions of people out of employment and millions more working short time." He warns that if the free enterprise system is unable to meet the challenge of high employment "in a practical and realistic way" then "the people will demand political action." He says "we must, in search of an ever-expanding market, produce existing things at always lower prices." (Detroit Economic Club, October 10, 1943.)

And Paul G. Hoffman, President of Studebaker, before the Detroit Board of Commerce, says:

"It isn't plotters on the left who constitute the real hazard to our free society but rather pressures stemming primarily out of widespread unwanted idleness. . . . If our free society is to be maintained, productive jobs—millions of them—must be made available in the shortest possible time after hostilities cease. . . . Nobody would suggest that business would go back to the '30's—if for no other reason than that the economy of the '30's left us still with considerable unemployment." (March 24, 1944)

From the foregoing it is clear that there exists the basis of cooperative efforts by management and labor collectively to approach and work out the problem which seriously affects them both. This basis is realistically conceivable, however, only in terms of the twofold aspect of the problem—the domestic and the foreign markets.

On Post-War Foreign Trade

There is hardly an automotive

manufacturer who desires to return to the past. And each of them is faced with a basic economic compulsion, to search for those solutions which will result in their plants keeping open and avoiding large deficits, which can be done only by maintaining and expanding their present volume of production.

Traditionally the industry has been a peace or famine set-up. When the country is prosperous, when income payments are increasing, when there is a relative stability in market relationships, national affairs and foreign trade, the industry instantly reflects a greater stability and prosperity with rapid increase in general output and employment.

Statistics show that when there is any decline in national levels of prosperity, arising from any economic or political disturbance at home or abroad, there is an immediate curtailment of employment, output and sales. This fact is clear to manufacturers, which impels them to favor measures for stability, foreign trade and profitable return on foreign investment.

Auto corporations have always favored increasing foreign trade as a mean of increasing their profits. The Export Department of the Automobile Manufacturers Association usually has its members exert pressure on both major parties for planks favoring reciprocal trade agreements. The Export Department cooperates extensively with the National Committee for Reciprocal Trade and pays most of the expenses of this committee, with the G.M. Export Division paying the remainder.

According to the Dept. of Com-

merce, exports for the auto industry for the typical pre-war years of 1929 and 1936 were, respectively, \$591,400,000 and \$409,900,000. This provided jobs for approximately 50,000 workers. The Department also estimates that the auto industry will be due for more than a proportionate increase in post-war foreign trade. Assuming an increase of foreign trade for the nation from the 1929 level of five billion dollars to only seven billion, the Department experts figure that the auto industry would derive out of this total for itself about 1.13 billion dollars' worth of exports. This would mean jobs for 100,000 workers and a big increase in the purchasing power and stability of the auto workers generally.

But the estimate of seven billion dollars is far under any satisfactory level of post-war export trade which can be attained by the program of stability and international cooperation on the principle of the Teheran accord. Expansion of this trade, if only to a total of twenty billion dollars, would serve to increase auto exports to at least 3.5 billion dollars, opening the way to employment for over 300,000 workers. Such a level of export would merely be comparable to the present total of 2.9 billion dollars annually, representing the auto industry's contribution to Lend-Lease output.

This is feasible, as is seen by the following, quoted from the joint statement on international cooperation presented to the Senate War Contracts Committee by Senators Kilgore, Truman and Thomas:

"It is entirely feasible for us to

aim at \$200 billion a year or more (in production) within five years after the end of the war. . . . It is clear that the only thing to take the place of war contracts is the purchasing power of the people and our fellow nations throughout the world. . . . All programs intended to adjust our economy to the removal of war contracts upon which it now rests in large part must be aimed at developing domestic and foreign markets to a level that has never before been known."

Thus, Earl Browder, basing himself on studies made by American government, business and labor leaders, projects the necessity and feasibility of developing our foreign market to absorb perhaps as much as half of our post-war products, tremendously increased to maintain our output at maximum capacity and full employment. In his Report to the National Committee of the Communist Party in January Browder said:

"The Teheran Conference, for the first time, gave a realistic perspective of the quick organization of such huge foreign markets. Such huge foreign markets are unthinkable except under stable conditions, without international or civil wars of major proportions. Without such foreign markets there is no possibility to find an economic foundation to the national unity within the United States."

How Difficult Will Reconversion Be?

For the auto parts industry, the process will vary widely from plant to plant.

Some, as Murray, Briggs and

other body producing corporations, have been entirely changed over from the production of shiny car bodies to that of wing and fuselage sections and other unrelated items. Some of these companies will have a major reconversion problem from a technical, engineering and, possibly, financial point of view.

Other plants supplying basic components of peacetime passenger cars will have no such difficulty. These include Bohn aluminum, spark plug, electrical ignition, bearing, piston, valve engine parts, all of which can swing into normal production by a few changes in setups on presently operating machinery.

From a technological aspect, reconversion will be less complicated than during the original conversion period. When the industry converted in 1942 there was a substantial unemployment, reaching 275,000 at one period in Detroit alone. For the most part the tools, jigs, dies and fixtures used on late 1941 and early 1942 production are in storage and available for immediate set-up. Also, full truck facilities for the industry are still in operation and will provide a considerable backlog of employment. The advance orders for parts to build up the necessary banks of supplies for final assembly plants will be sent out months ahead of resumption of final assembly. Usually this gives work to 200,000.

For tool, die and machine shops, no process of physical reconversion of any major nature will be required.

For plants of the type of Budd Wheel, Kelsey-Hayes, and La Young, the production lines will have to

be reconverted and a large amount of new equipment, mainly light machinery and punch presses, set up again.

Studebaker is well situated, now producing a military truck, the production process being similar to automotive production and requiring little reconversion.

Nash (Kenosha) is now engaged entirely on the 2,000 h.p. supercharged Pratt-Whitney aircraft engine. When reconversion starts, productive capacity of all divisions will be brought up to the highest pre-war level of any manufacturing division. Thus, for Nash, reconversion largely means an evening up of low capacity divisions to higher levels.

The outstanding problem will be in aircraft and certain plants reconverted over—or built new—to production of tanks, (Chrysler Tank, Hudson Arsenal, G.M. Tank in Flint, etc.).

In aircraft, while the task is extremely difficult, yet every aircraft-parts plant is readily convertible to output of various types of consumers durable goods. Similarly, aircraft-engine plants are available for any kind of metal fabrication. Though their jigs, fixtures and tools are suited only for specific models and are lighter, these are replaceable from the large stock of others now available.

What Are the Employers Planning?

A hopeful and positive sign is the preparations being made by many employers for post-war modernization, expansion and reconversion.

If a collapse is contemplated, it

is not reflected in the post-war plans of the leading figures of the industry.

A brief survey of the post-war intentions of the five companies, which normally account for about 70 per cent of total auto production (G.M., Chrysler, Studebaker, Packard and Nash) shows:

1. All are planning important expansion and modernization expenditures.

2. General Motors alone intends to spend \$500 million on getting back into car production, to expand capacity 50 per cent and to rearrange and modernize plants. President Wilson, testifying on March 22 before the House Committee on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning, said G.M. intends to employ 400,000 after the war (it employs 450,000 now), and in addition to employ 200,000 in distribution (greater by 50,000 than in the pre-war period).

3. Chrysler announces an expenditure of \$115 million in the first post-war year to get plants in shape, tool them, rebuild inventories and advertising.

4. Packard will spend \$10 million to return to production and increase pre-war capacity by 45 per cent.

5. Studebaker, according to President Mason, is in a position to double its pre-war capacity merely by putting into operation a two-shift schedule.

New firms are reportedly entering the field. Henry Kaiser is planning to enter with an improved car model. Boeing Aircraft, capitalizing on the reputation of the Flying Fortress, is also contemplating entering the automotive field.

The Ford Motor Company has not announced plans. There is some evidence to show that Ford is also making intensive post-war plans for passenger car, not aircraft, production. It is also possible to say that the Ford Motor Company is re-evaluating its attitude to the union and showing some evidence of desiring to cooperate with the union in the solution of common post-war objectives, which, of course, should be accepted.

The foregoing is for the purpose of establishing that a post-war collapse in the auto-aircraft industry is not inevitable; that management and labor do not so contemplate; and that there exists a practical foundation for joint labor-management cooperative efforts to approach and strive to solve jointly the common problem.

Labor's Participation in the Reconversion Process

A basic requirement for shortening the reconversion period is a joint industry planning committee embracing labor, management and government to deal with and collectively solve the issues which arise.

It is imperative that auto labor be officially represented on all agencies and committees dealing with reconversion, disposal of inventories, contract termination and placement, retraining programs, transferral plans, and new job placements.

Adopting the C.I.O.'s proposed "industry council" plan with such three-way representation is a necessary implementation of the pro-

posals of the Baruch report to the aircraft and automotive industry. It is the only practical and effective way to deal with problems of war production and of the post-war future. With labor so represented, all the mistakes of the conversion period of 1942 would be eliminated, and an assured protection of labor's rights relating to war security, dismissal pay, jobs for veterans, transfer of demobilized war workers, health conditions, etc.

President Roosevelt has already created an "Office of Works Director" and a "Surplus Property Board," as recommended by Mr. Baruch, and additional post-war bodies will likely be formed.

These events dictate the need of auto labor being a part of, and occupying its rightful position on, all reconversion bodies.

The W.P.B. recently established an Automobile Industry Advisory Committee composed of top officials from the nine major companies. This committee and the big producers held a conference with Donald Nelson on April 17 to establish, as Mr. Nelson said, "major policies to guarantee a minimum of unemployment when reconversion of the auto industry starts." W.P.B. is said to be contemplating a similar labor advisory committee; but at this writing has not created it. Mr. Nelson did, however, have a long conference on April 28 with the top national leaders of the C.I.O. and A. F. of L. auto unions, assuring them of his desire for labor participation: "On all these important readjustment problems, we want the advice and suggestions of labor just as we want the advice and suggestions of industry."

At this conference Mr. Thomas of the U.A.W.-C.I.O. advanced an important ten-point preliminary program on reconversion problems, stressing these two points: (1) immediate creation of an industry council on which government, management and labor would be represented to develop detailed plans for speedy reconversion when the war program permits; this council would also explore post-war marketing techniques with the objective of insuring full distribution and continuous employment. (2) Authorization to manufacturers to use machinery now owned by the government for post-war production, with financial settlement to be subordinated to clearing the plants of any encumbrance to speedy resumption of peacetime production.

Post-War Outlook of the Union

The U.A.W.-C.I.O. has played an outstanding role in raising and seeking application of principles of planning for the post-war period. The basic features of the union's plan were released some time ago by President Thomas, giving clear recognition to basic issues. The union's plan takes no diversionary, pie-in-the-sky attitude or evasion of wartime tasks. It states "the immediate and primary task of the U.A.W.-C.I.O. as it is of the entire nation is to plan and work for an early and unconditional surrender of the Axis powers." The union is guided by four major principles:

Nothing must be done now which will in any way threaten production of needed weapons of war; every measure of planning and coordination must be taken to speed the period of changeover when declin-

ing war needs do finally open the way to a return toward civilian production; in the changeover period full protection must be given to the living standards of auto workers through increased unemployment compensation and layoff bonuses; powerful corporations must not be allowed to squeeze their smaller competitors to the wall.

As essentials to a post-war accomplishment of opportunity, security and work for all, the U.A.W., through its President, R. J. Thomas, declared before the Senate Subcommittee on War Contracts:

"Nothing should be done which would in any way hamper war production, with an offensive in Western Europe close ahead of us, no other position is thinkable."

The union advised a carefully worked out program of reconversion to be directed by the same agency now responsible for war production. Thomas indicated the union attitude on reconversion legislation as necessarily containing the following principles: (1) The basic need to continue war production; (2) The determination to keep the goal of expanded production and employment as its major objective; (3) Recognition of the importance of labor-industry-government cooperation; (4) Recognition of the need for protection of small business.

To attain such development it calls for the "complete shattering of the political power of financial and industrial monopolies in Axis countries. . . ." and on the home front "an uncompromising fight against the insidious forces, financial, industrial and political, who would turn our nation aside from

its battle for world freedom to shady negotiations and manipulations for the continuance under American sponsorship of new forms of fascist dictatorship in Europe and Asia."

With this recognition of the issues of the nation's great war, the U.A.W. then advances a specific program to implement and help realize its slogan for full production and full employment.

Into the framework of such excellent general principles, certain distortions have crept in, due to the Reuther-Social-Democratic influence. Conflicting with the general U.A.W. perspective is the demagogic demand for "government-municipal ownership and operation of monopolistic industries, and of industries strategically essential to the national safety."

Reuther has woven his Norman Thomas type of economic thinking into a grandiose sixteen-point program which is in obvious contradiction and opposition to the U.A.W.-C.I.O. program presented to the War Production Board on April 28 by President Thomas. Reuther's program is, in effect, a disguised demand for nationalization of America's most basic industry. It would imply that only through such processes of nationalization may the goal of full production and employment be obtained in the post-war period. This would be to accept the defeatist thesis that from the war can come only renewed chaos, economic disorder, and world catastrophe. It would be, further, to bring division into the camp of national unity, and of labor itself. That such a point of view is far from the considered viewpoint of

the membership or its leadership has been clearly indicated by many statements by Thomas, Addes, Frankenstein and others. We are confident that the sensible membership of the U.A.W.-C.I.O. will repudiate Reuther's incorrect program.

In his approach to the problems of aircraft, Vice-President Frankenstein has made valuable contributions to the clarification of post-war problems. He sees salvation for the aircraft workers in the following objectives:

"1. That the United Nations carry through to a complete and unconditional victory over the Axis, and establish thereby the bedrock foundation of a peaceful and democratic world;

"2. That political and economic cooperation among the United Nations continues to develop for winning the peace and assuring the democratic development of a national and world economy;

"3. That the American people rally in this year's elections to defeat the rightist reaction at home which would snatch away from us the victory over fascism;

"4. That American labor, industry and farm groups press for an economy of full production and employment, with gross national output running at levels close to \$200,000,000,000 annually." (*New Republic*, Feb. 28, 1944.)

Vice-President Frankenstein sees the dangers of post-war unemployment for auto and aircraft workers as having to be met, not by a demand for socialization of the industry, but through achievement of the full productive possibilities lying before the nation in the post-war period of world reconstruction.

The most specific discussion of the post-war productive facilities of the nation as a whole came from George F. Addes, Secretary of the U.A.W., in addresses on January 26, 1944, in Cleveland, and before the U.A.W. Aircraft Conference in Chicago on Feb. 28, 1944. In the potential buying power of home markets plus foreign trade reaching levels of twenty to twenty-five billion dollars yearly, Addes sees a possibility of solution to the problem of production and employment:

"On the basis of the unity which is being forged today in the fighting of the war there can emerge a new international unity of trade and cooperative progress. From the mutual development of all nations can come the solution to the direct problems which have afflicted and cursed America in the years from 1929 up to the outbreak of the great war."

In line with its concentration upon immediate war problems the union has given no general pattern for the reconversion. It has correctly avoided giving any detailed blueprint for the reconversion, but has given full support to the C.I.O. national industry council program "to work out reconversion schedules" and provide for "the maintenance of labor standards during the reconversion period." It has also actively campaigned for enactment of the Wagner-Dingell social security bill, has sought to establish through W.L.B. decision a system of layoff and separate bonuses, and advanced the demand for establishment of the thirty-hour week, protection of seniority and protection for the welfare of servicemen and veterans during the reconversion period.

THE COMMUNIST VANGUARD

BY V. J. JEROME

[This is the second of two articles, the first of which appeared in the April issue. In this series, V. J. Jerome discusses the dissolution of the Communist Party and the formation of the Communist Political Association in the light of the historical role of the Communist vanguard of the working class.

The first article drew upon the history of the earliest proletarian vanguard in order to define labor's main tasks in the varying periods and the adjustments of the form of Communist organization to the prevailing objective necessities. The present article, beginning with the First International, develops the theme of the role and organization of the vanguard, relating it to the changed political situation of today and to the current changes in the American Communist organization.
—The Editor]

SINCE the passing of the Communist League three proletarian Internationals have been built as the vanguard of world labor by the advanced workers of many lands.

The First International was founded under Marx's leadership in 1864 during a new upsurge of the general democratic forces, and of the labor movement in England, France and

Germany, precipitated by the crisis of 1857. That same period saw the outbreak, in 1861, of the Civil War in the United States and, two years later, of the Polish Insurrection. The formation of the International responded to the urgent need for working-class political organization, for the closest combination of labor's political and economic action, for labor's growing participation and influence in the broad democratic movement in all lands.

This was the underlying purpose also of the Communist League. But in the decade and a half following the defeat of the Revolution of '48, the working class had become ripe for an independent movement requiring a vanguard of a broader type. As Marx wrote in 1871 to Bolte, member of the Provisional Federal Council of the First International in New York:

"The *International* was founded in order to replace the socialist or semi-socialist sects by a real organization of the working class for struggle. . . . On the other hand, the Internationalists could not have maintained themselves if the course of history had not already smashed up the sectarian system. . . . Nevertheless, what history has shown everywhere was repeated within the

International. The antiquated attempts to re-establish and maintain itself within the newly achieved form." *

Marx, Engels and their followers waged a constant struggle in the International against the "antiquated." They had anticipated this struggle against petty-bourgeois, half-socialist, and anarchistic theories, aware of the varied groupings, with their varied levels of political development, that were to comprise the International. We find Marx writing to Engels on November 4, 1864, apropos of the *Inaugural Address* of the International which he composed:

"It was very difficult to frame the thing so that our views should appear in a form acceptable from the present standpoint of the workers' movement. . . . It will be necessary to be *fortiter in re, suaviter in modo* [firm in matter—moderate in manner]."

But Marx and Engels took into account the general level of the movement as a whole. They sought to guide the movement, in the interests of strengthening labor and promoting the people's democratic advance, from their vantage point of historical materialism, their "understanding the line of march."

Although the International existed only twelve years, the lessons of its broad and influential struggles have remained a permanent heritage in the forward movement of labor to united political action, nationally

and internationally, in common with all other democratic forces.

Centrally, under the leadership of Marx and Engels, the International helped the trade union movements of England and other countries, on the basis of their own experiences, to broaden their scope of interest and struggle beyond narrowly economic issues; to emerge from pure and simple economic laborism; and, by interconnecting the two, to advance simultaneously the growth of trade unionism and the political movement of labor.

The International worked unceasingly in the cause of national liberation and national integrity. Marx and Engels taught consistently that the modern nation was the necessary framework for the development of the democratic forces, including labor, in every country. For international peace and the harmonious cooperation of peoples to be ensured, Engels wrote, "each people must be independent and master in its own house." In the same vein, Lenin said: "The working class could not grow strong, could not become mature and formed, without 'constituting itself within the nation' . . ." * Guided by this Marxian teaching, the International championed the national cause of all oppressed peoples and nations, throwing its strength behind the national-liberationist movements, uprisings, and wars. It promoted in that cause the broadest unity of labor upon a national scale, the fullest inter-class national unity, and

* Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, International Publishers, Vol. II, p. 616.

* V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, International Publishers, Vol. XI, p. 35.

international solidarity of all the democratic forces, primarily of labor.

For us Americans, a prominent expression of that international solidarity was the moral and political aid that the International, and its initiators on the eve of its founding, extended to the Union cause in the Civil War period.

"The English members [of the International]," Marx wrote in 1864 to Georg Weydemeyer in the United States, "consist mostly of the chiefs of the local trade unions, that is, the actual labor kings of London, the same fellows who . . . prevented Palmerston from declaring *war* upon *the United States*, as he was on the point of doing, through the monster meeting in St. James' Hall. . . ."

Coming into being toward the conclusion of the American Civil War, the International, through its General Council in London, forthwith launched a campaign to mobilize the European labor movement in support of the North.

Notable in this connection is the congratulatory Address of the First International, written by Marx, to President Lincoln, on the occasion of his re-election, containing the memorable declaration: "From the commencement of the titanic American strife, the workingmen of Europe felt instinctively that the Star-Spangled Banner carried the destiny of their class." Equally notable is Lincoln's reply to the International, given in his behalf by the United States Legation at London, which stated that the United States, in its struggle against the slave-holding power, derived "new encouragement

to persevere from the testimony of the workmen of Europe that the national attitude is favored with their enlightened approval and earnest sympathies."

Through their adherents and friends in the United States, Marx and Engels exerted influence on the American sections of the International to break with sectarianism and dogmatism. They continuously impressed upon them the need to integrate themselves with American life through recognizing the unique national traditions and specific characteristics of American labor and the American people. The International expressly declared it as its task "to extend and unify the spontaneous movement of the working class without imposing on it any doctrinaire system." As Engels was later to write to an American follower of Marxism:

"It is far more important that the movement should spread, proceed harmoniously, take root and embrace as much as possible the whole American proletariat, than that it should start and proceed from the beginning on theoretically perfect lines. There is no better road to theoretical clearness of comprehension than '*durch Schaden klug werden*' [to learn through bitter experience]. And for a whole class there is no other road, especially for a nation so eminently practical as the Americans."*

Marx and Engels advised their American adherents to follow a tactical principle that would bring them forward as a unifying and

* Engels to Florence Kelley Wischnewsky, December 28, 1886.

vital factor in the movement, broadly, of all the democratic forces—labor, the farmers, the Negroes, and the urban middle classes: the new alignment of progress that had begun to shape itself in the course of the Civil War.

The zenith of the First International's achievements was the leadership and aid it extended to the Paris Commune, which was both "the highest example of the greatest proletarian movement of the nineteenth century" (Lenin) and "the true representative of all the healthy elements of French society, and therefore the truly national government" (Marx). Although represented by a minority in the Council of the Commune and in the Central Committee of the National Guard (the majority consisting of Blanquists), the International exercised an important role in formulating the guiding ideas of the Commune. Marx, as leader of the International, gave himself with burning zeal to the struggle, keeping in close touch with the Internationalist minority in the Commune leadership, although these Internationalists were in the main under the influence of the semi-anarchist Proudonists, Marx built up support for the Commune in all corners of the world, and defended its honor in words of fire. Although not, in a practical sense, the product of the International, the Commune was indeed "the child of the International intellectually," in the words of Engels.

Yet the very crowning point to which the Commune brought the International was also its declining point. The defeat of the Commune

was followed everywhere by a bacchanalia of reaction. In France the movement was outlawed. The conservative British trade-union leaders withdrew from the International in protest against the General Council's staunch support of the Communards and the publication of Marx's *The Civil War in France*—a work as magnificent in its tribute to "the heaven-storming Titans" of the Commune as it is in its analysis of their charge to power, their rule, their defeat. In addition, the International was greatly weakened by the dissension and the split brought about by the Bakuninist (anarchist) opposition.

Actually, the conditions had ceased to exist for the continuation of the proletarian vanguard in the form of the International Workingmen's Association. The transfer of the General Council from London to New York in 1872, designed to keep the International from becoming an instrument in the hands of putschists and anarchist adventurers, only led to its further separation from the main European center of the labor movement and to its formal dissolution four years later. The form of the First International was conditioned by the necessity of coalescing into one association of action the varying and dispersed workers' organizations and currents, in each of the advanced countries and internationally. Such an association, by Marx's prospect, would in the course of common action and common discussion gradually develop the theoretical program for the labor movement as a whole. In epic struggles the International carried through thi

fundamental task. By now, a new factor, the development of national proletarian parties in the various countries, had outmoded the framework of the International.

The dissolution of the First International did not, however, represent liquidation of the proletarian vanguard; it was, rather, *the necessary organizational recognition that the form of the vanguard had changed*. In this sense Marx wrote in 1878:

"In reality the social-democratic workers' parties in Germany, Switzerland, Denmark, Portugal, Italy, Belgium, Holland and North America, organized more or less within national frontiers, represent just as many international groups. They no longer represent isolated sections, sparsely distributed over various countries and held together by a General Council on the periphery, but the working class itself in constant, active and direct connection, held together by the exchange of ideas, mutual assistance and joint aims. . . . Thus, far from dying out, the International has developed from one stage to another and higher one in which many of its original tendencies have already been fulfilled. During the course of this constant development it will experience many changes before the final chapter in its history can be written."*

* * *

Engels' expectation that the next International "will be directly Communist and will straightforwardly proclaim our principles" fell short of fulfillment in the ideology and practice of the Second International, which was founded in 1889.

* Franz Mehring, *Karl Marx*, New York, 1935, p. 508.

The great expansion of the working-class organizations—trade unions, as well as labor and Socialist parties—in the various countries during the comparatively peaceful development of capitalism in that period was accompanied by the growing influence of Marxism. The place in history of the Second International was that, in the early and fruitful period of its existence, it prepared the soil for the development of broad mass organizations of labor, both economic and political, and brought together the working-class parties of many lands into one broad political association.

Its formation coincided with the rise of imperialism and with the emergence, in the advanced capitalist countries, of the labor aristocracy, which became the source of opportunism in the labor movement. Although the International and its principal parties, especially the now tremendous Social-Democratic Party of Germany, was headed by the "orthodox" (Kautskyan) Marxists, revisionist distortion of Marxism became the dominant trend, to which the Kautskyans "appeasingly" adapted themselves. The unchecked departure from Marxian fundamentals led to the corrosion of Social-Democracy with opportunism. Upon the outbreak of the imperialist World War of 1914-18, the parties of the Second International, with the exception of the Bolshevik Party and a few small groups, aligned themselves with imperialism. This great betrayal by its leaders brought the Second International to ignominious collapse.

* * *

The death-knell of the Second International was the rousing sound of the new proletarian vanguard.

Under Lenin's leadership, the Bolsheviks, most clear-sighted and consistent among all socialists, had in the opening years of the century fashioned in Russia the "Party of the new type." Its timely formation and its unwavering loyalty to the principles of Marxism-Leninism enabled the Bolshevik vanguard to struggle for proletarian internationalism in the midst of the imperialist World War. That "Party of the new type," guided by Lenin and Stalin, in November, 1917, took the tide at the flood and led the workers of Russia, in broad democratic alliance with all the oppressed masses of village and city, to the establishment of the Soviet Power, whose socialist democracy has become the mainstay and matchless defender of democracy throughout the world.

On a world scale, the conditions had ripened for an International of a new type. The imperialist World War and the crisis that followed brought disillusionment among the peoples. The world which was to be saved for democracy saw itself betrayed. The initial doubts and misgivings among the workers masses now turned to wrath, rising against the imperialist war-makers and against the treacherous leaders of Social-Democracy. The urge grew daily stronger for the reconsolidation of labor's forces, for the affirmation of international labor solidarity on a basis not again to be shattered. Lenin, not Kautsky, had been proved by history the guardian and champion of Marxism. The consistent So-

cialist forces in all lands advanced to reclaim the great heritage of the First International, to build an International based on Communist principles, with a program and structure corresponding to the higher tasks of world labor in the new stage of history.

* * *

The Third, Communist, International, founded under Lenin's leadership in 1919, attained during the twenty-four years of its existence a record of imperishable achievements in the cause of world labor, democracy, and social advance. Guarding the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin against Trotskyism and Bukharinism, against opportunism of all brands, the International applied the principles of scientific Communism, in a living, dialectic manner as a guide to action in behalf of everything progressive in the economic, social, and political life of our times.

The Communist International and its affiliated parties worked to consolidate and strengthen labor's forces, through proletarian unity nationally and on a world scale. The International worked to help labor free itself from being an appendage to reaction, to which Social-Democracy sought continuously to commit it. It helped labor to develop its independent political action and to participate as a leading force with other democratic groups in anti-fascist unity fronts.

The International fought for the right of nations and peoples to their integrity, independence, and social structure; its celebrated Seventh

Congress of 1935 condemned "national nihilism" as contradictory to the principles of Communism. It championed the struggle of colonial and all oppressed peoples for freedom and equality in the community of nations.

Its voice was a warning and a summons to the working class and to all progressive humanity to rally unitedly in the struggle against fascism. It fought consistently for the realization of a basis for world peace, security, and progress. To this end, the Communist Parties everywhere struggled to build a solid front of the democratic nations for checking fascist aggression. The only scientific analysis of fascism and its war-essence was formulated by the Communist International. Such a scientific understanding is a requisite for a clear and consistent struggle against fascism. Those equipped with this understanding can render most effective service in the progress of the democratic national front and the anti-fascist coalition of nations.

The fraternal exchange of opinions helped to develop in the Communist Parties everywhere, mastery of Marxist theory and practice. Only a vanguard party thus armed could enhance its own strength and effectiveness in helping labor advance its organization, unity, and political understanding for carrying through its tasks in the democratic interests of the nation. Only such a party could bring to the advanced sections of the working class a scientific understanding of the laws of social development and the historical inevitability of socialism.

There can be no doubt that, had the policies of the various Communist Parties in the International become the policies of the labor movements in the respective capitalist countries—particularly Germany, France, England, China, Spain, and the United States—there would have been no fascism nor its outcome in a new world war.

The realization of the mighty anti-fascist coalition of nations and peoples marked a new stage of unity of the world's progressive forces. It brought to a head the factors, which had for some years been developing, that rendered the Communist International outmoded. The dissolution of the International became necessary with the increased diversity of the various countries, their social orders, their national tasks, and the political levels of their labor movements, resulting from their changed internal and international situation—a complexity which the war had sharpened. These conditions presented insuperable obstacles to the functioning of an international center. Further, Hitler and those he influenced sought by demagogy and slander to make the existence of the International a pretext for bringing division among the world forces of democracy and national liberation, both internationally and nationally. The dissolution had the effect of strengthening the unity of all the United Nations and of creating more favorable conditions for the unification of the working class, for the collaboration of Communists with non-Communists in the national unity. It helped to expose the falsity

of the outcries of Red-baiters and anti-Sovieters regarding "world bolshevization" and "foreign agents." The dissolution was made possible by the fact that Communist Parties had grown and matured in the individual countries, able to act with Marxist steadfastness, initiative, and flexibility in the interests of labor and the nation.

In proposing the dissolution, the Presidium of the Executive Committee stated:

"Communists, guided by the teachings of the founders of Marxism-Leninism, have never advocated the preservation of those organizational forms which have become obsolete. They have always subordinated the organizational forms of the labor movement and its methods of work to the basic political interests of the labor movement as a whole, to the peculiarities of given concrete historical conditions, and to those problems which arise directly from these conditions."

Proceeding from such basic considerations, and faced with necessities of a legal nature, the Communist Party of the United States of America had as far back as November, 1940, ended its affiliation with the Communist International.

The international organization of the proletarian vanguard does not today exist. But its dissolution does not mean a weakening in proletarian internationalism, which it promoted and advanced. International collaboration of labor is now taking place in new ways, on a far more inclusive and extended scale. The proposed international labor confer-

ence called by the British Trades Union Congress demonstrates that the general recognition of the importance of international labor cooperation has grown, that the horizons of world labor unity are widening to an unprecedented expanse. The factors have ripened for bringing together into one community of action the many millions of trade unionists of the Soviet Union and the capitalist countries for building the organizational base of world labor to strengthen the wartime and post-war cooperation of the United Nations.

* * *

We have examined, in brief survey, aspects of the activity and organization of the working class vanguard in varying epochs and countries, under varying historical conditions. Although world conditions have changed vastly in the century since the pioneer formation of this vanguard as the Communist League, its experiences, internationally, offer us in America important lessons as we carry forward our great task in anti-fascist national unity. But these lessons are of the fullest value to us only as they deepen our understanding of the experiences of the Communist vanguard of our own country, as they clarify the necessary changes in functioning and in organizational form.

The emergence of the American Communist Party in 1919 expressed the need of the American working class for political orientation and for political leadership. The party's inauguration and its formative pe-

riod were the confluence of the most progressive currents in the American Socialist movement and the labor movement generally, representing those advanced forces that had most clearly and determinedly opposed America's involvement in the imperialist World War of 1914-18. The Communist Party fused the Left-wing Socialists and the trade union militants, who fought against opportunist Social-Democracy and trade union bureaucracy and who worked for labor's organization, unification, and advance as an independent political force. The Communist Party arose at a time of great mass struggles against placing the burden of the after-war crisis upon the common people. It opposed committing our country to further imperialist collusions that would bring greater misery at home and greater world conflicts. It opposed the sending of American troops, in military intervention, to destroy the newly-risen Soviet Republic. It urged recognition of the workers' state which from its very inception had made peace the keystone of its foreign policy. It advocated, from the first, friendship and collaboration with the Soviet Union as a policy vital to our national interests.

History has proved the Communist organization American to the core, voice of the basic needs of labor and the nation, organizer and fighter for their fulfillment. The Communist vanguard, rooted in the earliest struggles of our working class, came as the culmination of over sixty years of socialist and Marxist movements in America.

The Communist organization constantly worked to guide the labor movement out of by-paths of sectarianism and blind alleys of pure-and-simple trade unionism on to the highroad of economic and social advance, in broad political unity with all the democratic forces of the nation. The Marxian vanguard helped the advanced workers to develop an understanding of the process of social change, of the historic role of the working class, of the teachings of scientific Socialism.

The Communist organization worked to strengthen labor's alliance with the farming masses, with the oppressed Negro people, with the city middle classes, with the democratic sections of the bourgeoisie—an alliance expressed today in the anti-fascist national unity. In struggles that belong with the epics of our land, the Communists have unceasingly fought to safeguard and extend the rights of labor and the people's democratic liberties. With a devotion that has imbedded itself in the heart of the Negro people and has won the respect of all progressive Americans, the Communists have championed the struggle for the full democratic rights of the Negro people. The Communist Party—unforgettable champion of the unemployed—was a pioneer force in the fight for unemployment insurance and social security, despite the "contempt for doles" on the part of labor's conservative officialdom; it initiated movements for relief to farmers and for aid to veterans.

Communist policy has consistently been dedicated to forwarding the

interests of our nation as a force for world democracy. The Communist Party supported the anti-fascist, national-liberation struggles of China, Ethiopia, and Spain, giving its best sons to the Spanish Loyalist fight. It urged consistently a good neighbor policy toward the countries of Latin America. It boldly condemned the Munich policy of appeasing Hitler and called upon the people to struggle against it. From the first, it rallied mass support to President Roosevelt's slogan, **Quarantine the Aggressor**, and urged its effective implementation. Even when working "against the grain," the Communists knew profoundly that the test of history would find their policies basically *with* the grain of America's interests and aspirations. Had the policy urged by the Communist Party and its foremost spokesman, Earl Browder, for friendship with the Soviet Union been adopted in time by our country, these two great Powers acting together could have rallied the peace-desiring nations into a system of collective security that would have checked the Axis advance and prevented a second world war.

The swift unrolling of world events and the costly experiences of the nations of both hemispheres have with the inexorable logic of history brought about the anti-fascist consolidation of the United Nations and the Herculean comradeship-in-arms of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. To this end, the Communists untiringly contributed with their full efforts.

* * *

In the course of its activities, the party necessarily underwent certain organizational changes. Although the general organizational form remained, there were structural adjustments to changes in functioning called forth by economic and political changes.

A notable example of this was the party's operation for some years through Communist shop branches and shop papers, as well as industrial branches, and through Communist fractions in trade unions and other mass organizations.

In 1924, the party (then the American Workers Party), at its Third Convention, decided upon the shop branch as basic unit of the organization.

That structure can best be understood in relation to the party's main task in the labor movement of the 'twenties and most of the 'thirties, prior to the large-scale organization of the unorganized and the advent of a progressive industrial union center, such as the C.I.O. In that period the party virtually had to fulfill the role later to be assumed by unions in the basic industries and lead economic struggles on departmental and all-shop bases. Throughout these years the Communists were in the forefront of the struggle to organize the workers in such basic spheres of production as the automobile, steel, and rubber industries. The language federation structure of the party was necessary for propaganda among the foreign-born workers; but it served less and less as the structural form of the vanguard that required uniformity, mo-

bility, and, above all, organization at the point of production. The Communist shop branches and shop papers, together with the industrial branches, proved a necessary instrumentality to stimulate and aid the organization of the unorganized industrial masses in the shops and mills.

In the old-line A. F. of L. unions the general absence of inner democracy, the policy of repression and wholesale expulsion of militant workers, made necessary the cohesion of the advance-guard trade unionists, which took the form of the Communist fraction working in close conjunction with the non-Communist trade union militants. The fraction was in no sense a dividing factor, but rather a leverage instrumentality to integrate the rank-and-file trends toward greater organization, trade union democracy, economic betterment, and labor's independent political action. Thanks to those fractions, the A. F. of L. Executive Council could not totally black-out democracy in the trade unions, the voice of the membership often made itself heard, and unions recorded many partial gains, economically and organizationally.

The working class upsurge in the Economic Crisis years of 1929-33 brought forth, along with the great struggles of the unemployed, many strikes and organizing efforts among the employed workers. The A. F. of L. leadership not only failed to carry through, but even sabotaged that movement. This brought about the establishment of the independent, militant unions of the Trade

Union Unity League. This formation, directed toward democratic industrial unionism, was supported by the Communist Party. By 1934-35, however, the economic revival stimulated by the New Deal, coupled with the affirmation by Federal legislation of the right of collective bargaining, gave impetus to mass trade union organization. The independent work of the T.U.U.L. ceased to be necessary. In 1935, its unions terminated their existence. Their membership merged with the membership of the A. F. of L., thereby strengthening the militant forces that had begun to arise within the A. F. of L. and whose united forward movement helped to prepare the way for the launching of the powerful Committee for Industrial Organization.

The conditions of one period made necessary and inevitable an independent trade union formation, while those of the succeeding period required its amalgamation with the main trade union center. Each policy in its own period served the paramount purpose of building labor's organized strength and furthering the process of its unification.

Likewise, the new situation which had brought about the large-scale organization of mass production workers in the progressive industrial unions of the C.I.O. soon rendered unnecessary the Communist fractions in the trade unions. Accordingly, in 1936, this form of organization, now outmoded, was abandoned. For the same reason, the Communist shop papers were given up that year, to be followed

several years later by the formal dissolution of the Communist shop branches and industrial branches.

In recent years the Communist Community Club has progressively become the norm of unit organization, reaching its highest functioning point during the war. The Community Club corresponds to the outlook and spirit of national unity. The war for the national existence of the country demands that the entire people make their fullest contribution; it demands the widest opportunities for all patriotic Americans to contribute. The Communist Community Club provides the needed organizational form for Communists to give their maximum to the national war effort. The concept and role of the Community Clubs were thus set forth by John Williamson, National Administrative Secretary of the Communist Party:

"The exclusive form of community branch, under present-day conditions in our country, does not lessen our contact with the masses of the workers and other people. On the contrary, it makes it possible politically to clarify and mobilize our members on all urgent questions confronting the labor movement and nation; to become active wherever they are in contact with workers, including shops, local unions, and communities. Under present-day conditions, the community branch provides the most effective organizational form to function as an American political organization influencing, inspiring and mobilizing broad sections of the people in the nation's victory drive."^{*}

The Community Clubs throughout the country have been an active political factor in their localities, organizing legislative and political action and war activities around such varied issues as civilian defense and morale, scrap collections of critical materials, war bond drives, Red Cross fund drives, blood bank campaigns, flag raising ceremonies, child care, book collections for soldiers, and mass volunteering in O.P.A. price control and rationing programs.

In the interests of winning the war, the problems which heretofore in the main were considered as the specific, sectionalized concern of various groups are now increasingly the concern of the entire people and can best be solved through strengthening the role of labor and working through the instrumentalities of national unity. The problem of employment is now the problem of the full utilization of the nation's manpower. The problem of wages and decent living standards is now the problem of creating favorable conditions for maximum results on the production front. The problem of economic, political, and social rights for the Negro people is now increasingly seen as part of the problem of forging national unity, of integrating 13,000,000 Americans in all phases of the national war effort, and of carrying out on the home front the democratic intent of the war. The problems of the high cost of living, rent control, child care, and jobs for women, are today recognized as national war problems, officially the concern of the nation's war

^{*} *The Communist*, January, 1944, p. 69.

agencies. Today, the Communists' contribution in helping to solve the differentiated but interrelated problems of labor and the people cannot, as before, be made through small organizational branches—whether shop, industrial, or residential—concentrating on one or another of these issues. Through the larger Community Clubs the Communists can best participate in meeting the common problems of the entire community, including those of the working people, in relation to the nation at war. The Community Club necessarily came to replace the shop and industrial branch types of Communist unit which, having outlived their usefulness, could, like the outmoded fractions, continue only as a barrier between Communists and non-Communists in the trade unions and between the Communist organization and the masses generally.

Now, with the formation of the entirely new Communist organization, how can the specific Marxist role of the Communist clubs manifest itself in the general community activities?

In line with Earl Browder's stress in his now famous January Report to the National Committee, unprecedented emphasis must now be laid upon the Communist educative role. For the individual Communist to exercise initiative and leadership, to contribute to the political understanding of the people, the Club must enrich his Marxian knowledge to help him meet the problems of his community and mass organizations. This makes necessary a systematic program of education, not

only in the principles and the history of Communism, but simultaneously in the rich heritage of American thought and achievement, in all democratic aspects of American life and organizations. Through such grounding in Marxist-Leninist theory, the members will participate effectively in community action; they will make better contributions as trade unionists, as individual members subject to their trade unions' democratic rules. By adequately meeting their political-educational tasks, the Communist Clubs will increasingly become radiating centers in the neighborhoods and a force in the nation.

* * *

The functioning and form of the Communist vanguard are determined by the definite characteristics of a given historical period and the main task of the working class and the nation in that period. The vanguard is constant, in that, whatever the period, whatever the conditions, the working class always brings forward those sufficiently advanced to understand the direction society must take in order to achieve progress. Though this vanguard is constant, its way of functioning and its form are necessarily variable. The organizational form of the Communist vanguard—of its basic unit or of the organization as a whole—is therefore not, in itself, a principle.

It may be asked: Could not the Communists have effected the change in their organization earlier?

The Communists do not lightly or

arbitrarily adopt new policies or new forms. These are always basically the outcome of objective necessity. Were sincerity and reason, not cynicism and bias, the mental guide of so many of our critics, they would see in the Communist "flip-flops" the resilient responsiveness of earnest Marxist leaders to new political tasks created by changed political conditions which necessitate corresponding change in policy, tactic, or organizational form—or in all of these.

The change in the Communist organization corresponds to the political necessities of the profoundly changed situation, in America and the world, which culminated in the Declaration of Teheran.

In the past decade, the Roosevelt Administration, together with advancing labor and other democratic forces, has written epoch-making pages in the history of our country. The economic and social benefits of the New Deal, the President's struggle against the economic royalists, the recognition of the Soviet Union, and the enunciation of the policy to "Quarantine the Aggressor" highlighted the many indications that our domestic and foreign policies were maturing toward meeting our democratic responsibilities at home and abroad. At the same time, the relation of forces during the 'thirties was such—apparent especially in the absence of a firmly established foreign policy—that there was always the possibility of a change to reaction. This actually happened with the capitulation to the Munich forces. Only when the

war and the pressure of world events had brought the anti-Axis forces into decisive ascendancy in our country and our nation achieved a new, realistic approach to international and internal problems, could organizations work in a new way, with new responsibilities, could the trade unions begin to play a new role. Only in such a situation, marked by far-reaching progress as a result of the new unity of the democratic forces around the Roosevelt Administration, could the factors arise for such a merger as that of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party and the Democratic Party. And only in such a situation could new forms of labor organization, including the organizational change in the Communist Party, become a practical and immediate step.

Why—some may ask—was not the change proposed in 1941 or 1942? There were occasions when such a step might have seemed proper; but our nation's new policies needed to be definitely crystallized, both for winning the war and for the post-war world. That crystallization was effected in the Teheran Agreement.

The war for national liberation has given us the foundation and the structure of national unity—an alignment and collaboration of the democratic majority of classes and groups which demands subordination of all partisan considerations and conflicting interests to victory over fascism. Further progress of national unity demands solidification of the pro-Teheran forces in support of Roosevelt, of

his re-election, and of the election of a victory Congress. The confederates in defeatism are sharpening their activities. The American people can only on penalty of disaster remain tolerant toward division in its ranks. Support to the war program of the Government is the program for devoted Americans in all parties. This is the key issue in the elections of this year. The nation's victory over fascism stands above all other interests. The change in the Communist organization is motivated by these considerations of the problems of the elections and the non-partisan support of Roosevelt, and is designed to enable the Communists to meet most effectively their responsibilities to the working class and to the nation.

The Marxian test of the correctness of the reconstitution of the Communist organization from a po-

litical-electoral party to a Communist political-educational association lies in the fact that the change advances the unity and organized strength of labor; it contributes to bringing labor into broader and firmer alliance with all the national-unity forces; it helps labor to fulfill its main political task in the nation; it facilitates the most effective Communist participation in the forging of national unity, in the nation's advance to victory, and in the post-war reconstruction.

New and deeper currents in America are moving toward a fuller realization of the economic benefits and political freedoms which our country's great material resources and democratic heritage can render. The Communist Political Association, reflecting and strengthening these currents, will help the nation realize this goal.

HISTORIC DOCUMENTS

STALIN'S ORDER OF THE DAY

May 1, 1944, No. 70: Moscow

COMRADES, men of the Red Army and Navy, N.C.O.'s, officers and generals, partisans, men and women; working people of the Soviet Union; brothers and sisters who have temporarily fallen under the yoke of the German oppressors and who have been forcibly deported to fascist slavery in Germany!

On behalf of the Soviet government and our Bolshevik Party, I greet you and congratulate you on the occasion of the First of May. The peoples of our country are meeting May Day at a time of outstanding successes of the Red Army. Since the rout of the German divisions at Stalingrad, the Red Army has been conducting a practically continuous offensive. In this period the Red Army advanced in battle from the Volga to the Siret, from the foothills of the Caucasus to the Carpathians, exterminating the enemy scum and sweeping them off Soviet soil.

In the course of the 1943-44 winter campaign, the Red Army won the historical battle for the Dnieper and the Ukraine on the right bank of the Dnieper, smashed the powerful defenses of the Germans at

Leningrad and the Crimea, and in skillful and sweeping operations crushed the German defenses on the rivers, the southern Bug, the Dniester, the Pruth, and the Siret.

Nearly the whole of the Ukraine, Moldavia, the Crimea, Leningrad and the Kalinin regions, and a considerable part of Byelorussia have been cleared of the German invaders.

The ferrous and non-ferrous industry of the south, the ore of Krivoi Rog, Kerch and Nikopol, the fertile soil between the Dnieper and the Pruth have been restored to the country. Tens of millions of Soviet people have been freed from fascist slavery.

Fulfilling the great mission of liberation of the native soil from the fascist invaders, the Red Army emerged at our state frontiers bordering with Rumania and Czechoslovakia, and now continues to batter the enemy troops on the territory of Rumania.

The Red Army successes have been made possible thanks to the correct strategy and tactics of the Soviet command; thanks to the high morale and offensive élan of our troops and commanders; thanks to

the first-class Soviet military equipment of our troops; thanks to the airmen, signalmen, servicemen, sappers, infantrymen, cavalrymen, and scouts.

A considerable contribution has been made to these successes by our great allies, the United States and Great Britain, who are holding the front in Italy against the Germans and are diverting a considerable part of the German troops from us, supplying us with very valuable strategic raw materials and armaments, systematically bombing the military targets of Germany, and thus undermining her military strength.

However, the Red Army successes might have been unstable and reduced to nought after the very first serious counterblow from the enemy, had not the Red Army been supported in the rear by our whole Soviet people, our whole country.

In the battles for the country the Red Army displayed unexampled heroism. But neither have the Soviet people fallen short in their obligation to the Red Army. In the difficult conditions of war, the Soviet people achieved decisive successes in mass production of arms, munitions, clothing, provisions, and their timely delivery to the Red Army fronts. In the past year, the capacity of Soviet industry increased substantially. Hundreds of new plants, mines, dozens of electric power stations, railway lines, bridges have been put into operation. New millions of Soviet citizens have taken their place at the lathes, mastered complex trades, have become experts at their job.

Our collective and state farms have passed the test of war with flying colors. In the difficult conditions of wartime the Soviet peasantry, tirelessly working on the fields, were supplying our army and population with provisions, delivering raw materials to our industry.

And our intelligentsia enriched Soviet science and technology, culture and art with outstanding achievements and discoveries. The Soviet women who are selflessly working in the interests of the front, who are bravely enduring all difficulties of wartime, who are inspiring the men of the Red Army, the liberators of our native land, to deeds of valor in the field, have rendered invaluable services in defense of the motherland.

The patriotic war has shown that the Soviet people are capable of performing miracles and emerging victors from the grimmest ordeals.

The workers, collective farmers, Soviet intelligentsia, and the entire Soviet people are determined to hasten the rout of the enemy, fully to restore the economy ruined by the fascists, to make our country still stronger and more prosperous.

The bloc of the fascist states is cracking and crumbling under the blows of the Red Army. Fear and consternation are today rampant among the Rumanian, Hungarian, Finnish, and Bulgarian "allies" of Hitler. These Hitlerite accomplices, whose countries have been occupied or are being occupied by the Germans, cannot fail to see now that Germany has lost the war.

There is only one possibility left to Rumania, Hungary, Finland, and

Bulgaria to avoid and escape disaster, and that is to break away from the Germans and withdraw from the war.

However, it is scarcely to be expected that the present governments of these countries are capable of breaking with the Germans. It looks as if the peoples of these countries will themselves have to take the matter of their liberation from the German yoke into their hands. And the sooner the peoples of these countries realize the blind alley into which they have been led by the Hitlerites, the sooner they cease giving any support to their German enslavers and their Quisling accomplices in their countries, the less sacrifices and destruction will these countries suffer from the war, the more will they be able to reckon on the understanding of the democratic countries.

As a result of the successful offensive, the Red Army has emerged at our state frontiers along a stretch of more than four hundred kilometers, liberating more than three-fourths of occupied Soviet soil from the German fascist yoke. It is now a question of clearing *all* our soil of the fascist invaders and of restoring the state frontiers of the Soviet Union *along the whole line* stretching from the Black Sea to the Barents Sea.

But our tasks cannot be limited to driving the enemy troops out of the confines of our motherland. The German army today resembles a wounded beast who is compelled to crawl away to the threshold of his lair in Germany in order to heal his wounds. But the wounded beast

who withdraws to his lair does not cease to be dangerous.

To rid our country and the countries allied with us from the menace of subjugation, it is necessary to pursue the wounded German beast, close on his heels, and finish him off in his lair. And while pursuing the enemy, we must free from German captivity our brother Poles, Czechoslovaks, and other peoples of western Europe allied with us, under the jackboot of Hitlerite Germany.

Obviously, this task is more difficult than driving out the German troops from the confines of the Soviet Union. It can be accomplished only through the concerted efforts of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States, by joint blows delivered by our forces from the east and the forces of our allies from the west. There is not a doubt whatsoever that only such a combined blow can completely crush Germany.

Comrades, men of the Red Army and Navy, N.C.O.'s, officers and generals, partisans, men and women, working people of the Soviet Union, brothers and sisters who have temporarily fallen under the yoke of the German oppressors and who have been forcibly deported into fascist slavery in Germany! Greeting and congratulating you on the occasion of the First of May, I hereby order:

Today, on the day of the universal celebration of the working people, to fire a salute of twenty salutes at 8 P.M. in Moscow, Leningrad, Gomel, Kiev, Kharkov, Rostov, Tbilisi, Simferopol, and Odessa in

honor of the historical victories of the Red Army at the front and to mark the great successes of the workers, collective farmers, and intelligentsia of the Soviet Union in the rear.

*Long live our Soviet motherland!
Long live our Red Army and Navy!
Long live the great Soviet people!
Long live the friendship of the peo-*

ples of the Soviet Union! Long live the Soviet partisans, men and women! Undying glory to the heroes who have fallen in the battles for freedom and independence of our native land! Death to the German invaders!

*Signed: Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Marshal of the Soviet Union,
JOSEPH STALIN.*

The July issue will contain a number of the principal reports to the Convention of the Communist Political Association, as well as vital articles dealing with questions of national and world import.

New Books on the Soviet Union

VLADIMIR LENIN

A Political Biography

Prepared by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute of the U.S.S.R., this new definitive study of the founder and leader of the Soviet Union constitutes in many essential respects a history of the socialist revolution of 1917 which gave birth to the mighty Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and an exposition of Lenin's social, economic and political theories which guided it to power.

Price \$1.90

The Red Army

By Prof. I. Minz

The history and organization of the Red Army and a record of its achievements from its foundation up to the epic victory at Stalingrad.

Price \$1.25

Soviet Economy and the War

By Maurice Dobb

A factual record of economic developments during the last few years with special reference to their bearing on the Soviet war potential.

Paper \$2.25; Cloth \$1.00

Soviet Planning and Labor in Peace and War

By Maurice Dobb

Economic planning, the financial system, work, wages, the economic effects of the war, and other special aspects of the Soviet economic system prior to and during the war.

Paper \$3.35; Cloth \$1.00

The Secret of Soviet Strength

By Hewlett Johnson, Dean of Canterbury

The sources and challenge of Soviet economic, political and military might, described by the author of the best-selling book, *The Soviet Power*.

Paper \$3.35; Cloth \$1.50

WORKERS LIBRARY PUBLISHERS

P. O. Box 148, Station D (832 Broadway), New York 3, N. Y.

Just Published!

TEHERAN

OUR PATH IN WAR IN PEACE

By *EARL BROWDER*

Americans of all classes and political affiliations will find in Earl Browder's brilliantly illuminating book on the new problems, tasks and perspectives confronting our nation and the world as a result of the historic Teheran Agreement, a penetrating guide to the future. As the newly-elected president of Communist Political Association writes:

"The Teheran concord furnishes the platform upon which can and must be gathered all forward-looking men and women of all classes and political ideologies, subordinating all other considerations to the single purpose of welding a firm and effective majority of the people and directing the nation and the world along the Teheran path."

His new work is a continuation and companion-volume to *Victory—and After*. But while in his former book the author devoted only one short chapter to the problems "After" victory has been won, his latest book is practically entirely occupied with the vast, world-enveloping tasks of post-war reconstruction which press ever more urgently for attention as D-Day approaches, and which will be tremendously influenced by the outcome of the 1944 presidential elections.

Among the chapters is included Browder's searching evaluation of the problems of "The Guarantee of Teheran"; "Reconstruction of Europe"; "Characteristics of Capitalism"; "Elements of an Economic Program"; "The Changes in Communist Organization" and "What Marxism Contributed to America."

Price \$.35

Cloth \$1.00

WORKERS LIBRARY PUBLISHERS

P. O. Box 148, Sta. D (832 Broadway), New York 3, N.Y.