## POLITICAL AFFAIRS A magazine devoted

to the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism

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WILLIAM Z. FOSTER National Chairman, Communist Party, U.S.A.

# LABOR AND THE PROBLEMS OF RECONVERSION\*

THE COUNTRY IS NOW face to face with a reconversion crisis. This is now admitted by the very government officials who a short time ago were issuing the most reassuring statements. Even under favorable conditions, a changeover from war to civilian production within the framework of a capitalist economy would necessarily involve mass unemployment. The whole conception of reconversion was one envisaging a gradual absorption of war workers and returning veterans into civilian production between V-E Day and V-J Day, originally estimated at a period of at least one year. The victory over Japan, comhined with the absence of serious reconversion planning in industrial circles, has brought us right up against the problem. It is now estimated that six million or more war workers will be laid off in the next thirty days and that we will have some ten million unemployed by the end of the year.

This situation needs to be met by a specific program aside from the general program labor elaborated on the basis of the previous perspective regarding the ending of the war. If not met immediately with special emergency measures, the situation of today can be the signal for bringing on a sharp economic crisis in the country even before the postwar boom will have a chance to develop.

The responsibility for this situation rests in the first place with Big Business, which resisted every effort to prepare for reconversion and preached sole reliance on the ability of so-called free enterprise to cope with the situation. Now it is clear that private enterprise has failed. The responsibility rests with Congress, which failed to pay heed to the many warnings from the progressive forces in the labor movement and in Congress. The leading spokesmen of Big Business knew what was coming and wanted it. They wish to utilize this situation to weaken the trade unions, lower the living standards of the masses, and create divisions between labor, the veterans, the Negro people, the farmers and other sections of the population. They wish to weaken labor economically and politically as a force in the country. This is their postwar

The Administration shares a great responsibility for the present situation. It yielded to the pressures and policies of the big monopolies. It preached complacency. Partly this resulted from the fact that Big Business interests are strongly entrenched in many of the government boards charged with preparing for reconversion. But the labor movement

Memorandum of the Labor Committee of the C.P.U.S.A.

itself bears a great responsibility for failure to foresee and prepare for the present situation. Even where the unions have worked out programs for their industry or for labor generally, their lack of serious drive was demonstrated in a failure to explain the situation to the membership, to draw the bulk of the union members into the elaboration and understanding of the program. Only lately and on a small scale have unions begun to develop the necessary struggle around such programs, notably within the National Maritime Union. Absence of unity or even united action on the part of the labor movement is one of the main reasons why the inertia and lack of planning on the part of Congress and the Administration and has led some employers to entertain high hopes repeating attacks on labor similar to those which followed World War I. Finally, our own wrong policies of the war period and the postwar illusions that we tried to foster among the workers contributed in large part to the present aggravated situation. Therefore, any criticism which we may direct at the labor movement for its shortcomings in this respect cannot fail to include our own responsibility as Communists.

### IMMEDIATE EMERGENCY MEASURES

Only governmental action can deal adequately with the mass layoffs resulting from reconversion and provide jobs for returning veterans. This means that wherever the process of reconversion is of relatively short duration, workers must be kept on the job, with full or part pay, regardless of curtailed production. Where production must be completely suspended or where the changeover will be of long duration, the workers must receive a substantial sum of dismissal or severance

pay.

This demand, raised in general form in the pages of the Daily Worker, has received positive working class response in all quarters. It has been adopted by the New York State Convention of the Communist Party on the basis of suggestions and discussions by a number of trade unionists. Even the New York Times, alarmed, perhaps, by the situation it helped foster, has also raised mild demands for dismissal pay for workers. It urges that employers granting such payments be recompensed by the government. This serves to emphasize the seriousness of the problem, and also indicates that an immediate mass movement within labor can, at this time, win the support of other groups of the population. Mrs. Roosevelt gave strong support to the proposal in her syndicated column of August 16, thus demonstrating that liberal circles recognize the need for action. Proper utilization of such support will contribute to the winning of this demand.

Great sacrifice by the armed forces

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and by the workers on the home front has brought the war to an earlier conclusion than was originally thought possible. This achievement has not only saved innumerable lives, but has also made unnecessary the expenditure of an estimated thirty billion dollars which were already set aside for continuing the war through 1945. Proper emphasis on this fact in mass campaigns will popularize the demand for demobilization bonuses for soldiers and war workers.

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It is up to the trade unions to discuss and decide on the specific amount to be allotted for this purpose. It is well to bear in mind, in this regard, that if six million workers were to lose their jobs within the next thirty days and be paid \$1,000 each, this would require a total outlay of six billion dollars, or only onefifth of the thirty billion dollars originally planned for continuation of the war. Use of the money in this way, by preventing a sharp decline in the purchasing power of the people, will head off the spread of unemployment to other industries and will stimulate reconversion to peacetime production.

It might also be proposed that the remainder of these thirty billion dollars be used directly to stimulate war-plant reconversion, to augment the unemployment bonus fund, and to initiate large-scale public works, housing, education and health programs.

The demand for action on this

emergency proposal should be directed to President Truman, who, through his emergency powers, can put it into immediate operation.

### LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

In addition to the immediate program outlined above, labor must simultaneously organize a powerful legislative drive to push the program for creation of jobs, maintenance of take-home pay at wartime levels, and unemployment compensation—a program with the long-range objective of sixty million jobs and the right to work for all. This means a campaign for the immediate reconvening of Congress, as well as state legislatures and local municipal groups, for action on the program outlined by labor, various governmental agencies, and Roosevelt's second Bill of Rights.

Labor's legislative drive must at the same time be aimed to prevent Congress from yielding to such reactionary demands as profit guarantees and reduction of corporate taxes.

Specific measures for realization of labor's postwar program for the protection of the people's interests include:

1. Amendment of the unemployment relief setup to guarantee \$25 weekly for twenty-six weeks without any waiting period, without any discrimination, and without leaving the states free to lower the payments.

2. Raising of the legal minimum wage to sixty-five cents, with increase to seventy-five cents within a year.

3. Abandonment of the Little Steel formula, and in its place an order by the government for a general 20 per cent wage increase to meet the increased cost of living and the reduced working hours which determine take-home pay. To lift the Little Steel formula alone would not be enough now. The employers will now attempt to utilize the changed employment situation to cut wages. The government, which froze wages and promised the workers wage rises later, has the obligation now to assure the increases.

4. Passage of the Murray full employment bill. It must be made clear that this bill does not actually provide full employment or a job to every worker. All it does is to establish the right to work and the general responsibility of the government to supplement with public-works jobs, etc., where private industry fails. Inasmuch as private industry has already failed to provide full employment, it is evident that the time for mobilizing these public works has

already come.
5. Immediate measures by Congress and the Administration to stimulate foreign trade—through participating in the reconstruction of devastated areas, bringing relief to the war-impoverished people of Europe and Asia, and aiding in the industrialization of economically backward Asia, Africa, Latin America, etc. Toward this end, it is necessary to increase immediate relief through UNRRA, and to extend long-term

credits to the USSR and all other democratic nations. These credits and other forms of assistance must be extended on the basis of mutual interest, and must under no circumstances be used as instruments of interference in the internal affairs of the peoples aided.

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6 Initiation of a broad program for public health and health insurance through passage of the Wagner-

Dingell Bill.

This program of demands on Congress and the Administration must be supplemented by special demands for veterans, farmers, and small businessmen. It must also include a tax program which is based on ability to pay and which removes the unequal burden now carried by the lower-income groups.

Such a program can rally the support not only of labor, but of the vast majority of the American people. It is, indeed, a program already accepted by the majority of the people, and widely recognized to be in the national interest. It is a program that can be won through a struggle to curb the power and profiteering of the monopolies. Furthermore, the campaign for this program will unquestionably stimulate a movement toward more advanced demands by the working class and the common people, such as nationalization of some industries. The people's experience in the struggle for sixty million jobs will teach them the impossibility of achieving such aims through reliance on private enterprise alone; it will teach them the necessity for government intervention and for steps toward nationalization. These advanced questions are already implicit in the current issue of government-owned war plants: labor should demand continued government operation where shutdowns by the private operating companies occur or are threatened.

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To bring about immediate action by Congress on this program, it will be necessary to strive for the broadest unity of labor on every planenational, state and local-and for a united campaign by labor together with every interested section of the people. The forms of this campaign will be manifold, and will include demonstrations of all kinds in shops and communities, and before national and local government agencies and legislative bodies. It will include mass meetings, labor and community conferences on specific issues, and legislative conferences. It will include delegations to Congress and to individual Congressmen, to state legislatures, etc. The movement must be built solidly in each factory, industry and community; at the same time, it must become nationwide in character if it is to succeed. Labor alone can give leadership to this movement. Labor, which has already gained a new status in the nation as a result of its role in the war, can become an even greater force in leading the majority of the people by launching this campaign at once and resolutely.

### TASKS OF THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT

In order to fulfill its role in the fight for this program, in its own and the national interest-in order to defeat the planned attacks of the monopolists and the open-shop forces against the labor movement-the trade unions must strengthen their own position. This requires the fight for labor unity, national and international, further organization of the unorganized workers, and measures to insure maintenance of the present union membership. It also requires special attention to the problems of unemployed members of the unions, and correct application of the strike tactic. Now, with victory in the Pacific, labor has fulfilled its nostrike pledge; it is free to use its right to strike whenever and wherever it is in the best interests of labor and the people.

Labor Unity: The A. F. of L. reactionaries led by Green, Woll, Hutcheson and Dubinsky will try to use the present period of readjustment to widen further the breach in the labor movement. They are out to smash the C.I.O., and may make full use of John L. Lewis for this purpose. They will unite with the open-shop employers' forces in their drive on the C.I.O. As for their own organization, the perspective of these labor reactionaries does not exclude the possibility of actually driving many mililons-especially the most militant workers, and the unemployed—out of the A. F. of L. On the other hand, the rank-and-file members have the same problems and are ready to fight for the same program as the C.I.O. This lays the basis for an earnest and effective struggle for joint action by C.I.O. and A. F. of L. The A. F. of L. Council refuses to allow joint action of any kind on the false ground that they favor organic unity. Hence it is necessary to show the A. F. of L. workers that their Council actually opposed unity; to strive to unite the workers of both organizations in struggle on the postwar economic program, showing to the local A. F. of L. organizations that this unity of action is also at the same time the road toward the earliest realization of organic unity.

In order to further the struggle for united action it is, however, essential that the C.I.O. renew its initiative in this direction on a national scale. In addition to the reasons discussed above, this is necessary in order to prevent the jurisdictional disputes that will be incited by employers and reactionary A. F. of L. officials, and in some cases by Reuther elements in the C.I.O. Such an initiative by the C.I.O. should be addressed to the A. F. of L., the Railroad Brotherhoods, and the miners, on the basis of the pressing issues and dangers facing the labor movement. It should stress the urgent need to work out a common program and common action on labor's immediate demands, to beat back the attacks of the employers, and to settle peaceably all threatening jurisdictional disputes. It should call for the formation of a joint committee of all the national labor organizations, as a first concrete step toward complete unification of the American trade union movement.

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Such an initiative by the C.I.O. also might well include an expression of hope that united labor action at home, even before achieving organic unity, might stimulate full American participation in the World Federation of Trade Unions through the coming World Congress in Paris.

Orzanization of the Unorganized: There is ample evidence that many workers who did not join trade unions during the war-because, for one thing, of a feeling that all issues were decided by government boards —are now ready to join the unions in self-defense against unemployment and wage-cuts. These workers can now be organized effectively around the issue of labor's economic program outlined above. Even if they join, however, they will not remain in the unions and will be prey to the propaganda of reactionaries, fascists and company unions unless they find their unions actually fighting for their interests. The same is true of millions of new union membersyouth, women, Negroes and new proletarians who only recently were at home, on the farms, in the offices and small businesses-who have not yet been won to trade unionism through education.

The labor movement has a great opportunity to organize new millions of workers if it demonstrates that it fights for their interests. But, for both these unorganized as well as the millions recently organized, it will be necessary to combine with the struggle for their needs a great educational campaign. In the same connection, it is essential to pay greater attention to the development of democracy in the unions, to drawing the workers fully into the life of their organizations. Unfortunately, even in unions under progressive leadership we find cases where only a fraction of the membership attend meetings and participate in organizational life.

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To organize the unorganized workers, it will be necessary for the unions to develop their campaigns on new foundations and through combined economic and political struggle, mass agitation, community work, etc. It will be insufficient to wait for the workers to sign up, or to depend wholly on paid organizers. Large sections of the union membership will have to be involved: large corps of volunteer organizers must be launched. We must bring out once more some of the great pamphlets of Comrade Foster on this subject, most of which are fully applicable to the organizing of such mass campaigns today.

The unions have a special problem in regard to the millions that may become unemployed. After World War I and during the great crisis, A. F. of L. policy actually drove the unemployed out of the unions. Together with the general weakness of the entire labor movement at that period, which comprised only a few million workers, this made a separate unemployed workers' movement inevitable.

But today such a separate movement is not inevitable. It should be our policy to see to it that the unemployed remain members in good standing in their locals; that the unions waive or make nominal dues payments for those long unemployed. At the same time, the unemployed members should retain their full membership rights. Unemployed committees should be formed in the locals and larger bodies. A. F. of L. and C.I.O. city councils also should form committees to coordinate all work among and for the unemployed on a city-wide scale, performing the functions of the old city-wide Unemployed Councils. Such a policy will insure the unity of the employed and the unemployed workers, and will strengthen their actions for their combined interests. For the present, separate organizations of the unemployed should be formed only where the alternative would be complete failure to organize the unemployed.

Special attention is needed for the women workers, 80 per cent of whom among the newly-recruited workers wish to remain working. They require special consideration, both as a large section of the unorganized workers awaiting organization, and as a major element among the newly-recruited union members who must be retained and consolidated in the labor movement. It is clear that this demands the fight for women's incorporation in the life and leadership of the trade unions.

Of the greatest importance to the labor movement and to the democratic unity of the nation is the fight for the right of the Negro workerstheir right to remain in industry and to employment in all new jobs and industries that are opened up in civilian production. Even the passage of a permanent F.E.P.C., which must be fought for, will not guarantee the Negro workers equal rights to newly-created jobs, much less security in their present jobs where their seniority is often low because they were the last to be hired. These rights can be achieved only through a conscious and persistent struggle by the trade unions.

This inevitably has to involve some modification of the seniority rule in such plants where its strict application would mean that most, if not all, of the Negro workers would lose their jobs. This is not an easy problem to solve, especially since most unions have not clarified this issue among their members and since some union officials are themselves hostile to the Negro workers' employment and union membership rights (as is the case in some A. F. of L. and Railroad Brotherhood

unions). But the problem cannot be solved by ignoring it or by capitulating to the most backward elements among the workers. It has to be solved through education and struggle, as well as through elaboration of a joint program by the outstanding responsible leaders of both the Negro people and the trade unions in each locality.

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#### THE RIGHT TO STRIKE

With the end of the war the workers have fully and honorably (with such exceptions as that of John L. fulfilled Lewis) their no-strike pledge for the duration. This correct policy has brought immediate and lasting benefits to the labor movement. Labor is now again free to exercise its right to strike wherever and whenever it finds it to be in its interests. The question of strikes in the form in which it existed prior to the end of the war no longer exists.

Hereafter labor disputes must be settled primarily through direct collective bargaining between the employers and the workers. As for the War Labor Board, President Truman has announced its temporary continuation until new machinery for government aid in settling labor disputes can be created within a reorganized Labor Department. He is further expected to call a conference of labor, industry and government to work out agreements designed to minimize and settle disputes arising during the reconversion period.

Labor should insist on immediate favorable settlement of all cases now pending before the W.L.B. involving long-standing grievances of the workers and at present tying up many millions of dollars in retroactive pay. Furthermore, in view of the limited role the W.L.B. can play in settling new disputes which may arise during its remaining period of existence, labor can only accept W.L.B. jurisdiction by retaining full freedom of action regarding recommendations this agency may make.

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By the President's statement, the Little Steel formula ceiling is now lifted in all cases where wage increases will not necessitate a change in prices in accordance with the price control effective until June, 1946. On the basis of this statement, labor and the people must insist that in practically all industries and establishments wage increases can and must be granted without any further rise in prices. This is made possible by the big profits that the capitalists have made in the war years and the big reserves that they have built up as a consequence of these superprofits.

The attitudes of labor and the capitalists to the proposed conference of labor, industry and government stem from different motives. Labor is interested in speedy and orderly reconversion, in full employment, a rising standard of living for the people, and strengthened trade unions to guarantee these objectives. Gov-

ernment officials have time and again stated that it is the policy of the government to bring about a 50 per cent increase in the standard of living. Employers, on the other hand, and such spokesmen of theirs as Senator Vandenberg, wish to create a big reserve army of unemployed and openly attack the principle of the right to work and full employment. They scoff at the idea proposed by President Roosevelt and supported by Secretary Wallace that we must aim to create sixty million jobs. They wish to cut wages and increase their profits. They seek to weaken the trade unions everywhere and destroy them where they can. For this purpose they intend to use, not only their economic power, but reactionary forces in Congress to try to shackle labor with such legislation as the Burton-Hatch-Ball anti-labor bill.

Clearly, then, labor must enter such a conference with its own program, which represents the best interests of the people. Labor must oppose all plans of the monopolists whose only reconversion program is to enrich themselves at the expense of labor and the nation. President Philip Murray of the C.I.O. has already indicated such a stand in his comment on the recent Vandenberg proposal for a labor-management conference. The entire labor movement should be clarified on this issue and mobilized behind President Murray on this issue. In this respect, the A. F. of L. workers should be urged to support this position. President William Green's announcement that the A. F. of L. is opposed to government participation in such a conference should be exposed as a reactionary stand, similar to the A. F. of L. leaders' opposition to unemployment relief and unemployment insurance in the early 1930's.

With regard to strikes, the workers do not desire strikes for the sake of strikes, and will do everything possible to promote orderly and speedy reconversion. But strikes can be avoided, not by disregarding, but only be recognizing labor's just demands. The labor movement, having grown to its present proportions and recognizing its responsibility for national welfare, having grown to greater political maturity and possessing many allies among the American people, also recognizes that it has other means to fight for its interests beside that of strike action. It can rely on the political struggle of labor in conjunction with its allies in the fight to realize its aims. Whether labor must resort to strikes or rely upon other means will be determined by the labor movement itself in each given circumstance, always, of course, with due consideration to the welfare of labor's allies.

Broad demands for sixty million jobs, for the right to work, for emergency measures during the reconversion layoffs, for unemployment benefits, and even for higher wages can be realized only through planned and organized political struggle, uniting all those who stand to benefit by labor's demands, since the government still retains powers of decision in all these matters.

Where it is impossible by other means to halt employers' attempts to cut wages, weaken or break union contracts, the workers will be compelled to exercise their right to strike in defense of their conditions. Similarly, in industries where the wartime freeze on wages subjected the workers to lowered living standards in face of the soaring living costs (while the employers made huge profits), the workers will use their organized strength to win improvement in their conditions; they will take care that the workers' allies know that the responsibility for the strikes lies with the employers. Employers will often try to provoke strikes in order to force the workers to enter the struggle when the conditions are least favorable to them. In such cases the workers must expose the tactics of the employers and go to the people for support, by demonstrating the employers' guilt in forcing the strike upon the workers and the community.

The working class does not entertain the prospect of strikes lightly, especially under the conditions prevailing now, where mass layoffs are the order of the day. They will do everything in their power to achieve their demands through collective bargaining and negotiation. But they will defend their interests.

## TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

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enterlightly, as preoffs are vill do achieve llective ut they In fulfillment of these objectives, the Communist Party has the task of stimulating and aiding the labor movement to carry forward the stated program of struggle. This imposes increased responsibilities upon all Communists in the trade unions, irrespective of whether the leadership in a given union is progressive or not.

In addition to the activities which Communists will carry through in mass organizations, we must develop activity in the name of the Communist Party itself. This must be done, however, in a manner that will not tend to replace, but will buttress, the activities of the trade unions. The Party should make its position on issues clear to the masses through leaflets, the press, meetings, etc. It should mobilize its own members and clarify the issues, the tactics to be followed and the methods of struggle. It should strive to partici-

pate in all the important actions undertaken by the labor movement and the general people's movement, under its own banner and as an integral part of the broad labor and people's coalition. From time to time the Party should also organize actions in its own name striving to rally other forces and organizations in their support.

A series of actions have already been planned by the progressive labor movement in New York, Chicago, and other places. These must receive the fullest support. It is of the utmost importance that this movement, centered around the Labor Day actions coinciding with the reconvening of Congress, does not decline but that, on the contrary, it is raised to an even higher level and broader mass character immediately following the opening of Congress, so that throughout the coming session of Congress the will of labor and the people will be registered to the maximum.

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# THE STRUGGLE AGAINST REVISIONISM\*

By WILLIAM Z. FOSTER

DURING THE PAST SEVERAL weeks we have been engaged in the frankest, deepest, and most self-critical theoretical analysis and practical political discussion in the history of our Party. Now, therefore, in its overwhelming majority, our Party has become convinced that our policy for the past eighteen months was "a notorious revision of Marxism." The complete dissolution of the Party in the South shows where Comrade Browder was leading with his policy.

In this report on behalf of the National Board, my task is to deal with this revisionism. I shall try to explain what it is, how it came about, and what we must do about it. I shall limit myself to the Party aspects of the question. I shall not undertake a general analysis of the military, economic and poltical situation, nor shall I dwell at length upon our Program of Action. These matters will be handled by later reporters and in our various resolutions.

#### OUR PARTY'S REVISIONIST MISTAKE: ITS ORIGIN AND COURSE

Browder, with his revisionism, was trying to fasten a system of Rightwing bourgeois liberalism upon our Party; a liberalism so conservative that on many questions it put us far to the Right of Roosevelt, of the liberal press, and of the main sections of the labor movement. This revisionism has nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism, being a complete abandonment of its basic

principles.

A. Browder's line is a rejection of the Marxian economic doctrines. Browder has developed bourgeois theories of the liquidation of the capitalist cyclical and general crises; he rejects Marx' theory of surplus value and of the exploitation of the workers. Thus, for the past two years our Party has made no criticism whatever of capitalism as a system of human exploitation, nor has it challenged the blood-wrung profits of the employers. Instead, we have heard many comrades, without rebuke from Browder, talking about our alleged obligation to guarantee the employers, already the richest in the world, a so-called fair profit. That such shameful nonsense should be heard in a Communist organization! When Browder adopted so glibly the slogan of "free enterprise," he accepted in practice most of bourgeois economics along with it. With his great faith in capitalism, he outdoes

Report to the Specian Convention of the Communist Political Association, held in New York, July 26-28, 1945, which reconstituted the Communist Party of the United States of America.

even such enthusiastic bourgeois economists as Chase, Hanson and Johnston.

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B. Browder's line is a rejection of the Marxian principles of the class struggle. Comrade Browder denies the class struggle by sowing illusions among the workers of a long postwar period of harmonious class relations with generous-minded employers; by asserting that class relations no longer have any meaning except as they are expressed either for or against Teheran: by substituting for Marxian class principles such idealistic abstractions as the "moral sense," "enlightenment," "progressivism," and "true class interests" of the big monopolists, as determining factors in establishing their class relations with the workers. Browder's theories of class collaboration and the harmony of interest between capital and labor are cut from the same opportunist cloth as those of Berstein, Legien and Gompers, except that his ideas are more shamelessly bourgeois than anything ever produced by these notorious revisionists of the past.

C. Browder's line is a rejection of the Marxian concept of the progressive and revolutionary initiative of the working class, and with it, the vanguard role of the Communist Party. The very foundation of Marxism-Leninism is that the working class, with the Communist Party at its head, leads the democratic masses of the people in the amelioration of their conditions under capitalism and also in the eventual establishment of

Socialism. But Comrade Browder has thrown this whole conception overboard. His books Victory-and After and especially Teheran: Our Path in War and Peace, present the thesis of a progressive capitalist class, particularly American finance capital, leading the peoples of this country and the world to the achievement of the great objectives of the Moscow, Teheran, Yalta and San Francisco Conferences, and the building of a peaceful, democratic and prosperous society. Browder sees labor and the democratic forces, including the Communist Party, playing only a secondary, non-decisive role in the present-day world.

D. Browder's line is a rejection of the Leninist theory of imperialism as the final stage of capitalism. Comrade Browder, in his books and speeches, paints a utopian picture of a world capitalist system, not moribund, but vigorous and progressive, especially in its American section—a world capitalist system about to enter into a period of unprecedented expansion. It is a denial of the general crisis of the capitalist system. Browder believes that under the leadership of his "enlightened" American monopolists, the imperialist ruling classes in this and other capitalist countries will peacefully and spontaneously compose their differences with each other, with the U.S.S.R., with the liberated countries of Europe, and with the colonial and semicolonial countries, without mass struggle. This is the bourgeois liberal notion that the epoch of imperialism is past. It conflicts fundamentally with the Leninist theory of imperialism as the last stage of a dec-

adent capitalist system.

E. Browder's line is a rejection of the Marxian-Leninist perspective of Socialism. Obviously, if world capitalism, under the leadership of Comrade Browder's beneficient American monopolists, can overcome its inner contradictions and produce an era of well-being and capitalist progress such as Browder sees ahead, the whole question of Socialism is reduced to a mere abstraction. Browder accepts this logic and has abandoned the advocacy of Socialism, even in a purely educational sense. In his book on Teheran he casts aside our Party's ultimate goal of Socialism and expands our program of immediate demands into a fantastic capitalist utopia which leaves no room whatever for Socialism.

From all of this, it should be clear that Browder is preaching anti-Marxism, in fact "a notorious revision of Marxism," as Duclos said. He is fighting our Party and with it, what he has designated as "the Marxists of Europe." But like all other revisionists, he presents his opportunism under the false flag of a Marxism brought up to date. That he realizes he is making a head-on attack upon the whole body of Marxist-Leninist principles, however, is clear from his often-expressed scorn for the "old books" and "old formulas," by which, of course, he

means Marxist-Leninist books and formulas. Browder would have us throw away the Marxist-Leninist classics and adopt instead his Rightwing bourgeois liberalism, which he misnames Marxism. His two latest books cannot be called Marxist works, they are more akin to the ideas of Eric Johnston than to those of Karl Marx.

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Browder's amazing bourgeois revisionism is a surrender to the pressure of American imperialism upon our Party. The class beneficiaries of his whole program are the big capitalists of this country. His line dovetails with their plans of imperialist expansion and world domination when he sows illusions about their alleged progressivism, hides their imperialist aggressions, spins capitalist utopias that shut out all perspectives of Socialism, deludes the workers with prospects of their employers voluntarily doubling their wages in the postwar stage, and weakens the Communist Party by transforming it into the Communist Political Association, etc. Thus he plays into the hands of the most reactionary elements, American big capitalists, who in the postwar period will be the strongest world force making for economic chaos, fascist reaction, and a new world war.

One of the most dangerous aspects of Browder's revisionism is that it was penetrating into the Communist parties of other lands through the spread of his writings. Thus, a number of our brother parties in this

hemisphere, especially in Latin America, became infected with it, thereby weakening their guard against advancing American impe-Various European and Asiatic parties also felt the liquidatory effects of Browderism. Indeed, Browder wrote a public letter to the Communist Party of Australia, virtually telling it what it should and should not do-advice which that Party indignantly rejected. Before the Duclos article was published, Browder also contemplated sending a public letter to the British Communist Party urging it to orientate itself in the then approaching Parliamentary elections on the perspective of an election alliance between the British democratic forces and the Churchill group of Tories against the reactionaries (sic). How preposterous this sounds now in view of the Labor Party's victory-over Churchill. Browder's plan, apparently, was to develop some sort of a loosely integrated cooperation between such Communist parties as he could influence, with the C.P.A. as a new world center, with himself as its leader, and with his revisionist policies as its program. The Duclos article smashed this whole plan.

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Browder's revisionism, although it burst into full expression following the Teheran conference, has roots reaching back several years earlier in his Party leadership. An examination of this earlier period will reveal the major reasons why the Communist movement has not made greater progress in the United States during the past several years. Browder's policies have been a detriment to our Party for years.

Our Party discussion has made it clear that Comrade Browder's revisionism has exerted a weakening effect upon our wartime policy. Many of our comrades still believe that Browder's policy was necessary during the war. It was not. It was definitely a detriment in our war work, as I have shown in detail in my article in The Worker of June 10. And not a few believe that Browder worked out our policy of all-out support of the war, of strengthening the United Nations coalition, of the fight for the Second Front, of maximum war production, of the no-strike pledge, etc. But this is not true. Browder was in Atlanta when this correct general war policy was developed, and he had nothing whatever to do with its formulation. Almost as soon as he was released from prison, however, he began to undermine our correct policy with his enervating revisionism. He did not succeed, however, in completely destroying our otherwise correct wartime policy. Despite his revisionism, our Party may well be proud of its record during the war, its wholehearted and devoted struggle on every front to win the war. The full destructive force of Browder's revisionism would have been felt, however, if we had attempted to extend his policies over into the postwar period. This would have

proved disastrous to our mass work and to our Party itself. The corrective Duclos article arrived at a most

opportune time for us.

As it was, the corrosive effects of Browder's revisionism were fast bringing our Party into a major internal crisis. His pro-capitalist liberalism alienated our Party sympathizers and confused our Party members. So badly had he undermined our policy that it finally took an expert to explain to a member of a progressive trade union why he should join the C.P.A. or remain a member of it. Our members' morale fell rapidly. Fluctuation figures rose steeply and our power to recruit members declined accordingly. The percentage of trade unionists dropped off sharply in our Party. Our contacts with the Negro people were weakened, especially by the disastrous liquidation of our Party in the South. Attendance at branch meetings declined alarmingly, and dues payment percentages fell to record low levels. This is what happens to a Communist Party when it gets poisoned with revisionism. It will take hard work upon our part to overcome this developing crisis and to start our Party off again on a course of healthy growth and development.

A peculiarly harmful effect of our Party's disease of Browder's revisionism was that by crippling the Party's militancy, it tended to throw the workers into the grip of the pseudo-left demagogy of the Trotskyites, Reutherites, Thomasites, Dubinskyites and Lewisites.

The Party membership is mystified as to how our Party leadership, almost unanimously, came to make the serious mistake of adopting Browder's crudely revisionist line, especially during the past 18 months. Let me try to explain this:

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First, for several years prior to the adoption of Browder's distorted policy on Teheran, our Party had under Browder's leadership, slipped into the opportunist practice of supporting Roosevelt without serious self-criticism. It thereby began to adopt a wrong attitude toward the bourgeoisie. Our developing opportunistic attitude toward the capitalists was further strengthened by the failure to recognize clearly that the big capitalists of this country were supporting the war for their own imperialistic purposes and not to advance the democratic objectives of the American people. Browder's opportunistic line was to welcome the big capitalists more or less as loyel comrades in arms with the democratic forces. With all this opportunistic confusion as a background in Party policy, it was not difficult for Browder, after the Teheran conference, to take his final plunge into revisionism by contending that our so-called wartime cooperation with the big capitalists would be continued and intensified in the postwar period. This argumentation seemed reasonable to many; for if the Socialist sector of the world could arrive at an agreement on Teheran to cooperate in war and peace with the capitalist parts of the world, then why could not American workers and capitalists also work together in harmony in the war and in the postwar period? With this opportunistic reasoning as a basis, Browder then added his utopian theories of a progressive capitalist system, the liquidation of imperialism, the harmony of interests between capital and labor, etc. Unfortunately, the rest of our Party leadership was not able to demolish this complex utopian structure by exposing its grossly opportunistic core.

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Secondly, a vital reason why Comrade Browder was able to foist his opportunism upon our Party was because of the super-centralism prevailing in our organization. With his great personal prestige and his excessive degree of authority, Browder's word had become practically the law in our Party. Consequently, he was able to suppress any analytical discussion whatever of his false thesis regarding Teheran. It is my opinion that if Browder's proposals could have been really discussed, they would have been finally rejected by our Party, but such a discussion was out of the question.

Now I come to another matter this is deeply troubling our Party and its friends; namely, how does it happen that a Party leadership that had been almost unanimously following Browder's opportunist line for eighteen months could suddenly switch over and take a stand flatly against Browder?

In answer to this general question, I think that the basic cause of the sudden, almost spectacular change of not only the leadership's, but of Party, opinion was that Browder's policy had been proved bankrupt by life itself as the war in Europe was coming to an end. Moreover, thousands of Party members had accepted the policy at its outset with grave doubts and hesitations and were ready for the change.

There were, indeed, many signs of an impending change of Party policy. The end of the war against Germany, the death of Roosevelt, the imperialist raid upon the San Francisco conference of the United Nations, the obvious preparations of the N.A.M. for a postwar drive against organized labor, the development of many strikes, etc., were awakening concern among our leaders in the National Board. Comrades Dennis, Green, Thompson, Williamson and other leading members were either beginning to express directly opposing views to Comrade Browder's, or were raising questions that he found it increasingly difficult, on the basis of his distortions of Teheran, to answer. Even Browder himself, under the pressure of events, had been forced to cast aside some of the cruder forms of his revisionism and recently had felt compelled to write several "radical" articles which apparently contradicted his line. Already, Dennis and Green had made proposals for a meeting of the National Committee, to review our postwar perspectives and policies. Such a review could not have been avoided, and when it had eventually taken place I am sure it would have produced important changes in the Party's line. As we can see from Comrade Browder's present opposition to the National Committee's Resolution, however, such changes could have occurred only in the face of his stubborn resistance.

Had the Duclos article been published a few months earlier, its reception in our Party would have been much less unanimous. As things turned out, however, it appeared at just the right time. The objective situation was ripe for it, and so, increasingly, were our Party leaders and members. Hence, the stage was all set for the sudden switch in Party opinion that has perplexed so many people. Our Party has suddenly reverted to its basic Communist principles.

So much for the character of Browder's revisionism, how the Party came to make the mistake of adopting it, and how it is managing to cast off this error. Now to the second phase of my report, namely:

### THE NEXT TASKS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST REVISIONISM

A. An ideological campaign against Revisionism: From the Par-

ty's overwhelming endorsement of the National Committee's Resolution, it is clear that this Convention will decisively reject Comrade Browder's bourgeois liberalism. This is vitally important; but the worst mistake we could now make would be to conclude therefrom that the fight against Browder's revisionism has been fully won and that we can now proceed unconcernedly with our daily tasks. On the contrary, we must continue and intensify the ideological struggle. While at the conclusion of this convention our formal general Party discussion will end and we will close our ranks and proceed in unity and discipline to the application of the line we have adopted, we must, however, conduct the broadest and deepest campaign of enlightenment we have ever led in our Party. As never before, we must train our Party in the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism. To this end we must check over the curricula, teaching personnel and textbooks of all our schools. We must re-examine all our recent literature. We must prepare new propaganda and agitation material in harmony with our new line. We must especially be alert to eliminate, not only Browder's wrong theories, but also all those opportunist ways of thinking and working that have developed during Browder's long regime as head of the Party. So prevalent are these opportunist moods and methods that many comrades in State and National leading posts are deeply afflicted with them, often without even realizing the fact.

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The eradication of these insidious open and concealed forms of opportunism, the scars of Browderism, will need our close and earnest attention in the coming period. At the same time, we will have to be vigilantly on guard against a sharp growth of "Left"-sectarianism, which is a perennial danger in our Party and of which there are already manifestations. We must avoid doing what we have done several times before during sharp turns in Party policy; namely, to make the mistake of over-correction. We must avoid flying from the one extreme of open revisionism to the other extreme of a narrow sectarianism. One evil is as harmful as the other.

B. Re-establish the Communist Party: It is the National Board's opinion that this Convention should reconstitute the Communist Party. It was a grave error to form the Communist Political Association in the first place, a long step toward dissolving the Communist movement in the United States, as we now see so dramatically in the South. And it will be compounding that deadly mistake if we do not here and now reorganize the C.P.A. into the C.P. Comrade Dennis, in his report to our National Committee, showed conclusively that the formation of the C.P.A. did not help our election campaign, as Comrade Browder avers, but seriously hampered it. Likewise, Comrade Williamson, in reporting to the National Committee, demonstrated beyond question that the continuation of the C.P.A. is having a liquidationist effect upon every branch of our Party work and organization. The clear lesson from all this is that the convention should re-establish the C.P. without delay, including especially the organization in the South.

There are no electoral complexities in this country that the C.P. cannot meet better than the C.P.A. To keep the present name is politically indefensible. We will have more standing among the people operating frankly as the Communist Party. Besides, every advanced worker knows the meaning of a "party," but does anyone, even Comrade Browder himself, really know what a "political association" is? Only with a party can we meet the great tasks confronting us. Failure to re-establish the Communist Party at this Convention would be a major political mistake. It would disappoint our membership; it would cripple our future work; it would stimulate the Browder opposition; it would be a sign that we are not clear-sighted and resolute enough to take the decisive steps necessary to eradicate Browder's revisionism. In view of all this, therefore, it is imperative to re-establish the Communist Party.

C. Refresh and Strengthen the Party Leadership: During my various reports and articles in this situation, I have taken Comrade

Browder sharply to task for our Party's revisionist mistake. I have done this because Browder was the chief author of the revisionism; he theorized it: he rammed it down our Party's throat without discussion; he now refuses to accept correction, and he has been busily trying to organize an opposition against the National Committee's Resolution. Some comrades believes, however, that I have been unduly severe in polemizing against Browder. But this is sentimentalism, when it is not political uncertainty. Comrade Browder has done and is still doing severe injury to our Party. He subjected it to ridicule when he introduced his absurd capitalist ideas into it a year and a half ago, and he is exposing it to a severe Red-baiting attack now that we have to change back from his false policies. He has seriously weakened our Party's daily work and confused its membership. He has also profoundly lowered our Party's prestige among other Communist Parties.

While it is necessary, therefore, to concentrate the main fire against Browder as the ideological leader of our revisionist error, this does not remove the heavy burden of responsibility borne by the rest of our national leadership, especially the members of the National Board. It was a great weakness that our leadership was not capable of theoretically unmasking Browder's opportunism and thus saving the Party from the ensuing ravages in its

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Political mistakes are serious matters and cannot be lightly passed over. In these times of crucial struggle against fascism they involve the welfare, the liberties and possibly even the lives of large masses of people. Leaders who make such mistakes must, therefore, be held strictly responsible. Consequently, the proposal as stated in the National Committee's Resolution, to "refresh and strengthen the personnel of all responsible leading committees in the Association," is a pertinent one. The Party must provide the best guarantees it can in its leadership that such a disastrous mistake shall not take place again. This does not signify, however, as some comrades assert, that "the whole national leadership must be cleaned out." Such a Leftist course would be throwing the baby out with the bath water.

Communist parties are not infallible, and even the best Marxists sometimes make mistakes. The distinction between Communist parties and other parties of the people in this respect is that, armed with the science of Marxism-Leninism, the former make far fewer mistakes than any other group, and when they do commit errors, they frankly admit and correct them. Just a little while ago Stalin stated that many serious errors had been made in the U.S.S.R. during the prosecution of the war. And in his famous speech on Mar-

tering Bolshevism, delivered on March 3, 1937, when pointing out that the leadership of the Party made the serious error of failing to recognize the danger of Trotskyism, he said:

How can it be explained that our leading comrades, who have a rich experience of struggle against every kind kind of anti-Party and anti-Soviet trend, proyed to be so blind and naive in this case that they were unable to recognize the real face of the enemies of the people, were unable to discern the wolves in sheep's clothing, were unable to tear the mask from them?

They forgot Soviet power has conquered only one-sixth of the world, that five-sixths of the world is in possession of capitalist powers. They forgot that the Soviet Union is in conditions of capitalist encirclement. . ...

This was a very serious error, as all will agree, and in the most advanced Communist Party in the

When errors are made by Communist leaders, and our error was a serious one, it calls for a check-over of the leading forces; but this must not be interpreted as a signal for a reckless decimation of the Party leadership. Such a decimation would be in order only if the Party should have fallen into the hands of a hardboiled group of incurable revisionists, which is not the case in our Party. What is called for in our situation in order to refresh and strengthen the leadership, therefore, is to select our new National Committee and National Board on the basis of a careful review of the various members' qualifications, including their social background, their Marxist-Leninist training, their previous Party record, their degree of participation in the present error, their connections with trade unions and mass organizations, their present attitude toward Browder's revisionism, and their general prospects of doing effective future Party work. viously, there must be important changes in our leading committees, particularly the National Board. Trade unionists and war veterans especially must be brought into the leadership, both nationally and in the districts. The present Party situation must result in a very substantial improvement in our whole Party leadership.

D. Re-establish Democratic Centralism: A basic essential in our fight against Browder's revisionism is to re-introduce Leninist democratic centralism into the Party. During the tenure of Comrade Browder's leadership the Party drifted far from these principles and allowed itself to become infected with a corroding bureaucratism in which Browder was the key figure and chief moving

force.

Centralism we had, a super-centralism in fact, but very little democracy. Comrade Browder during the course of the years had managed, with the acquiescence of the leadership and of the Party in general, to develop among us a totally wrong

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serious S.S.R. e war. Masconception of Communist leadership. He had grown almost into a dictator. His authority reached such a point that his word had become virtually unchallengeable in our Party. His policies and writings finally were accepted almost uncritically by the leaders and the general membership. Browder around himself an atmosphere of infallibility and unchallengeable authority. All this was accentuated by the deluge of petty-bourgeois adulation, praise-mongering and heroworship that was constantly poured upon him by our leadership and our members.

Comrade Browder was deeply intoxicated by this unseemly adulation and by his arbitrary power. He quite lost his political balance from it. He abandoned Communist modesty and Leninist self-criticism and fell into the most extravagant boasting. This boasting attitude has done Browder great personal damage and it has brought havoc to our Party.

Constantly grasping for more power, Comrade Browder had largely liquidated the political functions of the Party's leading bodies. He habitually by-passed the National Board in policy making. Characteristically, his notorious report on Teheran was never presented as a whole to the National Board. All the Board saw of it beforehand were a few fragments. It was sprung suddenly and sensationally, in the true Browder manner, at a National Committee meeting attended by sev-

eral hundred people. The National Committee, also, had gradually log all real political power. It assembled it listened to Browder's proposals: it affirmed them; and it dispersed to the districts to impress the policy upon the membership. Of genuine political discussion there was none whatever in the National Committee. Similarly, our recent National Conventions were hardly better than the National Committee meetingswith their formal endorsement of Browder's reports, no political discussions and no self-critical examination of the leadership.

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In this stifling bureaucratic atmosphere. Leninist collective leadership could not and did not exist. Political thinking itself was hamstrung. Comrade Browder, basing himself upon the high prestige which he enjoyed among the Party membership, made policy pretty much as he saw fit, with the sad results that we now see. How far Browder was prepared to go to prevent political discussion was shown by the way he suppressed my letter of January, 1944, to the National Committee The only way I could have gotten this letter to the membership was by facing expulsion and a sure split in the Party. Even then my letter would not have really come before the Party, for the issue would have been the unity of the Party, and any one who attempted to discuss my letter would have been denounced as a Trotskyite by Browder.

The Party must insist that this

whole bureaucratic system be swept away, in the districts and nationally, as a basic condition for freeing itself from Browder's revisionism. There must be a genuine collective leadership built up. The Secretariat must report regularly to the National Board, which must discuss its reports freely. The National Committee must establish its political power and it must have the fullest freedom to discuss all reports coming from the National Board or members of the Secretariat. Important differences of opinion in the National Board must be reported to the National Committee. The National Convention must not be a mere rubber stamp, as it was under Browder's leadership, but must be, in fact as well as in name, the most authoritative body in our Party.

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The Party must insist that the Party leaders be self-critical, and it must learn to be on guard against leaders who cover up their mistakes, instead of frankly admitting and Petty-bourgeois analyzing them. adulation of leaders must also be ended. We should respect our chosen leaders, but not make gods of them. We must insist that real political discussion take place at all levels of the Party, from the branches to the highest committees. However, our Party is not a debating society; we have to arrive at decisions and then resolutely carry them out. But we can neither formulate sound policies nor carry them out effectively without collective thinking, collective discussion, and collective leadership. Only by applying the sound principles of Leninist democratic-centralism can our Party keep its mistakes to a minimum and develop the clear-thinking unity of action and resolute discipline that are the great strength of Communist parties all over the world.

E. Strengthen the Party's Independent Role: Central to Comrade Browder's revisionism was the constant playing down of the independent role of the Communist Par-This blunting of the political initiative of our Party expressed itself in various forms of tail-ending after the bourgeoisie. This deadly opportunism is to be found in Browder's leadership for at least the past ten years. It has had the effect of facilitating the demagogy of the Trotskyites and Dubinsky Social-Democrats.

Thus, under Browder's leadership, our Party habitually failed to criticize adequately the Roosevelt Administration for its shortcomings and to come forward boldly with its own proposals. In the same spirit of tailism, Browder refused to criticize sharply the reactionary policies of the A. F. of L. Executive Council, except in the most flagrant cases. But the worst instance of all was his attempt to set our Party to tail-ending shamelessly after American finance capital directly, by picturing the National Association of Manufacturers. the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, the American Bankers Association

and other reactionary employers' associations as progressive bodies and as qualified therefore to lead the nation in various branches of its economic and political policy. This example of tailism, which is the very core of the distortion of the Teheran decisions, was the most disgraceful piece of misleadership in the his-

tory of our Party.

Another expression of Comrade Browder's settled policy of minimizing our Party's leading role was his systematic hiding of our light under a bushel. That is, instead of having our Party speaking out boldly under its own name on all political questions, Browder nearly always, in recent years, sought to shove the Party into the background and to surrender the initiative to other organizations. This harmful practice has done much to weaken our prestige among the masses, to surround our Party with a false conspiratorial air, and to hamper the full legalization of our movement.

Still another, and a very deadly form of such playing down of the role of the Party, was Browder's long-continued practice of virtually limiting our Party's activities to mass agitation and of avoiding all mass organization and struggle. Browder has a magic reverence for the spoken word. He is a talker, not a mass fighter. He has had very little experience in, or understanding of, the need to back up the word with action. Especially of recent years has this trend become manifest, as Brow-

der, poisoned by our sickly adulation, developed more and more of an inflated idea of the importance of his speeches. He eventually got to the point where he seemed to believe that all that was necessary in the case of a given issue was for him to make a speech, for the Party to scatter huge quantities of it throughout the country, and all would be well Browder grossly underestimates the importance of mass organization and political struggle, so that it is several years since our Party has organized any real mass movements on its own or by mobilizing its forces to sup port other organizations that were campaigning for the people's rights This long-developing tendency of liquidating the mass organization work of the Party finally reached is climax in the dissolution of the Party and the formation of the C.P.A. II almost exclusively a political education society.

The Party must break sharply with Browder's chronic tailism, his hiding the Party's face, and his avoidance of mass struggle. The Party must recover its political initiative and Communist boldness-even though certain public officials leaders of the A. F. of L. Executive Council and of the N.A.M. may not

like it.

It is good, of course, that many mass organizations now speak out progressively on various questions, and we must do all we can to develop this trend. But this must not be done by pushing the Communist

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Party into the background, into the shadows, where the workers cannot see it in action. Our Party, if it is to be recognized by the masses as their political leader, must speak out quickly and boldly on every important question. Of course, in this sharpening up of the Party's political role we must not fall into the sectarian errors of the past. And, above all, our Party must regain its skill of backing up its spoken word with the most complete possible mobilization of our membership and of the organizations with which we cooperate.

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At the present time we are facing a big task in this respect in the wage movements of the workers, where there is the most urgent need of our helping to organize a broad and active political campaign within the framework of the wartime nostrike pledge. We will face a still greater task in the Congressional elections of 1946, when the reactionaries will make a desperate attempt to capture control of Congress. We must employ all our skill to awaken and mobilize the workers and all democratic forces to beat back the political offensive of reaction.

This is the final point that I want to make under the general head of our tasks in fighting revisionism.

F. Improve the Party's Social Composition: To eliminate Browder's opportunism and to build a strong dike against its future recurrence, the Party must radically improve the social composition of its

membership and of its leadership. We must enlist more and more workers from the basic industries. We must, above all, recruit trade unionists and war veterans and bring them into our leadership. The winning of such members will be facilitated by the Party's present change of line.

The morale of our Party members and sympathizers is now being greatly raised by the Party's new line. They are happy to get from underneath the suffocating cloud of Browder's opportunism and bourgeois revisionism. We should be alert, therefore, to translate this new enthusiasm into a big Party building campaign that will bring many thousands of new members into our Party, particularly in our concentration districts, and that will vastly extend the circulation of the Daily Worker and the rest of our press. The best answer we can make to Comrade Browder and his revisionism will be to enroll many thousands of new members into our Partyworkers from the steel mills, coal miners, automobile plants, railroads, and other key and basic industries.

IV.

### SOME QUESTIONS ANSWERED

Now I come to the last section of my report. The supreme measure of our new policy is its application in practice to the immediate demands and interests of the people.

Only if we have successful practical mass policies and activities can we free ourselves from Browder's revisionism, on the one hand, and avoid the pitfalls of "Left" sectarianism, on the other. As I said at the outset, it is my task in this report to deal almost exclusively with the Party aspect of our work. Our Program of Action will be handled in later reports. Accordingly, I shall not deal here with that vital aspect of our policy. I want to direct my concluding remarks to the correction of some general misconceptions regarding the new political line of

our Party.

The first of these misconceptions is voiced in the argument that Comrade Browder stands for a broad national unity, whereas the new line of the Party tends to narrow down our activities. The reverse is the case. Actually, Comrade Browder's policy, measured in the light of our Party's experience, was definitely cutting down our organization and its mass contacts. Proof of this is the fact that his liquidatory policy was fast taking the vitality out of our Party and throwing it into a serious internal crisis. Thus it was undermining the very foundations of all our work. Besides, Browder's line, with its nonsense about the socalled progressive capitalists voluntarily protecting the workers' interests, was destroying our Party's prestige among the workers and alienating them from us, as was shown in the defeat of Communists in more than one important trade union election in this period.

Many of our Party members found Browder's policy so absurd that they would not even try to apply it in the industries. But a comrade, Freda Werb, of Buffalo, in a discussion atticle showed what happened to comrades who did try to apply the policy in the shops.

Being faced with lay-offs as we were the discussion in the plant naturally wa around what was going to happen it us after we were laid off, and what sort of post-war world we were going to live in. For months I stood there and told everyone who would listen that it the post-war world our purchasing power would be greatly increased, that the capitalists would voluntarily pay is more money because they wanted to have a prosperous post-war world. I may say in passing that many either wouldn't listen, or having listened laughed.

If we had persisted in advancing Browder's no-strike pledge for the post-war period, it would have is lated us in the labor movement. It addition to all this, Browder sweeded in alienating whole section of pro-war liberal forces of the courtry and turning them into a vitriolity opposition to our Party. There is nothing "broad" in a policy that cut the heart out of our Party, that run our prestige among the workers, and violently antagonizes the democratic forces generally.

In contrast to all this, the new

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Party line will build the Party and inspire its members with an incomparably better morale; it will restore our waning standing among the workers, it will lay the basis for real cooperation with all democratic forces, it will lay the basis for the broadest possible democratic coalition.

The second misconception that I want to deal with is now being spread by Browder. It is akin to the foregoing one, and it runs to the effect that Comrade Browder speaks for the whole nation, whereas the Party, with its new line, speaks only for the working class. This, too, is a falsification of realities. Browder is speaking for a nation which he wants to be led by reactionary finance capital. In doing this he is speaking in the interest, not of the nation, but of the big capitalists. Whereas, our Party is speaking for a nation in which only the proletariat can and must be the decisively progressive force. thereby indeed speaks for the whole nation. Thus, in the present fight to maintain their wage rates, our Party holds that the workers are in fact fighting to advance the economic prosperity of the nation by preventing the collapse of their purchasing power and with it a breakdown of the whole industrial machine. We maintain that in all their wage struggles, therefore, the workers should place in the very forefront of their propaganda the fact that by keeping up their wages they are defending most vital economic interests of the entire people. The same principle holds true of the other fields of struggle of the working class. By championing the interests of the proletariat in this broad sense, the Party is indeed speaking in the true interest of the whole nation. The same is true regarding the fight of the Party in behalf of the Negro people, the farmers and the middle classes.

A third erroneous idea now being circulated in the Party by Browder, would have the Party membership believe that whereas Comrade Browder is the champion of Teheran, the Party is now opposed to the Teheran decisions. Nothing could be further from the truth. In reality, Browder, by appeasing American finance capital, is surrendering to the worst enemies of Teheran; whereas our Party, by basing its present policy upon the combined struggle of the democratic forces of the world, is taking the only course by which the great objectives laid down at Teheran can be achieved. Complete victory over fascism can be won in this war: peace can be maintained for a long period of time, and joint steps can be undertaken by the United Nations for world economic rehabilitation. However, the way to these ends is not, as Browder proposes, to turn world leadership over to American finance capital, but through alert struggle by the democratic elements throughout

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world against monopoly capital, especially the most reactionary sections of American finance capital.

The fourth and last false conception that I wish to speak against is the idea being circulated by "Left" sectarian voices in our Party to the effect that the present program of the Party is only transitory, that we are on our way to a much more Left interpretation of the present national and world situation. According to these comrades, we are going to, or should, denounce the war against Japan as imperialist, condemn the decisions of Teheran as unachieveable, drop the slogan of national unity, call for a farmer-labor government, give up our wartime nostrike pledge, abandon the fight for 60,000,000 jobs, bring forward the question of Socialism as an immediate issue, and generally adopt a class-against-class policy.

But these comrades are indulging in wishful thinking. Our Party, if I know it, is not going to take any such Leftist course. For the Party. in its overwhelming majority, understands that Leftist policies of this character would be no less disastrous to us than Browder's Right The line of the Narevisionism. tional Committee's Resolution is the correct one: in its analysis, its formulation of immediate demands, and its placing of the question of Socialism. We must hew to the line of that Resolution, taking into account, of course, necessary amendments. We are not getting rid of

Browder's Right opportunism to fall into a swamp of "Left" sectarianism

Now, in conclusion, let me say that our Party at the present time is passing through one of the most serious crises in all its history. There are those who hope that it will low heavily in membership and will fall into a bitter and destructive factionalism. But such people, whether inside or outside of the Party, will be completely disappointed. The Party is making this crucial tun in decisive unity. There will be m factionalism, nor will our Party to erate any, either from the Right a the "Left." Our Party will emerge from this situation healthy and growing, with its mass contact broadened and strengthened and with its members and leaders refreshed and fortified by a deeper understanding of the great science of Marxism-Leninism.

With the economic conditions of the workers deteriorating and unemployment growing, with the N.A.M., the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other employers' organizations out to weaken or smash the unions, with the combined reactionaries planning an all-out attempt to capture Congress in 1946, and with the Government lacking in adequate response to the workers' needs, ob viously serious economic and political struggles loom in this country. The workers will have to defend as tively their rights, economic stand ards, and unions. The people in general will have to fight for the objectives of Teheran, Yalta and San Francisco. This situation will place great responsibilities upon us Communists. But with our Party rejuvenated and re-invigorated, and playing a vanguard role, we will face these oncoming struggles with Communist confidence and resoluteness.



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## THE RECONSTITU-TION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY\*

By JOHN WILLIAMSON

THE AIM OF THE Constitution Committee has been to make all the necessary changes to bring the Constitution into accord with the principles of a Marxist political party of the working class.

Because of the limited time to prepare this special convention and the need for the convention to center its attention on the correction of our revisionist errors as well as the reorganization of our leadership, it has not been possible to involve the membership in a real discussion on

amending the Constitution.

Similar considerations at this convention make it impossible to present a separate report on the functioning of the organization and the organizational-educational work and tasks confronting the Party. In the course of this report, I will comment briefly on that phase of our work, leaving the discussion of these remarks together with my sub-report to the last National Committee meet-

ing, to the special panel which will hear and discuss a report on further aspects of the proper functioning of our organization.

I would like to make one further remark of an introductory nature. In the preparation for the work of this Convention, the National Board established a preliminary but representative Preamble and Constitution Committee which has devoted considerable effort to revising the Constitution. Your Convention Committee was greatly assisted by this premilinary work and made many additional changes and improvements.

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The proposed recommendations for changes in the Constitution are as follows: First, we propose to add 20 new Sections that deal explicitly with many questions we consider necessary to insure the proper functioning of our Party and especially to guarantee the full participation of the membership in the work of the Party, clearly defining the rights and duties of the members. Secondly. we propose the deletion of three old sections which in our opinion are not in accord with the effective functioning of our organization. Thirdly, we have made additions to five existing sections. And, finally, we have strengthened eight and reformulated three of the existing sections. Each of these, you will note as we go along.

In presenting this report, I will follow the procedure of making extended remarks explaining related Articles, and the Convention will

<sup>\*</sup> Report to the Special Convention of the Communist Political Association, held in New York, July 26-28, 1945, which reconstituted the Communist Party of the United States of America.

then discuss and act on the Sections of these Articles, seriatim.

### NAME AND PURPOSES

The first two Articles dealing with the Name and Purposes are obviously of prime importance. Our Constitution must reflect in the proposed name and purposes the distinguishing character of our organization-namely, that it is the Marxist political party of the working class. As you will note, we definitely propose changing the name of the organization to Communist Party. We recognize that the change of name from Communist Party to Communist Political Association in May 1944 was basically incorrect. We say this, not because a Marxist political party of the working class must at all times have the name "Party." In the circumstances of May, 1944, however, the change of name was fundamentally unsound and incorrect, because it had its origin and motivation in our revisionist policies. Here, for instance, is what Earl Browder gave as the reasons for dissolution:

The Communists foresee that the practical political aims they hold will for a long time be in agreement on all essential points with the aims of a much larger body of non-Communists, and that therefore our political actions will be merged in such larger movements. The existence of a separate political party of Communists, therefore, no longer serves a practical purpose but can be, on the contrary, an obstacle to the

larger unity. (Teheran: Our Path in War and Peace, p. 117.)

This meant destroying the whole concept of the indispensability of the Communist Party as an independent political force. This meant the liquidation of the political and organizational role of the Communists. Precisely because the dissolution of the C.P. symbolized our revisionist errors, we definitely propose returning to the name Communist Party. It is our firm conviction that:

1. The question of re-establishing the name and form of Communist Party is a question of principle connected with the proper role and functioning of the Party. The necessary political and organizational corrections that we must accomplish will definitely be aided by resuming the name Communist Party;

2. It is necessary to resume the name Communist Party to restore the correct Marxist concept and role of a vanguard party of the working class; and, furthermore,

3. It is necessary to complete in all its aspects, including the name, the job we are doing at this Convention, thus leaving no room for further speculation and any "unfinished business."

As to the purposes of our Communist Party. These are outlined with precision in the completely rewritten Preamble, which will be presented later since it is still in the hands of a sub-committee. Let me merely re-

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iterate certain prerequisites of a

Marxist Party.

1. The Party must constitute itself and function as the vanguard of the working class. Some people think that we can fulfill our vanguard role today by merely reflecting and putting into more precise and correct form what the democratic masses are thinking. Obviously, this is not correct. This does not mean giving leadership to the mass movement, for it can only result in tailing behind the mass movement. While we must constantly feel the pulse of the people, and remain an integral part of the mass movement, we can never forget that the Party, as one of the Marxist classics emphasizes, "cannot be a real party if it limits itself to registering what the masses of the working people think or experience. . . ." In fulfilling the vanguard role of the Party, we must be able to project ideas often not yet fully accepted or understood by the masses, and do so in such a convincing and effective manner, that we can influence labor and the people to accept them as their own. We must constantly strive to develop the political understanding and consciousness of the working class. We must at all times maintain an independent position aimed at influencing in the first place the most decisive force within the nation, the working class, while vigilantly criticizing and overcoming hesitations and vacillations within the camp of our allies. In my sub-report to the

National Committee meeting, I outlined a series of independent activities of the Communist Party in the field of public relations, electoral activities and mass campaigns which explain in a practical immediate way how we are to function.

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The correct emphasis we place on the independent role of our Party is not to be interpreted to mean the weakening of our ties with the masses or their organizations. Nor. should it be distorted to mean the breaking of alliances and close work ing relationships with other democratic forces. It should not be interpreted to mean replacing leadership of broad masses with the self-satisfied leadership of a small but advanced group of workers. Fulfilling the independent role of the Party means to strengthen our ties with the masses: for it must be clearly realized that without our contributions and activity, the masses would be left to the influence of all the currents and of non-Marxist counter-currents forces and ideologies. Developing the independent activities of the Communist Party means activating larger numbers of Communists, in volving them more fully in the mass movement and setting in motion ever greater numbers of non-Communists.

In its broader and more fundamental aspects, the essence of the whole concept of a vanguard working class organization is that we be come more and more the Party of the working class, in fact as well

as in program, helping to free the working class of all bourgeois influences and ideologies, strengthening its unity, organization and class consciousness.

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In the past, people always had respect for us as a pioneering organization-a trail blazer-an organization which always raised and defended the needs of the working class while cementing ever closer ties with the whole mass movement. People had respect for us as an organization of action, an organization that got things done. While indinon-Communist might like us to limit our activity to that of political advisers, the masses of the people, and first of all the workers, see in the Communist Party an organization of struggle. That concept must be fully re-established again in the months to come.

2. The second prerequisite for a Communist Party is the mastery of Marxist-Leninist theory. This may appear a truism, yet it was in the name of Marxism that we entered the road of revisionism. During these last eighteen months particularly we fell victim to a superficial understanding of Marxism. We repeated that "Marxism is not a dogma but a guide to action," and that "Marxism needs enriching and developing," but we forgot that to master Marxist-Leninist theory means above all to assimilate its substance. We neglected the substance—and clung to the appearance of the letter. Without the rudder of substance we swam into the revisionism that we discussed and officially acted upon yesterday. In emphasizing that we adhere to the principles of Marxism we should never forget that this means:

a. That we must fight untiringly for the everyday interests of the workers and all other oppressed sections of the population; that we must give consistent leadership to the national struggles of the Negro people and the struggle for the liberation of the victims of U. S. imperialism;

b. That the working class, upon which the Communist Party bases itself, is the bulwark and most consistent champion of democracy, the nation and social progress, and that therefore the organization, unity and independent role of the working class is in the interest of our nation;

c. That while carrying forward all the democratic traditions of our country and the fighting traditions of the working class of all nations, we always keep before the masses the aim of Socialism as the historic solution of the contradiction between the social character of production and the private ownership of economy by a small group of monopolists.

The effort to understand and master Marxism is not just a task for the leadership—but a necessary task of the entire membership. We must achieve the understanding that the higher the political level and the Marxist-Leninist knowledge of our members and cadres, irrespective of

whether they be Party functionaries or active in trade unions, the more effective will be the result of their work and leadership. Let us never forget the emphasis of Lenin that "the role of the vanguard can be fulfilled only by a Party that is guided

by an advanced theory."

However, this is not the first time we have said this, and merely to repeat it, even under the circumstances of today, does not in itself give us the guarantee that our organization will meet this test. To fulfill this objective will require that we break with the historic underestimation of the real significance of Marxist theory within our ranks so crassly demonstrated in the recent past. It will mean, furthermore, that practical measures must be adopted of aiding our membership and leadership in their day-to-day activities to equip themselves with the science of Marxism-Leninism.

I would like to re-emphasize some of the tasks outlined in my report to the National Committee,

especially:

a. The need to outline a still more comprehensive program of various types of schools than originally scheduled for this summer, covering C.P. functionaries, trade union activists, national group leaders and Communist youth. However, it must be understood that the quantitative carrying through of such a program does not by itself meet the essential problem we face. To achieve that absolutely necessary Marxist under-

standing, it is essential that we create a new atmosphere and proceed from the individual to the organized forms of study and schooling.

b. That there be established a fully-equipped educational department in the national office and in the

larger districts.

c. That we overhaul and strengthen the editorial staffs of all our

papers.

d. That we shall organize the most thorough and sustained political struggle against all manifestations of Trotskyism and Social-Democratism in the labor movement.

3. The third prerequisite is that the Communist Party must understand that the determining factor in all our organizational and educational work is to help influence and lead the workers and the people in struggle. Organizational work is not some inner activity, but is directed essentially toward the strengthening of our ability to influence and lead the masses in their activities and struggles. Educational work is not mere study groups, established for the sake of study, but is aimed at equipping our members with the knowledge and experience to know how, in the course of all struggles, to adopt the most effective strategy and tactics, helping the workers themselves to arrive at a correct understanding of the questions involved. Agitational work is the ability to speak, to write, to formulate demands that will rally masses in struggle. Training of cadres is to ceed nized

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make available to the working class the most experienced, tested, trained and loval leaders, so as to have the greatest possible assurance of victory over the enemies of the workers and the people.

4. The fourth prerequisite for a Communist Party is to have firm roots in the working class and to guarantee that industrial workers comprise the majority of its members. Successful leadership and ability to influence the course of our nation require above all that we maintain and greatly extend our ties with the working class, especially in the basic industries. I understand that some people have posed the question somewhat in this manner: under Browder's leadership we became a political force and influenced the life of our nation, but under Foster's leadership we will merely be a sounding board for the working-class sentiments. Obviously this is wrong. Under Browder's leadership, as a result of our liquidationist practices, we becames less an influence in the nation than before, precisely because we weakened our connections with the most important force within our nation-the working class. In actuality, we were influenced by other class forces in the nation. To influence successfully the political life of the nation, the center of gravity of the Communist organization should be in the main cities and especially in the centers of large industry. This means our strongest roots must be among the

industrial workers-particularly in the steel, auto, coal, marine, electrical equipment, shipbuilding, and metal industries. This is not so to-Being slow in recognizing changes in the situation and failing to quickly adjust our slogans and tactical line to new problems and conditions, we many times, even if only temporarily, forfeited leadership to the Reuthers and other radical phrase-mongers. However, the Party has great reserves among the workers of basic industry, and if we work correctly we can win their confidence and re-establish our leadership.

For all of these reasons, I urge you to act favorably upon Articles I and II of our Constituton. It is precisely by this action now that we will be acting upon the expressed will of our membership to change the name of the present organization, the Communist Political Association to the correct name, the Communist Party of the United States of America. I formally move the adoption of these two Articles as amended in the Draft Constitution that is in your hands.

MEMBERS' RIGHTS

AND DUTIES

I propose now to comment on the next two Articles, III and IV. These deal with Membership and the Rights and Duties of Members of the Communist Party. We cannot be satisfied with the correction of our program and policies alone. An understanding of our errors also must reflect itself in a development of Communist consciousness expressed in greater activity, better attendance and larger participation at club meetings, with the membership everywhere helping to hammer out policy and fulfilling our new responsibilities.

Acceptance of program and policies is only the expression of the will to become a Communist. The first condition for carrying out the program is participation of all the members in the daily work of the Party. While recognizing that there can be no equality of service and activity, the Communist Party must strive to have within its ranks only really active members. Every member must find his or her place, however small the contribution, in the overall picture of activity. This of course should not be distorted to mean withdrawing members active in mass organizations for community mass work, important as that may be, or, far less, for some inner club activity. As far as is practical there should be a merging of such activities. Members active in mass organizations must attend their club meetings. Leadership of Party clubs shall be considered of equal importance with leadership in community mass organizations.

While all conditions of membership are equally important, we emphasize at this convetnion "activity" and the new clause "attendance at club meetings," because in the past we incorrectly encouraged the idea of two categories of members—active and supporting members. This was both an expression of liquidationism, a distortion of the high and singular role of Communist leadership, as well as a distortion of democratic centralism.

Attendance at club meetings for all members, and not just 30 per cent as in the past, is indispensable if we are to have an active membership under organized political direction. This also requires that we correct the exclusive emphasis placed on the purely educational activity of the clubs. By developing independent Communist activities side by side with our participation in the broader mass movements of the communities or cities, we will demonstrate that the Communist Party has distinctive qualities which differentiate us from all other organizations with whom we cooperate in fulfilling one or another immediate perspective. We will make clear by what the club says, by what the club does, exactly how the Communist Party differs from other progressive organizations.

It is necessary to comment briefly on other conditions of membership. Take the question of reading our press. If all our members would read the *Daily Worker* each day, we would without exaggeration increase the political effectiveness of the Party in the mass movement several-fold. On the question of dues payments—instead of a 60 per cent dues payment, as we have had

in the C.P.A., reflecting both looseness as well as dissatisfaction with our policies, we must again aim for a 100 per cent dues payment and reach at least an over-all average of over 90 per cent.

#### DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM

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I call your attention to two new Sections—4 and 5. The first re-states, in accord with the principles of democratic centralism, the right of unrestricted discussion in the pre-convention period. Seciton 5 meets a need that we thought should be emphasized, that of involving the membership in the formulation of major policies between conventions, when we do not have the same unrestricted right of reviewing and discussing all our policies and work as in the 60 days prior to conventions.

This does not mean that our present discussion shall, as Comrade Earl Browder implied last evening, continue after the authoritative action of this convention. Our Constitution in later articles correctly restates a traditional Communist concept that the highest authority of the Party is the national convention and that its decisions are binding on every member. Browder's conception that after the participation of our membership in the most thorough-going discussion in our Party's history and after the deliberations of this Convention, that all this has little significance and that the decision will not be rendered here, is, firstly, a reflection on the capacity of our membership and of ourselves as delegates, and, secondly, a crass example of Browder's American exceptionalism—an exceptionalism in the face of the well-established organizational principles of the Communist movement everywhere.

Finally, as regards these two Articles. You will see we have a number of new Sections. Some of these are to clarify more specifically certain obligations of Communist membership, but most of them are an effort to emphasize especially the rights of Party members. As we take up each one separately, the committee will make specific comments.

I therefore want to move the adoption of these two Articles, with the understanding that we take up each Section seriatim.

#### ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS

I propose that we postpone the discussion of Article V until the Convention acts on the question of dues payments. I will now comment on Articles VI, VII, and the new Article VIII.

The structure and functioning of the Communist Party must be considered in connection with the concept of membership which we have already established. The structure must provide the means by which to assure the most effective mobilization of the membership, guarantee adequate opportunity for full membership participation in formulating and hammering out the policies of the organization, develop the necessary membership responsibility for carrying through decisions and tasks, create the conditions for mastering the principles and the program of the organization, and thus enable the Party to fulfill its role

as a vanguard organization.

In recognizing how the revisionist policies we pursued also expressed themselves in the character and functioning of the organization, we must now quickly overcome all Social-Democratic practices and methods that developed during this period and hindered the Communist organization from fulfilling its vanguard role. Our mistake was not in trying to "streamline" or Americanize our organizational form. The decisive thing is the political content of our organization, and that is precisely where our revisionist line had its But organizational foundations. forms are indissolubly bound up with content, and therefore decisive changes in organization must be made simultaneously as we correct our revisionist policies. The proper combination of political content and form will enhance our influence and prestige as an organization of American Communists.

The Community Club shall remain a major and important form of the organization. However, since the size, the practices and the content of the existing clubs have greatly undermined the independent leading role of the Party, weakened the ties with the membership and distorted the Communist concept of the rights,

responsibilities and duties which accompany membership in our organization, immediate steps shall be taken to adapt the organization of the Community Club to the main objective of re-establishing the vanguard role of the Party.

The size of the Community Club shall be greatly reduced to make possible the establishment of more homogeneous and clearly-defined Communist Clubs, clubs which can readily secure a knowledge of their membership and develop greater mobility in carrying through their de-

cisions and tasks.

The establishment of smaller clubs shall not be regarded as a return to the units of years ago. The opening up of club headquarters, the development of more popular forms of bringing the position of the Communist club to the people of the community, is today more essential than ever before. But there is no reason why Community headquarters cannot be maintained under these conditions with a number of clubs utilizing central headquarters, known to the community as the clubrooms of the Party in a given area or town. Furthermore, the public political character of the club must be greatly expanded so as to win the acceptance of the club in the community mass movements. Only a club which speaks out regularly to the people in the community on the burning issues of the day, develops a many-sided activity program which will give leadership to the solution bed the

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of these issues; strengthens as an organization its relationship with other leaders and organizations in the community; reaches the community regularly through forums, leaflets, literature and the *Daily Worker*—can hope to win the respect and confidence of the community and become an accepted participant of the anti-fascist democratic community movement.

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During the past period, the elimination of the shop form of organization has greatly weakened the ties of the C.P.A. with the workers in the basic industries, thereby actually hindering our working-class members from making their maximum contribution to our own organization and the labor movement, influencing negatively our ability to win the labor movement for correct policies. The trend, for the first time in many years, of a decline in the industrial composition of our membership, is due in no small measure to the fact that the shop form of organization was dissolved and the community club did not provide the trade unionists with the necessary guidance for the solution of the complex prob-While we lems they faced daily. must not ignore the consideration which led to the dissolution of the shop form, namely, the strengthening and maintenance of our ties with the progressive forces within the labor movement, we must simultaneously strengthen our organization among the decisive sections of the working class and provide a medium through which the shop workers can be involved in the development of policies that affect the labor movement and our nation. For this reason your committee is firmly convinced that the shop branch shall be reconstituted as a basic form of Communist organization.

In the opinion of your committee, emphasis shall be placed upon the shop and not the industrial form of organization. We say this because the shop form of organization has the advantage of enabling the Communists to influence and raise the working class understanding and consciousness of their fellow-workers with whom they are in constant contact. This is not so in the industrial branch. An industrial branch does not decisively facilitate these objectives. Its members are not able to be in closer and more effective daily contact with masses of work-Of course, the industrial branch may serve the purpose of bringing the Communists of a given industry together to exchange opinions, but that is far from the full role and purposes of a Communist club. Furthermore, shop clubs are one of the keys to concentration in the basic industries. Shop clubs, as distinct from industrial clubs, will also prevent depleting the community club of all its trade union and shop workers, which could only lead to further weakening the effectiveness of the community club as an organization which must react to and defend the needs of the working class within the community. We shall consider establishing shop clubs especially in the large shops in the basic industries where such organization will strengthen the role and activity of the workers, guarantee more effective mobilization of our membership and more consistent growth of our organization, and in industries where the Communist organization is especially weak and must be rapidly strengthened.

With the establishment of smallersized community clubs, many of the main cities and regions will have a larger number of clubs than heretofore. To provide more direct leadership, state organizations shall take under consideration the re-establishment of organizations on a county, Congressional or Assembly district

basis.

To provide a direct link with the membership and help to involve the active members from the clubs in the direct formulation of policies, the state organizations shall give serious consideration to the establishment in the counties or other subdivisions delegated bodies representative of the clubs-County Councils-as the key leading body within the subdivision. Such delegated Councils are not to be viewed as merely functionaries' meetings, which convene at given intervals to listen to a report, but shall become working bodies which have the opportunity of discussing and determining policies with the delegates drawn into committees, and regularly reporting back

to their clubs the problems discussed and decided upon in the Council.

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Because we erred so heavily in neglecting the time-tested Communist principle of democratic centralism, we must emphasize that these principles are embodied in Articles VI and VII. Let me restate briefly our concept of democratic centralism.

Democratic centralism is the method of functioning of the Communist organization which combines the maximum democracy in the shaping of policy and the election of all leadership with sufficient centralization of committee authority to guarantee immediate reaction to problems and speedy mobilization of the entire membership and organization around the fulfillment of key tasks. Democratic centralism thus guarantees that all leading committees are elected by the membership and all basic problems are discussed and shaped by the membership. The elected leadership has the responsibility to report systematically to the membership on the actions and decisions taken by the higher committee. But once decisions are made in the higher committees, these decisions become the line of activity for the membership as a whole.

Centralization with formal democracy can never be successful. The fusion of democracy and centralism can only be achieved on the basis of constant common activity and struggle of the entire membership of the Party, operating through clubs where general policies are discussed and elaborated to meet the specific conditions and problems of that area.

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We recognize the failure of our leadership to provide true democracy in the Party. Equally important, however, was our failure to help the membership equip itself theoretically in our Marxist-Leninist science so that it could most effectively exercise initiative and effectively take part in formulating and executing relicies.

We must be alert to distortions of democratic centralism, whether it be in the form of restating an old I.W.W. syndicalist theory that leaders should not hold office longer than one year, or the pure-and-simple trade union theory that everything must be submitted to a referendum vote before the Party leadership can institute or carry through a policy or campaign. On the other hand, it is not practicing democratic centralism for a State Committee to send out a series of questions to all Clubs on a very vital subject, and expect answers, without indicating the thinking of that leadership as to what the policy on the given subject should be.

Much has already been said about methods of leadership. Suffice it here to emphasize that in the Constitution we place before you we propose that the National Committee shall meet at least three times a year, instead of permitting a lapse of ten months as was the case between our 1944 Convention and the first meeting of the National Committee electing of the National Committee elections.

ted there. Policies shall be worked out in consultation with the key Communists concerned, even if they are not on the Committee. New major policies shall be brought to the membership for discussion. Efforts shall be systematically made to recheck the correctness of policies through the National Committee members having close contact with the members in key shops, basic industries and decisive areas. A committee system of work involving most of the members of the National Committee shall be established. The most important weapon in improving both the policies and the functioning of the membership and leadership of a Communist Party is that of self-criticism. Only an organization of Communists can make skillful use of this important weapon and not injure itself. It is well to recall the experiences of the CPSU on this question as stated in the History of the CPSU:

A party is invincible if it does not fear criticism and self-criticism, if it does not gloss over the mistakes and defects in its work, if it teaches and educates its cadres by drawing the lessons from the mistakes in Party work, and if it knows how to correct its mistakes in time.

A party perishes if it conceals its mistakes, if it glosses over sore problems, if it covers up its shortcomings by pretending that all is well, if it is intolerant of criticism and self-criticism, if it gives way to self-complacency and vainglory and if it rests on its laurels.

Many of us, including myself, who used to know and use effectively the weapon of self-criticism, began to commit precisely the things warned against in this quotation. I think the entire Party will watch carefully every leader to see that his future actions square with his words.

Let me call your attention to a different concept of officers proposed in this amended Constitution. The old Constitution provided for the election of officers by the State and National Conventions. We propose that the State Committees and the National Committee shall elect not only their Executive Board but all the officers they deem necessary. The Constitution indicates by name only the post of Chairman, leaving the balance of officers to be decided upon by the National Committee and each State Committee, although it is clear that several secretaries and a treasurer will be needed in every case.

This concept of leadership emphasized that the authority rests in committees and not in individuals. It builds upon the premise of the collective, rather than the individual officers. It makes the officers responsible to the committee, with the committee having authority to change officers without waiting for a convention. This works out for a greater democratic practice. It is the practice in all other Communist Parties.

Lastly, we have added a new Article entitled National Review Commission. Section I of that article thus explains its purpose:

In order to strengthen, as well as review, the integrity and resoluteness of our cadres, to guard against violations of Party principles, to maintain and strengthen discipline, to supervise the audits of the financial books and records of the National Committee of the Party, the National Convention shall elect a National Review Commission.

Suffice it to add that during this past period when there was great looseness in organizational concepts and functioning, there was also a complete dulling of all vigilance Numerous problems exist or have arisen, that have never been followed through. With proper alertness, serious consequences could be averted by preventative methods. It is for these and other reasons outlined that we urge favorable action on this new Article. With these remarks I would like to move approval of Articles VI. VII and VIII after we act on each section seriatim.

## THE NEED FOR A CONSISTENT CONCENTRATION POLICY

Before voting on the final motion to accept the Constitution as a whole as amended, I would like to make some extended concluding remarks. The Constitution we have agreed upon article by article is a correct Marxist document. But the key to fulfilling our Communist responsibility to the working class and the nation is not only in correct policy but in our ability to carry out this correct policy. This is where we must

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I would like to emphasize in this connection that the war against militarist Japan which must be vigorously prosecuted in order completely to smash Japanese imperialism and assist the liberation movements of the peoples in Asia, together with the accompanying political struggle against reaction at home, emphasizes the tasks before our Party. To make the American working class conscious of its role as the best defender of the interests of the nation and all the working people, and to prepare it to assert its independent organized power, is not only the central task of our Party today but a possibility which can be fulfilled in life itself. To achieve this objective, there are certain things that particularly stand out and need attention:

1. Despite our larger membership today, we are not always as effective as we should be because of the lack of political understanding among sections of our membership and the less effective functioning of our Clubs.

2. We have had a decline in our industrial and trade union composition for the first time in 6 years. In only 7 districts have we a slight majority of industrial workers. In only one district—Michigan—have we a majority of our members from basic industries.

3. During this past year, progressive workers, including Communists,

have suffered certain losses of influence among important local groups of organized workers in a number of industries. While this can be balanced by certain successes, the overall picture is unsatisfactory.

 Our press circulation among workers in basic industries is far from satisfactory.

5. As part of our entire revisionist line with its liquidationist tendencies, we have committed the most serious crime against the workers of the South-first of all the Negro workers and people-in the complete liquidation of the Communist movement, both in name and concept. This action in the South can be understood and dealt with only as part of our entire policy. The difference is one of degree. In the South we dropped the name Communist with the political act of dissolution of the Party and did not even retain the organizational forms of the Communist movement. This was discussed and decided upon by the former National Board. It was thereafter discussed at a meeting of Southern delegates after the C.P.A. convention. For this action in the South the National Board as a whole is responsible, as it was for the entire wrong policy. The educational and press associations of Southern Marxists that were substituted could never fulfill the role of a Communist movement, but we now hear that some of them capitulated almost completely to many reactionary white chauvinist practices of the South in day-to-day functioning. Clearly, we must correct this grave mistake at this convention and adopt special measures by the incoming Board that will immediately guarantee the reconstitution of the Communist Party in every Southern state.

In analyzing our tasks in the light of these circumstances we must always keep in mind two factors-the tremendous growth of the trade union movement-but also the influx of non-working class elements into industry during the war that has created many problems still unsolved for the growing trade union movement. While labor, in pursuing its own independent line, will be in a better position to establish democratic unity of all anti-fascist and democratic forces, we Communists, while noting this, must simultaneously help the working class to stand on its own feet politically and free itself from the influence of the monopolies and their ideologists.

We Communists must adopt a program of concentration tasks as part of that necessary fixed course from which we must not deviate.

This means:

1. To help organize the influence of the working class and its organizations for speeding victory over militarist Japan, for maintaining unity of the Big Three on the basis of the Teheran and Yalta agreements, for rooting out all fascist and reactionary influence at home, for defeating all provocations of employers aimed at breaking the unity

and organization of labor, and for stimulating the organization of the unorganized. Therefore, we must concentrate all Party work in such a manner as to have our strongest roots and decisive membership and influence among the workers in the basic industries and large shops.

2. We must activate the maximum number of Communists in these concentration areas, among the masses and in workers' organizations. To achieve this, we shall shift forces, including key national forces, into the leadership of concentration dis-

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tricts and areas.

3. We must understand the specific problems confronting the Negro people with the beginning of postwar reconversion, and the resulting ferment and moods of struggle amongst the Negro people. To meet this problem, the Party must, as part of the concentration policy, direct sustained attention to this problem and give greater attention to training working-class Negro Communist cadres.

4. That this Convention shall decide, in consultation with our Scuthern friends, immediately to rebuild the Communist Party in the South, especially in the industrial areas.

5. We must, as part of this concentration, work out special plans for concentration amongst Italian and Polish-Americans in the basic industries.

#### TASKS OF CONCENTRATION

Clearly, every district must adopt a policy of concentration "ork. This applies no less to New York than to Michigan.

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What does concentration signify for us under present-day conditions? It means:

- To strive to influence all mass organizations to root themselves among the basic workers.
- 2. To direct our work in such a manner as to guarantee that all industrial districts, particularly New York, California and Eastern Pennsylvania, shall have a membership whose majority is industrial workers. That Michigan, Illinois and Ohio shall aim at 75 per cent industrial workers.
- 3. To give a hundred times greater attention by the Party Committees, as far as speakers, literature, organizers and press are concerned, to the so-called small industrial towns, such as McKeesport, Schenectady, Youngstown, Akron, Flint, Gary, and towns in the Anthracite and West Virginia.

4. To mobilize the entire Party membership to direct its work in such a way as to be conscious at all times of the need to strengthen our position in basic industries.

5. To concentrate on increasing the circulation of the *Daily Worker* and *The Worker* among the workers in all concentration industries, districts and areas, and to speed the issuance of editions of *The Worker* in Illinois, Michigan and Ohio.

6. To center our cadre policy upon developing and promoting Party leadership from among the most promising active members in the concentration industries and shops.

Let us declare with resoluteness that this course of concentration will be adhered to, no matter what obstacles may confront us. In fact this is the only course that will carry us through all storms.

With this I propose that the Convention vote approval of the Constitution in its entirety as amended.

# PRESENT SITUATION AND THE NEXT TASKS

RESOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U.S.A., ADOPTED JULY 28, 1945.

#### PART I

I.

The military defeat of Nazi Germany is a great historic victory for world democracy, for all mankind. This epochal triumph was brought about by the concerted action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition—by the decisive blows of the Red Army, by the American-British offensives, and by the heroic struggle of the resistance movements. This victory opens the way for the complete destruction of fascism in Europe and weakens the forces of reaction and fascism everywhere. It has already brought forth a new anti-fascist unity of the peoples in Europe marked by the formation in a number of countries of democratic governments representative of the will of the people and by the labor-progressive election victory in Great Britain.

The crushing of Hitler Germany has also created the conditions for the complete defeat and destruction of fascist Japanese imperialism. The winning of complete victory in this just war of national liberation is the first prerequisite for obtaining peace and security in the Far East, for the democratic unification of China as a free and independent nation, and for the attainment of national independence by the peoples of Indonesia, Indo-China, Burma, Korea, Formosa, the Philippines and India. The smashing of fascist-militarist Japan is likewise essential to help guarantee the efforts of the United Nations to build a durable peace.

All these crucial objectives are of vital importance to the national interests of the American people, to the struggle for the complete destruction of fascism everywhere. Now with the defeat of Nazi Germany and the Axis, the possibility of realizing an enduring peace and of making new democratic advances and social progress has been opened up for the peoples by the weakening of reaction and fascism on a world scale and the consc-

quent strengthening of the world-wide democratic forces.

2.

However, a sharp and sustained struggle must still be conducted to realize these possibilities. This is so because the economic and social roots

of fascism in Europe have not yet been fully destroyed. This is so because the extremely powerful reactionary forces in the United States and England, which are centered in the trusts and cartels, are striving to reconstruct liberated Europe on a reactionary basis. Moreover, this is so because the most aggressive circles of American imperialism are endeavoring to secure for themselves political and economic domination in the world.

The dominant sections of American finance capital supported the war against Nazi Germany, not because of hatred for fascism or a desire to liberate suffering Europe from the heel of Nazi depotism, but because it recognized in Hitler Germany a dangerous imperialist rival determined to rule the world. From the very inception of the struggle against fascism, American finance capital feared the democratic consequences of defeating Hitler Germany.

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This explains why the monopolists opposed the concept of collective security in the days when the war still could have been prevented and instead chose the Munich policy which inevitably led to war. Later, even after the anti-Hitler coalition was forged, the forces of big capital who supported the war continued to hesitate and delay, to make vital concessions to the worst enemies of American and world democracy—to the sworn foes of the Soviet Union and to the bosom pals of Hitlerism. That is why American capitalism gave aid to Franco Spain; why it preferred to support the Petains and Darlans and the reactionary governments in exile as against the heroic resistance movements of the people. And that is also why it hoped that the Soviet Union would be bled on the battlefieds of Europe and why it tried to hold off the opening of the Second Front until the last possible moment.

Only when these policies proved to be bankrupt, meeting growing opposition from the ranks of the people, from the millions of patriotic Americans fighting in our heroic armed forces and working in war production; only when it became obvious that the Soviet Union was emerging from the war stronger and more influential than ever precisely because of its valiant and triumphant all-out war against Nazism, did American capital reluctantly and belatedly move toward the establishment of a concerted military strategy and closer unity among the Big Three.

Now that the war against Hitler Germany has been won, the American economic royalists, like their British Tory counterparts, are alarmed at the strengthened positions of world labor, at the democratic advances in Europe and at the upsurge of the national liberation movements in the colonial and dependent countries. Therefore, they seek to halt the march of democracy, to curb the strength of labor and the people. They want to save the remnants of fascism in Germany and the rest of Europe. They are trying to organize

a new cordon sanitaire against the Soviet Union, which bore the main brunt of the war against the Nazis, and which is the staunchest champion

of national freedom, democracy and world peace.

This growing reactionary opposition to a truly democratic and anti-fascist Europe, in which the people will have the right to choose freely their own forms of government and social system, has been reflected in many of the recent actions of the State Department. This explains why, at San Francisco, Stettinius and Connally joined hands with Vandenberg—the spokesman for Hoover and the most predatory sections of American finance capital. This explains the seating of fascist Argentina as well as the aid given to the profascist forces of Latin-America; the British-American reluctance to live up to the Yalta accord on Poland; the American delegation's refusal to join with the Soviet Union in pledging the right of national independence for mandated territories and colonies and to give official recognition to the representatives of the World Labor Congress.

These facts reflect the current shift of hitherto win-the-war sections of American capital to closer political collaboration with the most reactionary

and aggressively imperialist groupings of monopoly capital.

It is this reactionary position of American big business which explains why powerful circles in Washington and also London are pursuing the dangerous policy of trying to prevent a strong, united and democratic China; why they bolster up the reactionary, incompetent Chiang Kai-shek regime and why they harbor the idea of a compromise peace with the Mikado in the hope of maintaining Japan as a reactionary bulwark in the Far East. It accounts, too, for the renewed campaign of anti-Soviet slander and incitement calculated to undermine American-Soviet friendship and cooperation.

On the home front the big trusts and monopolies are blocking the development of a satisfactory program to meet the human needs of reconversion, of the problems of economic dislocations and severe unemployment, which is beginning to take place and will become more acute after the defeat of Japan. Reactionary forces—especially the NAM and their representatives in government and Congress—are beginning a new open-shop drive to smash the trade unions. They also endeavor to rob the Negro people of their wartime gains. They are trying to prevent the adoption of governmental measures which must be enacted at once if our country is to avoid the most acute consequences of the trying reconversion period and the cyclical economic crisis which is bound to arise after the war. Likewise, they are vigorously preparing to win a reactionary victory in the crucial 1946 elections.

Already the reactionaries are using the increased cutbacks to lower wages and living standards and to provoke strikes in war industry. They are obstructing the enactment of necessary emergency measures for federal and state unemployment insurance. They are sponsoring vicious anti-labor legislation, such as the new Ball-Burton-Hatch labor relations bill, and are blocking the passage of the FEPC and anti-polltax bills. They are trying to scuttle effective price and rent control and to exempt the wealthy and the big corporations from essential tax legislation. They are endeavoring to place the entire cost of the war and the difficulties of reconversion upon the shoulders of the working people.

If the reactionary policies and forces of monopoly capital are not checked and defeated, America and the world will be confronted with new aggressions and wars and the growth of reaction and fascism in the United States.

3.

However, the conditions and forces exist to defeat this reactionary threat and to enable our country to play a more progressive role in world affairs in accord with the true national interests of the American people. For one thing, the military defeat of Nazi Germany has changed the relationship of world forces in favor of democracy. It has enhanced the role and influence of the Land of Socialism. It is bringing into being a new, democratic Europe. It has strengthened those forces in our country and elsewhere which seek to maintain and consolidate the friendship and cooperation of the United States and the Soviet Union—a unity which must now be extended and reinforced if a durable peace is to be secured.

This is evidenced by the fact that the overwhelming majority of the American people, and in the first place the labor movement, which has grown in strength and maturity, is opposed to reaction and fascism, and supports the foreign and domestic policies of the late President Roosevelt as embodied in the decisions of Crimea and in the main features of the Second

Bill of Rights.

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This is demonstrated by the great mass support for the San Francisco Charter and by the determination of the American people to guarantee that the United Nations security organization shall fulfill its historic objectives—that the amity and unity of action of the American-Soviet-British coalition shall be consolidated in support of the agreements of Teheran, Crimea and Potsdam, shall be strengthened in the postwar period and made more solid and effective, in order to prevent or check the recurrence of new aggressions and wars.

This majority of the American people must now speak out and assert its collective strength and will. The united power of labor and of all democratic forces, welded in a firm anti-fascist national unity, must express itself in a decisive fashion so as to influence the course of the nation in a progressive direction.

It is imperative that the American people insist that the Truman Administration carry forward the policies of the Roosevelt-labor-democratic coalition for American-Soviet friendship; for the vital social aims of the economic bill of rights; for civil liberties; for the rights of the Negro people; and for collective bargaining. It is equally necessary that labor and the people sharply criticize all hesitations to apply these policies and vigorously oppose any concessions to the reactionaries by the Truman Administration, which is tending to make certain concessions under the increasing pressure

of the reactionary imperialist combination led by the monopolies.

The Truman Administration, like the Roosevelt government from which it is developing, continues to receive the support of the Rooseveltlabor-democratic coalition, and responds to various class pressures. While it seeks to maintain contact and cooperative relations with labor and the more democratic forces of the coalition, its general orientation in both domestic and foreign policies tends, on some vital questions, to move away from the more consistent democratic forces in the coalition and tries to conciliate certain reactionaries. Hence, it is of central importance to build systematically the political strength and influence of labor, the Negro people, and all true democratic forces within the general coalition for the strggue against imperialist reaction, for combatting and checking all tendencies and groupings in the coalition willing to make concessions to reaction. The camp of reaction must not be appeased. It must be isolated and routed.

Toward this end it is necessary, as never before, to strengthen decisively the democratic unity of the nation, to create that kind of national unity for the postwar period which will be able to facilitate the destruction of fascism abroad and to prevent fascism from coming to power in the United States. Therefore, it is essential to weld together and consolidate the broadest coalition of all anti-fascist and democratic forces as well as all other supporters of

Roosevelt's anti-Axis policies.

To forge this democratic coalition most effectively and to enable it to exercise decisive influence upon the affairs of the nation, it is essential that the working class-especially the progressive labor movement and the Communists-strengthen its independent role and activities and display far greater political and organizing initiative. It is imperative that maximum unity of action be developed among the CIO, the AFL and the Railroad Brotherhoods and that their full participation in the New World Federation of Trade Unions be achieved. It is necessary to rally and imbue the membership and lower officials of the AFL with confidence in their ability to fight against and defeat the reactionary policies and leadership typified by the Greens, Wolls, Hutchinsons and Dubinskys.

While cooperating with the patriotic and democratic forces from all

walks of life, labor must, in the first place, strengthen its ties with the veterans, the working farmers, the Negro people, youth, women, intellectuals and small business men, and with their democratic organizations. At the same time, while forging the progressive unity of the nation, labor should cooperate with those capitalist groupings and elements who, for one or another reason, objectively at times, promote democratic aims. But in so doing, labor must depend first of all upon its own strength and unity and upon its alliance with the true democratic and anti-fascist forces of the nation.

The current war and postwar needs of the working class and the nation, including the adoption of an effective reconversion program and the maintenance of workers' living standards, also demand the initiation of large scale mass campaigns to organize the millions of still unorganized workers. This is imperative if organized labor is to achieve its full strength and fulfill its role as the leading democratic force of the nation.

In the vital struggle to crush feudal-fascist-militaristic Japan it is necessary that American labor reaffirm its no-strike pledge and give the necessary leadership to mobilize the people for carrying the war through to final victory and for national liberation aims. In so doing labor must collaborate in the prosecution of the anti-Japanese war with all democratic forces who

favor and support complete victory over Japanese imperialism.

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However, labor and the other anti-fascist forces must take cognizance of the fact that amongst those big business circles who desire military victory over Japan, there are influential forces, including some in the State Department, who are seeking a compromise peace which will preserve the power of the Mikado after the war, at the expense of China and the other Far Eastern peoples, and directed against the Soviet Union. Similarly, there are powerful capitalist groupings including many in Administration circles, who plan to use the coming defeat of Japan for imperialist aims, for maintaining a reactionary puppet Kuomintang regime in China, for obtaining American imperialist domination in the Far East.

Labor and the people should and will continue to do all in their power to hasten complete victory over Japanese militarism and fascism. And to do this, labor and the popular forces must fight for and rally the people for a consistent anti-fascist and an anti-imperialist policy, and must rely, first of all, upon the people and their democratic organizations and aspirations.

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To achieve the widest democratic coalition and the most effective antifascist unity of the nation, it is vital that labor vigorously champion a program of action that will promote the complete destruction of fascism, speed victory over Japanese imperialism, curb the powers of the trusts and monopolies, and thereby advance the economic welfare of the people and protect and extend American democracy.

In the opinion of the Communist Party such a program should be based

on the following slogans of action:

I. Speed the defeat of fascist-militarist Japan!

Prosecute the war against Japan resolutely to unconditional surrender. Rout and defeat the advocates of a compromise peace with the Japanese imperialists and war lords. Curb those who seek American imperialist control in the Far East.

Strengthen United Nations cooperation to guarantee postwar peace in the Pacific and the world and to ensure a free democratic Asia with the right of national independence for all colonial and dependent peoples.

Press for a united and free China based upon the unity of the Communists and all other democratic and anti-Japanese forces so as to speed victory. Give full military aid to the Chinese guerillas led by the heroic Eighth and Fourth armies.

Continue uninterrupted war production and uphold labor's no-strike

pledge for the duration. Stop employer provocations.

II. Complete the destruction of fascism and build a durable peace!

Cement American-Soviet friendship and unity to promote an enduring peace and to carry through the destruction of fascism.

Carry out in full the decisions made by the Big Three at Teheran,

Crimea and Potsdam.

Punish the war guilty without further delay including the German and Japanese staffs and monopolists. Death to all fascist war criminals. Make Germany and Japan pay full reparations.

Strengthen the World Labor Congress as the backbone of the unity of the peoples and the free nations. Admit the World Labor Congress to the Economic and Social Council of the World Security Organization.

Support the San Francisco Charter for an effective international se-

curity organization, based upon the unity of the Big Three.

Guarantee to all peoples the right to determine freely their own destiny and to establish their own democratic form of government. Put an end to Anglo-American political and military intervention against the peoples, such as in Greece, Belgium and Italy. Admit Italy to the ranks of the United Nations.

Grant the right of self-determination to Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Support the Puerto Rican and Filipino peoples in their demand for immediate and complete independence. Break diplomatic relations with fascist Spain and Argentina. Full support to the democratic forces fighting to reestablish the Spanish Republic. Support the struggles of the Latin American peoples for national sovereignty and against the encroachments of American and British imperialism.

Remove from the State Department all pro-fascist and reactionary offi-

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Help feed and reconstruct starving and war-torn Europe. Reject the Hoover program based on reactionary financial mortgages, and political interference.

Use the Bretton Woods Agreement in the interests of the United Nations to promote international economic cooperation and expanding world trade. Grant extensive long term loans and credits, at low interest rates, for purposes of reconstruction and industrialization. Expose and combat all efforts of monopoly capital to convert such financial aid into means of extending imperialist control in these countries.

III. Push the Fight for Sixty Million Jobs-Meet the Human Needs of Reconversion!

Make the right to work and the democratic aims of the Second Bill of Rights the law of the land. Support the Murray Full Employment Bill.

Increase purchasing power to promote maximum employment. No

reduction in weekly take-home pay when overtime is eliminated.

Revise the Little Steel Formula to increase wages so as to meet the rise in the cost of living. Pass the Pepper 65-cent Minimum Hourly Wage Bill. Support the Seamen's Bill of Rights, H. R. 2346. Defend the wartime gains of the Negro workers in industry.

Establish the guaranteed annual wage in industry.

Establish a shorter work week except where this would hamper war

production.

Enforce the right to work and to equality in job status for women. Guarantee the exercise of this right by adequate training, upgrading, seniority rights, as well as by providing day nurseries and child-care centers to aid all working mothers. Safeguard and extend existing social legislation for women, as workers and mothers, and abolish all discriminatory legislation against women.

Support President Truman's proposals for emergency federal legislation to extend and supplement present unemployment insurance benefits as a necessary first tep to cope with the current large-scale cutbacks and layoffs. Start unemployment insurance payments promptly upon loss of job and continue until new employment is found. Provide adequate sev-

erance pay for laid-off workers.

Prevent growing unemployment during the reconversion and postwar period by starting large-scale federal, state, municipal and local public works programs—(rural and urban)—slum clearance, low rental housing developments, rural electrification, waterway projects (such as the St. Lawrence and the Missouri Valley), the building of new schools, hospitals, roads, etc.

No scrapping of government-owned industrial plants. Guarantee the operation of these plants, at full capacity for peacetime purposes.

Establish public ownership of the munitions, power and utility in-

dustries to place them under democratic control.

Support all measures for full farm production. Defeat the advocates of scarcity. Extend and strengthen the farm price support program. Establish low-cost credit and adequate crop insurance. Safeguard the family-sized farms. Help tenant farmers to become owners. End the semi-feudal sharecropping system in the South.

Maintain and rigidly enforce rent and price control and rationing. Strengthen the law enforcement powers of the OPA. Smash the black

market.

Prosecute the war profiteers. No reduction or refunds in corporate, excess profit and income taxes for the millionaires and big corporations. Lower taxes for those least able to pay.

Pass the Wagner-Murray-Dingell social security bill.

IV. Keep Faith With the Men Who Fight for Victory!

Raise substantially dependency allotments to families and relatives of men in the Armed Forces.

Extend and improve the system of democratic orientation and discussion in the Armed Forces. Draw more personnel from labor's ranks into orientation work. Eliminate all anti-labor and anti-democratic material and teachings from the education services conducted in the Armed Forces.

Guarantee jobs, opportunity and security for all returning veterans and

war workers, regardless of race, creed or color.

Extend the scope and benefit of the GI Bill of Rights and eliminate all red tape from the Veterans' Administration. Guarantee adequate medical care to every veteran.

Press for the speedy enactment of legislation providing for substantial demobilization pay, based on length and character of service, and financed by taxes on higher personal and corporate incomes.

Insure full benefits of all veterans' legislation to Negro veterans.

V. Safeguard and Extend Democracy!

Enforce equal rights for every American citizen regardless of race, color, creed, sex, political affiliation or national origin.

End Jimcrow. Establish a permanent FEPC on State and National scales. Abolish the poll-tax and the white primary. End every form of discrimination in the Armed Forces. Protect the rights of the foreign-born.

Outlaw anti-Semitism, one of the most pernicious and damaging of fascism's ideological weapons. Support the just demands of the Jewish people for the immediate abrogation by the British government of the imperialist White Paper. Support the upbuilding of a Jewish National Home in a free and democratic Palestine in collaboration with the Arab people, on the basis of the agreement of the Big Three in the Near East.

Protect and extend labor's rights, especially the right to organize, strike and bargain collectively. Repeal all anti-labor laws such as the Smith-Connally Act. Defeat the Ball-Burton-Hatch anti-labor bill.

Outlaw and prohibit all fascist organizations and activities and every form of racial and religious bigotry.

Rescind all anti-Communist legislation.

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Curb the powers and policies of the monopolies and trusts which jeopardize the national welfare and world peace. Prosecute and punish all violations of the anti-trust laws. Demand government dissolution of all monopolies and trusts found guilty of attempting to restore the Anglo-German-American cartel system. Revoke their patent rights and prosecute their officials. Enact new legislation subjecting the monopolies to a greater measure of public control with labor, farm and small business representation on all government bodies exercising such supervision.

Protect and extend federal aid to small business.

VI. Safeguard the Future of America's Youth!

Guarantee full and equal opportunity for education and jobs for all vouth.

Establish an adequate program of training and retraining in new and higher skills during the period of reconversion.

Fix adequate minimum wage standards and guarantee equal pay for equal work to young men and women workers.

Reestablish and strengthen minimum working standards for working minors which have been relaxed during the war. Abolish child labor.

Pass legislation for adequate federal aid to schools and students especially in the South. Establish full and equal opportunity for schooling, including college education. Guarantee full academic freedom.

Enact federal legislation to safeguard the health and well-being of the youth. Develop adequate recreational, cultural and social programs for democratic citizenship in schools and communities as a means to prevent juvenile delinquency.

Establish the right to vote at 18 by State legislation.

Establish a federal government agency, including representation of youth and labor, to develop and coordinate planning to meet the nation's responsibility to youth.

Adopt special safeguards for guaranteeing education, vocational train-

ing and job opportunities for Negro youth.

. . .

This program meets the most urgent immediate interests of the American people and nation. It is a program of action around which all progressive Americans can unite today. It is a program of action which will advance the struggle for the moral and political defeat of fascism, leading to its final destruction and eradication. It will help create the conditions and guarantees for a stable peace and for a larger measure of economic security and democratic liberties for the masses of the people. The antifascist and democratic forces of our nation, being the overwhelming majority of our people, can become strong enough to check and defeat imperialist reaction and to realize the great objectives of this program of action.

As class-conscious American workers, as Marxists, we Communists will do all in our power to help the American working class and its allies to fight for and realize this program. At the same time we will systematically explain to the people that substantial gains for the masses secured under capitalism are inevitably precarious, unstable and only partial and that Socialism alone can finally and completely abolish the social evils of capitalist society, including economic insecurity, unemployment and the danger of fascism and war.

However, this program of action will help the working class and the people as a whole to meet their urgent immediate practical needs, enhancing generally their strength and influence in the nation. In the struggle for the program for peace and democracy, jobs and security, favorable conditions are created for the masses of our people to recognize, on the basis of their own experiences, the need for the eventual reorganization of society along socialist lines.

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We shall assist this process by every available educational means, taking full cognizance of the growing interest of the American people and its working class in the historic experiences of the Soviet people in the building of a new socialist society, which has played the decisive role in the defeat of Hitler Germany and the Axis. We shall aim to convince the broad masses that the eventual elimination of the profit system and the establishment of Socialism in the United States will usher in a new and higher type of democracy and a free road to unlimited and stable social progress because it

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will end exploitation of man by man and nation by nation, through the establishment of a society without oppression and exploitation.

While not yet accepting Socialism as an ultimate goal, the American people today agree that fascism must be destroyed, wherever it exists or wherever it raises its head. The American people are ready to protect and extend the Bill of Rights and all democratic liberties. They are determined to fight for greater peace and democracy, for the right to work, greater job and social security.

Therefore, Communists and non-Communists, all progressives and antifascists can be rallied in support of the above program of immediate action. For this program meets the immediate desires of the American people upon which the majority can unite today to prevent the rise of fascism and to assure victory in the 1945 municipal elections and in the fateful 1946 congressional elections which must be organized and prepared for now. This is a program which must be championed in every factory and industry, in every community and state, through the medium of labor's political action; through labor's joint and parallel action locally, and through broad shop steward conferences and united community movements, as well as through other broad united peoples and democratic front activities.

#### PART II

5.

The foregoing program demands a resolute struggle. The reactionaries will seek desperately to divide the ranks of the people, to pit one group against the other—veterans and farmers against labor, Gentile against Jew, white against Negro, Protestant against Catholic, A. F. of L. against C.I.O. They will strive to break the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition and foment bitter class, racial, partisan and sectional strife. For these purposes they will use Hitler's secret weapon of "white supremacy" and anti-Communism, and make maximum use of the David Dubinsky and Norman Thomas Social-Democrats, the Trotskyites, as well as the John L. Lewises and Matthew Wolls.

To meet this situation the people need a great strengthening of every one of their progressive organizations and particularly the organizations of labor—the trade unions. They need loyal, courageous and honest leadership, men and women who combine clarity of vision with the qualities of firmness in principle and flexibility in tactics. Above all, they require a larger, stronger, more influential and more effective mass Communist Party.

The Communists have a greater responsibility to labor and the nation

than at any other time in their history. And these greater responsibilities can be fulfilled by us with honor because of our long record of devotion and service to the cause of the working class and the people, and by our adherence to the scientific principles of Marxism-Leninism.

The American Communist movement confidently faces the future. We are proud of our consistent and heroic struggle against reaction and fascism over the years. We draw strength from and are particularly proud of our efforts to promote victory over Nazi barbarism and Japanese imperialism.

On the field of battle and on the home front, we Communists have been in the forefront of the fight to defend our country and our people. In the struggle for the establishment of the anti-Hitlerite coalition, for the opening of the Second Front, for defeating fascist-militarist Japan, for national unity, for the re-election of Roosevelt, for the rights of the Negro people, for building a strong and progressive labor movement, for uninterrupted war production and for the attainment of international trade union unity—the contributions of the Communists have been vital and second to none.

6.

We recognize that the future of the labor and progressive movements and therefore the role of the United States in world affairs will depend to no small extent upon the correctness of our Communist policy, our independent role and influence, our mass activities and organized strength.

That is why today we Communists must not only learn from our achievements in the struggle against fascism and reaction, but also from our weaknesses and errors. In the recent period, especially since January, 1944, these mistakes consisted in drawing a number of erroneous conclusions from the historic significance of the Teheran accord. Among these false conclusions was the concept that after the military defeat of Germany, the decisive sections of big capital would participate in the struggle to complete the destruction of fascism and would cooperate with the working people in the maintenance of postwar national unity. The reactionary class nature of finance capital makes these conclusions illusory. This has been amply demonstrated by recent events revealing the postwar aims of the trusts and cartels which seek imperialist aggrandizement and huge profits at the expense of the people.

This revision of Maxist-Leninist theory regarding the role of monopoly capital led to other erroneous conclusions, such as to utopian economic perspectives and the possibility of achieving the national liberation of the colonial and dependent countries through arrangements between the great powers. It also led to tendencies to obscure the class nature of bourgeois democracy, to false concepts of social evolution, to revision of the fundamental laws of the class struggle and to minimizing the inde-

pendent and leading role of the working class.

In consequence, we Communists began to carry on the historic struggle against fascism, for democracy and national freedom, in a way that was not always clearly distinguishable from that of bourgeois democrats and bourgeois nationalists, forgetting the class character and limitations of bourgeois democracy and nationalism. Finally, this right-opportunist deviation also tended to ignore, revise or virtually discount the fundamental contradictions of capitalism, declaring wrongly that the changed and changing forms of their expression indicated that they had ceased to operate in the period of the general crisis of capitalism.

Furthermore, the dissolution of the Communist Party and the formation of the Communist Political Association were part and parcel of our revisionist errors, and did in fact constitute the liquidation of the independent and vanguard role of the Communist movement. As a consequence, our base among the industrial workers was seriously weakened. This further resulted in a general weakening of Communist activities and in adversely affecting the role and policies of other Marxist parties in the Western Hemisphere. Far from aiding the carrying out of such correct policy as support for Roosevelt's re-election, the dissolution of the Communist Party weakened the democratic coalition because it weakened the initiative, strength and contributions of the Communist vanguard.

A flagrant expression of this liquidation was the abolition of the Communist organization in the South through its transformation into non-Communist, anti-fascist organizations. This action undermined the foundation for consistent and effective struggle for the needs and aspirations of the masses of the South, especially the Negro people. This glaring example of the logical outcome of our revisionist errors reveals the direction in which our policy was leading. The dissolution of the Communist Party of America and the formation of the C.P.A. was in fact the liquidation of the inde-

pendent Marxist Party of the working class.

The correction of our revisionist errors demands the immediate reconstitution of the Communist Party and guaranteeing the re-establishment of

the Marxist content of its program, policies and activities.

The source of our past revisionist errors must be traced to the ever active pressure of bourgeois ideology and influences upon the working class. The failure on our part to be vigilant and to conduct a sustained struggle against these bourgeois and petty-bourgeois influences permitted their infiltration into our own ranks and sapped our proletarian vitality. One of the most harmful and far reaching consequences of this bourgeois

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of a system of bureaucratic practices and methods of leadership.

This found expression in a failure to analyze and re-examine constantly our policies and methods of work in the spirit of Marxist self-criticism; to check our policies with the experiences of the masses in the class struggle; to develop a correct cadre policy; and to draw our full membership into the shaping and clarification of basic policy. The crassest example of this was the suppression of the Foster letter from the membership. Another example of this bureaucratic method of work was the manner in which the former National Board proceeded to liquidate the Communist organization in the South.

The growth of revisionism was helped by bureaucracy. While the main responsibility for the bureaucratic regime rests upon Browder in the first place, the former National Board and National Committee must assume a heavy responsibility for the bureaucratic system of work which prevailed in all Party organizations. The former National Board, in accepting the Browder system of leadership, set a bureaucratic example and did not carry on a struggle to establish genuine democracy in the organization. This was also reflected by the former Board's inadequate self-criticism during the preconvention period.

The incoming National Committee and Board, by example, and with the active assistance of the membership, must undertake an ideological and organizational struggle to root out all vestiges of bureaucracy, and be constantly on guard against relapses to old bureaucratic methods of work and opportunistic practices, which could only obstruct the most rapid and com-

plete correction of our revisionist errors.

7.

The opportunist errors of our former general policy limited the effecttiveness of Communist work on the Negro question. This was especially expressed in our glossing over the national character of the Negro question, and in our unwarranted illusion that the big bourgeois themselves would carry forward after V-E Day the wartime gains of the Negro people.

It is true that we continued to proclaim our uncompromising demand for full Negro democratic rights, and in many instances fought hard and effectively against Jimcrow practices, especially in the interests of the war effort. However, the struggle for the national liberation of the Negro people as fundamentally related to the whole struggle of the working class against capitalist exploitation and oppression was often lost sight of.

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Moreover, our revisionist policies narrowed the scope and weakened the vigor of such struggles, even causing us at times to soft-pedal the struggle

to eliminate Negro discrimination in the armed forces.

The results of this opportunist policy are all too apparent. We have not adequately prepared the labor movement and the Negro masses to combat current efforts of reaction to create sharp Negro-white conflicts within the ranks of labor and to wipe out the wartime democratic gains of the Negro people. Despite limited gains we have had serious weaknesses and inconsistencies in our work in the Negro communities and have been unable to consolidate our thousands of new Negro recruits into a stable membership. We completely liquidated the Communist organization in the South. We failed to develop a substantial corps of Marxist-trained Negro workers for leadership in the labor movement.

It is now incumbent upon us to give militant leadership to the struggle for Negro democratic rights on all fronts, especially intensifying our educational work among white trade unionists. We must rebuild the Communist organization in the South. We must develop and bring forward a strong corps of working class Negro Communist cadres in the great industrial

centers of the nation.

Above all, we must deepen the theoretical understanding of all Communists, both Negro and white, on the fundamental nature and far-reaching implications of the Negro question and conduct a vigorous struggle to root out every manifestation of open or concealed white chauvinism in our own ranks. As one step toward this end, we should create a special commission to undertake a basic study of the conditions and trends of the Negro people in relation to the broad social, economic and political movements in America and the world today, and, in the light of Marxist-Leninist theory, to formulate a comprehensive definition of Communist policy and program on the Negro question.

8.

The opportunist errors which we were committing adversely influenced our work during the war, limited the effectiveness of our anti-fascist activities, and were disorienting the Communist and the progressive labor movement for the postwar period.

Our Communist organization was moving toward a crisis, among other things, because of its inability to answer the growing complex problems arising out of the present world situation. This developing crisis could not be resolved without the full recognition and correction of our former revision-

ist policies.

In this connection, therefore, we must recognize the sterling leadership and the important contributions which Comrade Foster made in the struggle against opportunism. Likewise, we can appreciate the basic correctness of the sound fraternal, Marxist opinions expressed in the recent article of

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kened ruggle Jacques Duclos, one of the foremost leaders of the Communist Party of France.

Life itself, especially our recent experiences in the struggle against the forces of fascism and reaction on both the foreign and domestic fronts—in the trade unions, in the struggle for Negro rights, in the struggle against the trusts—has fully confirmed the validity of Comrade Duclos' criticism and of Comrade Foster's repeated warnings, and has fully exposed the basic revisionist errors of American Communist policy since January, 1944.

In ascertaining the grave responsibility for the opportunist errors and mistakes committed in the recent period, it is necessary to state that while Comrade Browder, who was the foremost leader of the C.P.A., bears a proportionately greater share of responsibility than any other individual leader or member, the former national leadership, and in the first place, the former National Board, must and does assume a heavy responsibility for these errors.

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Clearly, the single, most essential pre-condition necessary to enable us to perform effectively our Communist duties in the postwar period as the vanguard and champion of the interests of the working class and the nation, is to overcome quickly and decisively our errors and mistakes, especially to eradicate all vestiges of opportunism in our policies and mass work.

Toward this end the entire Communist organization must immediately make a thorough and self-critical examination of all policies and leadership. We must establish genuine inner-democracy and self-criticism throughout our organization. We must refresh and strengthen the personnel of all responsible leading committees in the organization, and establish real collective leadership in all Party committees. In doing this we must combat all tendencies toward factionalism, toward distortions and toward weakening

the basic unity of our Communist organization.

At the same time, we Communists must avoid all sectarian tendencies and boldly and energetically expand our own Marxist working class and anti-fascist mass activities and our most active participation in the broad labor and democratic movements. We must resolutely strengthen our independent Communist role and mass activities. We must develop a consistent concentration policy and build our Communist organization especially amongst the industrial workers. We must wage a resolute ideological struggle on the theoretical front, enhancing the Marxist understanding of our entire organization and leadership.

We Communists renew our pledge to do everything to destroy fascism and reaction, to advance the cause of American and world democracy, the cause of national freedom and social progress. We are determined to cooperate with all anti-fascists and all democratic forces to achieve these great

objectives.

# PREAMBLE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES

The Communist Party of the United States is the political party of the American working class, basing itself upon the principles of scientific socialism, Marxism-Leninism. It champions the immediate and fundamental interests of the workers, farmers and all who labor by hand and brain against capitalist exploitation and oppression. As the advanced party of the working class, it stands in the forefront of this struggle.

The Communist Party upholds the achievements of American democracy and defends the United States Constitution and its Bill af Rights against its reactionary enemies who would destroy democracy and popular liberties. It uncompromisingly fights against imperialism and colonial oppression, against racial, national and religious discrimination, against Jim Crowism, anti-Semitism and all forms of chauvinism.

The Communist Party struggles for the complete destruction of fascism and for a durable peace. It seeks to safeguard the welfare of the people and the nation, recognizing that the working class, through its trade unions and by its independent political action, is the most consistent fighter for democarcy, national freedom and social progress.

The Communist Party holds as a basic principle that there is an identity of interest which serves as a common bond uniting the workers of all lands. It recognizes further that the true national interests of our country and the cause of peace and progress require the solidarity of all freedom-loving peoples and the continued and ever closer cooperation of the United Nations.

The Communist Party recognizes that the final abolition of exploitation and oppression, of economic crises and unemployment, of reaction and war, will be achieved only by the socialist reorganization of society—by the common ownership and operation of the national economy under a government of the people led by the working class.

The Communist Party, therefore, educates the working class, in the course of its day-to-day struggles, for its historic mission, the establishment of Socialism. Socialism, the highest form of democracy, will guarantee the

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scism y, the to cogreat full realization of the right to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," and will turn the achievements of labor, science and culture to the use and enjoyment of all men and women.

In the struggle for democracy, peace and social progress, the Communist Party carries forward the democratic traditions of Jefferson, Paine, Lincoln and Frederick Douglass, and the great working class traditions of Sylvis, Debs and Ruthenberg. It fights side by side with all who join in this cause,

For the advancement of these principles, the Communist Party of the United States establishes the basic laws of its organization in the following Constitution:



# THE BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION AND ITS LESSON FOR THE FUTURE

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By HARRY POLLITT

General Secretary, Communist Party of Great Britain

THE MAGNIFICENT results of the recent General Election are proof, first and foremost, of the Communist Party's repeated assertion that military victory in a People's War inevitably leads to victory over reaction at home.

It was the failure to understand this concept which led many people to believe that, because of certain superficial similarities between the recent elections and those of 1918, the prestige of the "war-winning Prime Minister" would carry to victory at the polls whatever party he chose to lead.

However, although the underlying reasons for the profound change in the political outlook of the people, which had been developing during the war years, was obviously beyond the ability of the Tories to understand, it would be untrue to say that they did not appreciate that this change had taken place. Indeed, it was just because their information, particularly from the Services, convinced them that the people had "gone left" that such extraordinary precautions were taken to prevent the full expression of the people's will. The rushed election timed to take place while the electoral register was still inadequate, owing to the war-time movements of large sections of the people, and when thousands of workers would be away from their constituencies on badly needed holidays, together with the resurrection of time-dishonored bogies about "Socialist Gestapo" and the "danger to the people's savings," were devices expressing the Tories' fear. So, too, with the Tory press campaign, which descended to such depths of misrepresentation and calumny as to be denounced, not only by Labor supporters, but by some of their own friends. The character of the Tory press campaign, as well as democratic opinion on it, was aptly summed up in the pithy comment of two Canadian journalist Servicemen, Lieut. P. F. Berton and Lieut. J. F. Scott, who said in a letter to World Press News: "The London papers are not so much taking advantage of the freedom of the press as raping it."

Nevertheless, in spite of all this, the people overwhelmingly rejected the Tories and returned, for the first time, a Labor Government with a large enough majority to enable it to combine responsibility with power. The result was a surprise, not only to the Tories, but to the Labor Party itself, and even to our own Party. For, it must be admitted, even we had underestimated the forces of the contributing factors, viz: The growth of political consciousness among the people as a result of the part played by the U.S.S.R. and Resistance Movements in the struggle against fascism; the development of political maturity and the assimilation of pre-war and war experiences by the people, to which our Party's work has largely contributed; the effect of the work of the Labor Ministers in the National Government. occupying as they did responsible but very difficult positions; and the influence of the result of the Presidential elections in America and the recent municipal elections in France.

The Labor victory at the polls registers the immense advance of the British people during the war. They have learned their own power and ability and have time and again demonstrated them under the most difficult circumstances. Their vote is an expression of their determination to share in the peace-time administration of their country, to play their part and have their say.

It is in the experience of a Labor Government that the Labor movement will learn more rapidly and completely than ever it could with Labor in opposition without respon-

sibility.

The present state of the Parties, with one more seat to be contested —Central Hull\*—is as follows:

Labor	392
Liberal	12
I.L.P	3
Communist	2
Commonwealth	1
Irish National	2
Conservative	198
Ulster Unionist	9
National	2
Liberal National	13
Independents	14

The following table shows the number of votes cast in each case:

Electorate32,836,419	
Voted24,953,332	
Labor	
Liberal 2,234,126	
Commonwealth 110,634	
I.L.P 46,679	
Communist 102,780	
Others 195,233	
Independent 325,202	
Tory 8,660,560	
Ulster Tory 392,454	
National 142,906	,
Liberal National 759,883	

The revolt against the Tories was not confined to the industrial centers but was spread all over the country. For the first time in British

<sup>\*</sup> A cabled dispatch of August 10 reported a Labor victory for this constituency, with a vote of 8,776 in a total vote of 14,954.—The Editors.

history, a serious political awakening was seen in the Labor vote from the rural areas, both among agricultural workers and small farmers: and large sections of middle-class people voted Labor, also for the first time. For much of this "swing to the Left" among these particular sections, the Tories' own propaganda must take the credit-or the blame. Their hand was shown too plainly over such questions as wages and prices, controls and industry. They forgot, or did not know, that the experience of the war years had convinced these sections of the necessity, in their own interests, to end the chaos of the past. The agricultural worker and small farmer had learned that agriculture must be planned to be prosperous; the middle-class had learned that only the big monopolist was the gainer when industry and prices were left to the uncontrolled mercy of the industrialists themselves. As for the attempt to present Churchill as the one man who won the war, this merely angered hundreds of thousands of people who had struggled, sacrified and lost their dear ones and their homes in order to defeat fascism. When it came to the test, the organized workers particularly remembered the Churchill of 1926 and not of 1940. Churchill's own election broadcast, in which he gave the impudent warning that trade unionists would lose their freedom under a Labor Government, contributed in no small measure to

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a of the reviving of that memory, and added another one—the fact that he was the man who, just prior to the elections, refused to amend the Trades Disputes Act, and moreover bluntly said that the Conservatives would never agree to this.

Taken in conjunction with all this, the sober exposition of Labor's policy in the working-class press, and through able speakers on the radio and in the constituencies, captured the imagination of a serious, thoughtful electorate. While the weaknesses in Labor's organization, which might have meant a serious loss of votes, were offset by the readiness of local Labor Parties to accept the assistance of Communist Party Branches.

# THE COMMUNIST PARTY RESULTS

In this election, the decisive choice before the people was between Toryism and Labor, and the conditions were unfavorable for any other Parties. Hence, the direct reflection of the Communist Party was necessarily low, and not the full reflection of its real political strength.

We ran 21 candidates, gained two M.P.'s and won 102,780 votes. But what lies behind the facts? For two years, since its July Congress in 1943, the Communist Party placed clearly before the people the issue of ending Tory domination. It was an aim that sank in and captured popular imagination. In this election, we had to

carry out a difficult tactical line. We were recommending the people to vote Communist where there was a Communist standing, and elsewhere to vote Labor. In the circumstances in which the election was fought, we had to set the pace for winning votes for Labor. This was bound to affect the thoughts of people, even in those constituencies where our own candidates were contesting. The workers were so keen on driving out the Tories that in the majority of cases they were taking no chances, even where a Communist candidate was concerned.

The very intensity of our campaign, with its factual exposure of the Tories, and its positive explanation of the political situation at home and abroad, and our policy—which was similar in content to that of the Labor Party—undoubtedly helped to win votes for Labor. The defeat owin votes for Labor. The defeat ous thing not only for Birmingham but for India; and we believe that the fight put up by Comrade Dutt played an important part in defeating this arch-reactionary.

The Communist Party takes as much pride in what it did in securing the Labor victory at the election as in its fight for the second front in Europe. Aided by the Young Communist League, we know that we have played an important part in achieving this splendid result, both by our political activity, which we alone have conducted during the

war, and by the support we gave all Labor candidates during the campaign itself.

We must remember that this great movement to the Left takes place in a country where there is a splendid fundamental loyalty to Labor in its best and truest working-class sense. This never expressed itself so strongly as in the results of the General Election. In such circumstances, the fact that there are now two Communist M.P.'s, instead of the previous one, that I, myself, lost in East Rhondda by a mere 500 votes, and that our candidates altogether polled over 102,000 votes, is a significant recognition by the electorate of the importance of the role of the Communist Party. These gains were recorded, remember, in an election in which all other smaller Parties were almost swept away in the violence of the Labor avalanche.

And here I must emphasize a point which I touched on in a previous paragraph. The establishment of splendid new relations between Branches of the Local Labor and Communist Parties is one of the most important gains of the General Election, and one which is bound to have tremendous influence on the future work of the whole Labor movement. We are determined that this new-found unity shall not remain merely a phenomenon of the General Election. We intend to consolidate the new relations we have established and prove that if the cor

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assistance of the Communist Party is essential to win power for Labor, it is more essential still for the purpose of developing the mass support that will enable the policy of the Labor Government to be carried out. Many Labor M.P.'s have since the election given public expression to their warm appreciation of our assistance. They, and the whole Labor movement, may be assured of our continued and as freely given support.

# THE NEW LABOR GOVERNMENT

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There has never been a Government with such mass support and world-wide goodwill behind it as the new Labor Government in Britain. From America to Russia, from Poland to France, from Spain to Greece, from China to India, there is a world-wide expectation of the new policy at home and abroad that the Labor Government will carry out.

There can be no doubt that the situation in which the Labor Government has now to operate is both difficult and complicated. The problems to be solved are urgent and gigantic; but it would be a profound under-estimation of the will and support of the people behind the new Government, and the new developments now taking place throughout Europe, to believe that these problems cannot be solved in the interests of the common people. Any sugges-

tion of a moderation of Labor's declared policy will arise from the traditional desire of some Labor leaders to serve the interests of the ruling class rather than their own, and to make this the excuse for succumbing to difficulties and complications that otherwise would be overcome. We must wage war on the conception, for example, that the Labor Government in Britain can only carry out its policy successfully on the basis of the good will and benevolence of American monopolists. Instead of seeing this aspect of the situation, we have to see the enormous impetus given to the American labor and progressive movement as a result of the political victory over the monopolists in Britain.

The workers quite rightly will expect great things from the new Government, and whilst the Communist Party must guard against expecting too much too quickly, it must insist in its propaganda on a real fight being made to carry out the priority measures which will be indicated in the Labor Government's "King's Speech." It is necessary to emphasize this point because there can be tendencies to moderate the Labor Party policy outlined in "Let us Face the Future" (on which Labor won the Election), on the part of some Conservative-minded leaders, who may tend to succumb to the difficulties of the situation and the resistance of the monopoly capitalists. Our Party must develop the will and feeling of

confidence that Labor in and out of Parliament can solve all problems however difficult they may appear to be, and that it will not tolerate any attempted sabotage and resistance by the monopoly capitalists to the declared will of the people.

It is not a question of the Communist Party now putting new demands on the Labor Government, but of successfully organizing the mass support of the people, which will help the Labor Government to carry out its declared policy.

## THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Our responsibilities in the new situation are greater than ever before. The fight for the carrying out of Labor's program will not be conducted only in the Parliamentary field. Tory reaction will not give up as easily as all that; and we would be naive not to expect sabotage and obstruction in industry and wherever the Tories still retain power. It will be for the Communist Party to maintain the people's vigilance in support of the Labor Government.

Our opportunities were never greater, because never has our pres-

tige been so high.

In the future, as in the past, the Communist Party sets itself the task of uniting and strengthening the Labor movement, not only for the immediate struggles against reaction, but so that we can stride still further along the path to Socialism. As each practical measure of social reform is carried out by the Labor Government, we will rally the people in its support, and explain the greater possibilities that open out for the nation when once the full socialization of the means of production, distribution and exchange has been established, and the system of exploitation of man by man finally ended.

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Never before has our work in the trade unions been so important as now. The Labor Party and the Labor Government will need the help of the trade unions. The reactionaries are fully aware of this; and we are certain that their main line of attack will be the attempt to drive a wedge between the trade unions and the Labor Government. It will be remembered that on the occasion of the two previous Labor Governments there were serious differences between the trade unions and the Government. We are confident that the constructive role now played by our members in the leadership of some of the most important trade unions in the country will be a powerful factor in bringing these differences to an end.

We have to help the trade unions to retain and increase their present membership. Already there is evidence that some unions are losing members because of the closing down of war factories. We must combat this with all our strength.

We must rouse the Labor move-

ment to demand the immediate application of the policy adopted at the Blackpool Trades Union Congress in 1944 on trade union reconstruction. We must give increased support to shop stewards and strengthen factory organization. The trade unions must be given more say than they have had during the war in the administration of controls and in the carrying out of policy generally. The closest possible consultation between the Labor Government and the trade unions is essential.

Our Party must help the Labor Party to strengthen itself numerically and financially. We shall try to win the affiliation of every trade union Branch to the Labor Party and Trades Councils. We shall carry out a campaign for the payment of the political levy, for the continuation of

united activity.

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We need a stronger Labor Party than exists at the present time. The more support that can be won for the affiliation of the Communist Party to the Labor Party, the stronger the Labor Party becomes, and the stronger the Labor Government will be to resist the opposition of reactionaries and fascists in the operation of its own policy.

Finally, we must now do everything in our power to strengthen the Communist Party. This is the key to real success. Our present registered membership bears little relation to the opportunities that exist, and very inaccurately reflects our actual in-

fluence in the Labor movement.

We need a strong Communist Party because only the Communist Party can bring a Marxist understanding to the problems which are bound to confront the Labor movement in the coming period. We need a strong Communist Party because only through our Marxist education and propaganda can the people be brought to understand the present problems in relation to the whole advance of the working class to final victory over capitalism and the es-


tablishment of Socialism.

It is not a question of placing the Communist Party against the Labor Party. It is a fact that the more fighters by hand and brain are organized in the Communist Party, and the greater the circulation of our Communist paper, then the stronger the entire Labor movement becomes. With a Labor victory at this election, the first steps have been taken towards the realization of a new Britain, a Britain for the people, which will win greater prestige, authority and influence in the councils of the nations of the world than has ever been the case before. But we do not delude ourselves that these are anything but the first steps, and we know that there are many more that must be taken before our final goal is reached.

We need a strong Communist Party to follow and explain to the people the significance of every phase of the international situation, and especially the work and policy of the Communist Parties on the continent—in the new governments. Some elements in the Labor Party will try to keep this dark. It is our job to show the positive and constructive role that our brother parties are playing all over Europe.

Already, as a result of our work during the election campaign, we are pleased to note a significant rise in our membership. The drive for new members will now be carried forward with greater intensity.

We are moving into a new situation, giving the opportunity of writing glorious new pages of history for our country. It shall be our proud duty to give the very maximum of our assistance in writing these pages. The terrific blow that reaction has received in the General Election is the spur to new efforts and new battles.



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# AVERT CIVIL WAR IN CHINA!

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By FREDERICK V. FIELD

ON THE GLORIOUS DAY of Japan's surrender reactionaries and pro-fascists were engaged in provoking a new threat to world security in China. This plot centers in the Chungking dictatorship, which since 1939 has obstructed the democratic war effort of the Chinese people and which is today determined to betray the victory won against Japanese militaristfascism before the victory can be consolidated by China's democratic forces.

The plot centers in the Kuomintang dictatorship; but it is nourished by the political, economic and military policies of the United States toward China. Under the shamefully reactionary leadership of such Americans as Patrick J. Hurley, Ambassador to Chungking, and powerful anti-democratic personages who poison the atmosphere of the State Department the corrupt forces of Chinese feudalism allied with outright pro-fascist elements in the Chinese government are encouraged to provoke civil warfare.

China is in grave danger of becoming another Greece with the United States playing the role of Britain. The cry of the Chinese people to their American allies, "We don't want a General Scobie in China," must be heard and acted upon by every decent American whether in the government or in a civilian occupation. The danger is upon us. We must mobilize our forces accordingly.

What are the facts in the case?

#### CHUNGKING PROVOKES CIVIL WAR

On July 24 the Yenan radio announced that Kuomintang troops were attacking Eighth Route Army forces sixty-five miles north of Sian, that is, on the southern boundary of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, principal base of the Communist-led armies. Nine Chungking divisions, according to Yenan, had been moved from the front facing the Japanese under the treacherous slogan, "Fighting the Communists comes first and fighting the Japanese comes second." Thus the most recent of Chungking's innumerable civil war provocations came during the very last weeks of the war against Japan and indicated the Kuomintang's disregard of the defeat of the Japanese enemy.

Immediately following Japan's offer of surrender Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek issued two orders. The first, directed to Kuomintang armies, said: "Supreme commanderin-chief today orders officers and men in the various war zones to intensify your war efforts and actively push forward without the slightest relaxation, according to fixed plans and orders." The second was dispatched to Yenan. It said, "Units of the Eighteenth Group Army [Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies] are to remain at their present posts and wait for further instructions" and went on to forbid these troops from disarming the enemy.

Simultaneously the Chungking Ministry of Information let it be known that the Chinese government would hold Japan "strictly accountable" for arms which Japan or her puppets "might surrender to any organization or party other than officers or men duly authorized by the Chinese (Central) Government."

In commenting upon Chiang Kaishek's appeal to both the Japanese and their Chinese quislings to continue resistance, that is to refuse to surrender their arms to the Eighteenth Group Army, A. T. Steele cabled the New York Herald Tribune as follows: "It is no secret that many puppet officials and army officers are in league with Chungking and plan to declare allegiance to the central government when the opportunity is ripe. These will be expected to hold their garrison areas against Communist pressure until central government troops arrive."

On August 15, the day after the formal Japanese surrender, Chiang Kai-shek issued the following extraordinary instruction to the Japanese Supreme Commander in China: "Upon the cessation of hostilities, Japanese troops are temporarily permitted to retain their arms and equipment for the maintenance of public

order and communications, and must wait for military instructions from Gen. Ho Ying-chin, Chinese military chief of staff." (Emphasis mine— F.V.F.)

#### U. S. GOVERNMENT'S ROLE

The press has reported that throughout these crucial days there have been almost continuous conferences in Chungking between Chinese and American representatives. Chiang Kai-shek, Ambassador Hurley and Lieut. General Wedemeyer have been reported to be discussing the use of American airplanes and other forms of military equipment by Kuomintang troops in order to parachute into the areas liberated by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. The newspapers indicate that Kuomintang forces will take over the surrender of Japanese troops throughout the nation with the assistance of American advisers.

The following pattern of policy on the part of the Chungking dictatorship with American backing is therefore evident: (1) Now that the war is over, the Chiang Kai-shek government is moving from a policy of sitting aside while others fought the Japanese enemy to one of furious activity to seize the Chinese nation from those who have fought valorously to save it; (2) Kuomintang troops are to be rushed to areas which they have had no part in liberating for the purpose of wresting them from those democratic Chinese who

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have in fact defeated the enemy; (3) Chinese puppet troops, the gestapocontrolled gangsters and the quislings who sold out to the Japanese and killed Chinese for them, are to be an important prop of the Chiang Kaishek regime; (4) even the loathsome Japanese invaders are called upon to assist Chiang to save his country from the fate of democracy; (5) the United States, without whose support the Chungking government would quickly evaporate leaving little except a bad small, is counted upon to supply the equipment and the power with which this treacherous scheme is to be carried out.

### THE HEROIC RECORD OF THE COMMUNIST ARMIES

We need to look at this appalling situation more closely. The Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies which Chiang Kai-shek now proposes to strangle have borne the brunt of the war against the Japanese forces of occupation in China. They have furnished the only formidable opposition to the enemy in North and Central China since the central government's enforced retreat to Chungking, in 1938. They have cooperated loyally with American military personnel and they have rescued nearly one hundred American airmen forced down in such widely scattered areas as Peiping, Tayuan, Hankow, Shanghai, Canton and Hongkong.

These Communist-led troops have grown from an army of 100,000 in

1937 to over 900,000 regulars and 2,200,000 militiamen at the close of the war. During the war they liberated areas comprising 31 per cent of the total Chinese territory occupied by the Japanese and containing 94 million people or 37 per cent of those suffering under the fascist invader. These armies had lost 446,336 soldiers up on the end of 1944, but they had destroyed 1,360,877 Japanese and their puppets. This was a ratio of better than 3 to 1.

The 31 per cent of former enemyheld territory liberated by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies before August 14 was organized into nineteen democratically governed areas stretching from the Manchurian and Mongolian borders, through northern, central and southern China, to the island of Hainan off the coast of Indo-China. A glance at their location on a map of China indicates that these liberated areas were adjacent to the great northern cities of Peiping and Tientsin, covered virtually the whole China coast from Tientsin south to Shanghai, and included powerful concentrations surrounding the immense Yangtze River cities of Hankow, Wuchang, Nanking and Shanghai, as well as the southern centers of Canton and Hongkong.

It is from these vast areas which they have liberated with their blood and by virtue of their patriotism, democratic leadership and loyalty to the cause of China of the United Nations that Chiang Kai-shek and

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valornintang s which perating them see who Patrick J. Hurley would now expel them. Let Chiang Kai-shek and his reactionary henchmen but try and they will discover what it means to thwart the democratic will of the Chinese people! Let the United States government give so much as a bullet to assist in such a treacherous policy and we will see our government condemned from one end of the world to the other for seeking to re-impose fascism upon a people who have thrust it out of their lives!

The Walter Judds and the Clare Booth Luces, the Hurleys and the Grews demand support of the corrupt Kuomintang dictatorship as the alternative to a "Communist Asia." They are mistaken in their confidence that we cannot see through their shabby demagogy. These are the people who would have us believe that the Chungking clique of feudal, pro-fascist and corrupt reactionaries is the standard bearer of democracy in Eastern Asia. And against whom do these American antidemocrats want us to believe that the heroic knight of Chungking is bearing his banner? Against the "Red menace" of course!

But these persons run into a real difficulty at this point in their poisonous argument. For do not hundreds of thousands of Americans, and particularly those who have served in the armed forces assigned to the China theater of war, know that it is only thanks to the heroism of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies that China was not

utterly defeated? Is it not mainly thanks to these brave soldiers wearing the Red Star in their caps that the mainland front against Japan held up during all the years since 1937? Is it not in fact thanks to the Chinese Communist Party's vigorous leadership against Chiang Kai-shek's policy of appeasing Japan that the Chinese nation assumed a semblance of unity in the early years of the war and that it was able to stem the tide of fascism in the Far East before our entrance into the struggle?

Yes, the American people know this and they cannot be ungrateful. But do they also fully understand the base deceit of the reactionaries' propaganda? Do they fully understand that the Chinese Communist Party and their brave armies are the actual leaders of today's democratic upsurge in China and that the Kuomintang dictatorship, far from bearing the standard of democracy,

tramples it under foot.

#### FIRST-HAND OBSERVERS EXPOSE REACTION'S DECEIT

Again we must have the facts before us. Every correspondent, every American military representative who has visited the liberated areas or the main base in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region attests to the basic fact that here and only here have been planted the seeds of genuine Chinese democracy. I know of no exception. You will find the record of Chinese democracy as it has been introduced under the leadership

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dict force over of the Communist Party in practically any of the large American, nonfascist newspapers. Turn the pages of the New York Times, of the New York Herald Tribune, of the Christian Science Monitor, the Chicago Sun. PM. the New York Post, the Philadelphia Bulletin-I could go on with the list throughout the country -and you will find first-hand stories about the new China. Even the conservative and frequently reactionary pages of the Saturday Evening Post and Colliers have carried the story of the New Democracy. And you will find it in some issues of Life and Time and Newsweek, though not in the editorial sections.

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Can it be that everyone is lying, that every observer who has visited Yenan has been duped? Is it not a matter of some wonder that American journals whose publishers and editors are themselves opposed to the extension of democracy are obliged to print objective descriptions of how democracy has made a beginning in China during the war? No, it is really not, for the facts are inescapable.

The democracy of the Border Region and of the Liberated Areas explains why the Japanese were never able to penetrate the former and were ousted from the latter and kept out. The lack of democracy in those parts of China under the Chungking dictatorship explains why Japanese forces were able to knife through overwhelmingly larger Kuomintang armies almost at will after 1939.

Democratic economic policies were the reason the Border Region and the Liberated Areas were able to raise the standard of living of their 100 million inhabitants in the course of the war while at the same time equipping and supplying the troops that were victorious over the Japanese. They were responsible for strengthening these areas in spite of the Kuomintang blockade which for five terrible years kept out almost all supplies, military, medical or financial. Reactionary, feudal economic policies, in contrast, spelled the ruin of the much more richly endowed regions under Chiang Kai-shek.

# THE REAL ISSUE: DEMOCRACY VERSUS KUOMINTANG DICTATORSHIP

The perspective of the Chinese Communists is no secret. They are Communists and they proudly proclaim it. They are Marxists. They know that China must eventually adopt Socialism. They form the vanguard of the Chinese revolution, the goal of which is no different from that of any other Communist movement. But the Chinese Communists are not fighting for the immediate establishment of Socialism. For Socialism is beyond the reach of China in its present undeveloped stage. Today's program of the Chinese Communists is for the early completion and consolidation of the long overdue bourgois-democratic revolution. In describing the war-time economy of the Border Region and the Liberated Areas, Tung Pi-wu, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, has written: "The basic character of the fighting, people's economy is capitalism of a new democratic type. It recognizes private ownership and private gains, but economic endeavors are guided along cooperative and public channels as far as possible to increase the efficiency as well as to assure a fair distribution of social income so that more and more human energy may be saved for higher social-economic development, and China may thus become eventually a democratically industrialized nation."

The issue of Communism does not exist for China today. It exists only in the feverish minds of those who fear democracy. The Chinese Communists are the spokesmen for Chinese democracy. It is they, consequently, who are attacked most

vigorously by reaction.

The Communists are the spokesmen for democracy, but they do not stand alone on this issue. On the contrary, the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people strive for unity and for democracy; they oppose the feudalism and fascist orientation of the Chungking dictatorship. Except in the Border Region and in the Liberated Areas it is difficult for these people to give political expression to their aspirations because of the activities of Chiang Kai-shek's several gestapo organizations. In spite of these handicaps, however,

within Kuomintang exist China SIX democratic political parties which together are known Democratic Federation. They range from conservative to progressive, but they are unanimous in advocating a national democratic unity. There are also within the Kuomintang itself important leaders and groups, such as Sun Fo and Madame Sun Yat-sen and General Feng Yu-hsiang, who struggle against the ruling clique and speak publicly on behalf of unity.

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Neither these democratic elements within Kuomintang China nor the broad masses of peasants, artisans, workers and soldiers are able to give leadership to the struggle. This historic task is left to the Chinese Communist Party whose strength, geographical location, armed forces and Marxist perspective equip it to spearhead the democratic movement.

One hears, however, that the Chungking government has promised the Chinese people constitutional government and that a National Assembly for that purpose will be convened this fall. One also hears that Chiang Kai-shek has repeatedly attempted to solve the internal situation "by purely political means." Only the other day he sent a most obsequiously worded invitation to the Communist leader, Mao Tse-tung, to come to Chungking to renew negotiations for unity. Are these not evidence of democracy on the part of the Kuomintang?

A brief look at the facts will quick-

ly dispel any illusions on that score. Take the question of a constitution, for instance. The delegates to the National Assembly which Chungking has promised, were appointed in 1936 when China was torn apart by civil war and when the traitor Wang Ching-wei was high in the ruling circles. 1,200 delegates were chosen, without consultation with the people, through the Kuomintang party apparatus. There were no Communists among them. Today many of the delegates have passed from the scene through natural causes or treachery. Yet this is the group, with a few replacements, again chosen from above, which the Kuomintang seriously proposes to convene to launch constitutional government. Take a look at the draft constitution itself. It dates back to the early 1930's when Chiang Kai-shek first began throwing out promises of early constitutional government. drafted exclusively by Kuomintang officials. Its obvious purpose is to provide a quasi-legal basis to a continued dictatorship of the same gang that now desecrates the name of China. Among other things the proposed constitution gives the President of China unheard of powers. He may assume dictatorship over the nation in the case of "emergency." And emergency is defined as a situation in which there is a need for "averting national crisis, maintaining public order, or promoting public interest." One is forced to ask, when would there not be an "emergency"?

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There have been repeated attempts to bring about unity by negotiation between representatives of the Kuomintang and of the Communists, All of these attempts since 1939 have failed for the fundamental reason that the Kuomintang is not interested either in unity or in democracy. Its one objective has been to maneuver the Communists into giving up their armies and their power as a demagogic pretext for postponing the introduction of democratic institutions. The purpose obviously has been to destroy the principal advocate of democracy in order to strengthen the power of the dictatorship. The Communist reply has consistently been to express its willingness to make certain concessions toward national unity, but only after the Kuomintang had shown the honesty of its intentions by removing the main obstacles to democratic development. The demands made upon the Kuomintang on this score have been reasonable and easily within the competence of any government genuinely desiring unity. They consist mainly of the following four points: the release of all anti-fascist political prisoners; the withdrawal of all troops blockading the Border Region and cessation of all attacks upon the Communist-led armies; elimination of all restrictions on freedom of speech, assembly, press and association; and the abolition of the secret police. In view of the fact that the Kuomintang has shown no inclination to move in any of these directions, Chiang Kai-shek's invitation to Mao Tse-tung can only be viewed as another attempt to deceive the Chinese people and the world.

In the light of this tragic situation there can be only one American policy which serves the interests of the American people and of international security. That is a policy which gives full support to any and all Chinese groups genuinely striving for national unity and democracy and which immediately abandons the present line of subsidizing the most backward, the most reactionary, profascist minority within China. It must be clearly understood by Americans that the Chungking clique can no longer stand on its feet. It has already been repudiated by the majority of active political forces in China. Its weakness is evident from the need it finds to lean, not only upon the Chinese quisling puppets in the immediate post-surrender period, but even upon the Japanese forces of occupation. Without the political, economic and military support which Chungking now receives from the United States the moribund Chinese government which constitutes the main obstruction to unity and democracy would be but short-lived.

An American policy based upon support of the forces of democracy and abandonment of the forces of reaction and fascism in China must express itself in the immediate period by non-interference in the disarming of the Japanese enemy and the occupation of his areas by those democratic Chinese forces which are already on the spot and by those anti-Japanese political groups which have the capacity to win the support of the Chinese people. General Chu Teh, Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, has demanded participation in the acceptance of the Japanese surrender and in the peace conference and immediate cessation of American lend-lease to Chungking, Any other policy on the part of our government will involve it directly in provoking a Chinese civil war. It will place the United States in the position of helping to enslave a nation which it has helped to liberate through the defeat of the Japanese enemy, and, in short, will destroy the security which American men and women have fought to establish.

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Americans must become aroused over this danger. Workers in the factories, farmers, church groups, all the great democratic organizations of the American people must protest the use of American arms and American personnel in the effort of the Chungking dictatorship to uproot and destroy Chinese democracy. President Truman, Secretary of State Byrnes, and members of Congress must be informed of America's alarm over the present trend of policy. We must insist, immediately, upon a foreign policy toward China which strengthens that nation's unity and democracy and eradicates its pro-fascist elements. Only then can our victory over Japanese fascism be consolidated and security assured for ourselves and

for the Chinese people.

### VITAL DOCUMENTS

#### THE POTSDAM TRI-POWER DECLARATION, BERLIN, AUGUST 2, 1945

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#### Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin

On July 17, 1945, the President of the United States of America, Harry S. Truman; the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Generalissimo J. V. Stalin, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Winston S. Churchill, together with Mr. Clement R. Attlee, met in the tripartite conference of Berlin. They were accompanied by the Foreign Secretaries of the three governments, Mr. James F. Byrnes, Mr. V. M. Molotov and Mr. Anthony Eden; the chiefs of staff and other advisers.

There were nine meetings between July 17 and July 25. The conference was then interrupted for two days while the results of the British election were being declared.

On July 28 Mr. Attlee returned to the conference as Prime Minister, accompanied by the new Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ernest Bevin. Four days of further discussion took place. During the course of the conference there were regular meetings of the heads of the three governments accompanied by the Foreign Secretaries,

and also of the Foreign Secretaries alone. Committees appointed by the Foreign Secretaries for preliminary consideration of questions before the conference also met daily.

The meetings of the conference were held at the Cecilienhof, near Potsdam. The conference ended on Aug. 2, 1945.

Important decisions and agreements were reached. Views were exchanged on a number of other questions, and consideration of these matters will be continued by the Council of Foreign Ministers established by the conference.

President Truman, Generalissimo Stalin and Prime Minister Attlee leave this conference, which has strengthened the ties between the three governments and extended the scope of their collaboration and understanding, with renewed confidence that their governments and peoples, together with the other United Nations, will insure the creation of a just and enduring peace.

II

#### ESTABLISHMENT OF A COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

The conference reached an agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers representing the five principal powers to continue the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements and to take up other matters which from time to time may be referred to the council by agreement of the governments participating in the council.

The text of the agreement for the establishment of the Council of Foreign

Ministers is as follows:

1. There shall be established a council composed of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France and the United States.

2. (I) The Council shall normally meet in London, which shall be the permanent seat of the joint secretariat which the council will form. Each of the foreign ministers will be accompanied by a high-ranking deputy, duly authorized to carry on the work of the council in the absence of his foreign minister, and by a small staff of technical advisers.

(II) The first meeting of the council shall be held in London not later than Sept. 1, 1945. Meetings may be held by common agreement in other capitals as may be agreed from time to time.

3. (I) As its immediate important task, the council shall be authorized to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The council shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established.

(II) For the discharge of each of these tasks the council will be composed of the members representing those states which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy state concerned. For the purpose of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy. Other members will be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion.

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(III) Other matters may from time to time be referred to the council by agreement between the member gov-

ernments.

4. (I) Whenever the council is considering a question of direct interest to a state not represented thereon, such state should be invited to send representatives to participate in the discussion and study of that question.

(II) The council may adapt its procedure to the particular problem under consideration. In some cases it may hold its own preliminary discussions prior to the participation of other interested states. In other cases, the cound may convoke a formal conference of the state chiefly interested in seeking a solution of the particular problem.

In accordance with the decision of the conference, the three governments have each addressed an identical invitation to the governments of China and France to adopt this text and to join

in establishing the council.

The establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers for the specified purposes named in the text will be without prejudice to the agreement of the Crimea Conference that there should be periodic consultation among the foreign secretaries of the United States, the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom.

The conference also considered the position of the European Advisory Commission in the light of the agreement to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers. It was noted with satisfaction that the commission had ably discharged its principal tasks by the recommendations that it had furnished for the terms of Germany's unconditional surrender, for the zones of occupation in Germany and Austria, and for the inter-Allied control machinery in those countries. It was felt that further work of a detailed character for the co-ordination of Allied policy for the control of Germany and Austria would in future fall within the competence of the Allied Control Council at Berlin and the Allied commission at Vienna. Accordingly, it was agreed to recommend that the European Advisory Commission be dissolved.

#### III

#### GERMANY

The Allied armies are in occupation of the whole of Germany and the German people have begun to atone for the terrible crimes committed under the leadership of those whom, in the hour of their success, they openly approved and blindly obeyed.

Agreement has been reached at this conference on the political and economic principles of a co-ordinated Allied policy toward defeated Germany during the period of Allied control.

The purpose of this agreement is to carry out the Crimea Declaration on Germany. German militarism

Nazism will be extirpated and the Allies will take in agreement together, now and in the future, the other measures necessary to assure that Germany never again will threaten her neighbors

or the peace of the world.

It is not the intention of the Allies to destroy or enslave the German people. It is the intention of the Allies that the German people be given the opportunity to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of their life on a democratic and peaceful basis. If their own efforts are steadily directed to this end, it will be possible for them in due course to take their place among the free and peaceful peoples of the world.

The text of the agreement is as

follows:

The political and economic principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period.

#### A. POLITICAL PRINCIPLES

1. In accordance with the agreement on control machinery in Germany, supreme authority in Germany is exercised on instructions from their respective governments, by the commanders in chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the French republic, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the control council.

2. So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany.

3. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the control council shall be guided are:

(1) The complete disarmament and

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demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production. To these ends:

(a) All German land, naval and air forces, the S. S., S. A., S. D. and Gestapo, with all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the general staff, the Officers' Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans' organizations and all other military and quasi-military organizations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism.

(b) All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialized facilities for their production shall be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed. The maintenance and production of all aircraft and all arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be prevented.

(II) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable.

(III) To destroy the National Socialist party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to insure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi militarist activity or propaganda.

(IV) To prepare for the eventual

reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany. with

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4. All Nazi laws which provide the basis of the Hitler regime or established discrimination on grounds of race, creed or political opinion shall be abolished. No such discriminations, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated.

5. War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested and brought to judgment. Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organizations and institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned.

6. All members of the Nazi pany who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany.

7. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas.

8. The judicial system will be reorganized in accordance with the principles of democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights for all citizens itical life eventual ernational

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the prince under l citizens without distinction of race, nationality or religion.

9. The administration of affairs in Germany should be directed toward the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end:

(I) Local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles and in particular through elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with military security and the purposes of military occupation;

(II) All democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussions shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany;

(III) Representatives and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and state (land) administration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful application of these principles in local self-government;

(IV) For the time being no central German government shall be established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative departments, headed by state secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of Finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act under the direction of the Control Council.

ro. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted.

#### B. ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES

11. In order to eliminate Germany's war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and seagoing ships shall be prohibited and prevented. Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a war economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany's approved post-war peacetime needs to meet the objectives stated in Paragraph 15. Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan recommended by the Allied commission on reparations and approved by the governments concerned or if not removed shall be destroyed.

12. At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements.

13. In organizing the German economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries.

14. During the period of occupation, Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To this end common policies shall be established in regard to:

(a) Mining and industrial production and allocations;

(b) Agriculture, forestry and fishing;

(c) Wages, prices and rationing;(d) Import and export program for Germany as a whole; (e) Currency and banking, central taxation and customs;

(f) Reparation and removal of industrial war potential;

(g) Transportation and communications.

In applying these policies account shall be taken, where appropriate, of varying local conditions.

15. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy but only

to the extent necessary;

(A) To carry out programs of industrial disarmament and demilitarization, of reparations, and of approved ex-

ports and imports.

(B) To assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of the standards of living of European countries. (European countries means all European countries excluding the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

(C) To insure in the manner determined by the Control Council the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the

need for imports.

(D) To control German industry and all economic and financial international transactions, including exports and imports, with the aim of preventing Germany from developing a war potential and of achieving the other objectives named herein.

(E) To control all German public or private scientific bodies, research and experimental institutions, laboratories, et cetera, connected with economic activities.

16. In the imposition and mainte. nance of economic controls established by the Control Council, German ad. ministrative machinery shall be created and the German authorities shall be required to the fullest extent practicable to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. Thus it should be brought home to the German people that the responsibility for the administration of such controls and any breakdown in these controls will rest with themselves. Any German controls which may run counter to the objectives of occupation will be prohibited.

17. Measures shall be promptly taken:

(A) To effect essential repair of transport;

(B) To enlarge coal production;

(C) To maximize agriculture out-

(D) To effect emergency repair of housing and essential utilities.

18. Appropriate steps shall be taken by the Control Council to exercise control and the power of disposition over German-owned external assets not already under the control of United Nations which have taken part in the war against Germany.

19. Payment of reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany the necessary means must be provided to pay for imports approved by the Control Council in Germany. The proceeds of exports from current production and stocks shall be available in

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the first place for payment for such imports.

The above clause will not apply to the equipment and products referred to in paragraphs 4 (A) and 4 (B) of the reparations agreement.

#### IV

#### REPARATIONS FROM GERMANY

In accordance with the Crimea decision that Germany be compelled to compensate to the greatest possible extent for the loss and suffering that she has caused to the United Nations and for which the German people cannot escape responsibility, the following agreement on reparations was reached:

1. Reparation claims of the U.S.S.R. shall be met by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the U.S.S.R. and from appropriate German external assets.

2. The U.S.S.R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations.

3. The reparation claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the western zones and from appropriate German external assets.

4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U.S.S.R. from its own zone of occupation, the U.S.S.R. shall receive additionally from the western zones:

(A) Fifteen per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine-manufacturing industries, as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the western zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products and such other commodities as may be agreed upon.

(B) Ten per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the western zones, to be transferred to the Soviet government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return.

Removals of equipment as provided in (A) and (B) above shall be made simultaneously.

 The amount of equipment to be removed from the western zone on account of reparations must be determined within six months from now at the latest.

6. Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as soon as possible and shall be completed within two years from the determination specified in Paragraph 5. The delivery of products cover by 4 (A) above shall begin as soon as possible and shall be made by the U.S.S.R. in agreed instalments within five years of the date hereof. The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace economy and therefore available for reparations shall be made by the Control Council under policies fixed by the Allied Commission on Reparations, with the participation of France, subject to the final approval of the zone commander in the zone from which the equipment is to be removed.

7. Prior to the fixing of the total

amount of equipment subject to removal, advance deliveries shall be made in respect of such equipment as will be determined to be eligible for delivery in accordance with the procedure set forth in the last sentence of Paragraph 6.

8. The Soviet government renounces all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the western zones of occupation in Germany as well as to German foreign assets in all countries except those specified in Paragraph 9 below.

9. The governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America renounce their claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the eastern zone of occupation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and eastern Austria.

10. The Soviet government makes no claims to gold captured by the Allied troops in Germany.

#### V

#### DISPOSAL OF THE GERMAN NAVY AND MERCHANT MARINE

The conference agreed in principle upon arrangements for the use and disposal of the surrendered German fleet and merchant ships. It was decided that the three governments would appoint experts to work out together detailed plans to give effect to the agreed principles. A further joint statement will be published simultaneously by the three governments in due course.

#### VI

#### CITY OF KOENIGSBERG AND THE ADJACENT AREA

The conference examined a proposal by the Soviet government that pending the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement the section of the western frontier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which is adjacent to the Baltic Sea should pass from a point on the eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east, north of Braunsberg-Goldap, to the meeting point of the frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish republic and East Prussia.

The conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet government concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the city of Koenigsberg and the area adjacent to it as described above subject to expen examination of the actual frontier.

The President of the United States and the British Prime Minister have declared that they will support the proposal of the conference at the forthcoming peace settlement.

#### VII

#### WAR CRIMINALS

The three governments have taken note of the discussions which have been proceeding in recent weeks in London between British, United States, Soviet and French representatives with a view to reaching agreement on the methods of trial of those major was criminals whose crimes under the Mocow declaration of October, 1943, have no particular geographical localization.

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The three governments reaffirm their intention to bring those criminals to swift and sure justice. They hope that the negotiations in London will result in speedy agreement being reached for this purpose, and they regard it as a matter of great importance that the trial of those major criminals should begin at the earliest possible date. The first list of defendants will be published before September 1.

#### VIII

#### AUSTRIA

The conference examined a proposal by the Soviet government on the extension of the authority of the Austrian provisional government to all of Austria.

The three governments agreed that they were prepared to examine this question after the entry of the British and American forces into the city of Vienna.

#### IX

#### POLAND

The conference considered questions relating to the Polish provisional government and the western boundary of Poland.

On the Polish provisional government of national unity they defined their attitude in the following statement:

A. We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Confer-

ence, of a Polish provisional government of national unity recognized by the three powers. The establishment by the British and United States governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish provisional government has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish government in London, which no longer exists.

The British and United States governments have taken measures to protect the interest of the Polish provisional government as the recognized government of the Polish state in the property belonging to the Polish state located in their territories and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish provisional government for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property belonging to the Polish state which may have been wrongfully alienated.

The three powers are anxious to assist the Polish provisional government in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish armed forces and the merchant marine. They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens.

The three powers note that the Polish provisional government in accordance with the decisions of the Crimea Conference has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal

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suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates, and that representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections.

B. The following agreement was reached on the western frontier of Poland:

In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimea Conference the three heads of government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north and west which Poland should receive. The President of the National Council of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been received at the conference and have fully presented their views. The three heads of government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement.

The three heads of government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemunde, and then along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former

Free City of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish state and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.

#### Y

CONCLUSION OF PEACE TREATIES AND
ADMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ORGANIZATION

The conference agreed upon the following statement of common policy for establishing, as soon as possible, the conditions of lasting peace after victory in Europe:

The three governments consider it desirable that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania should be terminated by the conclusion of peace treaties. They trust that the other interested Allied governments will share these views.

For their part the three governments have included the preparation of a peace treaty for Italy as the first among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. Italy was the first of the Axis powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the fascist regime and is making good progress toward the re-establishment of a democratic government and institutions. The conclusion of such a peace treaty with a recognized and democratic Italian government will make it possible for the three governments to fulfill their desire to support

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ent will govern support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations.

The three government have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing peace treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania. The conclusion of peace treaties with recognized democratic governments in these states will also enable the three governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations. The three governments agree to examine each separately in the near future, in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries.

The three governments have no doubt that in view of the changed conditions resulting from the termination of the war in Europe, representatives of the Allied press will enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Rumania, Bulgaria,

Hungary and Finland.

As regards the admission of other states into the United Nations organization, Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations declares that:

"I. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states who accept the obligations contained in the present charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations:

"2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council." The three governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for membership from those states which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfill the qualifications set out above.

The three governments feel bound, however, to make it clear that they for their part would not favor any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor states, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership.

#### XI

#### TERRITORIAL TRUSTEESHIP

The conference examined a proposal by the Soviet government concerning trusteeship territories, as defined in the decision of the Crimea Conference and in the charter of the United Nations organization.

After an exchange of views on this question it was decided that the disposition of any former Italian territories was one to be decided in connection with the preparation of a peace treaty for Italy and that the question of Italian territory would be considered by the September council of ministers of foreign affairs.

#### XII

REVISED ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION PROCEDURE IN RUMANIA, BULGARIA AND HUNGARY

The three governments took note

that the Soviet representatives on the Allied control commission in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary have communicated to their United Kingdom and United States colleagues proposals for improving the work of the control commission now that hostilities in Europe have ceased.

The three governments agreed that the revision of the procedures of the Allied control commissions in these countries would now be undertaken, taking into account the interests and responsibilities of the three governments which together presented the terms of armistice to the respective countries, and accepting as a basis the agreed proposals.

#### XIII

ORDERLY TRANSFERS OF GERMAN POPULATIONS

The conference reached the following agreements on the removal of Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary:

The three governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner.

Since the influx of a large number of Germans into Germany would increase the burden already resting on the occupying authorities, they consider that the Allied Control Council in Germany should in the first instance examine the problem with special regard to

the question of the equitable distribution of these Germans among the several zones of occupation. They are accordingly instructing their respective representatives on the Control Council to report to their governments as soon as possible the extent to which such persons have already entered Germany from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and to submit an estimate of the time and rate at which further transfers could be carried out, having regard to the present situation in Germany.

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The Czechoslovak government, the Polish provisional government and the Control Council in Hungary are at the same time being informed of the above, and are being requested meanwhile to suspend further expulsions pending the examination by the governments concerned of the report from their representatives on the Control Council.

#### XIV

#### MILITARY TALKS

During the conference there were meetings between the chiefs of staff of the three governments on military matters of common interest.

#### Approved:

J. V. STALIN HARRY S. TRUMAN C. R. ATTLEE

#### LIST OF DELEGATIONS

For the United States:
The President, Harry S. Truman.
The Secretary of State, James F. Byrns
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy

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F. Byrnes

U.S.N., chief of staff of the President. loseph E. Davies, special ambassador. Edwin Pauley, special ambassador.

Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, political adviser to the Commander-in-Chief, United States zone in Ger-

W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.

General of the Army George C. Marshall, chief of staff, United States Army.

Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, U.S.N., chief of naval operations and commander-in-chief, United States Fleet. General of the Army H. H. Arnold, United States Army Air Forces.

General Brehon R. Somervell, commanding general, Army Service Forces.

Vice-Admiral Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator.

William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State.

James C. Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State.

Ben Cohen, special assistant to the Secretary of State.

of staff of H. Freeman Matthews, director of European Affairs, Department of State. Charles E. Bohlen, assistant to the Secretary (together with political, military and technical advisers). For the United Kingdom:

The Prime Minister, Mr. Winston S. Churchill, M.P.; Mr. C. R. Attlee, M.P.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Anthony Eden, M.P.

Mr. Ernest Bevin, M.P. Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport.

D. Leahy Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent

Under Secretary of State for Foreign

Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, H.M., Ambassador at Moscow.

Sir Walter Monckton, head of the United Kingdom delegation to Moscow Reparations Commission.

Sir William Strang, political advisor to the commander-in-chief, British zone in Germany.

Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary of the

Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, chief of the imperial general staff.

Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Sir Charles Portal, chief of the air staff.

Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord.

General Sir Hastings Ismay, chief of staff to the Minister of Defense.

Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, supreme Allied commander, Mediterranean theater.

Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, head of the British joint staff mission at Washington, and other advisers.

For the Soviet Union:

The chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, J. V. Stalin.

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov.

Fleet Admiral N. G. Kuznesov, People's Commissar, the Naval Fleet of the U.S.S.R.

A. I. Antonov, chief of staff of the Red Army.

A. Y. Vyshinski, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

S. I. Kavtaradze, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

I. M. Maisky, Assistant People's Com missar for Foreign Affairs.

Admiral S. G. Kucherov, chief of staff of the naval fleet.

F. T. Gusev, Ambassador of the Soviet Union in Great Britain.

A. A. Gromyko, Ambassador of the Soviet Union in the United States of America.

K. V. Novikov, member of the Collegium of the Commissariat for foreign Affairs, director of the second

European division.

 K. Tsarapkin, member of the Collegium of the Commissiariat for Foreign Affairs, director of the United States division.

S. P. Kozyrev, director of the first

European division of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

A. A. Lavrishchev, director of the division of Balkan countries, Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

A. A. Sobolev, chief of the politic section of the Soviet military admiistration in Germany.

 Z. Saburov, assistant to the chief d the Soviet military administration in Germany.

A. A. Golunsky, expert consultant of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and also political, military and technical assistants.

## THE DECLARATION BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT OF A STATE OF WAR WITH JAPAN, MOSCOW, AUGUST 8, 1945

After the defeat and capitulation of Hitlerite Germany, Japan was the only great power which was still for continu-

ation of the war.

The demand of the three powers— United States, Britain and China—of July 26 for unconditional surrender of the Japanese forces was declined by Japan. Thus the proposal of the Japanese government to the Soviet Union concerning mediation in the Far East loses all significance.

In view of the Japanese refusal to surrender, the Allies approached the Soviet government with a proposal to join the war against the Japanese aggressors and thus shorten the time for ending the war, reduce the number of victims, and aid in the speedier restoration of a general peace.

True to its duty as an ally, the Sovie government has accepted the propos of the Allies and has joined the declaration of the Allied powers.

The Soviet government believes the such a policy is the only means the can bring closer the ending of the waliberate people from further sacrification and sufferings, and give the Japanese chance to avoid the danger and struction which Germany lived through after its refusal to accept uncondition surrender.

In view of the above, the Soviet gernment declares that beginning morrow, that is Aug. 9, the Sou Union considers itself in a state of with Japan.

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