

POLITICAL AFFAIRS

*A magazine devoted
to the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism*

EUGENE DENNIS, *Editor*; V. J. JEROME, *Managing Editor*

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With the publication of the present issue, *Political Affairs* marks its first year of growth. It has achieved an average monthly circulation of more than 20,000, which is approximately 4,500 higher than the average of its predecessor, *The Communist*, for the year 1944. The number of its paid subscriptions has risen from 500, in 1944, to over 7,000 at the end of 1945. This figure is encouraging, yet it is still far from commensurate with the political needs of the present period of heightened struggle for peace and in defense of the workers' interests, in which the science of Marxism-Leninism is an indispensable instrument of the working class. The goal now is to reach a circulation of 25,000 by mid-year and 30,000 by the end of 1946, half of which shall be in the form of paid subscriptions. The successful fulfillment of this goal depends in large measure upon the present readers of *Political Affairs*, on the degree of their active participation in the drive to secure new readers for the leading monthly magazine of Marxist thought and opinion in the United States.

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STOP AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN CHINA!

By ROB FOWLER HALL

"The fate of the whole nation is in the balance," a Chinese newspaper, quoted in the *New York Times*, declared. "The situation is more sinister than one cares to believe. . . . There is every danger of China's becoming another Spain."

THE PARALLEL IS DEADLY. The popular, democratic forces of Spain were crushed by the reactionary minority headed by Franco because, and only because, of the military and financial help he received from Hitler and Mussolini. If China does become another Spain, it will be because the United States government, through its military intervention, will have enabled the dictator Chiang Kai-shek to crush the popular, democratic forces of China.

There is no doubt that this is the direction in which American policy in China is heading. A U.P. dispatch from Chungking thus describes the latest developments in Chiang's civil war against the Chinese Communist forces:

More than 12,000 (U.S.) Marines of the Sixth Division guarded the port as

Chinese troops, carrying American rifles, machine guns, mortars, flame throwers and bazookas, marched from United States transports onto the Tsingtao piers. (November 15, 1945.)

The same dispatch announces that at the port of Chinwangtao other American transports were disgorging units of Chiang's Fifty-second Army for an assault on the Great Wall of China, defended by Communists.

Thirty-nine of Chiang's divisions, approximating half a million men, have been completely equipped by the United States, the War Department admits. At least three of these divisions have been trained by American officers. Although it was at first denied, it is now known that 3,000 American war planes have been turned over to the Chinese dictator.

Since V-J Day, American transport planes and ships have been engaged in ferrying Chiang's troops into North China, to cities and ports within the Communist region which are garrisoned by some 50,000 American marines.

Secretary of State Byrnes claims that the American Marines and American transport are necessary to help the Generalissimo in receiving the surrender of some 2,000,000 Japanese troops in North China which are not yet demobilized. Responding to the tremendous pressure of public opinion, Mr. Byrnes said that plans were under way for the withdrawal of the Marines, as soon as this "mission" is completed. The jubilation of the American Marines

at this news was rudely shattered several days later when Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer admitted that there was no immediate perspective for the withdrawal of American troops. And neither Byrnes nor Wedemeyer even indicated the ending of other and more subtle forms of intervention.

THE "MISSION" OF THE MARINES

General Wedemeyer's admission, together with other facts which have reached the press, reveal a great deal more about the "mission" of American forces in China.

On November 5, the *New China Daily*, published in Chungking, presented a list of eight incidents in which American armed forces had intervened on the side of Chiang Kai-shek against the Chinese Communists. Instead of disarming the Japanese or puppet troops at Peiping or Tientsin, the American troops had collaborated with the Japanese puppets and the Kuomintang (government) troops in attacking the Communists, the paper reported.

Marines participated with Kuomintang troops in a number of skirmishes with Communist troops, seizing several towns held by the Communists. Marines arrested personnel in the Tientsin office of the Eighth Route Army and six Communist representatives sent to negotiate with the Americans at Chinwangtao. Finally, U.S. planes based in Peiping strafed Communist-held

Antse and dropped an ultimatum to Communists at Kuan.

In brief, it has become completely clear that American policy in China is all-out support, including military aid, to the reactionary dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek and his clique within the Kuomintang against the democratic elements in China, led by the Chinese Communists. This is the policy which Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley and General Wedemeyer represent. It is a radical departure from the Roosevelt policy of seeking agreement among the various Chinese trends and groupings for the development of a strong, united, democratic China in the interests of victory over Japan.

COMMUNISTS BORE THE BRUNT OF THE WAR

The latter is the aim for which the Chinese Communists have been fighting. Since 1936 their fire has been concentrated on the Japanese imperialists as the main enemy of a free and democratic China. The anti-Japanese unity of the Chinese people, which Chiang betrayed, was built largely through their efforts.

It was the Chinese Communists and their armies, the Eighth Route and the New Fourth, and democratic, popular elements who supported them, that bore the brunt of the war against Japan in China. For eight years they carried on the struggle with no outside aid, compelled to fight not only the Japanese, but also Chinese puppet troops (openly in

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the service of Japan) and the troops of Chungking.

During the course of the war, up until September, 1944, the Communist armies liberated 90 million people, or 43 per cent of those in the occupied areas. The Japanese seized 1,260,000 square kilometers, but the Communists reconquered 66 per cent of this area. Prior to the Honan campaign of March, 1944, the Communists engaged 64.5 per cent of the Japanese troops in China and in October of that year were still engaging more than three-fourths of the enemy troops.

On the thirty-third anniversary of the Chinese Republic, General Chou En-lai, a Communist leader, declared:

The enemy has occupied a total of 45 of our large cities. Thirty-eight of these are subject to our frequent siege or assault. The enemy has occupied about 10,000 kilometers of our railways; 9,600 kilometers or 96 per cent of which are constantly being attacked or interrupted by us. We have complete control of 800 kilometers of coastline behind the enemy and our regular field of activity covers 6,500 kilometers of coastline.

At that time, the regular Communist forces fighting behind the Japanese lines numbered 570,000, consisting of the Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies and the South China Echelon. In addition, there were more than two million militia and guerrilla forces and several million in local self-defense corps. "In brief," said Chou, "after more than seven

years of war our combined regular and militia forces of 2,770,000 are almost equal to the present armed strength of the Kuomintang."

Throughout these seven years, the people's forces were compelled to arm and equip themselves with what they could seize from the Japanese. From the Kuomintang government, they received exactly 120 light machine guns and six anti-tank guns. No munitions, clothing, food or funds for administrative expenses were received after 1940. A shipment of 101 crates of medicines from the American and British Red Cross were confiscated by representatives of Chungking.

Harrison Forman, author of *Report from Red China*, has given us a very moving description of the zeal with which the Chinese peasants, under the leadership of the Communist Party, fought against the Japanese with the most primitive weapons. Cannon were made from hollowed logs. Anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines were contrived from glass, tin cans, and home-made gunpowder. The guerrillas even managed their own "gas attack" against a Japanese-held blockhouse by piling the carcasses of hundreds of dogs around the besieged fortress.

More than a hundred American flyers, shot down over Japanese-occupied China, were rescued by the Chinese Communists.

American newspaper men and women who visited the Communist areas during the war all testified to the progress made there. Land rents

in the newly liberated areas were reduced from the 60, 70 and sometimes 80 per cent of the crop, charged by the feudal gentry, to 40 per cent. They encouraged cooperative farming and organized the reclamation of much waste land. "During six years of war and ruthless Kuomintang blockade," wrote Gunther Stein, author of *Challenge of Red China*, "they doubled agricultural production in the Border Region around Yen-an and raised it even in war areas."

The Communists . . . mobilized the people for manufacture; fostered cottage industries and industrial cooperatives; raised the production of primitive consumer's goods and of primitive weapons for their armies far above Kuomintang standards. (*PM*, November 11, 1945.)

It was only in the Communist areas that American correspondents found democracy. In contrast to the appointment of all local and higher officials by the Kuomintang bureaucracy in the areas dominated by Chiang, county and area governments in the liberated areas are elected by the people.

These, then, are the forces of progress and democracy which Hurley and Wedemeyer would use American marines to crush.

CHIANG'S CLIQUE REACTIONARY AND MORIBUND

The Hurley policy means support of a small, feudal and reactionary clique of landlords, bankers and war-

lords, against the interests and the opinions of an overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. "Many observers on the spot have agreed," wrote Philip Jaffe in *PM* on November 11, "that if free elections could be held in Kuomintang China, 80 per cent of the people would vote against the present regime."

Brooks Atkinson of the *New York Times* described the Chungking clique as "a moribund and anti-democratic regime that is more concerned with maintaining its political supremacy than in driving the Japanese out of China." The military record of the Kuomintang troops confirms this characterization. Instead of fighting the Japanese, the Generalissimo used his crack troops—some 450,000 of them—to blockade the Communist Border Region.

When battle with the Japanese could not be avoided, the poor leadership and lack of morale among the Kuomintang troops proved costly. In the Honan campaign, mentioned above, 50,000 Japanese troops defeated and routed 700,000 Chinese troops under Tang En-po, some of which are now being used in Chiang's campaign in Manchuria.

WHY STILWELL WAS RECALLED

General Stilwell was well aware of this situation. He had considerable admiration for the Chinese people and was convinced that, properly trained and equipped and under honest leadership, the Chinese army

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could make a major contribution to the defeat of Japan. This required that the best possible use be made of available supplies and forces. He was opposed to providing Chiang with arms and material for armies used only to blockade the most effective anti-Japanese fighters on the continent. Either the Kuomintang should collaborate with the Communists against the Japanese, or a share of American lend-lease should go to the Chinese Communists who would use them to advance the cause of the United Nations.

The general's firm insistence on this point infuriated Chiang, who demanded that he be recalled. This was done, and the Communists got no supplies. But had Stilwell's strategy been adopted, much of the costly island hopping and the particularly bloody battles of Iwo and Okinawa might have been avoided.

Meanwhile the strategy of Chiang Kai-shek emerges more clearly. Chinese generals who "deserted" to the Japanese with their armies are now being welcomed by Chungking as heroes and great patriots. Their "desertion" was simply a plot by which these armies could be used to help the Japanese fight the Chinese Communists.

Prince Teh (Teh Wang) is back in Chungking as an expert on Inner Mongolia. From 1937 to the end of the war he was the chief in a Japanese puppet government in Inner Mongolia. In 1941 he had an audience with Hirohito in Tokyo. General Yen Hsi-shan, who during the

war operated in Shansi, not against the Japanese but against the Communists, is back on the scene as a champion of Chungking. In addition to these, Chiang has appointed a number of other erstwhile puppet leaders to high positions.

The Chungking government has no economic program for developing China. Its base is among the landlords, usurers, speculators, and militarists. Production of war materials, even in such factories as were available, actually declined during the war because the owners found that they could make a larger profit if they hoarded the raw materials than if they attempted to manufacture finished articles. The Kuomintang's economic policy is so patently bankrupt that any outlook for its steering China along a path of economic progress is bound to prove illusory.

The income of the bureaucrats is derived from scandalous rents on farm tenants, which take almost the entire crop, and from interest rates up to 100 or 150 per cent. As office holders in the villages and counties, they fix taxes as they wish and rule the people at will. Their brutal method of conscription into the army constitutes one reason for the low morale of the Kuomintang troops.

The Kuomintang regime is not even a one-party system because the members of the party have little or nothing to say about the conduct of its affairs. The ruling body, the Yuan, meanwhile, excludes representation from the Communists, the second party in China, and from the six

smaller democratic parties which are also opposed to Kuomintang rule.

COMMUNISTS FIGHT FOR UNITY

Negotiations continue between the Kuomintang and the Communists in Chungking, even while Chiang's troops, with the help of U.S. forces, shoot down Chinese Communists. The proposals of the Communists are simple. They are prepared to participate as a minority party in a united democratic China. Civil liberties must be guaranteed, and a constitution drawn up by representatives elected by the people. On such a basis they would work for agrarian reform, the encouragement of co-operatives and the development of China's natural resources.

There seems to be no question but that Chiang would have been forced to reach an agreement with the Communists and the Democratic League of China, had he not been assured by Hurley that the American government would back him up to the limit. With such assurances, the Generalissimo has arrogantly refused to compromise and has utilized negotiations as a blind for treachery. It is clear now, however, that Hurley has done more than simply give Chiang the green light; he has been a gadfly goading Chiang into new fascist adventures.

The real intentions of the Truman government are emerging more clearly with each passing day. Forced to the defensive by public opinion, its excuses for armed intervention are

lame and halting. The presence of American troops is necessary, it is claimed, to protect American lives. The Chinese Communists retort, quite aptly, that if the U.S.A. would withdraw its troops, there would be no American lives to protect.

Robert Patterson, Secretary of War, has declared that American troops are needed in North China "to disarm the Japanese troops." In the Peiping and Tientsin areas, the *New China Daily* points out, American marines have collaborated with Kuomintang and Japanese puppet troops in attacking Communists. In this area Japanese troops are being used by the American command to patrol railroads alongside of U.S. marines. Americans are not disarming the Japanese.

According to the press of November 15, Tsinan, a large city in the heart of the Shantung province, is garrisoned by Japanese troops of the 47th Division together with some 20,000 former puppet troops. It is the Communists, not Americans or Kuomintang forces, who are besieging this city in order to disarm the Japanese. Vice Admiral Barbey, after inspecting Chefoo, has attested to the success of the Communists in disarming Japanese and puppet troops. The policy of General Wedemeyer actually impedes the disarming of the Japanese, sacrificing this objective to promoting the fortunes of the Chiang Kai-shek dictatorship in North China.

Washington is attempting to prepare American opinion for a long

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term involvement, with increasingly deeper commitments of men and materials, in the Chinese civil war. Ambassador Hurley, in a speech at Santa Fe, declared that the Chinese Communists "wanted Japanese arms in order to set up a separate government or destroy the present government of China." This is an obviously inflammatory statement which is contradicted both by the statements of the Chinese Communists and by the record.

As a prelude to "atrocities" stories which we can confidently expect to emanate from General Wedemeyer's public relations office as part of the "build-up," the general has charged that Communists fired on a train bearing, in addition to Kuomintang troops, an American officer. The officer was unharmed, but General Wedemeyer has warned the Communists that their villages will be strafed by U.S. planes if another such "incident" occurs.

Denied by Hurley's headquarters but admitted in Washington, is the fact that a \$50,000,000 credit for Chiang is being negotiated. This will permit the dictator to take over lend-lease equipment not yet delivered.

THE REACTIONARY DRIVE OF U.S. IMPERIALISM

The events in China, therefore, cannot be considered as simply an unfortunate episode, an accidental involvement resulting from bungling by the military or mishandling by a minor division of the State Department. They are the most open ex-

pression of a policy, the source of which lies in the reactionary drive of American imperialism. This drive—to an ever-increasing degree—finds expression in the policies of the Truman Administration.

The key to understanding the role of the Truman Administration in the postwar world can be found in the fact that the United States is today the strongest imperialist power with enormous military and economic strength. The decisive American monopolists are determined to utilize this power to achieve world domination for U.S. imperialism. However, the various sections of monopoly capital may differ as to the method, they are united, in the final analysis, in striving to achieve this end. Hence, their policy of buttressing the weakened world capitalist system. This explains American policy in China.

Reporting recently before the National Committee of the Communist Party, Eugene Dennis, member of the National Secretariat, characterized America's role in China:

The present course of America's policy regarding China can be described as one of acting "soft" towards fascist-militarist Japan and getting "tough" with the forces and representatives of a democratic and united China. This stupid and dangerous imperialist policy, which is now being pursued by the Administration, is calculated to prevent the emergence of a strong and progressive China, to make China an American tool and appendage, and to erect a new anti-Soviet bulwark in the Far East.

This policy is doomed to failure. It ignores the real relationship of forces in China and in the Pacific area. And it is as un-American as it is anti-Chinese and anti-Soviet. For it is a policy which can only lead to prolonged civil war in China, to increased imperialist intervention by the United States, and to a further worsening of the relations of the great powers in the Pacific. In short, it is a Hoover-like policy which endangers peace and democratic progress in the Far East and hence in the world, as well as a policy which contracts instead of expanding foreign trade and economic recovery."

That this policy is doomed to failure is confirmed by Chinese history during the past 15 years. It will be recalled that Chiang organized seven well-equipped campaigns by picked divisions trained by German officers—the notorious "bandit suppression" campaigns—and led them against the Chinese Communists. Despite very substantial aid from a number of foreign imperialist powers, and despite the fact that in that period the Chinese Communists were far weaker than today, the campaigns failed. There is far less reason to expect that Chiang and Wedemeyer will succeed today. The New York *Herald Tribune* in this country (which together with other conservative organs of finance capital opposes our Administration's Chinese policy) and many non-Communist observers in the Far East predict a protracted civil war, should Washington persist with its interventionist policy.

Meanwhile, intervention in China

is blasting the moral prestige that accrued to the United States because of its leadership in the war in the Pacific against the fascist-military imperialism of Japan. Its present role is condemned, not only by the masses of toilers who bear the brunt of the imperialist intervention, but also by middle-class democratic elements in China, who formerly hailed the liberating role of American arms. A mass meeting held in Chungking on November 19, under the auspices of a newly-organized Anti-Civil War Association, denounced American policy, according to a U.P. dispatch. Dr. Lo Lung-chi, leader of the Democratic League which sponsored the new organization, declared "We cannot help but doubt American policy. . . . We cannot understand why President Truman decided to continue lend-lease to China after the common enemy, Japan, collapsed. We are decidedly opposed to any country helping any one of our warring parties."

Those sections of Chinese opinion which adhere neither to the Communist Party nor to the Chiang clique of the Kuomintang, are contrasting American and Soviet policy.

At the San Francisco conference of the United Nations, the Soviet delegation, led by Molotov, was the most forceful spokesman for self-government and self-determination, and for the general advance of the colonial nations. In deeds as well as words, the Soviet government has a record of consistently promoting the development of this objective.

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eral score nations which were subjects of the Czar and were liberated only with the October Revolution, but for the smaller nations lying along the Soviet borders. In Asia, this includes the now independent Outer Mongolia, whose government has for many years maintained a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union and whose people have the closest fraternal relations with the Soviet people.

The Soviet government has made it clear in the conduct of its relations with China throughout the years that it has no territorial ambitions against her. This was further established in the Sino-Soviet treaty which was signed on August 14, 1945. This document constitutes a clear recognition of the equality and sovereign rights of the Chinese nation, based, among other things, on the Soviet position that a durable peace in the Pacific requires the development of a free, independent, united and strong China.

In every way, the Soviet has been scrupulously correct in its relations with the Kuomintang government. At the present it is evacuating Manchuria, under the terms of the Sino-Soviet treaty, although Manchuria occupies a highly strategic situation in terms of Soviet security. The Red Army is withdrawing only after having fully lived up to its obligations as a war ally of China. It has completely disarmed and interned the Japanese Kwantung Army, and arrested the chief puppet forces, including the "boy Emperor" of Manchuria.

Thus, for the first time since 1931, the people of Manchuria have been able to establish civilian administrative bodies really representative of, and responsible to, the people.

While the Soviets have carefully avoided intervention in the internal affairs of China, they have also given no aid to the reactionary dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek. In the words of Tillman Durdin, New York *Times* correspondent at Chungking:

"In effect the Russians in Manchuria are declining to do for the [Kuomintang] government what the Americans have done in North China, to garrison and hold areas against the Communists until Government troops have arrived and consolidated their control." (Nov. 20.)

Soviet restraint in China is thus the subject for widespread comment, especially because the anti-Soviet overtones of American imperialist intervention are beginning to be recognized. The Soviet policy of non-intervention thus stands out in the sharpest contrast to the program of the Truman Administration which, if unchecked, will lead to further imperialist adventures and the outbreak of a new world war.

However, there is no basis for defeatist or fatalist moods. An aroused American people can check the aggressive, interventionist drive of U.S. imperialism along a course that can only lead to a new world slaughter.

But this requires, in the first place, that labor and all democratic forces shall push forward boldly, in concert, to protest the offensive of American

imperialism and to force a change in the Truman Administration policies.

Because the Truman Administration executes the program of the monopolists in its foreign policies, labor must rely in the first place on its own strength in the fight for peace. If labor will adopt an independent position in this struggle and at the same time demonstrate the initiative and organizing energy of which it is capable, it will be able to rally its popular allies and to unite a majority of the nation in a crusade against imperialist intervention.

In this connection, Dennis declared to the National Committee:

"The anti-fascist workers, from the Communists to the progressives in the C.I.O., as well as in the A. F. of L., must immediately appear before the nation as the leaders in the fight for peace and, above all, for American-Soviet friendship and cooperation, and for ending America's imperialist interference in China. They must speak out, organize public expressions of opinion and mass demonstrations in support of the policy of Big Three unity and peace, and in behalf of advancing China's independence, integrity, unity and democracy.

They must join hands with the returning veterans and their families, with the scientists, professionals and intellectuals, with the anti-imperialist Negro people, and with all other peace-loving groups and individuals. They

must promote world labor unity, concretely through strengthening the W.F.T.U. Likewise, labor and the anti-fascists, in organizing the broadest movement for peace should not hesitate to enlist the support of various non-labor groups and individuals who, for one or another reason, and as one or another issue, can be drawn into a democratic movement against preparations for war, against imperialist aggression, and for the strengthening of United Nations cooperation.

At this moment, the American people are impatient for the return of their sons and husbands from the far-flung battlefronts. They are opposed to a policy which requires the continued absence of American boys from their homes for reactionary militarist objectives.

It is under the conditions described in the foregoing pages that the Communist Party has called for an energetic struggle by all labor and democratic forces in America around the concrete slogans of action:

Stop the reactionary intervention of the U.S.A. in China's internal affairs!

Repudiate and recall Hurley and Wedemeyer!

Withdraw American troops from China!

Speed demobilization and bring the boys home!

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BACKGROUND OF THE AUTO STRIKE

By CARL WINTER

(Written before the start of the General Motors strike, the following article by the Michigan State President of the Communist Party provides a valuable analysis of the factors involved in the auto workers' struggle—The Editors.)

WHAT IS NOW happening in the automotive industry is a dramatic demonstration that American monopoly is bent on holding tight to its swollen profits and other war-time gains while fiercely striving to destroy the advances made by labor during this period. This general postwar program of the monopolists takes its most glaring forms in the automotive industry, where the greatest combines of capital, such as General Motors, Chrysler and Ford—the Big Three—confront the most powerful industrial union of the workers, the U.A.W.-C.I.O.

THE MAIN ISSUE

The chief contention between the auto barons and the union is the demand of the workers for a 30 per cent increase in wages. This demand corresponds to that put forward by the steelworkers' and electrical workers' unions of the C.I.O. following the cutbacks in war production after V-J Day, for a \$2.00-a-day wage in-

crease. The very readiness with which the employers offer to discuss almost any problem relative to peacetime production, except the demand for a substantial wage increase, emphasizes the major significance which both management and labor rightly attach to this issue. When Philip Murray insisted at the outset at the Federally-convened Labor-Management Conference in Washington that it place on its agenda the question of wage increases, he spoke in the interests not only of labor, but of the nation as a whole.

The auto workers' demand for the admittedly substantial wage raise of 30 per cent is a fight to preserve the level of take-home pay. It is thus a struggle to maintain purchasing power at the very moment when a shrinkage of the home market threatens to throw the whole country into an economic crisis. The need for such an increase in wages to meet postwar employment conditions can be easily demonstrated. The prevailing wartime work-week of 48 hours, for which 52 hours' pay was earned under overtime provisions, has now been reduced to a maximum of 40 hours for the overwhelming majority of production workers in the automotive industry—that is, of course, for those fortunate enough not to be among the 500,000 who have been totally disemployed. Obviously, for those still working, it would require a 30 per cent increase to bring their earnings up to the level received prior to curtailment of the work-week. Such an increase would

merely restore wage levels that even previously failed to keep up with the more rapidly rising cost of living.

This lag of even the full-week pay envelope behind living costs was incidentally acknowledged by G.M. when it accompanied rejection of the union demand on November 7 by a counter-proposal. While refusing the 30 per cent demand, the corporation proposed to increase wage rates "by classifications which since 1941 had not been increased in proportion to the increase in the cost of living."

Equally demonstrable as the need for a 30 per cent wage raise to keep up the auto workers' take-home pay is the ability of the auto industry to grant this demand. A memorandum released by the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion at the end of October declared that savings in post-war operating costs and repeal of the excess profits tax would permit industry to increase wages 24 per cent and still maintain wartime profit levels. This, without taking into account the accumulated huge reserves from wartime profits, the government guarantee against reduction of "normal" profits during a two-year reconversion period, capacity for greater productivity acquired during the war, or the great accumulated market demand for automobiles as for other consumer goods.

MONOPOLY'S OFFENSIVE

But the powerful automobile magnates headed by G.M., Chrysler and Ford are now busy presenting to the

country a picture of injured innocence. They complain that they are being taken advantage of by powerful "monopolistic unions" and that they cannot afford to stay in business if the union's wage demand is to be met. Of course, the actual situation is exactly the reverse. Far from being the victims of unreasonable demands, the auto monopolists are themselves engaged in a reactionary offensive, not only against labor, but against the mass of the American people. Simultaneously with their outcries against the union, and as part of their anti-labor drive, the corporations are demanding that the country assume the burdens of higher prices, more inequitable taxation, and mounting unemployment.

Vice-President Richard T. Frankenstein of the U.A.W. recently charged publicly that, during the summer of 1944, a conspiracy had been hatched in a meeting at the Detroit Athletic Club for an all-out anti-union campaign when the time would come for reconversion. Already last spring spokesmen for the auto barons indicated the outlines of such a campaign in testimony before the Mead Committee hearings in Detroit. Thus, George Romney, general manager of the Automobile Manufacturers Association, unleashed an attack upon the auto union, charging irresponsibility, slow-downs, wild-cat strikes and violation of contract. The chief burden of his plea, which was echoed by spokesmen for General Motors, Chrysler and other corporations, was that labor was encroach-

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ing upon the "prerogatives of management."

What the employers understand by management's prerogatives was made clear when Romney wrote to Secretary of Commerce Wallace in November complaining against a Commerce Department report which showed that the automotive industry could increase wages by 25 per cent during the next two years, without price increases, and still make high profits. Denying the Commerce Department's report that increased efficiency in the auto industry can be expected to lower costs, Romney wrote that progress can be made in auto production only "if an end were put to union-imposed restrictions on output."

This theme runs through all the literature and propaganda the auto magnates have let loose upon the country in especially large volume since labor presented its wage demands.

PRESSURE FOR SPEED-UP

Under the pretext of discussing the wage issue, the automobile employers are pressing for the lowering of all union safeguards and the extraction of increased profits through intensified speed-up of curtailed working forces. Thus, full-page advertisements in the press of the major cities throughout the country, issued by General Motors on October 4, took up the demagogic wail that "higher wages without a corresponding increase in productivity are inflationary." As soon as cutbacks in war

orders relieved the manpower shortage, auto employers began to clamp down for increased output per worker, hoping that their desperate drive for still higher profits would not be strongly resisted in the face of the threatening growth of unemployment. In a whole number of plants in Detroit and elsewhere, shortly after V-J Day, scores of key workers were summarily dismissed on management's charge that they would not keep up with the desired production pace. Cries about "productivity" began at the first moment that management saw the opportunity of taking advantage of labor, long before any demand for wage increases had been presented by the union. What management is concerned about underneath its present pretext of gearing wages to output is, not any imaginary danger of inflation, but merely the extraction of additional profits.

BOOSTING CONSUMER PRICES

Coupled with the drive for increased speed-up is the auto industry's drive against the whole price ceiling structure and for higher prices on cars. This campaign, too, is being waged under the pretext that price increases on automobiles, and a general rise in the cost of living, must be an inevitable result of any substantial increase in wages. What the industry's propagandists seek to conceal, however, is the fact that price ceilings, which were set at 1942 levels, already include a 27 per cent increase over 1940 automobile prices. This increase was granted in considera-

tion of the wartime curtailment of volume of auto production. Despite the fact that reconversion to civilian production will result in a tremendous increase in automobile output, with greater savings and heightened profits, the auto monopolies are now trying to squeeze out additional price raises for themselves. The demand for a 25-30 per cent increase in prices on delivered cars pre-dates by many months any demand on the part of the auto union for wage adjustments. The companies' linking of wage demands with the campaign against government controls and the consumers, is thus clearly intended to place upon the labor movement the discredit for monopoly's rapacious demands. It is designed to deprive labor of popular sympathy and support. But the very unions which are asking for substantial wage increases are playing a growing part in leading the fight against a rise in prices. Labor's struggle to preserve purchasing power is thus becoming increasingly a vital part of the national effort to ward off economic catastrophe.

DESTROYING SOCIAL LEGISLATION

The Big Three in auto is furthermore spearheading the fight for Big Business as a whole against national social legislation. One of the objectives of the well-laid plans of the auto barons revealed at the Mead Committee hearings was a drive to eliminate the Wagner Act and to substitute labor-shackling laws along the lines of the Ball-Burton-Hatch

Bill. This objective was further revealed in the proposal to establish a 45-hour work-week at straight-time rates, offered by GM's President C. E. Wilson, in response to the union's demand for a wage increase to preserve take-home pay. Such measures as the bill introduced in Congress on November 5 by Representative Hebert of Louisiana to amend the anti-trust laws so as to treat strikes and labor disputes as actions "in restraint of trade" fall in line with this offensive of monopoly against the social advances won by labor in the past decade.

WHO'S STRIKING NOW?

In spite of these and numerous other provocations, the auto workers throughout the country have, by and large, avoided being stampeded into isolated and scattered strike actions. It is significant to note, as was pointed out in the September 15 issue of *Automotive and Aviation Industries*, that most of the strikes in the recent period are "over disciplinary action taken by management." In other words, most of the interruptions of production in the auto industry are provoked by management itself.

The main body of the organized auto workers is keeping its powder dry for the showdown struggle to win its demands for substantial wage increases. The workers in General Motors, Chrysler and Ford plants throughout the country have voted overwhelmingly, in elections held under the Smith-Connally Act late in

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October and in the beginning on November, to strike if need be, to win these demands. These votes were preceded in each instance by even heavier balloting in the respective local unions, in which an average of over 90 percent supported the authorization of strikes.

Nevertheless, the real strike against auto production is being waged today, not by the workers, but by management itself. This is a strike leveled against the economic security of the nation and designed only to preserve high profits for the privileged few at the top of the auto industry, while the nation as a whole suffers high living costs and mounting unemployment. The effects of this strike by management are revealed in a recent report of the Civilian Production Administration. This Federal agency reports that, despite the auto industry's claims of anxiety to get back to civilian production as quickly as possible, it has turned out only 19,136 new passenger cars in the four months from July to October, as against 72,740 cars anticipated earlier this year, according to the report. Originally, the War Production Board had estimated tentative production for the last half of 1945 at 250,000 units and had divided quotas among automotive firms on that basis.

The auto monopolists' motives for holding up reconversion and car production at this time are many. They range from savings on taxation and raising of prices, to profiting from prolonged unemployment and

the turning of public sentiment against the trade unions.

SAVING EXCESS PROFITS TAX

The auto corporations are undoubtedly counting upon materially increasing their total profits with the aid of postponing sales of their product from 1945 to 1946. This is now assured by Congressional elimination of excess profits taxes in 1946. For G.M. alone, the resulting saving would be 99 million dollars, on the basis of an income equal to that earned in 1944.

BREAKING CEILINGS

The Automotive and Aviation Parts Manufacturers Association demonstrated several weeks ago that the government could be pressured into granting price increases. When the parts manufacturers announced that there would be no production unless OPA ceilings were lifted, the OPA replied by eliminating all ceilings on the price of parts and sub-assemblies in the auto industry. Although this was defended by the government with the promise that the increased prices would be absorbed within the price ceiling of finished cars, this action encouraged the auto corporations in their demand for higher ceilings on their product. The door to higher prices, set by company dictation, has already been opened by the OPA's latest grant of a 6 per cent plus \$30.00 increase for new Ford cars even without reference to any wage increase.

RETARDING EXPANSION

With limited production, high prices, and lowered labor cost per car, the auto manufacturers see an opportunity for the greatest returns with the least possible outlay. Despite optimistic predictions by the War Production Board about the great increase in output to be expected after reconversion, the auto magnates have their eyes, not so much on the potentially great market of 1946-47, but on a shrunken market after 1948. Their policy therefore tends to be geared to limiting output to a restricted demand which could be met without the investment of new capital or expansion of productive facilities.

SOFTENING UP LABOR

If the auto industry's outlook for restricted production at a rate of no more than six million cars a year prevails, the bulk of half a million disemployed auto workers will understand that their chances of re-employment in this industry are very slim. The way in which the corporations are speculating upon lowering labor standards and weakening union strength, as a result of this situation, is evidenced daily by deliberate contract violations and other arbitrary acts. Innumerable plants in Detroit, as elsewhere, have engaged in the practice of discharging women wholesale without regard to seniority; hiring men off the street; and lowering classifications, especially in the case of Negroes. In addition, deliberate efforts are being made to

pit veterans against the unemployed and even against workers with highest seniority.

DANGEROUS ILLUSIONS

It would naturally be expected that, in the face of this well-conceived and brutally executed offensive by the auto barons, labor in the auto industry would be thoroughly aroused and would energetically conduct a counter-struggle in its defense. However, almost all observers who have recently come to report the anticipated national conflict as it shapes up in the auto center of Detroit have expressed amazement at the relative calm which they encounter.

That is not to say that the auto workers are in anything like a passive mood or that their local unions are lacking in militancy. On the contrary, the average auto local is more alert than ever to any injury and is ready to defend the rights of its members. However, what characterizes predominantly the actions of most auto locals against company encroachments in this period is that these actions are chiefly of a defensive character. Despite the overwhelming vote of the U.A.W. members, authorizing a national strike against each of the Big Three for the central demand for a 30 percent wage increase, there are yet inadequate signs of recognition of the need to coordinate all local actions for an early transition to a counter-offensive. This does not represent any feeling of weakness on the part of the union but, on the

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contrary, arises from what could be dangerous over-confidence. It is necessary to dispel the notion that the national demands of the auto workers will be substantially won without a real, stubborn struggle. Especially since the revisionist premises on which we Communists operated in the recent past helped give currency to certain dangerous illusions as to labor's postwar perspectives, it is necessary that we expose all such fallacies to the auto workers now.

COUNTING ON WASHINGTON

There are some tendencies to count upon a benevolent attitude on the part of the Federal government toward labor's demands. Especially because of the close connection which the wage increase has with safeguarding the whole country from economic disaster, many auto workers expect that President Truman will step into the breach at the final moment to order substantial concessions on the part of the auto manufacturers. But labor has had at least one clear-cut demonstration of what many be expected from the Truman Administration. That was in the oil strike, at the beginning of October, in which the workers had also asked for a 30 percent wage increase. To the accompaniment of much fanfare, Truman's new Secretary of Labor, Schwollenbach, proposed a settlement on the basis of an immediate 15 percent raise and arbitration on the balance; and the strikers accepted that proposal. However, when the oil companies rejected this settlement, President

Truman ordered the Navy to take over the struck plants and enforced, under government operation, not the Labor Secretary's compromise, but the original wage of the companies which remains in effect to the day of this writing! If any doubt remains as to what may be expected of President Truman in the auto situation without substantially more labor and public pressure, then his radio speech of October 30 should be called to mind. In that speech Truman warned: "labor must . . . not demand more than an industry or a company can pay under existing prices and conditions." Consequently, it would appear that others have at least as good cause to count on Washington for help as have the auto workers. But, certainly as far as the auto corporations are concerned, even the President's solicitude cannot hide the fact that unprecedented profits and productivity put them definitely in the class that "can pay."

"FAR-SIGHTED" CAPITALISTS

Hopeful mention is being made in some circles of the U.A.W. about the recent change in leadership of the Ford Motor Company. With the taking over of the presidency by young Henry Ford II and the ouster of union-buster Harry Bennett as head of the personnel department, certain illusions have arisen that the U.A.W. wage demand will be eased toward fulfillment by the new management. Dispensing with analysis of the Ford pedigree which would entitle him to any progressive reputa-

tion, the realities of labor's situation were brought home with the recent entry of Henry Kaiser upon the Detroit auto scene. Kaiser, who acquired a reputation as a far-sighted capitalist and progressive during the war, recently took over the former Willow Run Bomber plant for auto production. But it took a picket line, marching for six days around his 16½ mile plant, to bring Kaiser to an agreement with the union on recognition of preferential rights and seniority of former employees to be hired. What can therefore be expected of the Ford scion who since September 12 has refused to settle the strike of ten thousand workers in the Windsor, Canada, Ford plant, whose chief demand was not a 30 per cent wage raise, but union security?

"ONE-AT-A-TIME" SPECULATION

Much has been said in the press about the supposed strategy of the U.A.W. to defeat the Big Three auto corporations by striking them one at a time. Unfortunately, this notion was given some currency by the bravado speech of Walter Reuther before the G.M. Council on September 14. Regardless of the merit in any serious plan to divide its opponents, the union must guard against any illusions of easy victory. To win, the union will have to muster its full strength and all reserves commensurate with the power of the great monopolies it challenges. Despite competitive interests among

the Big Three in the auto industry, it must be recognized that they will seek to act as one against the demands of labor. This was illustrated dramatically when, within two hours after Reuther's tip-off on September 14 that G.M. had been selected as the union's target for the first shut-down, the Ford company closed down its plants throughout the country as if in direct reply. This collaboration against labor extends beyond the confines of the auto industry, as was indicated in a press conference held by C. E. Wilson, which was reported in the *Detroit News* of October 28. Wilson cynically said then: "While we think of our own people first, we actually know of no good reason why they should have that preferred position, as against other workers in the country. We also know as a realistic matter that they cannot put themselves in that position. The steel workers, the rubber workers, even you men will want your 30 percent...."

LABOR'S REPLY

The importance to the nation as a whole of the auto workers' demand to preserve the level of take-home pay, as well as the leading position occupied in the ranks of American monopoly capital by its opponents, dictates the direction of the steps which must be taken to win this struggle. All illusions about an easy victory or making progress piecemeal must be pushed aside. Particularly dangerous at this moment is any notion that mere maneuvering

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can win the demanded substantial wage increase without the most serious preparations for a national strike in the auto industry. Whether or not such a strike will actually prove to be necessary will depend upon the employers' attitude. But the greatest influence upon that attitude will be evidence on the part of the union that it is prepared.

STRIKE PREPARATIONS

The best preparation for victory short of strike is the timely establishment of all necessary strike machinery. This includes immediate attention to the strengthening and alerting of the entire shop committee and steward apparatus as well as all local union committees. It also includes the creation of additional necessary machinery and the adoption of measures for assuring adequate finances and all necessary facilities for a show-down struggle.

LEGISLATIVE ACTION

At the same time, increased attention must be given to the legislative struggle in order to prevent a reactionary Congress from stacking the cards against labor's fight and the nation's postwar economic security. This calls for the mobilization of increased public pressure against new anti-labor legislation or legislation easing the controls upon monopoly. It calls for a renewed campaign to increase unemployment compensation as well as other protective measures for labor and war veterans.

ATTENTION TO SPECIAL GROUPS

Company efforts at provocation in order to lead the union into false starts, and to confuse and demoralize its ranks, can be expected to increase. But a special series of circumstances, aggravated by postwar lay-offs, tend to make these provocations more dangerous than ever. These circumstances include the mass unemployment, coupled with the return of tens of thousands of auto workers from the armed services, and the wholesale elimination from many plants of Negroes and women. The U.A.W. has given altogether too little attention to the organization of its unemployed members within the respective locals, and especially to the organization and struggle on behalf of veterans. Certainly, failure to take up these issues now, as well as any continued neglect of the fight upon discrimination against Negroes and women, can be fatal in the union's coming national struggle.

LABOR'S BIG THREE

Just as the auto barons are fully conscious of their common interests with the magnates of oil, steel, rubber and other monopolies, so must the U.A.W. recognize the need for gearing its whole wage fight with the similar efforts of such unions as the Steel Workers and the United Electrical and Radio Workers. Together with the Auto Workers, these constitute the Big Three of labor. The most effective wage-fight strategy for the auto workers will be one that is

correlated with the strategy of the other major unions in what is essentially a common national fight against the concerted reactionary program of monopoly.

From the magnitude of the tasks now confronting the U.A.W., it should be apparent to all that the single greatest requirement for success is unity within the ranks of the United Automobile Workers Union. A united union can meet and successfully solve the problems confronting the workers of this industry. The union can play a decisive part in the emerging national struggle for America's postwar economic security. But only a *united* union can adequately meet these responsibilities.

It is necessary to stress the urgency of unity in the U.A.W., since the greatest economic struggle in its history is taking shape in the very months when the union is preparing for its next International Convention. The annual conventions of the U.A.W. have unfortunately been marked by extreme factional division. The pre-convention months have usually witnessed extreme internal dissension. The importance of inner-union unity in the coming wage fight is more than ever evident from increasing appeals on the part of such agencies as the Automobile Manufacturers Association to "decentralize" the union. Pleading that bargaining should be brought down to the company level—between company executives and local unions—George Romney recently declared that it is "unhealthy" for all union contracts

to be subject to ratification by the U.A.W. International Executive Board. And, in a parting shot at the organization, he characterized the Board as being dominated by "four international officers who themselves are vying for complete control of the world's biggest union."

It is to be hoped that the serious business in hand will have a restraining and sobering influence against factionalism in the coming U.A.W. convention, scheduled for April. Neither the U.A.W. nor the nation can afford the disruptive activities of the so-called "rank and file caucus," initiated by Reuther's satellites, or the factionalism engineered by a handful of well-placed A.C.T.U. agents, any more than the provocations and irresponsible manipulations of the Trotskyites. The economic demands of the auto workers must be lifted out of the one-man newspaper-column fight, to which Walter Reuther has relegated them as part of his campaign for election to the union presidency, and instead be translated into realistic terms of organization for struggle on the part of a united union.

The maturing wage struggle, not only dictates the necessity, but affords the opportunity, of uniting all constructive forces around the U.A.W. leadership headed by Thomas, Addes and Frankenstein on the basis of an effective program to strengthen labor's fighting capacity, rally broad public support and rout monopoly's reactionary offensive.

LABOR MOVES FORWARD IN THE NEW YORK ELECTIONS

By MAX GORDON

NEW YORK CITY'S municipal election campaign ended with victory for the city's labor-progressive elements and with a disastrous defeat for both wings of the reactionary Republican-Social Democratic alliance, organized by Governor Dewey in an effort to take over the city.

Working in coalition with the Democratic Party, the labor-progressive movement played an important part in the election of William O'Dwyer, Democratic-American Labor Party candidate for mayor, and his running mates. O'Dwyer won by an overwhelming plurality. His vote was 1,119,225; Dewey's candidate, Jonah Goldstein, received 434,050; and Mayor LaGuardia's "No Deal" candidate, Newbold Morris, received 399,437 votes.

The fact that O'Dwyer will be the next mayor of New York is not in itself the decisive feature of the election results from the viewpoint of progress. Several other features emerge, each of which will have im-

portant national and state political consequences and will help to determine the course O'Dwyer will follow as mayor.

These features are:

1. The record vote polled by the two Communist candidates for City Council, Benjamin J. Davis, Jr. and Peter V. Cacchione, both of whom were overwhelmingly reelected to the Council from their respective boroughs.

2. The strong independent role played by labor within the coalition behind O'Dwyer, and its reflection in the vote of the A.L.P. and in the election of two of its candidates for City Council, Michael Quill and Eugene P. Connolly. The defeat of several other A.L.P. councilmanic candidates was a serious negative aspect of the election results.

3. The extremely low vote cast for the Republican Party and the resultant weakening of Dewey's position in the city G.O.P. and in the state as a whole, including the emergence of an organized group of liberal Republicans associated with the Newbold Morris campaign.

4. The stunning defeat of the Liberal Party, center of reactionary Social-Democracy, not only locally, but nationally.

Each of these positive objectives had been sought by the Communists in the campaign. In a statement the day before the elections, Robert Thompson, New York State Chairman of the Communist Party, said:

The first part of [labor's] task is to

defeat Goldstein, the candidate of open reaction. . . . The second part of the task is to strengthen the independent position and influence of labor within the progressive coalition, recognizing that labor is the core of that coalition.

Further, Thompson stated:

The crucial conditions for the maintenance and further development of the labor-progressive coalition are these: a sweeping victory for the Communist councilmen, Benjamin J. Davis, Jr. and Peter V. Cacchione; an overwhelming vote for Michael Quill and other A.L.P. councilmanic candidates; a mass vote for O'Dwyer on labor's terms, on the A.L.P. line.

THE COMMUNIST VOTE

The two Communist councilmen, one running in Manhattan and the other in Brooklyn, cast a combined first choice vote of 122,629. Though achieved only in two of the five counties, this vote was far higher than any ever received by Communist candidates for the entire city. Two years ago, with candidates running in all four major boroughs, the total Communist vote was over 106,000. The highest recorded Communist vote on a city scale is the 100,000 received by Israel Amter, running for Representative-at-large in the elections of 1938.

Councilman Davis, Negro Communist leader who ran for reelection in Manhattan, received a first choice vote of 56,129, which is an increase of 22,000 or 65 per cent over the first choice vote he received when

elected two years ago. Though topped this year by a popular progressive Republican, Stanley Isaacs, who received 60,092 first choice ballots, Davis' first choice vote was higher than any ever polled before by a councilmanic candidate in Manhattan. (Under New York's proportional representation system of electing councilmen, voters indicate first, second, third, etc. preferences. Several councilmen are elected from each county, depending on the size of the valid vote.)

Davis' final vote, after transfer of second and later choice votes from defeated candidates, was 63,498. Five councilmen were elected from Manhattan.

Councilman Cacchione finished far out in front in Brooklyn with 66,496 first choice votes, 11,000 ahead of his closest competitor. This was the second successive election in which the popular Communist councilman headed the list in first choice votes. His count this year, however, was 13,000 greater than the high vote he received two years ago, or an increase of nearly 25 per cent. It is the highest first choice vote ever recorded by a councilmanic candidate in Brooklyn.

The high Communist vote in New York duplicates the experience of Communist candidates for school board in Cleveland and Boston. Arnold Johnson, Ohio Communist leader, received over 56,000 in the Cleveland elections and Otis Hood,

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Boston Communist leader, polled more than 26,000 in the elections in that city. Both votes were higher than any previously recorded by Communists in these cities. This showing of the Communists has two important consequences:

1. It is a serious blow to Red-baiters, since it indicates that voters will not be frightened by the "Red" label out of voting for those they consider the best candidates.

2. It is being interpreted in national political circles as indicative of a trend toward greater political independence on the part of progressive labor, an interpretation that is entirely justified, since the Communist Party is the most advanced expression of working class political independence.

The Communist vote in New York is one aspect of the rejection of Red-baiting by the voters. The other aspect is the extremely low vote received by the candidates of the reactionary G.O.P.-Liberal Party coalition, which made Red-baiting its chief campaign issue, and particularly by the Liberal Party, whose platform is built on Red-baiting.

Again, the fact that over 122,000 citizens voted for Communist candidates in two boroughs tells only part of the story about the singular lack of regard shown by the electorate for the advice of the anti-Communists. For one thing, the A.L.P. councilmanic candidates, in the face of the virulent Red-baiting by the Dewey coalition against their

party, received over 200,000 first choice votes. And the two A.L.P.ers who were the particular butts of the Red-baiters, Quill and Connolly, were elected.

Besides the first choice votes, however, scores of thousands of voters gave the Communist and A.L.P. candidates second, third or later choices. No record of all the ballots so marked is available, but an extremely conservative estimate would be that one out of every four voters gave some choice to a Communist or A.L.P. candidate.

Unquestionably, many of those who cast ballots for Davis or Cacchione did so on the basis of their excellent records as fighters for the economic and social needs of the people of New York, as well as on the basis of their programs and policies. But more is involved than that. Since the United States is not insulated from Europe, some of the political currents that contributed to the great tide of Communist strength among the nations on the continent doubtless operated here.

The part the Communists played in the underground struggle against Hitlerism, the fact that they are the backbone of the democratic movements of Europe and Asia today, and the fact that they are the genuine advocates of Socialism affected a portion of the voters. They gave their support to the American Communists as the most firm fighters for a democratic domestic and foreign policy and for unity of the progres-

sive forces at home, and as the most competent political leaders of the working class.

Among many of these voters there was considerable uneasiness concerning the reactionary direction of American foreign policy under Truman, with its atom bomb diplomacy and its intervention against the peoples of the Far East. There was also hostility towards its week-kneed domestic policies. Both Davis and Cacchione dealt with these developments in their campaigns.

The vote received by Davis is of special significance nationally. An outstanding leader among the Negro people, he was the target of attack not only by local reactionary elements but by such national spokesmen for reaction as the fascist Representative John E. Rankin. Rankin's Committee on Un-American Activities called Davis down to Washington during the campaign in an effort to "smear" him. Committee members quickly dropped the idea when they realized he intended to take the offensive against them, thereby exposing too plainly the political aims of their activities. They recognized, too, that their persecution would greatly aid rather than hurt him.

The Negro people throughout the nation watched Davis' fight for reelection with intense interest. It was considered one of the most advanced political expressions of Negro-white unity, since Davis was running not simply in a Negro constituency but in the entire borough. He could not

win without a substantial vote from whites. He had the backing of the C.I.O., of many individual A. F. of L. and C.I.O. unions, and the endorsement, though not the designation, of the A.L.P. Hence, he was the symbol of Negro-labor unity. The question was whether labor would deliver for him.

It did, not only in the votes he received from workers in white districts but in the aid it gave him in getting Negro voters to the polls. In Harlem, Davis received over 32,000 first choice votes, or about 75 per cent of the vote cast by Negroes there. Outside of Harlem, he received close to 24,000 first choice votes.

This was done in the face of a vicious campaign of slander conducted against him by the reactionary G.O.P.-Liberal Party coalition which put Benjamin F. McLaurin, Negro Social-Democratic trade unionist, in the field in an effort to split the vote in Harlem. McLaurin's Harlem vote was less than 3,500.

In Brooklyn, Cacchione's vote has gone up progressively since his election in 1941. At that time, he received a little over 34,000 first choice votes. In 1943, his vote was approximately 53,500. His jump to the record figure of 66,496 this year is a tribute by the voters of Brooklyn to the kind of leadership he has given them. He has set new standards of activity for elected public officials and the people recognized the fact.

It must be noted that this sizable Communist vote, both in New York

and elsewhere, comes after the American Communist movement had passed through a severe crisis that shook it from top to bottom. The fact that it was able to emerge so strong after the period of re-evaluation of policy that followed publication of the Duclos article testifies to its health and to the fact that the policies it has adopted are essentially correct. It must be admitted, however, that largely as a result of the past mistakes of the Party, the number of active Communists in this campaign was not so great as in past elections. A relatively small proportion of the membership was actively engaged in it.

Moreover, in one county a sufficiently broad and firm coalition policy was not carried through. This resulted in strains in the progressive-labor coalition and in the failure to elect an additional progressive candidate in the councilmanic contest.

In the main, however, the Communists furnished outstanding leadership in fighting against reactionary tendencies within the coalition behind O'Dwyer, including O'Dwyer's own concessions to reaction, while at the same time maintaining and strengthening that coalition in the course of the campaign.

LABOR'S ROLE

At the beginning of the campaign, progressive labor's aim was to unite those elements in the city that had backed F.D.R. in the 1944 elections. That included the Democratic and

American Labor Parties, both wings of the labor movement, as well as the independent and liberal Republican forces grouped around Mayor LaGuardia.

Brig. Gen. William O'Dwyer, Brooklyn's district attorney on leave to the Army where he had performed several important missions for F.D.R., was supported as the candidate who could best unite these elements. Before his nomination, however, F.D.R. died and a bitter struggle developed for control of the Democratic Party. The struggle took the form of a fight against the nomination of O'Dwyer. Behind this, however, was the issue of whether the Democrats would line up with progressive labor in this campaign, as was O'Dwyer's inclination, or whether they would line up with reactionary elements against progressive labor, as demanded by Bronx Boss Ed Flynn.

The O'Dwyer forces won out and he was nominated both by the Democrats and the A.L.P. It was clear, however, that the reactionary elements were powerful in the Democratic Party and would attempt to exert strong pressure upon him. In the course of the campaign, when it became certain that O'Dwyer would win by a wide margin, some of these elements that had previously decided to knife him changed their tactics and began to campaign vigorously to get out the Democratic vote. Less than two weeks before Election Day, James A. Farley entered the cam-

paign for O'Dwyer in an obvious move to convince reactionary Democratic rank-and-filers opposed to O'Dwyer to vote Democratic anyway. It was also designed to bring Farley back into the Democratic picture.

The reactionaries had a twofold aim. They wanted to surround O'Dwyer and capture him, since he was bound to win anyway; and, two, they wanted to get out a huge Democratic vote in relation to the A.L.P. vote, thereby minimizing the strength and influence of the progressive labor forces. Their aim was to have the Democratic Party emerge with an absolute majority as a demonstration that it needed no alliances with the A.L.P. in order to dominate the city.

In this situation, the strength that the progressive labor forces would be able to register was highly important in relation both to O'Dwyer's course as mayor and to the future direction of the Democratic Party. That strength would be registered in the councilmanic vote for the Communist and A.L.P. candidates, and in the mayoralty vote cast on the A.L.P. line.

Serious difficulties were caused by concessions made by O'Dwyer to reactionary pressures during the campaign. For one thing, he was instrumental in forcing the Manhattan Democrats to withdraw the Democratic designation from Councilman Davis after they had given it to him as a result of pressure from

Harlem and from labor. Second, he Red-baited twice in the course of the campaign. Third, he failed to disassociate himself from the reactionary foreign policies embarked on by the Truman Administration.

The effect of this on many progressives, within and without the labor movement, was to make them doubtful about O'Dwyer and cool to his campaign. There was a tendency on the part of quite a few progressive voters to swing to Newbold Morris, a liberal Republican closely identified with the LaGuardia Administration whom the Mayor had thrown into the race belatedly to maintain his own position in city and state politics. This endangered the A.L.P.

Labor was thus faced with the job of combatting reactionary tendencies within the coalition which it had been instrumental in organizing, while at the same time maintaining its own independent position and strength. It met this situation by placing all emphasis on the A.L.P. vote as the crucial aspect of the campaign. The most advanced forces of progressive labor, the Communists, severely criticized O'Dwyer's concessions to reaction, but made it clear that it was essential to roll up a big A.L.P. vote for him and the largest possible vote for the Communist and A.L.P. councilmanic candidates as the best means of combating reaction.

The election results showed that labor's aims were in large mea-

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ure achieved. Of O'Dwyer's 1,119,225 votes, the Democrats gave him 839,957 and the A.L.P. 259,268. The Democratic vote was 44 per cent of the total cast and the A.L.P. was 13½ per cent. Thus, the Democrats failed to get a majority by themselves and would have faced certain defeat if the coalition that had elected Mayor LaGuardia in the past had operated.

The A.L.P. proportion of the total vote dropped very slightly from the 14 per cent of last year, but only for mayor. For the other city-wide offices, the A.L.P. proportion was somewhat greater than last year's, while the combined A.L.P. vote of 330,000 for the five borough presidents was considerably greater. Thus, in the face of a difficult situation and in a three-way race, with an additional party in the field, the A.L.P. more than held its own.

It emerged as a stable political force, proving that its vote was not the result, as many contended, of a landslide for a popular candidate such as Roosevelt had been in 1944. As a consequence of its electoral showing, it must be considered the base and core of any labor-progressive coalition in New York.

The vote for the five borough presidents is particularly significant, because the bulk of the increase over the O'Dwyer A.L.P. figure came in two counties where Newbold Morris' candidates for borough office had been ruled off the ballot. The A.L.P. candidates were the greatest bene-

ficiaries of the division of the Morris vote, the Democrats coming second. The Republican candidates for borough president actually received fewer votes in those boroughs than did their candidate for mayor. In other words, the Morris vote was primarily an A.L.P. and Democratic vote rather than a dissident Republican one.

But labor's effectiveness was not confined to the vote gotten for the A.L.P. It was the progressive labor movement that exposed the reactionary nature of the Goldstein candidacy and the aims of Governor Dewey, and that presented the issues in the campaign most clearly and forcefully.

One of the major weaknesses of the campaign, contributing to a lower vote for the A.L.P. than it should have received, was the fact that, while some sections of progressive opinion, including P.A.C. and some unions, did an excellent job of exposing the Dewey role they failed to stress sufficiently, if at all, the need for labor and progressives to register their independent strength through the A.L.P. They campaigned for O'Dwyer and not for the A.L.P.

The A.L.P. vote suffered also because the C.I.O., which worked through and with the A.L.P., did not mobilize its forces to the maximum degree. Local political action committees in many unions either no longer existed or did not function. The failure of the A.L.P. to attract the support of many A. F. of L.

unions was an additional weakness in its campaign. The A. F. of L. strongly supported O'Dwyer, but not on the A.L.P. line. Thus, many independent, labor-conscious voters backed O'Dwyer because he was the nominee of the labor and progressive movement but voted for him on the Democratic line.

Despite that, the results showed a rather remarkable break-away from the two major parties. Over 40 per cent of the electorate voted A.L.P., No Deal or Liberal, casting almost as many votes as the Democrats. The A.L.P. and No Deal vote combined was 35 per cent of the total.

The results of the councilmanic race confirmed even more strongly the independent strength of the labor-progressive movement. The nine Communist and A.L.P. candidates received 19 per cent of the total first choice vote cast, almost half the vote cast for the 22 Democratic candidates. In the Bronx, Councilman Michael Quill, A.L.P. and C.I.O. leader, received the highest first choice vote in the city, over 71,000, and the second highest ever recorded in city history. In Brooklyn, Councilman Cacchione came out on top and in Manhattan, Councilman Davis came second. Also in Manhattan, Eugene P. Connolly, executive secretary of the A.L.P. in that county, was elected to the Council. Two other A.L.P. candidates, Charles Rubenstein in the Bronx and Charles Belous in Queens, came close to election.

The Councilmanic results revealed that lack of complete unity among the progressive labor groups was a source of weakness. That lack was expressed in A.L.P. failure in Manhattan and Brooklyn to designate Davis and Cacchione as its candidates, despite their superlative labor and progressive records. And in the Bronx, where no Communist candidate ran, it was expressed by failure of some of Councilman Quill's backers to sufficiently coordinate their campaign with that of the rest of the A.L.P.

THE REPUBLICAN-LIBERAL COALITION

Both wings of the coalition organized by Governor Dewey and by David Dubinsky, leading reactionary Social-Democrat, suffered disastrously in the elections. The G.O.P. received 302,000 votes or 15½ per cent of the total, while the Liberal Party got only 123,000 votes, or six per cent. Last year, the Liberal Party vote was 14 per cent of the electorate.

The G.O.P. vote was a stunning blow to Governor Dewey and may affect his chances of reelection next year and hence his national position. It has brought the hitherto suppressed anti-Dewey sentiment in New York City Republican circles out into the open. That sentiment is being crystallized around Newbold Morris and may result in the first serious organized opposition to Dewey within his own party. One of

the possible consequences is that Dewey will be forced to drop some of his liberal demagoguery in order to consolidate reactionary Republican support behind him. Concessions he has had to make in the past to progressive opinion have caused him some difficulties from recalcitrant reactionaries in his party. But the very necessity for surrendering some of that demagoguery will make his position more difficult, since it will expose all the more clearly the reactionary character of his politics.

The low Liberal Party vote has unquestionably weakened the ability of the Social-Democrats, who control it, to carry on their disruptive activities in state politics. It has already caused serious dissension within Social-Democratic ranks. A movement to give up the Liberal Party and to unite with the Norman Thomas Socialists as a more effective way of diverting Leftward-moving sections of the people has been started.

CONCLUSION

In any case, those reactionary Democrats who had been speculating on the possibility of smashing the Democratic coalition with the A.L.P. by pressing for a line-up with the Liberal Party were sorely disappointed. So was the tory *World-Telegram*, which had adopted the Liberal Party as its own and had hoped to build it up as the major anti-Communist and anti-progressive force in New York City politics.

The bankruptcy of the Liberal Party in itself strengthens the position of the A.L.P., since politicians will find it far more difficult to play the Liberal Party off against it in order to neutralize its influence.

The reactionary direction taken by the Truman Administration, which heads the Democratic Party in the nation, underscores the immense importance of labor's independent political role. That role consists not merely in registering labor's political strength, but in uniting its allies, particularly the Negro people, the veterans, the farmers, the small businessmen and professionals, into a broad movement capable of determining America's foreign and domestic policy along democratic lines.

The New York election indicated that there is a very wide section of the electorate that is ready to express itself independently. It also indicated that labor is the backbone of that section. The problem facing New York labor, as labor everywhere, is to unify that progressive section and organize it into an effective force that can make its weight felt in determining the future direction of the nation, which means also the future direction of civilization. Specifically, that means organization around the Congressional domestic and foreign policy issues facing the nation, around the coming sessions of the State Legislatures in those states where they will be held, and around the Congressional and state elections of 1946.

THE RANK-AND-FILE STRIKE OF THE NEW YORK LONGSHOREMEN

By HAL SIMON

THE STRIKE OF THE rank-and-file longshoremen of the A. F. of L. in the port of New York was of outstanding importance to the labor movement. It revealed the militancy of the workers. It showed their determination to fight, not only for their economic conditions, but for democracy within their union. It exposed and shook the reactionary, racketeering leadership of the International Longshoremen's Association-A. F. of L. It was a rank-and-file revolt against twenty-five years of strong-arm tactics. It was a revolt against the conditions imposed upon the men by their \$20,000-a-year lifetime president, Joseph P. Ryan. The strike caused consternation in the ranks of the bureaucracy of the A. F. of L. Central Trades and Labor Council leadership in the City of New York, and nationally. It was powerful enough to permit William Green himself to say: "It came within an inch of changing the leadership."

Why did the strike break out at this time? Since V-J Day there has been a growing resistance on the part of the workers generally to the drive of reaction. Throughout the country, in automotive and steel industries, in the electrical industry, among the oil workers, there is a growing resistance to the open drive of the monopolists to destroy the trade union movement, to place the whole burden of postwar reconversion and the cost of the war upon the backs of the workers. The workers throughout industry have many serious grievances that have accumulated in the course of the war. Not the least among them is the problem of the precipitous drop in real wages that has taken place, while the monopolists have gathered the greatest profits in their entire history. The workers' resistance, their resentment against profiteering, is resulting in growing struggles against the domination of big capital.

In the midst of these sharp struggles, the Ryan leadership of the I.L.A.-A. F. of L. had taken no steps to protect the interests of the men on the docks. The demands of the longshoremen in the port of New York had already been won in most other ports. On the West Coast the International Longshore and Warehouse Union, C.I.O., had gained most of the conditions that the New York longshoremen were demanding. Even I.L.A. locals in Seattle, Boston, Philadelphia and Baltimore have working conditions far in ad-

vance of those existing in the port of New York.

RANK-AND-FILE DEMANDS

What were the demands of the men? 1. The 2,240-pound slingload; 2. The 22-man gangs; 3. Four hours' pay or four hours' work when the men are called in; 4. Time and a half for all work during lunch hour; 6. Two shapeups a day instead of three; 6. Increased wages.

The most important demand of the longshoremen was the 2,240-pound slingload. In the port of New York, with the high mechanization in the handling of cargo, the size of the sling had become a danger to the safety of the men on the docks. Slingloads of six to seven thousand pounds were not unusual, and it is a regular experience to see men carried off the docks injured or killed as a result of the over-loaded slings. The size of the slingload is first of all a safety factor. During the war it was tolerated to some degree because of the manpower shortages, but it is also the basis for a vicious speed-up on the waterfront which is being fought by the men.

On September 30 Ryan announced to the longshoremen that it would be impossible to give consideration to any of these demands. He said that the negotiations with the Shippers Association were completed. He announced that the men were to receive a raise of ten cents an hour (they had asked for 30 per

cent). The next day the men on the west side docks walked out. Within 24 hours the strike had spread to the entire port.

For eighteen days, despite every attempt to send the longshoremen back to work, they stayed out. Ryan, who boasted on many occasions his complete domination over the men on the docks, made four public statements that the strike was over. In each case his statement was disregarded. Government agencies, such as the War Shipping Administration, tried to break the strike. Mayor LaGuardia made a strikebreaking plea to the longshoremen, even going so far as to call upon the wives of the longshoremen to urge their men to go back to work. The capitalist press of New York City, and nationally, with very few exceptions, sought to whip up public hysteria against the strike.

The longshoremen, however, were determined to stay out until Ryan agreed to negotiate their demands. Without any official organization, a meeting was held of more than one thousand longshoremen on an open lot in Brooklyn. A Rank-and-File Committee came forward and began to coordinate and give leadership to the struggles of the men in Brooklyn. This committee represented five of the Brooklyn locals. The Committee called meetings of thousands of I.L.A. workers in Brooklyn and issued a call to other sections of the port to form one united rank-and-file committee. A mass meeting of

more than 5,000 I.L.A. workers was held in Manhattan. This was a tremendous event for the longshoremen. They never had an opportunity to come together and give voice to their problems. Their local unions rarely hold meetings, and even then, such meetings are held in rooms that seat no more than 50 or 100 workers. The mass meeting in Manhattan gave the rank-and-file an opportunity to discuss their program. At the end of the meeting, democratic elections were held and the Rank-and-File Committee was expanded to represent twenty-two locals.

This Committee held regular meetings, out in the open, on the west side docks and in Brooklyn. It was a real achievement for the men to gather in the midst of the Ryan stronghold. For years this waterfront was patrolled by Ryan goons and strong-arm men who terrorized and intimidated the workers. The Rank-and-File Committee broke through this terror. It conducted a parade of thousand of workers, starting on the upper west side docks and ending down at the Battery. The paraders marched right past the Ryan headquarters.

The Committee immediately secured a lawyer and began to issue leaflets, explaining the issues to the dock workers. For the first time in years the rank-and-file had an opportunity to speak in an organized manner.

By this time, Ryan, who had on

a number of occasions declared the strike over, promised to negotiate the demands of the men. The longshoremen, however, beginning to feel their own strength, decided that if any negotiations were to take place they must be conducted by the Rank-and-File Committee and that the men must vote on the contract before it could be signed. It was clear that Ryan no longer had any control over the men. In fact, the Rank-and-File-Committee saw Ryan's attempts to break the strike as the main obstacle to achieving their demands. The demand began to be raised among the men for the ousting of Ryan.

There was an overwhelming response among the men to this demand. In fact, in the later days of the strike the demand to oust Ryan tended to submerge the economic demands of the workers. This was a weakness. Had this not been overcome and the economic demands placed first, with the question of ousting Ryan related to the struggle for these demands, the unity of the striking longshoremen would have been seriously threatened.

LaGuardia, who originally had made a vicious strikebreaking speech, completely changed his position. He recognized that Ryan no longer had any control over the men. He recognized that there were two contending groups within the I.L.A. and he proposed an election to determine which group was entitled to leadership. Ryan realized

that he could not win the men back on the docks by persuasion. He began to mobilize scabs and non-I.L.A. members to break the strike of his own union. Lundberg and the reactionary leadership of the International Seafarers' Union-A. F. of L., supplied scabs and strikebreakers. Loads of scabs were also brought in from out of town. Ryan became the chief strikebreaker of his own union.

The Shippers Association saw that the position of Ryan was a desperate one. They declared thereupon that, in their opinion, sufficient men (scabs) were back at work. They declared that the strike was over and that they would resume negotiations with Ryan on the demands of the men. The Rank-and-File Committee then made its most important decision. It decided to terminate the strike and called upon the men to go back to work to continue the fight for their demands and for democracy within the I.L.A.

The decision to terminate the strike was correct. The men had been out for eighteen days without any funds, and the beginnings of demoralization were noticeable. The strike was called off at a time when the Rank-and-File Committee had reached the peak of its strength. It called off the strike before it began to peter out and permit a division in the ranks of the longshoremen, with some working on the docks and some staying out. The decision to terminate the strike guaranteed that the men would go back with

the greatest unity and strongest organization.

LESSONS OF THE STRIKES

What are the main lessons that we can learn from this rank-and-file strike of the A. F. of L. longshoremen?

1. The militancy of the workers. The determination to struggle for their demands, is not limited to the workers in C.I.O. and other progressive unions. It is a fundamental development that is taking place throughout the labor movement.

2. The strike of the longshoremen showed the tremendous possibilities for the development of rank-and-file movements within the A. F. of L. It showed that when the men are united behind a program of real demands they are no more susceptible to Red-baiting than the workers in the more progressive unions. The newspapers throughout the city, with the help of the Social-Democrats, attempted to develop a huge Red-baiting campaign to intimidate and break the unity of the rank-and-file workers. They concocted stories to the effect that the "Communist-C.I.O." was attempting to take over the waterfront. Samuel Wolchok, president of the United Wholesale and Retail Union, C.I.O., claimed in a public statement that this was part of a Communist plot to destroy the warehouse union. The *New Leader* condemned the strike as Communist inspired. In spite of all this reactionary pressure,

the rank-and-file remained united and did not succumb to these attempts to destroy the strike.

The officials of the A. F. of L. Central Trades and Labor Council, together with the reactionary Social-Democrats spearheaded by David Dubinsky, were alarmed by the unity of the rank-and-file. They saw in the Rank-and-File Committee a movement that not only threatened Ryan's domination of the longshoremen's union, but was a threat to their own dictatorial leadership. Well did they realize that if the longshoremen, who had been kept under the complete domination of strong-arm racketeers for so many years, could solidly stand up against the Ryan leadership, there was nothing that could prevent the same thing from happening in their own unions.

3. The longshoremen's strike was an outstanding example of militant rank-and-file unity between the unions of the C.I.O. and the A. F. of L. strikers. The support which the A. F. of L. longshoremen received from the C.I.O. unions has laid the basis for a greater common action among the workers of these two trade-union centers in the coming period. From the first days that the longshore Rank-and-File Committee emerged, other sections of the labor movement recognized the importance of this strike, not only to the longshoremen, but to the labor movement as a whole. The other seamen's unions, with the exception

of the Lundberg S.I.U., were the first to come to the aid of the longshoremen. The National Maritime Union, C.I.O., refused to provide steam or man ships that were struck by the Rank-and-File Committee. The seamen's unions, together with the West Coast International Longshore and Warehouse Union, C.I.O., issued statements in support of the strikers.

These actions were decisive in the first days of the strike in keeping up the morale of the men and in showing to the longshoremen that they were not alone in their struggle. The Greater New York Industrial Union Council, representing 600,000 C.I.O. workers, also supported the strike and called upon its affiliated locals unions to do likewise. Although some A. F. of L. unions in the city gave unofficial support to the Rank-and-File Committee, the A. F. of L. leaders generally did not support the strike. The rank-and-file sentiment in their own unions, however, was so strong in support of the longshoremen that they were unable to pass resolutions condemning the strikers or to give any tangible support to Ryan in the form of helping to break the strike.

The C.I.O. support to the A. F. of L. longshore strike came directly on the heels of the A. F. of L. building service strike in the City of New York. Here, too, the C.I.O. unions gave official support to the striking building service workers. The C.I.O. workers refused to ride on struck

elevators, they circulated petitions and sent delegations to building owners, demanding that they sign with the A. F. of L. union. It is such rank-and-file unity between the A. F. of L. and C.I.O. workers that will in time bring the top bureaucracy of the A. F. of L. either to come to closer working agreements with the C.I.O. on the common problems facing the labor movement or to forfeit their leadership.

4. The strike of the longshoremen confirmed the correctness of the decisions of our Party convention, to reconstitute the Party and to build it among the most decisive sections of the industrial workers.

WEAKNESSES

The strike showed that a small number of such workers, when they move into action in a decisive industry, can stir and influence hundreds of thousands of workers. In the longshore strike there were 30,000 longshoremen and checkers on strike. Yet this relatively small group of workers tied up the entire port of New York. They drew the attention of, and stimulated and encouraged, the progressives in the A. F. of L. nationally. They became the center of the attack of the entire reactionary press throughout the country. Big business and its Social-Democratic allies within the labor movement trembled with fear at the thought of a successful action on the part of the rank-and-file longshoremen.

There were many weaknesses in the eighteen-day struggle of the longshoremen. The labor movement should examine very carefully the weaknesses and the lessons to be learned from this strike. It is one of the many growing struggles on the part of the workers.

1. The weakness of organization. The strike of the rank-and-file in its origin was spontaneous. It grew out of the accumulated grievances of the workers. Therefore, there were many peculiar problems. The strike was in existence for almost a week before an authoritative strike leadership was established. The strike leadership, once it came into being, was unable to completely break through the terror of past years and to organize mass picketing on the docks. While it is true that the Rank-and-File Committee held a number of mass meetings involving longshoremen, the strike was not carried on in such a way as constantly to involve masses of the workers. There was a fear on the part of many of the committee members to go down to the docks and to organize demonstrative actions with the workers. When the committee did do this on the upper west side and in Brooklyn, it received a very good response. Such mass actions involving the workers were not carried on, however, with any real consistency. The Rank-and-File Committee was also unable to organize welfare activities or to open soup kitchens for the strikers. This

failure can be traced to the fact that there was not an early enough or sufficient appreciation of these activities for the effective conduct of the strike. The longshoremen were out of work for more than two weeks and the weaknesses in organization brought apparent demoralization among some sections of the men.

2. Support for the strike. The Rank-and-File Committee was unable to secure sufficient support for the strike from the rest of the labor movement. Most of the support it did receive came in the closing days of the strike. The Social-Democrats and the capitalist press, together with the bureaucrats of the Central Trades and Labor Council, did their best to paint the strike as a C.I.O.-A. F. of L. struggle. They were successful to some extent in creating this impression among many workers in the city. Some confusion did exist. This weakened the ability of the Rank-and-File Committee to get effective and widespread support from the labor movement.

The Rank-and-File Committee received expressions of sympathy from I.L.A. workers in Boston, Baltimore and Philadelphia. In Boston there was a one-day strike in support of the New York longshoremen. In Philadelphia the workers refused to handle a ship with "hot cargo" that had been diverted to that city from the port of New York. The strike of the New York longshoremen was an inspiration to the

longshoremen in the other East Coast ports. The workers in these ports, however, did not move with sufficient rapidity in turn to give support to the New York longshoremen. The strike therefore, was a rank-and-file strike of only a section of the I.L.A. This inability to achieve rapid and effective support from the rest of the labor movement was a significant factor in the decision of the Rank-and-File Committee to terminate the strike.

3. The question of leadership. In a strike that develops spontaneously the question of leadership is always a difficult one. The men lack sufficient opportunity to give serious consideration to the workers who come forward into leadership. Often mere articulateness and popularity determine their choice. In the longshore strike the problem of leadership was further complicated by the existence of racketeers and gangsters in the pay of Ryan who rove the waterfront. Their job is to smash any progressive movement among the workers. Where they are not successful in smashing a movement through terror, they have a regular practice of preying on the fears of the workers and attempting to intimidate or buy off the key leaders. Such intimidation was used in the case of Warren and Barone, two of the strike leaders, who deserted the men and issued statements to the capitalist press repudiating the Rank-and-File Committee. This further attempt on the part of Ryan to

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destroy the unity of the men failed. The Rank-and-File Committee was able to weather this attack because it was a broad representative committee. It immediately issued a unanimous denunciation of the actions of Warren and Barone, and called for greater unity in the fight for the economic demands and against the strikebreaker Ryan. They now have a committee of five that issues all material in the name of all the members of the committee.

This experience of the Rank-and-File Committee is a lesson for the labor movement. In any similar strike situation, the workers must exercise care in the choice of leadership. In addition, it must not permit one person to become the uncontrolled spokesman for the strikers.

THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNISTS

The Communist Party played a positive and constructive role among the longshoremen. We recognized bitterly the mistakes of our past revisionist policies which permitted us to dissolve the Party organization on the waterfront. One of the first steps that our Party took was to reach our members who are longshoremen. They were an important force throughout the strike in helping to win support for the Rank-and-File Committee. They contributed towards deepening the understanding of the longshoremen of the full significance of the strike. In the course

of the strike the Party was able to reestablish its influence among sections of the dock workers. Many old-time longshoremen remembered the past good work of the Party on the waterfront and gave our comrades a warm reception. The *Daily Worker* was well received among the longshoremen. The paper was sold every day down at the front. There was no fear among the rank-and-file longshoremen of accepting the *Daily Worker*. The workers did not fall victim to the Red-baiting campaign that was caried on. They were concerned in the first place with their demands, and the *Daily Worker* supported their demands. The longshore strike has demonstrated the importance of strengthening our Party and its influence among the workers upon the waterfront.

The strike was a victory for the rank-and-file longshoremen. It brought into national focus the racketeer-dominated leadership of the I.L.A. It brought sharply before the people the problems of the dock workers. The strike was a victory for the longshoremen because, in the first place, it forced a resumption of negotiations which Ryan had said could never take place. At this writing, the Shippers Association has made concessions on almost every one of the six points in the men's demands. The struggle of the longshoremen created a Rank-and-File Committee that is continuing to carry on the fight within the I.L.A. Al-

ready this Committee has conducted job actions on the docks. On a number of docks the men have refused to handle the overloaded slings and have forced the stevedores to give them smaller slingloads. The Rank-and-File Committee also secured an injunction against Ryan, prohibiting him from signing any contract with the Shippers Association unless it is first ratified by the membership. The successful struggle of the longshoremen has begun a movement up and down the East Coast which threatens the entire Ryan leadership of the I.L.A. and is a warning to

the bureaucrats within the A. F. of L. generally.

We are entering the period of growing mass struggles of the workers against the offensive of the monopolists and the imperialist policies of the Truman Administration. We must with rapidity rebuild our Party among the decisive sections of the workers. We must give that leadership and guidance which the Marxist Party, the vanguard of the working class, is called upon to extend in the face of the great tasks confronting labor and all the democratic forces of the nation.

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THE PEOPLE'S FIGHT FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION

By GEORGE BERNSTEIN

CRUCIAL TAX BATTLES lie ahead. These will decide whether the financial costs of the war will continue to be saddled upon the masses or whether the monopolies will be compelled to bear a real share of the tax load.

In preparing for the tax battles of 1946, we must analyze the 1945 tax battles. We must understand the issues involved in the reconversion tax legislation. We must arm ourselves with the vital economic facts. We must analyze the achievements and shortcomings of the forces fighting for progressive taxation.

The outstanding feature of the reconversion tax battle was the unity achieved of 16 national organizations which banded together to advance a sound tax program to meet the reconversion needs. The coalition includes the American Council on Education; Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen; C.I.O.; Consumers Union; Independent Citizens Committee of Arts, Sciences and Professions; League of Women Shoppers; Methodist Federation for Social Service; N.A.A.C.P.; National Business and Professional Council of

Y.W.C.A.; National Citizens Political Action Committee; National Farmers Union; National Lawyers Guild; National Woman's Trade Union League of America; Non-Partisan Council of Alpha Kappa Alpha; Political Action Committee (C.I.O.); United Christian Council for Democracy.

These organizations have joined together in a Coordinating Committee for a Progressive Tax Program. The Committee represents the first unified force to advance progressive taxation. Its influence will undoubtedly grow and be a major force, not only in halting the trend of reactionary tax measures, but in advancing the interests of the broad masses of the people in other spheres as well.

For the first time in history, an instrument has been created that will fight in a collectively organized fashion for tax measures in the interest of the people. Only a short time ago a central agency for business organizations was formed to further tax policies for conservative business interests. It seeks to consolidate industry behind the reactionary tax program of monopoly interests.

8-POINT RECONVERSION TAX PROGRAM

The coalition of labor and progressive organizations supported an 8-point reconversion tax program founded on three principles:

- (a) Tax revision should aim to sustain mass purchasing power.
- (b) Taxes should be firmly

grounded on ability to pay.

(c) Taxes should provide adequate revenues to finance human and industrial demobilization.

To achieve these objectives, its program called for the adoption of 8 concrete measures:

1. Eliminate the 3 per cent "normal tax" ("victory tax") which hit all incomes above \$500, regardless of family status and the number of dependents.

2. Increase exemptions from \$500 to \$1,000 for single individuals and from \$1,000 to \$2,000 for married couples, while continuing the \$500 credit for each dependent.

3. Permit individuals a 2-year carry-back and carry-over of unused personal exemptions.*

4. Cancel wartime taxes owed by veterans up to \$250.

5. Cancel the \$5 automobile tax and reduce wartime taxes on items of mass consumption (movie tickets, electric light bulbs, leather goods, inexpensive toilet articles and cosmetics).

6. Give tax relief to small business through an exemption of \$5,000 from the corporate income tax, lower rates for profits below \$100,000, with an option to small corporations to be taxed as partnerships.

* The carry-back provision would operate in this manner: If a married taxpayer had a 1945 income of \$5,500, he would pay a tax of \$518. If his 1946 income was \$500 less than his exemptions, the unused exemption of \$500 would be carried back to 1945. His revised 1945 income would be \$3,000 (\$5,500 less \$500) on which the tax is \$411. The taxpayer would then receive a refund of \$107 (\$518 minus \$411).

7. Continue the excess-profits tax until January 1, 1947 and then repeal the tax along with the unused excess-profits credit carry-back.

8. Curb inflationary speculation in securities, real estate and farm land by taxing gains from the sale of capital assets held for less than 36 months at full rates (under existing law, gains from the sale of capital assets held for more than 6 months are subject to a maximum tax of 25 per cent, instead of full rates).

PROPOSALS TO SUSTAIN PURCHASING POWER

The first five points aim to counter-act the shrinkage of purchasing power. Individual taxpayers, particularly the low income groups, would have tax savings of about \$6.5 billion during 1946 convertible into effective purchasing power.

These proposals grant tax relief where the need is greatest. The elimination of the "victory tax" would free twelve million hard-pressed families with small incomes from the worst tax ever levied by the Federal Government. It would benefit taxpayers in the lower and middle income brackets much more proportionately than those in the upper brackets.

The exemptions proposed in point 2 give a family with two children an exemption of \$3,000 which is what the Heller Committee finds is necessary to maintain a minimum standard of living at a level of health and decency. These exemptions are an application of the democratic prin-

principle that no taxes ought to be exacted from a person whose income is insufficient to maintain a minimum standard of decent living.

Point 3 extends to individuals the carry-back and carry-over benefits which corporations and business now enjoy. It would be particularly helpful during reconversion when workers' earnings are declining.

Point 4 would free veterans seeking jobs from the burden of paying past taxes. To avoid discrimination, veterans who had already made tax payments would secure a refund. This would help ease the veteran's financial problems and be of some help to veterans starting their own small business.

TAX RELIEF FOR SMALL BUSINESS

The broad character of the coalition's tax program is evidenced by its comprehensive proposals to help small business. Small business, unlike big business, has been hard-hit during the war. Many small firms lack the finances to reconvert speedily. The distribution of governmental contracts and shortages of materials, machinery and manpower, have weakened the ability of small business generally to survive in the competitive struggle with powerful corporations. Small business runs relatively large risks since it must concentrate on a few products and markets, whereas big business enjoys the benefits of diversification. The 3-pronged proposals (point 6) to aid

small business would give the small concerns a new lease on life.

THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDUSTRY

The focal issue in the reconversion tax fight involved the excess-profits tax. The big guns of monopoly capital laid down an incessant barrage for its immediate repeal. The labor-progressive coalition called for its retention through 1946.

There was no economic justification for repealing the excess-profits tax. It was nothing less than a raid on the Treasury to swell monopolies' financial power.

Repeal was indefensible because American corporations, particularly the powerful monopolies, had the greatest financial strength in their history. They had accumulated unprecedented reserves during the war years, despite wartime taxes and the payment of big dividends.

During the six war years, 1940-45, American corporations made profits after payment of taxes of \$52 billion according to Department of Commerce estimates. Of this vast amount, they paid out \$25.9 billion to their stockholders and kept \$26.1 billion of undistributed profits in their corporate treasuries.

The average annual profits of corporations, after taxes, during the six war years was \$8.7 billion, compared to an annual average of \$3.3 billion in the pre-war years, 1936-39. Thus, wartime corporate profits, after pay-

ment of taxes, rose more than 160 per cent.

Despite falling production and mounting unemployment after V-J Day, corporate profits, after taxes, for the full year of 1945 will be \$9.3 billion. By contrast, corporate profits, after taxes, in 1939, were \$4.2 billion.

For 1946 the Treasury* estimated that profit-making corporations will earn \$18,695,000,000 before taxes. If the excess-profits tax was retained and no reductions made in the regular corporate taxes, corporation taxes

* Testimony of Secretary of Treasury Vinson before the Senate Finance Committee, October 15, 1945; *Hearings*, Part I, p. 45.

Number of Excess-Profits Corporations	Amount of Excess Profits
900	over \$1,000,000
6,000	\$100,000-\$1,000,000
12,200	under \$100,000
Total	19,100

The sole beneficiaries of repeal would therefore be the most prosperous corporations and the bulk of the tax hand-out would go to the 900 giant corporations, each receiving an average of \$2,000,000. The 241,000 corporations not making excess profits would receive no benefit whatever from repeal.

Surely the prosperous corporations which will earn excess profits are not in need of tax "relief." Equity and sound economic considerations dictated that every penny of tax reduction should first go to relieve the 43,000,000 taxpayers with incomes be-

would total \$9,050,000,000 leaving corporations a balance of \$9,645,000,000. This is close to the all-time high of \$9,900,000,000 in 1944.

These statistics show that corporations will reap fat profits in 1946, even though the national product in 1946 will be at least 20 per cent below the wartime high achieved in 1944.

The Treasury statistics also show that corporations will earn \$6,000,000,000 in excess profits in 1946, despite the generous credits allowed in computing excess profits. To repeal the excess-profits tax would mean a tax bonanza of \$2,555,000,000 distributed as follows:

Total Amount of Tax Reduction	Average Amount of Reduction
\$1,797,000,000	\$1,996,666
628,000,000	104,666
130,000,000	10,657
Total	\$2,555,000,000

low \$3,000, now paying exorbitant taxes.

It cannot be over-emphasized that the reconversion period partakes of the nature of the war period for expenditures in the fiscal year 1946 will still amount to \$50 billion. Finally, retention of the excess-profits tax would have a salutary effect since it would offset the competitive advantages which early reconversion will obtain.

It must not be forgotten that Congress in July, 1945, had already made available \$55 billion of cash tax relief to corporations in the first "

conversion" tax act. This sum includes the reduction of \$1.3 billion in outstanding postwar refunds; \$1.5 billion in current rebates (10 per cent) of excess-profits taxes; \$1.7 billion from accelerated amortization of emergency wartime facilities; and \$1 billion in carry-back refunds.

Government estimates indicate that the total costs of reconversion will run from \$3 billion to \$5 billion, so that these tax savings will more than cover the cost of reconversion.

TREASURY PROGRAM

In the light of these facts, the Treasury's recommendation to repeal the excess-profits tax as of December 31, 1945 was indeed shocking.* It shows how dominant is the influence of finance capital in the Truman Administration. It is an abandonment of the ability-to-pay principle which characterized so much of the Roosevelt tax policy.

Secretary Vinson mouthed Big Business propaganda that the excess-profits tax was the "strongest impediment to reconversion." His efforts to justify repeal as an aid to small business was sheer sham. He made no recommendations to cut the heavy corporation taxes on small corporations. While it is true that 12,200 corporations with excess profits under \$100,000 would benefit by repeal, these relatively small corporations could have been relieved by increasing the excess-profits-tax exemption

from \$25,000 to \$100,000. Such an amendment would have retained the tax on the large corporations while relieving the small corporations. It would have recaptured for the Treasury \$2,425,000,000 from excessive profits. And Secretary Vinson was very adamant about limiting the amount of tax reductions in view of budgetary requirements.

Unfortunately, labor-progressive forces had not in the past counteracted the incessant drive of Big Business for repeal. The lesson is clear. Opposition to repeal came "too late and too little."

To counterbalance the reactionary proposal for excess-profits tax repeal, the Treasury advocated repeal of the grossly unfair 3 per cent "normal tax."* Thereby the Truman Administration acceded to the demands of labor and the progressive forces. It also afforded Secretary Vinson an opportunity to dilate on the democratic principle of ability-to-pay and to voice his concern over the heavy tax burden on low income groups. On this point his testimony breathes the spirit of New Deal tax policy and the need for sustaining mass purchasing power.

It is significant, however, that he made no mention of the critical need

* It is worthy of note that certain reactionary organs, such as the Committee on Postwar Tax Policy, which reflects the Big Business viewpoint, had also advocated the repeal of the 3 per cent normal tax in an effort to enlist popular support for their reactionary proposals, particularly the immediate repeal of the excess-profits tax. It was evidently regarded as a small price to pay for the colossal tax windfalls accruing from excess-profits tax repeal.

* England and Canada are continuing excess-profits taxation at reduced rates.

for raising personal exemptions above the sub-marginal level of \$500 per capita—a level which the reactionary forces seek to perpetuate in the Federal income-tax structure.

The third point in the Treasury program called for reducing wartime excise taxes to pre-war levels on liquor, wines and beer, amusement admittances, jewelry, transportation and luggage.

Finally, the Treasury recommended that payroll taxes for old age and survivors' insurance be held at the present rate of 1 per cent, rather than permit it to rise automatically to 2½ per cent on January 1, pending broader action on social security as a whole.

The Treasury's 4-point program called for a total tax reduction of \$5,187,000,000, of which \$2,555,000,000 would be the net tax loss by repeal of the excess-profits tax, \$2,085,000,000 by repeal of the 3 per cent normal tax, \$547,000,000 on account of cuts on wartime excise taxes.

ACTION IN THE HOUSE

The House Ways and Means Committee, without public hearings, in record-breaking time, framed a tax bill which was railroaded through the House under a gag rule which, in effect, barred amendments. This undemocratic procedure was protested by the coalition. The coalition's pressure was successful in forcing the Senate Finance Committee to hold public hearings.

The tax bill was passed in the

House by a vote of 343 to 10. The opposition came from liberal Congressmen. In addition, 13 Democratic members signed a statement indicating they were giving the bill "reluctant" support and attacked it as "giving the lion's share of tax forgiveness to those who did not need it"; adding that they were swallowing it since it removed the "worst tax provisions which have borne down almost unbearably on the lowest income tax groups."

INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX CHANGES

The House Way and Means Committee eliminated, in effect, the 3 per cent "normal tax." As a special concession to wealthy taxpayers the Committee adopted a modification of the Republican Party plan providing a minimum cut of 10 per cent in taxes for all individual taxpayers. This \$100,000,000 concession was entirely for the benefit of people making more than \$25,000 a year. It was engineered by Republican Congressman Knutson, senior minority member of the Committee. It was opposed by the liberal Democrats, but carried 12 to 6.

The two major proposals of the reactionary forces, spearheaded by the Republican Congressmen and pushed by the N.A.M. and U.S. Chamber of Commerce, were repeal of the excess-profits tax and a 20 per cent across-the-board reduction in individual income taxes. This latter proposal would have meant

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tremendous tax reductions for the wealthy with only picayune relief for the low-income groups. A married worker earning \$3,000 would have his take-home pay (after taxes) increased 3 per cent; a millionaire would have his take-home income (after taxes) increased 180 per cent. Such was the quality of reaction's equality proposal—20 per cent tax cut for all. In the House bill it met with partial success when the 10 per cent minimum cut was approved.

The 10 per cent minimum cut was vigorously opposed by the labor-progressive coalition. It had its effect in

the Senate Finance Committee where it was trimmed down to a uniform 5 per cent reduction. In this form it was finally adopted.

COMPARISON OF TAX PLANS

Here is a table showing how the tax cuts finally approved would affect a married man with two children, as compared with his tax increases during the war, the Treasury plan, the Republican (N.A.M.) proposal for reductions, the proposals of the labor-progressive coalition, and the tax cuts originally adopted by the House.

Net Income	Present Tax	Amount of Wartime Increase	Reduction Under				Final Act
			Treasury Plan	Republican Plan	People's Coalition Plan	House Bill	
\$1,000	\$ 15	\$ 15	\$ 15	\$ 3	\$ 15	\$ 15	\$ 15
1,500	30	30	30	6	30	30	30
2,000	45	45	45	9	45	45	45
3,000	275	275	75	55	275	85	85
4,000	505	493	105	101	385	125	125
5,000	755	707	135	151	455	165	166
10,000	2,245	1,902	285	449	585	365	383
50,000	26,865	18,244	1,485	5,373	2,205	2,745	2,754
100,000	68,565	36,568	2,985	13,713	3,855	6,905	6,264
1,000,000	900,000	221,565	17,000	180,000	17,910	90,000	61,150

CORPORATION TAX CHANGES

The Ways and Means Committee did not follow the Treasury's proposal to repeal the excess-profits tax. It voted instead to cut the excess-profits tax rate from 85.5 per cent to 60 per cent, and delayed its repeal until the end of 1946. This reduction would have benefited corporations

by \$1,270,000,000. The Committee's action was characterized by the *Wall Street Journal** as "a sop to the labor unions which have demanded the retention of the tax without rate reduction."

The Committee's action reflected in large measure opposition to repeal. However, as subsequent devel-

* October 6, 1945.

opments showed, it was also part of the deal whereby the Senate Finance Committee would do the outright killing.

Secretary Vinson, testifying before the Senate Finance Committee, denounced the partial repeal voted by the House. This made the reactionaries' task of killing the tax so much the easier. The tax bill as passed by the Senate provided for outright repeal as of December 31, 1945. In the conference between House and Senate members to "iron out" differences, no opposition was made against outright repeal.

The regular corporation tax rates were reduced in the House bill by 4 percentage points with the top rate reduced from 40 to 36 per cent, corporations thereby saving \$404,000,000. This reduction would have benefited mainly the large corporations. Small corporations with income under \$60,000 would have savings of \$59,000,000, while the larger corporations would benefit to the tune of \$345,000,000.

The reduction in the 40 per cent rate on large corporations was attacked by the labor-progressive coalition which urged greater tax reductions for small business. The Senate Finance Committee retained the 40 per cent rate while providing very modest tax savings for small corporations with incomes under \$60,000. In this respect it was an improvement over the House bill.

The compromise finally adopted allowed corporations with incomes

up to \$50,000 a reduction of 4 percentage points but only 2 percentage points for corporations with profits above \$50,000. The revenue loss as a result of this change was estimated at \$347,000,000.

The capital-stock and declared-value excess-profits taxes were repealed as of next July, corporations thereby saving \$183,000,000.

EXCISE TAX CHANGES

The House adopted the Treasury's recommendation to repeal the wartime increases in excise tax rates on more than a dozen goods and services as of July 1, 1946. It also repealed the \$5 automobile-use tax. This particular point had been pressed by the coalition.

The Senate Finance Committee, however, refused to repeal the wartime sales taxes. It went along with the automobile-use tax repeal. The Senate version triumphed in the final bill so that relief from wartime sales taxes on many consumption items was denied the mass of consumers.

ROOSEVELT VS. TRUMAN

This caricature of a "tax relief" act—aptly branded by the coalition as tax-relief-for-99,900 because the juiciest plums went to the 900 wealthiest corporations and the 99,900 richest taxpayers with incomes above \$25,000—was approved by President Truman. Contrast the courageous veto by President Roose-

veto of the 1943 Revenue Act, despite the pressures of a global war, despite a tradition which never saw a veto of a tax bill in the nation's history. Sharply he rebuked Congress for passing a tax bill "providing relief not for the needy but for the greedy." Iniquitous as that bill was, it pales before the tax piracy of the 1945 revenue act.

Popular pressure failed to sustain Roosevelt's veto. This should accentuate the herculean task of mobilizing the people on tax issues. Roosevelt resisted soak-the-poor taxation. Truman's administration initiates spare-the-rich taxation.

Monopoly capital seeks to abolish corporation taxes entirely. Big Business seeks to freeze the submarginal exemptions of \$500 per capita into the permanent tax structure. A national sales tax is being boomed. It will require prodigious efforts to hurl back reaction's offensive.

ACHIEVEMENTS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF THE COALITION

The form of the final tax bill indicates that the labor-progressive coalition restrained to some degree the reactionaries' assault. It helped stem the reactionary drive for a 20 per cent horizontal cut which would have meant tremendous tax windfalls to the 99,000 richest taxpayers. The 5 per cent cut ultimately adopted reflects a partial victory.

The elimination of the iniquitous

"victory tax" was a major victory over the vigorous opposition of the reactionary Republicans and poll-tax Senator George, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee—the hatchet man of monopoly capital.

The coalition's fight for relief to veterans bore fruit in the final bill which cancelled wartime taxes on service pay of enlisted men and provided that both enlisted men and commissioned officers may have three years in which to pay deferred taxes.

The coalition's fight for relief to small business won partial recognition in the reduction of 4 percentage points of the regular corporate rates on small corporations.

The elimination of the automobile-use tax, which did not have Treasury support, was also a gain, although the coalition was not successful in eliminating the many wartime sales taxes.

By its efforts alone, it forced the Senate Finance Committee to hold public hearings. The people's voice was publicly heard and the coalition's tax program received widespread newspaper and radio publicity.

The coalition's achievements, in their totality, were, however, limited. The coalition was organized at the eleventh hour and therefore lost the opportunity of having its own tax bill introduced in the House. Thus, it was deprived of an important weapon for enlisting popular support. There is a real vantage point in calling for enactment of a specific

bill (H.R. —) as distinguished from a program.

The speed with which the tax bill was rushed through Congress afforded little time to the coalition to work among the memberships of the participating organizations. Thus the entire fight was carried on through the medium of statements. Valuable as such analytical statements are, there can be no substitute for rank-and-file pressure. Mass pressure on individual Senators and Congressmen was lacking. This is the indispensable weapon. In the tax battles ahead, this weakness must be corrected.

Future campaigns must be waged on a national scale, mobilizing the citizenry of each community, the membership of each local union, of each national union and of all democratic groups. Our 130,000,000 people have an important stake in our tax system which has a profound effect on our national economy. We need only to recall the striking statement of C.I.O. president Philip Murray that if labor were as well supplied as capital with reserves for the reconversion period, every worker in the country would have \$18,000 in savings and possible tax refunds. And if the billions which corporations will receive in tax refunds were instead made available to workers, the increase in their purchasing power would indeed be a real stimulus to reconversion.

Finance capital, through its domination of the executive and legisla-

tive branches of the government, has been given free rein in the tax arena as in so many other areas. We have here a sordid example of the application of the "free enterprise" slogan. In terms of tax policy it has meant that Big Business has been given every tax advantage to better its financial position, with the lion's share going to the monopolies. The false doctrine has been propagated that the prosperity of our people would be automatically guaranteed if industry were financially prosperous.

"FREE ENTERPRISE" APPLIED TO TAXATION

In the tax field, the logic of the "free enterprise" doctrine has led to crushing burdens on the workers alongside unparalleled profits for the giant corporations, with the bitter prospect of millions of unemployed. Events have shown that free enterprise—industry free of government intervention—cannot and will not assure a prosperous economy for all the people. Hypocritically, the die-hard opponents of government intervention have not been timid about calling on our government to "intervene" by way of tax privileges, tax concessions, and tax rebates.

TAX MEASURES DOMINATED BY MONOPOLIES

The two "reconversion" tax acts have been molded to advance the financial position of the monopolies. They benefit primarily Big Business.

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The masses receive only tax crumbs. This tax pattern is an important part of reaction's plan for taking over America lock, stock and barrel.

The Truman Administration—becoming more and more the instrument of the giant corporations—has been retreating rapidly from the progressive tax policies of Roosevelt. The people's pressure must block this retreat. Congress, dominated by monopoly interests, steamrolls through tax measures with little opposition which give billions to a handful of the wealthiest corporations—pennies to the millions of workers.

Big Business has been able to ride roughshod because there has been no mobilization of the people in these tax battles. The reactionary trend of tax legislation can be halted only by the most intensive activation of the people—the worker, consumer, veteran, farmer and small businessman.

The hour is very late. But not too late. The tax battle will soon be renewed. The House Ways and Means Committee is expected to begin work on more permanent tax revisions in January, 1946.

LABOR'S ROLE

The brunt of the struggle for progressive taxation falls on labor. The full weight of labor's influence to defeat the rapacious tax program of the monopolists cannot be brought to bear short of effective united ac-

tion by organized labor as a whole. The common interests of all labor demand the participation of the A. F. of L. in the Coordinating Committee for a Progressive Tax Program.

The C.I.O. has broken ground in this field. It has been the only labor organization which has waged a consistent struggle for democratic taxes. It has formulated tax programs whenever tax legislation was under consideration. Yet, it has not utilized to full capacity its potential strength, which is very substantial. In the 1945 tax battles its major activity was confined essentially to the issuance of statements.

It is important that each national union be stimulated into action. The rank-and-file must participate in the struggle. Delegations to Congressmen on the tax issue must be organized. Mass literature is an essential weapon in each tax campaign. The rank-and-file, the local unions, the parent bodies must swamp Congress with a flood of mail.

The battle for tax legislation must be waged with the same vigor as the battle for full employment legislation, minimum-wage laws, and re-conversion unemployment-compensation benefits. We must drive home the hard fact that progressive tax measures mean more bread and butter for the worker; that a raise in income-tax exemptions is equivalent to a wage increase.

The crucial tax sector must be tackled with everything in labor's

power. The serious weaknesses must be corrected—and quickly.

In their battles for wage increases, the unions have made complete analyses of the tax situation of the particular industry or corporation involved. Where the tax issue specifically and directly affects the wage issue, labor has utilized the tax weapon to great effect. It must now demonstrate the same awareness where general tax legislation is concerned, for the amount of take-home pay is affected by tax reductions no less than by wage increases.

THE PARTY'S RESPONSIBILITY

The Communist Party must also bear a measure of responsibility for the tax measures that have been adopted. It has not mobilized its energies in this important fight.

Education on the tax issue has been altogether too meager in the Party press and other Left publications. There has been little, if any,

discussion at membership meetings on this critical issue. It is significant that no extended analysis, economic and political, of the tax issues has been made in the *Daily Worker* whose coverage was confined to the highlights of daily developments. Not a single full-length article on this issue appeared in *New Masses* during the passage of the recent tax act. Technical though this subject is, it must be mastered and translated into language which can be understood by the worker. The statements of the Coordinating Committee, C.I.O., and Lawyers Guild analyzed fully the economic situation and the significance of the various tax proposals.

The Party has the responsibility of formulating, without delay, a postwar tax program and of popularizing the issue. The Party must expose the dominant role of monopoly capital in the framing of tax legislation. The Party must help mobilize the American people in the fight for progressive taxation.

NEW ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

By JOHN WILLIAMSON

*REPORT TO THE MEETING OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U.S.A., ON NOVEMBER 17, 1945.*

THE REPORTS OF Comrades Foster and Dennis have evaluated the results attained in fulfilling the Convention decisions concerning the reconstitution and activation of the Party in the light of the general political developments. This evaluation is fundamental. Without it we cannot examine critically other aspects of our work. I propose to deal with some of the specific aspects of the status and functioning of our Party in the past four-month period.

Since the Convention we have directed our major attention to the following key questions in the field of organizing the Party's functioning:

The reconstitution of the Party in all districts, and the popularization of the Convention decisions.

The adoption of special measures by the Center to speed up the reconstitution of the Party in the South.

The reestablishment and popularization of the correct Marxist concept of a vanguard Party, with emphasis on the role and function of the shop clubs, section organizations,

functioning committees, and the activation of the passive members.

Aid to the districts in selecting the most able and competent leading personnel.

The establishment of a functioning collective leadership in the National Center, with the necessary committees, departments and staffs.

The development of a policy of concentration on basic industries.

The convening of representative regional conferences, to complete certain unfinished Convention business.

The organization of broad discussions on Party policy in the field of Negro work and national group work, and the issuance of a memorandum in each of these fields of work, as well as other material outlining our policy on reconversion, wages and strikes.

The organization of a drive to re-register every member and to increase the critically low dues payments.

The initiation of a nation-wide *Worker* circulation campaign.

Regular visits to the majority of

our districts, exclusive of the Pacific Coast, in an effort to establish close contact with the Party below, to learn at first hand from the comrades in the field the situation in each locality, while at the same time conveying to them our thinking on these and other organizational questions.

Obviously, we have not met and answered every burning problem. In fact, there were many deficiencies in the carrying through of the tasks we undertook. It required from two to three months finally to organize our staff and establish the various departments on a functioning basis in the Center. During that period a few comrades tried to do everything, with the result that many problems were neglected and inadequate answers and attention given to the numerous questions raised by our district organizations. Much of the Center's time was devoted to the solution of personnel problems, nationally and in the states, of which a number still require attention. In the process of reorganizing and strengthening the work in the Center and in the states we attempted to solve the basic organizational questions connected with the reconstitution of the Party.

While we can by no means be satisfied with the results of our work in this field, the tasks outlined were essential for the transformation of our organization into a Marxist vanguard Party. The hard, patient job of rebuilding and transforming our organization has been and still is a central point on the order of business in every state. The tempo of this

transformation in the various states will be determined by the extent to which we bring the understanding of our Convention policies to the maximum number of members, especially those we did not reach during our discussion period. It will be determined to the extent to which all of us, the leading cadres everywhere, realize that we have gone through a serious crisis in our organization, that we cannot be satisfied with the little progress made, but must be aroused to the need of making a decisive change in method of work and functioning. In this connection we must learn to merge our old and new cadres in the leadership of our Party with much greater effectiveness, utilizing to a maximum every force within our Party. Finally, the transformation of our Party will be determined by our ability to involve the entire membership in mass work, in the day-to-day struggles of the working class, thereby testing in life the correctness of our policies.

Since the Convention, we have made progress. But there are no grounds for complacency. This National Committee meeting must review all these problems with the utmost seriousness.

In the light of the analysis and tasks outlined in the political reports of Comrades Foster and Dennis, we must determine precisely the kind of organization our Party must become to meet the tests of the struggles ahead. In our convention report on the Constitution, we outlined in a very specific and understandable way

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the broad general concepts of what our Party should be. We need a mature and aggressive Communist Party, a Party that can in the coming struggles hold firmly to the coalition-strategy of democratic unity while developing simultaneously its own independent initiative and activity. We need a Party that can aid the trade unions and democratic mass organizations, not only in resisting the growing attacks, but actually to pass over to the counter-offensive and smash all reactionary onslaughts and in the process strengthen themselves ideologically and organizationally. This means that we must strive to achieve a Party in which every member is active, with a membership ideologically equipped, understanding our policies, and able to explain and win support for them among the most decisive sections of the working class. It means that we must build a Party that has its strongest roots in the factories and local unions, as well as working class communities in every city. It means, furthermore, that we need a Party that is not distracted and weakened by internal struggles, but is a united and disciplined Party, abounding in enthusiasm, with confidence in itself and its leadership, and thus qualified to lead the masses forward successfully.

PRESENT PARTY STATUS

Let us now pass to a more detailed examination of the present-day status and functioning of our Party. The activities initiated by the National Board since the Convention are now

in the process of being carried through in every district, although considerable discrepancies are visible in the tempo of work in the various districts. We must recognize that revisionism ate deeply into the very vitals of our organization. Its effects are felt by both new and old members. While it is true that an appeal can be made to the previous experiences and traditions of the average old member, this alone is not enough. Our revisionism ideologically disarmed the membership and leadership. Some have become "soft," eased themselves out of mass struggles and out of the every-day "leg work" of the club. Some try to live politically by their wits instead of constantly reading and learning from the generalized experiences of the working class. Generally, the revisionism we have passed through induced a tendency to lose that inspiring spirit of sacrifice for the Party and pride of membership in the Party and its program of bold challenge to capitalism. It weakened our Party's struggle against such heinous social evils emanating from capitalism as white chauvinism and anti-Semitism. While we have emphatically rejected revisionism and liquidationism, we must recognize that we are proceeding at entirely too slow a tempo in transforming the Party. We must fight doggedly for our policy and concept of a Marxist Party as outlined at the convention and elaborated since. This can be done most effectively if it is not done abstractly but in relation to the many

urgent and vital everyday problems, issues and mass struggles in which our entire membership, must be involved.

To avoid repetition, I will center my remarks on a few selected problems which remain the key to our entire work.

THE PARTY CLUB

While fully appreciating the significance of the election results and the need of drawing all conclusions from the positive trend in support of Communist municipal candidates, we must not overlook a general weakness in our functioning, which was evident also in certain of the election struggles. Too often our work is done mainly from the top. Too many top-directives are issued. We organize at the top Citizens Committees in support of our Party candidates. The radio talks are prepared from the top. Most of the leaflets and other election material are similarly prepared from the top, as are most of the meetings planned. What happens to the Party Clubs? They are required primarily to respond to these directives, supply manpower and do the leg work. Sometimes, too, the directions to the Clubs in the election campaign tend to come from some of the Citizens Committees established and not from the Party as an organization. The result is that our Clubs do not function politically as a force in the community; they are not creative in their activity. After such splendid election campaign activity we find our Clubs

have not grown and do not function substantially better and more effectively than before. This is so because the Club does not take on all the functions of the Party organization amongst the masses. It does not yet develop the Party's independent role and activity. It does not work out its own plan of activity based on the needs of the community.

Yet if we want to sink deep roots among the workers, in the communities and in the shops, we must recognize that it is precisely the Club which can bring this about. Past influences weigh so heavily that it is always easier to do everything from the top. While we might decide otherwise in a resolution, in practice we relapse back to this old habit of reducing our Clubs to bodies that merely carry out directives from above. This is further seen in the tendency to underestimate Club leadership, to fail to elevate it to a position of prestige and worth, many times more decisive than some other higher-sounding titles.

In all campaigns at this moment the main help needed by our Clubs is of a political character to assist them in finding their way to the masses, to help them display initiative and leadership in the mass struggles. If they get that, quotas and goals will be more readily achieved.

OUR INDEPENDENT ROLE

In relation to promoting the independent role and activities of the Party, there is thus far more talk than action, as can be seen by the inade-

quate response of the Party to American imperialist intervention in China and to the activities of the Rankin-Wood Committee as a threat to the entire labor movement. I refer both to our own independent actions as well as to our efforts to set the labor movement into motion. The New York demonstration against intervention in China, called by the Party, was not only of political significance in America as well as in China, but was a direct means of inspiring and activating our membership. A like spirit was evident, though on a smaller scale in the action in Bridgeport against the production of the anti-Negro play, *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, and in other beginnings of independent activities by our Party in all Districts.

However, we must note a tendency in some cases to counterpose our independent activity to that of all others. We must fight for the correct understanding of combining our own independent role and activities with our ability to influence the mass movements to develop simultaneously still broader and more extensive activities. These should not be posed one against the other; they are inter-related. The Party's independent activity—whether expressed through a leaflet, through shop or street meetings, through demonstrations, radio talks or conferences, will politically set the tone for the entire working class and its organizations. It should set in motion all the Party members among the masses and help influence the non-Party masses to press their

unions and mass organizations into action on the basis of correct policy. Such effective Party activities will influence the quality and form of the actions developed by the mass movement, whether these be shop delegates meetings, strike actions, parades, mass meetings, or demonstrations. In these mass movements, as a result of the pressure of capitalist ideas and influences, as well as of the activities of Social-Democrats and the Trotskyite fifth column, many debates, clashes of opinion, and struggles over correct policy will arise. It is precisely on such occasions that the Communists should be in the center of all such mass movements, convincing the masses as to the course to be followed, the adoption of the most effective tactics and forms of struggle, as well as exposing the enemy within. The Party at the same time shall speak out publicly, clarifying those issues, which will help to solidify the mass movements of the people, winning support for our position among non-Party masses. In this connection, the circulation of the *Daily Worker* and our literature is of prime importance.

Another aspect of this problem is the more effective involvement of the Party and its membership in mass activities and mass struggles. This is a key, not only to our vanguard role generally, but to the functioning of the Party Club. Since the Convention, we have reacted to and developed successful activities around many issues, such as reconversion, layoffs, wage struggles, demobiliza-

tion, universal military training, and many other issues, as outlined by Comrade Dennis. But, too often, while working to move mass organizations into action, we do not involve the Party in independent mass activity on the identical issues. As a result of such failure, the Social-Democrats, Trotskyites and bourgeois reformist forces sometimes can the more easily mislead many workers. The reasons for this weakness in our Party are:

1. Hangovers of old concepts that it is unnecessary to bring the Party forward boldly in its own name simultaneously with the development of the mass movement.

2. Failure to plan the mobilization of the Party for such campaigns in the same thorough-going manner in which we make our contributions to the mass movement.

3. Insufficient mastery of the technique of mobilizing the Party members for immediate mass actions and campaigns and the day-to-day follow-up of such campaigns through the columns of the *Daily Worker*.

4. Our weakness—basic to the other defects—in reaching and activating the members through the Clubs.

We correctly stress the need to develop the Party's independent role and activity without breaking our ties with the labor-progressive coalition. We must understand that this is no mere phrase. We are talking about living people whom we must influence. The coalition is not and must never be merely a committee of lead-

ers. It is essential that the masses behind these leaders are won and are drawn actively into the struggle to realize the demands around which the movement develops.

Similarly, our independent Party activity cannot be limited merely to too activity or to statements; it must primarily aim to involve our Party membership in day-to-day mass activities. Again we see the decisive role of the Club and Club leadership, without which we cannot hope to activate our members and ideologically influence the masses who constitute the democratic coalition.

The masses in the community or shop are alert to the issues of the day. They reflect every cross-current of opinion on political developments, including wrong opinions. They need clarity and guidance. They need leadership for the actions they must undertake to meet the problems facing them. Ninety per cent of the trade union membership does not attend the local union meetings and is not reached by the excellent statements of Murray, Emspak, Thomas, Weinstein, Ganley and others. We find these workers in the community and shop. It is at the Club level that we can develop, with the least effective opposition, both independent Party activity and united front activity of workers and community organizations.

If our Clubs will throw themselves into such work in the shops or neighborhoods, we shall really be developing mass work on the broadest possible basis and waging a struggle to

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win the masses ideologically. We shall thus establish such ties that, for instance, Arnold Johnson's election campaign will not be jeopardized when most of the C.I.O. top leaders withdraw their previous endorsement, and our comrades in the Machinists Union will not have to lose sleep if Harvey Brown finds out they are Communists. By such activity, we can extend the distribution of our literature, as against its recent tendency to shrink; we can increase our press circulation and recruit into the Party. Thus, too, our Clubs can be made interesting and lively, by becoming centers of activity.

Our aim always is to strengthen our relations with the masses, even when they adopt wrong policies with which it is necessary for us to take issue. Just as we fight for a foreign policy of Big Three Coalition, so at home we fight for a policy of democratic unity and the maintenance of a firm coalition of all democratic forces, with the independent working class movement as its backbone.

We must never allow ourselves to forget that capitalist America, with its developing open imperialist policies, today becomes the center of world reaction and a breeder of fascism. The very retreat of the Truman Administration will result in an encouragement of all fascist organizations and their activities. This developing fascist activity can be defeated and must be combatted. But this cannot be done by the Communist Party alone or by the Left-wing alone. There must be developed

and strengthened, as outlined in Comrade Dennis' report, a democratic anti-fascist coalition, inclusive of the Communist Party. Our task, while helping to develop this coalition and its activity, is not to allow ourselves to get boxed up in a corner and above all never to relinquish our own independent role and activity and our right to criticize. If we do not understand the proper relation between our independent Party activity and its role in helping to organize, activate and unify the working class and all anti-fascist forces, then we shall isolate ourselves, weaken the mass movement, and, in the course of that, make it possible for the Social-Democrats to exert their reactionary influence.

STRUGGLE AGAINST BOURGEOIS INFLUENCES

We must help everyone of our Clubs to understand that in the course of all its activity it should help free the working class of bourgeois influences and ideologies and thus strengthen its own unity, organization and consciousness. In its more fundamental aspects, that is the essence of the whole concept of our Party's vanguard role.

In a strong capitalist country like ours, where the trade unions and their leadership in the main are still tied to capitalism, we cannot win the working class for our position unless we simultaneously undermine bourgeois influences. We have a special responsibility in regard to this, since our revisionist course helped to

strengthen bourgeois illusions and influences among the workers generally. While this is a many-sided task and all of our activities should contribute toward its fulfillment, certain of its propaganda aspects particularly need our attention. We should paint our capitalist system and its Sixty Ruling Families in word pictures that every worker will recognize from his or her own experiences. I heard Milton Howard last week, when he came back from the Army, tell how in France the Party has succeeded in making every worker conscious of who the Two Hundred Families are. That figure has been translated into human beings with names and addresses, with figures of profit contrasted with the wages of the families in their shops. It has been translated into human connections with newspapers, with political representatives, with fascist organizations. Everything is in syllables spelled out from the life and experience of the working man of France. And all of it has burned a hatred against capitalism into the mind of the worker or farmer reached by our brother Party. We must draw the lesson and operate in the same way.

We must bring to the people a true understanding of democracy, clearly showing the limitations of bourgeois democracy, explaining the character of the new democracies in Europe, and above all explaining why Socialism brings about the development of the fullest democracy.

We must learn how to utilize the prevalent popular conception that,

if our country could attain maximum production and full employment during war time for purposes of destruction, then the American people, and in the first place the workers, are determined that what could be done in war shall be done in peacetime. Of course, the nature of capitalism is such as to make impossible full employment, but precisely this truth enables us to help weaken and break the ideological hold of capitalism on the workers. There are many other issues, such as the two-party system, the position of American imperialism in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and China, that can, by proper clarification on our part, be utilized for the purpose of helping to free the masses from the grip of bourgeois influence. And in the process of such systematic propaganda, we must consciously and continuously learn how to link up all the various issues and problems of the day with our Socialist perspectives, with the manner in which Socialism would solve these problems.

Another important part of this question is the need of restoring to our Party that alertness and irreconcilable attitude towards the penetration of alien ideas into our own ranks, such as white chauvinism, anti-Semitism, conciliation towards Trotskyism, ideological compromising with bourgeois liberalism. It is essential that we conduct a much more thorough educational activity against these alien ideas which penetrate the working class and as a result infiltrate into our organization.

It is of no small significance, as some comrades pointed out in the discussion, that a number of recent Red-baiting attacks did not register as their sponsors expected. This was demonstrated by the results of the New York elections. In Cleveland, where the barrage of Red-baiting and other reactionary pressures forced trade union and Negro leaders to repudiate their previous endorsement of Arnold Johnson and call for his defeat, these leaders were rebuked by the voters. As a result the bourgeois press is now alarmed. Another example that comes to mind is the case of a trade union leader whom we wanted to elect to the National Committee at our Convention. The co-workers of this Communist trade union leader resisted the suggestion, mainly on the ground that this might endanger success in the coming union elections. Actually, I understand, the Trotskyites and A.C.T.U. used the generally-known fact that the comrade was a Party member, to wage a vicious campaign against his re-election. The result was that a fight had to be made on this issue without the additional prestige the comrade would have gained by being a member of the National Committee of our Party. But even under this handicap the comrade won by a 9-to-1 victory.

A reverse situation was seen in the failure of Richard Frankenstein to get elected in the Detroit mayoralty campaign, although he thought that by engaging in miserable Red-baiting during the last week of the cam-

paign he would commend himself to the voters. Actually, he lost votes by his Red-baiting. The smashing defeat of the Red-baiting Liberal Party, into which Dubinsky poured money, is indicative of the same trend. Our Party's quick public criticism of Red-baiting, even when done by so-called progressive or democratic forces, as in the case of O'Dwyer and Frankenstein, was absolutely correct and necessary. We must learn how to combat and completely defeat this Hitlerite tactic even more effectively.

In order to strengthen our ties with the masses and to prepare the working class to fulfill its immediate role as the backbone of the labor-democratic coalition, as well as its historic Socialist role, we must conduct such types of systematic propaganda work. In everything we do, let us get away from the superficial. We must lay solid working-class foundations everywhere. Our Party roots, sunk in working-class soil, will be strong and politically sound. With political explanation, active leadership in mass struggles, a program representing the interests of the masses, and an active Communist Party organization and membership, ever larger sections of the workers and anti-fascist people will support us. While initiative and guidance must come from Party leading committees, it is the Club that will be decisive in achieving this type of activity, and it is there that we must make a decisive change.

In Comrade Dennis' report, we heard presented the idea of a national

campaign around the struggle for peace and, in the first place, against American intervention in China, as a unifying campaign of our Party in all sections of the country. In general, I think we should also agree to the restoration of the practice of large mass meetings and, wherever possible outdoor demonstrations, as a necessary part of our transformation into a real Communist Party.

In addition to organizing demonstrative actions of the Party on the issues of current events, we must restore the practice of holding Party mass meetings on such occasions as Lenin Memorial Day, Lincoln's Birthday, May 1, July 4, the Communist Party anniversary, the Paris Commune anniversary, and the October Revolution anniversary. The coming Lenin Memorial Day, when the central issue will be the fight against American imperialist policies, shall be an occasion for a large number of mass meetings in all communities, big and small.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS

I turn now to a series of problems related to the organizational status and functioning of the Party.

To avoid repeating what I stated in my report to the Convention or the Midwestern Regional Conference, I shall single out for emphasis and further development a few specific questions:

Concentration:

While the objectives set forth in our National Board Memorandum

have been generally approved and most districts have held discussions on them, I venture to say that some of our large districts are not dealing with this question energetically enough. One notable exception is our Chicago District. The greatest danger is the tendency to relegate concentration policy and tasks to a corner somewhere, with a special comrade "responsible" for them. We will not get results unless the concentration tasks become the concern of the entire leadership and of every department within the leadership. Every campaign, whether it be to force withdrawal of our troops from China, or whether it be the *Worker* circulation campaign, must be related to our concentration policy and tasks. Furthermore, concentration work in a given shop or industry should receive outside help from specially constituted Branches, although these must not substitute for the members within the shop or industry. Concentration work also includes, for instance, activity among steel workers, in the territories where they live. In every large city there are dozens of areas where basic industry workers are concentrated. Too often these are not areas of strong branches, but weak branches, or no branches at all. This should be changed, as part of our concentration policy.

In order to dramatize further our understanding of the key importance of establishing new and decisive bridgeheads of Party influence and strength, we propose an extension of our Concentration Plan, as follows:

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To select six of our most experienced and leading comrades returning from the Army and from among those available at home, and send them as Organizational and Educational Instructors supplementing the local organizer, to the following towns (or to others after consultation with the Districts)—Youngstown, Gary, Flint, McKeesport, Toledo, and Kansas City. If we should agree to this, we should charge these comrades, with the active support of the districts concerned, with the task of building the Party during 1946 to 500-1000 dues-paying members in each city and to reach a paid *Worker* circulation of double the Party membership.

Further, in our Concentration Plan we emphasized the importance of strengthening our position among A. F. of L. workers. This is still underestimated in most districts. The experience of the longshore strike in New York City yields important lessons concerning work in such A. F. of L. industries, some of which I shall note here:

1. Without the efforts of the Party, this spontaneous strike might have been lost in twenty-four or forty-eight hours. Instead, it was able to last 18 days and as a result forced economic concessions from the employers and organized a force for democracy within the union and against Ryan.

2. Certain progress toward unity between A. F. of L. and C.I.O. members was achieved.

3. The strike stimulated activity among longshoremen in other cities,

and as a result the Party in each of these cities has undertaken work among longshoremen.

4. Party members, long inactive and dormant, have come to the fore and are today developing as active Communists.

These experiences serve to indicate the great possibilities for activity among workers in A. F. of L. industries. There are some unions, like the Machinists, Teamsters, Painters and Food Workers unions, where we have a considerable membership and where we have a right to expect substantial results.

Closely tied up with concentration activities is the reconstitution and effective functioning of a chain of shop branches from coast to coast. In the period since our Convention we can say that so far all too few shop branches have been organized. Clearly, we have two tasks: firstly, to speed up the organization of shop branches, and, secondly, to give more systematic and sustained political and organizational attention to those already in existence so that they may be rapidly developed into live political centers of Party influence within their shops.

Returning Veterans:

It is not my task to deal with policy toward the many problems confronting the returning veterans, or our policy toward the organization of the veterans. I want to limit myself to some aspects of a special problem we have—that of the returning Communist veterans. 11,500 Communists entered the armed forces, plus 4,000

YCLers—a total of 15,500. You know that few recruiting campaigns have exceeded that figure in the history of our Party. Yet, these 15,500 Communists, many of whom have returned or will be returning very soon, must still be reincorporated into the Party. This is primarily a political task. The fight for the veterans is the fight for the future. That is true in general political terms and it is equally true of our Party.

We must recognize that we have been slow in coping with this question since the demobilization has been stepped up. We are now going to face the time of reckoning. In calculating our membership at the end of this registration, we cannot just add 11,500 to our resident members as we did in the last years. Roughly, one-fourth of the veterans have already returned. We can assume the return of the same proportion of Party members. Until now, too many of the districts know only the leading comrades who went into the army. But the 900 in Illinois, or the 470 in Ohio, or the 1,000 in California, are not known or listed by name and branch, and we therefore do not have the first requisite for re-incorporating them into our Party.

Without setting any goals, we propose that the weight of this National Committee meeting be put behind the issuance of a Call to every Club, emphasizing that they have the responsibility to re-enlist the great majority of these 15,500 Communist veterans into our Party ranks. This organized effort must consist of some

very elementary but most urgent tasks. These, however, cannot be carried out in a vacuum, but only in relation to our basic policy with reference to veterans and in connection with the Party's efforts in organizing mass activities around the urgent demands of the veterans. What are some of these elementary Party activities we must carry through?

1. A letter to every Club in the name of the National Committee, emphasizing that it must compile a complete list of its members in the armed forces, irrespective of prior length of Party membership and record of attendance at Club meetings; that each of these members shall be investigated individually to determine whether or not he has been discharged; that everything shall be done to give assistance to those who have come home in getting back their jobs, to restore old connections, and generally to help in every way possible; that each veteran shall be dealt with on an individual basis and made acquainted with the general political developments and with the developments in the Party during the period of his absence; and that Welcome Home affairs shall be organized to greet returning comrades.

2. In the name of the National Committee, we shall issue a special letter of greetings to each returning Communist veteran and give him a specially printed booklet containing the indispensable reading material for a grasp of the political developments during the war-years.

3. Special tours of returned veterans

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who are leading comrades shall be organized throughout the communities and Clubs of large cities and in all areas in the districts.

4. Attention shall be given to the incorporation of returned veterans into Club leadership.

5. We shall shortly convene a national conference of returned Communist veterans.

On Winning the Youth:

A definite part of the fight for the future is the struggle of our Party to influence the youth. Reaction is hard at work among the youth of America. If we draw the conclusions from our own analysis of the role of American imperialism, it is clear that this political situation demands:

1. The most intensive activity must be carried on to win the American youth for an anti-fascist program; this refers to both the organized and unorganized youth.

2. In the course of such activity, the most effective form must be found of uniting or federating all anti-fascist youth organizations.

3. Simultaneously, the Communist Party must give full support and additional forces to help build the A.Y.D. *now*, not next month or next year, as an anti-fascist educational organization of youth aspiring and fighting for a new and better world, an organization of struggle striving to win the demands of America's young people.

4. The Party must institute a definite organizational activity to win

the most advanced youth directly into our Communist ranks.

If we are serious about the future of America, the future of the trade unions and the future of our own Party, then, as with respect to the returning veterans, we must make a drastic change in our approach, understanding and leadership of Communist work amongst the youth.

In every district there should be a Youth Commission of the State Board. This should not be a committee of Communist youth already active in youth work, although they should be included. It should be composed, like other district commissions of leading comrades together with those active in the work. It should outline policy and plan work and activity on behalf of the Party Clubs, and not on behalf of a special group within the Party.

We shall undertake an organized and large-scale Party recruiting activity amongst young people, both workers and students. We shall take under consideration the most desirable forms of organization within the Party for many of these young people who often are not most effective in the existing community clubs. Young shop workers should be incorporated into shop branches. Student branches of the Party should be organized on every campus.

On Marxist-Leninist Study:

In commenting upon the functioning of our Party, I wish to stress the fight for the most systematic and earnest study of Marxism-Leninism

in the Party ranks from top to bottom, in the course of our mass work. We have established a National Education Department which has started to function and has projected a program of activity, including seven short-term schools. We know that our work in this field is still inadequate; but we have guarantees in the leadership of the Department that the work will be extended and improved. The planned activity must also be followed through in the districts, where in many cases there are not yet functioning educational departments and in some not even directors. We recommend:

1. The organizing of a national educational conference in the coming period whose objectives will include:

a. a systematic plan of club education and training;

b. the organizing of city and district schools, full-time and part-time, supplementary to the national schools;

c. a program of self-study, with some organizational check-up within the Party to guarantee that it is carried through;

d. a system whereby every full-time Party leader becomes a teacher;

e. proper utilization of the Marxist-Leninist classics and theoretical pamphlets;

f. the organization of two three-month full-time national training schools during 1946.

2. The organizing, during 1946, of an appropriate 100th anniversary celebration of the founding of Marxism, with publication of appropriate

books, a nationwide series of lectures, exhibitions, and other related activities.

3. The launching of an organized campaign throughout the Party and in the press, to encourage the study and deepening of the understanding of Marxist-Leninist theory and its application to the conditions of the United States, and to publish new material towards this end.

4. To improve the theoretical content of *Political Affairs* and to extend its circulation, as well as to institute the publication of theoretical material in the *Daily Worker*.

Membership Perspectives:

What should be our present perspectives on membership and press? They should be the following:

1. Depending upon the success of the present registration, we can finish the year with a registered resident membership of between 45,000 and 55,000. If we can limit our losses to 10 per cent, we should have 58,000 members. If they should reach 20 per cent (which is a high loss), our membership would be only 51,000. Anything above a 20 per cent loss—especially in New York, Illinois, California or Philadelphia, would push our membership below the 50,000 mark. We must guarantee that we stay above the 50,000 mark.

Clearly, a Party of only 50,000 is not large enough to carry out most effectively the tasks outlined at this National Committee meeting. The reconstitution of the Party and the enthusiasm and support evidenced

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these past few months, make it possible, we feel, to submit for your consideration a projected Party Recruiting Campaign for 20,000 new members, starting some time in February and concluding in May. The concentration plan goals shall be incorporated and the emphasis shall be on quality of social composition.

It is not intended to elaborate at this time upon the various aspects of such a recruiting campaign. It should, however, center its attention especially on the following categories—shop workers and trade unionists, veterans and young people, and Negro workers. In connection with the last-named category, it is important to understand why the oppressed Negro people look to our Party for leadership and are ready to join it in numbers far exceeding their ratio in the population. We should not be afraid of this disproportion in our membership. It is understandable and correct that it be this way in a country where the Negro people, still have to struggle for their most simple democratic demands. In New York there is no reason why we should not have a Party of 5,000 Negroes in Harlem and proportionately in many other large and small cities. In the South, while striving to recruit Negro and white workers, we should expect to recruit many times more Negro workers than white ones.

2. We shall continue giving special attention to the South. With the reconstitution of the Party in the South, we shall have added by the

end of this year nearly one thousand Party members, but only several hundred subscriptions to the *Worker*. We shall aim at a goal by mid-1946 of 2,000 members and 3,000 readers of the *Worker* in the South.

3. Successful completion of the *Worker* campaign for 40,000 readers, will merely return the *Worker* to its circulation status of January 1945. It seems to me that, not only must we feel confident that the Chicago District will issue its own weekly, but we must establish a system of permanent circulation work for the *Worker* that will result in substantial increases in circulation instead of annual drives for replacement of circulation losses. Moreover, we must ask the New York District if it will consider increasing the *Daily Worker* circulation by at least 5,000 new readers by mid-1946. The present New York *Daily Worker* circulation, 90 per cent of which is sold on the newsstands, is an obstacle to maximum mobilization of our own members, not to speak of our ability to influence non-Party supporters.

Problems of Cadres:

In this last section of my report, I want to deal with the functioning of our leadership and with some new problems of cadres. Shortly after the Convention, the National Board discussed and adopted a report on the most effective functioning of the national leadership—a copy of which all members of the National Com-

mittee and Review Committee received at that time. The Board and Secretariat both function regularly. Departments or Committees have all been established and are beginning to function, except for the two very important ones on Veteran and Agrarian problems. Some of these departments, however, are not yet giving adequate help to the districts. Nor can we be satisfied as yet with the involvement of the National Committee members in the work of the National Committee on a day-to-day basis, particularly those outside of New York City. We have not yet carried through our decision to prepare a monthly political analysis to be published in *Political Affairs*, nor have we as yet initiated the projected theoretical columns in our press. We must try to establish a closer living tie between the National Center and the membership. Now that most departments have responsible heads, these comrades must go into the Districts and Sections to help carry through their directives and to learn how most effectively to answer and solve the problems that the membership below faces.

We should always be conscious that the newly-elected national leadership, especially the National Board, is under close observation by the entire Party. This is both understandable and correct when one remembers the serious consequences to our Party of our past revisionism. However, we should also take note of certain rumor-mongering and gossip concerning the national leader-

ship which is injurious to the Party as an organization and can only be helpful to our enemies. While some people who should know better engage in this detraction, there can be no doubt that it has its source in enemy forces who are busy at work. Today, when the entire Party must speedily and completely recover from all the consequences and effects of our mistakes, the greatest need of the moment is Party unity and support of the leadership elected by our Convention. The slogan of "Everyone to Work" should penetrate our entire Party and be our guide from top to bottom. This objective can be furthered only by a Party practice in which every member and every Club feels free, as many now do, to make known, critically, their opinions, comments, or suggestions as to policies, editorials, activities and leadership practices. We receive daily many such letters in the National office, as, I presume, do the Districts, and we give serious consideration to all of them. We must continue to encourage such free critical expression which combatting the unprincipled gossip that stems from and aids the enemy camp.

The Party leadership, especially the full-time functionaries, must be ever alert to the influences of old methods of work and old practices creeping into their everyday work. All of us must still more skillfully and effectively make use of the Communist weapon of self-criticism, so that we may more speedily overcome all those habits and methods of work which

are not consistent with the system of Communist leadership.

What are some of the new problems of cadre policy?

Firstly, we must recognize some grave deficiencies in our cadres policy. Too often the determining factor is the need of the moment rather than a long-time approach as to what the comrade can best be prepared for. In recognizing this weakness, I frankly admit that all of us, and first of all myself, tend to bow to day-to-day pressure by the districts, as well as to our own over-anxiety speedily to solve a particular personnel problem.

Secondly, we should learn to evaluate all of our cadres more critically, not from the negative viewpoint of knocking them down, but from the positive viewpoint of getting the best out of everyone. In this connection it is well to examine what may become a comrade's "blind spot," so to speak, in the future, traceable, as the case may be, to social origin, lack of shop experience, inability to work well with people, or anyone of a dozen other factors. Even while someone is doing good work, a conscious cadre policy will seek the means to strengthen and overcome precisely the particular weakness that a comrade may have, so as to prevent it from becoming an obstacle in his daily work and future growth.

Thirdly, we must more effectively utilize our returned veteran cadres and develop new cadres from among them. Aside from the invaluable experience and political prestige,

these comrades have, they will also have something that none of us at home have had the opportunity to acquire—the ability to mix and get along with a cross-section of average Americans. These assets make them invaluable as Communist cadres, and with proper political development and merging into the existing leadership, they will immeasurably strengthen that leadership as we already have seen from the first steps in this direction in many Districts and Sections. The great majority of these veterans will not be in the very top leadership. Some will strengthen our trade union and mass organization cadres. Some can really be a cornerstone of strength in a dozen cities like Altoona where we have not even one Party member, or in hundreds of shops where, as shop workers, they will build the Party and become both Party and union leaders.

Fourthly, we must consciously and boldly promote Negro comrades to responsible posts of every kind, and get away from the practice of limiting Negro comrades to Negro work. Precisely because of this broader orientation still greater emphasis has to be placed on the deliberate development and promotion of Negro comrades of working-class origin.

A particular question that needs greater elaboration has to do with our Communist trade union cadres. While our leading trade union comrades gave us much help in correcting our revisionist policies and in reconstituting the Party, they must never-

theless be more aware of the meaning of our Convention analyses and Resolution as they apply, not only to the Party in general, but specifically to our trade union comrades and cadres. The great majority of our Communist trade union leaders have risen from the ranks of shop workers and have won their leadership on the basis of merit because they were among the best organizers, strike leaders, negotiators, and fighters for the improvement of the workers' conditions and the building of strong unions. Some of them have learned to combine these qualities with effective leadership in the field of electoral and political struggle. However, just as bureaucracy infected the Party leadership when democracy, self-criticism and collective leadership were weak, so did it equally affect our Communist trade union leaders.

Without a serious correction of such bureaucratic practices, and the establishment of closer and more intimate ties with their membership, the Communist trade union leaders will not have the full confidence of large sections of the non-Communist rank-and-file union members, and this in turn will reflect upon the Party.

The rank-and-file trade unionists know our Communist trade union leaders through their daily actions; they know the Party, not only by its proclamations and statements, but by these leaders who represent the Party.

If we can re-establish a feeling of confidence in our Party and its leader-

ship among the shop and trade union members—a responsibility of our National Committee and the various State Committees, as well as of our Communist trade union leaders—then we shall have consolidated and united our ranks and shall make headway on all fronts, especially in building the Party and extending its influence. It is particularly necessary that Communist trade union leaders set examples in having close ties with the rank and file of their membership, developing the broadest forms of democracy and expression of the rights of the membership, finding effective forms for educating and raising the political understanding of their membership, and at all times receiving support and winning elections on the solid support of the membership because of correct policy and fighting leadership.

Moreover, Communist trade union leaders must be particularly alert to avoid falling into some of the accepted but bad practices of some other trade union leaders with reference to finances and similar corrupting influences. The overwhelming majority of our Communist trade union leaders are not guilty of such practices, but they are always subject to the influence of their surroundings. Such practices, where they do exist, whether on a small or large scale, not only bring the individual leader into disrepute in the eyes of the membership and the workers, but what is much more grave, they cast a reflection on the Party.

In the recent period definite pro-

gress has been made in refreshing our committees with new working-class forces from the shops and returning veterans. One-man leadership has been replaced with committee-form of leadership. Bureaucratic practices have been sharply reduced, although they are not fully eradicated. There is still need in our midst to clear out all remnants of the corroding influence of the "easy" period of the past, and there must be utmost vigilance as to the life and habits of every Communist leader.

We have no reason to cover up the fact that the Budenz betrayal created certain fresh problems for the newly-elected leadership in again winning the complete confidence of our membership. Among many other lessons from the Budenz case is that of the need for vigilance in general, but also vigilance in not "overlooking" little things that might point in a certain direction. The main lesson from the Budenz case is to recognize that we are not only surrounded by the class enemy, but that the enemy's agents are also at work inside our ranks.

Budenz was incorrectly promoted without any real testing. In the Communist Party, we must never forget the background of one who was active in the enemy camp, whether that be the KKK, the Trotskyites, the police force, the Black Legion, the Christian Front, or any such outfit. This does not mean a permanent black-balling of one in the past con-

nected with an enemy organization, who, being of working-class origin, has repudiated and fought the enemy, proved himself in struggle, and shown devotion to the working class and the Party. It does mean that such people have to be doubly conscious of their own past. It means however, that at the first sign of deterioration in such people, the Party must act ruthlessly. These signs of deterioration were evident in Budenz, as expressed in his holding a position without performing its duties, his laziness, his constant demands for money, and his general failure to participate actively in political life.

Everywhere, the Review Commissions must examine the leadership from top to bottom and emphasize the need of constant vigilance against political deterioration, as well as root out and expose the agents of the enemy who smuggle themselves into our ranks and who, in a period of crisis, try to create doubts about the Party leadership as well as demagogically worm themselves into posts of leadership.

Precisely because the reconstitution of our Party was the indispensable step in turning from the disastrous revisionist course we had previously followed, it is necessary that we hammer out in these deliberations a common policy on the questions now raised and that we then fight consistently for its full realization throughout the Party.

THE COMMUNISTS AND NATIONALIZATION*

By ETIENNE FAJON

THE PROGRAM OF ACTION adopted unanimously on March 15, 1944, by the National Council of Resistance calls for nationalization of certain industries.

It demands in fact:

"The return to the nation of the great monopolized means of production, the fruit of our common labor, of the sources of power, of the riches of mineral wealth, of insurance companies and big banks."

This demand received the unanimous vote of all groups affiliated to the C.N.R. (National Council of Resistance), in particular of parties like the Radical Party, the Democratic Alliance, or the Republican Federation. It was approved, with the entire program, by the President of the Provisional Government of the Republic.

The Communist Party is among the signatory organizations of the program of the Resistance. It approves all its terms. Today the Party demands their fulfillment. It there-

fore calls without reservation for the nationalizations projected in the program.

In spite of the National Council's clear declarations, however, there is much demagogic chatter on the subject of nationalization. This chatter does not fail to arouse some anxiety in certain circles.

On the one hand, in fact, extreme confusion has developed over the meaning of the term *nationalization*. We have, for example, the indiscriminate use of the terms *nationalization* and *socialization*; so that the nationalizations to be carried through are presented as though they were measures of a revolutionary, socialist character.

On the other hand, to listen to certain demagogues, one no longer knows exactly what comes under the question of nationalization. Is it to be the big banks and the trusts, or entire basic branches of the economy? Or, again, as a recent plan had it, is it to be all enterprises that employ more than fifty workers?

It is important to clear away this confusion, to establish the fundamental difference once and for all between nationalization and socialism, and to state precisely the character and extent of the demand of the C.N.R.

NOT "NATIONALIZING OF THE DEFICIT"

Within the framework of present-day France, two principal forms of nationalization are possible.

Nationalization of the first type

* Translated from *Cahiers du Communisme*, theoretical organ of the Communist Party of France, February, 1945.

are profitable operations for the people concerned.

This is notably the case with nationalizations that reduce themselves to the creation of a company formed by the State and the nationalized enterprise. A characteristic example of this type, cited by Jacques Duclos on January 23 last, to the Central Committee of the Party, was the establishment in 1937 of the National Association of French Railroads.

The total social capital of the new company is fixed. It is divided into a certain number of shares which are distributed, part to the interested capitalists and part to the State. In the case of the National Association of French Railroads the State's portion was 1,447,000 shares to the railroad companies' 1,391,024 shares.

The State thus becomes, not the owner, but the co-owner of the nationalized industry. Private capital continues to play a decisive role in the enterprise. Not only is no blow struck at capital's privileges, but these are henceforth guaranteed by the public treasury; eventual deficits are covered; payment of interest on stock is assured. Any capitalist corporation in straits would naturally aspire to a nationalization of this type which consists quite simply of reinforcing its resources at the expense of the nation or, as the popular formula puts it, nationalizing the deficit.

Such an operation can be lucrative for the exploiters when the nationalization means payments to them

of substantial periodic indemnities by the State. Thus it is that in the case of the coal mines of the Nord and Pas-de-Calais, "nationalized" by the law of December 13, 1944, the coal magnates, while waiting for the final terms of their indemnification to be set, fixed a monthly allocation of eight francs per ton of coal mined, based on the monthly average in 1938 and 1939. According to the calculations of the newspaper *Figaro* of December 25, 1944, this netted them over 238 million francs for the year, without counting reimbursement for fixed charges and amortization incurred during the period under consideration.

It is obvious that this is an instance of a purely fictitious nationalization. Leaving to the State the problem of struggling with the actual difficulties of operation, the coal magnates continue to pocket their surplus value calculated on the years when exploitation was most favorable.

There is no need to say that such "nationalizations" which end up most often in the passing of money from the taxpayers' pockets into the hands of the capitalists through the intermediary of the State, correspond in no way to the proposals of the National Council of Resistance when it demands the return to the nation of the great monopolized means of production.

REAL NATIONALIZATION

Nationalization of the second type

—the only ones that merit the name—consist of the expropriation pure and simple of the monopoly affected. In such cases, the measure gives the State exclusive title to the nationalized enterprise. This is so, whether or not owners are paid an indemnity, depending on whether or not they harmed the national interest and whether or not there are stockholders who are innocent of collaboration and whose interests must be protected. All participation of private capital, whether through management or through profits, is abolished.

In all the capitalist countries of the world, such State ownership already covers certain enterprises. In France, for example, the postal, telegraph and telephone systems are a State monopoly.

We shall examine later what advantages certain nationalizations of this type have for the country. But what we must understand is that neither the real nationalizations nor the pseudo-nationalizations of which we have given examples are in any way measures of a socialist character.

No one acquainted with scientific socialism would be surprised by this statement. For, it is in conformity with the teaching of Marxism, with the ideas brilliantly developed by Engels in the last century in his celebrated *Anti-Dühring*.

THE TEACHING OF ENGELS

The position of Engels on nationalization is not negative. According

to him, nationalization or State ownership can represent economic progress.

That is the case where the means of production, notably industry itself, have reached a degree of development so gigantic that they have become incompatible with the management of individual capitalist enterprises and even of corporations. Under these conditions, "the State is constrained to take over their management."

I say is *constrained to* [stress Engels]. For it is only when the means of production or communication have *actually* outgrown management by share companies, and therefore their transfer to the State has become inevitable from an economic standpoint—it is only then that this transfer to the state, even when carried out by the State of today, represents an economic advance, the attainment of another preliminary step towards the taking over of all productive forces of society itself.*

For Marxists, a nationalization represents an economic progress when it becomes an *inevitable economic necessity* for the State. To the extent that it expresses incompatibility between the development of the modern means of production and the capitalist form of ownership, to the extent that it denotes the revolt of the productive forces against their

* Frederick Engels, *Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science* (Anti-Dühring), International Publishers, New York, p. 312, n. 2. Editors.

capitalist character, it can even constitute a "preliminary stage" to socialism.

A preliminary stage, but not a socialist measure.

As for nationalizations in general, they have nothing to do with socialism, and Engels deals harshly with the "socialists" who confuse the two things. He says:

Recently, however, since Bismarck adopted State ownership, a certain spurious socialism has made its appearance—here and there even degenerating into a kind of flunkeyism—which declares that *all* taking over by the State, even the Bismarckian kind, is in itself socialistic. If, however, the taking over of the tobacco trade by the State was socialistic, Napoleon and Metternich would rank among the founders of socialism. If the Belgian State, for quite ordinary political and financial reasons, constructed its own, main railway lines; if Bismarck, without any economic compulsion, took over the main railway lines in Prussia, simply in order to be better able to organize and use them for war, to train the railway officials as the government's voting cattle, and especially to secure a new source of revenue independent of Parliamentary votes—such actions were in no sense socialist measures whether direct or indirect, conscious or unconscious. Otherwise, the Royal Maritime Company, the Royal Porcelain Manufacture, and even the regimental tailors in the army, would be socialist institutions.*

THE MACHINERY OF THE STATE AND THE NATIONALIZATIONS

Thus, a nationalization is not a socialist measure. Why? Because Engels recalls to us:

. . . The modern State, too, is only the organization with which bourgeois society provides itself in order to maintain the general external conditions of the capitalist mode of production against encroachments either by the workers or by individual capitalists. The modern State, whatever its form, is an essentially capitalist machine. . . . The more productive forces it takes over, the more it becomes the real collective body of all the capitalists, the more citizens it exploits. The workers remain wage earners, proletarians.*

No conscientious adherent of socialism could be ignorant of the Marxist estimate made here by Engels which has so many times been proved in fact.

France, for example, has had and can have certain Cabinet Ministers disposed toward the replacement of capitalism by a more equitable system.

What remains, nevertheless, is the machinery of the State with its permanent bureaus, its elaborate departments, headed by high functionaries who are products of capitalist circles, educated at schools subsidized by big capital, like the Free School of Political Sciences—all of which assures, despite the said Ministers,

* *Ibid.*, The Editors.

* *Ibid.*, p. 313. The Editors.

the maintenance of the general conditions of the capitalist system, *including the nationalized enterprises.*

The machinery of the State created by the functioning of specific economic and social relationships is not an insurmountable obstacle to the accomplishment of certain reforms within the frame work of those relationships. But it can in no case be the instrument for the destruction of those relationships of capitalist production and for their replacement by new socialist relations of production, that is to say, revolution.

This is perhaps why convinced advocates of nationalization thus regarded as socialist measures merely brought forth corporations of the type of the National Association of French Railroads when they held Cabinet posts in 1936-37.

And this is why a French post-office worker or a French railroad worker remains a proletarian, just as much exploited as a worker in private industry and gets not a jot more in wages than the price of his labor power.

THE FIRST CONDITION FOR SOCIALISM

Thus, socialism cannot be realized in the framework of the present State. This is moreover one of the lessons that Marx drew from the historic experiences of his time, notably of the Paris Commune. If it were a question in France of the inauguration of socialism—which is in no

way the case today—it would be useful not to forget this teaching of Marx:

... the next attempt of the French revolution will be no longer, as before, to transfer the bureaucratic and military machine from one hand to another, but to *smash it*.*

The first condition for the introduction of socialism in a country is a revolution leading to the replacement of the capitalist state by a socialist State, all of whose organs derive from the people. That is what happened in October, 1917, on one-sixth of the globe, not by ministerial decision but by the struggle of the entire people, united around the working class.

Suppressing the institutions that make the State "an essentially capitalist machine," the emanation thenceforth of the working class and the entire people, the socialist State proceeds to nationalize the banks, the railroads, the merchant marine, and heavy industry. Such a process results truly in the social ownership of the great means of production. *Only then* is this a socialist measure.

Once the general conditions of capitalism are abolished, the exploitation of man by man disappears.

The worker in a socialist enterprise ceases to be exploited. His wage is no longer the price of his labor power, no longer strictly limited, but is instead his personal share, varying

* Karl Marx, *Letters to Kugelmann*, International Publishers, 1934, p. 123. The Edition.

according to the quantity and quality of his work and according to the wage fund which continues to grow along with the development of production.

Thus, we have established the difference between nationalization and socialism. Nationalization is a socialist measure when it is accomplished by a socialist State. In all other cases, it is not a socialist measure.

But the fact that nationalizations in the framework of the present State have nothing to do with socialism in no way affects the attitude to be adopted toward them. . . .

NATIONALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY

Certain nationalizations can, under given circumstances, represent a step forward from the point of view of democracy.

In his interview in 1934 with H. G. Wells, Stalin notes that they can permit:

. . . bridling to some extent the most unbridled of individual representatives of capitalist profit, some increase in the application of the principles of regulation in national economy.*

Thus, in Russia, in September, 1917, in the framework of the February Revolution (democratic and not socialist), Lenin called for the nationalization of the banks and monopolized industries to offset the

disorganization of the national economy, to smash the sabotage of reactionaries, and to strengthen democracy.

Thus, in France, nationalization of the insurance companies has figured for the past 50 years in the programs of democratic parties as a means of bringing immediate revenues to the State, thus better assuring a greater measure of its independence as against big capital, and as a means of lightening the burden of certain categories such as the peasantry.

Communists are not opposed in principle to those nationalizations that represent progress from the democratic point of view. Quite the contrary.

"Our Communist Party can and must support such a demand," said Maurice Thorez in 1937 at the Congress at Arles, apropos of the nationalization of the insurance companies.

Currently, the "return to the nation of the great monopolized means of production" demanded by the CNR constitutes at the same time a democratic measure, as was stressed by the Secretary General of our Party in his report to the Central Committee on January 21 last:

. . . whose application would permit the development of the national war effort and the protection at the same time of the small producers and the mass of consumers against the financial oligarchy.

Moreover, the return to the nation of the great monopoly-held

* Joseph Stalin-H. G. Wells, *Marxism vs. Liberalism, An Interview*. New Century Publishers, New York, 1945, p. 6. The Editors.

means of production constitutes today a measure of national security.

THE TREASON OF THE MEN OF THE TRUSTS

In fact, the caste of men most representative of the trusts, the caste of the Two Hundred Families, betrayed France.

We know how, in the period that preceded the war, the coal, metal, banking and other magnates, counting on the Hitler "Order" to maintain their privileges, deliberately sabotaged production and weakened the national capacity to resist the aggressor.

This betrayal was carried on openly when France was occupied by the Nazis. For example, the French Kuhlmann trust turned over the products of the French chemical industry to the enemy and participated in the formation of the corporation Francolor (with 51 per cent of the shares going to the German trust).

The steel trust, under pressure from men like de Wendel, on the basis of a profitable exchange, ceded to Germany essential industries in Lorraine.

The directors of the coal trust, headed by Peyerimhoff, pushed production to the maximum for the enemy.

The insurance trust, where we again find de Wendel, Schneider, Lehideux, etc., turned over the French market to German capital.

The four big French banks (Crédit Lyonnais, Société Générale, Comp-

toir d'Escompte, and Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et l'Industrie) created in 1942, a fictitious "Financial association for the development of industry" and put it at the disposition of large German enterprises.

We could multiply these examples of the high treason of the financial oligarchies, high treason which continues since liberation principally in the form of organized sabotage of production and food supply.

With regard to this general treason, the return to the nation of the wealth and properties of the trusts seems not only a democratic measure but a measure of justice and a condition for the country's return to work, an essential element of the war.

It is no longer only because the Two Hundred Families crush the workers, the small producers and the consumers that their property must return to the nation. It is because they betray the country. It is no longer because they are a State within a State, but rather because they are an agency of the foreigner in the bosom of the State.

NATIONALIZATION AND CONFISCATION OF THE WEALTH OF TRAITORS

Hence, why present this social project as a "socialist" slogan? Why present it under conditions that can rally only a part of France behind a measure of patriotic and national interest that ought to receive the unanimous backing of the country?

The program of the National Council of Resistance demands, as we have seen, the return to the nation of trustified industries. But this dovetails with another demand, which, without being confused with the first, makes it concrete; it gives specific form to the nationalizations that are indispensable now since the treason committed for the past ten years has on the whole been committed by the Two Hundred Families. This second demand is the "confiscation of the wealth of traitors."

Certain people are making rash proposals about nationalization which may be used to protect the really guilty, the men of the trusts, and to disquiet or discourage many patriotic employers whose efforts are indispensable to the war. Therefore, the Communists do not separate the slogan of nationalization from the clear slogan of confiscation of the wealth of traitors, a slogan that is not open to any equivocation.

As democratic measures and as confiscation of the wealth of traitors, the nationalizations that we demand in accord with the C.N.R. are cal-

culated to gain the unanimous support of all patriots and all republicans, that is to say, the great masses of the French people.

Such a demand strikes home. It has not the disadvantage of being general. Traitors are not a vague entity. We know their names and their crimes. Confiscation of their wealth permits us to strike at them all, while respecting and setting at ease employers who conducted themselves like good Frenchmen.

Nationalization of the big monopolies, the fountainhead of treason, carried through with the support of the entire people, alone can extricate the State from the deadly stranglehold of the anti-national forces. It can strengthen the nation's economic and financial independence and thus open the way to rapid economic recovery, a major factor in heightening the national war effort.

Let who will consider the program of the National Council of Resistance too moderate; but let it be applied first. Its realization, quite simply, is one of the conditions essential for rapid victory over fascism.

VITAL DOCUMENTS

TEXT OF THE ADDRESS BY SOVIET FOREIGN COMMISSAR VYACHESLAV MOLOTOV TO THE MOSCOW SOVIET, NOVEMBER 6, 1945, ON THE OCCASION OF THE 28TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER SOCIALIST REVOLUTION.

Comrades, after several years of severe war we are celebrating the 28th anniversary of the October Revolution under conditions of peace and of glorious victory over fascism. Behind us are four years of war against Hitlerite Germany which lacerated our country and the whole of Europe. Behind us, too, is the war against aggressive Japan, in which we had to participate in autumn of this year. In this heroic fight a decisive place must be allotted to the Soviet peoples. Peace has been won for the peoples of all the world. The main hotbeds of world fascism and world aggression have been liquidated in the West and the East. Now we have achieved the possibility of returning to peaceful work in order to strengthen our victory.

From now on we can regard our motherland as liberated from the threat of German invasion in the West and from Japanese aggression in the East. The long-awaited peace has come. As Comrade Stalin has said, our Soviet people has not shirked and was not miserly in its work and its manpower, in its victories. We have lived through difficult years. Now every one of us can say we have won. The Germans invaded our country, counting on the

fact that the unexpectedness of their criminal attack would ensure success for them. Not only Germany but many other countries were of the opinion that the Soviet Union would not be able to hold out for a long time—that after a few weeks or at any rate in a few months Germany would crush the Soviet Union, that Hitler would celebrate his victory.

After the comparatively easy victories of the Hitlerites in Western Europe many people thought this was inevitable. These conclusions were drawn first and foremost by those who did not recognize the lawfulness of the October Revolution in Russia and by those who proved unable to understand the popular character of the Soviet nation created by our revolution. The German invasion of the Soviet Union was a tremendous ordeal for our friends abroad as well, who with sunken hearts were watching all those exceptional difficulties experienced by our country in the first period of the war. The Soviet Union withstood everything. The Soviet Union remained on her feet in spite of the criminal attack on her.

Material losses and deep wounds inflicted on the Soviet Union during the first years of war did not shake her

physical and moral might. Our Army succeeded in reorganizing and recovering from the first blows. The Soviet people strained all their forces and inflicted a crushing return blow on the enemy. All remember the time when our Army went over to the offensive from the defensive, first on single districts of the front, and then along the entire front. Interests of self-defense dictated the necessity of formation of one single anti-Hitlerite front amongst the big and small democratic countries.

It is known to everybody that the Anglo-American-Soviet Coalition successfully fulfilled its historic task in the organization of a common fight of the democratic countries against fascism. It is also known that the opening of the Second Front in western Europe, when Germany found herself in a pincers between two fronts, made the position of fascism hopeless. At the same time it must not be forgotten that the turning point in the situation on the German-Soviet front took place one year before the opening of the Second Front, when the Hitlerites began rolling back under the tremendous might and ever-growing onrush of the Red Army.

Our nation created by the October Revolution has been able, not only to defend herself from fascist incursion, but to go over to the offensive and to the finish of the main hotbed of fascism and aggression. Then all understood that Soviet might is not the same as the heartless might of fascism, the originator of the Second World War. It became clear that the Soviet Union can with honor defend herself and is capable of withstanding the most trying ordeals ever experienced in the history of our country. Hitlerite Germany threatened not only the Soviet Union. Before the

attack on the Soviet Union German fascists took possession of Norway, Belgium, Holland, France, Greece and Yugoslavia. Among their allies the Germans had not only Fascist Italy but also a number of other European states.

These had concluded military alliances with Germany. Spain and some other countries helped Hitler more or less openly. Threat of a Hitlerite invasion was hanging over Britain. If the campaign against the Soviet Union had ended in success, all Europe would have found herself under the boot of Hitler. The Hitlerites in many fashions were already planning their "New Order" which they were going to introduce in Europe. Fascist underlings, such as all kinds of Quislings and Laval, had already begun their work for their German masters.

Everywhere fascist Hitlerite rule was being established by the destruction of links with democratic institutions, by the liquidation of the links of political rights of the working classes. At the same time the Hitlerites dragged from enslaved countries and extorted from them all material resources to supply, and still more, to equip their criminal fascist hordes. The first successes of the invasion of the Soviet Union made the Hitlerites still more giddy with success. They began to talk still more openly of their mastery over Europe, still more of their claim to world sovereignty.

Thus, these dangerous plans were disclosed to the entire world—plans of adventurers for rule of the German race over other peoples of Europe and not only over Europe. The German fascist theory of the mastery of the superior race over other peoples regarded in the lower category of races

became a direct threat to the existence of civilization in Europe.

In all countries invaded by Hitlerite bands, the peoples found themselves badly prepared for repelling the fascist invaders. Only step by step, thanks to the greatest efforts of the best patriots and democrats, did the democratic forces of resistance against the invaders begin to take shape and grow.

But even in those countries, as, for instance, Yugoslavia, where the entire people supported a rising against the invader, they lacked the power to break the military might of Hitlerism.

Only when our army went over to the offensive and began to smash German forces, tearing from them the aura of invincibility, did the large-scale possibility arise for the liberation of the peoples who had been enslaved by German imperialism. The Red Army brought liberation to the neighboring countries and to other peoples of Europe. The Soviet armies, together with the armies of her allies, began to play the part of liberators of Europe, including those countries which broke their alliance with Germany and entered the ranks of those peoples fighting for the liquidation of Hitlerism.

Thus the task of liberating the countries of Europe from the yoke of Hitlerism will enter as a glorious page into the history of our victorious Red Army.

Fascist Italy was the first to join the ranks of Germany who unleashed the war in Europe. From the moment of the attack on the Soviet Union, the governments of Romania, Hungary and Finland, having concluded a military alliance with Hitlerite Germany, led their countries into a war against the Soviet Union.

Bulgaria, under her then existing

government consisting of Hitlerite agents, found herself, as well, in alliance with Germany. Thus, with no exceptions, European countries with fascist regimes bound their fate to the fate of Hitlerite Germany in the Second World War.

The defeat of Germany thus meant not only the defeat of fascist Germany but also the defeat of fascism in other European countries. Thus the significance of our victory must be judged not only as the defeat of German fascism but also as a military, moral and political defeat of fascism in the whole of Europe.

After the ending of the war in Europe, the Allied powers were faced with the task of liquidating Japanese aggression in the East in order to hasten the re-establishment of peace in the whole world.

The Soviet Union could not stand aside during the solution of this task because of mutual obligations existing among the Allies and because this was insistently required by the interests of security of our country in the East.

We all remember that Japan in the past had attacked our country several times. In the East a continuous threat of Japanese invasion existed. All of this made inevitable the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan.

It is not difficult to believe that from the time when German fascism began to suffer one defeat after another on the Soviet-German front the outcome of the Japanese aggression in the East had become a foregone conclusion.

Having at last entered the war against Japan, the Soviet Union hastened her defeat, thus hastening the end of the war in the East. Japan capitulated be-

fore the Allies, following the road of Hitlerite Germany. Not only did the plans of German imperialism for domination over Europe collapse, but also those of Japanese imperialism for domination over Asia.

Yet, not a long time before, these western and eastern fascists regarded these plans as only one step on the road to world domination, thus showing how very shortsighted and foolhardy are such aggressive intentions in our times.

The defeat of Japanese imperialism as the main hotbed of aggression and fascism in the East and the liberation of China from the Japanese invaders has a tremendous constructive significance for the democratic development of nations.

It is in the interests of all democratic states to strengthen this victory. It is therefore understandable that the Soviet Union attaches such great importance to the negotiations between the allies for setting up an adequate control of the main allied powers over the surrender conditions of Japan.

Difficulties which have arisen have not yet been removed with regard to this question. Yet the Soviet Union expresses her conviction that all peace-loving nations are profoundly conscious of the necessity to strengthen victory over aggressive Japan—to create for it adequate conditions of cooperation among the allied powers.

Germany as well as Japan had to surrender unconditionally to the Allied powers. Thus the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition achieved the goal set for itself.

The peoples of our country are recognizing with satisfaction that in the

victorious end of the Second World War, in the interest of the democratic nations and, in particular in the liquidation of the most dangerous hotbed of fascism and aggression—Hitlerite Germany—a decisive role was played by the Soviet Union. The Soviet peoples have called the war against fascist Germany the "great patriotic war."

Taking example from the Soviet people, the patriots of other nations learned how to fight for their countries, their independence and freedom. It is also true that the Soviet people not only liberated their own country but also waged a heroic struggle for the re-establishment of peace and liberty throughout Europe.

A year ago Comrade Stalin said, "Now all admit that the Soviet people, in its self-sacrificing struggle, has saved the civilization of Europe from fascist wreckers. In this lies the greatest achievement of the Soviet people in the history of mankind."

The Second World War differed from the First World War in many respects. First of all by the number of nations participating in it and also by the number of human victims and by the material damage caused. Four-fifths of the population of the globe in one way or another took part in the last World War. The number of mobilized in both belligerent camps reached over 110,000,000 people.

It is almost impossible to name a country which was really neutral in these years. Having allowed a Second World War—that is, not having in time taken measures against aggressive forces of fascism who launched this war of unheard-of scale—mankind has paid an incalculable price in human life and

devastation of many countries. War was imposed upon our people, who declared a great patriotic war only in reply to aggression. Hitlerite Germany attacked the Soviet Union not only with the aim of seizing our territory and destroying the Soviet state. Hitlerism had as its aim the destruction of the Russian people and all Slavs.

Until the moment when the people of the Soviet Union completely reorganized themselves according to Stalin's appeal "Everything for War" and finally broke the back of the German army, the Hitlerite beasts did not stop at anything in putting their man-hating aims against territories which they had captured. To forget that would be a crime to millions of innocent victims, toward their orphaned families and toward the whole people.

Nor can one forget what tremendous material damage has been caused us by the German invaders and their allies in their rule over Soviet territory during many months. For all this, first of all the main war criminals must answer. German fascist invaders completely or partially destroyed or burned 1,710 towns and more than 70,000 villages in our country. They burned or destroyed more than 6,000,000 buildings and rendered homeless about 25,000,000 people. Among the destroyed towns and those which suffered the most are the main industrial centers of the country—Stalingrad, Sevastopol, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Odessa, Smolensk, Kharkov, Voronezh, Rostov on the Don, and many others.

The Hitlerites destroyed or damaged 31,850 industrial undertakings which employed nearly 4,000,000 people. The Hitlerites devastated and ransacked 98,

000 collective farms, including most of the collective farms in the Ukraine and White Russia. They killed or drove off into Germany 7,000,000 horses, 17,000,000 heads of large horned cattle and dozens of millions of pigs and lambs. The direct loss alone caused to the national economy and to our citizens has been assessed by an extraordinary government commission at 679,000,000,000 rubles.

We cannot forget all this. We must demand from the countries which started the war at least partial reparation for the damage caused. One cannot deny the justice of this demand by the Soviet people. There can be no argument on the justice of this wish of the Soviet people.

One also should not pass over the fact that the decision of the Berlin Conference of the Three Powers on German reparations has not yet progressed satisfactorily. However, among us there are no partisans of a policy of revenge against defeated peoples. Comrade Stalin has more than once pointed out that feelings of revenge and vengeance against wrongs should be absent from politics and relations among people. In relations to defeated peoples we do not satisfy our feelings but we make new aggression more difficult and by consideration of that new potential, the aggressor should find himself in the greatest possible isolation.

We must not be guided by the wrongs of the past but by interests of safeguarding peace and security among nations in the postwar period. Undoubtedly the interests of safeguarding a firm peace demand that peace-loving peoples should possess adequate armed forces. In any case, this appli-

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to those countries which bear the main responsibility for the guarantee of peace. The interests of safeguarding peace have nothing in common with a policy of an armament race among the great powers. This is preached abroad by some particularly fierce partisans of a policy of imperialism.

In this connection we must speak of the discovery of atomic energy and about the atomic bomb, use of which in war has shown its enormous destructive force. Atomic energy is not yet tested, however, in the field of prevention of aggression or in the field of peace.

On the other hand, there can be no technical secrets on a large scale at the present time which could remain the property of any one country or any narrow group of governments. Therefore, the discovery of atomic energy must not encourage either enthusiasm for the use of this discovery in a game of foreign power politics or indifference regarding the future of the peace-loving nations.

There is also no little talk of the creation of blocs and grouping of states as a means of defending definite foreign interests. The Soviet Union has never taken part in a grouping of powers directed against peace-loving states. In the West, however, such attempts occurred, as is known, more than once.

The anti-Soviet character of such groups in the past is well known. In any case the history of blocs and groups of western powers is witness to the fact that they served not so much to bridge the aggressors as, on the contrary, to foster aggression, first and foremost on the part of Germany. That is why

vigilance in this respect on the part of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving states must not weaken.

Establishment of peace throughout the world did not and could not bring back the pre-war situation between nations. For some period Germany, Italy and Japan will no longer be among the great States playing the lead in international life. Consequently, it holds good for the period during which there operates an allied and united control of these countries, and directed against a resurgence of aggression of these powers, but which does not hinder the development and rise of these countries and democratic peace-loving states.

Of no small significance for the future of Europe is the fact that several fascist and semi-fascist states have taken the democratic road and are aiming to establish friendly relations with the Allied powers. It seems clear that not only should one not impede, but it is imperative to cooperate in consolidating the democratic beginnings of these states. It is impossible not to notice that in the camp of the Allied powers also the war has wrought no small changes. As a rule reactionary forces are now pushed back from their previous positions, clearing the way for old and new democratic parties.

In several European countries fundamental social reforms have been carried out, such as liquidation of the feudal land-owning system which has outlived itself, the distributing of land to small-holder peasants, thus depriving the reactionary fascist forces of their strength and stimulating the rise of democratic and socialist movements in these countries.

Some countries now have on their

agenda such important economic reforms as nationalization of heavy industry, an eight-hour working day and other measures, which bring in a new spirit and confidence to the growing ranks of the democratic movement in Europe and beyond the confines of Europe.

Some organs of the reactionary press make attempts to attribute these daring democratic reforms mainly to the increased influence of the Soviet Union. The lack of foundation of such arguments is obvious. Everyone knows that problems of such nature were successfully solved in the foremost countries of Europe even earlier. This does not mean that the forces of fascism are completely liquidated and that one has no longer to contend with them.

We have all read the Crimea declaration of the three powers regarding liberated Europe, in which it was stated "the establishment of order in Europe and the reconstruction of the national economic life must be achieved in such a way which would allow liberated peoples to destroy the last vestige of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions according to their own choice."

A great deal remains to be done in order to achieve correct fulfillment of the declaration. However, there is no doubt that in spite of all the negative consequences of the war with fascism, which ended in victory, it has in many respects helped to clear the political air of Europe, and has opened new ways to resurrection and development of anti-fascist forces as never before in the past.

Such a situation beyond doubt corresponds to the interest of peace-loving

states and it is to be hoped that among the peoples of Europe the consciousness for the necessity to wipe out the last traces of Nazism and fascism will be strengthened. The Soviet Union was always true to a policy of consolidating normal relations between all peace-loving nations.

During the war years the Soviet Union established friendly relations with Great Britain and the United States, with France and China, with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and with almost all these countries now has long-term agreements of alliance and mutual assistance against any possible new aggression on the part of those states which were the main aggressors in the world war. On our part, everything is being done to normalize and establish good relations also with other countries which have done away with the policy of enmity and mistrust of the Soviet Union. To this end we are also working to extend trade and economic relations of our country with an ever-widening circle of foreign countries. Cultural ties are also being strengthened.

The strength of the Anglo-Soviet-American anti-Hitler coalition which came into being during the war is now undergoing a test. Will the coalition be just as strong and capable of arriving at common decisions under the new conditions when new problems of the postwar period are forever coming to light?

The failure of the London Conference of five foreign ministers was a certain warning as far as this is concerned. But also during the war there arose difficulties within the Anglo-Soviet-American Coalition. However, even

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not at once, the coalition of these three powers was able to find the right solution of the current problem in the interests of the whole anti-Hitlerite coalition of great and small powers, taking into account also the further strengthening of cooperation of the great democratic powers.

A new international organization has been created in this year, that of the United Nations. It was the creation of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition which thus has taken upon itself the main responsibility for the result of its further work. It is clear to us that the United Nations Organization must not be similar to the League of Nations, which proved itself totally incapable of contracting aggression and organizing the forces of resistance to aggression.

Neither must the new organization become the tool of any one of the great powers, since the claim to be the leading party by any one of the powers in world affairs is as unfounded as a claim to world domination. Only the common efforts of all powers who bore on their shoulders the brunt of war and have ensured the victory of the democratic countries over fascism, only such cooperation can assist in the success of the work of a new international organization for the creation of a lasting peace.

For these, good wishes are not sufficient. The ability of such cooperation in the interest of the freedom-loving nations must be proved. The Soviet Union was and will be a reliable factor in the defense of peace and the security of the nations and is willing to prove it both in words and deeds.

The war with Germany was the test for all forces of the Soviet state. The

Soviet Union has with honor passed this test. Again and again were the confirmed words of the great, immortal Lenin, "Never will a people be conquered in which workers and peasants have felt and seen that they are fighting for their Soviet Power, that they are fighting for victory which for them and their children means the possibility of making use of all blessings of culture and all the products of man's work."

The Red Army has come out of the war with the glory of the victor. It has increased in size and become stronger in its Soviet fighting spirit. From its ranks are now returning to peaceful work at home millions of people who come back to the collective farms, factories and plants of our country and who have started their new tasks of Socialist reconstruction. The Soviet people is rallying around its Party as never before and in organized ranks goes forward under the leadership of the Lenin-Stalin Party. This is our fortune, that in the hard years of the war the Red Army and the Soviet people followed in the steps of the wise and experienced leader of the Soviet Union, the great Stalin.

In the history of the world the glorious victory of our armies will be inscribed in the pages of the history of our country and in the pages of world history. Under the leadership of Stalin, the great leader and organizer, we now have entered a period of peaceful reconstruction, of a real, flourishing period of Socialist society, to justify the best hopes of our friends all over the world.

Everyone knows how strong has grown the international authority of

the Soviet Union. This has become possible thanks to the military, economic and political successes of our country. One year ago Comrade Stalin expressed it in the words, "Just as the Red Army in the long and heavy fighting obtained one victory after another over the fascist troops, the workers of the Soviet rear in their single combat against Hitlerite Germany and her satellites have won an economic victory over the enemy."

Comrade Stalin also said that "during the war the Hitlerites suffered not only military but also moral and political defeat." The war has shown everyone how our country has grown and waxes strong in the military and economic sphere. The war has also shown how the Soviet Union has grown strong in the moral and political sphere. We lived through exceptional economic difficulties in the first years of the war, but in spite of this our country proved itself able to provide everything necessary for our heroic Army, including first class equipment which was superior in quality to the weapons of our foe.

In spite of the privations inevitable in the years of the war, the Soviet people worked without laying down their tools, and we must give credit to our workers in the rear, especially to the Soviet women and to Soviet youth, boundlessly devoted to our country.

Thanks to this we succeeded in maintaining the standard of living of our people in the difficult time of war. Millions of sons of the working class were mobilized and fought at the front. But the factories and plants continued to work, new cadres were formed, especially of women and young people. Dur-

ing the war years, not a few new factories and workshops were built, including electric power stations, mines and rail lines, especially in the eastern areas of our country.

Socialist emulation and its new forms—raising the productivity of labor—were invariably the preoccupation of the leaders of labor and the whole working class. Trade unions and other workers' organizations carried out intense organizing and educational work among the working classes. Workmen and women toiled harder than in pre-war years. As a result of this, difficulties were overcome.

Peasants showed during the war their political consciousness and the consciousness of the collective organization of agriculture. Our peasant men and women have understood well the significance of socialist emulation, and have done a great deal to make good the enormous loss inflicted on agriculture by the temporary occupation by the Germans of part of Soviet territory.

All this gave us a chance to live through the war years with safe reserves of grain and to guarantee to agriculture the raw material indispensable to it. To solve all these problems was not easy, especially if we remember that the ranks of our Red Army consisted mostly of collective farm workers. We solved the problems of the Soviet front and rear also because in the war years the Soviet intelligentsia also fulfilled its duty to its country. The war has clearly shown what the intelligentsia has become in the years of Soviet power. There is no longer any talk of "old" and "new" intelligentsia.

This problem is connected with life itself. In the overwhelming majority

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the intelligentsia fulfills honestly and successfully its high duty in the organization of economics, in the education of new socialist personnel, in the preservation of health, and in the raising of the cultural level of the population. We can say with great satisfaction that the Soviet intelligentsia is worthy of its people and is faithfully serving its country.

The friendship of nations of the Soviet Union has strengthened during the years of war. Our multi-national state with its various languages, customs, cultures and history has become even more welded together, and its various peoples have come closer than ever to one another. No other multi-national state could have withstood the ordeal through which we passed during the war.

Only our state, in which there is no place for exploitation of man by man, where there are no conflicting class interests, but where workers, peasants and intelligentsia are equal citizens and direct local affairs as well as state affairs, I repeat, only such a state—and certainly not the old nobility of Czarist Russia—could have resisted the invasion of the Germans, and the hardships of 1941 and 1942 to crush with its own powers the foolhardy enemy, to cast him out beyond the borders of the motherland, and in addition to render mighty help to the liberation of other peoples from foreign enslavement.

In our country there are now no oppressed or disfranchised peoples, which not long ago in the days of the Czarist regime were on the level of colonies or semi-colonies. In the Soviet state all peoples have their recognized rights of independence and free

national development. All peoples are educated in a spirit of friendship and respect for each other as well as in the spirit of recognition of rewards to each of the peoples, corresponding to its efforts in the development of its national culture and the furtherance of its culture with the aim of raising the level of the Soviet state.

In the activity of our innumerable trade unions, industrial, sport and other workers' organizations; in the formation of collective farms; in the uniting of many million Soviet peasants over the wide territory of the Soviet Union; in the constant growth of Socialist emulation, in works and factories, in the collective farms and state farms, mines and railways—in all of this there is visible the flourishing of genuine popular democracy which was unknown to us in the old times and which cannot exist in any other state divided into classes of oppressors and oppressed; a state which was long ago done away with in our country.

In the fast growth of the cultural life in our country and in the fact that now the intelligentsia, as the most forward and cultural section, has fused with the people and has thus raised the moral-political unity of Soviet society to an even higher level, in all this it is impossible not to see Soviet democracy attaining new heights, and this fills us with new hopes and certainty in our future.

In the fact that there is a visible raising of the national culture in the whole people, in the active care for education of the national talents, in the growing friendship and fraternal help among the peoples of equal rights, above all, in a state which did not exist

in the old Russia and which does not yet exist in other countries, neither in republics nor in monarchies—in all this we see the all-conquering might of the Soviet democracy and its great importance in the truly progressive development of the people.

The great mobilizing force of Soviet democracy and Soviet patriotism which inspires to valorous deeds has been particularly marked during the war. The Soviet peoples are fortunate that thanks to the October Revolution which prevented our country from being reduced to the status of a second class power, the forces of the people which were shackled by a regime of nobles, bourgeoisie and landowners were freed, receiving unheard-of opportunities for development based on the power of the Soviets. That is why in our victory over fascism, we also see a great victory of the Soviet democracy.

In the course of the war the Soviet people had to go far beyond the limits of their country. The stubborn resistance of fascism compelled our forces to enter the boundaries of a number of foreign countries, to learn from close contact their way of life, and reach in the West such capitals as Vienna, Budapest and Berlin. In all these countries, including those that yesterday were ranged on the side of fascism, the Soviet people found a common language among men of the working class and democratic circles. It could not, of course, be expected from the Soviet people that they should regard as their friends the enemies of yesterday from the fascist camp, or from the top cream of society who were followers of fascism.

Of course, acquaintance with the way of life of other peoples will bring

our people certain advantages and will widen their horizon. It is, however, interesting that the Soviet people to turn home with an even warmer feeling of devotion to their motherland and to the Soviet government. The Soviet is strong in its proximity to the people. In contrast to the parliamentary democracies, Soviet democracy is truly of a popular character.

The Soviet state is a state of a new type and takes upon it a task which is beyond the compass of a state of the old type. Thus, into the duties of the Soviet state enters the task of political education of the people in the spirit of guarding peace in the whole world. In the spirit of the establishment of friendship and cooperation between peoples, which not only does not eliminate but on the contrary proposes a further necessity of laying bare any attempts of new aggression and resurrection of fascism, which must not be forgotten in postwar years.

According to the Soviet Constitution, to preach hatred between races and nations, such as anti-Semitism, is a crime, as also praise of murders, robberies and assault on man is banned from our press. Such restrictions are just as natural in the conditions of Soviet democracy as the other is natural in some of the countries where freedom of speech and press is still understood in such a way that mercenary servants of fascism have no need even to put on a mask to indulge in limitless propaganda of fascist aggression. This, despite the fact that peoples in all parts of the world have already paid a colossal price in blood and privation for the aggression and fascism which they allowed to be unleashed.

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try to take upon itself the political education of its people, but when a fascist state embarked on this nothing was left of spiritual life, culture and rights of the people. Advantages of Soviet democracy have been proved by the Soviet Union particularly forcefully during the war years. The Soviet Union passed through the fire of trials of war and has grown even stronger as a true peoples' state. As is known, particular responsibility in the matter of the political education of the people lies on the shoulders of the Bolshevik Party, and for successes in this field we are indebted first and foremost to our great Party.

That is why the Soviet people attach deep meaning to the words about the leader of the Bolshevik Party, saying with gratitude and deep love, "Our teacher, our father, our leader, Comrade Stalin."

We approach new elections to the supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. New general elections will take place after all the trials of the Soviet state in the Great Patriotic War. Our people will go to the polling booths with the enormous political experience they have gained in these years, having thought much over the fate of their country and the events in Europe and throughout the world.

The Bolshevik Party, together with the great mass of non-Party Soviet population, is making ready for these elections, seeing in them the most important manifestations of Soviet democracy and yet another mighty way of linking our nation and of further consolidation of the Soviet state.

Our country has gone over to peace construction. New great tasks face the whole population. We shall, of course,

give necessary attention also to the new territories which have entered the Soviet Union. As is known, the invading enemy impeded us from giving due attention to the Western Ukraine and to Western Byelorussia which before the war had only for a short time formed part of the Soviet Union.

Now, according to agreement with Poland, the new Soviet-Polish frontier has been established. As a result of this, all territories inhabited by Byelorussians have been finally united. . . . As a result of our agreement with Czechoslovakia, Transcarpathian Ukraine has at last become part of our state. Now the Soviet Ukraine fully comprises all the Ukrainian territories of which our Ukrainian brothers have dreamed for so long.

According to agreement with Romania, Soviet Moldavia has also in its entirety united territories inhabited by Moldavians, opening wide possibilities for further national development. The western frontier of our country has been moved to allow for incorporation into the Soviet Union of the area of Koenigsberg, which gives us a good ice-free port in the Baltic. In the Baltic area, Soviet Latvia, Soviet Lithuania and Soviet Esthonia have been established. Such are the outlines of our western frontiers which are significant from the point of view of safeguarding the security of the Soviet state.

In the northwest we have established our frontier with Finland according to the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty of 1940. Apart from that in the north the Soviet Union has had returned to it the territory of the Petsamo area.

In the Far East finally the Soviet Union has received the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands

which have great importance for the security of the Soviet Union in the East. It remains to re-establish the rights of our state over railroads of Manchuria and also to re-establish our rights in the area of Port Arthur and Dairen in the southern part of Manchuria. To all these areas as well as to our Prokhalau naval base in Finland we must give due attention. In the case of the new Soviet territories, these will require special attention on the part of the Soviet Government.

We must decide as quickly as possible problems that cannot be delayed regarding Soviet territories which were temporarily under occupation of enemy armies. The Germans left behind them many devastated towns and thousands of looted villages. Immediately after the expulsion of the invaders there began everywhere the work of reconstruction. But so far only a small part of the work has been done.

Efforts of the entire Soviet people and of all Soviet Republics must be directed to helping in the speedy and complete rebuilding of the economic and cultural life in these areas. Our urgent task is the building of factories, collective farms, motor tractor stations and state farms, schools and hospitals and housing, in order to give each town and village dweller of these regions again a home for himself and his family.

It is also essential that the care of those who fought and who are now returning home from the army, and also the care of the disabled, orphans and bereaved families of Red Army men should be among the most important tasks of the Soviets and the trade unions, and Communist youth organizations, as well as collective farms and their organizations. We must do all

in order to solve successfully this difficult question and to heal the wounds of war as soon as possible.

Now we must at once think about solving the fundamental problems of advancing national economy, so that within a few years we may considerably surpass the pre-war standard of the country's economic development and secure a considerable improvement in the living standards of the entire population.

Such is the meaning of the decision recently issued by the Party and the Government for drafting a five-year plan for rehabilitating and developing the national economy of the U.S.S.R. in 1946-50, and a similar plan for rehabilitating the developing railway transport. Our people are well aware of the force of the Stalin Five-Year Plans that have built the might of our state and insured our victory.

We need a fresh upsurge of heavy industry in order to provide the country with metal, coal, oil, locomotives, rolling-stock, tractors, agricultural machinery, motor cars, vessels of various kinds, power stations and many other necessities. The populations of town and country expect a considerably increased supply of consumers' goods and improved supplies of foodstuffs.

To satisfy the needs of the collective farms and the requirements of agriculture is a matter more pressing today than ever before. Our cultural requirements have grown and have become much more varied.

Not for a moment must we forget our big obligations, providing as we should for the needs of the country's defense, the Red Army and the Navy. We have no more unemployment and shall not have any. In our country there is work

for all; for ours is a state of the working people. We also need to think more about the proper organization of labor, so that the productivity of Soviet men and women and the quality of their work may yield the highest results.

In our days of advanced technology and extended employment of science in production where it has become possible to harness atomic energy and other great technical discoveries, attention in economic planning must be focused on problems of technology, on the problem of raising the technological power of our industry and training highly skilled technological trainers. We must keep level with the achievements of present-day world technology in all branches of industry and economic life and provide conditions for the utmost advance of Soviet science and technology.

The enemy interrupted our peaceful creative endeavor, but we shall make up properly for all lost time and see to it that our country shall flourish. We will have atomic energy and many other things, too.

Let us tackle these tasks with all our inexhaustible Bolshevik energy, with all the boundless energy of the Soviet people. Let us work as Comrade Stalin teaches us to do.

Lastly, about our tasks in foreign policy. The Soviet Union has always given first place to promoting peace and collaboration with other countries

for universal peace and the development of international business relations.

As long as we live in a system of states, and the roots of fascism and imperialistic aggression have not been finally pulled up, our vigilance as regards possible new breakers of peace must not be slackened, and efforts to consolidate collaboration among peaceful powers will remain, as before, our most important duty.

We have no task more important than the one of consolidating our victory, which we achieved in a staunch struggle and which opened the road toward a new great rise of our country and a further improvement of the living standards of our people.

Never before did we face the prospect of Socialist construction on so vast a scale or such possibilities for the growth of the Soviet Union's strength. Our people are full of faith in their great cause, the cause of the great October Socialist Revolution.

Long live the Soviet people, the victor-people, and their Red Army and Navy!

Long live and flourish our great country, the home of the October Revolution!

Long live the Party of Lenin and Stalin, inspiring and organizing our victories!

Long live the leader of the Soviet people, our great Stalin!

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