

politics

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Greece

DEMOCRACY was born in Athens two thousand years ago. She was reborn there two weeks ago. Byron, who died for Greek independence in an age when Englishmen (and poets) were cast on a more heroic scale, complained of the servility and degeneracy of the modern Greeks. Centuries of Turkish enslavement had apparently rotted the fibre of the race of Socrates and Pericles. The vital resources of a people, however, are much greater than is often recognized. The Greeks are a heroic people once more. Attacked by Mussolini's legions, they electrified the world by throwing back the invaders in spite of lack of manpower, planes, guns and other material resources. In spite, also, of their own government being the hated, corrupt Metaxas dictatorship. And now, after years of German occupation in which they have been massacred and starved on a scale equalled only in Poland, these hungry, tortured, diseased ragamuffins have taken up their arms and fought to a standstill the tanks and Spitfires of British imperialism. They have forced Churchill himself to "go to Canossa": to travel personally to Athens, along with his Foreign Secretary and his Mediterranean Commander-in-Chief, to sit down at a conference table in order to negotiate with those EAM leaders he had three weeks earlier called "bandits", "gangsters", "ruffians." To have forced such a trip to be made by such personages is evidence that popular Resistance movements, if they have arms and the guts to use them, and if they are backed up by the mass of people, can make themselves felt even in this age of the Big Three. It might be called the first "people's victory" of the war.

Churchill's trip is also evidence that British policy in Greece was so rotten that, when its time-table for crushing EAM was thrown off and the facts began to leak out, the Churchill cabinet felt it had to end the struggle at once. For the facts are—and I shall cite a mass of evidence, some of it not printed over here up to now, to prove this—not only that the Churchill-Labor government intervened to put down by force of arms the one big popular party in Greece, but much more—that its agents, General Scobie and Ambassador Leeper, acting on direct orders from London, provoked the fighting in the first place, and deliberately prolonged it by vetoing two successive compromises reached by the Greeks themselves. No event—except for Warsaw—has more glaringly illuminated the real character of this war and the real aims of "our" political leaders.

Before considering the events of the last few weeks, let us look at the conflict from the standpoint, first, of Greek politics, and, second, of international power politics.

The Rottennest Episode of a Rotten War: The Churchill-Labor Government's Provocative Intrigues. The Full Story, Documented. Salute to the Heroic Greek Resistance!

Inside Greece

In few countries of Europe has the split between government and people been deeper than in Greece for the past decade. In 1936, the present king, George II, a German princeling with not a drop of Greek blood in his veins who has kept his throne only because of British pressure, abolished parliamentary democracy and set up the Metaxas dictatorship. (This fact, incidentally, makes nonsense of Churchill's claim of constitutional legitimacy for the king and his government; in installing Metaxas, the king violated the constitution.) The Metaxas regime was fascist in every sense except that it had no popular support whatsoever; it ruled not by demagoguery and ideology but by police terrorism alone. When Metaxas died, the king appointed a successor, and it was actually not until 1942 that he finally decreed the re-establishment of republican forms.

When the Germans took over Greece, they found their best collaborationists, naturally, in the well-to-do, reactionary circles close to the king (who himself was in London), the same people as had backed Metaxas. To resist them a popular movement arose called EAM, with its military arm, ELAS. It soon became the only significant Resistance movement. (Its rightwing rival, EDES, never grew very big, and has now collapsed completely.) Estimates of EAM's popular support range from 75% (Anthony Eden) to 90% (London *Times*), but no one denies it is the only political party in Greece today with mass support. Its leadership is largely Communist, and it has followed a general Communist line, which means that since Teheran it has subordinated everything, including basic social changes, to "national unity".

Although the Communists are dominant in EAM, many other parties also take part in it; the Socialists, the Union of Popular Democrats, the Agrarian Party, the leftwing Liberals, etc. And EAM's popular support is so great—apparently much greater than any other party in Europe today—that it must be considered in a broader frame of reference than that of Stalinism. It represents today, as the Spanish Republicans during the civil war period represented, the deepest interests and aspirations of the common people of Greece. Those leftists who, making anti-Stalinism the axis of their politics, look on the Greek conflict with indifference—or even support Churchill—should recall the strong Communist influence on the Spanish Loyalist side, and should remember that, if the imperialist power-conflict between England and Russia is an important facet of the Greek situation today, so was the Hitler-Stalin conflict in the Spanish war.

Moscow v. London

The Churchill-Labor government has various good reasons for supporting George II and his government against

EAM. Briefly, they are: (1) Greece for a century has been heavily in debt to The City, and the king is a more dependable rent-collector than EAM. (2) A monarchy is preferable to a less "stable" popular regime which might develop in a socialist direction. (3) Greece is strategically located in relation to the Empire's "Mediterranean Lifeline", and the king has demonstrated his patriotic loyalty to London in the past, and may be expected in future, in exchange for continued British support, to give away bases and other concessions more readily than a regime which owes its power to the Greeks themselves. (4) Above all, Britain wants to keep Russia out of the Mediterranean, and to control Greece as a base of operations against the Russianized Balkan hinterland.

Moscow, on the other hand, probably finds recent Greek events not exactly displeasing; we may assume safely that Stalin would like to see EAM as strong and the British (and their princeling) as weak as possible. However, the deal made at Teheran—which has now authoritatively been revealed to be about what some of us surmised it was at the time—provided that England was to get a free hand in Greece and Italy in return for Russian dominance in Poland, Central Europe and most of the Balkans. (We Americans bear no moral responsibility for this reprehensible deal, since, luckily, Roosevelt is said to have been temporarily absent—perhaps in search of the Men's Room—while Churchill and Stalin cooked up their deal. If he had heard a word of it, we may be sure he would have put a speedy end to such shennanigans, so characteristic of European power-politics and so happily unknown in our own foreign policy.)

Both sides have honored this agreement within the past month. Churchill has publicly "advised" the Poles to cede half their country to Russia, nor has he made any objection to the regimes Moscow has set up in Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary. Stalin, for his part, has helped the British strengthen the monarchy in Italy by sending the Italian Communist Party into the new Bonomi government (which could not have been formed without Communist participation, since the other two left-of-center parties, Socialist and Action, refused to come in). His press and radio have scrupulously refrained from any comment at all on events in Greece. (Last year, at the time the British suppressed the mutiny of the Greek army and fleet, the Soviet radio and press ventured a few growls on behalf of the mutineers. Eden at once protested to Molotov, who promptly silenced his propagandists. This time, Molotov seems to have learned his lesson.) The Communists inside Greece, furthermore, as I shall presently show, were equally faithful to The Spirit of Teheran. They did their honest best to sell out EAM to Papandreou-Scobie, asking in return only the kind of "national unity" government they have in Italy. They made every possible

concession, including disarming, short of committing political suicide. But it was just this suicide—in the shape of a demand that ELAS disarm, while the royalist factions kept their arms—that the Churchill-Labor government erroneously thought it could force on EAM.

That it has not succeeded is not due to Russia and the Communists but to the splendid resistance of the Greek people. For, as "Gallicus" shows elsewhere in this issue apropos Hitler's experiences in occupied Europe, superior military force is not enough if a population is determined to resist. His Majesty's government has just learned this Fact of Political Life. Salute to the Greeks!

The Chance that was Lost

In a very informative article cabled from Athens which appears in *The Nation* for Dec. 23, Constantine Poulos writes:

"On the basis of having traveled over most of Greece both during the occupation and after liberation, I estimate that in the Peloponnesus the EAM's strength is between 50 and 60 per cent, and in the rest of Greece, 90 per cent. Having this strength, the EAM could have seized power. They had plenty of time in which to do it between the German withdrawal and the British arrival. There are two reasons why they didn't. One was their keen understanding that the Greek people have suffered so much during the past eight years that they are sick and tired and anxious for peace. The other and major reason was Teheran.

"Not only the Communists but all the EAM party heads believed that at Teheran Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin agreed to the one-world idea and that small nations would be under the joint protection and combined influence of the three great nations. Therefore, the EAM leaders calculated, by virtue of the Greek people's contribution to the common anti-fascist cause, all three powers would jointly guarantee and insure the right of the Greek people to a new, democratic socialist way of life. Those who tried to convince the EAM leadership that it wasn't so, that power politics and spheres of influence were still very much in vogue, and that the future of Greece lay in the hands of the Greek people themselves, were accused of shortsightedness or condemned by the Communists as anti-Soviet and anti-Stalin. Thus was the real Greek revolution lost."

The role of the Communists today, and the importance for leftwing leadership of a cynical and hostile attitude towards all the Powers-That-Be—these lessons have rarely been demonstrated more dramatically than in this story of the lost chance for a Greek revolution.

The Background

To understand the present political situation in Greece, we must go back to the mutiny of the Greek Fleet and the First Brigade of the Greek Army which took place in Egypt last April. The mutiny was anti-King and pro-EAM, and it was suppressed, after sharp fighting, by British troops. It caused the fall of the Venizelos government which had just replaced the reactionary Tsouderos government which had also fallen because of EAM pressure. The present Papandreou government was formed after the mutiny; Papandreou himself, the most liberal premier to hold office in the Greek government-in-exile to date, had recently ar-

rived from Greece and was persona grata with EAM. In May, he called a meeting of all political parties to form a "government of national unity", which the EAM agreed to enter—sending a message, jointly with the Greek Communist Party, to Churchill thanking him for his "interest in Greece and its future." Such "national unity" regimes have been, of course, the usual Stalinist tactic for some time. EAM had repeatedly asked for such a government—in August, 1943; in December 1943; in February, 1944. There is no reason to suppose that the Greek Communists, and the EAM movement which they dominated, were any less sincere in their desire to avoid revolutionary struggle and to play power politics within the framework of a "national front" than the Communists of other lands.

After a summer of negotiations, the EAM finally entered the Papandreou government in September of this year. Only one big issue—the biggest of all, it is true—remained to be settled: the terms on which ELAS would disarm. The fullest account of what happened next which I have seen is the speech made by Sir Richard Acland, leader of the Common Wealth group, in Commons on December 8 immediately before Churchill's big speech on Greece. It has not been reported in the American press.

Quoting a radio broadcast by Papandreou on December 3, after the fighting had begun, Acland stated that on October 18 an agreement had been reached that both EDES, the rightwing armed group and ELAS should simultaneously disarm, and that they should be replaced by a National Guard to be called up by the Papandreou government. *This peaceful solution did not at all suit the British, however, who speedily injected a new irritant into the situation. "Subsequent to October 18, the Sacred Battalion and the mountain brigade were brought into Greece from Italy and Cairo respectively. These were strong rightwing bodies in their sympathies."* The result was that ELAS, in view of this new shift in the balance of power, withdrew its disarmament agreement. After more negotiations, however, a new one was made: ELAS would disarm if (1) EDES did too; (2) the gendarmerie, a force which had been used to hold down the people first by Metaxas and later by the Germans, were also disarmed; (3) ELAS were permitted to keep under arms as many men as were in the two new rightwing formations the British had just imported.

This second agreement apparently worked out satisfactorily to every one. Its essence was simply that, as in the first, the Left would disarm to the extent the Right did. If ELAS had had the revolutionary aspirations credited to it by Churchill (as it unfortunately did not) it would never have agreed to such terms, since it had an overwhelming superiority of armed numbers. But the Communist mentors of ELAS were only too pathetically anxious to avoid a conflict. On November 19, for example, Secretary-General Siantos of the Greek C.P. made a speech on the 26th anniversary of the founding of the party: "We support and participate in the government of national unity because we absolutely agree with its aims. . . . We believe that the first basic requirement for the application of the government's program is the just solution of the arms issue. We agree with the Prime Minister that all voluntary bodies which were formed in Greece and abroad should be disbanded and a national army formed . . . by regular conscription." And when Anthony Eden visited Greece about that time (probably to work out with General Scobie and Ambassador Leeper the strategy of provocation later put into effect) this same Siantos called on him, pledged full support of the EAM and the C.P., and "expressed the hope that the liberating power would continue to aid the reconstruction of the country."

The deadline for disarming of all factions, under the revised agreement, had been set, by *General Scobie*, at December 10. At the end of November, it looked to all observers—except, of course, those few who knew what Churchill-Scobie were preparing—as though everything was going along with remarkable smoothness. The usually well-informed London *Economist* in its November 25 issue actually pictured the Belgian disarming crisis as much more threatening than the Greek: “Unlike General Erskine in Belgium, General Scobie had no need to issue a drastic warning, for the EAM ministers have so far loyally co-operated with the Greek Prime Minister, M. Papandreou. . . .” And the *N. Y. Times*’ Greek correspondent, Sedgwick (whose reports have been venomously anti-ELAS) wrote on Nov. 29, just four days before the first bloodshed: “It looks now as if the program of disarming all interested parties would follow gradually. . . . M. Papandreou’s stock has risen among the Leftist factions within recent days, principally because of his appointment of ELAS General Sarigiannis as Deputy Minister. . . . *It is hard to see how, in the present circumstances, he can do other than trim his sails and take a Leftist course.*” (The “present circumstances” being the overwhelming popular backing of ELAS-EAM.) On November 28, according to Acland, Radio Athens reported that the three EAM ministers in the government had conferred with Papandreou, and that “all present declared that full agreement had been reached on military matters.”

Three days later, the EAM ministers had been forced out of the government on the arms issue. Six days later, Papandreou’s police had killed 21 EAM demonstrators in Athens. Nine days later, RAF Spitfires were strafing ELAS troops.

Scobie & Churchill, Ltd., Agents Provocateurs

What had happened was that the Churchill Government, acting through General Scobie, had maneuvered so as to split the Papandreou government, to destroy the recently achieved agreement on disarming, and to put the EAM-ELAS into a position where it had to fight or face certain annihilation later on.

On November 30, Radio Athens reported, as quoted by Acland: “The Deputy Minister of War, General Sarigiannis of ELAS, has visited General Scobie and described to him the organization of the National Guard.” Thus on the very day before the crisis broke, Scobie was informed by the ELAS of the whole plan to substitute, according to the common agreement, a National Guard for all private formations. “Next day,” continues Acland, “there were dropped (by RAF planes) all over Greece pamphlets which must have been in print at the time General Scobie was meeting General Sarigiannis, and one would like to know whether he mentioned those leaflets during their discussion. The leaflets repudiated the agreement which had been made between the parties. Let me quote:

“The Allied Commander-in-Chief in Greece, General Scobie, has undertaken to supervise the execution of this government order. According to the orders of the Greek government, all Ardentes [i.e., EDES and ELAS troops] are to be demobilized between Dec. 10 and Dec. 20.” *These RAF leaflets made no mention of the two concessions to the ELAS in the actual agreement: that the gendarmerie would also be disarmed, and that ELAS could keep as many troops armed as there were in the two pro-royalist units imported by the British at the end of October.* Thus Scobie, with full knowledge of what the agreement really was, broadcasts from RAF planes a fake agreement; and even

if it had been the real one, what possible purpose except provocation to civil war would have been served by these leaflets at a time when all parties were getting along peacefully together?

If ELAS had accepted this unilateral disarmament, the gendarmerie and the two rightist formations would have been able to dispose of EAM later on, and install the hated King George again. On the very day Scobie’s leaflets went out, therefore, the six EAM ministers left the Papandreou government (which presumably chose to go along with the British). Three days later, on December 3, Papandreou’s police in Athens fired on unarmed EAM demonstrators, many of whom died with “Long Live Roosevelt!” on their lips. (21 demonstrators were killed and 140 wounded, as against police losses of 1 dead and 5 wounded—in short, it was a massacre.) The government had originally allowed the demonstration, and had then withdrawn the permission. Why? Papandreou’s explanation was that he had in the meantime learned that EAM was plotting a coup d’etat. Churchill has also stressed this alleged conspiracy by EAM in defending his policy. But neither of them has given any evidence as to the existence of this plot. (The level of Churchill’s charges may be gauged from this sample: “The six EAM ministers resigned from the government at this timely moment. One gentleman, I believe, was a little slow, but on being rung upon the telephone and told he would be killed if he did not come out, he made haste to follow the general practice.” This is the Prime Minister of Britain speaking in the House of Commons.) The evidence, on the other hand, of British provocation is copious and clear. It seems likely, therefore, that Scobie-Churchill played some part in persuading Papandreou to change his mind about the EAM demonstration.

There is no question at all as to the complete British responsibility for the action which forced EAM to fight: the refusal to disarm the two newly imported royalist regiments. The London *Tribune* of December 8 gives the story:

“Thereupon Rex Leeper, British Ambassador, informed Papandreou that His Majesty’s Government would not allow the demobilization of . . . the Sacred Battalion and the Mountain Brigade. *These two, Leeper said, were incorporated in the British Forces and consequently outside the authority of the Greek Government.* Also, His Majesty’s Government were of the opinion that these were the only reliable Greek troops available to protect the Greek Government against a possible coup d’etat.” (During the Dec. 8 Commons debate on Greece, Anthony Eden said, in defense of Rex Leeper: “It is a matter of utmost difficulty for an Ambassador to maintain a fair and impartial position and truly to represent the instructions he received from His Majesty’s Government.” It is our opinion that the hon. gentleman said more than he intended to say.)

Tribune’s account continues:

“It was then that General Scobie ‘discovered’ an alleged conspiracy by EAM against the government. . . . A major clash was imminent. But circumstances were not favorable for crushing the Left. It was in the highest of spirits. Its guerillas were still armed. Papandreou, therefore, was against provoking EAM by forcing the demands of the Right. He made substantial concessions to the Left. Changes were made in the personnel of the Ministry of Defense. Royalist and pro-Fascist officials were replaced by staunch Republicans. This solution was accepted by EAM. On November 27, M. Papandreou announced that complete agreement had been reached. The Left Center would be strengthened rather than the Left. This Left Center, cooperating with EAM, is composed of Radicals,

Liberals and Republicans. All these, however, are the foremost opponents of the Monarchy in Greece. To strengthen such uncompromising opponents of the King proved fatal to M. Papandreou's statesmanship. King George II, watching from Claridge's Hotel in London, saw that his position was menaced. He transmitted his alarm to the Foreign Office and to Mr. Churchill, appealing to them to prevent 'the shameful capitulation of Papandreou to the Bolsheviks of EAM.'

"Mr. Churchill responded with warmth and alacrity. This was real social insurance. *Papandreou was warned by Rex Leeper that His Majesty's Government would withdraw their support if the Greek Government allowed one wing (the Left) to grow at the expense of the other (the Right). On these lines, General Scobie annulled the compromise agreement of the Greek Government.*"

How to Keep a Civil War Going

On December 4, EAM called a general strike which paralyzed Athens; street fighting broke out between ELAS and government troops; British tanks also swung into action for the first time—to restore "order." That day, Greeks paraded before the British Embassy with signs: BRITISH SOLDIERS! LET US CHOOSE OUR OWN GOVERNMENT! That day, General Scobie declared: "I reiterate that, with the vast majority of Greeks, I stand firmly behind the constitutional government." (Despite its backing by the vast majority of Greeks, including General Scobie, the Papandreou government effectively controlled just three square miles of the whole country, namely the center of Athens. And even there its troops were reported outnumbered by those of the ELAS six to one.)

That day, also, the funeral of the victims of yesterday's demonstration was attended by a vast crowd which filled the Athens cathedral and stretched for a quarter of a mile in all directions around it.

But the big event of December 4 was something which didn't take place: Papandreou almost made hash of the whole British strategy—those undependable Greeks! — by resigning in favor of a new government which would have resolved all conflicts peacefully. How the British averted this catastrophe was told in Commons (Dec. 8) by the Laborite, Mr. Cocks:

"Then occurred an odd incident. On Monday, M. Papandreou apparently resigned . . . and invited M. Sophoulis, a venerable Liberal leader—all Liberal leaders seem to be venerable nowadays—to form a government. It was stated that leftwing leaders were prepared to serve under him, but, according to M. Sophoulis himself, the British Ambassador informed him that according to the latest instructions from the British Prime Minister, any change in the head of the Greek government was impossible. That is an amazing situation, and I think the House is entitled to some explanation. Is the Prime Minister claiming the right to appoint Prime Ministers of allied states as he might appoint a few parliamentary private secretaries, or as Hitler appoints gauleiters?" This account is confirmed by an interview the *N. Y. Times* correspondent had in which Sophoulis stated that he had been approached by all parties, including the Communists ("even though the Communists know that I do not share their views"), and asked to form a new government; that Papandreou had offered to resign; and that the British Ambassador had intervened to prevent this solution of the crisis.

This narrow squeak showed the British strategists that they could not rely on the Greeks themselves to keep the war going. It was, therefore, necessary to commit fully

the British troops, planes and tanks to the fight against ELAS. Churchill acted the very next day—Tuesday, December 5—with energetic promptness. *"In the small hours of Tuesday morning," he told Commons on December 8, "I directed General Scobie to assume complete control of Athens. . . . I also directed our Ambassador to do his utmost to prevail on Papandreou, who seemed to wish to resign, to remain in power."* Later on Tuesday, Churchill gave his first report to Commons on the Greek crisis, shedding crocodile tears over the civil war "which we are trying to stop." He did not tell Commons that he had cabled Scobie—as revealed by Drew Pearson, who got the actual text of Churchill's messages through a leak in American diplomatic channels—to instruct his troops to shoot to kill, without fear of consequences, whenever they came in contact with "disorderly" or "subversive" elements.

By Wednesday, the sixth, Spitfires were in action against the ELAS. After a week of fighting, in which ELAS more than held its own, a new threat of peace arose. All parties, including EAM, reached an agreement on the liberal Archbishop of Athens, Damaskinos, taking office as a Regent, with full personal powers, to govern Greece in place of the King until a popular vote could determine the question of monarchy v. republic. (As it chanced, on the very day the fighting had begun, the Communist paper had proposed a Regency be instituted.) EAM now offered to conclude an armistice on three conditions: (1) institution of the Damaskinos regency; (2) formation of another all-party "national unity" cabinet; (3) no reprisals against EAM-ELAS members and leaders. After these steps, the disarming of all factions was to proceed under the direction of the new government, without interference from British troops. These proposals were apparently acceptable to all the Greek factions. But General Scobie was now in full control of Athens, and his troops were doing most of the fighting against ELAS. And General Scobie found all kinds of reasons to reject EAM's proposals. He wanted the offer to be formally signed by the ELAS heads (as well as the EAM heads); he insisted ELAS disarm *first* and talk about a new government later; etc. He managed to protract negotiations another two weeks, while the Tommies and the Greek guerilla fighters blasted away at each other.

But Scobie's trump card was the King of the Hellenes himself, George II, of the ancient Greek lineage of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Glücksburg-Hohenzollern. For two weeks, the comedy was drawn out. Papandreou cabled George, who was in London not too far away from 10 Downing Street, asking him what he thought of the idea of setting up a Regency; and George cabled Papandreou that he didn't think much of it. The only note of uncertainty was Papandreou's pathetic twisting and squirmings, caught between the Devil, as represented by EAM (and by the unanimous opinion of the rest of even his own "government" in favor of a Regency and peace with EAM), and the Deep Blue Sea of British policy. First he opposed a Regency, then he favored it, and finally he again opposed it. His Majesty of Schleswig-Holstein, etc., knew his mind better: he insisted (by cable) that EAM be excluded from any new government. For two weeks the British backed him up, and the war went on.

"Gangsters . . . Ruffians . . . Murder Gangs."

Meanwhile, at home, Churchill took a line which showed the supreme importance his government attached to crushing, at all costs, EAM-ELAS and the Communists. His first report to Commons on Greece, on December 5, was moderate in tone—since he had only that day sent Scobie

his secret instructions to use extreme measures against ELAS. Yet even here he showed how far his cabinet was willing to go when he was questioned about the failure of Scobie and Papandreou to disarm the "Security Battalions". These were military units which had been formed by the Germans to fight against the Resistance forces. Churchill actually defended them: "The Security Battalions came into existence gradually in a large measure to protect Greek villages from the depredations of those who, under the guise of being saviors of their country, were living upon the inhabitants and doing very little fighting against the Germans." (A few days later, it should be added, even Scobie thought it best to disarm these pro-German troops. But it is indicative of where the British cabinet thinks The Enemy now is in "liberated countries" that it should have insisted on disarming the Resistance forces, while tolerating the Security Battalions.)

The major debate in Commons took place on December 8. The Labor Party wanted to restrict the point at issue to a mere expression of "regret" at the government's policy, since its leadership was unwilling to challenge Churchill's war leadership in general. Churchill, however, insisted on the broader question of confidence being raised, indicating that if the vote went against the government, he would resign. His speech was not so much a defense of his policy as an attack of unprecedented (even for him) coarseness and violence on all popular Resistance movements in Europe. In language which recalled Hitler, Churchill denounced EAM as "swindle democracy" and "mob law with bands of gangsters armed with deadly weapons [as against, presumably, the non-lethal weapons of His Majesty's Forces—D.M.] endeavoring to introduce a totalitarian regime." He saw "bloody revolution" being prepared in Belgium—no details given—until His Majesty's Forces intervened to support Pierlot. With his usual contempt for his Laborite critics, whom he knew would talk a lot but take no action, he made jokes, said he had "enjoyed" the debate, and engaged in such skirmishes as:

"Mr. Bowles: But the right hon. gentleman supported Mussolini?

"The Prime Minister: In 1928? I certainly did.

"Mr. McGovern: The right hon. gentleman thought that Fascism was better?

"The Prime Minister: I certainly thought, at that particular time, that the kind of regime set up in Italy at that time was better than a general slump of Italy into the furious Bolshevik civil war which was raging in many other parts of Europe."

The furious Bolshevik war raging in 1928 has a family resemblance to the "bloody revolution" Churchill saw materializing in Belgium and Greece in 1944.

After the debate, the government was sustained by 279 votes to 30. For the first time since the coalition was formed in 1940, the majority of the Labor members abstained from voting. However cowardly and unprincipled such an abstention was for a party which presumes to call itself socialist—and it was without question both—it should have been a storm signal for Churchill. But he drove ahead on his course without paying any attention to his Laborite critics.

This contemptuous dismissal seemed well justified by the results of the annual conference of the British Labor Party, which took place a few days later. With the ineffable Professor Laski in the chair (who made a ringing speech about . . . India), the BLP Executive shelved half a dozen resolutions offered by trade unions which condemned the government's policy on Greece and substituted one of its own which made no criticism and merely called for an end of hostilities and

the installation of a "democratic" system in Greece. (Churchill himself could have voted for it.) To help put this across, the Executive brought in Ernest Bevin, who, on behalf of his Laborite colleagues in the cabinet, stated: "The steps which have been taken in Greece are not the decision of Mr. Churchill. They are the decisions of the cabinet. I took part with my Labor colleagues in the whole of these discussions, going over nearly four years, trying to work out these terrifying problems that would arise at the end of the war." Remarking that "you cannot govern the world by emotionalism", Bevin revealed that at Teheran Russia had been given the ask of "restoring order" in Rumania, while Britain dealt with Greece—and that Russia had made no protest whatever against current British policy in Greece. He also reminded the more "emotional" of the delegates that: "The British government cannot abandon its position in the Mediterranean."

There was considerable sentiment, nonetheless, for amending the Executive's resolution, but all attempts to do so were ruled out of order, amid great uproar. When the votes were counted, the resolution carried by the comfortable margin—positively luxurious, in fact—of 2,450,000 votes to 137,000.

Mr. Churchill Goes to Athens

It looked very much as if the Churchill government were to be permitted to exterminate ELAS and smash EAM at its leisure. And certainly if the Greek insurgents had had to depend on the help and goodwill of the organized "workingclass" forces, it would have been all up with them. The British Labor Party top leadership had behaved precisely as Churchill had expected; and the Soviet Union had loyally observed its agreement to let Britain have a free hand in Greece. (The Soviet press, which does not hesitate to attack Franco and the Pope, to intervene actively in American presidential campaigns, and to print rumors of alleged peace negotiations between "high" British functionaries and German agents—this press didn't venture a word of criticism on the Greek events. Nor did the Soviet radio find anything to say on the subject.) Fortunately, there are other factors in history besides parties, armies and governments—though this is often not recognized. Despite his apparent complete victory in Commons and in the Labor Party conference, Churchill found as the days went by that for the first time criticism increased rather than diminished after he had met his critics in debate. The trade unions became restive; the press, including the London *Times*, became more and more hostile; so great was the pressure of public opinion that the Laborites in Commons, against the wishes of their own Party leaders, insisted on forcing another debate—on December 21—in Commons. This time Churchill was prudently kept away by the government, and the soft-spoken Eden was put up to make a diplomatic speech. But the facts about the gov-

Hey diddle-diddle, the diplomat's riddle;

The Balkans shall have a new tune.

King George played the fiddle

(Both ends and the middle)

While Moscow jumped over the moon.

MORAL: With the Commies away

The Tommies will play.

Marjorie Farber

ernment's conspiracy of provocation slowly oozed out, and public opinion became more and more aroused.

More important, EAM-ELAS more than held its own. A month of fighting failed to win for the Papandreou regime even the bulk of Athens—and in the rest of Greece ELAS was in full control. Towards the end of December, ELAS forces marched against the one remaining right-wing armed group, General Zervas' EDES, which were quartered in Epirus. When the British were unable or unwilling to send him help, General Zervas in a few days was practically eliminated as a force, the majority of his men promptly deserting to the ELAS. It began to look like a long drawn-out and costly campaign against a determined patriot force supported by the majority of their fellow-countrymen. The British have lively memories of *that* kind of thing from the black and-tan era in Ireland, and even the most rabid Tory might well hesitate to get involved in another such business.

Adding these dismal considerations to the growing hostility of public opinion at home and the initial success of the German breakthrough on the Western Front, the Churchill-Labor government apparently decided to extricate themselves as speedily as possible from the Greek situation. On Christmas Day, therefore, Churchill, Eden and Field-Marshal Alexander arrived by plane in Athens "to put an end to fratricidal strife in Greece". (There's something awe-inspiring about British hypocrisy—like the Matterhorn.) They held a conference, presided over by Archbishop Damaskinos, with Greek leaders including Papandreou, Sophoulis and . . . the representatives of EAM-ELAS (who checked their guns at the door, in Wild West Style). "Do not let any one have the idea," intoned Churchill after the meeting, "that Great Britain desires any material advantage from Greece. . . . Very violent and unexpected troubles have arisen and we have become involved in them through doing what we believed was our duty. . . . We have not the slightest intention of interfering. . . . Whether Greece is a monarchy or a republic is a matter for the Greeks and the Greeks alone to decide." (Matterhorn, hell—Mount Everest!)

As this goes to press, the conference has agreed on a Regency headed by Archbishop Damaskinos, the solution proposed by EAM two weeks earlier and blocked by George II from London. The fighting is still going on, however, since the specific peace terms are yet to be negotiated. It would be premature to conclude that the war is over. The British may still have a few cards up their sleeve. Press reports are that the discussions between the Greeks themselves—the British delicately withdrew after the first day—have been "stormy". The British have done their best, certainly, to make them so. Papandreou, who last spring was considered an independent liberal, like Bonomi in Italy, has become, like Bonomi, a British puppet and an open apologist for a London-supported monarchy. They also imported several weeks ago from France General Plastiras, a rather dubious old-time politico, who has been injected into the conferences for reasons which will no doubt appear later. Perhaps with a hopeful eye to the future, Churchill on December 27 remarked to reporters that it might be necessary to establish an "international trust" for Greece, adding: "We can't see this place drifting into anarchy."

Good heavens, No! Mean to say—Gad, sir!

Commonnonsense

¶ Democracy, says Churchill, is not a harlot to be picked up in the streets of Athens (where, incidentally, she was born). The inference is that she is a harlot to be kept by her procurer in his "garconniere" at 10 Downing Street, and sent out on "missions" whenever he runs out of moral credit.

¶ That the re-invasion of Athens was a purely internal Greek matter is shown by the fact it was organized in London by Winstonopoulos Kurkiliki. He uses other aliases, such as Guinnistone Giorcili in Italy, Weinstone Kirchberg when he acts as an Architect for the Future (in the Hereafter) of the Jewish People, and Wyntzzschtn Czrrtchl when he divines the free will of the Polish People.

All the same, Kurkiliki, you should stop non-intervening into the affairs of other countries. And if you feel another fit of democratic non-intervention coming over you and just can't get it out of your system, we suggest you call up your friend, the Second Person of the Big Trinity, and have another Atlantic Chatter with him. It doesn't cost anything, doesn't mean anything and gives a lot of harmless pleasure to the liberals.

¶ The only thing Anthony Eden's apologia for what is happening in Greece demonstrated is that, as an emetic, Mussolini's speeches were better. They gave quicker results. Il Duce's pills were coated with such a thin layer of sugar that you tasted the rotten substance right away, and reacted accordingly. But these British Made pills, now: the coating on them is so thick (rich country, of course) that before you get a real taste of them, your reflexes are gone and instead of a helpless individual who vomits out his soul, you are One of Them. With the great advantage that you don't directly approve of oppression, tyranny, and all that, because you are, like Eden, *For the People*. But you accept the stolen food the cutthroats bring to your democratic sacristy every day, and, with tears in your eyes, you eat it all. "Tragic loss of life . . . an unhappy phase of Anglo-Greek relations." (*sigh*) "Of course, it is true that we have an interest in the Mediterranean." (*gobble, gobble*)

¶ Reminds me of poor old Cardinal Gasparri, who used to say: "This is a valley of tears, my son, but one cries so well in it."

¶ Or of that sad scene in "The Walrus and the Carpenter" when the two Big Powers proceed to dine on the Small Nation oysters:

"It seems a shame," the Walrus said,

"To play them such a trick.

After we've brought them out so far

And made them trot so quick!"

The Carpenter said nothing but

"The butter's spread too thick!"

"I weep for you," the Walrus said;

"I deeply sympathize."

With sobs and tears he sorted out

Those of the largest size,
Holding his pocket-handkerchief
Before his streaming eyes.

In some ways, I think I prefer the Carpenter.

¶ Now they call them simply The Big Three. The papers are full of them: BIG THREE TO MEET IN FEBRUARY; BIG THREE SEEN IN RIFT; BIG THREE ASKED TO STOP WARS; BIG THREE URGED TO BRING MOON CLOSER TO EARTH. No adjectives, ever. Not one paper asking, Big Three *What?* Ah, the Anglosaxon genius for understatement. . . .

¶ Note for a political dictionary:

Untrammelled: Non-Existent. EX: "The *untrammelled* rights of the Italian people", "the——rights of the Greek people", etc. ANT: Substantial. See also, Stettinius on the Polish question, *passim*.

¶ It feels grand to be a prophet, even if one has only prophesied the past. I had just finished writing the above item in which I advised Churchill to have another Atlantic Chatter with Roosevelt, when the papers came out with the great news that the Charter *is* a Chatter, that it was never signed by anybody, and in fact it did not exist at all. Roosevelt told his press conference in so many words that he just had a chatter about it with his friend Churchill and a few notes were scribbled down on paper, but they don't make up a document at all. Then it must have been those rascals of the press as usual who wrote Charter instead of Chatter. How careful one must be with misprints!

¶ And they talked so much about it that poor Roosevelt himself was fooled into believing that it was a historic document, the Magna Charta of the world and similar nonsense. Millions of times this Magna Charta was mentioned by the O.W.I., promised to the occupied countries, then withdrawn from them, then implored by fools like Count Sforza and Bonomi as a guarantee for the Italian people, and now that these indignant statesmen accuse the Big Two of considering it just as a scrap of paper, in the good old Hitler-Mussolini tradition, out comes the President, that fine old fox, and says: You gentlemen seem to consider it a scrap of paper. We would never do such a thing, and in fact we have taken measures to avoid this very accusation: it isn't even a scrap of paper, it's just plain chatter.

¶ A couple of days after Roosevelt proclaimed the Atlantic Chatter, he tried to undo the damage by transposing the whole question to a higher plane, so high indeed as to reach Heaven itself. "The objectives of the Atlantic Charter still stand, the President said, just as do objectives of documents which go back many centuries. The objectives in some instances have never been attained, Mr. Roosevelt continued, but they still are good. People don't live up to all the Ten Commandments and all the doctrines of Christianity, he went on, but they still are something pretty good to shoot at."

Now, speaking of theology, it occurs to me that there is a difference between the God who composed the Ten

Commandments and the Two Gods who drew up the Atlantic Chatter. Much as I hate to say anything in favor of Jehovah, it must be admitted that He lived up to His Own commandments, so far as we know: even if mere mortals weren't able to obey them very well, *He* at least led a moral, respectable life (unlike those disreputable Greek gods). But the authors of the Chatter are themselves the first to break their own commandments. Maybe the difference is due to the fact that Jehovah was incautious enough not only to put *His* precepts in writing, but even to choose so permanent a material as stone for His medium. Of course, He was a rather primitive old fellow, a simple tribal deity who had no State Department, no Anthony Eden, not even an Archibald MacLeish.

¶ What the Germans were unable to do to the Belgian people during more than three years of occupation, the Allies have kindly done for them in a brief and unglorious parenthesis of "liberation": they have disarmed the people and scorned them for wanting to have their say about the liberty achieved by them. Now the Germans will have an easy job of killing Belgians, who have been unarmed, both physically and morally. They who have listened to Allied broadcasts at the risk of their lives to draw inspiration for more daring deeds, have been liberated indeed—of their hopes, of their illusions and, what is even worse right now, of their hard-won weapons. Let the Big Chiefs sitting in safe, heated offices away from the struggle, explain it away on the basis of legalism, constitutionalism, tradition and what not. The people who are now under the Germans again, know. They know something no one will ever be able to contest, no matter how good his logic. They know that there is an unbreakable, steady alliance between Allied conservatives, Nazis and Russian imperialists. This alliance needs no propaganda to strengthen it, and runs no risks of going to pieces if one or the other statesman tells one more lie or reveals one more secret in parliament or in the state department. The people are alone, whether in Belgium, Holland Greece or Italy, Poland or Norway, Finland or China, they are alone with their sorrows and their hunger, and governments are also alone, with their wealth and their coupons and their fears and lies. The line is drawn.

NICCOLO TUCCI

THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO COMRADE LUKE

"Is it possible, when mentioning the German monsters, to recall Christ's holy commandment 'love your enemies'? No, in no wise is it possible. It is impossible because to love them is completely and absolutely impossible not only for human beings, but also for the angels, and for the very God of Love Himself. For God hates evil and destroys evil-doers. The German monsters are not only our foes, but God's foes, and who can, who dares talk about loving God's enemies?"

"I have called the German invaders anti-Christ. Rightly, justly? This right is given me by the holy Apostle, St. John the Divine, who said:

"'In this the children of God are manifest, and the children of the devil: whosoever doeth not righteousness is not of God, neither he that loveth not his brother.' (1 John iii. 10)"

Luke, Archbishop of Tambov, in "The Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate", No. 2, 1944. (Note the curious resemblance to Stalin's oratorical style: "Is it possible? . . . No, in no wise is it possible. . . . It is impossible because . . ." This catechism-style is the standard uniform of Soviet thought today. We should not forget that Stalin was educated in a religious seminary.—ED.)

The Liberals' "Indispensable Man": Hitler

"Gallicus"

RUNGS on the ladder of hopes fall softly. There was hardly a sound in the loss of this one: the dream that the war would solve the problems which created Hitler. That was radical jingoism. It collapsed on to a less lofty wish: that, by restoring something comparable to the status quo ante, the war would at least solve the problems which Hitler created. That was liberal jingoism.

Now it's gone too. The lowest rung remains: that the war was needed to solve the problem of Hitler himself. That without it he and his would have remained masters of a great portion of the earth. To the radicals and liberals who have descended to this rung with everybody else, it is all there is between them and the abyss. Hitler is the indispensable man of their war.

Yet the idea that victorious National Socialism could have lasted any great length of time, or long enough to cause as much damage as the war, even perhaps appreciably longer than we are taking to beat it down through war, is not only unsound. It is also a denial of every belief about history and the dynamics of social change that these radicals and the left-most liberals have previously held.

Hitlerism versus History

Let's go back to the fork in the road, after the fall of France. Suppose Britain, with or without getting invaded, had been forced by myopic reactionaries or unmyopic revolutionists to come to terms with Hitler, giving him the rest of Europe. The two things we want to know are: Could National Socialism have won loyalty from the conquered countries for any time? Failing this, could it have prevented a successful rebellion abroad and at home?

At the moment of defeat in France, at the end of June, 1940, the greater part of the war-weary population there sighed "Never again!" and turned unmistakably collaborationist. By October, that is to say at the very time Europe expected an imminent German conquest of England and complete Nazi success, the collaborationists had shrunk to a small clique of intellectuals and a few opportunists. The rest were divided between anti's who wanted to compromise and anti's who wanted to resist.

What had happened?

Even the members of the two official movements that were intended to be collaborationist—Valentin's French Legion and the Compagnons de France youth organization (the latter in good part antisemitic)—had by that time become genuinely nationalist, hoping to build a martial France under Pétain that could hold her own and some day reassert herself against Germany. Most of them finally dropped out, fled to join de Gaulle or, like Valentin, were arrested by Laval.

What on God's earth had happened? They were all sure Germany was going to win in those days, and that National Socialism of a sort was the key new type of government for everybody. Nobody expressed any doubts

about this. The Communists were idle by order; the rest of the Left, hated for supporting the war, didn't know what had hit it. But it was nothing mysterious. Those who did not accept the Nazi ideal of nationalism could not be collaborationist; those who did, automatically found their nationalism in contradiction with collaboration. The Action Française remained legal only in the unoccupied zone; Dr. Martin of the Cagoulards was eventually arrested; so later was Colonel de La Roque of the Croix de Feu, which actually sent a member, while officially pretending to expel him, as its representative to DeGaulle.

To imagine that Hitler, assuming his complete success in war, might have gained the loyalty instead of the opposition of conquered countries is to grant either—that his conquests simply were interventions creating some kind of social revolution and setting up systems under which the inhabitants would completely abandon their special national interests; or—that German Nazism actually could represent the national interests of foreign countries, which is to say it was not imperialistic or nationalistic and lacked the born features of every capitalist state.

In other words that Hitler really had, as he claimed, the solution to the problem of war and had developed a new type of society so obviously superior to anything else that he had a good case for suppressing ideas and persons opposed to him. You can't logically accept the Nazi claim of a new and united European order under Germany without believing in Nazism itself.

The perfectly inevitable expressions of Nazi imperialism abroad were what passed for errors in judgment. In France at the time we are talking about they included: establishing the demarcation line as a virtual frontier instead of merely the limit of the occupied area, charging occupation costs to the Vichy government, seizing all French troops found in the occupied zone as prisoners of war, requisitioning supplies to give the German army and homeland preferential treatment. To them were later added: German policing, taking hostages, reprisals and other repressive measures. All, of course, very trying to occupied peoples.

Can we say these were only mistakes that might have been avoided had the Nazis been smarter or if England's surrender had ended their war problems? The Nazis acquired power at home and abroad by being uncompromising opponents. If they had really represented universal interests, their uncompromising fight would have ended when they were in a position to further those interests peacefully. Their whole character would have changed when their revolution was completed. But as a group representing only interests (of a few) within one country against all others they had no basis for changing. Their unyielding nature, so effective in the underdog and so ruinous in a ruler, had to be maintained or the movement would become meaningless and impotent—an alternative that actually developed, as we shall see.

The 'Mass Base' that Became a Sect

To think the Nazis could have avoided mistakes and ruled abroad intelligently is thus again to suggest that Nazism was a true revolution of a very high order. Part of this is the suggestion that a new generation of foreign youth could have been reeducated to accept German Nazi domination.

Youth is often a little outside strict class divisions and most sensitive to difficulties involving the nation as a whole. In case of such difficulty it offers precisely the most energetic nationalists—Nazis in Germany, anti-imperialists in Cuba and China and, as it turned out, Maquisards in France. It would be against all reason and all history to expect them to become bourgeois "nationalists" for another country. German nationalism was a response, twisted as it was, to German needs. What would be the basis of "allopatritism" in a conquered country?

The Doriot, Quisling, Rexist, Greek fascist, Ustashi and kindred movements among the youth, all small compared with the resistance movements, were built up largely on the fact that *the war was still going on*, on bitterness that Albion had supposedly led each country into war and abandoned it and was now attacking them as well as Germany with bombings and blockades. Their pro-Germanism was actually a sort of spiritual *war alliance*.

The other factors which attracted these youth were the heroics and romance of war, of a successful and determined "underdog" fight against the Goliaths of democracy. Their recruiting period began in earnest only in the Spring of 1941, when it became evident the war would continue, and ended a year and a half later when the resistance movement with its superior romantic appeal had gathered momentum, while the glitter of Nazism had begun to wear off. Which is to say even the minority "reeducated youth" groups grew in reaction to outside intervention on the Continent, while their growth could not continue when those at home took up the fight. They became embittered and isolated sects. Their press, once so proudly confident of a landslide sweep, grew acidly ironical against the pig-headedness of the average citizen, against blind patriotism, against popular unfriendliness toward them and the doing nothing attitude of local authorities toward the other side. They ended up describing themselves in their press and meetings as martyrs and boasting of their ideological purity and their bravery in withstanding the current.

That is what happened to the last of Hitler's great hopes, and of our liberals' great fears, that he could win a mass base abroad.

"Just Leave It to Us"

Talk of resistance, secreting of arms that were brought out years later, discussions of strategy and of future plans began in the conquered countries in the Fall of 1940. The quantities stored were vast. Even some tanks and artillery pieces and gasoline stocks of the disorganized beaten armies were sealed up in mountain caves and in the underground storing places so common in rural Europe. No matter how many guns were seized later, there always seemed to be more forthcoming from these and other sources we'll discuss farther on. The possibilities also were vast, although they would of course have taken time to gather force. This was a continent of universal military training, where every adult male knew how to man and take apart a rifle or a

plane, a machinegun or a howitzer. And the Wehrmacht, which depended heavily on local police forces, of course could not bank on them in a showdown. As just one example, the Mobile Guards sent to quell a food riot at Sète later, in January, 1942, stood by with folded arms and allowed dockworkers to rush the townhall, capturing the mayor and freeing eight prisoners.

But really popular local outbreaks like that were then purely isolated happenings in Western Europe. For by the Spring of 1941 word spread and was spread to every city and village—fed by the rantings of our propagandists which became even more exaggerated in the retelling—that America was piling up a huge reserve of armament which would be used against Germany, that America would probably land on the Continent before the year was out. The discussions of strategy were dropped. *There was obviously only one thing to do—sit tight and wait for these Hitler-exterminating experts.*

The spirit of the occupied Rhineland in the years after 1918, of self-reliance and defiance because there was nobody else to rely on, was held in restraint in occupied Europe this time by continual outside propaganda containing tacit or express promises of "just leave it to us." Russia's and then America's entry into the war were additional impetus to let George do it.

The British blockade, too, was a great thing for slowing down the forces of revolt—directly, because it was resented by earlier allies, but, much more important, indirectly because it kept people's thoughts on how to get supplies almost to the exclusion of anything else. It is astounding what a tremendous proportion of people's time, plans, initiative, discussions and energies went into the subject of food, tobacco, clothing, fuel and how to get them. They were the normal topic of conversation, replacing all other banalities. Procuring consumers' goods became an all-absorbing challenge to ingenuity, not just a diversion of thought but even diverting as a game and an outlet from sordidness. The lack of bread was the circus.

Whatever the romantic tableau of starvation leading to revolt, semi-starvation in any case is not very good for it. The countries that were best fed, Belgium and Holland, were the first to develop widespread resistance tendencies. Norway awoke next. In France, outside of a few food-riots deliberately started by some well-intentioned individuals, political consciousness reached a new low and only slowly began to brew again among the few until it was suddenly released by another of those colossal Nazi errors, the Riom trial.

Of course there were factors besides food. The fact that Yugoslavia's war against Germany had started with a domestic overthrow of the government gave it an élan other countries lacked. The uncalled for obsequious curtsy to Hitler by Denmark's Social-Democratic administration made that country for a while the model of collaboration. But such restraints were only temporary and in the end have made little difference, as the French Maquis and Copenhagen strikes show. For resistance came inevitably. In each country it had its individual early history, quite different from elsewhere, but come it did. *It is of shattering significance that huge tributaries of it, sometimes the mainstream itself, had their springs wholly outside the little underground liaison and activity groups started by the*

conscious Left. In one country, the latter had to regroup themselves around a force of several thousand prisoners of war who in Germany volunteered to become workers there, were rewarded with a fortnight's leave home and then took to the hills rather than go back into the Reich. They developed a fighting spirit and a dash the Left itself had hardly ever known.

(And to imagine such resistance came because outside forces were waging a war is the nadir of social-mindedness. Successful revolts against conquerors are as a matter of fact very rare while a war is on; they occur after wars or in the middle of peacetime.)

Nor, once started, was resistance given appreciable help by Allied sources until very late. This is not the time to discuss details, but *Allied sources urged and aided the Underground to act only as an information network for Allied operations, not to undertake operations of its own.* Not yet. It was easier to get a short-wave sender than a pistol. Supplies of Allied arms to the Underground were laughable until the last months before D-Day. Requests for explosives often were used as information for air raids in which the would-be saboteurs of a key plant were buried in their own factory, unwarned because "one cannot take chances"—except with the lives of Underground volunteers.

Ineffective air raids were preferred even on factories where vital machinery could be reached only from within, where Undergrounders, kept waiting by promises of matériel, gritted their teeth at the pointless aerial destruction of workers' lives and homes. So that the towns where resistance was strongest, getting more and fuller reports to the Allies, were hit the hardest and had rows of scores or hundreds of poor wooden coffins at a time to decorate the German newsreels shown everywhere. Then there was the fliers' lark of machinegunning railroad workers, friendly message-bearers and smugglers for the Underground, ready with information on freight and troop movements and how to destroy the right trains. Despite Underground pleas to the Allies, the lives of these men, usually exempted from the German labor draft because they had many dependents, were traded for a few easily repaired bullet holes in the engine boiler of some unknown train.

The positive aid that did at last come brought new perils and bondage with it. For volunteers who had to undertake an operation with half the matériel they expected to receive were faced with death or capture. Not just failure. And then those fancy weapons that needed special ammunition and arrived without any, or with just enough "for D-Day." Meanwhile the things remained in the hayloft while the owners waited (for ammunition or for D-Day) instead of getting other arms and doing something. And in those last months when everybody got tired of waiting and the bands in the hills grew bigger and bigger came the outside instructors and liaison officers foisted on them. Whose main job was to get them to wait some more—and to watch their politics with care. *But the true Greek gift, long before that, was the encouragement always given to militants to flee to the "free" troops fighting under the Allies.*

The resistance movements tried to organize, in view of all this, partly as nuisance forces but primarily as auxiliaries of the Allied invasion to come. It was coming each Spring and each Fall. The ravings of the short-wave sta-

tion at Boston before Pearl Harbor and later of the "Voice of America," and to a smaller degree the B.B.C., kept up this criminal misinformation. Each season there was a superhuman gathering of hope, preparedness, tension, risks and losses, followed by a heart-sickening let-down.

When a British commando party which landed to destroy a submarine lock at St. Nazaire was cut off from its boats and driven into town, the people rose to defend them and held the center of the city for 24 hours, while the Wehrmacht rushed reinforcements from other towns where the people remained quiet on advice from the experts on the air. The whole country knew about it, but did not follow suit because it waited for the broadcast word that never came. *When the Allies landed in North Africa they broadcast quarter-hourly warnings to Continental French not to rise although there never was a more favorable situation.* And in spite of this, road and rail blocks were laid, communications cut and arms brought out of hiding by the volunteers who hoped and waited only that the radio would change its mind and support them because of what was happening.* I don't know how many were finally caught and killed.

The Underground was kept discouraged, beaten, made dumbly to learn its lesson that initiatives on its part were stupid and doomed, that it had to wait for the Allies to decide and nobody else. The fact that it still had the energy to do all it did, to maintain what was becoming a perpetual and general slowdown strike in the factories, and to gather for its final spring after D-Day is a monument to the great resources within it, kept on a leash by the war.

The Corruption of Nazism

Where could it have got arms, without the Allies? From the same sources from which, as a hundred news items have finally made public here, it did get them—a lot from hiding places, some by smuggling, others by capture, *but mainly through the vast corruption that set in within the triumphant Nazi world.* The French Maquis used German arms. The Vilna ghetto insurrectionists used German arms. The R.A.F. had to drop—the precious little it did drop—captured German ammunition to the rebels of Warsaw. They all got their arms through graft, by purchase from bribed German sources.

For a great change had taken place inside National Socialism once it was winning. A change of which we have heard very little. Recent travelers and repatriated prisoners and fugitives from Germany know a tale of easy-going cynicism, making light of regulations, a piecemeal individualistic revolt which does not fit the stories of goose-stepping. The black market, alarming rumors, non-conformist humor—these were tolerated not only by the public but also by the authorities, who enforced regulations against them only when something more was involved—just as Al Capone was nabbed for income-tax evasion.

Regulations inside the Reich tell the same tale. In the Summer of 1942, when the German conquests were just at their greatest extent, all feature war films were withdrawn from German movies, which have not shown them

*A fuller account of this incident is given in the May issue of *Tricolor*, by André Girard who says "there were half a million in France awaiting the signal."—G.

since; all slogans of "master race," "super-men," a life of Spartan glory, were dropped in favor of promises of economic and spiritual well-being and peace, and survive only in Allied propaganda.

Nazism had lost its soul, its little black soul. It was trying to hide from its own people at the moment of victory. It takes no profound analysis to see what had happened. In turning from a "have-not" into a "have," the Nazi system had lost whatever little revolutionary character it once owned; it had to put up or shut up. Hitlerism had dug its own grave. Only the artificially prolonged war situation, very much up its alley, could leave it with some sort of basis for meaningful existence. Nonetheless it had lost most of its meaning. And so the German occupation troops and bureaucrats, who amazed Europe at first by refusing graft, later became the most susceptible and corruptible of authorities anywhere.

200,000,000 Enemies

Is this the military machine that could have faced a wall of hatred outside of war-time? With no fronts to glory in, no oligarchic Carthages to defy, no Vaterland to defend, no air raids on their cities to stir the blood, no promise that when this is over we go home and find the rest and peace we fight for? With no prospect but weary effort and vigilance forever?

And before it the general slowdown strike and the gigantic force of resistance the continent over, without the bondage of allies at war who can "do it better," being held down by a single conqueror.

When little Ireland was able to defy the power of the world's greatest empire.

When the Rhineland, alone against the world, could make occupation by the earth's mightiest armies a profitless proposition.

When the citizen troops of the American, French and Russian revolutions could win as they did.

When we accept it as a truism that the powers of Western imperialism will have to yield freedom to colonies like India—because these are distantly approaching a state of development that Germany's conquered Europe had had for two centuries!

Has our vaudeville gag, the so-called Hitler mystique of the Nazis, affected us more than them, who had sense enough to make the "mistake" of stowing as many people as possible in war prisoners' camps? Blinded us so much that we can't understand why no army on earth can face the resistance of 200,000,000 people or why that resistance would have been forthcoming? And with no artificially prolonged war situation to buffer it, why it would have been such a corrupting force as to make Nazism in Germany itself hopeless and impossible?

We can deny it by denying the national character of every capitalist state outside of Germany. We can deny it by accepting every single premise of the Nazi analysis of the world and of history, every premise of Hitlerism itself. The liberals and radicals who accept Hitler's boast he could have remained master of Europe are simply Nazis standing on their heads, whether they like it or not.

What is the present European resistance that they imagine would have been less effective than the Irish rebellion, that they think of as a by-product of their war? Just the

same resistance movement that sleeps throughout the world and wakes when people discover they are not represented by their rulers—and what keeps them from discovering it is the war-tempered cult of the nation, requisite of oppressive regimens, and the national state with a claim to speak for all.

Because such a claim can't stand up under a system of Nazi foreign occupation and puppet governments, there is nothing left that could pretend to represent the people or lull their dormant resistance. That is how the stirrings come, not from outside.

That is why they had to come, why nothing could have kept the beast from waking in the suicidal Hitlerdämmerung of European capitalism; or kept it from attacking the peculiar lackey-masters and ruling foreigners whom it was never trained to regard as part of its household.

And, by God, if the beast had already tasted blood, it would not have stopped with the Nazis! It would have turned on the whole corrupt social system — as, even as things are, it shows a tendency to do throughout Europe. Better to keep it on a leash as a trained police dog and conduct the operations yourself. Such was the understandable strategy of the Anglo-American conservatives. But why of the liberals and radicals?

I leave the war liberals and war radicals with this argument, which is all they have left, and I won't answer it because they know the answer: they have ended up fighting against everything in which they ever believed. Only people who can plead complete innocence of knowledge about social forces and capitalism can beg their way out of this; the enlightened ones can't.

That supreme masterpiece of the lesser-evil theory, the idea of war-making as an alternative to successful Hitlerism, is the necessary cover for the plain truth about the war's social function. Necessary, that is, to the liberal or radical jingo. The ordinary man doesn't really need it. He has always believed in patriotism and in supporting his country right or wrong in wars, which come even when there is no Hitler. Though one may argue with this faith, it is worthy of respect.

But those who have tasted the fruit of the tree of knowledge, haunted by the memory of forbidden words like imperialism, militarism, merchants of death, can't recapture this innocent view of war, hard as they are trying. They must maintain at every price that they are saving Europe from their indispensable man, Hitler. And that they are not doing Hitler's work for him, but a whole lot better, in the process.

I'll take the simple American patriots who are fighting for their country.

LAND REFORM A LA HORTHY

A few days ago, the Hungarian government announced in a broadcast that "the hitherto unfortunately unrealizable dream of the Hungarian peasant to get a piece of land for himself, however small, can now come true." Every soldier who destroys or captures an enemy tank will receive five acres of land within a fortnight as a free gift from the nation. If he is killed in the fight, his immediate relatives will receive ten acres.

— *The Tribune (London), Oct. 13, 1944.*

"IT IS UP TO YOU, GENTLEMEN!"

The struggle between the resistance groups and the politicians who have returned from exile has become the question of the day in Europe, especially in Greece, Belgium and France. The following editorial from the Socialist paper, Voorhuit, of Ghent, Belgium (as quoted in Tribune for Nov. 3) is as able a summary of the case for the resistance as has appeared:

"The Resistance groups, which acquitted themselves so brilliantly during the occupation, at the time of the liberation and also afterwards, when it came to the quick 'clean-up,' have now been pushed into a corner. They have been thanked. A lot of bouquets have been thrown at them. Mountains of flowers and wreaths. Mountains large enough to bury them. The Resistance groups were even given a Minister—but he is expected to wear out soon.

"Why?

"The Resistance groups were formed by self-sacrificing and patriotic youths from all parties and classes. The illegal struggle had lifted them above the pre-1940 one-legged politics, and they were well on the way to becoming a democratic guard, which, free from all political influences, would have persevered with the purge and afterwards—would have nipped in the bud the open reappearance of the camouflaged Fascist parties.

"Three groups looked on them with suspicion: (1) the war profiteers, who, along with their usurers and lawyers—half-hearted, as well as out-and-out collaborators—preferred peace; (2) local and petty professional politicians, who were afraid that the Resistance would become a party of its own and did not realise the immense difference between a democratic movement of purge and a political group; (3) reactionary elements which never had confidence in the (sometimes) too go-ahead energy of this popular movement, which included mainly the lesser members of the working and middle classes and uncorrupted and disinterested young people.

"These three forces which conspired behind the scenes are the ones that want to liquidate as quickly as possible the F.I., the Partisans . . . the A.B.S., and other popular resistance organisations. The right wing is asking for their immediate disarmament. Others urge a swift demobilisation.

"Boys, go back home, back to your workshops. We can dispense with you now. Already there has been too much purging! . . .

"And the Government? And the men who came from London? What have they done to take the Resistance groups immediately in hand, to supply them, to pay them, to organise them better and more publicly, to support them with all means and give them directives to put behind lock and key quickly and efficiently the collaborators and traitors?

"Nothing!

"They want to absorb them in the army; they want to disband them; they want to see them disappear as quickly as possible.

"They want the purge to be executed without them, with little fuss and in a friendly manner, of course. . . . That is all.

"Is the Government not afraid that one day it may have to pay dearly for such a policy?

"The Resistance groups have worked underground for four years, and are they being driven underground again?

"It is up to you, gentlemen!"

To which we might simply add the slogan reported (N. Y. Times, Nov. 17) to be circulating in the Dutch re-

sistance groups in Maastricht, Holland (where the restored royal government has been replacing resistance mayors with the old officials who worked for the Germans):

"We took up arms against the Germans, and we can do it again if necessary."

A NAZI MEETS A C.O.

A story by Leonard Mosley of an interview he had with a young Nazi officer in the backroom of a British Medical dressing station appeared in the Sunday Graphic of June 25th. He gives an interesting sidelight on one aspect of the C.O. movement. "The English are mad—stark staring mad," the Nazi claimed. And then he rather gloomily added: 'But it is a glorious kind of madness just the same.'

"It was an intriguing opening to a conversation with the first enemy officer I had seen since our landing in France. I naturally began probing him. And this, it turned out, is what had happened to him.

"He was out on anti-airborne invasion manoeuvres with his company in the woods and apple orchards of the Orne Valley in the early hours of D-Day when the thunder of British planes filled the air and down on to French soil tumbled hundreds of British paratroops. "So I scattered my men where the paratroops had landed, warned them that they must be swift and ruthless, and then set off to kill my own personal Englishman." The young Nazi's face puckered.

"And what happened when I found my first Englishman is the reason why I say you people are mad. I lifted my revolver and fired at him twice. The two shots missed. The British paratrooper dodged behind a tree and instead of firing back—to the amazement of the Nazi—he cried out in German, 'Tell me, Herr Officer, have you fellows any blankets I can borrow?'

"Who are you? What is this nonsense about?' asked the German lieutenant. 'I'm a conscientious objector,' said the paratrooper calmly.

"Then,' said the Nazi, 'Gott in Himmel, what are you doing here?'

"Oh' said the paratrooper, 'Our blankets dropped in the marsh, and we've got some wounded men—a couple of Germans among them—in a cottage up the road and I'm looking around for something to keep them warm. Can you help me?'

It was no use trying to explain the situation to the German. How can you explain to a German the remarkable story of six airborne divisions of paratrooping C.O.s? When our airborne army dropped upon Normandy on June 7th, down by parachute with the first troops at 1 a.m. went scores of them as orderlies and assistants attached to our airborne medical ambulance units. And in those first few hours their casualties were as heavy in killed and wounded as the rest of our troops—"The New Leader" (English), Aug. 12, 1944.

PLUS CA CHANGE . . .

Under the occupation, by order of the Nazi authorities, a number of books were banned or withdrawn from public libraries in Paris.

The Paris Committee of Liberation has decided . . . to replace volumes banned since June, 1940, and to get rid of those containing enemy propaganda or material prejudicial to the honor and interests of the French people.

—*Bulletin from Ministry of Information, Paris, Oct. 19, 1944.*

LIBERAL LOGIC

As the political campaign goes into its final days, the best-informed observers appear to believe that President Roosevelt will win by a substantial margin. (*The New Republic*, Nov. 6, p. 579.)

Occasionally, a correspondent of *The New Republic* suggests that . . . it is desirable to vote for Norman Thomas and the Socialist ticket. There have been elections in which *The New Republic's* editors were not unsympathetic to this type of thinking. . . . This year, however, we do not feel that the argument is valid. With the race as close as it seems likely to be . . . (*The New Republic*, Nov. 6, p. 583.)

Socialism In Extremis

D. S. Savage

Editor's Note: Mr. Savage, the English poet, recently sent in the article that follows, which he plans to have printed in the London Adelphi. Its interest is so great, and so lively to POLITICS readers especially, that it seems well worth printing here as well. Since my own views are largely in question, I should like to add that, while sympathetic to most of the author's criticism of traditional socialism, I entirely fail to see the logic of an otherworldly religious faith as the way to rehabilitate individual moral values. It seems to me that we have a secular—and indeed rather sharply anti-religious—libertarian tradition which can be traced from the 18th century French Enlightenment through the Utopian socialists to important elements of Marxian and anarchist thought; and that we should turn not to God but to this tradition to find again the link between the individual and society. I hope to publish, in a month or two, "The Root is Man," an article I have been working on a long time. This will deal with somewhat the same questions—central to socialism today—as are raised here by Mr. Savage.

THE almost universal apostacy of the socialist movement from the principles which governed its formation, its total lack of inspired leadership and its inglorious submergence in the confused currents of contemporary history, is a phenomenon whose significance has yet to be fully realized. There is now, it is possible to say, no socialist criticism of society which has any convincing prospect of mass support. And since mass action is an essential postulate of socialist theory, it is a situation which places the small number of intellectuals who still hold to a doctrinaire socialism in a peculiarly anomalous position.

The war has done much to clarify the real social situation in our day. Socialism, in relation to the war, has shown itself to be a dead issue, a back number. Pacifism becomes the only genuine issue in war time: the socialist who is not a pacifist merely becomes drawn into the pattern of a total-war, i.e., totalitarian, society. He may tenaciously cling to his theory, but it gives him no help whatever in the bewildering and uncontrollable circumstances in which he finds himself implicated, and he is forced to move in a pattern not his own in the uncertain hope that some time in the future events will conspire in such a way as to favour the re-emergence of "socialist action."

1

These thoughts occur after a perusal of a new socialist periodical from America: *POLITICS* (issue for July 1944), which is making a brave attempt at the restatement of socialist principles at a time when they seem to be everywhere relaxed to the point of abandonment. Nevertheless, despite its good intentions, the magazine has what can only be described as an academic air. There is an intelligent critical commentary on world affairs; there are articles, from a left-wing angle, on racial discrimination, industrial organization, and other issues. But there is nowhere the slightest indication of the outlines of a proposed program

for the achievement of socialism. This is strange, for that would be the only feature which might radically differentiate *POLITICS*—as it would no doubt wish to be differentiated—from the many other "progressive" periodicals in America and in Britain, and show it to be practically in earnest. And yet it is not so strange: for what possible socialist policy, of the old style, could there be, in the face of the present world situation?

In view of this predicament, one article in *POLITICS*, with the "Rejoinder" by the Editor, stands out as particularly interesting. And that, curiously enough, is an article entitled "The Political Relevance of Conscientious Objection."

(Editor's Note: At this point, Savage quotes at length from the Calhoun-Macdonald exchange. Since this has already been printed in POLITICS, it seems best to summarize his points briefly here, referring the reader to the July issue for the full text of the exchange. Savage quotes Calhoun's observation that the pacifist position is essentially a moral one in that it is (1) "something pretty personal", and (2) absolute and not relative. ("It is a conviction," Calhoun wrote, "that there are in life certain evils which are so fundamental that he cannot himself contribute directly to them." As against the revolutionary socialist who, for reasons of political strategy, personally takes part in a war "for purposes with which he is in profound disagreement.") From Macdonald's rejoinder, Savage quotes "the concessions he makes to the pacifist position" as relating, more directly than does the Marxist, the individual's daily behavior to his long-range values; also his description of "the psychologically dessicating qualities of Trotskyist political behavior" because of its failure to relate adequately means-ends and present-future.)

"The C. O.," writes Macdonald, "like the European anarchist or our own oldtime Wobblies, at least reacts spontaneously, immediately against the evils he fights, and shapes his everyday behavior to fit his principles. This is a great thing."

This is a great thing. That is a significant admission to come from a political socialist. For a socialist to be so honestly troubled by the gaping disparity which exists, in the behaviour of individual socialists, between morality and politics, personal and social action, is indeed unusual. For if our society is to be brought round to a new human centrality, that will certainly only come about through a new movement which has in its theory and activity reconciled morality and politics, brought political action around to a moral centre. And of present social movements, it is pacifism alone which does precisely that.

In the controversy from which I have quoted above, illuminating because it shows a representative genuine socialist's patent dissatisfaction with his position between the extremes of pacifism and totalitarian Stalinist communism, the most pressing general issue of our time is touched upon: the relationship between morality and politics, means and ends, personal life and social responsi-

bility. It seems worth while to attempt to put the matter in its perspectives.

2

In order to do so it is necessary to approach critically the foundations of the general socialist attitude. It is unfortunately true that socialism, besides its completely valid aspect as an economic criticism of capitalist society, has another aspect which is by no means so valid. In this secondary aspect (which however tends always to become primary), erecting itself upon the spiritual vacancy which exists in the mind of modern man through his characteristic absence of religious faith, it offers an entire attitude to life, an attitude which is false from the bottom up because it is founded upon a series of negations and is itself largely unacknowledged. Socialism, in other words, forces itself into that central position in man's mind which has been left vacant by the absence of a belief in God, and its tenets become transformed into the creed, whether liberal or fanatical, of a secular and atheistic religion.

At this point it is necessary for me to become autobiographical, not for egoistical reasons but for the sake of the clarity of my argument. Like most young men of my kind in this age, when I began to question the assumptions of the world in which I found myself in adolescence, a world which I did not like very much, I soon perceived the irrational and superstitious, or else merely conventional, character of the religious myths by which people pretended to direct their lives. I became an atheist—in fact, comically enough, a militant atheist! But then I encountered and became involved, in my character as a piece of labor-commodity, in the machinery of capitalistic commerce and industry. My experience of the complete inhumanity of the principles motivating it prepared the way for conversion to socialism, and when I encountered my first comprehensive textbook of socialist principles and learned of the iron law of wages, of the conflict of class interests in society and of the economic motivation of political events, I became a convinced and active socialist. I have no hesitation in saying that my socialism became an integral part of my personal attitude to life, and remains so still. But I was not long in learning, through bitter experience, that socialism, completely valid in one sphere of life, that is to say in relationship to capitalist society, is entirely inadequate as a philosophy of existence as a whole. In my personal experience as an individual I came—there is no need to elaborate the process—to a belief in God, and in man as made in the image of God. This is for me the central truth of existence: and in placing this at the centre of my mind I relegated socialism to its proper place, the circumference.

Persons like myself, who are first Christians and then socialists, stand in a peculiar and in some way unenviable relationship to the movements of our time. For we stand at the immediate centre of a position which places on one side of us our fellow Christians and on the other our fellow socialists. To the former we are bound to say: Your Christianity is a sterile idolatry if it works in combination with toleration of a class society based on exploitation, fear and greed. To our fellow socialists we are constrained to add: Your pursuit of a classless society is a preparation for totalitarianism unless your socialism is rooted in a

real affirmation of the validity of the individual existence in its direct, vertical relationship to God. The essential unity of our attitude is seen in our stand on the issue of opposition to war.

Now, the determining feature of the socialist movement as it exists today is that it is *not* Christian, and is not composed of Christians, but of materialists, atheists, agnostics. I am not now considering either the liberal socialists who have shown themselves at the pinch to be timid servants of capitalist imperialism, or the fanatical totalitarian worshippers of Soviet state power. I am considering the sincere and doctrinaire socialist remnant as represented by individuals such as Dwight Macdonald. They are theoretically anti-war, but not pacifist, and they still pin their hopes to some future mass-renaissance which will result in the establishment of the socialist society. And I affirm that these are people who have failed to go beyond the second stage which I have mentioned in describing my own development. At bottom, they are simple atheists and agnostics, who have been led into accepting socialism not merely as a criticism of capitalist society but as a total attitude to life: in which character it is an ineffective and illusory substitute for a real religious faith.

As a religious surrogate (for it is no less) socialism works by negatives. When explicated (as every attitude to life, when explicated, reveals certain definite philosophical commitments), the socialist attitude reveals itself in the following shape. Unable to affirm the existence of God, the socialist is unable to affirm the integral validity of man—of the separate individual existence. For Christianity, the individual has a vertical relationship with eternity, which stabilizes and formalizes his life, giving it intrinsic significance. But the socialist, by his rejection of the supernatural, unconsciously transfers meaning and purposes from the individual as he exists in the present moment with its direct, vertical relationship to eternity, to the collective in the future. The hypothetical socialist collective of the future is transformed into the goal, or end, of existence, and the individual's life is given fictitious significance through his making of himself into an instrument adapted to the achievement of that end—not in eternity, but in *history*.*

3

I think no one will venture to contradict me when I say that the predominant feature of the pseudo-religious aspect of socialist theory is its forward-looking or "progressive" character. Socialism, as an end, is a desirable condition of the social collective which is to be achieved at some future time, and which will radically differentiate that collective from all preceding social orders. Socialist politics are to a remarkable degree determined by devotion to that end, which is conceived as so important as to reduce to a minimum the intrinsic importance of the means employed for securing it.

Now, this forward-looking, "optimistic" quality of socialist thought—we see it, for instance, in Macdonald's attitude towards some hypothetical future popular revolution—

*For a fuller analysis of this trend in socialism, and its relationship to totalitarianism, I venture to refer the reader to my essay "Time and the Zeitgeist"—*Adelphi* Oct.-Dec. 1942 and April-June 1943.

ary movement in occupied Europe—has some interesting implications. To cut a long argument as short as possible: the “end” being in the *future*, the consequence of such an orientation towards reality is to minimize the intrinsic significance of the *present*. And the “end”, furthermore, being a condition of the *collective*, its further consequence is to minimize the importance of the *individual*. What really matters is the realization of the socialist collective of the future. But in proportion to the fervor with which this conviction is held, there is inevitably a coincidental diminution of the value ascribed to the individual existence in the present. What this means for the relationship between politics and morality is evident: a devotion to such an end in historical time necessarily results in an emphasis upon political method (i.e., opportunism) at the expense of morality.

The antitheses which I wish to make clear are those between individual and collective, morality and politics, means and ends, and present and future. It is by its emphasis upon the second of these series of antitheses (collective-politics-end-future instead of individual-morality-means-present) that the socialist movement has been brought to its present pass. That pass is, perhaps, inherent in the very nature of socialist origins. To me it is quite obvious that a neglect of the concrete present for the sake of an uncertain future, of immediate means for the sake of some distant end, is to prepare the way for such a condition of things as that which Macdonald describes with such mixed feelings as existing among the Trotskyists of his acquaintance. It's an inescapable consequence. As Macdonald says, “The political logic . . . is perfect.”

4

In the kind of socialist typified by Dwight Macdonald we encounter an individual who is honestly scandalized by the inhumanity of capitalist society with its injustice, oppression and wars. His revulsion from it is, of course, basically a moral revulsion. The evident conflict in his mind between the claims of morality and politics is caused by the fact that the particular variant of Marxist theory which he has made his own lends no real sanction to his moral feelings or to his insight into the necessity for moral standards. It is this element in socialist theory—which deprives morality of its absolute sanctions and disintegrates it in the quicksands of expediency and opportunism—that has actually brought about the *demoralization* (a good word) of the socialist movement and its downward trend into the hell of totalitarianism.

The confusion in Macdonald's thought about morality and politics is shown by the final paragraph of his Rejoinder: “After our experience with the bureaucratic degeneration of the Bolshevik revolutionary movement, radicals must be more concerned about individual morality than they have been in the past. This seems to be the political relevance of conscientious objection.” The assumption here is that you can at will reintroduce morality for the sake of your political end. But—“when the salt has lost its savor, wherewith shall it be salted?” Morality cannot casually be introduced at the eleventh hour as a stiffening to a wilting “revolutionary” *morale*. Morality, which is always and inescapably individual, is inextricably

bound up with a conception of the real value of the individual and of his integrity. And the fact is, that the conscientious objector, who is the occasion both of this discussion and of Macdonald's concessions to the importance of morality, is “made” by—“something pretty personal.” The essential difference between the pacifist and the non-pacifist antagonist of war can only be that the former *thinks that it really matters* what line he personally, as an individual, takes in the face of certain circumstances, quite irrespective of its apparent effectiveness in relation to the achievement of a collective end. Obviously, if he hasn't this intense inward conviction that it really matters, he will never make a pacifist. But how *can it matter*? It can only matter, intrinsically, if he is in some *real* sense important, is in some real way, with every other single individual, an end in himself and not merely a means to some abstract collective end conceived of as existing outside himself and in a mystifying independence of the concrete individual consciousness. The pacifist, it therefore follows, is one who has faith,—faith in the intrinsic validity of the individual existence, a faith which he asserts in the fact of a social process irresistibly bent upon the obliteration of human values and the transformation of human beings into robots and cannon-fodder. It is the loss of that faith which has made the socialist movement in general what it is—an ancillary to totalitarianism.

5

It is in pacifism that Christian and socialist thought join hands, each bringing its specific contribution to the formation of a coherent and integral outlook on and attitude towards the world of social affairs. To say this is in no way to give socialism equal importance with Christianity. My religious faith is at the centre of my existence: but translated into social terms, in the fact of capitalist society, that faith impels a demand for the ending of exploitation and privilege, a demand which makes use of the socialist analysis and takes the political form of socialism, but a socialism freed of its false religious attributes, its historical mysticism, and made a matter of practical organization and common sense.

At the crisis of war, my Christianity and my socialism become completely one: and I oppose war and refuse to participate in it, primarily, it is true, because it violates my deepest moral convictions of the sacredness of human personality, but also because (springing, I know, from the same root) through my acceptance of socialism I am led to dissociate myself from the political values of the society in which I live, and therefore am immune from the illusion that its Government is fighting to preserve Decency or Freedom or Democracy or whatever from the attacks of the Evil Power, identified with the national enemy of the moment. In the conscientious objector's stand, morality enters into the political realm and introduces the possibility—or rather, the actuality—of a morally-centered “revolutionary” (in the realistic sense) politics.

To accept the pacifist position is, by implication, to repudiate a primarily *political* interpretation of the present age and to see the main struggle, not as a horizontal one of conflicting interests which will be ended and solved for good and all by the triumph of one of the parties to

the conflict; but as a vertical (and therefore individual as well as social) war of values, with material commitments. It is very true that this does away with the collective optimism of socialism, the belief that some time in the future everything will automatically come right for everybody in the best of all possible worlds. But to do away with that is to clear the mind of an illusion. And in return for this clearance, pacifism offers the union of means and ends, of personal and social activity, and the affirmation of the real and intrinsic validity of the integral individual existence and the significance of his moral life. The notion that at some future time a certain outward organization of the framework of society, independent of the operation of moral principles, will guarantee justice, liberty and security, is quite illusory. A nominally "socialist" state which does not accommodate the values which are based upon a deeply rooted respect for the individual personality—deeply rooted because it acknowledges the individual's supernatural origin and end — will be only a variant of totalitarianism. The example of Russia is here a clear warning. In his concentration upon an abstract collective of the phantasmal future, at the expense of the individual existence in the present, and the consequent destruction of the roots of morality, however good his intentions, the socialist is playing straight into the hands of totalitarianism. For totalitarianism is more than a political phenomenon: it is also a spiritual one. His Utopia never comes, never can come; but instead there supervenes the totalitarian collective, with its ruthless contempt for personality and its ogre-like exaltation of the power of the State. In failing to make an individual moral stand, now, against the idiocies and devilties of war, the socialist is already letting totalitarianism succeed by default.

Doctrinaire socialism, now confined to a diminishing number of intellectuals (the others having succumbed to the attractions of totalitarianism), is in a quandary which can only be resolved by one of two movements: an acquiescence in totalitarianization and the further demolition of human values, or a movement towards the acceptance of the values asseverated by the pacifist in his uniting of morality and politics. That such an acceptance depends upon an act of faith is quite true. And if the socialist objects that such a belief is unthinkable, finally, without a "retrograde", "reactionary", and, in this enlightened age, totally outmoded belief in God and in man as made in the image of God—well, that is what I have been trying to say all the time.

EXTRA! REDS UNCOVER GOP ARSON PLOT!

Of course, I'll be glad to shake hands with the grass-root Republicans. . . . But I submit there is no charity in my heart for the men who braintrusted the Republican campaign because I know what they meant. I would strike down the outstretched hand of a fire-brand who tried his damndest to destroy my home. . . . Is the unsuccessful arsonist to be excused because he failed? . . . It is my contention that these mealy-mouthed pleas to let bygones be bygones serve the plotters' purpose.—*Editorial by Joseph North in "New Masses" of Nov. 21, 1944. (Illustrated by cartoons of Dewey, Hoover and Bricker with smoking torches setting fire to government buildings.)*

The American Scene

The Albany Story

A Drama of Real Life, in Six Scenes

Editor's Note: The old muckrakers used to get very indignant about "political corruption", by which they meant the methods by which local political bosses exploited the citizenry. Lincoln Steffens wrote a whole book on "The Shame of the Cities." It was all very reprehensible, no doubt, but to the contemporary observer the muckrakers' cries of outraged morality have the quaint flavor of a more innocent age. We know what real political corruption is now, on a national and international scale. Compared to our Fuhrers and Leaders and Commanders-in-Chief, the old-fashioned ward boss is a humane and even likable figure; compared to the waste of modern warfare, his raids on city treasuries were kid stuff; and his political "machine" was a low-powered affair compared to the great bureaucracies that have fastened themselves upon us to help us more efficiently kill each other. Let us, therefore, enjoy the following American folk drama without worrying too much about the skulduggeries involved. The most alarming aspect of the whole affair, indeed, is that an Associate Justice of the N. Y. Supreme Court should be so weak on grammar.

The background may be very briefly sketched. About a year ago, Governor Dewey (Rep.) initiated a special investigation of crime in Albany County, whose political bosses are the O'Connell clan (Dem.). His investigators tapped Dan O'Connell's phone, with the results given below. The various conversations revolve around the efforts of the O'Connell machine and its legal and judicial henchmen to block the maneuvers of the great Gang-Buster. As the talks indicate, these efforts were often pathetically unsuccessful. In fact, the moral seems to be that, if Supreme Court justices are sometimes semi-literate, machine bosses are also often ineffectual. One of the most humanly endearing traits of the O'Connell gang is its obvious inefficiency; another is the warm emotional responses of its members to the difficult situations they find themselves in. It's really hard not to develop a fellow-feeling for the rascals.

Dramatis Personae

Dan.....	Daniel O'Connell, Democratic boss of Albany county.
Gil.....	The Hon. Gilbert V. Schenck, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Sir Robert.....	Robert E. Whalen, Albany lawyer and henchman of Dan.
Bill.....	The Hon. William Murray, a judge, of Troy, N. Y.
Francis.....	The Hon. Francis Bergen, a judge, brother-in-law of Dan O'Connell's chief lieutenant, John J. Murphy. The latter is now under indictment on 19 counts of grand larceny.

First Irate Taxpayer.....Mr. Drislane
 Second Irate Taxpayer.....Mr. McCormick
 "That Big Bum Hill".....The Hon. James P. Hill, presiding
 justice of the Appellate Division,
 3rd Part, of the N. Y. Supreme
 Court. (A Republican.)

Scene 1: "What the hell did we ever do to bring on this animosity?"

Schenck: Hello.
 O'Connell: Hello.
 Schenck: Dan?
 O'Connell: Yes.
 Schenck: This is Gil Schenck.
 O'Connell: How are you, my boy?
 Schenck: Oh, I have been having one hell of a time since well, since 2 o'clock, we have had that case before our court.
 O'Connell: Umh'm.
 Schenck: I would have had three votes tonight, except your little boy in Schoharie—even when I got him in his own room, and tried to pin him down he wouldn't go with me.
 O'Connell: Umh'm.
 Schenck: So—
 O'Connell: (interrupting) You got to be careful with the phones.
 Schenck: Yeah, I know. So I told him—put it over till tomorrow, and I'll do the best I can. One fellow's all right—I'm all right—but takes three to do it.
 O'Connell: Umh'm.
 Schenck: Yep. We won't talk about it, I just want to tell you, Dan.
 O'Connell: You got the law with you all right, you think?
 Schenck: Got the law with me, and I am perfectly satisfied, and so is the fellow that granted the order.
 O'Connell: Yep.
 Schenck: Yep.
 O'Connell: Looks like they are going to gang us around here, don't it?
 Schenck: What?
 O'Connell: It looks—the attitude of that big bum Hill—
 Schenck: Oh, it was terrible—
 O'Connell: (truculent)—You would think in—
 Schenck: Oh, it was terrible—it was worse than anybody ever told you.
 O'Connell: Yeah.
 Schenck: His performance there today was the most embarrassing thing I ever heard of.
 O'Connell: What the hell did we ever do to bring on this animosity?
 Schenck: Oh—the only thing I thought, if you wanted to do it—but I don't think it would do a damned bit of good—I thought you might call Whalen, and I could get this young fellow to go and see Whalen tomorrow morning before we make any—
 O'Connell: He might get some law down there.
 Schenck: What?
 O'Connell: He might get some law down there.
 Schenck: God, he got it from me tonight. I was well primed, I had every case laid out, laid it down to him, and he still says—"Well, I want to be right,"—and that high-brow stuff. But I did the best I could, Dan, anyway.
 O'Connell: O. K.
 Schenck: And it looks as though the other fellow will be with me, but I don't know.

O'Connell: Yes—
 Schenck: But this fellow won't—
 O'Connell: Yes—okeydoke.
 Schenck: Hate to bother you—but it's the fortunes of war—that's all there is to it. We just left down there—first chance I've had to telephone.
 O'Connell: Okeydoke.
 Schenck: O. K., big boy.

Scene 2: "It is not a good thing over the phone."

The next day the court denied the petition, as Justice Schenck had told O'Connell it would. On January 27, the Court of Appeals upheld the ruling. That day, Schenck again calls up O'Connell:
 Schenck: Hello, Dan?
 O'Connell: Yeah.
 Schenck: This is Gil—Gil Schenck.
 O'Connell: How are you, my boy?
 Schenck: Well, they kind of threw me to the wolves, Dan.
 O'Connell: Yeh.
 Schenck: Well, it's all we could do.
 O'Connell: Yeah.
 Schenck: How's everything?
 O'Connell: Oh, I see Whalen's judge became leader of the Bar Association.
 Schenck: Yes.
 O'Connell: That's all he needs.
 Schenck: And the leader of the Judicial Section.
 O'Connell: Umh'm.
 Schenck: If I had had his vote, there would have been no appeal, you know.
 O'Connell: Uh?
 Schenck: If I—if he had given me his vote, there would have been no appeal.
 O'Connell: I know it.
 Schenck: You couldn't have had an appeal.
 O'Connell: I know it.
 Schenck: Bob will tell you all about it.
 O'Connell: Yeh, well, I am going to see him tomorrow.
 Schenck: Well, I did the best I could, and there were two good fellows with me.
 O'Connell: Okeydoke, big boy.

Schenck: Whalen has some ideas of some additional—
 O'Connell: All right. Well, I am going to see him tomorrow.
 Schenck: Well, go and see him in the morning, because I want to see him late in the afternoon, with Bergan.
 O'Connell: Well, I will leave a message there for you. I told it to Aronowitz today.
 Schenck: What is it?
 O'Connell: Well, I will tell you then. It is not a good thing over the phone.
 Schenck: Yeh. O.K., big boy.
 O'Connell: O.K., good-by. (Hangs up.)
 Schenck: This is the thing we want to do—(Hangs up)

Scene 3: Enter Two Irate Taxpayers

The remaining conversations are between O'Connell and the machine's lawyer, Robert E. Whalen (see "Dramatis Personae"). The first is on March 21, 1944, after the State Legislature has passed a jury bill designed to facilitate the Monaghan investigation. Lawyer Whalen has just "looked up the law on the question of constitutionality" and has concluded the threatening bill is reasonably unconstitutional. He rings up O'Connell:
 Whalen: Mr. Whalen to speak to Dan, please.

Woman: Hold the wire.

O'Connell: Hello.

Whalen: How are you, Daniel?

O'Connell: Hello, Sir Robert.

Whalen: On that subject that we were discussing yesterday—

O'Connell: Yeah?

Whalen: I have come to the conclusion that you have got a good fighting chance to get away with that, though I can't tell you that it's dead open and shut.

O'Connell: Go ahead.

Whalen: Well, now, I tell you what I think has got to be done. I think we got to dig up an irate taxpayer—

O'Connell: Yeah?

Whalen: or two, and bring the action against Mrs. what's her name—the Commissioner,—

O'Connell: Yeah?

Whalen: to restrain her from carrying it out. Now in that event, Collins, as County Attorney, would appear for her, but, as it involves a constitutional question, you'd have to give notice to the Attorney General and let him come in—

O'Connell: Yeah?

Whalen: and try to uphold the act. That's the—how it would work out.

Whalen: Now, another thing, speaking of Johnny [John J. O'Connell Jr., Albany County chairman of the Democratic party, and O'Connell's nephew], when we get this started, I appear for the irate taxpayer—

O'Connell: Yeah.

Whalen: And I think we ought to have two, Dan.

O'Connell: Yeah.

Whalen: That's what we've done in former years, in case one should die all of a sudden, we'd be left high and dry.

O'Connell: Drislane and McCormick used to be the irate taxpayers.

Whalen: Yeah, they did.

O'Connell: (Laughs).

Whalen: Well, now, will you pick a couple of irate taxpayers that are not office holders?

O'Connell: I don't know how I can pick one without having Drislane in it.

Whalen: Yes?

O'Connell: Maybe I'll have Drislane and Jess McCabe in it.

Whalen: Fine.

O'Connell: They're taxpayers, and—heh?

Whalen: Fine, all right. Now I am going to talk to Johnny over the telephone about this, because, after we get this started, I'm quite likely to be subpoenaed up here on the Hill and asked with whom did I talk before this action was brought—

O'Connell: Yeah?

Whalen: and I want to say I talked to the Chairman of the County Committee.

O'Connell: Yeah?

Whalen: So I am going to talk to Johnny first to tell him—

O'Connell: You're talking to him right now. (Laughs).

Whalen: Yeah?

O'Connell: (Laughs).

Whalen: All right (laughs). So I'm going to be able to say I talked to Johnny, and it was on his instructions.

Scene 4: Family Matters

In this undated conversation, O'Connell confides his uneasiness about his nephew, the figurehead leader of the machine, and takes counsel with Whalen:

O'Connell: Now, listen here, I was thinking this, Johnny never had any taste for politics, and it was a damned shame to put him in there as a figurehead, and, in addi-

tion to that, he is in the brewery, and it is a good way to raise his family, and it would be a good thing to have him out of there on account of being in the brewery.

Whalen: Yeah.

O'Connell: Couldn't very well withdraw him except under one condition, and that is, to make myself county chairman.

Whalen: Why, hell, that's the way it ought to be.

O'Connell: I'll be the wartime premier, and I'll let the boys and girls know that I'm going to carry on the duties until Erastus is back out of the Army.

However, this scheme, on reflection, appeared to both men to have its drawbacks, since Dan O'Connell, as county chairman, would be subject to embarrassing questions. Thus, the next day, the following took place;

Whalen: Say, I was thinking of another thing. You were talking about Johnny going out and so forth. Don't you think it might be as well to mark time a little bit yet until this investigation thing dies down because, if you go in as chairman, they will probably subpoena you just to try to show what you know about documents that are not in the headquarters, and so forth, and of course they'd invite you to sign this waiver, which you would not do, and then they'd blow that, but I think, if Johnny is likely to go into service before long, that would be the psychological time, then.

O'Connell: All right, then—

Whalen: You might think of that.

O'Connell: Well, we'll re-elect him, and, when he goes into service, then we will take care of the matter.

Scene 5: "They're going to yell murder."

The final conversations center around "Bill" and "Francis", two judges who evidently could be "got hold of" and induced to give a sympathetic hearing to the suit which has meanwhile been brought by the two Irate Taxpayers: Whalen: Now, another thing, can you get hold of Bill Murray easily?

O'Connell: Yeah.

Whalen: Will you do—

O'Connell: All right.

Whalen: And you'll let me know?

O'Connell: I hope you don't involve me in any of your old deals.

Whalen: Oh no, no, I wouldn't do that.

Woman: Whalen, McNamee, Creble & Nichols.

O'Connell: This is Dan O'Connell. Is Mr. Whalen free?

Woman: Yes. Just a moment.

Whalen: Yes.

O'Connell: Sir Robert. I didn't get that fellow last night.

Whalen: Yeah. I imagined you didn't get a hold of him. Well, let me tell you. I've been thinking it over.

O'Connell: How?

Whalen: But I wanted to speak to you about it first. Francis is through down in Hudson, I guess, with that murder trial out of the way.

O'Connell: Yeah.

Whalen: It's going to be a damn sight more convenient to bring it on before him than to be jackassing up back and forth to Troy three or four times, for everybody.

O'Connell: Okay, okay, okay.

Whalen: And, of course, they're going to yell murder, that it was one of our judges, but the thing is pretty straight and clear; everybody with whom I've discussed it thinks we are all right on it.

O'Connell: Okay.

Whalen: So I think I'm going to take it up with him, if that's all right with you.

O'Connell: Right.

Whalen: Right.

O'Connell: That's the place for it. Let's see what they'll do.

Whalen: All right.

O'Connell: Okay.

Whalen: Good enough.

EUROPEAN NEWSREEL

Stalin's Balkan Headaches.

The Balkans are in a state of continued political agitation. The uneasy government alliance between most incongruous elements, bound only by a common desire to jump on the Russian bandwagon and a common opposition to mass activity from below, makes for permanent crises in both Rumania and Bulgaria; in addition, workers and peasants continue to take initiative into their own hands.

Rumania is already at her third government since the Russian occupation. The Rumanian CP is allied with a number of former fascists but now conducts a great campaign against Maniu's Peasant Party because it allegedly shields collaborationists. Yet Maniu has been an uncompromising foe of the dictatorship and of King Carol. The real reason for the attacks against him are that he is apparently not pliable enough to Russian wishes. Sentiment has become very bitter on both sides. General Radescu, head of the present coalition government (in which both the Peasants and the CP are represented) belongs to the military clique which was among the prime movers of the pro-Russian Putsch that ousted Antonescu. Radescu's programmatic speech after his assumption of power is revealing: "I have asked for discipline and order to be re-established through the country. Order in all places of work. I cannot allow workers in the factories to take their own initiative—as they have done in the past—when they are dissatisfied with the management. . . . I also do not approve of prefects and mayors being nominated by those who believe that they have the right to do so, and who replace legal authorities."

Bulgarian problems are similar. The Sofia Radio nearly every day sends out appeals against unauthorized local initiatives. There is also latent conflict between the heterogeneous elements of the Fatherland Front government. The officer's clique of Col. Velchev clashes with the leftist Peasant Party of the late Stambulisky. But here again all groups are united with the Russians in their opposition to any mass initiative from below. "Russian troops entering the capital found it in the grip of a general strike controlled by workers councils. The first act of the Russian commander, whose forces were welcomed by the leaders of the workers councils as Socialist comrades, was to order their arrest. Some were shot, others were deported." (Henry Leder, *The Call*, December 15.)

Russia's policies and difficulties in the Balkans resemble curiously in several respects those of Germany during the occupation of France. There are many contending groups and cliques vying for support. Russia now, as Germany then, is shifting her favors from one group to the other, sometimes backing the army clique, sometimes the more extreme pro-Russian wing, but always intent on getting as much loot as possible. The popular movements, on the other hand, fought Germany in France while they favor Russia in the Balkans, yet these movements are funda-

mentally as dangerous to Russia as they were to Germany. The Balkans begin to develop into one of Stalin's big headaches as France was for Hitler. Stalin might soon discover what Hitler must have realized a few months ago: Social problems of conquest cannot be solved by the Gestapo or by the GPU.

Progress or Poverty in the Balkans.

It is not uncommon for anti-Stalinist radicals to express the idea that while Russian domination of the Balkans will suppress all free working-class movements, it will nevertheless constitute a historic step forward, for it will mean industrialization of regions yet hardly touched by the Industrial Revolution. Opposing this idea, I wrote in the March 1944 issue of *POLITICS*: "A Russian bureaucracy would rule Europe and its main purpose would necessarily be to keep the outer fringes of the Empire in a state of dependency (as did all conquerors). The center of gravity must remain in Russia proper; therefore development in the dominated areas cannot be allowed to outstrip the center." This view is now being confirmed. Far from aiming at the reconstruction of the main Rumanian industry—oil—the conquerors have begun to ship refining machinery and other equipment to Russia. 26,000 tons of material have already been removed, causing output to drop from 2,600,000 gallons to 600,000. The *Time* correspondent in Rumania reports that: "Equipment is also moved to Russia. Some eight to nine billion lei worth of cattle, food and fuel have been requisitioned. Included in this is a large amount of agricultural machinery and grain. Even seed grain has been taken, so that the outlook for next year's harvest is gloomy." The Russian economic policy in Rumania is clearly characterized by wholesale looting and nowhere is there any concern about economic reconstruction. Nor can this be dismissed by reference to the "necessities of warfare." Dismantling of industrial machinery is as clearly a part of a well-conceived long-term policy as the Nazi policy was. In both cases, the apologists spoke of wartime necessities, but in both cases also there can hardly be any doubt that for a long period to come it is the aim of the conqueror to live and expand at the expense of the conquered.

Neither is the outlook in the agricultural field more promising. Balkan agriculture can be made profitable only if the poor peasant is provided with enough agricultural machinery to improve his methods of cultivation. It is too often forgotten that in countries like Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, there are hardly any great estates, so that the slogan "land to the peasants" mean very little. In Rumania and Hungary, large agrarian revolutions are in the offing, but even here the poor peasant will be able to cultivate the newly acquired land only if he gets agricultural equipment. Russia, however, is not at all interested in providing this equipment. For a long period, she will be interested only in putting Soviet agriculture onto its feet again. Furthermore, Russia does not need Balkan agricultural products. Balkan agriculture can develop and prosper only if it finds markets for its products. These markets lie in the rest of Europe. If the Balkan farmer had ready buyers for his products, he could in turn import machinery and fertilizer to improve methods of cultivation (this could be done most efficiently through some sort of agricultural co-operatives). The Balkans can expect neither industrial nor agricultural development under Soviet rule; their only hope lies in a European Federation of (agricultural and industrial) Nations.

Belgium—Reasons Why.

Henri Pierlot, Premier of Belgium *par la grâce de* Churchill, when recently asked what measures he intended to take against Belgian industrialists who had collaborated with the Nazis, replied: "The government refuses to commit itself on the attitude of the industrialists, since in its capacity as government it cannot judge of the behavior of any category of men under the occupation." Indeed, what else could Pierlot reply? To punish collaborationists would have meant to punish the very forces which support him. It is not without reason that people both in France and in Belgium have changed the old Proudhonian saying, "*La Propriété c'est le vol*," into: "*La propriété c'est la collaboration*."

Belgian banking and industry is dominated by one huge bank: the Société Générale de Belgique, which controls the sixteen principal banks of the country, has a big share in iron and steel production, controls a quarter of Belgian coal output and a great part of mining production in the Belgian Congo, has large textile interests, etc. etc. Blair Bolles, writing in *PM* on the Société Générale, states quite correctly: "The S.G. interests are so extensive that they are practically identical with those of the Belgian State as it has been conducted in the past."

The Société Générale has fully cooperated with German industry during the occupation. One of its chief subsidiaries, Ougrée-Marihaye, was practically integrated into the German Otto Wolf steelmaking empire; the rayon-making Tubize—controlled by the S.G.—worked in close relationship with the German Zellwolle Ring; the steel making ARBED of which the S.G. holds 25% of the capital shares, was working full blast for Germany, etc. etc.

The S.G. was always assured that come what may its interests would be taken care of: a member of the Pierlot cabinet was general manager of an S.G. subsidiary; and above all there is Camille Gutt, Pierlot's Minister of Finance, and also a former deputy administrator of the S.G. board.

A list of Mr. Gutt's connections reads like a Who's Who of Belgian finance capital. To mention just one of his manifold interests, the Société de la Vielle Montagne, of which he was one of the administrators. This concern not only controls a great part of the zinc smelting industry of Belgium (the second largest in Europe), but also zinc mining and smelting in all parts of the world. It has subsidiaries from Mexico to Greece and from North Africa to Italy. The most important subsidiary is . . . in Germany.

P.S. Pierlot's cabinet also includes "socialists." The best known is Paul-Henri Spaak. Old timers will remember that he's the gentleman who way back in the early thirties, as head of the left-wing *Action Socialiste* group, flirted with Trotsky and led hunger strikes of Belgian unemployed—until he suddenly turned up a cabinet minister. The decision was taken at such short notice that his paper *Action Socialiste* still came out with a red-hot article against the government—when Mr. Spaak had already joined it . . .

P.P.S. "Paul Kronacker, soft-spoken sugar millionaire . . . will become a member of the cabinet." (*New York Times*, Dec. 9.)

The French CP again.

A few incidents which have been reported by the London *Tribune* from France throw a revealing light on the policy of the French Communist Party. The first took place in the National Council of Resistance. The extreme right-

wing *Fédération Républicaine* proposed to delegate for the consultative Assembly two deputies who in 1940 had voted for Pétain and for the armistice with Germany. The Socialists opposed this decision violently as did the Trade-Union representatives and most left-wing Resistance delegates. But to the surprise of everybody present the Communists came to the rescue of the *Fédération Républicaine*. They moved a resolution stating that the Council must not interfere with the free choice of candidates by various affiliated organizations.

The second incident was provided by the election of the new president of the Consultative Assembly. Of the three candidates, the Socialist Gouin, the Resistance delegate Copeau and the conservative senator Justin Godart, the CP supported the latter (unsuccessfully, for Gouin was finally elected).

Though the C.P. is running a tremendous campaign against traitors and reactionaries, it is willing to take all those under its protective wing who support the Russian line. The leader of the *Front National* (C.P. front organization), for example, Debru-Bridel, was formerly close to the monarchist *Action Française*. Stalinists are conducting a violent campaign to defend the interests of the Resistance against De Gaulle, but at the same time indulge in veritable orgies of French nationalist phraseology. The word "boche" is current coin in CP papers. Jacques Duclos, secretary of the party, has come out "for the defense of the integrity of the French Empire" and has indicated that "the French CP program was pretty much on the conservative side in the light of Marxist theory." Duclos also said that his party was anxious to avoid anything that might "divide the people." Maurice Thorez, in his first Paris speech, stated: "We need a large army worthy of France,—we need a National Union at the side of our Allies to win the war and reconstruct France." The mixture of French nationalism and left-wing phrases makes for a growing suspicion of the Stalinists among resistance leaders who at the beginning were rather sympathetic. This explains why the majority of the Left-wing De Gaullists have joined the Socialist Party. The over-clever policy of the CP trying to ride all horses at the same time begins to defeat its own purpose.

The renewal of the Laval-Stalin pact of 1935, just signed by De Gaulle in Moscow, will probably make for a more definite turn of the CP toward a conservative line. In this case the differences between Stalinism and the left are bound to widen (as they are now widening in Italy) and—as now also happens in Italy—splits within the party are to be expected.

Add: Pierlot

The Nov. 24 issue of *Tribune* (London), a weekly whose material on European events is unmatched by anything in our own press, has some very interesting data on the present Belgian government:

"The Pierlot Government had left Brussels when that city's fall was imminent, and in stages reached Bordeaux at the time of the French capitulation. There Pierlot called his cabinet together and read to them the following memorandum he had prepared:

"I have thought this over again and again. We shall not go to England. France has thrown in her hand. We shall give up the struggle with her. . . ."

"Pierlot then . . . proposed to announce publicly that the work of the Belgian Government was done, and that they would all retire to private life. This was carried by

an overwhelming majority, M. Spaak, the Foreign Minister, then — and now — supporting Pierlot all through. . . . Pierlot and Co. stayed behind in France where no one paid any attention to them. One day they arrived in London — with the gold from the National Bank. That gave them authority. Pierlot was recognized as the government of Belgian resistance. . . .

“ . . . Before leaving Brussels in 1940, the Pierlot Government called together five of the leaders of high finance and big business and informed them that the Government had decided to leave behind them a group of men, not to lead resistance against the enemy, but to ‘counsel the nation and maintain production!’ ”

“Another revelation was recently made: General van Overstraeten reappeared on the scene not long ago and was recruiting men for the *Mouvement National Belge*, a rightwing Royalist and authoritarian organization. The General was wellknown. He was the King’s man who had refused consultation with the Allies prior to the invasion of Belgium in 1940. . . . He organized some kind of private army during the German occupation, which received the mammoth share of arms from the Allies and which, it seemed, was more or less tolerated by the Germans. . . . And now comes the news that this man is again recruiting bands. There is no indication that he has surrendered his arms to the Allies. Almost at the same moment a decree is issued by the Pierlot Government ordering the Resistance to surrender its arms. . . .”

Add: Greece—Reasons Why

M. J. Politis sends in, apropos my paragraph last issue on the part played by British loans in the present Greek crisis, some interesting material by Eva Palmer-Sikelianos (obtainable from her at Stanhope Hotel, 895 Fifth Ave., New York City). Miss Sikelianos traces the sordid and almost unbelievable history of “The City’s” financial exploitation of Greece, through loans at exorbitant interest rates, from the early nineteenth century to the present. She shows, with much factual detail, why The City needs George II on the throne, and why “England needs a chain of fascist governments to guard the road to India.”

Ivan The-Not-So-Terrible

The climax of the Russian theater season this year was Alexei Tolstoi’s “Ivan the Terrible.” Says a *New York Times* dispatch: “Until now Ivan has been pictured as a bloodthirsty, willful, unreasonable tyrant who eventually broke physically and mentally after his senseless execution of nobles who opposed his will. Today *Pravda* says that it is possible now, because of ‘Soviet Historical Science,’ to appreciate him as a fighter for the creation of a powerful centralized Russian state, a patriotic diplomat, strategist and politician who personally was a culturally progressive individual.” Eisenstein is also preparing a monumental biographical motion picture on Ivan. “An effort is made on the part of the Soviet authorities to re-educate the people on the role of the Czar.”

A 700 page historical novel called *Port Arthur* has recently been published in Moscow. The novel describes the battle in which Czarist Russia lost this fortress to Japan in 1904. The Moscow review *Literature and Art* explains: “Port Arthur was to the officers and men defending it what Sevastopol has been to the Black Sea sailors—not merely a city and a port, but something much more than that, the very symbol of the Fatherland, Russia’s soil.” Some old-

fashioned historians previously stated that the 1905 revolution had been caused by Russian defeats in the war against Japan. Incidentally, a man named Lenin stood for the defeat of Russia in this war.

Praise the Lord and Pass the Holy Water

On October 17, the Bulgarian radio broadcast a message by His Highness the Metropolitan Stefan of Sofia, vicar of the Holy Bulgarian Synod: “Now we rejoice that in the holy Kremlin’s shadow are assembled with Marshal Stalin the highest representatives of the Allied powers to solve the major questions concerning final victory and to establish blessed peace. May God help them. The Bulgarian people hope . . . that mercy will be granted, that righteousness will prevail, and with God’s grace the great Slav family will be created. The dawn of the unity of the Slav people is already showing on the horizon. We believe the Russian people remember their messianic mission. It is the only people possessing this particular mysticism, which is often expressed in strife for sublime ideals. . . . The Russian people are leading along the road of creative work. If the Russian revolution had not achieved anything else, this alone would force one to admit its benign influence and its moral necessity for Russia.”

LOUIS CLAIR

The Jews, “The New Leader”, and Old Judge Hull

The most nauseating thing I’ve read in a long time in a left-of-center publication is the following little tribute to the retiring Secretary of State, which appeared in *The New Leader* for December 2:

“The resignation of Cordell Hull is a blow in more ways than one to the cause of democracy and freedom. The blow is softened somewhat by the fact that his successor as Secretary of State is his level-headed Undersecretary, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

“Judge Hull wasn’t always right. And he’ll be the first to admit this. He sometimes made mistakes. But they were honest mistakes with no mean motives underlying them. But even so he made fewer mistakes than the totalitarian minds who so frequently assailed him because he couldn’t be either coerced or cajoled into playing their game and because he insisted on working 100 per cent of the time for Uncle Sam instead of for Uncle Joe.

“The totalitarian smear campaigns against the ‘Judge’ may have obscured for some the fact that none surpassed him in helping to save the refugee labor leaders of Europe; the doomed Jews in the Nazi grip, the honest democratic elements who found it necessary to flee totalitarianism everywhere. . . .

“Judge Hull was a sober, steady force for good in the State Department. He served his country faithfully and to the best of his ability for 12 years. . . .”

Any one whose brains have not been addled by the kind of simple-minded Moscow-baiting *The New Leader* goes in for (in which *any* anti-Communist personality or institution, regardless of other considerations, acquires superhuman virtues) I say any one in possession of his wits knows that Hull is a narrow-minded, petty-pompous, provincial reactionary who has never made a speech that says anything; whose press conferences are models of bumbling and evasion; who has had just one idea in his entire career (to save the world and abolish wars forever through . . . reciprocal trade treaties); who found the State Department a nest of reactionaries twelve years ago

and who has laid a few new eggs in the foul place himself; who carried out Roosevelt's imperialistic foreign policies, from the saving of Cuba for the Chase National Bank after Machado's downfall to the support of Franco in the Spanish war and the current burking of popular movements in Europe, without so far as is known any complaint except that Roosevelt sometimes made leftward gestures; whose one discernible virtue is that he is personally honest, a distinction which he shares with some millions of his fellow-citizens.

As for "his level-headed Undersecretary", the photogenic Mr. Stettinius, I interviewed him some years ago when I was on *Fortune* and did a research job on his career which convinced me that he is an extreme type of "front man", devoid of any special knowledge or talents, who became first Chairman of U. S. Steel Corp. and now the Secretary of State because of three personal qualities: (1) he is a glad-hander and back-slapper with no ideas of his own; (2) he has prematurely white hair, thick black eyebrows, and the flushed, gross, handsome face of Hollywood's idea of an aviator; (3) his father was an important partner in the House of Morgan.

The Judge and the Jews

But the thing that really makes one unable to believe one's eyes is *The New Leader's* tribute to Hull for saving the Jews and labor leaders of Europe from Hitler, and the statement that all criticism of his State Department on the score of refugees has been simply a "totalitarian smear campaign." This is especially abominable in a paper which is closely identified with the garment workers' union and other sections of the New York Jewish community. Such a paper may be presumed to be acquainted with the facts about the State Department's refugee policies. To whitewash them in this manner, simply because Hull is anti-Communist, is a betrayal of its own people.

I say that, far from being a matter for congratulations, Hull's refugee policy should be a cause of shame to every decent American. This is not a strikingly original idea: for years every publication with any pretensions to liberalism has been complaining about the refusal of the government to save the tortured Jews of Europe; the most conservative Jewish groups have kept up a running fire of criticism; in fact, *The New Leader's* extraordinary statement is the first I recall having ever seen in a leftwing publication which defended, in fact eulogized, Hull on this score.

The most complete exposure of the State Department's failure to do anything about refugees (except keep them out of the country) is perhaps provided in two critical analyses of the testimony of Breckinridge Long, the Assistant Secretary of State to whom Hull entrusted refugee matters, before a secret session of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Nov. 26, 1943. The Committee released the testimony on Dec. 10, 1943, and it is summarized in the *N. Y. Times* of the following day. The two lengthy analyses and rebuttals are: (1) a letter in the *Times* of Dec. 31, 1943, from Leibush Lehrer, president of the Yiddish Scientific Institute; and (2) the Dec. 24, 1943, issue of *Jewish Comment*, the organ of the World Jewish Congress.

Long appeared before the House Committee in order to persuade them (successfully) to kill two bills providing for a special government commission "to effectuate the rescue of the Jewish people of Europe." These bills reflected the dissatisfaction of the Jewish Community with the State Department's policies, and Long's job was to show that these policies had been good and that for Congress

to pass any such bill would amount to "a repudiation of the acts of the executive branch of your own Government." (Hull is notoriously unable to take the slightest criticism; rather than allow the policies of his department to be censured, even by implication, he was willing to block any "outside" effort to help the Jews.) Long's testimony was partly a smear campaign against American Jews, who he suggested were trying to help Jews at the expense of non-Jews. Sample: "The situation has come to such a state of publicity today where I think the Jewish interests have emphasized the fate of the Jews as such . . . the State Department's policy I think must be that we cannot exclude persons from our sympathetic attention if they are not Jews." He also intimated the Department felt the Jews were selfish and unreasonable in expecting any special treatment for their refugees. To these insinuations, *Jewish Comment* tellingly replied that (1) the Jews have a right to ask for special aid because they are specially marked out for death by the Nazis simply by virtue of being Jews; (2) they have, naturally, never conceived of this aid as being *instead of* aid to non-Jewish refugees, but as a supplement *over and above* such aid.

Long's other strategy was the use of misleading statistics and actual misstatements. To give the impression of vast numbers of Jewish refugees entering this country, he stated: "We have taken into this country since the beginning of Hitler's regime and the persecution of the Jews, until today, approximately 580,000 refugees." But Long was really talking about *visas issued*, and all visas are not used. Thus the actual number of aliens admitted *from all over the world* (including Canada, Mexico, etc.) in the period was only 477,000; of these 296,000 came from Europe; and of these 166,000 were Jews. Quite a drop from the half million alleged victims of Hitler. Furthermore, Long fails to specify how many were mere transit visas. He also defended the disgracefully small number of refugees admitted since Pearl Harbor—i.e., during the time, as we are now learning from the horrors uncovered at Maidanek and other Nazi death camps, that the Jews were being slaughtered on a scale not approached before then. (In the year 1943, immigration was cut down so drastically that only 5.9% of the legal quota—low enough anyway—was filled.) This drop in admissions was explained by Long as due to lack of shipping facilities after the country entered the war. But *Jewish Comment* points out that the Spanish and Portuguese ships *alone* which made trips to this country in that period had a capacity of 1,000 to 2,000 persons a month—as against the average 200 who actually arrived in them each month. The real reason for the small number of refugees admitted in recent years is the restrictive regulations adopted by Good Judge Hull's State Department, under the pretext of keeping out Gestapo spies, notably the almost incredible provision that *no one with relatives in Axis-occupied Europe was eligible for admission*. The result was that while Hitler was slaughtering tens of thousands of Jews a day, the U. S. A. was issuing visas, according to Long's own testimony, at the rate of 100 a week, or about 5,000 a year.

The most recent instance of the Judge's concern for refugees was the admission of 1,000 extra-quota refugees last fall for internment in a barbed-wire-enclosed camp at Oswego, N. Y. This was a cheap publicity gesture of the most revolting kind: the thousand admitted were taken from Rome and North Africa, where they were already under Allied protection, and not from Axis-occupied countries; and Roosevelt stated at once that the tiny band was *not* the first instalment of such extra-quota refugees but all that would be admitted.

Such is the record of the man whom *The New Leader* sentimentalizes over as the unsurpassed savior of "the doomed Jews in the Nazi grip." The shabby episode was worth going into at length, I think, because it shows (a) the fraudulency of the Roosevelt Administration's humanitarian claims, and (b) the corrupting influence of an editorial line whose major and often apparently sole criterion of value is anti-Stalinism.

DWIGHT MACDONALD

Books

Social Law, After Proudhon*

In 1940, on the eve of Europe's Doomsday, H. G. Wells published a pamphlet on "The Rights of Man" which was based on the only too well-founded assumption that, in the contemporary world, even if they kept some of their hold on the conscience of a minority and on the actual working of certain societies, the Rights of Man were in fact completely obliterated by the action of the Governments, not only in the totalitarian countries but everywhere, and needed intellectual reinstatement as well as restoration in the political field. And now, in 1944, on the eve of what is hoped will be the Resurrection of Europe, Georges Gurvitch attempts to draw the conclusion of fifteen years of profoundly original researches in the field of the philosophy of law. This he does in a "Declaration of Social Rights" which he devotes especially to the future of France but whose fundamental principles are evidently meant to be valid for the reconstruction of society everywhere.

Gurvitch's effort is very different from Wells'. But there is also one common characteristic, which is worth noting. They are both directly related to the great intellectual movement of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries which we are accustomed to call "liberal" but which would be better defined as "libertarian", insofar as its real meaning lies not in any middle-of-the-road "conciliation" between liberty and authority, but rather in the bold upholding of "liberty above all", a liberty which, in political philosophy, is expressed as the absolute supremacy of "natural law", hence of the natural Rights of Man.

It is precisely a brilliant reinterpretation of the idea of natural law that constitutes the starting point of Mr. Gurvitch's pluralist philosophy of law.

Georges Gurvitch is a scholar of Russian birth, who, after having lectured on philosophy in Berlin and published there an important book on Fichte's ethics, made France his adopted country, and is now living in America. His ideas about Social Law and juridical pluralism have been expounded in a series of books of which the fundamental ones are *L'Idée du Droit Social* (1932) and *L'Expérience Juridique et la Philosophie Pluraliste du Droit* (1935). They were followed in 1940 and later by some very interesting studies on the sociology of law. In France, beside earning him the esteem of scholars and the chair of phil-

osophy at the University of Strasbourg, his ideas were partially and rather confusedly accepted by the magazine *Esprit* edited by Emmanuel Mounier, a Catholic who, in collaboration with other Catholic and non-Catholic intellectuals, was making a sincere effort to break through the many blind alleys of contemporary political and social thought. It may be noted that, especially in France, Catholics as well as Protestants are bound to be attracted by any philosophy which, like Gurvitch's, provides an effective weapon against the monistic conception which is at the basis of the modern centralized State and of its claims on the spiritual sphere.

To summarize Gurvitch's ideas on Social Law is not an easy task. One constantly runs the risk of formalizing notions whose specific meaning lies entirely in the complexity of the analysis through which they are brought to life and extricated from current intellectual prejudices and habits of thinking. It is difficult to appreciate the meaning of this "Declaration of Social Rights" and to criticize it properly except in the light of Gurvitch's "juridical pluralism" which, in its turn, implies also a specific philosophical outlook.

For his pluralist philosophy, and for his method of concrete analysis, Georges Gurvitch is indebted mainly to Husserl and Bergson, among modern philosophers, while his philosophy of law comes straight from Proudhon and its fundamental principles could well be expressed in quotations from the great anarchist. A debt which Gurvitch abundantly recognizes by attributing to Proudhon the central place in the development of modern social and juridical philosophy. But since Mr. Gurvitch is a Russian, it is appropriate to remember that the distinction and the opposition between Society and the State was one of the great themes of Russian intellectual life before the Revolution, inspiring as it did with peculiar force the thought and action of men like Herzen, Tolstoi, Kropotkin, and the philosopher Leon Petrasizki, in whom Gurvitch recognizes one of his teachers. The first three take us back to Proudhon, by whom they were all directly influenced, as Georges Gurvitch was after them.

"Association is Justice"—wrote Proudhon. He also wrote: "In the framework of universal society there exist, for every one of us, as many particular societies as there are particular interests. . . . This is the key to all the problems that can be raised by the conflict of the different kinds of social duties". Gurvitch's conception of Social Law and of juridical pluralism is all contained in these two principles.

By Social Law, Georges Gurvitch means essentially the expressed or unexpressed norms on which the life of a social group is founded. These norms can be expressed in statutes or exist only in the form of tacit understanding. The important fact is that it is neither the statute, and not even the understanding, that create the law, but only the objective nature of the relationship. It is only independently from and in opposition to all mechanisms of compulsion and subordination that law can be created, because compulsion and subordination do not express juridical relationships, but the very opposite: the intervention of external force in order to oblige the group to renounce its own nature and to realize aims which are not its aims but those of a foreign will. Compulsion from above cannot give life to anything but purely formal law, a law whose only justification is the power behind it. Only Social Law can be concrete and substantial. As for Proudhon, for Gurvitch the establishment, nay the simple existence, of relationships between men implies, if free from the corrupting element of compulsion, some notion of Justice, or rather aims at the realization of one of the many aspects of Justice. The essence of the juridical experience

**La Déclaration des Droits Sociaux*. By Georges Gurvitch. Editions de la Maison Française (New York). \$150.

The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology, with particular reference to German Politico-Legal Thought. By John H. Halliwell. U. of California Publications in Political Science. Vol. 1, No. 1. U. of California Press. \$150.

of mankind is there, and nowhere else. Any formal definition of Justice becomes impossible, in such a context. Such a conception cannot be accused of being relativistic, since according to it Justice always exists objectively in the nature of the relationship. From this point of view it is clear that the subordination of the workers to the interests of production as defined either by the Board of Directors of General Motors or by the Commissariat of the People for Industry is supremely wrong (no matter how tempered by various regulations) not only because it deprives the workers of the fruits of their labor, but, more fundamentally, because it deprives them of any possibility of creating their own laws for their own common toil. The same could be said of the relationship between the citizens and the State when, as to-day, State compulsion, and formal law, is generally considered the only alternative to individualistic anarchy, with utter disregard for the most important source of law and harmony, human society itself. In terms of Social Law, the notion of a "just law" coming from above, being imposed from the outside, appears simply meaningless—and the notion of a "Socialist State" with it. All organized superstructures are to be judged by the degree to which they are open to the living experience of justice, to the Social Law of the groups on which the existence of the superstructures themselves is based.

Juridical pluralism is the necessary counterpart of such a conception of right and wrong. Society is a plurality of groups and interests or is nothing at all. The moment in which the multiplicity and autonomy of the groups is denied is also the moment in which sheer authority is imposed on society. And the intervention of authority coincides with a parallel destruction of the very substance of lawfulness, as is clearly shown by the totalitarian idea which, in denying any autonomous right to the individual and the groups, openly proclaims that the State knows no law, except despotic expediency. Besides being an indestructible fact, pluralism is, according to Mr. Gurvitch, an ideal: the ideal, one could say, of a society in which extreme variety and multiplicity are held together not by any external force, but by the substantial harmony which only the principle of equality can create. And equality does not mean identity, but equivalence between different groups and individuals, the equivalence without which, as Proudhon said, there is no possibility of social operations. Pluralism is also a technique in the struggle for social and individual freedom. If the eternal principle of power politics is "Divide and Conquer", the principle of pluralism could be expressed by saying: "Multiply your associations and be free".

It is undeniable that Georges Gurvitch has succeeded in giving an articulated content to the notion of natural law, rescuing it from formalism and from the traditional individualistic interpretation (with its two corollaries, the hopeless antinomy individual-society, and the ever recurring confusion between society and the State). Mr. Gurvitch has also been able to indicate a consistent method of socialist thought based on clear philosophical premises. For both achievements, his debt to Proudhon is great indeed. If Proudhon is very much alive to-day, it is not for having worked out a more or less consistent compromise between socialism and liberty (any tired liberal or bewildered socialist can do that) but fundamentally because of the clarity and the vigor with which, without ever giving up the rights of analytical thought, he upheld: 1) that the establishment of a just society implied a new definition of the "just law", and that the just law could not be sought elsewhere than in the essential nature of human solidarity; 2) that political freedom could not mean anything but

freedom of the groups; 3) that the group itself was inconceivable if not based on equality, while any notion of equality excluded at one and the same time individualism and authoritarianism. From this point of view it appears clear enough that, whatever one's opinion of historical materialism, Marx simply did not deal with the problem which occupied Proudhon, namely the redemonstration of the social reality of Justice.

It is on Proudhonian lines, corroborated by a great deal of new juridical and sociological analysis, that Georges Gurvitch has conceived this "Declaration of Social Rights". In such a context, the Rights of Man become the *social* rights of man, not in the sense that the individual is absorbed by society (and least of all by the State) but, on the contrary, in the sense that only in a pluralistic society is the defense of the rights of the individual recognized to be one of the fundamental interests of the group. Social rights are nothing if they do not express the idea of the groups themselves wresting actual power from the State in the name of the law they themselves create from below. That is why Mr. Gurvitch is careful to distinguish his Declaration both from a set of proposals for social legislation and from the draft of a new Constitution. Social legislation and constitutions, as Proudhon decisively showed in his attacks against the liberals of his time, do not express justice but, at most, a profoundly unstable compromise between society and the state, Force and Justice. They cannot be anything but promises by the State, and the State, having the monopoly of force, is also by definition the entity which cannot be forced to keep its promises; political expediency, not contract, is the essential basis of State action. Gurvitch rightly insists that in our times social legislation, as it is currently conceived, with the two parallel aspects of group pressure on the State and State intervention to regulate the action of the groups, creates political and economic contradictions which can logically lead only to a social and economic organization *imposed* by the State, to corporatism and totalitarianism—a blind alley in which most socialists and liberals now find themselves.

It had better be said right away that Gurvitch's concrete proposals for a fundamental chart of future society are conceived according to the most moderate aspects of Proudhon's ideology. His analytical comments on the various proposals are more interesting than the proposals themselves. This is in harmony with Proudhon, for whom clearly the method of approach (and such principles as the one that socialist action not accompanied by actual social construction is blind) mattered more than this or that practical step, since the direction in which to act depends entirely on the nature of the concrete situation. But, although Proudhon's fundamental principle of social construction was "balance" and not drastic (and illusory) elimination of contrasts, the radicalism of his opposition to what he called the Industrial and Financial Empire, and to State power, remained inflexible throughout. If he were alive to-day, he certainly would take as his starting point the only too evident fact that to-day State power and economic imperialism not only oppose with all their forces any attempt at social construction, but are destroying and corrupting the very roots, physical as well as moral, of human society. More than ever, he would be aware that the central problem of socialism is how to give new life to the depressed and repressed social energies, and not how to come to terms with the existing superstructures. And this is precisely the question on which Gurvitch remains silent. His proposals are not radical enough, in the sense that they do not express a clear consciousness of how

radical the problem of social construction has become to-day.

Gurvitch's idea of socialism is mainly that of a planned economy accompanied by radical economic democracy, i.e. by "the struggle against the perversion of a power founded on property into a power of domination over groups and individuals". The basis of economic democracy should be the notion that "man is not only a political animal, but also a producer and a consumer". The interests of the same man as a citizen, as a producer and as a consumer do not coincide. Accordingly, they should be given separate recognition in the form of definite rights. Of course, the freedom to create as many groups as there are different interests and fields of activity would be unlimited. But, in the economic sphere, justice would essentially be guaranteed by allowing the rights of the consumers and those of the producers to check one another freely. Political freedom would consist in the guarantee of the free competition and interplay among the groups, and would become a concrete common interest instead of an abstract right. The groups themselves would be controlled in their turn by the absolute right for the individual to enter or leave them of his own free will.

All this, of course, presupposes the abolition of the unlimited right of property. Property should become a definite right and cease to be a means of political domination. In dealing with the problem of property, Gurvitch gives a good example of his moderatism. He proposes the admission of three kinds of property, individual, public and social, to be applied in different fields, and all based on the notion that property is to be considered a social function. It is only in the last pages of the book that we learn that "what really matters is to give a preponderant role, and a special legal protection, to social and federalist property", that is to common ownership of the means of production. Which is, of course, the essential question.

Equally timid is Gurvitch's approach to the problem of the State, especially when he wants to reassure his readers that juridical pluralism would not weaken the State, but simply liberate it from all the functions that rightly belong to society itself. A misplaced timidity, in a follower of Proudhon. It is, in effect, a most important feature of Proudhon's personality that the notions of extremism and moderatism cannot properly be applied to him. He was radical in thought—that is, he questioned all accepted ideas and vested interests—while being quite often moderate in argument, because he did not believe in the elimination of realities. One can find in Proudhon such temperate definitions of anarchism as "the delimitation of the State by the groups", or "the application of Justice to Government". The basic point is however that, for him, the State (i.e. political power) had to be entirely and concretely subordinated to society and that, as contemporary developments have shown only too well, this is precisely the rule to which the modern State most consistently and violently refuses to submit.

I must add that I did not like Mr. Gurvitch's quoting several commonplaces by Jacques Maritain as relevant to the present situation. Gurvitch is too good a philosopher himself not to know that Mr. Maritain's good intentions are founded on shifting grounds. He also quotes President Roosevelt's Four Freedoms and Economic Bill of Rights: as signs, one has to assume, that the demand for social rights makes itself felt in the highest places. But if constitutions have no meaning, how much less political speeches. . .

Georges Gurvitch has not considered it his business to indicate by what concrete political means the aims he

describes can be attained. To criticize him on this account would not be fair. One can only take notice that his Declaration seems to imply the existence of a milieu in which, in the face of the natural opposition of the political and economic oligarchies, certain principles of right are actively and clearly maintained by the initiative of the social groups. The fact, however, is that what we have seen in the past and are seeing to-day is not only the monstrous growth of the Leviathans. It is, more fundamentally, the progressive disarticulation of society into masses of individuals who have been dispossessed of the very sources of social power, and to whom nothing seems feasible except through the same organizations which they know they cannot control. To them, Georges Gurvitch offers the "juridical symbols" of social rights and of a pluralistic society. But, to be something more than unsubstantial shadows, these symbols presuppose the existence of an attitude to life based on confidence in the strength of human society, a proud rejection of authority and a generous love for diversity which is precisely what

The ANTIOCH REVIEW

IN THE WINTER ISSUE

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is lacking at present. To arouse such an attitude seems to be the real problem of to-day. Mr. Gurvitch stops short of it.

Mr. Hallowell's essay on the "Decline of Liberalism" is a good example of the hopeless position in which intellectual liberalism finds itself because of its obstinate refusal to re-examine its premises. It also indirectly corroborates Gurvitch's ideas. There are, for Mr. Hallowell, two kinds of liberalism: substantial liberalism and formal liberalism. Substantial liberalism is characterized by the fact that it believes in the absolute moral worth of each individual, in the natural rights of man, and in the supremacy of the law, that is "in the assumption that positive law will conform to certain norms and values secured transcendently." Formal liberalism, under the evil influences of Romanticism and positivism, reduces all law to positive law, hence ending up in the deification of the State. Substantial liberalism is good, formal liberalism is bad, as shown by Nazism. This is what Hallowell's thesis amounts to.

His first difficulty is that while he is able to give a concrete example of the bad consequences of formal liberalism, the Nazi state, he seems unable to give a single example of substantial liberalism in action. Liberalism, it would seem, was substantial only in Grotius, Adam Smith and Wilhelm von Humboldt. Which is, in fact, very near to being the truth. But the second and main difficulty lies in Hallowell's notion of the transcendental basis of law, a kind of absolute from which he derives the rather disquieting idea that substantial liberalism is against despotism, but not necessarily against autocracy. This "transcendental basis" can, of course, only be some kind of divine will. But if there is a Divine Will, then not only law, also human reason, and natural law with them, become purely formal. In fact, from a Divine Will, one can only derive hierarchy and authority (and autocracy), not liberalism. Substantial liberalism loses its substance.

That Mr. Hallowell should not have realized the contradiction inherent in the notion of a natural law "secured transcendently" can only be explained by the fact that he assumes as an unshakeable postulate the opposition between the arbitrariness of the individual and the supreme rationality of the Law. But, once again, this opposition leads straight to totalitarianism, not to liberalism. Because in that case there is no other possible definition of law than the will of the State, theocratic or not.

Of course, in the classical tradition of liberalism, the notion of natural law is central. And the point is that it cannot be identified either with abstract Reason or with positive law. It has to have a concrete content, independent both from the will of the individual and from that of the State. A content, one might add, more substantial than the medieval concept of the natural order of the universe established by divine will, and also more substantial than the notion of one individual related to other individuals by the simple fact of physical coexistence and submission to the same moral law. A third notion is necessary: that of society, that is of the individuals as not only living together, but also as not conceivable except in the context of their mutual relationships. Natural law either means the natural law of society (Leibniz's *Jus Societatis*), or else is a sheer abstraction, as Hegel maintained. And although the classical theorists of natural law were strongly influenced both by the theological conception of a natural order and by individualism, what is original in their ideas points all the time in a different and new direction. This is apparent in a beautiful quotation from Adam Smith given by Hallowell himself: "Though every man may, ac-

cording to the proverb, be the whole world to himself, to the rest of mankind he is the most insignificant part of it. Though his own happiness may be of more importance to him than that of all the world besides, to every person it is of no more importance than that of any other man." Besides being a graceful statement on the essence of sociability, this also clearly implies the idea that human society allows for no privileged point of view from which a law can be promulgated except the point of view of the mutual relationships of which society consists.

Here at least was a problem to be considered. The same problem, for that matter, that exists in Grotius, Humboldt, Fichte, Mazzini and other authors quoted in this book. Had he dwelt on it, Hallowell might even have found the reasons for "the decline of liberalism as an ideology" elsewhere than in the pernicious influence of romanticism and positivism.

NICOLA CHIAROMONTE

Diagnosis of Our Time.

By Karl Mannheim. Oxford University Press. \$3.

In this book one of the foremost sociologists tries to diagnose our time. This effort is interesting, if for no other reason than because it permits conclusions on whether a representative of the most widely recognized school of sociological thought is able to formulate such a diagnosis and to develop an adequate and workable treatment. Mannheim does not present a coherent treatise, but offers in its stead a number of lectures and essays dealing with such varied topics as: the problem of valuation, youth, education, Nazi group strategy, and the relationship between Christianity and planned society. He asserts that he retained the original essay and lecture form of the studies because "the personal appeal may communicate more widely" and because he hopes that "the reader will still notice the scheme of purposes and means which integrates the essays." It may be doubted that many readers will find the essays coherent, unless they are satisfied by the fact that they all claim that what we need is a planned society which still retains a great measure of freedom and spontaneity. The thesis is neither new, nor does it exactly fulfill the demands which one may rightly ask of a diagnosis of our time.

The book abounds in excellent analyses of details, and its thinking is lucid on some aspects of timely problems. Mannheim recognizes the "dictatorial tendencies of modern social techniques" which can easily be "monopolized by any single group." He does not believe, however, that any new group could handle the new social techniques to good purpose, nor does he have much confidence in the old ruling groups. He thinks that "the new leadership must be blended with the old." According to him "ruthless attacks on liberals and conservative intelligentsia and the persecution of the churches are designed to annihilate the last remnants of Christianity and humanism and to frustrate all efforts to bring peace to the world." He does not present any convincing arguments as to why the old leadership should be willing to be blended with the new one, nor how this process of slow evolution can take place in actuality.

Mannheim is at his best in demonstrating how and why our value system has become antiquated. Since the need for a better value system seems clear, the main question is how to acquire it and how to make it work. The treatment which Mannheim prescribes is "awareness in social affairs." The author says about this central concept of the

book: "By 'awareness' I do not understand the mere accumulation of rational knowledge. Awareness means both in the life of the individual and that of the community the readiness to see the whole situation in which one finds oneself, and not only to orientate one's action on immediate tasks and purposes but to base them on a more comprehensive vision." The examples Mannheim uses belong, interestingly enough, to the sphere of individual psychology. He speaks, for instance, of a man who is "quite unaware of those hidden anxieties which again and again interfere with his actions and defeat his purposes. By becoming aware of his psychological type, of the deeper sources of his anxieties he gradually can gain control over factors which controlled him in the stages of unawareness."

Any psychoanalyst could tell Mannheim how difficult it is for a man to become aware of his hidden anxieties and how strongly the unconscious defense works against the coming to awareness of repressed phenomena. Mannheim's examples for coming to awareness deal mostly with such phenomena as hidden anxieties and the conflicts of adolescence. According to one example, an adolescent passes through the age of puberty and is being tormented by psychological and social conflicts; guidance consists in making him aware of the new situation. Not a single example is given in which a group of persons come to awareness. Mannheim is certainly familiar with the studies of group behavior, which seem to indicate that the larger the group, the smaller the chance that it will act rationally, and awareness be possible to its members. One may ask who is going to make the members of social groups aware if the old groups are in possession of the means for forming mass opinion. Particularly since, according to his thesis, these groups should not be dispossessed but rather blended with the new groups.

It seems that the beneficial influence of awareness can be demonstrated only for the individual, but not for the masses. Moreover, what good do the masses derive from their awareness if they cannot use the new social techniques for their own benefit? The answer to this difficulty is again hope. Hope that these new elites will embrace the new value system, or at least the old value system of Christianity. Since the author has nothing better to offer than hope, it is only logical that the crowning final essay, which is the longest and deals with the problem of Christian values, was originally addressed to a group of Christian thinkers. Although the author does not clearly seek, or ask, for a new religion, his emphasis on an ethical system which should be all embracing and his assertion that the new consistent system of values will be similar to the "Summa" of St. Thomas indicates the drift of his thinking.

We thus see here an effort to apply to the problems of a new mass society psychological concepts which originate in the sphere of individual experiences. But it is doubtful whether these concepts may legitimately be used when dealing with mass-sociological phenomena. Arthur Koestler makes much the same misuse of psychoanalytical concepts in his novels. It would appear that the baffled sociologist takes the same road as the frustrated literary man: each borrows concepts from individual psychology and applies them to mass phenomena, with the result—if not the intention—that he extricates himself from the obligation to take a clear position on social and political issues.

In borrowing from individual psychology, furthermore, Mannheim is extremely selective: he disregards most of its concepts and fixes on only one, namely, awareness. This despite the fact that awareness alone hardly ever functions in more difficult cases without the help of other mechanisms, such as transference. Awareness alone will certainly not

cure such deep-rooted diseases as the disorganization of modern society. Understanding this, Mannheim has to borrow again, this time from precisely the system which a new system based on awareness logically should supersede—i.e., from Christianity.

Since the doctor's prescription does not seem adequate, our only hope—in Mannheim's terms, at least—is that his diagnosis is erroneous.

BRUNO BETTELHEIM

The Good Soldier Schweik.

By Jaroslav Hasek. Penguin Books. 25c.

Schweik is one more illustration of the fact that in a rigid bureaucratic structure, "any attitude turns out to be incongruous" (I quote from Paul Goodman's *The Grand Piano*). Revolt is annoying, but "honest service is worse, because it turns out to be sabotage."

Schweik himself, of course, is not unambiguous. I, for one, have never been sure whether, despite his shrewdness in getting himself out of jams, he was a Chaplinesque hero, really trying to give honest service but tripped up by the nature of the system in which he was working, or a companion to that other great "feeble-minded" hero, Francisco VIII of Silone's last novel: a conscious and subtle saboteur. This ambiguity only makes the satire the more piquant: either honest service turns out to be revolt, or the most effective technique of sabotage turns out to be the attempt to give honest service.

Hasek's ridicule is, if anything, *more* pertinent now than even at the time the book was written. He produced here the paradigm which our present empires have not failed to follow.

Schweik, however, is not merely a work of political satire. It is one of the best modern examples of the comic epic, in the tradition of Don Quixote.

It is difficult in such a short review as this to convey the wonderful humor of the work. Most of it depends upon situation and context, and Schweik's own pronouncements are always couched in the most engaging garrulousness. His reaction to the assassination at Sarajevo is typical. Told that the Archduke was shot while riding in a motor car, he replies, "Just fancy that, Mrs. Müller, in a motor car. Ah, a gentleman like him can afford it and he never thinks how a ride in a motor car like that can end up badly." Upon which he goes on to solemnly discuss the proper dress for an assassin: "I wouldn't mind betting, Mrs. Müller, that the man who did it put on his best clothes for the job. You know, it wants a bit of doing to shoot an archduke; it's not like when a poacher shoots a gamekeeper. You have to find out how to get at him; you can't reach an important man like that if you're dressed just anyhow. You have to wear a top hat or else the police'd run you in before you knew where you were."

His "beg to report"'s are classics. The following colloquy takes place before a medical commission examining him under an accusation of "malingering" (in his "enthusiasm" he has had his landlady push him to the induction center in a wheel-chair, since rheumatism prevents his walking there. All the way he shouts "To Belgrade, to Belgrade!"):

"The chief of the medical staff came close up to Schweik. 'I'd like to know what you think you're up to, you porpoise, you!'

"'Beg to report, sir, I don't think at all.'"

"'Himmeldonnerwetter!' bellowed one of the members of the commission, clanking his sword, 'So he doesn't think

at all, doesn't he? Why don't you think, you Siamese elephant?"

"Beg to report, sir, I don't think because soldiers ain't allowed to. Years and years ago, when I was in the 91st regiment, the captain always used to tell us: 'Soldiers mustn't think. Their superior officers do all their thinking for them. As soon as a soldier begins to think, he's no longer a soldier, but a lousy civilian.' Thinking doesn't lead . . ."

"Hold your tongue," the chairman of the commission interrupted Schweik fiercely, 'we've heard all about you. You're no idiot, Schweik. You're artful, you're tricky, you're a humbug, a hooligan, the scum of the earth, do you understand?"

"Beg to report, sir, yes, sir."

The last accusation refers to Schweik's plaintive protest: "No, I'm no malingerer, I'm feeble-minded, fair and square."

Finally there is Schweik's self-introduction when Lieutenant Lukash acquires him as his batman from Chaplain Katz:

"Beg to report, sir, I'm Schweik who the chaplain lost at cards."

The continual pertinence of Schweik can be seen in the book's history. Appearing weekly during the last war, it is said to have caused Czech soldiers "to laugh and refuse to fight," and to have been an important factor in the Czech revolt at that time. In 1933 it was banned and burned by Nazi stormtroopers. In the early years of the present war, sabotage in Czechoslovakia came to be called "Schweikism". And to crown its glorious history, the following memo was sent in December, 1943, to all USO clubs by Daniel Culhane, National Catholic Community Service representative. "It is important that this book be removed from our shipments of Penguin Books and that it be *destroyed immediately*." There was a motion to this effect passed by all 6 of USO's member agencies (YMCA, National Catholic Community Service, Salvation Army, YWCA, National Jewish Welfare Board, and National Traveler's Aid Association), the reason given (somewhat tautologically): "objections to it on the grounds that it is objectionable from a religious point of view." It would seem that religion was in great danger from Hasek's caricatures of a couple of drunken chaplains. But it is obvious that the real reason for *Schweik's* ban is that its satire is not directed against Germans as such, but rather against militarism and bureaucracy; it is all too applicable, not only to the various imperial armies now engaged with one another, but also to the USO itself.

JACKSON MAC LOW

The Intelligence Office

"WHERE ARE YOU GOING?"—FURTHER COMMENTS
Sir:

The discussion between Mr. Elliot and the Editor in the September issue brings to mind the following comments upon the American as politician.

Sometimes it is necessary to destroy before one can build better, as in razing slums, for example. But when the political stream is conservative, as it is now, the "ins" shout to the critics that they are destructive, thus putting upon the critics the onus of wanting to destroy the best

of all possible worlds. The only alternative, then, is that chosen by Mr. Dewey and the traditional one in American politics since 1865, and that is to praise the work of "ins" and promise to revise, extend and improve upon that work if elected. The *Nation*, to choose but one example, is forced by the selfsame logic of politics into the selfsame position as is Mr. Dewey, the "constructive" critic. Since both promise more of the same, says the *Nation*, let's have more of the same under the old horse (I say 'under', with malice aforethought).

From a scientific point of view, then, criticism is constructive (read good) if it is true in terms of the particular problem. What ought to be done about the particular problem, if anything, is frequently another problem entirely, and ought to be decided by the people not by POLITICS.

A magazine which attempts to help its readers understand politics is constructive, whether or not it tries to satisfy the world longing for a god to *tell* the faithful what to do. In fact, for this reader, POLITICS would lose much of its value if it attempted to do so. A magazine of your kind can do the greatest good just by helping interested people evade the censorship on serious discussion of politics. More power to you.

HENNEPIN, ILLINOIS

ALBERT PUCCI

The Politics of the Unrejected

Sir:

"Things aren't," writes Mr. Elliott with an absolute zero of pity or fury (truly dispassionate!) "as bad as Macdonald thinks" and he concludes that he at least (and perhaps such of the rest of us as are not *too* neurotic) can be accepted in the new society, nerves "insulated by the strong sense of historical necessity." (One might picture this leftist professor sitting on his veranda of the future, laying aside his volume of Cain's latest thriller—how to enjoy a murder without getting your hands bloody—and remarking as he watches the Negro and white—neurotic, of course—chain gangs working on a gigantic highway project in the distance: "Things aren't as bad as Macdonald thought." He turns on the latest Negro jazz record—isn't it fine what these Negroes can do to keep us amused?—"If you're not jealous, defeated, rejected, hating, y'know, you don't have to be a slave at all.")

"Direct raw pity, warm human sympathies, will undermine the political worker", he goes on. "Nothing happened because of Debs or Vanzetti or Luxemburg, let us say; their importance is more symbolic than political." And it is everywhere inferred in the article that we must choose the politically effective individual. On this specific point we agree, but how shall we determine the politically effective individual whose politics Debs symbolizes? Is Debs a symbol of the politics which has conquered in Soviet Russia, in the United States? Or is he a symbol of pity and fury, a symbol of those who reject in all its terms modern society? There are symbols enough for Stalin and Roosevelt without suggesting the absurd alternatives which Elliott offers: (1) that pity and fury are only symbols and (2) that only slavery and exploitation are realistic solutions of the modern crisis ("In brief, the Soviet Union represents as much socialism as there are any rational grounds to expect . . .") Debs' and Luxemburg's ideals (what they symbolize) were not abstractly derived; they were determined by unremitting hatred of all that Mr. Elliott suggests we might accept (if we have not been rejected).

In viewing Elliott, himself, I might point out that just

as he considers that Debs' pity is symbolic rather than political so his own lack of pity (and here I do not want to be dealing in shadings; I mean his absolute incomprehension of pity and consequently the placid unemotional approach of his prose, an approach which he celebrates as "the strong sense of historical inevitability"; which Macdonald calls his "moderation and seriousness") might be examined as symbolic and not political. I mean to intimate that perhaps Mr. Elliott stands in relation to Debs as pitilessness does to pity: that back of Mr. Elliott as a symbol is a political reality of pitilessness, the "insulated nerve" which permits man to exploit man; that back of Debs as a symbol is a political reality of pity which threatens that ruling class.

Mr. Elliott appeals to us as intellectuals to accept "historical necessity" on the grounds that our "normal" class position is that of society's heirs, that neurotically we have been incapable of taking advantage of our bourgeois origins, our "historical" destiny. Looking ahead, seeing himself among the privileged, teaching in a respectable university, being neither Jew nor Negro, accepted by society, why should he reject the great opportunity that lies ahead? And mind you, he has no illusion as to what that opportunity is: to share in that intellectual freedom and flowering culture which can be made possible by the slavery of those rejected from society and those rejecting society, those incapable of democracy ("How quickly does *Politics* think the Russians could have been made democratically responsible—and by what specific means?"*). Can we really pretend that things are not going to be very good indeed in the coming period for Mr. Elliott?

NEW YORK CITY

ROBERT DUNCAN

THE MEANING OF TRUMAN

Sir:

Not enough attention has been given, it seems to me, to the significance of Roosevelt's choice of Truman as a running-mate. The deal on Truman has far-reaching implications for the future policies of Roosevelt. To wit:

(a) As a Pendergast man (and one who was saved by Roosevelt when he stopped the Pendergast investigation), Truman fits into the type of machine politics that will be necessary in dealing with veterans and with a labor union movement that has given up all freedom of political action—as against Wallace who was needed for the period which was to include America's entry into the war, an entry which had to be covered with idealistic talk, anti-Nazi fervor, etc.

(b) As Senator from a former slave state (this is remembered in Southern politics), Truman was the nearest Roosevelt could come in giving power back to the South without alienating much of the northern labor vote. This shows that in the inevitable Republican period that will succeed Roosevelt in 1949, Roosevelt apparently intends to hand the party back to the Southern leaders.

(c) Truman was an ideal combination of a conservative with a progressive reputation. His heading of the war industries investigation was not due to his being progressive but to his being a western Senator; traditionally the Senate investigations of big business are conducted by Senators from non-industrial areas who will therefore come less into conflict with those they investigate (e.g. Nye).

*It is interesting to note in the light of Ciliza's *Russian Enigma*, if no other evidence, that the immediate problem of the Bolshevik government was not how "to make the Russians democratically responsible" but how to destroy the democratic responsibility which the Russian revolution itself represented. The burden of irresponsibility lay with the government which posed as "democratic", representing the people.

These men permit themselves to appear anti-monopoly because of regional and not class conflicts, and are otherwise quite conservative.

(d) The action of Roosevelt in helping to hand the Democratic party back to the South is a good example not so much of Roosevelt's conservatism (which after all is not so important) but of the fact that a political leader is limited by the status quo independently of his own attitudes. For the Democratic nominee in 1948 and following will be important not as a potential President but as Party leader. That, and the 1944 vice-presidency, and the present control of the Democratic machine are primarily important as determining the character of the Democratic party during the period when it will be out of power and at the point when it will next make a bid for power. (Here is another reason—aside from their usefulness in this election—for Roosevelt's support of the city machines; their usefulness in this election was never a sufficient reason since they would support him anyhow.) Now consider Roosevelt's position toward the future control of the party. He cannot keep it indefinitely. The northern city machines are not strong enough to control the party alone. *Probably only two groups could hold it: Northern and Pacific labor, or the Southern upper class. If he helps labor get the party, American politics would become a fight between two class parties, and the whole class conflict would have a political vehicle. But this is exactly what American politics have always avoided.* Hence Roosevelt could only give it back to the South, even if he actually disagrees with the South.

STATEN ISLAND, N. Y.

TERENCE DONAGHUE

Oops, Sorry!

Sir:

This is a somewhat belated apology for the note I wrote you before the election. The apology is not the result of organizational pressure (I didn't speak for the YPSL in the first place) but of my own scruples. I intended the note to be personal. . . . I certainly would never have used that language about you in public. . . . By the way, I know of several cases where your article had the effect of shifting votes from Thomas to Roosevelt. I know this wasn't your intention, but you should have taken it into consideration when you published the article.

Once again, sincerest apologies for a nasty and uncalled-for letter. I shall try to make repairs for it by giving *POLITICS* a boost when I get the chance. In between elections, you're turning out a swell mag.

CHICAGO, ILL.

IRWIN SUALL

Sir:

As a member of the Socialist Party I feel that I, and the Socialist Party owe you a public apology for the letter sent you by the "organizer" of the Young Peoples Socialist League which you printed in the November issue of *POLITICS*. The individual who wrote the letter accuses you of "hindering the Socialist movement" but I am certain that letters like the one you printed hinder the Socialist movement a thousand times more than *POLITICS* does. In fact I think that *POLITICS* is an asset to the Socialist movement and especially to the Socialist Party. I say this because the ideas that are expressed in *POLITICS* more closely approximate those of the Socialist Party and especially of its left wing than they do that of any other group or party now in existence in the United States. Therefore, when someone reads *POLITICS* and wants to support an organization that advocates these ideas he is forced to support the Socialist Party.

The main disagreement that the left wing of the Socialist Party has with you is that they think that the "perfect" party that we all dream of—The revolutionary, democratic socialist party will emerge out of and through the Socialist Party. Therefore we belong to the Socialist Party and work hard to build it up. Sometimes the Socialist Party adopts a position that we do not agree with and sometimes it elects a leadership that is incapable of leading it, but the democracy of the Socialist Party functions well enough to allow the eventual removal of these difficulties. At the present time the Socialist Party means Socialism to many people in the United States. As the political level of the people in the U. S. who want Socialism rises, the Socialist Party will amplify and clarify its program and assume its place as the leader of the masses that want a new world. The only other possible alternative to this prospect is to create a small group with a perfect program. The history of the U. S. during the last 15 years has shown us that this method leads either to a theological sect or to the disintegration of the perfect organization. Therefore, the Socialist Party becomes the only organization for the advancement of the Socialist idea.

Not many people can express their political opinions by starting a magazine. Especially is this true for those of us who live out in the center of the country. We could either sit at home and wait for the perfect party to emerge or we can engage in the activity of the Socialist Party and help to make it emerge. We have chosen the latter role.

With comradely greetings,

URBANA, ILL.

HARRY KANTOR

Correction

Sir:

The "filler" in your November issue about the three salesmen at dinner, and the one who wanted to pay the check because his firm was on a cost-plus basis and would make money on the meal, is in error. The *Accountant's Weekly Newsletter* for March 27 last states, apropos this story, which has been widely circulated:

"The only kind of a cost-plus contract on which a firm could add to its profit by spending more money is a cost plus a fee based on a percentage of cost contract. We had them in World War I, but there are no such contracts in this war. They are illegal. So-called cost-plus contracts today are cost plus a fixed fee. The fee cannot be increased by raising the cost.

"Unless the dinner was a legitimate expense against his contract, the salesman's firm would have to bear the entire \$15 out of its own pocket."

NORTH BERGEN, N. J.

LAURENCE SPIRER

Watchful army authorities are already taking measures to prevent defilement of Anglo-Saxon blood during the occupation of Germany. James Macdonald cables the *New York Times*: "Once the Allies' armies have advanced deep into Germany, women auxiliary members of the United States and British forces will move into the rear areas . . . the proposal being put forward on the ground that it will prevent the Allies' troops from fraternizing with German men and women. Both the American doughboy and the British tommy are incurably friendly and it is desired that their attitude toward German civilians shall be coldly correct and courteous. . . . Soldiers in foreign lands like feminine company. . . . How much more pleasant it will be, it is argued, if the Allies' troops have English speaking women to mingle with, instead of German women . . ."

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