

politics

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June, 1945

The Face of War



Left: Passport photo of a Parisian truck-driver taken in 1939. Right: Passport photo of same man for year 1944. (Sent in by an overseas soldier-reader)

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A Japanese Badoglio?

Not the least ironical aspect of this ironical war is the fact that the war in the Pacific has always been more popular with all classes of Americans than the war in Europe. Ironical because the war against Germany had at least a certain moral ambiguity about it—even we who opposed it had to admit that fascism was the most terrible enemy of our ideals to emerge so far; our dissent was on the means employed to fight it. But the war in the Pacific is a straight imperialist conflict of the classic old pattern; even a “P.M.” editorial writer would scarcely have the heart to argue that we are fighting to prevent the spread of Japanese political ideas. This very fact, of course, makes that war popular with our businessmen. They have no interests in Europe so vital as those of Britain and Russia, which is one good reason for the ineffectuality of American policy there. But in the Pacific they have real interests: raw materials, cheap labor, and, in the densely populated regions of Eastern Asia, the last great commercial frontier. The general public, on the other hand, also responds more enthusiastically to the Pacific war because of simple racial hatred of the Japanese. The confinement of all West Coast Japanese, even those who were American citizens—a breach of civil liberties for which our history provides only one parallel: the treatment of the colored people of the South—is one index of this racism. The “no prisoners” policy of our troops in the Pacific is another, as are such statements from high public officials as the recent postwar plan for Japan that was publicly suggested by Paul V. McNutt, War Manpower Commissioner: “Extermination of the Japanese—in toto.” (“I know the Japanese people,” added Mr. McNutt.)

Our press has been so busy hating the Japanese as an alien race that it has failed to provide us with any information as to what Japan and the Japanese are really like. A nightmare of 70 million bucktoothed grinning apes, whose totalitarian uniformity is only exceeded by their political fanaticism, this is the general picture we are given. If it is true, not only is the McNutt formula justified, but the Pacific war will last many years. It is, of course, not true. The Japanese are people, not apes. In the next issue, some basic books on Japan will be considered as guides to a more realistic interpretation of the Japanese people. Here I want to speculate on the possibility of a “Badoglio clique” taking over in Japan in the near future

and accepting "unconditional surrender" terms. In considering this possibility, we shall perhaps get some idea of the general nature of Japanese society.

1.

A nation may be taken out of a war from the top or from the bottom. The Bolsheviks did it from the bottom, inciting the people against Kerensky's war policy with the slogan, "Peace, Bread, Land." The failure of the junkers and businessmen to take Germany out of the war even in the last terrible months when all was obviously lost was due to the fact that the Nazis had organized a mass political party, with an ideology and program, with large and powerful armed forces (SS and Gestapo), and with several millions of adherents in the population. Even had the generals' attempt on Hitler's life last summer succeeded, it seems doubtful they could have made a coup of the Badoglio type: with a politically conscious mass organization at their disposal, the Nazis could probably have only been overthrown by a mass revolution. (That there were apparently not even the faintest stirrings of such a revolt would seem to be one more indication that Nazism was a far more serious affair than the "Bonapartist dictatorship of monopoly capitalism" which some unimaginative Marxists have thought it to be; that it rather resembled the kind of bureaucratic-collectivist alternative to both socialism and capitalism that Stalin has created in Russia.) In any event, it is obvious that Mussolini never was able to create in Italy the kind of totalitarian regime Hitler had—whether because of the national character of the Italians or the country's economic backwardness or both. Like a Latin American dictator, he ruled as the bravo and demagogue of the old ruling groups—the army, the Court and big business—with little popular enthusiasm for his program and ideology. His Fascist Party therefore never developed the mass roots which Hitler's did, and when the army and the Court decided to take Italy out of the war, they had a freedom of action in two directions: there was no other powerful group to block them, and there was no mass support for Mussolini. For better or worse, the decision could be taken at the top level, without worrying about the politically inert popular masses.

2.

The situation in Japan is more like that of Italy than of Germany. At first glance (which is also last glance so far as most of our press goes) it would seem that the opposite is the case. For it is true that, from the standpoint of the control of the masses by the ruling class, Japan is the most totalitarian nation on earth, including Russia. As is well known, the Meiji Restoration which overthrew the old order and "Westernized" Japan simply laid a veneer of democratic-capitalist institutions over the old feudal social structure without seriously altering that structure. The Japanese people are even more docile, disciplined, and politically unconscious than the Russians are: their lives are regulated from above even more extensively and intimately. They reverence the Emperor as the living representative of the gods, an aberration that is fully exploited by the very ungodlike characters who rule them in his name. From these facts, it is usually deduced that

the Japanese people will enthusiastically follow the Emperor's leadership to the grave and beyond, and hence that the war will be prolonged to the bitter end.

An instance of successful cultural conditioning is the frequency with which Japanese civilians on islands captured by American troops commit mass suicide. Several hundred destroyed themselves and their children on one of the Kerama islands recently, duped by propaganda tales of what awaited them if they fell alive into the hands of the "Western barbarians". Those who did not kill themselves, or who were not successful, were amazed when the Americans gave them food and medical treatment, and became extremely bitter against the leaders of the suicide movement. "A group of seventy refugees, munching food, stopped when a Japanese soldier was put in the circle with them. They turned on him and denounced him with such vehemence that the American soldiers removed him to a safer place—for him." (*N. Y. Times*, April 2, 1945.)*

There is, however, another factor to be considered: the conflict within the ruling class. In this respect Japan is far from totalitarian: two distinct groups have for years existed, and still exist, with quite different approaches to the war question. There are the militarists of the Kwantung Army clique, dominant since they succeeded in forcing the occupation of Manchuria in 1931; their policy was a rapid and daring expansion of Japanese imperialist rule over Eastern Asia, regardless of possible military clashes with the Western powers; their policy now is war *a l'outrance*—preferring, like the Nazis, to see their country

* I might add that little was said in "The Responsibility of Peoples" about the Pacific war because the problem involved there is historically different from that of Germany. Japan is an essentially feudal nation, with capitalist trimmings; the Oriental attitude toward individual moral responsibility, the infliction of death and torture, and the relationship of people and State proceeds from quite a different historical tradition than the Christian-humanitarian-bourgeois tradition of the West. Yet, as these few instances show, even here something of the same patterns can be traced. And so far as our side of the question is concerned, the animus of the average American towards the Germans as a collectivity is mild compared to his feeling, compounded of racial prejudice and dislike of a dramatically alien culture, against the Japanese people. It is notable, for example, that, while all Japanese *including American citizens* were deported to concentration camps in the interior, similar measures were not taken against Germans, not even those who were not American citizens.

politics

VOLUME 2, NO. 6 (Whole No. 17)

JUNE, 1945

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Circulation Manager: Dorothy Brumm

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POLITICS is published monthly at 45 Astor Place, New York 3, N. Y., by Politics Publishing Co. Telephone: GRamercy 3-1512.

Subscription \$2.50 for one year, \$4 for two years. Add 30c a year for Canada, 50c a year for all other foreign countries. Single copy: 25c. All back issues are still available. Special rate for service men and C.O.'s anywhere: \$1.75 a year.

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perish in flames rather than abate their fanatical (and, in bourgeois terms, irrational) ideology. On the other hand, there are the businessmen, led by the great family monopolies (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, etc.), the politicians, most of whom are even more intimately linked to big business than our own are, and the "moderates" of the older generation of nobles and Court advisers (Prince Konoye is the type). Frightened by the risks of shoestring-imperialism, and better informed about the industrial and military strength of the Western powers than the Kwantung Army fanatics, this predominantly bourgeois faction has tried in vain to slow down the pace of Japan's military expansion. They have no prejudices against imperialism as such, of course, nor against wiping out half the globe, including most of "their own" people, in total warfare. They simply calculate the risks and costs in a meanspirited bourgeois way that is alien to the dashing spirits of the Kwantung Army.

It seems likely that at the present the businessmen and "moderates" are making some very dismal calculations indeed. The Japanese fleet has been almost eliminated as a military factor; the air force largely destroyed; the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is rapidly contracting; American bombers now have land bases comfortably near the Japanese mainland; and all this while the main weight of Allied military power has been occupied in Europe. Already the cities of Japan are being destroyed from the air almost at will.* The invasion of Japan can be made costly to the Allies, as the bloody fighting on the various Pacific islands has shown, and resistance on the Asiatic mainland, where big and effective Japanese armies exist and where the supply situation is better and there is more space to maneuver, might go on for years after the fall of Japan itself. But (1) there seems little prospect of ultimate success; (2) the destruction of Japanese industry and cities would be even greater than in Germany (3) the longer the war goes on, the harder it will be for the big businessmen and the Court "moderates" to survive, in the Badoglio style, as a ruling class tolerated by the victorious Allies for fear of something worse (i.e., more leftwing). For all these reasons, it seems likely the non-militarist section of the Japanese ruling class is thinking in capitulation terms, and that the many rumors of peace "feeler" that have recently come out of Washington have some basis in fact.

*In a single raid on the great industrial center of Nagoya recently, 500 Superfortresses dropped 3,300 tons of incendiary bombs, the biggest incendiary raid on record to date. The human horror of such raids on cities built largely of wood and paper hardly needs underlining. In Nagoya the heart of the city, where the population density was 75,000 to the square mile, was deliberately bombed. The military justification, or rather excuse, was that the Japanese "home industry" system makes every house in a workingclass district a military objective. Such excuses are of interest only to military scholars, and can be dispensed with if necessary: our air forces roasted to death tens of thousands of civilians in vast incendiary raids on Hamburg, Dresden and other German cities where "home industry" has been unknown since the 18th century. The real spirit behind our air force's fire raids on Japanese cities is that expressed by one of our top naval officers in the struggle against Japanese barbarism, Admiral William F. (Bull) Halsey, who said in a recent newsreel: "We are drowning and burning the beastly apes all over the Pacific, and it is just as much pleasure to burn them as drown them."

The very phenomenon which is often considered a guarantee of Japanese resistance to the bitter end—the hold of the Emperor over the people—might also be turned in the opposite direction. The Emperor is an institution without specific political content; for many centuries, those who have held or usurped the real political hegemony have done so "in the name of the Emperor"; the Army fanatics who assassinated a number of leading "moderate" statesmen in 1936 in an unsuccessful putsch acted in the name of the Emperor even while shooting some of his most intimate counsellors. Thus the Emperor could be exploited by a "capitulation cabal" just as readily as he is now exploited by the dominant militarist clique to rally the masses behind the war. Furthermore, there is no mass political party, with a definite program and ideology, of the Russian and German type. Thus all the obstacles to a reversal of policy are on the top level, not rooted in mass institutions and beliefs, and the issue will be decided, as it was in Italy, by the struggle of groups within the ruling class.

Let us look into this last point a little more.

3.

For some time, the Japanese militarist clique have realized the desirability, perhaps the necessity, of a mass totalitarian party, especially in a desperate defensive war as at present. *The Economist* (London) of February 24 outlines the situation clearly:

"It may be that Japanese society resembles the Italian far more closely than the German model; it may be even less totalitarian. Until 1940 there was something of a parliamentary regime. The single party, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA), which was set up that year in imitation of the German model, was never a mass party. It was simply an association imposed from above to embrace in a single organization all such groups as local party associations, ARP, youth groups, neighborhood groups, and the like. It was supposed nominally to replace the two traditional parliamentary parties, the Minseitō and the Seiyūkai, but the party members in the Diet only discarded their labels. . . . In 1942, elections were held nominally under the single party system; but a great many of the old party men were returned and the new Diet, like the old, offered persistent and successful resistance to any attempt at incorporating it bodily in a new regime."

The Economist notes that "the arch-extremist, Colonel Hashimoto", one of the architects of the attempted 1936 Army putsch and also of the "Panay incident" which threatened war with the USA in 1937, is one of a group of Kwantung extremists trying to form a mass nationalistic party which would "swallow the IRAA, purge the Court, set up a full dictatorial government and prepare Japan for war to the bitter end." However, as *The Economist* points out: "It is one thing to dream of a mass totalitarian party, another to build one at the eleventh hour."

The attempt to create such a party—i.e., to give a specific political content to the undifferentiated submission of the Japanese people to the State—has given Japanese politics a dialectical color of late. The tension between the two opposing groups in the ruling class increases as the war becomes more desperate, and moves in opposite directions are taken almost simultaneously. The Koiso

cabinet, which succeeded the Togo cabinet after last summer's military reverses — such governmental changes in themselves show the enormous difference between the Japanese and the German systems — began in turn to weaken as fresh disasters occurred. It took desperate measures of total mobilization. On March 19, the Government ordered all schools and colleges, beginning with the second grade of primary school, closed for one year so that their students could be conscripted for war and food production. This measure, unparalleled in modern history, means that every male over the age of 6 is drafted for State service. Three days later, the cabinet submitted to the Diet an emergency law which would have increased the already great control of the Army and Navy over the economy; had this measure passed, the Kwantung clique would have definitively eliminated its "moderate" rivals. But what happened was that the measure was not passed, and the Koiso Government itself fell on April 6. Its successor is headed by the aged Baron Suzuki, a leader of the "moderates", who had been shot and left for dead by the Army putschists in 1936. Of the 14 posts in his cabinet, big business and the civil service hold 9 as against 4 for the Navy and 1 for the army.*

4.

Two significant developments are reported in the *N. Y. Times* of May 23:

(1) Naisaki Nakano, the Procurator General, admitted the growth of peace agitation "in a portion of the population" and admonished his police officials: "The first thing to be stressed in regard to ideological violations is the control of speech and action agitating peace. It is impossible to repulse the enemy outside Japan if there is no perfect unity within Japan."

(2) A Domei broadcast quotes a current article in the *Tokio Shimbun* to the effect that Japan should draw from "the powerful leadership, based on Sovietism" of Stalin "the inspiration and ingenuity" necessary to defeat "Anglo-American capitalist aggression." The *Shimbun* pointed out (as the Nazis used to do) that Russia had lost vast territories and armies and yet had "fought back to ultimate victory"—a victory which shows that the Russian people, "miserably beaten in the first World War", have been "completely regenerated by the Soviet system." This analysis, by the way, is quite realistic if by "regeneration" is meant the ability to fight a war, and it must be slightly confusing to the liblabs who deduce from this ability the socially progressive nature of Stalinism to find the Japanese warlords publicly seeking inspiration in "the powerful leadership, based on Sovietism" of Marshal Stalin.

Thus we see peace agitation and military totalitarianism advancing side by side, as the tension between the two ruling-class groups increases. To speculate on the possibility of a Japanese Badoglio in the near future is, of course, not to predict that one will emerge (though I think the weight of probability lies there). The political crosscurrents

*One of Suzuki's first acts as premier was to transmit by radio his "profound sympathy" to the American people for their "great loss" in the death of President Roosevelt. This significant gesture contrasts sharply with the reaction of the Nazi press, which reviled Roosevelt as a "war criminal" and attributed his death to "divine justice", and emphasizes the difference between the Japanese and the German war regimes.

are choppy. But the significant thing is that, to date, the fifteen-year-old struggle between big-business and the Court moderates on the one hand and the Kwantung militarists on the other has not resulted in a decisive victory of either side. Perhaps the most significant index of the nature of the Japanese war regime is the fact, recorded in *The Economist* of Feb. 24, that: "There have been no shootings in Japan to increase discipline." This is a striking indication at once of the docility of the Japanese masses and the evenly balanced power-struggle at the top.

DWIGHT MACDONALD

The Ford

The Analects, Book XVIII, Chapter 6

Here's a boiling river ripped by fangs, rocks:
on tranquil shore in the pink sunlight plough

the bitter Chang, with pity swollen-hearted,
and rational Chieh-ni: profound recluses.

Now (bow low) comes in a dusty carriage
Confucius, humanely wandering

from prince to prince: 'These are the rules of Order'
—soon withdrawing! (When will his heart break?)

Says: "Tze-lu, ask them where to ford this flood."
The young man stands beside the lonely sages.

Chang: "Is not yon noble with the reins
Confucius?" "Yes, Confucius my teacher."

"He knows the ford! he knows the ford!
wandering with advice from state to state."

Chieh: "You see the flood! you see the fangs!—"
(*Beware, Chieh-ni! the shore itself is rotting*)

"disorder like a flood has won its way;
the Empire is raging. Who will change?

who will change? from state to state withdrawing
Confucius is traveling in disorder.

Once and for all withdraw: is it not better?"
Without another word he fell to ploughing.

—"I asked them for the ford across the flood:
they mention a philosophy of life."

The Master said: "It is impossible to live
with birds and beasts as if they were like us;

if I do not associate with people
with whom shall I associate?"

PAUL GOODMAN

Conscription & Conscientious Objection

Editor's Note: Any one who follows the CO press, notably such journals as Fellowship, Pacifica Views and Compass, must be struck with how much serious and original thinking is being done by CO's these days. Unlike the routinized Socialist and Trotskyist press which, with the intermittent exception of The New International, just plods along month after month in the old treadmill, the CO's seem to be examining their basic ideas in the light of experience. Letters from and conversations with individual CO's have reinforced this impression.

The most encouraging thing about the present ferment in CO thinking is that it has of late come to center mostly about the issue of conscription. As the letters and articles below indicate, more and more CO's are coming to realize, from their experience in the last few years in the CPS camps, that it is not enough just to oppose war, that a stand must also be taken against conscription. At the beginning of the war, the three "historic peace churches" (the Brethren, the Mennonites, and the Quakers) made a deal with the Government by which they would finance and operate work camps for CO's. Their concern was to provide a better alternative to jail for CO's, and also to improve the lot of CO's by operating the camps themselves instead of having the State or the military operate them. As it has worked out, however, the Peace Churches have become more and more the docile agents of the State and, far from exerting a humane and liberalizing influence on the coercive apparatus behind CPS, have rather themselves been corrupted and comprised. (The extent of this corruption is indicated by the extraordinary statement by Paul French quoted below in Roy Kepler's article; Mr. French is executive secretary of the National Service Board for Religious Objectors, the agency through which the Peace Churches administer their CPS camps.) Four year's experience has also shown many CO's that submission to conscription into CPS camps is as morally compromising as conscription into the Army, and that life in a CPS camp, where trivial and uncongenial tasks are performed under State coercion, is as psychologically stultifying as life in the armed forces, especially for persons whose values conflict basically with those promulgated by the State.

And so a widespread movement has developed among CO's in the past year to make the fight against conscription as important as the fight against war, with the result that CO's have come into conflict with the basic political principle of the modern State: its coercive powers. This expresses itself in the slowdown and noncooperative technique described below in the letter from Gernsback, and in an increasing number of "walkouts" from CPS camps. (A "walkout" occurs when a camper simply leaves the camp and goes home, without permission; no attempt is made at concealment, and the walkouter generally keeps the authorities informed of his address; the final upshot is almost always that he goes to prison, and in this sense the walkout is also a "walkin".) The hard conclusion that these CO's have come to is that prison is a more acceptable alternative than CPS camp, which is just the reverse of the assumption on which the Peace Churches started the CPS program.

This new kind of CO thinking is not only more politically conscious in that it sees the coercive power of the State as a major problem, but also in that it has split those who hold to such ideas off from the bulk of purely religious

objectors. The law allows CO status only to those with religious objections to war, but this requirement is vague inasmuch as membership in any specific church is not required. Therefore, many whose objections are moral and even political have been granted CO status by liberally-minded examiners and draft boards. It is impossible to say exactly how many of the 11,000 CO's who have been in CPS camps since 1941 are purely religious CO's and how many are, shall we say, quasi-religious. Each of the three Peace Churches runs its own camps, and I am told that the great majority of those in the Brethren and Mennonite camps are members of those churches, while almost all the non-religious objectors have chosen camps run by Quakers, because the Quakers are much the most generally known of the three sects. This seems borne out by the concentration of our own CO subscribers in a half dozen Quaker camps (or in the four recently established camps directly run by the Government). About 8,000 of the total number of CO's are in Brethren and Mennonite camps, which leaves about 3,000 for the Quakers. Thus the anti-conscription trend is limited to a minority of CO's, who are becoming more and more sharply differentiated from the religious majority. This split is a healthy one, and may bear good fruit in the next war. Conscientious Objection indeed seems to be becoming politically relevant. (See the discussion on this subject between Don Calhoun and myself in the July, 1944, issue.)

CONSCRIPTION IS THE ISSUE

YOU have asked my opinion on "pacifism as a revolutionary device." I believe that pacifism is revolutionary but it is not a device. In other words I do not look upon it as a means to an end but rather as something in which the dichotomy of ends and means is absent. Organized movements usually place their aims and visions in a vacuum while concentrating on the means to preserve their organization: means which achieve far different ends than were intended. Wars to end wars do not end wars but produce more wars. Dictatorship of the proletariat to achieve socialism does not achieve socialism but the extension of that dictatorship to a bureaucratic dictatorship. Reforming capitalism to bring about socialism achieves but a better preserved capitalism. The participation of the Historic Peace Churches in administering the Selective Service System doesn't nullify the evils of such conscription but helps to make them more acceptable.

1.

If pacifism ever emerges as an effective social force, I cannot see it as a movement whose success depends upon its formal organization: a movement which gradually places first importance on what tactics and techniques to use in preserving itself institutionally. *Rather its tactics and techniques will be suggested by acting in accordance with principles connected with its ideals.* With whatever creative intelligence pacifism has, it must consider as inseparable *what it fights for and how it fights for it.*

In your rejoinder to Calhoun (See "The Political Relevance of Conscientious Objection", *Politics*, July, 1944) you say, "entering or not entering the armed forces is a

question of tactics, not principles for the leftist." I agree . . . but I think it ought not to be a question of tactics, but one of principle. You continue, "The question presents itself to him thus: Will he be able to further his ends better if he submits to the draft or if he goes to jail (or a C.O. camp)?" Submitting to the draft in no way furthers the leftists' ends (or for that matter, the pacifists' ends), but it does further the ends of the draft with which ends he might not be in agreement. The choice of place is not the criterion whereby we can perform the most effective service, or in other words whereby we can best further our ends: *we can be most effective by doing what we believe is right regardless where we might find ourselves as the result.* This is facing action more as a question of principle than of tactics.

2.

It is my opinion that pacifism today in action is revolutionary. Pacifists' beliefs are arrived at from a variety of convictions but none of them sanction the social injustices which are necessary for the successful functioning of our present capitalist state. Simply acting on the belief of the early Quaker, George Fox, "To hold up the ideal of living in the virtue of that life and power which takes away the occasion of war," is to be at odds with a system which needs the violences of war and of class and race hatreds. Although capitalism is not the basic cause of war, it is the outstanding occasion today in which the causes are set in motion. "The removal of the causes" as Calhoun stated, "and the prevention of the occasion must proceed simultaneously or not at all."

I speak of pacifism as something more than just being ideologically and emotionally against war. In its full implication it becomes operative in objective social situations. When it takes action commensurate with its ideas it runs into conflict with the contemporary State, or at least is in serious discord with it. If pacifism aims at the elimination of war it must also aim at the elimination of capitalism. It cannot rest content on the mere reform of the status quo—it must strive to bring about radical change—it must be operative at the roots.

If pacifism is not revolutionary in its relation to a politico-economic system which needs war or the possibility of war to perpetuate itself, if it remains merely a "cooperative" opposition within the status quo, then it becomes, and is about as ineffectual as any other variant of present day liberalism. Liberal activity often misleads itself sufficiently to support that which it so sincerely criticizes. Notwithstanding the Socialist Party's criticism of the war, only a handful of its members have definitely refused to support the war. Notwithstanding the Historic Peace Churches' criticism of military conscription they administer a program within the military-dominated Selective Service System. The traditional pacifist movement seems most concerned today with conserving its special minority privilege of exemption from bearing arms. Like the Socialist Party—its non-pacifist counterpart—it seems to have no direction beyond the limits of the modern warring state.

Both the liberal and revolutionary-socialist approaches, so it seems to me, have been affected too much by and have adopted too devotedly the concepts based on a practical materialism, out of which arises the justification of means in terms of intended ends. They have absorbed the spiritual bankruptcy evident in the world today. (When I speak of the spiritual aspects of movements and organizations, I mean it more or less in reference to that kind of spirit which united and sustained such groups for instance as the early American Quakers and our old-time Wobblies.) Non-

support of war requires more than being critical of, and calling wicked, those with whom we disagree. Being revolutionary we need not continue to cling to the skirts of the materialist who now manipulates events; we can refuse allegiance to his creed of expediency even though we are called impractical, negative, and disloyal. We need to align ourselves with forces moving in an altogether different direction if we wish our war resistance to become at all effective.

3.

Finally, I think both you and Calhoun overlooked, in your discussion, one capital point: that the C.O. who is inducted into a Civilian Public Service camp is "submitting to the draft" just as much as the civilian who lets himself be conscripted into the armed forces. (That the C.O. does it provisionally does not negate the fact that he submits.) The relation of the C.O. to the law that conscripts him is important, particularly in regard to the *political* relevancy of conscientious objection. In relation to the military machine, i.e. the armed forces, there is obviously a difference in the *degree* of cooperation given by the C.O. in a CPS camp and the soldier; but in relation to the Selective Service Act (essentially a law of military conscription) there is *no* difference in degree. It is more a difference in the *kind* of cooperation. The C.O. confronts the State with his conscientious objection to war, and the State meets this pressure by providing CPS. If the C.O. does what the State requires him to do by accepting CPS, this kind of cooperation does not interfere with the State in its war effort to the extent of challenging its power and right to conscript its citizens. It seems to me that the most meaningful *political* relevance of conscientious objection lies in such a challenge.

If the leftist who goes into the army is a "critical supporter" of the war, the CPS man is a "critical supporter" of military conscription. He is cooperating where there is still a further alternative short of committing suicide; the alternative of non-cooperation with the military conscriptive system. Am I going too far to say that "critical support" of military conscription, particularly the institutional support from Peace Churches and service committees, might become the Achilles heel of liberal "pacifist" thinking today? (I use the word "support" in the sense that it does not involve personal endorsement.)

The practical significance of this is becoming clearer all the time. C.O.'s are "walking out" of CPS camps more and more—I myself have lately done so. They are realizing the incompatibility of conscientious objection to war and participation in a system of conscription for purposes of war; *they are realizing it is at the point of conscription that issue can be taken to most effectively communicate their protest against war.* They are refusing to cooperate despite the efforts of the church groups to hold the CPS program together. (The continued financing and support of CPS by religious and liberal bodies in this war is one more instance of liberalistic evasion of the real issue and compromise with the powers-that-be.) Although he knows that he will go to prison as the result, the C.O. who refuses to cooperate also knows that a new direction must be taken if pacifism is ever to become an effective social force.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

FRANK TRIEST

THE SLOW-DOWN AT GERMFASK

Sir:

The Civilian Public Service (CPS) camps, which detain 8,000 conscientious objectors solely by administrative edict, have now served as laboratories in forced labor for almost four years. Unfortunately, much that might have

been learned from this experience, has been obscured by church sponsorship of most of the program. In the past 18 months, however, the government has operated three of the camps directly, without the churches acting as morale agencies and with the pretense of "volunteering" removed. The resulting ferment has shown itself in written articles, in a wide variety of so-called "obstructionist tactics," and an increasing number of "walkouts" by the men.

The three government camps have definitely been the "hot potatoes" of the system. In them, the labor conscripts face their overseers directly; there is no church opiate to hide the fundamental nature of the program. From these camps important lessons are emerging. They have recently come to a head in this camp (Germfask), located on the northern peninsula of Michigan, where Selective Service has concentrated its worst "problem cases."

Work production in the government camps has always been practically non-existent. Some of the men fail to produce out of protest against forced labor, despite the regulation demanding performance of assigned duties "promptly and efficiently" on penalty of imprisonment. Others fail to produce because they find no incentive under a system that offers neither interesting nor important work commensurate with their abilities.

Congressman Bradley, in whose district the Germfask camp is located, brought the issue into national prominence on January 31 when he wrathfully offered an amendment to the May-Bailey bill intended to force the men of Camp Germfask to "work or fight." Though his amendment was rejected, he has served to sharpen the issue. Selective Service officials have explained to Bradley and to reporters that the federal courts will not prosecute slowdown cases and other obstructionist tactics. They consider the cases both petty and on shaky legal grounds. To solve the problem, Bradley is working with the government to devise a possible "commission" system "before which malingersers can be brought for action."

Here then seems to be the inevitable progression of forced labor:

1. Men inevitably slow down and produce far below the standards of free labor;
2. Under the Constitution, our regular courts are reluctant to consider a charge against a labor conscript for failure to produce at free labor standards;
3. Unless the system is to fall apart completely, the administrators are forced to set up a star-chamber procedure outside the courts that can further restrict a conscript's "privileges" and conceivably sentence him to additional time at hard labor for failure to produce.

Realization of this progression is the chief lesson to be learned from the CPS experience with forced labor. Those who see this and are concerned over Selective Service plans to perfect their experiment are demanding that the camps be closed.

GERMFASK, MICH.

E. JOHN LEWIS

(Note: Since this letter was written, two important developments have taken place at Germfask. (1) Two weeks after taking on the job, Paul G. Voelker resigned as camp manager (a Government post). "I have found the Selective Service treatment of men in CPS camps to be the re-establishment of slavery in our nation," wrote Mr. Voelker, a Civil Service employee. "As a liberty-loving American citizen and ex-serviceman, I cannot take part in the administration of a system of unpaid, forced labor." (2) It was officially announced that the Germfask camp, which has of late months become Selective Service's biggest headache, is shortly to be closed down and the men transferred to Weatherville, California, to fight forest fires.—ED.)

AN OPEN LETTER TO CPS MEN

A FAIR degree of public and pacifist attention has recently been centered on Germfask because of "something" that is taking place there. Press representatives, Selective Service officials, and private citizens have variously reported to the public that the men here are saboteurs, sex perverts, irreligious, intellectuals with crackpot theories, drunkards and communists who are lacking in humility, crazy, rejecting all discipline, threatening violence, and practicing vandalism. Local citizens reportedly fear for the chastity of their daughters, and that our pernicious ideas will corrupt their youth.

Several visiting ministers—two pacifist—have spent from one to three days with us in order to analyze the situation. They sense cynicism, bitterness, "studied confusion", individualism, dedication to principle, lack of self-discipline, "distinct religious tone", and frustration.

Out of the whole, they are unable to pick or formulate any pattern with which they are familiar. . . . This "something" that is happening at Germfask is so elusive that many of the campers themselves have not realized the drives or the direction in which it is headed. . . .

Slowly, but almost inevitably, the people of this country and the world are being cast into a mold: authority from the top, unquestioning obedience to that authority. These are becoming a part of our life. The most effective instrument of coercion in the hands of such authority is controlled public opinion. If some one person or group "flaunts" authority, turn loose on him the righteous wrath of his friends and neighbors. If the paymaster attempts to speak out or hesitates to obey orders, authority lets loose the hounds of "national unity" or "casualty lists", crying "We're all in this together." There must be no opposition.

A brief philosophy to make pacifists comfortable as "individual parts of the whole" in the growing regimented State appeared in Paul Comly French's *General Letter No. 111*. He points out that individuals are never really free to make decisions for themselves—other people, institutions, and ideas always influence and help to mold decisions. To be a "part of the whole of God's creation" is to avoid becoming "an egocentric unit seeking personal satisfaction regardless of the consequences to the whole group. . . . Once we see individualism in its proper place, *then a regimented state will not affect us* (Italics, Kepler) because we will contribute our insights and understandings to the whole. We will not be so deeply concerned then about our individual rights and privileges but much more concerned about the whole human society coming to the right solutions of the complex problems that confront us."

I would like to ask of all readers of this piece: Were all the men in history, then, who worked and died to gain and defend the rights of men concerned only with personal satisfaction and privilege?—or are those rights basic to the fabric of society and to the chances of "the whole human society coming to the right solutions of the complex problems that confront us"?

In the regimented world a'coming (and now in the process), we, as citizens (subjects), will be ordered by the authorities to many tasks "in the national interest". This condition, Paul French tells us, has been hastened by "technological improvements", but he neglects to add that much of the problem has arisen because of a cultural lag whereby men have not adjusted their social and economic institutions and mores to the technological improvements. Because we have not adequately and voluntarily made the necessary adjustments, while there was time and oppor-

tunity, we now face the penalty in the fact of increasing regimentation.

Unless we now make a radical revision then, sure enough, we will get the authoritarian State in its most virulent form.

It is at this point that the present "service" philosophy of church-CPS falls short—and the "something" of Germfask seeks to become valid, as well as more articulate. In order to render service in a restricted area, we have long collaborated with uncontrolled authority. The desire to secure public approval and identification, to assure people C.O.'s were not cowards, has led to what one Quaker leader has called "an unholy alliance" between Church and State. In seeking recognition of conscience, pacifists got an expedient system of unpaid forced labor. As one observer put it: "The largest group of C.O.'s are the ones who went to (CPS) camps as an alternative to military service. In the sense in which Macdonald found praise for pacifism in that it is a direct opposing and challenging of a State's power to make war, these men are not pacifists at all. They did not oppose the State; they made a deal with it." This observer goes on to criticize sharply the political consciousness (or lack of it) shown by such men—and he is right. ("POLITICS", Nov. 1944, P. 318)

It is not too late. CPS is here; men have embraced it, accepted it, tacitly acceded to it, wrestled with it, or rejected it. But we are all uneasy. If we were not aware of its implications when we entered CPS two or three or four years ago, time has remedied much of that. The question is, then, what to do? . . .

Experience is showing that the most politically effective methods are beginning to arise in the government camps where more and more men are "opposing the State and its power to make war" without the disadvantage of being shuttled completely out of sight. In fact, in recent months, more and more public attention is being attracted to the situation.

CPS men are in a position to strike a very effective blow at areas of uncontrolled authority—and the growing public complacency and acceptance of such authority—if they are willing to consider themselves as expendable for their principles and convictions as is the soldier expendable (less voluntarily) for the purposes of the State. We must recognize that a majority of human beings are rapidly falling into two categories: those who resist and those who collaborate. This is the *reality* as far as the future is concerned. The manifold reasons behind the embracing or resisting of Statism are varied and personalized. It is impossible to overrate what a really positive direction we can give to resistance if we are willing to step boldly into action, giving to such resistance the non-violent temper for which we should be better trained than most.

The first step in such an effort would be to serve notice to the State and the church sponsors of CPS either by transferring from church-administered units to government-administered units, or by persuading the church sponsors to withdraw from their administrative position so that the way may be clear for unequivocal direct dealings with the State. A new sense of freedom is the great experience many of us have felt at the government camps, a freedom from the confusing and vitiating inhibitions which have characterized the church sponsorship and have rendered sharply-defined opposition utterly impossible. The next step would be to join in opposing the right of the State in war or peace to use its citizens in a program of forced labor which is contributing to the totalitarian cast of the future. To voice our opposition to the war and the power-

truce that is growing out of it. To work in firm dedication for the inalienable right of all men everywhere to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

CPS men will have to come to grips with the authoritarian world sometime. Either we can work to divert the tide of the future to serve the highest purposes of men, or, indeed we will be engulfed in its stultifying waters and made to conform or go down.

ROY C. KEPLER

(Reprinted from "The Germfask News-Letter")

WITH THE HEAVY THINKERS: AGEE DEPT.

The moving pictures of President Roosevelt made at Teheran and at Yalta and when he reported to Congress after Yalta are, I believe, the best records we have of him. . . . In the Yalta pictures there is not only the frightening thinness and sickness, or portent of sickness, but also much more. President Roosevelt had long been a great and fascinating figure for reasons which seemed mainly external, historical; now beyond any question, it seems to me, he was himself becoming a great man. An exceedingly complex and in many ways devious personality was undergoing profound and very rapid change. It was becoming integrated on a level it had scarcely before approached. In the plainest, simplest senses of the words that I can think of, his face was becoming the face of a religious, even of a seer, without loss of its adroitness and worldly resourcefulness and its singular, triumphant, essential gaiety. I felt in the face an intimacy with death and with tragedy which I had never seen in it before, and through that quiet and resolute, cheerful intimacy, a wonderful kind of recklessness, of all save the best that might be perceived and endeavored for the good of all other men. In this curiously light, shining, calm recklessness, this sense that all personal scores were settled and dismissed, in this quality of heroism emergent at last upon its highest level and its grandest prospect, I felt hope of a kind it was impossible to feel in any other living man, and reverence, regardless of how sure I felt that the best hopes must be proved idle. In the moving pictures made when the President addressed Congress, I saw all the same newly crystallized qualities at ease within the gentleman, and was convinced that nothing could destroy them. Their only impermanence was in their great possible increase; now this possibility has been ended. I will not try to describe with what glacial implacability this fact and the following days corroborated and enhanced my impressions. If there is any possible excuse for my writing so subjectively, beyond the fact that I can hardly write or think of anything else, it lies in the fact that I was and remain fairly close to political agnosticism; and that if a person of my kind can be so moved by such a man, and such an event, that may be one more measure and one more expression of what the man and the event mean to those who have and who practice political hope and faith. For my own part I continue without much hope. But I doubt that I can ever again think of a man who works in politics, if his effort seems truly disinterested, without deepest respect.

—Movie review by James Agee in "The Nation" for April 28.

WITH THE HEAVY THINKERS: Dolivet Department (Cont'd.)

When a normally educated citizen hears about difficulties his national government is encountering, he suffers from it and tries to do his best to help solve the difficulty. It is only when the same citizen comes to feel about the weaknesses of world organization a similar urgency or distress, that international cooperation will be on a solid foundation. . . . This specific international loyalty does not need in any way to be opposed to a normal patriotic or national feeling—it is merely an extension of the latter. . . . A vast majority is ready for this combined "national-international" loyalty. (Louis Dolivet in "The New Republic", April 16.)

A new steel allocation order has just been issued by the War Production Board:

"A new requirement has developed from the Office of Economic Warfare in which it requested \$4,000 worth of this equipment (leg-irons and handcuffs) each quarter for use by the Rubber Development Corporation in foreign countries and for export to other nations. There is no prospect that this requirement will be reduced in the near future."

The Rubber Development Corporation is a government corporation which operates in South America and Africa. It does little of the actual production of the rubber, but acquires it on a contract basis after the raw product is gathered by private operators such as Ford and Firestone.

—"The New Leader", March 11, 1944

The Liberation of China

SOME carping critics suggested that it might have been more helpful if Russia had declared war on Japan before, rather than after, the U. S. Army occupied Tokyo. On the whole, however, both the American and British press hailed the Russian declaration as a striking demonstration of the solidarity forged at Teheran and Yalta. Chungking too hastened to welcome its new ally. It was only when Stalin failed to acknowledge Chiang Kai-shek's telegram of gratitude that a certain note of disquiet crept into the editorial page of the *New York Times*. Walter Lippman, however, pointed out in the *Herald-Tribune* that Chiang's failure to come to an agreement with the Chinese Communists made a certain coolness inevitable, if regrettable; moreover, there could be no question that Russia could be of more assistance than China in driving the Japanese out of Manchukuo, where they had left two divisions when they brought home the rest of their troops from the mainland for the unsuccessful defense of the capital.

And there was no question that the Russians rendered valuable military assistance. Within a week after their entry into the war they had taken Harbin; within a fortnight the last Japanese troops had surrendered without a struggle (their commanding general stating that they had failed to surrender before only because of the uncivilized behavior of the Americans, but that they knew that the Russians did not torture prisoners.) And if it seemed to involve somewhat unnecessary zeal when they announced their intention of coming south of the Great Wall to wipe out all remaining pockets of Japanese and puppet government resistance, there was certainly no reason for anyone to object.

It was, however, something of a shock when Tass announced that delegations of Manchus and Mongols from the five northern provinces, Sinkiang, and Szechwan had protested against being returned to Chinese misrule and demanded that they be reunited to their brothers in the People's Republic of Outer Mongolia. Chiang Kai-shek called his Ambassador home from Moscow, and Madame Chiang appealed to the Atlantic Charter, the Stimson doctrine, and the Ten Commandments. Secretary Stettinius told his press conference that he was unable to comment, in view of the fact that he had received no official communication on the subject from either Moscow or Chungking. In Parliament, Prime Minister Eden told a questioner that he felt sure that Russia, like Britain, intended to respect the territorial integrity and independence of China, but that in any case Britain was certainly not committed to preserving Chinese rule over non-Chinese peoples against the will of the latter. And Emanuel Shinwell pointed out, in a speech which was roundly applauded by both sides of the House, that in any conflict over borders between Russia and China, all Englishmen would remember that the latter had already showed its violently imperialistic tendencies by asking for the British city of Hong Kong.

Three days later, the Russians announced that a plebiscite in the disputed areas had shown 96.7% in favor of

joining the People's Republic of Outer Mongolia. (3.3% of the ballots were spoiled.) Chiang Kai-shek brought the matter to the attention of the world security council—or rather tried to—but the Russian delegate interposed his veto, and the matter could not be discussed. For the People's Republic of Outer Mongolia was not a member of the Soviet Union, and the U. S. S. R. was therefore not a party to the dispute, and could use its veto without restriction.

By now, the *New York Times* was indignant. It pointed out that, however justified Russia might prove to be if the question were impartially investigated, her procedure so far looked suspiciously like unilateral action. On the other hand, Samuel Grafton pointed out that in its first test the voting procedure in the Security Council had come through with flying colors. "For," said he, "had it not been for the right of Great Power veto, so wisely and far-sightedly exercised by the Russian delegate, it might have been possible for the Chinese fascists to disrupt the harmony on which peace depends by forcing the discussion of these delicate questions in public, thus playing into the hands of Colonel McCormick and his ilk. Now, however, the responsible leaders of Russia, Britain, and the U. S. A. meet in private and, free from the pressure of the Chinese vote in San Francisco, decide the matter in accordance with the permanent interests of the peoples of their respective countries and — yes — China. 'Open covenants openly arrived at' is a pretty good slogan, but 'It's always fair weather when good fellows get together' is a better one."

In PM, Max Lerner wrote a three-day editorial. On the first day, he said that, while there had been Chinese provocations which no one could deny, nevertheless he felt that Russia's procedure in the matter had been somewhat more abrupt than was necessary or desirable. On the second day, he demonstrated at length that the territories in question, despite the historical claims which China had advanced, were really more Russian than Chinese, since their populations were really identical with the Buryats across the border. Moreover, even China's historical claims were no stronger than Russia's. Not only had Russia held Manchuria, and built the great Russian city of Port Arthur —wrested from it only by Japanese treachery— under Czar Nicholas II, but these areas were the ancient heartland of the Russian people. From them, Genghis Khan and Tamerlane had led their followers to settle Kiev and Muscovy; was it not natural then that those who had been left behind should seek to be joined again to their brethren under the Great Mongol Father in the Kremlin? On the third day, Lerner pointed out that the important thing about this dispute was that it must not be permitted to destroy the unity of the three *really* great powers, and to this end urged that another Big Three conference be held at the earliest possible moment.

Rumors began to fly about that the President was on his way to an undisclosed destination. In the Commons, Deputy Prime Minister Attlee answered questions—or dodged them—in the absence of the Prime Minister. But all doubt that there really would be a meeting of the Big Three to straighten out the situation disappeared when Molotov announced that Russia was withdrawing recognition from

Chungking and had sent an Ambassador to the People's Government at Yen-an.

Within a few days the secret was out. And what a secret! As a special concession to his two great allies, Stalin had for the first time consented to leave Russian territory. For the Big Three had met at Warsaw—or, as it had been renamed in honor of the General who had liberated it for Catherine the Great, Suvorovograd. From such an auspicious beginning, nothing but success could possibly follow. And indeed the U. S. and Britain succeeded in winning the Chinese even better terms than they had secured for the Poles at Yalta. Stalin graciously agreed that, although the territory in question was unquestionably ethnically Russian, China would be allowed to retain the entire Great Wall as a national monument, as well as a substantial part of the Gobi desert. And the Yen-an regime was to be broadened by adding three members each from the Chungking and Shanghai governments. Moreover, the U.S.S.R. would train an army and a secret police for the new government, in order that it might effectively suppress the banditry which had long been China's curse, and in which so-called patriotic guerillas were now engaging.

But the full extent of the American diplomatic victory at Warsaw, did not become known until, in his report to Congress, the President disclosed that Russia had agreed to undertake single-handed the policing of Japan, thereby making it possible for all American troops to come home at once.

MAURICE GOLDBLOOM

Germany 1945: Current Notes

I have seen no news item on Germany today with more implications than the following brief dispatch from Cologne:

"HEADQUARTERS, 12TH ARMY GROUP, May 22—Troops of the United States Fifteenth Army dispersed a gathering of 5,000 German civilians who gathered at Cologne Sunday to welcome home German political prisoners from the Buchenwald camp. The troops fired shots over the heads of the crowd, it was disclosed today.

"Despite the gunfire there was no violence. The meeting was said to have been entirely orderly, although some Germans were reported to have carried signs saying that they were dissatisfied with the Allied handling of Nazis and suggesting that the Germans take matters into their own hands.

"An investigation is under way to determine, among other things, how an advance notice of the meeting was circulated among the Germans."

¶ It is all there: the same use of Allied troops to put down anti-fascist demonstrations that we have seen in Italy, Greece, Belgium; the same remarkable ability of people to plan and act in the face of all authority (to call out 5,000 demonstrators under the noses of the American military was no mean feat); even the same objection to too lenient Allied treatment of fascists. That American troops should have dispersed by force a meeting to honor released Buchenwald prisoners shows the fraudulency of the whole "antifascist" mystique in our war aims, and also the seriousness with which our Army carries out its all-Germans-are-guilty line (except for Germans like Goer-

ing, that is, who get friendly handclasps from our generals instead of rifle volleys from our privates). Finally, let us note well that both the returned prisoners who dared fight against fascism *from within* and the 5,000 people who turned out to honor them were *Germans*, not heroic Russians or peace-loving Frenchmen or democratic Englishmen but militaristic, authoritarian-minded, sheeplike, barbaric *Germans*.

¶ And let us also add that when the Buchenwald prisoners—all of them, Russians and Frenchmen and Jews and Dutchmen as well as the Germans—elected their camp-leader several years ago, they chose a German. As the remarkable report on Buchenwald life reprinted from the *London Tribune* elsewhere in this issue shows, those who actually risked their necks against the Nazis have developed quite a different conception of the problem from that of our own leaders. As Mussolini called his veteran blackshirts "Fascists of the First Hour", so we might call the Allied leaders "Antifascists of the Last Hour."

¶ According to the *London Tribune* (April 27), official Gestapo figures show that in the first half of 1944, the Gestapo was arresting about 1,000 Germans a day. It seems likely that in the final months of the war this average increased greatly. Those sheeplike Germans!

¶ The famous *Frankfurter Zeitung*, leading liberal newspaper of pre-Nazi Germany, has been revived under American Army auspices as the *Frankfurter Presse*. Its new editor is Captain Hans Habe of the Psychological Warfare branch of the U. S. Army. Captain Habe will be remembered as the author of *A Thousand Shall Fall*, a book about his experiences in the French Army in 1939-40 which was perhaps the most vulgar, self-glorifying, mendacious and generally nauseating of all the "I'm a democrat" volumes with which the more opportunistic European refugees flattered the liblab suckers of America. And that is really saying something.

¶ Those dead-end kids of journalism, the worldly-wise editors of *Time*, often display an odd naivete when Certain Things are involved. Thus the May 28 issue remarks: "When Army G-5 surveyed the rubble that had been Cologne, they discovered, surprisingly enough, that the Ford Motor Co. plant was only 15% damaged by bombs and artillery fire." They might have added that the great Cologne rayon plant of Britain's Courtauld, Ltd., was (surprisingly enough) not damaged either. "Where have you been living during the raids?" Stanley Barron of the *London News-Chronicle* asked some women parachute-makers employed at Courtauld's. "In the factory," they replied. To make it all even more surprising, Barron notes that the bombing of Cologne was "so miraculously accurate that it missed the Cathedral almost completely, while completely smashing the main station and marshaling yards a hundred yards away." Will wonders never cease?

¶ When we think of Lidice, Maidanek, and Buchenwald, we should also think of Dresden. The destruction of Dresden by the Allied air forces on February 13-14 (at the request of the Russians, in whose zone of operations the city was but who shrewdly let their Allies do the dirty work) may well stand alongside those terrible names in the history-books of the future. Last issue I quoted one eyewitness account. Now a soldier sends me another from the May 5 *Stars and Stripes*. It is printed right next to a picture of an American Senator looking at a pile of naked corpses at Buchenwald, the editors apparently being unconscious of any irony in the juxtaposition. (Or were they?) The story, by Dan Regan, a *Stars and Stripes* correspondent, reads:

"WITH THE FIRST ARMY.—The Allied air raid on

Dresden on Feb. 13-14 killed 300,000 persons in the city, Dresden police told 600 British and French prisoners who were given passes by the Germans to enter the American lines.

"Nine British PWs, who were working in Dresden during the raid, said the horror and devastation caused by the Anglo-American raid was beyond comprehension unless one could see for himself.

"One British sergeant said the police report did not include deaths among 1,000,000 evacuees from the Breslau area trying to escape from the Russians. There were no records on them.

"After seeing the results of the bombings, I believe their figures are correct.

"They had to pitchfork shriveled bodies on to lorries and wagons and cart them to shallow graves on the outskirts of the city. But after two weeks of work the job became too much to cope with and they found other means to gather up the dead.

"As a second means they burned bodies in a great heap in the center of the city, but the most effective way for sanitary reasons was to take flame-throwers and burn the dead as they lay in the ruins. The whole city is flattened. They were unable to clean up the dead lying beside roads for several weeks,' the sergeant said."

¶ The most encouraging sign we have had so far that the German people have not forgotten how to resist oppression has come not from any of the old parties, not from the labor movement, but from such anti-Nazi youth movements as the "Edelweiss." Louis Clair described them in the last issue. The most recent of the "Inside Germany Reports" (April) brings together a great deal of material on this subject; it may be obtained free from the American Association for a Democratic Germany, 8 East 41st St., New York City 17. The report's most sensational revela-

tion is that the student underground at Bonn University played a big part in helping American troops to capture intact the vital railway bridge over the Rhine at Remagen (perhaps the most important tactical coup of the whole offensive). From the report two significant conclusions about totalitarian systems may be drawn. *Psychological*: the ease with which authoritarian demagogues can play on insecurity and fear to make willing slaves of the masses has perhaps been overestimated; the "Edelweiss" movement, precisely because it has no connection with any political tendency, no program and no ideology but is a purely "negativist" and individualistic *revolt*, shows how deep the craving is for free, spontaneous, "unstated" behavior. *Historical*: we also often forget that a mature totalitarian system is quite different from a young one. As the report notes: "For boys and girls who are under twenty today, National Socialism never had the glamour of being the movement of the youth against the decadent society of the old that it had for those who were in their teens in 1932 and who are around thirty now. [Reports on German prisoners show a significant difference in attitude towards Nazism between those of 18 or less and those of the generation just above them, the latter being much more fanatical.—ED.] For the teen-aged generation of today, National Socialism is the world of the grown-up, it is what their fathers believed in. These youngsters joined the *Jungvolk* and the Hitler Youth not as 'heroic fighting organizations', but as compulsory state organizations. They were just like school, a duty prescribed by the government. Even before the outbreak of the war, the Hitler Youth had become a huge bureaucratic machine lacking the qualities of freedom and self-government that make a good youth organization attractive for adolescents."

¶ Wonder what the Russian eighteen-year-olds are thinking these days. . . .



Cologne, A. D. 1945

Credit: Press Association

Some first-hand reports sent in by soldier readers "somewhere in Germany":

Despite the fact that our papers say nothing about it, there was definitely a resistance movement over here. It seemed to have taken the form of a United Front. The Social Democrats seem, at least numerically, to have been the dominant element. The Communists probably came next (some of them view with suspicion some of the events and means of Stalin). . . . At present we are screening the population for former soldiers, and it has happened more than once that one of the anti-fascists was treated like any other PW—I'm not surprised though. The mayor of this town is a Nazi (appointed by us). The reason for this is that he is the only one capable of doing the job. At least that was the explanation I received. . . . There are quite a number of displaced persons here, mostly Russian and Polish slave labor. Quite a few of them have weapons, and both looting and shooting of civilians is not uncommon.

I have had a chance that anybody except someone who has been here would probably call excellent to observe what's taken place on the front lines this winter. I was lucky enough not to be in a rifle company, or I wouldn't be writing this now. But a battalion headquarters company, which is the organization of which I form a quite unwilling part, is always close enough to the front to be most uncomfortable and to let me see only too much of what those poor riflemen went through. About the only aspect of being an infantry rifeman that is not bad is the fact that it's almost impossible for you to go through more than two or three months of really tough going. After—or rather by—that time, the law of averages has caught up with you and you're in a hospital or dead.

As Macdonald pointed out (see *"On the Psychology of Killing" in the September, 1944 issue—ED.*) there is very little actual combat between troops at close range. Of course there is a great deal of small-arms firing, but practically all of it comes in the "marching-fire" technique used in the assault of enemy positions, by which every one carries as much ammunition as he can and blasts away at a general target, forcing the enemy to cover and turning the whole thing into just another assault by machines. I have many friends who tell me that they don't actually know of any German they have killed; and it is certain that the vast majority of our—and the Germans'—casualties are from artillery and mortar fire.

There is, of course, the same old schism between what is "serious" for the soldier and what is "real." Practically every one believes that the war must be fought and that he is "doing his part"; practically every one would get out of the army if he could. The same with "fraternization." There is almost no resistance to the policy that in order to put down Nazism for good we must punish the Germans and that we must put up a stern front. This is serious. It is concerned with ideology. But that certainly doesn't prevent them from following German girls home at night and from going to German whorehouses, despite frequent raids by the MP's. This is real, this is "life."

So far as ideology goes, the identity of the German people with the Nazis has been so thoroughly drilled into us that even looking at Germans and realizing how like Americans they are doesn't do any good. Certainly they're human, but they're Germans. The most frequent reply to any expression of pity for the victims of bombing is, "Well, they should have thought of that when they started bombing England." "They" means those two children poking

in the rubble of what used to be their home, as well as Goering and his bomber crews. Since this is ideology and "serious", it is therefore abstract and the fact that you may actually pity these persons has no bearing on the matter because the feeling is only subjective and what would be a "real" emotion if it were connected with sex.

You of course know that we are subject to court-martial and heavy fine for "fraternization." For some time before the order came out, we were bombarded with all sorts of propaganda about not trusting the Germans and how German kids to whom you threw candy hate your guts. Of course the heaviest weapon is still the punishment, but the propaganda has undoubtedly had its effects. I have a good friend who burns all extra cigarettes and food he doesn't want to carry along every time he leaves a German town. So the German civilians won't be able to have them. . . .

Psychology note: all the proclamations of the AMG are printed in two languages. The English version is always either to the left or above the German. Of course the proclamations are all for the benefit of the German civilians, but aren't we shrewd?

I think Eisenhower has been reading Rex Stout.

"The Responsibility of Peoples" was good and stimulating reading, though I thought quite drawn-out. The whole point that I got was that not all the Germans are Nazis or Fascists, and hence the German people as a whole weren't responsible for the war, which was the responsibility (or rather irresponsibility) of "power politics" and men in high places. This is all very true. Yet what Germans were "good" and what Germans were "bad" is more of a point than it is easy to define.

Without exception every German civilian I've encountered over here tells me he was "nix Nazi"—and against Hitler all along. Without exception, though there are many whose towns have been burnt to the ground and who have hatred and anger in the face (this is understandable). But in those towns where no bombardment has taken place, the women and children wave and smile and welcome the coming of the Americans. They can't understand that it is forbidden for American soldiers even to talk to them or give a bit of chocolate to a child. And yet think of it—it was not long ago that these Germans heiled and shrieked themselves hoarse over German victories. Something has really died in the moral conscience of these people—something has happened that has poisoned the moral conscience of all people.

The Germans have much fear for their own SS men, whom they term fanatics. They also fear the Russians and expect better treatment at American hands. Won't they be surprised. No peace in our time.

WITH THE LABOR STATESMEN

The CIO had a lavish welcome ready for its new political hero, Henry Wallace. He was housed in the six-room Skyway Suite of Chicago's Hotel Stevens—where Tom Dewey stayed last June . . . In the tumult when Wallace had finished his speech [at the CIO Convention], few could hear Phil Murray's ecstatic tribute: "We love him because he is one of us, a common man." . . . Murray and Hillman hustled Wallace to the Skyway Suite for luncheon. As two waiters served the first course (honeydew melon), Henry Wallace looked about him, at the luxury of the room, the sumptuousness of the menu. . . . He drily observed: "You common men live well."

—"Time", Dec. 4, 1944.

BUCHENWALD BEFORE THE WAR

THERE was nobody in the Viennese Labour Movement who had not known Dr. Emil Maurer, district chairman of the Socialist Party in Vienna, barrister of the *Schutzbund*, chairman of the Socialist Party's Central Arbitration Committee—a metal-worker who had studied in his spare time and had become a doctor of law. This is the story he told me of the nine months he spent in Buchenwald before the outbreak of the war, after having been for six months in Dachau and, for shorter or longer periods, in various other camps.

He speaks in a simple matter-of-fact way of working days which lasted from three in the morning till seven at night, with only fifteen minutes' break for a lunch consisting of a watery soup; he mentions, by the way, that for a long time not a drop of water was given to any of the prisoners for fear of typhoid infections, that they had to go unwashed for months (while working in quarries or building roads and barracks) that limbs had to be amputated as the result of blood-poisoning, that men got shot for breaking into the room where the water tap was kept under guard. Now at last all this will be believed in the outside world. But it is only one part of the story, and, Dr. Maurer insists, not even the most important part.

First and foremost, the Nazis were concerned with trying to break the morale of their political captives, and they did so by mixing criminals with the political prisoners. When Dr. Maurer came to Buchenwald in September, 1938, out of the 6,000 inmates of this camp roughly one-third were there for political reasons; about 1,200 were religious Pacifists; another 1,200 were ordinary criminals, while the rest consisted of so-called "asocial elements" or "work shirkers," and homosexuals. The S.S. in charge appointed foremen from the ranks of the prisoners, who were held personally responsible for the discipline of the inmates. They enjoyed certain privileges, but they were able to hold on to them only by the utmost brutality against their fellow prisoners.

At the beginning only criminals were appointed as foremen, and in order to earn favours from the S.S. guards they gloried in the most gruelling treatment of their work gangs. This vicious system, however, was broken by the unshakable solidarity among the political prisoners. A bitter and unequal battle began between the Reds and the Greens (patches of political prisoners were red, of criminals green, of "asocial elements" black, and of Jews yellow). In spite of all the favours they found with the guards, the Greens lost this battle.

We realised, says Dr. Maurer, that we could only protect our weaker comrades and keep them alive by taking over the foremen's jobs ourselves. So we set about ousting the Greens. This became possible because, on the whole, the political prisoners were more intelligent and better equipped for skilled and office jobs, but chiefly because the Greens extracted bribes from their fellow prisoners. Those who had some money accredited to them in the camp office or had money sent from outside, could buy themselves "lighter jobs, such as the cleaning of la-

vatories, or even jobs like carrying the dead away (in October, November and December, 1938, the death roll in Buchenwald was about 80 per day). Anything was better than the unbearable drudgery in the quarries.

The most intensely coveted privilege was that of being allowed to carry an armlet indicating that one was "mentally unsound," which gave some protection against the horrors of daily camp life. The Greens could always be bribed to grant such "favours." But this was where they could be brought into conflict with the guards who considered it *their* special privilege to extort bribes. And so it came about that more and more Green foremen were replaced by Red ones. The Reds steadfastly refused to beat their comrades and were repeatedly beaten instead. That was the only way in which they could protect their weaker fellow sufferers. That was, in particular, how they helped their comrades whose Jewish faith made them a special target for the sadism of the S.S.

The most terrible "ordinary" punishment was to be beaten in public—25 strokes on the naked back. Yet, Dr. Maurer says, not one day passed without one or the other of the Red foremen refusing to beat his comrades, in the full and clear knowledge that this meant being beaten himself.

The recognised leader of the Reds in Buchenwald at that time was Max Urich, former general secretary of the German Metal-workers Union. They used to get up even before three in the morning, Dr. Maurer says, to have a talk with him about the political situation outside the barracks. Information was supplied by a Socialist comrade from Berlin, who, as a skilled radio mechanic, had occasionally an opportunity to get near a wireless set and listen-in. When some of the prisoners got woollen vests during winter, the Reds immediately delivered theirs to Urich, who hid them and distributed them to those most in need.

Robert Danneberg, one of the outstanding leaders of the Austrian Labour Movement, former general secretary of the Austrian Socialist Party, suffered from a painful disease. A lemon would have relieved his sufferings. But what an unheard-of luxury was a lemon for a prisoner in Buchenwald! Still, after asking around everywhere it turned out that one of the prisoners actually possessed half a lemon, which he had never dared to touch, considering it as his greatest treasure. Without a second's thought he handed it over. (Danneberg later died in the camp in Oswiecim).

In November, 1938, the prisoners were put to work building large extensions of the camp. They were soon to learn why. Twenty thousand Jews were brought in after the fearful pogroms following the assassination of the German official, vom Rath, in Paris. The Reds were faced with a new situation. The S.S. introduced special foodless days for the Jews—the Yellows. On those days the Reds shared their scanty bread rations with the Jewish prisoners. The number of daily burials increased greatly during this period. Some of the non-political Jewish prisoners were gradually released, but in the meantime 10,000 of them had perished.

When two comrades went down with typhoid fever, the Reds went without their pathetically small and urgently

needed fat ration to help their comrades. When the Red foreman got to know that the guards intended to "liquidate" one or the other of the prisoners they often managed to save him. They arranged for instance, for a convenient "accident" in the quarry which cost a broken foot, but kept the endangered friend for some time in hospital and out of sight of the guards. The list of brave and selfless deeds of solidarity could be extended to fill page upon page. So could be the scroll of honour bearing the names of Buchenwald's unknown martyrs. Max Urich is among those who died in Buchenwald, so that his comrades might live; König, the former Secretary of the Metalworkers' Union in Halle; Barthel, a former Communist Member of the Reichstag; Heilmann, the leading Prussian Social Democrat; the Austrian Robert Danneberg, Kurt Eisner, the son of Bavaria's Socialist Prime Minister, himself murdered soon after the Revolution of 1918, and many, many others.

Special mention should be made of the 1,200 religious Pacifists who were in Buchenwald in 1938. They belonged to the sect of the Bible Students, and they were repeatedly offered release on the one condition that they should drop their objection to joining the Wehrmacht. Dr. Maurer saw only three give in out of 800 who were offered this way out.

The most unforgettable scene which Dr. Maurer remembers from his days in Buchenwald occurred on the 1st of May, 1939. When May Day came 200 of the prisoners, the most trusted of all, assembled in their filthy and bare barrack-room to pay tribute to the day of International Labour. Never has there been a more solemn and moving May Day celebration—200 candidates of death, 200 men in deepest humiliation and helplessness, hungry and tired, and worn out, meeting under the fearful threat of being discovered by the guards or the Greens (who might easily denounce them.) What discovery would have meant does not bear thinking about, for an organised attempt at a demonstration like this was considered the worst of all possible crimes. Yet they celebrated their May Day. For a whole hour they sat in complete silence. Then the oldest member got up—the Social Democrat, Ernst Heilmann; and slowly they all got up, silently walking away from this hour of memories, vows and hopes—back into the reality of Buchenwald.

JAN LEVCIK

(Reprinted from "Tribune" (London), April 27, 1945.)

EUROPEAN NEWSREEL

Fluttering Banners and Empty Bellies

The only thing that is actively being reconstructed in France is the army. In all other fields deadly lethargy reigns. None of the decisive social forces—bureaucracy, bourgeoisie, working class—has as yet come out victorious. This stalemate must be overcome soon lest France should completely collapse.

The industrialists do not invest, they are on strike against the government and its vague nationalization plans, they want guarantees first. The government, on the other hand, is torn between different tendencies, and in the meantime does not intervene actively in the economic field.

The middle classes are wiped out slowly by growing inflation, assuming ever more startling proportions. The black market gradually undermines the whole economic structure.

The Left repents its backing of De Gaulle but sees no alternative. Fearful of chaos if it should actively attack De Gaulle, it stares at him frightened, yet fascinated. A leading trade-unionist recently said: "De Gaulle se pétainise"—yet he continues to back him publicly. The Left does not dare to speak out about what the London *Tribune* calls "the vainglorious policy of fluttering banners and empty bellies." "The trouble is that nobody in France says what's at the back of his mind." (Jean Schlumberger in *Figaro*).

France is demoralized, feels deceived and frustrated. To want to get something for nothing is not only an American disease, as Dwight Macdonald recently wrote. It is a French disease too. We have heard the leader of the French Socialist Party, Daniel Meyer, say recently: "We want an economical revolution." The trouble is that this sort of thriftiness doesn't pay. Those who have backed De Gaulle will realize soon that political stalemates cannot exist for long. If the Left doesn't take a decisive lead soon, the Right will definitely seal its alliance with De Gaulle and install an authoritarian state.

Where Danton called for "de l'audace, de l'audace", Meyer and his brethren ask for "de la prudence, de la prudence". But the prudent of today will be the victims of tomorrow. Those who dare not speak up while they still can speak, soon may find that they can no longer speak when they want to. They should have heeded the advice of that master politician: Lloyd George: "There is no greater mistake than to leap the abyss in two jumps."

The Age of the Common Slave

People are shifted like cattle: if you give me 500,000 Sudeten-Germans, I might deliver some Tyrolians; we might barter a few Germans against machine tools. Here again, what Hitler has started will be realized now in even larger proportions.

The haste with which the victorious powers vie with each other for the only commodity that notwithstanding all technological advance is more in demand than ever—I mean slave labor—is obscene. On May 16th alone, the papers carried stories to the effect that (1) Italy is to receive 200,000 German prisoners; (2) British building trade unions who previously were hostile to employing German slave labor, have now rescinded these scruples, and Duncan Sandys, Minister of Works, has stated: "We are going to waste no time and I hope that within the next fortnight we should see the German prisoners at work"; (3) Belgium has been assured that at least 200,000 German prisoners will soon be available to work in the Belgian coal mines; (4) De Gaulle has demanded at least 1,000,000 German workers for France.

Russia makes no longer any demands; she just sends the prisoners back and,—to use a quaint phrase I read in the *Daily Worker*, or was it *PM*?—"re-educates them through useful labor."

Time for Toughness

The late Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, met the Chinese ambassador shortly after Pearl Harbor. The ambassador expressed China's sorrow at the Japanese attack. "Don't you worry", exploded Knox, "we'll fix those little yellow bastards."

After an American tank column had liberated one of the large concentration camps in Central Germany, the major in command made a little speech to the inmates:

"The whole German people will have to pay for the bestialities which they have committed—they are all responsible". One of the prisoners rose, looked at the officer, and said: "We are Germans too, you know."

Two quotes taken from one and the same article by Drew Middleton (*New York Times*, May 17)

"A recent directive to military Government officers said: 'Mere membership in the Nazi Party is not to disqualify persons for positions under the Military Government, except in the case of high officials'".

"We haven't modified the non-fraternization order because we haven't found any decent people in Germany", General Clay declared. . . . He couldn't define American policy toward anti-Nazi Germans freed from concentration camps and apparently the non-fraternization rule will apply to them as well as to senior Nazi Party members."

When the former inmates of Buchenwald held a memorial meeting for their slain comrades, they raised the flags of all those nations from which victims had died in the camp; a German flag was flown among the others. . . . These Buchenwald inmates formed a committee with two members for each nation. The head of the Committee is a former German deputy.

Descent to Hell

Dr. George Dimitrov (not to be confused with the Comintern Dimitrov), the leader of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union (the leftist peasant party of Stambuliski) lived in exile in the Near East.

First Circle: In the autumn of 1944, Dimitrov returns to Bulgaria, to be received with great ovations: in every village he is welcomed home by the peasants, all Bulgarian papers carry lead articles on this courageous anti-fascist who finally has returned. He immediately became Secretary-General of the National Agrarian Union, one of the most important groups in the Fatherland Front government coalition.

Second Circle: Dimitrov is not a man to accept Stalin's orders. Very soon "certain difficulties arose between the Agrarian Union and the Communist Party." In January 1945 it is announced that "Dimitrov has resigned all his positions in the Agricultural Union."

Third Circle: Since April, all Bulgarian papers carry lead articles against the defeatist and fascist activities of Dimitrov's adherents.

The Fourth Circle is not hard to guess.

Economic Potpourri in the Balkans

The economic system which the Russians now impose on the conquered territories is a strange mixture of small landholdings, cooperative farming, nationalized industry, small- and medium-scale, semi-free enterprise, the whole under the direction of the state—a system which baffles any economist who has been accustomed to thinking in the fixed categories of "capitalism or socialism." The "mixed economy", dear to the heart of Lewis Corey may very well come to life—under strange auspices—in the Russian-occupied parts of Europe.

Large-scale industry has in most cases been taken over by the governments under various pretexts: the owner has fled, or has been shot as a collaborator, etc. Small- and medium-size enterprises are being run by the former owners—if they can be found. The state tries to encourage local and regional associations of manufacturers to organize specific branches of industry under general government directives.

The Bulgarian CP leader, Dimitroff, recently character-

ized the new Bulgarian regime as "a lasting fighting alliance of workers, peasants, intelligentsia and artisans which also includes patriotic tradesmen and industrialists." And the General Council of Bulgarian Industry (the Bulgarian equivalent of the NAM) sent the following telegram to the erstwhile head of the Comintern: "The Bulgarian industrialists gratefully accept your council. . . . We wish you health so that you may be able to advise us in the future."

Neither is the land question solved in a uniform way. In Yugoslavia, for example, some land is being distributed to the peasants, other lands are only given in permanent tenancy free of charge. In other places again the land is given to agricultural cooperatives and the peasants till the land in common. (By the way, I made a grievous error when I wrote a few months ago that there was practically no land that could be distributed to the peasants in Yugoslavia: Tito has found a solution: all the land that belonged to the German minority has become state property—the original owners having been shipped to Russia—and is now being distributed; so is the land of real or alleged collaborators and of Michailovich's followers.)

Yet this strange assortment of various economic systems, this alliance of the most diverse elements, this mixture of state-directed economy and nationalization with land distribution, and therefore extension of the market economy, this partial elimination of the traditional middlemen, all this, added to the fact that large deliveries still must be made to Russia, amounts to a grandiose "negative accumulation", to a tremendous economic chaos.

It is impossible to have a clear picture of Balkan conditions since the Russians have imposed a news blackout more complete even than the Nazis ever succeeded in imposing. But the very few reports that have filtered through tell of incredible misery, starvation, typhus epidemics, and complete economic breakdown. And on top of all this reigns a political terror which not seldom takes the form of mass butchery.

In short—"Socialism" on the march! LOUIS CLAIR

BLUSHING VIOLET DEPT.

But we have once again, as so often before, been successful in turning fate away. Some credit is due—apart from the struggle and work of all my countrymen at home and at the fronts—to my own work and my own devotion.

—From Hitler's speech of Dec. 30, 1944.

EMANCIPATION OF WOMAN: LATEST NEWS

Graduates of the Central School for Volunteer Girl Snipers in Moscow have killed more than 20,000 enemy officers and soldiers.

—"Capitol Times", Madison, Wisc., for April 6.

Just off the Press!

The Responsibility of Peoples

Dwight Macdonald's discussion of German "war guilt." In pamphlet form; new material added; photographic cover.

15c a copy; 10 for \$1; 100 for \$9.

Order from "Politics", 45 Astor Place,
New York 3, N. Y.

The Danger Was Within (3)

Vignettes of NEP

Victor Serge

IN the spring of 1921, Lenin wrote a long article defining the NEP: no more requisitions, no more taxes in kind from the peasants; freedom to buy and sell; removal of the restrictions on production by craftsmen; concessions on attractive terms to foreign capitalists; freedom of enterprise—within limits, to be sure, but limits imposed by the Soviet citizenry themselves. What it added up to was a partial restoration of capitalism, and Lenin admitted it in so many words. At the same time he denied the country any political freedom whatever: "The Mensheviks will remain locked up!" And he proclaimed a party purge, directed against those revolutionaries who had come from other parties—i.e., who had not been saturated with the Bolshevik way of thinking. Within the party, this meant a dictatorship of the old Bolsheviks, plus disciplinary measures aimed not at the opportunists but at the critics.

Some time afterwards, during the Third Congress of the International, I went to hear Bukharin lecture before the foreign delegates. His case for the NEP ran in terms of "the impossibility of finishing off the rural *petite bourgeoisie* (the peasants, with their attachment to small property-holdings) in a single blood-letting—an impossibility which is itself the result of the isolation of the Russian revolution." If a German revolution, backed up by Germany's industrial capacity, had come to our assistance, we would have pressed forward along the path of all-out communism, even if it had called for bloodshed. I do not have Bukharin's text before me, but I printed it once, and I am sure this is an accurate summary. It surprised me all the more because I had run into Bukharin several times at Zinoviev's, and genuinely admired him.

The Brains of the Revolution

Lenin, Trotsky, Karl Radek, and Bukharin had, beyond question, come to be the brains of the revolution. They spoke the same Marxist language, and had the same background of experience with European and American socialism. Moreover, they understood each other so well, with so little need to depend upon the spoken word, that they actually seemed to think *collectively*. (The party in fact drew its strength from its collective thinking.) Compared to them, such a man as Lunacharsky, People's Commissar of Public Education (a playwright, a poet, an able though pretentious public speaker, he had translated Hoelderlin into Russian, and set himself up as a protector of futurist painters) seemed to be a mere dilettante. Beside them, Zinoviev was just a rabble-rouser, a popularizer of ideas furnished by Lenin. Chicherin, specializing in questions of foreign policy, kept to his archives. The wily Kalinin, chosen for his job because of his good peasant head and his intuitive knowledge of popular feeling and opinion, was a representative figure-head. There were other big names in the

party, men of proven worth; but they were secondary figures, who gave full time to practical tasks: Krassin, Pyatakov, Sokolnikov, Smilga, Rakovsky, Preobajensky, Joffe, Ordjonikidze, Dzerjinsky.

Nicholas Ivanovitch Bukharin, now 33 years old, had been a militant for fifteen years. He had lived through a period of exile in Onega, had been with Lenin in Crakow, and had done party work in Vienna, Switzerland, and New York. A tireless researcher in economics, he had worked out, even before Lenin, a doctrine of the complete overthrow of the capitalist State. His mind was both effervescent and rigorously disciplined; always alert, always active. The high forehead, the thin hair the slightly turned-up nose, the chestnut-brown moustache and chin-beard—all made him look the picture of the average Russian. His careless clothing only completed this picture. He dressed in the most devil-may-care fashion imaginable—as if he had just never found time to get a suit that fitted him. His normal expression was jovial, and even when he was silent, the look in his eye, sharpened by a humorous sparkle, was that of a man about to venture a witticism. He devoured books in several languages, and spoke lightly about the most serious subjects. You knew, a moment after you met him, that what he most enjoyed was turning ideas over in his head. Young people always crowded about him, and hung smiling on every incisive word he spoke. He had a great contempt for the trade union bonzes and the parliamentary politicians of the Western countries, and never missed a chance to ridicule them.

Because he spoke all other languages with an incredibly bad accent, we used to say that Karl Radek (35 years old at the time) expressed himself in his own idiom no matter what language he was using. A Galician Jew, he had grown up with the socialist movements in Galicia, Poland, Germany and Russia—all at the same time. He was a brilliant writer, with an equal flair for synthesis and sarcasm; and an uncompromising realist. Thin, rather small, nervous, he was always ready with an anecdote—as often as not one with a sharp point to it. Like an old-time pirate, he let his beard grow in a fringe around his clean-shaven face. His features were irregular, and because he was extremely near-sighted he always wore thick tortoiseshell glasses. His walk, his quick gestures, his pout, his way of screwing up his face, every muscle of which moved as he talked along without ever stopping, all had something monkey-like about them which it was amusing to watch.

In 1918, when Lenin was considering a mixed economy, these two men Radek and Bukharin, had been the first to speak up in favor of the nationalization of large industries. That same year, in the course of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, they had accused Lenin, some 15 years their senior,

of opportunism, and had romantically demanded all-out resistance by the Soviet Republic against the German Empire. In 1919 Radek had put his daring and good sense into an attempt to guide the Spartacist movement in Germany, and by pure luck had survived the assassination of his friends Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, and Leo Tychko (Jogiches). I had myself watched him use his satirical dialectic on the German moderates, and make life miserable for them. I can see him now, hitching up his trousers (they were always too big for him) as he took his stance beside the dispatch-box, and demonstrating, after an ear-splitting "Parteigenossen!", that the days of the old regime in Europe were numbered. Though more of an improviser than a theoretician, he also was a scholar, and read all the learned journals he could lay his hands on. He was now being called a Rightist, because he had no use for the German Communist Party, and because he believed that, for the time being anyhow, there was no likelihood of revolutionary uprising in Central Europe.

The Third Congress

The Third Congress of the Communist International met in Moscow. Save for a certain letdown in intensity, its mood was much the same as that of the preceding Congress, though the attendance was larger. With the NEP, food had become less scarce, and the atmosphere by now was heavy with the smell of appeasement. The delegates from abroad asked no questions about the tragedy at Kronstadt, and all but a handful deliberately closed their minds to information about it. They condemned the Workers' Opposition without even giving it a hearing. And they considered the NEP—I quote one of the French delegates—an "inspired turn to the Right that had saved the revolution." But it doesn't take much inspiration to yield to a famine, or to back out of a hopeless situation. The truth is, rather, that the spectacular character of the Russian Revolution, even at this time, was undermining the critical faculties of its sympathizers. Supporting the revolution, to them, meant abdication of the right to do your own thinking. Lenin defended the NEP—in a speech delivered at the Kremlin, among the tall gilded columns of the throne room of the Imperial Palace. As he spoke, he stood under a canopy of crimson velvet, embroidered with the emblem of the Soviets. When he came to international strategy, he argued in favor of a breathing-spell, and an attempt to win over the masses. He was easy, warm, friendly; and he expressed himself as simply as he knew how to—as if determined to get across with every gesture the fact that the head of the Soviet government and of the Russian Communist Party was still just another comrade—the most eminent one, it is true, because of his recognized intellectual and moral leadership, but no more than that, and one who would never become just another statesman or just another dictator. He had obviously determined to carry the International with him by persuasion. Now and then, he would leave the speakers' stand and take a seat on the steps, near the stenographers. With his note-pad on his knee he would break in with an occasional wisecrack that made everybody laugh, and a mischievous smile would light up his face. Or he would buttonhole one or another of the least known and least conspicuous foreign delegates,

draw him into a corner, and, man to man, press home the points he'd been making: The party must turn to the masses! Yes, to the masses! The party must not become sectarian! The NEP was not nearly so dangerous as it might look from the outside, because the party had the situation completely in hand. The capitalist concessionaires from abroad would have a hard row to hoe! As for the neo-capitalists inside the country—well, the thing to do was fatten them up for a while, like chickens, and then, when they began to cause trouble, gently wring their necks, which it would be easy enough to do.

On several occasions I happened to see him on his way home after one of the sessions—dressed in the familiar cap and jacket, alone, marching along with quick step with the Kremlin cathedrals towering up above him on either side. And once I was present when, genial as always, his face shining with health and good spirits, he took Bela Kun apart in a mercilessly abusive speech. It was at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the International, held during this same Congress in the ballroom of a hotel—the Continental, I think; that speech of Lenin's was a real turning-point in the history of Communist policy.

"Our Carnot"

Trotsky attended many of the Congress' sessions. Nobody ever carried the burden of a great destiny more gracefully. Still only 41 years old, there was little—of power, popularity, fame—left for him to win: tribune of Petrograd in two revolutions; creator of the Red Army, which he literally, as Lenin put it to Gorki, "pulled out of his hat". Victor in such decisive battles as Svajsk, Kazan, Poulkovo; Organizer of Victory ("Our Carnot," Radek called him). In oratorical gifts, in organizational capacity (first the army, then the railroads), in ideological brilliance, he overshadowed Lenin, who was his superior in only one respect (but a most important one): before the revolution he had been the undisputed leader of the tiny Bolshevik Party, which supplied the cadres of the new state organization, and whose sectarian spirit distrusted the rich and subtle mentality of the chairman of the supreme War Council. At one time during the Congress little groups here and there were talking of Trotsky for the chairmanship of the International. But Lenin preferred to keep the "world party" in the hands of his own mouthpiece.

Trotsky's own attention was given to Soviet economy. He came to the session dressed in a white uniform of special design, without insignia. The headgear, white also, was a broad, flat garrison cap. The effect, what with his huge chest, his jet-black hair and beard, the sparkle of his eye-glasses, was imposing. He lacked Lenin's easy way with people, there was a touch of the authoritarian in his bearing. That, at least, is how he looked to my friends and me, who though Communists still had our critical faculties about us. We admired him greatly, but were not fond of him. His severity, his insistence on punctuality both in the office and on the battlefield, his invariable correctness (at a time when nobody else was paying much attention to formalities), all lent themselves to malicious gossip. I was indifferent to that, but the solutions he proposed for the problems then under discussion struck

me as downright dictatorial. Had he not favored absorption of the trade unions by the state—while Lenin, rightly, had wished to leave the unions a certain degree of independence? We did not grasp the fact that trade-union pressure would perhaps have imposed a wholesome proletarian orientation upon the State itself. Had he not created the labor battalions? Had he not proposed militarization as a remedy for the unbelievably disorganized condition of industry? We didn't know that, still earlier, in the Central Committee, he had tried unsuccessfully to put an end to requisitioning. The labor battalions had been an acceptable expedient during the demobilization period. Had he not signed a manifesto, a shamefully threatening one, against Kronstadt? The truth was that he had been in the thick of things, of everything, acting with a vigor which was both sure of itself and willing to seek solutions first in one direction and then in another.

During one of the sessions he left the speakers' stand, came over to where our French group was sitting, and gave us his own interpretation of the speech he had just made. His French, though ungrammatical, was fluent and expressive. When he was heckled about the terror, about violence, about party discipline, he responded sharply. Our little group—Paul Vaillant-Couturier, André Morizet, André Julien, Fernand Lorient, Jacques and Clara Mesnil and Boris Souvarine, among others—seemed to irritate him. Trotsky was courteous, cordial even, but implacable in his argumentation. On another occasion he tore into the Spanish delegate, Arlandis, who resented the persecution of the anarchists. Trotsky, seizing him by his coat collar, almost shouted: "I'd like to see the same thing happen to you, you petit-bourgeois."

Could It Have Been Done Better?

The NEP, though it had been in effect only a few months, was giving marvelous results. You could tell the difference from week to week: food was easier to get; there was less speculation; the restaurants were reopening their doors. More incredible still, they were selling pastries, edible pastries mind you, at a rouble apiece! The general public was beginning to breathe more easily, and there was a good deal of loose talk about the return to capitalism . . . and prosperity. The confusion among the rank and file of the party, on the other hand, was appalling. What did we fight for, spill so much blood, accept so many sacrifices? Those who had fought in the civil war asked such questions bitterly. Most of them lacked all the necessities: clothes, decent lodgings, money; and now everything was turning back into exchange-value. You had the feeling that money, dethroned, had been restored to its kingdom.

Myself, I was more hopeful. I saw some good in the turn things had taken, although the reactionary aspect of the change—the arbitrary snuffing out of every trace of democracy—disturbed and hurt me. Would any other ending to the drama of War Communism have been possible? It was a problem of merely theoretical interest, but one well worth thinking about. I developed some ideas about it, and set them forth, on the occasion I best remember, to two Spanish socialists I had a talk with at

the Hotel Lux. (Fernando de los Ríos was one of them.) They ran as follows:

Because of its intolerance, and because it had arrogated to itself an absolute monopoly of power and initiative in all fields, the Bolshevik regime reached a dead end. It had spread a sort of general paralysis over the country, and had put the revolution in a desperate position. The big concessions to the peasants had been unavoidable; but small-shop production, middle-sized stores, and even some industries could have been revived by merely appealing to the initiative of groups of producers and consumers. By granting freedom of action to the State-strangled co-operatives, by calling economic associations into existence, large-scale recovery could have been achieved almost overnight. The country was out of shoes and out of leather; but the rural districts had leather, and the shoemakers' co-operatives, if they had been let alone, would have got hold of it and would have gone into action at once. They would have had to sell at relatively high prices, but at one and the same time the State could have assisted them in their operations and exercised a downward pressure on their prices. These, in any case, would have been below those charged on the black market. I saw, in Petrograd, what was happening to the book trade. The stocks of the bookstores, taken over by the State, were rotting away in basements. In the spring, the basements often filled up with water. So we were downright grateful to the thieves who salvaged items and—illegally, of course—put them back into circulation. If the books had been turned over to associations of booklovers, the book trade could have been saved in no time. In a word, I favored a "communism of associations"—in contrast to the existing State communism. The clashes of interest between such associations, the disorder natural to beginnings, would have caused less trouble than we were having with our highly bureaucratic centralization, with its red-tape and its muddling. I thought of the scheme not as something to be handed down by the State from on high, but rather as resulting from the harmonizing, by congresses and meetings of specialists, of initiatives working up from below. However since the Bolshevik mind had already conjured up other solutions, it was all a venture in pure theory.

Brook Farm, Soviet Style

After Kronstadt, some friends of mine and I got to wondering what lay ahead of us. We did not have the slightest wish to join the ruling bureaucratic clique and become bureau chiefs or executive secretaries. I was offered a chance at a career in diplomacy that would have taken me, first of all, to the East. The East had its attractions for me, but diplomacy did not. Finally, we thought we had the answer. We would build an agricultural settlement deep in some rural section of Russia. While the NEP was busy making the cities re-learn the folkways of a bourgeois society, and creating sinecures and easy careers for new recruits to the governing group, we would live close to the soil and grow wheat. The broad expanses of the Russian countryside, bleak but kindly, have infinite charm. We easily got hold of a huge tract of unoccupied land, hundreds of hectares of woods and prairie, and thirty head of stock—a big landowner's estate north of Petrograd, not

far from Lake Ladoga. There a group of us—several French communists, some Hungarian prisoners, a doctor who was a disciple of Tolstoy, and Roussakov, my father-in-law—founded the “French Commune of Novaya-Ladoga.” There were many difficulties to be overcome, but we went into it with cheerful determination. The land had gone unused because the peasants, unwilling to cultivate it collectively, had insisted upon its being divided up. The chairmen of the two short-lived collectives established there within a period of eighteen months had been murdered. The worker who represented the Cheka in the district, a printer, advised us to win the peasants over at any cost, because if we didn’t they would make life impossible for us.

There were fine woods—of the northern type, with scant foliage, bright clearings, closed in by thick-grown trees, a pretty stream. And a big frame house, almost seignorial in appearance, where we found only things nobody had thought worth carting off: for instance, a few iron bedsteads cast in the style new-rich merchants used to like. Almost all the farm tools had been stolen. As for the four work-animals they had promised us, well, they finally came through with three spent horses and a one-eyed mare that never got enough to drink. We nick-named her “La Parfaite”. Most of our food we had to bring from Petrograd on our backs, along with rope, tools, matches—and lamps, which we were unable to find oil for even after we’d got them there! Getting things to town and back required new feats of endurance every day. Novaya-Ladoga was twenty kilometers away, along a grassy path through the woods: but it was a desolate little town which had nothing to offer us except a handful of dull officials who had let themselves be terrorized by the hostility that beat in on them from all sides. At frequent intervals, with my knapsack on my back, I made the trip to Petrograd. It took me up the Neva, which in this part of the country is a wide river whose sea-green waters, with quiet forests on either side, flow along under a limpid sky. When I got to Schulusselberg, I had to change to another boat, which was like something out of a storybook—a tiny skiff swarming with poor folk laden like pack-animals and which regularly ran aground.

Once I made this fine trip standing up—with a steel deck-plate under my feet and nothing to lean my back against but a sizzling funnel. A stiff north wind kept my face and chest frozen while the fire in the boiler was roasting my backside. But the view was superb: the sombre fortress of Schluselburg, rising sheer above the lake, blended softly into the blue of the horizon. I had a good twenty kilometers to do on foot at the end of the journey, all of it over lonely paths through the forest; and with this in mind we were trying to decide whether it would be wise for me to carry a revolver. You should have a weapon with you—there was no doubt about that. But then someone might well kill you just to get it. However, except for getting very thirsty sometimes, nothing ever happened to me. Once, in the depths of the forest, I came across a charming little house whose windows were framed in geraniums, in full bloom. I knocked on the door and asked for a glass of water. The peasant woman who opened the door looked at me suspiciously, and wanted to know

whether I had a handkerchief. “Yes,” I answered, “but why?” “In this house, a glass of water costs *you* a handkerchief.” “Go to hell!” And, as she stood there crossing herself, I went on my way.

We were boycotted by the village nearest us, although the youngsters came to look us over every chance they got—as if they considered us quite extraordinary beings. At the same time, they spied on us so constantly that a spade left lying in a field was gone for good. One night somebody stole our entire wheat reserve, our food, and our supply of seed—everything we had to go on until harvest-time. That, for us, was the beginning both of a famine and a state of siege. And every night we expected someone to set fire to the house. We knew the very house our wheat had been taken to, but we did not do as we were expected to and go after it with guns in our hands; and this, too, contributed to the restlessness and dislike we felt about us. For a while, because of a magnificent wind-fall, we fed ourselves on acid-sour soups, which even if they weren’t nourishing at least warmed our insides: someone had stumbled upon a barrel of pickled cucumbers in one of the cellars! Gaston Bouley, an ex-officer of the French army who had led shock troops in the Argonne Forest (later he was a soldier in the Munich Commune) was now our groom, and every time we sat down to eat he would propose that we devour our one-eyed mare. The proposal invariably gave rise to a lively debate. I got up every night to stand my watch; dressed in the dark to avoid being seen through the openings in the shutters; crept stealthily to the front door, opened it, and stepped outside—with a steel-pointed stick in my hand and a revolver in my belt. . . .

The peasants had everything we needed, but they refused to sell anything to “Jews” and “Antichrists.” We finally decided to break the blockade. One day I went into the village with Dr. N., who was both an Old Believer and a Tolstoyan and had a sing-song manner of speech and a grave smile which might well turn the trick. When the peasant woman we went to coolly refused us everything we asked for, the doctor opened the collar of his blouse and fished out the little gold cross he wore on a chain around his neck. “But we are Christians too, little sister!” The faces around us brightened up, and we got some eggs! Some young women from the village even went so far as to visit us evenings, when we sang French songs together. But it was no use. After three months, hunger and fatigue obliged us to abandon the whole scheme.

The Terror Continues

After Kronstadt, there was a new reign of terror in Petrograd. The Cheka had just “liquidated” the Tagantsev conspiracy by executing some thirty persons. I had known Professor Tagantsev a little: a skinny little old man with white whiskers, a jurist, and a university teacher with a long record of service there in the former capital city. Along with Tagantsev they shot a lawyer by the name of Bak, to whom I had now and then sent translation jobs. With me, Bak had never made any secret of his counter-revolutionary opinions. The gifted poet Nicolas Stepanovitch Goumilev, my comrade (and sometimes my adversary) from days in Paris, was shot at the same time

as Tagantsev and Bak. I dropped in at the Moyka Art House, where he shared a room with his very young wife—a tall girl with a slender neck and the eyes of a frightened gazelle. It was a tremendous room, with walls decorated with swans and lotus—the former bathroom of a merchant with a taste for swans-and-lotus poetry. “You haven’t heard?” Goumilev’s young wife said to me in a low voice, “They took him away day before yesterday.” The comrades at the Soviet Executive tried to quiet my fears, but at the same time made me feel uneasy: Goumilev was being well treated at the Cheka. For a while every night he recited his poems—poems overflowing with vigor and high purpose—for the Chekists. But he confessed that he had drafted certain political documents for the counter-revolutionary group. That seemed likely enough. Goumilev had never concealed his opinions. During the Kronstadt rebellion the university crowd had evidently believed the regime was about to collapse, and had planned to take a hand in liquidating it. The “conspiracy” had gone no further than that. The Cheka prepared to shoot everybody. “We mustn’t go soft now.” One comrade journeyed all the way to Moscow to ask Dzerjinsky a question: “Wasn’t it a little too much to shoot one of the two or three great poets of Russia?” “Can we make an exception of the poet,” Dzerjinsky replied, “and still shoot the others?” The spot chosen for the execution was at the edge of a forest; and Goumilev, with his cap pulled down over his eyes and a cigarette drooping from his lips, fell at dawn—with the same peace of mind he had expressed in the poems he brought back with him from Ethiopia: “I stood fearless in the sight of the Lord God.” That, at least, is how it was told to me. . . . I reread, with mingled admiration and horror, his *The Worker*, in which he described a gentle, grey-eyed man who, before going to bed, shaped “the bullet which will bring me death.” The faces of Nicolas and Olga Goumilev were going to haunt me for years.

I know, of course, that in the great revolutions of the past, terror could not have been dispensed with; that revolutions aren’t made according to the wishes of men of good will, but rather follow their own laws, moving with the destructive fury of the hurricane; that our duty in a revolution is to forestall unnecessary defeat by fighting with whatever weapons history places in our hands. But I have come to see, also, that the continuance of the terror beyond the end of the Civil War, into the period of economic freedom, was a big mistake—and a demoralizing one. I believed then, and I still believe, that if at the beginning of that period the new regime had proclaimed its socialist respect for human life and for individual rights, no matter whose, its strength would have increased a hundred fold. Convinced as I am of the probity and intelligence of the regime’s leaders, I am still asking myself why it did not do that. What psychoses—of fear and of authority—tied its hands?

(Translated from the French. This is the third and concluding section of Chapter IV of Victor Serge’s unpublished memoirs. The first two parts—“War Communism” and “Kronstadt” appeared in the March and April issues.—ED.)

Modern Texts

The Plessy Dissent

EDITOR’S NOTE: We reprint below the essential passages of a great “modern text”: the late Justice Harlan’s dissent in *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896). The *Plessy Dissent* is little known to the general reader, although it is a classic refutation of the basic arguments by which lawyers and judges to this day attempt to show that racial segregation is not discrimination.

The author of the *Plessy Dissent* is also little known today. And yet, in my opinion at least, John Marshall Harlan, who sat on the Supreme Court from 1877 to 1911, was a more courageous and truly liberal figure than his better-publicised colleagues, Holmes and Brandeis. He was a solitary figure during more of his long term, defending civil rights and standing out against the Court’s protection of Big Business in a long series of weighty dissents. Although he was a Kentuckian and a pro-slavery man until after the Civil War, his concern for civil rights was such that he became the one member of the Supreme Court up to the present day, including Holmes, Brandeis and Cardozo, whose record is good on the crucial issue of racial discrimination. The *Plessy* dissent is only one of several important dissents by Harlan in cases involving Jim Crow laws. If there is a type of American liberal of whom we may be proud, the late Justice Harlan represents it. In an early issue of *POLITICS*, I hope to write a biographical article about him and his conception of justice.

The facts in the *Plessy* Case were as follows. In 1892, an octaroon named Plessy took a train trip in Louisiana. He entered a “white” coach. The conductor ordered him to move to the “colored” coach. When he refused, he was taken off the train by the police and locked up in jail. Plessy brought suit alleging he had been deprived of his rights under the 14th Amendment to the Constitution. The lower courts ruled against him, and in 1896 the Supreme Court upheld them.

Justice Brown wrote the majority opinion. This made two main points: (1) segregation is not discrimination; (2) in any case, the 14th Amendment applies only to “political”, not “social” equality, since social equality cannot be decreed by legislation (although, apparently, social inequality, as expressed in Jimcrow laws, can!).

(1) “We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with the badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.”

(2) “The argument also assumes that social prejudices may be overcome by legislation, and that equal rights cannot be secured to the Negro except by an enforced commingling of the two races. We cannot accept this proposition. . . . Legislation is powerless to eradicate social instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation. . . . If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane. . . . The judgment of the court below is, therefore, **AFFIRMED.**”

U. S. Reports
Supreme Court

Vol. 163, pages 554-564
Oct. Term 1895

Dissenting Opinion: Harlan, J.

In respect of civil rights, common to all citizens, the Constitution of the United States does not, I think, permit any public authority to know the race of those entitled to be protected in the enjoyment of such rights. Every true man has pride of race, and under appropriate circumstances when the rights of others, his equals before the law, are not to be affected, it is his privilege to express such pride and to take such action based upon it as to him seems proper. But I deny that any legislative body or judicial tribunal may have regard to the race of citizens when the civil rights of those citizens are involved. Indeed, such legislation, as that here in question, is inconsistent not only with that equality of rights which pertains to citizenship, National and State, but with the personal liberty enjoyed by every one within the United States.

The Thirteenth Amendment does not permit the withholding or the deprivation of any right necessarily inhering in freedom. It not only struck down the institution of slavery as previously existing in the United States, but it prevents the imposition of any burdens or disabilities that constitute badges of slavery or servitude. It decreed universal civil freedom in this country. This court has so adjudged. But that amendment having been found inadequate to the protection of the rights of those who had been in slavery, it was followed by the Fourteenth Amendment, which added greatly to the dignity and glory of American citizenship, and the security of personal liberty, by declaring that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside," and that "no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." These two amendments, if enforced according to their true intent and meaning, will protect all the civil rights that pertain to freedom and citizenship. Finally, and to the end that no citizen should be denied, on account of his race, the privilege of participating in the political control of his country, it was declared by the Fifteenth Amendment that "the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude."

These notable additions to the fundamental law were welcomed by the friends of liberty throughout the world. They removed the race line from our governmental system. They had, as this court has said, a common purpose, namely, to secure "to a race recently emancipated, a race that through many generations have been held in slavery, all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy." They declared, in legal effect, this court has further said, "that the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their color." . . .

It was said in argument that the statute of Louisiana does not discriminate against either race, but prescribes a rule applicable alike to white and colored citizens. But this argument does not meet the difficulty. Every one knows that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose,

not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons. Railroad corporations of Louisiana did not make discrimination among whites in the matter of accommodation for travelers. The thing to accomplish was, under the guise of giving equal accommodation for whites and blacks, to compel the latter to keep to themselves while traveling in railroad passenger coaches. No one would be so wanting in candor as to assert the contrary. The fundamental objection, therefore, to the statute is that it interferes with the personal freedom of citizens. "Personal liberty," it has been well said, "consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due process of law." 1 Bl. Com. *134. If a white man and a black man choose to occupy the same public conveyance on a public highway, it is their right to do so, and no government, proceeding alone on grounds of race, can prevent it without infringing the personal liberty of each.

It is one thing for railroad carriers to furnish, or to be required by law to furnish, equal accommodations for all whom they are under a legal duty to carry. It is quite another thing for government to forbid citizens of the white and black races from traveling in the same public conveyance, and to punish officers of railroad companies for permitting persons of the two races to occupy the same passenger coach. If a State can prescribe, as a rule of civil conduct, that whites and blacks shall not travel as passengers in the same railroad coach, why may it not so regulate the use of the streets of its cities and towns as to compel white citizens to keep on one side of a street and black citizens to keep on the other? Why may it not, upon like grounds, punish whites and blacks who ride together in street cars or in open vehicles, on a public road or street? Why may it not require sheriffs to assign whites to one side of a court-room and blacks to the other? And why may it not also prohibit the commingling of the two races in the galleries of legislative halls or in public assemblages convened for the consideration of the political questions of the day? Further if this statute of Louisiana is consistent with the personal liberty of citizens, why may not the State require the separation in railroad coaches of native and naturalized citizens of the United States, or of Protestants and Roman Catholics? . . .

The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved. It is, therefore, to be regretted that this high tribunal, the final expositor of the fundamental law of the land, has reached the conclusion that it is competent for a state to regulate the enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely upon the basis of race.

In my opinion, the judgment of this day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision

made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott case. It was adjudged in that case that the descendants of Africans who were imported into this country and sold as slaves were not included nor intended to be included under the word "citizens" in the Constitution, and could not claim any of the rights and privileges which that instrument provided for and secured to citizens of the United States; that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution they were "considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, had remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the government might choose to grant them." 19 How. 393, 404. The recent amendments of the Constitution, it was supposed, had eradicated these principles from our institutions. But it seems that we have yet, in some of the States, a dominant race—"a superior class of citizens", which assumes to regulate the enjoyment of civil rights common to all citizens, upon the basis of race.

The present decision, it may well be apprehended, will not only stimulate aggressions, more or less brutal and irritating, upon the admitted rights of colored citizens, but will encourage the belief that it is possible, by means of state enactments, to defeat the beneficial purposes which the people of the United States had in view when they adopted the recent amendments of the Constitution, by one of which the blacks of this country were made citizens of the United States and of the States in which they respectively reside, and whose privileges and immunities, as citizens, the States are forbidden to abridge. Sixty millions of whites are in no danger from the presence here of eight millions of blacks. The destinies of the two races, in this country, are indissolubly linked together, and the interests of both require that the common government of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of law. What can more arouse race hate, what more certainly create and perpetuate a feeling of distress

between these races, than state enactments, which, in fact, proceed on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they can not be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens? That, as all will admit, is the real meaning of such legislation as was enacted in Louisiana.

The sure guarantee of the peace and security of each race is the clear, distinct, unconditional recognition by our governments, National and State, of every right that inheres in civil freedom, and of the equality before the law of all citizens of the United States without regard to race. State enactments, regulating the enjoyment of civil rights upon the basis of race, and cunningly devised to defeat legitimate results of the war, under the pretense of recognizing equality of rights, can have no other result than to render permanent peace impossible, and to keep alive a conflict of races, the continuance of which must do harm to all concerned.

This question is not met by the suggestion that social equality cannot exist between the white and black races in this country. That argument, if it can be properly regarded as one, is scarcely worthy of consideration; for social equality no more exists between two races when traveling in a passenger coach on a public highway than when members of the same races sit by each other in a street car or in the jury box, or stand or sit with each other in a public assembly, or when they use in common the streets of a city or town, or when they are in the same room for the purpose of having their names placed on the registry of voters, or when they approach the ballot box in order to exercise the high privilege of voting. . . .

I am of opinion that the statute of Louisiana is inconsistent with the personal liberty of citizens, white and black, in that State, and hostile to both the spirit and letter of the Constitution of the United States . . . For the reasons stated, I am constrained to withhold my assent from the opinion and judgment of the majority.

A Note on Soviet Education

"The victory of the revolution can only be consolidated by the school. The training of the future generations will anchor everything won by the revolution."—Lenin.

In few fields of Russian life is the reactionary tendency under Stalin more marked than in that of education. The main trends may be summed up as follows:

(1) Freezing of caste lines by introducing such high tuition fees in secondary schools and colleges that only the top stratum of Soviet society can afford higher education for their children.

(2) Extension of the State's control over the individual by the institution of a labor draft for boys over 14 years of age.

(3) A retreat from the progressive experimentalism of the twenties to traditional methods relying on discipline and repression.

(4) The reduction of women to mere child-bearing instruments, a shift expressed in this field by the abandon-

ment of co-education and the setting up of very different educational objectives for boys and for girls.

These developments are revolutionary, or more correctly, counter-revolutionary, in that they constitute a vast retreat from pedagogical principles espoused by Soviet educational authorities for a decade and a half. They promise a drastic transformation in the future of the present school-age generation.

Exit Progressive Education

Before 1932, the Soviet educational techniques were unquestionably of the most advanced experimental caliber, employing the most progressive methods yet developed. Though not accepting the so-called "child-centered" school, the Russians were all-out for the project method, allowing for an individual rate of advancement. They furthered the "union of school and society" by associating the school

closely with the total environment, including industry and agriculture. Nursery schools and adult education were expanded as much as limited resources would permit. Old-fashioned forms of coercion were banished and student self-government flourished. In these respects they followed the ideas of John Dewey.

Formal methods came back after the Communist Party Central Committee had declared, late in 1931, that hereafter "the accepted form of teaching in both the elementary and secondary schools must be classroom recitation based on a strict schedule and designed for a definite group of pupils." Teachers were admonished to present the subject matter "in a systematic and sequential way, the pupils to be trained in the use of text books."⁽¹⁾ Thus was accomplished the first step in the retreat. The reason assigned was that the youth were not learning the fundamentals of reading and writing. There is evidence however that incompetent teaching personnel and inadequate facilities, rather than progressive methods, were responsible for such deficiencies.⁽²⁾

Re-Enter Tuition Fees

Something of a different nature, but far reaching in its social implications, was the reintroduction of tuition, in 1940. In the early revolutionary years, the Soviets made a great effort to provide universal free education for as many as possible. So well established had the principle become that the propaganda constitution of 1936 declared:

"Citizens of the U. S. S. R. have the right to education.

"This right is ensured by universal, compulsory elementary education; by education, including higher education, being free of charge; by the system of state stipends for the overwhelming majority of students in the universities and colleges; by instruction in schools being conducted in the native language, and by the organization in the factories, state farms, machine and tractor stations and collective farms of free vocational, technical and agronomic training for the working people." (Article 121)

In reality, as Victor Serge points out,⁽³⁾ access to institutions of higher learning at this time existed only for the sons and daughters of the privileged, and those contingents of students taken from among the workers by the party. One had to be sent into a university location by the state authorities, and when there his courses of study and future occupation were prescribed for him. The technical training which has always been a prominent feature of Soviet education, was a necessary appendage of Russian industrial expansion.

The juridical trappings about "free education" were thrust aside however on Oct. 3, 1940, when a government decree suddenly ordered that students in the 8th, 9th, and 10th grades pay tuition of 200 rubles annually in the cities and 150 in towns and villages. College students were required to pay 400 rubles annually in cities and 300 in towns. Art, music, and theater school fees were set at 500 rubles per year. ⁽⁴⁾

Thus in a single stroke perished one of the constitutionally guaranteed "fundamental rights of Soviet citizens" without the formality of an amendment to that document, a revealing commentary, incidentally, on the cynical contempt of the bureaucracy toward the much vaunted charter.

"The growing material level of the workers and the increased expenses of the state" were the reasons assigned. The new regulations meant that most Soviet wage earners, ill fed, ill clothed, and ill housed, must furnish for each

child desiring to proceed through the eighth year and beyond, roughly a month's pay annually. Higher education henceforth was to be the well nigh exclusive privilege of the junior elite; children of higher paid government officials and employees, the party secretariat, factory and kolhoz managers, and the kept coterie of artists and writers.

Class Lines in Education

In the post-revolutionary decade, students of proletarian and peasant origin were accorded decided preference in the higher educational institutions. Of the 20,865 students admitted to the universities of Russia proper in 1928, workers, peasants, and their children accounted for 68.1% of the total.⁽⁵⁾ Teachers likewise were chosen from the lower ranks. The aim was to weed out the political unreliaables, possible adherents of the old regime, and school a new leadership passionately loyal to the new order. Since a sufficiently numerous group of the post revolutionary generation has now been prepared to perform the tasks of the new elite, it is now considered time to call a halt, and let class lines coagulate.

Skilled toilers are needed; there is no time for theories or culture. It is not without significance that the day prior to the announcement of the decree altering the free school system, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet declared a labor draft for youths 14 to 17 years of age "for the purpose of establishing state labor reserves for industry." It was found "necessary to train annually for subsequent transfer into industry State labor reserves numbering from 800,000 to 1,000,000 persons by training rural and urban youths to certain industrial professions . . ." the decree stated.⁽⁶⁾

The next epochal step in the overhauling of the school system was the abolition of co-education in the fall of 1943. To the segregation by sex of all pupils above the age of eight was coupled a revamping of the curriculum to facilitate training boys and girls for their disparate missions in the service of the State.⁽⁷⁾ Military experts were appointed to conduct drills and pre-conscription classes for boys, and the girls were to be trained in "pedagogy, handicraft, domestic science, personal hygiene, and the care of children."⁽⁸⁾ "In the future" it was prophesied, "Russian women will find in improved homes a wider scope for domestic virtues." In both boys' and girls' classes new emphasis was to be placed on Russian history, hitherto ignored, as well as classical literature and foreign languages.

In the nine Suvorov military academies, which are increasingly regarded as models for Soviet schools, 8 to 15 year old boys receive instruction in tactics, firearms, military history, drill, automobiles, fencing, skiing, dancing, and academic work.

For Naughty Children: the Guard House

Simultaneously with the abolition of co-education, a campaign was unleashed for stricter discipline. "The slightest signs of rudeness or disrespect toward elders must be firmly dealt with," proclaimed Education Commissar Vladimir Petrovitch Potemkin. "There is still a reluctance to adopt a strong attitude toward laziness and hooliganism."⁽⁹⁾

A set of rules was prepared governing the conduct of students in the senior classes of Russian secondary schools. Twenty regulations are listed on a card which each stu-

dent is required to carry with him. Included are such as these:

"Obey unquestioningly the orders of the principal of the school and the teacher . . . Sit straight during the lesson . . . Arise and stand at attention upon the entrance either of the teacher or the director of the school and on their exit from the class . . . Stand straight when answering the teacher."⁽¹⁰⁾

Writing from Moscow, Edmund Stevens gave a remarkable picture of the bureaucracy's state of mind (Christian Science Monitor, April 2, 1944.) Guard houses and labor camps were needed to deal with the situation, according to A. Orlov, head of the Moscow Board of Education, who favors "general adoption of the system now in force in the Suvorov officer training schools where children from the age of eight . . . are subject to a scale of punishments that range from kneeling in a corner to confinement in the guardhouse."

Mr. Orlov, the report revealed, believed that two or three days in the guard house would be more effective in dealing with serious offenses than the existing practice of expulsion from school, and if the guard house should prove inadequate, he recommended compulsory enrollment of the "culprit" in "labor education colonies."

Mr. Orlov further deplored "the unfortunate trend to make life in these camps varied and interesting." The special detention rooms in police stations, he complained, had been transformed into "cozy clubrooms" that made detention there a pleasant episode rather than a "punishment and deterrent to delinquency." The Moscow school head went on to say that such methods arose from "the sentimental fallacy that children misbehave because they haven't enough to do in their spare time, and that the way to keep them out of mischief is, therefore, to provide them with amusements." This, he avowed, "did not develop character or a sense of responsibility in any industry, but on the contrary encouraged the inclination to avoid doing things that are hard or uninteresting, thereby failing to prepare the rising generation for any hard experience."

Why the Retreat? Pinkevitch v. Dewey.

The retreat of Soviet education has been proceeding now for better than a decade, coincident with the social reaction in other aspects of Soviet life. To gauge the distance of the retreat, we may examine the earlier writings of Russia's pioneer exponent of progressive education, Albert P. Pinkevitch.

"The demand for obedience and military discipline" he wrote in 1929, "should never be raised to the status of a principle."⁽¹¹⁾ The purpose of Soviet education was then declared to be the training of "warriors for socialism who clearly understand the problems of their class and are able to evaluate independently all of the most important expressions of the contemporary culture." Assuredly discipline and a firm will were important, granted Pinkevitch, but it was to be self-discipline. "Only he who is able to wish and to desire can have a strong will. We ought therefore to train in children a strong desire toward what we consider goodness, beauty and truth. Without this all organization and discipline become mechanistic and formal."⁽¹²⁾

Pinkevitch saw no necessary contradiction between this aim and teaching to "evaluate independently . . . the contemporary culture." It is clear of course that the Soviet educator and his contemporaries took exception to John Dewey's argument that "setting up any end outside of

education, as furnishing its goal and standard, is to deprive the educational process of much of its meaning, and tends to make us rely upon false and external stimuli in dealing with the child."⁽¹³⁾ The Russians not only aimed to provide the pupil with tools for growth and adjustment, but also attempted to create a definite direction and a goal.

Dewey's adherents will argue that what has happened is the logical outcome of any attempt to set definite aims external to the process of education itself. They would probably charge that in Pinkevitch's aim of training the child toward a definite goal lurk the germs for the mass production of automatons. But in like manner do the foes of Dewey flay his progressive pedagogical techniques, on the ground that "they failed in Russia." Both camps resemble, and are probably no more correct than those who examine Russian society and conclude that "socialism won't work." For the historical conditions requisite to the building of either socialism or revolutionary educational policy were lacking.

It may further be said that the training of youth toward the ruling group's concept of good is a universal practice, more or less effectively applied everywhere, though carried through more systematically in regimented states. Even the progressive educators in America speak glibly of "education for democracy." Both public and private progressive schools hold patriotic exercises, and the progressive denominational schools practice religious devotions. "Education for its own sake" or merely for the "development of the capacities of the child" is about as realistic a concept as "peace between the classes."

Soviet education must be condemned not for setting up goals, but for having the wrong goals, and the wrong methods. True, their methods are consistent with their goals. A regimented society requires regimented schools. But these are not the methods and goals of a progressive industrial democracy.

"I doubt" reflected Andre Gide, "whether in any other country in the world, even Hitler's Germany, thought is less free, more bowed down, more fearful, more vassalized."⁽¹⁴⁾

VIRGIL J. VOGEL

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OOPS, SORRY!

A long-standing U. S. Army view that the whole Mediterranean campaign, and particularly the long and costly Italian part of it, was a very bad mistake now is beginning to crop out into the open.
—"U. S. News", March 16.

Political Persecution in England

THE government campaign in England against freedom of the press in general and against the anarchists in particular, achieved a Pyrrhic victory on the 27th April, when, after a four days trial three anarchists, Vernon Richards, John Hewetson and Philip Sansom, all associated with the work of Freedom Press and *War Commentary*, were sentenced to nine months' imprisonment on a charge of incitement to disaffection. A fourth anarchist, Marie Louise Berneri, author of *Workers in Stalin's Russia*, was acquitted and discharged.

The trial was the culmination of a campaign, lasting since early in December, of police raids, searches and arrests of a peculiarly ruthless and extra-legal kind, carried out under the Defence Regulations and completely outside the rules of the common and statute laws. These raids were accompanied by visits to employers, landlords, etc., so that indirect as well as direct persecution was visited on the anarchists concerned.

The prosecution was based on a circular letter addressed to soldiers who had subscribed to *War Commentary*, in which it was suggested that they should attend discussion groups and in which mention was made of soldiers' councils, on articles in the issues of *War Commentary* for the 1st, 11th and 25th November, which were either historical articles on the Russian and German Revolutions or commentaries on events in continental Europe in connection with the disarming of the maquis, and, finally, on a poem entitled 'Fight! What For?', which was written by an American woman named Whitehead in 1929 and has been circulating in various forms ever since without objection having been raised before. As evidence of the intent to cause disaffection, two historical pamphlets, *The Kronstadt Revolt* and *The Wilhelmshaven Revolt*, were brought forward in addition to the above documents.

The case was regarded as an important one by the Government. It is not yet known who ordered the prosecution, but the importance attached to it as a test case is shown by the fact that the case for the prosecution was conducted by the Attorney General himself. On the day of the trial, moreover, the court contained large numbers of Special Branch detectives and military representatives, as well as a number of known informers who mingled with the crowds of sympathisers who filled the public benches and waited outside the court.

The case for the prosecution was particularly sinister, because it was based entirely on an accusation of intent, and not of achievement. The soldiers who were called as witnesses declared unanimously that their duties had not been affected in any way by any writings they had received from the anarchists, and, as out of five thousand copies of *War Commentary* printed for each issue only one hundred were sent to soldiers, the accusation of intent to disaffect seems very thin indeed.

The Attorney General's case was built round the theory that it is an offence to write history from such a point of view that any person reading it might draw analogies which would have a bearing on a present situation at all adverse to the interests of the governing class.

"Of course," he said, "writing history is no offence, and it is really a good thing that the history of that (the Russian and German mutinies of 1917-18) and other events should be written, but I shall submit to you that the descriptions of those events in this paper are not put forward as matters of history but are put forward as examples

of what our soldiers should do in this country when the time comes at the end of the war and when demobilisation or partial demobilisation may take place."

None of the articles which the Government objected to made any reference to events in Britain at the present moment, but the Attorney General contended that they were intended to incite British soldiers to disaffection.

"I submit" he said, "It is quite plain that what has happened in the past is being put before the readers of this paper as a policy which is to be followed and the lessons of which are to be learned so as to see that it does not fail this time." He brought his case to an end by stating, "If you take all these references together, in our submission, they amount to an endeavour to seduce from their duty those in the service of His Majesty and to create disaffection among them likely to lead to breaches of their duty."

In the evidence were included the two pamphlets, *The Kronstadt Revolt* and *The Wilhelmshaven Revolt*, which were purely historical documents containing no exhortations to action of any kind whatsoever.

The case for the defence was conducted in such a way that the points of the prosecution were shown to contain very little foundation. However, the procedure of English law came to the rescue of the Crown. By an ancient privilege, the Attorney General claimed his customary right of speaking after the defence, and the judge, in summing up, devoted a great deal of time to the points for the prosecution and about ten minutes to the case for the defence. In this manner, by the time the jury retired, the arguments of the defence had become dim in their minds, and, after retiring for two hours, they found three of the prisoners guilty, on all counts except that of the poem, 'Fight—What For?', and one not guilty. The judge, remarking that he realised the three men were idealists, sent them all to prison for nine months.

The iniquity of this case is shown, not so much in the sentence itself, which was a comparatively light one for an offence carrying a maximum of fourteen years and was made so in order to avoid too much feeling for the prisoners, but in the effect it is likely to have on the freedom of the press in this country. It amounts virtually to a decision that history and political commentary must be written in such a way that a soldier reading them will form no conclusions hostile to the existing order of society. The fact that it should have been imposed not for any achievement of disaffection, but merely for a presumed intention to disaffect, means that, after such a test decision, an astute lawyer will be able to gain a conviction in almost any case where the discussion of revolutionary tactics is involved.

However, as I indicated above, the victory is one on which the government can hardly congratulate itself. It has certainly given the anarchist movement more publicity and limelight than it has ever had in this country before, and after the way in which anarchist ideas were thrashed out in the open court and repeated in the newspapers, I think the cloak-and-dagger legend has received its final quietus. Whether the Public Prosecutor likes it or not, he has succeeded in presenting to the public in Britain the idea that anarchism is something to be thought about seriously, which all the efforts of the anarchists themselves have never done before. An example of bureaucratic stupidity is shown in the case of the poem, 'Fight! What For?'. Two copies of this had been in the possession of one of the defendants for years, among a collection of pamphlets. At the trial he was accused on this evidence of being in possession of a document likely to cause disaffection. The poem was then read several times in open

court by the Attorney General, and caught the fancy of the pressmen, so that it was reprinted in most of the evening papers and in several dailies the following morning, thus being read by several millions of people, including many soldiers.

As an example of Gestapo methods at work over here, when the police realised that the court was crowded with hundreds of sympathisers, they decided to violate the old principle of open access to courts of law, by examining the identity cards of all members of the public and recording the particulars, no doubt for use in case they get a chance to extend the area of prosecution. Significantly, the inspection was directed by the two Special Branch inspectors who gave evidence for the prosecution.

A Defence Committee has been formed, which is now pushing ahead for three objectives, the release of the prisoners, the elimination of regulations interfering with freedom of speech and press, and the abolition of the Special Branch of Scotland Yard, which, although the authorities pretend otherwise, is the dangerous nucleus of an authoritarian political police. Commonwealth, the I.L.P., the Peace Pledge Union, and the left-wing group in the Labour Party are giving their support, and the sponsors include most of the liberal writers and editors. Any kind of support, moral or financial, from America will be received with gratitude, but what we should like most is that full publicity be given in America to the facts of the case, and the tendencies which it reveals in English political developments.

GEORGE WOODCOCK

Books

POLITICS AND MORALS. By Benedetto Croce. Philosophical Library. \$3.00.

This is a collection of essays written by Croce at various times; the most important is a translation of his *Elementi di Politica*, which appeared in 1925. Nicola Chiaromonte, in his excellent piece on Croce (*Politics*, June, 1944) says that "It was only in 1925, when it became clear that fascism meant the strict business of dictatorship, and the end of the liberal conservative State together with the vilification of culture, that Croce started his way back to the pure liberalism of the 1830's and found that philosophy and liberalism were one and the same thing. But a conservative he always was, an anti-democrat, an anti-socialist, not less than an anti-clerical, although at the same time he knew (and this was his peculiarity) how to keep an eye on the opposite thesis." These remarks are amply justified by this collection, for here (in 1925) Croce is a liberal, and his head bobs back and forth from thesis to antithesis, watching the Truth as though it were a ping-pong ball and he were at the middle of the table. The result, as seen through Croce's eyes, is a blur, an image that defies definition or analysis. Perhaps the translator is at fault, but if he's not (and I don't think he is), the book is a remarkable cartoon of the philosophy of politics—a hodge-podge of obscurity broken only by an occasional clear tribute to obscurity itself. If I try now to indicate what I think Croce is saying, I do so with trepidation; if I'm wrong I don't know what he means.

The first chapter contains an attack on the separation of political and moral action; Croce denies that it is sometimes necessary to do evil in order to do good, or that it is impossible to take part in politics and keep one's hands clean. Why? Because our "human conscience" cries out against murder and lies. Here he is completely Kantian, and can find no basis for moral judgment other than intuition, a private capacity to see what's right and wrong, one that cannot be checked except by a sharp inspection of the heart. But this moral conscience is capable of the most peculiar lapses. One of them bears mentioning. Croce is disturbed by the fact that such cynical maxims ("in the interest of the State one must, if necessary, break a promise or commit murders") have been found "on the lips of such men as Frederick of Prussia and Camillo di Cavour." How account for this? Well, the Truth is that if "at a time when moral conscience was at its greatest clarity" (!), murders, lies, and broken promises proved "necessary," "these actions can be neither breach of promise, nor murders, nor any kind of roguery or wickedness; just as the 'magnanimous lie' of which Tasso speaks could not be a 'lie,' exactly because it was magnanimous." What horrible casuistry! It reminds one of stern Kant's willingness to suspend the *lex talionis* in the case of maternal infanticide and killing in a duel.

What is most fascinating about Croce's double-talk here is its concern with *distinctions*. On other occasions, when he is not convincing Frederick of Prussia and Cavour that their lies are not lies, he can hate distinctions. Most of them become "dualisms" and instantly they are transformed into philosophical poison. So, for example, he cautions us not to limit the idea of force to the "superficial meaning" which the word usually suggests. "We must think of force in the complete truth of all human and spiritual force, which includes the wisdom of the intellect no less than the strength of the arm, foresight and prudence no less than daring and boldness, gentleness no less than severity, candor no less than discernment or even malice, the virtue of beauty no less than the beauty of virtue." Croce's book is for those who like this sort of thing. I won't comment upon the connection between his views and his actual political behavior, whose history I don't know well. But certainly this love of merging everything into everything else bears out Chiaromonte's comment: "When it comes to the worst, that is to say to ultimate morality, Croce's liberal philosophy reveals itself as nothing else but a constant re-justification of accepted moral, intellectual and social conventions."

About the best point in the first three chapters of the book (these make up the *Elements of Politics*) is a distinction (strangely enough) between the philosophy of politics, the empirical science of politics, and practical politics. Not that Croce develops it in any interesting way, but it does furnish the basis for a fruitful study of political thought. The actual practise of politics is experimental, particular, very much like the tentative groping that goes on in advance of a physical discovery in the laboratory. It needs direction, generalization, and it seeks this in political theory and science, just as the experimental physicist looks to theory for guidance and explanation. But then there is a third level—the philosophy of politics, a discipline that hopes to analyze the meanings of terms like "state," "law," "government," "force"—which is relatively remote from political practise. Some men, geniuses, have combined skill on all three levels. Croce narrows his purpose; he proposes to discover the "nature" of fundamental concepts. In this he fails miserably, not because the task is impossible, but because he is committed to a stifling

metaphysic. It should be remembered, however, that no political philosophy so narrowly conceived can furnish us with a program. It can no more solve our political problems than can Mach's analysis of "mass" in physics help us build bridges. The philosophy of politics is twice removed from the political world; it can only get to it by first erecting a political technology—a theory of political practise. In this Croce is hardly interested; he is a Senator and a Philosopher.

M. G. WHITE

THE SINEWS OF PEACE. By Herbert Feis. Harper and Brothers. \$2.50.

This liberal capitalist, now fully aware of his responsibility in shaping his profit system to the end that the world's productive ability is fully employed and the producer receives a "fair" return for his labor, proposes an international economic policy of post-war construction to this end. His book is scholarly, tightly-written, logical; full of practical suggestions which deserve thoughtful reading.

He paints the post-war picture: in the U. S. "uncertainty as to costs of production, prices and future markets; a great hunger for domestic and foreign orders"; and generally abroad, "an overwhelming need for the minimum essentials of life, for raw materials, for machinery."

In his attempt to formulate our external policy, all the important international issues are competently examined. He recommends:

One: Bretton Woods, for its monetary plans and its arrangements for mutual assistance in post-war foreign reconstruction; eventually, for long-term productive development as well.

Two: a foreign trade policy based on the assumption that self-sufficiency is neither practical nor desirable (less reliance on exports to keep up employment at home, enough imports to give other countries the means to pay their debts, the use of exports to strengthen our friendship with politically compatible countries).

Three: cooperative arrangements with Britain, the other main source of post-war capital besides the U. S., to regulate competition in aviation and shipping, to allow Britain a necessary expansion in exports, and to allow the U. S. to participate in the economic development and trade of the Empire and Commonwealth (Britain's tentative willingness to do this has already been expressed).

Four: an international policy concerned with foodstuffs and raw materials designed to assure all countries a minimum of essentials.

Five: a compromise between the open and closed door to sources of supply, probably with some intergovernmental organization.

Six: an international arrangement to help the producer of foodstuffs and raw materials to find "markets for all efficiently produced supplies at comparatively stable prices," by some production regulation plan, controlled by government, not by producers.

Some of Mr. Feis's suggestions will undoubtedly be adopted. A monetary arrangement is certain; an investment bank which will outlast the post-war reconstruction period is doubtful. His full program would require more planning than the U. S. is ready to accept. Mr. Feis points out that our foreign policy has been in the past in the hands of nine different governmental divisions—and then hopes for a "basic similarity of outlook" among these departments. Even under war-time cooperation, weaker than in World War I, the profit motive activates all our eco-

nomic life: black market operations, even among the troops; the use of government funds by war industries to build factories for peace-time use; the back-room manufacture of peace-time products under the claim of full war production. . . .

Mr. Feis seems to be attempting to reconcile production for profit with distribution for use. The individual capitalist has neither the altruism nor the long-term view which would lead him to stop production now in anticipation of a future over-supply, or to forgo the interest on a foreign loan to help that country buy from him again. Government is not composed of a new type of human being, without economic past or future, but in this country, at least, of individuals who have "made good" in business, and are more interested in the prestige and security attached to money-making now than to the administration of "idealistic" government which might or might not keep the system intact for their grandchildren.

LILA ROTH

The Intelligence Office

EDITOR'S NOTE: The following two letters were written, from London and Paris respectively, by an American soldier to a friend back home.

LONDON, MARCH 1945:

Perhaps the most encouraging feature of English politics—you might even say the only encouraging feature—is that most people seem to be more or less intelligently interested in political questions. You need only say "Greece" or "general election" in the usual railway carriage to start some sort of ball rolling. Discussions are on a higher plane than in America. Those on the left are at least members of the Labour Party, which however battered is still not as fantastic an object of progressives' support as Roosevelt's Democratic Party. And those on the right quite often know what they are talking about and need not resort to demagoguery; I argued with several people about Greece but nowhere heard statements either as flatly false or as lacking in taste as Churchill's in his report to Parliament.

Most people, left and right, seem to think that there would be a general move to the left after the war. Usually this was put in the form, Labour would win the election. How true this might be, and how much of it is wishful thinking (among the leftists, that is, whom I talked to predominantly), I have hardly any way of judging. Certainly there seems to be a vague groping leftward on the part of many people who before the war probably never thought of politics, but who can say where this will lead? To date, the CP is absorbing most of it. In the small town immediately adjacent to my camp, the Stalinists had hired a large store as their headquarters, from which they were quite active distributing leaflets and selling papers. The ILP, on the contrary, had written post mortem to the local branch a few months before I came.

Both the ILP and CW have made formal overtures to the Labour Party, requesting admission as a group. The ILP is to get its reply, which will almost certainly be No, some time this month. The application from Common Wealth, so far from being favorably considered, was denied even formal discussion outside a small committee. The argument behind this move runs something like this: The

Labour Party will take power after the war. In its present form, it will be unable to satisfy the demands of the people who put it there, and ultimately they will turn elsewhere. However, most of them will not go further left but to the right, and there will be a growth of a fascist movement. The best way to prevent this is to inject new life, now, into the Labour Party, by bringing in the relatively far more progressive elements in the ILP and CW. This line of reasoning seems to me not only fallacious but very possibly insincere. It seems to me, on the basis only of the published documents and one short discussion with an ILPer, that if the attempt at unity were made in entire good faith, it would not be published openly until it was assured of a better reception, if not necessarily complete success, than either got. It is my guess that by an essentially demagogic appeal for Unity of the Left both groups hope to woo some Labour Party members to their own ranks.

I am sorry I did not get a chance to learn more about Common Wealth. Superficially at least, its line seems very like the ILP's, but better presented. Tom Wintringham, who is one of its leaders, is a good publicist, and its journal makes *Left* or *New Leader*, the two ILP organs, seem amateurish. He also wrote, anonymously, at least one of a series of brochures being published by Gollancz and sold everywhere for a half crown (= half a dollar). This one, *Your MP*, is the most effective bit of political propaganda I have seen in years.

Just because they stand at one end of the political spectrum (I wonder why no one has thought to call the right "violet"), the Trotskyists are often one of the best barometers to general political feeling. In England they have certainly been very active, much more so than in America. One reason is that instead of splitting just before the war, as they did in America, they here combined several grouplets into one party, which seems to be functioning very effectively. For example, they were quite apparent in the leadership of the Tyneside strike, which was called to protest the substitution of machines and unskilled labor for skilled labor, and which was the only wartime strike to get the support of the official trade union movement. Also, for the first time, they are contesting a by-election, running a candidate in South Wales against a Labour Party incumbency. What puzzles me in the Trotskyist line is that they very evidently share the sanguine, if not cheerful, acquiescence of the English left in the postwar domination by Russia of continental Europe. Here at least, you might think, the successful Russian offensive, and the shorter war presaged by it, would not be the principal determinants of a political line. After all, Trotsky himself spent the entire last years of his life in documenting his allegations about Russia, and if the mess that he portrayed is spread over Europe, the Trotskyists will be the first to be shot.

This growth of pro-Stalinist (not necessarily pro-Communist) feeling is more than a little frightening. Not only are there plenty of Party members about (on three separate occasions I ran into one riding with me in a train) but, from every indication I could grasp, a good portion of the general public shares to an amazing degree its general principles concerning Russia's prerogatives in postwar Europe. And what is still worse, the organs of the left do nothing to counteract this sentiment. A discussion of the Greek situation, for example, whether it appears in *Tribune*, *Left*, the *Common Wealth Review*, or the *Socialist Appeal* (the Trotskyist organ), would contain, from more or less the same point of view, an attack on the British government position, but nothing, or virtually nothing, to indicate that the opposing forces are *in part* a cat's paw for Russian Balkan policy. . . .

FRANCE, APRIL 1945:

News from the other world again. I would write more often, except that I use you as a receptor for my more or less rounded impressions, and it takes a while to get anything more than a jumble out of France.

The major political factor is food. Just to satisfy my curiosity, I made a real effort to get under all the stories you hear, ranging in probability from zero up. For one person, the total legal outlay for rationed food last month amounted to 196.25 francs (just under \$4). This is less than 7 francs per day. The price of a kilo of bread (one of those thin French breads about two feet long) with ration coupons is 4.90 francs, though by the time you receive this letter it probably will be something in the neighborhood of its actual cost of production—6.47 francs.*

In other words, no one can subsist on the basis of rationed food alone. To the extent that he can afford it, everyone purchases in the black market—*everyone*. For an American, the spirit of the thing is inevitably reminiscent of Prohibition: the same cant, the same flagrant violation of the law, the same profits for some people. The difference is that here they are not dealing in whiskey but butter. Butter has recently become almost unobtainable; its price range is now above 800 francs a kilo, when you can find it, compared with about 500 francs a year ago. Black-market oil costs 600 francs a liter, against half that a month ago. Cheap meat on the black market costs between 250 and 300 francs a kilo. To have their full meaning, these prices must be compared with wages. I know the pay of only one man, but that should indicate the range. He is in his fifties, a skilled electrician, working for the railroads. His pay is 3,500 francs a month. That is roughly the price of one good shirt.

The only alleviating factor has been the increase recently in certain vegetables (mostly the cabbage family and root vegetables). These are not rationed, and their price is moderate, e. g. 8 francs for a head of cabbage. In this respect there has been an immense improvement over conditions during the occupation, when a large portion of the vegetable crop was exported. But in this respect only; in general conditions now are worse than during the occupation. The ration of bread and potatoes has been increased slightly, but that of everything else has been cut, in some cases (e. g. butter) in effect to zero. The reason given for this is the lack of transportation facilities. The Germans conquered France so quickly that they took its railroad system virtually intact, but before the landing in Normandy the Americans and British attempted to cut off reinforcements and supplies to the coast by bombing all lines leading there. Only a portion of this damage has been repaired, and even if it had all been repaired the major coal supply in France was until several weeks ago too close to the front to permit anything approaching normal production. Transportation is undoubtedly inadequate. But there are persistent allegations, even in the Paris papers, that this inadequacy is but one of several factors, and that another is the inefficiency or worse of government officials.

A woman I know asked my advice on how to vote in the communal elections to be held this month. She lives in a small town outside Paris, whose present administration is Communist from the mayor down to the French equivalent of dogcatcher. If only to get a change in administration, I suggested Socialist, which is the strongest competing party. She told me that someone else had

*The price has been increased since writing this.

suggested the same thing, for the same reason. He is one of the town's outstanding collaborators, who went about last Summer boasting that if the Americans ever got that far north, he personally would shoot the first one he saw. Now he is acting as middleman between the Socialists and Catholic vote, attempting to build a solid block strong enough to oust the Communists. In the face of this, my never very enthusiastic recommendation was not revived. In France, as in America, a vote is hardly worth the time it takes to make a cross.

So far as political parties are concerned, the left has all but disappeared. The major left parties, the Communists and Socialists, are hardly to be distinguished from their supposed antagonists, and the minor ones cannot be found. The PSOP disappeared without a trace; even a Populaire salesman to whom I spoke did not recognize the initials until I mentioned Pivert's name. The Trotskyists are still illegal; their publications, which can be bought at a few newsstands, carry no address.

Paris has an intellectual atmosphere not to be equalled anywhere in America. All over the Latin Quarter there are bookstores thicker than on lower Fourth Avenue, and all over Paris you find them one every couple of blocks. An ordinary newspaper vendor in one of the Paris railroad stations had among his supply of books to be bought one on the languages of Africa. A truckdriver, whom I met in a cafe, invited me to borrow what I wanted from his library, ranging from Moliere to Mallarme. But there is virtually nothing new; the shortage of paper is acute. Walking down Champs Elysees you see, instead of Coca Cola ads, notices of exhibitions by Bazaine, Esteve, Lapique. Their work is as uncompromisingly modernist as anything by Picasso, and I could not help wondering how many out of an average Fifth Avenue crowd would interrupt their promenade to look at them. Along the Boulevard de Batignolles there is an apparently permanent outdoor exhibit, a bit like that at Washington Square except that there are more and better pictures.

Except for a few suburban bus lines, the only transportation in Paris is the Metro. All the people who used to stay home, now crowd into the Metro, and the Lexington Avenue express is like a bowling alley by contrast. The trains stop running about 11:30, and the last train of the day is always the most crowded. I once saw five husky infantrymen, on leave from the front, trying to push a sixth into a car; they made it, but only just. It is not only a crowd such as you have never seen, or had walk on you, it is a French crowd: you not only listen in on your neighbor's conversation, you join in, tell him why he's wrong. One woman lifted her breast so that it rested on a short man's shoulder, explaining meanwhile that what they did to the rest of her was "egale," but her breasts were something special. When another woman became volubly annoyed because a man had stepped on her feet, he took off his hat and, with as much bowing as there was room for, conducted her to the door and helped her off, talking all the while so fast that she could say nothing more. The whole car stopped talking for the moment to listen in, and after she left they almost applauded the performance.

There are all sorts of strange conveyances in the streets, from bullock carts up. There is a new taxi, consisting of a bike with a wheel chair behind, and it annoys me no end to see a man puffing away to pull some fat bastard. It is some centuries since Western Europe has seen coolies. There are girls all over the place on bicycles, apparently oblivious that their skirts are halfway up their thighs.

IN DEFENSE OF FROMM-HORNEY

Sir:

In the middle of an otherwise interesting review of a book by Anna Freud in your March issue, Mr. Paul Goodman suddenly dons his armor and charges into the "revisionism" of "Horney, Fromm, and company", who are, he says, trying to "adjust" everybody to: 1. Centralized big factory technology; 2. Mass distribution; and 3. Bureaucratic centralism in government. What the hell? It would be hard to find in modern literature two authors who devote more attention to the liberation of the personal, individual, and creative side of human character from centralized, standardized, and bureaucratic conditions of modern life than Horney and Fromm.

I am forced to the conclusion that Mr. Goodman has never read "Horney, Fromm, and company", whose works he attacks with such admirable and completely misdirected enthusiasm. They're worth reading.

Mr. Goodman neglected to quote, paraphrase, or even mention the theories he was attacking. I have a copy of Erich Fromm's *Escape from Freedom*, at hand, from which I quote beginning at page 117: "Although man has reached a remarkable degree of mastery of nature, society is not in control of the forces it has created. The rationality of the system of production, in its technical aspects, is accompanied by the irrationality of our system of production in its social aspects. Economic crises, unemployment, war, govern man's fate. . . . The work of his own hands has become his God. He seems to be driven by self-interest, but in reality his total self with all its concrete potentialities has become an instrument for the purposes of the very machine his hands have built."

. . . Mr. Goodman seems to believe that Freud is the bulwark of humanity in the modern world because he based his psychology on immutable human instincts, which neither feudalism, capitalism, nor statism can destroy. This is not correct. Freud's immutable instincts were basically anti-social. He held that they could and should be sublimated in the interests of society and civilization. It is hardly necessary to point out that this theory of sublimation as the basis of civilization furnishes an excuse for every sort of phony "adjustment" psychology. Your instincts rebel at modern life? Your instincts are anti-social anyway. Sublimate them!—or, as they used to tell us in college, take a cold shower and a long walk. Horney, Fromm and company, do not hold to this sublimation theory, but rather maintain that the human being has social instincts and that these demand fulfillment, not sublimation.

Now I ask Mr. Goodman in all seriousness which one of these theories, aside from the question of which is right, furnishes the greatest bulwark against the inhumanity of the modern world?

NEW YORK CITY

DANIEL EASTMAN

Sir:

Paul Goodman, in a review of *Infants Without Families* in the March *POLITICS*, pauses for a rapid critique of the Freudian revisionists—"Fromm, Horney, and company." The revisionists, according to Goodman, ". . . argue that Freud's doctrine is biological, individualistic and fatalistic; . . . and [that it] stands in the way of the adjustment of the individual to his social role." Goodman seems to have missed the whole point of the Fromm-Horney criticism of Freud. It is not that Freud is "biological, etc."—these terms are not to be found in their writings. Rather, it is that Freud, while he understood the mechanism of character development and discovered existing character com-

plexes, thought these mechanisms and complexes were universal; that man's instinctual drives were everywhere frustrated by society, for if they were allowed to operate they would inevitably destroy society.

But neither the drives nor the social institutions frustrating them are the same everywhere; in actual social life, the instinctual drives Freud assumed were basic shrink to insignificance besides acquired drives, varying with a specific culture and sub-culture—class, ethnic group, age-group and so forth. . . . Fromm and Horney object to the universalization of the characteristics of people in western upper- and middle-class society. And their objection is now supported by a tremendous mass of material from non-western cultures, establishing without a doubt that personality is a function of a specific culture, and not a universal constant

Such a complete misinterpretation of an important scientific development is incredible and inexcusable; Goodman, let alone not having read the books, has apparently not even read the titles of the Fromm and Horney writings. Freud does not have to be "defended" by such tactics.

NEW YORK CITY

NATHAN GLAZER

—Let readers Eastman and Glazer keep their shirts on. Mr. Goodman not only has read Fromm and Horney, but he has written an exhaustive critique of their ideas, "The Political Meaning of Some Recent Revisions of Freud", which will appear in *POLITICS* next month.—ED.

Comment

The Geise Case One trouble with our society is that those at the bottom obey the laws, while those at the top don't; it would be healthier if this situation were to be reversed. A case in point is the way the armed forces have taken over the Selective Service system, despite Congress's obvious intention, when the 1940 Draft Act was passed, that civilians should run it. According to the *N. Y. Post* of Feb. 13: "There's not one civilian left in an executive position in the entire national headquarters organization of Selective Service." The *Post* counted 741 commissioned officers in the Selective Service bureaucracy, including no less than 14 generals. This contravenes the clear intent of Congress, but at least it does not directly disobey the law. This excuse cannot be given for one important branch of Selective Service, the top national Appeals Board, which has long been composed entirely of officers on active duty. The 1940 Draft Act stated explicitly: "Appeal boards and agencies of appeal within the Selective Service system shall be composed of civilians."

A legal fight on this basis was recently made by Willis E. Geise, formerly an analyst with the War Manpower Commission in Washington. When his appeal from the decision of his local draft board denying him C.O. status was finally turned down by the national Appeals Board (acting in the name of the President), Geise's lawyers took the case to the Supreme Court. Their brief describes the all-military composition of the top Appeals Board and comments: "A more flagrant violation of the Draft Act in the consideration of Presidential appeals could not be imagined." Among the Government's counter-arguments, one was, we may surmise, especially powerful: to rule in

favor of Geise would be to invalidate over 20,000 decisions already rendered by the board. The Court, therefore, acted as it did in the Lynn case (see *POLITICS* Nos. 1, 3, 5): it upheld the Government. It was a narrow squeak, however: the vote was 4 to 4. The ninth member, that darling of the liblabs, Douglas, abstained from voting, without giving any reasons for his self denial. Such an unmotivated abstention, especially when it results in a split Court, is almost unprecedented; but one can depend on a liblab to find a means of serving Mammon without openly offending the other end of the equation.

As a result of Douglas's opportunist evasion of the issue, Geise is now in jail and the military are still firmly and illegally entrenched in the Presidential appeals board.

The Italian Mystery What is going on in Northern Italy? It has been liberated for weeks—in some parts, months—and yet we have had almost no news in the press of political development there. The bulk of the Italian workingclass and of socialist consciousness are in the industrialized North. When the Germans were driven from the North, we expected a sharp shift to the left in Italian politics. Almost no news comes through from there, however. From some reports, not published, I gather that the situation is something like that in Greece last fall, with the Anglo-Americans trying to disarm the Partisans, and the latter insisting on first getting guarantees that a political turn to the left will be made (which, of course, they don't get). Former fascists are being shot, apparently, in large numbers by the Partisans—ironically enough, because they don't trust the Allied military authorities to punish them. It also looks as the Northern Partisans stand to the Bonomi Government in much the same relation as EAMS-ELAS stood to the Papandreou Government, with the British again playing precisely the same role as in Greece. The recent arrest of Nenni, the Socialist leader, for violating the Allied ban on political speeches in the North seems to show that the lid is being kept on very tight. But what is boiling underneath it? Allied political censorship has so far blacked out all news.

The English Have Two For some reason, the English now have two excellent political weeklies, while we don't have any. For both information and intelligent criticism, *Tribune* and *The Economist* are as superior to our own liberal weeklies as the latter are to, let us say, *New Masses*.

Tribune is the organ of the left Labor Party group that centers around Aneurin Bevan. It supports the war, of course, which sometimes gives it the same fuzziness as to general ideas that characterizes our own liberal journals. But it is much bolder and more honest in its criticism, more intelligently pessimistic, and better journalistically. Its news comment covers the European political scene better than any similar week-to-week source I see. Its editors—who are not listed in the magazine—have also had the happy notion, unusual in leftwing journalism, of bringing together data, and often digging up material not elsewhere available, instead of endlessly reiterating an ideological "line." *Tribune* also has a strong book section, doubtless due largely to the efforts of George Orwell, who also contributes an excellent weekly column. Harold Laski used to write regularly for *Tribune*, but has fortunately written very little for it of late. (Subscriptions to *Tribune* may be entered through *The New Republic*, 40 East 49th St., New York City.)

The Economist is a combination of our own *Commercial & Financial Chronicle* and *The New Republic*, if you can

imagine the former acquiring a broad social perspective and the latter developing some intellectual muscles. It is an old and 100% capitalist journal, full of advertisements for banks and insurance companies and with pages of business statistics and corporation reports at the back. Economically it is less "progressive" than our own liberal weeklies (that is, it is more hostile to nationalization, Beveridge plans, etc.), politically it is more so (that is, it speaks out more frankly on the war and on foreign policy, is more critical of Russia, more concerned about the rights of small nations). Its leading articles are always on a high level, solidly documented and intelligently realistic. Its material on Russia, Germany and the Far East seems especially good.

Is Everybody Going Crazy?

Our readers may have noticed that the "fillers" at the end of articles have been getting steadily wackier. The promising new department, "With the Heavy Thinkers", in particular has contained some remarkable specimens from the works of Samuel Grafton, Archibald MacLeish, and, in this issue, alas, my friend James Agee. The success with which James Burnham has impersonated a thinker and theoretician is another instance, as is the recent appearance of Orson Welles in the role of a political columnist, or any issue of that journalistic curio, *Free World* magazine. I don't mean simply that I disagree rather strongly with the above writers (as I do). It is possible to disagree violently with some one's conclusions and still recognize they have been reached by methods of thought, and in accordance with ethical assumptions, which one holds to one's self. Two cases in point, for me, would be John Dewey's political philosophy and Trotsky's conception of the Soviet Union. But in the above cases, and in many more I run across in books and the press these days, the *methods* by which conclusions are reached seem to me so irrational—and in some though not all cases the ethical assumptions so anti-pathetic—that one simply cannot even discuss the question. Agee, for example, may be right in asserting that Roosevelt was a hero and saint who died for suffering humanity. But the sentimental mush he unloads to prove it has nothing to do with the question one way or the other. In fact, I'll show my fair-mindedness by saying that Agee's eulogy of Roosevelt does not necessarily show that Roosevelt was *not* a modern saint, any more than the fact that fascist and Stalinist rhapsodizers have praised *their* Leaders with the same kind of "blood-thinking" necessarily proves that Hitler and Stalin are not exemplary characters.

What I mean is that the kind of wild stuff we used to associate, in the innocent old days, with the "yellow press" has been cropping up in the highbrow and middlebrow press with rather alarming frequency of late. *PM* is perhaps the prime example: here is a paper that crusades for the causes we leftish intellectuals have always considered "good"—labor unions, better housing, progressive education, socialized medicine, democratic racial relations, etc.; a paper which is typographically modern and whose writers use the jargon of "advanced" circles; and yet a paper which has even less respect for objective truth than the great bulk of our commercial press (a poll among Washington correspondents, for example, showed that only *The Chicago Tribune* was considered by them to more consistently color the news to fit its editorial line); which is uncritical to the point of irrationality on the big political issues of our time, such as the war, the Soviet Union, Roosevelt's leadership, and the New Deal, and which uses methods that are Hearstian in their grossness to cover up unpleasant reality, smear every critic, and induce in its readers a hypnotic assent to the use of any means toward

what its editors consider a good end. The liberal weeklies still irritate me, which means I feel *some* contact, *some* common intellectual and moral ground. But *PM* simply depresses me—or did until I stopped reading it some time ago—because I feel, as with the *Daily Worker*, that the gap has become simply too great between our respective methods of thinking and behaving. What makes it all confusing, and rather ominous for the future of the left-of-center movement, is that one agrees with a paper like *PM* to a large extent on ends and even on values, and disagrees on *methods* only—that is, on the war as a means to advance social progress or on Roosevelt as a Friend of the People; or, on hysteria and halftruths and evasions and suppressions as a means of propagating democratic values. It is easy enough to see where one stands with Colonel McCormick, the type of the old obscurantist and demagogue. But the growing tension between a world organized more and more along the most brutal imperialist lines and a liberal creed which rejects imperialism and brutality seems to be forcing liberal thinking (which of course is too "realistic" to buck the tide) into increasingly pathological forms. The process may be also be considered as part of that contemporary merging of mass and "highbrow" culture which I described in "A Theory of Popular Culture" (*POLITICS*, February 1944).

Footnote to the Gratsos Memorandum

The publication of the Gratsos memo seems to have caused pain to certain local Greek shipowners. The May 19 issue of their *Free Press* terms *POLITICS* "a Communist periodical, though of a heretic character inasmuch as it is Trotskyist" and charges that my introduction is full of "distortions" (not specified) which are "indispensable for slandering the bourgeois system and for propagandizing Germano-Asiatic Hitlerism which is also called Marxian Communism." (What I like about these shipowners is their prose style.) The *Free Press* concludes on a rather sinister note: "Let the shipowners search among themselves and find out who is the informer from their fold who gave the information to *POLITICS*. If they want us to help them in this effort, let them *officially* request us to do so."

Fact is, I found the Gratsos Memo in the subway.

Algerian Uprising

Frederick Pearson began his North African letter in the March, 1945, *POLITICS*: "French North Africa is ripe for revolt." The May 28 issue of *Time* contains the following interesting report: "Through the Paris censorship trickled news of a bloody insurrection in Algeria. Since May 8, fierce Kabyle tribesmen had stabbed or beaten to death a hundred French officials and wealthy *colons* (landowners who exploit native farm labor) in the mountainous district of Little Kabylia. The Europeans had picked up their guns, banded together and held off the Kabyles as best they could until police and regular troops arrived."

"The Colonial Government proclaimed martial law in Little Kabylia, sent out punitive columns of Foreign Legionnaires, Senegalese and Moroccan troops. Artillery and aircraft smashed native villages. The new Algerian nationalist party *Amis du Manifeste* ("Friends of the Manifesto"), was outlawed, its leaders arrested. The old *Parti Populaire Algérien*, whose slogan is 'Algeria for the Algerians,' was carefully watched."

"In Paris General Charles de Gaulle's Cabinet hastily drafted plans to remove the causes of revolt, chiefly hunger. Algeria's 8,000,000 people are near the famine line. A succession of bad harvests, coupled with a wartime lack of imports, has reduced Algerian rations to 500 calories a

day, only a third of what a Frenchman gets. In Little Kabylia whole villages were abandoned by a desperate population streaming toward the cities. Fields were torn up in a desperate forage for edible roots.

"The strangest victim of the revolt was the Algerian Communist Party. Like the French Communist Party last spring the Algerian Communists suddenly abandoned their traditional anti-imperialism, took a stand against the natives (presumably, Communists want to keep intact the French Empire which they may one day rule). Furious Algerian nationalists retaliated by killing one local Communist Party secretary and beating up other Communists."

Where to Buy It

The following is a list of out-of-town bookstores and newsstands which now carry POLITICS. We should be most grateful for suggestions from our readers of any additional stores that might carry the magazine.

Perhaps some of our readers are in a position to distribute some copies themselves. If so, we urge them to write in for special rates at which they may obtain, on consignment, five copies or more a month for resale.

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Modern Books, 12 Church St.
JOHANNESBURG, S. Africa
Vanguard Booksellers, Warwick House, 28 Joubert St.

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