

politics

Winter, 1949

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SOVIET v. AMERICAN INTELLECTUALS:

Fadayeve, Pavlenko, Shostakovitch v.
Counts, Lowell, McCarthy, Macdonald

Special Supplement on
the Waldorf Conference

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Homage to Twelve Judges

An Editorial

THE Fellows are aware that objections may be made to awarding a prize to a man situated as is Mr. Pound. In their view, however, the possibility of such objection did not alter the responsibility assumed by the jury of selection. . . . To permit other considerations than that of poetic achievement to sway the decision would destroy the significance of the award and would in principle deny the validity of that objective perception of value on which any civilized society must rest."

This seems to me the best political statement made in this country for some time, just as the action of the Fellows in awarding the 1948 Bollingen Prize to Ezra Pound's *The Pisan Cantos* (New Directions, \$2.75) is the brightest political act in a dark period. Let me explain why, despite the disclaimers of the Fellows themselves, I consider their award a political, as well as a literary, event.

As is well known, Mr. Pound's situation is disreputable and hopeless to a dramatic degree. For many years, he has articulated fascistic and anti-semitic sentiments; during the war, he made radio propaganda from Italy for Mussolini's regime and against his native country; he is now under arrest in a Washington mental hospital and will be tried for treason when and if he is pronounced mentally competent. The very book for which he is now honored was mostly written in a U.S. Army prison in Pisa, nor is it by any means free of its author's detestable social and racial prejudices.

The prize committee is a distinguished one. Its members are: Conrad Aiken, W. H. Auden, Louise Bogan, T. S. Eliot, Paul Green, Robert Lowell, Katherine Anne Porter, Karl Shapiro, the late Theodore Spencer, Allen Tate, Willard Thorp, and Robert Penn Warren. These constitute the Fellows in American Literature, a board appointed by Luther Evans, the Librarian of Congress. Thus we have a committee composed of eminent American writers and appointed by a high Government official, giving an important literary prize to a man under arrest for treason. I think there are not many other countries today, and certainly none East of the Elbe, where this could happen, and I think we can take some pride as Americans in having as yet preserved a society free and "open" enough for it to happen.

Whether *The Pisan Cantos* is the best poetry published by an American last year or not, I am incompetent to judge. Nor is this the point considered here, which is rather that by some miracle the Bollingen judges were able to consider Mr. Pound the poet apart from Mr. Pound the fascist, Mr. Pound the antisemite, Mr. Pound the traitor, Mr. Pound the funny-money crank, and all the other Mr. Pounds whose existence has properly nothing to do with the question of whether Mr. Pound the poet had or had not written the best American poetry of 1948.

"That objective perception of value on which any civilized society must rest"—this seems to me a formulation difficult to improve. Is not one of the most repellent aspects of the present Soviet system—or, for that matter, of the fascist system which Mr. Pound was so foolish as to admire—precisely that any "objective perception of value" is impossible under it? For such a perception is possible only under two closely related conditions. The first is that no one sphere of human activity is exalted over the rest. The second is that clear distinctions be maintained between the various spheres, so that the value of an artist's work or a scientist's researches is not confused with the value of their politics.

The horror of Soviet communism, of course, is that it reduces the individual to one aspect, the political. The consequence is the obliteration of the boundary lines between the various aspects of culture—or better, the imperialist conquest of all the rest by politics—so that the fifteen members of the Politburo decide, *ex cathedra*, literally all questions, including the most abstruse problems of esthetics and science. (See page 10 for the Communist rationale on this.) Is not the literal meaning of "totalitarianism" just this pretension of the political power to control the *totality* of human life?

Such imperfect democracy as we of the West still possess depends on our continuing ability to make the kind of discrimination the Bollingen committee made, to evaluate each sphere of human activity separate from the rest instead of enslaving them all to one great reductive tyrant, whether it be The Church, The Proletariat, People's Democracy, The Master Race, or American Patriotism. Such limping justice as our courts produce likewise rests on their ability to distinguish the defendant's total behavior and personality from the specific action he is accused of having committed. And such cultural achievement as we are still capable of is nourished by "that objective perception of value on which any civilized society must rest."

The wave of the future is rolling in the other direction, as the warmaking centralized State becomes more powerful. It is ironical that it is precisely those who are misnamed "liberals" and even "socialists" who seem to be least enthusiastic about the Pound award. What bothers them is the very thing that is healthiest, politically, about it: the fact that Pound's treason and fascism were not taken into account in honoring him as a poet.

An extreme reaction was that of Albert Deutsch (whose liberalism has a Stalinoid tinge) writing in the liberal *N. Y. Post* of February 28. After a virulent column, in which he denounces Lowell and Eliot as "friends of the turncoat poet" and criticises them because they have not turned *their* coats ("they have been faithful visitors to Pound's ward in St. Elizabeth's"), Deutsch concludes: "There is something unholy in the act. To bestow honor in any form on the man who broadcast Fascist propaganda under the auspices of the Fascist enemy of his native land smacks, to me, like Benedict Arnold's American contemporaries awarding him a medal for his undoubted military ability—after his betrayal of West Point. . . . Regardless of the protestations of the prize committee, the prize given to the turncoat poet is likely to be regarded not only as a literary event but as a political act in many parts of our world."

On which: (1) such a medal to Benedict Arnold would have been, in my opinion, a noble gesture; (2) the award is indeed, as argued above, a "political act"—and one which should demonstrate to "many parts of our world"

To Our Readers

THE next (Spring) issue will appear in June. Whether there will ever be another issue depends on our readers. We have run out of money.

In its five years of publication, **POLITICS** has had an average annual deficit of \$3,300. Up to now, we have made this up out of our own pockets. At the end of last year, however, we faced the unpleasant fact that our 1949 income will be hardly enough to keep the family, let alone the magazine, in the modest style to which both are accustomed. Therefore, if **POLITICS** is to continue, its friends and readers must put up the money.

We want to continue **POLITICS**. Our plan is, if the money can be raised, to resume publication late next fall as a monthly. A prospectus outlining a new "editorial formula", which we hope will both improve the quality of the magazine and attract a wider readership, is now being worked out. Before the next issue, every subscriber will receive a draft of this new editorial plan, with a cordial invitation to make suggestions or criticisms. The final version will be printed in the Spring issue.

We estimate that a Publication Fund of from \$10,000 to \$15,000 (an average of \$2 to \$3 from each of our readers) will provide a solid base for a new, monthly **POLITICS**. Contributions are now solicited to this Fund. They will be kept in a separate account, and will be returned to the donors if enough money is not raised to resume publication next fall. Also, we should like to hear from readers who either have suggestions to offer as to what they would like to see in the new **POLITICS**, or who think they can help us raise the sum required.

NANCY & DWIGHT MACDONALD

that at least some Americans have a right to oppose Soviet totalitarianism in the name of freedom.*

* Let us not, however, become puffed-up with righteousness. On February 11 last, John Tsourakis, a Jehovah's witness who for reasons of conscience had refused military service, was executed at Larissa, Greece. About a month later, I am informed, a second conscientious objector was tried and executed in Larissa. The government which committed these acts of barbarism is dependent for its existence on the government of this country. The State Department has not expressed any objection to the executions.

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Editor: Dwight Macdonald

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ERP—A Critique of Production Economics

MARTIN FRENCH

A bewildering variety of regimes have disputed the once holy name of Socialism: Hitler's National Socialism, Stalin's Socialist Construction, Blum's Democratic Socialism, Cripps' Laborite Socialism. But there has come to be one common economic denominator to all of them: they are all production-oriented. That is, production comes first, and the consumer afterward, if at all.

Production Economics—there is the *leitmotif* of our age, the chord that vibrates harmoniously amid the dissonances of East v. West. It was the "total war effort" of both Axis and Allies. It is the *sine qua non* of war preparations today. It is also the basic principle of all the national "plans" and of the European Recovery Program (ERP). It seems to fit every ruling group's purpose.

IN a production-oriented economy, what happens to the consumer?

In Russia, he waits eternally for the Five Year Plan after next. In Germany, he paid for his Volkswagen in advance and it turned out to be a Panzerwagen. Under France's Monnet Plan, all the worker has to do is starve for four years and industry will recover admirably. Even in Britain, a traditional consumer economy like USA, he sees his rights whittled away under the Austerity Plan, which only the very rich can get around.

The nationalizations, of course, make this for "everybody's" benefit. We are all capitalists now, in Europe. The French CGT, in the midst of its Communist campaign against high prices, had to recommend that the French nationalized industries get "fairer compensation" for their products so as to survive. The British TUC, at its last meeting, had to recommend the government slow up nationalizations and concentrate on improving conditions.

Nobody seems to have raised the central objection that the nationalizations and the "Plans" are nailing labor and the people to the cross of the whole exploitative production system.

The economic plans behind the iron curtain are the worst of all. In the only comprehensive Stalinist study thus far of "European Recovery and United States Aid," by J. J. Joseph (constituting the Summer, 1948, issue of *Science and Society*) we are told about the Eastern European economic plans:

"Industrial targets are seen to be substantially higher than agricultural goals. The high rate of capital investment is indicative of the long-range assumptions underlying the plans—as the first of a series—and shows a marked restraint on immediate sharp increases in the standard of living."

BUT an even greater historical development is involved. From the beginning of 19th century industrialization, most of Europe has known only a sellers' market. (The

chief exceptions: Scandinavia, Switzerland, the pre-Hitler Rhine Valley.* Producer arrogance meshed gears smoothly with consumer apathy. Advertising, salesmanship, the wooing of customers—these never developed as they have in this country.

The American at home cannot imagine (and the American abroad is continually distressed by) the degraded position of the South and East European consumer who at best goes hat in hand—and at worst does not even consider the possibility of going to ask for service from his telephone company, his railroad, his utilities. He waits in long queues and contents himself with grumbling under his breath or to his neighbor if at all. There is virtually nothing corresponding to this in America except the landlord who bosses his tenants.

I recall a visiting American banker who expressed surprise that depositors tolerated such long queues in Italy. An Italian banker explained that big depositors were received privately in his office; the queues were made up only of small depositors, who could take their money elsewhere for all he cared. (Cf. the efforts of American banks to attract—by advertising and competitive service—precisely these small depositors.)

I also recall a community in prewar Greece where peasants depended on a passing bus line to go to market with their produce. The buses were so crowded—literally with people sitting on the roof—that many along the road were turned away day after day. Farther on, the same line operated buses next to a railroad and provided excellent frequent service, to compete. Yet over the first stretch, where it had a monopoly, there was no consumer pressure, no complaint, and passengers were wholly indifferent when I pointed out the situation to them. This was reflected also in lack of demands on the government. Nearby villagers who had no road acknowledged vaguely that a road which reached the next village was convenient, but showed absolutely no reaction to suggestions they might ask for one too. It was as if one suggested they "do something" about the weather.

On a lesser scale, this consumer apathy appeared all the way across Europe, including France. But it stopped short at Pre-Austerity England. When the war began, for instance, all sorts of new demands were created among civilians—blackout paper, flashlights, maps of the front, travel articles for evacuating the cities, etc. All sorts of fly-by-night (and established) producers met the demands. In

* It is significant that industrialization first developed in England and the Rhine Valley, from Basel to the Low Countries, thus creating a "sellers' market" on the rest of the Continent. It is only in this area of early industrialization—plus Scandinavia, which had special trading advantages—that the European consumer has held his own. Elsewhere, industrialization followed a demand created by the more advanced countries, giving the seller an advantage he has never lost.

France, the needed articles simply ran short immediately and people could not get them.

Democracy suffers enormously. These sellers'-market countries know no equivalent of the American who telephones to demand ice be cleared off his street and threaten to sue the city if his son slips coming home from school. Instead, the Continental votes social-democrat and gets a "Plan" to eliminate snow clearance in favor of heavy industry.

Here is one aspect of the American system that could profitably be understood, encouraged and exported. It is just this aspect that the Marshall Planners don't understand, since they are trying to do the opposite of it abroad. It is also exactly the thing that is wrongest about the Russian system.

By the standards of the conventional socialist, America should be pretty close to a dictatorship. Look at it in his terms. A two-party system with so little difference between the two parties as to come near to a one-party system. Government ownership limited to schools, post-offices and highways. The most elementary services—utilities, railroads, airplanes, telephone, telegraph, radio—are at the mercy of private interests. Our museums, operas, symphony orchestras, libraries, and universities depend largely on private donations. Our president has what would be dictatorial powers for a European prime minister. Our administration remains in office for four years, regardless of whether or not the people may meanwhile repudiate it in legislative elections.

But the American economy is built around the consumer. As a consumer, the individual thinks he has the right to demand services even from a monopoly; he is the one on whom the social pressure of advertising is automatically concentrated (even in wartime with nothing to sell), who shouldn't be kept standing in line too long or you may lose him, who must be rushed around by fast rides and get his telephone orders through in a hurry.

This is something we can keep—forever—if we are smart enough to understand it and fight for it. In spite of all the theories of leisure class and conspicuous waste, even the donation-supported operas are evidence that something not so far from anarchism, from that forgotten term "Red Republicanism," is the most effective and practical system of "planning"—from the human being upward, not from the government down—that has been devised.

It can and must be applied to better economic systems. But the principle must not be lost.

HOW does all this apply to ERP? To begin with, ERP might have been considered the dream of bourgeois economic theory. It can't any more because the term, bourgeois (but not the reality), has disappeared. Such unpleasant differentiations as the word implies were obliterated by the friendly semantics of the late national unifier in the White House. Except for a few pamphleteers connected with the Communist Party or the National Association of Manufacturers, all economists are automatically liberals. The very word economics somehow sounds liberal.

Because of this standardizing of labels, the ERP can be accepted as liberal by people who would have labeled it reactionary 15 years ago, when America was struggling

out of a depression, and there were two major schools of thinking on how to do it. One school, dubbed bourgeois by its foes, believed you had to increase production first. The other, or liberal, school believed this: Recovery can only (or at least: should only) be fostered by raising the standard of living and consumer purchasing power. In this school's view, the production-firsters simply wanted to subsidize big business instead of subsidizing the people.

But how, asked the production-firsters, are you going to raise the standard of living unless you start the wheels of industry that provide the jobs and pay-checks? First things first. Nobody seemed impressed by that argument at the time. Its proponents got called economic royalists. People from the most exclusive political families left their mimeograph machines to join the Workers Alliance and demand that the Government supply more jobs raking leaves, boondoggling, and painting ruthless proletarian murals for post-offices.

Today the same people who in 1935 damned Hoover's producer-oriented RFC and praised Roosevelt's consumer-oriented WPA are enthusiastic about the producer-oriented ERP. For this change of mind (and heart), they give many arguments. European factories lack equipment and raw material; the people are ill-clad, ill-fed, ill-housed; Communism is spreading. So along comes a great politico-eleemosynary innovation imposed by common decency and the defense of democracy, which will correct these ills and given Europe a chance to fend for herself again. It has its weakness but it's the best you can get, certainly better than nothing. To oppose it puts more arguments in the hands of the Communists.

None of this is true.

The ERP is not a *recovery* program but an *expansion* program. It calls for production levels undreamed of before the war (111,900,000,000 kwh of hydroelectric power in 1952 against Europe's 59,800,000,000 in 1938). Prewar production levels already were passed or sighted by the majority of ERP countries before the ERP started, in such key sectors as steel, coal and electricity. In his authoritative book, *The European Recovery Program* (Harvard, \$4.50), Prof. Seymour Harris writes: "For most Western European countries, late 1947 (and a fortiori early 1948) industrial output greatly exceeded that of the prewar period."*

One production index still lagged, however, food. Nor did consumption keep pace with increased industrial production. Consumption (in the ERP countries) of bread grains was 159 kilograms per capita in 1947-8, down from a prewar average of 192; consumption of fats and oils was 17, down from prewar 24. Even in Britain, traditionally a consumer-oriented economy, the percentage of national income spent on personal consumption was 78 in 1938, 70 in 1947 and—as planned under ERP at least—69 in 1948. The European consumer is still further squeezed by continuing inflation, which has become even more severe in ERP's first year. In a word, the benefits of this immense

* Exceptions were the three ex-enemy lands, above all Germany. And Germany was precisely the country whose 1948-9 ERP allocation was trimmed down from 14.5% originally recommended to 10.6%. (Harris, p. 300)

postwar industrial recovery are going not to the European people, who are much more ill-clad and ill-fed than before the war, but to the war-preparing national States, to strengthening the industrial base for war, and to an increase in exports. (Inflation is good for one thing at least: cheap exports.)*

The hardships of the European people are not caused by lack of production but by production-first and capital-first planning, which robs them of consumer goods in favor of capital expansion and export commodities. ERP is a system for subsidizing this planning.

This is not a necessary evil but an unnecessary one. The same expansion could be obtained by consumer-first planning, which throughout history has stimulated capital expansion as well. On the other hand, we have yet to find an instance where a promised return to consumer goods emphasis took place smoothly once a trend against consumer power and living standards was firmly established.

LAST year a group of American and French journalists went to see the first American-aid cotton go into production at Epinal. The factory owners welcomed them with champagne and took them through the plant. The owners and spindles and shuttles of industry all buzzed merrily. Too far off to be noticed (about 20 feet), small girls were working. Two or three reporters talked to them. They pretended to the legally minimum age of 14. Hours: 48 a week. Pay: not quite \$4 a week. These girls did not get their jobs because of U.S. aid. France has no unemployment problem but a labor shortage. The factory needed and used the girls before. It did, however, increase production.

Now what exactly was the economics of the cotton going through that factory?

Two different sellers got paid for the cotton in full. One was the capitalist in America, that philanthropic sieve through whom all profits are supposed to filter down eventually to the people. The other was the French government, which got it free and sold it (for resale) to the Epinal capitalist for its own French francs, thereby saving itself printing ink for more paper money (somewhat drained by the expenses of the army in Indo-China. Half the national budget of France goes into national defense.)

We now take the cotton to the Epinal factory. It definitely increases the owner's profits: he can have a surer stream of raw materials; he has to make fewer deals for black market materials; he doesn't have to use so much poor quality cotton. Nobody has suggested that some of the Marshall Plan profits be passed on to the European working class in pay raises. This might arouse enthusiasm in labor, but our all-wise U.S. diplomacy concentrates on the capitalist producers—to win them over from Communism! This should make one suspicious of the anti-Communist rationale of ERP.

Nonetheless, we get past all this and the cotton comes out of the factory. Here at last is our great objective. Let bygones be bygones. We have here a hunk of material from American cotton that wasn't here before. The wealth of "France" has been increased.

But who is "France"? Who can buy the material? It takes more working hours today for a workman to earn the price of a piece of material than it did a year ago. Says Seymour Harris, tugging uncomfortably at his collar: "One of the disturbing factors in the situation was the failure of wages to respond to the increase in the cost of living."

Of course, the material gets bought—by the factory owner's wife and her friends. This is economic recovery. Once it's bought, maybe the Epinal factory can expand and ultimately *something* must filter down to the people from such increased production. The *average* per capita income (no matter how distributed) will be increased by ERP.

Production, in other words, has become something good in itself. It is Wealth. It is Recovery. Never mind whose. France's. The lady you see in all the political cartoons, talking to Uncle Sam and John Bull.

THE new leftist production-first economics puts some curious problems up to people who would like to be friendly to labor, as I do now and then for old time's sake. About a year and a half ago some 1,500,000 tons of U.S. coal were held up for weeks in French ports by a general longshoremen's strike under anti-ERP Communist inspiration. (It is of course axiomatic by now that only workers outside of Stalinist-run unions ever have legitimate grievances.) Now what do we make of this? Was this strike wicked because it paralyzed production? What on earth does any strike ever do except that?

And what happens if European strikers win? Let us say they gain shorter hours, more vacations, fewer working days, safety measures, eliminations of speedups and protection against overtime—what a snafu *that* makes of production!

Or do we have to fall back on the argument that employers really don't know what's good for them, and they will make better profits with happy labor?

In other words, since when in heaven's name was labor ever supposed to be fascinated by production—before the imperious and idealistic necessity of another war to make the world safe for whatever it is we've got now? One can support the Marshall Plan for increasing European production only by merging one's interests completely with those of the management class of the several countries.

(We will see later how effective it really is for production, and what the alternatives are).

So the political effects of support of the Marshall Plan have been quite curious.

On the American left:

"ERP PREVENTS STARVATION ABROAD: STIFFENS RESISTANCE TO COMMIES," reads a headline in the December 31 *Socialist Call* over a piece by William Becker. Now Becker, ex-Communist, ex-Lovestoncite and now a member of the ex-Socialist Party, supposedly is no babe in the woods. At first, he writes, agricultural products unfortunately predominated but "since the middle of August, the emphasis has shifted to industrial supplies, thus making ERP aid contribute directly not only to relief but to recovery." In other words, the ERP almost reverted to the outmoded idea of helping consumers' living standards in-

* The figures in this paragraph are from Harris, pp. 251-4.

PRODUCTION ECONOMICS: NORWAY

OSLO, Feb. 27—Norway's heroic drive for a self-supporting status by 1952, when ERP ends, has reduced her living standards to the point of diminishing returns. . . . The actuality is that the combination of high taxes and low consumption is depriving workers of the incentive to produce. The workers are losing interest in overtime pay since there is very little on which to spend extra money. . . . The ambitious schemes for the country's recovery include the reinvestment of one-third of the national income in productive faculties each year, the highest of any Marshall Plan country. . . .

Although the Government is saying nothing officially, the plan is to increase the supply of shoes, textiles and a few food items in the next few months. Meanwhile, the Government has its hands full countering propaganda linking consumer privation to the decision to seek membership in the Atlantic Pact and generally to align Norway with the West. The country is now spending about \$100 millions on defense that could otherwise be going to better living conditions. . . .

It goes without saying that there are receptive ears for such propaganda. Although living conditions would be substantially lower without Marshall Plan aid, this is difficult to explain to the average family. They look at the meager fare set on the table and fail to see the great improvement in the last year.

—Dispatch by Felix Belair, Jr., in *N.Y. Times*, Feb. 28, 1949

stead of capitalists; it was a narrow escape, says Comrade Becker.

After ERP, he continues, "far-sighted planning" will be needed because "American generosity alone will not be enough." (Only the village idiot in any part of Europe thinks the ERP is "American generosity.")

On the Europeans:

The ERP has everywhere been accompanied by a strengthening of the forces of the extreme right and of the Catholic Church in the center, all feeling their day has come. The political state of mind in Europe is well illustrated by a joke that went the rounds, that the pocket republic of San Marino had begged France to send some Communists there so it could get in on the ERP. France replied, "We wouldn't dare lose a single one."

On the Americans:

It has strengthened our whole "white man's burden" attitude, so offensive to Europeans. Marshall Planners' speeches are peppered with references to our "new obligations" imposed by our "leading world role." The ERP is indissolubly tied up with plans for American international domination, and is felt so by everybody in Europe.

You would have to go to Russia to find people as unaware as Americans are of what the rest of the world thinks of them.

POLITICALLY the ERP is a fizzle. The workmen and child laborers of Europe who find their earnings worth less and less under inflation, somehow can't share the liberals' enthusiasm for industrial supplies increasing their employers' profits. They just don't understand the new theory of production economics, or rather the old theory of bourgeois economics which has gobbled up its liberal rivals while assuming their name.

This is not out of jealousy toward America, surliness, or Communist anti-American propaganda. Aid by individual American relief organizations, stunts like the Friendship train—by that reactionary Drew Pearson—have met with great enthusiasm. Politically these have succeeded beyond anybody's dreams. The people, in their ignorance of economics, seem to like it better if they get things themselves instead of through their steel trusts.

Now the question is, economically, just how effective is the mechanical first-things-first theory of production economics? Its main fallacy is that it assumes the first thing to be the machine that turns out the goods. It forgets the worker who has to operate the machine to begin with.

The American worker has not known since 1935 what it's like to have to work month after month without a decent smoke to relieve his nerves. Or how easy it is to cut down on the cost of food gradually so that you don't get hungry but just stay listless. Or what coming home to an unheated flat all winter can do to you. Or what the lack of a glass of good beer or wine means to somebody who has been unhygienically raised on it.

But even this is a bit beside the point. An American dissatisfied with his boss and what he is getting out of life may still continue to labor like an ant; a European doesn't. This is certainly economically related to the fact that America is a consumer paradise—if only a consumer fool's paradise—where the worker is conditioned to feel a direct connection between his labor (embodied in his paycheck) and his well being (in the store window).

NAM ex-President Eric Johnston reported after a pre-ERP tour of Europe that he had everywhere found a direct ratio between the consumer goods available in each country and the productivity of the individual worker; both reached their peak in Belgium. And Professor Harris states: "Of the European countries for which information is available, Belgium alone increased its per capita income as much as dollar prices had risen—i.e., the Belgian per capita real income in 1946 was above that of 1939."

Now, after the war, Belgium alone plunged directly into consumer goods, "used up its reserves" making whatever Belgians wanted to buy, de-rationed as fast as possible, adopted no nationalizations, no Monnet Plan, no Austerity Program. Today Belgium, a pre-war debtor, is a creditor to all surrounding countries.* Steel production is at 120 per cent of prewar level, machinery at 133 per cent, gas at 143, woolen yarns and rayon at 150 and 155, nitrogen at 174, electricity production at 196 per cent.

There are some other explanations—some war-blocked gold returned; wartime credits earned in the colonies—but none enough to make that much difference. The fact is plain. Belgium, using a consumer approach, put "last things" (human beings) first and—as anybody would have predicted 15 years ago but what seems like a discovery now—the human beings produced more with "neglected" capital goods than capital goods elsewhere have produced with neglected human beings. Obviously, after getting started, Belgium laid in capital goods too—more than anyone else.

* For this very reason, she is now in an economic depression: a productionist Europe, with its trade barriers and lowered living standards, cannot pay for Belgium's free-market production.

WHAT happens in the long run to the ERP type of production-first planning?

First, it is economically unsound. A good example is agriculture. Most of ERP Europe has a majority of farms too small to own machinery. Almost everywhere, after the war, they formed farm machinery cooperatives in the hope of overcoming this, but these languished for lack of the machines.

ERP comes in with farm machinery. To give it to the cooperatives would be folly from a productionist point of view, as I have heard privately hinted in official circles. They have no experience and cannot handle the machines as profitably or efficiently. Naturally, the 20 per cent of the land occupied by efficient farms (read: large land-holders) is favored because it can use the machines for maximum production. The human beings don't count. (Thus, even when it finally turns to the actual business of producing consumers' goods [i.e., food], production-first planning does so by sacrificing the individual in some other way, as a worker or farmer.)

What will be the result if this trend continues? As soon as the food shortages are licked, the smaller farms—the whole farm economy of Western Europe—will face economic ruin. The fact is that production economics is the reverse of long-term planning. It begins with “first things” and brings everything to an end right there.

Secondly, while producing consumer goods automatically creates a demand for more production goods to make it, the manufacture of production or export goods creates no such demands for making consumer goods. Quite the contrary, it lowers the whole standard of consumption demands.

Government economic planning which finds some excuse for ignoring consumption and the standard of living is a political habit-forming drug. The very way in which European consumer shortages caused by the war have been prolonged is proof enough of that. It is much more appetizing to any ruling group to pile up credits abroad and capital plant at home than to encourage a demanding domestic population. How beautifully the Five Year Plans succeed each other in Russia into eternity! In February, 1946, Stalin set eventual goals for steel, oil, coal—not butter or bathtubs—to be met by Five Year Plan VII. He was at that time inaugurating Plan IV.

Thirdly, there is the inevitable “interference” which always seems to get in the way of production economists' plans, but which is entirely implicit in them. The plans imply a low standard of living and then, lo, strikes break out. Communists. Just can't stop the workers from listening to them. And it plays the devil with production curves, all planned out otherwise. France, starting her Monnet Plan, “lost” her whole 1947 advance over 1945 in total production because of Communist-led strikes which weren't supposed to count in the statistics.

Likewise in totalitarian plans, the needs of munitions industries always “interfere” with consumer goods. But one of the points about non-consumer production is precisely that it makes it easy for the planners to divert such production into armaments. Governments have rarely been bashful about concentrating as much on armaments at

PRODUCTION ECONOMICS: FRANCE

1.

Despite the drag of constant strikes, French industry moved forward in 1948 to 9% more production than in the pre-war year of 1938. . . . French agriculture, aided by almost perfect weather, also showed gains, although production still remained 4% under the 1934-38 average. . . . The government made constant efforts during the year to curb inflation. Last year's rise of only 62% in wholesale prices was considered something of a victory. . . . ERP aid was of vital importance: it supplied about half France's normal imports, and the counterpart fund permitted a start in re-equipment of French industry, (*N.Y. Herald-Tribune*, Feb. 6, 1949)

2.

During the third period of the Monnet Plan (first six months of 1948) the net increase in our productive plant was four times greater than it was during 1938. (Release from French Embassy, Feb. 10, 1949)

3.

Current wages of Paris street-railway workers are as follows:

Common Laborers	55 francs (20c) an hour
Semiskilled Workers	65 francs (24c) an hour
Conductors	70 francs (26c) an hour
Drivers	76 francs (28c) an hour

In other areas, wages are from 5% to 25% lower than the above. (News Service, International Transport Workers Federation; Feb. 18, 1949)

everybody's expense as they could get away with. Now we are begging for it.

WHAT are the alternatives to ERP? Its advocates now claim a monopoly not only on charity but even on charitable feelings. Anybody against it is a brute who would rather see Europe starve than get an insufficient half a loaf. Or just a crackpot Utopia Now advocate.

First of all, the Marshall Plan didn't invent U.S. aid to Europe. It was, rather, a *substitute* for such aid. “It is a continuation of a trend over a period of 35 years,” writes Seymour Harris, “during which this country assisted foreigners with about \$100 billion worth of goods and services. For this sum, which equalled about 4% of the income of this country, and 40% of the total goods and services exported over the 35 years, we received in return about \$20 billion in gold and IOU's both promising little return in goods.”

The first year of ERP—and it tapers off from now on—represented only 2½% of our national income, which is 1½% less than our 35-year average. (ERP is not our *only* unpaid exporting, of course; but it is by far the main one.) In the two postwar years ending mid-1947, the ERP countries got \$9.1 billions in U.S. loans, grants and credits, plus \$2 billion goods in exchange for gold transfers.* A total of \$11 billions in *two* years, in short, as against the \$15 billions ERP offers in *four* years.

* Our mad magpie hoard of gold in Fort Knox has reached a current high of \$24,234,000,000, all capable of buying exactly nothing. Our gold-purchasing program benefits chiefly the two main producers of gold: South Africa and . . . the Soviet Union.

A second consideration which ought to give pause to the Marshall Planners and their liberal periphery is that ERP is also a substitute for a lowering of tariffs and a removal of trade barriers which American business would—without ERP—have had to seriously consider. One minor (to us) but major (to Europe) example is the case of the International Wine Convention, which American wineries have refused to respect. They are allowed to violate world copyright, and to cash in on valuable names which European producers have built up literally over centuries: Italian Chianti, Portuguese Port, Spanish Sherry, French Burgundy, Hungarian Tokay, German Rhine Wine.

Thirdly, ERP does not cover all the imports of the beneficiary countries: it liberates their credits so they can make other purchases. In short, it merely selects what goods they will get free and what they will pay for. As long as any ERP country is spending a single dollar of hard currency for consumer goods, that much free allocation can be taken off production goods and the equivalent in consumer goods given free instead. Suppose ERP precisely reversed the present policy and gave Europe free *consumer* goods (food, clothing, cigarettes—just the things which our production-minded liberals today damn as “a mere dole,” just as, in 1935 the production-minded conservatives did). We don’t need to worry about the European governments using the liberated credits to buy plenty of capital goods! The difference **would be that the consumer goods could be given free to the people**, thus raising living standards in the simplest, most direct possible way, and also holding down inflation by reducing the circulation of money. Whereas, with the present ERP “reconstruction” policy, savings on production goods cannot very well be passed on to the consumer; and each movement of the goods through various hands is accompanied by a reverse movement of money in payment, which means increasingly rapid circulation of money and greater inflation.

THE alternative, then, is roughly what is now damned by respectable liberals, plus the disreputable Communists and the demi-mondaine Wallaceites, as—sinister chords in the background—“dumping.” That is, the unloading of surplus finished or semi-finished American products onto foreign markets.

The fact is that a consistent policy of “dumping” would make ERP into a fairly decent economic program. It would create work here, dispose of surplus goods which can be exported without causing high prices here, and present them to the ill-fed and ill-clad European consumer with a minimum of profiteering and inflationary money-transactions. In 1910, dumping meant the Steel Trust selling tinplate abroad for half the price which monopolistic collusion was able to extort from the American consumer; the effect was bad on both the USA and Europe: the former had to pay more for its steel (since there was an artificially induced shortage, to which dumping contributed), and the latter’s industry was wrecked by the American cut-price competition. But this is 1949, not 1910, a fact which the liberals and Wallaceites are constantly forgetting. Today the USA has surpluses (though not of the very things ERP exports most prolifically), and European production of food and consumption goods is still so low

that American “dumping” can easily be absorbed for years.*

The Communists and the American liberals are not the only ones who criticise “dumping.” The European capitalists, both of the old-fashioned private kind and of the new State variety, also object to it. Each of these odd bedfellows has his own special reason for being in the bed: the Communists quite simply and honestly want to do the utmost possible damage to both the American and the European economies; the European private capitalists want to get American capital goods to build up their future competitive position on world markets; the European State capitalists (the Monnet and Cripps planners) want capital goods in order to make armaments and in order to produce export commodities which will bolster up a “strong” State; as for the American liberals, they have come to think “internationalism” means supporting foreign *governments*. This liberalistic notion dates from Roosevelt’s semantic wizardry, which changed internationalism into internationalism, thus identifying a nation with its government.

There is, however, one powerful grouping that favors dumping: the American business community. For obvious reasons, the private capitalists of the USA want to send chiefly consumer goods and finished goods to Europe and to cut down on the capital goods and industrial raw materials which will rearm their European competitors. Their influence is exerted through the ECA (Economic Cooperation Administration), which is the American control body for ERP, just as the OEEC (Office for European Economic Cooperation) is the similar European body. Conflicts between ECA and OEEC are, naturally, frequent; in most of them, OEEC is on the reactionary side. It was OEEC which cut down Germany’s percentage of ERP benefits to an unworkable level; on item after item, OEEC has asked for a higher proportion of raw materials and heavy industrial equipment **than ECA wanted to give**. For OEEC represents both kinds of European capitalists: State (who want to strengthen the industrial base for a strong war economy) and private (who want to protect their profit position regardless of the effect on the people).†

At this point, we must remember another part of Amer-

* The only kind of dumping to which a liberal can sensibly object is when it is a question of exporting without a surplus at home (as with the 1910 Steel Trust, or the 1949 Soviet Lumber Trust). The chief and almost the only Communist argument against ERP—that it competes with European business—is really an argument for their own kind of economy: an economy of scarcity. Their claim that it creates unemployment in Europe is invalid, except perhaps in the case of Italy. On the contrary, what worries Harris and other economists about ERP is whether Europe has enough manpower to put it across.

† Protecting profits in Europe means also perpetuating the whole sellers-market system. For generations American railway workers have insisted on automatic couplings between cars, but this elementary safety device—the manual coupling is extremely dangerous to brakemen—is still unknown in France. When the USA replaced after the war one-third of France’s rolling stock, the French railroads refused to take cars with automatic couplings, lest the railway workers demand that safety device on the old cars as well. So at considerable extra expense, American car-builders turned the clock back and turned out cars with the old hand-couplings specially for the French railroads. (And what “consumer apathy” on the part of the French railway unions to have put up with this sort of thing so long!)

PRODUCTION ECONOMICS: OVER THE TOP!

GENEVA, Feb. 7—Europe, excluding Russia, produced 47 million metric tons of steel during 1948, an increase of 29% over 1947, the UN Economic Commission for Europe reported today. . . . Every European country with the exception of Russia and Germany is now producing more steel than the average of its 1936-8 production.

—N.Y. Herald-Tribune, Feb. 8 1949

ican capitalism, and a part which in foreign policy is dominant: the State or political capitalists.* And they side with their European colleagues against both the European masses and the American pure-businessmen. They are just as concerned as the European State capitalists are to build up a strong European war economy, since they think in terms of an alliance against Russian expansion. They also have a strong political motive in giving the European capitalists what they want. As we have seen, the popular notion that ERP is a method of winning "the Europeans" away from Communism with economic bribes, is false. For, as we have also seen, ERP's economic largesse is channelized away from the European masses and toward the European capitalists, that is, away from the people Communism attracts and toward the very people it could never attract.

ERP is indeed a bribe, but the recipient is not the people but the ruling classes of Europe; and its purpose is to get the latter to accept American leadership and support American foreign policy.

It is the continuation of an American drive several years old: from the Paris peace conference of 1946, when other countries let America do most of the talking against Russia, to the present loud pro-Americanism of Europe's governments; from the French role of East-West mediator, to the new Western Big 3; from the futile announced hopes of the Brussels Western Union as a third force between the Soviet and American Unions, to its absorption into the North Atlantic Alliance by smarter U.S. power politicians who encouraged Western Union all along with this idea (it still will remain as a bargaining unit inside the Alliance; otherwise it mightn't have come in).

The bargaining simply means haggling over the price at which European capitalism is being bought. While recognizing it must make economic concessions to gain political advantage, America naturally wants to conserve as many economic advantages as possible. The European rulers are trying to do the same for their side. The Communists are naturally on the side against America, and if there is an ERP they want it to be as costly for American

* Just as there are "business unionists" and "political unionists," there are also "business capitalists" (even "business businessmen") and "political capitalists." The former are mostly interested in immediate profits; on the world scale, they are just "traders." The latter—who include the men who run the great Government economic agencies—have a more longterm perspective and are interested in such recondite matters as the current extension of the Monroe Doctrine to include Western Europe. They are the "imperialists" or the "internationalists," depending on one's point of view.

capitalism as possible, and to leave the European workers as discontented as possible.

SO, finally, what is to be done? If by European recovery we mean the recovery of the European people and not simply of European exploitation, let the goods we deliver be such as will raise the standard of living (and at the same time even liberate a certain amount of European credits in the process, to help somewhat with other purchases). And what is the best way to raise the living standard to the maximum in this transaction? The same as the way to prevent these shipments from intensifying fiduciary circulation and causing inflation. Simply have no money change hands.

Instead of giving it free to the government, for its capitalists' profit, give it free to the consumer. Add directly to the wealth of the country without disturbing the circulation. Place the goods in the hands of the ultimate consumer. In other words, give direct relief. The relief that the veteran socialist and liberal politicians have suddenly

PROFESSOR HARRIS DISSENTS—OR DOES HE?

Author's Note: At the end of his book on ERP, Seymour Harris has a four-page "postscript" reviewing ERP's first six months. The facts he cites fit in so neatly with the thesis of this article—though Prof. Harris draws quite a different conclusion from them—that some of the more salient seem worth reproducing here.

On the whole, ERP has progressed reasonably well. . . . The fact that total production in Europe, both on the farm and in industry, advanced in the latter part of 1947 and the first half of 1948 has contributed to the favorable developments in the ERP. . . . Recent developments do not, however, suggest that Europe is reconciled to interference by the USA in her internal affairs, or that much progress has been made in contending with the inflation. . . .

First, we comment on output. . . . For thirteen ERP countries, industrial output (unweighted mean) in 1947 exceeded that of 1946 by 15%, but food production in 1946-47 was still 11% below the prewar level. . . .

Inflation remains a crucial problem. Undoubtedly, the high level of investments is a factor. Five of the ERP countries used 27% of their gross product for investment in 1947, as compared with 18% in 1938.

Even the United Kingdom suffered a rise in prices: the increase was 9% in the first half of 1948. . . . In France, the wholesale price level increased almost 40% in the first six months of 1948, and the cost of living, 20%. . . . On the other hand, many of the smaller countries seem to have the inflationary situation under control. Seven ERP countries suffered a rise in wholesale prices of less than 2% in the first quarter of 1948.

Related to the domestic inflation is the failure of the international accounts to improve. . . . One has but to read M. Reynaud's statement of August 19, 1948, on the French budgetary situation—the absence of savings, the excessive investment—to realize that Britain is not alone. . . . The difficulty was not a failure to realize export plans but rather the high value of imports, to which a rise of 10% in import prices in the first six months of 1948 contributed. . . .

Little progress was made on the cooperation front. European experts are not so enthusiastic as in July, 1947. . . .

In summary: the probable outcome of the ERP is almost as beclouded late in September as it was early in April, 1948. The most perplexing unknown is the course of inflation, both in Europe and in the USA. . . .

come to look on with Union Club horror. And the more these goods are surplus, the better.

What irony that at the time of the Congressional hearings on the ERP, the man who proposed this alternative was Herbert Hoover. Hoover, who in 1931 wanted recovery by doles to business instead of the people, has now changed places with his critics. The Hoover Plan is the only progressive one.

Hoover wanted it simply because he is an old-fashioned politician who puts the immediate economic interests of private U.S. business groups in foreign trade ahead of the State Department's foreign power politics. Hoover's and Drew Pearson's politicalized Quakerism sees foreign politics simply in terms of gaining popular goodwill. When Hoover directed the same kind of aid program after World War I in Belgium and Russia, the Left was understandably cynical about his motives but certainly never objected to giving or accepting his kind of relief goods as such.

This does not prevent making additional demands—to increase the proposed expenditure, to tax excess ERP profits at home for ERP benefit, to abolish tariffs, to join agreements like the International Wine Convention, possibly to establish some legal protection against price rises from competitive ERP buying (the best protection is to concentrate on surpluses—and away from raw materials, in which any price rise pyramids out to a myriad finished articles).

But no matter how inadequate, the Hoover Plan at least would help insure some consumer benefits, outside the supposedly necessary vicious cycle of production for production's sake. Hoover did not propose anything like the full \$15 billions for his plan because he obviously did not expect it also would cover the usual heavy deals between American and European capitalism—who know how to take care of themselves without any help from *The Nation* or the CIO. Yet Hoover's smaller appropriation offered a much bigger sum (or saving) in the pockets of Europe's millions than will reach them under ERP. Let them get at least this and maintain a minimum standard of human demands.

We can only support aid meaningfully if it goes to the people. Not to industries, governments, "countries." We can only fight Communism meaningfully if we understand the nature of Soviet reaction. Write off as a dead loss the would-be progressives who, having become equally nationalistic, cannot oppose Stalinist nationalism and imperialism except by upholding their own. If they must lean on "Truman and the Marshall Plan" for backing against Communism or Wallace—in the unions, at the ballot box, and in Europe—they will find no Holy Alliance there. Only the kiss of death.

THE STATE, by Randolph Bourne

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That's What the Man Said

EDITOR'S NOTE: *The following is not a hoax. It is the complete text—omitting a rather flowery prelude—of Milton Howard's regular column in the N.Y. "Daily Worker" of January 16 last.*

I believe it to be a document of the first importance because: (1) it demonstrates better than cancelled checks or stolen state papers that the American Communist movement is simply an instrument of Kremlin policy, for here is a journalist in New York City giving out with a line indistinguishable from the most extreme pronouncements from Moscow; and (2) Howard does not apologize, he does not defend or rationalize or sidestep, but with admirable and reckless candor he meets head-on the criticism which even the most sympathetic Western observers have been making of the Kremlin's cultural policy. He is quite right when he claims that there has arisen in Russia—and in Stalinoid circles over here—a wholly new Weltanschauung, which breaks sharply with the whole tradition and development of Western culture since the middle ages.

There is, indeed, a gap between Soviet—or, better, Kremlin—and Western culture which can no longer be bridged. But this gap, this abyss is not just a political matter: democracy v. totalitarianism, or—if you prefer—bourgeois decadence v. socialist creativity. It is that, too, but it is also something much bigger. There was more in common between Bakunin and Metetrnich, or Debs and Frick, or Marx and Mill—and there is more in common between the present-day similars of such extreme antagonists—than there is between, to reduce the scale slightly, Comrade Howard and myself. The chasm that separates Western from Kremlin culture is the most important political fact in the world today. The basic premises, the very concepts of reality have become so different that there is simply no communication possible, and it is either ignorance or hypocrisy to assert that there is.

Perhaps the text that follows will show what I mean.

The well-known journalist, Albert Deutsch, writes in the "New York Star" that it is not the fact that the Soviet scientist Lysenko believes in the inheritance of acquired characters and rejects the philosophy of the unchangeable gene which appalls him. It is the fact that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union takes part in scientific issues which revolts him.

According to him, it is the adjustment of science to politics which marks the degradation of science in the USSR. Scores of others have echoed the same thoughts. "Bulgarian Communists Warn Scientists to Follow Party Line," reads a stupid headline in the press.

What all this reveals is that these writers simply do not have the slightest comprehension of what is new, creative and intellectually liberating in the leadership which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union exercises in every phase of life in the USSR. To these journalists the word "politician" signifies a Congressman, a Cabinet member, a Senator or President Truman.

When they hear that "the politicians" in the USSR have taken a stand on a matter of biology, they jump to the conclusion that it is as if Congress were to take a vote on the theory of evolution, and they shudder at the thought.

The Soviet Union was brought into existence by a group of men, led by Lenin, through the application of a new and invincible science. That science is Marxism.

It is the science of history and historic change. It is a science which embraces every phase of social and human activity.

It is a world-view, an attitude toward nature, history and life, which discards all superstitions, dogmas, and mysticism. It places man squarely in the midst of reality, teaches him that knowledge is real, and expands as man increases his control over nature.

The Bolsheviks who founded the Soviet Union created not merely a new state, but a new type of human existence in which all knowledge is interrelated in a common vision of ever-greater mastery of history and nature. Stalin is a great philosopher and

thinker, as Lenin was a tremendous genius of science, and Marx and Engels before them.

In short, the members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, far from "interfering" in the arts and sciences of the Soviet Union, are the veritable leaders in the arts and sciences of their country.

The Communist leaders approved Lysenko's work not because of any preconceived dogmas, as the slanderers say, but because it is confirmed by nature, by experience, and by its clear superiority over the Mendel-Morgan theories in the mastery of nature. It was not that Lysenko appealed merely to an arbitrary political authority (which does not exist in the USSR) but that both Lysenko and the Soviet leadership appealed in their struggle against obscurantism to the new experience of socialist labor on the collective farms in changing organism to suit the needs of men. This is what the journalists try to hide.

The establishment of Socialism by the Communist Party was an act of science, as was the miracle of Stalingrad. It is only the philistinism which is wholly typical of even many sincere persons in our culture which would separate the creation of Socialism as a "political act" from the mastery of nature as a "scientific act."

It is Marxism-Leninism, it is Socialism which unites for the first time all the creative grandeur of man into a single, unified, marvellous science of human liberation.

A Conjecture in American History, 1783-1815

Author's Note: The following hypothesis is purely speculative. I offer it because, if it is true, it is important in political theory. I do not have the time or skill to document and attempt either to prove or disprove it; but I hope that some one better situated may be interested enough to develop the matter further.—P.G.

WHEN the United States broke free from the British crown, there occurred the famous political events of the troubles of the Articles of Confederation, the framing and ratification of the Constitution, and the voting in and establishment of the new federal state. These are generally considered to be the essence of the political history of that society. Now let us consider the following striking fact: less than 10% of the adult population were voters, that is had an effectual positive role in the new state, or the old states;* yet the remaining disfranchised, the majority, were not for the most part servile people. What about these remaining families, the vast majority of people on the Atlantic seaboard? It is about this group that I should like to conjecture.

Uniformly, progressive historians treat this disfranchised group as outsiders; they lament the disfranchising qualifications, of property, religion, color, sex, etc., and trace the succeeding history, therefore, as a growth in democracy, a progressive removal of disqualifications, from the Jacksonian revolution thru the Civil War to the 19th Amendment. That is, the assumption of the historians is that it was obviously to the advantage of the outsiders to become voters, exerting their social influence thru the machinery of the State. But suppose, once, we make the opposite assumption: that a large part of the disfranchised, perhaps a majority of the American people, during the first thirty, intensively formative years of the freed society, were indifferent to the new state and carried on their social functions with unofficial, decentralized and improvised political forms.

From this point of view, the most important part of the Constitution would be not the affirmative powers given to the voters and their legislators and executives, but just the negative freedom guaranteed to all by the Bill of Rights. We should have to envisage a pluralistic political structure: a functioning state and a quasi-anarchic society of the majority existing peaceably side by side. Under what conditions could such a structure exist?

* "On the eve of the revolution . . . a large proportion of the people in each colony were deprived of the vote; and many who were entitled to that privilege failed to exercise it in elections. In the rural districts of Pennsylvania about 1 person in 10 had the right to vote, and in Philadelphia only about 1 in 50 owned enough property to qualify. At times in Massachusetts and Connecticut, where approximately 16% of the population were enfranchised, only 2% took the trouble to vote. Similar conditions prevailed elsewhere." (p. 73) "The property requirement for voting was removed among the original 13 states in the following order of time: 1778—S. Carolina; 1784—New Hampshire; 1789—Georgia; 1792—Delaware; 1810—Maryland; 1818—Connecticut; 1821—Massachusetts, New York; 1842—Rhode Island; 1844—New Jersey; 1850—Virginia; 1856—N. Carolina." (p. 213) *A Basic History of the United States*, by Charles and Mary Beard, 1944.

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Such a structure, if it existed, would be unique in civilised political history. Let us compare it with two other remarkable periods of anarchist history, the uprising and self-government of the provincial towns and the peasants during the French Revolution, as told by Kropotkin, and the independence of certain soviets during the Russian Revolution, as told by Voline.* One crucial difference is that in neither of these cases was there a *peaceable* interlude for the development of the pluralistic structure; both external invasion and internal abrogation of power by the state (caused by economic crisis, domineering leaders, a tradition of tyranny, etc.) soon made the State take over total sway. Further, in both cases the liberated masses had immediately previously been in complete feudal or industrial subjugation.

The American situation was far otherwise. Tho there was considerable economic and personal bondage, yet the great majority of the "unpolitical," artisans and farmers, had the status and psychology of free men. The geographic isolation lessened the external dangers and obviated the booby-traps of military establishments. And perhaps most important, in differentiating the American from the French and Russian post-revolutions, was that there was no overwhelming internal pressure—of crisis or economic tradition—forcing the State to encroach on the anarchist liberties of the people. *It was not necessary for the State and the people immediately to enter into a conflict of interests.* If we consider the composition of the "politically active"—the 5-10% enfranchised—we see that they were merchants, large planters and manufacturers, lawyers, clerics, etc. This group carried on a life and trade that required its code of rules and arbitration; the federal and state laws expressed these conflicts and provided the rules. But it was possible, in a time when the majority of ventures were small, when self-dependence for every kind of subsistence and manufacture was common, and when the propertyless could migrate with ease—it was possible in these conditions for the majority to regard the constitutional game of the minority with relative indifference, for a time—so long as they were secured in the personal rights of free men, and this the Bill of Rights granted.

The matter of degree is important: not that the laws, law by law, did not impinge on the majority, but how vitally did they impinge? And likewise, how onerous and unescapable were the taxes?

That is, here existed side by side, in a shifting and uneasy yet mainly peaceable relation, a minority State and a majority anarchy. (By anarchy I mean simply a loose system of pro tem and decentralized functional politics.) "Peaceably": that is, regarding such incidents as Shay's Rebellion as not the rule.

Still another important opportunity for the existence of such a pluralistic structure was the fact that the official political state itself was decentralized, into 13 units, many of them differing radically amongst themselves in laws and mores. The tug of war among the 13 and between them all and the Federal state perhaps allowed a breathing space for free men, since the State as such could not powerfully encroach on the people until it had adjusted its internal conflicts.

The hypothetical analysis offered here (for which, to repeat, I have no documentary evidence) is meant to apply only to the first generation of the Articles and the Constitution, 1783-1812: till on the one hand the state had

consolidated its internal relations and begun to encroach more widely, even engaging in war, and the people on the other hand, for reasons partly of self-protection, began to hanker after franchise in the State. Yet, it seems to me, this first period is of the highest theoretical and moral importance. For on any account, this is one of the high tides of human freedom, the inspirer of movements of liberation in Europe and America; and to this period we must look for the fixing of major traits of the American character that continued to work thruout the next century. Now it is customary among the historians to attribute the positive traits of this character—inventiveness, adventurousness, classlessness, etc.—to the official "democratic" institutions, as well as to the frontier, the select immigration, the Common Law, etc. But perhaps it was just the taste of anarchic freedom that fixed these good habits. That is, that the virtue of the Constitution was not that it gave, or gave order to, freedom, but that it did not much disturb the ordered freedom that was in being or coming to be. Surely the first settlers of the West were not the few enfranchised who ran the State—precisely not these, for they had reason to remain at home. But on the contrary, far from fixing good habits, the encroaching centralization of the State gave impetus to the unexperimental conformity we are now cursed with; and the need of the encroaching State to come to terms with the free people by means of official democracy has helped produce the superficial party-participation, "front" personalities, and symbolic satisfactions of our modern politics and culture.

In conclusion, let me hasten to say that little of the foregoing is novel, except in my extreme statement of it as a peaceable pluralistic structure of State and anarchy. In spirit most of the observations occur in ordinary text-books. But these authors, neglecting the anarchist critique, hopelessly beg many questions by confounding freedom with franchise and sociality with democracy. The advantage of framing the hypothesis in the foregoing form is that definite questions are asked: did the disfranchised have a political life? What kind of association came spontaneously into being? Was rational indifference an important factor in the apparent subjugation of the majority? How vital, item by item, were the official rules to a man not involved in the official game? Is there, under what circumstances, an attitude of creative political indifference? Such questions are important to us. In short, I am asking a scholar to look in this perhaps fruitful field, and certainly happier field, for what Kropotkin found in France and Voline in Russia.

PAUL GOODMAN

COMMENT

Sir:

I think Mr. Goodman is right in his suspicion that his insight is not particularly novel. What he is trying to say, as I understand it, is that because the federal government interfered a great deal less in the life of the ordinary citizen, the citizen's lack of, or failure to exercise, the suffrage was not by any means as important an impairment of democracy as it would be in later periods. I think this is true, so far as it goes.

On the rest of Mr. Goodman's suggestions: 1. He has thought too much in terms of the federal government. The state governments, which had a long mercantilist tradition, interfered at many crucial points in the life of the common man; their action included a great deal of wage and price fixing. 2. Many of the independent farmers needed the action of the federal government to open up access to their markets. There are innumerable ramifications of this during the period Mr. Goodman is con-

* See his "La Revolution Inconnue" (Paris, 1947). A translation of this important Anarchist history of the Russian Revolution will be published by Freedom Press (London).

cerned with. 3. What about the Whisky Rebellion? 4. Mr. Goodman assumes the existence of some kind of "decentralized functional politics," as an alternative to the concern of the common man with the federal government. If he means anything other than the local self-government about which a great deal has been written, what does he mean? Why assume that such a spontaneous political life went on? Why is it not possible to describe the essential state of the non-voters as substantial political apathy, encouraged by a long stretch of prosperity after 1787?

In the modern perspective, characterized so much by a fearful preoccupation with the centralized and omniscient state, the affairs of this early period seem relatively anarchic. They also seem pretty attractive. That this period was one of the high points in the history of the free man and of the estimable ideal of live-and-let-live, I have little doubt.

Columbia University

RICHARD HOFSTADTER

Mr. Goodman's conjecture embodies one significant insight and two important misinterpretations. He has perceived that the government of early America—that is, the method through which political power was exercised—was not simple. Rather it operated on several levels and through a variety of agencies. The main streams of American historiography have never given adequate weight to this factor because their attention has been focused entirely upon the national government; the majority of historians who have treated politics have written in terms of a succession of presidents. That is why political history has been quite sterile in this country. It is well to be reminded that the most important acts of government, those which had the most direct and most effective influence upon the life of the people and upon the structure of society, were exercised through "decentralized" political forms.

However, I cannot see that this amounted to anarchism or even quasi-anarchism. These forms proliferated not because people—at any social level—distrusted or were indifferent to government, but rather because they wanted a great deal of government. In the inter-constitutional period (1774-1788), the most authentic popular voices are those which call for an end to the state of nature and the beginning of "a State of well regulated Society," complete with "a fundamental Constitution securing . . . sacred Rights & Immunities against all Tyrants that may spring up." (See my *Commonwealth*, Ch. I) There was by no means indifference to government as such, although the affairs of the federal government often did seem remote from the interests of the great masses of people. (I think Goodman takes too literally the statement from Beard on property qualifications. The reference was to the period just before the break with England, and the Revolution changed a good deal. In any case, the property qualification—in a society of small farmers and artisans—did not of itself exclude a great many people.)

Finally, I am not sure whether the structuring of government and of attitude toward government in this period can really be termed pluralistic. I agree there were several levels on which power was exercised. But there was a willingness, on the part of some groups at least, to ascribe paramount authority to one level of government. The various decentralized political forms were not really autonomous, independent of each other. The town, the county, the parish, each had a life and function of its own. But the state could create such agencies, and destroy them at will. To that extent power was more hierarchically than pluralistically distributed. However, there was, at the time, no unanimity of opinion on this question; and the divisions over it may have been significant. It is certainly a question that merits further investigation.

Harvard University

OSCAR HANDLIN

The Life and Thoughts of Simone Weil

SIMONE PETREMENT

Editor's Note: Simone Weil is familiar to the readers of POLITICS from her several essays published here: Reflections on War (Feb. 1945), The Iliad (Nov. 1945), Words and War (Mar. 1946), Factory (Dec. 1946). Mlle. Petrement's essay is translated by Lionel Abel. It is reprinted, with permission, from "Critique" No. 28, 1948, and is, in part, a review of a collection of aphorisms from Simone Weil's notebooks recently published by Plon under the title: "La Pesanteur et la Grace."

The interested reader is also referred to the collection of letters by and reminiscences about Simone Weil which appeared in "Cahiers du Sud" (No. 284, 1947), and to the excellent study by Aime Patri in "La Table Ronde" (February, 1948).

IT is with misgiving that one resolves to speak of this book, for it has no need of us, while we may well fear that what we can say will prove inadequate. It is a work of a grandeur that is uncommon, and perhaps unique today, a religious work, not because it deals with religious questions, but because its beauty is inseparable from strength and purity of soul. It elevates us and saves us

during such times as we are concerned with it, but only by lifting us to a point at which we cannot long remain. Since it takes us so far out of ourselves, we should recognize that we have little chance of assimilating to our own level, or of properly discussing it in our own terms. Not that this work is inhuman, for surely one feels the troubles and griefs of the human condition to the degree that one resists them and rises above them. But Simone Weil resists them with such unconquerable energy, and seems to see them from so far off, that the effect is frightening. To have known her does not help us much to understand her; on the contrary, the knowledge we have of her could very well lead us astray, since it gives a feeling of familiarity with a genius about whom so much is still not known. We ought to be more on guard than others, since, limited to the same means of understanding, we might imagine ourselves provided with better ones. Much effort and close attention will be necessary, and if we are to arrive at her thought, we shall have to rely almost entirely on what she wrote, very rarely on what she said in conversation, and then only when we are sure that we recall exactly the words she used. Her life instructs, it is true, and in such a way as to better prepare one to understand her work.

1.

Her life instructs, as much as a human life can, and with a light blinding to our frailties. Almost all lives are ambiguous, confused, subject to more than one interpretation; hers is terribly distinct and pure, not only in its actions, but also in the complete liberty (or the purely internal necessity) by which just these acts were chosen. The daughter of a Parisian doctor, a graduate of the *Ecole normale supérieure*, where she took her degree in philosophy, she was certainly never compelled to cast her lot with those who bear the weight of others. But the choice she made, in complete freedom, of not being separated from them, and of not defending them only by words—an acceptable career, that—but of sharing their hardships, this choice is evident in every detail of her life. As soon as she began to teach—this was at Puy, in 1931—she profoundly affected all in contact with her, eliciting the admiration and friendship of her students and scandalizing the bourgeoisie of the town by going along with strikers who demonstrated before the mayor's office. It was like this throughout her short career as a professor. While devoting herself passionately to her work, she was a militant in the unions, spoke and acted fearlessly and uncompromisingly, was regarded as a communist by many, and as a trotskyist by the communists; the fact is that she never supported either party. In 1934, obeying a sense of obligation that took precedence over every other inclination, she stopped teaching to take a job in a factory, and despite her poor health remained at this job for the whole period she had decided on. Some time after this she took part in the Spanish Civil War, on the Republican side, without hope, and without enthusiasm for the way the war was being conducted, but simply in order not to be spared its dangers; her parents found her in a Spanish hospital, wounded as a result of some accident, poorly cared for, and in a condition which worsened daily.

In June of 1940 she was in Paris, and despite the love she felt for her parents, and they for her, she refused to leave with them until Paris was declared an open city. She followed her parents to Marseilles, and there she decided, freely, not compelled by circumstances, to become an agricultural worker for a while. She had wanted to do this long before, and doubtless she now felt that her time was short. In 1942 she left for America with her parents, expecting, after this detour, to reach England and participate in the war. She had to go to England alone; her parents were not permitted to follow her. Her request that she be parachuted to French soil was turned down, but as she restricted herself to eating very little, having in mind all the time the hunger of the peoples of Europe, she died of exhaustion in an English hospital in 1943.

It must be added that her whole life had been saintly. She gave herself freely, never taking into account her time, her money, her weariness, her knowledge. She was always in the most difficult spot. Obstinate when it came to defending others, she often could not bear to defend herself. For example she was unwilling to send a protest to the Vichy Ministry about the non-payment of her salary. When she saw an opportunity to save not only the life, but also the dignity, the humanity of someone, she scarcely noted whether the means to so doing involved risk to her own person. In Italy she gave her confidence to a stranger, not

a fascist, but politically shaky and in want, and who had informed her that the fascists would pay well any one who informed on an anti-fascist. Perfectly well aware of the risk she was running, but hoping that by overcoming temptation he would recover his lost dignity, she confided to him that she had fought in Spain. He was equal to the test, and did not denounce her.

From the beginning of the war she led an ascetic life, sleeping on the ground, eating very little, certainly eating less than her official rations allowed when she was in Marseilles, for she gave half of her allotments to the political prisoners in a nearby camp, and she refused to buy on the black market. This asceticism—so strange to us—was not at all arbitrary. Not only were the needs of others greater then, but the war itself elicited such conduct from the noble soul of one who wanted to share to the utmost a frightful misfortune. One cannot recall a single circumstance of her life in which she had not shown herself pure, tender, courageous, and absolutely generous.

It is not unreasonable to pay special attention to the words of those whose lives are saintly. There is only one wisdom, the same wisdom that makes one live rightly, makes one think clearly. Since we have lost this heroic and incorruptible lass, who was at the same time so reasonable, there is not much chance that we can find a better guide than the words she left us. But even if one left her life out of account, her work would be well-nigh indispensable. For the problems she had raised courageously and tried to solve, with the necessary science, intelligence and integrity, are perhaps the most important and difficult that we confront. What some lack to solve these problems is science, but what most lack is complete honesty of thought; she had both. In politics and on questions of social organization and work, as in philosophy and in religious reflection, she developed a powerful and original line of thought; there is no need to look at her life to perceive that. Moreover, she was able to combine various fields, and in an epoch in which there is no lack of specialists, but in which there are few indeed who are able to see the various fields as a whole—so that a thinker may be reasonable on details and yet childish and illogical when it comes to understanding the whole—in such an epoch, a mind that is powerful enough to see the whole is just what we need.

2.

There is little about politics in this book, and the few things one finds do little more than suggest her profound criticisms of Marxism and her own positive doctrine; these are known to very few. However, the fragments touching on politics are far from negligible. Moreover, one cannot pass by politics without a word when speaking of Simone Weil, for her lucidity in this domain is one of the main supports of her philosophy. She herself remarks in this book that “to contemplate the social is as valid a way as to withdraw from the world,” and thus she was not wrong “to keep close to politics for so long a time.” By contemplating the social she was able to recognize what makes for the most shameful abjectness; it is neither poverty nor suffering, but the sway of force over the mind. One is so afraid of force that one does not even strive to protect one's idea of the good; one is convinced of having been mistaken, that the good was not good, since it was not vic-

torious. She remarks that one is willing to do in behalf of the powerful what one would not be willing to do for the sake of justice alone, and that the idea of force sustains the soul even when the force in question is prevented from acting and really aiding.

¶ "Although one gains nothing by victory, one is ready to die for the cause that will be victorious."

¶ "One will die for the strong and not for the weak, or at least for the party which, momentarily weak, preserves a halo of force."

¶ "To see a good, loved as such, condemned by the next turn of events, is intolerable. . . . The strength of soul shown by the communists is to be explained by the fact that they are directed not only towards what they believe good, but also towards what they believe must ineluctably and soon come to pass. Thus, without being saints—they are very far from that—they are able to bear dangers and sufferings which only a saint could endure for the sake of justice alone."

Perhaps it is impossible to understand the ideas of Simone Weil without taking into account the moral position of Alain—of which we shall speak of later—as well as this meditation of hers on force, this resolution never to let oneself justify force simply because it is force, never to confuse what is good with what is not good but only victorious. Even if a political view has no possible application at the present moment, one must not relinquish the right to call good what is good, and evil what is evil. Moreover, it is only thus that one can discover and apply the least harmful solutions. If from the beginning we renounce the good, we have no longer any means of judging.

She was profoundly mistrustful of the future, but was steadfast in her esteem for those values which the future threatens. Society dominates man more and more, she knows this, and she speaks of the social with a scorn that is truly liberating (whereas so many of our contemporaries are so naively happy to use this word.)

¶ "Consciousness is seduced by the social. . . ."

¶ "The social is irreducibly the domain of the prince of this world. One has no other duty with respect to the social than to try to limit the evil done (Richelieu: The salvation of states is only in this world). A society which pretends to be divine, like the Church, is perhaps more dangerous for the ersatz of good it contains than for the evils that soil it. A divine etiquette of the social: an intoxicating mixture legitimizing every license—the devil in disguise."

¶ "The Leviathan is the only object of idolatry, the only ersatz of God."

¶ "It is the social which covers the relative with the color of the absolute."

¶ "Of course the city is a necessary milieu in which the individual takes root. But this is not the social. It is a human milieu of which one is no more conscious than of the air one breathes, a contact with nature, the past, tradition. Taking root is something other than the social."

We see in this book certain ideas which make one think of Rousseau, and which sometimes seem to be better founded than with him. Perhaps because it was Rousseau's temperament that led him to such ideas, but not hers; on the contrary, it is only by an extreme attention that she

arrives at them. We see, for instance, in what sense society corrupts men.

¶ "To confront things liberates the mind. To confront men degrades, if one depends on them, and this whether the dependence take the form of submission or of domination."

¶ "To face nature and not men is the only discipline. To depend on another's will is to be a slave. . . . The slave depends on the master and the master on the slave, a situation which makes one servile or tyrannical, or both at once (*omnia serviliter pro dominatione*). On the contrary, facing inert nature, one's only recourse is to think." Man is not really human, that is to say reasonable, except before things, or at least it is much more difficult for him to be human when before other men.

But henceforward we shall depend much more on men than on things. "Capitalism has succeeded in freeing the human collectivity from nature. But this collectivity has taken up with respect to the individual the oppressive function formerly exercised by nature." Somewhere else she says that technics are *accursed*. It is modern technique that gives force to the social; and those who today believe that machines, as they are now, can serve human liberation as well as human enslavement, are likely to be dupes. They do not see that these machines, as soon as one tries to utilize them, impose certain forms of work, of organization, of domination and of obedience. The same is true of science, which is too vast now to be carried by the individual; it imposes a certain type of organization, and makes for the force of the state which alone can possess it entirely. We must "individualize the machine, individualize science," says Simone Weil. But in the meantime, all that one can do, it seems, is to preserve as much as possible whatever gives the individual roots, whatever enables him still to lead a human life, and not be completely swept up by the infernal wave of society, completely subject to the "Leviathan." One must do whatever can be done to protect the individual from the immediate future and to prepare for a more remote future. Act at each moment not to advance towards an illusory paradise, but to reestablish a human order, an equilibrium constantly broken or menaced. "If one knows at what point society is unbalanced one must do what one can to add weight to the light side of the scale. But one must first have conceived the equilibrium, and be always ready to change sides with justice, 'that fugitive from the camp of the conqueror'."

Despair is a sign of weakness only when it is unreasoning or the result of merely personal failures. Simone Weil gives a content to the wholly gratuitous despair of our philosophical and artistic schools. What the epoch feels as a sort of vague foreboding she justifies, thus founding the philosophy of the epoch along with her own. By conceiving the good as being in no way assured of success, one is able to conceive of a transcendent and absent god, weak and crucified here below, distinct from the world and power. (Power determines the judgment of the world, but there is another type of judgment.) By the notion that the mind itself is enslaved when slavery exists, we become aware that there must be a pure, absolute and unalterable truth, which is not weakened when it yields; and if there is no such truth, if the mind is entirely at the mercy of force, it will always yield to force, and even ought to.

But to understand this philosophy of Simone Weil, we must look at the ideas of Alain, for she was his pupil and ever faithful disciple. Now this might seem to take us off the main trend of contemporary philosophy; but only apparently. Alain, while above this epoch, belongs to it nevertheless, and his philosophy, as will be seen, contains the essential points of phenomenology. He had derived from Lagneau the idea that there is no such thing as subjective knowledge, and, without using Husserl's terms, he showed in his lectures that knowledge is directed towards a real object, that simply by describing the act of knowing one can be assured that knowing is not dream, or rather that the dream is already an act of knowing. (When one circles about an object in order to grasp its character, the center of one's understanding is the object.) On the other hand, the cardinal point of existentialism is not, as the French think, that "existence is prior to essence," which is simply the formula of empiricism, but rather the notion that "subjectivity is the truth," as Kierkegaard put it. The word "subjective" has a different meaning here than as used above: what has to be grasped is that one cannot judge a doctrine independently of the man, of the *existant* who maintains it. Now Alain rediscovered this idea: his position on the history of philosophy consisted essentially in preferring those doctrines that are strong, and which could only be projected or held by strength of will, to those doctrines that are weaker, though apparently more orderly; much as Kierkegaard preferred the faith of Abraham (leading his son to death while yet believing in the promise) to the cunning system of Hegel. Finally, Sartre himself seems to have gotten from Alain his fundamental idea; that man is free insofar as he believes in his freedom; along with many other of his soundest notions: for example, his ideas about the importance of the "situation," about man's freedom to change the meaning and value of his past, about what really defines the "bourgeois," and the ideas he developed in *L'Imaginaire*.

Alain is one of the rare thinkers of our epoch and of France who dared teach morality, and he could do this: he had the necessary strength. He who can paint a face that is beautiful without yielding to convention, is stronger than the one who can only feel his force and originality by painting ugliness. Alain taught self-mastery, domination of nature, freedom. But above all, he taught one to think, and not to shun consciousness of truth. Simone Weil took up Alain's ethic with all the generosity of her nature, and she carried this ethic to its most extreme point. Perhaps it is impossible to halt mid-way, perhaps there is no middle ground between extreme weakness and saintliness. The fact is that the desire to see if one is capable of detachment leads to detachment. The desire to know whether the principle of one's actions is will or nature leads one to test oneself, and to test oneself continually. But what is most serious is to love the truth, and to be always seeking more lucidity and consciousness. Alain, in a joking way, let it be understood how frightful the truth can be. He said, ironically, that one must never seek the truth for one never knows what one will find. One is committed only to the search for it.

Here again Simone Weil went the furthest possible, as becomes clear in this work. For her the imaginary is almost evil itself. To encourage oneself with illusions or by simply turning aside from the real, is the essential sin and the cause of all the others. "The root of evil is reverie," she said, not here, but in a letter to Joe Bousquet. And even in this work: "What arises in us through Satan is the imagination." "The possible is the locus of the imagination, and consequently of degradation." "One should prefer a real hell to an imaginary paradise." Hell is to "erroneously believe oneself in heaven." The most atrocious acts are caused by the desire to escape from one's misery.

¶ "Whoever suffers, tries to communicate his suffering—either by injuring someone or by eliciting pity—in order to diminish it, and in so doing really succeeds in diminishing it. He who is completely beaten down, for whom no one grieves, who has no power to injure anyone (if he has no child, if there is no one who loves him), his suffering remains within him and poisons him."

¶ "To do harm to others means to get something in return. What? What has one gained (and which must be repaid) when one has done evil? One has augmented oneself, extended oneself, one has filled an empty place within oneself by creating a vacancy in others."

¶ "Patience consists in not transforming suffering into crime."

¶ "I can sully the whole universe with my grief and not feel it—or I can contain it within me."

In this search for lucidity, unhappiness is preferable to pleasure. For pleasure deceives much more than pain. "There is no contradiction in the domain of the imaginary." Contradiction, that which wounds the soul and gives the lie to hope, is not what our imagination loves to fabricate; rather is it the evidence of what really exists outside ourselves.

¶ "We do not fabricate our grief, it is real. This is why we ought to cherish it. All the rest is imaginary."

¶ "Human life is *impossible*, but only misfortune makes this felt."

¶ "To love the truth means to endure the void and hence accept death. Trust is on the side of death."

Not that pleasure is rejected, but one must not expect true knowledge from it.

¶ "Pleasure can be innocent if one does not expect to learn by it."

¶ "Human misery contains the secret of divine wisdom, pleasure does not."

4.

One who has followed this ethic to the end, understands that it is necessary to change it into a kind of mysticism, for one has some notion of what it means to "seek the truth." One must, so to speak, become intimate with death, which is unendurable; one must observe and accept one's limitations, which means to transcend them in a sense; one must go over to the *side of the truth*, against oneself, and without any natural support. And how could one do this, if the truth itself had no power at all? "One would quickly soil the point of internal purity if one could not renew it by contact with an unalterable purity, placed beyond anyone's reach."

In total misery one learns that the truth exists, for without it nothing could make us seek it. The truth is not willed by us, but contemplated.

Moreover it must exist, and it must appear to us of itself, for he who is involved in evil does not know it. How could he will to emerge from evil? "When one does wrong one does not know it." "Evil, when one is caught up in it, is not felt as evil, but as necessity or even as duty."

Here there is an abrupt departure, or at least so it appears, from the philosophy of Alain. While with Alain we are led to believe the "I" is good, and that the spontaneous activity of the ego should be an object of admiration and confidence, for her, on the contrary (but perhaps only apparently), the "I" is what forges the imaginary and substitutes it for the real; it is the "I" which resists truth. "The ego is only the shadow projected by sin and error which ward off the light of the divine." "Sin in me says 'I.'" Doubtless we should modify this opposition, seeing that for Alain the ego is not good without qualification, and that for her it is not to be always feared or totally overcome; but it is the opposition between their views on this question which first strikes one. While with Alain it is the *will* which makes for the truth, with her, on the contrary, it is the *effacement* or *limitation* of the will, and real intelligence and knowledge are *contemplation* rather than *action*.

¶ "It is extreme attention which constitutes the creative faculty in man."

¶ "Try to remedy one's faults by attentiveness and not by will."

¶ "Attention is linked to desire. Not to the will, but to desire. Or more precisely to consent."

The will, being ours, cannot take us beyond ourselves.

¶ "One cannot rise: one has to be pulled up."

¶ "Man's moral energy comes from the outside, as with physical energy."

¶ "The irreducible character of suffering by which one cannot but feel horror for it at the moment one endures it, results in stopping the will, as absurdity stops the intelligence, and as absence stops love, so that, come to the end of human faculties, a man folds his hands, stops, looks and waits."

¶ "Evil consists in actions, the good in non-action, in non-acting action."

¶ "The good accomplished . . . almost despite itself, almost with shame and remorse, is pure. All absolutely pure good completely escapes the world. The good is transcendent. God is the good."

¶ "In all things, only what comes from outside, gratuitously, by surprise, as a gift of fate, without our having thought it, is pure joy. Similarly a real good can only come from outside, never from our own effort. We can in no circumstance make something which would be better than us."

¶ "We ought to be indifferent to good and evil, but, in being indifferent—i.e., in projecting on both alike the light of our attentiveness—the good wins us automatically. Here is the essence of grace."

¶ "From the moment that there is a point of eternity in the soul, one does not have to do anything except preserve it, for like a seed of grain, it grows of itself. One

must maintain around it an armed unmoving watchfulness and sustain it by the contemplation of numbers, of fixed and rigorous relationships."

5.

It is true that the spontaneity of the ego is a condition without which one cannot rise higher.

¶ "Desire is evil and lying, but yet without desire, one would not seek for the veritable absolute, the really illimitable. There is no other way. Woe to those whom fatigue deprives of that extra energy which is the source of desire."

¶ "Deprive no human being of his *metaxu*, that is to say of those relative and mixed goods (home, fatherland, traditions, culture, etc.), which warm and nourish the soul and without which, except for saints, a *human* life is not possible."

¶ "One must love life very much to be able to love death still more."

¶ "To say that the world is worthless, that life is worthless, and to cite evil as proof, is absurd, for if these are worthless of what can evil deprive one? . . . Of what can suffering deprive the one who is without joy?"

On the other hand, liberty is certainly not denied. There is at least a liberty to give or refuse attention. "A divine inspiration works infallibly, irresistibly, if one does not relax one's attention. . . . One does not have to choose in its favor, it is sufficient not to refuse to recognize that

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it is there." "If one direct the intelligence towards the good it is impossible that little by little the whole soul should not be drawn there, despite itself."

We are free but there is a necessity in the things of the soul, though they be free. "A rigorous necessity which excludes anything arbitrary, every sort of chance, governs material phenomena. There is if possible even less of the accidental and the arbitrary in things of the spirit, which however, are free." One thinks of Spinoza; there are various planes, but necessity is present in all of them. Liberty is only in the relationship of the different planes. The higher escapes the lower, it is not contained in it, rather it contains it.

One thinks again of Spinoza when she expresses love for the necessity of the world. "The absence of God is the most marvelous testimony to the most perfect love, and this is why pure necessity, necessity so clearly different from the good, is so beautiful." "This world, insofar as it is entirely empty of God, is God Himself." We do not have here a pantheism such as springs naturally from the imagination (which is not to be found in Spinoza either). What must be understood is that the more the world is seen as empty of God, as pure and impersonal necessity, the more the world relates us to God, and the more it is God, at least for us. For it is transcendent. The imagination cannot conceive necessity.

Thus the good and the true become God, since they exist in themselves, since we contemplate them and could never know them otherwise, since it is by their grace and their light that we think and live. It is not only in the ego that they are found, but the ego is suspended from them, held in place by absolute forces. "Two forces govern the universe: Light and weight." Thus from a purely human view of knowledge one passes to a religious view. By a deepening of morality and method, Simone Weil went on to mysticism, which at first sight seems to deny both. But it is always necessary to surmount this apparent contradiction. One must constantly underline the bonds which unite morality to mysticism, for mysticism is valueless if it is not founded on morality. Alain is almost purely the moralist, he seems to refuse to go further. It is to be feared that there is a certain dryness in his thinking; but there is no other route to follow than his: it remains the foundation of everything.

6.

Thus religion is rediscovered as truth, and not something received through tradition; and there is much in this to frighten believers. For they do not imagine, the majority of them, that religion is true. They think it useful, convenient, consoling, a source of hope. But this useful, consoling religion which gives us hope, Simone Weil rejects firmly and considers an obstacle to real religion.

¶ "Religion insofar as it is a source of consolation is an obstacle to real faith. In this sense atheism is a purification."

¶ "When God has become as full of meaning as is his treasure to the miser, one should repeat to oneself firmly that he does not exist. Feel that you love him even though he does not exist."

¶ "The baser parts of myself ought to love God, but not too much. It would not be God. Let them feel love as one feels hunger and thirst. Only the highest has the right to be satiated."

The good is beyond this world. The imagination, which represented it to us in certain objects and actions, prevents us "from really encountering God, who is no other than the good itself, which is found nowhere in this world." The good is impossible, and this is no reason for not seeking it: "That action is good which one can achieve while maintaining one's intention and attention totally orientated towards the pure and impossible good, without veiling by any lie either the charm or the impossibility of the pure good." The good can exist in the world only in an infinitesimal state: "Within any given realm, a higher realm, and hence infinitely above it, can be represented in the former only by an infinitesimal. The mustard seed, the instant, image of eternity." The good does not intervene in the world so as to interrupt necessity. God is still. "Silence of God." "God is weak because He is impartial. He lets fall sunbeams and rain on good and evil alike. This indifference of the Father and the weakness of Christ, tally. Absence of God . . . God changes nothing to nothing."

Thibon rightly sees a difference between the religious thought of Simone Weil and the Catholic theology, in that the God of Simone Weil is much more transcendent, much more absent from the world and from society than that of the Church. Insofar as He is good He is absent from the world, if He is found there he appears as necessity. She uses such words as "creation" and "providence," but gives them a very particular meaning, one almost contrary to their customary sense. For the misfortunes of the innocent are here a proof, and not an objection. She speaks somewhere of an "uncreation" necessary to man. For "we are turned the wrong way, we are born so; to reestablish the proper harmony we must unmake the creature within ourselves."

From this difference others follow: For example, Simone Weil does not accept the God of the Old Testament, and does not recognize in him the God of the Gospels. "Christianity became totalitarian, aggressive, murderous, because

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it did not develop the notion of the absence and non-action of God on earth. It was as much attached to Jehovah as to Christ. . . . Israel alone could resist Rome because it resembled Rome." "Israel simultaneously chose the national God and rejected the Mediator." This Mediator, by his weakness, taught that God is absent and that He is not power; in Jehovah, the good is confused with power and with the social. Israel served as a buckler to the youthful Christianity in its struggle against Rome, but it, alas, aided the Church in becoming *Roman* in its turn. Simone Weil rejects the artifices by which the New Testament has been tied to the old.

¶ "Primitive Christianity invented the poison of the notion of progress, through the idea of the divine pedagogy

forming men so as to make them able to receive the message of Christ . . . the metaphor of the divine pedagogy dissolves the individual destiny, which alone is important for salvation, into that of collectivities. Christianity wanted to find a harmony in history. This is the germ of Hegel and of Marx."

¶ "The atheistic idea par excellence is the idea of progress, which is the negation of ontological experimental proof, for it implies that the mediocre can of itself produce the better. . . . All modern science moves to the destruction of the idea of progress."

¶ "Nothing can have as its end what it did not have for its origin. Contrary idea, idea of progress, poison. The tree which bore this fruit ought to be uprooted."

TRANSATLANTIC

FRANCE (I):

Why I Left France

SEVERAL months ago, I emigrated to the United States. I am a journalist, and it is not too easy to adapt this calling to a strange tongue and a foreign milieu. But, like many of my compatriots, I felt that I could do nothing useful in France today, and that emigration was the only solution. The difference between me and them is simply that I was able to actually do it.

Let me try to explain why so many Frenchmen—traditionally among the most firmly attached to the homeland of all European peoples—have come to the dismal conclusion: escape or perish.

For us, in France, the future is summed up in a few key phrases: "we will flounder about a little longer—six months? a year?—in the bog of the Christian-Socialist 'Third Force'; then we will have the dictatorship of General DeGaulle and under-cover civil war; then, sooner or later, war and a Russian occupation."

We feel there is so little question about it that everyone is acting accordingly; some join the Communists whom they see as the masters of tomorrow. Some join DeGaulle, not out of "fascist" inclinations or a morbid desire to plunge the country into civil war, but because they are looking for a solution to the current grind of daily life, because they fear the Communist threat, because of a sense of the incapacity of the Christian-Socialist "Third Force" (which is generally referred to as the "Third Weakness.")

When I say these things on this side of the Atlantic, people look at me with skepticism and invariably answer: "You have a sense of defeat before the battle has begun, and of illogical fatalism. There are so many factors that could change the course of events: the Marshall plan, the strengthening of ties among Western countries, the fact that the 'Third Force' is not yet dead, that America does not like DeGaulle, and that, after all, NOBODY REALLY WANTS WAR. . . ."

The Marshall Plan

I want to say candidly what is often heard in France when the Marshall plan is discussed: "The Marshall plan? I can't see that it is working. To judge the success of the plan you have to look not just at official figures on imports and hand-outs, but at the general *standard of living*. Well, in spite of American help, that is still going down."

It is unquestionable that the plan has averted a real economic

catastrophe in France. But it is just as unquestionable that along with prices as high as those in this country, the average salary of a French industrial or white-collar worker is equal to about *one quarter* of the average salary of an American worker. And even this ratio is steadily deteriorating.

There was a great wave of hope among us around the middle of last year when the Marshall plan was first spoken of; even those who knew that the trouble was very deep, that France had already absorbed nearly \$3 billion in American credits and \$2 billion more representing foreign investments—even they believed that the ship could be turned around and a new chapter would open in the history of the West.

And then, little by little, this hope turned to disillusion.

In the first months, during the debates in Congress, the plan appeared as an extraordinarily complicated system of "charity-credits" begged for by our government and granted, with a string attached, by Washington. Every senator, every congressman seemed to want to bargain over, pare down and diminish these credits.

Our newspapers, unfamiliar with American parliamentary procedure and lost in the complicated maze of reports and committees analyzing the plan, would run a banner headline one day reading "plan definitely adopted . . ." and contradict it the next in a back-page notice explaining that the plan still had to "pass from a Senate Committee to a House Committee (or vice versa) before the adoption is final, as it surely will be this time." And the plan began its Calvary again from the first to the last page of our newspapers, through all the well known episodes that preceded the final passage of the plan a few months later. All the psychological benefit of the plan, hurriedly put to use before the final vote of Congress, was thus frittered away.

Few Frenchmen have forgotten this preface to the Marshall plan, of which it was said that, "the older it got, the more it shrank." Furthermore few people in France could say how the plan, for all its celebrity, actually works, and just what the importance of the allotted credits is. For, absurd and shocking as it may seem, there is more concern over what the government is exporting or is supposed to be exporting than over what is being received or is supposed to be received. How many times standing on line at a market, I have heard the remark, "Oh Lord, it's gone up again! . . . They're exporting everything, and our children are hungry. . . .!"

I know that the bitter truth is that our economy has been shaken to its foundations and that reconstruction is going to be a problem of long duration. The heart of the matter is that our shaky production is scarcely beyond the level of 1938 and that at

best the reference to 1938 is depressing for in that year we were still in a depression and there was still unemployment. Our inflation moreover destroys the normal system of exchange. Our monetary circulation is eight times greater than before the war while our gold reserve is only one tenth of our resources at that time. Finally, our exports in 1945, 1946, and 1947, respectively covered only 23, 43, and 61 per cent of our imports, so that our debt has steadily increased. Our equipment is old and worn and we are beaten in advance by world competition. To be sure, we have adopted a plan for the modernization of industry (called the "Monnet Plan") but it is hard to put much faith in it when it presupposes investments on the scale of one to one and a half billion dollars a year. Everyone knows that the state has no money and that private capital prefers to go abroad.

France, weak, ruined, had only one real chance to revive: close collaboration with Western Germany and Great Britain. But this would have called for a reversal of psychological and political patterns such as nobody dared undertake.

"Immunizing Europe Against Communism"

I think, too, that speaking of France alone many things could have been changed from the beginning if the M.R.P. (Catholic republicans) and Socialist "Third Force" had been given *solid* help before the crystallization of the country into two blocs—Communist and Gaullist. The French lose little sleep over the fact that cabinets and governments fall one after the other and that the Prime Ministers of the Third Force, who theoretically dispose of only 300 votes in the Chamber (310 being needed for a majority and power to govern) should be always trying to pick up a few more parliamentary votes. What is serious, and apparent to all is that these governments, which make political capital of support by the United States, are showing themselves incapable of stopping France's economic deterioration. And so, little by little, this question begins to take shape in the minds of many: *what is the real value of that support if with it we are still sliding ever closer to hopelessness?*

In my opinion one of the rare Americans who has had the courage to face squarely the reality of Europe, Mr. Eric Johnston, was correct in stating recently that "*Communism or its 'totalitarian counter-part' are on the increase in Europe in spite of the Marshall plan.*" In France "Gaullism," even if it does not consider itself "Totalitarian," remains in essence a "counter-part of Communism" and by the same token represents a *lack of confidence in the value of foreign aid and a desperate reaction to the contemporary situation.*

General DeGaulle was not speaking casually when he declared recently:

"We have gotten along for years without the Marshall Plan. Naturally I am not going to oppose its execution, and I think that it can be of enormous use to Europe and to France. But on one condition, that is that it should not lead us, in return for commodities of the moment, to sacrifice the future of the country and that of Europe."

I remember the impression made by General DeGaulle at the time of one of his first speeches after his break with the government of the Fourth Republic. It was at Bayeaux, June 18, 1946. He spoke jerkily, seeming to hesitate before every word, and to be completely lacking in self-assurance. And I can see DeGaulle at Marseilles last summer, sure of himself and of his cause, crying with certainty from the height of a promontory overlooking the port: "We are marching toward power. . . ."

Yes, public opinion has changed. In 1946 many people could not forgive DeGaulle for having given up, on January 20 of that year, the responsibilities of power, in order to throw on others the discredit provoked by the country's difficult situation. And then, later, the memory faded as many other illusions were lost and as the "Third Force" crumbled. The choice began to be dictated by despair, the falling back on itself of a whole section of the country.

Many of our parliamentarians will turn toward DeGaulle in case of an acute crisis: no one has any doubt of that, and the estimate (like a pall) is in itself a decisive *political* factor. It

is a common saying now in Paris: "You don't know who is in the government and who isn't," since the Radical bourgeois, or the Popular Republican or even the Socialist deputy may when least expected declare that he sides with DeGaulle.

For the Marshall plan, DeGaulle—like the Communists—is no "minor problem." He is anti-American, because he considers the U.S. to be too closely interested in the affairs of Europe. He is anti-British, because Great Britain has remained too powerful in relation to France. He is anti-Russian, not only out of anti-Communism but because Russia has come too close to the Rhine. He is anti-German, for historical and economic reasons. He is anti-everything, even anti-France, by a sort of republican coquetry. DeGaulle in short is the dis-union of the West.

A strange turn of affairs. . . . The slogan of the old royalist leader, Charles Maurras, "France Alone," which DeGaulle incarnates so perfectly, may thus one day work to the advantage of those whom he hated the most: the Communists.

The other side of the coin is precisely the Communists. Since 1947 they have isolated themselves more and more from other parliamentary groups, in the Chamber of Deputies, and have lost certain points of support in the middle classes. Still, it would be absurd to say that they have lost their hold on the workers. I was in the North of France during the last miners' strike: it was impossible to visit the mines anywhere without the express and direct agreement of the Communist functionaries.

It is perfectly true that these leaders hurl their troops into the most inconsidered, criminal, absurd brawls. Many observers conclude after such demonstrations: "This is the beginning of the end of their influence." Unfortunately, that is not, or one might say, *that is no longer the problem.* The Communists know very well that they are using up some of their support by throwing themselves into all sorts of adventures. What matters to them is no longer to "co-ordinate larger and larger masses"—which was the problem up to 1947—but to sabotage the Marshall plan, destroy the economic substance of France (to prevent its economic potential from being used against Russia should need arise) and to prepare illegal groups to carry on their destructive activity in case of the dissolution of the legal party.

The Communists do not at all pay, in local influence, for each of their bloody adventures. Communism is no longer exclusively a national problem. Even in the case of a military dictatorship, the Communists will retain their hold, precisely because behind them there stands Russia, which will direct one side of the struggle in a next war. A Communist journalist told us one day in Paris during the miners' strike: "Anyway, the loss of a local battle won't make any difference. The USSR will help us to win everything back." I believe that this sums up quite clearly what many of their followers think confusedly.

When War Comes . . .

A leading French newspaper the other day reported a statement by the former head of the Wehrmacht, General Halder, who declared that the only line "temporarily defensible in Europe in case of war" would be "the line of the Rhine." The general added that after sporadic resistance by a French force on the order of "three divisions," Russia would proceed to the occupation of the country. The prominence given this statement by the newspaper—which followed it with a politely "indignant" commentary—gives a little testimony to the sense of defeat already in people's hearts. Who can really have any faith in the defensive capacity of our army which costs a great deal, but which, in a modern war, could only repeat on a lower level the drama of 1940?

In private, not a single political figure, not a single journalist of capacity expresses views differing from this in any important respect, although a few of them cherish the fearful hope that by some miracle the war *will avoid our soil.* In fact, certain "Gaullists" hope that the general will manage to keep France out of a war. It is said that he will be quite willing to negotiate an accord with Russia for a kind of French "non-belligerence" and that he is preparing "the great Western schism" corresponding to Tito's "Eastern Schism."

The country divided, bruised, without confidence, is thus playing its cards on two equally hopeless blocs: on the one hand De Gaulle, on the other the Communists. It is no longer possible to fight one's way back against this current of false hopes, hatreds and misunderstandings.

The more or less imminent collapse of the Fourth Republic, the Gaullist crisis, civil war, foreign occupation as an outcome of ruthless war and a frightful internal struggle. And above all, the conviction of thinking people that all this is gratuitous for us, as for others, since the decision no longer depends on our struggles but on struggles between the U.S. and Russia.

It seems to me that the feeling in France is of being more confined every day in this false dilemma: "De Gaulle or the Communists." But whatever card we play is secondary, the aces not being in our hands. In France the hour of decision is approaching, of a false decision.

Personally I will not be dragged into the consequences. The only road into another future is flight. This road I took when I came to the United States several months ago.

CANDIDE

FRANCE (2):

Is France Finished?

Editor's Note: The author of this letter, who uses the pseudonym "Albert Michaels" for personal reasons, is an American who has been living and working in France for almost a year. It is painful to read this report of the agony and decay of the nation which, above all others, has for the past 150 years been the cultural and political torchbearer of our civilization. Some readers may think the picture is overdrawn. But from recent conversations I have had with people fresh from France, and from personal letters, I would say that, unfortunately, it is not.

THE recent series of governmental crises in France seem to lead to only one result: a De Gaulle regime. This is true despite the demagogic appeals of the two main "Third Force" governmental parties, the SFIO (Socialists) and the MRP (the liberal-centrist Catholic party), for a new "offensive alliance for democracy." Gaullism is still, to say the least, an unknown quantity. But the decay of the Third Force is all too definite.

Crisis—and De Gaulle

Let us briefly review the recent crises. Last July, the Socialists precipitated the fall of the Schuman government by voting a token cut in the military budget. After this purely electoral manoeuvre, the SFIO then entrusted Blum, who had opposed the original vote of no-confidence, with negotiating the new government. The result was the Marie-Blum-Reynaud "inner cabinet." The Socialists promised to support the "Reynaud Plan"—and then only after a virtual ultimatum from President of the Republic Auriol—on condition that the cantonal elections be postponed. After a series of *opéra-buffe* manoeuvres, the Radicals accepted postponement. The SFIO then voted *against* the Reynaud Plan.*

Subsequent to the unsuccessful attempts by Schuman to form a government with a Socialist Minister of Finance, during which time the Socialists finally accepted wage increases of from 8½% to 10% after first refusing Schuman's offer of . . . 10%, the Queuille government was formed.

The most recent crisis was occasioned by the Gaullist successes

* This abrupt *volte face* gave rise to considerable speculation on the possible role of the BLP. Part of the Reynaud Plan was to put the pound on the so-called free exchange. Since sterling is grossly over-valued with reference to the franc, this naturally provoked vigorous British protests. Since the subsequent Queuille government retained, with Socialist support, the essential features of the "Reynaud Plan" without decontrolling the pound, the question of BLP control within the SFIO was, of course, raised. It is true that the SFIO is almost bankrupt—there is talk of discontinuing *Le Populaire*, for instance, and a recent appeal to the federations raised only 700,000 of 13 million francs demanded—it seems that subsidies from the BLP play no role in the SFIO, amounting to only about 2% of the SFIO budget for 1948. On the contrary, BLP-SFIO relations are anything but close or cordial.

in the election for the Council of the Republic—the French Senate. The results are not too significant, since they are based on the municipal elections of November, 1947. However, three interesting facts are apparent: the defection of considerable MRP city councillors to the RPF (the De Gaulle movement); the use of majority vote instead of proportional representation, which militated against both the CP and the MRP; and the close Radical-SFIO alliance during the elections—again to the discomfort of the MRP. The result of these elections is to give the balance of power to the Radicals. Thus it is likely that SFIO cooperation with the Radicals will be more important than the rather vague "*cartel offensif de la démocratie*" with the MRP.

These crises, as vital as they are for the Fourth Republic, are in effect rather unreal, since, and this is one of their causes, the National Assembly does not reflect the opinion of the French people. The Third Force represents only about 30% of the French voting population. The CP, which represents about 30% of the French people, is still the best organized party in France. It has, however, been losing ground to the Gaullist RPF, which controls roughly the remaining 40% of the votes. This explains the Stalinist decision not to press for immediate elections—except, of course, on the verbal level. Even though they may have recouped some of their losses as a result of the recent strike, they are still not strong enough for a civil war or even for a successful general strike—except perhaps in the Midi, whose common frontier with the Stalinist strongholds in northern Italy will be an important factor in the event of war.

De Gaulle's weaknesses lie in his lack of any union base (thus his demand for worker-employer syndicates on the model of Fascist Italy) and internal difficulties within the still loosely organized RPF, caused primarily by personal ambitions as well as by De Gaulle's own intractability. His strength lies in the Communists and in the Third Force. The former, by continually precipitating political strikes of a purely adventurist character, can only succeed, with the help of the government, in destroying the cadres of the working class, which are the only conceivable counterweight to De Gaulle. In addition, in many municipal elections the Stalinists have been voting with the Gaullists against, mainly, the Socialists. (The SFIO has also voted with the RPF against the CP, but this is much less frequent than CP-RPF collaboration.) As for the government, its present policy is to do the work of De Gaulle without De Gaulle himself. This is especially the perspective of Moch and the Radicals. This, of course, makes the Third Force popular in England and in certain circles in the States, who demand a militarily strong France but distrust De Gaulle personally. This policy, however, will destroy the MRP and the SFIO, and with them the Fourth Republic.

The Government Parties: MRP

Of the two original parties of the Third Force, the MRP is in much worse shape than the SFIO. In the first place, it has never really had any reason for existing; whereas the SFIO has a certain degree of organizational stability. The Right Wing has now a *real* right-wing party to join, and is flocking to the RPF. Individual resignations from the MRP have been many, and one organized parliamentary group of about nine members, the Independent MRP, has split off and joined the Gaullist "intergroup" in the Assembly. Finally, the strong Catholic region of the Old Vendée, originally an MRP stronghold, is now almost completely Gaullist.

On the other hand, interestingly enough, the MRP is much more subject to Communist encroachments than the SFIO. The Catholic unions in the CFTC are solidly working class, and their leaders have been quite critical of MRP participation in the government, receiving about one sixth of the votes at the recent National Executive meeting of the party. For a while before the mine strike, CGT-CFTC cooperation was the order of the day; and it is likely that in the case of the collapse of the present government the CFTC will march with the Stalinists against De Gaulle. In contrast, the FO* is composed primarily of white

* "Force Ouvrière": the non-Communist unions which Jouhaux split off from the Communist-controlled CGT. Much smaller than CGT but larger than CNTC, the Catholic union group.

collar workers and members of the proletarianized petite bourgeoisie who are as yet unwilling to admit that they have lost status. Many have no real trade union tradition and are, in fact, politically to the Right of the SFIO, voting either Radical or independent Right.

The Government Parties: SFIO

The SFIO, too, is rapidly disintegrating. It is financially very weak, and in the last year it has lost over a third of its militants. Its role during the series of recent crises has been disgraceful: viz, the Reynaud affair and the recent elections for the *Conseil de la République*.

This is only a reflection of the fact that the class basis for the SFIO has radically shifted since 1939. During the war there was never any SFIO Resistance; there were only individual socialists in the Resistance, usually cooperating with the Stalinists. Thus after the war the latter emerged with the allegiance of the vast majority of the workers; the SFIO, on the contrary, drew to it those lower middle class elements who, opposing the Catholics on the issue of education and faced with the almost universal ill-repute of the pre-war parties of the Right, had no place else to go. The two Federations of the SFIO which are still predominately working class are in the Nord and Pas-de-Calais, and here the working class militants take no active part in Party affairs. It is, thus, playing the role which the Radicals played before the war.

In addition to this shift in class composition, the SFIO suffers from ideological confusion within its ranks. The dominating tendency is classically centrist: that is, lacking in ideological unity and held together merely for personal reasons. It is dominated theoretically by Blum and Ramadier, organizationally by Guy Mollet, who, it will be remembered, was originally elected by the Left-Wing in 1946. It includes such disparate types as Pivert, who presently collaborates almost exclusively with the extreme Right of his federation; Lacoste (Minister of Production) and Le Troquier (Blum's lawyer), the two most frequently mentioned leaders of the pro-Gaullist section of the Party; and such types as that member of the Bureau National who voted for participation in the Marie government in the morning because he had been promised a position and against in the afternoon because his promise was not fulfilled. It is difficult to understand the perspective of this group, except the usual desire to hang on to what they have; suffice it to say that at various times a majority of the SFIO group in the Assembly would have voted for either Gaullist or Communist participation in the government if either seemed likely to help them out of their difficulties.

The Left-Wing of the SFIO is at present almost completely eliminated. They received a fourth of the votes at the national convention in July and less than one sixth at the recent national council. Many of their militants have withdrawn in disgust; those that remain must choose between silence and expulsion. What strength they had last summer was largely based on antagonism to collaboration with Reynaud, not on any of the more fundamental problems of the SFIO. In short, the Left has failed to build itself a base. Worse yet, the Left has never fought for internal democracy within the SFIO—the first job of any left-wing today and the only guarantee against “betrayal.”

With the exception of these deficiencies, the program of the Left is adequate. In addition to the usual slogans against war, colonialism, and clericalism, they have raised the demand for workers control of nationalized industries and for the direction of rationing by the factory committees and the cooperatives. The difficulty lies in that this Left, as with most of the Left-Wings which have arisen in the SFIO, is cursed with ineffectiveness and incompetence. In 1946 the Left-Wing made a strong push . . . and elected Guy Mollet National Secretary. In 1947 at Lyons the Left had a majority, but failed to enforce their program on the Ramadier government. The present Left has a tendency to temporize—in the Party with the bureaucracy, outside with the Stalinists.

The RDR

It is difficult to be Left in France today and still distinguish oneself clearly from the Stalinists. This is one of the many prob-

lems of the RDR (*Rassemblement Démocratique et Révolutionnaire*). This organization, launched last April as a para-party grouping, was met with considerable enthusiasm. It has by now, unfortunately, surpassed its initial elan without consolidating itself organisationally.

The composition of the RDR is of an extremely high calibre, albeit mostly intellectual. The Left-Wing of the SFIO contributed largely, including several deputies (mostly from overseas) and unionists. The WP-type Trotskyites split from the Fourth International in order to enter. But the largest group were independent intellectuals: David Rousset, Sartre and his following from the Left Bank, several from the *Esprit* group (Catholic Left), and the majority of the editorial staff of *Franc-Tireur*, the third largest morning paper in France. The purpose of the group was to provide a meeting place for members of all political groupings for the elaboration of a program against war and for complete economic democracy and workers' control, and ultimately to launch a new revolutionary party. This purpose is as vital today as ever; but it appears that the RDR will not be able to fulfill the high expectations with which some of us greeted it.

The main difficulty with the RDR is that it is primarily pacifist. Now there are so many reasons for being anti-war, that to date the RDR has been unable to elaborate a specific program. There is one group which hopes to use the anti-war slogan as a rallying cry in the hopes of arousing the French masses from their apathy. The difficulty with this is that the CP now holds the monopoly on anti-war propaganda and, as the Oxford Pledge experience seems to demonstrate, there is no necessary connection between anti-war enthusiasm and a revolutionary program.

Secondly is a problem of leadership. Most of the intellectuals in the RDR have had no practical political experience; many, indeed, did not discover the world of politics until 1944 or 1945. Thus they cannot provide either capable leadership or a concrete program. Since the decision of the SFIO that no Party member could belong to the RDR, this element, which was capable and experienced, had to leave. This left only the former Trotskyites, whose organizational experience is indeed great but who suffer from the Trotskyite malady of the inability to make themselves understood to any but the politically sophisticated or to distinguish between words and reality. This combination of highflown theorizing by the intellectuals plus Trotskyite sectarianism is hardly the most healthy environment for a new revolutionary organism.

Thirdly, the RDR suffers from the French incomprehension of Stalinism. This is wide-spread among French intellectuals, witness the fact that Merleau-Ponty can write three hundred pages on Stalinism without once taking a clear-cut position or that Claude Bourdet can write in *Combat* that a French Tito would cure the French CP of its ills. Thus on many crucial trade union issues, such as the mine strike, for instance, the stand taken in *La Gauche* (organ of the RDR) or *Franc-Tireur* is almost indistinguishable from that of the Stalinists.

Finally, there is a lack of seriousness—this is the only term by which it can be described—manifested in *La Gauche*. In the eight issues which have to date appeared, there have been twelve “philosophical” articles (intricate and labored), five articles which could have appeared in the Stalinoid press, and one piece of irresponsible misinformation. The paper is neither seriously analytical nor readable.

These criticisms must be taken with the understanding that the RDR is trying sincerely and earnestly to fill a most important void in French politics. It has drawn to it the best elements in France today, and it does provide the only place where serious consideration of the problems facing socialists can be undertaken. I must add, however, that its recent actions are discouraging, perhaps because so much of its effort seems to be concentrated behind Garry Davis's overdramatized and underthought-out campaign for world citizenship.*

* For the text of the manifesto out of which the RDR grew, see *POLITICS* for Winter, 1948. The same issue also contains (pp. 56-7) an analysis of this manifesto in somewhat more acidulous and uncharitable terms than our correspondent uses.

The Economic Situation

The present series of crises, as well as the decadence of the French Left, are rooted in general developments which are too recent to be fully understood. But in addition there are certain features peculiar to France which are most unhealthy and which indicate some parallel between the Fourth Republic and Weimar.

The situation of the French economy is much more grave even than the press indicates. Military expenditures (including the costly war in Indo-China, which France is physically unable to win), physical destruction (including that caused by the recent mine strike), the almost complete immobility of both capital and labor, and the extreme political instability, are all part of the picture. Politically this means, in general, that the peasants, who are strong for De Gaulle, are the most powerful single economic group in France today, and that the French lower middle class is being completely wiped out.

The Marshall Plan has saved France from complete collapse. 60% of French basic supplies come from the United States, and the application of the Marshall Plan sector is of inestimable importance. (For instance, the decision to release counterpart funds, in which the Marshall Plan administration in France played a determining role, saved the Third Force government of Queuille.) The most important benefits will accrue to French industry, which is in bad need of retooling. Since between the wars the French industrialists distributed their supplies in dividends instead of farming some of it back into equipment, the average age of machinery in France is thirty to thirty-five years, compared to ten years in the United States.

The long-term implications of the Marshall Plan are not too constructive, however. As some of us indicated when the plan was first proposed, it has not cut at the roots of economic autarchy. Quite the contrary: the requirement forcing participating countries to balance their budgets has given rise to a series of autarchic national plans which will negate the value of whatever stop-gap aid has been given. This procedure is aggravated by the ruling that half of the goods must be carried on American ships, this when many of the participating countries had previously relied on their merchant marine to balance their imports!

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In France, balancing the budget is almost impossible. (Hence France, with Italy, is one of the most enthusiastic supporters of European federal union.) In order to balance the budget the French government, which is unwilling to cut military credits, must cut down on subsidies for food and for the nationalized industries. Colonial exploitation will be increased; the French will attempt to import more raw materials and food from the colonies and in turn force them to buy almost exclusively from France. In other words, the long term results of the Marshall Plan as it is implemented by the present European governments, will be highly reactionary.

In addition, the French workers, whose purchasing power has decreased by one third since the war, are now faced with unemployment. The low value of the franc, as well as the drive for national self-sufficiency, make importation of certain basic materials, especially coal and non-ferrous metals (which are now in very short supply) increasingly difficult. Cut off from raw materials, certain sectors of French industry will be forced to shut down. This process has already started: in spite of the reduction of prisoner-of-war manpower from 473,000 to 48,675, the number of French unemployed has increased from 6,678 (average from 1947) to 19,472 (October, 1948). And the French government has proposed to ERP the introduction of an additional 200,000 foreign workers!

It is no wonder, then, in the face of this economic pressure and with their union organizations completely at the mercy of various political parties, that the French workers are demoralized and increasingly apolitical. Under both *dirigisme* and *libéralisme* wages lag far behind prices; conditions of work in the nationalized industries are no better than in the private sector of the economy. (Indeed, during the recent coal strike the private owners of the steel mills interceded with the government in favor of moderation!) The French workers must start from nothing and rebuild their trade union movement free from political direction. (Thus the non-Stalinist unions have just rejected a socialist proposal for closer collaboration.) The recent conference of the autonomous unions, which formed a coordinating committee grouping representatives from the autonomous unions, the CNT (anarchist), and the minorities in the FO and CGT, is a hopeful step. Their program demonstrates an awareness of previous errors and is at the same time a tragic indication of the profound retrogression of the union movement. In addition to calling for the reduction of wage differentials and workers' control, the conference demanded the following: suppression of wage ceilings, the forty-hour week (*sic!*), collective bargaining, suppression of compulsory arbitration, and protection of the right to strike (*re-sic!*).

The Mine Strike

The recent coal strike points up the fact that the three main French unions are incapable of or unwilling to better the conditions of their members and exist primarily now as bureaucratic fungi on the demoralization of the workers. The economic demands of the miners are completely justified (a miner's monthly salary will last him only fifteen days) even though the Lacoste decrees, which theoretically precipitated the strike, were recognized—even by the CGT . . . previously—as necessary. On the miners' side there was general discontent, even though few of them were aware of the CGT's demands and almost none of them, thanks to a carefully kept silence by the CGT and Stalinist press, knew of Lacoste's rather reasonable counter-offers. But the miners' motivations did not control the strike; and as this soon became apparent, the back-to-work movement was almost unanimous.

The "revelations" of Jules Moch tell us nothing about the strike. More important, and less well known, are the acts and statements of the leaders of the CGT. They stated publicly that the strike was directed against the "war mongers," Truman, and the Marshall Plan. Needless to say, these slogans found no echo from the miners. Effective, however, was the terror exercised by the CGT on the miners, which was far more vicious than anything done by the troops, who on the whole showed remarkable restraint.

The strike vote was taken at the pit heads, in the open; a negative vote was extremely dangerous under these circumstances.

Subsequent to this, and in the face of widespread lack of interest among the miners for a strike so completely out of their control, the CGT leadership decided to sabotage the pits by removing the services of security—unprecedented in the history of the French miners. This failed; for the pits were occupied by troops while the mining communities on the whole stood by passively. Thus the Stalinists resorted to terror. The President of the CGT Mining Federation, Lecoeur, demanded non-resistance to the troops but the murder, if necessary, of miners who returned to work. Following this were threats, incendiary fires, bombings, and physical assault, all directed against those miners who desired to return to work—i.e., the vast majority.

The manipulation of legitimate demands for political reasons is possible primarily because of the demoralization of the miners—for reasons we have discussed above. In addition there is the Stalinists dictatorship over the CGT, a dictatorship which has been increased as a result of the strike. This in turn is a reflection of the increasing lack of democracy within all French organizations, which makes impossible any understanding between the leadership and the rank and file.

The purposes of the Stalinists were fourfold. The first, sabotage the Marshall Plan, was successful. The cost of the strike equalled the amount of Marshall Plan aid to France for that period; in addition, there is the damage to the pits and coke furnaces. Secondly, the CP wished to force its way into the government; although this was once possible, it is no longer, primarily because of French military engagements in the Brussels pact. The third, realization of practical unity of action with the rank and file of the other two main unions, has to a certain extent been achieved (although this is more than counterbalanced by the increased demoralization within the CGT). This enervation is not to be taken as a Stalinist defeat. Quite the contrary, since—and this is the fourth purpose for the strikes—the CP seems determined to destroy the working class cadres in France as a prelude to Soviet invasion. This is the only possible explanation for the series of adventures into which the CGT embarked following the mine strike. Another indication is the disposition of foreign financial aid given CGT. Enough money was collected to give each miner 850 francs; they actually got 100 francs. The bulk of the funds went to reliable Stalinist agents, one of whom admitted using 26,000 francs from this fund during the strike.

I should not conclude this summary without mentioning the Third World War, which everyone expects momentarily. No one, except the "leaders," thinks France will have any role other than to be occupied by the Russians. Both the man-in-the-street, and the more politicalized elements, expect the United States to start the war; since the Soviet Union is the aggressor, they reason, it is not for them to decide when the war must be fought.

In general, the expectation is that the Soviet occupation will be far worse than the Nazi, since the Nazi fifth column was negligible whereas the French CP knows almost every individual working class militant in France. Thus elements of the Left envisage no possibility of resistance within France. Expecting both Switzerland and Spain to be occupied, they see no hope outside of escape to America.

Even more serious than the situation of the French comrades is that of the refugees from Central Europe, who, needless to say, can hardly be expected to survive another Soviet occupation. In constant danger of deportation, they must live from day to day on what they are given by the AFL, the Jewish organizations, and the impoverished and uninterested SFIO. They range from important theoretical and political leaders to, for example, the young Yugoslav I recently met whose mother was killed at Auschwitz, his father by the Titoists, and who, at the age of eighteen, has not yet reached puberty because of malnutrition. Some of these refugees have long since pinned their hopes on a war, but there are many who still seek a revolutionary solution. The latter, need it be said, do not receive too much aid. Their condition, at present, is not desperate; but they must be helped to escape from Europe if they are to survive.

Paris, December 1948

ALBERT MICHAELS

GERMANY

Politics in a Vacuum

(The author of the following spent several years as an officer in the British occupation forces in Germany; he is now out of the army and living in England.)

WESTERN Germany is slowly being pulled out of the rubble. The drastic surgery of currency reform has cut away the dead paper tissues which were strangling the whole economy. Wheels are turning again, shops are full, and incentives to hard work have been re-established.

But though the patient is recovering the use of his limbs, he is still mentally sick. The mass neurosis which plunged the country to ruin has not yet run its course. It is true that the complicated apparatus of a parliamentary democracy is painfully emerging from the wreckage of the Third Reich. The Press has a fair measure of freedom. And the game of politics is played with a gusto which obscures the unpleasant fact that it is largely played in a vacuum.

All parties in West Germany might be called revisionist. Even the Communists regard the Oder-Niesse line as a standing affront, and only keep silent to stay in the good books of the Kremlin. The Eastern boundaries of Germany make up the one issue with which non-Communist orators can shake their audiences out of their customary passivity.

Most Germans vote Social Democrat and try to forget that they once heiled Hitler. They vote because that is part of the new order. Nobody expects to change anything by voting. And they often wish Speer were back to clear away the rubble, and think back with regret to the time when their country dictated the politics of Europe.

Now they feel it has become a drill-ground for World War III. War is the main topic of conversation in clubs and cafes, trains and trams. Its shadow gives an air of unreality to all political programmes and every effort at reconstruction. If West Germany is to be brought into the Marshall family it is only because it is needed as a military base. What is the use of voting for Schumacher and Socialism or Adenauer and Capitalism if both are destined to perish on the same funeral pyre? And why should the housewife give a thought for the morrow, if she has no atom-proof shelter to run to next week?

The mind, of course, usually succeeds in keeping such thoughts beyond the threshold of consciousness. Otherwise nobody in West Germany would work at all, and there would be no reconstruction to speak of. But the feeling that they are being kicked around like a football by the Great Powers remains, adding fuel to the fire of resentment that is never far below the surface.

Political parties make bold promises in their platitudinous programmes. But who cares? Not even the members at bottom. They know as well as the leaders that their parties are powerless and have only been saddled with responsibility for carrying out the policies of the occupying powers. Occupation costs and reparations represent a crippling burden. The German regards the honeyed phrases of his occupiers as mere camouflage for the kind of looting he saw carried out by Hitler in Europe.

So the people sniff at their representatives as the helpless hostages of Britain and America, and flock to the theatres and cabarets. There they can salvage a little self-respect by seeing themselves in perspective. The most popular pieces in Germany today, like Zuckmayer's "Des Teufels General," show them what happened to them under Hitler, and how much better they were than the party which led them. This is balm for wounded souls. The Control Commission, with its "democratic" uplift, has nothing comparable to offer.

There is one constant theme in this discordant symphony of mass suspicion: that is hatred and fear of Russia. But it would be a mistake to assume that this hatred is the reverse side of a great love for the Western Powers. It is far from it. Most Germans are relieved to see armies between them and Russian Imperialism. But they feel that they could do the job much better themselves if they had the power. The respect they once had for their British and American conquerors has long since evaporated. German women who marry foreign soldiers are regarded as little

better than whores, a far more reliable indication of public temper than the ovations given to Western politicians in Berlin.

The Germans do not like any of their occupiers, democratic or dictatorial. If anything, they detest the French more than the Russians, a consequence of French looting in their Zone and the petty childishness they have displayed in Berlin. There is no neo-Nazism in this resentment. Nobody loves a privileged caste; and there is a vast difference between the slap-happy soldiers who conquered Germany and the ossified bureaucracy which rules now.

Nothing in Germany is certain. The ground shifts under German feet every twenty four hours. The people do not trust their Press, and the wildest rumor will sweep the country like a prairie fire in a matter of hours. Millions of them, many more than we ever realised, listened to the BBC during the war. They contrast Mr. Lindley Fraser's promised Four Freedoms with three years' hunger and helplessness and lack of hope. It is not a bit of good explaining about world economy to Frau Schmidt. She understands it as little as Mrs. Smith next door. She has been fed on lies for so long that she regards them as the one staple item in her diet.

Yet this sick psyche shows signs of improvement in parts. Germans, as their periodicals and theatres show, are finding their way to the soul-saving virtue of being able to laugh at themselves and their occupiers. This is a tremendous step forward from the Messianic frigidity of the Hitler period. Only laughter can bring down the psychological supports of dictatorship.

L. R. FLETCHER

SPAIN

The Garrison State

Editor's Note: Kenneth Lynn, who lives in Cambridge, Mass, sends us the following report on an extended trip he recently took through Spain.

THE town on the French side of the frontier is well named Cerbère. For this is indeed the entrance to a modern Hades, guarded not by a three-headed dog but by even more chilling sentinels: the Spanish Civil Guards, wearing those tricornered black patent leather hats which are by now perhaps the oldest symbol left in Europe of brutal police repression.

The first thing that strikes one is the uniforms. Endless, swarming, confusing: regular soldiers, conscripts, police, assault police, elite guards, Falangists. The smallest town has its military headquarters and its garrison. The cities are jammed with soldiers, some on leave, most on duty. There is a military parade almost daily in Madrid, coiling past the cavernous Army building at the corner of Via Alcalá, then up through the main streets. Almost as frequent are demonstrations by blueshirted young Falangists, filling the air with shouted defiance of both the Soviet Union and the Western democracies.

The Permanent Counter-Revolution

The whole country is on a war footing. I tried to escape the martial atmosphere of Madrid by a visit to the Escorial nearby, that austere monastery built by Philip II for his contemplations. The first thing I saw in the courtyard was a hundred boys drilling to the hoarse commands of a black-robed Jesuit. Inside, in front of the high altar, lie, in hushed and solemn state, the remains of Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, founder of the Falangist Party and first martyr of Spanish fascism.

There are probably more men in the Army in Spain today, relative to the population, than there were in Hitler's Germany up to 1939. Despite the construction of many new office buildings, such as the vast new Air Ministry in Madrid, the military bureaucracy is still cramped for space. Last year the Army expropriated the building of the National Institute for the Deaf & Dumb (which, shoved into the street without warning, has simply expired).

It is with somewhat of a shock that one realizes that this mobilization is directed not against any foreign threat but against the Spanish people themselves. The Guardia Civil, for example, are trained not for warfare but for standing 24-hour watches, guns at the ready, along every highway, in every mountain pass, up and down the length and breadth of Spain. They are watching for illegal movement between towns. Incredible as it seems to an American, a Spaniard who lives in Barcelona and, say, wants to go to Valencia must get police permission and a special internal passport. Such permission is hard to obtain except for those who are close to the regime; for any one with a Republican record, it is virtually impossible. It is the duty of the Guardia Civil to see that only persons with the proper passports are permitted on the highways, the trains and the buses. For a Spaniard to be caught travelling without permission means an automatic jail sentence.

The Guardia Civil are understandably nervous. For they are standing guard duty in a war that has not ended. Nine years after the capitulation of the last Republican Army, the war in Spain goes on. Throughout Spain, there are hundreds, perhaps thousands, of men who have been hiding and fighting in the mountains continuously since 1939, known officially as the Year of the Victory. In certain parts of Galicia, the mining area to the north, the guerrilla power is so strong that neither the Guardia Civil nor the armed police dare try to establish themselves. For the men of the Spanish resistance, the war has merely changed its nature, from one with troops in the field to one of attrition, picking off a guard in one place, blowing up a Falangist headquarters in another. For food and funds they depend on their compatriots in the cities, who despite informers and rigid police supervision continue to hold meetings, publish clandestine newspapers and post anti-Franco signs. It is with the destruction of these men that the Guardia Civil has been specifically charged.

Capture means immediate execution, without benefit of judge or jury—the jails are overcrowded as it is. Every Spanish prison is jammed with political prisoners, twenty thousand in Barcelona alone, men and women whose chief crime in most cases is that they are suspected by the police of conspiracy against the government. A Spaniard may be arrested without charges and held indefinitely that way; he may be sentenced, to a long term prison term or even to death, on ridiculously insufficient evidence merely if the police believe him to be guilty.

Many thousands of Spaniards are not in jail only by the grace of what the government chooses to call provisional liberty. Persons on provisional liberty include most of those who played some sort of role in the loyalist cause. It is a broad category. Such people are second class citizens in every respect. They are not eligible for office; they cannot leave the country; they must report in person to the police every fifteen days. All are restricted from certain occupations, such as teaching. The most unfortunate have been blacklisted by the factories and shops in the city where they live, and in which they are obliged to remain, and so cannot find jobs of any sort. Public charity is of course out of the question.

It is impossible to know exactly what proportion of the population is against Franco. Once their confidence has been won, the people talk freely about the government, although it is a jail offense to criticize either the generalissimo or the Falange. It is in the villages and small towns that hatred for the government is most apparent. Beyond that it is difficult to say anything with certainty.

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4 Slices of Bread a Day

Almost all items are rationed in Spain, including bread and all other staples. The size of the ration varies with different occupations. A factory worker receives a daily bread ration that amounts to approximately four slices of American bread, a real hardship on a people for whom bread is the foundation and main substance of the diet, even more than it is for the French or the Italians. Since the official ration is not enough, the worker is forced to buy bread on the black market or go hungry. The price of a kilo of bread on the black market is twenty pesetas, which is the average daily wage of an average factory worker in Spain. Thus if a worker wishes to buy sufficient bread for himself and his family, he must spend his entire daily wage in order to do so, leaving nothing for rent, for clothing, or for other essentials of life.

The example of bread is not a scandalous exception, but only indicative of the general situation. Prices in general parallel those in France, where the high cost of living has this past year produced a prolonged general strike and continued unrest. In strike-less Spain, the average monthly wage is slightly more than half of the corresponding wage in France.

With the possible exception of Germany, the black market in Spain is the most widespread of any in Europe, and it is undoubtedly the most powerful. American cigarettes, white bread, chickens, even stolen articles, are sold openly in the streets, not only with the tacit permission, but sometimes with the aid of the police. Milk is strictly rationed, yet it is totally unavailable in the official stores, even for babies, since the entire production is funnelled into the black market. So immensely rich is the Spanish black market that it has not only created a new privileged class, it has corrupted two of the oldest. While both the Church and the nobility have enjoyed a triumphant renaissance under Franco, neither has been entirely successful in recouping the enormous land holdings each possessed under the monarchy. To make up for these losses, members of both institutions have been constrained to live by their wits. In a town near Barcelona, a bishop was recently arrested for trading in American dollars, while in Estremadura it is openly acknowledged that a celebrated monastic order controls and operates the sugar black market for the entire province. Similarly, members of the nobility have become active black market agents, most notably in automobiles, where a title is useful in obtaining of all-important import licenses.

The factory manager and the shopkeeper, although better off than their employees, are also suffering from the existence of the black market and the price spiral. Wages are low, but for every daily wage of twenty pesetas he pays out, the manager or shopkeeper must match that with another twenty pesetas in the form of taxes and various kinds of benefits. He also finds himself engaged in an unfair competition for control of Spanish industry with foreigners of superior technological know-how and infinitely vaster capital resources. The electrical plants of Barcelona, which supply the city with most of its power, were overrun at the beginning of the war by German technicians who soon took over the industry with the financial backing of high-ranking Nazi officials and still control it. Since 1945, American capital has been flooding into Spain. Working closely with the regime (the situation is nicely symbolized in the handsome engraving of Generalissimo Franco that hangs in the office of a Standard Oil subsidiary in Madrid), American corporations have assumed a stranglehold on Spanish investments formerly competed for by France and Germany.

Luxury Hotels . . . And Caves

Housing conditions are intolerable. There is a great deal of building activity in Spain today, in Madrid and Barcelona it is almost feverish. But in cynical indifference to the desperate needs of the people, almost all the activity is centered on office, bank, and government buildings, on extremely expensive apartment houses, and on the mushrooming structures of the military. In Barcelona, a luxurious hotel and apartment development is rising at the edge of the city, casting its shadow across the miserable mud shacks and crazy lean-to's of working class families. Along the Barcelona waterfront is an entire area of modest apart-

ment houses, completely gutted, which were destroyed by Italian and German aviation in 1938. In nine years of peace, the section has never been rebuilt. The people who lived in those apartments fled to the edge of the sea, right down to the beach, when the bombers came. They set up temporary housekeeping in bath houses and jerry-built shanties, and most of them are still living there—without heat, running water, or electricity.

The contrasts in Madrid are even vaster. The capital is Franco's showcase, his demonstration to the world of how fat and prosperous Spain has grown under the "order and unity" of fascism. The city is without a doubt what it claims to be—the wealthiest big city in the world. Nowhere else in the world can there be seen such a plethora of plushy bars, big cars and swank shops. New bank buildings and magnificently modern apartment buildings are rising all over the city. Even the University City, rebuilt by Franco since the end of the war, possesses in its glittering newness a resort quality. From its gleaming hallways and auditoriums to the glass and chromium bar (in the Philosophy building), the University City seems like a dream version of an American high school, a Hollywood portrayal of higher education come to life.

But the showcase has another side, not meant for the eyes of the world. To the west of the city there are entire suburbs where the people live in converted animal sheds and the empty shells of bombed-out houses, or simply in holes. For a while it was a criminal offense to take photographs in such districts. Finally, Franco ordered the razing of many of these shacks and bombed-out houses, forcing many of the inhabitants to move into caves beyond the city limits.

A Hermetic Culture

Newspapers, books and movies coming from abroad are censored by the military, the Falangist Party and the Church. Because of this triple screening, Spain has been cut off not only from information about contemporary events, but from most of the books that are rightfully her heritage as a western European nation. Marx and Freud are verboten, which might have been predicted, but so are the novels of Anatole France and Victor Hugo. The government's suppression of all vestiges of Catalonian autonomy has meant among other things the burning of all books written in Catalan, including the Catalan translation of the Dialogues of Plato, reputed to have been the finest translation of the Dialogues in any language. The only books popular in America during the last year or so that now appear in Spanish bookshops are the confessions of Kravchenko and Budenz and such perennial Spanish favorites as the novels of Zane Grey. The censorship of foreign movies is less apparent but no less sweeping. All foreign films are dubbed in Spanish, which means that when one of the censors objects the offending sequences are eliminated and the remaining dialogue is completely rewritten without any regard for the original meaning of the picture.

Because of a split between the military and Falangist censorship, the official Spanish attitude towards the United States displays a curious ambivalence. Newspaper editorials appear daily hailing the United States as a savior of western civilization, our role in Greece being singled out for special praise. Prominent space is also given to articles on our military power, which openly exult over our latest developments of warships or long-range bombers. On the other hand there is the hyper-nationalist Falange, which makes a cult of believing that Hitler is still alive and follows the Fuhrer's ancient line about the decadence and moral degeneration of the western democracies, most notably the United States. Recently in Madrid the signs advertising the movie, *Gilda*, were torn down by Falangists and the projection of the film in Madrid's largest cinema was forcibly halted by a contingent of blue shirts on the grounds that it was morally decadent and capable of infecting Spaniards with its American pollution.

Student Life Under Franco

The students, who during the war, were almost entirely on the Republican side, offer a cardinal instance of what an effective police state, if allowed to remain in power over a period of years,

can do to a people even when that people is patently against those who hold the power. Since 1939, Franco has ruthlessly rooted out all professors and students who were known Republicans. Every possible inducement is offered to students to join the student Falangist movement, including first crack at accommodations in apartments near the University City. Student demonstrations, of even the most frivolous nature, against the government are unlawful and offenders when caught are thrown into jail. Impecunious students are bribed by the police to act as informers against their fellows. In this fashion most of the Republican student leaders who had not fled to Paris at the end of the war have been caught and imprisoned.

What remains is a group of students most of whom are so young that they themselves played no active part in the war, totally disorganized and beginning to suffer from the cultural stunting that is the inevitable result of being cut off from a free interplay of ideas with the rest of the world. The students of Spain today seem in the main naive, well-intentioned and completely incapable of effectively aiding any kind of serious opposition to the regime. Their clandestine newspapers reveal as much as anything else these qualities.

These papers are neither factual nor eloquent, but simply boyish exhortations to stick together. Instead of serving as the nucleus around which to build a coherent resistance movement (as did such papers as *Combat* and *Franc-Tireur* in France during the occupation), giving the underground something which could serve simultaneously as a running account and as a criticism of its efforts, they seem merely to be a private and highly dangerous form of amusement calculated to appeal to the cloak-and-dagger instincts of a group of growing boys.

If there are many signs that the majority of the Spanish people detest Franco, it is nevertheless untrue that his regime is tottering—or even weak. If opposition is widespread, it is also divided, and kept so by the unending efforts of the omnipresent police.*

Also, the professional soldiers, especially the Moors, are completely loyal to the regime. Military service for conscripts is so long and begins at such a young age that the draft army, a potential source of opposition, feels no sense of solidarity with the rest of the community so long as they are in uniform. The army career is also sufficiently attractive in comparison with civilian life that many men choose a professional army career and therefore never do come into contact with the interests and grievances of the bulk of the population.

Salvation must come from the outside, either through military or economic pressure. In a moving and eloquent essay on Spain written two years ago, Albert Camus stated that Spain is a country from which we of the West have obstinately turned away our eyes, for it reminds us of our guilt. Today that statement is more than ever true. Financially incapable of continuing a policy which hurt her more than it hurt Franco Spain, France has resumed relations with Madrid and reopened the frontier, while private American banks are now loaning to Spain more money than she would have received under the Marshall Plan.

In Granada, where Garcia Lorca was executed, a thirty-year old Spaniard, a veteran of both the French maquis and the fight against Franco, sat in a room and spoke of his country's plight. He talked of the Spanish people's pride and love of life and of the long history of their oppression. On provisional liberty and under constant police surveillance, this man has nevertheless managed to continue work in the underground. But as he himself admitted, it is hopeless work, proceeding almost mechanically, because there is no other choice, until the day when—"What about help from the United States?" he asked, lifting his eyes. I had no answer.

KENNETH LYNN

* Editor's Note: Cf. the report in the *N.Y. Times* of December 1, 1948, on internal conditions in Spain, which begins "Organized opposition to the Franco regime has been pretty well smashed and splintered. This results from several factors, the most important of which is probably the effectiveness of Generalissimo Franco's secret police."

DEPARTMENT OF UTTER CONFUSION

The Reformation was one of those fierce pulsations of the mind and spirit through which. . . . Western civilization has repeatedly released great circles of liberating and irradiating energy. . . . For this age knew massacres which resembled battles, like that of St. Bartholomew's Day in France when the Catholics murdered more than 10,000 Protestants. . . . It knew persecutions. . . . wars, civil wars, rebellions. . . . And above the rush of armies and the crash of cannon were heard the groans of martyrs and the awesome invective of bigots. It has been observed that in the name of religion the Reformation caused more death and destruction than the Huns. For when men are resolved to test in agony the three insights that constitute their highest manhood—love of truth, love of freedom, and that love of God from which alone the other two derive their meaning—horror is an inevitable reflex of humanity at strife. Nor does this horror impair at all that prayer in which the whole aspiration of the age was condensed. . . .

—Article on "The Protestant Revolution" in "Life," June 14.

DEPARTMENT OF SANITATION

Note: Amateurs of the grand-opera style of polemic, which has unfortunately almost completely died out of American political life, will enjoy the following authentic specimen, from an article by Arnold Petersen, head of the Socialist Labor Party, in "The Weekly People" for February 12 last. Comrade Petersen is objecting to the article *POLITICS* published last issue on the Socialist Labor Party.

. . . Other than to expose briefly a few of the most brazen lies and stupidities by Haldeman-Julius (lifted, as said, from the *POLITICS* lampoon concocted by an expelled SLP disrupter, convicted liar and slum conspirator) I have no intention of dignifying either with a detailed reply.* As De Leon would say, one treats such creatures as one treats the vermin that accidentally lands on one's coat lapel: one flips it off and sends it back to the filth in which it was bred. . . . the gutter-dweller who wrote the *Politics* scurrilities. . . . the *Politics* slummist. . . . And now a few words [1,020, to be exact—DM] about the sheet, *Politics* and its editor who extended hospitality to the repeatedly convicted liar and unprincipled disrupter and his bucketful of slime. The editor, a nonentity known as Dwight Macdonald, recently achieved some notoriety by raking up the record of Henry Wallace. . . . This gentleman's standards and ethics are exemplified in his publishing of the guttermire offered him by the aforesaid proven liar and renegade. His anarcho-bourgeois creed is well illustrated by his acceptance of Proudhon as a philosopher. . . . [whom] Marx so completely demolished more than 100 years ago. . . . Macdonald (who lyingly and sneeringly refers to Marx as "a pathologically quarrelsome old sponger")† affirms his anarchist creed. . . . in his editorial on the recent elections. . . . Truly, birds of a feather—the expelled traitor and foul renegade and organization-anarchist who spilled his filth in *Politics* and the anarcho-bourgeois antediluvian, Dwight Macdonald! Nice bedfellows! . . . The insect who crawled through the pages of *Politics*, leaving his flyspecks there, the insect who welcomed him to those pages. . . . each in turn has demonstrated the scientific acumen of Daniel De Leon when, in 1901, he placed the anarchist insect under the loupe (a jeweler's magnifying glass). . . . As for the rest, I repeat what De Leon said: "The Party will never go into the gutter in pursuit of calumnious mudslingers; it leaves the gutter all to themselves to wallow in."

* The article is 4 full newspaper columns.

† These words are Arthur Koestler's, not mine, and are quoted, on p. 177, precisely to disagree with them! Come, come, Petersen, you contemptible old sectarian-bureaucratic guttersnipe with your filth-bucket of calumny, you loathesome vermin spawned in the intestines of a noisome political cesspool—get the hell off my lapel!—DM

A First Step Toward World Disarmament

CUTHBERT DANIEL & ARTHUR M. SQUIRES

THERE are many elements of symmetry in American and Russian relations. Each country proclaims its desire for peace, yet each country prepares for a war of annihilation. Scientists and engineers of both countries are at work on more horribly effective ways of killing people, and each country blames the other for the "necessity" of this work.

Which country is sincere? Which country is responsible for the armaments race?

The air over Europe is filled with these questions and with partisan answers. Yet these questions will have little interest to thirtieth-century historians. The similarities between the present power struggle and earlier struggles are more striking than the differences. Historians do not speak of the "sincerity" or "responsibility" of Sparta and Athens. The attributes of nations are not as simple and direct as the attributes of individual men. Sincerity and lack of sincerity are not attributes of nations—preparation for the eventuality of war is a major function of every national government, and this overriding function destroys the frame of reference for sincere words and acts; it rules out "trust and cooperation" between two nations competing for the same things.

No nation is "responsible" for an armaments race—it is a process, it is the way of nations. Each nation is stimulated to its present actions by the other's act of yesterday. One cannot look for clearly separated cause or effect—each nation's every move is both cause and effect of moves by the other.

THE FIRST STEP TOWARD DISARMAMENT MUST BE TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES—UNILATERALLY.

Until recently all efforts to escape this vicious circle have reflected the attempt to maintain symmetrical relations between the two great powers. The United Nations Security Council and Atomic Energy Commission are typical of the failures of this approach.

The leaders of the USSR have not the capacity for constructive action or negotiation. This is not entirely because of some personal deterioration. They are caught in a net woven of their materialistic beliefs and of their success in reaching and maintaining their miserable aims. No advances and no concessions can be expected from the Russian government. Any proposal made by the United States government will be misunderstood, distorted, or ignored. Negotiation with the Kremlin is worse than meaningless: so long as our diplomats look for sense in its pronouncements, Soviet diplomats are accomplishing their mission. Negotiation is just what they want. They need time, and negotiation will give them time. They are men who wait with a purpose.

What then remains? *Only unilateral action by the United States*—that is to say, action which does not depend on prior agreement with the Soviet rulers.

So long as American statesmen engage only in symmetrical talk and action—negotiation and arms-building—they share the responsibility (or charge of irresponsibility) for the war toward which we are headed. They are also men who wait; and they just wait, without purpose: hoping that Stalin will have a change of heart, that his successor will be more tractable, that there will be a palace revolt, that the people of Russia will rise, etc.

Only by unilateral action can the United States government command the situation—rather than be commanded by it. We hasten to add that unilateral action can be effective only if it is incapable of being misunderstood, only if it will force both sides away from war, only if it can be used as an honest political lever on the Soviet rulers.

The only thing to which the USSR can respond is a major objective change in the situation. The way to probe the Russian government's adaptability is by deeds, not by proposals—least of all, by the question: "Would you do this if we do that?" The United States can put to test the Russian rulers' ability to adapt their power to the world-inspection which world disarmament requires. By assuming responsibility herself, America can force responsibility on Russia.

Perhaps the most comforting material aspect of the present world situation is the tremendous strength and productivity of the United States. Our press leads many of us to over-estimate the economic and military strength of the USSR. We must not forget that well over half the world's industrial production is accomplished in the United States. Students of the economic strength of the USSR differ only as to whether its total production is one-third or one-fourth of America's. The likelihood of a Russian-initiated war in the next few years arises only from the danger that the Soviet government may in a given situation feel compelled to act desperately; it cannot arise from an objective analysis of Russian and American industrial strength.

America must lead from strength, not from presumption of weakness. America can use its power constructively only if its actions are unambiguously on the side of peace. *In order to use power constructively some of it must be given up.* The United States proposals for the international control of atomic energy provide an example of the (proposed) constructive giving-up of power. The European Recovery Program, insofar as it conforms to the aims originally stated by Marshall, is another example. Each of these examples has, of course, become somewhat infected with other aims: the insistence of the American delegation in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission on absolute guarantees of security for the United States; the tying of ERP benefits to accords on military alliances.

A bolder action than ERP is needed to break the circle of confusion, irresponsibility, and immorality; ERP cannot

both build a democratic peace *and* build a strong position from which to wage war.

The aim must be to start a *disarmament race*. America has the power to start such a race. America can start it by taking the first step—alone.

An American step toward disarmament must be a real, weakening of the military strength of the United States. It must not be a phony gesture meant to feint the Russians into a probably phony counter-gesture. It must be an act of disarmament such that Europeans and Russians who hear of it cannot believe, as they are told by the Communists, that America plans “imperialist” war. For this end the United States need not disarm completely; to do so would create a power vacuum inviting early Russian domination of all Europe. Yet the weapons given up must be those of most advanced design; the sinking of a few obsolete battleships is not enough. And the step must have a serious political objective in view, as America’s rapid demobilization in 1945 did not.

THE MINIMUM STEP: THE DISMANTLING OF AMERICA’S ATOMIC BOMB PLANTS

The sequence of events might be about as follows:

The United States government announces its intention to destroy its atomic bomb parts; to dismantle the Oak Ridge and Hanford atomic production plants; to stop all mining and refining of uranium ores; to quarantine its stockpiles of U-235 and plutonium, setting aside only the small amount needed for a year’s laboratory use.

Russia and other countries are asked to send inspectors to audit atomic production records; to check the stockpiles of U-235 and plutonium; to witness dismantling of production plants; to stand watch over the quarantined U-235 and plutonium (ready to flash a signal if it is seized); to guard declared mines and refineries to see that they are not operated; to begin inspection of the United States for clandestine mining, plant construction, etc.; to supervise the use of fissionable material in laboratories. If Russia refuses to send inspectors, the operation is carried through anyway under the eyes of inspectors from other countries. In short, there is full, effective, “international” control of atomic energy within the United States, now.

Little technical information need be revealed to Russian inspectors. It is easy to determine that a plant is *not* operating or does *not* exist, even if little is known of its nature. (We are among those who believe that American atomic scientists should not freely publish their findings before Russian agreement on control; too much has been published already.) It should also be easy to account for the locations and activities of all nuclear physicists who know how to put a bomb together.

Russian inspectors, as they begin to look for clandestine atomic bomb plants in the United States, are certain to demand entry to all known installations for weapon development. They are admitted everywhere, but all workers on biological weapons, rockets, submarines, and so on have already been given vacations. The Russian inspectors are conducted through *empty* laboratories and work-shops, they learn nothing except that nothing is being done, and they are stationed outside to see that no one enters. They are given the opportunity to verify the locations and activities of a reasonable sampling of the supervisory, scientific,

and engineering personnel formerly active in these laboratories.

In this way, at some risk, the government of the United States can give convincing evidence to the world that its intentions are *not* to use atomic bombs. The goal of the Lilienthal-Baruch proposal for atomic control is achieved: the world is made secure against surprise atomic attack.

America’s step toward disarmament will not directly affect the power situation in Europe: the considerations affecting a Russian decision to march to the Atlantic will not be changed. If Russia is ready to march, she will not be prevented from doing so by any weapon whose development may be completed in the next few months, or by the atomic bombs which will be produced in the next year or so. The Soviet leaders plan to take over the countries of Europe piecemeal, under circumstances which keep the semblance of national independence—i.e., rule by local Communist leaders. Heavy opposition would be aroused by seizure of all Europe in a single military campaign—and by the concomitant exposure of Western European cities to atomic attack.

What does the United States ask in return? After a month or so is allowed for the seriousness of the first step to sink in, the United States asks that the Russian government stop the construction of large-scale atomic production plants; that it admit inspectors of all countries to witness the destruction of any such plants, to begin inspection of all Russia for clandestine mining, refining, or production operations, and to supervise laboratory use of fissile materials. In short, the United States asks Russia to accept effective international control. The American inspectors, on admission to Russia, will also ask to see all installations for weapon development, empty.

A time limit must be set on Russian compliance. Six months seems long enough to wait.

The possibility of Russian intransigence seems slight to us. We discount in advance the first blasts about rotten deceitfulness and cynical traps, followed by explanations that America’s action is a cold-blooded trick intended to prepare American minds for an attack on Russia at the end of six months. To the people of the world, a country which has just dismantled its atomic bomb plants will not seem a potential aggressor. Inaction will make Russia the aggressor, and the Kremlin will probably consider a few hundred inspectors inside Russia the lesser evil.

America’s step will exert on the Kremlin three pressures: (1) Threat of early war, which it knows it cannot win. This threat, which could not be constructive if put as an ultimatum, is implied: If the Kremlin refuses to match America’s move within a reasonable period, the hand of those Americans who advocate “preventive” war now will be greatly strengthened. (2) Threat of sharp decrease in support for Communist Parties outside Russia. (3) Threat that hundreds of millions of confused and politically passive people will wake up to the nature of the USSR. The latter threats are direct: America’s act will have an effect on the people of the world which millions of words proclaiming America’s good intentions for future use of atomic energy can never have. America’s act will have dramatic impact on ordinary people on both sides of the Iron Curtain which the Kremlin can neutralize only by a similar act, not by its usual propaganda blasts. We do not hope

to exert moral pressure directly on Stalin and his gang—to such pressure these men are immune; but the moral effect elsewhere will represent a heavy change in the realities in terms of which they must act.

Making a virtue of necessity, Soviet propaganda will claim America's step toward disarmament as a triumph of Soviet diplomacy—"Gromyko was right all along."

THE SECOND, THIRD, ETC. STEPS MUST ALSO BE INITIATED BY THE UNITED STATES

To maintain the advantage in the disarmament race, the United States must make another step even as the USSR takes its first step toward disarmament. Denaturing or destruction of fissionable material usable in bombs, stopping manufacture of long-range planes, stopping mass infantry training programs—these and other steps can be taken and verified, followed by the demand that Russia match the steps and admit additional inspectors to confirm the fact.

Furthermore, the United States must give early proof of its recognition that world peace cannot be built on world disarmament alone. The major fears and miseries of the world's people will not be resolved by such a simple stroke. The pressure of the disarmament race on the Kremlin will be greater if the United States offers to place the money formerly spent on armaments at the disposal of world agencies whose purpose is to foster economic cooperation and cultural exchange.

The whole problem of peace—or of disarmament—cannot be solved short of democratic world government. We will not achieve this government until heavy changes occur on both sides of the Iron Curtain. With total disarmament in modern weapons—verified by inspection—we can reasonably expect a period of peace during which to work for these changes.

Most important, disarmament will help produce the changes which we must seek. It will lower the potential behind the Communist drive for world power. It will greatly increase the probability that the Russian people, in the foreseeable future, may become able to take command of their destiny and to join other peoples of the world in democratic world government. These effects of disarmament will be enhanced if it is accompanied by American engineering, agricultural, and material aid.

While disarmament is not a *sufficient* condition for world recovery, it is nevertheless a *necessary* condition. Whatever program of social advance the reader supports—constructive planning, democratic socialism, progressive capitalism—it cannot even be initiated while a large fraction of the effort of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Russia is going into arms. Each week the United States government finds new "urgently needed" military requirements of the Western European nations. A humane (therefore new) type of world politics was implied in the Marshall Plan as first announced; but the realities, as they are called, are shifting its emphasis and effect steadily toward military preparation. So long as our government finds itself obliged only to make *counter-moves*, these moves will be of a type that makes European recovery *less* likely. And Western European statesmen—Socialist as well as Catholic—are so pre-

occupied with national strength that little substance will come of their proposals for social democracy.

An abatement in the Soviet expansionist drive cannot come until there is an abatement of the Soviet regime's internal practice of enslavement of the Russian people. Long ago the drive became a necessity arising from the permanent unbalance of Soviet economy. The drive will continue as long as the rewards to ordinary labor are so small as today and the rewards to the bureaucratic ruling class so disproportionately large. The drain of the non-productive bureaucracy and the fantastic inefficiency of "socialist" planning which reaches down to the minutiae of village life lead to recurring crises in Soviet economy which must be alleviated by short-term expedients: filling the labor camps with millions of slaves; expropriation of a class; aggression.* No prospect of escape from the vicious circle can now be seen. A palace revolt, a coup by a clique of discontented bureaucrats, Stalin's death—these would lead to no essential change: planners never plan a decrease in their own cut of the pie (or in their own importance). A revolt by the people themselves? A large part of the bureaucracy's efforts are directed toward making that impossible.

Disarmament can help establish conditions making possible a change inside Russia. It will release manpower and machines for consumer production; it will relieve the recurrent economic crises. The necessity for expansion will become less sharp. The presence of international inspectors will inevitably result in some relaxation of the Soviet power.

Eventually peace must be based on a community of enterprise from which it is unthinkable to withdraw. The United States is the only country capable of the heavy investment required to initiate effective, timely measures toward developing the world community without which world government will fail. We must look toward a permanent program whereby those industrialized countries able to produce a surplus direct it toward raising standards of living in backward regions. The American standard of living, by and large, is already dangerously far ahead of the rest of the world. Without neglecting those Americans who are below the national average, we can afford to decrease the rate at which we plow back industrial profit into the creation of new capital goods, increased production, and a higher standard of living. The surplus which in the past has permitted roughly a two-fold expansion in our national income in each generation can be spent on world problems with no decrease in our present living standard.

To disarmament and programs of economic aid must be added measures directed toward creating loyalty to the world community and to world institutions. Each Russian peasant must meet a world agent from time to time as he distributes the peasant's share of the world food supply. Conditions must be established such that populations which, from the point-of-view of national tyrants, become tainted with the poison of world loyalty cannot be transplanted or wiped out.

We cannot expect the Russian bureaucracy to like any

* For a description of the Soviet "business cycle," see Gunther Reimann in *Commentary*, September, 1948.

of these developments. We can force it to accept each one, by putting each in terms of a choice where the alternative is the less desirable by Soviet standards.

THE ROAD TO PEACE IS FULL OF RISKS; THE ROAD TO WAR IS SURE; FREE PEOPLE CAN CHOOSE.

We find ourselves insensitive to the notion that since all these things take time, they must be strung out one after the other. The Principle of Unripe Time, as J. S. Cornford called it, always means unripe for those in political power, or for those wanting it.** It is not the people of the world who are unready for world government; it is their governors, even where elected.

The best time to have started a disarmament race was the fall of 1945. Can anyone really imagine that the atomic bombs manufactured by the United States in the year following August, 1945, confer strength adequate to offset the accompanying reduction in the chances of winning agreement on atomic control? Does anyone suppose that America's position would not now be stronger if those bombs had not been made—stronger morally, politically, *even militarily*—even if the Soviet regime had refused the challenge to disarm?

Too full of risk, the statesman exclaims. The slogan is, A Strong America Is a Safe America.

Like the dinosaur, strong and stupid.

Like the dinosaur, obsolete.

The period during which America's strength guarantees peace will be short. The period during which America has the power to start a disarmament race will soon be over. In a decade or two, if matters take their present course, the factors which make a nation strong will be

decentralization,

isolation from world community (i.e., secrecy),
knowledge of enemy's society,

stocks of modern weapons *in being*.

The laurels of the arms race will no longer belong to the side which can develop and produce weapons the faster. At the start of a war it will not be essential that the weapons in hand be the last word in efficiency, nor that they exceed the enemy's in number. The new weapons are relatively so cheap that a sound economy and balanced productivity are not necessary for their development or manufacture.

America must *use* her military superiority before it is gone.

This is the logic of the arms race; it is what makes a war, *before America's superiority is gone*, so likely. Yet from the Soviet point-of-view, there is recent historical

** It is too early to rely upon such formulas as world government and disarmament, desirable though these goals may be for the long future. Discussion of world government is futile until men can come to an agreement as to what form of government they want for the world. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has one idea of that government. We have another. We have no desire to impose ours upon them and we certainly do not propose to have theirs imposed upon us. It is better to live in two worlds than to accept force as the means to impose our views or our system. For the same reason while we can work toward the goal of disarmament it is totally impracticable to talk about it as something just around the corner."—Secretary James Forrestal, New York *Herald-Tribune*, October 21, 1947.

precedent for a stronger nation's waiting until its opponent catches up and passes it in strength before finding nerve for the struggle.

The risks of our proposal for *constructive* use of America's strength are not negligible. If Russia refuses to admit inspectors or starts to rearm after disarmament is under way, the risk is the high probability of war, initiated perhaps by an act of Soviet desperation. There is an outside chance that Russia already has a few atomic bombs, and an even more outside chance that she is prepared to use them in demonstration against America.

But where can we find a safe road to peace? Not containment, not appeasement; not preparedness for retaliation, not passive withdrawal—each of these courses moves away from peace. Each is an easy way to escape *for the time being* the real dangers of the power struggle. A brave people will face these dangers. We of this generation *must* live dangerously—that has already been seen to. Let us take risks, where we can choose them, with big potential rewards. The risks of a first step toward disarmament must be compared, not with a mythical one hundred per cent security, but with the near certainty of the war to which the arms race is leading.

Most self-confessed American realists will claim that such a proposal "could never be sold to the American people." We are not impressed with this claim at this time. This is not the place to discuss at length ways of getting the proposal adopted. Others will make heavier contributions to this problem than we can. We indicate only our own *feelings* on the matter of feasibility: What is now being sold to the American people is *suicide*; if that can be sold, surely there must be some small market for an alternate that is only dangerous, not guaranteed to be fatal.

The American people must develop worldmen to put an end to statesmen. To this end, there must be more responsible democracy at the *local* level. Farmers' organizations, professional societies, labor unions, religious groups—all must ask themselves, in democratic discussion, in what degree they are responsible for blind continuing of preparations for war.

The responsibility—undiscussed and unacknowledged—of small groups is nowhere more clearly typified than in the case of scientists and engineers now at work on weapon development. Working in secret on projects started by decisions in whose making the American people took no part—decisions of which the American people often do not even know—these men have no tradition of testing ideas by discussion, or of reaching democratic conclusions. Let these men ask themselves whether their present professional activities contribute to peace or to war. Let them decide whether they should assume responsibility for the probable use of their studies, or whether they dare delegate this responsibility to other men. If they decide that some of their present activities should stop, they will find constructive proposals for stopping them.

Through local democracy such as this there is a small chance of building public opinion favoring a first step toward disarmament. Peace will not miraculously come some fine day when suddenly everyone in the world agrees on a scheme for keeping peace. It can come only by a series of small steps, first by individuals and groups, next

by nations, and last by the world. The people of the United States are not at all convinced that the atomic scientists mean it when they say that there *must* not be another war. But the American people will not fail to appreciate genuine moral leadership. If, after discussion and agreement, scientists propose a moratorium on weapon research—an act against their short-time personal interests—most Americans will give the proposal fair consideration.

Political realists, because of their concern with feasibility, come up with half- and quarter-measures every time. Let us act on our ideals, not on our notions of other people's shortcomings. Let us point out what we think should be done. Let us point out what are the obstacles, who are the obstructionists.

POSTSCRIPT: THE FIRST STEP HERE PROPOSED INVOLVES NO LOSS OF THE BENEFITS OF THE DISCOVERY OF NUCLEAR FISSION

This postscript is necessary only because of a widely held misconception, which has been reinforced by statements of men who know better.

Ninety per cent of the activities supported by the United States Atomic Energy Commission are solely military; Mr. David Lilienthal's public speeches mainly point to the benefits of the other ten per cent. Moreover, he makes it appear that the ten per cent which is good cannot be had without the ninety per cent which is military.

The United States has now spent over three billions of dollars on atomic energy. Mr. Lilienthal says, "If this country means business, then within the next several years this total expenditure will increase to approximately five billions." He hastens to assure us that the "business" of which he speaks is not only the business of war but also the business of peace, because "the peaceful and military aspects of the development of atomic energy are, as a matter of physical fact, not possible of effective separation. . . . Whether atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes, such as the production of power and aids to medical and biological research, or for weapons, the same steps and processes and industrial activities are required up to the point where at Los Alamos an actual weapon is fabricated and put together."*

Mr. Lilienthal's remarks give a dangerously wrong impression. In order to have any of the benefits of peaceful use of atomic energy, he seems to say, we must engage in almost *all* atomic activities, going nearly all the way to bomb fabrication. He implies that the benefits of atomic energy must come in one dangerous package or not at all.

This is not true. The fact is that *only the power aspects of atomic energy are impossible to separate from the military*. An atomic power industry will be a nearly complete atomic bomb industry, since it will produce and consume large quantities of U-235, U-233, and plutonium. A relatively small shop can quickly turn these materials into many atomic bombs.

"Aids to medical and biological research," on the other hand, depend on the use of laboratory piles which produce plutonium at a very small rate. A laboratory pile could accumulate plutonium for one bomb only after many years

of operation. The piles at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (formerly Clinton Laboratory), Argonne Laboratory (Chicago), Chalk River Laboratory (Ontario), Harwell (England), Fort de Chatillon (France), and the pile under construction at Brookhaven National Laboratory (Long Island) are examples of small laboratory piles. One of these piles costs less than ten million dollars. Since 1946 the Clinton pile alone has filled several thousand orders for radio-isotopes for use by research workers in physics, chemistry, biology, medicine, agriculture, and industry. Laboratory piles use natural uranium as mined, and *depend in no way upon the existence of the large-scale atomic production plants at Oak Ridge and Hanford*.

The field of atomic energy is physically separable into two parts—production of radio-isotopes and neutron radiation for use as research tools, and production of nuclear fuel for use today in bombs and someday (perhaps) in atomic power plants. The distinction is simply a matter of size. Use of atomic energy in research is small-scale, inexpensive, and "safe." Use of atomic energy for bombs or power is large-scale, expensive, and "dangerous."

Every authority agrees that small-scale atomic science will bring far more important benefits to mankind than large-scale atomic power. Indeed, small-scale activities alone bring benefits of immediate consequence. Mr. Lilienthal has said, "It is fair to say that the entire investment in the atomic energy project . . . may be more than repaid by the benefits to agriculture and human nutrition alone." It should be remarked that these benefits would have required the expenditure of considerably less than five per cent of the three billions spent so far.

The great bulk of the USAEC's annual budget of three-quarters of a billion dollars is being spent on increasing America's atomic production and on intensive efforts to develop atomic power. It is folly to suppose that this outlay is economically justified. The total investment in power generating equipment in the United States is in the neighborhood of six billion dollars. Mr. Lilienthal asks us (for economic reasons, he says) to spend nearly this much on atomic production before 1950—probably before any electricity whatever has been generated from atomic power, certainly before any has been generated economically. Moreover, if the plants at Oak Ridge and Hanford were to process all the uranium ore in the Congo deposits, the Great Bear Lake deposits, and every other commercial source known before the war, the U-235 and plutonium produced would not supply the United States' energy needs for as much as two years!

No banker or private investor would put large sums of money into a development so beset with uncertainties as atomic power is. Engineers do not know today how to construct an atomic furnace with a long life. They do not know how to dispose safely of the dangerous radioactive ashes produced when atomic fuel is burned. The process of breeding—converting nearly all U-238 in natural uranium to plutonium, instead of the tiny fraction converted at Hanford—remains only a theoretical possibility; until it is demonstrated, there is no assurance that the world's resources of commercially recoverable uranium are adequate to the world's energy needs for more than a few months.

* New York Times, December 3, 1947.

The Waldorf Conference

ON March 26 and 27, the National Council of the Arts, Sciences and Professions held a "Cultural and Scientific Conference for World Peace" at the Hotel Waldorf-Astoria in New York City. The Conference had little to do with either culture, science or peace but it was nevertheless of great significance. It was strictly a Stalinoid affair: the NCASP is a Communist-front organization shepherded by the reliable Hannah Dörner, and the Conference itself excluded from the speakers' platform all known anti-Communists, no matter how capable or eminent (except for Norman Cousins). There was room on the writing panel for Shirley Graham but not for John Dos Passos; there was room on the Natural Science panel for an electronic engineer named W. A. Higinbotham but not for Herman J. Muller, the Nobel prize-winner who had protested about the Lysenko scandal; there was room on the Religion panel for the retired Bishop of Utah and the retired Bishop of Honolulu, but not for Reinhold Niebuhr, John Haynes Holmes, or A. J. Muste. The "call" to the Conference followed the same lines: it denounced at length the State Department's "cold war" policy but had not one word criticising the Russian power-moves to which this policy is a reaction. Finally, all the old familiar Stalinoid names were prominent throughout the Conference: from Professor Harlow Shapley, the chairman, and Professor Frederick L. Schuman, the keynote speaker, to Howard Fast, Paul Sweezy, T. O. Thackrey, I. F. Stone, Victor Bernstein, F. O. Matthiessen, Richard O. Boyer, Agnes Smedley, Aaron Copland, Clifford Odets, and Guy Emerson Shipler. When you get all these gathered together, plus some political illiterates and minus every known opponent of the Communists, then the conclusion is reasonable that the Conference is a front operation of the CP.

Comrade V. Tovarich

I attended, as a delegate, as many of the sessions as I could, and I know from my own observation that the above conclusion is not only reasonable but also true. The Waldorf Conference was the lineal descendant of last fall's conference at Wroclaw, Poland; and it will itself have issue in the World Congress of Partisans which is soon going to be held in Paris. It was also the first big action our own Stalinoids have taken since the debacle of the Wallace presidential campaign. (Wallace, of course, spoke several times at the Conference, but it was amusing to see how he was kept out of the spotlight; he was, after all, a kind of *memento mori*, a skeleton at the feast.)

The Waldorf Conference showed one thing very clearly: the Communists are on the defensive, in this country at least. The most politically revealing episode took place at the final plenary session on Sunday afternoon. Professor Schuman gave the keynote speech: it was a middle-of-the-road, both-sides-are-guilty speech; he pictured both the Kremlin and the State Department as neurotic and even a little psychotic, and he found that America's "war disease" had its counterpart "among the leaders and peoples of Eastern Europe." (Professor Shapley, in opening the Conference, had taken the same line.) His speech was applauded mildly by the 3,000 assembled delegates (whom he had shushed when they booed Churchill's name). Presently, the chief Russian delegate, A. A. Fadayev, gave his speech. At the end he said, "I must say that I found certain aspects of Professor Schuman's speech astonishing. He indicated that he believes there are elements in the Soviet Union to some extent responsible for the menace to the peace just as there are such elements in the United States. . . . Professor Schuman is mistaken. There are no such elements in our country." Mr. Fadayev was also unkind enough to add that Professor Schuman had once reviewed favorably the party-line classic on foreign policy, "The Great Conspiracy" by Kahn and

Sayers; yet "this book stated most emphatically that these elements were not in our country and that some of them *were* in the United States." The clash between Russian intransigence and American appeasement thus came out sharply—and, judging by the thunderous applause which Fadayev's remarks got, the rank and file in the audience were on the Russian side. Professor Schuman, later, took the floor again. "I am delighted," he said, looking depressed, "to agree with Mr. Fadayev's statement that there are no elements in the USSR which desire war with the USA. I agree entirely with this. I also agree that there *are* elements in the USA which desire war with the USSR." Thus Professor Schuman, not for the first time (see Frank Trager's article on him in *Partisan Review*, March-April, 1940), bowed to superior force, and hypocritically agreed with a formulation he had himself attacked just an hour before. It was a shabby spectacle.

But if the Russian carried his point then, the victory short-lived. At the close of the session, an extremely vague and innocuous resolution about world peace was presented from the platform, one which I myself could sign. Several delegates objected from the floor: they wanted "something with teeth in it" i.e., something which backed Russian world policy and attacked American policy. (Judging by their reactions throughout the meetings, I would say that the great majority of the delegates were ardent Russia-firsters; only the Russian delegates, whom they cheered by far the loudest, gave them the fighting pro-Russian and anti-American line they wanted; the American leaders of the Conference took a very cautious, critical-of-both-sides line.) These rank-and-file objections were successfully met when Shapley recognized, also from the floor delegates, first Howard Fast and then the very Albert E. Kahn who had written "The Great Conspiracy." These veteran Communist whips persuaded the assembled delegates *not* to insist on a more militant resolution! It was, all in all, a richly confusing session which brought to a head the conflict visible all through the Conference between the American leaders, who favored a "soft" or "popular front" policy, and the American ranks plus the Russian delegates, who favored a "hard" or "third period" policy. This split, as yet just potential, may become serious. There is, for example, a surprising number of small groups of ex-party members who have been expelled for "Trotskyism" (i.e., ultra-leftism) recently, but who still regard themselves as loyal Communists and who criticise the present leadership as "Browderite liquidators."

The Anti-Communist Left Takes the Offensive

The placatory line taken by the Conference leaders—contrasting even with the original Call, which took the unilateral approach favored by the Russians and the ranks of the delegates—may also have been due to the fact that we of the anti-Communist left really went into action to expose the Conference for the CP front it was. After various preliminary meetings—I'm proud to say that the first was held in my own apartment—a small group crystallized, led by Sidney Hook, with two aims: to keep up a running barrage in the press, and to get up a counter-meeting at Freedom House on Saturday afternoon. The immediate cause, or stimulus, of the whole action was the refusal of the Shapley group to permit Dr. Hook to read before one of the panels a paper criticising the notion of class or national truths in science as leading to war, and arguing in favor of a concept of scientific truth as international in character. When the Conference, despite its alleged interest in culture, science and peace, refused even to hear this viewpoint, Dr. Hook, a man of considerable energy and bellicosity, took the lead in organizing an ad hoc group: Americans for Intellectual Freedom. In its brief week of existence, the AIF, operating from two rooms in the Waldorf, spent about \$2,000

(half from trade unions, half from individuals), gave the press so much usable copy that AIF threatened to blanket the Waldorf Conference in the news, and staged a very successful meeting at Freedom House, which was addressed by Drs. Counts, Hook, and Muller, by George Biddle and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., by Bertram J. Wolfe and A. J. Muste,* by Madame Kosenkina, and many others, and which filled every one of the 450 seats available inside Freedom House, and drew an overflow crowd, listening to the loudspeakers in Bryant Park, of several thousand. The AIF action, devotedly staffed by Arnold Beichman, Pearl Kluger, and Mel Pitzele, assisted by dozens of part-time volunteers who fell all over each other's feet and yet somehow got things done, was an inspiring instance of how much can be accomplished if people really feel excited about a cause. Its chief importance was that it showed up the absurdity of the claim of the Waldorf Conference to represent all, or even a major part, of American culture today.

An even more modest action also produced some interesting results. Three or four of us decided to apply for delegates' cards; we got them, on payment of the \$3 fee, with no trouble, and we attended the Writing & Publishing panel. This session, which turned out to be very dramatic, is worth describing in detail.

Old Sheep At New Gates

About 800 delegates packed the Starlight Roof for the Writing & Publishing panel on March 26th. Our Dissenting group took the precaution of getting there very early and securing strategically placed seats. The panel speakers sat behind a long, cloth-covered counter, facing the delegates. They included Agnes Smedley, W. E. B. DuBois, Richard O. Boyer, Howard Fast, Norman Mailer, Ira Wolfert, F. O. Matthiessen. Right in front of me, not ten feet away, sat the Russian delegates: P. A. Pavlenko, Stalin Prize novelist; A. A. Fadayeve, secretary of the Union of Soviet Writers and No. 1 literary bureaucrat; Dimitri Shostakovich, the composer. The contrast between the two last (Pavlenko was a nonentity and looked the part) was extreme. Shostakovich was pale, slight, sensitive-looking; he sat hunched over, his hand covering his mouth or shading his eyes; he looked tense, withdrawn, unsmiling—a tragic and heart-rending figure. Fadayeve was a big, bulky, square-shouldered man, with a ruddy, fleshy bigjowed face and iron-grey hair; his expression was cold and wooden; he looked more like a plainclothes detective than a writer.

Louis Untermeyer chaired the meeting, on the whole quite fairly, and with wit and presence of mind (he needed both). In his opening remarks, he ingratiated himself with the audience (which was about 95% Stalinoid, judging from its reactions) with a reference to "a dirty, four-letter word, Hook." Robert Lowell: "I object." Untermeyer: "What is your objection, Mr. Lowell?" Lowell: "Hook is not a dirty word." Untermeyer: "All right, let's just say a four-letter word. . . ." This was the first, and almost the last, comfort the comrades got from the chairman. (He was a literary man, after all, and about the only discernible literary people in the audience were all Dissenters, the rest being UOPWA organizers, high school teachers, and public-relations workers, etc.)

Three panel members opened the meeting with longish speeches. Boyer talked about the Communist Party as the only defender of freedom of thought and individual conscience. Matthiessen, Professor of English at Harvard, talked about Emerson, Thoreau, Whitman and Melville as the Henry Wallaces of their day (high point was the reference to Captain Ahab as a "common man"), and praised Emerson's dedication to "the organizing of liberty" as pretty good considering that Lenin hadn't yet come along to show us how to do the job right. Fast wound up the preliminaries

* Muste spoke for Peacemakers, the leftwing pacifist group to which both he and I belong. He asked for a place also on the Waldorf Conference program, but, although they had two whole days with all kinds of different panels as against AIF's single meeting, they could not find five minutes for a pacifist voice. I hope A. J. Muste, and my fellow-pacifists, will draw some political conclusions from this contrast.

with a bold statement in favor of peace and against those who "want peace to fail."

The floor was then thrown open to the delegates and the other panel speakers (3 minutes apiece). I got up and got the floor without difficulty. There was some commotion, firmly quelled by Chairman Untermeyer, when I gave my name and mentioned "Politics." The gist of my speech follows (like all other quotes here, I believe this to be accurate in substance though perhaps not always word for word):

"I don't want peace to fail; in fact, I'm a pacifist. But I want to know how it serves peace and culture to accept as the spokesman for Russian literature a man who is primarily not a writer but a State functionary. As secretary of the Union of Soviet Writers, Mr. Fadayeve represents precisely that exploitation of culture by the warmaking State which it is the alleged purpose of this conference to protest against. Why didn't Russia send, instead of an official with no literary standing, one of her internationally known writers—some one like Boris Pasternak, Isaac Babel, Ivan Katayev, Anna Akhmetova, Michael Zostchenko, or Boris Pilnyak?

"I want to ask Mr. Fadayeve three questions:

"(1) What has happened to the above six writers? Are they alive? Are they free or in prison?

"(2) In 1945, Mr. Fadayeve published a novel, *Young Guard*. In 1948 the Government denounced it as politically incorrect. Mr. Fadayeve at once agreed to rewrite the entire book "attentively and lovingly." Is this his idea of proper behavior for a writer?

"(3) At the Wroclaw Congress last fall, Mr. Fadayeve attacked American culture in these terms: 'Patented religions; standardized literary ideals, theatre and moving pictures; sport jargon; endless novels; and street songs all beginning with Christian doctrine and ending with shivering American swing—this modern St. Vitus dance is absolutely all we now get from America. . . . In the United States, the expression of any thought which might be regarded as dangerous will be punished with ten years in prison, a fine of \$10,000 and deprivation of American citizenship.' How does this sort of thing advance world peace? And does Mr. Fadayeve expect the 3,000 delegates to this Conference to all be arrested and fined \$10,000 on Monday?"

Chairman Untermeyer: "Mr. Fadayeve, do you want to answer?" Fadayeve (after a huddle with his translator): "Yes." Presently, he strode to the microphone and spoke in Russian, forcefully and with angry gestures, his flushed face thrust forward aggressively. His reply, as translated, was essentially as follows:

"(1) These people are still in existence. Pasternak has the *dacha* next to mine in the country and is busy translating the works of Shakespeare. Zostchenko published a novel in 1947.

"(2) My questioner seems frightened because writers are criticized. But in Russia, writers don't stop writing because they are criticized. As for my novel, *Young Guard*, it is true that I am revising it. The Politburo's criticism has helped my work greatly. This criticism was not political, but was raised because my novel slighted the contribution of adults in the partisan fight against the Germans. The book has sold three million copies* and I have received 18,000 letters about it. I have been too busy to complete the revision, but the original edition is still being sold.

"(3) I did not attack American culture in general but only those forces working against peace. I must also say that I can talk about American literature because I have read it and know it better than my questioner knows Russian literature. This is because in Russia we have many translations of American writers, while the writers my questioner mentions are not available in translation in America.**

* Top figure hitherto reported: one million. Mr. Fadayeve is at least this much of an author: he exaggerates the sales of his books.

** The N. Y. Public Library has the following English translations of books by the six writers in question: AKHMETOVA: "47 Love Poems" (J. Cape, London, 1927); BABEL: "Benia Krik, a Film Novel" (Collet, London, 1935) (not there, but in my own library is "Red Cavalry"—Knopf, 1929); KATAYEV: "The Embezzlers" (MacVeagh, 1929), "Time, Forward" (Farrar & Rinehart, 1933), "Squaring the Circle" (Wishart, London, 1934), "We Carry On" (Moscow, 1942), "The Wife" (Hutch-

"Finally, the point of view of my questioner is familiar: it is that of an enemy of the Soviet Union. It is the viewpoint of an old sheep taken to a new gate."

Civil Disobedience—and Tangerines

Mary McCarthy, author of "The Company She Keeps" and "The Oasis," next got the floor: "I want to ask Mr. Matthiessen two questions. (1) Does he think Mr. Fadayev answered Mr. Macdonald's questions satisfactorily? (2) How does he conceive that Emerson would go about "organizing liberty" in the Soviet Union today, and does he think Thoreau could practice civil disobedience there?" Matthiessen: "I don't know the whole background from which the questions and the answers came, but I would say that Mr. Fadayev met the questions directly, in fact head-on.*** As for the second question, we must always take into account the historical factor. Society in the early 19th century had an anarchistic and protestant coloration. Today, society is more collective. I can't say that I think that Emerson and Thoreau could exist in the Soviet Union today, but neither do I think Lenin could exist in the United States today." (This last is hereby nominated for Non-Sequitur-of-the-Year.)

Following this exchange, Delegate Pavlenko's translator read a very long speech about the democratic traditions of Russian literature and the ditto of "the progressive literature of America," with special reference to Sinclair Lewis and Upton Sinclair—both of whom, as he did not mention and most likely didn't know, have recently condemned both the Wroclaw Congress and the Kremlin's cultural policy. He hymned at length Soviet writers ("Did they preach hatred toward mankind and international discord? [breathless pause] No, they did not!") and composers ("No Russian composer ever was or could be the spokesman of the knife and bomb."). He quoted, as required by statute, the epigram of "the leader of the Soviet people, J. V. Stalin" that "writers are the engineers of the human soul." He described at length how the inhabitants of his home town—Yalta, of all places—are fruitfully engaged in planting orange, lemon and tangerine trees, and manfully confessed: "I have come here without having fulfilled my obligation. I have promised to plant twenty tangerine trees and two lemon trees in the garden of my home." [Stormy applause] When the translator, after some fifteen minutes of this kind of thing, said he would have to skip a few pages because of time limitations (each delegate was supposed to get only three minutes), protests arose everywhere. This was what they had come to hear, these heartwarming generalities

inson, 1946); PASTERNAK: "Collected Prose" (Drummond, London, 1945), "Selected Poems" (New Directions annual, 1946); PILNYAK: "Tales of the Wilderness" (Knopf, 1925), "The Naked Year" (Payson & Clarke, 1928), "The Volga Falls to the Caspian Sea" (Cosmopolitan, 1931); ZOSCHENKO: "Four Sketches" (Nazaroff, Paris, 1922), "Russia Laughs" (Lothrop, Lee & Shephard, Boston, 1935), "Dawn of the New Day" (Moscow, 1939).

*** True enough, in the sense that he collided violently with them. It is unfortunate that Prof. Matthiessen was not familiar with "the whole background," or indeed with the foreground, and that his political passions so got the better of his scholarly discretion that he expressed an opinion anyway. It is also unfortunate, especially for Dr. Matthiessen, that Chairman Untermeyer refused me the floor to expose briefly the lies and half-truths in Mr. Fadayev's answer. Thus he mentioned only two of the six writers I asked about, and even there (a) it has long been known over here that Pasternak has been forced to give up poetry for the safer job of translating, but this, of course, is just the point; (b) Zoschenko was purged by Zhdanov in August, 1947, so it proves nothing to say he published something "in 1947." Thus the slighting of adults in "Young Guard" was objected to on political grounds, since this meant slighting the role of Stalin and the Communists in the war and emphasizing the spontaneous resistance of the youth and common people (see "Politics," Spring 1948, p. 112 for details on the "Young Guard" case); also, Fadayev may not have finished revising his novel but he and Shostakovitch *did* collaborate on a movie from it which conformed to the Politburo's "suggestions." And thus he lied about his Wroclaw speech, which was a virulent attack on American culture as a whole.

were what the audience wanted. Indeed, Pavlenko's speech was evidently designed to set the keynote for the afternoon, an effect that was quite spoiled by the sour notes from the Dissenters.

As soon as the translator had finished, Robert Lowell, author of "Lord Weary's Castle," got the floor: "I am a poet and a Roman Catholic. [sensation—mob noises offstage] I want to ask Mr. Pavlenko a simple question: what are the laws governing conscientious objection in the Soviet Union? And I want to ask a much more difficult and complicated question of the only person in the Russian delegation who might be able to answer it, a man to whom my heart goes out, Mr. Shostakovitch. Will he answer as fully as he can this question: how has the criticism of his Government helped his own work?"

A woman delegate rose to a point of order to object that neither question was relevant in a conference devoted to peace and culture. The chairman ruled against her. Pavlenko then replied: "I do not know the laws on conscientious objection because when my country called, I fought. I am now fifty, and I hope to be still able to fight for my country when I am a hundred." [Stormy applause]

Shostakovitch was made obviously unhappy by the question (unlike Fadayev, who had responded with polemical ardor to my questions). Nervously (his hands were literally trembling) he spoke a few words, in a thin voice, into the microphone. These were translated: "Our musical criticism is a reflection of our life. The criticism brings me much good because it helps bring my music forward." This minimum formula was all he could say of his own accord; the next morning, in the same room, at the music panel, he gave a long speech full of passionate defense of Soviet cultural policy and violent attack on "modernistic" and "formalistic" composers. It seems likely that his reply to Lowell was all he could say spontaneously, in his own person, and that his next morning's speech was written for him by some one else.

The Chairman then recognized Dr. George S. Counts, of Teachers College, one of the organizers of Americans for Intellectual Freedom. Dr. Counts dramatically flourished a copy of the Russian text of the Wroclaw proceedings, from which he read some further interesting statements by Comrades Fadayev and Ehrenburg. He also gave some information about cultural life in Russia, and was about to call to Comrade Pavlenko's attention Upton Sinclair's recent statement, when his time ran out. Although Pavlenko's discourse on tree-planting had run a good twenty minutes, the Chairman firmly held Counts to the 3 minutes allotted to all non-Russian delegates. (Mr. Untermeyer is clearly a liberal and a decent fellow, but also clearly No Hero, and only a hero could have let Counts continue in the face of the booing and the shouts of "Sit down!").

The Mailer Episode

Agnes Smedley then spoke, and got the biggest hand of the afternoon when she asked (*tremolo*): "If 25 million Russians had not died in the war, would we be sitting here today?" A series of delegates, hard to distinguish from each other—most were youngish, Jewish, male, and organizers of some kind, either trade union or Wallace-Progressive—made a series of little talks on the Greek guerrillas, the importance of forthcoming petitions and meetings, and other cognate subjects. Two or three (with a side glance at Delegate Lowell) wanted a resolution to be passed condemning the award of the Bollingen Prize for Poetry to the fascist traitor, Ezra Pound, but the Chairman ruled them out of order. Evidently, the organizers of the Conference had done a slipshod job: they had made sure that only "reliable" speakers were on the panel (though, as we shall immediately see, even here their planning was defective) but they had not arranged for any literary people of the slightest prominence to take the floor as delegates, nor had they prepared any polemics against the Dissenters. They had evidently calculated on an idyllic rather than a dramatic work of art. Comrade Fast will certainly hear from headquarters about this.

There were still some more rude surprises in store for the comrades. Ira Wolfert, author of "An Act of Love," complained about

the iron curtain in his speech from the platform, and said that he wanted to go to Russia to see for himself but was unable to obtain a visa. This was answered from the floor by Albert E. Kahn, co-author of "The Great Conspiracy" (still the party-line bible on foreign affairs) who said that *he* had had no trouble in travelling freely all over Eastern Europe (though he reported no trips in Russia). But the greatest shock was the panel speech of Norman Mailer, author of "The Naked and the Dead."

This was led up to by some remarks by Jean Malaquais, author of "The Javanese" and "World Without Visa," a Dissenting dark-horse who spoke from the floor to criticize the lack of cultural freedom in Russia and to inquire precisely how Soviet socialism and American capitalism differed in their treatment of intellectuals. This Trotskyist thesis was received with the usual offstage murmurs. Presently Norman Mailer got up to speak. (Of the American panel-speakers, Mailer seemed to be the popular favorite, just as Shostakovich among the Russians got much the biggest applause. Whenever the Chairman turned to select a new panel-speaker, cries of "Mailer" arose.)

Mailer's speech was the most moving and sincere of the afternoon: it was serious, halting, almost painfully honest; he spoke quietly and intensely, literally sweating with an effort that was spiritual rather than rhetorical: I had the impression that he was publicly stating a profound and even disagreeable (to him, as well as to his hearers) change of mind and heart. "I must disagree somewhat with my French translator, Jean Malaquais," he began (snickers at this ironical context—snickers which died away abruptly with the next remark) "... who is also my good friend. I think Jean Malaquais goes too far. But I must say this: I have come here as a Trojan horse. I had hesitated about coming here and speaking. I don't believe in peace conferences. They don't do any good. So long as there is capitalism, there is going to be war. Until you have a decent, equitable socialism, you can't have peace. But you can't have socialism until the mass of workers are organized into a revolutionary party. And as I look about me here, I see few who believe in revolutions and many who believe in resolutions. . . . I am going to make myself even more unpopular. I am afraid that both the United States and the Soviet Union are moving toward state capitalism. There is no future in that. I see the peoples of *both* America and Russia—neither of them want war—caught in a mechanism which is steadily grinding on to produce war. The two systems approach each other constantly. All a writer can do is tell the truth as he sees it, and keep on writing. I am sorry to be so pessimistic, but I am a writer and not a political man."

The session was concluded by the Chairman's reading of a resolution so vague that it was passed unanimously.

Aftermath: How Formidable Are They?

After the meeting, Mary McCarthy got involved in an argument with Howard Fast which was terminated by his inviting all the Dissenting faction to attend a reception for the foreign delegates at the Hotel Sutton, limited to members of the National Council of Arts, Sciences and Professions, the Stalinoid front which had organized the Conference. He wrote out a special pass (since none of us were either members of the NCASP or were willing to pay \$2 to become so), and we attended in a body. It was held in a grubby, smoky room, where various foreign delegates made speeches in their native tongues to the halting translations of which no one paid much attention, while some 150 NCASP members stood about awkwardly holding drinks (Scotch: 60c) in their hands. It reminded me of the Trotskyist "social" gatherings I used to attend ten years ago: no showmanship, no fun, no dash—all very dutiful and worthy and abstract. I must confess that I got quite a different impression of the Stalinoids—at least of their New York "cultural" periphery—than I had had from my previous experience, which was based largely on their press. Talking to them face to face, I had two main impressions. The first was that it was possible to communicate, since we had a common cultural and even (oddly enough) political background: that is, we read the same books, went to the same art shows and foreign

films, shared the same convictions in favor of the (American) underdog—the Negroes, the Jews, the economically underprivileged—and against such institutions as the Catholic hierarchy and the U.S. State Department. In contrast, I felt very little in common with the pickets who demonstrated against the Conference, who booed me as roundly as any other delegate (since their hatred was directed against all alien-appearing intellectuals) and who marched under the (to me repulsive) banners of religion and patriotism. It proved to be very easy to enter into discussion, or at least argument, with the NCASP members at the reception; even Howard Fast proved to be quite genial, nor did I find any trouble in giving away a half dozen copies of the USSR issue of "Politics." My second impression was that these Stalinoids are much less effective and dangerous than I had expected, partly because of the above, partly because their political ideas (as in the case of the Trotskyists) are so disconnected from the rest of their lives and personal interests that it is really a duty, not a spontaneous pleasure, for them to take this political stand. The great stumbling-block, of course, is the deep sentiment in favor of the present Soviet system; this is the keystone of their faith and, indeed, of their whole ethical and mental existence; its psychological roots are so deep as to make it very hard to affect it by rational argument or documentation; yet I had the feeling that the task is by no means impossible, and that there are more inner forces working on our side than perhaps we realize.

Dissident voices were also heard at two other panels. Peter Blake attended the Planning and Building panel, where he gave an account of the purge in Soviet architecture and submitted a resolution inquiring about the fate of a number of prominent Russian architects. And Nicholas Nabokov, after Shostakovich had delivered his violently "anti-formalist" speech at the Fine Arts session, asked him whether he agreed with the official condemnation of Hindemith, Shoenberg and Stravinsky, and whether he thought this kind of wholesale attack on modern Western music contributed to world peace. The answers were both in the affirmative.

A Moscow Conference Next Fall?

The U.S. State Department, after acting with intelligence and liberality in giving visas to the Russian and satellite delegates, returned to its usual form by refusing visas to the delegates from Western Europe—except for W. O. Stapledon, billed as "professor" but innocent of any academic experience. This refusal—and also the attempt at intimidation by mass picketing from the Catholic and other war veterans—was quite properly denounced by the Waldorf Conference sponsors. But the American government *did* let in the Russians, and it *did* permit the Conference to be held, and the local police *did* protect the delegates. So let us hear no more from Messrs. Shapley, Schuman et al. about the mote in the eye of the State Department until they have cast out the beam from the eye of the Kremlin.

That is, until they have prevailed on the Politburo to permit, in, say, Moscow's Hotel Lux, a similar gathering of 3,000 pro-USA Russian citizens (especially released from the labor camps to attend), which will be addressed by a seven-man American delegation chosen by Dean Acheson. Clarence Buddington Kelland would do very well, politically and esthetically, for Comrade Fadayev's opposite number, the Komsomols could substitute for Catholic War Veterans on the picket line, and Comrades Fadayev, Shostakovich and Pavlenko can have three minutes each, from the floor, to ask awkward questions of Mr. Kelland.

I fear the Hotel Lux conference will be long in materializing. But I think we American intellectuals might seriously consider holding an international conference here next fall, to which the really significant representatives of European culture would all be invited, Communists like Eluard, Joliot-Curie, and Picasso as well as anti-Communists like Gide, Malraux, Eliot, Auden, Sartre, Koestler, Orwell, Silone. Let us try to inveigle the Communists into discussion and debate. Such a really free and really representative conference could only be helpful to the cause of true culture, true democracy and freedom—and true peace.

DWIGHT MACDONALD

THE ATOM IN WAR AND PEACE: A FOOTNOTE

"Atomic energy has been produced in sizeable quantities ever since 1942, but so far, not a single kilowatt has been put to practical, peacetime use." (*Time*, Jan. 31, 1949) . . . "More efficient weapons are coming out of the nation's atomic-energy program. But even the Atomic Energy Commission is dissatisfied with progress in other directions—chiefly toward developing non-military applications of nuclear energy." (*Business Week*, Feb. 5, 1949) . . . "Can atomic energy produce large-scale electric power for industry at a cost comparable with existing coal and hydro power plants? Along about 1957, AEC expects to have a full-scale power plant running which will furnish a real test of the cost of atom-electricity." (*Business Week*, Feb. 19, 1949) . . . "ATOM OUTPUT AT PEAK, BOMB MORE DEADLY" (headline in *N.Y. Herald-Tribune*, Feb. 1, 1949). . . . "The United States is continuing to increase its atomic bomb stockpile," Bruce R. Prentice, member of General Electric's nucleonics committee, said yesterday. However, he added, it will probably be from 30 to 50 years before power derived from atomic energy will become commercially important." (*Chicago Tribune*, Feb. 24, 1949)

Clearly an atomic power plant will always cost much more than a coal plant: the latter's inexpensive coal furnace must be replaced by a complicated and expensive atomic furnace; the coal-handling system must be replaced by an elaborate chemical plant for purifying the atomic fuel charged to the furnace; while the coal plant's steam boiler, turbines, and electric generators, which ordinarily represent three-quarters of its cost, have their exact counterparts in an atomic plant. In the summer of 1946 the Monsanto Chemical Company, at that time the operator of Clinton Laboratory at Oak Ridge, estimated that an atomic power plant will cost two and one-half times as much as a coal plant of the same capacity. This estimate, which is now regarded as optimistic,* brings the cost of an atomic power installation in the range generally found in the case of water power: for example, the total investment in the Tennessee Valley Project was \$290 per kilowatt of installed capacity (we ignore the fact that part of this investment is assignable to navigation and flood control), while the figure for a coal power plant is about \$120. But unlike the water power installation, which can be amortized over many decades to provide the cheapest source of electricity now known, an atomic power plant must be expected to have a life comparable to that of a coal plant. Thus atomic power can be expected to be economically competitive only in unusual circumstances, where the major cost of generating electricity is the transportation of coal and where opportunities for water power are absent. Atomic power does not represent an attractive means of alleviating the present world power shortage except in a few places remote from coal deposits.

* The basis for the Monsanto estimate is an atomic power plant built along the lines of the Hanford plutonium plant: it would consume but a small fraction of the U-235 initially present in natural uranium and would produce less plutonium (as a by-product of power production) than U-235 consumed. Plants of this type can never become of great economic importance—there simply is not enough uranium, unless there are several hundred deposits similar to those in the Congo waiting to be discovered. It is clear that plants which use uranium more efficiently will cost considerably more.

Moreover, we must understand that atomic power's development is probably decades away. The USAEC's General Advisory Committee, composed of leading atomic scientists and engineers, has stated:

"Assuming even a most favorable and rapid technical development . . . a word of caution is needed as to time scale. We do not see how it would be possible under the most favorable circumstances to have any considerable portion of the present power supply of the world derived from nuclear fuel before the expiration of 20 years."

How many billions will have been spent by that time?

The money spent *each year* by the United States Atomic Energy Commission could construct one Tennessee Valley Project *each year*,* to provide in twenty years a power-generating capacity equal to the *total* of 50,000,000 kilowatts now available in the entire United States!

* * *

Military applications of atomic energy involve no such considerations as those just discussed under the head of commercial atomic power. The economy of destruction through the agency of atomic bombs has already been demonstrated. A rocket with an atomic propulsion unit needs a life of only a few hours—it will get there in that time, and no one wants it to come back. An atomic power plant for a long-range, deep-diving submarine can be rebuilt every year or so. The hazards of radiocative waste disposal at high sea and in the stratosphere—the hazards of the crashup of an atomic-powered airplane—these are the kinds of calculated risk which the military man bravely undertakes. The advantage of atomic fuel—its small weight per unit of energy—is a decisive consideration in its choice for these military uses. Cost and long equipment life are almost never important considerations for the military man.

The *only* reason for currently operating, improving, and expanding the large Oak Ridge and Hanford production plants is the accumulation of large stocks of material for bombs and for military applications of atomic power. This is the *only* reason for huge atomic development programs.

Oak Ridge and Hanford are a threat to peace. These particular plants, however important economically atomic power may become a few decades hence, will never be economic. The road to peace will be clearer when they are destroyed. Their loss requires giving up none of the benefits of small-scale, safe atomic science. Instead of spending billions to maintain atomic parity, Russia and the United States can reduce their atomic expenditures to sums in keeping with the long-range prospects of atomic power: Russian scientists and engineers can achieve parity in atomic know-how by participating in pilot-plant studies of atomic power production, which can be carried out with no threat to peace. Russia has nothing to gain, economically, from immediate production of large quantities of atomic fuel, and little to gain absolutely—nothing by way of profit—from an intensive program for developing atomic power during the next decade: if, for example, the United

* The Tennessee Valley Authority has received *total appropriations* of a little under three-quarters of a billion dollars from the United States Congress (1948 *World Almanac*, p. 469); TVA accountancy charges two-thirds of this investment to power production (Lilienthal, *Democracy on the March*, Pocket Books, Inc., 1945, p. 46). We are used to so much larger sums that this no longer seems enormous.

States offers instead to work with Russian technicians on the efficient utilization and transportation of coal energy (as artificial gas), a much smaller staff and investment can produce much more important results, much sooner. Everyone will gain if scientists and engineers now working at military enterprise will turn their attention to problems of food and fuel production, conservation of resources, and development of industrial methods conducive to decentralization.

Until there is reasonable assurance of permanent peace, until the world is united under a single democratic government, atomic power will be of greatest benefit to man if its use is confined to the sun and stars.

COMMENT

Sir:

There are three elements in the Daniel-Squires article. (1) The proposal for a disarmament race with the USSR. (2) The suggestion, put forward with a gentleness that makes it almost unnoticeable, that scientists working on weapons research could start the movement by direct action ("local democracy" is the euphemism). (3) The appendix showing how questionable is the economic usefulness of atomic power and how the much more important gains from nuclear research for peaceful purposes would have needed only a very small fraction of the expenditure we have made on the atom bomb.

Point (2) has been discussed in a more explicit form in the October, 1948, and January, 1949, issues of *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, where I was one of those who took issue with Daniel-Squires on it. Their article there, to me and to others, seemed to be a claim for special powers for scientists which, if there were any chance of their being exercised, would constitute a danger to democratic society—and which would also be indistinguishable in their effects from sabotage by Russian agents.

Point (3) is of the greatest importance, and I find myself in complete agreement with it. In my own article referred to above, I apparently gave the impression that the whole of the vast expenditure on the atom bomb was necessary for obtaining the benefits of radio-isotopes for research in chemistry, biology, etc. Daniel-Squires have corrected this and have shown furthermore that the large investments in atomic energy projects are really justifiable only for military purposes—that the potential benefits from industrial atomic power are so small that even a tiny contribution to peace or to security would be ample justification for giving up the attempt to produce energy until we have established a secure peace.

But neither of these two points have very much to do with (1), the proposal that the USA should embark on a disarmament race with the USSR.

While I do not think the proposal makes much sense, I am in favor of it. I do not think it makes much sense because if an act of disarmament could have started a disarmament race, it should have done this when the USA disarmed with breakneck rapidity at the end of the war (when the Communist slogan, "Bring Home the American, not Russian Boys!" helped to create the power vacuums that now plague our conscience). It does not make sense because any act of disarmament that left us strong relatively to the USSR would be denounced as a hypocritical trap, while one that left us significantly weaker—and which would amount to telling all our friends in Europe and Asia that the only way to save their necks is to join the Russians—would not, I think, be proposed by Daniel and Squires. It does not make sense because the people behind the Iron Curtain (which includes those in the free countries who bind their own eyes with little private iron blinkers) will never get a true account of the disarmament step, while all others do not need to be persuaded by such a gesture that the USA is not dedicated to any manifest destiny of restoring capitalism in Russia. It does not

make sense because there was more excuse for believing that Hitler had no aggressive intentions than for any literate person believing that the Russians are merely afraid or that anything less than conviction of failure would prevent them from trying to establish Russian communism over the whole planet.

Nevertheless, I am in favor of the proposal. I favor it because the situation is desperate. If this should be a way of upsetting the Russian Date with Destiny, it should be tried even though its chance of success be very small indeed. The risk need not be too great. We can make many steps of disarmament without seriously jeopardizing our relative military position.

It is important to recognize that although what is proposed is a disarmament race, its success must be judged not by our really being *weakened*, but by our being *strengthened* through winning—to our side—to the side of peace, though not at the price of surrender—in exchange for some atom bombs, those people who may be persuaded by the gesture that our objective is indeed peace.

If such a policy should be tried, I have no doubt that it will be branded as warmongering, as Daniel and Squires fear. The refusal of the Russians to take the next step in disarmament would indeed strengthen those who warn us of Russia's aggressive intentions and even those who are in favor of immediate "preventive" war. Every peace plan can become a war plan in the moment of its rejection, as every rejected declaration of love can be the beginning of hatred. This, too, is one of the dangers that must be braved in the search for peace.

There is a way in which this danger can be reduced, a way that was suggested to me by my colleague, George Watson, of the Political Science department of Roosevelt College. Let the first American step be taken at a time when the Russians have done something that it is possible to call a peace move. Let the American step be declared to be not the first but the *second* step, made in response to the Russian peace move. The failure of the Russians to make a third step could not then so easily be turned into a further (and unnecessary) unmasking of Russia's aggressive intentions. But whether this extension of Daniel-Squires' proposal is a good thing or a bad thing, I don't know. I know only that anything should be tried that might postpone the war and thus increase the possibility of preventing it.

Chicago, Ill.

ABBA P. LERNER

Sir:

If World War III is prevented and the world moves into an era of peace and a decisive advance in civilization, this paper by Cuthbert Daniel and Arthur M. Squires may come to be regarded in that so much to be desired future as one of the greatest and most influential documents in the history of human politics and thought. Its publication now is so timely as to seem providential, for it suggests what seems to me the one way in which the initiative could be transferred from the forces making for war to those making for peace. The one way, to state the case in another form, in which the initiative both in the field of propaganda and that of action can be taken out of the hands of the Kremlin and put into the hands of the democratic and peace forces in the world.

The basic thesis of the Daniel-Squires paper is absolutely sound: "the only thing to which the USSR can respond is a major objective change in the situation," just as this is the only thing to which the USA can respond. Unless the "I will only if you will first" deadlock is, therefore, to continue until it is exploded in open warfare, there has to be unilateral initiative. Obviously, that is something which one power cannot ask of another. So far as we in the USA are concerned, therefore, the only possible conclusion is that the USA must take the first step toward disarmament unilaterally. For the armaments race we must substitute a disarmament race. We must lead off and see whether the others will and can catch us.

Daniel-Squires furthermore take the bull by the horns by flatly declaring that "an American step toward disarmament must be a real, objective weakening of the USA. It must not be a phony gesture meant to feint the Russians into a counter-gesture." I do not want to spend more time summing up the points in this paper with which I am in agreement, for that would mean virtu-

ally summarizing the whole of it. I want to come straight to the dilemma which the paper itself raises for the authors and for all who want to find the way to peace.

The USA, Daniel-Squires argue, must take the initiative in an objective weakening of its own power position over against the USSR. Such weakening must, above all, not be phony. Clearly, therefore it must be substantial. But, they contend, this need not mean complete disarmament. Indeed, the USA will presumably be still so potent in a military way (what with the atomic weapons as to which it possesses the know-how and to the production of which it could return plus the military establishment which it still holds in reserve) that the first—and chief?—argument in favor of their proposal for unilateral action is that if Russia does not follow the U.S. example, it will be threatened with “early war, which it cannot win. . . . If the Kremlin refuses to match America’s move within a reasonable period, the hand of those Americans who advocate ‘preventive’ war will now be greatly strengthened.”

The U.S. will objectively weaken its position since its actions must be “unambiguously on the side of peace”; but the result of such weakening of its position is to be that Russia is put at a great disadvantage in the propaganda battle and the U.S. is left so strong in a military way as to be unquestionably able to lick Russia, if it “misinterprets” our gesture, in a “preventive” war which is very likely to come about and may even be speeded up because the Russians misinterpret—or interpret only too accurately?—what the U.S. is about.

I think that any move toward such a moratorium on the production of atomic weapons as Daniel-Squires propose would have a considerable psychological effect, and I am all for it. But I question whether the U.S. can both weaken and not weaken its power position.

One reason suggested for avoiding complete disarmament is that taking this step “would create a power vacuum inviting early Russian domination of all Europe.” But the threat of atomic attack by the U.S. in case Russia advances further in Europe either is or is not a factor in the power struggle and a deterrent to Russia. If it is, then removal of that factor may lead to a forward move by Russia and a softening of resistance to the Kremlin in Western Europe. If it is not, then on Daniel-Squires own showing the U.S. is not objectively weakened.

It is also doubtful whether in the economic field a partial, limited or gradualist transition can be made from a war to a peace policy. What would be the effect on the American economy at this jittery moment if atomic weapon production were suddenly curtailed and an indication thus given that the economy was probably going on a peace basis shortly?

The point of the various questions that I am raising is that I believe thoroughly in the thesis which underlies the Daniel-Squires paper, viz., that the way to disarm is to disarm. I think that what they are really proposing is complete disarmament—i.e. so far as any ability to wage modern war is concerned. They point out that if Russia accepted the American example, then we’d have to maintain the initiative by at once disarming further. It seems to me that the only logical answer they could give to the question, “But what if Russia remains recalcitrant and ‘takes advantage’ of our kindness?” is that in that case, too, we ought to take further steps toward disarmament to prove that we don’t mean war. If that is what we are setting out to prove, then war is just what we refuse to turn to *under any circumstances*.

Finally, one reason why Daniel-Squires do not come out for complete disarmament is, I surmise, that they believe it is too much to ask the American people to accept in one dose. But they are as a matter of fact asking the American people to make a great moral decision—to act unambiguously for peace, to stop threatening the Russian people and so on. Their observation that the threat of “preventive” war “could not be constructive if put as an ultimatum” is, of course, entirely correct and very revealing in this entire context. But if the American people are to “wage peace,” then they will have to be free from “ambiguity” and divided motives in their own minds and they will have to know the price they may have to pay. Therefore, the way to meet

their undoubted hesitation and questioning is to hold forth the possibility of non-violent resistance, not to suggest that we can make a motion toward non-violent procedure and still fall back in the ultimate extremity on atomic war.

A. J. MUSTE

Sir:

Messrs. Daniel and Squires are naive. The political kernel of their proposal is their *hope* that if the United States destroys its atomic bombs and plants, Stalin will be ashamed of himself and abandon his dictatorship. The Stalin regime cannot permit the kind of inspection and control they desire without relinquishing the dictatorship of the Communist Party—a dictatorship which instead of growing weaker over the years has grown stronger.

Anyone who has studied the structure of power in the U.S.S.R. realizes that this is a fantastic assumption to make. The only time Stalin *refrains* from aggressive action is when he is weaker than those whom he wants to destroy. The only time and place he acts aggressively is when and where he is relatively stronger. Stalin never takes chances. This is demonstrated by the factional history of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, by the domestic policies of the Soviet regime, and by its foreign policy.

Berlin does not disprove this generalization. When I was in Berlin last summer I learned from the best possible sources that the American military authorities had been aware of the possibility, before it happened, that the Soviets would impose a blockade on the city. The original intention of General Clay’s staff was to force that blockade with troops and planes and armored trains. But this proposed plan for breaking the blockade was vetoed by Truman. There is every reason to believe that Truman’s veto was known to Stalin—whose sources of information, as perhaps everybody is now aware, are excellent!—*before* he gave the orders to the Russian commanders to go ahead. As it was, he gave the orders gradually, first for one mode of transportation, then for another, until he became convinced that Truman would stick by the veto, especially in an election year.*

If we were to adopt the Daniel-Squires proposals, we would be inviting ten Pearl Harbors, or as many as Stalin has atomic bombs for. For once we disarm, he would be free of the only thing he fears—retaliation and failure.

Stalin cannot disarm for the same reason that Hitler could not disarm—it would mean the end of his dictatorship. I wonder whether Daniel-Squires would have made the same proposal to Hitler in 1939 if we had discovered the bomb then. My guess is that if Hitler had known we possessed the bomb, he would *not* have gone to war, mad and incautious as he was. And Stalin is *not* mad and far from incautious.

The nub of the whole matter is that Stalin cannot be controlled by a free public opinion in the Soviet Union because there isn’t any. Nor does he care a damn about free public opinion elsewhere.

I am *not* in favor of a preventive war because I am as confident as one can be in human affairs that so long as Stalin fears he will be blasted off the face of the earth once he strikes against the West, he will wait. We can see to it that he is never free of that fear. Even less than the romantic Hitler has he the demonic desire to bring the world down on him in a universal ruin.

Our own free public opinion can prevent the West from waging a preventive war. But there is no free public opinion in the U.S.S.R. and its satellite countries to prevent Stalin from waging a preventive war. But there is no free public opinion in the strategy is wrong. While the preponderance of power is still in the hands of the West—and Daniel-Squires apparently believe that it can be retained for at least five years—all efforts must be directed to spread a passion for elementary political freedoms among the peoples behind the iron curtain. There are many ways in which this can be done—not by governments, and certainly not by those businessmen of the Western world who believe they

* I recommend in connection with Stalin’s strategy a close study of Boris Souvarine’s book on *Stalin*, together with his remarkable newsletters *L’Observateur des deux Mondes*.

can do business with Stalin as they once thought they could do business with Hitler.

I speak in the first person only for purposes of expository emphasis. *Give me a hundred million dollars and a thousand dedicated people, and I will guarantee to generate such a wave of democratic unrest among the masses—yes, even among the soldiers—of Stalin's own empire, that all of his problems for a long time to come will be internal. I can find the people. . . .*

SIDNEY HOOK

REPLY BY DANIEL & SQUIRES

Hook tells us that Stalin never takes chances. This is not quite true. He never takes chances *which he can avoid*. Our proposal poses alternative, inescapable risks for the Soviet leaders: (1) weakening of their power by a real exposure of its role, accompanied by implied threat of an early war which they cannot win; or (2) weakening of their power by minimal inspection inside Russia. Our proposal makes it easier for them to accept the latter risk, in order to forestall the former. Stalin, like any other man, will take chances when he must—e.g., with the Nazi-Soviet pact—e.g., if the United States government carries out partial unilateral disarmament.

Does Stalin care about free public opinion? The American Communist Party, with its fronts, worthy causes, and progressive parties, exists solely to influence American public opinion. Stalin's letter to Wallace during the recent Presidential campaign, his current "peace offensive," the Wroclaw conference of intellectuals, and a hundred other maneuvers are known to Hook as to us. A nearly unanimous American opinion in favor of immediate "preventive" (i.e., aggressive) war would be a political fact of first importance to Stalin.

Can Hook have understood our proposal? Its political kernel is not a hope to shame Stalin; its aim is not to get him to abandon his dictatorship. That will be relaxed degree by degree only under the pressure of alternatives which appear less desirable to the Soviet leaders. An American step toward disarmament will pose one such pair of alternatives.

Hook asks if we would have proposed such a step against Hitler in 1939. Our proposal is made *now*, before all the mistakes have been made, before war is inevitable, before the U.S.S.R. has atomic bombs for "ten Pearl Harbors" (or one). Our proposal is made while military strength is still largely industrial strength and America could not make herself weaker than Russia even by total disarmament.

There are defects of method in Hook's argument even more disappointing than his defects of content: the polemical exaggeration, the inside dope, the anthropomorphism of Stalin-scaring, the simple demagoguery (if we are to take it seriously) of his last paragraph. Give him 10^3 dollars and 10^3 men—the request of every latter-day savior, with no word of how he or they will proceed. No inkling of the interaction of means and ends.

Hook's program for peace has two elements: (1) stay more powerful and keep the Soviet leaders intimidated; (2) spread a passion for elementary political freedom behind the Iron Curtain. The first element can be called political only in the sense that the average American gets his view of world politics by multiplying his own feelings of pugnacity and fright by a factor of a hundred million. We are for the second element, but wonder whether Hook takes it seriously himself. A hundred million dollars is less than one per cent of the Federal military budget. If we can have peace so cheaply, why not tell us more about it? And why a counter-proposal? Such a small item as this could be carried alongside anything or everything else.

As stockpiles of modern weapons grow higher, both Stalin and his scarers abroad will get *very* afraid. When that happens, they will all draw the same conclusion.

We too are frightened.

REJOINDER BY SIDNEY HOOK:

I do not recognize myself in the picture of scaremonger, demagogue and would-be savior which Daniels and Squires paint. Nor do I usually continue discussion with people who call names when they cannot answer arguments. But it is high time that scientists learn to think about politics instead of losing their temper, as well as their sense of humor, when their ignorance is exposed.

Daniels and Squires have evaded every point I made. The Acheson-Lillienthal proposals for international control of atomic energy—in which we offer to destroy our bombs provided only we have some assurance that bombs will not be dropped on us—requires even *less* of Stalin than the Daniels-Squires plan. Yet Stalin spurned it despite the fact that the USA is stronger than the USSR. What reasonable ground is there for believing that Stalin will yield *more* if the USA makes itself relatively weaker? The "implied threat" of a preventive war—we are told. But if Stalin can be moved to agreement by such a threat is he more likely to give way when the U.S. is weaker than when it is stronger? Even in its own terms, the Daniels-Squires plan simply doesn't make sense.

Daniels and Squires do not and cannot know whether Stalin has the atomic bomb or *something as powerful*. Yet they brashly assert that to-day "America could not make herself weaker than Russia even by total disarmament." This is irresponsible talk. Daniels and Squires, as they themselves confess, are certainly frightened—frightened plumb out of their wits.

Nor has my question about Hitler been honestly answered. But we know enough to answer it even if these two innocent scientists don't. Hitler would have regarded unilateral disarmament at any time as a golden opportunity to move faster to his goal of world domination.

Stalin does not care a rap for free public opinion, as the Moscow and Mindszenty Trials show. Of course, he uses the Communist Parties to influence public opinion in free countries in order to put pressure upon the government in *those* countries. But he doesn't permit public opinion in free countries to influence him. These are two entirely different matters and anyone who cannot see it should leave politics strictly alone.

One of the reasons Stalin is indifferent to free public opinion is that he thinks it is synthetically contrived, like the public opinion he manufactures in his own countries, and through his fifth columns, in other countries.

One final point. In making my counter-proposal, I explicitly stated that I was speaking in the first person only for the sake of emphasis. Yet Daniels and Squires sneer at me as a would-be "savior" who offers no word on how he would spend other people's money. Let me spell it out for them. When I wrote "me," I meant "us"—a group that can and should be organized some day among all the democratic elements in the West.

CONTRIBUTORS

Martin French is an American journalist who has travelled widely abroad. He has written previously in "Politics" under the pen-name, "Gallicus." . . . Paul Goodman is a poet, novelist and critic; his books include "The Facts of Life," "The Grand Piano," and "Communitas." . . . Kenneth Lynn was graduated from Harvard in 1947, spent the next 15 months in Europe, and is now back at Harvard working for a PhD in American Civilization. . . . Cuthbert Daniel and Arthur M. Squires both worked as engineers at Oak Ridge during the war, and both now live in New York City. They are currently seeking a publisher for a book they have written on the whole atomic question. Daniel is a consultant chemical engineer; Squires is engaged in development work on the production of synthetic fuels. . . . Lionel Abel, editor of "Instead," is now living in France. He has contributed to "Partisan Review," "Politics" and other little magazines. . . . Daniel Rosenblatt is a young writer now doing free-lance work in New York City. He has taught English in Detroit, and has worked in the headquarters offices of both the UWA and the NMU. . . . Mary McCarthy, author of "The Company She Keeps" and "The Oasis," has contributed to "Partisan Review," "Commentary," "The New Yorker" and other magazines. . . . Alvin Schwarz lives in Chicago; his novel, "The Blowtop," was published last year.

The Existence of Jews and Existentialism

LIONEL ABEL

THE modern Jew is concerned to know what being a Jew means. This is what distinguishes him, on the one hand, from religious Jews for whom this question was answered by their life in common, the Bible, the Talmud, and the expectation of the Messiah, and on the other hand, from the secularized Jews of Europe and America who were intent on becoming Europeans or Americans, and for whom the question did not exist. The religious Jew thanked God in his prayers for having made him a Jew, the secular Jew supported the governments of the democratic bourgeois states for permitting him not to be one. But the modern Jew who is estranged from Judaism, and has begun to feel himself an alien even in the democratic countries as a result of the virulent development of Anti-Semitism—for this Jew, who does not see the way clear to a condition of real non-Jewishness, the meaning and import of his being a Jew appears as a problem, and a problem of a very special sort: in a way, it seems to be a problem which cannot be confronted without having been already resolved, and in a way there seems to be no satisfactory resolution of it.

To say this is to say that the question of what being a Jew means, when raised by a Jew, is an existential question, since the one who is doing the questioning is included within the question. The Jew, asking about the meaning of his Jewishness, recognizes that he is being asked to reply, and his feeling of distress at not being able to do so satisfactorily is inseparable from his feeling that he must.

What is the character of his togetherness with other Jews with whom he has not shared a common life—a togetherness which, not realized in concrete beliefs and customs, is simply implied by the fact that he is—or can be called without contradiction—a Jew? What does it mean for him to be in a situation of such evident reality, but which he is not really in?

A MODERN philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre, has taken it upon himself to ask the question as to the meaning of Jewishness and to try to answer it. But let us note at once that since he is a non-Jew, the question has a different character for him than it has when asked by Jews. For Sartre, the existentialist, the question as to what a Jew is, is rationally formulable and thoroughly objective, and, at least in principle, could be answered by an analysis sufficiently subtle and concrete; whereas the same question, when asked by a Jew, even if one without metaphysical flair, has at once an existential character, and instead of being asked to be answered, has to be answered in order to be asked.

It would be unmannerly for Jews to be insensitive to the moral earnestness and generous spirit with which Sartre set about making their problem his, and I for one shall always admire in his *Anti-Semite and Jew* (Shocken, \$2.75), as in so many of his works, a quality rarer in contemporary writing than even Sartre's noted verve and intelligence; his zeal to make his mind available to others, and to make of thought, not just a display of cleverness, but an act of solidarity. In answering Sartre's answer to the

question as to the meaning of being a Jew, I'm aiming less at the pleasure of being right on certain points against a thinker of such vigor—to eliminate that pleasure entirely would be to destroy reflection—than at preserving the question itself in its integrity. I want to restore it to those who, if they cannot ask it as intelligently on a single occasion, must continue to ask it, and with their whole life.

Sartre's contribution has been to define the Jew as someone caught in what the French philosopher calls the *Jewish situation*. For the Jews are neither a national nor a religious group, they are not a race, and they are not members of a civilization alien to the West's; in addition to being Jews, they are Germans, Frenchmen, Italians, Europeans or Americans, Socialists or Communists. What makes them Jews is the fact that while they may regard themselves as other, others may regard them as Jews: "If they have a common bond, if all of them deserve the name of Jew, it is because they have in common the situation of a Jew, that is, they live in a community which takes them for Jews." And the fact that those who regard them as Jews are enemies, while those who disregard their Jewishness are friends, changes nothing. For the democrat is friendly to the human being which he takes the Jew to be, while the anti-Semite, for all his malice, takes note of the Jew in his Jewishness. However bad the motives of the Anti-Semite, and in his book, Sartre has described these motives in all their odiousness, yet it is the Anti-Semite who performs the magical transformation of the Jew who does not know he is a Jew into the Jew who does. As the poet, according to Heidegger, calls the existant to *be*, so the Anti-Semite, according to Sartre, calls the Jew to *appear* as such. Conversion to Jewishness, if not to Judaism or to Zionism, is effected through the play of Anti-Semitism: "it is the Anti-Semite who *makes* the Jew." And the Jew must be a Jew for himself because he is a Jew for others—first, because he has no alternative, and then, because he *ought* to be a Jew, ought to assume the burden of his Jewishness and recognize the past that it implies, which is not the same past as that of non-Jews. If the Jew is to be authentic, he must not refuse to be what the Anti-Semite insists he is.

FOR Sartre it is irrelevant to ask whether the Anti-Semite's insistence that the Jew is a Jew is true or false opinion. This is what is peculiar and novel in his discussion. For it might be argued that whatever the Anti-Semite thinks or says should not matter, and that what should matter is what happens in fact to be the case. The Jew should be a Jew if such indeed he is. But no, according to Sartre, the question as to whether or not the Jew is *really* a Jew is irrelevant, and the fact that the Anti-Semite persists in his opinion is what finally counts. So the Jew has the peculiarity of being a creature of opinion, and of the opinion of those who despise him, and who, in turn, are morally and politically despicable.

Yet on the other hand there are those who persist in not regarding Jews as Jews but take them for human beings: these, as we saw before, are the democrats. And the

question arises: if *opinion* is so powerful, if we *are* what others *call* us, then the Jew must also be a non-Jew, since the democrat takes him for that. Now Sartre might have held to his original position, despite this difficulty, if he had been willing to grant the validity of truth to the opinion most passionately asserted; he does remark, and justly, that the Anti-Semite is impassioned, while the democrat is simply moderate. And thus he could have justified his agreement, otherwise incomprehensible, with the view that certain physical traits, like the hooked nose, are Jewish, for he could have argued that they have been *made* Jewish, and that the Anti-Semite made them Jewish by *nam-ing* them such with passion. But Sartre responds to the difficulty, the point of which he sees perfectly well, by attacking the democrat not for lacking passion in terming the Jew a human being, but for being *wrong* in doing so. For there is no such thing as a human being, he says. This is an abstraction of the understanding, a structure derived from a life which has to be first of all concrete, with a concrete past, and definite historical connections. Thus it appears that the democrat is wrong to regard Jews as non-Jews, and the Anti-Semite is right to regard them as Jews. So that what finally matters is not opinion at all, not even the opinion most violently held, but truth, and with respect to the Jews there is more truth in the hatred of the Anti-Semite than in the democrat's good will. So we learn, in the course of an argument which began by asserting the opposite, that the Jews are Jews not because this is what the Anti-Semite supposes, but because this is what in fact they are.

But Sartre gives no argument to justify this shift in his position, no argument, that is, beyond the negative one that the human being is first of all concrete, and that if the Jews are not Jews then what are they? But the democrat does not deny that the Jews have some connection with a Jewish past. What he denies is that in the secular modern world that past has any very great importance. And what the Anti-Semite asserts, in a negative way, of course, is that in the modern secular world the Jewish past is of very great importance. Moreover, the Anti-Semite is determined to *make* the Jewish past increasingly important, whereas the democrat is concerned to make it increasingly irrelevant. I see no reason why on this point the attitude of the Anti-Semite can be considered more correct or closer to what is essential. And I see no way in which to separate what the Anti-Semite asserts as fact from what he proposes to achieve, nor what the democrat denies as fact from what he is bent on realizing. In other words, the attitudes of both the Anti-Semite and of the democrat are irretrievably ideological, and equally so. And there is no surer, clearer opening on being in the one than in the other.

MOREOVER, if the Jews are what they *were*, they are also what they will be. The democrat minimizes their past because he conceives of their future as non-Jewish, as does Sartre himself; the Anti-Semite maximizes their past because he supports a policy of segregation. He is interested in seeing to it that a time shall never come when Jews may not be Jews. Sartre apparently wants to combine elements from both attitudes, to privilege neither the past nor the future, to call the Jews to be Jews as the Anti-Semite does, though with friendliness, not with malice, and at the same time to envisage, like the democrat, their future assimilation.

But one wants to know how so paradoxical a view can instruct the Jew in a situation which he does not have

to be told is paradoxical: this he knows by his alternate fits of resolution and uneasiness, by his unhappiness in hope, by his assurance in distress. He is urged to join his past to his future, and he is informed that they are split; of this he was aware all the time, that is why he felt obliged to *choose* between Jewishness and assimilation. For how can the immediate prospect of a return to Jewishness have as its horizon the final liquidation of the Jews? Moreover, if the Jews have to be Jews *now*, aside from Anti-Semitism, simply because it is the human lot to be ethnically specified, why will this not be true in the *future*, when, presumably, Anti-Semitism will have been eliminated? Indeed, looking at the matter in this light, it would appear that the Jew's present cares are to be preferred to his anticipated disburdenment, and that the Anti-Semite's hateful cry of "Jew!" actually serves the one against whom it is hurled, since it seeks to protect, like a magic spell, against that barren abstractness of the "human being," which, according to Sartre, is so objectionable, and to which he is ready to consign all future Jews.

But it must be noticed that Sartre's *recommendations* to the contemporary Jew do not flow from the French philosopher's *description* of the Jewish situation as such, nothing else being presupposed. His contention that the Jew should accept the burden of his Jewishness and be responsible for it, follows rather from an application to the Jewish situation of the philosopher's particular values and pet ideas.

First of all, I think Sartre sees the Jewish situation in the light of the Resistance movement in which he participated. In that movement of rebellion, Frenchmen who were neither internationalists nor patriots, neither partisans of the Republic nor bent on modifying it, who affirmed no positive ideologies, risked and gave their lives and those of their comrades simply to say a collective "No!" to the values of the German occupying forces. History had thrust them into a situation which called for fighting a rear-guard action; unable to think in terms of the triumph of their values, they gave themselves over wholly to the aim of doing damage to the forces they were certain could not be right. That obstinate stoicism and strength of will, that independence of ideology, that minimum assertiveness of his comrades in the Resistance movement which Sartre has eloquently presented in his dramatic works, he sees as elements in the moral attitude proper for contemporary Jews. To resist, to say "No!" to Anti-Semitism, but to stay together as Jews, without being clear about the nature of this togetherness, without vindicating it ideologically as nationalism or Judaism, without making it intellectually reputable or justifiable, to be Jews out of defiance and not out of belief, in all the inexcusableness of a condition which is not to be perpetuated, seems to Sartre the most dignified and authentic attitude for Jews today.*

* Since I myself take this attitude—though I doubt whether it can properly be urged on other Jews—and since I have no objection to calling it "authentic," to avoid any misunderstanding, I must note right here that the *special distinction* Sartre makes between "authentic" and "inauthentic" Jews is completely unacceptable to me. For Sartre the inauthentic Jews are "men whom other men take for Jews and who have decided to run away from this insupportable situation. The result is that they display various types of behavior not all of which are present at the same time in the same person but each of which may be characterized as an *avenue of flight*." Sartre has presented a lively portrait, which, if somewhat conventional, is yet entirely free from malice, of such Jews, characterizing their special sense of alienation from their bodies, their practical reflectiveness, ambition, deliberate generosity, and passion for the universal.

THE fact is that many Jews have spontaneously adopted precisely this attitude, though there are many more who have tried to interpret their present episodic togetherness in more conventional terms. An example of this would be the attitudes of Waldo Frank and Will Herberg, who have tried to find something essential to non-Jews in the Jewish tradition, so that in sticking together Jews could justify their togetherness in universalist rather than in particularist terms. On the other hand, there was the directly contrary, and even less plausible—though intellectually ingenious—effort of Harold Rosenberg in the article “Pledged to the Marvellous” which *Commentary* published last year, to justify Jewishness (or was it Judaism? Rosenberg never made this clear), as something irrational and interesting, conferring upon every Jew a privileged relation to the “marvellous” and even to the “pathos of existence.” Now surely the Surrealists have at least as much claim on the “marvellous” as those Jews who are not interested in it, and it is hard to see what St. Augustine or Pascal could learn about the “pathos of existence” from any Jew since Job. And of course, by presenting Jewishness (or Judaism) as something *interesting*, Rosenberg was not really getting away from the universalism he wanted to overcome, but merely substituting a weaker, aesthetic universalism for the ethical universalism of Waldo Frank and Will Herberg. This was made evident when he remarked that the Jew is interested in Palestine because it is a landscape charged with meaning “like a

All these traits Sartre interprets as efforts to escape from or to forget about their situation as Jews—as though Jews had nothing else to escape from or to forget about.

But it is by no means evident that the above types of behavior are best or even properly understood as “avenues of flight.” I am afraid that here Sartre has yielded to the banal conception of “escape” held by the psychoanalysts. For the same human movement may be interpreted as a running from or towards something, depending on the *perspective* of the observer. The man who joins a revolutionary party will be said by his past associates to be “escaping” from his class responsibilities, but his new radical comrades will say that he faced up to the “realities” of the political situation. The author of *L'être et le néant* is perfectly entitled to identify flight from some “reality” with “inauthenticity,” but he might have recalled that in his celebrated philosophical work he demonstrated, and brilliantly, that inauthenticity may consist in trying to escape not *from* but *to* what you are, as in the case of the waiter who persisted in trying to *be* a waiter, even when there was no need to *act* like one. I can think of many Jews whom Sartre would *have* to call authentic, since they insist upon their Jewishness, and are anything but unaware of their situation as Jews; but if the French philosopher observed them as carefully as he has their opposite numbers, the term “authentic,” I suspect, would not come spontaneously to his mind.

Sartre writes: “The common characteristics we have attributed to the inauthentic Jews emanate from their common inauthenticity. We shall encounter none of them in the authentic Jew; he is what he makes himself, that is all that can be said.” And he declares that by becoming authentic the Jew “at one stroke” “escapes description.” But in that case, what does it mean for this Jew who has escaped “description” to insist that he is a Jew? For what distinguishes a people, as distinct from a collection of individuals is precisely accessibility to description. It may be that a “people” is by that very fact inauthentic, and that without inauthenticity there would be neither Frenchmen nor Americans, neither Irishmen nor Jews. But this is strange doctrine coming from one who has protested so strongly against the rationalists and democrats for their disregard of concrete regional and ethnic ties. Does not Sartre’s notion of the “authentic” lead as surely as the “reason” of the rationalists and democrats to the postulation of a purely abstract “human being?” In any case, the meaning he has given to the word *authentic* makes it self-contradictory for him to speak of an *authentic Jew*.

symbolist poem.” . . . On a more elementary level, there are those Jews who have become violent nationalists or partisans of Jewish orthodoxy out of an inability to accept Jewishness as a predicament rather than as an affirmation. Nevertheless there are those who confront their situation very much in the way that Sartre recommends.

THESE Jews do not even have as a justifying theoretical structure for their attitude the existentialist notion of the *situation*, of which Sartre has tried to make a general norm, and which he has applied to the Jewish situation as a special instance. The existentialist notion of the situation comes, I think, from Kierkegaard. It was he who pointed out that the characteristic of Greek thought was a movement away from existence and towards the idea, away from the situation and towards an intellectual transcendence of it. This movement was symbolized by the Platonic myth of the cave, within which one could not see clearly, and which one had to leave in order to attain real knowledge. But, said Kierkegaard, this was all very well for the Greeks who had existence to start with, and were really in situations which they wanted to dominate by intellect; but the modern individual stands in a very different case. Since he starts with the idea, his problem is to accomplish a reverse movement and attain to existence, his problem is to get into a situation rather than out of one. He needs to be caught and overtaken rather than to extricate himself and escape. The notion of transcendence postulated here is one of passionate entanglement instead of dispassionate discernment. The problem is not to leave the cave but to get into it.

Jaspers continued this line of thinking, making the point that there are situations in life in which the moral effort consists in actively trying to be ever more deeply involved. But he made it quite clear that this moral necessity to become ever more involved in a situation is not

RUSSIA'S "THIRD REVOLUTION"

The Complete Story of Kronstadt by Ida Mett

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intellectually justifiable and cannot be rationally urged on anyone. Only an exit from the cave is reasonable. If it is the *idea* that takes us outside, it is *myth*, or intuition, which leads us further in. If, for example, I, a Jew, am with people who do not know I am a Jew and speak scornfully of Jews, it might be that the proper thing for me to do would be, if not to let the matter pass without notice, to initiate an examination of what is implied by taking such an attitude towards Jews, and thus bring the others and myself, too, out of the murk of hostile assertion, and with them move towards a calm consideration of what can be truly said about Jews. But it might be that in a concrete case this would not be the proper action for me as a particular person, that I personally cannot spiritually afford such Greek detachment on a topic raising the question of my whole being, and that I, but perhaps nobody else, in this special circumstance, ought to push towards a conflict with the others, rather than towards a joint transcendence of hostility. But only I can know this. Anyone advising me would have to advise the opposite. In being right against such advice, I can only know that I am by some sense of what is personally required of me.

Sartre has made a general norm of this notion of push-

ing deeper into situations. This is what he means by the term *commitment*. And here, I think, is his great error. For commitment cannot be a general norm; one cannot rationally advocate deeper involvement; this amounts, to use the terms of Kierkegaard, to speaking for the paradox without passion. The idea of the situation, like all ideas, can only take one out of the situation. To penetrate deeper into it, myth is necessary, and if that be lacking, while yet one has a sense that a deeper involvement is required, then the only means of movement in a direction which cannot be called right by intellect, and has not been made sacred by myth, is through an experience which modern philosophers have called *anguish*, but which could be as well described as a rending of the mind, a horror upon the heart. And this experience can only occur at a point where it is impossible to be advised by anybody. Each Jew who accepts his Jewishness has to do it alone; to do it together with other Jews would be to accept the Jewish myths, and in the absence of the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, confronted by those who hate their seed, each Jew, unable to be told what he must do, has to determine for himself how he is to deal with his situation. That is why his problem is an existential one, and that is why he cannot be illuminated with respect to it by the eminent existentialist, Jean-Paul Sartre.

WHAT IS A JEW?

A Letter to a Minister of Education

(The following letter was written by Simone Weil in November, 1940. It originally appeared in "Etudes Materialistes" No. XVII, December 1947, a very interesting mimeographed periodical put out by Robert Louzon (Avenue Fragonard, Cannes (A.M.), France). This issue also contains a poem, "Prometheus," by Simone Weil, and an article by J. Pera.)

Monsieur le Ministre,

In January, 1938, I took a sick leave, which I renewed in July, 1938, for one year, and again for another year in 1939. When my leave expired last July, I asked for a teaching post, preferably in Algeria. My request was not answered. I very much want to know why.

It occurs to me that the new Statute on Jews, which I have read in the press, is perhaps connected with your failure to reply. So I want to know to whom this Statute applies, so that I may be enlightened as to my own standing. I do not know the definition of the word, "Jew"; that subject was not included in my education. The Statute, it is true, defines a Jew as: "a person who has three or more Jewish grandparents." But this simply carries the difficulty two generations farther back.

Does this word designate a religion? I have never been in a synagogue, and have never witnessed a Jewish religious ceremony. As for my grandparents—I remember that my paternal grandmother used to go to the synagogue, and I think I have heard that my paternal grandfather did so likewise. On the other hand, I know definitely that both my maternal grandparents were free-thinkers. Thus if it is a matter of religion, it would appear that I have only two Jewish grandparents, and so am not a Jew according to the Statute.

But perhaps the word designates a race? In that case, I have no reason to believe that I have any link, maternal or paternal, to the people who inhabited Palestine two thousand years ago. When one reads in Josephus how thoroughly Titus exterminated this race, it seems unlikely that they left many descendants. . . . My father's family, as far back as our memory went, lived in Alsace; no family tradition, so far as I know, said anything about coming there from any other place. My mother's family comes

from Slavic lands, and, so far as I know, was composed only of Slavs. But perhaps the Statute must be applied to my grandparents themselves, perhaps we must now investigate whether each of them had less than three Jewish grandparents? I think it may be quite difficult to get reliable information on this point.

Finally, the concept of heredity may be applied to a race, but it is difficult to apply it to a religion. I myself, who professes no religion and never have, have certainly inherited nothing from the Jewish religion. Since I practically learned to read from Racine, Pascal, and other French writers of the 17th century, since my spirit was thus impregnated at an age when I had not even heard talk of "Jews," I would say that if there is a religious tradition which I regard as my patrimony, it is the Catholic tradition.

In short: mine is the Christian, French, Greek tradition. The Hebraic tradition is alien to me, and no Statute can make it otherwise. If, nevertheless, the law insists that I consider the term, "Jew," whose meaning I don't know, as applying to me, I am inclined to submit, as I would to any other law. But I should like to be officially enlightened on this point, since I myself have no criterion by which I may resolve the question.

If the Statute does not apply to me, then I should like to enjoy those rights which I am given by the contract implied in my title of "professor" ("agregée").

SIMONE WEIL

Editorial Note: This letter was not answered. Almost two years later, however, on June 21, 1942, the Vichy Government amended the Statute on Jews so that it defined as a "Jew" any one with three or more grandparents "of the Jewish religion." It added, perhaps with a sideglance at the above letter: "Non-participation in the Jewish religion is to be established by proof of adherence to one of the other religious confessions recognized by the State before the law of December 9, 1905." Thus Simone Weil's free-thinking grandparents were put in their place—the Ghetto—by a Nazi-Catholic regime claiming to represent the country of Voltaire and Diderot!

NMU and UAW

Two Kinds of Union Democracy

DANIEL ROSENBLATT

THE two most democratic unions in the country are the United Automobile Workers and the National Maritime Union of America, both CIO. The UAW claims 1,000,000 members (the same as its wartime peak) and the NMU claims 50,000 members (down 150,000).^{*} Each represents a different kind of democracy, and, in my opinion, that of the NMU is the better kind. There are three areas of difference: (1) the environment and nature of the industries, (2) the personalities of the top leaders: Reuther and Curran and (3) the effect of (1) and (2) on the two unions.

The Sea and the Factory

On the one hand: the life of the sea, despite its restrictions on board ship of limited companionship, limited intellectual resources, limited freedom (outside of articles, the captain is the law) still offers a chance to go beyond the horizon, to abandon oneself literally to the winds, to be tempest-tossed. It still offers escape from shore and its entanglements of parents, wives, children, and all the impedimenta of modern middleclass life.

On the other hand: the factory worker bound to his plant like the serf to the manor. Rooted to one spot (unless he has the dubious value of being a migratory agricultural worker) he becomes provincial, regional. The factory worker is able to go to the movies with Mabel, bowl with the gang, play poker with the boys, watch the fights on the television set at the local bar, take the kids out to the country in the car. And there are always the papers, the radio, puttering about the house and sex to distract him. The solitude of a night watch, the silence of the sea—these have no place in such a life. Instead there is the noise of the factory (which is literally deafening) and the landscape of the slagpile—the modern city.

The nature of the work performed is also different. The sailor is a service worker. He transports cargo—whether human or otherwise—from one place to another and is part of the system of distribution. But the factory worker produces, and is thus at the very heart of the property system. He spends his energy when times are good accumulating other products. A car, a home, a farm, a family. The seaman is propertyless and in many cases can carry his total possessions or “gear” on his back in a dufflebag. He does not produce goods nor is he the ideal consumer at whom the market aims. The only seafarer I know who owns a car is called “Capitalist” by the other men. Mariners (whether merchant seamen, sailors or marines) are famous and

not without justification as being free-spending, improvident and all too frequently broke.

If the seaman is financially poor because of his extravagance, he is linguistically rich because of a similar extravagance. The language of the sea, in addition to its cant of hatches and poops and the oaths of the proverbial sea cook, is especially rich in trade union argot. The Anglo-saxon quality of *fink*, *hack*, *crimp*, *phonie*, *shapeup* and the verbs to *dump*, *beef*, *turn to*, *square away*, *weed*, *gas*, *tank* and *tee up* is unrivalled among unions, not excluding the outré concoctions of Hollywood crafts or the infant “video” people.^{*} Only in the underworld or among isolated rural groups is there a comparable opulence. So common is the word “beef” (in place of “grievance”) among seamen that one high NMU official, on those rare occasions when he uses the latter term mis-pronounces it as “griev-i-ance,” clearly indicating that it is for him purely a book word.

The occupational life of the seaman is fluid. He is not frozen to the punch press for life. Instead he changes his rating through experience and by successfully passing Coast Guard examinations. The next time he registers for shipping, he sails in his new rating rather than wait for a promotion to open in a plant or office or bureau. It is one of the few places in the twentieth century where nineteenth-century individualistic competition still prevails to some degree.

Finally, the nature of the nautical life is different from that of the auto workers. The complement of a ship is never so large that one loses his identity. Moreover since the ship is a community afloat, there is a diversity of occupations from messman to fireman-watertender to engineer to electrician to steward to radio operator to chef to a.b. to o.s. In the plant there are all the threats to individuality that Simone Weil points out so brilliantly in “Factory Work,” (*POLITICS*, December, 1946). The sailor cannot lose his identity, the worker’s is already lost. The sailor’s life is not atomized or fragmented while aboard ship. The men he works with are the men he spends his free time with. The term “shipmate” means more to the sailor than “fellow worker” to the average laborer. It involves more than a drink at the beer garden across from the plant after work, and thus the use of the term “brother” among seamen does not have the false ring it does among auto work-

^{*} The membership of UAW Ford Local 600 (River Rouge) is larger than the entire membership of the National Maritime Union.

^{*} Fink (Pinkerton man), hack (Stalinoid), crimp (non-union employment agent), phonie (fake), shapeup (method used to pick crew in pre-union days when men lined up in circle to be picked by boss who was later rewarded with a kickback); to dump (beat up), to beef (complain), to square away (fix up), to turn to (work), to weed up, tee up (take dope), to gas up, tank up (get stewed).

ers. The NMU stores a seaman's gear, keeps his mail, gets him his job, pays him hospital benefits, gives him free legal advice and when necessary buries him. Certainly these are functions of kin rather than of kind.

The attitudes of the union officials toward their old jobs aboard ship or in the plant indicate the basic differences between the two industries. A member of the NMU Research Department recently returned from a leave of absence which he spent working aboard a ship as messman; one of the NMU vice-presidents sincerely laments the number of years that have elapsed since his last trip and is seriously thinking of taking a leave for that purpose; Curran constantly refers to his shipping days with semi-nostalgia and his speech is saturated with the sea. In the UAW, however, the bureaucrats who have risen from the ranks rarely mention "the old days," as NMU officials often do. Unless one is politically or socially ambitious, the position as an elected official is not too much sought after in the NMU. In the UAW, on the contrary, elective position is an escape from the plant. Furthermore once having attained this refuge, auto workers lose their integrity in exchange for a promise of perpetuating their position, or are threatened, if recalcitrant, with banishment and exile to the production line. Economically the NMU bureaucracy does not offer the advantages the UAW does, and again the men competing for the positions are consequently much more interested in the job itself than in a *schmalzgrub* or a rest cure.

WALTER Reuther, the current president of the UAW, and Joseph Curran, the present head of the NMU, have only this in common: each has passed through the adolescence of adherence to the Communist Party and the Great Experiment. They differ in almost every other way. Indeed, in their physical, mental, emotional, cultural, and intellectual makeups, Curran and Reuther represent contrasting types that would have delighted Max Weber.

Curran of the NMU

The first of the many things that are impressive about Joseph Curran is size. He is six feet, two inches tall, large-boned and broad-shouldered. Every suit looks small on him. Physically he represents The Father and dwarfed beside him, every man a son. (In direct contrast to Curran is his treasurer who seems almost half his size, for which he compensates with a Napoleonic complex.) The next thing that impresses one about Curran is his remarkable face. It is the sculptured visage of an Antonine emperor; it is the deeply lined face of a tired clown. The large, distinct features are responsible for the sculpturesque quality; the more than life size head and outsize features recall the patriarchs.

Joseph Edwin Curran was born in 1906, the only child of an Irish-American family on the Lower East Side of New York. His father died when he was very young and his mother returned to her earlier occupation as a cook. Young Joe was boarded with a German family in Jersey. Here he completed only about five years of schooling. He helped the German baker for a time, and occasionally he still makes pies. At 16 he went to sea. At that time the

International Seamen's Union had just concluded its disastrous strike in 1921 and was barely active. Curran in time earned a bosun's rating and in this capacity earned the nickname "No Coffee Time Joe" because of his refusal to allow the men time off for coffee. During the early thirties he spent nights on the benches in Battery Park (he recommends layers of newspapers as an aid to warmth). Then came the founding of the NMU in 1937. Curran was elected its first president and has served in that capacity since. He modestly says, "If it wasn't for the union, I'd still be a goddamn, good-for-nothing bum. It's the same way all over the country. The Unions have made it possible for thousands of men and women to participate in decisions governing their own lives. Participation is what makes the difference."* Installed in those hectic days as president, Curran admits, "I was a tough kid."

Unfitted at first for the role, he yelled equally at the members and shipowners. Although he is more adroit now, he can still use his lungs to make a point. At that time, he found it impossible to dictate letters, but today he talks so fast that only crack stenos can keep up with him. His spelling has similarly improved. But his handwriting remains a schoolboy's script that suffers from overcapitalization, in contrast to Reuther's which is florid and nearly as large as John Hancock's. He enjoys spending evenings at home "in the bunk" reading. Generally he reads until one a.m. and usually takes more than one book as well as all the New York newspapers with him. His reading reveals the same catholicism as his vocabulary, which he has built up through studying the dictionary. (Because of his self-education his choice of words is sometimes erratic.) A single night's reading may range from Shakespeare to shaggy dogs.

Curran is informal in all his relationships. He is universally known as "Joe." The bulk of seamen's correspondence with him, many of whom he has not personally met, begins, "Hello, Joe." He is greeted by everyone in the same manner. When he is called Mr. Curran or Mr. President, he smiles at the joke or explodes with amiable anger, inquiring what the flatterer hopes to gain. In the NMU building on West Seventeenth Street in New York City, Curran spends most of his time on the sixth floor where the National Office is located. When he wants a few minutes from his desk, he is likely to stroll into the office of another national officer, casually put his feet up and bum a cigarette. Entrance to his office is similarly free (one newspaperman complained that any Tom, Dick or Harry could walk right up to Curran's desk). His private office is equally accessible when he is not present; during a recent World Series, a few of the patrolmen† of the port of New York gathered there to listen to the games, and when a

* See the three-part profile of Curran by Richard O. Boyer, in the "New Yorker" in 1946.

† Patrolman. A patrolman "patrols" the waterfront. That is, he meets ships when they dock, takes care of beefs that have arisen which the ship's committee has been unable to settle, collects dues, accepts minutes from ship's delegates, instructs men on union policy and such items of interest as elections or referendums that may be going on, brings Pilots (the union paper) aboard ship, accepts and if necessary prefers charges against members, collects for PAC, etc.

National Council meeting coincided with the last day of the Series, they periodically entered the Council room and facing the chair, from the back of the room held up the appropriate number of fingers to indicate inning and score. The patrolmen and members feel that it is their union, he is their president and it is his office, so why shouldn't they be there? Once Curran wanted to see one of the vice-presidents of the union, and instead of summoning him by phone wandered down the hall to his office. The VP was in conference and had the door locked. Curran, smiling broadly, with exaggerated stealth produced a pass key from his pocket. Silently he unlocked the door and then strode in, to the amusement of everyone including Curran himself. On another occasion he was at a meeting with the National Officers and, after trying to establish order, exploded with, "Shut up, God damn you, Shut up!" This was aimed at a man he likes and respects—but who kept interrupting one of the other officers.

Curran believes that, given access to all available information, men will for the most part make the right decision, and that it is important that they make the decision rather than it be made for them. Yet he is not above giving them a shove in the right (his) direction. Thus as the chairman at membership meetings in the port of New York or at the National Council sessions he is willing to spend the time that democratic procedure demands. He allows full freedom of expression (sometimes it goes to absurd lengths), defends his case, modifies it in the light of the discussion, and then submits it to a vote. Even when chairing a meeting with a compact organized minority of Stalinoids, he gives them equal access to the floor and insists that they be given proper parliamentary privileges. At a recent meeting, he deliberately called on his ex-chum Blackie Meyers who he knew would speak in opposition to his own policies. He also called on other well-known hacks and insisted that order be maintained while they spoke. One went on for a full half-hour; he was interrupted during his harangue at one point and Curran had masters-at-arms (burly seamen) carry the anti-hack bodily to the exit.

Curran's platform manner is completely relaxed. New garments cleave not without the aid of use and after ten years he now wears the purple of power with assurance. He is an able speaker. Talking extempore, he has a loud, clear voice and the ability to express himself simply and coherently. He pauses to think when he needs to, is completely at ease and uses dramatic gestures sparingly. His humor is refreshingly spontaneous and shrewd. Conversationally Curran at times delights in an intricate antiphonal pattern of question in affirmative, repetitive reply in negative, re-statement of question in affirmative, repetitive reply in negative, re-statement of question, proper answer. For example: "Here are some letters for you to sign." "You ain't got no letters for me to sign." "You can sign them when you have some time." "I ain't gonna sign them letters." "I'll leave them for you." "I'll get to them later." There are of course variations, and the response is by no means automatic.

Curran's ambitions do not extend farther than leadership of an amalgamation of the eight or nine maritime unions in America or a similar amalgamation of transport workers—land, sea, air. There are few indications of a longing for a more powerful role in CIO policymaking.

Here he is content to follow the lead of Philip Murray.

There is also little reason to believe he wants to run for elective political office.

Reuther of the UAW

Walter Reuther is short and plump. His face would be cherubic if his gaze were not so penetrating and his personality so hidden. He dresses like a smalltown business man. His voice is high, nasal, strident and irritating. His most outstanding physical characteristic is his crop of copper colored hair (in contrast to Curran's black balding pate), and he is known to friend and foe as "the Redhead."

Walter Philip Reuther was born in 1908, in Wheeling, West Virginia, the second of four sons. His grandfather left Bismarckian Germany for the greater freedom offered by America. Reuther's father settled in Wheeling and named his third son Victor after Eugene Victor Debs. As a boy, Walter Reuther imbibed populism from his father and piety from his mother. He won an award for approximately seven consecutive years of perfect attendance in Sunday school. At 18 he was fired by the Wheeling Steel Corporation. With his younger brother, Victor, he left for Detroit and the automobile industry. In addition to working in the plants, both brothers attended Wayne University, a big Detroit college combining the worst features of CCNY and NYU. By 1933, he had joined the Socialist Party, been fired by Ford, and received a degree from the academic factory. Thus armed, he set off with Victor and a few hundred dollars to complete his education—a trip around the world. The brothers visited Western Europe on bicycle and then settled down as comrades in a Russian factory for over a year. (Today even the Socialist days are glossed over in Reuther's press biography and his fellowtravelling until 1938 is mentioned only among confidantes.) The brothers then went to China, India, and Japan. Back in Detroit in 1936, Reuther proceeded to organize the UAW West Side Local. The first success of what was later to become the second largest local in the union was from a spontaneous sitdown strike at Kelsey-Hayes. Reuther presented himself as the organizer and was admitted only on condition that he end the strike. Once inside, he delivered an agitational speech urging the men to continue their strike and got their permission to represent them. Then came the famous sitdown strike of 1937 in GM, and the growth of CIO. After his break with the Unity (Stalinoid) faction of the UAW, Reuther during the Homer Martin episode was strong enough as president of the West Side Local to support neither Martin nor the Unity group. He formulated and led the "strategy" tool and die strike against GM in 1939 and became a Vice-president at about the same time. From here he fought to maintain himself against Addes-Thomas-Frankenstein opportunism and to consolidate his position. He climaxed his career by leading the exhausting 1945-46 GM strike with the themes of "a look at the books," "30% or else," "ability to pay" and "no wage increase if it means a price increase." Although he accomplished none of these, two weeks after the strike ended he was elected president of the UAW. Since that time he has cleared the UAW International of Stalinoid influence and concentrated on entrenching his position.

Reuther is notoriously cold and formal in his relationships. A teetotaler, non-smoker and non-gambler, in the best tradition of American public relations he posed after his election with a cigar and a glass of beer, looking about as nonchalantly wicked as a farmer at the Stork Club.*

Like the tabernacle that sheltered the ark of the covenant, Reuther's office is the holy of holies in American labor. It is also his permanent military camp. It is as hard for an ordinary man to get past his secretary as for an ordinary camel to get through the eye of a needle. His relation to his office staff is distant and abrupt. One feels he would be happier if they had no personalities or if humanitarian ethics did not demand that they exist. His relations with his team of hand picked right-hand men is not much better: he is superior and demanding, with little sociability.

Until this spring, Reuther continued to lunch on his now famous bottle of milk and roast beef sandwich (with no lettuce, mustard or mayonnaise). In his personal friendships he reveals a similar continence. He seldom sees his friends; he has no life or interests apart from the UAW and his immediate family. Plagued by insomnia, he may relax by going to the movies and falling asleep. Although he receives *Fortune* at the office (the magazine for executives), as far as I know he has no subscriptions to magazines at home and very rarely buys books. He never attends concerts, plays, exhibitions or lectures. In the December *Progressive*, Irving Howe writes: "Reuther eats, sleeps, and talks union; he is as close to being a political machine as any man alive today. He has forgotten how to relax and how to play; according to his own admission, he becomes bored when he tries to taper off by reading a mystery novel." Howe then suggests that Reuther has taken on the coloration of "The American business executive type: the personality of colorless efficiency." Yet these men golf, drink, hunt, gamble, fish, fornicate, collect stamps, guns, dog pictures, read detective and sport magazines and pursue hundreds of other harmless diversions in their spare time. But Reuther deliberately excludes these as well as more intellectually approved time killers. He literally has no "spare time," just as he has no personal life.

Reuther comes from the middle class, and he has not wandered very far from the old homestead. His German ancestors were Lutherans as well as Social Democrats, and he has been influenced by both traditions. Like Luther, Reuther believes in *Beruf* or calling, the gospel of grace through works and the importance of working within the existing framework or status quo. Even in his choice of a mate, Reuther is middle-class. Curran's wife was a waitress, Reuther's a school teacher. Both wives, incidentally, have red hair, but while Reuther tamely calls his wife "Mae," Curran raffishly calls his "Red". As a worker, Reuther belonged to the elite or the tool and die makers, who make the most money and who have as a caste always belonged to the middle class.

Reuther's prose, whether he writes it himself or not

* The editor in a marginal note asked in connection with Reuther's tectotalism what Curran's habits were. Dutifully I asked a member of the staff at the NMU and received only a derisive laugh to the question, "Does Curran drink?"

(he seldom does), is unreadable. His style is completely lacking in humor and human-ness. It is essentially Wallese: *The Good Things in Life, Full Employment, Full Production, Full Consumption* (all on a Huxleyian assembly line), *We Fight Today for A Better Tomorrow*. In the presentation of his ideas, Reuther is often guilty of deliberate distortions for the sake of publicity.

In late 1940, for example, he issued what became known to the world as the Reuther Plan. In it he claimed that the automobile industry was capable of producing 500 planes a day by utilizing only *unused* plant capacity, and that it could continue to manufacture automobiles. Two-and-one-half years later, the then public relations head of the UAW, Edward Levinson, and John Chamberlain collaborated on an article in *Harper's* which stated, "The 500 plane-a-day figure was ridiculous on the face of it, for certain key machine tools and skills that are necessary to plane production just did not exist in Detroit in late 1940." Nor were there enough trained mechanics.

Similarly, his demand in 1945 for a 30 per cent wage increase was in reality a bargaining position which he misrepresented to the press as an actual program. Although GM was able to pay the increase, it did not follow that he could get it or that he was serious about it. But the whole lib-lab movement followed lamblike behind, and for months discussions in Detroit were salted with statistics proving or disproving his contentions. Actually, like any popularizer, his presentation of an issue is too flamboyant. By attempting to vulgarize ideas to the level of a cliché, Reuther loses his point (he didn't get 30%, or even 20%) but is left with the rewards of publicity. Perhaps this sensationalism of the comic strip, the detective magazine, the western movie is an attempt to remedy the blank prose style. His over-dramatic plan for 500 planes a day while still producing cars, his expose of the Area-Bracket Racket, his "War Plants are not Expendable" pamphlet on Willow Run, his demand for a 30 per cent wage increase in 1946, his first words after being shot, "They got me, Mae," smack of the pulps and nickelodeons.

Reuther—like Henry Wallace—is singularly inept at press conferences. During the fatiguing 1945-46 GM strike, his press conferences often turned into peevish lectures by Reuther. He is much stronger at issuing press releases—the most congenial mode of expression of the modern bureaucrat. At the 1947 UAW Convention, one awed reporter gasped that the spate of mimeographed material and press releases was even more overwhelming than that at Lake Success.

On what then does Reuther's leadership rest? One factor is his monomania, already referred to. Industrious, energetic, single-minded, on the job 24 hours a day, he has shown he knows how to organize a political machine—and how to control it. The UAW hierarchy is now thoroughly bureaucratized. One of his pet projects is his Research Department, whose members are as busy as mice in a swiss cheese and about as productive. Gorging themselves on facts, statistics, percentages and indices, they live properly Spartan lives as they run from UAW headquarters to library to adding machines. One sees them, wan and haggard, darting through UAW headquarters on Their Search For Truth. (I understand that as a result of their study

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it has been discovered that we are now in the midst of a "hidden depression" over which there is an "iron curtain.") In addition, they manipulate compiled statistics for negotiations. One project headed by an Eastern professor recently backfired when the first results looked unpromising and was subsequently dropped.

One must also consider the character of Reuther's opposition. The clumsy Stalinists have succeeded in controlling only the electrical workers, among the large unions. And the unimaginative leadership of R. J. Thomas was bound to fall to either the right or left. Among the right in the UAW, there is no one with as much drive or intelligence as Reuther. George Addes, Reuther's foremost opponent on the left and ex-secretary-treasurer, now runs a bar in Detroit, and the former personnel manager measures out the drinks; R. J. Thomas is pensioned off with a vice-presidency in the CIO; Richard Frankenstein is now a manufacturer of auto parts and continues to write operettas.

Reuther's relation to Big Business is ambivalent. On the one hand he is personally repugnant to a lowbrow like GM's Harry Coen;* on the other hand, he is respected by certain segments of the industry for his efficiency and executive ability—two qualities any plant manager of the GM family might well envy. Reuther is thus hated for what he represents but is given a grudging recognition for his managerial talents. He has been featured in every one of the Luce publications but *Architectural Forum*, and some of his followers agree that the Redhead would fit well across the street. (The UAW office building, as reporters never tire of pointing out, is directly across from the General Motors Building.)

He knows where he's going, even though he won't say where it is. He means to be president of the CIO unless Philip Murray becomes content to be a figurehead. How much beyond that he will go depends upon the opportunity. A third party which he controls or a revitalized Democratic party under CIO leadership matters little (providing he is that leadership). In addition there is the dream of an alliance with the Labor Party in England, a Reuther sacred cow, to which the German Social Democrats and the French Socialists might be admitted as lesser partners. (One must not forget that Walter Reuther took

* See the excerpts from the stenographic record of the 1945 GM-UAW wage negotiations which were printed in Vol. 14-15 of *Twice A Year*. These excerpts are a document of the first importance for any one interested in the culture and psychology of the bureaucrats of both labor and big business. They show the two are more similar than is sometimes supposed.

a trip around the world and knows Europe.*) From this combination would follow domination of the UN (a perfect instrumentality for liblabial socialism) as a bulwark against Russia. In case of war . . . what happens to social democrats and socialists in case of war?

The Unions they Head

Since each man is powerful enough and has held power long enough to make any changes he considers essential, where in the two unions do we see reflections of these personality differences as well as of the diverse nature of the two industries?

The constitution of the UAW has 51 articles, 400 sections, and contains about 30,000 words, as befits the constitution of a large bureaucratic organization. The constitution of the NMU has 20 articles, 205 sections and contains about 15,000 words.

In the NMU, the election of all officials is direct. The officers are elected in a national election, and include the men who run for local port agent and patrolman. In the UAW, national officers are elected by the convention delegates, thus leading to more political maneuvering and the formation of cliques who control large blocks of votes. In order to run for office in the NMU, a member must have accumulated three years sea-time, which usually takes about five years to acquire. This assures the membership that its officials will be genuine seamen and not bureaucratic career unionists, a new social-intellectual class that is arising. In the UAW eligibility rests upon good standing for only one year prior to the election.

The only appointive jobs in the NMU (and there are a mere handful) pay \$70 a week and are hardly attractive to the bureaucrat or homeless intellectual. In the UAW, however, there are several hundred appointive positions which are well paid (ranging from \$70 to \$100) and offer sanctuary to "porkchoppers."

In the UAW, policy is formed by the National Convention and by the Executive Board, whose sessions are secret. In the NMU the policy is formed by the National Council, (whose meetings are open and at which a stenotypist is present to take down every word—a record which is open to every member) by the National Convention, and by the membership itself in national referendums on important issues.

Dues in the NMU are \$40 a year, in the UAW \$18 a year—both uncommonly low. Preferring charges against officers in the UAW is a long and complicated process (try reading that constitution for fun sometime) involving the consent of over fifty percent of the membership before a trial is possible. In the NMU, preferring charges involves only a member submitting a statement in which he accuses the officer of an offense. Under the UAW constitution, members may be fined not more than \$1.00 for non-attendance of meetings. In the NMU members cannot ship out unless they have their books stamped proving that they attended the membership meeting.

* Curran's twelve years of deep sea sailing in foreign ports are comparable to Reuther's *Wanderjahre*. It would be amusing to compare reminiscences of the two on Paris, Tokyo, Shanghai, and San Francisco.)

Reuther gets \$10,000 a year, the Secretary-Treasurer \$9,500, the VP's \$8,000 and the members of the executive board (regional directors) \$6,500. In the NMU, Curran gets \$7,800, the Treasurer, Secretary and VP's \$6,500 and the port agents \$4,700. Several hundred porkchopping UAW bureaucrats for whom there is no NMU equivalent receive salaries from \$3,650-\$5,200. Anyone while travelling for the UAW is entitled to first class accommodations and up to \$15.00 for expenses per day. The NMU also pays for first class accommodations and allows \$10.00 for expenses.

In the NMU it is all right to be a Cannonite, Shachtmanite, Anarchist, Socialist, Democrat and as Curran is fond of saying, even a Republican. (At the present time, it's not too good to be a Stalinist.) In the UAW you can be a socialist if you don't talk too much about it, but it's better to be an active Democrat. During the last summer at the Michigan CIO summer school in Port Huron, dominated by the UAW, a visitor from New York commented that the AFL offered more freedom and less thought-control since in that organization one could either be a Democrat or a Republican, whereas in the CIO one could only be a Democrat. Not only is political conformism demanded in the UAW, but one finds that the membership of the UAW is, on the whole, suspicious of the intellectual, the "college grad." A well-known novelist visiting Detroit recently complained that as he talked to UAW leaders he could watch the suspicion grow on their faces until he told a dirty joke. The head of the Education Department stated he was uninterested in having staff members who were geniuses. In the NMU, however, intellectuals are accepted as are all other misfits in our society. One more outcast, one more queer duck. The *Pilot* even carries some doggerel verse and pretentious letters.*

The members of the NMU feel close to their top officials and have pet names for them which some of the officers use in designating one another. Although not miracles of invention, they represent an attitude toward the leaders. Some of Curran's nicknames are: "No Coffee Time Joe," Curly (Curran's bald head), the Pope (his position as leader), Lunkhead (equivalent of dope), Chowderhead (the same), The Bull of the Woods, and Old Carpet Slippers. There is also Moneybags (the treasurer), Little Caesar (the same), Newsreel Jack (VP in charge of education—refers to his policy of visual education), the Lover, Crip (dim. of Cripple when he had an accident and used crutches for two weeks). In addition, many of the minor officials and rank and file are known only by such nicknames as: Snapper, Constitutional Joe, Fine and Dandy, Pork Chops, Soapbox, King Kong, Capitalist and Showboat. Outside of the Redhead, I do not know any pet names for any of the top officers or bureaucrats in the UAW except one or two that are used only by the closest intimates of Reuther, and have no currency aside from this group. I doubt that they exist. Instead one finds the "UAW Complex."

* As a true proletarian, the sailor is close to the Bohemian in spirit. In fact Greenwich Village has a large NMU contingent as residents, including one vice president and several patrolmen. The auto worker, however, is as bourgeois (i.e. "Philistine") in his cultural taste as in his way of life.

The men closest to Reuther's heart in the UAW are a group of non-elective officials who have—or rather, had—long records in the Socialist Party. (NMU officials tend to have CP rather than SP backgrounds.) It may be that the SP, because of its quiescent character, perpetuates adolescent zeal whereas the CP channelizes this zeal only to destroy it at a later date. At any rate, there is an oppressive air of history, a sense of destiny, a portentous aura at the UAW. As every move is numbered against an intangible day of Judgment, against an unwritten balance sheet, a mass neurosis develops. Joy, leisure and mirth become luxury commodities to be consumed only at the cost of guilt feelings, and to be expiated only with the compulsive return to routine. Before the frivolous, is always the stern Jehovah who neither drinks, nor smokes, nor gambles, nor eats, who gets to headquarters before anyone and leaves after everyone but the cleaning woman. There are also those sterner souls who follow the leader joyously. The UAW aims only at change from without. Everybody is so busy with the process of change (progress) itself that he has no time to think of its intangibles. And there is always the doctrine of works: if one has not changed from within, works command grace. Consequently we find the UAW officialdom making Progress as bees make honey, with about as much psychic enjoyment.

Members of the NMU are not discriminated against for race, religion, language, sex or politics.* In addition, the NMU extends equality to those deemed socially inferior for other reasons. A member may be re-admitted and permitted to ship with the knowledge that a psychiatrist has declared him mentally deficient, but indicated he is capable of performing simple tasks. The NMU constitution provides that if a member is sent to jail for union activities, he is paid \$15.00 per week while in prison. If he is detained because of offenses committed on his own behalf, when he is free he may reapply for membership, or if he has retired his book he continues as a member (except in specific crimes such as dope-smuggling on the job). The union upon request may write to parole boards and accept responsibility for the welfare of a member.

Melancholy P.S.: The Current NMU "Purge"

Unfortunately for the simplicity of the contrast drawn above between Curran's NMU and Reuther's UAW, it is now necessary to state that Reuther is handling the Communist problem much more decently and democratically than Curran is.

Both unions were long bedevilled by strong CP fractions.* Both Reuther and Curran were able to drive the CP fractions in their unions out of the leadership, and to

* Except for Stalinists, as discussed below.

* A "fraction" is a group within an organization whose main allegiance is to an outside organization of which it is a part (fraction). Thus the Communists—and the Trotskyists—in any trade union always form a "fraction," since they work for the benefit of their respective parties rather than for that of the union; if there is a conflict of loyalties, the parties come first. . . . A "faction"—often confused with fraction—is an indigenous group wholly within an organization which owes allegiance only to itself and to the organization. *Fractions* may join a *fraction* and may even capture its leadership.

do it by democratic methods: exposing the way the Communists injured the union in order to advance their political aims, and then defeating them in honestly conducted conventions. The difference is that whereas Reuther has continued to use such methods in dealing with the beaten but still existent CP fraction in the UAW, Curran of late months has more and more used devious and authoritarian tactics.

Thus the Curran leadership picked up the membership books of certain "Hacks" (Stalinists) "pending clarification of constitutional status," and only the courts forced their return. There was also an attempt to deprive Hacks of rights which the union's constitution gives to all members—and again the courts intervened. (Union democracy has fallen pretty low when members have to go to law to protect their rights.) At a membership meeting in the Port of New York on December 27 last, three leading Hacks were expelled and four others fined \$100 and put on one year's probation. The charges were deplorably vague ("participating in an illegal meeting," "anti-union activity," etc.) but the real scandal was the way the meeting was conducted. The report recommending these penalties was voted on as a whole, instead of each case being considered individually; contrary to established NMU practice, only one set of vote-counters—Curran's—was permitted,** and an *ad hoc* strong arm squad of Puerto Ricans, who had been promised membership books in return for their muscular services, was much in evidence. The Curran methods were all the more inexcusable because the platform of his own Rank and File Caucus, during the struggle against the Hacks, had denounced the opposition for (a) strong-arm methods, (b) denial of double-counters, and (c) refusing to allow voting on individual reports.

There are two superficial reasons for the difference in Reuther's and Curran's tactics: (1) Shipping has fallen off badly since the war ended, while automobile manufacturing has not; the result is that the UAW is as big as it ever was, while the NMU has dwindled so much that Curran is now faced with a financial crisis. (2) The CP was much more firmly entrenched in the NMU than in the UAW; for years it actually ran the NMU—in close partnership with Curran—and even today its New York fraction is around 300, which is more than its entire strength in the seven-times-larger UAW. The CP, in a word, is for Reuther only an irritant, but for Curran it is still a real threat; the former can thus afford democracy better than the latter. But this excuse, and it is at best a feeble one, does not explain the most recent NMU scandal: its treatment of its office workers.

The CIO office-workers' union (UOPWA) has long been, and still is, dominated by the CP. Since the office staffs of most CIO unions, naturally enough, belonged to UOPWA, this has given the Stalinoids a very strategic position in the CIO—analagous to the Ministry of the Interior in the satellite states. Thus the UAW office staff constantly sabotaged the Reutherites: refusing to run off mimeographed documents for them, to buy supplies for them, even to get hotel reservations for Reuther delegates to conventions. And thus, after Curran's Rank and File

Caucus had defeated the Stalinoids, members of the NMU office staff took home files and union accounts, "leaked" confidential items to the CP press, and otherwise aided The Cause.

Both the UAW and the NMU have by now cleaned out the Stalinoids from their office staff. But the Curran regime has gone farther, and has not only cancelled the UOPWA contract, but is currently behaving very badly towards its office staff—who are now completely non-Stalinoid. In January, Curran and his top officers handed down a new set of working rules which put their staff not only far below the UOPWA level but even below most unorganized office workers: cuts have been made in vacations, holidays, overtime pay, severance pay, maternity leave; employees are docked for absence, whether sick or not; seniority is to be by department instead of by shop; salaries have been downgraded, so that the NMU now pays about 10% less than private business does; job classifications have been reduced—except for the book-keeping department—to just three, thus frustrating the most elementary trade union demand: equal pay for equal work.* Although the NMU has won substantial wage increases for its members since 1946, it has granted no increase at all to its office workers; and now it is actually cutting them.

Nor is this all—or even the worst. Curran's regime has refused to recognize not only the UOPWA, but any union at all. It has told its office employees that the above new working rules are not subject to collective bargaining, that all grievances are henceforth to be settled unilaterally by the management, and that it proposes to deal with its employees individually and not collectively. The NMU at the moment, in short, is behaving towards its own workers like the most bitterly anti-union employer. Whether it can maintain this policy is problematical, since the CIO can hardly afford to permit so open a violation of its own basic principles by one of its constituent unions. But Curran is meanwhile making a heroic effort to imitate Tom Girdler, E. T. Weir, and Sewell Avery.

What seems to have happened is that the very personal qualities which make Curran in most situations a more democratic leader than Reuther—his warmth, spontaneity, directness, disregard of red tape and bureaucratic rules—in this situation have caused him to act worse than Reuther probably would act even were the UAW as threatened by the Stalinoids as the NMU still is. For the bureaucratic Reuther lives by a set of regulations which, if they cut him off from the needs and life of the rank and file, also inhibit him from going beyond a certain point in violating democratic and orderly procedure. And Reuther the Wallesian progressive, along with a lot of hypocrisy and liblab rhetoric, also has a general system of values against which he measures his behavior; the values are neither profound nor adequate, but they do exercise some restraining force. Like the British old-school-tie gentleman ("There are some things a chap just doesn't *do*."), Reuther "draws a line," and it is doubtful that he would ever violate the principles

* The three: clerk, stenographer, secretary. Cf. the 375 different classifications in the standard NMU contract, each with wage differentials depending on the type of shop and job. Thus on a ship carrying over 450 passengers, there are 56 classifications in the galley alone—22 kinds of cooks, 6 kinds of bakers, 5 of butchers, not to mention "toastmaker," etc.

** Voting at NMU membership meetings is by raising hands; both sides are customarily allowed to have their own counters.

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of trade unionism as thoroughly—one might almost say as innocently—as Curran is now doing.

Innocently—there is the clue. Curran is a primitive type, innocent of guile and innocent of the great modern sins of abstract ideology and concrete bureaucracy; but also, unfortunately, innocent of any general principles at all. He is, instinctively, a democrat, even a bit of an anarchist; while Reuther is, instinctively, a bureaucrat and even a bit of a fuhrer. When the pressure is not too great, Curran is "Curly" and "Old Carpet Slippers," the genial comrade and tolerant father who listens to every one, permits the enemy to have the last word, and wins by charm and persuasion. But when things get tough, when the heat is on, he becomes "No Coffee Time Joe" and "The Bull of the Woods," using a combination of force and fraud against the CP fraction, and denying his own employees the most elementary trade union rights.

The present situation in the NMU is tragic: the union which, more than any other big union in the country, has built up a real tradition of rank-and-file democracy is rapidly destroying that tradition. Complaints are increasing from veteran anti-Stalinists, who now find that any criticism of Curran's policies are likely to be met with cries of "Hack!" The treatment of the NMU office workers is becoming a scandal inside the CIO.

The only hope is that the situation is still fluid. The UAW, under Reuther's able leadership, has hardened into a "British type" union; nothing very bad will come out of

it—and nothing at all living or hopeful. A dead level of bourgeois-progressive mediocrity that will continue to mesh gears with society as it is today. (It could be worse, of course.) But the NMU is still in flux: it may degenerate into something like Joe Ryan's longshoremen or Dan Tobin's teamsters, or it may reverse the present trend and become something like the old IWW unions of the pre-1914 period: an indigestible element in respectable society, and a seedbed for freer human relations. Which course it will take will depend, in lesser degree, on Curran's own development: can he transcend his own Communist past, slough off the ruthless methods he learned in that school, and release his own instinct for democracy by becoming more conscious of basic principles?*

In greater degree, the NMU's future evolution depends on its own members: how deeply are they penetrated by the free and individualistic tradition of the sea; did they turn against the Communists because they favor democracy—or because Curran is their Leader?

If the NMU is not to degenerate into another bureaucratic American union, both Curran and the membership must realize that democracy is a two-way street—that it works for your opponents as well as against them.

* A reporter recently asked 19 prominent New Yorkers what the word, "liberal," meant to them. Only two declined to tackle the question: the chairman of the board of U.S. Steel Corp.—and Joe Curran, who said it was "too big a question to answer these days." (*N. Y. Herald-Tribune*, Feb. 14.) It's certainly too big a question for the Joe Curran of the last few months.

A Project for the Soviet Union Academy of Sciences

Instead of wasting their time on trivial matters like the atomic bomb, Soviet scientists should try something big: the Disciplinary Circuit. This would solve the chief problem in the building of socialism: the refractoriness of the human raw material. Murray Leinster, in "Thrilling Wonder Tales" gives a description of this device, from a future encyclopedia, which suggests its possibilities:

DISCIPLINARY CIRCUIT: The principal instrument of government for the so-called era of perfection in the first galaxy. In early ages, all the functions of government were performed by human beings in person. The Electric Chair (q.v.) was possibly the first mechanical device to perform a governmental act. . . . The Disciplinary Circuit was a device based upon the discovery of the psychographic patterns of human beings, which permitted the exact identification of any person passing through the neuron field of the type X2H. It was based on the induction of the alternative electric currents in any identified person. Circuits were set up in all cities. When a broadcast adaptation became possible, the system was complete. Every citizen was liable to discipline at any time. No offender could hide from the government. Wherever he might be, he was subject to punishment focused upon him through his individual psychographed pattern.

Utopian? Perhaps. But let the members of the Academy of Soviet Science take to heart Comrade Stalin's words, "In the bright lexicon of the Politburo, there is no such word as failure." Onward to the emancipation of the toiling masses, including the colonial peoples, the victory of socialism and the construction, in accordance with the principles of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin, of the Disciplinary Circuit!

Theatre

Sartre and the McCoy

RED GLOVES, by Jean-Paul Sartre; Mansfield Theater.

THE VICTORS, by Jean-Paul Sartre; New State Theater.

HOW you cling to your purity, my little laddie! How afraid you are of getting your hands dirty. Well, stay pure, then! What good will it do anybody and what business have you got with us? Purity is for monks and fakirs. You intellectuals and bourgeois anarchists simply use it as a pretext for doing nothing. Do nothing, don't make a move, hug your arms to your sides, wear gloves. Me, I have dirty hands. Right up to the elbow. I've plunged them in shit and blood. And supposing you could take power your way, what then? Do you imagine there's such a thing as governing innocently?" Half brutally, half tenderly, the Old Bolshevik realist is quizzing the fledgling secretary in a scene from *Les Mains Sales*, brought to New York somewhat altered under the title of *Red Gloves*. The moment is typically Sartrian in its combined harshness and good humor, its chattiness, its contempt for the untried and uninitiate, its swagger know-how and toughness. "Maybe some day you'll find out that I'm not afraid of blood," cries Hugo, the young doctrinaire, darkly, but his chief is unperturbed. "Well, well! Red gloves—how elegant. It's the rest of it that scares you. That's what stinks to your aristocratic little nose."

This is not a discussion of ends and means but a contest in authenticity. "All means are not good" Hugo has piped earlier in the scene, but the Leninist answered curtly, "All means are good when they are effective." Soon Hugo is stammering and Hoederer, pushing his advantage, is able to show him that he does not love men but principles. Hugo detests men because he detests himself; he is a destroyer, and his purity is that of death—an intellectual is not a real revolutionary; he is just good enough to make an assassin. And Hoederer, the Party man, loving the imperfections of humanity, its "beastliness," "vices," "hot, grasping hands" its poor naked hide, nakeder than any animal's, its anxious look and desperate struggle against death and anguish, can justify in its Name the seamy side of politics so that the rule of expediency (of adjustment, that is, to events) becomes an existentialist discipline, a condition of total "engagement."

Hoederer, the seasoned revolutionary, is the Real, Real Thing, and as such, he is the hero of *Les Mains Sales*, both in the French version and in the American one, against which M. Sartre has protested. The play, however, will be misread if this is interpreted as a declaration of political sympathy; it is merely an act of connoisseurship. Rejecting the older aestheticism, the discriminations of Flaubert and Proust, Sartre himself, in his preoccupation with authenticity, has arrived at his own aesthetic, in which the Authentic Jew is preferred to the inauthentic, the professional revolutionary to the amateur, the man who has been tortured to the man who has not been tortured (*The Victors*), and all this on grounds which are really those of sensibility—if Sartre in *Les Mains Sales* rates the Stalinists higher than the anarchists, it is because among the cadres of the Communist movement there existed in greater numbers that type of revolutionary worker which he described almost with idolatry in an article in *POLITICS*, June 1947. And the Authentic Jew, dimly enriching the background of *Anti-*

Semite and Jew, like some figure in an Oriental carpet, is assigned to no National Home; on his behalf, Sartre, so far as I know, has not engaged in any Zionist activity.

NEVERTHELESS, Sartre's is an aesthetic of action. Men in the world of doing are its objects and the task well done is gauge. Sartre's theater, like Shaw's presents itself as a classroom in which there is a constant competition for awards and honors; its situations are exemplary rather than dramatic. The characters are *answerable* to the playwright as if they existed in life. Even in hell (*No Exit*), correct behavior is demanded, and here, since no action, strictly speaking, is possible, an etiquette is substituted: eternity is a salon à la Mlle. de Scudéry. Etiquette, too, is the criterion of *The Victors*, and the professional revolutionary (the man who knows *how* to be tortured) is the one who acquits himself best. Since living in Sartre's world is a vocation, the trained man naturally has the advantage. In *Red Gloves*, the professionals—Hoederer, Olga, the woman revolutionary, and the Regent—constitute a tacit elite, from which Karsky, the Social-Democratic windbag, Hugo, the bourgeois trying to escape his origins, and Jessica, his doll-wife, are excluded. Hugo, indeed, throughout the play, is trying to gain entrance to this charmed circle by becoming the murderer of Hoederer. At the end, however, he is still conscious of shortcoming: "Louis, Hoederer, you," he tells Olga sadly, "belong to the same kind. The good kind. . . . I'm the only one who's come to the wrong address." This tense atmosphere of judgment and comparison, this dour precision of measurement which estimates a man with finality by the laws of success or failure—a practice hitherto confined to the "real" world this side of the proscenium—creates in an audience an anticipation of social direction which Sartre, like Shaw, encourages while perpetually evading.

Sartre's intelligence, his positive tone, his self-assurance, his position in the world of ideas, his inveterate topicality all seem to promise answers to questions of the day; yet Sartre's drama, at best, like the lectures of a clever professor, remains merely "provocative." Lynch law, torture, the resistance, ends and means, issues of the soul and of society, figure in Sartre's work as so many learned allusions, bearing witness to a ranging mind and a fluency of citation. Despite its crudities and its horrors, Sartre's theater is at bottom polite. Like the best conversation, it avoids the barbarity of statement. It touches but does not rest, glides, pirouettes, dips. In short, by a paradox, it is precisely what one would not expect from the author of a doctrine of commitment. And, in this connection, M. Sartre's quarrel with the New York producers of *Red Gloves*, whom he first accused of making the play too anti-Communist and then (revised suspicion) too pro-Communist, becomes almost comically apropos. The play is in fact a triumph of equivocation. It takes no stand whatever (not even a neutral one) on the Communist question, while going through all the motions appropriate to an act of judgment. That question is at the center of attention and yet it is not there at all; it has vanished when seemingly most present, like the coin in a magician's act. In full view of the audience, a concrete and ponderous issue has become a deceptive appearance; the depth of the author's inquiry is an illusion of perspective.

These *trompe-l'oeil* effects are a kind of professor's coquetry. *Les Mains Sales* seems designed to unsettle the mind, to irritate and dissatisfy not only the committed person but also the person in search of commitments. A game and a mystification, an exercise in reversals, it has ended

by confusing M. Sartre himself, who, like the ingenuous spectator he predicates, has leapt unguardedly to a conclusion and found the ground cut from under him—the “distortions” of Jed Harris and Jean Dalrymple have nothing to do with Communism. Stupid cuts have been made here; the New York Hugo is more colorless, the New York Jessica more vapid than inauthenticity demanded. A worse play has resulted but not a weighted one. For if Hugo’s pathos is more vibrant in the French version, this does not constitute an endorsement of his political ideology (as a critic in the *Nation* seems to think). Far from it, in fact: one-third of Hugo’s pathos derives from his ideological impotence. He cannot act, he cannot make love, he cannot think. He can only feel a torturing envy of those who are capable of these things: “It must feel good to be in your skin,” he tells Hoederer, in a typical thrust of abjection which calls to mind Sartre’s other damned soul, the inauthentic Jew, who is not at home in his own body. And to sympathize with Hugo, and all the other young men like him, in their worm’s-eye view of a crushing and rejecting world, is by no means an act of political solidarity—one can feel for King Charles without being a royalist and even for Hitler in the bunker.

The cutting and sleazy casting of the parts of Hugo and Jessica does, however, impair the functioning of the play as a theatrical mechanism, for the ingeniousness of the original is in the mouse-trap construction, with ideas providing the bait, which the audience swallows, only to find itself caught in the steel grip of one of those cruelly timed and sardonically efficient plots so popular in the age of inventors, with Maupassant and O. Henry. The play, in this aspect is a jest at the expense of the young secretary, a practical joke devised by the meaningless cunning of destiny, which seems to take a personal interest in thwarting the attempts of obscure people to give their actions significance.

Beginning with a young man’s resolve to shoot his Party chief in the name of abstract principle, the play, on this level, tells of the weakening of that resolve and the slow loss of conviction, till uncompromising hostility melts into dependent love, and the would-be assassin, bewailing his weakness in argument as well as in action, turns to his proposed victim for comfort and manly solace. Finding his wife a few moments later in the arms of this magnetic opponent, he knows himself thrice defeated and shoots him out of envy, jealousy, and disappointment. After his release from prison, he finds that the Party line has changed. Hoederer’s policy has become the official one—orders have come through from Moscow, and even his own faction, which acted against Hoederer on its own initiative when Moscow was unavailable for directives, has hastily fallen into line. The murder is being attributed to the work of a German agent (Hugo himself, slandered), and Hugo, deprived of the meaning of his sole action in life by this shift, chooses death to survival in the Party.

NOW if the play is seen simply as this human story, the change in the Party line has no other function than to illustrate the irony of fate. An action suddenly turned upside down, like a pitcher, and emptied of its rationale—this is an old fluke, very much to the taste of Maupassant (see *The Necklace*) and O. Henry (see *The Gift of the Magi*). No objections to Communist strategy can be inferred from it; at most, there is a wry comment on the instability of political affairs.

Hugo, however, is more than destiny’s plaything. He is offered, quite openly, as a sample of the kind of thing to be expected from “sincere” critics of Communism, and

this sample, this poor flimsy piece of human material, is tested on the stage by every method known to the author’s tactile sensibility. Stretched, squeezed, fingered, the unfortunate piece of merchandise quickly gives up its secret, the damning facts of its biography. Hugo is *known* in all his infantile feeding problems, his guilty self-admiration, his intimate failures with women; and this clinical expose has supposedly, an illustrative force, as though idealism (as opposed to realism) had been convicted of being a poor little rich boy that carried pictures of itself in a suitcase. The *argumentum ad hominem* has never in intellectual dispute been more frankly undertaken, especially since Hugo’s inadequacies are not seen to stem from the position he espouses but in fact to have *caused* him to take the position he does, so that a principled criticism of Communism is shown to be merely the end-product of an assortment of biographical data. With Hoederer, the case is the opposite. His outlines are broad and ample—a great geniality, a capacity for work, a vague colorful history, an active and resourceful mind. The big flexible man is a future, the rigid boy is a past. Hoederer *exists* on the stage in all his abounding vitality, but where Hugo as idealist is made to answer for every detail of his short personal history, Hoederer as realist is exempted from particulars. The man of power is excused, by Sartre’s methodology, from the necessity of accounting for the thirty years of history in which he, as Stalinist bureaucrat, has played a decisive part: no episode in Bolshevik annals, from Kronstadt to the Hitler pact, receives mention on the stage. The court of Sartre’s theater, like the courts of class society, has one law for the powerful and another for the weak. The principled issue becomes dependent on the establishment of credentials.

The martyred workers, Hugo ventures, who were shot down by the Regent’s police, will they not reproach us for betraying them? (Hoederer, head of the Illyrian party in the year 1943, is bargaining with the Regent of that Nazi satellite state to enter a coalition government and conclude a peace with the Soviet Union; the analogy is with Hungary.) “F—the dead!” exclaims Hoederer. “They died for the Party and the Party can make its own decisions. My politics are for the living.” And he goes on to explain, more gently, that his policy will save lives by shortening the war: human life is precious to him, just as the capture of power is a dream too dear to be risked by premature action. “Would you blot out a hundred thousand lives with a single pen-stroke?” he inquires, and Hugo answers, chokingly, “The revolution is not made with flowers. If they must die. . . .” “Well,” Hoederer prompts him. “Well, so much the worse!” His tone is defiant, and now Hoederer has him. “You see?” he elucidates. “You see? You don’t love men, Hugo.”

With that blurted admission, the idealist defense collapses. The fact that Sartre himself has appointed this advocate is forgotten, and it appears as though the playwright, having conscientiously searched for a true visionary, could only discover a killer. Since no other quarter is heard from (characterization also disposes of the Social Democratic functionary), the audience is convinced, half against its will, that Hoederer is right. Like Hugo, it has been *fascinated* by a power virile enough to make it doubt its own truths; it lets itself be seduced by the caress of experience. The scenes mounting persuasively to the climax have an erotic cadence. When Jessica finally offers herself (“You are real, you are a real man of flesh and bone, I am really afraid of you and I think that I love you for real”), the audience is experiencing on a political

level this same sweet pliancy and abdication of judgment.

In the epilogue, the spell is broken. Hoederer's policy, without Hoederer, has lost some of its appeal. In the daylight of two years later, it seems a little shabby, just as the Truman administration seems somehow lacking in magic to the "progressive" followers of Roosevelt. And yet it is precisely the same; only the man is missing. Why, if it was right before, should it be wrong now? Do not the ends still justify the means? For some people, Sartre would appear to say, but not for others. For the Hoederers anything is justified, for they themselves are the means, if not perhaps also the end. The means, the end, and the man are inseparable. The problem, therefore, does not exist, or rather it exists anew in every place, at every instant, and so cannot be discussed abstractly. A dramatic fiction named Hoederer was during his brief hour on the stage a law unto himself; he was killed and his propositions died with him; it is idle to question them now. This, in effect (to invoke the practical world), would seem to be an elegy on Leninism or on Lenin's personal characteristics. If Lenin had lived. . . . As to Stalin's relation to Lenin, inheritor or betrayer, parricide or priest—ah, the author seems to say, that is a tantalizing question!

MARY MCCARTHY

Is Vyshinsky a Traitor?

—a "Politics" Exclusive!

EDITOR'S NOTE: *The following document, which has just come into our hands from a refugee newly arrived in this country, is of special interest because of the recent elevation of Vyshinsky to the post of Foreign Minister. It is the text of an editorial which appeared in the September 31, 1948, issue of Prod nam Livornik! (Forward with Justice!), the official organ of the Academy of Soviet Jurisprudence. Vyshinsky was able to have the issue recalled and made into pulp for the Soviet Shoe Trust, but a few stray copies survived. Our correspondent—who, by the way, made his escape from a Siberian labor camp after his conviction on a charge of erasing mustaches from portraits of Stalin in the Moscow subway—vouches for the authenticity of the following text.*

ON THE TRAIL OF A MENSHEVIK WRECKER!

We call the attention of Comrade Stalin, the founder and beloved protector of Soviet jurisprudence, to the following statement by A. Y. Vyshinsky in the new edition of his standard textbook, *The Theory of Court Evidence in Soviet Law*: "Soviet judges, just like judges everywhere—if the court and its role are properly organized—are not expected to make law but to administer justice in conformity with the existing law."*

Exactly what does Comrade Vyshinsky mean by "just like judges everywhere"? Obviously, this includes the pluto-fascist-reactionary United States. So we have a leading

* CF. "Soviet Press Translations" (U. of Washington, Seattle), Jan. 1, 1948, for a review from *Izvestia* which, by coincidence, quotes this very passage, though without apparently realizing its traitorous implications. A translation of the whole book, incidentally, has just appeared in this country.

Soviet personality slavishly putting the people's courts of our Soviet land on the same plane as the corrupt and rotten pluto-fascist-reactionary courts of the world center of imperialist warmongering! What about the Scottsboro case? What about Sacco and Vanzetti? What about such notorious frame-ups as the execution of Major André and the condemnation *in absentia* of the great American patriot, Benedict Arnold? Is Comrade Vyshinsky in his mad-dog petty-bourgeois frenzy willing to defend also *those* instances of bourgeois class justice?

Nor is this all, beloved Comrade Stalin, founder and protector of Soviet jurisprudence. No, this cunning snake's trail of anti-popular trickery leads us into even murkier depths. What are we to make of the word "if" in the above quotation? The word "if" in the above quotation can have only one meaning. That meaning is that even in such pluto-fascist-reactionary countries as the United States it is possible for the corrupt and rotten courts to be "properly organized." How many times, beloved comrade Stalin, founder and protector of Soviet jurisprudence, have you warned us of the danger of yielding to the corrupt and rotten influence of the decadent West!

To cover up his hyena-tracks, Comrade Vyshinsky interlards his wrecker's work with hypocritical denunciations of "rotten bourgeois jurisprudence." This is not the first time he has used such cunning tricks! In the Moscow Trials, Comrade Vyshinsky masqueraded as the chief prosecutor, but he was secretly in the pay of the Bukharinite-Trotskyite-Hitlerite wreckers who were masquerading as defendants. How else explain the great damage which those trials did to Soviet prestige abroad? He continued his wrecking activities at the United Nations, where he pretended to present the point of view of our glorious Socialist fatherland, but sabotaged so successfully as to isolate our beloved Soviet Union in a tiny minority in that witches' den of pluto-fascist reaction.

Is there any other possible explanation for these criminal actions of the wrecker and saboteur, Comrade Vishinsky? No, there is no other possible explanation for these criminal actions of the wrecker and saboteur, Comrade Vyshinsky.

Finally, A. Y. Vyshinsky was a member of the Menshevik Party in 1912.

DEATH TO THE HIRELING OF PLUTO-FASCIST-REACTION, A. Y. VYSHINSKY! LONG LIVE THE GREAT AND BEAUTIFUL SOVIET UNION! LONG LIVE OUR BELOVED COMRADE STALIN, THE FOUNDER AND PROTECTOR OF SOVIET JURISPRUDENCE!

PACIFISM: THE LENIN LINE

A Marxist-Leninist cannot be a pacifist. Pacifism is a petty-bourgeois illusion, spread by the imperialists and their agents to lull our watchfulness. . . . Memories of the recent war are still alive in the masses, who flee from them in the most primitive manner and who do not want to hear about arms and armies. They make no distinction between just and unjust wars. Our party will extirpate these pacifist remnants.

—G. Palffy-Osterreicher, Chief Army Inspector of Hungary, as quoted by "Worldover Press" recently.

The Case for Pacifism

THE difference between the pacifist and the self-styled left or liberal exponent of war against the USSR lies essentially in the relation of each to what I would call *the category of the other man*. The pacifist holds the Christian view of the enemy, that is, of the enemy in his human essence, or the neighbor become foe. The advocate of war believes that the Russians are so brutalized by battle and totalitarian constraints that no human appeal can soften their drive and, consequently, that the Christian view of the enemy (whose humanness is addressed through the act of turning the other cheek) has no relevance here.

According to the advocates of war, the USSR is strictly speaking not as an enemy at all, since the term enemy presupposes a consciousness of oneself as object. In this sense, the Soviets are merely a force in whose path one happens to stand. Whether one is threatened as a result of the decisions of men (the Soviet leaders), or by some purely natural upheaval such as a flood or an earthquake makes little difference since, in either case, it is not specifically but only incidentally oneself who is threatened.

This is not to hold that in not being an enemy, but the agents of some impersonal force of nature, all Russians are inhuman. The advocates of war are certainly ready to grant the possible good intentions of the individual Russian soldier, but since the latter is in no position to win a pacifist victory in the USSR, he will most probably have to fight against us. Since, however, he will be attacking not us but the place and situation in which we happen to stand, his humanness too is extrinsic to the situation. The reverse is also true. If we kill Russian soldiers, it is only incidentally, in the act of seeking to avert the blind menace of the configuration USSR which is about to destroy us with the supreme impersonality of an earthquake. The pacifist charge that killing is immoral and will lead to inhuman and undesirable ends is therefore not applicable here. Killing is immoral when one man deliberately slays another and not when, in the effort to prevent a natural catastrophe, men are killed by what is finally an accident of situation.

Thus, calling for an all-out struggle against the Russians does not involve the *intention* of killing other men. Our intentions are concerned with the destruction of the Russian means for waging war, such as armies, industries, lines of communication, and so forth. Undoubtedly this will mean the bombing and shooting of Russian soldiers and civilians who happen inadvertently and much to our regret to be men also. In a case where killing is merely an accident of situation, morality is beside the point.

It would seem that the "left" and "liberal" opponents of pacifism have taken the human elements into consideration as much as the difficulties of the situation will permit. They are clearly opposed to conducting a war against the Russian people whom they do not regard as anything other than victims of circumstance like themselves; they are against needless killing and strenuously speak out against the barbaric and inhuman demand for "unconditional" surrender. I quote from the postscript to Calder Willingham's letter in the previous issue of *POLITICS*:

"At present, the only possible stand-point, it seems to me, is one of calling for all-out economic and political resistance to Stalinist aggrandizement, and should this fail, the demand should be for military attack, for the destruction of Soviet communications and war industry, ac-

companied by a message to the Russian people guaranteeing them freedom and peace when they overthrow the Stalinist bureaucracy. This is very different from the prospect of mass atomic attacks on the Russian population, demands for "unconditional" surrender, a final mass invasion of Russia. . . ."

Apparently, the pro-war position combines the virtues of morality, reason and practicality as compared to the unreal and contradictory aims of pacifism. But this is to overlook the basic psychological misconception involved in distinguishing the shooting of the chance human agents of some "natural catastrophe" from the slaying of man by man. The consequences for ethics are vital and it is precisely from the ethical inadequacies of its attitude toward killing that the anti-pacifists arrive at a romantic and unreal view of the nature of total war. The peculiar relationship to the category of the other man in which war is justified by transforming the enemy into not-enemy is crucially amoral and inhuman. For if we accept the fact that the Russian soldier is not essentially our enemy because he no more aims to kill us than we him, then it can only be concluded that morality too is incidental, not just in this situation but in *all* situations. Because the fact is that *no man can ever kill another without first making him into something else*. If it is true that the man we kill is, as regards intention, not a man but a Russian soldier, then it is equally true that we *never* kill a man, but a criminal, a lunatic, a rival, an anti-Christ, or whatever the role happens to be in which his situation presents a man.

When one man appears before another as subject to subject, it is because an act of transcendence has occurred which, in going beyond the situation, also goes beyond the possibility of killing, since killing involves precisely a relation of subject to object. But, it may be argued, the pro-war position is derived only out of the insolubility of the problem by other means and even in the prosecution of the war as Willingham states in the section of his letter quoted above, the essential humanity of the Russians is not disregarded.

What can be questioned here is whether the situation actually is insoluble or only threatens to become so. For if the situation is, indeed, insoluble *now*, then any concern for the essential humanity of the Russians becomes, in actual practice, impossible. War as it must be conducted in today's atomic world is total war and requires an absolute justification, in other words, a moral one. Anything short of absolute commitment cannot possibly compensate anyone for the sacrifice of the certainty of the present moment. Otherwise commitment to the war effort will remain equivocal owing to the desire to cling to all that the present guarantees as against whatever dubious goods may be achieved in a victory over the enemy. This is why total war must have absolute aims which transcend the certainty of the moment. Such a war therefore must be represented as the struggle of absolute good against absolute evil. There can be no partial victory. It must be absolute. Thus, to advocate war means, despite humanitarian avowals to the contrary, to involve oneself in supporting absolute or unconditional surrender! Can one imagine anything else after the executions of the defeated German and Japanese leaders?

From the above, however, it follows that the situation has not yet become insoluble. The war is not now a total war, the moment not yet having arrived in which the requirements of the struggle demand each individual's total enlistment. Although many regard the war as hav-

ing already started, this cannot be so. There are limits to our commitment in the present "cold" war and consequently mediation is still a possibility. The pacifist seeks therefore to direct his efforts toward preventing the coming of that moment in which the conflict becomes absolute, by not now or *ever* allowing this moment, this *now* to be gambled away for *that* moment. He does this by continuing to act out of the concept of the enemy as neighbor, that is, him through whom he recognizes himself *no matter how his situation may present him*. For a man to know himself, he must recognize the other man wherever and whenever he happens to appear. The act of killing which makes the other man into something else is therefore a turning away from his own self. So no matter how heavily the probabilities are weighted against him, the pacifist acts out of the certain conviction that the conflict is *never* insoluble at *this* moment. Having faith in his human ability to choose, he cannot accept a situation in which his choice can no longer operate so that he himself ceases to exist.

Stated differently, if the situation is conceived of as insoluble by any means short of war, then presumably one must commit the present moment to the exigencies of tomorrow and take a stand for war. But in the complexity of the modern world, is it possible to predict the consequences of any political act, no matter how astutely reasoned, when even the random idiocies of a Truman may turn out to be as effective as anything else? The history of all recent political decisions and their consequences is the pacifist's license to abandon all practical anxiety and take his stand in the certainty of the moment. For if nothing can be reasoned for the future, then this moment contains all possibilities.

At the fall of Syracuse, Archimedes, intent on finishing a geometric problem and not even aware of the invasion of the city, paid no attention to the exhortations of the Roman soldiers and was consequently stabbed to death. It can be assumed that had Archimedes fought the Romans, he would have been killed anyway, in addition to which, his last hours would certainly have been wasted.

The pacifist takes his stand in the now. He lives his whole life. As for tomorrow which has yet to be born from the possibilities of today, who knows where he shall be or whether it will even be his?

ALVIN SCHWARTZ

THINGS WE NEVER KNEW TILL NOW

The Comtian triad of civilizational phases, now common intellectual coin. . . .

—article in "The Western Review," Autumn 1948.

THOSE WERE THE DAYS!

If imperialism continues in power, there is no end to war. But it is far more likely that, through this war, imperialism is killing itself. Arms are being put into the hands of tens of millions of workers and peasants. Every internal strain of world imperialism is stretched to the breaking point. Will the workers and the peasants continue indefinitely to slaughter each other for the profit of their masters? It is scarcely conceivable. . . .

The Socialist United States of Europe, of the Americas, a free Asia and a free Africa, a World Federation of Socialist Republics—these mighty slogans now, with the war, lose all their abstractness. They and they alone are the goal, the *immediate* goal, for mankind.

That goal will be won!

—editorial in "The New International" for October, 1939.

Books

I LEARN FROM CHILDREN. By Caroline Pratt. Simon and Schuster. \$2.75.

Caroline Pratt, founder of City and Country School, where the best educational theory is creatively practiced, tells her story of its growth with such simplicity and modesty that the reader, snugly content with the popular jokes about progressive education, may carelessly minimize her achievement. Some of her discoveries, which were revolutionary thirty years ago, are now accepted as truisms by most educators: for example, that the child studies the world by "experiencing it, and with his own eyes and ears and muscles." But that is not to say that the theory is put to use. Indeed, the commonly-asserted advantage of the public school, that the child "experiences" a cross-section of his community, thus learning to live with all kinds of people (and not only with those who share his social and financial status), is hopelessly lost to him there. For, above all, "the system enjoins him to go his own way and mind his own business." Chained to his desk, for the most part, and with mere friendliness denied him, he learns as little about his thirty or forty classmates as an urban apartment-dweller learns about his neighbors. And it is not only the over-crowding which is to blame, for that is only symptomatic of American attitudes to education—and, perhaps, to neighborliness. (Other countries have somewhat different suppressive ways with children!) To the average American, teachers are queer, unambitious creatures—the child is a financial burden—and anyway, education (and neighborliness) are woman's work!

But even our half-hearted American individualism seems to allow some surprising deviations. Miss Pratt began her experiment in 1914 with six neighborhood children in a three-room apartment at Fourth and Twelfth Streets. This was the Greenwich Village of the Bohemian days; and the artists and writers of the district, early champions of Freud and Feminism, were the first to entrust their children to her school. But the value of this setting was for her its closeness to coal barges, bakeries, and wholesale markets—the arteries of the city's life—which the children studied at first hand and played out with blocks on the classroom floor. They also modeled it in clay and painted it; but the great value of make-believe play for intellectual growth—as well as for emotional and social development—is the core of truth within most of the teaching experiments which are still proving successful at the school. The 3-year-old who takes down his first "Longy" block to use as a track for his train is making the best possible start to his so-called formal education. His block constructions become gradually more detailed and accurate, ever more enriched by his understanding and acceptance of the grown-up world; until at about seven, he begins to abandon them, of his own accord, in favor of the new tool, reading—an act which we falsely credit as the beginning of his education. There is a good description of the earlier kind of learning in Susan Isaacs' book, *Childhood and After* (Routledge 1948): "The child's make-believe play creates actual situations which lead him to remember and observe and compare and reflect upon his real experience, and which cause him to turn back to the real experience and look at it again and understand it further, so as to be able to make his dramatic play more vivid and more true to life." The child, ostensibly at play, is most seriously concerned with reality. The early name "play school" soon revealed itself as a frivolity to the children themselves, who resented it and demanded a change.

Encouraged by the "freedom to work with all kinds of material and media for the expression of their ideas," the children set their own pace, and the curriculum expanded as the children required it: the 8-year-olds, having outgrown block-play, took on the first "school job" (another invaluable discovery for elementary-school education), and jobs became the springboard for upper-school learning. The eights became shop-keepers, supplying stationery and other materials for the entire school; buying and selling and keeping accounts (being real accounts, they had actually to tally with the cash on hand), and receiving a small but

most gratifying salary. Other jobs were taken on in the following years: the post-office, the print-shop, toy repair—jobs of real usefulness to the school and which demanded, almost of themselves, an adherence to standards of responsible work. I know, by recent observation, what a force this stimulus can be. New impulses appear: a drive to perfect the skills necessary for business-like behavior (“You really have to be quick when you make change for the customers; they get so impatient.”); a more personal interest in the study of history and geography (the Boston Post Road, the Pony Express, early New York, the Indians); and an awareness of group responsibility and cooperation (“I sometimes volunteer to do the things I don’t like so much, because it’s not fair to let the others do them all the time.”).

I Learn From Children is filled with delightful description and anecdote in convincing defence of the school’s philosophy: that “it is the whole child we must nurture, not just one part of him” and that he must be thoroughly grounded in the “here and now” before he may safely wander into the past and the far-distant. Only pity is expressed for the precocious, over-titillated child, whose parents fail to realize that “a Sunday walk down the street with a 7-year-old may be an exciting experience,” for the parent as well as for the child.

But this sensible philosophy still, obviously, represents the “school of tomorrow.” The truth of progressive education (like the truth of psychoanalysis) is monotonously evaded by the “flight into ridicule.” Even the left-wing intellectual is inwardly disturbed by the fear that liberty (for children!) may lead only to license—or at least to bad manners! Miss Pratt suggests that the more open battle, of the early days, between parental authority and the new freedom may have been better than the “concealed resentments and buried antagonisms” of today. I believe that behind the surface indifference of Americans to education there lies a deep animosity to children: we envy them and fear them. We envy them their freedom to feel and to express their feelings (the outbursts of rage and hate as well as of joy and satisfaction)—and we envy their potentialities. They also threaten our own youth; they will inevitably replace us. These feelings are “natural” in our culture; we only fail, sometimes, to realize how they stain our most precious relationships. I remember a thread of bitterness among my delighted thoughts as I first watched a group of 3-year-olds: “What could I have become, if. . . .”

Even the best school philosophy cannot solve all the problems of childhood. The reader of this reassuring book may be left with the suspicion that Miss Pratt does not perceive the full significance of teachers and parents as unwitting representatives of our society—despite the best intentions. True, she set a fine precedent in choosing teachers for emotional maturity rather than academic excellence. (So far as I know, there is no such entrance requirement for parents.) For the teacher needs more than a knowledge of teaching techniques, especially in the crucial nursery years, to meet the deeper problems of emotion and behavior: “when to encourage a timid child to fight for his rights, how to meet the lack of security that often underlies unduly aggressive behavior; when to mother a child and when to serve up a little wholesome neglect, and when to step in and take responsibility from the children’s shoulders onto her own.” It seems to me that psychoanalysis is a great aid in the development of such maturity: can one fully understand the childhood (and childishness) of others, without reaching an accord with one’s own? There are underlying antagonisms—and envy and fear—in teachers as well as in parents. The modern teacher is, perhaps, aware of this, but she continues to give greater weight to the “right” word or deed, with the children, than to the underlying feelings and motives. The most serious problems are sometimes met with shallowness. There is a recurrent attempt, for example, to enlist the parents in the fight against over-competitiveness. The parents are advised not to ask the children for their paintings, clay work, etc.; and the teachers try bravely to praise the classroom work without revealing their personal comparisons. But competitiveness remains strong in the children—as it does in the grownups—and the children learn only to try to conceal it, as the parents and teachers do.

There are also the problems of aggression and sex roles, which seem “naturally” difficult and are made even more complicated

by cultural inconsistencies. The well-trained teacher is now taught that the submissive, “good” child is sometimes more neurotic than the over-belligerent one. But how is she to use this knowledge? She continues to give the over-belligerent child the greater share of attention, for he is more threatening to the smooth management of her class. At the same time, she is likely to admire, secretly, his fighting qualities (which is common in our culture), which does not help him to avoid delinquency—or, later, militarism. She may even enjoy him masochistically (the idea that his belligerence is “healthy” may be a welcome one), which encourages his sadism and the “good” child’s tendency to masochism. The latter continues to be ignored so long as he is “no trouble” to the teacher.

There is, also, in some of the best schools, a curious feminism, legacy of the early equalitarian movement. Despite the attractive new play materials, the little girls of Miss Pratt’s 1914 group clung to their domestic interests (cooking, washing, feeding baby). Miss Pratt’s explanation is that in those early days, “Woman’s place in our society was still in the home.” But the little girls of today still play house more often than the boys do (Charlotte Bühler, *From Birth to Maturity*, Kegan Paul 1947); and it is possible that their choice may be compelled by a very natural and valuable desire to emulate the mother in her motherly functions. (They seem to catch up to the boys, academically, soon enough, despite this initial “handicap”!) Some teachers, however, may openly assert that “boys are more fun”; for their greater curiosity about things outside the home, and their preference for blocks, may be more exciting to the teacher, and is considered a higher step in the learning scale. But perhaps the higher rating is only another instance of our culture’s depreciation of “woman’s work,” while doll-play may be a painful goad to the teacher’s own inferiority feelings.

Many other teaching problems can be made easier through psychoanalysis: the acceptance of dirt and mess; of exhibitionism; of sex-play. The problems I have mentioned may not be the most difficult. However, psychoanalysis for teachers (and parents) seems now to be an unimaginable goal: one does not undertake the hard work and suffering without courage; and few can afford the fees. But how terribly wasteful are our present penny-pinching ways in the education of children!

ETHEL GOLDWATER

DIE KOMMUNISTISCHE PARTEI DEUTSCHLANDS IN DER WEIMAR REPUBLIK. By Ossip K. Flechtheim. Bollwerk Verlag (Germany), 1948. \$5.00. (Available in the USA direct from author: O. K. Flechtheim, Colby College, Waterville, Maine.)

An excellent short (300-pages) but scholarly history of the German Communist Party. First two-thirds are devoted to a history of the KPD from 1914 to 1933, plus a lengthy chapter on the party’s sociology and ideology. Latter third contains a very rich bibliography and a documentary appendix presenting such important texts as the 1918 Spartacus Program, the 1925 Statutes of the KPD, the Declaration Concerning the National and Social Liberation of the German People (1930), and the once-famous but now almost forgotten letter by Clara Zetkin from Moscow in which, speaking for Brandler, she attacks the party’s tendency toward opportunism and putschism.

The author is an independent socialist, with no political axes to grind. When he speaks of the twisted and tortuous paths of the two great German proletarian parties and their interminable, suicidal strife, his heart hurts him considerably. His history is a well-documented tragedy which, like any drama, draws a moral conclusion without any preaching. If the material is dull at times, it is more the fault of the material than of the author: he is telling the story of little men who were trying to ride out a storm which, to them, was just a series of intrigues, resolutions, and political shenanigans aimed at patching up an unpatchable society, and conducted on the backs of docile workingmen organized into the two rival mass-parties. The author could have written a book which accuses or defends; instead he has chosen to tell the story in the actors’ own words; these monologues, resolutions, and shortsighted bickerings speak for themselves quite

eloquently; they reveal the attitude that governed all the marionettes involved—the belief that material questions alone determine success or failure in the political struggle.

ROBERT BEK-GRAN

Letters

Heinz Norden Objects

Sir:

In an article on "AMG in Germany" in your Summer 1948 issue Peter Blake discusses my person and my editorship in 1946-47 of the picture magazine *Heute*, published by U.S. Military Government in Germany. Mr. Blake chooses to bracket me with what he calls "Stalinist agents," an imputation I must emphatically reject.

The article as a whole contains a number of crude factual errors and misstatements that are in my opinion unworthy of a reputable journal. I am specifically concerned, of course, with the misrepresentations concerning myself, which call for correction.

Mr. Blake accepts at face value certain flimsy allegations about my prewar activities and affiliations. Unfortunately for him, my militant advocacy of slum clearance and better housing cannot be tortured into a picture of "political agitation." For some five years in the Army, before I was assigned to Counter Intelligence and to *Heute*, my record was subject to repeated official investigation. In every case, including a full-dress Loyalty Board hearing, I was cleared. I myself publicly refuted the malicious red smear, the result of an anonymous denunciation (*Washington Post*, Dec. 19, 1947, and Apr. 23, 1948; *New York Times*, Jan. 17, 1948) and the facts I set forth have not and cannot be challenged.

Mr. Blake, who falsely calls me "fanatically anti-German," states that my editorial policies on *Heute* were previously under attack. This is not a fact. During and after the entire controversy that ultimately led to my ouster, under circumstances that left a bad taste in many mouths, the quality of my editorship was not once called into question. On the contrary, at my departure General Clay himself wrote me: "I am very glad to state that your work with us in editing the Magazine *Heute* has been of high quality and has contributed materially to the accomplishment of our broad objective in Germany to reorient its people to a more democratic way of thinking."

This is likely to carry little weight with Mr. Blake, who attacks the whole policy of U.S. Military Government. I may add that I myself have grown bitterly critical of the Ilse Koch turn that policy has taken, though my criticism is rooted in views very different from those of Mr. Blake. Nevertheless, Mr. Blake ought to know that my editorship was the subject of repeated favorable comment in the conservative wing of the American press.

It is Mr. Blake who wins the dubious honor of being the first to attack my editorship as such. He is able to do so only by misrepresenting the editorial contents of *Heute* so grossly that the most charitable conclusion is the Mr. Blake does not read German very well.

His "analysis" of ten issues of *Heute* teems with outright errors of fact. There is no space to set forth these errors in detail. Suffice it to say that in more than a dozen instances Mr. Blake describes articles in *Heute* in terms that factually have nothing in common with the plain, unarguable text. In other instances Mr. Blake grossly distorts meanings that should have been and were apparent to every unbiased reader.

Perhaps worst of all, Mr. Blake infers that *Heute* devoted but insignificant space to the U.S., and then only to its most trivial aspects. Both quantitatively and qualitatively, the inference is unequivocally false. *Heute* gave almost 40% of its columns to significant news and features about America.

I do not think it is honest journalism, for example, to state that in a given issue the U.S. was represented by an Article

about Lily Daché, while neglecting to mention that the same issue carried an eloquent spread about the New England Town Meeting. This is but one of many similar examples. Mr. Blake fails altogether to give credit to my pioneer work on behalf of the CARE organization and in publicizing the U.S. Constitution (*New York Times*, Dec. 28, 1947).

I am proud to be called a progressive, and I think I can safely let my record on *Heute* speak for itself. The clearest evidence is that, contrary to Mr. Blake's assertion, the editorial policies I helped to set have been closely followed since I relinquished the editorship. Mr. Blake is entitled to his opinions and interpretations, but he should stick to the facts.

New York City

HEINZ NORDEN

Reply by Peter Blake

Mr. Norden in effect accuses me of two things: First, of having utterly misrepresented the editorial content and policies of *Heute*; and, secondly, of having smeared him,

1. My selection from *Heute* covered ten issues, all of them published after Byrnes' Stuttgart speech of September 1946, which marked a turning point in AMG policy. Of about 35 editorial items cited by me, Mr. Norden challenges "more than a dozen." Among them is my selection from the January 15, 1947 issue. It is quite true that this issue contained other American material in addition to the 4-page article on Lily Daché (San Francisco skyscrapers, Katherine Dunham, etc.). But since Mr. Norden claims that the editorial policy of *Heute* has not changed since he left, I tried to find some stories of the type that appeared in the post-Norden issue (1-12-47) which I quoted in my article. For in the weeks when Mr. Norden published a sprightly, frivolous story on women's hats, European democrats were risking their heads: in Poland, the Peasant Party was being bloodily suppressed just prior to the elections; and in Belgrade three US Embassy servants were being sentenced to death for "espionage." Today *Heute* would print that story. In January 1947 it didn't.

I wish to restate my personal impression of *Heute*: It seemed to be a kind of fortnightly PM, full of good works, full of subtle implications that, consciously or not, would lead its readers to a so-called "objective" view of the Soviet slave system, and full of picture stories that, consciously or not, would give comfort to

STATEMENT OF THE OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, CIRCULATION, ETC., REQUIRED BY THE ACT OF CONGRESS OF AUGUST 24, 1912, AS AMENDED BY THE ACTS OF MARCH 3, 1933, AND JULY 2, 1946.

Of Politics, published quarterly at New York, N. Y. for October 1, 1948. State of New York County of New York, ss.

Before me, a notary public in and for the State and county aforesaid, personally appeared Judy Miller, who, having been duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that she is the business manager of the Politics, and that the following is, to the best of her knowledge and belief, a true statement of the ownership, management (and if a daily, weekly, semiweekly or triweekly newspaper, the circulation), etc., of the aforesaid publication for the date shown in the above caption, required by the act of August 24, 1912, as amended by the acts of March 3, 1933, and July 2, 1946 (section 537, Postal Laws and Regulations), printed on the reverse of this form, to wit:

1. That the names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor, and business managers are:

Publisher, Politics Publishing Co., 45 Astor Place, New York 3, N. Y.; Editor Dwight Macdonald, 117 E. 10 St., New York 3, N. Y.

Managing editor none; Business manager Nancy Macdonald, 117 E. 10 St., New York 3, N. Y.; Business manager Judy Miller, 242 W. 10 St., New York 14, N. Y.

2. That the owner is: Politics Publishing Co., 45 Astor Place, New York 3, N. Y. (Business owned by Dwight Macdonald, 117 E. 10 St., N. Y. 3, N. Y.)

3. That the known bondholders, mortgages, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities are: none

4. That the two paragraphs next above, giving the names of the owners, stockholders, and security holders, if any, contain not only the list of stockholders and security holders as they appear upon the books of the company but also, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting, is given; also that the said two paragraphs contain statements embracing affiant's full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner; and this affiant has no reason to believe that any other person, association, or corporation has any interest direct or indirect in the said stock, bonds, or other securities than as so stated by him.

JUDY MILLER, Business Manager Sworn to and subscribed before me this 9th September, 1948.

HERMAN LEITNER, Notary Public (My commission expires March 30, 1950)

the Cominform. These items were all "little sins" in themselves. Added up, over the months they amounted, I think, to a rather "big sin," a sin of omission (as shown above) as well as of commission. Underlying all the good works there was a picture of the USA as the land of huge, vulgar wealth, and of abject poverty; of sex, lack of culture, and plenty of cash—and so on. It is clever picture-editing, I suppose, to show Red Army soldiers in Potsdam (German HQ of the NKVD) fondling their baby carriages and, a few issues later, show American GIs fondling their looted Leica cameras. That is all very innocent fun if published in New York; it takes on a very different meaning in Munich. I repeat, therefore, that *Heute* was an extremely "blunt . . . democratic weapon."

2. I do not believe Mr. Norden to be a Communist, and I did not say he was. I said he had been a member of several organizations, including the ALP. Rep. Dondero who, as I indicated in my article, made these allegations, also stated that Mr. Norden had been (a) Chairman of the City-Wide Tenants' Council (apparently a CP front); (b) member of the Consumers National Federation (apparently CP dominated); (c) member, Board of Directors, N.Y. Conference for Inalienable Rights (apparently a CP front); (d) translator of books by Czech Communist F. C. Weiskopf and *National Guardian* contributor Max Werner; (e) member of a couple of apparently CP dominated Unions. None of these facts is in any way conclusive in itself. Added up, they represent a pattern which, it was my thesis, should have made Mr. Norden unfit to edit the principal US picture-propaganda organ in Germany. AMG did not think so, and that prompted my article. I have no axe to grind against Mr. Norden personally. His appointment simply happened to be an outstanding example of a mistaken policy.

Mr. Norden recalls his Army loyalty checks, but seems to have forgotten that the Navy discharged him in 1942 after two weeks of service because, according to its Bureau of Personnel, Mr. Norden "had, while in New York City, close and active association with and in behalf of groups considered to have interests inimical to those of the United States." I don't believe the Navy ever discharged a man for slum clearance.

A Correction:

Sir:

Several weeks ago, Mr. Sam Warhaftig, an official of Military Government in Germany, was returned to this country under suspicion of disloyalty, and, presumably, for a hearing in Washington. Since my article in the last issue of *POLITICS* indirectly referred to certain events within Mr. Warhaftig's sphere of activities (without mentioning Mr. Warhaftig's name), I met with him a few days ago. As a result of our conversation I feel that I should correct and clarify several statements in my article:

1. Mr. Warhaftig's position in MG was not as important as I had thought. He was merely a member, and later the head of the Elections and Political Parties Branch.

2. Mr. Warhaftig states that he not only did not select, but actually disapproved of Venedey and Mueller, and that Venedey in turn disapproved of him. He further states that, while he did persuade other Germans to serve in the Hesse Government, neither Venedey nor Mueller needed persuasion.

3. Mr. Warhaftig indicates that only part of the German Police of Hesse was under the direction of the Ministry of the Interior: The Gendarmerie, including State Troopers and Border Guards; and that it was, further, supervised not by his Branch of MG, but by the Public Safety Branch.

4. Mr. Warhaftig admits that there existed innumerable rumors and polemics against him among certain groups of Germans, but that democratic, anti-Stalinist Germans and Americans saw in him a trustworthy friend. He documented this statement with impressive proof.

5. Mr. Warhaftig knows that he has been under a loyalty investigation for over two years. He once saw eight specific charges against him, seven of which seemed far-fetched to me as he recalled them. The eighth concerned his friendship with a prominent German Communist, a relationship which seemed to me to

show an astonishingly naive attitude in a man holding an important MG post.

My feeling after my talk with Mr. Warhaftig was that I was mistaken in believing that he had a part in the pro-Stalinist MG decisions which I described. But while I was impressed by his self-avowed good intentions, I found it upsetting to know that a man with Mr. Warhaftig's political insouciance was fighting the democratic fight for us in Germany.

New York City, Feb. 12, 1949

PETER BLAKE

Editor's Footnote: Since Mr. Blake wrote the above—a copy of which he made available to the Army Loyalty Board—the Board has suspended Mr. Warhaftig without pay; he is preparing an appeal, at his own expense. I may add (1) I agree with Mr. Blake's political estimate of Mr. Warhaftig, but (2) the Army Loyalty Board's procedure was stupid and unjust: not one definite name or fact was cited in the charges, nor did the defendant have a chance to confront his accusers. Nothing, so far, has been proved one way or the other by this absurd and outrageous mock trial; it can benefit only the Communists.

Is There a Pacifist Dilemma?

Sir:

In the first part of his "dilemma" statement in the last issue of *POLITICS*, the editor seems to me to confuse considerations relating to Stalinist versus democratic ideologies and values, and considerations relating to the power struggle between Russia and the United States. The result is to give a misleading picture of the role of the USA in the power struggle and needlessly to give plausibility to the idea that war against Russia might after all be the lesser evil.

Stalinism, we are told, is the chief enemy. If this means that the values of the Judeo-Christian, democratic way of life are to be preferred to and maintained against the values in Stalinist totalitarianism, that is a correct statement and its importance can hardly be exaggerated. But even in this field it must be noted that the practice does not—fortunately—fully accord with the theory in Russia, where life does not represent unrelieved evil; and that in the Western world the practice unfortunately falls far short of the profession. Furthermore, war is the one way in which democratic and humane, or Christian, values cannot possibly be preserved.

To go on from there to say that "in the many conflicts between USA and USSR since 1945" it is the former that enlists one's preference, seems to me a non-sequitur and utterly misleading. Here we are dealing with the mores of Russia and U.S. in the power struggle and the basic fact is that they are two sides of the same coin. Neither would exist or behave in anything like its present form without the other. Over against Russian behavior in Eastern Europe, conflicts in the U.N. and so on, you can attack the American use of the atomic bomb in completely inexcusable and irresponsible fashion, the equally inexcusable and irresponsible stockpiling of such weapons, the adventure in Greece and Turkey, the taking over of the Atlantic, Pacific, Mediterranean and way stations as American lakes, the refusal to establish trusteeship in the Pacific islands, and so on. To say that one or other is, on this level, the main enemy is to utter an irrelevancy. Here the war-making, conscripting, power-state is the enemy. The fatal thing is to direct the attention of people in either nation to the militarism of the other. Each people must address itself to the destruction of its own militarism. As Lenin taught, the results which may flow therefrom will not all be pleasant but they will be verily "the lesser evil."

This leads to my only other observation. The only chance there is for averting World War III and/or the spread of totalitarianism over the world is to give the Russian people a chance to complete their revolution which in its inception was of course aimed at achieving the prophetic vision of a class-less and warless world. Negatively, it is impossible for that revolution to be accomplished under the continued threat of war and capitalist expansionism from without. This strengthens the counter-revolution. Only a non-violent people's movement which consists of people who refuse to be dupes or slaves of their own national militarism and expansionism can successfully appeal to the Rus-

sian people to refuse any longer to be the dupes and slaves of Stalinist militarism.

The editor incorrectly phrases his dilemma when he speaks of violence and non-violence both seeming impractical. He himself makes it clear that violence and war are both evil and impractical, whereas non-violence is right and necessary. The "dilemma" then is not a speculative one or one which can be resolved by argument or research. It has to be resolved by and in action. The building of the non-violent revolutionary movement must begin. And in such a dilemma the only ones who can walk at all are those who are willing to walk by faith and not by sight.

A. J. MUSTE

A Reply by the Editor:

Dearly as I should like to be persuaded by the above, I cannot quite manage it. Maybe it is because I am not willing to walk by faith and not by sight. Such faith as I have been able to preserve is based entirely on my brain working on the evidence supplied by my senses; the religious vision which guides A. J. Muste's steps is, in me, blind.

The bulk of his letter fortunately, contains sight, not faith, arguments. They are, briefly, that while the *values* professed by the Western bourgeois democracies are admittedly superior to those professed by Soviet Russia, the actual *practices*, both at home and abroad, are not importantly different. If this is true, then clearly there is no reason to prefer the West to the East, since neither he nor I are foolish enough to be impressed by mere protestations of virtue when they are contradicted by actions. But precisely the point at issue is whether there is or is not an important qualitative difference (from our mutual point of view as radicals) between the *actual* social institutions and the *actual* foreign policies of USA and those of USSR. In my article, and in "USA v. USSR" in the preceding issue, I tried to show that there really IS such a difference, by contrasting the two social and political systems, in their actual functioning and not at all just in their ideologies. I regret that Muste has not tried to marshal this kind of evidence in support of his contrary view: that the differences are *not* of such importance. If he or some one else can do this, then the dilemma is resolved: two ethically symmetrical power-systems confront each other; we don't have to worry about which will prevail; and we can wholeheartedly and single-mindedly concentrate on "the building of the non-violent revolutionary movement." But if there IS an important qualitative difference between the two antagonists, then the dilemma is unresolved. I agree wholly with Muste that a third world war would probably mean the end of all we both hold dear, that the Russian people must make their own revolution against the Kremlin, and that war would have the same effect as it did on the German people: it would bind them all the closer to their oppressors. In fact, I said all these things in the article under discussion. In fact, it is precisely because these things are true, and because walking-by-faith pacifists like Muste are unable or unwilling to demonstrate that the two conflicting social systems are really "two sides of the same coin," that we sight-walkers are in the dilemma we are in.

Finally: Muste thinks I "confuse considerations relating to Stalinist versus democratic ideologies, and considerations relating to the power struggle between Russia and the United States." But, as his letter shows, what he is really objecting to is not a *confusion* of these two kinds of considerations but rather a *relation* of them. I fear that Muste's religiosity leads him to make an unhealthy separation between values and action. If I am right in believing that the *realization in action* of democratic values goes much farther in the West than in the East, then a corresponding difference in power politics must, and in fact does, follow.

WHAT PAPER D'YA READ? OR: WHO'S HIDING WHAT?

... Miss Bjurstroem won the title, "Miss Sweden of 1948," in her country's annual beauty contest. She was disqualified at Paris last summer in a contest to select "Miss Europe" because she had concealed the fact of her marriage. ("N.Y. Herald-Tribune" Feb. 13)

... Betty Bjurstroem was chosen "Miss Sweden" last year, only to be disqualified later from the "Miss Europe" contest because she was wearing falsies. ("N.Y. Daily News," Feb. 13)

Here & Now

a department dedicated to the possible

A Modern Schweik

Editor's Note: A reader sends in the following letter, from a German friend of his who during the war showed that even Hitler's army was not impervious to Schweikism. We print it here as a reminder that (a) the Nazi system was not so monolithic as its architects would have liked it to be; and (b) cunning and evasion are always at the service of the dissenting individual confronted by the warmaking State, whether German or American. "By the way," adds our correspondent, "my friend Ernst some years earlier got himself released from a concentration camp by cutting his wrist so expertly that everybody thought he was going to die; actually, there was lots of blood but no danger at all to life and limb!"

We do not give Ernst's last name because he is now in the Soviet zone, and may soon again have to do his stuff.

In 1940 I was called to the draftboard (Wehrmusterung) for the first time. I told the chief physician that I had been suffering from epileptic fits since my 15th year. He asked me to produce documents to prove this, but I behaved like somebody who doesn't need written proofs. When they called me the fourth time, they themselves had written to my physician. Well, the man had written something that was neither fish nor fowl. But in the meantime I had gotten a job as a worker in a propeller factory. In September 1944 they got me after all and I was finally drafted. I was assigned to the airforce and played the "good soldier." Only I couldn't shoot, simply couldn't. When I fired my first blank cartridge I was so scared that I dropped my gun. The startled sergeant ordered two soldiers to escort me on a walk to calm me down. The same thing happened during sharpshooting practice. The sergeant had left it to me whether I wanted to come along or not. I insisted that I wanted to try it again. Even the lieutenant in person took an interest in my case, yet it was all in vain. I almost wept for shame and the lieutenant did his best to console me. After this, I was sent to the carpenter shop. All of a sudden I heard a machinegun fire a few shots in the shed next to ours. I immediately dropped under the bench. The sergeant heard of this accident. From then on, whenever there was going to be some explosion, I received orders to go into the airraid shelter before the explosions started. The foreman was told that he must remind me of this so that I shouldn't forget.

Sergeants and other noncoms didn't hate me at all, they just knew that they couldn't use me. There was no order which I didn't execute in a completely wrong manner. They all tried their luck with me, but with no success. There are certain things which are not supposed to ever happen to a soldier; the dog tag, the paybook and the rifle, for example, are never supposed to be lost. I lost all of them and this within one single week. To make up for the loss, I went into the sergeants' office with a huge bunch of safety pins and told him that I had found them. The next day during the roll call he duly announced the find to the assembled men. I very timidly raised my hand

and said blushing that I had made a mistake: these safetypins were really my own and I had found this out soon after bringing them to his office. A roar of laughter went up from the men who stood at attention before him. I would never have imagined it was so easy to play such a role. I had very great fun during those months and am almost unable to hate militarism as much as I used to. . . .

I really pitied the other soldiers. How furious they were when I appeared without helmet, gas mask, rifle or any of the other important paraphernalia. I definitely lost two rifles, without being courtmartialed. But the humor of all this can only really be appreciated within the framework of the military life.

We were stationed in Upper Silesia and during the rapid advances of the Russians the frontline approached very quickly. When I saw the first eight dead bodies near the roadside, I said goodbye. I stayed at the front for exactly 24 hours (much too long!). In the last days of May, 1945, I marched through Czechoslovakia to Bavaria and there was taken prisoner by the Americans. But they kept me only for two weeks and I arrived home, safe and sound, on June 8, 1945.

Germany (Soviet Zone)

ERNST X.

HERE AND NOW: The "Free University" in Berlin

(The following letter, from one of our American readers in Berlin, shows that even in occupied Germany something can be done—and has been done. It also indicates how you, the reader, can do something here & now to help.)

The Free University in the Western zone of Berlin was set up in the fall of 1948 after six months' struggle and preparation. The thing began as a student rebellion in the old University of Berlin, which is situated in the Soviet sector.

Immediately after the war, the Russian authorities began a process of "coordination" of the universities in their zone, which went farther than the Nazis had gone. This included "packing" crucial faculties and departments with pro-Soviet people; rewriting university statutes to insure a friendly majority in the Senates, or governing bodies; attempts—largely unsuccessful—to do the same thing in the Student Councils; instituting required indoctrination courses and eliminating faculties, such as Law and Theology, which did not lend themselves to manipulation; bribery and corruption of the professors through a system of carefully graduated material rewards; espionage and denunciations; direct supervision by Russian education officers of the classes of suspected teachers; and, above all, continuous expulsions, arrests, and kidnapping of teachers and students who opposed such measures.

These methods intimidated and demoralized most of the professors, but have been less effective with the students. For three years, the student bodies of Leipzig, Halle, Jena and Berlin have shown enormous courage: they have resisted without any assurance of protection, or even of hope: despite all pressure, terror, and manipulation, non-Communist majorities have been consistently elected to the Student Councils of all Eastern Zone universities right up to the present time. (The most recent incident was the sentencing to 30 years' hard labor in Russia of Natonek, the leader of a dissident group in the Leipzig Student Council.) Even the SED (Communist front) fractions among the students are not "reliable"—they have refused on occasion to denounce the Marshall Plan and have otherwise shown their independence; drastic purges have been frequent.

The struggle in Berlin University reached a climax with the expulsion, on April 17, 1948, of three students who edited a magazine called *Colloquium*, which had been exposing corruption and terror in the universities. They were expelled by the General Agency for Public Education, of the Soviet Zone, over the heads of the university authorities, on the grounds that "by their writings they had violated the good manners and honor of

a student." One of them, Joachim Schwarz, who had already been "interrogated" (i.e., beaten up) three times by the NKVD, was ordered to report again to the NKVD. Instead, he took a British train to the Western zone; the Russians stopped the train; the British officer in charge, however, refused to give up Schwarz, and, after a long delay on a siding, the train was allowed to proceed to the British Zone—including Schwarz.

The episode gave a new impetus to efforts that had already been started to get the British and American military authorities to permit a new "free university" to be set up in the Western sector of the city. A call was sent out for a meeting of students in a hall seating 500; despite threats that any students attending would suffer the same fate as the *Colloquium* editors, over 2,000 Berlin students showed up at the meeting. From this time on, the Free University rapidly took shape: permission was obtained from the military authorities—American personnel played a major part in the whole effort;* buildings were secured in the grounds of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute: a faculty was gradually brought together, partly from other universities in the Western zones; the first recruiting lists were opened in the offices of the Berlin Social-Democratic party. The response has been enthusiastic. The Free University, which is now completing its first term, is constantly attracting refugee students from the Eastern zone.

The readers of *POLITICS* can help in various ways:

1. By mailing books and magazines for use in the library and in seminars.
2. By mailing used clothing: suits, overcoats, shoes, underwear, etc.
3. By arranging—if they are connected with some American college—exchange professorships and fellowships. (A tour of teaching in Berlin would be of unusual value for an American professor in history or social science.)
4. American students could correspond with German students in the Free University.

Correspondence on points 3 and 4 should be addressed to the corresponding-secretary of the student body: *Horst Hartwich, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin-Dahlem, Boltzmanstrasse 4, American Zone, Germany.*

Packages of books and clothing may be sent to me direct, at the address given below. (Please inscribe "For Free University" inside the wrapping.)

HAROLD HURWITZ
ISD, OMGUS
APO 742
c/o Postmaster, New York, N. Y.

* About the same time, the first issue of a new political and cultural monthly, *Der Monat*, appeared. Sponsored by the American Military Government and edited by Melvin J. Lasky, this is a handsomely printed affair consisting chiefly of translations of material by such American and English writers as Tynbee, Eliot, Koestler, Burnham, etc. Culturally, it is on a remarkably high level.—Ed.

THE MUNICH RUSSIAN LIBRARY

Readers who have books or magazines they can spare can put them to useful work by mailing them (at domestic book rates) to: Markoosha Fischer, International Rescue & Relief Committee, IRO Area 7, APO 407, c/o Postmaster, New York, N. Y. Mrs. Fischer, author of *My Lives in Russia* and wife of Louis Fischer, is in charge of the IRRRC office in Munich. She distributes all books received to individual DP's and to local libraries, especially the Russian Library which she started last summer for the benefit of the many anti-Stalinist Russian refugees now in the Munich area.—Ed.

JUST THE AVERAGE MAN-IN-THE-PENTAGON

Today—Kay Summersby tells how she first met Dwight Eisenhower in 1942, when Ike was still an obscure two-star general.

—advertisement for newspaper serialization of "Eisenhower Was My Boss"

The Hutterite Communities in Paraguay

WE wanted to build. We wanted to begin afresh and make a society genuine from its bed-rock foundations. We were sick of struggling with other men in wars and in daily business. We wanted to find real fellowship. We wanted to find a way of life in which the gifts that lie in each individual could develop without cramping and stifling those of other people. We wanted a common unity of work and purpose.

The story of our efforts for this is an adventurous one. This group—the Sociedad Fraternal Hutteriana—now in the heart of South America, arose in the post-war Germany of 1920. Complete dislocation of life through war and revolution, compelled a fresh attempt to get to the root: peoples' need and desire to live together as social beings, and their continual inability to do this. Many talks about economic and religious problems caused a small group—one family and few single people—to begin practically by pooling all they had and living in community. Many conferences were held and books and pamphlets were published about this new movement, and its relationship with earlier movements, especially with the Early Christian Community in Jerusalem, and the Communities of Brothers formed during the religious Reformation in Europe in the Sixteenth Century. It was only after several years of communal life that the group learned that the descendants of those brothers of Reformation times were still living in community—after four hundred years—and were now settled in North America.

Dr. Eberhard Arnold, leader of the group in Germany, visited the American communities, and both groups recognized complete unity of belief and practice—a significant fact, considering the wide difference between the time and historical context of their origin. Their stories also have a marked similarity. Arising in Switzerland and Germany, the communities of four hundred years ago were driven by persecution from one land to another across Central and Eastern Europe into Russia. From here, always in search of freedom of conscience, they emigrated to North America in 1870, though even in this land they have suffered because of their refusal to take part in war. After 1933 the new community in Europe was forced by persecution, through dissolution by the state [1937] and later by the danger that members would be forcibly separated, to find new homes for itself, first in Lichtenstein, then for some five years in England, and now in Paraguay. Three members, however, were left behind in England to wind up affairs there, and then follow the main group to South America. They soon found themselves joined by a growing number of men and women who sincerely wanted to live in community. This unexpected gathering led to the beginning of a new English Bruderhof at Wheathill in Shropshire, where there are now nearly one hundred and forty people.

We share all our property in common. That seems to us the natural consequence of comradeship, and we trust one another fully. Trust in each other also makes it possible to speak frankly about faults and grievances, and each one takes such honest speaking to heart as a duty. Being like any men and women anywhere, hating to 'give offence,' to put ourselves in the wrong, or to own up and ask pardon, it often goes much against the grain to speak openly of what makes us uneasy, but we know the only way to keep peace in the whole community is to have everything at peace, clear and honest, between the individual members. Usually a difference can be put right between the two or three people concerned, but if these cannot settle it alone they ask the help of others, and finally of the whole group. These guiding lines for living peaceably together are given in the Sermon on the Mount, and can be followed only in the spirit of these words.

The door is always open to those who wish to share in the common life. We welcome visitors who want to stay with us for a time to work with us and learn more of living in community.

If you visited us here in Paraguay, you would come, after a strenuous journey by river-boat and by wagon or truck ride over

bad roads, to a part of the country whose landscape alternates between forestland and grassland [known as *camp*]. The forestland is a littler higher than the *camp*, but it is all fairly flat. Here there are three settlements, which we call Bruderhöfe. Each Bruderhof is built on the edge of the forest and the camp. Large numbers of cattle graze on the camp; cattle-raising is one of the most important industries in Paraguay and we have both a beef and milk herd. Timber is felled in the forest and brought to the saw-mill to be prepared for building or carpentry work. We also need a large fuel supply for our steam-engines, besides firewood for cooking and water-heating. Our house-building is often done almost entirely in wood, with thatch for the roofs. When we are able to spare enough men from other work departments, we make bricks, but this is a tremendous undertaking when everything must be done from the initial digging out of the clay to the final firing. Nevertheless we now have several brick buildings, with thatched roofs.

We wish to educate our children for a full and creative life, encouraging the development of all good gifts, and bringing them through their own experience to realize that their powers are used to their deepest satisfaction only when they are used in service and in love to all around them. Such knowledge can, of course, come only by living experience, never by moralising. To win through to such a realisation demands the development of a firm character and of self-control.

As the children grow up they are, whenever possible, sent out from the community to learn a trade or profession. Two of our young people are now in Asuncion studying to be teachers, and another is training as a potter. Among others who have gone out, one is a teacher, one a nurse, one a midwife, one learned sewing and houswifery, another cobbling, another carpentry and two learned to work with cattle. The training usually takes place in Asuncion, the capital of Paraguay. Here we have a house where the young people live during their time away from the Brotherhood and where, while seeing the life that is normally lived to-day, they can turn to the house-parents, or other brothers and sisters, for advice in any problems that may arise, and can always find help and encouragement. They are then better equipped to make the decision, which each must make as he grows up, whether to stay in the community or to go away.

Much work on the agricultural and domestic side must be put in to support this big group of our five hundred people. Garden land is cultivated so that we may have fruit and vegetables. The cooking is done in the communal kitchen, and washing in the communal laundry, on each Bruderhof. The work for the men and that for the women is distributed by a man and woman chosen by the whole Brotherhood for that task. All are ready to do any services asked of them, however humble. We are glad to use any special ability or training when this is a help to the work as a whole, but if we have, for instance, several women teachers among us, and no one to clean the vegetables or wash the clothes, it is clear that a teacher will work in the kitchen or laundry. The determining factor is always: "What work will best serve the cause as a whole?" and accordingly, all work is done gladly.

The whole brotherhood bears the responsibility for all that is done in the community, and this remains the case when men and women are chosen from among them to be especially responsible for different branches of the work and for different functions in the peaceful ordering of the communal life. The brother or sister who is appointed to such a service has the complete trust of all the others. This is possible only in an atmosphere of mutual confidence, where we know that all work together for the same cause of peace and unity, and to bring this to more and more people.

While each Bruderhof administers its own purely internal affairs, the three Bruderhöfe are closely united, spiritually and economically, in one brotherhood. In times of great stress, as in the locust swarms of last autumn, one Bruderhof calls on another for help, and help is given in the fullest measure possible. Sim-

ilarly, if one Bruderhof has some crop in abundance, it shares with the two that lack. All that affects the whole Community, such as its task of mission in Paraguay and other countries, the maintenance and economic expansion of the Community, or the education of the older children, are talked over, and measures agreed upon by the three Bruderhöfe together.

Questions are discussed and settled in the brotherhood meetings. Everything is done with the full consent of *all* the members. This may sound difficult to achieve, or un-natural and unreal to those who are accustomed to meetings where there are as many opinions as there are people. When we consider all questions objectively, and when we look to a cause greater and more important than ourselves, then we come to a united answer: this is our constant experience. This real and free agreement takes away all problems of majority and minority votes and of compulsion, and so removes a potent source of division, weakness and discontent. All are convinced with heart and soul that there is only one truth, one supreme Absolute, and that is God. All are ready to give their whole strength that His will may be done: His will that is shown to us through Christ. This conviction brings an activity of love and service that cannot be expressed only within the group.

The community also offers help through its social work. As soon as the community settled in Paraguay, our three doctors began medical work among our neighbours: Paraguayans from nearby villages and Mennonite settlers from Europe. Soon a small hospital was built. Paraguay is poor and living conditions bad, and there is little knowledge of how to treat illness. Cases are frequently left too long and are then brought perhaps many miles to the hospital by jolting wagons. As people gain confidence in our doctors, the work with in-and out-patients is continually increasing. We need more doctors and nurses to serve this wide area where there is no other medical help available.

From its very beginning the Community has received orphan children and cared for them and educated them together with the children of our own families. Directly the war in Europe ended in 1946, plans and preparations were made to bring sixty orphaned children from the devastated lands of Central Europe and to look after them here in a Children's Village especially built and equipped. Two of our brothers went to Europe in 1947 to select the children, but, although they were able to choose as many children as we could receive, the whole scheme was rejected. In 1948 two brothers were once again in Germany, and it is now possible for ten children to come for three years to the Wheathill Bruderhof in England. While these brothers were in Germany, it

was decided, on reading their reports, to receive a number of displaced persons in Primavera. For this purpose our brothers visited D.P. camps and interviewed people who wished to come to us. One hundred and fourteen people of all ages, among them war widows and their children, sailed from Bremerhaven on October 7th and arrived in Primavera in the early days of November. A strenuous building program was undertaken to house them as they arrived, and the area of agricultural land is being greatly increased. They come from Russia, Poland and the Baltic States, and their coming has added to the already strongly international character of the community. We now have representatives of seventeen nationalities among us [two more than in I.R.O.!] Talks at mealtimes must often be translated into three languages: Russian or Spanish, German and English. It is too early as yet to say how these new helpers will find their feet among us. Their coming has brought us face to face with the problems of human life in Europe: the continual nightmare pressure of fear and distrust, national antipathies, the loss of freedom and normal relationships, the ingrained discontent, especially among the youth, but also there is often generosity and a strong sense of comradeship. We hope that the New Year will bring us to a progressively better understanding one of another.

With the widening rift between East and West, the constant menace of renewed war, and the hunger and distress of millions of people, fettered and dispossessed, it is imperative for each one to consider which type of social order shall claim his allegiance. The rift between East and West is beyond our individual power to close, but the gulf between word and deed, ideal and practice is left open at our own responsibility and peril. The signs that this gulf, which is the fundamental one, is closed, are the common interest, the common care one for another, the common purse, the common table: the reality that men can live together in unity. That is the significance of community in the world to-day.

The Brotherhood, Primavera, Alto Paraguay.

EILEEN TAYLOR

Allan Anderson and Herman Arnold, two members of the Hutterite Brotherhood in Paraguay, are now travelling in this country and will remain here through 1949. Any one who wants to know more about the community—or who might be interested in settling there—can get in touch with them at 2410 Wyoming Avenue N. W., Washington 8, D. C.

HERE & NOW:

The Uncommon People

Dwight Macdonald

AS citizens of a mass democracy, we hear a great deal about the Common People and the Common Man. We shouldn't forget, however, that the values for which these symbols stand have been created and are now being preserved, insofar as it is possible to preserve them in an age of total warfare, by the Uncommon People and the Uncommon Man. It is these people, the rebels, the eccentrics, the doers, the humorists, the congenial square pegs who live as though the platitudes about justice and freedom and democracy and the pursuit of pleasure were descriptions of real life: they act, here & now, according to the values which the church-going, law-abiding, Gallup-Poll-reading Common Man dares only to dream about.

This new department is dedicated to three propositions:

- (1) A deed in the hand is worth two manifestos on the bush.
- (2) The individual is *not* powerless, and something *can* be Done About It.
- (3) Human behavior is unpredictable and cuts across class lines: judges sometimes act as decently as pickpockets (see below).

These propositions obviously conflict with the theoretical system that underlies modern progressive thought: Marxism. The point about Marxism today is that it is not a philosophy of rebellion and action but rather one of conformity and quietism. By overstating the determinist element in history and by overemphasizing the role of organized mass action in historical change, Marxism de-

moralizes the individual by making him feel he "can't do anything about it anyway." Thus he becomes ethically irresponsible. I don't mean to suggest that individual action can prevent World War III but simply that there are lots of things an individual can do which make life pleasanter, which illuminate and inspire others, and which may even have a "historical" significance in that they weaken the oppressive social system that imprisons us all.

It is true that one must have a touch of the hero and the martyr to take certain actions which may have very unpleasant consequences: to publicly refuse to submit to the draft in this country, to make the slightest gesture of opposition in the Soviet Union and its satellites. I am in favor of heroes and martyrs, but I don't expect many people to act so, nor do I condemn any one for not acting so. Most of the stories which follow are not about heroes, who are getting pretty scarce these days anyway, but about actions which required only a reasonable degree of courage. What the ambitious young Uncommon Man needs for success in his chosen vocation is: first, to free himself from determinist apathy, and, second, to show a little ingenuity.

There is a natural tendency to react to any given situation in terms of the accepted stereotype. No particular action is expected of an American who is called a "dog" but let him be called a "son-of-a-bitch" (which is, after all, just a more verbose formulation) and he must either force a retraction or perish in the attempt. "When you call me *that*, stranger," drawls the Virginian, in one of the great ham scenes of our literature, "smile!" Our ambitious young Uncommon Man—who is, of course, a pacifist—would attempt to break the stereotype. His reaction might be humorous, or it might be reasonable, or it might be friendly—nothing very inspired occurs to me at the moment, I must confess—but it should above all be *unexpected*. The stereotype in his adversary's mind is that he is a son-of-bitch, i.e., something apart from *me* which will either fight ("The Enemy") or capitulate ("yellow"). This stereotype can be broken only by some reaction which shows that the adversaries are both human beings.* That is, something alive, something which is the opposite of Bergson's definition of the bureaucratic principle: "Complete automatism is only reached in the official who performs his duty like a mere machine, or again in the unconsciousness that marks an administrative regulation working with inexorable fatality and setting itself up as a law of nature." For the living is always individualistic, unpredictable, "eccentric," which is why none of the examples below are drawn from the Soviet Union or the satellite states, where bureaucratism in the uniform of Henry Wallace's Common Man, has reached a pitch that is, as yet, unknown in the West.

The trick, then, is to break the stereotypes—whether of how a husband should react, or how a judge or a scientist

* "If anti-Semitism is to be resolved effectively, there must not be any clash of stereotypes. Pitting one delusional system against its delusional counter-reaction precludes real action and real change. It only creates a vicious circle. In its stead, true and spontaneous interpersonal relationships between individuals must be established." (Bruno Bettelheim: "The Dynamism of Anti-Semitism in Gentile and Jew"; Jour. of Abnormal & Social Psychology, April 1947.)

or a cop or a pickpocket—in such a way as to show that all men are brothers, or at least brothers-in-law. That is, human beings with something in common (their humanity), and hence able to react to each other, if not with perfect brotherly love, at least with brother-in-law love. That is, affectionate criticism, or critical affection, which permits some interchange between the two parties. It is the great object of the Respectables to prevent this interchange: the American patriots of the Dies or D.A.R. variety excommunicate those critical of Free Enterprise; the Kremlin bureaucrats excommunicate those critical of People's Democracy; the Progressive excommunicates the Economic Royalist and the Militarist (excepting Eisenhower) in peacetime and the Enemy in wartime. It is all very depressing.

How exhilarating it is when some one steps outside these dreary boundaries, acts "out of character" for a moment! How confusing to the bureaucrats and the Wise Men! Did not almost every one feel a certain irrational and liberating joy in Truman's victory, a triumph of the Unexpected over the wise men and the wise money? Is it not a characteristic of all great ethical teachers, from Jesus and Socrates to Thoreau and Tolstoy and Gandhi, that they show a wonderful technical facility in devising practical ways to show what unexpected results flow from a consistent adherence to general principles which most of us consider so unexceptionable and commonplace as to be not worth talking about, and certainly not worth doing anything about? Love Thy Neighbor—what could be more tepid, until Jesus and Tolstoy actually try to do it? Return good for evil—what more banal, until Gandhi tries to do it in conflict with the British raj? Plain living and high thinking—how admirable, and unattractive, until Thoreau presents us with his balance sheet of an actual stay on the shores of Walden Pond.

Why are all the good arguments always on the Devil's side? Why are the virtuous expected to behave in a solemn and quite tedious manner? Pacifists, for example, are expected to react seriously to the absurd situations they are constantly being put into; that is, they are expected to behave in the same stereotyped way as their opponents. All too often they do but sometimes they break the stereotype. When the late Lytton Strachey, who was a C.O. in World War I, was asked by his draft board the usual silly question, "What would you do if a German soldier tried to rape your sister?", he threw the hearing into hopeless confusion by replying, in precise donnish tones: "I should endeavor to get between them, sir." And there is the story of the Quaker who was a passenger on a ship that was boarded by pirates. The Quaker quietly observed the fighting with his hands clasped behind his back. At the climactic moment, he slipped up behind the pirate captain, threw his arms about him, and deftly dropped him over the side of the ship, saying in gentle reproach: "Thou hast no business here, friend."

Now for some modern instances:

MR. & MRS. SIMON KLEIN, JR., of Philadelphia, Pa., and MR. & MRS. ALFRED DRIVER, of Cardiff, Wales, have acted reasonably, generously, and decently in a matter involving sex and marriage. This is in such

contradiction to all established custom that it may not be believed. My source is the *N.Y. Daily News* (a fascinating paper, by the way, of high journalistic competence) for October 6, 1948. The *News*, rightly considering this a man-bites-dog item, gave it a three-column headline.

During the last war, an American lieutenant named Klein, stationed in England, saw a good deal of a war widow named Margaret Burns. They lost touch with each other later, and in 1946 she married Alfred Driver, of Cardiff. Last fall, Mr. Klein, now married himself and with two children, wrote Mrs. Driver inviting her to come over and see him, and offering to send her the fare. Mrs. Driver showed the letter to her husband, who said, "Why go, by all means." She went. When she arrived in Philadelphia, Mr. Klein first took her out to meet the wife and kids, then installed her in an apartment hotel. Mrs. Klein is reported to have "highly approved" both the visit—which lasted three weeks—and Mrs. Driver herself. Mrs. Driver said: "I don't see very much of Mr. Klein. I like to go about on my own, and he knows that. He comes to see me, but mostly I walk about, buy little things for the children, try your strange foods, like the great ice cream sundaes, the silly salads and the fruit juices and all. But I really enjoy my little stove—and the electric refrigerator. It frightened me at first—I'd never used one before, you know." As for Mr. Driver, *he* said: "Of course, I told her to go. She deserves such a trip. She's one of the finest wives a fellow could have."

THE KUWAIT OIL COMPANY, a British concern operating in the Middle East, has donated \$100,000 for the relief of Arab refugees from the fighting in Palestine. "Other commercial undertakings which have prospered in their dealings with the Arab countries," comments the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, "might well follow this example." To date, no contributions have been announced from Sinclair, Royal Dutch Shell, Socony-Vacuum, or Standard Oil of N. J.

EARL BALDWIN, Governor of the Leeward Islands, is the Laborite son of the late conservative leader, Stanley Baldwin. He has been summoned to London by Prime Minister Attlee to defend his policies in the Islands; as this is written, the issue is still in doubt. The difficulty is that Lord Baldwin has behaved in office in much too radical a way for the taste of the trade union leaders and Fabian intellectuals who run the British Labor Government. He is extremely popular with the colored population of the Islands, and extremely unpopular with the white sugar planters, for the same reasons: he has improved the school system and has provided scholarships out of his own pocket; he has studied the economy of the Islands and has tried to raise living standards; he backs the unions against the planters; he has consistently and publicly violated the Jim Crow code of the whites, going so far as to dance, at state balls, with girls whose skin is the wrong color. Nor is Earl Baldwin very popular with his fellow-Laborites in London: he calls their colonial policy "a complete mess" and refers to his boss, the Colonial Secretary, as "poor little Creech-Jones." So when the planters turned the heat on in London, it looked like

a good chance to get rid of this embarrassingly democratic Earl, who acted out his socialism instead of just talking about it like a sensible chap. This will take a bit of doing, however, for Lord Baldwin was accompanied to London by two Caribbean labor leaders representing 120,000 workers. "Previous governors," explained one of them, "have been so large that they could not talk to anybody, but Lord Baldwin is not above seeing people in his office, and he often goes about among the people, asking questions." (This last item shows how unfit for Laborite office is the Earl: a bureaucrat never asks questions—unless he knows the answers already.) Lord Baldwin is anxious to get back home quickly: he has a production of *Pinafore*, with an all-native cast, in the works.

THE PICKPOCKETS OF MILAN and *THE HIGHWAYMEN OF BRACCO* are behaving in a way to do honor to the profession. The former keep foreigners' money but are careful to return their private papers and passports (by dropping them in a mailbox), and this despite the fact that in the Paris false-passport mills an American passport is worth up to \$5,000 cash. The latter last spring held up a priest who was taking 10,000 lire in contributions to the famous "children's village" near Pescaria; when he explained this, the bandits freed him, gave him 20,000 lire more, and invited him to found another children's village near Bracco, their home town, which they promised to support in magnificent style.

LESLIE KIRBY, a London carpenter, last winter built himself a four-room house to shelter his wife, two children, and an aged mother-in-law. This commonplace action brought Kirby into conflict with the whole bureaucrat apparatus that governs Britain in the name of socialism; he had been refused a building permit, and without a permit no one is supposed to build so much as a chicken coop. Kirby didn't see why he shouldn't have a permit, since he was going to use mostly second-hand material, since the labor was all his own, and since he desperately needed the house, so he went ahead and built it. The newspapers reported the case, and Kirby began to get sacks of letters from sympathizers all over England.

On May 3 the showdown began. A Government surveyor and a wrecking crew appeared at Kirby's new house; the neighbors gathered around and reasoned with the wreckers, who finally refused to do the job. The next day the surveyor showed up with another crew and with a gang of movers to take out Kirby's furniture. The crowd was larger and even more unsympathetic. The surveyor had to get the local cop to clear the way to the door. Then the furniture men rebelled: "Dammit," said their leader, "we won't do this bloody job." Amid cheers, they climbed back in their truck and rode off. The same thing happened with the men who were supposed to cut off the electricity. And finally, after a furious argument with the surveyor, the new wrecking crew walked off the job. "To hell with you," said their foreman, "It's a dirty job and me and my men won't do it." There was no third attempt: at this point, the officials just forgot about Leslie Kirby and his strictly illegal house.

PASTOR ADALBERT KNEES, now of the British Military Prison in Bielefeld, has been preaching sermons for several years protesting about Allied occupation policies, especially the forced migration from East Germany, the "Jim Crow" treatment of Germans by the Allied forces, and the dismantling of industrial plants. His sermons—one of which appears in the latest issue of the London magazine, *Contemporary Issues*—are eloquent and hard-hitting, he cannot see that the British and Americans are behaving in Germany like the Christian nations they profess to be. He has even gone so far as to suggest a campaign of non-violent resistance, on Gandhian lines, to the German population. After trying to silence him by putting him away for a while in a mental institution, the British authorities last fall arrested him—after a particularly stormy mass meeting the Pastor had addressed—and are now holding him in prison. Readers who feel sympathy for the Pastor's courageous stand, as I do, might write him c/o High Court Registry, Vereinhaus, Bahnhofstrasse, 67 H.Q., C.C.G., Bielefeld, BAOR 15, Germany.

The Bochum case might also be mentioned here: last December, seven young German workers refused to help dismantle a factory of the Bochumer Verein which was to be shipped out of the country as reparations. (Apparently, the British M.G. is able to order Germans to work on a given job, and, if they refuse, to put them in jail. This is called "slave labor" when it is practiced in Russia.) The Bochum workers are the first to refuse to tear down their country's industry; they have been sentenced to two months jail, lest the infection spread. The best hope for a democratic Germany is for individual citizens to dare to act, non-violently, against the occupation authorities when they are ordered to do something that is against their conscience. Indeed, it is precisely the Germans' failure to resist such injustice under Hitler which is criticised by the very same people who now are shocked when Allied injustice is similarly resisted.

NORBERT WIENER, Professor of Mathematics at M.I.T., is a leading American mathematician. His new book, *Cybernetics*, is having an extraordinary sale for a technical work; its success has been compared to that of the Kinsey Report. But so far I have seen no mention, in the press, of the fact that two years ago Dr. Wiener was also much in the public eye—because of his letter, printed in the January, 1947, *Atlantic* and partially reprinted in *POLITICS* (May-June, 1947), refusing to give certain technical information to a colleague who was working on guided missiles. "... The policy of the government itself during and after the war, say in the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has made it clear," wrote Dr. Wiener, "that to provide scientific information is not a necessarily innocent act and may entail the gravest consequences. ... If, therefore, I do not wish to participate in the bombing or poisoning of defenseless people—and I most certainly do not—I must take a serious responsibility as to those to whom I disclose my scientific ideas. ... I rejoice at the fact that my material is not readily available, inasmuch as it gives me the opportunity to raise this serious moral issue." Thus Dr. Wiener, in the most direct

and simple way, recognized he is a man first, a scientist afterward. To no one's surprise, Henry Luce's arguseyed newshawks last month told all about Dr. Wiener to *Time's* hydraheaded readership but forgot to mention *that*. For *that*, space lacked, but not for eyepopping news that chunky spadebearded Dr. Wiener reads many a detective story, is charter member of Boston's famed Sherlock Holmes Club.

Two related items may be touched on here: (1) apparently Dr. Wiener is not alone; at least, the *N.Y. Times* of February 18 reported an address before a meeting of teachers by Sumner Pike, of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, saying that "the entire field of atomic energy faces an overall shortage of qualified personnel" and denouncing current "unhealthy attitudes on the subject of the atom" which "range from hysteria to apathy." (2) One also recalls the splendid action of the late Max Planck, founder of quantum mechanics, when in 1934, an old man of 76, he went personally to Hitler to protest the persecution of the Jews. (Hitler turned his back while he talked.) As a result, Planck was removed from his honorary posts and officially boycotted.

MICHAEL F. COSTELLO, High Sheriff of Providence and Bristol Counties in Rhode Island, is a great believer in the family. This is not strikingly original, nor is the Sheriff's evaluation any more so: "The way I feel is that I am doing something to build the security of the family, and I am doing a wonderful thing." What is original is that he has done something, or rather failed to do something, that, in the present housing shortage, families are not doing. Up permanently after they were evicted, Sheriff Costello told his deputies to stop evicting people. For three months last summer Providence and Bristol counties were landlord's hell: ejectment cases piled up higher and higher without action; lawyers tried to force action by writs of mandamus and other strong medicine; judges uneasily admonished the Sheriff, while paying respect to his "humaneness and ideals." When he was finally forced to put the machinery of law & order into (slow) motion, the Sheriff had another practical idea: he put ads in the local papers asking landlords to inform him of vacant quarters and telling his "clients" (that is, the families he was forced to reluctantly evict) where they could find other housing. The ads are paid for out of his own pocket.

THE GOVERNMENT OF NEW ZEALAND has offered to admit 1,000 refugees from Europe, but on the strict conditions that they are (a) either orphans, widows, or aged persons, and (b) of no economic use whatever to the country.

WILLIS MEADE EVERETT, Jr., a lawyer of Atlanta, Ga., was appointed defense counsel for 73 German officers and soldiers who were tried in 1946 for the massacre of captured American soldiers at Malmedy, during the Battle of the Bulge. The evidence was strong, and there were confessions, besides; most of the defendants were sentenced to death. But one person was not satisfied: Everett. He had discovered that, to get confessions, the prosecution

"had applied various forms of torture, including the driving of burning matches under the prisoners' fingers; had administered beatings which resulted in broken jaws and arms and permanently injured testicles"; had used trickery (mock death sentences by a mock court), lies, and threats (including such Nazi-Soviet devices as threatening to penalize the prisoners' families). For two years, Everett carried on, at his own expense, an appeal to have the death sentences commuted to life imprisonment. His argument was not that the defendants were necessarily innocent, but that the tactics of the prosecution were so reprehensible, by the standards of American law, as to make the confessions, on which the verdicts were mainly based, of dubious value. Last summer, as a result of Everett's persistence, an Army Commission was set up to review the sentences; it sustained Everett, and recommended commutation of the death sentences. As this goes to press, General Clay, who has already commuted most of them, is considering the Commission's recommendations. It is good that we still have in this country a machinery of law—and of military law at that—which is sensitively enough attuned to justice to be thrown into reverse by the determined (and documented) efforts of a single individual with a conscience. And that we can still produce the individual with a conscience.

CLEON K. CALVERT, a Kentucky legislator, recently had a hangover and missed the next day's session: "I fine the court drunk yesterday."

HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the United States of America, was practically the only man in the country who thought he had a right to be re-elected last fall. He acted with vigor on this unpopular, not to say solipsistic, belief, with results that are now History. If Mr. Truman, whose best friends don't accuse him of any exceptional talents, could do it, there is hope for all of us to some day join the Uncommon People. Harry S. Truman is hereby nominated for Most-Uncommon-Common-Man-of-the-Year.

BACK ISSUES

The following back issues are available at 15c each: May, July, and September in 1944; June, July and December in 1945; February, March, July, August, September, October, November and December in 1946; January, May-June, and July-August in 1947; Winter, 1948.

All of the above may be had for \$2.50 the set

The following issues cost 50c each: April, November and December in 1944; May, August, September, and October in 1945; January, April, and May in 1946; Spring and Summer in 1948.

Two complete sets (all issues) are available, at \$30 each.

We will pay \$1 a copy for the March, 1944, and March, 1945, issues. We will pay 50c a copy for: June, 1944; October, 1944; January, 1945; and November, 1945.

Report on Packages Abroad

On December 17, we sent out 2400 leaflets ("You and Packages Abroad") explaining our project and asking for help. We went to *POLITICS* subscribers and to package senders. This has brought us in \$667 in cash, over half of it from people who had given before; this sum was contributed by 29 people. In addition, another 30 people sent us clothes or "adopted" families whom they promised to supply with regular packages.

We still have 57 families who need regular packages. The largest category is that of single people who are too old or too sick to get along by themselves; these remain because most requests are for families with children. We have not yet been able to supply that saxophone, and we now have a new appeal for a hearing aid, from a teacher, who will lose her job and livelihood if she does not get it. (\$75 would get her an inexpensive but efficient hearing aid.) We have just sent off some streptomycin to a TB victim in Spain. We have helped 3 families go to Venezuela, and are trying to get 4 more to Canada. And our office is full of the smell of camphor from a great pile of 20 packages of clothes ready to be mailed to Europe tomorrow.

We are planning a series of lectures to be given in New York shortly to raise some money to carry on through the summer (see below). And in the meantime, we hope that some of you will dig in a again and do what you can to help us with those 57 families whose needs torment my conscience.

NANCY MACDONALD

P.S. We still have about 1500 of the "You and Packages Abroad" leaflets available for free distribution, and will be delighted to send bundles, postpaid, to readers who will let us know how many they can profitably use.

Four Lecture-Discussion Meetings for the Benefit of "Packages Abroad"

at 8:30, RAND SCHOOL AUDITORIUM, 7 East 15th St
ADMISSION: 75 CENTS

Friday, April 15

BERTRAM D. WOLFE

Author of "Three Who Made a Revolution"

Josef Stalin, the Man and his Place in History

Friday, April 29

KARL WITTFOGEL

Director of Columbia University's
Chinese History Project

The Historical Meaning of Chinese Communism

Thursday, May 12

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.

Author of "The Age of Jackson"

Truman—Heir or Epigone of the New Deal?

Thursday, May 19

DWIGHT MACDONALD

Editor of "Politics"

Goodbye to Utopia