

SCIENCE FOR THE PEOPLE



50¢

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PICTURE CREDITS:

pg. 3	Arbolito
pg. 7	M.B. Schnapper, <i>American Labor</i> , Public Affairs Press 1972
pg. 9	Partisan Press Service
pg. 17	NACLA, <i>New Chile</i>
pg. 19	Cecelia Vrrutia, <i>Los Invertores Obreros</i> , Quimantu 1973
pg. 24	Alan Drew
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pg. 35	Thomas Hertzen, <i>Guardian</i>
pg. 37	Armand Puz, <i>La Mujer Chilena</i> , Quimantu, 1973
Cover	Partisan Press Service

EDITORIAL PRACTICE

Each issue of *Science for the People* is prepared by a collective, assembled from volunteers by a committee made up of the collectives of the past calendar year. A collective carries out all editorial, production, and distribution functions for one issue. The following is a distillation of the actual practice of the past collectives. **Due dates:** Articles received by the first week of an odd-numbered month can generally be considered for the magazine to be issued on the 15th of the next month. **Form:** One of the ways you can help is to submit double-spaced typewritten manuscripts with ample margins. If you can send six copies, that helps even more. One of the few founding principles of *SESPA* is that articles must be signed (a pseudonym is acceptable). **Criteria for acceptance:** *SESPA Newsletter*, predecessor to *Science for the People*, was pledged to print everything submitted. It is no longer feasible to continue this policy, although the practice thus far has been to print all articles descriptive of *SESPA/Science for the People* activities. Considerably more discrimination is applied to analytical articles. These are expected to reflect the general political outlook of *Science for the People*. All articles are judged on the basis of length, style, subject and content. **Editorial Procedure:** The content of each issue is determined by unanimous consent of the collective. Where extensive rewriting of an article is required, the preference of the collective is to discuss the changes with the author. If this is not practical, reasons for rejection are sent to the author. An attempt is made to convey suggestions for improvement. If an article is late or excluded for lack of space, or if it has non-unanimous support, it is generally passed on to the next collective. **Editorial statements:** Unsigned articles are statements of the editorial collective. **Opportunities for participation:** Volunteers for editorial collectives should be aware that each issue requires a substantial contribution of time and energy for an eight-week period. Help is always appreciated and provides an opportunity for the helper to learn, and for the collective to get to know a prospective member. There are presently plans to move the magazine production to other cities. This will increase the opportunity for participation. For legal purposes *Science for the People* has become incorporated.

ABOUT THIS ISSUE

In this issue of *SftP* several articles on the Chilean struggle have been collected together with reports of SESPA/SftP activities. While the fortunes of the Chilean people's struggles are very relevant to all people engaged in the same world-wide process, there is additional relevance to SESPA/SftP, since we see our role particularly in relation to the technical workforce. In Chile, the final weeks of dissarray revealed a disastrous split in the working class: large sectors, including not only small truckers, shopkeepers, etc., but also major portions of the technical and professional strata found themselves fighting against the rest of the working class. This should confirm to us that our area of political work is a vital part of any radical solution in America and the rest of the world.

Following an editorial statement outlining some of the lessons of Chile, is a rather extensive section recounting the history of working class struggle in Chile, including an analysis of U.S. economic imperialism in subverting the Allende regime. Against this backdrop is a section describing the structure and experience of workers' control in Chile during the last few years.

It was not until after the coup that the Magazine Coordinating Committee (mc²) decided to focus this issue on Chile, so the magazine has been produced from scratch in five to six weeks—a very short period of time for *SftP*. As a result, our editorial collective (composed mostly of the mc²) is exhausted, having produced the September issue as well, and many of us have been unable to work toward developing future issues of the magazine. We need your help and support to continue. In the past several magazines we have asked for contributions of articles and other materials on various topics (the energy problem, laboratories, actions at scientific meetings, etc.). These are still needed as well as your ideas and criticisms.

Our rush to get this magazine to the printer was due to our wanting to complete the task in time to participate in the Northeast Regional SESPA/SftP conference. We are hoping that the conference will help develop a clearer political perspective for the organization, and are anxious that it contribute as well to clarifying the role of *SftP* in the organization's work. We think the magazine only makes sense as a product as well as an instrument of the members' political practice. Much is yet to be done to make that a reality.

The toppling of President Salvador Allende of Chile contains a forceful lesson that will not be missed by other would-be social revolutionaries, in Chile or elsewhere in both hemispheres of the globe. The lesson they will read is not that Marxism runs contrary to the grain of human nature . . . but that Marxism or socialism or communism cannot achieve political power in a country peacefully or democratically or gradually, but only violently, totally, and suddenly.

—Anderson (Ind.) Bulletin



LETTERS

Dear People,

At the moment I am impoverished. Things go badly when I work. I scrap on \$30 a week. I have hope that things will pick up soon. Will try to pay something then, near \$10, (I want you to be able to publish), but in installments. I will certainly try to spread copies around and get more subscriptions.

Comments: It seems that you are sincerely into self-criticism—and not just as a formality—that is impressive.

—Don't shy away from being technical—people can learn if it is believed that they can and if it is explained—to avoid it is to reinforce the scientific aura.

—Be careful not to talk down to people—to oversimplify analysis. Many radical newspapers & magazines assume that working people are stupid and so are patronizing. So far I like what I see.

Sincerely,
Colleen Crotty
Cincinnati, Ohio

Dear SESPA,

I just read Jonathan Beckwith's SCIENCE FOR THE PEOPLE talk in the *Annals of the N.Y. Academy of Sciences* [vol 106, p.236-240 (1972)]. I was delighted to see such a statement and would like to receive your literature. I am in N.Y. MCHR and I think the medical students especially would like to receive your analyses re: science education. I saw a book by Dwight Ingle called *Who Should Have Children* on my medical school bookshelves—a simpleminded, clearly written prescription to involve doctors in racist ideology—sterilization etc. Also saw a movie *Blood of the Condor** a Bolivian film about Peace Corps sterilization of Indians. I would very much appreciate any writings you have or even references re: population control—from a socialist analysis. I am enclosing \$5 for any literature, mailings etc. Let me know if you have a newsletter, magazine etc to subscribe to.

Looking forward to hearing from you,

Linda D. Green, M.D.
New York, N.Y.

*available from: TRICONTINENTAL FILM CENTER
244 W. 27th St., New York, N.Y. 10001

Dear Friends,

Enclosed with many thanks is \$1.50 for the three issues of *Science for the People* which you recently sent to us. While we have always preferred action to theoretical discussion, the time has come (the walrus said) for us to do some disciplined thinking on the political vein, especially in regard to setting up Common Stock . . . both the content and the format of the Gorz dialogue has been very helpful [see *SftP* vol. V, no. 3, May 1973].¹

The only question I have about it is the language: in sharing your issue with some friends who are not what you would call in the mainstream of political activism, the strong Marxist line has been a bit alienating . . . but once digested for content and not semantics, has opened up a lot of discussion.

Thanks . . .

In the struggle,
Mollie Babize
Newton, Massachusetts

*** SPECIAL REPORT ***

The Nobel Prize Committee yesterday announced the 1973 Nobel Prizes in a short ceremony in Stockholm. The Literature Prize was awarded to Rod McKuen, the Economics Prize to the Penn Central Railroad, the Medicine Prize to the Christian Science Church, the Physics Prize to the Flat Earth Society. And the Peace Prize went to Henry Kissinger.

—MIT Thursday

Dear Comrades,

. . . We wish to extend our support and solidarity to you in getting the Northeast Regional Conference together, and for its success. As far as we can tell if the meeting is held after the 1st of October we would be able to send someone to participate, so as to help in developing communication and political understanding with the east.

If people are beginning to think in terms of a national meeting sometime in the future, regional meetings of this kind will be of great value in contributing to its planning and politics. We in the Midwest have had several meetings, and depending on future developments, should be having another later this year or early next. It would be of benefit if all the different regions could organize meetings over the next year. Possibly as a part of these meetings, some basic issues and/or workshops could be put together and agreed upon, that would be national in perspective. Many of the topics you suggest in your letter are ones we have been discussing also. We feel the most important subject is that of our political directions. . .

If you wish to give us some direction for discussion on some of these things, or others, one of us will possibly be coming out [east] around the end of August. This will afford the chance for more discussion. We feel the magazine has become politically much more relevant and responsive, and this is a healthy development for many. . .

Solidarity,
Wayne, for SVN/SftP
Minneapolis

Friends:

Please excuse the very tardy delay in my response to the letter of June 26 about a northeastern regional meeting of SESPA this coming fall. As I am in the midwest, and did not see the possibility of attending such a meeting myself, I simply put off the job of answering. Now, however, that a western regional meeting (with adjuncts from other parts of the country) is being planned for August 25 in Berkeley [see report on p.42], I thought I ought to at least reply by endorsing the northeastern regional.

From my recent experience in SESPA it is clear to me that a series of regional meetings would be particularly valuable at this point in time. SESPA is growing and incorporating increasingly large numbers of people. There was a time when most of us got to know each other through the Christmas AAAS (American Association for the Advancement of Science) gathering and actions. That seems less likely to be possible as time goes on. There is real value in the members of the group having periodic personal contact with one another to exchange ideas, revise our thinking, and simply develop new friendships.

Most important, however, regional meetings allow the mapping out of more long-range and cohesive objec-

tives of SESPA. Many chapters are still small and need to have direct contact with what other groups are doing. This cannot be done exclusively through the magazine, or by the frantic once-a-year contact at the AAAS or other such meetings. SESPA needs some time to itself. In this way, too, I think it would be possible to develop more constant and concrete input from different people and chapters into the magazine. The idea of revising methods of putting the magazine together seems important at this time, to include more people. I think one reason the job has remained in the Boston area so far, however, is the larger concentration of people there to carry out what appears to be a rather major operation every two months.

Good luck with the conference. Hope to see many of you at the AAAS meeting [San Francisco, February, 1974].

In struggle,
Gar Allen
St. Louis, Missouri

Dear Boston SftP,

. . . I would be interested in hearing about any impressions that the Boston delegation brought back about the SESPA meeting...[see report p.42] I was disappointed that a cleaner political discussion of the objectives of SESPA did not emerge. I would attribute this partly to the way the meeting was structured—reports from the locals in the morning with some time for discussion afterwards and workshops in the afternoon. The discussion was as unstructured as the reports, and when some NCLC [National Caucus of Labor Committees] representatives tried to raise the significant issue of elitism and the lack of a working class orientation in SESPA (admittedly in a divisive way), Charlie Schwartz used his position as chairman to prevent any debate. My own feeling is that if SESPA is to develop a consistent political line, it will be necessary to plan for sharply focused debate and discussion in future meetings . . .

Power to the People,
Pierre Noyes
Stanford, California

LETTERS continued on page 46



LEARNING FROM HISTORY

CHILEAN STRUGGLE and the U.S. LEFT

Addressing Chile's Congress, Allende referred to the circumstances of Russia in 1917, of the examples of the Soviet Union and China. He was no academic, no theorist, he was a practical man who considered himself no more nor less than an instrument of the struggle of the Chilean working class. To be able to contribute toward understanding and acting on the particular problems of the Chilean struggle, he and his comrades armed themselves with an understanding of the historic struggles of the working class throughout Latin America and the world.

It is this sense of history and awareness of one's role as subject in a world-historic process that accounts for the optimism of Allende, Lenin, Marx, and the unnamed millions that have played an inspirational, leading role in the struggle. And it is within this context that we in the U.S. left must evaluate the Chilean experience. By grasping the scope of the accelerating world revolution of which we are a part, we can overcome the sense of isolation fostered by the fragmented nature of our local struggles. Only then can we see the military coup, the murder in Chile, the burning of books, as a battle lost in a war which we all are winning and have been winning for 150 years despite lost battles, setbacks, and occasional retrenchments.

Who today would deny the inspiration to world revolution of the Paris Commune of 1871, a working class victory that was brutally smashed by the military in a blood-letting that drenched the streets of Paris with the blood of 100,000 workers? The Russian workers, educated and inspired by the Parisian struggle, created the Soviets in 1905 and achieved victory in October 1917. But how many in the U.S. know that they are heirs to the struggle of the workers of Paris in 1871, of the workers in St. Petersburg in 1917, and of the workers in Colorado in 1904? How many of us knew anything at all about Chile, about struggle in the Americas, before Allende was elected, before the coup?

If we do not know that the largest general strike in this century in North America occurred in Quebec two

years ago, a strike in which men struck for demands which primary beneficiaries were women, radio stations were occupied, socialism was the slogan, then we will despair if the police break a few heads. If we do not know of the occupation and worker self-management of a factory in Besancon, France this year, or in Sheffield, England three years ago, or of the occupations at Fiat in Italy, etc.; then we will not have confidence in the workers' capability and motivation to take what is theirs and run things without the capitalists and the parasitic managers. If we do not know of the three quarter century long struggles of the Chilean working class, of the growth of class consciousness, then we will despair at the coup or be unable to interpret the electoral victory of the Popular Unity [see the chronology, pg. 10].

The immediate lessons of recent Chilean history are not the same for all, but are dependent on the economic, political, and social conditions in each country and on the state of organization, numbers, and class base of the movement. For the U.S. left, the lesson of the Chilean struggle is in the *process* that led to the electoral victory of the Popular Unity in 1970, the growth of consciousness, and the revolutionary changes that were brutally and abruptly terminated on September 11, 1973. We must discover what made it possible for all this (that we cannot yet imagine here) to take place.

At the many rallies that became a way of life after the first attempt at counterrevolution in June, an increasingly popular sign carried by the workers was "This Government is shit, but it is my Government." Where did such class consciousness come from? Where did such nonsectarianism come from that workers could clearly distinguish between disagreements among themselves and irreconcilable class conflict between themselves and the ruling class? How is it that with virtually every newspaper and radio/T.V. station against the Popular Unity (U.P.) and the working class, 44% of the vote went to the U.P.? How did it come to pass that the major party of the capitalists, the Christian Democrats, had to pay lip service to many points of the working class program in order to get Eduardo Frei elected in 1964? The answer to these and many similar questions are what we of the U.S. left must seek in our study of the history of the Chilean working class. We also must break the thorough dominance of the ideology of capitalism over all aspects of the lives of our people. We also must participate in and give guidance if we can to the development of class consciousness and nonsectarian solidarity.

There was no singular event, no single factor, not even a single political party or union that made the events of 1970-73 possible. They were the result of a long history of class struggle in which the Chilean working class learned many brutal lessons: the massacre at Iquique (2,000 workers were killed in 1907), the Punta Arenas massacre (3,000 killed in 1925), the Santiago riots of April, 1957, etc. There were significant periods of political repression: the Communist Party was outlawed in the periods 1925-35 and 1948-58. Yet the overall development was in concert with the world-wide development

of working class consciousness and awareness of the necessity for socialism. Some of these events are similar to the history of the U.S. workers' movement in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. A most significant difference is that in Chile there was a "union of Marxist theory and the national workers' movement."* The activity of the working class itself on its own behalf was joined with the placing of "politics in command." This is essential in our struggle as well.

Allende, as a medical student, "lived in a very humble district...[the radical medical students] lived with the people, most of us were from the provinces and those of us who lived in the same hostel used to meet at night for reading of *Das Kapital*, Lenin, and also Trotsky."* Gene Debs, U.S. railroad worker, cast into prison for his militant participation in the class struggle, there read Marx and Engels and became an important contributor to the formation of the political organizations of the U.S. working class. During the 1937 sit-down strike of auto workers in Flint, Michigan, graduate students were invited to give talks on U.S. labor history and other subjects. When this pattern of self-education of the working class is thorough, it is an instrument for the development of class consciousness. It buoys the optimism and supports the sense of history that are necessary for the class to become the maker of its own destiny, the prime agent of contemporary history.

* Debray, 1971. See Bibliography, pg. 23.

In Chile the process of revolutionary struggle created a new culture, a culture which not only contains the historic examples of alternative institutions, of workers' councils, and factory schools, but which also contains the lessons of struggle, of mistakes and their correction, and of victory. It is the true counter-culture, the heritage of a century and a half of battle, which teaches of the *reconcilable* nature of the differences among *ourselves* and the *irreconcilable* conflict between the working class and capitalists.

There are other lessons of Chile important for our future struggles. We must ask, along with the leftist Chilean workers what are the limits of electoral politics? What does it mean to leave armed a military that served the old ruling class and not to arm the workers? What kind of law and order is it that restrains the take-over of land and factories but lets the petit bourgeoisie cripple the economy? What kind of mass organizations are necessary to unite the working class without the pitfalls of the bureaucratic left parties?

No formula will provide the answers to these questions. If we do not know the answers to the problems of our revolution as they arise, then we must know the method of getting them. The textbook of revolution is history. The struggle of the Chilean workers is one part. The conclusions they will draw from their experience are yet to come. That will be another.



Striking Colorado miners, still determined after Ludlow massacre, 1914.

CHILE

BECAUSE WE LOVE LIFE

Because we love life
we can fight to the death

We want it to be known
to be well understood, so that no one is mistaken
that these words circulate in our blood
and course through our bodies and into our hearts
where they are repeated day after day
in voices muffled and profound

Because we love life
we can fight to the death

We want it to be known
we want everyone on earth to listen to us carefully
and know that every person here carries
these ten words written on his forehead, floating
in his pupils, sheltered
in the nests of his clenched fists

We want it to be known
that here no one is blind
here no one walks with his eyes closed
nobody stumbles around in the darkness
or calls Ulysses; there are no sirens
here we all know the way
and the price of the passage
here we all say

because we love life
because we love
everything we have caressed
that which has existed
for eternities (the alchemy of dreams)
and those things which are so close
so much our own undiluted
in our blood the jubilation
limited to a certain name
or a few family names
the cultivated manners
which are so mysteriously congruent
with the pulse of our own hearts,
we can fight to the death

We want it to be known
to be well understood so that no one is mistaken
that here we can all say

Because we love life
because we love
the light of the patio, the sun on the eaves
that twisted branch of the orange tree
beside the well
the humble stones of a nameless street
so distant that it seems to enter
into the mythology of the soul.
We can fight to the death

We want it to be known
We want everyone on earth to listen
Here no one is blind
Here we all know

We know, yes we know
that it is possible to snap
the slender wire that strings together
life's small moments . . . unknowing
and banal, insignificant, alien
belonging to others . . . here
in this solitary universe
a nostalgic territory, our own.
All this, in a game
both fateful and cruel, can be
suddenly exposed and lost

We know
here no one walks with his eyes closed
here no one is blind
here we all have our cars tuned in
to the beating of our hearts.
That is the voice that orders and directs
and gives us our sentence

Because we love life
because we love
things that happy hands
create and build
without thinking that it is all
made for those who
have not yet been born

To death we will fight
to defend life

—Felix Pita Rodriguez

A HISTORY OF IMPERIALISM AND STRUGGLE

In this section:

A CHRONOLOGY 1847-1970

PRELUDE TO A COUP

An Analysis from Chile

QUICK COUP OR

SLOW STRANGULATION

U.S. Economic Imperialism

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Allende was overthrown, but leftist slogan—"for our country and revolution"—stands as warning to the fascists

A CHRONOLOGY: 1847-1970

In compiling the chronology, we tried to include those facts which could summarize the development of political awareness of the working class and its participation in the Chilean leftist political organizations which made the electoral victory possible. This way of describing a historical process cannot explain the internal struggles from which the facts emerge. The politicization of the working class is seen in terms of strikes and elections, rather than the daily struggles which gave rise to those strikes and the growth of working class political parties. Allende's government has been dismantled but the power of a politically deep-rooted working class cannot be dissolved. The coup can be seen as another Iquique Massacre—a starting point for defining better tactics which will lead to final victory.

*Much of this chronology was taken from **New Chile, 1973 Edition**, published by the North American Congress on Latin America. This book is an excellent source of information on the first three years of Allende's presidency. It can be obtained from NACLA, Box 226, Berkeley, California or Box 57, Cathedral Station, New York, New York. Other sources used were: **The Chilean Revolution, Conversations with Allende**, by Regis Debray; **Latin America, Reform or Revolution**, by James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin; **Latin American Radicalism**, edited by Irving Louis Horowitz, Josue de Castro and John Gerassi; and "Chile: Struggle for Socialism" from the **Guardian**, special supplement, June 1972.*

1847 Establishment of the *Sociedad de artesanos*, the first workers' association on the continent. Lacking class consciousness, this was primarily a fraternal organization.

1890 The country's first general strike spread from Iquique, a northern mining area, throughout the country.

1903 First strike of port workers in Valparaiso.

1906 Luis Emilio Recabarren, a linotype operator and the first working class Socialist leader, was elected as Deputy from the mining area, Antofagasta.

1907 Iquique Massacre. Ten thousand nitrate miners marched through Iquique demanding higher wages, higher safety standards at work, and an end to the exploitation of company stores. Machine gunned by the militia, 2,000 men, women, and children were killed. At this time the nitrate mines were owned largely by the British.

The first social legislation actually put into practice was the "Law of Sunday Rest".

1908 The Chilean Workers Federation (FOCH) was founded as a mutual aid society by conservatives.

1911-1920 This period witnessed 293 strikes involving 150,000 workers.

1912 Initiating the Left's long electoral struggle toward socialism, Recabarren founded the first working class political party, the Socialist Workers Party.

1919 FOCH, which had become a militant industrial trade union, called for the abolition of capitalism and became affiliated with the Communist International Trade Union Movement which had been organized in Moscow. By this time FOCH was the major workers' organization with 136,000 members, 37% of whom were miners.

The miners took the leadership in an early attempt at

rural organization. In 1919 an abortive effort was made to mobilize the *inquilinos* (tenant farm workers) into a nationwide federation in the Cometa region in the Aconcagua Valley.

1920 The Liberal Alliance's presidential candidate, Arturo Alessandri (whose son opposed Allende in 1970) was elected president. Supported by the middle class and by some sectors of the working class, Alessandri was the first president to try to win political power by mobilizing the masses on the basis of a socio-economic program. The middle-class hegemony which followed this election produced many changes in Chilean life; nevertheless, conditions for the masses remained difficult, and throughout the twenties the parties of the Left began to grow.

1921 The Chilean Socialist Workers Party, founded by Recabarren in 1912, became the Communist Party of Chile (PC) and joined the Third International. Though Communist Parties had been organized in other parts of Latin America, only in Chile was the PC a workers' party in origin as well as in ideology.

1925 After three years of discussion, the Senate adopted a Labor Code remarkable for its time, as well as a series of laws on the eight hour day, labor contracts, occupational accidents and trade union law.

Coruna massacre. Three thousand workers were killed in the saltpetre mines.

The Communist Party was outlawed under the presidency of Arturo Alessandri.

1927 In his first bid for the presidency, Carlos Ibanez obtained 98% of the votes and inaugurated the government known as the "Ibanez dictatorship".

1930's A broad militant movement of peasant unionization developed, supported by sectors of the urban working class; the movement was violently repressed by the state and politically defused by the electoral strategy that the leftist parties adopted during the Popular Front.

June 4-16, 1932 The Socialist Republic of Marmaduke Grove. A socialist government was established by a revolutionary movement headed by Colonel Marmaduke Grove (military leader) and Eugenio Matte (civil leader). Under the slogan "Bread, a Roof and Shelter", the new anti-imperialist government embarked on a series of measures in the interests of the dispossessed. The program of the revolutionaries did not, however, attempt either the socialization of the means of production or the confiscation of large fortunes. Moreover, the government did not depend decisively on the workers to mobilize its program. After twelve days the "republic" was overthrown by a *coup d'etat*.

December, 1932 Arturo Alessandri was elected president with 163,744 votes over Marmaduke Grove's 60,621. Alessandri had grown more conservative and presided over a repressive government which banished and imprisoned leftist leaders. The repression which eventually alienated even the Radicals furthered the creation of a united leftist opposition. (The Radical Party has traditionally represented the center in Chilean politics, expressing the hopes of a growing middle class.)

April 19, 1933 Founding of the Socialist Party of Chile. Like the PC the Socialist Party was Marxist and drew its support from the workers. Allende, one of its founders, explained:

...we believed that there was a place for a Party which, while holding similar views in terms of philosophy and doctrine [as the PC]—a Marxist approach to the interpretation of history—would be a Party free of ties of an international nature. However, this did not mean that we would disavow proletarian internationalism.

1935-1936 A growing fascist threat favored the development of an alliance between the workers and the bourgeois democratic forces. In March, 1936 a Popular Front was formed by the Radical, Communist, Socialist, and several smaller parties as well as the Chilean Labor Federation. The Front was dominated by the Radical Party and pushed for the defense of democratic liberties and some economic reforms.

Sept., 1938 An attempted coup by Chile's small Nazi Party resulted in severe repression and the imprisonment of presidential candidate Ibanez who had been implicated in the coup. In retaliation Ibanez instructed his followers to support the Popular Front candidate over Alessandri's chosen successor, Gustave Ross.

December, 1938 As the presidential candidate for the Popular Front, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, a member of the Radical Party, won a 4,000 vote victory. Reformist in nature, the Cerda government inaugurated some social legislation, but the upper and middle classes ultimately benefitted more than the workers. The administration's real importance lay in the opportunity it gave the Socialists and Communists to pursue their organizing activities. During 1939 and 1940 the number of unions and unionized workers grew rapidly,

and farm workers' unions appeared for the first time.

1942 A Radical, Juan Antonio Rios was elected president with the support of the Communist and Socialist Parties. Moderate reforms were accomplished, but the income of the working class increased only 1% per year.

January, 1943 Shortly after the U.S. entered WWII, Chile broke relations with Japan and Germany and was rewarded by the U.S. in the form of Lend-Lease arrangements and Export-Import Bank Loans.

1946 Due to the death of President Rios, new elections were held and Gabriel Gonzalez Videla was elected with Communist support. He assigned three Communists to his eleven-man cabinet.

April, 1947 In the municipal elections, the Communists received 71% of the coal miners' vote, 63% of the nitrate workers' vote, and 55% of the vote of the copper workers. Nationally, in contrast, they received only 18% of the vote. The Communists drew their support largely from unionized labor rather than the peasantry. Until 1937 farm worker unions were illegal and severely repressed. In fact, as late as 1965 there were officially only 20 farm workers' unions, with 2,000 members nationwide.

1948 President Videla, under pressure from imperialism and the national bourgeoisie, dismissed his three Communist ministers. The vacancies were filled by three Socialist Party leaders. He broke with the Communist Party on the alleged grounds of international conspiracy and promulgated the Law in Defense of Democracy, starting the bloody repression of Communist militants. The Law in Defense of Democracy was conceived as a means to outlaw the Communist Party, which remained illegal for the next ten years. The party's 40,000-50,000 members were struck from the voting registers and many leaders were deported or jailed. The Communist Party continued organizational activities underground, supporting the Socialist Party and Allende's presidential candidacy in 1952.

1949 Women are enfranchised. Before this time only 10% of the Chilean population voted. By 1957, 19% vote and by 1961, 25%. A literacy clause kept illiterates disenfranchised until after Allende was elected in 1970.

1951-1952 Deteriorating economic conditions led to skyrocketing prices, frequent strikes and demonstrations.

1952 Allende was nominated as presidential candidate for the first time. He was supported by the *Frente del Pueblo*, or People's Front (FRAP), a coalition of the underground Communist Party and a faction of the Socialist Party. Carlos Ibanez, nominated by a conglomeration of independent forces, won 50% of the votes, defeating the three other candidates. Allende received only 5.4% of the vote.

February, 1953 The militant leftist Central Workers' Organization (*Central Unica de Trabajadores*, or CUT) was organized after a long period of division within the leftist workers' ranks. The CUT was a strong supporter of Allende in 1970.

Sept., 1955 The Klein-Saks advisory mission, led by Prescott Carter of the National City Bank and organized by the Washington consulting firm, Klein Saks, released its blueprint for Chilean development. Contracted by President Ibanez, on the urging of Agustin Edwards, one of Chile's most influential oligarchs, the mission recommended reducing social programs, reducing government intervention in the economy, and opening the economy to more foreign investors.

1955 The U.S. Cerro Copper Corporation, with large operations in neighboring Peru, purchased the Rio Blanco Copper Mine.

1956 The Popular Action Front (FRAP), a coalition of the Socialist and Communist Parties, and several smaller parties, was formed. FRAP supported a common slate of candidates at election time and presented a fairly united front against Ibanez' government. Unlike the Popular Front of the 1930's and the Unidad Popular of 1970, FRAP did not include the centrist Radical Party.

1957 Two students were killed in student demonstrations to protest a decision to raise bus fares. This led to large scale riots which included thousands of the urban poor. The army was called in and between 40 and 60 people were killed.

1958 The Defense of Democracy law was repealed and the Communist Party became legal again. The party took an active role in FRAP and supported Allende's presidential campaign. The conservative Jorge Alessandri, son of the past president, was elected. Allende, representing FRAP, lost to Alessandri by only 35,000 votes out of the 1.3 million cast.

Both the Popular Action Front (FRAP) and the Christian Democrats had been organizing peasant unions and advocated programs of agrarian reform. The 1958 elections showed that the Popular Front was penetrating and broadening its support among the farm workers, in part through the diffusion of political awareness from adjacent mining areas.

March 1961 Congressional Elections. The Chileans expressed their discontent with Alessandri's government; FRAP registered a greater increase in voting strength than any other political organization.

1962 Electoral code was revised; voting became legally mandatory for all literate adults. However, 1/5 of the population and 1/3 of the working class were still prohibited from voting by the literacy clause.

Nov. 1962 The first Agrarian Reform Bill was passed. CORA, the agrarian reform agency, was established.

1964 Eduardo Frei, for the Christian Democrats, defeated Salvador Allende, again candidate for FRAP. Frei's campaign was designed to scare the electorate away from Allende. With up to \$1 million per month from U.S. sources*, Frei promised a "Revolution in Liberty" and headed a massive propaganda offensive saying that FRAP

* Bernard Collier, "A Revolution Without the Execution Wall," *The New York Times Magazine*, Feb. 19, 1967.

meant Communism and Communism meant the end of all freedom. Largely because of these scare tactics, Allende lost the election by a wide margin.

Regis Debray said of the Christian Democratic government (1964-70),

Delegated to its post by the bourgeoisie, Christian Democracy in power for six years built up the conditions for a revolutionary process, against its will, of course: it cleared the ground by its verbal populism for real popular conquests; it underlined and legitimized the need to take radical measures by its clumsy velleities; it raised the threshold of ideological tolerance in the middle strata...

*Christian Democracy was the first victim of its own instrument of ideological rule. In fact, inside its reformist project—the integration of the unorganized subordinate classes into the reigning system of exploitation in order to modernize its mechanisms and ensure a higher profitability—there developed at the base a spontaneous mass movement of a revolutionary kind, which inevitably overflowed the bounds set by the project itself.**

March 1965 Congressional Elections. Christian Democrats won all 12 contested Senate seats and gained a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. FRAP received 22% of the vote.

1965 Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) was founded at University of Concepcion. Organized from student and leftist groups dissatisfied with the political strategy and tactics of the traditional left parties, they criticized the Chilean Communist Party for being too bourgeois to lead a revolution and for following the Soviet line uncritically. Though many *Miristas* were former Socialists, they criticized the Socialist Party for its insistence on the electoral path to revolution. MIR believes that peaceful revolution is impossible, that armed struggle is inevitable. They have written "The seizing of power by the workers will be possible only through armed struggle. The ruling class will not surrender its power without a struggle..."† By 1970, MIR will be a significant force in the Chilean Left, with especially strong support among the homeless squatters in Santiago and the *campesinos* in the country.

March 1966 Workers in the U.S.-owned El Teniente mine went on strike for higher wages. A sympathy strike among other northern miners was declared illegal by the government. Troops invaded the union building at Anaconda's El Salvador mine; six mine workers and two women were killed, forty were wounded.

April 1966 Chilean legislature passed "Chileanization of Copper" law providing for partial nationalization of American-owned copper mines.

March 1967 Municipal Elections. Left's support among the electorate rose from 22% in 1965 to 30%. The Christian

* Regis Debray, *The Chilean Revolution, Conversations with Allende*.

† North American Congress on Latin America, *New Chile*, 1973 Ed.

Democrats won 35.6% of the vote,—seven percent less than in the parliamentary elections in 1965.

Nov. 1967 Nationwide strike was called to protest government proposal to cut workers' salaries and temporarily prohibit the right to strike in order to control inflation. U.S. trained and supplied soldiers and the *Grupo Movil* (specially trained anti-riot police) crushed the strike with helicopters, tear gas, crowd-control tanks and guns. In Santiago, seven were killed, including 4 children, and many wounded.

1968 In a special election in the south to fill a vacant Senate seat, the Radical Alberto Baltra was elected with the support of Radicals, Socialists, and Communists, foreshadowing the *Unidad Popular*.

March 1969 The Massacre of Puerto Montt. The *Grupo Movil* killed 9 and injured 30 farmworkers in the southern city of Puerto Montt as they forcibly evicted 100 peasant families who had peacefully occupied a piece of unused land.

In the parliamentary elections the Christian Democrats lost their absolute majority. They received 29.8% of the vote. The Communists and Socialists together received 28.1%.

May 1969 Outraged by Puerto Montt Massacre, left wing members of the Christian Democrat party defected and formed MAPU, the Movement of Popular Action, later an important part of the *Unidad Popular*. Jacques Chonchol, who had been responsible for Frei's agrarian reform program, was named secretary general of MAPU.

June 1969 After students at University of Concepcion battled with police and leading *Miristas* were arrested and tortured, MIR sent many of its militants underground. Student cadre, who were still the bulk of the organization, were sent into the countryside and the poblaciones (poor towns or camps). In the next two and one half years, MIR's actions included expropriations from banks and supermarkets, bombings of imperialist targets like The First National Bank of New York, armed seizures of land for squatters camps, consciousness-raising and fund-raising. During this time MIR changed from a movement of students and intellectuals to the beginning of a mass-based, disciplined party.

Oct. 1969 The Tacnazo. Two units of army division revolted in suburban Santiago (Tacna). The first military uprising in Chile in 37 years, the revolt was led by General Roberto Viaux, who said that his sole purpose was to gain

a hearing with the president to express the grievances of army officers, such as low pay and lack of adequate equipment. Frei's government saw the revolt as the first stage of a *coup d'etat* and quickly suppressed it. Viaux will be in the news again in 1970 when he is implicated in the assassination of General Rene Schneider.

Oct. 1969 Coordinating Committee of the *Unidad Popular* was formed, culminating months of discussions and plans to form a United Front.

Dec. 1969 The *Programma Basico de Gobierno*, (Basic Program of Government), the *Unidad Popular's* plans for Chile, was approved by the member parties.

Jan. 1970 The Coordinating Committee of the *Unidad Popular* nominated Allende as UP presidential candidate. Other candidates for the UP nomination were Pablo Neruda, from the Communist Party; Alberto Baltra, from the Radical Party; Jacques Chonchol, from MAPU; and Rafael Tarud, from API.

Sept. 1970 **Presidential Elections** Salvador Allende won the election and Chile became the first country in the world to elect a Marxist socialist president. The results of the election were: Allende (UP), 36.2%; Tomic (Christian Democrat), 27.8%; Jorge Alessandri (Independent), 34.9%. Since Allende did not receive a majority, a special vote of the legislature was necessary to confirm him as president.

MIR's position during the election was that voting would be only "a partial and formal expression" of the general social mobilization and would have importance only within that context. Its strategy was to leave the electoral struggle to the "traditional left", holding that both this struggle and their own program were not contradictory. MIR cadre in the mass organizations urged critical support for Allende's candidacy.

Oct. 1970 Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Rene Schneider, a military leader committed to non-intervention in the political process, was shot and killed by right-wing terrorists who hoped to kidnap him and provoke a military coup the eve of the special congressional election necessary to confirm Allende as president.

Oct. 24, 1970 Congress overwhelmingly proclaimed Allende as Chile's president.

Nov. 3, 1970 Allende was inaugurated.

J.O., M.V., V.P.



PRELUDE TO A COUP AN ANALYSIS FROM CHILE

Accompanying the following article was the letter below, dated July 18, 1973, and signed Fuente de Informacion Norteamericana Santiago, Chile.

Chile is entering a decisive stage in its history. Tensions and conflicts which have been held in check for many years are finally surfacing. This process is complex and extremely serious and, as such, warrants the understanding of the U.S. people.

As U.S. citizens who have been living in Chile since 1970-1971, and who, like everyone else, have been caught up in this increasingly conflictive process, we feel that the people in the U.S. probably do not fully understand the importance of recent events. Unfortunately, one of the reasons for this lack of comprehension is the way in which the U.S. press and its wire service have covered events in Chile during the past few years; the way in which they have consistently distorted and misrepresented the roots of the present conflict, the real forces involved, and the true significance of recent events.

In this brief and hurriedly prepared document, we can neither present a complete summary of recent events in Chile nor untangle all the misrepresentations and half-truths which appear in U.S. news reports. All we can hope to do is expose some of these systematic distortions and give you a general framework through which you can begin to understand the real significance of events here.

Introduction

The recent attempt by sectors of the Chilean army and the fascist organization "Fatherland and Liberty" to topple the Popular Unity (UP) government by means of a military *coup* made it apparent to both Chileans and foreigners alike that this nation's "peaceful road to socialism" is fast exhausting itself. The June 29th uprising, though quickly crushed by loyal troops, has ushered in a new stage in Chile's stormy process.

In the weeks following the attempted *coup* hostilities have mounted dangerously. The opposition parties, the Christian Democrat (PDC) and the National Party (PN) (the latter closely linked to "Fatherland and Liberty") have issued threats and ultimata to the government. The gist of these is that either the UP renounce its basic program of transition to socialism or "accept the responsibility for any violence which might occur". In the past, the UP's enemies have not balked at restricted and strategically timed use of violence. This violence has included the murder of Army Chief, General René Schneider just before Allende took office, shooting peasants in the South,

burning UP party headquarters, bombing a government TV broadcast tower, and many other incidents. But now, for the first time, significant segments of the opposition advocate nothing short of a military takeover by the nation's "constitutionalist" armed forces.

Confronted by this blatant rejection of the legal structures within which the UP set out to move towards socialism, workers throughout the country have occupied their places of work and have vowed to defend them "to the end". In short, dialogue has all but ceased, the nation's institution framework is tottering, and there now seems little to save Chile from open and widespread conflict.

What has brought Chile to this point? A view prevalent in the U. S. press is that the economic chaos and political instability created by the UP have broken down existing structures to a point that only drastic action by "democratic" forces can restore the peace and well-being which supposedly characterized pre-UP Chile.

The main problem with this view is what it leaves unsaid about Chile's past.

Economic disorder, extreme social and political in-

stability have indeed made Chile a difficult place for anyone to live at this point. But the current turmoil is hardly an example of life under socialism. Rather, it should be clearly understood to be the chaotic and explosive state of affairs caused by the all-out efforts of a powerful minority to preserve the inherently chaotic and violent system through which it has long prospered.

Under that system Chile, a nation blessed with vast reserves of natural wealth, has been unable to provide the majority of its people with the basic necessities of life. When the UP took office, 40% of Chileans suffered from malnutrition. Shortly before this, 68% of the nation's workers were earning less than what was officially defined as a subsistence wage; another large number of people were living slightly above what we would call the poverty level. And while allowing millions of Chileans to live under such conditions, this system permitted foreigners to drain off vast quantities of the nation's natural wealth. In the past 60 years alone, the U. S. copper companies operating in Chile have taken home profits equivalent to half the value of all the nation's assets, accumulated over a period of 400 years. What little remains of the country's wealth has traditionally been concentrated in the hands of a privileged few.

This irrational system has been marked throughout Chile's history by a long, bitter, and often bloody class struggle. On the one hand, the nation's peasants, miners, factory workers, manual laborers of all kinds, the many sub and unemployed, the vast majority of the population commonly referred to as the working class, has demanded a larger share of the nation's social wealth. On the other hand, the nation's bourgeoisie, the large landowners, industrialists, bankers — those who own and control all the major means of production and sources of wealth in the country, frequently as partners or representatives of foreign interests — has fought to retain its political and economic control of the society. The middle class — small and medium landowners, small and medium entrepreneurs, clerks, professionals, white collar workers, and public employees — has shifted its allegiance between these two antagonistic classes in accord with how it perceived its short-range interests.

Over the years, the Chilean working class struggle has grown in strength and size. It has evolved from sporadic, spontaneous uprisings to more organized protests and strikes, and from there it has entered the arena of parliamentary politics. As it has advanced, the national bourgeoisie and the foreign interests whose profits depend on the continued economic and political power of this bourgeoisie, have defended their threatened control. To do so they have used a variety of means. Violent repression was one. On a number of occasions it took the form of out-and-out massacres, the most brutal of which was the slaying of some 2,000 striking nitrate miners, portworkers and their families, all unarmed, in the town of Iquique in 1907.

But as the working class, organized in the Socialist and Communist parties, made its way into the realm of electoral politics, the bourgeoisie was forced to change its

tactics. If the vote of the organized working class now was strong enough to elect congressmen, the bourgeoisie had to appeal to them in order to win these votes. With practice, the bourgeoisie mastered the art of promising enough to win elections, while leaving the basic structures of capitalistic society intact once they were in office.

The party which proved best at this strategy was Eduardo Frei's Christian Democrats. In its 1964 presidential campaign, heavily financed by the U. S. and by Chilean conservatives, the Christian Democratic Party promised the electorate a "Revolution in Liberty". This "revolution" contained many measures traditionally promised by socialism; redistribution of the national income, massive social welfare programs, agrarian reform, banking and tax reform, an end to unemployment and inflation, an attack on monopolies, increased economic independence. All to be brought about in "Liberty — that is, without class struggle.

The Christian Democrats easily won the election. They were supported by the conservative bourgeoisie, who saw the Christian Democrats as a way to keep out the socialists and communists; peasants, who were attracted to the land reform; large sectors of the middle class; and some workers, who had lost faith in capitalism but were taught to fear socialism and were convinced the Christian Democrats offered a "third way".

In practice, however, the Christian Democrats simply didn't deliver. Frei promised a lot; but his primary allegiance was to the Chilean upper class. Thus, he did not redistribute income, because that would mean taxing the monopolists. He did not curb inflation, because the industrialists would not voluntarily freeze prices. Instead of nationalizing copper, Frei "Chileanized" it — buying up shares of stock at rates highly favorable to the U. S. copper companies. The piecemeal reforms which actually were carried out mainly benefitted the middle classes, increasing the gap between them and the working class. The reforms, like Frei's election were mainly funded through the U. S. Alliance for Progress, which attempted to prove that capitalism was indeed flexible enough to provide a substantially better life for the oppressed. Its main accomplishment for Chile was a huge foreign debt — some 4 billion dollars by 1970.

Shortly before his party's term was up, one Christian Democratic congressman summarized its failure in the following words: "We have a historic responsibility and we have done very little for that 85% of the population which voted for a revolution, while we are making continual concessions to an oligarchy and a bureaucratic minority of 15%."

By the 1970 elections, Frei's Revolution in Liberty had been such a flop, that Christian Democratic spokesman edged closer to socialism to hold onto their worker and peasant bases. They spoke carefully of a "non-capitalist" way to development and even of "communitarian socialism". The only party openly opposed to a sharp break with the past was the conservative National Party (PN), whose sole concern was to defend its members monopoly interests.

Together, the Christian Democrat's near-socialist and the UP's frankly socialist programs received 64% of the vote.

Since then, as the UP has tried to implement its program of peaceful advance towards socialism, the Christian Democratic Party has changed its position radically. From its socialist-sounding 1970 campaign platform, it shifted to support the National Party candidates in various local elections, to full alliance with the PN in the March, 1973 congressional elections, to its current position of threatening the government with a military take-over. As the Christian Democrats have shifted to the right, they have lost many of their party members who sincerely wanted change. The first splinter group formed the MAPU party; the second formed the Christian Left (IC). Both parties joined the UP coalition. The U. S. press still calls the Christian Democrats a "left center" party; but if that was ever true, it's old history now.

The intensification of the class struggle which has split the PDC has, over the course of the past few years, divided the entire country into two camps.

In the remainder of this article we hope to show how this conflict has reached a new stage in all areas of Chilean society: governmental institutions, the economy, the mass media, the armed forces, and the working class.

In short, the rules of the game have been changed.

The Institutional Conflict

Why is there such confusion and instability? On an institutional level, the conflict is primarily the product of the 1970 elections which gave control of the executive branch of the government to the representatives of the working class, peasantry, and poor, while the legislative and judicial branches remained in the hands of the old ruling class.

The UP's "peaceful transition to socialism" called for a legal process which would gradually turn over control of the nation's basic sources of wealth and power, held by foreign interests and the Chilean upper class, to the workers and poor. With the unanimous consent of Congress, Allende began to nationalize the country's natural resources. Using laws already on the books, he brought industrial monopolies and banks into the publically controlled or "social area" of the economy and broke up the large landholdings which were characteristic of the agrarian sector.

If at first the ruling class was too shocked by its electoral defeat to prevent this, it soon re-organized and fought back with all the arms at its command. One of the strongest is the Congress, where opposition parties hold a majority of both houses.

The Congress has been used against the interests of the working class in three basic ways:

I) The Congress has continually removed Cabinet ministers, preventing the government from constructing the stable administrative body which is so important in times of severe economic and political crisis. One justice minister, 2 labor ministers, 2 economy ministers, 3 interior

ministers (responsible for domestic security and police), and 1 minister of mines have all been removed from their posts by the Congress on politically motivated and highly questionable charges. Any minister who acts against the will of the Congressional majority — rather than against the Constitution — is likely to lose his post.

The Congress would like to remove Allende, but impeaching a President requires a 2/3rds majority — which they don't have. Therefore, they remove his Cabinet ministers instead — which only takes a simple majority.

II) The Congress has used its law-making and law-vetoing power to block every major government initiative, destroy the early advances of the UP, and return the economy to the pre-1970 situation. Besides blocking a government proposal to enlarge the sector of the economy in the "social area", the PDC has proposed a constitutional amendment which would dismantle that sector, returning strategic industries to private hands. Although Allende vetoed the measure, the Congress over-rode his veto with a simple majority, rather than 2/3rds, claiming they had the right to do so, due to a Constitutional ambiguity. As of now, nobody can solve this conflict since the Constitutional Tribunal especially set up to resolve such problems has declared itself incompetent in this matter. This is not a mere legal tangle, however. There are two important issues at stake. One is the creation of a worker-controlled industry through peaceful, legal means — a prime objective of the UP program. The other is the ability of Congress to over-ride vetoes with a simple majority, rather than a 2/3rds majority.

The latter has far reaching consequences. There is no way to settle the 2/3 versus simple majority issue within the Congress and neither side recognizes the right of the same outside authority to decide the issue. Thus, the Congress has reached a virtual dead-lock in its relations to the President.

The Congress badly wants the legal precedent of overruling the President with a simple majority. From such a legal basis, the opposition could proceed as it wants: dismantling the "social area" and shortening the President's term or impeaching him.

III) Finally, the Congress has fought against the workers and the poor by blocking government projects designed to control the unstable economic situation that the opposition itself has helped to create. For instance, the opposition parties blocked a government proposal to punish speculators and black market operators, thus giving them the full protection of law (or of the Congress) to continue their illegal acts which harm the entire population.

In addition, Congress has refused to appropriate any funds for the UP's redistributive wage adjustment program and reduced Allende's budget by 33%. Congressional refusal to finance government programs has forced the administration to print money. Thus, the opposition-controlled Congress is in large part responsible for the rampant inflation which severely affects all workers.

The Congress, with Eduardo Frei — the President of the Senate — as its leader, has established itself as an

“anti-government”, which daily presents the government with ultimatæ unless all its programs are accepted. A recent statement by the PDC, the largest party in Congress, called for a complete halt to the government’s program and concluded; “If the government does not immediately carry out these tasks, the historic responsibility of what will happen in Chile will fall on its shoulders alone.” (*El Mercurio*, July 7, 1973) Needless to say, a charge of that kind more resembles blackmail than a responsible action by the largest congressional party.

The Judiciary, too, is flagrantly being used as a weapon of the ruling class rather than acting independently as another “branch of the government”. Justice is dispensed discriminatorily with the interests of the rich, not the poor, always held highest.

free and no charges were pressed against them.

One of the most spectacular cases of “class justice” was that of Robert Viaux, tried and found guilty of planning the kidnap operation which took the life of General René Schneider, Commander in Chief of the Chilean Army, just before Allende took office. The commando operation was planned to create a state of political chaos which would have prevented the peaceful transferral of power to Allende. Viaux first received a 20-year sentence, but this was later reduced to 2 years by a higher court. This term is less than peasants regularly receive for stealing chickens.

In addition to the traditional three branches of government, there is a fourth institutional power in Chile, the office of the *Contraloria* or Comptroller, which



We can cite many examples of what this system of “class justice” has come to mean. When Moises Huentelaf, a peasant leader, was killed by a landowner during a land takeover in the south of Chile, his murderer was allowed to go free. The 21 peasants involved in the takeover with Huentelaf, on the other hand, were kept in jail for six months. On another occasion, landowners whose land had already been expropriated came back to their former holdings one morning and attempted to rob the machinery which now belonged to the peasants. When the peasants peacefully opposed this, the ex-landowners shot and killed four of them. Again, the murderers were allowed to go

oversees the financing of all government projects. The present Comptroller was appointed to his 12 year term before 1970 when the UP took office. He has greatly amplified the powers of his office, pronouncing on the legality of projects as if he were a Supreme Court.

Thus, whenever industries are brought into the “social area”, the Comptroller declares the move illegal. This means that all funds for these industries are frozen, curtailing plans and destroying production. To override him, Allende must obtain an “insistence decree”, signed by all government ministers. The last time he did this, the National Party initiated Congressional action designed to

remove *all* of Allende's ministers from their posts.

The UP's attempt to advance towards socialism by legal means, to use the existing legal system to create new laws benefitting the working class, has run up against a solid wall of opposition. However, the legally stamped documents that rush from one house of Congress to another, from the courts of Justice to the Presidential Palace and from there back to the Congress are not writing Chile's history. Much to the outrage of the ruling class's representatives in the Congress, the Judiciary, and the Comptroller's office, Chile's history is now being decided in worker-controlled factories and farms and in the community and labor organizations where Chilean men and women are struggling to create a just and non-exploitative society.

The Economy

"Dr. Salvador Allende, similar to Fidel Castro, is conducting his country rapidly to bankruptcy and ruin." (Statement from *Barron's* magazine, reprinted in *El Mercurio*, April 20, 1971.)

This statement, published two years ago, is typical of numerous predictions which have been expressed about the UP government since it came into office in 1970. It was written during a year when Chile's GNP increased by 8.5 percent (compared to an average increase of 4.4 percent during the decade of the '60's).

The U. S. press and the Chilean opposition have placed the blame for the presumed Chilean economic disaster squarely on the shoulders of a "socialist" economy. If the UP had not moved Chile to a socialist system — so the argument goes — the economy would still be thriving. There is no doubt that a very severe economic crisis does exist in Chile, but its roots are not to be found in a socialist economy. Rather, the crisis arose when Allende began to dismantle the structures of the capitalist economy, but the Congress and other institutional opposition forces prevented him from putting anything in their place. The opposition demands have become increasingly simple: the government should renounce its commitment to the creation of a workers' state or suffer the consequences of the economic chaos which opposition forces will (and have) unleashed.

The government's economic program called for:

- 1) nationalization of the U. S. dominated mining industry,
- 2) socialization of key sectors of the economy such as the banks and strategic industries,
- 3) expropriation of large landholdings,
- 4) redistribution of income in favor of the working class and the poor in general,
- 5) lowering of the unemployment rate,
- 6) reactivation of the economy after severe recession during the final years of the Frei regime, and
- 7) the redirection of production toward the needs of the masses rather than the upper classes.

In its first two and a half years, the Allende government has managed to accomplish most of these structural changes. The short-term goals were fulfilled through

the middle of 1971 since, at the end of the Frei years, there was a good deal of unused capacity in the economy, as well as stocks of goods and raw materials and a large quantity of foreign exchange reserves. Thus, consumption of the lower classes could be increased without major investment and without threatening the high level of consumption enjoyed by the middle and upper classes. After 1971, however, these factors began to disappear. In addition, as the opposition saw its economic privileges threatened, it openly created chaos in the economy by speculating, hoarding, sabotaging production, not investing, and fostering and supporting an extensive black market system.

The United States did not stand apart from this process. While its newspapers predicted disaster in the Chilean economy, the government and U. S. private corporations took steps to produce that disaster. It is no secret that ITT favored "economically squeezing" Chile in order to bring down the UP government. The U. S. government may deny that it accepted this advice, but the facts prove differently. Loans (both bilateral and from multinational organizations in which the U. S. plays a decisive role) were quickly cut off to Chile. Spare parts and raw materials which are crucial to the Chilean economy were withheld. Public and private credits to the government were slashed.

What is actually behind the present economic crisis in Chile? Some ideas can be obtained by looking at the three most obvious symptoms—lack of foreign exchange, shortages of basic commodities, and rampant inflation. The shortage of foreign exchange stems from three economic trends. First, from 1970 until the beginning of 1973, Chile had suffered from a drastic lowering in the world price of copper which supplies over 80 percent of its foreign exchange earnings. Prices on a pound of copper fell more than 28% between 1969 and 1972. Second, the drop in copper prices occurred at the same time that the prices of Chilean imports, especially foodstuffs, went up. And, because of increased consumption of the lower class, the government was forced to import more agricultural products than usual. Even now, with high copper prices, the foreign exchange earnings of copper are not sufficient to cover the increased costs of imports. Third, the loans and foreign investment which have traditionally offset the current account deficit in the Chilean balance of payments (trade balance, shipping costs, plus repatriation of profits by multinational corporations) dropped drastically during 1971. During 1972 and 1973, however, loans from the socialist countries have partially alleviated this problem.

Various factors have created the commodity shortages, none of which has to do with the existence of a socialist economy although there is bound to be some disruption in a transition to socialism. Agricultural production probably will decline in 1973 because the October owners' strike prevented seed and fertilizer distribution, and bad weather conditions damaged the crops. Industrial production is also down this year because of lack of investment by the private sector over the last two years, lack of raw materials and spare parts (aggravated by the

foreign blockade), and sabotage in the factories. In addition to production problems, there are also distribution problems since the government controls only 30% of food distribution. A good deal of the part controlled by the private sector goes directly to the black market where prices are so high that the majority of the Chilean population cannot afford to buy through this channel. It is not uncommon, for example, to see upper class Chilean women selling chickens from the trunks of their cars in the upper class neighborhoods of Santiago for five and six times the official government price. With its still large profits, the opposition has invested in speculation rather than production. These speculators purchase everything from cigarettes to houses and sell them a few months later for two or three times their purchase price.

The third sign of economic crisis is inflation. This, too, is based on the middle and upper classes' political opposition to Allende rather than being the natural result of a socialist economy. Major causes of the inflation are the objective lowering of production due to the factors mentioned above, a thriving black market, and the government's liberal recourse to printing money. This latter factor is important to understand. The government has been forced to print money for one basic reason: the Congress has refused to authorize financing for many government projects including wage readjustments to make up for increases in the cost of living. Any project which is financed by increased taxes on the upper classes, e.g. taxes on corporate profits, high incomes, real estate value of second and third homes, is immediately blocked by the Congress. Opposition congressmen see themselves as egalitarian; rich and poor should be taxed equally; if the wages of the workers are raised, the salaries of the wealthy should be increased proportionally.

The opposition prefers the traditional way out of the supply and demand problem implied in the inflation: lower demand by raising prices to the point where the lower classes cannot afford to pay them. The government, however, is pledged to protect the level of consumption of the masses. Given the structure of the Chilean economy and its position within a world economic system, it is totally unrealistic to think that the economic status of the Chilean masses can be raised while the middle and upper classes maintain their same privileged level of consumption.

The left is basically agreed on the solution to these economic problems. The recent Congress of the UP made a series of recommendations: broaden government control of the economy by bringing the rest of the major production and distribution firms into the social area; finish expropriation of all landholdings over 40 hectares and include the farm machinery and livestock in the expropriation; ration essential consumer goods; restructure wage patterns to produce equal pay for equal work; increase the effectiveness of government planning; and increase the participation and control of the mass organizations in the economy. The main problem is that in order to carry out these goals, the UP must increase its political power. Resolution of Chile's economic problems

depends, to a large extent, on the prior resolution of the question of political power.

Mass Media

An important distortion which regularly appears in the U. S. news media is that the UP government is determined to destroy freedom of the press in Chile; that it is economically and politically stifling the opposition's news media.

A quick glance at a corner newstand or brief exposure to an opposition radio station clearly indicates the contrary. There is probably no country in the world at this point in which the opposition press bombasts the government in power with such vindictiveness as in Chile. Headlines range anywhere from one declaring the country to be on the verge of total economic collapse (this only a few weeks after Allende took office) to a recent headline in the National Party's paper, *Tribuna*, which demanded that those military officers responsible for *putting down* the attempted *coup* of June 29th be tried and punished.

And, if the level of insult is astonishing in the press, radios are far worse. In the first minutes of the recent *coup*, Radio Agricultura, owned by the national association of large landowners (SNA), proclaimed the *coup* to be, "without doubt a definitive move to bring about the changes which the majority in this country has been waiting for."

Cold figures also refute the contention that the voice of the opposition is being squelched in Chile. The opposition still owns the vast majority of the nation's radio stations—as a quick run down the dial will prove—and six daily Santiago newspapers with a total weekday circulation of 541,000 copies. Pro-government groups and parties publish only 5 Santiago dailies with a circulation of 312,000. In the provinces, the opposition press is far more widely distributed than the pro-government press.

However, the publicity given to the "freedom of the press" issue serves an important purpose. In the first place, accusations that the government is infringing on this

Continued on page 33



QUICK COUP OR SLOW STRANGULATION

During the days immediately following the successful counter-revolutionary take over by the fascist military forces in Chile, charges and counter-charges about the involvement of the United States in the events were bitterly exchanged in the press and national media. Thus, the *New York Times* reported in its first article: "U.S. Not Surprised" in a headline on Sept. 12 and repeated on Sept. 14: "U.S. Expected Chile Coup But Decided Not to Act". Most of these stories concentrated on specific events and actions in which the U.S. did or did not have a hand. But the point is not the precise way in which the U.S. is involved with particular counterrevolutionary forces, it is rather the pervasive influence of U.S. economic policies on the internal political situation in Chile and their impact on the whole of Chilean society and economy.

Direct involvement dates back at least to the beginning of this century when U.S. capital took over control of one of the largest Chilean copper mines from the Chilean government. The U.S. supported Chilean government which encouraged the growing wave of foreign investment and permitted the importation of consumer goods which transformed the country from an economy which exported food into one incapable of even producing sufficient food for its own population; by the time the UP (Popular Unity) government was elected to power in 1970, more than one-fifth of all domestically consumed consumer food stuffs had to be brought in from abroad because the high concentration of land, past agricultural policies and U.S. aid programs prevented an expansion of production in this area. In place of agricultural production, Chilean economic policy substituted an import-substitution industrialization program designed to produce light industrial consumer goods and to strengthen the budding base of heavy industrial production which was largely in foreign hands; these efforts largely benefitted the upper and middle classes who had the income to enjoy non-essential consumption goods. In spite of a large presence

of U.S. private investment, however, the economy continued to experience serious bouts of inflation and economic stagnation (prices increased by more than 25% in 13 of the 18 years prior to Allende's election while per capita income remained virtually stagnant).

The U.S., especially after the Alliance for Progress (ALPRO) was underway, pumped large amounts of money into Chile to buoy up the economy. During the first four and one-half years of the program's existence, Chile received more than \$4.9 billion in new commitments from the U.S. government (1961-1965); with a population of about 8 million people, this works out to be about \$600 in foreign aid per person. Part of the reason for this generous outpouring was a fear that Chile's political process would be unable to continue to defend itself from the onslaught of Salvador Allende's repeated attempts to win the presidential elections. Some \$64 million dollars in aid funds were used for "budget support and balance of payments assistance during the 1964 election to prevent economic deterioration which would have sparked unemployment and discontent and, presumably, a swing to the far left politically." Senator Gruening (quoted above) remarked, when he examined the Chilean situation in detail, that the 1964 aid package was a "bail-out operation for political purposes" and it was instrumental in making "far-reaching reforms" less urgent. In other words, the U.S. aid was explicitly designed to provide the economic support for the Frei election campaign. Eduardo Frei received 56% of the vote to implement his "Revolution in Liberty" which was cast in the jargon and spirit of the ALPRO—a greater margin over Allende than the narrow defeat of 1958. (Allende lost by 33,500.) The U.S. felt, however, that it had to reinforce the aid package which Senator Gruening criticized so strongly by spending an additional \$20 million during the election itself (reported by a former Ambassador to Chile).

U.S. aid took many forms during the mid-sixties and was complemented by important loans from the

World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. From 1964 to 1970 the U.S. Export-Import Bank provided \$368,779,000 in loans to Chile to finance the export of U.S. industrial equipment which supported North American manufacturers while at the same time ensured that there was an 'attractive' climate for investment; many of the loans were for machinery and materials used by subsidiaries of U.S. companies making direct investments in Chile. The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank also provided financial support for foreign private investment; cement, copper products and paper were among the areas where loans were made in which foreign investors joined with the most elite group in Chile to reshape the economy for the bourgeoisie and firmly establish the economic control of the elite over the whole country (e.g., 17 financial groups are reported to control 78% of the working capital of the 284 businesses which dominate the economy).

Just as important, however, as the support of large industrial projects and the bourgeoisie which controlled them was the support provided to the efforts to create a middle-class consciousness among a sizable group of Chileans. The middle-class was expected to be a strong bulwark against efforts to collectivize the economy and even the future electoral prospects of a candidate like Salvador Allende. To this end an agrarian reform law and urban housing programs were strongly supported with loans to create a small number of model agricultural communities for a new group of prosperous peasants and to finance relatively luxurious housing for the rapidly swelling ranks of the government bureaucracy and professional groups. Neither the problem of extreme concentration of land on Chile's irrigated farms nor the growing needs for inexpensive housing for the wave of new immigrants to the industrial zones was attacked.

At the same time, the U.S. poured large amounts into the Chilean armed forces. Chile received more military aid than any other Latin American country—except Brazil—between 1953 and 1970, in spite of the lack of overt guerilla movements as in countries like Peru, Columbia and Guatemala. The aid was used for war materials and more than 15,000 Chilean military officers received extensive training from U.S. counterparts; many of them, along with officers from the para-military national police force, visited installations in the U.S. and Panama for training and coordination with U.S. military forces.

Thus, by the time Allende was elected president in 1970, the way was paved for a long-term institutionalized opposition among a number of key sectors of Chilean society. The new industrial structure was closely connected to the international economy of the transnational corporations; the burgeoning middle class was just beginning to enjoy some of the comforts of a consumer society and its expectations of further gains were high in spite of the growing consumer debt; the military was well trained and equipped to handle internal disruptions and understood its mission of maintaining law and order. Only the working classes were not well represented in

the structure which was created and they provided the base by which Allende came to power.

Allende's ascendancy brought an immediate reaction from the financial community, both domestic and international. Commercial bank credit to finance normal export-import trade with the U.S. declined from more than \$200 million to about \$35 million and followed on the heels of a decision to deny credit for Chilean purchases of commercial jet aircraft. At about the same time, the World Bank declared that Chile was no longer a worthy subject of credit and new obligations were not undertaken. The Inter-American Development Bank, much more sensitive to the political realities of the hemisphere, was not as unbending: two loans (\$12 million) were extended to the Catholic and Austral Universities; the first school was the center of anti-governmental activities and often invited foreign professors in to lend legitimacy to its seemingly professional activities, while the latter is dominated by Chile's conservative German population. Virtually all U.S. aid was stopped and only "humanitarian and people-to-people" programs were continued; these included exchange programs with influential people and others representing middle-class groups and trade union interchanges arranged through the American Institute for Free Labor Development, a well-known corporate- and labor-financed organization used to infiltrate labor movements in other parts of the world.

The dramatic reduction in aid from the extravagant levels of the mid-sixties—when Chile is reported to have received more per capita economic and military aid than any other country in the world except South Vietnam—had further repercussions. A large accumulated debt was pressing on the nation's fiscal resources. Normally debt renegotiation leads to a restructuring of payment obligations to fit a country's long-term ability to pay and near-term financial requirements; an increasing part of U.S. aid to many countries is now being used to finance the repayment of past debt obligations. Chile, under Allende, not only ceased to receive assistance in purchasing new equipment and paying off loans, but was also unable to renegotiate its debt obligations equitably.

The invisible blockade—as the combined series of measures described above was christened—was strengthened by the rear guard actions of Kennecott and Anaconda through the courts where Chile's assets in the U.S. were temporarily attached and in several European countries where they unsuccessfully attempted to argue that they were the rightful owners of the Chilean copper being exported to France, Holland and Germany, among others. In response, some credits were forthcoming from the socialist countries, but these could not counter-balance the effective political pressures which were being used to try to strangle the country financially.

At the same time, internal resistance to Allende from the bourgeoisie was also receiving encouragement from foreign sources. Although it is difficult to establish the sources for this assistance, there are indications that American dollars were more readily available at the time when the Chilean truck owners staged their lock-out.



These truck owners kept their trucks off the roads during October 1972 and mid-1973 and together with small shop-keepers, large producers and distributors of consumer goods and some professional groups, carefully engineered shortages and hoarded goods. This exacerbated already difficult supply conditions created by the successful policies of redistributing income and reducing unemployment from the unacceptably high levels inherited from the Frei years of economic stagnation. These well financed efforts disrupted the economy. The black market flourished and American dollars commanded a premium as high as 900% over the official exchange rate; these dollars were skillfully used for counter-revolutionary support activities and economic disruption. The general easing of pressures on the *escudo* in the black market prior to and during the truck lock-outs is a clear indication of an increased supply of dollars in the country at that time. While we can only speculate about the source of the increased flow of dollars, the presence of experienced political officers on the U.S. Embassy staff suggests that the charges of U.S. involvement in the encouragement of counter-revolutionary activity may have some basis in fact.

The Chilean opposition saw the need for a coup more clearly than ever after March 1973 when the UP succeeded in raising its electoral support from the 1970 level of 36% to 43% of all voters in the mid-term elections; historically, the governing party loses support in these elections. The increased support was due, in part, to the greater polarization of society induced by the counter-revolutionary activities of the right and was heightened by the acts of terrorism which accelerated in the three months prior to the coup. The polarization led to more support for the government and class consciousness among the workers and peasants. At the same time economic problems were easing slightly because of the rise in the world price of copper to over \$1.00 a pound (up from

47 cents in early 1971). This state of events made UP leaders optimistic about the possibility of Allende winning in a popular referendum on his legislative program. A national referendum is a legal possibility offered to the Chilean president who seeks popular support for a measure which the legislature refuses to enact. The increasing foreign exchange earnings and greater mobilization of the workers and peasants was clearly a major threat which might become an insurmountable barrier were Allende to effectively mobilize his supporters in defense of the regime.

It doesn't seem necessary, in view of this analysis, to rest the case for U.S. involvement in the counter-revolutionary activity on the degree of direct involvement in the military events leading up to the drama of Sept. 11. It is clear that the U.S. embassy was well informed about the impending coup; everyone in Chile was discussing the possibility in the preceding days. Ambassador Nathaniel Davis' hurried trip to confer with Kissinger on the previous weekends may just be a coincidence, as may be the increased U.S. Air Force activity in the near-by Argentinian city of Mendoza and the joint naval maneuvers between the Chilean and North American forces. The existence of a sizable political staff in the Embassy with past experience in Soviet counter-intelligence work and direct participation in the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Dominican Republic invasion and the counter-insurgency activities in Guatemala may also all be coincidences. But the fact remains that inaction is often as powerful or at least a complement to overt action in preparing the grounds for counter-revolutionary activity of the Chilean variety.

A Postscript

It is important for us to anticipate and understand glowing reports which may appear as a result of policies of the new regime. There are likely to be short-run economic successes in the traditional sense of

capitalist economics—stability, increased employment, more goods in the stores, control of inflation, etc. The world price of copper is still high and may even be rising while receipts from exports of the past three months are just being received; shipments can rise rapidly for a short while under the coercive labor policies of the military. wages were frozen while prices will be rising rapidly with the readjustment of the price of the dollar which was recently announced. The President of the U.S. announced a program of emergency aid even while Congress was debating an amendment to cut off all aid as long as the torture and political repression continue. Wheat shipments were immediately arranged and in the coming months it is likely that the supply problems will be rapidly dealt with as hoarding by the upper classes ends and the lower classes reduce their consumption.

But we must not forget that the gains in the consciousness of the workers and peasants were real and not readily destroyed. The Chileans can be expected to embark on a people's struggle and they will make the fascists' task extremely difficult; sabotage of all sorts has already begun and the people do have arms. Those of us who are not in Chile must be prepared to read and to deal with the likely barrage of favorable news about the events in Chile long after the current wave of vocal indignation about the fascist regime has subsided or been displaced by similar atrocities in other parts of the world. We must understand that this task—providing a better analysis of the events in Chile and mobilizing support for the people's struggle in Chile—must be a part of our response to Salvador Allende's challenge as he fired bazooka shells into the tanks from the Presidential Palace:

This is how the first page of this story is written. My people and all of America will write the rest.

D.B.

A Note on Sources

Most of the information for this article was drawn from sources cited in NACLA (North American Congress on Latin America), *New Chile* and in their "CHILE: The Story behind the Coup," *Latin America and Empire Report*, vol. VII, no. 8 (October, 1973). These materials provide a good introduction to the subject for people who wish greater details.


The Gruening Report referred to in the text is entitled: *United States Foreign Aid in Action* (1966: Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) and is a committee print of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 89th Congress, 2nd Session.

For more information on activities being organized in solidarity with the popular forces in Chile, please write: Chile Solidarity Committee, 244 West 27th Street, New York, New York 10001, Fifth Floor.

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*Selected mainly from NACLA's *Bibliography on Latin America* in NACLA's *Latin America and Empire Report*.



THEY RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS AGAINST CHILE

But we have to see behind all these, there is something behind the traitors and the gnawing rats, an empire which sets the table, and serves up the nourishment and the bullets. They want to repeat their great success in Greece. Greek playboys at the banquet, and bullets for the people in the mountains: we'll have to destroy the flight of the new Victory of Samothrace, we'll have to hang, kill, lose men, sink the murderous knife held to us from New York, we'll have to use fire to break the spirit of the man who was emerging in all countries as if born from the earth that had been splashed with blood. We have to arm Chiang and the vicious Videla, give them money for prisons, wings so they can bomb their own populations, give them a hand-out, a few dollars, and they do the rest, they lie, bribe, dance on the dead bodies and their first ladies wear the most expensive minks. The suffering of the people does not matter: copper executives need this sacrifice: facts are facts: the generals retire from the army and serve as vice-presidents of the Chuquicamata Copper Firm, and in the nitrate works the "chilean" general decides with his trailing sword how much the natives may mention when they apply for a raise in wages. In this way they decide from above, from the roll of dollars, in this way the dwarf traitor receives his instructions, and the generals act as the police force, and the trunk of the tree of the country rots.


—Pablo Neruda

O CHILES

THE SONG OF MAN AT DEATH

When the social revolutions spread over the world
planting their justice, and there's no more hunger
or crimes of other hungers, man will continue to breathe out
his song, that springs to life
from the ephemeral lips that shaped it. Strange destiny,
bright and courageous. Strange and delicate.
Then many men will have sufficient peace
to revel in the beauty of the song, in the beauty that travels
the changing human world, in the human art. And they will need songs
to go with them, and will rejoice
in new and ancient art, in their defiance of death.
Like every man, the singer confronts his shadow;
it has eaten childhood, adolescence and friends,
parents and days, loves, dreams and deeper parts. He enters it
shrinking in its illusion, with the weariness it causes
that violence at death shall not exist. He enters it
with the huge treasure of the dreams of youth,
vast well-spring cast into the hints of time.
These were the greatest days;
within himself he carried an immense
unspeakable confusion. He could never sing of it.
His mouth serves to light fires. The evenings tired him.

—Tom Raworth



WORKERS'

The following articles, solicited on short notice, come from two observers, holding academic positions in the U.S., who spent part or all of the past year in Chile. Both articles deal with an important component of the then advancing Chilean Revolution: workers' control in the factories. This phenomenon resulted from two parallel and frequently joint processes: 1) moves by the government against private owners or managements which were uncooperative toward, or active saboteurs of, the government's economic policies, and, 2) the actions of rank-and-file workers who seized factories because for them that was the concrete meaning of collective ownership of the means of production.

"Workers' Control: Its Structure Under Allende" is based on a survey of 40 enterprises in the socialized sector. It describes the organizational changes and kinds of worker participation that developed within enterprises, often in spite of the government guidelines proposed for these situations. The article points up the difference between industrial democracy from below as was beginning to happen in Chile, and job enrichment from above as is being introduced in the U.S. by some managements to increase output.

The second article, "At The Side of The Workers", is a personal account by a physicist who worked alongside Chilean workers in the metallurgical factory they had seized. It presents (somewhat romantically) concrete examples of the problems that arise in developing relations between production workers and technical or professional workers. In the course of dealing with real production problems, such as the maintenance of deteriorating machinery, or interpreting design drawings, the vast potential of worker participation and control is illuminated and the technical professional discovers how much he must also learn.

These articles do not deal with the difficult problem of maintaining and defending such cooperative gains in

ITS STRUCTURE UNDER ALLENDE

The author of the following article spent the past year in Chile working on a survey of 40 randomly selected socialized factories, in collaboration with the Chilean Notional Labor Organization (now abolished). The article sketches the emergence and experience of worker's management in these enterprises.

Some 275 enterprises passed into the socialized sector of Chile's economy during Allende's 34 months as president. These firms were managed by an administrative council theoretically composed of 5 worker representatives (3 blue-collar, 1 technical person and 1 professional person), 5 state representatives and 1 state appointed administrator. In practice, only a handful of the largest enterprises actually followed this scheme. In the great majority of these "socialized" firms the worker representatives had more than 50% of the seats on the administrative council. Where the worker representatives didn't control the council outright, it was the case that several of the state representatives were chosen amongst

the workers of the factory in question. Indeed, in many instances the workers themselves chose their administrator.

At the shop floor level worker run production committees were formed. These committees dealt with production issues in their sections. Suggestions and information flowed from the shop floor to the administrative council through the coordinating committee. The latter body was run by the president of the largest union. (Typically, the Chilean firm had 2 unions, one white-collar and one blue-collar. During Allende's period there was a tendency for these two groups to merge and form a single class-unified union.) The heads of the production committees and the worker representatives on the administrative council also attended the meetings of the coordination committee.

Aside from the task of presiding over the coordinating committee, the union leaders were not allowed to serve as worker representatives on the production committees or on the administrative councils. This decision

CONTROL

a country where the working class is not in full control, and the embittered, money-dispossessed are actively sabotaging the revolutionary gains. The political reality is that on September 11 the global oppressors could smash, unretarded, the fruits of the people's struggle. That setback demands that the political and organizational lessons of Chile's struggle also be learned.

Also unanswered in these articles are questions as to the nature of the gains that were realized in the workplace. The "technical proficiency campaign" to which Maurice Bazin addresses himself is in itself a consciousness raising experience. But it is not clear from his article how the workers perceived their role in a larger struggle and whether this was a subject of discussion and political education in the factory. Clearly socialization of the factories was not complete, but to what extent was this due to the unpreparedness of the Chilean working class, or the power of foreign imperialism, or remnants of the administrative bureaucracy, and how did the workers approach these problems? Although we know that priorities of production were modified, it is not clear how or to what extent workers determined what they would produce.

We must also ask ourselves how we can contribute to this struggle? How does the scientific and technical work-force employ its revolutionary potential? Bazin engaged his commitment to the revolutionary process in the factory. Working at the side of the Chilean laborer he attempted to translate his technical learning into pragmatic tools which might advance the possibilities for real industrial democracy. By what other processes did professionals in Chile channel their skills and energy into the revolutionary tide? And the problem that presses us at home: what can be the role of the professional in factories which are not socialized, amongst a work force which is not so politically astute and hardly so organized as the forces which militated for their own liberation in Chile?

to separate union and worker management functions was based on a dual proposition. One, so long as the State itself was not completely controlled by the working class, the working class needed to maintain an independent basis for its self-defense and for advancing the class struggle, *viz.*, the union. If the union assumed management functions, then it would cease to effectively lead the workers in the class struggle. Two, the Chilean union, although rarely as co-opted and undemocratic as the U. S. union, has historically concerned itself with economic demands and has tended to develop a paternalistic and bureaucratic style. Such an organization was clearly not optimal to develop industrial democracy.

The theory behind the separation of union and management powers was sound, but it created contradictions in practice. Specifically, the more bureaucratic unions (those controlled by the Communist Party and many of those controlled by the Christian Democratic Party) opposed the formation of parallel institutions to represent the workers, *i.e.*, the organisms of workers' control at the firm level. In these instances, the participatory apparatus was either not set in motion or it failed to effectively develop.

Workers tended to comprehend and participate immediately in union related issues, *e.g.*, safety, security, wage levels, work rules, etc. Other administrative matters such as hiring, firing, scheduling and training courses were also quickly grasped and dominated.

Soon after participation blossomed in the above areas, workers would actively make recommendations and decide upon the physical ordering and reorganization of production — job transfers, job rotation or expansion, maintenance of machinery, quality control, provision of raw materials and spare parts, the selection and modification of technology, etc. In the past, foremen were discouraged by their employers from accepting suggestions from the workers. This gave the worker a sense of ignorance and impotence regarding his or her work environment. With socialization, either the foreman was eliminated or he would assume a different role.

Workers and former foremen generally agreed that the production worker knew more about the machinery than either his or her immediate or remote boss. Participation on this level, thus, liberated an enormous creative energy. It is not surprising then, that in 32 of the 40 socialized factories that we surveyed worker productivity either stayed the same or increased (it increased at a rate of over 6% per annum in 14 firms.) This record is all the more impressive given the raw material shortages and generalized macro-economic problems of the Chilean economy during this period. Without diverting resources from productive uses, socialized factories rapidly expanded social services available to the worker: plant medical facilities, day care centers, cafeterias and consumer cooperatives, athletics fields, libraries and so on. In several factories cultural departments were created. These departments

sponsored factory folk groups and theater troupes that visited other factories singing and acting the story of the expropriation of their factory and their social liberation.

In virtually all the socialized factories wage differentials were drastically reduced. The ratio of the highest to the lowest wage would typically have been 30 or 40 to 1 beforehand. Now, it varied from 5 to 1 to 11 to 1. This result along with increased production constitutes an anomaly to bourgeois economic theory which maintains that differentiated incentives are necessary to motivate efficient economic performance. To the contrary, the reduced wage disparities in Chile's political context produced less invidious division and more solidarity within the working class. The resulting cooperative spirit motivated the productivity gains.

Matters of financial and economic management — investment financing, production plans, cash flow strategy, pricing policy, etc. — were the most difficult to decentralize. Only in the most advanced factories did the worker representatives knowledgeably and energetically participate in related decision making. More often, the technical and professional staff were relied on for these matters. In most cases, middle and upper management remained on the job after socialization of the firm and cooperated more or less enthusiastically depending on their political position. Production problems tended to emerge more frequently where the middle and upper management were in opposition to Allende.

Consistent with the above line of argument, we found production to be positively correlated with participation. The extent of participation, in turn, was a function of the system of communication and information flow within the factory, the style and political ideology of middle and upper management, the degree of labor mobilization (for instance, whether the firm was socialized by decree or by a workers' take-over) and the union and political party structure in the enterprise. The most important of these variables, we found, was the level of political consciousness and activity amongst the factory's workers. Variables such as technological intensity (capital-labor ratio), technological complexity (percent of personnel preferentially dedicated to maintenance), technological type (artisan, machine-tending, mounting or assembly, assembly line and continuous process), size of firm, vertical or horizontal integration, average educational attainment were poor predictors of the extent of participation.

The Chilean experience reconfirms the desirability of industrial democracy. Capitalists in the United States are discovering the profitability of "job enrichment" and "team" production. While the latter, at least in the short run, tends to enhance the workers' identification and satisfaction with the job, it should not be confused with industrial democracy. Ultimately, employer introduced "job enrichment" programs will only co-opt the pressure and undermine the perspectives for true democracy. If, however, issues as job rotation or expansion, speed rates, working conditions are raised from below and the "job enrichment" is implanted and directed by the workers, then workers' control begins to be a real alternative.

AT THE SIDE OF THE WORKERS

In the difficult task of uniting theory and practice, of uniting ones dream of a socialist society and a concrete daily struggle toward it, of believing in class struggle and bringing ones tangible contribution to the strength of one side, I decided to spend one sabbatical semester in a Chilean metallurgical factory, a workers-run cooperative.

I worked regularly at the various tasks, although not the normal full ten hours. The factory is located on the outskirts of town, half an hour by bus from the center and surrounded by shantytowns. It is this large industrial area mixed with working class dwellings which has been strafed mercilessly by the Air Force and shelled by artillery since the beginning of the military coup.

The overwhelming majority of the Chilean population is made up of workers and peasants, notwithstanding the fashionable talk about the importance of the Chilean middle-class. The Chile which was struggling to take control of its own destiny starts in the many of the less-than-100-worker factories often installed in rudimentary buildings. Where I worked and taught, the factory building was a former wine storage hangar with the outside air blowing through the rafters. In winter the only heat available came from a few open fires built in metal containers by the individual work stations. It is from such factories that the idea of seizing factories from the boss originated. With it came the fundamental problem of making a factory run without some representative of the technocratic elite or, if with such representatives, the problem of keeping them under the workers' control. It should be clear that workers cannot control their own destiny by holding formal political power alone. Especially in larger factories a workers' council will be powerless in dealing with the bourgeois engineers who are still around, if the workers remain mystified by technology and the jargon of the educated few. To overcome that situation demands a workers' education program which will hand over to workers those intellectual tools which allow them to judge, evaluate, and decide when technico-scientific considerations are at stake. Those attitudes which give strength to the liberal young executive must become familiar tools to members of the working class, in order to do away with any possibility of further class manipulation at the intellectual level. Such a program does not aim at making workers into better specialists in their narrow trade, although it must involve guaranteeing the knowledge of some basic skills; it aims at making workers active critical judges of their productive activity in order to modify and control it according

to their own class interest. But to be able to do this, one must first overcome the attitude of "but how can I, poor laborer with no education, ever understand any of that" which the bourgeoisie spent centuries to inculcate in the minds of those whom it exploits.

My task was to be just as little of a catalyst as necessary to achieve a qualitative change in the workers' self assurance. It is of no use to describe this practice in academic pedagogical language; its justification is ideological. It is, however, one of the very concrete things that a scientist intellectual could do to put himself at the service of the working class at the given stage of the class struggle in which Chile was.

This kind of work may be called a "technical proficiency campaign" which at the same time raises political consciousness. It has the same ideological intent as the cultural "literacy campaign" for peasants described by Paulo Freire in his book *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. To explain what I mean and to avoid generalities, let me give in simple diary form, examples of what I did, as I noted them down candidly after a day's work.

February 13, 1973

The young workers who use machinery welcomed me, asking when we would have "classes." We had agreed before to try to meet after lunch for a half hour to minimize interfering with production. All morning I had been punching holes with a young fellow on the machine which is called the guillotine. The bars we were handling were heavy and lining up the holes was unpleasant because the punch was getting old and metal barbs were staying stuck to the metal and it would not slide along easily. But how could I bring about a discussion of this problem when I knew that there is no other punch arrangement available for the machine? All the machinery in the factory is old and mistreated; the workers have to keep producing, but in so doing they degrade it even more while they hesitate to spend time to think about how to do maintenance work. How to overcome this dialectical contradiction? This is one of the most acute problems for the workers in this cooperative.

At lunch there were no more spoons for eating the soup, the tomatoes and the inevitable *porotos*, which are bland white beans. So I waited for another worker to finish eating to borrow his spoon; the youngest person at the table, who happened to be a student of high school age doing some practical work for the summer, offered to loan me his spoon. In the future I shall bring my own spoon from home as many workers do.

The sun was beautifully warm after lunch and one could see the Cordillera in the mist. I sat on the ground in the factory's unfinished service building with a MIR worker, a welder, and we were joined by the only trained electrician in the factory who just came back from taking an exam to enter some more advanced course in INACAP (the state-run workers' technical training center). He was rather nervous because 50 people were applying and only 20 will be admitted. He mentioned that after completing this course

he would like to take the pre-university course and then go to the university to obtain what he called more advanced knowledge. We talked about the need to form engineer-type persons out of the working class but also of the fact that the present university will only shape elites and that one would automatically be taken out of the working class into a bourgeois frame of mind by being trained in Boeninger's university (Boeninger was the reactionary Christian Democrat rector of the University of Chile). We discussed the fact that of the 20 students admitted, only 10 would obtain the diploma because the Communist Party, which dominates INACAP, believes in the traditional, competitive training of students.

As I walked back into the work area, the young people who man the machines announced that we should get together *al trio* (as fast as a shot) and not ask the shop supervisor to be with us. So we sat down on the floor of the office, got a batch of wrenches and bolts, and started talking about how one picks out a wrench to fit a given bolt. The fact that using an adjustable wrench is not good practice especially when one does not adjust the wrench tightly (which is never done by the men I work with) was a heated subject of discussion among the *companeros* (name used to address one another, meaning "comrades" and now banned by the military). But they were still looking for a recipe for "how to use wrenches" from an all-knowing gringo man. I wanted them to stick to that which they had discovered by themselves. So I finally pointed out that the only concrete thing that we had learned together after one hour of discussion was that wrenches can be metric or in inches and that one has to take a good first guess to select a wrench and then zero in using the knowledge that there exists a metric wrench every millimeter in size. My *companeros* had never been told (or better no one had ever given them a break to let them discover) how English measures work with the idea of dividing by two; no one had ever helped them stop and look at the two scales which appear on a caliper, one in inches graduated in 1/16 in. and the other graduated in millimeters. So we kept discussing how to measure bolts and ended up learning, rather conventionally, how to use the caliper. After 20 minutes, 4 out of 6 workers could make measurements to one tenth of a millimeter, but 2 still could not accept the position of the zero of the scale. But then, how do you proceed with people who have



November, 1973

never heard of a fraction, to talk about a wrench of 5/16 inch? You just let them ask, since they will not abandon the struggle now. And I was the one who had to end the meeting and mention the word production. So we measured a few bolt heads on the guillotine and then measured again and again until 4 p.m. the position of the holes which we were making with the punch.

At that time the group of mechanical workers, roughly 10 of them, got together because an experienced worker wanted to bring up the problem of wasted efforts and material in the production and had a solution to propose. The main trigger for the discussion was the fact that more than one hundred cable hooks had been manufactured recently but they were not acceptable. Each hook is made by bending over in the forge a long strip of metal with a hole drilled at each end; the holes had been drilled so much out of place that they did not overlap enough after the piece had been bent over to let a bolt pass through them. The worker pointed out the cost of the lost metal and also the work done. His solution to the situation was to propose to hire a new chief steward who, in his words, would be able to tell everyone how to do things correctly and supervise everyone and every step of the fabrication. It took a lot of questioning on my part and on the part of the MIR worker who was chairing the meeting to bring to light other means of keeping control over the production. And the discussion broadened to consider how to improve the possibility of control by the workers themselves. Why did the companero who sweats his life away at the galvanization bath ignore the fact that the piece looked so bad and crooked and proceed to spend hours of wasted effort? Why did no one know that a bolt had to go through this restricted hole? Why, in fact, did the worker who was presenting the problem to us today not act and talk earlier? And why would anyone be so sloppy as to drill holes half a centimeter off in a piece which is 5 cm. wide? The man who had initiated the discussion came back to his request for hiring a qualified supervisor but then went on to remark that all he knew he had learned at work from other companeros. Then someone mentioned that everyone should know how to use the caliper; and tomorrow I'll sit with them again and cut up an inch into 16 pieces and somehow get at the fact that 7/8 and 14/16 are the same thing.

Friday, March 16, 1973

Every day at the side of the working class is exhilarating. I always come across the concrete proof of the fact that those who are manning the means of production are the progressive elements of the society.

Yesterday the companero who dips the metallic pieces into hydrochloric acid for galvanization told me how they modified the galvanization process because the standard procedures which I had just read about in a booklet of the Association of American Galvanizers were too time-consuming, required too much personnel, and did not give good results anyway. So instead of using a bath

of degreaser followed by a bath of sulfuric acid, followed by a wash followed by a bath of *fundante*, a saturated goeey mix of zinc in pure hydrochloric acid, followed by the molten zinc bath at a temperature which, the manual says, must be maintained at 450 degrees within less than 10 degrees, today they use only a bath of hydrochloric acid at 25%, dry the pieces and spray them roughly with "salt of ammonia" and dip them in the molten zinc which is kept at the right temperature by looking at the color of the pieces which come out and opening more or less the fuel valve at the entrance of the heater.

Those that saved work for themselves in this fashion and made a process 30% cheaper, do not know how to do divisions or fractions; but somehow they overruled those technical dictates which generations of diligently educated petty bourgeois have accepted as sacred.

This day started out with my going early to Quimantu's documentation center (the national publishing house whose publications are now banned) to find out what CONICYT (National Council on Science and Technology) is really doing; it seems to be a mix, with all the fellowships controlled in fact by cultural imperialism but also with a few signs of progressive attitudes. On the one hand, all the papers presented at last year's congress were just empty verbiage; on the other hand, the last issue of the weekly CONICYT newsletter announced the creation of a national prize for research and discoveries which consists however of two prizes, one for usual academic investigations, the other for technical discoveries made by workers in their factory.

As I walked along the river Mapocho towards the bus stop to go to the factory, it blew my mind to think that the galvanization process used by my companeros might get the first national prize. And I recalled the evening before, as I came out of the weekly general meeting at the factory, when one of the older leaders started telling me about their struggle four years ago in the days of President Frei; he had informed me that this group had been the originator of the movement of *tomas* (seizing factories). None of them still has a copy of the booklet which they had put out then to distribute to other factory workers and to trade unions. They simply initiated a new step in the class struggle; they lived it; they suffered through it; and now they go on without special pride or any evidence of looking for fame. They do not tell their story easily to political tourists who come around with uniforms of leftist journalists to visit the factory. But in the dusty yard of the factory I did not feel any romanticism either; I had worked hard with my gloved hands too many hours to romanticize proletarian life; it was much too real to be reified in any way.

So I was once again on my way to the industrial suburbs. Upon arriving, I intended to teach to a new group of six workers, those who are building the protective tubes for the support cables of the telephone poles; but my intention was put aside when one of the six, who is in charge of soldering the long seam of these tubes, asked me to help him find a better way to hold the tube closed up while welding it. The tubes were over two

meters long, and clamping them little by little along their length to put the 35 welding spots required more than one hour per tube. Since there are 450 tubes to make now and more than 1000 later, he had come to the decision that it was worth putting together some piece of apparatus which would work more efficiently. But he felt very unsure of himself at the idea of having to invent, and I felt very unsure of myself confronted with the reality of the factory where only delivering something which works immediately for the production counted. Our only tools were crude: the welding machine, hammers, vises and all kinds of pieces of iron in the back storage area. We set to work, picking up angle irons, deciding to link them together, inventing a hinge by welding pieces of tubing along the edge of the angle irons and sticking a rod through it all; and a something started taking shape. We then took two vises from work tables and set them up onto the welding area table; but our cumbersome hinged gutter-like contraption would not stay inside the vises and it kept turning on its side. Moreover, handling it was difficult, because the two of us could barely lift it. Finally, my companion said we should attach guides to the vises so that our contraption would not move. Thus as the day was ending and the bell had already rung, we welded on some more guiding pieces. How I knew where to set the vises along the tube holder to spread out the compression was hard to discuss, and my companion forced me just to do it, saying that I could always explain some other time. Here were again the beautiful contradictions, this time between the necessity of getting my companero to reason by himself and make decisions on his own and the requirements of immediate achievement for production. But the resolution of this dialectical situation was evident to both of us without mentioning Engels, because, as we finally closed down the vises and brought the lips of the tube to touch, ready to weld all along in one sweep, the seam was not straight; it went slightly in a helix. Here again was the ideological necessity of linking our work with the work of the other companeros who had shaped the tube before us and had not carefully lined it up in the molding press. It is with them that we shall discuss what we built today and why their own work too must be well done. We shall educate them in technical matters just as we were educating ourselves in the practice of production work. Neither I nor my companero could have devised alone what we finally built together; we controlled and reinforced what each thought and did. And our best moment came as we finally walked out of the factory with the sun all red behind the chimneys of other San Miguel factories, and my companero said: "*Todos los otros dias hemos producido, pero hoy dia ademas hemos creado*" (all other days we have been producing, but today we also created) and we took a soft drink at the little stand alongside the dusty soccer field, between the shantytown where the Socialist Party and MIR flags fly side by side and the wall on which was painted the slogan "*Avansar: la canasta popular*" (let us go forward with direct food distribution).


November, 1973

Our Lives Are At Stake is the story of the Shell strike of 1973--the first national strike for health and safety contract protection by a trade union.

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OUR LIVES ARE AT STAKE



workers fight for health and safety

SHELL STRIKE 1973

by Dave Worsley

40¢

When someone called me up that evening to ask me to teach a course in group theory [an abstract mathematical theory] at the University, I simply said: "I can't."

Monday, June 18, 1973.

Talked with the new accountant, a former student who became worker, then student again and is now back at the factory after graduating. Together, we figured out the cost of galvanization which he could not reconstruct alone. We used my old notes when I was having the companeros describe to me what the galvanization work was, in order to have them do some calculations. Later he got together all the companeros who work on galvanization and had them discuss the pricing of various pieces.

Wednesday, July 4, 1973.

At lunch a companero who works making cement posts at the back of the factory yard asked me to teach him and his fellow workers how to read blueprints, as I had done with the companeros who work with machinery. So, we stood in the open air, near the concrete mixer on which a companero kept banging with a wooden cudgel to prevent the mixture from sticking. We had opened up on a wooden table the blueprint of the 10 meter reinforced cement posts. A companero asked immediately: "How can I find the size of this indented area which is drawn out here but has no dimension written along it?" We would need to find the place on the drawing where the scale was indicated; but the idea of scale, the very convention of representing an object by a scaled down drawing were new ideas. So we looked for *Escala 1:5* on the general drawing and the detailed cross sections, respectively. We started measuring on paper the size of the cross section of the post (it was 3 cm. wide) with difficulty, counting centimeters one by one on the measuring tape that I alone possessed in the group. Three centimeters is too small to be the true width of a cement post; so we discussed on and on why the size drawn was not the real one; I had to offer some direct hints because time was passing quickly; we cannot be perfect

all the time and go through the full "discovery" process. Then someone saw the numbers 1:5. He moved on it: "The real size must be five times larger, five times." "That means which size?" "That means 25 centimeters," said one *companero*. "No, five times larger than three does not give 25," said another. "It gives what?" I asked. "It gives like 10 or a little more." So I said: "Wait a minute! Five times one, that gives—five. Five times two; sorry, two times five, that makes—ten. And three times five, that makes—fifteen." And in the silence that followed, as the sun reddened behind the polluted afternoon mist and the cold from the fresh snow on the Cordillera made our heads come down between our shoulders, one of the *companeros* smiled and his face relaxed as he said, weighing each word: "So that is what we can use the multiplication table for." And the wind stung my eyes as they slowly filled with tears, having been involved in an act of "conscientization," of biting the pear of power over knowledge.

Forty years ago my *companeros* had chanted dutifully mathematical litanies on elementary school benches. Since then one had worked filling pisco liquor bottles in a privately owned factory, then had been fired for falling asleep on the toilet after inhaling alcohol vapor and licking too many overflowing drops. They all had come to work here, straightening out the spools of iron wire for the reinforced concrete with an antiquated winch. They "knew" their tables of multiplication to satisfy the standard educational system. But, somehow, that system never bothered to

give them the power to make real use of the stored up "knowledge". Today, however, they felt freer, in their cooperative; free also to catch the pneumonia which their underfed bodies could not resist. At noon we had a noodle soup with three tiny cubes of tough meat and a dish of mixed vegetables. I had kept in my pocket half of my ration of bread, to eat at the four o'clock break when the welders would offer me in a tin can with a welded-on handle some hot milk prepared for them to fight the bad effects of emanations from arc welding.

We walked over to the metal moulds in which the posts get manufactured. We measured the width of the pole at mid height; it was 15 centimeters. To get to predicting the size of the indented area which we were interested in at the beginning was just one small step away. By now, reading the tape measure and multiplying by five was a surmountable task. We did it. In passing, we discussed the purpose of the indentation, namely, to economize cement without affecting seriously the strength of the post.

By then the mixer was ready for a new batch; we poured it out into the open mould.

This article is dedicated to the Chilean workers who taught me more than I could ever offer them in return and who always welcomed me strictly on the basis of my deeds. It is also dedicated to Amalia Pando, Bolivian, 19 years old, textile worker, member of the Socialist Party, missing since Sept. 11th, and to the memory of Newton da Silva, Brazilian, member of M.I.R., killed at age 22 by early fascist shots in the streets of Santiago.



Continued from page 19

freedom are quickly picked up by the international press. A headline stating that "Opposition Parties Claim Allende is Curbing Press Freedom" misinforms millions of newspaper readers around the world. Secondly, by constantly pretending to be under attack itself, the opposition press distracts attention from the unprecedented way in which it attacks the government. Standard legal norms such as libel can no longer be applied to the opposition press without setting in motion a worldwide furor.

The ruling class has always employed its vast mass communications resources in defense of its own interests. In ordinary times, when the bourgeoisie is solidly in power, it may do so without resorting to sensationalism. The "establishment" press, in fact, cultivates a sober, polished style which in itself conveys the impression of "responsibility". But when the interests which it represents are under serious attack, as is now the case in Chile, this stylistic veneer of "objectivity" dissolves, and the press reveals itself for what it basically is — an immensely important political weapon.

As a case in point, we can take *El Mercurio*, owned by the wealthy Edwards family. Agustin Edwards, the paper's publisher, left Chile when Allende was elected and is now serving as a vice-president of Pepsi-Cola in Miami. As the ruling class came under greater pressure from the workers, *Mercurio* lost its traditional "calm". With each issue it has become easier to see in whose interests the paper is written. *Mercurio* is a good example to pick since the *New York Times* (June 25, 1973) sees fit to call it a "conservative but widely respected Santiago newspaper." Our guess is that the *Times* never bothered to ask a Chilean worker whether he or she "respects" *El Mercurio*. The answer would be "no".

The use of the press as a political weapon is not simply a matter of the size of headlines or color of the vocabulary. Through distorted and alarmist reporting, the news media can create economic chaos and bring about political havoc. It moves past "reporting" the news to making the news. For example, it is enough for *El Mercurio* to state that there is a shortage of toothpaste one day for there to be a shortage the next. After reading such reports, people immediately rush out to purchase as much of the item as possible thus, obviously, creating a shortage which did not exist the day before. This has been done not just with toothpaste, but with bread, coffee, powdered milk, baby nipples, and other items whose lack is keenly felt by the entire population.

On June 23, the *New York Times* ran an article with the headline, "Court in Chile Shuts Paper Over Anti-Allende Ad." There is a two-fold implication here — that the ad was merely a statement of opposition to Allende, and that the government has the ability (and desire) to shut down the press for such an offense. The ad, run by the National Party, in fact called on Chileans to reject the government as "illegitimate" and "unconstitutional" and, further, to disobey all measures the government might propose — nothing less than an open call to insur-

rection, something quite different from an "anti-Allende ad". The government filed suit to close the paper for six days, not indefinitely as the *Times* implied, and the courts opened it again after just one day of closure.

Actually, this was somewhat of a victory for the government, at that. Of the approximately 50 suits it has filed against openly seditious use of the news media by the opposition, it has won almost none. The reason is simple: the courts are headed by staunch members of the opposition who guarantee the wielding of this powerful political weapon in the hands of those so desperately resisting change.

The Armed Forces

"...politicizing the military could be disastrous for Chile's durable democratic system..."
New York Times, editorial, early 1973.

"Under the watchful eye of the traditionally non-political armed forces, Chile's democratic system has survived..." *New York Times*, editorial, April 3, 1973

On June 29th at 8:40 A.M. tanks of the Chilean Army's Second Armored Regiment in Santiago rumbled out into the streets and set course for the Presidential Office Building. The rebel regiment fired on the "Moneda" for three hours before surrendering to Army Commander-in-Chief, General Carlos Prats. Other *coups* have been planned during the last three years, but this one actually reached the streets. Once again, it shattered the myth that Chile's armed forces, traditionally, have been non-political. As with all else in Chile, the deepening political and ideological crisis of the ruling class is pushing the armed forces into the center of an intensifying class struggle.

The phrase "non-political military" can mean two things: 1) a military which does not intervene in the administration of the State, or 2) a military which holds no political opinions — a "professional" force which stands above politics. It is quite possible to have a State in which the military is non-political in the first sense; it is impossible to find a State where the military is non-political in the second sense. Neither case holds in Chile: the military has taken an active role in the administration of some areas of the State economy, and the vast majority of military personnel hold political opinions.

Prior to the presidential elections of 1970, the Chilean armed forces intervened in the nation's political processes in two important ways. First, they actively intervened on behalf of the ruling class in the *inter-class* struggle by repressing many protest movements of the working class and poor. The bourgeoisie called in troops to put down the 1907 Iquique strike. More recently, the armed forces were used to crush protest movements in Santiago (1946: 8 killed, and 1957: 18 killed), El Salvador (1966: 8 killed, 37 wounded), and Puerto Montt (1969: 9 killed, 30 wounded).

Secondly, the armed forces have been used by

various sectors of the ruling class in the *intra-class* struggle when all other methods of conciliation had failed. In the twentieth century alone, there were successful military *coups* in 1924, 1925 and 1932. Each represented an attempt of one sector of the ruling class to displace another sector from a position of power.

The picture changed fundamentally in 1970. If the pre-1970 armed forces could play the "constitutionalist" role of upholding the political system, this was no longer the case following the electoral victory of the Unidad Popular. All three branches of the government, until 1970, were controlled by the same class — all three branches protected the same interests. Now, however, with the executive branch of the government in the hands of an administration which represents the working class and the legislative and judicial branches still controlled by the old ruling class, the matter of determining just what is "constitutional" gets increasingly difficult.

The Chilean military is not a monolithic institution. It, too, is composed of the classes which make up Chilean society in general. The majority of high ranking officers, according to a recent sociological study, come from upper class or upper-middle class families. Most middle ranking officers tend to come from the middle class, and the majority of the lower ranking officers, recruits and the conscripted soldiers and sailors originate in the peasantry and industrial working class.

Furthermore, the orientation and composition of the Chilean armed forces has been heavily influenced by the United States. In 1947, the U. S. and Chile signed the "Inter-American Mutual Defense Treaty" designed to extend U. S. "protection" to Latin America in case of communist "attacks". When the U. S. Military Assistance Program (MAP) began in 1952, Chile quickly became one of the prime recipients of U. S. military aid on the continent. Between 1950 and 1965 over 2,000 Chileans received training in the United States as part of this program, more than any other Latin American country with the exception of Brazil and Peru. Chile received the highest per-capita amount of military aid in Latin America between 1953 and 1966.

When the Unidad Popular took office in 1970, the class struggle obviously intensified, and this struggle continues to remain the dominant theme underlying present crises in all areas of Chilean life. But, the victory of the UP also aggravated the struggle for leadership among the different factions of the ruling class. The Attempted *coup* of June 29 demonstrated how deep the roots of the class struggle in Chile actually are: but, it also demonstrated that the Chilean ruling class is divided, for its failure called attention to the fact that the ruling class has not been able to decide when or how to use the armed forces to protect its interests.


Just as there are two dominant tactical positions in the Chilean Right, reflected in the positions of the National and Christian Democratic Parties, there are also two anti-UP trends within the military hierarchy. A minority sector believes that a military *coup* followed by a prolonged period of open military dictatorship is necessary

if they are to regain full control of the State and protect their economic interests. This group is willing to risk open civil war and the consequent rupture of military hierarchy and institutionality. This is the faction that acted June 29th and is supported by the fascist "Fatherland and Liberty" movement and the reactionary National Party.


A majority of high ranking officers believe that some form of open political intervention is necessary, but want to do it in such a way as to preserve their institutional interests and avoid a prolonged period of outright military dictatorship and civil war. This is the so-called "constitutional Right" which reflects the Christian Democrats' desire for a "constitutional *coup*" that would install a temporary caretaker government until a Christian Democratic president (presumably Eduardo Frei) could be elected.

There is also a third group of "Left Constitution-*alists*" composed of high-ranking military officers who believe that, since Salvador Allende was elected to a 6 year term of office, no movement could remove him from office before 1976 and still remain constitutional. General Prats, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, is included in this group.

Among the soldiers and sailors themselves, though, the situation is different. A trend towards the Left may well develop as workers and peasants identify with other members of their class. Shortly after the unsuccessful *coup* of June 29, a group of high-ranking officers in the southern city of Valdivia began preparations for a new *coup* to overthrow Allende. They were opposed and finally denounced by the low-ranking officials and the soldiers. Also, one now frequently sees smiles of approval on the faces of many soldiers when the Left chants, "Friend, soldier, the people are with you!"



These experiences may influence the armed forces' final allegiances. Clearly, though, the military in Chile can no longer be conceived as neutral; neither can they be expected to act as a unified institution.





The Workers

"Much of the labor force is striking against the government for higher pay. A prime example: the copper workers at El Teniente..."
James Nelson Goodsell in the *Christian Science Monitor*, June 25, 1973

"The copper strike is the first bitter confrontation between blue-collar workers and the two and one half year old government, which has championed workers," Jonathan Kendell in the *New York Times*, June 16, 1973

The accusation appears over and over again in the U. S. press: the UP – the workers' government – has turned against the workers. The reporting on the recent El Teniente strike was important since it called into question the fundamental social basis of the government: if the workers had abandoned the government, who remained?

The roots of the Teniente strike are complex, but they deserve to be explained. Teniente is the largest underground copper mine in the world. As such, it plays a tremendous role in the Chilean economy which receives over 80% of its foreign exchange earnings from copper sales. The copper miners are well organized and have a long tradition of struggle for decent living and working conditions. Unlike most Chilean workers, they were able to win significant economic battles before the UP government took office.

Because the copper mining industry is so profitable, the U. S. companies operating the mines before 1971 were able to offer the miners higher wages and benefits and still maintain what they later admitted to be an average rate of profit over 50% a year.

Furthermore, the owners were aided in their dealings with the miners by the historic division that has existed within the Chilean working class: that between "obrerros" and "empleados", a division roughly corresponding to the blue-collar/white-collar distinction. In Chile, this division has been given a certain legal recognition and

has resulted in the establishment of two different legal minimum wages, two separate sets of unions with two separate contracts and with different benefits. Politically, the "obrerros" have always stood close to the Communist and Socialist Parties while the "empleados" were divided between the former and the Christian Democrats.

What, then, are the facts of the strike which didn't appear in the U. S. press?

1) *The New York Times* (June 16) reported that the miners struck for a 41% raise as part of a nationwide wage increase approved by the legislature last year. In fact, the government has granted all workers 100% across the board wage increases for a cost of living compensation. Yet, the opposition argues that since the miners already had an automatic 50% readjustment for inflation written into their private contract, they were entitled to this *plus* the 100% increase in the government bill, i.e., 150% rather than the 100% granted to all workers. Copper miners, it should be noted, already receive at least 4 times the average industrial wage. A discriminatory wage increase in their favor would only raise this ratio higher. The government, opposed to increasing the wage differential between workers, obviously could not accept this measure.

Nevertheless, the opposition argued that the mining and labor ministers were breaking the law by not granting 150%. So the Congressional opposition removed them from office. The strike came to an end when the remaining sectors of striking miners accepted the identical proposal that the mining and labor ministers had made seven weeks earlier.

2) *The Christian Science Monitor* (June 25) reported that "much of the labor force" was out on strike against the government; most other newspapers reported that 12,000 workers at Teniente were on strike around the same time. There are 12,750 workers at the various mines and foundries of the Teniente complex. In June, at least 70% of the total work force at Teniente was on the job and over 90% of the "obrerros" were working. The strike found its strongest support in the white-collar workers, largely controlled by the PDC, and not in the blue-collar workers. There were no other major strikes involving large numbers of workers at that time.

3) Most papers reported wide backing for the strikers, implying that few people actually supported the government position. In fact, the support which the strikers did receive was so uncharacteristic that it clearly belied the opposition's position that this was an economic, not a political, strike. Never in the long history of the working class movement in Chile has a workers' strike received the support of the national organization of large landowners (SNA), the national organization of large industrialists (SOFOFA), the national organization of merchandise distributors, the Chilean doctors', lawyers' and engineers' associations, the conservative National Party and the fascist "Fatherland and Liberty" organization. On the other hand, none of the large workers' organizations favored the strike, and no other miners' union, regardless of U. S. and Chilean opposition press reports, joined the walkout.

Clearly, the strike was politically, and not economically, motivated. The political motivation developed from the failure of the owners' strike in October, 1972. During this strike, 99% of factory workers (blue and white-collar) remained on the job and many, along with students, did voluntary work to counteract effects of the strike. The opposition realized that if they were to bring the country effectively to a halt and, thereby, justifying military intervention in the government, they would have to divide the working class. That's what they tried to do with the El Teniente strike. As one El Teniente worker said: "Those who claim to be defenders of the workers are provoking an enormous conflict between workers. They are creating hatred between workers, and this has never existed before." The PDC union leaders at El Teniente went to the other large copper mines to try to generate sympathy strikes, while the PDC and PN press urged all workers to strike in sympathy of the 150% wage increase for the El Teniente miners. As already pointed out, their efforts failed and the strike at El Teniente slowly petered out.

The working class remains the social base of the UP government. During the period between the elections of 1970 and the present they have led the battle to break down the old ruling class and build a socialist society in Chile. The most important advances have been in the creation of the seeds of popular power: worker control in over 300 socialized factories, peasant control of farms encompassing some 40% of farmable lands and neighborhood control of food distribution in working class districts. The process is still new and much remains to be done: but each new crisis sees the working class advancing with great determination. During these periods the workers demonstrate an ability to learn and to organize themselves that often surpasses that of the UP government.

During the owners' strike of last October, for example, two new forms of popular power sprang up: the "Cordones Industriales" and the Communal Councils. The "Cordones" are based on the industrial workers who are concentrated in various "bands" of large factories that surround Chile's major cities. The Communal Councils are coordinating organizations which, in addition to the representatives of factories and farms, include representatives of all community groups (women's organizations, food distribution cooperatives, students, etc.). Both are broad-based organizations composed of elected representatives which decide basic policies from defending the factories against right-wing attacks, to pressuring the government for the socialization of new factories, to the distributing of primary necessities in their areas.

The workers are the driving force behind the UP government and they have continually demonstrated their desire and commitment to establish a socialist society in Chile. When the *New York Times* (editorial, June 25, 1973) recommends that Allende "stand up to the radicals in his own ranks", it somehow forgets that the "radicals" are his ranks.

The United States and Chile

The Senate hearings on ITT's activities in Chile showed that U. S. corporations and government officials worked to defeat the Unidad Popular in 1970 and tried to prevent Allende from taking office after he won the presidency. Since then, U. S. banks, corporations, the press and government agencies such as the CIA have sided with the Chilean upper class. They have acted in many ways to paralyze and discredit the Unidad Popular:

1) U. S. copper companies, especially Kennecott, have attempted to block Chilean shipments of copper to Europe, thus cutting off a vital source of foreign exchange to the country. Kennecott claims they have not received "just compensation" for their nationalized mines in Chile, even though since 1955 their average rate of profit on invested capital was 52.8% (Their average rate of profit in other countries where they own mines is 10%).

2) The U. S. Eximbank curtailed all loans until the question of compensation for U. S. mining and other interests has been resolved.

3) U. S. private banks also curtailed loans. By last year, only \$35 million in short term credits were available from private banks as compared to about \$220 million in past years.

4) Almost all suppliers cut off credit.

5) U. S. A.I.D. cut off loans to the Chilean government (although AID programs continue to train opposition labor, business and political leaders in their schools in the U. S.).

6) The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank curtailed their loans to Chile. Both these multi-national lending agencies are dominated by the United States.

7) The United States tried to pressure European creditors ("The Paris Club") into forcing Chile to immediately pay its foreign debts. The vast majority of these debts were contracted long before Allende took office.

8) Private U. S. corporations curtailed all credit for shipments of replacement parts to Chile, thus effectively denying the nation these items.

9) Various CIA agents acting in Chile are implicated in the activities of openly seditious groups. Keith Wheelock, for example, a CIA agent who "officially" held a post at the U. S. Embassy in Santiago shortly after Allende was elected, served as the contact with the fascist "Fatherland and Liberty" movement. Neither is U. S. Ambassador Nathaniel Davis above suspicion. Davis was previously ambassador to Guatemala during the period when U. S. diplomats and military advisors helped the dictatorship organize fascist terror groups such as "White Hand", "New Anti-Communist Organization", and the Anti-Communist Council of Guatemala", which murdered thousands of Guatemalan students, workers and peasants. Davis was transferred to Chile shortly after Allende was elected to office and brought a large "political" staff with him from Guatemala.

10) U. S. dollars have supported opposition strikes, such as the October owners' strike when truck owners

were paid to stop transporting goods and offers were made to pay workers if they stopped producing. U. S. funds were also used in the 1964 and 1970 election campaigns – both times against Allende.

11) A manifestly anti-Allende press campaign has been conducted in the major U. S. newspapers and other media. The U. S. press has blamed the Unidad Popular's "Marxist-dominated coalition" for bringing about the present crisis. As a June 25 *New York Times* editorial said:

“ ‘Civil war must be avoided,’ declares President Salvador Allende; but his Marxist-dominated coalition perseveres with policies and tactics certain to accelerate the polarization that has pushed Chile close to the brink.”

It is true that Chile is deeply polarized. But the *Times* has not written editorials against the Congressional opposition which has blocked every government proposal designed to help the workers. Or against the Christian Democratic youth groups who burned Socialist and Communist Party headquarters. They have not criticized the Christian Democratic congressmen who have refused to talk with the government (even though the latter has shown itself willing) unless the UP totally discards its

program. Or the leaders of the National Party, who have threatened Chileans with a civil war unless its demands are unconditionally met.

• This type of coverage in the U. S. press is guided by an implicit assumption: that the Chilean upper class is justified to defend its interests by any means necessary; and that the Chilean working class and peasantry should yield graciously.

The left parties in Chile conscientiously explored a new road to social justice – the *via Chilena* – which was intended to provide a peaceful transition to socialism. This road was blocked by the upper class, using its congress, its courts, its economic power and, most recently, cooperative sectors of the armed forces. In President Allende's words, "It is not the fate of the revolutionary process which hangs in the balance. Chile will inevitably continue its march towards socialism. What the fascist opposition threatens is the completion of this process in accordance with our historical tradition, without the use of generalized physical violence as an instrument."

The U. S. people should know these facts: we should know the role of our government in the events which are currently developing in Chile. And we should oppose any and every action taken by the U. S. against the Chilean people.



THE LOCAL STRUGGLE

The following pages report on the political activities of scientific and technical people who are challenging the system that uses their skills to perpetuate imperialism and the subjugation of Third World peoples.



ACTIONS AT THE INTERNATIONAL GENETICS CONGRESS

Every five years an International Congress of Genetics takes place, organized by the genetics society of the host country. The meeting attracts large numbers of geneticists from outside the country (even though no translating services are available), and most of the meeting is devoted to technical sessions. Traditionally, the focus of the congress has not been on social issues, with the exception of denunciations of the Soviet Union during the Lysenko period for refusing to allow anti-Lysenko geneticists to attend the meeting [Lysenko assumed that environment *directly* modified genetic makeup.]

The initial plans made by the Genetics Society of America (GSA) for this year's congress were totally purged of any discussion of political and social issues. When SESPA members heard of these plans, we protested vigorously that at least the controversy about genetics and IQ could not be ignored at the 1973 congress. After continued pressure, partly by some halfway sympathetic liberals in the GSA, congress officials agreed to provide rooms for a forum on Genetics and IQ and one on the Green Revolution, and a place in the plenary session on Genetics and Society.

SESPA members in many cities including Chicago, Boston, Berkeley, St. Louis, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis began planning around three main issues: genetics and IQ, genetic engineering, and the green revolution. We decided to write short position papers on each of the three issues. In Berkeley, the Committee on Genetics and Society (COGS) formed to bring out these issues at the congress and to do additional research on the topics. They negotiated with congress authorities for meeting rooms and a place for SESPA to have a literature table. Since congress officials wanted to make clear to everyone that we were not an official part of the congress, which was being held on the second floor of the student union, they put us right by the front door on the first floor. As a result, many of the congress participants talked to us and read our literature even before they registered. We also found ourselves directing people to registration, bathrooms, and restaurants.

In spite of the small concessions that congress officials made, it was clear that it was up to SESPA and COGS not only to present radical alternatives but to initiate discussion of social and political issues. For example, in the plenary session on genetics and society, such topics as "the failure of Cartesian dualism as a functional ethical base and the cohesiveness of genetics as a scientific discipline and university department" were discussed as though they were burning issues. Our first goal, therefore, was to initiate discussion on the political ramifications of genetics.

Our critique of the green revolution involved two main public activities: a SESPA member gave a talk at the plenary session, and a forum was held on the issue. SESPA speakers pointed out that politically and economically the green revolution represents a capitalist incursion into Third World markets as well as an attempt to secure the Third world politically for the West [see position paper on the green revolution, p. 41]. We then attempted to show how the imperialist goal of the funding organizations (principally the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations) created great strictures on agricultural research itself. This resulted in agricultural research directed toward mechanized (capital-intensive) monoculture, in which problems connected with long-term ecological and environmental effects are ignored. Agricultural products are treated as trading commodities rather than as anything produced to serve people's needs (*i.e.*, food). The position papers and talk at the plenary session provoked a great deal of discussion. Many agricultural geneticists felt threatened by what we said. Others accepted our critique of imperialism but felt that technical aspects of the green revolution were politically neutral.

The forum on the green revolution drew about 700 people, many more than we had expected. Two of the speakers, who were entomologists from Berkeley, concentrated on a technical critique of the use of pesticides. The two SESPA speakers tried to combine a political and technical critique. The discussion got off to a bad start when two nuts, taking advantage of the open microphone, talked about something called 13-dimensional genetics and

the potato as the ideal, nutritionally complete food. After that, questions and comments centered around technical aspects, and political issues often were ignored. This happened, in part, because many of the agricultural scientists in the audience felt threatened and under attack by the technical critique, and did not want to face the political critique at all. As a result they retreated to their area of expertise. Green revolution enthusiasts claimed we were against high yields and plant breeding in general. They contrasted their detailed knowledge as practical men in the fight against hunger to our theoretical "carping," and pretended that the only alternative to their way of doing things was hunger. One of the problems we faced was trying to describe what *could be* instead of what *is*. We did not convince most of the audience of the correctness of our point of view, but we did open discussions and raise serious questions about the green revolution. During succeeding days, individual agricultural scientists from developing countries came to us to express support for our overall approach, offer new information, and correct errors of detail. For example, one Pakistani pointed out that the tough straw of the new varieties of wheat injures the mouths of cattle and causes infection.

Later in the week, a group of scientists from the Third World organized a session on teaching and research in genetics in developing countries and several SESPA members attended this meeting. There was a clear split among Third World scientists. One group felt that the most effective thing scientists in the U.S. could do was keep Third World scientists abreast of the latest advances in genetics and help provide them with equipment to do research on "pure" genetics. The other group was concerned with solving local problems and training local people to work on these problems. They considered many aspects of modern genetics irrelevant to the important genetic questions in their countries, and were concerned with finding local organisms to illustrate genetic principles rather than to continue to use fruit flies which are both economically irrelevant and often difficult to obtain and rear.

We tried to learn from our experiences at the green revolution forum so that we could avoid some of the pitfalls at the forums on genetic engineering and genetics and IQ. First, we knew that we would have a large group of people coming to hear us, and that it was important to coordinate what the various people speaking would say. Second, we wanted to avoid nuts and crackpots. On the other hand, we felt that the audience would be less hostile, in part because the direct victims of racism would be represented in the audience while the direct victims of the green revolution weren't in the audience.

The forum on genetic engineering was not publicized by the congress or by the local papers, but we still filled the meeting room with 70 to 80 people. The openness of the discussion was a welcome change from the more formal forum on the green revolution. SESPA speakers emphasized the shoddy science and the racism inherent in much of this area of genetics, especially in the current genetic testing programs. The discussion tended at times to go off on questions involved with long-term prospects

of genetics research, such as cloning. We believe that these prospects and their implications should be discussed, but it seemed that bringing them up sometimes diverts thinking from current problems.

The forum on genetics and IQ drew about 2000 people and the forum was shown on closed circuit television in several buildings on the Berkeley campus. Speakers at the forum had discussed their talks with each other prior to the forum, and the presentations had a continuity that was missing in the green revolution forum. What resulted was a multi-faceted attack on the Jensen-Shockley-Herrnstein-Eysenck school of genetics and IQ.* We refuted the idea that all compensatory education is bound to fail, and documented the cultural bias of IQ tests. We pointed out the technical errors in Jensen's concept of heritability. Further, we showed that he and Shockley define race culturally, but use it in a context where only a genetic definition of race is appropriate. The final speaker drew parallels with the anti-foreigner eugenics movement of the thirties and discussed what kind of actions geneticists should take to oppose the new eugenics. In the discussion afterwards most speakers were in agreement, including a white from Johannesburg, South Africa.

In conjunction with the forum on genetics and IQ, we attempted to get congress delegates to sign a petition, which (1) condemned the work of Jensen, Shockley, Herrnstein, and Eysenck as being scientifically invalid and based upon the social prejudices of the investigators, (2) opposed the acceptance and use of the racist conclusions of their work in educational, welfare, penal, and other aspects of public policy, and (3) recognized the responsibility of geneticists to speak out in classes, in their professional societies, and in public arenas against this misuse of genetics. Approximately one-tenth of the delegates approached signed the petition, giving us about 300 signatures. Some who did not sign objected to what they saw as personal attacks on Jensen, Herrnstein, Shockley, and Eysenck, or to the statement about social biases of the investigators. Many did not sign because they felt insufficiently acquainted with the technical issues of the controversy, even though SESPA and COGS had distributed an immense amount of literature. Many geneticists felt it was outside their responsibility because it was physicists (Shockley) and educational psychologists (Jensen and Herrnstein), rather than geneticists who were talking about genetics. There was a great deal of controversy about whether to officially present anything to the GSA. Arguments centered around whether it was a useful thing to do, whether the GSA would do anything with it if presented, and what the consequences

*A forthcoming issue of SftP will focus on an analysis of Genetics, IQ, and Social Class. We hope to present in that issue a major counterattack to the racist position. Much of the material developed for the activities at the International Genetics Conference will be used, and we ask others who have relevant material (articles, photographs, cartoons, etc.) to please send them in.

would be if an anti-racist resolution were defeated. The statement was introduced as a petition to the GSA business meeting. With characteristic courage and integrity the GSA amended it to death and tabled the corpse.

In discussions at the end of the conference several criticisms emerged. We had underestimated the receptivity of people at the congress to our challenge of current scientific ideology. The table was the center of a great many discussions, and there were frequent inquiries about new literature and new meetings. However, we didn't respond by new talks or by preparing new literature. We were inadequately prepared with detailed information to confront technical experts of the green revolution. Since we were part of the official program, some of us fell into the trap of letting our "official" program define, in part, our activities. We also limited ourselves to issues that were directly relevant to genetics. The general SESPA message was limited to selling the magazine, and holding informal discussions. We stirred up the geneticists and prevented them from doing their narrow professional thing in isolation from the rest of the world. Ideological struggle is an important political struggle, and it is possible and essential to wage it at technical and professional meetings as well as elsewhere. We still have a lot to learn about waging this struggle, but we are getting there.

Berkeley SESPA



THE GREEN REVOLUTION - A - CRITIQUE

There have been two types of criticisms levelled at the green revolution. One group of critics primarily scientists, have pointed out the failures of the technical aspects of the green revolution, including periodic crop failures and the ecologically unsound and massive use of pesticides. Other critics, especially Marxists, have examined the specific political, economic, and social changes which have accompanied the green revolution. They contend that the green revolution is "the latest chapter in the long history of increasing penetration of Third World agriculture by the economic institutions of Western capitalism." [1] At first glance, these critiques seem unrelated. On the one hand, scientists are pointing out technical problems with the implication that they have technical solutions. Marxists, on the other hand, make a political and economic critique with the implication that they have political solutions. We contend that these critiques are inextricably bound; that technical changes require political changes and political changes require technical changes.

Green revolution advocates claim that by using the new grains of wheat and rice, accompanied by massive fertilization, pesticide use, and irrigation, food production will increase several-fold. Indeed, wheat production in Mexico, where the new wheat varieties are used, has nearly quadrupled. [2] On the other hand, in 1972 rice production in the Philippines fell 5% despite increased use of "miracle" rice, and grain production in India in 1972 was only 10% better than the worst drought year in the past decade. [3] Critics attribute this to several factors. First, the miracle grains work well only under favorable soil conditions and with the aid of large amounts of fertilizer,

pesticide, and irrigation. Therefore, farmers in regions with poor soil, and farmers unable to purchase the "whole package" of seeds, pesticides, and fertilizers will benefit little. Second, the widespread use of a very few varieties of wheat and rice creates new opportunities for pests and disease. [4] When many local varieties are planted, pests and diseases rarely attack all of them, but when one variety is planted nothing checks the spread of a pest except massive pesticide and fungicide applications, a short term proposition at best. Third, the increased drain on resources, especially water, creates new problems. In Pakistan, increased use of tube wells has lowered the regional water table, cutting back the hydroelectric power needed to run the wells. Fourth, and this is really implied in the first point, there are some indications that, while mean yields may increase, the variance of yields over the years also increases. That is, the difference between boom years and bust years is greater. This results in economic disaster for the small farmer.

Leftist critics point out that the United States is using food as a weapon to counter national liberation movements. In the words of Hubert Humphrey:

I have heard...that people may become dependent on us for food. I know that is not supposed to be good news. To me that was good news, because before people can do anything they have got to eat. And if you are looking for a way to get people to lean on you and to be dependent on you, in terms of their cooperation with you, it seems to me that food dependence would be terrific... [5]

Among the effects of the green revolution has been the integration of previously isolated areas into a capitalist market system. An Agricultural Development Council publication [6] urges teaching peasants to want more for themselves and abandon collective efforts. In short, they are to be taught to "keep up with the Joneses." The encroachment of multi-national corporations is encouraged as "an amazingly efficient way to institutionalize the transfer of technical knowledge in agriculture." [2] And there is no doubt that whoever controls the distribution of seeds, pesticides, and fertilizer can also withhold these materials. Since the initial capital outlay is not inconsequential, it is these farmers who initially have more land and more money who benefit most. Again in the words of Lester Brown, a green revolution apologist: "A new rich class of farmers is bound to arise, comprised of those who have proximity to markets, or ready access to fertilizer, or who can afford to mechanize." [2] The increasing mechanization of agriculture creates at least a temporary increase in unemployed agricultural laborers. Finally, in order to make use of green revolution techniques profitable to farmers, governments must provide higher price supports for the agricultural products, at least initially. This requires an increased cost to consumers, which once again hurts the poor most of all.

We can now see how the two criticisms are related. The problem that agricultural scientists were given to work on was not how to solve the world's hunger problem, but a much more narrow, technical one. The problem was to maximize yield of wheat and rice under optimal soil and weather conditions. It became a narrow engineering problem, methodologically equivalent to designing a color television set. The environment was viewed as a rather simple, manipulable component of the system. This methodology results in ignoring the problem of drought and bad weather, ignoring poor land, and, on the part of the scientist, ignoring the economic consequences of the need for fertilizer, pesticides, and irrigation. Only the wealthy farmer can afford to manipulate the environment. Also ignored are any aspects of the grains except their mean yield and nutritional content. The miracle rice is almost universally agreed to have an inferior taste. This

problem is relegated to the domain of peasant superstition, because after all agricultural scientists do not survive on a rice or wheat diet. Non-food uses, such as rice stalks for roof thatching in parts of Asia, make the new dwarf varieties inappropriate unless the multi-national corporations begin to sell houses as well. Because agricultural scientists are given a narrow technical problem (to increase crop yield) rather than an explicitly human problem (to eliminate hunger) their work becomes useful not to the people, but to large corporate interests. And these corporate interests are not in the main humanitarian, but rather concerned with profit and in continued and increased stability in the Third World. Their business is selling fertilizer, selling seeds, selling pesticides—and increasing Third World dependence on them. The narrow technical view of agriculture, so strong in American scientists nurtured in a system which emphasizes growth, Yankee ingenuity, and environmental destruction, plays into the hands of continued imperialism by the U.S. government and multi-national corporations.

Likewise, it is a mistake to believe that the green revolution can be used, with little technical modification, in socialist nations. Pests and diseases spread under a red flag just as they spread under the stars and stripes. Problems associated with pesticides remain. If poor land is an important part of agricultural economy, present varieties will be of very limited value in these areas. Efficient use of green revolution techniques requires large farms, that is, collective farms in a socialist country. Collectivization of agriculture is a different, wrenching, time-consuming process and its course should be dictated by the needs and political understanding of the peasants, not by the technology of agriculture. However, the green revolution should not be thrown out in its entirety. Hunger is a real, human problem, and some aspects of the green revolution offer promise toward increased agricultural production and the alleviation of hunger. At the base of the technical advance is the use of hybridization and polyploidy. Valuable seed banks of local and wild varieties of grains have developed. These need not be used to develop widespread varieties that require fertilizer and pesticide. They can be used on the local level to develop varieties that fit local needs. Local needs may include a strong stalk for roof thatching and even something that tastes good. Local needs cannot be assessed solely by agricultural experts, but require the active participation of farmers.

The green revolution is one of the more insidious forms of imperialism and neocolonialism. It is essential that scientists, leftists, and farmers join forces in the struggle against it. Those who the green revolution affect most—the small farmers and agricultural laborers—have already begun the struggle. Markers that guide planes spraying pesticides have been removed, and some have refused to use the new seeds. We contend that this is not an example of ignorance, but rather some exemplary first steps in the struggle. Scientists can help in this struggle by making more information available to those directly involved? They can demand that the planning and research in agriculture involve all classes affected by it. Only in this way will agricultural science be part of the struggle against hunger and for human rights.

FOOTNOTES

- [1] Cleaver, H.M. 1972. The contradictions of the green revolution. *Monthly Review* 24(2): 80-111.
- [2] Brown, L.R. 1970. *Seeds of Change*. Praeger, N.Y. 205 p.
- [3] Harris, M. 1973. The withering green revolution. *Natural History* (March 1973): 20-23.
- [4] Allaby, M. 1973. Miracle rice and miracle locusts. *The Ecologist* 3: 180-185.
- [5] H. Humphrey, 84th Congress, First Session, Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Hearings, Policies and Operations of P.L. 480, p. 129, 1957. Quoted by Cleaver [1].
- [6] Mosher, T. 1966. *Getting Agriculture Moving*. ADC, New York.

~ REPORT ~ WEST COAST REGIONAL SESPA CONFERENCE

A West Coast regional SESPA conference was held on August 25 in Berkeley, with about 80 people attending. Our main purpose in calling this conference was two-fold: to try to bring together many scattered people who had shown an interest in SESPA, seeking to replace the isolation of many individuals with new contacts that could lead to the formation and growth of new groups; and also to try to advance the general discussion of the political nature and goals of SESPA in its entirety. Organization for this conference was carried out by a few people in the Berkeley group, with the concurrence of the newly formed group in Palo Alto. Announcements (perhaps 200 in all) were sent not only to members of these two ongoing groups and to the other SESPA contacts listed in the magazine, but also to western subscribers to *Science for the People*, as well as a few other individuals we thought might be interested. The conference was scheduled to take place during the International Genetics Congress since we knew that a number of active SESPA people from other parts of the country would be present on that occasion and we wanted their participation. As it turned out, and not surprisingly, most of those who attended came from the San Francisco bay area and only a handful came from farther away.

The morning session, lasting almost two hours, was intended to bring everyone together in a general discussion of broad political issues as they relate to SESPA. We hoped to engage in substantial exchange of views among those with longer histories of involvement with the organization as well as to provide some introduction and orientation for those who were newcomers. Six people were asked to give very brief presentations—of a political perspective or of a particular activity—in order to stimulate the general discussion. As it turned out, we were not successful in generating very much at all in the way of group discussion; the session was accurately described as an aggregate of monologues uttered by different individuals.

One brief political clash that did arise in this morning session was over the subject of scientific aid to Indochina and the implied intrusion of capitalist technologies

into socialist countries. This debate (which has already surfaced somewhat in the magazine [see *Science for the People*, Vol. V, no. 5, Sept. 1973]) formed the major part of one of the afternoon workshops.

The other bit of mini-fireworks was provided by the delegation from the NCLC (National Caucus of Labor Committees). About five members of that group came to our conference to promote their organization. Their tactics were to try to make SESPA members feel guilty, inferior and incompetent, both politically and morally, while hinting that people could achieve salvation by joining up with NCLC. They passed out a leaflet renaming SESPA, *the S.E.S.-Pool*, and describing our activities at the Genetics Congress a “weeklong demoralization and disorganization of possible (and actual) pro-working class tendencies.” During the morning session, the NCLC members would make comments attacking SESPA in an arrogant way and presenting their particular solution as the only correct course.

It seemed that the response of most people during this discussion was to ignore the NCLC. They did, however, have the disruptive effect of confusing some people and of destroying any continuity in the general discussion. While the chairperson successfully stopped them from monopolizing too much of the discussion period, their overall negative influence was felt. This points up the necessity of being aware of such problems in the future and developing a wholesome method for dealing with them.

The afternoon was devoted to a series of smaller group workshops, scheduled so that each person could attend at least two topics of interest. Two workshops dealt with organizing, one specifically oriented for technical workers in industry; the workshop on science teaching and the one on combatting Jensenism each met twice to accommodate the large number of people interested; other subjects studied were: health and health systems; population, energy, resources; alternative (good) uses of technology; and scientific aid to Indochina.

Much of the discussion on alternative uses of technology centered around the work of Resource One, Inc., a community computer service located in San Francisco. Some of the people talked about their experiences in designing electronic and other tools for peoples’ use, pointing out the difference in their design philosophy (cost/simplicity) as compared to the commercial world.

The workshop on population, energy and resources decided to discuss all these topics together rather than splitting into subgroups on these topics individually. The result was a rather rambling meeting in which little was accomplished: neither a clear political-economic analysis of ecological problems nor a clear sense of how SESPA might effectively deal with environmental issues emerged. Apparently, the participation of NCLC people in this workshop contributed largely to this disarray.

The chief ideological dispute in the workshop on scientific aid to Indochina has already been referred to. The group did agree on assigning and coordinating geographical responsibilities for the ongoing collection of materials to be sent to Indochina.

The most concretely successful workshop was that dealing with science teaching. This was held in two sessions, with 27 people attending the first one and 15 people in the second, each very different. In the first one the chairperson from Berkeley SESPA, presented some ideas on radical teaching methods, described a section of a science and society course, and circulated materials and sources used in the course. A member from Boston SESPA, discussed the activities of the Boston SESPA Science Teaching Group, a 1972 conference for high school teachers on raising social and political issues in high school classrooms, and briefly described a course on Genetics and Society.

In the second and smaller workshop, each person described his or her own concerns, activities, and questions about science teaching. From this a natural agenda presented itself, on the basis of which people responded to the problems of others and shared ideas, advice, and support.

A wide range of problems was raised by the two workshops. Some of these were:

1. Social and political issues should be a part of all science courses (chemistry, mathematics, astronomy etc.) not just raised in science and society courses. How can this be accomplished when the professor claims there is time only for technical content? How can students influence a teacher to include these issues?

2. How can a teacher with social and political concerns get science majors, pre-medical students, and graduate students to take an interest in social issues?

3. What can we do about science and society issues in elementary school curricula? Most of these children never reach college science courses and if they do they are completely turned off to science. Children with poor reading skills in the high schools would never be exposed to materials we might prepare for use in high school courses. What materials can we use to reach minority children?

4. In dealing with the teaching of technical and mechanical skills how can we integrate social and political questions into the programs?

The workshop brought many people together who had been struggling alone with the problems of getting political content into science teaching. But it emphasized the frustrating lack of good concrete materials, bibliographies, and techniques for answering the problems raised. Eleven people signed a list indicating an interest in an ongoing Bay Area science teaching group.

This new Bay Area Science Teaching Group has already met twice since the conference and has begun to chart a course for itself that will embrace a broader spectrum of people and activities than has previously been a part of the local SESPA chapter.

The other concrete accomplishment of the conference was finding a number of new people in Northern California who have an interest in SESPA activities but had no group to associate with. With the new contacts made we will try to encourage the formation of several new groups


in a number of communities and establish helpful cooperations between these groups. It is too soon to see how this will work out. Also, we had a number of people express interest in SESPA organizing around the next annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), scheduled for San Francisco early in 1974. Anyone else interested in planning for that affair should contact us.

Overall evaluation of the conference: if we had intended to solve the question of SESPA's politics or to swell the ranks of SESPA with hordes of new followers, then this conference was a flop. Wisely, we had few expectations beyond getting acquainted with some new people. The failure of the morning session to evolve any satisfying political discussion may be due to the fact that it was short of time, or that it was not planned with a sufficiently clear and coherent program. Some of the workshops were criticized also for lack of preparation; others were praised for their excellent planning. With the single exception of the science teaching workshop, it did not appear that we were able to generate any sense of excitement that would carry people on into new and better SESPA work. But this is hard to measure. (One person said at the end of the day that he was disappointed in the conference: he had come hoping to be roused with spirit and enthusiasm which would let him return to his home town with a renewed dedication to political activity. It was pointed out that, more than brief inspiration, the movement needed people committed to long term organizational work.)

Finally, we had a party that night for all participants at the conference: this was a smashing success.

Berkeley SESPA

A Northeast Regional Conference was held late in October (see letters p. 4 and 5). Reports will appear in forthcoming issues.



CHAPTER REPORTS

BOSTON AREA STEERING COMMITTEE REPORT

REPORT FROM SUSSEX, ENGLAND

Some Background

It's been just over a year since an *ad hoc* group of Boston SESPA/Science for the People members called a general meeting (meeting of the whole) of the Boston chapter to discuss organizational (political) problems. At that initial meeting it was suggested that SESPA/SfP of Boston begin a series of discussions on the political understandings, positions, and activities of each project group within the Boston organization.

By mid-November 1972 an Interim Steering Committee had volunteered to facilitate these political discussions and bring about better communication and a wider participation in decision-making. (See *SfP* magazine Mayday 1973.) The Boston Interim Steering Committee (BISC) took on the responsibility of publishing a newsletter, whose primary focus was the ongoing political and organizational discussions of the monthly General Meetings and the reporting of activities of the local subgroups.

The role of the Boston Interim Steering Committee was further defined in May 1973 when the general meeting agreed that the Committee should select important and pertinent topics for discussion, presenting different political positions as clearly as possible. These topics were to be initially discussed in the project subgroups and subsequently discussed at general meetings. Thus, in September 1973 the BISC selected as its first topic for discussion, "Should workplace organizing be the primary task of Boston SESPA/SfP?" A position paper was distributed and the project groups and members of the Boston chapter were encouraged to discuss it before the general meeting.

The September 1973 General Meeting

The general meeting called to discuss workplace organizing was held at Univ. Mass./Boston. About 50 persons attended many of whom had not only read the proposal beforehand, but had discussed the proposal in the various project groups.

The meeting began with short statements by each of the project groups. The Interim Steering Committee apologized for the arrogant tone of the proposal and expressed the hope that everyone would skim over the proposal's possible weaknesses and attempt to come to grips with the main thrust. One group (MIT) even described how they were actually carrying out workplace organizing in their area.

Although the proposal was not voted upon, many people thought that while workplace organizing was essential it should not be described as Boston SESPA/SfP's "primary task." However, most did agree that the Boston group should be taking this task seriously. Therefore, the general meeting (by a show of hands) did direct the BISC to take up the activity of promoting workplace organizing wherever possible within Boston SESPA/SfP.

Thus, the BISC is currently involved in a number of activities. It is accumulating information on various workplaces and attempts and experiences of workplace organizing activities. In addition, it is trying to identify SESPA members who do similar work (or non-work) with others in the same workplace, with the hope of getting them together and stimulating possibilities of organizing.

I would like to describe what has been happening to our group. This is not a proper chapter report by any means, but is rather my personal view on what has become of Science for the People at Sussex. We are hoping to have a full meeting of all SESPA people before the university breaks up for summer vacation. I hope that meeting will result in some clearer objectives and commitments for the SESPA group. We will send you a fuller report of where we stand after that meeting.

We first came together as a group almost exactly a year ago. We had a regular attendance of about 30 people at the few meetings we had weekly during the last few weeks of summer term. At the beginning we discussed a wide range of topics and projects we thought we could tackle. Since we were in a university, some people wanted to put their energies into criticizing courses and curricula, making them more relevant, and in the process demystify the way science is presented. Some people wanted to get into a heavy sociological analysis of the class nature of scientific education and work—how it offered a specialised understanding of the world to a few, an understanding which carried with it no obligation to share with others, no commitment to use it as a tool for liberation, but was seen rather as a passport to a privileged life. Some people thought we ought to compile a vast resource library, comprising technical information, an inventory of people with skills to offer, and make this available to local community groups. Others wanted to research into the financing of all the different research groups on campus. Despite this wide-ranging enthusiasm, however, we were hampered by the fact that it didn't seem feasible to get deeply committed to any major projects since the summer vacation was almost upon us. Instead, we put our efforts into organizing some literature to give to the people coming up to the university in the following autumn. In this paper we argued briefly that science was not neutral, but that it supported and gave power to oppressive forces in our society. We saw this oppression as being directed both at us—with a view to keeping us in our places serving the capitalist interests that held power in society—and at people in underdeveloped countries, who were kept under control while their lives and resources were exploited.

At this stage, very near vacation time, an issue arose which we felt we ought to get involved in. Sussex University has had, for some years, a teaching arrangement called the Arts/Science scheme. Under this scheme, an undergraduate is required to take some courses in Arts subjects if he is majoring in a science subject, and vice versa. This may sound curious in comparison to the American system, where, as far as I know, it is possible to study almost any combination of courses you wish. At an English university you usually have a rigid course either in all arts or all science subjects. Sussex is one of the few places that give the opportunity to step outside your special discipline, and we felt that this could be a valuable facility, provided it wasn't only seen as an opportunity to get a taste of French literature, or Elizabethan poetry. When we heard that the university was

intending to drop the scheme because of the administrative difficulty of organizing a vast number of small courses, we decided it would be worthwhile to do some research into the scheme, attempt to salvage it, and design some new courses for it. A number of people felt that this was just the kind of trivial, parochial issue we *oughtn't* to get involved with, and they began to drift away from the group. Some of the people who would be staying on at the university during the summer decided to nurse this project along themselves. We also arranged a programme of meetings during the autumn term to which we invited outside speakers to come and talk on specific issues.

We started the new academic year with the Arts/Science project limping along, and attracted some interest from the arriving new students at our bookstall, where we distributed copies of back-issues of *Science for the People* magazine, and rapped with people. The programme of meetings with guest speakers got under way, with speakers on the abuses of cost-benefit analysis, showing the kind of productivity parameters that are used by government agencies when deciding complex social and ecological issues; a talk by Steven Rose on Ideology in Biology, showing how certain biological theories are shaped by, and contribute to social and political values; a talk on what a community science would mean; and a talk on alternative or appropriate technology. This last talk, given by David Dickson from the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science, took up a theme mentioned in the paper by Andre Gorz [see *SfP*, vol. V, no. 3, May 1973]: that the reorganization of productive processes that occurred during the Industrial Revolution brought about by mechanization and division of labour, not only resulted in increased productivity, but also brought with it increased social control of the worker at his workplace. Dickson argued that particular types of technologies and production processes implied particular social orders to accompany them, and pointed out that when we exported any technological process to an "underdeveloped" country, we were in effect also exporting a new social system to them.

While all this was going on, the regular informal gutsy meetings lapsed away, and we were no longer working together to generate a critique of the role of science in society. The following term the Arts/Science project pulled itself together and staged a two-day teach-in which attempted to gather together people sympathetic to the scheme and tried to map out possible lines of growth for it. There is at the moment a small group of people trying to get together a course in the School of Biological Sciences which will look at different biological theories and their appropriateness when applied to biological and social phenomena. By now the regular group meetings are a thing of the past, and yet there is still a group of people who still see themselves as belonging to a group called Science for the People, or SESPA, and who share certain values and concerns. Some of us attended the recent conference on Science and Indochina in London [see *SfP*, vol. V, no. 5, September 1973], which was organised jointly by the Indochina Solidarity Committee, and BSSRS. Some of us have been working with the Sussex Indochina Solidarity Committee on this Huntington campaign [see the report which follows]. I have started gathering material for a conference later this year on the use of technological crowd-control systems by the British Army in Northern Ireland (their latest toy is a sound unit which produces pulses which beat inside your head at a frequency of 8-10 cps. It is used in conjunction with an ultraviolet flashing unit, operating at about the same frequency, and results in about 10% of the people in any crowd having attacks like epileptic seizures. I would be grateful for any information on how to bugger-up/protect yourself from such a system.)

I hope that this meeting before the end of term will show us how we ought to develop from here. It may be that we will feel that we should simply continue meandering along as we are, attaching ourselves to other groups and joining with other issues as they come up. If so, then I should think we must be the most flexible group within a flexible organization. I will write again when I know more clearly what kind of structurelessness we are going to have. If any of you find the description of the changes our group has gone through is something you are familiar with please let us have your advice and criticism, because it will help us to grow if we can see our problems in perspective.

G.M.

The following report describes and analyzes the struggle at Sussex University over the appearance of Samuel Huntington, U.S. counterinsurgency strategist, as a guest lecturer and academician.

HUNTINGTON AT SUSSEX

Professor Samuel P. Huntington, professor of Politics at Harvard, was invited to give a seminar at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), a separately financed Institute which is based on the university campus. Rupert Wilkinson, a lecturer in the School of English and American Studies, took the opportunity to invite Professor Huntington to give an additional lecture to some students in American Studies. As soon as it was announced, the visit was opposed by the Sussex Indochina Solidarity Committee, whose members include fellows of IDS as well as students and faculty from throughout the university. Our reasons were that Professor Huntington, through his academic writings, and long service as a consultant to many U.S. Government agencies, had helped formulate and lend academic credibility to the new-style counterinsurgency techniques being used by the U.S. in Indochina. "Forced draft urbanization" and "accelerated modernization" are some of Huntington's phrases to describe the "social revolution" wrought by the massive American bombardment of the Vietnamese countryside. We felt that the university had no business inviting this man to give a straight "academic" lecture while his complicity in the horrors of this Indochinese "social revolution" went unchallenged.

With three weeks to go to the date of the visit, and the invitations definitely confirmed, the committee got down to some hard work researching Huntington's work and publishing it as regular campaign sheets. A counter-movement organized itself round the slogan of "Free Speech" and circulated a petition around campus which was very strongly supported.

During this period we got more information on the format of the lecture and the seminar. The lecture was to be on "The Soldier in American Society," (a neutral, academic topic!), and although a short period for questions would be allowed at the end, discussion on Indochina would not be appropriate, as that was not the subject of the lecture. Professor Huntington was, however, "prepared to meet two or three students, in private,

afterwards, to discuss Indochina." We were not impressed by this, and decided that Professor Huntington wasn't going to give a lecture on the Soldier in American Society, or anything else, for that matter. The seminar in IDS, was to be on development in Southeast Asia, presumably drawing on his work for AID (U.S. Agency for International Development), and the Presidential Task Force for International (mis)Development. Here it was clear there was to be a confrontation on Vietnam, with equal time allowed to his critics. Most of us felt that there wasn't very much about forced-draft-urbanization we wanted to debate with this man. It didn't seem like the kind of issue one would settle by having a reasonable, gentlemanly "debate," and it was part of the liberal myth of the university as a "market-place of ideas" to pretend that one could settle issues like that.

On the day of Huntington's visit, Tuesday June 5, a mass meeting was held in preparation for the lecture, scheduled for 2:15 p.m. About 600 people attended this meeting, about 200 of whom *opposed* our intention to stop Huntington. In the end, we occupied the lecture theatre and created such a fuss that the university authorities smuggled Huntington off the campus because they "feared for his safety." We had a meeting later in the day to decide what to do about the proposed seminar in IDS, scheduled for 11:15 the following morning. We had decided to picket outside the IDS building, leaving it to IDS fellows who were also members of the Indochina Solidarity Committee to organize a confrontation inside, when we heard that the arrangements for the seminar had been changed. Now only 15 minutes was to be allowed for discussion of Indochina and the provision of equality of time had also been dropped. As far as the IDS study group (whose decision it was) was concerned, the invitation still stood, the seminar was on, *unless* there was a likelihood of violence. We immediately announced our intention to occupy the building from 9:00 a.m. the following morning, and use the day to hold seminars on Indochina, and attempt to set up a War-Crimes Tribunal, which would look into the role of social and behavioral scientists in the American war against the Indochinese peoples. IDS cancelled their seminar.

On Wednesday we called off our occupation, and went ahead with the other activities we had planned. We had seminars in the morning on the situation in Cambodia today, both with reference to the degree of American bombing, and the present political situation within

the country, and also on the use of anti-personnel weaponry in the Indochina war. In the afternoon we talked about Huntington's work, and the contribution of Sir Robert Thompson, Presidential advisor on counterinsurgency. Sir Robert has a long history in this work, as he was previously advisor to the British Government during their Malayan campaign against communist "infiltrators"! We noted the fact that Huntington, in common with many other social scientists, is on record as "deploring" the bombing of south Vietnam, and his more recent work argues for more subtle social means of countering insurgency. This led us into a discussion of the involvement of behavioural scientists in "social engineering," using Skinnerian theory to arrange regimes of reward and punishment to facilitate social stability and control.


Aftermath

The immediate result was good—we prevented this man from speaking and exposed the myth of the neutrality of his academic work. The press and T.V. coverage was better than hoped for, in that we succeeded in getting our reasons across clearly. Two members of the committee were interviewed on local radio, and managed to focus the discussion on the implications of Huntington's work in the Vietnam war, and the question of whether he should be described as a war criminal, rather than the issue of "free speech" which was what the interviewer wanted to talk about. A local newspaper took to describing Huntington as a "... 'war' professor ...", which was a nice touch.

Speaking for myself, helping with this campaign and reading some of Huntington's original work was a valuable experience, particularly as up to now I have had little contact with social science literature. Huntington's work makes chilling reading—you have to make a continuous effort to remind yourself what this scholarly language and detailed argument is about. Anyone who can describe the desolation of Vietnamese life resulting from massive bombing as an "... American-sponsored urban revolution ...", reveals quite clearly which side he supports in wars of national liberation. After describing the "... often heartrending ..." conditions of overcrowding and poverty in the refugee camps and slums of the major cities of South Vietnam, he goes on to remark that the "... urban slum, which seems so horrible to middle-class Americans, often becomes for the poor peasant a gateway to a new and better way of life" (*Foreign Affairs*, July 1968, p. 649). Nowhere is there a single word of criticism for this new-style social revolution. At no time in his work does he question the right of the United States ruling class to control and determine the future of the Indochinese people. Instead we get a dose of cynical REALPOLITIK, a disinterested and "objective" description of suffering and oppression.

Another dimension to the campaign—the attempt to broaden the critique from Huntington to social science in general, was less successful. The thesis that the function of most academic social science is to provide theories and justifications for repressive social systems was not well developed. Insofar as *anything* was discussed during this campaign—most discussion centered round Huntington's work. I make this last qualification because there were a large number of people on campus who were not in the slightest interested in discussing Huntington's contribution to the war effort, but were very vehement in insisting on his right of "free speech." I think we underestimated the intensity of this reaction, and we have probably not as yet seen the full strength of it. Some encounters were revealing, as well as humorous—one person said that Huntington "... must have a point of view, after all, I have enough respect for Harvard as an institution to realize that one of their professors must be intelligent ..." Some people cautioned that free speech was an important and fragile right, and if it were to disappear, the first to suffer would be left-wing groups, because they were generally weakest in society. We argued that "freedom of speech," as an abstract right, had always existed with qualifications imposed by, and in the interests of, those who held power in society. Huntington, as a respected academic with access to international professional journals and other media, had a degree of freedom of speech most of us could never hope for. On the other hand, the urban slum-dwellers in Vietnam, for all the bullshit about gateways to a new and better way of life, had precious little freedom of anything, let alone freedom of speech.

THE AMRC PAPERS



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WRITE to the Madison or Boston Chapters to obtain your copy. \$1.25

Continued from page 5

LETTERS

Dear Boston SESPA/SftP,

I am writing to you on behalf of "Social Responsibility in Science," a small group at La Trobe University in Melbourne, Australia, concerned about the evil use of science and technology. It's difficult to communicate how inspiring it is to suddenly discover SESPA—an organization with the same objectives, but far in advance of our own, on the other side of the world. We have operated for over a year but it was not until a month ago that we learnt of SESPA's existence through the article in *Science* on Jason. Berkeley SESPA kindly sent us a huge amount of literature and suggested that we write you a letter for publication—and this is it!

Here's what we've been doing. For more than a year we've published our newsheet *Fire*. The main topics so far have been Vietnam and Nuclear Weapons and we will be dealing with CBW and ecology (from a pro-people outlook) soon.

We put on a display called "Scientific War Crimes" consisting of pictures of napalmed children, the formulas for nerve gasses, pictures of chemical warfare use in Vietnam and so on. Also, we showed the NARMIC* slides to a large audience.

**The Automated Air War*, available from NARMIC, 112 S. 16th St., Philadelphia, Pa., 19102

Our main problem is that although people are generally not hostile it is difficult to get involvement. We do not want to be just another "left" organization; we want to reach outside the core of "progressive" type students and across the barriers separating students from academics. We are considering new forms of activity such as:

*a napalm display (burning an animal carcass with simulated napalm accompanied by appropriate commentary on its inventor and uses).

*a display of animals with birth defects similar to those suffered by babies deformed by impurities in the defoliant 2-4-D. (We haven't been able to get any yet.)

*preparation of leaflets on subjects like linear programming, nuclear physics, genetic engineering, and distributing them at critical points in lecture courses while demanding discussion in lecture time.

Science for the People magazine and other SESPA publications are excellent. Another "new form of activity" once you have sent us our order, will be setting up a mobile bookstore with SESPA, Computer People for Peace, and Survival literature for sale, probably inside science buildings.

A big issue in Australia is that of secret U.S. bases here—like the proposed Omega navigational station. Existing bases are apparently for military communications, interrogation of spy satellites, and listening for nuclear tests. But is this so, and is this all? Australians are forbidden entry to most, and some like Pine Gap, operated by the Advanced Research Projects Agency, are a mystery. Maybe someone in SESPA can help us out?

Because our aims and activities seem so similar we are wondering if S.R.S. could affiliate with SESPA.

Anyway writing this letter has been like communicating with life in another galaxy. We sure are excited to make contact and look forward to hearing from you.

Yours sincerely,
Julian Shaw
Chairman, S.R.S.
Victoria, Australia

PUBLICATIONS

AVAILABLE from SESPA/SftP

Science Against the People (Jason: Scientific Consultants for the Pentagon)	\$1.00
Science and Technology in Latin America: Por Que?	\$.50
Los Nuevos Conquistadores (Spanish translation of Science and Technology in Latin America)	\$.75
Towards a Science for the People (Formerly published as the Censored pamphlet)	\$.30
The AMRC Papers (An indictment of the Army Mathematics Research Center)	\$1.25
Science Teaching: Towards an Alternative	\$.15

Send checks to: SESPA/SftP, 9 Walden St., Jamaica Plain, Mass. 02130 617-427-0642

We in the U.S. are also excited to hear of your activities in faraway Australia, and hope that our experiences can be mutually reinforcing. One of the things we've learned over the past few years is that focusing on particular uses of science as "evil" tends to ignore the more pervasive misuse of all science and technology in the present society. What we have tried to do is analyze the systematic way in which our scientific efforts go into maintaining and strengthening the power of those who rule. Referring to some science as "evil"—and by implication other as good—makes the question a moral rather than a political one. Napalm, for example, although a particularly atrocious misuse of science, is only one of many instruments of imperialism; to do away with one we must do away with all. And that requires a political struggle against the whole system of imperialism, and against those who direct and benefit from it.

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
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*Chapter—three or more people
meeting regularly





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SUBSCRIPTIONS TO *SCIENCE FOR THE PEOPLE* AND MEMBERSHIP IN SESPA

SESPA is defined by its activities. People who participate in the (mostly local) activities consider themselves members. Of course, there are people who through a variety of circumstances are not in a position to be active but would like to maintain contact. They also consider themselves members.

The magazine keeps us all in touch. It encourages people who may be isolated, presents examples of activities that are useful to local groups, brings issues and information to the attention of the readers, presents analytical articles and offers a forum for discussion. Hence it is a vital activity of SESPA. It is also the only regular national activity.

We need to know who the members are in order to continue to send *SCIENCE FOR THE PEOPLE* to them. Please supply the following information:

1. Name:
- Address:
- Telephone:
- Occupation:
(if student or unemployed please indicate)

If you are working, do you work in industry [], government [], university [], other _____

2. Local SESPA chapter or other group in which I'm active:
3. I am enclosing money according to the following scheme: (a) regular membership—\$10, (b) indigent membership—less than \$10, (c) affluent or sacrifice membership—more than \$10, (d) completely impoverished—nothing, (e) I have paid already.
4. I will sell _____ magazines. This can be done on consignment to bookstores and newsstands, to your colleagues, at meetings. (If you want to give some away free because you are organizing and can't pay for them, let us know)
5. I am attaching a list of names and addresses of people who I believe would be interested in the magazine. Please send them complimentary copies.
6. I would be willing to provide technical assistance to community, movement, or Third World groups in the areas of:

Please add any comments on the magazine or SESPA or your own circumstances. We welcome criticism, advice, and would like to get to know you.

SEND CHECKS TO: SESPA, 9 WALDEN ST., JAMAICA PLAIN, MASS. 02130