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Announcement is made of a supper for readers of the A S Q early in October, at a price not exceeding seventy-five cents. Place, date and speakers to be announced in the next issue. Topic for discussion:

Whither the American Socialist Movement: Toward Marxism or Reformism.

A Note on the American Political Scene

NORMAN THOMAS

THIS is a modest little article from a man far too busy with innumerable practical details to find time for an article worthy of the pages of a magazine which would deal at all adequately with some of the theoretical problems of Socialism. Nevertheless the facts I want to present are at least raw material for every thinker about socialist tactics in America.

Everybody agrees that this year is a year of socialist opportunity. Socialist interest and even socialist locals are springing up in unexpected places in gratifying fashion. In my own experience we can get twice the audiences with half the difficulty of any previous year since the war. Discontent is universal. People who were economically, or at any rate, psychologically, of the middle class—among the psychologically middle class, I include the higher salaried employes—are being forced with amazing rapidity into the proletariat, and into the unemployed proletariat at that. Moreover they are beginning to understand what is happening to them. The most vigorous cursing of Wall Street that I have heard in my various trips around America comes not from Communists but from Americans who usually vote the Republican or the Democratic ticket.

Nevertheless it will be a fatal mistake if any considerable number of Socialists let themselves think that because capitalism is breaking up we are drifting into Socialism. We are more likely to drift into chaos and catastrophe. The economic contradictions of capitalism are bringing about its doom. By no fatalistic process are they bringing about So-

cialism. They give us our opportunity. They do not make it unnecessary for us to take advantage of that opportunity by an intelligent effort of the creative will.

This generalization, the soundness of which most reflective Socialists will admit on the basis of socialist theory, is supported by a great deal of immediate evidence, some of which I should like to point out.

Such depression as we are living through, while it produces a vast army of the unemployed and produces radicals who think they have no possible stake in the preservation of the status quo, also arouses a great fear in the minds of those who have or think they have anything to hang on to. They may in their spare moments curse Wall Street for fooling or betraying them. They might vote for a program of punishing Wall Street, but not for a minute will they take any risk of endangering what little security they have in the present social order. Thus, it is spokesmen of small property owners in the cities and of farmers in state legislatures who have been most bitter against any adequate program of unemployment relief. I have heard more cold blooded denials that unemployment was a social problem and more cruel affirmations, or virtual affirmations, that it was more important to keep down the tax rate than the death rate from starvation, from the mouths of the representatives of small property holders in New York and elsewhere than from the representatives of big business interests. Having little they fear to lose that little.

One of the most genuinely progressive Congressmen from Wisconsin, a man who ought to be a Socialist, told me that in his opinion Wisconsin progressivism was politically in greater danger this year than for a long time. Why? Because Phillip LaFollette's fairly enlightened program for unemployment relief, public works, etc., had irritated a great number of the population, some of whom claimed that it was the other states from which the material for road building came who had profited most from a road building program which had raised their tax rates. Whatever the reason, it is certainly true that the LaFollette brothers lost control of

the Republican delegation to Chicago for the first time in many years.

Beside this blind, almost hysterical, opposition to any extra expenditure which would raise the tax rate there is an equally dangerous amount of faith in impossible nostrums. The American landscape is cluttered with political equivalents of Indian herb doctors, all of them trying to sell some patent medicine which will make us happy without changing in any basic essentials the system of private ownership. Your average discontented American, even in some cases the American wage worker, still sighs for a simpler stage of capitalism. He is not for the Cooperative Commonwealth; he is for some individualistic system in which the little man will have his chance. In a vague, confused sort of way he wants to stabilize a condition under which he will keep all the privileges he has over those more unfortunate than himself but take away some of the power and privilege of those more fortunate than himself. He looks with baleful eye upon stock market bears but remembers somewhat kindly the bulls of the great days of successful gambling. He dreams of some kind of regulation of Wall Street under which little lambs need not fear bears and maybe can grow up to be bulls. He is against chain stores theoretically, though he usually trades with them, but he has no use for so practical a substitute for them as consumer's cooperatives. If he is particularly enlightened and a little more daring than his fellows he will tell you that Socialism is not a bad thing and that he might even vote Socialist if we would change our name. Question him however and you will soon find that he would not vote for us unless we would change a great deal more than our name

Still worse, your average discontented American not only lives in an intellectual atmosphere of economic illiteracy carefully cultivated by an owning class; he also lives in an atmosphere of assorted prejudices—racial, national and religious. Some of them are getting less. Religious phobias and in general the power of organized religious denominations have greatly waned in America in recent years. The Ku Klux Klan has no successor at the moment. The con-

sciousness, however, of various racial and nationalistic groups in America is still very intense and not much progress has been made in improving the relations between blacks and whites. (If I ever get time I should like to make a study of the effect of Negro slavery upon American working class solidarity. All American workers, I think, have paid and still are paying a ghastly price for a racial prejudice with its original economic roots in chattel slavery which has made so many white workers willing to take out part of their pay in the consciousness of being white.) It is significant that the flamboyant radicalism of a man like Huey Long of Louisiana is accompanied by a vehement racial prejudice.

Among the mental attitudes of Americans with which we must reckon is the growing impatience with political action. That is in part a natural reaction to our present miseries. It is accentuated by the complete similarity of the two old parties, and I am inclined to think that it is deliberately inculcated by powerful representatives of the owning class. It is a good thing and helpful to us Socialists that everywhere there is such cynicism about the old parties. On this point Will Rogers speaks what the public thinks. Even conservative newspaper editors were almost contemptuous of the Republican Convention. What is bad about the situation is that contempt for the old parties so easily spreads to contempt for political action. Both Communists and capitalists have taken great pains to tar us Socialists with the same stick of futility. The failure which I think honest Socialists must admit of German Social Democrats and the British Labor Party to accomplish what we had hoped, has been published abroad and exaggerated by our enemies very sucessfully in unexpected parts of the country. The result of all this is that many a man who imagines that some day possibly he might stand on the barricades and that certainly he would ride on a revolutionary band wagon won't take the trouble to vote at all, or if he votes he will docilely vote Republican or Democrat.

Docilely, did I say? The word should be fearfully. The first effect of such great depression as this on the masses is

to make them afraid of losing whatever little favors their political or economic overlords may give them. In a country with barely the rudiments of social insurance fear of what some district leader may withhold or hope of what he may give is tremendously powerful in keeping the voting masses in line.

To all this must be added a recognition of the fact that a dying capitalist system is by no means wholly dead. American capitalism has been singularly impotent to plan even for its own good in the present crisis, but it still hangs on to the press and all the means of communication and education. and there are increasing signs that the more vigorous and enlightened capitalists are going in consciously for a Fascist stage of capitalism. Capitalist planning means Fascism. The Swope plan was an example of it. In truth we have all the elements of an American Fascism except the particular demagogue to put the pieces together.

What are the elements of Fascism as we have seen it develop, let us say, in Italy or Germany? A lot of economic illiteracy and prejudice; the desire of the little man to save himself; an immense passion of nationalism, and, finally, a more or less farseeing effort of bankers and big industrialists to capitalize prejudice and nationalism, to give some sops to the workers and some assurances to small owners as against collectivism while at the same time they work out a kind of capitalist syndicalism in which profit and privilege will still remain. All this requires a sufficiently picturesque and vigorous leader to handle the matter, and for this "American Mussolini" voices are being raised in increasing numbers in America. That reputed paragon of all virtues, Owen D. Young, talks about the need in an emergency of more power in the hands of the president. Trade news services discuss more or less openly the possibility of a "super government of best minds" after Congress adjourns, if not before.

I do not mean by all this that I think Fascism is immediately around the corner. I repeat: the Fascist leader is not yet in sight. Of course there will be a certain resistance to Fascism by an assorted lot of politicians in their own

interest as well as from the democratic tradition. The Democratic platform adopted as I was writing this article shows the strength of that tradition. It also shows how far we are from an automatic Socialism for it is a very conservative document, "liberal" only in an old-fashioned semi-"Jeffersonian" sense. Yet a high degree of Fascism could be arranged without too open an assault on certain American fetishes. A strong enough organization under a strong enough boss might make both the president and Congress mere puppets. The best alternative to Fascism is the growth of Socialism. Communism, I am sure, whatever its intentions, is now playing into the hands of Fascism by continually discrediting democracy and by insisting on the inevitability of ruthless dictatorship and of great violence. Nothing could be better calculated to scare the timid into the arms of Fascist saviours of "order and security".

The moral of this, of course, is the need for desperate energy of education and organization on our part in this campaign. In spite of the disadvantages which I have enumerated we have a magnificent opportunity. If we do not take advantage of it we may not have it again or, indeed, deserve it. In taking advantage of it there is one point that I want to urge with all my might. Socialists will not bring about Socialism simply by insisting that capitalism is doomed. The fear of chaos is likely to drive millions of Americans—yes, of American farmers and workers—into the arms of those capitalists and politicians, Fascist and otherwise, who say they can prevent it. The last British election showed how a false fear of financial chaos such as Ramsay MacDonald shamefully exploited can be used to turn even workers against Socialism. G. D. H. Cole is right when he says: "Men will not revolt so as to destroy the life to which they are accustomed unless that life is either sheerly intolerable or its continuance plainly out of the question. Nor will they in the mass rally to the support of a fundamental change in the basis of society unless they can be convinced that change can be effected without an interval of making matters worse." Here in a nutshell is the case for socialist planning and for

a socialist immediate program carefully linked up to fundamental socialist change. The emphasis of all our workers in this campaign must be on the constructive aspects of Socialism and not on the inevitable doom of capitalism. It is what Socialism can do and capitalism cannot do that we must emphasize.

In this process the class struggle which is being clarified by the economic crisis cannot simply be taken for granted. It must be explained. Some of our romantic preachers of class struggle proclaim it in such terms that professional people, engineers, and even the better paid workers, especially if they wear white collars, think that they are ruled out and doomed to destruction. Our first task is to convince such people that they really belong to the working class and should identify themselves with its interests which in the large are their interests. If Socialism is a constructive force to win plenty, peace and freedom not only idealists but even the more far seeing among the middle class may conquer immediate class interest, as many of the great socialist intellectuals have done, and identify themselves with the workers. This does not mean that the class struggle can be avoided or ended until the classless society is achieved. It does not mean "pink tea" Socialism. It certainly does not mean a Socialism unwilling to pay the hard price of victory in organization and energetic action, but it does mean a positive emphasis on the constructive aspects of Socialism as against any mere proclamation of the doom of capitalism. It does mean that we shall have to insist that our hope of salvation lies not in some romantic act of revolutionary violence at the appropriate moment but in the education of the workers with hand and brain to accept the philosophy of Socialism, and inspired by it, to plan for the present and the future, and to organize to give power to their plans.

The Five Year Plan

A. JUGOW

(Translated by B. Sacharoff)

The Basic Idea of the Five Year Plan

BEGINNING with 1926, after Russian economic life had become somewhat stabilized, the highest planning organ of the U. S. S. R. (Gosplan) began to work out annually an economic plan for the coming year, consisting of so-called "control figures". In 1929 the All-Union Congress of Soviets ratified the first plan of **Economic Reconstruction** worked out for the period of 1928-29 over 1932-33. (May 23, 1929.)

In working out the "control figures", the planning organs supported themselves upon a study of economic processes and the measure of their mutual interrelationship in Russia as well as in the developed capitalist countries. The authors of the Five Year Plan, the Communists Krchyzhanovsky, Stramlinin, Grinko and others, were guided consciously by "the purposes in view", considering themselves "free from any subordination to age-long economic laws".

The fundamental ideas on which the Five Year Plan is based can be formulated briefly as follows: The main purpose is to create a socialist economy in the U. S. S. R. in the shortest possible time. It is the belief of the Bolsheviks that "the U. S. S. R. possessed in ample measure all the necessary prerequisites for the building of a Socialist economy and that all that is necessary is to overcome the anarchy of production by substituting for it a plan of Socialist construction". The industrial backwardness and the agrarian structure of U. S. S. R. must be eliminated in the shortest possible time; hence the fundamental task of the plan is intensive industrialization and a desire to "catch up with and outstrip Europe and America" in all fields of industry and culture. The plan is

permeated by the idea of self-sufficiency, i.e., the idea of making Soviet economy entirely independent of the rest of the world industrially and in supply of raw materials. The enormous capital required for industrialization under the Five Year Plan was to be obtained from the agricultural population, for the plan as originally adopted, rejected absolutely the capitalist methods of "expropriation of the surplus value created by the workers". Considering it essential to utilize the village as the source of financing the industrialization program, the Five Year Plan presupposed, as regards agriculture, only a slow transformation of small private economy, into collective economy. In accordance with this conception, the Five Year Plan envisaged as permissible "the coexistence of private enterprise in small industry and trade".

Simultaneously with the expansion of industrial and agricultural production, the plan provided also for a rapid increase in the material and cultural welfare of all toilers. In this connection, the Five Year Plan provided also for the raising of the wages, expansion of social insurance, solution of the housing problem, improvement of the food situation for the city and village population (2 to 3 times within the five years), liquidation of illiteracy and the development of a thick network of educational and cultural institutions throughout the country. (See The Five Year Plan, Vol. II, Part II.)

INDUSTRY

The limits of this article make it necessary to deal only in a general way with the aims set under the Five Year Plan and the actual achievements for the past 3½ years.[1] The comparison between aims and achievements is all the more important since the directing organs have undertaken to complete the Five Year Plan in four years, i.e., by October, 1932.

From this table we see that the industrialization is proceeding at a very rapid tempo. Particularly accelerated has been the development of heavy industry, but the commodity

1) For details see A. Yugoff: "The Five Year Plan", 1931, in Russian, German, French and Swedish.

industries are developing less rapidly. Especially lagging behind the plan is the production of coal and metals, thus retarding the development of other industries. For 1932, the plan proposed "to concentrate all energy on the liquidation of the breakdown in the production of coal and metals". However, despite the opening of new mines, the mechanization of labor and introduction of unlimited piece work, the output of coal in 1932 has been falling from month to month. The average daily production of coal in January was 194.6; in February, 191.3; in March, 186.3; in April, 183.6; in May, 176.1 thousands of tons. In order that the plan of coal production for 1932 may be realized, it is necessary that from now on the average daily output should be not less than 270 thousand tons. "In no other branch of industry is there such danger of non-fulfillment of the plan, as in the coal industry," admitted Piatakov, head of the People's Commissariat for Heavy Industries. Still smaller is the rate of fulfillment of the plan in metallurgy. To fulfill the plan for 1932, the average daily output from now on requires a production of cast iron of not less than 28 thousand tons; of steel and rolling mill products, 29 to 30 thousand tons; while output in recent months has been averaging 17 thousand tons in cast iron, 16 thousand tons in steel, and 12½ thousand tons in rolling mill products. Great success has been achieved in different branches of **machine building.** Production has been doubled in some branches and tripled in others—tool making machines, engines, and parts. The average daily production of tractors has reached 250 pieces, automobiles 100. But even in machine building the plan is not being fulfilled. The production of locomotives is only 42 per cent of the plan; of threshers, 35 per cent; combines, 20 per cent. The finished metal industry feels sharply the lack of necessary metals, especially of high grade steel.

The directives given by Stalin in June, 1931, for the speeding up of **light industry** were not realized, although, also for 1932 the plan projected the development of light industry on a much smaller scale than that set for heavy industry. But even this plan is not being fulfilled. For the

THE DYNAMICS OF THE RISE OF THE SEPARATE BRANCHES OF INDUSTRY IN PRODUCTS[2]

			1928–29	1929–30	Extra Quarter	1931	First Quarter 1932	1932 Plan	For 3½ Yrs. Achievements	For 5 Yrs. Plan	Total for 3½ yrs. in % of 5 yr. Plan
Capital invested according to prices of corresponding years		Millions of Roubles	1,7	2,9	0,9	6,7	3,2	10,5	15,4	16,3	95%
Coal	Plan	Millions of Tons	41,1	46,6	21,3	83,6	19,8	90,0	.....	280,8	.....
	Achievements		38,5	45,7	13,1	57,6	17,2	.....	172,1	.....	61.5%
Petroleum	Plan	Millions of Tons	13,2	14,8	5,3	25,6	5,8	28,0	.....	85,6	.....
	Achievements		13,6	17,0	5,3	22,9	5,6	.....	64,4	.....	75.2%
Cast Iron	Plan	Millions of Tons	4,1	5,0	1,5	8,0	1,7	9,0	.....	33,0	.....
	Achievements		4,0	5,0	1,2	4,9	1,4	.....	16,5	.....	50%
Steel	Plan	Millions of Tons	4,6	5,3	1,8	8,8	1,9	9,5	.....	35,0	.....
	Achievements		4,8	5,5	1,5	5,4	1,5	.....	18,7	.....	53.4%
Rolling Mill Products	Plan	Millions of Tons	3,5	4,1	1,5	6,7	1,3	6,7	.....	26,6	.....
	Achievements		3,9	4,4	1,2	4,0	1,1	.....	14,6	.....	55.0%
General Machine Building	Plan	Millions of Poods	737	959	360	4407	.....	5900	.....	.....	.....
	Achievements		792	2101	290	5700	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Agricultural Machine Building	Plan	Millions of Poods	210	262	139	819	.....	940	.....	1600	.....
	Achievements		185	330	74	440	100	.....	1130	.....	70.6%
Electrical Energy	Plan	Millions of Kw. Hours	6600	.....	.....	12700	.....	17000	.....	55000	.....
	Achievements		6465	8400	2500	10500	3000	.....	30845	.....	56.0%
Cotton Goods	Plan	Millions of Meters	2970	3206	660	2820	660	3060	.....	18636	.....
	Achievements		2822	2414	620	2087	600	.....	8543	.....	45.8%
Woolen Goods	Plan	Millions of Meters	105	124	38	128	38	135	.....	850	.....
	Achievements		115	124	34	117	30	.....	420	.....	49.8%
Shoes	Plan	Millions of Pairs	.....	.....	19	85	26	96	.....	450	.....
	Achievements		38	56	17	77	21	.....	209	.....	46.4%

[2] The table is compiled by the author on the basis of official reports of the Gosplan, Supreme Economic Council and of the Central Control Administration.

3½ years of the Five Year Plan for cotton goods, woolen goods, shoes, and soap, the production has been less than half of the schedule. Moreover, the annual production of textiles for 1930-31 was below the years preceding the Five Year Plan.

Particular concern is provoked by the quality of production. In some branches of industry the waste through damaged goods is as high as 30 and 50 percent of the entire production. Official Soviet organs have been forced to admit, that notwithstanding all efforts the quality of the production even in 1930 and 1931 was markedly worse. No better is the situation as regards cost of production. Instead of the projected decrease, there was a rapid increase in 1931, the average being 6 per cent. The productivity of the new plants is likewise inadequate. In 1931 and 1932 more than 600 new magnificently equipped "giants of industry" were put into operation, including electric power stations, dynamos, mines, metallurgical and machine plants, chemical factories, paper mills and like enterprises. But the majority of the new factories remain for many months after commencement of operation in a state of chronic struggle with mismanagement, sudden breakdowns and accidents, while production fails to reach its quota, both as regards quantity and quality. For instance, eight months after opening Magnitogorsk produces only 60 per cent of its quota of cast iron. The automobile factory in Nizhni-Novgorod, three months after opening, was closed for two months and now produces only 15 per cent of its capacity. The newly built combine factories have produced for the first quarter of 1932 800 machines instead of 3,840; the Sharikopodshipnik ballbearing plant works only one fifth of its capacity, suffering breakdown upon breakdown. The cost of construction of new enterprises has been from 2½ to 3 times higher than was provided under the plan.

AGRICULTURE

The present agricultural policy of the Soviet government was not contemplated under the Five Year Plan. While the plan provided for collectivization for all the five years of

only 15 per cent of peasant farms, the Soviet government, at the end of 1929, launched upon the road of forcible collectivization, so that at the end of the third year of the Piatiletka, the average percentage of collectivization was brought up to 60, and in principal grain regions the percentage of peasant households collectivized was brought up to even 80. Contrary to the provision of the plan, individual peasants not only failed to receive any credits from the government but in a great measure suffered the process of "dekulakization", i.e., physical and economic destruction. At the same time the government invested in state farms and collectives more than 4 billion roubles in the form of machines, tractors, buildings, credits, and subsidies, besides putting a considerable part of the property of the Kulaks at the disposal of the collectives. By a series of measures, the Soviet government reorganized radically agricultural production in the collectives. As a result, the Government succeeded in raising somewhat the agrotechnical level of collective economy. The records show considerable expansion of the area cultivated for the first years of collectivization. This area increased from 113,000,000 hectares in 1928 to 136,400,000 hectares in 1931. The amount of grain collected likewise increased. In 1929 the amount collected was 717 million double cwt.; in 1930, 875 million double cwt.; in 1931, 785 million double cwt. Collections in the so-called technical fields of cultivation were also increased. For instance, in cotton collections in 1929 were 8.6; in 1930, 11.1; in 1931, 12.6 million double cwt.; sugar beet in 1929, 62.5; in 1930, 129; in 1931, 121 million double cwt. The tempo of production increase in grain, however, is far behind the increase of population. In 1909 to 1913, the amount of bread produced per capita was 3.3 double cwt.; in 1927, 5.5; in 1930, 4.5; in 1931 5.4; in 1932, 4.8.

Very disastrous was the effect of compulsory collectivization on the quantity of live stock. Seeking to escape collectivization, many peasants slaughtered their live stock for meat; a great quantity of cattle died from negligence. According to the official data for 1930, the amount of live stock decreased for the year as follows: horses, 98 per cent; large cattle,

22.2 per cent; cows, 11.8 per cent; sheep, 33 per cent; pigs, 43 per cent. (See "Planovaye Khoziaystvo", 1930; No. 9.)

The Soviet government has at any rate achieved one of its aims; by means of the collectives the state has obtained control of the entire agricultural output of the collective, increasing the government's collection from year to year. Thus, in 1928 the amount of grain collections was 109; in 1929, 163; in 1930, 225, and 1931, 229 million double cwt. But already at the end of 1931, and especially in 1931, the compulsory collectivization, and above all the withdrawal by the government of huge amounts of grain from the village had begun to manifest destructive effects on the condition of agriculture. The peasant began to lose all interest in production. The area cultivated began again to decrease, the quality of work deteriorated, and as much as 15 and even 20 per cent of the harvest was left uncollected in the fields. In the beginning of 1932, fearing the refusal of the peasants to harvest the crop, the Soviet government was forced by special decrees to lower the amount of the government grain collections by 20 per cent and of live stock by 50 per cent, and to permit the peasants "after turning over the required amount to the government to sell the remainder in the open market." (Decrees of May 6, 10, and 20.)

CONDITION OF THE URBAN WORKERS AND SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONDITIONS

The first years of the Five Year Plan brought great surprises also in the field of labor policy. The necessity of achieving the great objectives set for industry compelled the Soviet government to intensify the labor of the workers. In the beginning, the Soviet government tried the method of so-called "Socialist competition". This having failed, the government introduced in all enterprises the system of unlimited piece work and bonuses. Production quotas were increased. Overtime work was extended in such manner that violations of the 7-8 hour day became common. (See "Trud", 4.14,30, and "Pravda", 5.13.31.) The workers were bound to the factories where they were employed and were denied the right

to seek employment in other plants. (Decree 9.7 and 10.11.30.) Factory cards were introduced together with a system of fines. (1.23.31 and 1.31. 1931.) Prohibition of night work for women and miners virtually ceased to exist. Because of the growth of inflation, real wages declined. Living conditions of the workers grew particularly worse because of shortage of food supply. Having liquidated all private trade, the state took upon itself the task of supplying the workers and white collar employees with necessities. The intention was to supply them with all necessary food and articles of consumption by means of ration cards and coupons through controlled distributing organs and cooperative restaurants. In reality, however, by the end of 1931, the toilers found themselves living on hunger rations. Even in the larger cities, the supply of necessities was limited to the distribution of one or two pounds of bread daily, and, on rare occasions, of small amounts of sugar, meat, and fats. (See "Krasnaya Gazetta" of Leningrad and "Rabochia Gazetta" of Moscow on this subject.) The majority of the working people were forced to satisfy their elementary needs by buying from illegal private traders. In May 1932, after the working people had repeatedly shown their dissatisfactions, the Soviet government permitted the peasants to sell necessaries in the open market.

The Five Year Plan has almost entirely done away with unemployment in the cities. For this there are three main causes. First, the big program of industrial construction, (the number of workers in factories and offices in cities in 1928 was 5.4, in 1931, 10.1 million men); second, the great inflational increase in the number of officials and employees in state bureaus; and third, the influx into the villages of millions of men from the cities, due to the collectivization, the desire of all those having any connection with the village being to legalize their right to land and of membership in the collectives. The villages were flooded with millions of people, superfluous and without any opportunity for any constructive work in the village economy. According to the official reports of the Institute of Collectives the superfluous peasant population in 1931 was 52 per cent of men and 70

per cent of women in the Caucasus; 64 per cent men and 73 per cent women in the Ukraine, etc. ("The Bolshevik" No. 18, 1931.) With the progressive adoption of mechanization by the collectives and the rationalization of labor, the overpopulation of the village will inevitably make itself felt and the problem of unemployment will present itself with sharp acuteness.

There is a great lack of skilled workers and technical personnel in industry. The Soviet government is trying to cope with it by opening technical schools for quick training and inviting workers and technicians from abroad.

While the Five Year Plan provided for considerable improvements in social welfare and education, in practice the opposite is apparent. Appropriations for these purposes have been considerably reduced. The pay of teachers and medical personnel is lower than the wage of the average worker. Because of lack of funds many clubs and libraries are closed. Nurseries and homes for children are overcrowded but their supply and alimentation are on a very low level. Social insurance has been cut down, while unemployment insurance has been entirely discontinued. (10.11.30.) Lagging far behind the plan is housing construction, despite the considerable increase in rents. "The tempo of the increase of housing and communal economy is behind the general tempo of socialist construction," writes "Pravda", May 26, 1931.

BALANCE SHEET AND PERSPECTIVES

The past 3½ years of the Five Year Plan show that the task of creating a planned economy in the U. S. S. R. as a harmonious system has not been achieved. The cause lies in the economic, social, and cultural backwardness of Russia. Due to the power of a centralized governmental apparatus, the Soviet government has succeeded in realizing individual portions of the plan. It has paralyzed commodity and exchange economy, but has shown itself unable to substitute planned regulation and direction for "elemental, uncontrolled market relations". In the field of industry great quantitative successes have been attained, but individual branches of in-

dustry continue stubbornly to develop disproportionately. There is a fuel, metals, transport and, finally, food famine. The superindustrialization has demanded such great investments that the cost estimates of the Five Year Plan will be exceeded by 2 to 2½ per cent. The Five Year Plan was to achieve industrialization at the expense of the mobilization of 20 to 30 per cent of peasant savings, but already in the second and third year of the plan the Soviet government has compelled each citizen of the U. S. S. R. to surrender more than half of his income for the financing of the plan.

The collectivization has increased somewhat the commodity production of agricultural economy and has improved agriculture. At the same time, however, in the domain of live-stock raising, it has dealt agriculture a severe blow. The compulsory expropriation from the peasants of nearly all the products of their toil revealed at the beginning of 1932 dangerous indications of decline in the village. There was a real threat of a decline in the area of cultivation, accompanied by the perspective of a lowering in grain collections and agricultural raw materials. The insignificant accumulation of capital in the village has compelled the Soviet government to place upon the workers the heavy burden of direct taxes, compulsory loans and inflation. The food supply of the city and rural population has been brought to the verge of catastrophe, while the government appropriations for social and cultural purposes have markedly declined.

Is the Five Year Plan being fulfilled? Will it be fulfilled? The Five Year Plan was not only a plan of industrialization and expansion of technique; it provides also for a large measure of improvement in the welfare of the population and the raising of its social and cultural level. This latter object has to this moment not been achieved by the Five Year Plan. More than that, the experiment has demonstrated that under the conditions of present-day Russia it is impossible to fulfill both sides of the Five Year Plan. The rapid tempo of industrialization has been made possible only at the expense of confiscation of half of the purchasing power of the population. The enormous investments in heavy in-

dustry have been possible only at the expense of the reduction in the tempo of light industry. The technical development has been possible only at the expense of a lowering of the cultural level. One need only read attentively the text of the Five Year Plan and the commentaries thereto to perceive that the plan as a whole is not being carried out and that the present satisfaction of the most elementary needs of the toilers is not only far removed from the provisions of the Five Year Plan, but is even below the level achieved in the period immediately preceding the Five Year Plan.

In its idealogical substance the Five Year Plan was a plan of socialist construction, but all the circumstances, all conditions of life of the toilers in the U. S. S. R. give evidence that it has proven impossible to build a socialist system of economy in Russia. After 3½ years of the Five Year Plan, the Russian worker remains as before a seller of his labor power. He remains not a conscious and self-reliant participant in the production process, but only a poorly paid and intensively exploited labor unit. During the period of the progress of the Five Year Plan even the remnants of "workers' democracy" have been liquidated, in the factories as well as in the trade unions. To be sure, the class of private capitalists has been liquidated in Russia, but the surplus value taken from the worker goes to the government apparatus, to the collective capitalist. It is quite true that the worker in the U. S. S. R. belongs to the privileged class, but the material conditions of his existence are considerably worse than those of the European or American workers. Instead of Socialism there has been built in Russia a system of state capitalism with its own peculiar features, determined by the peculiarities of the Bolshevist dictatorship.

The hope of the Russian Communists to build "Socialism in one country", and in a country as backward as the U. S. S. R., has proven to be Utopian. Only the victory of Socialism in one of the advanced industrial countries can make possible a quick transition from the forms of state capitalism in the U. S. S. R. to socialist forms, without the necessity of passing through the stage of capitalist development.

The Five Year Plan

The Russian Five Year Plan experiment—the first experiment in the building of a planned economy—should be studied attentively by Socialists of all countries. The attempt to build the planned economy of Socialism in a country like Russia was doomed to failure, but even in backward Russia the enthusiasm of socialist construction and the desire for a plan or the elements of a plan, have given the Soviet government exceptional stability and capacity to resist enemy classes. From this we may perceive what a tremendous power a planned economy would be in the hands of the workers of the advanced countries when they acquire the will for the building of Socialism and substitute a creative plan for "the anarchy of production".

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Bourgeois "Planning" and Antidemocracy

ALGERNON LEE

BOURGEOIS social thinking in the United States has through the last two or three years exhibited two features characteristic of the time—one of them new and probably ephemeral, the other novel only in its now bolder emphasis. The first is an apparently unquestioning belief, a tacit assumption, that it is possible as well as desirable, could exactly the right formula be found, to stabilize the capitalist system of production and exchange, and thereby eliminate some of its most alarming tendencies, without changing its essential nature as a property system. The second is a positive aversion from the democratic ideals to which, for almost exactly a hundred years, even the spokesmen of our ruling classes have in general at least paid lip-service.[1]

Economic planning is today almost as much in vogue as was "self expression" and the glorification of "personality" in the jazzy mid-twenties. Economists and pedagogues, philosophers and engineers, bankers and trust magnates, social workers and social saviors, politicians and statesmen, vie with one another in pouring scorn upon a society which, like topsy, has just "growed", instead of being made to order. That a planned capitalism is within the possibilities, seems to be taken for granted. The mental attitude of the planners is that of the young lady in the limerick who wondered why she couldn't look in her ear with her eye—

> If I put my mind to it
> I'm sure I could do it;
> You never can tell till you try.

1) Let me stress the fact that what I am discussing is the tendencies of contemporary *bourgeois* thought. Both the features of which I speak are to some extent paralleled in Socialist and near-socialist circles. This is no doubt due in large measure to conscious or unconscious imitation; but in these circles there are also special influences at work. The revival within our movement of utopian and antidemocratic tendencies (I do not wish to exaggerate its strength, but its existence cannot be denied) might well repay a thoughtful study. There is no room for it, however, within the limits of this article; perhaps this is not, in any case, the most opportune time.

Their plans are as numerous, as varied, and if not always so elaborate, just as superficial in approach and as confidently set forth, as were the proposed political constitutions that were put on the market in England during the sixteen-fifties or in France during the seventeen-nineties.

At the same time, and as a rule by the same persons, belief in the right or the capacity of human beings collectively or of most human beings individually to solve their own problems and manage their own affairs is being treated as an outworn superstition. The politicians, for a good reason of their own, are somewhat reticent on this point, but the preachers make up for them. The sermon page in Monday's paper is about equally occupied with the glorification of God and the minification of the so-called "average man"—a term which, by an unwritten grammatical law, is never to be understood as in the first person, and usually in an indefinite third. What most preachers say, in so far as they talk of mundane affairs, is always a pretty good indication of the prevailing trend of opinion among not too thoughtful laymen. It is so in this case. College professors, editorial writers, professional wisecrackers, and the pseudo-bohemians of Greenwich Village join the parsons in solemn or jocular voicing of contempt for the intelligence of the masses and of disillusionment concerning popular self-government. Lincoln's way of thinking is out of style; the "strong man" is idealized. And on the whole, the masses acquiesce—perhaps because they do not take their critics seriously, but also, I am afraid, because they do not take themselves very seriously.

It is no mere coincidence that the dislike for democracy, always latent in ruling-class minds and in the minds of those whom W. J. Ghent once so scathingly addresesd as "You Retainers", finds such open expression simultaneously with the vogue of social planning. It is nó accident that they both flourish just in a time of severe economic depression. The two phenomena fit together, and both of them correspond to the economic situation.

I use the word "vogue" advisedly, meaning a tendency which, however strong at the moment, is bound to be short-

lived—one which is not the prelude to a new act in the drama of history, but only an intermezzo. It was Louis Waldman at the recent L. I. D. conference, I think, who quoted the familiar old couplet—

When the Devil was sick, the Devil a monk would be;
When the Devil got well, the Devil a monk was he,

and predicted that, once business clearly takes an upward turn, the capitalists and their theoreticians will quickly lose interest in the notion of a "planned economy" and will again hold, as they held in former years, that everything is very nearly for the best in approximately the best of all possible worlds. I have little doubt that time will prove him right—that the dream of a "rationalized" capitalism will pass as did the dream of a "moralized" capitalism which flourished for a while under the influence of hard times in the eighteen-nineties.

With the anti-democratic tendency it is not just the same. No ruling class, once it is well established in power, can be democratic at heart. For half a century after the American Revolution neither the large landholders nor the mercantile and industrial capitalists nor their political or intellectual mouthpieces made much pretense of believing that the common people were fit to govern themselves. "Your 'great people', sir, is a great beast", Alexander Hamilton was not afraid to say; and in 1814 the foremost citizens of New York held a public banquet to celebrate the restoration of the Bourbons. Only about 1830, when the wage-workers and the working farmers began seriously to assert themselves, did the "better classes" learn that it was wise to be outwardly courteous to Demos. In the main they have since then refrained from openly insulting him. Only of late, when he appears to be both helpless and hopeless, and when they have taken to making economic plans which necessarily involve political adjustments have they again begun to say what they really think of him. And tomorrow, when industry revives and unemployment recedes? If, as seems likely, Demos plucks up spirit to fight, they may again take to cajoling him—or they may not. But "that is another story". For the present, not only

is it to all appearances quite safe for the dominant class to speak its mind on the subject of democracy, but it cannot elaborate its capitalistic utopia without doing so.

The capitalist mode of production and appropriation, beyond all that have preceded it, fairly bristles with contradictions, strictly inherent in its nature, whose influences ramify through the whole society of which it is the nucleus, and give rise to irrepressible conflicts in every department of our social life—in law, in politics, in international affairs, in family relations, in ethics and religion, in philosophy and in art. Merely to enumerate these would require more space than is at my disposal, nor is it to my present purpose. The most striking of social paradoxes at this moment is the fact that superabundant production of wealth causes widespread want and misery. This and all the rest stem back to the radical inconsistency between methods of production which are essentially social and a form of property which is essentially individualistic.

From this economic contradiction it follows, as inevitably as any effect follows its cause in human affairs, that within the capitalist system the only dominant motive to the production of wealth is the acquisition of private profit;[2] that profit can continue to be realized only on condition that the methods of production are continually improved; that the increase of productive power thus brought about continuously tends to outrun the increase of the whole effective purchasing power; that, the manifold use of credit providing an element of elasticity, this disparity between producing power and purchasing power manifests itself in recurrent crises of overproduction (**crises pléthorique,** as Fourier vividly called them), each of which can normally come to an end only through the reimpoverishment of the working classes, the ruin of many small enterprises (and often of large ones too), and the wiping-out of some considerable part of the existing property titles and credit claims; and that, while this readjustment is going on, the whole machinery of production and exchange must be

2) It would be more strictly accurate to say "the acquisition of surplus-value", but in the present case the use of a more popular terminology will not lead to confusion.

brought as nearly as possible to a standstill.

Agonizing as this process is to the working people and the other less wealthy classes, it is full of bewildering terror also to the capitalists, and even the great capitalists. That some of these will emerge from the crisis enormously enriched by it, is perhaps generally known; but it can hardly be known which ones will be the beneficiaries of the huge disaster and which will be among its victims. The ever increasing complexity and delicacy of all business relations, and especially of financial relations, makes this ever more uncertain; and in proportion as the control of economic life passes from the hands of industrial capitalists into those of financiers, and as ownership of capital takes on ever more and more the indirect form of ownership of what are so inaptly called "securities", rather than of specific lands, factories, mines, and so forth—in like proportion do the capitalists, large as well as small, lose touch with economic realities. They can see the less clearly what it would be to their common interest for all of them to do; and in so far as they do see it, their individual interests are oftener at war than in harmony with the common interest of their group. As with a panic-stricken mob in a burning theatre, each of them does just the thing from which he wishes all would refrain; nor would it be safe for him to do otherwise, since he is but one in the mob.

So. while our bourgeoisie through all its strata is more gravely alarmed by this than by any former crisis,[3] less than at any previous time can it trust its own members to act in such a way as to minimize the danger—nay, more than ever before must it expect them to do just the reverse. Its only hope—a vain one, but the drowning man clutches at a straw—its only phantom of hope, let me say, is to find a substitute for the consensus of individual wills which it cannot attain. This it finds or thinks to find by subjecting itself to a master, taking the long chance that he will rule it for its good and not just for his own.

3) Alarmed, I mean, by the magnitude and complexity of the economic depression itself, quite apart from any apprehension it may have as to popular revolt and reprisal. Perhaps our American capitalists are more afraid of an uprising of the masses now than they were in the hard times of 1893 and the following years. I doubt if they have reason to be.

Bourgeois "Planning" and Antidemocracy

To resume,—the ineradicably individualistic nature of capitalist property, linked with the growingly social nature of the processes of production and exchange, makes it ever more difficult and by now virtually impossible, for capitalists to behave democratically in their relations with one another. Anarchic strife is the law of this economic being. When they dare—that is, in periods of business activity and expansion—they live according to that law and glorify it under such names as "the strenuous life" and "rugged individualism". Some must perish in the struggle, but each may hope that he will survive. When at intervals the mutual throat-cutting becomes too frantic, it is only in a dictatorial order that they can seek refuge from anarchic strife.

This, I take it, besides and much more than the desire to hold the masses in subjection, is the reason why all the proposals for a "planned economy" emanating from bourgeois sources are more or less frankly antidemocratic. So long as the democracy of the masses retains the negative and individualistic character which on the whole it has thus far had, it will hardly be so great an evil from the capitalists' point of view as to seem to them worth the somewhat hazardous effort to destroy. It would not be easy, it would in all likelihood not be possible, for them to impose a dictatorship upon the people without imposing it also upon themselves. In good times that would be too heavy a sacrifice for them to make; only in times of panic and self-distrust can they seriously consider it.

Why the society that will result from the conquest of power by the working class can and must be a democratic one; why it is better worth while for Socialists to devote all their energies to the winning of power through present class struggle than to spend time in trying to draw up now the plan of that future society; and why there cannot be a "planned capitalism", an extension to capitalist production as a whole of that orderly adaptation of means to ends which is so brilliantly successful within the limits of particular capitalist enterprises—these are questions outside my present scope.

Spain under the Republic

JULIO ALVAREZ del VAYO

(translated by Harry Lichtenberg)

THE AWAKENING OF SPAIN

THE Spanish revolution was the result of years of covert fermentation. Notwithstanding the fact that it escaped the notice of many, it was a profound process. Even during those months when the atmosphere had become extremely tense and during which protest meetings predominated in the streets, when the proper occasion for an outbreak was awaited, the newspapers of the world carried surprising allegories about the popularity of Don Alfonso.

This was true not only of the mediums of publicity in Spain which were uncompromisingly monarchist in their attitude and whose inability to measure the degree of public tension was characteristic of the impenetrable confines of the Cortes, which manifested that same unfailing optimism described by the ex-ambassador of Great Britain, Sir George Buchanan, in his history of the end of Czarism, nor only of the diplomatic world which generally accepts without question the conceptions of the officials; but also of the newspapermen and writers who visited Spain and who in the most spirited and independent comments on the situation played their roles in misleading the public. The existence of turmoil on a national scale, of a rising discontent, was recognized and referred to frequently, but a sort of fetish worship which surrounded Alfonso prevented a realization of where this was ultimately leading to and gave rise to a sort of strange and silly hope that at the last moment one of Alfonso's quizzical smiles or a popular local witticism would be sufficient, by some magic art, to restore his prestige. However, the truth was that not only at that point but for a long time previous the divorce between the Spanish State and the monarchy on

the one hand and of the people on the other hand had been irremediably consummated.

It was a divorce which commenced with the rupture between official Spain and the Spanish intellectual and working classes. While the proletarian organizations in accord with the universal struggle engendered by a growing class consciousness consolidated their positions in the struggle, they also realized that in Spain there still existed a feudal residium that needed to be attacked and destroyed, and so in addition to defending their working class interests, it was necessary to formulate others of a purely political and democratic character. The more intelligent section of the intellectual class realized that it would commit a spiritual and ethical error if it neglected to take an interest in the fate and the future of the people. The intelligentsia arose against the indolent sequences of an inept government with no other object in its domestic politics than that of favoring the dynasts and its only foreign policy of being agreeable to those foreign powers whose friendship was considered favorable to the continuation of the monarchy.

Therefore, the indignation felt by those of us who closely followed foreign affairs was felt even more directly by the rest of the Spanish intellectuals, conscious of their duties, as well as by the masses of the citizens with respect to the internal politics of the country. Spain is a country the development of which depends solely upon an intelligent leadership and the ability of the masses to undertake national reconstruction on its own account. Ours is a country which, according to the calculations of our best economists, could very easily sustain a population of 35 millions on a basis of equilibrium not difficult to secure in its different branches of production, and with an intelligent population whose supposed disinclination toward labor is an illusion which has been mistakenly formed by the outside world, and which has been sufficiently disproved in Mexico by the universally recognized industry of those Spaniards who have emigrated to that country.

All that Spain needed was to get a start. The intellectual

minority and the proletarian masses backed more and more in the course of time by other groups realized for many years that this was impossible within the monarchy. In the five year period preceding the war there began an exodus of the intellectual elements of Spain to foreign universities. Contrary to the false presumption which was widely accepted, and which perhaps also prevailed in other countries, these spiritual excursions toward the social and democratic world instead of obliterating the national spirit of the intellectual increased the depth of his consciousness of his historic mission. I do not say that there were not some few score of intellectuals who, instead of growing in political consciousness during the period of their voluntary exile, fell into a lamentable, individualistic pedantry returning to their country with no other ambition than the very modest one of exercising a sort of hegemony of distinction and learning. But this whether they leave their native land or not is the tragedy which is held in store for all those intellectuals without sufficient emotional spirit to establish and maintain a contact with the people. It is the tragedy of the egotistic intellectual without breadth condemned to exercise a sterile or ineffectual super-criticism toward the events in his country in which he is unable or unwilling to participate. It is the tragedy of these minorities calling themselves select that they are condemned by fate to be engulfed by the historic wave when heedless in their contemplative aloofness and intellectual detachment they fail to see the approaching storm.

The deep conviction that all hope of the national re surgence within the Spanish monarchy was illusory had already mobilized, from a revolutionary standpoint on various occasions, the most advanced elements of the country. The first explosion took place in 1917. In that year the Spanish republicans and laboring masses arose against the monarchy in the form of a general strike which was brutally suppressed. There remained of that, as of all revolutionary mass movements, the smouldering embers ready to be rekindled. An unpopular military campaign, carried on in the midst of criminal incompetence, the campaign of Morocco, provided

the opportunity for the recrudescense of the anti-monarchical sentiment. Unaccustomed since the loss of its colonies to exact responsibility, accustomed to seeing each attempt toward reestablishing the national dignity shattered by brute force, the Spanish people threw itself spiritually into the streets for the first time since 1898 in a compact mass overcoming the differences of parties and classes in search of those who were responsible and found that the principal and real culprit was the King. This is the point of departure in 1921, of the actual Spanish transformation which 10 years afterward was to destroy the monarchy and lay open the road to the revolution. Although later, and principally during the dictatorship, the different parties of the left found themselves in difficulties at times, the revolutionary pact between the various anti-dynastic tendencies was subsequently augmented by the enrollment of the monastic orders, disappointed in their king. It was in 1921 that the revolution became an established fact.

Beginning with that date, Spain has been divided into two great conflicting camps: on the one side the king and his servitors—people who disregarding the national well-being place the interests of their monarch above those of the rest of the country; on the other, the rest of the people. But, midway between these two large, antagonistic nuclei, there was in evidence, confused and uncertain, the neutral mass without a political background, endowed with the selfish short-sightedness of the bourgeoisie, only half Spanish in its attitude, before the establishment of the Republic. Upon this foundation General Primo de Rivera tried to raise the national edifice. At times a conscious and at other times an unconscious tool of the king, of an Andalusian temperament which was conducive to the most dangerous unrealities, and totally unprepared for the delicate functions of the State, this general was not born to be a dictator nor in condition to be one. His lack of political acumen led him to assume that the task before him was simpler than in fact it was. His was an infantile conception of the problem. Far from being the savior of the monarchy, he became its gravedigger.

There was a lapse of seven long years, the period of Berenguer and Minister Aznar, during which the Spanish State, already self-debilitated, suffered from continuous attrition as a result of the banality and ineptitude of the government. Even the program for public works, which at times served as a disconcerting factor, and which so strongly impressed the numerous foreigners who were influenced only by what they saw and who judged the situation in Spain only by the condition of its highways, was carried out in so uneconomic a manner that at present and for a long time to come its consequences will be felt before we can balance our finances.

When the power of Primo de Rivera was overthrown through royal disloyalty, he left the country in complete political anarchy. He was, in his own way, an involuntary but efficient instrument for the revolution. All the attempts that were subsequently made to reconstitute the monarchy were condemned to sterility beforehand. The cleverest and most able politician could not have built on those shifting sands. The army was divided in a lamentable chaos of ambitions and purposes; the majority of the officials did not know which way to turn and constantly fluctuated between submission and rebellion. The demoralized bureaucracy wasted most of its time in commenting harshly on the happenings of the day without faith or effort in the work assigned to the different departments which they found had no other function than that of copying on the typewriters of the ministries, documents which found no outlet in solid type on account of the inflexibility of the censor and the lack of clandestine presses.

The municipal governments were ruined by much graft in the public works many of which were undertaken solely because of the private interests of contractors and their henchmen. Commerce and industry in this crisis were decentralized and violated every rule of economics in the midst of an orgy of blundering subsidies and a regime of foreign concessions and monopolies which altogether threatened seriously to damage the independence of Spain. Every day brought a clearer perception of the national decomposition without the

possible reorganization of the political forces within the monarchy, inasmuch as the old parties, their authority discredited, anathematized during the years of the dictatorship by the official charges with the sanction and approbation of the monarch, were nothing but a heap of rubbish exposed to public contempt, while the Union Patriotica which at a given moment was considered a possible hero had only succeeded in grouping together the most compliant of the old organizations. It was at this moment of desperate doubt that, moved by pure conservatism, and by the impossibility of continuing from day to day without knowing at night what commotion the following morning would bring, the Spanish middle classes and the neutral masses emerged from their ostracism and gave themselves in spirit to the cause of the Republic.

It happened with increased frequency that a banker was converted into a republican propagandist or that a conservative or monarchist of ancient lineage, such as the ex-minister Don Francisco Bergamin and Don Angel Ossorio, requested the abdication of the king as the only means of saving the country.

In cinema theatres, under the protection of darkness at first and later with open impudence, the silhouette of Don Alfonso, whenever it appeared in the newsreels, was greeted by a whistling and stamping of feet. The government had to request the king, in the spring of 1930, to frequent the theatres as rarely as possible in order to avoid the hazard which might be produced by demonstrations of discontent.

A heterogeneous element of the people who until then had fallen into the error that it was most inconvenient for them to mix into politics, was added to the protesting phalanx of intellectuals, workmen and students.

The revolution was in the very air and only required harvesting and leadership.

The need for prompt action, if the risk of the country being lost for both the monarchy and the republic was to be avoided, finally resulted in the Republican union.

The pact of San Sebastian in the summer of 1930, in which the various republican parties agreed upon a plan of

attack was efficiently amplified and completed toward the end of September when the two strongest political organizations of Spanish labor, the Socialist Party and the Union General de Trabajadores (General Union of Workmen) which for many years had presented a common front, decided to aid the revolutionary movement, which, with the cooperation of the more advanced sections of the army was to overthrow the monarchy.

There followed two months replete with casualties and defeats. It was extremely difficult to coordinate a plan of attack upon the basis of a body of officers of whom only a small minority was capable of living up to contractual engagements.

There were times when a given matter appeared to be definitely settled and complete, when a simple promotion or a promise of compensation made to several of the coadjutors, would destroy all the combinations that had been planned, and a new start became necessary. It was an attempt to make bricks without straw.

These difficulties explain the delays occasioned, and one man who could not curb his impatience, upon seeing that the day upon which the revolution was to break had twice been retarded, was the heroic Galan who by himself rebelled in Jaca, thus breaking up the united action upon which the revolutionary committee depended as one of the indispensible requisites of success.

The uprising of Jaca opened the eyes of the government which, although considering itself well-informed had no idea of the extent of the movement in preparation. When Don Alfonso was informed that the garrison in Jaca had rebelled, his only comment was, "It is nothing—just a sergeant and four soldiers, of whom I shall shortly make an example." This is an example of the reaction of the chief of the state. In reality there was not a single garrison in which at least one regiment was not involved. The aviation department, as is well known, was all on the side of the revolution, and the best officers from Morocco had come, full of enthusiasm, to place themselves at the head of the civilian shock troops in

which figured people of every profession, students and workers.

Everything having been arranged to occur three days later, the news that Jaca had started in advance of the time set was disconcerting indeed to the military chiefs. Neither did the new strategy of individual action, imposed by the situation just created, find time for development, nor did the blow at Madrid which had been definitely postponed to the date previously agreed upon, (two days later), have the expected results.

A plan had suddenly been destroyed in which the smallest detail had been foreseen—foreseen too well, perhaps,—and it was impossible to substitute it effectively by another which would adequately meet the new situation.

In the provinces the people struggled as best they could, with an intrepidity which for all time destroyed the stupid legend that in Spain nobody was capable of putting words into action and that all the revolution amounted to was demagogic chatter.

The movement of December having been suppressed, the opposition found itself in a situation replete with dangers, its principal leaders imprisoned or in flight to foreign parts and its revolutionary instrument dismembered and decomposed.

To revamp the military instrument in a short time on the basis of military bands and civilian shock troops was unthinkable. On the other hand a public atmosphere charged with a revolutionary spirit at high temperature could not be permitted to cool off because of spiritless inaction.

It was necessary to abandon the field of combat and transfer the battle to a different plane. In a word, it was necessary to transfer the revolutionary activities from the zone of an armed uprising to the political arena. That was the meaning of the municipal elections of April 12, into which we all threw ourselves with the same fervor with which, in December, we proposed to riot in the streets.

Preceding the elections there was a campaign of intense agitation, in which all shared who felt the tremendous responsibility of the moment, including the universities and

writers from the highest social rank to those of the greatest lyric refinement. All of these threw themselves into the conquest of town and village.

It required no great effort to attract thousands of followers. The ground of Iberia was already saturated with the sap of republicanism. In the days which preceeded the elections I travelled over a considerable area of Andalusia as well as Asturia. Everywhere I found an echo of the cry for liberty that was unanimous, while the will to impose respect for the popular vote gave every pre-election meeting the distinctive character of a small revolutionary convention.

While visiting towns in Andalusia, where for months hunger had been playing havoc—and it is well to bear this in mind if one wishes to appreciate the situation today,—I heard from the lips of peasants, (who waited in queus at the doors of their municipal headquarters for a daily subsistence dole of 25 centimos, or of a few beans which they could easily hold in the palm of the closed hand) that on election day they would refuse to sell their votes even if they were offered 10 or 20 dollars. I returned to Madrid convinced that the revolution was a fact.

Two days later, after the elections, the revolution took form, ousting the monarchy from Spain forever.

A YEAR OF THE REPUBLIC

The Republic found itself in control of a state the machinery of which had been destroyed during years of blundering, as previously described.

Everything had to be reconstructed, from reorganization of the army to public education in the villages. It was confronted with five fundamental problems. The first was the social problem, which, especially in Andalusia, was extremely acute as a consequence of the regime of large rural landowners, under which this parasitical aristocracy had been permitted to live on their incomes, away from their lands and indifferent to the requirements of modern production.

The clerical problem had been aggravated during the

years of the dictatorship by the frequent interferences of the episcopate and the high clerics in politics, as well as by the approbation accorded to all the attempts (of which many were successful) made by the various religious orders to extend further and further their sphere of action in the field of education. The third was the military problem. In the past two decades the king had made the army an instrument to promote his own designs of personal power; a tool of the official juntas, even utilizing the army during the dictatorship to make triumphant his Coup d'Etat, so that it had been considerably poisoned by the demoralizing incentives to subordination launched from above. The financial problem was incarnated by a treasury ruined by the dictatorship and an economic policy of exclusive service to the interests of the larger enterprises. Finally there was the regional policy. Seven years oppression in Catalonia in which unnecessarily and stupidly the most intimate sentiments of the Catalonians had been wounded, so that on certain occasions even the playing of their folk songs embodying their most sentimental traditions was prohibited, although these had no political significance, had created a serious condition.

For the treatment of its social problems, the Republic counted in its favor the presence of the Socialists in the government. Aware of the difficulties which always present themselves to Socialists of any country when they begin to participate in a coalition government, and of the supposed danger of becoming "white" in the seats of the ministry, aware of those sectors of the working class which are most nervous and impatient, the Spanish Socialists, faithful to the traditions of their party, did not evade the responsibility which the circumstances demanded. Not very strong numerically, but always counting upon the close alliance of many years between the "Socialist Party" and the "Union General de Trabajadores", (General Union of Workers), which even before the proclamation of the Republic had more than 400,000 members (there are today nearer a million members), the Socialists of Spain had in their favor the advantage of being the only really organized force at the moment when the Republic was pro-

claimed, with a discipline unequalled by any other political party in the country.

Against it there arose in the first place the "Confederacion Nacional el Trabajo", (National Confederation of Labor), of a markedly Anarchist tendency, whose principal center of activity had been the region of Catalonia, but which soon extended itself to Andalusia, where the desperate economic conditions of the agrarian masses opened a way singularly propitious for agitation of a syndicalism of a thorougly simple and primitive type.

The Spanish syndicalist is more familiar with Bakunin than with Sorel. His conception of the future state makes it impossible for him to understand, not only the limited task the Spanish Socialists are required to perform at this time, but also their more radical organic and centralized work. In Spain these syndicalists have been, amongst the labor elements, the most decided adversaries of the Soviet Russian regime. Obsessed by the effectiveness of direct action, they have called in the short period of a year since the advent of the Republic, more than one thousand strikes which, lacking the support of the Socialist masses belonging to the "General Union of Workers", have invariably met with failure. This explains the growing weakness during the last few months of the "General Federation of Labor" the official Communist Party, which has been unable to develop and which suffers from the opposition of the adherents of Trotsky, who in Spain count upon individuals of greater capacity than those which direct the Spanish section of the Third International.

The unfortunate manner in which this agtitation has been carried on, instead of being favorable to the effective treatment of the social problems which confront the Republic, has retarded it in some measure. However, the Spanish Parliament is already discussing agrarian reforms from the application of which in Andalusia and the rest of Spain the government expects great results.

The clerical question was solved much more rapidly and felicitously than was thought possible abroad. For many weeks one read in a large part of the foreign press all sorts of

lugubrious perdictions of a supposed danger of grave internecine strife. The Spanish monarchists, not very numerous to be sure, who had carried their loyalty to Don Alfonso to the point of following him into exile, speculated upon the eventuality of an uprising on a larger scale in the northern provinces where the clericals felt strongest. All of this vanished, however, in the midst of a most complete calm. Neither the secularization of the cemeteries nor the introduction of divorce, nor yet the expulsion of the Primate of Spain, Cardinal Segura, who was the idol first of the reaction and later of the Jesuits, provoked the awful cataclysm which had been proclaimed as inevitable.

Civic consciousness had been so solidly assumed that no one would seriously risk opposing it.

It seemed even more difficult to approach the military problem with success. The Spanish army suffered from an excess of officers whose numbers had been augmented to the extreme, exclusively to assure royalty the friendship and support of the armed forces. However, overnight the new minister of war, now Prime Minister Manuel Azaña, cut with one clean stroke, and reduced by more than 8000, the number of generals and officers. This, in what was considered the classic country of military pronouncements! Yet none of the officers affected offered the least resistance, because the will of the nation was now the will of the army.

Before a year had elapsed since the establishment of the new regime the Republic had a balanced budget. All the superfluous expenditures which characterized the era of monarchy was reduced, while on the other hand the expenses of public education were augmented to a considerable extent in order to establish the plan for the creation of 27,000 new schools and to do away with illiteracy which, during the monarchic regime prevailed in some regions to the shameful extent of some 60%.

The fifth of the tremendous problems above enumerated, that of harmonizing the legitimate aspirations of particular regions with the historic necessity of maintaining the unity of Spain, is the one which is now occupying parliament in the

discussion of the Catalonian statute. In a speech which caused an extraordinary sensation in the camara, Prime Minister Manuel Azaña defined very clearly the attitude of the government confronted by a question which had for many years hindered national life and which the monarchy not only did not know how to solve but which indeed aggravated it to the point of placing the unity of the nation in a grave danger. Referring to finances, Mr. Azaña defended the advantage of endowing Catalonia in the same manner as those other regions to which later autonomy would be granted with a fiscal system of its own, without granting privileges to one region not possessed by others. This plan would in any case be subject to the periodic rectification of the Spanish Parliament. Great care is to be taken to prevent, as a result of this relative financial autonomy, an injury to the general treasury of the Republic. On that phase which had to the greatest extent impassioned public opinion, that of education, the Prime Minister manifested an opposition to the existence of two universities. Against the pretentions of the Catalonian extremists who wanted a Catalonian University independent of the Spanish University Mr. Azaña supported a single bilingual university where, alongside of Castilian (Spanish) Catalan would also be used in teaching. The Spanish State reserves to itself the right to create in Catalonia all the necessary centers of education to be served by functionaries of the state. He clearly established the fact that the only serious risk which had to be overcome was the granting of autonomy in a form which would insure it against attack, supposing a situation should arise which would endanger it—and this is obviated by the constitution, which within itself permits the rectification of articles referring to autonomy and the system established by statute.

And Azaña, born within the very heart of Castile, in Alcala de Henares, terminated his splendid discourse in these words: "The hour has struck when we Castilians, proclaim to the people of the States of Spain: Of us Castilians, you have nothing to fear, we are content with our destiny, which is to carry on our shoulders the universality of the name of

Spain. And when one has this well defined destiny, there is no pride which remains unsatisfied."

In one year the Spanish Republic has overcome all of those problems inherited as a calamitous burden from the monarchy. It has given itself a constitution which is the most advanced of Europe and of the world. It has leapt forward a hundred years in its history. It has renovated the attitude of its external policies, valiently introducing in its constitution as norms of the Spanish State institutions which in other parts of the world are still considered as vague, pacifistic Utopias.

Much still remains to be done. Of this the Spanish Socialists are well convinced as they are firmly determined, whether through the government or through the opposition, to make sure that the Spanish Revolution carries out its historic mission.

A WORD ABOUT OUR CONTRIBUTORS

NORMAN THOMAS
Candidate for President, Socialist Party of America.

A. JUGOW
Noted economist of the Russian Social Democrats, now living in Berlin. One of the editors of "Westnik".

ALGERNON LEE
President of the Rand School of Social Science and one of the leading Marxists in the U. S. A.

JULIO ALVAREZ DEL VAYO
An outstanding member of the Socialist Party of Spain.

The Social Philosophy of Marxism

HAIM KANTOROVITCH

(Continued from the last issue)

III. SYSTEM AND METHOD

THE revolutionary potentialities of the Hegelian dialectic method lay dormant within the narrow walls of his idealistic system. Did Hegel himself realize what revolutionary possibilities lay hidden in his method? Some are inclined to think that he did, but did not care to make full use of them. Was not Hegel a radical and libertarian in his youth? Did he not, together with Schelling, plant a liberty tree, when both were young? Did he not fill his album with such exclamations as "Vive la Liberte!" "Vive Jean Jacques!" etc.?

Heinrich Heine has indeed accused him of "intellectual cowardice". "Once when I seemed puzzled by the words, 'Everything that exists is reasonable'," Heine relates, "he gave a strange laugh and remarked: 'But this also means that everything that is reasonable **ought** to exist'. Then he became restless, and uneasily looked around. Seeing that no-one, except Heinrich Beer, heard him, he felt relieved." * It does not matter whether what Heine relates is truth or fiction. It shows what people like Heine thought about Hegel.

Whether Hegel himself did or did not realize the full revolutionary import of his method, he certainly did not use it to its utmost. It is true that it often helped him to gain a much broader, deeper and truer insight into the world, especially into human history. In his historical studies, he was from time to time able to forget his idealism, and look at one or another historical incident from a realistic, dialectical

*) Quoted by Plekhanof, in his notes to F. Engel's "Feuerbach" collected works, Vol. VIII, p. 360.

point of view. Realism coupled with dialectics could produce great results. But these were only the exceptional "happy moments". In these exceptional moments he did attain brilliant results; often he thus really gained a glance behind the scenes of history, and dimly perceived the real forces shaping human destiny. Thus, he was able, for instance, to see the history of philosophy, not as the "story" of unsuccessful attempts in the search for ultimate truths (as it is still seen by some "very modern" historians) but as the expression of certain time, place and environment; "true" for its time and place, though outlived later. Thus, for instance, in speaking about the decline of the Spartan state, he attributes its decline to "the growth of inequality of wealth". Many other instances of this kind could be cited. It may really be said that "two souls fought in his breast": a realist according to his method, an idealist and mystic in his general philosophy—that was the tragedy of Hegelianism!

Two obstacles were in Hegel's way—two obstacles which were avoided by Marx and Engels. They were his system and his idealism.

"Systems" of philosophy are nowadays somewhat out of fashion. The universal acceptance of the theory of evolution, the mood of relativity prevailing in all branches of human thought, the theory of subjective unconscious motivation established by the New Psychology, have made "systems" not only impossible, but even somewhat ridiculous. We have done with the naive belief that some one philosopher will come along and solve all problems; discover all truths; establish once for all such ultimate principles that will make an end to all searchings after truth in the future. The time for philosophic systems has passed forever!

But in Hegel's time the creating of a system of philosophy was just the thing for a philosopher to do. It was expected of him. This was the time of the great philosophic systems. A "system" must not only be all inclusive; it must not only be universal; it must also be monolithic; it must be one whole; rounded out, finished and closed, and therefore dogmatic. Behind the system-making lay, consciously or unconsciously,

the thought of a finished universe, given once for all, of ultimate final truths that are to be discovered once for all.

All systems of philosophy, no matter how much they prided themselves on their critical spirit, no matter how vehemently they seemingly fought against dogmatism, always ended in dogmatism. Systems are, according to their nature, metaphysical (in the sense that Hegel used the word as opposed to dialectical). Hegel's imposing structure was therefore rent by an inner contradiction. His dialectical method required open space, an open unfinished universe. It scorned final and ultimate truths. It viewed the universe as a constant process, as constant change, in which everything develops into something else, in which everything negates itself; in which quantities constantly create new qualities; a universe in which there is nothing final; nothing finished; in which truths become falsehoods, and falsehoods truths. A universe of this kind could not be squeezed into the narrow frame of a system. The two cannot house together. One has to choose between the two. Either one accepts the dialectic view and gives up all hope of ever creating a final system, or one sacrifices dialectic for system making. Marx and Engels chose the first alternative. They adopted Hegel's dialectic method and left system making to those who have the time and the inclination for mental gymnastics. They had more important things to do—perfect this method and use it for their own purposes.

They had to perfect it before they could use it. Hegel's dialectic was very imperfect because it was imbued with mystiism. This was the second great obstacle that prevented Hegel from making full use of his method. Here again the duality of Hegel's thinking comes to the fore. He wanted to be objective. He believed that "as to nature, philosophy has to understand it as it is. The philosopher's stone must be concealed somewhere in nature itself." That sounds like a sentence from a materialistic book. He even thought that "Thought is the last product of the world process". If thought is a product, and the last product at that, there must be causes, other than thought of which it is a product. It must conse-

quently lead to the conclusion that consciousness (thought) is determined by the "world process", or as Marx expressed it, "by social being". But Hegel did not draw these logical conclusions; he was a thorough-going idealist, and, in spite of his dialectics, in spite of his objectivity, social being (or the world process) was for him determined by consciousness (idea). As an idealist he could not think otherwise.

IV. IDEALISM

Many are the sins of idealism. We need not dwell upon them now, but its original sin is that it reduces the world of reality to a world of shadows. "Literally idealism is the name for a philosophical doctrine", explains Hoernle[1] "a theory of reality in terms of ideas". The world of reality, the world of "things" are for the idealist nothing but a reflection of some idea or spirit. Different schools of idealism gave different names to their "idea", but whether one calls it idea, absolute idea, world spirit, or any other name, it comes to the same thing. Real is only the spirit; whatever is mundane, material, corporeal, is nothing but an emanation of the spirit. "Simple minded people" may think that they see houses, rivers, mountains, people, and that these things which they see, hear, touch, smell, are real objects outside of them. They think so only because they are "simple minded", because they do not approach these things philosophically; the idealist philosopher knows better. "It is evident . . . that extension, figure, and motion are only ideas existing in the mind," declares one of the greatest idealists, George Berkely.[2] It is beyond Berkely's understanding how sensible people could ever imagine that material world, the world of corporeal things in space and time does really exist outside of their minds. "It is indeed," he says, "an opinion strangely prevalent among men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence natural or real distinct from their being perceived by the understanding . . . for what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive, and

1) R. F. A. Hoernle—"Idealism as a Philosophy". P. 47.
2) "Principles of Human Understanding". P. 9.

what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations?" [3]

Berkely's words are representative not only of his own philosophy but of idealism in general from Plato to our most recent idealists. When some of our present day philosophers felt an urge to return to the mystic, but for them comforting, philosophy of idealism, they turned to Berkely. Sir James Jean speaking about Berkely adds "Modern science, (that is "modern science", as Jean interprets it, H.K.) seems to me to lead, by a very different road to a not altogether dis-similar conclusion." He also believes, together with Berkely and all idealists, that the objectivity of things outside of us "arises from their subsisting in the mind of some eternal spirit".[4]

This "eternal spirit" is also a very old "friend" of idealism. Idealism must either postulate some eternal spirit or come to the absurd idea of Solipcism.[5]

"Spirit" is necessary to idealism also for another reason. Philosophic idealism has always served the cultured parts of the ruling classes as a surrogate for religion. Religion is one of the most important pillars on which the class society rests, but the crude religion of the church, good as it may be for the masses, cannot satisfy the cultured. It is too primitive, too crude, too vulgar, if you please. The ideologists of the class society know well that something more refined, more "modern" must be found, to replace the old religion of heaven and hell; a new foundation is necessary for the old structure. Berkely knew very well what practical purpose his idealism must serve; he says: "So I shall esteem them (his own writing) altogether useless and ineffectual, if by what I have said I cannot inspire my readers with a pious sense of the presence of God". So does Kant hope to make "reason prepare a way for faith". Idealists of our own day are no exception to the rule; speaking in the name of science, such men as Jean, Eddington and others created a new idealism by way of which they arrived at a new idea of the old God. The reason for the religious mood of at least some of the

3) Ibid. Par. 4—P. 115; Open Court Edition.

4) "Mysterious Universe". P. 147.

5) On the new developments of idealism, in connection with the discoveries in physics, see my article "Historical Materialism and the New Science"—"Modern Quarterly".

scientific metaphysicians was stated by Bertrand Russell (himself a half-hearted idealist) in the following frank, even brutal, words:

The reconciliation of religion and science which professors proclaim and bishops acclaim rests, in fact, though subconsciously, on grounds of quite another sort, and might be set forth in the following syllogism: science depends upon endowments, and endowments are threatened by Bolshevism; therefore science is threatened by Bolshevism, therefore religion and science are allies. It follows, of course, that science, if pursued with sufficient profundity, reveals the existence of a God." [6] "Bolshevism" is here inserted only because it is now fashionable. Idealism with its metaphysical God and refined prejudices, was always in mortal dread of the enemies of the established, whether they are called Bolsheviki or any other name. "Philosophy," says John Dewey, meaning really idealist philosophy from which he himself is by no means free, "was . . . invented in a fanciful way in order to justify and preserve the existing social fabric. . . . The sanction of traditional authority was its motive." [7] And we may add, so it has remained until to-day.

Hegel was a thorough-going idealist in spite of the seeming objectivity of some of his statements. "Spirit," Hegel declares, "is the only reality. It is the inner being of the world. It is that which essentially is, and is per se." [8]

What is this spirit that is the "only reality", the "inner being of the world"? What is this eternal spirit, the spiritual substance, the absolute idea, about which the idealists of all schools speak so glibly? No one knows; idealists fill volumes about it, but cannot say what it is or how they come to know about it. One of the arguments most often advanced against materialism is that the materialists themselves do not know what matter is, and it is true, the materialist could no more say what matter is in itself, than the idealist could say what spirit is in itself. But, there is one very significant difference: while the materialist cannot say what matter is in itself, he

6) The Scientific Outlook. P. 96.
7) Reconstruction in Philosophy. Chapter 1.
8) Phenomenology of the Mind. Preface English translation by J. B. Baillie.

can describe its properties and its behavior; he does know a great deal about matter, and what he knows about matter is scientifically proved; the truths of materialism are the products of scientific research and experiment, and are proved by centuries of human experience. The idealist cannot say the same about his spirit. It was born and reared in his own head. It is a creation of his own phantasy; the idealist needs a spirit, and therefore creates it.

What, for instance, is "spirit" for Hegel? It is universal reason, and universal reason is for him the reason of God. "Reason," he says, "in its more concrete manifestation is God" and "God rules over the world, the contents of his rulings, the execution of his plans is universal history" (The philosophy of history). What is the dialectic process of history to Hegel? Nothing but the result of the dialectic process of the spirit.[9] Ludwig Feuerbach was certainly right when he saw in Hegel's philosophy the last hiding place for theology.

The great merit of the Hegelian philosophy, says Frederic Engels, is that "for the first time the whole world, natural, historical, intellectual, is represented as a process; i.e, as in constant motion, change, transformation, development. An attempt is made to trace out the internal connections that make a continuous whole of all this movement and development."[10] But, what is it that was changing, developing? For Hegel the idealist, it was the changing and development of the spirit. "To him the thoughts within his brain were not the more or less abstract pictures of actual things and processes, but conversely, things and their evolution were only the realized pictures of the idea existing somewhere from eternity before the world was".[11] Therefore Engels passes this harsh sentence on his teacher, "The Hegelian system in itself was a colossal miscarriage—but also the last of its kind."

The inner contradiction of the Hegelian system made it possible to include within the Hegelian school people of the

9) N. Cunow, "Die Marxische Geschichts-Gesellshaffts und Staatstheorie", Band 1, p. 224-252. The reader will find here an excellent exposition of Hegel's social and historical views. See also Plekhanof's excellent essay, "From Idealism to Materialism", collected works, Vol. 18.

10) Engels: Socialism, Scientific and Utopian. P. 85.

11) Ibid, p. 86.

most diverse social and philosophical opinions. The conservatives have taken over his system and his idealism. "Some Hegelians maintained," says Harold Höffding in his 'History of Modern Philosophy', "that rightly understood, the philosophy of their master accords with ordinary faith and the teaching of the church. Others declared that when logically carried out it is found to stand in irreconcilable antagonism to the latter." [12] Insofar as each side has taken only one element of the Hegelian structure, it was always right. The "Young Hegelians" could very well debate as to the real Hegelian. This was of no interest to Marx and Engels; they took from Hegel what in their opinon was valuable and revolutionary—his method—and left the metaphysicians and theologians to fight about the rest.

12) Vol. 2; p. 268.

The Milwaukee Convention

ANNA BERCOWITZ

CONFRONTED by an opportunity unlike any other in its history, the recent convention of the Socialist Party in Milwaukee spent the greater part of four days not primarily in facing the momentous problems offered by the unprecedented world economic crisis, but in what, to all outward appearances, seemed to be a petty squabble, a squabble which actually masked the struggle for power between two opposing philosophies — one, the working class Marxian international concept; the other the liberalizing, reformist concept of many of the so-called "New Blood".

The groups which represented the so-called "New Blood" at the convention, the Militants and the Liberals and which at this convention merged for the sole purpose of deposing the present leadership had little in common. Many members of the most aggressive, although numerically weakest of these groups, the Militants, had little in common with the so-called Thomasites. Philosophically they claim to be Marxian. And

as for the so-called Mid-western group, although they cast their vote with the opposition, on fundamentals they too are opposed to much of the liberalizing tendencies manifest in the party in recent years. Yet they voted, contrary to their usual procedure in their respective communities, with the opposition. That trades had been made there can be no doubt, and that some groups had been used as innocent dupes can also hardly be doubted in view of occurrences following the convention.

Fundamentally there is much more in common between the Militants and the so-called "Old Guard" than between the Militants and the Thomasites and surely than between the frank practical "mid-western" type of Socialists, yet when it was a question of vote on the Russian resolution, on the T. U. resolution and on the question of the National Chairman and the Executive Committee votes were not cast on the basis of principles but apparently on the basis of "trades". The real difference between the Militants and the "Old Guard" seems to be based on lack of sufficient activity and on tempo rather than on principle.

For months there had been rumors of an attempt to depose the National Chairman. This became the important issue. As a result it was quite natural that there should have been a test of strength as early as possible. This test came on the first day with the introduction of the Russian resolution. By a vote of two to one the resolution as introduced by Blanshard and amended by Thomas was carried. The vote gave the so-called opposition great confidence, and assurance that the convention was theirs.

The Russian resolution, vague and open to individual interpretation, is to all intent the most unsatisfactory resolution ever adopted by the Party. It contains fundamental contradictions. If "the experiment is a natural outgrowth of the conditions peculiar to that country" then the terrorism which is an essential phase of the plan is "natural". Yet the resolution urges "the release of political prisoners and the restoration of liberty".

Strangely enough the Milwaukee Leader did not print the Russian resolution on which the Wisconsin delegation

had voted unanimously (the Wisconsin delegation adopted the Unit rule, except on the T. U. resolution). But, the "Socialist Campaigner" of May 28, Milwaukee propaganda weekly, carried a story of the resolution which is worthy of consideration. The Campaigner declares, "the whole debate and its outcome was rich stuff for the Sovietist liberal and humiliating for those versed in the history and rise of the Socialist movement who know that a Stalin dictatorship is not Marxian Socialism". To add emphasis to this view they print the first installment of Kautsky's "Socialism and Communism" under a six column head with the following introduction: "The action of the Socialist Convention in adopting a debatable clean bill of health for the Stalin dictatorship shows the lack of actual knowledge of the Russian situation even among loyal Socialists in this country." It is significant that this article appeared in the issue immediately following the convention.

It may also be noted here that although the Wisconsin delegation voted for the Blanshard resolution, Hoan on another occasion had urged the delegates to forget Russia and other foreign problems that divide them and to concentrate on the building of Socialism in America; and that Norman Thomas when, a motion was made to substitute "confiscation" for "transfer" in the platform urged the voting down of the substitution on the grounds that "there was a possibility of achieving Socialism in a generation if guided by the desire for orderly revolution and that the cost of taxation was trivial when compared with the cost of putting into motion confiscation." As against a roll call vote of 8,735—3,928 (117-62 by aye and nay vote) for the Russian resolution, the confiscation amendment was lost by a vote of 166 to 14.

With the definite aim on the part of several groups to depose Morris Hillquit as National Chairman, the opponents of Hillquit made an effort to forestall the nomination when they introduced a motion to increase the N. E. C. to eleven with power to elect its own chairman. The motion was defeated by a vote of 111-48. With Maurer's nomination of Morris Hillquit and William Quick's nomination of Hoan,

the tensest session of the convention began. It was at this session when principles and issues should have been brought to the fore. On the pretext of chairmanship, the contest was really one of principles, although at no time was a clean cut fight made, except when Hillquit, Waldman, Solomon and others challenged Hillquit's opponents. It was a veiled line-up of the reformist liberal groups together with the small number of Militants against the Marxian groups. Surely the following phrases by the opponents of Hillquit indicate clearly the differences which actuated the fight: "Ability to drop ballots into the box"; "American needs of the party"; "Desire to have the national office stay in the U. S."; "Bring mid-western ideals into the American movement"; "Want those who succeeded in building a political organization"; "Materialist conception not one tenth as important as unemployment insurance".

As against such reasons for change in leadership, Waldman emphasized the fact that it had never been known that Hillquit did not want an American movement. Hillquit was one of those who wanted to keep the Socialist movement an American, instead of a Russian movement. He challenged the enunciation of the differences in principles, policies and tactics. But none was forthcoming.

Definite attempts were made to inject the bugaboo of a New York domination of the Party, and to discredit the work done in N. Y. on the basis that it was not American and suffered from the wrong kind of leadership. To these references figures were cited to show that the New York vote had grown steadily and solidly and that the percentage increase was greater than that of the mid-west.

It is quite apparent that the sneering at theoretical Marxian concepts of Socialism can hardly be accepted as a move against Hillquit alone, but against the movement as a whole. Nor should the playing up of one part of the country against the other go by unchallenged. Oddly enough two days before the Convention an article appeared in the Chicago Daily News of May 19, which stated in part: "The Socialist Party has changed a great deal in recent years. Where once it

was dominated by what is known as conservatives, European born and led by Morris Hillquit of New York, the Hillquit group represents scarcely more than one fifth of the party strength. Falling off in immigration and the campaign for enlistment of young folks have given the progressive wing its majority." And for some time previous a letter had been circularized among some of the western comrades pointing to New York "Old Guard" and foreign domination.

In a masterful address, Hillquit in challenging his opponents enunciated his stand: a working-class, common garden variety Socialism—just plain Marxian international Socialism. The opposition, he indicated, came from three sources: the Militants, immature, effervescent, but well-meaning; the opportunists, liberal, white-collar collegiate groups; and the practical reformists who want results and votes today. He reemphasized the fact that translation of sentiment into ballots was not now the supreme socialist requirement. Votes are not always Socialism, and Socialism comes first. The only issue which he could see was one of an attempt to introduce a liberalizing tendency into the Party. Hillquit was reelected National Chairman by 105-86 delegates and 7526-6984 on a roll-call, on the basis of dues paying members for the first three months in 1932.

And right here note should be made of the delegates. To a large extent many were very recent members. Peculiarly, the outstanding elements in the convention were not the Militants, some of whom are Marxists, and who form a small group including some good material, but the "American group", many of whom had recently joined, and "radicals" with strong leftist utterances but with opportunistic "practical" progressive demands. Alliances, however, were made between all of these groups regardless of their principles.

Strange methods and tactics were adopted by some of these groups in order to have the influence they desired at the convention. In California for instance, nine names, including George R. Kirkpatrick, candidate for vice-president in 1916, were deliberately left off of the referendum ballot. Kentucky had no organization. Yet a delegate who was not

even a member of the Party was seated. Attempts at pocket boroughs of North and South Carolina where there were no organizations were made by having each state represented by a party member from Virginia.

Thus we see that an "American Party" brings with it some of the worst phases of American politics.

Six of the newly elected N. E. C. were of the so-called Hillquit group and seven of the opposition, but eleven in all, including the national chairman, some having been on both slates.

One hour was devoted to the trade union resolution, perhaps the most important resolution before the convention. The T. U. resolution of the Agenda Committee carried by a vote of 82-62 as against the McDowal resolution. By implication, a number of items in the McDowal resolution would commit the Party to dual unionism, although this was far from the intent of its sponsors. On the other hand the resolution adopted by the convention commits the party to the inadequate labor policy which has hampered the growth of the Socialist movement.

The inclusion of the word "class-struggle" in the application card for membership was the occasion of another lively discussion. The form finally adopted "I, the undersigned, apply for membership in the Socialist Party", carried by a close vote to 68-66. Queerly enough, the liberal groups were the strongest advocates for inclusion of the word "class-struggle." The omission is to be regretted greatly, for while it is true that the character of the party will determine its membership, a positive statement would tend to emphasize our class struggle working class position.

With a closing appeal for unity by the National Chairman, and emphasis on the fact that in the essential points—platform, nomination of candidates and practical plans for the campaign—the convention was unanimous, much of the bitterness and feeling was sunk in the determination to conduct an enthusiastic and successful campaign. We must not delude ourselves, however, into thinking that the large vote which we probably shall poll, will be a registration of socialist

strength. It will not necessarily be.

But was this the convention that many comrades had hoped for? For myself I must admit it was not. It seems to me that more important than immediate expediencies right now is the building up of a strong socialist movement and a direct appeal to the working class, with the emphasis directed mainly to socialist propaganda, literature and education, utilizing the campaign year as a vantage point for that purpose. No session was devoted to these vitally important problems. If we are to grow as an intelligent, class-conscious movement, we must first of all, bring home to the workers an understanding of their mission and knowledge of their social and economic power.

To do so we must devote ourselves relentlessly to a program of socialist education to reach first the members of the Party and through them the workers; a well thought out literature; a youth movement that will inspire young workers; a disciplined membership; a well defined trade union policy; a clear statement of the meaning of immediate demands; a reorientation of Socialist Party tactics to emphasize the class struggle nature of the movement. With a live militant approach to these problems the party will no doubt gain many adherents from the class it hopes to reach—the working class of America.

Perhaps the next convention two years hence may treat of some of these problems. But, if the liberal, reformist tendencies are to predominate, these problems will not be faced.

Comrades who are not in agreement with the liberal tendencies, or who are not impressed by mere "revolutionary" phraseology, should bend every effort to keep the Socialist Party a Marxian, class-conscious working class movement, and realize that the lines must be sharply defined at the next convention.

Book Reviews

"Toward Soviet America" by William Z. Foster,

International Publishers and Coward McCann, New York, $2.50

AMERICAN Communism is bedevilled by the necessity of being at once "revolutionary" in order to retain the blessings, material and intangible, that the Comintern has it in its power to bestow, and opportunistic in order to make headway with the masses. The result is a movement that blusters loudly about the need for "dictatorship", and that asserts vehemently that the present depression is the collapse of capitalism, and that (if Mr. Foster is to be believed) is hell-bent for—unemployment insurance.

That revolutionary phrases often go hand in hand with a very mild reformism is an old story in labor annals. That the Communist party has, since its inception in 1919, indulged in such demagoguery is a commonplace to all who remember that thirteen years ago it called for the repudiation of all national debts—except of those bonds in the hands of the small investors. It is one thing to know these things. It is another to persuade the usual Communist or his sympathizers that such inanities are not revolution.

"Toward Soviet America" is permeated with that same spirit of sweetness and light that characterizes all Communist literature. So we are told that "The Proletarian Revolution marks the birth of real democracy" (p. 133). On page 141 this is proved by stating that "In a Socialist society, based upon the workers and farmers and where the aim of the government is to advance solely in the interests of these toiling masses, there is room for only one party, the Communist Party". And lest anyone protest that this is not democracy, we are assured (p. 141) that "it is a capitalist lie that pictures the Russian Communist Party as a sort of clique ruling over the masses". Its doors, we are assured, are open "to all earnest workers and poor farmers who accept its full pro-

gram" (Bold mine). Democracy, how art thou translated.

If it is a capitalist lie that the Soviet state is not democratic, how much more dastardly a lie is it to say that in Russia there is no freedom. "For the first time the toiling masses are free", but of course (page 134) "Its freedom is only for useful producers, and not for social parasites". And the definition of social parasite,—Is it left to the OGPU?

"One of the most infamous and ridiculous capitalist lies against the Soviet Union is that the Russian workers are 'exploited'. How can they possibly be exploited when there is no ruling, owning class, no class to get a rake-off from the workers' production?" Mr. Foster's book is full of impudent statements; of all that might be quoted this is at once the most stupid and the most insolent. It is designed to impress the enthusiast, the economic illiterate. It will be swallowed whole by the faithful, and also by those of the bourgeoisie who delight in revolution provided it be sufficiently far away from them in time and space to leave them safe in the enjoyment of their privileges.

Exploitation consists in taking from the workers a substantial part of the value of their product. No one will argue that the taking of moderate taxes with the consent of the taxed is exploitation. The Five Year Plan, however, contemplates the heaping up of value, of capital therefore, sufficient to make Russia independent to a degree, if not entirely, of outside capital. We are told that the second Five Year Plan contemplates a new capital investment of 150 billion rubles. By 1933 the number of workers is to be, according to the plan, 21 million. In five years, therefore, capital totalling 7,143 rubles is to be accumulated from the labor of each worker, or 1,429 rubles per worker, per year. Since the average annual wage of the workers, as given by Foster (page 101), in 1931 was 1,010 rubles, we have a rate of exploitation of more than 141 per cent. When we compare the total wage fund for 1932 of 26,800,000,000 rubles with the estimated total of 30 billion annual increase in capital we have a rate of exploitation of 112 per cent. Either rate is worse than the worst that the capitalist world can show.

There can be only one source of this capital,—the unpaid labor of the masses of the Russian workers. To the benighted eye of a non-communist the difference between capitalist exploitation of the laborer for the heaping up of wealth, and the far more stringent exploitation practiced by the Russian Dictatorship so that new capital may be heaped up for the Dictatorship to use, seems like the difference between Tweedledum and Tweedledee. The only conceivable condition that makes such accumulation as the Five Year Plan contemplates excusable is **self-imposed denial.** The Communists in Russia, and Foster here make great parade of the assertion, or rather the assumption, that the Five Year Plan is the self imposed will of the workers.

How such an assumption can be made to harmonize with the well-known facts about the Dictatorship it is difficult to see. Foster himself states that only one Party is tolerated,—and only those may join this party **who accept its full program.** Non-party members, proletarian and peasants, have a voice and a vote in the Soviets—but the Soviets are dominated by the Communist Party. By Communist metaphysics, party is made to equal worker and peasant. We are under no compulsion to accept this hocus-pocus.

How the will of the people, or the will of anyone but the Communist Party Machine can find expression, it is difficult to see, as Trotzky, Eastman, Bukharin, and Foster himself have learned. The frequent "cleansings" of the universities and public offices, the activities of the secret police (G. P. U.), the imprisoning and exiling of political opponents (even those of revolutionary antecedents) are evidence that the will of the Soviet is **not** the will of the worker—that in fact, the Soviets live in dreadful fear that the will of the worker should find even the narrowest avenue of expression. The fine unanimous chorus of "yes men" that surrounds Stalin must awaken envy even in Jimmy Walker and Herbert Hoover.

Th Foster manuscript presents the usual array of undigested and uncorrected figures. Most reviewers of Soviet statistics labor under the disadvantage of not knowing the facts that lie behind the facade that Soviet comptometers so

beautifully compound. It is enough, however, to apply a few simple principles to Mr. Foster's figures. On page 82 Foster gives us the official figures in the production of some dozen commodities for 1925 and for 1931 with a handsome balance in favor of 1931. The fly in the ointment is that no information is given for pre-war years; that no statement is made as to the reason for using 1925 as a base; and no proof is given beyond the bare statement that the figures for either years represent the facts, and not what the Soviets wish their subjects, and the world outside to believe to be the facts.

Many of the figures quoted are given in ruble values. In a footnote on page 18 the value of the ruble is given as 51 cents. On page 95, on the other hand, we are told that 150 billion rubles equals about 78 billion dollars, a slight error of 1½ billion dollars even on the basis of Mr. Foster's valuta of the ruble. When, however, we hear (as we assuredly do not from official Russian source) that to the bootlegging Russian speculator in the dollar the ruble is worth about five cents instead of fifty-one, Mr. Foster's figures become less glowing.

Fully to answer all the assertions and boasts of this book would be to require a book as large. Fortunately it is not necessary. It is enough to suggest that Mr. Foster's glowing boast of Soviet efficiency will not bear analysis. His boast that the Russians are free he has himself refuted. He has himself borne witness to the frightful exploitation to which they are subjected.

Mr. Foster is significantly silent on a number of pertinent matters. He says much about preparations for war in every country in the world. Russia, however, is preparing not for war. No—Russia is preparing for—defense. To assert that Russia is simply another imperialist power fishing in the troubled waters of Manchuria and Mongolia would be treason to the Comintern. That the youth in Russia is being subjected to a military training more rigid than that given anywhere else but in Italy, is ignored. But we are told (page 53) that "When the capitalists, to save their bankrupt system, launch their armed attack into the U. S. S. R., to destroy its

new Socialism (sic), they must be taught a revolutionary lesson from which their system of robbery and misery will never recover. On page 327 Mr. Foster finds it necessary to say that "Once the power of the bourgeoisie is broken internationally—there will be no place for the present narrow patriotism, the bigoted nationalist chauvinism that serves so well the capitalist war-makers." The usual sop to peace! There are no chauvinists in the world to-day like the Russians. "My country right or wrong" is in comparison with the Russian slogan "Stalin right or wrong", the essence of an enlightened liberalism.

The pages on the Cultural Revolution alleged already to have taken place in Russia, are pathetic. Here we are told (page 112) that "Capitalist science is planless and anarchic, the hit-or-miss task of whoever may be", but in the United Soviet States of America (page 317) "Science will be thoroughly organized and **will work** according to plan; instead of the present individualistic hit-or-miss scientific dabbling, there will be a great organization of science, **backed by the full power of the government.**" (Bold mine) This will indeed be news to Einstein and Millikan, to Carrell, to Loeb, to Pavloff, to those who are to-day seeking to find the cause of cancer, and the possibilites of harnessing atomic energy. The possible implications of the words I have emphasized will suggest infinite horrors to those who know the Soviets.

A good portion of the book is devoted to an attack on all non-Communist elements in the labor movement. There is much play with the phrase Social Fascist, by which apparently Mr. Foster means anyone who claims to be "progressive", or "liberal", or "socialistic", and who does not accept the simon-pure gospel of Moscow. The Social Fascists, we are told, are betrayers of the workers; they are agents of the capitalist system, more dangerous than the frank apologists for capitalism because they use the phraseology of Marxism. This head-on and vigorous attack on Socialism, and on non-Communist portions of the labor movement is part of the stock-in-trade of the Communist movement the world over. It arises from the futility of the Communist attack on cap-

italism, and the concurrent necessity of giving Communist followers the illusion of revolutionary achievement. To oust the "traitors to labor" from their power in a union; to frustrate a "Social Fascist" in his plot to "betray a strike"—such things are at least tangible accomplishments. In lieu of real progress against capitalism they become necessary to the Communist oligarchy. It is regrettable that, after thirteen years, it is still necessary to point out how criminal this attitude is. Criminal, in that it sows dissension where there should be harmony; because it divides the labor movement, as it has done in Germany, so opening the door to reaction; because it is futile. But to the Communist party necessity is superior to the welfare of the working class.

Socialists will sympathize with much of Mr. Foster's criticism of the A. F. of L. without, however, being in the least moved to accept his tactics. The American labor movement has been dilatory; it has tended to become a movement of the skilled workers, rather than of the **working class.** It has tended to be non-revolutionary, and even anti-revolutionary. The remedy for this situation is assuredly not along the lines laid down by Mr. Foster in this book. "The (Communist) Party promotes the formation of the revolutionary opposition in reformist trade unions; it organizes the workers to oust their reactionary leaders, to themselves take over the leadership of their strikes and other struggles, to break through the cliques of the gangsters who control the local unions and suppress all trade union democracy, to disregard the mazed trade union legalism that has been built up by the bureaucracy to prevent the development of real struggles." (page 257.) This from Mr. Foster, who left the I. W. W. because it stood for dual unionism. To be sure he says that "The T. U. U. L. is not a dual organization in the sense of the I. W. W. It does not make war upon the A. F. of L. unions as such, but against their reactionary leaders!" Just as Mr. Wilson waged war, not against the German people, but against the German government. Blessed indeed are words; they shall obscure thought!

This book naturally makes much of the part Communists

have played in recent strikes—in Passaic, Gastonia, in West Virginia and in Kentucky. Some day an exhaustive study of these strikes—their inception, their conclusions—must be written. There are many dark corners into which a knowledge of the facts will shed much needed light. This much is already clear: wherever the Communists have been markedly active, the position of the workers has been clearly made worse by their interference. They come—they make much noise — they go, having accomplished little more than to achieve martyrdom for themselves and their dupes. They leave no organization behind. Not for the workers, nor even for themselves have they achieved any tangible results,—unless to leave the labor movemnt in ruins is to achieve something.

For America Mr. Foster offers a replica of Russia. He assumes that his readers will not be able to see through his case of Russia—and that they will hasten to replace capitalism with the Soviet States of America, Russian model. He assumes further, that the revolution will come here as it came in Russia; that it will follow the same course; that Soviets will be formed along the Russian lines. There will be a Red Guard, to destroy counter-revolution; later the Red Guard will become the Red Army. All parties but the Communist Party will be liquidated (another blessed word). Industry will be socialized; the large farms will be confiscated. But note that (p. 278) the "socialization program will be carried through on the basis of confiscation without remuneration, **except for special consideration for small investors.**" All this will be followed by an earthly paradise—like that in Russia to-day? Like the Russia where to-day the workers live in constant fear; where red tape, inefficiency, doctrinaire experimentation, slogans, the suppression of thought, and stupid waste have caused a vast, rich agricultural land to come to the edge of famine.

There is no future for the Communist Party in America. It misreads American History, as it misreads the American mind. Not for always can the propaganda machine of the Comintern prevent the truth about Russia's economic col-

lapse from appearing. Americans will play with the idea of dictatorship but will they endure for as much as a week the type of dictatorship that Foster visualizes? The very idea of a political system that tolerates only one party will seem to Americans ludicrous, if not dangerously mad.

There is far more vitality in democracy than Mr. Foster is willing to admit. In America he and his cohorts may be hustled about a bit when they become abusive. In America he is allowed to publish "Toward Soviet America". In Russia he would never get past the censor with a book that attacked the Russian system as he attacks capitalism. In America there is room in the political system for an attack on unemployment, for agitation for a change, for demonstrations. In Russia one may not even whisper that the sacred State has any flaws. There is virtue in democracy. Communists ought to be witnesses to the fact. They ought to have the sense to use the weapons democracy puts into their hands, at least as long as they are weapons and in their hands. They ought to learn the value of honesty in giving testimony. They ought to admit that what Russia has is not Socialism, but bureaucracy gone mad. They ought to hesitate a little before they suggest to the American workers that they too throw themselves into the abyss.

But Mr. Foster cannot hesitate. If he does the Comintern will turn him out—as it will sooner or later anyway.

Physically, the book before us shows signs of having been slapped together hastily to gain whatever sales value there may be in Mr. Foster's candidacy for the Presidency on the Unemployment Insurance Issue. It lacks an index. Its footnotes often do not explain the text. Names of unknowns are cited as authorities. Altogether an unsatisfactory piece of work.