HISTORY
OF THE
COMMUNIST
PARTY
OF THE
SOVIET
UNION,

Second, revised edition

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INTRODUCTION

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, founded and brought to maturity by the great Lenin, has travelled a historical road the like of which is unknown to any other political party in the world. Its history is a record of more than half a century of the heroic struggles, severe trials and epoch-making victories of the working class, the victories of socialism and communism.

At the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century the Party entered the historical arena and boldly led the working class and the peasantry into battle against the tsarist autocracy and Russian capitalism. The struggle against tsarism and capitalism in Russia was also a struggle against world imperialism. Russia became the centre of the world revolutionary movement. By arming the working class and the bulk of the labouring peasantry of Russia with the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the Party ensured the victory of the people over the tsarist monarchy and the bourgeoisie.

Starting with small Marxist circles active in the working-class movement of Russia in the eighties of the nineteenth century, the Party developed into a great force which today directs a powerful socialist state. By the time the Twenty-Second Party Congress, a congress of builders of communism, convened, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was a mighty army ten million strong, united on the basis of Marxist-Leninist ideas and closely linked with the people. Once the vanguard of the working class, it had become the vanguard of the Soviet people, the party of the people as a whole.

The Communist Party led the peoples of Russia through three revolutions: the bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1905-07, the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917 and the Great October Socialist Revolution, and brought the Soviet people to the victory of socialism which opened a new epoch in world history. The Communist Party stood the test of two imperialist wars (the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 and the First World War of 1914-18). The Communist Party headed the heroic struggle of the Soviet people in two patriotic wars—the Civil War of 1918-20 and the Great
Patriotic War of 1941-45. Led by the Party, the Soviet people and their Armed Forces successfully defended the freedom and independence of the socialist Motherland against the assaults of a host of enemies.

At every historical stage of its struggle to overthrow the rule of the exploiters and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, and at every stage of socialist and communist construction, the Party accomplished tasks scientifically formulated in its programmes. The struggle of the Party and the people to carry out the first Programme, adopted by the Second Congress in 1903, led to the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Their struggle to fulfil the second Programme, adopted by the Eighth Party Congress in 1919, led to the complete and final triumph of socialism in the U.S.S.R. These are the main results of the activities of the Party and the people, and they constitute a historic feat. At its Twenty-Second Congress, the Party adopted a third Programme, the programme for building a communist society in the Soviet Union. The Party solemnly declared: "The present generation of Soviet people shall live in communism."

At all stages of its development, the Party has elaborated and pursued a policy based on the theory of Marxism-Leninism, a policy answering the interests of the working class, the labouring peasantry, and all the nations inhabiting the country, the interests of the Motherland, the interests of the victory of communism in the Soviet Union and of the cause of international socialism.

The Communist Party has accumulated great and varied experience in the struggle for the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the years before the October Revolution, working underground in the hardest conditions, the Bolsheviks developed the theoretical solutions for complex ideological, political and organisational problems and carried out in practice the tasks involved, which enabled them to achieve victory in the bourgeois-democratic and socialist revolutions. These problems and tasks included: elaboration of the theory of a revolutionary Marxist party—a party of a new type—and the creation of such a party; elaboration of a new theory of revolution applicable to the era of imperialism; elaboration of the strategy and tactics to be used in the bourgeois-democratic and the socialist revolutions; the struggle to win the hegemony of the proletariat for victory over tsarism and capitalism, to achieve unity of the working-class movement, to establish an alliance between the working class and the peasantry with the working class leading, to win over the oppressed nations to the side of the proletariat; the struggle against the enemies of Marxism in the ranks of the revolutionary and working-class movement in Russia and in the international arena, and other problems. The Party's activities provided a pattern of how legal and illegal, parliamentary and extraparliamentary forms of struggle and work should be combined. The Party also showed how
the various forms of movement of the masses should be rapidly changed with due regard to a new historical situation.

The Communist Party's experience in conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the period of socialist and communist construction, has been even more rich and varied. Socialism was built for the first time in human history in a vast country with a comparatively underdeveloped economy, with a predominantly peasant population, and inhabited by many different nations and national groups. The difficulties of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. were made even more formidable by the fact that the country had for more than thirty years been the only socialist state in the world, a state under bitter attack from the hostile capitalist world encircling it. The Party had to, and did, work out theoretically the most complicated problems of socialist construction. The historical experience of the C.P.S.U. covers a vast range of problems relating to the transition from capitalism to socialism, and to the development of socialist society towards communism.

Chief among these problems are:

- implementation of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of socialist democracy at different stages of development of Soviet society;
- realisation of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry under the leadership of the working class throughout the period of socialist and communist construction; solution of the national question, and formation of a commonwealth of socialist nations in the Soviet state; elaboration of the basic problems of the transition from socialism to communism;
- creation of socialist forms of economy; industrialisation of the country and bringing into being of the material and technical basis of socialism; collectivisation of agriculture and development of large-scale mechanised socialist agriculture; elimination of the exploiting classes and abolition of the exploitation of man by man; the transition of formerly backward peoples to socialism without passing through the capitalist stage of development;
- working out of new principles of inter-state relations, in keeping with the interests of the Soviet people and of the working people throughout the world; consistent pursuance of a peaceable foreign policy—a policy of peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems; consolidation and strengthening of the defensive capacity of the socialist state; consolidation and extension of co-operation among the countries of the world socialist system;
- the establishment of a socialist ideology and the victory of a scientific, Marxist-Leninist world outlook; the carrying out of a cultural revolution; the flowering of socialist science and the training of a large new people's intelligentsia; education of the new man in a communist spirit;
- transformation of the Communist Party from a force for overthrowing the system of exploitation into a force for building a new,
communist society; giving effect to the leading role of the Party in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat; consolidation of the unity of the Party on the basis of Marxism-Leninism; development of inner-Party democracy, the principle of collective leadership and other Leninist standards of Party life; education and ideological tempering of the Party cadres and of all members of the Party; strengthening of ties with brother Communist and Workers’ Parties, based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, of proletarian internationalism.

Comprehensively elaborated in theory and tested in practice, all this can now be drawn upon, in their struggle for socialism, by the peoples of different countries who are at various stages of social development, with due regard, of course, to the specific national features of each country. The experience of the Soviet Union and the people’s democracies has fully borne out the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the decisive role of the Communist Party in establishing and developing a socialist society, and of the increased significance of its leadership in the period of the full-scale construction of communism.

Thus, as a result of the theoretical work and practical struggle of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which won the leadership of the working class and the mass of the people and based itself on the objective laws of social development, mankind has acquired the first socialist society in history, and together with this the science of building socialism, a science tested in practice. The Soviet people, led by the Communist Party, has opened the highroad to socialism for the whole world. This road is being followed by many peoples, and will sooner or later be taken by all the peoples of the world.

Today the Soviet people, led by the Communist Party, are engaged in the full-scale construction of communist society and are blazing the trail to communism for mankind. In the new conditions, the Party has set excellent examples for a genuine Marxist-Leninist attitude to revolutionary theory, and has enriched Marxism-Leninism with new important theoretical deductions and propositions. This has found its fullest embodiment in the new Programme of the C.P.S.U., which substantiates the construction of communism in the Soviet Union from the philosophical, economic and political points of view. The Programme of the C.P.S.U. is recognised by all the fraternal Marxist-Leninist Parties to be the Communist Manifesto of the modern epoch, a vast treasure-house of Marxism-Leninism, and an important stage of its development in present conditions.

The documents of the Twentieth, Twenty-First and Twenty-Second congresses and the Programme of the C.P.S.U. provide creative solutions for all the main problems of communist construction and for urgent problems of the world revolutionary movement. Among them are the problems of the development of the dictatorship of the working class into a state of the whole people, and of its fortunes
under communism; of the objective laws of the development of socialism into communism; of the ways of providing the material and technical basis for communism; of the formation of communist social relations and the education of the new man; of the increased leading role of the Party during the transition to communism, of the character of the present epoch; of the diverse forms of transition from capitalism to socialism; of the possibility of preventing world war in our time, etc. The theoretical elaboration of the problems involved in building the first communist society in history serves the Party and the Soviet people as a guide to action.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, true to the principle of proletarian internationalism, has consistently discharged its obligations towards the working class and the liberation movement of the peoples of other countries, and has done everything possible to secure the triumph of the ideas of socialism. During the Second World War the Soviet Union played the decisive part in securing victory for the anti-Hitlerite coalition and in delivering the peoples from the fascist yoke. The Soviet people, under the leadership of the Party, helped the peoples of South-East and Central Europe, as well as of China, Korea and Vietnam, in their struggle against German and Japanese occupation; and later it assisted them in establishing and consolidating the system of people's democracy in their countries. The Party regards communist construction in the U.S.S.R. as a great internationalist task of the Soviet people that accords with the interests of the entire world socialist system and the world revolutionary movement.

As a result of the victory of the working class over the exploiting classes, and on the basis of the combined efforts and fraternal cooperation of the states which have taken the path of socialism, a world socialist system that embraces one-third of mankind has come into being. The world socialist system is advancing confidently to a decisive victory in the economic competition with capitalism. Its influence on the course of social development is growing steadily. The Communist Party as it guides the Soviet Union, the core of the socialist system, spares no effort to help accomplish the great and historic task of further strengthening and advancing the world system of socialism. The C.P.S.U. is the standard-bearer of peace and friendship among the peoples of all countries.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has always been guided by the revolutionary theory of Marxism-Leninism. It has defended Marxist theory against the attacks of its enemies, overt and covert, against opportunists of every hue, and has developed this theory further. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, the founder of the Communist Party, enriched the theory of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels in every respect and raised it to a new, higher level. Leninism is the continuation and creative development of Marxism; it is Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, of the era of socialist and
communist construction in the U.S.S.R., of the rise and development of the world socialist system, of the era of the transition of human society from capitalism to communism.

Marxism-Leninism is the banner under which the Great October Revolution achieved victory, a socialist society was built and the world system of socialism founded. Marxism-Leninism is the banner under which millions of workmen and other working people in all countries are today waging their struggle.

The faithful disciples and followers of Marx, Engels and Lenin have ever upheld their great teachings, and have developed them further in keeping with the new, present-day conditions of the struggle for the building of socialism and communism, for the interests of the world proletariat and for the national liberation of the peoples.

In the course of the preparations for and during the revolution in Russia, the Communist Party waged a stubborn and uncompromising struggle against the hostile political parties and groups active in the country—the Economists, the Mensheviks—the main variety of opportunism in the working-class movement in Russia—the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the anarchists, and also against the monarchists, the Cadets (Constitutional Democrats) and the bourgeois-nationalist parties.

After testing all the political parties by their own experience, the working class, the masses of the people, became firmly convinced that the Communist Party was the genuine representative of their interests, and the sole party that could lead them.

Within the Party itself, a prolonged and bitter struggle was waged against various anti-Leninist groups—the Trotskyists, the "Workers' Opposition", the "Democratic Centralism" group, the Trotskyist-Zinovievite bloc, the Right opportunists, and nationalist and other groups.

Political victory over all hostile parties and anti-Leninist groups and their ideological defeat, were essential for the victory of the socialist revolution and for the building of socialism in the U.S.S.R.

The history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union falls into two main periods. The first period covers the Party's struggle to overthrow the tsarist autocracy and the capitalist system and to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the second period the Party is in power, directing the struggle for the building of socialism and communism in the Soviet Union. The tasks of the Party, its strategy and tactics, and the forms in which its activities were organised, varied in accordance with these periods.

The study of the history of the C.P.S.U., of the victorious path it has travelled, and of the theory of Marxism-Leninism arms the working people with a knowledge of the laws of social development, the laws of the class struggle and of the motive forces of revolution, with a knowledge of the laws governing the building of socialist society and of communism.
The study of the history of the Party inspires Communists and all Soviet people with pride in their great Party and in its epoch-making victories, with a desire to be worthy of their Party and their country in every way. It helps them to apply the rich experience of the Party in solving new problems, and engenders the creative energy required for building communism.

The history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which has achieved epoch-making victories of socialism over capitalism, undermined the roots of the world imperialist system and ensured the triumph of Marxism-Leninism, inspires the Communists of other countries with pride in their victorious brother Party and strengthens the faith of the working people of the whole world in the victory of socialism. The study of the history of the Party helps to master Marxism-Leninism and assimilate the experience of the struggle to overthrow the exploiters' tyranny and to build communism.

Mankind will everlastingly look to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, under whose leadership the working people overthrew the exploiting classes and began a new epoch of world history, the epoch of building the happiest society, communism. It will always turn to the heroic record of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and admire the great achievements of the Soviet people in building the first communist society in history.

* * *

This book gives a concise outline of the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The first edition of this textbook was discussed at numerous meetings of teachers, propagandists and research workers engaged in the field of Party history. In preparing this edition, use was made of the materials of the Twenty-Second Congress of the C.P.S.U. and new materials derived from the Party archives; furthermore, the suggestions and criticisms made in discussing the textbook were taken into account. The rise and development of the Stalin personality cult, the enormous damage it caused to the Party and the country, and the Party's determined struggle to eliminate its effects are dealt with in greater detail. This led to the inclusion of additional data and new facts in the textbook.
CHAPTER ONE

BEGINNING
OF THE WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT
AND THE SPREAD OF MARXISM IN RUSSIA

(1883-1894)

1. Development of Capitalism and the Conditions of the Masses in Russia in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century

In the second half of the nineteenth century Russia underwent striking changes which at the beginning of the twentieth century brought its working class to the forefront of the struggle of the world proletariat and the world revolutionary movement as a whole. As late as the middle of the last century, tsarist Russia was one of the particularly backward countries of Europe. Capitalism began to develop there comparatively late. In the Russia of that period there existed serfdom, under which the peasant could be bought and sold like chattel. The productivity of the forced labour of the serfs was low, and agriculture based on such labour was extremely backward. There could be no real development of industry, which needed a free labour force and a home market. The development of capitalist commodity relations made the abolition of serfdom imperative, but the serfowning landlords stubbornly resisted this step.

The rottenness of the serf system and its damaging effect on the country became increasingly evident. This was revealed all the more glaringly by the Crimean War (1853-56). In 1861 economic necessity and the menace which stemmed from mounting peasant unrest compelled the tsarist government to abolish serfdom.

After the fall of serfdom the development of capitalism in Russia proceeded fairly rapidly, primarily in industry. Between 1866 and 1890, the number of factories was more than doubled, growing from 2,500-3,000 to 6,000. Machines were gradually superseding manual labour. The eighties saw the completion of the industrial revolution. What were in those days very large factories, equipped with machines and employing thousands of workers, made their appearance. By 1890 big enterprises, employing more than 100 workers each, comprised less than 7 per cent of all enterprises, but they produced more
than 50 per cent of the total industrial output. The length of the railways increased more than sevenfold, from under 2,500 to over 18,000 miles. The large cities, centres of economic, political and cultural life, began to grow rapidly. New industrial regions came into being: the Donets coalfield and the Baku oil area. All these changes took place in the course of a quarter of a century, during the life-time of a single generation.

The development of capitalism produced radical changes in the class composition of the population. Under serfdom there were two principal classes in Russia—the landlords and the peasants. With the development of capitalism, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat entered the arena of social life. The bourgeoisie, which had already come into being in the period of serfdom, grew rapidly, amassing wealth and acquiring great economic power.

The rise and development of large-scale capitalist industrial production was attended by the appearance and growth of a modern industrial proletariat. In 1890 the number of workers employed in the large factories alone, in the mining industry and on the railways had grown to 1,432,000 or double what it was in 1865. Nearly half the industrial workers (48.3 per cent) were concentrated in the bigger enterprises, each employing 500 workers or more. Factory workers constituted the backbone of the huge army of wage-labour. Altogether, according to Lenin's estimates, at the end of the nineteenth century there were in Russia about 10 million wage-workers employed in industry, on the railways, in agriculture, building, lumbering, navvyng, and so on.

The rise of large-scale machine industry and of an industrial proletariat was a progressive development; but Russia's transformation into a capitalist country was achieved, as everywhere else, through the intensified exploitation of the working people. The statistics showing the increased number of factories, the building of railways and the increased number of workers, concealed the misery of the people, their tears and blood. What made the conditions of the masses all the more unbearable was the fact that capitalist exploitation was combined with survivals of feudal oppression.

Serfdom was abolished in such a way as to preserve the privileges and the power of the serfowning landlords. In the process of their "emancipation", the peasants were robbed in the most unscrupulous manner. More than one-fifth of the land previously cultivated by them for their own benefit the landlords cut off for themselves, seizing the best tracts as they did so. These cut-off portions of land were called by the peasants _otrezki_ (cuts). The tsarist authorities forced the peasants to pay exorbitant redemption prices for the rest of the land. Not surprisingly, the peasants reacted to their "emancipation" by mass actions, which were brutally suppressed by the tsarist authorities. Almost half a century after their "emancipation" the peasants were still paying off the landlords for their own land, land drenched
with their sweat and blood. It was only under pressure of the revolution that the tsarist government abolished redemption payments in 1907.

The landlords retained vast estates and power. The first and biggest landlord was the tsar. In European Russia the imperial family alone owned nearly 19 million acres of land, which was more than the holdings of half a million peasant families. In the late seventies the landed nobility owned more than 197 million out of a total of 247 million acres of privately-owned land. The big landed estates formed the basis for semi-feudal exploitation. The peasants were compelled to rent land from the landlords on terms which put a noose round their necks: to cultivate the landlord’s land with their own implements and horses, to give up one half of their crops to the landlord. The existence of otrabotki (labour service), ispolu work (share-cropping) and redemption payments meant that survivals of serfdom were still strong in the countryside.

Capitalism was developing not only in the towns, but also in the countryside. Peasant farming turned more and more from natural economy to commodity production, and became ever more dependent upon the market. Competition was growing, the renting and purchase of land began to spread, and agricultural production was increasingly becoming concentrated in the hands of the more prosperous peasants. Under the influence of capitalism differentiation proceeded among the peasantry; there were emerging the kulaks (rural bourgeoisie) and the peasant poor (rural proletarians and semi-proletarians, as Lenin called them). By the end of the nineteenth century, of the 10 million peasant households in the country, approximately 6.5 million were poor-peasant, 2 million middle-peasant and 1.5 million kulak households.

The landlords and the kulaks bled the peasants white, dooming them to poverty and extinction. Crop failure and famine were frequent visitations upon the countryside. About 40 million peasants were affected by the terrible famine of 1891. Poverty drove the peasants from their native villages in search of a livelihood. By the end of the nineties five or six million peasants left the countryside every year. A large proportion of them settled in the cities permanently—they went to work in the factories and became workmen.

The peasant’s lot was a bitter one. Incredibly hard, too, were the conditions of the workers, who were entirely at the mercy of the capitalists and the tsarist authorities. The working day was not less than 12-13 hours, and as much as 15-16 hours in the textile mills. There was no labour protection at all. The terms of employment were of the hardest. The beggarly wages paid afforded no more than a bare subsistence. And even these miserly wages were cut in every possible way. The workers were cheated, wages were paid irregularly, at the employer’s discretion. Workers were compelled to buy foodstuffs on credit in company stores and to pay exorbitant prices for stale goods.
They were especially plagued by fines, which were imposed on any pretext and often swallowed up as much as one-third, or even 40 per cent, of wages. Female and child labour was widely employed. Although women and children worked the same hours as men, they were paid much less.

Most of the workers lived in factory-owned barracks, in common "dormitories" with double- or triple-decker berths. Three or four families huddled together in the corners of a small room. Miners as a rule lived in hovels or dugouts. Back-breaking toil and poverty bred disease on a mass scale. They led to the rapid exhaustion and early death of workers and to high child mortality.

The survivals of serfdom were particularly evident in the country's social and political life. Politically, Russia was an absolute monarchy, that is, full and undivided power was vested in the tsar, who decreed laws and appointed ministers and officials at his own discretion, levied taxes and spent the people's money entirely uncontrolled. The tsarist monarchy was in effect a dictatorship of the feudal landlords, who had all the political rights, enjoyed all the privileges, held all the important posts in the state and received huge subsidies out of the people's money. The tsarist government supported the big manufacturers and financial magnates. The people in Russia had no political rights whatever. They were denied freedom to assemble, to voice their opinions and present their demands, freedom to form unions and organisations, freedom to publish newspapers, magazines and books. A veritable army of gendarmes, secret police, jailers, constables, village police of different kinds and zemsky nachalniks (rural superintendents)\(^1\) protected the tsar, the landlords and the capitalists from the people.

The Church zealously served the exploiting system. By the beginning of the twentieth century Russia numbered almost 69,000 Orthodox churches, 110,000 priests and 58,000 monks. Besides, there were tens of thousands of Catholic, Protestant, Moslem, Hebrew, Buddhist and other priests. This vast army vigorously peddled the opium of religion, calling on the working people to submit to the tsarist authorities.

The autocracy feared lest the spread of knowledge should make the people insubmissive. It therefore kept the people in darkness and ignorance. The Ministry of Public Education was in fact a department for befogging the minds of the people. The annual allocations for schools were paltry, amounting to only 80 kopeks a year per person. "Cook's children", as young people of working-class and peasant origin were contemptuously called, were kept out of the secondary schools and universities. Nearly four-fifths of Russia's population were illiterate. Tsarism doomed the people not only to material, but also to intellectual poverty.

Tsarist Russia was a prison of the peoples. The exploiting classes, together with tsarism and its entire machinery of state, were respon-
sible for national oppression in Russia. The non-Russian peoples, who constituted the bulk of the population (57 per cent), were denied all rights; they were mercilessly exploited, and suffered countless humiliations and insults. Tsarist officials administered arbitrary justice and meted out punishment. The national culture of the non-Russian peoples was savagely persecuted. Many peoples were forbidden to publish newspapers and books and to instruct their children in their native language. The population in the eastern areas was totally illiterate. The government deliberately fomented national enmity, officially referred to the non-Russian peoples as “aliens”, and tried to foster in the Russians a contemptuous attitude towards these peoples as supposedly inferior races. The tsarist authorities incited one nation against another. They engineered Jewish pogroms and provoked Armenians and Azerbaijanians to massacre each other.

The survivals of serfdom hindered the country’s progress. At the end of the nineteenth century about five-sixths of the population were engaged in agriculture, with inefficient small-scale peasant farming predominating. Notwithstanding the development of capitalism in Russia, she remained an economically backward agrarian country.

An approximate idea of Russia’s class composition at that time is provided by the figures of the 1897 census. Altogether Russia had a population of 125.6 million. Of these the bulk were peasants, two-thirds of whom were poor peasants. Workmen and their families made up almost one-fifth of the population. Approximately as many belonged to the well-to-do strata: the kulaks, owners of small enterprises, bourgeois intellectuals, officials, etc. The big bourgeoisie, landlords and high officials accounted for about two per cent.

The exploited masses of the workers, poor and middle peasants and artisans made up nearly four-fifths of the population. And this vast majority of the people was oppressed and enslaved by a handful of landlords and capitalists, who had a faithful guardian in the tsarist government. The millions of indigent and enslaved working folk of town and country represented a powerful revolutionary force. But this force had to be organised and politically enlightened; it had to be given a clear understanding of its own interests and of the ways of fighting for its freedom from oppression; it had to be rallied around the working class.

The abolition of serfdom did not eliminate the contradictions between peasants and landlords. On the other hand, contradictions developed between workers and capitalists, and discord between the rural poor and the kulaks grew in intensity. The development of capitalism aggravated all the class contradictions in Russia. The working masses suffered both from capitalist exploitation and from remnants of the yoke of serfdom. The interests of the people and of all social development demanded, first and foremost, the abolition of the survivals of serfdom and the overthrow of the tsarist monarchy.
At the end of the nineteenth century Russia was no longer what it had been before 1861. Here is how Lenin described the processes at work in Russia at that time:

“Capitalist Russia was advancing to replace feudal Russia. The settled, downtrodden serf peasant who stuck firmly to his village, had implicit faith in the priests and stood in awe of the ‘authorities’ was gradually giving way to a new generation of peasants, peasants who had worked as seasonal labourers in the cities and had learned something from their bitter experience of a life of wandering and wage-labour. The number of workers in the big towns, in the factories, was constantly on the increase. Gradually the workers began to form associations for their common struggle against the capitalists and the government. By waging this struggle the Russian working class helped the peasant millions to rise, straighten their backs and cast off serf habits” (*Collected Works*, Vol. 17, p. 89).*

These processes fostered the revolutionary movement in Russia.

2. The Revolutionary-Democratic Movement. The First Workers’ Organisations

The revolutionary movement in Russia has a rich and heroic history. The yoke of serfdom, which doomed the people to grinding toil and poverty, and stifled all that was alive in the country, roused discontent and protest among the masses. These sentiments flared up in revolts and disturbances. Revolutionary thought in Russia had its roots in the struggle of the peasant masses against serfdom. Already in the period of serfdom, in the forties and fifties of the nineteenth century, the rich soil of the class struggle nurtured the great revolutionary democrats V. G. Belinsky, A. I. Herzen, N. A. Dobrolyubov and N. G. Chernyshevsky. Their work was permeated with a deep hatred of all the manifestations of serfdom in Russia’s social life, and was dedicated to the ardent advocacy of progressive development of the country. They fought selflessly for the interests of the working people, and played an outstanding part in the emancipation movement of the peoples of Russia.

Their influence was instrumental in moulding the characters of T. Shevchenko, Z. Sierakowski, K. Kalinovsky, A. Mackevičius, M. Nalbandyan and other fiery revolutionaries. A particularly strong influence was exerted on advanced men and women in the latter half of the nineteenth century by N. G. Chernyshevsky, leader of the

* All references to Volumes 1-14 and 17 of Lenin’s *Collected Works* are given according to English edition. Quotations from the other volumes refer to the 4th Russian edition. All the other references are given according to Russian editions unless otherwise specified.—Trans.
Russian revolutionary democrats and the most outstanding revolutionary thinker of the pre-Marxist period.

The revolutionary democrats persistently sought for a sound theory, as the instrument for the emancipation of the people from the autocracy, from exploitation. They rightly thought the people to be the principal motive force of social development. But they did not see, nor could they have seen at that time, the historic role of the working class, the only class capable of transforming society.

The revolutionary democrats were ideologists of the peasant revolution. They regarded militant democracy and utopian socialism as being one inseparable whole. All over Europe protest against social oppression at first gave rise to utopian socialist doctrines. The utopian socialists condemned capitalism and dreamed of a better social system, but they could not show the real way out, because they did not see the social force that could become the builder of the new society, a society free from the exploitation of man by man. The utopian socialists of Russia, unlike the West European utopians, advocated the transformation of the country through a peasant revolution; they dreamed of a transition to socialism through the peasant commune. The village commune which existed in pre-revolutionary Russia was based on common ownership of the land. Individual peasant households received land for temporary use; the land was periodically redistributed on an equalitarian basis. And it was this village commune that the utopian socialists mistakenly regarded as the embryo of socialism.

After the fall of serfdom the revolutionary movement in Russia grew stronger. The Narodniks played the chief role in the movement. The name “Narodnik” (from the Russian word narod, the people) owes its origin to the fact that the revolutionaries of the time declared their mission to be the defence of the people, of the people’s interests. Narodism was a widespread social movement with different trends and shades. In the seventies the main trends of revolutionary Narodism were represented by M. A. Bakunin, P. L. Lavrov and P. N. Tkachov; but all the Narodniks held the same views on Russia’s development. They were ideologists of a peasant democracy; they believed that the Russian way of life was a special one, and saw in the village commune the starting-point for socialist development of the country. They idealised the peasant. Hence their belief in the possibility of a peasant socialist revolution in Russia. They were inspired by this idea, which roused them to a heroic and selfless struggle against the tsarist autocracy and the tyranny of the landlords. Among the Narodniks were such outstanding revolutionaries as A. I. Zhelyabov, I. N. Myshkin and S. L. Perovskaya. The tsarist hangmen dealt ruthlessly with the revolutionary Narodniks, hanged them, left them to rot in prison dungeons or made them suffer the horrors of penal servitude. The revolutionary Narodniks did not understand the historic role of the proletariat, but some of them were
the first people in the history of the Russian emancipation movement to begin propaganda among the factory workers. Lenin, who showed the complicated and contradictory nature of Narodism, spoke highly of its revolutionary peasant democratic spirit and its call to revolution.

The Narodism of the seventies played an important part in the development of the revolutionary movement in Russia. But the course chosen by the Narodniki for their struggle, and especially their theory, were profoundly erroneous. Although the Narodniki were influenced by N. G. Chernyshevsky, their views on many questions were a step back. They were far from holding materialist views. Many Narodniki were guided by the erroneous theory of active “heroes” and the passive “crowd”. According to this theory, history is made by outstanding individuals, who are obediently followed by the masses, the people, the “crowd”. Erroneous views on the peasant commune as the basis for socialist development of the country became especially harmful in the new historical conditions, when capitalism began to develop in Russia and an industrial proletariat appeared. But the Narodniki failed to understand these new conditions. They asserted that capitalism in Russia was an “accidental phenomenon”, and therefore denied the leading, revolutionary role of the working class in the development of society.

In 1874 the Narodniki made a heroic attempt to put their ideas into practice. Advanced, revolutionary-minded intellectuals, above all students, “went among the people”, to the countryside, in the hope of rousing the peasants to a revolution against the tsarist autocracy and effecting an immediate transition to socialism. But reality proved the utter fallacy of the Narodnik ideas about the peasant’s “communist instincts”. The peasants were mistrustful of the preachings of the Narodniki, which they did not understand. The tsarist authorities arrested the revolutionaries by the hundred. The unsuccessful “going among the people” did not however undermine the Narodnik illusions all at once. A Narodnik organisation, Zemlya i Volya (Land and Freedom), was formed at the end of 1876. It sent its supporters into the countryside to settle permanently there, in the hope of winning the confidence of the peasants and rousing them to revolution. But the Narodniki were no more successful here. Disputes over methods of continuing the struggle grew ever sharper.

In 1879 Zemlya i Volya split up. A minority among the Narodniki clung to their old position: they rejected the struggle for political freedom, considering that such a struggle could only benefit the bourgeoisie. They preached redistribution of all the land, the landlords’ estates included, among the peasants, and set up an organisation known as the Chorny Peredel (General Redistribution).

The majority of the Narodniki founded their own organisation, the Narodnaya Volya (People’s Will). The Narodnaya Volya took a step forward by engaging in political struggle against the tsarist autocr-
racy. However, the members of the Narodnaya Volya regarded the political struggle not as a struggle of the masses, but as a conspiracy by a small organisation of revolutionaries to overthrow the tsarist autocracy and seize power. They chose as their method of struggle individual terrorism, that is, the assassination of individual representatives of the tsarist autocracy and of the tsar himself, hoping to seize power by frightening and disorganising the government. Marx, Engels and Lenin saw the chief merit of the Narodnaya Volya in its selfless struggle against serfdom and the autocracy. But as the mass struggle developed, the tactics of terrorist acts injured the revolutionary movement more and more, for they fettered the activity of the masses.

Narodism doomed the revolutionary movement to defeat. Their erroneous theory directed the Narodniks along the wrong path. They did not see the historical force which was to take the lead of the struggle of the masses against the landlords and the bourgeoisie, and to bring it to victory. That force was the working class.

Rapacious exploitation and complete denial of political rights roused the protest of the workers. Disturbances and strikes took place already in the sixties. Their number increased in the seventies. According to incomplete data, there were 326 strikes and disturbances among workmen in ten years (1870-79). But they were, as yet, only the spontaneous acts of people driven to despair, of people who, though they did not yet know why they were suffering such hardships or what they should be striving for, were looking for a way out of their intolerable situation.

But the spontaneous struggle of the workers was a rudimentary manifestation of class consciousness: in the course of the struggle the workers were beginning to realise that the existing social system which oppressed them was not something permanent; they would no longer bear everything with servile submissiveness; they were becoming aware of the need for a common stand against their oppressors. In the course of the struggle there began to emerge from the mass of the workers more advanced and class-conscious workmen, who were becoming revolutionaries.

The Narodniki held undivided sway in the revolutionary movement of that time, and the revolutionary workers fell under their influence and joined them. But the more advanced workers were eagerly acquiring knowledge. They avidly sought for the root causes of the workers’ miseries and ways of setting them free. They already had some idea of the First International and of the activities of the European working-class parties. The first writings of Marx and Engels translated into the Russian began to reach them. They were contemporaries of the Paris Commune. The revolutionary worker pondered a great deal over the lessons of the mass actions of the Russian proletariat. He could no longer be satisfied with the Narodnik teachings, which assigned to the workers an auxiliary role in the
revolution. The foremost workers were trying to find their own ways of struggle, to create an independent organisation.

The first organisation of this kind was the South Russian Workers’ Union, formed in Odessa in 1875 by Y. O. Zaslavsky, a revolutionary intellectual. The Union had a membership of about 200 workers. It had supporters in Rostov-on-Don, Kharkov, Orel and Taganrog. The Union existed for about a year and was then broken up by the tsarist police. The aim of the South Russian Workers’ Union was “to propagate the idea of emancipating the workers from the yoke of capitalism and the privileged classes”, and to unite the workers for “the future struggle against the existing economic and political system”. The influence of Narodism, was still felt in the Union. It found expression, for example, in a decision to organise settlements in the countryside for work among the peasants. The historic service rendered by the Union lay in the fact that it spread in the working-class movement the idea of political struggle, and established an independent organisation of the proletariat.

In the mid-seventies the advanced workers of St. Petersburg also proceeded to form their own organisation, which took final shape in 1878 as the North Russian Workers’ Union. Its founders were Victor Obnorsky and Stepan Khalturin, outstanding working-class revolutionaries. The appearance of this Union was another important step in the development of the working-class movement. Its programme proclaimed the idea of the international class solidarity of the proletariat and stated that “in its aims it stands close to the Social-Democratic parties of the West”. The ultimate aim of the Union was “the overthrow of the existing political and economic system of the state as extremely unjust”. Its immediate aim was to win political liberty. The influence of Narodism was still felt in the programme of this Union, which saw the peasant commune as a factor of socialism.

The membership of the Northern Union was about 200 workers. It took part in several strikes, issued leaflets and introduced an element of organisation into the struggle. The Union enjoyed great prestige among the workers. It was broken up by the gendarmes in 1879-80, but the cause for which it fought was not lost. “And so, the final decision rests with you, workers. On you depends the fate of the great Union and the success of the social revolution in Russia”—this impassioned appeal in the programme of the Union found a response among the foremost workers.

The Russian working class gradually began to set itself broad political tasks, to develop splendid militant, revolutionary qualities in the course of its struggle, to advance outstanding revolutionary leaders. The words of the Moscow weaver Pyotr Alexeyev at his trial in 1877 about the historic role of the Russian working class rang like a prophecy: “The muscular arm of millions of working men will be lifted and the yoke of despotism, guarded by soldiers’ bayonets,
will be smashed to atoms!" The first class organisations of the proletariat arose. But they were merely the initial steps of the working-class movement along its independent course. It required great effort on the part of the foremost workers to rid themselves of the dead weight of Narodnik ideas. A striking case in point is S. Khalturin. After the Northern Union had been broken up, he gave up systematic work among the masses to fight against the autocracy by the erroneous method of individual terrorism. The proletarian stream was still unable to break away from the general current of Narodism.

In order to emerge as an independent force from the general democratic movement the working class had to draw a distinct line of demarcation between itself and the other classes, to determine its own position ideologically and politically. To this end the working-class movement needed to overcome the petty-bourgeois ideology of Narodism and adopt Marxism as the real ideology of the proletariat.

Marx and Engels, the great teachers of the proletariat, accomplished a most radical revolution in science in the middle of the nineteenth century. They converted socialism from a utopia into a science. They made a study of capitalism, discovered the laws of its development and proved scientifically that capitalism was historically transient, just as the feudal order had been before it, and that capitalism itself prepares the conditions for its destruction. They showed that the development of capitalism is attended by concentration of the means of production: small and medium enterprises are continually being ousted and swallowed up by the big ones. Labour and production acquire an increasingly social character, but the product of social labour is appropriated by a handful of capitalists because they own the means of production. Thus capitalism itself creates the material prerequisite for the establishment of socialism—large-scale production. If the capitalist mode of production is to be replaced by the socialist mode, the means of production have to be converted from the private property of the capitalist class into the property of society as a whole.

But the dominant exploiting classes will not voluntarily relinquish their property, privileges and power. A social force is needed which is capable of sweeping away the old, exploiting society and creating a new society free of exploitation. Such a social force is the proletariat, the modern working class. Marx and Engels showed the historic role of the working class as the grave-digger of capitalism and the builder of a new, communist society. Capitalism itself calls into existence the proletarians, people deprived of the means of production and obliged to sell their labour power in order to subsist. The proletariat grows and develops along with the growth of capitalism. It occupies a special position in capitalist society, as compared with the rest of the working people. The working class has no property in the means of production; it is not in the least interested in preserving a social system based on exploitation; it has nothing to lose in
a revolution but its chains. Joint work at the big factories in the large cities brings the workers together in masses, disciplines and unites them, teaches them to take common action. At every step the workers encounter their chief enemy, the capitalist class. The struggle between the workers and the capitalists grows ever sharper. Being the most oppressed class of capitalist society, the proletariat is interested in the radical reorganisation of society as a whole, in the complete abolition of private property, poverty and oppression. It cannot emancipate itself without at the same time freeing the remaining mass of the working people from all exploitation. It follows that the working class expresses and effectively defends the vital interests of all working people. The proletariat is therefore the most revolutionary, the most advanced class of society.

Marx and Engels proved scientifically that the development of capitalist society and the class struggle within it will inevitably lead to the downfall of capitalism and the victory of the proletariat. This victory will be won in decisive and uncompromising struggle against capitalism. In order to convert capitalist property into social property and to replace capitalist by socialist relations of production, the working class, taking the lead of all the oppressed, will have to carry out a socialist revolution and establish its political supremacy, the dictatorship of the proletariat, to suppress the resistance of the exploiters and to build a new, socialist society.

Marx and Engels taught that the strength of the working class lies in its organisation and class consciousness, in its having a clear understanding of its aims and tasks and of the ways and means of struggle. In order to be victorious, the working-class movement must be armed with the theory of scientific socialism. Marx and Engels thus proved the need for fusing socialism with the working-class movement, for only if they are fused does the class struggle of the workers become a conscious struggle of the proletariat for its emancipation from capitalist exploitation. The fusion of socialism with the working-class movement is effected by the party of the working class which represents, not the particular interests of individual groups of workers united according to occupation or nationality, but the common interests of the proletariat as a whole. The party must point out to the working-class movement its political tasks and ultimate goal. Consequently, in order to overthrow capitalism and build communism, the proletariat must have its own independent party, a Communist party.

Marxism was an influential force in the West European working-class movement of the seventies. This fact exerted a certain influence upon the revolutionary movement in Russia. The founders of scientific communism, Marx and Engels, were in contact with many Russian revolutionaries. They watched developments in Russia with unabating interest; they were deeply convinced of the world-wide impact of the coming Russian revolution, and they studied the
Russian language in order to have a better knowledge of the country and its people. Marx and Engels struck the first blows against the Narodnik theory. In his work, *On Social Relations in Russia*, written in close collaboration with Marx, Engels criticised the basic tenets of Narodism—the conception of the special lines along which Russia must develop, the denial of the development of capitalism in Russia, the idealisation of the peasant commune, and failure to understand the bourgeois character of the coming Russian revolution.

Progressive Russians became acquainted with some of the writings of Marx and Engels as early as the forties and fifties, but it was only in the seventies that the writings of the founders of Marxism began to circulate among the Russian revolutionaries. Of special significance was the legal publication, in 1872, of a Russian translation of Volume I of *Capital*, actually the world’s first translation of this fundamental work of Karl Marx.

“Almost immediately after the appearance of *Capital,*” wrote Lenin, “the destiny of capitalism in Russia’ became the principal theoretical problem for Russian socialists; the most heated debates raged around this problem, and the most important points of programme were decided in accordance with it” (*Collected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 267).

Thus, at a time when Narodism still held full sway in the revolutionary movement, the entire course of development of revolutionary thought and of the working-class movement had already prepared the ground for the appearance of Marxism in Russia. But for Marxism to spread and triumph in the Russian revolutionary movement, Narodnik views had to be overcome and ideologically defeated.


A revolutionary situation developed in Russia in 1879-80. The conditions of the masses had grown worse after the Reform of 1861. Their resentment was mounting against brutal oppression and utter lack of civil rights. According to very incomplete data, in 1877 peasant disturbances broke out in 11 gubernias.* and in 1880 they spread to as many as 34 gubernias of European Russia. The working-class movement was also growing. Big strikes occurred in St. Petersburg in the late seventies. The revolutionary struggle against tsarism assumed an unprecedented scale. Fear of revolution grew in the dominant

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*Administrative divisions*: the biggest territorial division in tsarist Russia was the *gubernia* (literally—governor's province); each gubernia had its capital city which was the seat of the governor. The gubernia was divided into *uyezds* (counties), each with its administrative centre and these in turn were divided into *volosts* (rural districts) containing a number of villages.—*Ed.*
class, the landlords. The ruling clique began to dash from pillar to post, now intensifying police terror, now promising a constitution.

However, the workers and peasants were not yet mature enough to overthrow the tsarist autocracy by bold and resolute mass action. The peasantry could do no more than rise in isolated spontaneous revolts, while the proletariat was taking only its first steps in the revolutionary struggle. The bourgeoisie behaved in a cowardly manner; it humbly begged the tsarist government for petty reforms and in effect helped to bolster up the autocracy. There was no revolutionary party connected with the masses and equipped with the right revolutionary theory, a party capable of appraising the situation properly and advancing scientifically substantiated watchwords for the struggle. As for the Narodnaya Volya, its members had chosen the profoundly erroneous course of individual terrorism. On March 1, 1881, they succeeded in assassinating Tsar Alexander II. But he was succeeded on the throne by Alexander III. The change of tsars did not alter the political and social system, while the autocratic regime intensified its oppression of the masses. The tsarist government took the offensive. Isolated from the people, the Narodnaya Volya was broken up. The tide of revolution began to ebb.

This defeat provoked a deep ideological crisis in Narodism. Some of the Narodniki tried in vain to revive the Narodnaya Volya organisation. Most of them, however, abandoned the revolutionary struggle altogether. Those revolutionaries who did not want to give up the struggle were confronted with a number of questions: Why did not the assassination of the tsar lead to a revolution in Russia? What were the prospects of the revolutionary movement? Where was the real force that could bring about socialism? What should be the ways and methods of revolutionary struggle? It was only natural that the revolutionaries should continue their search for a new revolutionary theory with still greater energy. They were impelled primarily by disillusionment in Narodism. The development of the working-class movement in Russia and the successes of the West European proletariat had a considerable influence on revolutionary thought.

A small group of revolutionary Narodniki, the General Redistributionists, who had been compelled to emigrate, began to make a careful study of Marxism and the West European working-class movement. Its members pondered seriously over the significance of the workers' strikes in Russia and, in particular, over the lessons of their own work among the advanced Russian proletarians. On September 25, 1883, the group issued a statement of programme, announcing its final break with Narodism and proclaiming the need to organise a separate party of the Russian working class. It declared as its principal aims to disseminate Marxism, to criticise Narodism, still prevalent among the revolutionaries, and to work out the crucial problems of Russian social life from the standpoint of Marxism and
of the interests of Russia's working people. Thus there arose the first Russian Marxist organisation, the Emancipation of Labour group. Its members were G. V. Plekhanov, P. B. Axelrod, L. G. Deich, V. I. Zasulich and V. N. Ignatov. The founder and leader of the group was G. V. Plekhanov, a talented theoretician and propagandist of Marxism.

The Emancipation of Labour group accordingly began to disseminate Marxism in Russia. With this end in view, the group translated into Russian, published and secretly circulated in Russia a number of writings by Marx and Engels: *The Communist Manifesto, Wage-Labour and Capital, The Poverty of Philosophy, Ludwig Feuerbach, Development of Scientific Socialism, Address on Free Trade, Frederick Engels on Russia (On Social Relations in Russia)*. Marx and Engels prepared special prefaces to some of the Russian translations of their writings. Plekhanov wrote many books and articles in which he brilliantly expounded and defended Marxism. In Plekhanov's writings the Russian revolutionaries found the answers to many of the questions that had troubled them. His works of that period played an important part in educating the first generation of Russian Marxists.

The first work of the Russian Marxists was Plekhanov's pamphlet *Socialism and the Political Struggle* published in the autumn of 1883. On the basis of an analysis of the Russian revolutionary movement, Plekhanov showed the profound vitality of Marx's proposition that every class struggle is a political struggle. Far from contradicting each other, socialism and the political struggle are inseparable; they must be closely linked, fused into one. The way to socialism lies through the political struggle of the working class, through the conquest of political power by the proletariat. The revolutionary movement in Russia will lead to the fusion of socialism with the working-class movement, and that will make it invincible.

To disprove the Narodnik theory, it was necessary to make a study of the economic processes at work in Russia, which were little known at that time. Plekhanov's book, *Our Differences*, published in 1885, was the first attempt to give a Marxist analysis of Russia's economy.

Plekhanov refuted the views of the Narodniki, who asserted that capitalism was an "accidental phenomenon" in Russia because conditions for its development were lacking, and in general saw capitalism in Russia as a process of decline and retrogression. But facts such as the expansion of the home market, the number of workers, the position of the handicraftsmen and the number of factories, showed that Russia had already entered the path of capitalist development. It was therefore wrong to bemoan the fact and speak of the "ulcer of proletariatism", as the Narodniki were doing. It was the task of the revolutionaries, said Plekhanov, to use the development of capitalism in the interests of revolution and of the working people. It was therefore essential that the revolutionaries should understand that
capitalism engenders a powerful revolutionary force, the proletariat, and that they should rely upon this force in the struggle against the autocracy and capitalism.

The Narodnik view that the peasant commune was a bulwark against capitalism and a bridge to socialism was utterly untenable. The peasant commune had existed in many countries and had disintegrated under the blows of capitalism. There were obvious signs of the disintegration of the commune in Russia as well. Poor peasants and kulaks were emerging within the commune. Lacking the means for cultivating their land, the poor peasants were surrendering it to the kulaks and hiring themselves out to them as farm-labourers, or seeking a livelihood elsewhere. The poor peasants were already dependent upon the kulak and the usurer, and the commune was becoming a burden to them. To the tsarist government, however, the commune was a convenient means of exacting taxes on the basis of collective liability. A commune of this type was not and could not be either the embryo or the basis of socialism.

Plekhanov showed how deeply mistaken the Narodniks were in denying the leading, revolutionary role of the working class in the transformation of society. The vanguard, revolutionary role in the struggle belonged to the workers and not to the peasants. The peasants were engaged in small-scale production and were dispersed. They were less capable of conscious political initiative, less receptive to socialist theory, and lent themselves less easily to organisation than the proletariat, which was bound up with large-scale industrial production. The ranks of the proletariat were growing steadily, it was receptive to the ideas of socialism and was capable of organisation. It was the task of revolutionaries to develop the class consciousness, initiative and organisation of the workers, to concentrate on the organisation of a workers' socialist party. The prime task of the revolutionaries at the moment was socialist propaganda among the workers.

Plekhanov also criticised the Narodniks' erroneous views of society. His writings enriched Marxist materialism. Of particular importance in this respect was his book, *The Development of the Monist View of History*, published in 1895. The Narodniks denied the existence of objective laws of the development of society; they held that history is made by outstanding individuals, by heroes, and that the world is ruled by ideas. They claimed that the intelligentsia exerts a decisive influence on society, and that the direction in which the wheel of history will be turned depends on its will. But the life and the development of society are determined, not by the wishes and ideas of outstanding individuals, but by material conditions, by changes in the mode of social production. The people is the real maker of history. Ideas become a material force only when they take hold of the minds of the masses. Outstanding individuals play an important part only in so far as they correctly express the pressing requirements of
social development. The most outstanding individuals are doomed to defeat if they do not understand existing historical conditions, if their acts run counter to the requirements of society. A correct understanding of the laws governing historical development, with the object of transforming society, is provided only by Marxism. Plekhanov's book was of great importance in spreading the scientific, materialist world outlook. Lenin noted that this book helped "to rear a whole generation of Russian Marxists." (Collected Works, Vol. 16, p. 243).

An important contribution to the Marxist working-class movement in Russia was the programme of the Emancipation of Labour group. In the main and for its time, the programme showed rightly the tasks of the Russian Marxists and the course they must follow in the struggle. It emphasised that only the working class was an independent fighter for socialism. The ultimate aim of the proletariat was to replace capitalism by a new social order, communism. The precondition for the achievement of this aim was the conquest of political power by the working class. The programme proclaimed the need to form a revolutionary workers' party, whose primary political task was the overthrow of the autocracy. Nevertheless, it was the programme, not of a militant political party, but of a revolutionary organisation operating abroad, at a time when conditions for a broad and independent working-class movement were lacking in Russia. This explains the abstract and vague character of many provisions of the first programme document of the Russian Marxists.

The Emancipation of Labour group shattered the Narodnik illusion about the possibility of Russia passing at that time directly to socialism. That idea was wrong both from the theoretical and the historical standpoint. The most urgent problem of the revolutionary struggle was the abolition of the survivals of serfdom, the overthrow of the autocracy; consequently, at the first stage, the country faced a bourgeois and not a socialist revolution. This proposition was an undoubted service rendered by the first Russian Marxist group.

However, the group had no clear idea of the alignment of classes in the coming bourgeois revolution, and was unable correctly to assess the place and role of the bourgeoisie and the peasantry in the revolution; its attitude to this question was inconsistent and contradictory. In some of his writings, Plekhanov erroneously declared that in its policy the proletariat should take the bourgeoisie as its guide-star; he ignored the revolutionary role of the peasantry. He also expressed the view that it was inadvisable as yet to frighten the liberal bourgeoisie with the "red spectre" of socialism, and that it was therefore necessary to have a programme to which the liberals would also subscribe. The future workers' party in Russia was conceived as something like the Social-Democratic parties then existing in Western Europe. All these erroneous views subsequently led the leaders of the group away from Marxism to the camp of opportunism.
Engels welcomed the appearance of the first Marxist organisation in Russia. Plekhanov took part in founding the Second International, and addressed its First Congress, held in 1889.

The Emancipation of Labour group played a prominent part in Russian history. Plekhanov's theoretical works enriched Russian culture. A Marxist trend came into being within the emancipation movement. The period of the undivided domination of Narodism in the Russian revolutionary movement came to an end. The traditional Narodnik foundations of the revolutionary ideology of the time crumbled under the well-aimed blows of Marxist criticism.

But the ideological defeat of Narodism was still far off. Narodism was still very influential among the revolutionary intellectuals and advanced workers, and was the main ideological obstacle to the spread of Marxism. Marxism was battling its way forward, penetrating ever deeper into the revolutionary movement and also exerting ever greater influence on many Narodniks. Evidence of that was the activity of the group led by Alexander Ilyich Ulyanov ( Lenin's elder brother). The influence of Marxism was evident in its programme, which regarded socialism as the inevitable result of capitalism, and attached great importance to the workers as the core of a socialist party. But it continued to regard the political struggle as one of terrorist acts and conspiracies. The group called itself the "Terrorist Wing of the Narodnaya Volya Party". Its attempt to organise the assassination of the tsar on March 1, 1887, ended in failure. The leaders of the group, including A. I. Ulyanov, were executed.

Only by waging a struggle against Narodism could Marxism develop and grow strong in Russia.

The activity of the Emancipation of Labour group cleared the way for the creation of a Marxist workers' party in Russia. But in practice the group had no connections with the mass working-class movement. The place of this first Marxist organisation in the history of the working-class movement and of the proletarian party in Russia was precisely defined by Lenin as follows:

"The Emancipation of Labour group only laid the theoretical foundations for the Social-Democratic movement and took the first step towards the working-class movement" (Collected Works, Vol. 20, p. 255).

A critical reappraisal of the theory and practice of Narodism was taking place also in Russia. There were heated debates at secret meetings of revolutionary-minded youth, and the determined search for new ways continued. Considerable influence on the revolutionary circles was exerted by the Emancipation of Labour group, whose activities had greatly undermined the influence of Narodism. Revolutionary thought was developing on the basis of the working-class movement, which continued to grow in spite of the savage political reaction that had set in in the country. Four hundred and forty-six
strikes and disturbances took place in the eighties, and 232 strikes in the early nineties, involving 157,000 workers.

Particularly notable for its level of organisation was the strike at the Morozov Mills in Orekhovo-Zuyevo, in January, 1885. It was headed by talented leaders, Pyotr Moiseyenko and Vasily Volkov. A former member of the Northern Union, Moiseyenko had experienced prison and exile. At a secret meeting of the more active workers, a number of demands were drawn up which were to be presented to the mill-owner. These included the demand to restore the old piece-prices and reduce fines. The steadfastness and courage of the workers astounded public opinion and frightened the tsarist government. The strike was suppressed by armed force. About 600 workers were exiled and 33 were committed for trial. But the picture of outrageous maltreatment of the workers disclosed at the trial was so shocking that even the jurors of the tsarist court were compelled to return a verdict of “not guilty” on all 101 points of the indictment. The reactionary newspaper Moskovskie Vedomosti (Moscow Recorder) wrote with fury about the “salute of a hundred and one guns fired in honour of the labour problem having made its appearance in Russia”. Notwithstanding the fact that Moiseyenko and Volkov had been acquitted by the court, the gendarmes did not release them from their clutches. They were exiled. Volkov died shortly after. Moiseyenko later became a Bolshevik.

The Morozov strike was indicative of the awakening class solidarity and class consciousness of the workers. They had come to realise the significance of leadership and organisation. When Volkov and Moiseyenko were brought into court, all the workers present rose and bowed deeply to them.

Soon afterwards the tsarist government was compelled to promulgate a law on fines which to some extent restricted the tyranny of the capitalists.

The Morozov strike became an important landmark in the Russian working-class movement. Lenin subsequently described it as a mass strike in which a few socialists took part. The Morozov strike eloquently showed what a formidable force the working class could become when led by a strong organisation.

The struggle of the proletariat influenced revolutionary thought in a Marxist direction. Along with the Emancipation of Labour group abroad, Marxists appeared inside Russia as well, primarily in St. Petersburg. Here in the winter of 1883-84 there arose a Marxist organisation, calling itself the Party of Russian Social-Democrats, and known in history as the Blagoyev group. Its organiser was the Bulgarian D. Blagoyev, a student at St. Petersburg University, who subsequently became the founder of the Social-Democratic Party, and later of the Communist Party, of Bulgaria.

Contact was soon established between the Blagoyev group and the Emancipation of Labour group. The Blagoyev group began to dissem-
inate Marxism among the workers and students of St. Petersburg. It organised about 15 workers’ circles. In 1885 it secretly published two issues of the newspaper *Rabochy (Worker)*, the first Social-Democratic workers’ newspaper to appear in Russia.

Tracked down by the tsarist police, the Blagoyev group was broken up at the beginning of 1887. But the group’s activity had left its mark. The seeds sown by the group bore fruit. The group had initiated the systematic propaganda of Marxism among the workers in the country’s political and industrial centre, St. Petersburg.

In the autumn of 1885 another Marxist organisation arose in St. Petersburg. It later adopted the name of Association of St. Petersburg Workmen. Its organiser was P. V. Tochissky. At that time the Blagoyev and Tochissky groups worked separately and had no contacts with each other. A great merit of the Association was that it established strong ties of organisation with the advanced workers. Among the remarkable revolutionary workers to come from its circles were Y. A. Afanasyev (Klimanov) and V. A. Shelgunov. Later Tochissky, Shelgunov and Klimanov became members of the Bolshevik Party.

In 1888 the Association was broken up by the police. Workers who escaped arrest provided the element of continuity with a new organisation formed in 1888-89. It is known as M. I. Brusnev’s group, after its organiser. Gradually the Brusnev group developed into a well-knit organisation, with circles in almost all the districts of St. Petersburg. Altogether there were about twenty circles, each composed of six or seven workers. Furthermore, the first Marxist circle of working women was organised.

The Brusnev group sought to establish closer contact with the workers. It issued appeals in connection with some strikes. In 1891 advanced workers marched in the funeral procession of the democratic writer N. V. Shelgunov. On the ribbon of the wreath they bore were the words: “To N. V. Shelgunov, who pointed the way to liberty and fraternity, from the workers of St. Petersburg.” The same year, the Brusnev group organised the first May Day celebration in Russia. Between seventy and eighty workers gathered at a secret out-of-town rally. The speeches delivered by workers were secretly printed and later widely circulated. These were the first Social-Democratic demonstrations of the advanced workers, but there was no mass movement as yet.

Many members of the group later took an active part in the Social-Democratic movement. The worker F. A. Afanasyev subsequently became a prominent figure in the Party.

In 1892 the Brusnev group was broken up by the gendarmes, and only a small nucleus escaped destruction. It retained contact with some of the workers’ circles.

The late eighties witnessed the spread of Marxism to a number of regions in Russia. Marxist circles appeared in Moscow. The Volga
region—Kazan, Samara (now Kuibyshev) and Nizhni-Novgorod (now Gorky)—became one of the centres of Marxist propaganda. A big part in guiding the revolutionaries to Marxism was played by N. Y. Fedoseyev, a talented and devoted revolutionary. In after years he died in exile in Siberia. Marxist circles sprang up in the Ukraine—in Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa and Yekaterinoslav (now Dnepropetrovsk). The organiser of the first Marxist circles in the Ukraine was Y. D. Melnikov, a prominent revolutionary.

Among the first Russian Marxists was Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (Ulyanov), the founder and leader of the Party of the Bolsheviks, the Communist Party. In 1887, at the age of seventeen, he was arrested and exiled for taking part in the revolutionary student action in Kazan. This was Lenin’s entry upon the path of revolutionary struggle. His bitter hatred of all tyranny and oppression and his ardent love for the ordinary working man made Lenin a revolutionary. He dedicated his whole life to the struggle for the emancipation of the working people from oppression and exploitation, to the struggle for mankind’s happy future. Lenin absorbed the traditions of sublime heroism and supreme self-sacrifice of the Russian revolutionaries, his predecessors, but chose a different path, a path free from their mistakes—the path of revolutionary Marxism.

Lenin studied the writings of Marx and Engels and became a convinced Marxist. At the end of 1888 he joined a Marxist circle in Kazan. In 1889 he moved to Samara, where he organised a Marxist circle and established contact with the Marxists of Nizhni-Novgorod, Vladimir and St. Petersburg. At that time Lenin was already playing an important part in disseminating Marxism in Russia. In Marxism he saw a powerful weapon for the revolutionary transformation of the world, for the emancipation of the working people from economic, political and spiritual slavery.

A bookish, abstract conception of Marxist theory was alien to Lenin. To him Marxism was always a living guide to revolutionary action, not a lifeless dogma. From the very beginning of his revolutionary activity Lenin, with his mastery of Marxism, set about solving the most important theoretical problem facing Russian Marxists, namely, to make a comprehensive study of the social and economic system of the Russia of that period, her economic development and class relations. Without that it was impossible to rout Narodism completely and work out scientifically the programme and tactics of a workers’ party in Russia.

In the spring of 1893 Lenin set forth a number of important ideas in his article “New Economic Developments in Peasant Life”, the earliest of his writings which have been preserved. He showed that deep economic discord and class antagonisms had matured among the peasantry, that the peasantry was splitting up into three basic groups—poor, middle and well-to-do—and that capitalism in Russia was developing irresistibly. This article reveals the great skill with
which the young Lenin was applying the Marxist method in his analysis of the most complicated problems of Russian life.

The years 1883–94 were a period of the slow and difficult growth of a Social-Democratic movement in Russia. There were very few supporters of the new Marxist teachings. Throughout the vast country there were hardly more than a dozen small Marxist groups and circles in the big cities. And these circles conducted propaganda only among the advanced workers; they did not carry on any political work among the masses. The Social-Democratic movement, as Lenin wrote, was in the process of foetal development.

The first Russian Marxists became steeled in ideological battles with the Narodniki. The teachings of scientific socialism brightly lit up the path of struggle ahead of them, and they carried their knowledge to the workers. A bitter struggle was being waged in the revolutionary circles between the Marxists and the Narodniki. More and more of the foremost workers and revolutionary intellectuals were becoming convinced Marxists. The generation of Marxists of the late eighties and early nineties advanced from their midst outstanding leaders of the Bolshevik Party: L. B. Krasin, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, V. K. Kurnatovsky, A. V. Lunacharsky, M. N. Lyadov, V. L. Schantzer (Marat), A. G. Schlichter, N. A. Semashko, P. I. Stuchka, M. G. Tskhakaya, A. D. Tsyurupa, M. F. Vladimirsky, V. V. Vorovsky, and many others. At that period A. M. Gorky and A. S. Serafimovich, the future proletarian writers, were developing under the influence of Marxist ideas. Marxism was becoming an appreciable factor in the country’s intellectual and political life. The influence of Narodism was greatly undermined.

**BRIEF SUMMARY**

With the development of capitalism and the appearance of an industrial proletariat in tsarist Russia, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the revolutionary struggle grew in intensity. It manifested itself in the working-class movement, peasant unrest, and in the activities of the revolutionary organisations.

As in all other countries where a revolutionary struggle began, socialist theory and the working-class movement in Russia were not connected at first. Gradually Marxist organisations arose in Russia, on the basis of the Russian working-class movement, as a result of the defeat of Narodism and under the influence of the successes of the West European proletariat. The Emancipation of Labour group, founded by Plekhanov in 1883, dealt a serious ideological blow to Narodism and took the first step towards the working-class movement.

Marxism developed and gained strength in Russia in the struggle against Narodism. But old, obsolescent views never give way without stubborn and bitter resistance. It took Marxism years of determined
ideological struggle against Narodism to gain the upper hand and to become the theoretical foundation of the Russian working-class movement.

The first Marxist groups and circles were not connected with the working-class movement. Until the mid-nineties, Marxism in Russia remained an ideological trend that had no contact with the working-class movement. The development of the struggle of the proletariat and the work of the Marxist organisations prepared the ground for combining scientific socialism with the mass working-class movement, and for the appearance of a Marxist party in Russia. The task of founding such a party was accomplished by Lenin.

A new era was beginning in the history of the working class and of the revolutionary movement in Russia.
CHAPTER TWO

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CREATION OF A MARXIST PARTY IN RUSSIA.
FORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY. THE RISE OF BOLSHEVISM

(1894-1904)


Capitalism in Russia continued to make headway in the nineties of the nineteenth century. It was a period of industrial boom. Railway construction was developing at a particularly rapid pace. More than 14,000 miles of new railway lines were laid between 1890 and 1900. This stimulated the rapid growth of the metallurgical and fuel industries. Foreign capital, attracted by high profits, flowed into the country. In the course of the decade the volume of production and the total number of workers doubled. Industry alone absorbed about 1,000,000 new workers. Fifty per cent of the industrial workers were hereditary proletarians, whose fathers had worked in factories before them.

The spontaneous strikes of the seventies and eighties helped to rouse the working-class masses to conscious struggle. In the autumn of 1893, on the eve of the upsurge of the working-class movement, Lenin arrived in St. Petersburg from Samara to take part in the revolutionary struggle. His very first speeches in the St. Petersburg groups showed that the revolutionary movement had acquired an outstanding figure, a profound theoretician and brilliant organiser, a staunch revolutionary of inexhaustible energy and iron will, one who had deep faith in the victory of the working-class cause and inspired others with this faith. Before long Lenin became the generally recognised leader of the St. Petersburg Marxists.

Lenin put forward before the Marxists the problem of founding an independent Marxist workers' party. This party had to be built
up in the harsh conditions of illegality, under the fire of incessant police persecution. The Russian Marxists had to build up their party in bitter struggle not only against Narodism, but also against other political trends and against the opportunists in the working-class movement, who sacrificed the vital interests of the proletariat to gain for it temporary advantages. Formerly, the leading role in the struggle for Marxism had been played by the Emancipation of Labour group. Now the decisive part in this struggle was taken over by the serious Marxist cadres who had grown up in Russia.

Narodism still remained the main ideological obstacle to the establishment of Marxism. It had to be defeated completely if the victory of Marxism was to be assured and a proletarian party created. In an attempt to arrest the rapid growth of Marxist influence among the revolutionaries, the Narodniks started a campaign against it. This evoked numerous letters of protest from the Russian Marxists, notable among which were the letters of N. Y. Fedoseyev. These illegal letters were passed on from hand to hand; they were avidly read in the underground revolutionary groups.

An outstanding role in the ideological defeat of Narodism was played by Lenin’s book, *What the “Friends of the People” Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats*, printed secretly in the summer of 1894. The book criticised the world outlook, economic views, political platform and tactics of Narodism.

Lenin opposed the idealist views of the Narodniki on history by the Marxist, materialist conception of social life. The course of history is conditioned, not by the subjective desires of individuals, but by the objective laws of development of society. Marxist science discloses all the forms of contradiction under capitalism and shows the proletariat the way to deliverance from capitalist exploitation. It was the task of the Russian socialists to develop Marxist theory further, to disseminate it among the masses of the workers and organise the working class. The theoretical work of the Marxists must go hand in hand with their practical activity, theory must serve practice, it must supply the answers to the questions put forward by real life, and it must be tested in practice. Only on this condition would the Marxists become the real ideological leaders of the proletariat, free from dogmatism and sectarianism.

Lenin showed that Narodism had undergone profound changes, that it had turned from revolutionary into liberal Narodism, and he completely exposed the Narodniki of the nineties. The Narodniki (Mikhailovsky, Vorontsov and others) had begun to assert that capitalism could “enter the life of the people” without ruining the peasants and without exploiting the working people. They lauded the hard-working “enterprising muzhik”, that is, in effect extolled the development of kulak farms. The Narodniki slurred over the class contradictions in the countryside and the poor peasants’ decline into bondage to the kulaks, representing all this as mere “defects”
that could easily be remedied by a "people-loving" administration. They offered a paltry programme of petty reforms which, leaving the foundations of exploitation in the countryside intact, tended to divert the peasants from the revolutionary struggle and benefited only the rich, kulak households. The Narodniks abandoned the struggle against the tsarist regime. They now placed all their hopes in the tsarist government, which they claimed was above all classes and therefore capable of helping the working people.

Liberal Narodism differed fundamentally from revolutionary Narodism. The degeneration of Narodism was due to the profound social and economic processes which had taken place in the countryside. The revolutionary Narodniki of the seventies were active at a time when the differentiation in the countryside was just beginning, and they reflected the mood of the broad masses of the peasantry. The liberal Narodniki of the nineties were active in the period when the peasantry was splitting up under the influence of capitalist development. They in fact expressed the interests of the upper section of the rural population, kulaks, and, consequently, were false friends of the people.

While unrelentingly laying bare the reactionary aspect of Narodnik views, Lenin stressed the democratic features of the Narodnik programme, features which were an expression of a protest against the survivals of serfdom, against landlordism and the peasants' lack of rights. He declared that the Marxists, being true spokesmen of the people, were more precise, and went further and deeper, in promoting general democratic demands. They called for the overthrow of tsarism, the abolition of the yoke of the landlords and of capitalist exploitation.

In his book, *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats*, Lenin charted the historical course of the Russian working class as the political leader of the people, advanced the idea of the hegemony (leading role) of the proletariat and dealt with the question of the allies of the proletariat in the revolutionary struggle. The ally of the working class in the struggle against the tsarist autocracy was the peasantry, the broad mass of the people. The working class was coming forward against capitalism, not as a solitary fighter, but at the head of the entire working and exploited population of the country.

In order to accomplish its historic tasks, the proletariat needed a Marxist party which would impart class consciousness to and organise the working-class movement. The prime task of the Russian Marxists was therefore to form a united socialist workers' party out of the scattered Marxist groups. Once the Marxists have created a strong organisation, a party capable of transforming scattered revolts and strikes of the workers into a politically conscious proletarian class struggle, "then," wrote Lenin, "the Russian WORKER, rising at the head of all the democratic elements, will overthrow
absolutism and lead the RUSSIAN PROLETARIAT (side by side with the proletariat of ALL COUNTRIES) along the straight road of open political struggle to the VICTORIOUS COMMUNIST REVOLUTION" (Collected Works, Vol. 1, p. 300).

Lenin was the first Russian Marxist to advance the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat and the idea of a revolutionary alliance of the working class and the peasantry as the principal means of overthrowing tsarism, the landlords and the bourgeoisie.

These ideas of Lenin's were a valuable contribution to Marxist theory. Lenin taught Marxists and advanced workers to understand the historic role of the proletariat as the leader of all the oppressed; he taught them to understand the tremendous revolutionary potentialities of the masses of the people, and, above all, of the peasantry.

In the nineties the revolutionary Marxists in Russia had another enemy to contend with besides the Narodniks—the so-called "legal Marxists". These were bourgeois intellectuals who used the banner of Marxism to expound their views in the legal press, that is, in newspapers and periodicals licenced by the tsarist government. Advocating the capitalist development of the country, the "legal Marxists" criticised the Narodniks in their own way as defenders of small-scale production. And it was for the purpose of such criticism that they tried to make use of Marxism—but Marxism stripped of all revolutionary content. P. B. Struve, the leader of the "legal Marxists", extolled capitalism, and instead of calling for a revolutionary struggle against the bourgeois system urged that "we acknowledge our lack of culture and go to capitalism for schooling". Thus, the "legal Marxists" were spokesmen of bourgeois ideology. They sought to adapt Marxism and the working-class movement to the interests of the bourgeoisie.

In the struggle against Narodism, the revolutionary Marxists entered into a temporary agreement with the "legal Marxists", and began to publish articles in magazines edited by the "legal Marxists". At the same time, however, Lenin, in his work, The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book (1895), sharply criticised "legal Marxism" for its revision of the principles of Marxism, namely, the theory of the socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Describing "legal Marxism" as a reflection of Marxism in bourgeois literature, Lenin exposed the "legal Marxists" as ideologists of the liberal bourgeoisie. Lenin's characterisation of the "legal Marxists" was later completely confirmed: they became prominent Cadets (as the principal party of the Russian liberal bourgeoisie was called) and, after the October Revolution, diehard Whites.

The Narodniks were open enemies of Marxism. In the "legal Marxists", the Russian Marxists for the first time encountered disguised enemies who called themselves supporters of Marx's teachings, while in reality they deprived Marxism of its revolutionary content. Similar distortions of Marxism were current also in Western Europe. Lenin's
fight against “legal Marxism” was of international significance; it was a model of ideological irreconcilability to distortions of Marxist theory.

Of outstanding significance in the development of Marxism and in the ideological and theoretical education of Marxists was Lenin’s book, The Development of Capitalism in Russia, published in 1899. This book completed the ideological defeat of Narodism.

Basing himself on the study of a wealth of factual data, Lenin drew some very important conclusions. Russia had become a capitalist country. The contradictions between capitalism and the survivals of serfdom were growing increasingly acute. The development of capitalism was undermining the foundations of the autocratic system. Objective conditions for the abolition of this system were maturing in the country. The forces of revolution were taking shape in society. The decisive role in the revolution belonged to the working class; the strength of the proletariat in the historical movement was immeasurably greater than its proportion to the general mass of the population. The ally of the working class was the peasantry, whose revolutionary spirit had deep-seated economic roots. Lenin’s analysis of economic development and class relations in Russia was the basis on which the programme and tactics of the Marxist party were subsequently worked out.

The Russian Marxists introduced Lenin’s ideas into the practical activity of the working-class movement. Lenin called on the St. Petersburg Marxists to undertake political agitation among the mass of the working class. In December 1894, in connection with disturbances at the Semyannikov Works (now the V. I. Lenin Works), Lenin, in collaboration with I. V. Babushkin, a worker at this plant, wrote an appeal to the workers which was circulated in several copies. Social-Democrats took part in the strikes in the New Port, at the Thornton Mills (now the Ernst Thaelmann Mill), the Putilov (now Kirov) Works and many other enterprises. The leaflets, in which economic demands were combined with political ones, greatly encouraged the workers and raised their revolutionary consciousness. The Marxists began to conduct systematic political education and organisational work among the workers. In this way under Lenin’s guidance they changed over from propaganda among small groups of advanced workers to agitation among the broad mass of the working class.

To develop their work among the masses, the Marxist groups in St. Petersburg united on Lenin’s initiative into a single illegal Social-Democratic organisation, which at the end of 1895 adopted the name of League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. The League was organised on the principles of centralism, strict discipline and close contact with the masses. Its core was composed of fifteen to seventeen members assigned to the three districts into which the city was divided. The workers’ circles in the factories and
mills formed the basis of the League. Its leadership consisted of a central group headed by Lenin, who was at the same time the editor of all the League’s publications. Among the League members were G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, N. K. Krupskaya, Y. O. Martov, A. N. Potresov, S. I. Radchenko, V. V. Starkov, A. A. Vaneyev, P. K. Zaporozhets, and others.

Alarmed by the activities of the League, the tsarist government dealt it a severe blow. The leadership of the League, headed by Lenin, and about forty active members were arrested on the night of December 9, 1895. A number of other police raids, carried out in 1896, wrested more and more fighters from the ranks of the League. Lenin spent more than a year in prison. But even there he carried on his revolutionary activities, and continued to assist the League in its work: he wrote leaflets for it and drafted a party programme. In 1897 Lenin was exiled to a distant place in Siberia. Many active members of the League were also exiled. Severe as these losses were, the League was able to withstand the blows of the tsar’s henchmen, for it had deep roots in the working-class movement.

The year 1896 brought a major victory to the League. In the summer more than 30,000 St. Petersburg workers went on strike. The strike at the Yekaterinhof Textile Mill (Ravenstvo—Equality—Mill today) grew into a general strike of the textile workers of the capital. Notwithstanding the arrest of its leadership, the League directed the strike. It issued thirteen leaflets in the course of one month. The tsarist government arrested more than 1,000 workers; it attempted not only to break the strike by brutal repressions, but also to demoralise the movement ideologically by the false assurances that the government had “equally at heart the interests of the employers and of the workers”. The League immediately exposed this manoeuvre in a leaflet. The news of the strike spread throughout the country and far beyond its borders. Terrified by the extent of the strike movement, the tsarist government was compelled in 1897 to issue a law limiting the working day to 11½ hours.

The St. Petersburg strikes of 1895-96, and especially the strike of 1896, ushered in a new period in Russian history, the period of preparation for a people’s revolution. For the first time the working-class masses had risen to fight under the leadership of a Social-Democratic organisation.

The action of the proletariat created a new situation in the revolutionary struggle. As Lenin noted afterwards, there were three distinct periods in the Russian revolutionary movement in the nineteenth century, depending on which social class left its distinguishing mark on the movement. In the serf period, from the Decembrist revolt to the fall of serfdom, it was revolutionary noblemen that predominated in the revolutionary movement. From 1861 and up to the mid-nineties, the leading force in the movement were the democratic intellectuals of non-noble origin. The development of capitalism, the
growth of the working-class movement and the activities of the Marxists prepared the ground for a radical change, for the third, proletarian period of the revolutionary movement, which began about 1895. The working class emerged as a major political force, a powerful revolutionary factor. With the rise of a mass Social-Democratic working-class movement, the question of who was to lead the peasantry, whether the working class or the liberal bourgeoisie, acquired paramount importance in Russia's political life.

The League of Struggle produced a group of advanced proletarians, builders of the Party, who worked tirelessly among the masses. Among the leading members of the League were workers employed in big factories, such as V. A. Shelgunov at the Obukhov (now Bolshevik) Works, I. V. Babushkin at the Semyannikov Works, N. G. Poletayev (subsequently a member of the Third State Duma), M. I. Kalinin and others at the Putilov Works.

Under Lenin's guidance, the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class was the first organisation in Russia that began to fuse socialism with the working-class movement, linking up the struggle of the workers for economic demands with the political struggle against tsarism and capitalist exploitation. The League was, as Lenin wrote, the first real rudiment of a revolutionary party, supported by the working-class movement and leading the class struggle of the proletariat. The St. Petersburg League of Struggle had a powerful impact on the development of the Social-Democratic movement in Russia. It served as a model for similar leagues organised in other cities. A Workers' Union was formed in Moscow, Social-Democratic groups were organised in Tula, Ivanovo-Voznesensk (Ivanovo), Yaroslavl, Kostroma, Vladimir, Rostov-on-Don and other cities. Social-Democratic organisations arose in the Ukraine and in Transcaucasia. Many of them adopted the title of League of Struggle. They saw it as one of their main tasks to organise strikes and sought to convert every strike into a school of class struggle for the proletariat. In this way it became a tradition for the Social-Democratic organisations to take an active part in strikes. The Social-Democrats began to live the life of the workers.

The Social-Democratic movement spread to the western non-Russian border regions. The Social-Democratic Party of Poland was founded in 1893, and the General Jewish Workers' Union in Russia and Poland (the Bund) in 1897. In the second half of the nineties, the first Social-Democratic organisations were formed in Latvia.

The changeover from propaganda circles to agitation among the mass of the workers was not accomplished without a struggle within the organisations. Some stubbornly clung to the obsolete forms of study-circle propaganda and organisation. Others favoured the advance to agitation, but neglected the political tasks of the proletariat. They proposed confining the work to economic agitation, to
setting up organisations which would meet the economic needs of the workers, and leaving the political struggle to the liberals.

Thus at the very dawn of the Social-Democratic movement in Russia, there arose a dangerous tendency: to build a narrow trade union organisation of the proletariat rather than a political one, to deprive the working-class movement of its independent political character. The supporters of such views were called Economists. They based themselves on the ideas of the “legal Marxists” in Russia and the reformists in the West, and in practice subordinated the working-class movement to the liberal bourgeoisie.

Lenin and his supporters launched a vigorous struggle against these first manifestations of opportunism in the Russian working-class movement. Lenin considered Marx’s conclusion that the proletariat must have its own independent party a lasting gain of the international working-class movement. He began to form such a party in Russia, and waged an uncompromising struggle against the slightest encroachments upon its independence. That struggle was of great significance for training cadres for the future Bolshevik Party and for the birth of Bolshevism. That was just how Lenin appraised its historic significance when he wrote later: “The Bolsheviks are no ‘freak’, they grew up out of the struggle against opportunism in 1894-1914!!” (Lenin Miscellany XIV, p. 317).

Lenin’s activities in the nineties, the ideas he advanced, his uncompromising struggle against distortions of Marxist theory, the education of Party cadres and the working-class masses in a revolutionary spirit—all this marked the beginning of a new stage, the Leninist stage, in the development of Marxism.

The Social-Democratic movement was making appreciable progress, and the revolutionary Marxists were confronted with the task of uniting the Social-Democratic organisations into a party. The ideological ground for this unification had been prepared by Lenin’s League of Struggle. Practical steps were also taken to hold a congress. N. K. Krupskaya, a member of the League, negotiated with Social-Democrats in other cities. Lenin, who was in exile at that time, wrote his pamphlet, The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats, in which he outlined, on the basis of the experience of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle, the Marxist platform for a workers’ party.

The First Congress of local Social-Democratic organisations met secretly in Minsk, from March 1 to 3, 1898. It was attended by only nine delegates, representing the St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev and Yekaterinoslav Leagues of Struggle, the Bund and the Rabochaya Gazeta (Workers’ Gazette) group of Kiev. The Congress resolved to form the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (R.S.D.L.P.) and elected a Central Committee of three members. By its very name, “Russian”, the Party emphasised from the outset that it was uniting the foremost workers of all the peoples of Russia. Lenin specially noted this historic achievement of the Congress. “The Party,” he said,
“arose in 1898 as a ‘Russian’ party, i. e., a party of the proletariat of all the nationalities of Russia” (Collected Works, Vol. 19, p. 219). The manifesto issued on behalf of the Congress declared: “The Russian proletariat will throw off the yoke of the autocracy in order to continue, with still greater energy, the struggle against capitalism and the bourgeoisie until the complete victory of socialism” (The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee, Part I, Gospolitizdat, 1954, p. 13).

The manifesto did not express clearly enough the basic ideas regarding the conquest of political power by the proletariat, the leading role of the working class, and its allies in the struggle against tsarism and capitalism. But the manifesto played a big role as an open statement of aims by the Party. Lenin subscribed to it.

The Congress proclaimed the formation of the Party, a fact of great political and revolutionary-propagandist importance. The announcement was received with great satisfaction by Social-Democrats everywhere. The news of the Congress encouraged and heartened the Party cadres in the difficult conditions of illegal revolutionary work and opened wide prospects before them. The local Social-Democratic organisations began to call themselves committees of the R.S.D.L.P. The Party gained increasing recognition and popularity among the workers.

In reality, however, no party had as yet been formed. The Social-Democratic organisations had no common Programme, Rules or tactics, they had no single leading centre, and there was no ideological and organisational unity. Soon after the First Congress the tsarist police arrested two members of the Central Committee and many prominent Social-Democrats. Ideological vacillations increased, and so did the influence of opportunist elements. The absence of the strong core of revolutionary Marxists headed by Lenin, who were in exile, began to tell.

It was in these difficult conditions that the Marxist party began to take shape in Russia.

2. Lenin’s Plan for Building a Marxist Party. The Struggle of the Leninist Iskra for the Creation of the Party

The need for a workers’ party was becoming increasingly acute. By the beginning of the twentieth century enough inflammable material for a revolutionary explosion had accumulated in tsarist Russia.

In 1900-03 the world was in the grip of an economic crisis. Russia was particularly hard hit. Small and medium enterprises crumbled under its blows. About 3,000 factories were closed down. The concentration of industry increased, and capitalist monopoly associations grew rapidly, gaining control of the mining, metallurgical,
engineering and other important industries. Capitalism in Russia was becoming imperialist.

The crisis heightened the tension in the country. Unemployment grew. The unemployed returned "home" by the thousand, to villages stricken by crop failure and famine. The workers began to adopt new forms of struggle, passing from economic to political strikes and demonstrations. In February and March 1901, in response to the call of the local committees of the R.S.D.L.P., thousands of demonstrators came out in the streets of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kharkov, Kiev and other big cities with the slogan: "Down with the autocracy!" May Day demonstrations and strikes took place in many cities. The strike of the Obukhov Works developed into a clash with the police and troops. The workers offered stiff resistance, but the odds against them were too heavy, and the tsarist authorities retaliated with savage reprisals. The heroic "Obukhov defence" raised the militant spirit of the proletariat.

The year 1902 witnessed a further upsurge in the working-class movement. Strikes and demonstrations took place in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Baku, Batum (Batumi), Nizhni-Novgorod, Sormovo, Odessa, Saratov, Tiflis (Tbilisi) and other cities. Of particular importance were the big strike and demonstration in Rostov-on-Don. It was led by the local committee of the R.S.D.L.P. Meetings were held several days in succession, with many thousands of workers listening eagerly to Social-Democratic speakers. The police were powerless to disperse these open-air meetings and rallies, and only by summoning troops were they able to get the better of the workers.

In 1903 the tide of the working-class movement rose still higher. May Day strikes and demonstrations were held in many cities. Political general strikes under the leadership of the R.S.D.L.P. committees took place in the summer of that year in the South: in Transcaucasia (Baku, Tiflis, Batum, Chiatury, on the Transcaucasian Railway) and in the Ukraine (Odessa, Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, Nikolayev, Yelisavetgrad). More than 200,000 workers took part in these strikes. The proletariat of Russia was rising for a revolutionary struggle against the tsarist regime.

Frightened by the growth of the working-class movement, the tsarist government tried to arrest it by all possible means. More and more often it responded to the revolutionary actions of the proletariat with the bullet and the Cossack whip, prison and exile. An especially brutal act was the shooting of the Zlatoust workers by the police in March 1903. At the same time the tsarist government tried to divert the workers from the revolutionary struggle. Through its agents the Okhrana (tsarist secret police) set up in several cities organisations which tried to persuade the workers that the tsarist government itself was prepared to help them to secure the satisfaction of their economic demands, so long as they kept out of politics. These tactics, designed to mislead the workers, became known as "police
socialism", or Zubatovism (after the name of its initiator, Zubatov, a colonel of the gendarmes). But the growing revolutionary movement of the working class swept these police organisations out of its way.

Under the influence of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, other classes and social strata began to rouse themselves to action. Driven to despair by hopeless want, the peasantry rose to fight. Its struggle manifested itself most forcefully in 1902 in the Poltava, Kharkov and Saratov gubernias, where peasants began to set fire to landlords' mansions, seize their land and offer resistance to the police and troops. A movement developed among the students. In answer to police attacks, the students in a number of cities went on strike in the winter of 1901-02.

The liberal bourgeoisie also began to stir. But inasmuch as it was economically linked with tsarism and feared the movement of the masses, it was incapable of taking any sort of decisive action. The liberals confined themselves to sending petitions to the tsar to introduce minor reforms.

The approach of revolution was felt everywhere. "Let the storm break in full fury!"—this impassioned appeal of Gorky's "Song of the Stormy Petrel" splendidly reflected the revolutionary sentiments then prevailing. It was necessary that the proletariat should meet the revolution fully prepared, with a militant Marxist party capable of leading the struggle of the working people.

The Social-Democratic movement had considerably developed by the end of the nineteenth century. It had its committees and groups in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Tula, Tver (now Kalinin), Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Yaroslavl, Kostroma, Nizhni-Novgorod, Saratov, Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, Odessa, Kharkov, Nikolayev, Baku, Tiflis, Batum, Gomel, Vitebsk, Ufa and other cities, in the Donets coalfield and in Siberia. The early twentieth century also saw the beginnings of regional organisations known as committee unions—the Caucasian, Crimean, Northern, Siberian and the Union of Mining Workers in the Donets coalfield.

But all these organisations were not yet connected with each other. The committees had no well thought-out plan of action; they confined themselves to narrow, practical activities on a local scale, and did not set themselves political tasks on an all-Russian scale. Owing to their parochial methods of work and their poor observance of conspiratorial practice, the Social-Democratic organisations were often broken up by the police. There was therefore no continuity in their work. This lack of organisational cohesion was aggravated by ideological confusion among the Social-Democrats, who had as yet no common understanding of the tasks of the working-class movement, or of the ways and means of fulfilling them. The Social-Democratic organisations were clearly lagging behind the spontaneous movement of the masses. Russian Social-Democracy was in a state of disunity and vacillation. The ideological confusion and lack of organisation-
al integration were so great as to make it extremely difficult to form a united and centralised party.

Particularly dangerous were the Economists. They had their own press—the newspaper Rabochaya Myisl (Workers’ Thought) in Russia and the magazine Rabocheye Dyelo (Workers’ Cause) abroad. They urged the workers to confine themselves exclusively to the struggle for economic demands—wage increases, a shorter working day, etc. The Economists declared: “A struggle for better economic conditions, the struggle against capital for daily vital interests, with strikes as the method of this struggle—such be the motto of the working-class movement.” Some Economists advocated this opportunist idea in more veiled form, preaching a “theory of stages”. According to this “theory”, the working class should begin its economic struggle by advancing the demand for the right to strike, then pass to the demand for the right to organise trade unions, and only then cautiously approach the idea of political liberty in general.

The views of the Economists were most vividly expressed in the document known as the Credo (confession of faith). Its authors, Kuskova and Prokopovitch, subsequently became Cadets, and in the Soviet period White émigrés. “The economic struggle is for the workers, and the political struggle for the liberals,” was the view they advocated. The Economists denied the independent political role of the proletariat and the need for an independent political party of the working class. There was the danger that the spread of these opportunist ideas would convert the proletariat into a political appendage of the bourgeoisie.

At the end of the nineteenth century the Economists were predominant in the Social-Democratic committees. Economism in Russia originated from the same source as opportunism in any other capitalist country, namely, the penetration of bourgeois influence into the working-class movement and the mixed composition of the proletariat. The predominance of the petty bourgeoisie in the population * was another factor contributing to the spread of opportunism in Russia. Furthermore, the Economists were able to gain ground because a great many leading Marxists were in prison or in exile at that time, and the young intellectuals who streamed into the Social-Democratic organisations under the influence of the victory of Marxism over Narodism lacked the necessary Marxist training and political experience.

Economism was the Russian variety of international opportunism. In the nineties Marxism had already become the leading force in the West European working-class movement, and the enemies of Marxism began to camouflage themselves. They put forward the slogan of “freedom to criticise” Marx, and demanded the revision of his teach-

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* Here “petty bourgeoisie” means chiefly the peasantry, which at that time made up the overwhelming majority of the population. — *Trans.*
ings. The revisionists denied that the need for and inevitability of socialism could be scientifically proved, and declared that the very idea of an “ultimate goal” for the working-class movement, that is, communism, was untenable. They denied the growing impoverishment of the masses and the intensification of capitalist contradictions. They insisted on rejecting the basic propositions of Marxism—the theory of the class struggle, the socialist revolution, and the dictatorship of the proletariat. The German Social-Democrat Bernstein, the leader of revisionism, declared: “The ultimate goal is nothing, the movement is everything.” In other words, the main thing so far as the opportunists were concerned was to get the ruling exploiting classes to grant reforms, minor improvements for the workers, without affecting the foundations of capitalism. The opportunists strove to turn Social-Democracy from a party of social revolution into a party of social reforms. In Russia, the Economists were reformists of precisely this kind, people who betrayed the fundamental interests of the proletariat.

Lenin came out vigorously against the Economists. In answer to the Credo, he wrote in 1899 “A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats”, which was approved at a meeting of seventeen Marxists then in exile in Siberia. In their programme statement, the revolutionary Marxists called for an uncompromising war on the whole range of Economist ideas. The “Protest” was widely circulated among the Social-Democratic organisations; it played a tremendous part in the building of a Marxist party in Russia. A struggle against the Economists started in a number of Social-Democratic organisations. Abroad, the struggle against the Economists was taken up by Plekhanov.

It was necessary to unite all revolutionary Social-Democratic forces to combat such evils as primitive methods, ideological vacillations and Economism. While still in exile, Lenin came to the conclusion that the decisive role in the formation of a Marxist party would be played by an all-Russian political newspaper. In 1900, as soon as he returned from exile, Lenin energetically set about organising such a newspaper. He visited a number of cities, held talks with many Social-Democrats, and enlisted and united the supporters of the future newspaper. After preparing the ground in Russia, Lenin went abroad to make arrangements for the publication of the paper. Iskra (The Spark), as the paper was called, was the first illegal all-Russian political newspaper of the revolutionary Marxists. Its editorial board consisted of representatives of the Social-Democratic organisations in Russia—Lenin, Martov and Potresov—and of members of the Emancipation of Labour group—Plekhanov, Axelrod and Zasulich. The real inspirer, organiser and director of Iskra was Lenin.

The first issue of Iskra appeared abroad, on December 11, 1900. It bore the epigraph “The spark will kindle a flame”, taken from the
reply of the Decembrists to Pushkin’s message. The Russian Marxists abided firmly by the great slogan proclaimed by Marx: “Workers of all countries, unite!”, and regarded themselves as one of the detachments of the international working-class movement. At the same time they openly declared that the Russian working class would carry on the work of the preceding generations of revolutionaries, and voiced the deep conviction that it would be the proletariat that would accomplish the task bequeathed to it by the history of the revolutionary struggle in Russia.

The editorial “The Urgent Tasks of Our Movement”, written by Lenin in the paper’s first issue, stated that Iskra’s main task was the formation of a Marxist party in Russia. Without such a party, wrote Lenin, the proletariat would be incapable of rising to the level of conscious class struggle, the working-class movement would be doomed to impotence, and the working class would never succeed in discharging its great historic mission of emancipating itself and all the working people of Russia from political and economic slavery.

“Before us, in all its strength, towers the enemy fortress which is raining shot and shell upon us, mowing down our best fighters,” wrote Lenin. “We must capture this fortress, and we will capture it, if we unite all the forces of the awakening proletariat with all the forces of the Russian revolutionaries into one party which will attract all that is vital and honest in Russia” (Collected Works, Vol. 4, p. 371).

It was to the building of this party that Iskra dedicated its efforts. How to begin the building of the party in the conditions obtaining at that time? The answer to this question was given by Lenin in the article “Where to Begin?” published in Iskra in May 1901. This article outlined Lenin’s famous plan for building a Marxist party. The important thing, wrote Lenin, was that the broad masses were rushing into battle, but the revolutionaries lacked a staff of leaders and organisers. And his answer to the question “Where to Begin?” was: begin with the establishment of an all-Russian political newspaper. This newspaper would clear the way for the ideological defeat of the enemies within the working-class movement and would uphold the purity of the revolutionary theory. It would help to achieve a common understanding of the programmatic aims and tactical tasks of the party, and of its practical methods of work. The newspaper would also be a powerful instrument for organisationally uniting local committees and groups into a single party. Around the newspaper, being the affair of the whole party, a network of agents would come into being, who would supply it with information, circulate it, and bring it into contact with the workers. The organisation of the paper’s supporters would form the core, or skeleton, of the future party.

Iskra launched its activities at a time when wide sections of society were up in arms against the autocracy. There were many different groups in the Social-Democratic movement, and each insisted
that the course it recommended was the only right one. This movement also involved petty-bourgeois intellectuals, who in essence had nothing in common with the socialist aims of the proletariat but who for the time being were fellow-travellers of the working class in so far as the struggle against tsarism was concerned. All the revolutionary Marxist forces had to be united, and to achieve this they had to dissociate themselves from all sorts of fellow-travellers and opportunist elements, and give a clear-cut definition of their own position. And *Iskra* proclaimed:

"Before we can unite, and in order that we may unite, we must first of all draw firm and definite lines of demarcation" (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, p. 354).

What had to be done in the first place was to draw a line of demarcation from the Economists, who constituted the principal obstacle to the founding of a Marxist party. *Iskra* launched an energetic offensive against them.

An outstanding part in the struggle for a revolutionary Marxist party was played by Lenin's book, *What Is To Be Done?*, published in March 1902.

The idea which runs through Lenin's book is that the Party is the revolutionising, leading and organising force of the working-class movement.

Lenin showed that Economism was a most vicious caricature of Marxism. The Economists maintained that since everything in history was governed by immutable laws, the role of the conscious element in social development was insignificant. More than this. All conscious, planned activity was superfluous and even harmful, because it was almost an act of violence against the objective course of history. That is why, the Economists argued, the Party should not consciously guide the spontaneous working-class movement, but should wait passively for the proletariat itself to come gradually to socialism.

Marxism, however, has nothing in common with the opportunist philosophy of spontaneity, which depreciates theory and consciousness in the eyes of the workers. On the contrary, Marxism attaches vast importance to the consciousness, energy and determination of the leaders of the people. The right theory is a powerful weapon in the revolutionary struggle that helps us to understand the present and foresee the future, and facilitates and hastens the proletariat's achievement of its aims. Lenin wrote:

"The role of vanguard fighter can be fulfilled only by a party that is guided by the most advanced theory" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 370).

This advanced, revolutionary theory, a reliable guide to revolutionary action, is Marxism.

The proletariat fights the bourgeoisie not only in the sphere of politics and economics, but also in that of theory, of ideology. The
ideological struggle is of exceptional, vital importance for the working class. The point is that there are two ideologies in capitalist society: bourgeois and socialist. By virtue of its social position, the working class is drawn towards socialism; but the bourgeoisie, as the ruling class, does its utmost to inoculate the proletariat with its own ideology. The Economists helped the bourgeoisie in this by denying the necessity of imparting a socialist consciousness to the working class and declaring that the socialist ideology springs of its own accord from the spontaneous working-class movement. But socialist ideology, that is, Marxism, arises in the process of the development of science, and is introduced into the working-class movement by the political party of the proletariat.

“All worship of the spontaneity of the working-class movement, all belittling of the role of ‘the conscious element’, of the role of Social-Democracy, means, quite independently of whether he who belittles that role desires it or not, a strengthening of the influence of bourgeois ideology upon the workers” (Collected Works, Vol. 5, pp. 382-83).

The socialist and bourgeois ideologies are engaged in a life-and-death struggle: Lenin emphasised:

“The only choice is—either bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle course. . . . Hence, to belittle the socialist ideology in any way, to turn aside from it in the slightest degree means to strengthen the bourgeois ideology” (ibid., p. 384).

It is therefore imperative to wage constant and resolute struggle against bourgeois ideas which penetrate into the ranks of the proletariat. This struggle is waged by the Marxist party, one of whose most important tasks is to guard the ideological independence of the proletariat, to disseminate socialist ideology among the working class. The Party is the class-conscious section of the proletariat, which imparts a socialist consciousness to the spontaneous working-class movement.

Lenin explained that the worship of spontaneity converts the working-class party into a passive force, that such a party trails behind the working-class movement and bears no resemblance whatsoever to the guiding staff of this movement. In fact, it leaves the proletariat without a party and thus disarms it in the face of its class enemies.

The Economists preached profoundly erroneous and harmful views on the political struggle of the proletariat in general, and on the political tasks of Russia’s working class in particular. They advised the Social-Democrats to confine themselves exclusively to organising the “economic struggle of the workers against their employers and the government” and thus “lend the economic struggle itself a political character”. But the economic struggle against the employers and the government restricts the working-class movement to questions of better terms for the sale of labour power, whereas the proletariat is interested in the complete abolition of the exploiting system and replacement of it by socialism.
In order to wage a successful struggle for socialism, the proletariat must have a high level of class political consciousness. This consciousness is fostered in the proletariat by the Marxist party, which teaches it to observe and properly appraise all classes in every aspect of their life, and to react against every case of tyranny and oppression from its own standpoint, no matter what class is effected.

The working class of Russia, wrote Lenin, must act as the vanguard fighter for democracy, as the organiser and leader of the nation-wide struggle against tsarism. For this the proletariat needs a party that is really the vanguard of its class. In order that the party may in fact become this vanguard, it must organise the political exposure of the autocracy from every angle and utilise every manifestation of protest against this, the bitterest enemy of the people. It must be in the forefront of the struggle to solve all common democratic problems, while unwaveringly defending the interests of the proletariat and its socialist aims. Therein lies one of the most important tasks of the Marxist party as the political leader of the working class in the struggle for its emancipation.

"The Social-Democrat’s ideal," Lenin pointed out, "should not be the trade union secretary, but the tribune of the people, who is able to react to every manifestation of tyranny and oppression, no matter where it appears, no matter what stratum or class of the people it affects; who is able to generalise all these manifestations and produce a single picture of police violence and capitalist exploitation; who is able to take advantage of every event, however small, in order to set forth before all his socialist convictions and his democratic demands, in order to clarify for all and everyone the world-historic significance of the struggle for the emancipation of the proletariat" (ibid., p. 423).

It was this famous definition by Lenin of the real revolutionary as a tribune of the people that guided the Party in educating its members and demanding that they should become political leaders. The Party organisations learned how to organise the masses, explaining to them the socialist convictions and democratic demands of the working class.

The Économists’ servile worship of spontaneity caused no less harm in the sphere of working-class organisation. The Économists sought to justify primitive methods and to create organisations of a narrow trade union type. Lenin wrote bitterly that the activity of the Social-Democratic organisations of that period reminded one of a march of peasants armed with cudgels against a modern army. To win the war against tsarism and capitalism, the working class needed a strong organisation of its own.

"Give us an organisation of revolutionaries, and we will overturn Russia!" declared Lenin (ibid., p. 467).

Lenin pointed out that the working class of Russia could fulfil its historic tasks only if it had a militant, centralised, revolutionary
Marxist party, inseparably linked with the masses. Such a party would ensure the strength and stability of the revolutionary working-class movement. Completely devoted to the revolution, it would enjoy the absolute confidence of the widest sections of the working class. To build a party, professional revolutionaries were needed who would devote themselves wholly to revolutionary activity, perseveringly and systematically cultivating in themselves the necessary qualities. In this way a well-knit team of leaders would be built up, tested and trained in a long school of political activity, without whom “no class in modern society can wage a determined struggle” (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 461).

The Marxist party, wrote Lenin, is “the highest form of the socialist working-class movement”. A specific feature of the working-class movement in Russia was that in it there first developed a political organisation of the working class, which had no organisations other than Social-Democratic. Lenin, however, foresaw the appearance of various organisations in the working-class movement. He pointed out that the party of the working class should be surrounded by the latter’s other organisations: trade unions, cultural and educational societies, etc. The Party, as the *highest form of class organisation*, had the mission of leading all the other organisations of the proletariat.

Lenin showed that great historic tasks confronted the revolutionary Marxist party of the working class of Russia. He wrote prophetically:

“History has now confronted us with an immediate task which is the *most revolutionary* of all the *immediate* tasks confronting the proletariat of any country. The fulfilment of this task, the destruction of the most powerful bulwark, not only of European, but (it may now be said) of Asiatic reaction, would make the Russian proletariat the *vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat*” (*ibid.*, p. 373).

Lenin’s book *What Is To Be Done?* played an outstanding part in the ideological defeat of Economism, in uniting the Party cadres on the basis of Marxism, in preparing for the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and in founding a revolutionary Marxist party in Russia. It dealt a telling blow at the revisionists in the West European Social-Democratic parties as represented by Bernstein and his followers, and exposed their opportunism and betrayal of the interests of the working class.

In the new period of history, when revolutionary battles of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie were approaching, Lenin raised the question of the working-class party from a new angle. The West European Socialist parties were not directing the various forms of the class struggle of the proletariat. They confined themselves to parliamentary activity. Their opportunism was becoming increasingly evident, they were not preparing the Party cadres and working-class masses for revolution.
Lenin was the first Marxist to see that the working class needed a party of a new type. He expounded his views on this party, on its character and its role in the working-class movement, and the basic principles that should underlie its activities, in his book *What Is To Be Done?*

The historic significance of *What Is To Be Done?* lies in the fact that in it Lenin, developing the ideas of Marx and Engels on the proletarian party, worked out foundations of the theory of the revolutionary Marxist party as a party of a new type.

He substantiated the fundamental Marxist proposition that a Marxist party is a fusion of the working-class movement with socialism.

He brought out the supreme importance of the theory of scientific socialism for the working-class movement and for the entire activity of the Party.

He elaborated the conception of the Party as the political leader of the proletariat, as the guiding force of the working-class movement, a force which unites and directs the class struggle of the proletariat.

He proved that it was necessary completely to reorganise the whole work of the Party with a view to educating and preparing the masses for revolution.

He showed that the ideological roots of opportunism lie primarily in worship of spontaneity in the working-class movement and in belittling the role of socialist consciousness in that movement.

The Leninist *Iskra* raised aloft the banner of struggle for the revolutionary theory of Marxism. In the international battle of the revolutionaries against the opportunists, the Russian Marxists were in the front ranks. In defending the purity of Marxism, Lenin laid special emphasis on the necessity of developing theory further, of enriching it with the experience of the practical movement. At the time when preparations were still being made for the publication of *Iskra*, Lenin wrote:

“We do not regard Marx's theory as something completed and inviolable; on the contrary, we are convinced that it has only laid the foundation stone of the science which socialists must develop in all directions if they wish to keep pace with life” (*Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 211-12).

Lenin explained that the general principles of Marxism must be applied in each country with due regard to its specific features, and that it was the duty of the Russian socialists to elaborate Marxist theory by themselves. The work of Lenin himself was a brilliant example of this creative approach to Marxism.

Narodism, which had revived under the influence of the revolutionary upsurge, was a great danger to the creation of a revolutionary Marxist party. At the end of 1901 the remnants of various Narodnik groups united under the high-sounding title of Socialist-Revolutionary Party (S.R.s). In 1901-02, the S.R.s carried out several terrorist acts, and, in particular, assassinated two tsarist
ministers. The Narodnaya Volya traditions of conspiracy and terrorism, and a certain, purely outward revolutionism of the Socialist-Revolutionaries appealed to the revolutionary intelligentsia, to a section of the workers and even to less stable Social-Democrats.

Iskra came out most sharply against the Socialist-Revolutionaries. By denying the class distinctions between the proletariat and the peasantry and dissolving them, together with the intelligentsia, in the general mass of the working people, the Socialist-Revolutionaries made it difficult for the working class to realise its own leading role in the revolutionary struggle. By preaching that the intelligentsia should fight the autocracy single-handed, they were diverting the revolutionary forces to futile terrorist acts and undermining the organisation of the revolutionary struggle of the masses. In advancing the demand for the “socialisation of the land”, they deceived the workers and the peasants by arguing that socialism could be introduced in the countryside even under capitalism, by abolishing private property in land and dividing the land equally among the peasants.

One of the most important achievements of Iskra was the drafting of a Programme for the Party. Defining the aims and tasks of the Party, the Programme was to cement the scattered Social-Democratic organisations ideologically into a single party. The draft Programme was published in June 1902. It specified clearly and precisely that the ultimate goal of the working-class movement was the replacement of capitalism by socialism; that the way to this goal was through socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat; and that the immediate tasks of the working-class party in Russia were the revolutionary overthrow of the autocracy and the establishment of a democratic republic.

In conditions of an upsurge of the revolutionary movement in the country, Iskra put forward a broad political plan for organising a nation-wide struggle against tsarism. The activities of Iskra greatly facilitated preparations for the approaching revolution.

Iskra considered one of its main tasks to be the transformation of the existing Social-Democratic committees into real headquarters of the leaders and organisers of the class struggle of the proletariat. Unlike the West European Socialist parties, which confined themselves to peaceful parliamentary activities, Iskra called for revolutionary struggle and stressed the importance of revolutionary methods, such as political strikes and demonstrations. The role of the committees in the working-class movement grew steadily, and so did their influence and leadership. Working in the very heart of the working-class movement, they strengthened their contacts with the masses, and trained genuine leaders of the masses.

Iskra consistently advocated proletarian leadership of the revolutionary struggle of the masses. It set before the Social-Democrats the task of “going among all classes of the population”. Under its
influence the Social-Democratic organisations broadened the scope of their work.

*Iskra* devoted special attention to the peasantry as the ally of the proletariat. It called on the working class to give all possible support to the peasant movement. And when peasant disturbances began in the spring of 1902, the Social-Democrats reacted to them with a clearer understanding of their tasks. In the nineties, Social-Democratic ideas had been carried to the countryside by workers who had been banished from the cities for taking part in “disorders”. Now the R.S.D.L.P. committees established direct contact with the countryside: leaflets addressed to the peasants appeared and Social-Democratic propaganda groups were organised among the peasants. Modest as those early successes may have been, they were of tremendous and fundamental importance, for they marked the beginning of the regular dissemination of the ideas of the class struggle and of political consciousness among the many millions of peasants.

In his pamphlet, *To the Rural Poor*, published in 1903, Lenin expounded, in popular language comprehensible to the peasantry, the policy of the workers’ party, and explained to the village poor what their position should be in the revolutionary struggle.

“All Russian workers and all the rural poor,” wrote Lenin, “must fight with both hands and on two sides: with one hand,—fight against all the bourgeois, in alliance with all the workers; and with the other hand,—fight against the rural officials, against the feudal landlords, in alliance with all the peasants...”

“The first step in the countryside will be the complete emancipation of the peasant, full rights for the peasant, and the establishment of peasant committees for the purpose of restoring the cut-off lands. But our final step will be the same in both town and country: we shall take all the land and all the factories from the landlords and the bourgeoisie and set up a socialist society” (*Collected Works*, Vol. 6, pp. 409, 419).

The Social-Democratic organisations were also active in the army. A Revolutionary Military Organisation, closely associated with the R.S.D.L.P., was formed in December 1902. The influence of Social-Democracy among the students increased. Social-Democratic groups were formed in the universities and colleges. At the beginning of 1902 the All-Russian Students’ Congress resolved to establish the closest possible relations with the R.S.D.L.P.

*Iskra* encouraged manifestations of discontent at the order existing in tsarist Russia on the part of any section of society. That also determined its attitude towards the opposition movement of the liberal bourgeoisie. So long as the liberals did not constitute an organised political group, *Iskra* encouraged their protests against the arbitrary rule of tsarist autocracy, at the same time, however, criticising their half-heartedness and cowardice. But in 1902, following the appearance of a political group of liberals headed by P. Struve, with
its own organ *Osvobozhdeniye* (Emancipation), which was published abroad and laid claim to leadership of the liberation movement, what became most important for *Iskra* was the exposure of the anti-revolutionary nature of liberalism.

The militant newspaper of the Russian Marxists consistently defended the right of every nation to shape its own fate. It vigorously combated all manifestations of national oppression. *Iskra* took up the defence of the legitimate rights of the Finnish people, indignantly denouncing the violence of the tsarist gang. It exposed the policy of colonial conquest in the Far East, and branded as a crime the war against the Chinese people organised by Russian tsarism and the European imperialists. The Leninist *Iskra* did much to inspire the working masses of the oppressed nations with confidence in the Russian proletariat, and to make them see that it was a steadfast and indomitable fighter against all forms of national oppression. At the same time *Iskra* waged an uncompromising struggle against the Jewish, Polish and other petty-bourgeois nationalists who sowed national discord among the workers. Lenin tirelessly conducted propaganda for the principle of proletarian internationalism. He explained that only a close alliance of the workers of the oppressed nations with the Russian proletariat, only the militant unity of the entire working class of Russia, irrespective of nationality, would lead them to victory over tsarism and ensure the complete political and economic emancipation of the working people.

Thus, by steadily and consistently spreading the influence of the working class to all spheres of the country's social life, the Leninist *Iskra* awakened political discontent in the various strata of the population. *Iskra* was building a party that would fight against all economic, political, social and national oppression; it was educating the working class to be the leader of the struggle of the whole nation against tsarism.

*Iskra* persistently put into effect Lenin's plan of organisation. In his "Letter to a Comrade on Our Organisational Tasks", Lenin proposed the following pattern for building the local organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. There should be one Party committee in every city to lead the local movement. An end should be put to the abnormal and harmful division of the local organisations into two separate committees, one for the workers and the other for the intellectuals, as practised by the Economists. The committee should include all the chief leaders of the working-class movement, with the widest contacts and the greatest prestige among the masses. It should have two types of organisation subordinated to it. First, district groups and factory subcommittees. Every factory should become our stronghold, Lenin insisted. The district and factory groups would link the committee with the working-class masses. Secondly, groups attached to the committee itself, serving the various requirements of the Party: groups for propagandists; groups for transport, printing, the provi-
sion of clandestine quarters, shadowing spies; youth groups; groups of government officials assisting the Party, etc. Some of these groups would be part of the Party organisation, while others would be closely associated with it and work under its influence. In this way each local Party organisation was to consist of leading Party workers, chiefly professional revolutionaries, and of a wide network of circles and groups around them. This structure of the organisation would ensure centralism, discipline, close contact with the masses, manoeuvrability and flexibility. The reconstruction of the Social-Democratic organisations began on the basis of Lenin’s plan.

A strong organisation of professional revolutionaries was built up around *Iskra*. A Russian organisation of *Iskra* and the League of the Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad were formed. A body of professional revolutionaries, people selflessly devoted to the cause of the proletariat, men and women of high principle and well-disciplined, uncompromising in their attitude towards all opportunist scum and inseparably linked with the masses, was tempered in the severe conditions of underground work, in the struggle against numerous enemies. Among these professional revolutionaries were I. V. Babushkin, N. E. Bauman, M. I. Kalinin, V. Z. Ketskhoveli, N. K. Krupskaya, M. M. Litvinov, G. I. Petrovsky, O. A. Pyatnitsky, S. G. Shahumyan, N. A. Skrypnik, A. A. Solts, S. S. Spandaryan, J. V. Stalin, Y. D. Stasova, Y. M. Sverdlov, R. S. Zemlyachka and many other *Iskra*-ists. The *Iskra*-ist organisation of professional revolutionaries played a signal part in the creation and development of the Party.

*Iskra* took part as a single unit in the struggle to found the Party. But during the drafting of the programme and tactics of the Party Lenin had to overcome serious wavering and vacillations on the editorial board of *Iskra*. Differences made their appearance over the question of the attitude towards the liberal bourgeoisie. Lenin favoured severe criticism of the political flabbiness and cowardice of the liberals and held that their anti-revolutionary nature should be exposed. Plekhanov and Axelrod regarded the liberals as allies in the revolution.

Sharp disputes arose over the Programme. Plekhanov vacillated on the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was only thanks to Lenin that the basic proposition of Marxism regarding the dictatorship of the proletariat was formulated clearly in the draft Programme. Plekhanov dissolved the proletariat in the general mass of the working people; he failed to emphasise that the working class could and should unite around itself all those oppressed by capital. The idea of the leadership of the Party in the class struggle of the proletariat was likewise lacking in his conception. At Lenin’s instance, the proletarian character of the Party and the idea of the hegemony of the working class were clearly expressed in the draft Programme, and the vanguard, leading role of the Party in the working-class movement precisely indicated.
A sharp struggle developed over the agrarian programme. Lenin put forward the demand for the abolition of the survivals of serfdom in the village, and, in particular, for the return of the "cut-off" lands (otrezki) to the peasants. At the same time Lenin held that, as the revolutionary peasant movement developed, the demand for the restoration of the "cut-off" lands to the peasants would have to be replaced by a programme of nationalisation of the land. Lenin's proposition on the nationalisation of the land was opposed by Plekhanov, Axelrod and Martov, who underestimated the importance of an alliance of the workers and peasants in the revolution.

In the disputes on the editorial board two political lines already became evident: the revolutionary Marxist and the opportunist trends. The sharp clashes over basic questions of principle threatened at times to cause a complete rupture in the leadership of Iskra, but matters were not carried to a split at that time.

Thanks to Lenin's leadership, Iskra adopted a revolutionary Marxist position on all questions concerning the working-class movement. Lenin later described the old Iskra as having been fully Bolshevik in its trend.

"During the three years 1900-03," wrote Lenin, "Bolshevism led the old Iskra and emerged for the struggle against Menshevism as an integral trend" (Collected Works, Vol. 16, p. 41).

Iskra began its work in an atmosphere of ideological vacillations and organisational chaos. As a result of its work over a period of almost three years, the ground was prepared in ideology and organisation for the foundation of a revolutionary Marxist party. In the second half of 1902 and the beginning of 1903 all the committees (with the exception of the Voronezh Committee, where the Economists were still in control) joined Iskra. It was necessary to consolidate the victory of Iskra at a Party congress.

3. Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Founding of the Bolshevik Party

The Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. met secretly at first in Brussels and later in London, from July 17 to August 10, 1903. It was attended by 43 delegates representing 26 organisations, with 51 votes between them. For the thoroughness with which it was prepared, its wide representation and the range of questions it had to decide, the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. was an event unprecedented in the whole history of the Russian revolutionary movement. Immediately before and during the Congress, a great wave of general strikes swept over the southern Russia. The delegates brought to the Congress the breath of the approaching revolutionary storm.

The principal task of the Congress, Lenin pointed out, was to create a real revolutionary workers' party according to the princi-
pies and on the organisational lines proposed and worked out by Iskra. This task was accomplished in a bitter struggle against opportunism.

With 33 votes, Iskra commanded a majority at the Congress. The opponents of the Iskra-ists had 8 votes (3 Economists and 5 Bund-ists). The Southern Worker group, which was supported by the vacillating elements, the Centrists, or the "quagmire", as Lenin called them, had 10 votes. Although the majority of the delegates considered themselves supporters of Iskra, they were not all real Leninist Iskra-ists. The firm and consistent Iskra-ists, the supporters of Lenin, commanded 24 votes; the so-called "mild" Iskra-ists, the future Mensheviks, who followed Martov, commanded 9 votes. The opponents of the Iskra-ists tried to exploit every disagreement among the Iskra-ists to their own ends.

When founding the Party, the Congress had to overcome an obstacle such as the existence of separate "circles". The existence of separate "circles", each with its own conception of the fundamental principles of the Party's policy, was a specific feature of the development of the Social-Democratic movement in Russia. The task of the Congress was to replace the narrow study circle connections by a single system of wide Party connections, to set up a party in which all units would be firmly welded together ideologically and organisationally. The process of drawing all these "circles" into the Party was a painful one, and at the Congress the principles of Party organisation came into conflict again and again with the protagonists of the "circle" principle.

The Congress opened with a discussion of the place of the Bund in the Party. That was not accidental. Iskra upheld the idea of uniting the foremost workers of all the nations inhabiting Russia in one centralised party. The Bund, however, wanted a party based on the principles of federation, regarding it as a formal union of national organisations independent of the general leadership of the Party. Such organisations would have been loosely linked with one another, and would not have constituted a united proletarian party. The issue was all the more important because federalist sentiments made themselves felt in the Social-Democratic organisations of the Poles, Letts, Lithuanians and Armenians.

Lenin and his followers waged an uncompromising struggle against the organisational nationalism of the Bund, explaining the harmfulness of federation, which sanctioned estrangement in the internal life of the Party and contradicted the principle of centralism. The Congress rejected the nationalist principle of federation in building the Party. Lenin's idea of a party based on the principles of centralism and proletarian internationalism triumphed.

The significance of the Congress decision transcended the bounds of Russia. The point at issue was a cardinal organisational principle of a workers' party in a multi-national country. Shortly before the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. the Austrian Social-Democrats,
who were also operating in a multi-national country, declared for a federation, and their single party broke up into organisations representing the various nationalities. The Russian Marxists indicated the only correct path of building up the Party, a path ensuring the militant unity of the workers of all nations.

The Congress then proceeded to consider the question of the Party Programme.

A sharp struggle developed around the clause on the dictatorship of the proletariat. The opportunist leaders—the Bundist Lieber and the Economists Akimov and Martynov—furiously opposed the inclusion of the clause on the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Programme, referring as they did so to the programmes of the West European Socialist parties, which did not raise the question of establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat. They alleged that class contradictions were growing less sharp, and that a gradual improvement in the standard of living of the working class would automatically lead to socialism, without the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Congress delivered a decisive blow to the opportunist and voted for the inclusion in the Programme of the fundamental Marxist principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The Economists objected to the Programme’s proposition on the leading role of the Party in the working-class movement, and proposed a number of amendments along the lines of the “theory of spontaneity”. The Congress rejected all their amendments.

The opportunist objected with particular vehemence to the Programme’s demands on the peasant question. By assertions that the peasantry was not revolutionary they sought to cover up their unwillingness, and even fear, to rouse the masses to revolution. Essentially, the opportunists were bitterly opposed to the proletariat being the leading force in the revolution and to an alliance between the workers and peasants.

Speaking in defence of the agrarian programme, Lenin emphasised that the demand for the abolition of the survivals of serfdom was revolutionary in character.

“We believe,” said Lenin, “that, since the Social-Democrats have now taken up the struggle for the interests of the peasants, we shall in future reckoning with the fact that the peasant masses will get used to looking upon Social-Democracy as the defender of their interests” (Collected Works, Vol. 6, p. 497).

Serious disputes arose over the national question. For a multi-national country like Russia it was exceptionally important to have a correct programme and policy on the national question. Lenin elaborated the theoretical principles and practical demands of the Marxist national programme. In his work, The National Question in Our Programme, and in other articles published in Iskra, he substantiated the consistently internationalist principles of the Programme: the demand for the full equality of all citizens irrespective
of nationality, recognition of the right to self-determination for all
nations forming part of the state, the principle of uniting the workers
of all nations in common class organisations (party, trade unions,
etc.).

The Programme slogan of the right of nations to self-determination
was a powerful weapon for the Party in its revolutionary struggle,
for it drew the oppressed nationalities of Russia to the side of the
proletariat as the consistent fighter against national oppression, and
helped to educate the working class in the spirit of proletarian inter-
nationalism. To this slogan, the Bundists opposed the utterly oppor-
tunist and nationalist demand for national cultural autonomy. This
demand divided the workers according to their various national cul-
tures, and destroyed the international class unity of the proletariat;
it limited the interests of the working people of different nations to
cultural matters and diverted them from the struggle for revolution,
for the democratic reorganisation of the state as a whole. An incor-
rect stand on the national question was taken at the Congress by
the representatives of Polish Social-Democracy. They wrongly held
that the demand for the right of nations to self-determination would
play into the hands of the Polish nationalists, and proposed that it
be withdrawn.

Lenin's ideas and the Party Programme on the national question,
adopted by the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., represented a
blow at nationalism. They enriched Marxist theory and helped the
Party to pursue a correct national policy.

All the attacks of the opportunists were beaten off by the Iskra-
ists. The Congress approved the Iskra Programme which consisted
of two parts: a maximum programme and a minimum programme.
The maximum programme dealt with the fundamental task of the
Party, that of building a socialist society, and with the conditions
necessary for achieving this—a socialist revolution and the establish-
ment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The minimum programme
dealt with the immediate aims of the Party, namely, the overthrow
of tsarism, a bourgeois-democratic revolution, the establishment of
a democratic republic, the introduction of an 8-hour working day,
complete equality and the right to self-determination for all nations,
and the abolition of the remnants of serfdom in the countryside.

The Programme adopted by the Second Congress was a truly Marx-
ist programme of a revolutionary proletarian party. Unlike the
West European Social-Democratic parties, the R.S.D.L.P. at that
time was the only working-class party in the world whose Programme
formulated the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This Pro-
gramme was the result of the theoretical work of the Russian Marx-
ists, and it enriched Marxism considerably. It defined the consist-
ently Marxist policy of the Party and helped to educate the prole-
teriat in a spirit of revolutionary struggle for power. The Party could
legitimately be proud of this Programme. It was the foundation on
which the Bolshevik Party took shape and gained strength. Guided by it, the Party fought successfully for the victory of the bourgeois-democratic and socialist revolutions in Russia.

The Congress noted the outstanding services of *Iskra* in the fight against opportunism, in the defence and development of Marxism and in building the Party, and declared *Iskra* to be the central organ of the Party. The Congress thereby recognised the *Iskra*-ist trend as that of the entire Party.

Discussion of the Party Rules, and, especially, of Clause 1, dealing with Party membership, revealed two sharply opposed approaches to the question of the Party. Lenin proposed the following formulation for Clause 1: “A Party member is one who recognises the Party programme and supports the Party financially, as well as by personal participation in one of its organisations.” In opposition to Lenin, Martov proposed his formulation, according to which a Party member could be “one who accepts its programme, supports the Party financially, and renders it regular personal assistance under the guidance of one of its organisations”. Thus, when the definition of membership was discussed, Lenin insisted on “personal participation in one of the Party organisations”, while Martov proposed simply “regular personal assistance”.

Lenin regarded the Party as an organised whole. Every Party member must belong to one of the Party organisations. That ensured both a Marxist training and high discipline for every one of its members, and real control and firm guidance of his activities by the Party. This made the Party a harmonious system of organisations functioning according to a single plan, and an embodiment of discipline and organisation.

Martov proposed admitting to the Party all who wanted to join, without binding them to membership of one of its organisations or submitting them to Party discipline. Martov and his followers supported the “open-door” policy of the Social-Democratic parties of the Second International, which weakened strict adherence to principle in the Party organisation of the proletariat. In the opinion of the Martovites, any striker or intellectual had the right to regard himself as a member of the Party, even if he did not belong, and did not want to belong, to one of the Party organisations. Thus the Party would have lost its clearly defined organisational boundaries, and would have become a heterogeneous, loose and amorphous body.

Lenin’s conception of membership safeguarded the firmness of the Marxist party line and the purity of its principles, and made it difficult for unstable elements to get into the Party.

“It is our task,” said Lenin at the Congress, “to safeguard the firmness, consistency, and purity of our Party. We must strive to raise the calling and importance of a Party member higher, higher and still higher—and I therefore oppose Martov’s formulation” (*Collected Works*, Vol. 6, p. 504).
Lenin warned against the danger of cluttering up the Party with all kinds of unstable, vacillating and opportunist elements. This danger, which threatens a workers’ party in any country, was particularly great in Russia, a country which was on the eve of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, in consequence of which petty-bourgeois elements were seeking to join the Party. Lenin’s advice to be discriminating when admitting members into the Party and to be most exacting as regards the title of Party member became one of the basic principles of organisation of the Bolshevik Party.

The cardinal issue in the struggle over Clause 1 of the draft Rules was the question of what the nature of the Party should be. The Leninists fought for a monolithic, militant and disciplined revolutionary proletariat party with a clearly defined organisational structure, whereas the Martovites wanted an amorphous and heterogeneous, loose, petty-bourgeois, opportunist party. Lenin fought for such internal Party structure as would ensure its consistent revolutionary character. That is why Martov’s formulation was solidly backed by all the opportunist elements: the Bundists, the Economists, the Centrists and the “mild” Iskra-ists. The opportunists, from Akimov to Trotsky, joined forces, and the Congress adopted, by a majority of 28 votes to 22 with one abstention, Martov’s formulation of Clause 1 of the Rules.

The Leninists were not discouraged by the opportunists’ temporary victory. A sharp struggle developed over the question of the role of the Party’s leading bodies. The opportunists tried their utmost to limit the leading role of the Central Committee. They proposed restricting the right of the Central Committee to dissolve local committees, and considering only those decisions of the Central Committee which concerned the whole Party as binding on Party organisations. These proposals were rejected by the Congress. It was clearly stated in the Rules that the Central Committee “unites and guides all the practical activities of the Party”, allocates the Party’s forces and funds, organises the various Party institutions and guides their work, and that “all the decisions of the Central Committee are binding on all Party organisations . . .” (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part I, p. 46). These provisions remained in all the later rules of the Party. The firm Iskra-ists thus successfully upheld the principle of centralism in the structure of the Party, as against the opportunist principle of autonomy and federation.

The struggle for the Party Rules which the Iskra-ists waged under Lenin’s leadership was of tremendous significance. Lenin and his supporters won the day for Iskra’s organisational plan at the Congress. It was on the foundation of this plan that there arose and was consolidated a revolutionary Marxist party in Russia—the Bolshevik Party.

In connection with the adoption of the Rules, the Congress adopted a number of decisions aimed at strengthening Party organisation.
It resolved to put an end to the abnormal situation abroad created by the existence of two organisations, the Economist Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad and the Iskra-ist League of the Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad, and recognised the latter as the only organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. abroad. In protest, the two Economists representing their Union left the Congress.

At the Congress, the Bund demanded to be recognised as the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat. That would have meant dividing the workers in the Party organisations according to nationality, and renouncing common class organisations of the proletariat. The Bund was a Jewish nationalist organisation. The Congress rejected its demands, whereupon the five Bundists also left the Congress, declaring that the Bund was withdrawing from the R.S.D.L.P. The departure of these seven opportunists altered the balance of forces in favour of the firm Iskra-ists.

It was necessary to consolidate the victory of Iskra-ist principles in the spheres of the programme, tactics and organisation by taking decisive steps to do away with the narrow study circle principle and electing a leadership which would ensure a consistently revolutionary direction of the Party’s entire activity. The Leninists demanded the election of a Central Committee which would be composed of staunch and consistent revolutionaries. The Martovites strove to secure the predominance of unstable, opportunist elements in the Central Committee. The firm Iskra-ists proposed electing Lenin, Martov and Plekhanov to the editorial board of Iskra. The Martovites insisted on all the six former editors remaining there.

Lenin’s plan for consolidating the victory of the Iskra principle of Party organisation had the firm support of the majority of the delegates. Lenin, Martov and Plekhanov were elected to the Iskra editorial board, Krzhizhanovsky, Lengnik and Noskov were elected to the Party’s Central Committee. Martov, however, refused to join the editorial board, and his supporters did not take part in the elections to the Central Committee.

By its vote on the question of the central bodies the Congress confirmed the victory of Lenin’s principles in the Party. From that time on, Lenin’s supporters, who obtained a majority of votes in the elections to the leading organs of the Party, have been called the Bolsheviks (from the Russian word bolshinstvo, majority), and Lenin’s opponents the Mensheviks (from the word menshinstvo, minority). The word Bolshevik, born in the battles at the Congress, became synonymous with the conception of “a consistent Marxist revolutionary, who is utterly devoted to the cause of the working class, to the cause of communism”.

The victory of the Bolsheviks at the Congress was prepared by the entire development of the Social-Democratic movement. Represented
at the Congress were the Party cadres who had grown in a bitter struggle of principle against the opportunists. The intention of the Martovites to turn the leadership of the Party over to unstable, vacillating elements was bound to alienate consistent supporters of the *Iskra* line. The interests of the Party were staunchly defended at the Congress—against the alliance of heterogeneous opportunist elements that was taking shape—by the representatives of the biggest committees: A. V. Shotman of St. Petersburg, N. E. Bauman of Moscow, B. M. Knunyants of Baku, S. I. Gusev of the Don Committee, P. A. Krasikov of Kiev, R. S. Zemlyachka of Odessa, L. M. Knipovich and A. M. Stopani of the Northern League, S. I. Stepanov and D. I. Ulyanov (Lenin’s brother) of Tula.

At the Congress Lenin’s outstanding role in the struggle for the Party became increasingly evident. All those who consistently fought for the formation of a Marxist party united around Lenin.

*The creation of a revolutionary Marxist party, the Bolshevik Party, was the principal result of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.*

The working-class movement in Russia had travelled a long and thorny path before it evolved its highest form, namely, an independent political party. This Party was based on the ideological and organisational principles elaborated by the Leninist *Iskra*; its core was made up of professional revolutionaries tempered in battle, and its leaders were Leninist Bolsheviks.

The appearance of a working-class revolutionary party was a most important landmark in the history of Russia. Since the middle of the nineties the proletariat had been a major political force in the life of the country. And with the formation of its own party it began to be transformed into the leader of all the working people. In the Programme of the R.S.D.L.P., the working class, the dispossessed peasant masses and the oppressed nationalities found expression for their innermost aspirations. While the liberals were willing to settle for a moderate constitution, with the tsarist monarchy being retained, and the Socialist-Revolutionaries went no further than the vague demand for political liberty, the workers’ party called on the masses to overthrow the tsarist autocracy and completely democratise all public life with the aim of fighting for the socialist revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the fundamental reconstruction of society on socialist principles. The R.S.D.L.P. proved to be the only party in Russia whose activities wholly accorded with the interests of the country and the people.

The Second Congress was an event of historic importance for the world. It marked a turning-point in the international working-class movement. In Western Europe the working-class parties had taken shape in the conditions of a comparatively peaceful development of capitalism, when the era of bourgeois revolutions had in the main come to an end, and the era of socialist revolution had not yet begun.
In this situation there gradually developed parliamentary parties that were corrupted by bourgeois legality and reconciled to opportunism in their midst. In Russia the workers’ party took shape in a situation of approaching revolution. It was faced with the task of preparing the masses for that revolution. The Party became steeled and tempered as a completely revolutionary force in conditions of savage police persecution and in bitter struggle against various manifestations of opportunism.

In Russia, the Marxist party appeared at the beginning of a new era in history, the era of imperialism, when the proletariat was on the threshold of revolutionary battles. The parties of the Second International were incapable of solving the new problems correctly, in a Marxist way; they did not prepare the working class for revolutionary battles aiming at the overthrow of the capitalist yoke and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. After the death of Engels (1895) the leadership of the Second International drifted more and more towards opportunism. The very first battles against revisionism at the opening of the twentieth century ended in the leaders of the West European Socialist parties virtually submitting to the enemies of Marxism, who preached renunciation of socialist revolution and agreement with the bourgeoisie. The revolutionary elements in the Second International were too weak to change the situation.

Only the Russian Marxists, that is, the Bolsheviks headed by Lenin, proved equal to the challenge of the new era and supplied the right answer to the fundamental problems of the working-class movement. They defined the role of the Party as that of political leader of the proletariat, and set themselves the task of winning over the masses of the working people to the side of the working class, in order to carry out the socialist revolution and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. They declared one of the most urgent tasks of the working-class movement to be a resolute struggle against opportunism, and they set an example of uncompromising attitude towards it. The Russian Marxists founded a party which systematically educated the working class in a revolutionary spirit, and which trained in its ranks leaders who were closely connected with the masses and able to influence them.

Bolshevism became the most revolutionary and consistently Marxist trend in the international working-class movement. As a result of the activities of Lenin and the Marxists guided by him there arose in Russia, a party of a new type, uncompromising in its attitude towards opportunism and revolutionary with regard to the bourgeoisie, a party of social revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Bolshevik Party.

“As a trend of political thought and as a political party,” wrote Lenin afterwards, “Bolshevism has existed since 1903” (Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 8).
4. Development of the Struggle Against the Mensheviks, for the Consolidation of the Party

The situation in the Party after the Second Congress was complicated by the split that had taken place in the ranks of the Iskra-ists themselves. The Economists had been completely exposed as opportunists and defeated. In the case of the Mensheviks, the Party had to deal with new opportunists, but the truly opportunist nature of the Mensheviks had not yet been laid bare. Every Iskra-ist had yet fully to realise the grave danger which the Mensheviks represented to the Party.

A bitter and stubborn struggle which was to last many years began between the revolutionaries (Bolsheviks) and the opportunists (Mensheviks). It was to have tremendous significance for the destiny of the Party, for the development of the revolution and the country. Lenin and the Bolsheviks sought to ensure that the Party acted on the revolutionary Marxist Programme approved by the Congress and put the Programme into practice. The Mensheviks, on the contrary, tried to direct the Party into opportunist ways. They refused to submit to the decisions of the Congress; but they did not venture to call openly upon their followers to break with the Party; they did not openly proclaim the formation of another party. The Mensheviks resorted to this tactic because they realised how close the R.S.D.L.P. was to the workers, and because they feared they might expose themselves as splitters of the working-class movement. Soon after the Congress the Mensheviks, in secret from the Party, formed their own anti-Party factional organisation, headed by Martov, Trotsky and Axelrod. They set out to capture the leadership in the Party by boycotting the central Party institutions and disorganising the work of the Party. The Mensheviks, in the words of Martov, "rose in revolt against Leninism."

They chose as the base for their struggle against the Party the League of the Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad, where traditions of the old "circles" were particularly strong, where intellectuals predominated and there was no direct contact with the masses of the workers. Gradually the Mensheviks captured all the central institutions of the Party: Iskra in November 1903, and the Central Committee in July 1904. They succeeded in doing so, not because they were able to win over the Party ideologically and convince it that they were right, but because of help received from conciliators in the central Party institutions.

Plekhanov came forward as the advocate of conciliation. He had supported Lenin at the Congress, but soon after it he demanded that the four former Menshevik editors of Iskra be included in the editorial board. Lenin could not agree to this breach of the Congress decision and resigned from the editorial board. Co-opted into the Central Committee, Lenin from this position launched an attack against the
opportunists. Acting by himself, Plekhanov “co-opted” all the former editors to the editorial board of *Iskra*. Explaining his action in an article entitled “What Should Not Be Done”, Plekhanov wrote that it was necessary to make concessions to the opportunists for the sake of peace in the Party. That amounted to surrendering positions of principle to the opponents of the Party. Plekhanov’s article was received with jubilation by all those who were opposed to a revolutionary Marxist party. The bourgeois liberal Struve described it as a “momentous turning-point”.

The activity of Plekhanov himself was a glaring example of “what should not be done”. Starting out with his statement on the need to make concessions to the Mensheviks, even though they occupied a mistaken position, Plekhanov soon ended up by becoming a rabid Menshevik himself. The Party members were able to see for themselves that concessions to opportunism on questions of principle enable opportunism to gain the upper hand.

Plekhanov’s departure from Marxism was due primarily to the fact that he did not understand the new tasks of the working class in the new historical era. His many years of isolation from the Russian working-class movement were also telling. Plekhanov’s vacillations and mistakes in the past, even before the Second Congress, accounted in large measure for his fall.

Beginning with issue No. 52, *Iskra* ceased to be a militant newspaper of revolutionary Marxism, of struggle for the Party. The Mensheviks who had captured *Iskra* converted it into a newspaper fighting against the Party and a forum for the advocacy of opportunism, primarily in the field of organisational questions. The Mensheviks themselves had to admit that “a gulf has formed between the old and the new *Iskra*”. A campaign aimed at undermining the fundamental principles of the Party began. The demand for absolute compliance with all the decisions of the Party was declared to be “bureaucracy” and “formalism”; subordination of the minority to the majority was considered a “grossly mechanical” suppression of the will and freedom of the Party member, and Party discipline was denounced as “serfdom”. The Mensheviks were trying to drag the Party back to organisational disunity and looseness, to the parochial outlook of the old “circles” and to primitive methods.

It was necessary to give decisive battle to the Mensheviks, to expose the opportunistic nature of their views on questions of organisation, to show the full extent of the danger of Menshevism to the Party. This task was accomplished by Lenin in his book, *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*, published in May 1904. In it, the Marxist doctrine of the Party was developed further. Proceeding from the view that the Marxist party is the political leader of the proletariat, Lenin elaborated the following organisational principles of the Bolshevik Party. *The Marxist party is a part of the working class, its vanguard contingent*. The Party must not be confused with the entire class.
It is formed by admitting to its ranks the finest members of the working class, the most class-conscious and best organised, those who are selflessly devoted to the cause of the revolution.

The proletariat is not homogeneous. It consists of strata with varying degrees of class consciousness and practical experience. More than that. Under capitalism, the ranks of the working class are being constantly swelled by ruined peasants and small handycraftsmen. Distinctions between the advanced elements and the remaining mass of workers are inevitable. What would become of the Party if it indiscriminately admitted to its ranks all those who desired to join? Clearly, it would be incapable of performing its role as the vanguard contingent.

The basic mistake in the Mensheviks' views on the Party was that they confused party and class. By demanding that every striker be allowed to call himself a member of the Party, the Mensheviks were obliterating every distinction between the advanced elements and the remaining mass of workers. That would have meant converting the Party into an organisation which would be dragging at the tail of unprogressive moods among the least advanced strata, instead of elevating the entire working class to the level of the class consciousness of its most advanced contingent. That would inevitably have led to the Party losing its vanguard role.

The Party is the highest expression of the class consciousness of the proletariat; it absorbs the most rich experience and the revolutionary traditions of the working class. The Party is armed with advanced revolutionary theory, with a knowledge of the laws of social development and of class struggle: that is what gives it the ability to lead the working class.

The Party is not only the vanguard, but also an organised contingent of the working class. It can carry out its role of advanced contingent if it is organised as a single and general contingent of the working class, welded together by unity of will, unity of action, and unity of discipline.

In order to secure unity of action, the proletariat needs unity of will, and unity of will is inconceivable without organisation. As a class-conscious contingent of the working class, the Party is an embodiment of its organisation. Only as a solidly united organisation can the Party successfully guide the struggle of the working class.

The Mensheviks tried to frighten the Party by saying that many intellectuals would remain outside the Party because they found Party discipline irksome, and did not want to join any of the Party organisations. But the party of the working class had no use for intellectuals with individualist inclinations. The proletariat does not fear organisation and discipline. The whole life of the workers accustoms them to organisation. Large-scale capitalist production unites and disciplines the proletariat; the class struggle helps them to understand the need for organisation and discipline. That is why the
advanced worker appreciates organisation and realises its impor-
tance for the struggle.

The proletariat is heterogeneous not only as regards level of class
consciousness, but also as regards degree of organisation. Organisa-
tion and class consciousness are closely interdependent. The higher
the level of class consciousness, the greater the degree of organisa-
tion. The ranks of the workers include quite backward, unorganised
elements and those less politically developed strata to whom the trade
union is the height of organisation. The Party, as the vanguard con-
tingent of the working class, is the highest form of class organisation
of the proletariat.

The Party will be strong and united only if it is organised on the
principle of centralism. The principle of centralism implies the build-
ing and functioning of the Party on the basis of one set of rules,
its guidance by one leading body—the Party congress and, in the
intervals between congresses, the Central Committee; it implies
uniform discipline, the submission of the minority to the majority
and of the lower units to the higher.

In view of the fact that the Party existed illegally under the tsarist
autocracy, the Party organisations could not in those days be built
up on the elective principle and had therefore to work in strict se-
crecy. But Lenin believed that when the Party became legal, its organ-
isations would be based on the principle of democratic centralism.

The Mensheviks demagogically alleged that centralism would
transform the Party into a “factory” and its members into “cogs and
wheels”. In reality the Mensheviks were opposed to Party discipline,
they wanted to drag the Party back to the times when every Party
organisation acted at its own discretion and did not recognise any
authority in the shape of higher Party bodies.

“Previously,” Lenin wrote, “our Party was not a formally organ-
ised whole, but merely a sum of separate groups, and therefore
no other relations except those of ideological influence were pos-
sible between these groups. Now we have become an organised
Party, and this implies the establishment of authority, the trans-
formation of the power of ideas into the power of authority, the
subordination of lower Party bodies to higher ones” (Collected

Without leadership from a single centre, the party of the working
class cannot be a really revolutionary party, cannot guide the class
struggle of the proletariat.

A united and centralised party is inconceivable without discipline.
Organisation and discipline are closely interconnected; there can be
no strong organisation without strict discipline. Freedom of discus-
sion and criticism, unity of action—that is how Lenin defined dis-
cipline in a workers’ party. Once a decision has been adopted, all the
members of the Party must act as one man, for organisation is unity
of action.
By boycotting the resolutions of the Congress and the decisions of the Central Committee, the Mensheviks were in practice undermining discipline in the Party. They advocated that the Congress resolutions should not be binding on Party members, especially on the "chosen few", the leaders. But the party of the working class cannot establish a procedure which would make its decisions binding on the rank-and-file members but not on the leaders. Such a "procedure" would create a grave threat to the unity of the Party.

"To the individualism of the intellectual, which already manifested itself in the controversy over Clause 1, revealing its tendency to opportunist argument and anarchistic phrase-mongering, all proletarian organisation and discipline seems to be serfdom," wrote Lenin (ibid., pp. 356-57).

Real Party unity is not only ideological unity; it is also unity of organisation, unthinkable without a uniform discipline binding on all Party members.

The Marxist party is the embodiment of the connection between the vanguard of the working class and the working-class millions.

Lenin exposed the fallacy of the Menshevik assertion that the union of the advanced elements in a centralised and disciplined organisation would weaken their contact with the masses, and that a party built up on these principles would lose contact with the masses.

"On the contrary," replied Lenin, "the stronger our Party organisations, consisting of real Social-Democrats the less wavering and instability there is within the Party, the broader, more varied, richer, and more fruitful will be the Party's influence on the elements of the working-class masses surrounding it and guided by it" (ibid., p. 260).

The Party must ever be concerned with multiplying and strengthening its contacts with the non-Party masses, and with winning the confidence of its class. The Marxist party cannot develop unless it strengthens its contacts with the working-class masses, unless it has their support.

The Party gains strength and multiplies its contacts with the masses if it practises inner-Party democracy and self-criticism.

All the members of the Party should be encouraged in every possible way to be more active, to take part in discussing all major questions of Party life.

"To be a party of the masses not only in name, we must get ever wider masses to share in all Party affairs . . ." (ibid., p. 117).

The Marxist party regards it as its duty to carry on "self-criticism and ruthless exposure of its own shortcomings" (ibid., p. 208), and regards this as one of the best ways of eliminating shortcomings in its own work and in training Party cadres.

The Marxist party is the highest form of class organisation of the proletariat.
Lenin explained that by effacing the distinction between the Party as a political organisation and the working class, the Mensheviks were actually denying the significance of the Party as the leading organisation of the working-class movement.

The Marxist party unites the most class-conscious and organised elements of the working class. It is armed with a knowledge of the laws of social development, and has a clear programme and flexible tactics. Such a party is the best school for training working-class leaders; in its ranks the advanced workers acquire the theoretical knowledge and political experience that are essential in order to guide the class struggle of the proletariat in all its forms. By taking part in the daily struggle of the proletariat, and firmly defending its fundamental interests, the Party, its committees and its leaders win the confidence of the working-class masses. All this enables the Party as a political organisation to ensure leadership of all the other organisations of the proletariat, to map out their friendly and concerted action, and to guide their activities towards the common goal—the overthrow of the system of exploitation and the establishment of a socialist system.

Lenin showed that the views of the Mensheviks, which found expression in the discussion on Clause 1 of the Rules, had grown into an entire system of opportunism. The principal features of the organisational opportunism of the Mensheviks were their hostile attitude towards centralism, hatred of discipline, defence of organisational backwardness, their opening of the doors of the party of the working class to petty-bourgeois, opportunist elements, and their denial of the role of the Party as the principal weapon of the working class in the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, for socialism.

The fundamental difference between the Bolshevik and the Menshevik approach to questions of organisation was an expression of two opposite tendencies in building the Party. The Bolsheviks represented proletarian organisation and discipline, while the Mensheviks supported bourgeois-intellectual individualism.

This was the first time in the history of Marxism that an exhaustive criticism had been made of opportunism in matters of organisation and the great danger revealed which the belittlement of the importance of organisation represented to the working-class movement. In his book, Lenin emphatically stressed the immense importance of a Marxist party in the struggle of the working class, especially in the new period of history when the tide of a great people's revolution was rising in Russia and the capitalist world was ripe for a socialist revolution.

"In its struggle for power the proletariat has no other weapon but organisation. Disunited by the rule of anarchic competition in the bourgeois world, ground down by forced labour for capital, constantly thrust back to the 'lower depths' of utter destitution, savagery, and degeneration, the proletariat can, and inevitably
will, become an invincible force only through its ideological unification on the principles of Marxism being reinforced by the material unity of organisation, which welds millions of toilers into an army of the working class. Neither the senile rule of the Russian autocracy nor the senescent rule of international capital will be able to withstand this army” (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 7, p. 415).

“In its struggle for power, the proletariat has no other weapon but organisation”—this Leninist proposition became one of the cornerstones of Bolshevism.

In the struggle for the Party, its cadres displayed political maturity and a thorough understanding of Lenin’s ideas of organisation. Many committees levelled sharp criticism at the Menshevik *Iskra*. The committees in the Urals linked the question of the Party and of its organisational principles directly with the tasks of the fight for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

“The preparation of the proletariat for its dictatorship,” wrote the Ural members, “is so important an organisational task that all other tasks should be subordinated to it. This preparation consists, among other things, in creating a sentiment in favour of a strong and powerful proletarian organisation, and in fully explaining its importance” (*Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., Collection of Documents and Materials*, Gospolitizdat, 1955, p. 146).

Lenin had to wage the struggle for the Party without the support, and even in face of the outright hostility, of the leadership of the West European Social-Democratic parties. The leaders of the Second International came out against Lenin, who had made a new contribution to Marxism on the role of the Party, its character and principles of organisation, and on the training of Party cadres in decisive and uncompromising struggle against opportunism. The Mensheviks in their struggle against the Bolsheviks could rely for support on such recognised authorities of the time as August Bebel and Karl Kautsky.

The Bolsheviks gave a fitting reply to the leaders of the Second International. In a number of statements, and in particular at the Amsterdam Congress of the Second International in 1904, the Bolsheviks plainly declared that Lenin’s formulation of Clause 1 of the Party Rules took into account the sad experience of the German Social-Democrats. The Rules of the German Social-Democratic Party did not demand that a Party member should belong to one of the Party organisations, and the opportunist elements took full advantage of this to the detriment of the Party.

The Bolsheviks refused to build the Party after the pattern and image of the parties of the Second International. Carefully studying and critically assimilating the experience of the international and Russian working-class movement, they, under Lenin’s guidance, boldly set about building a party of a new type. Bolshevism was active
on the world scene and influenced the international working-class movement.

In the summer of 1904 the Party was in a very difficult position. The Menshevik leaders had captured its central bodies and proceeded to split the local Party organisations. The disruptive activities of the Mensheviks were undermining working-class unity of action. This situation was all the more intolerable since the revolutionary situation in the country called for the consolidation of the Party forces and for militant unity of the proletariat.

An important part in uniting the Party was played by the conference of 22 Bolsheviks, which met in Switzerland in August 1904, under Lenin's leadership. In its appeal "To the Party", the conference called on the Party organisations to start a campaign for the convening of the Third Congress, which would put a curb on the Mensheviks and constitute a new leadership, one that would conform to the will of the Party.

Between September and December 1904 three conferences, the Southern, Caucasian and Northern, met. Thirteen committees of the R.S.D.L.P. were represented at them. They set up a Bureau of Committees of the Majority under the leadership of Lenin. On December 22, 1904, the first issue of the Bolshevik newspaper Vperyod (Forward) appeared; it was a worthy continuator of the cause of the old Iskra. Its editors were V. I. Lenin, V. V. Vorovsky, A. V. Lunacharsky and M. S. Olminsky.

The Bolsheviks had the support of the big industrial areas and leading centres: St. Petersburg, Moscow, Riga, Baku, Yekaterinoslav, Odessa, the Central Industrial Region and the Urals. Lenin had the full support of the bulk of professional revolutionaries. New Party forces developed in the struggle for Bolshevism. Many prominent workers of the Party attained maturity in grim ideological battles against the Mensheviks. Among them were A. S. Bubnov, M. V. Frunze, S. M. Kirov, V. V. Kuibyshev, D. Z. Manuilsky, G. K. Orjonikidze, P. P. Postyshev and K. Y. Voroshilov. Having put such leaders as Plekhanov, Axelrod and Martov to the test, the Party, in its overwhelming majority, turned away from them and rallied around Lenin as its leader.

**BRIEF SUMMARY**

The decade preceding the first Russian revolution (1894-1904) was marked by major changes in the life of the people. Lenin noted that with the appearance of the working class as the most powerful revolutionary force in Russia, a new era had begun in the country's history.

The Russian revolutionaries' search for a correct, and truly scientific revolutionary theory over half a century, was completed by the middle of the nineties. At the cost of countless sacrifices, and by test-
ing various theories in practice and critically comparing them, Russian revolutionary thought and the Russian working-class movement arrived at Marxism. There arose a mass working-class movement connected with Social-Democracy. Two trends emerged in Social-Democracy—the revolutionary Marxist and the opportunist trends. Lenin raised the banner of uncompromising struggle for Marxism, and formed in St. Petersburg the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, the embryo of a Marxist party in Russia. A new, Leninist stage in the development of Marxism had begun.

At the beginning of the twentieth century revolution was maturing in Russia; the working class was forging its ideological and political weapons for the coming battles. Under Lenin's direction, Iskra waged a victorious struggle against the Economists and prepared the ground for the founding of a Marxist party. The Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. served as the beginning of the existence of the Bolshevik Party, the party of social revolution and of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The Bolsheviks waged a decisive struggle against the Mensheviks at the Second Congress and after it. The struggle of Bolshevism against Menshevism was of the greatest historical significance. It was a struggle for a Marxist party of a new type, for the leading role of the working class in the revolutionary battles against the autocracy and capitalism. It was a struggle against opportunism in the international working-class movement.

In the fire of this struggle, Lenin worked out the theory of the Party as the principal weapon of the working class in the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, for the victorious communist revolution. In the person of Lenin there appeared a great leader of the proletariat, a worthy continuator of the teachings of Marx and Engels. Lenin's writings constituted an enormous ideological treasure-store for the Party, and formed its unshakable theoretical foundation.

The appearance in Russia of a revolutionary Marxist working-class party was to be of momentous significance for the future destiny of the country and of the international working-class movement. For the first time in history the most oppressed and most revolutionary class, the proletariat, entered a revolution possessing its own independent Marxist party.
CHAPTER THREE

THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY
IN THE REVOLUTION OF 1905-1907


Revolution in Russia had been maturing for many years. The economic and political situation in the country at the beginning of the twentieth century clearly showed that a revolutionary explosion was imminent. By that time capitalism in Russia, as everywhere else in the world, had entered its highest and last stage of development, imperialism, which is characterised by the extreme sharpening of all the social and political contradictions within the capitalist system.

Imperialism in Russia had its specific features. There existed a highly concentrated large-scale industry, in which capitalist monopolies were coming to play an increasingly powerful role. Highly developed capitalism was interwoven with strong survivals of serfdom in the social and economic system. The chief of them were tsarism and landlord proprietorship, which left a feudal (serfowning) impress on the entire social life of the country. They gave rise to particularly brutal forms of exploitation of the proletariat, extreme poverty of the peasantry and gross oppression of the non-Russian nationalities.

The Russian proletariat was experiencing all the horrors of capitalist exploitation. The economic crisis of 1900-03 made the plight of the working people even worse. A large army of unemployed appeared, their number exceeding 200,000. During the years of crisis the wages of the workers were further reduced and their working day lengthened. Although, under the law of 1897, the working day was restricted to 11½ hours, it was in fact not less than 12 to 14 hours at most of the factories.

The diet of the workers became still worse. Most of the workers continued to be crowded together in basements and factory-owned barracks. Even the bourgeois press was compelled to admit that "life in them differs little from that of convicts".
Lenin described the conditions of the working class at that time as follows:

"Thousands and tens of thousands of men and women, who toil all their lives to create wealth for others, perish from starvation and constant malnutrition, die prematurely from diseases caused by horrible working conditions, by wretched housing and overwork" (Collected Works, Vol. 5, p. 25).

Exceedingly hard was the lot of the working peasantry. A large part of the land, and the best of that, was owned by the landlords, by the privileged nobility. In 1905, 10,500,000 peasant households, ruined and crushed by feudal exploitation, possessed in all just over 200 million acres of land while almost as much land—nearly 190 million acres—was held by 30,000 big landlords. One landlord owned as much as 330 poor peasant families. The land shortage compelled the peasants to lease land from the landlords on most onerous terms. The peasants paid the landlords and the Treasury over 700 million gold rubles in rent annually.

To bondage under the landlord was added bondage under the kulak. The kulaks concentrated in their hands half the total area of peasant land and more than half the total number of draught animals. The kulaks grew rich while the mass of the peasants were falling into pauperism. In the closing decade of the nineteenth century alone, the number of peasant households possessing no horses, or only one horse, increased from 5,700,000 to 6,500,000. Crop failures and famine were the constant lot of the bulk of the rural population. Every year 8,000,000 to 9,000,000 peasants quit their villages to earn a livelihood elsewhere: at factories, on building railways, on lumbering and timber-floating, as unskilled workers in the towns and ports, or as kulaks' farmhands or day-labourers.

For the slightest "offence" against the authorities or for tardy payment of taxes, the peasants were flogged and their property sold. Right up to 1903 officially, but actually even later, peasants were subjected to corporal punishment.

Describing the life of the peasantry on the eve of 1905, Lenin wrote:

"The forty years since the Reform have been marked by this constant process of 'de-peasantising' the peasants, a process of slow and painful extinction. The peasant was reduced to beggary. He lived together with his cattle, was clothed in rags, and fared on weeds... The peasants were in a state of chronic starvation, and they died by the tens of thousands from famine and epidemics in bad harvest years, which recurred with increasing frequency" (Collected Works, Vol. 4, p. 422).

Landlord and capitalist oppression was intensified by the arbitrary rule of the tsarist autocracy which crushed everything living and progressive. Standing guard over the interests of the exploiters were the army, the police, the courts—in a word, the entire machinery of the tsarist state.
The various forms of oppression—landlord, capitalist and national—combined with the police despotism of the autocracy, made the plight of the masses intolerable and particularly aggravated class antagonisms. The fundamental needs of social development and the vital interests of the workers and peasants imperatively demanded, above all, the abolition of the landlord domination and the tsarist monarchy. Only a revolution could accomplish these tasks.

In the years immediately preceding the revolution the political activity and revolutionary inclinations of the working class and peasantry grew rapidly.

The proletariat openly opposed all the exploiting classes and the tsarist government, and put forward demands that rallied all the country’s democratic forces. In 1904 political strikes and demonstrations took place in several industrial cities. In December of that year a big strike broke out in Baku, led by the Bolshevik Committee. It ended in a victory for the workers. The action of the Baku proletariat set off solidarity strikes in St. Petersburg and other Russian cities.

By its revolutionary activity the working class set an example to the peasantry, who were increasingly indignant at the survivals of serfdom. The peasants in various regions of Russia began to rise up more and more often.

The actions of the working class and the peasantry had a political effect on other sections of society. A student movement developed, which demanded political liberties—freedom of assembly, of the press, etc.

The Bolsheviks taught the proletariat to utilise, in the interests of the revolution, all elements opposed to tsarism, but at the same time they consistently exposed the policy of the liberal bourgeoisie and its striving to come to terms with the tsarist government.

The national bourgeoisie of Poland, the Baltic provinces, Finland, Transcaucasia and other regions were at that time more oppositionally inclined than the Russian bourgeoisie, for the tsarist monarchy was the vehicle not only of political and feudal oppression, but also of national oppression. The bourgeoisie of the oppressed nations would have liked to throw off the yoke of Russian tsarism in order to become masters of the situation and have a free hand themselves to exploit the working masses. But the development of capitalism within these nations was also bringing with it the development of a working class that was waging a class struggle not only against tsarism but against its “own” national bourgeoisie as well. The bourgeoisie of the non-Russian areas was therefore extremely inconsistent in its opposition, and only too ready to make common cause with tsarism. Thus, in Poland the big bourgeoisie, nobility and clergy, while seeking petty reforms for Poland, reconciled themselves to Russian tsarism because it protected their class interests. In Fin-
land the bourgeoisie and landlords, for all that the people were oppressed, paraded their allegiance to tsarism. In Latvia and Estonia, the German landlord-barons were a bulwark for the tsarist government. Many of them, like the representatives of the landlord-bourgeois upper crust in Georgia and Finland, held important posts in the tsarist government.

The working class was the only force that fought consistently against all forms of national oppression, and for the complete self-determination of the nations oppressed by tsarism. Following the example of the Russian workers, the proletariat of the oppressed nationalities rose more and more often to fight against tsarism, against feudal, class and national oppression.

Under pressure of the rising revolutionary movement the tsarist government sought to enlist the support of the liberal bourgeoisie by making slight concessions to it. At the end of 1904 there began the so-called “liberal spring”, the expression current at the time. The government allowed the bourgeoisie and the Zemstvo bodies to hold congresses and banquets; at these the representatives of the liberal bourgeoisie and landlords made speeches about the need for a constitution, saying that it would be a good idea to bring the bourgeoisie nearer to power.

The Mensheviks put forward a plan for a “Zemstvo campaign”. They urged the workers to go to these banquets in order to get the bourgeoisie to plead their cause with the tsarist government. The workers were thus assigned the role of trailing behind the liberal bourgeoisie.

The Bolsheviks, on the contrary, called on the workers not to attend the banquets of the liberals, but to go out into the streets and head all the militant, revolutionary forces in demonstrations against the autocracy. Thus, on the eve of 1905, the differences between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks had sharpened. Added to the differences over questions of organisation that had arisen at the Second Congress and that continued to grow sharper, there were now differences over tactical questions, differences in defining the Party’s policy in the rising revolutionary movement.

The outbreak of war with Japan in January 1904 further aggravated social contradictions within the country and accelerated revolutionary events. The Russo-Japanese war was one of the first in the era of imperialism. Its underlying cause was the clash of interests between Japanese and Russian imperialism. For many years already the Japanese ruling classes had been plundering China. Japan was seeking to lay her hands on Korea and Manchuria, to entrench herself on the Asian continent. Tsarism, which Lenin described as “military-feudal imperialism”, was, in its turn, pursuing an annexationist policy in the Far East, where concessions were being secured in the selfish interests of the tsar and his immediate entourage. The Russian bourgeoisie was seeking new markets.
Foreseeing a clash with other imperialist states, Japan began vigorous war preparations. She enjoyed the financial and diplomatic support of American and British imperialism, which encouraged her to attack Russia, calculating that a war would weaken the two countries. Russia was not prepared for war. The tsarist government, however, continued to pursue its adventurist policy, thinking that war would help to check the approaching revolution. It reckoned that an “easy” victory over Japan would bring with it new colonies and new markets, would enhance the prestige of the autocracy and would help to smash the revolutionary movement in the country.

The tsarist government miscalculated. The Japanese imperialists, well informed of the unpreparedness of the tsarist army and navy, treacherously attacked the Russian Pacific Fleet and the fortress of Port Arthur without declaring war, and struck a sudden and heavy blow at Russia’s armed forces in the Far East.

The Russian troops fought bravely. But the tsarist army, unprepared for war and commanded by stupid and ignorant generals like Kuroptakin and admirals like Rozhdestvensky, suffered defeat after defeat. The rout of the First and Second Pacific squadrons, the defeat of the army near Mukden, and the fall of Port Arthur showed that Russia had lost the war. The tsarist autocracy was ignominiously defeated.

The R.S.D.L.P. was confronted for the first time with the question of the attitude that the working class should adopt towards an imperialist war waged by the government of its own country. Lenin and the Bolsheviks gave a clear answer to this question. They showed that the war was being waged, not in the interests of the peoples of Russia and Japan, but in behalf of the tsarist autocracy and Russian imperialism on the one hand, and of Japanese imperialism and the ruling classes of Japan on the other. The Bolsheviks, therefore, agitated against the war. They explained its unjust character to the people and called upon them to fight against the autocracy that was waging it.

The Bolsheviks were the only Social-Democratic Party to advance the slogan of the defeat of their own government in the imperialist war. They maintained that the defeat of tsarism in the war would not signify the defeat of the people, that, on the contrary, the people stood to gain by it. The defeat of tsarism would lead to a revolutionary upsurge in Russia; it would help to overthrow tsarism and promote the victory of a people’s revolution.

“The cause of Russian freedom,” wrote Lenin, “and of the struggle of the Russian (and the world) proletariat for socialism depends to a very large extent on the military defeats of the autocracy” (Collected Works, Vol. 8, p. 53).

In conformity with this line of Lenin’s, the local Bolshevik organisations conducted explanatory work among the workers, peasants and intellectuals, as well as among the sailors and soldiers. They brought
out broadsheets and leaflets in which they explained the real aims of the war and exposed the tsarist autocracy. The Bolsheviks called on the people to fight against the war and tsarism. The revolutionary Marxist position taken by the Bolsheviks in the Russo-Japanese war prepared the way for the correct policy which they adopted in the imperialist war of 1914-18.

The Mensheviks’ attitude was different. They advocated the slogan of “peace at any price”, that is, favoured the conclusion of peace by the tsarist government and did not call for the revolutionary overthrow of the autocracy. They thereby prepared the ground for the openly defencist platform which they were to take up in the war of 1914-18.

The war was unpopular in Russia from the very outset. The revolutionary and democratic strata of the population all realised that the Russian army had been defeated because of the rottenness, not only of the war machine but also of the entire autocratic regime. Defeat in the war with Japan dealt a heavy blow at tsarism.

The war brought new hardships for the working masses. It undermined the economy, dislocated transport, and drained the Treasury; the cost of living soared. Real wages dropped by nearly 25 per cent. But the ruling bourgeois upper crust and commissariat officials were raking in enormous profits. In the countryside, mobilisation was depriving peasant families of their breadwinners, arousing resentment and discontent.

The war was the last drop that filled the people’s cup of patience to overflowing. A profound revolutionary crisis matured in the country.

The tsarist government resorted to all kinds of measures, including the most unscrupulous, in an effort to check the revolutionary movement. Thus, in 1904 a priest by the name of Gapon, on the instructions of the Okhrana, set up an organisation of St. Petersburg workers on the pattern of the Zubatov organisation. At the beginning of January 1905, when a strike broke out at the Putilov Works, which was joined by other factories, Gapon provocatively proposed to the workers that they march to the Winter Palace and present a petition to the tsar.

The Bolsheviks could not prevent this. As a result of the splitting activities of the Mensheviks after the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. there were three Social-Democratic organisations in St. Petersburg at that time: the St. Petersburg Committee of the Bolsheviks, the St. Petersburg group of the Mensheviks and a group of conciliators. This had an adverse effect on the working-class movement in the capital.

The Bolsheviks exposed the provocative Gapon venture and warned the workers that the tsar might resort to bloody reprisals against them. A leaflet issued by the St. Petersburg Bolshevik Committee in this connection read:
"Liberty is bought with blood, it is won arms in hand, in bitter battle. Do not beg anything of the tsar, do not even demand anything of him, do not humble yourselves before our sworn enemy. Cast him off the throne. . . . The emancipation of the workers must be the act of the working class itself. Don't expect to be given your liberty by the priests or the tsars. . . . Down with the war! Down with the autocracy! Long live the armed uprising of the people! Long live revolution!"

Under the influence of the Bolsheviks, who spoke at workers' meetings, the petition proposed by Gapon was supplemented by demands for a political amnesty, political liberty, responsibility of ministers to the people, the equality of all before the law, the right of labour to fight capital, freedom of conscience, an 8-hour working day, and a number of other demands which coincided with the Social-Democratic programme. The petition ended with words that expressed the wretched lot of the working people: "Our patience is exhausted. The dreaded moment has arrived when we would rather die than bear these intolerable sufferings any longer. . . . There are only two ways open to us: to liberty and happiness, or to the grave. . . ."

However, at that time a large part of the workers still believed in the tsar. On Sunday, January 9, more than 140,000 St. Petersburg workers carrying church banners, icons and portraits of the tsar set out in peaceful procession for the Winter Palace.

The Bolsheviks' warning proved right. The unarmed workers, and their wives and children who came with them, were met, on the orders of the tsar, with rifle fire, sabres and whips. Over a thousand people were killed and about five thousand wounded.

A storm of indignation swept over the working people of the capital, "We no longer have a tsar!" shouted thousands of people by the brutal massacre. Workers began to arm. There, in the very streets of St. Petersburg, they heroically beat off the attacks of the soldiers and Cossacks.

Since then January 9 has been known as "Bloody Sunday". That day was a momentous one in the political awakening of the workers of Russia. On that day they realised whose interests the tsar and the tsarist government were defending. On that day their faith in the tsar was riddled by bullets. In answer to the shootings at the Winter Palace, a wave of protest strikes swept the country. On January 10 armed clashes between the workers and the troops continued in St. Petersburg. On the same day a general strike broke out in Moscow. On January 13 the proletariat of Riga went on strike and marched in a political demonstration. Seventy people were killed and some 200 wounded in a clash with the police. On January 14 a general strike broke out in Warsaw, and on January 18, in Tiflis, starting off a series of political strikes in Transcaucasia.

On learning of the events of January 9, Lenin wrote:
"The working class has received a momentous lesson in civil war; the revolutionary education of the proletariat made more progress in one day than it could have made in months and years of drab, humdrum, wretched existence. The slogan of the heroic St. Petersburg proletariat, ‘Death or freedom!’, is reverberating throughout Russia..." (Collected Works, Vol. 8, p. 97).

The events of January 9, 1905, roused the working masses throughout the country to a struggle against tsarism. In January alone, 440,000 workers went on strike, that is, more than during the whole preceding decade.

After January 9 events developed rapidly. Revolution had begun in the country.

On May 1, 1905, workers' political strikes under the slogan of "Down with the autocracy!" took place in nearly 200 towns of Russia. May Day strikes and demonstrations in the towns of Poland ended in a big armed clash with the troops. The strike in Baku lasted two weeks.

The struggle of the proletariat spread to the countryside, awakening a revolutionary ferment among Russia's one hundred million peasants. In February peasant actions took place in the Orel, Voronezh and Kursk gubernias. They swept one gubernia after another. In the spring the peasants, taking the law into their own hands, began to till the landlords' lands, pasture their cattle on them and seize the meadows. The peasant movement was particularly powerful in the Volga region, the Baltic provinces, Transcaucasia and Poland. Meetings and demonstrations took place in the villages. Strikes of agricultural labourers, organised by the Social-Democrats, occurred in many places in the spring of 1905.

2. Bolshevik Appraisal of the Character, Motive Forces and Tasks of the Revolution. Third Party Congress

The strengthening of the Party and the elaboration of a correct policy in the revolution were of decisive importance if it was effectively to lead the revolutionary struggle of the workers and peasants. But owing to the disorganising activities of the Mensheviks, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party was at that time split into two groups. Since its Second Congress the Party had been going through a serious crisis caused, as Lenin pointed out, by "the stubborn refusal of the minority at the Second Congress to submit to the majority" (ibid., p. 442).

Lenin worked to secure the speediest possible convocation of a third congress, which should elaborate the tactics of the Party in the revolution already in progress and rally the Party on the basis of the R.S.D.L.P. Programme.

All the Party organisations were invited to the Congress, but the Mensheviks refused to take part in it and met separately in Geneva.
Since the number of delegates attending was very small (only eight committees were represented), the Mensheviks did not venture to call their gathering a congress, and described it as a conference of Party workers.

The Third Congress met in London from April 12 to 27, 1905. It was attended by 24 delegates with the right to vote and 14 delegates with voice but no vote. The delegates who had the right to vote represented twenty-one Bolshevik committees. The work of the Congress was guided by Lenin. Among its delegates were A. A. Bogdanov, P. A. Krasikov, N. K. Krupskaya, M. M. Litvinov, A. V. Lunacharsky, M. N. Lyadov, M. G. Tskhakaya, V. V. Vorovsky and R. S. Zemlyachka.

The Congress discussed the cardinal problems of the developing revolution and specified the tasks of the proletariat as the leader of the revolution. It dealt with the questions of armed insurrection, the attitude to be taken towards the tactics of the government on the eve of the revolution, a provisional revolutionary government, the attitude to be taken towards the peasant movement, the section that had split away from the Party (the Mensheviks), the attitude to be taken towards the non-Russian Social-Democratic organisations, the question of open political action by the R.S.D.L.P., etc.

"The Russian proletariat," stated the announcement about the Third Congress which was written by Lenin, "will be able to do its duty to the very end. It will be capable of taking the lead of the people's insurrection. It will not be daunted by the difficult task of participating in a provisional revolutionary government, if it has to tackle this task. It will be able to repel all attempts at counter-revolution, to crush ruthlessly all enemies of freedom, to defend staunchly the democratic republic, and to realise, in a revolutionary way, the whole of our minimum programme. The Russian proletarians should not fear such an outcome, but should passionately desire it. Our victory in the coming democratic revolution will be a giant stride forward towards our socialist goal; we shall deliver all Europe from the oppressive yoke of a reactionary military power and help our brothers, the class-conscious workers of the whole world. . ." (Collected Works, Vol. 8, pp. 438-39).

The strategic plan worked out by the Third Congress provided that in the first stage of the revolution the proletariat should establish an alliance with the entire peasantry, neutralise the bourgeoisie and paralyse its instability, and fight for the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, that is, for the overthrow of the autocracy and the establishment of a democratic republic, and for the abolition of all survivals of serfdom. The working class must not merely take a direct part in the revolution and fight selflessly for its triumph; it must also lead the struggle of the masses, must place itself at the head of the revolutionary movement. In the next stage, the prole-
tariat must fight for the immediate development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution.

The Russian bourgeoisie was incapable of heading the revolution and bringing it to a victorious finish, because it was not interested in overthrowing the autocracy: it sought only to restrict the power of the tsar and come to terms with tsarism. It was to its advantage to preserve the monarchy and the survivals of serfdom, on which it could rely in its fight against the proletariat. Only the peasantry could be an ally of the working class, for it sought to do away with the survivals of serfdom in the countryside, obtain the land of the landlords and get rid of tsarist and landlord bondage. And the peasantry could achieve this only with the complete victory of the democratic revolution.

In keeping with this strategic plan, the Congress also worked out the tactical line of the Party, recognising the organisation of armed uprising as the chief and most urgent task of the Party and the working class. Proceeding from the thesis of the leading role of the proletariat in the general democratic revolutionary movement, the Congress pointed out that “the task of organising the proletariat for direct participation in the struggle against the autocracy through armed insurrection is one of the main and most urgent tasks of the Party at the present stage of the revolution” (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part I, p. 77). All Party organisations were called upon to explain to the proletariat not only the political significance of the impending armed insurrection, but also the practical aspects of its organisation.

The Congress noted the special role of mass political strikes on the eve of insurrection and during its course. It recommended adopting the most energetic measures to organise the fighting forces of the proletariat, drawing up a plan of armed uprising in advance, and taking steps to give direct leadership in it, setting up special groups of Party workers for the purpose.

One of the main tactical questions discussed at the Congress was that of the provisional revolutionary government which was to be formed following the overthrow of tsarism and the victory of the people’s revolution. The Bolsheviks held that the provisional revolutionary government must be a government of the dictatorship of the victorious classes, that is, a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

The Congress defined the attitude of the Party towards the peasant movement in conditions of the rising tide of revolution. The decision which the Third Congress adopted on this question stressed that the Social-Democratic Party and the working class must fully support the revolutionary demands of the peasants, including confiscation (that is, expropriation in favour of the peasants without compensation) of all lands belonging to the landlords, the Treasury, the Church, the monasteries and the tsar’s family. This demand was a concrete expression of the Bolshevik Party’s policy of an alliance of the working
class with the entire peasantry in the bourgeois-democratic revolution. It promoted the development of the struggle of the peasantry against the autocratic and landlord system. The Congress called for the immediate establishment of revolutionary peasant committees throughout the country and for the implementation of revolutionary-democratic reforms from below. All Party organisations were instructed also “to strive for the independent organisation of the rural proletariat, for its fusion with the urban proletariat under the banner of the Social-Democratic Party and for the election of its representatives on the peasant committees” (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part I, p. 81).

In this way the Bolsheviks were setting in motion the huge mass of the peasantry which were to fight, together with the urban proletariat and under its leadership, for the overthrow of the autocracy.

The resolution “On the Section that Has Split Away from the Party” condemned the opportunist views of the Mensheviks on questions not only of organisation but also of tactics. However, taking into account the vital necessity of uniting the forces of the proletariat in the developing revolution, the Congress at the same time considered it permissible for members of the Party who supported the Mensheviks, especially workers, to take part in the activities of Party organisations, provided they abided by the decisions of the Party congresses and by the Rules and submitted to Party discipline. The Central Committee was instructed to dissolve those Menshevik organisations which refused to recognise the decisions of the Third Congress.

The Congress instructed the Central Committee and local committees to do all in their power to reach agreement with the national Social-Democratic organisations in order to co-ordinate work at local level and pave the way for the association of all the Social-Democratic parties in a single R.S.D.L.P.

The Third Congress annulled Clause 1 of the Rules as formulated by Martov at the Second Congress, and adopted Lenin’s formulation of Clause 1. This was to be of vast importance in the continuing struggle to cement the party of a new type. One of Lenin’s basic organisational principles was thus incorporated in the Rules of the R.S.D.L.P.

The Congress put an end to the existence of two central bodies in the Party (the Central Committee and the Central Organ) and elected one directing body—the Central Committee. In view of the fact that Iskra had fallen into the hands of the Mensheviks and was pursuing an opportunist line, the Third Congress instructed the Central Committee to establish a new central organ, Proletary. Lenin was elected editor of the paper.

At their conference in Geneva the Mensheviks made a different evaluation of the character, motive forces and tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. They maintained that the revolution in Russia, like earlier bourgeois revolutions in Western Europe, should
be carried out under the leadership of the bourgeoisie and, in the event of victory, should place the bourgeoisie in power.

The Mensheviks denied that the proletariat had any independent tasks in the revolution. They held that the job of the workers was to support the bourgeoisie and to prevent determined revolutionary actions of the masses in order not to frighten the bourgeoisie away from the revolution. They refused to recognise the leading role of the proletariat in the revolution and denied the revolutionary role of the peasantry.

The Mensheviks were opposed to organising an armed rising with particular zeal, an attitude which was fully in accord with their "theory of spontaneity" in the working-class movement and their negation of the active, leading role of the Party in the revolution. Insurrection, they said, is a spontaneous process and cannot be prepared in advance. Plekhanov, Axelrod, Martov and the other Menshevik leaders argued that an insurrection could only frighten away the bourgeoisie and that a party of the working class should not prepare for it. In this, as in all other questions, the Mensheviks occupied essentially the same position as the opportunists of the Second International.

The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. worked out the Party's policy in the revolution which had begun without the Mensheviks and in opposition to them. The Bolsheviks existed in effect as an independent party with its own Programme, Rules, and tactical line, with its own organisations, press and Central Committee. Two congresses—two parties: that is how Lenin summed up the situation in the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in 1905.

The Third Congress decisions, the Party's strategic plan and its tactics found comprehensive theoretical substantiation in Lenin's book Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution, written in June-July 1905. This work was a major contribution to the theory of scientific socialism.

In this book, for the first time in the history of Marxism, Lenin elaborated the question of the specific features of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in the era of imperialism, its motive forces and prospects. He subjected to devastating criticism the anti-Marxist, opportunist standpoint of the Mensheviks in questions of theory, strategy and tactics of the Party in the revolution, and also the reformist views of the leaders of the Second International, whose support the Mensheviks enjoyed.

In its character and aims, the revolution which had begun in Russia was a bourgeois revolution, that is, one aimed at abolishing the tsarist autocracy and eliminating the survivals of serfdom. It did not immediately raise the question of abolishing the capitalist system. Yet the bourgeois revolution in Russia, said Lenin, had a number of new features and peculiarities which fundamentally distinguished it from the bourgeois revolutions in Western Europe in the
period of rising capitalism and provided conditions for its development into a socialist revolution.

The first Russian revolution was a revolution of the people. As distinct from the bourgeois revolutions in the West, its principal motive force and leader was the proletariat. Though bourgeois-democratic in character, the revolution in Russia was a proletarian one in respect of the leading role played in it by the proletariat, and the methods employed in the struggle against the autocracy (strikes and armed uprising).

The Russian revolution was at the same time a peasant revolution, since its chief aim was the abolition of landlord proprietorship. The peasantry was one of the motive forces of the revolution and the proletariat’s immediate ally, for it could obtain possession of the landlords’ land and achieve its emancipation from oppression by the autocracy and the landlords only under the leadership of the working class.

As for the bourgeoisie, it came forward as a counter-revolutionary force and its interests were closely intertwined with those of tsarism. Frightened by the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat, it was not, and could not be, a motive force of the revolution. With the advance of the revolution it lost more and more of its opposition spirit, made outright deals with tsarism and went over to the camp of the counter-revolution. By coming to terms with tsarism it sought to put an end to the revolution.

“The victory of the bourgeois revolution is impossible in our country as the victory of the bourgeoisie,” wrote Lenin. “This sounds paradoxical, but it is a fact. The preponderance of the peasant population, its terrible oppression by feudal (semi-feudal) big landowning, the strength and class consciousness of the proletariat already organised in a socialist party—all these circumstances impart to our bourgeois revolution a specific character” (Collected Works, Vol. 15, p. 41).

Proceeding from a scientific Marxist analysis of the basic and distinctive features of the Russian revolution, Lenin in Two Tactics discussed and elaborated the following questions:

the hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution;

the alliance of the working class and the peasantry in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and the alliance of the proletariat with the poorest peasants, and with all the semi-proletarian masses of town and country, in the socialist revolution;

armed insurrection as the principal means of overthrowing the autocracy and achieving the victory of the revolution;

the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the working class and the peasantry, and the provisional revolutionary government as its political organ;

the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution;
the political party of the proletariat as the decisive condition for the latter fulfilling its role as leader of the people’s revolution.

The fate of the revolution depended on whether the working class would play the part of leader of the people’s revolution or that of a subsidiary of the bourgeoisie. Lenin foresaw two possible outcomes of the revolution: either a decisive victory over tsarism and the establishment of a democratic republic, or, if the forces were inadequate for a decisive victory, a deal between the tsar and the most inconsistent and most self-seeking elements of the bourgeoisie. The working class and the broad masses of the people were interested in complete victory over tsarism. But such an outcome was possible only if the proletariat became the leader of the revolution.

Lenin pointed out that in Russia the working class suffered not so much from capitalism as from insufficient capitalist development. The preservation of the survivals of feudal relations hampered the development of the productive forces and was an obstacle to the development of the struggle of the working class for a socialist revolution and the victory of socialism. The working class, therefore, was vitally interested in ridding the country of all survivals of serfdom as soon as possible.

In order that the proletariat might actually become the leader of the revolution it needed, first, to have an ally who was interested in the decisive victory of the revolution, and, secondly, to neutralise, force out of the arena and isolate the liberal bourgeoisie, which was trying to end the revolution by a deal with the tsar at the expense of the workers and peasants.

“Only the proletariat can be a consistent fighter for democracy,” wrote Lenin. “It can become a victorious fighter for democracy only if the peasant masses join its revolutionary struggle” (Collected Works, Vol. 9, p. 60).

Contrary to the Mensheviks, who asserted that the peasantry was reactionary and therefore could not be an ally of the proletariat, Lenin held that the vital concern of the peasantry—the abolition of landlord proprietorship and the complete elimination of the survivals of serfdom—made it a natural ally of the proletariat in the revolution and a supporter of a radical democratic revolution. Landlord proprietorship could be abolished and democratic liberties won only by revolutionary means. And only the proletariat was capable of supporting the peasantry in this struggle. Lenin scathingly criticised the opportunist views of the Mensheviks, who advocated the hegemony of the liberal bourgeoisie in the revolution and the substitution of petty reforms for revolution.

It was of greater advantage to the bourgeoisie, wrote Lenin, for the necessary changes in the direction of bourgeois democracy to take place through reform rather than revolution,

“for these changes to develop as little as possible the independent revolutionary activity, initiative, and energy of the
common people, i.e., the peasantry and especially the workers, for otherwise it will be easier for the workers, as the French say, 'to change the rifle from one shoulder to the other', i.e., to turn against the bourgeoisie the weapon the bourgeois revolution will supply them with. . . ." (Collected Works, Vol. 9, p. 51).

In his book Lenin conclusively substantiated the proletarian forms and means of struggle which would ensure the victory of the revolution. Contrary to the Mensheviks, who clung to reformist methods, Lenin considered that the most decisive means of overthrowing the autocracy was armed insurrection. Tsarism relied on armed force: the army and the police. Only by force of arms, through a victorious armed rising, could this force be crushed, tsarism be overthrown and a democratic republic established. The revolutionary movement, Lenin pointed out, had already brought about the necessity for an armed insurrection.

Lenin was the first since Marx and Engels to raise the question of organising armed insurrection as a practical task, to which all other Party activities must be subordinated during the revolution.

To rouse the revolutionary energy of the masses, to draw them into open armed struggle against tsarism, it was necessary for the Party to issue political slogans that particularly appealed to the people, and would be understood by them. The following, the Bolsheviks considered, were such slogans: immediate introduction, in a revolutionary way, of an 8-hour working day; the setting-up of revolutionary peasant committees in order to carry out democratic changes in the countryside, including the confiscation of the landed estates; mass political strikes; the arming of the workers and the formation of a revolutionary army.

Lenin considered it of exceptional importance that an 8-hour working day be introduced everywhere from below, by the workers themselves, and that democratic changes in the countryside be carried out by the peasants. These were new tactics, which called into play all the activity and creative initiative of the masses. Application of these tactics paralysed the state machinery, rendering it powerless to combat the revolution.

The mass political strike, a specifically proletarian method of struggle that played a most important part in mobilising the masses for the struggle against tsarism, was a new and very important weapon. Lenin treated the question of state power, the basic question of revolution, in a new way. He showed that a victorious bourgeois-democratic revolution in which the proletariat was the guiding force must lead not to the winning of power by the bourgeoisie, as had been the case in bourgeois revolutions of the past, but to a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

"The revolution's decisive victory over tsarism," wrote Lenin, means the establishment of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. . . .
"And such a victory will be precisely a dictatorship, i.e., it must inevitably rely on military force, on the arming of the masses, on an insurrection, and not on institutions, of one kind or another established in a ‘lawful’ or ‘peaceful’ way” (*Collected Works*, Vol. 9, p. 56).

The implementation of revolutionary changes in the interests of the workers and peasants would call forth the desperate resistance of tsarism, the landlords and the big bourgeoisie. In order to break down this resistance, to repel attempts at counter-revolution, complete the bourgeois-democratic revolution, defend its gains and completely clear the arena for the struggle for socialism, a dictatorship was essential. But it would be as yet a democratic, not a socialist, dictatorship.

The political organ of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry would be a *provisional revolutionary government*, relying on the armed people. Its task would be to consolidate the gains of the revolution, crush the resistance of the counter-revolution and give effect to the minimum programme of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, i.e., establish a democratic republic, introduce an 8-hour working day, confiscate the landed estates and advance the revolution further.

Lenin held that it was permissible for, and under favourable circumstances incumbent upon, the Social-Democrats to take part in a revolutionary government. That would enable them to wage a relentless struggle against the counter-revolution, defend the independent interests of the working class and promote the further development of the revolution. At the same time it was necessary to organise pressure upon the provisional revolutionary government from below, by the working class and the broad masses of working people. Participation in the government and pressure from below would help to consolidate and extend the gains of the revolution, to put into effect the minimum programme of the Social-Democratic Party, and to prepare the ground for the bourgeois-democratic revolution developing into a socialist revolution.

Exposing the harmful standpoint of the Mensheviks, who were opposed to participation in a revolutionary government, Lenin pointed out that it in fact implied yielding leadership of the revolution to the bourgeoisie.

In his book Lenin worked out *the theory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution developing into a socialist revolution*. Marx’s ideas on uninterrupted (permanent) revolution and on the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry as an indispensable condition for such a revolution were consigned to oblivion by the opportunists of the Second International. To Marx’s revolutionary ideas they opposed an opportunist scheme, according to which a long interval would separate the bourgeois revolution from the proletarian revolution. This anti-revolutionary scheme was based on a denial of the leading role of the
proletariat in relation to the peasantry, a denial of the hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution.

Lenin developed Marx’s idea of permanent revolution into the consistent theory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution developing into a socialist revolution. According to this theory, the hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeois revolution, the proletariat being in alliance with the peasantry, would develop into the hegemony of the proletariat in the socialist revolution, the proletariat now being in alliance with the poor peasants and the other semi-proletarian elements. The democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry must develop into the dictatorship of the proletariat.

“The proletariat must carry the democratic revolution to comple-
tion, allying to itself the mass of the peasantry in order to crush the autocracy’s resistance by force and paralyse the bourgeoisie’s instability. The proletariat must accomplish the socialist revolution, allying to itself the mass of the semi-proletarian elements of the population, so as to crush the bourgeoisie’s resistance by force and paralyse the instability of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 9, p. 100).

In substantiating the theory of the bourgeois revolution developing into a socialist revolution, Lenin showed that the objective conditions for this existed in the social and economic system in Russia. The numerous survivals of serfdom and the relatively high development of capitalism in Russia produced contradictions of two kinds. The contradictions between the development of the productive forces and semi-feudal relations of production created the prerequisites for a bourgeois-democratic revolution. The contradictions between the growth of the productive forces and capitalist production relations created the necessary objective conditions for the bourgeois-democratic revolution developing into a socialist revolution.

Hence there arose a social war of two kinds. One was the struggle of the entire people against the tsar and the landlords, for a democratic republic; the other was the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, for the dictatorship of the proletariat, for a socialist structure of society. In 1905-07 the nation-wide struggle for the overthrow of the autocracy was the paramount task. The mission of the proletariat was to fight “at the head of the whole people, and particularly of the peasantry—for complete freedom, for a consistent democratic revolution, for a republic! At the head of all the toilers and the exploited—for socialism!” (ibid., p. 114).

Lenin repeatedly emphasised the necessity for the uninterrupted development of the revolution right up to the victory of the socialist revolution. In his article, “The Attitude of Social-Democracy Towards the Peasant Movement”, Lenin wrote:

“From the democratic revolution we shall at once, and precisely in accordance with the measure of our strength, the strength of the class-conscious and organised proletariat, begin to pass to
the socialist revolution. We stand for uninterrupted revolution. We shall not stop half-way" (ibid., pp. 236-37).

The West European opportunists and the Russian Mensheviks held that in the socialist revolution the proletariat would stand alone, without allies, against all the non-proletarian classes and strata. They denied the revolutionary potentialities of the semi-proletarian masses of town and country, who were exploited and downtrodden by the capitalists and who for that very reason could become true allies of the proletariat in the struggle against capitalism. Hence their wrong conclusion that the conditions for a socialist revolution could be considered ripe only when the proletariat, as a result of the economic development of society, became a majority in the nation.

Lenin's theory of socialist revolution confuted these exceedingly harmful opportunist dogmas, which doomed the proletariat to inaction.

Lenin considered that the existence of an independent political party of the working class, with the mission of leading and organising the revolutionary struggle, was one of the main prerequisites for the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and its development into a socialist revolution. The proletariat could play the role of leader in this revolution. Lenin pointed out, only if it united into a solid, independent political force under the banner of a revolutionary Marxist party guiding the proletariat in its struggle, not only ideologically but in the practical sense as well.

Lenin's theory of socialist revolution confuted not only the theories of the Russian Mensheviks and the reformists of the Second International, but also Trotsky's theory of "permanent revolution". Trotsky falsified Marx's idea of permanent revolution. He denied the hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the revolutionary role of the peasantry; he rejected the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. He advanced the slogan: "No tsar, but a workers' government", which was Left in form but opportunist in essence. Such a skipping of the bourgeois-democratic stage of the revolution would only have led to the isolation of the proletariat from the many millions of peasants and to the defeat of the revolution.

Lenin's theory of revolution, worked out in 1905, armed the Bolshevik Party with a scientifically substantiated strategy and tactics. It already contained nearly all the basic elements for the conclusion that socialism could triumph at first in a single capitalist country: the propositions on the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution, on the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, on the leading and guiding role of the party of a new type in the revolution, on the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, and on the bourgeois-democratic revolution developing into a socialist revolution. Lenin arrived at this
conclusion in 1915. Lenin enriched Marxism with a new theory of socialist revolution, which became a powerful ideological weapon of the proletariat in the struggle for the victory of its cause.


The course of revolutionary events proved the decisions of the Third Congress correct. The tide of revolution mounted rapidly. The strikes assumed a more stubborn and aggressive character, and were marked by a high level of organisation.

In May 1905 a strike broke out in Ivanovo-Voznesensk. It lasted 72 days. It was an example of the staunchness of the workers, and was a rich political schooling for the masses. A Council (Soviet) of Workers' Representatives (deputies) was elected to direct it. In the course of the revolutionary battles it became one of the first Soviets of Workers' Deputies. The strike was led by the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Bolshevik organisation headed by F. A. Afanasyev and M. V. Frunze, actively assisted by the worker Bolsheviks S. I. Balashov, Y. A. Dunayev and F. N. Samoilov. Workers came together openly at meetings to draw up and discuss their demands and their answers to the factory owners, and outline plans for further action. At these meetings Bolsheviks delivered reports and lectures on the tasks of the working-class movement. These meetings were a veritable "socialist university" for the workers. The strike of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk workers was joined by the textile workers of Shuya, Orekhovo-Zuyevo and other towns. The tsarist authorities carried out a bloody massacre of the workers.

The shooting down of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk workers roused a storm of protest throughout Russia. In June 1905 the workers of Lodz erected barricades in the streets and for three days battled against the police and the troops. They were, wrote Lenin, "a new example, not only of revolutionary enthusiasm and heroism, but of superior forms of struggle" (Collected Works, Vol. 8, p. 537). In the Urals, the metal-workers of Perm and Yekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk), the gun-smiths of the Zlatoust Works, the iron and steel workers of Nadezhdinsk and Nizhni Tagil, and the railwaymen of Chelyabinsk, Ufa and Yekaterinburg were at the head of the strike movement. As the revolution developed, the Councils of Workers' Representatives (deputies) that were set up in the spring of 1905 at Alapayevsk, Nadezhdinsk, Motovilikha, Nizhni Tagil, and other industrial centres of the Urals were transformed from strike organisations into organisations for revolutionary struggle.

The working class of Latvia fought heroically. In Nikolayev, Yekaterinoslav, Kharkov, Lugansk and other towns, political strikes developed into clashes with the police and troops. In June general
strikes took place in Tiflis, Kutais, Batum and Chiaurty. In June and July strikes spread to three quarters of the Baku oilfields and other enterprises. The general strike of the Baku proletariat in August was accompanied by armed clashes with the troops.

The working class of Russia emerged from these strikes politically more and more mature and steeled, gathering its forces for the decisive struggle against tsarism.

In the summer of 1905 semi-legal trade union organisations began to spring up everywhere. Even then, while defending the economic interests of the workers, the trade unions advanced a number of important political demands. The Bolsheviks took an active part in establishing the trade unions and in their work. This was to have an important bearing on the subsequent development of trade unions in Russia as militant class organisations of the proletariat.

By its consistent revolutionary struggle the proletariat was teaching the peasantry how to fight the tsarist system. The rising tide of the working-class struggle was followed by a surge of the peasant movement. In the spring and summer of 1905 peasant actions spread to nearly a fifth of all the uyezds, and in the autumn to more than half. Strikes of agricultural labourers broke out in the Ukraine and the Baltic provinces. The peasant movement was on a particularly large scale in the Volga region, in many parts of the Ukraine, in the Baltic provinces and in Georgia.

The combination of the proletarian movement with peasant revolts shook the tsarist army and navy. The Bolsheviks developed self-sacrificing activity in the army and navy in 1905. The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. sent I. F. Dubrovinsky, Y. M. Yaroslavsky, R. S. Zemlyachka, M. I. Vasilyev-Yuzhin and other prominent functionaries to work among the armed forces.

The Bolsheviks employed diverse forms and methods of revolutionary work among the soldiers and sailors: they issued newspapers and leaflets, arranged meetings, set up study-groups. As a result, the influence of the Bolshevik organisations among the soldiers and sailors grew considerably. Contacts were established between the latter and the workers. The defeat of the tsarist army in the Far East intensified revolutionary feeling in the armed forces.

The first instance of mass discontent among the soldiers and sailors was the revolt on the battleship Potemkin in June 1905. For the first time in history, the crew of a battleship raised the banner of revolution and revolts against the existing regime. The insurgent battleship came to Odessa. But the Bolshevik Committee in the city, weakened by arrests, was not united at that time, while the Mensheviks did not organise any rising of the workers of Odessa in support of the insurgent sailors.

Despite the heroism of the sailors, the revolt ended in defeat, for it lacked proper leadership. It was the first attempt at revolutionary action in the tsarist armed forces. But the very fact that a revolt
had occurred was of the utmost importance. It made the idea of the necessity and possibility of the army and navy joining forces with the working class in the struggle against tsarism more comprehensible and acceptable to the workers and peasants, and especially to the soldiers and sailors themselves. The question of the formation of a revolutionary army was now on the order of the day.

After the revolt of the Potemkin the Bolsheviks increased their revolutionary activities in the armed forces. The summer and autumn of 1905 witnessed dozens of revolutionary actions by soldiers and sailors. The individual actions of workers, soldiers and peasants were growing into a general Russian revolutionary conflagration.

The tsarist government tried to divert the people from the revolutionary struggle by concessions and promises. On August 6, 1905, it issued its manifesto on the convention of a State Duma (called the Bulygin Duma after the tsarist Minister Bulygin, who drew up the project for it). The tsarist government also hastened to end the Russo-Japanese War. At the end of August 1905 it signed peace with Japan.

The Duma was an attempt by the tsarist government to put an end to the revolution by diverting it to a monarchist-constitutional path. In trying to convene a Duma, tsarism also sought to put an end to oppositionist ferment among the liberal bourgeoisie which, itself fearing the revolution, tried nevertheless to use it to frighten the tsar. The Bulygin Duma was intended to be an assembly of landlords, capitalists and a negligible number of rich peasants. It was to be no more than an advisory body controlled by the tsar. It was a crude travesty of popular representation.

The Bolsheviks called upon the workers and peasants actively to boycott the anti-popular Duma. Their agitation campaign centred entirely around the slogans: an armed insurrection, a revolutionary army, and a provisional revolutionary government. The Mensheviks hailed the Duma as "a turning-point in the emancipation movement" and advocated collaboration with the liberals in the farce of Duma elections, upholding the parliamentary, reformist way. These tactics of theirs played into the hands of the liberal bourgeoisie, helping it to deceive the masses of the people and side-track them from the revolutionary struggle.

A conference of the Social-Democratic organisations of Russia, which met in Riga in September 1905 to work out their tactics towards the State Duma, approved the Bolshevik policy of active boycott of the Bulygin Duma and condemned the Menshevik policy of participating in it. The tactics of active boycott were supported not only by the workers, but also by the peasants and the progressive section of the intelligentsia. The Bolsheviks utilised the boycott campaign to mobilise all the revolutionary forces for mass political strikes and preparations for armed uprising.

In the summer and autumn of 1905 preparations proceeded apace
for a general political strike. The tremendous organisational and agitational work carried on by the Bolsheviks facilitated the progress of the revolution. In September a printers’ strike broke out in Moscow. It was supported by the workers of other plants and factories, and was accompanied by meetings and demonstrations. The workers had armed clashes with the police and troops in the streets of Moscow.

The September strike of the Moscow workers was a rich political schooling for the proletariat. The mass political strike, accompanied by revolutionary meetings, demonstrations and armed clashes with the police, became the most widespread form of working-class action. In the course of the struggle a Soviet of workers of five trades was formed: printers, metal-workers, tobacco workers, joiners and railwaymen. New sections of the working class were drawn into the political struggle under the leadership of the Bolsheviks.

On October 6 the Moscow Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. decided to call a general political strike in Moscow. The strike spread rapidly to all industrial centres and grew into an all-Russian strike. The railways came to a standstill all over the country. The factories closed down. The post and telegraph stopped operating.

The October strike grew into a powerful political demonstration on the part of the proletariat. It was carried out under the slogans: overthrow of the autocracy, active boycott of the Bulygin Duma, conviction of a Constituent Assembly and the establishment of a democratic republic. The strike was joined by clerks, students, lawyers, doctors, engineers, etc. Over two million people took part in the strike. The all-Russian political strike conclusively revealed the Bolshevik Party’s close ties with the masses and the vitality of its slogans.

It also revealed the strengthening ties between the workers of the different nationalities inhabiting Russia. Lettish, Polish, Ukrainian, Azerbaijani, Georgian and Byelorussian workers, together with the workers of other nationalities, fought side by side with the Russian proletariat against their bitterest enemy, the tsarist autocracy. The Party was striving to draw the working masses of the eastern areas of Russia into the revolutionary struggle. The Russian proletariat came forward as the main force; it roused and united the Tatar, Azerbaijani, Kazakh and Uzbek workers and workers of other nationalities. The Baku Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. formed the organisation called Gummet for work among the Moslem working people. The Bolsheviks published the newspaper Ural in Tatar and the Koch Devet and Tekamül in Azerbaijani, and through them spread Lenin’s ideas among the disinherited masses of the nationalities inhabiting the Volga region, Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Many workers who came from Iran went through a school of revolutionary training in Russia. Prominent among them was Haidar, who later became organiser and leader of the Communist Party of Iran.

Lenin explained the paramount importance of mass proletarian actions such as political and economic strikes and demonstrations.
Such actions, he noted, play a big role in the defence of the vital interests of the working class and the masses generally, and also in the preparation for higher forms of struggle—the general strike, armed insurrection, and, hence, the struggle for power. The political and the economic strike, Lenin wrote subsequently, “mutually support each other, the one constituting a source of strength for the other. Unless these two forms of strike action are closely interlinked, there can be no really broad mass movement—one, moreover, that will be of national importance” (Collected Works, Vol. 18, p. 67).

The workers are drawn into the political movement as well by taking part in economic strikes and seeking an improvement of their economic condition.

In the course of political strikes the working class not only advances political demands that express its own vital interests, but also champions the common interests of the mass of the people. In political strikes the working class acts as the vanguard class of the whole people, as the leader of the popular movement.

The all-Russian October strike demonstrated the might of the working class as the vanguard fighter, organiser and leader of the struggle of the whole people against the autocracy. The strike paralysed the forces of the government. The sweep of the revolution grew ever more powerful. The tsarist government, frightened by the growing tide of the revolution, hastened to make certain concessions to save the autocracy. On October 17 the tsar issued a manifesto containing many false promises. The manifesto proclaimed freedom of speech, assembly and association and the inviolability of person. It promised to convene a “Russian parliament”—a State Duma with legislative functions.

The promulgation of the tsar’s manifesto, Lenin noted, was caused by the establishment of a certain temporary equilibrium of forces: the workers and the peasants, who had wrested the manifesto from the tsar, were still not strong enough to overthrow tsarism, while tsarism was no longer able to rule by the old methods.

The bourgeoisie gladly accepted this sop from the tsar. The big capitalists and the landlords who ran their estates on capitalist lines backed the tsarist government, although they still continued to argue with it about the division of power. The tsar’s manifesto suited them perfectly. They united into the League of October Seventeenth, the party of Octobrists, that is, supporters of the tsar’s October manifesto. Part of the capitalists, landlords, Zemstvo leaders and bourgeois intellectuals formed the Constitutional-Democratic Party (Cadets), the leading party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie. The Cadets wanted the tsar and the landlords to share power with the bourgeoisie. To deceive the working masses, they falsely called themselves the “Party of People’s Freedom”. Their programme, however, did not even contain the demand for a republic.

Characterising the Cadet Party, Lenin wrote:
"The liberal bourgeoisie are oscillating between the people and the pogrom-mongers' government. In words they oppose the government, but in fact what they fear most is the struggle of the people; they want to come to terms with the monarchy, i.e., with the pogrom-mongers, against the people" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 305).

The bourgeois parties saw in the tsar's manifesto an opportunity to direct the revolution into peaceful, constitutional channels, and to save the autocracy and the semi-feudal system from downfall. They therefore extolled the manifesto of October 17 in every possible way.

The Bolsheviks called on the workers and peasants to place no faith in the paper "constitution" and to continue the struggle until they had overthrown tsarism. They declared that the government was deceiving the people. Instead of the promised liberties, the government, with the help of the police-sponsored organisations which demagogically called themselves the Union of the Russian People and the League of Michael the Archangel—and which the people christened the "Black Hundreds"—was beating up and murdering revolutionaries and advanced workers, and breaking up meetings. That was when N. E. Bauman, a prominent Bolshevik, was atrociously murdered by the Black Hundreds in Moscow. In order to disunite the forces of the people, the tsarist authorities were kindling enmity among the different nationalities and engineering bloody pogroms of Jews. They provoked a massacre between Azerbajianians and Armenians.

After the first victory, wrested by the political general strike, the struggle had to be continued for the overthrow of tsarism. The workers, inspired by the Bolsheviks, energetically set about forming fighting squads.

The October upsurge of the working-class movement gave an impetus to the revolutionary struggle of the peasants.

The peasantry in Russia had no party of its own. The All-Russian Peasant Union and the Trudovik group, which arose during the revolution, were mere beginnings of a political organisation. The Popular Socialists and the Socialist-Revolutionaries did not develop into genuine peasant parties. At that time Lenin wrote: "In their class character, the Trudoviks, Popular Socialists and Socialist-Revolutionaries are petty-bourgeois and peasant democrats" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 12, p. 198). The Trudoviks never became a well-knit organisation. The Popular Socialists were a small group gravitating to the liberals and expressing to an increasing degree the interests of the kulak upper crust in the countryside. The Socialist-Revolutionaries had not established strong links with the countryside. Their activity began to take a turn which afterwards led them to defend the interests of the propertied sections of the rural population, of the kulaks. Reviving the old Narodnik theory about the supposedly socialist character
of the peasant movement, the Socialist-Revolutionaries denied the leading role of the working class in the revolution. Lenin and the Bolsheviks exposed the pseudo-socialist character of the Socialist-Revolutionary programme, and criticised the vacillations and inconsistency of the peasant organisations. At the same time the Bolsheviks concluded temporary agreements with them in the fight against tsarism.

Being the advanced contingent of the proletariat, the Bolsheviks also championed the interests of the peasantry, both political (overthrow of the autocracy and the entire semi-feudal system which was the enemy of the peasantry) and economic (abolition of landlord proprietorship and the transfer of the land to the peasants). The fact that it was the Bolsheviks who upheld the interests of the masses of the peasantry was to have tremendous significance in the further struggle for the victory of the revolution.

The local Bolshevik organisations worked energetically to win the peasantry over to the side of the proletariat. Beginning with the summer of 1905 agrarian groups were set up by the Moscow, Kazan, Nizhni-Novgorod, Simbirsk, Saratov, Samara, St. Petersburg, Vladimir, Kostroma, Ivanovo-Voznesensk and other committees in Central Russia, and by the Minsk, Vilno, Lugansk, Odessa and other committees in Byelorussia, Lithuania, the Ukraine and Latvia.

The Bolshevik organisations conducted political work in the countryside: they distributed proclamations and leaflets, and set up revolutionary study groups among the peasants. The Moscow Committee issued special instructions for Party members working among the peasantry. Most popular with the peasants was Lenin’s pamphlet, *To the Rural Poor*, which was reprinted several times by local Bolshevik organisations.

The Bolsheviks intensified their activities among the soldiers and sailors. By the autumn of 1905 they had set up a number of Party organisations in the armed forces. The biggest of them were the St. Petersburg, Moscow, Finland and Riga organisations. Many more leaflets and appeals, addressed to the soldiers and sailors, began to be published. That autumn there were revolutionary outbreaks by the soldiers garrisoned in Kharkov, Kiev, Tashkent, Warsaw and other cities. Revolts broke out among the sailors of Kronstadt, Vladivostok and in Sevastopol.

It was during that rapid rise in the tide of revolution that the *Soviets of Workers’ Deputies* first arose as a result of the revolutionary creative activity of the workers. Originally organs of the delegates or representatives of workers of various factories set up to direct economic and political strikes, the Soviets became organs for preparing insurrection; they were the embryo of a new authority. In defiance of all the institutions of the tsarist government, they issued their own decrees, orders and instructions and introduced on their own authority an 8-hour working day and democratic liberties.
Lenin, with his usual perspicacity, saw in the Soviets organs of struggle for the victory of the revolution, for socialism, organs of the dictatorship of the people, and highly appraised their significance. Lenin dealt with this question in “Our Tasks and the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies. A letter to the Editor”, a work he wrote early in November 1905. Lenin theoretically elaborated the question of the Soviets. The combination in practice of the revolutionary creative activity of the working class, which gave rise to the Soviets, and of the theoretical substantiation of the latter provided by Lenin and the Party produced a remarkable form of political organisation of the working class and labouring peasantry, a form that played an historic role in the struggle for the victory of the revolution, for socialism. The Soviets of 1905, one of the greatest historic gains of the working class, served as the prototype for the Soviet power set up in our country in 1917.

The Bolsheviks entered the Soviets everywhere, and wherever they succeeded in winning a dominant influence the Soviets became militant headquarters for mobilising the revolutionary forces and for preparing and carrying out armed insurrection; they became embryonic organs of a new authority. As for the Mensheviks, they regarded the Soviets simply as strike committees or organs of local self-government.

At the beginning of November 1905 Lenin returned to Russia from abroad illegally. Immediately on his arrival in St. Petersburg he threw himself into vigorous activity. He directed the activities of the Central Committee of the Party, took charge of the editorial committee of the legal Bolshevik paper Novaya Zhizn (New Life) which at that time was in effect the central newspaper of the Party, addressed meetings of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers’ Deputies, and took part in various Party meetings.

The October all-Russian political strike had brought the working class to the threshold of the highest form of class struggle, armed insurrection.

The Bolsheviks, giving effect to the decisions of the Third Congress of the Party, combined agitation and propaganda work with practical preparations for the insurrection. The fighting squads formed by the Bolsheviks became most active. Their members were trained in street fighting and musketry, and workshops for the manufacture of bombs, arms depots, etc., were organised. Fighting detachments and squads were formed in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Sormovo, Yaroslavl, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, the Urals, the Ukraine, Siberia, the Caucasus and the Baltic provinces. The military and technical preparation for the insurrection was directed by the Fighting Group of the Central Committee of the Party.

The Moscow proletariat was the first to raise the banner of armed insurrection against tsarism. On December 5 a conference of the Moscow Bolsheviks, voicing the will of the workers, declared in favour
of a strike and an armed insurrection. The Moscow Soviet declared a political general strike as from December 7 with the object of turning it into an insurrection.

More than 150,000 workers went on strike in Moscow in the very first two days. There were numerous meetings at factories, and street demonstrations. The first clashes with the Cossacks and the police occurred. Hurriedly mobilising their forces, the authorities launched an offensive. The proletariat of Moscow replied by putting up barricades. On December 10 the strike developed into an armed revolt. Bitter fighting ensued. The Presnya, Zamoskvorechye and Rogozhsko-Simonovsky districts, and the vicinity of the Kazan Railway, became the centres of the insurrection. About a thousand barricades appeared in the streets of Moscow. For nine days the workers waged a heroic battle.

Maxim Gorky, an eyewitness of the armed fighting, wrote: "I have just come in from the streets. Fighting is in progress near the Sandunov Baths, near the Nikolayevsky Station, on the Smolensk Market and in the vicinity of Kudrino. Good fighting!... Everywhere on the streets the gendarmes and the police are being disarmed.... The workers are behaving splendidly!"

Exceptional heroism and tenacity were displayed by the workers in the Presnya District, where the best of the workers' fighting squads of Moscow were concentrated.

The Moscow workers fought heroically. The whole world tensely followed the course of the insurrection, which was shaking the very foundations of one of the biggest monarchies. The tsarist government realised that the entire autocratic-feudal regime was in danger of collapsing, and dispatched large forces to crush the uprising. The arrival of fresh military units in Moscow fundamentally changed the balance of fighting forces in favour of the counter-revolution.

The insurgent workers lacked experience in armed struggle, they were short of arms, and their contact with the troops was inadequate. When, at the beginning of December, the Rostov Regiment, quartered in Moscow, revolted and the Moscow garrison was wavering, the organisers of the insurrection delayed too long, and failed to take advantage of the garrison's vacillation to win it over to the side of the insurgent workers. The tsarist government succeeded in keeping the Moscow garrison under control and in isolating it from the insurgents. It was also able to retain control of the St. Petersburg-Moscow Railway. The St. Petersburg Soviet, which was headed by the Mensheviks, did not raise the banner of revolt in the capital, nor did it paralyse the actions of the government. The Moscow insurrection did not develop into an all-Russian one.

The leadership of the insurrection as a whole lagged behind the movement of the masses, which was growing spontaneously. At the beginning of the insurrection the leading workers of the Moscow Bolshevik Committee and organisers of the rising—V. L. Schantzer (Ma-
rat), M. I. Vasilyev-Yuzhin and others—were arrested. The Moscow insurrection turned into isolated revolts in separate districts, and followed defensive instead of offensive tactics. This doomed it to defeat.

The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries brought disorganisation into the ranks of the insurgents. Soon after signing, under pressure from the workers, the call for a general strike and an armed insurrection, they announced the disbanding of their squads. On December 14, even before the arrival of troops from St. Petersburg, the Mensheviks demanded that the Soviet call off the insurrection immediately. The capitulationist attitude of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries contributed to its defeat.

In order to preserve the revolutionary forces, the Moscow Bolshevik Committee and the Moscow Soviet called for the cessation of the armed struggle as from December 19. Unshakable faith in the coming victory of the working class is expressed in the last appeal issued by the headquarters of the Presnya fighting squads: “We began. We finish.... Blood, violence and death will dog our footsteps. But that does not matter. The future belongs to the working class. In all countries, generation after generation will learn tenacity from the experience of Presnya.... Long live the struggle and victory of the workers!”

Following Moscow, insurrections flared up in December 1905 and January 1906 in other cities. On December 12 the proletariat of Nizhni-Novgorod rose in armed revolt at the call of the R.S.D.L.P. Committee. On December 13 an insurrection broke out at Rostov-on-Don. A political strike in Novorossiisk that started on December 8 grew into an armed insurrection. Power passed into the hands of the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies, whose leadership consisted mainly of Bolsheviks. The Soviet was the organ not only of the uprising, but also of a new people’s authority. The Novorossiisk of those days has gone down in history as the “Novorossiisk Republic”. The proletariat of the Ukraine took up arms against the autocracy. Particularly extensive armed actions occurred in the Donets coalfield, Kharkov and Alexandrovsk (Zaporozhye).

The revolutionary struggle of the Urals workers was best organised at Perm (at the Motovilikha Works) and at Ufa.

A bitter armed struggle was waged by the workers of Siberia, particularly at Krasnoyarsk and Chita, under Bolshevik leadership. There the insurgent workers were joined by the soldiers. In Krasnoyarsk a united Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies was set up which became the organ of revolutionary power. The Soviet proclaimed freedom of the press, assembly and association, introduced an 8-hour working day, and disarmed the police and gendarmerie. In Chita the garrison went over to the workers. The Soviet of Soldiers’ and Cossacks’ Deputies, formed there at the end of November, was the virtual organ of power in the town. The so-called Chita Republic came into being.
In Poland and the Baltic provinces, the workers, farm-labourers and peasants engaged in armed clashes. A wave of risings swept over Transcaucasia, where the Bolshevik organisations skilfully linked up the struggle of the workers with the peasant movement. The revolt of the peasants in Guria, where whole districts passed into the hands of the insurgents, assumed a particularly stubborn character. In Finland the armed struggle against tsarism was widespread.

Although the armed insurrections assumed a large scale, they were not sufficiently active and well co-ordinated, and did not take place simultaneously. The success of the Moscow uprising depended largely on support from the workers of St. Petersburg, the country's capital. But the Mensheviks—Trotsky, Khrustalyov-Nosar and others—who headed the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies pursued opportunist tactics, checking the development of the workers' revolutionary initiative. Street fighting by the St. Petersburg workers in December never rose above isolated clashes with the police and troops. As a result of the Mensheviks' opportunist policy, the St. Petersburg Soviet was unable to play its role of organ of the insurrection and of the struggle to overthrow the autocracy.

All these insurrections were crushed with incredible ferocity by the tsarist government. The tsar earned the nickname of "Nicholas the Bloody", and it stuck.

The December Armed Insurrection, started on the initiative of the Moscow workers and headed by the Bolsheviks, was the climax of the revolution.

The Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks differed fundamentally in their appraisals of the insurrection. The Mensheviks condemned the heroic struggle of the Russian proletariat which had taken to arms. "It should not have taken to arms," declared Plekhanov. On the contrary, replied the Bolsheviks, they should have taken to arms more resolutely; it should have been made clear to the masses that tsarism could not be defeated by strikes and other peaceful means alone, and that the victory of the revolution could be achieved only through armed struggle. Lenin thought very highly of the December Insurrection. He made a profound analysis of its positive aspects and the causes of its defeat, and called on all class-conscious workers to study its lessons and prepare for new battles.

The December uprising revealed the unprecedented growth of the political consciousness and organisation of the working class. A tremendous distance had been travelled since January 9. The working class had fought heroically, arms in hand, for the overthrow of the autocracy and for the victory of the revolution. The idea that the tsarist monarchy must be overthrown and the semi-feudal system abolished was taking firm root in the minds of the working class and the millions of labouring people in Russia.
The December events proved conclusively that "freedom cannot be achieved without tremendous sacrifices, that the armed resistance of tsarism must be broken and crushed by force of arms" (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 539-40).


Unlike the Social-Democratic parties in most countries, which had developed legally, the Bolshevik Party up to 1905 took shape and grew in conditions of underground, illegal work. Revolutionaries paid with years of imprisonment or penal servitude for the slightest attempt to organise workers' groups or to publish appeals or leaflets. Members of the Party and Party committees could not hold meetings openly. The local Party committee was appointed by the Central Committee or by the relevant regional committee of the R.S.D.L.P. Revolutionary newspapers, pamphlets and books were mostly printed abroad and brought into Russia secretly.

The conditions of illegality demanded the strictest secrecy on the part of all members of the Party, but this did not result in the Party becoming an exclusive organisation. In all its work it maintained close contact with the workers and other sections of the working people, and led many actions of the proletariat.

The rising tide of revolution created new conditions for Party work. The revolutionary struggle of the masses had won them freedom of assembly, association and the press. Meetings, conferences and congresses of representatives of various public organisations were being held throughout the country. Halls and auditoriums for mass meetings were being seized without legal authority. The summer and autumn of 1905 witnessed huge open-air meetings. They were openly addressed by Bolshevik speakers and by representatives of other parties, who stated the platforms of their respective parties and called on the masses to support them. The ideas of the Bolshevik Party were spread far and wide, and were winning an ever larger number of active adherents.

"In the spring of 1905," wrote Lenin, "our Party was a league of underground circles; in the autumn it became the Party of the millions of the proletariat" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 132).

Taking advantage of the relative liberties won by the people, many Bolshevik organisations began to issue legal workers' papers: *Borba (Struggle)* and *Vperyod (Forward)* in Moscow, *Kavkazsky Rabochy Listok (Caucasian Workers' Sheet)* in Transcaucasia, *Krasnoyarsky Rabochy (Krasnoyarsk Worker)* in Krasnoyarsk, *Zabaikalsky Rabochy (Transbaikal Worker)* in Chita, etc. The publication of leaflets and proclamations was considerably increased. During the period of the revolution the Bolshevik organisations issued more than
two thousand different leaflets, the monthly circulation of which exceeded one million copies. On the initiative of the Bolsheviks, a considerable quantity of Marxist literature was published in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Odessa, Rostov-on-Don, Tiflis, Baku, Tomsk, Irkutsk, Krasnoyarsk and other cities in 1905-07.

The new conditions necessitated changes in the structure of the Party and in its organisational work. In his article, "Reorganisation of the Party", Lenin outlined the programme for such a reconstruction. He proposed making every possible use of legal opportunities, setting up legal and semi-legal Party bodies, as well as a network of organisations close to the Party, but at the same time preserving the illegal apparatus of the Party. Lenin called for drawing a mass of new members into the ranks of the R.S.D.L.P., first and foremost from among the workers. "Let the new spirit of young revolutionary Russia be infused through them," wrote Lenin. Wherever possible, election of leading Party bodies was to be introduced, and in place of the "circles" which had existed underground Party nuclei were to be formed, as the principal primary organisations of the Party.

The Party rearranged its work in conformity with the new conditions. The principle of democratic centralism began to be put consistently into practice.

In the course of the revolution the Party grew, being joined by the best, advanced workers. Towards the end of 1905 the St. Petersburg organisation had a membership of nearly 3,000, the Moscow organisation 2,500, the Ivanovo-Voznesensk organisation nearly 900, the Baku and Kharkov organisations 1,000 members each. During the revolution R. I. Eiche, M. N. Pokrovsky, J. E. Rudzutak and N. M. Shvernik joined the Party. Subsequently they became prominent Party workers.

More than 50 Bolshevik committees and groups functioned in Russia at that time, predominantly in the industrial centres. As for the Mensheviks, they enjoyed influence among the handicraftsmen, intelligentsia, students, urban petty bourgeoisie and the less class-conscious workers.

With the influx of many new workers into its ranks during the upsurge of the revolution, the R.S.D.L.P. was becoming a mass party. Its young members only gradually learned of the existence of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, with different views and platforms. They strove to understand what these differences were. The existence of separate local Bolshevik and Menshevik organisations using one and the same name—R.S.D.L.P.—caused confusion among the workers. Their class feeling told them that such a state of affairs could only weaken the working class, the Party and the revolution. But at that time the Mensheviks still regarded themselves as Social-Democrats; they did not openly reject the Programme of the R.S.D.L.P., and drew new members into their organisations. Some time was needed before the Party members could convince themselves, from
their own experience, of the opportunism of the Mensheviks and realise that the Bolsheviks were the sole spokesmen of the interests of the working class and of socialism.

Soon after the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. many members of the Party began to demand the unification of the Party. The movement from below of the Party masses and the advanced workers for Party unity was an expression of their desire to strengthen the Party and increase its prestige in the working class, to consolidate all forces for a successful struggle to win the revolution. The Central Committee of the Party, elected at the Third Congress, supported this demand. Lenin and the Bolsheviks were firmly convinced that in the end revolutionary Marxist principles would triumph in the R.S.D.L.P. and the Mensheviks would be isolated.

Describing the history of the struggle inside the R.S.D.L.P., Lenin noted:

“It should be said that the formal breaks with the Mensheviks in the spring of 1905 and in January 1912, alternated with partial and complete unification in 1906 and 1907, and then in 1910, not only owing to the vicissitudes of the struggle, but also under the pressure of the rank and file, who insisted on testing matters by their own experience” (Lenin Miscellany XXXV, p. 303).

Lenin and the Bolsheviks held that it was necessary to ensure that the entire R.S.D.L.P. take a revolutionary Marxist stand and guide the working-class and the revolutionary movement in Russia. The Bolsheviks sought to win over the widest possible sections of the Social-Democratic workers to their side. Lenin put before them the task of inducing the entire R.S.D.L.P. to accept the platform of the Third Congress. He pointed out that victory of the Bolsheviks over the Mensheviks in those circumstances called for tactics of manœuvre and compromise “but such manœuvre and compromise, of course, as would assist, accelerate, consolidate and strengthen the Bolsheviks at the expense of the Mensheviks” (Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 56).

A unity Congress was made imperative not only by these considerations. There were in Russia at that time, besides the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, some other Social-Democratic parties, among them the Social-Democracy of Poland and Lithuania and the Lettish Social-Democratic Labour Party. These parties were not affiliated to the R.S.D.L.P., and acted separately. The interests of the struggle against tsarism, particularly at a time of revolution, demanded the unification of the efforts of all the nationalities inhabiting Russia, and the international consolidation of the workers of the whole country.

The next Congress of the Party was to decide the question of unification. The Bolsheviks did not succeed in holding the Congress at the appointed time, on account of the railway strike, and of the armed insurrection that had begun in Moscow. Having assembled in
Tammerfors, the Bolshevik delegates held a conference of their own there, from December 12 to 17, 1905.

The Conference expressed itself in favour of Party unification, of "the immediate and simultaneous amalgamation of the practical (centres) and literary central organs on a basis of equality..." (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part I, p. 98). In its resolution on "Reorganisation of the Party", the Conference recommended the wide application of the elective principle and the principle of democratic centralism. Departures from this principle were considered permissible only in the event of insurmountable practical obstacles. In its "Agrarian Resolution" the Conference, enlarging on the decisions of the Third Congress, proposed that the provision of the Party's agrarian programme concerning the otrezki be replaced by the demand for the confiscation of all state, landlord and church lands.

At the end of December a joint Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. was formed. It was entrusted with convening the Fourth Congress of the Party.

Lenin considered it necessary that the Bolsheviks should come to the Congress with their own platform on all the major questions of the revolution, so that the workers might see clearly the attitude of the Bolsheviks and be able to choose between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. In the second half of February 1906 Lenin drew up the platform of the Bolsheviks—a draft of the main resolutions of the Congress. The resolutions of the Bolsheviks called for preparations for a new revolutionary onslaught on the autocracy. The armed struggle of the broad masses of the people was recognised as the main form of struggle. The Mensheviks put forward their own tactical platform, which in essence rejected the revolutionary struggle. As a result of the discussion of the two platforms, a majority of the Party organisations supported the Bolshevik platform. Lenin substantiated the Bolshevik tactics in his work The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party, in which he generalised the experience of the revolutionary creative effort of the masses in developing new forms of state activity, and elaborated the Marxist doctrine of the state.

The Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. met in Stockholm from April 10 to 25, 1906. It was attended by 112 delegates with the right to vote, representing 57 local organisations, and 22 delegates with voice but no vote. The Social-Democracy of Poland and Lithuania, the Bund, the Lettish Social-Democratic Labour Party sent to the Congress three representatives each, and the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party and the Labour Party of Finland one representative each.

Bolsheviks at the Congress were supported by F. E. Dzerzhinsky, a delegate from the Social-Democracy of Poland and Lithuania.

Among the delegates with the right to vote were 46 Bolsheviks and 62 Mensheviks. A small group of the delegates held an indefinite position. The numerical predominance of the Mensheviks was due to the fact that many Bolshevik Party organisations which had headed the armed uprising were unable to send delegates. Central Russia, the Urals, Siberia and the North—strongholds of the Bolsheviks—were represented by only a small number of delegates. The Mensheviks, who had the most numerous organisations in the non-industrial regions of the country, were able to send more delegates. The composition of the Congress determined the Menshevik character of most of its decisions.

The Congress discussed the agrarian question, the current situation and the class tasks of the proletariat, the attitude to be taken towards the State Duma and other questions.

Lenin delivered a report on the agrarian question for the Bolsheviks. He defended the demand for confiscation of all the landed estates and the nationalisation of the land, that is, the abolition of the private ownership of land and the handing over of all land to a democratic state. In the historical conditions in which Russia found herself, this was a necessary solution of the agrarian problem, the only solution that was correct. The Bolshevik agrarian programme called upon the peasants to fight the landlords and the tsar. Nationalisation of the land, stated Lenin, like the solution of the agrarian-peasant question as a whole, was possible only with the overthrow of the tsarist autocracy, the seizure of power by the people and the establishment of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Nationalisation of the land would not only destroy the survivals of serfdom. It would also sharpen the class struggle within the peasantry, and in this way help to rally the poor peasants around the proletariat; it would hasten the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution.

Some of the Bolshevik delegates (J. V. Stalin, S. A. Suvorov and others) supported the demand that the landed estates be divided and transferred to the peasants as their private property. Lenin criticised this demand of the "divisionists", noting that it was a measure limiting the scope of the revolutionary movement. The "divisionists" did not see the intimate connection between the solution of the agrarian problem and the political revolution, or between the programme for nationalising the land and the complete victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. They proceeded from the erroneous assumption that a long interval would elapse between the bourgeois-democratic and the socialist revolutions, and failed to take into account the prospect of the bourgeois-democratic revolution developing into a socialist revolution.
The Mensheviks advocated a programme of municipalisation of the land. According to this programme the landed estates were to be placed at the disposal of the municipalities, from which the peasants were to rent the land. The political harmfulness of this programme lay in the fact that instead of calling for revolutionary action it sowed harmful illusions about the possibility of solving the agrarian question in a peaceful way while preserving the reactionary central authority. Instead of the idea of an alliance of the working class and the peasantry, the Mensheviks actually preached a policy of peasant-landlord agreement. Lenin sharply criticised the Menshevik programme of municipalisation, and exposed its erroneousness and the damage it would cause to the revolutionary movement. The Menshevik agrarian programme received a majority of votes at the Congress. The Bolsheviks, however, secured the inclusion of their slogan of confiscation of the landed estates in the resolution, in place of the opportunist formula, “alienation”, proposed by the Mensheviks.

The report “On the Current Situation and the Class Tasks of the Proletariat” was also made by Lenin. The Bolsheviks were for exposing the parties of the liberal bourgeoisie and for an alliance with the democratic forces in the fight against the tsarist autocracy and the political parties supporting it. The Mensheviks, on the other hand, were ready to place the leadership of the revolution in the hands of the bourgeoisie.

The Bolsheviks put forward the task of combating the constitutional illusions about the Duma spread among the people by the liberal bourgeoisie, destroying confidence in the promises and laws of the tsarist government and exposing the hypocrisy and instability of the Cadet majority in the Duma. The Mensheviks, on the other hand, regarded the Duma as a “national political centre”, capable of uniting and “co-ordinating” the struggle against the old regime. They advocated a course directed towards liquidating the revolution, seeking to switch it over to a parliamentary or Duma path. This showed more than anything else the role of the Mensheviks as the vehicles of bourgeois influence on the working class.

The Fourth Congress adopted the Party Rules. Clause 1 of the Rules was given in Lenin’s formulation. The Bolshevik formulation on democratic centralism was introduced in the Party Rules for the first time. It has been included in the Rules ever since.

The Congress decided on unity with the Polish and Lettish Social-Democracies which had joined the R.S.D.L.P. as territorial organisations working among the proletariat of all the nationalities of their region. It approved a draft laying down the conditions on which the Bund could join the R.S.D.L.P., but in a separate resolution emphatically opposed the organisation of the proletariat on the national principle. The question of admitting the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party into the R.S.D.L.P. was deferred and later became superfluous in view of that party’s petty-bourgeois, nationalist charac-
The workers and other advanced representatives of the working people of the Ukraine united and carried on the struggle in the all-Russian organisations of the R.S.D.L.P., where they were educated in a spirit of class struggle and proletarian internationalism.

The Fourth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. thus demonstrated the triumph of the principles of proletarian internationalism proclaimed by Lenin and upheld by the Second Congress of the Party. One of the major achievements of the Fourth Congress was the merging of the Social-Democratic parties of the various nationalities of Russia within a single R.S.D.L.P. This unity secured the Bolsheviks ideological influence on broad sections of the workers of all the nationalities in the country, promoted the internationalist education and close rallying of all the genuinely revolutionary forces of the proletariat, and facilitated the exposure and isolation of the opportunists, chauvinists and nationalists.

"An important practical result of the Congress," wrote Lenin, "is the proposed (partly already achieved) amalgamation with the non-Russian Social-Democratic parties. This amalgamation will strengthen the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. It will help to efface the last traces of the old circle habits. It will infuse a new spirit into the work of the Party. It will greatly strengthen the proletariat among all the peoples of Russia" (Collected Works, Vol. 10, p. 376).

The Central Committee elected at the Fourth Congress consisted of three Bolsheviks and seven Mensheviks. The editorial board of the central newspaper, Sotsial-Demokrat (Social-Democrat), was formed entirely of Mensheviks.

The sharp struggle at the Congress between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks on all the fundamental questions of revolution was of great importance in educating the proletariat, exposing the Mensheviks and strengthening the Marxist party, a party of a new type. The cardinal questions of the revolution demanded an answer. In the course of the revolution the differences between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks grew deeper. The Mensheviks slipped lower and lower, revealing themselves more and more as agents of the bourgeoisie in the working-class movement.

Immediately after the Congress Lenin, on behalf of the Bolshevik delegates, addressed an appeal to the Party, making a fundamental criticism of the Menshevik decisions adopted by the Fourth Congress despite the protests of the Bolsheviks. He sharply criticised the programme of municipalisation of the land, and called on all Social-Democrats to secure at the next congress a decision cancelling that programme. The Bolsheviks began to work within the R.S.D.L.P. to ensure that the next Party congress adopted correct, revolutionary, Marxist decisions and thereby reject the incorrect, Menshevik resolutions of the Fourth Congress.
Since the central newspaper of the Party was in the hands of the Mensheviks, the Bolsheviks began in August 1906 to publish their own illegal paper, *Proletary*. It was edited by Lenin, and, in fact, became the central newspaper of the Bolsheviks. They also organised the publication of the legal papers *Volna* (*The Wave*), *Vperyod* and *Ekho* (*The Echo*).

Only formal unity within the R.S.D.L.P. was effected at the Fourth Congress. In reality, the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks retained their own views and platforms on the vital issues of the revolution. The Bolsheviks continued to carry on a profoundly principled struggle against the Mensheviks and against opportunism in the working-class movement. They preserved their organisational independence and leading centre. The Mensheviks, for their part, had their own independent organisations. Lenin wrote later:

"Between 1903 and 1912, there were periods of several years in which we were formally united with the Mensheviks in one Social-Democratic Party, but we never ceased our ideological and political struggle against them as opportunists and vehicles of bourgeois influence on the proletariat" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 53).

The Bolsheviks were guided by Lenin's proposition that the policy of unification must not be taken to mean mixing up Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, or confusing their ideological and political standpoints. Lenin and the Bolsheviks, taking into account the great harm caused by the increasingly opportunist line of the Mensheviks (support for the Cadet Duma, capitulation to the liberal bourgeoisie, and a policy of liquidating the revolutionary struggle), intensified their fight against this line.


After the defeat of the December Insurrection the tide of revolution gradually subsided. But the causes which had given rise to the revolution had deep roots, and the revolutionary sentiments of the masses were strong both in town and country. The revolutionary struggle continued right up to the middle of 1907. The working class and the people of Russia generally, who had risen in revolution, made a fighting retreat.

Tsarism intensified its onslaught on the forces of the revolution. Punitive expeditions and courts martial were at work everywhere, the Black-Hundred pogrom-makers were rampant. The tsar's hangmen smashed up the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, the trade unions and other mass organisations of the workers, peasants and soldiers. Particularly savage was the persecution of the foremost representa-
atives of the working class, the Bolsheviks. Thousands of them were sentenced to death, shot or hanged without trial or investigation. Among those shot by a punitive expedition in Siberia was I. V. Babushkin, whom Lenin described as a hero of the people and the pride of the Bolshevik Party.

The tsarist government, in combating the revolution, did not confine itself to repressive measures. It also had recourse to reforms. On December 11, 1905, at the height of the armed insurrection in Moscow, a law on elections to the State Duma was promulgated. Tsarism hoped in this way to sow among the masses the illusion that they would achieve their demands peacefully, through a "Russian parliament". The government sought to deceive the peasants, who still believed that they could obtain the landlords' land through the Duma, to wrest them from the working class and thus to deal the revolution a final blow.

The electoral law deprived over half the population of the suffrage. Elections to the Duma were neither universal, nor equal, nor direct, nor by secret ballot. The electoral law ensured the overwhelming preponderance of the representatives of the landlords and capitalists in the future Duma. The electorate was divided into categories known as curias, according to property and class qualifications (landowners, urban, peasant and worker). Electors were elected in every curia, but not on an equal basis. Thus the landlords elected one elector for every 2,000 voters, the peasants one for every 30,000 and the workers one for every 90,000 voters.

The stubborn struggle waged by the working class and peasantry in 1906 raised hopes of a new revolutionary upsurge. In these circumstances, the Bolsheviks could not abandon their policy of the further deepening and extension of the revolution. In accordance with the decision of the Tammerfors Conference, therefore, they called on the masses to boycott the Duma, and made wide use of election meetings to carry on agitation for armed insurrection. As for the Mensheviks, they advocated semi-boycott tactics (participation in the election of delegates and electors, but not in the election of members to the Duma). This half-hearted and unprincipled attitude of the Mensheviks split the ranks of the workers and fostered harmful constitutional illusions.

The Bolshevik and Menshevik tactics towards the Duma were widely discussed in the R.S.D.L.P. in January and February 1906 on the basis of the respective platforms. Most local Party organisations declared in favour of the tactics of active boycott. The more class-conscious and revolutionary workers, and a section of the democratic intelligentsia, boycotted the elections. The boycott, however, was unable to frustrate elections to the Duma. The principal reason for this was the absence of a mass revolutionary upsurge capable of preventing the convocation of the Duma. Another reason was the disorganising policy of the Mensheviks and the strong consti-
tutional illusions of the peasantry, a large section of which succumbed to the overtures of the Cadets. Analysing the experience of the revolution, Lenin admitted later that the boycott of the First Duma in 1906 had been a mistake, reality showing that the revolution had by then passed its peak.

The Cadet Party won a majority in the First State Duma.

The Bolsheviks set themselves the task of exposing the activities of the Duma, which was no more than a fig-leaf for the autocracy. Lenin considered the struggle against the constitutional illusions prevalent among the peasantry to be one of the Party’s most important political tasks at that period. With the object of strengthening the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, the Bolsheviks supported the Trudoviks—the peasant deputies in the First Duma who reflected the aspirations of the peasant masses in their fight for land.

The Mensheviks, proceeding from an opportunist appraisal of the motive forces and prospects of the revolution, regarded the Duma as the “rallying centre” of the revolutionary forces. The Menshevik Central Committee elected at the Fourth Congress called for support of the Duma in its intention to form a Cadet government. This sort of appeal could only bolster up constitutional illusions and engender false hopes of a peaceful transfer of power to the people.

The Central Committee did not voice the will of the Party on questions concerning the State Duma. Most local Party organisa­tions, proceeding from Lenin’s appraisal of the Duma and the Bolshevik criticism of the Menshevik position, condemned the opportunist line of the Central Committee.

The convocation of the First Duma did not halt the revolutionary movement. The proletariat fought heavy rearguard battles against the onslaught of reaction, drawing its deepest reserves into the revolutionary movement. Taking into account the experience of the December Insurrection, the Party intensified its work among the peasants, and particularly among the soldiers. At the end of 1905 and the beginning of 1906 a number of Party organisations in the armed forces began to publish newspapers for the soldiers and sailors: Kazarma (Barracks) in St. Petersburg, which was actually the central newspaper of the Bolshevik organisation in the armed forces, Soldatskaya Zhizn (Soldier’s Life) in Moscow, Soldat (The Soldier) in Sevastopol, Golos Soldata (The Soldier’s Voice) in Riga, Zhizn Kazarny (Barracks Life) in Voronezh, etc.

In the summer of 1906 the peasant movement flared up with fresh vigour. Peasant unrest spread to 215 uyezds in the European part of Russia, i.e., to half the uyezds in that part of the country. Revolutionary actions continued in the armed forces. The biggest revolts of soldiers and sailors in 1906 broke out in the Baltic Fleet—at Sveaborg, Kronstadt and Revel (Tallinn).
The tsarist government took new steps to crush the revolution completely. On July 8, 1906, the First State Duma, from whose rostrum the tsarist government had often been criticised, mainly on the agrarian question, was dissolved. The counter-revolution then intensified its onslaught.

The revolution having begun to recede, the Bolsheviks changed their tactics. They decided to take part in the Second State Duma in order to use it as a platform for revolutionary propaganda and for exposing the autocracy and the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

The Bolsheviks launched an election campaign, using it to organise the proletariat and educate it politically. They advanced the idea of a "Left bloc" with the Trudoviks, stressing the revolutionary-democratic character of the agrarian demands of the Trudoviks who, as Lenin noted, in spite of their narrow petty-bourgeois outlook, "do express something real and progressive at the present historical moment" (Collected Works, Vol. 13, p. 236).

The principal aim of the Bolshevik Duma tactics was to rid the peasantry of the influence of the liberal bourgeoisie and to form a revolutionary bloc of representatives of the working class and the peasantry in the Duma.

The Mensheviks advocated a bloc with the Cadets during the election campaign and in the Duma itself. By taking this stand they helped the bourgeoisie to spread among the people false hopes of the possibility of winning liberty without a revolution, without an armed insurrection.

The opportunist position of the Menshevik Central Committee on the principal questions of tactics aroused the indignation of the overwhelming majority of the local Party organisations, which demanded that an extraordinary Party Congress be convened as speedily as possible. In September 1906 the St. Petersburg Committee, the Regional Bureau of the Social-Democratic organisations of Central Russia, the Chief Board of the Polish and Lithuanian Social-Democracy, and the Central Committee of the Lettish Social-Democracy adopted an appeal for the calling of a Party Congress. This appeal was supported by many Party organisations.

The Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. met in London from April 30 to May 19, 1907. It was attended by 336 delegates representing 147,000 members of the Party (46,000 Bolsheviks, 38,000 Mensheviks, 25,000 Bundists, 25,000 Polish Social-Democrats, and 13,000 Lettish Social-Democrats). Among the delegates were 105 Bolsheviks, 97 Mensheviks, 44 members of the Polish and Lithuanian Social-Democracy and 29 members of the Lettish Social-Democracy. The remaining delegates represented the Bund and the other organisations of the Party.

As a result of the resolute struggle waged by the Bolsheviks under Lenin's leadership against opportunist trends and against a conciliatory attitude to them, and as a result of the day-to-day explanatory work conducted among the Party membership, a majority of
the delegates from the big industrial centres (St. Petersburg, Moscow, the Urals, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, etc.) were Bolsheviks, while the Menshevik delegates represented mostly non-industrial districts.


Maxim Gorky, the great proletarian writer, took part in the work of the Congress. A true friend of the people, closely linked with the working-class movement and the Bolshevik Party, Gorky sympathised whole-heartedly with the revolution and rendered the Bolsheviks tremendous assistance. Lenin thought very highly of Gorky, with whom he maintained close contact over many years. Gorky more than once took issue with the Mensheviks, and openly condemned their opportunist line. He castigated the Cadets and the liberals, and waged a resolute struggle against tsarism.

The Polish and Lettish Social-Democrats supported the Bolsheviks at the Congress. However, the representatives of these parties occasionally vacillated and voted for the Mensheviks.

On the basic questions the Congress adopted the Bolshevik resolutions, which determined the Party’s long-term policy.

The main question discussed was that of the attitude towards the bourgeois parties. Lenin delivered the report on this question.

The various parties in Russia expressed the interests of specific classes. The different attitudes of the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks towards the non-proletarian parties also determined their attitude towards the fundamental questions of the revolution. To accomplish the mission of leader of the democratic revolution, the working class must understand well the class nature of every party and decide on the proper tactics to be used towards them. Lenin held that a relentless struggle must be waged against the parties of the Black Hundreds (Union of the Russian People, the Council of the United Nobility, and others) and against the parties of the big landlords and the bourgeoisie (League of October Seventeenth, the Commercial and Industrial Party, and others). As regards the Cadet Party, the party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, Lenin stressed that in fighting this party it was particularly necessary to expose its sham democracy and thus prevent the Cadets from leading the peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie in its wake. The Mensheviks, on the contrary, proposed forming a bloc with the Cadets in the State Duma. At the Congress, Lenin exposed these capitulationist tactics of the Mensheviks.

Lenin took a different view of the Trudoviks, the name then given to representatives of the Trudovik group in the Duma. The group consisted of deputies from the peasantry—non-party people, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Popular Socialists. They wavered between submitting to the hegemony of the liberals and carrying on a resolute
struggle against landlord proprietorship and the feudal state. Lenin proposed exposing the reactionary aspect of the Trudovik group, but at the same time considered it advisable, in particular circumstances, to conclude agreements with the Trudoviks, as representatives of petty-bourgeois democracy in the common struggle against reaction and the liberal bourgeoisie. During the revolution this Bolshevik policy found expression in the activity of the Soviets, in the Duma elections, and in joint votes in the Duma against the Black Hundreds and the liberals.

By passing the Bolshevik resolution on the attitude to be taken towards the bourgeois parties, the Congress showed that most of the Social-Democratic workers had satisfied themselves of the historical correctness of Lenin’s line in the revolution.

The Menshevik idea of convening a so-called “labour congress” was a dismal failure. The idea was suggested by the Menshevik Axelrod and supported by other prominent Mensheviks. They proposed holding a congress of representatives of various workers’ organisations, and forming at this congress a “broad labour party” grouping the Social-Democrats, Socialist-Revolutionaries and anarchists. Actually this would have meant the liquidation of the R.S.D.L.P. On the proposal of the Bolsheviks, the Congress condemned the idea of a “labour congress” as being definitely prejudicial to the working-class movement. The Polish Social-Democrats (headed by Rosa Luxemburg) and the Lettish Social-Democrats, like the Bolsheviks, were against calling a “labour congress”.

The Bolsheviks won a big victory over the opportunists on the Party’s tactics in the State Duma. The Congress declared that the activities of the Social-Democrats in the Duma should be subordinate to the struggle outside the Duma, that the Duma should be utilised pre-eminently as a platform for exposing the tsarist autocracy and the treacherous policy of the bourgeoisie, and for proclaiming and popularising the revolutionary programme of the Party.

This was a new, revolutionary Marxist course of action for the representatives of the proletariat in parliamentary bodies. It provided a model for the entire international working-class movement. It acquired particular significance in view of the fact that the West European Social-Democrats were sinking deeper and deeper into opportunism, renouncing revolutionary struggle and sowing illusions in the working class as to the possibility of power being won by parliamentary means.

The Congress also adopted the Bolshevik resolution on the relations between the Party and the trade unions. The trade union movement in Russia had been growing rapidly as a result of the revolution. By 1907 there were nearly 650 trade unions in the country. The further course of the revolutionary struggle greatly depended upon whom the trade unions would follow. The Mensheviks advocated “neutrality” of the trade unions. The Bolsheviks, on the contrary, held that
the workers must be educated in a spirit of class struggle and the socialist aims of the proletariat. The Fifth Congress decided accordingly that all members of the R.S.D.L.P. must help to induce "the trade unions to recognise the ideological leadership of the Social-Democratic Party..." (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part I, p. 170).

The Congress elected a Central Committee in which the supporters of Lenin's line were in the majority. The C.C., however, also included Mensheviks and representatives of the non-Russian Social-Democratic organisations, who often vacillated between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. To guarantee the implementation of a consistently revolutionary policy in keeping with the Fifth Congress decisions, the Bolsheviks during the Congress held a meeting at which they formed their Bolshevik Centre, with Lenin as its head.

The Bolsheviks did not let their victory at the Congress turn their heads. Lenin stressed that they must not rest on their laurels in the fight against the opportunists, that many battles and trials still lay ahead.

That victory was indicative of the growing strength of the Bolshevik Party, which had gained tremendous political experience in the course of revolutionary struggles.

The first Russian revolution strengthened the links between the Bolsheviks and the masses. Many advanced workers and the finest representatives of other sections of the working people joined the Party in those years. The revolution made the Bolshevik Party the party enjoying the greatest prestige among the working class. Characteristically, the police department in the spring of 1907 instructed all the Okhrana section chiefs "to pay special attention to the activity... of the 'Bolshevik' faction of the Social-Democratic Party, since the Menshevik groups do not at the moment represent, with regard to their sentiments, as serious a danger as the Bolsheviks".

During the revolution Lenin's genius as leader of the revolution, a brilliant theoretician of Marxism and an outstanding organiser of the masses manifested itself with exceptional force. Lenin became widely known. His revolutionary Marxist policy and courageous activity were earning him increasing prestige among the Russian Social-Democrats, the revolutionary workers and other sections of the working people.

The first Russian revolution continued for nearly two and a half years. It actually began to recede after the defeat of the December Insurrection. It retreated slowly, continuing to fight. By the middle of 1907 it was clear that the workers and peasants lacked sufficient strength to defeat tsarism. Reaction passed to an all-out offensive.

On June 3, 1907, the tsarist government dissolved the Second State Duma. The members of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma were arrested. A new law on elections to the Third State Duma was promulgated which ensured undivided sway in the Duma for the feudal landlords and the big bourgeoisie.
The working-class organisations were smashed. Particularly savage was the persecution of the Bolshevik Party. The police authorities began a zealous search for Lenin in order to wreak vengeance on him. Forewarned by friends, Lenin managed, at the risk of his life, to cross the ice-bound Gulf of Finland and to make his way abroad. It was his second exile abroad where he remained until April 1917.

The first people’s revolution in Russia had ended in defeat.

One of the causes of its defeat was that the working class of Russia had not yet succeeded in forming a stable alliance with the peasantry in the fight against tsarism; the peasants’ actions were scattered, they were not sufficiently organised and resolute. The major revolutionary actions of the peasantry occurred when tsarism had suppressed the strongholds of the revolution in the industrial centres of the country. The bulk of the peasants, extremely backward politically, still had faith in the tsar. Being under the influence of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Cadets, they placed their hopes in the tsarist State Duma. Nor was there a sufficiently concerted revolutionary onslaught on tsarism by the working masses of the oppressed nationalities, whose forces were being undermined by the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalist parties.

All this had an adverse effect on the conduct of the army, which consisted largely of peasants clad in soldiers’ uniforms. Even though some military units came out against the autocracy, most of the soldiers remained loyal to the tsarist government and executed its orders.

The working class acted as the leading force of the revolution. But the action of the workers, too, was insufficiently concerted; some sections of the workers entered the struggle when the vanguard of the working class had already been considerably weakened. Owing to the absence of a single all-Russian centre to direct the insurrection, the armed struggle assumed the character of scattered local uprisings.

Because of the splitting, disorganising activities of the Mensheviks, the R.S.D.L.P. was not united. The Bolsheviks fought to extend the revolution in every possible way, overthrow tsarism by armed insurrection, strengthen the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, neutralise and isolate the Cadet bourgeoisie, and form a provisional revolutionary government consisting of workers and peasants. The Mensheviks stubbornly opposed the revolutionary line of the Bolsheviks and acted as agents of the bourgeoisie in the working-class movement. The absence of unity inside the R.S.D.L.P. tended to split the ranks of the working class and thus to weaken its onslaught. For these reasons, the proletariat proved unable fully to play its leading part in the revolution to the end and to bring the revolution to a victorious conclusion.

A counter-revolutionary role was played by the Russian liberal bourgeoisie, which came to terms with tsarism.
Another factor for the defeat of the revolution in Russia was the financial assistance received by the tsarist government from foreign imperialists, who feared the loss of their investments in Russian industry and the possible spread of the revolution to other countries. World imperialism had been the sworn enemy of the Russian revolution from the very beginning.

The conclusion of peace with Japan in August 1905 also served to bolster up the position of tsarism.

Despite the fact that the first Russian revolution ended in defeat, the first breach had been made in the autocratic system. By its heroic struggle, the proletariat won a number of political and economic gains for itself and for the entire people. For the first time freedom of speech, association and assembly was won in Russia, if only for a short time; a legal workers' press, educational and cultural societies, and trade unions came into being.

The revolution compelled tsarism to establish the first representative body, the State Duma. Even though the State Duma, whose composition was packed and whose rights were curtailed, was no more than a powerless appendage of tsarism, the Bolsheviks used it as a platform for revolutionary propaganda and for exposing tsarism and the political parties of the bourgeoisie.

The proletariat won some improvement in its working conditions. Wages were raised in many industries. The peasantry as a result of the revolution secured the abolition of redemption payments, and a reduction of rentals and sale prices of land.

But the principal aim of the revolution, the overthrow of tsarism, was not attained. The revolution conclusively showed the mass of the people that it was not enough merely to undermine tsarist rule; this rule had to be completely destroyed.

6. International Significance of the Revolution

The Russian revolution of 1905-07 ushered in a new era, one of most profound political upheavals and revolutionary battles. The first blow delivered by it to tsarism, whose interests were interwoven with those of West European imperialism, weakened the imperialist system as a whole.

The revolution began a new stage in the international working-class movement, and exercised a powerful influence on the development of the national liberation struggle of the peoples of the colonies and semi-colonies.

The revolution produced a tremendous impression. It aroused the warm sympathy and received the support of the proletariat of Germany, France, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and other countries. “The working people of Paris, the city of revolution,” stated a manifesto addressed to the proletariat of Russia, “are heart
and soul with you, and address these words to you: Count on us! Our help is assured! Down with tsarism! Down with the exploiters! Long live social revolution!"

The Russian revolution was enthusiastically hailed by the representatives of French socialist thought: Jules Guesde, Paul Lafargue, Jean Jaurès; by the leading figures of German Social-Democracy: August Bebel, Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin. "The liberty that Russia will gain will also mean liberty for Prussia, for Saxony, for Germany," said Liebknecht, calling upon the German workers "to rally under the banner of the Russian revolution".

The revolutionary events evoked a warm response among the working people of the Slav lands of Austria-Hungary, especially of Bohemia, Moravia and Galicia; the Slovenes and Croats began to rise up in a national liberation struggle. In November 1905 mass demonstrations of working people, which in some cases were accompanied by open clashes between working people and the police, took place in the major industrial centres of Austria-Hungary—Vienna, Budapest, Prague and Lvov. Under the pressure of the sweeping strike movement, the Austrian Government was compelled to introduce universal suffrage.

In Bulgaria under the influence of the Russian revolution a stubborn economic and political struggle of workers developed under the leadership of the Tesnyak Socialists.

In Rumania, the working people enthusiastically greeted the revolutionary sailors of the battleship Potemkin and, through them, the people of Russia risen in revolution. In 1907 a powerful peasant movement started in Moldavia and Walachia.

In Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary and other countries the workers, in defiance of the will of the Right Social-Democratic and trade union leaders, had recourse to political strikes more and more often. The Russian revolution was of particularly great significance to the national liberation movement in the countries of the East. Between 1905 and 1912 bourgeois revolutions took place in the major countries of the East—Iran, Turkey and China. There began an upsurge of the national liberation movements in India, Afghanistan, Indonesia and other countries. Lenin noted that the mighty uprising of 1905 had left deep traces and that its influence, to be seen in the progressive movement of hundreds of millions of people, was not to be eradicated.

In 1912 the monarchical regime was overthrown in China. Describing the Chinese revolution, Lenin prophetically spoke of a great people "capable not only of bemoaning its age-long slavery, and dreaming of liberty and equality, but of fighting the age-long oppressors of China" (Collected Works, Vol. 18, p. 144).

The democratic revolutions that began in the countries of the East after 1905 shook the colonial system of imperialism.
The struggle of the Bolsheviks for a revolutionary solution of the fundamental problems of the Russian revolution, namely, the leading role of the party of the working class, the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, the hegemony of the proletariat, the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution, the leadership of the national liberation movement, forms and means of revolutionary struggle, dealt a telling blow to the opportunists of the Second International. The Bolsheviks disproved the views current in the parties of the Second International about the inevitability of the hegemony of the bourgeoisie in bourgeois revolutions, the reactionary character of the peasantry, and the inevitability of a long interval between the bourgeois and the socialist revolutions.

The struggle of the Bolsheviks against opportunism facilitated further demarcation between the revolutionary and reformist trends in the Social-Democratic parties of Europe, and the crystallisation and development of Left trends (the German Left Social-Democrats, the Lefts in the British Socialist Party and others). The experience of the first Russian revolution helped the Bulgarian Social-Democratic Workers' Party of Tesnyak Socialists to take a firm revolutionary position. By their example the Bolsheviks showed how opportunism should be combated and stable positions among the masses won.

Lenin and the Bolsheviks also exposed the Centrists in the Second International, including its official leaders, who were pursuing a policy of conciliation with and concessions to the opportunists. Lenin insistently urged the Lefts in the German Social-Democratic movement to break not only with the reformists, but with the Centrists as well.

BRIEF SUMMARY

The First Russian revolution was an outstanding event which had a tremendous influence on the entire subsequent development of the country and the international revolutionary movement. It roused the broadest masses of the people in Russia to conscious revolutionary action, and enriched them with great political experience.

"So far as teaching the fundamentals of political science—both to masses and leaders, both to classes and parties—was concerned," wrote Lenin, "each month of this period was equivalent to a whole year of 'peaceful', 'constitutional' development" (Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 11).

The revolution conclusively proved that the tsarist autocracy, and then the capitalist yoke, could only be overthrown by a revolutionary struggle of the masses, by the joint fight of the oppressed peoples of Russia.
The revolution showed the various classes and parties in action; it revealed their aims, role and significance in the life of the country. It showed the masses of people what the different parties were fighting for, whose class interests they were defending.

The revolution graphically confirmed that working-class unity was an essential condition for the victory of the revolution.

The labouring peasantry, despite its vacillations, came forward as the ally of the working class. True, the alliance of the working class and the peasantry was still in the making, and as yet something spontaneous and often unconscious. The forces of the workers and peasants were still scattered and insufficiently organised.

The proletariat, for the first time in history, came forward as the leader of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, having wrested the leadership of the masses of the people from the liberal bourgeoisie. It was thus confirmed that the proletariat was capable of becoming the leader of the revolution, even if, owing to the inadequate development of capitalism, it numerically constituted a minority of the population. The revolution also proved the ability of the democratic masses of the peasantry to help the proletariat to win. The revolution clearly revealed the counter-revolutionary character of the bourgeoisie.

The first Russian revolution showed that the centre of the world revolutionary movement had shifted to Russia, and that the heroic Russian proletariat had become the vanguard of the revolutionary proletariat of the whole world.

The first Russian revolution advanced new forms and methods of struggle, unknown to previous revolutions. For the first time a mass political strike had been held which developed into armed insurrection. The Soviets of Workers' Deputies that were set up in the course of the revolution were not only organs of insurrection. They were also the embryo form of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. They were the prototype of the Soviet power that was established in Russia as a result of the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

Throughout the revolution the workers and peasants of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Poland, the Baltic provinces, Transcaucasia, Central Asia and other outlying regions of tsarist Russia heroically fought side by side with the Russian workers and peasants against tsarism and the landlords. The experience of the revolution confirmed the necessity for, and possibility of, a militant alliance of the working people of all the nationalities inhabiting Russia, under the leadership of the proletariat, for a joint struggle for national and social emancipation.

During this period Lenin elaborated the basic questions of the revolution and the course to be followed by the party of the working class in the struggle for the victory of the revolution.
The years of the revolution were a test for two political lines—Bolshevik and Menshevik. The course of the revolutionary struggle bore out the soundness of the strategic plan and the tactics of the Bolsheviks.

A most important landmark in the life of the Party was the Third Congress, which gave a Marxist-Leninist definition of the character and motive forces of the revolution. The Congress armed the Party with a revolutionary Marxist strategic plan and tactical policy, which differed fundamentally from the opportunist policy of the Mensheviks. The Congress adopted Lenin's formulation of Clause 1 of the Party Rules, which was to be of great importance in strengthening the Party.

At the Fourth (Unity) Congress, a number of non-Russian Social-Democratic parties merged with the R.S.D.L.P. in the interests of the revolution and of working-class unity, on the principles of proletarian internationalism worked out by Lenin. As regards unification with the Mensheviks within the R.S.D.L.P. only formal unity was achieved owing to fundamental differences of principle.

The Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. adopted Bolshevik resolutions on such important questions as the Party's policy towards the bourgeois parties, the trade unions and the so-called "labour congress". The Congress decisions and the relation of forces at the Congress reflected the successes achieved in disseminating Lenin's ideas, and the headway made by the Bolsheviks in winning over the masses.

During the years of the revolution the Bolshevik Party received a rich political schooling and gained tremendous experience as an organiser of the masses. Prior to 1905 only a comparatively small circle of people had heard of the Bolsheviks, but after the revolution they became known to the broad masses. The Party became a mass party. The Bolsheviks battled selflessly for the interests of the people; they were always to be found in the forefront of the struggle, where the fighting was most dangerous. All this left a profound impression on the minds of the masses of the people, and later bore fruit during the Great October Socialist Revolution.

"Without the 'dress rehearsal' of 1905, the revolution of 1917—both the bourgeois February revolution and the proletarian October Revolution—would have been impossible" (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 29, p. 284).
1. The Stolypin Reaction

Following the defeat of the revolution tsarism established a reign of Black-Hundred terror. The workers and peasants were put down without mercy. Punitive expeditions and courts martial were at work everywhere; savage sentences were passed on everyone suspected of association with the revolutionary movement. Thousands were executed for having taken part in the revolution, and tens of thousands sentenced to penal servitude. The jails were filled to overflowing. The exploiting classes were visiting cruel reprisal upon the working people for having dared to rise up in revolt. Stolypin, the tsar's Minister, was dubbed "Stolypin the Hangman", and the people called the gallows he set up throughout the country "Stolypin neck-ties".

The government's assault on the working class was especially brutal. Workers' organisations were hounded by the police with particular zeal. From 1906 to 1910 the tsarist authorities banned about 500 trade unions and refused registration to more than 600. Legal trade union membership dropped from 245,000 at the beginning of 1907 to 13,000 at the close of 1909. The tsarist secret police honey-combed revolutionary organisations with agents-provocateurs, who spied on the revolutionaries and betrayed them.

Police terror went hand in hand with a capitalist offensive. With industry stagnant (a slight recovery began only in 1909), unemployment increased. The employers' associations fiercely attacked the workers. Factory owners proclaimed lockouts, i.e., closed down factories and laid off workers in masses. Militant workers were blacklisted, and could not find work in any factory belonging to members of the employers' associations. Many of the pre-revolutionary practices were re-established, working hours were lengthened, wages reduced and fines imposed on the slightest pretext. "Our day has come, we're back in the saddle," employers brazenly told the workers.
However, tsarism could not fully re-establish the pre-revolutionary order of things. Russia was not the same as before 1905: the revolution had affected all classes and each drew its own conclusions from it.

Tsarism and the feudal landlords realised that if they were to retain their power and profits they would have to adjust themselves to the capitalist development of Russia. Accordingly, they sought allies among the urban and rural bourgeoisie. The government launched a new policy associated with the name of Stolypin, who headed the government. The June Third political regime and the new agrarian policy were its most distinctive features.

Tsarism needed the State Duma to consolidate the counter-revolutionary alliance of landlords and bourgeoisie and to mislead the backward sections of the population. But it needed a docile Duma. The new electoral law curtailed the rights of the people still further: in the gubernia assemblies of electors, at which the deputies were chosen, there was a standing landlord and capitalist majority, since the landlords and capitalists, through their respective curias, controlled more than three quarters of the votes, while the workers and peasants controlled less than one quarter. Representation of the oppressed nationalities was likewise drastically cut; the indigenous population of Central Asia was denied the franchise altogether, and the number of Duma members from Poland, the Caucasus and other national-minority areas reduced by nearly two-thirds. This monstrous electoral law produced the results the ruling clique desired. Nearly half the seats in the Third Duma were held by landlords, and together with the tsarist officials and the priests they commanded a two-thirds majority.

The tsarist government also tried to find its own solution for the land problem, one that would enable it to grant land not to all the peasants and not at the expense of the landlords. The revolution had made it clear to the ruling clique that it could no longer rely on the peasants’ blind loyalty to the “Little Father, the tsar”, and it decided to build up a solid base of support for itself in the rural bourgeoisie, that is, the kulaks. This found expression in Stolypin’s agrarian policy, laid down in the tsar’s edict of November 9, 1906, and the law of June 14, 1910.

Both were designed to further the interests of the landlords and the kulaks. The landed estates were not affected at all. The peasants were given the right to withdraw from the village communes and take possession of their allotments as private property. When a peasant left his commune, the latter was obliged to allot him land in one piece (*khutor, otrub*). The commune was thus being forcibly broken

*Khutor*—a form of land tenure under which the peasant with his household moved out of the village to the land allotted to him from the village commune’s holdings.

*Otrub*—a form of land tenure under which the peasant was allotted his main piece of land in one place, his household remaining in the village.—*Ed.*
up, with the kulaks obtaining the best peasant land. No won­
der the peasants dubbed the government land adjustment commit­
tees "land-grabbing committees" and the whole Stolypin scheme "misadjustment".

In the nine years 1907-15 some 2,500,000 peasant householders withdrew from the communes, and nearly 46,000,000 acres of land became private property. Those most interested in this arrangement were the village bourgeoisie, for it enabled them to build up their farms. But part of the poor peasants, especially those working in the towns, also withdrew from the communes to be able to sell their allotments and thus sever all connection with village life. The kulaks were able to buy these plots cheaply with loans from the Peasant Bank. However, the bulk of the peasants did not see a way out of poverty and exploitation in the new system, and despite strong pres­
sure by the tsarist authorities, only about a quarter of the peasant farms in European Russia withdrew from the communes.

Stolypin's agrarian policy led to the further impoverishment of the peasant population and aggravation of class contradictions in the countryside. Weighed down by want, the peasant's farm remained as backward as ever. The peasant had, as before, to eke out a mis­
erable existence on a tiny plot of poor and exhausted soil, using old, primitive implements and obsolete methods. In 1910 there were about 10,000,000 primitive wooden ploughs on peasant farms.

Stolypin's policy was the second step, after the 1861 Reform, towards converting tsarism into a bourgeois monarchy. It was, in the words of Lenin, an attempt to open the last safety valve in order to prevent revolution and retain the power, property and privileges of the feudal landlords. But tsarism did not become a bourgeois monarchy. It remained a dictatorship of the diehard landlords, who ruled the country in close alliance with the big bourgeoisie. Stolypin's reform, which sharpened the struggle among the peasantry, did not remove the basic contradiction, that between the peasantry and the landlords. Tsarism remained the chief enemy of the entire people.

The class struggle after the revolution found expression in the po­
sition of the various parties in the Third Duma. The 429 seats were distributed as follows: Rights—144, Octobrists—148, Cadets and kind­
dred groups—104, Trudoviks—14 and Social-Democrats—19.

The interests of the feudal landlords were upheld by the Rights, who openly supported the tsarist autocracy. It was they who organ­ised the bloody massacres of workers and peasants, the Jewish pog­
roms, the persecution of non-Russian nationalities and the assassi­
nation of revolutionaries and progressives. The people rightly called them the Black Hundreds.

The bourgeoisie, tied to the landlords and the tsarist bureaucracy by a thousand economic links, and frightened by the revolution and the leading role of the proletariat in it, took up a counter-revolution­ary position.
This determined the conduct of the Octobrist and Cadet members of the Duma. The Octobrists, who spoke for the big bourgeoisie and the landlords running their estates on capitalist lines, zealously supported Stolypin’s policy and were one of the government parties. The Cadets, who championed the interests of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, played the role of an opposition party in the June Third Duma and occasionally criticised individual government measures. They tried to bring the masses under their ideological and political sway by fraudulent propaganda. But in reality the Cadets were counter-revolutionary liberals, kowtowing to the reactionaries. The Cadet members of the Duma supported the tsarist government on all cardinal political issues—its fiscal policy, allocations for the preparation of a new war, the agrarian policy that was ruining the peasants, and the measures it took to strangle the revolution. In 1909 a group of prominent Cadet writers put out a volume of articles entitled Vekhi (Landmarks) in which they declared: “We should bless the government which alone, with its bayonets and jails, protects us from the ire of the people.”

The peasantry was anxious to get rid of the landlords and abolish landed proprietorship. It had learned much from the revolution, but had not yet fully realised that victory was possible only under the leadership of the proletariat, and that the so-called “party of people’s freedom” was really a party of traitors to people’s freedom. The Trudoviks, who represented the peasants in the Duma, were poorly organised, lacked adequate political understanding and were prone to swing from one policy to another. Their class status as small proprietors determined their vacillation between Cadets and Social-Democrats.

The working class was represented in the Duma by the Social-Democrats, among whom were both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. Only the Bolsheviks voiced the interests of Russia’s working folk consistently and unswervingly in the Duma. Lenin said that the task of the party of the working class in the Duma was to help the weak petty-bourgeois democrats, wrest them from the influence of the Cadets, and, in the struggle against tsarism, rally the democratic forces not only against avowed supporters of the autocracy, but also against the counter-revolutionary liberals—thereby influencing the peasant masses.

The reaction was manifest in every realm of public life, in science, philosophy and the arts. Tsarism, the landlords, the bourgeoisie and their parties carried on a rabid chauvinist (jingo) propaganda campaign. Aggressive clericalism was active. Counter-revolutionary sentiments, renegade ideas, mysticism and religion gained wide currency among intellectuals. The purpose was to erase all memory of the revolution from the minds of the people.

With the defeat of the revolution and the triumph of counter-revolution, the mass struggle abated. The tide of the working-class
movement receded: the number of strikers declined drastically, from 740,000 in 1907 to 46,500 in 1910. The sharp agrarian struggle likewise subsided for a time. Fatigue after several years of extreme revolutionary tension was making itself felt, and time was needed for this to pass. But the workers and peasants had not forgotten those heroic years; there was an undercurrent of ferment among the masses. In reply to the Black-Hundred government terror and the tyranny of the employers, the workers used to say: "Wait, there will be another 1905!"

2. The Struggle of the Bolsheviks for the Party, Against the Liquidators, Otzovists and Trotskyists

The Black-Hundred government concentrated its fiercest attacks on the revolutionary party of the working class. Wholesale arrests began, several members of the Central Committee were sent to prison. The workers' press was throttled. Publication of Sotsial-Demokrat, the central Party organ, was resumed only in 1909. Not a single local Party committee escaped the police raids. The St. Petersburg organisation was an object of wholesale arrests no less than fifteen times in these years. Many prominent Party functionaries were in convict camps, prison and exile. Petty-bourgeois intellectuals deserted the Party. Some of the vacillating workers withdrew from illegal Party work. Membership fell considerably: in St. Petersburg, where the Party had nearly 8,000 members in 1907, there were only about 3,000 in 1908; in Yekaterinburg the figure dropped from 1,070 to 250, and in Ivanovo-Voznesensk the drop was from 2,000 to about 600. Contacts between Party organisations were weakened.

Working underground in this period of reaction was much more difficult than in the pre-revolutionary period. At that time Party organisations had worked in conditions of maturing revolution: now they worked in conditions created by its defeat. Conducting an offensive was one thing, forced retreat quite another: it called for particular staunchness and stamina. The organisational weakening of the R.S.D.L.P. was attended by serious ideological differences within its ranks. The gulf between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks became still wider.

The Mensheviks were utterly demoralised by the defeat of the revolution. They retreated in panic, proclaiming more and more loudly that there could be no question of a new revolution. They disgracefully renounced the Party's revolutionary programme and revolutionary slogans. Instead, they urged the working class to come to an agreement with the bourgeoisie, or, in other words, to accept in effect Stolypin's Black-Hundred regime. They were thus betraying not only socialism but democracy as well. They pressed for liquidation of the illegal Party organisations and cessation of all illegal rev-
olutionary activity. They were working for the abolition (liquida-
tion) of the revolutionary party of the working class, the party of
revolutionary Marxism. By renouncing the Party’s programme, tac-
tics and revolutionary traditions, the liquidators hoped to secure
police permission for a legal party. No wonder they were dubbed the
“Stolypin labour party”.

Some Menshevik leaders, notably Dan and Martov, in an effort
to conceal their liquidationist policies, began to publish abroad a
new Menshevik paper, *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata (The Voice of the
Social-Democrat)*. There was thus a curious division of labour; the
liquidators in Russia were entrenched in legal organisations and
would not hear of an illegal party, while the covert liquidators abroad
did their utmost to whitewash the anti-Party activities of those others.

There were dangerous vacillations at this time among some un-
stable Bolsheviks. Resorting to revolutionary phraseology, they de-
clared that only those who summoned the workers to the barricades
were true revolutionaries, and that it did not befit revolutionaries
to sit in the Black-Hundred Duma. Accordingly, they urged the
Party to renounce legal forms of work and to recall the Social-Demo-
crats from the Duma. The otzovists, as they were called (*otozvat* means
to recall), formed a group of their own, led by A. A. Bogdanov, which
began to fight against Lenin and the Party’s Leninist policy. Lenin
described as bashful otzovists the “ultimatumists”, who, instead of
patiently educating the Social-Democratic group in the Duma,
presented it with an ultimatum, insisting that it immediately get
rid of all shortcomings or withdraw from the Duma. The otzovists
proved to be an insignificant minority within the Bolshevik ranks.
Whereas the liquidators openly advocated abolishing the illegal Party,
the otzovists endangered its existence in an underhand way: by re-
fusing to utilise legal opportunities for work among the masses, the
Party would cut itself off from the latter which would mean that it
would degenerate into a sectarian organisation with little or no in-
fluence. That is why Lenin described the otzovists as liquidators
inside out.

Liquidationism and otzovism had their class roots. Numerous petty-
bourgeois fellow-travellers joined the R.S.D.L.P. during the revolu-
tion. Its defeat led to confusion and demoralisation among the petty
bourgeoisie, and this found expression within the Party. The Menshe-
viks were obediently following the liberal bourgeoisie, and under the
direct influence of counter-revolutionary bourgeois liberalism,
Menshevik opportunism developed into liquidationism. Both liq-
uidators and otzovists were petty-bourgeois fellow-travellers of the
proletariat and its party, agents of the bourgeoisie within the working-
class movement.

With the revolution defeated and the masses tired out by struggle,
ideological waverings were especially harmful. They represented
a grave danger to the Marxist party and the working class. The liq-
uidators were implanting the defeatist ideology of surrender to tsarism. The otzovists were impelling the movement towards rash and adventurist actions. Both were instilling disbelief in the revolutionary potentialities of the masses and in the victory of the working class. They were encroaching on the very existence of the Party.

In these trying times Lenin's voice resounded as a clarion call to the Party. In the very first article written on his arrival abroad, Lenin foretold that victory lay ahead. He addressed these words to the Party:

"We knew how to work during the long years preceding the revolution. Not for nothing do they say we are as hard as rock. The Social-Democrats have built a proletarian party which will not be disheartened by the failure of the first armed onslaught, will not lose its head, nor be carried away by adventures. That party is marching to socialism, without tying itself or its future to the outcome of any particular period of bourgeois revolutions. That is precisely why it is also free of the weaker aspects of bourgeois revolution. And this proletarian party is marching to victory" (Collected Works, Vol. 13, p. 446).

Lenin gave the Party a clear perspective for its continued struggle, defined its objectives and tactics in the new conditions.

The fundamental causes of the revolution remained: the people still had no rights, the peasants were still under the landlord yoke and the workers under the double yoke of employer and gendarme. A new revolutionary upsurge was inevitable. The Bolsheviks' basic political objectives remained the same as in 1905, namely, the complete triumph of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and its development into a socialist revolution. The demands of the Party's revolutionary programme retained all their validity: a democratic republic, confiscation of the landed estates and their distribution among the peasants, an 8-hour day, the right of nations to self-determination and other demands that accorded with the interests of the people.

But the revolutionary struggle had to be continued in new and changed conditions, in a situation when reaction had triumphed and the mass movement was on the decline. This meant that the Party's tactics during the revolution—appeal to the masses for the direct attack on the tsarist monarchy—had to be altered. It was necessary to retreat, to pass from direct revolutionary struggle to flanking methods, in order to prepare for a new revolution by indefatigably training and organising the working class and the working people generally. To do that the illegal Party would have to make maximum use of every available legal opportunity—the State Duma, the trade unions, co-operatives, workers' clubs and other legal bodies. The Bolsheviks would have to learn to combine illegal work with legal, under the direction of the illegal Party organisation. Lenin
worked out and substantiated these flexible tactics, designed to pre-
serve and muster forces for the starting of a new revolutionary offen-
sive when conditions were favourable.

The revolutionary Marxist party was faced with a problem which it had never yet had to solve—to carry out an orderly retreat and, at the same time, make revolutionary use of all legal forms of work and organisation. The issue of the proper use of legal opportunities directly affected the vital requirements of the international working-
class movement. This movement showed two principal deviations, the anarchists rejecting the political—and hence parliamentary—struggle and the Social-Democrats being tethered by bourgeois le-
gality and adapting themselves more and more to the bourgeois state.

The otzovists’ negative stand on legal opportunities made them akin to the anarchists. The liquidators’ effort to keep within legal bounds under tsarism was particularly repellant, and as for its mean-
ing, it was the same as in the case of the Socialist parties of Western Europe. The Bolsheviks were advocating the only correct solution, a solution arising from the views of Marx and Engels—revolutionary use of the bourgeois parliament and other legal opportunities. In the conditions of tsarist Russia, this found expression in the principle of combining illegal and legal work under the leadership of an ille-
gal Party organisation, a principle formulated by Lenin.

None but a revolutionary party closely linked with the masses was capable of using Leninist tactics. To preserve and strengthen this party, the Bolsheviks began to fight on two fronts—against the liquidators and the otzovists.

The turning-point in the Party’s development in these years of reaction was the Fifth All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. held in Paris in December 1908, at which Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Polish Social-Democrats and the Bund were represented. The Con-
fERENCE was attended by delegates from such major Party organisations as those of St. Petersburg, Moscow, the Central Industrial Region, the Urals and the Caucasus. The main report was delivered by Lenin. On the basis of this report, and after a sharp struggle against the Menshevik liquidators, the Conference adopted resolutions, which determined the Party’s revolutionary line and organisational policy for the entire period of reaction. A new revolutionary crisis was inevitable, the Conference declared, and the Party would continue to pursue its old revolutionary objectives. The first task to be under-
taken was sustained work on training, organising and uniting the proletariat, peasantry and soldiers and utilising such legal opportu-
nities as existed. On Lenin’s proposal, the Conference condemned liquidationism as an anti-Party trend and called on all Party organisa-
tions to wage an implacable struggle against it. At the same time, the Conference resolutely dissociated itself from otzovism. The Con-
ference signified a big victory for Bolshevism over Menshevism.
Lenin spoke highly of the Conference in his article “On the Road”. Its decisions guided the Party in the trying years of reaction.

The fight against otzovism was of great importance for the Bolshevik Party. A section of the workers of Moscow, St. Petersburg, Odessa and several other industrial cities felt that the Party should not participate in the Black-Hundred Duma; but Lenin pointed out that their resentment of the Black-Hundred Duma and the activity of the Social-Democratic group within it should be clearly distinguished from otzovism as a political trend. “We will not allow this justified resentment to lead us into a wrong policy,” he said (Collected Works, Vol. 15, p. 272). These workers’ sentiments, Lenin pointed out, would soon pass; experience would show, and the Bolsheviks would explain, the need for making use of the Duma. As for otzovism as a political trend, a relentless fight must be carried on against it. Lenin taught the Bolsheviks to abhor “revolutionary phrase-mongering” and to realise that a genuine revolutionary must be able to perform his duty even in the most difficult, inconspicuous and prosaic everyday activities.

A conference of the enlarged editorial board of the Bolshevik newspaper Proletary (which in fact was the Bolshevik centre) was held in Paris in June 1909 to rally the Bolshevik forces for struggle against the otzovists and strengthen the Bolshevik’s position in the struggle for the R.S.D.L.P. The conference was attended by delegates from St. Petersburg, the Moscow Region and the Urals. It expelled the otzovists from the Bolshevik Party, declaring that otzovism was incompatible with Bolshevism, and urged all Bolsheviks resolutely to combat this defection from revolutionary Marxism. The otzovists formed a faction of their own, called Vperyod-ist after their paper Vperyod.

In connection with the new developments in the life of the Party, the conference mapped out the new tasks facing the Bolsheviks in their struggle for the Party. In a number of organisations (the Vyborg District of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Yekaterinoslav, Kiev, Baku, Ufa, etc.), worker Mensheviks had declared against the liquidators; they began to be called pro-Party Mensheviks. Plekhanov also criticised the liquidators. In view of this, the conference, without obscuring the fundamental differences between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in any way, called for a tactical bloc of Bolsheviks and pro-Party Mensheviks in the struggle to preserve and strengthen the illegal Party.

At that time there were many workers who did not clearly realise what divided the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, and were still under Menshevik influence. But there was a growing realisation that the liquidators had betrayed socialism and democracy and were out to destroy the illegal Party, into the building of which the working class had put its best forces. As time went on, these workers became more and more convinced that it was only the Bolsheviks who, in
the hard years of reaction, were staunchly and unswervingly upholding the interests of the Party in a determined and uncompromising struggle against the liquidators. The workers rallied around the Bolsheviks.

Meanwhile the struggle in the R.S.D.L.P. grew more and more acute. The factional activity of the liquidators, Golos-ists, Trotskyists, Vperyod-ists and other opportunist groups imperilled the very existence of the illegal Party. In that difficult period only the Bolsheviks, who were led by Lenin, showed themselves to be staunch revolutionaries courageously championing the principles of the Party. Lenin put forward a plan for rallying all the Party forces on the principle of fighting to uphold the illegal Party. His plan confirmed the revolutionary character of the R.S.D.L.P.; it was aimed at ridding the Party of hostile elements and consolidating the victory of the Bolsheviks.

Lenin's plan was opposed by Trotsky, who was trying to implant Centrism in the Russian working-class movement. In the Second International, the Centrists distorted Marxism while swearing allegiance to it. They were paving the way for the victory of opportunism by pursuing in the parties concerned a policy of subordinating the proletarian elements to the petty-bourgeois ones. Trotsky advocated a similar policy. He took advantage of the workers' desire for unity to proclaim himself an "extra-factional" herald of unity. Through his newspaper Pravda, published in Vienna, he tried to instil the pernicious and harmful "theory" that revolutionaries and opportunists could coexist in one common party, and advocated unity on an unprincipled basis. He was exposed by Lenin, who showed that Trotsky's claim to stand above factions was spurious. In reality, Trotsky's attitude was one of support for the Mensheviks and a form of liquidationism. Lenin branded him "Judas Trotsky", declaring: "Trotsky behaves like a most despicable careerist and factionalist.... He pays lip service to the Party, and behaves worse than any of the other factionalists" (Collected Works, Vol. 34, p. 349).

Trotskyism was a particularly great evil because it covered up its opportunist substance with phrases about "unity". It was very important for the Bolsheviks to expose Trotskyism. But they were handicapped by the conciliatory mood of certain noted Bolsheviks. Among those who vacillated was Dubrovinsky. Rykov and Nogin, members of the Central Committee, and Zinoviev and Kamenev, members of the editorial board of the central organ, Sotsial-Demokrat, who were prone to accept Trotsky's plan for indiscriminate unity, were greatly injuring the Party by their activity.

These circumstances made it all the more difficult for Lenin and his followers to rid the R.S.D.L.P. of liquidators.

On the other hand, certain local functionaries, such as Stalin and Tomsky, did not realise the need for an uncompromising struggle
against vacillation in philosophy and against otzovism. Stalin took an incorrect stand on Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, a work of immense ideological importance for the activity of the Party; he regarded Lenin's struggle against the opportunists of every shade in the R.S.D.L.P. as "a storm in a tea-cup' abroad".

It was in that situation that the Central Committee held a plenary meeting in Paris in January 1910. Besides the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, the meeting was attended by the Polish and Lettish Social-Democrats and the Bundists. There was a bitter controversy that lasted three weeks. Lenin prevailed on the meeting to condemn liquidationism and otzovism as manifestations of bourgeois influence on the proletariat. It was an important gain.

However, the allied Trotskyists, Bundists and conciliators left their imprint on the decisions of the meeting. Its resolution did not speak plainly of liquidationism and otzovism; it merely condemned "both deviations". Included in the central bodies were Menshevik liquidators and not pro-Party Mensheviks. Financial support was extended to Trotsky's *Pravda*, and Kamenev, a representative of the Central Committee, was made a member of its editorial staff. This was a decision tending to turn Trotsky's newspaper into a Central Committee organ.

The conciliatory decisions of the plenary meeting did much damage to the Party. As Lenin had foretold, the conciliators played into the hands of the liquidators. The Bolsheviks closed their newspaper, *Proletary*, in response to the call of the plenary meeting but the Mensheviks refused to close their factional organ, *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*. The liquidators started publication of a legal periodical in Russia, *Nasha Zarya* (*Our Dawn*), to which Axelrod, Dan, Martov and other Mensheviks associated with *Golos* contributed. The Mensheviks were frustrating the work of the Central Committee, declaring in so many words that the C.C. was useless and, indeed, harmful.

It required considerable effort by Lenin to rectify the errors of the plenary meeting. Experience was to prove to Party members and class-conscious workers the correctness of Lenin's line. The Bolsheviks championed the interests of the Party in an uncompromising struggle against opportunists of every hue.

In doing so, they based themselves on the decisions of Party conferences and plenary meetings of the Central Committee which were binding on all members of the R.S.D.L.P. The Bolsheviks' policy was a correct one: to unite all the forces capable of fighting to preserve the illegal Party against its disrupters. This enabled them to gain new positions in the battle for the Party and for winning over the whole of the R.S.D.L.P, to revolutionary Marxism.
3. Lenin's Defence and Development of Marxist Philosophy; His Further Elaboration of the Theory of the Party

The Bolsheviks worked to strengthen the proletarian party on the firm ideological basis of Marxism, enriched by the experience of the revolution.

In the years of reaction, defence of the Marxist philosophy, the theoretical foundations of the Party and its world outlook assumed prime importance in the ideological struggle. This was due to a number of reasons.

The reactionary offensive was being waged on the ideological front as on all others. Bourgeois scientists, writers and journalists were "refuting" Marxism in every possible way, particularly its philosophical foundations. Dialectical materialism was declared to be old-fashioned and obsolete, and religion was proclaimed the "supreme achievement" of the human spirit. The bitterest attacks against Marxism came from many former fellow-travellers of the revolution, bourgeois intellectuals, who were now vilifying the revolution and extolling those who abjured it. They ridiculed defence of the people's interests as "idolatry of the people" and proclaimed betrayal of the people to be an act of supreme courage. In an effort to dupe the people and divert them from revolutionary struggle, these bourgeois intellectuals preached clericalism and mysticism, sang the praises of pessimism and decadence, and cultivated sexual depravity.

Ideological demoralisation penetrated the revolutionary ranks as well. A section of Party intellectuals, who considered themselves Marxists but had a very poor knowledge of Marxism, abandoned it and drifted to a revisionist position in philosophy. Menshevik writers (Valentinov, Yushkevich) and several intellectuals who had once been in the Bolshevik ranks (Bogdanov, Bazarov), attacked the fundamental tenets of the Marxist philosophy. But the attack was not conducted openly and directly; it was waged in a veiled and hypocritical form under the guise of "defending", "improving" and "correcting" Marxism.

Some Social-Democrats even went so far as to advocate the combination of Marxism with religion. Their contention was that "socialism is a religion" (Lunacharsky), and that they were building a new and superior religion of the future. Such preachers, who wanted to turn scientific socialism into a religious faith, came to be known as "god-builders".

Bourgeois scientists and their revisionist echoers endeavoured to use the achievements of natural science—giving them their own perverted interpretation—against Marxist philosophy and for the preaching of idealist or religious views.

They took advantage of the fact that many recent discoveries in physics and other natural sciences had demolished traditional conceptions and notions. Hitherto scientists had considered the atom
to be the final, indivisible particle of matter and the chemical elements to be immutable. The discovery of the electron and radioactivity showed that the atom was divisible, while chemical elements were mutable. The old concept of mass as something constant and not dependent on motion was likewise disproved. Studying the electron, physicists established that its mass depended on the speed of motion. There were also other important discoveries that radically changed the existing conception of the structure and motion of matter.

Many scientists, however, could not assess the new discoveries properly. It seemed to them that matter was being destroyed, that science itself was perishing, and that the very foundations of knowledge were being undermined. There was talk of a "crisis in natural science". The supporters of clericalism and the idealists of diverse schools decided to take advantage of this. They gave their own, idealistic interpretation of these discoveries and on this basis opened an attack on Marxist philosophy.

The revisionists, both in Western Europe and Russia, who were followers of the Austrian bourgeois philosopher Mach, sought to prove that the new scientific discoveries were evidence of the "disappearance" of matter and that philosophical materialism was obsolete and dialectics sheer "mysticism". The Machists furthermore claimed that their idealistic philosophy was a "neutral" one, standing above the two warring camps of materialists and idealists. Actually, in the Machian doctrine idealism was adopting a particularly subtle and streamlined form.

In this situation, the absence of a correct, materialist generalisation of the latest developments in science threatened the very fundamentals of the Marxist outlook.

It was all the more necessary to fight for the purity of Marxist theory because the revolution had awakened vast sections of the people to political life. Many workers who had fought in the revolution had joined the Party and made their first acquaintance with Marxism. The preaching in the Party's ranks, and among the workers generally, of philosophical views that rejected materialism and dialectics, the dissemination of Machism represented a grave danger. It might have done irreparable damage to the political education of the masses and the ideological tempering of Party members. Machist philosophy, and particularly god-building, merged with reactionary views in politics. The views of the revisionist philosophers led to acceptance of the existing order of things in Russia, renunciation of the struggle and faith in the "divine will". In other words, revisionism in questions of philosophy doomed the masses politically to docility and inaction.

Furthermore, the need to defend and develop Marxist philosophy was dictated by the situation in the international working-class movement. Imperialism strengthened the reaction all along the line,
in the political as well as the social sphere. The reactionaries attacked the ideology of the working class. The West European opportunists affirmed that it was perfectly possible to reconcile Marxism in politics with idealism in philosophy. Meanwhile the atmosphere in the Social-Democratic parties was dominated by indifference to theoretical issues and a tolerant attitude to distortions of Marxist philosophy. They seemed to have forgotten how unrelentingly Engels had fought against Dühring, who sought to substitute an eclectic medley for the Marxist world outlook of the party of the working class. It was Kautsky who fathered the conviction that all philosophical arguments were “a private matter” in which a party should not interfere. The struggle against apostasy from Marxism in Russia was, therefore, also a struggle against revisionism in the international Social-Democratic movement.

The party of the working class considered it to be its duty resolutely to rebuff these attacks on Marxism and provide a scientific, philosophical generalisation of the achievements of natural science. That important and responsible task was undertaken by Lenin.

Lenin had always devoted much attention to the development of Marxist philosophy. His exposure of the Narodniks, the Economists and the Mensheviks in What the “Friends of the People” Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats, What Is To Be Done? and many other works, had enriched Marxist philosophy. In the period of reaction, when philosophical problems acquired great acuteness, Lenin wrote his Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, specially devoted to ideological problems. Published in 1909, it represented a whole epoch in the development of Marxist philosophy.

Its historic significance lies in the following:

Lenin beat off all the attacks of bourgeois ideologists and revisionists on the philosophy of Marxism. He demonstrated that all the idealistic schools of philosophy were contrary to science and based on fallacious theories. He marshalled an immense amount of scientific and historical evidence to demonstrate convincingly that only one philosophy—dialectical materialism—offered a scientific explanation of the world we live in, and armed mankind with a knowledge of the most general laws of development in nature, society and thought. Only Marxist philosophy enables us correctly to understand and re-fashion the world around us. Lenin thus accomplished what no other Marxist before him had undertaken—a Marxist generalisation of the latest discoveries in natural science. He demolished the attempts of the foes of Marxism to give these discoveries a wrong, idealist interpretation in the interests of reactionary ideology. Lenin showed that the radical break in science did not nullify the materiality of the world or materialism, as the Machists maintained, but changed and deepened our conceptions of matter and its properties. Only dialectical materialism offered a way out of the “crisis in natural science”. Lenin’s analysis of the essence of this “crisis” and the way
out of it has been fully vindicated. His *Materialism and Empirio-
Criticism* retains all its validity today as the methodological basis
of advance in the natural sciences.

Lenin upheld and developed *Marxist philosophical materialism*,
which has indicated to the proletariat the way out of spiritual
slavery. Drawing on the latest discoveries in natural science, he
further developed the Marxist conception of matter and further
substantiated the view that the world is material.

Lenin upheld and developed the theory that the material world
is knowable, disclosed the complexity of the process of cognition and
the path its development has followed. Gradually, step by step,
man’s cognition provides an increasingly exact understanding of the
phenomena and laws of the objective material world. Thus, the un-
known becomes known, incomplete and inexact knowledge becomes
more and more complete and exact. Whereas idealistic philosophy
advocated what was in the final analysis the surrender of science to
religion, Marxist philosophy proclaimed that science is all-power-
ful, and there is no limit to its development.

“Human reason,” Lenin wrote, “has discovered many amazing
things in nature and will discover still more, and will thereby
281-82).

Lenin developed and substantiated the Marxist view that prac-
tice is the basis of cognition and the criterion of truth. Science, knowl-
edge stem and develop from human practice, from experience, from
man’s productive and social activities. Only conclusions of science
tested by practice are authentic knowledge, having the validity of
objective truth. Practice constantly enriches science and ad-

dances it.

Lenin upheld and developed *Marxist materialist dialectics*, which
is of primary importance for the revolutionary activity of the prole-
tariat and its party.

In *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, and in a number of other
works, Lenin demonstrated that materialist dialectics is the most
comprehensive, rich and profound theory of development. It has
proved that the world is neither static nor immutable, but undergoes
a constant process of development and renewal. The source of this
development is the contradictions intrinsic in every thing, every
process and phenomenon; and these contradictions arise, reach a
definite degree of sharpness and are subsequently resolved. The abil-
ity to perceive and resolve these contradictions in good time is the
great art of dialectics, an art taught by Lenin.

The most important proposition of materialist dialectics—the con-
tradiction, the unity and struggle of opposites in every process of
development—constitutes the basic law, or “kernal”, in dialectics.

“In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity
Materialist dialectics gives us a correct understanding of how the gradual but continuous changes in the processes at work in nature and society lead to abrupt turns, to fundamental changes, to leaps in development.

Lenin upheld and developed historical materialism, the science of the laws of social development. He demonstrated that behind the verbal trickery of the Machist Bogdanov about being and consciousness was concealed denial of the objective laws governing the development of society. He revealed the utter scientific untenability of the Machists’ contention that the evolution of human society follows the laws of physiology or some other biological science, and not its own intrinsic laws. Once it knows these laws, the Party can foresee what course social development will take over a long period, scientifically define the tasks maturing in the revolutionary struggle, and mobilise the masses of the people to accomplish them.

Lenin developed and substantiated the principle of partisanship in philosophy. His exhaustive critical analysis of the various attempts to revise Marxist philosophy revealed their class roots. He demonstrated that the struggle of philosophical trends was essentially an expression of the conflicting ideologies of the antagonistic classes of modern society. The Machists, like all other supporters of idealism, objectively served clericalism and reaction.

Lenin proved, further, that there was a direct connection between a party’s philosophy and its policy. “The political line of Marxism... is inseparably bound up with its philosophical principles,” he wrote (Collected Works, Vol. 15, p. 374).

There was a similar connection also between defection from Marxist philosophy and opportunism. That was particularly apparent from the example of the revisionists in philosophy—the Mensheviks who were liquidators in politics, and the Bogdanovites who turned out to be otzovists in politics and slipped into Menshevism.

Lenin’s Materialism and Empirio-Criticism enriched Marxist philosophy and raised it to a new, higher stage, in accordance with the new developments in science—thereby advancing social thought as a whole.

The book played a tremendous part in the ideological growth of the Marxist party, the theoretical tempering of its membership, and the defence and development of its theoretical principles. It has served, and still serves, as a guide for the training of revolutionary fighters all over the world. Lenin’s struggle for the purity of Marxist ideology set an example to the leaders of the revolutionary working-class movement in all countries.

The conference of the enlarged editorial board of the Bolshevik newspaper Proletary in 1909 rebuffed the revisionists in the sphere of Marxist philosophy and condemned god-building as an anti-Marxist trend. This conference decision on a matter of principle was of vast importance. The Bolsheviks emphatically declared that the
Party could not be neutral on philosophical issues and must carefully safeguard Marxism, its great ideological treasure. The Bolsheviks saw unremitting defence of the Marxist outlook against attack from any quarter whatsoever as a cardinal task of the Party.

Lenin's defence and further development of the Marxist concept of the Party played an exceptional part in the Party's ideological life. The first Russian revolution had conclusively confirmed the outstanding importance of the Party. For the first time in history, a Marxist party had laid a powerful imprint on the course of revolution and had led millions of workers into battle. That is why the enemies of the working class were doing their utmost to destroy its party.

In his writings during the period of reaction, Lenin elaborated the Marxist conception of a party's leading role in the mass struggle. Experience had clearly proved that the masses do not at once come to understand the need for the Party and its role in the class struggle. Appreciation of the Party and Party allegiance grow as the masses become more class-conscious and see more clearly the alignment of class forces in society. The bourgeoisie, anxious to dull the political consciousness of the masses, preaches in every possible way a negative attitude towards partisanship and extols non-partisanship. To this bourgeois concept of non-partisanship the Marxists oppose proletarian partisanship.

"Politics, in the serious sense of the term, can be made only by the masses," Lenin wrote, "but the mass that is non-party and does not follow a strong party is a disintegrated, politically unconscious mass, incapable of sustained effort and a plaything in the hands of the adroit politicians of the ruling class, who always appear on the scene 'at the right time' in order to take advantage of 'opportune' situations" (Collected Works, Vol. 19, p. 393). Lenin upheld the Marxist concept of the historic role of the Party as the highest form of class organisation possessed by the proletariat, and taught the Party to value the outstanding importance of organisation for the working-class movement.

"The strength of the working class lies in organisation. Unless the masses are organised, the proletariat is nothing. Organised—it is everything" (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 11, p. 320). Diverse organisations of the proletariat, embracing different sections of the working class and catering to its various needs, emerged during the revolution. The question of the Party's relations with them became one of the vital problems of the Russian working-class movement.

The bourgeoisie tried to tear these workers' organisations away from the Marxist party and set them against it. Its agents within the working-class movement advocated "neutrality" of the trade unions and co-operatives, the "right" of a Party writer to contribute to the capitalist press in whatever way he saw fit, and demanded the "independence" of the Duma group, or even its domination of the Party.
To follow that path would have been tantamount to eliminating class consciousness from these organisations—that consciousness of which the Marxist party is the supreme expression. Organisation without class consciousness, Lenin pointed out, was meaningless, if not worse, for it played into the hands of the enemy. To the bourgeois idea of “independence” of the Party, the Bolsheviks opposed the Marxist principle of the Party’s ideological and political leadership of all other working-class organisations.

Lenin developed the Marxist views on the question of the social roots of opportunism and the Marxist views on the nature and significance of the struggle within the working-class movement and the Party. In the early 1900s, and more particularly after the revolution of 1905-07, the struggle between revolutionary and opportunist elements within the Russian and international working-class movement became more acute. That struggle had deep class roots. For the sharpening of the conflict between labour and capital and the successes of the working-class movement intensified the struggle of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. The bourgeoisie seeks for ways and means of penetrating the working-class movement and subjecting it to its influence. Against the idea of class struggle and socialist revolution it counterposes ideas of class harmony and social reform. The opportunists spread these bourgeois ideas within the working class.

The proletariat is not isolated from other classes. It comes into contact with the petty bourgeoisie, and its ranks are constantly swelled by petty-bourgeois elements ruined by big capital. Furthermore, the bourgeoisie systematically bribes and corrupts the top stratum of the working class, whose way of life approximates to that of the petty bourgeoisie. The petty-bourgeois elements are proponents of bourgeois influence in the working-class movement. This influence manifests itself in two forms: overtly—in the form of outright advocacy of an agreement between the working class and the bourgeoisie—and covertly—in the form of “Left” phrase-mongering, which denies the necessity for applying flexible tactics and using every opportunity in the revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat. This gave rise to the revolutionaries’ struggle on two fronts against all opportunists, Right and “Left” alike.

The struggle against opportunism is one of the laws of development of the working-class movement. It is an essential pre-condition for the preparation and victory of the socialist revolution. The development of the proletarian party is impossible without a resolute struggle of the revolutionary Marxists against the opportunists. The policy of peaceful “cohabitation” of revolutionaries and opportunists in one common party leads in practice only to the victory of opportunism. That is why the Party must be uncompromising in relation not only to the opportunists, but also to those who, like the Centrists, advocate reconciliation with the opportunists. The Party becomes strong by
cleansing itself of opportunist elements. Lenin pointed out that “we cannot conceive of the social revolution being accomplished by the proletariat without this struggle, without clear demarcation on questions of principle” between revolutionaries and opportunists prior to the revolution, “without a complete break between the opportunist, petty-bourgeois elements and the proletarian, revolutionary, elements of the new historic force during this revolution” (Collected Works, Vol. 17, p. 230).

Drawing on the vast experience of the pre-revolutionary and revolutionary years, Lenin explained the cardinal importance of the Party’s work in preparing for a revolution. He pointed out that the Party should not lose heart because it again consisted of small illegal organisations, conducting seemingly unimportant, inconspicuous work among the masses. That work would not be wasted. For the revolution in Russia had shown that the years of persevering effort in organising the masses and enlightening them politically had greatly facilitated the maturing of the revolution.

Summarising the experience of the revolution, Lenin wrote:

“The long period during which the proletarian forces were prepared, trained, and organised preceded those actions of hundreds of thousands of workers which dealt a mortal blow to the old autocracy in Russia. The sustained and imperceptible work of guiding all the manifestations of the proletarian class struggle, the work of building a strong and seasoned party preceded the outbreak of the truly mass struggle and provided the conditions necessary for turning that outbreak into a revolution. And now the proletariat, as the people’s fighting vanguard, must strengthen its organisation, scrape off all the green mould of intellectualist opportunism, and gather its forces for a similar sustained and stubborn effort” (Collected Works, Vol. 13, pp. 119-20).

In the dark night of Stolypin reaction Lenin’s ideas were a vivid beacon, lighting up the great objective and guiding the Bolsheviks in their self-sacrificing effort.

4. The Struggle of the Party to Win Over the Masses and Prepare Them for a New Revolution

The Bolsheviks realised that there were two possible paths of development for post-revolutionary Russia: complete democratic transformation, or a bourgeois evolution that would preserve the monarchy and the rule of the landlords. The tsarist government, the landlords and the bourgeoisie employed every means available to prevent a new revolution, and in this they had the ready assistance of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, advocated the revolutionary path of development, one that fully conformed with the people’s vital interests. And it
was only the people who could make the choice. Stolypin was aware of that when he declared that he needed “twenty years of quiet” that is, twenty years of meek submission and no mass struggle—to carry out his plan. But the people, who had gone through the crucible of revolu-
tion, did not grant the Black-Hundred government these “twenty years of quiet”.

The Bolsheviks were the only organised revolutionary force in the country. The illegal Menshevik organisations had fallen apart. The Socialist-Revolutionaries were in a state of ideological and organisational disintegration. The defeat of the revolution had not broken the Bolsheviks. Marxist seasoning, unshakable confidence in the coming triumph of the revolution based on a knowledge of the laws of social development, supreme devotion to the interests of the proletariat, and irreconcilable opposition to opportunism, all helped the Bolsheviks to surmount the great difficulties that faced them, to retreat in full order, and to preserve the Party’s fighting core. Despite incessant police raids and persecution, Party organisations continued to function nearly everywhere, and Party committees were at work in all the major towns and industrial centres. In the big factories the Party retained its units or its contacts with the workers. Leaflets and illegal Party newspapers were issued in many localities. Regional Party conferences were held in the Central Industrial Region, the Volga region and the Urals, and local Party conferences in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Nizhni-Novgorod and other towns.

The desertion of wavering petty-bourgeois elements was at the same time a cleansing of the Party. It helped to rid the Party of unsta ble adherents and fellow-travellers. Every crisis breaks some and steels others. The severe crisis of the years of reaction steed the Bolshevik Party organisations. New contingents of advanced workers came to the fore, and on them fell the whole burden of Party work in the localities.

The stern school of underground activities, the fires of revolution, the days of defeat, the battles against tsarism and the bourgeoisie, the clashes with many other opponents, were the training-ground that produced the remarkable qualities of the Bolshevik, an unyielding and courageous fighter for the working people’s interests of whom Lenin said: “Not for nothing do they say we are as hard as rock.” It was of such fighters that a famous revolutionary poet wrote:

Were nails made of these men,
there would be no tougher nails in the world.

Though hounded by the police, the Bolsheviks continued to train, organise and rally the proletariat. Nor did they abandon their activities among the peasants, patiently explaining that the only way out of poverty and misery was through a joint struggle with the working class, and under its leadership, to overthrow tsarism.
The story of the publication of a May-Day leaflet in St. Petersburg in 1909 was a vivid illustration of the revolutionary energy of the Bolsheviks. Following a police raid on the illegal printing press of the St. Petersburg Committee the printing of the leaflet was undertaken by the Polish Social-Democrats. The copies of the leaflet delivered from Poland were immediately seized by the police. The Central Committee promptly resorted to a private printing-works, but a few days later the police closed that establishment. Then the St. Petersburg Committee instructed the district committees to organise the publishing of leaflets on their own, and the leaflets were actually brought out by May Day.

The preservation and strengthening of its contacts with the masses was of vital importance to the Party, and the chief guarantee that Russia would follow the revolutionary and not the Stolypin path of development. And to extend contact with the masses it was necessary to utilise every legal opportunity of working among them, from the Black-Hundred Duma to temperance societies.

It was important for the Party to make use of the Duma rostrum for educating and organising the proletariat in the revolutionary Marxist spirit, and for winning over the peasantry. The elections to the Third State Duma showed that the proletariat had remained true to its Party. Despite police terror, the working class elected only Social-Democrats.

The Bolsheviks had to go their own way in working out their parliamentary tactics. The parliamentary experience of the West European Socialists had to be approached critically, for it was dominated by opportunism. During the revolution itself, on the basis of experience gained in the First and Second Dumas, Lenin worked out the fundamental principles of the Party’s tactics in the Duma; and he developed them and made them more concrete in the period of reaction. Much attention was paid to proper relationships between the Duma group and the Party leadership. The Duma group was considered one of the organs of the Party, directly subordinated to the Central Committee. Criticising the Mensheviks, who urged the Social-Democratic deputies to share in the Duma’s so-called legislative activities. Lenin insisted that they should consistently champion the interests of the people, and speak from the Duma rostrum of what was disturbing the masses. The Social-Democratic deputies, he emphasised, should not confine themselves to work within the Duma; they must extend their activities beyond the Duma, establish contacts with the workers and participate in all of the Party’s illegal activities.

The Bolshevik deputies were guided by these propositions. Their position was extremely difficult. Of the 49 Social-Democrats elected to the Third Duma, one, the Bolshevik V. Y. Kosorotov, representing the Urals workers, had been handed over by the Black-Hundred majority to the police and sent to prison; five Menshevik
deputies had deserted to the enemy. The Mensheviks, who were mostly elected by petty-bourgeois votes, had a majority in the group. At first the group committed many serious mistakes. It failed to emphasise its class, socialist character, it did not champion democratic demands consistently nor expose the counter-revolutionary policy of the Cadets. But gradually criticism of these mistakes by the Party and the workers' organisations had its effect, and the activities of the group improved.

The militant voices of the Bolsheviks rang out in the musty atmosphere of the Black-Hundred Duma. An important part in the Social-Democratic group was played by the Bolshevik N. G. Potevayev, representative of the St. Petersburg workers. The worker deputies criticised the government's home and foreign policy, its part in suppression of the Persian revolution, the shackling loans it received abroad to maintain the police and army, the police terror, the heavy tax burden laid on the labouring population, the oppression of the Finnish people. The Bolshevik deputies vigorously opposed the offensive of the tsarist government and the Black-Hundred Duma against the vital interests of the workers. They drew up bills providing for an 8-hour day, trade union freedom, the right to strike, opposed the Stolypin agrarian reform and demanded the transfer to the peasants of all the landed estates without compensation. The Bolsheviks made use of the Duma to expose the government's reactionary policy and the treacherous conduct of the Cadets, to further the political education of the masses and to win the peasantry over to the side of the working class.

The various legal congresses, which the tsarist government was obliged to permit, played no small part in the situation of prevailing reaction. The Bolshevik delegates, representing diverse workers' organisations at such congresses, expounded the Party's views on many vital issues. At the congress of people's universities, a resolution tabled by the workers' group demanding abolition of police control of education, and the right of the workers' organisations themselves to approve study programmes and select the tutors, received wide support and was defeated only by a very slight majority. At the women's congress, the delegates of women workers declared that the emancipation of working women could be won only through participation in the working-class movement. At the factory physicians' congress, the workers' group, representing trade unions in St. Petersburg, Moscow, the Central Industrial Region, the Ukraine and Transcaucasia cited numerous facts and figures to show the unbridgeable gulf between the interests of labour and capital. The workers' delegates and part of the physicians left the congress in protest against police persecution, after which the conveners of the congress had to close its proceedings. The firm stand taken by the workers' group at the temperance congress, and the adoption of several resolutions tabled by it, infuriated the tsarist government.
The reactionary press wrote: “This is no congress for fighting drunkenness: it is a congress for fighting the government.” The tsarist officials and church representatives hurriedly left the congress, and nearly all the workers’ delegates were arrested. The Duma group immediately tabled a question in which it exposed the actions of the tsarist authorities.

The Duma, the legal organisations and the congresses provided a wealth of material for the Party’s political work, which the illegal Bolshevik organisations directed along revolutionary lines. What the Party’s spokesmen could not say from the legal platform, the illegal Party organisations said in their leaflets, at illegal gatherings and in talks with the workers, always driving home the need for uniting in an organised force and for the revolutionary overthrow of tsarism.

Party work was making good headway in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Baku and other industrial centres. Here many tried and tested revolutionaries worked, whenever they succeeded in escaping from prison or exile. In St. Petersburg I. F. Dubrovinsky, M. I. Kalinin, V. V. Kuibyshev were active; in Moscow—A. S. Bubnov, D. I. Kursky, I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, Y. M. Sverdlov. Among the leaders of the Baku organisation were such prominent figures as Meshadi Azizbekov, P. A. Japaridze, G. K. Orjonikidze, S. G. Shahumyan, S. S. Spandaryan, J. V. Stalin. Despite the cruel reign of the reaction, new devoted workers came to the fore in the Party, including A. V. Artyukhina, V. Y. Chubar, L. I. Kartvelishvili, V. G. Knorin, S. V. Kosior and K. I. Nikolayeva. The St. Petersburg and Moscow Bolsheviks bore the main burden of organising the activities of the Duma group and of the workers’ groups at legal congresses. The Bolsheviks had strong positions also in the trade unions where there were Party groups. At Baku the Oil Workers’ Union was under Bolshevik leadership, and so were the trade union newspaper, Gudok (Whistle), the Workers’ Educational Society Znaniye—Sila (Knowledge is Strength) and the People’s House. The revolutionary use of legally existing organisations was no easy matter, but the Party had many achievements in this sphere. Gradually the Bolsheviks were superseding the liquidators, and becoming an influential force in the legal organisations.

An important aspect of Party activity was acquainting the masses with the experience of the revolution. The Cadets and liquidators were anxious to erase the very idea of revolution from the minds of the people. They tried to discredit revolutionary traditions and to divert the masses from revolutionary methods of struggle to “the constitutional path”. For the liberals and the Mensheviks, Lenin wrote, the revolution was an example of what should not be done; for the working-class party it was an example of what should be done. The Party used the historic examples of mass struggle during the Russian revolution to train new generations of fighters.
Much of what Lenin wrote in this period was devoted to generalising the experience and popularising for the masses the lessons of the revolution. Thus, in *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution of 1905-1907*, Lenin analysed a number of theoretical problems of the revolution. He elaborated a concept of peasant revolution under proletarian leadership, proved the need for the programme of revolutionary break-up of the remnants of serfdom in the countryside, and the Bolshevik slogan of land nationalisation, and indicated the ways and means of strengthening the alliance of workers and peasants in the revolutionary struggle.

Being consistent proletarian internationalists, the Bolsheviks took an active part in international affairs. The struggle of the masses against oppression in any part of the globe invariably won the wholehearted support of the advanced workers of Russia, who hailed the struggle begun by the colonial peoples under the influence of the Russian revolution. Many a Russian Social-Democrat fought in the ranks of the Iranian revolutionaries. When the British and Russian imperialists set about crushing the revolution in Iran, the Social-Democratic group in the Duma exposed tsarism.

The opportunist leaders of the European Social-Democratic parties were frankly hostile to the Bolsheviks. The official socialist press readily made its columns available to all sorts of insinuations at the expense of the Bolsheviks. Things came to a point where the Russian delegation to the International Socialist Congress in Copenhagen (1910) was compelled to send a protest to the Executive Committee of the German Social-Democratic Party over the publication in *Vorwärts* of Trotsky’s slanderous article on the state of affairs in the R.S.D.L.P. The Bolsheviks did much to convey the truth about their attitude and their struggle to the European workers.

The Bolsheviks were among the foremost champions of revolutionary Marxism. Lenin devoted many of his writings to the criticism of opportunism in the international working-class movement. In his article “Marxism and Revisionism” he described the nature and class roots of revisionism and revealed the untenability of its ideological and political principles in terms of science. He strongly criticised Kautsky’s Centrist view on vital issues of Marxism and the working-class movement. The Bolsheviks’ activity at the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International (1907) made for the adoption of revolutionary decisions. The Congress introduced into the resolution on war an amendment by Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, which said that the Socialists must use the crisis occasioned by the war to overthrow the bourgeoisie. During the Stuttgart and Copenhagen congresses Lenin held meetings of Left Social-Democrats to unite the revolutionary elements in the international working-class movement.

The liquidators maintained that the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat was dead and buried. But events disproved this; they showed that the working class was exerting an increasing influence on
the broad mass of the people. The Party’s consistent defence of the interests of the working people and its unflagging struggle for democracy won the masses over to its side. By exposing the Cadets and criticising the wavering of the Trudoviks, the Bolsheviks helped to dispel the peasants’ illusions. Under the Party’s influence, the Trudovik members of the Duma frequently dissociated themselves from the Cadets and joined forces with the Social-Democrats. In a Duma by-election in the second St. Petersburg curia (which was composed of petty bourgeoisie, intellectuals, shop assistants and worker-houseowners) in 1909, the Social-Democrat candidate polled a bigger percentage of the vote than in the 1907 elections. At the legal congresses the workers’ group usually had the support of all the democratic elements. Throughout the whole of this period of reaction, in the face of incredible difficulties, Russia’s working-class party successfully fought for the hegemony of the proletariat and paved the way for a new revolutionary upsurge in the country. The symptoms of this upsurge had become unmistakable towards the end of 1910.

**BRIEF SUMMARY**

The defeat of the revolution ushered in a difficult period in the life of Russia and her people. All the parties that had styled themselves oppositionist and revolutionary failed to withstand the grim test. They all capitulated to reaction, renounced the revolution and betrayed the people. Only the Bolshevik Party stood firm, did not lose heart, and steadfastly continued to strengthen its ranks and stubbornly gathered its forces for fresh revolutionary battles. By their actions the Bolsheviks proved their devotion to the people and their loyalty to the revolution. They gave the proletariat a revolutionary perspective and, at the same time, firmly upheld the day-to-day needs and interests of the working people. In those trying times the working class drew closer to the Bolsheviks, for in them it saw staunch friends and reliable leaders.

In the years of reaction the working-class party was subjected to bitter attacks by renegades and degenerate elements of every shade. The liquidators, otzovists, Trotskyists and other opportunist factionalists tried to destroy the illegal Marxist party and discredit it in the eyes of the working class. These enemies of Marxism levelled their bitterest attacks at the theoretical foundations of the Party, its dialectical-materialist philosophy. The Bolsheviks proved to be the only force that successfully defended the Party, its revolutionary theory, its revolutionary principles and traditions in uncompromising struggle against the opportunists of every hue. In this struggle the Bolsheviks ideologically routed the traitors to the revolution and the enemies of Marxism, and won unchallengeable prestige and complete predominance in the Party organisations, which rallied around

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Lenin and the Leninists. In those years Lenin, working to preserve
the revolutionary party of the working class, developed the Marxist
doctrine of the Party still further.

The revolutionary struggle in the years of reaction enriched the
Party with new political experience, new methods of struggle and
new forms of organisation. During the revolution the Bolsheviks
learned how to advance; the defeat of the revolution taught them how
to conduct an organised retreat and preserve their main forces. From
direct revolutionary methods of struggle the Party passed to round-
about ones. The Bolsheviks systematically and persistently mastered
the art of doing legal work in a revolutionary way, in a country un-
der Black-Hundred regime, and of combining it with illegal work.
That experience was of inestimable importance for the subsequent
victory of the revolution. As Lenin pointed out, victory could not be
won without mastering the art of organised advance and organised
retreat. The Bolsheviks set the international proletariat an example
of how a Marxist party should utilise bourgeois legality for its
revolutionary aims.

In the dark days of the Stolypin reaction, the Bolsheviks preserved
their illegal Marxist party, the main leading force of the working class.
Headed by Lenin, the Bolsheviks held the banner of revolution firmly
aloft, training and organising the masses for further struggle.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY DURING
THE NEW UPSURGE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT
(1910-1914)

1. Collapse of the Stolypin Policy. Beginning of Revolutionary Actions by the Masses

A new economic and political situation arose in Russia in 1910-11. Beginning with 1910, industrial stagnation was succeeded by a boom. Coal output rose from nearly 26 million tons in 1909 to nearly 36 million in 1913, pig-iron from under 3 million tons to over 4½ million, steel from just over 3 million tons to nearly 5 million, with increases in the output of textiles and sugar.

The post-revolutionary years saw the rapid development of imperialism in Russia. There was a marked increase in the concentration of production and capital, with monopoly concerns dominating nearly every branch of industry and transport. In iron, for instance, the Prodamet syndicate controlled more than 80 per cent of total output, and in coal another syndicate, Produgol, controlled three-quarters of the Donets coalfield output. Over 80 per cent of the assets of the joint-stock banks were concentrated in 12 big banks. The financial oligarchy was steadily extending its domination over the country’s economic life and establishing ever closer links with the bureaucratic upper levels of the government machine.

There was a greater inflow of foreign capital. By 1914 approximately one-third of all industrial shares, and over two-fifths of the capital of the principal banks, were held by the West European bourgeoisie. Foreign capitalists held sway in such key industries as coal, oil and metal working, and their annual profits from investments and loans ran into hundreds of millions of rubles. Tsarist Russia was becoming more and more dependent upon West European imperialism.

A handful of European and Russian capitalist magnates were growing richer, while the people were growing poorer. The landlords, capitalists and kulaks appropriated about three-quarters of the national income. Hundreds of thousands of people were forced to
emigrate in search of work. Over one and a half million left the
country in the first ten years of the century.

The cost of living had risen, and the position of the worker had
deteriorated. An official industrial survey revealed that while
annual wages averaged 246 rubles, annual profit per worker averaged
252 rubles. The greater part of the working day was thus passed in
work for the capitalist. The workers’ life and health were cheap in
tsarist, landlord and bourgeois Russia. The “Accident Compensation
Table” at the big Obukhov Works in St. Petersburg allowed 100
rubles’ compensation for complete blindness, 35 rubles for loss
of one eye, 50 rubles for total loss of hearing, and 40 rubles for
loss of speech. But the worker was never paid more than 100 rubles
even if he lost his eyesight, hearing and speech, even if he became
completely disabled.

Incredible poverty reigned in the countryside. Stolypin’s agrar­
fan policy had, as its direct result, the mass impoverishment of
the peasants and enrichment of the kulak blood-suckers. The num­
ber of farms with one horse or no horse at all increased by nearly
two million between the turn of the century and 1912. The Russian
countryside presented a picture of omnipotent feudal landlords,
growing kulak farms, the impoverishment of a vast mass of middle
peasants, and a substantially increased mass of landless peasants
who were becoming proletarians. The tsarist government had attempt­
ed to remove some of these contradictions by settling several million
peasants from European Russia in Siberia; but this policy failed
completely. The peasants would sell all their property and move
to Siberia. But, unable to settle there for lack of means, they would
return full of resentment, having lost everything.

Class contradictions within the rural community became sharper.
The peasant’s chief enemy was still the feudal landlord. But there
was also sharper conflict between the poor peasant and the kulak.
Cases of peasants setting fire to manor houses and kulak farmsteads
became more frequent after 1910. On top of this came the terrible
famine of 1911, which affected some 30 million peasants. The situa­
tion left no doubt whatever that the Stolypin policy had collapsed.

Its collapse brought out more saliently than ever the profound
contradictions throughout Russia’s social and political system. It
demonstrated anew that the tsarist government was incapable of
solving the country’s basic social and economic problems.

The remnants of serfdom were an intolerable obstacle to national
development. Though Russia had taken the capitalist path, every
year that passed saw her lagging further and further behind the
advanced capitalist countries. Lenin wrote in 1913 that, though in
the half century since the emancipation of the peasants iron consump­
tion had increased fivefold, Russia still remained a backward country,
equipped with modern machinery four times worse than Britain,
five times worse than Germany and ten times worse than the United
States. In 1900 Russia led the world in oil production; some ten years later she was behind other countries. Poverty, oppression, lack of human rights, humiliating indignities imposed on the people—all this, Lenin emphasised, was in crying contradiction to the state of the country's productive forces and to the increased political awareness and demands of the masses, awakened by the first Russian revolution. Only a new revolution could save Russia.

No amount of savage Stolypin repression could eradicate the people's urge for freedom and a better life. The fatigue of the masses was passing; hatred of the oppressors was coming to the surface with ever greater force.

The working class was the first to take the offensive. The years of revolution and reaction had taught the workers much and had raised their class consciousness. They had grown considerably in numbers since the beginning of the century. In 1913 there were already 3,500,000 workers in industry alone, and they were more highly concentrated than in any other country. Over half (53.4 per cent) worked in factories employing 500 workers or more, whereas in the United States the proportion was about one-third.

In the summer of 1910 strikes broke out in Moscow. They gave an impetus to the movement, and towards the end of the year there were political demonstrations in St. Petersburg, Moscow and other towns, followed by student rallies and strikes. The movement continued to mount throughout 1911, with over 105,000 workers, or double the number as compared with the preceding year, involved in strike stoppages. The year ended with powerful demonstrations at St. Petersburg factories in support of the Social-Democrats' Duma interpellation on the frame-up trial of the Social-Democrat members of the Second Duma. The Bolshevik demand for their release was supported by the workers.

The Bolsheviks' prediction that a new revolutionary upsurge was inevitable proved to be true. Everywhere there was growing discontent and indignation among the people. The workers saw in the Bolshevik revolutionary slogans a clear-cut expression of their own aspirations. An important part in bringing these slogans home to the masses was played by the Bolshevik weekly legal newspaper Zvezda (Star), which began to appear in St. Petersburg towards the end of 1910.

The opportunists played a particularly harmful and ignominious role in this new revolutionary revival. The liquidators and Trotskyists wanted to divert the workers from revolutionary struggle and urged them to sign a petition to the Duma requesting "freedom of coalition" (freedom of association, assembly, strikes, etc.). The Bolsheviks explained to the workers that there could be no freedom as long as the country remained in the hands of the Black-Hundred landlords. Freedom for the people could be won only with the overthrow of the monarchy. The "petition campaign" launched by the
liquidators proved a fiasco. The liquidators collected a mere 1,300 signatures, whereas the Bolshevik slogans had the solid support of hundreds of thousands of workers.

These strikes, political demonstrations and rallies, together with the peasant actions against the landlords and kulaks, were the harbingers of a new revolution. Could the proletariat perform its role as leader in this mounting revolutionary struggle of the mass of the people? That depended, to a decisive extent, on the state of the Marxist party of the Russian working class.

2. The Prague Party Conference

The new revolutionary struggles posed the urgent need to strengthen the Party and formulate the new tasks in leading the mass revolutionary movement.

The formal uniting of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks within a single R.S.D.L.P. had led to a peculiar situation and had predetermined what the Bolsheviks had to do within the Party. The Bolsheviks had set themselves the task of cleansing the Party of opportunist elements through ideological struggle. They had accomplished much in that respect. Nearly all the illegal Party organisations were Bolshevik. The Menshevik betrayal of the proletariat had gone so far that the Party membership was coming to realise more and more the need for a complete break with the liquidators and their expulsion from the Party.

The Bolsheviks began to prepare energetically for a Party conference. The liquidators, Trotskyists and conciliators made frenzied but futile attempts to prevent a conference taking place, and thereby block the consolidation of the Party on Bolshevik principles. In the summer of 1911, G. K. Orjonikidze, I. I. Schwarz (Semyon) and other Party workers were sent to Russia. At a conference of leading Party committees, a Russian Organisation Commission (ROC) was set up. It carried out a vast amount of organising and propaganda work in preparation for the conference.

The Sixth All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. was held in Prague on January 5-17, 1912, and was attended by delegates from more than twenty Party organisations, among them St. Petersburg, Moscow, the Central Industrial Region, Kazan, Saratov, Tiflis, Baku, Nikolayev, Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, Dvinsk and Vilno. Police persecution and other obstacles prevented the participation of the Party organisations of the Urals, Samara, Nizhni-Novgorod, Sormovo, Lugansk and Rostov-on-Don.

The “Announcement” on the Conference issued by the Central Committee declared that, notwithstanding the trying years of reaction, political persecution and opportunist betrayal, the Russian proletariat and its Party were prepared for new class battles
against tsarism, the landlords and the capitalists. The statement said:

"Not only have the banner of the Russian Social-Democratic Party, its programme and its revolutionary traditions survived, but so has its organisation, which persecution may have undermined and weakened, but could never utterly destroy" (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part I, p. 267).

Considering that almost all the Party organisations active in Russia were represented, the Conference was fully justified in declaring, in a special resolution, that it "constitutes itself a general Party Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., the supreme body of the Party". The Conference in effect had the significance of a Party congress.

A most important task of the Conference was to cleanse the Party of opportunists. Of vast theoretical and practical significance were its resolutions "On Liquidationism and the Group of Liquidators", and "On the Party Organisation Abroad". The Conference declared that the liquidators, grouped around the legal magazines Nasha Zarya and Dyelo Zhizni (The Cause of Life), had, "by their behaviour, definitely placed themselves outside the Party". The Conference expelled them from the Party.

But in addition to the avowed liquidators, there were the undercover liquidators with their various supporters. They banded themselves together in small groups abroad that had no contact with the workers, and were not supported by even a single illegal Party organisation in Russia. To this category belonged the Mensheviks grouped around the newspaper Golos Sotsial-Demokrata, the Trotskyists, the Vperyod group and others. With regard to all these groups, the Conference adopted the following decision:

"The Conference declares that the groups abroad which have refused to submit to the centre directing Social-Democratic work in Russia, i. e., the Central Committee, and are introducing disruption by setting up their own communications with Russia which bypass the Central Committee, have no right to use the name of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party" (ibid., p. 286).

All these groups demonstrated their anti-Party attitude by refusing to accept the Conference decisions.

The final result was that the opportunists found themselves outside the Party. Their expulsion from the R.S.D.L.P. only strengthened its ranks, heightened its discipline and fighting capacity, and thus helped to create genuine Party unity. Like the sturdy oak that becomes stronger when dead branches are cut off in good time, the working-class party became stronger and more solid with the expulsion of the Mensheviks. The Bolsheviks carried their struggle against opportunism to its conclusion, i. e., the expulsion of the Mensheviks from the Party. This was of the utmost importance for the triumph of the democratic and socialist revolution in Russia.
The Conference devoted much attention to tactics. It noted the rise of a revolutionary mood among the masses, and in this connection adopted a number of decisions on the next tasks in building up the new type of proletarian party and leading the revolutionary upsurge. The proletariat should be the leader of the peasantry in a democratic revolution. The demands of the Party’s minimum programme were put forward as the main slogans of the hour: a democratic republic, an 8-hour working day, confiscation of all landed estates. It was the task of the Party to make these “three pillars”—as they were called—the common demand of all the democratic forces, the slogans of the people’s revolution. It was under these slogans that the Party fought at the elections to the Fourth State Duma.

In a special resolution on the Party’s tasks in combating the famine, the Conference called on all Party organisations to explain to the peasants the connection between the famine and the tsarist policy, and to direct the mass unrest caused by the famine into an organised struggle against the tsarist monarchy. The Conference urged the Party organisations to strengthen the illegal nuclei, which were surrounded by a ramified network of diverse legal workers’ societies, and to increase their number.

The Conference discussed international matters. The Russian Marxists lashed out at the disgraceful system of national and colonial oppression. The relevant resolution pointed out the world significance of the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people, which was liberating Asia and undermining the rule of the European bourgeoisie. The Conference denounced the predatory policy of Russian tsarism in China and Iran, and exposed British imperialism as an accomplice in the bloody crimes of tsarism. It condemned the policy of strangling the Finnish people and stressed the oneness of the tasks of the workers of Russia and Finland in the struggle against tsarism and the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

It addressed a message of greeting to the German Social-Democrats on the occasion of their signal victory in the Reichstag elections. The Conference resolutions were expressive of the principles of proletarian internationalism.

Of all the political parties then active in Russia only the Bolsheviks had a platform that fully accorded with the interests of the working class and the people generally.

Of major importance was the election of a Central Committee. The Central Committee elected at the Fifth R.S.D.L.P. Congress had virtually ceased to exist as a result of Menshevik subversion. There had been no Central Committee meetings since January 1910, and the Party was without an official directing centre.

As the supreme Party assembly, the Conference elected an authoritative Central Committee, headed by Lenin and including representatives of local Party organisations, men steeled in the difficult
years of reaction and known for their revolutionary courage and staunchness. Among those elected, besides Lenin, were F. I. Golo-
shchekin, G. K. Orjonikidze and S. S. Spandaryan. The Central Committee co-opted I. S. Belostotsky and J. V. Stalin and appointed A. S. Bubnov, M. I. Kalinin, S. G. Shahumyan and Y. D. Stasova as alternate members to replace the C. C. members arrested. Sub-
sequently the Central Committee also co-opted G. I. Petrovsky and Y. M. Sverdlov.

The Prague Conference played an outstanding part in building the Bolshevik Party, a party of a new type. It summed up a whole historical period of Bolshevik struggle against Menshevism, and consolidated the victory of the Bolsheviks, retaining the banner of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party firmly in their hands. Factionalism was thus eliminated within the Party and its leadership, the Central Committee, and this was of exceptional importance for the Party’s continued growth and for enhancing its role in the revolutionary struggle. Assessing the Prague Conference decisions, Lenin wrote in 1914:

“Since 1912, for over two years, there has been no factionalism among the organised Marxists in Russia, no controversies over tactics in united organisations, at united conferences and congresses. There is a complete break between the Party—which in January 1912, formally announced that the liquidators did not belong to it—and the liquidators” (Collected Works, Vol. 20, pp. 304-05).

The Conference was of tremendous importance for the life of the Party. Party organisations were built up in various parts of the country on the basis of its decisions, and it strengthened the Party as an all-Russian organisation. Now that it was free of the dead weight of opportunism, the Party could provide effective leadership for the new and powerful rise of the revolutionary mass struggle.

Lenin wrote to Maxim Gorky at the beginning of 1912, on the results of the Prague Conference:

“At last we have succeeded, in spite of the liquidator scum, in restoring the Party and its Central Committee. I hope you will rejoice at this with us” (Collected Works, Vol. 35, p. 1).

The Prague Conference also holds an important place in the history of the international working-class movement.

The degeneration of the parties of the Second International was becoming increasingly obvious. The struggle between revolutionary and opportunist elements within the international labour movement became more acute with the approach of the First World War. The Bolsheviks played a very active part in that struggle. At the congresses of the Second International, at meetings of the International Socialist Bureau, and in the press, Lenin resolutely combated deviations from Marxism in theory and practice and stressed the necessity for firmly resisting the growing menace of opportunism.
and reformism. The Bolsheviks supported the Lefts in the Socialist parties of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and other countries and called on them to unite and to close ranks. We are nearing an epoch of titanic revolutionary battles, wrote Lenin, and the working class therefore absolutely needs a solid and principled Party organisation true to socialism.

But the revolutionaries in the parties of the Second International did not fully appreciate the dangers of opportunism, and they lacked consistency and determination in combating the agents of the bourgeoisie in the labour movement. The Bolshevik victory over the Mensheviks was, for that reason, of international importance. The expulsion of the Mensheviks set an example, for the revolutionary elements in other Social-Democratic parties, of how an uncompromising struggle against opportunism should be carried on, up to a complete organisational rupture.

3. The Bolshevik Newspaper Pravda. The Bolshevik Group in the Fourth State Duma

The declaration of the Prague Conference that a new revolutionary upsurge was on the way was confirmed within three months. The event that converted the revolutionary temper of the masses into a revolutionary upsurge was the bloody drama at the Lena goldfields in Siberia.

The goldfields belonged to British capitalists and their partners, Russian capitalists, members of the tsar’s family and high-ranking tsarist officials. The owners made an annual profit of some seven million rubles. In remote Siberia the capitalists and their underlings acted entirely without restraint. The workers were paid beggarly wages for their back-breaking toil, and supplied with rotten food. Their wives and daughters were subjected to all manner of insult. Unable to endure this monstrous oppression any longer, the workers struck in protest. They stood together firmly, and presented their demands in an organised manner. But all the demands were insolently rejected. Even the demand for decent treatment was considered a “political offence”. The police authorities resolved to break the resistance of the workers by force. On April 4, 1912, on the order of a gendarme officer, troops fired on a peaceful demonstration of workers proceeding to negotiate with the management. More than 500 were killed or wounded.

News of the Lena massacre flashed throughout the country and aroused a storm of indignation. Mass protest strikes, demonstrations and meetings began. The Bolshevik newspaper Zvezda provided the slogans for the movement, and by its truthful account and interpretation of events dispelled the fog of foul lies behind which the bourgeois press was trying to conceal this bloody tsarist crime.
Every issue of *Zvezda* was confiscated by the police, but many copies none the less found their way to the workers. The Social-Democratic Duma group interpellated the government on the shooting. The insolent reply of the tsar's Minister, Makarov: "So it was, so it will be!" only further aroused the anger of the workers. Almost 300,000 workers participated in the protest strikes, and about 400,000 in the May Day strikes that followed. The scope of the strike movement in 1912, Lenin pointed out, was comparable to that of 1905.

The days following the Lena massacre emphasised how important it was for the proletariat to have a legally published newspaper. The *Zvezda* was a weekly, intended for advanced workers. What the Party needed now was a daily paper for the widest mass of the workers. And the workers readily responded to the Bolshevik appeal to subscribe their coppers so that one might be started.

The first issue of the Bolshevik paper *Pravda (The Truth)*, founded by Lenin, appeared in St. Petersburg on May 5 (April 22, old style*) 1912. It was a daily mass workers' Marxist paper. Since 1914, the day it first appeared—May 5—has been celebrated as Workers' Press Day. *Pravda* was the Party's all-Russian legal organ, and played an immense part in the life of the working class.

In connection with the rise of the revolutionary tide and the appearance of *Pravda*, the Central Committee Bureau Abroad, headed by Lenin, moved to Cracow in order to be nearer to Russia. More than 280 articles by Lenin appeared in the pre-revolutionary *Pravda*; they were a guide to the Party in its work and policy. At various times its editorial board and active contributors included N. N. Baturin, Demyan Bedny, N. K. Krupskaya, V. M. Molotov, M. S. Olinsky, N. I. Podvoisky, N. G. Poletayev, K. N. Samoilova, N. A. Skrypnik, Y. M. Sverdlov, J. V. Stalin, K. S. Yeremeyev. The Party's best forces wrote for *Pravda*; contributions by Maxim Gorky appeared in its columns.

*Pravda* was a legal workers' paper of a new type. To found such a paper was no easy task. Lenin devoted exceptional attention to *Pravda*. He insisted that it should be brought out in a militant, revolutionary spirit and should strictly pursue a policy true to Bolshevik principle. Lenin closely followed the work of the *Pravda* editorial board as a whole and of its individual members, and criticised their mistakes. He levelled particularly sharp criticism at V. M. Molotov who in 1912 was secretary of the editorial board and took a conciliatory stand on the liquidators.

Lenin voiced his indignation at the outrageous treatment of his articles by V. M. Molotov and certain other staff members of *Pravda*. In the summer of 1912 he wrote a letter to V. M. Molotov, saying: "You wrote—apparently on behalf of the editorial board since you

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* The "old style", or Julian calendar, was thirteen days behind the more modern, or the Gregorian calendar; but Russia still retained it until the October Revolution.—Trans.
are its secretary—that ‘fundamentally the editorial board considers your article perfectly acceptable, including its attitude towards the liquidators’. If that is the case, why does Pravda persistently and methodically delete all mention of the liquidators from my articles and from those of other colleagues?...

“You know by experience that I am also very tolerant of the corrections you make for reasons of censorship. But a question of principle requires a straightforward answer. You cannot refuse to inform a contributor whether or not the editorial board intends to run the elections section of the paper against the liquidators and to name them clearly and specifically. There is not, and cannot be, a mean course” (Collected Works, Vol. 35, p. 22). Lenin insisted on a reorganisation of the editorial board such as would “end the so-called ‘autonomy’ of those sorry editors” (ibid, p. 50). When Molotov and other conciliators were removed from the Pravda staff, Lenin welcomed the measure.

The Bolshevik Pravda kept the Party in daily contact with the broad mass of the workers. Every issue contained dozens of items from worker correspondents, describing the appalling conditions in the factories and citing instances of police terror and employer tyranny. These were damning indictments of the tsarist regime and the capitalist system. More than 17,000 such items appeared in Pravda in a little over two years. Rallied around the paper was a veritable army of worker correspondents, staunch and courageous propagandists of Leninist ideas and Bolshevik slogans.

The paper played an especially big part in organising the strike movement. Each issue carried one or more items on strike actions. All told, there were some 10,000 strike reports in Pravda—daily communiqués from the battle fronts of the war of labour against capital. They did much to unite the workers and spur them on to greater effort in the class struggle. Pravda formulated the workers’ demands, organised support for the strikes by workers in other factories and towns, and brought ever new sections of the workers into action. It developed a spirit of class solidarity among the mass of the workers. It was the heart and soul of the fighting proletariat.

Pravda enjoyed tremendous authority among the workers. They regarded it as their own paper, one that unfalteringly stood up for their interests. From every part of Russia came messages of warm affection and gratitude. The workers were eager to support their paper. Pravda’s circulation was 40,000, whereas the liquidationist Luch (Ray) sold a bare 16,000 copies. Four-fifths of the donations to the proletarian press made by workers’ groups went to Pravda, which by the summer of 1914 had subscribers in 944 localities. They carried its message to the masses.

Pravda devoted much space to peasant problems and ran a special section called “Peasant Life”. The numerous peasant letters it published, from practically every gubernia of European Russia and from
many of those in Siberia, described in plain and simple language the unending misery of the peasants, the tyranny of the landlords and the exploitation by the kulaks.

The Bolshevik paper carried dozens of articles by Lenin dealing with various aspects of peasant life. The position of the peasant, Lenin wrote, was approximately as follows: for every landlord with over 5,000 acres there were about 300 peasant families, tilling their poor and exhausted land with hopelessly obsolete implements and methods. In this system of big landownership lay the root of peasant poverty and recurrent famines. Pravda demonstrated to the peasants that the only way out of their bondage was to fight the tsar and the feudal landlords under the leadership of the working class.

Pravda played a prominent role in the Party’s ideological work. Lenin regarded the struggle against bourgeois ideology and revisionism as a prime task of the newspaper. A large share of the Party’s organisational work was concentrated in the Pravda editorial offices. Here meetings were arranged with representatives of local Party nuclei. Here reports were received of Party activities in the mills and factories, and from here were transmitted the instructions of the St. Petersburg and Central committees of the Party. Pravda helped to found new Party organisations in the factories.

The tsarist government was, of course, alive to the formidable revolutionary influence exerted by Pravda, and used every conceivable method to stop its publication. But the workers gave their newspaper unfailing support. When it was confiscated, they would see to it that a large part of the issue did not fall into the hands of the police, but found its way to the factory districts. When heavy fines were imposed on it, they collected the money—kopek by kopek—needed to pay them. The tsarist government then resorted to periodical bans. Pravda was suppressed eight times, but each time reappeared under a new but similar name—Rabochaya Pravda (Workers’ Truth), Severnaya Pravda (Northern Truth), Pravda Truda (Truth of Labour), Za Pravdu (For Truth), Proletarskaya Pravda (Proletarian Truth), Put Pravdy (The Path of Truth), Rabochy (The Worker), Trudovaya Pravda (Labour Truth). Each time the Bolshevik Pravda was born again and each time its voice rang out anew in the working-class districts.

Pravda was a genuine workers’ paper. Only with the workers’ support were the Bolsheviks able to carry out their bold plan of publishing—in the heart of the police-ridden Black-Hundred regime—a legal daily newspaper that spoke for an illegal party, and educated the workers in a consistently revolutionary spirit.

Pravda holds a place all its own in the history of the Bolshevik Party and the revolution. In those days the Bolsheviks were called “Pravdist”. Their paper resolutely fought the opportunists, those agents of the bourgeoisie in the working-class movement, exposed their treacherous role and trained the workers in a spirit of revolu-
tionary Marxism. *Pravda* reared a whole generation of revolutionary workers, hundreds of thousands of self-sacrificing vanguard fighters for the revolution, for the cause of the working class and the interests of the people. It helped considerably to swell and strengthen the Party's ranks and cement its ties with the masses.


Another legally functioning all-Russian organ of the Party was the Bolshevik group in the Fourth State Duma.

The Duma elections were held in the autumn of 1912, in a situation that was extremely difficult for the working class. The police furiously hounded militant workers and resorted to the most shameless fraud to deprive the working class of Duma representation. The Black Hundreds and liberals frequently joined forces against the Social-Democrat candidates. The liquidators attempted to split the ranks of the working class.

The electoral law allowed for a deputy to be elected from the workers' curia only in six industrial gubernias: St. Petersburg, Moscow, Vladimir, Kostroma, Yekaterinoslav and Kharkov. The election procedure was very involved: meetings of the workers* elected delegates, who, in turn, chose the electors to nominate the candidate from the workers' curia. But the actual nomination and voting took place in the gubernia electoral colleges, and here the landlords and capitalists had a majority.

Despite police obstacles, the Party developed a mass political campaign around its basic minimum-programme demands, presenting them as part of the struggle for socialism. The Bolshevik position was explained in the Party's election platform, drawn up by Lenin. Taking this as a basis, local Party committees drew up "mandates" (lists of demands) for the workers' deputies. *Pravda* appealed to all workers to vote for "consistent and staunch labour democrats", and the workers knew that this referred to the Bolsheviks. The paper exposed the Cadets and the liquidators.

The success of the Bolshevik campaign alarmed the tsarist government. It tried to break the workers' will, primarily in the capital, St. Petersburg, where it cancelled the elections of workers' delegates at many of the big factories. In reply, 100,000 workers, responding to the call of the St. Petersburg Bolshevik Committee, went on strike. The tsarist government was forced to retreat: not only did it withdraw its decision, but actually extended the list of factories sending delegates to the workers' curia. This victory greatly stimulated the movement in other parts of the country.

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* Only in factories employing 50 or more workers; in other factories the workers were disfranchised.—*Ed.*
All of the six major industrial gubernias, accounting for about four-fifths of the Russian working class, returned Bolshevik deputies from the workers’ curia. This brilliant victory was conclusive proof that the majority of the working class was with the Bolsheviks. The six Bolshevik Duma members were A. Y. Badayev, M. K. Muranov, G. I. Petrovsky, F. N. Samoilov, N. R. Shagov and R. V. Malinovsky (subsequently exposed as a police agent). Seven Mensheviks were elected from non-industrial gubernias.

The Bolshevik deputies boldly expounded the Party’s policy on pressing issues of the life of the people. From the Duma platform they told the truth about the appalling conditions of the workers, the needs of the peasants, the oppression of the non-Russian nationalities, the urgent need of the working people for an educational system uncontrolled by the tsarist government, the latter’s feverish preparations for war.

The Bolshevik interpellations became in the Fourth Duma an even more effective weapon than they had been in the Third. A minimum of 30 signatures was required to table a question, and, as a rule, the Social-Democrats could obtain the signatures of the Trudoviks and some of the progressive-minded deputies of other parties. Every question dealt with some definite fact—the suppression of a trade union, persecution of a workers’ newspaper, a pit disaster, a fatal accident at a mill, the arrest of strikers, the murder of a peasant by the police, etc. These interpellations enabled the Bolshevik deputies to present the country with a true picture of arbitrary police rule and the monstrous exploitation of the working people. The speeches of the Bolshevik deputies reached the masses, and fanned the popular resentment against tsarism, the landlords and the capitalists.

The worker deputies framed three bills: on the 8-hour working day, on social insurance and on national equality. They were published in *Pravda*.

The Bolshevik deputies did not confine themselves to work in the Duma. They were very active outside it as well, visiting mills and factories, touring the chief industrial centres, reporting back to the workers at meetings, conferring with individual workers, contributing to *Pravda* and organising strike relief and solidarity actions. They also took an active part in illegal Party work, addressing underground meetings, helping local organisations and carrying out various assignments for the Central Committee.

The small group of Bolshevik deputies were incessantly harassed in the Duma. Their sharp speeches exposing tsarism were constantly interrupted by the infuriated Black-Hundred representatives, and were often cut short by the Duma Chairman. But the courageous stand of the Bolshevik Duma group won the confidence of the working class, among whom it enjoyed tremendous authority and prestige. It played an important part in the country’s political life. The peasant masses and the oppressed nationalities, too, regarded
the workers’ deputies as true defenders of their cause. The following letter is typical of this attitude: “We, a group of peasants of Kazino village, having learned from the workers’ press of the situation in the State Duma, find that only the six workers’ deputies are living up to their high calling, and that they alone uphold the interests of the toiling masses staunchly and consistently. To them we say: ‘We are with you and wholeheartedly wish you every success in your difficult work!’”

The Duma group was guided by the Party Central Committee. The deputies frequently visited Lenin abroad to consult with him. He drafted many of the speeches they made in the Duma. Party leadership, close contact with the masses, skilful combination of legal and illegal work, helped to train a new type of parliamentarian—a revolutionary parliamentarian who faithfully championed working-class interests.

Pravda, the Bolshevik deputies and the illegal Party organisations worked in close contact with one another. In December 1912 the Bolsheviks in the Duma tabled a question on the persecution of the trade unions. Pravda and the St. Peters burg Party Committee organised a mass campaign in support of the question. Pravda published reports showing how the trade unions were being hounded by the police, and the St. Petersburg Committee put out a leaflet (illegally) calling for a one-day stoppage in support of the Duma group. While Badayev was exposing the tsarist authorities in the Duma, the workers of several big factories downed tools in support of their deputy.

In March 1914 many women workers were poisoned at the Pro-vodnik factory in Riga and the Treugolnik factory in St. Petersburg. The St. Petersburg Committee immediately circulated an illegal leaflet calling for a protest strike. Pravda published numerous reports exposing the monstrous exploitation of working women. The Bolshevik deputies interpellated the government on the subject, and one of them made a speech in the Duma. About 120,000 people took part in the protest strikes against the inhuman treatment of women workers.

These are examples of how the Bolsheviks skilfully combined the activities of Pravda and the Duma deputies with illegal work.

4. The Party at the Head of the Revolutionary Struggle of the Masses

The workers’ movement continued to grow in scope and strength. There were over one million strikers in 1912, and 1,272,000 in 1913. Economic struggles were intertwined with political ones, and culminated in mass revolutionary strikes. The working class went over to the offensive against the capitalists and the tsarist monarchy.
The strikes were of national importance: they aroused wide masses of the people and spurred them on to action. In 1910-14, according to patently minimised figures, there were over 13,000 peasant outbreaks, in which many manor houses and kulak farmsteads were destroyed, and grain, cattle and farm equipment seized. The unrest spread to the tsarist army. In July 1912 a sapper unit stationed in Turkestan mutinied; in January 1913 there was unrest in the Kiev garrison; mutiny was brewing in the Baltic and Black Sea fleets.

A new revolution was maturing in Russia.

Practical experience was fully confirming the correctness of the policy mapped out by the Prague Conference. It was now necessary to sum up the experience accumulated by the Party in these new conditions, and chart its next tasks in preparing for revolution. This was done at two conferences of the Central Committee with Party functionaries. The first was held in Cracow in December 1912, and the second at Poronin, a village near Cracow, in September 1913. They were attended by the Bolshevik Duma deputies and delegates from the Party organisations of St. Petersburg, Moscow, the Central Industrial Region, the Ukraine, the Urals and the Caucasus. Under Lenin’s guidance, the conferences adopted decisions on major aspects of Party activity. They emphasised that Party organisations, combining illegal and legal activities, should develop and organise revolutionary mass actions, notably revolutionary mass strikes and street demonstrations, and draw the peasants into broad revolutionary actions, co-ordinated to the utmost possible extent with those of the workers.

The illegal Party, a system of illegal nuclei surrounded by a network of legal and semi-legal workers’ societies, was recognised as the only correct form of organisation. Party committees made up of the most active workers should be set up in every factory; and Party groups, conducting their activities in strict accordance with the Party spirit, should be formed in all legal workers’ societies.

In its statement on the Poronin Conference the Central Committee wrote the following to all Party organisations:

“The path has been mapped out. The Party has devised its basic forms of work in the present transition period. Loyalty to the old revolutionary banner has been tested and proved in a new situation and under new conditions of work. The most difficult times are past, comrades. We are entering a new stage. Events of the utmost importance are on the way, and they will decide the fate of our country. To work, then, comrades!” (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part I, p. 308).

Militant unity of the proletarian ranks was a prerequisite of victory. The Cracow Conference regarded the fight for unity of the working-class movement as one of the Party’s basic tasks. It called for unity from below, forged by the workers themselves and based on recognition of the illegal Party and acceptance of revolutionary tactics.
This slogan fully accorded with working-class sentiment. The 1905 Revolution had shown the workers how injurious a split within the movement could be, and now, in preparation for new revolutionary battles, there was an insistent demand for unity. No one understood or appreciated all the significance of the great principle of proletarian unity better than the Bolsheviks. “Disunited the workers are nil. United they are everything,” Lenin declared (Collected Works, Vol. 19, p. 470). The basis of proletarian unity lay in the community of class interests and aims, in class discipline, and in the acceptance of the will of the majority. Explaining the Marxist conception of working-class unity, Lenin wrote:

“The working class needs unity. Unity is feasible only within a united organisation whose decisions are faithfully, and not just formally, carried out by all class-conscious workers. The discussion of an issue, stating and hearing diverse opinions, ascertaining the views of the majority of organised Marxists, expressing those views in a decision taken elsewhere, scrupulously carrying out that decision—that is what intelligent people throughout the world regard as unity. And such unity is supremely prized by the working class, is supremely important to it” (ibid., p. 470).

Working-class unity implies, first and foremost, ideological and political unity. It is impossible without unity of the workers’ organisations, and primarily the political organisation of the proletariat, the Party. The liquidators and Trotskyists were undermining that unity, covering up their disruptive activity with the hypocritical declaration that they stood for unity. It was therefore necessary to expose their unscrupulous exploitation of this great slogan and pillory them as destroyers of unity.

The liquidators were attacking the illegal Party more and more openly, maligning the revolutionary “underground” and advocating the formation of an “open” party. They ridiculed the heroic strike struggle of the workers as “strike fever”. They had their own newspapers in several localities, notably St. Petersburg, Moscow and Yekaterinoslav, and their own organisations, or so-called “initiating groups”. Actually, they had set up their own party, though it had not taken definite organisational shape. And they still had a foothold in various legal organisations, where they did what they could to prevent united action.

The formation of an independent Bolshevik Duma group was of outstanding importance in the struggle against the liquidators for unity of the labour movement. The workers naturally wanted to see their parliamentary representatives united in a single group, and it was therefore necessary to explain to the masses that in forming a group of their own, the Bolsheviks were guided solely by working-class interests.

At first the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks formed a joint Social-Democratic group in the Duma; but an extremely abnormal situation
prevailed within it. The six Bolsheviks had been elected from industrial gubernias with over a million workers, while the seven Menshevik liquidators represented non-industrial gubernias with only 136,000 workers. Using their accidental majority of one vote, the liquidators violated the elementary rights of the Bolshevik deputies. The result was that the liquidators, representing an insignificant minority of the working class, ignored the will of the vast majority of workers and tended to disrupt the unity of the working-class movement. The Cracow meeting of the Central Committee resolved to demand equality for the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in the Duma group. Nevertheless, Stalin, who represented the Central Committee, did not put forward that demand but yielded to the Mensheviks. It was only at the instance of Lenin that the right course was adopted on whose implementation the Bolsheviks’ use of the Duma group depended in large measure. The Party decided to submit the issue to the workers. There was a heated debate in the press, in Party organisations and at workers’ meetings. Over two-thirds of the class-conscious workers pronounced in favour of the Bolshevik six. When the latter constituted themselves into an independent Duma group, in the autumn of 1913, the majority of the workers sided with this group and not with the seven liquidators. This was an important victory for the Bolsheviks.

The Bolsheviks were successful in getting liquidators removed from responsible positions in legally functioning organisations, especially the trade unions. In St. Petersburg nearly all the unions were under Bolshevik leadership, the liquidators retaining the support only of the clerks, draughtsmen and pharmacists. In Moscow, all unions were either under the leadership of the Bolsheviks or closely associated with them. A particularly important victory was won in the St. Petersburg Metal-Workers’ Union, where the liquidators polled only 150 votes out of a total of 3,000 in the elections to the Union Board.

Another big victory was one in the insurance campaign, that is, in the elections to the sick-benefit societies organised under the social insurance law which the Duma had had to pass as a result of mass pressure. There was a keen contest between Bolsheviks and liquidators in the elections to the All-Russian and St. Petersburg insurance bodies, with over 80 per cent of the elected delegates supporting the list of Bolshevik demands and candidates whose names were published in Pravda.

The working class was rallying to the Bolshevik banner. The campaign against the illegal revolutionary Party was meeting with no support among the workers, and the enemies of Bolshevism decided on a new manoeuvre. Under the guise of “unity” Trotsky began building up a motley bloc of anti-Bolshevik groups. By posing as “non-factionalists” the Trotskyists were unscrupulously misleading the workers and thereby hampering the exposure of the liquidators.
They were therefore much more dangerous than the avowed liquidators.

This anti-Bolshevik bloc was formalised at a conference called by Trotsky in August 1912. Its opportunistic character was clearly revealed by the platform the conference endorsed. Conspicuously absent were the demands for a democratic republic, confiscation of the landed estates and their transfer to the peasants, and the right of nations to self-determination. This attempt to start a Centrist—in fact liquidationist—party in Russia was not supported by the workers. The Polish Social-Democrats and Plekhanov’s group, in their turn, refused to have any part in the anti-Party bloc. The Vperyod group withdrew from the bloc at once; they were followed by the Lettish Social-Democrats, and then all the others fell away. Attacked by the Bolsheviks, the August bloc actually fell apart less than eighteen months after its formation.

The liquidationist Stolypin “labour party” dragged out a miserable existence, while Trotsky’s anti-Bolshevik bloc ended in complete failure. This was due primarily to the fact that the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, unrelentingly combated opportunism, constantly explaining the great harm the opportunists were causing to the workers’ interests, and instilling a spirit of implacable hatred for opportunism in all its ugly manifestations. The long years of hard struggle against the police tyranny of tsarism and capitalist oppression had developed splendid militant revolutionary traits in the Russian proletariat. Now that a new revolutionary crisis was maturing, and the workers were preparing for a new revolution, they indignantly turned their backs on the liquidators and their Trotskyist henchmen, who were preaching renunciation of the revolutionary struggle. No less than four-fifths of the class-conscious workers, the vast majority of the proletariat, were as a result won over to the Bolshevik side. The Bolsheviks were able to bring about working-class unity primarily because they upheld the unity of the Party, cleansed of opportunists.

In this period of revolutionary upsurge the question of international unity of the working-class movement acquired especial significance. The imperialists had intensified national oppression and were fomenting national hatred. The bourgeoisie was also seeking to divide the working class along national lines. In a multi-national country such as Russia, it was extremely important that the class struggle of the workers of the oppressing nation should merge with that of the workers of the oppressed nations. A characteristic feature of the post-revolutionary years was the spread of Black-Hundred chauvinism and the growth of nationalism among the bourgeoisie of all the nations of Russia. Nationalist tendencies became more pronounced in some working-class organisations of the border regions. All sorts of nationalist deviators—Bundists, Georgian Mensheviks, Ukrainian and Armenian Social-Democrats (known as “specificists”)—
who were joined by the liquidators and Trotskyists, bitterly attacked the national programme of the Party. All this created a definite threat to the consistent class nature and militant unity of the movement. Naturally, the national question occupied a prominent place in the Party’s activities. Both the Cracow and the Poronin conferences adopted special resolutions on the subject. The Marxist programme on the national question and the Party’s policy on nationalities were developed and substantiated by Lenin in his articles “Critical Remarks on the National Question” and “The Right of Nations to Self-Determination”. The national question was dealt with in the writings of many Bolsheviks, of which mention should be made, first and foremost, of Stalin’s Marxism and the National Question and S. G. Shahumyan’s “On National Cultural Autonomy”.

Lenin explained that bourgeois nationalism and proletarian internationalism were irreconcilably hostile philosophies. The nationalist holds narrow national interests above all others, while for the internationalist the most important consideration is the international class solidarity of the workers.

The national question, Lenin wrote, is part of the general question of revolution. National peace under capitalism is possible only under a consistent and fully democratic republican regime. The victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution is essential for the complete democratization of Russia. The demands of the Bolshevik programme in that revolution were: the right of nations to self-determination, i.e., the right of secession and formation of independent states; regional autonomy for nations which, for one reason or another, choose to remain part of a given state; complete equality of all nations and languages, with constitutional provisions that would rule out privileges of any kind whatsoever for any one nation and prevent violation of the rights of national minorities.

Such a nationalities programme would help the workers’ effective struggle for socialism. The interests of the proletariat in the battle against capitalism required the closest unity of the workers of all nations and their association in united proletarian organisations. In order to eliminate all national distrust, the working class must seek complete equality for all nations, for only on that basis could fraternal unity in the class struggle be achieved. The fundamental slogan of the right of nations to self-determination was a powerful instrument for the internationalist education of the workers, and one that would rally the masses of the oppressed nationalities around the proletariat. The substance of the Party’s nationalities programme, Lenin wrote, was:

“Complete equality of rights for all nations; the right of nations to self-determination; the amalgamation of the workers of all nations—this is the nationalities programme that Marxism, the experience of the whole world, the experience of Russia, teaches the workers” (Collected Works, Vol. 20, p. 423).
The theoretical elucidation by the Bolsheviks of the national question was a crushing blow to nationalism. Lenin's programme on the national question had international significance, for it was directed against the bourgeois-nationalist and anti-Marxist theory and practice of the parties of the Second International, which held the oppressed peoples in contempt and supported more and more openly the predatory colonial policy of the major imperialist powers.

The fundamental theses which Lenin formulated in those years on the international unity of the working-class movement and the internationalist character of proletarian organisations were a major contribution to the doctrine of the Party.

By relentlessly combating even the smallest manifestation of national oppression and every variety of nationalism, the Bolsheviks were able to unite the workers of all the nationalities of Russia around the Russian workers, who formed the core and leading force of the working-class movement. The Party drew the finest sons of the non-Russian peoples into its ranks. The Bolshevik organisations conducted their revolutionary work in many of the national-minority areas. In Transcaucasia, they set an example of proletarian internationalism by uniting in their ranks Russians, Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis.

Appreciable headway was also made by the Bolsheviks in the national Social-Democratic organisations. The Polish Marxists were represented at Poronin and supported the Bolsheviks. The Lettish Social-Democratic Congress condemned the liquidators. The legal newspapers published by the Estonian and Lithuanian Marxists followed the Pravda line.

Together with the rise of the working-class movement, the party of the working class, the Bolshevik Party, grew and gained in strength. After the hard years of reaction, and amidst the difficulties created by their illegal status, the Bolsheviks re-established a mass party, firmly led and guided by its Central Committee and the latter's Russian Bureau and the C.C. Bureau Abroad. The Party published a widely read daily newspaper, had an independent parliamentary group, several regional, and a number of city committees, nuclei in many factories and mills, and Party groups in workers' legal organisations. The Central Committee maintained contact with nearly 100 organisations and groups throughout the country, from Vladivostok to Warsaw and from Vologda to Tashkent. The Central Committee and local organisations reacted with leaflets to every major development in the life of the country. Despite continuous police persecution, the Party was able to publish, in addition to Pravda, the legal magazines Prosveshcheniye (Enlightenment), Voprosy Strakhovaniya (Social Insurance), Rabotnitsa (Woman Worker) and lead a number of trade union journals in a Bolshevik spirit.
The Party led every manifestation and form of proletarian struggle. It organised the fight for the "partial demands" of the workers, integrating the economic needs and political interests of the proletariat. The Bolsheviks taught the workers to react to every major manifestation and every crime of tsarist tyranny.

Of special importance for the revolutionary and class education of the proletariat were the annual illegal May Day meetings and the commemoration of Bloody Sunday (January 22 [9], 1905), and the Lena shootings. In recalling these memorable stages of the struggle, the Party conducted its campaign beforehand, calling on the workers to strike and demonstrate on these days. The police, for all its Draconian measures, was powerless to prevent the workers responding to the Bolshevik appeals. On January 22, 1913, about 200,000 workers went on strike, and a year later the number was 250,000. The May Day gatherings in 1913 were attended by 420,000 workers, and by more than half a million in 1914.

Everywhere—in mass strikes, street demonstrations, factory gate meetings—the Bolsheviks emphasised that revolution was the only way out, and put forward slogans expressing the people’s longings: a democratic republic, an 8-hour working day, confiscation of the landed estates in favour of the peasants. News of these revolutionary strikes and revolutionary demands of the workers reached peasant huts and army barracks. In the revolutionary struggle of the workers the peasants, driven to despair by the exploitation of the landlords, and the soldiers, furious at the tyrannous conditions to which they were subjected, saw an example for themselves to follow.

The working class thus became the leader of the revolution, its standard-bearer, training and organising the masses for revolution.

The Bolshevik Party fought indefatigably and consistently against the threat of imperialist war. When, in October 1912, the Balkan war broke out, the Central Committee issued an appeal "To All Citizens of Russia", written by Lenin. The appeal exposed the imperialist intrigues in the Balkans, primarily those of Russian tsarism. It was published in the main European languages and became known to the workers of many countries. Pravda in numerous articles denounced the imperialists and revealed to the masses the truth about the war that was being planned and that would bring the peoples unprecedented hardships while the landlords and capitalists would derive huge profits from it. Lenin stressed that "an organised, class-conscious movement of the working class is the only guarantee of peace" (Collected Works, Vol. 19, p. 64). The defence of the interests of the whole people by the working class played a particularly important part in the struggle against the impending war.

Meanwhile the tide of the working-class movement rose higher and higher. In the first half of 1914 about 1,500,000 workers were involved in strikes. One strike followed another. The strikes on the anniversary of Bloody Sunday were followed by stoppages in protest.
against the mass poisoning of women workers at a number of St. Petersburg factories. After May Day action came the general strike in Baku, a courageous struggle supported by the workers of St. Petersburg, Moscow and other cities. On July 3, 1914, the police opened fire on a workers’ meeting at the Putilov Works in St. Petersburg. A wave of indignation swept over the country. The St. Petersburg Bolshevik Committee called for immediate strike action. On July 4, 90,000 workers downed tools, on the 7th, 130,000, and on the 11th, 200,000. Demonstrations began in protest against the actions of the tsarist authorities and the war, for which preparations were being made. The strike wave spread to Moscow; barricades were thrown up in St. Petersburg and Lodz. By the summer of 1914 the strike movement led by the Bolshevik Party, had surged higher than in the summer of 1905.

Russia was faced with a revolutionary crisis. The landlords and capitalists were accusing each other of inability to put out the flames of revolution. One Black-Hundred newspaper came out with the eloquent headline: “Badayev to the Gallows!” and called for the physical extermination of the working-class leaders. The tsarist government adopted “emergency” measures, the capital was turned into a veritable military camp. Pravda was closed down on July 8; wholesale arrests of Bolsheviks began.

The advance of the revolution was interrupted by the outbreak of the world war.

**Brief Summary**

During the years of the new rise of the revolution (1910-14) the Bolshevik Party was a cardinal factor in the political life of the country.

The Bolsheviks’ uncompromising fight against the Mensheviks on all key issues of the working-class movement culminated at the Prague Conference in the expulsion of the Menshevik liquidators from the Party as traitors to the working-class cause. This complete break with the opportunists played an important part in forging victory over the autocracy and capitalism in Russia and in shaping the destinies of the international working-class movement. The Prague Conference laid down the Party’s policy and tactics in conditions of the new rise of the revolutionary movement.

By defeating the liquidators, Trotskyists, national-deviators and other opportunists, and by skillfully combining illegal with legal work, the Bolsheviks won over the majority of the working class. This made for unity of the working-class movement and represented a momentous victory for the Party. It was made possible by the resolute struggle to cleanse the workers’ movement of bourgeois influences, and by the correct policy of gathering together all the revolutionary forces of the proletariat.
The Bolshevik newspaper *Pravda* widened and strengthened the Party's ties with the working class. The generation of front-rank workers trained by *Pravda* subsequently played an outstanding part in the Great October Socialist Revolution and in building socialism. In this period of revolutionary upsurge, the Bolshevik Party made masterly use of the legal press and parliamentary platform for the revolutionary enlightenment of the masses.

The national question figured prominently in the Party's theoretical and practical work. With the labour movement subjected to intensified nationalist propaganda, the Bolsheviks set a shining example of proletarian internationalism. The Party built up its organisations on the principle of proletarian internationalism, and fought indefatigably against nationalism. The Bolshevik organisations in the non-Russian regions combated nationalist parties and trends, and educated the masses in an internationalist spirit. Lenin's programme on the national question and the Party's nationalities policy convinced the peoples oppressed by tsarism that only the Bolsheviks were the true defenders of their rights and interests.

The Bolshevik Party mastered and skilfully applied every form of working-class struggle and organisation, and passed from one form to another promptly and efficiently. It took the lead in the battles of the proletariat at a time of mounting revolutionary crisis. Headed by the Bolsheviks, the working class came forward as the leader of the whole people's revolutionary struggle for freedom.

By all its revolutionary and genuinely internationalist activity the Bolshevik Party was prepared for the great ordeals of the imperialist world war.
CHAPTER SIX
THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY IN THE PERIOD OF THE IMPERIALIST WORLD WAR.
THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA
(1914-February 1917)


The imperialist world war broke out on August 1 (July 19, old style), 1914. It was the cumulative result of sharp imperialist contradictions.

The distinctive feature of imperialism, the highest and last stage of capitalism, is the domination of monopolies—syndicates, trusts and similar organisations of a handful of millionaires controlling vast amounts of capital. Not content with the home market, the capitalists made their way into the colonies and economically underdeveloped countries in search of profit. By the beginning of the century the whole world had already been divided among a small group of leading capitalist powers.

But under capitalism, an even course of development is impossible. Individual enterprises, industries and, indeed, countries overtake and outstrip others, which have to give way to their more successful competitors; or the latter themselves yield place. Imperialism, with its domination of giant monopolies, accentuates this unevenness, both in the economic and political fields. The development of capitalism becomes spasmodic, and this uneven development constantly upsets the international equilibrium, changing the relative economic and military strength of the powers. And the greater their strength, the more insistent becomes their demand for more markets and for new colonies, because in a society based on private ownership of the means of production, division of spoils is always in accordance with strength or capital. With the world already divided up among the biggest capitalist states, its redivision could only take place at the expense of one or another of these states, that is, through war.
Lenin pointed out that the emergence of powerful capitalist monopoly associations and their struggle for an economic redivision of the world which was already divided territorially was bound to lead to imperialist wars.

The imperialists had, in fact, long been preparing for a war to redivide the world. The most bellicose in this respect were the German militarists, who considered that they had been cheated out of their share of colonies. By the close of the last century, Germany had overtaken Britain in industrial development and was ousting her from her traditional markets. Germany’s aim was a radical redivision of the world in her favour. This contradiction between British and German imperialism was in fact the root cause of the war. However, a big part was also played by the imperialist contradictions between Germany and France, Russia and Germany, etc. Long before the war, in 1879-82, Germany had formed an alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy against Russia and France. The latter retaliated by forming an alliance of their own, and the British imperialists, fearing Germany’s advance to world domination, concluded an agreement (Entente) with France to combat Germany by joint effort. In 1907 Russia concluded a treaty with Britain, as a result of which Russia joined the Entente. The two mutually opposed imperialist blocs in Europe thus took final shape.

Economically dependent, mainly on French and British capital, Russia was drawn into the war on the side of the Entente. But the tsarist government had its own reasons for taking part in the imperialist war. The Russian capitalists strongly resented German competition in the domestic market. The dominant classes of Russia wanted new markets in which there would be no competition. The Russian imperialists were out to gain possession of Constantinople and the straits leading from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean; they wanted to seize Turkish Armenia and thereby bring the whole of Armenia under Russian rule. This clashed with German imperialist plans in the Middle East: Germany was penetrating into Turkey and Iran and had secured a concession for a railway from Berlin to Baghdad. Russo-German contradictions in the Middle East became especially keen in the twentieth century.

Another major cause of the war was the imperialists’ desire to suppress the revolutionary movement, which in the past ten years had grown to powerful dimensions. The Russian revolution of 1905-07 had greatly stimulated the working-class struggle in Europe and America and set off a national liberation movement in the East. The governments of the leading powers—and the tsarist government first and foremost—feared a further spread of the revolution, and believed that war would sidetrack the masses from revolutionary struggle. The imperialists hoped that by instigating the workers of different countries against each other they could split the international proletarian movement, poison it with the venom of chauvinism,
physically annihilate a big section of the advanced workers and in this way crush, or at any rate weaken, the revolutionary pressure of the masses.

The war grew into a global conflict, with 28 countries with an aggregate population of over 1,500 million gradually drawn into its vortex. About 74 million people were mobilised.

The bourgeois parties of every country urged the people to support the war. In Germany, the people were told that Russian tsarism would destroy all their democratic gains. In France, the argument was that Prussian militarism would trample down French democracy. In Russia, the people were told the Germans had attacked their country with the object of enslaving it. In short, the bourgeois parties tried to condition the people to the belief that the war was being fought for national salvation and that everyone had to take up arms in defence of the bourgeois fatherland. There was the propaganda figment that this was to be the last war. The petty-bourgeois parties also supported the capitalists and sought to justify the war.

Following in the wake of the bourgeois parties, nearly all the parties of the Second International, which considered themselves to be the representatives of the proletariat, disregarded the class interests of the workers and came out in support of the war. The German Socialists, for many years regarded as the foremost party of the Second International, voted in parliament for war credits. The French Socialists, and their colleagues in Britain and Belgium, went a step further and joined the reactionary capitalist governments in order to facilitate prosecution of the war.

In Russia, the Menshevik Duma members at first voted against war credits, so strong were anti-war sentiments among the workers. But their move turned out to be merely a manoeuvre motivated by fear of losing whatever influence they still enjoyed within the working class. Thereafter the Mensheviks accepted the bourgeois slogan of defence of the fatherland. The Socialist-Revolutionaries were divided on the war issue. The bulk of them supported the tsarist government; the Left wing at first came out against the war and even shared in international Socialist anti-war conferences, but flatly refused to break with defencists in their party.

The Second International collapsed and fell to pieces: the Socialists of the Entente countries (including the Russian Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries) held a conference in London in 1915, while the Socialists of the German bloc met in Vienna. Both conferences voted for defence of their bourgeois fatherlands.

This was open betrayal of the interests of the working class and outright treachery to the socialist cause. Up to that time the Social-Democratic leaders had time and again adopted resolutions against war and had given a pledge to the workers of their countries, and to the international labour movement generally, to oppose an imperialist war. Moreover, the Stuttgart (1907) and Basle (1912) congresses
of the Second International had solemnly, in the name of all the Socialist parties, appealed to the workers not only to fight against the outbreak of war and for its cessation if it did break out, but also to take advantage of the crisis created by the war in order to hasten the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. Now, by betraying the proletariat and supporting their own bourgeoisie, the parties of the Second International were assuming political responsibility for the long and devastating war into which the imperialists had plunged mankind.

How did it come about that the Socialist parties went back on their own Basle manifesto and betrayed socialism?

Colonial rapine enabled the imperialists to share part of their profits with other sections of the population. In a number of developed capitalist countries, over several decades, there emerged a labour aristocracy, a legal trade union officialdom, Social-Democrat parliamentarians and a staff of assistants. Thus a petty-bourgeois opportunist trend came into being in the Second International. Through it the bourgeoisie spread its influence among the workers. Lenin described the opportunists as agents of the bourgeoisie in the working-class movement. They advocated class collaboration and repudiated the class struggle; they renounced revolutionary methods and helped the bourgeoisie and the government of their particular country. The Bolsheviks had vigorously opposed the opportunists at congresses of the Second International where they united the Left-wing forces in the struggle against opportunism. Lenin repeatedly warned that the Social-Democratic leaders only talked of being opposed to opportunism, but that they would in practice side with the bourgeoisie.

The opportunists had got the upper hand in most Socialist parties, and with the outbreak of the war their secret compact with the bourgeoisie became an open alliance. Their approval of war credits and participation, in a number of countries, in bourgeois governments, meant open class collaboration between those parties and the imperialist bourgeoisie, a policy of preserving “civil peace” and supporting the imperialist governments in their predatory war. In Russia that policy was followed by the Mensheviks (Plekhanov, Potresov, Chkheidze and others) and by the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Opportunism had developed into chauvinism, into direct betrayal of internationalist principles and open support of the bourgeoisie. The social-chauvinists called on the workers of their own country to defend the bourgeois fatherland, incited them to fight the workers of other countries, called on the working people to exterminate one another.

Besides the Right wing, which had come out openly in defence of the bourgeoisie, there was another form of opportunism in all the parties of the Second International, namely, the Centrist trend. It had manifested itself even before the war, when the Centrists had urged that avowed opportunists be allowed to remain in the Social-
Democratic parties. Through these opportunists, the Centrists main-
tained the alliance with the bourgeoisie. Kautsky, Trotsky, Martov
were representatives of the Centrist movement. Lenin considered
Centrism to be the most harmful and dangerous variety of opportu-
nism, for the Centrists were disguised opportunists. To quote Lenin,
they were “a hundredfold more harmful and dangerous to the working-
class movement” than the avowed opportunists, since they masked
their betrayal of the workers and their alliance with the bourgeoisie
under Left-wing phraseology. The Trotskyists’ slogan “neither victory
nor defeat” could only mean that everything, including the tsarist
regime, should be left unchanged, should be preserved. This was a
patently chauvinist slogan amounting, in fact, to defence of the
tsarist government, to protection of tsarism. Lenin wrote:
“Those who support the slogan ‘neither victory nor defeat’,
are conscious or unconscious chauvinists, or at best conciliatory
petty bourgeois; in any case they are enemies of proletarian
policy, supporters of the existing governments and existing
ruling classes” (Collected Works, Vol. 21, p. 251).
In the whole of the Second International only one party had
worked out a consistently revolutionary Marxist policy on war and
peace and was heroically fighting for its application. That party was
the Bolshevik Party. The war was also opposed by the Bulgarian
Workers’ Social-Democratic Party (Tesnyaks) led by Dimitr Blago-
yev, Georgi Dimitrov and Vasil Kolarov. It conducted active propa-
ganda in the army and in the rear, rousing mass sentiment against
the imperialist war. The Serbian Social-Democratic Party likewise
came out against the war. The Italian Socialist Party at first took
an internationalist stand, but subsequently slid into defencism. In
Germany, the imperialist war was actively opposed by Karl Lieb-
knecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Clara Zetkin and Franz Mehring. But even
they took the wrong view of the slogan advanced by Lenin and the
Bolsheviks, that of the defeat of one’s own government and the trans-
formation of the imperialist war into a civil one, and did not support it.

For the war and, consequently, for imperialism, or against the
war and, consequently, for revolution—such was the dividing line
between the parties. The basic position of the overwhelming majority
of the parties in the Second International was to support the war,
their own bourgeoisie and their own government, for victory over
other nations.

Lenin and the Bolsheviks went “against the stream”. Led by
Lenin, the Party called for a struggle against the imperialist war
and for converting it into a civil war; it called on the peoples to fight
against their own governments, against their own bourgeoisie and
landlords. Above the strident chorus of imperialist toadies, who
were glorifying war, rose the courageous voice of the fighters for
socialism and for the people’s interests. Amidst the flood of oppor-
tunism which, it seemed, had drowned the whole international working-class movement for a long time to come, Lenin and the Bolshevik Party raised aloft the banner of Marxism, of internationalism, and set an example of devotion to the cause of international proletarian solidarity.

2. The Party's Revolutionary Activities Among the Masses During the Imperialist War

The outbreak of the war found Lenin at Poronin, in Austria-Hungary, where he was arrested by the Austrian police. After his release Lenin went to Berne, Switzerland, where, in the closing days of August 1914, he acquainted the local Bolshevik group with his theses on the war. These were then sent to Russia through F. N. Samoilov, a Bolshevik Duma member. They were discussed and approved with some amendments by the Petrograd (former St. Petersburg), Moscow, Kharkov, Kiev and other leading Party organisations. In October 1914 the Party's central organ, *Sotsial-Demokrat*, published the Central Committee manifesto, "The War and Russian Social-Democrats".

The nature of the war was differently assessed by different parties. For most parties the criterion was: who had begun the war? They accordingly divided wars into offensive and defensive ones. For other parties the criterion was: on whose territory was the war being fought? Bourgeois pacifists called for opposition to all wars, because, they argued, every war involves violence, rapine and the seizure of foreign territory. They dreamed of everlasting peace without the overthrow of capitalism.

The Bolsheviks maintained that the historical background and nature of the war should be concretely examined in each individual case. They rejected as incorrect the division of wars into offensive and defensive, for both elements are likely to occur in every war. The aggressor is at times obliged to take the defensive, and offensive operations are widely employed in wars of liberation. In defining the nature of a war, the important thing is likewise not who started it, who attacked whom. All the imperialists had prepared the First World War; but Germany had unleashed it at what she believed to be the most opportune moment.

The whole question was, what class is waging the war, what policy is the war continuing, what political aims is the ruling class pursuing in the war. From that standpoint, revolutionary Marxists divide wars into just and unjust. Wars waged by an oppressed class against its oppressors, by slaves against slave-owners, by serfs against feudal landlords, by wage-workers against the bourgeoisie, wars for national liberation, peoples' wars against the menace of national enslavement, wars of the victorious proletariat in defence of socialism,
against imperialist powers—such wars, in the Marxist view, are just wars.

The imperialist world war, like all wars generally, was the continuation of the pre-war policy of the ruling classes. The policy of the imperialists at home had been to strengthen their own position and intensify the exploitation of the working people. The continuation of that policy on an international scale meant a struggle for world domination, for the redivision of the world in favour of the stronger powers; it meant a drive for new markets and colonies and for the intensified plundering of dependent countries. The world war was therefore imperialist on both sides.

And from this imperialist nature of the war followed the Bolshevik attitude towards it. The policy and tactics of the Party were clearly formulated and thoroughly substantiated by Lenin in the Central Committee manifesto “The War and the Russian Social-Democrats”. True to the interests of the working class and the ideas of socialism, the Party called on the masses not only to fight against that particular war, but also to use the crisis engendered by the war for the purpose of overthrowing tsarism. The Bolshevik Party’s fundamental slogan was the conversion of the imperialist war into a civil war, into revolution against the ruling classes. The Party recommended a number of concrete measures to attain that goal: 1) unconditional refusal to vote for war credits, and immediate withdrawal of all Socialists from bourgeois governments; 2) complete rejection of any agreement with the bourgeoisie and of “civil peace”; 3) establishment of illegal organisations in countries where they did not exist and where work in legal organisations was difficult; 4) support of fraternisation by the soldiers at the front; 5) support for all revolutionary mass actions of the proletariat.

Another slogan, closely linked with the first, was that of the defeat of the tsarist government in the imperialist war. It did not, of course, imply that the Party called on the people to blow up supply depots or commit other acts of sabotage. What it did imply was that the proletarian party should under no circumstances support measures designed to strengthen the tsarist government. The policy of the defeat of one’s own government in the imperialist war was a continuation of the revolutionary struggle. The reverses suffered by the tsarist government weakened tsarism and thereby helped the revolutionary movement, making it easier to overthrow tsarism and carry the revolution to its victorious conclusion. The opponents of these Bolshevik tactics alleged that a policy aimed at the defeat of tsarism would lead to the victory of Germany. They were careful, however, not to mention the fact that Lenin considered the slogan of the defeat of one’s own government in the war to be binding not only on the Socialists of Russia, but also on those of all the warring countries. This was an indication of the internationalism of the Bolshevik tactics.
Not a single party put forward, let alone accepted, the slogan of defeat. That slogan proved to be the touch-stone of truly revolutionary and internationalist views both for parties and for individual revolutionaries. Only its acceptance was proof that the struggle to transform the imperialist war into a civil war was shifting on to realistic ground.

The third and last slogan advanced by the Party during the war was for a complete break with the bankrupt Second International, since continued unity with the opportunists would have been tantamount to continued alliance with the bourgeoisie. Lenin called for the creation of a new, Third International.

The manifesto of the C.C. R.S.D.L.P.(B.), particularly its slogan of transforming the imperialist war into a civil war, was met with hostility by the social-chauvinists and with a distrustfully sceptical silence by the Social-Democrats of the “Centre”. Lenin commented on their reaction to the manifesto as follows: “David, the German social-chauvinist and social-imperialist, called it ‘crazy’, and as for Plekhanov, a spokesman of Russian (and Anglo-French) social-chauvinism, he called it a ‘dream farce’... As regards the representatives of the Centre, they dismissed it by keeping silent or cracking flat little jokes about this ‘straight line drawn in a vacuum’” (Collected Works, Vol. 23, p. 363).

The bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties accused the Bolsheviks of indifference to the interests of their country, of treason and lack of patriotism because they opposed the bourgeois slogan of defence of the fatherland in the imperialist war. The very men whose policies were inimical to the people and who were converting a great country into a pawn of the imperialist powers, Britain and France, were now slanderously accusing the Bolsheviks of lack of national pride. Lenin indignantly refuted that calumny. He wrote in his article “The National Pride of the Great Russians”:

“Is the sense of national pride alien to us, Great-Russian class-conscious proletarians? Of course, not! We love our language and our country, we are doing more than anybody to raise her toiling masses (i.e., nine-tenths of her population) to the level of conscious democrats and Socialists. It pains us, more than anybody else, to see and feel the outrage, oppression and humiliation inflicted on our splendid country by the tsarist hangmen, nobles and capitalists. We are proud of the fact that these outrages have roused resistance in our midst, the midst of the Great Russians; that from this midst came Radishchev, the Decembrists and the revolutionary commoners of the seventies; that in 1905 the Great-Russian working class created a mighty, revolutionary mass party; that at the same time the Great-Russian muzhik began to become a democrat, and began to overthrow the priest and the landlord” (Collected Works, Vol. 21, p. 85). The Bolsheviks were opposed not to the fatherland as such, but
to the landlord-bourgeois fatherland, to the attempt to present tsarist Russia, whose landlords and capitalists were ruthlessly exploiting the labouring people, as the fatherland. The Party exposed the false, bourgeois interpretation of the concept of fatherland.

The Bolsheviks represented a genuine patriotic force in the country precisely because they called for the defeat of their government in the imperialist war, for the overthrow of the anti-popular government. Lenin explained how the Marxists understood the relation between proletarian internationalism and patriotism. He was not a patriot who supported this predatory war, a war fought in the interests of the landlords and bourgeoisie, and sought to preserve the privileges of the ruling classes. He alone was a patriot who fought for the interests of the people, who wanted a “free and independent, democratic, republican, proud Great Russia, building her relations with her neighbours on the humane principle of equality, and not on the feudal principle of privilege, degrading to a great nation” (Collected Works, Vol. 21, p. 86). In rousing the people to overthrow tsarism, and in fighting for socialism, the Russian proletariat—“the principal driving force in the communist revolution”—was fighting for a free, independent and democratic fatherland.

“The interests (not as some lackey would understand them) of the national pride of the Great Russians,” Lenin wrote, “coincide with the socialist interests of the Great-Russian (and all other) proletarians” (ibid., p. 87).

A conference of Bolshevik organisations abroad held in Berne, Switzerland, in February 1915, discussed the Party’s tactics and approved its slogans on the war issue.

On the basis of Lenin’s recommendations, the Bolsheviks developed their revolutionary work among the masses.

The tsarist government tried to crush the Party by unprecedented repressions and wholesale arrests. Every local Party Committee was raided by the police. Members of the St. Petersburg Committee were arrested on more than thirty occasions during the war; the Moscow organisation was kept in a state of constant tension by police raids, and several attempts to re-establish the Moscow Committee failed. In Samara successive committees were arrested six times in one year.

All the Bolshevik publications were closed, including the legal journal Voprosy Strakhovaniya. Most of the surviving trade unions were dissolved by the government. Even such cultural associations as the Wholesome Recreation Society in Samara, the Enlightenment Club in Moscow and the Self-Education Society in Petrograd were banned, out of fear that they might become centres of revolutionary propaganda and meeting places for Party functionaries.

No other revolutionary party had ever had to work in such conditions. An employer had only to give the police a list of “undesirable” workers for them to be clapped in jail immediately.
But neither police terror, nor frame-ups, nor victimisation could break the Party's will or prevent its activities. In the very first week of the war, anti-war leaflets were issued by the Party organisations in Petrograd, Yekaterinoslav, Kharkov, Kiev, Moscow, Ufa, Tula and Samara.

The Bolshevik Duma members toured a number of industrial areas, re-establishing Party committees and organising new ones, and arranging numerous workers' meetings at which anti-war resolutions were adopted. The Bolshevik Duma members called a conference of representatives from Petrograd, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Kharkov and Riga at Ozerki, a village near Petrograd, on November 2-4, 1914. It discussed Lenin's theses on the war and endorsed them unreservedly.

Acting on information supplied by agent-provocateurs, the police arrested all the participants on November 4. The Duma members were searched and released, only to be re-arrested on the night of November 5, and committed for trial. The trial was held on February 10-13,1915, and the Bolshevik deputies took advantage of it to explain the Party's anti-war slogans. The tsarist court sentenced them to life exile in Turukhansk Territory (Eastern Siberia).

Tried together with the courageous Duma deputies was Kamenev, who had attended the Ozerki Conference. Unlike the Duma deputies, however, he renounced the Party's slogan that called for the defeat of one's own government in the war, declaring that he disagreed with Lenin and the Party. To prove this he requested that a Menshevik defencist be summoned as witness.

The Party branded Kamenev's behaviour at the trial as treachery.

The trial was of vast political significance. It showed the world proletariat the stand that a genuinely internationalist party should take in an imperialist war. At a time when the opportunists of the Second International had disgraced themselves by joining bourgeois governments, the Bolshevik deputies remained loyal to socialism, though this meant penal servitude.

The arrest of the Duma members left the Party with less legal facilities for directing the revolutionary struggle. This made things more difficult, but it could not halt Party activities. The St. Petersburg Committee issued over 90 leaflets during the war (an average of three leaflets a month) in a total of more than 300,000 copies, and they found their way to every part of Russia. According to very incomplete data, over 40 Party organisations issued leaflets during the war. In addition to those mentioned above, they included the Yekaterinburg, Zlatoust, Ivanovo-Voznesensk and Krasnoyarsk organisations and the Donets coalfield, Kronstadt, Nizhni-Novgorod, Rostov, Riga, Baku and Tiflis Party committees. All in all, over 500 different leaflets were put out in the war years.

The Party made use of every opportunity to conduct revolutionary propaganda. Its members were active in the trade unions, in the
workers' co-operatives, sick-benefit societies and cultural organisations that had so far escaped the police ban. In these bodies the Party fought to win the masses over from the social-chauvinists. The Menshevik defencists were helped by the police; quite often the Mensheviks arrested at a meeting would be set free, while the Bolsheviks would be sentenced to penal servitude. In the teeth of ceaseless persecution, the Bolsheviks were able to gain a dominant influence in the trade unions and other labour organisations. The Bolshevik Party was the recognised leader of the workers. This was most clearly demonstrated by the development of the strike struggle.

The war brought the working people hunger, cold and incalculable sacrifice. The economy was dislocated; the transport system could not cope even with food shipments; the people were left without bare necessities, even bread. Prices soared, but wages remained the same or increased only slightly. The capitalists were making enormous profits out of the war, while all its burdens were borne by the people.

The early victories of the tsarist army at the front were followed by one reverse after another. The Germans overran Poland, part of the Baltic provinces and Byelorussia. Millions of refugees fled to the interior provinces. Their position was even more difficult than that of the rest of the population.

There was growing popular discontent with the war and with the policy of the tsarist government. The industrial workers were the first to translate this resentment into action; they set a fighting example to all the working people. The number of strikes grew continuously—from about 70 in 1914 (after the outbreak of the war), involving about 35,000 workers, to more than 1,000 (according to minimised official figures) in 1915, involving over 500,000 workers. The strikes were brutally suppressed: in June 1915 the police fired on a strikers' demonstration at Kostroma, killing and wounding more than 50, in August over 100 were killed and wounded at a meeting of strikers in Ivanovo-Voznesensk. The St. Petersburg Party Committee organised a protest strike.

Frightened by the surging wave of strikes and the government's inability to crush it, the capitalists resorted to a skilful manoeuvre in an attempt to placate the workers and bring them under their influence. War industry committees were set up in 1915, by permission of the authorities. Their purpose was to support the tsarist government, boost munitions production, step up exploitation and give factory owners a say in the allocation of immensely profitable war contracts. The next step was to set up "workers' groups" in these war industry committees, in order to create a semblance of "class truce" between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The Mensheviks helped in this, declaring for the workers to take part in the "groups". The Mensheviks were, in effect, following in the footsteps of their West European counterparts who had joined bourgeois governments,
for the war industry committees were semi-governmental bodies.

The Bolsheviks vigorously opposed participation in the committees, and explained the position to the workers in the factories. Though the Party had to face the combined forces of the tsarist government, the bourgeoisie, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, it was able to foil the scheme of the bourgeoisie. The overwhelming majority of the working class declared against participation in the war industry committees: out of the 239 regional and local committees, elections of workers' representatives were held in only 70, and representatives were elected in only 36, or in 15 per cent of the total. The Russian proletariat had not given in to war hysteria.

The Party developed extensive activities among the soldiers. Industrial workers had been called up for active service, including tens of thousands who had taken an active part in the revolutionary struggle. These were the Party's chief support in the army.

This work acquired immense significance. Concentrated in the army were millions of peasants, chiefly poor peasants; and the Bolsheviks took advantage of this to promote worker and peasant unity in the revolutionary struggle. Bolshevik leaflets dealt not only with the issue of peace, but also with that of land.

The Party committees in Petrograd, Moscow, Kharkov, Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, Riga and many other industrial centres issued special leaflets for distribution among the soldiers, telling them about the workers' strike struggles, the mounting revolutionary sentiment among the people and the need for a joint struggle against tsarism. They called for fraternisation at the front. There had been individual cases of fraternisation towards the close of 1914; in the spring of 1915 more and more instances were reported from the Austrian front, and in 1916, they became a common occurrence. Party organisations were founded in a number of army units. M. V. Frunze, N. V. Krylenko, A. F. Myasnikov (Myasnikyian), S. G. Roshal and other prominent Bolsheviks were active in the army and navy.

The Party conducted extensive political work in the navy, which was recruited largely from skilled workmen. Party groups were formed on every major vessel of the Baltic Fleet. Their activities were co-ordinated by the Central Collective of the Kronstadt Military Organisation, which had established connections with the military branch of the St. Petersburg Party Committee.

In October 1915 a mutiny broke out on the battleship Gangut. The vessel was surrounded by destroyers and submarines and forced to surrender. In December about a hundred of her crew were court-martialled, and 26 sentenced to penal servitude.

The St. Petersburg Committee made this trial the occasion for a special appeal to the army and navy, calling for unity of the revolu-
tionary army with the revolutionary proletariat and the entire people. In October 1916, when another group of Bolshevik sailors was court-martialled, the committee issued a strike appeal, to which some 130,000 Petrograd workers responded by a three-day stoppage. The mass actions frightened the government and the court did not dare pass any death sentences. The close connection between the working-class movement and these actions in the army and navy was a clear indication of the strengthening alliance of the proletariat and peasantry.

At that time the Central Committee, headed by Lenin, led the Party through Sotsial-Demokrat, a newspaper which published articles by Lenin, the resolutions and directives of the Central Committee and of Party conferences, and information on activities and the situation in Petrograd, Moscow, the Urals, the Volga region and Siberia. Contact between the Central Committee and the Party organisations was maintained through a lively correspondence. The Central Committee circulated its directives and instructions through representatives sent expressly or through local functionaries who came to Lenin. Several theoretical collections were brought out abroad—Kommunist Nos. 1 and 2 and two issues of Sbornik “Sotsial-Demokrata”. In Russia, over ten illegal and legal newspapers and periodicals were published intermittently, in addition to leaflets.

The Party continued to grow despite the reign of terror. New Party members joined in the struggle against tsarism, taking the place of the arrested. In 1916 the number of Party members in Petrograd who paid regular membership dues exceeded 2,000. Among those who joined the Party during the war were A. I. Mikoyan, A. A. Zhdanov, N. N. Demchenko, Y. B. Gamarnik and V. K. Blücher. One of the prisoners of war among whom the Bolsheviks carried on their work and who joined the Party was Béla Kún, the Hungarian revolutionary.

During the war, to bring leadership closer to local Party organisations, the Bolsheviks formed regional organisations in Moscow, Ivanovo-Voznesensk and the southern Mining Area, as well as the Donets Committee, which co-ordinated Bolshevik work in the Donets coalfield. In the face of police persecution, the Bolsheviks succeeded in organising several regional conferences. They held a regional conference of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Bolsheviks in 1915, a conference of the Urals Bolsheviks in Yekaterinburg, and a conference of the Caucasian Bureau of the R.S.D.L.P. in Baku. In 1916 regional conferences of the Bolsheviks took place in the Volga region, the Donets coalfield and Yekaterinoslav.

The Party’s work assumed a large scale. Representatives of the St. Petersburg and Moscow organisations, upon attending regional conferences, found an all-Russian conference to be imperative.

The Party’s self-sacrificing and heroic work in the face of tsarist terror and provocation showed the working class that in the Bolshe-
viks it had a party fully capable of leading the people to victory in the revolution, and ready to do so.

The Party availed itself of every opportunity to make known the ideas of Bolshevism to the international proletariat and thereby help Social-Democratic workers to break free of opportunist influence.

In March 1915 the Bolsheviks participated in the International Women’s Socialist Conference in Berne, at which eight countries were represented by 25 delegates. The Conference was convened on the initiative of Bolshevik women’s organisations, and the Party’s representatives, I. F. Armand and N. K. Krupskaya, played a prominent part in its proceedings. The Central Committee delegation drafted a resolution condemning social-chauvinism and urging acceptance of the slogan of converting the imperialist war into a civil war. Lenin and the Bolsheviks also rendered valuable assistance to the revolutionary youth and their movement. The Party took part in the International Socialist Youth Conference (Berne, March 1915), at which ten countries were represented and at which International Youth Day was inaugurated.

Though these conferences did not fully accept the Bolshevik proposals, the speeches of the Party representatives exerted a powerful influence on the development of the international revolutionary movement.

An International Socialist Conference was held at Zimmerwald, a village near Berne, in the latter part of August 1915. The war had been going on for a year. It had taken a colossal toll—millions of killed and crippled. More and more people were pondering on the causes of the war and seeking a way out of it. The main problem facing mankind was how to end that particular war and abolish all wars between peoples. But no one tried to find a solution—not even the party leaders of the Second International, who were caught in the common chauvinist torrent. The first to offer a solution to this problem, which affected the destinies of all mankind, were Lenin and the Russian Marxists, the Bolshevik Party. Lenin substantiated the revolutionary Marxists’ attitude to war in his famous pamphlet, *Socialism and War*, which appeared in the summer of 1915, shortly before the Zimmerwald Socialist Conference. The pamphlet was disseminated illegally in Germany and France and reprinted in Norway. Published in Russian abroad, it was brought to Russia, where Moscow workers spread it after copying it by hand.

The Zimmerwald Conference was attended by 38 delegates from 11 countries. Most of the delegates were Centrists, followers of Karl Kautskcy. The Conference manifesto, though emphasising the need to campaign for peace, did not advance the slogan of converting the imperialist war into a civil war, nor that of the defeat of one’s own government and a complete break with opportunism.

The Bolsheviks took part in the Zimmerwald Conference although it was dominated by inconsistent and vacillating elements, believing
that closer contact with them was both possible and necessary to further the struggle against social-chauvinism. But Lenin suggested that the Party should not confine itself to what was acceptable to these elements; it must criticise their vacillations, underline their half-heartedness and explain that a democratic peace was possible only by converting the imperialist war into a civil war.

On Lenin’s initiative a Zimmerwald Left group of eight delegates was formed at the Conference. It proposed a draft resolution which, basically, adhered to Lenin’s slogans, and in a special statement pointed out the inadequacy of the manifesto and the refusal of its authors to break with opportunism. But the group voted for the manifesto, since it represented a first step in the fight against the war.

After the Conference the Zimmerwald Left held a meeting of its own and elected a bureau. The group declared that, while remaining within the Zimmerwald organisation, it would conduct an independent international campaign in conformity with the draft resolution and draft manifesto it had brought before the Conference. The Zimmerwald Left published a magazine in German, Vorbote (Herald). The Bolsheviks, the only group to take a consistent stand, were the guiding force in the Zimmerwald Left.

The Zimmerwald Left became the kernel of a broader internationalist movement that spread to every country. Its success made itself felt at the second International Socialist Conference at Kienthal, Switzerland, in April 1916. This time there were 43 delegates, 12 of them adherents of the Zimmerwald Left, which on a number of issues obtained as much as 45 per cent of the total vote.

*The Bolsheviks fulfilled their international duty.* Their courageous stand and activity contributed to the subsequent formation of Communist Parties in all the capitalist countries.

3. Development of the Theory of Socialist Revolution by Lenin

Imperialism had brought mankind up to the threshold of socialist revolution, and had made the latter an immediate and practical task. The war had accelerated the maturing of the prerequisites of revolution. The new conditions in which the proletarian class struggle was taking place required a new approach on the part of Marxist parties to the problems of revolution, and the ability creatively to apply the basic principles of Marxism in the new situation.

The founders of Marxism had disclosed the laws governing the rise, development and doom of the capitalist system. But in the days of Marx and Engels socialist revolution was not yet an immediate goal; and Lenin was the first Marxist to give a profound analysis of the new era. This he did in his *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, written in 1916 and based on a searching study of a vast amount of factual and historical data. From this analysis
Lenin concluded that towards the beginning of the century capitalism had entered a new stage, imperialism, that it had "grown into a world-wide system of colonial oppression and financial strangulation of the overwhelming majority of the population of the world by a handful of 'advanced' countries" (Collected Works, Vol. 22, p. 179).

Imperialism rendered all the contradictions of capitalism extremely acute, above all its basic contradiction: production was becoming increasingly social in character, while appropriation remained private, the means of production being the private property of a handful of monopolists. It was the latter, and not the working people, who benefited from the gigantic development of the productive forces. Having concentrated immense wealth in their hands, the monopolies were all-powerful and, in fact, controlled the whole power of the state. Political reaction was becoming more pronounced everywhere. Monopoly rule brought with it a drastic rise in living costs, more unemployment and excessive taxes to maintain the army and government machine. Oppression and exploitation were carried to unprecedented extremes. This greatly aggravated the contradiction between labour and capital, between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

At the same time, the contradictions between individual imperialist countries and between groups of countries over redivision of the world became ever sharper, culminating in the world war.

Lastly, there was an immense sharpening of contradictions between the handful of imperialist states and the numerous colonial and semi-colonial areas where hundreds of millions of people were enslaved. The development of capitalist relations in the colonies led to the emergence of a national proletariat capable of leading the masses.

It was the extreme aggravation of all the contradictions of capitalism that distinguished imperialism as the last stage of capitalism. Lenin defined imperialism as "moribund capitalism".

From the very outset of his revolutionary activity Lenin concentrated on a study of such vital theoretical problems of the revolution as that of the hegemony of the proletariat; the alliance of the proletariat and the whole of the peasantry and their revolutionary-democratic dictatorship in the bourgeois-democratic revolution; the development of the latter into a socialist revolution, and the alliance of the proletariat with the poorest peasantry; proletarian dictatorship, and the leading role of the Party in the revolution. Now, in the war years, on the basis of his analysis of imperialism, Lenin developed the theory of socialist revolution, and enriched it with new propositions, which in the main amount to the following:

1. Imperialism had created the objective prerequisites for carrying out a socialist revolution. "Imperialism is the eve of the social revolution of the proletariat," is how Lenin defined the last stage of
capitalism (Collected Works, Vol. 22, p. 182). But revolutions do not come of their own accord; nor can they be artificially induced or imported. Revolution matures within society itself, it grows out of objectively matured crises. Revolution is inconceivable without a general political crisis embracing all strata of the population. Such a crisis was created by the imperialist war of 1914-18.

For the war was the product of an age in which capitalism had reached the apex of its development—a stage characterised by the domination of monopoly and finance capital, when the export of capital had acquired decisive importance, when the territorial division of the world among the leading capitalist powers was complete and its economic division among the international monopolies had begun. The war had been engendered by imperialism, a system characterised by accentuation of all the contradictions of capitalism. But in its turn, the imperialist war had greatly aggravated all the contradictions of imperialism, and brought them to the surface. It accelerated the development of capitalism. Lenin demonstrated that in the course of the war monopoly capitalism was being converted into state-monopoly capitalism, with the monopolists gaining increasing control over the state. But, on the other hand, the war had placed such a strain on the working people that they were faced with the choice of either perishing under imperialist rule, or entrusting the guidance of society to the proletariat for the transition to socialism. Thus the war constituted a manifestation and the beginning of the general crisis of capitalism. It created a revolutionary situation in most countries.

2. The three basic features of a revolutionary situation are: first, the ruling classes can no longer continue to govern as before. “For a revolution to break out,” Lenin wrote, “it is not enough for the ‘lower classes not to want’ to live in the old way; it is necessary also that the ‘upper classes should be unable’ to live in the old way” (Collected Works, Vol. 21, p. 189). Second, serious aggravation—in comparison with the usual state of affairs—of the poverty and misery of the labouring masses as a result of the crisis. Third, much greater discontent with the policy of the ruling classes, expressed in active revolutionary movements by the broad masses.

Such are the objective conditions (that is, conditions not dependent on the will of individuals, parties or classes) that create a revolutionary situation.

However, not every revolutionary situation results in revolution. For a revolutionary situation to translate itself into revolution, subjective, as well as objective, factors are needed, namely, the ability and readiness of the advanced class to fight for the overthrow of the ruling classes. And that, as Lenin already emphasised in his early works, is a quality that has to be forged, fashioned, by the revolutionary Marxist party of the working class.

3. For a socialist revolution to take place, it is not at all necessary
for the proletariat to become the majority of the population, as the opportunists maintained. The socialist revolution is not a single act nor a single battle. It is a whole era of class battles, economic, political and ideological. Lenin showed that the revolution would consist of a series of battles waged against the ruling classes by all the oppressed and discontented classes, groups and elements of the population, but first and foremost by the proletariat and its ally, the peasantry. It would consist, also, of a movement of the semi-proletarian masses against landlord, bourgeois, national and other forms of oppression, of revolts of the colonial peoples and of other forms of mass struggle. The task of the proletariat is to lead all these battles, and direct them towards a single goal—the overthrow of imperialism and the accomplishment of a socialist revolution. Lenin wrote: "Whoever expects a ‘pure’ social revolution, will never live to see it. Such a person only pays lip service to revolution without understanding what revolution really is" (Collected Works, Vol. 22, p. 340).

4. The national liberation movement against imperialism weakens and undermines it, thereby facilitating its overthrow by the workers of the more advanced countries. On the other hand, the workers' revolutionary struggle makes for the success of the national liberation struggle of the oppressed nations.

The increased national oppression brought by imperialism made for growing resistance on the part of the people.

The leaders of the bankrupt parties of the Second International refused to recognise the national liberation movement as a component of the socialist revolution. Thereby they deprived the revolution of powerful support. The Trotskyists, like all the Centrist elements, maintained that national liberation wars were impossible in the imperialist era. Bukharin and Pyatakov likewise believed that national liberation wars were impossible in the conditions of imperialism, and opposed the Party's programme demand for the right of nations to self-determination.

Lenin proved that this non-recognition of national liberation wars under imperialism actually amounted to a defence and justification of imperialism; it meant refusing to take into account such an important reserve of revolution as the anti-imperialist struggle of oppressed nations. He declared, in 1916, that the Party was "for utilising all national movements against imperialism for the purposes of the socialist revolution" (ibid., pp. 327-28).

5. Imperialism was a world-wide system, and it was therefore by no means obligatory that the revolution should take place in the most advanced capitalist country. Given the necessary objective and subjective factors—a certain level of capitalist development, the existence of a proletariat and a proletarian party capable of leading the other non-proletarian masses, primarily the peasantry—the imperialist chain would be broken at its weakest link. A socialist
revolution could take place in a country where the contradictions were acutest and where the necessary forces had been prepared.

6. Imperialism and the imperialist war had created a new situation. Lenin, basing himself on Marxist theory, accordingly reviewed the proposition formulated by Marx and Engels that socialism would triumph simultaneously in all or most capitalist countries. From that proposition, by which all Marxists had been guided before the war, it followed that the victory of socialism in one separate country was impossible. That was true of pre-imperialist capitalism, in the period when capitalism was on the upgrade, and when the success of a socialist revolution could be ensured only by the simultaneous revolutionary action of the proletariat in all or the majority of capitalist countries against the domination of capital. This proposition, however, did not hold good in the era of imperialist capitalism; it had become obsolete and had to be replaced.

Lenin proved, by his study of imperialism, that the unevenness of the economic and political development of capitalism in its imper­­ialist stage had assumed a particularly catastrophic and spasmodic character. Proceeding from this law, Lenin came to the conclusion that in the imperialist period socialism could not triumph simultaneously in all countries, but that its victory was possible first in one country alone, or in a few countries. That view was set forth in two of his articles, “The United States of Europe Slogan” (1915) and “The War Programme of the Proletarian Revolution” (1916).

“Uneven economic and political development,” Lenin wrote, “is an absolute law of capitalism. Hence, the victory of socialism is possible at first in a few capitalist countries, or even in one, taken singly” (Collected Works, Vol. 21, p. 311).

The proletariat of a country where all conditions, objective and subjective alike, are ripe for the revolution, does not wait till a similar situation shapes in other countries but pierces the imperialist front and establishes its dictatorship. Thereby it fulfils its internationalist duty towards its fellow-proletarians, towards the world proletariat. The very fact that the revolution will have triumphed in one country will greatly influence the world movement, which in turn will strengthen and ease the position of the victorious proletariat. This is a manifestation of proletarian internationalism, of the international solidarity of the working people.

Lenin stressed that the proletariat, after achieving victory in the revolution, would by no means wait for revolutions to triumph in all or many countries but would expropriate the overthrown capitalists and organise socialist production in its country. The successful construction of socialism, the abolition of private ownership of the means of production, and a radical improvement in the life of all the working people of the country would show the whole of the world proletariat the way of deliverance from imperialist oppression and would inspire it to fight against the oppressors.
The triumph of socialism in one country provides a basis for strengthening and expanding the world revolutionary movement, for supporting and assisting the proletariat and the masses of the people in other countries. Afterwards Lenin, in explaining the internationalist tasks of the proletariat that had achieved victory in one country, described them as the necessity for doing "a maximum of what is feasible in one country in order to develop, to support, to arouse the revolution in all countries" (Collected Works, Vol. 28, p. 269).

Reverting to the question of the victory of socialism in one country in his "War Programme of the Proletarian Revolution", Lenin emphasised:

"The development of capitalism proceeds extremely unevenly in the various countries. It cannot be otherwise under the commodity production system. From this it follows irrefutably that socialism cannot achieve victory simultaneously in all countries. It will achieve victory first in one or several countries, while the others will remain bourgeois or pre-bourgeois for some time" (Collected Works, Vol. 23, p. 67).

7. After the victorious socialist revolution, the proletariat will establish its dictatorship, without which the abolition of classes and the building of socialism are inconceivable. The form of transition to socialism may vary in different countries, depending upon the economic level, the relation of classes, and historical tradition. Lenin wrote in this connection:

"All nations will arrive at socialism—this is inevitable, but all will do so in not exactly the same way, each will contribute something of its own to some form of democracy, to some variety of the dictatorship of the proletariat, to the varying rate of socialist transformations in the different aspects of social life" (Ibid., p. 58).

While noting that the transition from capitalism to socialism was bound to produce a vast abundance and diversity of political forms, Lenin emphasised that the substance of all these transitional forms would be one and the same, namely, proletarian dictatorship. He wrote:

"Dictatorship of the proletariat, the only consistently revolutionary class, is necessary to overthrow the bourgeoisie and beat off its attempts at counter-revolution" (Ibid., p. 57).

8. The victory of socialism in one country will move the imperialists to try to defeat the socialist state. The proletariat will therefore have to defend its socialist state, arms in hand.

"This must create not only friction," Lenin wrote in "The War Programme of the Proletarian Revolution", in reference to the victory of socialism in a single country, "but also a direct striving on the part of the bourgeoisie of other countries to crush the victorious proletariat of the socialist state. In such cases a war
on our part would be legitimate and just" (Collected Works, Vol. 23, p. 67).

The Marxist postulate of armed defence of the socialist state, of just wars in defence of victorious socialism, is thus an integral part of Lenin’s theory of socialist revolution, and follows directly from the possibility of socialism emerging victorious in one country.

This was a new theoretical concept, a new theory of socialist revolution formulated by Lenin.

It represented a further step in the creative development of Marxism, of the ideas expounded in Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution and other works by Lenin. Lenin’s theory took account of the new situation created by imperialism and the new experience gained by the world proletariat in the revolutionary struggle.

It armed the working class in all countries with a clear understanding of the motive forces of the revolution, the conditions necessary for its victory and the prospects of its development. The supreme value of Lenin’s theory lies in the fact that it unfetters the initiative of the workers in their fight against their national bourgeoisie, and shows the working class of each country the path to salvation from the innumerable calamities engendered by imperialism.

4. The February Bourgeois-Democratic Revolution. Formation of Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies. Dual Power

The objective course of history fully confirmed Lenin’s view that the war had created a revolutionary situation. Backward Russia, the weakest link in the world imperialist chain, experienced the impact of the war more heavily than the other countries. Two years of war were enough to break the strength of tsarist Russia. In 1916 famine had begun in the towns. The government lacked money to finance the war, and was compelled to borrow nearly 8,000 million rubles abroad, which made tsarism even more dependent on British and French imperialism, and created the threat of Russia losing her national sovereignty. The landlords and capitalists sought the support of foreign imperialists against their own people. It fell to the proletariat to save the country from ruin and from the danger of being converted into a semi-colony of foreign imperialists.

The Bolshevik Party realised that the country was on the threshold of a revolution. In 1915, in his article, “A Few Theses”, Lenin made a profound analysis of the coming revolution. He showed that it would be bourgeois-democratic in character—its immediate task being, as previously, the overthrow of tsarism and elimination of all the survivals of serfdom. Much had changed during the ten years since the first bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1905-07. Differentiation of classes in the countryside had become much more
pronounced; the proletariat had grown in numbers and strength; the imperialist war had aggravated all the contradictions of Russian life, and laid them bare. Favourable conditions had been created by the course of history for a more rapid development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution. That was the chief difference between the second and the first Russian revolutions.

The labour movement had grown considerably: in 1916 there were 1,500 strikes involving over one million workers, or double the 1915 figure.

Influenced by the working-class movement, action by the soldiers grew more frequent and widespread: cases of entire regiments refusing to obey combat orders were more frequent. Thousands of soldiers abandoned the front, preferring punishment for desertion to death in war for interests that were alien to them. Fraternisation became more frequent on many sectors of the front.

Peasants began to seize the landlords’ grain stocks and farm implements, and often to set fire to manors—the detested “nests of the nobility”.

There was unrest among the oppressed nations too. In mid-1916 a rising flared up in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, involving millions of people. It was obvious that a revolutionary crisis was maturing.

Alarmed by the approach of revolution, the ruling classes began to take measures to prevent it. It was planned to dissolve the Duma and vest power in a military dictator to be appointed to that end. In order to have a free hand in suppressing the revolution, the tsarist government began secret negotiations with Germany for a separate peace.

This alarmed the Entente and the Russian imperialists. The Entente was afraid of losing the help of the Russian army; the Russian bourgeoisie was afraid of losing its war profits and seeing its imperialist plans come to naught. Supported by the Anglo-French and American imperialists, it decided to avert revolution by replacing the tsar. The plan was to arrest Nicholas II, force him to abdicate in favour of his son, a minor, and appoint the Grand Duke Michael, the tsar’s brother, regent.

Both plots were directed against the revolution, and both proved ineffectual. The strike movement spread with every passing day—250,000 workers were out in January 1917, and over 400,000 in February. The situation was reaching its flash-point; a major strike could easily develop into revolution.

The situation was particularly tense in the capital. On February 17 a strike broke out in one of the shops of the Putilov Works, and the management decided to close the plant on the 22nd. On February 23 there were demonstrations to celebrate International Women’s Day. The St. Petersburg Committee of the Bolsheviks called for a political strike and nearly 90,000 workers in fifty factories responded.
The Putilov workers marched to the centre of the city and were joined on route by workers from other factories and by women from the food queues. The demonstrators carried placards bearing the slogans: "We want bread!", "Down with the war!", "Down with the autocracy!"

The next day the demonstration was resumed with even greater vigour. About 200,000 workers were out on strike. The Bolsheviks decided to continue the strike and turn it into a general strike and then into an insurrection. On February 25 the strike became general. There were clashes with the police and many were killed and wounded. The government called in reinforcements from the front. Nicholas II wired from General Headquarters: "I command that the disorders in the capital be stopped not later than tomorrow...." In the early hours of February 26 the Okhrana raided the working-class districts and made wholesale arrests. Five members of the St. Petersburg Bolshevik Party Committee were arrested.

On the following morning, February 26, in response to the Bolshevik appeal, the workers passed from political strike to armed revolt. The police opened fire on the demonstrators, killing about forty people in Znamenskaya Square alone. The workers disarmed the police and took possession of their weapons.

Influenced by the revolutionary events, the troops began to waver. The St. Petersburg Party Committee called on them to join the revolution. Its leaflet said: "Only a fraternal alliance of the working class and revolutionary army can free the enslaved people and put an end to this senseless fratricidal war." Many Petrograd workers in the reserve regiments stationed in the capital had kept in touch with the factories they had worked at. Workers came to the army barracks to persuade the soldiers to support the revolution. A company of the Pavlovsky Regiment refused to fire on the people.

On the following day, February 27, the whole city was in the grip of the uprising. The insurgent workers took possession of the arsenal and armed themselves. Soldiers began to go over to the revolution. Towards the evening over 60,000 men of the Petrograd garrison had joined the insurgent people. Thus an alliance of workers and peasants clad in soldiers' uniform came into being. The jails were seized and political prisoners released. The Bureau of the Party Central Committee issued a manifesto calling on the people to put an end to tsarism and to demand the formation of a Provisional Revolutionary Government which would establish a democratic republic, introduce an 8-hour working day, confiscate the landed estates in favour of the peasants and, together with the workers of the whole world, secure the immediate cessation of the imperialist war.

The Bolsheviks were the only party to offer the people a revolutionary programme, and to call on the masses to overthrow tsarism once and for all. The Romanov monarchy collapsed under the shattering blows of the people inspired by the Bolshevik Party.
On the day of the victorious insurrection the Bolsheviks called on the workers to set up a Soviet of Workers’ Deputies, declaring in their leaflet:

“Victory requires organisation, a centre to guide the movement. Begin immediately to elect strike committees at the factories. Their representatives will make up the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies, which will organise and direct the movement and establish a Provisional Revolutionary Government.”

On the evening of February 27 the first delegates elected at factories and military units appeared at the Taurida Palace. The militant unity of workers and soldiers, born in the streets of Petrograd, was now continued by the formation of a united revolutionary organisation, the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies. This was different from the 1905 Revolution, when there had been separate Soviets of workers and soldiers.

From Petrograd the revolution spread to every part of the country. Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies were set up in all the gubernias and in most uyezd towns. In many industrial areas—the Central Industrial Region, the Urals and the Donets coalfield—the Soviets introduced an 8-hour working day by direct action, disbanded the police and formed Red Guards to protect the factories and defend the revolution, discharged tsarist judges and elected people’s judges in their stead. In a number of places the Soviets dismissed factory managements notorious for their cruel treatment of the workers and instituted workers’ control, took measures to combat the food shortage and supported workers in conflicts with the employers. The army garrisons took their orders from the Soviets. The Soviets were the embodiment of the workers’ and peasants’ alliance; they were organs of insurrection and organs of power of the workers and peasants, victorious in the revolution.

But side by side with the Soviets, which embodied the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, there arose a Provisional Government representing an organ of bourgeois and landlord rule. At the very first news of the victorious revolution in the capital, the Duma elected a Provisional Committee with instructions to “restore order” in the city. The committee had no intention of assuming power. Its first step was to dispatch a delegation to Nicholas II, then at General Headquarters, to persuade him to abdicate in favour of his son. That demand was supported by all army commanders, who informed the tsar that they could not vouch for the troops. Nicholas II signed a manifesto abdicating, on his own behalf and on behalf of his son, in favour of his brother, the Grand Duke Michael.

This attempt on the part of the bourgeoisie to preserve the monarchy failed. The question of state power was being decided not in the Duma, but by the insurgent workers and soldiers. When Milyukov, a Cadet member of the Duma Provisional Committee, appealed at a public meeting for the retention of the monarchy, he
was shouted down by an angry crowd. The bourgeoisie decided to take power into its own hands so as to prevent the further development of the revolution.

The Duma's Provisional Committee decided to open negotiations with the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, where, especially in the Presiding Committee, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks had a majority. They feared the development of the revolution no less than the bourgeois parties, and sought to put an end to the revolutionary struggle of the people as quickly as possible. Their leaders did not discuss the matter at a meeting of the Soviet, but decided secretly, among their own adherents, to support the bourgeois government being formed by the Duma Provisional Committee. They refrained, however, from joining the government out of fear of losing the confidence of the masses.

In accordance with this agreement, a bourgeois Provisional Government under Prince Lvov was set up on March 2, with most of the ministers drawn from the Octobrist and Cadet parties. One of the ministers was Kerensky, a member of the Trudovik group. No one had delegated him to the government—he had been included by the bourgeoisie in an attempt to mislead the masses; the capitalist press described him as a "hostage of democracy". Provincial governors and local police chiefs deposed by the people were replaced, at the orders of the Provisional Government, by chairmen of the Zemstvo boards, elected under the old tsarist laws, and commissars drawn, as a rule, from the Cadet and Octobrist parties. The government was anxious to preserve as much as it could of the old machinery of state.

The result was a dual power: the Provisional Government and the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The latter's Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders voluntarily surrendered power to the bourgeoisie, pledging support for the bourgeois Provisional Government. The result was a peculiar interlocking of two dictatorships—the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, and the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.

The seizure of state power by the bourgeoisie was due to several factors.

The February Revolution came as an abrupt change from the lawlessness and terrorism of tsarism to broad political freedom. Tens of millions who had previously taken no part in politics and were not versed in them, now joined in political activity. The petty bourgeoisie, which wavered between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, made up the bulk of Russia's population and this exerted a decisive influence on broad sections of the workers. Lenin wrote in this connection:

"A gigantic petty-bourgeois wave has swept over everything and overwhelmed the class-conscious proletariat, not only by force of numbers but also ideologically, that is, it has infected
and imbued very wide circles of workers with the petty-bourgeois political outlook” (Collected Works, Vol. 24, p. 41).

This petty-bourgeois wave determined the composition of most of the Soviets, giving the petty-bourgeois parties a predominant influence. With the emergence of millions of petty bourgeois on the political scene, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks were able to gain a temporary majority in the Soviets. That explains why the victorious workers and peasants, represented by the Soviets, voluntarily surrendered power to representatives of the bourgeoisie.

While the Bolsheviks were fighting tsarism at the head of the masses, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks hastened to take advantage of the people’s victory and make their way to the leadership of the Soviets on the crest of the revolutionary wave.

Another reason for the seizure of power by the bourgeoisie was the inadequate organisation and political understanding of the proletariat and peasantry. Tsarist repression had played havoc with the workers’ organisations. Most of the Bolshevik leaders were in prison, in exile or abroad. Lenin had been compelled to live abroad and had great difficulty in communicating with Russia. Bourgeois political organisations, on the other hand, had not been persecuted at all. The bourgeoisie had grown stronger economically and politically during the war, and was now better organised than the masses, while the proletariat, as a result of the tsarist repression, was less organised. The most politically advanced workers were serving in the army. Many had been killed at the front. Their place in the factories was taken by raw peasants, and some time had to pass before their outlook could change.

The assistance provided by foreign capitalists also played its part in the victory of the bourgeoisie.

**BRIEF SUMMARY**

The imperialist world war of 1914-18 was brought about by the contradictions of imperialism. It was the result of the uneven development of capitalism, the struggle between the monopolists for redivision of the world and their attempts to suppress the revolutionary movement.

The war was a test for all the parties of the Second International. During its course, social-opportunism developed into social-chauvinism. Most of the parties of the Second International betrayed socialism, came out in defence of imperialism and thereby assumed responsibility before mankind for all the terrible consequences of the murderous war. The Second International collapsed. Only the Bolshevik Party set an example of devotion to socialism and of revolutionary mass activity—a pattern of struggle to prepare the masses, including the army, for revolution. Only the Bolshevik
Party put forward the right slogans for struggle against the imperialist war, and called for the overthrow of the government by the working class in each of the belligerent countries. The Party developed Marxism further, enriching it with Lenin’s theory of imperialism and the theory of socialism being able to triumph in one separate country.

The war brought incalculable calamities to the peoples: ten million were killed and twenty million wounded. It aggravated all the contradictions of imperialism, and was a clear manifestation of the general crisis of capitalism. It demonstrated graphically where the rule of imperialism was leading the world. It accelerated the development of capitalism and the growth of monopoly capitalism into state-monopoly capitalism. It thus intensified the objective prerequisites of revolution. Lenin said war was a powerful “stage manager” of revolution.

Taking proper account of the approaching revolutionary battles, Lenin developed, on the basis of the experience of revolutionary struggles, the Marxist theory of the revolution as applicable to the conditions of the imperialist epoch. He analysed the future revolution in Russia and described it as a bourgeois-democratic revolution which in the new epoch would soon grow into a socialist revolution.

The February bourgeois-democratic revolution confirmed the correctness of the Party’s slogans as formulated by Lenin. It marked the beginning of the conversion of the imperialist war into a civil war. It showed how correct the Party’s policy of encouraging people to work for the defeat of their own governments had been. The defeat of tsarism facilitated revolutionary action by the masses and their overthrow of the autocracy. The revolution confirmed the correctness and timeliness of the break with the Mensheviks, and of their expulsion from the Party.

In the course of the February Revolution the masses themselves created the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, organs of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. But the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who held sway in most of the Soviets, betrayed the interests of the workers and peasants and surrendered state power to the Provisional Government, the organ of bourgeois dictatorship. The result was a dual power. The Party was now faced with the task of securing the transfer of all power to the Soviets.

The February bourgeois-democratic revolution achieved the Party’s immediate goal—the overthrow of tsarism—and opened the way to the abolition of capitalism and the establishment of socialism.
1. International and Domestic Situation of the Country After the Overthrow of Tsarism. The Party Ceases to Be Illegal

The February Revolution of 1917 altered Russia’s position in the international arena. The working people of the world enthusiastically hailed the working class of Russia, who was the first to raise the banner of revolt during the imperialist war. Under the influence of the Russian revolution, the working-class and anti-war movements spread in other countries, especially in the belligerent states.

The ruling classes of the two imperialist blocs—the Entente on one hand and Germany and her allies on the other—viewed the revolution with deep alarm. The imperialists feared that the example of the Russian revolution might influence the working people of the world. They were not mistaken.

The position of the belligerent powers was not the same. Although Germany had won some major victories at the front she had overstrained herself: her industry could hardly cope with supplies for the front, and her people were starving. Continuation of the war on two fronts—both against Britain and France and against Russia—was fraught with the threat of utter defeat for Germany. The governments of Germany and her allies therefore decided to take advantage of the revolution in Russia to force a separate peace on her and then to throw the whole weight of their forces against the Entente. Another reason why Germany sought a separate peace was the fear that the further development of the revolution would lead to the overthrow of the bourgeois government in Russia, and would thus strengthen the revolutionary movement all over the world, including Germany.

Great Britain and France were in a somewhat better position than Germany and her allies. In April 1917 the United States, pursuing its own imperialist ends, joined forces with the Entente, and brought
its vast industrial might into play. The Entente, however, feared that the development of the revolution would influence the working-class movement in its rear, lead to the withdrawal of Russia from the war and, consequently, make victory over Germany difficult. The Entente imperialists therefore decided to back the Provisional Government and get Russia to continue the war. At the same time the imperialists of the United States, Great Britain and France hoped to take advantage of Russia’s position, weakened by the war, to tighten their economic stranglehold on the country and intensify the exploitation of her peoples.

Thus, the bourgeoisie of all the belligerent countries strove to help the Provisional Government to crush the revolution in Russia, and in this way to avert revolution in their own rear.

In carrying out the revolution, the working people of Russia hoped to secure peace, land, bread and liberty. The bourgeois government, however, had not the slightest intention of terminating the war. It planned, on the contrary, to take advantage of the revolution to further its own predatory designs. The Provisional Government confirmed the old tsarist treaties, which tied Russia to the Entente. The bourgeoisie hoped that the continuation of the war would help to destroy the dual power in the country, and that all power would then pass into its hands. Hence its slogan: “War to a victorious finish!”

The Provisional Government had no intention of settling the agrarian question, either. To give the land to the peasants would have meant striking a blow not only at landlord property but also at capitalist property, for the greater part of the landed estates was mortgaged to banks. To confiscate this land would have meant losing many thousands of millions of banking capital. Not daring openly to refuse to give the peasants land, the Provisional Government tried to hoodwink them by shelving the question, pending the convocation of a Constituent Assembly. Meanwhile, it suppressed every attempt of the peasants to take away the land from the landlords.

The bourgeoisie had no intention of improving the conditions of the working people. Having secured power it did everything possible to increase its profits. The bourgeois government annulled all the old laws that hampered the development of the banks, the establishment of joint-stock companies and the growth of monopolies. Throwing aside all restraint, the bourgeoisie began to pile up profits which far surpassed the scandalous profits it had made in the past, under tsarist rule.

The Provisional Government had no intention of putting an end to national oppression. Imperialist in character, it continued to pursue the tsarist colonialist policy. The machinery of oppression remained intact in the national-minority areas.

Since the revolution was in progress, however, the Provisional Government could not venture any open opposition to the Soviets,
which had the support of the masses. It therefore waged its struggle against the revolutionary movement of the masses covertly, trying to gain time to marshal its forces for an open assault.

In its fight for undivided power, the bourgeoisie reckoned on the support of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who held that the revolution was completed, that its aims had been achieved with the overthrow of tsarism and transfer of power to the bourgeoisie, and that there could be no question of a further development of the revolution, of going on to a socialist revolution. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks assured the people that with the victory of the revolution the nature of the war had changed, that it had ceased to be an imperialist war, and called for the defence of the bourgeois fatherland. To deceive the people, they called themselves "revolutionary defencists". The greater part of the masses, only recently drawn into politics, did not see through the fraud immediately and believed the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

Lenin differentiated strictly between the "defencist" feelings that gripped millions of peasants and workers and the defencism of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The workers and labouring peasantry had no interest in the war. The "defencist" sentiments of the masses were due, as Lenin noted, to the people being honestly mistaken. Not so in the case of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. Their defencism was an expression of the interest of a certain section of the petty bourgeoisie, whom they represented, in receiving some share of the superprofits secured by the capitalists from the war and from plundering the oppressed peoples.

In an attempt to disguise their treacherous desertion to the bourgeoisie, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks promised to establish control over the Provisional Government. They advanced the "in so far as" formula, which meant that in so far as the government would deal with the problems of the revolution, it should be supported; but should the government want to go back to the old order of things, it should be criticised, though under no circumstances overthrown. This was nothing but hoodwinking the people, for there can be no control without power. In reality, such control implied agreement with the bourgeois government, confidence in and support of it. It meant liquidating the Soviets and handing all power to the bourgeoisie.

Like the bourgeois Provisional Government, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks tried to persuade the people to wait for a Constituent Assembly to settle the questions of peace, land and bread, although they themselves were in no hurry to convene it. They came into the open as parties of compromise with the bourgeoisie. They sought to preserve and consolidate the capitalist system.

After the February Revolution the Bolshevik Party had emerged from its "underground" status, and for the first time was in a position to develop its activities openly and freely. On March 5 the first
issue of *Pravda*, the newspaper of the Central and St. Petersburg committees of the Bolshevik Party, appeared.

Armed with Lenin's theory of socialist revolution, the Party fought to consolidate the victory won in the February days and to extend the revolution. It opposed confidence in the bourgeois Provisional Government. On March 4 the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee adopted a resolution against any agreement whatsoever with the government, comprised as it was of representatives of the big bourgeoisie and the nobility. The Party exposed the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik slogan of control over the government. "Control over the Provisional Government?" wrote *Pravda* on March 9, 1917. "What will it give them?" (that is, the workers). "It is quite obvious that the bourgeoisie, even when controlled by the workers, cannot undertake the fulfilment of proletarian programmes, and the workers have no right to count on making a cat's paw of other people, as the bourgeoisie does, but must take action themselves."

The Bolshevik Party waged a struggle for peace and against the war, which under the new government still continued to be an imperialist war. The Bolsheviks called on the workers to continue the revolution and form a workers' guard. "The proletariat must remember," wrote *Pravda*, "that only arms in hand can it consolidate its gains and carry the revolution through to completion."

The Party committees were reorganised on the principle of democratic centralism. All Party bodies, from top to bottom, were made elective. Bolshevik newspapers began to appear in Moscow and other industrial regions. Bolsheviks who had been arrested by the tsarist authorities were released from prison. Members of the Central Committee and leading Party workers began to return from exile, prison and abroad. Among them were A. S. Bubnov, F. E. Dzerzhinsky, P. A. Japaridze, S. V. Kosior, V. V. Kuibyshev, G. K. Orjonikidze, O. A. Pyatnitsky, J. E. Rudzutak, S. G. Shahumyan, N. A. Skrypnik, J. V. Stalin, Y. M. Sverdlov, Y. M. Yaroslavsky and many others, as well as Duma deputies G. I. Petrovsky, M. K. Muranov, A. Y. Badayev, F. N. Samoilov and N. R. Shagov.

The overthrow of tsarism marked the end of one period in the country's history and the beginning of another. The new situation demanded a new orientation of the Party, a new strategic plan, different tactics and different slogans. Lenin supplied the solution for these problems. In the very first days of the revolution, while still abroad, Lenin wrote a series of articles which he called "Letters from Afar", and in which he indicated the line the Party should follow after the February Revolution. He wrote that the revolution was not yet over, that only its first stage had been completed, and that the workers must display heroism to achieve victory in the second stage of the revolution. He put forward the task of forming a workers' militia or workers' home guard, so as to prevent the bourgeois government from restoring the police and saving the monarchy. He
insisted on the following tactics, outlined in a special telegram to the Bolsheviks in Russia:

"Absolute distrust of the new government, no support for it. Particularly suspicious of Kerensky. Arming of the proletariat the only guarantee; immediate elections to the Petrograd Duma; no rapprochement with other parties" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 287).

Lenin particularly sharply castigated any attempt whatever to unite with the Mensheviks. Sentiments in favour of unification, which had spread, it is true, to only a small section of the Party organisations, constituted a grave danger to the development of the revolutionary struggle.

The Bolsheviks developed work on a vast scale among the masses. The Party focussed its attention on organising and rallying the vanguard force of society—the proletariat. The Bolsheviks called for the formation of Soviets throughout Russia, and played an active part in organising Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, committees in the armed forces, and peasant organisations in the countryside. At many enterprises in Petrograd, Moscow, the Urals, the Donets coalfield and other industrial regions, the Bolsheviks formed Red Guard workers' detachments, the fighting forces of the revolution.

The Party urged the formation of trade unions as being the mass organisations which united the greatest possible number of workers. The Bolsheviks strove to ensure that the trade unions worked in close unity with the Party, the ideological and political leader of the proletariat.

The factory committees, formed on the initiative of the Bolsheviks, embraced all the workers in the factory concerned, irrespective of the union they belonged to (at that period there were several trade unions in each factory; the metal-workers, for example, had their own union at their works, the carpenters were members of the Wood-Workers' Union, and so on). In Petrograd, Moscow and many other cities and industrial districts, the factory committees were under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party from the very beginning of the revolution.

A Military Organisation of the Central Committee and Petrograd Committee, headed by N. I. Podvoisky, was set up in the very first days of the revolution to guide political work in the armed forces.

Considerable work was carried on also among women. Publication of the Bolshevik magazine *Rabotnitsa* was resumed. Work was started on the establishment of a youth organisation.

Thus the Party was true to its principle of carrying on its activities wherever the masses of the people were to be found.

After the February Revolution the Party was confronted by a situation rarely met with in history, that of a dual power. The
The class significance and role of the Soviets were not understood all at once, or by all the people. Millions of the people had to be organised, the policy of the Provisional Government and the treacherous role of the compromisers had to be exposed. The magnitude of the tasks ahead was not at once clearly understood by the whole of the Party.

In the new situation some of the Bolshevik committees and several leading Party members adopted an incorrect attitude towards the Provisional Government. They called for the establishment of “control by the masses” over the activity of the Provisional Government, implying by such control the organisation of campaigns, demonstrations, public statements against the attempts of the Provisional Government to drag out the settlement of the issues involved in the revolution; they did not raise the question of all power passing to the Soviets. This meant that power continued to remain in the hands of the bourgeois Provisional Government, and created the false impression among the masses that this government could act in the interests of the revolution. Subsequently the erroneous line of “control” was also supported by the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee.

Kamenev, who had returned from exile, took a semi-Menshevik stand on the Provisional Government and the war. He contributed to Pravda an article calling for support of the bourgeois Provisional Government. Saying not a word about the fact that the war remained imperialist even under the Provisional Government, he urged the soldiers “to counter bullet with bullet and shell with shell”, that is, to continue the war.

Kamenev’s action at once brought sharp criticism from members of the C. C. Bureau and the St. Petersburg Party Committee. In the next issue of Pravda, Kamenev withdrew his thesis on support and declared for exerting pressure on the Provisional Government to make it propose a peace treaty.

Stalin adopted a similar attitude regarding pressure on the Provisional Government. He did not understand the significance and role of the Soviets as a new form of state power. He backed the policy of “pressure” on the Provisional Government and the demand for immediate peace negotiations. It was an attitude which led the masses to imagine that the bourgeois government could bring them peace.

“This was a profoundly mistaken position,” said Stalin subsequently, “for it gave rise to pacifist illusions, brought grist to the mill of defencism and hindered the revolutionary education of the masses. At that time I shared this mistaken position with other Party comrades and fully abandoned it only in the middle of April, when I associated myself with Lenin’s theses” (Works, Eng. ed., Moscow, Vol. 6, p. 348).

Stalin also declared for unity with the Mensheviks, which contradicted Party policy and Lenin’s recommendations. In mid-April
1917 he abandoned his erroneous position and adhered to Lenin's platform.

On April 3 Lenin arrived in Petrograd. He was given a rousing welcome by the masses. Numerous workers' delegations, appointed by all the districts of the capital, and headed by Red Guard detachments, came to meet him. Soldiers' delegations had been sent from the regiments of the garrison and men of an armoured car unit brought their vehicles with them. Sailors had come from Kronstadt. The square in front of the Finland Railway Station was crowded that evening with the workers, soldiers and sailors who had come to welcome their leader, returning after nine long years of exile abroad. Mounting an armoured car, Lenin delivered a speech in which he greeted those who had taken part in the revolution, and called upon them to fight for the victory of the socialist revolution.

2. Lenin's April Theses. Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference. The Party's Policy of Developing the Bourgeois-Democratic Revolution into a Socialist Revolution

Lenin's arrival was of tremendous importance for the fate of the revolution. On April 4, 1917, Lenin delivered a report "On the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution" at a meeting of members of the Central Committee and the St. Petersburg Party Committee and of the Bolshevik delegates to the All-Russian Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. On April 7 the theses of the report were published in Pravda. These were the brilliant April Theses, in which was defined the Party's policy of the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution.

In his theses Lenin elaborated the Party's political and economic platform at the new stage of the revolution. The basic question in any revolution is the question of power. Against what class is the revolution directed, and which class is taking over power—these are the cardinal features by which the character of the revolution is determined. After the February Revolution, dual power was established in Russia. But history teaches that two dictatorships of two classes, whose position in society makes them hostile and antagonistic to each other, cannot exist simultaneously for long. Dual power must inevitably end either in the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie or in the dictatorship of the proletariat. The class struggle will decide which. Lenin insisted that no confidence should be placed in the Provisional Government and no support be given to it. He called upon the Party to head the struggle of the masses and direct it towards the socialist revolution.

"The specific feature of the present situation in Russia," wrote Lenin in his theses, "is that it represents a transition from the first stage of the revolution—which, owing to insufficient class
consciousness and degree of organisation of the proletariat, placed power in the hands of the bourgeoisie—to the second stage, which must place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest strata of the peasantry” (Collected Works, Vol. 24, p. 4).

The new stage of the revolution brought with it a new relation of classes. The motive forces of the socialist revolution, that is, the classes interested in completing the revolution, were the proletariat and the poorest peasantry. As a toiler, the middle peasant inclined to the peasant poor, while as a property owner he supported the kulak. Owing to the duality of his position, he wavered. The Party advanced a new slogan for the peasantry, one that corresponded to the tasks of the new strategic stage. Already in his work, Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution, Lenin had shown the need for such a slogan in the new stage. He showed that in a socialist revolution the proletariat advances together with the peasant poor against the bourgeoisie in town and country, winning the neutrality of the middle peasant.

And it was understood that winning the neutrality of the middle peasant in a socialist revolution was not at all the same as neutralisation of the bourgeoisie in a bourgeois-democratic revolution. Neutralisation of the bourgeoisie in the first Russian revolution meant exposing its collusion with tsarism, isolating it, so as to prevent it from using the bogus title of the “people’s freedom party” to deceive the peasantry. Winning the neutrality of the middle peasant by no means implied isolating him from the revolution. On the contrary, the Party did everything to win over the middle peasant, to draw him away from the compromisers, to detach him from the kulak and make him an ally of the proletariat—but it always bore in mind his dual nature and the possibility of his wavering.

Charting the Party’s course for the development of the bourgeois-democratic into a socialist revolution, and describing the motive forces of the new revolution, Lenin in his April Theses also defined the political form which the organisation of power should take. Marx, proceeding from the experience of the Paris Commune, had spoken of a new form of state power “of the type of the Paris Commune”. But the leaders of the Second International, Kautsky, Plekhanov and others had distorted Marx’s idea of the state, and advocated the parliamentary republic as the best form of state for the transition to socialism. Lenin, on the basis of the experience of the Paris Commune and the 1905 Revolution, exposed the opportunists, and showed that practical experience had brought into being a new, “higher type of democratic state” as compared with the parliamentary democratic republic; that the Paris Commune and the Soviets were the embryo of this new state. On the basis of a study of the experience of the 1905 and 1917 revolutions, Lenin discovered the Soviet
republic as the political form the dictatorship of the proletariat should take.

"Not a parliamentary republic," said Lenin, "for to return to a parliamentary republic from the Soviets of Workers' Deputies would be a retrograde step, but a republic of Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Labourers' and Peasants' Deputies throughout the country, from top to bottom" (Collected Works, Vol. 24, p. 5). This was how Lenin, in the new conditions prevailing, elaborated the Marxist teachings concerning the forms of political organisation of society in the period of transition from capitalism to communism. It was a great scientific discovery, one that played a tremendous part in the victory of the socialist revolution in Russia. "All power to the Soviets!" was the slogan advanced by the Party.

This slogan did not simply imply removing the bourgeois ministers from the government and replacing them by representatives of the parties that were in the majority in the Soviets—the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. Such an interpretation of the slogan would have meant that the entire old state machinery would remain intact, only a change in ministers being effected. But the retention of the old machinery of state, whoever the minister at its head—even one appointed by the Soviet—meant in practice the retention of power by the bourgeoisie. Lenin's slogan "All power to the Soviets!" did not mean a mere reshuffling of personalities, the replacement of Cadets in the Provisional Government by Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. It meant abolishing the dual power and establishing the undivided and full power of the Soviets, organising a new type of state, abolishing the old state machinery that stood over the people, and establishing a new machinery based, from top to bottom, on the Soviets—one wholly in conformity with the interests of the people.

In the circumstances then prevailing the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" did not mean a call for the immediate overthrow of the Provisional Government, for an armed insurrection. At that time, the overthrow of the Provisional Government by force would have meant coming out against the Soviets too, because they had entered into an agreement with the bourgeois government and supported it. Like Marx, Lenin regarded armed uprising as the general rule of revolution, for no class that has outlived its day surrenders its power to another class voluntarily, without armed struggle. But in the concrete historical situation obtaining in Russia after the February Revolution, the possibility arose—"by way of exception", to quote Lenin—of a peaceful transition of all power to the Soviets. The bourgeoisie did not dare as yet, nor was in a position, to use violence against the masses. Force was on the side of the people. The Bolshevik Party could work unhampered among the masses. As distinct from all previous revolutions, the people were in possession of a ready-made apparatus of power—the Soviets. Had the Soviets,
representing the workers and peasants, that is, the overwhelming majority of the people, declared that they were taking over all power, nobody would have dared to oppose them.

At that stage the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" meant the transition of all power to the Soviets, the undivided rule of the Soviets of that period, in which the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks were in the majority. What is more, the peaceful development of the revolution signified not only a peaceful transition of power to the Soviets in question. With the Soviets holding undivided and full power, the struggle of classes and parties within the Soviets, and a change of the parties in power, could proceed peacefully. The transition from the bourgeois-democratic to the socialist revolution could proceed by peaceful means.

The Bolshevik Party realised that, with the transfer of power to the Soviets controlled by the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties, these parties essentially would not change. They would continue to vacillate and compromise—but now this would take place in Soviets which had broken with the bourgeoisie, and under the eyes of the broad masses of the working people, who had the right to recall from the Soviets deputies that had not justified their confidence. The waverings of the petty-bourgeois parties of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks which were in power but were incapable of giving peace, land, bread and liberty to the peoples would discredit them. The Bolsheviks in the Soviets, while not entering the government and remaining an opposition party, would criticise and unmask the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and demand that the Menshevik-S.R. government should settle all the basic questions of the revolution. But the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were incapable of settling these questions. The masses by their own experience, and as a result of the explanatory work of the Bolsheviks, would outlive their illusions about the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, convince themselves of the treacherous part played by these parties and hand over the direction of the state to the Bolshevik Party, which alone was capable of securing peace, land, bread and liberty for the working people. The change of government would take place by a peaceful struggle within the Soviets, once the latter had become the sole and sovereign organs of state power. In this way the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry would develop into the socialist dictatorship of the proletariat.

Lenin considered the possibility of the peaceful development of the revolution as something "extremely rare in history and extremely valuable". But the situation making this possible might change, and the Party would find itself confronted with the necessity of having to take power by armed action, as subsequently was the case. While insisting that the fullest use be made of every possibility of peaceful development, Lenin did not, however, forget for a minute that the
revolution might develop differently, in which case the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie would have to be overthrown by armed insurrection.

Lenin urged the formation of a Red Guard, unity of the working class, organisation of the proletarian and semi-proletarian elements in the countryside, and winning over the soldiers to the Bolsheviks. The Party worked tirelessly, even when the development of the revolution was proceeding peacefully, to prepare its forces for an armed struggle for the victory of the socialist revolution.

Recognition of the fact that a peaceful development of the revolution was possible, that is, that power could be transferred to the Soviets and the further struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat carried on within the Soviets, meant that the Party was for the time being withdrawing the slogan it had advanced during the war of turning the imperialist war into a civil war, a slogan which had materialised to some extent as a result of the February Revolution. The retention of this slogan would have been contrary to the Party policy of encouraging a peaceful development of the revolution. The main problem was to win a majority in the Soviets over to the Party. At that period of the revolution, wrote Lenin, “this civil war, so far as we are concerned, turns into peaceful, prolonged and patient class propaganda” (Collected Works, Vol. 24, p. 206).

In his April Theses Lenin showed what the attitude of the Bolsheviks to the war should be after the overthrow of tsarism. The war continued to be an imperialist one on Russia’s part even under the new government, because it was bourgeois in character and predatory in its aims. The Bolsheviks must therefore fight against the continuation of this predatory war and strive for a really democratic peace, without annexations or indemnities. After the February Revolution, however, the Bolsheviks ceased to be defeatists, for the autocracy had been overthrown in Russia and Soviets set up representing the workers and peasants, who were not interested in the war. Once having taken power, the Soviets could put an end to the war. The Party, however, did not adopt a defencist position either, for that would have meant support for the imperialist war and defence of bourgeois-landlord rule. The Party’s slogan on the question of the war called for the transfer of all power to the Soviets. Only they, as the representatives of the masses of the people, could ensure the conclusion of peace in the interests of the people, and not of the capitalists. It was necessary patiently to explain to the “honest defencists” the indissoluble connection between capital and the imperialist war, to explain that it was impossible to end the war by a democratic peace without the overthrow of the rule of capital. It was necessary to conduct the most extensive work in the army, showing the nature of the war, and encourage in every way fraternisation among the soldiers at the front, for it was revolutionising the minds of the soldier masses of the belligerent countries.
The economic platform in Lenin’s theses envisaged in the industrial field: introduction of controls by the Soviets over the social production and distribution of products, and immediate amalgamation of all the banks in the country into one national bank, under the control of the Soviets. On the agrarian question, the theses proposed the confiscation of all the landed estates, and on this basis the nationalisation of all land in the country, the disposal of the land to be vested in the Soviets of Peasants’ and Agricultural Labourers’ Deputies.

In the field of Party life, Lenin’s theses proposed the immediate convening of a Party congress and the revision of the Party Programme in the light of the new experience provided by the revolutionary movement since 1903, when the first Programme was adopted, and the new tasks confronting the Party after the February Revolution of 1917. Lenin further proposed that the Party’s name be changed from Social-Democratic to Communist Party, since the Social-Democratic leaders in nearly all countries had betrayed socialism and gone over to the bourgeoisie. The name Communist correctly described the Party’s ultimate aim, that of establishing communism. Lenin called for the creation of a new International, the Third Communist International, which would be free of opportunism and social-chauvinism.

Lenin’s theses covered all aspects of the struggle for the transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution. They pointed out the motive forces of the proletarian revolution, indicated the stages of transition, set forth the economic and, in particular, the agrarian platform of the Party. They specified that the political form of the dictatorship of the proletariat should be a Soviet republic. The theses supplied the Party with a concrete, theoretically well-grounded plan for advance to the socialist revolution.

Lenin’s theses were received with violent hostility by all the bourgeois and compromising parties. The bourgeoisie tried to persuade the people that Lenin was ignoring the history and the interests of the country. In its hatred of Lenin and his idea of a socialist revolution, the bourgeoisie, supported by the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders, went so far as to spread the monstrous slander that Lenin was connected with the German General Staff. The Mensheviks shouted that Lenin was rendering “a service to reaction”, that the revolution was being “threatened by undoubted danger”, and that it was “essential to give the most determined rebuff to Lenin and his followers”. Plekhanov went to the point of calling the April Theses “preposterous”. As for Trotsky, he upheld his old slogan “no tsar, but a workers’ government”, even after the February Revolution. This slogan would have led to the defeat of the revolution, for it would have broken the alliance of the workers and peasants. In his Letters on Tactics, Lenin stressed in particular
that his theses were levelled against Trotsky, who in his scheme for "permanent revolution" skipped the process of the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution. Within the Party, the April Theses were opposed by Kamenev, Rykov, Pyatakov and a handful of their followers, who claimed that Russia was not ripe for a socialist revolution.

In the course of two to three weeks the whole Party rallied round Lenin's theses. Its entire history, all its resolute struggle against opportunism, made this possible. The Bolsheviks were armed with Lenin's theory of the growth of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution; they based themselves on Lenin's doctrine of the victory of socialism in one country at first.

The ideological unity of the Party was vividly demonstrated by the Petrograd City Conference of the Bolshevik Party, which opened on April 14, ten days after Lenin had proposed his theses. The overwhelming majority of the delegates, after hearing Lenin's report, voted for the resolution which he had drawn up in the spirit of the theses.

The rallying of the Party round Lenin's theses on a country-wide scale was completed by the Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference of the Bolshevik Party, which met in Petrograd from April 24 to 29, 1917. The Conference was attended by 133 delegates with the right to vote and by 48 delegates with voice but no vote, representing 80,000 members of the Party. The Conference discussed the following questions: the current situation (the war and the Provisional Government, etc.); the attitude to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies; revision of the Party Programme; the situation in the International, and the tasks of the Party; the agrarian question; the national question, etc. Lenin reported on the main questions: the current situation, the agrarian question, and revision of the Party Programme. All his reports were based on the April Theses. The unanimity displayed by the All-Russian Conference in adopting the resolutions proposed by Lenin attested the solid political unity of the Party.

Lenin was opposed at the Conference by Kamenev, who asserted that the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia was not ended and that the country was not yet ripe for a socialist revolution. Kamenev declared his opposition to a break with the Provisional Government, and supported the Menshevik proposal for "controlling" the government, which meant leaving power in the hands of the bourgeoisie. Kamenev, by denying the possibility of socialism being victorious in Russia alone, dismissed the issue of socialist revolution. He was supported by Rykov, who declared that the objective conditions for a socialist revolution did not exist in Russia, and that the impetus for a socialist revolution must come from the West. Lenin exposed the capitulatory position of Kamenev, Rykov and their small following, and vigorously denounced their denial of the possibility of the victory of socialism in Russia.
“Rykov says that socialism must come from other countries with a more developed industry. But that is wrong. Nobody can say who will begin it and who will end it. That is not Marxism; it is a parody of Marxism” (Collected Works, Vol. 24, p. 215)

The Conference unanimously adopted a resolution on Lenin’s report regarding the current situation. After noting that the development of capitalism throughout the world had posed the question of the transfer of state power to the proletariat for the building of socialism, the Conference stressed the leading role of the Russian proletariat in explaining to the people “the urgency of taking a number of practical steps towards socialism, for which the time is now ripe”. Such steps were the nationalisation of the land, the establishment of state control over all the banks and their amalgamation into a single central bank, the establishment of controls over the insurance agencies and big capitalist syndicates. Parallel with the implementation of the above measures, the Soviets should be able to introduce universal labour service.

“All the above-mentioned and similar measures,” said the resolution, “can and should not only be discussed and prepared for application on a national scale, in the event of all power passing to the proletarians and semi-proletarians; they should also be put into effect by the local revolutionary organs of power of the whole people when the opportunity arises” (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part I, p. 351).

The Conference resolution confirmed Lenin’s teachings on the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country, Russia. It was directed both against the semi-Menshevik position of Kamenev and his followers, who repudiated socialist revolution, and Trotsky’s adventurist policy, which would have doomed the revolution to defeat.

The April Conference also adopted the resolution, drafted by Lenin, on the attitude to the war. The resolution noted that the transfer of power in Russia to a government of landlords and capitalists had not changed the imperialist character of the war. The proletarian party should therefore not support the war, the government, or its war loans. The Conference voiced its protest against the calumny spread by the capitalists to the effect that the Bolsheviks favoured a separate peace with Germany. “We regard the German capitalists,” stated the resolution, “as being the same kind of brigands as the Russian, British, French and other capitalists; for us, the Emperor Wilhelm is the same kind of crowned brigand as Nicholas II or the British, Italian, Rumanian and all other monarchs” (ibid., p. 337). The war could only be ended in one way — by the transfer of the entire state power to the Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies.

In his report on the agrarian question, Lenin specifically dwelt on the class significance of the demand for the confiscation of the land-
ed estates and the nationalisation of all the land. The confiscation of the landlords’ land without compensation would, before all else, meet the age-old aspirations of the peasantry. At the same time it would undermine the foundations of the rule of the landlords and bourgeoisie. Property in land was the mainstay of the feudal landlords and might lead to the restoration of the monarchy. The confiscation of the landed estates was a guarantee against the monarchy being restored. Since, moreover, these estates were mortgaged to the banks, their confiscation would also deal a heavy blow at bourgeois property. The nationalisation of all the land would free the use of land of all feudal survivals.

Moreover, as was noted in the resolution proposed by Lenin, “the nationalisation of the land, representing as it does the abolition of private ownership of land, would in practice deal such a mighty blow to the private ownership of all means of production in general that the party of the proletariat should assist such a reform in every possible way” (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part I, p. 340). The Party vigorously attacked the plan of the Provisional Government and the compromisers to postpone settlement of the agrarian question pending the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, and advised the peasants to take over the land immediately, in an organised way.

The victory of the socialist revolution depended largely upon whether the proletariat could secure the support of the working people of the oppressed nations. At the Conference, Stalin made a report on the national question.

The Conference adopted the resolution drawn up by Lenin. The resolution pointed out that the policy of national oppression followed by tsarism enjoyed the support of the landlords and capitalists and the petty bourgeoisie. National oppression enabled them to retain their class privileges and sow discord among the workers of different nationalities. The resolution said that modern imperialism was intensifying national oppression.

The basic point of the resolution was recognition of the right of all the nations forming part of Russia to secede freely and to form independent states. Only recognition of this right would ensure solidarity among the workers of the various nations concerned. “Denial of this right,” the resolution said, “and failure to take steps guaranteeing its implementation are tantamount to supporting the policy of conquest and annexation” (ibid., p. 345). At the same time the resolution spoke of the inadmissibility of confusing the right to self-determination with the question of the advisability of a given nation seceding. This question must be decided by the Party in each particular case from the standpoint of social development as a whole, as well as from that of the interests of the struggle of the proletariat for socialism.

For all nations who wished to remain within the boundaries of a single state, the Party demanded the broadest autonomy and the
enactment of special laws guaranteeing the free development of the national minorities, declaring invalid any privileges whatever enjoyed by any nation and prohibiting any infringements whatever of the rights of national minorities.

The Conference condemned the Menshevik and Bundist slogan of "national cultural autonomy" as one which artificially divided the workers living in one locality, and even working in the same industrial enterprise, and which strengthened the ties between the workers and the bourgeois culture of individual nations. The resolution noted that the interests of the working class demanded the unification of the workers of all nationalities in common proletarian organisations: political, trade union, co-operative-educational, and so forth.

"Only such common organisations of the workers of the various nationalities," stated the resolution, "will make it possible for the proletariat to wage a victorious struggle against international capital and bourgeois nationalism" (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part I, p. 346).

The nationalities policy of the Party was opposed by Pyatakov who repeated the same arguments he had advanced against Lenin during the war years. He asserted that the slogan of self-determination of nations up to and including secession was reactionary, for the national state was a thing of the past and was impossible under imperialism; that a struggle should be waged against national movements. Lenin scathingly criticised this standpoint, which actually meant refusal on the part of the proletariat to utilise the revolution's reserve forces represented by the various nationalities, and doomed the revolution to defeat. The overwhelming majority of the Conference voted down the resolution proposed by Pyatakov.

The new propositions on the national and colonial questions formulated by Lenin before and during the war were reflected in the Conference resolution.

The Conference devoted much attention to the Soviets. It heard reports and communications by comrades working in the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in various parts of Russia. The resolution drafted by Lenin and passed by the Conference stated:

"In many provincial localities, the revolution is advancing through the proletariat and peasantry organising in the Soviets on their own, removing the old authorities on their own, establishing a proletarian and peasant militia, transferring all the land to the peasants, establishing control over the factories, introducing an 8-hour working day..." (ibid., p. 353).

In a number of industrial districts in the Urals, in Orekhovo-Zuyevo and the Donets coalfield, a "single authority" had come into being, as Lenin put it. Such authority was exercised, for example, by the Rutchenkovo Soviet in the Donets coalfield, of which N. S. Khrushchov was elected Chairman in May 1917. "All affairs
passed virtually into the hands or under the direct control of the Soviet,” wrote N. S. Khrushchov in the newspaper *Diktatura Truda (The Dictatorship of Labour)* on March 12, 1922. “All workers obeyed only the Soviet. What the Soviet said was law.”

On the basis of a report by Lenin, the Conference deemed it necessary to revise the Party Programme, and indicated along what lines it was to be revised. It was necessary to give in the new Programme an evaluation of imperialism and the era of imperialist wars in connection with the impending socialist revolution; to alter the section in the Programme dealing with the state; to insert the demand for the establishment of a Soviet republic; to delete or amend the outdated sections of the Programme, and in particular to alter the agrarian programme in conformity with the resolution adopted on the agrarian question; to insert the demand for the nationalisation of the monopolies where this was already possible, etc.

On the question of the International, Lenin proposed breaking with the Zimmerwald organisation and starting to found a new International immediately; as a last resort, Lenin considered it possible to remain in the organisation only for purposes of information. Zinoviev opposed this proposal, and insisted on retaining a bloc with the Zimmerwaldites, although they had not severed their ties with the defencists.

The Conference decided that the Bolsheviks should remain in the Zimmerwald bloc and uphold the tactics of the Zimmerwald Left. Lenin considered this decision to be a wrong one. Subsequently his viewpoint was recognised as correct. At the beginning of May the Central Committee unanimously resolved to send delegates to the forthcoming Zimmerwald Conference, authorising them to leave the Conference immediately and withdraw from the Zimmerwald organisation should it declare itself in favour of any closer ties or any discussions with the social-chauvinists.

The Conference instructed the Central Committee to take the initiative in forming a Third International.

It elected a Central Committee headed by Lenin.

The April Conference was the first legal conference of the Bolshevik Party to be held in Russia. In importance it was equal to a Party congress. The Conference equipped the Party with a plan for the struggle to develop the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution. It exposed and rejected the opportunist line of Kamenev, Pyatakov and others, which would have doomed the revolution to defeat. The decisions of the April Conference showed the working class and all the working people the only way out of the war and of ruin for Russia, the way to deliverance from exploitation. They showed how the threat of the enslavement of Russia by foreign imperialists could be averted, and the victory of the socialist revolution in Russia ensured.
3. The Party’s Fight for the Masses in the Period of Dual Power. The July Days

Armed with the decisions of the April Conference, the Party launched activities on a great scale among the masses. It went to the people with a clear and integral programme which showed how peace, land and bread could be secured.

The Bolshevik Party came forward as the leader and champion of the interests of the exploited and downtrodden. The Bolsheviks roused all sections of the working people to action and directed the diverse revolutionary streams into a single channel for the fight against capitalism, for socialism.

In the struggle for the transfer of all power to the Soviets, the bourgeoisie, as Lenin stressed, was the outright and principal class enemy of the working people. It was backed by the compromisers, who were predominant in the Soviets. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks were the mainstay of the bourgeoisie. The problem was to knock this mainstay from under the feet of the bourgeoisie. It was necessary to wrest leadership in the Soviets and other mass organisations from the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and isolate them from the masses. In order, therefore, to defeat the bourgeoisie, the Bolsheviks directed their main blow at its supporters, the compromisers, the “immediate enemy”, as Lenin put it.

The Party carried on its main work in the mass organisations, primarily in the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, the Soviets of Peasants’ Deputies and in the soldiers’ committees. During March, Soviets of Workers’ Deputies were established practically throughout the country, in all industrial centres and cities. About 400 Soviets were formed in gubernia and uyezd towns and industrial centres at the beginning of the revolution, not counting the Soviets at many Donets mines and in several other regions. The Soviets of Peasants’ Deputies appeared later than the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies, but by the summer of 1917 they numbered about 400. Soldiers’ committees were formed in the army in all companies, regiments and in large units, both at the front and in the garrisons. The newspapers Soldatskaya Pravda (Soldiers’ Truth) and Okopnaya Pravda (Trench Truth) were published for the army. Work was carried on in the trade unions, factory committees and in other mass organisations. Thus, step by step, the Party built up a political army for the assault on capitalism.

The Party sought to convince the working people of the correctness of the Bolshevik ideas. Developments in the country, already on the eve of and during the April Conference, showed that the Bolsheviks were right.

On April 18 (old style) the working people of Russia celebrated May Day. For the first time on this day the workers and soldiers demonstrated freely. Most of the banners and posters bore slogans
demanding a democratic peace. On that same day, Milyukov, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent a note to the Allied Powers in which he assured them that the Provisional Government would observe all treaties signed by the tsarist government and that Russia would continue the war to a victorious finish. On April 20 the workers and soldiers, who only two days previously had demonstrated under slogans demanding peace, learned about Milyukov's note. That day the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison marched to the Mariinsky Palace, where the Provisional Government was sitting, carrying posters demanding: "All power to the Soviets!", "Down with the war!", "Down with Milyukov!", "Down with Guchkov!" (the War Minister). They began to be joined by workers. Meetings began in the city.

In reply to the action of the workers and soldiers, the supporters of the Provisional Government organised a counter-demonstration under the slogan of confidence in the government.

That same day, April 20, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party met. In a resolution drawn up by Lenin, the Central Committee pointed out that owing to its class character the bourgeois Provisional Government could not end the imperialist war. At the same time the Central Committee issued a warning against such slogans as "Down with Milyukov!" or "Down with Guchkov!" The bourgeoisie and its Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik allies might resort to a manoeuvre: they could reshuffle the government somewhat, and then tell the people that the government's policy had changed as a result. Only the revolutionary proletariat, by assuming state power with the support of a majority of the people, would set up a government, in the form of the Soviets, which the workers of the world would believe in and which alone would be able to end the war quickly.

On April 21, in response to the call of the Bolshevik Party, the workers of Petrograd downed tools and demonstrated. More than 100,000 people took part in the demonstration demanding peace.

The entire bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeois press started accusing the Bolsheviks of preparing civil war. But the boot was on the other foot, for the initiators of civil war were accusing those whom they were preparing to attack. On April 21 the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party adopted a resolution emphatically refuting the calumny. It called on all the workers to hold new elections of delegates to the Soviets, to drive out the compromisers, and to send real representatives of the people in their place.

During the demonstration of April 21 a small group of members of the St. Petersburg Committee (S. Bagdatyev and others) issued, without the agreement of the Committee, the slogan "Down with the Provisional Government!" On April 22 the Central Committee adopted Lenin's resolution condemning this slogan as an incorrect and adventurist one, for it was nothing less than a call to revolt and ran counter to the Party line of encouraging a peaceful development.
of the revolution and a peaceful conquest of the majority in the Soviets for the cause of the proletariat.

Demonstrations also took place in Moscow, the Urals, the Ukraine and in other cities and parts of the country.

The April events were no ordinary demonstration. April witnessed simultaneous action by the proletariat and the bourgeoisie; the broad sections of the people were thus confronted with the question: with whom shall we go along? Many of those who had been "honestly mistaken", and had believed in the compromisers, now saw for themselves that only the proletariat, by taking power, could end the war. The April demonstration brought about, as Lenin put it, the "washing away" of the middle elements, that is, it hastened the transition of the waverers to the side of the revolutionary proletariat. The April events thereby speeded up the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution.

The April demonstration marked the beginning of a crisis of authority. The Provisional Government, which had hoped to secure absolute power by a conspiracy, proved to be powerless. It decided on the new manoeuvre, suggested by the foreign imperialists, of broadening the composition of the government by including Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks in it, and thus deceiving the people. On May 5 an agreement was reached between the Provisional Government and the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet to include representatives of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties in the government. A so-called coalition government was formed, which included the compromisers V. Chernov (from the Socialist-Revolutionaries), I. Tsereteli and M. Skobelev (from the Mensheviks) and others. The Mensheviks, who in the first Russian revolution had declared it impermissible to take part in a revolutionary government, now entered a counter-revolutionary government. This coalition consolidated the bloc between the big and the petty bourgeoisie, a coalition which had in fact taken shape at the beginning of the revolution. The bourgeois government was saved by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who went openly over to the side of the bourgeoisie.

The coalition government did not remove the causes of the crisis, nor did it solve a single problem of the revolution. The dislocation that had begun long before the revolution continued to spread. Throughout May strikes broke out in all the industrial areas, the workers demanding better economic conditions. In defiance of the resistance of the capitalists, the workers themselves introduced an 8-hour working day. The strike wave was accompanied by growing agrarian unrest. In the countryside the peasants, without waiting for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, were themselves fixing the rents for land leased from the landlords, taking away from the latter their disused land and sowing crops on it. By July the
peasant movement had spread to 43 gubernias. The peasants were rising up against the landlords in defiance of the Socialist-Revolutionary leaders entrenched in the Soviets. Of tremendous significance for winning over the peasant masses was Lenin’s speech on May 22, at the First All-Russian Congress of Peasants’ Deputies, in which he outlined the Bolshevik platform on the agrarian question. The workers’ and peasants’ movement influenced the army; the continuation of the war was arousing indignation among the soldiers and heightening their revolutionary sentiments.

The work of the Bolsheviks in the army was facilitated by the All-Russian Conference of Bolshevik Army Organisations, convened by the Central Committee in June 1917. The Conference was attended by delegates from 60 military organisations at the front and in the rear, uniting about 26,000 Party members. Lenin addressed the Conference, speaking on the current situation and the agrarian question. He called for the greatest energy to be displayed in preparing the forces of the proletariat and the revolutionary army for the transition of power to the Soviets.

The more far-reaching the revolution became, the more the bourgeoisie sought to save itself in the only way it considered possible, namely, by driving the soldiers at the front to take the offensive. The calculations of the bourgeoisie were simple. In the event of success, the offensive would strengthen the authority of the government and enable it to attack the Bolsheviks and disband the Soviets. In the event of failure, the entire blame could be thrown on to the Bolsheviks. They could be accused of having undermined army morale, and the activities of the Party could be prohibited and, later, the Soviets could be disbanded as well.

But the bourgeoisie realised that it would not be able to compel the soldiers to continue the war by force alone. Kerensky, who had by then been appointed Minister for War, had drawn up in advance the order for an offensive, without, however, indicating when it was to be launched. He wanted first to have this decision approved by the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which met on June 3. The Congress was attended by over 1,000 delegates, only 105 of whom were Bolsheviks. The bulk of the delegates consisted of Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. The most important question on the agenda was that of the attitude towards the Provisional Government. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks declared in favour of retaining the bloc with the bourgeoisie. Speaking in defence of the coalition, Tsereteli, the Menshevik leader, declared that there was not a single political party in Russia that was prepared to assume all power. Lenin replied: “There is such a party!” When he was given the floor, Lenin outlined the Bolshevik programme, and called for the transfer of all power to the Soviets.

The compromisers mobilised all their forces in an attempt to prove that the slogan “All power to the Soviets!” was not feasible. They
carried a resolution approving the coalition with the bourgeoisie, and endorsing the Provisional Government's policy.

The Bolsheviks decided to show the Congress how utterly at variance the position of its majority was with the views of the advanced sections of the proletariat and the army. The Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party called on the workers and soldiers of Petrograd to demonstrate on June 10 under the slogans: “All power to the Soviets!” “Down with the ten capitalist ministers!” “Workers’ control over production!” “Against the policy of an offensive!”

But on June 9, the eve of the demonstration, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks decided to prevent it, and the Congress, which they dominated, adopted a resolution banning the demonstration.

To call it off was difficult. However, not to abide by the Congress decision meant setting oneself against the Congress. Late at night on June 9 the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party decided to submit to the Congress decision, and called on the workers and soldiers not to demonstrate. The members of the C. C., the P. C. and Party functionaries spent the whole night making rounds of the districts, factories and army barracks, explaining the Party decision to the workers and soldiers. In response to that decision, not a single factory or regiment came out to demonstrate. This spoke of the growth of the Party’s influence, of its ability to maintain contact with the masses and to retreat at the right moment.

On the following day all the newspapers started a campaign of Bolshevik-baiting. At the Congress, the Menshevik leaders accused the Bolsheviks of conspiracy, and demanded that they be disarmed. Having cancelled the demonstration, the Congress instructed its delegates to visit the factories and barracks. When they did, they saw that it was not a question of a Bolshevik “conspiracy” but of the temper of the entire proletariat and the garrison of the capital. Fearing that it might completely lose its influence among the masses the Congress presidium decided to hold a demonstration, but under its own leadership. The demonstration was fixed for June 18. It was no accident that the Congress leaders chose that particular day. Having assured himself of the support of the Congress, Kerensky had given the order for an offensive to be launched on the South-Western front on June 18. The demonstration was designed to screen the plans of the bourgeoisie, and express approval for the offensive at the front.

On the appointed day, June 18, Petrograd was the scene of a mass demonstration, in which about half a million people took part. The Bolsheviks decided to participate in it under their own slogans. The overwhelming majority of the demonstrators carried banners bearing the slogan “All power to the Soviets!” Only a small group displayed slogans calling for confidence in the Provisional Government.

The tremendous scale of the demonstration and the predominance
of Bolshevik slogans in it showed that the proletariat and the gar­rison of the capital supported the Bolsheviks. They showed that the masses had no confidence either in the Provisional Government or in the policy of compromise with the bourgeoisie pursued by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

The offensive of the Russian troops at the front failed and the counter-revolution immediately began to put into effect the plan it had made for this contingency, that is, to throw all the blame on to the Bolsheviks.

On July 2, as soon as news of the failure of the offensive reached Petrograd, the Cadets announced their withdrawal from the government. In doing so, they calculated that the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders would be afraid to remain in power alone and would agree to the terms of the Cadets, who demanded the disarmament of the workers, the withdrawal of revolutionary troops from Petrograd and, above all, the banning of the Bolshevik Party.

But the Cadets failed to take into account the mood of the people. They had hoped to create a government crisis, but overlooked the political crisis that had already come to a head, first in the capital and then throughout the country. On the morning of July 3, at a meeting of company and regimental committees of the First Machine-Gun Regiment in Petrograd, held to elect delegates to the Executive Committee of the Soviet, the soldiers spoke indignantly of the fact that the hated war was being continued, that the people were starving, while the bourgeoisie was amassing fortunes, and that the government was leading the country to catastrophe. Demands were made that the question of armed action and of the overthrow of the Provisional Government be discussed. The soldiers sent delegates to other regiments and to factories, suggesting that they take part in such action. The delegates met with support everywhere.

The Party supported the revolutionary sentiments of the masses, but it was opposed to immediate action. The workers and soldiers of Petrograd were strong enough to overthrow the Provisional Government and assume state power, but they would have been unable to retain this power, for the majority of the people in the country at that time still followed the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. Therefore the Central Committee decided on July 3 to refrain from any action or demonstrations. But it was no longer possible to restrain the masses. At the factories, in the regiments and aboard the ships of the Baltic Fleet, they listened to what the representatives of the Party had to say, yet continued to insist on action. There arose a danger that the masses would go out on to the streets and that the bourgeois government would have their demonstration shot down, declaring it to be an armed uprising.

The Central Committee of the Party annulled its decision and resolved to take part in the action of the masses, with the purpose of turning it into a peaceful and organised demonstration, under the
slogan “All power to the Soviets!” On the following day a huge demonstration took place, in which more than 500,000 people took part. The workers marched under the protection of the armed Red Guard, while the soldiers carried arms. Several thousand sailors from Kronstadt also took part in the demonstration.

The demonstrators appointed 90 representatives to present to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, in session at the Taurida Palace, the demand that all power be taken by the Soviets. But the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks had other plans. They had arranged with the government to smash the demonstration. The order was given to summon troops loyal to the Provisional Government from the front. In several districts—at the corner of Nevsky Prospekt and Sadovaya Street, on Liteiny Prospekt, and elsewhere—military cadets and Cossacks opened fire on the demonstrators.

The troops summoned from the front having arrived in Petrograd, the bourgeois government proceeded to repressive measures. Wholesale searches began in the working-class districts. The counter-revolutionaries disarmed the workers. The regiments which had taken part in the demonstration began to be disarmed. The counter-revolution fell upon the Bolsheviks with particular hatred. On July 6 the Trud printing plant, which had been purchased with money contributed by the workers to the Bolshevik Party, was wrecked, Pravda was banned. The same day counter-revolutionaries killed the worker Voyinov merely because he had taken from the printing plant copies of Listok Pravdy (Pravda Bulletin) published by the Party in place of Pravda, which had been suppressed.

The counter-revolutionary authorities began to arrest active Party workers. The order was given to find Lenin and detain him at all costs. In their search for him, the Provisional Government, which included Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks who posed as revolutionaries, had no scruples about using the services of agents of the former tsarist Okhrana. The slanderous fabrication, prepared long in advance, that the Bolsheviks had connections with Germany, was circulated. The Procurator issued an order for the arrest and trial of Lenin, and several other Bolsheviks, on a charge of “high treason” and the organisation of an armed uprising. General Polovtsev, the Commander-in-Chief of the Petrograd Military Area, ordered the commander of the unit specially formed for the purpose, to carry out a search for Lenin and to shoot him immediately he was found.

The Party arranged for a safe hiding-place for its leader. At first Lenin went into hiding in Petrograd, and later outside the city, near Lake Razliv. The bourgeoisie tried to set a trap. The entire Cadet and Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik press demanded that Lenin appear for trial. The counter-revolution, supported by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, sought to decapitate the Bolshevik Party. Counter-revolution was rampant all over the country. The War Minister, Kerensky, re-introduced the death penalty at the
front. With the help of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik committees, the authorities began disarming revolutionary units not only at the front, but also in the rear. Repressive measures were intensified with the appointment of General Kornilov as Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

The July events changed the situation and the relation of class forces in the country. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries rounded off their policy of compromise with the bourgeoisie by final desertion to the camp of the counter-revolution. Once parties of compromise with the bourgeoisie, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks had now become parties of accomplices of the counter-revolution. The dual power had come to an end. The bourgeoisie had achieved undivided authority. All power had passed into its hands. The Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Soviets became an appendage of the bourgeois government.

But the bourgeoisie did not succeed in crushing the revolutionary masses. The Bolsheviks had been able to retreat in good time and withdraw their main forces from under the blow.

4. Sixth Party Congress. The Party Adopts the Policy of Preparing for Armed Insurrection. Rout of the Kornilov Revolt

With the change in the situation and in the relation of forces in the country, the Party had to alter its tactics and slogans. In an article entitled “On Slogans”, Lenin showed that the political situation in Russia after July 4 differed radically from that of February 27 to July 4. The stage of peaceful development of the revolution, which would have then been possible and most desirable, had ended. By their treachery, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks had wrecked the peaceful course of development. Now that all power had passed into the hands of the counter-revolution, the working class could only take power by an armed insurrection.

At the same time Lenin gave warning that immediate action against the government would be a mistake. A decisive assault was possible only when a new revolutionary upsurge affected the widest sections of the people.

Lenin proposed the temporary withdrawal of the slogan “All power to the Soviets!” This did not mean the renunciation of a Soviet republic as a new type of state. The point was that the Soviets as they were then composed, and led as they were by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who had openly deserted to the camp of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, and whose hands were stained with the blood of the people, could not be organs of people’s power.

“SoVIets can spring up in this new revolution, and are indeed bound to do so,” wrote Lenin. “They will not be the present
Soviets, which are organs of compromise with the bourgeoisie, however, but organs of a revolutionary struggle against the bourgeoisie. It is true that we shall be, then too, in favour of building the whole state on the model of the Soviets. It is not a question of Soviets in general, but of combating the present counter-revolution and the treachery of the present Soviets (Collected Works, Vol. 25, p. 170).

Questions of the revolution, including the new tactics required to meet the changed situation, were dealt with by the Sixth Congress of the Party. The Congress met in Petrograd from July 26 to August 3, 1917. It had to work in semi-illegality. The campaign of Bolshevik-baiting in the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois press had intensified. The Provisional Government empowered the Ministers for War and Internal Affairs to prohibit all congresses, in other words, virtually gave the order to ban the Sixth Congress. Matters went so far that the foreign imperialists openly demanded that the Congress be dispersed and its delegates arrested.

But the plans of the counter-revolution were frustrated. The workers carefully guarded their Party’s Congress.

Although Lenin was unable to attend, he guided its work through the members of the Central Committee who visited him while he was in hiding at Lake Razliv. Lenin drafted the theses “On the Political Situation”, and his articles “On Slogans”, “Lessons of the Revolution” and others, served as the basis of the Congress resolutions.

One of the first questions discussed by the delegates was whether Lenin should appear for trial. Some delegates—Stalin, Volodarsky, Manuilsky—considered it possible for Lenin to appear in court, provided his safety was guaranteed. Stalin misinterpreted the political situation in the country, saying that it was not clear who was in power, although the bourgeoisie had fully established its authority following the July events. He allowed for the possibility of the bourgeois court giving Bolsheviks a fair trial. Yet it was obvious that the bourgeoisie would disregard all guarantees and avenge itself on Lenin, especially now that it wielded undivided power. The Congress declared against Lenin appearing in court, and protested against the outrageous attacks on the leader of the revolutionary proletariat. The Congress sent a message of greeting to Lenin.

The political report of the Central Committee and the report on the political situation were made by Stalin. The resolution adopted on the two reports was based on Lenin’s propositions.

“At the present time,” stated the resolution on the political situation, “peaceful development and a painless transition of power to the Soviets are no longer possible, for power has in fact already passed into the hands of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.
"The right slogan at the present time can only be the complete abolition of the dictatorship of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. Only the revolutionary proletariat, provided it is supported by the poorest peasantry, can fulfil this task, the task of a new upsurge" (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part I, p. 376).

The Sixth Party Congress thus showed that only by armed insurrection and by overthrowing the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, could the proletariat and poorest peasantry assume power.

The Party's course towards a socialist revolution was opposed by Bukharin, who asserted that the peasants had formed a bloc with the bourgeoisie and would not follow the working class. Stalin rejected this opportunist assertion, and showed that Bukharin, by approaching the peasantry without a class analysis, had abandoned the Marxist position. There were different kinds of peasants: the rich peasants supported the imperialist bourgeoisie, while the poor peasants supported the proletariat in its struggle for the victory of the revolution. The Congress rebuffed Preobrazhensky, who proposed an amendment denying that a socialist revolution could be victorious in Russia and stating that the country could be directed towards socialism only in the event of a proletarian revolution in the West.

Stalin replied by repeating the proposition on the victory of socialism in one country, Russia, advanced by Lenin against Rykov at the April Conference.

"The possibility is not excluded," said Stalin, "that Russia will be the country that will lay the road to socialism.... We must discard the antiquated idea that only Europe can show us the way" (Works, Eng. ed., Vol. 3, pp. 199, 200).

The Congress rejected the opportunist amendments of Preobrazhensky and Bukharin. The resolution was unanimously approved with four abstentions.

The report on the organisational work of the Central Committee was delivered by Y. M. Sverdlov. In the three months since the April Conference, the Party's membership had increased threefold: at the April Conference 78 organisations, with a membership of 80,000, had been represented; at the Sixth Congress, 162 organisations with a membership of 240,000 were represented. The Central Committee had succeeded in welding the whole Party together in this short period. An active part in the proceedings of the Congress was taken by representatives of the Polish, Lettish and Lithuanian Bolsheviks, who were carrying on revolutionary activity among the working people of the oppressed nations, sometimes as members of local Party organisations, and frequently as sections attached to the local Party committees.

The Congress declared against any unification whatsoever with the defencists, noting that unity was possible only with those
Menshevik internationalists who were really prepared to break with the Menshevik defencists.

The Sixth Congress admitted the Mezhrayontsy and their leader, Trotsky, into the Party, on their declaration that they agreed with all the tenets of Bolshevism. The Mezhrayontsy were a group that had already been formed before the war and consisted of Bolsheviks who had waivered and adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the opportunists, and of Trotskyist-Mensheviks. During the war the Mezhrayontsy had occupied a Centrist position, vacillating between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. They recognised the war to be an imperialist war, they were against defencism, but would not agree to a complete break with the Mensheviks. Now, however, they severed relations with the defencists. As events showed, some of the Mezhrayontsy—Volodarsky and Uritsky, for example—actually discarded their Centrist vacillations, whereas Trotsky and a small group of his followers only temporarily suspended their fight against Bolshevism, and joined the Party so as, once inside, to fight Leninism and foist their opportunist, anti-socialist policy upon it.

The changed conditions in which the Party had been working after coming out of illegality, and its rapid growth, made some additions to the Party Rules essential. Clause 1 of the Rules stated that anybody who accepted the Party Programme, was a member of one of the Party organisations and paid membership dues, was considered to be a member of the Party. In the new Rules the phrase “and who submits to all decisions of the Party”, was added. Another amendment to the Rules was that new members should be accepted into the Party by local Party organisations, on the recommendation of two Party members and the approval of a general membership meeting of the local organisation. The Rules stressed that all Party organisations should be built on the principle of democratic centralism, and that all Party organisations should be grouped on a district and regional basis. The Rules provided for the regular convocation of congresses once a year, and for plenary meetings of the Central Committee at least once every two months.

The Congress adopted a resolution on relations between the Party and the trade unions. After endorsing the Party’s decisions condemning the Menshevik theory that the trade unions should be neutral, the Congress resolved: that everything possible should be done to organise all workers in trade unions; that all Party members should join the unions and form groups within them; that work should be started to establish an international organisation made up of unions refusing to support the imperialist war and taking a stand for the class struggle.

The Congress dwelt separately on work among the youth. It declared itself in favour of establishing youth leagues not subor-
dinate to the Party organisationally, but led by it ideologically. The Congress stressed that the Party should aim to make these leagues socialist from the very outset. Their task would be to foster class consciousness among young working men and women, and lead them in step with the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat.

The Sixth Congress discussed the Party’s economic platform. In its resolution on this subject, the Congress noted that the country was passing through a profound economic crisis and was “sliding into a gulf of utter economic dislocation and ruin”. The crisis was being deliberately aggravated by the bourgeoisie, which sought to use it against the revolution. The only way out of the critical situation was for power to pass into the hands of the proletariat and the poorest peasantry. Only these classes, on assuming power, could save the country by taking the following revolutionary measures: nationalisation and centralisation of the banks; nationalisation of a number of monopolies (oil, coal, sugar, metallurgical and transport); repudiation of foreign and internal debt, with due consideration for the interests of small owners; establishment of real workers’ control, which should gradually develop into the complete regulation of production; organisation of proper exchange between town and country with the help of co-operatives and food committees, with a view to supplying the towns with the necessary agricultural products, and the countryside with manufactured goods, agricultural implements and machinery. The resolution called on all workers’ organisations—the trade unions, factory committees and Soviets—to encourage the application of these measures, to display initiative in the matter, and to secure their implementation on a national scale.

Underlying all the Congress decisions was Lenin’s idea of the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry as a condition for the victory of the revolution. Meeting as it did on the eve of a new upsurge of the revolution, the Sixth Congress set itself one principal aim in all its decisions—to prepare the proletariat and the poorest peasantry for armed insurrection, for the triumph of the socialist revolution. The Congress addressed a manifesto to all working people, to all workers, soldiers and peasants, calling on them to rally under the banner of the Bolshevik Party for the decisive battle with the bourgeoisie.

Having secured for itself undivided rule, the bourgeoisie set out to complete its plans for crushing the revolution and restoring the monarchy in Russia. One of the ways in which it hoped to achieve this was by further disorganising industry. This policy was brazenly expressed in the statement of the millionaire Ryabushinsky that “the gaunt hand of famine” should seize the revolution by the throat and strangle it. The capitalists closed down factory after factory, throwing tens of thousands of workers on to the streets. Business speculation
reached incredible proportions. Prices soared rapidly. The working people were starving. Economic catastrophe and enslavement by foreign capital threatened the country.

Not confining itself to economic measures, the counter-revolution made preparations for setting up a military dictatorship. By agreement with the American, British and French governments the role of military dictator was assigned to General Kornilov, the Commander-in-Chief. To cover up the preparations for a counter-revolutionary coup, the Provisional Government decided to convene a Council of State, composed of representatives of all the propertied strata of the population. Fearing the revolutionary workers of Petrograd, the bourgeoisie planned to hold the Council of State in Moscow, where it thought the situation was more tranquil.

The Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party requested the Moscow Committee to organise a one-day protest strike against the conspiracy of the bourgeoisie. On August 12, the day the Council of State opened, over 400,000 Moscow workers downed tools. By their unanimous strike action, they frustrated the designs of the counter-revolution. It became obvious that the counter-revolution would be able to carry out its plan only by armed force. The bourgeoisie decided to draw the people into a civil war. Kornilov began to muster armed forces. The United States, Britain and France promised him their help. He negotiated with the generals about withdrawing troops from the front. The traitors did not hesitate to open the road to the enemy into the heart of Russia. They considered the working people of their own country a more dangerous enemy than the foreign invaders.

On August 25 Kornilov moved the Third Mounted Corps from the front against Petrograd. The situation was complicated by the fact that Kornilov had started the revolt supposedly against the Provisional Government. And that is how the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks tried to present the matter. They called for defence of the Provisional Government. Lenin suggested a wise course to the Party. While rousing the masses against Kornilov, it explained that it was not calling for defence of the Provisional Government, which was an accomplice in the Kornilov affair. The Party conducted the struggle against the would-be military dictator without ceasing to expose the Provisional Government and its Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik aiders.

The masses responded to the call of the Bolsheviks by rising against Kornilov. The workers of the capital took to arms. New Red Guard detachments were hurriedly formed. The Kornilov revolt was crushed by the workers and peasants organised by the Bolshevik Party. At the instance of the people, Kornilov and his fellow-conspirators were arrested. The attempt of the bourgeoisie and the landlords to crush the revolution had failed. The only way
out of the situation that had arisen was to overthrow the Provisional Government by armed insurrection and to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat.

5. Preparations for Armed Insurrection. Victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution

Taking into account the great danger the Kornilov revolt represented for the revolution, and bearing in mind the rising tide of the mass movement and the fact that many Soviets had opposed Kornilov, Lenin proposed to the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who were still predominant in the Soviets, that power be assumed by the Soviets. The Party wanted to utilise this last opportunity for a peaceful development of the revolution. But the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who had aligned themselves firmly with the bourgeoisie, rejected the only possibility still open for a peaceful transfer of power to the Soviets.

The rout of the Kornilov revolt radically changed the situation in the country. The workers discovered the real nature of the compromisers, who had in fact screened and defended the bourgeoisie and the landlords. The peasants realised that behind the generals stood the landlords, who had no intention of giving up their land. The soldiers at the front became convinced that the intention was to compel them to spend a fourth winter in the trenches, and that the bourgeois and landlord government meant to prolong the bloody war. The working people of the oppressed nations now saw clearly that had the Kornilovites won, there would have been no question of the abolition of national oppression. The overwhelming mass of the people were now convinced from their own experience of the correctness of the Bolshevik ideas. The working people began to recall Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik deputies from the Soviets and to replace them by Bolsheviks. Non-Party deputies in the Soviets began to support the Bolsheviks. On August 31 the Petrograd Soviet, for the first time since its establishment, adopted a Bolshevik resolution for the transfer of power to the Soviets.

On September 5 the Moscow Soviet adopted a similar resolution. Following the two capitals, the Soviets of Kiev, Kharkov, Kazan, Ufa, Minsk, Revel, Tashkent, Samara, Bryansk, Krasnoyarsk and many towns in the Urals and the Donets coalfield also adopted Bolshevik resolutions. There began a rapid Bolshevisation of the Soviets.

The slogan “All power to the Soviets!” was again placed on the order of the day by the Party. By that time the composition of the Soviets in the key centres of the country had changed: they had become Bolshevik Soviets. This time the slogan “All power to the Soviets!” was a slogan calling for armed insurrection against the
bourgeois government, and for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. More than 250 Soviets declared for the Bolshevik slogan "All power to the Soviets!"

By September 1917 the Bolsheviks had, by their indefatigable work, convinced the people that the salvation of the country lay in the overthrow of the anti-popular government. The country was in the grip of a universal crisis. The national economy was heading for catastrophe. The ruling classes were incapable of averting disaster. If anything, they were rapidly bringing it closer by their policy. The masses refused to live in the old way and to let the bourgeoisie and its hangers-on go on running the country. In a word, all the signs of a revolutionary situation which Lenin had indicated were in existence. Graphic evidence of the crisis was the people's resort to more and more vigorous forms of struggle. The workers began to remove factory managements, arrest directors and take over the management of production. The working-class movement had come face to face with the problem of power. As the leader and guiding force of the revolution, the proletariat was rousing the whole people to struggle.

"We have the following of the majority of a class, the vanguard of the revolution, the vanguard of the people, which is capable of carrying the masses with it," wrote Lenin in September 1917 (Collected Works, Vol. 26, p. 6).

A change had also taken place in the character of the peasant movement. The peasants began to drive out the landlords, seize the land and implements and distribute them among themselves, and set fire to the manor houses. The peasant movement throughout the country was growing into insurrection. More than half the European part of Russia was in the grip of peasant revolts. "We have the following of the majority of the people ... " noted Lenin (ibid.).

After the defeat of the Kornilov revolt, new forms of struggle appeared in the army as well. The soldiers were driving out the reactionary commanders and electing new ones whom they trusted. The men refused to go on fighting. Discontent among the soldiers threatened to turn into insurrection. On the fronts closest to Petrograd and Moscow—the Northern and Western fronts—the majority of the soldiers followed the Bolsheviks; and there were over 1,700,000 armed men on these two fronts alone. All the reserve regiments, of which there were over 100, supported the Bolsheviks. The overwhelming majority of the personnel of the garrisons were on the side of the Bolsheviks. The soldiers of the Moscow garrison, for example, during the elections to the ward Dumas held at the end of September, voted solidly for the Bolsheviks. There were nearly four million soldiers in the reserve and rear units. They consisted, in the main, of the most advanced and militant section of the poor peasantry. The sailors of the Baltic Fleet also fully supported the Bolshevik Party.
A change had also taken place in the character of the movement among the oppressed nations. Despite the resistance of the bourgeois organisations, the struggle of the working people in the national-minority regions began to merge in a united front with the general movement of the workers and peasants throughout Russia. The Bolshevik Party was active not only among the working people of all the nations of Russia, but also among the refugees from Poland and the Baltic provinces, and also among German, Hungarian, Polish, Czech, Slovak and Croat prisoners of war. The Bolsheviks helped to form Communist groups among them.

The international situation, too, had changed. Faced with the threat of a mounting revolutionary movement in their rear, the British and French imperialists tried to come to terms with the German imperialists about the conclusion of peace, with a view to waging a joint struggle against the revolution. The Russian counter-revolution was ready to conclude a separate peace with Germany so as to have its hands free within the country. The ruling classes of Russia surrendered Riga to the Germans; they were prepared to give up Petrograd and part of the country in exchange for assistance in strangling the revolution. This was a glaring instance of the unpatriotic spirit of the bourgeoisie, of their treacherous attitude towards their native land. The true patriots were the Bolsheviks, fighting to save Russia from defeat by German imperialism, and from enslavement by foreign states. The treacherous plan of the bourgeoisie could be frustrated only by overthrowing the government of betrayal.

The national crisis also affected the situation in the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties. Disintegration set in in both parties. The Menshevik party broke up into several groups. A Left wing formed within the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, and declared itself to be an independent party. The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries tried to win over those sections of the peasantry that were disillusioned by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and had swung towards the proletariat.

Lenin closely followed the situation in the country from his hiding-place. The leader of the revolution responded to every change, to the slightest alteration in the mood of the people and in the relation of classes. During the 110 days that Lenin was "underground", he wrote more than 60 articles and letters, through which the Party received advice and guidance. Among these works the book, The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It, is particularly notable. It was the Bolshevik Party's platform which answered the question raised by the masses: how could the country be saved from ruin? After drawing a picture of the dire want and famine to which the people were doomed by the rule of the bourgeoisie and landlords, Lenin indicated the revolutionary measures which could save the people from the war and from famine, namely:
workers control over production, nationalisation of the banks, syndicates and so forth, parallel with the confiscation of the landed estates and the nationalisation of all the land. These measures for combating catastrophe and famine were quite feasible, wrote Lenin, and the only reason they were not put into effect was that they infringed "the sanctity of bourgeois property". The ruling classes tried to persuade the people that ruin and destruction threatened the country should the people set about putting these measures into effect.

"If, instead of a 'coalition' with the bourgeoisie, which is hampering every measure of control and sabotaging production," wrote Lenin, "the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks had in April effected the transfer of power to the Soviets... Russia would now be a country completely transformed economically, with the land in the hands of the peasants and the banks nationalised, that is, she would to that extent (and these are extremely important economic bases of modern life) be superior to all other capitalist countries" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 335).

Putting into effect the Bolshevik platform would immediately ease the lot and improve the life of the labouring masses. Lenin showed that the material basis for socialism existed in Russia, not only because Russia was one of the links in the imperialist chain, but also because capitalism in Russia, though it lagged behind by comparison with the advanced capitalist countries, was still sufficiently developed. Lenin described Russia as a country of medium-developed capitalism. In Russia, too, capitalism was growing into state-monopoly capitalism. The starting-point of the Bolshevik platform on the eve of the great proletarian revolution was Lenin's basic principle of the possibility of socialism being victorious at first in one country alone.

"One cannot mark time—in history in general, and during a war in particular," wrote Lenin. "One must either go forward or backward. To go forward in twentieth-century Russia, which has won a republic and democracy by revolutionary means, is impossible without advancing to socialism, without taking steps towards it..." (ibid., p. 333).

In his work Lenin set a momentous task before the proletariat, once it was victorious:

"The result of the revolution has been that in its political system Russia has in a few months caught up with the advanced countries.

"But that is not enough. The war is inexorable, it puts the alternative with ruthless severity: either we perish or we catch up with that advanced countries and outstrip them economically as well..."

"Either we perish or advance at top speed. That is the alternative with which history has confronted us" (ibid., p. 338).
In his work, *The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It*, Lenin substantiated the measures outlined in the programme for the transition to socialism. In their sum-total, they signified a gradual transition to new, socialist relations of production.

During this period Lenin completed his brilliant work, *The State and Revolution*, which constituted a further development of Marx’s teaching on the state. Lenin restored those of Marx’s and Engels’s views which had been forgotten or distorted by the opportunist, and on the basis of new revolutionary experience, especially of the work of the Soviets, developed further the Marxist theory of the state. The dominant idea that runs through Lenin’s book is that a resolute and uncompromising struggle must be waged on two fronts—against the opportunist traitors and against the anarchists. Lenin showed that they all were kindred in their rejection of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Right-wing Socialist leaders, who refused to recognise the need for the victorious working class to break up the bourgeois state, had sunk to an undisguised defence of that state. The anarchists, who were opposed to the revolutionary proletariat using state power to build socialism, thereby rejected the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The victorious proletariat must completely break up the bourgeois state machinery of violence—the organ of exploitation of the working people—and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat for the entire period of transition from capitalism to socialism, i.e., the first phase of communism.

“The essence of Marx’s teaching on the state,” wrote Lenin, “has been mastered only by those who understand that the dictatorship of a single class is necessary not only for every class society in general, not only for the proletariat which has overthrown the bourgeoisie, but also for the entire historical period which separates capitalism from ‘classless society’, from communism.... The transition from capitalism to communism certainly cannot but yield a tremendous abundance and variety of political forms, but the essence will inevitably be the same: the dictatorship of the proletariat” (*Collected Works*, Vol. 25, pp. 384-85).

In the bourgeois states, democracy is utterly hypocritical and spurious, for even in the most democratic of them it is democracy for an insignificant minority, for the rich, for the exploiters and parasites. The proletarian state, on the contrary, is one that is “democratic in a new way”, because democracy here is democracy for the vast majority of the working people, for the proletarians, for the broad masses of the peasantry, for all the poor, and “dictatorial in a new way”, because it is a dictatorship directed against the bourgeoisie, a dictatorship of the majority of the people against the minority, against the exploiters. The proletariat uses state power
not only to suppress the exploiters, but chiefly to lead the working people in building a socialist society.

"The proletariat," wrote Lenin, "needs state power, the centralised organisation of force, the organisation of violence, both to crush the resistance of the exploiters and to lead the enormous mass of the population—the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, the semi-proletarians—in the work of organising a socialist economy" (Collected Works, Vol. 25, p. 376).

Defining the role and significance of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the transformation of society, Lenin stressed that the Communist Party is the leading and directing force in establishing and exercising the dictatorship of the proletariat. He was relentless in unmasking the opportunists, dominant in the Second International, who distorted the role of the Party, turning it into an organisation for members of the top stratum of the better-paid workers, people isolated from the masses, who sell and betray the interests of the people.

"By educating the workers' party," wrote Lenin, "Marxism educates the vanguard of the proletariat which is capable of assuming power and leading the whole people to socialism, of directing and organising the new system, of being the teacher, the guide, the leader of all the toilers and exploited in the task of building up their social life without the bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie" (ibid.).

Lenin wrote his book at a turning-point in history, on the eve of the advent of the proletariat to power. It brings out in bold relief a characteristic feature of Marxism-Leninism, namely, the direct connection between theory and practice. Lenin noted in the preface that the question of the relationship of the socialist revolution to the state acquires "not only practical political importance, but also the importance of a most urgent problem of the day, the problem of explaining to the masses what they will have to do in the very near future to free themselves from the yoke of capitalism" (ibid., p. 356).

Lenin's book became a policy document regarding the organisation and building up of a state of a new type, the socialist state. Between September 12 and 14 Lenin wrote a letter to the Central, Petrograd and Moscow committees of the Bolshevik Party ("The Bolsheviks Must Take Power"), and a letter to the Central Committee ("Marxism and Insurrection"), in which he called on the Party to organise the insurrection. Equipped with a profound knowledge of the laws of the development of society, and possessing a wealth of experience in revolutionary struggle, Lenin in these letters summed up his analysis of the situation, and explained with the utmost clarity why the Bolsheviks could and should take power at that particular time. The leadership of the Soviets in both capitals had passed into the hands of the Bolsheviks. They had the support of
the people, who had convinced themselves that the Bolshevik Party alone represented and defended their interests. The Soviets, having assumed power, would immediately proceed to conclude a democratic peace, would deprive the landlords of their estates without compensation and hand them over to the peasants, and restore the liberties trampled underfoot by the government. All these measures would receive the full support of the masses.

Power must be taken now, noted Lenin, for the bourgeoisie was preparing to surrender Petrograd to the Germans, while the British and French imperialists were discussing a separate peace with Germany against, and at the expense of, Russia. Only by assuming power could the Bolshevik Party frustrate this criminal plot. The situation was quite ripe for an insurrection. It was the Party's task to treat insurrection as an art, to make thorough preparations for it, to think out all the measures necessary for its success, and not let things drift.

In his letters Lenin also worked out an approximate plan for the armed insurrection. He proposed the immediate organisation of a headquarters of the insurrectionary detachments, distribution of forces, concentration of the most reliable units at the most important points, preparations for surrounding government buildings, seizure of the telephone exchange and telegraph office. Lenin recommended that strong detachments be formed such as would be ready to die rather than let the enemy reach the centre of the city, that the workers be given arms, and that measures be taken to guarantee the city's defence against a possible attack by military cadets and other counter-revolutionary units.

Lenin called his plan an approximate one, but the actual course of the insurrection showed how profoundly and thoroughly this plan had been worked out. Lenin further developed the ideas of the founders of Marxism on insurrection, and turned them into an integral doctrine.

No other party in history had ever been so thoroughly prepared for launching an armed insurrection as was the Bolshevik Party. Thanks to Lenin, the Party had a most detailed plan for organising the rising, and a well-thought-out, integral programme of economic and political measures to be carried out on the very next day after victory.

Lenin's letters were discussed at a meeting of the Central Committee on September 15. Kamenev, continuing his fight against the socialist revolution, opposed Lenin's proposals regarding the organisation of the insurrection and insisted that the letters be destroyed. A capitulatory resolution proposed by this defender of capitalism was rejected. The Central Committee sent copies of Lenin's letters to the more important Party organisations.

The Central Committee began to prepare for the insurrection. The Military Organisation of the Central Committee was instructed
to speed up the formation of new Red Guard detachments. Special courses for training military instructors were started in the capital. Workers were trained in the use of arms. The Bolsheviks in the Baltic Fleet were instructed to get the fleet ready to take part in the insurrection. On all big ships, special fighting squads were formed, ready to come to the capital the moment the Party called. The Bolshevik organisations at the front selected combat units to assist the insurgents in Petrograd. The leaders of the biggest Party organisations were forewarned of the preparations for insurrection.

Meanwhile, the counter-revolution was taking measures against the rising tide of the revolution. Cossack units were moved up to the capital. It was decided to withdraw the revolutionary-minded units of the garrison from Petrograd, so as to weaken the Bolsheviks. At the front, troops were moved with the purpose of surrounding and disarming the pro-Bolshevik regiments. Kornilov and his confederates were considered to be in prison but were in fact in communication with the generals at the front and were mapping out a new plan for counter-revolutionary action. The Provisional Government was preparing a second Kornilov affair.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks were a party to this conspiracy against the people. Sensing that the insurrection was near, they made one more attempt to check the mobilisation of the revolutionary forces—they decided to convene an All-Russian Democratic Conference in Petrograd. The social-Kornilovites had lost their majority in the Soviets, and so were afraid to convene a new congress, although they had promised to do so in three months’ time. The leaders of the compromisers resorted to a subterfuge: they decided to substitute a Democratic Conference for a Congress of Soviets. The purpose of this manoeuvre was to retain leadership of the masses by deceit and uphold the Provisional Government.

The Democratic Conference opened on September 14. It was clearly a packed conference: the city Dumas, Zemstvos and cooperatives representing a small section of the population received more votes than the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies or the military organisations, which united the overwhelming majority of the people. The entire army of 10,000,000 men had only twice as many seats as the small Cossack force, which the Provisional Government considered as its mainstay. The Bolsheviks took part in the Conference to expose the designs of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

At the Conference, the compromisers set up a Provisional Council of the Republic, or, as they put it, a Pre-parliament, in an attempt to create the impression that a parliamentary system had been established in Russia. Kamenev, Rykov and Ryazanov supported this fraud on the part of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, trying thus to divert the workers from the uprising. Lenin considered the whole Democratic Conference affair to be a trap set
by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and categorically insisted on a boycott of the Pre-parliament. To participate in it, he said, would create the illusion that this institution could solve the problems of the revolution. The Central Committee discussed Lenin’s proposals and, despite the opposition of Kamenev and other capitulators, resolved to withdraw from the Pre-parliament. The Central Committee proposed that gubernia and regional congresses of Soviets be held and that an effort be made to bring about the convocation of the Second Congress of Soviets.

On October 3 the Central Committee resolved that Lenin should move to Petrograd so as to ensure regular and close contact with him and to enable him directly to lead the uprising. On October 7 Lenin arrived in the capital secretly and settled in an apartment in the Vyborg District, the most revolutionary in the city. On October 10 a meeting of the Central Committee took place at which Lenin reported on the current situation. He emphasised that the political situation was fully ripe for the transition of power to the proletariat and the poor peasantry. It was now a question of the insurrection itself. Lenin considered it necessary for the whole Party to place the question of the armed uprising on the order of the day.

"The Central Committee recognises," read the resolution drawn up by Lenin, "that the international position of the Russian revolution (the revolt in the German navy, which is an extreme manifestation of the growth throughout Europe of the world socialist revolution; the threat of peace between the imperialists with the object of strangling the revolution in Russia), as well as the military situation (the indubitable decision of the Russian bourgeoisie and Kerensky and Co. to surrender Petrograd to the Germans) and the fact that the proletarian party has gained a majority in the Soviets—all this, taken in conjunction with the peasant revolt and the swing of popular confidence towards our Party (the elections in Moscow), and, finally, the obvious preparations being made for a second Kornilov affair (the withdrawal of troops from Petrograd, the dispatch of Cossacks to Petrograd, the encirclement of Minsk by Cossacks, etc.)—all this places armed insurrection on the order of the day.

"Considering therefore that an armed insurrection is inevitable, and that the time for it is fully ripe, the Central Committee instructs all Party organisations to be guided accordingly, and to discuss and decide all practical questions (the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region, the withdrawal of troops from Petrograd, the action of our people in Moscow and Minsk, etc.) from this point of view" (*C.P.S.U. in Resolutions*, Part I, pp. 397-98).

Only Zinoviev and Kamenev opposed this resolution. They asserted that the working class was incapable of carrying out a
socialist revolution; they sank to the position of the Mensheviks, who were championing the bourgeois republic.

This was a betrayal of socialism. The capitulatory position of Zinoviev and Kamenev was no accident. Their treachery was the direct outcome of all their opportunist vacillations.

At that meeting of the C. C., Trotsky did not vote against the resolution on the insurrection. But he insisted on its being postponed until the Second Congress of Soviets was convened. This was tantamount to wrecking the insurrection, for the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks might postpone the Congress, and that would have enabled the Provisional Government to concentrate its forces by the time the Congress opened, so as to smash the insurrection.

The Central Committee adopted Lenin’s resolution, and it became the Party’s directive to prepare for armed insurrection immediately. The meeting elected a Political Bureau headed by Lenin.

On the Party Central Committee’s proposal, a Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet was set up to direct the rising in the capital. It consisted of representatives of the C. C. and the P. C., of the Petrograd Soviet, factory committees, trade unions, garrison, Baltic Fleet and other organisations. The Revolutionary Military Committee operated under the direct leadership of the Central Committee of the Party.

Systematic preparations for armed action proceeded in all the key areas of the country. In Petrograd the Third City Conference of the Bolsheviks met, representing nearly 50,000 Party members. On October 11 it adopted Lenin’s resolution on the insurrection. The same resolution was adopted by the Moscow City Conference of the Bolsheviks. The Moscow Regional Bureau, representing as many as 70,000 Party members, declared in favour of insurrection. During September and October more than 30 regional, gubernia, town and area conferences were held, representing the bulk of the Bolshevik Party. The Party was ready for decisive events.

Workers’ Red Guard detachments were being rapidly formed everywhere. In October they numbered about 200,000 advanced workers, who were ready to give their lives for the revolution and could carry the masses of the working people with them.

On October 16 an enlarged meeting of the Central Committee was held, with representatives of the Petrograd Committee, the Military Organisation, the Petrograd Soviet, the Petrograd Area Committee, factory committees and trade unions. The meeting reaffirmed Lenin’s resolution on the insurrection. At the end of the meeting a Revolutionary Military Centre of the Central Committee was elected to direct it; the members were A. S. Bubnov, P. E. Dzerzhinsky, J. V. Stalin, Y. M. Sverdlov and M. S. Uritsky. The Revolutionary Military Centre of the Party became part of the Soviet Revolutionary Military Committee.
Defeated in the Central Committee, Zinoviev and Kamenev committed an unheard-of piece of treachery: Kamenev, acting on his own behalf and on behalf of Zinoviev, published an interview in the non-Party paper *Novaya Zhizn (New Life)*, in which he stated their disagreement with the decision on armed insurrection. Thereby the decision of the Central Committee was betrayed to the enemy. In his “Letter to the Members of the Bolshevik Party” and “Letter to the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.”, Lenin indignantly denounced these strike-breakers of the revolution and demanded their expulsion from the Party.

Zinoviev tried, in a letter to the editors of *Rabochy Put*, to refute Lenin’s accusations by reducing fundamental differences over a matter of principle on which the fate of the revolution hinged to an immaterial “argument”. He declared that this “argument” could be put off to a more favourable time. Stalin, without consulting the Central Committee and without the knowledge of other members of the editorial board, published the letter in the issue of October 20, with the comment that “the question may be regarded as settled”.

Lenin’s letter calling for the expulsion of the strike-breakers Kamenev and Zinoviev from the Party was discussed by the Central Committee on October 20. Stalin, who was backed by Milyutin and Uritsky, opposed Lenin’s demand and adopted a conciliatory stand. He opposed not only the expulsion of the strike-breakers Kamenev and Zinoviev from the Party, but also their removal from the Central Committee, and proposed deferring consideration of the matter until the Central Committee met in plenary session. A majority of the Central Committee decided to prohibit Kamenev and Zinoviev from making statements on behalf of the Party.

Forewarned by the traitors, the Provisional Government took immediate steps to crush the revolution. Special units were summoned from the front, the whole of Petrograd was divided into districts, and these were patrolled by mounted detachments. But the counter-revolution was now powerless to halt the mustering of the revolutionary forces. The Party had roused and organised vast masses of the people to fight for the socialist revolution.

The work of organising the insurrection was directed by Lenin. He summoned members of the Revolutionary Military Committee, heard reports of the steps taken, and kept a check to see that everything was being done to ensure the victory of the insurrection. He gave instructions regarding the detailed plan of insurrection and the strengthening and arming of the Red Guard. Bolsheviks active in the army and the Baltic Fleet called on him and received instructions on the use of the fleet and on the summoning of revolutionary units from the front. Representatives who came to him from Moscow reported on the situation in that city and in the Moscow Region.
The Central Committee of the Party followed the basic instruction of Marxism to treat insurrection as an art. Representatives of the Central Committee were sent to various parts of the country to help the local Party organisations prepare for armed insurrection: G. I. Petrovsky was sent to the Donets coalfield and the Ukraine, and G. K. Orjonikidze to Transcaucasia. Representatives of local Party organisations came to the Central Committee for instructions. Letters and directives were sent from the C. C. to the localities. The biggest Party organisations were not only informed of the insurrection, but also received practical instructions on how to organise it. The Central Committee closely followed the work of the Military Organisation and helped it. It drew the trade unions into the work of organising the insurrection. The enlarged meeting of the Party Central Committee, held on October 16, was attended by representatives of the biggest unions. The work of the Central Committee during that period was a splendid example of collective leadership. In the three months alone, preceding the October Revolution, more than 30 meetings of the C. C. were held, including two plenary and two enlarged meetings.

Lenin insisted that the insurrection be begun without fail before the Second Congress of Soviets, scheduled for October 25. It was essential to forestall the enemy, who had been forewarned by the traitors and who expected the action to take place on the day the Congress opened.

"Under no circumstances," wrote Lenin in a letter to the Central Committee on October 24, "should the power be left in the hands of Kerensky and Co. until the 25th—not under any circumstances; the matter must be decided without fail this very evening or this very night.

"History will not forgive revolutionaries for procrastinating, when they can—and certainly will—win today, while they risk losing much, in fact everything, tomorrow" (Collected Works, Vol. 26, p. 204).

On Lenin's proposal, the insurrection was launched on October 24, before the Congress opened. The headquarters of the insurrection was in the Smolny Institute, where Lenin arrived late in the evening of the 24th to direct operations personally. On the instructions of headquarters, Red Guards occupied the preselected objectives. They mounted guard over the factories. All approaches to the capital were guarded by revolutionary units to prevent the arrival of reinforcements for the Provisional Government from the front. Sailors of the Baltic Fleet were summoned to the capital. In the course of the night all government institutions were occupied, and the Winter Palace, where the Provisional Government had taken refuge, was surrounded. The workers' Red Guard detachments formed the principal fighting force of the insurrection, the sailors of the Baltic Fleet sharing the glory of victory with them. Side by
side with the Red Guard detachments and the sailors, fought the regiments of the Petrograd garrison. The insurrection enjoyed such wide support among the masses, and had been so thoroughly planned, that it was carried out with rare speed. By the morning of October 25 the Provisional Government had been deposed. At 10 o’clock in the morning appeared the manifesto “To the Citizens of Russia!” written by Lenin, the genius who had inspired and led the revolution. It said:

“The Provisional Government has been deposed. State power has passed into the hands of the organ of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies—the Revolutionary Military Committee, which heads the Petrograd proletariat and garrison.

“The cause for which the people have fought, namely, the immediate offer of a democratic peace, the abolition of landlord ownership of land, workers’ control over production, and the establishment of Soviet power—this cause has been secured.

“Long live the revolution of workers, soldiers and peasants!”

(Ibid., p. 207.)

The government which had been overthrown remained in possession only of the Winter Palace, garrisoned by military cadets and a women’s shock battalion. Lenin gave orders for this last stronghold of the bourgeois government to be taken by storm. From the Neva, the cruiser Aurora fired a shot, giving the signal for the assault. That shot heralded the birth of a new world. On the night of October 25 the Winter Palace fell; the ministers of the last government of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie were arrested.

In the evening of October 25 the Second Congress of Soviets opened. It represented over 400 of the country’s Soviets. Of the 650 delegates present, about 400 were Bolsheviks. The rest of the delegates were, in the main, Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Mensheviks and Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, who had till then dominated the Soviets, comprised a small group of 70 to 80. At the Congress itself, this group continued to dwindle, its members deserting either to the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries or to the Menshevik internationalists. The miserable remnants of the bankrupt parties of compromise with the bourgeoisie left the Congress.

On the very first day of its labours the Second Congress of Soviets adopted the proclamation “To the Workers, Soldiers and Peasants!” written by Lenin.

“Backed by the will of the vast majority of the workers, soldiers and peasants,” read the proclamation, “and by the victorious insurrection of the workers and garrison which has taken place in Petrograd, the Congress takes power into its own hands. . . .

“The Congress decrees: all power in the localities is transferred to the Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’
Deputies, which must duly ensure genuine revolutionary order” (Collected Works, Vol. 26, p. 215).

The workers and peasant poor had overthrown the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and established the dictatorship of the proletariat. October 25 (November 7), 1917, has gone down in history as the day of the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia.

At the second session of the Congress, on October 26, Lenin delivered two reports. The first was devoted to the question of peace. The Congress unanimously adopted the Decree on Peace, which proclaimed the Soviet Government’s total renunciation of all predatory treaties and proposed to all the belligerent nations and their governments immediate negotiations for the conclusion of a general and just democratic peace. The first thing the people did after seizing power was to begin a fight for peace, inspiring the whole of mankind by their example.

The Decree on Peace declared the war to be “the greatest of crimes against humanity” and solemnly proclaimed the Soviet Government’s determination to sign peace immediately on terms equally just for all peoples, without annexations and indemnities.

For the first time in history new principles of international relations were proclaimed, principles which condemned war as a means of settling disputes and made peace the corner-stone of the foreign policy of the socialist state. That first Soviet decree already proclaimed Lenin’s idea of the possibility of coexistence of two systems differing in their social structure.

On Lenin’s second report, the Congress adopted the Decree on Land, which proclaimed the confiscation of all the landed estates without compensation, and the transfer of all the land to the people.

The Bolshevik Party thus fulfilled the promises it had made to the people in its Programme. The Decree on Land gave effect to the age-old hopes of the peasantry. In all, over 360 million acres of land passed to the people. For the first time in history the peasants were released from their land debts: they had been owing the Peasant Bank alone nearly 1,500 million gold rubles, not counting private debts to landlords, usurers and kulaks. The Decree on Land released the peasants from annual payment of rent for the land and from expenditure on the purchase of new lots amounting to 700 million rubles. In this way the land was nationalised. It became the property of the state.

The Decree on Land included the peasant instructions, compiled by the Socialist-Revolutionaries on the basis of 242 local instructions by the peasants to their delegates. While in power, the Socialist-Revolutionaries had done nothing to put the instructions into effect. The Bolsheviks made the peasant instructions law on the very day they assumed power—although in addition to the de-
mand for the abolition of private property in land and the confiscation of the landed estates without compensation, the instructions called for an equalitarian use of land, a point with which the Bolshevik Party did not agree. Replying to those who accused the Party of adopting the instructions, Lenin said:

“As a democratic government, we cannot ignore the decision of the rank and file of the people, even though we may disagree with it. In the fire of experience, in putting the decree into practice and carrying it out locally, the peasants will themselves realise where the truth lies” (ibid., p. 228).

This act expressed the wisdom of the Party, the flexibility of its tactics, its ability to take the interests of the masses into account, and its profound confidence that the peasants would solidly support the Bolshevik line on the agrarian question.

That same day, October 26, the Second Congress of Soviets formed the Council of People’s Commissars, headed by V. I. Ulyanov-Lenin. The people had entrusted the direction of the country to the Bolshevik Party.

The delegates to the Second Congress of Soviets left for various parts of the country to put the Congress decisions into practice. In a number of localities, the struggle for Soviet power was complicated by the actions of the Whites and bourgeois nationalist counter-revolutionaries.

But, notwithstanding the diversity of conditions in various parts of the country—the different degrees of the Bolshevik Party’s influence, the big differences in industrial development and in the numerical strength of the proletariat, national peculiarities, and so forth—Soviet power was established almost all over the vast territory of Russia in a comparatively short space of time.


1. The chief reason for the victory of the October Socialist Revolution was that it was led by the working class of Russia. No other detachment of the international army of labour had gained such tremendous experience in so short an historical period. The proletariat of Russia, led by Lenin, was the first of all the classes in the country to form its own party. The working class led the struggle of the whole people against the autocracy and against the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The other sections of the working people had convinced themselves that in the proletariat they had a champion of the interests of the whole people, who were languishing under the yoke of the landlords and bourgeoisie. The proletariat of Russia was the principal motive force of the entire social and political development of the country.
2. The October Revolution was victorious because a social force had been created in Russia—the alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry—that broke the resistance of the moribund classes. In the course of the revolution the Bolsheviks had exposed the traitors to the working-class cause, the opportunists, who had maintained that the proletariat could assume and retain power only where it constituted a majority of the population. The Russian proletariat had secured the full backing of the poor peasantry, which constituted the overwhelming majority of the rural population—as much as 65 per cent. The broad masses of the peasantry had realised from their own experience, and as a result of the extensive work carried out by the Bolshevik Party, that only under the leadership of the proletariat could they secure land, peace, bread and liberty. By winning a majority of the labouring peasantry over to the proletariat, the Bolsheviks won the peasant masses away from the bourgeoisie.

3. The October Revolution differed from all other revolutions in that the workers created their own organs of power. It was in the very midst of the Russian proletariat that a new form of revolutionary authority had arisen—the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies. The Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies were organs of the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry, a form of organisation that embodied the alliance of the workers and peasants under the leadership of the workers.

“Had not the creative effort of the revolutionary classes given rise to the Soviets,” wrote Lenin, “the proletarian revolution in Russia would have been a hopeless cause” (Collected Works, Vol. 26, p. 80).

4. The October Revolution was victorious because it was confronted with a comparatively weak enemy, the Russian bourgeoisie. The entire course of historical development of the Russian capitalism, its backwardness as compared with that of the leading capitalist countries, and its dependence on foreign capital explain the political flabbiness, cowardice and inadequate experience of the Russian bourgeoisie. The compromisers—the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks—likewise proved powerless to help the Russian bourgeoisie. In a struggle that had gone on for many years, they had been exposed by the Bolsheviks as agents of the bourgeoisie. On the eve of the October Revolution these parties openly deserted to the camp of the counter-revolution; they championed the capitalist system.

5. A decisive circumstance that made the victory of the revolution possible was the fact that the masses of the people were headed by the tested, militant and revolutionary Bolshevik Party, a party guided by the advanced theory of the working class, the theory of Marxism-Leninism.

While the revolution was being prepared and carried out, the
Party did an enormous amount of work in the theoretical field, and enriched Marxism with new propositions. The works of Lenin, the resolutions of the April Conference and the Sixth Party Congress, and the resolutions and decisions of the Central Committee contain the theoretical substantiation of a concrete plan for the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution.

In its fight against the opportunists the Party worked out and upheld the theory that socialism could be victorious in Russia. It showed that the development of capitalism in this country had created objective conditions in it for the establishment of socialism, and that the particular acuteness of the contradictions in Russia had made it the weakest link in the chain of imperialism. Lenin developed the Marxist theory of socialist revolution, discovered, in a republic of Soviets, a political form for the dictatorship of the proletariat, substantiated that view, and further elaborated Marxist views on armed insurrection, developing them into a full-fledged theory.

The Great October Socialist Revolution is a splendid example of the practical application and implementation of Lenin's theory of socialist revolution.

The toiling masses had seen all the other parties in power, separately and in various combinations. They had seen the Cadets, who represented the bourgeoisie as a whole; they had experienced the rule of a coalition of Cadets, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks; they had tested the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks by their deeds, when they were in a majority in the Soviets. In the course of the revolution, all the bourgeois and compromising parties had discredited themselves, had revealed their counter-revolutionary essence. The working people turned away from the parties of compromise with the bourgeoisie and, using their right to recall deputies, proceeded to oust from the Soviets those who had betrayed their confidence, electing in their place Bolsheviks, people who had proved by their deeds that they were consistent defenders of the people's interests and genuine fighters for freedom and independence. In this way the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were isolated from the masses. The Bolshevik Party was the only party to lead the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and all working people.

The Bolshevik Party succeeded in uniting all the diverse revolutionary movements and in directing them towards a single goal, that of overthrowing imperialism. The Party merged into a single revolutionary torrent the movement of the whole people for peace, the peasants' fight for the land and against landlord oppression, the struggle of Russia's oppressed nations against national oppression, and the fight of the proletariat, the leading force in society, for socialism. Under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, the
workers and poor peasants overthrew the government of the bour­geoisie and established Soviet power.

Such were the chief reasons of a domestic character that ensured the victory of the revolution.

Among the reasons of an international character that ensured the success of the Great October Socialist Revolution was the fact that the revolution began during the imperialist world war. Neither the Anglo-French nor the German bloc was able to give direct armed assistance to the Russian bourgeoisie. They helped it materially and by organising plots, but were unable to provide it with any considerable armed forces. The Russian bourgeoisie, left face to face with the Russian proletariat at the head of all the working people, could not withstand the onslaught of the masses.

The support of the international proletariat was also of enormous significance to the revolution. Under the influence of the October Revolution, the revolutionary mass movement grew stronger in all capitalist countries. The action of the international proletariat tied the hands of the imperialists and thereby facilitated the triumphal march of the Great October Revolution through the country.

Defining the international significance of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Lenin wrote that it manifested itself in two forms: in its influence on the revolutionary movement in other countries, and in the inevitable repetition of the basic features of the Russian revolution on an international scale.

All the cardinal questions of the Great October Socialist Revolu­tion are of international importance, in the broad sense of the word. Under the direct influence of the October Revolution, the exploited people throughout the world, languishing under the yoke of imperialism, were moved to action. A number of revolutions—in Germany, Austria-Hungary and several other countries—together with revolu­tionary mass actions of the workers in Europe and America, shook the capitalist world to its foundations. The enslaved peoples of the colonial countries awoke to action. The Russian revolution began to unite the revolutionary actions of the workers and the national liberation struggle into a single force, capable of overthrowing imperialism.

The October Revolution was the clearest manifestation of the sharpening of the general crisis of capitalism. The Russian revolu­tion broke the chain of imperialism and cleared the way for the establishment of a new, socialist society. It put an end to the un­divided rule of imperialism. The banner of socialism was raised over one-sixth of the globe. The world was split into two camps: the camp of moribund capitalism and the camp of rising socialism. The October Revolution ushered in a new era in the history of mankind, the era of the abolition of all forms of exploitation, the era of the victory of communism.
The great international significance of the October Revolution lies in the fact that it accelerated the course of world history and, moreover, demonstrated that its basic features must inevitably recur in the socialist revolution in any other country. It showed that without an alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry, led by the workers, without the dictatorship of the proletariat as a specific class alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry, the victory of revolution was impossible. "The Great October Revolution," the Programme of the C.P.S.U. says, "breached the imperialist front in Russia, one of the world’s largest countries, firmly established the dictatorship of the proletariat and created a new type of state—the Soviet socialist state, and a new type of democracy—democracy for the working people" (The Road to Communism, Eng. ed., Moscow, p. 455). The October Revolution was a classic realisation in Russia of Lenin’s proposition regarding the dictatorship of the proletariat. Lenin described the dictatorship of the proletariat as an alliance of the Russian workers not only with the Russian peasants, but also with the working people of all the nationalities of Russia, as an alliance of the proletariat of an advanced country with the oppressed peoples of the colonies. These fundamental tenets of Lenin’s theory of socialist revolution are applicable to all countries.

The great, world-wide significance of the October Revolution lies in its having been the first revolution in history to give the people not only political rights, but also the material conditions necessary for a prosperous life.

Of enormous significance for the international proletariat are the theory and practice of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. that began after the victory of the Great October Revolution. To the land of Soviets fell the task of blazing the trail from capitalism to socialism.

The October Revolution demonstrated to the whole world, and primarily to the dependent and colonial peoples, who comprised more than half the human race, the only correct way to solve the national question.

The Great October Revolution proclaimed new relations between the peoples. "For the first time there emerged in the international arena a state which put forward the great slogan of peace and began carrying through new principles in relations between peoples and countries. Mankind acquired a reliable bulwark in its struggle against wars of conquest, for peace and the security of the peoples" (ibid., p. 456).

The victory of the socialist revolution in Russia strikingly confirmed the vitality of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the correctness of the Bolshevik Party’s strategy and tactics, and in this way made easier the struggle of the working people of all countries for peace, democracy and socialism.
BRIEF SUMMARY

The October Revolution of 1917 showed all working people that the Bolshevik Party was the only force that could abolish the capitalist system, avert national disaster and put the country on the path to independent development. In Lenin's April Theses and in the decisions of the Seventh All-Russian Conference, the Party provided the people with a concrete plan for transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution, and called on the masses to fight for the transfer of all power to the Soviets, which would secure peace, bread, land and liberty. Lenin discovered in the Soviets a political form for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In advancing the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" the Party in the conditions of dual power proceeded from the assumption that a peaceful development of the revolution was possible, that a bloodless transfer of all power to the Soviets could take place, and that the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry could grow peacefully into the socialist dictatorship of the proletariat.

After the July events, however, when the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie succeeded in securing undivided power, a peaceful development of the revolution was no longer possible. The slogan "All power to the Soviets!" was temporarily withdrawn at the Sixth Party Congress, for the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries had converted the Soviets into an appendage of the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government. They had completely deserted to the camp of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

With the new revolutionary upsurge, stimulated by the Kornilov revolt and its defeat, the Soviets revived, and became once again militant, revolutionary organs of the masses. The period of Bolshevisation of the Soviets began. The Party again put forward the slogan "All power to the Soviets!", but this time it meant a call for insurrection against the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

By its selfless work among the masses and flexible tactics, which took into account the specific situation, the Party rallied the proletariat under its banners, and succeeded in convincing the masses of the correctness of its ideas and in rousing the people to decisive action against the Provisional Government. The Communist Party acted in the revolution as the wise and tested leader of the working people, ably directing all forms of the working people's struggle along the only right path—the path leading to liberty and a classless society.

The Provisional Government was not saved by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. On the eve of the October Revolution these parties completed the cycle of their development,
turning into outright defenders of counter-revolution, upholders of the capitalist system. In the course of the revolution and as a result of the explanatory work of the Bolsheviks, the people came to realise the counter-revolutionary nature of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. The masses convinced themselves that the Bolshevik Party was the only party whose words were never at variance with its deeds, that it alone would abolish all forms of exploitation and save the country from disaster. The workers, labouring peasants and soldiers convinced themselves of the Party's devotion to the interests of the people, of the heroism of its members, and of the Communists' readiness to face death in order to secure the triumph of the socialist revolution. The masses entrusted their fate to the only revolutionary and fully consistent defender of their interests—the Bolshevik Party. Responding to its call, they overthrew the bourgeois Provisional Government and set up a socialist republic of Soviets.

The October Socialist Revolution was a people's revolution. It overthrew the yoke of the exploiters. It established the dictatorship of the proletariat which, with the support of the poorest strata of the peasantry, set about laying the foundations of a communist society.

_The October Revolution ushered in a new era in the history of mankind, the era of the triumph of socialism and communism._
CHAPTER EIGHT

THE PARTY’S FIGHT
TO DEVELOP THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION
AND CONSOLIDATE SOVIET POWER

(October 1917-1918)

1. The Party’s Fight to Establish the Soviet State. First Socialist Changes

The victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat brought about radical changes in the position of all classes and strata of the population in Russia. The proletariat became the ruling class. Around it rallied the working masses of town and country, primarily the poor peasants. The Soviets had the backing of the vast majority of the people—the workers, soldiers and working peasants. This powerful camp of the working people was headed by the Bolshevik Party. The camp of the enemies of Soviet power was made up of the defeated landlords, capitalists and kulaks, and those who voiced their interests: the monarchists, Cadets, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, anarchists and bourgeois nationalists.

The October Revolution fundamentally changed the position of the Communist Party and the nature of its activities. It became the governing party in the world’s first socialist state of workers and peasants. It was confronted with new historical tasks—building up and consolidating the Soviet state, reorganising society along socialist lines, organising the country’s defence against the hostile capitalist encirclement, strengthening contacts with the proletariat of other countries and rendering them support.

The proletariat of Russia began to build socialism in an extremely complex and difficult situation. The socialist revolution had triumphed in one country, while capitalism continued to exist in the others. Russia’s working class was the first in history to pave the way to socialism. Economically, Russia was a comparatively backward country, with a predominantly small-holding peasant population. The war still continued. It had ruined and exhausted the country and created unprecedented chaos. The proletariat had
practically no trained personnel to administer the state and manage the economy. The defeated exploiters—the landlords and capitalists—were offering furious resistance to the proletarian dictatorship. They still had an economic basis in the country in the form of private production. They had the support of international capitalism, with which they were closely connected.

Russia’s proletariat had resolutely to suppress the resistance of its numerous enemies, who, in their fight against Soviet power, engineered conspiracies and revolts, resorted to sabotage, calumny and provocation, and to the bribing of vacillating and unstable elements. In the very first days after the victory of the October Revolution, the Bolshevik Party had to deal with attempts by the counter-revolution to overthrow Soviet power. Kerensky, who had fled from Petrograd to the Northern front, mustered Cossack units and dispatched them against the capital under the command of General Krasnov. After capturing Gatchina, Krasnov launched an attack on Petrograd on October 28. On October 29, a counter-revolutionary organisation formed by the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks under the demagogic name of “Committee for the Salvation of the Fatherland and the Revolution”, raised a mutiny of military cadets in Petrograd. White officers and military cadets mutinied simultaneously in Moscow. The counter-revolution started an armed struggle against Soviet power.

The Soviet power had to crush the resistance of their enemies by force of arms. The Party and the Soviet Government acted with dispatch and resolution. With the support of the workers, the sailors of the Baltic Fleet and soldiers of the Petrograd garrison, the anti-Soviet mutiny of the military cadets was suppressed the same day. Two days later, on October 31, General Krasnov’s Cossack detachments were routed at Pulkovo. In the early hours of November 3 the fighting in Moscow against the White rebels ended in victory for the workers. The first attempts of the counter-revolution to overthrow Soviet power by armed force were crushed.

When the anti-Soviet Kerensky-Krasnov mutiny was at its height, the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Railwaymen’s Union (the Vikzhel), which was headed by Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, demanded the formation of a so-called “all-socialist government”. The enemy wanted this “government” to include, in addition to Bolsheviks, representatives of the counter-revolutionary Menshevik and Right Socialist-Revolutionary parties, hoping in this way to end Soviet power.

In order to unmask the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party agreed to negotiate with the Vikzhel. These negotiations were also to serve, in Lenin’s opinion, as diplomatic cover for military operations against Kerensky and enable the Party to gain time in which to muster the forces of the revolution to defeat the enemies of the
Soviets. Agreement was made conditional on the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks recognising Soviet power and all the gains of the October Revolution, and the government’s responsibility to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee elected by the Second Congress of Soviets. The Central Committee appointed a delegation headed by Kamenev to conduct the negotiations. But Kamenev violated the Party’s instructions. He yielded to the demands of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, and agreed to the formation of an “all-socialist government” in which the Bolsheviks were to be assigned a minor role; he did not object to Lenin being replaced as head of the government.

Kamenev’s conduct during the negotiations with the Vikzhel roused the indignation of most of the Central Committee members. But Kamenev found several sympathisers. He was supported in the Central Committee by Zinoviev, Rykov, Nogin and Milyutin. The capitulatory position of Kamenev and Zinoviev was a continuation of the treacherous line they had followed prior to October. Kamenev, Zinoviev, Rykov and their supporters had no faith in the success of the socialist revolution or in the possibility of socialism being victorious in Russia. They proposed capitulating to the defeated counter-revolutionary parties, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, which was tantamount to renunciation of Soviet power and a return to bourgeois parliamentarism, to capitalism.

The negotiations with the Vikzhel proved that Lenin was right. What the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were aiming at was the overthrow of Soviet power. While professing neutrality, the Vikzhel was actually supporting Kerensky and sabotaging the revolutionary measures of the Soviet Government. Representatives of the Vikzhel could not be admitted into Soviet bodies. The Vikzhel had no support among the masses. The continuation of negotiations with it could cause damage to the Party and Soviet power.

At the beginning of November 1917 the Central Committee of the Party adopted a resolution categorically rejecting any agreement with the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks on the basis of the formation of an “all-socialist government”. The Central Committee demanded of the Kamenev-Zinoviev group that it cease its criminal activities. But the opposition group refused to submit to the will of the Central Committee majority, and at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee voted openly against the Party Central Committee decision to discontinue negotiations, thus committing a flagrant breach of Party discipline. Thereupon the Central Committee, headed by Lenin, presented an ultimatum to the opposition, demanding that it stop its disruptive work. In reply, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Rykov, Nogin and Milyutin announced their disagreement with the policy of the
Party and their resignation from the Central Committee. At the same time Nogin, Rykov, Milyutin and Teodorovich withdrew from the government.

The desertion of a handful of capitulators and cowards from responsible Party and government posts caused jubilation in the enemy camp. The enemies of the Soviets forecast the collapse of Soviet power, but their hopes were not justified. The desertion of the capitulators was emphatically condemned by the Central Committee of the Party. On the proposal of the Bolshevik group, Kamenev was removed from the post of Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. Y. M. Sverdlov was elected to this post. The Party Central Committee strengthened the Council of People's Commissars by appointing to it steadfast Bolsheviks who were veteran Party members. These were G. I. Petrovsky (People's Commissar for Internal Affairs), A. G. Schlichter (People's Commissar for Food), P. I. Stuchka (People's Commissar of Justice), and M. T. Yelizarov (People's Commissar of Railways). The local Party organisations unanimously supported the energetic measures of the Central Committee of the Party with regard to the capitulators. In a message to all Party members and to all the labouring classes of Russia, the Central Committee firmly declared: “There must be no government in Russia other than the Soviet Government” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 26, p. 269).

The months immediately following the victory of the October insurrection were a period of supreme triumph for the socialist revolution. Soviet power became more firmly established with every day that passed. After the failure of the Kerensky-Krasnov campaign against Petrograd, the counter-revolution renewed its attempts to overthrow Soviet power. But the more desperate the resistance of the bourgeoisie, the more energetic were the actions of the Soviet Government. In the latter half of November 1917 revolutionary detachments of sailors and soldiers, acting on orders from the Soviet Government, liquidated the General Headquarters of the old army at Mogilev. At the end of November, a counter-revolutionary plot organised in Petrograd by the Cadets was foiled. The revolts of the Cossack upper strata in the Don area and the South Urals were successfully put down. The counter-revolution had no support among the masses. The Soviets suppressed the resistance of the exploiters with comparative ease, and were victorious on the home front. Lenin called the victorious march of the socialist revolution across the vast territory of the country “the unbroken triumph of Soviet power”.

While crushing the counter-revolutionary revolts and routing the capitulators, the Party did an enormous amount of work to build up the new Soviet state. It was a difficult and complicated job. The old state machinery of the bourgeoisie and the landlords had to be demolished and a new, Soviet state machinery set up in its
place; all the Soviets had to be united from top to bottom into one well-knit state organisation, and the broad mass of the working people drawn into the work of administering the state. The difficulties were all the greater since the Party did not know the practical shape which the organisation of the administrative, economic, military and other machinery of a Soviet state should take. There was no experience it could draw upon, for it was the first state of its kind to be set up in history.

Gathering all its energy, the Party set about overcoming the difficulties involved in building the Soviet system. It was the only force in the country capable of taking the lead in the struggle for the establishment of a Soviet state. The Party was a militant and well-knit force. Party organisations existed in all the gubernia centres, in most uyezd towns, at big factories and in some of the volosts and villages. The Party sent its best people to work in the Soviet governmental machine. Communists headed the central and local organs of Soviet government, the people's commissariats and other government departments.

During the October Revolution and in the period when the Soviet state was being built up, Lenin's statesmanship and genius for organisation manifested itself most strikingly. As head of the Council of People's Commissars, Lenin personally directed the establishment of the central machinery of the Soviet state and guided the building up of the Soviet state throughout the country. Lenin personified a new type of statesman. He had deep faith in the creative power of the masses and maintained close contact with them. "The creative activity of the masses," he said, "is the basic factor in the new public life" (Collected Works, Vol. 26, p. 254).

The October Revolution awakened broad sections of the people to independent political activity. Their revolutionary activity was vividly expressed in numerous congresses and meetings. Lenin described this democracy of the working people, expressed in meetings which swept the country like a spring torrent, as the initial form of their discussion of the new conditions of life, their first step in building and governing their state. At all-Russian, gubernia and uyezd congresses of Soviets, at meetings and conferences of workers, soldiers and peasants, the Bolsheviks explained the historic significance of the October Revolution, the essence of Soviet power and its policy and decrees. The Party made extensive use of the press to enlighten the people politically. It used presses confiscated from the bourgeoisie to print Pravda, Izvestia, Derevenskaya Bednota and other newspapers, which were widely circulated throughout the country.

The Party channelled the revolutionary energy and creative initiative of the masses into building the Soviet machinery of state. The old, bourgeois-landlord machinery (police, bureaucratic, military and judicial) was destroyed and a new one created in its place,
that of the proletarian state. The ministries of the bourgeois Provisional Government were abolished in the very first days of the revolution, and replaced by people's commissariats. The agents of the Provisional Government were removed and the local organs of bourgeois-landlord rule abolished. The city Dumas and Zemstvo boards, which had represented the interests of the bourgeoisie and the landlords, were disbanded. The Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies became the sole organs vested with full political power all over the country. Soviet people's courts and a workers' militia were set up in place of the old courts and police. A special body, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission with F. E. Dzerzhinsky at its head, was formed to combat counter-revolution and sabotage.

The monarchists, Cadets, Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and other counter-revolutionary elements did their utmost to frustrate the building of the Soviet state and the work of the apparatus of the Soviets. They engineered sabotage by officials of the old machinery of state (former ministries, banks, postal service, telegraph, etc.). Officials and higher-paid office workers, bribed by the bourgeoisie and closely connected with it, refused to obey the Soviet authorities. Their sabotage created additional difficulties. The Party appealed to the masses, sent thousands of the best workers, sailors and soldiers to work in government offices, and set up the machinery of the people's commissariats. The sabotage of the officials was broken.

A most difficult task was the creation of new armed forces. The old army, notwithstanding the fact that the soldiers had gone over to the side of the Soviets, could not ensure the defence of the state against the foreign foe. Exhausted by the protracted war, it had long since lost its fighting capacity. The soldiers were eager to go home. To ensure the maintenance of revolutionary order among the troops, and the stability of the front until peace was concluded, the Soviet state democratized the army: all ranks and titles were abolished, election of all officers by soldiers was introduced, etc. In January 1918 the Soviet Government started the gradual demobilization of the old army. On January 15, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars adopted a Decree on the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. The Red Army was formed on a voluntary basis. War-weariness being general among the masses, the core of a new, revolutionary army could only be formed from members of the working class and the poor peasantry, who were prepared to defend Soviet power selflessly. The most class-conscious elements of the working people joined the ranks of the Red Army. Its organisation and formation was the responsibility of an All-Russian Board which included N. V. Krylenko and N. I. Podvoisky. The entire work of building the Armed Forces of the Soviet Republic was directed by the Party headed by Lenin.
The October Revolution while accomplishing strictly socialist tasks, at the same time carried the bourgeois-democratic revolution to its conclusion. No bourgeois revolution has ever abolished the feudal order of things so completely and decisively as the October Socialist Revolution in Russia. On assuming power, the proletariat, led by the Bolshevik Party, eradicated the remnants of medievalism with exceptional speed and boldness. The Decree on Land uprooted the survivals of serfdom in landownership. All the divisions of society into “estates” with their titles (nobility, clergy, merchants, middle classes, etc.) were abolished, and one common name was established for the entire population of the country, namely, citizen of the Russian Republic. The Soviet Government proclaimed freedom of conscience. The Church was separated from the state, and the school from the Church. Women acquired equal rights with men in all public spheres.

The October Revolution put an end to the oppression and inequality of the non-Russian nationalities. A People’s Commissariat for the Affairs of Nationalities was set up within the Soviet Government, and J. V. Stalin was placed at its head. The Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia, proclaimed by the Soviet Government on November 2, 1917, gave legal confirmation to the free development and full equality of all the nationalities of Russia. All nations inhabiting the country were guaranteed the right of self-determination, up to and including secession and formation of independent states. In December 1917 the Soviet Government recognised the independence of the Ukraine and Finland. It annulled all the unequal treaties concluded by the tsarist and Provisional governments with other countries. In its appeal “To All the Working Moslems of Russia and the East”, the Council of People’s Commissars proclaimed the freedom and inviolability of the national and cultural institutions, customs and faith of the Moslems, and guaranteed them full freedom to arrange their own way of life.

The Soviet state thus proclaimed a fundamentally new policy in relations between the peoples, the policy of complete equality, and thereby delivered a powerful blow to world imperialism and colonialism.

The bourgeoisie and its accomplices, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, claimed at the time that the Bolsheviks were destroying the Russian state, and that all the nationalities were forsaking them. That was downright slander of the Bolshevik Party. The Soviet state was being founded by the Party as a voluntary union of free national republics. It was the bourgeois nationalists, the bitterest enemies of the working people and of the Soviet state, who wanted to see Russia dismembered, and sought to provoke discord among the peoples inhabiting Russia. The workers and peasants of all the nationalities of Russia, however, wel-
coined the October Revolution. As soon as they took power into their own hands, they immediately addressed messages of solidarity to the Soviet Government, declaring their readiness to support it.

In December 1917 the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets met in Kharkov, and proclaimed the Ukraine a Soviet republic. The bourgeois nationalist Central Rada was outlawed. The Congress solemnly announced the establishment of a close union between the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Russia. The Ukrainians were the first to form their Soviet national republic. Between October 1917 and March 1918, power passed to the Soviets in Byelorussia, Estonia, the part of Latvia not occupied by the Germans, the Crimea, Moldavia, the city of Baku, the national-minority areas of the Volga region, Turkestan and the greater part of Kazakhstan.

Bolshevik organisations directed the people's struggle in the areas inhabited by non-Russian nationalities. The Bolshevik Party drew into its ranks the best elements of the working people of all the nationalities of Russia, and from among them trained revolutionaries, devoted to the cause of socialism and proletarian internationalism. Such were F. A. Sergeyev (Artem), G. I. Petrovsky, N. A. Skrypnik, V. Y. Chubar and A. G. Schlichter in the Ukraine; M. Azizbekov in Azerbaijan; A. F. Myasnikov (Myasnikyan) and S. G. Shahumyan in Armenia; P. A. Japaridze, F. I. Makharadze, G. K. Orjonikidze and M. G. Tskhakaya in Georgia; P. I. Stuchka in Latvia; V. S. Mickevičius-Kapsukas (Mitskevich-Kapsukas) in Lithuania; A. T. Jangildin in Kazakhstan; V. E. Kingissepp in Estonia; U. D. Buinaksky in Daghestan, and many others. They were all Party leaders who had been tested in struggle and who enjoyed the deep confidence of the working people.

One of the main tasks confronting the Party and the Soviets was that of satisfying the people's most urgent economic and cultural needs. Everything possible was done to immediately improve the living conditions of the workers and peasants by expropriating the capitalists and landlords. The Soviets took charge of food distribution, and ensured that the workers and their families were supplied first of all. They took over the municipal services. Hundreds of thousands of working-class families were moved from damp basements and congested barracks into well-appointed houses formerly owned by the bourgeoisie and the landlords. The workers, peasants and their children were given full access to education. Tuition fees in the schools were abolished and medical services were made free of charge. The palaces of the tsars and the mansions of the rich became the property of the people, and were turned into public meeting halls, sanatoria and museums. Working conditions and labour protection in industry were improved. An 8-hour working day was introduced in industry and a decree was issued providing for the insurance of industrial and office workers against sickness, disability and unemployment.
The Bolshevik Party proved to the labouring peasants by its deeds that the working class was their most dependable ally and leader, the defender of their interests. On winning power, the proletariat fulfilled the peasants’ most pressing economic demands with revolutionary dispatch and energy. The peasants received the land-ed estates for their own free use, and were liberated from the yoke of the landlords and capitalists. The peasant masses came to realise that the Decree on Land could only be implemented if they resolutely supported Soviet power in alliance with the urban workers, and by co-operating with them in the Soviets.

All these measures taken by the Party and the Soviet Government had a tremendous influence on the masses of the people. The alliance of the working class and the poor peasantry grew stronger. Soviet power was winning the increasing sympathy and support of the vast majority of the working people of Russia.

In November and December 1917 the Extraordinary and Second All-Russian congresses of Soviets of Peasants’ Deputies met in Petrograd. At these congresses, the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries conducted a desperate struggle against the Bolsheviks, and tried to set the peasant delegates against them. But they failed: the Bolshevik Party exposed them completely as betrayers of the interests of the labouring peasantry. The peasant congresses endorsed the decrees and the policy of the Soviet Government, and declared in favour of uniting the Soviets of Peasants’ Deputies and the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies. The unification of the workers, soldiers and peasants in common Soviets most effectively ensured the political leadership of the non-proletarian working masses by the proletariat, and the further consolidation of Soviet power. On the proposal of the Bolsheviks and at the instance of the delegates of the peasant congresses, representatives of the Party of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (Kolegayev, Proshyan, Steinberg) entered the Council of People’s Commissars. The Bolshevik Party was aware of the instability of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries but it brought them into the government because they still enjoyed the confidence of a considerable section of the peasantry and because they declared their support of Soviet power. This step weakened the forces of the enemies of Soviet power and struck a blow at the anti-Soviet parties, the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks.

The Party frustrated the designs of the counter-revolution to overthrow Soviet power with the aid of the Constituent Assembly. Elections to the Constituent Assembly were held in November 1917 on the basis of the lists of party candidates drawn up before the October Revolution. They took place at a time when large sections of the people had not yet grasped the significance of the socialist revolution. The Right Socialist-Revolutionaries took advantage of this, and managed to poll a majority in the regions and gubernias far removed from the capital and from the industrial
centres. The counter-revolutionary forces tried to exploit this situation in order to seize power.

On the eve of the opening of the Constituent Assembly, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted a Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People, drawn up by Lenin. The Declaration stated that all power in the country belonged to the Soviets; it confirmed the Decrees on Peace and on Land and other acts, and endorsed the foreign policy pursued by the Soviet Government. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee proposed to the Constituent Assembly, which opened on January 5, 1918, that it adopt the Declaration. But the counter-revolutionary majority of the Constituent Assembly evaded a discussion on it, and refused to recognise the Soviet Government and its decrees. The bourgeois Constituent Assembly thereby openly set itself against Soviet power and the will of the majority of the people, and exposed its counter-revolutionary nature. On January 6, by decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, it was dissolved. The dissolution of the bourgeois Constituent Assembly was approved by the people.

The policy of the Party and the Government with regard to the Constituent Assembly was supported by the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which opened on January 10, 1918, and which was joined by all the delegates to the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies, then in session. The Joint All-Russian Congress of Soviets endorsed the policy of the Soviet Government and adopted the Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People. The Third Congress of Soviets consolidated the achievements of the October Socialist Revolution and the establishment of the Soviet system. The Declaration stated: "Russia is hereby proclaimed a Republic of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies." The Russian Soviet Republic was instituted as a voluntary union of free nations, as a federation of Soviet national republics.

The Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People was one of the outstanding acts of world history. It differed fundamentally from the declarations of bourgeois revolutions. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of the French bourgeois revolution of the eighteenth century, by proclaiming liberty, equality and fraternity, made for the consolidation of the power of the bourgeoisie, the establishment of capitalism, and greater exploitation of the masses. The working people acquired neither liberty, equality, nor fraternity. On the other hand, the Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People, proclaimed by the October Socialist Revolution for the first time in history, expressed the true will of the working classes, established their rule and aimed at eliminating the exploitation of man by man, building socialism and abolishing classes.
The revolution spread in breadth and depth. Parallel with building the Soviet state system, the Party directed the struggle of the working class for the socialist reorganisation of society. As a result of the October Revolution, all enterprises owned by the landlords’ and capitalists’ state became the property of the people. A socialist form of economy came into existence. But in the early period following the establishment of Soviet power the greater part of the means of production remained in the hands of the bourgeoisie. In order to become the ruling class in the full sense of the term and set about organising socialist production, the proletariat, having won state power, had to dispossess the bourgeoisie of the banks, railways, factories and mines, and to convert them into public property.

In the middle of November 1917 the Soviet Government took over the administration of the State Bank, and then nationalised the private banks and declared banking a state monopoly. These measures greatly undermined the economic power of the bourgeoisie. At the same time the Soviet Government annulled all the foreign loans contracted by the tsar and the Provisional Government. Russia’s debt to other states amounted to about 16,000 million gold rubles. The working people of Russia were freed from the financial stranglehold of international capital.

The most difficult task was the transformation of capitalist into socialist property. The bourgeoisie offered furious resistance to the economic measures taken by the Soviet state. The capitalists closed down factories, concealed stocks of raw materials and finished goods, and delayed the payment of wages. The manufacturers tried to disorganise production and cause economic disaster. The capitalists had to be curbed and their sabotage broken. That could have been done by expropriating them immediately. But when the proletariat came to power, it had neither experience in economic management nor any economic bodies that could immediately take over the management of the country’s economic life. The Soviet Government therefore did not decree the nationalisation of the whole of industry at once, but instituted workers’ control at capitalist-owned enterprises.

On November 14, 1917, the Soviet Government issued Regulations on Workers’ Control, which introduced workers’ control at all industrial, commercial, agricultural, transport and co-operative enterprises. The implementation of the Regulations was entrusted to factory and other committees. This law unfettered the initiative of the working masses. By the beginning of 1918 workers’ control had been introduced at nearly all industrial enterprises.

Workers’ control helped to break the sabotage of the bourgeoisie and to frustrate its attempts to convert the factories into strongholds of counter-revolution. The workers gradually acquainted themselves with the economic affairs of their enterprises and learned management
of production. Organisers and executives emerged from among their ranks. In organising workers' control, the factory committees interfered more and more in the administrative and business activities of the employers, removed them from management and took it over themselves.

At the end of November 1917 the Soviet Government began the nationalisation of large-scale capitalist industry. There began a radical break-up of capitalist relations. The nationalised enterprises became the property of the Soviet state, they became socialist. By the middle of 1918 a considerable part of such large-scale capitalist industries as coal, metallurgy, oil, chemicals, engineering and textiles, and the whole of the sugar-refining industry were nationalised. Transport, the merchant marine and foreign trade were also nationalised. That, as Lenin aptly put it, was a "Red Guard attack on capital". The economic power of the bourgeoisie was thoroughly undermined. The Soviet state gained control of the key positions in the national economy.

To direct the socialisation of production on socialist lines, and for state management of the national economy, a Supreme Council of National Economy was set up under the Council of People's Commissars on December 1, 1917. Beginning with December 1917 economic councils began to be set up in the regions, gubernias and uyezds. The trade unions took an active part in the establishment of the councils. Gradually concentrating in their hands the management of the economy, the economic councils performed the function of the Soviet state in the sphere of economic organisation. With the establishment of the Supreme Council of National Economy, and the nationalisation of the banks, railways and large-scale industry, the Soviet state was able to turn to the work of building a new, socialist national economy.

The Communist Party raised the many millions of working people to the conscious making of history by giving them full freedom of initiative. The months immediately following the victory of the October Revolution showed what inexhaustible reserves of strength and revolutionary energy were latent in the masses, once they had freed themselves from the yoke of the landlords and capitalists. The whole country throbbed with new life. The absurd notion that only the rich could govern the state, implanted by the exploiters through the ages, was completely disproved. Having founded the new Soviet state, the workers and peasants began assiduously to learn how to govern it. The workers drove out the capitalists, and organised accounting and control. The peasants expropriated the landlords and arranged their life in a new way. The alliance of the working class and the labouring peasant masses, which constitutes the basis of Soviet power, was strengthened and tempered in the fire of the revolution. The Party inspired the masses with confidence in their own strength. In December 1917 Lenin wrote:
“Victory will be on the side of the exploited, for on their side is life, numerical strength, the strength of the mass, the strength of the inexhaustible sources of all that is selfless, true to ideas, and upright, all that is surging forward and awakening to the building of the new, all the gigantic reserves of energy and talent latent in the so-called ‘common people’, the workers and peasants” (Collected Works, Vol. 26, p. 364).

2. The Struggle to Withdraw from the War. The Peace of Brest Litovsk. Seventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.)

The profound revolutionary changes in all spheres of the country’s public life had considerably strengthened the Soviet system. However, its stability depended not only on the relation of class forces within the country, but also on the international position of the Soviet state. The biggest obstacle to the consolidation of the Soviet power was the state of war with Germany.

From the very first day that Soviet power was established the Party launched an active fight for peace. In the Decree on Peace the Soviet state proposed to all the belligerent countries the conclusion of a universal democratic peace, a peace without annexations and indemnities. The Entente countries (Britain, France, the U.S.A. and others), however, refused to conduct peace negotiations, thus making the conclusion of universal peace impossible. Thereupon the Soviet Government, in compliance with the will of the people decided to start peace negotiations with Germany and her allies.

The negotiations with Germany began on November 20, 1917, at Brest Litovsk (Brest). On December 2 an armistice was signed, after which negotiations for a peace treaty began. In the course of the negotiations it became clear that the German imperialists intended to impose a predatory and humiliating peace on Soviet Russia. They wanted to enslave Poland, Lithuania and part of Latvia and Byelorussia, all of which had been seized by their troops. The German imperialists also had annexationist designs on the Ukraine. Acting in collusion with the Ukrainian Rada which was living its last days, whose delegation had arrived in Brest Litovsk, they hoped, with the help of the bourgeois nationalists, to sever the Ukraine from Soviet Russia and enslave the Ukrainian people.

The internal and international situation at that time dictated the advisability of retreating before so strong and dangerous a raider as German imperialism, and of accepting onerous peace terms in order to save the young Soviet Republic. The national economy was in a state of chaos. Worn out and exhausted by the long war, the old army could not have withstood a German offensive.
The necessary enthusiasm for conducting a revolutionary war was lacking among broad strata of the working class and the peasantry. In order to save the country and the revolution, it was necessary to secure a peaceful breathing-space in which to consolidate Soviet power and to create a new army, the Red Army, which would be able to defend the country against imperialist invaders. It was mainly the bourgeoisie and the landlords, the White generals and officers, and also the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who were interested in continuing the war. And the counter-revolutionaries of every shade, from the monarchists and Cadets to the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, conducted a frenzied campaign against the peace negotiations. By impelling the Soviet Republic towards war with German imperialism, the foreign and Russian bourgeoisie was setting a trap for Soviet power, hoping to take advantage of its defeat to strangle the revolution and restore the old regime.

The Party had to decide the issue of war and peace without delay.

On January 8, 1918, Lenin submitted to a conference of members of the Central Committee of the Party and the Bolshevik delegates to the Third Congress of Soviets his theses regarding the immediate conclusion of a separate and annexationist peace. He showed that an objective appraisal of the social, economic and political situation in the country, and the fact that the Soviet Republic lacked an efficient army, dictated the necessity of concluding an immediate peace. But Lenin’s viewpoint did not receive the support of a majority at the conference. The situation was aggravated by the fact that a number of local Party committees (the Moscow and the Urals regional committees, the Petrograd and other committees) proposed stopping the peace negotiations with the Germans. Many Party workers were carried away by revolutionary phrases, and insisted that a revolutionary war be declared on imperialist Germany. Their mood strongly smacked of intoxication with the initial successes of Soviet power in the struggle against the internal counter-revolution. Neither did Lenin have a majority on the question of a peace treaty in the Central Committee. Trotsky, Bukharin and their followers were opposed to accepting the German peace terms; they asserted that the German troops would not be able to conduct an offensive and that a revolution was at hand in Germany.

An extremely difficult situation arose in the Party. It required Lenin’s tremendous perseverance and firmness to prove to the Party cadres the necessity of accepting severe terms of peace in order to win a breathing-space, and to expose the adventurist tactics of Trotsky and Bukharin, which spelled disaster for the Soviet Republic. Lenin explained that

"the fundamental change now lies in the establishment of a Soviet republic in Russia, and that both from our own and from the international socialist standpoint it is all-important to preserve
this republic, which has already started the socialist revolution; that at the present moment the slogan calling for a revolutionary war by Russia would mean either phrase-mongering and an empty demonstration, or would objectively be tantamount to walking into the trap being set for us by the imperialists, who want to draw us into continuing the imperialist war as a still weak particle, and to smash the young Soviet Republic as cheaply as possible" (Collected Works, Vol. 26, pp. 409-10).

To avert the breaking-off of the peace negotiations, and to prevent Trotsky and Bukharin from pursuing their adventurist tactics, Lenin secured a decision by the Party Central Committee in favour of dragging out the peace negotiations in every possible way, and the adoption by the Third Congress of Soviets of a decision to invest the Soviet Government with unlimited powers in deciding the question of war and peace. Lenin's position in the Central Committee was supported by F. A. Sergeyev (Artem), J. V. Stalin, Y. M. Sverdlov and others.

On January 27, 1918, the German delegates presented an ultimatum to the Soviet delegation, demanding that it sign the terms of a peace treaty which provided for the annexation of the German-occupied territories of Russia. The Soviet peace delegation at Brest Litovsk was headed at that time by Trotsky, who had specific instructions from Lenin to drag out the negotiations and to sign a peace treaty immediately should the Germans present an ultimatum. On January 28 Lenin in a special telegram re-emphasised the necessity of concluding a peace treaty. But Trotsky violated the directives of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. In spite of Lenin's insistent demand, he informed the German representatives on January 28 (February 10; from here onwards, all dates will be given in the new style) that the Soviet Government refused to sign the peace treaty on the terms presented by Germany. Trotsky also informed the Germans that the Soviet Republic was ending the state of war with Germany and demobilising its army. This was a treacherous statement, fraught with disastrous consequences for the Soviet Republic.

The German Government took advantage of Trotsky's statement. Breaking the armistice, the German Command, on February 18, 1918, launched an offensive all along the Russo-German front. The remnants of the old army could not withstand the onslaught of the enemy hordes. Encountering no serious resistance, the German troops within a few days occupied the whole of Latvia and Estonia, a considerable part of the Ukraine, captured Dvinsk, Minsk, Podoltsk, Pskov and other towns. They threatened Petrograd.

Lenin's forecast that this would be the course of events proved right. The offensive of the German troops showed that the object of the German imperialists was to overthrow the Soviet power and turn Russia into their colony. Mortal danger threatened the Soviet
land. On February 21, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars issued an appeal to the people written by Lenin: "The Socialist Fatherland Is in Danger!" The Central Committee and the Soviet Government called on all Party members, on all workers and peasants to defend the Soviet Republic against the invasion of the German imperialists.

The call of the Party and the Soviet Government evoked a surge of revolutionary energy among the working people. Advanced workers and demobilised soldiers volunteered in tens of thousands for service in the Red Army. Its detachments were sent forward against the enemy as soon as they were formed, and staunchly repulsed the onslaught of the German troops, which were armed to the teeth. Stiff fighting took place at Pskov, Revel (Tallinn) and Narva. Heroic resistance was offered to the German invaders at Pskov by Red Guard detachments and revolutionary units of the old army, which included Lettish riflemen. Sailors of the Baltic Fleet and Estonian Red Guard detachments took part in the fighting at Revel. Red Guard units of Petrograd workers, Red Army detachments and sailors of the Baltic Fleet fought in the battle of Narva.

The days of the mobilisation of the people's revolutionary forces and of the Red Army's heroic defence of the gains of the October Socialist Revolution against the invasion of the hordes of German imperialism marked the birth of the Red Army. In commemoration of this great exploit of the Soviet people's armed forces, February 23 is observed annually in the Soviet Union as Red Army Day.

During the German offensive Lenin exerted tremendous efforts to secure a decision by the Central Committee of the Party in favour of the conclusion of peace. The principal opponents of the conclusion of peace were Trotsky and Bukharin; the latter headed the anti-Party group of "Left Communists". Despite the fact that the offensive of the German troops showed quite patently the very great danger it presented to the Soviet Republic, the "Left Communists", masking their policy with leftist phrases, demanded continuation of the war. Lenin waged a relentless struggle against the "Left Communists" and against their policy, which was ruinous to the Soviet power. On February 18, 1918, on Lenin's insistence, the Party Central Committee had passed a resolution that the Soviet Republic was ready to sign a peace treaty. A telegram was sent to the German Government informing it of the Soviet Government's readiness to conclude an immediate peace. But imperialist Germany, in addition to its original demands, presented new, still more onerous terms. She laid claim to the whole of Latvia and Estonia; the Soviet Republic was to pay an enormous indemnity to Germany and to demobilise its army. The Ukraine was to become a vassal state of Germany, and fall under the yoke of the German imperialists.
On February 23 the Party Central Committee met to discuss the new ultimatum of the German Government. Lenin proposed accepting the ultimatum forthwith. The “Left Communists”—Bukharin, Uritsky, Lomov, Bubnov—again opposed the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. Stalin wavered; he declared for negotiations but was against signing a peace treaty on the new terms. After Lenin’s criticism he stated that peace on those terms must be signed. Most of the Central Committee members supported Lenin’s proposal for an immediate peace treaty. The “Left Communist” advocates of a “revolutionary war” found themselves in a minority in the Central Committee.

Defeated there, Bukharin and his followers adopted a policy of disorganizing the entire work of the Party and the Government. In an attempt to split the Party, they won over some of the local Party bodies and tried to oppose them to the Central Committee. The Moscow Regional Bureau, which was composed of “Left Communists” (Lomov, Osinsky, Sapronov, Stukov and others), passed a resolution containing the monstrous statement that it would be expedient in the interests of the international revolution to consent to the possible loss of Soviet power, which, they alleged, would become purely formal with the conclusion of peace. Lenin branded this resolution as “strange and monstrous”. He attacked the “Left Communists” most vigorously; in his impassioned articles, he exposed their adventurist policy which would have been fatal to the Soviet Republic. He wrote: “Whoever is opposed to an immediate, even if most onerous, peace, is destroying the Soviet power” (Collected Works, Vol. 27, p. 22).

On March 3, 1918, the peace treaty with Germany was signed. Meanwhile the “Left Communists”, far from discontinuing their attacks on the Party, intensified them. They openly called for the wrecking of the Brest Litovsk peace. The disruptive anti-Party activities of the “Left Communists” encouraged the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries to hope that there would be a change in the composition of the Soviet Government. They approached Bukharin with the proposal that Lenin be removed from the post of Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars and that a new government of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and “Left Communists” be formed. Bukharin did not accept the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries’ proposal, but the very fact that they had approached Bukharin showed how the enemy was trying to take advantage of the factional struggle of the “Left Communists”.

Lenin unmasked the “Left Communist” group as accomplices of the German imperialists and the Russian bourgeoisie. “And if the new terms are worse, more onerous and humiliating than the bad, onerous and humiliating Brest terms,” wrote Lenin, “it is our sorry ‘Left wingers’ Bukharin, Lomov, Uritsky and Co. who are guilty of it before the great Russian Soviet Republic” (ibid., p. 60).
Lenin showed that the differences which the "Left Communists" and Trotsky had with the Party went much deeper than appeared at first sight. The leaders of the "Left" opposition, along with Trotsky, denied that the victory of socialism was possible in one country alone, and declared that the dictatorship of the proletariat and the gains of the October Revolution in Russia could only be preserved in the event of a victorious world socialist revolution, which should be speeded up by war against world imperialism.

Exposing the "Left Communists", Lenin explained that their theory of "speeding up" the international revolution had nothing in common with Marxism. Marxism teaches that the development of revolution depends on the intensification of class contradictions within the capitalist countries. Lenin maintained that the victory of socialism was possible in a single country and held that the working class of Soviet Russia, the first country in which the dictatorship of the proletariat had been victorious, would discharge its international duty best of all if it preserved and strengthened its dictatorship to defend the gains of the revolution and build socialism.

Lenin also exposed another absurd argument of the "Left" opposition, namely, that the interests of the international revolution did not allow the Soviet state to conclude peace, or indeed any agreements, with the imperialists, and that the Soviet Republic could not exist in a capitalist encirclement. He wrote: "From this point of view, a socialist republic surrounded by imperialist powers could not conclude any economic treaties, and could not exist at all, without flying off to the moon" (ibid., p. 49). The thesis of the coexistence of countries with different social systems followed from Lenin's theory of the socialist revolution, from the possibility of socialism achieving victory first in a few countries, or even in one isolated country—a scientific discovery made by Lenin. The Party believed that by putting its economy in order and building up its armed forces, the Soviet Republic could withstand the onslaught of international imperialism, uphold its sovereignty and independence, win a peaceful breathing-space and ensure the building of socialism.

The "Left Communists" policy of wrecking the Brest Litovsk peace treaty suffered a fiasco. It needed Lenin's foresight, persistence and passion in the fight against the "Left Communists", his unshakable faith in the masses, to save the Soviet land from impending disaster. The Party membership and the advanced workers came out emphatically in support of the peace which had been concluded. In March 1918 the policy of the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet Government on the peace treaty was endorsed by the Moscow and Petrograd city Party conferences, as well as by other local Party organisations.

To take a final decision on the question of peace, the Seventh Congress of the Party was called. It was held in Petrograd on March
6-8, 1918. It was the first Congress to be held after the Party had assumed leadership of the state. It was attended by 46 delegates with vote and 58 delegates with voice but no vote. The Congress represented approximately 170,000 members. Actually, the membership of the Party at that time was about 300,000, but owing to the urgency with which the Congress was convened, and to the fact that part of the territory of the country was occupied by German troops, many Party organisations were unable to send delegates.

The Congress discussed the following questions: the report of the Central Committee; the question of war and peace; and the question of revising the Programme and changing the name of the Party. Lenin delivered the political report of the Central Committee and spoke on the revision of the Programme, on the alteration of the name of the Party and on other questions. In the political report, Lenin dealt comprehensively with the question of war and peace.

A sharp struggle developed at the Congress between the supporters and the opponents of the Brest Litovsk peace. The “Left Communists” were defeated. The Congress confirmed the correctness of Lenin’s line on the issue of the Brest peace, and deemed it necessary to approve the peace treaty with Germany signed by the Soviet Government. Lenin’s resolution on war and peace was adopted by 30 votes to 12, with 4 abstentions. The Congress declared that it was the prime task of the Party and the Soviet Government to take the most energetic measures to strengthen discipline and self-discipline among the workers and peasants, and to give full scope to the initiative of all the working people’s organisations in consolidating and defending the gains of the socialist revolution. Stress was laid on the need to intensify the building up of the Red Army and to introduce universal military training for the working people.

Subsequent developments showed that Lenin’s line in the fight for peace was the only correct one. His policy enabled the Soviet Republic to carry out an orderly retreat at a time when its forces were greatly outnumbered by those of the enemy, and to prepare with the utmost energy to repel fresh attacks by the imperialists.

The Seventh Congress adopted a resolution changing the Party Programme and the name of the Party. The first Party Programme had been fulfilled as a result of the October Revolution and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. A commission was elected to draw up a new Programme, based on the draft Programme prepared by Lenin. On Lenin’s proposal, the Party’s name was changed to the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)—R.C.P.(B.). In his speech at the Congress, Lenin said that the name “Communist” was the only correct one, for

“... in starting on socialist changes, we must clearly set before ourselves the goal to which they are directed in the final analysis, namely, the creation of a Communist society. . .” (Collected Works, Vol. 27, p. 103).
During the elections to the central bodies of the Party, the Congress again came up against the disorganising conduct of the "Left Communist" group. Even before the Congress, Bukharin, Lomov, Uritsky and Bubnov had announced their resignation from the Central Committee. At the Congress itself, they declared that they would neither take part in the elections nor enter the Central Committee. Lenin sharply criticised the unworthy behaviour of the "Left" opposition leaders, and the Congress demanded that the "Left Communists" stop their splitting activities, which were jeopardising the unity of the Party.

The Seventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) accomplished a task of great historic importance. It succeeded in withdrawing the Soviet Republic from the war and securing peace for the peoples of Russia. Afterwards Lenin wrote: "The first Bolshevik revolution freed the first hundred million people on earth from the imperialist war and the imperialist world" (Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 35).

The Congress approved the basic principles of the foreign policy of the Party and the Soviet state elaborated by Lenin, and specified the immediate tasks of the Party in building socialism. The Congress defeated those who tried to disorganise the Party—the "Left Communists" and Trotsky, who sought to wreck the unity of the Party and were undermining the dictatorship of the proletariat. It united the ranks of the Party on the basis of Lenin's policy.

The "Left Communists'" views were shared by V. V. Kuibyshev, S. V. Kosior, Y. M. Yaroslavsky and many other prominent functionaries of the Party. Despite the extreme bitterness of the struggle against the "Left Communists", Lenin strictly adhered to the standards which had formed in the Party. He was forbearing and used the method of persuasion. Reality proved Lenin's policy on the conclusion of the Brest Litovsk peace treaty to be correct. In the same year—1918—the "Left Communists" publicly admitted their mistake and joined vigorously in the activities of the Party and the state.

Soon after the Seventh Congress, the Soviet Government and the Central Committee moved to Moscow, which became the capital of the Soviet state. On March 14, 1918, the Fourth Extraordinary All-Russian Congress of Soviets met there. It ratified the Brest Litovsk peace treaty. The delegation of the Central Executive Committee of the Ukrainian Soviets likewise declared for the rati- fication of the peace treaty. The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries at the Congress opposed ratification of the treaty, and announced their resignation from the Council of People's Commissars. The agreement with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, based on co-operation in the Soviet Government, was abrogated.

The conclusion of the Brest Litovsk peace was of tremendous international significance. The working people of the whole world had before them the example of the Soviet Republic, which had
withdrawn from the imperialist war in spite of incredible difficulties.

The conclusion of the Brest Litovsk peace strengthened Soviet power. It won a breathing-space in which to normalise the country's economy, to build up the Red Army and to strengthen the alliance of the proletariat and the labouring peasant masses. A new stage in the development of the Soviet state was opening.

3. Lenin's Plan for Laying the Foundations of a Socialist Economy. The First Soviet Constitution

Thanks to the conclusion of peace, the Soviet Republic was able, in the spring of 1918, to concentrate on restoring the national economy and launching socialist construction. The Communist Party was confronted with a new task, that of organising the country's administration. The main difficulty lay in the economic field, in the need to reorganise the whole economic life of the country on a socialist basis. In April 1918 Lenin, on the instruction of the Central Committee of the Party, drew up theses the profound import of which was shown in his celebrated work *The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government*. In this work and in several others, Lenin outlined a plan for laying the foundations of a socialist economy. Summing up the results of the Communist Party's activities, he wrote:

"We, the Bolshevik Party, have convinced Russia. We have won Russia from the rich for the poor, from the exploiters for the working people. Now we must administer Russia" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 214).

Further developing Marx's teachings, Lenin substantiated most important propositions concerning the economy of the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. The state at this stage is that of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The economy in the transition period combines elements of several socio-economic formations. The forms and methods of transition from capitalism to socialism depend upon the specific conditions in the different countries in which the movement towards socialism begins.

In Soviet Russia, the transition to socialism was being effected at a time when the country's economy contained the elements of five socio-economic formations, namely, (1) patriarchal (i.e., largely natural, peasant economy); (2) small-commodity production (production by most of those peasants who sold their grain); (3) private capitalism; (4) state capitalism and (5) socialism. Russia was a country of small peasants, with a predominantly small-commodity production, which provided the basis for the preservation and revival of capitalism. Millions of small proprietors and traders in town and country were engaged in speculation. This was particu-
larly true of the kulaks, who speculated in grain and profited from the people's want. This petty-bourgeois element constituted the main danger to Soviet power and socialism. Lenin pointed out that it was the task of the Party and the Soviet state to overcome this petty-bourgeois element, to strengthen the socialist economic formation, and to convert it into the dominant and, later, the sole and all-embracing form.

The Party and the Soviet Government set about laying the foundations of socialist economy amid incredible dislocation caused by the war and bourgeois management. It required colossal effort on the part of all the class-conscious workers and peasants to restore the country's productive forces and introduce some elementary order into the national economy. Only the proletariat could relieve the sufferings and privations which had fallen to the lot of the working people. Only the proletariat could overcome the petty-bourgeois element, normalise economic life and ensure the country's advance to socialism. To that end, it was necessary that the broad working-class masses should have a clear understanding of the historic tasks set them by the revolution. A certain section of the workers, however, could not immediately adjust themselves to the new situation, and did not understand what being the ruling class meant. Their attitude to work in the factories which had become the people's property was the same as of old; they tried to avoid any extra responsibilities, to dodge work, and lived according to the principle: "Grab as much as you can and be off." Such sentiments were especially widespread among those workers who had come to the factories during the war. The Party helped the advanced workers to establish socialist order, to combat the parasites, shirkers and grabbers. Lenin taught the workers the Soviet way of running the economy. He called for a careful and conscientious handling of money, for economical management, for opposition to shirking and for observance of the strictest labour discipline. These were the immediate and main slogans of the moment. Their putting into effect was an essential condition for overcoming economic dislocation, restoration of normal economic life and the transition to socialism.

The organisation of accounting and control over the manufacture and distribution of products was put forward as the foremost task in the field of the economic construction of socialism. Without this, Lenin emphasised, it would be impossible to proceed to the management of production, and to ensure the smooth working of all branches of the national economy. While continuing to expropriate the capitalists, the Soviet state had to shift the emphasis to the organisation of accounting and control. Responsibility for the implementation of accounting and control was placed upon the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, the national economic councils, the consumers' co-operative societies and the

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factory committees. To curb the petty-bourgeois element and introduce accounting and control on a country-wide scale, Lenin proposed overhauling the state monopolies, especially the grain monopoly, strengthening state control over currency circulation and making use of the co-operative societies.

In the transition to socialism Lenin attached special importance to state capitalism. He considered state capitalism economically superior to the then existing peasant economy, and not dangerous to the Soviet state. In Lenin’s view, the system of state capitalism was to include various Soviet joint-stock companies, to participate in which private individuals possessing their own capital, state-controlled manufacturers and bourgeois co-operators were invited. The Soviet authorities were to exercise control over their activities. State capitalism facilitated the struggle of the Soviet Government against the petty-bourgeois element; it enabled the Soviet state to receive a portion of the output of state-capitalist enterprises for improving economic ties with small-commodity peasant production, and it promoted the growth of the country’s productive forces. The consumers’ co-operative societies were to serve the same ends. With the aid of the co-operatives, the Soviet state could regulate the exchange of products and control their sale. Bourgeois influence was still strong in many co-operative bodies at that time. But this circumstance, said Lenin, should not frighten the Party and the working class. With power in the hands of the proletariat, the use of bourgeois co-operators by the Soviet state enabled it to consolidate the position it had won and gradually overcome the bourgeois elements in the co-operative bodies.

One of the fundamental tasks of the socialist revolution, Lenin explained, was to achieve a higher productivity of labour than existed under capitalism. Russia was an industrially backward country. In order to ensure high productivity of labour, it was necessary first of all to develop heavy industry—the production of fuel and metal, the engineering, chemical and electrical industries. Lenin noted that the Soviet Republic possessed everything necessary for “Russia to cease to be impoverished and weak, and become mighty and abundant in the full meaning of the word” (Collected Works, Vol. 27, p. 134). For this the country possessed adequate natural and enormous manpower resources, and the tremendous popular initiative released by the great revolution.

An important condition for raising the productivity of labour and for restoring and developing the productive forces, in Lenin’s opinion, was the cultural advancement of the population. Under tsarism, knowledge and science were within reach of the privileged classes only. Neither the industrial worker nor the peasant who tilled the land could receive a higher education. The Soviet state made all the benefits of culture and science the property of the
whole people. The wide masses set eagerly about acquiring knowledge. Lenin called for placing all the scientific and technical achievements of capitalism in the service of socialism. “Socialism,” he said, “is unthinkable without a large-scale capitalist technology based on the latest achievements of science...” (ibid., p. 306). Only socialism, he pointed out, will release science from its bourgeois shackles, making it possible to organise production on truly scientific lines, lightening labour and providing prosperity for all working people. Only with the help of all the gains of science was it possible to build socialism successfully. In April 1918 Lenin wrote his “Draft Plan for Scientific and Technical Work” instructing the Academy of Sciences to plan the industrial reorganisation and economic advancement of the Soviet country. The Academy’s plan was to envisage the rational distribution of the industries, which must be brought closer to raw material sources; the electrification of industry and transport, and the use of electricity in agriculture; the achievement of economic independence by the country.

Large-scale industry is inconceivable without specialists in the various branches of knowledge and technology. The proletariat had no technical specialists of its own at that time. The bulk of the available specialists were bourgeois. Lenin taught the Party to be considerate towards the bourgeois experts. He warned it that, owing to their bourgeois way of life under capitalism, not all these experts would be able, at least at first, properly to appreciate the significance of the socialist revolution. It was necessary to re-educate them patiently, to give them the opportunity of applying their specialised knowledge extensively, to provide them with the best possible material conditions, and not to hesitate to raise their salaries. At the same time Lenin called for persistent effort to discover talented organisers among the people, for bold promotion of organisers with practical experience from among workers and peasants to responsible posts and for assistance to them in mastering the art of state and economic administration.

Lenin elaborated the principles on which the proletarian state should direct the national economy. He put forward the principle of democratic centralism in the organisation of Soviet economic management. Large-scale machine industry cannot function properly without the strictest order, created by the unity of will which directs the common labour of hundreds and thousands of people. The interests of socialism, Lenin taught, demanded that the masses should implicitly obey the will of the manager of the labour process. Economic management must therefore be centralised, and enterprises must be headed by directors appointed by the Soviet state. Centralised direction by the state and one-man management should be combined with the active, conscious participation of the masses in economic life, with various forms of control from below.
“Centralism, understood in a truly democratic sense,” wrote Lenin, “presupposes the possibility, created by history for the first time, of full and unhampered development not only of specific local features, but also of local inventiveness, local initiative, variety in the ways, methods and means of advancing to the common goal” (Collected Works, Vol. 27, p. 181).

That was how Lenin defined the Soviet socialist principle of management.

Lenin paid particularly great attention to developing a new conscious and comradely discipline among the workers and all working people generally, and to stimulating their initiative and sense of responsibility. This called for a long and painstaking effort, for the re-education of people. Lenin considered that this aim could be achieved by introducing the piece-rate system, the elimination of wage-levelling, organising emulation, and exercising the pressure of public opinion upon idlers and grabbers.

Lenin called for the consolidation in every possible way of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the development of the Soviet organisation. The dictatorship of the proletariat is necessary first of all to crush the resistance of the defeated exploiters and all the corrupt elements of the old society. It is necessary in order to build the new, socialist society. Only the proletariat, as the most advanced, politically conscious and disciplined class, is capable of winning the support of the majority of the working people, of helping the wavering strata and elements of the population to side definitely with the Soviet power, of crushing the resistance of the exploiters and overcoming the element of petty-bourgeois disorganisation, of directing the reorganisation of society on socialist lines.

Lenin’s work, The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government, was of enormous historic significance. It concentrated the Party’s attention on solving the organisational tasks of the socialist revolution, on organising the administration of the Soviet state. In it Lenin outlined a scientifically substantiated and concrete plan for reorganising the country’s economic system on socialist lines, and expounded the basic principles of the economic policy of the proletarian state in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism.

Lenin’s theses on the immediate tasks of the Soviet state were discussed and approved by the Central Committee and fully supported by the Party and the working class. On April 29, 1918, the theses were approved by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, at whose session Lenin made a report.

Lenin’s plan was opposed by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. An incorrect position was also adopted by the “Left Communists”, headed by Bukharin. Under cover of “Left” phrases, Bukharin and those who held similar views demagogically claimed
that the introduction of discipline and of one-man management in the factories, the employment of bourgeois experts and recourse to state capitalism would mean a return to the bourgeois order. In practice the "Left Communists" proved to be defenders of petty-bourgeois disorganisation and anarchic licence; they were encouraging the kulaks, speculators and idlers. The Party resolutely rebuffed the "Left Communists" and concentrated on establishing nationwide accounting and control, and organising socialist production.

The new tasks required the heightening of the leading role of the Party in the Soviet state, and the working out of the right relations between it and the state and other public organisations of the working people. By the spring of 1918 the proletarian state machinery had in the main taken shape. The system of the dictatorship of the proletariat embraced the Party, the Soviets, the trade unions and other mass organisations of the working people. It was especially important to establish the right relations between the Party and the Soviets. The Party was working out relationships of a kind which gave the Soviets full scope for initiative as organs of state power, while ensuring the Party's leading role in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Party was acting as the leading and guiding force of the Soviet state. It determined the policy of the latter and united the efforts of all the public organisations of the working people in their fight to consolidate the Soviet system and reconstruct society on socialist lines. The Party exerted political influence on the Soviets and the trade unions, and carried its directives into effect through its Communist groups among their members.

Problems arising in the building of the Party were decided in close connection with the requirements of state and economic development. The structure of the leading Party bodies was brought into line with the administrative division of the country then existing (gubernias, uyezds and volosts). From April to October 1918 Party conferences were held in most of the gubernias of the Soviet Republic, and everywhere they elected gubernia Party committees (Gubkoms). Uyezd and volost Party organisations were likewise set up and given organisational shape. Thousands of Party members were promoted to various posts in the Party apparatus. The Party devoted much attention to improving its composition, and to drawing up membership rules which would make it difficult for alien elements to penetrate into it. In raising the requirements for Party membership, some of the local Party organisations established a term of probation for applicants. Many Party organisations set up groups of Party sympathisers.

The building of the Party also proceeded in the non-Russian areas of the country and in German-occupied territory. In June 1918 the First Congress of the Bolshevik organisations of the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Republic proclaimed the founding of
the Communist Party of Turkestan as part of the R.C.P.(B.). In July 1918 the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine held its First Congress. This Congress demonstrated its loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism. Its resolution "On the Party" declared that the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine was part of the one Russian Communist Party. In October 1918 the First Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania took place illegally in Vilno (Vilnius).

Under the influence of the October Revolution, the youth movement began to develop rapidly in the Soviet Republic. Socialist youth leagues came into existence throughout the country. The First All-Russian Congress of Young Workers' and Peasants' Leagues, which met in October-November 1918, proclaimed the establishment of the Russian Young Communist League (Komsomol). In its foundation and activities the Komsomol was guided from the very outset by the Communist Party, by Lenin. The Komsomol became a strong bulwark and militant reserve for the Party.

In the economic field, the Party paid attention primarily to the organisation of socialist industry. Central departments and trusts for managing the nationalised industries were set up within the framework of the Supreme Council of National Economy. Of great importance in organising the management of industry and the national economy as a whole was the First All-Russian Congress of Economic Councils, convened on the initiative of the Party Central Committee at the end of May 1918. The Congress declared in favour of the nationalisation of all industry and the centralisation of its management. On June 28 the Council of People's Commissars adopted a decree on the nationalisation of all large-scale industry. By this decree the nationalisation of large- and medium-scale industry was in the main completed. By June 1 there were a little over 500 nationalised industrial enterprises; by the beginning of September their number exceeded 3,000.

The Party used the respite to engage in cultural development. Public education was radically reorganised. The Soviet school was based on the principles of educating the rising generation in a Communist spirit and closely linking instruction with life and with socially useful labour. The children of workers and poor peasants were admitted to higher schools on a priority basis. Work started on the abolition of illiteracy among the adult population. Much was done to win over the teachers to the side of the Soviet power. The summer of 1918 saw the convening of two all-Russian congresses of teachers. They were addressed by Lenin, who called on the teachers to become the chief army of socialist education.

Political work among the masses assumed an immense scale. Numerous meetings took place in towns. Lenin often spoke at meetings held in Moscow. The Party paid special attention to political work among the peasants. Town organisations sent thousands
of propagandists to the country. Lenin gave instructions to many of the propagandists who were leaving for the countryside. In August 1918 the Socialist Academy of Social Sciences was opened in Moscow.

The Party’s fight to carry out Lenin’s plan of socialist construction proceeded in incredibly difficult circumstances. At the end of the spring of 1918 a severe food crisis hit the country. The urban population was suffering from hunger, and, as a result, discontent began to spread. Counter-revolution reared its head. The enemies of the Soviet system tried to throw the blame for the acute food shortage on the Bolsheviks. But hunger was the result of the fact that the grain was concentrated chiefly in the hands of the kulaks and the rich, who refused to sell it to the Soviet state at fixed prices, sabotaged the grain monopoly and engaged in speculation. There were about two million kulak farms in the country. They constituted the main support of internal counter-revolution and of the foreign imperialists. The kulaks hated the Soviet power. Lenin wrote that “the kulaks are the most brutal, callous and savage exploiters, who in the history of other countries have time and again restored the power of the landlords, tsars, priests and capitalists” (*Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 39). In a number of gubernias of the Soviet Republic the kulaks, along with other counter-revolutionary elements, and with the support of foreign imperialists, raised anti-Soviet revolts. They decided to give battle to the workers’ state on the most vitally important front—that on which the battle for grain was being waged—and tried to wreck the first socialist reforms by means of famine.

It was necessary to suppress the revolts of the kulaks with an iron hand, to break their resistance, to take away their grain, so as to preserve the gains of the revolution. The fight for grain merged with the fight for socialism. “This seems to be just a fight for grain,” said Lenin, “but in fact it is a fight for socialism” (*Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 433). The countryside at that period was in the throes of a struggle between the poor peasants and the kulaks. The kulaks were seizing the landed estates and oppressing the poor peasants. The latter put up a staunch fight against kulak domination, but they lacked organisation.

The Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet Government took resolute measures to curb the kulaks and relieve the worst of the hunger. The Soviet Government confirmed that the grain monopoly was inviolable and centralised the food supply service. The Party issued an appeal to the advanced workers to organise a mass crusade to the countryside, in order to assist the poor peasants in their fight against the kulaks. Tens of thousands of workers responded to the Party’s call. Workers’ detachments were formed in the factories. They were headed by Communists. Thousands of such detachments were sent to all parts of the country. By explaining
matters to the poor peasants and organising them, these detachments of advanced workers helped to break the resistance of the kulaks, who were concealing their grain surpluses and speculating in grain.

"One of the greatest, and indefeasible accomplishments of the October—Soviet—Revolution," wrote Lenin, "is that the advanced worker, as the guiding spirit of the poor, as the leader of the toiling masses of the countryside, as the builder of the state of the working people, has 'gone among the people'. Petrograd and other proletarian centres have given thousands upon thousands of their finest workers to the countryside" (Collected Works, Vol. 27, p. 361).

On June 11, 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets, on Lenin's proposal, adopted a decree to set up Committees of Poor Peasants in the countryside. These committees were formed within the framework of the Soviet state system, under the leadership of the local Party organisations. The work of the committees was one of the main questions discussed at the gubernia and uyezd Party conferences held in the summer and autumn of 1918. Committees of Poor Peasants, which included middle peasants, were set up in almost all the villages, and by November 1918 they numbered about 105,000.

The Committees of Poor Peasants were the strongholds of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the villages. They did an immense job in confiscating grain surpluses from the kulaks and in providing foodstuffs for the urban population and the Red Army. Redistribution of the land among the peasants, and the confiscation of draught animals and implements from the kulaks for the benefit of the poor peasants, were carried out through the Committees of Poor Peasants. 125 million acres of land were taken away from the kulaks and placed at the disposal of the poor and middle peasants, which seriously undermined the economic power of the rural bourgeoisie. The confiscation of a considerable portion of the means of production from the rural bourgeoisie did not, however, mean the abolition of the kulaks as a class. Individual, small-property peasant farming continued to predominate in agriculture.

The organisation of the Committees of Poor Peasants meant a further development of the socialist revolution and consolidation of the Soviet power in the countryside. The committees rallied the poor peasants round the working class, they helped the Soviet state to break the resistance of the kulaks, and they played an important part in winning over the middle peasants to the side of the Soviet power. The position of the poor peasants improved. Many poor peasants set up their own farms. The countryside became increasingly middle-peasant. The Committees of Poor Peasants helped to recruit peasants for the Red Army.
The socialist transformation of the countryside was stepped up thanks to the activity of the Committees of Poor Peasants. Numerous agricultural communes and other peasant producers' associations arose; by the end of 1918 their number exceeded 1,500. During the period when these committees existed there began in the countryside a rapid growth of Party groups which drew into their ranks the most advanced and class-conscious section of the poor peasants. At the end of 1918, having completed the tasks set before them, the Committees of Poor Peasants were merged with the volost and village Soviets. The role and significance of the local Soviets in socialist construction were enhanced.

On July 4, 1918, the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets opened in Moscow. It reflected the growth of the influence and prestige of the Communist Party among the masses. About two-thirds of the Congress delegates were Communists. The influence of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries among the masses was rapidly declining. Before the Congress, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries had done their utmost to wreck the Brest Litovsk peace, opposed the food policy of the Soviet Government and the Committees of Poor Peasants, and spoken in defence of the kulaks. They were hatching an anti-Soviet conspiracy which was timed for the Congress of Soviets. During the Congress, on July 6, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries assassinated Mirbach, the German Ambassador, with the object of provoking Germany to make war with Soviet Russia, and started an anti-Soviet revolt in Moscow. The foreign diplomatic missions secretly supported the rebels. The Soviet Republic was within a hairbreadth of war with Germany.

Thanks to the prompt and decisive action of the Soviet authorities, the revolt of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in Moscow was suppressed within a few hours. The conflict provoked with Germany was settled. The adventure to which the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries had resorted exposed them completely as an anti-Soviet party which had no support among the working masses. The Fifth Congress of Soviets unanimously endorsed the energetic measures taken by the Soviet Government to suppress the revolt of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, and voted for the expulsion of all representatives of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries from the Soviets.

The Congress adopted the first Soviet Constitution—the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. It gave legislative confirmation to the great achievements of the October Socialist Revolution: the new, Soviet political system, the abolition of private capitalist and landlord property, equality of all the peoples inhabiting Russia, etc. The Constitution provided legislative confirmation of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the form of the Soviet state, guaranteed all the working people of Russia the opportunity to take part in governing the state, and disfranchised the exploiters.
With regard to the disfranchisement of the exploiters, Lenin observed that “the question of restricting the franchise is a nationally specific, not a general, question of the dictatorship. One must approach the question of restricting the franchise through a study of the specific conditions of the Russian revolution and the specific path of its development” (Collected Works, Vol. 28, p. 235).

It would be a mistake, wrote Lenin, to assert in advance that future revolutions in other countries would necessarily result in the restriction of the suffrage for the bourgeoisie.

“This is not an indispensable condition of the historical and class concept of dictatorship” (ibid.).

The Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. was translated into foreign languages, and met with a wide response abroad. The working people of the capitalist countries saw in it the expression of their own aspirations, and welcomed it warmly. The bourgeoisie, on the other hand, received the Soviet Constitution with hostility. Kautsky and other leaders of the Second International sided with the bourgeoisie. Kautsky maliciously accused the Bolsheviks, who had established the dictatorship of the proletariat, of “violating democracy”.

Lenin gave a resolute reply to Kautsky in his book The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky. He exposed Kautsky’s falsification of Marx’s theory of the state and the dictatorship of the proletariat, his gross distortion of the essence of Soviet power and of the experience of the Russian Communists. Kautsky’s defence of so-called “pure democracy”, in a society divided into antagonistic classes, was branded by Lenin as the empty and lying phrasemongering of a bourgeois liberal, bent on defending bourgeois democracy and duping the workers.

Lenin demonstrated that, as a result of the victory of the October Socialist Revolution and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia, a new and higher type of democracy—proletarian, Soviet democracy—had arisen for the first time in the history of the world.

“Proletarian democracy,” wrote Lenin, “is a million times more democratic than any bourgeois democracy; the Soviet state is a million times more democratic than the most democratic bourgeois republic” (ibid., p. 227).

The dictatorship of the proletariat immeasurably extended democracy for the masses of the people. Soviet power was the first governmental authority in the world really to draw the working masses into the administration of the state. From the first day of the establishment of the Soviet power, the labouring classes—the workers and the peasants—began to enjoy all the benefits of Soviet democracy. The strength and stability of Soviet power lie in the fact that it combines democracy for the broadest sections of the people with revolutionary dictatorship against the exploiters.
In his book, *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, Lenin showed the epoch-making significance of the experience of the Communist Party, which had armed the international proletariat with a new theory, strategy and tactics for socialist revolution. The Communist Party had demonstrated to the whole world the transformation of the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat into reality. After crushing the resistance of the landlords and capitalists and overcoming tremendous difficulties, the workers and poor peasants of Russia had succeeded, under the Party's leadership, not only in retaining the power they had won, but in consolidating it, in creating a new, Soviet democracy, and in embarking on socialist construction in practice. All this enabled Lenin to declare with good reason that "Bolshevism can serve as model tactics for all" (Collected Works, Vol. 28, p. 270).

**BRIEF SUMMARY**

The October Socialist Revolution established the dictatorship of the proletariat. The working class became the ruling class, and the Communist Party the governing party. In the difficult conditions of war and economic dislocation, the Party assumed responsibility for the country's destiny. It saved the country from economic and national disaster, freed it from financial bondage and from the threat of colonial enslavement by the imperialist robbers, and led the Soviet people boldly and confidently along the untrodden roads to socialism.

Within the short period from November 1917 to 1918, the Communist Party roused the broad masses of the working class and labouring peasantry to revolutionary creative activity, and carried out a number of fundamental democratic and socialist changes. All the survivals of medievalism were completely swept away, and full freedom and equality were proclaimed for all the peoples and nationalities of Russia. Landlords' property rights were abolished for all time. The land confiscated from the landlords was turned over gratis to the peasants for their use, and all the land in the country was nationalised. The old, bourgeois-landlord state machinery was broken up and a new, Soviet machinery of state built up in its place. A new, socialist type of state came into being. A new and higher, proletarian form of democracy, democracy for the working folk, for the vast majority of the people, was established in the Soviet Republic.

Led by the Communist Party, the working class expropriated the means of production from the bourgeoisie and converted the factories, railways, land and banks into the property of the whole people, into public property. Having established its political rule and smashed capitalism, the proletariat took possession of the
commanding heights in the country's economy, laid the foundation for the new, Soviet national economy, and created the conditions necessary for undertaking the building of socialism. The October Revolution brought knowledge within reach of the working people. A new, socialist culture began to develop. Lenin elaborated the basic forms and methods of building socialism.

The Party exposed and ideologically routed and isolated the capitulators Kamenev, Zinoviev and their supporters, and later Trotsky and the group of "Left Communists" headed by Bukharin, who opposed the peace of Brest Litovsk and revolutionary socialist measures, and strengthened the unity of the Party ranks. In conformity with the tasks involved in administering the Soviet state, the Party rearranged its organisational structure and strengthened its local organisations.

In the course of the fight to develop the October Socialist Revolution and consolidate Soviet power, the counter-revolutionary nature of the Mensheviks and the Right and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries was completely exposed; they were isolated from the masses. All these petty-bourgeois parties became anti-Soviet, and took the path of struggle against Soviet power.

The Party rallied the poor peasantry round the proletariat, crushed the furious resistance of the counter-revolutionary kulaks with the help of detachments of advanced workers and of the Committees of Poor Peasants, won the middle peasants over to the side of the proletariat, and consolidated Soviet power on the basis of the alliance of the working class and the poorest peasantry. The great achievements of the October Socialist Revolution received legislative confirmation in the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. adopted by the Fifth Congress of Soviets.

By its active fight for peace, the Communist Party achieved the withdrawal of Russia from the war, and made the utmost use of the breathing-space obtained to organise the Red Army and embark on socialist construction on the basis of Lenin's plan. It roused the masses of the people for the conscious building of a new life.
CHAPTER NINE
THE PARTY IN THE PERIOD OF FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION AND CIVIL WAR
(1918-1920)


It was not for long that the Soviet Republic was able to enjoy its hard-won breathing-space. External and internal enemies of the Soviet state imposed war on the Soviet people, compelling them to interrupt their peaceful socialist constructive work.

The foreign imperialists could not reconcile themselves to the existence of a country governed by workers and peasants, whose example had a revolutionising effect on the working people of the capitalist countries. The monopolists did not want to lose the thousands of millions of rubles they had lent to the tsarist government and the bourgeois Provisional Government, or the huge profits they had derived from the factories, mines, etc., which they had owned in Russia.

Russia's withdrawal from the war greatly alarmed the Entente imperialists. They found themselves deprived of the support of the Russian army, which had until then tied down more than half the German forces. Moreover, they feared that Soviet Russia would, by her peace policy, set an example to the working people of other countries of how to put an end to the hated war.

The imperialists of Britain, France, the U.S.A. and Japan had begun to prepare for their predatory attack on Soviet Russia from the very first days after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

In December 1917 the British and French governments, with the knowledge and consent of the United States, signed a secret agreement dividing spheres of military operations between them. France undertook to fight Soviet power in the Ukraine, Crimea and Bessarabia, while Britain was to deal with it in the Don and Kuban.
areas and in the Caucasus. In January and February 1918 bourgeois-
landlord Rumania seized Bessarabia with direct support from the
French, British and U.S. imperialists. After the conclusion of the
Brest Litovsk peace, which shattered their hope of strangling the
Soviet Republic with the help of the German army, U.S., British
and French imperialists landed troops at Murmansk in the spring
of 1918. The Japanese imperialists landed a force at Vladivostok,
and were followed by the U.S. and British imperialists. The Entente
used the Czechoslovak corps in Russia against the Soviet Govern-
ment.

That corps, over 40,000 strong, had been formed during the war
out of Czech and Slovak prisoners of war and men who had volun-
tarily gone over from the Austrian army to the Russians. On the
conclusion of peace with Germany the Czechoslovaks received per-
mission from the Soviet Government to leave by way of Siberia
and the Far East for France to take part in the war against Germany.
But the organisers of intervention decided otherwise; they began
to incite the Czechs and Slovaks, whose troops extended from the
Volga to the Pacific Ocean, to revolt against the Soviet power.

There were Communists among the Czech and Slovak prisoners
of war, as well as in the corps. In May 1918 they held their consti-
tuent congress. Many Czech and Slovak prisoners of war joined the
Red Army and fought, shoulder to shoulder with Russians, for
the land of socialism, the homeland of the working people of the
world.

The rank and file of the corps were unwilling to take up arms
against the Soviet people. But the British, French and U.S. imperial-
ists made a deal with the corps command and secured its consent
to fight the Soviet power. The corps command deceived the Czecho-
slovak soldiers by spreading the provocative rumour that the Soviet
Government was going to hand them over to Austria-Hungary. At
the end of May 1918 it engineered a revolt. The rebels were joined
by several thousand volunteers from among the Russian officers,
generals and the Cossack upper stratum. The rebels made up
an impressive force of 60,000 well-armed men and officers.

The action of the Czechoslovak corps raised the hopes of the in-
ternal counter-revolution. The exploiting classes overthrown dur-
ing the October Revolution started a civil war. The imperialists
helped the counter-revolutionaries to organise, and supplied them
with arms and munitions. The Cadet, Socialist-Revolutionary,
Menshevik and bourgeois nationalist parties made deals with the
imperialists. The counter-revolutionaries agreed to cede vast areas
of the country to the foreign invaders, to dismember Russia and
turn her into a colony, if only they could wrest power from the work-
ing people. Anti-Soviet kulak revolts, organised by counter-revolu-
tionaries, began in Siberia, the Urals and the Volga region. Under
the influence of the revolt of the Czechoslovak corps and with help

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from the interventionists, scattered anti-Soviet actions merged into a single torrent of all-Russian counter-revolution. In a matter of two months the Czechoslovaks, operating jointly with the forces of internal counter-revolution, occupied a sizable part of Siberia and the Urals, and seized Samara, Kazan and several other Volga towns.

Thus, two counter-revolutionary forces—foreign interventionists and Russian bourgeois-landlord-kulak Whites—joined up to fight the Soviet Republic.

In the areas overrun by the enemy, the organs of Soviet government were replaced by counter-revolutionary "governments", such as the Siberian "government" at Omsk, the Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly at Samara, and so on. These "governments" consisted mainly of Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who sought to disguise an outright bourgeois dictatorship by slogans purporting to be democratic.

The interventionists and Whites also attacked other areas of the country. From Murmansk they advanced on Petrozavodsk, threatening Petrograd. British, French and U.S. warships entered the White Sea. The interventionists seized Archangel.

The Japanese and U.S. troops which had landed at Vladivostok helped the Czechoslovak corps and Russian Whites to capture the town and then the entire Far East. In an attempt to encircle Soviet Russia, the British imperialists invaded Turkestan and occupied part of its territory. In Transcaucasia, the British, co-operating with White units, seized Baku. They arrested the Soviet government leaders of Azerbaijan, including some prominent Party workers, such as S. Shahumyan, P. Japaridze, M. Azizbekov, I. Fioletov and Y. Zevin, who were shot, along with the rest of the twenty-six Baku Commissars, on instructions from the British imperialists. The interventionists bolstered up the counter-revolutionary governments of the Musavatists in Azerbaijan, the Mensheviks in Georgia and the Dashnaks in Armenia.

The capture of Baku closed the enemy ring around the Soviet Republic, a ring built up by the British, French, U.S. and Japanese invaders.

The invaders owed their military successes to the fact that the Red Army was only just being formed, that it was still small and lacked experience.

The difficulties of the Soviet state were aggravated by the wavering of the middle peasantry. Having received their land from the victorious proletariat, the middle peasants decided that the revolution was over. They did not realise that the landlords and bourgeoisie would not reconcile themselves to the loss of their power, and that land and freedom must be defended against counter-revolutionary attacks. The counter-revolutionaries took advantage of the middle peasants' vacillations.
Furthermore, matters were greatly facilitated for the interventionists by the fact that they were seizing in the main non-industrial border regions where there were few factory workers, or areas inhabited by an ethnically heterogeneous population, where nationalist counter-revolution was very active.

The interventionists and Whites tried to start an anti-Soviet struggle in the heart of the country as well. In July 1918, on instructions from Noulens, the French Ambassador in Russia, the Socialist-Revolutionaries seized Yaroslavl, and were making preparations for revolt in 20 other towns. The insurrectionary action of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in Moscow, which was suppressed, was one of the links in that conspiracy. The Yaroslavl revolt was quelled in two weeks. In the other towns the conspiracy was discovered in good time, thanks to the vigilance of the working people and the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission. A new conspiracy was contrived in the summer of 1918 by Lockhart, the British diplomatic agent with Noulens and Francis—the French and U.S. ambassadors—participating. It involved the intelligence services of all the imperialist powers. The conspirators planned to arrest the members of the Council of People’s Commissars and assassinate Lenin. Official representatives of the imperialist powers were conducting a vicious slander campaign against the Soviet state. But the central areas of the country, where the bulk of the Russian proletariat was concentrated and which had an ethnically homogeneous population, remained an impregnable stronghold of the Soviet state.

The German imperialists, too, had a hand in the fight against the peace-loving Soviet state. Although they were committed to non-interference in Soviet Russia’s domestic affairs by the terms of the Brest Litovsk peace treaty, they seized Finland and overthrew the workers’ government there. They not only occupied the Baltic provinces, Byelorussia and the Ukraine, but invaded the Don area, took Rostov-on-Don, and occupied Georgia by agreement with the Georgian Mensheviks. The counter-revolutionaries gave the German troops an enthusiastic welcome. The landlords and bourgeoisie suddenly “forgot” that a mere six months earlier they had been calling on the Russian people to fight Germany in order to save the “fatherland”. The behavior of the propertyed classes once again went to show that they saw their fatherland wherever they had their investments.

In the Ukraine, the Germans put Hetman Skoropadsky, a former tsarist general, in power. In the Don area, they supplied arms to Ataman Krasnov and helped him to raise an army.

After the Entente had begun its intervention Ataman Krasnov’s White Cossack army marched on Tsaritsyn in the summer of 1918 to block the Volga, help the counter-revolutionaries beyond the river, cut off the famine-stricken country from North Caucasian
grain and Baku oil, and advance in a single front on Moscow, the Soviet Russian capital. It followed that Germany was virtually collaborating with the Entente. In the west and south—from the Baltic Sea to the Caucasus—the threat to the Soviet Republic came from the German imperialists.

The Soviet Republic found itself in an exceptionally difficult position. A vast part of its territory was occupied by her enemies. The interventionists established an unprecedented reign of terror in the occupied areas. Those who had worked in Soviet government offices were shot. Tens of thousands of workers and peasants were butchered in cold blood for offering the slightest resistance. In the north, the British, French and U.S. invaders set up convict prisons controlled by hangmen brought expressly from the colonies. Unparalleled atrocities and monstrous tortures were the rule in the interventionist prisons on Mudyug Island and in Yokanga in the north.

In the Far East and Siberia, the U.S. monopolies and the United States Government itself supplied arms and munitions to the Russian counter-revolutionaries on a tremendous scale. The United States not only supplied the Russian counter-revolution with arms; her troops took part, along with the Japanese invaders, in military operations against the partisans; they persecuted the civilian population and put many to death. The invaders plundered national property; they removed from the country timber, furs, gold and raw materials without paying anything for them.

The interventionists cut off the Soviet Republic from its major food and raw material resources. It lost its oilfields and the Donets coalfield, its principal, and at that time almost the only, source of coal. Factories were stopping for lack of fuel. The towns had no lighting, because the power stations were at a standstill. The fuel shortage affected transport, which was unable to cope with freight-age. The people were starving. The daily bread ration had dropped to two ounces, and even this was not issued regularly. The starving population fell an easy victim to epidemics. Typhus took a heavy toll of lives. In addition, the interventionists’ agents were organizing mutinies, sabotage and conspiracies everywhere.

That was how armed intervention and Civil War, which was unleashed by the foreign imperialists in common with the internal counter-revolution and which lasted until the end of 1920, began in Russia.

“Everyone knows,” wrote Lenin, “that this war was imposed upon us; we ended the old war early in 1918, and did not begin any new one; everyone knows that the Whites were able to come out against us in the west and south and east only because the Entente helped them....” (Collected Works, Vol. 29, p. 48).

The Communist Party roused the people to a patriotic war against the foreign invaders and the Whites. The task which the Party set before the working people was viv-
idly expressed by Demyan Bedny, the proletarian poet, in the following lines:

We're in a ring of fire, comrades!
Descending on us is the whole rapacious breed,
Our native land they'd make their chattel.
But two ways out has destiny decreed:
To win, or honourably fall in battle.

The Central Committee, headed by Lenin, decided all the more important matters concerning the conduct of war. It drew up strategic plans, took measures to ensure the execution of military operations, to mobilise and use reserves and to build up and distribute resources.

The Party’s attention was devoted chiefly to the organisation of the Red Army. By the summer of 1918 nearly 500,000 had volunteered for military service. It was a force sufficient to crush the landlords and bourgeoisie, but clearly not enough to wage a protracted and difficult war against the allied forces of external and internal counter-revolution. The Soviet Government therefore decided to introduce compulsory military service. Workers and poor peasants joined the Red Army to defend, arms in hand, the gains of the socialist revolution and the independence of their Soviet country. Red Army units were rapidly formed everywhere. The Party sent its best functionaries to work in the army. They brought with them the spirit of organisation and the ideas of the Communist Party. Communists combated laxity and strove to create a strictly disciplined regular army. They carried on extensive educational work among the troops, exposing the schemes of the interventionists and Whites and showing the just character of the Soviet people’s patriotic war. Red Army men went into battle fired by the example of the Communists.

Numerous foreign workers, who had come to Russia to work before the revolution, joined the Red Army. Many former prisoners of war volunteered too. International units were formed of them and of foreign workers—Chinese, Germans, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Yugoslavs, Hungarians, Koreans, Rumanians and others who had adopted Soviet citizenship. They regarded the defence of the first Soviet republic in the world as their own cause.

Courses for training commanders from among the workers and peasants were set up in towns. Many privates and N.C.O.s of the old army became Red Army commanders. From the Communist Party, from among ordinary people there rose Civil War heroes and leaders such as V. I. Chapayev, V. K. Blücher, G. I. Kotovsky, N. A. Shchors, S. G. Lazo, S. S. Vostrotsov, A. Y. Parkhomenko, J. F. Fabricius, I. F. Fedko, M. V. Frunze, K. Y. Voroshilov, S. M. Budyonny, M. N. Tukhachevsky, I. P. Uborevich and I. E. Yakir.
Military experts—generals and officers of the old army—were called up for service in the Red Army. They had the knowledge and experience indispensable for building up the army and directing its military operations. Many of them performed their duties in good faith, for they realised that the Red Army was defending the country and the interests of the people. Among them were A. I. Yegorov, S. S. Kamenev, D. M. Karbyshev, B. M. Shaposhnikov, A. V. Stankevich, A. P. Nikolayev. The last two were subsequently taken prisoner by the Whites and hanged for their loyalty to the Soviet power. But there were also many military experts who betrayed their country, gave away military secrets to the enemy and deserted to him.

Military commissars, representatives of the Communist Party and the Soviet power, were introduced into the Red Army. They exercised control over the military experts and with a firm hand cut short all attempts to weaken the army and help the enemy. Supported by the army Communists, they carried on extensive Party and political work in the Red Army and among the population in the front-line areas, and organised Communist Party nuclei. Selected from among tested and experienced Party members, the commissars were the life and soul of the Red Army, and rallied and inspired the men to fulfil their revolutionary duty—defence of the Soviet Republic. Front, army and divisional political departments were set up to direct Party, political, cultural and educational work in the army. The Party called on all working people to redouble their defence effort and their vigilance. By decision of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, adopted in June 1918, the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks were expelled from the Soviets for having backed the open enemies of Soviet Russia—the Whites and foreign interventionists.

In the summer of 1918 the Party Central Committee considered the Eastern front to be the decisive front for the Republic, because that was where the latter was faced with the greatest danger. There the revolt of the Czechoslovak corps had merged with anti-Soviet revolts by the kulaks. Furthermore, the enemy had large, well-trained forces there and planned to march on Moscow from that area by the shortest route. In addition, the Czechoslovaks had cut off important granaries of the country—the Volga region and Siberia—from the central gubernias. Lenin said: "The salvation not only of the Russian but also of the international revolution is on the Czechoslovak front" (Collected Works, Vol. 28, p. 65).

In June 1918 a Revolutionary Military Council and headquarters of the Eastern front were set up. S. I. Gusev, M. S. Kedrov, V. V. Kubyshhev, A. F. Myasnikov, V. I. Mezhlauk, P. K. Sternberg and other experienced Party workers were assigned key posts in the armies operating on that front. The Central Committee adopted a special resolution to reinforce the Eastern front. A mass mobili-
sation of Communists was declared a priority task. The Moscow, Petrograd and other big Party organisations of the country’s central areas sent one-fifth of their membership to the front. Those of the Volga region and the Urals sent nearly all their members. By the end of 1918 the number of Communists in the army Party organisations of the Eastern front was close on 25,000. Scattered detachments were reorganised into regular army units and formations. As a result of the organising work of the Party and its representatives on the Eastern front, five Soviet armies were formed within a mere two months. A sixth army came into being on the Northern front. Ten more armies were gradually formed on the other fronts.

Lenin followed operations on the Eastern front day by day; he saw to it that the troops were reinforced in good time, and gave directions on the work of the commissars and political departments. He personally instructed hundreds of Communists about to leave for the front.

Thanks to the measures taken by the Central Committee and the Party organisations, the Eastern front was strengthened. The Red Army withstood the onslaught of the Czechoslovaks and Whites, and barred the enemy from Moscow.

Simultaneously the Soviet troops succeeded in repelling attacks by the White Cossack army of the Don, which was trying to force its way into the country’s central regions and into the Tsaritsyn area, where Soviet troops were covering the right flank of the Eastern front and preventing the White Cossacks from joining the Czechoslovak corps and the counter-revolutionaries of the Urals and Siberia. The brunt of the defence of Tsaritsyn was borne by the workers’ detachments which had withdrawn from the Ukraine and by the city’s own workers, who made up the Tenth Army. A Military Council of the North Caucasian Military District was set up which included J. V. Stalin, K. Y. Voroshilov and S. K. Minin. The defence of Tsaritsyn also relieved the strain on the Eastern front.

Just then the counter-revolution struck a heavy blow at the Soviet people. The Socialist-Revolutionaries made an attempt on the life of Lenin, the great leader of the Party, the founder and head of the Soviet state. On August 30, as Lenin was leaving a meeting at the Michelsohn (now Vladimir Ilyich) Works, he was badly wounded with two poisoned bullets. That same day, the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries assassinated M. S. Uritsky in Petrograd, where shortly before they had assassinated V. V. Volodarsky.

The news that Lenin had been wounded roused a storm of indignation all over the country. The working people pledged themselves to spare no effort to defeat the enemy. Red Army men went into battle eager to avenge the attempt on Lenin’s life. The workers and peasants closed their ranks around the Party, and helped the Red Army more vigorously than ever.
On September 2, 1918, the Soviet Republic was proclaimed an armed camp. The Soviet state replied to counter-revolutionary terror by introducing Red terror. All persons who had belonged to White organisations, or had been involved in conspiracies or revolts, were liable to be shot. During those days the All-Russian Extra-ordinary Commission, headed by F. E. Dzerzhinsky, dealt a number of crushing blows to imperialist agents. Specifically, the Lockhart conspiracy was nipped in the bud.

The Red Army took the offensive on the Eastern front and defeated the combined forces of the Czechoslovaks and Whites. It freed Kazan and Simbirsk in September 1918 and Samara early in October. This brought about a radical change on the decisive Eastern front. In summing up the experience gained by the Red Army in battle, the Central Committee of the Party wrote: “The military successes achieved on the Eastern front in September were due, first and foremost, to the vigorous, resolute and selfless work which Party members carried out on the Eastern front as commissars, commanders and Red Army privates.”

The Party’s work to build up the armed forces, and the courageous, selfless efforts of the Communists were soon crowned with success—by the autumn of 1918 the Red Army was about one million strong.

2. The Collapse of German Intervention in Soviet Russia. Extended Intervention by the Entente

The German and Austria-Hungarian invaders brought untold calamities to the working people of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Baltic provinces and Transcaucasia. They plundered the occupied regions, and massacred with unheard-of cruelty the patriots who rose to defend their country. They razed entire villages by artillery fire, and shot all persons suspected of taking part in the partisan movement. They were assisted by the bourgeois nationalists, represented by all manner of nationalist parties and the so-called “national governments” set up with the help of the interventionists. But all the atrocities and repressions to which the German invaders and their lackeys, the bourgeois nationalists, resorted were powerless in the face of the rapidly mounting tide of the people’s anger.

In the Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Baltic provinces and Transcaucasia, the working people started a patriotic war under Communist Party leadership against the German invaders. The partisan units grew, underground Party organisations extended and strengthened their ties with the masses, the prestige of the Communists grew, and so did their influence among the people.

The German Command had to withdraw large forces from the Western front in order to hurl them against the insurgents. In Russia,
the German soldiers came to realise that Soviet power was power of the working people. They returned to the Western front with revolutionary ideas. This weakened the German armies in the West.

In the autumn of 1918 the armies of Britain, France and the United States succeeded in breaking the resistance of the German army, which was exhausted by the long war and weakened by partisan action in the occupied areas and influenced by Russian revolution.

A soldiers' revolt broke out in Bulgaria in September. It was followed in October by a revolution in Austria-Hungary and in November, in Germany. Although the revolution in Germany did not end in victory for the workers and peasants, it eased the position of the Soviet Republic. On November 13, 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee declared all the provisions of the Brest Litovsk treaty, and all the commitments of the Soviet Republic regarding the payment of indemnities and territorial concessions, to be null and void. Lenin's forecast that the predatory Brest Litovsk treaty would be short-lived was fully borne out.

The annulment of the Brest Litovsk treaty and the collapse of the German imperialists' annexationist policy raised the struggle of the working people in the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltic provinces against the invaders and bourgeois nationalists to new heights.

The Red Army came to the aid of the insurgents. Pressed by Soviet troops and partisans, the Austro-German invaders fled from the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltic provinces. The Ukrainian counter-revolutionary bands formed by the invaders were also defeated. The Soviet governments of the Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Byelorussia began to function. The Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. recognised the independence of the new, non-Russian Soviet republics, and rendered them every possible assistance.

But the defeat of the German imperialists had, along with its tremendous positive results for the Soviet Republic, serious negative consequences as well, for it enabled the imperialists of Britain, France, the United States, Japan and other countries to use their armies against the Soviet Republic. Gaining easy access to the Black Sea through the Straits, they began to land large forces in the south. French, Greek, Rumanian and other troops appeared in Odessa, Kherson, Sevastopol and Novorossiisk. The Entente also increased the strength of its forces in the north of the Soviet Republic. Over 40,000 British and U.S. soldiers were landed at Murmansk and Archangel. Japan and the United States signed an agreement under which each country was to land 10,000 troops in the Far East. Japan, however, landed close on 100,000. At the same time the Entente requested Germany to leave her troops in the oc-
cupied areas of Russia, to prevent those areas from falling into Bol-
shevik hands. The German bourgeoisie readily accepted the propos-
al, hoping thereby to secure more advantageous peace terms.
Analysing the history of foreign interference in Soviet affairs, Lenin said:

"The first stage, naturally the more accessible and easier one for the Entente, was their attempt to settle matters with Soviet Russia by using their own troops" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 187).

Simultaneously the imperialists increased their aid to the inter-
nal counter-revolution. In some parts of the country, the So-
cialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks cleared the way for open military dictatorship. In November 1918 the British intervention-
ists installed a tsarist admiral, Kolchak, in Siberia as "supreme ruler" of Russia. In the south, the Entente had the Don and Vol-
unteer armies unified under Denikin, a tsarist general, whom it began to supply with equipment and munitions. It also helped him by sending him military advisers and in other ways.

In the face of such great danger, Lenin called for the raising of an army of three million men. His proposal to that effect was ap-
proved by the joint meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Moscow Soviet and delegates from the factory com-
mittees and trade unions held in October 1918. The resolution adopt-
ed on Lenin's report pointed out that the Soviet Republic was threatened with "the onslaught of an immeasurably more dan-
gerous force—that of the international counter-revolutionary bour-

The Soviet Government had repeatedly protested against the intervention, and had offered to conclude peace with the Entente Powers. The Sixth All-Russian Extraordinary Congress of Soviets, which met at the beginning of November 1918, once again called on the governments waging war against Soviet Russia to begin peace talks. But the Entente governments ignored the Soviet pro-
posals. The successes achieved by the Soviet Republic and the revolution in a number of European countries had greatly frightened the imperialists. They had decided to overthrow Soviet power in Russia at all costs, and to replace it by a bourgeois government that would do their bidding.

It was essential to mobilise all the forces of the Party, the work-
ing class and the mass of the people, all the country's resources, for the defeat of the invaders and Whites. With that aim in view, the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence was established, under Lenin's chairmanship, on November 30, 1918. The Council was charged with the task of using all the industrial and other national resources to fight the invaders and Whites, of organising transport and expanding war industry to the utmost.
The military situation necessitated a reorganisation of Party work in order that the Party might fully mobilise the working people to beat back the enemy. Typical of Party life and activities were the strictest centralism, iron discipline and self-denying heroism in the struggle for the victory and consolidation of Soviet power. The Party repeatedly mobilised its members to fight on the civil war fronts.

Much attention was given to the strengthening of the home front. Special units were set up under gubernia and uyezd Party committees to combat espionage and sabotage and to guard factories, railways and storehouses. The military training of Communists held an important place in the work of Party organisations. A decision adopted by the Central Committee on May 8, 1918, demanded that every Communist should receive military training and acquire perfect mastery of the use of arms.

The Party concerned itself especially with various forms of political agitation and propaganda among the masses. It laid great emphasis on individual and group agitation work. It assigned agitators to barracks, Red Army units, factories and houses. The agitation trains and ships of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee sent into the front-line areas were led by prominent Party workers and statesmen appointed by the Party. The Oktyabrskaya Revolutsia train, for example, was led by M. I. Kalinin. Active on board the Krasnaya Zvezda was N. K. Krupskaya. The Voronezh, Tambov, Ufa, Tsaritsyn, Simbirsk and Don gubernia committees organised local agitation and propaganda trains, ships and carriages. Non-Party conferences, of which Lenin spoke highly, became a new, widespread form of political work among the masses. They discussed vital problems of defence and economic development. They helped the Party to strengthen its ties with the masses, meet their requirements and assign government jobs to the more efficient. The Party organisations' political work among the masses went a long way towards mobilising them to fight the Whites and interventionists.

The Soviet state had the support of all the working people. There was a change of heart among the middle peasants, who were becoming more and more convinced that the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet state was correct. Having had personal experience of the horrors of counter-revolution and seen that the victory of the enemy was followed by the restoration of the landlords and the seizure of the peasants' land, as well as by the loss of the country's independence, the middle peasants swung over to the Soviet power. The Bolsheviks took this circumstance into account. In the autumn of 1918 Lenin was already calling on the Party to pass from the policy of neutralising the middle peasants to a policy of stable alliance with them.

Encircled by superior enemy forces, the Soviet Republic had to fight single-handed. Its resources were greatly depleted, and it was
necessary to revise the economic policy of the Soviet state as set out by Lenin in the spring of 1918 in *The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government*. The war made it imperative to concentrate the industrial effort on defeating the interventionists and Whites. Step by step, the Soviet Government nationalised not only large-scale, but also medium-sized and even small industries. The Soviet state took industrial production into its own hands. It strictly centralised industrial management to meet the requirements of the front as effectively as possible.

Food became a major economic problem in the Civil War. A law passed in October 1918 introduced a tax in kind to be levied on the peasants. But the heavy burden of war prevented its enforcement. It was imperative to supply the Red Army regularly, and to save the working class from death by starvation. Steps taken in the course of 1918—the introduction of a grain monopoly, the prohibition of private trade and the confiscation of surplus grain—were supplemented by further measures. In January 1919 a decree was adopted providing for assessment of the grain and fodder to be requisitioned for the benefit of the state in the producing gubernias. Under its terms, the Soviet state specified the amounts of grain and fodder it required; these were then apportioned among the producing gubernias, and were to be requisitioned from the peasants at fixed prices.

“Being in a besieged fortress as we were,” said Lenin, “we could hold out only by applying the surplus-requisitioning system, that is, by taking from the peasants all the surplus produce they had, and sometimes not only the surplus, but also some quantity indispensable to the peasant, in order to maintain the fighting capacity of the army and prevent a complete breakdown in industry” (*Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 266).

Universal labour service was introduced during the war. Thereby the Soviet state gave effect to the principle: “He who does not work, shall not eat.” By making physical labour compulsory for the bourgeoisie it became possible to release the proletariat for work that was more essential to the front.

That was how the economic policy which has gone down in history as *War Communism* came into being. It was introduced gradually, in the course of approximately one year—from the summer of 1918 to the spring of 1919. An economic policy of the working class completely centralising production and distribution, it was aimed at mobilising the country’s material resources and making the best use of them for defence and for the building of socialism. War Communism was not an inevitable stage in the development of the socialist revolution. It was of a temporary character, necessitated by foreign military intervention and economic dislocation. In conditions of foreign intervention and Civil War, War Communism was the only feasible policy, and it fully justified itself. But it would be wrong to consider that War Communism is the way to socialism. Afterwards, even
while noting that credit was due to the Soviet state for introducing War Communism, Lenin said:

"But it is no less necessary to know the real extent of the service that stands to our credit. We were forced to resort to 'War Communism' by war and ruin. It was not, nor could it be, a policy that corresponded to the economic tasks of the proletariat. It was a temporary measure" (Collected Works, Vol. 32, p. 321).

The measures taken by the Party and the Government, and the self-sacrificing support which the working people gave them, enabled the Red Army to withstand the interventionist and White attacks.

At the close of 1918 a grave situation arose on the Southern front, then the Republic's main front. In November the Central Committee of the Party, after discussing the situation, decided to strengthen the front. On instructions from the C. C., experienced military political workers were sent to the Southern front, along with fresh reinforcements—the Moscow Workers' Division, the Inza, Urals and other units. In the course of December the Red Army succeeded in checking the advance of the interventionists and Whites in the south, and early in January 1919, it launched a counter-offensive. Krasnov's Don Army was smashed by the joint operations of the troops of the Southern front. Bolshevik propaganda and the setbacks at the front prompted many Cossacks to go home.

To divert Red Army forces from the south, the Entente struck in the north. Kolchak was instructed to move a sizable force to the northern sector of the Eastern front, in order to effect a junction with the British and American troops in the Perm-Kotlas area, and from there march on Moscow in a united front. The Whites succeeded in defeating the Third Soviet Army and, at the end of December 1918, in capturing Perm.

Nevertheless, the enemy was unable to carry out his plan. The Soviet troops wore out the White forces in battle. The measures adopted by the Central Committee of the Party enabled the Third Army to take the offensive already in January 1919. A committee of inquiry appointed by the C.C. R.C.P.(B.), and composed of F. E. Dzerzhinsky and J. V. Stalin, brought to light shortcomings in the organisation of the troops on the Eastern front, and thereby played an important part in strengthening that army and increasing its efficiency. Soviet troops advanced in other sectors of the Eastern front as well. In December 1918 they freed Ufa. In January 1919 a combined thrust by the Soviet troops operating from the west and from Turkestan resulted in the liberation of Orenburg. In the southern sector of the Eastern front, the Red Army entered Uralsk.

The Red Army was on the offensive everywhere. In a war against a revolutionary people, the fighting efficiency of the imperialist troops began to decline. They had been sent to northern and southern Russia ostensibly for the purpose of continuing the war against the Germans. But as they did not meet a single German there, the sol-
diers began to realise that they had been deceived. They saw that the power in Russia was in the hands of the people, that the workers and peasants were building a new society free from exploitation. This was largely the result of the work conducted in the enemy rear. The Central Committee and local Party committees did much to organise the Party underground. The Central Committee had set up a Central Bureau in charge of the work of Party organisations in the enemy rear. In the Don and Kuban areas, underground work was organised and led by the Don Bureau and in the Ukraine, by the Trans-front Bureau of the C.C. C.P.(B.)U. Numerous underground Party organisations were operating in Siberia. They were led by the Siberian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.). Underground Bolshevik organisations were active not only among the population but among the interventionist troops. In Odessa, the Regional Party Committee headed by the fearless Bolshevik I. F. Smirnov (underground name, Nikolai Lastochkin), set up a “Foreign Collegium” for agitation work among the interventionist troops. Many Communists, including I. F. Smirnov, the Frenchwoman Jeanne Labourbe and others, lost their lives at the hands of the interventionist executioners.

The Bolsheviks’ work in the enemy rear bore fruit. A mutiny broke out in the French fleet operating in the Black Sea. A ferment began among foreign soldiers, who insisted on being sent home. In the spring of 1919 the invaders were compelled to leave several areas of the Soviet Republic.

“The victory we won by compelling the British and French troops to evacuate,” Lenin said, “was the greatest victory we had over the Entente. We deprived them of their soldiers” (Collected Works, Vol. 30, p. 189).

3. Founding of the Third, Communist International. Eighth Party Congress

The rising tide of revolution in Western Europe was of great help to the Soviet state. In many capitalist countries mass strikes developed into armed clashes with the bourgeoisie. Soviet republics came into being in Hungary and Bavaria in the spring of 1919. The colonial peoples began to rise up to fight for their national liberation.

The October Revolution radically changed the situation in the international working-class movement. The struggle to found a Third International had entered a new phase. A meeting of the Left groups of the Socialist parties, held in Petrograd in January 1918, resolved to convene a world internationalist conference. During that year Communist Parties sprang up in a number of capitalist countries. The constituent congress of the Communist Party of Germany met at the end of December 1918 and the beginning of January 1919. The Party was founded by outstanding leaders of the German and
international working-class movement—Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring and Wilhelm Pieck. Liebknecht and Luxemburg were assassinated shortly after by hirelings of the German imperialists.

Communist Parties were founded in Argentina, Finland, Austria, Hungary and Poland. Communist groups and Left Socialist organisations were formed in many capitalist countries. It became at last possible to accomplish the task put forward by Lenin during the First World War, namely, to found a Third, Communist International. A meeting of internationalist delegates took place in Petrograd in January 1919. On a motion tabled by Lenin, it called on the Communist Parties and Left Socialist groups of all countries to take part in the constituent congress of the Communist International.

The First Congress of the Communist International took place in Moscow in the early part of March 1919. It was attended by delegates from the Communist Parties and Left Socialist organisations of 30 countries. Its work was guided by the leader of the world proletariat, Lenin. The Congress resolved to found the Third, Communist International, approved Lenin’s theses on bourgeois democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat, adopted the platform of the Comintern, and addressed a manifesto to the proletarians of the world, calling on them to wage a resolute struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, for the victory of Soviets in all countries. The founding of the Comintern was a great victory for Marxism-Leninism over social-reformism. The best of the revolutionary forces of the world proletariat rallied to the banner of Communist internationalism.

From March 18-23, 1919, the R.C.P.(B.) held its Eighth Congress, which represented over 300,000 Party members. The Congress discussed the Central Committee’s report, the draft Programme of the Party, the military situation and military policy, work in the countryside and questions of organisation.

The Eighth Congress adopted the new Party Programme, drafted by Lenin. The Programme summed up the results of the new stage of the world-wide emancipation movement of the proletariat. More than 15 years had passed since the adoption of the first Party Programme. The fundamental task it had set had been performed with the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Republic. The Party was now faced with other tasks—consolidation of the state embodying the dictatorship of the working class, and the construction of socialist society. The new Programme gave a Marxist-Leninist analysis of pre-monopoly capitalism—an analysis contained also in the first Programme of the R.S.D.L.P.—and an analysis of imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism. It demonstrated that the October Socialist Revolution in Russia was an inevitable and law-governed development.

The new Programme defined the Party’s tasks for the entire period of transition from capitalism to socialism. It gave a comprehensive
description of Soviet democracy as a democracy of a higher type, and unmasked the class essence and spurious nature of bourgeois democracy.

In the economic field, the new Programme considered the development of the country’s productive forces in every possible way to be the paramount and decisive task that must govern the entire economic policy of the Soviet state. The Programme called for the completion of the process of expropriating the bourgeoisie, the transformation of the means of production and circulation into public property and the co-ordination of all the economic activity of the country on the basis of a single state plan. It provided for further extension of co-operation in local and handicraft industry, financial support for it by the state, and its inclusion in the general plan for raw material and fuel supplies. These measures were designed to facilitate a smooth transition from those backward forms of production to a higher, large-scale mechanised industry. The Programme pointed out that the socialist mode of production can be stabilised only on the basis of the comradely discipline of the working people and the maximum degree of initiative, sense of responsibility, mutual control over labour productivity on their part. It assigned the main role in creating a new, socialist discipline to the trade unions. It provided for extensive development of science and its closer connection with production, as well as for the employment of bourgeois experts under the control of the Soviet power.

In the sphere of agriculture, the Programme recommended that measures be taken to organise large-scale socialist farming by (1) establishing state farms, (2) founding and supporting societies and associations for collective tillage, (3) state sowing of all uncultivated lands, (4) mobilising all the forces of agricultural science to raise the efficiency of agriculture, and (5) supporting agricultural communes, as completely voluntary unions of cultivators, to conduct large-scale socialised farming.

Seeing that small individual peasant farms would continue to exist for a long time to come, the Party considered it necessary to increase their productivity by supplying the working peasants with improved seeds and fertilisers, disseminating agronomical knowledge, repairing implements at state-owned workshops, setting up centres for the hire of implements and experimental stations, carrying out reclamation work, and so on.

Specific measures were laid down for labour protection and social maintenance, housing, health and public education. They were to secure higher living and cultural standards for the working people of the land of Soviets.

During the discussion of the draft Programme, Bukharin and Pyatakov opposed the idea of including in the Programme a description of pre-monopoly capitalism and simple-commodity production in addition to a definition of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism. Their attitude was in fact a continuation of their struggle
against Lenin's theory of socialist revolution. They held that imperialism was a special social and economic formation, and not a stage in the development of capitalism. Bukharin and his supporters argued that imperialism was incompatible with pre-monopolist forms of economy. It followed from this anti-Leninist theory of "pure imperialism" that in the era of imperialism only a "purely" proletarian revolution was possible, in which the proletariat opposed the bourgeoisie single-handed, and which included neither anti-feudal movements nor national liberation wars. In this attitude Bukharin and Pyatakov were proceeding from the Menshevik-Trotskyist denial of the role of the peasantry in the socialist revolution and in the building of socialism. In practice, their attitude amounted to depriving the proletariat of its ally, and in the final analysis represented the rejection of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Lenin vigorously opposed the anti-Bolshevik views advanced by Bukharin and his supporters. He pointed out the political harmfulness of Bukharin's proposal.

"Pure imperialism, without the fundamental basis of capitalism, has never existed, exists nowhere and never will exist," he said (Collected Works, Vol. 29, p. 144).

Serious differences arose over the national question during the discussion of the Programme. Bukharin and Pyatakov opposed recognition of the right of nations to self-determination up to and including political secession. Exposing the anti-Bolshevik nature of the Bukharin and Pyatakov proposal, Lenin showed the disastrous consequences to which it led. The Party and the Soviet Government were overcoming by their correct nationalities policy the mutual distrust which the nations felt as a result of national and colonial oppression by the landlords and bourgeoisie, and had laid a foundation for friendship among the peoples. The proposal of Bukharin and Pyatakov would have revived that distrust. It would also have been detrimental to the international influence of the Soviet Republic, for the imperialists would have begun slanderously to allege that the old nationalities policy, a policy of oppression and conquest, was being restored in Soviet Russia.

"And this is what may happen if the principle of the self-determination of nations is denied..." said Lenin.

"We cannot refuse to recognise what actually exists; it will itself compel us to recognise it. The demarcation between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is proceeding differently in each country. Here we must act with utmost caution. We must be particularly cautious with regard to the various nations, for there is nothing worse than distrust on the part of a nation" (ibid., p. 153).

The Congress rejected the anti-Leninist proposals on the nature of imperialism and the national question and approved Lenin's draft of the Party Programme.
The attitude to the middle peasantry was one of the most important items on the Congress agenda. Lenin, who reported on it, called for a policy of solid alliance with the middle peasantry. The policy of neutralising the middle peasants was the only correct one in the early period of the existence of the Soviet Republic, when the chief task was to suppress the bourgeoisie and firmly establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, when the middle peasants were wavering and Soviet power had not yet been consolidated. But in the new conditions, with the first onslaught of the counter-revolution beaten back, with Soviet power firmly established and the tasks of socialist construction in process of accomplishment, the policy of neutralisation was no longer suitable. The middle peasant had swung over to the side of Soviet power, he had to be drawn into the work of building a socialist society. Socialism could be built only in alliance with the middle peasants, who at that time made up the bulk of the peasantry.

"We have entered a stage of socialist construction," said Lenin, "when we must work out, specifically and in detail, basic rules and directions that have been tested by work in the countryside and that we must follow if we want to secure a stable alliance with the middle peasantry..." (ibid., pp. 124-25).

On the basis of Lenin's report, the Congress adopted a resolution on changing to a policy of stable alliance with the middle peasantry while relying on the peasant poor, for the purpose of combating the kulaks and all the other class enemies of Soviet power, and of continuing socialist construction. The Congress enjoined all administrative and Party workers to pay proper attention to the needs of the middle peasant, to draw a strict dividing line between him and the kulak, to continue an unrelenting struggle against the kulak, and gradually and steadily draw the middle peasant into socialist construction, making concessions to him when determining the ways of carrying out socialist changes.

This Congress resolution was of exceptional importance both for the consolidation of the Soviet state and for the revolutionary movement of the world proletariat. Summing up the experience of the Party in solving the problem of the proletariat’s attitude to the middle peasantry after the victory of the socialist revolution, Lenin assessed the significance of an alliance between the proletariat and the middle peasantry as follows:

"The dictatorship of the proletariat is a specific form of class alliance between the proletariat, the vanguard of the working people, and the numerous non-proletarian sections of the working people (petty bourgeoisie, small proprietors, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, etc.), or the majority of these strata, an alliance against capital, an alliance whose aim is the complete overthrow of capital, complete suppression of the resistance offered by the bourgeoisie as well as of attempts at restoration on its part, an
alliance for the final establishment and consolidation of socialism” (Collected Works, Vol. 29, pp. 350-51).

Lenin enriched the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and developed the theory and policy of the Party on the peasant question. The Congress decision on an alliance with the middle peasant, with the main mass of the peasantry, played a great part in rallying all the working people for the fight against the interventionists and Whites, for the building of socialism. Speaking of the establishment of an alliance with the middle peasant, Lenin emphasised at the Congress that “we shall cope with this task, and then socialism will be absolutely invincible” (ibid., p. 191).

The military question held a special place in the Congress deliberations. Although, as Lenin said at the Congress, the country had succeeded in repulsing a furious onslaught from all sides, there was still the danger of fresh Entente campaigns. In fact, the Congress already had information about a new offensive by the invaders and Whites from the east.

By the time the Congress met, a so-called “Military Opposition” had made its appearance. It included certain former “Left Communists” who opposed the Party’s policy on the military question as well. But it also included people who had nothing whatever to do with opposition groupings. The “Military Opposition” was against the introduction of iron discipline in the army and against any utilisation of the experience of the old military experts. It advocated the preservation of partisan methods in managing the army and in waging war.

The “Military Opposition” also advocated erroneous and harmful views regarding Party work in the armed forces. It proposed extending the rights of the primary Party organisations in the armed forces, entrusting them with the leadership of all military activities, abolishing the political organs and setting up army Party committees. Ignoring the special character of the armed forces with their strict centralisation and iron discipline, the “Military Opposition” mechanically tried to apply the experience of the Party work of the time when the Red Army was built up on a voluntary basis, of the period of partisan units and territorial organisations, to the conditions of the standing army of the proletarian state. Its proposals amounted to an attempt at decreasing and not increasing the military power of the armed forces.

During the discussion of the military question the delegates rejected the proposals of the “Military Opposition”. At the same time, they protested against the policy followed by Trotsky, who ignored Party leadership in the army and placed blind trust in the old military experts, among whom there were obvious traitors. The delegates also condemned indiscriminate mobilisations, which did not take into account the class principle of selection, with the result that some units often showed political instability.
Lenin sharply criticised the “Military Opposition”. He pointed out that the Central Committee of the Party decided all the more important military matters, planned appropriate measures and verified their fulfilment. Speaking of the unexampled heroism of the defenders of Tsaritsyn in 1918, Lenin also stressed the mistakes of the Tenth Army Command—its scornful attitude to military experts, and its failure to combat laxity of organisation and discipline, which had entailed great losses. Without iron military discipline, Lenin pointed out, there can be no powerful Red Army, particularly in a peasant country, such as Russia was at the time. While insisting that the achievements of the bourgeois art of war be utilised and the assistance of military experts enlisted, Lenin stressed the need for closer political control over their activity.

The Congress adopted a resolution on the military question unanimously. At the basis of the resolution was the chief principle of army building and activity, that is, the Party’s leadership of all the Armed Forces of the country. The Congress condemned the attempt to substitute guerilla units for a well-disciplined regular army under a centralised command.

The resolution laid special emphasis on the role of the military commissars. It noted the heroic work being done by the commissars in the Red Army, and stated that their work was most effective when it was supported by the Communist groups of the regiment.

“The military commissars,” said the resolution, “are not only direct and immediate representatives of the Soviet power; they also, and above all, embody the spirit of our Party, its discipline, its firmness and courage in the struggle for the attainment of the goal set” (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part I, p. 435).

It was decided to form a Political Department of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, and to entrust it with the direction of the entire Party political work in the Red Army.

The practical section of the resolution stated the necessity of strictly adhering to the class principle of calling up working people only, and of conscripting kulak and other parasitic elements into special labour battalions; enlisting the assistance of military experts and establishing unremitting Party political control over them through the commissars; extending the training of commanders of proletarian and semi-proletarian origin, etc. These provisions were designed to counteract Trotsky’s distortions of the Party’s military policy.

In its resolution on Party building, the Eighth Congress outlined measures to strengthen the Party’s central bodies and specified the structure of the Central Committee. A Political and an Organisational Bureau and a Secretariat of the Party Central Committee were established. The Congress instructed the Central Committee carefully to watch the social composition of the Party and to see to it, by exercising the utmost fastidiousness in admitting non-workers and non-peasants to Party membership, that its quality did not deteriorate.
As tens of thousands of Party members were employed in the machinery of state, the Congress called for a vigorous struggle against the danger of their drifting away from the masses and becoming infected with a bureaucratic spirit. It was decided to re-register all Party members, which meant in fact cleansing the Party. Much attention was given to the strengthening of Party discipline. The situation in the country required the most strict centralisation and rigorous discipline. “The Party at the present time needs outright military discipline”, said the resolution.

The Party organisations in the non-Russian areas acquired great importance in Party building. Congresses of local Bolshevik organisations were held in some of these areas, and Communist Parties were founded with Central Committees of their own. In the second half of 1918 and the beginning of 1919, Communist Parties were formed in Turkestan, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Byelorussia, Latvia, Estonia and Bessarabia. The fundamental question arose of the principle on which the Party organisations of the non-Russian areas were to form part of the Russian Communist Party.

Lenin’s idea was that all the non-Russian organisations should be integral components of a single Communist Party of Russia. The Eighth Congress declared emphatically against a federation of independent Communist Parties and firmly stated that a single centralised Communist Party, with a single Central Committee directing the work of the entire Party, was essential. The Central Committees of the Communist Parties in the non-Russian Soviet republics would enjoy the rights of regional committees under the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.).

In accordance with this decision, the Transcaucasian Bolshevik organisations, namely, those of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, were transformed in 1920 into the Communist Parties of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, and headed the struggle of the workers and peasants of Transcaucasia for Soviet power.

The founding of Communist Parties in the non-Russian Soviet republics as integral parts of the R.C.P.(B.) marked a new stage in the development of the Communist Party of the Soviet Republic on the basis of the Leninist principle of proletarian internationalism. It was a pattern of Party development in a multi-national socialist republic.

The Congress resolution “On the Question of Organisation” administered a rebuff to the Saponov-Ósinsky opportunist group, which denied the leading role of the Party in the Soviet state.

The resolution pointed out that the Party “must win undivided political sway in the Soviets and effective control over all their activities” through selfless day-by-day work in the Soviets and the promotion of devoted Communists to all Soviet posts. Party groups strictly observing Party discipline must be formed in all Soviet institutions. “The Party seeks to guide the activi-
ties of the Soviets but not to supplant them,” the resolution said (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part I, p. 446).

The Congress hailed the founding of the Third, Communist International and declared its unqualified adherence to the platform of the International.

The Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) was of great importance. The new Party Programme which it adopted was a programme for the building of socialism. The Congress resolutions helped to consolidate the military and political alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry, and to strengthen the Red Army, which ensured the success of the further struggle against the interventionists and Whites.

The new Party Programme armed the workers and peasants with a clear perspective of socialist construction. It inspired the mass of the people to wage a selfless struggle for the triumph of the new social order.

The Programme was also of lasting international significance. It answered the question that interested the working people of the whole world, namely, how the socialist revolution had triumphed, why it was inevitable and wherein lay its strength. Speaking of the international significance of the Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Republic Lenin stressed that

“A simple translation of our Programme will best answer the question what the Russian Communist Party, which is a contingent of the world proletariat, has accomplished. Our Programme will be very forceful propaganda and agitation material; it will be a document that will entitle the workers to say: ‘Here we have our comrades, our brothers. It is here that our common cause is being realised’” (Collected Works, Vol. 29, p. 198).

4. The Radical Turn in the Civil War. The Defeat of Kolchak and Denikin

The end of the Eighth Party Congress coincided with the launching of a new campaign by the Entente and the Whites. Protected and aided by the interventionists, the Russian counter-revolutionaries continued to form armies of many thousands. Their position was particularly strong in Siberia, where all elements hostile to the Soviet power gathered to join Kolchak. Kolchak held the industrial Urals. With support from the kulaks, the Whites forced the peasants to supply them with food. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks backed Kolchak, for whom they had cleared the way. The British, French, Japanese and American imperialists continually supplied the Whites with arms, munitions and equipment.

Kolchak’s offensive was supported by the counter-revolutionary troops in the south, west and north, which had, in their turn, received aid and support from the invaders. The main blow was to be dealt
by the Kolchak forces, which intended to push to the Volga and there join Denikin to strike a combined blow at Moscow.

The Kolchak army took the offensive early in March 1919. The Red Army had to abandon Ufa. The Soviet front was breached. White troops were forcing their way through to the Volga. In the south, General Denikin captured Lugansk and part of the Donets coalfield, with the result that the country was deprived of its coal base. In May General Yudenich took the offensive against Petrograd. In the Baltic provinces, the Whites opened an attack, supported by the British Navy and German troops. A Polish army, formed and equipped by the Entente, invaded Lithuania and Byelorussia. An army under the White General Miller, and detachments of British, American and French interventionists were advancing from the north. Thus all the forces of counter-revolution took the offensive.

Once again Soviet Russia found herself encircled by enemies. On April 11, 1919, the Central Committee approved the Theses of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.) in Connection with the Situation on the Eastern Front, written by Lenin. The theses gave an appraisal of the Republic's military and political situation and underlined the decisive importance of the Eastern front. The Central Committee called on all working people to do their utmost to defeat the enemies. Over 15,000 Communists were sent to the Eastern front. The Komsomol announced the first country-wide mobilisation of its members, and dispatched upwards of 3,000 of them to the front. The trade unions mobilised over 60,000 workers. The arrival of the Communists, mostly workers from Petrograd, Moscow, Ivanovo-Voznesensk and Tver, raised Red Army morale. They reinforced the Party groups and political departments in the army, and improved the political education of the Red Army men.

The working class responded to the call of the Central Committee with labour heroism on a mass scale. In industry, the Communists initiated and organised veritable feats of labour. A new form of social labour, known as Communist subbotniks, was initiated by the workers. The Party supported it. By decision of a general meeting of Communists and sympathisers in a subdistrict of the Moscow-Kazan Railway, the first Communist subbotnik took place on May 10. In the second half of 1919 subbotniks spread throughout the country.

Lenin described the Communist subbotniks as a great initiative. He assessed them as conscious, voluntary and supremely heroic work on the part of the working people, as the actual beginning of communism. The workers' heroic effort in the home front made it possible to supply the Red Army with all it required, primarily arms and ammunition.

On instructions from the Party Central Committee and the Government, the Soviet Command drew up plans for a Red Army counter-offensive. The decisive blow was to be struck by the Southern group of the Eastern front, under M. V. Frunze. V. V. Kuibyshev was a
member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern group, which included the V. I. Chapayev division of legendary fame, with D. A. Furmanov as its commissar.

At the end of April 1919 the Southern group began the counter-offensive, and inflicted a shattering defeat on the enemy. Conditions were thus provided for the utter defeat of Kolchak and for the liberation of the Urals and Siberia.

At the decisive moment, when the execution of the plan for defeating the enemy was almost complete, Trotsky, then Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, proposed to the command of the Eastern front that it should transfer a considerable part of its troops to the Southern front. To do this, the command would have to halt the offensive. This would have enabled Kolchak to restore his army. Lenin had to intervene. He insisted that the Urals be freed without fail before the winter. The Central Committee rejected Trotsky's proposal and directed the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern front to proceed with the offensive. The Red troops took the offensive all along the Eastern front. By the summer of 1919 the threat from Kolchak, which was the main threat, had been eliminated, although his army had not yet been completely destroyed.

In Siberia and the Far East, the partisans were harassing the White troops and the interventionists. They engaged the enemy in bitter fighting, blew up railways, derailed trains, and rescued Red Army men who had been taken prisoner. The partisan movement was led by underground Party committees, which also directed strikes in Kolchak's rear. All these factors contributed to the successes of the Red Army.

In an attempt to frustrate the Red Army offensive on the Eastern front, the counter-revolutionaries attacked in the vicinity of Petrograd. The troops under Yudenich, supported by Finnish Whites and Estonian White units, closed in on the city.

The C.C. R.C.P.(B.) decided on defence measures for Petrograd. It called for the mobilisation of Communists, Komsomol and trade union members for the Petrograd front, and revoked an order to send Communists mobilised in Petrograd to the Eastern front. But the Petrograd Defence Committee, which was headed by Zinoviev, did not take all the necessary measures. It ordered the evacuation of factories working for the defence of Petrograd, and even discussed the question of scuttling the fleet in view of the enemy advance. On a proposal by Lenin, the Council of Defence categorically prohibited the evacuation of factories and property from Petrograd.

The White command tried to support its offensive at the front by striking from the rear. A mutiny engineered by Entente agents broke out at the Krasnaya Gorka, Seraya Loshad and Obruchev forts. The mutineers opened fire on Kronstadt. Drastic measures were adopted immediately against the traitors. A unit formed for the suppression
of the mutiny attacked the forts with the support of the Baltic Fleet. The mutineers were crushed. Yudenich's offensive against Petrograd was foiled.

In August 1919 Lenin addressed a letter to the workers and peasants in connection with the victory over Kolchak. He pointed out the chief lessons of that victory, which had to be learned if the country was to be made secure against a repetition of the Kolchak affair. First, a powerful Red Army was needed. Secondly, the Soviet state could not maintain an army and the workers unless it had grain, which the peasants must give the state in the form of a loan. Thirdly, it was necessary to maintain revolutionary order and strictly observe Soviet laws and decrees. Fourthly, it would be criminal to forget that it was the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries who had helped Kolchak appear on the scene and had given him outright support. Fifthly, a strong alliance of the workers and peasants was needed if the enemy was to be vanquished. “An implacable fight against capital, and an alliance of the working people, an alliance of the peasants and the working class—that is the last and most important lesson of the Kolchak affair,” wrote Lenin (Collected Works, Vol. 29, p. 518).

The nationalities policy of the Soviet Government played a very great part in defeating the enemies of the Soviet Republic. As soon as danger threatened the country, the independent Soviet republics showed greater initiative in combining their forces in the struggle against enemies. The Central Committee of the Party approved this initiative and, on a proposal by Lenin, decided on the military unity of the republics. On June 1, 1919, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, at a special meeting in Moscow attended by delegates from all the Soviet republics, decided to conclude a military alliance and establish a single command, and to amalgamate the councils of national economy, the transport system and the commissariats of labour.

The unification of all the forces of the Soviet peoples strengthened the country, enabling it to fight the invaders and Whites more effectively and to ensure their subsequent rout.

Kolchak's defeat did not stop the imperialists from continuing their intervention. In the second half of 1919 the invaders and the Whites shifted the centre of their struggle against Soviet Russia to the south. This time the main blow was to be struck by the Denikin army.

Churchill, British Minister of War, boasted of having organised a “campaign of 14 powers” against Soviet Russia.

Once again Soviet Russia found herself in an extremely perilous situation. Although a substantial portion of Siberia, one of the principal grain-producing areas, had been captured by the heroic Red Army, Denikin still held the entire south, which included the main fuel areas—the Donets coalfield and the Grozny oilfields. Baku was
in the hands of the invaders and Musavatists. On June 30, 1919, Tsaritsyn fell, and Denikin then ordered his army to march on Moscow. He counted on support from the “National Centre”, a counter-revolutionary organisation operating inside the country. The conspirators were planning to raise a revolt as soon as the enemy troops approached Moscow.

The Central Committee issued a call to the Party and the country written by Lenin and entitled “All Out for the Fight Against Denikin!” It laid down a concrete programme for rallying the whole people to defeat the enemy. Leading Party and Soviet workers and fresh Red Army forces were dispatched to the Southern front. As a result, the Soviet troops on the Southern front were able as early as the end of July to begin preparations for a counter-offensive against Denikin.

The counter-offensive was to start at the beginning of August 1919. The plan of the command was to strike the blow in the direction of Tsaritsyn. That would prevent Denikin from crossing the Volga and making a junction with Kolchak’s southern army; secondly, it would be easier to move reinforcements into the Tsaritsyn area from the Eastern front; thirdly, the blow would threaten the flank of Denikin’s troops advancing on Moscow, and would enable the Soviet forces to break through into the enemy rear.

But the counter-offensive produced no decisive result. It began much later than planned, owing to the inefficiency of the war department, which was headed by Trotsky. Denikin, who had his agents in the headquarters of the Southern front, was informed of the intended offensive, and took measures to frustrate it. He was greatly helped in this by a raid of Mamontov’s White cavalry into the rear of the Southern front. A number of units had to be withdrawn from the front to counter the raid. Meanwhile, Denikin succeeded in forming a striking force, which he hurled against Moscow by way of Kursk-Orel-Tula. He seized Kursk and Orel, and was threatening Tula. Never before had the Whites drawn so near to the heart of the country as in the autumn of 1919.

The other forces of counter-revolution took the offensive simultaneously with Denikin, seeking to divert the Red Army troops from the Southern front. The remnants of Kolchak’s army launched an offensive. In the north, Miller was advancing on Vologda and Petrozavodsk. Yudenich again broke through to the environs of Petrograd. The troops of bourgeois-landlord Poland captured Minsk.

Denikin’s advance on Moscow made the Southern front the main one. In these critical days the Central Committee of the Party took further measures to reinforce the Southern front. In September a plenary meeting of the Central Committee accepted Lenin’s proposal to send the largest possible number of Party workers to the army. The Party launched an extensive political campaign, explaining the situation at the front. By decision of the Central Committee, the command of the Southern front was replaced. The Southern front was
divided into the Southern and South-Eastern fronts. A Defence Committee for the Moscow fortified area was established. Additional reserves were moved to the Southern front.

The Central Committee of the Party sent about 30,000 Communists to the front. The Komsomol announced a second country-wide mobilisation of its members, and 10,000 of them left for the front. The Denikinites’ hopes of a revolt in the Soviet rear were shattered, for the conspiracy of the “National Centre” was discovered and nipped in the bud.

The Party proclaimed a Party Week, to reinforce its ranks and strengthen its ties with the masses. Over 200,000 workers and peasants joined the Party in the central areas alone. The Party Week was also highly successful in the army in the field whose finest men joined the Party. That was how the working people of Soviet Russia reacted to Denikin’s threat to disband the Soviets and hang the Bolsheviks. It was a gigantic political victory for the Party, a victory which showed plainly that the masses were following the Communists. The C.C. R.C.P.(B.) stated in its report: “Under the circumstances, a Party membership card made its holder a candidate, to some extent, for Denikin’s gallows. Contrary to all the predictions of our opponents, the Party Weeks everywhere were crowned with a completely unexpected and most brilliant success. . . .”

The original plan for delivering the main blow from the Tsaritsyn area no longer met the requirements of the moment. A meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, held on October 15, took the following decision: “Tula, Moscow and the approaches to them must not be surrendered, and a general offensive must be prepared in the course of the winter. . . . On the South-Eastern front, we must, for the time being, go over to the defensive with the aim of (a) preventing Denikin from joining up with the Urals Cossacks and (b) releasing a part of our manpower to defend Tula and Moscow.” As for the other fronts, the Political Bureau directed High Command to consider the Northern and Western fronts “from the standpoint of the security, first, of the Moscow-Tula area and, secondly, of Petrograd.”

The Red Army struck its main blow along the Kharkov-Donbas-Rostov-on-Don line. A striking force of Soviet troops was assigned to defeat picked White units composed of officer volunteers. In the battles fought in the Kromy-Orel area from October 10 to 30, the striking force formed of a Red Cossack cavalry brigade, students of military schools and a Lettish division routed the Whites. The Red Army freed Orel. Simultaneously Budyonny’s cavalry routed the main forces of the Shkuro and Mamontov corps on the approaches to Voronezh, which the Soviet troops liberated on October 24. It was at this time that the cavalry corps under Budyonny was reorganised into the First Cavalry Army, with S. M. Budyonny appointed its commander and K. Y. Voroshilov member of its Military Council.
The successes achieved by the Soviet troops at Orel and Voronezh enabled the Red Army to assume the offensive all along the front. Liberation of the Ukraine and the North Caucasus began. Partisans were operating in Denikin’s rear. On the occasion of the victories won over Denikin, Lenin addressed a message to the workers and peasants of the Ukraine at the end of December 1919. Pointing out the lessons of the struggle against Kolchak, Lenin stressed that the Soviet Republic would have been unable to win those victories without the alliance of all the peoples of the country. “He who undermines the unity and close alliance between the Great-Russian and Ukrainian workers and peasants is helping the Kolchaks, the Denikins, the capitalist marauders of all countries,” he wrote (Collected Works, Vol. 30, pp. 271-72).

The victories won on the Southern front inspired the Red Army men fighting at Petrograd. Yudenich’s troops were defeated, most of them were taken prisoner, and only a small remnant succeeded in escaping to Estonia.

In December 1919 the Party convened its Eighth Conference, which played an important part in strengthening the Party and its ties with the masses. The Conference adopted new Party Rules, which defined precisely the structure of Party organisations, bringing it into line with the administrative and territorial division of the country established since the foundation of the Soviet state. A provision was included in the Rules to the effect that a Party group consisting of not less than three members was the primary unit of Party organisation. A term of probation was established for everyone joining the Party, necessary for the new-comer to familiarise himself with the Programme and tactics of the Party, and for the Party organisation concerned to appraise his personal qualities. Another new element of the Rules was the section dealing with Party groups in Soviet institutions and other organisations of the working people.

The Conference decisions “On Soviet Policy in the Ukraine” and “On Soviet Power in the Ukraine” were of particular importance. A C.C. resolution drafted by Lenin and endorsed by the Conference emphasised: “Steadfastly applying the principle of self-determination of nations, the C.C. considers it necessary to reaffirm that the R.C.P.(B.) recognises the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic” (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part I, p. 459).

Pointing out the necessity for a close alliance of all the Soviet republics in their struggle against imperialism, the resolution said that it was for the Ukrainian workers and working peasants to determine the forms that alliance should take. For the time being, the relations between the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic were defined as of a federative character.

With regard to carrying out land policy, the resolution recommended that special attention be paid to the interests of the poor and
middle peasantry. This should involve: abolishing landlordism restored by Denikin; transferring the land to those who have little or no land; setting up state farms strictly within the necessary limits, with due regard to the interests of the peasantry; preventing any coercion in uniting the peasants in communes, artels, etc. The Party insisted that the poor and middle peasantry be drawn more extensively into governing the state, and that all obstacles to the free development of the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian culture be removed.

The Conference resolution on Soviet power in the Ukraine was of great help to the Ukrainian Communists, and strengthened the friendship between the peoples.

In December 1919 the Seventh Congress of Soviets met. It once more addressed to the governments of Britain, France, the United States, Italy and Japan a proposal to begin immediate peace negotiations, jointly and severally. The Soviet Government proposed to the small countries that peace negotiations be held on the condition that their independence was recognised. Estonia, and later Latvia and Finland, agreed to hold peace negotiations.

Denikin’s defeat made it possible to eliminate other links of the counter-revolutionary chain encircling the country. Kolchak, the “supreme ruler”, was the first to be finished off. His troops were defeated and he himself taken prisoner. He was tried and shot.

The defeat of the enemy on the Southern front also made it possible to complete the liquidation of the Turkestan fronts.

The Red Army victories helped the working people of Transcaucasia in their struggle against the invaders. In the spring of 1920 the Red Army forces operating on the Caucasian front drew near the boundary of Transcaucasia.

As soon as the workers of Azerbaijan got word of the approach of the Red Army, they rose against the Azerbaijani bourgeois. In February 1920 the C.P.(B.) of Azerbaijan held its First Congress illegally in Baku. It decided on an armed rising against the bourgeoisie. The insurgents asked Soviet Russia for armed aid. On instructions from the Soviet Government, Red Army troops were sent to the assistance of the working people of Azerbaijan. On April 28, 1920, Baku became a Soviet city. G. K. Orjonikidze, S. M. Kirov, A. I. Mikoyan and N. N. Narimanov, who implemented the Party’s Leninist line, played a leading part in expelling the invaders and crushing the internal forces of counter-revolution, in establishing and consolidating Soviet power in Azerbaijan. In November 1920 the workers and peasants of Armenia rose up in arms. Three months later, in February 1921, the working people of Georgia overthrew the Mensheviks. Transcaucasia became Soviet. The “campaign of 14 powers” had failed.
Expressing the sentiment of the Soviet people, the poet Mayakovsky derided the ill-fated venture of the interventionists and Whites in the following caustic lines:

They came and fought like mad,
They marched on Petrograd,
They got their arms in plenty
From kind old Aunt Entente. . . .
Britons, Frenchmen, Poles,
And brutes like von der Holz,
Mamontov, Shkuro,
They came from high and low.
They came supplied with tanks,
With dollars, pounds and francs,
They came and thought they’d win,
But got their heads bashed in.

5. Ninth Party Congress. Defeat of the Armies of Landlord-Bourgeois Poland and of Wrangel. The End of Intervention and of the Civil War

By defeating the interventionists and the Whites the Soviet state had gained a temporary breathing-space. The Entente was compelled to call off the blockade. In January 1920 the Supreme Council of the Entente found it necessary to allow the exchange of goods with Soviet Russia. The conclusion of peace treaties with the Baltic countries and the lifting of the blockade eased the economic position of the Soviet country.

The Party and the Soviet Government were doing their best to turn the respite into permanent peaceful coexistence of the Soviet country and the capitalist countries. Lenin pointed out that given peace, the Soviet country could do more to demonstrate its superiority over capitalism and exert a revolutionising influence on the working people of other countries.

"We," said Lenin, "cling to the peace proposal with both our hands and are willing to make the greatest concessions possible, being confident that peace with the small powers will advance matters infinitely better than war, because the imperialists have used war to deceive the working masses and conceal the truth about Soviet Russia. Therefore any peace will do a hundred times more to clear the ground for our influence" (Collected Works, Vol. 30, p. 422).

After winning a respite, the Soviet state immediately set about rehabilitating the economy dislocated by the Entente campaigns. The country's over-all economic situation at that time was very bad. Agriculture was supplying only half its pre-war output. The railways and industries were short of fuel. Numerous factories had
been destroyed. The dislocation of transport, in turn, aggravated the food situation, handicapping food deliveries to the industrial centres and the front.

The brief respite won enabled the Party to shift more manpower to economic construction and prepare for the victorious termination of the Civil War. In view of the continuing danger of a new armed attack by the imperialists, the Soviet state was compelled to keep a large Red Army. The Party decided to draw the army units into economic construction. Labour armies were formed in the Ukraine, the Urals, the North Caucasus, near Petrograd and in the Middle Volga region. During the Civil War, thousands of skilled workers and Bolshevik organisers had been sent to the Red Army. Now the Red Army began to return part of its manpower for the rehabilitation of transport, the fuel industry and other priority sectors of the economic front. The Central Committee sent 5,000 Communists to work in transport. Army Bolsheviks became organisers of the struggle to restore the Donets coalfield and get the regular transportation of Grozny, Baku and Ural-Emba oil under way. The military authorities undertook to supply food to the miners and oil-workers, and to restore the coal mines and oilfields.

Lenin saw the Soviet system as an inexhaustible source of strength both for military victories and for overcoming the difficulties of socialist construction. At the beginning of 1920 he outlined a bold and strictly scientific plan for the electrification of Russia within 10 to 20 years.

"It must be provided now," wrote Lenin, "so as to be able to present it to the masses in graphic, popular form and to carry them with us by a clear and vivid (and in principle perfectly scientific) prospect, saying to them: Let us get to work, and within the next 10 to 20 years we shall make all Russia, both industrial and agricultural, a country of electricity" (Collected Works, Vol. 35, p. 370).

In March 1920 the Council of People's Commissars set up a State Commission for the Electrification of Russia (GOELRO) under G. M. Krzhizhanovsky. The commission drew up a plan providing for the construction of 30 large power stations with a total capacity of 1,500,000 kw.

The prospects of socialist construction during the new period of respite were outlined by the Ninth Party Congress, which met from March 29 to April 5, 1920. The delegates to the Congress represented more than 600,000 Party members. In the year which had passed since the Eighth Congress the Party had doubled its membership, despite the heavy losses sustained in the struggle against the interventionists and Whites. The growth of membership in the extremely difficult conditions of civil war was plain evidence of the correctness of the Party's policy and of the strength of its ties with the working class and the masses in general.
The main items on the Congress agenda were the immediate tasks of economic development and the trade unions. Lenin dealt with both questions in the Central Committee report which he delivered. The Congress resolution “The Immediate Tasks of Economic Development” stressed that the basic condition for the country’s economic revival was the steady implementation of a single economic plan based on the electrification of the country. The resolution specified the sequence in which the cardinal tasks of the plan should be carried out. They were: (a) first of all, an improvement in the condition of transport, and the delivery and creation of essential stocks of grain, fuel and raw materials; (b) production of machinery for transport, for the extraction of fuel and raw materials and for the production of grain; (c) the vigorous development of the manufacture of machinery for the production of consumer goods, and (d) the extensive production of consumer goods. The Congress recommended drawing the entire industrial proletariat into production, carrying out mass-scale labour conscription, putting the economy on a military footing and making extensive use of army units on the economic front. Particular attention was devoted to the organisation of emulation. With regard to industrial management, the Congress pointed out the necessity of preserving and further developing centralisation and of encouraging one-man management. On the other hand, it recommended taking into account local features, setting up regional economic boards in the case of large districts far removed from the centre, and distinguished by specific economic conditions, and giving the masses a greater role in industrial management.

As intervention and the Civil War were not yet over, the Congress decision on economic construction was based on the policy of War Communism.

The Party’s policy in economic development was opposed by the “Democratic Centralism” group of T. Saponov, N. Osinsky and V. Smirnov. The “Democratic Centralists” declared against employing the old experts and against one-man industrial management, and advocated unrestricted collective management. The group, thereby disputed the Party’s basic organisational principle, democratic centralism. Its erroneous and harmful position was supported at the Congress by Rykov and Tomsky, who in their turn opposed one-man management, recognising collective management as the sole principle of administration in industry, from the Supreme Council of National Economy down to the factory management. The Congress rejected these anti-Party ideas.

The Congress resolution on the trade unions stressed the necessity for the working people to take an active part in the economic development of the country. It obliged all Party organisations, with the aid of the trade unions, to carry the spirit of labour enthusiasm which had already begun to show into the widest mass of the working people.
In keeping with the decisions of the Ninth Congress, workers throughout the country set about rehabilitating the national economy. Labour discipline in industry improved. Transport began to function more efficiently. The name of the Moscow-Kazan Railway, where the idea of the *subbotnik* had been conceived, was inscribed on a Red Board of Honour. The prospect of transition to peaceful socialist construction inspired the Soviet people to unprecedented creative effort. This found particularly vivid expression on May Day, 1920, a day which the Ninth Party Congress had set for an All-Russian *subbotnik*. About 500,000 people took part in the *subbotnik* in Moscow, and nearly 200,000, in Petrograd. Communists were in the lead, and carried the masses with them by their labour heroism. Leaders of the Party and the Government took part in the *subbotnik*. Lenin worked in the Kremlin *subbotnik* and M. I. Kalinin at the Michelson Works. In response to the Party's call, tens of millions of working people at the All-Russian *subbotnik* showed their readiness to devote themselves to peaceful labour as selflessly as they had defended their socialist country at the front.

But the imperialists broke the respite again, interrupting the progress of peaceful socialist construction. Notwithstanding the failure of its campaigns against Soviet Russia, the Entente resolved to launch a new one, with bourgeois-landlord Poland as the chief anti-Soviet force.

Since the beginning of the war against the invaders and Whites, the Soviet Government had repeatedly offered to conclude peace with Poland. It renewed the offer in the early part of 1920. But the Polish imperialists were bent on seizing Soviet territory. The Polish bourgeoisie was completely dependent on the imperialist countries, both economically and politically. The position of the Polish landlords and bourgeoisie was precarious. The masses of the working people, especially the proletariat, rose against the ruling classes more and more frequently. The governing circles of Britain, France and the United States, as well as of Poland, were afraid of the growing revolutionary movement. They saw war against the Soviet Republic as a means of diverting the people from revolution. The Communist Party of Poland resolutely opposed the Polish imperialists' war of aggression. It explained to the working people of Poland that war against the Soviet Republic amounted to war against themselves.

The Entente leaders and the rulers of Poland, moreover, regarded the peace proposals of the Soviet Government as a sign of weakness, and hoped to bring about the fall of Soviet power by means of war. On April 25, 1920, the Polish army attacked the Soviet Republic and occupied Kiev, the Ukrainian capital. The imperialists sent Wrangel's White army, stationed in the Crimea, to Poland's aid.

Once again the Soviet Republic was compelled to bend its energies to fight the invaders and Whites. On May 23, 1920, the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) published its theses, "The Polish Front
and Our Tasks”. Calling on the workers and peasants to rally all their forces to defeat the enemy, the Party and the Soviet Government stressed that the Soviet Republic had no designs on the independence and sovereignty of Poland, and that the Polish working people were the masters of their own destiny. “The defeat of the Polish whiteguards who have attacked us will not in the least change our attitude to the independence of Poland,” the theses said.

The Red Army was reinforced with Communists. Almost half of the Party members, or upwards of 300,000 Communists, were in the army, which also included some 70,000 Komsomol members.

An offensive was started on the Western front in the middle of May. It was unsuccessful, because it had not been properly prepared. True, it tied down enemy forces, thereby easing the situation on the South-Western front. At the beginning of June the First Cavalry Army, which had been moved up from the south, broke through the front of the Polish Whites in the Ukraine. Following the Cavalry Army, all the armies of the South-Western front took the offensive, pushing back the enemy. Early in July 1920 the troops of the Western front also launched an offensive. By the end of July they had entered Polish territory, while the troops of the South-Western front had entered Western Ukraine. The front line drew near to Warsaw, the Polish capital.

The Red Army victories inspired the working class in the West. The “Hands Off Soviet Russia!” movement gathered momentum in Britain, France, the United States, Italy and Czechoslovakia. Workers refused to load arms for Poland, and called strikes.

After the First Congress of the Communist International the Communist movement made great progress all over the world. In May 1919 the Bulgarian Workers’ Social-Democratic Party (Tesnyaks) reorganised itself into a Communist Party.

By 1920 Communist Parties had been formed in the United States, Britain, Yugoslavia, Spain, Turkey and other countries. As a rule, they were founded on the basis of the Left groups that had broken away from Socialist parties. The newly established parties had as yet no experience of work among the masses, and their activities were handicapped by a certain burden of Social-Democratic traditions and old forms of struggle. On the other hand, there arose within them “Left-wing” groups which rejected all the old methods of struggle employed by the working class, opposed the use of parliament and advocated boycotting those trade unions that were in reactionary hands. Such a policy led to isolation from the masses, to sectarianism, to an underestimation of the role of the Party. These errors were camouflaged by Left phraseology, the “Lefts” trying to represent their tactics as being revolutionary. These were the growing pains of young parties that had not yet gone through the school of revolutionary struggle. Lenin described them as a “Left-wing infantile disorder” in communism.
In July 1920 the Second Congress of the Communist International was convened. Its fundamental task was to strengthen the Communist Parties ideologically and organisationally and to direct them towards winning a majority among the masses. Before the Congress met, Lenin wrote his book “Left-Wing” Communism, an Infantile Disorder. The main purpose of the book was to acquaint all Communist Parties with the rich experience of the Russian Communists, with their strategy and tactics, in order that the brother Parties might be equipped with that experience. In this book Lenin, who had founded and reared the Bolshevik Party, summed up the work done. He showed that the Party had grown, gained strength and become steeled in the struggle against the principal enemy in the working-class movement, who remained, indeed, the principal enemy on an international scale as well, namely, opportunism or Menshevism. At the same time the Party had grown stronger in combating petty-bourgeois revolutionism, opportunists “from the Left” and the Socialist-Revolutionaries and anarchists.

Lenin’s book showed the role and place of the Communist Party in the system of the dictatorship of the working class. Lenin explained why the Party, when it became the governing party, had withstood all trials. The Party had been able to cope with its titanic tasks thanks to the strictest, truly iron discipline, to the fact that it was based on the granite rockbed of revolutionary theory, to its close connection with the working people, and to the complete and unreserved support it received from the mass of the people, who had convinced themselves by their own experience of the correctness of the Bolshevik ideas. In analysing the strategy and tactics which had enabled the Party to win over the mass of the workers and a majority of the people, Lenin laid special emphasis on the necessity for the closest ties with the masses and for working among them under all circumstances—in a period of revolution and at a time of retreat, and in all public organisations—parliament, trade unions, co-operatives, etc.,—that is, wherever the masses are to be found. Lenin showed the harm caused to the working-class movement by the absurd “theories” of the “Lefts”, by their refusal to work in reactionary trade unions, in parliament and in co-operatives. Non-participation of the Communist Parties in the work of those organisations led, he pointed out, to isolation from the masses, thereby rendering the greatest service to the bourgeoisie.

“One must be capable of every sacrifice,” wrote Lenin, “of overcoming the greatest obstacles, in order to carry on agitation and propaganda systematically, stubbornly, persistently and patiently, precisely in those institutions, societies and unions—even the most ultra-reactionary—in which the proletarian or semi-proletarian mass is to be found” (Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 35).

Lenin taught Communists to master all the forms of struggle. His book summed up the strategical and tactical experience gained by
the Communist Party, both during the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat and when the dictatorship of the proletariat had been established and socialist construction begun. Lenin showed that the Russian Marxists’ rich experience was not only of national, but also of international significance.

“The Russian model,” he wrote, “reveals to all countries something, and something very essential, of their inevitable and not distant future” (ibid., pp. 5-6).

Lenin’s brilliant book is of vast international significance. Its conclusions formed the basis of the decisions of the Second Congress of the Communist International, which was attended by delegations from 41 countries. The Congress, which heard Lenin’s reports and speeches on the tasks of the Comintern, the role of the Communist Party and the conditions of affiliation to the Comintern, passed a resolution on the role of the Communist Party in the proletarian revolution, approved the Statutes of the Comintern and adopted the 21 conditions of affiliation to it, based on the Leninist principles of building up a party of a new type.

The Second Congress of the Comintern called on the workers of all countries to defend revolutionary Russia. The revolutionary movement in Germany and throughout Central Europe gained ground. The Polish proletariat was becoming more active from day to day. A Provisional Polish Revolutionary Committee was formed in Bialystok which called on the working people to fight the landlords and capitalists.

The defeat of the imperialists’ Polish servants brought about a radical change in the international situation. The capitalist system in Poland and, indeed, the whole Versailles system which the Entente had set up in Europe after the world war, were on the verge of collapse. The Entente took all possible measures to save the bourgeois dictatorship in Poland. Britain and France threatened to begin hostilities against Soviet Russia. France sent enormous quantities of equipment and a large group of officers and instructors to Poland. Britain, seeking to sever the Crimea from Russia and create more favourable conditions for a counter-offensive by the Polish gentry, demanded that the Soviet Government should halt the offensive of the Soviet troops and conclude an armistice with Wrangel. She offered to mediate in the conclusion of peace between Soviet Russia and Poland.

With Entente aid, the command of the Polish White army mobilised its reserves and in mid-August 1920 launched a counter-offensive. The Soviet troops had to retreat. The advance on Warsaw had failed.

The reverses on the Polish front in August were largely due to the mistakes made by the Soviet Command. The rapid Soviet offensive was not fully provided for, contrary to the relevant directive of the Soviet Government; reinforcements lagged behind and munitions were not brought up. The hasty retreat of the Polish Whites was mis-
taken for a defeat, whereas the enemy was simply seeking to save his manpower and materiel. “During our offensive, advancing too fast as we were, almost all the way to Warsaw, we undoubtedly made a mistake... and that mistake was due to our overrating the superiority of our forces,” said Lenin (Collected Works, Vol. 32, p. 149). The fact that the command, in particular that of the South-Western front (J. V. Stalin, A. I. Yegorov), was slow in moving the First Cavalry Army to the Western front had an adverse effect on the advance on Warsaw.

But the reverses were due not only to military miscalculations. Part of the Polish workers and other working people had been deceived. The rulers of Poland had played on the Polish working people’s hatred for tsarist Russia, which had enslaved Poland, and had represented the Red Army’s liberation struggle as a foreign invasion. The working people had failed to see through the deceit. The Red Army reverses were also due to the fact that the Soviet country had to fight on two fronts—in the west and in the south. Economic dislocation and the disruption of transport also made themselves felt.

In September reserves were moved up, and the Soviet troops began preparations for striking a blow at bourgeois-landlord Poland. The Polish Government feared this blow, and in October agreed to conclude an armistice, which later became peace. Despite the reverses at Warsaw, the Soviet Republic had gained an important victory. The war had ended, to quote Lenin, “with a peace more advantageous to us than the one we offered Poland in April” (Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 457).

Nevertheless, the Polish reactionaries secured, with the backing of foreign imperialists, the annexation of the western regions of Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Byelorussia.

With the Polish war over, the Soviet Government was able to mass its forces against Wrangel, the last puppet of the Entente. The Party Central Committee addressed a message to all Party organisations, directing them to mobilise Communists for the front and enlist the trade unions and the workers in the struggle against the Whites. In accordance with the directives of the Central Committee and the Government, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern front, headed by M. V. Frunze, worked out plans for defeating Wrangel. Numerical superiority was achieved over Wrangel’s troops. In response to the Party’s call, Party and Komsomol organisations sent more than 10,000 of their members to the Southern front.

As a result of furious fighting, Wrangel was driven into the Crimea. In November 1920 the Red Army, after gallantly storming the Perekop Isthmus, swept into the Crimea and cleared it of the enemy.

This was the end of foreign intervention and the Civil War in Russia. It is true that the last groups of invaders and Whites—in the Far East—were completely defeated only in 1922. But the principal forces of the enemy, against which the Soviet Republic had had to exert
enormous efforts, had been shattered and ignominiously expelled from Soviet soil.

The people had maintained their Soviet power and the independence of their country. The young Soviet state had won the duel with the imperialists of the whole world.

6. Why the Soviet State Was Victorious. Lessons of the Civil War

The chief reasons for the victory of the Red Army over the interventionists and White armies are the following:

1. Russia's workers and peasants, having freed themselves from landlord and capitalist rule, continued in the Civil War, their struggle for the consolidation of their power and for the establishment of a socialist society, free from the exploitation of man by man. The Civil War waged by the working people of Soviet Russia was a just war. The policy of the Soviet Government, in whose name the Red Army fought, was a correct policy expressing the interests of the people, and the latter supported it as being their own policy. The Red Army, an offspring of the people, was fighting for the interests of the people, whereas the Whites and the interventionists were fighting against the people. Consciousness of this inspired the mass of the people, though exhausted by long years of an imperialist world war and seemingly incapable of offering resistance, to rally enough strength to bring a civil war of unparalleled difficulty to a victorious conclusion.

2. The principal reason for the Soviet Republic's victory over the interventionists and the Whites was its social and political system, founded on the stable alliance of the workers and peasants and on friendship among its peoples. The working class and the peasantry formed and consolidated their military and political alliance in the struggle against the landlords, the capitalists and the world bourgeoisie. The economic foundation of that alliance was the fact that the peasant received land and protection against the landlord and the kulak from the workers' state, while the workers received farm produce from the peasants under the surplus-requisitioning system.

The experience of the masses themselves, who had learned all the horrors of intervention and White rule, strengthened the alliance of the workers and peasants.

War puts all the forces of a country to the test. Imperialist wars aggravate class antagonisms which, as the experience of Russia and many other countries has shown, lead to revolution. The liberation war against the invaders and the Whites aroused the patriotic sentiments of the people, and resulted in the internal consolidation of the country. In heavy battles with the foreign invaders and the Whites, who were striving to stifle the revolution and crush the Soviet Re-
public, the workers and peasants became steeled, their alliance grew stronger and they rallied more closely round the Party. In this was revealed a characteristic and organic feature of the Soviet system: it does not divide the people, but unites them.

3. The correct nationalities policy pursued by the Soviet Government was one of the chief reasons for the Soviet Republic’s victory. That policy united the working people of the once oppressed nations of all Russia in the struggle against intervention and counter-revolution. Wherever they were victorious, the counter-revolutionaries at once restored the old regime of national oppression. The working people of the formerly oppressed nations learned by experience that the Soviet system was the only reliable guarantee of genuine freedom and national independence for the peoples. The alliance of the working people of various nationalities grew stronger as they fought shoulder to shoulder in the ranks of the Red Army during the Civil War.

4. The partisans operating in the enemy rear greatly helped the Red Army. Organised and led by the Communist Party, they harassed the enemy by disrupting his communications, destroying his manpower and military equipment and wrecking the administrative machinery of the invaders. They helped the Red Army by diverting considerable enemy forces.

5. Soviet foreign policy contributed to the victory of the Red Army. Under the direct guidance of the Central Committee, the Soviet Government consistently pursued a policy of equal rights for all peoples, big and small, made skilful use of the profound contradictions among the imperialist countries and of its enemies’ miscalculations, and thereby strengthened the position of the proletarian state.

6. The victory of the Red Army was facilitated by the revolutionary struggle of the international proletariat against intervention. The working people of the capitalist countries stopped arms deliveries, and set up “Hands Off Russia!” committees, thus making operations more difficult for the interventionists and helping the working people of the Soviet Republic. Speaking of international solidarity, Lenin said:

“It was precisely this support, it was precisely the sympathy which the working masses—the masses both of workers and peasants, tillers of the soil—showed for us all over the world, even in the states that were most hostile to us, it was just this support and this sympathy that were the last and most decisive source, the decisive reason why all the invasions against us ended in defeat” (Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 119).

7. The decisive condition that made the victory of the Soviet people and the Red Army possible was the leadership of the Communist Party, which was able to rouse, to rally and to organise the proletariat and the vast mass of the working peasantry for the struggle against their enemies.
The Red Army’s imposing victories showed what a great force a people can become if it is headed by so experienced a party as the Bolshevik Party. Lenin, who was Chairman of the Council of Workers’ and Peasants’ Defence, played an outstanding role in the building up of the Soviet Armed Forces and the organisation of defence in general. It was the Central Committee of the Party, headed by Lenin, that guided the struggle. It decided all matters relating to the conduct of the war, the distribution of forces, supply and the working out of strategic plans. The Party resolutely combated all counter-revolutionary machinations; it safeguarded the alliance of the working class and the peasantry and the friendship of the working people of all the Soviet nationalities. While waging a ruthless struggle against all enemies and all counter-revolutionary tendencies, the Party followed a flexible policy with regard to the wavering intermediate, petty-bourgeois sections, winning over to the side of the people all those who recognised Soviet power and were ready to defend it.

At the call of the Central Committee, Communists went into the army. The Party lost not less than 50,000 of its members, who gave their lives for the Revolution. This notwithstanding, its membership doubled during the war. Hundreds of thousands of the foremost workers and peasants joined the Party and went through the school of courageous battle. The Civil War steeled the old cadre of Party leaders, the comrades-in-arms and pupils of Lenin, organisers of the victory of the great Revolution. It also brought up new leaders, on whose shoulders fell the burden of eliminating the consequences of the war and building a socialist society. Among them were A. A. Andreyev, A. S. Bubnov, F. E. Dzerzhinsky, M. V. Frunze, S. I. Gusev, M. I. Kalinin, N. S. Khrushchov, S. M. Kirov, S. V. Kosior, L. B. Krasin, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, V. V. Kuibyshev, D. Z. Manuilsky, A. I. Mikoyan, A. F. Myasnikov, G. K. Orjonikidze, G. I. Petrovsky, P. P. Postyshev, J. E. Rudzutak, N. M. Shvernik, N. A. Skrypnik, J. V. Stalin, Y. M. Sverdlov, A. D. Tsyurupa, K. Y. Voroshilov, Y. M. Yaroslavsky, R. S. Zemlyachka and A. A. Zhdanov.

 Everywhere—in the rear, at the front and underground—the Bolshevik Party was with the masses, and leading them; it directed their titanic struggle, and ensured the Red Army’s victory in the Civil War. This is how Lenin appraised the role which the Communist Party played in that war:

“It was only because the Party’s vigilance and its strict discipline, because the authority of the Party united all government departments and institutions, because the slogans issued by the Central Committee were followed by tens, hundreds, thousands and finally millions of people as one man, because incredible sacrifices were made, that the miracle could take place which actually did take place” (Collected Works, Vol. 30, p. 416).
The defeat of the interventionists and the Whites was of tremendous significance not only to the peoples of the Soviet Republic, who had maintained their independence and the gains of the Revolution, and could now proceed with their work of socialist construction interrupted by the imperialists' armed invasion. The lessons of the Civil War in Russia were also of great international significance.

1. The failure of intervention and the outcome of the Civil War in Russia proved to the working people of the world that no forces whatever of internal counter-revolution can defeat a people's power, based on the alliance of the working class and the peasantry and led by the working class. Of course, no defeated class ever surrenders without putting up a fight, without trying all possibilities of resistance. Russia's landlords and bourgeoisie did their utmost to recover their lost power over the people, resorting to savage terror, sabotage, assassination, and bloody revolts. But they proved powerless against a people led by the Communist Party. The foreign imperialists' armed intervention raised the hopes of the defeated exploiting classes, who took up arms against the people and plunged the country into a long and strenuous war. The British, French, U. S., Japanese and German imperialists were to blame for the unparalleled suffering and untold sacrifices the working people of the Soviet Republic had to go through.

2. The defeat of intervention in Russia showed all peoples, particularly the dependent and oppressed peoples, that world imperialism could be fought and defeated. The victories of the Red Army showed the peoples of the East that, no matter how weak they were and no matter how strong the imperialists with their advanced technique and well-trained armies, the struggle against them was not hopeless and the emancipation of the peoples was feasible. The experience of the Soviet Republic, which had withstood the onslaught of the most powerful countries of the world, inspired the enslaved peoples and stimulated the national liberation movement throughout the world.

3. The struggle against the foreign invaders and their White puppets revealed to the working people of all countries the international character of the Soviet power. The Soviets united all the peoples, all the nationalities of Russia. Fighting for their own interests, Russia's workers and peasants were also championing the interests of the working people of all countries. By fighting the interventionists, the working people of the Soviet Republic were diverting the imperialist forces, weakening them, and thus helping the workers in the capitalist countries to fight more successfully against their own bourgeoisie. The world proletariat realised that the Soviet state was fighting for its interests as well; hence the struggle which the world proletariat waged against the interventionists was not only of assistance to the Soviet people, but also a revolutionary war against its own exploiters.

4. During the intervention and the Civil War, the issue of the advantages of Soviet democracy over bourgeois democracy was, to
all practical intents and purposes, settled. The working people saw that no country had ever done so much for real freedom and genuine equality as the Soviet Republic, where complete freedom from the exploiting classes, the landlords and the bourgeoisie, had been achieved. Events in Russia brought out the genuinely popular democracy of the Soviet system. In all the capitalist countries, including the most democratic ones, war was attended by a curtailment of democratic liberties, violations or complete disregard of the constitution, increased use of force against the masses, terrorism and the introduction of military servitude for the workers. The Civil War in Russia was accompanied by a tremendous increase in the activity of the masses who had risen for the fight, and by new sections of the working people being drawn into political activity. Three all-Russian congresses of Soviets, preceded by regular and numerous volost, uyezd and gubernia congresses, were held during the Civil War period alone. The Soviet Constitution was effective through this period. Of course, the Soviet state had to resort to force, and in such cases it acted resolutely and sternly, as the dictatorship of the proletariat should. But it used force only against its enemies, against the accomplices of the interventionists and internal counter-revolution, against the agents and supporters of Kolchak, Denikin and Wrangel.

The defeat of the foreign imperialists and their White agents in Russia demonstrated to the working people of all countries that a people led by a militant, thoroughly revolutionary party is invincible.

“Nobody can ever vanquish a people,” said Lenin, “most of whose workers and peasants have come to know, feel and see that they are defending their own Soviet power, the power of the working people, that they are defending a cause the triumph of which will enable them and their children to enjoy all the benefits of culture, all the creations of human labour” (Collected Works, Vol. 29, p. 292).

**BRIEF SUMMARY**

During the imperialists’ armed intervention and the Civil War of 1918-20 the Communist Party came forward as a faithful defender of the achievements of the working people, and the organiser of a patriotic war against the invaders and Russian Whites, who sought to abolish the rule of the people and restore the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie in Russia.

The bourgeoisie and the landlords overthrown in October 1917 did not lay down their arms, and refused to submit to the authority of the people. Backed by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, the anarchists and the nationalists, the classes previously in power resorted to all methods—from subversion, bribery and wreck-
ing to bloody terrorism—in order to overthrow the dictatorship of the proletariat. But they proved to be powerless against the people. Seeking to restore in Russia the rule and property rights of the bourgeoisie and landlords, the counter-revolution did not hesitate to invite foreign troops, to invite armed intervention, to dismember the country and sell its territory.

The foreign imperialists, alarmed by the breach in the imperialist chain effected in Russia, and fearing that the Russian revolution would kindle the flames of revolution in their own rear, attacked the Soviet state, sending their armed forces to the Soviet Republic and giving their full support to the Russian counter-revolutionaries. Thus there came into being the united bloc of internal and foreign counter-revolution. For three years the interventionists and the Whites drenched the Soviet Republic in blood, destroyed her industry, her towns and villages, and subjected the country to a hunger blockade; but they failed to break the resistance of the people.

The Party rallied the working people for a patriotic war against foreign invasion. It placed all the forces of the country at the service of the war. By its correct policy it strengthened the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, the union of all the peoples of Russia. It created a powerful Red Army, which was inspired by the knowledge that it was waging a just war. The Soviet state appeared before the whole of mankind as a champion of peace, freedom and independence.

Despite the difficult situation created by intervention and the Civil War, the Party adhered to the Leninist standards of Party life. Plenary sessions of the Central Committee and meetings, conferences and congresses were held at regular intervals. During the war years the Party convened two congresses, which dealt with such important matters as the adoption of a new Programme, the drawing of wide masses of working people into the building of the Soviet state, the organisation of the armed forces, etc., and which generalised the experience of a party directing, for the first time in history, the building of a socialist society, an experience that was of importance to the working class of all countries.

The people became convinced that the Communist Party was capable not only of rousing and organising the masses for the overthrow of the anti-popular rule of the bourgeoisie and landlords, but also of organising the defence of the country and the defeat in open battle of the combined forces of internal and foreign counter-revolution. The Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, anarchists and bourgeois nationalists exposed themselves not only as accomplices, but also as active partners of the counter-revolutionaries, as counter-revolutionary parties. The working people of the oppressed nations saw that in the Communist Party they had a real defender of the interests of the people, and in the dictatorship of the proletariat, the only guarantee of the free development of all nations. The proletariat and peas-
antry of all the peoples of Russia closed their ranks behind the Communist Party.

The heroic struggle of the Soviet people, which diverted considerable forces of the imperialists and weakened them, made it easier for the working people of the West to fight the capitalists of their own countries, and facilitated the national liberation movement of the oppressed peoples against imperialism. The struggle of the working people all over the world and the growth of the national liberation movement, in their turn, were of great help to the Soviet state.

The Soviet Republic won the possibility for peaceful coexistence with the capitalist countries and secured the conditions for successful socialist construction.
CHAPTER TEN

THE PARTY IN THE STRUGGLE TO REHABILITATE
THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

(1921-1925)

1. The International and Internal Situation After the Civil War. The Discussion on the Trade Unions

After the interventionists and the Whites had been driven out of the country, the Communist Party and the Soviet people were confronted with the task of rehabilitating the national economy and charting the path for the further advance to socialism.

The transition to the peaceful building of socialism was taking place in a complex international and internal situation. The world bourgeoisie, who had lost the war against the Soviet country, continued to nurture the design of destroying the Soviet system, this time planning its economic strangulation.

But the realisation of the imperialists’ designs came up against the inter-state and class contradictions in the capitalist world. An economic crisis broke out in the capitalist countries in 1920. Factories closed their gates and workers were thrown on the streets. The army of totally or partially unemployed reached 40 million. The crisis accentuated the contradictions between Britain and France, Britain and the United States, the United States and Japan, Japan and Britain. Each of these imperialist powers sought to emerge from the crisis at the expense of the others, above all of the Soviet Republic.

Class contradictions, too, became more acute. The world bourgeoisie launched an offensive against the gains won by the working class during the revolutionary upsurge following the October Revolution. The workers fought back. In April 1921 the British miners went on strike against wage cuts. In the same year in Germany (Hamburg, the Mansfeld mining area and a number of cities in Central Germany) the workers rose in revolt, but the rising was crushed by the bourgeoisie aided by the Social-Democrats. Fierce class battles were also fought in other European countries.
The positions of the imperialists were weakened by the spread of national liberation movements in the colonies and semi-colonies—India, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, China and other countries.

Lenin characterised the international situation of Soviet Russia as a certain equilibrium, which, although an extremely precarious one, nevertheless enabled the socialist Republic to exist and develop, despite the hostile capitalist encirclement.

As regards relations with the Soviet state, two basic tendencies existed among the ruling circles of the imperialist powers. Some were anxious to develop economic relations with the Soviet republics, though most of them did not relinquish hopes of the degeneration of the Soviet state and of Russia, the Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia being turned into colonies. Others held that it was necessary to seize an opportune moment for renewing armed intervention. According to the political situation in the different bourgeois countries, now one tendency, now the other grew stronger. The danger of armed attack on the land of Soviets had not been removed. “It must be remembered,” said Lenin, “that we are always within a hair’s breadth of invasion” (Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 122). Consequently, he added, it remained the task of the Party and the Soviet Government to build up the fighting strength of the Red Army.

The country’s internal situation was grave in the extreme. The national economy was dislocated by the imperialist and civil wars and by foreign military intervention. Economically, the Soviet Republic was reduced to the level of tsarist Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century. The interventionists and the Whites had wrecked rail transport, flooded most of the mines in the Donets coalfield, wrought havoc in the Baku oilfields and destroyed many factories. In 1920 the output of large-scale industry was slightly over one-seventh of the pre-war volume. The iron and steel industry was in a particularly bad plight. A mere 116,000 tons of pig-iron, or roughly 3 per cent of the pre-war out-put, was smelted. The amount of coal brought to the surface was one-third of the pre-war amount, oil output was about 60 per cent less, and the output of cotton fabrics had dropped to five per cent of the amount produced before the war. Shortages of fuel and raw materials had brought most enterprises to a standstill. Annual production per head of population averaged less than one kilogram (2.2 lbs) of pig-iron and less than one metre (39 inches) of cotton fabric. There was an acute shortage of essential manufactured goods.

Agriculture, too, was in an extremely bad way. The output of agricultural produce in 1920 was down to 65 per cent of that of tsarist Russia. There was not enough bread and other staple foods. The workers in the industrial centres were starving. Many, seeking to escape hunger, were leaving the towns for the countryside. Compared
with 1913, the number of industrial workers in 1920 had dwindled by almost half. The working class began to scatter, part of it becoming declassed. This meant a weakening of the social basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat and threatened the very existence of Soviet power, because it is exceedingly difficult to run the state in a petty-bourgeois country with only a thin proletarian stratum. In the conditions of utter economic dislocation then prevailing, the danger from the petty-bourgeois element was particularly great. The petty-bourgeois element, Lenin said, was more to be dreaded than all the Denikins, Kolchaks and Yudeniches put together. The exploiting classes of landlords and big capitalists had been abolished. Some two million landlords and capitalists, including the members of their families, had fled abroad, where many of them became imperialist agents. The hostile elements who had not been able to leave the country did their utmost to instigate the peasants against the workers, to undermine the alliance between them and to overthrow the dictatorship of the proletariat. Moreover, one exploiting class—the kulaks—remained in the country. Although its strength had been considerably reduced during the Civil War, this class constituted a great danger to the Soviet power.

Early 1921 brought with it serious political difficulties which were due to the fact that the policy of War Communism did not accord with the new conditions. The surplus-requisitioning system gave rise to discontent among the peasants, for it deprived them of an incentive to produce more. The military-political form of the alliance of the working class and the peasantry that had taken shape during the Civil War and intervention turned out to be inadequate in peace time. The peasants, being small commodity producers, were not satisfied with the surplus-requisitioning system. They wanted freely to dispose of the products of their labour, to sell them on the market and to buy manufactured goods with the proceeds. Peasant discontent was seized upon by the rump of the counter-revolutionary parties—the Cadets, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, anarchists and bourgeois nationalists. Taking advantage of the difficulties arising from the country’s transition from war to peaceful development, they engaged in feverish activity against the Soviet power. In a number of places in the Tambov Gubernia, the Ukraine, the Don area and Siberia, they succeeded in inciting kulak revolts.

At the beginning of March 1921 a mutiny broke out at Kronstadt. The composition of the Kronstadt seamen had changed greatly during the Civil War. The cream of the older seamen had gone to the front to uphold Soviet power. Their place in the navy had been taken by recruits drawn from the countryside, politically quite raw and reflecting peasant discontent with the surplus-requisitioning system. The Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, anarchists and Whites, taking advantage of the weakening of the Party organisation in Kron-
stadt, conducted frantic agitation against the requisitioning of food surpluses.

After suffering defeat in the Civil War, the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie did not dare to come out openly against the Soviet power, and changed its tactics. The leaders of the Kronstadt mutiny, with a view to deceiving the masses, coined the slogan “Power to the Soviets, not to the parties!” By means of this slogan, the counter-revolutionaries aimed at inducing the people to smash the revolution and destroy the Soviet system. This aim had been formulated in a concealed way by the émigré Milyukov, one-time leader of the Cadet Party, in his slogan “Soviets without Communists!” The counter-revolution sought to remove the Communists from leadership of the Soviets and thereby to reduce the Soviets to nought, install a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and restore the capitalist order in Russia.

The world bourgeoisie in its press described the Kronstadt mutiny as a “popular revolution”, thereby masking its designs and its activities against the people. It dispatched its agents to Kronstadt, with instructions to turn it into the centre of an all-Russian uprising. It believed that the fortress of Kronstadt was impregnable for the Soviet Armed Forces.

But there were no impregnable fortresses for the Red Army. Neither the sweeping fire from the forts nor the losses sustained when crossing the thin ice were able to halt the advance of the valiant Soviet warriors, who were led by M. N. Tukhachevsky. The example of valour and heroism was given by delegates of the Tenth Party Congress, headed by K. Y. Voroshilov, who took part in suppressing the revolt. The fortress was taken by storm on March 18, 1921, and the mutiny was crushed.

The events at Kronstadt, in Siberia and elsewhere testified to a political crisis in the country. Lenin referred to the crisis in these terms: “We felt the impact of a grave—I think it was the gravest—internal political crisis in Soviet Russia, which caused discontent not only among a considerable section of the peasantry but also of the workers” (Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 383).

Part of the workers, especially those connected with the country-side, gave way to the influence of the petty-bourgeois element. Driven by hunger, these workers voiced their dissatisfaction with the Soviet Government’s economic policy, and in some factories even resorted to strikes. Realising how dangerous was the situation that had arisen in the country, Lenin began to devise ways for changing over from a policy which had suited the conditions of the Civil War to a new policy, which would enable the country to engage in peaceful socialist construction.

The political crisis had repercussions in the Party, too. The gravity of the situation in the Republic at the end of 1920 gave rise to wavering among unstable Party members, including some leading
functionaries. This became apparent primarily on the issue of the role of the trade unions in building a socialist society.

The working class is the chief force in socialist construction. It was associated in trade unions. The Party was to rouse the workers to heroic labour. In the Civil War years, however, the unions had been considerably weakened. It was necessary to readjust the work of the unions to peace-time conditions.

At the Fifth All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions held in November 1920, the Party posed the question of abandoning military methods of work in the unions and passing to broad democracy, that is, to the election of the leading union bodies, instead of the practice of co-opting and appointing their members; regular general meetings of union members—which had practically been in abeyance during the war; and reporting back by elected bodies to the membership. Trotsky opposed any extension of workers' democracy in the unions. He wanted instead to introduce the methods of issuing orders, methods of dictation, such as he had practised in the Union of Rail and Water Transport Workers, when he was leader of its Central Committee. He recognised only one way of enlivening the trade unions—an administrative "shaking up" of all their officials from top to bottom.

The question of the trade unions was, in effect, one of the approach to the masses, of the ways and means of enlisting them in the work of socialist construction, of the methods of leading them. "The real difference" with Trotsky on the trade union question, Lenin said, was "on the methods of approaching the masses, of winning the masses, of contact with the masses. That is the heart of the matter" (Collected Works, Vol. 32, p. 5).

The trade union question was discussed by the Central Committee of the Party, which decided that the differences that had emerged should not be discussed widely.

Trotsky, however, in violation of Party discipline, made the differences in the Central Committee public, and announced that he and his supporters disagreed with the line of the Central Committee. He stated that the forthcoming Tenth Party Congress would have to choose one of the two basic platforms—his or Lenin's—and challenged the Party to elect delegates to the Tenth Congress according to platforms.

This statement by Trotsky marked the beginning of a factional struggle against the Party.

Trotsky's action in giving publicity to the differences in the Central Committee was condemned at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee in January 1921. Although it held that the discussion would do harm, the Central Committee, with a view to cutting the ground from under Trotsky's feet, decided to go ahead with it and declared the election of delegates to the Tenth Party Congress according to platforms permissible. It was confident that its decision would help to expose Trotsky and other opportunists.
Thus Trotsky forced a discussion on the Party at a trying moment in the life of the country, distracting the Party from the solution of its economic problems.

In the course of the discussion other opposition groups—the “Workers’ Opposition” group headed by Shlyapnikov, the group of “Democratic Centralists” headed by Sazonov, and the “buffer” group headed by Bukharin—put forward their platforms.

The rise of various groups and platforms within the Party was due to the influence exerted by the petty-bourgeois element on unstable Party members. By the end of 1920 the Party membership exceeded 600,000. Its social composition was not homogeneous: workers numbered less than half the total, peasants accounted for about a fourth, while the remainder consisted of professional and office workers and handicraftsmen. Many of the Party members had not yet been tempered as Bolsheviks. Moreover, the Party had been joined by some ex-Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Bundists and Borotbists, who had declared their adoption of the Bolshevik standpoint. They were affected by petty-bourgeois vacillations more than anyone else. When counter-revolutionary revolts broke out in a number of places, these unstable Party members were seized with panic. Trotsky, for example, stated in connection with the Kronstadt mutiny that the end of Soviet power had set in, that “the cuckoo had sung its last note”.

With regard to the trade unions, to their role and activities, each opposition group advanced its own demands.

The watchword of the Trotskyists was that the unions be immediately “governmentalised”. They demanded that the unions be turned into appendages of the state machinery, that they be fused with the state and that as organs of state they be vested with the function of managing production. The Trotsky platform meant taking away from the unions the function of protecting the material and cultural needs of the workers, and the function of training them in the spirit of socialism. These, according to Trotsky, were matters for departments of the Soviet Government. Instead of persuasion, Trotsky advocated methods of sheer compulsion, of administrative injunction. He demanded the militarisation of the workers’ labour, and the use of military methods in the unions and in industry.

Trotsky’s platform, if adopted, would in fact have led to the abolition of the trade unions and would have undermined the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The “Workers’ Opposition” demanded that the administration of the national economy be transferred to the unions—to an “all-Russian producers’ congress”. The group wanted the machinery of the Supreme Council of National Economy to be split up among the respective unions; it opposed the unions to the Soviet state and the Party. In contrast to the Trotskyists, who were all for governmentalising the unions, the “Workers’ Opposition” wanted to “unionise”
the state, that is, to subordinate it to the trade unions and reduce it to nought. This was tantamount to denying the leading role of the proletarian state in the national economy. The views of the "Workers' Opposition" were, in effect, anarcho-syndicalist, for it is anarcho-syndicalism that denies the need for a proletarian state during the transition from capitalism to communism. The anarcho-syndicalists are opponents of a party of the working class and of its leading role in building a socialist society. They regard the trade unions as the sole organisations of the working class, which, so they claim, are capable of running industry, without the Party and the state. The same ideas were at the bottom of the trade union platform of the "Workers' Opposition".

The "Democratic Centralists" advocated that the Presidium of the Supreme Council of National Economy should be nominated by the trade unions, that there should be freedom for factions and groups in the Party, and that candidates nominated by factions and groups should be elected to leading Party and government bodies. The "Democratic Centralists" opposed one-man management and strict discipline in the factories, and centralism in the machinery of administration. They shouted about the trade unions being in a bureaucratic death-grip. Lenin called this group the faction of the "loudest shouters", and its platform a Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik one.

During the discussion, the Bukharin group put forward a "buffer" platform, so called because Bukharin tried to reconcile Trotskyism with Leninism, and sought to play the role of buffer in the clash between the two platforms—the Leninist platform, which was that of the Party, and the Trotskyist platform, which was that of an anti-Party group. Bukharin concocted his platform by borrowing some formulations from Lenin and some from Trotsky. The Bukharinites said that the trade unions should nominate their candidates for posts in the economic administration bodies, and that their nominees should be obligatory for the leading Soviet bodies. Lenin characterised this as a deviation towards syndicalism. The Bukharin platform, Lenin said, was "the acme of ideological depravity". In effect, Bukharin's "buffer" platform was a defence of Trotskyism. It was, therefore, no accident that Bukharin soon abandoned his own platform and subscribed to that of Trotsky.

The platform drafted on the basis of J. E. Rudzutak's theses and signed by a majority of the Central Committee members headed by Lenin regarded the trade unions as a transmission belt from the Party to the masses, as a school of communism.

Lenin pointed out that the trade unions—the broadest organisation of the ruling working class—play a highly important role in giving effect to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

"But," he said, "they are not organisations of state, nor bodies which exert compulsion, they are organisations of education, organisations which attract and train, they are schools, schools
of administration, schools of management, schools of communism” (Collected Works, Vol. 32, p. 2).

The trade unions provide a link between the Communist Party and the masses. The Party guides the non-Party mass of workers, it enlightens, trains, teaches and educates “first the workers and then the peasants” (ibid., p. 29). By means of its educational work conducted through the trade unions, the Party ensures that every union member becomes conscious of the need to increase the productivity of his labour, and that the productivity of labour of the entire Soviet people is raised. Defining the tasks of the trade unions, Lenin said:

“Following its winning of political power, the principal and fundamental interest of the proletariat lies in increasing the output of products, in tremendously increasing the productive forces of society” (Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 163).

The principal functions of the trade unions in building a socialist economy are, in Lenin’s view, their participation in the planning and economic agencies of the Soviet state, their fight to raise labour productivity and improve labour discipline, the training and promotion of administrators from the ranks of the workers and the working people in general. The activities of the unions consist in promoting workers’ democracy, fighting against bureaucracy and high-handed methods, educating the union members and encouraging their creative initiative. The unions look after the material and spiritual needs of the workers, and are a source of personnel for the state apparatus and economic bodies. Persuasion is their basic method.

In the discussion, which became sharp and widespread, Lenin’s view on the unions prevailed. Only in a few Party organisations did the platforms of the opposition groups secure a majority.

At a time when the country was faced with enormous difficulties, was under the increasing pressure of the petty-bourgeois element, and was in a capitalist encirclement, the discussion, as Lenin pointed out, was an impermissible luxury. The enemies of the revolution banked on the inner-Party struggle, on a split in the Party, and hoped that it would lead to the collapse of Soviet power.

In order to govern the country—moreover, an essentially petty-bourgeois country—and to lead the masses, millions of people, in the work of socialist construction, the indispensable and decisive condition was unity, solid cohesion of the Party, its ideological staunchness, iron discipline in its ranks, intolerance of opportunist wavering and factions. Consequently, it was necessary to put an end to the factions and groupings in the Party at all costs. Without that, it would be impossible to overcome the political crisis in the country and successfully build socialism, repulsing renewed attacks by the imperialists.

These issues were resolved by the Party’s Tenth Congress.
2. Tenth Party Congress. The Transition to the New Economic Policy

The Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) took place on March 8 to 16, 1921, and was attended by delegates representing more than 700,000 Party members. The agenda consisted of the Central Committee’s report, the questions of Party unity and the trade unions, the national question, replacement of the surplus-requisitioning system by a tax in kind, questions of Party development, etc.

Lenin delivered the reports on the Central Committee’s political work, the replacement of the surplus-requisitioning system by a tax in kind, Party unity and the anarcho-syndicalist deviation. A. D. Tsyurupa, People’s Commissar for Food Supply, made a co-report on the tax in kind.

The Congress examined the question of passing from War Communism to the New Economic Policy (NEP), a problem directly connected with that of the relations between the two principal classes—the working class and the peasantry. The essence of the matter was that, in building socialism, the working class had absolutely to go hand in hand with the working peasantry, who constituted the overwhelming majority of the population. Whereas the landlords and capitalists could be expropriated and ousted, the small producers, which the working peasants were, “cannot be driven out, or crushed; we must live in harmony with them; they can (and must) be remoulded and re-educated only by very prolonged, slow, cautious organisational work” (Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 27). So Lenin taught. The working peasants should be helped at first to rehabilitate their farms and then gradually to make the change-over from fragmented petty-individual farming to large-scale socialised machine agriculture, which ensures an abundance of products. This was a most difficult problem of socialist construction. It was particularly complicated in Russia because of the country’s backwardness and economic dislocation. But it had to be solved at all costs, otherwise there could be no talk of building socialism. In tackling it, the former ties between industry and agriculture had to be taken into account.

Over the centuries, the economic tie between town and country had been the exchange of farm produce for manufactures through sale and purchase. During the transition from capitalism to socialism, when numerous forms of economy existed, the commercial link between state-owned industry and small-commodity peasant farming was an objective necessity. The Soviet Government began to employ this form immediately after the October Revolution. But the Civil War upset this form of contact; the food surplus-requisitioning system had to be substituted for buying and selling.

Lenin taught that the supreme principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat is the alliance of the working class and the peasantry. The peasants’ discontent with the requisitioning of food surpluses threat-
ened to upset this alliance. In order to avoid this danger, it was necessary to conduct a policy that would stimulate the expansion of agriculture and the country's productive forces. It was essential in the interest of socialism to rehabilitate the industries, primarily heavy industry, the backbone of the socialist economy. But this must be begun with agriculture, which, because of its very ruined condition, was unable to meet the needs of the industrial centres for grain and raw materials. And unless this was done, industry, could not be rehabilitated, let alone developed. The restoration and development of agriculture was at this period the main link on which the entire chain of socialist construction depended.

The question of the relations between the working class and the peasantry was examined in the political report of the Central Committee and in the report on the substitution of a tax in kind for the surplus-requisitioning system. Lenin stressed that only by means of the New Economic Policy, which provided for the introduction of a tax in kind, would it be possible to enlist the millions of peasants in the work of building socialism.

"The essence of the New Economic Policy," Lenin said later, "is the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry, it is a union of the vanguard of the proletariat with the broad peasant masses" *(Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 145).*

In the new conditions, this union must rest on an economic basis. The proletarian state, Lenin pointed out, should take not all, but only part of their surpluses from the peasants, in the form of a tax in kind. As for the remainder, it should be left at the peasant's disposal, to be sold freely on the market. This would serve as an incentive to the small cultivator. Personal interest in obtaining as much produce as possible would encourage the peasant to develop his farm, and this would lead to a rapid improvement in the country's agriculture as a whole. On this basis it would be possible to rehabilitate and develop state-owned industry, to strengthen the positions of socialism in the economy of the country and to create the basis for the reconstruction of agriculture along socialist lines.

But the tax in kind brought free trade in its wake. And free trade signified a certain revival of capitalism, the growth of kulak farming and the opening of small private enterprises. It meant a life-and-death struggle between socialism and capitalism.

Did the policy of permitting free trade contain a danger to Soviet power, to the destinies of socialism? In a way, it did. But the danger was not a very grave one, because the commanding heights in the national economy—industry, the banks, rail and water transport, foreign trade and the land—were in the hands of the state. Besides, the growth of the kulak class would be held in check by the Soviet state. Private capital would be placed under state control, and its expansion permitted only within certain limits.
Lenin proposed placing private capital on a state capitalist footing. As one of the forms of state capitalism, he pointed to the possibility of leasing some enterprises as concessions to foreign capitalists for the production of manufactured goods. This could help to rehabilitate the country's large-scale industry, primarily heavy industry, more speedily. Operating under the control of the Soviet state, the state-capitalist enterprises would act as auxiliaries to socialism. Consequently, there was nothing to fear from a certain revival of capitalism.

The delegates to the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) unanimously approved Lenin's plan. The Congress declared for the immediate replacement of surplus-requisitioning system by a tax in kind, making clear that the amount of the tax should be considerably smaller than under surplus-requisitioning system.

The Congress adopted the directive that the poorest peasants should be exempted from some, and in exceptional cases from all, forms of the tax in kind, the privileges be granted to diligent farmers, and that trade in surplus products be permitted.

The New Economic Policy ensured a firm economic and political alliance between the working class and the peasantry in building socialism.

The only correct policy for the Soviet state during the transition from capitalism to socialism, the New Economic Policy was designed to consolidate the proletarian-peasant alliance, to reinforce the dictatorship of the proletariat, and to develop the country's productive forces in a socialist direction; it was designed to permit capitalism within certain limits, while retaining the commanding heights of the national economy in the hands of the proletarian state; it envisaged a struggle between the socialist and the capitalist elements, the triumph of the socialist elements, the abolition of the exploiting classes, and the construction of socialism in the U.S.S.R.

The New Economic Policy signified, compared with War Communism, a certain retreat. Lenin said that during the Civil War years we had run too far ahead in our advance to socialism, and that we were now threatened with losing touch with our rear, that is, with the peasantry. He drew an analogy between the methods of building socialism during the Civil War and the storming of a fortress. In the period of War Communism we tried to take capitalism in town and country by storm, that is, "to pass to production and distribution on socialist lines by the shortest, speediest and most direct way" (Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 69). But experience showed that, for this transition to be successful, a long siege of the fortress of capitalism was necessary. "Not a direct frontal attack," said Lenin, "but the very hard, difficult and unpleasant task of a long siege..." (ibid., p. 70).

It was necessary to fall back for a time nearer to the rear lines, to regroup the forces and then launch a new and decisive offensive by
the entire mass of working people against capitalism. Given this condition, that is, if the tie with the peasantry was maintained, the rate of the Soviet people’s advance to socialism would be such, said Lenin, as we could not even dream of at present.

The adoption of the New Economic Policy marked a sharp turn from the policy of War Communism. The Communists had quickly to find their bearings in the new situation, to adapt their methods of work to the conditions of NEP, to learn to manage the economy and to trade efficiently. The difficulties of the task were enormous, because, in the underground and in the prisons, nobody had taught the Communists how to manage the economy or how to trade; none had experience in this field and there was no place in which to acquire it, because socialism was being built for the first time in history. Lenin gave the warning that building socialism was an incredibly difficult job. But the Party trained by Lenin was not daunted by the difficulties; it boldly began to implement the New Economic Policy, seeing it as the only right road to socialism.

The adoption of the New Economic Policy by the Tenth Party Congress was an indication of the wisdom of the Communist Party, and of Lenin’s brilliant perspicacity, based on a profound knowledge of the laws of social development. Lenin was the first Marxist to substantiate theoretically the economic policy of the proletarian state during the transition from capitalism to socialism. The New Economic Policy drawn up by him was an elaboration of those propositions for laying the foundations for socialist economy which he had set forth in the spring of 1918, in his work The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government. The experience of the subsequent years of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. fully bore out the correctness of Lenin’s views and showed how great was his scientific, Marxist foresight.

The New Economic Policy is of international significance. Lenin said that wherever a proletarian revolution took place, socialism would be built by the working class jointly with the peasantry, and that measures characteristic of NEP would inevitably have to be carried out. Experience fully confirmed this.

NEP was of international significance also in the sense that, by strengthening and developing the land of Soviets, the base and bulwark of the world revolutionary movement, it thereby exerted an influence on the international revolution, on the entire course of world history.

"Now," said Lenin, "we are exerting our influence on the international revolution mainly by our economic policy. . . . The struggle has been transferred to this sphere on a world scale. If we fulfil this task, we shall have won on an international scale for certain and for all time" (Collected Works, Vol. 32, p. 413).

The Tenth Congress also discussed the national question, which was of world-wide importance. The correct solution of this problem
contributed to the successful building of socialism in the Soviet Republic, and inspired the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries to fight for national liberation.

The national question was closely linked with the task of restoring the national economy and developing it along socialist lines, on the basis of NEP. It was chiefly a peasant question, because the population of the country’s non-Russian border regions consisted chiefly of peasants. Drawing the economically underdeveloped peoples into socialist construction meant drawing in the peasants. The New Economic Policy was in keeping with the vital interests not only of the Russian peasantry, but also of the peasantry of all the other nationalities of the country. The Party devised methods for drawing the backward peoples into socialist construction with due regard to the characteristics of each person and with the aim of guiding all the peoples along the road of socialist development. These methods were noted in the Congress resolution on Stalin's report “The Current Tasks of the Party on the National Question”. To join the efforts of the working people of all the Soviet republics in the struggle for socialism, it was indispensable to establish proper relations between the working class of the one-time dominant nation and the peasantry of the one-time tsarist colonies.

Tsarism had kept the peoples of Kazakhstan, Central Asia, the Caucasus and the North in ignorance, had preserved their patriarchal-feudal and tribal relations. The Party was intent on leading the peoples of these former tsarist colonies to socialist society, bypassing the capitalist stage of development. In the conditions of a multinational Soviet state, Lenin elaborated and enriched the brilliant ideas of Marx and Engels concerning the possibility of backward peoples advancing to socialism along a non-capitalist path. The Party began to carry out Lenin’s recommendations.

The Communist Party set out to abolish the political, economic and cultural backwardness of the formerly oppressed peoples.

The Tenth Congress resolved to end the actual inequality of those peoples. Their juridical inequality had been abolished during the first days of Soviet rule. But the abolition of actual inequality required considerable time and effort on the part of the proletariat, of advanced Soviet peoples; it required their disinterested assistance to the lagging brother peoples. To enable the backward non-Russian border regions to catch up with Central Russia, the first thing to do was to establish industries in them by building plants at the very sources of raw materials.

With a view to abolishing the actual inequality of the backward peoples as speedily as possible, the Congress considered it necessary to help them develop and consolidate their Soviet statehood, their governmental and economic bodies, judiciary, press, schools, theatres, etc., using the native language, and to accelerate the training of native skilled personnel.
The Congress dealt at length with the problem of unity of the Soviet republics. In view of the capitalist encirclement, no Soviet republic, taken as an isolated entity, could consider itself safe from defeat at the hands of the imperialists. Hence, the Congress resolution said, common interests—economic, political and defence—"make imperative a political union of the various Soviet republics as the only salvation from imperialist slavery and national oppression". The experience of Soviet Russia, which had used different forms of federation, "has fully confirmed that federation is perfectly advisable and flexible as a general form of political union of the Soviet republics" (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part I, pp. 557, 558).

The implementation of the Leninist policy on nationalities was hindered by two deviations—dominant-nation chauvinism and local nationalism. The Congress called for a resolute struggle against these, and in the first place against dominant-nation chauvinism. This was the main danger, for it threatened to disrupt the unity of the peoples that had come together under the banner of internationalism to fight for socialism.

The Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) devoted special attention to Party unity.

The capitalist encirclement and the existence in the country of a vast mass of petty bourgeoisie fostered the growth of opportunism and factionalism in the Party. The Trotskyists, "Workers' Opposition", "Democratic Centralists" and other opportunist groups, by conducting a factional struggle and demanding freedom of factions and groups, were pushing the Party towards a split. They wanted to reduce the leading role of the Party in the Soviet state to nought. The Party launched a resolute struggle against opportunism and against the factional groups in its ranks.

Lenin called upon the Congress to put an end to factionalism once and for all, to ban factions and groups in the Party. He taught that unity of will, outlook and action, and iron discipline, are a law of development for a Marxist party, which rules out any sort of factionalism and violation of Party discipline.

"Only with such a will on the part of the proletarian masses," said Lenin, "can the proletariat in a peasant country carry out the gigantic tasks of its dictatorship and leadership" (Collected Works, Vol. 32, p. 155).

The Congress adopted the resolution moved by Lenin on the question of Party unity. It read:

"The Congress orders the immediate dissolution of all groups without exception, formed on the basis of a particular platform, and instructs all Party organisations to keep a strict watch to prevent any outbreaks of factionalism. Non-observance of this Congress decision shall entail unconditional and immediate expulsion from the Party" (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part I, p. 529).
The Congress empowered the Central Committee to resort to expulsion from the Party as an extreme measure also in respect of members of the C.C., in the event of their violating Party unity, forming factions or attempting to split the Party. "The conditions for applying this extreme measure (to Central Committee members, alternate members of the C.C. and members of the Control Commission) shall be the holding of a plenary meeting of the Central Committee, to which all the alternate members of the C.C. and all the members of the Control Commission shall be invited" (ibid., pp. 529-30), the measure of the penalty to be decided by a two-thirds vote.

The resolution written by Lenin and adopted by the Congress on the syndicalist and anarchist deviation in the Party severely condemned the views of the "Workers’ Opposition". The Congress pointed out that the views of the "Workers’ Opposition", which represented a complete break with Marxism, constituted a great political danger to the dictatorship of the proletariat, and described them as anti-Party, syndicalist and anarchist, a reflection of petty-bourgeois vacillations. In practice, stated the resolution, the ideas of the "Workers’ Opposition" weakened the consistent leading role of the Communist Party and aided the class enemies of the proletarian revolution. The Congress declared advocacy of these ideas to be incompatible with membership of the R.C.P.(B.).

The decisions of the Tenth Congress on Party unity, and on the impermissibility of factions, became the unshakable principle of Party life and Party building. They equipped the Party for its fight against Trotskyism, against deviations on the national question, and other opportunist deviations from the general line.

The Congress devoted much attention to the problems of Party building, which were closely allied to the unity of the Party and its leading role. Characteristic of Party work during the Civil War were organisational centralism, curtailment of inner-Party democracy, appointment instead of election to posts, and so on. In the conditions of peaceful socialist construction, it was necessary to change the organisational forms and methods of Party work, enliven and extend democracy in the Party, which meant that all leading bodies were to be elected from top to bottom, were obliged to report on their work and were subject to control by the membership, and that collective leadership must be practised more widely.

The methods employed in Party work were to be those "of broad discussion of all the more important issues, with complete freedom of inner-Party criticism, and of the collective working out of general Party decisions . . ." (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part I, p. 520).

The Congress decisions were binding on each member of the Party, and were to be carried out speedily and to the letter. This combination of democracy and centralism, freedom of expression and iron discipline, unconditional fulfilment of collectively worked out
decisions, is the essence of the principle of democratic centralism.

Seeing that during the years of Soviet power some petty-bourgeois elements, including ex-Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, had joined the Party, elements prone to wavering and ideologically unstable, and that careerists and self-seekers had wormed their way into its ranks, the Tenth Congress instructed the Central Committee to purge the Party of the non-Communist elements.

After summing up the discussion on the trade unions, the Congress adopted Lenin’s platform. It condemned the views of the Trotskyists, “Workers’ Opposition”, “Democratic Centralists” and other opportunist groups, and defined the basic functions of the unions.

The trade unions, the Congress resolution stressed, were schools of communism, and their chief functions were those of economic organisation and education. The unions must make the greatest possible contribution to organising production and restoring the country’s shattered productive forces. They must concern themselves with all aspects of the daily life of their membership and protect its interests. The unions’ basic method of work was persuasion.

The Congress pointed out that the methods of working-class democracy, which had been greatly restricted during the Civil War, should be restored first in the trade union movement. The structure of the unions should be based on the principle of democratic centralism, with the Communist Party guiding their work.

These fundamental propositions are the guiding principles in the work of the trade unions throughout the period of the building of socialism and communism.

Many working-class members of the Party, the Congress noted, upon taking up jobs in the administration, or leaving for service in the Red Army, had lost direct contact with industry. Many Party members had been killed in action during the Civil War. In view of this, the Congress declared for a vigorous recruitment of workers into the Party.

With a view to reinforcing Party unity and raising the Party’s prestige, the Congress set up control commissions, whose function was to combat bureaucratic practices, careerism, abuse of their status in the Party or other bodies by Party members, and violation of comradely relations inside the Party.

The Central Committee, the unanimity of its members, is of immense importance for the unity and prestige of the Party. The discussion on the trade unions showed that such unanimity was lacking. This greatly preoccupied Lenin. At his instance, the Congress resolved, “with a view to ensuring complete stability of the policy” of the Central Committee and strengthening its links with the masses, to bring into the Central Committee “organisers who had proved their worth in Party work among the masses” (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions,

The Tenth Congress was of historic significance. It specified the path for the transition from capitalism to socialism, and the ways and means of building socialism, which were new compared with the period of War Communism. It stressed with all seriousness the necessity of the worker-peasant alliance for the building of socialism, and the decisive role of the Party in guiding the political, economic and cultural life of the country. It issued the directive to preserve the unity of the Party as the apple of one's eye and to wage a relentless struggle against factionalism. It pointed to the need for the closest contact between the Party and the non-Party masses, and specified the forms and methods of leading them.

In his notable work, *The Tax in Kind*, published in May 1921, Lenin theoretically substantiated the New Economic Policy. The propositions elaborated in this work were a further contribution to the treasure-house of Marxist-Leninist thought.

The historic turn from War Communism to NEP, proclaimed by the Tenth Party Congress, was approved by the Third Congress of the Comintern, which took place in Moscow in June-July 1921. By then the number of Communist Parties had grown considerably. The period between the end of 1920 and mid-1921 had seen the founding of Communist Parties in France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and other countries. An outstanding role in the founding of Communist Parties was played by Marcel Cachin and Paul Vaillant-Couturier in France, Antonio Gramsci and Palmiro Togliatti in Italy, Antonín Zapotocký and B. Šmerál in Czechoslovakia. July 1921 witnessed the birth of the Communist Party of China, with Mao Tse-tung as one of the founders. The Comintern Congress, which was attended by delegates from the Communist and Socialist Parties of 52 countries, heard a report by Lenin on the tactics of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

The Congress unanimously endorsed the policy and tactics of the R.C.P.(B.) and called upon the international proletariat to support the socialist revolution in the land of Soviets.

The Congress noted the temporary lull in the revolutionary struggle in the capitalist countries that had set in, and pointed out that Social-Democracy, the social mainstay of the bourgeoisie, was helping to preserve capitalism and the rule of the bourgeoisie. The Congress put before the Communist Parties the cardinal problem of winning over a majority of the proletariat to their side. Unless the proletarian vanguard won over the masses to its side, there could be no question of overthrowing capitalist rule and establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat in any country. The Congress therefore proclaimed the slogan “To the masses!” and the tactics of creating a united working-class front.

The Party began to carry out the New Economic Policy with the utmost energy. Economic questions—the rehabilitation of agriculture, industry and transport, the revival of trade between town and country, and the normalisation of the credit and financial system—now became the focal questions in the work of the Party organisations.

The Party conducted a wide campaign among the working people to explain the New Economic Policy, and reorganised its ranks in line with the new tasks. The Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) and the Soviet Government headed by Lenin devoted daily attention to the problems of economic rehabilitation and the normalisation of the country’s economic life. Many members and alternate members of the Central Committee, and other prominent Party leaders, were directed into the decisive sectors of Party, state and economic work. Felix Dzerzhinsky, while retaining his post as Chairman of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission-Joint State Political Administration was appointed People’s Commissar for Railways, and later Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy. From 1921 to 1926 G. K. Orjonikidze functioned as Secretary of the Territory Party Committee of Transcaucasia, where he supervised the economic rehabilitation of the Transcaucasian Soviet republics. From the summer of 1921 onwards S. M. Kirov worked as Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, where, under his leadership, the economy of the republic, primarily the oil industry, was being rebuilt. V. V. Kuibyshev was sent into the Supreme Council of National Economy, where he combined the functions of member of the Presidium of that body and head of the Central Power Administration. Later he became Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy. L. B. Krasin was appointed People’s Commissar for Foreign Trade. V. Y. Chubar worked as Chairman of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Council of National Economy and afterwards as head of the Donets coal industry, to the restoration of which Lenin attached great importance.

Thousands of Party members were transferred from the Red Army to economic work. Many commissars, commanders and political workers became factory managers, executives in the state trading organisations, co-operatives, etc.

The Central Committee paid great attention to strengthening the Party groups in the factories. Many Communists were transferred there from posts in Soviet offices with a view to improving the Party’s political work among the masses. Communists were sent from economically less important enterprises to those of greater importance. The Party groups were the combat units, as it were, of the Party and exerted an all-round influence on the work of the enterprises; they effected control from below, without, however, interfering with
the orders of the management. Their task was to rally the effort of the non-Party workers for the fulfilment of production assignments and for higher labour productivity.

In fulfilment of the decision of the Tenth Congress, the Party carried out a cleansing of its ranks. This was done at open Party meetings, at which non-Party factory and office workers and peasants helped in exposing alien, demoralised and careerist elements and in ousting them from the Party. Almost a quarter of the membership was expelled. The result was a considerable improvement in the Party's composition. Discipline was heightened, and the unity and cohesion of the Party were strengthened. The Party's prestige grew, and the confidence of the non-Party masses in it increased. The Party began to lead socialist construction on the basis of NEP more efficiently.

The Party's measures yielded positive results. The New Economic Policy had an increasingly beneficial effect on the country's economy. The working peasants welcomed the replacement of the surplus-requisitioning system by the tax in kind, and in the spring of 1921 increased their crop area. They actively helped the Red Army in suppressing the kulak uprisings and the political banditry which occurred in some parts of the country. The conditions of the working class improved, and the process of its declassing was arrested. Skilled workers were returning to the factories. Large-scale industry began to revive, and the economy gradually rose from the ruins.

The economic gains of the first year of NEP would have been still greater had it not been for the unprecedented famine which fell upon the country. The root causes of the famine lay in the economic backwardness of the country, especially of agriculture, and in the ruin wrought in the national economy by the interventionists and the Whites. The food shortage was greatly aggravated by the drought which took place in 1920, and which was followed by an even more severe drought in 1921. Thirty-four gubernias, with a population of some 30 million people, were affected by the crop failure.

The Party and the Government took emergency measures to combat the famine. And, grave though the difficulties were, they coped with this great disaster.

The results of the first year of peaceful socialist construction under NEP were summed up by the Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), which sat from March 27 to April 2, 1922. The Congress, at which more than half a million Party members were represented, discussed the political report submitted by the Central Committee, organisational matters, the results of the Party cleansing, the question of strengthening the Party, and other items.

In the political report of the Central Committee, Lenin said that the retreat had ended and the aim had been achieved, that the tie-up with peasant economy was being established, the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry had grown stronger, and the economic
achievements were obvious. The Party was now confronted with a new task—to regroup its forces for an offensive against the capitalist elements.

NEP signified a bitter struggle between capitalism and socialism. The question was: "Who will beat whom?" Would socialism emerge the victor from this mortal combat, or would capitalism regain its lost positions?

In order to triumph over capitalism, Lenin said, it was necessary to learn the art of management. The past year had shown that the Communists had not yet learnt this art. Lenin called upon the Party members to prove to the people that they could run the economy better than the capitalists.

The main problem that confronted the Party at the time was trade. The tie-up of socialist economy with peasant economy assumed the form of trade. But private capital occupied strong positions in trade and possessed, moreover, considerable experience in this sphere. The struggle on the market against private capital was a particularly hard one for the Communists. Trade was an art they had not yet mastered. They had not brought the machinery of trade under their control. Many of them did not appreciate the importance of trade, and tended to treat it with contempt. "Learn to trade" was the slogan put forward by Lenin. The task now, he said, is "to gain the upper hand in competition with the ordinary shop assistant, the ordinary capitalist, the merchant . . ." (Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 246).

In order to be able to manage, to govern the state, to trade efficiently, to oust private capital, and to build socialism, it was essential to select and place personnel properly. The heart of the matter, Lenin said, lay in people, in selecting personnel and in verifying fulfilment of decisions.

The policy of the Party and the Government was carried out by people, by competent personnel. Success in any sphere of activity largely depended on the correct placing of experienced, tested and loyal workers. But these workers need supervision and help. The personnel should be verified systematically according to the results of their work; they must be helped, transferred in good time and even removed in the event of their falling down on the job.

The selection and placing of personnel and verification of the fulfilment of assignments became focal points of the work of the Party and the Soviet state.

The Eleventh Congress paid considerable attention to strengthening the ranks of the Party. It was a special task of the Party as leader and guide of the masses in solving the titanic problems involved in building socialism to see to it that its composition answered to the high demands made on the vanguard of the working class. With a view to reinforcing the proletarian core of the Party and making it more difficult for non-proletarian elements to enter its ranks, the Congress divided applicants into three categories: 1) workers, and Red Army
men of working-class or peasant origin; 2) peasants (excluding Red Army men) and handicraftsmen not exploiting the labour of others; 3) others (office workers, etc.). Special procedure and conditions for admission were established for each category; admittance into the Party was facilitated for the first category but made more difficult for the third.

The Congress was particularly strict towards all manifestations of factionalism. The leaders of the “Workers’ Opposition”, headed by Shlyapnikov, had ignored the decision of the Tenth Congress, which stipulated the dissolution of factions. They gathered in secret and through conspirative channels circulated their decisions aimed against the Party. The Congress sharply condemned the factional activity of this group and warned Shlyapnikov, Medvedev and Kollontai that if they continued their anti-Party activity, they would be expelled. By adopting this decision, the Party re-emphasised that it sacredly guarded its unity and its iron discipline and would in no circumstances tolerate factional groups in its ranks.

The Eleventh Congress was the last Party Congress attended and guided by Lenin. In his closing speech, Lenin said that the Party, thanks to the flexibility of its mind and to its tactics, had raised our revolution to unprecedented heights. He uttered the prophetic words:

“No power on earth, no matter how much evil, hardship and suffering it may yet cause to millions and hundreds of millions of people, can take back the major gains of our revolution, for these are no longer ‘our’ gains, but world-historic gains” (Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 290).

The first meeting of the Central Committee elected by the Congress elected a Political and an Organisational Bureau and a Secretariat. J. V. Stalin was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee.

At this period the Party’s work of ideological tempering of its membership and the masses, educating them in the spirit of the Marxist world outlook, had acquired particular importance. The world bourgeois press was waging an ideological offensive against Bolshevism. Inside the country, the Cadets, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and bourgeois nationalists had renewed their activity. Striving to spread bourgeois ideology among the working people, they engaged in a whispering campaign about the inevitability of a return to capitalism, saying that the question “Who will beat whom?” would be decided in favour of the capitalist elements, and that Soviet power would degenerate into bourgeois democracy.

The bourgeoisie who had fled abroad also had big hopes of a degeneration of the Soviet system. What was known as the “Smena Vekh” (Change of Landmarks) trend had the support of part of the émigrés. The name “Smena Vekh” derived from the symposium published under this title in Prague in 1921 by a group of White émigrés, and from the journal of that name published by White émigrés in Paris. The Smena Vekh group advocated co-operation with the Soviet state, in the
hope that the development of the national economy in NEP conditions would take the capitalist road.

As the Smena Vekh trend included a group of émigrés who sincerely wanted to co-operate with the Soviet state, the Party called for a positive attitude towards it, and for using the services of those bourgeois specialists who belonged to it. But with regard to those of the Smena Vekh group who co-operated with the Soviet state to politically camouflage their counter-revolutionary activity, the Party called for repressive measures.

The Party exposed the inventions of the bourgeoisie and its agents about the Soviet system degenerating, and explained to the masses that there would be no question of a return to capitalism, and that the Party would lead the Soviet people through NEP to socialism. The Party inculcated in the minds of the people Marxist ideology, which alone gives the right interpretation of the laws of social development and shows the way to remaking capitalist into socialist society.

Lenin's article "On the Significance of Militant Materialism", published in March 1922 in the journal Pod Znamenem Marxisma (Under the Banner of Marxism), played a big part in the Marxist upbringing of the Party's cadres and in mobilising them for an uncompromising struggle against bourgeois ideology. Lenin called upon the Communists to propagate Marxist ideology, Marxist materialism, among all sections of the population, and to expose idealism and clerical obscurantism.

It was the duty of Communists, Lenin pointed out, to work in close collaboration with consistent materialists, with representatives of present-day natural sciences who did not belong to the Communist Party. Together with them, and guiding them, the Communists should spread the materialist world outlook among the masses. Lenin called upon all Communists and consistent materialists to spread knowledge of the natural sciences among the masses, to conduct broad atheist propaganda among them on this basis, and help them overcome their religious prejudices. He directed the attention of Soviet natural scientists to the necessity of mastering Marxist dialectical materialism.

"It must be realised," Lenin wrote, "that unless it stands on a solid philosophical ground no natural science and no materialism can hold its own in the struggle against the onslaught of bourgeois ideas and the restoration of the bourgeois world outlook. In order to hold his own in this struggle and carry it to a victorious finish, the natural scientist must be a modern materialist, a conscious adherent of the materialism represented by Marx, i.e., he must be a dialectical materialist" (Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 207).

Lenin warned the Communists against sectarian narrowness, and insisted on utilising all the forces of the old society loyal to the
Soviet power for the purpose of building socialism. To think that communism can be built by the hands of Communists alone was one of the biggest and most dangerous mistakes. Without an alliance with the non-Party people working in various spheres, he wrote, there could be no question of successful communist construction.

Lenin called the attention of Communists to the extreme importance of systematically exposing bourgeois “contemporary democracy”, especially that of the United States of America. All kinds of “Socialists” worshipped at the shrine of this “democracy”, “bowing and scraping” as they lauded it. In reality, this vaunted “democracy” was “nothing but the freedom to preach that which is to the advantage of the bourgeoisie to preach, namely, the most reactionary ideas, religion, obscurantism, defence of the exploiters, etc.” (Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 206).

Lenin called on the Party to learn to appreciate science, to be considerate towards scientists and support them in every way. He stressed that industry and agriculture should be revived, not on the old basis, but on a new, modern basis in keeping with the latest achievements of science. “It would take too much labour and time,” he wrote, “to re-establish industry on the old basis. We must give industry more up-to-date forms, that is, must go over to electrification” (Collected Works, Vol. 32, p. 469). To accomplish this task, Lenin pointed out, it is necessary to enlist the assistance of the foremost scientific and technical personnel in economic development, begin training such personnel on a large scale and vigorously promote science.

Guided by Lenin’s directives the Party successfully tackled the economic rehabilitation of the country. By the end of 1922 the living conditions of the workers and peasants had improved. Politically, the country was in a stronger position. All the more or less major forces of kulak banditry had been smashed. In the autumn of 1922 the Red Army cleared the Japanese interventionists out of the Far East. On the international arena, the political prestige of the land of Soviets had risen considerably.

Peace was essential for the success of socialist construction. “Peace and every opportunity to devote all our energies to economic rehabilitation,” Lenin said, “is what we hold dearest of all” (Collected Works, Vol. 32, p. 94). This thesis of Lenin’s extended to the entire period of existence of the two systems, socialism and capitalism. Lenin pointed out that “we have won conditions in which we can exist side by side with the capitalist powers...” (Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 384). He constantly stressed the desire of the Soviet people to live in peace with all the peoples and patiently explained the peaceful foreign policy of the Soviet state and the interest it had in the development of economic and cultural relations with all countries. “We definitely favour,” he said, “economic understanding with America—with any country, but above all with America” (Collected Works, Vol. 30, p. 32). “Let the American capitalists leave us alone,” he declared. “We shall

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leave them alone" (ibid., p. 340). In other words, immediately after the working class of Russia had won state power, the Communist Party headed firmly for the peaceful coexistence of socialism and capitalism.

Taking as its starting-point Lenin's idea of the peaceful coexistence of the two systems, the Party sought to normalise relations with the capitalist countries. In 1921 the Soviet Government concluded a trade agreement with Great Britain, and afterwards with several other countries. In 1921 the All-Russian Central Executive Committee approached the United States, too, with a proposal to establish trade relations. But the U.S. Government, persisting in its interventionist attitude, turned down the proposal. French ruling circles likewise sabotaged the development of trade with Soviet Russia.

In the autumn of 1921 the Soviet Government, with a view to facilitating economic co-operation with the capitalist countries, declared its readiness to recognise the pre-war debts of the tsarist government on certain conditions, and suggested the convening of an international conference to examine the claims of foreign countries against Russia and the Soviet counter-claims, and to draw up a final peace treaty between Russia and her adversaries.

In view of the acute shrinking of markets caused by the economic crisis, the Entente Powers decided to convene, in the Italian city of Genoa, an economic and financial conference of all European states, including Soviet Russia and vanquished Germany, ostensibly for the purpose of "facilitating the economic rehabilitation of Europe".

The conference was held in April and May 1922. Lenin was appointed head of the Soviet delegation. The workers, however, fearing an attempt on his life, protested against his going abroad. Lenin guided the work of the delegation from Moscow. The functions of head of the delegation to the Genoa Conference were fulfilled by G. V. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. The Soviet delegation read a statement endorsed by Lenin and approved by the Council of People's Commissars. The statement said: "While abiding by the principles of communism, the Russian delegation admits that in the present historical epoch, which makes possible the parallel existence of the old and the rising new social systems, economic co-operation between countries representing these two systems of property is an imperative necessity . . . ."

At the conference—a conference of all the European countries—the Soviet delegation again proclaimed the necessity of peaceful coexistence of countries with differing social systems. This implied renunciation of war as a method for settling disputes; it implied the settlement of disputes by negotiation, non-interference in the internal affairs and recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of any nation, and organisation of economic and cultural development. To foster extensive economic co-operation with the capitalist countries, the Soviet delegation signified its willingness to make certain concessions to them. As a condition, however, for recognising the pre-
war debts of the tsarist government, it required that Russia be granted a new loan and that de jure recognition be extended to the Soviet Government. The delegation announced the Soviet Government's readiness to grant foreign property-owners definite compensation for their losses in Russia. At the same time, it advanced counter-claims for compensation for the damage caused to the country by the interventionist troops and the Russian Whites who had been supported by the Entente.

But the imperialists had their own plans. They had no desire to co-operate with Soviet Russia on an equal footing, and sought to impose a colonial regime on her by means of economic and diplomatic pressure. They demanded the repayment of all debts and the return of all nationalised property to its former foreign owners. Their brazen-ness was such that they wanted to establish foreign control over Soviet finances and even over the entire national economy of Russia. The Soviet delegation flatly rejected these claims and exposed their predatory character.

Sharp contradictions became apparent at the conference among the imperialist powers, chiefly between the victor countries in the First World War and vanquished Germany. In vain did Germany seek from the Entente an easing of the intolerable reparations burden imposed on her by the Versailles Treaty. Soviet Russia, alone among the powers, denounced this rapacious treaty, and called for easing Germany's burden. The more farsighted members of Germany's ruling circles reached the conclusion that rapprochement with Soviet Russia would strengthen the international position of Germany, help her to gain some concessions from the Entente and, at the same time, open up broad opportunities for trade with Russia.

The Soviet Government, in turn, was interested in preventing the isolation of the Soviet republics. Thus the possibility of a mutual rapprochement was created. In April 1922, in Rapallo, a suburb of Genoa, a Soviet-German treaty was signed. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were resumed. Soviet Russia and Germany relinquished all claims against each other—the reparations accruing to Russia under the Versailles Treaty, payments on account of the old debts and compensation for nationalised property.

By signing the Treaty of Rapallo, the Soviet Government made a breach in the front of the imperialist powers. It skilfully utilised imperialist contradictions in the interests of peace and the security of Soviet Russia.

No agreement was reached with the Entente Powers at Genoa. The talks were continued at the Hague Conference in the summer of 1922, but these too were barren of results.

The Party and the Soviet Government made use of the Genoa Conference to initiate a struggle for disarmament. The Soviet Government suggested that the Genoa Conference should discuss the question of a universal reduction of armaments and the banning of
the more barbarous means of warfare—"poison gases, aerial warfare, and others". The imperialist powers refused to discuss this proposal. The Soviet disarmament proposals showed the masses in all countries that, for the first time in history, there had appeared a government that sincerely and consistently strove for general disarmament.

The Party and the Soviet Government made every effort to establish close contact with the oppressed and dependent nations. In 1921 Soviet Russia signed treaties with Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey, and rendered considerable help to these countries in their struggle for national liberation. Those were the first equal treaties to be signed between countries of the East and a Great Power. The Soviet Government relinquished without compensation all the imperialist privileges and concessions that tsarist Russia enjoyed in these countries.

In 1921 the people of Mongolia, led by the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party which had been founded in March of that year, and aided by Soviet troops, drove the Whites—agents of the Japanese—out of their country and formed a people's government. Ever since, firm friendship has prevailed between the Soviet and Mongolian peoples.

The year 1922 saw the end of the war between Turkey—battling for her independence—and Greece, behind which stood the British imperialists. Victory was won by Turkey. For the purpose of drawing up the terms of peace, an international conference was convened at Lausanne. The imperialist powers invited Soviet Russia to take part in discussing only one question, that of the Straits. The Soviet Government defended Turkey's sovereignty over the Straits and demanded unconditional closure of the Straits to all naval craft except Turkish, and complete freedom of mercantile navigation. The imperialists refused permission to the representatives of the Soviet Republic to take part in the discussion of other issues, because they feared that the anti-imperialist stand of the Soviet state, friendly to the nations of the East, would further the development of the national liberation movement in the oppressed countries. Notwithstanding protests by the R.S.F.S.R., the conference adopted decisions whereby the Straits and the Black Sea would be open to the warships of all countries. In this way, the imperialists retained access for their armed forces to the southern borders of Soviet Russia. The decisions of the Lausanne Conference were yet another reminder to the working people of the Soviet republics of the danger of war from the capitalist countries and of the necessity of always keeping their powder dry.

Constant reminders of this were also the numerous hostile sallies of the imperialist states against the land of Soviets. For example, in 1923 the British Government presented an ultimatum to the Soviet Government, which became known as the "Curzon Ultimatum", after the name of the British Foreign Minister. This ultimatum demanded,
among other things, that the Soviet representatives be recalled from Iran and Afghanistan. The Soviet Government proposed convening an Anglo-Soviet conference to settle the controversial issues on a peaceful basis, but it flatly rejected the main demand of the ultimatum—to recall its representatives from the countries named. Following this vigorous rebuff, the British Government retreated. The policy of force in relation to the Soviet state had suffered yet another failure.

Thanks to the firmness, Bolshevik vigilance and wise peace policy of the Party, the Soviet people succeeded in warding off a major war for a period of twenty years—up to 1941.

The task of safeguarding the country's sovereignty, of recovering from the economic devastation, and of building socialism, insistently called for the closest integration of the economic, political and military resources of the Soviet republics and of their diplomatic activities.

The need for unifying to form a single entity was appreciated by the working people of all the Soviet national republics. United by the common struggle to establish and consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat, by joint labour in building socialism, the Soviet peoples strove for state unification as well, which was indispensable for the effective defence of the gains of the October Revolution and a speedy advance to socialism.

These aspirations were expressed by the Party. The question of unification and the forms it should take was worked out and discussed by the Central Committee.

Stalin advanced and upheld the idea of "autonomisation", that is, the joining of the R.S.F.S.R. by all the Soviet republics on an autonomous basis. Lenin sharply criticised Stalin's proposal. He wrote that "Stalin's rashness and excessive administrative zeal played a fatal part" in the matter (Collected Works, Vol. 36, p. 554). Lenin proposed establishing a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Stalin withdrew his erroneous proposal.

A plenary meeting of the Central Committee, held in October 1922, adopted Lenin's proposal for a voluntary, equal union of the Soviet republics, including the R.S.F.S.R., in a new state formation—the U.S.S.R. Its decision read:

"To recognise the necessity of the conclusion of a treaty between the Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Federation of Transcaucasian Republics and the R.S.F.S.R. providing for their unification in a 'Union of Socialist Soviet Republics', each retaining the right to free secession from the 'Union'."

In October-December 1922 plenary meetings of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia declared for the unification of the Soviet republics in a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. After these decisions the movement for unification assumed a country-wide scale.
The sentiment of the peoples was reflected at the congresses of Soviets of the national republics, including the Tenth Congress of Soviets of the R.S.F.S.R., which took place in December 1922, and unanimously called for the formation of the U.S.S.R.

The First Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics opened in Moscow on December 30, 1922. Lenin, who did not attend on account of illness, was elected Honorary Chairman of the Congress. It adopted a declaration on the formation of the U.S.S.R., and a Treaty of Union. It elected a supreme legislative body—the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. M. I. Kalinin, G. I. Petrovsky, A. G. Chervyakov and N. N. Narimanov were elected Chairmen of the Central Executive Committee, and the C.E.C. elected V. I. Lenin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.

Thus, under the leadership of the Party, headed by Lenin, a multinational Soviet socialist state was created. It was formed on a voluntary basis, with each Soviet constituent republic preserving its national sovereignty. It was a federative proletarian state of a new type that constituted a great scientific discovery of Lenin's.

The formation of the U.S.S.R. was a triumph for the ideas of Leninism, for the Leninist nationalities policy of the Communist Party. This development showed to all progressive mankind the way to solve the national question, to abolish the inequality of nations and peoples, the way to unite the peoples into a single fraternal family for the building of communism.

The first Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was adopted at the Second Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., in 1924.

The Fourth Congress of the Comintern, at which the Communist Parties of 58 countries were represented, was held in November-December 1922. Lenin delivered a report to the Congress on the subject: "Five Years of the Russian Revolution and the Prospects of the World Revolution". The chief result of these years was the consolidation of the position of socialism. Had the New Economic Policy helped in this? That, Lenin said, was the principal question, and it was of prime importance for all the Communist Parties; for if the reply were in the negative, "we would all be doomed" (Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 384). But the eighteen months' work of the Soviet state on the basis of NEP had proved the absolute correctness of the Party's decision to pass from War Communism to the New Economic Policy.

Lenin's speech at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern was his last address to a congress. In content his report was a kind of testament to all the brother Communist Parties—to learn from the experience of the Russian Communist Party how to fight against capitalism and for the dictatorship of the proletariat, creatively applying this experience to the concrete circumstances of their countries.
The Fourth Congress of the Comintern noted that for the world proletariat Soviet Russia was a rich treasure-house of revolutionary experience.

Reviewing the international situation, the Congress pointed to the sharpening world economic crisis, the growth of unemployment and the world-wide capitalist offensive against the gains of the working class. The capitalists sought chiefly to reduce wages and the standard of living of the workers generally. In all countries the proletariat had been forced on to the defensive.

The growing pressure exerted by capital had evoked a spontaneous desire for unity among the workers, and brought them closer to the Communists. The Congress reaffirmed that the basic task facing the Communist Parties was to win over the majority of the working class, and that the struggle for this aim should be based on applying the tactics of the united front. The working-class united front implied the unity of all workers ready to fight against capitalism, including those who followed the Social-Democrats, the anarchists, syndicalists, etc.

The Congress pointed out the precarious nature of the Versailles system, the aggravation of the antagonisms between the main imperialist powers and the growing militarisation of all the capitalist countries. It noted that the inherent laws of capitalism were irresistibly pushing it towards a new world conflict, and called on the Communist Parties to combat the danger of imperialist war, and more particularly the threat of war against the Soviet country.

4. Lenin’s Last Articles and Letters. Lenin’s Plan for Building Socialism in the U.S.S.R.

The consolidation of the external position of the Soviet state and the achievements of socialist construction rejoiced the Party and the Soviet people. But this sentiment was marred by the illness of Lenin. The terrific strain of long years of work had undermined his health. The effects of the wound inflicted by the murderous hand of a Socialist-Revolutionary terrorist also made themselves felt.

In the autumn of 1922 Lenin’s illness took a turn for the worse. On November 20, after a slight improvement, he delivered a speech at a meeting of the Moscow Soviet. Referring to the results of the country’s development during the last eighteen months, on the basis of the New Economic Policy, Lenin said that difficulties attended the change-over, but these would be overcome. The Party had registered definite successes: “We have brought socialism into everyday life.” Amidst loud applause, he concluded his speech by expressing the firm conviction that “NEP Russia will become socialist Russia” (Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 405).

This was the last public appearance of the leader of the Party and the Soviet people.
In December 1922 his illness took a grave turn.

In December 1922-March 1923 he dictated his last articles: “Pages From a Diary”, “On Co-operation”, “How We Should Reorganise the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection”, “Concerning Our Revolution”, “Better Fewer, but Better”, and his letters “Letter to the Congress”, “On the Assignment of Legislative Functions to the State Planning Committee”, “The Question of Nationalities or of ‘Autonomisation’”. These articles and letters were the culminating stage of Lenin’s elaboration of the plan for building socialism in the U.S.S.R. In a way, they were his political testament to the Party.

In his articles Lenin proceeded from the assumption that the main thing in building socialism was the development of large-scale industry, particularly heavy industry, as the economic basis of socialism. He put before the Party the problem of industrialising the country, and showed how this should be done.

“By exercising the greatest possible economy in the economic life of our state,” he wrote, “to use every kopek we save to develop our large-scale machine industry, to develop electrification, the hydraulic extraction of peat, to complete the Volkhov project, etc.

“In this, and this alone, lies our hope” (ibid., p. 459).

On the order of the day, too, was the question of the socialist reconstruction of the countryside. The proletariat would succeed in solving its basic problem only by retaining its leadership of the peasantry and drawing the latter into the building of socialism. Lenin considered the consolidation of the alliance of the working class and the labouring peasantry to be a decisive condition for building socialism in the U.S.S.R. He saw in the co-operatives the means by which the peasantry could be drawn into socialist construction. Under capitalism, the co-operatives bear a capitalist character; they are, as Lenin put it, “collective capitalist undertakings”. Under the Soviet system, with power in the hands of the proletariat, with the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry under the leadership of the working class made secure, and with all the basic means of production, including the land, in the hands of the state, the co-operatives are socialist undertakings. Given these conditions, co-operatives are the way most comprehensible for the peasants to unite in large-scale collective undertakings. Co-operation combines the private, personal interests of the peasant with the common interests of society.

“For now we have found,” Lenin wrote, “that degree of the combination of private interest, private trading interest, with state supervision and control of this interest, that degree of its subordination to the common interests, that was formerly the stumbling-block for very many socialists” (ibid., p. 428).

To win the small peasant producer for the co-operative system is the most difficult problem after the conquest of power by the proletariat. It can be solved only on condition of extensive aid on the part of the
state and the active participation of the peasant masses themselves. The organisation of the peasants in co-operatives must take place on a voluntary basis, and in no circumstances by administrative measures. With the population of the country organised in co-operatives, Lenin wrote, this would be a system of civilised co-operators. And such a system in a proletarian country, where the means of production were the property of society, was a socialist system.

Lenin’s teachings on co-operation as the sole possible means of leading the peasantry out on to the path of socialism were a creative development of Marxism in the new conditions. Lenin outlined a clear perspective of the building of socialism in the countryside, of the victory of the Soviet power in solving this vital and complicated problem.

In the matter of establishing and consolidating the co-operative system in the countryside, as in the entire work of building socialism, Lenin attached enormous importance to the cultural revolution. The Party and the Soviet Government, he said, must bring about universal literacy. He suggested that cultural and educational and “patronage” organisations of factory workers should be set up to help educate the peasantry, and that regular visits of workers to the villages should be arranged.

In his last articles and letters, Lenin again stressed that the instrument for building socialism was the Soviet state, and that it must constantly be improved and strengthened. He proposed that the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection and the Central Control Commission should be amalgamated, and the combined body vested with broad powers to reduce administrative staffs to the greatest possible extent, and to refresh and cheapen the machinery of state. The Central Committee of the Party, too, would gain from the amalgamation, wrote Lenin, because through the new body the C.C. would be in closer contact with the masses and better informed, and would be in a position to solve all problems better and more correctly. “Among the gains,” he wrote, “there will also be the advantage that in our Central Committee the influence of purely personal and casual factors will diminish, and this will reduce the danger of a split” (Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 443).

Lenin was anxious above all to preserve the solid unity of the Party. It was his desire that the Party should always remember the decision of the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.( B.), which categorically prohibited all factions and groupings in the Party. A split in the Party, he pointed out, would inevitably lead to a split in the worker-peasant alliance. And that would signify the end of Soviet power and a return to capitalism. There were no grounds in the Soviet system for any split in the worker-peasant alliance. Such a split could take place only as a result of blunders and wrong actions by Party and state bodies. For that reason, Lenin said that the basic task of the Central Committee, the Central Control Commission and the
Party as a whole was "to watch closely the circumstances which may cause a split, and to forestall them, for, in the last resort, the fate of our republic will depend on whether the masses of the peasants will march with the working class and loyally maintain their alliance with it, or whether they will permit the ‘Nepmen’, i.e., the new bourgeoisie, to drive a wedge between them and the working class, to split them off from the working class" (ibid., p.444).

Lenin dwelt also on the international situation. Did the Soviet state possess the strength with which to uphold its independent existence against the pressure of the world bourgeoisie, to safeguard the peaceful labour of the builders of socialism? Would the Soviet country be able to achieve the victory of socialism?

Proceeding from a scientific analysis of the international situation and of the objective laws of the development of society, Lenin gave a clear and positive answer to these questions.

In the camp of the imperialists, unity and complete agreement were impossible, because in the drive for profits, for dominion on the world market, the imperialists were bound to become embroiled in rivalry. On the other hand, the international policy of the Soviet Union was not aimed at seizing foreign territory or unleashing war; its aim was to promote peace, business-like agreements with the capitalist countries on mutually advantageous terms, peaceful coexistence of the two systems—socialism and capitalism. Lenin said that we must keep a firm hand on the helm, and go our way without succumbing to any provocation or intimidation on the part of the imperialists. Firmness and steadfastness—these were the qualities that the Communists should display.

Although the victory of the revolutionary movement of the world proletariat was slow in coming, this was a temporary matter. "Peace" between the antagonistic classes in the capitalist countries was only illusory. The reality was ceaseless class struggle, which at times smouldered, only to flare up again. Sharpening of the class struggle in the future was inevitable, just as the victory of the proletariat was inevitable.

An intensification of the national liberation struggle was equally inevitable. As a result of the imperialist world war, and chiefly as a result of the Great October Socialist Revolution, a number of countries in the East—China, India and others—had been drawn into the main stream of the world revolutionary movement. Hundreds of millions of working people in the countries of the East had been reduced by the imperialist exploiters to the last degree of human misery and endurance. And no reactionary forces could stem their revolutionary movement, which would grow with every year. The struggle of the colonial peoples for their liberation would, with incredible force, shake the foundations of capitalism, sap its strength and facilitate the development of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat in the capitalist countries.
Lenin pointed out that the great peoples of the countries of the East—China, India and others—which together with the peoples of Soviet Russia constituted the overwhelming majority of the earth’s population, were rapidly being drawn into the national liberation struggle. For this reason, wrote Lenin, “there cannot be the slightest shadow of doubt what the final outcome of the world struggle will be. In this sense, the ultimate victory of socialism is completely and absolutely certain” (ibid., p. 458).

In his last articles and letters, Lenin substantiated and elaborated his plan for building socialism in the U.S.S.R. The basic propositions of this plan, which he outlined in his brilliant works written after the October Revolution, are the following:

1. **In the Soviet country there was all that was necessary and adequate for building a complete socialist society.** The main task of the Party was to revive and develop industry, especially heavy industry, to electrify the country, and to ensure a substantial rise in labour productivity through the national economy. In order to build the material and technical basis of socialism and to increase the defence capacity of the Soviet state, it was necessary to industrialise the country and overcome its technical-economic backwardness.

2. The socialist proletariat should draw the working peasantry into socialist construction and help it to organise its scattered individual farming into large-scale socialised farming. The best way to draw the peasants into socialist construction was through co-operation. The Communist Party should help the peasantry to establish the co-operative system in the countryside. This should be done gradually, step by step, so that the peasantry might by its own experience, become convinced of the advantages of collective forms and willingly, without any compulsion, take the path of co-operation. When the peasants became convinced of the need to go over to collective forms of farming, the rate of their advance to socialism would be accelerated.

Small-peasant farming could be switched to a socialist path provided agriculture were amply supplied with modern machinery. As early as at the Eighth Congress of the Party, in 1919, Lenin said that if we could give the countryside a hundred thousand first-class tractors, the peasantry would declare for communism. Industrialisation, with priority development of heavy industry, would make it possible to supply the countryside with all the machinery it needed.

3. The development of large-scale industry, equipping the entire national economy with up-to-date machinery, drawing the peasants into co-operation, and the management of the state and the entire national economy called for a sharp rise in the cultural level of the people and the training of highly skilled personnel in sufficient numbers. This required universal literacy, a considerable extension of the network of elementary and secondary schools, higher educational
establishments and publishing facilities, and the development of all branches of science. In short, what was needed was a cultural revolution. Without it, without training an intelligentsia drawn from the ranks of the people, socialism could not be built and securely established.

4. The fundamental condition for building socialism was the dictatorship of the proletariat. To preserve and consolidate it, the Party must continuously strengthen the alliance of the workers and peasants, in which the working class, led by the Communist Party, played the leading role. The Party must closely follow all developments that threatened to split the alliance, in order to counteract them on time. Then the Soviet state would be unshakable.

In the hands of the working class, the state was an instrument for building socialism. For the purpose of enhancing the role of the machinery of state, and also to economise resources, it was necessary to reduce that machinery to a minimum by getting rid of bureaucratic and alien elements, and replenish it with fresh forces drawn from the ranks of the working people. The job of improving the machinery of state, of cutting staffs and reducing costs, should be carried out by the joint organ of the Party and the Government—the Central Control Commission and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. With the help of the working people, this body would check and improve the work of the Soviet state apparatus, and make it worthy of the new social system.

5. Socialism could be built only if there was an increasingly solid friendship of the peoples of all the nationalities of the Soviet Union. With this aim in view, the Party must work for the early abolition of the actual inequality of the backward peoples, educate all peoples in the spirit of internationalism and fraternal unity, and be tactful and considerate towards the national sentiments of each people. Lenin wrote: "What is the important thing for the proletarian? It is not merely important but essential for the proletarian to gain the greatest possible trust of non-Russians in the proletarian class struggle. What does this call for? It calls for something more than nominal equality. It calls for making up in some way or another, by one's behaviour or one's concessions to non-Russians for the distrust, the suspicion and the grievances which the government of the 'Great-Power' nation bred in the historical past" (Collected Works, Vol. 36, p. 556).

6. The building of socialism in the U.S.S.R. was wholly assured from the international point of view as well. In the capitalist world the contradictions, both class and inter-state contradictions, were bound to become more acute. Class battles between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie were bound to grow in intensity. The developing national liberation movement in the colonies and semi-colonies, especially in the countries of the East, would increasingly undermine the rule of the imperialists. In their totality, these circumstances would in ever greater measure undermine the foundations of capital-
ism. Any attempt by the imperialists to destroy the Soviet system would end in failure.

7. Taking into account the capitalist encirclement of the Soviet country and the international situation, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government should conduct a wise foreign policy and seek to avert military clashes with the bourgeois countries. An indefatigable struggle for peace, for peaceful coexistence and economic competition between socialism and capitalism should be the undeviating policy of the Party. Lenin expressed his unshakable confidence that socialism would win this competition, that “socialism contains within itself gigantic forces and that mankind has now entered into a new stage of development, which offers uncommonly brilliant prospects” (Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 456).

At the same time Lenin insisted on the Soviet people vigorously strengthening their defences and building up the fighting capacity of the Red Army and Navy to enable them to deliver a crushing blow to an eventual aggressor.

8. The Communist Party, which represented the interests of the working class and all working people and was closely linked with the masses, was the decisive force in socialist construction. The Party led the state and all voluntary organisations; it guided economic and cultural development on socialist lines, organised the defence of the country and worked out the principles and methods of Soviet foreign policy. Unless led by the Party, “the dictatorship of the proletariat is infeasible” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 32, p. 222). To translate Lenin’s plan for building socialism in the U.S.S.R. into reality, the Party must follow a wise, farsighted policy enjoying the unqualified support of the working class and all working people. Lenin held that unanimity and proper organisation, strict discipline and unity of the Party ranks, the ruling out of factions and groupings, and the exercise of collective leadership and of criticism and self-criticism were highly important if the Party was to play its leading role in socialist construction. He saw all this as the basis for the success of the policy and work of the Party, of its strategy and tactics.

Such were the main points of Lenin’s plan for building socialism in the Soviet Union.

Lenin’s plan became a most powerful theoretical and practical weapon of the Party in the struggle to fulfil the Party Programme adopted by the Eighth Party Congress, to achieve socialism. It inspired the working class and working peasantry to feats of labour in the name of the victory of socialism over capitalism.

In the struggle for the victory of socialism, the perspective being distinct and plans clear-cut, it was very important for the ruling Party to use the right methods of leadership and style of work.

Lenin personified a new, superior type of political leader and teacher of the working people. His versatile Party and government activity equips the Party cadres with tested methods of leadership.
Lenin thought highly of the practical experience of the masses, seeing it as a focus of the collective mind of the people. “The intellect of millions of creators,” he stressed, “brings into being something infinitely superior to the greatest and most brilliant prevision” (Collected Works, Vol. 26, p. 431). Lenin’s faith in the creative power of the working people, and his ability to appraise their actions and carefully study their experience enabled him to give the movement of the masses the right direction and effectively lead their struggle. His activity was a solid combination of revolutionary theory and revolutionary practice. One must realise, he wrote shortly after Soviet power had been established, that “the important thing now is practice, that now is the historical moment when theory becomes practice, and is enlivened, corrected and verified by practice” (ibid., pp. 373-74).

Lenin made a constant effort to strengthen the ties with the masses and draw the masses into the making of history. Proper leadership, he said, is impossible unless we know how to “draw the working class and labour masses into the whole of our constructive work ever more deeply and extensively” (Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 165). Lenin’s activity was an example of work among the masses. Lenin was linked with them by thousands of threads. Numerous workers’ delegations, peasants’ messengers and people of every nationality and occupation turned to him with their problems and proposals. Lenin knew the sentiments of workers, peasants and intellectuals from the talks he had with them, from his fellow-workers, from the numerous letters which working people wrote him. He carefully weighed and generalised the thousands of facts he learned through his contacts with the people. He used them to verify, as it were, his conclusions and plans. He knew how to rouse and guide the creative initiative of the people, how to draw the most backward sections of the people into an active struggle for the victory of the revolution and of socialism. He not only taught the masses but also learned from them.

The fire of creative effort never died down in Lenin, who had an excellent ability to discern the new, to which the future belonged. He carefully studied and resolutely fostered the shoots of the new, and held care of them to be a prime duty of the Party and the state.

Lenin was a model of supreme devotion to the cause of the Party and the people, a model of selfless service in the cause of the socialist revolution. He gave his all, and his very life, in the struggle to emancipate the working class and all working people, to bring about the triumph of communism. He was a Marxist of unshakable loyalty, and abhorred all manifestations of opportunism, Right- and “Left”-wing alike.

A staunch and fervent revolutionary, Lenin was always a far-sighted, realistic political leader who saw life in its true colours, without any embellishments. He never overrated a success and never
lost heart over a failure. A Party leader or statesman, he said, must be able "to think, and to weigh and verify things most coolly and soberly" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 87).

**Bold thinking and revolutionary scope in work** were typical of Lenin's style of work. Lenin stressed that it takes "vastly daring, historically great initiative and scope, full of supreme enthusiasm on the part of a truly revolutionary class" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 132) to accomplish the historic tasks of changing the country along revolutionary lines. Before the last shot of the Civil War had been fired, Lenin was busy making bold plans for the electrification of the poverty-stricken and ruined country and painting a breath-taking picture of the coming socialist changes, on the strength of a profound study of the creative activity of the people and of his knowledge of the laws governing social development.

Lenin combined revolutionary scope with efficiency, with concrete leadership, with painstaking organising and educational work encouraging the activity of the people and strengthening their faith in their own forces. In Lenin, bold thinking and the wide scope of a revolutionary who saw the immediate and the remote goal, invariably went hand in hand with a sober, strictly scientific appraisal of the situation.

**Collectivism** in deciding the main questions of policy and practice was a most important feature of Lenin's style of work. Lenin regarded it as the highest principle of Party leadership. It is the collective character of leadership that enables the Party to draw on the experience of its cadres, of all Communists, of the millions of working people, and to fight properly for socialism and communism. Although he enjoyed the greatest prestige and the unqualified trust of the whole Party, Lenin never decided questions of principle by himself, without consulting the Party's collective bodies. He strongly rebuked a functionalist who alleged that in the Central Committee Lenin decided every question all by himself. "You are wrong," he said, "in saying again and again that I am the Central Committee. One can write that sort of thing only in a state of great nervous excitement and over-strain..."

"How can you work yourself up into writing a *perfectly impossible*, *perfectly impossible* sentence, saying that I am the Central Committee?" (*Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*, p. 208). Needless to say collectivism is unthinkable without officials being personally responsible for the job entrusted to them. It does not reduce the importance or authority of leaders.

Lenin would have no exaltation or glorification of his person or his services, and detested toadyism and servility. He set an example of modesty and simple behaviour. When he heard that the Commission for the History of the Communist Party and the October Revolution was collecting material for a future Museum of Lenin, he emphatically forbade it. To M. S. Olminsky, who reported to him the de-
cision of the commission, he said: "You cannot imagine how unpleasant this constant accentuation of my person is to me."

Lenin was positively against all show, all political blather and "speechifying", and ruthlessly combated bureaucratic practices. He strongly condemned "Communist swagger" and an overbearing attitude on the part of officials. He advised against appointing to leading posts people who plumed themselves on their position, who were presumptuous and bureaucratic-minded and scorned the experience of the masses.

Lenin acted openly. He considered hypocrisy and lack of principle intolerable in a party official. A principled policy, he said, is the most correct policy. Truthfulness and honesty, two very important qualities of a Communist, must be in evidence in all things, primarily in one's attitude to one's job. "It is a very bad thing," wrote Lenin, when a person's "words do not accord with his deeds. It leads to hypocrisy" (Collected Works, Vol. 11, p. 233).

Lenin set an example of respecting the laws and insisted on others strictly observing revolutionary legality. It was on his instructions that the pamphlet Observe the Laws of the Soviet Republic was published in 1919. He allowed himself no exemptions whatever from regulations laid down by law.

Lenin knew how to single out what was important and concentrate on it. He demanded self-discipline and insisted on people carrying through what they had begun. He held that to take the right decision was only a beginning. The important thing, he stressed, is the proper selection of people, and supervision. "To check up people and verify the actual execution of assignments—this, and only this, is now the pivot of our whole work, of our whole policy" (Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 200). In selecting personnel, Lenin always took account primarily of political and practical qualifications. In the case of a certain functionary, he wanted to know how far that person was suitable: "(a) from the point of view of conscientiousness, (b) politically, (c) in terms of competence, (d) in terms of administrative ability" (Lenin Miscellany XXIII, p. 164). Lenin appreciated single-mindedness, efficiency, initiative, independence in taking decisions, and awareness of one’s responsibility; he thoroughly abhorred a formal attitude to work, negligence, and indifference to shortcomings. Social considerations and the interests of the state as a whole, he said, must outweigh personal considerations and interests. He warned officials against complacency and condemned those who took a scornful view of criticism and self-criticism.

Lenin combined an exacting approach to people with great tact. He considered the requirements of the working people with the greatest attention. Like a father, he followed the everyday life and work of his fellow-workers. This, wrote Maxim Gorky, had nothing of "the selfish solicitude which a clever master occasionally shows for his honest and skilful labourers."
“It was not that. It was sincere attention on the part of a true comrade, a sentiment of affection for an equal” (Reminiscences About V. I. Lenin, Part 1, 1956, p. 448).

Demyan Bedny described Lenin’s genius, clear thinking and profound wisdom in the following lines:

*Lenin speaks—not a twist, not a quirk in his speech,*  
*Not a thunderous note—yet his words will not reach*  
*Only hearts, only ears that are closed with intent.*  
*Like the Volga it flows with a power never spent,*  
*With a clearness, a depth uncompered, unsurpassed,*  
*Encompassing future and present and past;*  
*So simple—as simple as wisdom itself;*  
*So sparing and terse, yet displaying such wealth*  
*Of meaning and power—like a river in spate*  
*Bearing seaward its waters, majestic and great.*  
*Throughout all the world there is no such force*  
*That can bar its way or divert its course.*

Lenin’s statements on the methods of leading the masses, and his versatile activity serve as an excellent school for training workers of the Lenin type.


The ideas of Lenin’s plan for building socialism in the U.S.S.R. found expression in the decisions of the Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.). The Congress, at which about 400,000 members were represented, was held on April 17-25, 1923. This was the first Congress after the October Revolution from which Lenin, through illness, was absent.

The reduced membership was due to the Party cleansing which took place in 1921 and 1922.

Items on the agenda included reports by the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, industry, the national question, tax policy in the countryside, and others.

The resolution adopted on the report of the Central Committee stressed that NEP was creating favourable soil for deviations in the Party. Particularly dangerous and disastrous were those deviations which opposed the Soviet state to the working class and the Party to the state. The Congress gave categorical warning that those who in these matters, so vital to the destiny of the revolution, tried to sow confusion in the Party, divert it from the Leninist path and undermine its unity, would be rigorously dealt with, to the point of expulsion from the R.C.P.(B.).
The Congress pointed to the need for systematically improving the machinery of state, regarding this as a prime duty of the Party. Only a really socialist state apparatus could assure the indissoluble alliance of the workers and peasants.

In pursuance of Lenin's directives, the Congress decided to merge the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and the Central Control Commission, and charged the new body with improving the state machinery with the help of workers from the bench.

The Congress stressed the necessity for a precise division of labour between Party and Soviet organisations, for better specialisation of economic and administrative personnel, for the strict adherence to the principle of personal responsibility for the work assigned.

Noting the successes achieved in the national economy and in raising labour productivity in the factories, the Congress called upon the working class to direct its energies to expanding industry, above all heavy industry, "which alone can be a firm foundation for genuinely socialist construction" (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part I, p. 682).

Along with heavy industry, and on its basis, light industry, too, was to be rapidly developed.

The key to success or failure in production was in the factories. The proper organisation of work at each enterprise, in keeping with its particular features, was decisive. The Congress recommended that "everything be done to avoid stifling centralisation, the damping of initiative and arbitrary interference in the work" of enterprises (ibid., p. 697).

The Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) underlined that the main responsibility for the work of the economic and state organisations rested with the Party, which must determine and verify this work as far as its more important points were concerned. "Still closer to the economy, still greater attention, guidance and help to the economic bodies, this is the Party slogan for the next period" (ibid., p. 683).

The attention of the Party was directed to proper organisation of the marketing of manufactured goods. Faulty organisation in this respect was already leading to excessive overhead charges and partly to excess stocking of goods. In order to overcome this, it was essential, in the first place, to build up a network of local trading establishments, so as to ensure contact between industry and the peasant market. It was also necessary to adjust prices, for the prices of manufactures were much higher than those paid for agricultural produce.

With a view to easing the conditions of the peasantry and expanding trade in the country, the recommendation was made that all direct state taxes levied on the peasants (tax in kind, household tax in cash, labour and cartage tax), and all local direct taxes, should be replaced by a single direct agricultural tax, and also that part of this tax could be paid in cash. (Subsequently, beginning with 1924, the single agricultural tax began to be computed in gold rubles and
was levied wholly in cash.) The main burden of taxation was placed on the richest farms (a manifestation of the policy of restricting the kulaks); some of the poorest peasants were exempted from all tax payments.

At the Congress, attempts were made by opportunist elements to divert the Party from the Leninist path. Trotsky called for a rigorous concentration of industry and the closure of a number of establishments that were unprofitable at the time. This was a concealed form of cutting down heavy industry. On the eve of the Congress Trotsky had proposed that some of the biggest plants like the Putilov Works in Petrograd, the Bryansk Works and others should be closed down on the grounds that they were then working at a loss. Actually the closing down of these plants would have caused the gravest injury to heavy industry and would have set the workers against the Party.

The Central Committee emphatically rejected Trotsky’s proposal and pointed out that its acceptance would amount to a political defeat for the entire Soviet Republic. And it was in this same spirit that the Twelfth Congress decision was adopted.

In the theses which he compiled for the Twelfth Congress, Trotsky advanced the slogan of a “dictatorship of industry”. As Trotsky employed it, this slogan did not signify emphasis on the leading role of industry in the national economy or on priority development of the production of means of production as against that of consumer goods. In his understanding, it signified the development of industry by exploiting the peasantry. This line would have led to the break-up of the alliance of the workers and peasants, and to the ruin of the Soviet system.

In its decisions the Congress stressed that at the given stage of economic development agriculture was of prime importance to the entire economy of the country.

The Congress decision on the monopoly of foreign trade was of fundamental importance. This problem had been studied and repeatedly considered by the Central Committee of the Party over a year. Sokolnikov and Bukharin insisted on partial abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade. Most of the Central Committee members, including Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev, likewise favoured a relaxation of that monopoly. Stalin held that its “relaxation is becoming inevitable”. Lenin in his letters took a determined stand against Sokolnikov and Bukharin, and against the vacillation of other members of the Central Committee.

The Congress pronounced Lenin’s policy on the monopoly of foreign trade to be correct, stressed that it was unshakable and all waver- ing in its enforcement impermissible, and resolutely condemned the opportunist views of Sokolnikov and Bukharin.

Some delegates (Krasin and others) put forward the erroneous proposal that substantial economic concessions should be made to the
capitalist countries, in return for credits and loans for rehabilitating industry. Their proposal was rejected.

After hearing a report by Stalin on the national question, the Congress called for the speedy elimination of actual inequality among the Soviet nationalities. The Russian proletariat had to increase its help to the backward peoples of the U.S.S.R. in their economic and cultural development.

In the conditions created by NEP, when bourgeois elements had revived, bourgeois nationalism had likewise revived and become active. The Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), like the Tenth Congress, called upon the Party to fight resolutely against Great-Russian chauvinism, which was the main danger, and against local nationalism, which was particularly marked in Georgia. The Georgian deviators (Mdivani, Okujava and others) attempted to pursue a policy of dominant-nation chauvinism in relation to the other nationalities inhabiting Georgia. They were also opposed to the establishment of the Transcaucasian Federation and to the entry of Georgia into the U.S.S.R. through the T.S.F.S.R. They demanded that foreign banks be opened in Georgia, which would have paved the way for turning Georgia into an appendage of foreign capital and for the restoration of capitalism there. The Congress vigorously condemned the activity of the Georgian deviators.

The guidance of the national economy improved after the Twelfth Congress. The rehabilitation of agriculture and industry proceeded successfully. Crop areas were extended and annual industrial output increased. The number of workers in large-scale industry, planned by the Supreme Council of National Economy, rose by 14 per cent in 1923 compared with the previous year. But there were also major shortcomings. Labour productivity and the workers' wages were still below pre-war levels. State and co-operative trading organisations were working badly. The directives of the Twelfth Party Congress to close the price gap between manufactured and agricultural goods had not been carried out. By the autumn of 1923 the price gap ("the scissors") had widened enormously. As a result the Soviet ruble became more unstable, and its value was declining.

All these factors, in their totality, had an adverse effect on the living conditions of the workers and peasants and on their purchasing power. Manufactures piled up in the warehouses despite the fact that output was small at the time. The peasants needed them but could not buy them because of the high prices.

This price policy gave rise to discontent in the countryside. Among the workers, too, there was grumbling, because overstocking resulted in delays in paying wages. In some enterprises, things went as far as strikes.

The Party Central Committee and the Soviet Government took urgent measures to eliminate the causes of the discontent among the peasants and workers. Prices of consumer goods were lowered. The
chervonets,* introduced in October 1922, was brought increasingly into circulation and became the firm, stable currency unit, in place of the unstable paper money in circulation. The regular payment of wages was resumed. Measures were taken to put trade on a proper footing, squeeze out private traders and vigorously combat profiteering. Agricultural prices were raised and low-interest credits were made available to the peasants for the development of their farms. Credits freed the poor peasants from the necessity of borrowing from kulaks at extortionate rates and of becoming in fact their farm-labourers.

These measures ended the discontent among the peasants and workers and assured the further development of the national economy. The difficulties on the economic front occasioned a revival of the anti-Leninist elements in the Party.

Taking advantage of the fact that Lenin, the Party leader, was incapacitated by grave illness, Trotsky resumed his fight against the Leninist Central Committee, against the Party. He decided that the country's difficulties gave him a favourable opportunity to realise his designs—to take the leadership of the Party into his own hands and pursue his own line, one that, in the end, would have led to the restoration of capitalism.

At the beginning of October 1923 Trotsky addressed a letter to the Central Committee in which he vilified the work of that body. Instead of trying to help overcome the shortcomings in the Party through discussion at meetings of the Political Bureau and plenary meetings of the Central Committee, as was and is usual when there are normal relations between the members of leading Party bodies, Trotsky mustered all his supporters for a fight against the Central Committee. Shortly after Trotsky's letter, the Central Committee received a statement of the Forty-Six, signed by Trotskyists, "Democratic Centralists" and remnants of the "Left Communist" and "Workers' Opposition" groups. Among them were members of the Central Committee. Slanderously declaring that the Party apparatus had replaced the Party, they endeavoured to set the membership against the Party apparatus, opposing the latter to the Party. This Trotskyist crusade against the Party apparatus was a recurrence of Menshevism, which denied the very principle of guidance of Party work. The Trotskyists and the other opportunists demanded freedom for factions and groupings. They sought to secure the annulment of the Tenth Party Congress decision banning and ruling out factions in the Party, and expressed the aspirations of the Mensheviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the new bourgeoisie, who, with NEP in existence, were all craving to appear openly on the political scene.

* A bank note, backed by gold and other reliable cover, and equivalent to 10 gold rubles.—Trans.
Trotsky's letter and the statement of the Forty-Six were circulated by the Trotskyists to the local Party organisations.

The situation in the Party was discussed at a joint plenary meeting of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, held in October, together with representatives of the ten biggest Party organisations—Petrograd, Moscow, Kharkov and others. The meeting condemned the action taken by Trotsky and the Forty-Six as being profoundly erroneous politically and as having assumed "the character of factional activity threatening to deal a blow at the unity of the Party and creating a crisis in the Party" (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part I, p. 768).

The decision of the plenary meeting compelled some of the Trotskyists, including V. A. Antonov-Ovseyenko and A. S. Bubnov, to revise their concepts, and they subsequently combated Trotskyism. But it had no effect on Trotsky. He issued a pamphlet entitled The New Course, in which he charged the Party leadership with degeneration, compared the old Party leaders with the opportunist leaders of the Second International, and opposed to the old and tried Party cadres the raw youth—raw in the Party sense—especially the students, flatteringly referring to this youth as the "barometer of the Party".

Trotsky and his followers began levelling charges against the Central Committee at Party meetings in factories and higher educational institutions. Thus once again, as in 1924, the Trotskyists forced a discussion on the Party.

A heated discussion began in the Party organisations all over the country. Once more the Party was diverted from the job of rehabilitating the national economy. The Party organisations in Moscow, Petrograd, the Ukraine, the Urals, Baku and other big industrial centres, crushingly rebuffed the Trotskyist attack. The discussion ended in the utter defeat of the Trotskyists. The Party rallied round the Leninist Central Committee.

The results of the discussion were summed up by the Thirteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.), which took place in January 1924. The Conference strongly condemned the factional struggle of Trotsky and the Trotskyists against the Party, and declared that "in the shape of the present opposition, we have before us not only an attempt to revise Bolshevism, not only a direct departure from Leninism, but also a clearly expressed petty-bourgeois deviation" (ibid., p. 782).

The latest sally of the Trotskyists reflected the sharpening of the class struggle in the country caused by the revival of the bourgeoisie and its ideologists in NEP conditions. In the towns, private traders and all kinds of Nepmen intensified their struggle against the proletarian dictatorship, and the kulaks did the same in the countryside. The Trotskyists acted as the spokesmen of these elements.

To give Party members a better insight into the nature of Trotskyism and the danger it represented, the study was organised of the history of the R.C.P.(B.), of its struggle against all kinds of factions,
groupings and deviations, against opportunism in its ranks, against the agents of the bourgeoisie in the working-class movement. Young Party members learned of the disgraceful struggle waged by Trotsky for many years on the side of the Mensheviks, against Lenin, against the Bolshevik Party. Lenin's *Collected Works*, published by decision of the Party and the Soviet Government, were the chief ideological weapon of the Communists. In them the great theoretician developed Marxism as applicable to the new stage of history. As it studied them the new generation of Communists saw the titanic struggle which Lenin and the Bolsheviks had waged for the interests of the working class and the masses, for the victory of the revolution in Russia. Lenin's writings and speeches showed how resolutely he had fought against Trotsky and the opportunists of the Second International in order to turn the international revolutionary movement into a Marxist channel. They are a truly inexhaustible source of knowledge on the theory and practice of the struggle for socialism.

The exposure of Trotskyism was aided by the appearance in 1924 of Stalin's *Foundations of Leninism*, which briefly set forth the basic questions of Leninism.

Shortly after the Thirteenth Conference of the Party, the Soviet people, the world proletariat and all progressive mankind suffered a most grievous loss—on January 21, 1924, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin died. The news of his death evoked inexpressible sorrow among the Soviet people and among the workers and oppressed peoples of the world. An extraordinary plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee adopted an appeal "To the Party, to All Working People". In this appeal, the Central Committee informed the people of the death of the great leader.

"All that is truly great and heroic in the proletariat," the appeal read, "a fearless mind, a will of iron, unbending, persistent and able to surmount all obstacles, burning hatred, deadly hatred of slavery and oppression, revolutionary passion that moves mountains, boundless faith in the creative energies of the masses, vast organisational genius—all found magnificent embodiment in Lenin, whose name has become the symbol of the new world from West to East, from South to North" (*C.P.S.U. in Resolutions*, Part I, pp. 804-05).

For nearly a week the people took farewell of Lenin. Despite the exceptionally severe frost, they went to the Hall of Columns in the Trade Union House day and night to pay a last tribute to the departed leader.

On the day of Lenin's funeral, in every town and village, the Soviet people stopped work for five minutes and in great sorrow bade farewell to their father, teacher and friend. To the mourning sounds of factory and locomotive sirens, which resounded throughout the country, the coffin with Lenin's body was borne to its resting place in the Mausoleum in Red Square.
In taking farewell of Lenin, the Party and the people solemnly vowed to carry out his behests.

The great sorrow of the Soviet people was shared by the international proletariat and by the working people of the whole world. On the day of Lenin’s funeral workers in many capitalist countries stopped work for five minutes, bidding farewell in thought to the leader of the workers of the world.

The death of Lenin rallied the working class still closer round the Party. During the days of mourning thousands of applications for Party membership were received from workers. Taking into account the large scale of this movement, the Central Committee announced a Lenin Enrolment of workers from the bench to the Party. It addressed an appeal to working men and women, in which it said that the death of the leader had deeply stirred the working class, and that hundreds of thousands of workers had extended a helping hand to the Party.

During the Lenin Enrolment the best, politically advanced workers, those who had been tempered in revolutionary battles, joined the Party. At the open Party meetings, which discussed the applications for membership, non-Party workers, too, played an active part, helping the Party to select the foremost people in industry, those most devoted to the proletarian revolution.

The Lenin Enrolment resulted in over 240,000 workers joining the Party. This was a vivid demonstration of the indissoluble unity of the working class and its Party.


The unity of the Party’s ranks after the death of the leader was demonstrated at the Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) (May 23-31, 1924). Nearly 736,000 members and over 127,000 candidate members were represented. The membership had almost doubled since the Twelfth Congress, the Party’s ranks having been replenished mainly by workers. This fact alone testified to the Party’s strengthening bonds with the working class, to the rallying of the masses round the Party and to the growth of its prestige.

The agenda included reports by the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, trade, the co-operatives, Party work in the countryside, and other items.

The Congress noted with satisfaction that although the Party had been deprived of Lenin’s direct leadership, its Central Committee, in a difficult and complicated situation, had achieved impressive successes in all spheres. The Congress expressed complete approval of the Central Committee’s firmness and uncompromising Leninist stand in the fight against Trotskyism, of its staunch defence of Leninism,
and instructed the C.C. to continue, with the same resolution and firmness, to safeguard the unity of the Party and its consistent line against any deviations whatsoever.

The Congress approved the resolution of the Thirteenth Party Conference, which characterised Trotskyism as a petty-bourgeois deviation.

The Congress attached exceptional importance to the Marxist-Leninist education of the Party membership, especially of those who had joined during the Lenin Enrolment, for it regarded them as a reservoir of Party personnel for state, public, economic and cultural activities. It laid down that the entire educational work of the Party should be linked up with the “main stages in our Party's history, in view of the exceptional significance in it of the guiding ideas of Comrade Lenin” (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part II, p. 21).

The Congress noted the general economic uptrend in the country. The rehabilitation of socialist industry and transport was making good progress; the working class was growing numerically, and agricultural production was increasing.

On the basis of the successes achieved in the restoration of the coal industry and in transport, the Congress issued the call to extend the struggle for metal, for the expansion of heavy industry and for the organisation of production of means of production.

The achievements in agriculture prompted the Congress to stress the need for intensifying the Party's work to win the rural population for co-operation. Bearing in mind that the poor peasants were falling into kulak bondage, the Congress obliged the rural Party organisations to ensure observance of the laws concerning tax exemptions for the poorest peasants and the protection of their interests, and to see to the strict observance of the tax policy regarding the kulaks, in order to restrict their growth.

The Congress noted that the policy of reducing prices of manufactured goods had completely justified itself. It endorsed the establishment of a People's Commissariat for Internal Trade. The chief task of this commissariat was to secure a dominant position for the state on the home market, and in the first place in wholesale trade; to exercise control over private capital, and to squeeze it out of trade.

The Congress resolution “The Immediate Tasks in Party Building” stressed that every effort must be made to draw the main cadres of the proletariat into the Party. The Lenin Enrolment had greatly reinforced the Party with workers, and the membership of Party groups in the factories had grown. The Congress instructed the Party organisations to conduct active Party and political work among the new members, and to do everything to draw them into Party, government and public activity. It was necessary to improve the work of the factory Party groups and enhance their role in production, and to provide them with better guidance.

The Congress also discussed work among the youth and called for
greater Party guidance to the Komsomol. The Leninist Komsomol was the loyal helpmate of the Party. Led by the Party, the Komsomol had valiantly defended the young Soviet Republic against its enemies during the Civil War years and subsequently had worked devotedly for the restoration of the national economy. The Congress called upon the Komsomol to take an active part in socialist construction, in all the public, political and cultural undertakings of the Party and the Soviets in town and country, in educating the young people in the spirit of communism, in training skilled workers and intellectuals. It called upon the Komsomol to study and acquire knowledge.

All the decisions of the Congress were aimed at extending socialist construction, strengthening the bond between the working class and the peasantry and enhancing the leading role of the Party.

At the Thirteenth Congress no speeches were made by the opposition groups. Whereas at the Seventh Congress the anti-Leninist opposition on the issue of peace with Germany mustered a quarter of the votes, and at the Tenth Congress it managed to get one-eighth of the votes, at the Thirteenth Congress not a single oppositionist statement was made. This was an obvious indication of the ideological consolidation of the Party in face of which Trotsky and his followers were compelled to hold their peace. They adopted a wait-and-see policy in order to resume their factional struggle at a later date.

Lenin's "Letter to the Congress", which became known as his testament, was read out to each delegation separately. In this document, Lenin emphasised the necessity of maintaining the unity of the Party, of creating a stable Central Committee capable of averting a split in the Party. With these aims in view, Lenin suggested bringing more people on to the Central Committee in order to make it a more authoritative body, to improve the work of the Party apparatus and "to prevent conflicts of small sections of the C.C. from assuming excessive importance for the future of the whole Party" (Collected Works, Vol. 36, p. 543).

Lenin's letter contained a characterisation of some members of the Central Committee. About Zinoviev and Kamenev, he wrote that the "October episode" was by no means accidental. He mentioned the "non-Bolshevism" of Trotsky, thereby warning the Party of his extremely dangerous relapses into Menshevism, and added that Trotsky "has too enterprising self-assurance and excessive enthusiasm for the purely administrative side of the work" (ibid., p. 544). Bukharin was described by Lenin as scholastic, as a man who "never studied and, I think, never fully understood dialectics" (ibid., p. 545).

Lenin was giving a summing-up of these people, who at decisive moments of the struggle for the victory of the October Revolution had opposed the line of the Party and tried to split its ranks. Only the firmness and uncompromising attitude of Lenin and the Central Com-
mittee of the Party in combating the strike-breaking of Zinoviev and Kamenev at the time of the October Revolution, in combating the treacherous and disastrous policy of Trotsky and Bukharin during the Brest period, and their anti-Party line and factionalism during the trade union discussion, had ensured the carrying out of a correct policy by the Party and the solid unity of its ranks, which was the decisive condition for the victory of the October Revolution and the defence of its gains.

In his letter Lenin also expressed his views on Stalin. After pointing out that Stalin was one of the Party’s outstanding men, Lenin went on to criticise his failings. “Comrade Stalin,” he wrote, “having become General Secretary, has concentrated boundless authority in his hands, and I am not sure whether he will always be able to exercise that authority with sufficient discretion.” Lenin suggested “thinking over a way of removing Stalin from that post and appointing somebody else, differing in all other respects from Comrade Stalin by one single advantage, namely, that of being more tolerant, more loyal, more polite and considerate to the comrades, less capricious, etc. This circumstance may appear to be a negligible trifle but “it is not a trifle, or it is a trifle which can acquire decisive importance” (Collected Works, Vol. 36, pp. 544, 546).

Lenin’s letter was discussed by the Congress delegations. They took into consideration Stalin’s uncompromising struggle against Trotskyism and the Trotskyists and the circumstance that relieving him of the duties of General Secretary at that time would play into the hands of the Trotskyists. In view, furthermore, of Stalin’s pledge to eliminate his shortcomings, pointed out in Lenin’s letter, the delegations declared for Stalin continuing as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party.

Lenin’s criticism of Stalin’s negative qualities made it his duty as a Communist to fully get rid of his shortcomings, all the more because he was a leading Party official and had always emphasised his allegiance and devotion to Leninism and Lenin. But subsequent developments showed that Stalin had not drawn the necessary conclusions from Lenin’s criticism. He did not justify the confidence of the Congress, and broke his promise and his pledge. As a result, the Party and the Soviet country had later to pass through the difficulties born of the Stalin personality cult.

Lenin’s recommendation to increase the membership of the Central Committee considerably was carried out by the Thirteenth Congress.

Shortly after the Thirteenth Congress, in June and July 1924, the Fifth Congress of the Comintern took place in Moscow. In the interval between the Fourth and Fifth Comintern congresses the class battles in the West European countries had ended in defeat for the workers. The bourgeoisie had succeeded in beating off the offensive of the proletariat. The defeat suffered by the working class was due in large measure to the treachery of the leaders of Social-Democracy,
and also to the serious mistakes made by some of the Communist Parties. The defeatist behaviour of the Right opportunists who were then in the leadership and were later expelled from the Communist Parties greatly harmed the working-class movement and the Communist Parties of Germany and some other countries.

The year 1924 was the beginning of the period of capitalist stabilisation. But this stabilisation was relative and precarious.

On the strength of its analysis of the international situation, the Fifth Congress of the Comintern elaborated the tactics of struggle of the Communist Parties in the new conditions. The absolutely sound tactics of the united front remained inviolate. It was based on unity of the working masses, unity from below.

The Congress advanced as one of the main tasks the Bolshevisation of the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries. This signified assimilation by the Parties of the ideological, organisational and tactical principles of Bolshevism, relentless struggle against deviations from Marxism-Leninism, skilful combination of the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat with the fight for the everyday demands of the workers, and the closest contact with the masses.

The Fifth Congress reviewed the discussion which Trotsky had forced upon the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), and condemned Trotskyism. It approved the decisions of the Thirteenth Conference and Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), which had characterised Trotskyism as a petty-bourgeois deviation in the Party. The Comintern Congress declared the actions of the Trotskyists to be a threat to the unity of the Party and, consequently, to the dictatorship of the proletariat in the U.S.S.R.

The decisions of the Thirteenth Congress of the Party and the Fifth Congress of the Comintern inspired the Communists of the Soviet Union to intensify the building of socialism. In the factories, they set an example of high labour productivity, and their example was followed by non-Party workers.

The Communists were improving the trading machinery and securing a dominant position in trade and on the market, squeezing out the private traders more and more. They organised cultural "patronage" over the countryside and guided the work of bringing the working peasantry into all types of co-operatives. Leningrad workers, for example, assumed "patronage" over 300 volosts, Moscow workers, over more than 200 volosts and Tula workers, over 400 villages.

The Central Committee closely followed what was going on in the countryside. NEP had fully proved its worth. Productivity of agriculture was rising and the living standard of the peasants, chiefly that of the middle and well-to-do sections of the rural population, was improving. The capitalist elements also began to grow. Politically, these developments manifested themselves in the growing activity of the well-to-do peasantry. The kulaks increased their influence on the middle peasants. The middle peasants again began to waver—an
effect of their being small proprietors. With their support, kulaks began to worm their way into rural Soviets, where they pursued a policy of their own. Where this happened, the Soviets distorted the Soviet Government's tax policy in favour of the kulaks and to the detriment of the poor peasants. In some localities the kulaks, waging their fight against the dictatorship of the proletariat, murdered Soviet personnel, village activists and rural newspaper correspondents who had exposed their anti-Soviet activities. In Guria Uyezd, Georgia, the kulaks actively supported the Mensheviks, who in August 1924 raised a revolt against the Soviet power. The Mensheviks received material aid from the foreign bourgeoisie, but the working peasantry in Georgia did not support them, and the rising was crushed overnight.

A plenary meeting of the Central Committee, held in October 1924, discussed immediate tasks in the countryside and outlined measures for combating kulak influence on the middle peasants. It was necessary to win over the middle peasants from the kulaks and to strengthen the alliance of the former with the poor peasantry. The C.C. meeting recommended that the activity of the peasantry should be directed above all towards *invigorating the work of the Soviets*, towards increasing the activity of the co-operatives and other voluntary organisations. The enlivening of the Soviets, said the resolution, "is one of the basic and most urgent tasks of the moment" (*C.P.S.U. in Resolutions*, Part II, p. 102). It was essential to enliven the rural Soviets in order to isolate the kulaks politically.

With a view to strengthening contact with the peasant masses, it was decided to draw the peasants into the administration of the state on a greater scale. The C.C. meeting recommended that the number of non-Party peasants on the Central Executive Committees of the Union and Autonomous Republics should be enlarged. The recommendation was made that the collegiums (boards) of a number of people's commissariats—for example, the People's Commissariat for Agriculture, the People's Commissariat for Education, the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection—should each be reinforced by one or two members drawn from the peasantry. Peasants were also brought into the collegiums in the corresponding gubernia and uyezd departments, and were elected chairmen of volost and uyezd executive committees of Soviets.

The C.C. plenary meeting thus turned the attention of the entire Party to the countryside. On the basis of its decisions, the rural Party organisations changed their methods of work; they began to pay still greater heed to the needs of the peasants.

The carrying out of the decisions of the October plenary meeting of the Central Committee strengthened the Party's influence on the working peasantry, promoted the political isolation of the kulaks and reinforced the worker-peasant alliance.

At a time when the Central Committee and the Party as a whole were straining every nerve to restore the country's productive forces as
rapidly as possible and to advance further along the road to socialism, Trotsky and his followers made another bid to block these efforts and to divert the Party from its Leninist course.

In the autumn of 1924 Trotsky once again forced a discussion on the Party. He published an article distorting the history of the Party and slandering Lenin and Leninism. According to Trotsky, Bolshevism became consistent only in 1917, and only after it had borrowed the Trotskyist idea of “permanent revolution”. Furthermore, he claimed that the leading role in the October Revolution had been played by him and not by the Party, not by Lenin. Thus, after the death of Lenin, Trotsky made a brazen attempt to substitute Trotskyism for Leninism.

During Lenin’s lifetime Trotsky had never dared to parade his pernicious ideas, which Lenin had long ago exposed as opportunist ideas reflecting the pressure of bourgeois ideology. Now that Lenin was no more, Trotsky fell back on his old weapon poisoned with the venom of opportunism—slander of Leninism.

Trotsky opposed the basic concepts of the Party’s world outlook, opposed Leninism. It was essential to refute his malicious slander. To do so, the Central Committee and all the Party functionaries were obliged to interrupt constructive work. They opposed Trotsky in the press and at Party meetings. The Trotskyists rallied to his support. A discussion began.

Trotsky was opposed by prominent Party workers, primarily those who together with Lenin had fought for the victory of the October Revolution. They proved by citing facts that Trotsky was distorting the history of the struggle for the Party, for its theory, strategy and tactics, for planning and carrying out the revolution, for socialism. In the course of the discussion the Trotskyists were exposed as anti-Leninists and condemned for violating Party discipline.

The joint plenary meeting of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission which met in January 1925 discussed Trotsky’s new sally. The meeting pointed out “Trotsky’s continuing attacks on Bolshevism”, which it described as an attempt “to substitute Trotskyism for Leninism” (ibid., pp. 107, 108). It warned Trotsky in the most categorical terms, insisting that he submit to Party discipline in practice and not just in words, and unconditionally renounce the struggle, in any form whatsoever, against the ideas of Leninism. The meeting removed him from the Revolutionary Military Council of the U.S.S.R., and replaced him as chairman of that body by M. V. Frunze, a loyal Leninist. The meeting decided to consider the discussion closed, but to continue to explain, in Party propaganda, the anti-Bolshevik and petty-bourgeois nature of Trotskyism since 1903.

This marked the defeat of yet another attempt by Trotsky and the Trotskyists to divert the Party from its Leninist positions.
Having thus resolutely rebuffed Trotsky’s latest sally, the Party, with redoubled energy, went ahead with its historic mission—to guide the building of socialism in the U.S.S.R.


Party Steers a Course Towards Socialist Industrialisation. Defeat of the “New Opposition”

The heroic labour of the Soviet people under the Party’s leadership had borne fruit: the restoration of the national economy was nearing completion. The country was steadily growing stronger. The hopes of the world bourgeoisie that NEP would result in the Soviet system degenerating into capitalism had not been realised. Foreign capitalists were extending their economic connections with the Soviet country. The capitalistic ruling circles were beginning to realise that the policy of “non-recognition” of the U.S.S.R. was powerless to prevent its consolidation and its success. This policy, moreover, was prejudicial to the capitalist countries themselves, being a hindrance to the development of economic relations with the U.S.S.R., which signified good business for them. Realising this, Britain, Italy, Austria, Norway, Greece, Sweden, Denmark, Mexico and France recognised the Soviet Government, and established diplomatic relations with it in 1924. Diplomatic relations were also established between the U.S.S.R. and China (the agreement on the occasion was China’s first equal treaty with a Great Power). The example of these countries was followed in 1925 by Japan. Of the Great Powers, only the United States persisted in its policy of “non-recognition” of the U.S.S.R.

With the national economy of the Soviet country approaching the pre-war level, its socialist reconstruction according to Lenin’s plan for building socialism in the U.S.S.R. became an urgent task. This task would have to be accomplished through a new economic policy inside the country, at a time when world capitalism had become stabilised. Guided by Lenin’s thesis that the Soviet country had everything it needed to build socialism, the Party set out to fulfil Lenin’s plan for building socialism in the U.S.S.R.

The Trotskyists again opposed the Leninist policy of the Party. The issue of the possibility of building socialism in the U.S.S.R. became particularly sharp. In fighting against the Party, the Trotskyists alleged that it was impossible to build socialism in economically and technically backward Soviet country encircled by a hostile capitalist world, with capitalism stabilised, and without state support from a victorious West European proletariat. They were inciting the working class to capitulate to capitalism.

The Party firmly repelled the defeatism preached by the Trotskyists. The Fourteenth Conference (April 1925) stated quite clearly:
"The Party of the proletariat must exert every effort to build a socialist society, confident that this construction can and will certainly be successful, provided the country is safeguarded against any attempt at a restoration of capitalism" (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part II, p. 170).

The Party knew very well that the Soviet workers and peasants were unquestionably strong enough economically to overcome their own bourgeoisie. But even if a complete socialist society were built, the Soviet state would not be guaranteed against intervention on the part of the capitalist countries, against attempts to restore capitalism in the U.S.S.R.

"The sole guarantee of the final victory of socialism, i.e., the guarantee against restoration," said the Conference resolution, "is, therefore, the victory of the socialist revolution in a number of countries" (ibid., p. 169).

The decisions of the Fourteenth Conference on the possibility of building socialism in the U.S.S.R. became a Party law, binding on all Party members. They expressed the quintessence of Lenin’s theory that socialism can be victorious first in one separate country, the quintessence of Lenin’s plan for building socialism in the Soviet Union.

By the end of 1925 the Party and the Soviet people had achieved considerable success in socialist construction. The national economy had in the main been rehabilitated. Its commanding heights, which were in the hands of the Soviet state, had been consolidated and extended. The worker-peasant alliance had grown stronger as a result of economic progress, and so, consequently, had the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Agricultural output amounted to 87 per cent of the pre-war output. The crop area reached 99.3 per cent of the area sown in 1913. The cattle and pig population was greater than in 1916.

Considerable progress had been made in agricultural co-operation. Between January 1, 1924, and July 1, 1925, the number of peasant farms covered by various types of co-operation rose from 1,740,000 to approximately 5,000,000, i.e., increased almost threefold.

In 1925 large-scale industry was producing at the rate of 75 per cent of the pre-war volume. State and co-operative industry accounted for 81 per cent of the total output, and private industry for 19 per cent. The iron and steel industry, however, was still lagging far behind. Pig-iron smelting was approximately one-third, and steel output about half the pre-war volume. The total output of the consumer goods industries was over two-thirds of the pre-war figure. The railways were being rehabilitated, and carried 80 per cent of the 1913 amount of freightage.

Lenin’s electrification plan was being carried out successfully. By the end of the restoration period, the Kashira, Shatura, Krasny Oktyabr (Leningrad), Kizel, and Nizhni-Novgorod (Balakhna) power sta-
tions had been built. The Shterovka and Volkhov power stations were being completed.

Notwithstanding the impressive gains in industry, unemployment had not yet been abolished. About a million men and women were out of work. These were mostly people who had come to the towns from the countryside, where they had been unable to find jobs. Industry and the other branches of the national economy were not in a position to absorb the flow of people from the villages, though in the course of one year the number of factory and office workers had increased by one and a half million. By the end of 1925 the total number of workers in the country—industrial and agricultural, including the unemployed—was more than seven million.

Considerable headway also had been made in home trade. Total turnover amounted to 70 per cent of the pre-war figure, the state accounting for 50 per cent, the co-operatives for 25 per cent, and private traders for 25 per cent. Thus the Communists were effectively fulfilling Lenin’s directive to learn how to trade. They were successfully ousting the private trader from the market.

The conditions of the working people had improved. Real wages in state-owned industry were higher than before the war. The gap between the rise in labour productivity and the growth of wages had been closed. The consumption of bread, meat, lard, edible oils and sugar by peasant families had increased considerably.

The declassing of the proletariat had ceased. The alliance of the working class and the peasantry grew much stronger and the dictatorship of the proletariat was consolidated.

Some headway—as yet insignificant, it is true—had been achieved in public education and in cultural development. Literacy among the population had risen from 32 per cent in 1920 to 40 per cent by the end of 1926. More than 22,000 reading-rooms were now functioning in the villages; radio and the cinema were beginning to be introduced into the daily life of the peasant.

During the years in which the national economy was being rebuilt the Party greatly strengthened the state apparatus. Under the leadership of the Party there took shape the system of industrial management based on the Leninist principle of democratic centralism.

The Party achieved successes in planning the national economy, especially industry. In carrying out this work, it never lost sight of the priority role of heavy industry. Thanks to the principle of planning, which was improving from year to year, the economy was restored at an unprecedented rate, a rate which the post-war economy of the capitalist countries did not and could not know.

By the end of the rehabilitation period the U.S.S.R. had become still stronger. The years 1924 and 1925 were marked by an important event in the nationalities policy. In Central Asia, the independent Soviet Republics of Turkmenia and Uzbekistan were created, and a few years later that of Tajikistan, all three republics vol-
untarily joining the Soviet Union as equal members. These developments were accompanied by the formation of Communist Parties in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and then in Tajikistan, on the basis of the existing Party organisations. The Communist Parties of the Union Republics were confronted with the task of working more actively to draw the masses into the socialist construction.

By its foreign policy, the Party secured the consolidation of peace and an enhancement of the role of the U.S.S.R. in the international arena. Lenin's principle of peaceful coexistence of the Soviet state and the capitalist countries was being implemented with success.

But there were forces in the world which continued to make preparations for an armed attack on the Soviet Union. It was necessary to strengthen the Red Army. With this aim in view, the Soviet Government in 1924 began a military reform introducing radical changes into military organisation in accordance with new techniques. Territorial militia units were formed in addition to the small standing army.

The military reform was completed in 1928. It considerably increased the fighting capacity of the Soviet Armed Forces.

During this period the Party itself had grown considerably stronger ideologically and had increased its membership. This testified to close contact between the Party and the masses, to the confidence which the masses reposed in the Party, to its incontestable prestige and to the soundness of its policy. The Party was the guide of the more than one-and-a-half-million strong Komsomol, the seven-million strong trade unions and the ten million members of various voluntary societies. The work carried on by all these large voluntary organisations was a sign of the growing activity of the masses, of the development of genuine proletarian democracy, and of the tremendous educational work done by the Party; it was a guarantee of the rapid advance of the Soviet people towards socialism.

The progress made in economic and political life was clear proof that the question "Who will beat whom?", posed by Lenin at the beginning of NEP, was being answered in favour of socialism. The New Economic Policy had justified itself. The Soviet people were advancing steadily along the road to socialism.

But it was necessary to increase the rate of this advance. This was pointed out by the Fourteenth Congress of the Party, held on December 18-31, 1925. Represented at the Congress were 643,000 members and 445,000 candidate members. The Congress discussed reports by the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, amendments to the Party Rules, and other questions.

The Fourteenth Congress approved the political and organisational line of the Central Committee, the carrying out of which had ensured the successful rehabilitation of the national economy, bringing it close to the pre-war level, and had strengthened the positions of socialism.
Considering the capitalist encirclement of the U.S.S.R. and the fact that the capitalist countries, headed by Britain and the United States, were forming blocs for a new attack on the Soviet Union, the Congress instructed the Central Committee not to give way to provocation, to fight for world peace, to cement the alliance with the international proletariat and the oppressed peoples and to do everything to strengthen the defensive capacity of the country and the might of its Armed Forces.

In the economic sphere, the Congress set the target of fulfilling Lenin's plan for socialist industrialization. The resolution it adopted said: "The Congress holds that the struggle for the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. is the basic task of our Party" (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part II, p. 195). Economic development should aim at transforming the country from an importer of machinery and equipment into a country producing machinery and equipment, an industrialized country provided with the latest machinery. The U.S.S.R. must be a sovereign economic entity, not depending on the capitalist world economy.

The important and difficult problems which confronted the Party in connection with the country's industrialization could be solved only on the condition that absolute unity of will and solidarity prevailed in the Party ranks. The Congress instructed the Central Committee to "wage a resolute struggle against all attempts to undermine the unity of the Party, irrespective of their source or of who is directing them" (ibid., p. 201).

One reason for this decision was that by the time the Fourteenth Congress convened, the so-called "New Opposition", headed by Zinoviev and Kamenev—members of the Political Bureau of the C.C.—had taken shape. Whereas previously they had opposed Trotskyism, after the Fourteenth Party Conference they themselves had sunk to a Trotskyist position. At the Fourteenth Conference, they had voted for the resolution which set forth the line of the Party aiming at the building of a complete socialist society in the U.S.S.R.; but soon after the Conference they had begun to assert that it would be impossible to build socialism in the U.S.S.R. without a socialist revolution in the West. This was a relapse into the defeatist attitude adopted by Zinoviev and Kamenev in October 1917 when, lacking faith in the strength of the proletariat and in its ability to lead the working peasantry, they had opposed the Party line on the socialist revolution. Trotsky, too, had begun long ago to assert that without state aid from a victorious West European proletariat, socialism could not be built in Russia. Thus the ideological standpoints of Zinoviev, Kamenev and Trotsky converged on the Menshevik view, which denied the possibility of the victory of socialism in Soviet Russia.

The question of the possibility of building socialism in the U.S.S.R. was the main issue on which all the opportunists, all the groups and factions, differed from Lenin and the Party. The most bitter opponents
of the Leninist theory of the building of socialism in the Soviet coun-
try were Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev and Radek.

Denying the possibility of building socialism in the U.S.S.R.,
and opposing the Party’s policy of industrialising the country, the
“New Opposition” claimed that state industry in the Soviet Union
was not socialist but state-capitalist industry, that NEP was nothing
but a retreat, a retreat towards capitalism. The opposition began
a struggle against the Party’s Leninist line of an alliance between the
working class and the middle peasant, a struggle which meant under-
mining the foundations of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The
“New Opposition” calumniated the Party, saying that it was degen-
erating.

The “New Opposition”, whose views were evidence of pressure
from the petty-bourgeois strata of the country, became the rallying
point for opportunist elements in the Party, for defeatists and scep-
tics who took fright at the colossal difficulties encountered in build-
ing socialism. The strength of world capitalism sent them into
a panic, and the activity of the kulaks frightened them. The “New
Opposition” spread the slander that the Party was not fighting the
kulaks and was turning a blind eye to the kulak danger.

The Party, however, was waging a struggle on two fronts—against
those who exaggerated the kulak danger and underestimated the
role of the middle peasant, and against those who ignored the kulak
danger. The resolution of the Fourteenth Congress said:

“The Congress emphatically condemns the deviation which
underestimates the differentiation in the countryside, which
does not see the dangers represented by the growth of the kulaks.

“At the same time the Congress, no less emphatically, condemns
the attempts to slur over the cardinal question of communist poli-
cy in the countryside, the question of the struggle for the middle
peasant as the central figure in agriculture, and of co-operation as
the basic organisational form of the advance of the countryside
towards socialism.

“The Congress particularly stresses the necessity of fighting the
last-mentioned deviation” (ibid., pp. 198-99).

In order to cope with the difficulties of building socialism in
the U.S.S.R., it was essential to rid the Party of all opportunist
scum, to make it a solidly united body. The “New Opposition” had
come into being on the Trotsky platform. This fact re-emphasised
the necessity of exposing Trotskyism to the masses. Trotskyism had to
be utterly smashed as a variety of Menshevism. Trotsky and the Trots-
kyists sought to belittle and distort the role of the Party as the
leading force in the revolution and in socialist construction. By
advocating the permissibility of factions in the Party, they were
seeking to destroy the Party, because the existence of factions in its
ranks, especially at a time of bitter class struggle, would have
doomed the Party to destruction.
The Trotskyists aimed at breaking up the alliance of the working class and the working peasantry, for they regarded the peasantry as a reactionary force fighting against socialism. Their line thus meant the destruction of the dictatorship of the proletariat, since Soviet power could not exist without the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, an alliance in which the leading role was played by the working class headed by the Communist Party.

In fighting the Party line of building socialism in the U.S.S.R., the Trotskyists were sowing defeatist ideas among the workers. From the standpoint of the Trotskyists, there was only one thing for the working class to do—go hat in hand to the capitalists.

Thus, on all the fundamental questions of Leninism, the Trotskyists adopted an anti-Leninist, anti-Party attitude; and hence an end had to be put to Trotskyism at all costs.

The centre of the “New Opposition” was in Leningrad. Zinoviev and his followers managed for a time to conceal their differences with the Central Committee from the Leningrad Communists. They pretended to support the line of the Central Committee, the line of the Party. By this deceit, the members of the “New Opposition” got themselves elected as delegates to the Fourteenth Congress, where they acted as a separate group, determined to give battle to the Central Committee with a view to overthrowing it and taking over the leadership of the Party.

They put up Zinoviev to oppose the Central Committee. In the report he submitted, he counterposed the views of the “New Opposition” to the line of the Party on all fundamental issues. Whereas the Leningrad Gubernia Conference had voted confidence in the Central Committee, the “New Opposition” at the Fourteenth Congress voted against confidence in the C.C. Things went so far that the “New Opposition” declared it would not abide by the decisions of the Congress, and, upon returning to Leningrad, began to work in this spirit among the Party members.

In order to expose the leaders of the “New Opposition”, the Congress, in a special message to the Leningrad Party organisation, told of their behaviour at the Congress.

After the Congress a group of Central Committee members went to Leningrad to explain the Congress decisions and to expose the anti-Party activity of the “New Opposition”. Stormy debates took place at the Party meetings in Leningrad. The members were outraged by the conduct of the “New Opposition”. More than 97 per cent of the Leningrad Party members endorsed the decisions of the Congress, and condemned the “New Opposition”. The Leningrad Gubernia Conference, held a month after the Congress, removed the Zinoviev leadership and elected a new Gubernia Committee headed by S. M. Kirov.

Thus yet another anti-Party grouping suffered shameful defeat in its attempts to shake Party unity and substitute Trotskyism for Leninism.
The Fourteenth Congress adopted new Party Rules, and decided to change the Party’s name from Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)—C.P.S.U.(B.).

The Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) has gone down in history as the industrialisation Congress. Its decisions expressed the Leninist line of the Party—the rapid development of heavy industry, large-scale socialist machine industry capable of equipping the factories and agriculture with up-to-date machinery, reorganising peasant farming along socialist lines and transforming what was an agrarian country into an industrial one.

The policy of industrialising the country became possible as a result of economic and political achievements, the consolidation of the Party and the dictatorship of the proletariat, the enhanced prestige and role of the U.S.S.R. in the international arena.

Industrialisation was that main link in the chain of tasks of economic development which, when grasped, would make it possible to haul forward the whole chain of socialist construction and build a socialist society in the U.S.S.R.

Having repelled repeated attempts by the various opposition groups to divert it from its Leninist path, the Party was passing on to a new phase in its history, solidly united behind its Leninist Central Committee.

**BRIEF SUMMARY**

The years 1921 to 1925—years of peaceful development—were years of tense struggle by the Party and the people to rehabilitate the national economy and ensure the country’s advance towards socialism.

Having adopted the New Economic Policy as the solely correct policy for the entire period of transition from capitalism to socialism, the Party by this wise step reinforced the alliance of the workers and peasants, consolidated the dictatorship of the proletariat, and began to develop the socialist sector of the national economy, thereby providing favourable conditions for its successful struggle against the capitalist sector.

By its correct, Marxist-Leninist policy towards the nationalities, the Party secured the unity and fraternity of the peoples inhabiting the country, and united them in the unbreakable Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Party boldly and resolutely carried out Lenin’s directive to the effect that the Soviet country possessed all that was necessary and adequate for building a complete socialist society. The question of the possibility of building socialism in the U.S.S.R. was the fundamental and most acute issue, and it was no accident that a bitter anti-Party struggle was waged over this issue by all the opportunists,
all the factional groups, among whom the chief role was played by the Trotsky group. They all tried to divert the Party from the Leninist path, to switch it to another path, the path leading to bourgeois democracy, to the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet land.

The Party completely defeated these groups. For this it owes an immense debt to the great Lenin, who set the example of an uncompromising attitude towards opportunists and who equipped the Party with a powerful ideological weapon in the struggle for the solid unity of its ranks, for iron discipline and intolerance of factionalism of any kind.

Consistently carrying out Lenin's policy, the Party in this period of NEP won big successes in the course of a bitter class struggle against the capitalist elements. In an extremely brief space of time the working class and working peasantry, under the leadership of the Party, completed the rehabilitation of the national economy. Under the leadership of the Party, a solid foundation was laid for proceeding to a new phase of socialist construction.

Giving effect to the Leninist principle of coexistence of the two systems—socialism and capitalism—and working to preserve peace, the Party added greatly to the influence of the U.S.S.R. in the international arena.

Thus, in one of the most complicated periods in its history, the Party passed a difficult test. Its prestige among the working people rose high. The people convinced themselves by experience of the wisdom of the Party, of its able leadership, and saw for themselves that it defended the interests of the working people, that its activity was wholly directed towards the well-being and prosperity of Soviet society.

Having solved the main problems of the rehabilitation period, the Party brought the people up to the threshold of new tasks of immense importance, to a new historical phase—the phase of socialist industrialisation of the U.S.S.R.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE STRUGGLE OF THE PARTY
FOR THE SOCIALIST INDUSTRIALISATION OF THE
COUNTRY AND THE PREPARATION FOR THE SOLID
COLLECTIVISATION OF AGRICULTURE

(1926-1929)

1. The International Situation and the Foreign Policy of the Party and the Soviet State in 1926-1929

The Party started on the socialist industrialisation of the country in an international situation marked by the relative stabilisation of capitalism. The stabilisation was a precarious and temporary one. It did not, and could not, eliminate the acute character of imperialist and class contradictions. Particularly acute at this time were the contradictions between Britain and the U.S.A., which was ousting Britain from her positions on the world market.

The stabilisation of capitalism was everywhere accompanied by intensified exploitation of the working class and all working people. The offensive of the capitalists against the working class led to fierce class battles by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. In 1926 a giant strike of British miners broke out; it developed into a general strike of the British proletariat, in which more than five million workers took part. The working class of the U.S.S.R. responded immediately to the strike of the British proletariat and collected considerable funds for the strikers. Despite the opposition of the Trades Union Congress General Council, the British workers welcomed the moral and material support extended by the working class of the U.S.S.R. as a vivid example of proletarian solidarity and internationalism. In July 1927 the Vienna workers rose against the offensive launched by the capitalists and reactionaries in Austria.

The upsurge of the national liberation movement in the colonial and dependent countries against intolerable imperialist oppression dealt a powerful blow at capitalist stabilisation. The most important event in the struggle of the oppressed peoples for national liberation was the revolution of the great Chinese people. In 1924-27 there raged the first revolutionary civil war in China. The Communist Party of
China, basing itself upon the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, and heading the working class and working peasantry, pursued united front tactics aimed at bringing together all the revolutionary forces, and strove to ensure the leading role of the proletariat in the revolution. The progress of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. and the initial successes of the Chinese revolution had a powerful impact on the development of the national liberation struggle all over the world, particularly in India, Indonesia, Morocco, Egypt and other colonial and dependent countries.

The national liberation movement of the peoples in the colonial and dependent countries found a warm response among the Soviet people. The working people of the U.S.S.R. enthusiastically hailed the Chinese revolution. Close friendship sprang up between the U.S.S.R. and the insurgent people of China. The Party was guided by the counsel of Lenin—the great friend of the oppressed peoples—who in the historic struggle between socialism and capitalism attached the utmost importance to the development of the revolutionary movement in China, India, Egypt and other countries.

The imperialists in all countries saw a threat to the capitalist system in the development and consolidation of the Soviet Union. Relations between the capitalist states and the U.S.S.R. continued to be strained, although the Soviet Union had been recognised by many countries. The imperialists understood that industrialisation would accelerate the advance of the Soviet people to socialism, consolidate the independence of the U.S.S.R., and add to its defence potential. They therefore sought to frustrate or retard the industrialisation of the Soviet country. They refused to grant it credits, pursued a policy of isolating the U.S.S.R. economically, and threatened it with another armed intervention.

The instigator of anti-Soviet policy in those years was the old enemy of the national liberation movement—British imperialism, then experiencing very great difficulties. The national liberation movement was developing in the British colonies. The knowledge that the oppressed peoples were deriving inspiration for their struggle from the example and achievements of the Soviet Union prompted the British imperialists everywhere to encourage interventionist acts against the U.S.S.R. Through their agents they organised anti-Soviet provocations in various countries; Soviet embassies and other offices in Peking, London and elsewhere were raided, and the Soviet Ambassador to Warsaw, Voikov, was assassinated. The imperialists supported the subversive activities of the remnants of the Whites in the Soviet Union. In 1927 British saboteurs threw bombs into a gathering of people in a Party club in Leningrad, wounding about thirty. The British, French and U.S. imperialists resorted to every conceivable provocation to impede the industrialisation of the U.S.S.R.

In 1927 the British Conservative Government broke off diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. and tried to get other capitalist countries
to follow suit, the idea being to secure the isolation of the Soviet Union. But the scheme miscarried—not a single capitalist state followed the example of the British Conservatives.

The foreign policy of peace pursued by the Party and the Soviet Government helped in no small measure to foil the anti-Soviet designs of the British Conservatives. It paralysed their attempts to establish an anti-Soviet front of capitalist states. Britain tried particularly hard to win Germany for the anti-Soviet policy. In those years Germany, aided by U.S. dollars, was rapidly reconstructing her heavy industry, particularly her war industry. In 1925 the German Government signed the Locarno agreements with Britain, France, Italy and Belgium, which signified a step towards setting up a British-led bloc of European capitalist countries against the Soviet Union. But the ruling circles in Germany could not bring themselves to make a complete break with the Soviet Union and link themselves wholly with the anti-Soviet front. They continued to think that it was highly important for Germany to maintain normal relations with the Soviet state. In 1926 the U.S.S.R. and Germany signed a neutrality pact which made it difficult for Germany to participate in an anti-Soviet policy. In 1925-27 the Soviet Union signed treaties of neutrality and non-aggression with Turkey, Afghanistan, Iran and Lithuania. These treaties served to some extent to prevent the capitalist states listed above from being drawn into an anti-Soviet coalition. This was an important victory for the U.S.S.R.'s foreign policy of peace.

As her attempt to organise another intervention against the U.S.S.R. had failed, and as the disruption of normal trade with it was proving detrimental to her interests, Britain was compelled in 1929 to resume diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

But the imperialists did not discontinue their provocations against the U.S.S.R. On their instigation, the Chinese warlords then in control of the north-eastern provinces of China (Manchuria), in the summer of 1929 seized the Chinese Eastern Railway, which belonged to the U.S.S.R. All attempts by the Soviet Government to settle the conflict by peaceful means proved fruitless. Troops of the Chinese warlords and Russian Whites began to make systematic raids on Soviet territory, menacing the security of the U.S.S.R.'s Far Eastern frontier. Retaliatory measures had to be taken against the instigators of war in the Far East. In August 1929 a Special Far Eastern Army was formed under V. K. Blücher. It soon went into action against the violators of the Soviet frontier and smashed the troops of the Chinese militarists. Soviet-Chinese negotiations followed, and in December 1929, an agreement was signed which ended the conflict. The status quo was re-established on the Chinese Eastern Railway.

During 1926-29 the Party and the Soviet Government, anxious to consolidate peace, continued to work indefatigably for disarmament. For this purpose wide use was made of the Preparatory Commission for a conference on disarmament set up by the League of Nations.
In November 1927 the Soviet Government laid before the commission a proposal for total disarmament by all nations. The proposal was rejected, however, and the Soviet Government advanced another proposal (in 1928)—for partial disarmament. But the imperialists, sabotaging disarmament, turned down this proposal too.

The Soviet Union's fight for peace and its disarmament proposals were most sympathetically received by the international proletariat and all working people. The U.S.S.R.'s prestige among the people in the capitalist, colonial and dependent countries mounted steadily. This was of tremendous importance for building a socialist society. The Party regarded socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. as a great internationalist task of the Soviet people that met the interests of the world proletariat and all working people.

Lenin pointed out that it was highly important for the Soviet Union, building socialism in a hostile capitalist encirclement, to win the support of millions of working people on a world scale.

International proletarian solidarity was a factor of prime importance in preserving peace. The working class in the capitalist countries opposed the predatory plans of the imperialists. The working people of the Soviet Union on their part rendered great assistance to the international working-class movement. Each success won by the Soviet Union strengthened the positions of the working class in the capitalist countries and helped it in the class struggle against capital.

The working class and the working people of the world followed the construction of socialism in the U.S.S.R. with keen interest. Workers' delegations from Britain, the United States, France, Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Belgium and other countries visited the U.S.S.R. and acquainted themselves with the achievements of socialist construction. On returning home the delegates told the working people the truth about the first socialist country; they exposed the slanders spread by bourgeois propaganda. In November 1927, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, a World Congress of Friends of the Soviet Union was held in Moscow. The Congress pointed out that the building of socialism in the U.S.S.R. met the interests of the revolutionary movement in all countries and was the vital concern of the proletarians of the whole world.

2. Beginning of the Socialist Industrialisation of the Country. The Party's Fight Against the Anti-Party Bloc of Trotskyists and Zinovievites

The transition to socialist industrialisation signified a new stage in the struggle for socialism in the U.S.S.R., a new period in the life of the Communist Party and the Soviet people. Having restored the national economy, the country proceeded to reconstruct it along socialist lines and set up a modern industry.
Rehabilitation had been carried out in the main on the old technical basis, which lagged behind that of the advanced capitalist countries. Despite the tremendous work done by the Party and the Soviet state to restore large-scale industry, its capacity and its technological and economic level were not high.

The Party proceeded from Lenin's counsel:

"The sole material basis possible for socialism is large-scale machine industry, capable of reorganising agriculture as well" *(Collected Works, Vol. 32, p. 434).*

The main object of socialist industrialisation was to provide the material and technical basis for socialism, and to develop and strengthen socialist relations of production in the country.

The expansion of large-scale industry is closely bound up with the electrification of all branches of the national economy. Lenin saw electrification as the key to technological advance.

"If Russia," he wrote, "becomes covered by a dense network of electric power stations and powerful technical installations, our communist economic development will become a model for the future socialist Europe and Asia" *(Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 486).*

Socialism could triumph in the U.S.S.R. solely as a result of the powerful expansion of heavy industry—the backbone of a socialist economy—which could promote the light industries and the national economy as a whole, reorganise agriculture on socialist lines, raise living standards, and ensure the defence of the country. A whole series of new heavy industries had to be built, industries which had either not existed in tsarist Russia at all, or had been poorly developed: the iron and steel industry—the basis of industrialisation—the engineering, machine-tool, automobile, chemical, defence, tractor and other industries. It was necessary rapidly to reconstruct the old enterprises and build new ones turning out means of production.

Large-scale industry had to be developed at a high rate if the disparity between the most advanced social system in the world and its weak material and technical basis was to be eliminated.

Socialist industrialisation was the key to the reconstruction of the entire national economy, a condition for the growth of the working class, the leading force in the country. It was, moreover, fundamental for the further consolidation of the alliance of the working class and the working peasantry, of the production link between town and country.

The Party set the aim of building a powerful industry in all the Union Republics and the non-Russian regions. This was a step of the greatest importance for overcoming the actual backwardness of the formerly oppressed peoples, for the growth of national cadres and the development of national cultures.

Another most important aim of socialist industrialisation was to raise the material and cultural level of the working class, of all the working people.
The rapid rate of industrialisation was dictated not only by internal interests, but by external conditions as well—by the fact that the U.S.S.R. was surrounded by a hostile capitalist world. At that time the U.S.S.R. was the only socialist country.

To ensure the economic independence and defensive capacity of the Soviet Union, the Party put forward the task of transforming the U.S.S.R. into a leading industrial power, of overtaking the developed capitalist countries in the shortest possible time and then of outstripping them in industrial and general economic development.

The Soviet people were the first in history to pave the way to socialism for mankind. Our country had to build a heavy industry without any kind of economic aid from outside. In working to fulfil Lenin’s plan to industrialise the country, to build socialism, the Party faced grave internal and external difficulties. They were caused by technical and economic backwardness, the difficulty of accumulating the vast funds needed for capital construction in industry, and the scarcity of trained industrial personnel. Experience in the construction of new society was lacking. The difficulties were furthermore aggravated by the frenzy with which the capitalist elements in the country and the defeatists inside the Party resisted socialist industrialisation. In these conditions, the country’s industrialisation and the building of socialism were a great achievement of the Party, the working class and the people as a whole.

The socialist method of industrialisation differs fundamentally from the capitalist method. Socialist industrialisation is planned, not haphazard. It did not begin by developing the light industries, as was the case in the capitalist countries, but by developing heavy industry, which produces means of production.

Large-scale capital construction in industry called for investments of thousands of millions of rubles, but the Soviet Union was not a rich country at that time. The bourgeois countries secured the resources for building their heavy industry by plundering the colonies and semi-colonies, by exacting war indemnities, by ruthlessly exploiting the working people in their own countries. The Soviet Union could not as a matter of principle resort to such means of obtaining funds; they were incompatible with the socialist system. Foreign loans had played a big part in the industrialisation of the capitalist countries. The Soviet Union could not count on foreign loans, because the capitalist countries refused to grant it any. The funds needed radically to re-equip the old factories and to build new ones had to be found inside the country.

And they were found, thanks to the gains of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

The fact that the means of production were now concentrated in the hands of the proletarian state made it possible to mobilise enormous reserves for socialist industrialisation. The profits from state-owned factories, transport, the banking system, and state-controlled home
and foreign trade, instead of finding their way into the coffers of capitalists, were now used to expand socialist industry. The country had freed itself from having to make huge annual payments abroad to the tune of 800-900 million gold rubles in interest on tsarist loans and in dividends to foreign capitalists on their investments in Russia. In the previous phase this had facilitated the rehabilitation of the national economy; it now helped to accumulate the resources for building heavy industry.

The Soviet peasantry, freed by the abolition of landlordism from payments to the landlords for the lease and purchase of land, could now help by their labour and material resources to industrialise the country. The peasants were just as interested in this as the working class, because they were badly in need of agricultural machinery and manufactured goods.

All these sources of accumulation were in the hands of the Soviet state. All that was needed was to use them efficiently, practice the most rigid economy, put an end to unproductive expenditure, reduce inflated office staffs and invest the savings in industrialisation. It was necessary to raise labour productivity, rationalise production, and cut production costs. These were the economic tasks which the Communist Party tackled vigorously; it mobilised the working class and the whole Soviet people for the creation of socialist industry.

In April 1926 the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) called on all Party organisations and all working people to exercise the most rigid economy in public offices, industrial establishments and other organisations "from top to bottom" in order to increase socialist accumulation for industrialising the country.

The fight of the Party and the people for socialist industrialisation yielded fine results right from the outset. About 1,000 million rubles were invested in industry in the economic year 1926-27, and more than 5,000 million rubles three years later. Work was begun on the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station, the Turkestan-Siberia Railway, the Dzerzhinsky Tractor Works and other big projects.

Placed on a firm footing, the building of socialist heavy industry made good progress.

The industrialisation of the country and the growth of agricultural co-operation created the material basis for the elimination of the capitalist elements in the towns and of the only remaining exploiting class—the kulaks—in the countryside. The enemies of socialism did all in their power to prevent socialist industrialisation and to uphold the positions of capitalism. The reconstruction of the national economy was carried out in conditions of fierce class struggle.

The sharpening of the class struggle was reflected also inside the Party: various defeatists and opposition elements raised their heads. The chief danger to the Party during the early years of industrialisa-
tion came from the Trotskyists and Zinovievites, who had united on an anti-Leninist platform.

The "New Opposition"—Zinoviev, Kamenev and others—having suffered defeat at the Fourteenth Congress of the Party, openly adopted the defeatist positions of Trotskyism. In the summer of 1926 the Trotskyists and Zinovievites joined forces in an anti-Party bloc based on the Trotskyist platform. The bloc was joined by the remnants of all the defeated opposition groups—"Workers' Opposition", "Democratic Centralists" and others—and became in this way the rallying centre for all the opposition elements condemned by the Party. All these variegated anti-Party elements reflected the interests of the remnants of the capitalist classes in our country, and the dissatisfaction of the urban petty bourgeoisie and the top strata of the bourgeois intelligentsia with the proletarian dictatorship. They were agents of the class enemy inside the Party, mouthpieces of the hostile capitalist encirclement.

Could socialism be victorious in the U.S.S.R., or not—this was the main issue in the fundamental differences between the Party and the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc. In its ideological and organising work the Party proceeded from Lenin's view that, given the dictatorship of the proletariat and the steady strengthening of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, our country had everything that was necessary and adequate for building a complete socialist society. The Trotsky-Zinoviev anti-Party bloc stubbornly denied the possibility of socialism triumphing in one country, in the U.S.S.R.

The Party's fight against the Trotskyists and the other defeatists, and to carry out Lenin's plan for building socialism, was led by the Central Committee. Led by the Central Committee, the Party organisations waged a stubborn and relentless struggle against the defeatists, and won the people for fulfilment of the plans—plans which required strenuous effort—for the socialist industrialisation of the country. In this struggle an active part was played by such Party leaders and functionaries as A. A. Andreyev, V. Y. Chubar, F. E. Dzerzhinsky, M. V. Frunze, M. I. Kalinin, N. S. Khrushchov, S. M. Kirov, S. V. Kosior, V. V. Kuibyshev, A. I. Mikoyan, G. K. Orjonikidze, G. I. Petrovsky, P. P. Postyshev, J. E. Rudzutak, N. M. Shvernik, N. A. Skrypnik, J. V. Stalin, K. Y. Voroshilov, Y. M. Yaroslavsky and A. A. Zhdanov.

The Party unmasked the Trotskyists and Zinovievites as out-and-out defeatists, as people who had abandoned Leninism. They opposed Lenin's plan for socialist industrialisation, and advanced all kinds of reckless slogans. The Trotskyist proposals to increase the agricultural tax paid by the peasants and to raise prices of manufactured goods were especially dangerous. If carried out, these proposals would have ruptured the Leninist alliance between the working class and the working peasantry and weakened the dictatorship of the proletariat in the U.S.S.R. This defeatist policy of the Trotskyists and
Zinovievites would have led to renunciation of the gains of the October Revolution and to the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union.

The Trotsky-Zinoviev anti-Party bloc preached that class conflicts between the working class and the peasantry and a rupture of their alliance were inevitable. The leaders of the opposition contended that peasant farming could not be developed along socialist lines.

In furtherance of their defeatist policy, the Trotskyists and Zinovievites strove to secure freedom of factions and groupings, and the rescinding of Lenin’s resolution on Party unity adopted by the Tenth Party Congress; they infringed Party discipline, and sought to discredit the Party apparatus built up over decades of revolutionary work, counterposing it to the membership.

On questions of foreign policy, the Trotskyists and Zinovievites sank to the level of asserting that there was no need to defend the U.S.S.R. against the threat of imperialist intervention. Blinded by hatred for the Party and government leadership, they were even ready to stab the Soviet country in the back, the moment the imperialists attacked it.

The Trotskyists and Zinovievites embarked on the path of splitting the Comintern. They contacted anti-Leninist factional groups, got in touch with enemies of and traitors to the Communist movement who had been expelled from the Comintern, and with avowedly anti-Communist organisations, groups and individuals fighting against the Comintern.

Such was the defeatist essence of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc. The Central Committee called upon the Communists and the entire working class to wage a resolute struggle against the Trotskyist anti-Party opposition, which was undermining the unity of the Party and its leading role in the country. The Central Committee stressed that the Party could ensure the victory of socialism only if it were united, and only if it were the sole leader of the people and of the proletarian dictatorship. The Central Committee issued a clear warning that unless the anti-Party bloc stopped its factional activities and was dissolved, its members would be expelled from the Party.

The warning, however, fell on deaf ears. In the autumn of 1926 the leaders of the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition launched an open attack on the Party at membership meetings in the Aviapriabor Works in Moscow and the Putilov Works in Leningrad. They put up their factional platform for consideration, seeking to impose a new discussion on the Party. The Party members unanimously rebuffed these attacks, and in some places the workers simply ejected the Trotskyists and Zinovievites from Party meetings. Completely routed in the Party and among the working class, the leaders of the opposition bloc submitted a statement to the Central Committee in which they condemned their factional work. But this was merely a ruse. In reality, they were
secretly banding together an anti-Leninist party with its own discipline, membership dues and illegal printing press. In violation of the Party Rules they held clandestine meetings at which they discussed their factional platform and their tactics for fighting the Party and its Central Committee.

The Fifteenth All-Union Party Conference met in October-November 1926. It summed up the results of the 1925-26 economic year. The results proved convincingly, to anyone not blinded by Trotskyist demagogy, that the national economy, overcoming difficulties, was advancing along the socialist path. The Conference noted that the hegemony of large-scale industry in the country’s economy had been strengthened, that its leading role in promoting the development of agriculture, including agricultural co-operation, had grown. The Conference rallied the Party membership, the working class and the working peasants to fulfil the Leninist plan for the country’s socialist industrialisation.

In a detailed political assessment of the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition, the Conference qualified it as a Menshevik deviation in the Party, and warned the opposition members that continued evolution towards Menshevism would lead to their expulsion from the Communist Party. It called on all Communists to wage a determined struggle against the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc.

The Seventh Enlarged Plenary Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) was held during November-December 1926. This meeting was of outstanding importance in routing Trotskyism ideologically in the international arena, and in purging the brother Communist Parties of Trotskyist and other revisionist elements. The ECCI Plenary Meeting endorsed the resolution on the opposition bloc passed by the Fifteenth Party Conference and made it incumbent upon the Communist Parties resolutely to combat all attempts by the Trotskyists to split the international Communist movement. The decisions of the Fifteenth Party Conference, the Seventh Plenary Meeting of the ECCI, the reports and speeches by Party leaders in defence of the Leninist line played an important part in rallying the Party ranks under the Leninist banner, and in exposing the Trotskyists, their defeatism and their disruptive anti-Party activities.

In spite of the fact that the Fifteenth Party Conference and the Seventh Plenary Meeting of the ECCI had condemned outright the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc, and that the members of the bloc had been decisively rebuffed by the working class, they did not cease their anti-Party activities. In 1927, when the international position of the U.S.S.R. became more complicated in view of the fact that the Conservative government in Britain had severed diplomatic and trade relations with it, the Trotskyists intensified their anti-Party struggle and circulated what they called the “Platform of the Eighty-Three”.

It was a mendacious and hypocritical platform, designed to deceive the Party and the working class. In words the Trotskyists and Zinov-
levites professed to be against splitting the Party, to be in favour of industrialisation and of the collectivisation of agriculture, but in reality, they formed their own illegal party and jeered at the policy of industrialisation of the country and collectivisation of agriculture. The platform was a hotchpotch of slanderous fabrications such as that the Party and the Soviet Government wanted to abolish the monopoly of foreign trade and to grant political rights to the kulaks. The opposition printed thousands of copies of this utterly mendacious platform on its secret printing press and circulated it among Party members and non-Party people. The Party exposed to the masses the slanderous, anti-Party declaration of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc. Actively engaged in establishing a socialist society, the people indignantly rejected the slanderous fabrications of the Trotskyists.

Bent on striking at the unity of the Party and its leadership, the Trotskyists had for years exploited every difficulty encountered by the country. They wanted to turn the militant Party, directing socialist construction, into a debating club.

It was necessary to put an end to the anti-Party activity of the Trotskyists and Zinovievites, completely to lay bare the anti-Leninist, defeatist nature of their platform. By the decision of the joint plenary meeting of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission (October 1927), Trotsky and Zinoviev, the ringleaders of the opposition, were expelled from the Central Committee for waging a factional struggle against the Party and its unity. In October 1927 the Central Committee published theses covering the items of the Fifteenth Congress agenda, and opened a general Party discussion on them. The discussion meetings demonstrated the political maturity of the Party members and their solid support of the Leninist Central Committee: 724,000 Party members voted for the policy of the Central Committee and only 4,000 (or less than one per cent), for the bloc of Trotskyists and Zinovievites. The anti-Party bloc was routed.

The Leninist policy of the Party triumphed.

To mark the tenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., acting on the suggestion of the Central Committee of the Party, adopted a manifesto which proclaimed a seven-hour working day and a series of measures intended to improve the standard of living of the working people. The manifesto, which won the approval of the people, was opposed by the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc, an action which revealed that their policy was hostile to the interests of the people.

The more obvious the political bankruptcy of the anti-Leninist Trotsky-Zinoviev group and its isolation from the masses became, the lower did this group sink to the depths of anti-Soviet struggle. On the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution the Trotskyists made an anti-Soviet sortie. In an attempt to counter the vast demonstration of the people under the slogans of Leninism, a handful of Trotskyists headed by Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev, in gross
violation of Soviet laws, appeared in the streets of Moscow and Leningrad with anti-Party and anti-Soviet slogans. A wave of anger and indignation rose among the people at the action of the Trotskyists.

In November 1927 the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, fulfilling the will of the Party, expelled Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Party and removed the other oppositionists from the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. The question of the opposition as a whole was submitted to the Fifteenth Party Congress.


The progress of socialist industrialisation of the country necessarily involved heightening the militancy of Party organisations, increasing the political and production activity of the masses and drawing new sections of the working people, first and foremost of the industrial workers, into management of the state.

"Socialism," Lenin pointed out, "is the creation of the masses themselves" (Collected Works, Vol. 26, p. 255).

The amended Rules adopted by the Fourteenth Party Congress created favourable conditions for the further development of inner-Party democracy and for greater activity and initiative on the part of the membership. The Central Committee saw to it that the Leninist standards of Party leadership were observed and that Party bodies were properly elected; it fought with determination against manifestations of bureaucracy in Party work, attempts to stifle healthy criticism and other violations of inner-Party democracy. The work of the Central Committee and the local Party organisations was based on the principle of collective leadership and broadening of inner-Party democracy. Plenary meetings of the Central Committee and of Party committees, Party activists' meetings, and Party branch meetings were held regularly. These discussed important questions of Party, state and economic construction. The Central Committee established closer contact with the localities. Between the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Party congresses the Central Committee with the participation of local Party functionaries, examined the work of about forty local Party organisations. This helped to enliven and improve Party work in the localities. Live contacts between the Central Committee and local Party organisations assumed more varied forms.

The attention of Party organisations was focussed on rationalising production, raising labour productivity, effecting economies and lowering production costs. Large-scale socialist emulation was a highly important factor. The Central Committee criticised those
Party organisations which, immersed in mass political drives, tended to ignore problems of industrial production and practical questions of economic development.

It was especially important to improve the activity of the shop Party organisations in the factories, i.e., those closest to the masses. There were 2,000 shop organisations in 1924; by 1927, the number had risen to nearly 4,000. A large force of non-Party activists had grown up around them.

The Party’s political influence and its contact with the masses increased, as could be clearly seen from the growth of its membership through the admission of the foremost workers and peasants. The all-Union Party census held in 1927 showed that the Party had 775,000 members and 372,000 candidate members. In three years (1924-26), over 800,000 people joined the Party, including more than half a million workers.

The Central Committee took steps to improve the social composition of the Party membership, to increase the proletarian core of the Party. In connection with the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, a large-scale enrolment of workers in the Party was announced. Admission to membership was on a strictly individual basis. About 108,000 persons were admitted. This new and considerable working-class reinforcement of the Party enhanced its leading role in socialist construction. To strengthen the Party organisations in the countryside, the Party set itself the task of drawing into its ranks activists from among agricultural workers, farm-labourers, and poor peasants active in the poor peasants’ groups, the Soviets and the agricultural co-operatives.

The industrialisation of the country confronted the mass organisations with new tasks. The work of the local Soviets, the trade unions, the Komsomol and other public organisations had to be reorganised and enlivened. The Party issued the slogan “Production comes first!” addressing it to all the mass organisations of the working class.

The Party continued to improve the work of the machinery of the state through its policy of enlivening the Soviets and other public organisations. The role of the Soviets in political, economic and cultural development was enhanced. Ever larger numbers of the working class and the working peasantry were drawn into the work of administering the state. Groups of non-Party activists were set up to participate in the work of the Soviets. Deputies to the Soviets began to report back to their electors more frequently.

Elections to the Soviets took place in 1926 and 1927, in a situation of increased activity by the working people and a sharpening of the class struggle. The elections showed that the influence of the Party among the working people in town and country had grown, and that the positions of the capitalist elements had weakened; it was obvious that the kulaks were becoming increasingly isolated from the middle
peasants. In keeping with Lenin’s counsel, the Party took steps to reduce the governmental apparatus and maintenance costs, and waged a systematic struggle against bureaucratic distortions in this apparatus.

The policy of industrialisation called for better management of industry, the training of leading personnel, direction of economic construction with due regard to local conditions. The Party concentrated on these problems. Industrial management was based on the Leninist principle of democratic centralism. The growth of competent industrial personnel and the experience accumulated in running industry enabled the enterprises to operate with greater independence and heightened the responsibility of their managers for the fulfilment of state plans.

It was necessary to improve the work of the trade unions—the biggest mass organisation of the working class. The working class was growing rapidly: over two million people joined its ranks during the first two years of industrialisation. The switch-over to reconstruction of the national economy, and the difficulties involved, called for increased effort by the trade unions to educate the masses, particularly the new workers, and to draw them into socialist construction. Trade union work was improved by developing proletarian democracy. A most important means of drawing the masses of workers into socialist construction, the management of production and the battle to raise labour productivity was production conferences, which arose on the initiative of the workers. These conferences, in which the workers took an active part, became widespread; they discussed such questions as the state of production, how to economise and avoid waste, elimination of idle time, reduction of costs per unit produced, raising of labour productivity and improvement of discipline on the job. The Central Committee sought to ensure that the progressive practice of holding production conferences was extended to all branches of industry and transport.

During these years the Komsomol—the militant assistant of the Party—on which devolved the function of training the young generation of the builders of communism, played a more active part. It initiated many useful measures to promote the socialist industrialisation of the country and produced tens of thousands of rationalisers and inventors from among its members.

It was very important to involve women in production and in public life, especially in the non-Russian republics and regions. Delegate meetings of women workers and peasants became widespread. The First All-Union Congress of Women Workers and Peasants was held in October 1927. It pointed out the increased activity and culture of working women, the extension of their political horizons, and their devotion to the cause of the Party, of socialism. It contributed towards strengthening the link between the working class and the peasantry.
The sharpening of the class struggle in the country made it exceptionally important to increase proletarian influence in the countryside, where a bitter struggle was going on between the working class and the bourgeois-kulak elements for the allegiance of the main mass of the peasantry—the middle peasants. The Party's slogan "Agriculture comes first!" was successfully translated into practice by the Party organisations. Nearly 21,000 Party groups, or over a quarter of a million Communists—such was the Party's outpost in the countryside. At the same time as it sent Party members from the towns to the villages, the Party promoted new cadres who had grown up in the countryside. The role of the Communists in rural public life increased considerably. The results of the elections to the Soviets were eloquent proof of this: every fifth chairman of a village Soviet and half the members of the volost executive committees were Party members.

Proletarian influence was exerted on the peasants also through various urban voluntary organisations, embracing millions of workers. The trade unions were among the Party's mainstays in its work in the countryside, with which many workers were connected, having farms there. What is more, over two million trade unionists were employed in the countryside itself, of whom more than a million were members of the Agricultural and Forestry Workers' Union. The Party worked indefatigably to improve the work of the trade unions in the countryside, to get them to take part in rural public life and, in addition, induced workers in increasing numbers to take the countryside under their "patronage". The "patronage" societies of those years had as many as 1,500,000 members.

In the struggle for the reconstruction of the countryside along socialist lines, the Party had the support of the working class and of forces that were part of the peasantry itself. But these forces had to be united and organised. The Party was supported by groups of poor peasants in the Soviets and the co-operatives. Meetings of poor peasants, in which middle peasants also took part, were held more regularly. Thanks to better organisation, the poor peasants began to exert a growing influence on public life in the villages and actively combated the kulaks.

The Komsomol was a loyal helper of the Party in the countryside. A million young fighters for a socialist countryside waged a courageous battle against the kulaks and all anti-Soviet forces, and also against indifference and distrust of the as yet unexplored socialist path of agricultural development. The central and local Party press made a big contribution. Every volost had its wall newspaper, which rallied the peasant masses round the Party and the Soviets. Some 200,000 rural newspaper correspondents boldly campaigned for socialism, regardless of the danger of getting a kulak bullet in the back.

The Party also used the Red Army in every possible way to enlighten peasant youth politically and improve their educational background. Demobilised Red Army men exerted a powerful influence in the
countryside. Half the chairmen of village Soviets and two-thirds of the chairmen of volost executive committees had passed through the school of the Red Army.

As a result of the improved political and organising work of the Party and of the mass organisations under its guidance, resistance to the kulaks on the part of the working peasantry mounted. Supported by the poor peasants, the working class strengthened its alliance with the middle peasants. Growing numbers of peasants were drawn into various forms of co-operation. Thirty-eight per cent of the peasant households belonged to consumers' co-operatives, while agricultural co-operatives embraced nearly one-third of the peasant farms. Lenin's co-operative plan was successfully being translated into real life.

The Party was pursuing the policy of extending agricultural co-operation, with the object of preparing for the mass transition from individual peasant farming to the socialist, collective-farm system.


After two years of strenuous effort by the Party and the masses the socialist industrialisation of the country began to bear fruit. Old factories had been re-equipped and new ones built. By the end of 1927 the gross output of industry and agriculture had surpassed the pre-war level.

Particularly rapid was the rate of development of large-scale socialist industry, which in the economic year 1926-27 produced 18 per cent more than in the previous year. For the first years of industrialisation this was a record rate of growth of large-scale industry in the U.S.S.R. It was many times greater than the rate of industrial growth in the main capitalist countries. In the United States, for example, the average annual growth of industrial output over 29 years (1901-29) did not exceed 4 per cent. The high rate of industrial growth in the U.S.S.R., especially in heavy industry, testified to the superiority of the socialist economic system over the capitalist.

The growth of large-scale industry added to the dominant position of the socialist sector in the national economy. The share of the socialist sector in industry at the end of 1927 amounted to 86 per cent, while that of the private sector had fallen to 14 per cent (excluding flour-milling, a considerable part of which was in private hands). Here, then, was the proof of the socialist nature of the industrialisation taking place in the Soviet Union.

The steady growth of the socialist sector in industry was linked with the squeezing out of the capitalist elements from trade. The private share in retail trade declined from 53 per cent in 1924-25 to 35 per cent in 1926-27, and in wholesale trade from 9 to 5 per cent.
The national income in the economic year 1926-27 rose more than 11 per cent compared with the previous year. If we bear in mind that the average annual increase of the national income in the United States, Britain, Germany and other highly developed capitalist countries was not more than 2 to 4 per cent, it will be clear how rapidly the Soviet economy was growing.

Under the leadership of the Communist Party, the country was advancing confidently and rapidly towards socialism, squeezing the capitalist elements out of the national economy.

But while large-scale socialist industry was rapidly expanding and the towns and their populations were growing, agriculture, the most extensive and vitally important branch of the national economy, lagged very much behind. The gross output of agriculture as a whole exceeded the pre-war figure, the gross output of its most important branch—grain production—amounted in the 1926-27 economic year only to 95 per cent of the 1913 crop, while the marketed share (that consumed outside the countryside) was a mere 13.3 per cent, as against the pre-war 26 per cent.

This decline in grain marketed was due to the fact that the October Revolution had abolished the big landlord estates and had considerably reduced the number of kulak farms. Before the war the kulak farms and landed estates were the biggest growers of grain for the market: the landed estates accounted for 22 per cent—4½ million tons—of the grain sold on the market, the kulaks for 50 per cent—10½ million tons. In 1926-27 the grain produced for the market by kulak farms was only a little over 2 million tons.

In the Soviet period the middle- and poor-peasant farms became the main producers of grain. In 1927 they numbered about 24 millions, compared with about 17 millions before the First World War. The middle and poor peasants, freed from their landlords as a result of the October Revolution, and having undermined the strength of the kulaks, were living better. They were now the main holders of grain, producing more than in pre-war days (64½ million tons instead of 40 million tons), but sending only 11 per cent of their total crop to the market.

At that time the state and collective farms produced only 1.3 million tons of grain and provided only 6 per cent of all grain marketed.

Grain production, as it was then, could not satisfy the country’s needs, which were increasing as a consequence of the growth of the urban population and of the working class.

Big success in the development of socialist industry and a grave lag in agriculture—such was the economic situation before the Fifteenth Party Congress. The Congress was held on December 2 to 19, 1927. By that time the Party grouped 887,000 members and 349,000 candidate members.

The Congress discussed the report of the Central Committee, the report of the Central Control Commission—Workers’ and
Peasants’ Inspection, the directives for a five-year plan, work in the countryside, the opposition, and other questions. Reports were made by J. V. Stalin, S. V. Kosior, G. K. Orjonikidze, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky and others.

The Congress fully approved the political and organising work of the Central Committee. In the sphere of foreign policy it instructed the Central Committee steadfastly to pursue the Leninist line of struggle for peace, to strengthen international ties with the working people of all countries, and to raise the defence capacity of the U.S.S.R. In the sphere of home policy, the Congress gave instructions to continue socialist industrialisation at unremitting speed, pay special attention to the promotion of agriculture through socialist changes and to step up the offensive against the capitalist elements, the objective being their elimination.

The reasons for the slow growth of agriculture were brought out by the Congress.

Industry was large-scale and centralised, whereas agriculture was still small-scale and dispersed. Large-scale industry was based on the public, socialist ownership of the means of production; its expansion was strengthening the positions of socialism in the national economy and was leading to the elimination of the capitalist elements. Small peasant farming, on the other hand, was based on private ownership of the means of production, except for the land, which had been nationalised by the Soviet state and handed over to the peasants for their use. Socialist industry was conducted along planned lines, while small-commodity peasant farming was subject to market fluctuations. Large-scale socialist industry received a steady supply of new machinery and developed according to the principle of extended reproduction, while small peasant farming, based on primitive equipment and manual labour, could not make use of modern machinery, developed slowly, and at times failed to ensure even simple reproduction.

By 1927 small-scale dispersed peasant farming had in the main exhausted its possibilities for further raising labour productivity. The process of fragmentation of the peasant farms continued. They supplied only a minimum for the market, and this was especially true of grain. Year by year the rate of growth of agriculture slowed down and lagged more and more behind that of socialist industry. This created difficulties in supplying the urban population with agricultural products, and industry with raw materials. Agricultural produce constituted an insignificant part of exports, and difficulties arose in building up state stocks. The lag in agriculture was becoming a hindrance to the progress of socialist construction as a whole and to the strengthening of the country’s defences.

The Fifteenth Congress, after comprehensive discussion of this question, decided on the all-out collectivisation of agriculture, on switching over to large-scale socialist farming using modern machinery. It
was decided to begin preparations for a socialist offensive along the whole front.

Without mass collectivisation of agriculture it was impossible to bring the country out on to the broad highway of socialist construction and rid the millions of working peasants of kulak bondage, misery and ignorance. The Party was guided by Lenin's plan for building socialism in the U.S.S.R., by his brilliant co-operative plan, and his well-known precepts:

"So long as we live in a country of small peasants there is a firmer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism. This must be borne in mind. Anyone who has carefully observed life in the countryside, as compared with life in the towns, knows that we have not torn up the roots of capitalism and have not undermined the foundation, the basis of the internal enemy. The latter depends on small-scale production, and there is only one way of undermining him, namely, to move the economy of the country, including agriculture, over to a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production" (Collected Works, Vol. 31, pp. 483-84).

"If peasant farming is to develop still further, we must firmly assure its transition to the next stage as well; and the next stage will inevitably be the gradual unification of small, fragmented peasant farming, the least profitable and most backward, into public, large-scale agriculture" (Collected Works, Vol. 32, p. 264).

While recognising the pressing need for the extensive collectivisation of agriculture, the Congress categorically stated that the transition of the peasantry to collective farming must take place in an absolutely voluntary way, with the consent of the working peasants themselves. The Congress at the same time gave instructions to strengthen and develop the state farms.

The Congress emphasised that the only way to abolish the lag in agriculture was to carry out Lenin's co-operative plan for the transformation of social relations in the countryside on the basis of collective and state farms. Agricultural co-operation at the time of the dictatorship of the proletariat helped socialist industry to win over the countryside. The progress already made in the organisation of peasant co-operative societies showed that it was now possible to set the task of drawing all the poor peasants and the bulk of the middle peasants into co-operation in the ensuing period. Agricultural co-operation was intended to help the poor and middle peasants to free themselves from kulak bondage, by providing service for the weaker farms through a broad network of hiring stations, supplying them with machinery on easy terms for joint cultivation of the land.

The Congress came to the conclusion that now was the time to proceed, jointly with all the poor and middle peasants and on the basis of the strengthened alliance of the working class and the
peasantry, to more systematic and insistent restriction and squeezing out of the kulak and the private trader.

The development of socialist construction and vast, long-term capital investments required a higher level of economic planning. The Party had accumulated considerable experience in planning, and was now in a position to advance from annual targets to long-term plans for a number of years. This was a major victory for the Leninist economic policy of the Party.

In his last articles, devoted to the plan for building socialism, Lenin wrote that for the first time in history it had become possible “to ascertain the period necessary for bringing about radical social changes; we now see clearly what can be done in five years, and what requires much more time” (*Collected Works*, Vol. 33, pp. 441-42).

The Fifteenth Congress adopted directives for the *First Five-Year Plan* of development of the national economy.

The basic economic tasks of this plan were, as the Congress pointed out, steadily to expand heavy socialist industry, the material basis of socialism, and to use it for bringing about a rapid growth of all branches of the national economy and an increase of the share of its socialist sector, and to squeeze out the capitalist elements more vigorously, with a view to launching a socialist offensive against the remnants of capitalism along the whole economic front.

The adoption of directives for the First Five-Year Plan signified a new and higher stage of planning in the Soviet national economy. These directives specified the schedules and rates of the great social transformations to take place in the Soviet Union.

Fight to cement the unity of the Party—this was the keynote struck by the Fifteenth Congress. The report “On the Opposition”, submitted on behalf of the commission elected by the Congress to investigate the anti-Party activity of the Trotskyists and Zinovievites, was delivered by G. K. Orjonikidze. The Congress noted that the Trotsky-Zinoviev anti-Party “opposition has broken ideologically with Leninism, has degenerated into a Menshevik group, has taken the path of capitulation to the forces of the international and internal bourgeoisie and has objectively become a tool of the third force against the regime of the proletarian dictatorship” (*C.P.S.U. in Resolutions*, Part II, p. 441). The opposition had become a tool of the class enemies in their frenzied struggle against the Communist Party and Soviet power. The Congress declared that membership of the Trotskyist opposition and the propagation of its views were incompatible with membership of the Party.

The opposition, the Congress recorded, had not only committed a gross violation of Party discipline but transgressed the Soviet law, for from factionalism it had turned to forming an anti-Soviet Trotskyist party. Taking all this into account, the Congress approved the resolution of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission on the expulsion of Trotsky and Zinoviev, the ringleaders
of the anti-Party opposition, from the Party, and expelled 75 active members of the bloc—Kamenev, Pyatakov, Radek, Rakovsky, Safarov, Smilga, I. Smirnov, Lashevich and others. The Sapronov group of 23 members was also expelled from the Party as a patently anti-revolutionary group.

The Congress instructed Party organisations to cleanse their ranks "of all the clearly incorrigible elements of the Trotskyist opposition". It also instructed the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission to do everything to influence ideologically the rank-and-file members of the opposition in order to get them to renounce the defeatist views of Trotskyism and to take the Leninist path.

The Fifteenth Congress adopted an important addendum to the Party Rules: "Members of the Party refusing to give truthful answers to the questions of control commissions shall be immediately expelled from the Party" (ibid., p. 491). This addendum was necessitated by the fact that the oppositionists, when summoned to appear before the appropriate Party bodies, refused to give truthful testimony about the anti-Party activity of the Trotskyists, and tried to mislead the Party bodies and to cover up the criminal work of the Trotskyist factionalists.

The Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) is known in the history of the Party as the Congress of collectivisation of agriculture and of preparation for a socialist offensive along the whole front. Its decisions, which reflected the new stage in the building of socialism in the U.S.S.R., and in consolidating the Party’s unity, were approved by the Party organisations and by the many millions of workers, by all working people.

The Congress summed up the results of the struggle which Leninism had been waging against Trotskyism over many years; it completely routed Trotskyism ideologically and expelled its more active exponents from the Party.

Shortly after the Congress, many of the expelled participants in the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition began to submit applications, breaking with Trotskyism and asking to be reinstated in the Party. Seeing that in the past similar statements by opposition members had usually been followed by fresh anti-Party actions on their part, the Party acted with caution in regard to these applications of the Trotskyists. It made their reinstatement in the Party dependent on the condition of their complete ideological and organisational disarmament, forthright and public condemnation of their views as anti-Leninist, and an undertaking to uphold the decisions of the Party, of its congresses and its Central Committee. A six months’ probationary period was established for those applying for reinstatement. And only after the expiry of this term, having satisfied itself that the behaviour of the ex-oppositionists was in keeping with their undertakings—to observe the Rules and Programme of the Party and its discipline, and to carry out its general line as laid down in its decisions—did the Party
examine separately the question of the reinstatement of each individual.

The majority of the expelled fulfilled their undertakings and were reinstated in the Party. Many Communists—mostly from among the rank and file—who had adhered to the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition but had seen that the Party's Leninist line was correct and that Trotskyism was an anti-Leninist trend, were working honestly in the Party, taking part in the struggle to build socialism.

Trotsky, a rabid enemy of Leninism, did not lay down arms. In 1929 he was deported for his anti-Soviet activity; finding himself abroad, he at once joined in the general slander campaign which the bourgeoisie was conducting against the Soviet Union and the C.P.S.U.(B.).

It was the merit of the Party that it vigilantly protected its unity, equipped the masses of the people with a clear Leninist programme of struggle for the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R., and organised that victory.

5. Preparations for the Offensive of Socialism Along the Whole Front. The Party's Fight Against the Right Deviation. Adoption of the First Five-Year Plan. Beginning of the Mass Collective-Farm Movement

In pursuance of the Fifteenth Congress decisions, the Party with fresh vigour pressed forward socialist industrialisation and preparations for the mass collectivisation of agriculture based on Lenin's plan for building socialism in the U.S.S.R.

The socialist reconstruction of the national economy evoked the stubborn resistance of the capitalist elements inside the country and greatly alarmed the world bourgeoisie. The imperialists and the landlords, the big industrialists and bankers who had fled the Soviet country saw in the Nepmen and the kulaks their mainstay in the bitter struggle to frustrate the building of socialism in the U.S.S.R. In 1928 the capitalist elements in the country, reduced to 4.6 per cent of the population, still played some role in the economy. Approximately one-fourth of the retail trade and one-sixth of the industrial output were in the hands of the Nepmen. The kulaks grew one-fifth of the grain for the market. And although the share of the capitalist elements in the national economy was steadily declining, their absolute growth could still be observed. They had their roots in small-commodity production—in handicrafts and in individual peasant farming. The capitalist elements, especially the kulaks, still exerted an influence on a certain part of the peasantry, artisans, handicraftsmen and office workers.

The class struggle grew sharper. The capitalist elements tried to take advantage of the grain difficulties encountered by the Soviet state
in 1928. On top of the general lag in grain production, there came crop failure in southern Ukraine and in the North Caucasus. The gross yield of grain was nearly 5,000,000 tons less than in the previous year. In January 1928 state grain stocking and purchases fell 2.048 million tons short of the amount planned. Serious difficulties arose in supplying the population with bread, and industry with agricultural raw materials. Grain export ceased almost completely, a fact which handicapped the accumulation of foreign exchange needed for the purchase of foreign industrial plant.

The kulaks, who had regained ground owing to NEP and who held large quantities of grain, refused to sell it to the state at the prices fixed by the Soviet Government. They tried to terrorise the middle peasants who sold their grain surpluses to the purchasing agencies, and tried in every way to weaken and undermine the building of collective farms. They committed acts of sabotage against collective farms, set fire to grain-delivery stations and nefariously murdered Party and Soviet personnel in the countryside.

The Party and the Government, supported by the masses, firmly pursued a class policy in the countryside and broke the resistance of the kulaks. Emergency measures were taken against them. Kulak grain hoarders were brought before the courts, by whose decision their surpluses were confiscated. One quarter of the confiscated grain was turned over to the village poor in the form of loans. In carrying out the grain stocking, the method of self-assessment was used, that is, the peasants themselves were empowered to fix quotas for the different households. In this way the masses of poor and middle peasants were drawn into the battle for grain. They rallied round the Party and Soviet organisations against the kulaks. Elements who were degenerate, corrupt, infected with defeatist ideology and reluctant to “fall out” with the kulaks were expelled from posts in the Soviets and the cooperatives.

All these measures contributed to the success of the grain stocking. By the end of 1928 the state had adequate stocks of grain. The crushing of kulak resistance had strengthened and reinforced Soviet power and the positions of socialism in the countryside.

The grain-stocking and sowing campaigns in 1928 and 1929 stimulated the activity of the rural Party organisations and all the state and voluntary organisations of the working people. Undaunted by kulak threats, Communists actively fought for fulfilment of the state plan of grain stocking, for a class policy in the countryside. Some Soviet and Party organisations, however, overstepped the mark by applying the emergency measures intended for the kulaks to some of the middle and poor peasants. The Central Committee sharply condemned this distortion of the Party line and remedied the situation.

Solving the grain problem was one of the most important tasks of the national economy. The Central Committee and the Government
tackled it in accordance with the Leninist principle of properly combining the interests of the state and the personal interests of the working peasantry. A joint plenary meeting of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, held in April 1928, decided to increase the advances to peasant farms supplying the state by contract (agreement between state or co-operative organisations and peasant farms) to 135 million rubles, and to raise the total allocation for agricultural development to 717 million rubles. Additional large state grain-growing farms were established. In five years they were to produce up to 1,600,000 tons of grain annually for the market. The state farms became strong points in the socialist reconstruction of agriculture. The battle for grain became a component part of the battle for industrialisation, for building socialism in the U.S.S.R.

The frenzied resistance of the kulaks to the measures taken by the Soviet Government in the countryside encouraged concealed enemy groups in their struggle to restore capitalism in the country. At the beginning of 1928 a big saboteur organisation consisting of bourgeois specialists was discovered in the Shakhty and in other areas of the Donets coalfield (the "Shakhty case"). While most of the old specialists worked honestly and conscientiously in various branches of the national economy, the Shakhty case showed that there were also malicious wreckers and saboteurs bent on frustrating socialist industrialisation and the establishment of socialism. For several years a group of bourgeois specialists and camouflaged Whites had engaged secretly in subversive work aimed at destroying the coal industry in the Donets coalfield, carrying out assignments of the former owners of the mines—Russian and foreign capitalists—and of foreign intelligence services. The saboteurs caused explosions in the mines and flooded them, damaged costly equipment, set fire to power stations and deliberately misspent the people's money earmarked for capital construction. Members of this subversive organisation purchased abroad equipment for the mines and power stations that was obviously outmoded and useless. Especially dangerous were the wreckers' attempts to worsen the conditions of the miners. They deliberately disorganised the supply of food and consumer goods to the miners and their families, cheated the workers in paying wages, held up housing programmes and infringed safety rules in the mines, which endangered the lives of the miners. The underlying purpose was to cause discontent among the workers and turn them against the Party and the Soviet Government.

The wreckers also aimed at undermining the economic and defence potential of the country and providing favourable conditions for intervention by the imperialist powers. Nearly 300 one-time big capitalists and nobles were among the saboteurs exposed in the Shakhty case.

The Shakhty case testified to a blunting of revolutionary vigilance among the Communist managers in regard to the bourgeois specialists,
and to bad work on the part of the mass working-class organisations in the Donets coalfield, above all the trade unions, which were deaf to the miners' complaints, and did not encourage criticism from below. Such criticism would have helped to expose the saboteurs sooner.

The Shakhty case brought to the fore the question of training a new, Soviet technological intelligentsia drawn from the people and closely associated with them, an intelligentsia abreast of contemporary science and technology. Bolshevik economic executives themselves had to master technology in order really to run industry and to supervise the work of the bourgeois specialists. The training in a brief space of time of a new technological intelligentsia was an extremely complicated and difficult undertaking. The Party confidently tackled the job of creating a new, Soviet intelligentsia, new technological personnel.

The network of technical institutes and technical schools was extended and the numbers of workers and of Communists studying in them were increased. Thousands of Communists ("Party thousanders"), men and women experienced in Party, government, economic and trade union work, were sent to technical institutes. The doors to higher education were opened wide to skilled workers. The system of evening schools and correspondence courses was extended. Front-rank workers from factories, mines and building projects graduated from the technical institutes and schools, and considerably reinforced the Soviet technological intelligentsia.

The reconstruction of the national economy called for unrestricted criticism of shortcomings in socialist construction. A special Central Committee appeal "To all Party members and to all workers", issued in June 1928, said:

"The slogan of self-criticism 'irrespective of persons', criticism from top to bottom and from bottom to top, is one of the central slogans of the day."

For the Party, criticism and self-criticism was a means of improving the quality of the work as a whole, of reinforcing unity in the Party's ranks, and of exposing saboteurs, defeatists, bureaucrats and all other alien elements. Criticism and self-criticism served as a means of politically rallying the masses to fight for the general line of the Party. At the same time the Central Committee vigorously opposed any attempt indiscriminately and maliciously to disparage or discredit economic executives and Party leaders. In no circumstances could the slogan of criticism and self-criticism be allowed to become an instrument for baiting economic executives and local government officials, or be used by anti-Party elements against Party principles and Party discipline.

The difficulties encountered in socialist reconstruction, and the inevitable sharpening of the class struggle as a result of the socialist offensive, gave rise to vacillations among the petty-bourgeois strata of the population. There were echoes of this also in the Party. A group
of Right-wing defeatists took shape under the leadership of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky. As early as 1925 Bukharin had proclaimed the slogan “Enrich yourselves!” In practice this slogan signified a policy of support for the kulak farms in the countryside. But when the Party was engaged in combating the Trotskyists and Zinovievites as the main danger, the Right-wingers, did not voice their differences with the Party, and indeed took part in fighting against the Trotskyists. When however the Party launched its decisive offensive against the kulaks, the leaders of the Right-wingers openly came out against the policy of socialist industrialisation and the collectivisation of agriculture.

While admitting in words that it was possible to build socialism in the U.S.S.R., the Right opportunists in fact resisted the policy of the all-out expansion of heavy industry. They opposed rapid rates of industrialisation.

The Right-wingers opposed the all-out socialist offensive along the whole front, the elimination of the capitalist elements in the national economy, and the offensive against the kulaks. At a time when the capitalist elements were waging a fierce struggle against the construction of socialism, the Right-wingers propounded the “theory” that the class struggle in the country was subsiding and that the kulaks would peacefully grow into socialism. They refused to admit that the broad highway to socialism in the countryside was, as Lenin taught, the producer co-operative in its highest form—the collective farm. Lenin’s co-operative plan could not be put into effect unless the kulaks were eliminated as a class. The Right-wingers held that the countryside could be directed along socialist lines only through the marketing and purchasing co-operatives. They suggested giving “free rein” to spontaneous development of the market and removing all restrictions on kulak farming. Abandoning Lenin’s concept of the class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Right-wingers would have the Party and state organisations make direct concessions to the capitalist elements.

Thus, in practice, they denied that socialism could be built in the U.S.S.R. In the Party they spread the ideology of defeatism in the face of difficulties, and sought an agreement with the kulak and capitalist elements in town and country. Their stand ultimately meant the restoration of capitalism. The Central Committee rallied the Party and the working class for a decisive struggle against the Right-wing defeatists, now the main danger in the Party, the mouthpiece of the anti-Soviet forces in the country and of the capitalist encirclement.

The unrelenting struggle of the C.P.S.U.(B.) for the triumph of socialism, for the general line of the Party and against all deviations was whole-heartedly supported by the international Communist movement. The Sixth Congress of the Communist International, which took place in Moscow in August 1928, noted the achievements of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. These achievements, says the Congress
resolution, are strengthening the revolutionary position of the international proletariat and accelerating the growth of the revolutionary movement throughout the world.

The Congress gave a Marxist-Leninist appraisal of the international situation. The sharpening contradictions between the capitalist countries and the class contradictions within these countries, the growth of the national liberation movement in the colonies and semi-colonies, the intensification of the contradictions between the capitalist world and the Soviet Union—all were leading to the further undermining of capitalist stabilisation, to the growth of a severe world economic crisis, on a scale unprecedented in the history of capitalism. The capitalists saw new wars between the imperialist powers for a redivision of the colonies, and war against the U.S.S.R., as a means of warding off this crisis.

The Congress called upon the Communist Parties systematically to explain the danger of new wars, to fight steadfastly for peace and in defence of the U.S.S.R. and its peaceful foreign policy, to support the risings of the colonial peoples against imperialist slavery, and especially the Chinese revolution, which was an event of historic significance.

The Congress denounced the counter-revolutionary Menshevik activity of the Trotskyists in the C.P.S.U.(B.) and in the Comintern, and approved their expulsion from the C.P.S.U.(B.) and from the other Communist Parties. It called upon the Communist Parties to conduct a struggle on two fronts—against the remnants of the masked Trotskyists and against the Right-wing defeatists. The Right opportunists, including the Bukharin group, were slipping into a reformist assessment of capitalist stabilisation. They glossed over the basic contradictions of capitalism, denied the inevitability of a world economic crisis, the rise of a new revolutionary upswing of the working-class movement in the capitalist countries and of the national liberation struggle in the colonial and dependent countries. The Congress pointed out that Right opportunism in the Communist Parties, which was aligning itself with the reformism of the Second International, had become the main danger in the international Communist movement.

The Sixth Congress adopted the Programme and Statutes of the Comintern, which played an important part in consolidating and developing the international Communist revolutionary movement. Its decisions helped to consolidate the Leninist unity of the Communist Parties, to rally the masses for the fight against capitalism.

The Right-wingers in the C.P.S.U.(B.) and in the Comintern, despite the sharp criticism to which they had been subjected, persisted in their anti-Leninist views. The Right defeatists engaged in factional struggle against the Party; they inspired the anti-Party activity of the top leaders of the Moscow Party organisation (Uglanov and others), intending to counterpose the Moscow organisation to the Central
Committee. But this venture of the Right-wingers also ended in complete failure. At the call of the Central Committee, the Moscow Bolsheviks unanimously rebuffed the Right factionalists, who had grossly violated the Leninist unity of the Party and Party discipline.

A plenary meeting of the Central Committee, held in November 1928, called for a decisive struggle against the Right, openly opportunist deviation as the main danger, pointing out at the same time that there must be no relaxing of the fight against Trotskyism either. Irreconcilable struggle against opportunist deviations in the Party on two fronts and against a conciliatory attitude to them—such was the directive issued by the plenary meeting of the Central Committee.

The Right-wingers, in the person of Bukharin, linked up through Kamenev with the Trotskyists, and engaged in backstairs negotiations with them with a view to changing the policy of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau. The Right-wing leaders tried to exert pressure on the Central Committee and oblige it to make concessions to the kulaks in the countryside and to the capitalist elements in the towns.

The Party was obliged once more to deal with the question of the Right-wingers. The joint plenary meeting of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, and the Sixteenth Party Conference held in April 1929, condemned the political views of the Right-wingers as being incompatible with the general line of the Party, condemned their backstairs factional talks with the Trotskyists, and did not accept the refusal of the Right-wing leaders to perform the work assigned to them, regarding it as a gross violation of Party discipline. The joint plenary meeting of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission relieved Bukharin and Tomsky of responsible posts and warned them that, in the event of a further attempt to go against the decisions of the Central Committee, they would immediately be removed from the Political Bureau.

But even after this warning the Right-wingers did not take the path of the Party. They began to prepare a new attack against it and its Leninist leadership.

They resisted the Party in reorganising the work of the trade unions and bringing it into line with the tasks of socialist reconstruction. They ignored the creative activity of the masses in promoting socialist emulation and the shock brigade movement.

Led by the Central Committee, the Party exposed the defeatist ideology of the Right-wingers and their anti-Party activity in the trade unions. With the backing of an increased body of activists, the Party brought about the isolation of the narrowly trade union and bureaucratic elements in the executive bodies from the rank and file, and the promotion to key trade union posts of members devoted to socialism.

The Central Committee was forced to take more decisive measures against the Rights, who were openly opposing the general line of the Party. A plenary meeting of the Central Committee, held in Novem-
ber 1929, declared that propaganda of the views of the Right-wing defeatists was **incompatible with membership of the Party**. After discussing the question of the Right-wing leaders—Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky—the plenary meeting removed Bukharin from the Political Bureau, as the instigator and leader of the Right defeatists, while Rykov and Tomsky received a serious warning.

After this decision of the Central Committee the leaders of the Right defeatists submitted a statement in which they acknowledged their mistakes and recognised the correctness of the general line of the Party. But they were playing a waiting game instead of actively promoting the Party line.

In the Soviet period the Party had for more than twelve years been engaged in a stubborn, unrelenting struggle for Leninism, against the Trotskyists, Rights, national deviationists and other defeatists. This struggle had taken up much time and energy but had helped to rear and train Party cadres and to steel the Party organisations, which took a firm stand for the Leninist plan of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. and fought for the socialist industrialisation of the country, the collectivisation of agriculture, the triumph of the cultural revolution, and the steady improvement of the living standards of the people.

An important part in rallying the forces of the Party and the people for the new advance in socialist construction was played by the Sixteenth Party Conference, held in April 1929. The main questions on the Conference agenda were: the Five-Year Plan for the development of the national economy (1928-29—1932-33), ways and means of developing agriculture, the results and immediate tasks in the fight against bureaucracy, the cleansing and verification of the members and candidate members of the Party.

The Conference rejected the “minimum” variant of the Five-Year Plan put forward by the Right-wingers, and adopted the “optimum” variant. Capital investments for the five-year period were fixed at 64,600 million rubles, compared with the 26,500 million invested in the previous five-year period. Output of all industry was scheduled to rise 2.8 times, that of heavy industry, 3.3 times. The share of the socialist sector in the gross output of industry was to reach 92 per cent by the end of the five-year period. The number of peasant farms united in co-operatives of all types was to be raised to 85 per cent.

The plan envisaged the collectivisation of approximately one-sixth of all the peasant farms, raising the crop area of the collective farms to 50 million acres and increasing the proportion of marketable grain produced by the collective and state farms to 43 per cent of the total.

The First Five-Year Plan was the programme of a full-scale socialist offensive along the whole front of the national economy. Its purpose was to **lay the foundations of socialist economy**, and to continue to squeeze out capitalist elements in town and country with a view to their complete elimination. The adoption of the First Five-
Year Plan signified that the Party’s leadership in building socialist society had risen to a higher level.

The Sixteenth Conference outlined measures for overcoming the lag in agriculture, and for strengthening the new production forms of the link between town and country. Noting the urge towards collective farming not only among the poor strata of the peasantry but also among the middle peasants, the Conference stressed the necessity of doing everything to support the peasant masses in switching over to collective forms of farming, to extend material and financial assistance to the collective farms and to supply them with machinery and trained personnel. It was necessary to increase the vigilance of the collective farmers and to organise resistance to the kulak elements, who had penetrated into the collective farms, and smash them. Special emphasis was laid on the organisation of big collective farms which could supply the largest amount of marketable produce and make full use of modern agricultural machinery.

Much attention was devoted by the Conference to the fight against bureaucracy. Lenin had taught that this struggle called for prolonged and persistent effort. It required a high level of culture, universal literacy of the population and the enlistment in every possible way of the working people in the work of the Soviet state apparatus.

Noting certain advances in this sphere, the Conference gave directions to intensify the fight against bureaucracy in the state apparatus and pointed to the need for “a most resolute, most dedicated, most persistent struggle against the elements of bureaucracy within the Party itself and in the Party apparatus...” (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part II, p. 603). It stressed that criticism and self-criticism were an important method of combating bureaucratic practices.

The keynote of the Sixteenth Party Conference was the fullest development of the creative activity of the masses in the battle to fulfil the First Five-Year Plan. It adopted an appeal “To all workers and working peasants of the Soviet Union”, calling on them to engage in socialist emulation, as a mass movement for the fulfilment of the plan.

“Emulation and the Five-Year Plan,” said the appeal, “are indissolubly linked. In carrying out these tasks, the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. is continuing the offensive against the class enemies of the proletarian dictatorship” (ibid., p. 619).

The Conference decided to carry out a general cleansing and verification of members and candidate members of the Party. The chief purpose of the cleansing was to rid the Party of alien and corrupt elements. It was designed to strengthen the Party organisations still further, to raise the vanguard role of the Communists in carrying out the policy of industrialisation and in preparing a mass collective-farm movement.

As a result of the 1929 cleansing, 10 per cent of the members were expelled. These were useless, alien and corrupt elements. The clean-
ing and verification of members and candidate members was followed by the enrolment of many thousands of new members—the foremost industrial workers, farm-labourers, poor peasants and middle-peasant activists. The Party became still stronger and more united, and its prestige rose.

The year 1929 is known in the history of the Soviet Union as the year of great change on all fronts of socialist construction. In industry, a radical increase was achieved in labour productivity. In agriculture, the Party succeeded in leading the bulk of the peasantry on to the road of collective farming.

The adoption of the Five-Year Plan evoked a powerful wave of activity among the millions of workers and all working people. Emulation in the factories provided splendid instances of a socialist attitude to labour on the part of Soviet people. The famous slogan “Five-Year Plan in four years!” was advanced by the working-class masses.

A great role in this was played by Lenin’s article “How to Organise Emulation?”, published for the first time in Pravda in January 1929.

“Far from extinguishing emulation,” Lenin wrote, “socialism, on the contrary, for the first time creates the opportunity for employing it on a really large and on a really mass scale, for actually drawing the majority of toilers into the arena of labour of a kind in which they can display their abilities, develop their capacities, reveal their talents, of which there is an untapped spring among the people, and which capitalism crushed, suppressed and strangled in thousands and millions” (Collected Works, Vol. 26, p. 367).

New forms of socialist emulation arose and spread rapidly. The first youth shock brigade was formed at the Krasny Treugolnik Works in Leningrad in September 1926. This example was followed by members of the Komsomol and young people generally in other enterprises and on building sites throughout the country. In 1928 the Komsomol, on the occasion of its tenth anniversary, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for its courage and valour during the years of the Civil War. This award gave rise to a new wave of labour enthusiasm among the youth.

Socialist emulation and shock work became a mass movement of the working class for raising labour productivity, fulfilling production plans ahead of schedule and mastering the use of new machinery.

The Party organisations headed the socialist emulation of the workers. By the end of 1929, 63 per cent of the workers in large enterprises were taking part in various forms of emulation, while 26 per cent were members of shock brigades. The First All-Union Congress of Shock Brigades, held in December 1929, summed up the results of this powerful movement and charted a programme of struggle to raise labour productivity in all branches of the national economy.
The shock brigaders were front-rank members of the working class; under the leadership of the Party they fought for higher labour productivity, for advanced methods of work and for the better organisation of production. With solid collectivisation expanding, socialist emulation and shock work became widespread in the countryside as well. They were initiated by Party and Komsomol members and by other champions of collective farming.

In 1929 labour productivity rose by nearly 13 per cent compared with the previous year, thus exceeding the pre-war level by more than 30 per cent. The best workers broke world records for labour productivity.

By raising labour productivity, practising economy and lowering production costs, the Party and the Soviet state succeeded in solving one of the most difficult problems of industrialisation—the problem of socialist accumulation. In 1929 industrial investments amounted to 3,400 million rubles—50 per cent more than in the previous year. The rate of growth of socialist industry exceeded all the planned targets. Output in large-scale industry increased by 25 per cent in one year, and in heavy industry by 31 per cent.

Capital construction in industry assumed a large scale. Work was under way on the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station. Construction was begun of the Novokramatorsk plant in the Donets coalfield and of a heavy engineering plant (Uralmashzavod), the Berezniki and Solikamsk chemical plants and the iron and steel works at Magnitogorsk in the Urals. Heavy engineering establishments—aircraft, machine-tool, motor, etc.—were being built or reconstructed in Moscow and Leningrad. The Moscow automobile plant was under construction. Construction work on the Dzerzhinsky Tractor Works and on new big agricultural machinery works in Rostov and Zaporozhye was nearing completion. The country's second coal base—Kuzbas—was being extended.

The Party was consistently carrying out socialist industrialisation in the central regions of the country and in the non-Russian republics and regions. Among the enterprises under construction were the Ridder Non-Ferrous Metal Plant and the Chimkent Lead-Smelting Works in Kazakhstan, and textile mills and other enterprises in Tashkent and Ashkhabad. The rise of industrial centres in non-Russian areas was of the greatest economic, political and cultural importance. Industrialisation served as the basis for training members of the respective nationalities as skilled factory workers. Socialist construction strengthened the friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union.

In carrying out the Leninist nationalities policy, the Party waged an uncompromising struggle against manifestations of bourgeois nationalism, against dominant-nation chauvinism and local nationalism, which were weakening the friendship of the Soviet peoples, impairing the Soviet state and undermining the Leninist unity of the Communist Party.
Industrialisation was carried out with a truly Bolshevik élan, such as the world had never seen before. The working class provided splendid examples of labour valour. The scale and the rate of construction in the U.S.S.R. astonished the world. Enemies asserted that the targets planned by the Party would never be reached and foretold the failure of the Soviet plans. The working people in all countries were gladdened by the successes of the Soviet Union.

The vast scale of industrialisation and the heroism displayed by the working class exerted a strong influence on the mass of the working peasantry. They saw that the Party, the Soviet power, the workers, overcoming difficulties, were building factories to make tractors and new farm machines. Numerous peasant delegations visited the new factories and construction sites, attended workers' meetings and were inspired by their enthusiasm. Upon returning to their villages the advanced representatives of the working peasantry took the initiative in setting up new collective farms. The staffs of industrial enterprises and building sites assumed “patronage” over rural areas, and sent numerous workers' teams to the countryside.

That was how the mass movement for joining the collective farms was prepared and began, a movement which grew into solid collectivisation. The peasantry turned to the socialist path of development, to the collective-farm path. The middle peasants followed the poor peasants into the collective farms. In just three months, from July to September 1929, about one million peasant households joined collective farms—that is, almost as many as during the twelve years since the October Revolution. During the last quarter of 1929 nearly 2.4 million peasant households entered collective farms.

The solid collectivisation of agriculture had been prepared by a series of economic and political measures undertaken by the Party and the Soviet state.

The socialist sector had a planned transforming effect on the rural economy. In 1928 and 1929 the contract system embraced more than a third of all peasant farms. Year by year more and more tractors and other machines were sent to the countryside. The Soviet state helped the working peasants by organising hiring depots, tractor columns and machine-and-tractor stations. The economic link between the working class and the main mass of the peasantry acquired a chiefly productive character.

In carrying out Lenin's co-operative plan, the Party persistently promoted the co-operative movement in the countryside, and did everything to encourage agricultural co-operation. The collective farm was the highest form of agricultural co-operation.

The resolute struggle waged against the kulaks during the sowing and grain-purchasing campaigns in 1928 and 1929, which greatly undermined the strength of the kulaks and rallied the poor and middle peasants round the Party organisations and the Soviets, was of great importance in preparing a mass collective-farm movement.
The swing of the peasant masses towards collective farming was also stimulated by the achievements of the first collective and state farms. Practical experience convinced the peasants of the advantages of large-scale farming and collective labour over individual. The collective and state farms became centres of progressive agronomy. As Lenin had predicted, they helped the neighbouring peasant population with machinery, pedigree livestock, selected seed and so on.

The working class exerted great political influence on the countryside. During the years which preceded mass collectivisation, nearly a quarter of a million Communists, Komsomol members and non-Party workers were sent to the villages from the towns and industrial centres to help in the sowing and grain-purchasing campaigns.

The plenary meeting of the Central Committee, held in the middle of November 1929, summed up the results of the first year of the Five-Year Plan. The main questions on the agenda concerned collective-farm development. The plenary meeting noted that the decisive turn of the bulk of the peasantry towards socialism, expressed in the mass collective-farm movement, signified a "new historic phase in the building of socialism in our country" (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part. II, p. 621).

Equipped with Marxism-Leninism, and united round the Central Committee, the Communist Party boldly set about solving new problems of socialist construction.

**BRIEF SUMMARY**

During the years 1926-29 the Communist Party, equipped with Lenin's plan for building socialism in the U.S.S.R., and overcoming immense external and internal difficulties, prepared and embarked upon the socialist reconstruction of the entire national economy. In all its measures the Party was aided by the creative activity and selflessness of the millions of workers and peasants.

The Party and the Soviet state waged a successful struggle for peace, for peaceful coexistence of the two systems—socialist and capitalist. As a result, the designs of the imperialists to isolate the U.S.S.R. and to prepare a new intervention were frustrated.

Pursuing the principle of proletarian internationalism, the Party extended and strengthened its contacts with the world revolutionary movement of the working class and with the liberation movement in the colonial and dependent countries, and laid a firm basis for a militant alliance of the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese people's revolution.

At home the Party ensured the victory of the Leninist policy of socialist industrialisation. The general line of the Communist
Party, aimed at abolishing the age-long backwardness of the country and transforming it into a mighty industrialised socialist power found widespread support among the masses. In the main, one of the most difficult problems of industrialisation was solved, namely, the problem of accumulating funds for building a heavy industry, the foundations of which were laid during these years. In the battle to fulfil the First Five-Year Plan, the Soviet people, led by the Party, provided remarkable examples of heroic labour, and developed socialist emulation as a movement of millions of working people in building socialism. The rate of growth of socialist industry surpassed anything that the world had ever seen.

In 1929, which has gone down in history as the year of great change, the Party achieved a considerable rise in productivity of industrial labour and registered the first major successes in the socialist reconstruction of agriculture. The poor and middle sections of the peasantry swung towards collective farming and a mass movement began for joining collective farms.

The advance of the Soviet Union towards socialism was attended by a sharpening of the class struggle in the country and by an intensification of the struggle within the Party. The Party mobilised the working class and working peasantry for revolutionary activity against the capitalist elements in town and country. In bitter struggle against the class enemies the resistance of the kulaks and the saboteurs in industry was broken. The alliance of the workers and peasants, under the leadership of the working class, was consolidated. The Party regrouped its ranks and organised the work of all the mass organisations of the working people in keeping with the tasks of the socialist reconstruction of the national economy.

A vital condition for the success of socialist construction was the isolation and defeat of the anti-Leninist opposition groups—the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc, the Right-wing defeatists and the national deviationists. In this struggle the Party became tempered ideologically, and its unity became firmly cemented. The views of the Trotskyists and the Right-wing defeatists were declared incompatible with membership of the Communist Party.

During the years 1926–29 the Party grew considerably. Hundreds of thousands of the most advanced workers and working peasants joined its ranks; its cadres developed and became steeled in the battle to implement the policy of industrialisation and to overcome difficulties.

Steadfastly upholding the Leninist general line, skilfully leading the working class and the main mass of the peasantry, battling resolutely against factional groups, the Party prepared the offensive of socialism along the whole front.
CHAPTER TWELVE

THE PARTY IN THE PERIOD OF THE OFFENSIVE OF SOCIALISM ALONG THE WHOLE FRONT.
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COLLECTIVE-FARM SYSTEM

(1929-1932)

1. The Economic Crisis in the Capitalist World. The International Position of the U.S.S.R. During the Years of the All-Out Offensive of Socialism

At the end of 1929 the international situation underwent a considerable change. An economic crisis of unparalleled force and duration shook the whole capitalist world. Its devastating effect on the economy of the capitalist countries was tremendous. The decline in production lasted for almost three years. The volume of industrial output reached its lowest point in 1932. In the U.S.A. it had then declined by almost 50 per cent as compared with 1929 and in Germany, by more than 40 per cent.

The crisis caused unprecedented unemployment. In the United States alone the number of unemployed reached 15-17 million at the height of the crisis. In Germany in 1932 nearly 44 per cent of all members of trade unions were wholly unemployed. This mass unemployment was of a protracted character, and reduced a considerable part of the working class in all bourgeois countries to a state of extreme destitution.

The crisis put an end to the temporary stabilisation of capitalism, and revolutionised the masses of workers. The influence of the Communist Parties grew in many countries. In Germany, for example, the Communist Party polled nearly 6 million votes at the Reichstag elections in November 1932.

The crisis graphically showed the masses how rotten was the capitalist system. It made them feel the full brunt of the calamities which capitalism brings to the working people.

The crisis undermined the influence of the reformist theories about reconciling the class interests of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and about the possibility of a crisis-free development of the capitalist economy. These Right-opportunist theories had been
fairly widespread in the years of the temporary stabilisation of capitalism.

The successful building of socialism in the U.S.S.R. was exerting an ever greater influence on the international situation. Ever broader masses of the working people throughout the world were coming to see the superiority of the socialist system over the capitalist system.

In reactionary capitalist circles the advance of socialism revived their interventionist inclinations, and their desire to hinder socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. and to frustrate the fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan grew stronger. The imperialists did not venture to start a war against the Soviet Union, but resorted to a number of other measures aimed at hindering the building of socialism. They helped to engineer sabotage in the national economy of the U.S.S.R., and started anti-Soviet slander campaigns in the press. Following a campaign headed by the Pope in support of the counter-revolutionary clergy they began malicious propaganda about alleged Soviet dumping. Then came the lying story about forced labour in the U.S.S.R., and so on. This slander campaign against the Soviet Union knew no bounds. The ruling circles of many capitalist countries (the U.S.A., France, Poland, Belgium) made use of the anti-Soviet propaganda to restrict Soviet exports and to refuse credits to the U.S.S.R. A veritable economic war was waged against the land of Soviets.

At the same time, however, during the crisis years an opposite tendency in relation to the U.S.S.R. was also maintained in the policy of the capitalist countries. In these years the importance of the Soviet market for the industrial output of the capitalist countries grew immensely. The market of the socialist state acquired particular importance for such major branches of industry as engineering. This was due to the fact that the Soviet market was the only one in the world which was not subject to crises, and which was rapidly expanding when all others were shrinking. Influential business circles were interested in Soviet orders, and this to some extent hampered the anti-Soviet intrigues of the reactionary imperialist forces. The masses of workers, filled with profound sympathy for the Soviet country, resisted the pursuit of a policy inimical to the Soviet Union.

In the years of the economic crisis the international situation continued to be tense. The crisis aggravated to the extreme the struggle of the imperialists for markets and spheres of influence, and intensified contradictions between the imperialist powers. Many representatives of reactionary ruling circles in the capitalist countries sought a way out of the crisis in war and the seizure of foreign territories.

Japan was the first to embark on the path of aggression. In 1931 the Japanese imperialists, without declaring war on China, seized
the Chinese north-eastern provinces (Manchuria). As a result of this aggression, a seat of war arose in the Far East. The Soviet Government again declared that the sympathies of the working people of the U.S.S.R. were with the people of China.

Quite a different stand was taken by the Western imperialist powers. Although Japan's expansionist inroads into China affected their own interests, they in effect encouraged her aggression. In doing so, the Western Powers reckoned on provoking a conflict between Japan and the Soviet Union.

The foreign policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet state continued to be one of peace. During this period, too, the Party succeeded in maintaining peace, and did not allow its enemies to involve the Soviet country in international conflicts. But after the beginning of the Japanese aggression against China the international situation deteriorated sharply. The Soviet Union had to take certain measures to strengthen its defences on its Far Eastern frontiers. The intrigues of the interventionists, the sabotage and subversive activity they organised, the economic pressure of world capitalism on the Soviet Union, and the emergence of a seat of war near the Soviet Far East—all these external factors made it imperative that the Party and the Soviet people continuously strengthen the country's defences and divert substantial forces and resources to the heightening of the efficiency of the Armed Forces in order to be prepared at any moment to repel possible attack from imperialist aggressors.

2. The Advance of Solid Collectivisation of Agriculture. Adoption of the Policy of Eliminating the Kulaks as a Class. Sixteenth Party Congress

While the whole capitalist world was in the grip of the economic crisis, the U.S.S.R. was steadily promoting its socialist economy. The average annual increase of its industrial output in the first two years of the Five-Year Plan was about 20 per cent.

Along with the rapid growth of industry, the mass collective-farm movement was under way in the country. By the beginning of 1930 the five-year programme of collective-farm development had, in the main, been fulfilled. A number of regions became regions of solid collectivisation, with the peasants of whole villages joining the collective farms. In 124 districts more than 70 percent of all the peasant farms were collectivised. The largest number of districts of solid collectivisation were in the Volga region, the North Caucasus and the steppe part of the Ukraine.

The transition to solid collectivisation signified a radical turn of the bulk of the peasantry towards socialism. Prior to the mass collective-farm movement there were 24.5 million individual peas-
ant farms in the U.S.S.R., of which about 8.5 million belonged to poor peasants, 15 million to middle peasants and more than one million to kulaks. The poor and middle peasants together constituted the most numerous labouring class in the U.S.S.R. Though small-peasant commodity economy was not of a capitalist nature, it based itself on private ownership of the means of production and engendered kulak capitalists from its midst. When joining the collective farms, the peasants socialised the basic means of production. The working peasantry was abandoning the old path of development which spontaneously engendered capitalism and led to the enslavement of the poor and middle peasants by the kulaks; it was taking a new, socialist path, free of kulak bondage and capitalist exploitation. A socialist, collective-farm system was being established in the countryside.

Furthermore, the transition to solid collectivisation signified a radical change in the development of Soviet agriculture. Prior to the organisation of collective farms, each peasant worked on his small farm in isolation. Most of the peasants used antiquated implements. Many of them used wooden ploughs, harvested their crops with sickles and scythes and used flails for threshing. Horses and oxen provided the only traction force. The dwarf peasant farms precluded the use of tractors and other modern machinery. The labour of the peasants was of low efficiency. The swing of the bulk of the peasantry towards collective farming signified a transition from backward small individual farming to advanced large-scale collective, mechanised agriculture. The practical experience of the first collective farms showed that even the mere pooling of the peasants' implements resulted in a considerable increase in labour productivity. But the superiority of the collective farms over the small individual farms became even more evident when the former began to use new agricultural equipment — tractors and other machines. Collective labour, using new farm machinery, enabled the peasants to extend their crop areas, to increase the efficiency of agricultural production and systematically to raise their material and cultural level.

Thus the advance of the mass of poor and middle peasants to solid collectivisation meant a profound revolutionary change in the agriculture of the U.S.S.R. It was based on the transformation of the private ownership of the means of production by the working peasantry into social ownership, on the transition from petty individual agricultural production to collective, large-scale socialist production. The reorganisation of agriculture on the basis of collective farms signified tearing up the roots of capitalism in agriculture, the establishment of a socialist system in this highly important branch of the national economy. The basis of the restoration of capitalist elements in agriculture was destroyed, since in the collective farms there was no private ownership of
the means of production and the basic means of livelihood of the collective farmer was now the agricultural artel and his personal labour in it.

This greatest of revolutionary changes in the countryside, the way for which had been paved by the entire course of the country's development, was effected on the initiative and under the leadership of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government with the full support of the working class and with the active participation of broad mass of the working peasantry.

The powerful collective-farm movement necessitated revising the Five-Year Plan with regard to collective-farm development, specifying the time limits of the collectivisation of different areas of the country, and determining the forms and methods to be used in carrying it out. In December 1929 the Central Committee set up a commission under Y. A. Yakovlev, People's Commissar of Agriculture of the U.S.S.R., to study these questions, which were of great practical and theoretical importance. The commission included members and alternate members of the Central Committee and leaders of major Party organisations, among whom were A. A. Andreyev (North Caucasus), K. Y. Bauman (Moscow Region), F. I. Goloshchekin (Kazakhstan), M. M. Khatayevich (Middle Volga), S. V. Kosior (Ukraine), B. P. Sheboldayev (Lower Volga) and I. M. Vareikis (Central Black-Earth Region).

On January 5, 1930, the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) adopted a decision on "The Rate of Collectivisation and State Measures to Assist Collective-Farm Development". In this decision the Central Committee set the Party the task of completing collectivisation in the main by the end of the First Five-Year Plan. Full account was taken of the diversity of conditions in the various territories, regions and non-Russian republics, and of the varying degrees to which the peasants in these areas were ready for collectivisation.

The Central Committee divided the whole country into three groups of areas with different rates of collectivisation. The first group included major grain-growing areas, viz., the North Caucasus, the Middle and the Lower Volga, where the process of collectivisation was to be completed in the main by the spring of 1931. These areas were better prepared than the others for solid collectivisation. The Soviet state gave them priority in supplying them with large numbers of tractors and other agricultural machinery. Here the differentiation of the peasantry was more marked, the class struggle more acute and the poor peasantry better organised; these areas had the largest number of big state and collective farms equipped with up-to-date machinery; here agricultural co-operation was more developed. The Party organisations and the Soviets of these areas had considerable experience in promoting collectivisation. The second group included all the other grain-growing
areas of the country—the Ukraine, the Central Black-Earth Region, Siberia, the Urals, Kazakhstan—where the plan was to complete collectivisation in the main by the spring of 1932. In the rest of the territories, regions and non-Russian republics the process of collectivisation was to be completed in the main by the end of the Five-Year Plan, that is, by 1933.

Proceeding from Lenin’s recommendations on peasant production co-operatives and from the experience of districts with solid collectivisation, the Central Committee of the Party passed the decision that the main form of organisation of the collective-farm movement was to be the agricultural artel, which should collectivise only the use of the land and such means of production as draught animals, agricultural machinery and implements, farm buildings and cattle. As distinct from associations for the joint cultivation of the land and from communes, the agricultural artel could best combine the personal interests of the collective farmers with public interests; this facilitated the education of the individual peasants of yesterday in the spirit of collectivism.

In view of the growing rate of collectivisation, the Central Committee of the Party took steps to accelerate the construction of plants for the production of tractors, harvester combines, tractor-drawn machinery and other complex agricultural machines. The Central Committee emphasised the importance at that stage of the collective-farm movement, of combining mechanical traction with horse traction. The machine-and-tractor stations in all districts of solid collectivisation were fully switched over to servicing the collective farms. State loans totalling 500 million rubles were advanced to the collective farms for the economic year of 1929-30. The expense of demarcation of collective-farm lands was to be borne by the state. A wide network of intensive courses was set up for training skilled collective-farm personnel.

The Central Committee called upon all Party organisations to head the collective-farm movement which was developing from below. At the same time the decision adopted by it firmly warned the Party organisations against any attempts either to check the development of the collective-farm movement or (and especially) to “decree” the collective-farm movement from above in any way.

The decision of the Central Committee embodied the new policy with regard to the kulaks—the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class on the basis of solid collectivisation.

The kulaks were the most numerous exploiting class in the U.S.S.R. When the process of solid collectivisation began, kulak farms constituted about 5 per cent of all the peasant farms in the country. But they still occupied a significant place in agricultural production. In 1927 their crop area under grain was about 25 million acres (the total crop area was 236 million acres); they produced one-fifth of the total marketable grain.
The kulaks were the bitterest enemies of socialism. After the elimination of the landlords and capitalists they were the last mainstay of capitalist restoration in the country. They sabotaged all the measures of the Soviet Government, organised anti-Soviet revolts, terrorised rural activists and tried in every way possible to enslave the poor and middle peasants and subordinate them to their influence. Twice—in 1918 and in the economic year 1927-28—the kulaks made desperate attempts to deprive the Soviet state of grain and thereby to frustrate the government’s socialist measures. The kulaks believed that under the New Economic Policy they would be able to consolidate their position and secure the restoration of the old, capitalist regime in the U.S.S.R. The capitalists of all countries, who dreamed of restoring capitalism in the U.S.S.R., counted on the kulaks.

Since its Eighth Congress the Party had pursued a policy of restricting the exploiting proclivities of the kulaks, a policy of forcing out the capitalist elements. The Soviet Government by its laws on the renting of land and on the employment of hired labour on private farms had limited the scope of kulak production and the kulaks’ opportunities to exploit the working peasants. It had imposed higher taxes on the kulaks, and had required them to sell grain to the state at fixed prices. This policy of restricting the kulaks had only retarded the growth of the kulak class, but did not mean its elimination.

Lenin pointed out that there could be no peace with the kulaks, that the working class must carry on persistent preparatory work to gather the forces for dealing a crushing blow to the kulaks and eliminating them as a class. Lenin said: “We have been, are and shall be in a state of direct civil war with the kulaks” (Collected Works, Vol. 29, p. 139). At the Eleventh Party Congress Lenin warned the Party that the near future would witness “the last and decisive battle” against “Russian capitalism, the one which stems from small-peasant farming and which is fostered by it” (Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 248).

In waging this last and decisive battle against the kulak class, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government relied on the major successes of socialist construction which had been attained by 1930.

The socialist sector in all branches of the national economy had grown and become consolidated: socialist industry was rapidly developing, tens of thousands of new collective farms had sprung up in the countryside. The Party and the Soviet Government now possessed a solid socialist basis both in town and country which made it possible to eliminate the capitalist elements in the U.S.S.R.

The alignment of class forces in the country had changed in favour of socialism. Socialist industrialisation was accompanied by
a considerable growth in the numerical strength of the working class and the enhancement of its leading role in the socialist reorganisation of the countryside and in the struggle of the working peasantry against the kulaks. The working class was vitally interested in eliminating the kulaks, the remaining exploiting class in the country. The growing mass collective-farm movement involved millions of peasant farms. The middle peasants joined the movement too, and together with the poor peasantry waged a decisive struggle against the kulaks. The Party and the Soviet state could now count on the firm support, not only of the working class and the poor peasantry, but also of the middle peasants who had joined the collective farms, and do away with the kulaks as a class.

Furthermore, by 1930 the Soviet Government had created the necessary material basis for replacing the kulak grain output. In 1929 the collective and state farms had gathered in nearly 6½ million tons of grain, of which over 2 million tons were sold to the state. The rapid growth of the collective-farm movement made it certain that in 1930 the collective and state farms would produce not less than 6¼ million tons of marketable grain, i.e., would exceed the 1927 output of the kulak farms severalfold.

The development of the socialist sector of the national economy, the new alignment of class forces in the country and the possession by the state of a solid grain-producing base—the collective and state farms—enabled the Party to proceed at the end of 1929 from the policy of restricting and squeezing out the kulaks to the policy of eliminating them as a class on the basis of solid collectivisation. The essence of this policy was to deprive the kulak class of the means of production essential for its existence and development, namely, the free use of land, the instruments of production, the renting of land and the right to hire labour. This policy was legislatively embodied in a number of decisions adopted by the higher organs of the Soviet state. In districts of solid collectivisation the laws on the renting of land and the hiring of labour on individual peasant farms were repealed.

Solid collectivisation meant that all the land in the area of a particular village passed into the hands of a collective farm. All kulak plots in this land were transferred to the collective farm. Thus the kulaks were deprived not only of the right to rent any land, but also of those plots of land which had been used by them previously. The nationalisation of the land accomplished as a result of the October Revolution made possible such surveying and demarcation of the lands as benefited the collective farms. Lenin pointed out that the nationalisation of the land gave "the proletarian state the maximum opportunity of passing to socialism in agriculture" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 291). The collective farms did not have to make any redemption payments to the peasants for their plots of land, or to recompense them for the lands which
were passing into collective use, since there was no private property in land in the U.S.S.R.

The collectivisation of agriculture proceeded in bitter class struggle with the kulaks, in conditions of a hostile capitalist encirclement. The kulaks carried on malicious propaganda against the collective-farm movement, spread all kinds of provocative rumours, set fire to collective-farm buildings, poisoned the livestock, damaged tractors and other machines, assassinated rural Communists, chairmen of collective farms, rural newspaper correspondents and village activists. They did everything in their power to frustrate collectivisation. The entry of the mass of the peasantry into the collective farms on a mass scale was therefore accompanied by a decisive struggle against the kulaks. The peasants demanded that the state should completely expropriate the kulaks and expel them from the villages.

Supporting in every way the struggle of the poor and middle peasants against the kulaks, the Soviet Government lifted the ban on expropriation of the kulaks. Local organs of Soviet power in the districts of solid collectivisation were granted the right to evict the kulaks to districts far removed from their places of residence and to confiscate all their means of production (cattle, machines and other farm property), transferring them to the possession of collective farms. The kulaks were completely expropriated. This was the only way to deal with the kulaks. These measures fully met the interests of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R., and ensured the success of the collective-farm movement and the consolidation of the collective farms.

Thus, at the very beginning of the mass building of collective farms, the Party, in putting Lenin's co-operative plan into practice, equipped the working class and working peasantry with a specific plan for the struggle to establish a collective-farm system. The propositions of the Central Committee decision on the agricultural artel as the basic form of production co-operation of the peasants, and on the elimination of the kulaks as a class through solid collectivisation, were an elaboration of Lenin's co-operative plan, of Marxist-Leninist theory.

After the adoption by the Central Committee of its decision of January 5, 1930, all Party organisations, particularly in the areas, districts and villages, intensified their work of collectivisation. Rural Communists were the first to join the collective farms, carrying the poor and middle peasants with them. By the spring of 1930 almost 75 per cent of all the rural Communists engaged in agriculture became members of collective farms.

The Party focussed the attention of the Soviets on collectivisation; it put forward the slogan: "The Soviets must turn their face to the collective farms!" The Soviets became the vehicles of the Party's new policy in the countryside. A particularly big part in
the movement for collectivisation was played by the village Soviets, more than 70,000 in number. They united something like four million activists from among the poor and middle peasants. These advanced peasants were initiators of the collective-farm movement.

The Party enlisted the active help of the trade unions in building up the collective farms. It supported the growing movement among city workers to take part in the collectivisation of the countryside. In 1930 the trade unions sent 180,000 teams of workers to the countryside to help in organising collective farms and in the repair of agricultural machinery. A particularly important role in the development of the collective-farm movement was played by the 25,000 front-rank workers who came to work on the collective farms at the beginning of 1930 in response to an appeal of the Party. They were volunteers sent to the countryside by Party and trade union organisations of various plants and factories, by big collectives of workers. Communists constituted about 70 per cent of this body of volunteers.

The Komsomol, too, actively assisted the Party in carrying out collectivisation. By the spring of 1930, 550,000 rural members of the Komsomol—about 50 per cent of the total membership—had joined the collective farms. In the countryside the Komsomol was becoming the organisation of the collective-farm youth.

January and February 1930 were months of particularly rapid growth of the collective farms. The movement for solid collectivisation embraced ever new areas of the country. As of February 20, 1930, the collective farms comprised about 14 million peasant households, or almost 60 per cent of the total number. By then serious mistakes had been registered in collective-farm development along with certain achievements.

Lenin pointed out that the transition of the peasants from individual, private farming to large-scale, collective farming was the most difficult and complicated problem in socialist construction. The fact that this problem was being solved for the first time in history made it even more difficult. Lenin warned against compulsion, particularly with regard to the middle peasants, in setting up collective farms. He stressed that the greatest prudence must be shown in this matter, for the peasant was attached to his household. The resolution of the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) “On the Attitude to the Middle Peasants”, drafted by Lenin, emphasised that “undue haste in this matter is harmful, for it can only strengthen the prejudice of the middle peasantry against innovations” (C.P.S.U in Resolutions, Part I, p. 448). Frederick Engels likewise pointed out in his day that there must be no haste in the peasants’ transition to collective farming.

The experience of collectivisation in the first two months of 1930 showed that Lenin’s important recommendations had been
disregarded. The proportion of collectivisation achieved in February 1930 considerably exceeded the rate envisaged by the January decision of the Central Committee of the Party. This haste was not accidental, for at the end of December 1929 Stalin, speaking at a meeting of Marxists specialising in agrarian problems, had called for a higher rate of collectivisation. He had scorned the warning of Lenin and Engels against the overhasty establishment of peasant co-operatives. Pressure had been exerted on local Party and government organisations, and the harmful practice of hunting for high percentages of collectivisation had been encouraged. On instructions from Stalin, Pravda said in its leading article on February 3, 1930: "The latest collectivisation target—75 per cent of the poor and middle peasant households during 1930 and 1931—is not the limit."

Pressure from above resulted in collectivisation being artificially speeded up. To cite an example, the regional Party committees of the Central Black-Earth Region and Moscow Region pointed out to Communists that collectivisation must be completed in the spring of 1930, although the time allowed by the decision of the Central Committee of the Party was at least two years for the Central Black-Earth Region and at least three years for Moscow Region. The Party organisations of the non-Russian areas—the North Caucasus, Transcaucasia, Central Asia and Kazakhstan—did their best to keep pace with the two regions. As a result, administration by sheer injunction was substituted for painstaking preparatory organising and explanatory work among the peasants. Many peasants were forced into collective farms under threat of "dekulakisation", disfranchisement, and so on. In some areas, the proportion of the "dekulakised" was as high as 15 per cent and that of the disfranchised, between 15 and 20 per cent. Violations of the Leninist principle of voluntary entry into collective farms were resented by the peasants, particularly the middle peasants.

In addition, leadership turned out to be lagging behind the scope of the collective-farm movement. The establishment of peasant production co-operatives, that is, the collectivisation of peasant households, is the first stage envisaged by Lenin's co-operative plan. The important thing at this stage is socialisation of the means of production. Yet this important matter did not receive proper attention at the beginning of the mass collective-farm movement. Territory and regional Party committees turned to the Central Committee, to Stalin, earnestly asking them to put things right in the matter of socialisation in order to preclude eventual excesses. But they got nowhere. The Model Rules for the Agricultural Artel were not published until February 6, 1930. But even they did not make clear how the means of production of the peasants joining collective farms should be socialised. They said nothing about the collective farmers' household allotments, and did not explain what should be done with
regard to socialisation of livestock in the case of households having one cow, and whether or not small livestock and poultry should be socialised. As a result there were fairly numerous instances of skipping the artel form to set up communes, and of forcibly socialising the whole livestock, including small livestock and poultry. This practice was particularly widespread in the Urals and in Siberia.

These facts were resented by the poor and middle peasantry.

Stalin's underestimation of the power of the peasant's attachment to their small, privately-owned households, and his refusal to lend ear to the reasonable proposals made by local Party officials were the greatest miscalculation and a source of numerous mistakes at the beginning of the mass collective-farm movement. The enemies of the Soviet state, and above all the kulaks, took advantage of the mistakes made in collectivisation. Former Whites, Socialist-Revolutionaries and other hidden anti-Soviet elements raised their heads again. The enemy acted with craft and cunning. Every device was used—from provocation to brutal assassination of Communists and active non-Party people in the villages. The class enemies instigated the peasants to slaughter their animals before entering the collective farms, spreading the rumour that all the livestock would be taken away anyhow. Giving way to this provocation of the kulaks, many peasants slaughtered their cows, pigs, sheep and poultry. In the economic year 1929-30 the number of head of cattle in the country decreased by 14.6 million, pigs by one-third, sheep and goats by more than a quarter. Almost all this livestock was slaughtered mainly in February and March 1930. As a result of the mistakes committed in collectivisation and of the hostile actions of the kulaks and their toadies, animal husbandry in the U.S.S.R. suffered a heavy loss from which it could not recover for a long time.

The enemies of Soviet power calculated that the excesses and mistakes committed in the process of collectivisation would incense the peasantry and provoke mass anti-Soviet revolts. They hoped to take advantage of the temporary discontent of a certain section of the middle peasants and win them over. Here and there they succeeded in inciting the peasants to anti-Soviet actions.

Right-opportunist elements likewise attempted here and there to take advantage of the difficulties met with in the collective-farm movement. They tried to discredit all the activity of the Party in the sphere of collectivisation.

The mistakes committed in establishing collective farms threatened to discredit the collective-farm movement and to weaken the entire cause of socialist construction. They were fraught with the danger of breaking up the alliance of the working class and the bulk of the peasantry and undermining the dictatorship of the proletariat.
In the second half of February 1930, as a result of the mistakes made in collectivisation, dangerous signs of resentment on the part of the peasant masses made themselves felt in a number of areas of the country. The reports on the mood of the bulk of the peasantry sent in by local Party organisations were so alarming that the Central Committee of the Party immediately took steps to rectify the mistakes made in collective-farm development.

At the end of February 1930 the leaders of a number of territory and regional Party organisations met to discuss problems of collectivisation. The speakers pointed out that there were no clear-cut directives on socialisation; they criticised Pravda and its recommendations for hastening collectivisation. Among those who took the floor were M. I. Kalinin and G. K. Orjonikidze, members of the Political Bureau of the C.C., and others who had just toured various republics, territories and regions. M. I. Kalinin said that in the Central Black-Earth Region he “saw no particular tendency to overdo things, to break and crush”. “The breaking-up being done in the localities,” he said, “is a necessary minimum that cannot be dispensed with. In this respect, people there are using methods that are more correct than Pravda occasionally advocates.” G. K. Orjonikidze, who had made a trip to the Ukraine, said that “people there are doing a very good job, and there are no deviations at all”. Pointing out shortcomings in collectivisation, he said that “the Central Committee gives general directives and provides general leadership... But we must explain on the spot what has to be done in each particular case, for local officials seek the answer to this or that question in Pravda, which often recommends the wrong thing.”

At the instance of the leaders of local Party organisations and a number of members of the Political Bureau of the C.C., the Central Committee late in February specified and amended the Model Rules for the Agricultural Artel, which were published in the press on March 2, 1930. The Rules clarified the issue of socialisation of the means of production. The Central Committee also adopted decisions on the procedure of collectivisation in the non-Russian republics of Transcaucasia and Central Asia and in the non-Russian areas of the R.S.F.S.R. It warned Party organisations against transplanting the forms and methods of collectivisation used in advanced regions better prepared for collectivisation to the non-Russian regions of the country. It called for concentrating on preparatory work in connection with collectivisation, with due regard to the national and economic characteristics of the regions concerned.

On March 2, 1930, Pravda carried Stalin’s article “Dizzy with Success”. Stalin had written it on instructions from the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party but had not agreed it with other members of the Political Bureau. The article had a double effect. As it stressed that compulsory collectivisation was
impermissible, it was favourably received by the middle peasants. On the other hand, it dealt one-sidedly with the reasons for the mistakes made. Although collectivisation had been urged from above, by Stalin, he used his article to put the blame for the mistakes in collective-farm development entirely on local officials, whom he groundlessly accused of bungling. This is why the content and tenor of his article came as a surprise to the Party, and caused a certain perplexity among its rank and file. The peasants began to withdraw from the collective farms in large numbers. It was all the Party organisations could do to cope with the situation created in the countryside. The kulaks and various other elements opposed to collective farming profited by these developments to discredit the collective farms, rural Party and government organisations, and officials who had been carrying out collectivisation. Despite the difficulties, the Party organisations concerned stood their ground, and proved capable of revising their methods. The wave of open actions against collective farms began to subside.

On March 14, 1930, the Central Committee adopted its resolution “On Measures to Combat the Distortions of the Party Line in the Collective-Farm Movement”. The resolution pointed out that these distortions of the Party line were “the principal hindrance to the further growth of the collective-farm movement, and a direct service rendered to our class enemies” (*C.P.S.U. in Resolutions*, Part II, p. 670). The Central Committee instructed Party organisations to put an end to the practice of forced collectivisation, and at the same time to continue persistent efforts to draw the peasants into the collective-farm movement on a voluntary basis, to concentrate attention on completing the economic organisation of the collective farms and making them economically strong.

The Party made a sober analysis of the situation in the countryside and set out to remedy the mistakes committed. Party organisations began with determination to normalise the situation, concentrating on the organisational and economic structure of the new collective farms in accordance with the recommendations of the Model Rules for the Agricultural Artel. Mistakes and setbacks in collective-farm development did not shake the Party’s conviction that Lenin’s co-operative plan and the policy of collectivisation were correct. In rectifying mistakes and removing shortcomings in collectivisation, the Party made clear to the peasants that collective farming was the only correct way of deliverance from kulak bondage and from poverty and ignorance, and that only collective farming led to a free and happy life.

The energetic measures which were adopted to put right the mistakes made in collective-farm development set the minds of the peasants at rest. The proper Leninist approach to the middle peasant was restored. Thus the schemes of our enemies to utilise the
discontent of the middle peasantry against Soviet power were frustrated.

In the course of the rectification of the mistakes committed, the sham collective farms, collective farms formed on paper, fell to pieces, and the wavering elements of the peasantry withdrew from the collective farms. The percentage of collectivisation and the number of collective farms in the country decreased. Only the staunchest elements of the working peasantry remained in the collective farms; they were firmly convinced of the necessity for collectivisation and of the correctness of the policy pursued by the Party and the Soviet state.

The Party took a number of additional measures to consolidate the success of collectivisation. On April 2, 1930, the Central Committee adopted a decision: "The Granting of Privileges to Collective Farms." By this decision the livestock of the collective farms and of the collective farmers was exempted from taxation for a period of two years. By the time of the spring sowing the collective farms had received from the state an interest-free seed loan of close on a million tons of grain. The material and technical basis of socialist agriculture was being created at an accelerated rate. In June 1930 the Dzerzhinsky Tractor Works and the Rostov Agricultural Machinery Plant were put into operation. The Zaporozhye Harvesting Machinery Works was re-gearied to production of harvester combines. Many other agricultural machinery works were being built and reconstructed. By the spring of 1930 the Soviet state had organised 158 machine-and-tractor stations, their number increasing to 961 by the end of the same year. More than 30,000 tractors were at the disposal of these stations. In addition, the collective farms possessed over 13,000 tractors.

The Party remedied the mistakes and the distortions of the Party line committed in the process of collectivisation, and consolidated the first successes of collectivisation. By July 1, 1930, there were about 86,000 collective farms in the country, embracing six million peasant households. Nearly a quarter of all the poor and middle peasants (23.6 per cent) had firmly embarked on the path of collective-farm development. Enemy calculations that the spring sowing would be frustrated fell through; on the contrary, the first collective-farm spring sowing was successful, the collective farmers working with great enthusiasm.

While developing the mass collective-farm movement, the Party was at the same time busily engaged in carrying out the industrialisation of the country. During the first two years of the Five-Year Plan the output of large-scale industry increased almost by 63 per cent, and that of the industries producing means of production by 86 per cent. By 1930, for the first time in the history of the country, the share of industrial output in the national economy predominated over that of agriculture.
The rapid growth of socialist industry and of socialist forms of economy in the countryside widened the front of the offensive against the capitalist elements. Before 1929 the energetic offensive against the capitalist elements had been waged chiefly in the towns—in industry and trade. Agricultural production remained almost unsocialised. But with the radical turn of the bulk of the peasantry towards collective farming, the offensive against the capitalist elements assumed a general character, developing into an offensive along the whole front, in both town and country.

Such was the situation when the Party held its Sixteenth Congress (from June 26 to July 13, 1930), which has gone down in history as the Congress of the full-scale offensive of socialism along the whole front.

The delegates to the Congress represented 1,260,874 Party members and 711,609 candidate members. During the period between the Fifteenth and Sixteenth congresses more than 600,000 workers joined the ranks of the Party. Industrial workers at the bench constituted about 50 per cent of the entire membership of the Party. The Sixteenth Congress heard and discussed the political and organisational reports of the Central Committee, the reports of the Central Control Commission and of the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) in the Executive Committee of the Communist International. It also discussed the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan for industry, the collective-farm movement and the advance of agriculture, as well as the tasks of the trade unions in the period of reconstruction. Reports to the Congress were presented by J. V. Stalin, G. K. Orjonikidze, V. V. Kuibyshev, Y. A. Yakovlev and N. M. Shvernik.

The report of the Central Committee pointed out that the period since the Fifteenth Party Congress had been a period of a serious test for two opposite economic systems in the world arena—the Soviet and the capitalist system. The Soviet system of economy had successfully stood the test and demonstrated its tremendous superiority. The U.S.S.R. was the only country which had not been affected by the world economic crisis.

The superiority of the Soviet system of economy over the capitalist showed itself most vividly in the high rates of development of socialist industry. But while the U.S.S.R. had outstripped all the principal capitalist countries in rates of industrial development, it was still far behind them as regards the level of industrial development. In 1929 the U.S.S.R. held fifth place in the world in the output of steel (after the U.S.A., Britain, Germany and France), sixth place in the output of pig-iron and coal, and ninth place in the output of electric power.

Particularly intolerable was the Soviet Union’s lag in the output of the steel and iron industry. In 1929 the output of pig-iron in the U.S.S.R. was 4 million tons, while in the U.S.A. it was about 43 million tons, in Germany, 13.2 million tons, in France,
10.3 million tons and in Britain, 7.7 million tons. The U.S.S.R. reached and somewhat exceeded the pre-war level of output of pig-iron only in 1930.

The lag of the iron and steel industry impeded the development of the national economy and compelled the U.S.S.R. to import pig-iron from other countries. In 1930, for example, the U.S.S.R. imported 700,000 tons of pig-iron, and in 1931, 1,600,000 tons. The interests of socialist construction, of ensuring the economic independence of the U.S.S.R. and of making good its technical and economic backwardness, urgently required that the rate of development of the iron and steel industry be accelerated.

The Sixteenth Party Congress instructed the Central Committee to give priority to the development of heavy industry as the basis of socialist construction, step up the development of the iron and steel industry and create in the eastern areas, in the immediate future, a second coal and metallurgical centre, namely, the Urals-Kuznetsk Works. The Congress directed the attention of the Party to the importance of developing and reconstructing the country's transport system, which was becoming one of the bottle-necks in the national economy. Prominent in the Congress decisions were problems of the development of the light industries, the provision of agriculture with large numbers of tractors and other machinery, and the restoration and development of animal husbandry. The Congress stressed the decisive importance of training leading executive, business and technical cadres.

The rapid rate of socialist industrialisation proved possible, above all, because the Party was able to organise socialist emulation on a large scale, to stimulate the labour enthusiasm of millions of workers. By the time of the Sixteenth Party Congress more than two million workers were taking part in socialist emulation, while over a million workers belonged to shock brigades. The working class was battling for higher rates of socialist industrialisation. Emulation was developing with the watchword of “The Five-Year Plan in four years!” The Sixteenth Congress instructed the Central Committee of the Party “to ensure that the spirited Bolshevik tempo of socialist construction be maintained, and that the Five-Year Plan be actually fulfilled in four years” (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part III, p. 22).

The Congress defined the tasks of the trade unions in the period of reconstruction. The role of the trade unions in the development of the national economy was to be greatly enhanced. Their main task became that of developing socialist emulation. The Congress called upon the trade unions to improve the work of the production conferences in the factories, to devote more attention to the training of skilled workers, to encourage the promotion of advanced workers and specialists to economic posts, to combat inertia and red tape which were shackling the workers’ initiative and creative activity.
The Sixteenth Congress of the Party stressed the great significance of the mass collective-farm movement for the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. The resolution of the Congress, "The Collective-Farm Movement and the Advance of Agriculture", stated:

"While the confiscation of the landed estates was the first step of the October Revolution in the countryside, the transition to collective farming is the second and, moreover, decisive step, marking a most important stage in laying the foundations of socialist society in the U.S.S.R." (ibid., p. 60).

By the summer of 1930 collectivisation in the principal grain-growing regions embraced 40 to 50 per cent of the peasant households. The crop area of the collective farms reached 90,000,000 acres. The collective farms could supply the state with more than half the marketable grain. This meant that from now on the future of agriculture in the U.S.S.R. would be decided not by individual farms but by the collective and state farms.

The relative position of the different forms of economy in the U.S.S.R. was undergoing a change. Socialist relations of production which had up to now leaned almost exclusively on socialist industry, now began to lean also on the rapidly expanding socialist sector in agriculture. The question of the social basis of Soviet power in the countryside now bore a new aspect. Before the movement for solid collectivisation Soviet power had relied on the poor peasantry, the middle peasant being the ally of the working class in the struggle against the kulaks and for the victory of socialism. Now, in the districts of solid collectivisation, the whole collective-farm peasantry, as noted by the Sixteenth Party Congress, became "a real and firm mainstay of Soviet power" (ibid., p. 52).

By the time of the Sixteenth Congress of the Party certain successes had been attained in the cultural revolution. The Congress, however, considered the rate of cultural development insufficient, and set the task of introducing, in the immediate future, universal and compulsory elementary education and ending illiteracy throughout the country.

The Congress recorded that the Party had achieved successes in socialist construction thanks to the steady implementation of its general line and its determined struggle against Trotskyism and the Right deviation. It stated that the Trotskyists had completely sunk to counter-revolutionary, Menshevik positions. In conditions of the full-scale offensive of socialism along the whole front, the Right deviation was the main danger in the Party, since its adherents had objectively become agents of the kulaks in the Party. The Congress summed up the results of the struggle of the Party against the Right deviation and reaffirmed the decision of the November 1929 plenary meeting of the Central Committee, which said that the views of the Right opposition were incompatible with membership of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
Noting with satisfaction the growing fraternal co-operation among the peoples of the Soviet Union the Congress drew the attention of the Party to the necessity of waging a persistent fight against deviations on the national question, namely, dominant-nation chauvinism, which was the principal danger, and local nationalism. The Congress called upon all members of the Party to defend the Party's unity and instructed the Central Committee to continue "mercilessly to repulse any attempts to weaken and undermine iron Party discipline and the unity of Lenin's Party" (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part III, p. 22).

The Sixteenth Party Congress adopted the policy of reconstructing all branches of the national economy on the basis of modern technology. This reconstruction would put an end to the age-long backwardness of the country, strengthen its economic independence, provide the material and technical basis for socialism and raise the country's defence capacity. It would enable the Soviet country to overtake and outstrip, technically and economically, the developed capitalist countries in the shortest period of time.

Technical reconstruction was an indispensable condition for the successful offensive of socialism along the whole front. It facilitated the reorganisation of the old social and economic system in agriculture, the amalgamation of the small, individual peasant households in large collective farms and the tearing up of the roots of capitalism in the economy of the U.S.S.R.

The reconstruction of the technical base of industry and agriculture, with production organised on socialist lines, created conditions for a further, still more rapid development of the country's productive forces, rise in labour productivity, increase of output and improvement in the welfare of the working people.

3. The Organising and Political Work of the Party in the Period of the Full-Scale Offensive of Socialism Along the Whole Front

Armed with the decisions of the Sixteenth Congress, the Party continued to develop the offensive of socialism along the whole front. The main task was to accelerate the rate of socialist construction.

The First Five-Year Plan period was a period of new construction. Hundreds of big plants, pits, mines, and power stations were being erected on the vast territory of the Soviet Union. New towns and industrial settlements were making their appearance. New main railways were being laid. Thousands of collective farms, state farms and machine-and-tractor stations were being organised. New schools, clubs and hospitals were being built everywhere. During the First Five-Year Plan period there were commissioned every day, on the average: one industrial enterprise, two state farms,
one or two machine-and-tractor stations, and about 115 collective farms. But this construction was of an unusual nature. The newly erected enterprises were not ordinary plants or farms; they were enterprises of a socialist type. Each new plant, collective farm or machine-and-tractor station was a new stronghold of socialism.

The tremendous scale of new industrial construction and the socialist reconstruction of agriculture demanded from the Party a higher level of political and organising work. The Party had in practice to organise the creative activity of tens of millions of people both on a country-wide scale and at each building site, each factory, each collective farm. It was necessary to work out new forms and methods for the practical guidance of socialist construction, to bring all the levels of the dictatorship of the proletariat closer to the masses, to production. The Party was aware of the increased difficulties of organising work in the conditions of the full-scale socialist offensive, and understood its significance for the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. It remembered Lenin’s words that problems of organisation were the most difficult problems of the socialist revolution, since it was a question of radically reorganising the entire economic life of the country on socialist lines, and of remoulding the very foundations of the lives of tens of millions of people.

The Party regrouped its ranks in conformity with the tasks of the socialist offensive along the whole front.

Fulfilling the decision of the Sixteenth Congress to shift the stress of Party work to the factory shop and the workers’ team, the Central Committee carried out in the period between 1930 and 1932 a reorganisation of the Party groups in the factories. As a result of the tremendous growth of the Party, a large number of Party groups in the towns had become big organisations numbering many thousands of Communists. In view of this, the Central Committee of the Party recommended setting up at all industrial enterprises with not less than 500 Communists, factory Party committees, shop Party branches, and Party groups in the workers’ teams. This reorganisation improved Party work at the factories and increased the Party’s influence among the mass of the workers. The factory Party organisations began to devote more attention to production. With a view to improving the guidance of Party organisations, town Party committees were set up in towns with a population exceeding 50,000.

The Party organisations in the countryside were also reorganised. Most of the rural Party groups had been formed on the territorial principle. By June 1930 there were about 30,000 Party groups in the countryside embracing 404,000 Communists. Of this number, 263,000 Communists were members of territorial Party groups, 115,000 of collective-farm groups, and 26,000 of Party groups in state farms and machine-and-tractor stations. In districts of solid
collectivisation, Communist collective farmers were transferred from village territorial groups to Party groups in collective farms. In big collective farms, machine-and-tractor stations and state farms new Party groups were set up and old ones reinforced. They became the strongholds of Party work in the countryside. Soon after the Sixteenth Congress areas (okruga), as administrative and territorial divisions, were abolished while the districts (rayony) were reinforced as the main link of socialist construction in the countryside. The Party leading bodies were thus brought closer to the basic Party organisations, the collective farms and the peasant masses. They became more flexible and efficient.

The Party also took measures to enhance the organising role of the Soviets. The high rates of socialist construction necessitated smooth and efficient work of the state apparatus at all levels. But quite a number of workers of the Soviet apparatus had become bureaucrats, had lost touch with real life and did not try to understand the new tasks. The Party developed criticism and self-criticism to disclose shortcomings in the work of the Soviet institutions, and organised a cleansing of the state apparatus. Thousands of advanced workers at the bench were promoted to leading Soviet posts. The Central Control Commission—Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection and its local bodies contributed towards improving the machinery of the state. After the Sixteenth Party Congress A. A. Andreyev was appointed Chairman of the Central Control Commission and People’s Commissar of Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection of the U.S.S.R.

In order to establish closer contact between economic management and enterprise, and the better to ensure the development of the decisive branches of the national economy, some of the people’s commissariats were split up. For example, the Supreme Council of National Economy was reorganised into three People’s Commissariats for the Heavy, Light and Timber Industries. A number of leading Party people were placed at the head of the key branches of economic construction: V. V. Kuibyshev as Chairman of the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R., G. K. Orjonikidze as People’s Commissar for Heavy Industry of the U.S.S.R., A. I. Mikoyan as People’s Commissar for Supply of the U.S.S.R.

The trade unions, which numbered 11.5 million members by the time of the Sixteenth Party Congress, were also reorganised. The Party strove for a real turn by the trade unions to the problems of production and for their active participation in socialist construction. The trade unions cleansed their leading bodies of Right-wing defeatist elements. The Central Committee of the Party reinforced the leadership of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. N. M. Shvernik was elected its First Secretary. On the initiative of the Central Committee the trade unions were subdivided into smaller units. They began to make a more thorough study of
the various branches of industry, to give more practical guidance to their local organisations and to give better service to the workers.

The organising work of the Party was directed primarily at accelerating the rate of new industrial construction. The Party sent its best cadres and the best forces of the working class to the construction sites of a number of industrial giants—the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station, the Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk iron and steel works, the Berezniki and Neva chemical works, the Urals Heavy Engineering Works, the Novo-Kramatorsk Engineering Plant, the Chelyabinsk and Kharkov tractor plants, the Moscow and Gorky automobile plants, the Saratov Combine Harvester Plant, and others. The Central Commitee of the Party exercised day-to-day guidance of the construction of big enterprises and sought persistently to ensure the commissioning of every new works, every new power station, by the time fixed.

The new construction projects envisaged by the Five-Year Plan, especially in Moscow, the Urals, Western Siberia, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Gorky and Saratov, occupied the main attention of the local Party organisations. A tremendous amount of work was done at the construction sites by the Party groups, of which Communists sent from town and factory Party organisations constituted the core. They organised the building workers who were arriving from different parts of the country, mainly from the countryside, pulled together the new collectives of these workers and helped them to work effectively.

The political work of the Party among the masses was geared to the task of ensuring high rates of socialist construction. The Party explained to the masses the necessity for accelerating the rates of socialist industrialisation, and did not conceal from them the difficulties involved. It developed the political consciousness of the workers and of the technical personnel, encouraged their creative activity, mobilised them to overcome the difficulties of socialist construction and to fulfil the Five-Year Plan for industry in four years.

In conditions of the colossal construction during the years of the First Five-Year Plan the country had to put up with many privations and hardships. It was still a poor country. There was a shortage of clothing, footwear, and many other articles of prime necessity. At the construction sites the workers lived in tents and temporary wooden barracks. Foodstuffs and many manufactured goods were rationed. All these difficulties were shouldered primarily by the working class. But the workers realised that, in conditions of a hostile capitalist encirclement, there was no other way of transforming their country into a mighty industrial power. They realised that industry could be built up only at the cost of sacrifice and the most rigorous economy. Stinting themselves in
everything, and tightening their belts, the workers displayed unprecedented labour heroism. The working class and all the working people were firmly convinced of the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R., of the correctness of the policy of the Party; and they advanced unwaveringly towards their goal. The unity, high degree of organisation and selflessness of the working class exerted a tremendous moral influence on the poor and middle peasants who were developing the collective-farm movement. Particularly great was the labour enthusiasm of the youth. Tens of thousands of young people responded to the appeal of the Party and were sent by the Komsomol organisations to work in still undeveloped localities, and to construction sites in the Urals, Kuznetsk coalfield, Donets coalfield, Far East and Central Asia.

Mobilising the creative activity of the working class for the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan in four years, the Central Committee of the Party in September 1930 addressed an appeal to the workers calling on them to organise socialist emulation for successful fulfilment of the targets of the third year of the Five-Year Plan. There was not a single enterprise where the workers did not respond to this appeal of the Party. The socialist emulation movement developed with still greater force throughout the country. The atmosphere at the factories changed, and with it their habitual tenor of life. Workers at kindred construction sites, factories and plants began to exchange their labour experience, while production reviews and competitions for the best shop and workers’ team were organised in individual factories. More and more indices of the work of advanced workers’ teams and shock workers appeared on the boards of honour in factories and at construction sites. The number of heroes of labour steadily grew.

New forms of socialist emulation originated which were quickly taken up by Party, trade union and Komsomol organisations and spread throughout the country. In the summer of 1930 the workers of the Karl Marx Works in Leningrad, after discussing the target figures of their enterprise for the economic year 1930-31, drew up a counter-plan for output and financial economy exceeding those provided for in the state plan. They called upon all enterprises to follow their example. Soon this movement of counter-planning extended to the majority of factories, and marked the beginning of collective forms of emulation. The workers of the Ilyich Plant in Mariupol took the lead in drawing up shift counter-plans. In the beginning of 1931 the movement of cost-accounting workers’ teams originated in Leningrad. By April 1932 the number of such teams was already 155,000.

The basic form of socialist emulation during the First Five-Year Plan period was the shock-brigade movement. This movement carried on and developed the splendid traditions of the communist subbotniki. The political work of the Party was concentrated in
the shock brigades, which were headed by the most competent and energetic workers, who were most often Communists or members of the Komsomol. Many of these workers attended workers' faculties and technical schools without giving up their jobs, and upon graduation became shop managers or directors of factories.

The initiators and organisers of socialist emulation were Party organisations, Communists and members of the Komsomol. In the period of the First Five-Year Plan every sixth experienced worker was a Communist. By the autumn of 1932 the Party organisations at the biggest industrial enterprises had fulfilled the directive of the Sixteenth Party Congress: almost all the members of the Party and the Komsomol had been drawn into socialist emulation. The number of Communists in the leading shops and key sectors of the factories increased. Communists became coal-hewers and machine-tool operators, worked at blast or open-hearth furnaces and on the scaffolding at construction sites. Their labour heroism inspired the mass of the workers.

For outstanding services in socialist construction in the First Five-Year Plan period more than 600 shock workers, engineers, technicians and business executives were awarded the Order of Lenin, which had been instituted in April 1930; about 400 foremost people in socialist emulation were awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labour. The heroes of labour became well known throughout the country; they enjoyed the profound respect of the whole people.

The Party and the Soviet state combined measures of moral encouragement with those which gave the workers a material incentive to raise the productivity of labour. New and improved wage scales were introduced in industry, which provided for differentials reflecting the difference between skilled and unskilled labour, between heavy and light work.

Year after year the socialist emulation movement became more widespread. By the end of 1932 almost 75 per cent of all the workers were taking part in it. The Soviet intelligentsia too was actively participating in socialist emulation. The successes attained in socialist construction and the universal labour enthusiasm beneficially affected the attitude of the old technical intelligentsia, who in their vast majority began to take an active part in socialist construction. Emulation spread also to the countryside. Following the example of the factory workers, collective farmers and workers at state farms and machine-and-tractor stations started a drive for improved collective- and state-farm production and for a higher level of labour productivity. Socialist emulation and shock work became a nation-wide movement. Soviet people were labouring in the sphere of peaceful socialist construction with the same enthusiasm and heroism that they had displayed when fighting for Soviet power during the Revolution and the Civil War.
Never before had history known such an upsurge of creative activity of the mass of the people. The enthusiasm of new construction seized upon millions of workers. The mass movement of the workers to raise labour productivity appreciably reduced construction schedules and ensured the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan ahead of time. At Magnitogorsk and the Dnieper Hydroelectric projects, advanced teams of building workers established new world records in the pouring of concrete. The first turbine of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station was installed in 36 days, instead of the 90 days provided for by the plan. The machine assembly shop of the Moscow Automobile Works assembled 1,200 machine-tools during one month.

New industrial giants came into operation one after another. In 1931 the Kharkov Tractor Works, the Moscow Automobile Works, the Urals Copper-Smelting Works, and the first section of the Urals Heavy Engineering Works were commissioned. At the beginning of 1932 the Gorky Automobile Works and the Saratov Combine Harvester Works were put into service. In February 1932 the first Magnitogorsk blast furnace, and in April of the same year the first Kuznetsk blast furnace, went into operation. The coal output of the Kuznetsk coalfield increased almost threefold in the First Five-Year Plan period. With the commissioning of the first blast furnaces of the Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk iron and steel works, and the simultaneous development of the Kuznetsk coalfield, a firm foundation was laid for the creation of a new powerful coal and metallurgical base in the east of the U.S.S.R.

Big towns sprang up around the new industrial giants. Particularly rapid was the growth of Magnitogorsk and Novokuznetsk. At the end of 1929, when the foundation of a giant iron and steel works was being laid in distant Siberia, the poet Vladimir Mayakovsky, in verses dedicated to the workers of the Kuznetsk project, wrote:

\[
\text{That garden shall be blooming,}
\]
\[
\text{that city must arise}
\]
\[
\text{when Soviet Russia has such men}
\]
\[
\text{as those before my eyes.}
\]

Indeed, within a short two and a half years after building work began, a big town with a population of more than 100,000 had arisen on what had been a wilderness, and the Kuznetsk Iron and Steel Works began to produce its first pig-iron. Both the town and the plant were the fruit of the labour of Soviet people who were building and at the same time acquiring experience and knowledge.
Yesterday's navvies, concreters and assemblers became blast-furnace men and steel founders. I. P. Bardin, the construction chief, one of the first outstanding engineers who after the October Revolution devoted himself to the service of the people, to building up Soviet metallurgy, became an academician.

The remnants of the defeated exploiting classes and their toadies furiously resisted the victorious advance of socialism in the U.S.S.R. The hostile forces of the capitalist encirclement in every way possible supported their struggle against Soviet power, seeking to frustrate the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan and socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. In 1930 and 1931 three big counter-revolutionary organisations were uncovered. The "Industrial Party" included the leading group of the old bourgeois technical intelligentsia, which engaged in wrecking activities in industry. The so-called "Working Peasant Party", which had its centre in the People's Commissariat for Agriculture, expressed the interests of the kulak class and sought to frustrate collectivisation. The Menshevik counter-revolutionary group, the "All-Union Bureau of the R.S.D.L.P." was active in the State Planning Commission, the Supreme Council of National Economy, the State Bank, the Central Union of Consumers' Co-operative Societies, and in other organisations.

All the participants of these counter-revolutionary organisations were publicly tried, and their crimes against the people and the workers' and peasants' state exposed. The wreckers had been in close touch with Russian capitalists and Whites who had fled abroad. Supported by a number of bourgeois states, they had engaged in wrecking activities and espionage, with the object of overthrowing Soviet power and restoring capitalism in the U.S.S.R.

The criminal activities of these counter-revolutionary groups aroused the indignation of the people. Soviet people realised the necessity for the greatest vigilance and firmness towards all enemies who desperately resisted the building of a new society in which there was no place for exploitation and oppression. Big meetings of factory workers and collective farmers were held at which their participants demanded severe punishment of the traitors. The proletarian court passed severe and just sentences on the exposed enemies of the people. In answer to the subversive activities of the remnants of the internal counter-revolution and world imperialism, the workers, collective farmers and intelligentsia rallied still closer round the Communist Party and redoubled their labour efforts and political activity.

The Party inspired and organised the full-scale construction of socialism. It did much to raise the ideological standard of its cadres and all Communists. It steadily promoted inner-Party discipline, got rid of alien elements, and demanded of one-time opportunists that they take an active part in socialist construction. The Central Committee and the Central Control Commission firmly
upheld Party unity and resolutely foiled all opportunist attempts to shake Party discipline and check socialist construction.

A joint plenary meeting of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, held in December 1930, removed Rykov, one of the leaders of the Right opposition, from the Political Bureau. He was also relieved of the post of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. V. M. Molotov was appointed to this post.

4. The Party's Struggle for the Technical Re-equipment of the National Economy. Further Spread of the Collective-Farm Movement. Organisational and Economic Consolidation of the Collective Farms. Results of the First Five-Year Plan

Re-equipment of the national economy on the basis of up-to-date technique was a most important condition for the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. and a means of accelerating socialist construction. Lenin stated:

"Only when the country has been electrified, when industry, agriculture, and transport have been placed on the technical basis of modern large-scale industry, only then shall we be fully victorious" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 484).

In keeping with Lenin's directions, the Sixteenth Party Congress advanced the task of radically reconstructing all branches of the national economy on the most up-to-date technical lines. But this task called for eliminating the dearth of technique in the U.S.S.R. Thus technique became of decisive importance in the reconstruction period. The national economy could be re-equipped only on the basis of a highly developed engineering industry. It was, therefore, necessary not only to develop Soviet engineering, but to do it in the minimum of time.

The Party energetically set out to build a Soviet engineering industry, and ensured it a higher rate of development compared with the other branches of industry. Machine-tool construction, tool-making and the manufacture of other industrial equipment, which constitute the basis of engineering, were developed at a particularly accelerated tempo.

The reconstruction of old machine-tool plants and the erection of new ones (such as the Moscow Capstan-Lathe Works, the Gorky Milling-Machine Works, and others) were carried out with the greatest possible speed. The stock of machine-tools in operation rapidly grew. More than 50,000 metal-cutting lathes were produced in the period of the First Five-Year Plan. The output of such lathes increased from 2,000 in 1928 to 19,700 in 1932. The successes attained in machine-tool construction and in the production of other new industrial equipment made it possible completely to reconstruct the engineering industry and to create a number of new branches.
within it, such as heavy engineering, production of tractors and harvester combines, and an aircraft industry. The advanced technique of the capitalist countries was also widely utilised in the technical re-equipment of Soviet industry.

Thanks to the efforts of the Party and of the working class, the Five-Year Plan programme for engineering was fulfilled in three years. Since 1931 engineering has occupied the leading place in the country's industry. By the end of the Five-Year Plan period the gross output of engineering and metal-working had increased fourfold as compared with that of 1928 and sevenfold as compared with that of 1913. Technically, the U.S.S.R. became one of the most advanced countries in the world, ranking second in world engineering after the U.S.A. The task set by the Fourteenth Party Congress—to convert the U.S.S.R. from a country importing machinery into a country producing machinery and other equipment by its own efforts—was in the main accomplished. This was a tremendous victory in the sphere of the socialist industrialisation of the country. The national economy of the U.S.S.R. was being put on a powerful technical basis, which made possible the reconstruction of all its various branches.

First of all, Soviet industry itself was being given firm foundations. All its branches began to be supplied with new machinery. The bringing into being of a heavy engineering industry was of paramount importance for the technical re-equipment of industry as a whole. In 1931 industry began to turn out powerful machines and equipment for power stations (among them the country's first turbine with a capacity of 50,000 kw), for the iron and steel industry (including the first Soviet blooming mill), and for the coal industry.

The next step was the reconstruction of the railways which were in a backward state and hampered the development of socialist construction. In 1931 the question of the railways was discussed twice (in June and in October) by plenary meetings of the Central Committee of the Party. Electrification of the railways was declared the main link in the reconstruction process. In 1931 Soviet industry began to produce diesel locomotives, and in 1932, electric locomotives. Work was begun on the electrification of railway lines in the Urals and in the Donets and Kuznetsk coalfields, on reconstruction of railway tracks and mechanisation of loading and unloading operations. The output of locomotives and railway cars almost doubled in the Five-Year Plan period.

The supply of new types of machinery to the building industry made it possible to start on the complete reconstruction of a number of old towns and to accelerate the building of new towns. In June 1931 a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Party discussed "The Moscow Municipal Economy and the Development of Municipal Economy in the U.S.S.R." It was the first time
that the Party discussed this question on such a broad scale. The plenary meeting instructed the Moscow Party Committee and the Moscow Soviet to work out a scientifically grounded plan for the reconstruction of Moscow, which would provide for properly thought-out urban development, in particular for new housing and municipal schemes, for the construction of big heat and power plants, an underground railway, and a canal linking the Moskva River with the Volga. Large-scale reconstruction work was also planned in Leningrad, Kharkov, Baku, Gorky, Dnepropetrovsk, Rostov-on-Don and other cities. New towns were to be built in the Urals, in the Donets, Kuznetsk and Moscow coalfields.

Soviet agriculture too was being completely reconstructed technically. In the First Five-Year Plan its tractor fleet grew to 120,000 tractors with a total capacity of 1,900,000 h.p. The machine-and-tractor stations and state and collective farms received agricultural machinery to the value of 1,600 million rubles. The machine-and-tractor stations and state farms were the principal levers in the technical re-equipment of agriculture. By the end of 1932 there were already 2,446 machine-and-tractor stations in the country with a fleet of tractors exceeding 75,000. The establishment of the machine-and-tractor stations signified a profound technical revolution in agriculture and the abolition of its age-old backwardness.

But with the steady influx of modern machinery into all branches of the national economy, another difficulty arose—an acute shortage of people capable of organising the new branches of production and operating the complex machinery. The newly erected industrial enterprises needed technically competent administrative and business cadres, engineers and technicians fully answering the requirements of the science and technology of the day, and skilled workers able to operate the new machines. The Party first encountered this difficulty at the Dzerzhinsky Tractor Works: the plant had been built in record time—11 months—but more than a year was taken up in learning how to run it. Many of the plant's engineers, technicians and workers did not know how to handle the new machinery, how to co-ordinate their work in production-line conditions.

This backwardness in mastering the new branches of production and new technique threatened to retard socialist construction. The biggest danger was that a certain section of Communist business executives underrated the role of technique and did not realise the urgent necessity of raising the level of their own technical knowledge. Among the industrial managers were numerous promoted workers who were good organisers, but lacked special technical training. Many of them continued to hold the old views on technique current in the restoration period, and did not understand that in the new conditions, i.e., in the period of the technical reconstruction of the entire national economy, it was impossible to manage big industrial enterprises without proper technical knowledge.
Such business executives often fully entrusted the technical management of production to “experts”, reserving to themselves the function of “general” direction. At that time the percentage of Communists among the specialists with a higher education was insignificant. Among the technical personnel there were still many old experts, some of whom were politically unstable and even hostile towards Soviet power.

The Party realised in good time the danger of lagging behind in mastering new machinery. An important part in turning the attention of the Party, trade unions, business executives and the working class to the importance of mastering technique was played by the First All-Union Conference of Workers of Socialist Industry, held at the end of January 1931, on the initiative of the Central Committee of the Party.

The Party advanced the slogan: “Bolsheviks must master technique!” The struggle to put this slogan into effect was given priority attention by all Party, trade union, economic and Komsomol organisations.

In June 1931 the Central Committee of the Party convened a conference of business executives which considered the new conditions of industrial development and new methods of management. It defined the most important principles of socialist management in industry in the new conditions. These were the organised recruitment of labour power, overhauling of the wages system, better organisation of work, better cost-accounting, enlistment of the active co-operation of the old technical intelligentsia in socialist construction, and the training of a new working-class technical intelligentsia.

The Party carried out a number of measures aimed at raising the level of technical knowledge of business executives, and training new engineers and technicians. The network of industrial academies, where the leading cadres of socialist industry were receiving special instruction, was extended. In the First Five-Year Plan period the number of industrial higher educational establishments increased almost tenfold, and that of technical secondary schools fourfold. Preparatory workers’ faculties were opened at all technical institutes. Almost 75 per cent of all the students of the technical institutes and technical schools were workers. Every fourth student was a Communist. Large-scale industry received nearly 100,000 engineers and technicians during the Five-Year Plan period. This was a new Soviet technical intelligentsia upon whom Soviet power could fully rely in the colossal work of socialist construction.

The Party initiated a broad movement among the working class for mastering modern technique. Taking into account the experience of the Dzerzhinsky Tractor Works, the Central Committee of the Party recommended all Party organisations at large construction sites to promote the extensive training of the workers in new trades. The trade unions and the Komsomol actively helped to give effect
to this measure. Workers' training centres, technical study circles, schools and courses were started at factories and building sites; regular "technical training days" were held all over the country. Many workers engaged in the building of new factories visited factories already in operation to learn new trades. The number of factory apprentice schools greatly increased. The Party supported another important undertaking initiated by the Komsomol, namely, organisation of technical tests. This movement, originating in 1931, spread to all factories and construction sites. The technical knowledge acquired by the workers helped them to become real experts at their jobs. Hundreds of thousands of the country's unskilled workmen and builders of yesterday became skilled lathe-operators, metal-workers, blast-furnace workers, steel founders, operators of coal-cutting machines, etc. In agriculture, by the spring of 1931, over 200,000 collective farmers had become tractor-drivers and machine-operators, and operated the machinery of the machine-and-tractor stations on the collective farms.

The reconstruction of the national economy was accompanied by a cultural revolution. In 1930 the Soviet state introduced universal compulsory elementary education. A nation-wide movement to wipe out illiteracy among the adult population was started. In the period between 1930 and 1932 over 30 million people attended special schools for the liquidation of illiteracy.

Technical reconstruction and the mass movement of the workers to master new machinery facilitated the acceleration of the pace of socialist industrialisation. The successes attained in industrial production in 1931 made possible the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan in four years. The Party turned to the task of drawing up a second Five-Year Plan. This question was considered by the Seventeenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.), held in January-February 1932.

The Party systematically guided the socialist development of agriculture. The initial successes of collectivisation were consolidated. A plenary meeting of the Central Committee, held in December 1930, set the task of collectivising in 1931 not less than 50 per cent of all peasant farms in the country; of completing collectivisation in the main in the steppe part of the Ukraine, the North Caucasus, the Lower Volga and Middle Volga (the Trans-Volga area); of drawing not less than 50 per cent of all peasant households into collective farms in all other grain-growing regions, as well as in the cotton-growing and sugar-beet-growing regions; and about 25 per cent in the regions of the consuming belt.

Local Party organisations started explanatory work among the peasants still practising individual husbandry, drawing collective-farmer activists into this work.

There began a new powerful upswing of the collective-farm movement. During the year following the Sixteenth Party Congress,
more than 7 million peasant households joined the collective farms. In the North Caucasus, the Lower and Middle Volga, the Ukraine (the steppe and the parts situated on the left bank of the Dnieper), the Crimea and the grain-growing regions of the Urals and Moldavia, collectivisation embraced from 68 to 90 per cent of all peasant farms. Thus, *collectivisation in these regions was completed in the main.* In other grain-growing, cotton-growing and sugar-beet-growing regions more than 50 per cent of all peasant farms were collectivised.

The kulak class was completely eliminated in all districts of solid collectivisation. The kulaks who resisted collectivisation were evicted from their places of residence. From the beginning of 1930 up to the autumn of 1932 altogether 240,757 kulak families, that is, about one per cent of the total number of peasant households, were evicted from the districts of solid collectivisation. The Soviet Government did everything necessary to provide the former kulaks with work at their new places of residence and to create proper living conditions for them. The bulk of the evicted kulaks were engaged in the timber, building and ore-mining industries, and in the state farms of Western Siberia and Kazakhstan. The Party and the Soviet Government re-educated the kulaks, helped them to become equal citizens and active builders of socialist society.

A very big role in effecting solid collectivisation, in establishing and consolidating the collective-farm system was played by the machine-and-tractor stations. The first machine-and-tractor station in the country was organised in 1928 by the workers of the Shevchenko state farm in Odessa Region. The peasants of this locality began to cultivate their land in common. Proceeding from the practical experience of the Shevchenko machine-and-tractor station, the Central Committee of the Party considered it expedient to set up an all-Union centre for the organisation and direction of machine-and-tractor stations. Such a centre—the Tractor Centre—was set up in June 1929. Tractor columns, organised by agricultural co-operatives and by area groups of collective farms, became widespread in 1929 and also helped to promote the collective-farm movement. But they suffered from a number of major defects: they lacked permanent organisational centres, did not have the necessary material and technical base, and did not use the new machinery efficiently.

Soviet industry was from year to year turning out an increasing number of tractors and other agricultural machines. This confronted the Party with the question of how to use them more efficiently when collective farms were being set up on a mass scale. It was necessary to find a suitable form for the technical servicing of the collective farms, a form which would ensure the most rational use of the new machinery. At first, along with the organisation of machine-and-tractor stations, the Soviet state used to sell part of the tractors to collective farms. But practice had shown that this way of using
the tractors was unsuitable in the initial period of collective-farm development. The young and economically weak collective farms lacked the necessary funds for the purchase of tractors and other machines; nor did they have the necessary technical personnel. Besides, Soviet industry was still unable to supply all the collective farms with tractors. The practice of collective-farm development suggested that it was advisable to concentrate the tractors and all the other agricultural machinery in the hands of the state. There was also the highly important political aspect of the question. The machine-and-tractor stations were powerful levers with the help of which the Soviet state could exert its guiding influence on the development of agriculture along socialist lines and strengthen the alliance of the working class and the peasantry. In the hands of the state they were a means of educating the millions of collective farmers in the spirit of collectivism.

Taking all this into account, the Party considered it necessary to concentrate all agricultural machinery in the state machine-and-tractor stations. After the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) the co-operative tractor columns and the machine-and-tractor stations were transferred to the Tractor Centre, which was entrusted with the further organisation and direction of the machine-and-tractor stations. The Soviet state took upon itself the organisation of the technical servicing of the collective farms and the training of machine-operators for agriculture. The establishment of machine-and-tractor stations was advantageous both to the state and to the collective farms. They ensured a highly efficient use of the new agricultural machinery, served the state as an additional source of obtaining collective-farm grain and raw materials for industry, and helped the collective farms to grow stronger organisationally and economically and mechanise labour on an increasing scale.

By the summer of 1931 the collective farms embraced 13 million peasant households (52.7 per cent). They became the main producers of grain, cotton, sugar-beet, sunflower and other agricultural crops. Together with the state farms they accounted for more than two-thirds of the country's spring crop area. The collective-farm peasantry had become the leading force in agriculture.

The Party had won a decisive victory in the battle for the collectivisation of agriculture. In 1931 there were already 211,400 collective farms in the country. The principal task now was to strengthen these farms and to draw the remaining individual peasants into them, rather than to organise new collective farms.

Without slackening its work of drawing new individual peasants into collective farms, the Party concentrated its main attention on the organisational and economic consolidation of the collective farms.

As large-scale socialist enterprises, the collective farms offered tremendous possibilities for raising the labour productivity and
the material welfare of the collective farmers. But it was a complicated and difficult task to learn how to use these possibilities. Collectivisation meant completely upsetting the age-old tenor of rural life. The peasant who had been accustomed for centuries to work on an individual farm, on the principle of “everyone for himself”, could not, upon joining the collective farm, immediately adjust himself to the new and unfamiliar environment. The old habits and customs of individual private farming were still strong with him. The remoulding of the psychology of the individual peasant of yesterday in the spirit of socialism had only just begun in the collective farms, and the new, social discipline was only just beginning to take shape.

The work of the collective farms therefore suffered from many defects which hindered utilising the advantages offered by large-scale collective farming. The bulk of the collective farmers and the collective-farm leaders were still inexperienced in managing large-scale agricultural production. Work was still badly organised in many collective farms. Nor was the accounting properly organised. In many cases the income was distributed not according to the work done, but according to the number of members of the family. This lowered the collective farmers’ incentive to work and slackened their labour discipline; there were many instances of collective farmers shirking work. Harvesting was often dragged out, and large quantities of grain were lost. The absence of individual responsibility for machines, livestock and other property greatly harmed the economy of the collective farms. Former kulaks and other hostile elements penetrated into collective farms, where they stole property, damaged agricultural machines, destroyed horses and productive livestock, often neglected their duties, and, in every way they could, prevented the honest members from organising a normal collective-farm life.

The creation of a new social labour discipline in the collective farms required much time and effort. The main difficulty lay in finding the proper form of organisation of the collectively-owned economy and the right material incentives for the collective farmers to develop this economy. The Party still lacked experience in this field. Only the collective farmers themselves could find new forms of labour organisation, new methods of strengthening labour discipline and of applying the socialist principle of distribution of collective-farm incomes according to work done. These new forms and methods were found.

Collective-farm practice advanced a quite new principle for calculating social labour in the collective farms, namely, the workday unit combined with piece-work.

Proceeding from the experience of the best agricultural artels, a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Party, held in June 1931, recommended collective farms to organise all their work on the piece-work basis, to calculate work done in workday units,
and to distribute the incomes (both in cash and in kind) according to the number of workday units earned.

The Party and Komsomol organisations of the collective farms, supported by district Party activists, headed the campaign to introduce the piece-work system in the collective farms and to organise strict accounting of the work done by the collective farmers. The advanced section of the collective-farm peasantry received with satisfaction the normalisation of the work in the collective farms and the improvements of labour discipline, and actively supported these developments. In the course of 1931 all collective farms went over to piece-work and the workday-unit system.

The next step in the organisation of labour in the collective farms was the formation—in keeping with the experience of the best agricultural artels—of production teams, membership of which remained the same over a long period. Definite sections of the land, livestock, machines and agricultural implements were assigned to each production team. In stock-raising teams it was considered advisable to assign definite animals to each milkmaid or pig-tender, and to pay them according to the results obtained.

With the consolidation of the collective-farm system the role of the Soviet state in planning and regulating agriculture markedly increased. The state was now able to influence the development of collective-farm production and to strengthen it.

In May 1932 the Party and the Soviet Government took a decision to expand collective-farm trade which greatly contributed to the growth of collective-farm production. Obligatory grain deliveries to the state were reduced, and the sale of grain surpluses, remaining after the collective farms had fulfilled the plan of grain deliveries and seed storing, was permitted on collective-farm markets.

At the beginning of 1933 the contract system of state purchases of grain was abolished. Obligatory grain deliveries to the state at fixed prices were introduced for collective farms and individual peasant farms. The grain delivery quotas were calculated per hectare of land to be sown under the sowing plan. Any counter-plans of grain deliveries, exceeding the established per hectare quotas, were forbidden. All grain surpluses left after fulfilment of obligatory deliveries to the state remained wholly at the disposal of the collective farms and collective farmers. All this stimulated the collective farms and collective farmers to extend crop areas and to produce more grain for the market.

On August 7, 1932, the Soviet state issued a law for the protection of socialist property. This law strengthened the foundations of the collective-farm system. Collective-farm property was equated in its importance with state property. Like state property, it was declared sacred and inviolable.

The First All-Union Congress of Collective-Farm Shock Workers, held in February 1933, in which leaders of the Party and the
Government took part, greatly stimulated the activity of the collective-farm peasantry in collective-farm construction. The Party advanced the slogan of making all collective farms Bolshevik and all collective farmers prosperous.

Great progress was made in the establishment of state farms, whose number had topped 4,500 by the end of 1932. The crop area of the state farms had increased eightfold in the four years of the Five-Year Plan, and approximated to 13.5 million tons. In 1932 the state farms produced over 1.6 million tons of grain for the market, or almost one-tenth of all the grain acquired by the state.

At the beginning of 1933 the glad news spread throughout the country that the First Five-Year Plan had been fulfilled ahead of time—in four years and three months. In January 1933 a joint plenary meeting of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the Party reviewed the results of the Five-Year Plan. It noted the following major results:

The U.S.S.R. had been converted from an agrarian into an industrial country. The socialist system had completely eliminated the capitalist elements in industry and had become the sole economic system. In 1932 the volume of output of large-scale industry exceeded the pre-war level more than threefold, and that of 1928 more than twofold. Its proportion of the total output of the national economy had risen to 70 per cent. The U.S.S.R. had created its own advanced technical basis which had made possible the reconstruction of all branches of the national economy. During the First Five-Year Plan period 1,500 new industrial enterprises had been put into operation. A number of new industries had been built up, such as an up-to-date iron and steel industry, a tractor industry, an automobile industry, a chemical industry, and an aircraft industry. A new coal and metallurgical base had been created in the east, the Urals-Kuzbas base. The output of electric power had increased by more than 150 per cent. The economic independence of the country had been strengthened: the U.S.S.R. had now begun to produce the greater part of necessary industrial equipment at its own enterprises. The Soviet Union had strengthened its defence capacity; it had built industrial establishments that could manufacture military equipment meeting the requirements of the day and munitions for the Red Army and Navy.

In agriculture, as a result of the determined swing of the poor and middle peasants towards socialism, the collective and state farms had become the predominant force. A collective-farm system, large-scale socialist farming, had been created in the countryside. From a country of small-peasant farming the U.S.S.R. had become a country where agriculture was run on the largest scale in the world. A leap from an old qualitative state to a new qualitative state had taken place in agriculture. The elimination of the kulaks as a class had been carried out on the basis of solid collectivisation. The ma-
chine-and-tractor stations, equipped with tractors and the most up-to-date agricultural machinery, had become important levers in reorganising agriculture along socialist lines. The agricultural artel had become the principal form of the collective-farm movement.

The progress of socialism in all spheres of the national economy had brought about a radical improvement in the material conditions of the working people. Unemployment in the towns, this scourge of the working class of all capitalist countries, had been completely abolished in the U.S.S.R. The collective-farm system had put an end to kulak bondage and to impoverishment of the working peasantry. The poor peasants and the lower stratum of the middle peasants had been raised to a level of material security in the collective farms. The growth of the national income and the improvement of the material conditions of the working people had been accompanied by a marked rise of their cultural level and the rapid growth of a new, Soviet intelligentsia.

The foundations of socialism had been laid in the Soviet Union. As in the towns, the socialist form of economy had firmly established itself in the countryside, too. Radical changes had taken place in the class structure of Soviet society. The capitalist elements in the country had, in the main, been eliminated. The social basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat had been extended and consolidated. The collective-farm peasantry had become the firm mainstay of Soviet power. This was already a new class, building its life on the basis of collective ownership of the means of production. The alliance of the working class and the peasantry had undergone a change, and had acquired a new content. Lenin's wise policy of an alliance between the working class and the poor peasants, on the one hand, and the middle peasants, on the other, had helped to draw the bulk of the peasantry into socialist construction and had ensured victory over the capitalist elements. The alliance of the working class and collective-farm peasantry was being established on a new basis—the community of their interests in the building, consolidation and development of socialism in town and country.

This was an epoch-making victory of the working class, working peasantry and intelligentsia of the U.S.S.R., won under the leadership of the Communist Party.

The results of the First Five-Year Plan were of tremendous international significance.

The Soviet Union had demonstrated to the whole world the superiority of the planned socialist system of economy over the capitalist system, strengthened its economic might and independence and became an important factor in international affairs.

The fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan exerted a revolutionising influence on the working masses of the capitalist countries. The alignment of class forces markedly changed in favour of socialism. The results of the Five-Year Plan raised the revolutionary spirit
of the working class all over the world and strengthened its confidence in ultimate victory.

Even the enemies of the Soviet Union had to admit the success of the Five-Year Plan. The predictions of the world bourgeoisie and its agents about its inevitable failure had proved false. The working class and the working peasantry of the U.S.S.R. had proved that they could manage perfectly without landlords, capitalists and kulaks, that they could create a new and better, socialist system, which knew no crises and unemployment and ensured a continuous improvement in their material and cultural well-being.

**BRIEF SUMMARY**

The period between 1929 and 1932 witnessed the offensive of socialism along the whole front.

In importance and complexity of the problems tackled, novelty and profundity of the social and economic processes, rates and scales of socialist construction, this was one of the most difficult periods in the activity of the Party. For boldness of planning, creative solution of the practical problems of socialist construction, tremendous scope of the Party’s political and organising work, variety of forms and methods of its work, intensive activity and unprecedented selflessness displayed by the working people in the building of socialism, this was a truly heroic period in the history of the Party and the Soviet people.

In its constructive work the Communist Party was ever guided by Lenin’s plan for building socialism. The Party smashed the remnants of Trotskyism, exposed and isolated the Right defeatists and consolidated its unity. It reorganised its ranks in conformity with the requirements of the reconstruction period, guided the reshaping of the mass organisations of the working people, set up within these organisations strong groups of active workers with initiative, and brought the Party, Soviet, trade union and economic apparatus closer at all levels to the masses and to production. It stimulated tremendous energy in the working people and organised nation-wide socialist emulation.

Backed by the sweeping labour enthusiasm of the masses, the Party successfully overcame numerous difficulties, and secured an accelerated tempo of socialist construction and the fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan ahead of time.

Within an unprecedentedly brief space of time the U.S.S.R. was converted from a backward agrarian country into an advanced industrial power. A heavy industry, including highly developed engineering, was created in the country. The national economy was given a powerful material and technical basis, which made possible the completion of the technical reconstruction of the whole national economy on the basis of new technology.
The Party began to put into practice Lenin's brilliant co-operative plan. The most difficult historic problem of the socialist revolution, next to the conquest of power by the working class, namely, to get the millions of small individual peasant farms to adopt the path of collective farming, the path of socialism, was solved. This was a great revolution in economic relations, in the entire way of life of the peasantry. Collectivisation provided the Soviet state with a firm socialist basis in agriculture; created the decisive conditions for the building of a socialist economy; led to the final consolidation of Soviet power in the countryside; reinforced the alliance of the working class and the peasantry and raised it to a new, higher level.

The full-scale offensive of socialism had been completely victorious. The capitalist elements were completely ousted from industry, and the socialist form of production had become the sole and exclusive form. The last class of exploiters in the country, the kulak class, which had been the mainstay of capitalist hopes of a restoration, was broken up and in the main eliminated on the basis of solid collectivisation. The entire trade turnover was concentrated in the hands of the state, co-operatives and collective farms.

Unemployment in the towns and beggary in the countryside had gone. A veritable cultural revolution was being accomplished in the country. A new, Soviet intelligentsia was making its appearance in large numbers.

These successes of socialist construction strengthened the internal and international position of the U.S.S.R. and its defensive capacity.

In its struggle to overcome the difficulties of socialist construction the Communist Party became ideologically tempered, grew organisationally stronger and acquired new experience.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE STRUGGLE OF THE PARTY TO COMPLETE
THE SOCIALIST RECONSTRUCTION OF THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY. THE VICTORY OF SOCIALISM IN THE U.S.S.R.

(1933-1937)

1. Beginning of Fascist Aggression. Soviet Foreign Policy in the Conditions of a Growing Menace of War

The international situation in 1933-37 was characterised by an economic slump in the capitalist world, the further aggravation of all the antagonisms of capitalist society, the establishment of a fascist dictatorship in Germany and the development of fascist aggression.

One of the particular features of the economic situation in the capitalist countries was that the crisis of 1929-33 was not followed by an upward trend, as had usually been the case before. This time the crisis passed into a prolonged slump that lasted till 1937, when a new economic crisis began in the capitalist countries. From 1929 to 1937 industrial output in the capitalist world hardly increased. Unemployment remained exceedingly high. In the United States, for instance, there were about 10 million unemployed in 1935. The capitalist and colonial countries were in revolutionary ferment. A new round of big class battles was approaching.

In many countries, the capitalist monopolies considered that they could save their rule by establishing a fascist regime, that is, an open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary elements of monopoly capital. They meant to use fascism both to suppress the working-class movement and to start a war for a new redivision of the world.

The situation was particularly tense in Germany. During the years of the temporary stabilisation of capitalism the German imperialists had, with the aid of U.S. credits, restored their economic power. Bolstered up by that power, they were seeking not only to break the fetters of the Versailles Treaty but seize Alsace, Lorraine, Polish territory, and colonies—in short, all that they had lost in the First
World War. Furthermore, they were planning a radical redistricting of the world to their advantage. Theirs was a programme setting the course for war. On the other hand, Germany was one of the countries which had been most affected by the economic crisis. Revolutionary feeling was particularly strong among her working class. The German bourgeoisie feared a socialist revolution.

The fascist party headed by Hitler, and calling itself the National-Socialist Party for demagogic reasons, was openly putting forward chauvinist slogans calling for a war for the supremacy of the German race. It fomented hatred of other peoples and called for ruthless measures against Communists and for the suppression of the working-class movement.

The leading circles of German imperialism decided to put the Hitlerites in power. As a result, in January 1933, a war party was placed at the helm of the state in one of the biggest countries of Europe.

The Hitler Government brutally suppressed all progressive forces in Germany, first and foremost the Communists. It abolished all democratic rights and liberties, and proclaimed the maniacal idea of winning world supremacy for Germany. As they prepared for war, the Hitlerites, in contravention of the Versailles Treaty, restored universal military service and set about arming the country at a frenzied pace. In 1936, again in violation of existing treaties, they marched their troops into the Rhineland. For the first time since the First World War, German armed forces again moved up to the French border.

Thus, following the aggressive invasion of China by imperialist Japan and the rise of a seat of war in the Far East, a second seat of war arose in the centre of Europe. The Soviet Union had therefore to look to the strengthening of its defences on its western frontiers as well.

The third power interested in a redistricting of the world was Italy, where a fascist regime had been set up as far back as 1922. In 1935 the Italian imperialists began a war to seize Ethiopia. In 1936 Germany and Italy kindled a civil war in Spain, backing a fascist rebellion against that country’s Republican Government. The German and Italian fascists expected to entrench themselves in Spain so as to be able to threaten France from the rear, and jeopardise the vital lines of communication of Britain and France in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The acts of aggression undertaken by the Japanese, German and Italian invaders were a menace to the peoples of Asia, Europe and Africa, and subsequently of America as well.

The three aggressor states were also encroaching, very tellingly, on the imperialist interests of the United States, Britain and France. As a result of the First World War, these victor countries had profited most and had gained a dominant position in the capitalist world. But now Germany and Japan were pressing them hard in world mar-

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kets. The Japanese militarists, having ousted the U.S. and British imperialists from the north-eastern provinces of China (Manchuria), were preparing to oust them from the rest of Chinese territory, where Britain and the United States had important economic interests. Italy, which had established herself in Ethiopia, was threatening British positions in Egypt and on the Red Sea, on the routes to India, and to Iranian and Iraqi oil. But the greatest danger came from Germany, as the most powerful aggressor.

Thus the economic crisis and its consequences, in the conditions of the general crisis of the capitalist system, sharply intensified the imperialist antagonisms between Germany, Japan and Italy, who were preparing a war for a redivision of the world, on the one hand, and the United States, Britain and France, who were holding on to their imperialist positions, on the other.

The Communist Party foresaw not only the end of the relative stabilisation of capitalism and the inevitable aggravation of all its contradictions, but also the imminence of a second world war. This was clearly stated at the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. (B.).

The Soviet Union was threatened with attack both in Europe and in the Far East. The Hitlerites were calling for war against the Soviet Union with an eye to seizing the Ukraine and other Soviet territories, and also with the object of “destroying communism”. In 1936 Germany and Japan concluded the so-called anti-Comintern pact, to which Italy adhered a year later. It was a bloc of three aggressors. Its signatories did their utmost to advertise its anti-communist nature. In reality, however, the German-Japanese-Italian bloc was directed not only against the U.S.S.R., but also against Britain, France and the U.S.A. The Hitlerites were clamouring for a “crusade” against communism. But, under cover of appeals to combat communism, they were preparing a world war for the redivision of the world in favour of the German monopolies.

In what was a tense international situation, the Party continued to champion peace. This was indispensable to the interests of socialist construction, to the interests of the working people of the Soviet Union and of the rest of the world. The Party continued its policy of expanding business relations between the Soviet Union and all countries willing to pursue a similar policy towards the Soviet state.

Simultaneously, in view of the development of fascist aggression, the Party directed Soviet foreign policy towards supporting the peoples who had fallen victims to aggression and were fighting for the independence of their countries. The Party and the Soviet Government also considered it necessary to do their utmost to establish a system of collective security, of collective resistance to the aggressor. In December 1933 the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (B.) adopted a resolution envisaging the possibility of the Soviet Union joining the League of Nations and the conclusion of a regional agreement with a large number of European states for mutual defence against
aggression. Shortly afterwards the U.S.S.R. was invited to join the League of Nations, and the Soviet Government accepted.

By then the attitude of the League of Nations had changed to a certain degree in view of the changed international situation. Since the beginning of its activity the League had been an instrument of Anglo-French domination in Europe and Asia. But now other imperialist powers were laying claim to such domination—Hitler Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia. In 1933 Germany and Japan withdrew from the League of Nations. These circumstances afforded some possibility of using the League as an instrument, even if an imperfect one, for combating aggression. In the League of Nations, the Soviet Union vigorously defended the peoples of China, Ethiopia and Spain, and later other peoples that had become victims of the imperialist aggressors.

Of the major European countries, France, as an immediate neighbour of Germany, was exposed to the greatest danger of a fascist attack. This circumstance made for a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and France. In 1934 the two countries jointly called for the conclusion of a treaty for collective resistance to aggression. The projected collective security system was to include, besides its two initiators, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Germany among them.

The British Government, while professing to be in favour of a collective security system, in reality helped Hitler to foil the organisation of that system. The bourgeois-landlord government of Poland, too, opposed it.

Seeing that it was impossible to reach a broad agreement on the establishment of a collective security system because of the opposition of Germany, Britain and Poland, the Soviet Government in 1935 concluded mutual assistance treaties with France and Czechoslovakia. Under the treaty with Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union’s obligation to render assistance to that country in the event of aggression became operative only provided that similar assistance would be forthcoming from France as well. The treaties with France and Czechoslovakia could have formed the basis on which to administer an adequate rebuff to aggressors.

But that was not to be. The partisans of a policy of collusion with the Hitlerites gained the upper hand in the ruling circles of Paris and Prague, as they had in London. The French and Czechoslovak governments began to sabotage the treaties signed with the Soviet Union, and eventually disregarded them. The governments of the Western Powers were not putting up effective resistance to Japanese, Italian and German aggression. During the German-Italian intervention in Spain the British and French governments, contrary to the national interests of their countries, adopted an attitude of "non-intervention", which in practice meant abetting fascist aggression.
An important political event, testifying to the growth of Soviet influence in world politics, was the establishment in 1933 of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. By that act, the United States acknowledged the bankruptcy of its policy (over many years) of “non-recognition” of a Great Power like the Soviet Union. The ruling circles of the United States were compelled to renounce their discredited policy, first of all, because of their fear of Japanese and German aggression, which threatened their interests and against which they expected to use the Soviet Union, and, secondly, because of their increased need for the Soviet market in view of the long-drawn-out crisis. With normal relations restored between the two countries, Soviet-American trade expanded appreciably.

The establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union was conducive to the maintenance of peace. But, taken as a whole, U.S. policy actually abetted the fascist aggressors, whom it enabled to enslave unhampered one people after another. In 1935 the U.S. Congress passed a law banning the delivery of American arms to belligerents. This was during the Italo-Ethiopian war, and the law deprived Ethiopia of the possibility of buying from the United States the arms she so badly needed. As for Italy, the aggressor, she was hardly affected by this law. Waging war against a poorly armed country, Italy did not particularly need American arms. In other words, the law helped fascist aggression. When the Spanish war broke out, the U.S. Congress passed an amendment extending the law to civil wars. In this instance, too, the American law was to the advantage of the fascist aggressors, since it refused arms to their victim, the Government of Republican Spain.

The international situation in the thirties required that the Party and the peoples of the Soviet Union exert every effort to increase the country’s defence potential in order to be able to repel an aggressor at any moment. In view of growing imperialist aggression, preparations for a crushing rebuff to any invader or anyone who broke peace were the most reliable means of averting war. The fight against aggression benefited first of all from the increasing economic and political might of the Soviet state, the strengthening of its Armed Forces, the friendship of the peoples, and the moral support of the working people of all countries, who had a vital interest in preserving peace.

The C.P.S.U.(B.) and the other Communist Parties were in the van of those fighting against fascism and the danger of a new war. Fascism was a product of monopoly capital. As early as 1921 Lenin described Italian fascism as a variety of bourgeois terror against the proletariat. Only on the basis of working-class unity of action, he maintained, is it possible to resist the offensive of imperialist reaction and bar the way of fascism.

With the fascist regime established in Germany, the mass of the people began to realise that fascism in power was an open terrorist
dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinist and most imperialist circles of financial capital. Fascism was a great danger to the working class, to the working masses and all freedom-loving peoples. Everywhere it began with a bitter fight against communism. The fascists, who had made anti-communism their watchword, were above all intent on isolating and routing the Communist Parties, the main factor barring them from power. They sought to split the forces of the proletariat in order to beat it peacemeal. After routing the Communists, they struck at the Socialists and at the other democratic parties and organisations. The fight against fascism and the effort to curb the aggressors became the paramount task of the world Communist and working-class movement.

The success of the struggle against fascism hinged on the establishment of working-class unity of action, on the consolidation of all the democratic forces in an anti-fascist front. The Communist Parties persistently and patiently proposed to the leadership of the Social-Democratic parties, which at that time were supported by large numbers of the workers, joining effort in the fight against fascism. But in a number of countries, primarily in Germany, where the fascist menace was particularly great, the Right Social-Democratic leaders refused to co-operate with the Communists and frustrated working-class unity. Their treacherous tactics contributed in tremendous measure to the establishment of a fascist dictatorship. Thousands of Communists and other anti-fascists from among the best sons and daughters of the German people were tortured to death, and tens of thousands of them found themselves in prisons and death camps. The Hitler gangsters put in gaol Ernst Thaelmann, leader of the Communist Party and the German people. The Communist Party was bled white, but still the fascists were unable to destroy it. The German Communists continued their courageous struggle in the exceedingly difficult conditions created by the fascist dictatorship. The Right-wing leaders of the German Social-Democrats had hoped to save their party by betraying the Communists. But this did not help them—the Social-Democratic Party was banned, and virtually ceased to exist.

With the victory of fascism in Germany, the wide mass of the working class, who had followed the lead of the Social-Democratic parties, swung to the left. Fascism was also opposed by sizable sections of the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie, and by certain sections of the middle and big bourgeoisie. The situation made it imperative that all anti-fascist forces unite in the struggle for peace and democracy.

Of great importance in rallying the masses against fascism was the struggle which Georgi Dimitrov waged at the trial engineered by the German Government in Leipzig in 1933. Dimitrov was falsely charged with setting fire to the Reichstag, a crime committed by the Hitlerites themselves. He exposed fascism and its crimes.
with the greatest courage. The storm of popular indignation which the fascist provocation raised in many countries of the world, and mass actions in defence of the Communist hero were so powerful that the Hitlerite monsters did not dare to destroy Dimitrov. Dimitrov was wrested from the clutches of the fascists, and arrived in the Soviet Union.

In February 1934 the French working class foiled an attempted fascist coup d'état. The anti-fascist forces of France, led by the Communist Party, launched a powerful movement. Under pressure from the workers, the leadership of the Socialist Party in the summer of 1934 signed a Communist-proposed pact on unity of action against fascism. In the same period, the Austrian workers rose in revolt to prevent the reactionary clericals from establishing a fascist dictatorship. On the initiative of the Communists, the workers of Vienna—Communists and Social-Democrats—implemented their unity of action in barricade fighting. The revolt failed, but it had shown the importance and necessity of revolutionary unity of the working class. In 1934 the Communist Party of Italy succeeded in establishing cooperation with the Socialist Party.

It was in this situation that, in the summer of 1935, the Seventh Congress of the Communist International was held. It was attended by delegates from the Communist Parties of 65 countries. It testified to the growth of the revolutionary forces of the world proletariat and to the ideological consolidation of the Communist Parties on the principles of Marxism-Leninism. The anti-Leninist groups in the Communist Parties had been ideologically defeated and isolated. A staunch Marxist-Leninist core had formed in the struggle against Trotskyism and Right-wing opportunism within the Communist Parties. In China it was united around Mao Tse-tung; in Germany, Ernst Thaelmann, Wilhelm Pieck and Walter Ulbricht; in France, Maurice Thorez and Marcel Cachin; in Italy, Antonio Gramsci and Palmiro Togliatti; In Finland, Otto Kuusinen; in Bulgaria, Georgi Dimitrov and Vasil Kolarov; in the United States, William Z. Foster; in Czechoslovakia, Klement Gottwald; in Poland, Jerzy Lénski; in Spain, José Díaz and Dolores Ibárruri; and in Britain, William Gallacher and Harry Pollitt.

The fight against fascism and against preparations for a new war was the main item on the Congress agenda. The principal report, "The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist International in the Struggle for Working-Class Unity and Against Fascism", was delivered by Georgi Dimitrov. The Congress called on the Communist Parties persistently to seek working-class unity of action against the fascist menace and the war danger through co-operation with the Social-Democratic workers. It set the task of establishing, on the basis of proletarian unity, a broad popular anti-fascist front grouping the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia around the working class. It also acknowledged the necessity for a
united anti-imperialist front in the colonial and dependent countries. It called on all peoples to rally and help the countries fighting for their independence, against aggression and imperialist oppression.

The Seventh Congress equipped the Communist Parties and the working class with a militant programme for combating fascism and the war menace. The Communist Party of China achieved great successes. It established a united anti-imperialist front that fought vigorously against the Japanese aggressors. The Communist Party of China and its Central Committee headed by Mao Tse-tung, leader of the Party and an experienced guide of the masses, rallied the people and set up armed forces to defeat the Japanese imperialists. In France, the Popular Front led by the Communist Party won the elections in 1936. A Government of the Popular Front was formed which at that stage delivered France from a fascist dictatorship. A Popular Front Government was also formed in Spain. It helped to consolidate the democratic forces led by the Communist Party and to increase their resistance to the fascist rebellion. But in most countries the Right Social-Democratic leaders foiled the establishment of working-class unity and of a popular front.

The decisions of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern mobilised considerable forces against fascism and the war menace. A broad popular movement against fascism and war developed in a number of countries. Subsequent events showed, however, that those forces were not yet strong enough to avert war.

2. The Struggle of the Party to Strengthen and Develop the Socialist Economy. Increased Party Political Work Among the Masses. Seventeenth Party Congress

After successfully fulfilling the First Five-Year Plan, the Soviet people in 1933 embarked on the second. The conditions of socialist construction in the Second Five-Year Plan period differed in many respects from those that had prevailed in the preceding five-year period. The foundations of socialism had already been laid in the Soviet Union, where a powerful heavy industry—the basis of the technical re-equipment of all the branches of the national economy—had been created and the collective-farm system had triumphed. A solid base had thus been established for the further growth of socialism in the Soviet Union. The country had entered the period of completion of the socialist reconstruction of the national economy.

Socialist reconstruction in its closing stage had certain peculiarities and was attended by certain difficulties.

In industry, one of the paramount tasks, along with further capital construction, was the mastering of new enterprises. This was much more difficult than using the old factories. Some time was needed to train the required number of engineers, technicians and skilled work-
ers, for them to learn how to use the new machinery, properly to organise the productive activity of the new large bodies of workers that were only just taking shape.

In agriculture, the chief task was the further organisational and economic consolidation of the collective farms. In 1931-32 the Party did a great deal to that end. Experience showed, however, that it was a difficult task. By the beginning of the Second Five-Year Plan period, nearly two-thirds (61.5 per cent) of the peasant farms had joined the collective farms. But most of the newly established collective farms were small and economically weak. Collective-farm property at the time consisted of the means of production collectivised by the peasants, namely, draught animals, ploughs, harrows and certain outhouses. The most important element of collective-farm property—non-distributable assets—was a mere 4,700 million rubles in 1932, or an average of 22,000 rubles per collective farm. Labour discipline was still lax on many of the collective farms. Three-quarters of the collective farms had no cattle departments producing for the market. The collective farms stood in need of constant help from the Party and the state in organising and developing collective agriculture, equipping it with modern machinery and reinforcing it with experienced personnel.

In the sphere of social relations, the Party during the Second Five-Year Plan period tackled the problem of completely eliminating the capitalist elements in the Soviet Union. This could not but give rise to desperate resistance on the part of the remnants of the exploiting classes. They could no longer act openly because they were not strong enough to do so. But they did not stop fighting. They wormed their way into factories and collective farms and engaged in wrecking and in stealing state and collective-farm property in an effort to undermine social property, the mainstay of the Soviet system. It was the most widespread form of the class struggle. It was essential to consolidate the new socialist forms of economy in all the branches of production and trade, organise the most strict protection of state and collective-farm property and complete the elimination of the capitalist elements.

In the ideological sphere, the Party was confronted with the pressing task of overcoming the capitalist survivals in the minds of Soviet people and making the whole of the country's working population active builders of socialism. The Party realised that it was a very difficult task and would take a long time to accomplish. Marxism-Leninism teaches us that men's consciousness lags behind their position in social production. Over four million new workers and other employees had gone into industry during the period of the First Five-Year Plan. They were people who had had no experience in large-scale production and who, to a large extent, had a petty-proprietor mentality. Private property habits were particularly strong among the collective farmers. The survivals of the past in the
minds of people manifested themselves in a negligent attitude to state and collective-farm property, in pilfering and damaging of this property, in self-seeking tendencies and in breaches of socialist labour discipline.

In inculcating upon people a conscientious attitude to labour in the conditions of socialist construction particular importance attached to Lenin's observations regarding strict adherence to the socialist principle of the material incentive, proper organisation of labour and the development of a new, socialist discipline. Lenin considered the re-equipment of agriculture through mechanisation and electrification a most important means of remoulding the peasant psychology.

"The task of remoulding the small farmer," said Lenin, "of remoulding his whole psychology and habits is a task of generations. Only the material basis, technical equipment, the employment of tractors and machines on a mass scale in agriculture, electrification on a mass scale can solve this problem of the small farmer, can cure, so to speak, his whole mentality" (Collected Works, Vol. 32, p. 194).

The main concern of the Party now became the organisation of socialist production and the education of the working people in the spirit of a politically conscious attitude to labour and to socialist property. The problems of completing socialist reconstruction required that the Party increase its political influence on the mass of the working people, improve the organisation and practical leadership of economic construction and perfect its working methods.

The Party strengthened and expanded socialist production. It concentrated on the decisive sectors of the national economy.

With the collective-farm system firmly established in the countryside, the responsibility of the Party for agricultural progress increased. It now had to render day-to-day assistance to the collective farms and their members in managing collective farming on a planned basis and in using scientific and technological achievements. The political departments set up in the machine-and-tractor stations and state farms, in the winter of 1933, by a decision of the January plenary meeting of the C.C. C.P.S.U.(B.) were of exceptional importance in this respect. The Central Committee sent 17,000 experienced Party workers to the political departments of the machine-and-tractor stations and another 8,000 to the state farms. About 80 per cent of the political departments of the machine-and-tractor stations were headed by Communists who had joined the Party before 1920.

With the organisation of the political departments, the machine-and-tractor stations became centres of political, economic and organisational leadership of the collective farms—centres of Party influence on the broad mass of the collective farmers.

The political departments strengthened the ranks of the Communists in the machine-and-tractor stations and collective farms. Between
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Party congresses, the number of Com-
munists in the countryside almost doubled, reaching 790,000. The
reorganisation of rural Party organisations on the production prin-
ciple was completed. By the autumn of 1933 there were 30,000 Party
branches in the collective farms, 20,000 groups of candidates for Party
membership, 22,000 mixed Party and Komsomol groups and 38,000
individual Communists working under the direct leadership of the
political departments of the machine-and-tractor stations and dis-
trict Party committees. The Party organisations in the collective
farms were becoming genuine organisers of collective-farm produc-
tion.

The political departments did a great deal politically to educate
and build up an active body of non-Party collective farmers. In every
collective farm a strong core of activists was formed who, under the
leadership of the political departments, took the lead in organising
socially-owned production and in improving labour discipline.

The political departments gave effect to Party supervision over
the work of the machine-and-tractor stations and the collective farms
they serviced. They exposed and foiled the intrigues of the enemies
of collective farming, and saw to it that the laws of the Soviet state
were strictly observed by the collective farms and their members.
The collective farms were cleared of kulaks and other hostile elements
that had penetrated into them.

The political departments devoted particular attention to the se-
lection and training of leading personnel for the collective farms.
Hundreds of thousands of collective-farm chairmen, stock-keepers,
team-leaders, field-crop experts, livestock-breeders and bookkeep-
ers were trained at machine-and-tractor station courses. The politi-
cal departments selected and promoted to leading positions over
250,000 advanced collective farmers, including about 30,000 collec-
tive-farm chairmen. They taught collective farmers to regard the ful-
filment of their obligations to the Soviet state as the prime duty of
the collective farms.

The workers of the political departments were always among the
mass of the collective farmers. They helped the latter to decide prac-
tical matters of collective-farm development and inculcated in them
an honest attitude to labour and care for collective-farm property.
They helped collective-farm leaders to organise the work of the col-
lective farmers.

By setting up the machine-and-tractor station political depart-
ments, the Party rendered important aid to the collective farms.
They began to grow appreciably stronger; labour discipline im-
proved. In 1933 the spring sowing, harvesting and grain deliveries to
the state were carried out more efficiently than in previous years.

The Party continued to pursue with unflagging energy the Lenin-
ist general line of industrialising the country. The Central Commit-
tee worked persistently for the planned and rapid development of
heavy industry; it revealed shortcomings in good time and overcame the lag in various industries, particularly the coal industry and railway transport. Industrialisation was accompanied by the growth of new towns and industrial centres, the development of new mineral deposits and the further economic opening-up of the country’s outlying regions. This increased the demands made on the railways. The railways, in turn, and also the new powerful electric stations and metallurgical plants, required a steady supply of coal and coke. Every year the national economy needed more and more coal.

During the years of the First Five-Year Plan a great deal had been done to re-equip transport and mechanise coal mining. Nevertheless, transport and the coal industry were not meeting the requirements of the rapidly growing national economy. The unsatisfactory state of affairs in the coal industry and transport was due chiefly to shortcomings in economic management and to the violation of the principle of material incentives—which made for wage levelling, a constant fluidity of labour, slow mastering and poor use of new machinery and techniques. Party organisations exerted little influence on the work of transport and the Donets collieries.

The Central Committee helped Party and economic organisations to eliminate these shortcomings. The staffs of trusts and central administrations were reduced and their structure simplified; most of the engineers and technicians were sent to work in industry. Remuneration of the labour of miners and railwaymen was normalised by introducing standard rates and by establishing a progressive bonus system for workers in the key trades who mastered the new machinery successfully.

To make the political work of the Party more effective, and to heighten its organising role, the Central Committee in the summer of 1933 established political departments on the railways and appointed Party organisers in the Donets collieries. The political departments in transport and the Party organisers in the coal mines gave effective guidance to Party and political work among the masses, helped managements to organise the fulfilment of production plans and improve labour discipline, and stimulated socialist emulation among the workers for the mastering of the new machinery and for higher labour productivity.

Thanks to the steps taken by the Party, the increase in coal output in 1933 was 12 million tons, or 50 per cent over that of the previous year.

The political departments, which represented an emergency form of organisation, depended on the strength and prestige of the Party. They were set up in those lagging sectors of socialist construction which had acquired special economic importance. They proved their worth. Thanks to them, Party leadership in agriculture and railway transport improved, and Party organising work became more effective. They were very helpful to Party bodies, and Party
organisations in other fields of socialist construction drew on their experience. The leading role of Communists in production increased.

The mass cleansing of the Party which took place at that time likewise enhanced the efficiency of Party organisations. It was carried out to rid the Party of untrustworthy, unstable, chance elements that had wormed their way into the Party. The admission of new members was suspended. Although the cleansing was attended by certain mistakes, particularly in the form of unwarranted expulsion of so-called passive members, on the whole it helped to strengthen the Party and heighten the vanguard role of Party organisations in socialist construction.

The Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), which met from January 26 to February 10, 1934, was held in an atmosphere of great political and labour enthusiasm. The Party had 1,874,488 members and 935,298 candidate members at the time.

The Congress discussed the reports of the Central Committee, Central Auditing Commission, Central Control Commission—Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection, and of the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) to the Executive Committee of the Communist International. It also discussed the draft Second Five-Year Plan and questions of organisation (Party and state construction). Reports were submitted by J. V. Stalin, M. F. Vladimirsky, J. E. Rudzutak and D. Z. Manuilsky.

The Central Committee report dealt with the radical changes that had taken place in the Soviet Union as a result of putting into effect the Party’s Leninist general line. The Soviet Union had become transformed. It had cast off the integument of backwardness and medievalism. From a backward agrarian country it had turned into an advanced industrial and collective-farm power.

The successes of socialism in town and country brought fundamental changes in the pattern of the national economy. In industry, the socialist sector constituted 99.5 per cent of the total, and held undivided sway. In agriculture, the socialist sector of the area sown to grain crops amounted to 84.5 per cent of the total. As for trade, the capitalist elements had been completely eliminated.

These facts were convincing evidence that capitalist economy had been wiped out in the Soviet Union. The socialist economic system, as embodied in public, co-operative and collective-farm property, reigned supreme in all spheres of the national economy.

A far-reaching cultural revolution was being accomplished in the U.S.S.R. From an ignorant, illiterate and uncultured country, which pre-revolutionary Russia had been, the Soviet Union was turning into a country of advanced culture, covered by a vast network of higher, secondary and elementary schools, with instruction conducted in the languages of the various Soviet nationalities. A new, Soviet intelligentsia was coming into being. The number of specialists engaged in the national economy had almost doubled in the
years of the First Five-Year Plan. The tremendous scope of cultural construction found vivid expression in an unprecedented expansion of the press, the cinema, radio, and the number of clubs and theatres.

The Congress called for steps to intensify ideological work in all the sectors of the Party, for vigorous propaganda of the ideas of scientific communism, educating Communists and non-Party activists in a spirit of internationalism, and boldly criticising deviations from Marxism-Leninism.

The Congress approved a resolution on the Second Five-Year Plan for the economic development of the U.S.S.R. The chief political task envisaged by the plan was the final elimination of capitalist elements, and the complete removal of causes giving rise to the exploitation of man by man and to the division of society into exploiters and exploited. The main economic task under the plan was completion of the technical reconstruction of the entire national economy. The plan stressed the inseparable connection between technical reconstruction, on the one hand, and the training of personnel, the mastering of new machinery and the advancement of Soviet science and technology, on the other.

Investments in capital construction in all the branches of the national economy were to total 133,000 million rubles in the period of the Second Five-Year Plan, as against a little over 64,000 million rubles invested under the First Five-Year Plan. Total gross industrial output in 1937 was to be approximately eight times as large as in 1913. The Congress directed all Party, state, economic and trade union organisations to concentrate on mastering new machinery and new branches of production, on raising the skills of workers and on training engineers and technicians. In agriculture, the emphasis was on the organisational and economic strengthening of the collective farms, machine-and-tractor stations and state farms, the completion, in the main, of the mechanisation of agriculture and the introduction of agrotechnical methods, and the increasing of the livestock herd and its productivity. Extensive measures were planned for the technical reconstruction of transport and communications. Measures were provided for the further development of science and culture.

The Seventeenth Congress adopted a resolution on Party and state construction. The resolution pointed out that the selection of personnel and the verification of the fulfilment of decisions were particularly important in organising work. The Congress resolved to reorganise the Central Control Commission—Workers' and Peasants' Inspection into a Party Control Commission under the C.C. C.P.S.U.(B.) and a Soviet Control Commission under the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.

The Congress adopted amended Party Rules. The preamble of the Rules gave a brief definition of the Communist Party, of its role in
the struggle of the working class and working people in general for the triumph of socialism, and its place in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Party basic groups, which had grown in numbers and organisation, were renamed primary Party organisations. A special section added to the Party Rules dealt with inner-Party democracy and Party discipline.

The Party came to its Congress solidly united. There were no opposition groups in it. Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky—former leaders of opposition groups—made repentant speeches at the Congress, and acknowledged the achievements of the Party.

The successes of socialist construction strengthened the faith of Communists and all working people in the complete triumph of socialism. Millions of working people in the capitalist countries rejoiced together with the Soviet people in their achievements. Their sentiments were expressed by the foreign Communist Parties in the greetings they sent to the Congress.

The Stalin personality cult, building up step by step, had taken shape by the time the Seventeenth Party Congress was convened. It had become customary to associate with Stalin all the successes in socialist construction achieved by the Party and the people. The Congress was the scene of the most excessive praise of his services. Stalin, who had decided that he was infallible, departed more and more from the Leninist principles and standards of Party life. He violated the principle of collective leadership, set himself apart from the people and committed abuses of his official position. His negative traits, too, came out more and more; he was rude and unfair to leading Party officials, would have no criticism, ignored collective opinion, and practised administration by injunction. The abnormal situation which the personality cult was creating in the Party caused deep concern to some of the Communists, above all to the old Leninist cadres. Many Congress delegates, particularly those who were familiar with Lenin’s testament, held that it was time to transfer Stalin from the office of General Secretary to some other post.

The Party and the whole Soviet people took legitimate pride in their achievements. The Soviet people acclaimed the Congress decision on the Second Five-Year Plan. They were advancing confidently and with firm step as they overcame numerous difficulties. But their joy was marred by a sad event which took place at the end of 1934.

On December 1, 1934, S. M. Kirov, an outstanding leader of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, a member of the Political Bureau, Secretary of the Central Committee and Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), was foully murdered in the Smolny, Leningrad, by a revolver shot. His death was a heavy loss for the Party and the people.

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The assassin, who was caught red-handed, was full of hostility towards and hatred for the Party and its leaders who were firmly implementing the Leninist general line aiming at the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. An embittered renegade who had once already been expelled from the Party, he had used his Party membership card as a cover to commit his heinous crime. It was a premeditated crime whose circumstances are still being investigated, as N. S. Khrushchev announced at the Twenty-Second Congress of the C.P.S.U.

The assassination of Kirov had a most adverse effect on the life of the Party and the state. It was committed under the personality cult. Stalin seized upon it to begin dealing summarily with people who did not suit him. Numerous arrests ensued. This was the beginning of wholesale repressive measures and the most flagrant violations of socialist legality.

It was in those conditions that the verification and exchange of Party documents were carried out. A verification of the records of Party members and of the procedure of their registration and safekeeping and of the issuance of Party cards had been proposed as early as October 1934. The C.C. C.P.S.U.(B.) was in possession of numerous facts speaking of irregularities in the matter. The registration of Communists and the safekeeping of Party records—important elements of Party organisation—were often regarded as a purely technical matter. They were therefore often entrusted to technical workers, not controlled by those in authority in the district and regional Party committees. Negligence in the handling of Party files had serious consequences. The misappropriation of Party cards, and the forging of Party records and cards, and erasures in them, assumed a dangerous character. This was the handiwork not only of impostors and rogues, but of downright enemies of the Soviet system, who were bent on wrecking activities.

The verification and exchange of Party cards were carried out in the course of 1935-36. On the whole, the measure proved its value. It enabled the Party to rid itself to a very substantial extent of alien and chance elements, to strengthen its ranks and increase its fighting capacity. Order was introduced into the registration of Communists and the keeping of Party records and issuance of Party cards. The leaders of Party organisations established closer ties with the membership.

But certain infringements of the Party's policy with regard to its membership were committed in the course of the verification and exchange of Party cards, as attested by numerous expulsions. As at the time of the last purge, there were instances of unwarranted expulsion of Communists classed as "passive". Many people, though devoted to the cause of socialism, were declared to be "passive". Those were distortions that could not but affect the situation within the Party.
The Central Committee began to receive numerous letters, applications and appeals from Communists wrongly expelled from the Party. This is why, even while the verification and exchange of Party documents went on, the Central Committee and local organisations set about rectifying the mistakes made. The matter was discussed at plenary meetings of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) in December 1935 and June 1936. Members of the Central Committee who spoke at the meetings called for a speedy rectification of the mistakes committed. But in view of the Stalin personality cult rectification proceeded slowly and lacked consistency.

After the verification and exchange of Party cards, admission to membership was resumed on November 1, 1936. The Central Committee reminded Party organisations of the necessity of admitting new members into the Party on a strictly individual basis and of enrolling “people really advanced and really devoted to the working-class cause, the finest people of our country, drawn above all from among the workers, and also from among peasants and working intellectuals tried and tested in various fields of the struggle for socialism”.


The efforts of the Party and the people to fulfil the Second Five-Year Plan ahead of time were marked by further feats of labour. Overcoming difficulties, the Party was coping successfully with the problem of mastering new industrial undertakings and new machinery. Progress manifested itself primarily in the iron and steel industry. Compared with 1913, pig-iron and steel output had increased by almost 150 per cent.

The victory of the collective-farm system had promoted a more rapid development of agriculture. By the end of 1934 the collective farms, which embraced about 75 per cent of all the peasant households and 87 per cent of the total crop area, had become a solid and invincible force. The output of grain and industrial crops had increased. Grain deliveries and purchases had assumed a more organised character. That year agriculture supplied the state with sufficient quantities of grain and other produce fully to meet the requirements of the population.

The November 1934 plenary meeting of the C.C. C.P.S.U.(B.) decided to abolish the rationing of bread and other foodstuffs, which had been introduced at the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan period. Unrestricted sale of foodstuffs began to supersede centralised distribution everywhere. The result was a substantial improvement in the economic life of the country, a further consolidation of the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, and more successes in socialist construction.
The consolidation of the collective-farm system enabled the Party to reorganise the political departments of the machine-and-tractor stations into ordinary Party bodies by merging them with the district Party committees. The political departments had performed their task with credit; but now leadership in the collective-farm countryside was becoming a more and more complex matter, and the ordinary Party and Soviet bodies had to be expanded and strengthened, if they were to cope with all aspects of the work in the collective farms—political, administrative, economic, cultural education, communal services, etc. This measure was added evidence of the Party’s flexibility in organisational leadership, of the growth of Party cadres in the localities.

The national economy was receiving more and more machinery. During the first two years of that period alone, industry, transport and agriculture were supplied with almost as many machines, machine-tools and other items of technical equipment as they had received during the whole period of the First Five-Year Plan. The solution of the Party’s chief economic problem, namely, the completion of the technical reconstruction of the national economy, was thus being assured. At the same time there was a danger that the increase in the number of personnel capable of using the new machinery might lag behind technical progress. A disproportion was arising between technical progress and the mastering of modern techniques.

The further growth of the productive forces of the Soviet Union depended on the efficient use of new techniques. The problem of skilled personnel capable of mastering new techniques and using them to the full became decisive. The Party issued the slogan: “Personnel decides everything!” This slogan was a logical sequel to the slogan: “Techniques in the period of reconstruction decide everything!” which the Party had advanced at the beginning of the reconstruction period, when the country needed new machinery and techniques first and foremost. Now that this problem had been solved, it was necessary to focus attention on personnel capable of mastering the new machinery. Nor was it a question of tens or hundreds of thousands but of millions of people capable of putting into operation and making full use of the new machinery in industry, transport, agriculture, and the armed forces—in short, wherever it existed.

When the Party proclaimed the slogan: “Personnel decides everything!”, it was aware that the new techniques were already being mastered in practice. The foremost workers in all branches of the national economy had launched a movement for the revision of obsolete technical standards. This revision was begun in coal mining and the iron and steel industry. The Party had always devoted particular attention to these important industries, and not without result. Numerous workers, engineers and technicians began to exceed old technical standards and to show higher labour productivity. In 1934 the Soviet Government awarded the Order of Lenin to Nikita
Izotov, a coal-hewer at the No. 1 Pit in Gorlovka, for the excellent results he had achieved as a shock worker. His example was followed by many other coal-miners.

A movement of shock workers in industrial production developed all over the country. By the end of 1933 there were about five million shock workers in industry and transport. The enthusiasm inspired by new building, a sentiment typical of Soviet people in the First Five-Year Plan period, was now supplemented by the enthusiasm for mastering new techniques and achieving high productivity of labour.

In 1935 the movement of the foremost workers for the mastering of new techniques and for the revision of old technical standards was named the Stakhanov movement after Alexei Stakhanov, a hewer who had cut 102 tons of coal during his shift and thus exceeded the standard output 14 times over. Innovators in production came to the fore in all branches of the national economy. Their initiative was given every encouragement by the Party which considered the movement of the foremost workers to be one of vast political importance, and assumed guidance of it.

The innovators' movement for a high productivity of labour was a new stage in the socialist emulation of the masses. Unlike that of previous years, it was now based on new first-class machinery and involved people who knew how to use that machinery. It was a result of the rise in the cultural and technical standards of the working class during the years of the five-year plans. It was inseparable from the establishment of socialist relations of production in all branches of the national economy, the radical change that had come to pass in the attitude of people to labour, their socialist attitude to labour.

The All-Union Conference of Foremost Industrial and Transport Workers, held in November 1935, played a notable part in rallying the working class of the country for the achievement of high labour productivity. About 3,000 people took part in the Conference. They described their experiences in using new machinery to fulfil high output quotas. This was indicative of the new features of Soviet men and women, who strove, in the interest of the whole of society, to place their personal achievements at the service of all.

The Party and the people are always guided by Lenin's precept that "communism is the higher productivity of labour—compared with that existing under capitalism—of voluntary, class-conscious and united workers employing advanced techniques" (Collected Works, Vol. 29, p. 394).

The movement of innovators in production indicated that the Soviet Union had entered the epoch of socialism. It was a movement to organise labour along new lines: proper division of labour in production, the release of skilled workers from secondary or preparatory work, better organisation of the work-place, and higher productivity of labour. New output standards were introduced which in
a number of cases topped the productivity of labour of the developed capitalist countries. Conditions were created for rapid growth of the production of consumer goods and cuts in their prices. The wages of workers and other employees were increased considerably. The cultural and technical level of the working class rose. Many prominent organisers of socialist industry rose from the ranks of innovators.

As it headed the movement of innovators in industry, the Party strove to give it a mass character. Party organisations encouraged every valuable initiative for the mastering of new techniques and for replacing the old, low output standards by new and higher ones, and made it known throughout the country. Under the guidance of Party organisations, conferences on production and techniques were called to discuss progressive working methods; factories organised exchanges of experience; front-rank workers took under their "patronage" those lagging behind, and old workers their younger mates; special schools were set up to promote progressive methods. Party and Komsomol members led the way in acquiring technical knowledge. They raised their technical level at correspondence or evening courses, in secondary specialised schools, technical schools or in higher educational institutions. All the other workers followed suit. The raising of the cultural and technical level of the working class, which was the only basis on which the movement of front-rank industrial workers could develop, became a prime task of the Party organisations.

Every new and progressive movement makes headway by combating the old. This was the case with the mass movement of innovators in production. Some workers feared that high production quotas might result in lower piece-prices and hence lower wages. Some engineers and technicians, who were fettered by their old notions of technical standards, proved incapable of supporting the movement and organising it properly. Furthermore, there were among the old experts hostile-minded people, too, who tried to disrupt the innovators' movement. It was primarily the Communists—as exponents of all that was new and progressive—who had to surmount these obstacles. And they coped with their task successfully.

The December 1935 plenary meeting of the C.C. C.P.S.U.(B.), which discussed the state of industry and transport in connection with the spread of the Stakhanov movement, greatly stimulated the mass movement of innovators in production. The C.C. meeting was attended by nearly three thousand business executives, Party officials, technicians and front-rank workers. It called for more bold and resolute revision of antiquated output standards and for their replacement by new ones, with due regard to the experience of the foremost workers. It laid special emphasis on the need for all working men and women to increase their technical knowledge.
Thanks to the innovators' movement, labour productivity in industry increased by 82 per cent during the years of the Second Five-Year Plan, instead of the 63 per cent originally planned. The growth in industrial output during that period was achieved chiefly through the higher labour productivity made possible by the use of new techniques.

While regarding industry as the foundation of the socialist national economy, the Party did not relax its attention to agricultural production. The development of socialist agriculture was experiencing difficulties of its own. The collective farms had been formed of small individual peasant farms, and the habits of individual farming told in the work of their members. But the collective farms could produce much more than individual farms. And it was to this aspect of the matter that the attention of Party organisations was directed.

A campaign began in the countryside to improve the cultivation of land, raise the yields of grain and industrial crops, and overcome the lag in livestock farming. There emerged people well versed in the new technique of agricultural production.

The Second All-Union Congress of Collective-Farm Shock Workers, which convened in February 1935, was of great importance in consolidating the collective-farm system. It adopted new Rules of the Agricultural Artel. They were adopted at a time when a certain amount of experience had been gained in the management of large-scale agricultural production. They summed up that experience. They assigned to the collective farms in perpetual tenure the land cultivated by them. This provided a durable foundation for the development and consolidation of the collective farms. The Rules indicated how large-scale socially-owned farming should be carried on, and specified the permissible size of individual holdings, having due regard to the interests of collective production and to the necessity of meeting the personal requirements of the collective farmer and his family. The Rules envisaged greater democracy on the collective farms and extended the rights of the collective farmers.

The implementation of the collective-farm Rules had a beneficial effect on agriculture and on labour discipline and productivity. However, this required strenuous efforts by the Party and the people. The Party made intense efforts to place the collective farms on a sound organisational and economic footing, and to assure the continuous growth of agricultural output.

In the years 1935-37 the Central Committee regularly discussed at its plenary meetings the preparation and carrying out of sowing and harvesting, aid to the still weak collective farms, and state stocking and purchases of grain. The same questions were given constant attention by the regional and district Party committees and by the collective-farm Party organisations.
The district Party committees in the countryside did much in those years to organise labour and its remuneration on the collective farms properly, improve labour discipline, select leading personnel for the collective farms, assign Communists to the decisive sectors of collective-farm production, reinforce and strengthen collective-farm Party organisations, and organise the individual Communists working at different collective farms. Every advance in this field was a valuable achievement by the Party. Party leadership of the collective farms was improving steadily.

Collective-farm Communists, putting the new Rules of the Agricultural Artel into practice, strengthened the socially-owned economy of the collective farms and increased its output. They inculcated a new, socialist attitude to labour in the collective-farm peasantry.

As it strengthened the collective farms, the Party also created conditions for drawing new sections of the peasantry into them. When the new Rules were adopted, there were still approximately four million peasant households outside the collective farms, but towards the end of the Second Five-Year Plan period the figure had dropped to about 1,500,000.

It was thanks to their selfless labour that the Soviet people had succeeded in fulfilling the Second Five-Year Plan, like the First, ahead of time, by April 1, 1937, that is, in four years and three months.

In 1937 the total output of large-scale industry was more than double what it had been in 1932, and eight times as great as in 1913.

The growth of large-scale industry, particularly of engineering, contributed to the technical re-equipment of all branches of the national economy. In 1937 over 80 per cent of the total industrial output was supplied by newly built factories or factories completely reconstructed in the years of the First and Second Five-Year Plans. Substantial successes were achieved in the mechanisation of agriculture. 456,000 tractors, some 129,000 combine harvesters and 146,000 lorries were being used in agriculture in 1937. The technical reconstruction of the national economy was in the main completed.

In agriculture, too, the Second Five-Year Plan had been carried out successfully. The collectivisation of agriculture was completed. The collective farms embraced 18,500,000 peasant households, or 93 per cent of the total. Their grain crop area accounted for more than 99 per cent of the total grain crop area sown by the peasants.

The year 1937 was particularly favourable for grain and industrial crops; the harvest was greater than in any previous year.

But livestock-farming was still making slow progress. It had suffered greatly in the process of transition from individual to collective farming; and to restore it, a steep rise in grain production, a considerable increase in fodder resources and material incentives to the collective farmers to develop this branch of agriculture were necessary.
The problem of trained personnel was solved in the main in the years of the Second Five-Year Plan—an important achievement. The number of experts with a higher or secondary specialised education who took jobs in the national economy more than doubled compared with the period of the First Five-Year Plan.

The living and cultural standards of the people rose appreciably during the Second Five-Year Plan period. The national income of the U.S.S.R. was more than doubled, and the wages and salary fund rose by 150 per cent, the number of workers and other employees increasing by 18 per cent. The money incomes of collective farms increased more than threefold.

The cultural revolution was making good progress in the U.S.S.R. The number of pupils attending elementary and secondary schools rose by more than 8,000,000 during the Second Five-Year Plan period. The number of students in higher educational institutions in 1937 was over 500,000. At that time the intelligentsia numbered about 10 million.

The Second Five-Year Plan period was marked by major achievements in the Leninist nationalities policy. Extensive expansion of industry was effected in the non-Russian republics. Large numbers of the local population were trained as engineers and technicians.

Such were the results of the victory of socialism in the Soviet Union, of the establishment of socialist relations of production in all branches of the national economy. The most difficult problem of the socialist revolution—that of creating a new, socialist economy—had been solved.

The building of socialism in the U.S.S.R. proceeded in keeping with the plan outlined by Lenin. The Communist Party was the principal, leading force in it. The brunt of the struggle for the victory of socialism was borne by the numerous Party workers in the republican, regional, district and primary Party organisations. The working class, the working mass of the peasantry and the intelligentsia gave their unqualified support to the policy of the Party and by their heroic labour ensured the triumph of socialism.

The profound changes in the life of the Soviet Union, and the decisive successes of socialism in the country’s economy and social system found legislative embodiment in the new Soviet Constitution. Soviet citizens took a most active part in the discussion of the draft Constitution, which lasted five and a half months.

In November 1936 the Extraordinary Eighth All-Union Congress of Soviets was convened. It adopted the Constitution which reflected the fact that socialism had triumphed in the U.S.S.R. The Constitution announced that the socialist system had become firmly established in every branch of the national economy. Socialist ownership of the means of production had become the solid economic basis of society, and the socialist principle of distribution—“From each according to his ability, to each according to his work”—had
become established. This principle of distributing material benefits guaranteed that the members of society would have an interest in the results of their labour. It allowed personal and public interests to be brought into harmony, and served as a powerful stimulus to increased labour productivity and to the promotion of the country's economy and the people's standard of living.

The class composition of the population had changed. All exploiting classes had been eliminated. There remained in the U.S.S.R. the working class, the peasant class and the intelligentsia. But they, too, had undergone radical changes in the struggle for socialism.

The working class of the Soviet Union, after destroying capitalism and transforming the means of production into public socialist property, had ceased to be a proletariat in the old, true sense of the word. The proletariat of the U.S.S.R. had become a working class emancipated from all exploitation, a class occupying the leading position in society and directing its development towards communism.

The peasant class, too, had ceased to be a class of small producers, tied to their small plots of land and exploited by landlords, kulaks, merchants and usurers. With the victory of the collective-farm system, the peasantry had been emancipated from all exploitation. Peasant labour had become co-operative labour based on social ownership.

The common character of the two forms of socialist property—property of the whole people and property of collective farms and other co-operatives—had brought the working class and the collective-farm peasantry closer together; it had strengthened their alliance and made their friendship unbreakable.

The intelligentsia had changed too. It was a new, people's intelligentsia devoted to socialism.

The Soviet people had achieved indestructible socio-political and ideological unity thanks to the fact that the workers, peasants and intellectuals had common interests.

The years of socialist construction had also witnessed a radical change in the aspect of the peoples inhabiting the Soviet Union. They had taken final shape as socialist nations. Their erstwhile feeling of mutual distrust had given way to one of mutual friendship. They had begun to co-operate fraternally within the system of a single socialist Union state.

Thanks to the Soviet system, certain peoples, such as the Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Turkmens, Tajiks, peoples of the Far North, Daghestan and others, had passed to socialism without having to pass through the painful stage of capitalism. By solving this complicated problem theoretically and practically, the C.P.S.U.(B.) had shown the way to socialism to many peoples of the world still in the pre-capitalist stage of social development.
The Constitution introduced into the political system major improvements aimed at the all-round development of Soviet democracy and genuine internationalism in the relations between the peoples of the country. It did away with all remaining restrictions in elections to the Soviets, and replaced indirect elections by direct. Elections to all Soviets of Working People's Deputies were made universal, direct and equal, by secret ballot. All Soviet citizens received the equal right to elect or be elected to the Soviets.

The Constitution guaranteed the right of all citizens of the U.S.S.R. to work, leisure, education, and maintenance in old age and in case of sickness or disability.

Granting to all citizens rights for which mankind had been fighting for centuries, the Constitution also imposed serious duties on them: strictly to observe the laws of the Soviet state and labour discipline, honestly to perform their duty towards society, to respect the standards of socialist conduct, to safeguard and build up socialist public property, honestly to perform their honourable duty of serving in the Armed Forces of the Soviet state and selflessly defending their socialist country. The Constitution proclaimed: "To defend the Fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the U.S.S.R."

The rights and duties of the citizens of the U.S.S.R. embody the principles of socialist democracy.

The further democratisation of the social and political system helped to strengthen and promote it.

The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. emphasised the leading position of the Communist Party in Soviet society as follows: "The most active and politically conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class, and of other strata of the working people, unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and which represents the leading core of all organisations of the working people, both voluntary and state."

The Constitution of the country of victorious socialism was the most democratic of all constitutions that had ever existed in the world.

The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. was a powerful encouragement for all those fighting for democracy in the capitalist countries. Therein lay its tremendous international significance.

**BRIEF SUMMARY**

In the internal life of the Soviet Union, the years 1933-37 were characterised by the completion of the socialist reconstruction of all branches of the national economy and the building, in the main, of a socialist society. The question "Who will beat whom?" inside
the country had been settled in favour of socialism. The victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. was a development of historic significance. It opened the highroad of socialism for all the peoples of the world. The building of socialism in the U.S.S.R. was the fulfilment of the behests of the great Lenin and a result of the organising and directing activity of the Communist Party, of its wise leadership and of the heroic labour of the workers, peasants and intellectuals, who gave their whole-hearted support to the policy of the Party.

With the fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan, the Soviet Union became a mighty industrial and collective-farm socialist power, supplying its economy with the necessary equipment and its armed forces with the armaments required for the defence of the country. The collectivisation of agriculture was completed.

The struggle to complete the socialist reconstruction of the national economy required that the Party intensify its political work among the masses and improve its organising work to a considerable extent. The Party concentrated on the more important tasks of socialist reconstruction, namely, the setting of the new factories into full production and mastery of the new techniques in industry, the organisational and economic consolidation of the collective farms, and the training of large numbers of technical intelligentsia for industry and agriculture.

The victory of socialist relations of production brought with it changes in the class structure of Soviet society. All the exploiting classes had been eliminated. There remained two friendly classes—the working class and the peasantry—and the working intelligentsia closely connected with them. Friendship and fraternal co-operation among the socialist nations of the U.S.S.R. grew stronger. Socio-political and ideological unity of the people was achieved. It was in these conditions that the Soviet people, on the initiative of the Party, adopted the second Constitution of the U.S.S.R., the most democratic Constitution in the world, which reflected the changes that had taken place in the economic and political life of the country.

With the victory of socialism the exploitation of man by man was abolished, and the living standards of the working people improved radically. The establishment of the socialist system in the country's economy created conditions for the rapid and continuous growth of social production on the basis of higher techniques, for increased social wealth and the steady improvement of the standard of life of the working people.

For all these achievements in the construction of socialist society, the situation in the Party and the country was complicated by the Stalin personality cult, which had taken shape by the time the Seventeenth Party Congress met and whose adverse effect made itself felt in abuses of power and in the wholesale repressive measures launched.

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The completion of the socialist reconstruction of the Soviet Union's national economy proceeded in a troubled international situation. The coming of fascism to power in Germany, and the increasingly aggressive actions of the German fascists in Europe and of the Japanese imperialists in the Far East, increased the threat of war for the U.S.S.R. Therefore, while carrying on peaceful socialist construction, the Party and the people prepared to defend their country.

The building of a socialist society in the Soviet Union, in the conditions of a hostile capitalist encirclement and the constant threat of attack from without, was an unparalleled, epoch-making feat of the Soviet people led by the Communist Party.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE PARTY'S STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSOLIDATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIALIST SOCIETY.

STRENGTHENING THE COUNTRY'S DEFENCES

(1937-June 1941)


The consequences of the economic crisis of 1929-33 were still in evidence when a new crisis broke out in the capitalist world in the autumn of 1937. Industrial output in 1938 was only 81 per cent of the 1929 level in the United States, and in France, only 76 per cent. A distinguishing feature of the 1937 crisis was that it did not affect the aggressor countries—Japan and Germany—which had placed their national economy on a war footing. Compared with 1929, Japan's industrial output in 1938 reached 185 per cent and Germany's, 121 per cent. The industrial boom in these countries was due to war preparations: militarisation all along the line attended by exceptionally brutal exploitation of the workers and mass impoverishment of the working people, who were robbed of all democratic rights. The German and Italian fascists and the ruling militarist clique in Japan speeded up their war preparations.

The struggle between the principal capitalist countries for markets and sources of raw material grew ever more acute. The unevenness of economic development stimulated the desire of the aggressor states to redivide the world forcibly, by means of war. In 1937 the Japanese imperialists entrenched in the north-eastern provinces of China started a war to conquer the whole of China and reduce her to a colony. In 1938 the German fascists moved their troops into Austria and occupied her. Immediately after disposing of Austria they started preparations for further conquest. Italian and German military intervention in Spain continued.

The flames of war enveloped various parts of the world, including such a vast country as China. The aggressive, imperialist powers were waging wars of aggrandisement; the peoples of China, Ethio-
pia and Spain, who were the victims of aggression, were fighting just wars for their national liberation. The second revolutionary civil war in China had been going on since 1927, with the revolutionary people, led by the Communist Party, fighting against the forces of domestic and foreign reaction. The intensification of Japanese aggression made it imperative to unite the people in the fight against the imperialist invaders. The Communist Party of China was the only genuinely patriotic force to come out in defence of the country. It put forward the slogan “End the civil war, unite to repel Japan!” and called on the people to give the invaders a decisive rebuff and drive them out. The Chinese Communists headed the heroic resistance of their people to the Japanese imperialists, who threatened to subjugate the whole country.

The flames of war were spreading more and more widely, increasing the danger of a world conflagration.

In that situation, the Communist Party and the Soviet state made fresh efforts to ensure collective security and thwart the aggressors. In March 1938, after the occupation of Austria by Hitler Germany, the Soviet Government stated that it was prepared to participate in collective action to check fascist aggression and prevent a new world war. The Soviet Government proposed immediate discussion of the appropriate practical measures with other powers in the League of Nations or outside it. “Tomorrow may be too late,” the statement said, “but there is still time today, if all countries, and especially the Great Powers, take a firm and unequivocal stand on the question of joint action for the preservation of peace.”

When Hitler Germany began to threaten Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Government signified its readiness to come to her aid in strict accordance with the stipulations of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of 1935, that is, provided France, for her part, took action against the aggressor. The Soviet Government proposed the holding of a conference of military representatives of the U.S.S.R., France and Czechoslovakia to discuss practical measures necessary for the defence of the new victim of Hitler’s aggression. The Soviet Union was prepared to do even more for Czechoslovakia than it was committed to under the treaty, that is, to come to her aid even without France, provided Czechoslovakia agreed to such assistance and herself resisted the aggressor.

The preservation of peace hinged to a large extent on whether or not the Western Powers would support the Soviet efforts to organise a collective rebuff to the aggressor, as the interests of the peoples demanded. Hitler would not have risked a war against a coalition of the U.S.S.R., Britain, France and the U.S.A., to which many other countries would have adhered.

The ruling circles of the Western Powers, however, once again rejected the policy of collective security, although the fascist aggressors were seriously threatening the interests and the very existence
of those states. Instead, they chose the policy of concessions to the fascist aggressors in the hope of coming to terms with them. Their aim was to divert the blow from themselves and direct it at the Soviet Union. The reactionary circles of the Western Powers planned to set Germany and Japan on the Soviet Union, in order to destroy the socialist state and at the same time weaken their rivals, since it was clear that a war against the U.S.S.R. would be no easy matter. By means of this perfidious policy the monopolists of Great Britain, the U.S.A. and France hoped to ensure their dominant position in the world. In September 1938, when the Hitlerites were preparing for aggression against Czechoslovakia, the Heads of Government of Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy met in Munich and decided to transfer a number of Czechoslovakia’s border regions to Germany. Czechoslovakia was betrayed by the ruling circles of Britain and France. This disgraceful policy of complicity with the aggressors came to be called the Munich policy — after the city where the conference was held. Under the pressure of the Western Powers, the bourgeois Government of Czechoslovakia capitulated and decided not to resist the Hitlerites, thus betraying the national interests of the country, although it was fully in a position to defend it with the help of the Soviet Union. Formally, the United States had not been a party to the Munich Conference, but it favoured its convocation and wholly approved of its decisions. The Soviet Union alone condemned the Munich betrayal.

Since France had betrayed Czechoslovakia instead of helping her, the 1935 Franco-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance in fact became null and void.

Under the guise of the so-called “policy of non-intervention”, the British, French and U.S. governments also helped fascism to power in Spain, although its victory weakened the strategic positions of the Western Powers themselves. Early in 1939 the Republican Government of Spain was defeated. A fascist regime was set up in the country.

The Party and the Soviet Government drew the necessary conclusions from the Munich betrayal by the Western Powers. It became increasingly obvious that they could not be relied upon to co-operate in the struggle against the aggressors.

2. The Party’s Political Work in the Period of the Completion of Socialist Construction. Eighteenth Party Congress

The economic and political upheavals of the capitalist world did not affect the Soviet Union. The land of socialism proceeded with its constructive job. The fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan marked the end of the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. The New Economic Policy introduced in 1921 had served its
purpose. The construction of a socialist society in the U.S.S.R. was in the main completed.

Socialism is the first phase of communism. Full communism grows out of socialism, through its stabilisation and development.

"Socialism," said Lenin, "is a society that emerges directly from capitalism. . . . Communism, on the other hand, is a higher type of society, and it can only develop when socialism comes into its own" (Collected Works, Vol. 30, p. 260).

With the task of building socialism in the main accomplished, the Soviet Union in its internal development entered—according to the definition given by the Eighteenth Party Congress—the period of completion of the construction of socialist society and of the gradual transition from socialism to communism.

Socialism in many respects still bears an imprint of the old society from which it has emerged. The level of development achieved by social production does not yet provide an adequate supply of material benefits to fully meet the requirements of every member of society. A certain inequality in the distribution of consumer goods still remains. New, socialist relations of production in so important an economic branch as agriculture have only just formed and are not solid enough yet. While productivity of social labour has increased to a substantial degree, it still falls short of the potentialities of the socialist system. Survivals of a private-property psychology persist in the minds of people.

These facts required that the Party and the socialist state concentrate on completing the construction of socialist society and on consolidating it. It was first of all necessary to build up the material and technical basis for socialism, canalise development in a way ensuring that the production of means of production kept ahead of production in other economic spheres, promote the collective-farm system and increase agricultural production. It was essential for the successful development of the socialist economy to improve the methods of economic management and leadership. Socialist relations of production had to be perfected in all economic fields, particularly in agricultural production. It was important to adhere strictly to the socialist principle of distribution according to work, stimulate people's material interest in the results of their labour, establish control on the part of society and the state over the amount of labour and that of consumption, and apply compulsion to people who refused to work honestly. Still more important was it to heighten the social consciousness of the working people and educate them in the spirit of a socialist attitude to labour and to public property.

The victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. increased the political and economic strength of the Soviet state and extended its socio-economic basis. With the abolition of the exploiting classes, the function of suppressing their resistance ceased to be necessary. The main functions of the socialist state—economic organisation, cultural and
educational activity—developed to the full. The socialist state entered a new period of its development—it began to develop from a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat into a state of the whole people. It was essential to continue strengthening the political foundation of the Soviet state—the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, the friendship of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and the unity of the Soviet people—and fostering socialist democracy. It was in the interest of socialism to promote the functions of the state in economic organisation and cultural and educational activity, maintain socialist law and order and protect public property more carefully, and reliably safeguard the defence and security of the country.

The leading role of the Communist Party in the life of society had increased under socialism. The new situation necessitated a new approach to Party work, and better organising work among the people. To increase its leading role in socialist construction and encourage the political and labour activity of every Communist, the Party set out to extend inner-Party democracy.

In fighting for socialism, the Party had become much stronger and had gained ample experience both in economic management and in work among the people. It was in a position to carry out its organising work and its political activity among the masses much better. But the activity of Party organisations showed serious shortcomings, which were particularly intolerable at a time when socialism was victorious and the Soviet system was being democratised still further. Decreeing and administration by injunction were often substituted for persuasion and educational work. These violations stemmed chiefly from the Stalin personality cult. A number of Party organisations infringed the Party Rules—they often violated the principle of election of the Party bodies, held Party conferences at rare intervals, and widely practised co-optation, thereby grossly violating the principle of democratic centralism.

Defects in the activities of Party organisations were criticised at the February-March 1937 plenary meeting of the C.C. C.P.S.U.(B.), which discussed the Party organisations’ preparations for the election to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. according to the Constitution of 1936.

The adoption of the new Constitution (1936) and the further democratisation of the Soviet electoral system meant a turning-point in the political life of the country. The Party had to be adequately prepared for this, and ensure its leadership in the forthcoming elections. But that could be done only if the Party itself was consistent in its democratic practices and in observing fully the principle of democratic centralism, as the Party Rules demanded. The C.C. instructed the Party organisations to overhaul their work. The reorganisation included elimination of the practice of co-opting to leading Party bodies, prohibition of voting by lists during the elections to
them, and introduction of the secret ballot. It helped the Party to prepare for the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. all the better.

The Party entered the elections in a bloc, in an alliance, with the non-Party masses, with whom it put up common candidates. The election alliance of Communists and non-Party masses was a logical and natural development in the country of victorious socialism. It reflected the socialist unity of Soviet society.

The elections to the Supreme Soviet took place on December 12, 1937. 96.8 per cent of the electorate went to the polls, and 98.6 per cent of those who did so cast their votes for the candidates of the Communist and non-Party bloc. The millions of Soviet people thus voiced their confidence in the Communist Party and their endorsement of its policy. The results of the elections graphically demonstrated the successes attained in the building of socialism under the leadership of the Party. They were evidence of the genuine unity of Soviet society, of the strength and vitality of socialist democracy embodied in the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

The victory of socialism created favourable conditions for the extension of Party and Soviet democracy. But in spite of that, there were direct violations of Party and Soviet democracy resulting from the Stalin personality cult. Stalin turned certain restrictions in inner-Party and Soviet democracy that were unavoidable in conditions of bitter struggle against the class enemy and his agents into a standard of leadership in the Party and the country. He began to violate the standards of Party life worked out by Lenin, the principle of collective leadership, deciding many important Party and government questions on his own.

Following the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) Stalin ceased completely to take into account the collective opinion of the Party and of its Central Committee. The personality cult was creating a favourable atmosphere for such negative practices as arbitrary decisions and abuses of power, self-seeking and servility, suspicion and distrust; in the ideological sphere, it bred dogmatism and led to the separation of theory from practice.

In Stalin's actions a discrepancy arose between word and deed. His speeches and writings contained correct, Marxist propositions concerning the people as the maker of history, the role of the Party and its Central Committee as the collective leader, solicitude for cadres, extension of inner-Party democracy, etc. But Stalin infringed these propositions. He said that it was impermissible to exaggerate the role of the individual in history and yet established, encouraged and spread the cult of his own personality.

Under victorious socialism, it was as essential as ever to consolidate the Soviet state in every way and to increase vigilance towards enemy intrigues, primarily those of the capitalist encirclement. Furthermore, it was indispensable to be on guard against hostile
elements from among the abolished exploiting classes and their agents. But the thesis alleging that the class struggle would grow in intensity as the positions of socialism were strengthened and the Soviet state made further progress—a thesis advanced by Stalin at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee held in February-March 1937, when socialism had triumphed—was harmful and erroneous. In reality, the class struggle in the Soviet country was at its sharpest stage in the period when the question “Who will beat whom?” was being decided, when the foundations of socialism were being laid. But after socialism had won, after the exploiting classes had been eliminated and socialist unity had been established in Soviet society, the thesis of the inevitable sharpening of the class struggle was an erroneous one. In practice it served as a justification for mass repressions against prominent officials of the Party and state, members and alternate members of the Central Committee, noted Soviet military leaders and many other completely innocent people—both Communists and non-Party people. By getting rid of leading Party and government officials and military men who did not suit him, Stalin grossly violated the Party Rules and Soviet laws. Responsibility for this also falls on Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov, who contributed actively to these gross violations. The false charges which the People’s Commissariat of the Interior levelled at members and alternate members of the Central Committee were not examined at plenary meetings of the C.C.

The Leninist principles of relations between the Party and the People’s Commissariat of the Interior were infringed at the time. Stalin established personal control over that office and eliminated Party control over it. He personally selected, bypassing the Central Committee, people whom he saw fit to assign key posts in that department. It was on his direct instructions that Yezhov was appointed People’s Commissar of the Interior.

With Yezhov’s participation, many Communists and non-Party people wholly devoted to the cause of the Party were slandered, and lost their lives. But Yezhov was soon subjected to repression himself. Beria was appointed People’s Commissar of the Interior thanks to Stalin, and stopped at no crime to further his infamous aims. Afterwards it was established that he was an inveterate political adventurer and one-time agent-provocateur. In 1953 Beria was punished according to his deserts.

At that time the Party and the people were unaware of the arbitrary methods of Stalin and his abuses of authority. Soviet people knew Stalin as an active champion of the victory of socialism and trusted him. They believed that the repressive measures taken affected real enemies and served the interests of socialism. It will be recalled that those measures were first taken against former ideological enemies, who were made out to be agents of imperialism and of foreign intelligence services. Similar charges were levelled at other Communists,
at people who had never participated in any political opposition and had been fighting for the Leninist general line of the Party.

Certain outstanding Party officials, who were close to Stalin, came to the conclusion that they could no longer work with him and share the responsibility for his abuses of power, for the wholesale measures of repression against perfectly innocent people. Some of them, who had been persecuted and humiliated (G. K. Orjonikidze), committed suicide, while others, who protested (P. P. Postyshev, G. N. Kamin-sky), immediately became the victims of repressive measures.

The violations of socialist legality and wholesale measures of repression caused serious damage to the Communist Party and to socialist construction. But while the Stalin personality cult slowed down the development of Soviet society, it could not stop its progress, could not alter the nature of the socialist system or shake the Leninist foundations of the Party. Despite the cult, the Party and its local organisations lived a vigorous, active life. The Party as a whole, led by its Central Committee, devotedly championed the interests of the people and the construction of socialism in the U.S.S.R. The Soviet people fully trusted the Party; guided by its recommendations, they continued to promote the great cause of socialism. Socialist construction achieved success after success.

The victory of socialism was marked by an influx of new members into the Party and a considerable growth of the Soviet intelligentsia. The young personnel promoted to leading Party, administrative and economic posts often lacked adequate experience or the necessary ideological and political training. It was therefore essential to improve the ideological and political education of the intelligentsia, government and Party personnel.

The C.C. C.P.S.U.(B.) adopted a number of measures to improve Party propaganda and agitation. The machinery in charge of the Party’s ideological work was reinforced in the centre and in the localities. Schools and refresher courses were set up for Party cadres. The study of the history of the Party was started. This played a useful part on the whole, although the History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), which appeared at that time, had serious shortcomings. It was pervaded by the spirit of the Stalin personality cult, and failed to elucidate many questions of Party history faithfully and objectively. This fact had an adverse effect on the Party’s ideological work.

The Eighteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), held on March 10 to 21, 1939, was an important event in the life of the Party and people who had entered the new phase of socialist construction. The Congress represented 1,588,852 Party members and 888,814 candidate members.

The Congress heard and discussed reports by the leading Party bodies; it considered and approved the Third Five-Year Plan for the development of the national economy and amendments to the Rules of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
The reports of the leading Party bodies were presented by J. V. Stalin, M. F. Vladimirsky and D. Z. Manuilsky.

The Congress noted that the war unleashed by the fascist states against peace-loving nations constituted a threat to world peace. At that time the war had not yet become a world war, though it had already drawn into its orbit countries with an aggregate population of 500 million.

The Congress exposed the Munich policy of the Western Powers, a policy of abetting the aggressors. It pointed out that the dangerous political game started by the advocates of the “policy of non-intervention” might end in a serious fiasco for them. This warning soon proved only too true.

After endorsing the foreign policy of the Soviet Government the Eighteenth Congress laid down the following directives: to continue the policy of peace and of strengthening business contacts with all countries; to be on the alert and not allow the Soviet Union to be drawn into conflicts by warmongers accustomed to making a cat’s-paw of other people; to strengthen to the utmost the fighting capacity of the Red Army and Navy; to strengthen international ties with the working people of all countries, who were interested in peace and friendship among the peoples.

The Congress discussed the cardinal economic task of the U.S.S.R.—to overtake and outstrip the principal capitalist countries in production per head. This problem was posed by Lenin on the eve of the October Revolution as the perspective in store for a socialist country. After the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R., when the technical reconstruction of the national economy had in the main been completed, it became the immediate practical task of the Party and the entire Soviet people.

The Eighteenth Party Congress noted with satisfaction that the victory of socialism had further strengthened the Soviet system and consolidated the alliance of the working class and the peasantry and the fraternal ties among the peoples of the U.S.S.R.

The Congress also considered some questions of Marxist-Leninist theory which were important for the consolidation and development of socialist society. It condemned the harmful, erroneous view that the state withers away under socialism and the organs of state power are curtailed and weakened. The spread of this view was highly dangerous at a time when the Soviet Union was the only socialist country in the world and was encircled by capitalist countries intent on destroying the socialist system by armed force. The report of the Central Committee of the Party and speeches by delegates described the principal stages of development of the socialist state and its main functions. The Soviet state had passed through two major phases in its development. The first covered the period from the victory of the October Socialist Revolution to the elimination of the exploiting classes. The second began with the elimination of the exploiting
classes and the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. The functions of the socialist state in its first phase included suppression of the resistance of the overthrown classes within the country, defence of the country from external attack, economic organisation, and cultural and educational work. During the second phase the function of suppressing the exploiting classes ceases because these classes have been eliminated; it is superseded by the function of protecting socialist property; the functions of economic organisation, and cultural and educational work develop to the full; the function of military defence of the country fully remains. The change in the functions of the socialist state after the victory of socialism does not at all mean the weakening of this state, or its withering away. For this reason the Party Congress called for the all-out strengthening of the machinery of the state, and above all of those parts of it which performed the function of defending the land of socialism.

But Stalin, who dealt in his report with the question of the state, underrated the theoretical heritage of Lenin. He reduced the significance of Lenin’s brilliant work, The State and Revolution, to mere defence of the Marxist doctrine of the state against distortion and vulgarisation on the part of opportunists. He ignored Lenin’s post-October writings on the dictatorship of the proletariat and on the socialist state, and attributed to himself the whole of the subsequent development of the doctrine of the state. In describing the functions of the Soviet state from the October Revolution to the victory of socialism, Stalin minimised the economic organisation and cultural and educational activity carried out by the organs of state power, alleging that this work had not assumed a large scale at the time.

The question of the Soviet intelligentsia and the right attitude towards it figured prominently at the Congress. In conditions of victorious socialism, the intelligentsia had become truly popular in nature, closely bound up with the working class and the collective-farm peasantry, an important force in Soviet society, in its economic and cultural development. The Congress called upon Party organisations to be tactful and attentive in their attitude towards the Soviet intelligentsia, and resolutely to do away with the still existing distrust of it and with the survivals of old pre-revolutionary views regarding the intelligentsia. The Soviet intelligentsia deserved the complete trust and constant consideration of the Party and the state.

The Eighteenth Congress considered the Third Five-Year Plan for the development of the national economy of the U.S.S.R. (1938-42), which was an important step towards solving the cardinal economic task of the U.S.S.R. It provided for increasing the industrial might of the country, strengthening the collective-farm system, raising the material well-being and cultural standards of the people, and strengthening the defence capacity of the Soviet Union. It was planned to increase industrial output in 1942 to nearly twice the
1937 figure. Capital investments earmarked under the Third Five-Year Plan approximated to the sum-total of all capital invested in the years of the First and Second Five-Year Plans.

An important objective of the Third Five-Year Plan was to develop the defence industries and create big state reserves of fuel, electric power and other branches of production. It was planned to build duplicates of existing enterprises in the eastern regions of the country—the Urals, the Volga region, Siberia and Central Asia—expand the coal and metallurgical base in the east of the country and create an oil base in the area between the Volga and the Urals and a new grain-growing area in the eastern and south-eastern regions of the U.S.S.R.

The Congress devoted considerable attention to questions of organisation. It adopted a resolution on amendments to the Rules of the C.P.S.U.(B.), and approved the amended Party Rules. In view of the fundamental changes in the national economy and the class structure of the U.S.S.R., the classification of people applying for Party membership in accordance with their social status was abandoned. Common rules and a common probation period were established for all seeking admission to the Party. This, however, did not imply a lessening of demands upon those joining the Party or of the responsibility of the Party organisations for the composition of the new membership. As in the past, the task was systematically to improve the composition of the Party, observing the principle of a strictly individual approach in selecting the best people, devoted to the cause of communism, for Party membership. An addendum specifying the rights of Party members was introduced into the Party Rules. It provided that every Communist had the right to take part in free and business-like discussion of practical questions of Party policy at Party meetings and in the Party press; to criticise any Party worker at Party meetings; to elect and to be elected to Party committees; to demand to be present when any decision concerning his activities or conduct was taken; and to submit any question or statement to any Party body, up to and including the Central Committee.

The Congress resolution: “On Amendments to the Rules of the C.P.S.U.(B.)” condemned a formal, heartless and bureaucratic attitude towards the fate of Party members, and sharply criticised the slanderers and careerists who defamed the Party cadres. The Party Rules were supplemented by a number of provisions ensuring a careful approach and thorough analysis of the soundness of charges made in deciding the question of expulsion from the Party, or of the rehabilitation of expelled Party members.

The Rules of the C.P.S.U.(B.) abolished mass cleansings, which were a means of improving the composition of the Party during the transition period, but were no longer necessary in conditions of victorious socialism, when capitalist elements had been eliminated. The Rules reflected the measures taken by the Party to further inner-
Party democracy. They laid special emphasis on the role of primary Party organisations in economic and cultural development.

The Party organisations at production enterprises, including collective and state farms and the machine-and-tractor stations, were given the right to exercise control over the activity of the management. This enhanced their responsibility.

The Rules pointed out that the Komsomol is an active assistant of the Party in the whole of state and economic development and that where there are no primary Party organisations, the Komsomol organisations can and must assume full responsibility for the execution of Party decisions.

The amendments and addenda to the Party Rules adopted by the Congress made for greater inner-Party democracy, greater activity and initiative on the part of Communists, and improved inner-Party work as a whole. The implementation of the new Rules was bound to extend and strengthen the links between the Party and the non-Party masses, and enhance the Party's prestige among the people. Taken as a whole, the decisions on Party organisation adopted by the Congress were useful, even though their execution was restricted by the atmosphere of the personality cult.

The Eighteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) focussed the attention of the Party on solving the tasks confronting the Soviet Union with its entry into a new phase of development, namely, the phase of completing the building of socialism and the gradual transition to communism.


The events which unfolded in the world arena after the Eighteenth Party Congress fully confirmed its assessment of the international situation. Hitler Germany was hastily completing war preparations. The fascist aggressors considered the situation suitable for starting a war to enslave the peoples of Europe and then of other parts of the world and to establish the world dominion of German imperialism.

The Western Powers' Munich policy proceeded from the assumption that a war against the U.S.S.R. could iron out the imperialist contradictions between them and the fascist states. Signs appeared, however, that these plans were not feasible, at least not in the immediate future. In March 1939 the Hitlerites seized the rest of Czechoslovakia without even securing the consent of Britain and France, which they had still considered necessary at the time of the Munich Conference. Having done with Czechoslovakia, the Hitler Government immediately began to prepare for aggression against Poland.
The Polish Government was presented with brazen and patently unacceptable demands for territorial concessions, changes in the status of Germans in Poland, etc. At the same time Germany had not the least intention of withdrawing her demand for the return of her former colonies, annexed by Britain and France under the Versailles Peace Treaty. It became clear that the Western Powers had failed, even at the price of the Munich betrayal, to protect their interests and come to a firm agreement with Hitler.

In these circumstances Britain and France announced in the spring of 1939 that they would guarantee the sovereignty of Poland, Greece, Rumania and Turkey, in other words, the countries which were threatened by the fascist invaders. At the same time they started negotiations with the Soviet Union on ways of countering German aggression.

Did all that mean that Britain and France had abandoned the policy of conspiring with Hitler against the U.S.S.R and had switched to a policy of collectively resisting the fascist aggressor? It soon became obvious that that was not the case. As a matter of fact, the governments of Britain and France were playing a double game. They continued to seek a deal with Hitler at the expense of the U.S.S.R and had merely altered their tactics. Democratic public opinion in these two countries was insistently demanding that their governments establish close co-operation with the Soviet Union. Though not in the least anxious to do so, British and French ruling circles were nevertheless compelled to start negotiations with the U.S.S.R. in order to camouflage their real plans. Moreover, they hoped to utilise these negotiations with the Soviet Government to exert pressure on Hitler, whom they sought to frighten by the prospect of a powerful coalition with the participation of the U.S.S.R., and thus to induce him to come to terms with the Western Powers and spearhead the German armed forces against the Soviet Union.

The Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet Government took this into account. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government agreed to start negotiations with Britain and France. The Soviet Union did not want to miss a single opportunity, however slight, to organise collective resistance to the aggressor and avert a new world war. The course of the negotiations, however, confirmed that the governments of Britain and France were not really willing to co-operate with the U.S.S.R. to that end.

The proposals made to the Soviet Union by the British and French governments were absolutely unacceptable. Without assuming any concrete obligations themselves, they sought to commit the U.S.S.R. to participation in a war, to involve it in a war against Germany, while themselves keeping out of it.

The Soviet Government rejected the British and French proposals as contrary to the principle of reciprocity. It submitted counter-proposals providing for the conclusion of a mutual assistance treaty
between the three powers. Under this treaty, the U.S.S.R., Britain and France were to assist one another in the event of aggression in Europe against any one of the three states, as well as in the event of aggression against Poland, Rumania, the Baltic countries, Turkey or Belgium. It was also proposed to define precisely the extent and forms of military assistance to be given by each of the three parties to the agreement. The adoption of the Soviet proposals would have meant the establishment of a powerful coalition against fascist Germany, and could have checked the spread of aggression.

The British and French governments would not consent to conclude a treaty providing for reciprocal commitments by all three states. As a result, the negotiations dragged out: started in March 1939, they continued until August of the same year. The British and French governments continually submitted new draft treaties, all of them possessing one and the same feature: they were all designed to provoke a Soviet-German war. It was only reluctantly, under the pressure of democratic public opinion, that Britain and France made some concessions. What the two governments wanted, especially the British, was clearly not to conclude an agreement with the U.S.S.R., but merely to talk about such an agreement, while pursuing other aims.

The unwillingness of Britain and France to form a coalition with the Soviet Union, in the event of Germany launching a war, became finally obvious during the negotiations between military representatives of the three states, held in Moscow, on the initiative of the U.S.S.R., in August 1939.

At that time, the Soviet Union had no common frontier with Germany. To open hostilities against the German troops, the Red Army would have to pass through the territory of Poland which separated them. In the course of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet military negotiations it turned out that the Government of Poland was against allowing the Soviet troops to cross her territory, and that Britain and France were not doing anything serious to induce the Polish Government to alter its stand. Yet unless the Polish Government did so, the Soviet Union actually had nowhere to take part in the war against Germany. It was clear that Britain and France, starting negotiations with the U.S.S.R., really had no intention of opposing Hitler aggression, arms in hand, together with the Soviet Union. The secret instructions to the British military mission conducting negotiations with the Soviet Command in Moscow expressly said that the British Government did not wish to assume any definite commitments whatever towards the Soviet Union.

While conducting negotiations with the Soviet Union, the British Government started secret talks with the German Government, proposing to Hitler the conclusion of a non-aggression pact and an agreement on the division of spheres of influence on a world-wide scale.
This included a truly monstrous proposal—that China and the Soviet Union be among the countries to be divided up. The British Government promised the Hitlerites to break off negotiations with the U.S.S.R. It was likewise ready to withdraw the guarantee of Poland's independence which it had only recently given. In other words, it was ready to betray Poland by surrendering her to Hitler, just as it had done in the case of Czechoslovakia.

The danger to the U.S.S.R. was aggravated by the fact that it was threatened not only from the west but from the east as well. The Soviet Union was rendering material and moral assistance to the Chinese people in their struggle against Japanese imperialism, while the U.S.A. and Britain were encouraging the Japanese aggressor and lavishly aiding him with strategic materials. "Since the outbreak of the war against the Japanese invader," Mao Tse-tung wrote, "none of the imperialist governments has given us any real help; the Soviet Union alone has rendered us assistance in the form of aircraft and material resources" (Selected Works, Vol. 3, p. 190). Relations between the U.S.S.R. and Japan were deteriorating. In 1938 the Japanese imperialists invaded Soviet territory in the area of Lake Hasan, near Vladivostok. They were intent on testing, with their bayonets, the strength of the Soviet Union and its military preparedness. In the summer of 1939 large Japanese forces invaded the area of the Halhin-Gol River in the Mongolian People's Republic, with which the Soviet Union had been bound by a mutual assistance pact since 1936. Both attacks were repelled with heavy losses for the Japanese.

Thus the U.S.S.R. was already forced to carry on hostilities in the Far East at a time when the Hitlerites were making preparations near the Soviet western borders to attack Poland, and the negotiations with the Western Powers had reached a deadlock through the fault of Britain and France. An extremely unfavourable situation had arisen: the Soviet Union was threatened with war, in conditions of its complete political isolation—and that on two fronts at once, in the west and the Far East.

The country had to be saved at all costs from the danger threatening it. This was a question of life and death not only for the Soviet people and the Soviet Union. The preservation of the first, and at that time the only, socialist state was in the interest of socialism throughout the world, in the interest of the working people of all countries.

The Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the Soviet Government were guided by the directive of the Eighteenth Party Congress: to be cautious and not allow the Soviet Union to be drawn into conflicts by warmongers. The Party and the Government proceeded from this directive when, in August 1939, they adopted the responsible decision to conclude the non-aggression pact with Germany proposed by the German Government. This decision was adopted
only when it became absolutely clear that Britain and France, as well as Poland, had no intention of concluding an effective agreement with the U.S.S.R. for a joint struggle against Hitler aggression, and when all other possibilities for ensuring the Soviet Union's security had been exhausted.

When the German Government proposed to the Soviet Union to conclude a non-aggression pact, it did so for reasons of its own and had by no means renounced the idea of an annexationist war against the U.S.S.R. But it reckoned with the enormous difficulties this war would entail; and it therefore planned first to subjugate the West European countries and then, making use of their resources, to attack the U.S.S.R. As for the Soviet Union, by the conclusion of this pact it gained a certain time to prepare its defence and was enabled to ward off the danger of being involved in a war on two fronts in the extremely unfavourable conditions prevailing in 1939, when the Western Powers did not wish to become its allies. The reactionary ruling circles of Britain, France and the U.S.A. sought to isolate the U.S.S.R. and to establish a united front of capitalist powers against it. Germany and Japan were to play the role of the shock force in a war against the Soviet Union and to shed their people's blood, so that the three Western Powers could later dictate their terms to the war-weakened countries.

It was impossible to avert war at a time when the U.S.S.R. was alone and encircled by capitalist countries, and the international working class was split by the Right-wing Socialists who had rejected the Communists' call for unity. But the first socialist country could and had to be saved from war in such adverse conditions. The Soviet Government was in duty bound to its people and the cause of socialism throughout the world to frustrate the reactionary schemes of the men of Munich. The non-aggression pact with Germany helped to do that.

The Munichites wanted to start a war in such a way that it should begin between the capitalist world and an isolated Soviet Union. But it so happened that the war broke out within the capitalist world itself. As a result, the Munichite politicians found themselves in a difficult position, like the one in the popular saying: "He falls himself that digs another's pit". They wanted to involve the U.S.S.R. in a war with Germany and Japan, while they themselves would stand aloof and build up their strength for the time when it would be possible to dictate their own terms to the three countries, exhausted by war. It so happened, however, that they had to fight themselves in difficult conditions.

On September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland. The Polish people fell victim to fascist aggression. It offered stubborn resistance, with the Communists, the workers and the other working people who rallied around the Communists, playing a heroic part. But, since the bourgeois-landlord government, committing an act of na-
tional betrayal, had rejected the help offered by the Soviet Union, Poland could not withstand the powerful onslaught of Hitler Germany.

After the Hitlerites’ attack on Poland, the British and French governments could no longer doubt that, having finished with Poland, Hitler Germany would strike at France, Britain and their vast colonies. The governments of Britain and France therefore declared war on Germany at the beginning of September 1939.

Thus began the Second World War.

Britain and France did not enter the war with Germany for the sake of Poland, and least of all with the object of overthrowing fascism. They did so in order to protect their own imperialist interests and positions and to maintain their position as Great Powers. That is why they did not raise a finger really to help Poland. The German forces advanced swiftly eastward through Poland, approaching the Soviet frontiers.

The Party and the Soviet Government realised that, while the treaty with Germany enabled the Soviet Union temporarily to stave off war with the Hitlerites, the latter could not be relied upon to observe their obligations for long. It was therefore essential for the country’s defence to halt the advancing Hitler troops as far away as possible from the vital centres of the U.S.S.R., and to prevent them from taking up strategic positions farther eastward, nearer to our frontier, that is, on the immediate approaches to Minsk. Nor could the Soviet Union remain indifferent to the fate of the brother peoples of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, and allow them to fall under the fascist yoke. On September 17, 1939, Red Army units crossed the frontier and soon occupied Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia. These regions reunited with Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Byelorussia to form single states of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian peoples.

In its early stages, the war that broke out between Hitler Germany and Anglo-French imperialism in 1939 was imperialist on both sides. The Polish people, like other nations that had fallen victim to aggression, were fighting for their independence; but as for the Great Powers, the two sides, both Hitler Germany and Britain and France, were pursuing imperialist aims. Germany was fighting for a redivision of the world in her favour, while Britain and France sought to retain their colonial empires and their rule over the peoples they had enslaved, and to eliminate Germany as a competitor.

But as it happened, Britain and France found themselves faced with the same enemy as all the nations who had fallen victim to fascist aggression—German fascism. Moreover, as a result of the heavy reverses they suffered at the hands of the Hitlerites in 1940, Britain and France had subsequently to think, not so much of achieving their imperialist aims, as of preserving their national independence. At the same time the masses of the people in Britain and France, as
well as in the U.S.A., were bringing increasing pressure to bear on their governments to wage an active anti-fascist war, a war of liberation. Under popular pressure the nature of Britain's and France's war against Hitler Germany changed in the course of time. In effect, it merged with the war waged by the freedom-loving nations against fascist aggression, and assumed the character of a war of liberation. The liberating character of the war became still more manifest after the Soviet Union's entry, when Britain, France and later the U.S.A. found themselves together with the U.S.S.R. in the anti-Hitler coalition.

In the early phase of the Second World War the Munichite elements in Britain and France, as well as in the U.S.A., continued to cherish the hope of switching the war against the U.S.S.R. French and British troops on the Western front were practically inactive, conducting no serious hostilities against Germany. At the same time Britain and France strove to involve the countries bordering on the Soviet Union into a war against it. In Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania the intrigues of the imperialists came to naught. They raised such a storm of indignation among the democratic forces there that the governments of the three states were forced in September and October 1939 to conclude mutual assistance pacts with the Soviet Union. But anti-Soviet intrigues in the Baltic countries did not stop even after that, and there was a danger of their being involved in fatal imperialist ventures. The working people of the Baltic countries then demanded the immediate re-establishment of Soviet power, overthrown by the Entente in 1919, and reunion with the Soviet Union. As a result of the pressure brought to bear by the masses, there was a change of government in all the three Baltic republics in June 1940. Power was taken over by the progressive forces. For the first time in the history of these countries, parliamentary elections were held in democratic conditions. The newly elected parliaments of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia approached the Soviet Government with a request that their countries be accepted into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In August 1940 the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. granted their request and admitted the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian Soviet Socialist Republics into the U.S.S.R.

Bessarabia, forcibly severed from Soviet Russia in 1918, and Northern Bukovina, the Ukrainian population of which gravitated towards Soviet Ukraine, were likewise reunited with the U.S.S.R. The reunion of the Baltic countries and Bessarabia with the Soviet Union strengthened its security, for the enemy could have utilised these regions as bridgeheads bringing their troops close to the vital centres of the Soviet Union.

The imperialists achieved a temporary success in Finland. Towards the close of 1939 they provoked the Finnish reactionaries into war against the Soviet Union.
Britain and France wanted to see the U.S.S.R. weakened, and therefore supplied the Finns with arms and planned to send troops to help them, although the Germans had concentrated huge armed forces on the French frontier. It was only the defeat of the Finnish troops that prevented Anglo-French intervention in the Soviet-Finnish war. In March 1940 that war ended with the signing of a peace treaty in Moscow.

In April 1940 Hitler Germany invaded Scandinavia and easily overran Denmark and Norway. In May she launched an offensive on the Western front. Hitler armies quickly occupied the Netherlands and Belgium. The British expeditionary forces in France and Belgium were routed. They beat a hasty retreat and embarked for Britain, leaving their arms behind. The defeated French Army retreated into the interior. On June 22, 1940, the reactionary French Government capitulated. The struggle against the Hitlerites was continued by French patriots, with the Communists in the van. Under the terms of the armistice, a considerable part of France, including Paris, was occupied by Hitler troops.

Such was the deplorable result of the Munich policy: France was defeated, and Britain found herself face to face with Hitler Germany.

The course of the war in Western Europe demanded new foreign policy measures by the Communist Party and the Soviet Government. The task was to prevent the further spread of war and fascist aggression. In April 1940 the Soviet Government warned Hitler Germany against violating Sweden’s neutrality, and thereby helped that country to avoid German invasion.

The Soviet Government took various measures to prevent Germany from bringing Finland, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Yugoslavia under her sway. After the defeat of France, however, Hitler Germany became so strong as to make it increasingly difficult to check her aggressive actions. Hitlerite troops were moved into Finland, Rumania and Bulgaria, and their reactionary governments became Germany’s vassals. In April 1941 the Hitlerites attacked Yugoslavia and then Greece, and occupied these countries.

From the second half of 1940 fascist Germany began direct preparations for war against the U.S.S.R. Her plans were to enslave the peoples of the Soviet Union, destroy it as the world’s bulwark of socialism and democracy, and thus remove the main obstacle to the further realisation of her aggressive aims. Following that she intended to seize the British Isles, which she dared not attack with the Red Army in her rear. Then, in conjunction with Japan, she meant to smash the U.S.A.

The grave danger threatening the Soviet Union called for redoubled efforts by the Party and the whole Soviet people to enhance the industrial might of the Soviet Union and strengthen its defensive capacity.

The Party regarded the Third Five-Year Plan for the development of the national economy as another major step towards completing the building of socialist society.

In industry, however, fulfilment of the plan entailed great difficulties. The international situation was becoming increasingly tense. The Second World War, started by the fascist aggressors, was a direct menace to the Soviet Union. The people had to be kept in a state of constant readiness against attack by the fascist aggressors, and considerable budgetary, material and manpower resources had to be diverted from peaceful projects to strengthen the country's defence potential.

When it started out on the Third Five-Year Plan the Party came up against other difficulties as well. Industry was growing rapidly and required a steady influx of manpower, especially skilled labour, of which there was frequently a shortage. At the same time, available manpower was not everywhere being used properly. The explanation lay in various organisational shortcomings. The organisation of work and wages still had certain defects. The saturation of all branches of industry with modern machinery required improved technical control. The demands put to economic executives—engineers, technologists, foremen, etc.—were growing continuously, but they did not all take that into consideration. The aim of the Party's organising work in industry was to surmount these difficulties and eliminate shortcomings, and to secure a further uninterrupted advance of socialist industry.

In its economic policy, the Party sought to distribute the productive forces in the most rational way, accelerate the rate of new construction and develop the production capacity of each enterprise to the utmost. New industrial enterprises were built as close as possible to sources of raw materials. Particular attention was paid to the development of the eastern regions—the Volga region, the Urals, Western and Eastern Siberia, Central Asia and the Far East. The goal was to achieve the comprehensive economic development of these regions. The production of building materials was organised, power stations, metallurgical works, coal and ore mines were being built, and light and food industries were being developed in each of these regions. A new oil base—known as the "Second Baku"—was being developed between the Volga and the Urals. The Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works in the Urals was being enlarged and the construction of the Nizhni Tagil Iron and Steel Works was nearing completion. Big iron and steel mills were going up in the Transbaikal region (the Petrovsko-Zabaikalsky Works) and in the Far East (Amurstal). Duplicating engineering and chemical factories and oil
refineries were being built. Co-operation between industrial enterprises was extended.

The Party saw to it that the strictest economy was maintained. Money, building materials and equipment were allocated, first and foremost, for the completion of the projects that had been started under the first two Five-Year Plans. A new feature in the Party’s economic policy was to increase the construction of medium-sized and small power stations, mines and other enterprises. This reduced the time taken in construction and speeded up expansion of production capacities.

The key industries—coal, iron and steel—were the main concern of the Party as in the past. This was extremely important because the demand for coal and metal was growing yearly. Large quantities of metal were needed by the defence industries. Yet in 1939, instead of increasing, the output of pig-iron and steel fell somewhat, and there was only an insignificant increase in coal output, especially in the Donets coalfield. This presented a serious threat to the development of the entire national economy, and was particularly intolerable in view of the mounting danger of war.

The Party discovered the cause of this lag in the coal, iron and steel industries. It was due mainly to inefficient economic and technical leadership and to the fact that local Party organisations did not pay sufficient attention to the work of the coal mines and the metallurgical plants. It was also essential substantially to increase investments in metallurgy and the coal industry.

A grave drawback hampering the work of the Donets coal mines was the fluidity of manpower. Frequently the personnel of the mines would change completely in the course of a year, which seriously affected the fulfilment of output plans. Moreover, there were distortions of policy in the organisation of work and in the wages structure in the mines. Output quotas were too low. As a result, in spite of fulfilment and overfulfilment, the actual output of coal fell short of the targets set in the state plan. In many cases engineers and technicians were not assigned to their proper jobs. A large number of engineers and technicians had been trained for the coal industry during the period of the first Five-Year Plans, but many of them landed in the offices of trusts and local boards. As a result, mines equipped with the latest machinery were left without adequate technical guidance, new and progressive methods of mining were introduced much too slowly, and labour productivity remained practically unchanged.

There were similar shortcomings in the iron and steel industry. At the Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk works and at the iron and steel mills in the south, the Party organisations paid insufficient attention to such important problems as the selection and training of men for executive posts, turning out skilled steel-workers, and the correct organisation of their work. Consequently, here, too, equipment was not used at its full capacity. The development of metallurgy was also
hampered by delays in the construction of new blast and open-hearth furnaces and insufficient mining of iron-ore.

In those years industrial management was impaired by repressive measures against executives, by their frequent replacement and by the occasional substitution of people with inadequate experience for competent directors, engineers, foremen and other executives. Repressive measures affected the directors of many of the largest iron and steel, engineering and defence plants.

In the first half of 1940 the Central Committee of the Party adopted several decisions aimed at improving the work of the Donets coal mines and of the iron and steel industry. The Central Committee demanded that Party and economic organisations improve their political work among workers and the management of enterprises, reinforce the leading sectors of these industries with technical personnel, secure an improvement in the skills of the workers, normalise the organisation and remuneration of their labour, and accelerate the building of new mines and blast and open-hearth furnaces.

Guided by these decisions, Party organisations began to devote greater attention to the organisation of production, the selection of people for Party and administrative posts and of engineers and technicians, and their appointment to suitable posts in production. They sought to increase the responsibility of business executives for the fulfilment of Party and government directives. As a result, the political work of the Party was linked more closely with the achievement of production targets, with the mastering of new technology and with stricter observance of labour discipline.

These measures taken by the Party brought about a certain improvement in the coal mining and iron and steel industries. In 1940 the coal output increased by 20 million tons. By the end of 1940 the average daily output of metal had grown considerably.

More and more people working in the industries joined in the socialist emulation led by the Party organisations. New forms of this movement came into being, such as the simultaneous tending of many machine-tools, high-speed work methods, the combination of trades, economy of raw materials and power, and the reduction of non-productive costs. Non-Party workers were drawn into this movement by the example of the Communists.

Of great importance in promoting a substantial expansion of industry at a time when the war danger was mounting was the change from a seven- to an eight-hour working day, a seven-day week and a ban on quitting a job at will. These measures were called forth by the urgent need to strengthen the country's defence. They had a positive effect on the work of enterprises: labour discipline improved, the productivity of labour rose and output increased.

The important problem of providing industry with skilled manpower was likewise being tackled, under the guidance of the Party, through the establishment of a system of state labour reserves. It

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was announced that there would be an annual enrolment (mobilisation) of young people for training at trade and factory schools. After finishing these schools the young workers were assigned to work at state enterprises. A constant replenishment of skilled labour for industry and transport was thus secured and this strengthened the country's economic and defensive might. The Soviet Government’s law setting up labour reserves was received with great satisfaction by Soviet people, above all by young people. They regarded it as a further manifestation of the Party's concern for the rising generation, which in the Soviet Union is given every opportunity of taking part in socially useful labour, acquiring knowledge and familiarising itself with scientific achievement.

Women were playing an important part in industry. By the beginning of 1940 they accounted for 41 per cent of the total number of factory, office and professional workers. Twenty-five per cent of workers employed in building were women. Working women were successfully learning to operate up-to-date machinery. The drawing of women into industrial production was of considerable importance for the country's economy and defence. Having learned men's skills during peacetime, they could, in the event of war, successfully replace in industry the men called up to the armed forces.

In the pre-war years, thanks to the efforts of the Party and the working class, Soviet industry began to advance. In 1940 the output of coal amounted to 166 million tons, of pig-iron about 15 million tons, of steel over 18 million tons, and of electric power 48,300 million kwh. Total industrial output in 1940 was 8.5 times, and production of means of production 15.5 times, as great as in 1913. Such was the Soviet Union's industrial and economic base when it entered upon the Great Patriotic War. Industrial output in Russia on the eve of the First World War was no match for it.

In a situation where the threat of war was increasing, the work of industry was the central issue of the activity of the Party. It was closely examined at the Eighteenth Party Conference in February 1941. The Conference discussed the tasks facing Party organisations in industry and transport. Since from the point of view of economy and technology, the world war that had begun was one of engines and reserves, the Party strove to raise industry to the level required by the need to reinforce national defence. To achieve this, constant improvement of the management of industry by the people's commissariats and Party organisations was imperative.

To bring management closer to the factories, many of the people's commissariats were broken up into smaller units in 1939. New people's commissariats were set up and put in charge of narrower fields. But there were still serious shortcomings in the work of the people's commissariats. They frequently calculated the fulfilment of the year's plan of output on the basis of over-all, summarised data, while the plan was not fulfilled as regards key items of output. Party organi-
sations and regional and town Party committees were still not paying sufficient attention to industry and transport.

The Conference set the Party organisations a number of concrete economic and political tasks. These were: to ensure constant supervision of the work of enterprises and their fulfilment of Party directives; to ensure strict stock-taking and maintenance of equipment, materials and all other property; to see that correct use was made of equipment and that thrift was exercised in the use of instruments, materials, fuel, and electricity; to introduce exemplary order and tidiness in industrial establishments; to get the latter to work at a steady pace and fulfil their plans in time; to secure the observance of strict discipline in the technological process itself, and ensure that output was of the best quality and in complete sets; to work without cease to improve and master new techniques; systematically to secure the reduction of costs, improve accounting methods and elimination of waste.

The Conference demanded consistent implementation of the principle of giving workers and managements material incentives for good work and called for promoting the one-man management principle at enterprises and improving the technical guidance of production. With the purpose of improving Party leadership in industry and transport, posts of secretaries for the key industries and for transport were instituted in town, regional and territory Party committees and in the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics.

The Conference adopted an economic development plan for 1941 which required an even bigger effort than the plan for the previous year. The purpose of this plan was to achieve a considerable strengthening of the country's defence potential.

The decisions of the Eighteenth Party Conference served as a powerful impetus to a further advance in all branches of the national economy, primarily in industry and transport.

The first sixth months of 1941 passed in unremitting efforts to attain a high rate of industrial development. By the middle of the year total industrial output reached 86 per cent of the figure envisaged for 1942 by the Third Five-Year Plan.

In the conditions of the mounting war danger, the Party and the Government put ever greater emphasis on the development of the defence industries.

Prior to the Revolution Russia's war industry bore the stamp of the country's all-round economic backwardness. It lagged far behind the war industries of the developed capitalist countries. This was one of the reasons for the military defeats of tsarist Russia. Soviet power radically changed the situation. A modern defence industry that was a match for the war industries of the developed capitalist countries was built up on the basis of industrialisation. The First Five-Year Plan provided the U.S.S.R. with automobile, tractor,
tank and aircraft industries. During the period of the Second and Third Five-Year Plans the Soviet defence industry was far ahead of the other branches of industry as regards the rate of increase of total output. In the three years of the Third Five-Year Plan, the annual increment in volume of production for all industries averaged 13 per cent, while in the defence industry it was 39 per cent.

At enterprises that were of importance for the country's defence there were Party organisers appointed by the Central Committee, to whom they were directly accountable for Party work and who assisted them in their work. The people for these posts were selected by the C.C. from among leading Party workers who had had good technical training, had proved their organising abilities and could properly combine Party work with the settlement of production problems.

Defence enterprises were given priority as regards supplies of raw materials, equipment, fuel, electric power, and so forth.

On the eve of the war the country had a large number of arms factories and other enterprises catering for the country's defence needs, at which during the war it was possible to organise mass production of tanks, aircraft, guns, munitions, and other armaments.

In spite of the undoubted progress of the defence industry, however, there were also serious shortcomings in it. The aircraft industry in the pre-war years fell short of its state targets. Some branches of the defence industry started the mass production of new types of armaments only on the very eve of the war, and this held up the equipment of the Red Army with modern weapons in the early stages of the war.

In the years preceding the war a reorganisation of the Soviet Armed Forces was carried out. Units and formations built up on the territorial militia principle were reorganised. The Soviet Armed Forces were now made up wholly of regular troops. The numerical strength of the army was considerably increased. The principle of building up the Soviet Armed Forces as a regular force was given legal shape in the new law "On Universal Military Service" adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in September 1939. The Soviet state could not allow its army to be weaker than the armies of the capitalist states. Defence of the achievements of socialism, and the success of the struggle for world peace, depended to a large extent on the strength of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces.

5. The Party's Efforts to Consolidate the Collective-Farm System and Expand Agricultural Production

Agriculture, and collective-farm production in particular, came next in importance in the country's economy after industry. It was to play a big role in the Third Five-Year Plan period in increasing
popular consumption, especially, the consumption of foodstuffs, 50-100 per cent. The expansion of raw material resources for the development of the light and food industries likewise depended on a further advance in agriculture.

But in the pre-war years agriculture was faced with serious difficulties, caused by the tense international situation and the threat of war hanging over the country. For instance, to complete the comprehensive mechanisation of agriculture, the collective and state farms needed a large number of tractors, harvester combines and other farming machinery. But part of the metal earmarked for the production of tractors and farming machinery had to be diverted to defence needs. During the period of the Third Five-Year Plan the output of tractors, as compared with the previous five years, fell by 50 per cent.

But even in those difficult conditions, agriculture kept on progressing. The reason for this was the superiority of the collective-farm system over scattered individual farming. Besides, socialist agriculture already commanded appreciable quantities of new machinery. In 1940 the collective farms embraced 96.9 per cent of the peasant households and had 99.9 per cent of the crop area. They were served by 7,000 machine-and-tractor stations. There were more than 4,000 state farms in the country. Altogether 531,000 tractors, 182,000 grain combines and 228,000 lorries were operating in the fields of the state and collective farms, and more than 1,400,000 tractor, combine and lorry drivers were employed for this huge fleet of machines.

Collective-farm development required the unrelenting attention and everyday care of the Party. The prime task of the rural Party organisations was to strengthen the collective farms organisationally and economically. That much was clear to everybody. But not all the leading workers in agriculture had a correct idea of the ways and means of fulfilling this task. The principle of giving the collective farmers a material interest in the results of their work was often ignored, not enough was done to expand and consolidate the socially-owned property of the collective farms, and there was often a conciliatory attitude to self-seeking, private-property propensities.

All this gave rise to a number of mistakes in collective-farm development, and retarded the growth of collective-farm production. To consolidate and develop the collective-farm system, the Party had consistently to implement the principle of giving the collective farmers a material incentive in their work, and to declare war on all self-seeking and individualist tendencies, which harmed the socially-owned economy of the collective farms.

The Party directed agriculture through the Party organisations in the collective and state farms and machine-and-tractor stations. With the development of the collective-farm system the Party organisations in the collective farms grew stronger. By the beginning of 1941 there were 62,300 rural Party organisations. Their responsibility
for the development of collective-farm production increased considerably after they were given the right to verify the activity of collective-farm management. They rallied round themselves all active collective farmers and drew the rural intelligentsia into their work. Komsomol members, who made up a large force in the countryside, contributed actively to collective-farm development. Their number exceeded two million at that time. Its organisations drew the rural youth into the work to strengthen the collective farms.

In the pre-war years the Party carried out many important measures to strengthen the foundations of the collective-farm system. One of them was the elimination of certain serious abuses in the use of collective-farm land. A draft decision of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (B.) and the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., "Measures to Safeguard Collective-Farm Land Against Squandering", was examined and approved at a C.C. plenary meeting held in May 1939. The decision cited numerous cases of violation of provisions of the Rules of the Agricultural Artel laying down the size of the household plots of the collective farmers, cases where such plots were illegally enlarged and where the collective-farm land had been squandered.

The question of the use of collective-farm land was inseparably bound up with the question of correctly combining the public and private interests of collective farmers. Enlargement of the household plots over the sizes established by the Rules undermined the socially-owned economy of the collective farms and inflated the personal economy of the collective farmers. Frequently the household plot lost its character of a subsidiary enterprise and was turned into the collective farmer's chief source of income. At some collective farms these household plots became in practice the private property of the collective farmers, who used them as they saw fit: leased them or kept them for themselves even if they were no longer working in the collective farm. Many sham collective farmers appeared who were not working in collective farms at all, or did just enough work to keep up pretences, devoting the greater part of their time to their personal subsidiary holdings.

All this hindered the growth of the productivity of social labour in the collective farms, undermined labour discipline and disorganised collective-farm production. Many collective farms began to suffer from an artificial shortage of manpower, although in reality it existed in abundance.

The Central Committee of the Party and the Government called on Party and local government organisations to introduce order into the use of collective-farm land. The socially-owned land of the collective farms was proclaimed inviolable. The collective farms and collective farmers were forbidden to rent out household plots. Any enlargement of these plots, over and above the size established by the Rules of the Agricultural Artel, was also forbidden. All excess
land in the personal use of the collective farmers was to be returned to the collective farms. After the household plots had been measured, it was found that there were over 6 million acres of excess land, of which $4\frac{1}{4}$ million acres were added to the socially-worked lands of the collective farms and the rest turned over to their household allotments funds. In 1939-40 over 800,000 collective-farm families living in outlying farmsteads were moved to collective-farm settlements. An annual minimum number of workday units, depending on the character of agricultural production in the different regions of the U.S.S.R., was laid down for every able-bodied man and woman at the collective farms. The result of all these measures was that the use of collective-farm land improved, labour discipline was strengthened and more and more collective farmers began to fulfil their yearly workday quota.

The lag in livestock husbandry was a big shortcoming in agriculture. On January 1, 1928, the cattle population was 60,100,000 in the various types of farms, and on January 1, 1939, it was 53,500,000. The development of livestock-breeding now depended chiefly on the establishment and enlargement of livestock-breeding departments in the collective farms. Some of the collective farms, however, either bred no cattle at all or kept very small herds. The restoration and development of animal husbandry at the collective farms depended directly on how the principle of giving the collective farms and collective farmers a material incentive to promote this branch of agriculture would be implemented.

In July 1939 the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R adopted a decision "On Measures to Develop Socially-Owned Animal Husbandry in the Collective Farms". This decision aimed at encouraging the development of animal husbandry by introducing a new system of assessing meat deliveries to the state. These deliveries were now assessed not on the basis of the actual herd at the collective farm, as had been the case before, but of the area of land used by the farm. The result was that nearly 200,000 livestock-breeding departments were set up in the collective farms during 1939 alone, whereas during all the preceding seven years 343,000 such departments were established. In 1939-40 the herd of socially-owned cattle in the collective farms increased from 15,600,000 to 20,100,000 head.

A collective farm with a developed livestock department was economically stronger than a farm that confined itself to grain production. At the same time these measures helped to solve another urgent problem, that of expanding livestock-breeding and thus ensuring the supply of foodstuffs to the population and of raw materials to industry.

The per hectare system of livestock produce deliveries justified itself. In March 1940 a plenary meeting of the Central Committee discussed the question of making changes in the policy of deliveries
and purchases of agricultural produce, and found it necessary to extend the per hectare system to all kinds of state deliveries. The old system, that was based only on the area sown to crops, was thereby abolished. Under the old system, the leading collective farms were at a disadvantage and were discouraged from developing the commonly-run economy. The new system put all collective farms on an equal footing. It promoted the expansion of areas sown to various crops and the all-round development of agricultural production. It also created conditions for the collective farms the better to plan their production on their own, from below. However, this principle of planning was not fully implemented in those years.

The consolidation of the socialist system in agriculture enhanced the planning and regulating role of the Soviet state in the development of agriculture. It became possible to introduce a more correct regional distribution of crops, to encourage development of crops needed by the state. The advantages of planned socialist agriculture were demonstrated by the expansion of the areas sown to industrial crops, which had increased in 1940 more than twofold as compared with 1913 (from over 12 million acres to over 29 million acres).

Cotton production grew considerably too. The area under cotton expanded from nearly 1 1/4 million acres in 1913 to over 5 million acres in 1940. While in 1913, the total yield of raw cotton was 744,000 tons, in 1940, it reached 2,237,000 tons. The needs of the Soviet textile industry were now met mainly by home-produced cotton, which was also required by the defence industry. Areas sown to such crops as flax, sunflower and sugar-beet were also considerably enlarged.

The shifting of grain crops from the southern regions to the east (Southern Urals, Siberia and Kazakhstan) also facilitated the expansion of areas sown to industrial crops. In the southern regions land was thus released for industrial crops. There were great expanses of good rich land in the east, including virgin and disused land, which could not be cultivated by the individual peasant. Now some collective farms possessing a considerable number of agricultural machines began ploughing up these lands. The Central Committee put on record that the eastern regions could and should become one of the chief granaries of the Soviet Union.

The Party emphasised that the basic sector of agriculture was grain production, and that its development made it possible to solve all the other problems of agricultural expansion. The Party and its local organisations strove to raise the yields of grain crops and bring them into conformity with the potentialities of the collective-farm system. Local Party and Soviet bodies showed great initiative in this respect. On the suggestion, and with the active participation, of local officials measures were worked out to combat droughts in the south-eastern regions and to build up a new grain base in the east. On proposals by the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of the Ukraine, the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. adopted at the end of 1940 a decision "On Bonuses to Collective Farmers for Raising the Yield of Agricultural Crops and the Productivity of Animal Husbandry in the Ukrainian S.S.R." The system of bonuses instituted by this decision served as a stimulus for raising the productivity of labour, it was subsequently extended to other regions and districts of the Soviet Union.

Although the measures taken by the Party to raise grain production brought about certain successes, the grain problem in the country was not yet solved. Stalin's announcement at the Eighteenth Party Congress that this problem had been successfully solved was at variance with the facts. There were quite a few backward regions and collective farms where grain yields were still low, and this told on the total grain harvest in the country. Although the total harvest in 1940 was somewhat higher than that in 1913, the country still needed more grain than was being produced. Grain requirements had grown for a number of reasons: by 1940 the urban population had more than doubled as compared with 1913; the development of animal husbandry also directly depended on grain production; there was need for grain stocks in case of war. Although intense efforts were made to enlarge state stocking and purchases, the grain procured could not satisfy all the country's needs.

Grain production under the collective-farm system could have developed more successfully had there been a more critical attitude towards its management and towards shortcomings. On the basis of the so-called biological estimate of the yield, it was considered that the annual total harvest figure had reached over 112 million tons, but in actual fact much less grain reached the granaries. This exaggeration of the progress achieved in grain production did not induce the people engaged in agriculture to strive for higher yields; on the contrary, it served to lull them and bred complacency. Expansion of the grain crop area and particularly of wheat was to a certain extent also hampered by an over-zealous application of the lea-farming system. Maize growing was underestimated in agricultural practice, although even in those years it could have added to the country's grain reserves and helped to develop animal husbandry. But the chief obstacle in the way of developing agriculture was the violation over a number of years of the principle of giving collective farmers and all workers in agriculture a material incentive to raise the output of agricultural produce. The violation of this principle in those years found expression above all else in the fact that collective-farm deliveries of produce to the state were fixed, not according to the amount of the arable and grassland the farms had, but according only to the land area developed. This procedure placed the advanced and the lagging collective farms on an unequal footing. Things began to pick up only in 1940 when a plenary meeting of the C.C.
C.P.S.U. (B.) established the per hectare principle of delivery and sale for all agricultural products. However, notwithstanding all the shortcomings and errors in agriculture, the Party and its local organisations did a great deal in the pre-war years to consolidate this major branch of the national economy. Soviet agriculture was able to withstand the severe stresses of the war years, and to provide the armed forces and the country with the necessary quantities of foodstuffs and raw materials.


The development of material production in Soviet society is aimed solely at improving the welfare of the people and strengthening the power of the socialist state. This is a law of the economic development of society in the period of building socialism and communism. Now that socialism was victorious and the exploiting classes had been abolished, the material standards of the people rose continuously. This rise found expression in the growth of the national income and of the wages of factory and office workers, the bigger incomes of the collective farmers, the development of trade, increased building of houses and in improved amenities in towns and villages. The national income had grown from 96,300 million rubles in 1937 to 128,300 million rubles in 1940. The wage fund in the national economy, over the same years, had grown by 50 per cent. The turnover of state and co-operative retail trade had increased from 126,000 million rubles to 175,000 million rubles.

Incomes of the collective farms and collective farmers, in cash and kind, had also grown. The collective farmers supplemented their cash income considerably by selling their produce at the collective-farm markets.

The cultural standards of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. were rising. State allocations for social and cultural purposes in the budget of 1940 exceeded the 1938 figure by 16 per cent. In the 1940-41 school year, general elementary and secondary schools were attended by 35 million pupils, while places of higher education had a student body of over 800,000 (including extra-mural students).

The continuous rise of the material and cultural standards of the people served to rally all strata of the population still closer round the Party and the Government, and strengthened the alliance of the working class and the collective-farm peasantry. The political might of the Soviet state was further enhanced.

Soviet patriotism was a powerful source of strength for the Soviet socialist state. The Party itself was a genuinely patriotic force in the country. Its interests lay in constantly serving its people and its
country. The idea of serving the country was inseparably bound up with the efforts to build a communist society.

Love for one's country, pride in its people, the accomplishment of feats that brought it glory—all this manifested itself most strikingly in the Soviet Union, especially in the conditions of victorious socialism. For the first time in history man had a homeland where he felt he was the complete master of his destiny. How could he not love and glorify it! To strengthen it by one's deeds and defend it self-sacrificingly from foreign attack was the sacred duty of every Soviet man and woman.

Soviet patriotism harmoniously combined the national traditions and interests of all the peoples of the U.S.S.R. with the common vital interests of the multi-national Soviet state—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the common socialist Motherland of all its peoples. It was the patriotism of new, socialist nations, forming a single federal state in which all peoples enjoyed equal rights and exploitation of man by man had been abolished. Soviet patriotism went hand in hand with proletarian internationalism. The patriotic deeds of the Soviet people were not aimed at disuniting the peoples but at strengthening their friendship and helping the working people of all countries in their struggle for peace, democracy and socialism.

In pre-war years Soviet people launched a broad patriotic movement on the labour front. The Party and the Government gave this national movement every support. In 1938 the title of Hero of Socialist Labour—the highest distinction for achievement in labour—and the medals For Labour Valour and For Labour Distinction were instituted.

A characteristic feature of the patriotic deeds of Soviet people was that by their example they inspired others to perform similarly glorious deeds. For instance, in 1938 the famous woman tractor-driver P. N. Angelina called for a hundred thousand girls to "mount the tractor". About two hundred thousand women responded to her patriotic appeal. Examples such as this could be cited by the thousand.

Soviet people performed heroic deeds in the name of their country. The famous Arctic drift of the ice-breaker Sedov, with its crew of fifteen, lasted for over two years. The long non-stop flights of Valeri Chkalov and other Soviet pilots brought glory to their country. Soviet polar explorers also distinguished themselves. Ardent patriots were reared in the Red Army and Navy and among the frontier guards. They became heroic defenders of their socialist country. Under the guidance of the Communist Party the Leninist Komsomol reared thousands of strong, courageous and staunch patriots.

Correct implementation of the Leninist nationalities policy, and the all-round development of the non-Russian republics, also served to enhance the might of the U.S.S.R. Under the new Constitution the Azerbaijan, Armenian and Georgian Soviet Socialist Republics, which had made up the Transcaucasian Federation, became Union
Republics and entered directly the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Kazakh and Kirghiz Soviet Autonomous Republics were also made Union Republics. Communist Parties of Kazakhstan and Kirghizia were formed. During the years of the Third Five-Year Plan, the socialist nations made great progress. This was facilitated by the economic, political and cultural measures taken by the Soviet state to promote the maximum development of industry, agriculture and culture in the Union and Autonomous Republics. The Ukraine, Byelorussia, Transcaucasia and the republics of Central Asia made great headway in their economic and cultural development. Even peoples which had been extremely backward in the past felt the beneficial influence of the country's socialist industrialisation and the collectivisation of agriculture. The total output of large-scale industry had grown between 1913 and 1940 sevenfold in the Uzbek S.S.R., 20-fold in the Kazakh S.S.R., 27-fold in the Georgian S.S.R., 153-fold in the Kirghiz S.S.R. and 324-fold in the Tajik S.S.R.

Once actual inequality between the peoples of the U.S.S.R. was done away with, friendship between them, a powerful source of might and strength of the Soviet state, was further consolidated.

Other factors that served to strengthen considerably the political, economic and defensive might of the Soviet state and to raise its international prestige, in those years, were the entry into the Soviet Union of new socialist republics—Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and the reunification of Western Ukraine with the Ukrainian S.S.R., of Western Byelorussia with Soviet Byelorussia and Bessarabia, with Soviet Moldavia. Entry into the great family of free peoples, as represented by the Soviet Union, basically changed the historical development of the peoples of these republics and regions.

Great social transformations in the new republics and regions, aimed at improving the life of the working people, were started immediately after the establishment of Soviet power there. These transformations were carried out under the direct leadership of the Communist Parties of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldavia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, with the most active assistance of the central Party and government bodies of the Soviet Union. The Communist Parties of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldavia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia started out on a vast programme of ideological education of the working people in these republics, who had freed themselves from capitalist slavery and established Soviet power. A great deal was being done to train leading workers in government, Party and economic affairs from among the local population. The work of the Party apparatus and government machinery was improved.

At the request of the Communist organisations of the new republics, they were incorporated in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Communist Parties of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October 1940. In February 1941, the Moldavian regional Party organisation was reorganised.
into the Communist Party of Moldavia. Communist organisations were formed in Western Ukraine, Western Byelorussia and Bessarabia after they entered the Soviet Union. Members of the Communist Parties of Poland, Western Ukraine, and Western Byelorussia who remained on the territory of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian S.S.R., were transferred to membership of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

The victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. and the successful achievement of the targets of the first years of the Third Five-Year Plan had a beneficial effect on the life of the Party. Its ties with the people grew stronger, and the influx of the foremost members of Soviet society into the Party increased. Between April 1, 1939 and June 1, 1940, 1,127,802 people became candidate members of the Party, and 605,627 joined it as members.

The bulk of the new membership was composed of the more active representatives of the working class, collective-farm peasantry and intelligentsia. They were advanced workers in industry and agriculture, innovators and inventors, scientists and technicians, engineers and agronomists, doctors and teachers, workers in culture and the arts, men and officers of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The establishment of a common procedure for admission to the Party of workers, peasants and intellectuals, and the granting to town and district Party committees of the right to take final decisions in the matter, served to increase Party membership. This imposed greater responsibility on Party committees and primary Party organisations for selecting the best representatives from among the workers, collective farmers and intellectuals. It had to be kept in mind that during a mass influx of new Party members the infiltration of chance people was not impossible. Nevertheless, in certain Party organisations the pursuit of numbers was accompanied by violations of the Leninist principles of Party enrolment. There were cases of people who had been accepted without a proper check-up and who turned out to be unworthy of membership. Some town, district and primary organisations adopted the harmful procedure of considering applications in bulk at one sitting, without carefully and thoroughly examining each. The decision on admission to the Party was, in such cases, reduced to a mere formality.

Many regional, town and district Party committees made but a superficial study of those to be accepted, and did not give proper attention to regulating the growth of the Party. It happened not infrequently that there were few workers in the key trades among new members admitted to town Party organisations, and few collective farmers, tractor-drivers and combine-operators in rural organisations.

The Central Committee of the Party proposed a number of measures to ensure the strict implementation of the principle of individual selection of new members. It was demanded that each application be thoroughly examined and carefully verified; that particular stress be laid on enrolling new members from among workers of key trades.
and among engineers and technicians in industry, and collective farmers, tractor-drivers, combine-operators and intelligentsia in the countryside. Regional and territory Party committees, and the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics, were required systematically to supervise the growth of Party organisations and regularly to discuss questions relating to the admission of new members.

Party organisations were instructed to pay more attention to the training in the Bolshevik spirit of new members, and to attach greater importance to the candidate member’s period of probation as a serious test for him. They were to examine the political views and working abilities of the candidates, and to help them study the Programme, Rules and policy of the Party.

After the Eighteenth Congress, the Party organisations improved the ideological and political education of their members, as well as Party propaganda. The educational work of the Party was based on the study of the decisions of the Eighteenth Party Congress and the history of the Communist Party. Particular attention was paid to the ideological and theoretical education of leading Party officials. The network of schools and refresher courses for Party workers was considerably enlarged.

The study of the history of the Party heightened people’s interest in the classical works of Marxism-Leninism. In view of this the Central Committee took measures considerably to increase the publication of Marxist-Leninist literature.

On the eve of the Great Patriotic War the Party was a powerful organisation of nearly four million members. It directed all spheres of the life and activity of the Soviet state and the Soviet people, and their struggle to complete the construction of socialist society.

**BRIEF SUMMARY**

The period from 1937 to 1941 was the beginning of a new stage in the history of the U.S.S.R., the stage when the construction of socialism was completed and the gradual transition to communism began. The features of the international situation of those years were an aggravation of the general crisis of capitalism, an extension of imperialist aggression by the fascist states, the outbreak of the Second World War, and an increasing danger of war for the Soviet Union.

The Party, the Government and the Soviet people, working to consolidate and develop socialist society, tackled the basic economic task of the U.S.S.R., which was to overtake and surpass the most developed capitalist countries in output per head. This found expression in the growth of the country’s industrial power, in the development and consolidation of the collective-farm system and in the rise of the material and cultural standards of the peoples of the U.S.S.R.
The Party and the Soviet state did all in their power to avert war. The Soviet Union worked actively to organise collective resistance to fascist aggression. The prevention of war, however, did not depend on the U.S.S.R. alone, but also on many other states, who did not join in these efforts and did not render the Soviet Union the necessary support. The mounting war danger confronted the Party, the Soviet Government and the people with the urgent task of strengthening the country's defensive capacity.

The victory of socialism brought about a powerful upsurge of creative initiative of the whole people, who strove to consolidate and promote socialism. The Party, guiding the creative activity of the masses, took a number of steps to extend Soviet democracy on the basis of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. The leading role of the Party in all spheres of life of the Soviet state was enhanced.

The development of socialist society and the country's defence preparations would have proceeded much more successfully but for gross violations of the Leninist standards of Party life and socialist legality. The Stalin personality cult had created an abnormal situation in the Party and the country. The development of socialist democracy and the creative activity of the people was handicapped. Many prominent Party and government officials, economic executives and prominent military leaders became victims of unwarranted persecution and lost their lives. But the injurious manifestations of the personality cult could not stop the development of Soviet society, let alone alter the socialist character of the Soviet system. Socialist construction, led by the Party, achieved success after success.

The Party defined the new tasks to be fulfilled in the period of completion of the construction of socialist society, and the organisational forms of work in the new situation. It rallied the people to fulfil the Third Five-Year Plan.

The Party carried out a tremendous programme of consolidation of the Soviet state. The alliance of the workers with the peasants became still stronger, and the friendship between the peoples of the Soviet Union still closer. The formation of new Soviet republics on the western boundaries of the Soviet state, and their entry into the Soviet Union, signified a new milestone in the historical development of these republics and served to increase the political, economic and defensive might of the U.S.S.R.

In those years great progress was made in carrying out a cultural revolution in the U.S.S.R.; a large body of Soviet intelligentsia came into being, particularly in the non-Russian Soviet republics. The virtual inequality of the peoples of our country which had previously existed in various spheres of life was done away with.
CHAPTER FIFTEEN
THE PARTY IN THE PERIOD
OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR
(June 1941-1945)

1. Germany’s Treacherous Attack on the Soviet Union. All the Resources of the Country Mobilised to Repulse the Enemy

On June 22, 1941, fascist Germany launched a surprise attack on the Soviet Union. The Hitler clique thus committed a monstrous act of treachery, tearing up the German-Soviet non-aggression treaty concluded in 1939. The wanton attack was made without declaring war or presenting any claims.

Hitler struck the Soviet Union a blow of tremendous force. Early in the morning thousands of fascist aircraft broke into Soviet air space, dropping bombs on peaceful towns, aerodromes and railway junctions, tens of thousands of guns opened fire on frontier posts and Red Army units, and large armoured and motorised formations invaded Soviet territory.

The Soviet people had to break off their peaceful labour and engage in a fight to the death against their worst enemy, German fascism. A new period began for the Soviet state and the Communist Party, the period of the Great Patriotic War.

The German imperialists intended to seize the territory of the Soviet Union and its riches, destroy the socialist system and exterminate millions of Soviet people, turning the rest into slaves. To put their schemes into practice, Hitler’s generals had planned a blitzkrieg against the U.S.S.R. They expected to crush the Red Army, destroy the bulk of its forces and end the war before winter came.

Hitler considered the year 1941 decisive for achieving world domination. By the time she attacked the U.S.S.R., Germany had subjugated the peoples of Czechoslovakia, Poland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Yugoslavia and Greece and established her rule almost throughout Western Europe. Nowhere in the capitalist world was there a force capable of barring Germany’s way and smashing the fascist war machine. Britain was all but
blockaded, and the U.S.A. was biding its time. The Soviet Union was the only country on earth which was an obstacle to the criminal designs of the German imperialists. The whole world was threatened with fascist enslavement.

The Party and the Soviet Government had done all in their power to save the U.S.S.R. from war. But this did not depend on the Soviet state alone. There existed imperialism and fascism in the world, and they attacked the Soviet Union. Thereby fascist Germany exposed herself in the eyes of mankind as a blood-thirsty aggressor. The U.S.S.R., on the contrary, won the sympathy of all freedom-loving nations, and took the lead in combating the fascist menace to mankind.

As soon as the Red Army was ordered to beat off the fascist attack, heavy fighting broke out on a vast front from the Barents to the Black Sea. But Hitler’s sudden attack put the Red Army in an extremely difficult position. Despite its staunchness and courage, it was unable to check the enemy, who was many times superior to it in numbers and armament. Attacking enemy forces pressed forward in three main directions—towards Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev. The Red Army had to fall back after grim battles. By early July 1941 the enemy had overrun Lithuania, parts of Moldavia and Latvia, Western Byelorussia and Western Ukraine. The Soviet Union found itself in mortal danger.

What were the reasons for the Soviet Union’s reverses at the beginning of the war?

The country was capable of repulsing imperialist aggression. The mighty industry set up under the pre-war Five-Year Plans adequately supplied the Red Army with armaments. The collective-farm system reliably provided the country and its armed forces with food. The Soviet people’s high cultural and technical standards enabled them to learn in a short time the use of modern military equipment. The country had made great progress in science and had a large body of competent specialists. The Soviet people were prepared to give their lives for their country. They spared no effort to strengthen their armed forces. They were certain of the devotion and staunchness of the Red Army and of its ability to defend the great gains of the October Revolution, of socialism.

In this respect, the U.S.S.R. had an immense advantage over any capitalist country. But at the beginning of the war the situation developed very unfavourably for the country and its Red Army.

Fascist Germany had long before placed her economy on a war footing, and her industry had mastered the mass production of all types of armament. Moreover, Germany had seized and was using the resources of nearly the whole of Western Europe. The military and economic resources of Germany, her vassals and the countries under her sway were more than twice as great as those of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet economy was geared to peace-time production. Defence
requirements were being met only by the war industry, which had begun to master production of new military equipment shortly before the war. The Soviet Union had only its own resources to rely on with confidence.

The Soviet Union bore single-handed the blow of fascist Germany and her allies—Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Italy. It could not afford to move a sizable part of its forces to the west, for it was threatened by Japan in the east. True, Japan had in April 1941 concluded a neutrality treaty with the Soviet Union, but she was clearly waiting for an opportunity to attack the Soviet Union and had therefore massed a huge army in Manchuria and Korea. The Soviet state, well knowing the ways of the imperialists, had to divert part of its forces to the protection of its Far Eastern frontier.

Germany had fully mobilised the Wehrmacht. On completing operations in the west, she transferred the greater part of her troops to the Soviet frontier, where she concentrated 190 divisions, including 153 German divisions. The Wehrmacht was superior to the Red Army in certain new types of arms—it was well equipped with tanks, aircraft and sub-machine guns and was motorised. This provided it with great striking power and mobility. During the two years of war in Europe, the Hitler Command had gained experience in modern warfare involving large numbers of tanks, aircraft and motorised troops.

By the time the fascist attack came, the Soviet Union, a peace-loving country, had only an army covering mobilisation. The Red Army was not inferior to the Wehrmacht in the numbers of its artillery, tanks and aircraft. But it had few tanks and aircraft of new types. The artillery was short of mortars and anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. The Soviet troops were not sufficiently motorised, a drawback which deprived them of manoeuvrability. The reorganisation and technical re-equipment of the Red Army had not yet been completed. The Red Army was short of experienced leaders. Many prominent army chiefs, including V. K. Blücher, A. I. Yegorov, M. N. Tukhachevsky, I. P. Uborevich and I. E. Yakir, had been subjected to unwarranted repressive measures before the war and had lost their lives.

The Red Army reverses were also due to the fact that the enemy attack came as a surprise. In the early days of the war the enemy succeeded in driving a deep wedge into the disposition of the Soviet forces, disorganising their control. The Red Army sustained heavy losses, particularly in aircraft. The enemy gained air supremacy. His air raids made it difficult to move troops to the front and to supply them. There were depots of arms, munitions and fuel left in the border areas seized by the enemy. The battling Soviet troops soon began to experience a severe shortage of ammunition and were unable to make full use of their weapons and vehicles. These facts still further tipped the balance in favour of the enemy.
One of the decisive reasons for this state of affairs was Stalin's impermissible misappraisal of the strategic situation on the eve of the war and his underestimation of the war threat. Stalin had trustworthy information about the concentration of German troops along the Soviet frontier and even on the date of the attack. But he relied on the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty, disregarding the treacherous character of the enemy, and did not take the necessary steps to repel the aggressor.

Stalin's lack of vigilance towards fascism, his misappraisal of the situation and his persistence in the conviction he had formed resulted in erroneous actions and deprived the Party and government bodies of the possibility of taking precautions against the eventuality of war. The tenor of press reports and radio broadcasts was reassuring. The TASS Report of June 14, 1941, which stated that rumours about Germany planning war against the U.S.S.R. were without foundation, relaxed the vigilance of the Soviet people and their armed forces. The more than eighteen months since the German-Soviet non-aggression treaty was concluded had not been properly used to strengthen the country's defences. When the war broke out the conversion of the war industry to the manufacture of the latest weapons had not been completed. It was not until shortly before the war that a mobilisation plan was adopted to place industry on a war footing in the second half of 1941 and in 1942. Most of the troops, particularly in the military districts of the border area, were undermanned and were short of military equipment and ammunition. The army groups necessary to beat off the enemy had not been formed. The construction of defences and the equipment of fortified border areas had been making very slow progress.

This caused serious concern to the Party bodies of the Union Republics and to the commands of the military districts bordering on hostile countries in the west. In April 1941 N. S. Khrushchov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.(B.) of the Ukraine, and the Command of the Kiev Special Military District in a report to Stalin called his attention to the slow progress of the work of fortifying the frontier, and asked him to have the troops in the fortified areas brought up to full strength, instruct the relevant industries to deliver concrete structures and the lacking armaments on time, and permit the enlistment of 105,000 civilians to hasten construction work, so that all operations would be completed by June 1, 1941. Stalin ignored these appeals, requests and proposals.

Stalin's confusion, hesitancy and dilatoriness in the early war days caused the loss of much precious time in organising resistance to the enemy. A considerable share of the blame for the Red Army being unprepared to repulse the enemy attack falls also on S. K. Timoshenko and G. K. Zhukov, who were in charge of the People's Commissariat of Defence and the General Staff respectively, and yet did not take immediate measures to deploy the Red Army in battle order.
No other state could have withstood the surprise blow which fascist Germany dealt the Soviet Union. But the Soviet state did withstand it. The Soviet people were certain that the socialist system could not be crushed, and had faith in their Communist Party, in its ability to organise resistance to the aggressor and defeat him.

During the Great Patriotic War, as in the years of peaceful socialist construction, the Communist Party headed by the Central Committee was the inspiring and guiding force of the Soviet people and their armed forces, the militant organiser of the struggle of the whole people against the fascist invaders. The Party called on the peoples of the U.S.S.R. to rally still closer together in the face of the terrible danger threatening the country.

The Communist Party roused the Soviet people and organised them in the Great Patriotic War.

Central Committee members received the ominous news of the war without flinching and proceeded with the greatest energy to organise resistance to the aggressor. On receiving instructions and full powers from the Central Committee, they, as well as prominent military leaders and economic executives, took charge of specific sectors on the war and home fronts and began independently to solve urgent problems of organisational, political, military and economic activity.

On June 23, 1941, the Central Committee of the Party and the Council of People’s Commissars of the U.S.S.R. took a decision defining the war-time tasks of Party and government bodies. Every Party organisation, said the decision, must reorganise its work in accordance with war-time requirements and must direct all military, economic and political activities efficiently and concretely; every Party functionary must be more exacting towards himself and towards others, must set an example of organisation, discipline and staunchness.

In the very first days of the war, the Central Committee of the Party drew up a programme for mobilising all the forces of the people to fight the enemy. This programme was laid down in a directive of the Council of People’s Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and the C.C. C.P.S.U.(B.) of June 29, 1941, to Party organisations and local government bodies in the front-line areas. The Party unmasked the criminal designs of the German imperialists.

“In the war against fascist Germany that has been forced upon us,” said the directive, “the issue is one of life and death for the Soviet state, of whether the peoples of the Soviet Union shall be free or fall into slavery.” The Central Committee and the Soviet Government called for realising the extreme gravity of the danger, doing away with peace-time sentiments, placing all work on a war footing, organising all-round assistance to the Red Army, to the front, increasing production of munitions, tanks and aircraft to the utmost, in the event of a forced withdrawal of the Red Army removing all valuable
property and destroying such property as could not be removed, and forming partisan units in the enemy-occupied areas.

With a view to speedily mobilising all the forces of the country to resist and defeat the enemy, a *State Defence Committee* was formed on June 30, 1941, by a joint decision of the C.C. C.P.S.U.(B.), the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. All power in the country—all administrative, military and economic leadership—was vested in this extraordinary body. The Committee co-ordinated the activities of all government and military institutions and Party, trade union and Komsomol organisations.

The programme worked out by the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet Government was on their instructions announced by J.V. Stalin, Chairman of the State Defence Committee, in a radio address on July 3, 1941. The Communist Party explained to the Soviet people the just character of the Great Patriotic War, stressing that it was the sacred duty of every Soviet citizen to defend his country and uphold the gains of socialism, and called for courage and heroism in the battlefield and for devoted labour on the home front. It addressed to the working class, the collective-farm peasantry and the intelligentsia the appeal: "*All for the front! All for victory!*" It set the Red Army the task of defending every inch of soil, fighting for the towns and villages to the last, wearing out the German fascist forces in defensive battles and bleeding them white, routing them and driving them out of Soviet territory, and helping the peoples of Europe to throw off the fascist yoke.

Soviet people rose to fight and work with courage and devotion. They realised the danger of fascist enslavement threatening their country but they had deep faith in their strength and in the triumph of their just cause. They were fired by patriotism and took guidance from the programme elaborated by the Party. The peoples of the U.S.S.R. were inflexibly resolved to carry the war through to complete victory over fascist Germany. This was clearly seen from the huge number of requests of Soviet people who wanted to be sent to the front line and from the movement to form people's volunteer units initiated by the workers of Moscow and Leningrad.

The Communist Party, carrying out the war-time programme, engaged in immense organising and political work which turned the country into a single armed camp. It was guided by Lenin's thesis that in war time "all Communists first and foremost, and more than anyone else, and all who sympathise with them, all honest workers and peasants, all government officials, must rally in military fashion and switch a maximum of their work, of their effort and attention, to the tasks arising directly from the war..." (Collected Works, Vol. 29, p. 403).

Party organisations set an example of prompt readjustment and of precise execution of Central Committee directives. Their activities
during the war became more complex and varied. The Party organisations of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldavia and the Baltic republics, which had become front-line areas, were working under a particularly great strain. The Party Central Committees of these republics led the effort to implement the programme drawn up by the C.C. C.P.S.U. (B.). The regional, town and district Party committees were functioning round the clock. They brought proper system and efficiency into the work of the government bodies and voluntary organisations. The members of local Party bodies headed all the more important jobs; they did everything to help Red Army units and contribute to the mobilisation of reservists, directed the construction of defences, the formation of destroyer groups and partisan units, and the evacuation of people and property into the interior of the country. Party organisations ensured the rapid conversion of industry to war production and the utilisation of all reserve plant. They helped to form and equip new units and formations and move them rapidly to the front.

The Party centred its attention on strengthening the armed forces and directing their military activities. As the Red Army was put on a war footing, its regular units were brought up to strength, new formations were set up and reserves trained. The Army became many millions strong. It was essential to form and strengthen new units and formations and turn them into an efficient fighting force. The Party realised that the morale of the troops was particularly important in view of the temporary reverses of the Red Army.

"In any war," said Lenin, "victory depends in the final analysis on the morale of the masses who are shedding their blood in the battlefield. The conviction that they are waging a just war, and awareness of the necessity of sacrificing their lives for the good of their brothers, raise the morale of the men and induce them to bear unprecedented hardships" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 115).

To strengthen Party leadership of the armed forces and increase the role of political bodies and Party organisations in the Red Army, the Central Committee carried out a series of important measures. In addition to the calling up of Communists under general mobilisation, the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Union Republics, and regional and territory Party committees selected and sent to the front Communists and Komsomol members who had had the most effective military training. By October 1941 over 95,000 Communists and Komsomol members had joined the armed forces under Party mobilisation. The armed forces were reinforced by thousands of Party workers—secretaries of regional, town and district Party committees. About a million Communists and over two million Komsomol members joined the Red Army and Navy during the first six months of the war. In the case of front-line servicemen, the terms of admission into the Party were eased. Men and officers who had distinguished themselves in action were admitted
on the recommendation of Communists with at least one year of Party membership who had known those they recommended from serving jointly with them even for less than a year. The length of candidate membership was reduced to three months. The bureaus of primary Party organisations were authorised to admit new members, with the result that membership grew fast. By the end of 1941 there were 1,300,000 Communists in the Red Army.

Almost one-third of the members and alternate members of the Central Committee of the Party were at the front. Prominent Party workers—N. S. Khrushchov, D. Z. Manuilsky, A. S. Shcherbakov, K. Y. Voroshilov and A. A. Zhdanov—took an active part in leading the troops. M. I. Kalinin, President of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, made frequent trips to the front line and to home-front towns to mobilise the people for the defeat of the fascist invaders. N. A. Voznesensky and A. I. Mikoyan, members of the State Defence Committee, A. A. Andreyev, Secretary of the Central Committee, and N. M. Shvernik, Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, headed key sectors of the national economy responsible for supplying the Red Army.

A General Headquarters was set up, and Stalin was placed at the head of the Soviet armed forces. The G.H.Q. was helped by the front and army military councils. In addition to front and army commanders, these councils included experienced Party leaders—members and alternate members of the Central Committee, and secretaries of the Communist Parties of Union Republics and of territory and regional Party committees. Among them were L. I. Brezhnev, N. G. Ignatov, J. E. Kalnberzins, A. A. Kuzevetsov, V. P. Mzhanadze and M. A. Suslov. The military councils were in constant contact with the Central Committee of the Party and the State Defence Committee, whose directives they put into effect, being supported in all their activities by the political apparatus of the Party and by the Party organisations in the armed forces. They did much to organise new Red Army formations and increase their fighting efficiency. They helped officers to master the experience of modern warfare. Their proposals were often of decisive importance to G.H.Q. in planning strategic operations of the Red Army.

Measures carried out by the Central Committee of the Party that were of great importance in strengthening the Red Army and Navy and improving the Party’s political work in them were the reorganisation of the political bodies in the armed forces and the institution of the post of military commissar. The Red Army’s Chief Department of Political Propaganda and Agitation was reorganised into the Chief Political Department. The political propaganda and agitation sections and departments which had existed in the armed forces were reorganised into political sections and departments. Their rights were extended and they came to play a greater role in the organisation of the Party’s political work in the armed forces and in the
direction of military operations. Military commissars did much to raise the morale of the troops, improve their organisation and strengthen their discipline. They were appointed by the Party from among experienced Party workers. They led political work, rallied all ranks, promoted the authority of commanders and helped them to execute combat tasks. Political bodies and Party organisations educated the personnel in the spirit of supreme devotion to their socialist Motherland, imbuing them with a sense of personal responsibility for the fortunes of the country and with deep faith in victory over fascism.

The Party began extensive work to organise the population for the war effort. Compulsory military training, and universal compulsory training of the population for anti-aircraft defence were introduced. The Komsomol was a true helper of the Party in the military training of the population. In the front-line areas, regional and town defence committees were formed under the secretaries of the appropriate Party committees. They concerned themselves with building defences, forming people’s volunteer regiments and divisions, anti-aircraft defence groups, and special squads for the elimination of saboteurs and paratroopers, and evacuating civilians and factories.

The Party led the conversion of the national economy to meet war-time needs. It proceeded from Lenin’s statement that to wage a war properly there must be a solid, well-organised home front continuously supplying the war front with adequate trained reserves and with sufficient quantities of arms and food.

The difficult task of reorganising the economy on a war footing was complicated by an unfavourable military situation. The temporary occupation of part of the country’s territory and the evacuation of industrial plants to the east had disrupted traditional inter-area economic relations and the system of co-operation between and inside the various industries. Important industries and entire highly developed economic areas had dropped out. All these facts had to be taken into account in reorganising the national economy.

All the activities of government and economic bodies and voluntary organisations were wholly adapted to war-time requirements. People’s Commissariats of the Tank, Ammunition and Mortar Armament Industries, a Committee for the Registration and Distribution of Labour Power, an Evacuation Council and the Soviet Information Bureau were established. With the expansion of the activities of the Councils of People’s Commissars of the Union and Autonomous Republics, as well as of the local organs of state power, they were allowed greater independence.

As early as mid-August 1941 a new war economy plan was drawn up on the instructions of the C.C. C.P.S.U.(B.) and the State Defence Committee to assure the defence of the country in the fourth quarter of 1941 and in 1942. It covered the Volga region, the Urals, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. It envisaged reorganising industry and transport, transferring factories from the front-line
zone and putting them into operation, building new plants and mines, redistributing manpower and material resources, training skilled workers and gearing agriculture to the war effort.

The Soviet people, led by the Communist Party, successfully solved, in a very short time and on a scale unprecedented in history, the formidable problem of transferring industry and millions of people from west to east. This work was directed by the Evacuation Council and by local Party and government bodies and front military councils.

From July to November 1941 over 1,360 large industrial establishments were evacuated to the east. Almost all machine-tools and a large proportion of power equipment were removed from the frontline areas. The State Defence Committee fixed a rigid schedule for putting evacuated plants into operation. Its representatives helped local Party, government and economic bodies to accomplish this task. The siting and reassembly of evacuated plants, the supply of new plants with manpower and materials, and the provision of living conditions for workers arriving from elsewhere were problems constantly dealt with by Party bodies in the Urals, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. As a result of the heroic effort of industrial, professional and office workers and of Party organisations, evacuated plants resumed production in three to four weeks. Work went on day and night. Workers, engineers and technologists showed unexampled heroism by working for 13 or 14 hours in the open, often in rain or on snow, with tents or dug-outs for living quarters. Some of those plants exceeded their pre-war output three or four months after starting production on the new site.

The Party devoted serious attention to the provision of manpower for industry. The rapid development of military operations had prevented a substantial proportion of the population from evacuating. Many industrial, professional and office workers had been called up. The total number had dropped from 31,500,000 at the beginning of 1941 to 18,500,000 by the end of the year. The resulting shortage was remedied by recruiting a large number of new workers and establishing new labour conditions. The working day was lengthened and compulsory overtime work introduced; leaves of absence and regular holidays were abolished. These measures made it possible to increase the use of plant by roughly one-third. All defence industry personnel were declared to be mobilised and were assigned to the establishments employing them. Young people were drawn into industry in large numbers, particularly through the labour reserve system.

Thanks to the immense efforts of the Party, the working class and the engineering and technical personnel, the operation of industry had improved and the decline in output had been halted by December 1941. January 1942 saw the beginning of a general uptrend of industrial production.
The railwaymen were working with selfless devotion. The railways had to handle the bulk of transport operations. While troop-trains kept on moving to the front, trains carrying evacuated civilians and industrial plant headed east. In 1941 the railwaymen, led by their Party organisations, reorganised with military dispatch and acquitted themselves honourably in the tremendous task of supplying the front and handling evacuation. During six months they carried about 1,500,000 wagon-loads of evacuated goods.

The Soviet Union’s entire home front was giving the war front powerful support. The Central Committee of the Party and the State Defence Committee directed the Red Army to stop the enemy. All the activities of the Red Army Command, the front and army military councils, the political bodies and Party organisations in the armed forces were subordinated to fulfilling this task.

The men of all arms and services of the Soviet armed forces fought against their inveterate enemy with matchless courage and bravery, showing the greatest tenacity and heroism. When fighting reached the approaches to Smolensk, the small garrison of the fortress of Brest under the Communists I. N. Zubachov, Y. M. Fomin and P. M. Gavrilov was still beating off continuous enemy attacks. “I am dying but I shall not surrender. Farewell, my homeland!” —this short, moving inscription on one of the fortress walls expressed the sublime patriotism of the defenders. Captain N. Gastello accomplished an unforgettable feat of bravery. When a shell splinter hit the fuel tank of his aircraft, he dived in his blazing machine into a column of enemy tanks and tank-cars. He was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously, and his exploit became for all Soviet soldiers a symbol of courage and self-sacrifice in the name of the Motherland.

The Red Army withstood the enemy’s powerful blows. Its resistance was growing. Fresh troops kept on arriving. The battle of Smolensk lasted two months. It was here that the Soviet Guards came into being. During the battle, over 500,000 people from the Smolensk, Moscow, Kalinin and Orel regions took part in building defences. Soviet troops did not merely defend themselves but launched counter-offensives. They routed eight German divisions at Yelnya.

Early in July the fascist Command announced that German tanks had broken through to Leningrad. It had already appointed a Hitlerite commandant of the city. But the enemy scheme was foiled. The fascists’ fierce attacks were frustrated by the unbending spirit of the defenders of the city of Lenin, the cradle of the October Revolution. Soviet ground forces were supported by the Baltic Fleet. Over 160,000 people of Leningrad joined people’s volunteer units. The 70,000 Leningrad Communists who had gone to the front joined effort with the army Communists in cementing the ranks of the defenders of the city and inspiring them to feats of valour. The people of Leningrad were busy day and night building defences, working with redoubled energy at the factories under continuous shelling.
and bombing. Leningrad became an impregnable stronghold. Having come up against stiff resistance, the enemy began a barbarous shelling of the city with long-range guns, seeking to destroy it.

The fascists were foiled in the south as well. They had hoped to capture Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, in the very first month of the war. By July 10 they had reached the approaches to the city but were stopped there. Grim battles broke out. The bitter fighting raged continuously for 73 days. About 90,000 of the people of Kiev and the region had joined people's volunteer units. The Hitlerites lost over 100,000 men and officers. It was not until September 19, when they were threatened with encirclement as a result of the German advance to the south-east, that the Soviet troops relinquished Kiev.

The enemy attempt to take Odessa from march columns ended in failure. They had expected that the defenders of the city would be unable to withstand the assault. At the call of the Party organisation, 100,000 people of Odessa took part in putting up fortification works. Heavy fighting before the city went on for over two months. The enemy was unable to take the city by assault. He entered it only after the Soviet troops had withdrawn from it on the orders of the G.H.Q. and its defenders had been evacuated to the Crimea.

In the second half of October 1941 the enemy broke into the Crimea. He tried to capture Sevastopol quickly but failed. A heroic defence of the city began. The troops of the Sevastopol Defence Area were supported by ships of the Black Sea Fleet. The population, rallied by the city Party committee, built defences under enemy fire and equipped underground workshops where mortars, mines and grenades were made and military equipment repaired. The marines fought with the greatest staunchness. In one of the sectors, five Black Sea sailors under Political Instructor N. D. Filchenkov joined battle with several tanks. Sailors I. Krasnoselsky and V. Tsibulko fell fighting. When the ammunition had run out, Filchenkov girded himself with grenades and rushed under an enemy tank. Y. Parshin and D. Odin-tsov followed suit. The enemy lost 10 tanks and his attack was halted. All the five men were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously, and a granite monument was erected on the site of their heroic deed.

The defence of Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa and Sevastopol was very important in frustrating the fascist blitzkrieg plan and defending Moscow. Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa and Sevastopol have for ever been entered in the list of honour of hero cities for the staunchness and heroism shown by their defenders in battles against the German invaders.

At the end of September the German Command launched a general offensive against Moscow. Operating in this sector were upwards of 75 enemy divisions, including 23 armoured and motorised ones. It was a great battle involving millions-strong armies on both sides. The enemy still had a considerable superiority in tanks and aircraft.
The German Command strove to encircle and smash the Soviet troops defending the capital and break into the city.

The situation took an exceedingly dangerous turn. On October 19 the State Defence Committee declared a state of siege in the city, and called on the people to help the Red Army with might and main. Moscow shall not be surrendered! Such was the will of the Soviet people.

As early as July 12 people’s volunteer divisions about 120,000 strong had been formed in Moscow under the leadership of the city Party organisation. Nearly half of them were Party or Komsomol members. Some 42,000 people joined the city’s anti-aircraft defence force and destroyer battalions. Half a million inhabitants of the capital were putting up defences. The entire population of Moscow, the whole Soviet people increased their aid to the defenders of the city. People were working hard at Moscow’s factories and everywhere else on the home front. The Moscow regional Party organisation accomplished the task set by the Central Committee—it provided the troops and the civilian population of the city with food. The Party organisations of the Urals, Siberia, the Volga region, Central Asia and the Caucasus were prompt in supplying fighting equipment for the divisions on their way to Moscow. More and more reserves were arriving in the capital.

November 1941 was a fateful period for Moscow. The fascist horde was standing at the approaches to the city, in the shape of a horseshoe whose ends pointed east. Many Party and government institutions had been evacuated. But the Political Bureau of the C.C. C.P.S.U.(B.), the Soviet Government, the State Defence Committee and the G.H.Q. remained in the city. The Red Army’s stubborn resistance had stopped the enemy offensive at the approaches to the city.

On November 6, 1941, despite the nearness of the front line, the Moscow Soviet of Working People’s Deputies held its usual meeting jointly with representatives of the Party and voluntary organisations of the capital on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. On November 7, 1941, the traditional Red Army parade took place in front of Lenin’s Mausoleum in Red Square. After the march-past the troops started straight for the front line. In those trying days the Soviet people rallied even closer behind the Communist Party.

In the middle of November the enemy started a fresh offensive against Moscow. The fighting that ensued was still heavier than before. The German fascist troops fought with the greatest fury. Hitler did not spare his armies. The Hitler clique realised that the battle of Moscow would decide its fate, the fate of German fascism. But the enemy effort to capture Moscow at all costs met with the unshakable determination of the Soviet people and their Red Army to hold the capital at any price. The enemy was unable to take all of Kalinin, nor did he succeed in capturing Tula. Thousands of
inhabitants of Tula took part in its defence. The workers' regiment formed by the town defence committee particularly distinguished itself. Its core was made up of Communists.

A number of divisions and certain units which displayed exceptional tenacity and military skill in the historic battle of Moscow were awarded the honorary title of Guards divisions and units. The 316th Rifle Division under I. V. Panfilov showed heroism and self-sacrifice on a mass scale. It was manned by Russians, Ukrainians and Kazakhs. They made a gallant stand against enemy tanks and infantry. The Communists were in the front ranks of the fighters. Near Dubosekovo, Panfilov's 28 heroic riflemen held their ground against 50 tanks. Most of them died a heroic death, but they had done their duty. "Russia is great but there's no retreating for us—behind us is Moscow!" These words, spoken by Company Political Instructor V. G. Klochkov, a Communist who was in command, echoed throughout the country.

The Moscow people's volunteer divisions fought valiantly before the city. Subsequently they became regular Red Army units and travelled a long path of military glory. The population of Moscow took part in the air defence of the city. The partisans of the Moscow, Kalinin and Tula regions struck telling blows at enemy communications.

By late November 1941 German fascist troops had overrun a substantial area of the European part of the U.S.S.R. Millions of Soviet citizens fell into fascist slavery. Fascist bands tortured and murdered Soviet people or drove them off to Germany; they sacked and burned Soviet towns and villages. But their atrocities did not go unpunished. Soviet people, prompted by patriotism, offered courageous resistance to the invaders.

A partisan movement started all over the enemy-held territory. It was organised by the Party. The Central Committee of the Party formed a commission to lead Party work and the partisan movement in the enemy rear. Operational groups were set up under the Party Central Committees of Union Republics and under regional Party committees in the front-line areas. The partisan units operating in the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Moldavia, the Smolensk, Kalinin and Leningrad regions and the Crimea struck blow after blow at the enemy. The underground Party bodies, partisan units and destroyer groups were led by staunch, strong-willed people who were excellent organisers. They were Communists, Komsomol members or non-Party activists.

The unprecedented valour and courage of the Soviet troops, their growing military skill, and heroic partisan operations in the enemy rear upset the calculations of the invaders. By holding its defence lines, the Red Army gained the time necessary to mobilise, form new units and formations, convert the national economy to war production and evacuate industrial plants. These developments entitled the Party
to declare at the end of November: “The defeat of the enemy must begin at Moscow!”

Early in December 1941 the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts and the right flank of the South-Western front took the counter-offensive at Moscow and inflicted a major defeat on the Wehrmacht. Simultaneously Soviet troops delivered powerful blows to the enemy at Rostov-on-Don and Tikhvin. The Red Army launched a general offensive. By late February 1942 it had advanced over 248 miles westwards and freed the Moscow and Tula regions, and several districts in the Kalinin, Leningrad, Orel and Smolensk regions.

The German defeat before Moscow and the Red Army’s successful offensive in the winter of 1941-42 were of tremendous military, political and international significance. This victory was clear evidence of the inexhaustible strength and might of the Soviet state and its armed forces. The fascist defeat at Moscow was a decisive military and political event of the first year of the Patriotic War and the first major defeat of the Hitlerites in the Second World War. It completely dislocated the fascist blitzkrieg plan and exploded the myth of invincibility of the Wehrmacht. The Hitlerites’ hope that the Soviet social and political system and the Soviet home front would prove unstable did not materialise.

The Hitlerites also failed in their plans to establish, under German supremacy, a general coalition of the capitalist countries, including Britain and the U.S.A., for a “crusade” against the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union, by bearing the brunt of the blows struck by the Hitler war machine, put itself in the van of the great historic battle of the freedom-loving peoples against fascism. The war of the Soviet state against fascism, the worst enemy of mankind, merged with the struggle which the peoples of Europe and Asia were waging for their national independence and for democratic rights and liberties.

The foreign policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government helped to prevent the establishment of a united capitalist front against the U.S.S.R. and paved the way for the formation of a powerful anti-fascist coalition. This coalition did not take shape without difficulty. It was a question of establishing a coalition of countries with different social systems and divergent war aims. The more reactionary imperialist elements of the United States and Britain, prompted by their hatred for the Soviet state, wanted to see it exhausted by the war. U.S. Senator Harry Truman, who later became President of the United States, said frankly: “If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible.” Moore-Brahazon, a British Cabinet Minister, expressed similar ideas. But the fascist threat to the world made an anti-fascist coalition imperative. Farsighted British and U.S. statesmen realised the danger which Germany would represent for their countries should she seize the resources of the Soviet Union. Besides, they could not but
take into consideration the opinion of large sections of their own peoples, who insisted on immediate assistance being rendered to the Soviet Union. An anti-Hitler coalition was formed on the basis of the common fight against the fascist pretenders to world dominion, a fight in which the U.S.S.R. played the decisive role.

In the very first days of the war the British and U.S. governments announced that they intended to support the Soviet Union in the war against Germany. On July 12, 1941, the U.S.S.R. and Britain concluded an agreement on joint actions in the war against Germany. Early in August the Soviet Government received from the U.S. Government a message saying that it had decided to render the Soviet Union economic assistance in the struggle against Germany. Simultaneously contact was established with the Free France National Committee and with the governments in exile of Czechoslovakia, Poland and other countries occupied by the Germans. The foundation was thus laid for an anti-fascist coalition. At the beginning of December 1941 Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, the U.S. naval base. The United States went to war against Japan and then against Germany and Italy. This hastened the formation of the anti-fascist coalition. On January 1, 1942, twenty-six countries, including the U.S.S.R., United States, Britain and China, signed a declaration on combining the military and economic resources to defeat the fascist bloc. It was agreed that Britain and the U.S.A. were to open a second front in Europe in 1942.

Under the impact of the Red Army victories, the national liberation movement in the fascist-occupied countries of Europe grew in strength. The peoples of the Balkan Peninsula were waging active partisan warfare against the German fascist invaders. In 1942 there were 110,000 partisans in Yugoslavia, 24,000 in Greece and 10,000 in Albania. Their operations diverted tens of thousands of enemy troops. A Resistance movement arose in Poland, Czechoslovakia, France, Belgium, Denmark and Norway. These were all developments weakening the rear of the fascist Wehrmacht.

But Germany's position was made easier by the fact that she was still waging war only on the Soviet-German front. There were few Hitlerite troops in the west. Britain and the U.S.A. did not keep their promise to open a second front in Europe in 1942, although they could have done so. Hitler took advantage of this to continue sending to the east the greater part of his armed forces and almost everything that the war industries of Germany and the countries occupied by her produced. Furthermore, the Hitlerites made their allies—Italy, Hungary and Rumania—contribute an additional force exceeding 40 divisions. By the summer of 1942 there were 237 enemy divisions massed on the Soviet-German front and by the autumn of that year their number was 266, including 193 German divisions, or almost fifty per cent more than in 1941. Nevertheless, the Hitler Command did not venture to carry on an offensive along the entire front. It
concentrated its troops on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front and thus secured an appreciable superiority in strength.

To safeguard his right flank, Hitler took the offensive in the Crimea. After capturing the Kerch Peninsula, the Hitlerites in June 1942 resumed their assault on Sevastopol. The grim battles that broke out lasted almost a month. But the forces were unequal. On July 3, 1942, the units of the Maritime Army and the Black Sea Fleet withdrew from Sevastopol on the orders of the G.H.Q., after 250 days of heroic defence. At the same time heavy fighting went on in the Kharkov sector, where the Red Army mounted an offensive. To foil it, the Germans flung a large force into an offensive south-east of Kharkov. The Soviet troops were encircled and found themselves in a critical position. The unfortunate outcome of the Kharkov operation was chiefly due to the fact that Stalin, ignoring the correct and persistent proposals of the Military Council of the south-western sector, had refused permission to turn the Soviet forces in good time from the Kharkov sector to the south-east from where the enemy was striking.

The forced retreat of the Soviet troops in the Crimea and their defeat at Kharkov changed the situation on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. The enemy recaptured the initiative. The shock forces of his armoured and motorised units was spearheaded against the Volga.

Late in June 1942 the enemy opened offensive operations in the Kursk-Voronezh sector, but, unable to overcome the resistance of the Soviet troops, turned towards Stalingrad in the south. Operating in this sector was the 6th Army, one of Germany’s picked formations. The Soviet troops staunchly resisted the enemy, who was twice as strong numerically. The Hitlerites had to call in reinforcements—at first divisions, then corps and lastly armies. They rushed to the Stalingrad area troops of their vassals—one Italian and two Rumanian armies. By the autumn of 1942 there were over 50 divisions, or more than a million men, massed in this sector, which involved one-fifth of the infantry and nearly one-third of the armoured divisions of the Wehrmacht.

The Central Committee of the Party and the State Defence Committee took emergency steps to upset the enemy plan for an offensive. They instructed the Red Army to hold Stalingrad. In July 1942 the Stalingrad front was established. Shortly afterwards it was put under A. I. Yeremenko, with N. S. Khrushchov as member of its Military Council. The front received fresh reinforcements, and its command organised the defence of the city. Officers, political instructors and Communists in the armed forces brought it home to the men that to withstand the enemy blow on the Volga meant assuring victory. The motto of the city’s defenders became: “Not a step back!”

The people of Stalingrad and the region rendered the Red Army considerable assistance. About 150,000 workers and collective farm-
ers took part in building defences. Thousands of Party and Komsomol members joined the Red Army. The city's industry was an important supplier of arms and ammunition. In mid-July 1942 the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the State Defence Committee instructed the Stalingrad Regional Party Committee to increase war production. This still further stimulated the activity of the city's Party organisation and the war effort of the population. As a result of the measures adopted, the Stalingrad Tractor Works, for example, increased the output of tanks, which started for the front line right from the works. Many workers drove in them to the battlefield and joined the ranks of the fighters.

The fighting on the approaches to Stalingrad lasted over two months. In September it spread to the city, which was defended by the 62nd Army under V.I. Chuikov and the 64th Army under M. S. Shumilov. Exceptional staunchness was shown by the 13th Guards Division under A. I. Rodimtsev, the Siberian division under L. N. Gurtyev and the units led by N. F. Batyuk, I. I. Lyudnikov and S. F. Gorokhov. They beat off hundreds of fierce enemy attacks and stood their ground. Every street and every house became a battlefield. A unit under Sergeant Y. F. Pavlov, which was defending one of the houses, won country-wide renown. It comprised Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Tajiks and Tatars. For 58 days they held the house, repelling all the enemy attacks. Communists supported the morale of the city's defenders and added to their tenacity. They inspired the men to heroic feats by their own supreme bravery and their Bolshevik words. Thousands of the defenders of the Volga stronghold became Communists. Hero of the Soviet Union V. G. Zaitsev, a sharp-shooter who joined the Party in those days, expressed the men's deep awareness of their patriotic duty by saying: "There is no land for us beyond the Volga."

As it waged defensive operations on the Volga and in the North Caucasus, the Red Army was pressing forward its offensive in the Rzhev and Velikiye Luki areas and before Leningrad. It kept the enemy pinned down along a front stretching from Leningrad to Voronezh and prevented him from shifting his troops to the Volga. The Soviet troops' defensive and offensive operations foiled the schemes of the enemy and halted his offensive.

The Party inculcated high moral qualities in the soldiers. An important part was played here by the appeals of the Party and the reports, speeches and statements made by members of the C.C. C.P.S.U.(B.) and the government in the press and by radio, and in Red Army units and formations. Making the feats of the defenders of the hero cities, of men and officers who had been awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, widely known among all ranks was an important form of the Party's educational work, in addition to various incentives. The country duly acknowledged the valour of its sons by decorating them with orders and medals. New decora-
tions were instituted: the Order of the Patriotic War and medals for the defence of Leningrad, Odessa, Sevastopol and Stalingrad, and later of Moscow, the Caucasus and Zapolarye. The mastery of the use of new weapons earned men and petty officers badges of excellence. For outstanding performance in the organisation and direction of combat operations, officers and military leaders were awarded the Order of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Alexander Nevsky.

The political steering and combat training of Red Army officers and political workers increased in grim battles. They gained experience in modern warfare. The cadre of leaders became more seasoned politically, while military commissars and political workers improved their military knowledge. This made it possible in October 1942 to abolish the post of military commissar and establish complete one-man authority in the Army and Navy. Thousands of Red Army political workers were appointed to command troops. The introduction of complete one-man authority and the improved professional and political training of generals and officers raised the authority of the commanders; these measures improved the direction of troops and had a beneficial effect on the fighting power of the armed forces.

The growing resistance to the enemy was due also to the consolidation of the home front and to its achievements in production. By the middle of 1942 the conversion of the national economy to war production had been completed, and by the end of the year the country had a well-coordinated and fast-growing war economy.

During the war women and young people made up the bulk of the industrial workers. The proportion of women in industry increased from 41 per cent at the beginning of 1940 to 52 per cent by the close of 1942. To guarantee the fulfilment of arduous war-time plans, it was indispensable speedily to train new workers. This task was successfully accomplished; in 1942 about 1,300,000 workers were taught new trades and more than 2,500,000 others improved their skills. The labour reserves system supplied upwards of a million skilled workers during the first eighteen months of the war.

The keen patriotism of the working class found expression in its creative effort and in the socialist emulation movement. The early war months saw the rise of Komsomol and youth front teams which exceeded output quotas per shift by 50 to 100 per cent. Their mottoes were: “In labour as in battle!”, and “Fulfil one quota for yourself and another for your comrade who has gone to the front!” The foremost workers fulfilled from five to ten quotas per shift. The performance of D. F. Bosy, milling-machine operator, A. I. Semivolos and I. P. Yankin, drillers, and N. A. Lunin, engine-driver, earned them country-wide fame. They were decorated and awarded State Prizes for radically improving working methods.

In April 1942 the Central Committee of the Party called on the working class to organise socialist emulation all over the country to aid the front. The first to respond was the personnel of the Kuz-
The Party's immense organising work in the economic sphere and the heroic effort and creative initiative of the working class and engineering staffs, the total output of all the Soviet industries in 1942 exceeded the 1941 amount by more than 50 per cent. The capacity of power stations increased by almost 700,000 kilowatts. Output of steel, particularly high-grade steel, went up too. Over 10,300 industrial plants were under construction.

The rate of armament and munitions production was growing fast. The eastern areas had become a powerful arsenal of the Red Army. Whereas in June 1941 the industry of the eastern areas accounted for one-sixth of the war production total, in June 1942 its share exceeded three-quarters. War production in 1942 exceeded the 1940 amount more than fivefold in the Urals, ninefold in the Volga region and 27-fold in Western Siberia. The tank industry produced about 2,800 tanks in 1940, about 6,600 in 1941 and as many as 24,719 in 1942. The aircraft industry turned out 15,735 aircraft in 1941 and about 25,500 in 1942. The production of guns and mortars, including jet mortars (known as "Katyushas") was organised on a mass scale.

The collective farmers and state-farm workers supplied the Red Army with food. The early period of the war was the most difficult for socialist agriculture, for the country was deprived of almost half its crop area and the whole burden of supplying it with farm produce had to be borne by the eastern areas. It was necessary to expand grain farming there and introduce new crops—cereals, sugar beet, flax, sunflower and tobacco. There was a sharp drop in manpower, tractors and motor vehicles in the countryside. The work was done chiefly by women and adolescents. The number of Communists and Party organisations had also decreased in the countryside. The members of many rural Party organisations left for the front to a man. Many new people were appointed to lead collective farms.

The Party took these facts into consideration and adopted effective
measures to overcome difficulties by aiding agriculture in every possible way. In the autumn of 1941 political departments were set up at the machine-and-tractor stations and state farms to improve political and organising work in the countryside. Assisted by Party organisations, they played a big part in the political education of collective farmers and the personnel of machine-and-tractor stations and state farms and in encouraging their production effort. To improve agricultural production organisationally and increase its productivity, the obligatory minimum of workday units per collective farmer was increased and material incentives were introduced for those who achieved the best results in agricultural production. In 1942 the collective farmers' performance in terms of workday units increased by 50 per cent as against 1941. The able-bodied population of towns and rural communities helped a great deal to tend the fields and gather the harvest on time. Production of tractor spare parts and the training of farm-machine operators were organised locally. Tractor works were being built in Altai, Vladimir and Lipetsk, and a harvester combine works was under construction in Krasnoyarsk. In the face of enormous difficulties, those engaged in farming increased acreages in the eastern areas by 12,356,000 acres in 1942. This greatly improved the food supply of the armed forces at the front and the urban population.

The first period of the Great Patriotic War culminated in successful defensive battles by Soviet troops on the Volga. The decisive steps taken by the Communist Party and the Soviet Government to organise the people's resistance to the enemy, and the heroic effort of Soviet people on the war and home fronts paved the way for a radical change in the course of the war.

In that first, most difficult period of the Patriotic War, the guiding and organising role of the Communist Party and its close, unbreakable bonds with the people became more evident than ever. The Party showed the greatest firmness and resolve in the struggle, and an ability to regroup rapidly and to mobilise all forces to repel the enemy. Its prestige grew. The people's increased trust in the Party was vividly illustrated by the growth of its membership. About 1,368,000 people joined the Party in 1942. In that year there were over two million Communists, or 54.3 per cent of all Party members, in the Red Army and Navy. The Party entered the new period of the war more steeled than ever, having considerable political, organising, military and economic experience.

2. The Communist Party Brings About a Fundamental Turn of the Tide in the Great Patriotic War

The Communist Party took timely account of the balance of forces at the front by the end of 1942. With due regard to the military and economic potential of the country and the growing power of the Red
Army, it set out to bring about a fundamental turn of the tide in the Patriotic War. On the Volga, the Red Army had checked an enemy onslaught such as no army in the world had ever had to face; it had worn out an attacking major enemy group and in November 1942 had gone over to a counter-offensive.

Preparations for the Soviet counter-offensive began at the height of the defence of Stalingrad. The Supreme Command massed large forces to the north-west and south of the city. The Red Army equalled the enemy in manpower, but, for the first time since the beginning of the war, it had a certain superiority in equipment, particularly in guns and tanks. It gained a considerable superiority in manpower and armaments in the sectors of the main attacks. Only in aircraft did the enemy somewhat surpass the Soviet troops.

The main object of the offensive was to encircle and wipe out the entire enemy group which had broken through to the Volga. The forces to be used in the operation were those of the South-Western, Don and Stalingrad fronts. The far-reaching strategic plans for the defeat of the German fascist troops at Stalingrad and for broad offensive operations in the winter of 1942-43 on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front had been worked out jointly by the G.H.Q. and the Commands of the Stalingrad, South-Western and Don fronts.

The troops of the South-Western and Don fronts took the offensive early on November 19, 1942, in several sectors at once. Following powerful artillery preparation the infantry and armoured formations broke through the enemy defences and thrust to Kalach in the south-west.

The next day the troops of the Stalingrad front launched a counter-offensive in their turn. Mechanised units moved through the breach that was made, and advanced rapidly on Kalach in the north-west.

The troops of the South-Western and Don fronts advancing from the north and those of the Stalingrad front advancing from the south were moving to join up and to cut off and encircle the German fascist troops in Stalingrad and its vicinity. On November 23 the Soviet forces accomplished this task by encircling more than 330,000 enemy men and officers amply equipped with war material. To prevent the enemy from aiding the encircled group, the Soviet forces simultaneously set up an internal and an external encirclement front.

Hitler ordered the 22 German divisions caught in a ring to stand their ground. He had hopes of rescuing them. The German Command mustered a shock force out of the formations operating in the North Caucasus and sent them to the aid of the troops encircled at Stalingrad. But the Soviet Command saw through the enemy design. The German attempt to break through to the encircled troops proved futile. The Red Army routed the fascist troops on the Middle Don and south of Stalingrad, launched a general offensive along the entire southern flank of the front and began to eliminate the encircled enemy.
group. Early in February 1943 the troops of the Don front successfully completed the operation. The complete encirclement and annihilation of so huge an enemy force was unprecedented in military history. In recognition of the great valour and heroism displayed by the defenders of the city on the Volga, the city has for ever been entered in the list of hero cities.

The victory on the Volga was one of the greatest military and political developments of the Second World War. It marked the beginning of a fundamental turn of the tide in the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War as a whole. It undermined the military power of Germany and her military prestige while enhancing the international prestige of the U.S.S.R. and its armed forces. It made for a further upswing of the liberation struggle in European countries, strengthened the anti-Hitler coalition and promoted the national liberation movement of the peoples of the East. It clearly showed to the world that fascism was doomed and bound to fall, and it had a decisive impact on the position of neutral countries.

The outcome of the battle of Stalingrad shook the fascist bloc and aggravated the political situation in Hitler Germany. Large sections of the German people, many men and officers of the Wehrmacht, and even some of Hitler's generals lost faith in the possibility of winning the war against the Soviet Union and the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. Fascist Germany entered a period of crisis. The internal political situation in Rumania, Italy and Hungary became acute. Japan and Turkey were compelled to refrain from joining the war on the side of Germany, against the Soviet Union.

The fascist defeat at Stalingrad became the starting-point for the subsequent devastating blows dealt at the enemy. It marked the beginning of a powerful Red Army offensive in the winter of 1942-43 in the North Caucasus, in the Upper and Lower Don areas, before Voronezh, in the central sector of the Soviet-German front and at Leningrad. Everywhere the Red Army inflicted heavy defeats on the Germans, achieving important successes.

The breach of the enemy blockade of Leningrad, effected in January 1943, was of immense military and political significance. The first half of March saw the elimination of the Rzhev-Vyazma bridgehead of the enemy. The front line was pushed back from Moscow even farther west. In the winter of 1942-43 the Red Army nullified the summer successes of the Wehrmacht by freeing Voronezh Region and a sizable portion of Kursk Region. In the southern sector of the front, Soviet troops reached the Northern Donets-Miuss line. In some sectors the Red Army threw the enemy back 370 miles to 440 miles and recovered an economically and strategically important area of 185,000 square miles. Highly important communications between the central and southern parts of the U.S.S.R. were re-established. Millions of Soviet people were delivered from German fascist captivity. The en masse expulsion of the enemy from Soviet soil had begun.
But the Hitler clique refused to reconcile itself to the idea that Germany could not win the war. It carried out a total mobilisation, mustering all manpower and material resources in Germany as well as in the occupied countries, and rushed them to the Soviet front. Having decided to remedy her impaired position, Germany undertook a new offensive in the summer of 1943, this time in a relatively small sector of the Kursk bulge. The purpose of the offensive was to rout the formations of the Central and Voronezh fronts defending the Kursk bulge, straighten out the front line and, in the event of success, push east and north-east. The new offensive was facilitated by the absence of a second front in Europe as a result of the U.S.A. and Britain grossly violating their commitments under the alliance. Germany took advantage of this circumstance to move to the Soviet-German front fresh divisions brought up to strength or newly formed in Western Europe. The enemy massed 232 divisions against the Red Army. In the Orel and Belgorod areas, he formed a powerful striking force over 50 divisions strong, including 20 armoured and motorised divisions. As regards its armour element, this force was superior to the fascist troops which had advanced on Moscow in 1941 and on Stalingrad in 1942.

The summer offensive of the enemy did not take the Red Army unawares. In connection with preparations for the summer campaign, the Voronezh front Command reported to the G.H.Q. its plan for the coming strategic operation. The report revealed the designs of the German Command and put forward specific proposals for organising the operations of Soviet troops so as to wear out the main enemy forces and bleed them white in defensive battles and then, choosing the right moment, to launch a counter-offensive and complete the rout of the enemy. These proposals were accepted as the basis of the plan for the summer campaign. In organising the defence along lines prepared in advance, the Soviet Command used the latest technical means. The population of the front-line area—the Kursk, Orel and Voronezh regions—took an active part in building defences. Unlike the defensive battles of 1941 and the summer of 1942, the defence at Kursk was not forced but deliberate, being undertaken in conditions favourable to the Red Army.

By the heroic efforts of Soviet troops, the German offensive, which started on July 5, 1943, was soon stopped. The Red Army, after sapping the enemy’s offensive power at Orel and Kursk, went over to a decisive counter-offensive. It razed the Hitlerites’ powerful defence lines one by one. Fascist Germany’s last offensive, which was intended to turn the tide of the war in her favour, prevent the disintegration of the bloc of fascist countries and regain the strategic initiative, failed completely.

The victory at Kursk marked the beginning of a new victorious Red Army offensive, which took place in the summer and autumn of 1943 on a front some 1,250 miles long.
The battle at Kursk was an outstanding event of the Second World War. The victory at Kursk, with the Soviet troops reaching the Dnieper, completed the fundamental turn of the tide in the Great Patriotic War and in the Second World War as a whole. The Red Army firmly retained the strategic initiative right up to the time when fascist Germany was finally defeated.

The Red Army liberated the Donets coalfield and cleared Left-bank Ukraine. On November 6 it drove the enemy out of Kiev. Soviet troops recovered Novorossiisk and eliminated the enemy bridgehead on the Taman Peninsula. They crossed the Dnieper with great courage and consummate military skill and took up firm positions on the right bank. Over 2,000 men, officers and generals were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the courage and heroism they had shown in the battle of the Dnieper.

After breaking enemy resistance on the Dnieper, the Red Army advanced in Right-bank Ukraine and thereby foiled the plan of the Hitlerites, who had hoped to dig in on the Dnieper line. By the end of 1943 over half the Soviet territory seized by the enemy had been recovered.

The Soviet success at Kursk made it easier for Britain and the United States to land troops in Italy, and enabled them to advance inland. Their operation was also facilitated by the situation in Italy. Italian patriots, in the forefront of whom were the Communists, began to fight against the fascist regime of Mussolini and German fascist tyranny, for the liberation of Italy. Popular revolts broke out, with the result that the Mussolini regime was overthrown and the Fascist Party disbanded. Defeated militarily and politically, Italy was the first to leave the fascist bloc. She surrendered unconditionally in September 1943. The bloc of fascist countries began to fall apart.

The Soviet successes on the Volga, at Kursk and elsewhere were due to the war effort of the home front, the vast organising work which the Party had carried out to strengthen the Red Army and equip it with the latest weapons, and the fact that Soviet soldiers had learned to wield these weapons skilfully.

In the second half of 1942 the first steps were taken to form large armoured, artillery and aircraft formations and increase their firepower. By the summer of 1943 the Red Army included five armoured armies. Anti-aircraft and jet artillery had made considerable progress. In 1943 the number of anti-aircraft guns in the lines was almost twice as great as in 1942. The Air Force was growing continuously. By then the Soviet Air Force had almost two and a half times as many aircraft in the field as the enemy. It was armed with high-speed YAK 7, YAK 9 and LA 5 fighters, powerful IL 5 attack planes and PE 2 dive bombers.

The Central Committee of the Party paid great attention to the training of the leading cadre of the Red Army. In 1943 the number
of military schools was 50 per cent greater than in 1941, and the number of courses three times as great. Every third officer attended a military school or military courses. The troops assiduously studied the experience of the Great Patriotic War.

The exceptional staunchness and activity of our troops in fighting the enemy were largely due to the valuable work of officers, political bodies and Party organisations in educating the servicemen, infusing them with a high morale and thus ensuring the success of military operations. Political work among the troops contributed in great measure to the successful course of fighting and steadily raised the morale of the armed forces. Political workers and agitators acquainted soldiers with Soviet Information Bureau communiqué, informed them of the achievements of men and officers who had distinguished themselves, of the feats of those who had been decorated, and of fascist atrocities in the occupied areas. The impact of their words was increased by what the men saw as they pushed farther and farther on—ruins and ashes where towns or villages had been, countless corpses of civilians or prisoners of war tortured to death or shot by the fascists. These scenes of crime filled the men’s hearts with righteous hatred for the enemy and spurred them on to further feats of valour. Among the advancing men there were many whose relatives were on the other side of the front line or had been driven away to Germany. They were eager to be in action, and carried the others with them. The Soviet troops broke the enemy’s stubborn resistance and destroyed his manpower and war material. The feat of Private Alexander Matrosov, a Komsomol member who did not hesitate to give his life—he stopped the gun-port of an enemy emplacement with his body in order to cut off the Hitlerites’ devastating fire, was one of many instances of soldierly valour and self-sacrifice to liberate the country from the hated enemy.

Communists were invariably in the crucial and dangerous sectors of the front. Typical of front-line Communists were moral and political integrity, unparalleled bravery, and great military proficiency. The ample experience in work among the troops gained by Party organisations in the Red Army made it possible to abolish the post of deputy company commander in charge of political matters and reshape Party organisations in order to establish closer links between them and the rank and file. Previously, primary Party organisations had existed only in the regiments, now they were formed also in battalions and other units equivalent to them. This measure, which was adopted in the spring of 1943, strengthened the links between Party organisations and servicemen and initiated new, more flexible forms of Party work among the troops.

The partisan movement played a big part in turning the tide of the war. It was growing from day to day and spreading to new areas. Often partisan units were joined by whole families or even villages. Led by the Central Committee of the Party, the Central
Committees of the Communist Parties of Union Republics and underground regional Party committees, the partisan movement became a force which struck terror into the heart of the enemy. In 1943 the partisans' numerical strength doubled compared with 1942.

The partisans helped the Red Army by inflicting huge losses on the enemy. In 1943 partisan formations under S. A. Kovpak and M. I. Naumov carried out raids deep into Right-bank Ukraine, covering a distance of over 1,250 miles. They destroyed enemy communications and munitions depots, killed many thousands of Hitlerites and derailed dozens of enemy troop trains.

The partisan movement involved the whole people—every nationality of the Soviet Union. It assumed an immense scale in the occupied areas of the Russian Federation—the Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk and Orel regions—and in the Ukraine and Byelorussia. It was also growing in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Moldavia. By the end of 1943 over a million armed partisans were fighting against the invaders. Among them were hundreds of thousands of Party and Komsomol members. The history of the partisan movement even in the Soviet country had never known one of such vast scope and numerical strength.

The Hitler clique had expected by its atrocities and monstrous reign of terror in the temporarily occupied areas to break the spirit of the Soviet people, to intimidate them. But the reverse was the case. The Hitlerites' atrocities merely increased the indignation of the people and their hatred for the fascist barbarians. In the occupied areas, millions of peaceful inhabitants waged a courageous struggle against the invaders. They sabotaged the political and economic measures of the occupation authorities, prevented the removal of property to Hitler Germany, and helped the partisans to destroy enemy manpower and war material.

The partisan movement and the fight of Soviet people against the invaders in the occupied areas were organised and led by underground Party organisations. The latter were headed by 26 regional and 539 town and district Party committee secretaries.

The Party's underground and partisan press greatly promoted the partisan movement and the struggle of Soviet people against the fascist invaders. The publication of newspapers and leaflets and their dissemination among the population of the occupied areas was one of the Party's major tasks in rallying the people to defeat the enemy. The number of printed underground newspapers exceeded 20 in the winter of 1941-42 and was nearly 270 in 1943-44.

Direct leadership of the entire partisan movement, and co-ordination of the military operations of partisan units and the Red Army were the responsibility of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement set up under General Headquarters by decision of the Central Committee of the Party on May 30, 1942. Partisan headquarters were also set up in the Union Republics and the regions
of the R.S.F.S.R. occupied by the Germans and in front-line areas.

In 1942 and 1943 the C.C. C.P.S.U.(B.) strengthened the leadership of the Bolshevik underground and the partisan movement. In the Ukraine and Byelorussia, illegal Central Committees of the Party were formed to give efficient leadership to underground Party organisations and partisan units and formations and co-ordinate their actions with Red Army operations.

The Leninist Komsomol did much to help the Communist Party in organising the partisan movement. The activities of the Komsomol members of Krasnodon (Ukraine), led by the local underground Bolshevik organisation, was a vivid example of selfless struggle against the fascist invaders. At the head of the Young Guard, as their underground organisation was called, were young men and women educated by the Communist Party—Ivan Turkenich, Victor Tret'yakevich, Oleg Koshevoi, Ivan Zemnukhov, Sergei Tyulinen, Ulyana Gromova and Lyubov Shevtsova, all of whom died the death of heroes. Among the many other underground Komsomol organisations that fought the invaders were the Partisan Spark in Nikolayev Region, the Lyudinovo organisation in Kaluga Region and the organisations operating in Kaunas, Lithuanian S.S.R., at Obol Station, Vitebsk Region, and in Khotin, Bukovina.

The struggle of Soviet people in the enemy rear undermined the strength of the fascist Wehrmacht and promoted Red Army successes. Hundreds of thousands of partisans—men and women—were decorated, and many of them awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, for their exceptional bravery in that struggle.

The turn of the tide in the Great Patriotic War which occurred in 1943 was largely due to achievements on the home front. The fast-growing war economy ensured the superiority of the Red Army in forces and armaments. In 1943 basic production assets showed a substantial increase over the previous year. Through the effort of the Party, the Soviet Government and the working class, output in heavy industry went up by 19 per cent. The total increase in industrial production in 1943 was 17 per cent. The greatest increase was achieved in war production in the eastern areas.

Soviet industry supplied the Red Army with increasing quantities of first-class fighting equipment. Despite the decrease in the number of workers by almost one-third compared with 1940, it gave the front considerably more military equipment than German industry gave the fascist Wehrmacht. The Soviet tank works made 44,600 tanks in two years (1942 and 1943), while the Germans made only 18,200 tanks. During the same period, the Soviet aircraft industry provided the front with 20,000 more aircraft than the German industry.

Increased war production was accompanied by improved quality. Whereas the aircraft, tanks and guns made in the early war period
followed models designed mostly before the war, new and better types of military equipment and arms were introduced early in 1943. Hitler’s generals had to admit the superiority of Soviet tanks over German tanks and draw conclusions that alarmed fascist Germany. No other country had ever been able to start the mass production of new types of military equipment in so short a time.

The growth of war production was handicapped by the lag in the output of fuel, power and metals, whose resources had been considerably diminished through the loss of the Krivoi Rog iron ore mines, the metallurgical plants and power stations of the Ukraine, and the Donets coalfield. It was indispensable to achieve a steep increase in the output of metal, power and fuel, particularly coal, in the country’s eastern areas.

The Communist Party did much to advance these industries. Metallurgical plants in the Urals, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan and elsewhere organised in record time the manufacture of all kinds of ferrous and non-ferrous metals. The smelting of alloy steel was mastered and was growing steadily, as was the output of rolled armour steel. The plants evacuated to the east were producing for the armed forces twice or three times as much as they had on their former sites. The Magnitogorsk workers built one of Europe’s largest blast furnaces in four months. Metallurgical works in Chelyabinsk and Uzbekistan, and new blast furnaces in Nizhny Tagil, started production.

New coal mines went into operation in the Urals, Siberia and Kazakhstan; supplies of firewood were organised on a large scale and local fuel resources were discovered and exploited. At the end of 1942 the Central Committee decided to improve Party work in the Kuznetsk and Karaganda coal pits. It had revealed serious shortcomings that prevented the use of the pits at full capacity, and instructed the Party bodies concerned to make increased coal output their paramount concern. The Party organisations of Kazakhstan and Novosibirsk Region rallied the working people to accomplish this task. They sent further thousands of Communists to work in the pits. In the north, the Pechora coalfield was being developed rapidly. The Party organisations of the Moscow and Tula regions roused the working people to restore the pits of the Moscow coalfield liberated from the invaders.

The Party and the Government took steps to supply the country’s eastern areas with electric power. New power stations were being built and the old ones expanded in those areas. The total capacity of the power stations put in operation in 1943 exceeded a million kilowatts.

The socialist economy proved strong enough to engage in extensive capital construction in the key industries despite the war. In 1943 investments in the iron and steel, coal and electric power industries were double the amount invested in 1942. In the Urals and the Volga
region, powerful complex plants were built on the basis of motor and tractor and heavy machinery works to manufacture first-class T-34 and heavy KV tanks of Soviet design. In the same areas and in Siberia, quantity production of fighters and attack planes, and guns for divisional, regimental and anti-tank artillery was organised.

The truly titanic organising and ideological work of the Communist Party was aimed at discovering and putting to use all the country's untapped economic resources. Inspired by the Party, Soviet people showed great initiative in mobilising production reserves, and they worked devotedly to increase output of munitions and other war supplies. The unexcelled valour of the defenders of the country at the front combined with the heroic effort of Soviet men and women on the home front.

In 1943 the country-wide socialist emulation movement to increase war production assumed even greater dimensions. Labour enthusiasm spread to the whole working class. Productivity of labour in industry increased by 40 per cent between April 1942 and April 1944. This growth was chiefly due to the installation of up-to-date machinery, better use of production capacities and an accelerated production cycle.

The difficulties in agriculture were being successfully overcome. The effort of the Party and the Government and the devoted labour of the collective farmers and the workers at the machine-and-tractor stations and state farms resulted in the sown area in 1943 expanding by 15,815,000 acres as against 1942. Output of potatoes, milk and other farm produce was increased. To provide the armed forces and the civilian population with more grain, vegetables and other produce, the working people of the countryside sowed crops over and above plan as a contribution to the war effort.

The entire population of the towns came to the aid of the peasants, who were very short of labour power because of the war. Factories rendered the collective farms substantial technical assistance. They increased the output of farm machine parts by drawing on their untapped reserves. Nevertheless, the achievements of agriculture in the country's eastern areas could not make up for the huge losses incurred through the enemy occupation of major farming areas. The population suffered from considerable food shortages. However, the supply of food for the population was organised thanks to the attention which the Party and the Government paid continuously to the problem of meeting the needs of the people in the extremely difficult war-time conditions. Rationing ensured a higher standard of consumption for the workers of the key industries. The Party and the Government maintained pre-war prices for the consumer goods that had to be rationed. Despite colossal war spending, the Soviet state was also able to find ways and means of meeting the social and cultural requirements of the people.
Concern for the welfare of the people marked the measures adopted by the Party and the Government to rehabilitate the economy of the liberated areas. On August 21, 1943, the Council of People’s Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and the C.C. C.P.S.U.(B.) adopted the decision “On Urgent Measures to Restore the Economy in Areas Liberated from German Occupation”. As a result of its implementation, the collective farms in the areas concerned had been supplied with 1,720,000 head of livestock and 96,000 tons of winter crop seed by January 1, 1944. A great deal was done to rebuild houses, schools, hospitals and factories.

The transport system was coping successfully with its tasks, carrying troops, munitions and goods on a vast scale despite a considerable drop in the number of locomotives, goods wagons, river boats and sea-going ships.

Soviet scientists and cultural workers, for their part, were doing all they could to help the front. The Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. by its researches contributed in tremendous measure to the use of the resources of the Urals and Western Kazakhstan for the war effort. Soviet writers and art workers by their work inspired the people and the armed forces for patriotic deeds in the struggle against the invaders.

The link between the war and home fronts was becoming stronger and stronger. In the autumn of 1942 the people of the Tambov and Saratov regions initiated a country-wide patriotic movement to collect funds for arming the Red Army. In 1943 the Red Army and Navy received additional tank columns, air squadrons and warships. In four years the amount of voluntary contributions by the population totalled 94,500 million rubles. Workers, collective farmers and intellectuals sent thousands of trainloads of gifts to the front to be distributed among the defenders of the country. These were all manifestations of creative Soviet patriotism, of the indestructible solidity of the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, of the unity of the Soviet people.

The turn of the tide on the home and war fronts was achieved through the most strenuous effort by the entire country. The Soviet people accepted great privations to defeat the enemy. Almost one-third of the national income was spent directly on the war. In 1943 the share of the consumption fund in the national income dropped to 60 per cent, its lowest level during all the years of the war. Only one-third of the required consumer goods was available for sale. War spending in that period was the greatest since the war began. The Soviet people mustered all the resources of the country to bring about a radical turn in the war, and their effort was crowned with success.

The momentous victories of the Soviet people on the war and home fronts contributed in vast measure to the development of the national liberation struggle in the occupied countries—Czechoslovakia, Po-
and, Yugoslavia, Albania and France—and of the Resistance movement in Germany herself and in her vassal countries.

The powerful partisan movement in Yugoslavia, led by the Communist Party, diverted part of the forces of fascist Germany and fascist Italy. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, the Bulgarian people rose against the fascist regime in their country. The Resistance movement assumed a large scale in Poland, where the partisan People’s Guard (Gwardia Ludowa) was active against the Hitlerites. With the aid of the Soviet people, the Polish and Czech patriots formed their own military units in Soviet territory. Anti-fascist Rumanian prisoners of war formed a volunteer division to fight the Hitlerites.

In the Resistance movement of the West European countries occupied by the German fascists, two political lines of struggle, two strategies and tactics, were to be seen from the outset.

One of them was the political line, the strategy and tactics of the Communist Parties, expressing the vital national interests of the people and aiming at the complete defeat of fascism and its helpers in the countries concerned. The Communist Parties were striving to rally the whole people, all the classes and social strata of the population, and thus establish a united national front fighting against fascism and internal reaction.

The other political line was shaped by bourgeois governments in exile and their supporters in the respective countries. They did not propose to bring about the complete defeat of Germany but merely sought to reduce her to the status of a secondary power. The advocates of this line were opposed to the establishment of a broad liberation front; they advocated a passive strategy and sometimes tried to check the liberation forces battling against fascism.

The Communist and Workers’ Parties and the patriotic masses following them were the main and decisive force waging the liberation struggle against the fascist invaders in the occupied countries of Europe. The Communist Parties roused the masses to fight against fascist tyranny, for the national independence of their countries and for freedom. The Communists of France, Czechoslovakia, Poland and other countries which had been attacked, and the working people who supported them had to pay an enormous toll in human lives during the war against the German fascist invaders and their time-servers. Thousands of Communists and people who supported them were shot by the Hitlerites, and many thousands of them lost their lives in prisons and concentration camps.

The Communist Parties of the countries in the fascist coalition—Germany, Italy, Rumania, Hungary and Finland—pursued a policy aimed at the military defeat of this coalition and at the overthrow of the fascist governments. The Communists of the fascist bloc countries carried out active work in the armed forces of their countries, revealing to them the predatory character of the war which fascist
Germany and her vassals were waging, and stressing the liberating and just character of the war waged by the U.S.S.R. and the anti-Hitler coalition. They called on soldiers to end the criminal war of the Hitlerites and their accomplices, and to do their utmost to bring about the defeat of the fascist conquerors. This effort of the Communist Parties bore fruit in the armies of all the fascist bloc countries. There were many cases of enemy soldiers evading active operations against the Red Army and the armies of its allies, and some of them surrendered readily and joined guerilla units or Resistance organisations. Entire sub-units, units or even formations of Slovak and Rumanian troops, and large groups of Italian, Hungarian, Austrian, Finnish and German soldiers went over to the side of the armies of the anti-fascist coalition.

The crushing blows of the Red Army and the growing activity of the German Communists led to the growth of anti-fascist sentiments in the Wehrmacht. More and more German soldiers refused to serve in the armed forces, as can be seen from the obviously understated figures of the Wehrmacht’s criminal statistics. During the war, about 27,000 death sentences were passed in the ground forces alone, and some 110,000 men were sentenced to penal servitude for terms of more than a year. This number would have been sufficient to man 11 divisions.

In an atmosphere of the most cruel terror, Communists worked fearlessly and indefatigably to rally members of the Resistance, and led them into battle against the fascist regimes. In Italy and Rumania, a guerilla movement developed under Communist leadership. The leading part which Communists played in the liberation struggle against the German fascist invaders, the Communists’ heroism and boundless devotion to the people, resulted in an immense increase in the influence and prestige of the Communist and Workers’ Parties, which became ever more strongly linked with large sections of the people.

The Communist Parties of the capitalist countries in the anti-Hitler coalition backed the war effort of their countries and contributed to their military co-operation with the Soviet Union to ensure an early and complete defeat of fascist Germany and her accomplices.

Experience showed that unification of the progressive forces and mobilisation of the masses against fascism and reaction in the capitalist countries of the anti-Hitler coalition could best be effected by the Communist Parties of the countries concerned, outside the framework of the Communist International. Moreover, it was essential fully to expose the bourgeois calumny that the Communist Parties were operating, not independently or in the interests of their peoples, but on orders from abroad. In view of this and the fact that the Communist International had accomplished its historic mission, the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International
in May 1943 decided to dissolve the Comintern. This move was approved by all the Communist Parties.

The Communist International played an important part in history. Credit was due to it for restoring and strengthening the links between the working people of various countries—links which the social-chauvinists had disrupted during the First World War—for defending Marxism-Leninism against the opportunists, who sought to vulgarise and distort it, for contributing to the internal consolidation of the young Communist and Workers' Parties and to their Marxist-Leninist steeling, and for helping to train revolutionary leaders. Thereby it enabled the young Communist Parties to become militant mass revolutionary parties of the working class based on the platform of Marxism-Leninism.

During the Great Patriotic War the Soviet Union firmly pursued a policy aimed at uniting the anti-fascist forces. This policy enhanced the international prestige of the U.S.S.R. and strengthened the anti-Hitler coalition.

Towards the close of 1943 the Heads of Government of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and Britain met in Tehran. They adopted a declaration formulating and reaffirming the common policy of the three Great Powers in the war and stating their resolve to co-operate in the postwar period. The declaration stressed the three Great Powers' desire to achieve a lasting peace after the war and organise co-operation of the peace-loving countries, big and small alike. The conference decided, in spite of Churchill's opposition, to open a second front in Europe not later than May 1, 1944. But this time limit was not adhered to. The Red Army continued to bear alone the brunt of the war against Hitler Germany and her vassals.

The Tehran Conference played an important part in consolidating the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. It revealed how futile it was for Hitlerite diplomacy to count on splitting the alliance.

In December 1943 the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia signed in Moscow a treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and post-war co-operation for twenty years. The treaty guaranteed Czechoslovakia military aid in liberating the Czechs and Slovaks from fascist slavery. Every article of the treaty was inspired by the idea of maintaining a durable peace in Europe after the war. The treaty was a vivid example of co-operation on the basis of complete equality and mutual understanding between the parties, of genuinely fraternal relations between large and small states.

The outstanding successes of the Red Army in the second period of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet people's devoted labour on the home front, and the consistent foreign policy of the Soviet Union made possible the subsequent decisive victories of the U.S.S.R. over fascist Germany.
3. The Victorious Conclusion of the Great Patriotic War

The Soviet Union entered the year 1944 after achieving a series of brilliant victories over Hitler Germany. The culminating period of the war began. But the road to its termination was arduous.

Two huge armies were facing each other. By early 1944 the Red Army’s superiority over the enemy was 1.3 times in numerical strength, 1.7 times in guns and mortars, 1.4 times in tanks and self-propelled guns and 2.7 times in aircraft. In two and a half years of war, the Soviet Union had not only succeeded in beating off the furious enemy onslaught, but in completely nullifying the enemy’s superiority in fighting power and military equipment. The unbreakable might of the U.S.S.R. and its armed forces were demonstrated in practice. But the fascist Wehrmacht was still strong. Germany still kept her main forces on the Soviet-German front. There were 236 enemy divisions and 18 brigades operating against the Soviet Union, while the Western Allies were confronted with a mere 102 divisions. Hitler Germany still had the resources of almost the whole of Europe at her disposal. The fascist beast was still ravaging nearly half the Soviet territory it had grabbed. The Soviet people needed to make an immense effort to complete the defeat of the enemy.

The Communist Party set the Red Army the lofty task of clearing the whole of Soviet soil from the invaders, helping the peoples of Europe to free themselves from fascism, and finishing the war by the complete defeat of Hitler’s hordes on the soil of Germany herself. This task determined the entire political work of the Party on the war and home fronts. The Party paid especial attention to the press, which helped to mobilise the soldiers to carry out combat assignments. Four central, 19 front and fleet, and over 90 army and corps newspapers were published in the Army and Navy in a total of about 3,500,000 copies. Fifty front, military district and army newspapers were brought out for non-Russian soldiers. In addition, every division had a newspaper of its own.

The Red Army allowed the Wehrmacht no breathing-space after the blows of 1943 but hit it even harder in 1944.

In January the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts began a powerful offensive supported by Baltic Fleet sailors. Advancing swiftly, the Soviet troops routed the main enemy forces in the area and completely freed Leningrad from the enemy blockade. In the middle of February the Red Army took the offensive south of Lake Ilmen and inflicted a new major defeat on the Wehrmacht. The Soviet troops reached the boundary of the Baltic region.

The fierce battles in the north-west were still raging when fighting on a colossal scale began to liberate Right-bank Ukraine. In February and March the troops of the four Ukrainian fronts went over to the offensive on a huge front extending from the Pripyet to the mouth of the Dnieper. The Red Army encircled and wiped out two
large enemy groups in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky and Zvenigorodka-Uman areas. It freed the Krivoi Rog iron and ore basin. It pushed on to the west, crossed the Dniester and freed a substantial portion of Soviet Moldavia. March 26, 1944, witnessed a notable event—Soviet troops reached the Rumanian border. The Red Army began to restore the state frontier of the Soviet Union. In April and May the troops of the Third and Fourth Ukrainian fronts, co-operating with the Black Sea Fleet, liberated the Crimea and Odessa.

By the summer of 1944 the Red Army had driven the enemy out of nearly three-quarters of the occupied territory. Soviet troops moved into the Carpathian foothills and thereby cut the Hitlereite front in two. The Red Army reached the approaches to the Balkans, and was able to extend direct assistance to the peoples of South-East Europe fighting against fascism. Discord among the satellites of fascist Germany grew and the political situation in them deteriorated. Hitler Germany was on the brink of complete political isolation.

The whole world saw that the Soviet Union was in a position to defeat fascism and liberate Europe unaided. This induced the U.S. and British governments to decide at last on invading the continent. The second front in Europe was opened in June 1944, or two years later than promised. But even then the Soviet-German front remained the decisive front, for it engaged two-thirds of the fascist troops.

Such were the results of the Red Army campaign in the winter and spring of 1944. The summer and autumn campaign was still greater in scale and results.

In June the troops of the Leningrad and Karelian fronts, supported by the Baltic Fleet, took the offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and in Southern Karelia. They penetrated three permanent defence lines and freed Viborg and Petrozavodsk, throwing the enemy back into Finnish territory. In August Finland asked the Soviet Union for an armistice and on September 4 declared that she was severing her alliance with Germany.

In June and July the troops of the First Baltic and the three Byelorussian fronts carried out a major strategic operation against the German army. On June 23, on a huge front stretching from the Western Dvina to the Pripyet, the Soviet troops struck at the enemy with unprecedented force. In a number of sectors, they penetrated deep into the enemy defences and a mere six days later encircled and destroyed a large enemy force in the Vitebsk and Bobruisk areas. Pushing rapidly on, they surrounded the Germans’ central group and on July 3 liberated Minsk, the Byelorussian capital, and on July 13, Vilnius, capital of the Lithuanian S.S.R.

On Byelorussian soil, the Red Army destroyed or took prisoner over 500,000 enemy men and officers. In the summer of 1944 the men, officers and generals of the fascist Wehrmacht, who had been conceited enough to make preparations for a triumphal entry into Moscow,
tramped as prisoners of war through the streets of the Soviet capital.

As a result of the German defeat in the centre, the Red Army completely recovered the whole of Byelorussia and a large part of the Lithuanian Soviet Republic. In twenty-four days Soviet troops advanced over 300 miles farther west, crossed the Neman and moved up to the frontier of fascist Germany. The hour when Hitler fascism would have to pay for all its monstrous crimes against mankind was about to strike.

The Soviet victory in Byelorussia paved the way for the Red Army to advance farther into Poland and the Baltic region and for an offensive against East Prussia.

Simultaneously, in July and August, the Red Army struck crippling blows in the south. The troops of the First Ukrainian front broke through the enemy defences and on July 27 freed Lvov, the main city of Western Ukraine. Pursuing the retreating enemy, they crossed the Vistula and soon liberated all of Western Ukraine. The troops of the Second and Third Ukrainian fronts achieved a major victory in August. Pressing swiftly forward, they encircled and destroyed 22 German divisions in the Kishinev area. Soviet Moldavia was completely liberated.

In September and October the Red Army won a major victory over the fascist Wehrmacht in the Baltic region. The troops of the three Baltic fronts undertook an offensive in the Riga sector and those of the Leningrad front began to advance on Tallinn. On September 22 the Soviet troops cleared the enemy from Tallinn, the Soviet Estonian capital, and on October 13 from Riga, the capital of Soviet Latvia. Soviet Estonia and a large part of Soviet Latvia were freed. The Germans’ Baltic group numbering over 30 divisions was pushed to the sea and cut off from East Prussia.

In October the troops of the Karelian front jointly with the Northern Fleet routed the north-western group of the Germans, drove the enemy out of Pechenga, a Russian region from ancient times, entered Norway and helped her people to regain their freedom from German fascist tyranny.

The Soviet frontier was restored along its whole length, from the Barents to the Black Sea.

The valiant partisans made a substantial contribution to the liberation of the country from the invaders. Immediately before the battle for the liberation of Byelorussia began, they carried out a vast and daring operation in the course of a week, blowing up railways in the enemy rear. At the crucial moment of the fighting the enemy was therefore unable to manoeuvre or call in reserves and military equipment.

Breaking enemy resistance and destroying his manpower and fighting equipment, Soviet troops performed miracles of heroism as they drove the Hitlerites westwards. In the battle of Nikolayev,
a group of sailors under Senior Lieutenant K. F. Olshansky won undying fame. Landing in the harbour at night, they fought a grim battle against three Hitlerite battalions armed with guns, mortars and tanks. Only 12 men survived out of 67. The courageous sailors were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and a monument has been erected in the town to commemorate their bravery.

In the battle to liberate the Polish village of Gierasimowicze, Corporal G. P. Kunavin performed the same feat as Alexander Matrosov by plugging a machine-gun post with his body. He was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In token of their deep gratitude to the Soviet soldier who had helped to liberate them, the villagers entered his name for ever in the list of honorary citizens and instructed the teachers at the local school to begin the first lesson in the first form every year by telling the children about Kunavin’s feat. “Let their knowledge of life begin with the thought of the friendship of the Polish and Russian peoples,” they wrote in their resolution.

The Red Army advanced westwards as an army of liberation. The Soviet people, who were fighting for their freedom and independence, could not be indifferent to the destinies of other peoples suffering from fascist tyranny. Throughout the war the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, true to the ideas of proletarian internationalism, stressed the historic liberating mission of the Soviet armed forces. Inspired by this lofty goal, the Red Army brought the enslaved peoples of Europe freedom from fascist captivity.

Late in March 1944 Soviet troops crossed into Rumania. Military operations were thus carried beyond the Soviet boundary. In July the Red Army entered Polish soil. The day of liberation of the enslaved peoples of Western Europe was breaking.

In view of the Red Army advance to the west there arose important political, economic and cultural problems affecting European peoples. The Communist Party and the Soviet Government proclaimed the following objectives:

1. To liberate the peoples of Europe from the fascist invaders and help them to rebuild their independent national states.
2. To grant the liberated peoples complete freedom in deciding their form of government and social system.
3. To ensure that the chief war criminals, those responsible for the war and the suffering of the peoples, were severely punished for their crimes.
4. To establish in Europe an order that would completely preclude new aggression on the part of Germany.
5. To establish lasting economic, political and cultural cooperation among all the peoples of Europe, based on mutual trust and mutual assistance, for the purpose of restoring the economy and culture in the countries that had been occupied and plundered by the fascists.
The victorious advance of the Red Army gave a powerful impetus to the national liberation struggle of the European peoples against Hitler's "New Order". Communist influence grew. The idea of a popular front, which the Communists had put forward before the war, won the support of wide sections of the population in many countries which had experienced the horrors of fascist slavery. In Bulgaria a Patriotic Front was formed, in Greece a National Liberation Front, in Rumania a National Democratic Bloc, and in Hungary a National Independence Front. In Poland, the Krajowa Rada Narodowa (National Council of the Country) became the spokesman and unifier of the country's democratic forces. The Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Italy and France called on the peoples of their countries to launch a general armed revolt against the German fascist invaders.

Soviet people took a direct part in the struggle of the European peoples against fascist occupation. Wherever they found themselves they fought with determination against fascism. On breaking out of death camps they joined the guerilla units and underground organisations of the countries concerned. In the first half of 1944 there were over ten Soviet partisan formations operating in Poland. At the request of the Communist Parties of Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Hungary, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine helped the peoples of those countries to develop the guerilla movement. In France a Central Committee of Soviet Prisoners of War was set up with help from the French Communists. By the spring of 1944 there were thirty Soviet guerilla units active in France.

In the middle of 1944 the Red Army began its great liberation campaign which directly helped the peoples of Europe in their struggle against fascist tyranny.

Advancing westwards with the Red Army to free their countries were the Wojsko Polskie (Polish Army), the Czechoslovak Corps, the Rumanian Division and the Yugoslav Brigade.

Soviet troops crossed into Poland in the summer. The Polish people, who had gone through severe trials and suffering and made great sacrifices, received the Red Army with love and gratitude. The First Polish Army fought together with the Red Army to liberate Poland. On Polish territory cleared of the invaders, the Polish people, led by the Workers' (Communist) Party, formed a people's government, known as the Polish Committee of National Liberation.

The Red Army victories inspired the Rumanian people to fight fascist tyranny. The patriotic forces of the Rumanian people, led by the Communist Party, rose in armed revolt on August 23 and overthrew the fascist government. The Rumanian Army turned against the German troops and joined with the Red Army. Patriotic units of the Rumanian Army drove the hated invaders out of the capital and together with Soviet troops started a decisive struggle for the complete expulsion of the German fascist troops from their
country. On August 31 Soviet troops entered Bucharest, whose population gave them a joyous welcome. Rumania ceased to be an ally of Germany and declared war against her.

The arrival of the Red Army in the Balkans had a decisive effect on the situation in Bulgaria. That country's fascist rulers, who knew of the people's heart-felt sympathy for the Soviet people, did not venture to go to war against the U.S.S.R., but they did their utmost to help Hitler Germany. In view of this, the Soviet Union on December 5, 1944, declared war on the fascist government of Bulgaria. Soviet troops entered Bulgaria and were enthusiastically greeted by the population. The struggle which the people were waging under the leadership of the Bulgarian Workers' Party against the Hitlerites and their own fascist rulers reached its peak. On September 9 an armed revolt took place in Sofia. The monarchist-fascist regime so hated by the people fell. A new government—the government of the Patriotic Front—was formed. Bulgaria severed relations with fascist Germany and declared war on her.

In October the Red Army undertook a new major offensive in the vast plain of the Middle Danube Lowlands. Its purpose was to rout the main forces of three German army groups, eliminate Hungary as a belligerent and turn her against Germany, and help the Yugoslav people to liberate their country. Soviet troops crossed into Yugoslavia and, in co-operation with the Yugoslav People's Liberation Army, freed her capital, Belgrade, on October 20.

After freeing Transylvania, the Soviet troops operating in Rumania drove a deep wedge into Hungary and by the end of December had completed the encirclement of a large enemy force in the Budapest area. The Hitlerites and Szálasists, the traitors to the Hungarian people, had turned the city into an inaccessible stronghold and were defending it stubbornly. The fierce battle of Budapest lasted nearly six weeks. On February 13, 1945, the German fascist and Hungarian troops were compelled to surrender. The Hungarian capital was freed. The Soviet troops cleared the invaders out of the greater part of Hungary. On December 28 the democratic government formed in Hungary declared war against Germany.

The Red Army's swift advance in the Balkans was of decisive importance for the success of the offensive against the German fascist invaders launched by the Albanian People's Liberation Army led by the Communist Party. On November 29, 1944, that Army completed the liberation of Albania.

The Red Army victories created favourable conditions for the struggle of the Greek patriots. By November 1944 the Greek people, led by the Communist Party, had routed the German fascist troops and freed their country from the invaders. This fact alarmed the Anglo-American imperialists, who were bent on using Greece as a springboard for the struggle against the Balkan peoples and the Soviet Union. The British Government, by moving its troops into
Greece, prevented the Greek people from enjoying the fruits of their victory to the full. The British troops restored the old, reactionary order in Greece.

The political and military results of the summer and autumn campaign of the Red Army were immense. The Red Army had completed the liberation of Soviet territory and had helped the peoples of South-East and Central Europe to cast off Hitler tyranny. The liberated peoples began to build their lives in a new way by establishing a people’s democratic system. The coalition of fascist countries had collapsed, and Germany found herself in complete isolation. The peoples of Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary had turned against fascist Germany.

The victories of the Red Army in the two campaigns of 1944 proved beyond all question that it was superior to the Hitler Wehrmacht in every respect. In two and a half years of war it had gained vast military experience and had become steeled in fierce battles. The country was lavishly supplying its servicemen with first-class armament, of which they made expert use. The Red Army firmly retained the initiative and delivered blows where it could derive the greatest advantage and where the enemy least expected it. Soviet servicemen were inspired by lofty and noble aims—the liberation of the sacred soil of the Soviet Union and assistance to the peoples of Europe oppressed by Hitler’s “New Order”.

The increased power of the Red Army, and the maturity and proficiency of its men and officers were displayed with particular force in the closing stage of the war, when the Soviet troops not merely expelled the enemy from native soil but encircled and destroyed his troops. Of the fascist divisions smashed on the Soviet-German front in three and a half years of war, over two-thirds were beaten in 1944 alone. These enormous losses were irreparable for Hitler Germany.

The brilliant victories in the battlefield were ensured by the increasing effort of the home front. In 1944 the defence industry was manufacturing five times as many aircraft and tanks per month as it had throughout 1941. The power of a single salvo fired by every type of artillery had trebled in that interval. In 1944 the Red Army was supplied with 29,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, over 40,000 aircraft and upwards of 120,000 guns, and was superabundantly supplied with light and medium machine-guns, rifles and sub-machine guns. Although the Soviet Union’s steel output was roughly one-third of that of Germany and the European countries occupied by her, it surpassed Germany in 1944 in output of tanks, aircraft and guns.

This was a major victory of the Soviet war economy indicating its tremendous might. The advantages of the socialist economic system, the moral qualities of the Soviet people, and the organising ability of the Communist Party had proved their worth.
The heroic working class played the chief role in the economic victory over the enemy. It had been increasing industrial output from month to month. Compared with the previous year, output of ferrous metals in 1944 increased by almost one quarter, steel by 28 per cent, pig-iron by 31 and coal by 30 per cent. The national income reached its war-time peak. In 1944 the proportion of war expenditure in the national economy began to decline for the first time since the beginning of the war. The amount of investment in capital construction was as high as in the pre-war year 1940. From 1942 to 1944, as many as 2,250 large industrial plants were built and put into operation in the eastern areas. Output of consumer goods increased. The Party showed foresight in laying a solid groundwork for the rapid rehabilitation of the national economy and its reconversion to peaceful socialist construction.

The victories at the front inspired Soviet people to further achievements. The country-wide socialist emulation movement grew in scale. In 1944 the movement which metallurgists and tank and aircraft industry workers had started at the end of 1943 to raise labour productivity spread to the whole country. Emulation by trades involved all workers. Emulation by Komsomol and youth teams gathered momentum. The watchword “Produce more for the front with less labour!”, put forward by young workers, was taken up by many factories and helped to reveal large internal reserves. By the end of 1944 over 85 per cent of the country’s workers were engaged in the emulation movement.

Working shoulder to shoulder with the working class the collective-farm peasantry scored fresh achievements in agriculture. The Krasny Putilovets Collective Farm in Kalinin Region called on all working people in the countryside to organise country-wide socialist emulation for high crop yields. The collective farmers of the Ukraine called on all working people in agriculture to compete for fulfilment of the grain delivery plan ahead of schedule and for deliveries of grain to the Red Army over and above plan. In 1944 the country’s crop area increased by almost 40 million acres as against 1943. More grain was harvested and the livestock population showed an increase. Nevertheless, agriculture was still in a difficult position.

The intelligentsia marched in step with the workers and peasants by contributing an increasing share to the defeat of the enemy. Scientific research and designing were making good progress. In 1944 the armed forces were supplied with new powerful weapons—excellent heavy tanks, new YAK 3 and LA 7 fighters, IL 10 attack planes and TU 2 high-speed bombers. Soviet doctors achieved unprecedented results. Over 75 per cent of the injured men and officers returned to the front line after treatment. Donors contributed over 1,400,000 pints of blood during the war, thereby helping hundreds of thousands of men and officers to return to the front line.
The complete expulsion of the fascist invaders from Soviet soil confronted the Party with yet another problem requiring tremendous effort. The liberated towns and villages lay in ruins and their rehabilitation brooked no delay. But this did not mean simply resuming work at factories and collective and state farms. The fascist vandals had destroyed most of the factories, blown up the power stations, removed the machinery or put it out of action and caused enormous damage to agriculture. The workers remaining in those areas were less than one-fifth of the pre-war number.

Problems of the economic rehabilitation of the liberated areas were dealt with continuously by the Central Committee and the Government. Over 40 per cent of investments in capital construction were devoted to the solution of this problem. Steps to remedy the ravages of the war were taken in each Soviet area as soon as it was liberated. The Red Army had hardly regained the Krivoi Rog iron and ore basin when the rehabilitation of the southern iron and steel industry began on a large scale. Fighting was still going on in the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Estonia when decisions were taken to re-establish the agriculture of these three republics. Almost simultaneously with plans for the liberation of Moldavia, measures were drafted for the revival of her fertile fields. Special groups set up on the instructions of the Party's Central Committee accompanied the advancing troops; they immediately began to restore Party and local government bodies and revive economic and cultural activities. The Party organisation of every liberated area applied itself vigorously to economic rehabilitation and the restoration of normal life. The questions involved were discussed at plenary meetings of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Union Republics and of regional, town and district Party committees. Leadership was entrusted to people steeled in underground and partisan struggles against the invaders.

The economic rehabilitation of liberated Soviet soil became a concern of the whole people. Party organisations everywhere regarded it as their sacred duty to help Soviet people delivered from fascist occupation. The Komsomol took the Donets coalfield under its "patronage". Miners of the Moscow and Kuznetsk coalfields, and iron and steel workers of Chelyabinsk Region helped to restore the respective industries. The staffs of the Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk works helped many plants in the South. Collective and state farms were supplied with machinery and livestock from Siberia, Kazakhstan, Central Asia and Transcaucasia. The friendship of the Soviet peoples, sealed in blood on the battle front, was displayed with renewed force in fraternal aid to the population which had experienced the horrors of fascist occupation.

The Soviet people's hard work in re-establishing the country's economy was making steady progress. They were successfully accomplishing the priority task of rehabilitating the southern coal and metallurgical industries. By the beginning of 1945 three out of every
four Donets coal mines that had been in operation before the war were working again. The metallurgical and engineering plants of the South came to life. Output of electric power was growing fast. The very first Soviet power station, that on the Volkhov, was fully restored. The Stalingrad, Zuyevka and Shterovka power stations resumed operation. The Dnieper Power Station was rising from the ashes. By the end of the war about 32,000 miles of track had been restored on the main railways. In the areas recovered from the enemy, 72 per cent of the pre-war crop area was sown to various crops.

The republics and regions freed from occupation began to make an appreciable contribution to the war economy and war effort. As early as 1944 they supplied approximately one-fifth of the country’s total industrial output. By the end of the war the Moscow coalfield was daily producing twice as much coal as in 1940. Already in 1945 the Dzerzhinsky and Kharkov tractor works accounted for 50 per cent of the country’s output.

The Party’s political work had an important share in military successes and production achievements, for it co-ordinated the efforts of all Soviet people. Two tasks became paramount at the time.

The increased unity of the Party and the people was seen, among other things, in the unprecedentedly fast growth of the Party membership. In 1944 the Party ranks were increased by 1,336,350 candidates and 1,124,853 members. Those who joined the Party in the war years made up nearly two-thirds of the total membership. Naturally, the ideological training of newly admitted members and political work among the people became pressing tasks for the Party. Yet Party organisations had relaxed their attention to ideological work. The Central Committee therefore took a number of decisions to remedy the situation, with the result that the Party’s ideological work improved noticeably.

Political work among the millions of Soviet people liberated from fascist captivity was an acute problem. For several years Hitler propaganda had been poisoning their minds, fomenting national hatred. The retreating enemy had left behind armed gangs of nationalist riff-raff. It should also be remembered that the peoples of the Baltic region and of the western areas of the Ukraine and Byelorussia had become members of the Soviet family of nations only a short time before the war.

The bulk of the population of the formerly occupied areas had remained loyal to the Soviet state and the ideas of the Communist Party. But it was essential to eliminate as speedily as possible the moral and political effects of fascist occupation. This, too, was what the C.C. C.P.S.U. (B.) strove for. In Western Ukraine, Western Byelorussia, Bessarabia and the Baltic region, as soon as they were liberated, the Soviet authorities restored to the peasants the land transferred by the fascists to landlords, and supplied the peasants with farm implements and livestock. The Communist Parties of these
republics were continuously engaged in teaching the people to take an uncompromising stand against bourgeois-nationalist ideology and strive to strengthen their bonds of fraternal friendship with the other Soviet peoples. This effort bore fruit. The people, who had had experience of the monstrous crimes of the Hitlerites and local nationalists, helped to end the subversive activities of the bourgeois nationalists. Large sections of the people joined actively in the development of their republics.

The Party adopted important decisions to consolidate the multinational Soviet state. In January 1944 the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., on the basis of a decision taken by a plenary meeting of the C.C. C.P.S.U.(B.), enacted a law extending the rights of the Union Republics in the sphere of foreign relations and defence. The People’s Commissariats for Defence and Foreign Affairs were reorganised from all-Union into Union-Republican People’s Commissariats*. The Union Republics were thereby authorised to enter into direct relations with foreign states and conclude agreements with them, and to establish military units.

The last year of the war became a year of great achievements of the Soviet people. Final victory was being forged in battles of unprecedented scale and intensity. All over the immense territory liberated from the enemy, towns were rising from the ruins, factories were resuming production and fields were being resown. At the same time new factories, power stations and railways were being built and new mineral deposits opened up. The Soviet people were fighting, rehabilitating and building. Each of these achievements has rightly been recorded in history as a heroic feat. The Communists’ organising ability and the patriotic enthusiasm of the Soviet people combined to work wonders.

The war was coming to a close. The Red Army had taken up highly advantageous positions in order to strike the finishing blows at Germany from the north-east, east and south-east. Its offensive was planned to start late in January 1945 but had to start earlier. The fascist Wehrmacht, by going over to the offensive in the Ardennes, had put the Anglo-American armies in a critical position, and Churchill asked for the Soviet Union’s aid. On January 12 the Red Army, true to its duty as an ally, began its culminating offensive on a 750-mile front extending from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians. This offensive was outstanding in scale, mobility, force, depth of penetration and speed of advance. Soviet troops cleared the invaders out of the whole of Poland and Hungary, freed considerable parts of Czechoslovakia and Austria and helped the Danish people to throw off German fascist tyranny. Military operations were carried into German territory.

* This meant that such people’s commissariats were established in the Union Republics as well.—Trans.
In the autumn of 1944 the Red Army liberated Transcarpathian Ukraine. The delegates from people’s committees who met in congress in November adopted a manifesto announcing the entry of Transcarpathian Ukraine into Soviet Ukraine.

Before the final stage of the war the Soviet and Anglo-American forces were approximately at an equal distance from Berlin. In the west, the Wehrmacht was retreating almost without fighting, while in the east it was defending itself with the fury of the doomed. But the Red Army offensive was irresistible. As a result of its January advance, the Red Army came to within 35 or 45 miles of the German capital, whereas the Anglo-American armies were still over 280 miles away.

At the height of the Red Army’s winter offensive, in February 1945, the Heads of Government of the three Allied Powers—Britain, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union—met in the Crimea. The immense growth of the Soviet Union’s international prestige due to its great victories caused the adoption of decisions that were in keeping with the interests of the peoples. The three Heads of Government agreed on plans for the final defeat of Germany and outlined the main principles of the post-war settlement in the world. They worked out the terms of the unconditional surrender of Germany and her transformation into a demilitarised, democratic and peaceful state. In response to the desire of the peoples to achieve international security, the Conference adopted a decision aimed at founding a United Nations Organisation.

The Crimea Conference was a further proof of the possibility of co-operation between countries with different social systems. Its decisions upset the calculations of the Hitlerites and the more reactionary elements of Britain and the United States, who were trying to split the alliance and conclude a separate peace treaty with fascist Germany behind the back of the Soviet Union.

However, Churchill, the head of the British Government, continued his perfidious policy towards the U.S.S.R. What he wanted was not so much to bring about the final defeat of Germany as to ensure that the Anglo-American forces entered the capitals of Germany, Czechoslovakia and Austria before the Red Army. After the war it became known that, seeing that the rout of fascist Germany was close at hand, Churchill had ordered Field-Marshal Montgomery to collect the arms of the surrendering German fascist troops and to be prepared to return them to the Hitlerites for a joint struggle against the Soviet Union.

The Soviet troops were advancing swiftly. On the occasion of the Red Army anniversary, the Central Committee of the Communist Party addressed the following call to the men and officers: Give the enemy no respite! Hit him hard, with all the might of Soviet arms! Forward, to the west! Millions of Soviet men and women languishing in German labour camps are looking to you for deliverance. Let
us free our brothers and sisters from fascist captivity! Let us wipe out German imperialism! Let us achieve a lasting peace among the peoples of the world!

Inspired by these watchwords, the Red Army went into the last, decisive battle.

On April 16 the Berlin operation began. On the eve of the offensive, the historic significance of the last blow to be struck at the enemy was brought home to the men and officers at Party and Komsomol meetings and in talks. The Hitlerites were unable to withstand the mighty Soviet onslaught. The war moved up to the German capital. Heavy street fighting went on for ten days.

The mass heroism and great military skill of Red Army men and officers manifested themselves again. Breaking the enemy's resistance, Soviet troops encircled the Reichstag. On April 30 many Red Army men fought their way into the building and hoisted Red flags on its columns, pediments and windows. Early on May 1 the Victory Flag was flying above the Reichstag. It had been hoisted by M. A. Yegorov and M. V. Kantaria, two intrepid scouts.

The fall of Berlin meant the end of the Hitler Reich. The German fascist state had collapsed under the blows of the Red Army. The Soviet people and their armed forces had defeated the aggressor in fighting alliance with the armed forces of Britain, the U.S.A., France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Albania, with units of the Rumanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian armies, and with the forces of the Resistance. The peoples of the anti-fascist coalition had contributed their share to the common fight against fascism. The Soviet Union, which had borne the brunt of the war effort, had played the decisive role in the victory. On May 8, 1945, Germany signed an act of unconditional surrender. The next day, May 9, Soviet troops completed their last operation—they routed the German fascist group encircling Prague, the Czechoslovak capital, and entered the city, already freed of the invaders by the population which had risen in revolt.

With the war in Europe over, the peoples turned their attention to the consolidation of peace. Post-war settlement in the world involved the issue of the fate of Germany. The solution of this problem, which preoccupied all mankind, was worked out by the Potsdam Conference of the Heads of Government of the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain, held on July 17-August 2, 1945. The Soviet delegation insisted on basing relations with defeated Germany on just and democratic principles; as a result, the U.S. plan for her dismemberment was dropped. The leaders of the three powers solemnly pledged themselves to see to it that Germany never threatened peace again. They agreed to abolish German militarism for ever, destroy the Nazi Party and prevent its revival, and liquidate the German monopoly associations. The Conference instructed the Council of Foreign Ministers to draft the terms of a German peace treaty.
that would rule out a resurgence of German imperialism and guarantee a lasting and durable peace and the security of the peoples. Its decisions pointed out that as long as Germany was occupied the Allies must regard her as an economic whole, and made it the duty of the control bodies to follow a common agreed policy. These principles were to guide the democratisation of Germany.

The Conference decided on the transfer of Königsberg and the adjacent area to the Soviet Union, thereby eliminating a bridgehead of German aggression in the east. The Soviet delegation, firmly upholding the interests of the Polish people, brought about the restoration to Poland of the territories belonging to her from of old, and a decision establishing her new frontier along the Oder and Neisse. At the instance of the Soviet delegation, the Conference resolved to expedite the trial of the chief fascist war criminals.

Hitler Germany was defeated, but the war was still going on in the Pacific area. Militarist Japan was still a strong enemy and was making ready to defend herself with all her might. The Soviet Union could not be indifferent to the hardships of the Asian peoples suffering from Japanese aggression. It was also concerned with safeguarding its security in the Far East. The Japanese imperialists had violated the neutrality treaty with the U.S.S.R. by helping Germany in the war against the Soviet Union; they had a large army at the Soviet frontier, and obstructed merchant shipping between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. Therefore, on April 5, 1945, the Soviet Government denounced the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty. At the Crimea Conference, in compliance with the request of Britain and the United States, the Soviet Government stated that the Soviet Union would begin hostilities against Japan within two or three months after the termination of the war against Germany. The Soviet Union accurately fulfilled its commitment as an ally by declaring war against Japan on August 8. The Mongolian People’s Republic likewise joined in the war against imperialist Japan. The People’s Liberation Army of China, led by the Communists, went over to the offensive against the Japanese invaders. The peoples of South-East Asia stepped up their struggle for freedom.

Despite the exceedingly difficult conditions of the Far Eastern war theatre, the Red Army dealt a crushing blow at the Japanese armed forces. The Kwantung Army, more than a million strong, ceased resistance and surrendered. The Japanese militarists were dumbfounded by the lightning-swift rout of their main striking force. On September 2, 1945, Japan signed an act of unconditional surrender.

At the close of the war, August 6 and 9, the U.S. Air Force dropped two atom bombs on the Japanese towns of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There can be no justification for the tragedy these two towns had to pass through. The action of the U.S. Government was prompted, not by military necessity, but by the desire to minimise the significance
of the Soviet Union joining in the war against Japan and exert pressure on it when post-war problems came up for solution. Nothing can alter the fact that the rapid termination of the war in the Pacific was made possible by the Red Army routing the Japanese armed forces in Manchuria.

*The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, and with it the Second World War, was over.* The Soviet Union, led by the Communists, saved mankind from the fascist plague. Peace, to which the peoples of the world had been looking forward for so long, was restored.

4. The Historic Significance and the Sources of the Soviet Union's Victory in the Great Patriotic War

In the Great Patriotic War, *the Soviet people achieved a military, political and economic victory over the enemies of their socialist homeland.* They upheld their socialist gains, the most advanced social and political system, and the liberty and independence of the peoples of the Soviet Union. As a result of this victory, the security of the Soviet frontiers was strengthened. Never in the course of history had the country's state frontiers been so justly and satisfactorily delimited.

By their heroic war effort, the Soviet people not only defended their country against the enemy, but *saved the peoples of Europe from fascist slavery, contributed in tremendous measure to the struggle of the peoples of China and other Asian countries against Japanese imperialism, and delivered the peoples of the world from the threat of fascist bondage.* The Red Army accomplished its liberating mission with credit. Supported by the peoples of the occupied countries, it expelled the invaders from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Austria, northern Norway, the northeastern provinces of China and North Korea. The countries which had fallen under the yoke of the invaders regained their national independence. The defeat of Japanese imperialism provided favourable conditions for the victory of the Chinese revolution.

The Soviet armed forces, by defeating Germany and her war machine, promoted the liberation of the peoples of France, Italy and other countries from fascist captivity. The defeat of German fascism created exceptionally propitious conditions for the development of the German people along the lines of peace, democracy and socialism.

The Second World War aggravated the general crisis of capitalism and ushered in its second stage. The world capitalist system was weakened. The peoples of a number of European and Asian countries overthrew the rule of capitalists and landlords. The people's democratic system established in those countries paved the way for them to build socialism. The liberation struggle against the fascist conquerors
ors heightened the class consciousness of the proletariat and increased the influence of the Communist and Workers’ Parties among the people.

The crisis of the entire colonial system of imperialism became more pronounced, and the national liberation movement assumed an unprecedented scale.

The victory of the Soviet Union over the fascist aggressors was perfectly logical. The source of the strength and might of the Soviet people and their armed forces, who won a great victory in the Second World War, lay in the very nature of the advanced socialist character of the country’s social and political system, in its great advantages over the decayed and outdated capitalist system. The Soviet Union proved stronger than its adversary precisely because power in it was in the hands of the workers and peasants, a socialist system with a powerful economy had been established and the unity of Soviet society achieved. The Soviet people, educated by the Communist Party in the spirit of the lofty ideals of genuine liberty, Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism, displayed unparalleled heroism on the war and home fronts and in the areas temporarily occupied by the enemy.

The class foundation of the might of the Soviet state—the indestructible alliance of the working class and the peasantry—became still stronger during the Great Patriotic War. This alliance is the chief and decisive force of Soviet society, the guarantee of its viability in both peace and war, the source of all the victories of the Soviet people.

In the war against the U.S.S.R., the enemy came up against the unbreakable friendship of the Soviet peoples. His expectations of splitting the union of the peoples of our multi-national country and provoking a conflict among them were shattered completely. From the very first days of the fascist invasion, all the peoples of the Soviet Union rose to defend their country. The Soviet socialist system proved to be not only the best form of development of the nations, but also the most suitable organisational form for the cooperation of the peoples of a multi-national state intent on carrying a just war of liberation through to a victorious conclusion. The friendship of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. was one of the main factors in the victory over the fascist invaders. It not only withstood the grave trials of the war but became even stronger than before.

The Soviet socialist system, both social and political, afforded unprecedented scope for the economic development of the country and for the mobilisation of all the forces of the people to solve the most complicated economic problems both in peace and war time. Drawing on the political, moral and material superiority of socialism over capitalism, the Soviet Union overcame the formidable difficulties of the war years and set up a well-organised war economy, which made possible the mass production of up-to-date armaments.
for the Red Army and contributed tremendously to the victory over fascist Germany. The war showed that the vitality of the Soviet economy was far greater than that of the capitalist countries. This was one of the major factors in the Soviet Union's victory in the Great Patriotic War.

The victory in the Great Patriotic War was ensured by the invincible might of the Soviet armed forces. The Red Army is inseparable from the people. It owes its moral strength to the people, it has been educated in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and has a clear-cut objective—the defence of a state that is building the most just society in history. All the qualities of an army of a new type were vividly manifest in its valour and courage, in its keen awareness of its liberating mission, in the readiness of its men and officers to sacrifice their lives for the liberty and independence of their country, for socialism, and in its complete moral and political superiority over the enemy armies. The Red Army heroically withstood all the hardships of the war, completely routed a strong and treacherous enemy and emerged from the war even stronger and more efficient than before.


The experience of the Great Patriotic War was striking evidence of the indisputable superiority of the Soviet art of war as a component of military science as a whole over the strategy and tactics of the German fascist troops. The course and outcome of the war showed conclusively that the military organisation based on the advantages of the socialist social and political system was superior to the military organisation in the capitalist countries in every respect.

With the reliable support of the most solid and stable home front, the Red Army was able effectively to fulfil its sacred duty towards the country. It had the undivided backing of the whole country, of all the peoples of the Soviet Union. The unity of the war and home fronts, of the armed forces and the people, was a decisive condition for victory.

During the war, Soviet patriotism proved to be a vital and power-
ful source of the strength of our people and their armed forces. The Great Patriotic War was an unexampled heroic feat accomplished for the sake of their socialist country by millions of Soviet people on the war and home fronts and in the enemy-held areas.

The lofty, noble aims of the war which the Soviet people waged against the German fascist and Japanese aggressors brought to the fore among the Soviet troops thousands of heroes who did not spare their lives in the service of their country. N. F. Gastello, V. V. Talalikhin, T. M. Frunze, A. M. Matrosov, P. O. Boloto, V. V. Smirnov, V. G. Zaitsev, A. V. Kalyuzhny, A. I. Pokryshkin, I. N. Kozhedub, V. G. Klochkov, N. D. Filchenkov and very many other heroes of the Soviet armed forces by their selfless fight against the enemy personified the great moral integrity and patriotism of Soviet people.

All Soviet people and all freedom-loving peoples of the world give due credit to the Soviet servicemen for their courage, bravery and mass heroism. During the war over seven million men, officers, generals and admirals were decorated with orders and medals of the Soviet Union, and upwards of eleven thousand were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The partisan movement, which involved the whole people, was a vivid indication of Soviet patriotism. It was a major factor in the struggle against the enemy. It sowed panic among enemy troops and disorganised them. In close co-operation with the Red Army, the partisans struck telling blows at the invaders. The people, who were defending their independence in the trying conditions of enemy occupation, produced many outstanding leaders and organisers of partisan warfare, among whom were A. F. Fyodorov, A. V. German, M. A. Guryanov, S. A. Kovpak, I. A. Kozlov, V. I. Kozlov, M. I. Naumov, P. K. Ponomarenko, S. V. Rudnev, A. N. Saburov and K. S. Zaslonov.

Soviet youth and their vanguard, the Leninist Komsomol, showed mass heroism in defending their socialist country. Young men and women fought gallantly for the freedom and independence of their homeland, battling against the enemy at the front and in partisan units, and worked devotedly in industry and agriculture. The people will never forget Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, Alexander Chekalin, Liza Chaikina, Oleg Koshevoi, Parfenty Grechany, Dasha Dyachenko, Vladimir Morgunenko, Frosya Zhenkova, Zinayida Portnova, Juozas Aleksonis, Boris Hubertas, Alfonsas Čeponis, Alexei Shumavtsov and their companions-in-arms.

During the war years the Soviet people displayed great moral stamina. Socialist ideology triumphed over bourgeois-fascist ideology. Fascism was defeated not only by means of war weapons and the military skill of our armed forces, but also by the great power of Marxism-Leninism and the socialist consciousness of the people.
German fascism and Japanese imperialism were waging an unjust war, a war of conquest. The Soviet Union was waging a war to defend its socialist country, a just, anti-fascist war, and the awareness of this increased the strength of the Soviet people tenfold.

The Communist Party—the guiding and directing force of Soviet society—inspired and organised the victory of the Soviet people and their armed forces in the Great Patriotic War. It roused the people and their soldiers to a just Patriotic War, spurred them on to great deeds of valour, united Soviet people on the war and home fronts and directed them towards a common goal, the defeat of the enemy.

The Soviet people’s heroic struggle for their freedom and independence completely refuted the legend invented at the time of the personality cult, a legend alleging that Stalin alone was responsible for all the major victories on the war and home fronts. In reality, the Soviet Union’s victory in the war was won by the Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist Party headed by its Central Committee, and was a result of their tremendous efforts and heroism.

The Party and its local organisations worked strenuously and creatively to rally all the forces of the country for ensuring victory over the enemy. The Communists were in the front ranks on the war and the home fronts alike, and inspired the people by their example, calling on them to fight courageously and themselves leading them. The links between the Party and the people increased, and the Party gained ever greater prestige among all sections of the people. The finest people joined the Party. During the war over 5,000,000 were admitted into the Party as candidates and about 3,500,000 as members. Despite enormous casualties among the Communists at the front, the Party membership grew considerably in the war years. By the beginning of 1945 there were 3,325,000 Communists, or nearly 60 per cent of the total Party membership, in the Red Army and Navy. The hardships of the war further cemented the Party and heightened its fighting capacity and leading role.

The peoples of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia and other European countries subjugated by the fascist invaders contributed greatly to the victory over Hitler Germany, and the peoples of China, Korea, Vietnam and other Asian countries did as much for the victory over imperialist Japan. The progressive forces of Hungary, Rumania and Italy did a great deal in the difficult conditions of the fascist regime to bring about the defeat of the common enemy.

The Soviet people greatly appreciate the moral support rendered them by the progressive forces of the world in the just war against fascism. They give due credit to the U.S.A. and Britain for their assistance to the Soviet Union during the war.

It is in vain that certain capitalist leaders seek to minimise or ignore the role of the Soviet Union and its armed forces in the defeat of fascist Germany and imperialist Japan.
“There are some,” said N. S. Khrushchov, “who would like to maintain silence about this victory or detract from its importance. But no one can erase from the memory of the peoples, from history, the great feat of the Soviet people. Not only our contemporaries but the generations to come will revere the memory of the heroic soldiers who in mortal combat routed the fascist hordes, will revere the memory of those who saved the bright future of mankind” (Forty Years of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Eng. ed., Moscow, pp. 10-11).

The historic victory of the Soviet people in the last war shattered the hope of the reactionaries of the world that, as a result of a war of attrition imposed by the German imperialists, the U.S.S.R. would be weakened to such an extent as to lose its significance as a Great Power for a long time and become dependent on the capitalist countries.

After winning the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Union proceeded to rehabilitate its war-ravaged economy and to continue developing socialist society.

**BRIEF SUMMARY**

Fascist Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union upset the peaceful life of the Soviet people. The Communist Party told the people the whole truth about the danger threatening the country and called on them to rise as one man to defend their beloved homeland with might and main, to give their all, and if necessary their lives, in the sacred struggle against the fascist aggressor. The Party mobilised all the material and spiritual forces of society, and inspired and organised Soviet people to defeat the enemy.

At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War the activities of the Communist Party aimed at rallying all forces and stopping the enemy, preventing him profiting from the suddenness of his blow and the mistakes committed as a result of Stalin’s underestimation of the danger of military attack from Hitler Germany. The task was to organise resistance to the enemy, destroy his troops everywhere, check his advance into the heart of the country and pave the way for a fundamental turn of the tide in favour of the U.S.S.R.

After halting the enemy, mustering a vast army, training it in the art of war within a short time, and mobilising the immense economic resources of the country, the Communist Party directed the efforts of the people towards defeating the enemy and organised the victorious offensive of the Red Army to expel the Hitlerite invaders from Soviet soil. A typical feature of the Great Patriotic War was that the Red Army and the blows it dealt at the enemy grew continuously in strength as the war progressed, whereas the Hitlerite armies grew weaker and weaker. The important measures in the military sphere carried out by the Communist Party in that period
promoted the Soviet art of war and the fighting efficiency of the armed forces.

After effecting a radical turn in the course of the war, the Party led the Red Army and Navy in the victorious conclusion of the war, the complete liberation of Soviet territory from the German fascist invaders, the fulfilment of a great liberating mission with regard to the peoples of Europe who had fallen under fascist tyranny, and the defeat of the militarist forces of Japan.

Drawing on the advantages of the socialist social and political system of the Soviet Union, the Communist Party built up a smoothly operating war economy and turned the whole country into a single war camp. During the war it headed the mighty patriotic movement of workers and collective farmers for timely and high-standard fulfilment of orders for the front, for the continuous supply of food and other necessities to the armed forces. Country-wide socialist emulation movement involved millions of industrial, professional and office workers. Thanks to the heroism of the working class, the collective-farm peasantry and the intelligentsia, the war and home fronts received all they needed to defeat the enemy.

The Soviet people had to surmount incredible difficulties before their victory in the Great Patriotic War. They were undaunted by these difficulties; they withstood the onslaught of the enemy and routed him. In this grim struggle, the Communist Party grew in numbers and strength, and the staunchness and courage of the Soviet people increased. The Soviet people had great confidence in the Party and actively supported its policy.

The lessons of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War as a whole were added proof of the great role played by the mass of the people in history. It was through the efforts of the people and through the militant activity of their vanguard—the Communist and Workers’ Parties—that the Second World War developed from the imperialist war that it was on both sides at the beginning into a just war of liberation on the part of the anti-Hitler coalition.

The Soviet Union’s victory over the fascist aggressors was a victory of the Soviet people and their armed forces over the imperialist invaders who aspired to world domination. The imperialists counted on the land of socialism being either destroyed or irreparably weakened in the Second World War. What happened, however, was that the capitalist system suffered a tremendous loss. A number of European and Asian countries broke away from it and established a people’s democratic system.

The Red Army saved the peoples of Europe from fascist enslavement and the peoples of Asia from the tyranny of Japanese imperialism. By helping them, the Soviet people showed in practice their proletarian internationalism and solidarity with the working people of all countries. The whole of progressive mankind saw for itself
that the Soviet Union was a staunch champion of free national development of the peoples and an invincible bulwark in the struggle for democracy, peace and freedom.

The lessons of the Great Patriotic War are a serious warning to all lovers of military adventures. They show clearly that an enemy who invades Soviet territory will inevitably be defeated, that the forces of socialism and progress are invincible and that the plans of imperialist claimants to world supremacy are unrealisable.

“By winning that war,” says the Programme of the C.P.S.U., “the Soviet people proved that there are no forces in the world capable of stopping the progress of socialist society” (The Road to Communism, Eng. ed., Moscow, p. 462).
1. Radical Changes in the International Situation After the Second World War. Formation of Two Camps

After the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet people turned all their efforts to the restoration and further development of the national economy, the completion of the building of socialism and the gradual transition to communism. The Party's domestic and foreign policy measures were all bent to achieving these aims.

The main foreign policy aim of the Party was to secure a stable and lasting peace, to strengthen socialism's positions in the world arena, to help the nations that had broken away from capitalism to build a new life.

One of the most significant features of the international situation was the radical change that had taken place in the balance of forces in the world arena, in favour of socialism and to the detriment of capitalism. This change was due above all else to the Soviet Union's outstanding victories during the Second World War. It had sustained heavier material and manpower losses than any other state. But it emerged from the war politically stronger than it had been at the beginning. The unity of the people, the Party and the Government was stronger, the authority and moral and political prestige of the Soviet state were greater and its international influence had grown. No major world political issue could now be fully settled without the participation of the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet state took a more active part in international affairs and extended its ties with other countries. The Party devoted more attention to foreign policy problems in its work.

Developments in the capitalist countries followed a different course. As a result of the war the capitalist system sustained enormous losses and became weaker. The second stage of the general crisis of
capitalism set manifesting itself chiefly in a new wave of revolutions. Albania, Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia broke away from the system of capitalism. The revolutions in these countries were governed by the general laws of development, yet they had their specific features, engendered by different historical and socio-economic conditions. The people’s governments established in these countries carried out important democratic reforms: the people acquired extensive democratic rights and liberties, an agrarian reform was carried out in the countryside, landlord property rights, where they existed, were abolished, and the peasants were given land.

As democratic measures were pushed to their conclusion, the working class in the people’s democracies passed to socialist changes in political and economic life. The new people’s governments everywhere confiscated the property of the German and Italian imperialists and of the people who had collaborated with the enemy. The bourgeois elements were smashed in a bitter class struggle. The question of power was thus settled. The dictatorship of the proletariat, in the form of people’s democratic republic, triumphed in the countries of Central and South-East Europe. Industry, the banks and transport were nationalised. The economy began to develop along the socialist path.

The rapid victory of the masses of the people in these countries over the bourgeoisie was achieved thanks to the correct policy of the Communist Parties and the leading role of the working class. A great factor in the liberation struggle of these peoples was the assistance rendered by the Soviet Union.

In their relations with the people’s democracies the Communist Party and the Soviet Government strictly adhered to the principle of non-interference in their internal affairs. The U.S.S.R. recognised the people’s governments and supported them politically. True to its internationalist duty, the U.S.S.R. came to the aid of the people’s democracies with grain, seed and raw materials, although its own stocks had been badly depleted during the war. This helped to provide the population with foodstuffs and also to speed up the recommissioning of many industrial enterprises. The presence of the Soviet Armed Forces in the people’s democracies prevented foreign imperialists and domestic counter-revolutionaries from unleashing a civil war and averted intervention. The Soviet Union paralysed the attempts of the foreign imperialists to interfere in the internal affairs of the democratic states.

Major breaches were made in the imperialist chain in Asia too. After years of armed struggle against the landlords, the compradore bourgeoisie and foreign imperialists, the Chinese people, headed by the working class and under the leadership of the Communist Party, overthrew the Kuomintang Government and took power into their hands. The People’s Republic of China was established in October.
1949, on the basis of the alliance of the workers and peasants, with the working class playing the leading role. The bourgeois-democratic revolution developed into a socialist revolution. The establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat opened the way to the socialist development of China.

The victory of the Chinese people was the most outstanding post-war development. In the history of the world liberation movement, the Chinese Revolution was second to the October Revolution in significance and influence on the destinies of mankind. It dealt another powerful blow at capitalism, especially at its colonial system, and altered the alignment and balance of forces in the world arena still more in favour of socialism.

After a long struggle, the socialist path of development in Asia was also taken by the Korean People's Democratic Republic (K.P.D.R.) and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (D.R.V.).

Eleven states in all, with an aggregate population of more than 700 millions, broke away from the capitalist system after the Second World War. This radically changed the international position of the Soviet Union. For many years the Soviet Union was the only socialist country in the world. This period was now over. International socialism entered a new phase of development.

Before the Second World War, the socialist system accounted for 17 per cent of the world's territory and about 9 per cent of its population; after the war the figures were 26 per cent and about 35 per cent respectively. The sphere of capitalist exploitation dwindled considerably.

Another important feature of the second stage of the general crisis of capitalism was the mighty sweep of the national liberation movement and the growing disintegration of imperialist colonial rule. The October Revolution started a profound crisis in the colonial system; after the defeat of the fascist aggressors it began to disintegrate. Besides the People's Republic of China, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Korean People's Democratic Republic, which broke away from the capitalist system and set out to build socialism, the path of independent development was taken by India, Burma, Indonesia, Ceylon and many other countries, which had been under the colonial yoke for centuries. A liberation struggle flared up in the African countries. The imperialists were left with less possibilities for colonial exploitation.

The growing national liberation movement weakened the imperialist forces, strengthened the front of the peoples' liberation struggle and consolidated the positions of the supporters of peace and democracy, and also the position of socialism. The disintegration of the colonial system was accelerated, above all, by the growing prestige and influence of the Soviet Union and the consolidation of the position of socialism on a world-wide scale. The U.S.S.R. consistently defended the rights of nations to choose their own way of life, and
together with the other socialist countries restrained the aggressive actions of the colonialists: in a number of cases it prevented military suppression of the liberation movement. The Soviet Union rendered moral and political support to the national liberation movement everywhere and promoted friendship with the peoples that had thrown off the colonial yoke.

Still another manifestation of the second stage of the general crisis of capitalism was the increasingly uneven economic and political development of the capitalist countries. Their economic life acquired a still more contradictory and unhealthy character, and the signs of decay and parasitism became still more pronounced. The economy of Italy, Japan and West Germany remained disorganised for a long time. France no longer played the role she used to play. The British Empire began to disintegrate. There began the decline of British imperialism. Industrial production in Britain and France long remained stagnant, whereas the economic and military potential of the U.S.A. rose sharply. The U.S.A. actually became the economic, financial and political centre of the capitalist world.

The war was followed by mass unemployment in the capitalist countries. In 1949 there were over 40 million unemployed, that is, more than in 1932, a year of crisis. The capitalist world staggered under heavy economic blows.

The U.S.A. decided to take advantage of the economic and political difficulties in the other leading capitalist countries and bring them under its sway. Under the pretext of economic aid the U.S.A. began to infiltrate into their economy and interfere in their internal affairs. Such big capitalist countries as Japan, West Germany, Italy, France and Britain all became dependent on the U.S.A. to a greater or lesser degree. The peoples of West European countries were confronted with the task of defending their national sovereignty against the encroachments of American imperialism.

It took five to six years after the end of the Second World War for the capitalist countries to overcome their economic difficulties to some extent. The pre-war level of production was surpassed and the number of unemployed decreased. The capitalists, however, failed to solve the more acute economic contradictions and achieve stabilisation. The growing unevenness of economic development in the capitalist countries still further aggravated the problem of markets. The struggle between the capitalist powers for spheres of influence and sources of raw material intensified with each passing year. The contradictions between the imperialist states grew sharper.

The second stage of the general crisis of capitalism was distinguished, lastly, by further exacerbation of the contradictions between the monopoly bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and the working class, the working people generally, on the other. This led to the narrowing of the social basis of monopoly bourgeoisie domination and to the further decay of bourgeois democracy. The reactionary nature of the
monopoly bourgeoisie became more pronounced in all the imperialist countries. It would not tolerate even the bourgeois-democratic liberties there were, and strove persistently to establish an open dictatorship of its own.

Further sharpening of the contradictions between the people and the monopoly bourgeoisie found expression also in the intensification of the class struggle and in the growing political consciousness and organisation of the working class. The prestige and influence of the Communist Parties grew. Before the war, the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries had a membership of about 1,724,000; in 1946, the figure was approximately 5,000,000, although the number of capitalist countries had decreased.

Some of the Communist Parties, formerly not strong numerically, became mass parties. In Italy and France the Communist Parties became the most influential parties. Wide non-proletarian sections of the working people began to rally around the working class. New weak links appeared in the capitalist system. The working people in Italy, France, Greece, Malaya, Indonesia, Burma, the Philippines and other countries launched an active struggle against reaction, for genuine freedom and people's government.

In most of the capitalist countries the monopoly bourgeoisie proved incapable of independently checking the revolutionary onslaught of the popular masses. The ruling circles of these countries thereupon began to unite their forces and build up reactionary international alliances for a joint offensive against the working class and all the working people, for the crushing of the liberation movement and for the struggle against democracy and socialism.

The capitalist world headed by the U.S.A. turned with all its strength to the task of reinforcing its weakened links and retaining them in the system of imperialism. To suppress the revolutionary movement it resorted to armed force, economic pressure and direct interference in the internal affairs of other countries. In 1947-49, the combined forces of international reaction crushed the popular movement in Greece and dealt heavy blows to the liberation struggle waged by the working people of Italy, France and other countries. The monopoly capitalists of the U.S.A., France, Italy and Britain embarked on a large-scale political offensive, with the object of destroying democracy in their countries and crushing the working-class movement. A crusade was organised against the forces of democracy, fascist tendencies in political life became more pronounced and there began the unbridled persecution of Communists. The attacks of the fascist and semi-fascist forces, however, were in the main beaten off and the proletariat retained its most important positions. In some countries the Communists preserved their influence among the masses, in others they even extended it. The strike movement grew in scope and became more militant. The proletariat became better organised and politically more conscious.
The radical changes that took place after the Second World War substantially altered the political map of the world. There emerged two main world social and political camps; the socialist, democratic camp and the imperialist, anti-democratic camp.

The socialist camp included the U.S.S.R. and the people's democracies in Europe and Asia. It was actively supported by the entire international working-class movement and all the Marxist-Leninist Parties.

The C.P.S.U. did much to expand its ties with the Communist Parties of other countries. The Communist Parties exchanged experiences, jointly discussed important problems of the political and ideological struggle and worked out a common point of view. The forms of these ties varied in accordance with the prevailing conditions. In 1947 the Communist Parties of the U.S.S.R., of a number of people's democracies, and of France and Italy set up an Information Bureau. It was entrusted with the task of organising the exchange of experience and, whenever necessary, of co-ordinating the activities of the Communist Parties on a basis of mutual agreement. It had its newspaper *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy*. The Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. maintained ties with other brother Parties through bilateral contacts.

Social forces and groups in the capitalist countries actively fighting for national independence and democratic freedoms began to gravitate towards the camp of socialism.

The forces of this camp are consistently battling for peace and against the threat of new wars, are defending democracy and the national independence of the peoples.

The core of the reactionary imperialist camp was made up of the bloc of leading imperialist states headed by the U.S.A. It was joined by all the reactionary classes, all the anti-democratic forces in the other capitalist countries. The imperialist camp aims at strengthening the positions of capitalism and suppressing the Communist movement, breaking the will of the peoples for national independence, and restoring capitalism in China, in the other people's democracies and in the Soviet Union.

The ruling circles of the U.S.A., striving for world supremacy, openly declared that they could achieve their aims only from "positions of strength". The American imperialists unleashed the so-called cold war, and sought to kindle the flames of a third world war. In 1949 the U.S.A. set up an aggressive military bloc known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). As early as 1946 the Western states began to pursue a policy of splitting Germany, which was essentially completed in 1949 with the creation of a West German state. Subsequently they set out to militarise West Germany. This further deepened the division of Germany and made her reunification exceptionally difficult. A dangerous hotbed of war began to form in Europe. In the Far East the United States strove to create
a hotbed of war in Japan, stationing its armed forces and building military bases on her territory.

In 1950 the United States resorted to open aggression in the Far East. It occupied the Chinese island of Taiwan, provoked an armed clash between the Korean People’s Democratic Republic and South Korea and began an aggressive war against the Korean people. The war in Korea was a threat to the People’s Republic of China, and Chinese volunteers came to the assistance of the Korean people.

The military adventure of the U.S.A. in Korea sharply aggravated international tension. The U.S.A. started a frantic arms drive and stepped up the production of atomic, thermonuclear, bacteriological and other types of weapons of mass annihilation. American military bases, spearheaded primarily against the U.S.S.R., China, and the other socialist countries, were hastily built at various points of the capitalist world. The imperialists were busy forming new military blocs. The threat of a third world war with the use of mass destruction weapons increased considerably.

In those conditions the question of peace became one of paramount importance. Defence of peace everywhere became the most important task facing the people, a task of national significance, the crucial point in the struggle for the fortunes of mankind. A democratic peace movement developed throughout the world. It was joined by people of different classes and parties, of different political views and religious beliefs. The peace movement is the biggest socio-political movement in the history of mankind. It by no means infringes the social and economic systems of states. But it helps to expose and isolate the most aggressive imperialist circles and thus undermine and weaken the position of reaction in general.

The struggle for peace was the main aspect of the activity of the Communist Party and the Soviet state in the sphere of foreign policy. Consistently pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems, the Soviet Union proposed settlement of outstanding international issues through negotiation, reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces, prohibition of atomic weapons, and the institution of effective control over the observance of all disarmament measures. The U.S.S.R. took the initiative in the all-round promotion of international trade and cultural relations.

The Soviet Government repeatedly proposed the reunification of Germany on a democratic basis with the participation of the Germans themselves and the conclusion of peace with a united democratic Germany. In the Far East the Soviet Union upheld the independence of Japan and strove to conclude a just peace and establish good-neighbourly relations with her. It worked for a peaceful solution of the Korean question and for an end to the war in Vietnam, waged by the French colonialists with direct support from the U.S.A.

The Party’s consistent peace policy found expression in a series of practical measures. After the war, the U.S.S.R. withdrew its
troops from China, Korea, Norway, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, which they had entered pursuing the German and Japanese aggressors. The greater part of the Armed Forces was demobilised. Soon after, they were reduced to the pre-war level of 1939. Actively participating in the peace movement, the Soviet people unanimously signed the Stockholm Appeal for the prohibition of atomic weapons. In 1951 the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet passed a law proclaiming war propaganda a grave crime.

In the struggle for peace and a just solution of international issues, the U.S.S.R. attached definite importance to the United Nations and actively participated in its work. Notwithstanding all the shortcomings and defects of the U.N., arising from the fact that the U.S.A. has knocked together a big group of small states, mostly Latin American, ready to do its bidding, the Soviet Government regarded the activity of the U.N. as a definite factor in international co-operation and in the fight for peace.

The consistent peace policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet state accords with the interests of all the peoples of the world, all progressive strata of society. In struggle for peace, the U.S.S.R. won many allies in the capitalist countries. Led by the Communist Party, the Soviet people established close ties with all peace supporters and, together with them, waged an active struggle against attempts by aggressive elements to unleash another world war. The Soviet people needed peace in order to accelerate their advance to communism.

2. The Party's Work for the Restoration and Further Development of the National Economy. Fulfilment of the Fourth Five-Year Plan Ahead of Schedule

In the post-war years the conditions for the activity of the Party as a whole and of its various organisations, from top to bottom, and for its organising work among the masses were very complicated. It was in those years that the contradiction between the transforming activity of the Party, and the historical creative effort of the people, on the one hand, and the Stalin personality cult, on the other, made itself felt more strongly than ever.

The war and the temporary occupation of a part of Soviet territory by the Hitlerite forces inflicted colossal losses on the peoples of the U.S.S.R. The Hitlerites annihilated millions of the civilian population in the Soviet Union. Millions of men were killed at the front. In the temporarily occupied areas the fascists destroyed or plundered tremendous wealth. They pillaged and laid waste 1,710 towns, and reduced to ruins or burned down more than 70,000 villages. They destroyed—completely or partially—close on 32,000 industrial enterprises and 40,000 miles of rail track, plundered 98,000 collective farms, 1,876 state farms and 2,890 machine-and-
tractor stations, and demolished tens of thousands of hospitals, schools, colleges, and libraries. The material values plundered or destroyed amounted to 679,000 million rubles (in pre-war prices). This was approximately as much as was spent in the U.S.S.R. during the four Five-Year Plan periods on building new factories, railways, mines, power stations, state farms, machine-and-tractor stations and other enterprises. But that was not all. The Soviet Union had to expend vast resources on reorganising the economy for war purposes and on the conduct of the war. Furthermore it suffered great losses through being deprived of its supplies from the invaded areas, which before the war had accounted for a third of the Soviet Union's industrial output. All this damage was estimated at about 1,900,000 million rubles (in pre-war prices).

The material losses sustained by the Soviet people totalled nearly 2,600,000 million rubles. No country had ever suffered such enormous losses and destruction in any war. The war held up the Soviet Union's advance towards communism for more than ten years.

Losses such as these would have thrown back any capitalist country a long way, and it would have fallen into dependence on stronger powers. But no such thing happened to the Soviet Union. The socialist system, the heroic effort of the Soviet people and the leadership of the Communist Party ensured the rapid restoration and further development of the national economy.

One of the cardinal tasks of the Party and the Soviet state was to reconvert the country's economy to peace-time production. In the capitalist countries, the change-over was a spontaneous and most painful process. Many factories were closed down. Millions of workers were left without jobs. The entire burden of reconversion fell on the shoulders of the working people. Under socialism, the transition to a peace-time economy likewise entailed great difficulties, and required time and sacrifices. But the socialist system made it possible to reorganise the economy without setbacks, on a planned basis.

All factories and plants were given plans for peace-time production. Manpower and raw and other materials were redistributed accordingly. In the course of this reorganisation, new proportions between the different branches of the national economy came into being. Investments in the national economy were increased considerably by cutting military expenditures. A large part of war industry was switched to peace-time production. The Party increased the financing of the national economy, primarily by running industrial enterprises more profitably.

The methods of management and the organisation of work were changed. In the industries, work returned to normal. Compulsory overtime was abolished, and factory and office workers began to get their holidays regularly. Reconversion of the economy to peace-
time conditions was, in the main, completed in 1946. This made it possible to enlarge the scale of restoration work.

In organising the masses to restore and further develop the national economy, the Party clearly indicated the supreme goal of the people’s effort—building communism.

The Party’s immediate and long-term tasks in the political, economic and ideological fields were specified in a number of Party and government documents of that period.

In defining the concrete perspective of the development of Soviet society, the Party proceeded from the fact that the first phase of communist society with its characteristic features had, in the main, been achieved in the U.S.S.R. But certain features of socialism had not yet manifested themselves in full. The productive forces had not yet reached a degree of development making it possible to create a sufficiency of consumer goods and meet the people’s housing requirements. There were difficulties in consistently applying the socialist principle of distribution. This was particularly evident during the first post-war years; rationing had to be continued for a number of years, there was a big difference between the low prices of rationed and high prices of unrationed goods, and prices in the collective-farm market were still higher. The output of consumer goods increased as progress was made in restoring the economy and expanding the productive forces. But there was still a shortage of some products, and the difference between the prices in state and co-operative trade and those in the collective-farm market remained.

The Party considered that it was necessary, first and foremost, to accomplish the unfulfilled tasks of the first phase of communism and consolidate socialism still further.

In the sphere of production, it was first of all necessary to restore the national economy as speedily as possible, considerably surpass its pre-war level, increase production, strengthen the country’s might and guarantee it against all eventualities. For a longer period ahead, a great goal was fixed—solution of the basic economic problem of overtaking and surpassing the leading capitalist countries in output per head of the principal products, reaching higher labour productivity than in the capitalist countries and thereby securing the complete economic victory of communism over capitalism.

In the sphere of economic relations, the task was to develop and improve socialist production relations as the productive forces grew; to strengthen the role of public property, and consolidate collective ownership of the means of production; to put an end as soon as possible to all departures from the socialist principle of distribution in accordance with the quantity and quality of the labour expended; to abolish levelling and other irregularities in remuneration for work, to increase real wages and to abolish all food rationing.

In the sphere of ideology and culture, the tasks were to start a resolute struggle against survivals of bourgeois views, morals and cus-
toms; to overcome completely the pernicious influence exercised by the reactionary culture of the imperialist West; to make all Soviet citizens politically conscious patriots, to raise still higher the cultural level of the working people, to publish more books, newspapers and magazines, and to produce more motion pictures.

All these tasks found specific expression in the Fourth Five-Year Plan, adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in 1946.

The principal economic and political aim of the Fourth Five-Year Plan was "to restore the ravaged areas of the country, to reach the pre-war level of industry and agriculture, and then to exceed that level considerably".

First and foremost, it was planned to restore and further develop heavy industry and rail transport, without which there could be no question of a rapid and successful restoration of the entire national economy. It was planned, on this basis, to secure the expansion of agriculture and the consumer goods industries; to reach the pre-war level of consumption and surpass it; to promote large-scale trade and systematically reduce prices; to restore and enlarge the network of schools and institutions of higher education; to develop housing construction on a wide scale; to improve the health services.

In 1946 the Central Committee took a decision on agitation and propaganda work in connection with the adoption of the Fourth Five-Year Plan. This decision defined the duties of the Party organisations in explaining the objectives of the post-war Five-Year Plan to the working people, organising socialist emulation and mobilising Soviet citizens to fulfil and overfulfil the Fourth Five-Year Plan.

The Party encouraged the holding of production conferences at factories, which stimulated the activity and initiative of the masses. Nearly four million production conferences were held in the country in 1946 and over six million in 1950. Participants in them made tens of millions of suggestions for improvements in the work of industrial enterprises. Most of the suggestions were carried into effect.

In mobilising the people to carry out the Fourth Five-Year Plan, the Party organisations devoted particular attention to promoting mass socialist emulation. The Central Committee checked up on the organisation of the emulation movement at some of the enterprises, and brought to light serious shortcomings, such as elements of formalism and bureaucracy, and an underestimation of political work among the masses.

As these shortcomings were eliminated, the socialist emulation movement rose to a new stage characterised by increased activity on the part of the masses, a fuller content and greater diversity of forms.

A country-wide socialist emulation movement, aimed at fulfilling and overfulfilling the Fourth Five-Year Plan, was started in 1946 on the initiative of the steel-workers in the town of Makeyevka and the workers of a number of factories in Moscow and elsewhere. It
was headed by the Party organisations, and Communists were in the van. Following the example they set, hundreds of thousands of workers took personal commitments to fulfil the annual plans, and the Five-Year Plan as a whole, ahead of schedule. The Party organisations came forward as the initiators of the advance from outstanding achievements by individual workers to highly productive work by whole teams, shops and entire factories. A movement for high-speed work methods began in 1946. Turner innovators employing high-speed methods increased cutting speeds from 70-80 metres to 1,000-1,500 metres a minute. On the initiative of the Communists, these methods became widespread in metallurgy, oil-well boring, and mining. High-speed workers were popularly called men who were outpacing time. Leningraders initiated close co-operation between scientists and workers at the bench. This movement spread swiftly to other towns. A movement to economise raw materials was started at the Kupavna (Moscow Region) Fine Cloth Mill. Through the efforts of Party organisations, this movement was joined by hundreds of thousands of the foremost workers in other enterprises. Workers in Moscow started a country-wide drive to raise the profitability of industrial enterprises, increase accumulations over and above plan and accelerate the turnover of circulating funds. This enabled Soviet industry to manufacture more than 20,000 million rubles' worth of additional goods in 1949 alone. The workers at the Krasnokholmsky Worsted Mill in Moscow started a movement for manufacturing only excellent quality goods.

*Popular initiative* spread rapidly. As a result of extensive organising work by Party organisations, the emulation movement was joined by increasing numbers of workers. In 1946 the movement embraced more than 80 per cent of the workers, and in 1950, 90 per cent. Shop competed with shop, factory with factory, Donets miners with the miners of the Kuznetsk coalfield, Baku oilworkers with those of Bashkiria. The movement of inventors and production rationalisers assumed a vast scale. Workers made hundreds of thousands of suggestions. An annual average of over 400,000 inventions, technical improvements and rationalisation suggestions speeding up production and yielding a big saving, were put into effect.

The Party organisations put before the working people outstanding examples of heroic labour; they perseveringly gathered the experiences of the foremost workers, and popularised them among the masses. Party technical conferences for the study and application of progressive work methods became widespread; advanced workers representing different industrial enterprises and towns met to exchange experience.

The Party directed all the energy of the working people towards the economic restoration of the war-ravaged areas. Komsomol members helped the Party to heal the wounds inflicted by the war. They assumed “patronage” over the restoration of fifteen of the oldest
Russian towns, including Voronezh, Pskov, Novgorod and Orel. Tens of thousands of Komsomol members helped to restore the Donets collieries, the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station and the Zaporozhye Iron and Steel Works. Factories, towns and villages were raised from ashes by the heroic labour of the Soviet people. The ore mines in Krivoi Rog and the collieries in the Donets coalfield, the iron and steel mills in the southern areas and the engineering works at Kharkov and Volgograd, the oil wells at Maikop and Grozny, all the power stations, including the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station, and thousands of other industrial enterprises destroyed by the Hitlerites were put back into operation. An important feature distinguishing post-war reconstruction was that the rebuilt factories were equipped with up-to-date machinery.

People performed miracles of labour heroism that were reminiscent of the feats of the war years. Hundreds of thousands of volunteers went to the building sites. The workers and engineers displayed much ingenuity and resourcefulness. For example, at the Azovstal Works, Blast Furnace No. 4, blown up by the Hitlerites, had been badly damaged. It sagged and leaned over. It was thought that the furnace should be dismantled and a new one built in its place. But on the initiative of the Party organisation, the technicians and workers decided to restore it. The furnace, which weighed 1,300 tons, was straightened out and moved back into place. This operation took only six weeks, and the furnace was commissioned four months ahead of schedule. At the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station, the workers employed an unprecedented method of closing the tunnels at the base of the dam, and expedited its reconstruction considerably. The Donets miners pumped 650 million cubic metres of water out of the flooded pits in record time. In its volume, this was equivalent to draining a lake 27 square miles in area and 33 feet deep. The miners restored more than 1,500 miles of mine workings choked with rock. This was approximately equal to cutting and securing a tunnel from Moscow to Paris at a depth of 600-2,200 feet. The Donets coalfield once again became one of the Soviet Union’s major coalfields.

In restoring the national economy of the republics and regions laid waste by the war, the Party and the people were assisted by the industry of the Urals, Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. The industrial capacity of these areas had grown considerably during the war years. Large numbers of highly efficient machines and other equipment were sent to the liberated areas from the eastern regions of the country. Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics, which had eliminated their backwardness with the help of the working people of the R.S.F.S.R., the Ukraine and Byelorussia, now rendered the war-ravaged areas tremendous assistance in the way of skilled personnel and equipment. This was a vivid expression of the great strength of friendship among peoples, one of the sources of strength of the Soviet system.
In 1948 total industrial output in the U.S.S.R. reached the pre-war level and even exceeded it. Industry was restored within an exceptionally short space of time. After the Civil War it had taken the country six years to restore its economy. The tremendous losses suffered during the Great Patriotic War were unparalleled. Nevertheless, industry was restored in roughly two-and-a-half years.

While organising economic reconstruction in the liberated areas, the Party took measures to develop industry in the other republics and regions, and continued improving the distribution of the productive forces of the country. The productive capacity of the metallurgical industry of the Urals and Siberia grew appreciably during the years of the Fourth Five-Year Plan. New centres of the ferrous metals industry arose in Central Asia and Transcaucasia. The building of a metallurgical base was started in the north of the European part of the U.S.S.R. Coal output grew steadily in the Kuznetsk coalfield, Karaganda and the Urals. The output of oil increased rapidly in the Urals-Volga Basin. The building of new thermal and hydroelectric stations (Gorky, Kama and others) was begun on a big scale. Construction was started on two huge hydroelectric stations on the Volga. The engineering and chemical industries made considerable headway.

Party organisations did much to equip the national economy with modern machinery. Economic competition between socialism and capitalism required rapid technical development. This was the only way in which higher labour productivity than under capitalism could be achieved. The problems of technical progress acquired paramount political importance.

Soviet specialists achieved a number of important successes in science and technology, including the mastery of atomic energy, whose use in production marked the beginning of a far-reaching technical revolution in human history, a new era in man’s conquest of nature.

During the Fourth Five-Year Plan period electrification made further progress, electronic machines began to be introduced, labour-consuming work was mechanised in the iron and steel industry and in coal-mining, and the production of turbodrills, the world’s best oil-well-sinking machinery, was begun. Production lines became widespread in the engineering industry. Automatic production lines were introduced, and an automatic factory making automobile engine pistons was built. Engineers designed more than a thousand different kinds of highly efficient machine-tools, automatic and other machines, and organised their manufacture.

Nevertheless, many problems of technical progress remained unsolved. In some branches of industry and agriculture, the newest achievements of science and technology were put to use much too slowly. The designing of highly efficient machinery did not receive adequate attention. At some factories the equipment had grown obsolete, the
technologies were inefficient, and antiquated types of machine-tools and other mechanical equipment were being produced. The timber and coal industries were not making satisfactory use of the latest machines and mechanisms. Complacency, and even stagnation and routine, reigned at many industrial enterprises. Having achieved some success in mastering new machinery, the heads of these enterprises stopped fighting for technical progress. The result was that technically some branches of industry lagged noticeably behind world science and technology. The struggle for technical progress remained a vital problem for the Party and the people.

Thanks to the heroic labour of the workers and the indefatigable organising effort of the Party, the Fourth Five-Year Plan was fulfilled in four years and three months in industry. During this period the country restored, built anew and put into operation more than 6,000 industrial enterprises (not counting small ones), or almost as many as were built in the period of the First and Second Five-Year Plans. An average of over three enterprises went into operation daily. In 1950 total industrial output exceeded the pre-war level by 73 per cent; the plan had called for a rise of 48 per cent. The output of pig-iron was over 19 million tons (29 per cent more than in 1940), steel over 27 million tons (49 per cent above the pre-war level), coal over 261 million tons (57 per cent more than in 1940), oil approximately 38 million tons (22 per cent more than in 1940) and electric power over 91,000 million kwh. Compared with 1940, labour productivity in industry had risen by 37 per cent.

Difficult problems had to be solved by the Party and the people in agriculture, which had suffered tremendous losses during the war and also during the drought of 1946. The Party organised the restoration of collective farms, state farms and machine-and-tractor stations in the liberated areas, and ensured the consolidation of collective-farm property.

The Soviet peasantry, which had through personal experience become convinced of the advantages of collective work, restored the collective farms under the leadership of the Party organisations as soon as the fascists were driven out. The government extended state aid to the restored collective farms in the shape of machines, livestock and seed. Socialist mutual aid assumed great proportions; collective farms in the eastern regions of the country sent large numbers of livestock and big quantities of seeds and farm implements to the collective farms that were being restored.

Practical measures to restore agriculture and a number of proposals aimed at promoting its development still further were outlined in a series of decisions taken by the Central Committee, in particular at its February 1947 plenary meeting. The decision of the Soviet Government and the C.C. C.P.S.U.(B.) “On Measures to Put an End to Violations of the Rules of the Agricultural Artel in Collective Farms”, adopted in the autumn of 1946, and the decisions
of the February 1947 plenary meeting of the C. C. criticised certain shortcomings in the life of the collective farms (the squandering and misappropriation of the land in common usage and collectively-owned property, the incorrect allocation of workday units) and mapped out ways of eliminating these shortcomings.

Collective-farm lands, livestock and other material values which had been used by various organisations and institutions, or illegally turned over to collective farmers or other persons, were returned to the collective farms. The managing staffs of the collective farms were reduced and this saved a considerable number of workday units. But their major shortcomings were in the organisation of collective-farm production and in the management of collective farms were not brought to light. Indeed, they were made worse in a number of cases, which handicapped the development of socialist agriculture.

In 1949 the collective farms, state farms and machine-and-tractor stations received two and a half to four times as many tractors and agricultural machines as in 1940. There were more tractors than before the war. The electrification of collective farms, state farms and machine-and-tractor stations proceeded on an extensive scale. The consolidation of the material and technical basis of collective-farm production and the supply of large numbers of the latest agricultural machines to the machine-and-tractor stations made it imperative to improve production on the collective farms. There were many small collective farms in the country, with small land areas and uniting from 10 to 30 households. They made poor use of machinery, and management expenses were very high. Collective farms such as these hampered the rise of productivity in agriculture. Proposals to amalgamate collective farms began to come in from many parts of the country.

In 1950 Communists initiated a broad movement among the collective farmers to amalgamate small collective farms into big ones. Amalgamation was effected on a strictly voluntary basis, and only if all the collective farms concerned favoured the measure. There were 254,000 small collective farms in the country, but after amalgamation, towards the close of 1953, there were 93,000 large collective farms.

This amalgamation was of great economic significance for progress in agricultural production. Large collective farms could make fuller use of highly efficient machinery, and had greater opportunities for growing big harvests and raising the productivity of livestock husbandry.

After the war collectivisation was carried out in the western regions of the Ukraine and Byelorussia, in Moldavia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In these regions and republics, which had become part of the Soviet Union on the eve of the war, agriculture was based on individual, small-commodity economy. The Party organisations of these republics and regions carried out a big campaign among the
individual peasants, showing them the advantages of large-scale collective farming and helped them to take that path. The collectivisation of agriculture in these areas was, in the main, completed in 1949-50.

Rural Party organisations were strengthened considerably in the post-war period. Many Communists, demobilised from the armed forces, went to the countryside. The number of Communists in the countryside increased and the network of Party organisations grew accordingly. In 1947 there were 110,800 primary Party organisations in the countryside, and in 1950, their number exceeded 148,000. They united about 1,500,000 Communists.

Under the leadership of the Party organisations and with the assistance of the entire Soviet people, the collective farmers and machine-and-tractor station and state-farm workers made good most of the enormous losses that had been inflicted on agriculture by the war. However, the opportunities which the collective-farm system offered for increasing agricultural production were not used to the full. Agriculture did not meet the growing food requirements of the population and the raw material requirements of the light and food industries. The grain problem remained unsolved. Although the grain crop area had increased by 20 per cent during the five-year period, it still fell short of the pre-war level. The crop yield was still low. There were big shortcomings in the development of livestock-farming. The number of cows and pigs was smaller than before the war. Livestock productivity remained low. Many collective farms made inadequate use of machinery. There were many collective farms and districts that lagged behind the others.

This state of affairs was due in large measure to serious defects in the management of agriculture, restriction of the initiative of local personnel, and violation of the principle of giving the collective farms and their members a material incentive to produce more.

On the basis of the rapid growth of industry and of certain successes in the development of agriculture, the Party achieved a rise in the living standards of the Soviet people. At the end of 1947 rationing was replaced by extensive state and co-operative trading. At the same time a currency reform was carried out and the prices of consumer goods were reduced. Between 1947 and 1950 the prices of consumer goods were cut three times. In 1950 the incomes of industrial, office and professional workers and peasants were substantially greater than in 1940.

There was a rise in goods consumption by the working people of the U.S.S.R. But its further rise was hampered chiefly by the lagging behind of agriculture.

Restoration of the housing destroyed by the Hitlerites and the construction of new houses was started on a big scale. In the course of the five-year period more than 1,000 million square feet of housing was restored or built in towns and industrial communities, and
2,700,000 houses were built in the countryside. But the need for housing was still great. The number of medical establishments and sanatoria was considerably increased, and the network of holiday homes, clubs, theatres and libraries was enlarged.

Great difficulties were encountered in fulfilling the Fourth Five-Year Plan. Not all of them were surmounted. On the whole, however, the Fourth Five-Year Plan period was marked by major achievements in promoting the economic strength of the country. It was an important step towards creating the material and technical basis for socialism.

3. Organising and Ideological Activity of the Party. Nineteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.

The termination of the war and the transition to peace-time development called for improvements in the organising activity of the Party, the efficient and rapid readjustment of the Party ranks, and higher ideological standards of social, cultural and scientific activity.

The Central Committee set about strengthening the local Party organisations and enhancing their prestige and leading role. The Party strove to ensure that its organisations exercised effective supervision over the activities of the local state and economic bodies and fulfilled their political and organising role among the masses.

The abolition of restrictions on inner-Party democracy imposed by war-time conditions was of great importance for heightening the efficiency of the Party organisations. Continuation in peace time of the practice of restricting inner-Party democracy would have led to a lessening of the activity and initiative of Communists, and would have created the danger of the Party becoming isolated from the masses.

After the war, the first step towards restoring inner-Party democracy was the regular holding of Party meetings and local committee plenary meetings, and reports and elections of Party bodies at the intervals laid down by the Party Rules. District and town Party conferences were held in 1945-47, and regional Party conferences met in 1947 and early in 1948. Congresses of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics were convened at the close of 1948 and in 1949.

At the same time the Party applied a number of measures aimed at effectively combining its political and economic activity. District, town and regional Party committees that had relaxed or neglected their organising, ideological and political work were criticised in decisions of the Central Committee and Party conferences. Such Party committees had assumed functions that did not come within their competence; they decided current economic questions, including minor ones, bypassing local government and economic bodies. They had accustomed the heads of collective and state farms, machine-
and-tractor stations and factories to refer all business matters solely to the Party committees and to receive instructions only from them. The role of the local Soviets of Working People's Deputies was greatly diminished. Many district and town committees, and departments of regional committees, took up requests with higher authorities on behalf of business executives. The result was that some of the local Party leaders unwittingly began to change from political leaders into officials of the departmental type, and some Party bodies began to change from militant, active political organisations into a peculiar kind of administrative and managerial office. Such Party organisations were not always able to oppose parochial, narrow-departmental interests. Absorbed in routine affairs, they lost sight of important, long-range questions of economic development, and underrated organising and political work among the masses. The Central Committee also brought to light cases of Party workers becoming dependent on economic bodies.

These irregular, non-Bolshevik practices began to be eliminated. The harmful practice of tutelage and administration by mere injunction was uprooted step by step. The district, town and regional Party committees became more exacting in their attitude to the workers in local government and economic bodies. Party supervision over their activities increased. As the methods of work improved, Party organisations began to play a bigger role as political leaders. They were enabled to concentrate on fundamental questions of economic and cultural development and did more than before to rally the people for the fulfilment of the post-war Five-Year Plan.

Party organisations which clung to the external, ostentatious side of Party work, disregarding its content and effectiveness, were seriously criticised in Central Committee decisions and at Party conferences and plenary meetings of Party committees. They adopted declarative, general decisions, and neither organised nor verified their putting into effect. The activity and initiative of the Party rank and file and the efficiency of Party organisations rose to a higher level as they eliminated these shortcomings. Party organisations began to play a greater organising and guiding role in state, economic and cultural development, and in the political education of the masses.

This period, however, did not witness the elimination of major shortcomings in Party work. Inner-Party democracy was not properly encouraged. Party work retained elements of administration by injunction, and the principle of collective leadership was violated. The Party's political work fell short of the growing requirements of the masses. These facts had an adverse effect on Party organisations and reduced the activity of Communists.

In the post-war period educational and ideological work occupied an important place in the activity of the Party. Lenin taught that communism is the result of the conscious historic creative effort
of the masses. The continuous growth of the conscious creative activity of the masses is a law of the progressive development of society and an absolute condition for the transition from socialism to communism. In the course of socialist construction the educational work carried out by the Party brought about radical changes in the psychology of Soviet people. The characteristic features of the moral aspect of man in Soviet society are lofty principles, unbounded faith in the cause of communism, the attitude to labour as a matter of honour and valour, the desire to augment socialist property, Soviet patriotism, and appreciation of the fact that public interests come before all others. But survivals of a private-owner psychology and of a bourgeois type of morality, servile admiration for the reactionary culture of the West, manifestations of nationalism and other survivals of capitalism still lingered in the minds of part of the Soviet people.

The completion of the building of socialism logically made the ideological activity of the Party the basic form of struggle against the survivals and traditions of the old exploiter system. The time came when capitalism had to be driven out of its last refuge—the sphere of ideological relations. Only when the remnants of the traditions and morals cultivated for centuries by private-property relations have been completely eliminated will it be possible to say that "the last nail" has been driven "into the coffin of capitalist society, which we are burying" (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 379). With every step forward, practical experience brings up questions of communist education, and they acquire increasing importance.

There were certain other circumstances that made it imperative to give greater attention to educational and ideological work. During the war tens of millions of people had lived in territory temporarily occupied by the enemy. Millions of people had been deported to Germany by the Hitlerites. Many Soviet servicemen had been prisoners of war. The Hitlerites had done a great deal to indoctrinate all these people. During the liberating anti-fascist drive of the Soviet troops to the west, part of them found themselves on the territory of capitalist countries, and reactionaries tried in various ways to influence them. In the western regions of the Ukraine and Byelorussia, and in the Baltic republics, bourgeois nationalist groups left behind by the Hitlerites carried on anti-Soviet propaganda among the population. A pernicious ideological influence was exerted on Soviet people through these and other channels. The wide masses of the people scornfully rejected the reactionary bourgeois views that were being thrust on them. But some of the citizens showed ideological instability.

It should also be borne in mind that ideological work was underrated in many Party organisations, and propaganda and agitation work was at a low level. For a long time a part of the leading Party cadres did nothing to improve their knowledge of Marxism-Leninism.
The result was that, as a whole, ideological work lagged behind the tasks which the Party was carrying out, and behind the scale of the socialist construction going on.

Taking into consideration the general requirements of socialist development in the post-war period, the Party stepped up its activity on the ideological front.

The success of the Party's educational work depended primarily on the ideological level of the Communists. The Party membership had changed considerably during the Great Patriotic War. It continued to grow rapidly in the first post-war years. In 1946 the Party had close on six million members, of whom more than half had joined during the war. A sizable section of the Party membership had not had time to receive the necessary theoretical training. There was a certain discrepancy between the Party's quantitative growth and the level of the political education of its membership. To overcome this discrepancy, the Central Committee decided not to press the further growth of the Party ranks but to organise Party education on a large scale.

Party organisations began to select new members more carefully, and devoted greater attention to the political education of Communists. A ramified system of Party education was again established. It included political literacy schools, circles for the study of the history of the Party, political economy and philosophy, district Party schools and universities of Marxism-Leninism. Many Communists studied theory on their own. Between 1946 and 1952 the bulk of Party and government workers went through refresher training.

The higher ideological level achieved by Communists made it possible to extend educational work among the masses.

The Central Committee of the Party took steps to improve agitation work, which showed major shortcomings. The general scope of agitation and its ideological level did not meet the tasks facing the people and the Party. In many cases, mass agitation lacked a militant spirit, and was inadequately used to raise the political consciousness of the working people and mobilise them for a more rapid development of the national economy. Many Party organisations underestimated the role of political agitation. Carrying out the decisions of the Central Committee, the local Party organisations considerably improved agitation among the masses. They were intent on extending political education to every section of the population.

On the ideological front, the Party directed the main blow at the survivals of bourgeois views and ideas, at uncritical appraisals of the reactionary bourgeois culture of the West, and at departures from Marxism-Leninism in science, literature and art. A major task of the Party in its ideological work was to expose and completely eradicate all manifestations of grovelling before the reactionary culture of the bourgeois West on the part of a section of the Soviet intelligentsia.
The aim of the Party organisations was to make every citizen of the U.S.S.R. a conscious Soviet patriot, an active fighter for communism. By showing the epoch-making significance of the successes achieved by the U.S.S.R. in building socialism and the advantages of socialism over capitalism, the Party strengthened the patriotic socialist pride of the Soviet people and their sacred feeling of love for their socialist Fatherland. It encouraged them to be confident of themselves and devoted to the communist cause. The Party paid special attention to the education of the youth, so that they might grow up ideologically well-tempered, spiritually robust and optimistic, full of creative energy and prepared to work selflessly for the cause of communism.

The propagation of Soviet patriotism played an outstanding role in the spiritual development of the Soviet people. Their ideological level rose, and their activity increased. At the same time, however, certain mistakes were made in propagating Soviet patriotism. The press frequently portrayed all life in the capitalist world as being a mass of corruption. The activity of the progressive forces was underrated and achievements in science and technology abroad were ignored. This hindered the speedy utilisation of major discoveries made in science and technology abroad, limited creative contacts between Soviet and foreign scientists and engineers, and impeded the establishment of close ties with the democratic, progressive sections of the people in the capitalist countries.

In order correctly to define the immediate tasks in the ideological field, the Central Committee adopted a number of important decisions: in 1946, “On the magazines Zvezda and Leningrad”, “On the repertoire of drama theatres and steps to improve it” and “On the film A Great Life”; in 1948, “On the opera A Great Friendship, by V. Muradeli”.

The Central Committee decisions and the Party press noted the achievements of Soviet culture, at the same time laying bare serious shortcomings in the development of literature and art. Certain writers and artists had begun to preach that art should be shorn of ideological and political content. There were cases of a truthful picture of life being distorted and realistic traditions discarded. Certain magazines were printing insipid, ideologically harmful works, sometimes imbued with depression and disillusionment, scepticism about the future. Theatres had included in their repertoires cheap, unartistic, banal plays by foreign bourgeois playwrights. Formalistic vacillations were in evidence in music. These facts indicated that there was a certain danger of the work of some writers, composers and artists losing touch with the vital interests of the people, the policy of the Communist Party.

The Central Committee took serious steps to eliminate these shortcomings, emphatically condemning all attempts to divorce art from politics. Its decisions further developed the fundamental Leninist
principles of Soviet culture: service to the people, recognition of the lofty social role of art, its links with the political tasks of the present day and with the life of the people, and realism in art. The Central Committee showed in all its magnitude the significance of Lenin's principle of the Party spirit in art, the role of the Marxist-Leninist outlook in giving a truthful portrayal of socialist reality. In its decisions the Central Committee worked out a programme of struggle for the creation of works that combine lofty ideological content and perfect artistic form.

The Central Committee's decisions on literature and art were discussed by all literary and art organisations. Many regional and city Party committees held special conferences with workers in literature and art. Hundreds of thousands of people took part in the discussions. The result was that the people as a whole became much more exacting towards workers in art and literature, and took an uncompromising stand on ideological vacillations.

At the same time, as the Central Committee pointed out on May 28, 1958, the C. C. decision on the opera A Great Friendship contained some unjust and unwarrantedly sharp criticisms of the work of a number of talented Soviet workers in art. This was a manifestation of the negative features that were characteristic of the period of the personality cult. In carrying out these decisions of the Party, the press and the organisations connected with literature and art had committed errors and distortions. They had sometimes substituted mere injunction for a constructive discussion of problems of art and, in appraising books, music and films, had levelled unfounded criticism at some works while giving undue praise to others.

In that period the Party also discovered some serious shortcomings in the development of science. Many theoretical works had no connection with reality, with the practical construction of socialism, and with the actual experience of the millions of people. This fostered dogmatism and quotation-mongering. Works appeared written in an objectivist spirit, which constituted a concession to bourgeois ideology. Un-Marxist concepts were infiltrating into the natural science as well.

On the initiative of the Central Committee, discussions were held on philosophy (1947), biology (1948), physiology (1950), linguistics (1951), and political economy (1951).

Serious shortcomings in the elaboration of Marxist-Leninist philosophy were revealed and criticised during the discussion of philosophical problems. These shortcomings were disregard of Party principles, attempts to gloss over the contradictions between Marxism-Leninism and philosophical trends alien to it, isolation from urgent problems of the day, and manifestations of scholasticism. The discussion mapped out ways of reorganising philosophical science.
The economic discussion dealt with the features distinguishing the economic development of modern capitalism, the basic laws governing the socialist reorganisation of society, and the ways of effecting the gradual transition from socialism to communism. Subjective and voluntarist views of all kinds were condemned. The advocates of these views denied the objective character of economic laws and alleged that under socialism economic laws could be made, transformed or abolished at will. The discussion revealed the serious consequences of the prolonged isolation of the economic sciences from the actual development of socialist society.

The discussions held in various fields of science helped to remove a number of ideological distortions, strengthened the Party principle in science and raised the standard of scientific research. However, under the influence of the Stalin personality cult, these discussions had negative consequences as well. In some cases the clash of opinions was narrowed down and scientific forces were divided. In the social sciences dogmatism and quotation-mongering were promoted.

In spite of the adverse effect of the personality cult, the decisions and measures taken by the Central Committee of the Party on ideological questions were of signal importance to the ideological life of the Party and the people, and to the development of Soviet culture. Questions concerning the progress of Soviet science, literature and art began to be regarded as a matter of national importance. The discussions on ideology brought scientists, art workers and the people still closer together; the people began to show a greater interest in questions concerning culture and science, and to exert a stronger influence on the creative work of writers and artists. Lack of principle, objectivism and other manifestations of bourgeois ideology were dealt crushing blows during the ideological offensive. The ideological level of Soviet culture rose considerably, which made it possible to raise the political consciousness and cultural level of the Soviet people to a higher stage.

The progress made by the Party and the Soviet people in economic, state and cultural development were appreciable. On the other hand, the personality cult had resulted in serious blunders, miscalculations and mistakes that hampered the full use of the vast possibilities of the socialist system. The harmful effect of the personality cult on every aspect of the life of Soviet society showed particularly in the post-war years. Stalin isolated himself from reality, from the people, more than ever, and had a vague notion of the actual situation in the country. He did not see the serious difficulties and shortcomings there were, and coloured the state of the country's economy.

The personality cult affected primarily the activity of the central bodies of the Party. Party congresses were not held for almost fourteen years. After the war the Central Committee ceased virtually to function as a collective body of the Party; only one plenary meeting of the C.C. was called throughout that period. Stalin decided
many fundamental political matters by himself, without a thorough study and discussion.

Violations of Soviet democracy found expression in the fact that the role of the Soviets was reduced and the rights of the republican, regional and other local organs of state power were restricted. An increasing number of questions which should have been settled locally were dealt with in the capital. Stalin abused his authority, and grossly violated socialist legality. This was particularly obvious in the so-called Leningrad case, which had tragic consequences for many honest people and for prominent Party officials, including N. A. Voznesensky, member of the Political Bureau of the C.C. and Chairman of the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R., A. A. Kuznetsov, Secretary of the C.C. C.P.S.U., and M. I. Rondonov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the R.S.F.S.R.

In the sphere of economic management and planning, the Leninist principle of democratic centralism was infringed and bureaucratic methods were implanted. In agriculture, economically unwarranted measures were carried out on instructions from Stalin. The delivery and purchasing prices fixed for certain basic collective-farm products were so low that they did not justify the expenses of their production. The principle of giving the collective farms and their members a material incentive to expand production was violated. The existing system of agricultural taxation was undermining the collective farmers' individual subsidiary households. All this had a most adverse effect on the growth of collective-farm production.

The personality cult delayed the solution of important problems of technical progress and of science. The practice of indiscriminately condemning scientific contacts and exchanges of experience with scientists and specialists of the capitalist countries was wrong and harmful.

In the ideological sphere, the personality cult at that time manifested itself in the increased isolation of theory from practice, in disregard of the collective thought of the Party in the creative development of theory. Stalin held that he alone had the right to speak the decisive word on any theoretical issue. This impaired the development of the social sciences and the whole of the Party's ideological work. Stalin committed serious errors in his writings. In his pamphlet *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.*, he underrated the significance of commodity-money relations in the national economy and denied the possibility of selling machinery to the collective farms, on the ground that this would extend the sphere of commodity circulation and so move the collective-farm, co-operative form of property further away from the property of the whole people. He expressed the erroneous view that collective-farm property had exhausted its possibilities and had become a handicap to the development of the productive forces. This view ran counter to Lenin's co-operative plan; it amounted in effect to scorning the development
of collective-farm production and tended to weaken the alliance of the working class and the peasantry. Stalin gave an incorrect elucidation of the fundamental questions bearing on the ways of gradual transition from socialism to communism.

For many long years, writers on economic and other problems propagated Stalin’s erroneous, un-Marxist-Leninist thesis that under socialism the purchasing power of the population must always keep ahead of production. This thesis in effect justified the shortage of the necessities of life in the country, and gave the wrong direction to the work of Party, government and economic organisations.

During the discussion of linguistic problems, Stalin made erroneous assertions concerning the philosophical legacy of Marxism, and the relationship between basis and superstructure. It was in this period that subjectivism in appraising events and developments in the life of the Party and of Soviet society in the spirit of the personality cult gained further ground.

In October 1952 the C.P.S.U. held its Nineteenth Congress. It represented 6,013,259 members and 868,886 candidate members. It summed up the results of the struggle and achievements of the Soviet people over a period of more than 13 years.

The principal results, confirming the correctness of the policy pursued by the Communist Party, were the historic victory in the Great Patriotic War, the rapid restoration and high rates of further development of the national economy, the rise in the material and cultural standards of the Soviet people, the further consolidation of the Soviet social and political system and the gathering of all the forces of the camp of peace and democracy around the Soviet Union. The Congress approved the political line and practical work of the Central Committee of the Party.

The Congress defined the Party’s new tasks in furthering the country’s economy and culture. It approved directives for the Five-Year Plan of economic development of the U.S.S.R. for 1951-55. The new plan envisaged further progress in the socialist economy through the priority development of heavy industry, and a rise in the living and cultural standards of the people. It laid down high rates of development for the metallurgical, coal, oil and engineering industries and electrification, as the basis for large-scale technical progress in all branches of the national economy. It called for a general increase during the five-year period of 70 per cent in the industrial product, specifically an increase of 80 per cent in the output of the means of production and a 65 per cent increase in the output of consumer goods. The output of the engineering and metalworking industries and the capacity of the power stations were to be nearly doubled in the five-year period, and the capacity of the hydroelectric stations in particular was to be trebled.

In agriculture, the task set was to increase the yield of all crops, to increase the number of livestock owned by the collective farms
and, at the same time, to raise its productivity considerably, and
to increase the total and marketable output of crop-farming and
animal husbandry. But these targets were not backed with the neces-
sary economic and organisational measures, with the result that for
a long time agricultural production made no headway.

The directives provided that labour productivity should increase
roughly 50 per cent in industry and 55 per cent in building. The
national income was to grow by 60 per cent. It was planned to achieve
a substantial rise in the living and cultural standards of the people.

The Nineteenth Congress adopted a decision to change the name of
the Party. It resolved that the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (Bolsheviks)—C.P.S.U.(B.)—should thenceforth be named
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—C.P.S.U. The double
name of our Party ("Communist" and "Bolshevik") has arisen histor­i­cally, as a result of the struggle against the Mensheviks, and its
purpose had been to draw a clear line between itself and Menshevism.
As the Menshevik party had long since left the stage in the U.S.S.R.,
the double name of the Party had lost its point, all the more so that
the concept Communist expressed most precisely the content of the
Party's main task—the building of a communist society.

The Congress discussed N. S. Khrushchov's report on changes
in the Party Rules, and amended the latter. The new Rules general­ised
the vast experience accumulated by the C.P.S.U. in Party de­velopment
since the Eighteenth Congress. They contained a short
definition of the C.P.S.U. and the most complete formulation of the
Party's main tasks and of the obligations of Party organisations and
all Communists in the conditions of the completion of socialist con­struction.

The question of the leading role of Communists in Soviet society
had acquired special importance in the new conditions. This was
reflected in the clauses of the Rules defining a Communist as an
active fighter for the fulfilment of Party decisions and describing
the duties and rights of a Party member, which were more
fully specified. The Rules emphasised the duty of the Commu­nist
to "do his utmost to guard the unity of the Party as the chief
condition of its strength and might".

The demands made of Communists by the Rules of the C.P.S.U.
are of great political and educational importance. They heighten
the role of each Party member as an active, conscious and selfless
fighter for the cause of communism. They are indicative of the in­creased activity of Party members.

The Congress introduced a number of changes into the structure
of the central Party bodies. It was considered advisable to discontinue
the practice of convening all-Union Party conferences, because basic
questions of the Party's policy and tactics should be examined in
good time by Party congresses. The Political Bureau of the Central
Committee was reorganised into the Presidium of the Central Com­
mittee, established to direct the work of the Central Committee in the intervals between plenary meetings. This reorganisation was in keeping with the functions that were actually being carried out by the Political Bureau. Practice had shown that it was advisable to concentrate the Central Committee’s organising work of an executive nature in a single body, the Secretariat of the Central Committee; hence there was no longer any need for the Organisational Bureau of the Central Committee. With a view to enhancing the role of Party control bodies in preventing violations of Party and state discipline by Communists, the Party Control Commission was reorganised into a Party Control Committee under the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.

Delegations from 44 brother Communist and Workers’ Parties attended the Congress as guests. The Congress also received greetings from the Communist and Workers’ Parties of a number of capitalist countries whose representatives had been unable to come to the U.S.S.R. because of persecution by their governments.

Inspired by the decisions of the Congress, Party organisations began to work for the fulfilment of the Fifth Five-Year Plan and for the further economic and cultural progress of the country.

On March 5, 1953, soon after the Congress, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin died. The enemies of socialism counted on confusion breaking out in the ranks of the Party and in its leadership, and on vacillation appearing in the conduct of home and foreign policy. But their hopes were dashed. The Communist Party rallied still closer round its Central Committee, and raised the all-conquering banner of Marxism-Leninism higher than ever. The Leninist Central Committee successfully led the Party and the entire people forward, along the road to communism.

4. The Role of the C.P.S.U. in Strengthening the Community of Socialist Countries. Formation of the World Socialist System

The emergence of socialism from the bounds of a single country confronted the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Parties of the other socialist countries with a new important task, namely, that of establishing international relations of a new type, the community of socialist countries. Such a task had never been set, or resolved by anyone in history. Formerly, in its foreign policy, the U.S.S.R. had proceeded from the fact that it was dealing only with capitalist countries. But now it was necessary to build up interstate relations with socialist countries as well.

The general principles of socialist foreign policy—complete equality of countries, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, mutual respect for territorial integrity, defence of peace—which
determined the content of its relations with the capitalist countries, also became the basis of the Soviet Union’s relations with the other socialist countries. But relations between the socialist powers could not be confined to this, especially as the young people’s democracies stood in need of political support, economic assistance and an exchange of experience in socialist construction.

International relations of a new type took shape between the U.S.S.R. and the people’s democracies of Europe and Asia. The content of Soviet foreign policy became richer and more varied. The international character of the dictatorship of the proletariat gave rise to a fundamentally new, hitherto non-existent function of the socialist state—the function of assisting other countries in the building of socialism and of establishing international socialist relations.

There were objective economic, political and ideological grounds for establishing new, socialist relations between the nations which had overthrown capitalism. In all the socialist countries, power was in the hands of the people led by the working class, which was headed by its vanguard, the Communist Party. Social ownership of the means of production determined the community of economic interests of these countries. It determined the interest of each country in promoting the economy of the socialist camp as a whole and of its individual members. All the countries whose peoples had overthrown capitalism were in their social and economic development moving towards socialism and communism and were equally interested in defending their revolutionary gains and their national independence. They were guided by the same ideology, Marxism-Leninism. It was on this basis that qualitatively new, socialist relations were established between peoples who had thrown off the yoke of capitalism. The features distinguishing these relations were fraternal co-operation, mutual assistance and sincere mutual support in the struggle for communism on the principles of proletarian internationalism.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union took an active part in creating and strengthening the community of socialist countries. As the guiding force of the first country to have built socialism, it shared, and continues to share, its experience of building a new life with the brother Parties, on a footing of equality.

To find the forms and methods of building socialism that would be best suited for their countries, the brother Communist and Workers’ Parties carefully studied the experience of building socialism accumulated by the C.P.S.U. and all the aspects of its activity since it came to power. “The work we have to do,” said Mao Tse-tung, “is difficult and our experience is insufficient. We must therefore study the advanced experience of the Soviet Union.” In his speech at the Nineteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U., Klement Gottwald said: “We come to you to learn how to build socialism.”

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The Communist and Workers' Parties, as well as the governments of the socialist countries, sent Party and government officials, trade union leaders, economic executives, engineers and technicians, scientists, workers and peasants to the Soviet Union to study Soviet experience. The Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., the Soviet Government and local Party and Soviet organisations did their best to help brothers from other countries in studying the experience of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. They gladly received these delegations and opened all doors to them. The envoys of the friendly countries visited towns and villages, factories, collective and state farms, machine-and-tractor stations, scientific and educational establishments, Party organisations and state institutions. In studying Soviet experience, the brother Parties compared it with their own experience and that of other socialist countries, and creatively applied it in their own countries, choosing the forms and methods of building socialism best suited to the specific conditions obtaining in their countries.

The extensive joint theoretical and practical activity of the C.P.S.U. and the brother Communist and Workers' Parties of the people's democracies produced the only correct, scientific view of the significance of the experience of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. This experience expresses the general laws governing the socialist transformation of society.

The path travelled by the Soviet people is the highroad of socialist development for the working people of all countries. The main features and laws of development of the socialist revolution and of the building of socialism in the U.S.S.R. are not of local, specifically national, significance; they are of international importance.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union established close cordial political co-operation between the U.S.S.R. and the other socialist countries. Bilateral treaties of friendship and mutual assistance were concluded, which strengthened the national independence of the people's democracies. The Soviet Union and the people's democracies co-operated in the struggle for peace. The U.S.S.R. rendered the socialist countries friendly assistance in setting up a new state machinery. At the request of their governments, the U.S.S.R. sent these countries advisers on various questions.

Through the joint efforts of the C.P.S.U. and the brother Communist Parties, a new type of economic co-operation, based on full equality, mutual benefit and comradely mutual assistance was set up between the U.S.S.R. and the people's democracies, and the forms of this co-operation worked out. As the socialist countries developed and grew stronger, relations between them embraced ever new spheres of economic life.

At first the basic form of economic co-operation was foreign trade. It was conducted not on the basis of competition and ruthless suppression of the weak, as is the case under capitalism, but on the basis
of complete equality and mutual benefit, without any selfish mo-
tives. The volume of trade grew year after year. A world socialist
market came into being.

Later, this economic co-operation became more varied. Aid by
means of credits acquired great importance. In the post-war years
(up to and including 1952), the U.S.S.R. extended to the people's
democracies long-term credits totalling close on 15,000 million ru-
bles. These credits were given on the most favourable terms possible.

Mutual assistance in the sphere of production and technology
increased from year to year. The Soviet Union helped the people's
democracies to design, build and operate new industrial enterprises.
Scientific and technical co-operation got under way. The U.S.S.R.
helped the socialist countries to build many industrial enterprises,
and handed over to them a large number of designs for industrial
and cultural projects, complete sets of blueprints for new machines
and equipment, technological specifications and calculations. Ex-
tensive assistance was rendered in training personnel and in mastering
technology. Thousands of people from the people's democracies were
trained at Soviet higher educational institutions. Many workers from
a number of the fraternal countries mastered the latest techniques
at Soviet factories. In its turn, the Soviet Union received production
and technical assistance from the people's democracies.

The need for a special body to co-ordinate economic relations was
felt more and more acutely as economic co-operation developed.
A Council for Mutual Economic Assistance was set up by the
function was to arrange exchanges of experience in economic man-
agement and to organise mutual assistance by supplying raw materi-
als, foodstuffs, machines, and so forth.

The co-ordination of economic plans was an important form of
economic co-operation and mutual assistance. In the early years it
was sporadic. The first steps to co-ordinate the national economic
plans were taken during the period of the Fifth Five-Year Plan.
Inter-state specialisation, and the co-ordination of production among
the factories of the socialist countries, began to be organised. This
provided the most favourable conditions for the development of the
productive forces and the best opportunities for utilising production
and raw material resources, accelerated the rate of socialist con-
struction and strengthened the economic independence of the people's
democracies.

As relations between the socialist countries developed and the
socialist mode of production took root in the people's democracies,
there came into being a socialist system of world economy. The world
system of socialism represents the sum total of the socialist economies
of independent and sovereign states, and develops in accordance with
economic laws inherent in socialism. It includes the gradually shap-
ing international division of labour among the socialist countries,
and is distinguished by specialisation and co-ordination of production. Its important distinguishing features is comradely co-operation and mutual assistance. These factors ensure the rapid and planned economic development of each country, and of the world economic system of socialism as a whole.

Certain difficulties were encountered and some mistakes were made in establishing and developing friendly co-operation between the socialist countries. The Central Committee was greatly concerned about relations with the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and relations between the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia. Whereas the C.P.S.U. and the Communist Parties of the people’s democracies were building up relations between themselves in a spirit of Marxism-Leninism, the attitude adopted by the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia on a number of fundamental questions ran counter to Marxism-Leninism. Step by step, the C.P.Y. leadership departed from the principles of proletarian internationalism, and slid towards nationalism. In 1948 the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers’ Parties, of which the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was a member, examined this question, and adopted a resolution “On the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia”. All the basic points of this resolution were correct. It contained Marxist-Leninist, principled criticism of the mistakes made by the leadership of the C.P.Y., and was approved by all the Marxist-Leninist Parties. The C.P.Y. leadership refused to take part in the work of the Information Bureau and rejected all criticism, declining even to examine it on its merits. The differences became acute.

While an effort was being made to overcome these differences, J. V. Stalin committed a grave error. Instead of developing comradely criticism in principle of the wrong views and actions of the C.P.Y. leadership and showing their incompatibility with the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, he took the path of interrupting normal state and diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia. All relations between the C.P.S.U. and the C.P.Y. were broken off. Under the influence of the hostile activity of Beria and his accomplices, certain unfounded charges were made against the leaders of the C.P.Y. Subsequently, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on its own initiative, took steps to restore normal relations between the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia.

The policy of friendship and mutual assistance, pursued by the C.P.S.U., triumphed. The mistakes made occasionally in the relations with fraternal countries were of a secondary, accidental character. The essence of these relations was genuinely socialist, and accorded fully with the principles of proletarian internationalism. The C.P.S.U. directed all its efforts to strengthening friendship with People’s China and the other people’s democracies, and this policy was entirely successful. The joint activities of the C.P.S.U. and the other Communist Parties standing at the helm of their
respective states, resulted in the establishment of a fraternal commonwealth of socialist countries, and no amount of intrigue on the part of their enemies could, or can, shake their solidarity and unity. This commonwealth and this unity are a source of the strength of the socialist camp.

The establishment of the world socialist system and of international relations of a new type was a great and historic gain of the peoples. The important progress made by the socialist countries in their economic and cultural development, in the struggle for socialism, would have been impossible without comradely co-operation and mutual assistance.

The relations of friendship and mutual assistance that have arisen between the socialist countries successfully combine the interests of each country with the interests of the socialist camp as a whole. The problem of relations between the socialist countries was, for all its complexity and novelty, successfully solved in the interests of each country and of the entire socialist camp.

**BRIEF SUMMARY**

The victorious termination of the Great Patriotic War against the fascist aggressors enabled the Party and the Soviet people to resume their peaceful, creative labour and set about completing the building of socialism and starting the gradual transition to communism.

The adverse effects of the personality cult seriously hampered the development of Soviet society. But the growing vital strength of the Party and the Soviet people, and the advantages of socialism in the final analysis guaranteed the solution of the major problems facing the country.

The fundamental post-war task of the Party and the Soviet people was to restore the national economy as quickly as possible and to ensure its further uninterrupted development. The Party rallied the working people for the fulfilment of this task, and organised mutual assistance between the different republics and regions. It achieved the rapid restoration of the liberated areas simultaneously with the further expansion of industry in the eastern areas of the country, the technical re-equipment of the economy and greater profitability of industry.

In the conditions obtaining after the war, the Party considerably improved its political and ideological work. The restrictions on inner-Party democracy that had existed during the war were gradually removed, though they were not completely eliminated, and criticism and self-criticism developed to some extent. The role of the Party organisations as political leaders was enhanced thanks to proper combination of the Party’s political and economic activity.
In the course of the ideological offensive the Party dealt crushing blows to all manifestations of lack of ideological principles, cosmopolitanism, objectivism and other expressions of bourgeois ideology. Victory over the fascist aggressors consolidated the position of the Soviet Union and raised its international influence and prestige. The relation of forces in the world arena changed radically in favour of socialism, to the detriment of capitalism.

The Party made effective use of the post-war changes in the world arena to create favourable international conditions for the building of communism.

The emergence of people's democracies ushered in a new stage in the development of socialism. A world system of socialism came into being. The U.S.S.R. ceased to be the only socialist country encircled by capitalist states. It now occupied the position of the leading country in the socialist world. A new sphere of activity opened up before the C.P.S.U., that of rendering assistance to the brother Parties of the people's democracies in socialist construction, promoting mutual assistance and co-operation with them. This mutual assistance benefits the Soviet Union, each one of the socialist countries separately and the socialist community as a whole.

The Party made use of the Soviet Union's immense prestige to preserve and consolidate peace and to combat the American and British warmongers. Consistently implementing Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems, the Party developed economic competition between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist countries, being confident that communism would win a decisive, epoch-making victory in this competition.
1. The International Situation in 1953-1958. The Efforts of the Party and the Soviet State for a Relaxation of International Tension

The period from 1953 to 1958 was marked by momentous events in the life of the Soviet Union, in the activity of the Party, in its struggle to build a communist society in the U.S.S.R. and to preserve peace.

The international situation had become extremely tense. The policy of the leading imperialist powers, primarily the U.S.A., had become still more aggressive, particularly after the North Atlantic military bloc was formed and war unleashed in Korea by the U.S. imperialists. The threat of a third world war loomed over mankind.

To save the world from a nuclear war of extermination, the U.S.S.R. and the other socialist countries had to make still greater efforts, pursue a still more active peace policy, rally all the peace forces and extend their relations and contacts with statesmen of the capitalist countries. True to Lenin's principle of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet state started, under the leadership of the C.P.S.U., an energetic and purposeful struggle to achieve a relaxation of international tension. Relying on its own steadily growing might and on the fraternal support of the other socialist countries and the international working class, the U.S.S.R. took a series of important steps aimed at consolidating peace.

To bring about a lessening of international tension it was necessary, first and foremost, to stop the bloodshed in Korea and Indo-China.

The Soviet Union actively supported the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the Chinese People's Republic in their efforts to end the war in Korea. For two years the U.S. aggressors kept disrupting the armistice talks. The armistice was finally signed in
1953. The war in Korea, which had been fraught with serious international complications, ended on the lines from which the American aggression had started. The predatory plans of the U.S. imperialists in this area were frustrated. One hotbed of war was extinguished.

In 1954 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Democratic forces of Cambodia and Laos succeeded, with the active assistance of the Soviet Union and the Chinese People’s Republic, in reaching an agreement with France on a cease-fire in Indo-China despite bitter resistance on the part of the American imperialists. This victory of the forces of peace met the interests of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and also the interests of the French people. Another hotbed of war was extinguished.

The Soviet Union also took steps to reduce tension in Europe. On its initiative, the Austrian problem was finally settled in 1955 on the basis of the permanent neutrality of Austria. On the initiative of the Soviet Government, diplomatic relations were established between the U.S.S.R. and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. and the Soviet Government took the initiative in settling the conflict between the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia. In 1955 an improvement in relations between the two countries was achieved.

The Party considered that a stable and lasting peace could be achieved by establishing a system of collective security. This system would be based on the joint efforts of all the states of a particular area of the globe to maintain peace, and would be the very antithesis of the imperialist system of military blocs, which divide countries into exclusive hostile alignments and endanger peace.

In 1954 the Soviet Government proposed a draft All-European Treaty on Collective Security in Europe to the countries of Europe and to the United States. This Soviet initiative was vigorously supported by the masses of the people. The Western Powers, however, rejected the Soviet proposal, for they had entirely different plans in view. In October 1954 they signed agreements providing for the remilitarisation of West Germany and her involvement in the North Atlantic military bloc.

The U.S.S.R., like the other socialist countries, could not ignore these acts, which constituted a grave threat to world peace. In the new situation that had arisen in Europe, the Soviet Union, jointly with the governments of the people’s democracies, worked out new measures to ensure peace and security. In May 1955 a treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance was signed in Warsaw between the U.S.S.R. and the European people’s democracies. The signatories to the treaty undertook, in the event of armed attack on any one of them, to render it immediate and all-round assistance. The Government of the Chinese People’s Republic declared its complete solidarity with, and support of, the decisions adopted.
The Warsaw Treaty became an important stabilising factor in Europe. It is a defensive measure taken by peace-loving countries, and serves the security of the peoples of Europe and the maintenance of peace throughout the world. Unlike the imperialist powers’ treaties on military blocs, the Warsaw Treaty is open to any state that may desire to accede, irrespective of its social system. The Warsaw Treaty loses its validity in the event of a collective security system being set up in Europe.

Meanwhile, militarism was being vigorously restored in West Germany. Former Hitler generals were put in command of the armed forces of the Bonn Government. Propaganda of revenge steadily increased. All this raised big obstacles to the settlement of the German question. The Soviet Union, however, persevered in its efforts to achieve such a settlement speedily. It proposed the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from her territory. It supported the aspirations of the German people for the national reunification of both parts of their country on peaceful and democratic lines. But since there were two independent German states with totally different social systems on the territory of Germany, this reunification could not be achieved by mechanically joining one part of Germany to the other. It could be brought about only by the German people themselves, through negotiation between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. The Soviet Government supported the proposal of the Government of the G.D.R. to establish a confederation of the two German states as a first step towards the restoration of Germany’s national unity.

By restoring militarism in West Germany and rejecting the proposals for negotiations between the Germans of the two parts of Germany, the governments of the U.S.A., Britain and France, and also of the F.R.G., closed the doors to a settlement of the German question. They preferred to keep Germany split indefinitely.

In the fight for peace and a relaxation of international tension, the C.P.S.U. and the Soviet Government paid unflagging attention to disarmament. They stepped up their fight for a reduction of armaments and armed forces, the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and the banning of nuclear tests, and for the establishment of strict international control over the implementation of all these measures. In an effort to facilitate reaching an international agreement on disarmament, the Soviet Government accepted a number of the proposals made by the Western Powers, although it would have preferred more radical decisions being taken on the matter. For example, at an earlier date the U.S.S.R. had proposed that the Great Powers reduce their armed forces by a third, but in 1955 it accepted the proposal of the Western Powers that the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and China reduce their armed forces to 1,000,000-1,500,000 men, and Britain and France to 650,000 men.
But whenever the Soviet Government accepted any of the proposals of the Western Powers, the latter either went back on them and renounced them altogether, or complicated matters by making numerous reservations. In this way the Western Powers revealed that their aim was to frustrate disarmament. Behind talk about disarmament, they were deceiving the peoples and continuing the arms race.

It was obvious that the U.S.A., Britain and France had no intention of solving the disarmament problem. The Soviet Government sought every opportunity to break the deadlock in the disarmament talks, and put forward a series of proposals for settling the problem by stages. But here again the Soviet Union came up against the Western Powers' sabotage of the very idea of disarmament.

It became increasingly clear to the peoples that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries were the only sincere advocates of disarmament, that they alone wanted to rid the working people of all countries of the burden of armaments and of the threat of a nuclear war.

A major achievement of the peaceful foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. was the extension of relations between the Soviet Union and the peoples of Asia and Africa who were upholding their independence against imperialism. Visits by Soviet leaders to the countries of the East and visits by numerous political leaders of those countries to the Soviet Union greatly helped to strengthen ties with those nations. Contacts with the peoples of Latin America expanded too.

During the period 1953-58 the disintegration of the colonial system of imperialism increased very noticeably under the impact of the national liberation movement. A large number of independent national states came into being in Asia and Africa. Following Syria, the Lebanon, India, Burma and Indonesia, which gained their state independence in the post-war years, freedom was won by Egypt and Iraq, which had been dependent on British imperialism, by Sudan and Ghana, which had been colonies, and by a number of other countries. The peoples who won their independence had to defend it not only against the old colonialists, Britain and France. More and more often they were compelled to defend themselves against U.S. colonialism, the mainstay of the colonial system of imperialism, the chief exponent of colonial and racial oppression.

In their struggle against the colonialists, the peoples of the East were strongly supported by the U.S.S.R. The bonds of friendship and co-operation between the U.S.S.R. and the Asian and African countries working for peace, grew steadily stronger. The Soviet Union's tireless struggle against imperialism and aggression was of immense help to the oppressed and dependent peoples in their struggle for political emancipation, and later in defending the state independence they had won against numerous encroachments by the colonialists.
The countries that had won political independence also received all possible assistance from the Soviet Union in their struggle to achieve economic independence. This aid was given on principles of full equality, non-interference in internal affairs, and without political or military strings attached. The character of this aid was the exact opposite of the onerous terms on which the U.S.A. and other colonial powers extended their so-called aid. Thanks to the Soviet Union, the economic position of the underdeveloped countries was strengthened in relation to the imperialist oppressors, and the colonialists’ possibilities of imposing onerous terms on these countries were limited. All this helped to raise the international role of the countries of Asia and Africa who stood for peace.

Relations between the Soviet Union and the neutral European countries that were not members of military blocs likewise developed and grew stronger.

The Soviet state time and again took the initiative for the improvement of relations with the U.S.A., Britain, France, Italy and other capitalist countries. The U.S.S.R. strove to secure mutual trust in international relations, to promote foreign trade, to remove all discrimination, and expand contacts and co-operation in the fields of culture and science. To quote N. S. Khrushchov: “Our country would like to have good relations with all countries that are against war and favour peaceful coexistence, and we are doing all we can to establish such relations” (Forty Years of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Eng. ed., Moscow, p. 69).

The steps taken by the Communist Party and the Soviet Government to promote peace had a beneficial effect on the international situation. A certain lessening of tension was achieved in international relations. In the summer of 1955 it became possible to convene a conference of the Heads of Government of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., Britain and France in Geneva. As a result of the exchange of views, the Heads of Government of the Four Powers announced their desire to contribute towards a relaxation of international tension. However, the Soviet Union was the only country to back up its declaration with practical steps to strengthen peace.

After the Geneva Conference, the Soviet Government made still more active efforts to bring about a détente and extend co-operation between states, thereby once again furnishing convincing proof of its good will. It took important steps radically to improve its relations with the U.S.A., as well as with Britain and France. These efforts of the Soviet Government met with no response from the reactionary ruling circles of the Western Powers. But in spite of the obstacles put up by them, the Soviet Government achieved a considerable expansion of international business and cultural contacts. Diplomatic relations were restored with Japan. Graphic evidence of the Soviet Union’s resolve to cut armaments was the reduction of its Armed Forces, beginning with 1955, by more than two million men.
The peace initiative of the Soviet Union was a most important factor in world politics. It exerted increasing influence on the entire course of international relations. The peace forces grew and united their ranks. The aggressive imperialist circles found themselves in ever greater isolation. The peoples felt more hopeful that war could be averted. The Soviet Union's prestige and influence increased immensely.

The ruling circles of the imperialist countries had always opposed a détente, but at the time of the Geneva Conference they tried to disguise their policy of intensifying the cold war and preparing for aggression. They soon discarded their peace mask and again openly reverted to their "positions of strength" policy. They had not abandoned their intention of restoring capitalism by force of arms in the countries that had taken the path of socialist construction, and of re-establishing colonial oppression where the peoples had overthrown colonial rule.

As it worked for a détente and for peace, the C.P.S.U. was ever aware of the fact that the reactionary imperialist forces had not laid down their arms, and were capable of engaging in all kinds of adventures, and that unremitting vigilance was therefore necessary.

In the autumn of 1956 Britain, France and Israel made an armed attack on Egypt in order to reimpose a colonial regime on her. Almost at the same time, reactionary imperialist circles, chiefly of the United States, organised a counter-revolutionary revolt in Hungary. The imperialists intensified their subversive activities against the other socialist countries as well. They made feverish attempts to disunite the socialist countries and viciously attacked the policy of the Soviet Union, doing their utmost to discredit it. No means were too low for them to use, if only they could discredit the ideas of socialism. The danger of war loomed large again. The forces of reaction at the same time intensified their fight against the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries. They placed great hopes on undermining these Parties from within by reviving the activity of revisionist elements.

With the war danger growing, the Soviet Union stepped up its struggle for peace, relying on its own economic and military might, on the support of the other socialist countries and on the warm sympathy of all the peace-loving peoples. It emphatically demanded that the aggression against Egypt be stopped. Faced with this demand, and coming up against the heroic resistance of the Egyptian people and the indignation of democratic opinion throughout the world, the British, French and Israeli governments were compelled to cease their aggression and withdraw their troops from Egypt. The forces of peace headed by the U.S.S.R. thus helped the Egyptian people to uphold their independence.

At the request of the Hungarian Government and in fulfilment of its internationalist duty, the Soviet Union rendered the brother
Hungarian people effective assistance in putting down the counter-revolutionary uprising. Thereby it prevented the restoration of capitalism and fascism in Hungary and her conversion into a springboard for imperialist aggression in the heart of Europe.

The U.S.S.R. frustrated the plans of the aggressors, and they had to retreat. It was a great and historic victory. It showed the significant shift that had taken place in the relation of forces between the advocates of peace and the advocates of war in favour of the former, and opened up further prospects of preventing aggression.

The imperialists' insidious plans to drive a wedge between the socialist countries completely failed too. Adhering strictly to the principles of proletarian internationalism, the Soviet Government, in a declaration published on October 30, 1956, advanced a programme for the promotion of friendly relations with all the people's democracies on the basis of complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, fraternal co-operation and mutual assistance. In the joint struggle against the onslaught of reaction, relations between the Soviet Union and China and the other people's democracies became still closer and friendlier than before. The fraternal co-operation of the socialist countries and their mutual assistance in the economic, political and cultural fields developed successfully. The unity of the socialist camp is a reliable guarantee of the national independence and sovereignty of each socialist country.

Victorious in the struggle against imperialist aggression in Egypt and Hungary, the U.S.S.R. continued to champion peace. It resolutely opposed the renewed threat of aggression in the Middle East. When the U.S.A. organised a conspiracy against the independence of Syria and set Turkey and other countries against her, the Soviet Union helped Syria to stave off the danger threatening her. In 1958 the Soviet Union prevented American and British aggression spreading to Iraq and other countries of that area, and helped the peoples of the Lebanon and Jordan to get rid of the American and British troops that had invaded their countries. The peoples see the U.S.S.R. as the most dependable bulwark of their independence.

In the latter half of 1958 a dangerous situation arose in the Far East, in the area of Taiwan and the Straits of Taiwan, as a result of aggressive acts undertaken by the U.S.A. against the Chinese People's Republic. War threatened to break out. The Chinese people were prepared to give a fitting rebuff to the aggressors. True to its duty, the Soviet Union declared that an attack on the Chinese People's Republic, which is the Soviet Union's great friend, ally and neighbour, would be regarded as an attack on the U.S.S.R. and that it would come to the assistance of People's China if the U.S.A. committed an act of aggression against her. This had a sobering effect on the high-handed American aggressors. The peace policy of the
Chinese People's Republic prevented a further complication of the situation in the Taiwan area.

The setbacks suffered by the imperialist aggressors were evidence of the growing might of the socialist camp and of other peace forces. There was now a real and increasing possibility of averting war, of preventing the imperialist aggressors from plunging the peoples into fresh military adventures. But if the great cause of peace was to succeed, all the forces opposing war had nevertheless to be vigilant and ready for action: they had to act in a united front and not relax their efforts.

The struggle for peace, for an international détente and for the promotion of friendship among nations had been, and remains, the corner-stone of the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. and the other socialist countries. This idea runs through all the proposals made by the Soviet Government on various international issues.

In March 1958 the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. took a further initiative in the matter of disarmament. It decided on the unilateral cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union called upon the other nuclear powers to take similar steps. It warned them, however, that unless the other nuclear powers did stop tests, it would have no choice but to renew its own.

The Soviet proposals for a peace treaty with Germany and for giving West Berlin the status of a free city, as well as for averting surprise attack, were all aimed at strengthening peace and relaxing international tension. The Soviet Government did all in its power to have outstanding international issues settled by negotiation. It considered a meeting of the Heads of Government to be the best means of lessening international tension.

These steps of the U.S.S.R., motivated by humanism and love of peace, were acclaimed by broad sections of world opinion. Nevertheless, the governments of the U.S.A., Britain and France persisted in their refusal to respond to the call of the peace forces to take the road to détente.

One of the major results of the activity of the Party and the Soviet Government in the field of foreign policy between 1953 and 1958 was the extension of the Soviet Union's international relations. The Soviet Union was visited by a large number of people representing all sections of the population in capitalist countries. They were able to see for themselves the peaceful intentions and goodwill of the Soviet people, and their great historic achievements. In their turn, many Soviet citizens visited foreign countries. All this helped to expose the slanderous anti-Soviet propaganda carried on by imperialist reaction, and convinced wide circles abroad that the Soviet people sincerely wanted peace; it exploded the slanderous assertion of hostile propaganda about "Soviet aggression". The attempts of imperialist reaction to impose on world opinion a distorted picture
of the situation in the U.S.S.R. came to nothing. The C.P.S.U. did much in those years to spread the truth about the U.S.S.R., the first land of socialism. The result was that considerably more people throughout the world came to appreciate the advantages of the socialist system over capitalism. The number of the Soviet Union’s friends grew, and so did the social forces supporting its policy. The lying story that the U.S.S.R. wanted to shut itself off from the capitalist world by an “iron curtain” was destroyed.

In 1953-58 the Communist Party and the Soviet Government developed the greatest activity in the fight for peace, to prevent aggression and to consolidate the international position of the U.S.S.R. Consistently adhering to the Leninist general line in foreign policy, the Party took into account all that was new in the international situation, and found ever new methods and means of implementing its peace policy in keeping with the changing conditions. This period was characterised by the tremendous constructive initiative displayed by the Party in foreign policy. The Party’s wise activity raised the Soviet Union’s international prestige and increased the possibility of repelling aggression. Aggressive circles found themselves in greater isolation.

The Communist Party and the Soviet Government combined their consistent policy of peace with a further strengthening of the Soviet Union’s defensive capacity. The growing might of the U.S.S.R. was the most dependable guarantee against the threat of war, and a powerful factor for world peace.

2. The Reorganisation of Party Work in Line with the Leninist Standards of Party Life. Rectification of the Errors and Shortcomings Produced by the Personality Cult. The Struggle to Achieve a Steep Rise in Agriculture and to Promote Technical Progress in Industry

In 1953-58 the Soviet people, led by the Party, carried out important political and economic measures that contributed towards further consolidating the Soviet social and political system, greatly promoting the development of industry, primarily heavy industry, achieving a steep rise in agriculture and improving the living standards of the people. In these years the Party came out against the Stalin personality cult and worked to eliminate its consequences from all spheres of Soviet life. In full keeping with the new historic tasks, it ensured the reconstruction of the work of Party organisations, state institutions and voluntary associations in accordance with tried and tested Leninist traditions, and enhanced its role as leader.

The Party resolutely eradicated everything that impeded the forward movement of Soviet society and was incompatible with Leninist traditions. It did not merely restore the Leninist principles,
but creatively applied them to the new historical conditions. It worked out new forms of leadership which, while fully conforming with the spirit of Leninism, took account of the new situation and the wealth of experience accumulated. Such were the most salient features of the new historic period in the life of Soviet society, and the features distinguishing the Party’s activity from 1953 to 1958.

In mobilising the masses to carry out the tasks of communist construction, the Party boldly laid bare serious shortcomings in Party, state and economic activity. It critically appraised the situation in agriculture and industry, and set out to eliminate these shortcomings and achieve a further rapid growth of socialist economy.

An irregularity in Party life had been the violation of the Leninist standards of Party life and the principles of Bolshevik leadership, as a consequence of the personality cult. After the Eighteenth Party Congress, no Party congresses had been convened for a long time although the country had passed through the Great Patriotic War and the difficult years of economic rehabilitation. Hardly any plenary meetings of the C. C. had been called. For a long time there had been no collective leadership, or criticism and self-criticism, in the activity of the Central Committee and its Political Bureau.

Serious mistakes had also been made in the management of the national economy, in particular of agriculture, where a very grave situation had arisen as a result of the violation of the principle of giving the collective farmers a material incentive in labour. The country was short of farm products. The Leninist principles of administration were not fully complied with in industrial management. As a result of excessive centralisation of economic management and planning, and of underestimation of the importance of economic incentives, the actual possibilities for increasing production, and the untapped resources, were not fully taken into consideration, while the creative initiative of the masses was not given sufficient scope. Little was done to stimulate the interest of factories in the development of technology. The result was that a number of industries lagged in technical equipment behind those of the most developed capitalist countries.

In the sphere of state development there was a tendency to restrict the rights of the Union Republics. The decision of many questions of republican and local significance was concentrated more and more in the capital, with the Union bodies being inflated to an incredible extent.

There were gross violations of socialist legality and the democratic rights of Soviet citizens.

There were other mistakes and distortions as well, arising from the Stalin personality cult, a phenomenon that was alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, and that had become widespread in theory and practice. The Party could not reconcile itself to these negative
developments, which were totally foreign to its very spirit and its activity.

The eradication of the consequences of the personality cult from all spheres of the activity of the Party and the state became a major political task of this period, and the main condition for strengthening the leading role of the Party, further reinforcing the Soviet social and political system and accelerating socialist construction.

On the initiative of N. S. Khrushchov, the Party and its Leninist Central Committee laid bare the harm caused by the Stalin personality cult and the mistakes and shortcomings arising from it, and began energetic efforts to eliminate them.

The exposure of Beria, a political adventurer and a sworn enemy of the Party and the people, was of great importance for the consolidation of the Soviet system, the promotion of socialist democracy and the elimination of the harmful consequences of the personality cult. As head of the state security service, Beria tried to place it above the Party and the Government and use it against the Party and its leadership, against the Government of the U.S.S.R. Pursuing hostile aims, he trumped up charges against honest people and grossly violated Soviet law.

The Central Committee, after hearing a report by N. S. Khrushchov, approved his proposal and put an end to the criminal activities of Beria and his associates. Having rid itself of these dangerous enemies, the Party considerably strengthened its ranks and consolidated the Soviet state still further.

At its plenary meeting in July 1953, the Central Committee of the Party approved the resolute measures that had been taken to end the criminal activities of Beria and his accomplices. The plenary meeting took steps to strengthen Party guidance at all levels of the state machinery, and to ensure effective supervision over the work of all agencies and departments, including the state security service.

The Central Committee adopted a firm policy of restoring and developing the standards of Party life, primarily the principle of collective leadership, that had been worked out by Lenin and tested in practice. The decision of the July plenary meeting stated that proper leadership of the Party and the country, the unshakable unity and cohesion of the Party membership and the successful building of communism could be ensured only by the collective political experience of the entire Party and by the collective wisdom of the Central Committee, which in its work draws on Marxist-Leninist theory and on the initiative and activity of the Party leaders and rank and file.

The Central Committee greatly extended inner-Party democracy through the consistent implementation of the principle of democratic centralism. Leninist methods and style of leadership, based on a thorough and detailed knowledge of life, on close ties with the masses, on a careful consideration and use of their experience, and on the encouragement of the creative activity and initiative of the working
people, were restored in the work of the Party organisations, state institutions and voluntary associations.

The reorganisation of the work of the Party's central bodies was of paramount importance. The principle of collective leadership was restored in the work of the Central Committee, after a long interval. Plenary meetings of the C. C. began to be held regularly, in accordance with the Party Rules. The Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., the supreme directing body of the Party in the interim between congresses and the centre of ideological, political and organisational leadership, began to play a more important role. Once again the Central Committee became a standing collective body.

The structure of the leading bodies of the C.C. C.P.S.U. was readjusted to the new conditions. Instead of two bodies, the Presidium and the Bureau of the Presidium, it was decided to have only one, the Presidium of the C.C. C.P.S.U. as established by the Party Rules. It was found advisable to institute the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee. N. S. Khrushchov was elected to this post in September 1953.

The principle of collective leadership began to be consistently implemented in local Party organisations as well. Methods of administration by injunction were resolutely uprooted in the work of the Party. The number of Party activists grew and their role was enhanced. Basic questions of the life of the Party and the people began to be submitted more regularly for broad discussion by Party activists and Party meetings. The C.C. abolished the post of C.C. Party organiser in industry and elsewhere, and the political departments on the railways, in the river and sea-going fleets and in the fishing industry. Greater responsibility for the work of these enterprises and organisations was assumed by the local Party organisations. The Party apparatus was reduced. The C.C. began systematically to invite rank-and-file Communists to help work out Party policy through a broad discussion in Party organisations of the fundamental questions of communist construction.

The Party did everything possible to promote the creative activity and initiative of local Party and government bodies, and encouraged the creative effort of the working people. The Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. firmly steered a course towards extending the rights of the Union Republics. The decision of many questions was transferred to the latter. In view of the granting of greater powers to the government and economic bodies of the Russian Federation, a Bureau of the C.C. C.P.S.U. for the R.S.F.S.R. was formed to provide more specific leadership for the economic and cultural development of this republic, the biggest of all.

When investigating and eliminating the flagrant violations of socialist legality, the C.C. looked into the so-called Leningrad case and established that it had been trumped up by enemies and careerists with the purpose of weakening the Leningrad Party
organisation and discrediting its leaders. All the doubtful cases fabricated in 1937-38 and other years were re-examined. Thousands of honest Party and government workers, business executives, Komsomol workers, military men and others, who had been declared to be enemies of the people and unjustly convicted, were exonerated. This act was a clear indication of the Party’s political courage, fidelity to Marxism-Leninism and devotion to the interests of the people.

Distortions of the Leninist policy on nationalities, committed during the Great Patriotic War, were eradicated. The national autonomy of the Balkars, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingushes and Karachais was re-established and they were thus enabled to develop unhampered in the fraternal family of peoples of the U.S.S.R. The friendship and socialist internationalism of the Soviet peoples benefited thereby.

The Party and the Government took resolute steps to have the standards of socialist legality strictly observed in all spheres of the life and activity of the Soviet state. The state security service, the courts and the Procurator’s offices were reinforced with tested personnel; Party supervision over the work of these bodies was restored. The Party put an end to all violations of the constitutional rights of Soviet citizens, and did all that was necessary to ensure Soviet people a tranquil life and the benefits of Soviet socialist democracy.

The restoration and development of the Leninist standards of Party life, and the reorganisation of the work of the Party and the state on this basis, enabled the Party to increase efficiency in its ranks, broaden its ties with the masses and enhance its leading role.

The Party did much to remedy the consequences of the personality cult in the economic field.

The Party devoted special attention to eliminating the lag in agriculture. This lag had given rise to a disproportion in socialist economy between industry and agriculture, a disproportion that could become a major obstacle to the country’s development and retard the growth of the national economy and the well-being of the people, and the advance of Soviet society towards communism.

A plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., held in September 1953, thoroughly examined the situation in agriculture and mapped out measures to improve it. It pointed out that the most urgent and important economic task at the moment was to achieve a steep rise in all the branches of agriculture while continuing vigorously to develop heavy industry. The plenary meeting was a turning-point in the development of agriculture. Agriculture was also discussed at the February-March and June 1954 and January 1955 plenary meetings of the Central Committee, with N. S. Khrushchov reporting. The Central Committee held a series of zonal meetings with the participation of leading republican, territory and regional officials and the foremost workers in agriculture.
These meetings worked out concrete measures for securing a steep rise in agriculture in the areas concerned.

In their decisions, the plenary meetings of the C.C. critically appraised the state of agriculture and established both the objective and the subjective reasons for its lag.

The objective reasons were that formerly it had been impossible simultaneously to maintain a high rate of development of heavy industry—the foundation of socialist economy—of agriculture and of the light industries. The considerable damage done to agriculture by the war told too.

The subjective reasons had their roots in inefficient leadership. Little had been done over many years to study the situation in agriculture. The actual state of affairs in some branches of agriculture was presented in unwarrantably rosy colours. Inadequate use was being made of machinery. Many collective farms, machine-and-tractor stations and state farms lacked competent leaders and specialists. Undue centralisation of planning fettered local initiative and impeded the development of agricultural production. Great damage was done to agriculture as a result of violations of the Leninist principle of giving the collective farmers a material incentive to increase agricultural output. The fixed delivery and purchasing prices of many agricultural products did not always correspond with the outlay of labour, and hence did not properly stimulate the output of these products. At many collective farms, payment for workday units was low. The principle of calculating fixed deliveries to the state on a per hectare basis was distorted. The commitments to the state that were not fulfilled by the more slack collective farms were being shifted to the more advanced and efficient collective farms.

The Central Committee outlined and carried out a series of measures to effect a rapid rise in agriculture. These measures produced an important effect on communist construction, and will do so for a long time to come.

First and foremost, the Party and the Government saw to it that the collective farms and collective farmers were given a greater material incentive for increasing output. They were guided in this by Lenin’s well-known proposition that socialist tasks can be successfully carried out “not directly relying on enthusiasm, but aided by the enthusiasm engendered by the great Revolution, and on the basis of personal interest, personal incentive...” *(Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 36)*.

Fixed delivery and purchasing prices for the main agricultural products were raised considerably. The size of compulsory deliveries of grain, potatoes, vegetables and oil seeds by the collective farms, and of livestock products by the collective farmers was reduced. An end was put to the impermissible practice of placing almost the entire burden of deliveries to the state on the more efficient collective farms. New and progressive forms of material incentives were intro-
duced. Monthly and quarterly advance payments to the collective farmers, which helped to increase labour productivity and improve discipline, became widespread. In 1956 such advance payments were already being made in two-thirds of the country's collective farms.

The government began to allocate substantially larger sums for the pressing needs of agriculture. In 1954-55 state investments in agriculture were 38 per cent greater than in the whole period of the Fourth Five-Year Plan. The technical basis of agriculture was strengthened. In 1954-55 the collective farms, machine-and-tractor stations and state farms received 404,000 tractors (in terms of 15 h.p. units), 227,000 lorries, 83,000 grain combines and a large quantity of other machinery. New progressive methods of cultivating the land and tending crops, such as the square-pocket method of planting potatoes and sowing maize and the square method of sowing vegetables, began to be applied in agriculture.

One of the most important measures taken in those years was the reinforcement of the collective farms, machine-and-tractor stations and state farms with specialists and managerial personnel. In 1954-55, at the call of the Party, more than 20,000 town Communists went to the countryside, and were recommended as collective-farm chairmen.

The Central Committee saw to it that specialists in agriculture were used to the best advantage. Of the more than 350,000 specialists with a higher or secondary school training who were employed in agricultural agencies at the time, only 18,500 were working directly in collective farms. By decision of the Party and the Government, more than 120,000 agricultural experts working in towns and district centres were assigned to collective farms.

Continuing to do everything to promote the initiative of the collective farmers in making the most of local conditions and potentials, the Central Committee and the Government revised the system of agricultural planning. The collective farms were permitted themselves to plan the size of their crop areas, the yield of certain crops, the number of livestock and the productivity of animal husbandry. State bodies retained the right to specify the amounts of produce to be delivered or sold to the state by the collective farms. The state retained supervision over the output of staple products in the quantities required by towns and industrial centres and necessary for foreign trade and for the accumulation of stocks. The new system of planning helped to eliminate bureaucratic abuses in agricultural management and gave full scope to the creative initiative of the collective farms.

The Party paid special attention to expanding grain farming, the basis of the whole of agricultural production. A sharp increase in grain output was a pressing task of prime importance.

The chief means of increasing the output of grain in that period was the development of virgin and disused land, which very soon yield-
ed good results. The original plan was to plough up 32 million acres of virgin lands in Kazakhstan, Siberia, the Volga region, the North Caucasus, and other areas. But in view of the immense labour enthusiasm and initiative shown by the people, the Party and the Government adopted a decision to develop a minimum of 70 to 75 million acres of new lands by 1956.

The Communist Party started extensive political and organising work. The Central Committee appealed to the youth to begin developing virgin and disused lands. Hundreds of thousands of people, including more than 350,000 young men and women, responded to the Party's call by going to the virgin lands of Kazakhstan and Siberia. The labour valour displayed by them was worthy of the builders of communism. More than 200,000 tractors (in terms of 15 h.p. units) and thousands of other machines and implements were sent to the new land-development areas in 1954-55. A total of 425 state farms were set up in these areas, a large number of machine-and-tractor stations, state storehouses and elevators were built and thousands of miles of motor roads and railways were laid. Close on 90 million acres of virgin and disused lands were developed in three years. The development of virgin lands was a great feat of the Soviet people. It gave the country additional millions of tons of grain and transformed immense areas in the east of the country, where a verifiable communist renovation of the land was effected.

There were enormous difficulties hindering the rise in livestock-farming, which had been lagging behind for many years. The development of livestock-farming was held up mainly because fodder resources were inadequate. The Party took steps to increase these resources; the maize area was enlarged. This made it possible to appreciably improve the situation in livestock-breeding within a short time.

To increase labour productivity in crop-farming and animal husbandry, the Party organisations widely popularised the achievements of agricultural science and advanced experience.

Agricultural management was radically improved. Big changes took place in the work of the Party organisations and local government institutions connected with the countryside, particularly the district Party committees and the district executive committees. These bodies were reinforced with well-trained and experienced personnel. New blood was infused into the ranks of Party workers. Bureaucratic methods and red tape were gradually eradicated from the leadership of the collective farms, machine-and-tractor stations and state farms. Party workers got down to studying the economics and techniques of agricultural production, which enabled them to guide the collective farms, machine-and-tractor stations and state farms more competently.

Party and Komsomol organisations in the collective farms began to play a bigger role in the countryside. At the beginning of 1941 there were Party organisations in only one-eighth of the collective
farms and in 1956, on almost every collective farm. Between 1954 and 1958 the number of Communists in the collective farms increased by more than 230,000.

Working for the fulfilment of the Party's decisions for the improvement of agriculture, the rural Communists headed a mass socialist emulation movement in the collective and state farms to increase output of grain, milk, butter, meat and other agricultural produce. The co-operation of a great mass of collective farmers and machine-and-tractor station and state-farm workers was enlisted in working out and implementing concrete measures to expand agricultural production.

The steps taken by the Party and the Government in agriculture, the energetic assistance rendered to the countryside by the socialist towns, and the selfless labour of the collective farmers and machine-and-tractor station and state-farm workers, soon yielded positive results. Before long thousands of previously slack collective farms had moved into the front ranks. Total grain output increased considerably in 1954 and 1955. The grain deliveries plan was carried out ahead of schedule. Thus the way was paved for all the branches of agriculture to forge ahead and the disproportion in Soviet economy to be bridged.

To secure a steady rise in the people's standard of living, the Party put forward the aim of supplying the population with greater quantities both of foodstuffs and of manufactured goods. The Central Committee and the Government took decisions to increase the output of consumer goods and improve state trade. The output of consumer goods began to grow steadily.

Aiming to achieve the balanced development of all branches of the national economy, the Party steadfastly followed Lenin's policy of giving priority to heavy industry. It did much to increase the capacity of the metallurgical, coal, power, engineering and other industries turning out the means of production.

The decisions adopted by the July 1955 plenary meeting of the C.C. C.P.S.U. played a big part in improving the work of the industries, primarily heavy industry. The plenary meeting and conferences attended by leading industrial executives, innovators, engineers and technicians, outlined measures to ensure a further powerful expansion of industry through better organisation of production and the introduction of the latest achievements of science and technology.

The plenary meeting of the Central Committee noted that the Soviet Union had made substantial progress in science and technology. New machinery was being introduced into the national economy. Automation was expanding in the power, iron and steel, and engineering industries. The Soviet Union was the first to begin using atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The construction in the U.S.S.R. of the world's first power station using atomic energy heralded a new
scientific, technical and industrial revolution, the greatest in history, a development in keeping with the requirements of the epoch of communist construction. However, along with these notable achievements, there was the fact that some industries were lagging behind technically. Many executives were doing little to introduce new techniques, lacked perspective and purpose in their technical policy. They forgot that technology must develop continuously, that the old must be replaced by the new and the new by the latest. Soviet scientific achievements were frequently not used or simply shelved, and the successes of science and technology abroad were ignored. This had an adverse effect on technical progress.

The plenary meeting demanded that the executives of socialist industry put an end to complacency and conceit, make a systematic and thorough study of the achievements of science and technology at home and abroad, and steadily move technology forward. The main trend in the development of industry was to be steady technical progress, the achievement of high technical standards, and a further rise in labour productivity on that basis.

The plenary meeting adopted decisions on other urgent questions of improving industrial production. It called for promoting specialisation and co-operation in industry in every possible way, and outlined measures to improve labour organisation and the system of remuneration, raise the quality of output and reduce costs.

To improve industrial management, the Central Committee and the Government introduced changes into the structure of the state and economic machinery so that it could meet the requirements of industry better. Parallel economic departments and offices that were not needed were closed down. In 1954 and 1955, administrative, economic, state purchasing and other staffs not engaged in production were reduced throughout the country by almost 750,000 people.

Party organisations extended their political work in industry and strove to do away with formalism in socialist emulation. A movement for the fulfilment of the Fifth Five-Year Plan ahead of schedule, initiated in 1954 by the workers of leading industrial enterprises in Moscow and Leningrad, stimulated the drive to achieve greater labour productivity. Emulation spread to promote technical progress and to make fuller use of production premises, equipment, raw materials and other inner potentialities. The spreading of technical knowledge was improved, and the experience of the best workers more extensively popularised, in the factories.

Enthusiastically supported by the Party and the Soviet people, the bold initiatives of the Central Committee led to big successes in industry and agriculture. The Party overcame the resistance of conservatively inclined executives who were blind to the new demands posed by reality, persisted in their outdated dogmatic views of the tasks of communist construction, hindered reorganisation and clung to obsolete methods of work.
True to its Leninist principles, the Party and its Central Committee combatted everything that hindered progress. They vigorously sought for the new, raised and confidently solved problems of Communist construction posed by practical experience. An outstanding role in formulating the new tasks and in creatively developing the basic problems of the Soviet Union’s home and foreign policy was played by the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U.

3. Twentieth Party Congress and Its Historical Significance

The Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. was held in February 1956. The delegates represented 6,795,896 members and 419,609 candidates of the Party. Delegations from the Communist and Workers’ Parties of 55 foreign countries attended the Congress as guests.

The Congress discussed the reports of the leading Party bodies and directives for the Sixth Five-Year Plan of economic development of the U.S.S.R. (1956-60).

The report of the C.C. C.P.S.U., delivered by N. S. Khrushchov, contained a comprehensive analysis of the Soviet Union’s international and domestic situation, summed up the results of the Party’s activity since the Nineteenth Congress, and outlined the prospects of communist construction.

In a detailed resolution, the Congress unanimously approved the political line and practical activity of the Central Committee and mapped out the Party’s tasks for the next few years.

The Congress laid special emphasis on the fact that the main feature of the present era was the emergence of socialism from the bounds of a single country and its transformation into a world system. This had given rise to favourable conditions for solving internal and international problems in a new way.

The C.C. report gave a vivid description of the results of the development of two opposite world social systems—socialism and capitalism. The interval between the two congresses had been marked by a further rapid increase in the economic might of the U.S.S.R. and the other socialist countries. A distinctive feature of their economic growth was their all-round development and peaceful trend. In the socialist countries, the rates of growth of industrial production far exceeded those of the capitalist countries. This was a real guarantee that socialism would achieve further successes in its economic competition with capitalism. The industrial basis of socialism was becoming more and more powerful. The steadily increasing share of the socialist countries in the world’s industrial production is a material expression of a progressive historical process: the contraction of the sphere of capitalist exploitation and the expansion of socialism’s world positions. A major result of the development of the socialist countries was the expansion of economic ties and the
establishment of still closer friendship between them. All this showed that socialism was advancing triumphantly.

The capitalist countries were developing in the opposite direction. The economy of world capitalism had become still more unstable and its development still more uneven, and the decay of the capital­ist system had increased. The problem of markets was becoming more acute and the contradictions between the imperialist countries were growing. The workers and working people in general were waging an ever more active and resolute struggle against imperialist oppression. In the capitalist countries there was taking place a further realignment of forces, leading to still greater isolation of the reactionary, aggressive circles. The positions of world capitalism were growing steadily weaker.

The Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. profoundly analysed and drew scientific general conclusions from the latest social developments in the world, and advanced a number of new propositions on fundamental problems of international development that enriched Marxist-Leninist theory.

The Congress developed Lenin’s principle of the peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems in its application to the present age. With the world divided into two different social systems, this principle is the only correct and reasonable principle in international relations. The alternative today is the peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems, or a devastating war. The Communists resolutely uphold the policy of peaceful coexistence.

Peaceful coexistence means competition in the economic and cultural spheres between countries with different social systems. This policy cannot lead to renunciation of the class struggle, to reconciliation of the socialist and bourgeois ideologies. It implies the development of the working-class struggle for the triumph of socialist ideas. But ideological and political disputes between states should not be settled through war.

Marxism taught that socialism would triumph inevitably in all countries: but victory would come, not as a result of the “export” of revolution, which was impossible and had nothing to do with the Marxist concept of history, but as a result of the development of internal contradictions and class antagonisms in each capitalist country. The confidence of Communists in the victory of the socialist mode of production in competition with the capitalist mode of production is based on the decisive advantages of the socialist system over the capitalist system.

The Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. drew the conclusion that there was a real possibility of averting wars of aggression in the present-day international conditions. Lenin formulated his thesis about the inevitability of such wars in the epoch of imperialism, at a time when, first, capitalism was the only, and all-embracing, world
system and, secondly, when the social and political forces that had no interest in, and were opposed to, war were weak, poorly organised and hence unable to compel the imperialists to renounce war.

It stands to reason that so long as imperialism existed, conditions and the economic basis for the outbreak of wars of aggression would remain, and this made it imperative for all the forces of peace to be particularly vigilant. But in the new conditions, when a powerful socialist camp had arisen, when nation-wide peace movements were gaining momentum in all countries, when in addition to the socialist countries there existed other peace-loving states, there were real possibilities of preventing the imperialists from unleashing another world war. If, however, they attempted to start another war, there were powerful social and political forces capable of dealing the aggressors a crushing rebuff, frustrating their reckless plans and defeating them. And that would be the decisive blow at the entire capitalist system. The peoples would not tolerate a system which brought them so much suffering and exacted such sacrifices from them.

Generalising the experience of the world working-class and Communist movement, the experience of the U.S.S.R. and the people's democracies, the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. developed Lenin's proposition on the diversity of the forms of transition to socialism in different countries and on the possibility of the socialist revolution developing peacefully. The radical changes that had taken place in the world, the existence and consolidation of the mighty camp of socialism, the growth of its power of attraction, the growth of the working-class and national liberation movement, and the weakening of the capitalist system had created a new, more favourable situation for the transition to socialism in those countries where capitalism still held sway. Moreover, while Lenin spoke of the possibility of the peaceful development of revolution as an exceedingly rare exception, in present-day conditions the possibility of such a development had increased. Later on the specific forms of transition of the various countries to socialism would be more diversified.

In a number of capitalist countries, the working class, led by its vanguard the Communist Party, had a real opportunity of uniting under its leadership the working peasantry, large sections of the intelligentsia and all patriotic forces. Supported by a majority of the people and resolutely repulsing the opportunist elements that were incapable of renouncing the policy of compromise with the capitalists and landlords, the working class could defeat the reactionary, anti-popular forces, win a solid majority in parliament and turn it from an instrument serving the class interests of the bourgeoisie into a genuine instrument of the people's will, that is, into an instrument serving the working people. Thus, conditions could be created for carrying out radical political and economic changes peacefully.
In those capitalist countries where the bourgeoisie possessed a strong military and police apparatus, and where the exploiting classes, supported by the militarists and a reactionary bureaucracy, resisted the will of the working people to the point of imposing an armed struggle on them, the working class and all working people would be compelled to overthrow the power of the bourgeoisie by armed force. The degree of intensity which the class struggle assumed, and the use or non-use of violence during the transition to socialism, would depend not so much on the proletariat as on the stubbornness with which the reactionary circles resisted the will of the overwhelming majority of the people, on whether these circles would resort to violence at any stage of the struggle of the working masses for socialism.

For all the diversity of the specific forms of transition to socialism, the decisive and indispensable condition was the revolutionary conquest of political power by the proletariat in alliance with the working peasantry, the establishment of the dictatorship of the working class, and political leadership of socialist construction on the part of the working class led by the Communist Party.

The Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. emphasised that the Communists' recognition of the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism, including the conquest of parliamentary institutions by the proletariat, must not be confused with the views of the reformists, who rejected the dictatorship of the proletariat, substituted petty reforms for revolutionary transformations of society and who, in fact, were opposed to the abolition of the capitalist system and the seizure of political power by the working class. The reformists must be vigorously combated as advocates of the capitalist system.

The basic propositions of the Twentieth Congress regarding present-day fundamental international problems were of great theoretical and practical significance. Being a creative elaboration of Marxism-Leninism, they provided the answer to problems of vital interest to the masses, and opened up before the Communist Parties new ways and means of preserving and consolidating peace, new prospects of the revolutionary transformation of capitalism into socialism. They extended the possibilities of uniting all progressive forces under the leadership of the working class, and establishing unity of action and working contacts between the Communist and Socialist Parties, as well as other parties which really wanted to uphold peace, to fight against imperialist oppression and to defend the national interests of their peoples, to defend democracy and independence.

The results of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. since the Nineteenth Congress were summed up in the Central Committee report. The Fifth Five-Year Plan (1951-55) had been carried out in four years and four months, as regards total volume of industrial
output. That was a major victory of the Soviet people in building up the economic and defensive might of the U.S.S.R. and in its further advance towards communism.

Compared with 1950, the total industrial product in 1955, had increased by 85 per cent, output of the means of production going up 91 per cent. As regards consumer goods, the Five-Year Plan was overfulfilled, pre-war output being more than doubled. Agriculture made successful headway. The real wages of industrial, professional and office workers had increased and so had collective farmers’ incomes. More than 1,500 million square feet of housing space had been built in towns and industrial settlements in the five-year period. Towards the end of that period the country’s institutions of higher education had a student body of almost two million, or more than double the number in all the capitalist countries of Europe put together.

The Congress issued the directive persistently to continue to carry out, in peaceful competition, the basic economic task of the U.S.S.R., namely, to overtake and surpass the more developed capitalist countries in output per head of the population within a historically very short period. The advantages of the socialist system of economy and the level of social development attained in the U.S.S.R. had made it practically possible to carry out this historic task successfully.

The Twentieth Congress pointed out the following principal ways for the speedy fulfilment of this basic economic task:

- to continue to give priority to the development of heavy industry—ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, the oil, coal, chemical and engineering industries;
- consistently to put into practice Lenin’s behests regarding the country’s electrification, to ensure the growth of electric power capacities ahead of production capacities and the further expansion of the use of electric power in industry, and to proceed with the electrification of transport and agriculture on an increasing scale;
- to develop and improve in every way the building industry, so that it might meet all the requirements of capital construction in industry, of housing construction and the building of cultural and other amenities;
- to make the most effective use of the country’s rich natural resources, to tap new sources of raw materials, fuel and electric power, and, within the next 10 to 15 years, to establish in the eastern regions of the country a major coal and power base, a third great iron and steel base with an output capacity of 15 to 20 million tons of pig-iron a year, and also new engineering centres;
- to work persistently to accelerate technical progress: by introducing in industry the latest achievements of science and technology, as well as highly efficient equipment and improved technologies, by speeding up mechanisation, by making extensive use of automa-
tion in the production process, by making fuller use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, by vigorously developing new branches and new types of production, and by technically modernising railway transport; to perfect the organisation of production through greater specialisation and co-ordination of work of factories;
to speed up the rate of production of consumer goods and to increase to a maximum the output of artificial and synthetic fibres, plastics and other synthetic materials for the manufacture of garments, footwear and household goods;
to continue unremittingly to advance agriculture, to complete the comprehensive mechanisation of the whole of agricultural production within the shortest possible time, to make extensive use of the achievements of agronomy and the experience of the more efficient farms, to reduce the outlay of labour and materials per unit of agricultural output, and sharply to increase the yield of all crops and the productivity of livestock-breeding;
to achieve a further rise in the people's living standards: to increase the real wages of industrial, professional and office workers, primarily of the low-paid groups, to increase the incomes of collective farmers, gradually to shorten the working day of industrial, professional and office workers without reducing wages, to increase pensions, and to carry out other improvements in the social services;
to encourage in every way the creative effort and initiative of the people in increasing labour productivity, steadily to raise the cultural and technical level of the working class and the collective-farm peasantry, to improve the training of specialists by establishing a close link between instruction and work in production and to bring instruction in the schools closer to life;
systematically to improve the work of local government institutions and trade union and Komsomol organisations, and to enhance their role in the country's economic life.
The guarantee for the successful performance of all these tasks, the Twentieth Congress emphasised, was improvement of all the organising work of the Party.

"Party organisations must focus their attention on problems involved in the concrete guidance of economic development; they must make a closer study of the technical operation and economic management of industrial enterprises, collective farms, machine-and-tractor stations and state farms in order to give efficient and competent leadership" (Resolutions of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Eng. ed., Moscow, pp. 23-24).

The Congress adopted directives for the Sixth Five-Year Plan of economic development of the U.S.S.R. for 1956-60.
The question of overcoming the Stalin personality cult, which is alien to Marxism-Leninism, and of eliminating its consequences,
occupied an important place in the proceedings of the Twentieth Congress.

The Central Committee, being thoroughly aware of its responsibility to the Party and the people, could not possibly embark on concealing or glossing over the mistakes and distortions bred by the Stalin personality cult. In keeping with the Leninist principle of open criticism and rectification of mistakes, it decided to tell at the Congress the truth about the abuses of power under the personality cult.

The Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. criticised from the standpoint of principle the mistakes and distortions which had arisen out of the cult. Its resolution approved of the extensive work which the Central Committee had carried out to restore the Leninist standards of Party life and promote inner-Party democracy. The Congress instructed the C. C. consistently to carry out measures guaranteeing the complete elimination of the personality cult, the removal of its effects in every sphere of Party, government and ideological work, and strict adherence to the Leninist standards of Party life and to the principle of collective leadership.

In criticising the personality cult, the Party was guided by the well-known propositions of Marxism-Leninism on the role played in history by the masses, parties and individuals, and on the impermissibility of the cult of the personality of a political leader, no matter how great his services.

The Party was aware that the mistakes and distortions that had been revealed, and the abuses of power stemming from the personality cult might give rise to bitterness and even discontent in the Party ranks and among the people. It knew that the enemy would try to take advantage of open criticism of the mistakes made under the cult to promote his anti-Soviet aims. Nevertheless, it took that step, being prompted by lofty considerations of principle and by the interests of the struggle for communism. The question was to abolish a harmful ideology and practice running counter to Marxism-Leninism, and injurious to socialism, and to remove the very possibility of violations of democracy, abuses of power and other developments alien to our society. The Party proceeded from the fact that, even if its criticism gave rise to some temporary difficulties, it would yield positive results from the point of view of the interests and ultimate goals of the working class. Thereby the Party would allow scope for the creative forces of the people.

The personality cult had to be resolutely denounced in order to provide sure guarantees that phenomena of this kind would never again arise in the Party and the country, that Party leadership would be based on the collective principle and on a correct, Marxist-Leninist policy with the active participation of millions of people. The criticism of this cult was of tremendous importance for the consolidation of the Party, the creative development of Marxism-
Leninism, the extension of socialist democracy, and for the whole of the international Communist movement.

In the Congress decisions, and in the resolution of the C.C. C.P.S.U. of June 30, 1956, “On Overcoming the Personality Cult and its Consequences”, the Party clearly explained the causes that had given rise to the personality cult, its manifestations and consequences.

The Stalin cult arose in definite, concrete historical conditions. Incredible difficulties had attended the building of socialism in a relatively backward, agrarian country, ruined by an imperialist and a civil war and surrounded by hostile capitalist states, in conditions of the constant threat of attack from without. The complicated international and domestic situation called for iron discipline, a high degree of vigilance and the strictest centralisation of leadership. In conditions of bitter attacks by the imperialist states, Soviet society had to make certain temporary restrictions of democracy. These restrictions were removed as the Soviet state grew stronger and the forces of democracy and socialism developed throughout the world. The triumph of socialism in the U.S.S.R. was an epoch-making feat that the Soviet people accomplished under the leadership of the Communist Party.

In those years Stalin held the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party. Together with the other leaders of the Party and the state, he actively fought to carry out socialist changes in the U.S.S.R. He led the fight against the Trotskyists, Right-wing opportunists and bourgeois nationalists, against the intrigues of the capitalist encirclement. He rendered great services not only in ensuring the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R., but also in developing the world Communist and liberation movement. This naturally earned him great prestige and popularity. However, as time went by, all the successes achieved by the Soviet Union under the leadership of the Party began to be ascribed to him. The cult of his personality was gradually built up.

The development of this cult was, to a very large extent, facilitated by certain negative personal qualities of Stalin, to which Lenin had called attention. The successes achieved by the Communist Party and the Soviet people, and the praises addressed to Stalin, turned his head. Excessively over-estimating his role and services, he came to believe that he was infallible, and began to encourage people to extol him. His words began to be more and more at variance with his deeds. The cult of his personality caused great damage to the leadership of the Party and the state, especially during the last years of his life.

The errors and distortions it engendered impeded the progress of Soviet society, caused it great damage, and stood in the way of the creative initiative of the masses. But, contrary to falsehoods spread by the enemies of socialism, they could not, and did not, change the thoroughly democratic and genuinely popular character of the Soviet
system, whose decisive motive power had always been, was, and would be, the millions of working people. The personality cult could not shake the organisational, political and theoretical foundations of a party founded and educated in a revolutionary spirit by the great Lenin. Even under the cult, the Party functioned as a living organism, and local Party organisations were engaged in creative work. The policy pursued by the Party was a correct one, and it expressed the interests of the people.

The Party criticism of the personality cult was essentially aimed at eliminating the harmful consequences of this cult and thereby strengthening the positions of socialism.

"We," said N. S. Khrushchov, "see two sides to Comrade Stalin's activities: the positive side, which we support and value highly, and the negative side, which we criticise, condemn and repudiate... Our Party and all of us resolutely condemn Stalin for the gross errors and distortions which seriously injured the cause of the Party, the cause of the people" (N. S. Khrushchov, *For a Close Link Between Literature and Art and the Life of the People*, Moscow, 1957, pp. 16,17).

As it worked to eliminate the consequences of the personality cult, the Party opened up great opportunities for the activity and creative initiative of the masses. In a short time it achieved substantial successes in advancing Soviet economy and culture, and greatly strengthened the position of socialism in the world arena. This was another striking expression of the Party's Leninist training.

The Twentieth Congress noted the substantial consolidation of the Soviet social and political system, the socio-political and ideological unity of Soviet society and the friendship between its peoples, and, with due regard to pressing requirements, marked out the course for the further development of socialist democracy.

"The majestic tasks of building communism," stated the Congress resolution on the C.C. report, "require further development of the creative activity and initiative of the people, wider participation of the masses in the administration of the state and in every aspect of its organisational and economic activity. This calls for maximum development of Soviet democracy, persistent efforts to improve the work of all governmental organisations, central and local, and bringing them into closer contact with the people" (Resolutions of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Eng. ed., Moscow, p. 21).

The Congress decisions contained fundamental directions on questions of nationalities policy. Approving the measures taken by the Central Committee to extend the rights of the Union Republics, the Congress recommended further steps in the same direction. At a time when the economy of the republics had developed and grown stronger, and when a larger number of local personnel had been trained, it was becoming more and more obvious that such forms of economic
management by the state had to be devised as would properly combine centralised leadership and the initiative of the republics, take account of the common interests of the peoples in building communism and their national distinctions and specific features, and would promote further friendship among the peoples.

The Congress adopted an extensive programme for cultural development and for the communist education of the people. It stressed the necessity of greatly improving the entire system of training and education of the rising generation by bringing education closer to productive labour.

Important measures were decided on to strengthen the Party ranks, raise the Party's leading role in the Soviet state and improve its organising work.

There was sharp criticism at the Congress of shortcomings in ideological work, and primarily of its lack of connection with the practical tasks of communist construction, of dogmatism and quotation-mongering. It set the task of overcoming these shortcomings, of radically improving all ideological work and closely linking theoretical activity, propaganda and agitation with the vital requirements of the struggle for communism.

In its decisions the Congress emphasised the duty of workers on the ideological front and of Party organisations to cherish, as the apple of one's eye, the purity of Marxist-Leninist theory, to wage an uncompromising struggle against all manifestations of bourgeois ideology and to improve the Marxist-Leninist training of cadres.

The Twentieth Congress instructed the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. to draft a Programme of the Communist Party in accordance with the fundamental propositions of Marxist-Leninist theory, which was being creatively developed on the basis of the historical experience of our Party, and of the experience of the brother Parties of the socialist countries and of the entire world Communist movement, and with due regard to the long-range plan for communist construction, for the economic and cultural development of the U.S.S.R., that was being drawn up.

The Congress introduced partial amendments in the Party Rules, prompted by the experience of Party development.

The Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. was a momentous historic event that marked the beginning of a new and important stage in the life of the Party, in the development of the Soviet Union and in the international Communist and working-class movement. It defined practical tasks involved in building communism in the U.S.S.R., and mapped out ways of developing and strengthening the Soviet system. The Congress posed from a new angle, and resolved, a number of fundamental problems relating to contemporary international development, problems which determined the course of current events and the prospects for the future.
The Congress drew scientific generalisations from the new phenomena at the present stage of history, and was an example of a creative elaboration of Marxism-Leninism, enriching revolutionary theory with new conclusions and propositions in the sphere of the Party's home and foreign policy. The Congress demonstrated that the Party and its Central Committee were not only a collective political and organisational centre, but also a collective centre of development of Marxist theory.

The Congress decisions had a tremendous effect on the life of the Party and on the advance of Soviet socialist society to communism.

4. The Development of Socialist Democracy. The Raising of the Leading Role of the Party and the Consolidation of Its Unity. The Reorganisation of the Management of Industry and Building

The historic decisions of the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. were unanimously approved by the entire Party and met with the warm support of the Soviet people. The masses saw in them an inspiring programme of struggle for further successes in developing socialist economy and culture and in raising the living standards of the people. The masses began a heroic movement to carry out the Congress decisions as speedily as possible.

The people became more active—and this found expression in the further spread of socialist emulation. On the initiative of the workers at several industrial enterprises in Moscow and Moscow Region, an emulation movement to fulfil the industrial plan of 1956 ahead of schedule started on a country-wide scale. The countryside vigorously set about increasing the output of grain and other agricultural produce. A broad movement to overtake and surpass the U.S.A. in the per capita output of milk, butter and meat in the near future was started early in 1957.

The rapidly growing activity of the masses and the increased scale of communist construction necessitated a further extension of socialist democracy, more effective Party leadership and better work on the part of state, economic, trade union and Komsomol organisations. The Party held that, in keeping with the requirements of society, its task was to extend its organising and educational work among the masses, and to improve the old and find new forms of direct participation by the masses in the economic, organising, cultural and educational work of the state.

The Party began to carry out this task by increasing the activity of Communists and the efficiency of Party organisations, improving leadership and all the methods of work of the Party organisations. A new and most typical feature in the life of the latter was that their activity was based on a profound and concrete knowledge of economics and on ability to make use of advanced practical experience and
achievements of science and technology. Party officials successfully studied economic processes and established the dominant trends in the economic development of industrial establishments, collective and state farms, districts, regions and republics. This helped them to find and to utilise new production potentialities.

Special attention was devoted by the Central Committee to district Party organisations, since the success of the effort to achieve a rise in industry and agriculture depended largely on the level of their work. The leadership at district level was reinforced with experienced, capable people who were well grounded in economic affairs and showed initiative as organisers of the masses. The Central Committee achieved a considerable improvement in the work of district Party committees.

In carrying out the decisions of the Twentieth Congress, the Party improved the ideological and political education of Communists and reorganised Party education. It resolutely began to overcome the harmful isolation of propaganda from the practical work of building communism. There was a noticeable and fruitful upturn in the theoretical activity of the Party. Dogmatism, which reduces living and continuously progressing Marxist-Leninist theory to a collection of petrified formulas, detaches theory from practice, hinders the creative development of theory and impedes the scientific elaboration and practical solution of major problems of communist construction, was a considerable danger to the proper education of Party personnel in the new conditions, and to a scientific substantiation of Party policy. The Party launched a consistent struggle against dogmatism in theory and practice, and against manifestations of revisionist views among individual Communists. It ensured the creative development of Marxist-Leninist theory, inseparably linking it up with reality.

Persistently and tactfully, the Party cleared up the ideological confusion among certain workers in the field of culture. Some writers, who had not understood the essence of the Party’s criticism of the personality cult, had begun to look only for mistakes and the seamy sides of socialist construction, and to deny the need for the Party to play the leading role in the ideological sphere. Voices made themselves heard opposing any Party spirit and ideology in science, literature and art, against linking them up with the urgent tasks of communist construction. Attempts were made to question the basic method of Soviet literature and art, that of socialist realism.

The Party and its Central Committee did much to explain the essence of Marxist-Leninist ideology to workers in science, literature and art. The Party once again showed that Soviet culture could flower only if it kept in touch with reality, if it served the cause of the people, the cause of building communism.

The May and July 1957 meetings of Party and Government leaders and literary and art workers went a long way towards enhancing
the partisanship and ideological integrity of literature and art. A Party document published later, *For a Close Link Between Literature and Art and the Life of the People*, stressed that the important thing in the development of Soviet literature and art was for them to maintain a close link with the people, take an active part in the implementation of the policy of the Party and faithfully depict socialist reality, showing the noble aspirations of the people and their high moral qualities.

In accordance with the decisions of the Twentieth Congress, the Party organisations reorganised their educational and propaganda work among the masses, and linked it up more closely with the tasks of communist construction. The Party further strengthened its ties with the working class, the collective-farm peasantry and the intelligentsia, and began more thoroughly to study, and draw general conclusions from their experience. On this basis, the Party and its Central Committee theoretically substantiated and carried out a number of important political and economic measures of programme significance, determining the ways by which socialism would develop into communism.

The Party took steps to improve the work of local government institutions. In its resolution, "On Improving the Activity of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies and Strengthening Their Ties with the Masses" (January 1957), the C.C. C.P.S.U. defined the basic tasks of the Soviets in the new conditions to be: to enhance the part played by the local Soviets in economic and cultural development and improve their activity, to strengthen their ties with the masses and to draw the largest possible number of working people into the work of the commissions of the Soviets and the latter's other channels for mass voluntary activity. The C.C. recommended that Party organisations and government institutions of the Union Republics should take practical steps to extend the rights of the local Soviets, first and foremost in economic planning, in the production and distribution of the output of the local and co-operative industries, in organising housing schemes, in the building of cultural institutions, public amenities and roads, in expanding the production of building materials and fuel and in deciding financial and budgetary questions.

The Soviets of Working People's Deputies began to play a more active part in economic and cultural development. This referred above all to their elective bodies, which began to exercise more effective control over the activities of economic, cultural and other local government organisations. The deputies to the Soviets began to work more actively. The political and economic work of the Soviets became more varied, and their importance as organisers of the masses increased.

One of the biggest economic and political measures carried out by the Party was the reorganisation of the management of industry and
the improvement of the socialist principles of economic management.

The Party bent its efforts to provide, by its policy and appropriate measures in the economic sphere, the greatest scope for the operation of the economic laws of socialism in all spheres of production. As it studied the organisational forms of management, the Central Committee came to the conclusion that the system of managing the national economy through specialised central ministries and departments had served its purpose, and no longer corresponded to the level and scale achieved by industry. There were more than 200,000 industrial enterprises and over 100,000 building sites in the country. A few all-Union ministries and departments could no longer give concrete and efficient guidance to such a large number of industrial enterprises and building jobs—scattered, moreover, all over the country. It was impossible for a single centre fully to take account of all the peculiarities of the various areas, enterprises and building projects and to lead them all.

The need arose to organise management of industry in a way that would be most appropriate to the requirements of the country's developing productive forces and allow the fullest possible use of the potentialities of socialist industry.

Taking into account these pressing necessities, the Party considered the problem of a radical change in the forms and methods of management of industry. The matter was dealt with specially by the February 1957 plenary meeting of the C. C. C. P. S. U., which adopted a decision, "On the Further Improvement of Management in Industry and Building".

The C. C. stated that the new system of management should be based on the combination of centralised state guidance with the extension of the rights of republican and local government and economic bodies, and with still more active participation by the broad masses of the working people in the management of industry. The national economy would continue to be developed under a single state plan, but the centre of gravity of day-by-day management was to be shifted to the localities, that is, to the economic councils to be set up in the country's principal economic administrative areas. The existence of a great number of trained and experienced personnel there would make it possible to effect this change.

In view of its great importance to the state, the question of reorganising the management of industry was submitted for country-wide discussion. More than 40 million people took part in the discussion at meetings and in the press.

In May 1957 the Supreme Soviet of the U. S. S. R. enacted a law based on the measures worked out by the C. C. C. P. S. U. and approved by the people.

The reorganisation of the management of industry was carried out quickly and efficiently. Economic administrative areas were rapidly
established, and economic councils set up and staffed with trained personnel. The economic councils took the direct management of industry into their own hands.

The reorganisation of the management of industry was an important revolutionary step. It drew management closer to production, made it more specific, efficient and flexible, and gave full rein to the initiative of local executives, enabling them to draw greater numbers of working people into directing economic development. This reorganisation still further enhanced the role of the Union Republics, local Party organisations and local government institutions in the guidance of industrial enterprises and opened up big opportunities for the comprehensive development of the economic areas and for better specialisation and co-ordination in the national economy.

This reorganisation represented a creative development of the Leninist principle of democratic centralism in the economic field. In the concrete historical conditions of the day, the new form of management was the best combination of centralised planning with democratic methods of guidance. It made possible the achievement of the greatest efficiency in managing the national economy, by making fuller use of the advantages of the socialist economic system and by greater participation of the working people in industrial management.

Of great political and economic significance was the decision of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. on the Rules of the Agricultural Artel and on the further encouragement of the initiative of the collective farmers in organising production and managing the affairs of the artel. It noted that the countryside now had vast material and technical resources and sample experience in organising and conducting collective farming. The political consciousness of the collective-farm peasantry had grown. The collective farms now had experienced and politically mature personnel capable of running a socially-owned economy properly. Thereby the necessary conditions had been created for increasing the independence of the collective farm and its members in settling matters of collective-farm life on the basis of a correct combination of the public interests with those of the collective farm. The Party and the Government advised the collective farmers to introduce amendments and additions to the collective-farm Rules, proceeding from the main task—the achievement of a steep rise in crop-farming and animal husbandry—and with due regard to local conditions.

This measure was an important step in developing collective-farm democracy, in extending and strengthening socialist democracy. It was of great economic and political importance, for it gave scope to the initiative of the collective farmers, gave them an incentive to run their farms properly, economically and efficiently, and created new opportunities for expanded agricultural production.
In pursuance of the course set by the Twentieth Congress to enlist the assistance of the masses in managing industry and the state, the Party took important steps to improve the work of the trade unions. A number of Party documents, above all the decision of the December 1957 plenary meeting of the C.C., explained the need for the trade unions to play an increasingly important part in the building of communism, specified the forms of their participation in the solving of political, economic, cultural and educational problems, and suggested ways of reorganising the work of the trade unions in the new conditions.

The Central Committee stressed the great obligations which the trade unions had in the matter of drawing the masses into the management of production, further improving the socialist emulation movement, mobilising the workers, at the bench and elsewhere, for the fulfilment and overfulfilment of state plans, raising labour productivity and improving the methods of management in industry. Experience had shown that production conferences were the best method of drawing large numbers of people into the management of industry. It was found desirable to convert production conferences into standing bodies, composed of representatives of workers, office employees, management, Party and Komsomol organisations, and scientific and technical societies, which would carry on their work with the active participation of workers, engineers, technicians and office employees.

To increase the part the trade unions played in the building of communism, the functions of the factory and office trade union committees were extended. They were accorded the right to participate in drawing up the industrial and financial plans of factories, settling questions concerning output rates and the wages system, and supervising the observance of labour legislation. They were empowered to demand the removal of business executives who systematically violated labour laws and evaded fulfilment of their obligations under collective agreements, and to express their opinion about those nominated for executive posts. Thenceforward no industrial, professional or office worker could be dismissed without the consent of the factory or office trade union committee concerned.

The trade unions improved their work on the basis of the decisions of the Party. They began to play a bigger role in economic development; the level of their work of organisation and their political and educational work rose to a higher level. Trade union democracy was expanded, and trade union members became more active.

Under the guidance of the Party, big changes also took place in the activity of the Komsomol and its organisations. Their work was enlivened considerably; it acquired a new content and became more purposeful. The decisions of the Twentieth Congress inspired the youth and opened before it broad vistas for creative endeavour and
daring feats. Komsomol organisations vigorously helped the Party in the execution of its decisions, in all its undertakings. They assumed "patronage" over the more important and difficult building projects of communism. In response to the call of the Party, Komsomol organisations sent hundreds of thousands of volunteers to develop the virgin and disused lands and to build mines, blast- and open-hearth furnaces, power stations and chemical plants. In the countryside, Komsomol members became more active in collective-farm production. The Party helped the Komsomol to promote the initiative of young people, to uproot formalism, ostentation and sensationalism, and to improve educational work.

The labour enthusiasm aroused among the masses by the development of socialist democracy, and the improvement of the activity of Party, government, economic, trade union and other voluntary organisations ensured the successful fulfilment of economic plans. More than 1,600 large industrial enterprises, including the Lenin Hydroelectric Power Station on the Volga, one of the biggest in the world, were put into operation in 1956 and 1957. There was a considerable increase in industrial output. The output of industries producing the means of production rose by 24 per cent. Major successes were achieved in agriculture. The total grain harvest in 1956 was bigger than in all the preceding years. This enabled the state to purchase over 53 million tons of grain.

After the Twentieth Party Congress important measures were taken further to improve the living and cultural standards of the people. The working day on Saturdays and on the eve of holidays was shortened by two hours, maternity leave was lengthened, the working day for adolescents was reduced by two hours, and some industries had their working day reduced to seven or six hours. Tuition fees were abolished in the senior grades of secondary school, in the special secondary schools and in the institutions of higher education. Old-age and disability pensions were substantially increased.

While the Party was implementing the decisions of the Twentieth Congress and making important progress in economic development and in raising the living standards still higher, there were some people who came out against the political line determined by the Congress. It was an anti-Party group that had formed inside the Presidium of the C.C., and included Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Bulganin, Pervukhin, Saburov and Shepilov. Voroshilov joined them in opposing the Leninist policy.

Even before the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U., Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and Voroshilov sharply opposed the Party's line aimed at overcoming the personality cult, promoting inner-Party democracy, condemning and rectifying all abuses of power, and exposing those personally guilty of repressive measures against honest Communists. That was no accident. Having held high positions in the Party and the country, they had been privy to the mis-
takes and abuses born of the personality cult, and were responsible for them. They did not come out openly at the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. Well knowing that they would find themselves in a minority at the Congress, they chose the tactic of playing a waiting game, in the hope of stepping forward at the opportune moment to effect a revision of the Party line.

Following the Twentieth Congress the factional group intensified its anti-Party subversive activity, and began to recruit supporters inside the Presidium of the C.C. It was joined by Bulganin, Pervukhin and Saburov, and later by Shepilov. The members of the anti-Party group launched an open attack on the Party’s home and foreign policy determined by the Twentieth Congress.

After coming to terms at clandestine meetings, the factionalists tried, through the arithmetical majority they had got together in the Presidium of the C.C., and behind the back of the Central Committee, to carry out their anti-Party schemes and seize the leadership of the Party and the country in order to change the Party’s policy and return the Party to the wrong methods of leadership condemned by the Twentieth Congress. But they miscalculated. The members of the Central Committee, on hearing of the factional moves of the anti-Party group inside the Presidium, demanded that a plenary meeting of the Central Committee be convened at once.

The plenary meeting of the C.C. C.P.S.U., held in June 1957, examined the question of the anti-Party group. It stated that the group was out to change the political line of the Party and frustrate the execution of the decisions of the Twentieth Congress.

The members of the anti-Party group were against the elimination of the consequences of the personality cult and against the extension of the rights of the Union Republics in economic and cultural development. They resisted the reduction of the state apparatus and the struggle against bureaucracy. They sought to frustrate the reorganisation of management in industry and building. They opposed highly important measures aimed at promoting agriculture, and did not consider it necessary to give the collective-farm peasantry greater material incentive to expand agricultural production. They opposed the replacement of the old system of agricultural planning by a new one. The anti-Party group took a negative view of the movement to overtake and surpass the U.S.A. in the output of milk, butter and meat per head of population in the near future—a movement which had been started by the collective farms and vigorously supported by the Party. Those factionalists resisted the development of the virgin and disused lands, a measure of tremendous economic significance.

The anti-Party group opposed the Party’s foreign policy of relaxing international tension, consolidating peace, promoting co-operation and strengthening friendship among nations.

The June plenary meeting of the C.C. C.P.S.U. was of exceptional importance in the life of the Party and the country. The point at
issue was whether the Party would continue the Leninist line worked out by the Twentieth Congress or whether the harmful methods which had been current under the personality cult would be revived. The struggle against the anti-Party factional group was acute and was waged from the standpoint of principle. In the course of that struggle, both in the Presidium and at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee, N. S. Khrushchov, as well as members and alternate members of the Presidium, members of the Central Committee, L. I. Brezhnev, A. P. Kirilenko, A. N. Kosygin, F. R. Kozlov, O. W. Kuusinen, K. T. Mazurov, A. I. Mikoyan, V. P. Mzhavanadze, N. V. Podgorniy, D. S. Polyansky, N. M. Shvernik, M. A. Suslov and other leading Party officials resolutely opposed the anti-Party group and gave a crushing rebuff to their bitter attacks on the Leninist line of the Party and its Central Committee. The plenary meeting demonstrated the Central Committee's solid unity and great fidelity to Leninist principle. Its decision on the anti-Party group was passed unanimously. The Central Committee emphatically condemned the behaviour of the splitters and factionalists, and took a firm stand for the Leninist policy.

The plenary meeting pointed out that the anti-Party group had violated the Party Rules and the decision of the Tenth Congress "On Party Unity", drafted by Lenin. The members of the group were trammelled by old notions and outmoded methods of work. They had lost touch with the life of the Party and the country, and were blind to the new conditions, to the new situation that had arisen. They displayed conservatism, adhered to dogmatic views on communist construction, and clung stubbornly to forms and methods of work that were outdated and no longer met the interests of the advance towards communism. That was the basis of their anti-Party stand. They tried to drag the Party back, rejecting everything new engendered by reality and prompted by the interests of the development of Soviet society, by the interests of the whole socialist camp.

"Both on domestic and on foreign policy," the decision of the C. C. plenary meeting stated, "they are sectarians and dogmatists; they display a dogmatic, unrealistic approach to Marxism-Leninism. They do not see that, in present-day conditions, living Marxism-Leninism in action and the struggle for communism manifest themselves in the application of the decisions of the Twentieth Congress of the Party, in the persistent application of the policy of peaceful coexistence and friendship among nations, in the policy of strengthening the socialist camp in every possible way, in improving the management of industry and in working for an all-round rise in agriculture, for an abundance of food, for big-scale housing construction, for an extension of the rights of the Union Republics, for the flowering of national cultures and for the utmost encouragement of the initiative of the popular masses" (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part IV, p. 275).
The June plenary meeting of the C.C. found the activity of the anti-Party group incompatible with the Leninist principles of the Communist Party. In the face of the incontrovertible facts brought to light at the plenary meeting of the C.C., the members of the anti-Party group admitted the harmfulness of their factional, anti-Party activity and undertook to submit to the decisions of the Party.

The plenary meeting removed Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov from the Central Committee and the Presidium of the C.C.

Pervukhin was demoted from member of the Presidium of the C.C. to alternate member of the Presidium, and Saburov was removed from the Presidium of the C.C.

Bulganin was severely reprimanded and warned. He promised to rectify his gross mistakes and vigorously to uphold the Party line. However, he did not keep his promise and did not live up to the trust that had been placed in him as a member of the Presidium of the C.C. For that reason, the Central Committee subsequently relieved him of his duties as a member of the Presidium of the C.C. C.P.S.U. Prior to this, he had been relieved of the office of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.

During the acute struggle against the factionalists, Voroshilov at the June plenary meeting of the C.C. acknowledged his mistakes and condemned the actions of the anti-Party group, thereby contributing in some measure to its exposure. The Central Committee therefore confined itself to sharp criticism of Voroshilov's mistakes.

The exposure and condemnation by the Central Committee of the factional activity of the anti-Party group still further strengthened the Leninist unity of the Party and was a new victory for the Party's general line, for creative Marxism-Leninism. The decision of the plenary meeting of the C.C. was unanimously approved by the Party and the Soviet people as a whole. Communists and non-Communists alike emphatically condemned the members of the anti-Party group who found themselves isolated individuals, having lost all contact with the Party and the masses. Communists and all Soviet people rallied still closer round the Leninist Central Committee for the successful fulfilment of the historic decisions of the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U.

Thus the Leninist line and the Leninist leadership of the Central Committee won the bitter fight against the anti-Party elements. This was of vast importance for the Party and the people, for the entire world Communist movement.

As it combated the departures from Marxism-Leninism and all violations of the Leninist principles of leadership, the Party came across serious shortcomings in the political work conducted in the Soviet Army and Navy. It was found that G. K. Zhukov, in his capacity of Minister for Defence, had violated the Leninist principles of leadership in the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R. He had sought to
restrict the work of the Party organisations, the political apparatus and Military Councils, to do away with the guidance and supervision of the Armed Forces by the Party, its Central Committee and the Soviet Government. With Zhukov’s personal participation, a cult of his personality had begun to be implanted in the Soviet Army, and his role in the Great Patriotic War excessively extolled. Thereby the true history of the war was being distorted and the all-out war effort of the Soviet people, the heroism of the Armed Forces, the role of the Communists and political instructors, the skill of Soviet military leaders and the guiding and inspiring role of the Communist Party, were belittled.

In a resolution, “On the Improvement of the Party’s Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy”, a plenary meeting of the C.C., held in October 1957, condemned the gross violations of the Leninist principles of leadership that had been committed in the Armed Forces and removed Zhukov from the leading bodies of the Party. The Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. appointed Marshal R.Y. Malinovsky Minister for Defence.

The plenary meeting stressed the decisive importance of the Communist Party’s leadership for the building up of the country’s Armed Forces. The Soviet Army and Navy, the decision of the plenary meeting pointed out, owed their might, above all, to the fact that they were organised, trained and led by the Communist Party. Besides the commanders, an important role in strengthening the Armed Forces was played by the Military Councils, political bodies and Party organisations in the army and navy, whose mission was to carry out the policy of the Communist Party firmly and consistently. The plenary meeting decided on measures to improve political work in the Soviet Army and Navy.

The steps taken by the Central Committee on the basis of Lenin’s teaching on the Party to strengthen Party unity still further and to reorganise Party and government activity were in keeping with the need to continuously enhance the role of the Party as the leading and guiding force of Soviet society.


In November 1957 the Soviet people, the working people of all countries, and the whole of progressive mankind celebrated the fortieth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Besides the deputies and representatives of the Soviet public, the jubilee session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. was attended by foreign guests—Party and Government delegations from all the socialist countries, representatives of 64 brother Communist and Workers’
Parties, numerous delegations from public, cultural and scientific organisations of various countries, and representatives of the biggest international trade union, youth and women’s organisations.

In a report to the jubilee session, N. S. Khrushchov summed up the epoch-making results of the socio-economic and cultural changes which the working people had effected under the leadership of the Communist Party in forty years of Soviet rule.

Guided by Lenin’s farsighted plan for the establishment of socialism, the Party was consistently carrying out the general line of industrialising the country, collectivising agriculture and accomplishing a cultural revolution, which were an earnest of the success of socialist construction.

In 1957 total industrial output in the U.S.S.R. was 33 times as great as in 1913, the manufacture of the means of production having increased 74-fold. Steel output had risen from 4.2 million tons in 1913 to 51 million tons in 1957. Whereas in 1913 our country produced less pig-iron than France and 2.5 times less than Britain, in 1957, its pig-iron output considerably exceeded that of Britain, France and Belgium put together. In 1957 the U.S.S.R. held first place in Europe and second place in the world for coal output, and ranked third for oil output.

Power generation increased from 1,900 million kwh in 1913 to 210,000 million kwh in 1957. The Lenin Hydroelectric Power Station on the Volga, put into operation ahead of schedule, by the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution, alone generated annually five times as much as all the power stations of Russia did in 1913. The growth of engineering, which underlies technical progress, was evident from the fact that the engineering and metal-working industries had increased output more than 200-fold in forty years.

The victory of collective-farm system had transformed the U.S.S.R. into a country of large-scale mechanised agriculture. In 1957 the country’s crop area was 478,650,000 acres, or 185.3 million acres more than in 1913. The collective and state farms were using 1,635,000 tractors (in terms of 15 h.p. units), 483,000 grain harvester combines, and millions of other intricate agricultural machines.

The cultural revolution had moved the U.S.S.R. into one of the foremost places in the world in the fields of science and technology. The people had achieved tremendous social gains.

The socio-economic and cultural changes brought about resulted in the construction of socialism in the U.S.S.R., which meant that what had been a dream and a scientific forecast had for the first time become a reality. In 22 years—for 18 out of the 40 years had been taken up with wars and economic rehabilitation—the Soviet Union had made a colossal leap from backwardness to industrial and cultural progress. Once an agrarian country, it had become an industrial-agrarian, highly developed country. The peasantry and the numerous nationalities of the country had taken the high road of
political, economic and cultural development. The Soviet state had become a country of genuine rule of the people, of the equality and fraternity of peoples.

Forty years of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. had shown that the socialist road was the only correct road for all mankind. The Soviet people's achievements in socialist construction had, and continue to have, a tremendous impact on the entire course of world history. Socialism had transcended the bounds of one country and had become a world system. This was a great victory of the world Communist and working-class movement. It was a result of the heroic struggle of the working class and the working peasantry, of the leadership of this struggle by the Communist and Workers' Parties, of their ability creatively to apply Marxist-Leninist theory in the specific conditions of their countries. The world socialist community is a steadily growing force.

A most important factor in the progress of socialist construction, and a source of the strength of the Soviet people, who have won fame as a people of creators, a people of heroes, is that their struggle for freedom and happiness, for communism, is headed by the Communist Party, founded by the great Lenin and steeled in battle. The Soviet people won their historic victories thanks to the correct policy of the Party, to its revolutionary energy and organising activity.

"The experience of the Soviet state during the past forty years shows that without a Party united and solid as a rock, without a Party armed with a knowledge of the laws of social development, without a Party faithful to the great principles of Marxism-Leninism, the working class, the working peasantry, and our people as a whole would not have been able to win power, smash their enemies, build a socialist society and successfully begin the gradual transition to communism" (N. S. Khrushchov, *Forty Years of the Great October Socialist Revolution*, Eng. ed., Moscow, p. 36).

A vivid indication of the Party's growing prestige among the people, and of its growing ties with the masses, is the striving of Soviet people to link up their destinies with the Party and to fight under its banner. On the eve of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the Party had 240,000 members. Forty years later the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had become a party of many millions. In 1958, it had a membership of over 7,800,000. The Party is doing everything necessary to extend and strengthen its ties with the masses.

The celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution strikingly demonstrated the unity of the Soviet people around the Communist Party, which they regard as the spokesman of their interests, as their recognised and tested leader and guide. It forcefully demonstrated the great unity and cohesion of the socialist countries, of all the Communist and Workers' Parties. The speeches delivered at the jubilee session by the leaders of the delegations from the foreign Communist and Workers' Parties, and from the international
voluntary organisations, testified to the increased solidarity of the working people of the whole world. Mao Tse-tung, who led the Party and Government delegation from the Chinese People's Republic, stated in his speech: "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, creatively applying Marxist-Leninist theory to accomplish practical tasks, has ensured the Soviet people continuous victories in the construction of a new life."

"Every day the peoples of all countries of the world see their future more and more clearly in the achievements of the Soviet people. The way of the Soviet Union, of the October Revolution, remains fundamentally the general high road of development for all mankind" (*Pravda*, November 7, 1957).

The delegations from the Communist and Workers' Parties that took part in the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution decided to use their visit to Moscow to meet and discuss questions that were of moment to all the brother Communist and Workers' Parties. A Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the socialist countries was held on November 14-16, 1957, and a Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties of sixty-four countries met on November 16-19. There were more than 33 million Communists in the ranks of the Communist movement in 1957. After an exchange of views on urgent questions of the international situation and the world Communist movement, the Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties adopted the Declaration fully supporting the conclusions and propositions of the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. on the major fundamental issues of international development. The Declaration drew theoretical conclusions from the vast experience of the struggle for socialism and peace, and thereby made an important collective contribution to the creative development of Marxism-Leninism. It contained a Marxist analysis of the international situation and of the basic changes that had taken place in the recent period in the alignment of forces in the international arena, and emphasised that at the present time the most important international task was to fight for peace and against the preparations being made by the imperialists for another world war. It pointed out that today the cause of peace was being defended by powerful forces, by forces capable of averting war.

The Declaration reaffirmed the Communist and Workers' Parties' unity of views on the basic questions of socialist revolution and socialist construction. Pointing to the diversity of the forms and methods of building socialism arising from the specific historical conditions obtaining in each country, the Declaration generalised the principal common features of the struggle for socialism and the laws governing it. These common features and laws are: leadership of the working masses by the working class, whose core is a Marxist-Leninist party, in carrying out a proletarian revolution in one form or another and
establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat in one form or another; an alliance of the working class with the bulk of the peasantry and other sections of the working people; the abolition of capitalist property and the establishment of social ownership of the basic means of production; the gradual socialist transformation of agriculture; the planned development of the national economy, with the aim of building socialism and communism and raising the standard of life of the working people; the accomplishment of a socialist revolution in ideology and culture, and the creation of a numerous intelligentsia devoted to the cause of socialism; the abolition of national oppression and the establishment of equality and fraternal friendship among the peoples; the defence of the gains of socialism against attack by external and internal enemies; solidarity of the working class of any particular country with the working class of other countries, that is, proletarian internationalism.

The Declaration pointed out that these main features and laws were characteristic of the development of all the countries that had taken the path of socialism, and that it was necessary to apply these basic principles of communism correctly, in conformity with the historical conditions and national peculiarities of each country concerned.

The Declaration dealt the opportunists a crushing blow. Indicating the need for resolutely overcoming revisionism and dogmatism in the ranks of the Communist and Workers' Parties, it stressed that in present-day conditions the main danger was revisionism, as a manifestation of bourgeois ideology that paralysed the revolutionary activity of the working class and demanded the preservation or restoration of capitalism.

The Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties addressed a Peace Manifesto to the workers and peasants of all countries, to the men and women of the whole world, to all men of goodwill. It called upon the peoples to redouble their efforts in the struggle for peace.

"Peace," the Peace Manifesto said, "can be preserved if only all to whom it is dear combine their forces, sharpen their vigilance in relation to the machinations of the war instigators, and become fully conscious that their sacred duty is to intensify the struggle for peace, which is threatened" (Peace Manifesto, Eng. ed., Moscow, p. 33).

The unanimity with which the Meetings of the Communist and Workers' Parties adopted the Declaration and the Peace Manifesto signified a major ideological and political victory of the world Communist movement. This unanimity was all the more important because international reaction had made every effort to split the Communist movement. The November Meetings of the Communist and Workers' Parties exposed the plans of reaction before the whole world.
All the Communist and Workers’ Parties of the world supported and approved the two programme documents—the Declaration and the Peace Manifesto—drawn up by the meetings.

Only the leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia disagreed with the propositions of the Declaration recognised by all Communists, and set themselves against the international Communist movement. The delegation from the League of Communists of Yugoslavia refused to attend the Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers’ Parties of the socialist countries or to sign the Declaration adopted at the Meeting. The leaders of the Communist League of Yugoslavia thereby showed that they had not discarded their anti-Leninist views and that they ignored the goodwill of the C.P.S.U. and the other Marxist Parties, which were striving to normalise relations with the League of Communists on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles. This apostasy from Marxism-Leninism found full expression in the programme adopted in 1958 by the Seventh Congress of the Communist League of Yugoslavia. All the Communist and Workers’ Parties of the world qualified that programme as revisionist. In an effort to help the leaders of the Communist League of Yugoslavia to see and rectify their erroneous views, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union offered comradely criticism of the non-Marxist propositions laid down in the programme. This criticism, made in the interests of the world working-class movement, in the interests of the triumph of Marxism-Leninism, was unanimously supported by all the brother Parties. But the leaders of the League of Communists rejected it. They made new hostile declarations against the C.P.S.U. and other brother Parties, and found themselves isolated in the ranks of the international Communist movement.

The Declaration was a powerful ideological weapon for the Communist and Workers’ Parties; it inspired the masses in the struggle for the triumph of socialism.

The constructive activity of the working people of the people’s democracies was headed by their militant Marxist-Leninist Parties: in the People’s Republic of Bulgaria by Bulgarian Communist Party (First Secretary of the C.C. T. Zhivkov); in the Chinese People’s Republic by the Communist Party of China (Chairman of the C.C. Mao Tse-tung); in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (First Secretary of the C.C. A. Novotný); in the German Democratic Republic by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (First Secretary of the C.C. W. Ulbricht); in the Hungarian People’s Republic by the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (First Secretary of the C.C. J. Kádár); in the Korean People’s Democratic Republic by the Korean Party of Labour (Chairman of the C.C. Kim Il-Sung); in the Mongolian People’s Republic by the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (First Secretary of the C.C. Y. Tsedenbal); in the Polish People’s Republic by the Polish United Workers’ Party (First Secretary of the C.C. W. Gomulkas); in the
The November 1957 Meetings of the Communist and Workers’ Parties and the documents adopted by them, as well as the criticism of the revisionism of the Yugoslav leaders by the brother Parties, were a vivid demonstration of the unbreakable unity, cohesion and close co-operation of the Communist and Workers’ Parties on the ideological basis of Marxism-Leninism, an expression of the great ideological and political upsurge in the international Communist movement. The meetings opened up new vistas for the development of the world Communist movement, for the further strengthening of the mighty forces of the socialist camp, for the struggle of all the peoples for peace, democracy and socialism.

6. The Party’s Efforts to Speed Up Fulfilment of the Basic Economic Task of the U.S.S.R. Measures Taken to Develop the Collective-Farm System. Working out the Problems Connected with the Gradual Transition to Communism

The Party steadfastly continued on the course set by the Twentieth Congress towards a sweeping advance in the country’s economy and culture. The Sixth Five-Year Plan was being effectively fulfilled. The reorganisation of industrial management had made it possible to use the rich resources of the country more fully, ensure a more correct distribution of production, and develop new industries and entire economic areas at a higher rate. Those years saw the discovery of large deposits of various raw materials and sources of power, which had to be used to set up new plants and industrial centres not envisaged by the Sixth Five-Year Plan. The remaining three years of the Plan were insufficient for the fulfilment of these tasks. The C.C. C.P.S.U. and the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. therefore decided to begin drawing up a Seven-Year Plan for 1959-65.

On the strength of the progress made by the Soviet people in forty years, and with due regard to the country’s resources and potentialities, the Party came to the conclusion that there was a real possibility of gaining time and shortening the period needed to carry out the basic economic task of the U.S.S.R. A course towards accelerating the fulfilment of the basic economic task was necessitated by the internal requirements of Soviet society, the interests of world socialism, and the struggle for peace.

In accordance with these requirements and tasks, the Party set about drawing up, along with a Seven-Year Plan, a new programme for the country’s economic development over a longer period.

In organising the people to fulfil the great plans of communist construction, the Party took steps to ensure the proper use of mate-
rial resources, constant improvement of techniques, and a rational distribution of the productive forces. Emphasis was laid on the advancement of those industries that steeply raised labour productivity, ensured the fullest use of raw materials and hastened the provision of the material and technical basis of communism.

The priority development of the chemical industry was of prime importance in this respect. A plenary meeting of the C.C. C.P.S.U., held in May 1958, planned a set of measures to develop the chemical industry, particularly the manufacture of synthetic materials and of articles made from them, to meet the requirements of the national economy and the population.

The Party showed constant concern for the well-being of the people. An important step was taken towards solving the housing problem. After the Revolution many houses were built in the U.S.S.R., and the situation improved somewhat. But housing again became a very acute problem as a result of the war. The Hitlerites had destroyed hundreds of towns and thousands of villages, leaving nearly 25 million people homeless. It took much effort to make good this loss; whole towns and thousands of villages were built anew. Nevertheless, there was still a serious housing shortage in the U.S.S.R. Thanks to the rapid growth of the Soviet Union’s economic might, the country was now in a position to solve the housing problem. The Party and the Government drew up an extensive housing programme. It provided for doing away with the housing shortage within the next 10 to 12 years.

Thanks to the correct policy of the Party, its extensive organising activities and the selfless work of the collective-farm peasantry in 1953-57, economic conditions in the countryside had changed. The collective-farm system had entered a new stage of development, which was distinguished by the following main features:

The collective farms had become big, economically strong socialist units, making wide use of modern equipment, science and advanced experience.

The amalgamated collective farms had acquired varied modern machinery, and many of them had built power stations and industrial enterprises processing farm produce.

They had trained numerous skilled field-crop experts, livestock-breeders, electricians, machine-operators, building experts, and leaders and organisers of collective-farm production.

The incomes of the collective farms had grown substantially and the living standards of their members had improved. In 1949, for example, the cash income of a collective farm averaged 111,000 rubles, whereas by 1957 it had risen to 1,250,000 rubles.

The new situation in agriculture necessitated a major reorganisation of collective-farm production and management. A plenary meeting of the C.C. C.P.S.U., held in February 1958, generalised the experience of advanced collective farms and adopted a resolution,
"On the Further Development of the Collective-Farm System and the Reorganisation of Machine-and-Tractor Stations".

The plenary meeting noted that the machine-and-tractor stations had played a historic part in setting up and consolidating the collective-farm system, in providing agriculture with technical equipment and in strengthening the alliance of the working class and the peasantry.

In the new conditions, this form of productive and technical service had begun to hinder the further development of the collective farms and to fetter the initiative of both the collective farms and their members. The negative consequences of two socialist enterprises—the collective farm and the machine-and-tractor station—cultivating one and the same piece of land began to tell more and more. This situation often led to the absence of personal responsibility for the organisation of production and the use of machinery, reduced the responsibility of both the collective farms and the machine-and-tractor stations for raising yields, and gave rise to big and unnecessary expenditure on maintenance of duplicating administrative units.

This state of affairs made it imperative that the existing form of productive and technical service to the collective farms be changed. The plenary meeting of the C.C. C.P.S.U. found it advisable to reorganise the machine-and-tractor stations into maintenance and repair stations, and to sell their machinery to the collective farms, at different dates, depending upon the specific conditions prevailing in the area concerned. Those collective farms which were unable to purchase tractors and other machines or, more important still, could not handle complex machinery properly, were for the time being to go on using the productive and technical services of the machine-and-tractor stations.

The proposals of the plenary meeting of the C.C. C.P.S.U. were discussed by the whole people. Close on 50 million people took part in the discussion. The measures worked out by the Party and approved by the people were given the force of law by the Supreme Soviet at its session in March 1958.

At that session N. S. Khrushchov, on the recommendation of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., was appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. by a unanimous decision of the deputies to the Supreme Soviet. The C.C. C.P.S.U. also decided that N. S. Khrushchov should retain his post as First Secretary of the Central Committee.

The reorganisation of the machine-and-tractor stations was the biggest and most significant event after the victory of the collective-farm system in the development of socialist agriculture. The land, assured to the collective farms for their use in perpetuity, and the agricultural machines were now concentrated in the same hands—in the hands of the collective farms. This opened up tremendous additional possibilities for rapidly increasing agricultural output.
The changes in productive and technical service to the collective farms called for new forms of economic relations between the state and the collective farms. First and foremost, it was necessary to change the system and conditions of purveying agricultural produce. The June 1958 plenary meeting of the C.C. decided to abolish the multiplicity of forms of purveying agricultural products and to change over to a single system of state purchasing with uniform, economically sound prices differentiated according to the different zones of the country.

In determining the level of the new purchasing prices, account was taken of the need to reimburse the expenses of the collective farms in accordance with the average zonal conditions of production, the growth of labour productivity, reduction of costs, and the creation of the necessary accumulation for extended reproduction.

The reorganisation of the machine-and-tractor stations and the change in the system and conditions of purveying agricultural produce were important political and economic measures, expediting the advance of Soviet society towards communism. They further strengthened the alliance of the working class and the peasantry and made it possible to develop collective-farm production and the whole of the national economy at a higher rate.

The decisions of the February and June plenary meetings of the C.C. gave a profound theoretical substantiation of the prospects for further advancing the collective-farm system and of its role in communist construction. They treated in a new manner the ways of raising collective-farm property to the level of national property and creating a single communist form of ownership.

The Party rejected the erroneous proposition current at the time, to the effect that the concentration of the basic implements of agricultural production in the hands of the state was always and under all circumstances a means of achieving a high rate of collective-farm production, while the sale of tractors and other agricultural machines to collective farms, with the latter becoming full owners of all the main implements of production, moved collective-farm property further away from the property of the whole people. The Party revealed the utter indefensibility and dogmatic narrowness of this view, and showed that the reorganisation of the machine-and-tractor stations made for the growth of the indivisible assets of the collective farms, strengthened the property of collective farms and other co-operatives and brought it increasingly close to the property of the whole people. The further expansion and consolidation of the indivisible assets were most essential for the gradual development of the property of collective farms and other co-operatives into property of the whole people, into a single, communist form of property.

Parallel with the tasks of economic development, the Party tackled urgent problems of the communist education of the people, particularly of the rising generation. The reorganisation of public
education was of immense importance for the material and spiritual progress of Soviet society towards communism.

The Soviet school had trained millions of educated, cultured citizens, active participants in socialist construction. It had trained excellent specialists in all spheres of economy, culture and science. But, all these achievements notwithstanding, the work of the general schools and places of higher education was not meeting the requirements of communist construction and had serious shortcomings. The main shortcoming, brought to light by the Central Committee of the Party, was that the school, while giving a general theoretical knowledge, did little to prepare the rising generation for practical activity, did not give it work training and did not do enough to accustom it to work in material production. This gap between instruction and life was at variance with the tasks of communist construction and could no longer be tolerated.

The Party raised the question of reorganising secondary and higher education. The basic propositions on the reorganisation of the schools were expounded in a memorandum submitted by N. S. Khrushchev to the Presidium of the C.C. C.P.S.U. and then in the theses of the C.C. C.P.S.U. and the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.: “On Establishing Closer Links Between School and Life and on the Further Development of Public Education in the U.S.S.R.”

The reorganisation of public education affected the interests of the entire Soviet people, and the question was therefore submitted for nation-wide discussion. The theses of the C.C. C.P.S.U. and the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., which were published in the press, evoked widespread response and were warmly approved by millions of citizens. Soviet public opinion recognised reorganisation of education to be a pressing matter. The main points of the theses, approved by all Soviet people, were embodied in a law passed by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. at its session in December 1958.

The reorganisation of education was based on the Leninist principle of linking instruction with productive work, with the practice of communist construction. The chief task of the school was to prepare the rising generation to take its place in life, for socially useful work, to raise the level of general and polytechnical education, to train highly educated people with a sound knowledge of the fundamentals of science, to bring up the youth in a spirit of profound respect for the principles of socialist society, in the spirit of the ideas of communism. Participating in socially useful activity, the younger generation of builders of a communist society should be accustomed to the most varied forms of physical work for which it was fitted.

In keeping with these requirements, universal compulsory eight-year education was substituted for universal compulsory seven-year education. Educational work in the eight-year school was to be reorganised in such a way as to combine the study of the fundamentals of science with polytechnical instruction and education in labour,
and widely to draw pupils into various forms of socially useful work compatible with their age. At the next stage young people were to engage in socially useful work, and all their further training (in schools for young workers and peasants, secondary polytechnical schools with instruction in production techniques, technical schools and other special educational establishments) was to be linked up with productive work in industry or agriculture.

It was decided to reorganise factory schools, the vocational, railway, mining, building, and agricultural mechanisation schools of the Labour Reserves Training Board, professional-technical, factory apprenticeship and other vocational schools under the economic councils and government departments into urban and rural vocational-technical schools.

Places of higher education were to enrol people who had received a full secondary education. They were to train specialists by combining instruction with socially useful work. The specific forms of combining instruction with practice, with work, would be determined according to the speciality of the establishment in question, the composition of the student body and also the specific features of the nationalities and localities concerned. It was considered necessary to do everything possible to improve and extend evening and extramural instruction, promote university education and improve the theoretical and practical training of students.

The reorganisation of the secondary and higher school system through the establishment of close links with material production and productive work was inspired by the Party’s concern for the upbringing of the rising generation, for the expansion and improvement of education in the country, for the shaping of the new man, a citizen of all-round development, harmoniously combining mental and physical labour in the single process of social labour. The reorganisation of the general school and higher education was therefore to play a great role in removing the essential distinction between physical and mental labour, and creating the conditions for the country’s transition to communism.

A plenary meeting of the C.C. C.P.S.U., held in December 1958, summed up the results of agricultural progress in five years, since the September 1953 plenary meeting of the C.C. It pointed out that the implementation of measures worked out by the Party and supported by the whole people had made it possible to achieve considerable progress in agriculture and to strengthen the collective and state farms economically. In 1958 grain output totalled 136 million tons, or 69 per cent more than in 1953; the state granaries received 56 million tons of grain as against 30.3 million tons in 1953. There was an increase in the total harvest and marketable output of industrial crops and vegetables. The lag in livestock-breeding was being eliminated. The cattle population had increased by 24 per cent in five years, that of pigs by 41 per cent and that of sheep by 29 per cent.
Milk output in 1958 was 1.6 times, and meat output 1.4 times, as great as in 1953 (taking into account the growth of the livestock total). The share of the collective and state farms in the total deliveries of livestock products rose considerably. The collective and state farms became the decisive force in supplying the state with livestock products.

These achievements were a result of the devoted creative effort of the Soviet people, of the tremendous political and organisational activity of the Communist Party and its Central Committee. An important role in the successful accomplishment of the task of developing agriculture and stock-farming was played by the leading Party bodies of the Union Republics, territories, regions and districts, and by primary Party organisations, which under the leadership of the Central Committee guided the effort of the people to bring about a steep rise in agriculture.

Summing up the results achieved in agriculture in the past five-year period, the plenary meeting of the C.C. noted that the general successes must not screen the shortcomings in the work of individual regions, territories and republics, and the lag of many collective farms and even of whole districts. It sharply criticised shortcomings in the work of some local Party organisations. It warned against overrating the progress made and stressed the need to devote more attention to agriculture and exert still greater effort to follow up the successes achieved in it.

“We must not allow these achievements to slacken our will to work for the further development of agriculture,” said the resolution passed by the plenary meeting. “We must remember that there is still a huge amount of work to do, and that what has been done so far is only a beginning. The successes achieved must stimulate a further and more powerful advance of agricultural production, so that Soviet people may be amply supplied with valuable foodstuffs, and industry with raw materials” (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Part IV, p. 379).

The December plenary meeting was the Party’s political report to the people on the state of agriculture. Its decisions brought a ready response from all working people.

The Central Committee persistently introduced the Leninist style and method of work in all Party, government and other public organisations. Possessing profound knowledge and experience, understanding the new demands posed by reality, and conscious of their responsibility for the work entrusted to them, leading Party workers imparted Bolshevik fervour to the work, devoted all their strength and knowledge to the good of the people, and by their tireless and devoted activity ensured the implementation of the Party’s Leninist general line.

The sweeping changes that the Soviet people brought about under the leadership of the Communist Party, and the vast achievements in
economic and cultural development, created every requisite and opportunity for the U.S.S.R. to enter a new, and most important period in its development—the period of the full-scale construction of a communist society.

BRIEF SUMMARY

The period from 1953 to 1958 was a new and significant stage in the life of the Communist Party and the Soviet people as a whole, in the struggle to complete the construction of socialism.

The Twentieth Congress of the Party, whose decisions had a tremendous impact on the life of the Party, the development of Soviet socialist society and the world Communist movement, was a major historic event of that period.

The Party openly and severely criticised the Stalin personality cult and the mistakes and distortions engendered by it, and set out to eliminate its consequences. It reorganised its work through consistent implementation and creative elaboration of the principle of democratic centralism, collective leadership, criticism and self-criticism and other Leninist principles and standards of Party life. As a result, the links between the Party and the people were strengthened, and the leading and guiding role of the Party in the Soviet state increased.

After doing away with the shackling influence of the personality cult in the ideological field, the Party steadfastly carried into effect the line of creative Marxism. It restored and consolidated the organic unity of theoretical and practical activity which was a feature of Leninism, but which had been violated under the influence of the personality cult. New opportunities were opened up for the scientific elaboration of the major problems of building communism.

The Party and its Central Committee theoretically elaborated and, with nation-wide support, put into effect a number of highly important socio-economic measures which bore the character of a programme and were a contribution to Marxist-Leninist theory. Among these measures were the reorganisation of industrial management and of the machine-and-tractor stations, the improvement of economic planning, the promotion of the system of public education, etc. The political and economic measures which the Party carried out before and after its Twentieth Congress were of great historic importance in the Soviet people’s struggle to build communism. The Party achieved outstanding successes in industry and agriculture. The standard of living of the Soviet people improved considerably.

The Soviet people, led by the Party, made important progress in culture, science and technology. A vivid indication of this progress was the launching of satellites of the earth and a man-made
planet of the solar system, which opened a new era in the development of world science and technology.

In the political sphere, the rights of the Union Republics and local Soviets were extended, and the work of trade unions and other voluntary organisations was reorganised. Socialist democracy was further promoted, and the working people began to take a greater part in the management of government affairs and in the shaping of the policy of the Soviet state.

The Communist Party set an example of creative approach to the solution of complicated international problems. Its scientific generalisation of the latest social developments in the world made it possible to advance and substantiate a number of new propositions on cardinal problems of world development that enriched Marxist-Leninist theory.

The C.P.S.U. made a valuable contribution to the consolidation and development of the community of socialist countries on the basis of Marxist-Leninist ideas and the principles of proletarian internationalism. Together with the brother Parties, it elaborated the principles of the international relations, economic, political and cultural co-operation, and mutual assistance of the socialist countries.

The Party made the foreign policy of the Soviet state much more active, and found new forms and methods of foreign policy activity that were especially in keeping with the requirements of the time. Thanks to their effort to ease international tension, the Party and the Soviet state made notable progress in their foreign policy activity, and strengthened the country's international ties. The imperialist aggressors were exposed. The flames of war they had kindled in Korea, Indo-China, Egypt and the Lebanon were put out and peace was maintained. The peoples of all countries satisfied themselves that by their active struggle for peace they could prevent a new world war. The Soviet Union's steadfast struggle for peace made for the growth of its prestige and influence in the world.

The Party defeated ideologically and organisationally the anti-Party group of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and others, who had opposed the Leninist policy charted by the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. The home and foreign policy pursued by the Party in the spirit of tested Leninist principles and traditions is firmly supported by the whole Soviet people.

Upon achieving, from 1953 to 1958, outstanding successes in every sphere of home and foreign policy, and upon completing the construction of socialism, the Soviet people set about fulfilling new great tasks of communist construction.
CHAPTER EIGHTEEN
THE PARTY INSPIRES AND ORGANISES THE FULL-SCALE CONSTRUCTION OF COMMUNIST SOCIETY
(1959-1961)


The Soviet Union entered the period of the full-scale construction of communism following new major changes in the alignment and balance of world forces. The world socialist system had grown stronger. In the competition between the two systems, socialism was winning one position after another from capitalism and achieving important victories.

The mighty wave of the national liberation movement had swept away the colonial regimes in many countries. The peoples of the greater part of Africa, once a preserve of colonialism, had gained political independence. The victory of the Cuban revolution had greatly stimulated the struggle of the Latin American peoples for their complete national liberation. A large group of Asian, African and Latin American countries uncommitted to military political alliances and advocating peace had emerged on the world scene. They had become an important factor in the struggle against the war danger and colonialism.

The mounting class struggle in the capitalist countries in those years was weakening the position of imperialism. The years 1959-61 were marked by a powerful rise of the strike movement. Mass political actions by the working class grew in strength to such a degree as to cause the fall of governments in Japan, Italy and Belgium, and foil attempts by the ultras to impose a fascist regime on France. The peasant and general democratic movement against the tyranny of the monopolies and the reactionaries gathered momentum.

The struggles of the working class and of the wide masses for peace, national independence and social progress were led by Communist Parties. Several new Communist Parties sprang up in those years. The increased might of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries created a situation in which the general trend of world
development was determined by socialism and not by capitalism as in the past. Due to the radical change in favour of socialism which had occurred in the balance of world forces, the policy of the peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems was acquiring an increasingly solid basis.

But this did not at all imply that the aggressive imperialist camp had relaxed its activity aimed at unleashing new wars. The U.S. monopolies and militarists—the principal inspirers of aggressive policies—continued a frenzied arms race. In Europe, the threat to peace came primarily from the West German imperialists. The Bundeswehr had become a major military force in Western Europe, and the Bonn Government was doing all it could to secure nuclear weapons.

The C.P.S.U. and the Soviet Government had to show a great deal of self-control, firmness and skill to defeat the intrigues of the enemies of peace and socialism. In those years as at the previous stages of history, the U.S.S.R. was an unshakable bulwark of peace, the freedom of the peoples, and human progress.

To promote peace in Europe and elsewhere on the globe, the Soviet Government was pressing for a peaceful settlement of the German problem and the conclusion of a German peace treaty that would do away with the survivals of the Second World War. A peace treaty would have tied the hands of the Bonn revenge-seekers and brought the protracted occupation regime in West Berlin to a close. It would have confirmed the existing frontiers as specified by the Potsdam Agreements and would have eliminated the highly dangerous centre of subversion against the German Democratic Republic and the other socialist countries that the imperialists had made of West Berlin. As far back as November 1958 the Soviet Government had called attention to the need to transform West Berlin into a free demilitarised city. Since there existed two German states, it proposed concluding a common peace treaty with them. Should this, however, prove unacceptable to the imperialist countries, the Soviet Government was willing to sign a separate treaty with each German state. It suggested that a German peace treaty be signed jointly with the Western Powers and all the countries which had fought against Germany. But the relevant negotiations with the Western Powers launched in 1959 were getting nowhere. For this reason, the Soviet Government declared that in the event of the Western Powers refusing to sign a German peace treaty, the Soviet Government would sign it with the German Democratic Republic without them, for it was impermissible to put off indefinitely a measure which had long been outstanding and was imperative for the consolidation of peace in Europe.

Being concerned for the preservation of peace, the Soviet Union strove to improve relations with all the capitalist countries on the basis of the Leninist principle of the peaceful coexistence of countries
with different social systems. It considered the improvement of Soviet-American relations particularly important. This was the purpose of the trip which N. S. Khrushchov made to the United States in the autumn of 1959 and which helped to spread the truth about the Soviet Union, about its home and foreign policy, among the working people of the U.S.A. During his visit the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. reached agreement with the U.S. President on the advisability of a meeting of the Heads of Government of the U.S.A., U.S.S.R., Britain and France. Discussions between them could be of great political importance for peace.

At the same time the C.P.S.U. and the Soviet Government increased their efforts for disarmament. In September 1959 N.S. Khrushchov, speaking at the Fourteenth Session of the U.N. General Assembly, put forward a programme for general and complete disarmament under strict international control. That historic appearance of the Head of the Soviet Government aroused a widespread echo throughout the world. Under strong pressure from public opinion, the session adopted a resolution appealing to all countries to work for the speedy implementation of general and complete disarmament. If put into effect, the Soviet proposal would have guaranteed a lasting peace all over the planet and saved colossal funds that could be spent on improving the living standards of people.

The U.S. imperialists were doing their utmost to frustrate the efforts of the Soviet Government towards strengthening peace. They did not want the international atmosphere to improve and stopped at no provocation, however brazen, to prevent the incipient détente. One of their provocations was the dispatch of spy aircraft into Soviet air space, an act grossly violating universally accepted standards of international law. In the spring of 1960 Soviet rocket troops shot down a U.S. U-2 spy plane and took its pilot prisoner.

Thus the act of aggression committed by the U.S. Government was exposed. By this act and by other provocations, the U.S. President and Government torpedoed the summit meeting for which the Heads of the Four Great Powers had arrived in Paris in the spring of 1960. The imperialist reactionaries had aggravated the international situation once again.

The C.P.S.U. and the Soviet Government continued their peace effort with unflagging energy. In the autumn of 1960, N.S. Khrushchov on behalf of the Soviet Government submitted to the Fifteenth Session of the U.N. General Assembly a draft of Basic Provisions For a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament. The governments of the imperialist powers raised all sorts of obstacles to a favourable decision of this question. They also took a negative stand on the draft resolution submitted by twelve neutral countries and backed by the socialist countries. The draft indicated the minimum measures required for working out the fundamentals of a Treaty on General and
Complete Disarmament. The imperialists continued to sabotage the issue of disarmament.

The struggle for disarmament, a durable peace and the national independence of the peoples brought the views of the socialist countries and the new sovereign states of Asia and Africa close together. This became particularly obvious at the Fifteenth Session of the U.N. General Assembly, during the debate on the complete abolition of colonialism and the draft Declaration on the Granting of Independence to the Colonial Countries and Peoples, submitted by the Head of the Soviet Government. The colonial powers led by the United States tried hard to prevent the General Assembly from passing a resolution on the abolition of colonialism. But at the Session there was formed a broad front of peace-loving socialist and neutralist countries that took a resolute stand against colonialism. The Soviet initiative was supported by a majority of the delegations, and the Assembly approved the Declaration in the face of resistance by the colonial powers.

The peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America saw again that the Soviet Union was their true friend. It fully supported their struggle to break free from colonial oppression and take the road of independent development. The U.S.S.R. supported the lawful government of the Congo against imperialist aggression in 1960. When, in the spring of 1961, the U.S. imperialists engineered an invasion of Cuba, the Cuban people, in routing the invaders, drew on the aid of the Soviet Union and of the socialist camp as a whole. The backing which the patriotic forces of Laos were given by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries helped the Laotian people to stand their ground against U.S. attempts to subdue them and involve them in an aggressive military bloc led by the United States. The Soviet Union renders extensive and disinterested economic, scientific and technical assistance to all the countries which have won their freedom from colonialism and to all underdeveloped countries.

The setbacks of imperialist policy in Cuba and other parts of the world did not, however, stop imperialist attempts at aggression. In the summer of 1961 the ruling circles of the United States, West Germany, France and Britain aggravated the international situation still further. The aggressive NATO bloc began openly to threaten the Soviet Union with war. Preposterous as it may seem, its threats were prompted by the Soviet effort to achieve a peaceful settlement of the German problem and normalise the situation in West Berlin on that basis. The U.S. imperialists were prepared to plunge mankind into a nuclear war in order to maintain the occupation of West Berlin. The United States backed its threats by increasing appropriations for military purposes and stepping up the arms race.

The Soviet Union was compelled to take vigorous steps to strengthen its defences. The Soviet Government called a halt to the reduction of the Armed Forces planned for 1961, increased defence expend-
iture and resumed its tests of new nuclear weapons. All nuclear tests had been discontinued on the initiative of the Soviet Government, with the U.S.A. and Britain reluctantly following suit. But as the U.S.A. and Britain had earlier carried out a long series of tests, they were abiding by their commitments in name only, while their ally, France, was carrying on tests, sharing with her NATO partners the experience she gained. In fact, the United States and France signed a special agreement on this score in 1961.

The Soviet Union warned the U.S.A. and Britain that France's nuclear weapons tests released the U.S.S.R. from the undertakings it had given. The increasingly aggressive policy of the U.S.A., Britain and France compelled the U.S.S.R. to take steps towards perfecting its thermonuclear weapon and resume the testing of new types of it. This measure was also prompted by the Western Powers' obvious reluctance to sign a treaty completely banning all nuclear weapons tests. The Western Powers were threatening the U.S.S.R. with nuclear war even as they remonstrated hypocritically at the fact that the Soviet Union was reinforcing its defence potential. Faced with direct threats from the imperialist powers, the Soviet Government was obliged to do everything to increase the country's defensive capacity. The Soviet Union's resumption of thermonuclear weapons tests accorded fully with the necessity for maintaining peace and with the interests of all mankind. The nuclear-rocket might of the U.S.S.R. is a decisive factor in safeguarding peace and one of the main means of deterring the imperialists from unleashing a world war.

The Soviet Government vigorously supports a ban on testing any kind of nuclear weapons. It considers that this matter should be settled in conjunction with that of general and complete disarmament.

The Party and the Soviet Government were seeking peaceful business relations and progress in economic and cultural intercourse with all countries. Contacts between leading Soviet statesmen and foreign political leaders became extensively developed. They went a long way towards improving the relations between the U.S.S.R. and capitalist countries, disproving adverse notions about the Soviet Union spread by imperialist propaganda and explaining the true objectives and policies of the C.P.S.U. and the Soviet Government. Foreign trips by N.S. Khrushchov, L. I. Brezhnev, F. R. Kozlov, A. N. Kosygin, A. I. Mikoyan, M. A. Suslov and other Party officials and statesmen helped to draw further millions of people into the struggle for peace, democracy and socialism.

The entire foreign policy activity of the Party in those years confirmed the correctness of the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence, the corner-stone of Soviet foreign policy, which aims at safeguarding peace and creating as favourable international conditions as possible for building communism. The C.P.S.U. and the Soviet Government
steadily laid bare the schemes of the imperialists; they initiated measures to promote peace, and strove to rally the peace forces of the world against imperialist reaction and aggression.

2. The U.S.S.R. Enters the Period of the Full-Scale Construction of Communist Society. Twenty-First Party Congress

The Soviet people, carrying out the decisions of the Twentieth Party Congress, made notable progress in economy, culture and science. The level attained by the productive forces and by socialist social relations and culture showed that the Soviet Union was passing to a higher stage of communist construction.

The Twenty-First Extraordinary Congress of the C.P.S.U. was in session from January 27 to February 5, 1959. The Congress delegates represented 7,622,356 members and 616,775 candidate members of the Party. The Congress was also attended by delegations from the Communist and Workers’ Parties of seventy-two foreign countries.

The Congress was convened to consider and approve the draft of a Seven-Year Economic Development Plan of the U.S.S.R. It met after a discussion of the theses of the report on the Seven-Year Plan by the Party and the whole people, a discussion in which over 70 million persons took part. N.S. Khrushchev made at the Congress a report “On the Control Figures for the Development of the Soviet National Economy in 1959-65”.

The Congress approved the activity of the Central Committee, the important measures which the C.C. had carried out since the Twentieth Congress in home and foreign policy, measures which had ensured the successful advance of the Soviet Union towards communism and the growth of the might and international prestige of the Soviet state. It demonstrated the solid unity and increased prestige of the Party and the Soviet people’s close unity around the Party. More than a million people had joined the Party between the Twentieth and the Twenty-First congresses. The Congress unanimously approved the decisions of the June 1957 plenary meeting of the Central Committee which had exposed and ideologically routed the anti-Party group of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and others.

The Congress summed up the great victories achieved by the Party and the Soviet people. N. S. Khrushchev’s report and the Congress resolution drew the important conclusion that socialism in the U.S.S.R. had triumphed finally and completely. There are now no forces on earth capable of restoring capitalism in the U.S.S.R., of overwhelming the socialist camp. As a result of radical changes in every sphere of the life of society, and due to the victory of socialism, the Soviet Union has entered a new period of its development, the period of the full-scale construction of communist society. The main tasks in this period are: to provide the material and technical basis for
communist society; to develop and perfect socialist social relations; to educate Soviet people in a communist spirit.

The whole of the previous development of Soviet society paved the way for the Soviet Union's entry into the period of full-scale communist construction. All aspects of the life of Soviet society benefited especially from the Leninist policy of the Party outlined by the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. By denouncing the Stalin personality cult, the Party cast off the shackles hampering the country's advance to communism. The creative activity of the Party and the people, and the growth of the productive forces of the country were afforded a wide scope.

The activities of the Party became more fruitful. The re-establishment and promotion of Leninist standards of Party life and principles of leadership encouraged the creative effort of Communists and the initiative of Party organisations. As had been the case in Lenin's lifetime, the Party began a free and business-like discussion of various questions, and principled self-criticism and criticism of shortcomings. All the elected bodies of the Party began to be convened at regular intervals; they discussed and settled questions collectively. The guiding and organising role of the Party in the life of Soviet society increased and the bonds linking the Party with the masses became stronger. Discussion of major issues of Party policy by the entire Party and by the people as a whole became the rule. Reliance on the collective wisdom and experience of the people made the Party more keen-sighted and enabled it to see better the road to be followed in advancing to communism. The Communist Party was becoming a party of the whole Soviet people.

The Party's resolute condemnation of the negative practices current under the personality cult radically improved the social climate of the country. The people realised better than ever before the true nature and vitality of socialist democracy. People began to show greater readiness in taking the initiative, sharing their experience and using public meetings and the press for an earnest discussion of various problems. The work of local government bodies, trade unions and the Komsomol became richer in content and more fruitful. The fullest expansion of democracy, and enhancement of the role of representative government bodies and voluntary organisations became paramount features of the development of socialist statehood.

Important changes took place in the economic field. In the sphere of material production all that was new and progressive was fostered. The Party restored the Leninist principles of economic management and carried out a series of important economic measures. Shifts for the better were brought about in every branch of the national economy by improving management and planning methods, developing more effective production branches, making use of new scientific and technical achievements, and offering greater material incentives.
to efficient labour. A high rate of growth was achieved in social production. The level attained by the socialist productive forces, and important changes in the social and political spheres made possible the transition to the establishment of the material and technical basis of communism and the gradual development of socialist social relations into communist relations.

The Soviet people were aware of the Party’s concern for raising their standards of living. This concern was evident in all fields: in the vast scale of housing construction, the development of immense tracts of virgin lands that yielded additional tens of millions of tons of grain, the accelerated expansion of the industries producing consumer goods, and other developments. Wages and salaries increased, and so did the real incomes of collective farmers. Public consumption funds for meeting many of the Soviet people’s requirements free of charge began to grow fast. In 1958 the various forms of free education embraced more than 50 million people, the entire population received free medical care, about 20 million people drew a pension, 3,300,000 students received allowances, 7 million mothers of large families and unmarried mothers were paid grants in aid, and 5 million children were cared for in children’s institutions gratuitously or for a small fee.

The Twenty-First Congress of the Party approved the control figures for the Soviet Union’s economic development from 1959 to 1965. The main target of the Seven-Year Plan was “a further steep rise in all branches of economy on the basis of a priority growth of the heavy industry and a substantial increase in the country’s economic potential with the purpose of ensuring a steady improvement of the standard of living” (Decisions of the Twenty-First Extraordinary Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Eng. ed., Moscow, 1959, p. 63).

The Seven-Year Plan envisages high rates of development and a considerable absolute growth of output in all economic branches. Total industrial output in 1965 is to exceed the 1958 volume by roughly 80 per cent, with output of the means of production increasing by 85-88 per cent, and that of consumer goods by 62-65 per cent. The average annual growth of industrial production is planned to approximate to 8.6 per cent. Within the seven-year period, the absolute growth of industrial production is to equal the increase achieved during the previous two decades.

Under the Plan, output is to reach the following totals in 1965: pig-iron, 65 to 70 million tons; steel, 86 to 91 million; rolled metals, 65 to 70 million; iron ore, 150 to 160 million; oil, 230 to 240 million tons; electric power, 500,000 to 520,000 million kwh. During the same period, gas extraction and production are to increase fivefold, output of chemical products roughly threefold, and output of the engineering and metal-working industries twofold. Coal output is also to go up substantially. It is planned to produce sufficient quantities
of fabrics, garments, footwear and certain other necessities to satisfy amply all demands. Attainment of the planned increase in total agricultural output will make it possible fully to supply the population with staple foodstuffs, increase the supply of agricultural raw material and meet all of the country’s other requirements in farm produce. The plan stresses the especial importance of increasing grain output in every way.

State capital investments in the national economy from 1959 to 1965 will amount to 194,000-197,000 million new rubles, or almost as much as was invested in the national economy since the Soviet state came into being. About 50 per cent of the investments will go to the industries, including the building and building materials industries. Huge sums are to be invested in agriculture, transport and communications, housing and communal development and in the construction of schools, hospitals, cultural, servicing and medical establishments. The eastern areas of the country—the Urals, Siberia, the Far East, Kazakhstan and Central Asia—are to receive priority attention. All the Union Republics will be further advanced economically and culturally.

The promotion of labour productivity through the extensive use of scientific and technical achievements in all economic fields is the mainspring of extended socialist reproduction and accumulation and of a further improvement of the people’s standard of living. At the end of the seven-year period, labour productivity will increase by 45 to 50 per cent in industry, 60 to 65 per cent in building and as much on the state farms, and roughly twofold on the collective farms.

Effective fulfilment of the Seven-Year Plan will create conditions for meeting the material and spiritual requirements of the Soviet people in fuller measure. In 1965 the national income will increase by 62 to 65 per cent against the 1958 amount, public consumption funds by 60 to 63 per cent and the volume of retail trade by roughly 62 per cent. The Seven-Year Plan envisages complete abolition of the taxes levied on the population, the construction of approximately 15 million flats in towns and industrial settlements, the provision of more nurseries, kindergartens, boarding-schools, and homes for the aged, and extension of the public catering system. In the closing years of the Seven-Year Plan, industrial, professional and office workers will begin to be transferred to a forty-hour week, which afterwards will be gradually reduced to 35-30 hours.

Important measures are planned in the fields of public education and scientific progress. The transition from seven-year to eight-year universal compulsory education will be effected. The network of town and village schools providing young people with secondary education in off-work hours, and of secondary specialised and higher schools will be increased. Many more specialists with secondary and higher qualifications will be trained. All the branches of science will be advanced at a still higher rate. Scientific research aimed at
accelerating production in all economic fields is to be carried out on a large scale. The seven-year period will be marked by further achievements in socialist culture—the press, radio, television, the cinema, literature and art.

In the political sphere, the Congress set the task of further promoting the socialist system and the unity and solidarity of the Soviet people, vigorously strengthening the alliance of the workers and peasants and the friendship of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., fostering Soviet democracy and the initiative and activity of the people, extending the functions of voluntary organisations in the decision of matters of state, and increasing the organising and educational role of the Party and the socialist state.

The Congress pointed out that the main task in the ideological field was to devote more attention to ideological education by the Party, increase the communist consciousness of the people, above all of the rising generation, educate people in the spirit of industry and collectivism, Soviet patriotism and internationalism, awareness of their public duty and strict observance of communist moral principles, and to overcome the survivals of capitalism in their minds and combat bourgeois ideology.

The Soviet Union’s entry into the period of full-scale communist construction made it necessary for the Party to solve in a creative spirit a number of major problems of the development of socialism into communism. The Twenty-First Congress of the C.P.S.U. outlined the ways and means of solving them.

The experience of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. had shown that society cannot pass from capitalism straight to communism, by-passing the socialist stage. The transition to communism comes after the construction of socialism. Communism grows out of socialism, being its direct continuation. This is a continuous historical process. The period of the full-scale construction of communist society is one of rapid growth of the productive forces and of the development of socialist social relations into communist relations.

Guided by the Leninist principle of the unity of theory and practice, and creatively applying Marxist-Leninist propositions, the Congress defined the paths towards establishing the material and technical basis for communism, shaping communist social relations and educating the new man. N.S. Khrushchov’s report and the Congress resolution scientifically substantiated important problems of the full-scale construction of communism: the development and perfection of socialist relations of production by gradually bringing closer together co-operative and collective-farm property and the property of the whole people, and eventually merging them to form a single, communist property; the development of the socialist principle of distribution by fostering the interest of the members of society building communism in the results of their labour, and by combining material and moral inducements; the development of socialist
statehood into public self-government on communist lines by promot-
ing and perfecting Soviet democracy. The propositions on the ways of transition from socialism to communism elaborated by the Twenty-
First Congress of the C.P.S.U. enriched Marxist-Leninist theory with new deductions.

The Seven-Year Plan of the U.S.S.R. is of vast international sig-
nificance. Its effective fulfilment will strengthen the positions of the Soviet Union and the socialist system in the world, reveal the advan-
tages of socialism over capitalism more fully and win millions of new supporters for socialism.

The Seven-Year Plan initiated a new stage in the economic com-
petition of socialism and capitalism. Its fulfilment will constitute a big stride towards the solution of the fundamental economic task of the Soviet Union. In 1965 the U.S.S.R. will exceed the 1958 level of the U.S.A. in absolute output of some of the main industrial products, and in the case of other items will closely approach it. Also, the Soviet Union will by then have surpassed the level attained by the U.S.A. in 1958 in the output of the more important agricultural products, both as a whole and per head of population. A deci-
sive shift will take place in the world economy in favour of social-
ism. The socialist system will gain superiority over the capitalist system in material production, the decisive sphere of human activity.

The fulfilment of economic plans by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries will create still more favourable conditions for preserving world peace. The achievements of the socialist countries and the economic potential to be built up by them will bring about a decisive superiority in the balance of world forces in favour of peace. Backed by the power of the socialist community, the peace-
loving peoples will be able to force the bellicose imperialist circles to renounce their plans for new wars. It will thus become really pos-
sible to banish world war from the life of society even before the complete triumph of socialism on earth, with capitalism surviving in part of the globe.

Congress decisions state that the Soviet Union sees it as its highly important task to contribute in every way to the unity of the socialist countries, the development of close economic and cultural ties be-
tween them, and the further consolidation of the socialist common-
wealth of peoples on the Leninist principles of proletarian interna-
tionalism. The Congress noted with satisfaction that the Declaration of the Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties in 1957, unanimously adopted by all the Communist and Workers' Parties, had become a programme of militant action for the world Communist movement. It declared that together with the other Communist Parties, the C.P.S.U. was responsible for the fortunes of the world Communist movement. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Congress resolution said, "will continue to follow faith-
fully the great international teaching of Marx, Engels and Lenin,
combat revisionists of all hues, uphold the purity of Marxism-Leninism, and work for new successes of the world Communist and working-class movement” (Declarations of the Twenty-First Extraordinary Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Eng. ed., Moscow, 1959, p. 35).

The Seven-Year Economic Development Plan of the U.S.S.R. is an embodiment of the Party’s Leninist general line in the period of the full-scale construction of communism. The chief task of the Party and the people is to ensure its complete fulfilment. The Congress called on the Party, government, trade union and Komsomol organisations to take the lead in the people’s effort for fulfilling the Seven-Year Plan, and to extend the scope of socialist emulation to assure a continuous increase in labour productivity, technical progress in all economic branches and the propagation of the experience of innovators.

The Twenty-First Extraordinary Congress of the C.P.S.U. was an important milestone in the Soviet Union’s advance to communism. Its historic significance lies in the fact that it adopted the Seven-Year Economic Development Plan, announced the Soviet Union’s entry into the period of the full-scale construction of communism, and made an important contribution to Marxist-Leninist theory.

3. The Struggle of the Party to Fulfil the Seven-Year Plan.

The Organising and Political Work of the Party Among the Masses

The Seven-Year Economic Development Plan adopted by the Twenty-First Congress of the Party inspired Soviet people to work with the greatest devotion. The Party organisations and the personnel of factories and collective and state farms sought out new reserves and put them to use in communist construction. The whole country set about fulfilling the Seven-Year Plan.

The motto of the country-wide socialist emulation movement was “Let us fulfil the Seven-Year Plan ahead of schedule!” In the van of the emulation were teams and individual workers using communist methods of labour. The movement for communist labour, which had arisen before the Twenty-First Congress of the Party, was growing fast. Its motto was: Learn to live and work the communist way.

In May 1960 an all-Union meeting of the foremost participants in the emulation of communist work teams and shock-workers was convened on the initiative of the C.C. C.P.S.U. At that time the movement for communist labour involved upwards of five million people. In October 1961, it was 20 million strong. Some 800 factories and 187,000 teams had won the honorary title of communist labour collectives and over 3,000,000 workers, engineers and technologists, that of workers using communist methods of labour. The powerful
movement of communist labour collectives and shock-workers was a vivid indication of a communist attitude to labour on the part of Soviet people, an attitude whose first shoots Lenin saw in communist subbotniks. This movement moulds the traits of the man of communist society. The people rightly describe those engaged in it as pioneers of the future.

The growth of the Soviet workers' political consciousness and of their cultural and technical standards was vividly seen in the outstanding achievements of the followers of Valentina Gaganova, a Party member in charge of a spinners' team at the Vyshni Volochok Cotton Mill. She was the first in the Soviet Union to go over from an advanced team into a lagging one, well knowing that her wages would drop at the beginning. And it was not long before she had brought that lagging team alongside the advanced ones.

The country-wide socialist emulation reinforced the millions-strong army of rationalisers and inventors, who contributed a great deal to the development and improvement of techniques and to production organisation. This played an important part in the annual targets of the Seven-Year Plan being reached ahead of schedule.

Party organisations worked perseveringly to improve the management of industrial establishments, perfect planning and utilise internal production reserves. In the first three years of the Seven-Year Plan industrial output increased by 33 per cent against the 27 per cent planned. During the same period, 19,000 million rubles' worth of industrial products were put out over and above the plan. In 1961 alone industry produced almost as much as it had produced throughout the period of the post-war Five-Year Plan. Today the Soviet Union accounts for nearly one-fifth of the world's industrial output, or for more than that of Britain, France, Italy, Canada, Japan, Belgium and the Netherlands put together.

Very substantial progress was made in the leading heavy industries. During three years of the Seven-Year Plan steel output went up by 15,800,000 tons, which almost equals the yearly output of France. Oil output increased by 52,900,000 tons—in other words, almost three new Bakus were brought into being in three years. Electric power generation grew by 92,000 million kwh, that is to say, the Soviet Union acquired the equivalent of thirty power stations the size of the Dnieper Power Station.

The higher rate of growth of production was largely due to technical progress in every branch of the national economy. The Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. called on the Party organisations to study and widely popularise the experience of the foremost workers and to utilise the latest achievements of science and technology in production operations. Two plenary meetings of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., held in June 1959 and July 1960, were devoted to problems of technical progress in industry. The two meetings, which were attended by many prominent scientists, engineers and advanced
industrial workers, discussed reports from local organisations on the fulfilment of the decisions of the Twenty-First Party Congress regarding the development of industry and transport and the use in production of the latest scientific and technological achievements.

The plenary meetings noted the considerable advances made in the technical re-equipment of industry. The scale of scientific research and experimental work had increased since the Twenty-First Congress. Much had been done in designing new types of equipment and new machines and machine-tools, automatic and semi-automatic lines, up-to-date instruments and means of automation. Progressive technologies and over-all mechanisation were being used in production on an extensive scale. New industries guaranteeing the greatest technical progress were further developed, including electronics, the atomic industry, specialised metallurgy and polymer chemistry. The electric power industry was put on a new technical basis. The chemical industry was developing at a much higher rate. Building projects were supplied with new mechanical facilities.

The reorganisation of management in industry and building contributed to the effective fulfilment of Seven-Year Plan assignments. This vital measure increased the role of Union Republics and local Party, government and economic bodies in economic development, and stimulated the creative effort and initiative of the people. All the industries began to make better and fuller use of production reserves.

Output indices in industry would have been higher had all the Party and economic organisations paid greater attention to technical progress. Many economic councils and factories failed to fulfil plans for developing and introducing new machinery and equipment; certain new machines, devices, instruments and materials were not equal to modern standards as far as their technical and economic indices were concerned. The heads of some of the economic councils and industrial works violated state discipline by failing to fulfil plans for co-ordinated deliveries, resorting to parochial practices or diverting investments and materials intended to serve the interests of the country as a whole to secondary uses of local significance without authorisation.

The C.C. C.P.S.U. re-emphasised that the cardinal objective of the Seven-Year Plan—that of gaining as much time as possible in the economic competition between socialism and capitalism—could be attained only through technical progress and a rapid increase in productivity of labour.

The Central Committee pointed out that with the emphasis shifted to efficient leadership at local level, public control over fulfilment of the directives of the Party and the Government acquired great importance. Its June 1959 plenary meeting found it advisable to set up in the primary Party organisations of industrial and trade undertakings committees for control over the work of the management.
The committees were entrusted with seeing to the fulfilment of government assignments and the observance of state discipline.

The decisions adopted by the two plenary meetings went a long way towards improving work in the industries, transport and building. The industries began to work more steadily and to exceed output quotas.

Capital construction assumed an immense scale. The first three years of the Seven-Year Plan saw about 3,000 large industrial establishments go into operation, including the hydroelectric station on the Volga named after the Twenty-Second Congress of the C.P.S.U., with a capacity of 2,500,000 kw, the Kremenchug, Baltic and other power stations. At the close of 1961, the builders of the Bratsk Hydroelectric Power Station, one of the world's greatest, completed and put into operation four units with an aggregate capacity of 900,000 kw. The world's largest power grids were set up and thousands of miles of oil and gas pipes laid. By the time the Twenty-Second Congress of the C.P.S.U. was convened, through traffic had started on the electrified railway linking Moscow with Lake Baikal. Its length of about 3,400 miles is unmatched anywhere in the world. Other units that went into operation were the Karaganda and Kuibyshev iron and steel works, blast furnaces ranking among the world's largest, many new mines, and new plants manufacturing machinery, chemical products, sugar, textiles and so on. By the end of 1961 the production capacities put into operation during the first three years of the Seven-Year Plan approximated to one-third of the basic production assets of Soviet industry.

The Soviet people were working hard under the leadership of the Party to promote agriculture. Agricultural production and state purchases of farm produce showed a great increase over the 1953 amount. In 1960 grain output was 131.2 million tons as against 80.6 million in 1953. Notable progress was also made in livestock husbandry on the collective and state farms. Nevertheless, there were serious shortcomings in agriculture. The Party took timely measures to remove them and ensure the continuous growth of agricultural production.

In December 1959 and January 1961 the C.C. C.P.S.U. at its plenary meetings discussed reports by the Party organisations of the Union Republics on progress in crop and livestock farming. Prominent people working on state and collective farms, agricultural experts and scientists attended the meetings. The resolutions passed by the meetings pointed out that many Party and government organisations had relaxed attention to agricultural production. After the December 1959 plenary meeting of the Central Committee, they had undertaken to achieve great increases in agricultural production but had not made vigorous efforts to keep their word. What is more, some functionaries had adopted the criminal course of deceiving the state by resorting to eyewash and garbled figures. A serious lag
was revealed in the rate of growth of agricultural production, particularly that of meat and milk. This caused understandable concern in the Party.

The January 1961 plenary meeting of the C.C. C.P.S.U. severely criticised the work of those Party organisations and condemned manifestations of complacency and indifference. This criticism of shortcomings took place in a situation entirely different from that in 1953, when there was a serious lag in all the branches of the country’s agriculture. Now shortcomings were laid bare at a time when agriculture was steeply rising. The Party bore in mind, however, that agriculture fell short of industry in rate of growth of output. Agriculture was unable to keep pace with the powerful progress of industry and the growing demand for foodstuffs. The country’s population had grown by more than 18 million in a mere five years (1956-60) and at the same time incomes had increased considerably. There was a greater demand for food, above all meat, milk and butter. The Central Committee therefore called on the Party organisations to step up their effort in agriculture and achieve higher rates of growth in crop and livestock farming.

The plenary meeting of the Central Committee called for an increase in agricultural production to a level that would keep it continually ahead of demand. To meet the country’s requirements in full, it made provisions for increasing annual purchases of grain to 67.2 million tons, of meat to 13 million tons and of milk to 50 million tons within the next few years.

The resolutions of the January plenary meeting of the Central Committee envisaged substantially increasing appropriations for agriculture and providing it with more ample material resources and technical facilities. The mighty industry set up in the country made it possible to spend more on the industries directly engaged in improving the standard of living of the people, above all agriculture, without detriment to the further growth of industry and the defence potential of the country. The resolution of the plenary meeting paid great attention to the problem of irrigating millions of acres of land in Central Asia, the Volga region, the southern areas of the Russian Federation and the Ukraine, and in the Transcaucasian republics, as well as of reclaiming lands in Byelorussia, the Baltic republics and the Polesye region of the Ukraine. The resolution provided for increasing the output of mineral fertilisers and improving supplies of up-to-date machinery to the collective and state farms.

The plenary meeting of the Central Committee invited Party organisations and government and agricultural bodies to draft—with the extensive participation of the people—measures for increasing the output of grain, industrial crops, vegetables, potatoes, meat, milk and other products. It laid special emphasis on the need to raise large maize crops, expand pig and poultry farming, increase the head of dairy cattle and provide a stable fodder supply. An impor-
tant means of advancing agriculture was to bring the lagging farms level with advanced ones and to apply widely the experience of the foremost workers, since their achievements set an example and served as a beacon for all who worked in agriculture.

The Central Committee condemned the excessive tendency of some local leaders to reorganise collective farms into state farms. This tendency could have stemmed only from an underestimation of the vitality of the collective-farm system and its immense potentialities, from an underestimation of the importance of collective farms as a school for the communist education of the peasantry. It showed that some people did not realise that the fusion of the two forms of socialist property in the countryside in a single communist form would come about, not through gradually curtailing collective-farm and co-operative property, but through consolidating it and gradually bringing it closer to the property of the whole people.

The plenary meeting of the Central Committee emphatically condemned those who resorted to eyewash and deception of the state. It pointed out that people guilty of these practices were careerists who had wormed their way into the Party and were bent on acquiring prestige by dishonourable methods instead of by their work and intelligence, and that it was necessary to wage a determined fight against them. The surest way of inducing Party organisations to counteract more vigorously practices injurious to the state, and of ensuring that these practices were appraised with proper severity, was strict adherence to the Leninist standards of Party life, and above all the principle of collective leadership.

Following the January 1961 Plenary Meeting of the C.C. C.P.S.U., meetings of the foremost people of the Soviet countryside were held in the principal zones of the Soviet Union. N. S. Khrushchov, G. I. Voronov, F. R. Kozlov, A. I. Mikoyan, D. S. Polyansky, M. A. Suslov, N. M. Shvernik and the secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics took part in those meetings. The meetings served as a school for teaching methods of agricultural management in concrete terms, and a democratic form of verifying fulfilment of Party and Government decisions. They were distinguished by frank exchanges of opinion and a principled criticism of shortcomings, and they worked out effective measures to overcome difficulties. Furthermore, they clearly showed the new style of leadership of the people by the Central Committee as the collective organ of the Party. Taking into account the experience of the foremost workers, the meetings outlined measures for a fuller use of the potentialities of socialist agriculture.

The collective farmers and state-farm workers were enthusiastically fulfilling the assignments for the third year of the Seven-Year Plan. The total grain harvest and grain purchases by the state increased. Grain purchases in 1961 amounted to 50.9 million tons; they
exceeded the figure for the previous year by 5.3 million tons although the year 1961 was not very favourable climatically.

Seven-Year Plan assignments for improving the standard of living of the people were also being successfully fulfilled, and the output of consumer goods was growing. A sum of approximately 2,500 million rubles was appropriated above that envisaged by the Seven-Year Plan to increase the production of fabrics, footwear and other necessities and to provide a greater supply of raw materials for their production. In accordance with the decisions of the Twenty-First Congress of the Party, the Fifth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in May 1960 enacted a law completing the transfer of all industrial, professional and office workers to a seven- or six-hour day, which came into force in 1960. Another law passed by the session provided for abolishing the taxation of workers and other employees within the seven-year period.

The construction of housing and of cultural and servicing establish­ments had assumed a large scale. In three years of the Seven-Year Plan, the living space of the houses built in towns and industrial settlements totalled 2,610 million square feet, or 6,700,000 new flats. During the same period, collective farmers and the rural intelligentsia built over 1,900,000 houses. Fifty million Soviet people, or almost one quarter of the country’s population, moved into new homes between 1957 and 1961. Thousands of schools, pre-school children’s establishments, hospitals and health and holiday homes were built in three years of the Seven-Year Plan.

Soviet science made great advances, particularly in the peaceful uses of atomic energy and in space exploration. In 1961 Y. A. Gagarin and H. S. Titov, two Soviet Communists, accomplished the first space flights in history. It was a tremendous achievement of science and technology, an unprecedented victory of man over natural forces, opening a new era in space research.

Science in the Soviet Union has become a matter of great state importance. It receives special attention from the Communist Party, the Soviet Government and the people as a whole. An all-Union meeting of scientific workers, held in June 1961, discussed urgent problems of scientific progress and co-ordination of research. In its message of greeting to the meeting, the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. pointed out that communism in the U.S.S.R. was being built on an unshakable scientific foundation and was based on a thorough knowledge of the objective laws of development of nature and society. The role and significance of science increased in the period of the full-scale construction of communist society. In all the more important directions, Soviet science was called upon to advance as quickly as possible to a leading position in the world.

The Party specially concerned itself with strengthening the links between science, on the one hand, and practice, the creative effort of the people, on the other. It is on this basis that science made prog-
ress in the past and will be assured of further successes in the fu-

ture.

"Only a science," said the message of the C.C. C.P.S.U., "which
keeps abreast of life, draws on the inexhaustible sources of the
creative effort of the people for inspiration and serves the people
with devotion, has a future. Soviet science, which bases its achieve-
ments on the method of dialectical materialism, has nothing to
do with dogmatism and stagnation, and is inspired by the life-
giving ideas of socialist humanism, is precisely a science of
that kind" (Pravda, June 13, 1961).

Further progress was made in Soviet culture, and in ensuring that
the cultures of Soviet socialist nations came closer together and en-
riched one another.

In keeping with Lenin's recommendations, the Party steadily
promotes the best cultural traditions of the peoples of the U.S.S.R.
The whole country celebrated the anniversaries of Pushkin, Lev
Tolstoy, Nekrasov, Chekhov, Belinsky, Glinka, Gogol, Shevchenko,
Kupala, Rustaveli, Khetagurov, Navoi and other outstanding ex-
ponents of the cultures of the Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian,
Georgian, Uzbek and other peoples of the Soviet Union, as well as
the anniversaries of Lomonosov, Mendeleyev, Tsiolkovsky, Popov
and other scientists.

The Party propagates among wide sections of the peoples of the
U.S.S.R. all that is best, most humane and most democratic in cul-
tural heritage. It shows how, in the difficult conditions of the old
regime, the foremost minds of the country advanced science, letters
and art, how they followed a path which may be described in the poet
Nekrasov's words:

*Sow the seeds of that which is sensible
and good and lasting,
Sow them, and you will hear heart-felt
thanks
From the Russian people... ."

The Party regards the achievements of the progressive culture of
the past and the greatest cultural achievements of the Soviet period
as components of a single whole. The ten-day national art festivals
and the anniversary celebrations dedicated to people prominent in
Soviet literature, art and science were very important in this respect.

Socialist social relations were perfected through the successful
development of the productive forces. This found an expression in
the property of the whole people and collective-farm and co-operat-
eive property gaining in strength and drawing closer together, in the
extension of socialist democracy, in the consolidation of the social,
political and ideological unity of Soviet society, and in the forma-
tion of communist principles in the lives and work of Soviet people.
The trade unions and other voluntary organisations, to which some
of the functions of government bodies had been transferred, extended the scope of their activities. The working people were drawn into active participation in the management of state affairs and production.

In inner-Party life, collective leadership was strengthened and Party democracy promoted by consistently applying the principle of democratic centralism and Leninist standards of Party life. Guided by Lenin's recommendations, the Central Committee and its Presidium did their utmost to promote the Leninist principle of collective leadership.

The Party's primary organisations and district committees became more active. In 1961 there were over 71,000 primary organisations in industry, building and transport, and upwards of 50,000 on collective and state farms. Their organising role had increased, and Party control over the fulfilment of state plans had become more effective. The role of the Communist vanguard had grown, over 70 per cent of the Communists being engaged in the decisive spheres of production. The Central Committee repeatedly addressed letters to the primary organisations, explaining the urgent tasks of communist construction and informing the Party membership of important steps in home or foreign policy.

The development of the voluntary principle constituted a new factor in the activity of all Party bodies and organisations in those years. Paid Party staffs were reduced and the number of commissions, departments and instructors working on a voluntary basis increased. The development of inner-Party democracy, the extension of the rights and enhancement of the role of local bodies, the consistent implementation of the collective principle, and the spread of the principle of work on a voluntary basis made the Party organisations still more efficient and strengthened their links with the people.

The Party improved the standard of ideological work, the main purpose of which is to make Soviet people communist-minded and shape their Marxist-Leninist world outlook. Of great importance for the improvement of ideological work was the decision "On the Tasks of Party Propaganda in Present Conditions", adopted by the C.C. C.P.S.U. in January 1960. By carrying out this decision, Party organisations extended the range of their propaganda and agitation work. They took vigorous steps to get rid of dogmatism and quotation-mongering in Party propaganda, and brought the latter closer to the realities of life, to the practical tasks of communist construction. Party propaganda benefited from the appearance of the second edition of the Collected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, the fifth complete edition of Lenin's Collected Works, collections of Party decisions, the textbook History of the C.P.S.U., The Biography of V.I. Lenin, and the manuals Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, Political Economy, Fundamentals of Marxist Philosophy and Fundamentals of Political Knowledge.
The decision to convene the Twenty-Second Congress of the C.P.S.U., and the publication of the drafts of the Programme and Rules of the C.P.S.U. for discussion by the Party membership and the whole people led to a general upswing of political activity and labour all over the country and a new wave of socialist emulation. Preparations for the Congress took the form of rallying the whole people to fulfil Seven-Year Plan assignments ahead of schedule.

4. The Role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Strengthening the World Socialist System and Furthering the Solidarity of the World Communist Movement

The Communist Party and the Soviet people, in setting out to build communism, vigorously helped to develop and strengthen the world community of socialist countries. The effective fulfilment of Seven-Year Plan assignments, the rapid growth of production and the tremendous achievements of science and technology enabled the Soviet Union to increase its all-round assistance to fraternal countries.

The Soviet Union made a major contribution to the industrialisation of the socialist countries. It granted them credits and loans on favourable terms amounting to some 8,000 million new rubles in foreign exchange. Over 750 large industrial establishments have been or are being built in the people's democracies with Soviet help. Thousands of Soviet specialists worked in those countries at the request of their governments. The Party and the Soviet people looked on this assistance as their internationalist duty.

The economic development of the world socialist system took a markedly industrial trend. In 1961 the share of industry in total industrial and agricultural output in the socialist countries averaged about 75 per cent.

By early 1961 most of the people's democracies had successfully solved a most difficult problem of socialist construction, that of the association of peasant farms in production co-operatives. The conditions in which this task was accomplished varied. In the European socialist countries, the peasants were greatly attached to private land ownership. In the Asian countries, the survivals of feudalism and patriarchalism were still very strong. In helping to set up farming co-operatives, the fraternal Parties took into account the specific conditions prevailing in their respective countries, skilfully combined the general principles of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of socialist construction, and made creative use of the experience of collectivisation in the U.S.S.R. The co-operative system became firmly established in the socialist countries. In 1961 the socialist sector accounted for more than 90 per cent of the total agricultural land of the socialist countries. Thus the great vitality of Lenin's
The co-operative plan was proved not only by the Soviet example but by that of other socialist countries. The achievements of socialism in the people’s democracies provided a basis for the firm establishment of socialist relations of production. The class structure of society changed. The landlords and capitalists disappeared. The working class became the chief force of society. The alliance of the workers and peasants under the leadership of the working class—an alliance underlying the people’s democratic system—grew stronger.

Thus the working people of the socialist countries, led by their Marxist-Leninist Parties and drawing on fraternal co-operation and mutual assistance, brought about radical socio-economic changes and achieved decisive results. The world socialist system entered a new stage of its development. The distinguishing feature of this stage is that the Soviet Union has begun the full-scale construction of communism and that most of the other socialist countries are completing the construction of socialism.

High rates of economic development are typical of socialism. In 1958-61 the annual rate of growth of industrial production in the socialist countries averaged about 13 per cent, almost three times as high as in the capitalist countries. The share of the socialist system in the industrial production of the world was steadily growing. It was roughly 20 per cent of world industrial output in 1950, 27 per cent in 1955 and nearly 37 per cent in 1961.

The C.P.S.U. was doing all it could for strengthening the socialist community, for closer bonds between the socialist countries, and for their political and economic consolidation on the principles of equality and mutual advantage. From 1959 to 1961 the Soviet Union concluded long-term agreements with other socialist countries on economic, cultural, scientific and technological co-operation and on mutual deliveries of goods.

An important result of the development of the socialist system was the establishment of a powerful basis for a single world socialist economy. There was an increased need to use the advantages of the international socialist division of labour, economic co-operation, and the potentialities of the world socialist market wisely and as fully and effectively as possible. Close economic co-operation enables each socialist country to make rational use of its internal potentialities and resources, maintain scientifically justified proportions in the development of various branches of the economy, develop the productive forces more rapidly, and steadily improve the standard of living of the people.

In the relations between socialist countries today the chief thing is co-operation in production, joint effort in the sphere of material production—co-ordination of economic plans, and specialisation and co-operation in production. The socialist countries of Europe reach agreement among themselves on the manufacture of basic
industrial products. Co-operation among them in the mutual supply of metals, electric power, fuel, machinery and various raw materials has expanded. The Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic are jointly building the giant Friendship pipe-line to deliver Soviet oil to those countries. Together with fraternal countries, the U.S.S.R. carries on highly important scientific and technological research. A major scientific centre in which scientists from the socialist countries are working—the Joint Nuclear Research Institute, has been set up in Dubna, U.S.S.R.

Since the vital interests of the peoples of the socialist community are alike, the various national economies are drawing closer and closer together within a single world socialist economy. Increased economic co-operation enabled the socialist countries to begin drawing up and co-ordinating long-range economic development plans reaching to 1980. Fulfilment of these plans will end the differences in economic level that came into being between the socialist countries in the course of history, and will provide a material basis for their more or less simultaneous transition to communism. The achievements of the U.S.S.R. which has entered the period of full-scale communist construction, facilitate and accelerate the advance of the other socialist countries to communism.

The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation—collective bodies of the socialist countries—have grown stronger. The Soviet Union takes an active part, together with other socialist countries, in the work of these bodies, and scrupulously carries out their decisions. It has become a regular practice to hold consultations and exchanges of views between Party and Government leaders of the socialist countries on major economic and political issues. In February 1960 representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the European socialist countries met in Moscow to share experience in agricultural development. In August 1961 a meeting of the First Secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Warsaw Treaty countries discussed preparations for the conclusion of a German peace treaty.

The links between the C.P.S.U. and fraternal Parties expanded and became closer. Soviet Party and Government and Party delegations visited all the socialist countries during the years 1959 to 1961. In their turn, similar delegations from the socialist countries and delegations from the Marxist-Leninist Parties of many capitalist countries visited the Soviet Union.

Visits by Party and Government delegations from the socialist countries and the presence of delegations from fraternal Parties at Party congresses are used for exchanges of opinions on questions of mutual interest. The Third Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party met in June 1960. The representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties attending it exchanged views on pressing issues of the
international situation. The participants in the exchange unanimously adopted a communiqué reaffirming their allegiance to the principles laid down in the Declaration and Peace Manifesto of 1957.

In November 1960 representatives of Communist and Workers’ Parties held a meeting in Moscow. It was the most representative forum of the world Communist movement and was attended by delegations from eighty-one parties, including a delegation from the C.P.S.U. led by N. S. Khrushchov.

The Meeting discussed urgent problems of contemporary world development and the Communist movement and unanimously adopted a Statement of the Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers’ Parties, as well as an Appeal to the Peoples of the World. The two documents were models of creative development of Marxism-Leninism and embodied the collective judgement of the Communist and Workers’ Parties. They elaborated and enriched the ideas expressed in the Declaration and Peace Manifesto of 1957.

The Meeting’s policy document, the Statement, generalised the many-sided experience of the world Communist movement; it made a profound Marxist-Leninist analysis of world development and of the international situation of the day, and summed up the outstanding achievements of the socialist system and the working-class and national liberation movements. The description of the contemporary epoch given in the Statement is of tremendous importance.

“Our time,” says the Statement, “whose main content is the transition from capitalism to socialism initiated by the Great October Socialist Revolution, is a time of struggle between the two opposing social systems, a time of socialist revolutions and national liberation revolutions, a time of the break-down of imperialism, of the abolition of the colonial system, a time of transition of more peoples to the socialist path, of the triumph of socialism and communism on a world-wide scale” (Programme Documents of the Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism, p. 39).

The principal distinguishing feature of the present stage is that the world socialist system and the forces fighting against imperialism, for a socialist reorganisation of society, determine the content, main direction and main characteristic of the historical development of society.

In describing the world capitalist system, the Statement points out that that system is passing through a far-reaching process of decline and decay. The general crisis of capitalism has entered a new stage characterised by the fact that it is a product, not of war, but of the competition going on between the two systems, of the increasing shift in the balance of forces in favour of socialism, a sharp aggravation of all the contradictions of imperialism and a tremendous growth of the anti-imperialist forces throughout the world. The United States of America is the bulwark of imperialism and world
reaction, the biggest international exploiter, a world gendarme and an enemy of the peoples of the world, backing the most reactionary and tyrannical regimes.

The Meeting noted that socialism had achieved decisive victories throughout the world socialist system. Today the socio-economic opportunities for restoring capitalism have been eliminated not only in the U.S.S.R. but in all the people’s democracies. The combined forces of the socialist community safeguard each of its member countries against imperialist encroachments and guarantee the complete triumph of socialism within the community. The Meeting called on the Communist and Workers’ Parties of the socialist countries to foster their unity and study their collective experience in socialist construction, make fuller use of the advantages of the socialist system and the resources of every country, abide by internationalist principles in the relations between countries, educate the working people in this spirit and take an uncompromising stand against all manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism.

The Statement and the Appeal constitute an elaborate programme for a resolute and purposeful struggle of the peoples against the threat of a new world war. The Communists see their historical mission not only in banishing all wars from the life of society for all time but in delivering mankind even in the present epoch from the nightmare of a new world war.

“We Communists,” says the Appeal to the Peoples of the World, “regard it as our sacred duty to do all in our power to spare mankind the horrors of modern war” (Programme Documents of the Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism, p. 87).

As long as imperialism remains, there is soil for wars of aggression, which are inspired chiefly by U.S. imperialism. But war is not fatally inevitable. Time is working for socialism and against capitalism. The near future will bring the forces of peace and socialism further successes. Their superiority will become absolute. In these circumstances, it will become actually possible to banish world war from the life of society even before socialism triumphs on earth, with capitalism surviving in part of the globe. The triumph of socialism throughout the world will finally remove the social and national roots of all wars.

The Statement stressed that at a time when the world is divided into two systems, the only correct and reasonable principle of international relations is that of the peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems, a principle put forward by Lenin and elaborated in the Declaration and Peace Manifesto of 1957, the decisions of the Twentieth and Twenty-First congresses of the C.P.S.U. and the documents of the Communist and Workers' Parties. Implementation of the programme for general and complete disarmament proposed by the Soviet Union would be of historic importance for the fortunes of mankind.
The Meeting noted that the colonial system of imperialism was collapsing under the impact of the national liberation movement. This is a development ranking next in historic significance to the formation of the world socialist system. The peoples of the countries which have taken the path of national independence can—with the support of the socialist community—resist imperialist intrigues, establish national democracies and take the path of non-capitalist development. The socialist countries and the international working-class and Communist movement consider it their duty to extend the fullest moral and material support to the peoples fighting to free themselves from imperialist and colonial oppression and to the peoples who have won their national independence.

The Statement deeply analyses the working-class movement in the capitalist countries. The main blow in present-day conditions should be aimed at the capitalist monopolies, whose interests are irreconcilable with those of the majority of the nation. It is possible on this basis to rally all the forces opposing the monopolies, achieve unity of action of the working class and strengthen its alliance with the peasantry. The Meeting appealed to the Social-Democratic rank and file to re-establish the unity of the trade union movement and other democratic organisations on a national and international scale.

After discussing the forms of transition of different countries from capitalism to socialism, the Meeting reaffirmed the proposition of the 1957 Declaration regarding the possibility of both a peaceful and a non-peaceful transition to socialism. With all forms of transition to socialism, the political leadership of the working class headed by a Marxist-Leninist party, and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat are decisive conditions. The Communist Parties, says the Statement, while opposing the export of revolution, are at the same time fighting resolutely against the imperialist export of counter-revolution. The Meeting called for indefatigably exposing anti-communism, which the bourgeoisie and its helpers use as a pretext in their struggle against the proletariat.

The world Communist movement has become the most influential political force, a most important factor for social progress. At the time the Meeting took place there were Communist Parties in eighty-seven countries uniting over 36 million members. They had ideologically defeated the revisionists in their ranks and unanimously condemned the Yugoslav variety of international opportunism. The Statement underlines the necessity for continuing a resolute struggle on two fronts—against revisionism, which remains the chief danger, and against dogmatism and sectarianism. It warns that unless dogmatism and sectarianism are combated with determination, they can likewise become the chief danger in some parties. What makes them harmful is that they hamper creative development of Marxism-Leninism, prevent a timely and correct appraisal of the situation and the use of new experience, isolate the Communists from people, doom
the parties to passive expectancy and Leftist actions, frustrate unification of the working class and all democratic forces in their fight against imperialism, reaction and the war danger, and prevent the peoples from being victorious in their just struggle.

The principles of co-operation between Marxist-Leninist Parties elaborated by the Meeting are very important. The interests of the Communist movement oblige every party to defend the unity of the movement in keeping with the principles of Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism, prevent any action likely to undermine this unity, and strictly adhere to the jointly elaborated appraisals and conclusions regarding common tasks in the struggle against imperialism, for peace, democracy and socialism.

The Meeting spoke highly of the activity of the C.P.S.U. The Statement said:

"The Communist and Workers' Parties unanimously declare that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been, and remains, the universally recognised vanguard of the world Communist movement, being the most experienced and steeling contingent of the international Communist movement. The experience which the C.P.S.U. has gained in the struggle for the victory of the working class, in socialist construction and in the full-scale construction of communism, is of fundamental significance for the whole of the world Communist movement. The example of the C.P.S.U. and its fraternal solidarity inspire all the Communist Parties in their struggle for peace and socialism, and represent the revolutionary principles of proletarian internationalism applied in practice. The historic decisions of the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. are not only of great importance for the C.P.S.U. and communist construction in the U.S.S.R., but have initiated a new stage in the world Communist movement, and have promoted its development on the basis of Marxism-Leninism" (Programme Documents of the Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism, pp. 83-84).

The main result of the Meeting was the further consolidation and strengthening of the unity of the world Communist movement on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, of proletarian internationalism. It was evidence of a new brilliant victory of the great Leninist ideas.

The documents adopted by the Meeting are a major contribution to the treasury of Marxism-Leninism.

The January 1961 plenary meeting of the C.C. C.P.S.U., upon discussing the results of the Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties, approved the activity of the delegation of the C.P.S.U. to the Meeting and the documents adopted by the Meeting. Its resolution said that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union regarded the Statement and the Appeal to the Peoples of the World adopted by the Meeting as most important Marxist-Leninist documents, accepted them as a guide to action and would
strictly adhere to the appraisals and conclusions contained in them.

All the Communist and Workers' Parties unanimously approved the Statement of the Meeting and its Appeal to the Peoples of the World. These documents became a fighting programme for the world Communist movement. The results of the Meeting were welcomed with deep satisfaction by hundreds of millions of people—the working men and women of the socialist countries, the workers and wide masses of the people in the capitalist countries, the champions of national independence and the whole of peace-loving mankind.

The strength of the world Communist movement lies in its unity and solidarity and in its loyalty to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, of proletarian internationalism. But the leadership of one party, the Albanian Party of Labour, whose representatives had put their names to the documents of the Meeting, departed from the common agreed line of the world Communist movement. Following the Meeting, the A.P.L. leaders openly took the road of splitting the community of socialist nations and the world Communist movement, and began to fight against the C.P.S.U. and the Marxist-Leninist line of the Communist movement.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union adheres strictly and undeviatingly to the documents of the meetings of the Communist and Workers' Parties held in 1957 and 1960. The C.P.S.U. does everything to live up to the great trust put in it by the fraternal Parties, that is, to be the militant vanguard of the world Communist movement. It has fought, and continues to fight indefatigably, to strengthen the unity of the movement in keeping with the principles of Marxism-Leninism, of proletarian internationalism. The fidelity of the C.P.S.U. to the great principles of Leninism has been proved by its long heroic history, by its signal achievements in socialist and communist construction.

**BRIEF SUMMARY**

In 1959 the development of the Soviet Union entered a new period, the period of the full-scale construction of communist society. Between 1959 and 1961, the international situation remained tense owing to acts of aggression committed by the imperialist countries. The Party worked perseveringly for peace, for general and complete disarmament under strict international control, for a peaceful settlement of the German problem, the establishment of business relations and the promotion of economic and cultural ties with all countries.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union contributed actively to the consolidation of the world socialist community. Socialist relations of production became established in the people's democracies, the people's democratic system gained strength, and the living
standards of the working people improved. The world socialist system entered a new stage of its development.

The powerful national liberation movement of the oppressed peoples led to the collapse of the colonial system. The Soviet Union, consistently opposing colonialism, showed by deeds that it was a true friend of the peoples fighting for their national independence. It actively supported their struggle against the colonialists and against imperialist aggression.

The links between the C.P.S.U. and the fraternal Parties expanded and became closer. The 1960 Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties again demonstrated the unity and solidarity of the world Communist movement based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, of proletarian internationalism.

The Soviet people, led by the Communist Party, achieved victories of historic magnitude. Socialism triumphed completely and finally in the U.S.S.R. The Seven-Year Economic Development Plan for 1959-65, adopted by the Twenty-First Congress of the C.P.S.U., is an important element of the great programme for building communism in the U.S.S.R. The Congress scientifically substantiated the cardinal problems of the transition from socialism to communism.

In putting the decisions of the Twenty-First Congress into effect, the Party and its Central Committee headed by N.S. Khrushchev brought about a further advance in industry, agriculture and culture and an improvement in the living standards of the people. Communist principles were taking shape in labour and in everyday life on the basis of the growth of the productive forces. Socialist democracy reached a higher level. The social, political and ideological unity of the Soviet people became stronger.

The country that was building communism began a new era in man's exploration of space. The space flights which Soviet man accomplished for the first time in history were further evidence of the great advantages of socialism, a colossal achievement of Soviet science and technology, an unparalleled victory of man over natural forces.

The consistent implementation of the Leninist principles and standards of Party life promoted collective leadership in the Party at all levels; in Party bodies, work on a voluntary, unpaid basis became a common practice; the Party rank and file became more active and began to show more initiative. The organising and ideological work of the Party and its local organisations attained a higher level.
TWENTY-SECOND CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE NEW PARTY PROGRAMME

1. A Congress of Builders of Communism

It has fallen to the lot of the Soviet people and their Communist vanguard to fulfil the great historic mission of pioneering the realisation of the most dearly cherished dream of mankind, that of establishing a communist society. After bringing about the complete and final triumph of socialism, the Soviet people began the full-scale construction of communism.

The Central Committee of the Party carried out the assignment of the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. by preparing and publishing, in the summer of 1961, a draft of the new Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It also published draft Rules of the C.P.S.U. About 73 million people, including over nine million Communists, took part in the pre-Congress discussion of the draft Programme by the Party and the whole people, which lasted two and a half months.

The Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—a congress of builders of communism—was held from October 17 to 31, 1961, in an atmosphere of the greatest solidarity of the Soviet people rallied around the Party. It was the numerically largest congress in the history of the C.P.S.U. and brought together 4,408 delegates with the right to vote and 405 delegates with voice but no vote, representing 9,700,000 Communists. It was also attended by guests—delegations from eighty Marxist-Leninist Parties and representatives of democratic parties from a number of African countries.

The Party came to its Congress solidly united, closely linked with the people and enriched with further political experience. The Congress reflected the character of the Party as a party of the whole people, the Party’s increased strength, the beneficial effect of the restoration and further development of Leninist standards in the activities of the Party, and the ideological, political and cultural growth of its membership. Nearly half the delegates with the right to vote were Com-
munists working in industry, transport, communications, building or agriculture. Three-quarters of the delegates had received a higher or secondary education. The Congress was representative of both veteran and young members of the Party.

The attention of the whole Soviet people and of working people throughout the world was riveted on the Congress. The Congress received over 10,000 reports on the fulfilment of pre-Congress undertakings, and many thousands of telegrams and letters conveying ardent greetings.

The Congress heard and discussed the "Report of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U." and the report "On the Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union", both of which were presented by N. S. Khrushchev, as well as F. R. Kozlov's report "On Amendments to the Rules of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union". Its resolution on the Report of the Central Committee approved of the political line and practical activities of the C.C. C.P.S.U. between the Twentieth and the Twenty-Second Party congresses. With great enthusiasm the new Programme was adopted and the Rules approved.

Major changes had occurred in the life of the country and the Party during the six years that had passed since the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U., as a result of the implementation of the Leninist course charted by the Congress, of the Party's bold, creative solution of big problems facing the Soviet Union, and of outstanding achievements in the country's home and foreign policy. As the Twenty-First Extraordinary Congress of the C.P.S.U. pointed out in 1959, a new stage had begun in the activities of the Party and the Soviet people a stage of revolutionary changes, a stage at which the material and technical basis for communism was to be provided.

The far-reaching political and economic measures carried out by the Party with the support of the whole Soviet people, and the increased might of the U.S.S.R., combined with progress in socialist construction in the other socialist countries, had a tremendous impact on international relations, the emancipation struggle of the peoples and the world Communist movement.

The Congress, summing up the results of the foreign policy of the Party and the Government, noted the qualitatively new features of contemporary world development.

In the course of the competition between the two social systems of the world, a competition which is the main content of the present epoch, socialism is becoming the decisive factor in social development. This is due to a number of circumstances. The might of the socialist countries, which have attained a high rate of economic development and are pushing back capitalism in the sphere of material production as they steadily increase their share in world production, is growing. The political, economic, cultural and military co-operation of the socialist countries is increasing. At the same time, capitalism is becoming weaker due to new economic and political upheav-
als, the collapse of the colonial system of imperialism, major ideological reverses, the aggravation of imperialist antagonisms, the growing political activity of the masses, the sharpening of the class struggle and the increasing scope of the movement of the peoples for peace, democracy, national independence and socialism.

It is typical of the present stage of history that the Communist movement has become the most influential political force of the epoch. This finds expression in the increased militancy and prestige of the Marxist-Leninist Parties and in the growing influence they exercise on the course of history. All reactionary attempts to eliminate or weaken the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries have failed. The number of Communist Parties has increased and the number of their supporters is growing. The Communists hold first place among the political parties and organisations of the world in terms of influence on the people. The historic Meetings of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties, held in 1957 and 1960, and the policy documents drawn up by them and approved by all the Marxist-Leninist Parties were clear indications of the increased strength and further consolidation of the world Communist movement. Fraternal Parties point out that the Leninist policy worked out by the Twentieth Congress contributed in appreciable measure towards increasing their militancy and strengthening their links with the masses.

The C.P.S.U. regards it as its internationalist duty to promote the unity of the world Communist movement in every way and to combat all who seek to weaken it. The Twenty-Second Congress stressed the great and fruitful effort made by the Central Committee to develop and strengthen co-operation between the C.P.S.U. and fraternal Marxist-Leninist Parties. It underlined the necessity for continuing unrelentingly to expose the theory and practice of modern revisionism, which had found its most concentrated expression in the Programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. It also criticised the actions of the Albanian leaders, who had departed from the Declaration and Statement of the Meetings of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties and behave like splitters undermining the friendship and unity of the socialist countries and playing into the hands of the imperialists.

The national liberation movement has risen to a higher plane. The peoples of the former colonies, who have won their political independence, are striving to end also their economic dependence on the imperialist countries. The existence of the world socialist system and the weakening of the position of imperialism have paved the way for the progress of the newly free peoples. The peoples of the new sovereign states and their progressive leaders, who reject the path of capitalist development, are looking more and more closely into the experience of the socialist countries as they study the possibility of using it in their own countries.
A most important feature of the present epoch is the fact that it has become possible to preserve peace. Events of recent years have borne out the deduction of the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. that in the present epoch wars between states are not fatally inevitable. The mighty forces standing on guard for peace have adequate means of curbing all aggressors and averting a world war. The radical change in the balance of world forces in favour of socialism has strengthened the foundation of the policy of the peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems. The principles of peaceful coexistence have won widespread recognition as the only way of maintaining peace.

The Congress gave its full approval to the foreign policy of the Central Committee and the Soviet Government, a policy intended to prevent war and promote peace. It appraised highly the consistent, flexible and enterprising foreign policy of the Soviet Union and of its increased political, economic and cultural relations with all countries. It described as timely and indispensable the steps taken by the Central Committee and the Soviet Government to strengthen the defences of the country still further, and approved the re-equipment of the Soviet Army with rockets and nuclear weapons.

"The fact that it has been possible to avert war and that the Soviet people and peoples of other countries have been able to enjoy the benefits of a peaceful life should be regarded as the main result of the activity of the Party and its Central Committee in augmenting the might of the Soviet state and implementing the Leninist foreign policy, and as a result of the activity of the fraternal Parties of the socialist countries and the enhanced activity of the peace-loving forces of all countries" (The Road to Communism, Eng. ed., Moscow, p. 410).

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union declared that it would do whatever was necessary to maintain and promote peace on earth and to strengthen friendship between peoples in the name of the triumph of the lofty ideals of social progress and the happiness of the peoples.

The Twenty-Second Congress summed up the results of the activities of the Party and the Soviet people in the period under review and gave a description of the new historical stage of the development of Soviet society.

After the condemnation of the Stalin personality cult at the Twentieth Congress, the Party set out to restore and further develop the Leninist standards of Party life, and to revise the methods of Party and government leadership in keeping with the requirements of communist construction. In the work of Party, government and mass organisations, Leninist principles were re-established and developed still further.

The series of measures imbued with a Leninist revolutionary creative spirit that were effected on the initiative of the Party altered
the social and political climate in the country. The Party had discarded conservative views and concepts hampering progress and was carefully studying the needs of the country and the experience of the masses. It brought to light and encouraged all that was progressive, and fully supported the development of communist principles in every sphere of the life of society. Socialist relations began to develop into communist relations. Soviet society began to assume new features in accordance with the new stage.

Important changes came about in the economic field. Subjectivism in economic policy—a characteristic of the personality cult—was eliminated. The economic measures adopted by the Party began to be in full accord with the objective laws of socialism. Economic management was thoroughly reorganised and became more specific and competent; local organisations and large sections of the people came to play a bigger role in economic and cultural development. The important economic requirement of maximum output at the least possible cost was being increasingly realised. This was done by choosing the more progressive and economically profitable trends of economic development, using new, more effective machinery and re-equipping every branch of the national economy through over-all mechanisation and extensive automation. Science was becoming a highly important productive force of society as it combined with production. Combining the construction of new industrial establishments with the modernisation of the existing ones made it possible to use investments in capital construction more effectively and put new production capacities into operation more speedily. Disparities persisting from war time or stemming from the shortcomings of the economic policy of the period of the personality cult were removed. New economic proportions were being created that would guarantee rapid and harmonious economic progress.

Changes in economic and technical policy opened up new prospects of developing the productive forces and made it possible to bring into play the colossal reserves latent in socialist production and to accomplish more rapidly the tasks involved in providing the material and technical basis for communism. A most important characteristic of the period following the Twentieth Congress was the heightened rate of communist construction.

The Party and the people achieved an immense increase in industrial production and a continuous growth of labour productivity. About 6,000 large establishments went into operation from 1956 to 1964, and industrial output increased by almost 80 per cent. Furthermore, the rapid growth of heavy industry, which retained its leading position in the national economy, was combined with the accelerated development of the industries producing consumer goods. These industries began to manufacture textiles, garments, footwear, furniture and other goods in much greater quantities.
The industrial progress achieved in the first three years of the Seven-Year Plan made it possible to revise plan targets for the subsequent years and increase the control figures for certain key branches of heavy industry. The Congress resolved to divert the funds obtained through the overfulfilment of industrial plans chiefly to agriculture and to the light and food industries.

In agriculture, the material and technical basis of the collective and state farms was strengthened—immense tracts of virgin land were developed, the machine-and-tractor stations reorganised, a new planning procedure introduced and the Leninist principle of material incentives to those engaged in agriculture re-established. All this made for a considerable rise in agricultural output. On the other hand, many problems of agricultural development had yet to be solved. The interests of communist construction call for continuous work to promote crop-farming and especially livestock-breeding, improve the Party's organising work in the countryside and use the ample reserves of socialist agriculture. The Congress set the task of increasing agricultural output within the next few years to such an extent as would fully meet the requirements of the country. To achieve this, it was indispensable to improve the crop pattern, replace ley farming by more intensive systems, introduce highly productive row crops and legumes on a large scale, increase the use of machinery and electricity in farming, use scientific achievements and advanced methods, increase labour productivity and reduce costs per unit produced.

The Party drew on the increased economic resources to carry out a series of measures aimed at improving the standard of living of the people. Consumption increased substantially and the forms of distribution underwent qualitative changes. In the interval between congresses the real incomes of the industrial, professional and office workers had increased by 27 per cent, and those of the collective farmers by 33 per cent. A seven- or six-hour day had been established for industrial, professional and office workers. Housing construction had assumed a vast scale. More and more categories of working people were being exempted from taxes. Public consumption funds intended to meet the requirements of the members of society irrespective of the quantity and quality of their labour—i.e., gratuitously—were increasing. Prompted by the Leninist principle of material incentives, and promoting and improving socialist forms of distribution according to the quantity and quality of labour expended, the Party vigorously supported and fostered communist principles in distribution through public funds for collective use.

The Twenty-Second Congress of the C.P.S.U. instructed the Central Committee to continue directing the efforts of the Party and the people to accelerate communist construction and to fulfil and exceed Seven-Year Plan assignments, which was of decisive importance in providing the material and technical basis for com-
munism and winning the peaceful economic competition with capital.

The Congress called for vigorously advancing heavy industry, achieving further successes in agriculture, steadily increasing productivity of labour in every branch of the national economy through technical progress and thereby ensuring a continuous rise in the living standards of the people.

In the political sphere, the new stage of history was marked by the further all-round development of socialist democracy and by the improvement of the old forms of democracy and the rise of new ones. The political role of the Soviets, the trade unions and the Komsomol increased, and the working people became more active in the economic, political and cultural fields. The people were enabled in greater measure than ever to take a direct part in shaping the policy of the Party and the state through the country-wide discussion of important economic and political measures, in managing production through production conferences, technical and economic councils and other bodies, and solving major problems through commissions and public councils under the Soviets concerned. The rudiments of public self-government on communist lines came into being. All this had a beneficial effect on the life and work of every Soviet citizen, increased his proud awareness of being the master of his country and his responsibility for its fortunes, and encouraged the independent social and political activity, initiative and productive work of the people.

The Twenty-Second Congress also analysed the changes which had taken place in the spiritual life of Soviet society. The adverse effect of the personality cult in the ideological sphere had been overcome and vast opportunities afforded for creative endeavour in every sphere of spiritual activity. The separation of theory from the revolutionary practice of the masses, of ideological activity from the realities of life, which had been caused by the personality cult and had manifested itself in dogmatism and quotation-mongering was at an end. The unity of Marxist-Leninist theory and revolutionary practice had increased, and the revolutionising role of Marxist-Leninist theory had been heightened. The practical work of the people consciously building communism was thoroughly substantiated from the scientific point of view, and communist ideas were becoming an increasingly powerful material force renovating the world as their grip on the minds of the people strengthened.

The Soviet Union has made tremendous progress in culture, science, literature and art. Universal compulsory eight-year education has been introduced. The Congress approved measures for establishing closer links between school and life, promoting extra-mural and evening studies, and training highly skilled personnel for all economic and cultural fields. The more than 350,000 scientific workers and almost 4,000 scientific institutions are evidence of the flourishing state of Soviet science. The Congress called on Soviet scientists
to win leading positions in all the main trends of world science and technology. Recent years had seen many notable literary works and works of art faithfully depicting socialist reality and the life and work of builders of communism. The Congress called for a further effort to promote literature and art, raise their ideological and artistic level and strengthen their connection with the practice of communist construction, with the life of the people.

The entire work of the Twenty-Second Congress and its resolutions marked the triumph of revolutionary innovation, the victory of the creative principle over all manifestations of conservatism—survivals of the personality cult in politics, subjectivism in economic activity, a hidebound approach to technology, dogmatism in theory and sermonising in propaganda. What was new and progressive was given full scope in the spheres of material production and spiritual creative effort.

The Twenty-Second Congress devoted much attention to the life and activity of the Party itself. It emphasised that the personality cult and the related question of the factional group of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and others were not merely a thing of the past. A Party appraisal of these questions was of great importance for shaping a correct Party policy at present and in the future, and for increasing the militancy of the Party. The Party did not confine itself to eliminating the more glaring and intolerable manifestations of the personality cult. It waged a struggle to eradicate all and any survivals of it.

The Congress completely exposed the evils of the Stalin personality cult. On the basis of the decisions of the Twentieth Congress, the Central Committee fully disclosed the grave mistakes made by Stalin, gross violations of socialist legality, abuses of power, and arbitrary acts and repressive measures against many honest people, including prominent Party officials and statesmen. It laid bare the dire consequences of the cult in the economic sphere, particularly in agriculture. Speaking at the Congress, N. S. Khrushchov said:

"What would have become of the Party and the country had the cult of the individual not been condemned, had its harmful consequences not been removed and the Leninist standards of Party and government activity restored? The result would have been a cleavage between Party and people, grave violations of Soviet democracy and revolutionary legality, slower economic progress, a lower rate of communist construction and hence a deterioration of the people's standard of living. In the sphere of international relations, the result would have been a weakening of Soviet positions in world affairs and a worsening of relations with other countries, which would have had dire consequences. That is why criticism of the cult of the individual and the elimination of its consequences were of the utmost political and practical importance" (The Road to Communism, Eng. ed., Moscow, p. 126).
Delegates who spoke at the Congress, as well as numerous Communists who discussed the drafts of the Programme and Rules of the Party at meetings and conferences or in letters they wrote to the Congress, pointed out numerous arbitrary acts perpetrated by Stalin and gross violations of Lenin’s behests he had been guilty of.

The Twenty-Second Congress of the C.P.S.U., voicing the will of the Party, unanimously adopted the resolution “On the Mausoleum of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin”. It found the further presence in the Mausoleum of the sarcophagus containing Stalin’s coffin inadvisable. “The grave violations by Stalin of Lenin’s behests, his abuses of power, mass repressions of honest Soviet people and other actions performed at the time of the personality cult make it impossible to leave the coffin with his body in the Lenin Mausoleum” (The Road to Communism, Eng. ed., Moscow, p. 627).

In accordance with Leninist traditions, the Congress told the Party and the people the truth about Stalin’s abuses of power and emphatically condemned the errors, excesses and anti-Leninist methods bred by the personality cult. It fully restored historical justice and specially stressed the decisive role of the Party and the people in history. It reaffirmed the beneficial policy which the Twentieth Congress had adopted to re-establish and further develop the Leninist standards of Party and state life, enhance the leading role of the Party and foster the creative activity of the people. The Congress expressed the unanimous resolve of the Party to end all the negative manifestations of the cult for all time and not to allow any repetition of it.

We must not, said N. S. Khrushchov at the Congress, allow the rise and development of a situation in which the well-deserved prestige of a leader takes the impermissible form of his glorification leading to the flouting of the principle of collective leadership. He also said:

“In many of the speeches at this Congress, and not infrequently in the press as well, when mention is made of the activities of the Central Committee of our Party, special emphasis is placed on my person, and my role is stressed in the implementation of major measures of the Party and the Government.

“I appreciate the kind feelings by which these comrades are prompted. But allow me to state most emphatically that everything said about me should be credited to the Central Committee of our Leninist Party, to the Presidium of the Central Committee. In fact, not a single important measure, nor a single responsible speech, was undertaken in our country on anyone’s personal instructions. They are all the result of collective discussion and collective decision” (The Road to Communism, Eng. ed., Moscow, p. 354).

The Programme and Rules of the Party and the Congress resolutions laid down further safeguards against relapses into the personality cult. The Congress decisions regarding the elimination of the Stalin personality cult are of vast importance for the life of the
Party, for the advancement of the Soviet Union, for the entire struggle for communism. The Congress again demonstrated to the world Communist movement and to the working people of the globe the Leninist justness and fidelity to principle of the C.P.S.U., and of its struggle for the purity of communism. It showed that the personality cult and the negative developments associated with it were alien to communism and that there must be no room for them in the theory and practice of a Communist party.

The final tearing down of the personality cult by the Twenty-Second Congress of the C.P.S.U., and the measures planned by the Congress against a revival of the cult serve to educate people in the Leninist spirit and to establish proper inter-relations in the Party and its leading bodies. The Party was prompted in this by Lenin’s well-known recommendation that “the whole Party must constantly, steadily and systematically train suitable persons for the central bodies, must see clearly, as in the palm of its hand, all the activities of every candidate for these high posts, must come to know even their personal characteristics, their strong and weak points, their victories and ‘defeats’” (Collected Works, Vol. 7, p. 117).

The Party’s principled, Marxist-Leninist criticism of the personality cult gives warning against abuse of power and its use for personal ends. Leaders are invested with great authority but they also have great obligations. The decisions of the Congress teach Party functionaries and statesmen to realise their tremendous responsibility to the Party, the people and history for using the authority entrusted to them by the people solely in the interests of their socialist country and for the triumph of communism. A leader who forgets this departs from communist principles. The Party and the people will always make a just appraisal of the historical role of any political leader.

2. The Historic Achievements of Socialism. The Main Characteristics and Distinguishing Features of the New Party Programme

In adopting the new Programme, the Twenty-Second Congress summed up the results of the fulfilment of the Leninist Programme adopted by the Eighth Party Congress.

The chief result was the complete and final victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R., a fact of historic importance.

“As a result of the devoted labour of the Soviet people and the theoretical and practical activities of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, there exists in the world a socialist society that is a reality and a science of socialist construction that has been tested in practice. The highroad of socialism has been paved. Many peoples are already marching along it, and it will be taken
Building socialism involves great difficulties for any country. They were particularly great for Russia because she was the first to carry out socialist changes. The world revolutionary working-class movement had no experience in organizing life along socialist lines. It was necessary to blaze a new, historic trail in the face of a hostile capitalist encirclement, eliminating the economic backwardness and dislocation caused by war. The Communist Party, equipped with documents of the Leninist programme, boldly led the people over unexplored ground. On the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory it thoroughly remoulded every aspect of the life of society—the political, economic and class organization of society, law, moral standards and the views of people.

The Party knew well that a new type of state, a socialist state, the dictatorship of the proletariat, was required to curb the exploiters, maintain the country's independence and build a new society. The Soviet people, led by the C.P.S.U., established that state and in fifteen to twenty years replaced centuries-old political, economic and social relations based on private property and the oppression of the working masses by socialist relations based on social ownership of the means of production. The exploiting classes were abolished. The entire wealth of the country became the property of the people. No one could appropriate the fruits of other people's labour. Labour became the only source of material and cultural benefits for all people. The sacred principle "He who does not work shall not eat" was established. Socialism became a reality, the content of the life of the people.

The political system that became firmly established was the rule of the people, Soviet socialist democracy. The working people of the U.S.S.R. are the masters of their country. They take an active part in managing state affairs and in deciding economic and cultural matters, something which does not and cannot exist in a bourgeois republic, however democratic.

When taking state power into its hands, the Party promised the people to transform the poverty-stricken and weak country into a mighty socialist power. Bourgeois leaders jeered at the Bolsheviks' plans. They affirmed that Communists were incapable of creating anything, that they brought nothing but destruction. The Communist Party by its deeds refuted the lies of its enemies.

"The Communists have entered history," N. S. Khrushchev said at the Congress, "as the greatest creative force, a force transforming and renewing the world" (The Road to Communism, Eng. ed., Moscow, pp. 171-72).

A mighty material and technical basis was provided for socialism in the Soviet Union within a historically short period. In 1961 overall industrial output in the U.S.S.R. had increased almost 44-
fold compared with 1913, output of the engineering and metal-working industries had risen 350-fold, and generation of electric power roughly 160-fold.

"The industrialisation of the U.S.S.R.," says the Programme, "was a great exploit performed by the working class and the people as a whole..." (ibid., p. 458).

In carrying out Lenin's co-operative plan, the Party helped the peasants to go over to socialism; it led the establishment of the collective-farm system in the countryside and for the first time in history brought the peasants a happy life. The centuries-long antithesis between town and country, engendered by a society based on exploitation, was abolished. The alliance of the workers and peasants became still stronger. The peasants' social consciousness and psychology changed radically. An entirely new type of peasant—the collective farmer, who is free from exploitation, is educated and has a broad horizon—came into being.

"The introduction in the Soviet countryside of large-scale socialist farming," the Programme says, "meant a great revolution in economic relations, in the entire way of life of the peasantry" (ibid., p. 458).

The Party broke the chains of national oppression and for the first time in history solved the problem of relations between peoples—through their association and union on the principles of equality and voluntary adherence in a single multi-national state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Within the U.S.S.R., every people is guaranteed complete freedom and political and economic equality. The various nations are continuously moving closer together, enriching one another's culture. Soviet people of different nationalities have developed common spiritual features which they owe to socialist social relations and which embody the best traditions of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. Material, political and ideological foundations have been laid, and are undergoing development, for the association of all the peoples of the Soviet Union in a single whole.

The cultural revolution accomplished in the U.S.S.R. under the leadership of the Party has raised the people from spiritual slavery and from ignorance and put within their reach the cultural treasures amassed by mankind over centuries. Before the Revolution, only one-fifth of the children and adolescents went to school. In the first fifteen years after the establishment of Soviet rule, illiteracy was in the main eliminated. Compulsory four-year, then seven-year and lastly, in 1958, eight-year education was introduced. On the average over 50 million people each year attend the Soviet Union's secondary and higher schools, including technical schools. In terms of cultural and educational standards, the population of the Soviet Union has surpassed that of all capitalist countries. The antithesis between intellectual and physical labour, a product of society based on ex-
ploitation, has been abolished. A new intelligentsia that is truly part of the people has come into being. The Soviet Union long ago moved into first place in the world for scale and quality of the training of specialists. Under the leadership of the Party, tremendous progress has been made by Soviet science, which has taken first place in the world in respect of many indices. The greatest forces of social development—the people and culture, the working masses and scientific and technological knowledge—which for thousands of years were shut off from each other, have been reunited, considerably accelerating the progress of Soviet society.

Socialism ensures continuous improvement of the living standards of the people. Soviet people, who freely enjoy cultural benefits, eat and dress better from year to year. Real wages in industry—taking into consideration the abolition of unemployment and the reduction of working hours—have increased almost 5.8-fold in the Soviet period, and real incomes of the peasants approximately sevenfold. Public health is protected by a vast network of medical institutions, and medical care is afforded free of charge. Every year millions of working people and their children take medical treatment or spend their holidays in numerous health and holiday homes, tourist and Young Pioneer camps—gratuitously or at a small cost. Soviet citizens are maintained in old age and in the event of illness or disability. The average expectation of life in the U.S.S.R. has increased to 69 years, which is double that of pre-revolutionary Russia. The housing problem is being effectively solved. Despite the growth of the urban population, devastating wars and the difficulties involved in rehabilitating the national economy, tens of millions of people have been provided with new, well-built flats in Soviet years. Rent in the U.S.S.R. is the lowest in the world—it amounts to five or seven per cent of the wages of industrial, professional and office workers.

The education of the new man is one of the most important achievements of the transforming activity of the Party. Throughout centuries the exploiting system stifled the talents of the people, whom it corrupted by introducing bestial, man-hating customs and habits into their mutual relations. In the course of socialist construction the spiritual cast of Soviet people, and their attitude to the community and to one another, underwent far-reaching, revolutionary changes.

On the very day it came into being, the Soviet socialist state advanced the great slogan of peace. It elaborated and proclaimed, and has consistently been implementing, entirely new principles of relations between countries, principles based on peaceful coexistence; renunciation of war as a means of settling disputes between states, and their solution by negotiation; equality, mutual understanding and trust between countries, consideration of each other’s interests; non-interference in internal affairs, and recognition of the right of each people to decide independently all questions bearing on its
life; strict respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries; promotion of economic and cultural co-operation on the basis of complete equality and mutual advantage. The foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. is a powerful factor for preventing a new world war and safeguarding peace.

By their activity in transforming the country the Communist Party and the Soviet people greatly influenced the course of world history and the destinies of mankind. The Soviet Union played a decisive role in changing the balance of world forces in favour of socialism; this created a favourable situation for the victory of the working people in a number of European and Asian countries, which established people's democratic republics.

The establishment of socialism in the Soviet Union truly marked the triumph of the policy and ideology of the Party; it was a result of its wise leadership of the people. Soviet experience shows that the socialist path is the only correct path for all mankind.

After putting the second Party Programme into effect and building socialism, the Soviet people started on the full-scale construction of the second phase of communist society. It was necessary to chart in scientific terms the further course of development of the country, that is its gradual transition from socialism to communism, the course it must take in building communist society.

Marx and Engels defined the most typical features of communism, of its two phases. Lenin, who elaborated the Marxist propositions on this point, gave a detailed definition of the two phases of communist society, and revealed the law governing the development of socialism into communism. These phases have common features—social ownership of the means of production, absence of the exploitation of man by man, and the gearing of production to the task of meeting the continuously growing requirements of the members of society as fully as possible. But these phases differ materially in the level of development of the productive forces, maturity of social relations, method of distributing the social product, and degree of people's social consciousness.

Socialism is the first, lower stage of communism, a stage growing out of the revolutionary transformation of capitalism. It still bears the birthmarks of the old system. Communism is the higher stage of development of society. When socialism had been built in the U.S.S.R., a more specific, profound and comprehensive analysis of the objective laws of the development of socialism into communism was required, and the necessary opportunities were created for this analysis.

The decisions of the Twentieth and Twenty-First congresses of the C.P.S.U., the elimination of the personality cult and its after-effects, the overcoming of dogmatism and a number of theoretical errors, and the restoration of a creative approach to Marxist-Leninist science and of its connection with practice, provided favourable
conditions for drafting a new Party Programme, the third. The Programme is a product of the collective thought of the Party and its Central Committee, a theoretical generalisation of the experience of socialist construction and world revolutionary practice.

The Programme was elaborated on the basis of creatively developing Marxist-Leninist theory and waging a fight on two fronts — against the revisionists, who distort the fundamental tenets of Marxism-Leninism, and against the dogmatists, who in the guise of defending Marxism-Leninism devitalise its tenets, divorce theory from practice, and reduce Marxist theory to a lifeless scheme.

The Programme of the C.P.S.U. gives a scientific analysis of the experience of the Soviet people. In accordance with the documents of the fraternal Parties, it also generalises the experience of socialist construction in other countries which find themselves in different historical conditions and have inherited from their past different levels of economic development. It reflects and further develops the ideas put forward in decisions of the Twentieth and the Twenty-First congresses of the C.P.S.U. and in the Declaration and Statement of the Meetings of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties.

The concrete character and scientific validity of the new Programme of the C.P.S.U. is one of its most important features. Underlying the Programme are the great Marxist-Leninist ideas regarding the ways of building socialism and communism. It reveals the objective laws of the development of socialism into communism, and paints a vivid and rousing picture of the organisation of the economic, political, cultural and ideological life of society on communist lines. People now have a clear idea of the edifice of communism; they know how it has to be erected and how life in it will be organised. Communism, says the Programme, is a society in which Peace, Labour, Freedom, Equality, Fraternity and Happiness will reign.

The Programme of the C.P.S.U. marks a new stage in the development of the revolutionary theory of Marx, Engels and Lenin. It takes a creative approach to the solution of pressing issues of today. It answers fundamental questions of the theory and practice of the struggle to build communist society, of contemporary world development. It has enriched the theory of scientific communism with new important deductions and theses. It is a philosophical, economic and political substantiation of communist construction in the U.S.S.R.

The Programme of the C.P.S.U. reflects a new stage in the development of the unity of theory and practice. It solidly combines theoretical and political propositions with a practical twenty-year plan for economic and cultural development.

The Programme of the C.P.S.U. is a grandly conceived and, at the same time, realistic plan for building communism in the U.S.S.R. Its every provision is fully substantiated; it is based on the wealth
of experience of the Soviet people and expresses the requirements of life and the interests of the people. Its every provision bearing on the country’s economic advancement, on the creation of the material and technical basis for communism, takes into consideration the fast-developing production, science, culture, actual resources and inexhaustible potentialities of the socialist system.

The Programme of the C.P.S.U. reveals the process of formation of communism and the main trends leading to it, shows the growth of communist features in socialist reality and gives a deeply based description of the stages of formation of communist society.

A typical feature of the Programme is its kinship with the people. It is truly a programme of the whole Soviet people. When, in 1903, the first Party Programme was being adopted, the Party was followed by small groups of advanced workers. When, in 1919, the Party was adopting its second Programme, it was followed by the working class and the bulk of the peasantry. Today the Party is followed by the whole Soviet people, who consider the fulfilment of the new Party Programme to be their own cause and the greatest objective of their life.

The Programme of the C.P.S.U. puts into practice the slogan “Everything for the sake of man, for the benefit of man!” Its entire content is aimed at steadily improving the living and cultural standards of the people, and shows the ways and means of realising the principle of communism: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs”.

The Programme of the C.P.S.U. is inspired by socialist internationalism. It was enthusiastically acclaimed by the fraternal Parties and the working people of the socialist countries. It lights up their future and provides a scientific basis for a higher rate of socialist construction. It has won the approval of the entire world Communist movement and of millions of working people in the capitalist countries, of progressive men and women on all continents. It makes them confident that communism, the most just social system, will be established on earth.

The Programme of the C.P.S.U. is a document of truly communist humanism. It is imbued with the ideas of peace and friendship among the peoples. The historic mission of communism is to do away with wars and establish everlasting peace on earth. The Soviet people, who are building communism, are placing the increasing might of their state in the service of peace and progress.

3. A Programme for Building Communism in the U.S.S.R.

The Programme of the C.P.S.U. gives a unified comprehensive description of communist society and substantiates the objective laws of the development of socialist society into communist society.
It specifies the ways and means of transforming every aspect of life on communist lines: the productive forces and relations of production, the forms of distributing products and meeting people's requirements, class structure and relations between nations, the political organisation of society and the machinery of state, science and technology, culture and art, everyday life and moral standards—the totality of human relations.

"Communism," says the Programme, "is a classless social system with one form of public ownership of the means of production and full social equality of all members of society; under it, the all-round development of people will be accompanied by the growth of the productive forces through continuous progress in science and technology; all the springs of public wealth will flow more abundantly, and the great principle 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs' will be implemented. Communism is a highly organised society of free, socially conscious working people in which public self-government will be established, a society in which labour for the good of society will become the prime vital requirement of everyone, a necessity recognised by one and all, and the ability of each person will be employed to the greatest benefit of the people" (The Road to Communism, Eng. ed., Moscow, p. 509).

The C.P.S.U. raises and solves problems of communist construction as the material and spiritual prerequisites take shape and mature. It is guided by the fact that one can neither skip necessary stages of development nor rest on one's laurels—thereby checking further progress. The Programme envisages consecutive stages of communist construction and is to be fulfilled in twenty years.

During the first decade—1961-70—the Soviet Union, in creating the material and technical basis for communism, will surpass the U.S.A., the wealthiest and most powerful capitalist country, in per capita production. By the end of the second decade—1971-80—the Soviet people will have created the material and technical basis for communism. Communist society will in the main have been built in the Soviet Union. Its construction will be completed in the subsequent period.

Building communism involves the accomplishment of three great interconnected historic tasks: providing the material and technical basis for it, developing communist social relations and educating the new man.

The main economic task of the Party and the Soviet people for the next twenty years is to create the material and technical basis for communism, the highest stage in the development of mankind's productive forces. This implies complete electrification of the country and perfection on this basis of the techniques, technologies and organisation of social production in all the fields of the national economy; comprehensive mechanisation of production operations,
and their comprehensive automation in the subsequent period; widespread use of chemistry in the national economy; vigorous development of new, economically efficient branches of production, new types of power and new materials; all-round and rational utilisation of natural, material and labour resources; organic fusion of science and production, and rapid scientific and technical progress; a high cultural and technical level for the working people. All this will ensure substantial superiority of the U.S.S.R. over the more developed capitalist countries in productivity of labour.

The Party Programme aims at an immense growth of the productive forces. Within the next decade industrial output is to increase roughly 2.5 times, exceeding the present U.S. level. In twenty years, from 1961 to 1980, industrial output should increase not less than sixfold. At the close of the twenty-year period Soviet industry will be producing almost twice as much as the entire non-socialist world is producing today.

The colossal growth of industrial production will be brought about by:

- increasing labour productivity in industry to more than double during the first decade and to four to four-and-a-half times in twenty years;
- completing in the main the electrification of the whole country, meaning the electrification of production operations in industry, transport and agriculture and in the communal services in town and country;
- qualitatively changing the make-up of industry by increasing the role of new, more economically efficient branches;
- rapidly increasing the output of metals and fuels, which underlie modern industry;
- vigorously developing the chemical industry, which greatly extends the opportunities for the growth of the national wealth, and for the output of new, better and cheaper means of production and consumer goods;
- developing engineering and introducing new types of machines and instruments, vigorously promoting the introduction of automatic production lines and machines, means of automation, telemechanics and electronics, and precision instruments;
- comprehensively mechanising and automating production and introducing perfected automatic control systems;
- stepping up the development of jet propulsion technology;
- rationally distributing the industries, which economises social labour, ensures the comprehensive development of areas, specialisation and co-operation, and contributes to the elimination of essential distinctions between town and country;
- accelerating scientific and technological progress to the utmost, stepping up the development of science, improving technology, and achieving a high degree of organisation in labour.
The building industry and transport system have an important part to play in providing the material and technical basis for communism. The Programme envisages the rapid development and technical improvement of the building and building materials industries and of all modes of transport and means of communication.

It is a necessary condition for building communism to establish a well-developed and highly productive agriculture along with a powerful industry. Total agricultural output is to increase 2.5 times in the next ten years and 3.5 times in twenty years. Productivity of agricultural labour is to increase five-to sixfold in twenty years. This growth of agricultural output will be achieved through a well-planned set of technical, organisational and social measures. The Programme envisages:

fully electrifying agriculture and introducing over-all mechanisation of production, including the use of automatic devices;

distributing agriculture—according to a scientifically substantiated plan—by natural and economic belts and areas, and specialising it more thoroughly and on a more stable basis;

applying chemistry to agriculture and carrying out a vast irrigation and land reclamation programme;

introducing a scientific system of crop- and livestock-farming on all collective and state farms;

improving the organisation of production, steadily increasing labour productivity, strictly and consistently observing the principle of material incentive, which implies higher pay for better work;

supplying the collective farms with various means of production and with skilled personnel;

completely eliminating the lag of the economically weak collective farms within the next few years and making all collective farms economically powerful and highly profitable;

vigorously developing collective-farm democracy and promoting the collective principle in the management of collective-farm affairs.

The growth of the productive forces in agriculture will lead to major changes in socio-economic relations. The Programme maintains that the shaping of communist relations in the countryside will come about through the development and improvement of both forms of socialist production—state-farm and collective-farm. All state farms will become model establishments, and their role as leading socialist undertakings in the countryside will grow continuously.

The collective farm is a school of communism for the peasantry. The economic progress of the collective farms will promote the improvement of relations within them by socialising production to a greater extent, by bringing rate-fixing, labour organisation and remuneration closer to the standards and forms existing in state establishments, by going over to a guaranteed monthly payment of labour, and by fostering public services. Socialisation will gradually tran-
scend the limits of individual collective farms, and production rela-
tions between collective farms will be established and strengthened. Production relations between collective and state farms will develop and grow stronger, and so will relations between them and industrial establishments. Agrarian-industrial associations will come into being wherever economically advisable. Agricultural production will be closely co-ordinated with the industrial processing of farm produce. Specialisation of agricultural and industrial establishments, and co-operation between them, will improve.

As it advances to communism socialist agriculture will draw nearer to industry in technical equipment and in the organisation of production. Great qualitative changes will occur in the nature of agricultural labour, which will become a variety of industrial labour. As production on collective and state farms develops and social relations there are perfected it will become possible to pass to communist forms of production and distribution.

“Economic advancement of the collective-farm system creates conditions for the gradual rapprochement and, in the long run, also for the merging of collective-farm property and the property of the whole people into one communist property” (The Road to Communism, Eng. ed., Moscow, p. 524).

The high degree of development of the productive forces of collective farms will ensure all collective farmers a comfortable living, and their requirements will be met by the collective farms. Collective-farm villages will be gradually transformed into enlarged urban-type settlements with modern facilities. The rural population will draw level with town dwellers in living and cultural standards.

“Elimination of socio-economic and cultural distinctions between town and country and of differences in their living conditions will be one of the greatest gains of communist construction” (ibid., p. 532).

Providing the material and technical basis for communism necessitates continuous improvements in economic management and planning. The Party Programme calls for rational and efficient use of material, financial and manpower resources, and the country’s natural wealth, for the elimination of undue expenditure and waste, and for the speedy development and introduction of up-to-date machinery.

“The immutable law of economic development is to achieve in the interests of society the highest results at the lowest cost” (ibid., p. 532).

The colossal growth of the productive forces and the far-reaching socio-economic changes envisaged by the Programme will serve the great task of achieving in the Soviet Union the highest standard of living for the working people ever registered in the history of society, creating conditions for the harmonious and all-round development of man, advancing to full satisfaction of the material
and cultural requirements of people, and subsequently completing the transition to communist distribution.

The Party Programme lays down a great plan for radically improving the living conditions of Soviet people, for raising their standard of living. It shows the interaction of the two fundamental principles of meeting the requirements of citizens: increasing individual remuneration for the quantity and quality of work done, combined with reducing retail prices and abolishing taxes from the population; expanding the public consumption funds intended to satisfy the needs of the members of society free of charge, irrespective of their labour effort. As society advances to communism the role and significance of public consumption funds and the rate of their growth will increase. The transition to communist distribution will be completed when the principle of distribution according to work done has become unnecessary, that is to say, when an abundance of material and cultural benefits becomes available and labour becomes a prime vital necessity for all members of society.

The improvement of the living standards of the working people will take place in consecutive stages. During the next decade the national income of the U.S.S.R. will grow almost 2.5 times, real wages of each working individual will almost double on the average, consumption of the more valuable foodstuffs will increase 1.5-2.5 times and the volume of public catering will grow more than threefold. The Programme envisages, by the close of the first decade, ending the housing shortage, introducing a 35-hour week, increasing the length of paid holidays for industrial, professional and office workers and gradually extending the system of holidays to collective farmers, increasing public expenditure on the maintenance of the incapacitated, and fully meeting, within the next few years, the demand for pre-school institutions.

The national income of the U.S.S.R. is to increase roughly fivefold in twenty years. By the end of the second decade, real incomes per head of population will have increased more than 3.5 times; the volume of public catering will have grown roughly thirteenfold, and will gradually become predominant. Every family will have a flat equipped with modern facilities. Working hours will be cut still further. The survivals of women's unequal position in everyday life will disappear completely and conditions will be provided for women to combine happy motherhood with a more active part in social labour and in scientific and artistic pursuits.

At the close of the twenty-year period public consumption funds will constitute about 50 per cent of the real incomes of the population. Society will provide at its own expense for the maintenance of children in children's institutions and boarding-schools (if desired by the parents); for the full maintenance of the incapacitated; education at all educational establishments; hot lunches for children in all schools, as well as dinners in extended-day schools;
the provision of school uniforms and textbooks; medical care for all citizens, including the supply of medicines and treatment at health homes; the use of flats and communal services; the use of public transport and certain services; the gradual reduction of payment for, and partly gratuitous use of, holiday homes, boarding-houses and tourist camps; ever increasing provision of grants in aid, exemptions and stipends (grants to mothers of many and unmarried mothers, scholarship for students); the gradual transition to free public catering (free dinners) at factories and public offices and in the case of collective farmers engaged in production.

The communist society that is being built is thus advancing towards the full, comprehensive satisfaction of the growing material and cultural requirements of people. Unlimited opportunities are being afforded for genuine liberty and the all-round development of the individual.

The Programme shows how, through the rapid growth of the productive forces and through changes in economic organisation, socialist social relations will develop into communist relations, how the political and spiritual life of society will change and the man of communist society come into being.

The development of socialism into communism leads to the abolition of all class distinctions and to the establishment of a uniform social structure of society. The fusion of collective-farm and cooperative property with that of the whole people will remove the essential distinctions between town and countryside, and class distinctions between the working class and the peasantry will gradually diminish and then disappear altogether. The distinctions at present existing between intellectual and physical labour will be eliminated as a result of major changes in technology and in the nature of labour, and as a result of the higher cultural and technical level of workers and collective farmers. Society will arrive at the establishment of the highest form of social equality, communist equality, which implies an equal relationship to the means of production and equality in distribution, labour, and way of life.

The Programme of the C.P.S.U. describes the political organisation of society during the full-scale building of communist society. It contains scientifically substantiated theses on the development of the state of proletarian dictatorship into a state of the whole people, and on the gradual transition to public self-government.

"Having brought about the complete and final victory of socialism—the first phase of communism—and the transition of society to the full-scale construction of communism, the dictatorship of the proletariat has fulfilled its historic mission and has ceased to be indispensable in the U.S.S.R. from the point of view of the tasks of internal development. The state which arose as a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, has, in the new, contemporary stage, become a state of the entire
people, an organ expressing the interests and will of the people as a whole" (The Road to Communism, Eng. ed., Moscow, p. 547).

The state of the whole people will persist until the complete victory of communism. Only when a developed communist society has been built in the U.S.S.R., and on condition that socialism triumphs and is consolidated in the international arena, will the state become unnecessary and wither away. The state of the whole people has to organise the provision of the material and technical basis for communism and the transformation of socialist relations into communist relations, exercise control over the amount of labour and consumption, ensure a higher standard of living for the people, protect the rights and liberties of Soviet citizens, socialist law and order and socialist property, inculcate into the people conscious discipline and a communist attitude to labour, guarantee the defensive capacity and security of the country, promote fraternal co-operation with the other socialist countries, champion world peace and maintain normal relations with all countries.

The Programme points out the path towards organising society on the basis of communist self-government. It defines the main trend of development of socialist statehood during the building of communism, a trend which consists in vigorously promoting and perfecting socialist democracy, enlisting the active participation of all citizens in the management of state affairs and of economic and cultural development, improving the work of the state machinery and exercising more exacting control over its activity, and increasing the role of voluntary organisations (the trade unions, Komsomol, co-operatives and cultural education associations) in communist construction.

The Programme reflects a new stage in the development of relations between nations in the U.S.S.R. Socialism has initiated the operation of two interconnected trends in the national question: the all-round development of every nation, with an extension of the rights of the Union and Autonomous Republics, and increasingly close relations between nations, with the latter influencing and enriching one another. As communism is built the Soviet nations will draw closer and closer together. The construction of the material and technical basis for communism is leading to increasingly close unity of the Soviet peoples. The effacement of boundaries between classes and the development of communist social relations will increase the social homogeneity of all nations and will contribute towards the development of common communist features in culture, morality and way of life, and towards strengthening mutual trust and friendship among them. The Party guarantees the unfettered development of the languages of the Soviet peoples, without allowing any restrictions, privileges or compulsion in the use of any particular language. The effacement of national distinctions is an objective historical process of a progressive nature. The Com-
munists are doing all in their power to help this process by educating
the people in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and Soviet
patriotism. But this is a very long process, and hastening it arti-
ficially can result only in a resurgence of harmful nationalist sur-
vivals.

To bring about the complete victory of communism and
the triumph of new relations, it is necessary to complete the rapidly
developing process of formation of the new man, the builder and
worker of communist society—a process begun by the socialist rev-
olution. The Party formulates the main tasks in this sphere as
follows: moulding the Marxist-Leninist world outlook in all Soviet
people and educating them in a communist spirit, educating the
members of society through labour; developing a communist atti-
ditude to labour; educating the whole people in the spirit of the great-
est ideological integrity and devotion to the communist cause, in
the spirit of proletarian internationalism and socialist patri-
otism.

The C.P.S.U. sets itself the aim of ensuring the all-round, har-
monious development of the individual, who should be spiritually
rich, morally pure and physically perfect. The Party attaches par-
ticular importance to the education of the rising generation.
The role of moral principles in the life of society steadily increases
during the transition to communism. The Programme advances a
moral code for the builder of communism comprising the following
principles:

devotion to the communist cause; love of the socialist Motherland
and other socialist countries;

conscientious labour for the good of society—he who does not work,
shall not eat;

concern on the part of everyone for the preservation and growth
of public wealth;

a high sense of public duty; intolerance of actions harmful to the
public interest;

collectivism and comradely mutual assistance: each for all and
all for each;

humane relations and mutual respect between individuals—man
is to man a friend, comrade and brother;

honesty and truthfulness, moral purity, simplicity and modesty
in social and private life;

mutual respect in the family, and concern for the upbringing of
children;

an uncompromising attitude to injustice, parasitism, dishonesty,
careerism and money-grubbing;

friendship and brotherhood among all peoples of the U.S.S.R.;
intolerance of national and racial hatred;

an uncompromising attitude to the enemies of communism,
peace and the freedom of nations;
fraternal solidarity with the working people of all countries, and with all peoples.

The all-round development of the individual also implies a high standard of education, his ability for fruitful activity in the spheres of production, science, culture and art, and for active participation in public affairs. The Party Programme envisages measures for the fullest development of public education in which instruction and education will be closely linked with life, with productive labour, as well as for the promotion of all forms of cultural and educational work outside school.

The Party concerns itself specially with promoting science in every respect and increasing its role in communist construction. Science is becoming a decisive factor in the powerful growth of the productive forces of society. Under communism, it will become in full measure a direct productive force of society. The Programme of the C.P.S.U. envisages the rapid development of every branch of science and the strengthening of its links with the creative labour of the people and the building of communism in practice.

Cultural life will develop to the full in the period of communist construction. Soviet literature, music, painting, cinema, theatre, television and all arts will attain new heights in ideological content and artistic mastery. The Programme of the C.P.S.U. devotes much attention to the expansion and enrichment of the artistic treasury of society by combining mass amateur art and professional art.

Cultural progress during the development of socialism into communism is the culminating stage of the great cultural revolution ensuring the provision of adequate ideological and cultural conditions for the triumph of communism.

The Programme of the C.P.S.U. proceeds from the Marxist-Leninist tenet that history is made by the people, and that the building of communism is a matter of the effort of the people, of their energy and their intellect.

4. Communism Brings All Mankind a Happy Future

The Programme of the C.P.S.U. regards the historical development of all countries and peoples as a single, interconnected and interconditioned process. It contains a profound Marxist-Leninist analysis of the major social developments today, of the growth of the forces of socialism; it critically appraises modern capitalism and its contradictions from a Marxist-Leninist standpoint and answers the most urgent and burning questions preoccupying the peoples. It shows that mankind has a joyous and happy future to look forward to. That future is communism, the most perfect and most progressive society, which will naturally and inevitably supersede the reactionary capitalist system.
Communist construction in the U.S.S.R. is a component of the construction of communist society by the peoples who have broken with capitalism; it is an essential factor in strengthening the world socialist system. The Programme advances and substantiates the thesis that other socialist countries can, within the framework of the world socialist system and using its advantages, shorten the time required for building socialism, which opens up the prospect of their more or less simultaneous transition to communism within one historical epoch. The country advancing to communism first paves the way for other peoples, and makes it easier for them to advance to higher forms of organisation of society. Communist construction in the U.S.S.R., the Programme states, accords with the interests of each member of the socialist community of countries, for it increases the might and defensive capacity of the socialist camp as a whole and affords more extensive opportunities for cooperation and mutual assistance.

The fraternal Parties of the socialist countries regard the Programme of the C.P.S.U. as the theoretical basis for the solution of major problems of the present and future development of their countries. The experience of socialist construction generalised in the Programme, and the objective laws governing the development of socialism into communism in the U.S.S.R., serve the fraternal Parties of the socialist countries, according to their statements, as an example in building socialism and communism in their countries.

The Programme of the C.P.S.U. illumines the path to a happy future for the working people of all the capitalist countries. It shows that capitalism is the last exploiting system and that the world capitalist system as a whole is ripe for a social revolution of the proletariat. Since the Great October Socialist Revolution the world has been passing through an epoch of revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism. Furthermore, in the present epoch, socialist revolutions, national liberation anti-imperialist revolutions, democratic revolutions of the people, broad peasant movements, the struggle of the masses to overthrow fascist and other tyrannical regimes, and general democratic movements against national oppression, are all being merged in the single world revolutionary process which is undermining and destroying capitalism.

Now that a world socialist system has arisen, developed and grown strong, the democratic, national liberation and socialist revolutions of the people are drawing still closer together and becoming intertwined. Today any country, whatever the level of its development, can take the road leading to socialism. In building a new society, it can draw on the fullest assistance and support of the socialist countries.

Socialism has already shown its superiority over capitalism in all spheres of social life. The victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. and the achievements of a number of other countries in socialist construction have ushered in the period of downfall of the capital-
The Soviet Union's achievements in communist construction will contribute in great measure to the expansion of the world revolutionary movement and will rouse hundreds of millions of those actively fighting for the establishment of a new system to history-making efforts. The Soviet example of communist construction will inspire the working people in all countries and serve as a source of tremendous moral support in the struggle to liberate all the peoples from social and national oppression. It will hasten the triumph of communist, Marxist-Leninist ideas throughout the world.

As the Programme is carried out and Soviet society advances to communism historical conditions for the class struggles of the working class and all working people in the capitalist countries will become more and more favourable. It is not through war against other countries but by setting an example of a more perfect organisation of society, the full development of the productive forces, and the provision of all the conditions for the happiness and well-being of man, that communist ideas win the hearts and minds of the masses.

"When the Soviet people will enjoy the blessings of communism, new hundreds of millions of people on earth will say: 'We are for communism!'" (The Road to Communism, Eng. ed., Moscow, p. 588).

The Programme of the C.P.S.U. shows the growing influence of socialism on social and political processes in countries that are breaking the chains of colonial oppression. Each of those countries has to choose the shortest path to economic independence and social progress. The experience generalised in the Programme indicates that the capitalist path today is a reactionary path with no promise of improvement, a path of suffering for the people, a path leading to fresh upheavals and wars.

Socialism provides the most efficient economic and political forms of organisation of the life of society, enabling it speedily to end backwardness and lack of culture among the population and to take the broad and bright road of progress.

The provisions of the Programme of the C.P.S.U. on the national liberation movement and the outlook for its development, on the completion of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal and democratic revolution, on the non-capitalist path of development, on the national democratic state, help the peoples of Africa, Asia, Latin America and Oceania to make the right choice for achieving political, social, economic and cultural progress.

The Programme of the C.P.S.U. is highly important in promoting world peace and preventing a new world war. Peace and communism are linked closely and inseparably. Communism removes all social causes of armed conflict and delivers people from the horrors of war. Moreover, peace is indispensable for building communism, for carrying out the great plans for its establishment.
The achievements of communist construction in the U.S.S.R. and the strengthening of socialism in other countries will lead to the forces of world socialism attaining a superiority over those of war and imperialism sufficient to curb all aggressors and safeguard peace. This will make it actually possible to banish war from the life of mankind, even assuming that capitalism survives in some part of the planet. As they study the Programme of the C.P.S.U., further millions of people in the capitalist countries are more and more becoming convinced that communism brings mankind deliverance from the threat of annihilation in the flames of nuclear explosions and that the Soviet Union is the most consistent champion of peace.

Implementation of the Programme of the C.P.S.U. will signify the gigantic leap forward in the development of the productive forces, science and technology in the U.S.S.R. It will show that communism uses science and technology for the benefit of people, for the purpose of fully satisfying their requirements. The transformation of the U.S.S.R. and the socialist system as a whole into a powerful source of public wealth, into a vast centre of advanced science and technology, will enable them to increase assistance to all the countries that have taken the path of independent development and are striving to increase their productive forces and achieve cultural prosperity. Increased assistance to the peoples who live in poverty through the fault of the imperialists will enable them speedily to overcome their backwardness and find progressive solutions to their economic and political problems.

The new Programme of the C.P.S.U. is an outstanding victory of communism on the ideological front, a powerful blow to bourgeois ideology, to anti-communism and Right-wing socialist reformism. As the advantages of communist society become evident and the forces of communism grow, the truth about it will spread far and wide, refuting all the calumnies of the bourgeoisie. All anti-communist myths will be exploded.

The Programme of the C.P.S.U. strikes a final balance in the historical dispute between Communists and Social-Democrats over the paths of mankind’s development. When Communists set about transforming backward Russia into a socialist power by revolutionary methods, the Social-Democratic renegades opposed them, alleging that mankind could not accept such methods for building socialism. They promised to show a different road to socialism. Decades passed. The Right-wing Social-Democrats did not keep their promise. There is no other way than that paved by the October Revolution. The Right-wing Social-Democratic leaders are in effect defenders of the interests of the bourgeoisie. Today the Right Social-Democrats have openly renounced the struggle for socialism, thrown the socialist banner overboard and taken the path of anti-communism. This has resulted in their complete bankruptcy, as
might have been expected. The congress of the so-called Socialist International, which was held in Rome simultaneously with the Twenty-Second Congress of the C.P.S.U., revealed the veritable political and spiritual decrepitude of the helpers of the bourgeoisie.


The Twenty-Second Congress of the C.P.S.U. paid great attention to the role of the Party during the full-scale construction of communism. It approved of the extensive and fruitful activities of the Central Committee aimed at finally eliminating the consequences of the personality cult and fostering Leninist principles in every sphere of Party, government and ideological work. It approved of the resolute measures taken by the Central Committee to expose and ideologically defeat the anti-Party group of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and others, who had opposed the Leninist policy of the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. Voicing the will of every Communist, it emphatically condemned the factional activity of the group as being incompatible with the Leninist principle of Party unity. The Twenty-Second Congress demonstrated the greatest solidarity of the Party membership and its unbreakable unity. The Programme of the C.P.S.U. puts forward and substantiates the proposition that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which arose as a party of the working class, has become a party of the whole people. In the course of communist construction the role of the Party as the highest form of social and political organisation increases—its guiding influence on every aspect of communist construction grows, the unity of the Party and the people increases, the forms of connection between the Party and the non-Party masses become richer, ever larger sections of the working people attain the level of the political consciousness and activity of Party members, the role of every Communist is enhanced, inner-Party democracy broadens, the activity and initiative of the whole Party membership increase, and the unity and solidarity of the Party ranks are strengthened.

The Programme, elaborating the Leninist teaching about the Party, comprehensively substantiates the thesis of the increased leading, guiding and organising role of the Party during the transition from socialism to communism. This objective law of historical development stems from:

the growing scale and complexity of the tasks involved in communist construction, which require a higher standard of political and organisational leadership. Only a party equipped with a knowledge...
of the economic laws of socialism can accurately express them in its policy, direct the development of the socialist national economy towards communism and lead the activities of the Soviet state;

the increasing creative activity of the people, and the drawing of more millions of working people into the management of state affairs and of production. Only the Party can organise the conscious creative effort of millions of people, direct it towards constructive activity, and weld the efforts of millions of people into a single effort and the will of the millions into a single will;

the further development of socialist democracy, the growing role of public organisations—the Soviets, trade unions, Komsomol, co-operatives, scientific societies, etc., and the extension of the rights of the Union Republics and local organisations. Only the Party—the most influential and authoritative leading organisation—is capable of combining the activities of all the other organisations of the working people and directing them towards a common goal, the establishment of a communist society;

the growing importance of the theory of scientific communism, its creative development and propaganda, the increasing communist education of the working people and the struggle to eliminate survivals of the past in people’s minds. The communist education of the working people is a complicated process. Only a party which has mastered Marxist-Leninist theory and develops it creatively, and which provides an example of political consciousness and ideological integrity, can educate the working people in a communist spirit, mould their communist world outlook and fight with determination against bourgeois ideology.

The transformation of the Party into a party of the whole people, the expansion of its guiding influence on every aspect of the life of society, and its growing role as the leading force of society, determined the nature of the amendments to the Party Rules made by the Twenty-Second Congress of the C.P.S.U. F.R.Kozlov’s report to the Congress and the new Rules adopted by the Congress generalised and embodied the rich experience gained in Party development, and in the Party’s leadership of socialist and communist construction, and elaborated the organisational principles of the Party in accordance with the conditions and tasks of the period of full-scale communist construction. The organisational principles incorporated in the Rules are organically bound up with the general plan drawn up by the Party, with the Party’s strategy and tactics in the struggle for communism.

On the basis of the provisions of the Programme, the new Rules specify measures for increasing the role of Communists and their responsibility for the militancy of the Party. The Rules make active participation in communist construction the most important criterion of Party membership. Thereby they also determine the main duties of Communists in social labour, in creating the material and
technical basis for communism, in promoting and perfecting socialist social relations and observing communist moral standards. The moral code of the builder of communism has been incorporated in the Party Rules as a law governing Party life.

The Rules are an important advance in the development of inner-Party democracy. They encourage the activity and initiative of Party members, increase their control over the activities of leading bodies and their staffs, and extend communist participation in the shaping and implementation of Party policy and in the promotion of criticism and self-criticism.

The Rules reaffirm the thesis that collectivism is the highest principle of Party leadership. Its strict enforcement is an essential condition for the normal operation of Party organisations, the proper education of people, the encouragement of the activity and initiative of Communists and the provision of reliable safeguards against erroneous unilateral, one-man decisions and actions. The collective principle helps to combine the manifold abilities, knowledge and experience of many people and to direct them towards accomplishing great tasks.

The Programme and Rules of the C.P.S.U. formulate new important standards of Party life guaranteeing steady enforcement of the principle of collective leadership and the promotion of inner-Party democracy. They provide for the periodical renewal of the composition of Party committees—from the bureau of the primary Party organisation to the Central Committee. At every regular election, the composition of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. and its Presidium shall be renewed by at least one quarter, that of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Union Republics and the territory and regional Party committees by not less than one-third, and that of the area, city and district Party committees and the committees and bureaus of primary Party organisations, by half. The systematic renewal of leading bodies is made a standard of Party life.

The Rules also provide that members of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the C.C. C.P.S.U., members of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Union Republics, of territory, regional, city and district Party committees, and the committees or bureaus of primary Party organisations shall not be elected for more than three consecutive terms. They stipulate the possibility of individual leading functionaries being elected to Party bodies for longer terms by virtue of their recognised prestige and their outstanding political and organising qualities. Secretaries of primary Party organisations shall not be elected for more than two consecutive terms. These major organisational measures guarantee an ample influx of new blood into the leading Party bodies and the proper combination of the experience of old and young functionaries. They are an important means of precluding excessive concentration
of authority in the hands of individual leaders and preventing the
Party organisations concerned from losing control over them. At
the same time, this procedure ensures proper continuity of leader-
ship.

The new procedure of forming Party bodies safeguards the Party
against recurrence of the negative developments in its life that took
place under the personality cult and heightens the prestige of Party
leaders. The Party has always protected the prestige of its leaders
and continues to do so. It now ensures the growth of truly authorita-
tive Party leaders of the Lenin type without whom the Party cannot
function properly.

“Marxists,” wrote Lenin, “cannot adopt the usual standpoint
of the intellectual radical, with his pseudo-revolutionary ab-
straction: ‘no authorities’.

“No. The working class, which all over the world is waging a
hard and persistent struggle for complete emancipation, needs
authorities ...” (Collected Works, Vol. 11, p. 412).

Inner-Party life will also be further democratized through the
reduction of the paid staffs of Party bodies and the drawing of non-
staff members into their work on a voluntary basis.

The direct participation of Communists in the shaping of Party
policies is a vivid indication of the promotion of the Leninist stand-
ards of Party life. It is facilitated by the free and earnest discussion
in the Party of questions bearing on its policy and practical activ-
ity, comradely discussion conferences on controversial matters or
questions that are not sufficiently clear, and the discussion of major
problems of state, economic and Party affairs by the entire Party
and the people as a whole. At the same time, the Rules retain safe-
guards against attempts by a minority to impose its will on the major-
ity, as well as against the formation of factional groups and the
splitting of the Party. The Party has waged and will continue to
wage a determined struggle to strengthen its unity against revision-
ists and dogmatists, maintain the purity of Marxist-Leninist theo-
ry and ensure its creative development.

In keeping with the tasks set by the Party Programme, the new
Rules reaffirm the increased role of local Party bodies and primary
Party organisations and the policy of extending their rights and
fostering their initiative and activity in the solution of economic
and political problems. Party and public control from top to bottom
acquires ever increasing importance as one of the most effective means
of the people influencing the activities of government, Party and mass
organisations. The Rules increase the number of Party organisations
entitled to exercise control over administrative activity.

The Rules adopted by the Twenty-Second Congress of the C.P.S.U.
reflect a new stage in the development of Leninist organisational
principles and standards of Party life, a new and higher level of the
Party's political work and organisational leadership.
With the increased role and significance of the Communist Party in the period of full-scale communist construction, the role of the Central Committee, the supreme collective leading body of the Party in the intervals between congresses, becomes still greater. The Central Committee elects a Presidium which leads the work of the Central Committee between plenary meetings, and a Secretariat which directs the current work of the Central Committee. L. I. Brezhnev, N. S. Khrushchov, A. P. Kirilenko, A. N. Kosygin, F. R. Kozlov, O. W. Kuusinen, A. I. Mikoyan, N. V. Podgorny, D. S. Polyansky, N. M. Shvernik, M. A. Suslov and G. I. Voronov were elected full members of the Presidium of the C.C. C.P.S.U. V. V. Grishin, S. R. Rashidov, K. T. Mazurov, V. P. Mzhavanadze and V. V. Shcherbitsky were elected alternate members. N. S. Khrushchov (First Secretary), F. R. Kozlov, P. N. Demichev, L. F. Ilyichov, O. W. Kuusinen, B. N. Ponomaryov, M. A. Suslov and A. N. Shelepin were elected Secretaries of the C.C. C.P.S.U.

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The Twenty-Second Congress of the C.P.S.U. and the new Party Programme and Rules adopted by it were a momentous event in the life of the C.P.S.U. and the Soviet people and in the development of the world Communist and working-class movement as a whole. It was the happy lot of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to achieve the first phase of communism—socialism—and to lead the Soviet people to the higher phase of communism.

The Congress equipped the Party and the whole Soviet people with a majestic programme for the establishment of communism. In terms of profound ideas, daring approach and scientific validity, the Programme adopted by the Twenty-Second Congress is an outstanding creation of scientific communism. Soviet people, the fraternal Marxist-Leninist Parties and the working people of all parts of the world justly describe the Programme of the C.P.S.U. as the Communist Manifesto of the present epoch.

Soviet people, who unanimously approved of the great plan for building a society that will be the most perfect in history, set about fulfilling it with the utmost devotion. The new Programme opened up the brightest and most fascinating vistas for the Party and the Soviet people.

All over the world, Communists and people of the most diverse political views and ideological convictions closely watched the deliberations of the Congress; they carefully studied its decisions and continue to do so. The Twenty-Second Congress of the C.P.S.U., its programme for building communism in the Soviet Union, and the progress made in carrying out Congress decisions, exert a growing influence on social development, on the alignment of forces on a world scale as well as inside each country, on the behaviour
of all classes and on the policies and tactics of every political party.

The results of the Twenty-Second Congress of the C.P.S.U. show again that there is only one social and political force in the world that knows where to lead mankind and is resolved to save it from the grave social upheavals and calamities which capitalism brings to the peoples. This force is the Communists, who lead the struggle of the peoples for a bright future, for communism.

The forces of communism are inexhaustible. It has the truth of life and history to support it. The foremost men and women of all the countries of the world associate with communism all that is best and brightest.
What are the principal results of the historic path travelled by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union? What are the basic laws governing its development and struggle? What does the history of the C.P.S.U. teach us?

1. The history of the Party teaches us that the working class can achieve victory, and carry out the historic tasks of establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat and building socialism and communism, only under the leadership of the Communist Party, a party revolutionary in its attitude towards the capitalist system, intolerant of all oppression, uncompromising towards conciliators and capitulators, and free from opportunism and dogmatism.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which was founded by the great Lenin, is a party of a new type. Unlike the reformist, Social-Democratic parties, parties of the old type that follow a policy of compromise and reconciliation of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie, the Communist Party expresses the fundamental interests of the proletariat as a class fighting for the triumph of socialist revolution, for the abolition of the exploiting system, for the creation of a communist society.

The C.P.S.U. is the organised, Marxist-Leninist vanguard and political leader of the working class and all the Soviet people. Leninism teaches, and history confirms this, that the Party wins and consolidates its role of vanguard of the working class, of leader of the masses, by fighting selflessly for the vital interests of the working people at all stages of the revolutionary movement and the building of communism.

"It is only the Communist Party," wrote Lenin, "provided it is really the vanguard of the revolutionary class, provided it comprises all the finest representatives of this class, provided it consists of politically conscious and devoted Communists educated and steeled by the experience of tenacious revolutionary struggles, provided it has succeeded in linking itself up inseparably with the entire life of its class and, through its class, with the entire mass of the exploited, and in winning the unquali-
fied trust of this class and this mass—it is only such a party that can lead the proletariat in the last, most ruthless and resolute struggle against all the forces of capitalism. On the other hand, it is only under the leadership of such a party that the proletariat is able to deploy the full might of its revolutionary onset and reduce to nought the inevitable apathy and partly the resistance of a small minority—the working-class aristocracy, old trade union and co-operative leaders and others, who have been spoilt by capitalism—is able to deploy its full strength, which is immeasurably greater than its share of the population, by virtue of the very economic system of capitalist society" (Collected Works, Vol. 31, pp. 163-64).

The existence of such a party in Russia and its leadership of the masses was a most important condition for the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The leadership of the Party ensured the establishment in the U.S.S.R. of the world's first socialist society in difficult and complicated international and domestic conditions. It ensured the defence of the country against hostile, imperialist forces, and its successful advance towards communism.

The Communist Party, founded by Lenin as a workers' party, brought about the complete and final victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. and became the vanguard of the whole people, became the party of the whole people. It groups the advanced, and more politically conscious part of the working class, collective-farm peasantry and intelligentsia of the Soviet Union.

The development of Soviet society revealed a definite law-governed process—the steady enhancement of the role of the Party in communist construction, the political and ideological leadership of society, and the economic and cultural life of the country. The Communist Party leads the great constructive activity of the Soviet people and imparts an organised, planned, scientifically substantiated character to their struggle to attain the ultimate goal, the triumph of communism.

The entire course of the emancipation struggle of the working people leads to the formation of Marxist-Leninist parties. The example of the Russian Marxists was followed by the foremost revolutionary workers of other countries. An end was put to the undivided rule of the Right Socialists in the working-class movement. Communist Parties sprang up in many countries. Communism took firm root in the international working-class movement; it became the most revolutionising factor in human progress, the dominant ideology of the new society, in which over one-third of the population of the globe lives.

2. The historical experience of the C.P.S.U. has confirmed one of the most important conclusions of Marxism-Leninism, that the transition from capitalism to socialism and the successful accomplishment of the tasks of socialist construction are possible only on
the basis of the *dictatorship of the proletariat*, that is, of the political, state leadership of society by the working class.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is necessary primarily for the purpose of crushing the resistance of the overthrown exploiters and of all anti-socialist class forces within the country, and for safeguarding the gains of socialism against attack from without.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is not pure force, not even predominantly force. One of its most important functions is to give effect to state leadership by the working class of the working masses of the peasantry, the non-proletarian sections of the working people in the towns and the intelligentsia, to strengthen the alliance with them for the purpose of re-educating them and drawing them into socialist construction.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is a special form of class alliance between the working class and millions of working people, above all, the working peasantry, with the purpose of establishing and consolidating socialism. In the socialist epoch, the development of this alliance has led to the socio-political and ideological unity of society.

The dictatorship of the proletariat expresses and defends the interests of the working people. It is a new and higher form of democracy as compared with bourgeois democracy. With the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R., democracy has become a universal, socialist democracy.

The history of the C.P.S.U. teaches us that the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be put into effect without the Communist Party. “The dictatorship of the proletariat,” Lenin said, “is possible only through the Communist Party” (*Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 176). Only a Marxist-Leninist, Communist Party, marching at the head of the masses, can organise the working people, enlighten them politically, show them the road to socialism and communism, and inspire them to heroic feats.

The Communist Party is the leading force in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was under its leadership that the machinery of the new state power and the principles of its activity were established and tested in practice. The system of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union consisted of Soviets of Working People’s Deputies, which are the direct expression of the dictatorship of the proletariat; *trade unions*, which are the biggest organisations of industrial, professional and office workers; the *Komsomol*, which unites broad sections of advanced Soviet youth; *co-operatives* of all types; other *voluntary organisations*; the *Party*, which is the vanguard of the Soviet people, the political leader of all the organisations of the working people.

“Thus, on the whole,” wrote Lenin, “we have a formally non-communist, flexible and relatively wide and very powerful proletarian apparatus, by means of which the Party is closely linked up with the class and with the masses, and by means of which,
under the leadership of the Party, the *dictatorship of the class is exercised*" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 30).

The experience of the U.S.S.R. proved the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the state to be correct, and enriched it with new important propositions and conclusions.

First, the dictatorship of the proletariat is historically transient. The working class is the only class in history that does not aim at perpetuating its rule. It needs power to build socialism, the first phase of communism. With the exploiting classes abolished, the function of suppressing them became unnecessary in the U.S.S.R. Having brought about the complete and final victory of socialism and the transition of society to the full-scale construction of communism, the dictatorship of the proletariat fulfilled its historic mission and, in terms of the problems of internal development, ceased to be necessary in the U.S.S.R.

Secondly, the dictatorship of the working class ceases to be necessary sooner than the state withers away. The socialist state which arose in the U.S.S.R. as a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat became a state of the whole people, an organ expressing the interests and will of the whole people. The state as an organisation of the whole people will persist till the complete victory of communism. The development of socialist statehood will gradually lead to its transformation into communist self-government. For the state to wither away completely, it is necessary to provide both internal conditions—by building a developed communist society—and external conditions—by ensuring the victory and consolidation of socialism in the international arena.

Thirdly, the leading role in socialist society throughout its existence belongs to the working class, the most advanced and organised force of society. This class retains its leading role also in the state of the whole people, in the period of full-scale communist construction. It will complete its role of leader of society when communism has been built and all division of society into classes has disappeared.

3. The history of the C.P.S.U. teaches us that the Party would not have been able to secure the historic gains of socialism in the U.S.S.R. if it had not been guided in all its activity by the *theory of Marxism-Leninism*.


Marxism-Leninism is an integral and consistent dialectical materialist world outlook, and the theory of scientific communism. It is the science of the laws of development of society, the science of the socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, the science of the building of communist society. From Marxist-Leninist theory the Party draws its strength and its confidence in the triumph
of communism. This theory enables the Party to ascertain the laws governing social life, to find the right orientation in any situation, to understand the inner connection of events and the trend of their development. It helps to find the answers to the basic questions posed by the revolutionary struggle and communist construction.

The absolute demands which the Communist Party makes on theory are:

(a) fidelity to Marxism-Leninism, defence and support of its principles, an uncompromising attitude towards any kind of deviation from it, and a determined struggle against all attempts to revise it;

(b) a creative approach to theory; the mastering of theory; its development in keeping with the changing conditions of the life of society and the tasks confronting the Party at different stages of the struggle for the triumph of the proletariat and the building of communism; a resolute struggle against dogmatism and quotation-mongering, against isolation from life, from the revolutionary struggle;

(c) the indissoluble connection of theory and practice, of theory and life; organic unity between theory and practice in the Party’s entire activity.

Throughout their activity, Lenin and his comrades-in-arms, the Party as a whole, carried on a resolute struggle against overt and covert opponents of Marxism, and against revisionists of all hues, both in Russia and in the international arena. As a result of this struggle, the revolutionary theory of Marx and Engels triumphed, in spite of bitter attacks, spread throughout the world, and today serves as a powerful ideological weapon in the building of communism in the U.S.S.R., and in strengthening and developing the world socialist system and the international liberation movement. The history of the Party is the history of uncompromising struggle for the purity of Marxist-Leninist theory, both against open revisionism and against dogmatism.

The struggle of Lenin and his followers for the purity of Marxist theory went hand in hand with a creative elaboration of this theory. Mastering Marxist theory does not at all mean learning its various conclusions and propositions by heart. Marxist theory must not be regarded as something set and fossilised, as a collection of dogmas. Like any other science, it develops, is perfected, is enriched with new experience, new knowledge, new conclusions and propositions. Mastering Marxist theory means assimilating its essence and learning to apply it in solving practical problems of the revolutionary movement and communist construction. The Communist Party’s fidelity to the spirit of Marxism has been combined with the replacement of some of its obsolete propositions and the elaboration of new fundamental theoretical propositions conforming to changes in the life of society and to the requirements of the practical struggle for the interests of the working class, for the cause of communism.

Proceeding from the essence of Marxist theory, Lenin made a num-
ber of brilliant discoveries that are of decisive importance for the proletariat and its revolutionary Party in the new conditions of the epoch of imperialism and socialist revolution.

An example of the creative development of Marxism, and the replacement of obsolete propositions by new ones that meet the requirements of the political struggle of the proletariat, is the theory of socialist revolution worked out by Lenin.

Marx and Engels, who discovered the laws of capitalism in its pre-monopoly stage, arrived at the conclusion that socialist revolution could not triumph in one country, that it would triumph simultaneously in all or most of the capitalist countries.

This conclusion, which was correct in the period when capitalism was on the ascent, became a guiding principle for all Marxists. But the situation had changed radically by the beginning of the twentieth century: capitalism had grown into imperialism, which intensified all the contradictions of capitalism to the utmost and brought mankind to the threshold of the transition to socialism; ascendant capitalism had turned into moribund capitalism. The proposition of Marx and Engels that socialism could not triumph in one country no longer corresponded to the new situation, and Lenin did not hesitate to revise it. Analysing capitalism at its new stage, he showed that the uneven development of capitalism becomes especially marked in the epoch of imperialism, and that this development assumes a spasmodic, catastrophic character. He arrived at the conclusion that in the conditions of imperialism, socialism cannot triumph simultaneously in all the capitalist countries and that, on the contrary, the world imperialist chain can be broken at its weakest link, that socialism can triumph at first in a few capitalist countries, or even in one capitalist country.

The Party upheld this brilliant discovery of Lenin’s in its struggle against the opportunists. It became a guiding principle for the whole of revolutionary Marxism, inspired the revolutionary struggle, opened up new prospects for it and unfettered the initiative of the proletariat in its revolutionary onslaught against its own bourgeoisie in each particular country. The victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the building of socialism in the U.S.S.R. furnished irrefutable proof of the correctness of the Leninist theory of socialist revolution.

According to Leninism, the world socialist revolution is not a simultaneous action by the proletariat of all countries but a whole revolutionary epoch. It begins with a socialist revolution in several countries or even in one country. The breaking away of other countries from the capitalist system cannot come about through the spurring on of the world revolution or through the export of revolution. It depends on the development of class antagonisms in the capitalist countries and on the degree of maturity of the revolutionary proletariat and its party. The victory of socialist revolutions in a num-
ber of European and Asian countries, and the formation of the world socialist system proved the Leninist theory of the socialist revolution correct. This theory was further developed, as applicable to the present stage, in the historic documents of the world Communist movement and in the new Programme of the C.P.S.U.

“Socialist revolutions, anti-imperialist national liberation revolutions, people's democratic revolutions, broad peasant movements, popular struggles to overthrow fascist and other despotic regimes, and general democratic movements against national oppression—all these merge in a single world-wide revolutionary process undermining and destroying capitalism”  
(The Road to Communism, Eng. ed., Moscow, p. 484).

Another instance of the creative elaboration of Marxism was Lenin's discovery of Soviet power as a state form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, established in the U.S.S.R. The Soviets, which arose in 1905, reappeared in February 1917. At that time, their role was misunderstood not only by the Mensheviks and the leaders of the Second International, but by many prominent Bolsheviks. Lenin gave a brilliant analysis of the nature and significance of the Soviets. He showed that the Soviets are a new type of state, the Soviet republic being a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. After the Paris Commune, Soviet power was the second historic step of the socialist revolution and of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But Lenin did not see the Soviets as the only form of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

“The transition from capitalism to communism,” he wrote, “certainly cannot but yield a tremendous abundance and variety of political forms, but the essence will inevitably be the same—the dictatorship of the proletariat” (Collected Works, Vol. 25, p. 385).

Still another illustration of the creative development of Marxism is the discovery by Marxists-Leninists of a new form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the shape of people's democracy. Only one form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Soviets, was known before the Second World War. The experience of the Soviet Union, which acquired all the more significance as a result of the establishment of a socialist society and the victory of the U.S.S.R. in the Second World War, attested the vitality of the Soviets. However, taking into account the international situation during and after the Second World War and the actual course of revolutionary development in the countries where a people’s revolution was unfolding, and drawing upon the Leninist proposition that different forms of the dictatorship of the proletariat were possible, and upon the experience of the masses, Marxists-Leninists advanced a new form of the dictatorship of the proletariat—people's democracy. It was applied in the Chinese People's Republic and in other socialist countries that came into being after the Second World War.
The decisions of the Twentieth and Twenty-First congresses of the C.P.S.U. serve as a vivid example of creative development of the theory of Marxism-Leninism. N. S. Khrushchov's reports and the decisions of the two congresses dealt with pressing problems of world development and the international liberation movement, and with many major questions posed by communist construction. They developed Lenin's doctrine of the peaceful coexistence of the two social systems, and of the diversity of forms of the transition from capitalism to socialism. Great theoretical and political importance attaches to the propositions put forward and substantiated by the congresses: on the possibility of preventing a world war in the present epoch; on the more or less simultaneous entry of the socialist countries into communist society; on the law-governed processes of the development of society from socialism to communism—the provision of the material and technical basis for communism, the ways and means of developing collective-farm and public, socialist property and bringing them closer together, the distribution of material benefits, and the political organisation of society during the full-scale construction of communism.


"When working out the third Programme," said N. S. Khrushchov at the Twenty-Second Congress of the C.P.S.U., "we constantly turned to Lenin for advice, and were guided by his masterly prevision, his brilliant ideas about the building of socialism and communism. This is why we have every reason to call this Programme, too, a Leninist one" (*The Road to Communism*, Eng. ed., Moscow, p. 170).

For the first time in history, the new Programme of the C.P.S.U. gives a detailed description of communist society and shows the specific ways and means of establishing it. It reveals the law-governed processes of the development of socialism into communism: the provision of the material and technical basis for communist society, the formation of communist social relations, and the education of the new man. It elucidates the major problems of the period of the full-scale construction of communism: the development of the productive forces and the perfection of socialist social relations, the production and distribution of material benefits, the development of socialist statehood and national relations, the fostering of communist consciousness, the development of the individ-
ual, of culture, ideology and morality, the enhancement of the role of the Party and other voluntary organisations. The Programme visualises the construction of communism in the U.S.S.R. with due regard to the present epoch of world development, of the existence of two world systems, and of the international liberation movement.

In importance and urgency of the problems of modern world development and communist construction, and in depth of ideas and of scientific substantiation, the Programme of the C.P.S.U. is, next to the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin, the most important creation of scientific communism. From now on, it determines the entire political, organising and ideological work of the Party. The propositions elaborated by the Programme are recognised by all the fraternal Parties to be of immense theoretical and practical importance for their activities.

Leninism teaches us that he who takes no account of the changes in the development of society, ignores concrete historical conditions, defends obsolete propositions and conclusions, and substitutes a simple repetition of old Marxist formulas for a scientific analysis of new historical conditions and a theoretical generalisation of new experience in the class struggle of the proletariat, remains true only to the letter of Marxism, distorts its revolutionary substance and, in fact, deviates from Marxism.

The Communist Party has never dissociated theory from revolutionary practice. The invincibility of the Communist Party lies in the organic unity of its theory and practice.

The Communist Party has always been guided by the proposition of Marx and Lenin that Marxism is not a dogma but a guide to action.

4. The history of the C.P.S.U. teaches that unity of the working class is an essential condition for victory in the socialist revolution, and that such unity cannot be achieved unless the petty-bourgeois parties are exposed and isolated from the masses, unless they are routed ideologically.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, anarchists, and nationalist and other petty-bourgeois parties, styling themselves socialist and revolutionary parties in order to deceive the masses, called upon the working class, not to fight against the bourgeoisie, but to compromise with it, not to abolish capitalism, but to preserve it. They denied the leading role of the working class in the revolutionary struggle of the masses, did not recognise the dictatorship of the proletariat, tried to convert the working class into a subsidiary of the bourgeoisie. The policy of reconciling the class interests of the proletariat with those of the bourgeoisie, the policy of agreement between them, led the petty-bourgeois parties to a betrayal of the interests of the working class and of all working people, and in the end landed them in the camp of the counter-revolution.

The Communist Party hammered out the militant unity of the working class of Russia by its uncompromising struggle against
the petty-bourgeois parties, and by its able and flexible tactics of winning the masses over to the side of the vanguard of the proletariat; it safeguarded the working class against compromise with the bourgeoisie, against chauvinism, against enmity between nations.

At the same time, the history of the C.P.S.U. shows that the proletariat, led by the Communist Party, could fulfill its role of leader of the masses in relentless, selfless struggle against all parties representing the interests of the landlords and bourgeoisie—the monarchists, Octobrists and Cadets. The Communist Party won over the peasant masses from the Cadets and Socialist-Revolutionaries to the side of the proletariat. It showed how the parties of the national bourgeoisie should be combated, and convinced the popular masses of the oppressed nations that they could win liberation only under the leadership of the proletariat.

While waging an uncompromising struggle against the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties, the Communist Party at the same time employed flexible tactics with regard to the wavering political groups and elements. Before the Revolution, the Communist Party co-operated with parties and groups that took a stand for the revolutionary struggle against tsarism and capitalism. It did everything possible to help those of them who were ready to co-operate with Soviet power, to recognize its platform, to overcome their vacillations, to realize the necessity for the dictatorship of the proletariat and support it. The Communist Party compromised with them in order to weaken the camp of the enemies of the revolution, to facilitate the separation of those who by virtue of their class origin upheld the capitalist system from those who took a different attitude, but did not belong to the staunch supporters of socialism. The Communist Party made it possible for all honest-minded public leaders, and for all political groups and parties that had proclaimed their socialist ideals and loyalty to the people, to side with the victorious revolution and serve the interests of the working class, of the masses, to serve the interests of the Motherland. A compromise of this kind was the well-known agreement with the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party on the question of state power, concluded in November 1917. As a result of that agreement, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries were included in the Council of People’s Commissars, and declared their support of Soviet power. Another example was the agreement with a number of democratic parties and groups in the non-Russian regions of the country, who were opposed to national oppression and supported Soviet power.

“At the moment of winning power and proclaiming the Soviet Republic,” Lenin wrote, “Bolshevism was united; it drew to itself all that was best in trends of socialist thought akin to it, and rallied around itself the entire vanguard of the proletariat and the overwhelming majority of the working population” (Collected Works, Vol. 30, pp. 37-38).
5. The history of the C.P.S.U. teaches us that the Party would not have been able to preserve its militant unity and to perform its role as leader of the socialist revolution, as the directing and leading force of the dictatorship of the proletariat, its role as the builder of a communist society, had it not waged an uncompromising struggle against the opportunists, conciliators and sceptics within its own ranks, had it not defeated and overcome them.

The history of the C.P.S.U. shows that the chief source of opportunism in the pre-revolutionary period was the influence of bourgeois ideology and the petty-bourgeois element on the proletariat and a certain part of its vanguard, the Communist Party; the heterogeneity of the working class, and the presence within it, besides a solid, regular core, of a labour aristocracy and non-proletarian elements, and the infiltration of petty-bourgeois fellow-travellers into the Party. The vehicles of bourgeois influence and opportunism were the Economists, Mensheviks, Trotskyists, otzovists, nationalist-deviators and other capitulators. With Lenin at their head, the Bolsheviks utterly defeated the opportunists of all shades, and cleared the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party of the Mensheviks, who sought to break up the revolutionary Marxist party of the working class. The Bolsheviks worked consistently to strengthen the proletarian core of the Party, to promote the ideological and revolutionary training of its members and organisationally consolidated the Party and its ties with the masses. Had the Bolsheviks not done so, they would have been unable to build up a militant, revolutionary Marxist party and to ensure the triumph of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

The history of the C.P.S.U. shows that a bitter class struggle develops in the period of the transition from capitalism to socialism. This struggle also found expression within the Party in the anti-Party activity of the Trotskyists, Zinovievites, Bukharinistes, nationalist-deviators and other capitulators. The principal sources of opportunism within the Party in the period of the establishment of socialism in the U.S.S.R. were: the stubborn resistance of the remnants of the capitalist classes, primarily the kulaks; hostile capitalist encirclement; the influence of the petty bourgeoisie, which infected the working class and unstable elements inside the Party with petty-bourgeois sentiments; the heterogeneity of the working class, which made it easier for hostile elements to influence workers who had not gone through the school of political struggles and were not sufficiently class-conscious. The ideological and organisational defeat of the anti-Leninist groups within the Party was an essential condition for the triumph of socialism in the U.S.S.R.

After the victory of socialism, the sources of opportunist vacillations were the capitalist survivals in the minds of men, the inadequate Marxist-Leninist and revolutionary training of part of the Party membership, their isolation from reality, from the life of the
people, dogmatism, failure to understand the new tasks of communist construction. Nor should it be forgotten that, so long as there are capitalist states, there is the possibility of bourgeois ideology penetrating into Soviet society and exerting a corrupting influence on unstable elements. This may find its reflection in the ranks of the Party as well. Hence it is one of the Party’s prime tasks to pay constant attention to the ideological training of Communists, to Marxist-Leninist propaganda among the broad masses of the working people, and to work steadfastly to further strengthen the unity of its ranks.

Unity of the Communist Party, based on the ideological principles of Marxism-Leninism, always has been, and remains, the chief condition for the stability of the Soviet system, the cementing factor in the socio-political and ideological unity of Soviet society, and an earnest of the triumph of communism in the U.S.S.R.

The Party must always have in its arsenal organisational safeguards against manifestations of factionalism and clannishness, which are incompatible with Marxist-Leninist Party principles.

"The unshakable ideological and organisational unity of the Party," says the new Programme of the C.P.S.U., "is the most important source of its invincibility, a guarantee for the successful solution of the great tasks of communist construction" (The Road to Communism, Eng. ed., Moscow, p. 587).

6. The historical path travelled by the C.P.S.U. shows that the Party can effectively lead the struggle of the working class for power, for the establishment of socialism and communism, only if the internal life of the Party is highly organised, if all of its organisations and all its members have one will, if they act as a solid force, if there is iron discipline in its ranks. The methods of Party work and the forms of Party organisation depend on concrete historical conditions; but the basic principles of organisation, which were worked out and substantiated by Lenin, and are now an integral part of Bolshevism, are immutable.

The Party consistently applies the Leninist standards of Party life and the principles of Party leadership. Democratic centralism is the guiding principle in the organisational structure and internal life of the Party. The merit of this principle, tested by more than half a century of Party history, is that it combines the strictest centralism with broad Party democracy, the indisputable authority of the leading Party bodies with their electivity and accountability to the Party membership, Party discipline with the creative activity of the Party rank and file. Lenin taught that democratic centralism is needed in order that “the organising role of the proletariat (and that is its principal role) may be exercised correctly, successfully, victoriously” (Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 27).

It is not accidental that the enemies of Marxism-Leninism, and revisionists of all shades, oppose the Leninist principle of democratic
centralism, advocating federalism, anarchic autonomism and other similar petty-bourgeois principles.

Party democracy and discipline are indivisible; the internal life, the strength and militancy of the Marxist-Leninist party, and the firmness of its ties with the masses, depend on this unity. Inner-Party democracy can be successfully extended only by strengthening Party leadership and discipline. In this is revealed the interrelation of democracy with centralism and Party discipline, freedom of discussion with the duty of all Party members to carry out Party decisions implicitly.

The Leninist principle of collective leadership, which stems from the very nature of the Party built on the lines of democratic centralism, is of utmost importance in the life and activity of the Party. The Party cannot, as Lenin pointed out, carry on its political struggle, organise the revolutionary forces and discipline them “without the collective elaboration of certain forms and rules for the conduct of affairs” (Collected Works, Vol. 4, p. 219).

Collective leadership safeguards the Party against unilateral decisions, against grave mistakes, and if such mistakes have been committed, it enables the Party to rectify them promptly. The collective experience of the entire Party and the collective wisdom of its Central Committee ensure the unshakable unity and cohesion of the Party ranks, correct leadership of the country and the successful building of socialism and communism.

The experience of the Communist Party shows that with the advance towards communism, inner-Party democracy expands and Communists display increasing activity and creative initiative in resolving questions of the country’s political and economic life.

Undeviating adherence to the Leninist standards of Party life and to the principle of collective leadership, which the personality cult thoroughly contradicts, constant renewal of leading Party personnel, and strict responsibility of the Party bodies and their officials to the Party rank and file are a law of the life and development of the Party. By rigidly observing this law, the Party provides safeguards against the personality cult and against the recurrence of mistakes engendered by the cult. While rejecting the personality cult, and while fostering and perfecting the Leninist standards of Party life, the Party must show constant concern for the promotion of the prestige of its leading workers, for the continuity of leadership, and for a combination of old and young personnel.

7. The history of the C.P.S.U. teaches us that the strength and invincibility of the Marxist-Leninist party lie in its close, indissoluble link with the working class, with the masses of the people. The strength of the people lies in their solid unity around the Party.

A party can really lead the people only if it is the conscious spokesman of the aspirations of the masses, if it marches at the head
of the masses, illuminating the road to victory for them with the theor-
y of Marxism-Leninism.
A party can perform its role of vanguard only if it does not shut
itself off from the masses but works with them day after day, and
is able to convince the masses, including their backward sections,
that it is right and to raise them to the level of advanced fighters
for the communist cause.

Sectarian isolation from the masses and opportunist adaptation
to backward sentiments are alike foreign to the Marxist-Leninist
party.

Leninism teaches us, and the experience of the C.P.S.U. con-
firms this, that a party is invincible if it is able to draw close to the
broadest sections of the working people, if it is able to link itself
closely with the life of the working class and working people in
general.

A party loses its role of vanguard of the working class if it shuts
itself up in its narrow party shell and turns into a sect, into a purely
propagandist organisation.

- A party is invincible if it not only teaches the masses, but also
learns from them, if it attentively studies the creative work of the
people, solicitorously cultivates the shoots of the new, resolutely elimi-
nates bureaucratic obstacles standing in the way of creative en-
deavour, vigorously supports every manifestation of initiative on
the part of the working people in the revolutionary transformation
of society, and critically tests its decisions by the experience of the
development of social life.

8. The history of the C.P.S.U. teaches us that bold criticism
of its own shortcomings, weaknesses and mistakes is a major condi-
tion for the successes of a party. The activity of the C.P.S.U. pro-
vides brilliant confirmation of Marx's idea that constant criticism
and self-criticism are a distinctive feature of the proletarian revolu-
tion, that they constitute a law of its development.

- A party cannot perform its role as leader of the working class and
all working people if it ceases to notice its own shortcomings, if it
is afraid to acknowledge its mistakes openly and honestly, if it
cannot correct them in good time.

- A party, Lenin teaches us, is invincible if it is not afraid of criti-
cism and self-criticism, if it does not gloss over the mistakes and
defects in its work, if it teaches and educates its personnel not only
on the achievements, but also on the mistakes in Party work and
state administration, if it is able to show up and correct its mis-
takes in good time.

- A party loses its prestige if it conceals its mistakes from the masses,
if it glosses over sore problems, covers up its defects by pretend-
ing that all is well, if it is intolerant of criticism and self-criticism,
gives way to self-complacency and is ready to rest on its lau-
rels.
"The attitude of a political party towards its own mistakes," Lenin wrote, "is one of the most important and surest ways of judging how earnest the party is and how it in practice fulfils its obligations towards its class and the toiling masses. Frankly admitting a mistake, ascertaining the reasons for it, analysing the conditions which led to it, and thoroughly discussing the means of correcting it—that is the earmark of a serious party, that is the way it should perform its duties, that is the way it should educate and train the class, and then the masses" (Collected Works, Vol. 31, p. 39).

The Party's frank statement about the serious consequences of the Stalin personality cult, about the grave mistakes and distortions committed by Stalin, particularly in the latter period of his life, may serve as an example of bold self-criticism. The Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. criticised these mistakes from positions of principle, and took the necessary steps to eliminate them. The Twenty-Second Congress of the C.P.S.U. fully approved the activity of the Central Committee aimed at eliminating the effects of the personality cult, and worked out measures precluding a revival of this cult. This resolute self-criticism was fresh and forceful evidence of the strength and stability of the Communist Party and the Soviet socialist system.

"We Communists criticise the personality cult as being alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, as something intolerable in a Communist Party, in a socialist society. The Party is doing this to strengthen its positions and consolidate the socialist system, so that such things shall never occur again. But we cannot agree with those who try to use the criticism of the personality cult for attacks against the socialist system against the Communist Party" (N. S. Khrushchov, Forty Years of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Eng. ed., Moscow, p. 33).

9. The historical path travelled by the Communist Party testifies to the fact that it is this party, a Marxist-Leninist party, that acts as the genuinely patriotic force, that expresses and upholds, consistently and fully, the interests of its people, the interests of its country.

The example of the C.P.S.U. shows that the Communists have gone down in the history of mankind as the greatest creative force transforming and renovating the world.

The C.P.S.U. came to power in a country which the ruling classes and their political parties had reduced to a state of utter decline and general ruin, and which was faced with the threat of partition by the imperialist powers. Assuming responsibility for the country's destiny, the Communist Party aroused, organised and inspired the masses for the struggle against backwardness, ruin, and the threat of enslavement by foreign powers, for the struggle to build socialism and communism.
Under the leadership of the Communist Party, the country's productive forces were unshackled and unprecedented progress was achieved in economy and technology, in science and culture. Within an extremely short time, the Party led the country to signal historic victories, transformed it into a mighty socialist power, and ensured the prosperity and greatness of the Soviet Motherland.

The Party ensured the victory of the Soviet Union in two patriotic wars, saved the country from the threat of enslavement by foreign imperialists, and successfully upheld the independence and sovereignty of the Soviet state. By its correct policy, which expresses the interests of the people, the Communist Party raised the country to heights it had never reached in all its history.

Although all the other political parties that had been active on the Russian political scene had advertised their “love” of Russia, they had in fact championed, not the interests of the people and the country, but the selfish interests of the capitalists and landlords. They had doomed Russia to backwardness and stagnation, and would readily have placed her under the yoke of foreign imperialists.

The people tested all the political parties in Russia by their own experience, and entrusted the leadership of the country to the Communist Party. They rejected all the other political parties—the monarchists, Octobrists, Cadets, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks and the numerous nationalist parties. The political evolution of these parties, which entered the service of the foreign imperialists, showed that they were not only anti-socialist, but also anti-popular and anti-patriotic. They came out against the national interests of the country.

Leninism teaches us, and historical experience confirms this, that Marxist-Leninist parties act as a genuinely patriotic force. This is a law for a party of the new type.

10. The rich experience of the C.P.S.U. teaches us that it has achieved historic successes in the struggle for the triumph of socialism and won tremendous prestige among the masses in the U.S.S.R. and foreign countries because, in its theory as in practice, it has invariably been guided by the principle of proletarian internationalism.

On Lenin's proposal, the Party was, from the very beginning, built up as a single organisation of workers of all the nationalities of Russia. The Party grew up and became steeled in the struggle against dominant-nation chauvinism and local bourgeois nationalism. It advanced the historic slogan of self-determination of nations. All the nations forming Russia were given the right of freely seceding and of forming independent states. By its selfless struggle against dominant-nation chauvinism and for the freedom of the peoples, for socialism, the Russian proletariat won the confidence of all the working people of the nations oppressed by tsarism. A multi-national state, founded on the voluntary union of all the nations of the country and their equal participation in socialist construction, was
created for the first time in history. The very difficult historical problem of putting an end to the economic and cultural inequality of the formerly oppressed peoples and of bringing about the transition of many backward peoples from patriarchal-feudal relations to socialism, bypassing the capitalist stage, was successfully solved in the course of socialist construction.

True to its internationalist duty, the Communist Party consistently cements the friendship among the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and unites them for the great common cause of building a communist society. The new Programme of the C.P.S.U. expresses the Leninist policy of promoting the economic and cultural prosperity of the Soviet republics and bringing the nations closer together in the course of full-scale communist construction.

The Marxist-Leninist concept of proletarian internationalism is the very opposite of that of the parties of the old type, that is, the parties of the Second International. Recognition of internationalism in words and its replacement by vulgar nationalism in deeds, Lenin pointed out, is a usual phenomenon among the parties of the Second International. Petty-bourgeois nationalism declares recognition of the equality of nations to be internationalism, leaving national egoism intact. Proletarian internationalism, Lenin teaches, demands indivisibly linking up the interests of the proletarian struggle in one country with the interests of this struggle in other countries, with the interests of the international working-class movement as a whole.

By upholding the principle of proletarian internationalism, the C.P.S.U. has discharged, and continues to discharge, its duty to the international proletariat. The programme, strategy and tactics of the Leninist Party, and its entire practical activity, are inspired by proletarian internationalism.

Regarding themselves as a contingent of the international army of labour, the Communists have always participated actively in the struggle for Marxism in the ranks of that army. From its very inception, the Bolshevik Party, led by Lenin, influenced the international working-class movement, and in 1914-19 directly helped to pave the way for establishing and giving organisational form to Left internationalist groups and trends within the Social-Democratic parties, groups and trends on whose basis Communist Parties began to be formed afterwards and the Third, Communist International arose.

Following the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the chief internationalist duty of the Communist Party and the Soviet people as a whole was the struggle to build communism in the U.S.S.R., which is of tremendous international significance. The building of socialism and communism in the U.S.S.R. signified effective aid by the C.P.S.U. and the Soviet people to the international working class and to the liberation movement of the peoples.
For their part, the Communist Parties and the working class of the capitalist countries supported the first socialist country in the most diverse ways. Regarding the Soviet Union as its shock brigade, the international proletariat considers its prime duty to be defence of the world’s first socialist state, the bulwark of progressive mankind. This reciprocal support is an expression of proletarian internationalism.

Proletarian internationalism was strikingly manifested during the Second World War. The war waged by the Soviet Union against the fascist troops was not only a war for the land of socialism; it was also a struggle for the freedom of the peoples of Europe and Asia, for the deliverance of the whole of humanity from the threat of fascist enslavement. In the bourgeois countries, the working people, all patriotic forces, among which the Communist Parties were in the forefront, fought selflessly against the German, Japanese and other imperialist invaders, thus facilitating the Soviet Union’s struggle against fascism.

Following the Second World War the C.P.S.U. continuously directed its efforts towards consolidating the world socialist system and the international Communist movement on the basis of the Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism. It waged an unrelenting struggle against revisionism, dogmatism and sectarianism in its ranks, and abided strictly by the principles of relations both between Communist Parties and between socialist countries, principles worked out by the Communist movement.

In the period of the formation and development of the world socialist system, a major requirement of proletarian internationalism is the struggle to preserve and consolidate this system, to educate the masses in a spirit of friendship and fraternal co-operation and mutual assistance. The relations between the socialist countries are built up on new international principles—fraternal friendship, all-round co-operation and mutual assistance. The unity and fraternal co-operation of the socialist countries are based on the community of interests of the Communist and Workers’ Parties and of the peoples of these countries, on their striving for one and the same goal—the building of a communist society.

The socialist countries strictly observe democratic principles in relations between peoples. These principles are complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

The working people of the capitalist countries and the oppressed peoples regard the world socialist camp, and the great Soviet Union, as the bulwark of international peace and friendship.

“Capital,” Lenin wrote, “is an international force. To vanquish it, an international workers’ alliance, an international workers’ brotherhood, is needed."
"We are opposed to national enmity, to national discord, to national exclusiveness. We are internationalists" (Collected Works, Vol. 30, p. 268).

The Programme of the C.P.S.U. adopted by the Twenty-Second Congress is inspired by proletarian internationalism.

"The Party," says the Programme, "regards communist construction in the U.S.S.R. as the Soviet people's great internationalist task, in keeping with the interests of the world socialist system as a whole and with the interests of the international proletariat and all mankind" (The Road to Communism, Eng. ed., Moscow, p. 450).

The victorious activity of the Communist Party in the period of the struggle for the overthrow of tsarism and capitalism, as well as in the period of the building of communism, is a graphic illustration of the mighty force of proletarian internationalism, of the international solidarity of the working people.

Throughout the history of its heroic struggle, the C.P.S.U. has consistently implemented the principle of proletarian internationalism, guided by the appeal of the Communist Manifesto: "Workers of all countries, unite!"

11. The experience of more than half a century of social development has proved that the C.P.S.U. was right in the historic argument against the parties of the Second International, in the struggle against the ideology and policy of Social-Democracy.

Guided by the theory of Marx and Engels, which was developed further by Lenin, the Bolshevik Party took the path of socialist revolution. It called on all the parties active in the international working-class movement to take the same path. But the Social-Democratic parties chose a different, a reformist path. The international proletariat and the oppressed peoples now have the opportunity of comparing and appraising the results of the development of the parties and countries moving along these two different paths.

The C.P.S.U. has ensured the epoch-making victories of socialism, which have been acknowledged by the whole of progressive mankind. It has achieved the transformation of the Soviet Union into a mighty socialist power, into a stronghold of peace, democracy and socialism. It is leading the people on to communism, which is the goal of the socialist movement of the working class.

Communism has become the most influential force of our time, the paramount factor in social progress. Under the banner of scientific communism, one-third of mankind is building a new life.

The experience of the Social-Democratic parties shows entirely different results.

In the past 30-40 years, the parties of the Socialist International have frequently been in power in many countries. During the years from 1918 to 1961, the Social-Democratic and Socialist parties of Germany, France, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the
Netherlands, and the Labour parties of Britain and Australia, were ruling parties or took part in governments in coalition with the bourgeois parties. Enjoying the trust and support of the working class, they had the opportunity of leading their countries along a different, non-capitalist path and of carrying out what their programmes proclaimed. Being in power, these parties could have taken steps to abolish the capitalist system, which engenders the exploitation of man by man, poverty, unemployment and destructive wars. But as everyone knows, nothing of the kind happened. Countries where the reformists, who call themselves Socialists, held power for many years remain capitalist.

In a number of capitalist countries, the working class, with the assistance of the Social-Democratic parties, secured some improvement in its economic conditions and won certain rights and democratic liberties within the limits of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. But the working class paid a high price for all that—the retention of power by the bourgeoisie, the preservation of an exploiting society, the preservation and intensification of the danger of war, ruinous crises, unemployment, and attendant hardships for the mass of the people. Moreover, whenever there is a serious complication of the economic situation, the ruling classes of exploiters deprive the working people of the material benefits and socio-political rights they have gained, and throw back the masses for whole decades.

A major reason why the capitalist system was preserved in the countries where the Social-Democratic parties were or are in power are the theoretical principles and views of these parties, which are contrary to Marxism-Leninism, and their opportunist practice. Both in theory and in practice, the Social-Democratic leaders have invariably proceeded from their basic proposition, that it is possible to reconcile the class interests of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, that the revolutionary overthrow of bourgeois rule is impermissible, that the dictatorship of the proletariat is unnecessary, and that a coalition of bourgeois and Social-Democratic parties should be formed instead. In time the Social-Democratic parties drifted further and further away from Marxism, and many of them eventually repudiated it openly.

A comparison of the results of the two ways chosen by different contingents of the international working class convincingly shows the bankruptcy of Social-Democracy, and the immense significance of Marxism-Leninism in the struggle of the working class for peace and freedom, for the triumph of communism throughout the world.

* * *

Thus the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the great victories achieved under its leadership are graphic evidence of the invincible force of communist ideas and of the crea-
tive power of the working class, which has performed its historic mission of transforming capitalist society into socialist society.

In close co-operation with the brother Parties of other countries, the C.P.S.U. is marching in the van of the struggle for world peace. The Communist Party embodies the “intellect, honour and conscience of our epoch” (Lenin).

Backed by the victories won in all walks of life and by its vast historical experience, the Communist Party, which is carrying out its new Programme, is directing the mighty forces of the Soviet people towards fulfilment of the inspiring task of building a communist society, on whose banner are inscribed the words: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs”.

“Communism,” says the Programme of the C.P.S.U., “accomplishes the historic mission of delivering all men from social inequality, from every form of oppression and exploitation, from the horrors of war, and proclaims Peace, Labour, Freedom, Equality, Fraternity and Happiness for all peoples of the world.”
NOTES

1 *Zemsky Nachalnik*—in pre-revolutionary Russia an official with administrative and magisterial powers over the peasantry, appointed from the noble class. p. 22

2 *Zemstvo*—so-called local self-government body which was dominated by the nobility. It was set up by the tsarist government in 1864 in several gubernias in the European part of Russia. The Zemstvo wielded very limited rights and was controlled by the tsarist authorities. p. 86

3 *Tesnyak Socialists* (Tesnyaks)—Revolutionary Social-Democratic Workers’ Party of Bulgaria, founded in 1903 after the split in the Social-Democratic Party. D. Blagoyev was the founder and leader of the Tesnyaks. In subsequent years the Tesnyaks were headed by Blagoyev’s disciples: G. Dimitrov, V. Kolarov, and others. The Tesnyaks opposed the imperialist war of 1914-18. In 1919 they joined the Communist International and henceforth called themselves the Communist Party of Bulgaria. p. 127

4 *Musavatists*—members of a counter-revolutionary bourgeois-landlord nationalist party in Azerbaijan formed in 1912. They were enemies of the fraternal unification of the Azerbaijani people with the Russian and other peoples of Russia. During the Great October Socialist Revolution and in the period of foreign military intervention and the Civil War in Soviet Russia they represented one of the principal counter-revolutionary forces in Azerbaijan. With the support of the Turkish, and later the British, interventionists they were in power in Azerbaijan in 1918-20. p. 294

5 *Dashnaks*—members of an Armenian counter-revolutionary bourgeois-nationalist party that arose in the early nineties of the last century. After the victory of the October Revolution the Dashnaks, together with the Georgian Mensheviks and Azerbaijan Musavatists, set up a counter-revolutionary bloc and with the help of foreign interventionists wrested Transcaucasia from Soviet Russia. In 1918-20, the Dashnaks, then at the head of the bourgeois government in Armenia, brutally oppressed the workers and peasants, incited Armenians against Georgians and Azerbaijani. They reduced Armenia to a state of utter ruin. In November 1920 the Dashnak government was overthrown and Soviet power was established in Armenia. p. 294

6 *Borotbists*—Left wing of the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries, which formed an independent party in May 1918. The Borotbists took their name from their central organ Borotba (Struggle). In March 1920, in view of the growing influence of the Bolsheviks among the peasant masses, the Borotbists
were obliged to disband their party, and joined the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine. The Fourth Conference of the C.P.(B.)U. decided to admit the Borotbists into the Party, all newly accepted members being re-registered. Subsequent years showed, however, that many of them were double-dealers, that they headed the anti-Soviet struggle of the counter-revolutionary, bourgeois-nationalist elements in the Ukraine. They were exposed as enemies of the people.

Nepman— a private trader or manufacturer in the early period of the New Economic Policy.
ИСТОРИЯ
КОММУНИСТИЧЕСКОЙ ПАРТИИ
СОВЕТСКОГО СОЮЗА

На английском языке