Read These Books

IMPERIALISM AND THE PEOPLE
By Frank Verulam. Annals 12.

Shows simply and clearly the declining strength of imperialism and the rising power of the people’s forces. It has been prepared as a Study course.

CHINA’S NEW DEMOCRACY
By Mao Tse-tung. Annals 8.

A great classic, in which the leader of the Chinese Communists surveys the development of China’s mighty battle for freedom. He draws invaluable conclusions both for China’s future and for all oppressed people.

MARX AS AN ECONOMIST
By Maurice Dobb. Annals 8.

Dobb is a lecturer in Economics at Cambridge and writes with the authority of an expert, with numerous other well-known studies on economics to his credit.

People’s Publishing House,
Raj Bhuvan, Sandhurst Road
BOMBAY 4.
The Soviet Worker
Looks at the War

The new Soviet Trade Union Magazine, War and the Working Class, is so far known to people in this country only through brief extracts in the daily press. These have been of quite extraordinary interest to everyone anxious to understand the wide range of new problems coming before the peoples of the United Nations as the war develops to its climax, and to learn what the Soviet people have to say about them.

In this book will be found the main articles from the 1943 issues of the magazine, printed in full and grouped into six sections:

- The United Nations
- The Allied Offensive
- Post-war Problems
- Problems of Separate Countries
- Trade Union Questions
- The Pacific War

This selection of articles will enable the reader to grasp the ideas and policies of the Soviet Union behind her great contribution to the common cause—on the battlefield, in the conference chamber and in the coming days of reconstruction and social advance in the liberated territories.

Rs. 2
Peace Front to People's War

Rs. 5

A solid book of 448 pages containing all the important documents of the Communist movement that have appeared between 1934 and 1944. How the Communists foresaw the growth of Fascism and the drift towards world war and built a movement to stem this drift and smash Fascism is given through the speeches of Stalin, Dimitrov, Ercoli and Manuilsky, leaders of the world Communist Movement.

The later writings include Joshi’s striking characterisation of the change in the world situation with the German attack on the Soviet and articles by Palme Dutt on the Anglo-Soviet Agreement and the Moscow and Teheran Conferences.

As a whole, the book gives a brilliant picture of how in the last ten years great changes have taken place—how Fascism, once thought invincible and inevitable, has been beaten back and a new people's world is rising in its place.
The Soviet Worker
Looks at the War

The new Soviet Trade Union Magazine, War and the Working Class, is so far known to people in this country only through brief extracts in the daily press. These have been of quite extraordinary interest to everyone anxious to understand the wide range of new problems coming before the peoples of the United Nations as the war develops to its climax, and to learn what the Soviet people have to say about them.

In this book will be found the main articles from the 1943 issues of the magazine, printed in full and grouped into six sections:—

The United Nations
The Allied Offensive
Post-war Problems
Problems of Separate Countries
Trade Union Questions
The Pacific War

This selection of articles will enable the reader to grasp the ideas and policies of the Soviet Union behind her great contribution to the common cause—on the battlefield, in the conference chamber and in the coming days of reconstruction and social advance in the liberated territories.

Rs. 2/-

Peace Front to People's War

Rs. 5/-

A solid book of 448 pages containing all the important documents of the Communist movement that have appeared between 1934 and 1944. How the Communists foresaw the growth of Fascism and the drift towards world war and built a movement to stem this drift and smash Fascism is given through the speeches of Stalin, Dimitrov, Ercoli and Manuilsky, leaders of the world Communist Movement.

The later writings include Joshi's striking characterisation of the change in the world situation with the German attack on the Soviet and articles by Palme Dutt on the Anglo-Soviet Agreement and the Moscow and Teheran Conferences.

As a whole, the book gives a brilliant picture of how in the last ten years great changes have taken place—how Fascism, once thought invincible and inevitable, has been beaten back and a new people's world is rising in its place.
THE SOVIET WORKER LOOKS AT THE WAR

Selections from the Moscow Fortnightly

WAR AND THE WORKING CLASS

PEOPLE’S PUBLISHING HOUSE
Raj Bhavan, Sandhurst Road,
MUMBAI 4

Rs. 2/-
# CONTENTS

I. THE UNITED NATIONS  
   The Anti-Hitlerite Coalition .. .. .. .. 1  
   The Moscow Conference .. .. .. .. 10  
   The Results of the Moscow Conference .. .. .. .. 16  
   Amyot .. .. .. .. 23  
   The Mediterranean Commission .. .. .. .. 28  
   Monopolists Sharpen Their Knives .. .. .. .. 30  

II. THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE  
   The Second Front .. .. .. .. 34  
   The Duration of the War .. .. .. .. 41  
   Military Operations in Italy .. .. .. .. 46  
   The Invasion of Europe—A Crushing Blow or a Prolonged War? .. .. .. .. 50  

III. POST-WAR PROBLEMS  
   War Aims and Post-War Problems .. .. .. .. 55  
   The Responsibility for Nazi Crimes .. .. .. .. 64  
   Compensation for War Damage .. .. .. .. 71  
   The Plan for an East European Federation .. .. .. .. 80  

IV. PROBLEMS OF SEPARATE COUNTRIES  
   The Situation in China .. .. .. .. 87  
   The Neutrality of Turkey .. .. .. .. 93  
   The French Problem Awaits Solution .. .. .. .. 100  
   Bulgaria’s Rulers and Patriots .. .. .. .. 104  

V. TRADE UNION QUESTIONS  
   The British Trade Union Congress .. .. .. .. 107  
   The War and the Trade Union .. .. .. .. 114  
   The World Trade Union Congress .. .. .. .. 120  

VI. THE PACIFIC WAR  
   The Pacific War and Japan’s “New Order” in Asia .. .. .. .. 126  
   Two Years of War in the Pacific .. .. .. .. 135  
   Japanese-German Relations in the Second World War .. .. .. .. 143  
   More Trouble for Japan .. .. .. .. 153
This pamphlet contains authoritative articles explaining the point of view of the Soviet people on the basic international problems of winning the war against Fascism and building up a new world.

These articles appeared in War and the Working Class, an important Soviet fortnightly magazine, started in June 1943. Published in Moscow under the authority of the Central Council of Trade Unions, its Editor is Andrei Danilov, former head of the school for training trade union organisers. Assistant Editor is Vladimir Krushkov, formerly Secretary-General of the Soviet Information Bureau.

The only Soviet periodical entirely devoted to foreign affairs, War and the Working Class carries trenchant and outspoken contributions on the international situation, on the problem of winning the war and building the peace. It has come to be regarded by all foreign papers and authorities as expressing the opinion of the Soviet people on crucial questions. The London Times, The New York Herald Tribune, Reuters, United Press, etc., all quote sections of its important articles to illustrate the Soviet attitude to problems facing all people today. But the full articles or summaries have not appeared in India at all except in a very mutilated form. It is for this reason that we are printing this collection of articles from War and the Working Class. Some of the articles are by well-known Soviet authorities, unsigned articles are editorials.

Taken as a whole this selection covers important issues facing all democrats the world over. The voice of the Soviet people breathes bold and strong through these pages. And there is no doubt that by virtue of their achievements the peoples of the Soviet will play an important part in shaping the post-war world.

Reading the articles will help all to a clearer understanding of the tasks ahead and the dangers that lie in store for us who are working for a new world in which all peoples will be masters of their own destiny.

June, 1944.

I. THE UNITED NATIONS

THE ANTI-HITLERITE COALITION

(War and the Working Class, June 15, 1943.)


History has known no few alliances and coalitions which have arisen in the course of great world events, uniting the efforts of the powers in a struggle for their common interests, for the realisation of common tasks and plans. These coalitions arose and vanished, came and went, coping in some degree or another or, as was more often the case, not coping with the tasks confronting them.

A peculiarity of all the coalitions which have existed up to now was that the tasks and aims pursued by these coalitions, however important or even great they may have seemed to their contemporaries, did not actually go beyond narrow interests, beyond the interests of the ruling classes or groups, beyond narrow social or governmental circles. The motives and aims which guided the organisers of these coalitions as a general rule had nothing in common with the great tasks of serving the interests of their peoples, at whose expense these coalitions were formed and operated; they were not people's coalitions, but government coalitions, not coalitions of peoples who were called upon to take an active and conscious part in the development of events, in the realisation of the programme drafted by the coalition; they were coalitions of governments operating independently of their peoples and the will, aspirations and hopes of the latter, regardless of and not infrequently against these peoples. There were not a few examples of such coalitions in the past; one need only mention the so-called Holy Alliance (1815), which enveloped the whole of Europe in a heavy stench of gloomy imperial reaction. A present-day example of such an anti-people's coalition, of an alliance against their own and other peoples
is the Italo-German coalition which plotted this international slaughter for the most debased and dirty aims, for the purpose of imperialist plunder.

The Birth of the Anglo-Soviet-American Coalition

The Anglo-Soviet-American coalition did not come about as international alliances and coalitions usually do. It was born, not in the quiet of diplomatic negotiations, not as a result of diplomatic compromises and ambiguous conventions. One might say that the birth of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition was not even entered in the minutes, was not recorded in the book of history under this or that number or this or that date. This coalition, unlike all other coalitions, in contravention of all formerly operating diplomatic rules and rituals, appeared on God’s earth without passing through the purgatory of an international congress, made its appearance de facto and later was more or less formulated de jure.

It is common knowledge that a few hours after the German air pirates had dropped their first bomb-loads on peaceful Soviet towns and the first tank columns of the Hitlerite bandits had invaded our peaceful country, Mr. Churchill announced to the world that the English people and their government, together with the Russian people and the Soviet Government would fight the common foe—Hitlerite Germany. Shortly afterwards President Roosevelt made a statement which perfectly clearly defined the position of the great overseas public in the struggle which had broken out. It required a certain amount of time to formulate, with the aid of diplomatic acts, the military collaboration which followed, but the time it took was the shortest possible. History knows many military alliances and coalitions, but hardly one example can be found of such a rapid union of the forces of three great international powers. Normally it took decades, long before the beginning of a war, to form coalitions by means of long drawn-out and extremely complex diplomatic negotiations, numerous talks, conferences and prolonged bartering, etc.

How can we explain the rapidity and seeming ease with which the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States of America united into one single militant camp of struggle against the common enemy.

It can only be explained by the fact that the anti-Hitlerite coalition of freedom-loving peoples was called into being by the vital state and national interests of all those taking part in it. Perspicacious and far-sighted politicians standing at the helm of the state in these countries could not fail to see that common danger compels solidarity, union of forces, the organisation of joint struggle. More than this, the whole situation clearly showed that for the freedom-loving peoples “delay is tantamount to death,” to use Peter the Great’s expression.

Hitler attacked the Soviet Union after twenty-two months of war in Europe. This gave him tremendous material advantages in the form of rich and easy prey: captured tanks, planes, artillery, supplies of strategic raw materials and munitions works seized in Czechoslovakia and Poland, France and Belgium, Norway and Holland, Greece and Yugoslavia. But this circumstance was a serious political loss for him. The moment Hitler attacked the Soviet Union, the Munich legend of “peace for our time” was already ideologically riddled. Between Hitler and Britain lay the Dunkirk tragedy, the ruins of Coventry, the fires of London, many thousands of sons and daughters of the British people slain by German-Fascist arms. One would have had to be possessed of the incredible self-conceit of Hitler to set off for England in 1941 with secret aims, as did Rudolph Hess!

The Mortal Danger to Britain and the U.S.A.

In 1940 Britain lost part of her army’s armaments at Dunkirk, but acquired something far more important and valuable for the war: an understanding of the danger which menaced her. In the months of the “Battle of Britain” illusions were burned with the smoking peaceful British homes. The facts alone remained. And the main decisive fact was that Britain, during the whole of its existence, had never before faced such a menacing, mortal danger. Even in Napoleon’s day the danger was not so great. A few days ago one of the American radio commentators said that one of Hitler’s fatal mistakes was to try to force Britain to her knees by means of an air offensive in 1940, instead of sending his mechanised hordes to the Near East, which was almost defenceless at that time. However that may be, knowing the idiotic pedantry of the German murderer, there is not the slightest doubt that Berlin had already selected, not only the commandant of Suez and the Governor-General of India, but also the gauleiters for London, Liverpool, Glasgow and other
British centres. In any case, the Hitlerite bandits in their correspondence and diaries at the time were writing in detail their plans of debauchery and plunder in London.

But America, perhaps, could consider herself beyond the Hitlerite danger? Of course not. Hitler’s plan was to follow up the subjugation of the British Isles with that of the American Continent. Hitler’s hints on this score were more than transparent in his book of raving, Mein Kampf. Hitler dilated even more openly on this theme in his conversations with Rauschning, published by the latter. It is hard to get away from mixed feelings on reading these utterances of the maniac “Fuehrer.” On the one hand, they are the frenzied ravings of a typical German “beerhall politician,” while, on the other hand, one cannot forget that behind these ravings is an enormous war machine ready at the first sign from the “fuehrer” to subject to destruction and annihilation everything which is incapable of resisting him. Not for nothing is Hitlerite Germany depicted as a gorilla armed with an automatic rifle aimed at the whole of mankind, its civilisation and culture. Long before the war in Europe the air ways across the Atlantic were carefully studied by Goering’s pilots in the uniforms of Germany’s “civil” air fleet, while the sailors of the German “mercantile” marine ploughed the Atlantic waters in the directions chiefly used by merchant ships. If there were not other countless proofs of the Hitlerite aggressive plans as regards the American continent, it would suffice to call to mind the ramified network of German Fascist spies from Alaska to Ognennoye Zemlya. It was not for promenades on Broadway or excursions to the Rocky Mountains that Hitler sent countless hordes of spies and diversionists across the ocean!

The Soviet Union stood in the way of Hitler’s subjugation of Britain and America. Even the extreme conceit of the Hitlerite strategists was not enough to make them rush into a grand adventure in the West, while they had a mighty power—the Soviet Union—behind them in the East.

But the Hitlerite adventurists did have just enough self-confidence (before aiming the general blow on the Anglo-Saxon countries) to chance “turning” for six to eight weeks to the East to ensure themselves large reserves of grain, oil and labour power for the continuation of war against the Anglo-Saxons. As we know, these six to eight weeks dragged out, in spite of all the Hitlerite plans and expectations. The campaign against the Soviet Union brought the German Fascist invaders huge disillusionment and the breakdown of their strategic calculations, which were overthrown by the unparalleled resistance and crushing blows of the Red Army against the Hitlerite troops. The German war machine was stranded in the wide open spaces of Russia and the acute danger to Britain and America was postponed. More than this: the Red Army’s powerful blows shook Hitler’s war machine to its foundations and created the conditions necessary for its complete rout.

But the Fascist beast is still strong. His open gaping wounds only multiply his fury. The mortal danger to the whole of mankind is by no means removed as yet. The British and Americans cannot fail to understand that only in close alliance with the Soviet Union are they in a position to win the war against Hitler, that without the unity of all the forces of the freedom-loving peoples, Hitler can turn the war to his advantage.

An Identity of Vital Interests

Thus, the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition stands on a stable basis, on the basis of the identity of the radical, vital interests of those taking part in the coalition for the struggle against the common enemy who menaces them with enslavement. It would be quite wrong, however, on the basis of the unusually rapid appearance of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition, to draw the conclusion that it owes its existence to transient conditions of a particular phase, to a spontaneous outburst or to a temporary mood on the part of the leading politicians of the countries forming the coalition. On the contrary, the rapid formation of this coalition, in this case, is proof that it answers the most vital interests of its participants, who are facing mortal danger from the Hitlerite bandits.

Let the enemy rage and reiterate day in and day out that the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition was the outcome of “bitter necessity.” Let him do so. This does not prevent our coalition from being strong and stable, based on mutual confidence and realising a brotherhood in arms.

But it would be ludicrous and unwise to hide from ourselves or others the fact that certain difficulties exist in the mutual relations between those taking part in the anti-Hitlerite coalition. It is an indisputable fact that a difference exists in the ideology and social system of the participants in the Anglo-
Soviet-American coalition. Each of these countries has traversed its own specific road of history and in each of them have developed their own traditions of state and social life. In the course of the development of their mutual relationships, certain misunderstandings, difficulties and vexed questions have more than once arisen between the countries of the coalition. Over a period of years not a few wrong ideas about our country have accumulated in Britain and America. There has been no lack also of "informers" who, without any concern for elementary logic, asserted that the Soviet Union had no other cares than to "conquer the whole world" and, at the same time, that the Soviet Union was a Colossus with feet of clay, worth nothing in the military sense. In so far as this stale commodity of German origin did not in most cases bear the Berlin trade-mark, it had a pretty wide sale.

If one considers the characteristic features of international development during the past quarter of a century, it is easy to understand that no few difficulties, real and imaginary, actual and psychological, lay in the way of the setting up of an Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. All this is well known. Not all the vexed questions have as yet been properly solved. The way to solve these vexed questions, the way to overcome the difficulties which arise, is quite clear to statesmen possessing political perspicacity, a clear understanding of the interests of their people and, what is most important, a readiness to put these interests above all else. This is the road of joint struggle against the common enemy, the mobilisation of forces and means for the speediest victory over the common enemy.

There is not the slightest doubt that precisely this road is the most effective one to overcome the difficulties which exist in the relations between the British, Soviet and American allies.

**Invented Difficulties**

But, besides the actual difficulties in the mutual relations between the powers of the anti-Hitlerite bloc, there exist also imaginary, invented difficulties which are piled up by people incapable of rising above their own, often poorly understood, narrow group interests, people who are inclined to put such interests above the interests of their country and their people as a whole. Such people are ready to transform any stumbling block on the common road into an impassable stone wall. Some do so from lack of understanding, others out of deliberate, blind hatred for the forces of democracy, but the results are the same. Happily these sections are small in number in the countries which are our allies and the outcry they make by no means corresponds to their relative weight and influence among the people.

Such are the isolationists in the U.S.A. and the Clive plan set in Britain. These traditionally backward and petrified political mummies try to make use of the natural difficulties encountered in the big and complex work to which the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition has devoted its efforts, to hamper the rapprochement of our peoples and the consolidation of friendly ties between them. Soaked to the marrow in narrow class prejudices, which completely control them and direct all their activities, these gentlemen sow venomous seeds of mistrust, suspicion and estrangement between our peoples, masking their harmful "politics" with a provocative, but unwise, outcry about the danger which Moscow constitutes, allegedly, for the U.S.A. and Great Britain.

It is a good thing that there are not so many of these gentlemen. It is well that almost nobody listens to them now. These gentlemen, when they blurt out their secret dreams and hopes that the Soviet Union will be weakened in the process of its duel with Germany, reveal themselves as the enemies not only of the Soviet people but of their own peoples. This was the case, for example, with Colonel Moore-Brabazon, former British Minister, who made a statement to this effect. These people like the notorious Lady Astor or such American gentlemen as Bullitt, Chandler, Wheeler, Dies and others, are systematically engaged in hysterically shouting aloud nonsense borrowed from the Hitlerites about the "bolshevisation of Europe," about Moscow's "Red imperialism" and the like. It was these gentlemen who at one time welcomed the victory of the Hitlerite gang in Germany as the establishment of a barrier against their own imaginary "bolshhevik menace." It was they who justified the feverish arming of Hitlerite Germany, assuring gullible people that German expansion would be directed towards the East, as though it were possible to invent guns which only fire towards the East, or tanks which can only move in an easterly direction. It was they who surrendered without a fight one position after another to the German Fascist aggressor, making ever more easy the success of his adventurist en-
terprises, increasing more and more his rapacious appetite which, as we know, grows while eating.

Anti-Soviet Intrigues of the "Peacemakers"

In circumstances of war against the Hitlerite bandits, the "peacelovers" of yesterday suddenly acquired a militancy which they so fatally lacked before. Unfortunately, they are manifesting this delayed militancy chiefly against the union of the war efforts of the anti-Hitlerite coalition. One involuntarily gets the impression that these people fear not so much the victory of the common enemy as what they consider the "excessive" friendship between the participants in the anti-Hitlerite coalition. In the struggle against this "danger," all means are good in the eyes of the peacemaker of yesterday. On many of these means the trademark "Made in Germany" shows clearly through the fresh paint.

In the camp of these "peacemakers" Hitler even now has some allies and semi-allies ready for every anti-Soviet intrigue through the medium, for example, of certain Polish circles who have learned nothing from experience, and so on. These people are suddenly evincing an unusually lively interest in the fate of the Baltic countries, the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia. It is common knowledge that the Baltic states have been linked with our native land from time immemorial by their common historic fate and, first and foremost, by common struggle against the rapacious German onslaught on the East, and were separated from the Soviet Union only at a time when she was temporarily weakened by civil war. What would the Americans say if during the Civil War of 1861-1864 Florida, shall we say, was separated from the U.S.A., and then politicians of other countries began seriously to discuss the question as to the "permissibility" or "impermissibility" of Florida's again joining with the United States? And what can we say of discussions to the effect that any references to the kinship of the Ukrainians and Byelorussians of the Eastern and Western regions of the Ukrainien S.S.R. and Byelorussian S.S.R. are akin to Hitler's "racial theory"? What would the British think of a man who dared to deny the kinship between the inhabitants of London and Manchester?

Recently the blustering "peacemakers" have been chiefly worried about the questions as to what the Soviet Union will do after the defeat of Hitler. The most astounding surmises have been made and the most incredible hypotheses built around this subject. As though it were not clear that the people of the Soviet Union are most of all interested in peaceful and friendly relations with other peoples, not to mention the fact that the Soviet people will have quite enough urgent needs and tasks on their hands to make up for the monstrous loss caused to our country by the German Fascist invaders and cut-throat! The moral of all these and similar surmisings and hypotheses is one—not to hurry with the defeat of Hitler.

Hitler failed with his plans for a lightning war and fell into the clutches of a long-drawn-out war which, for Germany, has been going on for four years. But Hitler's position is paradoxical in the sense that at the present stage of the struggle it is precisely Hitler who is interested in dragging out the war. He would like, at all costs, to gain time to heal the wounds inflicted on the German-Fascist war machine by the crushing blows of the Soviet armies and by the numerous blows of the Allied air force on German war industries and the expulsion of the German and Italian Fascists from Africa, which created a direct menace to Hitler's chief ally—Fascist Italy. Hitler would like to gain time to collect and train dozens of new divisions, to accumulate new masses of armaments, to try again and again to indulge in provocation, to sow dissension and strife in the anti-Hitlerite camp.

Great Tasks in War and Peace

The Anglo-Soviet-American coalition has withstood the most serious trials. No less serious trials will confront it in the future. Great are its noble tasks in connection with the defeat of the common enemy—Hitlerite Germany and its vassals. No less great tasks will confront it in connection with the organisation of a stable and lasting peace. After the defeat of the bloody Hitlerite adventure, humanity will be faced with new tasks regarding the organisation of international relations on new foundations to the advantage of all peoples. These relations cannot come about except on the basis of the complete defeat of Hitlerite Germany and its accomplices, on the basis of complete victory of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition over the Italian-German robber camp.

In the face of military danger the true character of the relations between countries and peoples is tested in the fire of struggle. In this sense, one year of war is sometimes worth
whole decades of peaceful development. The Anglo-Soviet-American coalition, like any other living, vital organism, cannot grow strong except by overcoming difficulties encountered on the road. Who can fail to see how the powers of the anti-Hitlerite coalition have come closer during the years of war? How many mutual misconceptions, how many old prejudices have been burned in the flames of common struggle! To whom is it not clear that the more concerted and strong the joint onslaught on the common enemy, the more stable will be the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition when it comes through the great military trial—to the advantage of the peoples, for the good of the whole of freedom-loving mankind!

Month by month the armed collaboration of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition grows stronger. All the facts and events of the past two years point to the progressive rapprochement of the members of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition and their union into a single militant alliance. This is clear logic—the logic of things. This logic of things says that the forces of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition will continue to grow strong and develop. This growth of the forces of our coalition, and all the advantages and high qualities inherent in it, serves as the guarantee of our inevitable victory in the struggle against the Histo-German coalition. On the basis of struggle and victory over the enemy, the close collaboration between the peoples of the Soviet Union, United States of America and Great Britain, the stable foundations of which lie in joint struggle on the field of fierce and bloody battles against the hated common enemy—the German-Fascist hordes—continues to develop in a still more powerful form.

THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE
(EDITORIAL IN WAR AND THE WORKING CLASS, NO. 10, OCTOBER 15TH 1943.)

As the possibility of the speedy defeat of Hitler Germany by the combined efforts of the Allied countries looms ever clearer, people ever more persistently and frequently ask themselves: what prerequisites must be created already to-day to ensure, on the basis of victory over Hitler Germany, a firm and lasting peace and security for all peoples? What must be done now in order not only to win the war, but also to win the peace?

These questions figure ever more frequently in widespread discussions in the democratic countries. Thoughts naturally turn to the experiences of the recent past. The two decades between the first and second world wars give ample food for thought. How many times during the war of 1914 to 1918 was it solemnly proclaimed that it was the last war, which would be followed by an almost eternal, inviolable peace between nations, and wellbeing on our sinful earth! Alas, these promises remained empty phrases.

For the second time in the life of one generation the world was swept by the storm of war, with even greater bloodshed and devastation. Not only millions of the sons of those who spent four years in the trenches of the first World War found themselves on the battlefields, but many veterans of the war of 1914-18 once again took up arms to defend the honour, independence and life of their countries against the Hitlerite invaders.

Following the first world war great hopes of securing a lasting peace were placed in the League of Nations. This organisation inscribed on its banner the noble principles of peace and security for the peoples. At the same time, alongside and frequently even behind the scenes of its activity, intrigues were plotted against peace, and new armed conflicts feverishly prepared.

The Failure of the League of Nations

It is now universally recognised that the League of Nations failed to justify the hopes placed in it. More than this, to a certain extent the League even weakened vigilance and led to a demobilisation of forces capable of defending peace, by creating certain illusions of security remote from the real facts. Only the representatives of the Soviet Union steadily fought against the spreading of these illusions by those in the League of Nations who tried to weaken vigilance.

One could, of course, mention many reasons for the betrayal of the hopes for lasting peace during the period following the first world war. However, the most important and decisive lesson of that period is clear. The League of Nations proved helpless owing to lack of unity between the major peace-loving powers which could become the bulwark of peace and security had they combined efforts in this direction.
The facts in this respect are universally known. They are: the withdrawal of the U.S.A. into the illusory shell of isolationism, the deliberate and consistent policy of artificial estrangement of the great Soviet power from participation in the solution of international problems, the policy of isolating the U.S.S.R. pursued by nearsighted politicians in the victor countries; dissension and disagreement in the camp of the victor powers, primarily between Britain and France. Added to this: in the last few years separating us from the present war, some great powers made attempts to buy off the aggressor by giving him a free hand in Central and Eastern Europe, and inciting him against the U.S.S.R. This is not the place to probe into the causes and dig into the roots of these phenomena. Suffice it to recall that the German imperialist vulture took advantage of this to recover from the 1918 debacle, arm himself to the teeth and prepare a new predatory adventure aimed at establishing domination over Europe and the world.

Lessons of the Recent past

If it is true that history is a great teacher of life, mankind cannot afford to ignore these sad lessons of the recent past. It is necessary to draw the proper conclusions, the most important of which clearly are: that no system of international security is conceivable without ensuring the unity of the principal leading world states, and that the preservation of this unity is indispensable for a firm and lasting peace.

This lesson cost mankind streams of blood, incalculable suffering and destruction.

This conclusion, unanimously arrived at by world public opinion, finds its reflection in the public pronouncements and press of the democratic countries. From a scientific point of view it is indisputable that, as long as modern society, with the contradictions tearing it apart, exists, it would be Utopian to count on an absolute guarantee of freedom from war. At the same time, the vital interests of the nations demand the rejection of every kind of fatalism and consistent stubborn struggle for measures capable to the maximum degree of averting the danger of war, tying the hands of all possible aggressors and rendering difficult, if not preventing, the recurrence of armed conflicts.

Taking into account the experience of the past, the peoples of the world are now expecting effective measures to establish a system of international security and a lasting peace. In authoritative statements, the political leaders of the Allied countries have repeatedly stressed that the guarantee of international security is a lasting post-war agreement, in the first place between Britain, the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and China, which countries, drawing in other opponents of aggression, must act jointly to eliminate all possibilities of new armed conflicts in any part of the globe.

Collaboration of the Three Leading Anti-Hitlerite Powers

Of decisive significance for much-suffering Europe is naturally the question of securing lasting collaboration in the first place among the three powers heading the anti-Hitlerite coalition: the Soviet Union, Britain and the U.S.A., which in the conditions of the present epoch have become a rallying centre for all the freedom-loving peoples.

True, there are some individual voices which sound a discordant note in the general chorus. For example, the opinion is sometimes voiced that the joint efforts of Britain and the U.S.A. are sufficient for creating a system of world security, that the isolated alliance of the Anglo-Saxon powers is capable of taking the world's destiny into its hands. There is no need to dwell on the negative implications of such unilateral plans and calculations on world hegemony at the expense of the interests of the other nations. Such plans, it is to be presumed, are not aimed at rallying the peoples against aggression.

The peoples of the world, and especially Europe, paid dearly for the aspiration of individual powers to decide the destinies of the world. And is the attempt to place the destinies of nations in the hands of an alliance of two united powers different in principle from an attempt to establish world hegemony of one power? It would be entirely unrealistic to build various schemes for achieving world security, ignoring the historically formed principal forces at present leading the struggle of the peoples against the bloody Hitlerite yoke.

These principal forces are the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the U.S.A. Does political realism permit, for example, in building such schemes, the omission of the U.S.A., the greatest
industrial country in the world, with a powerful production apparatus ensuring an output of an enormous mass of industrial and agricultural products with a high level of technique and a powerful war potential, with vast interests in the matter of strengthening economic ties with the other peoples of the world?

Is it possible, in projects of the future world, to disregard the British Empire, possessing tremendous economic and manpower resources, the biggest maritime power, whose territory is scattered all over the globe and whose interests demand political stability in international relations?

Is post-war world organisation, ensuring the peoples' security and peaceful labour, conceivable without the active participation of the Soviet Union, which comprises one-sixth of the globe, is the world's greatest land power and most reliable bulwark of the policy of peace between the peoples and which is now the great stabilising political factor in Europe?

Positive Results of Collaboration

Precisely the alliance of these powers leading the anti-Hitler coalition is naturally called upon to become the nucleus for rallying the nations of the world striving for lasting peace and security. Collaboration between these countries, resulting from the definite coincidence of their basic vital interests, arose of urgent necessity during the war, and its prime task is the defeat of the common enemy. This collaboration has already yielded indisputable positive results.

It is sufficient to recall such facts as war supply deliveries and extensive economic aid in general rendered by the U.S.A. and Britain to the United Nations, the allied collaboration in Iran, the co-ordination achieved in conclusion of the armistice with Italy and the setting up of the Military and Political Commission of the United Nations.

The solid foundation for collaboration between the Soviet Union and Great Britain was secured by the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance. This Treaty must serve as a political foundation for developing and deepening Anglo-Soviet collaboration. Between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. there is as yet no such political agreement, as, incidentally, there is none between Britain and the U.S.A. Nevertheless, it cannot but be recognised that the collaboration of the Soviet Union with the great transatlantic Republic has already achieved important successes.

Collaboration in the Military Field

On the further successful development of collaboration between the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the U.S.A. depends the positive solution of the most important problems of our day. This collaboration must be broadened and strengthened, not only in the political and economic fields, but most urgently under present conditions, also in the military field. It is precisely in this field that it must now be much more effective in order to frustrate the enemy's calculations for prolonging the war, which is the last trump of the Hitlerite gamblers.

Therefore it cannot be restricted by our allies to air-raids on Germany, which have their important significance, or the as yet small-scale operations in Italy. The inadequacy of this kind of allied military operations from the point of view of the basic task—the task of shortening the war and the defeat of Germany—is more than obvious.

The collaboration of the three powers is now, in a certain sense, entering a new phase through the creation of the Military and Political Commission of the United Nations, and especially through the conference of the representatives of the Soviet Union, Britain and the U.S.A. in Moscow.

Hastening the End of the War

There is no need to point out the essential importance of the problems awaiting solution by the Moscow Conference, which must remove no small difficulties involved by them. Everyone realises that it is a question of solving practical problems of cardinal importance, primarily for the further conduct of the war against Hitler Germany, as well as for the post-war organisation of the world.

The paramount task is the real and urgent unification of all forces of the anti-Hitler coalition for hastening the end of the protracted war. This is what is expected by the peoples who have suffered for years under the yoke of Hitler tyranny and to whom the prolongation of the war would mean new incalculable sacrifices and sufferings. This is what Hitler and his associates, banking on prolonging the war, would like to prevent.
The Moscow Conference will live up to its important task of smashing the calculations of the Hitlerites for prolonging the war, displaying determination in this fundamental, fully ripe problem of uniting the efforts of the allied countries on the basis of joint friendly collaboration to solve the urgent military questions facing them and the post-war problems now arising.

THE RESULTS OF THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE

(From War and the Working Class, Nov. 15th, 1943.)

The Moscow Conference of Foreign Minister of the U.S.A., Great Britain and the Soviet Union attracted the attention of the world to a far greater degree than many other meetings of the men responsible for the foreign policy of the United Nations. This is quite natural.

The Moscow Conference was the first meeting of authoritative representatives of the three leading Allied Powers which head the anti-Hitler coalition of freedom-loving peoples. This meeting was held at a stage in the struggle against Hitler Germany and her Allies when, as a result of the Red Army’s splendid victories and the successful operations of the Anglo-American troops, the full possibility is created for the quickest defeat of the common enemy by the joint efforts of the Allies.

Undoubtedly the success of the Moscow Conference is a considerable contribution both to the cause of the struggle against Hitler Germany and her satellites and to securing a stable and durable peace after the war.

Complex Tasks

The significance of the positive results of the Moscow Conference is all the greater because the problems before it were by no means simple and easy. The present stage of the war demands clear and unambiguous decisions both as regards the further prosecution of the war and the establishment of a stable post-war order protecting the peace-loving peoples from the danger of aggression. That there are many difficulties in the way of reaching such decisions is obvious to everyone.

Soviet public opinion and the press, just as public opinion and the press in the countries of our Allies, were fully aware of the complex nature of the tasks before the Conference. At the same time, the Hitlerites banked on the difficulty of these tasks in their calculations, and they forecast the failure of the conference. It is no secret either that isolated voices of “scepticism” regarding the prospects of the Moscow Conference were also raised in the pages of some organs of the Anglo-American Press which adopt an unfavourable attitude towards the Soviet Union.

By coping with the difficulties of the task facing it, the Moscow Conference upset the calculations of the enemy and his associates. Naturally, the Conference concentrated its attention above all on the great problems of the prosecution of the war and also on the more immediate problems of the post-war period.

The documents published as a result of the work of the conference fully reveal the firm determination of the peoples of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the U.S.A. to collaborate in solving the problems of the war and those of the post-war period.

The Prime Aim—to Shorten the War

As we already pointed out before the conference, the main foundation for the further strengthening of the friendly collaboration of the Three Powers, during as well as after the war, lies in combining their war efforts to shorten the protracted war.

The problem of shortening the war, raised by the Soviet public with understandable persistence, has, as a result of the work of the Moscow Conference, now received official recognition from the Governments of the Allied countries.

Expressing the will of their peoples, the Governments of the three countries represented at the Moscow Conference unanimously recognised the shortening of the war as their paramount aim. It is to be expected that “the definite military operations with regard to which decisions have been taken and which are already in preparation” mentioned in the communiqué on the conference, will upset Hitler’s last calculation, his banking on prolonging the war. It is now a question of practical realisation of measures recognised as most important and urgent.

It is now a matter of realising that decisions were taken
whose significance and value will be determined precisely by
the extent to which and the speed with which these decisions
will be carried into practice. This is well realised by the peoples
of all countries who drained the bitter cup of suffering and
humiliation caused them by the hated Hitlerite tyranny.

It is extremely important that the obligations undertaken
by the Allies and now confirmed by the Moscow Conference
should be carried out in time. Of great importance in this
connection will be the position of some States which hitherto
pursued a policy of neutrality, as for example, Turkey. The
change on the part of such neutral states to a policy of direct
support of the anti-Hitler coalition in its struggle against
already weakened German Fascism, the enemy of all freedom-
loving peoples, will be a factor of great importance in solving
the task of shortening the war.

The Problem of World Security

The Moscow Conference demonstrated the unanimous
desire of the peoples of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and
the U.S.A. to continue the present closer collaboration also
after the war, with the aim of ensuring lasting peace and
security for all the freedom-loving peoples.

The declaration on general security, in which the Chinese
Government joined during the Conference, outlines ways for
the solution of the world problem of security. This declara-
tion of the four Powers, representing the further development
of a number of similar international documents published
during the war, at the same time is distinguished from them
in that it gives for the first time concrete expression to the
idea of a leading international nucleus represented by the four
leading world powers, which is of great importance both for
the defeat of the common enemy of freedom-loving nations
and for the entire subsequent international development, and
especially for uniting all peace-loving States, large and small,
in the interests of their national security and universal peace.

Special note must be made of the decision to form after the
war an international organisation, membership of which is
accessible to all peace-loving states, large and small, alike.
This organisation must undoubtedly draw lessons from the
history of the pre-war decades when the League of Nations
was unable to fulfil its role as an instrument of peace and
security owing to the lack of agreement in the policy of the
biggest peace-loving powers, which precisely opened the door
to Fascist aggression. The historic experience of the period
between the first and second World Wars testifies how great
are the difficulties in securing a lasting peace in Europe. On
the other hand, the experience of the present war and the
creation of an anti-Hitler coalition show that there is ground
for a broad collaboration of the great democratic powers;
the U.S.A., Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

The consideration of European problems at the Moscow
Conference of representatives of the Soviet Union, U.S.A. and
Britain revealed the full importance of the broad collabora-
tion of these three great powers. Such a negative feature of
the past period as the U.S.A.'s aloofness from participation in
European affairs has already receded to the realm of the past.

The joint decisions of the three allied powers revealed
that these powers fully realize the responsibility for establish-
ing a stable post-war order which the entire course of history
has placed precisely on these countries.

No Artificial Federations

The principle of the sovereign equality of all freedom-
loving states joining the international organisation, which
is proclaimed in the declaration, frustrates ill-intentioned attempts
to sow distrust for the great freedom-loving powers among the
small and medium States, attempts originating with the
Hitlerites and their hangers-on.

Special zeal in this respect, as is known, is displayed by
reactionary circles of Polish emigres, who are more and more
manifesting their obvious isolation from their people. Preci-
sely these circles constitute a source of all sorts of artificial
plans for the creation of federations of states in central and
eastern Europe. These plans presuppose the formation of
some permanent groups of states by the emigre governments,
which in the majority of cases lack sufficiently strong ties with
people. Furthermore, these plans provide for the unification
in one federation of countries which suffered at the hands
of the Hitlerite brigands and those which helped the Hitlerites
in their brigandage. It is equally clear that, in the form of
such federations, it is proposed to revive the policy of the
notorious “Cordon Sanitaire,” directed against the Soviet
Union. The harm resulting from artificial encouragement of
such projects, which may lead to the violation of the real will
of the sovereign peoples by imposing upon them all sorts of political combination, is obvious. As regards the Soviet Union and its relations with other European States, a definite step forward may be noted. It is known that in recent months preparations have been under way for the conclusion of a Soviet Czechoslovak treaty of Mutual Assistance on the model of the Anglo-Soviet Agreement.

Obstacles in the way of the conclusion of this agreement, which are known to our readers, have now vanished and in the near future Dr. Benes, President of the Czechoslovak Republic, is expected to arrive in Moscow for the purpose of signing a treaty with the Soviet Union.

For the purpose of joint consideration by representatives of the three powers of the problems connected with the war, the conference decided to establish a European Advisory Commission in London, consisting of representatives of the U.S.A., the Soviet Union and Great Britain. The European Advisory Commission must undoubtedly play an important role in strengthening the collaboration of the three great powers: the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the U.S.A.

The Restoration of Democracy in Italy

Special mention must be made of the formation of an Advisory Council on problems relating to Italy which, to begin with, will consist of representatives of the three allied governments and the French Committee of National Liberation and will later include also representatives of Greece and Yugoslavia. Further development of military operations in Italy and the Mediterranean in general will gradually confront this council with important problems.

The declaration on Italy confirms the position of the Allies in favour of a restoration of democracy in Italy, a position steadfastly held and therefore especially welcomed now by Soviet public opinion. This declaration proceeds from the necessity of the utter destruction of Fascism and all its evil consequences, so as to ensure that the Italian people are given every opportunity to establish governmental and other institutions based on the principles of democracy.

The principles of the realisation of democracy in Italy, proclaimed in Moscow on behalf of Great Britain, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, must serve as a basis for the revival of the political life of the Italian people. They determine the general line of the three Governments also for other similar events.

The Declaration on Austria

The declaration on Austria strikes a blow at Hitlerite Germany and demonstrates the determination of the Allied powers to put an end to all the consequences of Hitlerite aggression.

The declaration of President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and the head of the Soviet Government, Stalin, on the responsibility of the Hitlerites for atrocities perpetrated by them is a grim warning for the Hitlerite brigands. The Allied Powers declared that the Hitlerite criminals will be pursued even “to the uttermost ends of the earth” and handed over to their accusers so that justice might be done.

The success of the Moscow Conference has increased the dismay and confusion in the enemy camp. On the eve of the Conference the Hitlerites with dull monotony predicted its inevitable failure, discussing all sorts of differences in the camp of the Allies. Now, after the success of the Conference, they are screaming that in Moscow the Allies surrendered almost all of Europe to the Bolsheviks. This invention is not only stupid, it is so outworn that it cannot serve even to cover the retreat before facts in the face of which the Hitlerite propaganda proved helpless. Apparently the Hitlerites lost their heads to such an extent that they were incapable of inventing anything new.

The Soviet Union—Bulwark of Peace

The Conference of the three Foreign Ministers was held in Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union, which is bearing the brunt of the struggle against the German Fascist brigands and their satellites. It was held on the eve of the twenty-sixth anniversary of the establishment of Soviet power. This coincidence may be accidental, nevertheless it is profoundly symbolic. Ever since the birth of Soviet power all the forces of international brigandage and aggression, as well as the associates of these forces in the countries destined subsequently to become victims of the aggressor, pursued a policy directed towards the international isolation of the Soviet Union. The Fascist highway robbers and all sorts of “ appeasers” abetting these brigands tried not only to isolate the Soviet Union, but also to shift on to its shoulders the “guilt” for this isolation.
Today, in the light of events of the past few years, it has become clear to everybody that attempts to keep the Soviet Union from participation in the solution of important problems of international policy can be of benefit only to forces inimical to the most vital interests of the peace-loving peoples. Ever since its origin the great Soviet power has been a firm bulwark of peace among the peoples. Following Hitler, Germany's treacherous attack, the Soviet Union became a steel wall against which the Hitlerite Imperialist vulture has already broken its teeth. Our country has already withstood ordeals which no other country in the world could have endured. Our country was able to inflict on the enemy blows which have already undermined the Hitlerite war machine built by Germany for the conquest of world domination, and which renders fully possible the defeat of the enemy by the combined Allied forces within a short time.

The strength and significance of these blows again received eloquent confirmation in the results of the Red Army's summer campaign. The Red Army's victories during the summer and autumn of nineteen forty-three laid a firm foundation for the speedy and complete rout of Hitler Germany. The scope of the contribution made by the Soviet people to the common cause of the Allies stands out now in especially bold relief.

The Guarantee of Victory

The Moscow Conference, coming as a natural result of all the preceding development of collaboration of the three great Powers heading the anti-Hitlerite coalition, at the same time heralds a new stage in the relations between these powers. Now that the outlines of the forthcoming victory loom clear, special significance attaches to the efforts of the principal Allied States to ensure co-ordinated policy in the solution of the most important problems of the war in Europe, above all, the problem of shortening the war, and also to the working out of definite guiding principles of policy with regard to the post-war period, which proceeds in the interests of the preparation of lasting peace and general security.

It would be a mistake to minimise the difficulties inevitably arising in the way of solution of these problems. But these difficulties can be overcome and the guarantee of this is the successful work of the Moscow Conference of representatives of the three leading world Powers.

A M G O T
(Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory)
(From War and the Working Class, September 1st, 1943)

By L. Volinsky

I

Amgott is exclusively an Anglo-American organisation. The Soviet Union takes no part in it. Nevertheless the nature of the tasks set to Amgott cannot but attract the attention of the Soviet public to this organisation.

The landing of allied troops in Sicily was received by the local population as an event heralding liberation from the Hitlerite war, which is alien to the vital interests of the Italian people, and from the hated Fascist regime. Amgott began to function in the cities and districts of Sicily immediately following the allied occupation. Nevertheless, judging from reports of the Anglo-American press, the activity of Amgott in Sicily has evoked many reproaches in Britain and the U.S.A. Apprehension has been voiced in many circles that the regime established on the island following the allied occupation is hardly up to the tasks of the defence of democracy, which the Allies set themselves in the war against Hitler tyranny.

When, in an interview with Genral Lord Rennell-Rodk, the News-Chronicle correspondent mentioned the fate of the political prisoners, and asked whether Amgott is pursuing the policy of freeing the anti-Fascists from prison, he received the reply that Amgott took measures against ordinary criminals, but is not concerned with political prisoners.

Amgott, continued the General, prefers not to appeal to any groups in Sicily. As regards the restoration of democratic liberties, and freedom of assembly in particular, the correspondent was told that there is no freedom of assembly in Sicily, and there will not be until the receipt of instructions to this effect.

Already, before the landing operations in Sicily, preliminary plans of Amgott were drawn up which provided for the use of Italian Carabineers as police. In the main, however, the leading local officials were used. The Italian government
employees continue to receive their salaries in spite of the fact that their institutions are not functioning at present.

In the economic field, enterprises with allied capital which were seized some time ago by the Fascist government, have been frozen by Amgot in the interests of their owners. Among these enterprises are the sulphur mines and others. Many leading Fascists, including the mayor, a prefect and other high officials, fled from Palermo, the biggest city in Sicily, before the arrival of the American troops, but many Fascists remained.

"The allied military government" left the assistant prefect and the vice-mayor, as well as a number of other officials in their former positions. The facts cited explain why the organisation of Amgot, and the first experience of its practical activity has evoked objections on principle, and some sharp criticism in press and political circles in Britain and the U.S.A.

Uneasiness among democratic public opinion in allied countries, caused particularly by information reaching the press to the effect that the activity of Amgot is planned in "broad European outline." Or, plainly speaking that this organisation is to be set up not only in the countries of the Hitler bloc, but also in the Hitler-occupied countries, following their liberation from the German occupation.

It is noteworthy that even those circles among the United Nations which voiced no doubt as regards Amgot activities on enemy territory, resolutely oppose the appearance of this organisation in their own countries.

It is no accident that the organisation of Amgot and its practice evoke debates. As seen from a factual description of Amgot activities and policies, which has arisen around this organisation, its characteristic feature is that, while officially proclaiming the liquidation of the Fascist régime, Amgot does not take the necessary steps to bring about the actual destruction of the Fascist system.

Amgot preserves the old Fascist administrative machinery and does not draw in democratic elements into administration. The administration itself is based on a foundation which has nothing in common with the principles of democracy. This cannot but have a certain effect on the further course of the struggle against the enemy.

II

(War and the Working Class, September 15th, 1943)

An earlier issue dealt with the activities of the Allied Military Government set up by the Anglo-American authorities in Sicily.

The characteristics of this organisation and criticism of it in the foreign press revealed that the activity of Amgot there was by no means directed toward the liquidation of the Fascist régime, and that indeed it was preserving the Fascist administration and in general building on foundations which have nothing in common with the principles of democracy.

Taking into account the interest in all questions of consistent and resolute struggle against Fascism it seems expedient to acquaint readers with certain additional facts and data about the work of Amgot.

The public and press in democratic countries cannot help taking interest in the question of the scope of Amgot's work.

Is it expected that the activities of this organisation will be extended only to Germany and the other countries of the Fascist bloc, or also to the countries now under German occupation?

Apparently there are differences of opinion on that score. At any rate, there is undoubtedly a tendency towards extending Amgot activities also to the countries liberated from German invasion. It is this fact that explains the appearance in the press of articles and statements resolutely opposed to the creation of Amgot in one or another of the European countries.

Thus, on August 28th, the Dutch newspaper Fröi Nederland, published in London, carried an article which, in connection with projects of applying Amgot to all liberated countries, pointed out quite firmly "not a single rational person will ever entertain the idea that such slogans would have any success in Holland, Belgium, France, Denmark and Norway."

On August 24th the Rabat Radio broadcast an account of a speech by the representative of the French Commission of National liberation in Washington, who stated: "The French Committee of National Liberation will surrender power to a Provisional Government to be formed soon after the liberation (even partial) of France. Thus no foreign administration of the type of Amgot can be established in France."
The head of the Belgian Government, Pierlot, said: “At the first opportunity the Government will go to the liberated regions—even during a transition period the country will not remain without a national government.”

There can scarcely be any doubt that the same position is held on this question also by the leading circles of other European states suffering under the yoke of Hitler Germany.

In the meantime the apprehensions as to the projected application of Amgot on the broad European plan are easy to understand if the scope of the preparations of the numerous personnel for “the Allied Military Governments of Occupied Territory” be taken into account.

On August 20th B.B.C. reported that there are five centres now instructing and training special personnel for work in Amgot organs. Upon graduation these special groups join the staffs of the armies and follow in the armies' wake.

Speaking of Amgot one cannot but mention the Board of Economic Co-ordination Abroad recently formed in the U.S.A. Herman Wells was recently appointed Associate Director of this Board. According to a telegram from Washington he is charged with the planning of economic activities connected with liberated territories. Wells is now Dean of the University of Indiana and he was formerly an employee of the Indiana Bankers’ Association. The Director of the Board is Under-Secretary of State, Atcheson. As seen from an interview published in the American press the tasks set Wells are quite varied and involve matters of big scope. His sphere of activity includes supply to the population of liberated territories, the organisation of supplies, the settlement of financial problems, and measures to prevent economic warfare and facilitate the restoration of trade.

Up to the liberation of one or another territory these Committees will engage in drafting and unifying a programme of economic measures. Following the liberation of a territory the committee corresponding to it will be transformed into a central organ receiving reports from the localities concerned and issuing instructions to the local civil administrations operating in the liberated territory concerned.

Not devoid of interest is the indication that the body headed by Atcheson and Wells is exclusively American. None the less it is recognised as necessary to work out some form of joint activity with Britain. Thus, for example, the Washington Committee dealing with the economic problems of North Africa is a joint Anglo-American Committee.

It is at present difficult to imagine the scope of the restoration work necessary to raise from the ashes cities wiped off the face of the earth and whole branches of industry, to restore national economy depleted and ruined by the German Fascist vultures. It goes without saying that the successful accomplishment of these tasks will demand extensive aid to the suffering peoples and countries. Of most serious significance is the question of the methods of this aid, irrespective of whether it is dictated by a sense of duty towards the peoples who have made incalculable sacrifices for the common victory or by the mere prosaic and selfish considerations of certain circles within the Greatest Powers.

In either case restoration is the task of the peoples themselves, and its planning as well as the realisation of plans of restoration may solely be determined by their supreme will, and by respect for the principles of democracy and truly national sovereignty, for the defence of which the United Nations raised their swords.

The ideas and methods of “Allied Military Government” as revealed by the data published in the foreign press contradict the above principles.

It is precisely this circumstance that explains the heated discussions around this organisation. In the course of these debates it is becoming clearer that the theory and practice of Amgot cannot but evoke legitimate apprehensions among all those who understand the political importance of the task of the destruction of Fascism on the territory liberated from the Hitlerite brigands.

Following the defeat of the enemy forces and the conquest of one or another territory by Allied troops, the task of restoring power during the initial period rests naturally on the Command of the Allied troops which won the victory over the enemy. But it is at the same time clear that all subsequent problems must be settled in the light of the necessity to consolidate the victory. And it is precisely for the consolidation of the victory that it is necessary within the shortest possible time to draw in local elements capable of aiding the Allies in the struggle against the enemy, to set up local organs of power functioning on a democratic basis and capable of winning over local forces to the side of the Allies.

This applies even more to districts liberated by the Allied troops from former occupation by the Hitlerites and their
henchmen, where the restoration of local administrations on
a democratic basis is especially urgent. Failure to solve the
problems inevitably confronting the Allies on liberated terri-
tory cannot but create unnecessary difficulties seriously imped-
ing the cause of victory over Hitlerite tyranny.

THE MEDITERRANEAN COMMISSION

(War and the Working Class, October, 1943)

According to reports published in the British Press, Mr.
Anthony Eden, speaking on the formation of the Mediterranean
Commission, as he calls the Military and Political Commission,
said that its first task will be to solve the problems connected
with the Armistice signed with Italy, and also the problems
connected with the liberation of enemy-occupied territory. It
is thus that the work of the Military and Political Commission
is envisaged in outline.

It must be pointed out, however, that this is only the
rough outline, the fundamental principles, so to speak, of the
Military and Political Commission's future activities. We do
not yet have a more detailed and fuller description of the
Commission's functions. However, what has been said is sufficient
to indicate the great importance of the matters coming under
its jurisdiction.

First among these matters are presumably the problems
connected with various measures regulating the political life
and administration of the countries concerned. The elabora-
tion of various declarations, proclamations, instructions and
other documents to be issued to the local authorities and the
local population on behalf of the United Nations or on behalf
of the Military and Political Commission should evidently also
come under this work.

A very important part of the Military and Political Com-
mission's work will probably be the exercise of control over
the observance of Armistice terms. This includes such matters
as the state of Italy's armed forces, problems bearing on the
demobilisation, disarmament, evacuation and further fate of
the enemy army after capitulation.

Control over the observance of the terms of Armistice
signed with Italy should undoubtedly be an object of the most
earnest attention of the Military and Political Commission,
which should take account of the experience of the initial
period after Italy's capitulation and render impossible in future
a repetition of the case of Mussolini and a number of other
Italian Fascist leaders who slipped through the hands of the
Allies.

Effective Powers Essential

Naturally, the formation of the Military and Political Com-
mission will arouse lively interest in the public and political
circles of the world, especially in Great Britain and the United
States, where the formation of this Commission and its forth-
coming activities are the object of discussion. The London
Times of September 21st makes the point that the Military and
Political Commission must be invested with very wide powers.
To this remark on the part of the Times, we cannot but sub-
scribe, for without powers wide enough to make the activities
of the Military and Political Commission as effective as possible,
we cannot envisage its functions at all.

We might observe, in passing, that this view expressed by
the Times with regard to the jurisdiction of the Military and Po-
litical Commission, is not the view of the Times Diplomatic Cor-
respondent, who regards the Military and Political Commission
as a commission of experts whose functions are limited to
submitting information and extending advice to their govern-
ments. Such a conception of the jurisdiction of the Commiss-
ion does not accord with its functions as outlined in the
official Soviet and British statements.

The collaboration of the Three Powers—the Soviet Union
the U.S.A. and Great Britain, on questions relating to the
Mediterranean, is accorded great importance in the American
Press. In the Soviet Union the Military and Political Com-
misson is regarded as of great importance in view of the
tasks which have been accorded it by the Governments of
the three leading Powers in the anti-Hitlerite bloc.

It is to be expected that the Military and Political Commiss-
ion, composed of representatives of these Powers, with the
inclusion of the French Committee of National Liberation, will
contribute by its activities to further strengthening the collab-
oration between the belligerent Allied countries and all
States struggling against Hitler Germany and its satellites,
both in the period of the war and in the post-war period.
It is to be hoped that the Military and Political Commission will begin its work in the near future.

MONOPOLISTS SHARPEN THEIR KNIVES

(War and the Working Class, March, 1944)

BY K. HOFFMANN

The question of the role of the international monopolies and cartels* and their influence on the economy, politics and future war effort of Britain and the U.S., is of special significance at the present decisive stage of the war.

The clearer the prospect of the final defeat of Germany, the greater the interest in post-war reconstruction shown by Wall Street and London, the centres of international finance, industry and trade.

A number of projects recently published by British and American economists reflect the desire of one or other monopoly group to extend the sphere of its activities and influence in the post-war world. Considerable attention is paid to the question of the fate of the German monopolies, and to the role of international cartels in the economy of post-war Germany.

The discussion of these problems proceeds against the background of a sharpening competition between the biggest monopolies of the Old World and the New. With all their interest in general in victory over Hitler Germany and its bloc, the monopoly groups are each striving for control over world markets and sources of raw materials and for a dominating influence over international trade. To them the war and victory mean first and foremost the strengthening of the power of their cartels.

The war has shown the world importance of inter-continental communications.

The shipping concerns in Britain have just established a consortium for stimulating the development of British civil aviation. They have reached the conclusion that the continuation of Britain's lag behind the United States in the establishment of air routes may become a danger to Britain's power on the sea. Vast projects for inter-continental air routes, problems of the new bases these require, and, above all, the problem of oil, without which engines are mere dead metal, occupy an important place in the plans and practical present steps of the respective monopoly groups.

As a result of the activity of the American oil concerns, their role and influence in Near Eastern affairs is increasing. British circles fully realize the big changes in the correlation of forces in the Near East that may result from a further extension of the activities there of the American monopolies.

The oil discussions have shown that British and American economists hold differing viewpoints on the question of cartels and their post-war role.

With few exceptions, the British favour the preservation of cartels in their pre-war form, and the restoration immediately after the war of the cartels' international contacts. The only defenders of this point of view in America are the economists who reflect the interests of those American monopolies that are linked by cartel agreements to the British and other European monopolies.

The rest, though for the most part they favour international collaboration, hold that it must be based not on the old cartels, but on "free competition."

These latter tendencies in turn cause uneasiness among the British monopolists, and accordingly these endeavour to use their extensive business contacts in the U.S. to secure a place and influence for themselves in the new associations which may be built up on American initiative.

The Truman Commission of the American Senate, appointed for the investigation of war industry, has issued a report on U.S. cartels and their pre-war contacts.

This stresses that many cartel agreements have remained in force, with only slight changes, during the war.

Prior to December, 1941, some of the American companies connected to Axis monopolies through cartels helped them to evade the British blockade, using especially channels through neutral countries in Latin America and Europe.

Some American companies, such as the Du Pont-de Nemours chemical concern, are parties to agreements providing for cartel relations with German companies interrupted by the war to

*Lenin defined cartels as associations of firms which "come to agreement on the conditions of sale, terms of payment, etc. They divide the markets among themselves. They fix the quantity of goods to be produced. They fix prices. They divide the profits among the various enterprises etc."

30
be restored immediately the war is over. This concern has an agreement for division of world markets with the British I.C.I. and the German I.G. Farben industrie.

One American aircraft company, the report points out, to evade action by the U.S. Department of Justice, actually asked the U.S. Government's permission to send a representative—subsequent to America's entry into the war—to Germany, Italy, France and Japan to propose changes in their cartel agreement.

Even Standard Oil, a monopoly particularly patronised by the U.S. Government, only broke its cartel agreements with I.G. Farbenindustrie after the Department of Justice began proceedings against it. And even then it refused to give a pledge not to contact the German cartel interests in the future.

The supporters of the British conception even utilise the Atlantic Charter to proclaim the "inviolability" of the rights of cartels. They actually call the U.S. Department of Justice measures undertaken to limit the activity of the cartels an "anti-British campaign."

On the other hand, the American supporters of "freedom of competition" polemize against the conception of the London Times leading article which, after saying that before the war the decisive branches of German industry were closely intertwined with the industries of neighbouring countries, urged that after the war this intertwining process must be pushed further, and German economy be closely welded with the European system.

An American radio commentator called the circles supporting this—British and American as well—"economic appeasers." They operate behind the stage, he said, placing above all else the personal, selfish interests of a small handful of international monopolists who are making immense super-profits out of war orders and are only afraid of a "premature" ending of the war.

Now that the Hitler war machine, built up by the German monopolists, is being smashed by the Red Army and the air blows at its rear, the world is naturally interested in the discussion so far as they affect the German problem.

It is common knowledge that, like Kaiser Germany, Hitler-Germany made extensive use of international cartels for its war preparations. This happened, but must not happen again. However, in the meantime there is a secret H.Q. functioning in Switzerland concerned with the preservation of the contacts of British and American monopolies with their German counterparts.

An ex-employee of the New York Guarantee Trust Company, who spent the first years of the war in Switzerland, writes as follows in Harper's Magazine:

"Switzerland is the country where money loses its national colours and becomes an international medium of exchange between men who understand one another even if their respective countries are at war.

"By 1939 official Swiss data showed that 2,278 international finance corporations had been registered there (360 of these during 1939 alone). There were 214 banks. The number of holding companies, investment trusts and personal corporations was 2,026.

"The most strenuous efforts were made by cartel managers in Europe and America to design the organisation of the cartels so that, in the event of the war, the component parts of each cartel could go on functioning and be easily reassembled when the war was over."

At a time when millions of persons all over the world are concerned only with speeding the defeat of Germany and her monopolies that before the war had succeeded in capturing dominating positions in the economics of the democratic countries, a handful of monopolists is planning the preservation of German cartels and their revival in full force after the war.

But lasting peace between the peoples, and economic business relations between the countries, can be attained only on the basis of the principles of post-war collaboration formulated in the decisions of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences.
II. THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE

THE SECOND FRONT

(War and the Working Class, August 1st, 1943)

The situation today is such that the victory of the freedom-loving peoples over Hitlerite Germany is possible in the very near future. In the course of the war a turning-point has been arrived at. It is enough to recall the following facts: the brilliant results of the Red Army's winter offensive, the defeat of the Germans before Stalingrad, on the Don and in the Caucasus, the rout of the armies of Hitler's allies on the Soviet-German front, the defeat of the German and Italian troops in Tunisia, the successes of our Allies in Sicily, the downfall of Mussolini marking the bankruptcy of Italian Fascism and the prospects of Italy's withdrawal from the war, the failure of Hitler's summer offensive against the Soviet Union and the successes of the Red Army offensive in the Orel direction.

The camp of the enemy is passing through a deep crisis. The necessary factors have been created for the final defeat of Hitler, who set himself the aim of achieving the domination of Europe and later the establishment of the world domination of Hitlerite tyranny.

The Possibility of Victory

Never since the war began have the conditions been so favourable for victory over Hitlerite Germany as they are today. But the possibility of victory is not identical with victory itself. This must particularly be borne in mind in the struggle against so powerful and pernicious an enemy as Hitlerite Germany.

The history of wars has examples when opportunities were allowed to slip. In such cases victory receded, the war was drawn out and the peoples suffered countless additional sacrifices. Today, millions of people throughout the world are with great concern raising the question whether every-

thing is being done to make timely use of the possibility of victory over Fascist Germany. And here, the question of the second front in Europe arises in all its magnitude.

Much has been written on the question of the second front. Yet actually the question is quite clear. The bravely attack by Hitler on neighbouring European countries and then on the Soviet Union brought into being the Anglo-American-Soviet coalition. The meaning of every war coalition lies in joint, armed struggle for victory over the common enemy. The anti-Hitlerite coalition was formed for armed struggle against Fascist Germany and its accomplices, for their defeat and the safeguarding of a lasting and just peace. The participants in the anti-Hitlerite coalition—the Soviet Union, Britain and the U.S.A.—undertook a mutual obligation: viz., to wage a joint war on the common enemy.

From the very beginning it was clear that the enemy is strong and dangerous. It was clear that the struggle against such an enemy would require the mobilisation and exertion of all the forces of those taking part in such a coalition. Consequently one had the right to expect that the members of the coalition would hurl themselves on the enemy in full force.

Gripping Hitlerite Germany in Iron Pincers

What are the ways in which the common struggle of the anti-Hitlerite coalition can be waged? These ways do not have to be found; they are pre-determined by the whole geographical and military-strategic position of Germany, by the whole historic trend of the struggle against German aggression. The task is to grip Hitlerite Germany in iron pincers from two sides, from the West and the East, to force her to wage war on two fronts, dividing her forces and reserves between the two.

For a long time German imperialism has endeavoured to avoid war on two fronts. Bismarck, throughout his life, was afraid of the "nightmare of coalition." The victory of the Allies over Kaiser Germany was won precisely because Germany was forced to fight a war on two fronts.

For over two years now the Soviet Union has been shouldering alone the full brunt of the struggle against the main forces of Hitler's war machine. It is precisely the absence of the second front in Europe which made it possible for the Germans to win temporary successes in the first stage.

34
of the Soviet-German war. In the summer and autumn of 1941, Hitler was able to send all his own troops and those of his allies against the U.S.S.R., to maintain a starvation blockade of Leningrad, to put Moscow in jeopardy, to reach Rostov, for no hostile forces menaced their rear from the West.

The absence of a second front in Europe saved Fascist Germany from defeat in 1942. More than this, the absence of the second front in the summer of 1942 enabled Hitler to move all his reserves on to the Soviet-German front, to build up a big superiority of forces in the South-west direction, and to reach Stalingrad and the approaches to Grozny.

The Agreement of a Second Front

Finally, this year again the Germans were able to venture a fresh summer offensive only because the absence of the second front in Europe allowed them once more to concentrate all their forces in the East. Yet, in June 1942, it was declared that "complete agreement had been reached concerning the immediate task of setting up a second front in Europe in 1942," as stated in two official communiques concerning the negotiations conducted by V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., with the heads of the American and British Governments in London and Washington. Nevertheless, no second front was opened in 1942.

Already then it was made clear, however, that in the spring of 1943, at any rate, the second front in Western Europe would be opened and that our British and American Allies would see to it that it was opened. Yet the spring passed and the second front in Europe was not opened. The Anglo-American troops restricted themselves to various operations to clear the German and Italian forces out of North Africa.

In January 1943, Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt met in Casablanca. In an official communiqué on this meeting it was stated that the leaders of Britain and the U.S.A. and their military staffs had reached complete agreement concerning war plans and measures to be adopted during the campaign in 1943. Reporting in February 1943, on the results of the meeting with Roosevelt and the decisions arrived at at Casablanca, Churchill, in a speech in the House of Commons, stated that the Allies had an exhaustive plan of operations determining the appointment of armed forces and the direction of their operations and that they intended to put this plan into effect in accordance with their policy in the course of the next nine months.

Thus, at the meeting at Casablanca in January 1943, on the joint plan of military operations of the Allies, it was decided that during the first nine months of the current year our British and American Allies would put into effect an exhaustive plan of operations which, naturally included the opening of the second front in Europe. However, the nine months are nearing their end and the second front in Europe still does not exist.

Recently the third session of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee took place in Moscow at which, as is known, the question of the opening of the second front in Europe this year was also discussed. The position being such as we have outlined, however, what could the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee say on this question?

The Soviet-German Front

The Soviet people, waging what is virtually a single-handed struggle against the whole monstrous war machine of Hitler and his brigandry that possesses Europe, has made the greatest sacrifices on the altar of struggle for the common cause of the Allies. The Soviet Union has withstood and still is withstanding the frenzied onslaught of the German Fascist hordes. But on the Soviet-German front the number of German officers and men put out of commission or killed is many times more than on all the other fronts together where a struggle has been waged and is still being waged against Hitler. On the Soviet-German front the picked divisions of the German-Fascist armies, the flower of the Hitlerite troops, have been wiped out. The Soviet troops have thoroughly battered the Hitlerite war machine, which met no defeats in Western Europe. The blows of the Red Army have once and for all time dispelled the myth of the invincibility of the Hitlerite Army, of the superiority of the much-vaunted German strategy and tactics and German weapons of war.

We consider it incorrect to underestimate the importance of the military operations which are being carried out by our Allies, the great importance of the numerous bombings of Germany by Anglo-American aircraft and also the importance of the aid which the Allies afford us in war material and supplies. But, nevertheless, the fact remains that on the
Lybian front the Allies were confronted by four German divisions in all and some ten Italian divisions; and in Sicily by only two divisions of German troops and a few Italian. These figures are sufficient to indicate the actual scale of these operations as compared with those on the Soviet-German front, where in the summer of 1942 Hitler had 180 German divisions and about 60 divisions supplied by his "allies." This year 200 German divisions and about 30 divisions of Hitler's "allies" are concentrated on the Soviet-German front.

What Is the Second Front?

All these figures point to the fact that the troops of our British and American Allies have not yet really come to grips with the troops of Hitlerite Germany, that the second front has not yet been established.

But what, in point of fact, is the second front? There is actually no need to enter into arguments with people who pretend not to understand what is implied in this term and who talk a lot about there already existing, not only a second front, but even a "third," and who even go to the length of talking about a "fourth," "fifth" and "sixth" front (including the submarine front, the air front and so on). The British and American press have also aired utterances to the effect that the Allied air-raids on German towns have practically taken the place of a second front.

By a second front in Europe, if spoken of in earnest, is meant a front which, as Comrade Stalin pointed out in the autumn of 1942, would draw on itself, let us say, sixty German divisions and about a score of the divisions of Germany's allies. When we talk about the second front, we must remember that it is a question of such military operations of our Allies on the European continent as would force Hitlerite Germany to divide its available forces and move to the Western front one-third, or at any rate one-fourth, of his land troops.

Hence it clearly follows that the creation of a second front in Europe would radically change the situation and would immediately ensure a great superiority of our forces over the Hitlerite army on the Soviet-German front. This would also mean that the opening of the second front would conclusively shorten the war and that the second front would be the key to victory over Hitler already in 1943. After this, what is to be said about those who call the demand for the second front, and the profound sympathy for it apparent among the masses of the people of the Allied countries, nothing more than a striving for a cheap effect.

Excuses For Postponement

We know that there exist many excuses to justify the postponement and protraction of the opening of a second front in Europe. What else are the arguments about the mythical "Atlantic wall," about the allegedly "insoluble" problem of tonnage, about the "risk of invasion"? Meanwhile, we know that the impregnable "Atlantic wall" only exists in the imagination of those who want to believe these fabrications, and nowhere else. The argument about shortage of tonnage, so much loved by some people, has long ago lost any appearance of conviction, and has repeatedly been smashed by the facts and figures published on the huge growth of shipbuilding in the Allied countries, particularly in America.

After the successful, very large landing of Allied troops and equipment in North Africa last year and after the brilliant successes of the landing operations in Sicily, reference to tonnage difficulties in carrying out a landing in Western Europe should have been relinquished. For a long time past all reference to tonnage has been clearly in the nature of an excuse. As to the references concerning the "risks of invasion" which have been repeated for more years than one, in 1943 one cannot advance such arguments to an army which for over two years has shouldered the full brunt of the struggle against the Hitlerite war machine and which has not hesitated before any sacrifices in the struggle for the common cause of the Allies.

Without doubt there are some public circles, though very few, who are not at all interested in a rapid termination of the war. But big state affairs obviously cannot be entrusted to such people, armament manufacturers, army caterers and others, whose first interests are not the wide masses of the people and those now groaning under the Hitlerite yoke in the occupied countries but their own personal interests. The incident of Colonel Moore-Brabazon is also known. Two years ago, at a congress of the British Trade Unions, it was declared that Colonel Moore-Brabazon, one of the Ministers at that time, had stated that the German and Russian armies should be permitted to exhaust each other, but that in that
the country would not lose by it. Soon afterwards the British Government freed itself of this Minister. Consequently his remark did not pass unnoticed and apparently did not miss the appraisal it deserved.

**Shortening the War**

The bankruptcy of Italian Fascism, which has been the centre of events recently, illustrates not only the bankruptcy of Hitler's largest ally in Europe. Although the process is not yet complete and various transformations are still taking place in the Italian theatre, the events in Italy give a new and at the same time most powerful impetus to the military and political disintegration in the Hitlerite camp, which will help to finish once and for all with Hitler's striving for the domination of Europe, and put an end to his aspirations for world domination.

For Hitlerite Germany there will be this year as yet unprecedented difficulties on the Soviet-German front, where the Red Army is inflicting on the enemy one powerful blow after another.

Sicily is on the eve of complete occupation by the Allies. Italy has no way out but complete capitulation. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the brilliant successes of our Allies in the Mediterranean became possible primarily thanks to the two years’ heroic struggle of the Red Army against the main forces of the common enemy and thanks to the most self-sacrificing, mighty pressure recently launched by our army along the whole Soviet-German front.

The question of the second front in Europe is of such great importance precisely because the question whether or not the war will be allowed to drag out and further colossal sacrifices permitted depends on the solution of this problem. The opening of the second front in Europe in 1945 will mean that in the present favourable conditions, the anti-Hitlerite coalition will be filled with determination to end Hitlerite tyranny and the war imposed by Hitler, that the Anglo-Soviet-American Coalition will not permit the war to drag on, will not allow further colossal sacrifices. In this it will have the support of the tremendous forces of the peoples, filled with an unwavering determination to finish now with accursed Hitler and to extricate themselves from the Hitlerite-imposed war.

---

**THE DURATION OF THE WAR**

(Original from War and the Working Class, No. 9, October 19th, 1943)

Mr. Harry Hopkins, who is well known as an active champion of the cause of the United Nations, recently published in the American Magazine an article on the prospects of the war. The author is undoubtedly right in taking the field against those who are inclined to underrate the enemy's strength and who expect an "easy victory," for instance, by air bombardment alone. However, from the correct assumption that the enemy is still strong, the author draws the conclusion that the allies are still faced with at least two years of heavy fighting on the world war fronts.

The author is of the opinion that this view is shared by American military circles. "I assume," he writes, "that we shall achieve victory in 1945 over both Germany and Japan. I do not regard this as too long a period for such a victory." Thus, according to Hopkins, the war in Europe will last at least six years. He does not find this period too long, taking into consideration the difficulties of fighting such a tenacious enemy as Hitler Germany.

This viewpoint appears to us to reflect a rather one-sided approach to the matter. Of course, from a narrow military-technical standpoint a war conducted in such a way, where the training of big armies, possessing unparalleled numerical and technical superiority proceeds calmly and without haste, only after which these armies embark on decisive battles against the enemy, may seem most attractive.

It is possible that, viewed from this angle, another two years is not such a long period. However, this picture of the further course of the war fails to cover certain other aspects which are just as important in conditions of a protracted war.

**War Evokes New Political Processes**

War is not only the titanic clash of war machines. War is fundamentally a social and political phenomenon and the present war has set in motion tens and hundreds of millions of people throughout the world, it has radically changed their conditions and their existence, forcing them to think and act differently. The war sharpens the contradictions existing in
modern society; it aggravates them and gives rise to new, acute political processes which further sharpen as the war drags out. This aspect naturally cannot be disregarded when discussing the prospects of the war, and especially the question of its duration.

The standpoint of the Soviet Union concerning the duration of the war is quite clear. For over two years now, our country has been engaged in a life and death struggle with almost the whole weight of Hitler's war machine brought to bear against it. The richest areas of the Soviet Union have been subjected to monstrous devastation by Hitler's plunderers, and a considerable part of our territory is still in their hands today. Every day of the war takes its toll of the lives of Soviet people and causes no small damage to our country. Is any further proof necessary to show that the Soviet Union is vitally interested in the speeding up of victory and in preventing the war from being drawn out?

But how do matters stand from the point of view of our Anglo-American allies? Can it be assumed that they are more or less indifferent as to how long the war will last and that a policy based on protracting the war involves no adverse features? Of course not.

Relations of Military and Political Factors

Among a number of consequences arising now from a protracted war, particular note should be taken of the fact that, to the degree that the war is protracted, the relations between the military and political factors determining the course and outcome of the war inevitably change. The longer the war lasts, the greater is the significance attaching to political factors as compared to purely military factors. Military factors, i.e., the operations of armed forces under the full control of the governments, become of relatively less importance, while the political factors, i.e., the complicated and contradictory social processes, which are to a lesser extent subject to the control and influence of the governments of the belligerent countries, become of relatively greater importance. This assumption is fully legitimate. It is borne out by the entire experience of the annals of past wars.

Let us recall the experience of the first world war. The war lasted for more than four years. What did protraction of the war lead to at that time? One of the most important results of the first world war and the political crisis connected with it was the utter collapse of the Tsarist empire in Russia, which took place already in the third year of the war, and which brought about vast changes in the system of international relations. Eight months after the overthrow of Tsarism, when the war was still in progress and the political crisis had grown more acute, the October revolution brought into being a state of an altogether new type—the Soviet state of workers and peasants, which is now the greatest bulwark of the peoples in the struggle against Fascism.

As is known, the world historic events in Russia were by no means the only consequences of the political crisis caused by the war. Other countries too, especially those which suffered defeat in the war, were shaken by great upheavals. Under the influence of the protracted war, and the obvious inability of the German army to offer further resistance, Kaiser Germany collapsed internally even before the armies of the victorious countries entered her territory.

Irrespective of how one views developments in Germany, Italy, Hungary and all Central Europe at the end of the first world war, and during the transition from war to peace, one thing is beyond doubt: These events were pregnant with very serious consequences in the sphere of international political and economic relations. Of course, unwise people found a dubious consolation by ascribing the actions of the masses of the people reduced to despair to the intrigues of "malicious agitators"; everywhere they looked for the "hidden hand." But did this affect the outcome in any way?

Changes of Social Relations in the Last War

Moreover, protraction of the war led to an extremely tense internal political situation and the aggravation of social relations in the victor countries as well.

Recall the state of affairs in France. Already in the summer of 1917, that is, towards the end of the third year of the war, indignation behind the lines and at the front at the protracted nature of the war reached such a scale that the French government found itself in a very difficult position. It is not for nothing that Poincare in his memoirs calls 1917 the "year of unrest." In his diary recordings of mass strikes and unrest in the rear alternate with notes about mutinies and mass shootings at the front.
Discussing the situation in Britain in the same year, 1917, Lloyd George wrote: “When reflecting on the ever-increasing violence of the struggle, the ever-remoter prospect of peace, and the provocative attitude of the employers, you are surprised not so much by disturbances so widespread in the country, but at the fact that they did not develop on a wider scale.”

Winston Churchill, describing in his memoirs the situation existing at the end of the war, characterised it in expressive words: “So many strange things happened, the collapse of established systems was so terrible, the peoples suffered for so long, that every state organisation is shaken by the earthquake.”

Let us now turn to the present war. More countries are involved in this war than in the war of 1914-1918. This war is truly global. It is beyond dispute that the violence and destructive power of the present war is greater than in the war of 1914-18.

Suffering of Peoples in This War

Finally it should be borne in mind that it has already lasted longer than the first World War. In these circumstances, can anyone doubt that every extra day and month of the war adds to the tension of the social atmosphere in countries involved in the vortex of war, above all in the countries of Europe? Hunger and epidemics, plunder, desolation, injustice and bloody terror are unleashed by the invaders—such is the terrible daily lot of tens of millions of people in the countries under the heel of the Hitler tyranny.

In Poland and Czechoslovakia, France, Belgium and Holland, Norway and Denmark, Yugoslavia and Greece, the peoples are undergoing incredible suffering and torments which are giving birth to boundless hatred, despair and wrath. This is seen not only from the heroic struggle of the Yugoslav partisans, and from the vengeance that the people are wreaking on the Hitlerite butchers in Poland, France and Holland, but also from the example of “peaceable” Denmark.

Naturally the peoples of the Hitler-occupied countries are striving as quickly as possible to escape from the war and liberate themselves from the yoke of the German-Fascist invaders. The peoples of the Soviet Union, who are undergoing exceptionally severe trials, readily appreciate this desire of the occupied countries to lessen the duration of the war and to put an end to the Hitlerite tyranny.

At the same time discontent at the protracted nature of the war is mounting in countries allied to Germany, particularly in view of the new military defeats suffered by Hitler and his satellites. This is strikingly reflected in events in Italy, where the masses of the people are burning with desire to get out of the war.

Hitlerites Count on Prolonging the War

Only the Hitlerites who have lost all faith in victory can be interested in prolonging the war. Mr. Harry Hopkins is undoubtedly right when he points out that the Nazis are displaying considerable stubbornness in their struggle for existence. He writes: “They fear the angry masses of Europe, the wrathful Russian people and the just punishment of the United Nations. Yes, they have every reason to fear this. It is possible that they no longer believe in victory, but they are hoping for a long drawn-out war and compromise.”

Mr. Hopkins correctly rejects the very thought of compromise with the Nazis. But one cannot stop there.

The calculations of the German Fascists on a protracted war, in which they see their last sheet-anchor, must be frustrated. The Nazis continue to bolster themselves up and still try to exult over the difficulties of their enemy. Recently the Berliner Lokalanzeiger, in an article entitled “For whom is time working?” wrote: “The prolongation of the war more and more intensifies the hunger and ruin in countries controlled by Britain and the U.S.A., as, for instance, at present in the Near East, North Africa and India.”

But this malicious gloating is merely an attempt to conceal the alarm and fear felt by the Hitlerites at the approaching hour of reckoning. Only recently the Hitlerites believed in victory and were winning military successes. All this is now a thing of the past.

The War Can Be Decisively Shortened

As a consequence of the major successes of the Red Army expressed in the mighty offensive along the whole of the Soviet-German front, from Smolensk to the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, and following the big successes of the Anglo-Ameri-
can troops in the Mediterranean theatre which ensured the landing operations of the allied troops on the territory of Italy, the military situation of Hitler Germany has fundamentally changed for the worse.

Naturally the Nazis are now looking for a way out by prolonging the war and speculating on the sharpening political crisis in Europe. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States of America, who today constitute a powerful political and military coalition, now possess enormous military resources, the biggest armies, and all the necessary arms to prevent the enemy from prolonging the war.

The Allied countries now have everything they need for decisively shortening the war by using with the maximum effect for this purpose all the military factors at their disposal. It is now only a question of the appropriate positive decisions.

The greatest interest of the peoples of the allied countries today is that those on whom it depends should solve in practice the problem of shortening the war, and that there be no further delay in this matter. A solution of the problem of shortening the war is the urgent and common affair of the Allied countries.

(N.B.—Quotations retranslated from the Russian.)

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN ITALY

(War and the Working Class, No. 12, Nov. 15th, 1943.)

BY COLONEL N. TOLCHENOV

Dwelling in detail on the landing operations of the British Eighth Army, the author points out that in existing conditions it was impossible to confine action to the operations of the Eighth Army, which had before it a long, difficult way through the whole Italian Peninsula. The Allied Command was fully correct in deciding immediately to bring operations closer to the centre of the country. To implement this decision, units of the Fifth Army landed in the Salerno area and British troops in Taranto. Developments in the area where the Fifth Army units landed were typical for military operations in cases when troops land on the territory of a country with a long coastline. Foreseeing possible invasion, the enemy can build on the coast hundreds of support points, with strong garrisons, and concentrate thousands of guns, tanks and planes. But a group of troops landing at any one point will meet resistance only on the part of one or at the most two coastal garrisons. The overwhelming mass of the defenders' forces will be unable for a long time to come to the aid of the attacked garrison. Subsequently the race for time begins between both sides to increase their forces locked in battle. This decides the outcome of the battle.

Precisely such was the case in the Salerno area. There was a moment when it seemed as if the strong attacks of the German troops could force the troops of the Fifth Army to withdraw from the coast. Nevertheless, the commander of the Fifth Army, slightly retreating on separate sectors, succeeded in stabilising the front line. The appearance of Allied troops in the rear of German units operating further south could not but influence the struggle of these German units against the Eighth British Army. Events in South Italy developed quite rapidly.

In the second half of September Allied troops joined forces to form a solid front line from the Adriatic to the Tyrrenian Sea. Emerging on the Foggia-Naples line, Allied troops concluded the first stage of the struggle in Southern Italy, and obtained the possibility of penetrating the vast coastal valley of Western Italy favourable for the use of motorised units and making it possible to get to Rome without crossing the mountainous district.

Slow Progress During the Second Stage

At that time, judging from the pace achieved by Allied troops and also the nature of the terrain, some foreign observers presumed that operations in Italy would continue to develop with adequate speed. Nevertheless, the results of the second stage were considerably below the results of the first stage.

The foreign press contains all possible explanations for the slow progress of the Allied troops during the second stage. Analysing these suppositions and explanations, Tolchenov concludes:

The theatre of military operations represents quite a narrow territory washed on the two sides by the Adriatic and Tyrrenian Seas where British and American naval forces
hold undivided sway and the air is dominated by the Anglo-American forces. All this favours extensive use of marine and airborne troops in the enemy’s rear.

This best and most effective method of struggle fully justified itself at the first stage of operations in Italy. True, during the subsequent period the Allies also carried out landing operations, but on a small scale which consequently could not produce the expected results. Inadequate communications, of course, render offensive operations difficult, but this is equally true of the defenders.

Mountain Defences can be Overcome

Lastly, it is also necessary to dispel the delusion that in a mountainous theatre of war defenders always have some unknown advantages over the attackers. It is true that a small detachment selecting a favourable position in the mountains, is able to offer prolonged resistance to a many times stronger enemy. But this cannot be mechanically transferred from the field of tactics to the field of operational skill, all the more so to strategy. In modern conditions static and consequently passive defence immediately leads to disastrous consequences. Limited communications and difficulty in surmounting obstacles between one sector of the front and another, restrict manoeuvring possibilities for the defenders and create favourable conditions for their encirclement and defeat.

Energetic widening of the breach by mobile formations and the use of tanks and airborne troops for capturing communication junctions in the enemy rear can bring about decisive results. Thus to insist that in a mountainous theatre the defenders have unquestionable and invariable advantages is to fail to understand the very nature of modern military operations.

Achieving a Decisive Breach

There is still one more question to settle: is wide operational breach of defence possible in concrete conditions in the Italian theatre? The number of German divisions operating in Italy is not greater than the number operating against the People’s Liberation Army in Yugoslavia. Operating in Italy is a fraction of Hitler’s armed forces which stands no comparison with the Hitlerite army operating on the Soviet-German front, whither more than ten German divisions were transferred during the last fortnight, including some from Italy. The Allied troops have the full possibility, not only of outflanking the enemy’s defence by landing troops, but also of effecting a concentration of forces at a definite point, and forcing a breach in the enemy’s defence zone so as to achieve decisive results.

Decisive results cannot, of course, be achieved as a result of a slow, systematic offensive on a wide front with equal distribution of forces on all its sectors. German tactics are calculated on the preservation of strength and prolonging military operations as a result of the natural weakening of Allied troops caused by ceaseless, and sometimes costly, slow “grawing” at the enemy’s defences.

The Need to Hasten the Campaign

The London Times has stressed the fact that the responsible leaders must be able to receive all necessary resources to hasten the campaign on land, sea and in the air. Indeed, the entire course of the present world war dictates the necessity of accelerating the tempo of the campaign in Italy. The Red Army’s victorious offensive and the successes of our Allies have sharply aggravated the position of Fascist Germany. The enemy is exerting every effort to delay decisive events at any costs, to gain even a day’s time. In these conditions the slow development of military operations in Italy undoubtedly represents a gain for the enemy.

The tremendous massing of Allied forces and means of warfare in the Mediterranean area is capable of fully ensuring the swift development of military operations on Italian territory. This relates not only to operations against six to ten divisions of General Kesselring, but also against Field-Marshall Rommel’s troops concentrated in Northern Italy. Precisely such sweeping development of operations against the Germans will clear for the Allied armed forces, concentrated in the Mediterranean, the way to fulfilment of other broader tasks connected with hastening the defeat of the common enemy.
THE INVASION OF EUROPE
A CRUSHING BLOW OR A PROLONGED WAR?

By Major-General M. Galaktionov

Every day brings nearer the date fixed by the Teheran Conference for the realisation of the active joint operations of the Allied Armies. In connection with the approaching date of the invasion there is growing opposition—now open, now thinly disguised—to the invasion of Europe on the part of elements hostile to the Allied cause in Great Britain and the U.S.A.

Such acts present a sharp contrast with the statements of responsible statesmen in Britain and America, and also with the facts confirming the energetic preparations of our Allies for active operations on the Continent.

The Teheran decisions speak with full clarity of the crushing blows to be dealt to Germany from the East, West and South, by the Allies. Consequently, the invasion of Western Europe is supposed to be such a crushing blow from the West. Delivered with all strength it must, together with simultaneous blows from the East and South, lead to the speedy defeat of Germany. Of course, such a problem cannot be solved without a corresponding strain and effort.

But the raising of this problem is fully realistic: from the point of view of her military situation, Germany is now near catastrophe, while our Allies have all the necessary forces and means for striking the enemy with sweeping and crushing blows.

Nevertheless, a certain section of the Anglo-American Press is energetically advocating a different conception, according to which the invasion of Europe will merely form a prologue to prolong the war for the exhaustion of Germany.

Thus, a correspondent in the Observer recently asserted that the forthcoming campaign will be aimed at the exhaustion of enemy reserves, to be accomplished by a gradual extension of the Front.

Even certain official persons, contrary to the spirit of the Teheran decisions, are trying beforehand to depict the invasion of Europe as a prolonged operation of a protracted war.

In his speech at Scranton on March 1, the British Ambassador to the U.S.A., Halifax, speaking of the difficulties involved in the forthcoming invasion of Europe, spared no sombre colours to represent the military operations in Western Europe to his American audience as a quite prolonged and protracted affair.

The same idea was actually pursued by the American journal, the United News. Curiously enough, this American journal cannot but recognise that precisely the plans of the Hitlerite Command are now aimed at protracting the operations. Germany hopes that the invasion of the European Continent will follow the pattern of a prolonged war of attrition. Yet the American journal considers the invasion of Europe will be 'a lengthy process.'

The strategy of exhaustion reflected in such pictures of the forthcoming invasion of Western Europe by our Allies, may be called the strategy of small-scale action.

Incidentally, it is quite well known, from the experience of the first World War, that some near-sighted people hoped to win victory over Germany by sitting time and digging in.

It is a fact that victory is won not by passive waiting. Germany in the last war was exhausted in the hard battles forced upon her by active Allied offensive operations and was defeated in 1918 as the result of a series of crushing blows by the Allies on the Western, Balkan and Italian Fronts, and by the young Red Army from the East.

The second World War began with the French army waiting behind Maginot fortifications, whereas Hitler Germany tested the use of the new mechanised Army on the field of battle against a weak Poland.

However, Allied strategy, based on the blockade and exhaustion of Germany in positional warfare, was scattered to the dust. The methods of exhaustion strategy not only failed to lead to the actual weakening of Germany, but on the contrary did not even prevent her strengthening herself. The real weakening of Germany began only in the battles on the Soviet-German front.

As a result of the war against the Soviet Union, Germany has now exhausted her manpower and her material resources have reached a state of extreme tension.

Hitherto a characteristic of the war against Germany on the European Continent has been the fact that active large-scale operations were conducted only on the Soviet-German Front.

The absence of a second front in Europe was reflected
by the fact that Great Britain and the U.S.A. adhered, in the war with Germany, to waiting—the strategy of exhaustion. During the early period of Germany's attack on the Soviet Union this was connected with the Allied need for time to deploy their armed forces. But how can the adequacy of the strategy of waiting and exhaustion, which still continues to be commended by certain circles and organs of the Press in Britain and America, be explained at present, when Britain and America are on the threshold of the invasion of Western Europe?

Let us briefly review these methods. First, the blockade of Germany. During the first World War this showed itself chiefly in a disastrous aggravation of the food situation in Germany, and, to a lesser degree, in the difficulties of supply, industry and certain war materials and products; yet the very end of the war, industry fully met the demands of the front for armaments (except for tanks) and munitions. In the conditions of the present war, the blockade of Germany is far from complete. In view of this, the Germans are able, in the present war, to cope with the economic difficulties and to maintain war production on a far higher level than in the last war.

The duration of the second World War, which has already been in progress 4½ years, reveals with complete clarity that to achieve victory over Germany—even if the question is viewed merely from the point of view of the strategy of exhaustion—she must be deprived of the districts from which she is drawing her material resources, namely that active offensive operations are necessary.

In present conditions the war of exhaustion has acquired a new and powerful weapon, aviation. We by no means intend to underrate the tremendous importance of this weapon. Nevertheless, the experience of air war has exhaustively proved that long range bomber raids, unaccompanied by ground operations, constitute a means of prolonged war. Several years of air war would be required to achieve substantial results in the sense of exhaustion against such an adversary as Germany. The quite intensive air raids on Germany in recent months, doubtless of great importance for the general course of the war, nevertheless have not brought about a considerable reduction of Germany's war production.

Let us go on to the third element of the military operations of our Allies against the common enemy—the landing operations in Italy. Already nine months have passed since the first landing in Sicily, and some conclusions may be drawn about the character of these operations. Their restricted scope is now completely obvious. The operations in Italy are the best illustration of the contention that a strategy of exhaustion cannot lead to a serious weakening of the enemy, which is attainable only as a result of active offensive operations and decisive battles. The operations in Italy have been hitherto restricted to the limits of small-scale strategy which does not lead to decisive results and prolongs the war.

The conception of the Second Front in Europe is associated throughout the whole world with a change to decisive operations.

The difficulty of the operations involved in the invasion of Europe must not, of course, be underestimated. Most of the difficulties are rooted in the very nature of the landing operations, every one of which begins with the landing of small forces, which renders it easier for the defenders to attack them. Nevertheless, this stage of the struggle obviously does not represent hardships for the Allies as the experience of landing operations has shown that, with domination of the sea and air, it is precisely the initial stage of the landing which can be accomplished with the greatest success.

The shortcomings of the abovementioned operations are due to other things. To begin with, they are very restricted in scope, whereas our Allies have vast armies at their disposal, fully equipped with modern arms. The second shortcoming is the slow rate of development of the operations and the irresolute action. Lastly and most important: to lend the operations a decisive character, they must be developed in directions vitally important for Germany.

In the Italian theatre the German Command was able to confine itself to defence, with the object of gaining time precisely because here they could afford to sacrifice part of the territory without substantial injury to the conduct of the war as a whole.

If the invasion of Europe were to resolve into a number of local operations on the Italian model, Germany would be given the possibility of defence with a restricted number of divisions, while retaining her main forces on the Soviet-German front. And only an invasion on a wide front in the most vital directions, an invasion with big forces and decisive aims would correspond to the demands of Allied strategy and wrest
from Germany the principal means of her strategy for the protraction of the war.

Crushing blows with powerful Allied forces from the East, West and South must become the shortest and quickest way to final defeat of Germany with the least losses. It would be extremely naive to maintain that victory over Germany is attainable without losses and sacrifices. Nevertheless, the prolongation of the war will demand incomparably greater losses and expenditures.

The present Allied methods of struggle with Germany, while not leading to decisive results, are nevertheless involving serious losses. This relates to the air war in particular. Half-hearted and irresolute methods of conducting the war against Germany are in the final analysis bringing grist to the mill of the opponents of the Second Front. The exaggeration of the difficulties and losses during the period of the invasion serves these circles with an additional argument in favour of its further delay.

The British Daily Mail recently published an article from its Stockholm correspondent where he clearly painted an exaggerated picture of Germany’s power of resistance and the strength of the German fortifications. Germany, the article says, will have time for repulsing our invasion in Western Europe and regrouping German forces for the final clash in the East. Perhaps this is the most fantastic plan of defence in history, it says, but it may prove successful if we invade prematurely, or without adequate trained troops.

This plan is truly fantastic. As if there were no brilliant Red Army operations which have brought Hitler Germany to the brink of disaster! As if there were not and was not the brilliant Red Army offensive which but recently breached the strongest German defence at Leiningrad! Manipulating with the Hitlerite fantasy, the author advocates delay in invasion. He is helping the open opponents of the second front, and the latter, let us say it outright, are helping Germany to realise her strategic plan for the prolongation of the war.

The firm implementation of the Tehran decisions about the simultaneous crushing Allied blows in directions vital for the enemy is the only way to the speedy and final rout of Hitler Germany.

III. POST-WAR PROBLEMS

WAR AIMS AND POST-WAR PROBLEMS

By Malinin

(War and the Working Class, July 1st, 1943)

Political and public leaders and journalists in Great Britain and the U.S.A. have for a considerable time been devoting great deal of attention to what are called “War Aims.” However, in our opinion, this term is not altogether well chosen. Aims are set by the planners and initiators of some action. One can therefore speak of war aims in the case of those who deliberately planned, provoked and began this war, namely, the Axis powers and Hitler, their instigator.

What are the aims of the war initiated by Hitler? He has made them clear. He proclaimed them long before his access to power, and repeated them time and again since he became dictator. The programme of action of the Italo-German coalition was described by Stalin in his report on the 6th of November, 1942. “Racial hatred; domination of ‘chosen’ nations; subjugation of other nations and seizure of their territories; economic enslavement of subjugated nations and spoliation of their national wealth; destruction of democratic liberties; the institution of the Hitlerite regime everywhere.”

For the purpose of deception Hitler and his satellites prefer to describe these war aims as the establishment of the “New Order,” although this new departure recalls the old days of the slave system of the middle ages, or the primitive existence of savage tribes, the brute force of the jungle.

The Programme of Action of the Anti-Hitlerite Coalition.

One can hardly speak of war aims in the case of the representatives and citizens of the countries on which war was foisted against their will and who did everything to avert it, but were subjected to attack and found themselves menaced
with defeat. They did not want war, and accordingly they set themselves no "war aims." They were compelled to unsheath the sword in order to frustrate the aims of the aggressors, plunderers, and enslavers. These countries are fighting because they must fight if they want to retain their right to existence, or recover their lost independence and deliver their people from slavery to Hitler. As long ago as November 6th, 1941, Stalin said: "Unlike Hitler Germany, the Soviet Union and its Allies are waging a war for the liberation of the enslaved peoples of Europe and the U.S.S.R. from tyranny.... Our first aim consists in liberating our territory and our people from the German Fascist yoke. We have not and cannot have such war aims as imposing our will and our regime on Slavs and other enslaved peoples of Europe who are awaiting our aid. Our aim consists in assisting these people in their liberation struggle against Hitler tyranny and then letting them rule freely on their own land as they desire. No intervention whatever in the internal affairs of other people!"

In conformity with these principles Stalin on November 6th, 1942, outlined the programme of action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition, which is—Abolition of racial exclusiveness; equality of nations and integrity of their territory; liberation of the enslaved nations and restoration of their sovereign rights; the right of every nation to arrange its affairs as it wishes; economic aid to the nations which have suffered and assisting them in matters pertaining to their material welfare; restoration of democratic liberties; destruction of the Hitlerite regime.

This programme of action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition also determines its "War Aims," or rather its general principles as regards the post-war organisation of the world.

Problems of Post-War Organisation

In the discussions of war aims in the countries of the anti-Hitlerite coalition it is also implied that changes must be made in the organisation of the world and in international relations in order to render the aggressors harmless, safeguard the world against the repetition of a disaster like the present and provide a solid basis for world peace. This confusion of the two ideas war aims and the post-war organisation of the world is no mere accident, it appears to us, in the utterances of those who before the war opposed resistance to the aggressors and who are still putting spokes in the wheel of their governments, doing their best to impede the united efforts of the anti-Hitlerite coalition to carry the war successfully to a victorious conclusion.

It is no mere accident that this matter of war aims should be a favourite topic of the American isolationists who still believe that the U.S.A. could have kept out of the war and has been dragged into it through the malicious intent of President Roosevelt, and that it might even now sign a separate peace with some, or even all, of the Axis powers.

In talking in this way about war aims where post-war problems are really involved, they think that by proving the impossibility of realising the aims of the war they will prove the pointlessness and uselessness of the war itself. In this expectation they depict as the aim of the war the complete resolution of all international economic and political contradictions, the abolition of all the century-old international disputes, and the institution in every country of the same regime—of their own choice—as, in fact, the establishment of heaven on earth.

From that it is no far cry to proving that such a Utopia cannot be materialised, and consequently that the aims of the war are impossible of achievement and that to go on with the war is pointless. The impossibility of achieving this arbitrary Utopia is, needless to say, ascribed by the isolationists to the policy of one or another member of the coalition, as, for example, to Mr. Churchill's refusal to do away with the British Empire, or to the Soviet Union's alleged scheme of "Bolshevising" Central Europe.

The isolationists' discussions of war aims are often nothing but a pretext for attacks on Great Britain, or more often still on the U.S.S.R. For one thing, it is levelled as a charge against the Soviet government that it has not yet revealed its aims, that is to say, has not published an exhaustive programme for the post-war organisation of the world. It is carefully forgotten that this has not been done by the British or American governments either, that such a programme must be the product of decisions adopted in common, and that the premature discussion of controversial issues may react unfavourably on the unity and intensity of action essential for the achievement of the principal aim of the coalition of free-dom-loving peoples, namely, speedy victory over the common foe.
On the Morrow of Victory

I am by no means implying that it is only the American isolationists who occupy themselves with the problems of post-war organisation, wrongly described as “war aims” or that this is always done with an ulterior motive. Numerous men of science and public affairs, as well as journalists in the other democratic countries, who are loyal supporters of the United Nations’ common cause, are striving quite sincerely to further it by studying in advance the problems which will arise on the morrow of victory, and seeking for solutions. Nor is it only individuals who are engaging in this work, but societies, associations and universities, which are publishing articles in the periodical press and bringing out bulky volumes discussing particular problems or whole groups of problems.

It is natural that the less active a country’s immediate participation in the struggle with the enemy in the field, the more forces and time it can spare for this kind of activity. I incline now to the view that neither is this work shunned by the governments in the countries of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. Of course, the more such wealthy blows as the defeats at Stalingrad and North Africa are inflicted on the armies of the Italo-German coalition, the greater the confidence of the United Nations in complete victory over the common foe and the approach to the end of the war, the more pressing becomes the task of public discussion of the principal, if not all, problems of the post-war organisation of the world. The range of these problems is exceedingly wide, for it covers all aspects of the life of Europe and of other continents.

I believe that this magazine, War and the Working Class, will be rendering a valuable service to our public, and to our Government as well, if it made its columns available for an all-round discussion of the post-war international problems, in the solution of which the Soviet Union’s word will carry so much weight.

Safeguards Against a New World War

Let us see what are the post-war problems being examined abroad in newspapers and magazines, books and pamphlets. The first place among them is, of course, occupied by the problem of safeguards against a new world war, the problem, in other words, of rendering harmless the forces that have produced the present bloody war and all its horrors—and in the first place the miscreants chiefly responsible—Hitler, his henchmen and the whole National Socialist Party. A subject of heated discussion is whether the blame for the war should be laid at the door of the National Socialists only or the German Army leaders as well, or even the entire German people, inasmuch as they have tolerated Hitler’s dictatorship, have not revolted against him and obediently took part in his wars of plunder and the perpetration of barbarous cruelties in the occupied countries.

One school holds the view that the German people, having produced a military Junker caste and aggressive Hitlerism, has proved its utter depravity and incapacity to live in peace side by side with other nations and must, accordingly, be punished with the utmost severity and reduced to the position of a penalised nation for all time to come. The representatives of this school forget that one should not identify Hitler’s clique with the German people. At the head of this school stands Lord Van-sturt, one of Britain’s prominent diplomats who, during recent years, has not occupied any official post. Other judges, less severe, propose that the German people should be deprived of rights only for a specified time, sufficient to re-educate it, this work of re-education being undertaken by the United Nations, which are to take over the whole German educational system for the purpose. Nor is there any lack of altogether indulgent judges who consider that it is only necessary to abolish the Hitlerite regime in Germany, acquitting of all responsibility both the perpetrators of these crimes and their accomplices. Such views are being assiduously disseminated by the German emigrants in Britain and the U.S.A., beginning with the former Hitlerite Otto Strasser and ending with the Social Democrats.

The Future of Germany

Arising from the idea of rendering Germany harmless and punishing her, there are a number of questions as to the means to be adopted to this end. There is not much argument as to the need of disarming Germany wholly or partially, whether by forbidding her to have an army, or merely by abolishing universal military service, or by reducing the military-industrial potential as well. Further, various projects are being
put forward for the dismemberment of Germany, for example, by partitioning-off from it Junker-Prussia, or converting Germany as she exists today into a number of separate states—Bavaria, Mecklenburg, the Rhineland, and so forth.

A problem inevitably encountered when this matter is discussed is that of the new internal state regime that is to take the place of the Fascist order in the future Germany; whether the Weimar constitution should be restored, and the government of the country entrusted to the men who were the leaders of Weimar Germany; whether the settlement of this question may be left to the German people themselves, either completely or within certain limits; whether it would not be proper to impose on Germany a regime that would preclude the revival of Hitlerism and its ideology; whether it is necessary for the forces of the United Nations to occupy the country pending the re-education of the German people and take its administration into their own hands, while, of course, collaborating with the anti-Fascist elements in Germany.

The Question of Compensation

This question of the punishment of Germany also gives rise to the discussion of various forms of compensation for the countries subjected to Hitlerite attacks, occupation and devastation. A question again being discussed is that of reparations by financial payments or by deliveries in kind, a well-known feature of Versailles. There are many who advocate removing factories from Germany to the countries devastated by Hitlerite occupation. This is intended not only to make good the economic damage wrought by Hitler's forces in the countries they have occupied, but also in order to make it impossible for Germany to restore her monstrous war industry.

Quite independent of the theory of Germany's dismemberment, there is the question of the frontiers of the future Germany, whether dismembered or intact. The point is whether she should be given ethnical frontiers, being allowed to retain even the Sudeten region and Austria, or whether she should be left with the frontiers laid down at Versailles; or whether her territory should be further reduced in favour of neighbouring states. There is a project to abolish the inconveniences occasioned by the Danzig corridor by handing over Eastern Prussia to Poland. Poland is known to be laying claim also to Eastern Silesia and even to all territory east of the Oder.

Czechoslovakia, naturally, aspires to the complete restoration of her former frontiers, the Germans to be deported from the Sudeten region. This would be a procedure suggested by Hitler's own present practice in the territories he has occupied.

The Future of Italy

Around the future fate of Italy there is comparatively little controversy and few projects. A very condescending attitude is to be observed with regard to the Italian people and a tendency to exempt them from responsibility for entering the war enforced on them by Mussolini. There are no two views, of course, as to the necessity of abolishing in Italy the Fascist party itself and the regime imposed by it. But in discussion of Italy's new internal regime there is a controversy, mainly as to whether the deposition of the Savoy Dynasty should likewise be regarded as a foregone conclusion or whether this matter should be left wholly to the discretion of the Italian people.

Here again there is the question of the administration of the country during the period of transition. Apart from the Italian anti-Fascist emigres, there are not likely to be many advocates of restoring to Italy her African colonies, but this question is to some extent tied up with the problems of colonies in general.

However, consideration of the post-war organisation of the world has in view not only the fate of Germany, Italy and Hitler's other vassals. Various proposals are put forward also for a radical solution of the territorial issues among the United Nations themselves. Further, a good deal of concern is displayed as to the status of the smaller nations. While the principle of self-determination and of sovereignty for them is acknowledged, it is pointed out that, standing in isolation, they too easily become a plaything of great-power diplomacy, which fact tends to increase international friction and produces additional grounds for armed conflicts. A theory has been put forward of establishing great-power tutelage over the small nations or of forming federations and confederations of small nations adapted to the needs of certain powers. When examining these theories we cannot help recalling at times that some cures are worse than the ailments.
Economic and Financial Problems

In Great Britain there has been animated discussion of the economic and financial problems of the post-war organisation of the world. Considerable popularity has been gained for example, by the “Beveridge plan” of post-war social provision for the workers, and the “Keynes plan” envisaging the establishment of an international clearing system. At the same time suggestions have been made for “international supervision of the national administration” of colonies (this is the Labour Party’s suggestion) and for the formation of international armed forces including air-force control, so as to preclude acts of aggression on the part of any power.

Very popular among Americans is the theory of radically revising the status of the colonies—the British, French, Belgian, Dutch and those of other nations. In place of the earlier League of Nations mandate is proposed a sort of international protectorate to be established over the colonies, dates being specified for granting various colonies their independence. The Americans, too, have recently brought up the matter of international air-lines and bases, although this is not immediately connected with the war. This question has given rise to lively discussion in Britain as well, and it has been suggested that an international airways organisation should be set up.

A problem that will cause the leadership of the United Nations no little concern will be that of establishing, in the countries occupied by the Hitlerites and ruled by them direct or through the medium of quislings, provisional authorities to take charge pending the expression of the people’s will. The existence in exile of governments, or what are known as national committees of the countries in question, will in some cases not simplify, but complicate, this problem. I have in mind those governments and committees in which places have been found not only by out-and-out reactionaries but even by pro-Fascist individuals, as was recently revealed in the case of the Sikorski Government by its behaviour. Among the exiles there are even claimants to certain thrones, and battered and compromised politicians claiming to return to power, and unfortunately encouraged in these schemes by the benevolent attitude of the representatives of the State Department in Washington and the Foreign Office in London.

The Question of an International Body

Inasmuch as a new international order is being mapped out, there inevitably arises the question of safeguarding this order, that is, establishing an international body which would see that no violations of this order were permitted. There are hardly likely to be any supporters of reviving the League of Nations in its old form. But along with proposed changes in the organisation of the League of Nations, a far more popular idea is that of establishing a directorate of representatives of the major powers who would give a periodical account of their activities to a wide international body or to a plenary session of representatives of every nation. The major powers are likewise, under this plan, to be charged with international police duties for which they are to detail the necessary armed forces.

We have not even approached a full enumeration of all the problems of post-war organisation now being debated. We have not touched at all on financial and economic problems. But even the questions we have mentioned are enough to give an idea of the vast amount of work that is to be done. Even if we take only the questions bearing immediately on the relations between the United Nations on the one hand, and Hitler Germany and her satellites on the other, they are so numerous and involved that the opinion has been expressed that even after victory it will be impossible to solve them for a long time to come, and a very long armistice will be inevitable before peace can be concluded.

The Soviet Union Needs an Enduring Peace

The Soviet Union, occupying as it does a sixth of the surface of the world and constituting the mightiest continental power which in this war has proved its colossal strength and unbounded resources, will, it is universally admitted, have one of the deciding voices in determining the post-war organisation of the world. It has been the lot of the Soviet Union to experience the greatest onslaught of the Hitler hordes, and accordingly to suffer from them more than the other United Nations have suffered. The Soviet Union will need enduring peace to repair the damage to its economy. It accordingly has a special interest in allowing no further violations of peace. None of the problems of post-war organisation can or
must be settled without the direct and active participation of the Soviet Union. All the more appropriate, therefore, must be considered the discussion of these problems in the columns of our press.

THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR NAZI CRIMES

BY PROFESSOR A. TRAININ

(War and the Working Class, August 15th, 1943.)

Among the questions which concern the Allies, and which will become urgent after the defeat of the Fascist Army, is the question who is to be held personally responsible for the crimes committed by the Fascist hordes.

This question of the individuals on whom the responsibility for Fascist crimes is to be laid is already a subject of discussion, and is viewed in different lights by different strata of society. Some judges are more or less inclined to be lenient. It is the duty of the Soviet legal profession to discuss the matter in accordance with the principles of international and Soviet law.

Responsibility of the Guilty State

It must be recognised quite definitely that the aggressor State can and must bear political responsibility, e.g., through disarmament, and material responsibility, e.g., through restitution of war damage. It is perfectly clear, however, that the State as such cannot bear criminal responsibility. Since a State cannot be brought before the criminal court, there arises the question of the criminal responsibility of parties representing the State and acting on its behalf.

It should be borne in mind that the State as such cannot act as a party to a court suit, criminal or otherwise. The State functions and acts through its machinery of government. The responsibility of the State, both political and material, which is generally recognised under international law, also arises as a result of the actions of the State authorities, its representatives and agents.

Accordingly, responsibility for criminal actions committed in the name of the State, or on behalf of the State, rests on the actual perpetrators of these acts, the individuals actually invested with the authority of government, its representatives and agents.

To say that it is not Hitler and his clique that should be in the dock, but the German State, would be a gross distortion of historical truth. It would amount to the substitution of a pernicious figment for definite individuals and indisputable facts. The State cannot be absolved of its responsibility for the crimes which the war involves, but this responsibility is political and material.

Criminal responsibility, on the other hand, must be laid at the door of the individuals who carried out policies, violating the laws humanity has made and the canons of the international code.

Such is the principle in broad outline. It should be most, specifically applied, so that the individual responsible for Hitlerite crimes may be seen in his true light, as regards both the place he has occupied and the role he has played.

Responsibility of the German People

Whoever speaks of the responsibility of Germany and the German people for this war and for all the crimes perpetrated by the Hitlerite hordes, whoever speaks of the great burden of guilt resting on them for all the outrages they have committed on the orders of the Hitlerite Government and the German Army Command, naturally has in mind moral, political and material responsibility. That responsibility admits of no question.

But the responsibility of the German people cannot be defined in terms of criminal law. On this subject a pertinent remark was made in a work examining German crimes during the first world war, which said: “The nation as a whole is to blame, and it must be penalised in the person of those of its members who carried out the plan of hatred and revenge.” The author is A. Merignat, writing in the “Revue Generale de January-February, 1917.

The millions of German people cannot be brought before the criminal court as the collective accomplice in Hitler’s crimes. Not only is that impracticable; it would be politically false, for one should constantly bear in mind Stalin’s revealing remark that “Hitlers come and go, but the German people and the German State continue.”
Thus, in deciding the problem of Nazi responsibility under the criminal code, it is essential to determine quite definitely and specifically which individuals or groups of individuals are to be regarded as the instigators, organisers and perpetrators of Hitlerite crimes, or accomplices in these crimes.

Responsibility of the Actual Perpetrators of Crimes

But first of all let us examine the nature of the actual perpetrators. The general run of Fascists are callous, brutal and avaricious. They plunder and kill on the orders of their superiors. They also plunder and kill of their own accord, actuated by the cruelty and ferocity of a beast that has broken loose.

But these men are not the instigators or organisers of governmental banditry. They are not concerned with world problems, but with the private business of plunder. Accordingly, the German soldier who kills a Soviet collective farmer, outrages the collective farmer’s wife, or burns down a building that is the property of the collective farm, is responsible for these particular offences of banditry, murder or arson.

It is he who actually commits these criminal offences, and he will not escape responsibility for them, even if he was carrying out the orders of his superiors. Even if the Imperial Court of Leipzig, before which Germany staged her mock trial regarding responsibility for the war of 1914-18—even this Court at Leipzig, trying the case of Ditmar, who torpedoed a British hospital ship on his submarine commander’s order, did not absolve Ditmar of criminal responsibility. This is recorded in the Voelkische Zeitung of July 17, 1921.

Such is the role and responsibility of the rank and file of Fascist soldiers who carry out the orders of their gangster chiefs.

Responsibility of the Nazi Chiefs

Very different is the position of these chiefs themselves, or the men in command. It is they who devise and put into effect this whole system of militarised crime. It would accordingly be wrong to regard them merely as associates in the criminal offences committed by the Nazi officers and men.

The responsibility of the men in command is of another order, a different quality. They are guilty of other offences, of grave offences of their own commission, of working out and pursuing a policy the whole of which is an outrage against the principles of International law, a system of organised governmental banditry. They are the perpetrators of these crimes against international law.

Specifically this category of worst offenders against International and criminal law include first and foremost the head and members of the German Government, Hitler and his cabinet ministers. This is the first, most dangerous, most vicious body of international offenders.

They took the lead in preparing, organising and perpetrating the most heinous crime in the history of the human race, the perfidious attack on the Soviet Union, accompanied by the flagrant violation of all human standards and all the canons and regulations of International law.

Inseparably connected with this governing group is another body of criminals, the Fuhrer and the members of the Fascist Party, great and small. By the law of the unifying of the Party and the State, published on December 3, 1933, the Nazi organisation was organically tied up with the German Government machine.

The heads of the government departments are at the same time the leaders of the Party. The men at the head of the local authorities are simultaneously in charge of the local Party branches. It follows that the Government Fuhrer and the Party Fuhrer are closely associated in their political and criminal activities, and must be held equally responsible for Hitlerite misdeeds.

The German Army Command organising and directing the operations of this army of plunder is also to be classed with these criminal leaders of the Party and Government. And finally, immediately associated with this group are the numerous officials and deputies, commissioners and Gauleiters who are putting into practice the policy of terror, plunder and violence in the occupied territories and in Germany itself.

V. M. Molotov, in his Note of May 11, 1943, stated:

"The Soviet Government places the whole responsibility for these vile crimes, which are being committed in flagrant violation of the universally accepted rules governing the conduct of war, in the first place upon the ruling Hitlerite clique and the Command of the German Fascist Army. The Soviet Government also holds fully responsible for the above crimes..."
all those Hitlerite officials who are in charge of the recruitment, abduction, transport, maintenance in camps, selling into slavery and inhuman exploitation of Soviet peaceful citizens, forcibly carried from their native country to Germany."

Hitler and his ministers, the Nazi Party, the Army Command, the Hitlerite Government commissioners have all engaged in a policy of unbridled Government banditry, a policy involving the systematic violation of all the traditions of international law, perfidious aggression, terror, violation of international obligations and customs of war and the organisation of military banditry.

All these most grievous crimes against law and man, all these criminal outrages against human beings and nations are their handiwork, although it is not their hands that are burning towns and murdering civilians. They are the real organisers and perpetrators of these crimes.

Complicity in International Offences

It is well known that the Hitlerite ruling circles, Hitler and his clique, have their social basis. They are maintained by the big financial and business magnates. Are these a party to the Hitlerite crimes?

Complicity in crime may take various forms. The individual members of a gang or group may not be known to one another, and may yet be responsible for all the crimes the gang or group commits.

With regard to complicity in international offences, the position is even more involved. The machinery at work in such cases is highly ramified and composed of a whole system of interconnected links and accordingly the threads between the confederates are even more delicate and tangled. Herman Bucher, the proprietor of an electric concern, or Ernst P., the steel king, are not posted outside to keep a look-out while the German soldiery dispersed over Europe plunders civilians and burns the property of Soviet collective farms.

In the vast majority of cases they do not know the actual perpetrators of these crimes and are not interested in knowing them. Yet they do keep a lookout, not in the technical sense as the term is used in the underworld, but in a deeper and more pernicious sense. They, the financial magnates, stand guard for the Hitlerite clique.

For with their funds, factories and guns they support and maintain the system of governmental banditry. Thus, the financial sharks, too, must not be absolved from legal responsibility. By determining the policy of the Fascist Party and helping to put it into practice, and by action in concert with the other participants in these offences, the German financial magnates, too, are accomplices in the organisation of these Fascist crimes, accessories to these acts.

Criminal Complicity of Private Individuals in Germany

In enumerating the culprits, we cannot omit to mention the private individuals who, while not endowed with any lofty titles and not holding any official position in the German Government machine, and not enrolled in Germany’s armed forces, yet have been and are guilty of criminal complicity in acts of Nazi violence and plunder.

There are two species of violations of rights by private individuals to be singled out: The offence of exploiting the forced labour of civilians deported against their will into Fascist servitude, and that of receiving goods known to be stolen or obtained by plunder in the occupied territories.

The Fascists endeavour to invent these offences with a fictitious semblance of legality. The forced labour is supplied by the State, the plundered property is sold by the State. But the persons guilty of appropriating slave labour and the property of others are not absolved thereby from criminal responsibility. The criminality of Hitlerite policy is by now well enough known inside Germany too! It has long ceased to be a secret.

Moreover, the acts in question themselves bear all the features qualifying them as punishable under every code of law in the world. For the labour relations existing in Germany between the imported labourer and his master are not at all the relations of hired employment even under the exploiters’ law of the capitalist State, which does formally assume that the individual is a free agent in respect of his labour power and does include certain, though of course very insufficient, regulations governing working conditions.

Forcible deportations to servitude in Fascist Germany, the master’s unlimited authority over the labourer and the brutal exploitation of the latter involve actions and proceedings constituting specific criminal offences, including assault and
battery, unlawful imprisonment, maiming and others.

It is accordingly with every justification that V. M. Molotov’s Note of May 11, 1943, states:

“At the same time the Soviet Government holds fully responsible also those private persons in Germany who are inhumanly exploiting at their enterprises or in their households the forced labour of peaceful Soviet citizens. These private persons must bear their full responsibility for the countless privations and sufferings they have brought to the Soviet people.”

Similarly the purchase of factory equipment removed from the occupied territories or of factories or real estate belonging to institutions of the occupied territories, which are not and cannot be regarded as the property of the occupation authorities is tantamount to receiving goods known to be stolen, for which private individuals, too, must be held to be responsible.

Thus the criminal responsibility of the members of the international Fascist criminal organizations may be defined as follows:

Hitler and his cabinet ministers, the Fascist Party leaders and the German Army Command, Hitler, Goering, Hess, Goebbels, Himmler, Ribbentrop, Rosenberg and the rest, and Hitler’s commissioners and representatives in the occupied areas, are the organisers and perpetrators of these grievous violations of the principles of international intercourse and human ethics. The heads of the financial or industrial concerns supporting them are the organisers of these crimes and associates in them. All of them, as members of the Hitlerite clique, are members of a gang of offenders against international law.

At the same time all of them are the organisers of the innumerable and atrocious criminal offences committed by the Hitlerite hordes. For these latter offences, moreover, the full measure of responsibility must be laid at the door of the persons guilty of their actual commission: the actual thieves, murderers, incendiaries, violators of personal rights, exploiters of slave labour and receivers of stolen goods.

For these heinous crimes against the life, liberty and culture of the nation, stern punishment must be meted out to all the culprits.

COMPENSATION FOR WAR DAMAGE

BY ACADEMICIAN EVGENY VARGA

(War and the Working Class, No. 10, October 15th, 1943.)

One of the major post-war problems will be compensation for the enormous damage done by the aggressor countries. There is no doubt whatsoever that the aggressor countries will have to make good all the damage caused by them during the war. In the solution of this problem it is necessary, above all, to take into account the experience of the first World War. The present situation, however, differs in many respects from that then existing. The material damage occasioned by Germany and her vassals in this war already far exceeds the losses suffered by the Allied countries in the first World War.

Damage far Greater than in the Last War

Firstly, the devastation of this war extends over a territory many times greater than in the first World War.

Secondly, in the first World War, the devastation caused mainly by military operations. But in the war against the Soviet Union, the Nazis, each time they retreat, destroy everything of value with German thoroughness. Over wide areas of the Soviet Union the damage is much more extensive than in France during the first World War. To this must be added the damage caused by the Germans in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, Belgium, France and other countries.

The material damage suffered by France and Belgium during the first World War was estimated at 14 milliard gold roubles. Some economists, for instance Keynes, thought that this sum was greatly exaggerated. But even if we halve it; and, moreover, bear in mind that some of the regions devastated in the present war were not so rich as the French districts which suffered in the first World War, nevertheless, since the European area devastated during this war is considerably greater (say 30 to 40 times greater), the sum total of material damage must amount at least to 200 milliard gold roubles. To this must be added the not inconsiderable damage caused by air raids on Britain, and the Allies’ big shipping losses.

Apart from the compensation for damage caused by des-
truction and bombing, the German-occupied countries are unquestionably entitled to demand compensation for damage caused to them in various forms during the domination of the Nazi invaders. This category includes the cost of the occupation and the requisitioning of all war materials, as well as other material values, etc.

The Germans themselves admit that the occupied countries pay 16 milliard marks a year to cover the expenses of the occupation. The actual losses suffered by these countries, bearing in mind the personal looting widely practised by German officers and soldiers, are undoubtedly double that sum. Consequently, for the period of the war these losses already amount to about 50 milliard gold roubles. And together with shipping losses and damage caused by air raids, the material damage alone totals 300 to 400 milliard gold roubles.

**Germany’s Reparation Debts Then and Now**

As is well known, after the first World War, the London ultimatum fixed Germany’s reparations debt at 132 milliard gold marks, that is, 65 milliard gold roubles. Two-fifths of this sum related to material losses. Three-fifths was intended to provide compensation for personal damage, mainly war pensions. But this war furnishes additional categories: the vast damage suffered by civilians of occupied countries, sent for forced labour in Germany or mobilised by the German invaders for forced labour in their own countries.

Taking the ratio established in the first World War between the material and personal damage, the reparations demands of the allies to Hitler Germany and her satellites should amount roughly to 800-1,000 milliard gold roubles. The lion’s share of this sum relates to losses suffered by the Soviet Union where entire regions have been devastated, thousands of villages and hundreds of towns razed to the ground and millions of Soviet citizens driven to forced labour in Germany, while a considerable part of the civil population in the occupied districts has been exterminated, crippled or tortured.

This vast difference, as compared to the first World War, requires, after this war, a new approach to the problem of reparations. In particular, it is necessary this time to avoid making those mistakes which were made after the war of 1914-18, and which finally produced a situation in which Germany was in fact able to free herself of her reparation obligations.

Reparations can be drawn from three sources: (1) from property possessed abroad and left after the war by countries obliged to pay reparations; (2) from the national wealth of these countries, and (3) from the national income of the post-war years.

When Germany started the present war, she had considerable capital investments abroad. These consisted both of short-term investments in the form of banking accounts, and long-term investments in the form of business enterprises and shares in business enterprises. The sum total of these investments can be estimated at 5 milliard marks. Of the “allies” of Germany, only Italy had small investments abroad.

**Payment of Reparations out of National Wealth**

Germany can pay only an insignificant part of the reparation claims out of her national wealth. Before the first World War, the national wealth of Germany was estimated at about 150 milliard gold roubles. No estimates exist for the period immediately preceding the present war. It would perhaps be a slight over-estimate to reckon the national wealth of pre-war Germany within her widened borders at 200 to 250 milliard gold roubles.

The combined national wealth of all Hitler’s satellites—Italy, Finland, Hungary and Rumania—hardly exceeded 120 milliard gold roubles before the war.

National wealth consists mostly of fixed assets: land, buildings, railways, highways and port installations. However, that part of the national wealth of the guilty countries from which reparations might most suitably be paid—for instance, ships, railway rolling stock, industrial equipment, stocks of goods, livestock—has been diminished in quantity and quality as a result of the war. This part of the national wealth of the Axis countries in the period just before the present war we estimate at approximately 120 milliard gold roubles.

At the end of the war, its actual value will undoubtedly be considerably less, as most of the accumulated stocks will have been used up, the machines and equipment will be worn out, and the livestock be diminished in quantity and quality, and so on. This means that only a small part of the reparation claims which will be presented to the aggressor countries after the war can be met from this source.

Moreover, nothing like the whole of the national wealth
suitable for reparations can in fact be taken out of the aggressor countries, as this would deprive them of the possibility of producing annual payments, after the war, from their national income. Thus, deductions from the national wealth could cover only an insignificant part of the material damage.

The experience of the last war confirms this. Suppose, for the sake of simplicity, that before the Dawes plan was put into force, all Germany's payments (apart from the sequestration of German properties abroad) had been made from Germany's national wealth. (In actual fact, part of the payments due, for instance, supplies of coal and coke, were taken from current production.) Then, according to Moulton's estimates, these German payments out of the national wealth amounted to about 8 milliard gold roubles.

But even if we take the greatly exaggerated German figures as correct, the payments amounted to not more than 14 milliard gold roubles—(apart from the 5 milliard gold roubles which were credited to Germany's reparations payments on account of her confiscated foreign assets).

Actually, not more than 10 per cent. of all reparation claims were paid out of Germany's national wealth. In view of the colossal material damage done in the present war, this percentage will be much lower.

**Payment of Reparations from Current Production**

It follows that it is the current production of the countries responsible for aggression which will be the main source of compensation for damage after the war. The Dawes and Young plans after the war also envisaged reparations from this source. However, analysis shows that though the Germans complained ceaselessly about the unreasonably hard burden of reparations, in actual fact they paid no reparations whatever after 1922!

It is true that during 1924-29 Germany formally paid about 3 milliard gold roubles reparations in accordance with the Dawes and Young plans. However, in the same period Germany got a considerably larger sum in the form of foreign loans. Wagemann, at that time the head of the German statistical department, estimated German debts by the end of 1930 as follows:

- Long term debts: (a) Loans 9 milliard marks, (b) Shares 8 milliard marks.
- Short term debts (bank credits, etc.): 26 to 27 milliard marks.
- Total, 41 to 42 milliard marks.

In the final analysis, German reparation payments proved to be pure fiction. For the period 1924-29, Germany transferred in the form of reparations only a quarter of the foreign credits received by her.

The fact that Germany thus avoided paying reparations does not mean of course, that the working people did not bear any burden. In Germany the reparation money was collected in the form of taxes borne mainly by the working people. The payment of reparations in foreign exchange hastened inflation, which greatly increased the exploitation of the working people and made the plutocratic monopolists still wealthier.

The fact that Germany did not in reality pay reparations out of her production is fully evident from the structure of her trade balance. Since gold is not mined in Germany, every real reparation payment has to be made by her in the form of an excess of exports over imports.

However, German foreign trade statistics for 1924-29 show an excess of imports over exports amounting to 16.2 milliard marks, or about 5 milliard gold roubles. This indicates that though the Dawes and Young plans were formally being carried out, in reality it was not Germany who paid reparations to the Allies: on the contrary, the Allied countries supplied Germany with capital greatly in excess of her reparation payments.

**Why Germany Paid No Reparations**

The reason why Germany did not pay reparations after 1922 was not at all because the extent of her production would not permit her to pay annually from 1 to 2½ milliard gold marks in accordance with the Dawes and Young plans. The German statistics department officially estimated Germany's national income from 1924-29 as averaging 60 milliard marks yearly. Thus, reparation payments consisted of only 1.5 to 4 per cent of the national income. For the same period, at least 10 per cent of the national income was cut off to new capital investments to increase Germany's military-economic potential.

The reason for this failure lay in the problem of transfer of reparation payments. The German bourgeoisie, of course, did everything to sabotage the payments. In 1910-22, the necessity of paying reparations in foreign exchange hastened
the complete devaluation of the mark, resulting from the
general disorganisation of German economy.

Not having any goldfields of her own, Germany could
pay only in goods. For that purpose, her exports needed to
exceed her imports by the amount of the reparation payments,
but market capacities in those countries which should have
received the reparation payments, as in all capitalist countries,
were far behind their productive capacities. Therefore, the
import of German goods in those countries was faced with
obstacles in the shape of duties and actual restrictions on im-
ports, etc. This was a serious obstacle to Germany's paying
reparations from her current production.

For instance, in 1922 Germany was supposed to pay France
950 million gold marks in the form of goods, but France
accepted goods only to the amount of 208 millions. Instead
of real reparation payments, a fictitious transfer was adopted:
part of the capital imported to Germany from abroad went
back in the form of reparation payments. It was not Germany
who paid the annual contributions fixed by the Dawes and
Young plans; they were paid by the capitalists of the U.S.A.,
Britain and France, who granted Germany credits exceeding
the amount of the reparation payments several times over.

When the economic crisis of 1929 broke out, the flow of
foreign capital to Germany ceased. The short term bank
credits were recalled and stopped. This led to the credit and
banking crisis of 1931 and the complete cessation of reparation
payments (the Hoover moratorium).

The Correct Approach

From all this it is clear how serious will be the difficulties
associated with reparations for damage caused by the Axis
powers during the present war. The full reparation of this
damage can hardly be expected in view of its colossal
dimensions.

For this simple reason alone, it is impossible, in a purely
mechanical way, to total up all the various damage suffered
by the Allied countries, as was done after the first World War,
and then to distribute reparations in direct proportion to losses.
Justice and practical expediency require a different approach
to the question.

1. Compensation should be made, in the first place, for
material damage. Only after this is done could payments start
for personal damage (for forced labour, war pensions, etc.)

2. Sums of incoming payments should be distributed
between the different countries, not in accordance with the
absolute amount of damage they have suffered but according
to the principle that compensation be paid above all to the
countries where the damage constitutes a major part of their
national wealth as a whole.

The justice and practical expediency of such an approach
is based on the following considerations. Such heavy material
damage has been occasioned in certain allied countries—for
instance, Poland, Greece, Norway—that immediate assistance
will be needed after the war to restore their economy. In all
justice and from the point of view of practical expediency
reparations should be paid first of all to countries that have
suffered most of all, including the Soviet Union, which has
indubitably suffered the greatest material damage in an abso-
lute sense, and perhaps also the greatest comparative damage,
that is, in percentage of the entire national wealth.

However great the material damage caused to the U.S.A.
by shipping losses, and to Britain by both shipping losses and
air raids, nevertheless these losses are relatively inconsider-
able in proportion to the total national wealth of those countries.

They could return to a peace-time economy and make
good their war losses by their own efforts, even if they did
not immediately receive reparation payments from the aggress-
or countries. On the other hand, a number of European
countries, including the U.S.S.R., in order to return to a peace-
time economy, and to replace the colossal material values lost
during the war, imperatively require reparations for the damage
caused by the aggressors. This order of precedence in receiv-
ing reparations payments appears not only just but also prac-
tically expedient, guaranteeing the speediest possible recon-
struction of the economy of all the Allied countries.

Hitler's Satellites Must Also Pay Compensation

As for the question of dividing the obligations to cover
the losses, it seems to us that as distinct from the first World
War, not only Germany, but also Italy, Rumania, Hungary
and Finland should be made to pay compensation. The vast
material damage sustained by the occupied countries—above
all by the Soviet Union—embraces all sections of their national
economy: agriculture, mining, industry and transport.
Therefore it is just, expedient, and necessary to demand that all the countries which have shared in the Hitlerites’ bandit campaigns should, immediately after the war, take all kinds of mobile property: machines, apparatus, tools, industrial equipment, engines, wagons, automobiles and ships. They also need livestock, seed and other agricultural products. They need coal, metal, and so on.

The reparation claims of Britain and the U.S.A., who do not require obligatory payments in the form of goods to reconstruct their economy, could be partly satisfied by the handing over to them the foreign capital investments of the aggressor countries.

As for the amount of compensation to be paid out of the national wealth of the aggressor countries, immediately after the war, it would be clearly unjust if the aggressor countries were not made to pay damages such as would place them in no more favourable economic position than that of their victims.

Furthermore, justice demands that the property of the persons responsible for unleashing the war and that of the persons who have grown rich on the plunder of the occupied countries, be confiscated and used in full as compensation for the damages occasioned.

Reparations from Current Production

The next question is that of compensation to be paid in the post-war years at the expense of current production. Here, too, we consider that the same principle should be applied as in the case of compensation from national wealth. It is not a question of punishing the peoples of the aggressor countries by imposing reparation payments on them.

It is outside the scope of this article to discuss the responsibility of the leaders of the Hitlerite gang for their aggression against and barbarous looting and devastation of the occupied countries and regions; the degree of responsibility of the German soldiers who obediently carried out the devastation orders and often looted without any orders; and finally the degree of the guilt of the German people who acquiesced in and supported such a bandit government. Undoubtedly it would be unjust if the peoples whose armies had caused unparalleled devastation were to live better after the war than the peoples who were made their victims.

That Germany will be able to pay big reparations annually is seen from the following: between 1935 and 1938 Germany spent, according to Hitler, 90 milliard marks on armaments. This averages 15 milliard marks annually.

Naturally, since there will be no such expenditure on armaments after the war, it will be possible to devote these sums to payment of reparations.

The Method of Paying Reparations

Concerning the method of paying reparations, stress should be placed on deliveries in kind, which is actually the only form possible. With its planned economy, under which there can be no disproportion between production and consumption, and where the supply of commodities never exceeds the demand, and hence precludes economic crises, the Soviet Union definitely prefers to receive payment in compensation for damage caused her, not in money, but in goods.

Finally, it would be just and expedient from a practical point of view to draw labour power from Germany and Hitler’s allied countries for post-war rehabilitation work in devastated regions. Hitlerite bandits, trampling underfoot international law, are forcibly driving millions of peaceful citizens of the occupied countries into Germany, and particularly inhabitants of occupied regions of the Soviet Union, forcing them to manufacture weapons for the struggle against their own country. Justice demands that after the war the Germans shall take part in restoring the railways, bridges, towns and factories destroyed by them during the war.
THE PLAN FOR AN EAST EUROPEAN FEDERATION

(War and the Working Class, No. 4, July 15th, 1943.)

In two years of the Soviet People’s heroic struggle against Hitlerite Germany, the prestige of the Soviet Union in the international arena has grown immeasurably and, first and foremost, its role in the camp of the United Nations. Evidence of this is seen in the daily growth in the movement of solidarity with the U.S.S.R. among all freedom-loving peoples, the recent establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the dominions of the British Empire, as well as with the Latin-American states, and the increased prestige the U.S.S.R. enjoys in the eyes of the peoples of the occupied countries of Europe and in the camp of the neutral states. Every sensible person understands that the U.S.S.R.—the biggest continental power, which has demonstrated its state and military strength in the course of the war—will have one of the leading roles to play in the organisation of the post-war order of Europe and the whole world.

Nevertheless, anti-democratic and semi-Fascist elements are trying to prevent the participation of the U.S.S.R. in the organisation of the post-war world, drafting the most fantastic plans in this direction, which are clearly permeated by hostility to the Soviet Union.

Stirring up Trouble

Particularly active in the discussion of problems of the post-war world order are precisely such bankrupt political groups as the offshoots of the Munich clique in Britain, the isolationists and various compromised politicians in the U.S.A., such as Hoover and Bullitt, and the anti-democratic groupings among political émigrés from Poland, Hungary, Austria, the Baltic and other countries. These groups and their press, such as The Nineteenth Century and After and the Fortnightly Review in Britain, the Hearst Press in the U.S.A. and various sheets of the émigré cliques, certainly do not reflect the opinions of broad public circles in England and the U.S.A. and the democratic circles among the political émigrés.

These groups are exerting themselves by all means to stir up trouble, playing into the hands of Hitler and his associates, who hope for a split in the camp of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. They have developed a furious activity, trotting out such worn-out bugbears as the menace of “bolshevisation” and inventing and treating the reader to scores of anti-Soviet plans for the “reconstruction” of Europe.

There are many such projects, beginning with that of forming a United States of Europe, a “Pan-Europe,” and ending with plans for the organisation of a Europe broken up into various federations, confederations and regional blocs of states.

In the present review we shall deal with one of the most typical projects for federation, for a Federation of East European Countries.

Polish Plans for an East Europe Federation

Among the most energetic advocates of the East European Federation are the reactionary groups of Polish émigrés, ranging from the disguised Beck supporters to the social democrats, as well as representatives of the Polish Government in London. These gentlemen and I cherish hopes that the imperialist intentions of the Polish plans will be realised and seek to obtain in the East European Federation a new basis for the realisation of their intentions, trying to fit their plans for the organisation of post-war Europe into these aims. Careful examination of these plans immediately exposes the imperialist aspirations of the Polish gentry, although they try to hide behind a lot of talk about the security of the Central European States, the political balance of power in Europe and the safeguarding of a lasting and stable peace.

The newspaper Dmiejś Polski describes the future Europe as a union of states, united in regional groups. Regional organisations, this paper wrote in August, 1942, will be inevitable. According to the Polish projects, the foundation of the European federation must be Polish-Czecho slovak and Greek-Yugoslav federations.

“At the present time,” wrote the Polish publicist Grabiowski in the newspaper Wyzdomostii Polski in October, 1942, “it is clear that Poland cannot exist alone in the new Europe. Even linked with Czechoslovakia, Poland does not reach the appropriate size. There is no doubt that the time of large areas is arriving. We must set up a bloc of states with a population of 100 to 125 millions, for only such a bloc could
stand up to Germany."

Raczyński, Acting Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated, in January, 1942, in an interview with a correspondent of the Sunday Times:--

"A centre of forces capable of ensuring collaboration for the purpose of maintaining European equilibrium must be created. Poland occupies a key position in Europe. It will be the centre of attraction for other countries, from Lithuania, Poland and Czechoslovakia to Hungary and the Balkan group of countries. Obviously Poland counts on being able to play such a role."

A resolution of the Polish National Council which was adopted in April, 1942, states: "The necessary condition for ensuring lasting peace in Europe after the destruction of the military might of Germany consists in closely-knit federative unions of the Central European nations between the Baltic, Aegaean and Adriatic Seas."

In an interview given to the Dziennik Polski on December 31st, 1942, Marian Seyda, a Polish minister, stated:--

"Polish politicians attribute much importance to a federation or confederation of peoples of Eastern and Central Eastern Europe, extending from Lithuania through Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania to Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece and Bulgaria. It cannot be said in advance whether it would be one union or two."

The manner in which this Polish minister divides the roles of those taking part in the "federation" is characteristic: "The Baltic countries," he said, "would bring to the future federation their love of labour and highly developed social spirit. Poland—her moral and cultural traditions, as well as the consciousness of her mission in Eastern Europe. Czechoslovakia—her splendidly organised industry and industrious population, while Hungary, Rumania and Yugoslavia would supply extremely valuable materials."

In all the statements given above can be clearly seen the special idea of the Polish politicians, who claim that Poland will have a dominating position in Central Europe. It is no accident that the Polish ministers with their statements as well as the many official publicists, affirm with one voice, "the key position of Poland in Europe" and assert with cynical frankness that Poland must become the "centre of attraction" for other countries.

We shall not dwell here on the fact that the Polish impe-

rialist plans contain aggressive claims to Soviet territory, to Lithuania and to the whole Soviet Baltic in general—claims worthy perhaps only of the fascist aggressors.

Despite all this, these Polish plans find support among certain organs of the British press, which lend their pages to the propaganda of the ideas of the Polish reactionaries and, in their turn, line up on the side of the creation of an East European Federation. Thus, for example, the Fortnightly, as far back as October, 1941, wrote that the wisest solution of the question of the future structure of Eastern Europe would be the creation of a bloc of states stretching from the shores of the Baltic right down to the Adriatic and Black Seas.

The authors of the plans for the creation of an East European Federation readily discuss the necessity to ensure "European equilibrium" and of the need that, with this in view, the small and medium states in Eastern Europe should create a bloc of states with a hundred million or a hundred and twenty-five million population. But the plans of these project-builders are clearly built on sand.

**Insuperable Internal Contradictions**

It is not difficult to understand in the first place that such a federation contains almost insuperable internal contradictions. Is it possible to ignore the fact that the East European federation has to be a political union of democratic Czechoslovakia and feudal Hungary, of republican Poland and monarchist Rumania? Is it possible to count on the stability of such a politically heterogeneous federation? Take, for example, the question of the relations between the states within the East European federation. Who does not know of the irreconcilable territorial contradictions between Hungary and Rumania on the question of Transylvania, or the differences between Czechoslovakia and Poland with regard to the question of the Teschen region, on which already over several years, Polish and Czechoslovak governments have failed to reach an agreement?

Consequently, the internal instability of such a federation is beyond doubt. Who can believe that such a shaky and obviously unstable federation can satisfy the aspirations of the peoples of these countries as regards their state security or ensure them common defence? This being so, all the discussions in the world about "a bloc of states with a hundred million or a hundred and twenty-five million population" cannot hide the
simple fact that the federation offered by the Polish politicians cannot be a hopeful basis for the freedom, independence and the very security of the states involved in this project of federation.

This is quite apart from the experience with the Little Entente (Rumania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia) and Balkan Entente (Rumania, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Greece). Both these blocs of states in Eastern Europe aimed at ensuring the external security of the states comprising them. But what has this experience shown? The Little Entente in no way helped Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in the struggle against Hitlerite aggression. When war came the members of the Balkan Entente split into three camps: Rumania—in Hitler’s camp; Yugoslavia and Greece—on the side of the Allies; Turkey with her neutrality—between the two belligerent camps. The main pretext of the pact of the Balkan Entente—“Greece Rumania, Turkey and Yugoslavia mutually guarantee the security of all their Balkan frontiers”—hung in the air and failed to hold good from the very first moment of the historical test. Rumania perfidiously violated her obligations. Turkey has done nothing to fulfill her obligations with regard to Yugoslavia and Greece, who were subjected to aggression. Such is the edifying experience with the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente.

**Plans Directed Against the Soviet Union**

On the other hand, it is not difficult to see that the plans for this federation, to be formed, allegedly, with the aim of struggling against potential German aggression in the future, are in the last analysis directed against the Soviet Union. This is easily and convincingly seen when one turns to the facts. Thus, the *Fortnightly*, which zealously supports the idea of a federation, is not ashamed to speak of it pretty frankly. The *Fortnightly* writes that the inability of the Western powers to organize, in the area between the Baltic and Black Seas, states of free nations with the object of giving them an opportunity of experiencing complete security from expansionist tendencies threatening them from the West and from the East, was one of the main reasons for the fall of the whole European system created by the peace treaties after the last war.

We see from this that the champions of the idea of an East European Federation, such as the *Fortnightly*, speak without embarrassment of the fact that plans for a federation “between the Baltic and Black Seas” imply security from outside aggression “from the west and from the east,” that is, from Germany, as well as, seemingly, from the Soviet Union. Thus, they advocate the same attitude to the “West,” in other words, towards Germany, as to the “East,” in other words towards the Soviet Union.

And this is done at a time when the Soviet Union, as recognized by honest people the world over, is heading the liberation struggle against the monstrous aggression of Fascist Germany, not only in the interests of its own people, but in the interests of the liberation of those countries of whose union into federation so much is being written at the present time, but which will not regain their freedom and independence without a Soviet victory over Germany.

**Czechoslovakia, Poland and the U.S.S.R.**

The anti-Soviet character of an East-European Federation is revealed also by the following fact: in 1940 Czechoslovakia and Poland reached an agreement on a Polish-Czechoslovak confederation which was to serve as the basis for an East European federation. Since 1942, Czechoslovak statesmen have repeatedly declared that the formation of a Polish-Czechoslovak confederation must be carried out in agreement with the Soviet Union, which borders both on Czechoslovakia and Poland.

President Benes indicated point blank the necessity for reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union on the question of the Polish-Czechoslovak confederation, in his speech on December 5, 1942. Time and again he persistently defended this idea, but met with no support from the Polish statesmen who are the most energetic advocates of the idea of a confederation. From this it must be concluded that the said Polish statesmen do not deem it necessary to decide such questions on the basis of friendly collaboration with the U.S.S.R. In this one cannot but see one more proof that the said Polish statesmen are nurturing their plan for a confederation, guided by intentions which are by no means friendly with regard to the Soviet Union.

No wonder that already, at the end of last year, the American journalist Callender, writing in the *New York Times*, pointed openly to the fact that the reactionary Polish press in the U.S.A. is painting the Polish-Czechoslovak confederation as a buffer...
bloc between Russia and Germany, that "it smells unpleasantly of the anti-Russian principle of the cordon sanitaire."

From this it is clear that the character hostile to the U.S.S.R. of the post-war plans of the Polish pans is by no means a secret, and that the Polish pens merely hide this hostility by talk about a "cordon sanitaire" against the U.S.S.R. and talk about defence against some mythical threat from the Soviet Union.

Finally, speaking of the plans for an East European federation, it would not be amiss to recall such no mean factor as the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition which has been formed in the course of this war. The plans for a post-war Europe, and the plans for European federations in particular, cannot ignore such an important historical fact as the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and post-war collaboration in Europe.

But how can the recognition of the Anglo-Soviet treaty be compatible with the policy of the struggle against the "threat from the West and from the East"? How indeed can the support of this agreement, designed to ensure collaboration and mutual aid between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain in averting aggression on the part of Germany in the post-war period, be compatible with the aims of the formation of an East European federation directed against an aggressive Germany and against the U.S.S.R. which, in the future, is to be one of the decisive forces in the struggle against any possible new aggression by Germany?

To build plans for creating an East European federation which is hostile to the Soviet Union is possible only by proceeding from a denial of the necessity for friendship and collaboration between the U.S.S.R. and the Allies in the post-war period, and only by proceeding from the denial of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty. Honest supporters of the Anglo-Soviet agreement cannot defend post-war plans which are hostile to the Soviet Union and Great Britain, or hostile to either of these countries.

IV PROBLEMS OF SEPARATE COUNTRIES

THE SITUATION IN CHINA

By V. Rokov

(From War and the Working Class, August 15th, 1943.)

JAPAN began her war against China on July 7th, 1937. On that date Japanese troops attacked units of the 29th Chinese Army at Marco Polo bridge on the outskirts of Peiping. Japanese leaders called this war the “Chinese incident.” Actually as the course of military operations demonstrated, the Japanese war in China is being waged with definite imperialist aims and is not the outcome of a fortuitous combination of circumstances or an incident of any kind. When the Japanese began the war they intended to rout the Chinese Army in one lightning blow, forcing the Chinese Government to capitulate and bringing China to her knees.

At the outset of the war it was perfectly clear that Japan had superiority as regards war material and economic aspects. In addition, Japan had a considerable advantage in that she was attacking China after prolonged and careful preparation. At the same time, political and administrative divisions and the industrial backwardness of China did not permit her quickly reconstructing her economy on a war basis or of organizing resistance to the Japanese troops. On the outbreak of the war, the armed forces of China had no uniform organization. The Chinese troops were poorly trained for the conduct of a modern war and had almost no up-to-date military equipment—planes, tanks and heavy artillery. All this facilitated the initial success of the Japanese troops and gave them an opportunity of advancing rapidly into the depths of Chinese territory.

In a relatively short time Japan took possession of the more densely populated and economically important areas of the country with such towns as Shanghai, Nanking, Wuhan, Peiping, Tientsin, etc. However, the speed of the Japanese advance gradually slowed down and after the fall of Wuhan
(October, 1938) the Japanese offensive almost came to a standstill. There began a period when the balance of forces was almost equal. The Chinese army began to withstand the onslaught of the Japanese troops, to repel their attacks and in some sectors to strike counter-blows at the enemy.

The Creation of a National Front

What is the explanation of this situation? First and foremost, the fact that the rapid successes of the Japanese invasion and the menace of conquest by Japan united the various strata of Chinese population in the struggle against the foreign aggressors. The task of resisting the enemy confronted the most varied sections of the Chinese people in all its magnitude and led to the creation of a national front of national defence which included in its ranks various parties and groups, regardless of their political trends and programmes. The united national front in China, formed early in the war in the face of the threat of an extension of the Japanese military successes, grew stronger and more stable. Between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party, the two largest political parties in China, collaboration developed for joint organisation of the country’s defence, for successful solution of the national tasks confronting the whole Chinese people in the struggle against Japanese aggression.

In his appeal to the people on December 17th 1937, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stated that China’s task was “to resist Japan to the end and achieve final victory.” All the political, military and economic efforts and measures of the Chinese Government led by Chiang Kai-shek were turned in this direction. At the initiative of Chiang Kai-shek, the hitherto scattered military forces of the country began to be united and the army reorganised. As Commander-in-Chief of China’s armed forces, Chiang Kai-shek made considerable efforts to create a powerful army, to equip it with modern war equipment and to perfect its military training. The experience of the earlier battles against the Japanese troops formed the basis of this military improvement.

The Guerilla Movement

The guerilla movement had no small influence on the course of military operations. Numerous guerilla detachments sprang up on enemy-occupied territory, and these gradually grew stronger and became a menacing force. Operating against enemy communications, attacking enemy garrisons, the guerillas disorganised the rear of the Japanese troops and give the Japanese no opportunity of consolidating their positions on occupied territory. By the second year of war, strong guerilla districts had been formed in the Japanese rear. This forced the Japanese Command to detail large numbers of its troops for the struggle against the guerillas, for a “second war” inside the country.

As they advanced further, the Japanese came up against the mountainous areas with their poor network of roads, which made it extremely difficult for them to manoeuvre their mechanised troops.

At the very beginning of the war, the Chinese Government evacuated a large number of industrial enterprises from the maritime area to the depths of the country. True, no little time elapsed before the greater part of them began to operate; nevertheless, the evacuation of these enterprises to some degree assisted the creation of new military-economic bases inside the country. This increased the power of resistance of the Chinese army and the Chinese people.

For all these reasons the Japanese found themselves incapable of breaking China’s resistance. The numerous offensive operations of the Japanese ended without result or in small, partial successes. At the same time the Chinese troops by the tactics of active defence, caused the enemy substantial losses in manpower and material.

The Japanese “Peace Offensive”

The Japanese militarists’ plan for the rapid conquest of China was a failure. The Japanese were unable to break the resistance of the Chinese people and bring them to their knees. The war against China was clearly dragging out and threatened Japan with ever increasing complications, encountering as it did the stubborn and courageous resistance of the Chinese army and the whole of the Chinese people. Having no hope in these conditions, of dealing with China by armed force alone, the Japanese aggressors combined other manoeuvres with their military operations against China and resorted to the tactics of a “peace offensive” laying new and no smaller hope on these tactics than they did on the tactics of armed attack.

At the beginning of the war the Japanese had already re-
sorted to this method of a “peace offensive”. They launched wide-scale activities to undermine National China from within. In December, 1937, through the German Ambassador to China, the Japanese tried to impose conditions for capitulation on the Chinese government, conditions which would actually have meant the enslavement of China. These Japanese intrigues evoked profound indignation among the Chinese people. Japan’s peace proposals were determinedly rejected by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and German mediation ended in complete failure. Similarly the Chinese rejected all the other Japanese “peace” proposals made during these years by prominent Japanese officials (General Matsun’s ultimatum of December, 1933, Prince Konoe’s proposals of December, 1939, and others.)

The Puppet Regimes Set Up by Japan

The Japanese imperialists placed great hopes in their creation of puppet regimes in the occupied districts, endeavouring with their aid to “conquer China by means of the Chinese.”

What were these puppet regimes?

To-day the Japanese imperialists represent that they are waging war against Chungking in order to establish an “independent Chinese state.” In actual fact the “governments” of Central China, Northern China, Inner Mongolia and Manchukuo set up by the Japanese are essentially puppet subservient to the Japanese. In Manchukuo the general staff of the Kwantung army, led by the Japanese General Umets, is complete master. Wang Ching-wei incontroversibly fulfils all the orders of the Japanese militarists. Through their advisers and military and other instructors, the Japanese imperialists are in fact the complete masters in the territory of the puppet governments, although on paper these “governments” have a semblance of independence: conducting diplomatic negotiations, having their ambassadors in the Axis countries, and so on.

Economic life in the occupied territories of China is wholly subordinated to the interests of Japan. The activities of the puppet governments in this sphere are directed towards securing Chinese raw materials for Japan, of which she is acutely in need for waging war in the Pacific. Recently the Japanese Command has been endeavouring to form armies of the puppet governments. These armies are to conduct military operations against the Chinese National Government and to serve as police troops in the occupied territory.

The Basis of Support for Japan

What is the basis of the imperialist puppet regime in China and on whom do they rely?

The blockade of Chinese ports during the Sino-Japanese war caused substantial loss of income to certain landlords and big traders of China. In consequence, they began openly to call for cessation of the war and peace with Japan. The breakdown of trade connections and loss of former incomes drove this section of the upper strata of Chinese society to seek for a possible compromise with Japan with a view to the speedy withdrawal from the war, and the restoration of the country’s trade turnover destroyed by the war.

This circumstance played, and continues to play, a part in the development of “peacemaking” endeavours and of interests represented by the group of Chinese bourgeois elements, landlords and old militarists of Northern China which had longstanding ties with the Japanese, as, for example, Van Ke-min, the chairman of the so-called North China Political Council, as well as the group of Kuomintang traitors who went over to the Japanese side after the fall of Wuhan, such as Wang Ching-wei and his assistants: Chang hun-beo, Chow Po-hai and other members of the so-called Nanking Government. The puppet governments, having no vital connections with broad social circles and no support from the masses of the people, would be unable to hold power for a single hour were it not for the fact that they rely on the bayonets of the Japanese occupation army.

However, the Japanese “peace offensive” brought none of the desired results. Reliance on the puppet governments in order to subjugate China by peaceful means is proving a failure. Yet Japan is not abandoning hope of reaching her goal.

Under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese people are waging their seventh year of war in difficult conditions against Japanese military aggression for their national independence and freedom. This is taking place, in spite of all the efforts of the Japanese and of the aid given to them by capitulatory elements in Chungking. Of course, nobody speaks openly in favour of capitulation in Chungking, but this does not mean that there are no capitulationists and defeatists there. Capitulationists and defeatists in the Kuomintang who occupy responsible posts are weakening the forces of China by their inactivity and harmful political intrigues at home. More than once
I have had to listen to responsible Chinese officials in Hangkow and in Chungking developing "theories" on the need, "while it is not too late, to conclude an honourable peace with Japan." On the "unsuitable choice of time for the war" or "the uselessness of further war efforts by China," and so on. There is not the slightest doubt that the defeatist and capitulatory elements at the present time constitute a serious menace to China.

The Strengthening of the "Peace Offensive"

Since December 7th, 1941, Japan's chief attention has been fixed on the war in the Pacific. The war in China has begun to be pushed into the background. In this connection I have observed that many Chinese military men and politicians have displayed a certain self-satisfaction and complacency, which the Japanese militarists have utilised by strengthening their "peace offensive" through their agents giving still greater support to defeatist sentiments in some Chinese circles and making wide use of them in their own interests.

Now that Japan is tied up in the Pacific war even the most zealous Japanese militarists have ceased to talk about the conquest of China by force of arms. All the more persistently then do the Japanese aggressors endeavour to fulfil their plans for a "peace offensive" in China, bringing pressure to bear for deepening and intensifying the contradictions inside China itself and endeavouring by all means to use these contradictions to weaken China and strengthen their own position in the struggle against China. Nothing could suit Japanese plans more than the manoeuvres of the Chinese "peace-makers," who provoke conflicts and incidents even to the extent of armed conflicts, endeavouring by every means to break the militant collaboration of Kuomintang circles and the Communist Party and inciting to the persecution and destruction of the 8th and 4th armies and the Communist Party as a whole, all, more than anything else, suit these Japanese plans.

For a very long time now these gentlemen have been working in this direction, bringing every kind of pressure to bear on the Chinese Government for the purpose of obtaining the liquidation of the 8th and 4th armies which were formed in the early days of the war out of units of the former Chinese Red Army, on the basis of the united national front of struggle against Japan. As part of the united national army of China, the 8th and 4th armies have written not a few heroic pages in the history of the Chinese people's resistance to the Japanese invaders. These armies consist of the most advanced, steadfast and self-sacrificing people of China. These armies are led by the Chinese Communist Party, which enjoys deserved authority among the wide masses of the working people as the organiser of their struggle for national liberation and independence.

The Danger from Capitulatory Elements

At the present time, fresh attempts are being made by means of direct military pressure to obtain the dissolution of the Chinese Communist Party and the liquidation of the 8th and 4th armies. Things have gone so far that on all kinds of provocative excuses the Chinese Command has transferred new divisions and enormous quantities of ammunition and food to the area where these armies are situated, in addition to the troops previously concentrated there, thus clearly preparing for an attack on the 8th and 4th armies with a view to their liquidation even at the price of starting civil war. If these intrigues are crowned with any sort of success, if these anti-democratic, anti-popular tendencies get the upper hand in Chungking politics, and under their influence civil war again flares up in the ranks of the Chinese people, this will have a ruinous effect on the whole struggle for the liberation of China from the jackboot of the conqueror, and will be a serious danger to the liberation struggle of China against the aggressor. The best and foremost representatives of Chinese society are decisively coming out against such a danger. The attack of the Chungking generals on the 8th and 4th armies, an attack that was quite unprovoked, was a treacherous stab in the back for the Chinese people and served only the Japanese imperialists who could have dreamt of nothing better.

A number of prominent members of the Kuomintang have come out against such treacherous activities on the part of these "pacificationists," capitulators and provocateurs, and have called for the strengthening of collaboration between all the anti-Japanese political groups, and the strengthening of the front of the people's war against the aggressor. Discontent with the policy of the Kuomintang on this question embraces considerable social circles in China. The Chinese government, however, does not display firmness in overcoming the activities of the capitulationists directed towards disrupting national unity and weakening Chinese resistance to Japanese aggression.
The Present State of the Chinese Army

What is the present state of the Chinese army? Is it ready for further battles for the independence of its country?

In six years of warfare, at the cost of considerable territorial losses, the Chinese Command has succeeded in saving its troops from defeat. Despite numerous unfavourable circumstances, the Chinese army has maintained its capacity for resistance. In defensive battles along an extremely long front, it has weakened the Japanese troops and won the time required to reorganise its troops and consolidate its fighting capacity.

It would be well to remember that soon after the fall of Wuhan in October, 1938, Chiang Kai-shek in a speech at a military-political conference in Nanjo (Wuhan province) expounded his programme for reorganising the country's armed forces. The principal points of this programme consisted of three propositions: 1st, China's national policy must be one of a prolonged defensive war; secondly, the guerrilla movement must be developed; thirdly, a new army of many millions, capable of using the most up-to-date war equipment must be created for launching a general counter-offensive. Soon after the Military Council published new instructions regarding the attitude of the army to the population and military-political courses were instituted for leaders of the guerrilla movement, while a number of reforms were introduced into the army. In the early part of 1939 it was officially announced that the Military Council had begun to recruit the new army, consisting of eighty divisions. It appeared that the period of preparation for the general counter-offensive had begun. However, from the very first day the intentions of Chiang Kai-shek, Command-in-Chief of the Chinese Army, encountered covert resistance.

Over three years passed. The army reforms directed towards creating new cadres, reorganising the leadership and strengthening discipline, were not carried through to the end and the creation of an independent military-economic base did not materialise. My observations, based on numerous journeys through China, give me grounds for asserting that the chief cause of this state of affairs is the disorganising work of the "pacificationists," defeatists and capitulationists.

Need For Full Use of National Resources

National China's military-economic resources are enormous and provide an adequate base for arming and equipping a mass army. All kinds of strategic-war materials, essential for the conduct of a long war, are to be found on the territory of National China.

Concerning the study of natural resources, the Ministry for Economics headed by the well-known geologist, Dr. Wong Wen-hao, has carried out much work during the last few years. However, it was not possible to begin large-scale construction, for under conditions of blockade industrial and financial circles consider it more profitable to them to engage in speculation—purchase and sale of articles of mass consumption and investment of capital in enterprises producing these commodities—than to invest capital in enterprises producing armaments. The speculators came out with "theories" to the effect that the people were tired of the war, that first and foremost the requirements of the people should be satisfied, etc.

This state of affairs led to a weakening of the fighting capacity of the army, to increased dependence on the arrival of armaments from the U.S.A. and Great Britain which, however, since the beginning of the Japanese war against the U.S.A. and Britain is encountering serious difficulties.

The necessary measures for the mobilisation of internal economic resources are not being carried into effect. The old arsenals and enterprises evacuated into the interior of the country scarcely cover half the modern requirements of the Chinese army. At the same time, Japan continues to pump strategic raw materials out of China, while, in consequence of the development of speculation and contraband, freight consignments fall into the hands of the Japanese after filtering through the front line from National Chinese territory. The capitulatory elements sabotaged measures to mobilise internal resources, designed to establish an independent military-economic base as well measures to extend the economic war against the Japanese invaders.

Manpower And Officer Reserves

It is known that China experiences no shortage of manpower reserves, yet the Chinese army is not regularly supplied with reinforcements. There are few properly trained military reserves. Neither is there any proper military census of the
population. To this day the universal military conscription
law is not fully carried out. The selection of new soldiers, as
hitherto, proceeds on the line of a certain quota from each
province, district or village. It is customary in the villages to
draw lots for the new recruits and in consequence of this a
large percentage of persons unsuitable for military service finds
its way into the army.

The chief defect of the Chinese army is the shortage of
trained commanders. All foreign military observers who have
visited the Chinese army agree that the Chinese soldier is
staunch and enduring in a campaign, not exacting as regards
food and clothing, but the commanding personnel is extremely
weak and, as regards military technique, backward. The selec-
tion of the commanding personnel does not correspond to
the requirements of modern warfare; until recently officers
were selected by the commanders of large army units on the
basis of being kinsfolk or coming from the same district. It
is not to be wondered at that one frequently encounters a
commander of a regiment who is completely ignorant of the
art of waging modern warfare.

Military equipment continues to be at a low level. The
army suffers from a marked lack of artillery. Ammunition is
frequently lacking for the guns in front-line sectors. The or-
organisation and direction of troops is by no means perfect. One
of the defects of the Chinese army is the absence of effective
unity of command and of co-ordinated actions on separate
fronts. A large part of the army is not at the front, but is
distributed among the provinces for "maintaining peace and
order" in the country.

The Danger of Internal Quarrels

Internal quarrels, mutual suspicion among the generals,
the endeavour to preserve autonomy, to set up staff H.Q. in
the centre or to be represented there by trusted persons, irre-
spective of their merits, could not but affect the fighting capacity
of the troops and the discipline in their ranks. Among some
Chinese generals national interests are pushed aside in favour
of the interests of the old feudal militarists. Personal grudges,
dissatisfaction with the central government and narrow selfish
aims impel such generals to treachery, and at the first oppor-
tunity they go over to the Japanese, considering it more pro-
fitable for themselves at the moment. Among such cases of
large-scale treachery must be included the recent betrayals of
Generals Sun Lan-chen, Pan Win-sun, Sun-Jan-In and some
others.

In recent years I have had occasion to visit over fifteen
Chinese provinces. Both at the front and deep in the rear,
in occupied Shanghai and in Manchukuo, representatives of
the most varied social circles of China are following with alarm
the criminal activities of traitors, renegades, defeatists and sabo-
teurs. They all, however, unanimously express the conviction
that all plans to provoke internal civil war in China are
doomed to failure as National China has accumulated consi-
derable strength in hard-fought engagements and will not allow
the great national cause of the liberation of the Chinese people
to end in failure.

Victory Depends on National Unity

Analysing the struggle of the Chinese people throughout
the course of history, Chiang Kai-shek, in his recently published
book, The Fate of China, expresses the firm conviction that
China will be victorious over the Japanese aggressor.

Possessing as it does inexhaustible resources of strategic
and tremendous manpower reserves, National China has all the possibilities of victory over the enemy. Essential
conditions for this victory are the realisation of radical
measures to reconstruct the whole economy on war lines, the
subordination of the entire economic life to the needs of the
front, the strengthening of the armed forces, determined
struggle against capitalismists and defeatist tendencies, and
what is most important of all—real unity of all national forces
for the struggle for freedom and national independence. The
success of China's national-liberation war against the foreign
conquerors and the successful culmination in the interests of
the whole of the Chinese people of the exhausting war im-
posed on the Chinese people by Japanese imperialism will de-
pend on how far Chiang Kai-shek and the Chungking ruling
circle will realise the importance of this chief condition and
will be able to remove the danger of internal struggle in China,
fomented by enemies of the Chinese people—a struggle the in-
evitable consequence of which would very likely be measures
directed against the 8th and 4th armies and the Communist
Party—and will be able to avert any weakening of the united
national front of struggle against Japan.
THE NEUTRALITY OF TURKEY

BY N. VASSILIEV

(War and the Working Class, No. 7, Sept. 18th, 1943.)

Turkey is among the few countries which until now has not been directly affected by the military operations. But the war has already long since reached her borders. Influenced by the danger threatening all European countries as a result of the aggressive actions of Germany and Italy, Turkey, in the spring of 1939, signed with Britain a declaration on mutual aid in the event of an act of aggression which could lead to war in the Mediterranean.

On October 19th, 1939, Turkey concluded a mutual assistance pact in Ankara with France and Britain, who at that time were already at war with Germany. Turkey was intended to take part in the operations to cut short German and Italian aggression in the Mediterranean. According to the official Turkish point of view, Turkey, as an ally of Britain and France, was not neutral but merely temporarily “outside the war.”

Under the influence of military events in the spring and summer of 1940, Turkish foreign policy gradually began to turn towards neutrality. In March, 1941, Germany started a mass concentration of her troops on the territory of Bulgaria in preparation for the robber attack on Yugoslavia and Greece. But Turkey’s tendency to remain outside the war at the time did not change. The logical development of this Turkish tactic, which judging from British comments met with no objection on the part of Turkey’s British ally, was that Turkey entered into a new phase of her foreign policy, characterised by a rapprochement with Fascist Germany.

Turkish Neutrality and Anti-Soviet Attitude

Within four days of the attack on the Soviet Union, a friendship and non-aggression pact was concluded between Turkey and Germany. For Fascist Germany this pact, which helped her to safeguard her Balkan flank, was merely the last link in the preparations for the robber war against the Soviet Union. Henceforth Turkey’s foreign policy had to combine such contradictory aims as alliance with Britain and friendship with the U.S.S.R. with a policy of friendship towards Hitlerite Germany.

During the first few months following Germany’s attack on the U.S.S.R., the whole Turkish press, in the name of this neutrality, published only the boastful despatches of the German Information Bureau about the victories and conquests of the Fascist invaders on Soviet territory. No one hindered the circulation of the Hitlerite lies in the Turkish press. Observing her peculiar kind of neutrality, the Turkish press never published the Soviet despatches about the Soviet-German war and completely ignored the information coming from the Soviet Union.

There will be recalled also the disgraceful Ankara trial in connection with the so-called “attempt” on the life of Von Papen, in which two honest Soviet citizens, Pavlov and Kornilov, were put on trial together with two suspicious Turks and sentenced by a Turkish court despite their innocence, to 16½ years’ imprisonment. Both Turkish justice, and the Turkish press displayed their neutrality, in which they aimed to please the Hitlerite government, by turning the Ankara trial into a tribunal for rabid anti-Soviet propaganda.

But the fact that certain circles of Turkey, in their desire to please Hitlerite Germany, tried to do so in a way that most suited their ends is not an all-important one. What is more important is the fact that this case has reflected the general trend of Turkish foreign policy, which guided the country along channels clearly favourable and sympathetic to Hitlerite Germany.

Turkish Neutrality Benefits Germany

From the very outset the Turkish policy of neutrality has benefited Germany. Even during the period when the German troops were scoring victories on the European continent, and when Germany did not particularly stand in need of Turkey’s favour from the point of view of her principal strategic interests, Turkish neutrality, nevertheless, was valuable for Germany, mainly because it protected her Balkan flank and to a certain extent released her from the need for scattering her forces.

It cannot be disputed, however, that at the time Turkish neutrality played a positive role as far as the Allies are concerned, and could be regarded by them as corresponding to
their interests at that stage of the war, inasmuch as Turkey's neutrality then barred the road to the Hitlerite troops leading to Egypt and Iran. But, as the tide of war in the East began to turn against Germany, particularly after Stalingrad and all the events connected with this Red Army victory, and also following the swift collapse of the German 1943 summer offensive and the successful offensive operations of the Red Army, which have sharply worsened Germany's military and political position, Turkish neutrality has acquired considerable value for Hitlerite Germany.

Turkish neutrality is becoming increasingly advantageous and necessary for Germany. Turkey has ensured the safety of the Balkan flank of the German armies and enables Germany to continue to hold a limited number of forces here, while concentrating the bulk of German troops on the Soviet-German front.

Germany clings to every possibility of postponing the moment of her final doom. This moment could be hastened if Turkey were to emerge from her neutrality, which favours Germany. The Soviet public, of course, realises that it is the affair of Turkey herself to define the line of her foreign policy, but the Soviet public is closely following the present Turkish foreign policy, and examining the facts in order to define its attitude to this policy.

THE FRENCH PROBLEM AWAITS SOLUTION

By N. Nikolayev

(War and the Working Class, No. 6, August 15, 1943.)

Unification of all forces of the French people for the struggle for liberating France from the German Fascist invaders is of no mean importance for the course of the war against Hitler Germany. A successful solution of this problem is in the interests of the Allied countries fighting Hitlerite tyranny. Hence, the formation of the French Committee of National Liberation as a centre for wider unity of the anti-Hitlerite French forces cannot be estimated otherwise than as a positive event. Considerable difficulties, however, stand in the way of the transformation of the French Committee into an organ leading the struggle of the French people for the liberation of France.

A whole group of problems connected with the French National Committee are still awaiting solution, in particular the question of official recognition of the Committee by the Allied Governments. Originally the question of recognition was left open, since as yet no agreement on some important questions had been reached within the Committee itself, between Generals Giraud and de Gaulle. As is known, such differences existed between the two generals in regard to the reorganisation of the French Army and its leadership. Nevertheless, even after the disputed questions within the Committee were settled the question of recognition remained unsolved.

Hitherto only the governments of several small and medium countries have announced official recognition of the Committee. The Soviet Union's attitude in this important question is known. It is known that some time ago the Soviet Union recognised the Committee of Fighting France and maintained friendly relations with it. All the more grounds for a positive attitude towards the French Committee exist today when unification involves broader French circles ready to fight against Hitler.

It is understandable, therefore, that as soon as the French Committee of National Liberation was formed in North Africa, the Soviet Union made an attempt to send a representative there to establish personal contact and receive direct information from de Gaulle and Giraud. Nevertheless, almost two months went by and the Soviet Union did not succeed in realising this intention as it encountered objections on the part of the Anglo-American authorities, who based their objection on military circumstances. The abnormality of this situation has been repeatedly pointed out in the British and American press.

Whereas from the very beginning of the formation of de Gaulle's Committee, Great Britain recognised and supported it, the U.S.A. never recognised it. Neither did the U.S.A. recognise the Committee of Fighting France which was the foundation for the French Committee of National Liberation in Africa which united de Gaulle and Giraud. This alone shows that the question of recognition of the French Committee is viewed differently in the U.S.A. and in Great Britain. As distinct from Britain, the question of recognition is a new question for the U.S.A.
During the first stage of discussion on this question, the American press devoted much space to personal attacks against de Gaulle. Accusations of "dictatorship" and "Fascist tendencies" advanced in the American press against de Gaulle did not prevent other American newspapers and some American broadcasting stations from spreading all sorts of contrary inventions about de Gaulle, accusing him of secret contact with the Bolsheviks and of receiving money from the Soviet Government. This provocative work of anti-Soviet blackmailers was completely disproved and exposed by the French Committee of National Liberation itself, as well as by an official Soviet communique issued by the Tass Agency.

It is not difficult to understand that all these smoke-screens and fantastic charges against de Gaulle were not in the least intended to clear up the situation and explain the motives of the actual relations to the French Committee. One thing is clear, that until recently there were not a few opponents of recognition of the Committee in certain American circles.

On the other hand, it was quite natural that arguments of the above-mentioned kind against recognising the French Committee could not long be upheld. These arguments could obtain a certain currency, counterposing de Gaulle to Giraud and playing on the earlier differences between them. But after de Gaulle and Giraud had reached agreement, personal attacks on de Gaulle could no longer be made a basis for refusing to recognise the Committee.

The well-known American publicist Walter Lippman wrote in one article that the U.S.A. ought to renounce the "mystical and mysterious doctrine that no one is authorised to represent France until France is free, i.e., until the end of the war, when all outstanding questions will be decided by a general election in France itself."

Thus, many voices have already been raised in the American press expressing serious doubts of the arguments put forward against recognition of the French Committee.

Finally, it is not possible to omit mention of sharp criticism of de Gaulle expressed in the New York Times, which stated that Washington circles point out that de Gaulle spoke of the "traitor" Vichy Government at a time when the U.S.A. recognised this government and maintained relations with it. Consequently, in Washington's opinion, de Gaulle clearly did harm to American policy and this "could not be easily forgiven."

It is possible that these remarks of the New York Times express better than others the real motives of U.S.A. dissatisfaction with de Gaulle, since the existing differences in the policy of the U.S.A. and that of de Gaulle in relation to the Vichy Government are known, and quite obvious. It is sufficient to recall de Gaulle's attitude to Darlan and the importance American circles attached to the well-known experiment of using Darlan.

Consequently, to understand better U.S.A. policy on the "French Question" it is necessary to bear in mind at least the following three things:—

Firstly, the fact that the break in diplomatic relations between the U.S.A. and Vichy did not prevent Washington from carrying out its experiment on the use of Darlan; secondly, that the recent visit of Giraud to the U.S.A. on a personal invitation from Washington took place at a time when the French Committee of National Liberation was already formed; thirdly, that the press went rather far in criticizing de Gaulle, although one cannot say that this criticism continues today on the former scale.

The situation is different as regards Britain. The British press does not publish articles against recognition of the French Committee. As regards the official British position, this was recently outlined by Eden in the House of Commons.

From what has been said it is seen that much attention is being paid to the "French Question" in U.S.A. and Britain and various attempts are being made to bring closer the positions in both countries on this subject. For the position of the U.S.A., what is, perhaps, especially characteristic is its reluctance to have its hands tied by any final commitments with regard to the "French Question." On the other hand, it is clear this question also reveals the tremendous interest of the U.S.A. in the present and post-war affairs of Europe. The "French Question" affords a new example of changes that have taken place in American foreign policy as compared with the period of the first world war.

It is not difficult to see that British policy on this question is based now on a desire to reach a certain agreement with the policy of the U.S.A., whereas but recently this desire was not as strongly revealed. The "French Question" is not yet solved, but it must be solved in the interests of anti-
BULGARIA'S RULERS AND PATRIOTS

By A. Shatzlov

(War and the Working Class, March 1944.)

Sacrificing the most vital interests and sometimes even the life of the people, the Bulgarian Government has made Bulgaria a base for the Hitlerite armies fighting against the Soviet Union. On March 1st, 1944, new age groups were called up in the Bulgarian Army. The newly-formed units are being dispatched to Yugoslavia and Greece, thereby releasing German Divisions stationed there for the Soviet-German Front.

This is an actual picture of Bulgaria's notorious "neutrality" in the Soviet-German war, despite the fact that Bulgarian politicians are hypocritically asserting their "loyalty" to the Soviet Union. Her rulers are responsible for the international isolation of Bulgaria.

The bombing of Sofia has stirred the whole country. The widest circles have realised that unless an end is immediately put to the shameful pro-German policy, Bulgaria will inevitably be transformed into a theatre of military operations, with consequent losses of tens of thousands of Bulgarian lives, the destruction of cultural treasures, greater dependence on Hitler Germany and, as a logical consequence of all this, future disaster and fatal results, which are even hard to foretell.

The Bulgarian patriots are united around the Patriotic Front, which sees the country's salvation in the resolute and speedy elimination of the present pro-German course of Bulgarian policy and the creation of a strong and independent, democratic Bulgaria. More and more supporters are rallying behind this programme of rupture with the bitterest enemy of the Slav peoples—the German imperialism, and of strengthening collaboration with her neighbours and with the great democratic powers. Fighting for it are several thousand guerrillas, whose strength is steadily growing.

The rupture of the fatal alliance with Hitler Germany and the immediate withdrawal of Bulgaria from the war are insisted on by important Bulgarian political leaders, by members of parliament, who represent the opposition, and even by individual representatives of the ruling circles.

Thus, struggling for Bulgaria's independence of Hitlerite Germany, for her withdrawal from the war, and for the establishment of friendly relations with the peoples of the Balkans and the Soviet Union, are now the most varied and widest sections of the population of Bulgaria, from the guerrillas in the central highland area, the soldiers, peasants and workers, to the old and important political leaders and even a certain section of Government deputies.

What way then is chosen by Bulgarian ruling circles, the Regents and members of the Government, direct Hitlerite agents, Tsankovites and others? The Filofs and the Christoffs do not want to break with Hitler, as it is to Hitler and the Hitlerites that they look for salvation from their own people and from its justice. Realising that they will not succeed in carrying through a policy so contradictory to the interests and aspirations of the people in a normal way, the ruling clique has resorted to the usual Hitlerite methods of propaganda and terror. At the same time, in an effort to create some kind of mass base for themselves, the Bulgarian authorities are trying to knock together into a single organisation all the pro-fascist elements in the country and to build up a front of fascist forces against the patriotic front.

At the beginning of February, a State Gendarmerie was set up under the Home Minister in order to suppress uprisings and demonstrations and for the struggle with the guerrilla movement. The Gendarmerie formations consist of infantry, cavalry and motorised units. The German Information Bureau reports that the task of the Gendarmerie is to "infiltrate all the organised resistance movement in Bulgaria, in the struggle against hostile rumours."

One can imagine the state of mind in the country if motorised units are mobilised for the "struggle against rumours!"

The next achievement of Bulgaria's ruling circles is the opening of a great number of concentration camps. In Sofia and other big cities a curfew is enforced from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. In the night the police are conducting mass round-ups in search of "suspicious elements." More than a thousand arrests were made during a round-up in Varna. Despite this orgy of terror, the anti-German and anti-Governmental demonstrations in the country are far from suppressed; on the con-
trary, they are growing.

The Soviet armistice terms conveyed to Finland, in accordance with her request, made a tremendous impression in Bulgaria. Despite the fact that the Bulgarian newspapers did not dare to publish these terms, they became widely known in the country. Sober political circles in Bulgaria realize very well that the significance of the Soviet terms to Finland transcends the boundaries of Soviet-Finnish relations. It can be said without exaggeration that immediate negotiations for withdrawal from the war are demanded by all sections of the population of Bulgaria.

The ruling circles, however, are still in a state of confusion and they continue to lead the country to its doom. Every extra day of Bulgaria’s participation in the war on the side of Hitlerite Germany increases the suffering of the Bulgarian people and worsens its position not only for today, but also for post-war Europe. The full responsibility for this rests with the present rulers of Bulgaria.

V. TRADE UNION QUESTIONS

THE BRITISH TRADES UNION CONGRESS

(War and the Working Class, Sept. 19th, 1943)

The 75th Congress of the British Trade Unions recently concluded at Southport undoubtedly marks a step forward in the development of the British trade union movement.

There were theoreticians—poor ones—who at one time tried to prove that the organism of the British trade unions is so out of date that it no longer lends itself to any rejuvenation. They saw nothing in these trade unions except ossified links. The incorrectness of such a narrow sectarian viewpoint was more than ever before exposed by the 75th Congress of the British trade unions.

The Progress of the British Trade Union Movement

How does the present progress of the British trade union movement express itself? Firstly in the fact that during the past year trade union membership has increased by 591,000. The membership of trade unions affiliated to the T.U.C. now exceeds six million. True, it has not yet reached the figure of 1921, and compared with the total number of workers in Britain (22 million) it is still not very high. But the constant growth of British trade union membership during the past decade is a positive factor.

Secondly, progress is expressed in the fact that a number of the biggest trade unions in Britain have now taken a considerably more progressive position than in the past as regards both trade union issues and certain issues of general policy.

Among these unions are, in the first place, the Amalgamated Engineering Union, the Miners’ Federation of Great Britain and the National Union of Railwaymen. The first of them, the Amalgamated Engineering Union, has been growing at an especially rapid pace: its membership has grown from 335,000 in 1938 to more than 800,000 at the present time, and it is now the second biggest trade union (after the Transport Workers).
Thirdly, during the war, solidarity with the Soviet Union has developed and strengthened among the broad membership of the British trade unions more than ever before, along with hatred of the Fascist invaders.

Fourthly, as compared with last year's Congress there was a definite progress evident at this year's Congress not only in the speeches of many delegates, but also in a number of decisions: if not on the most important political question of the Second Front, then at any rate as regards purely trade union problems. Some resolutions with a progressive trend which were repeatedly rejected by a majority at trade union congresses of the last few years have now been adopted, either unanimously or by a majority vote against delegates of the Right, for example, the resolutions adopted on the necessity to revise the obsolete structure of British trade unions, on readmission of the Chemical Workers' Union into the T.U.C., etc.

Labour Enthusiasm

Fifthly, the Congress also reflected the now manifest enthusiasm among the British workers and the steady progress of trade unions in the struggle for increased production for the successful conduct of the war against the Fascist invaders. For the first time in history, examples of labour enthusiasm are to be observed in the ranks of the British working class. Whereas in the past the manufacturers had to urge on the workers to increase production, today at war enterprises it frequently happens that workers bring pressure to bear upon certain manufacturers who, with a view to raising prices and increasing profits, hamper the expansion of production. Clearly this is a significant phenomenon connected with the fact that the present war, which the Soviet Union is conducting against Hitlerite tyranny jointly with Britain and other freedom-loving countries, is a just war, a war for liberation.

A similar phenomena, of course, did not exist and could not have existed during the first world war. And even during the first stage of the present world war, 1939-40, until the character of this war was fully determined, broad masses of British workers adhered to a more or less critical, waiting position with regard to the war and defended in industry merely their direct interests.

But after Hitler had extended his predatory aggression also to the U.S.S.R. and the Anglo-Soviet military alliance came into being, the British workers began to render active support to Britain's war effort, placing above all the interests of the war against Fascist Germany and her associates.

Trade Union Role in Increasing Production

During the first six months of 1942, according to Attlee, every British worker increased labour productivity by an average of one-third. Clearly the British trade unions are playing a leading role in the increase of war production. The high organisational ability of British trade union functionaries made itself felt here. A network of factory organisations, local branches and district trade union committees extended activities. Trade union members and workers' representatives elected at factory meetings participate in numerous Joint Production Committees, where, along with representatives of the management, they actively promote the increase of war production. On the basis of their own experience, many delegates to the Southport Congress sharply criticised managements for such selfish acts as unilateral reduction in piecework rates, arbitrary dismissals of workers, violation of bargaining agreements and the ignoring of trade unions. It was pointed out that manufacturers frequently hinder the work of Joint Production Committees directed towards the expansion of war production. But, by an overwhelming majority vote against a group of Right Wing elements, the Congress adopted strong resolutions demanding of the General Council more decisive steps to secure the rights of the workers and trade unions.

Thus with regard to a number of problems, the work of the Southport Congress has shown that participation of the British working class in the war effort is directed towards the destruction of German Fascism, and has had a certain rejuvenating effect on the old trade union movement in Britain. But at the same time the work of the Congress reflected the political weakness and inexperience of the progressive elements in the British trade unions. This was reflected primarily in relation to the most important political question to be discussed by the Congress—the question of creating a second front on the European Continent this year.

The Question of the Second Front

This demand undoubtedly meets with strong support in the ranks of trade union organisations in Britain. This is expressed with sufficient clarity in numerous resolutions not
only from lower organisations, but also from the intermediate bodies of the British trade union movement. It is also a known fact that, even before the Congress met, a number of large trade unions as a whole expressed themselves in favour of the need for opening a second front this year. At the Congress itself, this question was clearly raised in an amendment to the report of the General Council, introduced by the Fire Brigades Union.

In his speech at the T.U.C., Shvernik, Chairman of the Soviet Delegation, cited weighty arguments showing that unless a second front on the European continent is created in 1943, it will mean the prolongation of the war and new and tremendous sacrifices. Nevertheless, at the T.U.C., opponents of the Second Front succeeded in manoeuvring so as to achieve—even without any vote—the adoption of the evasive resolution of the General Council, which in essence means the rejection of the demand for the creation of a second front this year.

Sir Walter Citrine's Arguments

How did they achieve this? Were they able to produce new weighty arguments? No, the arguments of Sir Walter Citrine, who spoke on behalf of the General Council, were entirely weak and clearly outmoded. His first argument was that the delegates were allegedly "incompetent" to judge whether it is possible to create a second front in 1943, although unquestionably competent representatives of the British and American Governments as is known, approved the Anglo-Soviet and Soviet-American communiques in full agreement with regard to the urgent tasks of the creation of a second front in Europe in 1942, and already at that time binding statements were made to the effect that Great Britain and the U.S.A. would organise a second front in 1943 at any rate. Surely no one can deny this?

Citrine's second argument was the assertion that the creation of a second front this year "may prove not only an error but also a disaster." This assertion, we well remember, was used at last year's Congress of the British trade unions as the main argument by opponents of the second front, speaking on whose behalf Gibson, reporting for the General Council, exclaimed, addressing the delegates: "If you want soldiers to get on with the job without ammunition and supplies, then you are damned fools!" At that time this intimidation had an effect on part of the delegates, but hardly anyone will believe today that the British and American armies have no armaments or ammunition.

It is surely absurd to refer to such arguments today. Moreover, it is a matter of common knowledge that as a result of the brilliant success of the Red Army on the Soviet-German front, and also the remarkable successes of British and American troops in Africa, Sicily and lastly in Italy, such an essential change has been achieved in the correlation of the forces of the belligerents, that the ground for raising a scare about the "hazards" of opening a second front has completely vanished.

Citrine's third argument was very poor: the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Agreement, said he, provides for the support of one's own Government, but if the Second Front is not created in 1943, the acceptance of such a demand would acquire the character of a censure on the British Government. Here, however, Sir Walter Citrine forgot that the Anglo-Soviet agreement mentioned by him provides for the support of the Governments "in their common effort for the defeat of Hitlerite Germany"—hence in conducting this war and in prolonging it.

Is it not clear that precisely the prolongation of the war is not in the interests of Anglo-Soviet agreement? Apparently Citrine himself was aware of the weakness of his arguments. Only this can explain why to strengthen his position he permitted himself to resort to the entirely doubtful method of declaring: Britain has one enemy more than the Soviet Union. She is fighting Japan also. Suppose we had come and said: "We believe that the war can be shortened by you giving us and the Americans territory from which we can attack Japan." Would they have been prepared to conduct a public agitation to force their Government into such a course?

Thus it is to be regretted that Sir Walter Citrine resorted to arguments of the reactionary Hearst Press, which loves to use other people's hands to pull chestnuts out of the fire and which would not be averse to provoking a war between the U.S.S.R. and Japan contrary to the Soviet-Japanese Non-aggression Pact, although it is known to the whole world that the U.S.S.R. has always honestly fulfilled its obligations.

We understand, of course, that in his speech Citrine had no intention of discrediting the position of the Government
leaders of Britain and the U.S.A. but, on the contrary, intended to render them a service. But he did render them a disservice. Sufficient to recall, for example, Churchill's statement at a press conference in Washington last May. Replying to a question of one of the correspondents with regard to the possibility of a Soviet-Japanese conflict, Churchill remarked that he certainly had not felt that he could ask the British Government to request any more of the Soviet Union considering its achievements in the struggle against a German attack of such colossal strength. On the other hand, it is universally known that the question of a second front in Europe is not a new question for Britain and the U.S.A., which undertook a definite obligation on this question as far back as 1942.

The Question of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee

The General Secretary's viewpoint also won the upper hand in regard to another political question at the Southport Congress—also to the detriment of the matter of speeding up victory over Hitlerism. This was the question of extending the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee. It is known that at the Committee's Third Session in Moscow last July the Soviet delegation introduced the following proposal: The Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee must intensify its activity, especially with regard to unifying the working class of the anti-Hitler coalition for the defeat of the Hailo-German armies. It had in mind primarily the drawing into the Committee of the trade unions of North and South America, as well as of such countries as Yugoslavia, Poland, France, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Greece. Due to the objection of the British delegations, this question at that time remained unsettled and was placed on discussion before the Trades Union Congress. Sir Walter Citrine, who, at the Session of the Anglo-Soviet Committee in Moscow, raised merely formal objections against the Soviet delegation's proposals now, at the Congress revealed that it was not at all a matter of formalities but that, plainly speaking, he was on principle opposed to any expansion of the Anglo-Soviet Committee. According to him, he would have deeply regretted it if the Anglo-Soviet Committee was transformed into a broad, heterogeneous organisation. Why? Because he was afraid that this broadening of the Committee might produce a "new international."

With the aid of this artificial bogey, Citrine succeeded in burying the proposal for broadening the Anglo-Soviet Committee. True, he declared that he personally would have no fear even of such a terrible spectre as such an "International." Nevertheless, he induced Congress to beware of every step in this direction. And Congress adopted an outwardly attractive decision, but one which carried no obligations with it, actually calling upon the General Council to "give attention to the possibility of convoking a world conference of representatives of the organised workers of all countries as soon as war conditions permit." Clearly such a conference of representatives of organised workers "of all countries" cannot be organised earlier than some time after the war and therefore can in no way facilitate the mobilisation of forces for the defeat of Hitler Germany.

The proposal of the Soviet delegation had in view precisely the unity of the working class of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition in war time for the struggle to hasten the defeat of the common enemy. Hence the difference is indeed great. Instead of a business-like, practically important decision, Citrine carried through a declamatory, but in the present situation entirely useless, resolution on a future world conference.

Does not the adoption of these two political decisions by the Congress of British Trade Unions testify to the political weakness of the Southport Congress? Despite this, we representatives of the Soviet trade union movement are firmly confident of the further development and political progress of the British trade union movement. Such a mass organisation of the working class as that constituted by the British trade unions has unlimited possibilities for drawing ever new vigour from the midst of the most vital and energetic class in modern society.

Soviet Trade Unions Desire Brotherly Collaboration

At the same time we representatives of the Soviet trade unions re-emphasise our sincere and unwavering desire to strengthen the bonds of friendship and fighting collaboration with the British trade unions for achieving the speediest destruction of German Fascism and the liberation of the peoples enslaved by it. We remember well the statement of the Chairman of the Southport Congress, Annie Laughton, who said:
“It would be a base betrayal beyond human forgiveness if we ever forgot the sacrificial service of the Russian people or permitted the bonds of friendship forged and tempered in the agonies of war, to be weakened or broken again.”

We hail these words of Annie Laughlin as representative of the trade unions of Great Britain and express our complete solidarity with them and at the same time express our confidence that in the future the trade unions of Great Britain and the U.S.R. will go forward in growing friendship and ever more solid ranks in the struggle for the basic interests of the working class and all working people, both for the achievement of victory and for the solution of post-war problems.

THE WAR AND THE TRADE UNIONS

(From War and the Working Class, No. 4, July 15th, 1943.)

The working class and its mass organisations play an extremely important and responsible role in the struggle of the democratic countries against predatory Hitler imperialism. The working class contributes the whole of its organisation and singleness of purpose to the liberation struggle of the peoples of their countries against fascist Germany and its accomplices. The workers constitute a unifying basis for the formation of a powerful national front in every country without which the mobilisation of all national forces for victory over the hated enemy is unthinkable. An honourable role is played here by the trade unions, the most popular mass organisations of the working class.

The tasks of workers’ organisations in this war differ radically from the tasks confronting them during the first world war in 1914-1918. The latter was an imperialist war between states which aimed at re-dividing the already divided world, seizing new colonies, plundering and enslaving other peoples. Then, wide circles of the working class and progressive intelligentsia of both groups of belligerent countries were strongly conscious that the war was an unjust one and that it ought not to be continued in order “to divide among the powerful and rich nations the weak peoples seized by them” (Lenin). It is this that explains the position in relation to the war adopted at that time by the different social groups, classes and parties.

Difference from the First World War

During the first world war the task of the workers’ organisations consisted in preventing the “class peace” for which the ruling classes were then contendning. Political and trade union organisations, leaders of workers’ organisations which occupied a different position and called for “class peace” and demanded the continuation of that war for the sake of the alleged “defence of the fatherland,” took the road of obliviousness and direct treachery towards the interests of their class. Despite these groups and leaders, the advanced working-class movement strove towards launching a struggle for the front political and economic interests of the working class. In Russia, the Soviet state of workers and peasants was born in the fire of war and the struggle of the working class and opened a new page in international development.

The radical difference between the present war and the first world war is absolutely obvious. Lenin and Stalin distinguish two types of war. In his report on November 6th, 1941, Stalin said: “Lenin distinguished between two kinds of war—predatory, i.e., unjust wars, and wars of liberation, i.e., just wars. The Germans are now waging a predatory war, an unjust war, for the purpose of seizing foreign territory and subjugating foreign peoples. That is why all honest people must rise against the German invaders as their enemies.

“In contradistinction to Hitlerite Germany, the Soviet Union and its allies are waging a war of liberation, a just war, for the purpose of liberating the enslaved peoples of Europe and the U.S.R. from Hitler’s tyranny. That is why all honest people must support the armies of the U.S.R., Great Britain and the other allies, as armies of liberation.”

In the present war—“a war of liberation, a just war”—it is a question of the need to defeat the common enemy of the democratic countries, many of which have already themselves experienced all the horrors of Hitlerite slavery. Every honest person, every honest son of his native land, every genuine patriot of his country capable of valuing the blessings of democracy—the freedom and independence of his state, his personal freedom and rights won in long struggle, is interested in the defeat of Fascism. Consciousness of this danger united all the democratic elements of the states fighting against Hitlerite Germany. This was not the case, nor could have been, in the first world war.
A Bloc of Democratic States

But this does not exhaust the character and peculiarities of the present war in which the democratic countries have united for the sake of a just and liberating cause. The present war for the first time in history has created a bloc of democratic countries in which the Soviet state has a prominent place. Long before this war the Soviet Union had become an important factor in international life. From the outset of the establishment of fascist dictatorship in Germany, the U.S.S.R. has unswervingly unmasked the real essence of predatory Hitlerite imperialism and called on the democratic states to render collective resistance to the menace of fascist aggression. In its turn, fascist Germany regarded the Soviet Union as the greatest menace to itself. The German fascists deprived a number of European states of their independence and, aiming at the subjugation of Britain and the U.S.A., decided as a preliminary to finish off the U.S.S.R. On June 22nd, 1941, the Hitlerite hordes invaded the territory of the Soviet Union. This day marked a turning-point in the second world war. The fascist danger which threatened the freedom-loving peoples was revealed in the sharpest form. The victory of Hitlerite Germany over the Soviet Union would have signified the triumph of German Fascism over the whole of Europe, the end of the freedom and independence of the European countries, the conquest of a place d'armes for the world domination of Hitlerite tyranny. The freedom-loving peoples were confronted by radical questions concerning their very existence; it became clear that in order to save their own national existence, their own state independence, in order not to be thrown back to the dark ages of the most cruel slavery, in order to preserve and defend the level of progress achieved by mankind, Hitlerite tyranny must be destroyed. All freedom-loving peoples are vitally interested in the achievement of this aim. This aim is their common, sacred cause. For the sake of this aim a struggle is being waged now by all the peoples enslaved by the German imperialists or threatened with enslavement. In the first ranks of the fighters against Hitlerite tyranny stands the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition—the coalition of the peoples of the democratic United States of America and Great Britain and the socialist Soviet Union. This coalition, despite differences in ideology as well as in the social and political structure of the states belonging to it, born in the war against

German fascist barbarism, inspired hundreds of millions of people for struggle. This coalition, whose programme is clear, whose aims and tasks are clear to all freedom-loving peoples, brings death to Fascism, brings freedom and independence to the democratic countries united in a common determination for struggle and victory over the hated enemy.

It is clear that the tasks of the working class and its organisations in the present war are totally different from what they were in the first world war.

Interests Common to the Whole Nation

The chief alignment of forces in the countries of the anti-Hitlerite coalition at the present time is not along the line of social and class contradictions. These contradictions are neither removed nor abolished in the countries of Western Europe and America. They continue to exist in these countries, to manifest themselves in a variety of forms and to make themselves felt in the most varied ways. But, despite this, the freedom-loving countries constitute one camp in which, in these decisive times, all other interests, however great and important they may be for certain strata of society, must be subordinated to the interests common to the whole nation, of the struggle against Hitlerite Germany and its accomplices. The common national interests of the struggle of the freedom-loving countries for their freedom and independence must determine the basic political line of action of the different classes and parties in this war in the interests of unity and the maximum harnessing of the national effort for the sake of victory over the hated enemy, in the organisation and achievement of which the working class is obliged to render and does render full support. Only allies and semi-allies of Hitler, Fifth Column agents, can today oppose such a political line.

Soviet Trade Unions

The trade unions of the U.S.S.R. have taken a most active part both in building the military might of their country and in organizing the Red Army's defence and struggle against the accursed fascist enemy. All through they have headed the popular movement in the Soviet rear to supply the front with everything necessary for victory over Hitlerite Germany. Under exceedingly difficult conditions, Soviet workers are suc-
cessfully coping with the task of supplying the front with tanks, planes and other armaments. Thanks to the self-sacrifice of millions of Soviet workers producing arms, the Red Army has now been able to meet the new offensive of the Hitlerite armoured hordes with unparalleled steadfastness and to deliver another heavy blow to enemy manpower and material. Millions of Soviet trade unionists at the front, and in the factories, workshops and fields in the rear, are waging a sacred war for their motherland and for the cause of the freedom-loving peoples.

Trade Unions of the Allied Nations

In the other countries of the anti-Hitlerite coalition, too, a wave of creative enthusiasm is to be observed among the masses of the people. The example set by the U.S.S.R. has played its part also, in the efforts of the British workers to increase the output of arms. In the last two years, war production in England has increased several-fold. Workers in war factories and first and foremost the army of trade unionists, over six million strong, are contributing all their efforts for the production of the war materiel necessary to equip the anti-Hitlerite armies. In the United States of America the past two years have been marked by increased activity among workers in production. A direct result of this activity of the workers is the hitherto unparalleled increase in the war industry of the U.S.A.

Trade union bodies in the Allied countries have done much to mobilise the masses of the working class for the fulfilment of their war tasks, primarily in regard to increasing war production but also in satisfying the daily requirements of the population. But what has been done is still inadequate. The trade unions in Britain and the U.S.A., which are the largest mass organisations of the working class, unites, however, only the minority of the workers engaged in industry: in England—6½ million out of a total working class of 22 million; in the U.S.A.—11 million out of 33 million workers. The trade union movement in the U.S.A. is still split into a number of organisations as yet not always able to combine their efforts in the common interests of the working class. Attempts to organise co-operation between the trade unions of the Soviet Union and of the U.S.A., following the example of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee, encounter resistance from some of the reactionary leaders of the American trade union movement.

International Trade Union Unity

Today the workers of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the U.S.A. consider their principal political task to be the defeat of the Fascist aggressor. Nothing short of the defeat and unconditional surrender of Hitlerite Germany and its associates can satisfy this desire of the peoples of the Allied countries.

For the sake of realising this task, workers' organisations of the Soviet Union and Great Britain found it necessary to combine their efforts in the struggle against the common enemy and, together with the workers' organisations of the United States and other countries, must achieve further unity of their forces in the common interests of the working people. There are all the more grounds for this since the world war imposed by Fascism, with its hardship, privation and suffering for the peoples, demands most urgently that our victory over the Fascist camp should lead to a stable and enduring peace, a peace which will secure freedom and progress for the peoples.

Post-War Fruits of Unity

It must not be forgotten that in the course of the war, when the need for mutual understanding and unity of the forces of the people is particularly felt, the important conditions for post-war relations between the peoples are already being created. Already in many cases the workers of the democratic countries have become convinced of their great interest in working to the utmost for the complete union of their forces in the interests of the speediest defeat of the common enemy and the creation of favourable conditions for broad and friendly collaboration among the freedom-loving peoples after victory is won.

The trade unions have accumulated considerable political experience during the present war. This experience must yield its fruits in the period when the questions of organising peace and post-war construction confront them in all their magnitude.
THE WORLD TRADE UNION CONGRESS

BY A. DANILOV

(President of the Central Committee of the Trade Union of the workers of High Schools and Scientific Institutes of the U.S.S.R.)

(War and the Working Class, March, 1944)

Trade Unions are the most democratic mass organisations of the working class, called upon to defend its economic and political interests. In the conditions of the war against Fascist Germany, the deadliest enemy of the working class, of its rights and freedom and its political, cultural and mass organisations, the most vital task before the trade unions of the democratic countries is the mobilisation of all-out efforts of the working-class for the fight against the German invaders, along with their day-to-day work of securing legal rights for the workers, at the factories, regarding their living conditions and their social and political life.

The role of the trade unions in the fight against German Fascism is exceptionally important. The great work in connection with rendering help to the front which is being carried on by the trade unions of the Soviet Union, the country which up to now has been shouldering the chief burden of the fight with the Hitlerite hordes, is widely known.

The Trade Unions of the Allied countries have contributed no less to raising war production. The underground trade union organisations in the countries of Europe occupied by Hitler, have been carrying on a fight against the Hitlerite invaders by organising strikes, sabotage, diversion in the factories etc.

Further mobilisation of the efforts of the working class for the earliest and final destruction of German fascism as well as the fundamental interests of the working class urgently demand that the collaboration and unity of action on the part of the Trade Unions of the countries in the anti-Hitlerite coalition. This striving for the unity of the trade unions of the democratic countries is shared by the millions and tens of millions of the workers; it finds support among all the leading organisations and active workers of the trade-union movement.

The trade unions of the U.S.S.R. have been consistently striving for the international unity of the workers and the trade union movement in the fight against Hitlerite Germany and in the work of defending the fundamental interests of the working class. Precisely with a view to widening the international collaboration of the trade unions, the All Union Central Council of Trade Unions had already in the summer of 1943 put forward at the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee the well-known proposal for widening the composition of the committee by including in it the trade unions of North and South America and the German occupied countries of Europe. However, the British delegation did not agree to these proposals. The Southport Congress of the British Trade Unions agreed with the opinion of the British Delegation. The decision of the Southport Congress which entrusted the General Council "to deal with the question of the possibility of calling the world conference of the organised workers of all countries" in actual fact meant the refusal to call the International Trade Union Conference during the period of war.

After the Southport Congress, the question of calling the World Conference was raised in another form. The General Council of the British Trade Unions put forward the proposal to call a world conference of Trade Unions only of the democratic countries and fixed 1944 as the time for its meeting. The convening of such a Conference undoubtedly can help the work of further mobilisation of the efforts of the trade unions for hastening the victory of the United Nations over the German invaders; and also for laying the foundation for the collaboration of the trade unions in the post-war period.

The General Council of the British Trade Unions has already sent out invitations to the Conference to Trade Unions of 37 countries including the neutral ones. The representatives of 70 trade union organisations have been invited. So far as the question of conducting the war, which will be put forward at the Conference, is concerned, it is understood that the representatives of the trade unions of the neutral countries will participate only in the discussions regarding post-war reconstruction. According to the plan of the General Council, the decisions of the Conference are not binding on the organisations participating in the Conference, so long as these decisions have not been ratified by the participating organisations themselves.

On the preliminary agenda drawn up by the General Council the following questions have been included:—

(1) Co-operation with the Allied war effort;
(2) Position of the trade unions in relation to the future peace negotiations;
(3) Representation of the Trade Unions at the Peace Conference and at the preparatory commission or conferences to discuss the question of help to and restoration of the capacity for work of disabled workers and to discuss post-war reconstruction;
(4) Problems of post-war reconstruction including the reconstruction of the International Trade Union movement.

The final agenda will be fixed by the Conference itself on the basis of the proposal of the Special Commission appointed by the Conference. Each organisation participating in the Conference has the right to put forward its proposals for the agenda of the Conference.

At the present stage of the war, when the victorious offensive of the Red Army has created pre-requisites for early destruction of Hitlerite Germany, the calling of the World Trade Union Conference is of particularly important significance. The toiling masses of the freedom-loving countries are interested in the earliest possible termination of the war, in the earliest possible attainment of victory over the hateful enemy. The quickest destruction of Fascism with the help of all forces is the most urgent and noble task before the World Trade Union Movement.

The forthcoming Conference is extremely important in another way also. One must not forget that already in the period of the war when the necessity for mutual understanding and uniting the forces of the nations is being increasingly realised with the utmost force, the pre-requisites of the post-war relationships of the nations are also being created. The workers of the freedom-loving countries are interested in the creation of favourable conditions for an extensive and friendly collaboration among all the nations after the victory over Hitlerite tyranny.

In the Soviet Union, the workers are going to meet the coming day with quiet confidence, because the right to labour and absence of unemployment are guaranteed by our social and economic order. Such is not the situation in other countries of the United Nations. There the absence of this confidence in the workers regarding the coming day has already placed on the order of the day a number of serious problems in connection with the forthcoming transition to peace-time economy after victory. The trade unions cannot even for a moment tear themselves away from their fundamental class tasks, i.e. defending the interest of the working class, its political and economic liberties and rights. To lay the foundation of the World Trade Union Movement with the aim of securing the defence of the basic interest of the working class will be the important task before the World Trade Union Conference.

The successful solution of the most important problems that will face the World Trade Union Conference can bring immense help in hastening the end of the war as well as the organisation of peace after the war.

Already, the first messages about the convening of the World Trade Union Conference have called forth numerous responses among the Trade Union workers and organisations of various countries. The foremost organisations and their leaders are supporting the initiative taken by the General Council of the British Trade Unions in proposing to call the Conference. A number of trade union organisations have expressed their willingness to participate in the Conference. The biggest Centre of American Trade Union Movement—the Congress of Industrial Organisations, the Confederation of the Trade Unions organisations of a number of allied countries, have also agreed. The news of the convening of the Conference called forth a great amount of interest in the neutral countries also.

It is characteristic that organisations and the active workers who have been occupying in the past a reactionary position in the Trade Union Movement, are also taking a hostile attitude to the calling of the World Trade Union Conference. For instance, the decision of the Executive Committee of the American Federation of Labour (A.F.L.) refusing to participate in the proposed Conference is already known. In justification of this more than strange decision, the Executive Committee of the A.F.L. could not advance anything except slanderous fabrications about the Soviet Trade Unions.

In connection with this decision, the not quite unknown Mr. Woll, Vice-President of the A.F.L. has started a malicious anti-Soviet campaign. The fight which Mr. Woll carried on for a number of years against the unity of the Trade Union movement in the U.S.A. as also against the Soviet Trade Unions and the unity of the World Trade Union movement is sufficient to characterise him as a lackey of fascism. Woll and his
supporters have once more shown themselves to be the violent enemies of the Soviet Union. Blinded by their anti-Soviet prejudices, these leaders of the A.F.L. could not reconcile themselves to the prospect of joint participation with the representatives of the heroic Soviet people at the World Trade Union Conference. But they cannot openly declare this to the rank and file workers, the mass membership of the Trade Unions, and the reactionary leaders of the A.F.L. affiliated to the A.F.L. The reactionary leaders of the A.F.L. therefore frightened their listeners with stories of "Communist Agents," "Sowing discord" and other inventions.

The workers of the U.S.A., including millions of members of the A.F.L. have been genuinely moved by the heroism of the great Soviet people, who are defending not only the independence and freedom of their country, but the freedom and independence of all the democratic nations of the world including the freedom of the U.S.A. Workers of the U.S.A. value very highly the heroic labour of the Soviet workers and the glorious military exploits of the Red Army. The decision of the Executive Committee of the All-Union Central Council of the Trade Unions to participate in the Conference was adopted from the very beginning. However, the objection that, it is too late to do so now because the General Council has already sent out invitations to the Trade Union centres of different countries, regarding the calling of the Conference, cannot be considered as really convincing.

In this connection, the question of the method of the preparation of the Conference acquires a special significance. In their reply to the invitation received on behalf of the General Council of the British Trades Union Congress to participate in the Conference, the All-Union Central Council of the Trade Unions had already at the end of January raised the point that participation for the Conference could be assured in the best possible manner by the joint work of the General Council of the British Trades Union Congress, All-Union Central Council of the Trade Unions and the C.I.O. of the U.S.A. In this manner, the convening of the Conference could be realised by the trade union organisations of the leading powers of the anti-Hitlerite coalition, who are making the greatest contribution to the realisation of those aims, for the sake of which it is being called; and who have got the most significant weight in the number of the representatives at the Conference. Such a preparation of the Conference, undoubtedly, fully corresponds with the democratic spirit, which is natural to the Trade Unions and is the guarantee to its success. Finally, such a method of calling the Conference would have helped in a large measure to bring the Trade Union organisations of Britain, U.S.A. and the Soviet Union closer, which is very necessary.

Unfortunately, the General Council of the British Trade Union Congress did not agree to this suggestion of the Soviet Trade Unions, pleading as though it was now too late to introduce the changes in the organisation of the preparation of the Conference. Of course, it would have been better if a more expedient method of calling the Conference had been adopted from the very beginning. However, the objection that, it is too late to do so now because the General Council has already sent out invitations to the Trade Union centres of different countries, regarding the calling of the Conference, cannot be considered as really convincing.

In order to guarantee the success of the Conference, even now it is not late if the above-mentioned trade union centres carried on jointly the preparatory work of the Conference. Considerations of a formal and secondary character cannot have a decisive significance for such an important question as this, particularly when the interests of all dictate that the direct participation of the Trade Unions of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. in preparing this Conference, is necessary.

Unity of action of the trade unions is vitally necessary for co-operation in bringing about the earliest possible destruction of German fascism and in securing the fundamental interests of the working classes of the democratic countries. The World Trade Union Conference that is being called must prove itself to be an important stage in the realisation of these tasks.
VI THE PACIFIC WAR

THE PACIFIC WAR AND JAPAN’S “NEW ORDER” IN ASIA

BY E. ZAKROV, Doctor of History

(War and the Working Class, June, 1943)

The war in the Pacific has now been in progress for 18 months. During this time important events have taken place which have profoundly changed the situation in South-Eastern Asia. Japanese forces have occupied a whole series of important areas. In their capture of the Philippines, Indo-China, the Malayan archipelago and Burma, the Japanese militarists have approached close to the frontiers of India. Japan’s naval, land and air forces have attempted to consolidate their position on the approaches of Australia.

Certain susceptible observers have begun to jump to hasty conclusions regarding the significance and, as it seems to them, steadily increasing strength of Japanese imperialism. Some have begun to measure the actual strength of Japan by the extent of the territories which have been temporarily occupied by her. Let us examine the real state of affairs and the general trend of military events in the Pacific Ocean.

During the first 6 months after the 7th December 1941, when Japanese imperialism carried out an unexpected attack on the United States of America and Great Britain, Japan had a number of victories in the Pacific ocean which were accompanied by great territorial acquisitions. Of what did these Japanese victories consist? Were they the result of military superiority of Japan over the United States and Britain? Was Japan actually stronger than her adversaries—America and Britain? It is only necessary to ask these questions for the absurdity of the suppositions regarding the special advantages in this respect of Japanese imperialism to be revealed.

Japan might win victories in the first phase of the Pacific war, but these victories were only secured by the temporary existence for Japan of favourable conditions and factors of an ephemeral kind.

126

127

The first of these factors was the suddenness of the Japanese blow. Japan had been making careful preparations for the attack on American and British bases. Japanese diplomacy, on its part, had deliberately deceived the United States and England assuring them of Japan’s peace-loving nature and protracting the conversations up to the moment when Japanese armed forces were already in a state of military preparedness and had been brought close to Anglo-American bases in order to deliver a surprise attack.

Long before the beginning of the Pacific war, the Japanese armed forces were ready to pounce on the Philippines, had approached close to the Malayan archipelago and were masters in French Indo-China and in Siam. It was natural that this gave the Japanese military command a colossal advantage over the Americans and British in the first months of the war, inasmuch as the Allies had not yet at their disposal any powerful forces in the South-Western part of the Pacific ocean.

Once they were in possession of a large number of first class bases which could serve as a springboard for naval and air operations, the Japanese High Command was able without much difficulty promptly to concentrate large naval and air forces on a relatively narrow front. At this time the American and British fleets were dispersed over a wide area.

In the beginning of the war in the Pacific ocean, the Japanese military circles placed their greatest confidence in the unpreparedness of the enemy, in the effect of surprise and in the disadvantageous geographical disposition of Anglo-American possessions in the Far East from the point of view of their great vulnerability from Japan. In actual fact it may be pointed out that the principal British base in South China, Hong Kong, had been surrounded by the Japanese long before the beginning of military operations. The Philippines were also duly compressed into a Japanese semicircle. The occupation of Indo-China by Japanese forces, the complicity of the venal Vichy administration, and the presence of Japanese in Siam prepared the ground for the outflanking and capture by land of the highly important British naval stronghold of Singapore. All this taken together ensured for Japan favourable conditions which led to the serious military disasters suffered by the United States and Britain in the course of the first 6 months of the war in the Pacific.

In 6 months, however, the tide turned in favour of the United States of America and Britain. The first warning for Japan
was delivered in the shape of the outcome of the great naval battles in the spring and summer of 1942 which were fought in the Coral Sea and off Midway Island. The heavy losses suffered by the Japanese fleet in these defeats bore testimony to the fact that America and Great Britain had recovered from the consequences of the treacherous attack to which they had been subjected. As they gradually brought up their reserves, they achieved a fundamental improvement in their position. The naval battles fought out in the wide expanse of the Pacific ocean showed that America and Britain would not knuckle under to the Japanese fleet. By the end of the first year of the Pacific war the temporary advantages gained by Japan had disappeared. Japan's aggressive drive had come to an end and the Allied forces had inflicted serious losses on the Japanese in Northern Burma.

The bitter fighting which developed from the summer of 1942 on the distant approaches to Australia and which assumed a particularly violent form in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea ended in the withdrawal of Japanese forces. In May 1943 a serious disaster also overtook Japan during her attempts to consolidate for herself a jumping-off point for future operations in the Northern half of the Pacific ocean. American troops drove the Japanese from the Island of Attu to which, it may be mentioned, the impatient Japanese militarists had prematurely given a Japanese name.

All this goes to show how, as soon as the Japanese had come up against the serious resistance of Allied forces, they showed themselves no longer capable of keeping the strategic initiative in their hands.

At the present time, the people of Japan are observing with growing alarm the general tendency towards the development of military operations. Everywhere the Japanese are passing to the defensive. In Tokyo they are already recognising the extreme impermanence of territorial acquisitions in time of war. It is on this account natural that the attention of Japanese imperialism should be concentrated to a great extent on how to maintain those vast expanses which still remain in Japanese hands. Japan is not trying to handle this matter by military means alone.

A considerable time before the commencement of the war in the Pacific, the Japanese had put forward the thesis that there existed an age-long community of political, economic and cultural interests among the various peoples inhabiting Eastern Asia. The slogan of the "co-prosperity" sphere of the great East Asian masses had been brought into being. For a long time Japan had dreamed of strengthening her hold on the countries lying along the shores of the Pacific and Indian oceans. In this category came first of all China, French Indo-China, the Dutch Indies, British Malaya and the Philippines. All these countries were to form a single Eastern Asia Union, together with Japan. As was admitted in August 1940 by the editor of a Japanese newspaper, it was not appropriate to look upon the frontiers of this East Asian bloc as in any sense permanent; they could be unceasingly extended. Subsequent Japanese plans clearly spoke of how Japanese imperialism had in mind not only the abovementioned countries but also India, Australia, New Zealand, Alaska and other countries. The plans of the more violent Japanese militarists also included the seizure of the Far Eastern territory of the Soviet Union.

The imperialistic pretensions of Japan to a dominating role in the "East Asian Area" were first officially formulated in the celebrated Three-Power Pact signed by Germany, Italy and Japan on the 27th of September 1940. This document envisaged a politico-military alliance of the aggressor states with the object of pursuing an acquisitive policy in Europe as well as in Asia. According to this agreement, Japan bound herself to agree to and approve of conquests carried out by Germany and Italy in Europe and Germany and Italy acknowledged and supported Japanese gains in Asia.

Could Japan seriously reckon on seizing and holding by force of arms, the vast expanses of "Greater Eastern Asia"? Even the most aggressive elements among Japanese military circles have not fostered such an illusion. They did, however, hope that their acquisitive appetites would be satisfied if they managed to convince the peoples of Asia that the Japanese would bring to them the possibility of "prosperity" and of "freedom" from the United States and Great Britain. Similarly, Japan counted on wresting from the population of the Philippines, Dutch East Indies, Burma and other East Asian states the will to resist. More than this, Japan hoped that in the event of the success of her propaganda, this would permit the Japanese to utilise part of the local population against the British and Americans.

Striving as she was by every means in her power to achieve success in the Pacific Ocean, Japan tried artificially to arouse racial hatred of the "Yellow" races, such as the Malaysians inhab-
biting the Dutch East Indies, against the “Whites”, i.e., the British, the Dutch and the Americans. The Japanese tried to suggest to the population of the countries occupied by them that they, the Japanese, were the “blood brothers” of the Chinese, the Malaysians, the Filipinos, the Burmese and of all the other peoples belonging to the yellow race.

Even in the early years of her capitalistic expansion, Japan used just such a cover for her aggressive policy, announcing her “concern” for the “freedom” of Korea from the foreign yoke. In the years 1893 and 1894, on the eve of the Sino-Japanese War, some Koreans believed that Japan really desired the freedom of Korea. A few years passed, and Japan acquired the “liberated” Korea and annexed it as a colony.

In 1932, Japan created in Manchuria a new “state”, Manchukuo, which she announced as “independent”. In actual fact, it was nothing of the sort. Manchuria has been overrun by Japanese troops and all the principal branches of the administration and economy are firmly in Japanese hands. Side by side with the ministers and dignitaries of Manchukuo who are natives of Manchuria, sit the real rulers, Japanese officers, officials and police, who rely for support on the Kwantung Army.

The same sort of situation has been established in the provinces of China occupied by the Japanese. The Japanese yes-man, Wang Ching-wei, sits in Nanking and gives himself out to be the head of the Chinese Government. In actual fact, he merely does everything which he is ordered to do by his Japanese masters.

The Japanese regard as “model” the present mutual relations between Japan and Manchukuo and between Japan and the puppet regime of Wang Ching-wei. It is according to this model that they wish to set up the “new order” in Eastern Asia.

The Japanese affirm that it is for the sake of “co-prosperity” in the Greater Eastern Asian sphere that they are waging the war in Eastern Asia. The Japanese imperialists consider that the building of a new vast colonial empire can only be realised behind a barrage of “pan-Asian” phraseology. The “co-prosperity sphere of Greater Eastern Asia”, which is the accepted way of referring to Japanese colonial activity in official documents, is in actual fact a grandiose smoke-screen laid down to break down the resistance of the peoples who are the objects of Japanese aggression.

In contradistinction to the German fascist “new order” in Europe, in its first edition the Japanese “new order” falsely presents the relations between colonizers, i.e., the Japanese, and the peoples exploited, not as the relations between master and servant made necessary by different “racial origin”, but, on the contrary, as the relations between allies “permeated with the spirit of friendship, mutual assistance and co-prosperity.” In this matter, it is impossible to deny that the Japanese imperialists have displayed remarkable flexibility and power of manoeuvring.

The territorial conquests of Japan in the course of the Pacific war have been facilitated to a considerable degree by the extensive use of the pan-Asian doctrine by Japan. It is well known that the Japanese have managed to exploit the discontent on the part of the population of Indonesia, Burma and Indo-China with British and French policy, and to win over to their side certain strata of the population of these areas.

In the autumn of 1942, there was created in Japan a special ministry of “Greater East Asian Affairs.” In actual fact, the function of this establishment was the control of all the territories occupied during the war which were to be included in the Japanese colonial empire. Japan tried, however, to lend to her imperialistic claims an atmosphere of the “willing comradeship” of Eastern Asian peoples.

The Japanese have everywhere tried to create an appearance of “independent” existence on the part of the subject peoples. In order to sustain the illusion of phantom sovereignty even of obviously puppet states like the Nanking Government of Wang Ching-wei, Japan systematically organises solemn tours of high officials to her creatures, initiates serious political conversations with them, signs treaties and conventions which are drawn up in such a way that they give the impression of being bilateral.

Japanese imperialism not only endeavours to consolidate the old puppet regimes in Eastern Asia, but creates new ones. Thus, for example, feeling her weakness and her inability to maintain her position by the application of naked force alone, the Japanese military hierarchy has fabricated the new Japophile “governments” of Burma and the Philippines. These, be
it understood, have not come about of themselves, for it so happens that in the Philippines and in Burma there has developed a far more effective anti-Japanese movement. Japan recognizes her weakness and searches for any means by which she can take root in the territory occupied by her.

But in all the territories temporarily seized by Japan, the real power rests firmly in the hands of Japanese generals. With these there are civil officers who perform the role of agents of the various big plutocratic combines which are planning the exploitation of the natural resources of the occupied countries. These civil advisers are straining every nerve to speed up the exploitation of these newly acquired and rich colonies. But the lack of circulating capital is paralysing their efforts, as is the fear of risking the investment of large capital in unreliable enterprises which has always been a characteristic of the majority of Japanese capitalists.

The colonies which have temporarily fallen into Japanese hands come into the category of rich countries. The richest of the lands temporarily captured by the Japanese are British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. In the pre-war period, British Malaya held, for example, the first place in the world as regards the output of rubber and tin. The Dutch Indies held the second place in the world in the matter of rubber production, the third place for tin and the sixth place for oil. (The Dutch East Indies furnished ten times more oil than Japan.) Apart from this, the Dutch Indies held the third place in the world in the production of quinine and 50% of that of spices fell to the share of the Dutch East Indies. With the occupation of these countries, the Japanese have become the possessors of important resources of raw materials. They did not, however, acquire these riches in their entirety. During their retreat, the Anglo-American troops destroyed and burnt part of what represented considerable value in the territory which they were abandoning. A portion of the oil industry was destroyed by fire, mines were blown up and electric power stations, water towers, oil pipelines, tanks and machinery were destroyed.

The Japanese will certainly not be in a position to repair quickly this work of destruction. Consequently, it cannot be said that all that wealth has passed into their hands for which Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, Burma and other occupied countries were famous before the beginning of the war in the Pacific. Nevertheless, a certain portion of this wealth has passed into the hands of the occupying Japanese.

It is important to recall that before the Japanese invasion of China in 1937, Japan was receiving from China a far greater quantity of coal, ore and other materials than she has been receiving since the beginning of the war. In those Chinese provinces which have been occupied by Japanese troops the output has on the whole been sensibly reduced. There can be no doubt that this refers to a greater degree to Malaya, the Dutch Indies and the Philippines which have recently been seized by the Japanese, and where guerrilla bands are operating in the rear of the invaders and hindering the rapid re-establishment of economic life.

It is well known that even before the war, Japanese industry existed upon imported raw materials and imported fuel. The war has made impossible the conveyance to Japan of raw materials and fuel by the usual routes. The greater part of Japanese imports were made up of goods received from the U.S.A., Britain and their dependencies. The war has naturally interrupted all trade connections between the belligerent countries.

All this merely goes to show that the results of the recent Japanese acquisitions have not so greatly changed the position. It is doubtful whether the Japanese are in a position to build up supplementary reserves of raw material and fuel for military purposes from what they have been able to acquire from the territories of which they are in temporary occupation. The best they can hope for is that this will replace the quantity of raw materials and fuel which Japan formerly received from outside through her normal external trading operations and which she has ceased to receive since the beginning of the war. Lack of transport prevents the regular export by the Japanese of the materials which they have acquired.

Japan still lags behind her enemies in the matter of economic power and resources just as much as she did previously. As formerly, 18 times less steel is smelted in Japan than in the United States. Just as previously, 18 times less pig iron is produced in Japan and just as before the war, 18 times less coal is available in Japan than in the United States. Even if it is assumed that the Japanese have managed to repair all the destruction and all the burnt oil installations in the Dutch East Indies, the total output of oil in this area would only amount to 0 million tons a year. In the United States 185 million tons of oil are produced every year, that is to say, more than 20 times as much.
The Japanese are endeavouring to exaggerate the real importance of their successes in the Pacific Ocean. They assert that the loss by the British and the Americans of their possessions in the South-West Pacific has inflicted an irreparable blow on American and British economy, as if it had entirely deprived them of potential resources of tin and rubber. This, of course, is not true. The United States and Britain are able to obtain their entire requirements of rubber from Brazil and of tin from Bolivia. With both of these countries, the United States and Britain maintain close and friendly relations. For America and Britain their temporary territorial losses in Asia do not involve any really serious difficulties in the matter of their ability to continue the war. The loss of the Philippines, Guam and other Pacific islands have not reacted on the economic strength of the United States.

On the other hand, the temporary successes of Japan have not only taken heavy toll of the Japanese armed forces but they have palpably increased Japan’s military vulnerability. Japanese armed forces are forced to operate at a vast distance from their bases, as a result of which the maintenance of regular supplies has become extraordinarily difficult. In order to maintain constant touch with the armies of occupation in Burma, in the Philippines, in the Dutch East Indies and in the other islands scattered over the vast expanse of the Pacific, Japan must not only possess a fleet, but also a great merchant fleet with which to satisfy the ever-growing demands in the matter of long-distance sea convoys. Meanwhile, the losses both of Japanese warships and merchant tonnage are constantly rising and are practically irreplaceable.

The British and American fleets have also, of course, suffered heavy losses in the Pacific, but in the first place these losses have not shaken the fighting power of England and the United States at sea, and in the second place, the output of the American shipping industry alone is able to keep the Allied fleets up to the strength in warships.

These advantages which Japan used to such profit in the opening period of the war in the Pacific have finally disappeared with the successful carrying out of the American programme of production of all forms of arms for the land, sea and air forces of the Allies.

The first 18 months of the Pacific war have clearly shown that the overseas successes of Japanese imperialism are only of a temporary character. Events are already developing unfavourably for Japan. Constant and enduring factors which point to the final victory being on the side of the Anglo-American allies are constantly appearing on the scene. Japan is already obliged to pay dearly for the venturesome plans of the Japanese militarists which have drawn her into a hard and hopeless war with such powers as the United States and Great Britain.

The temporary mastery of the Japanese imperialists in the British, French, American and Dutch posts in the Pacific temporarily occupied by them is unable to revitalize the organism of Japan, exhausted as it already is by long wars.

TWO YEARS OF WAR IN THE PACIFIC

BY COLONEL E. M. TOLCHENOV

(War and the Working Class, December, 1943)

Two years ago on 7th December, 1941 the armed forces of Japan made a sudden attack on American and British possessions in the Pacific. These military operations at once involved huge territories together with their adjacent waters; and the immense space stretching from the shores of America to the Bay of Bengal and from Alaska to the shores of Australia became the arena of a new theatre of military operations—the Pacific Theatre.

As regards purely military measures, Japan had prepared carefully for the war. The Japanese Command had secretly concentrated in Indo-China and on the islands of Formosa and Hainan more than half a million troops, well supplied with technical fighting equipment. The operations of these troops were to be covered by 2,000 aeroplanes and the greater part of the Japanese navy which by that time had been moved forward into the waters of the South China Sea. This ability to concentrate in advance huge forces which were numerically three to four times as large as the forces of the enemy predetermined the character of the first stage in the war.

Taking into account the potential might of the U.S.A. and Great Britain, the Japanese Command planned their operations in such a manner as to have them completed in the shortest possible time—at all events before the U.S.A. and England
could manage to transport vital forces to the regions involved in the fighting. In order to fully utilise all their advantages, the Japanese began their advance simultaneously in several directions.

The past two years of war in the Pacific can be divided into three stages which differ in their character. The first stage which continued approximately till the spring of 1942 was marked by a violent offensive of the Japanese armies which culminated in the occupation by them of vast territories. The second stage which lasted until August, 1942, is characterised by a sharp decline in the momentum of Japanese offensive operations and by the growing strength of the armed forces of the Allies in these theatres of war, which were able actively to resist the enemy. We may consider the counter-offensive by the Anglo-American forces in the Solomons, which was the first attempt made by the Allied Command to recapture territories seized by the Japanese during the course of the war, as the beginning of the third stage. The first stage in the Pacific war ended in considerable successes for the Japanese armed forces. Japan occupied Hongkong, British Malaya, Burma, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, the islands of Guam and Wake and seized certain points on the islands of New Guinea, New Britain, New Ireland and the Solomons, etc. But it was precisely in the vast extent of the occupied territories that there lurked difficulties with which the Japanese Command had later to contend. The immensity of the theatre of operations and the fact that the separate fronts were removed from each other complicated the problem of feeding these operations. Troops had been removed to great distances from their original bases. Consequently, the protection of sea transports with troops and military supplies as well as the security of widely extended lines of communications greatly complicated the fighting efficiency of the Japanese navy. With the extension of the theatre of military operations, the struggle for supremacy at sea and in the air demanded greater and greater efforts from Japan.

All these causes, as also the growing strength of the armed forces of the Allies, changed the nature of further military operations in the Pacific. By this time Japan had lost to some extent, the advantages which had assured her success in the first stage of the war. Unlike the U.S.A. and Great Britain, the whole of Japan was situated in the western part of the Pacific, that is, in immediate proximity to her objectives. She was thus able to take the fullest advantage of her geographical position, whereas the Allied Command, in view of the remoteness of the theatres of operations, could not transfer sufficient reinforcements within a short time. But the further south the Japanese troops advanced the longer became their lines of communications. Equally, Japan lost another of her advantages—the element of surprise in her attack, which had decisively influenced the results attained by Japanese troops in the opening phases of the war.

In the second stage of the war the Japanese Command gave up their plans of an extensive offensive. Apart from the considerations mentioned above, this decision was possibly also influenced by the nature of the obstacles which the Japanese troops would have to encounter. To the west of the territories seized by Japan lay British India, to the south Australia, to the East the well-fortified Hawaiian Islands and the coast of the U.S.A., to the north-west the Aleutians and the shores of Alaska. All these were enormous well-fortified territories and the outcome of the struggle for them could not be successful without considerable effort and sacrifice.

At the same time, the refusal of the Japanese Command to undertake extensive offensive operations did not mean a change over to strategic defence on all fronts. On separate sectors of the theatre of war, the Japanese undertook active operations in order to improve the positions occupied by them, but these attempts were not crowned with success. The most conspicuous steps in this direction were taken by the Japanese Command in waters adjacent to Australia and in the Central Pacific. In the first instance, the attempt of the Japanese armed forces led to the battle of the Coral Sea (7-8 May, 1942) which ended unsuccessfully for them. The importance of the battle lies in the fact that it disclosed not only the growth of the naval and air forces of the Allies in the Australian zone, but also the ability of the Allied Command to use cleverly the forces at their command to upset the plans of their enemy. Japanese troops could no longer carry out tasks entrusted to them as easily as during the first stages of the war.

Even greater consequences attended the battle of the Midway Islands which developed from the 3rd to the 6th of June 1942. After the seizure by the Japanese, at the very beginning of the war, of the American islands of Guam and Wake which protected the most important operational lines of the theatre of war stretching from the western coast of
the U.S.A. to the shores of Japan, the Midway Islands became a forward base along the line of advance. Foreseeing the possibility of the Japanese armed forces becoming active in this sector, the American Command succeeded in concentrating in the Midway Island area their naval and air forces. As a result of the violent blows struck by the Allied airforce, the Japanese naval squadron which had approached the island suffered heavy losses and was forced to change its course to the west and eventually to withdraw to its home shores. Even apart from the losses sustained by both sides, the battle of Midway cannot but be considered as an important success for the American armed forces. The Japanese navy was prevented from moving into the Central Pacific and from carrying out its task.

Thus in the second stage, Japanese armed forces were inactive in most sectors of the Pacific theatre. They undertook offensive operations only in isolated directions, but they could not conclude any of these successfully. And one of the most decisive factors which has contributed to these failures is the increasing might of the Allied armed forces and their growing resistance. The Anglo-American forces continued to adhere, during this stage, to defensive tactics, gathering strength for the impending offensive operations.

In the third stage, the centre of gravity in the Pacific shifted to Australia. The Allies utilized the continued pull on their fronts to augment their forces and pass to the counter-offensive. In August 1942, Anglo-American naval forces moved forward into the area of the Solomon Islands and landed troops on the islands of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, etc. Irrespective of the results achieved, it is significant that these battles, constituting the first step towards the reconquest of territories seized by Japan, were launched on the initiative of the Allied Command. The year of armed clashes in the Solomons was crowned with considerable successes for Allied troops. During this period they were able to clear the southern and central island groups of the enemy and to occupy several important bases after driving the enemy to the north. Mention should also be made of the counter-offensive by Anglo-American troops which lasted several months and which resulted in the occupation by the Allies of the important Japanese bases at Buna, Gona, Salamaua, Lae and Finchafen.

The success of the Allies in the Solomons and in New Guinea enabled them to take further steps to improve their positions. On 22 November, 1943, the U.S.A. Navy Department announced that under the protection of strong naval units the Allied forces had landed in the Gilbert Islands. In the event of a successful culmination of this operation the Allied forces would secure bases in the Central Pacific where during the last 2 years the Japanese armed forces have had undivided sway. Consolidation in the Gilbert Island will secure for the Allies considerable advantages. By threatening the lines of communications leading to the islands of New Britain, New Guinea and Truk, the Allies will be able to isolate these important Japanese bases and, by doing so, change to their advantage the situation in the south-western and central areas of the Pacific.

The successes of the Allies in the Australian area are not accidental. They are the logical outcome of the general situation which has now arisen in the Pacific theatre of military operations. If during the first months of the war, Japanese aircraft dominated the battlefields, the position has now radically changed. In the struggle for the air, which has attained considerable proportions, the Allied air forces are now superior. Thanks to this the Allies have managed to wrest the initiative in the air and to carry out successful combined operations. Allied supremacy in the air is gradually increasing. It is supported by the great aeroplane industries of the U.S.A. The monthly output of aeroplanes in the U.S.A. is, at present, about 6-8 thousand machines, possibly even more, whereas Japan is apparently able to turn out a thousand to twelve hundred machines monthly. Under these conditions even if losses in planes on both sides are equal (lately Japanese losses have, however, continuously grown), Japan's air power will inevitably decline.

Japan's position at sea is also deteriorating in a similar way. The Japanese navy which is now operating at a considerable distance from its primary bases has been forced to defend the vast territories seized in the course of the war, against the stronger navy of the Allies. According to American press reports, the American navy operating in the Pacific has a double preponderance over the Japanese in battleships and carriers, is one and a half times stronger in cruisers, four times stronger in destroyers and has a treble preponderance in submarines. If one takes into consideration the manifold supremacy of the American shipbuilding industries over the Japanese, one can assert that the growth of the naval forces
of the Allies will increase at a greater pace than those of the Japanese.

The overwhelming majority of the territories seized by Japan are islands, and consequently supplies to almost all her fronts are seaborne. The protection of the greatly extended sealines of communication has imposed a heavy burden on the Japanese navy. But Japan is probably experiencing greater difficulties as regards her mercantile marine. In connection with the war her trade with distant countries has come to an end and her commercial shipping lines have been curtailed. At the same time, however, the task of supplying troops scattered over hundreds of far-flung islands as well as of satisfying the growing needs of her war industries has created for her mercantile marine new and complex tasks. According to the British Ministry of Information, at the time Japan entered the war the Japanese mercantile marine comprised about 6.75 million tons. For a number of years preceding the war, the Japanese government, by a series of measures, secured the rapid growth of their shipbuilding industries. As a result of the seizure, during the first period of the war, of Hongkong, Singapore, the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, the Japanese could have increased the annual productive capacity of their shipbuilding yards to one million tons, by using the dockyards available in these territories.

Owing to a shortage of cast iron, steel, non-ferrous metals, various kinds of equipment, man-power and also to the fact that the dockyards are overloaded with work on current repairs to vessels, Japan is unable to effect any considerable increase in the capacity of her shipbuilding industry so as to bring it into line with the demands of a prolonged war. Meanwhile the losses suffered by the Japanese mercantile marine are great. According to Allied reports, by the spring of 1943 Japan had already lost over 2 million tons of her mercantile shipping, that is, approximately the same tonnage which she would be able to replace during two years. Thus, apparently, Japan has not the means to build more ships than what is required to replace her current losses. At the same time, during the first seven months of this year alone the U.S.A. have built ships displacing 12 million tons which is double the tonnage of the entire mercantile marine which Japan possesses at the present time.

Military operations in the Pacific have been going on for about 2 years. The stormy unfolding of military events of the brief initial stage in the war was followed by a lengthy period of comparative calm during which no essential changes have taken place in the position of the various fronts. Japan holds, as before, the vast territories seized by her, but she is unable to take any steps either towards further conquests or towards firmly consolidating the territories seized. The Allied forces which have considerably increased in this theatre of war are engaged on most sectors of the front in a strategic defence. However, the separate counter-attacks which they have carried out with the object of recovering territories lost in the course of the war are acquiring increasing momentum.

What then has Japan attained in the course of the war? The military operations started by the Japanese against the Chinese people have continued for over six years now. The hope Japan had of a speedy termination of the war in China has not materialised, and considerable Japanese forces are still tied up on this front. Japanese calculations to attain decisive successes in the Pacific have equally miscarried. Having occupied these considerable territories rich in natural resources, Japan secured huge reserves of strategic raw materials, including such important items as oil, rubber, tin, nickel, etc. However, Japan is experiencing great difficulties in the matter of utilizing the economic resources of the conquered territories and working the accumulated raw materials. Judging by data published in the foreign press, the task of utilizing the natural wealth of these regions has proved to be more complicated than the Japanese had anticipated. These difficulties have been augmented to a considerable degree by a deficiency in transport vessels. It is known, for instance, that in Indo-China, in Malaya and in Indonesia there are large stores of rubber, but unable to utilize these reserves the Japanese have stopped the tapping of rubber there and are forcing the population to cultivate rice. The Japanese are endeavouring to use rubber for the manufacture of synthetic benzine and for the construction of roads; but, at the same time, they are building up enterprises in Manchuria for the production of synthetic rubber, as their shipping is not equal to the task of transporting rubber, coal, rice, etc.

By occupying British, American and Dutch possessions in the Pacific, Japan has undoubtedly improved her strategic positions, for this has enabled her to advance her forward bases far beyond her own territory. At the same time she has not succeeded in fully solving the problems set before her. Her
front line has reached British India and Australia, strongholds from which the Allies can inflict heavy blows on Japan. Japan's hopes that Fascist Germany would in the course of the war, considerably weaken the U.S.A. and England have been dashed to the ground. The Red Army, by undertaking to bear the brunt of the struggle with Hitlerite Germany, has tied up along the Soviet-German front the main forces of the German Fascist army and has inflicted on them a series of heavy defeats. U.S.A. and England have built up powerful armed forces and have provided them with modern military technical equipment. The armed forces of England and the United States have indisputably reached such a level of development that the successful conduct of the war in the Pacific cannot in any way hinder the immediate development of decisive military operations on the continent of Europe against the chief enemy—Hitlerite Germany.

The correlation of forces of the contending parties in the Pacific has changed in a decisive manner in favour of the Allies, who possess there a strength quite sufficient for accomplishing their set tasks.

This is reflected in the tone of the Japanese press, which is now assessing in a manner, different from that at the beginning of the war, the strength of their enemies and their potentials. The Japanese papers sound, at frequent intervals, notes of alarm about the increasing strength of the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain and about the threat of a wide counter-offensive by the Allies in the Pacific. The "Asahi" wrote on the 18th August: "We must admit that the enemy is moving northwards... the frontline is slowly moving north." On the following day, the "Yoneuri" stated: "the counter-offensive of the enemy is becoming more and more stubborn. The enemy is relying on numerical superiority and on technique." On 21st August the "Mainichi" observed: "Japan's mortal combat with the U.S.A. in the east, west, south and north is assuming more serious aspects."

The war in the Pacific is mainly a war on water and in the air combined with landing operations by land forces. Consequently, the issue of this war depends, to a marked degree, on naval and air power and on the efficiency of transport. In all these spheres the Allies decisively predominate; and, from this point of view, the future prospects of the war in the Pacific cannot be favourable to Japan.

JAPANESE-GERMAN RELATIONS IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

By E. Zhdanov

(War and the Working Class, January 1944).

A review of the actual relations between Japan and Germany in the Second World War is especially interesting in the light of the changes which have recently affected the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis. Events in Italy have shattered the illusory notions about the supposed unity between the European Partners of the Axis. And this is the reason why the Germans are now advertising with greater ardour than ever the stability of Japanese-German relations as Allies and are broadcasting to the world that Germany and Japan will march together 'to the bitter end.'

What are then, in fact, the mutual relations of Japan and Germany?

Relations between Germany and Japan bear a special character quite distinct from those subsisting between Germany and her European satellites. Japan has never been a vassal of Hitlerite Germany. Japan was prompted to a 'rapprochement' with Hitlerite Imperialism by her aggressive plans, but in achieving this rapprochement, leading Japanese circles never intended to follow humbly in the wake of German policies submitting to Germany's specific aims and acting to the prejudice of their own interests.

In order to get a clearer conception of the nature of Japanese-German relations it may be useful to turn to history. German colonial expansion in the Pacific began in the eighties of the last century. In 1885 Germany occupied part of the Island of New Guinea and a group of adjacent Islands, which they called the Bismark Archipelago. That same year Germany also took possession of the Solomon and Marshall Islands. In 1866 the German Admiral von Tirpitz, at the head of a special expedition, explored the coast of China seeking to find a suitable harbour for a future German military base. After an abortive attempt to acquire a harbour by diplomatic means, Germany, in November, 1897, forcibly occupied the Bay of Kiao-chow using as a pretext the murder of two missionaries which had been instigated by the Germans themselves. In 1899 Germany acquired the large group of Pacific
Islands known by the name of the Carolines, the Mariannas and Palau Islands.

The naval port of Tsingtao in the Shantung Peninsula became the spring-board for German expansion in the Far East. The projected German railway lines in China were to link Tsingtao with the most important centres of North China. This revealed the aspirations of German imperialism to penetrate deeply into the East Asiatic continent. All of these events took place in the immediate proximity of Japan and naturally created considerable tension in Japan-German relations.

Unlike China, Japan eluded colonial subjugation by other Powers. German imperialism reckoned on utilising Japan's accession to military and economic power to the detriment of her own interests. At the end of the 19th century when the Germany of Wilhelm was getting ready to launch a large-scale policy of aggression in Europe, Africa and Asia, Japan, in accordance with the plans of the Germans, was to serve as a counter-balance to Russia in the Far East. At that time treacherous German diplomacy was actually carrying out a policy inimical to Russia (though this was concealed under the cloak of 'solicitude' for Russian interests in the Pacific) and systematically tried to provoke Russia against Japan. In this way the Germans intended to divert the attention of Russia from European and Near Eastern affairs.

The anti-Japanese policy of Germany at that period could not but make an impression upon the mind of the Japanese people. There are many people in Japan who even to this day remember the public utterances of the sabre-rattling Wilhelm II who made blood-thirsty speeches on the 'Yellow Peril,' and propounded the 'civilizing mission' of Germany in the Far East. The well-known Japanese diplomat Viscount Ishii, in his book 'Diplomatic Comments,' refers to Wilhelm II as follows:

"He not only made enemies in Europe but by his senseless propaganda about the yellow peril infuriated Japan. It has been said that at several European courts he demonstrated a picture in which Japan was represented as a second Genghis Khan about to destroy the white civilization."

This inimical attitude of German imperialism towards Japan did not prevent Wilhelm II, on the eve of the First World War, from expecting that he would be able to provoke Japan against England and Russia. But German diplomacy did not succeed in exploiting the economic clash between Anglo-Japanese interests which had become apparent by that time in China. The pro-German elements in Japan which were mostly influential in military circles remained in a minority. In the war of 1914-18 Japan joined the Entente and fought against Germany.

During the First World War, Japan not only drove the Germans out of Shantung but took possession of Germany's island colonies, thus laying the foundation for further expansion in the Pacific. Under a League of Nations mandate Japan occupied the Marshall, Mariana and Caroline Islands, thus inheriting the main German colonial possessions in the Pacific.

It is common knowledge that German imperialism having suffered defeat in the first World War began to prepare for a 'revanche' immediately after its termination. At first Japan regarded with considerable anxiety the resurgence of German imperialism as Japan nowise intended to part with her colonial inheritance received from Germany after the first World War. But in general Japan was not against the strengthening of Germany in as much as this strengthening was creating a definite anxiety among the other Powers which had come out victorious from the Great War and whose interests deviated more and more from the aspirations of Japan.

The more definite became the plans of German imperialism as directed against the interests of the Soviet Union, England, France, Czechoslovakia and other democratic countries, the more did Japan observe the advantages which were likely to follow the resurgence of an imperialist Germany. With the passing of power to Hitler and to his gang, the German aggressor disclosed his real intentions and began to prepare frantically for a new war. His monstrous appetite for territorial aggrandisement embraced the entire globe. The political and economic penetration of the Germans into the Far East also became stronger. Within a short period Germany not only restored most of her previous economic position in China, but even extended it.

Naturally enough, Japanese militarists began to regard Germany's growing activities in Far Eastern affairs with a certain amount of jealousy. But the logical development of international affairs continued to prompt the militant elements in Japan and Germany to a certain degree of co-operation.

The comparatively easy seizure of Manchuria by Japan
in 1931-32 to a large extent spurred on Japanese militarists in their megalomaniac aspirations. The changed balance of power in Eastern Asia disclosed the comparative weakness of the democratic countries of England and United States in resisting Japanese pretensions. This circumstance further prompted Japan and Germany to collude or at first to parallel action against the democracies. Hitlerite scribblers, forgetting the contemptuous remarks made about Japan by their own Fuhrer—one can find as many such remarks as one wishes in his book Meine Kampf—began to babble about the Aryan origin of the Japanese race.

On November 28th, 1936, Germany and Japan signed the so-called ‘Anti-Comintern Pact,’ a document which in its published text pre-supposed only police and ‘ideological’ cooperation between the two countries. Though not formally directed against England, the United States or China, this pact was intended to exploit the anti-Soviet feeling and prejudice existing in different countries, to hul the vigilance of certain democratic powers and thus to distract attention from the intensive war preparations which the aggressors were making against these very countries.

A considerable body of public opinion in England, the U.S.A. and France regarded with understandable mistrust this official announcement of the aims of Japanese-German cooperation. Nonetheless, the ‘Anti Comintern Pact’ did not cause particular anxiety in England or America. However, the course of events which followed the signing of this document was a clear indication of a growing military danger. Japan and Germany (and since 1937, Fascist Italy which also joined the anti-Comintern Pact) were enabled to motivate and camouflage their intensive military preparations by fictitious ‘anti-Comintern’ aims.

In the summer of 1937 Japan attacked China, thereby initiating a prolonged war in the Far East. The German Fascists were dreaming of quite another war by provoking Japan against the Soviet Union. The Japanese attack on China in the summer of 1937 in fact caused a definitely negative reaction on the part of certain German circles intimately connected with China. The passing of Shanghai into Japanese hands threatened considerable German interests concentrated in China. However, the Hitlerite Government which aspired by all means to provoke Japan against the Soviet Union decided temporarily to sacrifice the interests of German exporters in China.

On September 1, 1939, began the European War. The Hitlerite hordes were unleashed and they began the devastation of Europe. In a declaration on 7th September, 1938, Japan announced her neutrality in the European War. The war unleashed by Germany was thus of interest to Japan only in so far as it could inflict serious losses on or tie up the forces of her chief potential enemies—the United States and England. Until that time came Japan decided to wait.

After the capitulation of France, Japan came to the wrong conclusion that the strategic positions of the democratic powers and particularly those of Great Britain had been weakened to such an extent that it would be to Japan’s advantage to discard her policy of ‘abstention’ from the world war. It was precisely at this time that Japan allowed herself to be influenced by a dangerous illusion, namely that of the military invulnerability of Hitlerite Germany. Urged by Germany’s example the Japanese aggressor began to exert successively pressure on French and Dutch colonial territories, and above all on French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies.

On September 27th, 1940, the Japanese-German-Italian Pact known as the ‘Three Power Pact’ or the Tripartite Pact was signed in Berlin. This document laid the foundation of a military and political alliance between the aggressor states. In its preamble the pact stated that a prerequisite for a lasting peace was for each nation of the world to acquire sufficient living space. Thus it was announced that the primary aim of the alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan was territorial acquisition. Article 1 of the Pact stated “Japan recognises and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.” Article 2 ran: “Germany and Italy recognise and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in the great East Asiatic sphere.”

The Tripartite Pact opened up the prospect of a certain co-ordination of the aggressive plans of Germany and Japan. It introduced officially the term ‘New Order’ by which was understood forcible subjugation by the Fascist countries in Europe and by Japan in the Far East of other countries and peoples. The signing of the Tripartite Pact, therefore, in many ways pre-determined the spread of the European war to further immense regions and its conversion into a truly global war. Japan’s alliance with Fascist Germany was a means for
realising her own political plans, which were gradually maturing under conditions of a steady growth of American-Japanese antagonism and of a marked sharpening of Anglo-Japanese disagreement.

Hitler’s maniacal plans to establish world hegemony for Germany could not find approval in Tokyo. But they were considered of value as a kind of guarantee that Hitlerite Germany being drawn into the war would anyhow considerably weaken the Anglo-American bloc. Japan was keen on utilising the aggressive acts of Germany and her European satellites which had tied up the forces of the democratic powers, as this enabled her to push her weakened rivals and competitors out of territories in Eastern Asia which had been earmarked by her.

Fascist Germany in its turn hoped that Japanese imperialism would create a diversion against the eastern colonial rear of England and the United States and would in this way assist in the success of Hitler’s plans for world domination. Germany also expected that Japan would undertake military operations against the Soviet Union as well. Basing their speculations on the existence of “anti-Comintern” feelings, the Germans thought that irresponsible and adventurous elements which in the past had several times created tension in Soviet-Japanese relations would again gain the upper hand. But in Japan, apart from pro-Fascist elements which had been urging an anti-Soviet war policy, there were also other forces which soberly estimated the actual possibilities and prospects. In her relations with the Soviet Union Japan, therefore, showed prudence. The signing of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty in Moscow on the 13th April, 1941, corresponding as it did to the fundamental interests of Japan and the Soviet Union, upset all the calculations of the Hitlerite war-mongers.

Nevertheless it is absolutely clear that the war unleashed by Japan two years ago against the United States and Great Britain is closely connected with the actions of the greatest and most dangerous aggressor—Hitlerite Germany. It is unlikely that Japan would have risked challenging two such powerful nations as the United States and Great Britain if she had not been inspired by the example of Germany and had not entertained exaggerated hopes of Germany’s military strength. Japan which had, for years, been preparing for war for supremacy in the Pacific, regarded the Hitlerite aggression in Europe as a never-to-be repeated favourable concurrence of events which seemingly gave Japan her chance to launch, with no great risk, a campaign for the acquisition of large territories. There is hardly any doubt that Japanese imperialists were intoxicated with the initial easy military successes of Germany. The treacherous attack of Hitlerite Germany on the Soviet Union could also, at first, have appeared to short-sighted persons as a sign of extraordinary strength—and even of the military invulnerability of German Fascism.

Actual facts, however, cruelly dispelled these fantastic hopes and calculations of the ill-starred German strategists and of their followers.

The Red Army inflicted on the German military machine the deadliest and most irreparable blows thus dispose of the myth of the invincibility of the German Fascist army. The adventurous character and defectiveness of Hitlerite strategy became apparent in all their ugly nakedness. Sustaining blow after blow on the Soviet-German front, the Hitlerite military machine found itself unable to undertake any active operations against Great Britain and the United States of America, the Western Allies of the U.S.S.R.

Among other things this meant that Japan had greatly miscalculated in backing Hitler in the vain hope that “unconquerable” Germany would be able to undermine the military might of England and the United States.

Japan opened military operations against the United States and England on the night of December 7th 1941, that is, two years ago at a time when the counter-offensive of the Red Army which culminated in the smashing of Hitlerite hordes outside Moscow had only just begun. On December 11, Hitler and Mussolini declared war on the United States. On the same day Germany, Italy and Japan signed a new tripartite pact mutually pledging not only to pursue the war against England and the USA until final victory and to abstain from concluding a separate peace, but also to co-operate “in the closest possible manner’ ‘within the spirit of the tripartite pact’ after the termination of the war. The war had, in fact, involved the entire globe. In a comparatively short time Japanese troops occupied a number of important territories, including the Philippines, Indo-China, the Malaya Archipelago and Burma. Japanese soldiers approached the very frontiers of India.

The Hitlerite robbers watched, with apparent envy—and even ill-concealed irritation, the seizure by Japan of the richest...
Far Eastern colonies of Great Britain, France, and United States and Holland—and all this at a time when Fascist Germany was engaged in waging her vital, difficult and 'total' war with countries of the democratic coalition, without getting any substantial assistance from Japan. Japan had not given Germany the expected assistance that it expected, and Japan did not launch a dauntlessly attack against the U.S.S.R.

The Hitlerites were not pleased with the behaviour of Japan. Their displeasure was all the greater because the colonial conquests of Japan also included the territories which had, in the past, been taken away from Germany. These were North Eastern New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago and the Solomons Islands which previously belonged to Germany. Japan had already acquired some experience in assimilating former German colonies. And the Japanese made it sufficiently clear that they were not prepared to share with the Germans.

In 1942 the Germans, for their part, were still taking seriously their colonizing mission with regard to the peoples of Eastern Asia. Thus, for example, the increased interest taken by Nazi imperialism in Thailand was demonstrated by the activities of a certain Berlin ‘Doctor’ Gerre (Herre?) who in 1942 fitted out an entire expedition to the northern and central regions of Thailand. In the first half of 1942 when Japanese agents had begun to develop special activity in India, there appeared in the German-Fascist press some profound ‘scientific’ reflections about the future of Indo-Germanic together with ‘reminders’ that India was in fact the cradle of Aryan culture. This suspicious flush of ‘sympathy’ for the down-trodden Indian ‘Aryan brothers’ on the part of the Hitlerite cut-throats clearly reflected the concern of the Germans which had resulted from Japan’s approach to such important key-positions in Asia, the possession of which had been visualized by the master programme of Hitlerite Germany.

Subhas Chandra Bose, an Indian adventurer who had been marked down by the Germans for the role of Gauleiter of India after the expulsion of the British, had emerged from the Berlin nursery for the rearing of Quislings after a long period of fasting. The activities of this Bose bore, from the very beginning, such a frankly pro-Hitlerite character that the Japanese simultaneously made haste to find their own pretender for the role of all-India Fuehrer. This pretender was Haz Chhari Bose, less well-known than the Bose from Berlin, but possessing the undoubted advantage that he was nearer at hand.

Thus, within a period of a few months, there were created for India two ‘centres’ of subversive and pseudo-nationalist leadership, a German one in Berlin and a Japanese one in Singapore. Both the Booses, the German and the Japanese, each working in his own interest, ‘unmasked’ British policy with regard to India and promised the Indians an imaginary ‘independence’.

The rout of the German armies at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus during the winter of 1942-1943 dissipated the pleasant dreams of the Germans about the possibility of a break-through to India via the Caucasus and Persia. The fantastic projects for establishing a world domination of German imperialism were exploded. German diplomacy decided to make a generous gesture towards Japan by temporarily abstaining from independent intrigues in India. The Berlin Bose was ‘presented’ to Japan with a fan-farouade and the Germans transferred him to Tokyo.

Indisputably, Hitlerite Germany is not overplesed with her Far Eastern ally both as regards its active participation in the war against England and the United States and its uncompromising attitude on political questions. Japan is not inflicting damage on the military and economic potential of the U.S.A. and Great Britain to such an extent as would affect the position of Germany. Japan is limiting her participation in the war in large-scale though limited local operations in the South Eastern corner of the Pacific. Japan has her own aims and is not inclined to co-ordinate her South Eastern affairs with the strategic plans of Hitler.

Reviewing the question of mutual relations between Germany and Japan the Turkish paper Yeni Asir stated in July 1943 “Germany and Japan did not achieve strategic unity even at a time when the fortunate of war smiled on them.” Having lost their Italian ally the Hitlerite adventurers are doing their utmost to prove that the Berlin-Tokyo Axis is in full working order and that ‘everything is going well’ and ‘according to plan.’

However, it is impossible to conceal the differences in the interpretation by Germany and Japan of the general military situation. The Japanese Press, for instance, commented with great restraint on the military situation on the Soviet-German front which had arisen as a result of the ignominious failure
of Hitler's summer offensive in 1943. The influential Japanese newspaper, the Asahi, wrote on the 29th July:

"The salient feature of this year's summer campaign is the fact that the Soviets have assumed the offensive. The experience of the last two years of the Soviet-German war shows that in the summer the Germans take the offensive whereas in the winter the Soviets undertake counter attacks. However, during this summer the Soviets have gone over from a strategy of defence to that of offence. This fact shows that one cannot ignore the fighting power of the Soviet Union. The German-Soviet war has taken a new turn."

These half admissions of an influential Japanese newspaper show that in Japan as well, a more sober estimate of the military prospects of Hitlerite Germany is gaining ground. Similar statements were made not long ago by other Japanese papers also.

The mighty blows inflicted by the valiant Red Army on the German military machine have brought Germany and her European vassals to the verge of disaster. There is growing disillusionment in Japan about the military strength of Germany. Indisputably Japan expected from her German Ally much greater support for herself in her war against the United States and England.

The Hitlerites no less than the Japanese have been disillusioned about their allies—above all, because Japan evinced sufficient political insight in not getting involved in Hitler's military adventure against the Soviet Union.

Japanese-German relations will inevitably be influenced by the colossal shake-up of the German military machine and the decline in the prestige of Hitlerism. However, it should be borne in mind that the military failures of Hitlerite Germany are causing contradictory reactions on Japanese-German relations. On the one hand, the Axis allies are losing confidence in each other and the diversity of their final aims is becoming more and more apparent. But on the other hand, the military alliance between Germany and Japan remains valid, as Japan fears the consequences which a sudden and complete defeat of German imperialism may have, while Germany is interested more than at any other time in retaining her military alliance with Japan.

At the present stage of the war Germany and Japan are interested in a maximum prolongation of military operations and in postponing the termination of the war which would threaten them in the most unpleasant consequences.

At certain stages of the war both Germany and Japan were able to score victories. But these victories were determined exclusively by favourable conditions of a temporary nature, by factors of transient significance. While embarking on their military adventure both Germany and Japan based their main hopes on the military unpreparedness of their enemies, on the effectiveness of a sudden blow and on psychological factors connected with false and bare-faced propaganda about their supposed supremacy and 'invulnerability' and so on.

On the limitless fields of Russia the Hitlerites have irretrievably lost their advantages. Facts are proving that the temporary advantages of Japan are likewise a thing of the past. Japan has lost her strategic initiative. She would now do well to recall the old oriental proverb 'having saddled a tiger, it is not easy to dismount from him.'

At all events, Japan cannot any longer count on receiving effective help from Germany. The Germans are now concerned only with saving their own skins. Germany is standing on the brink of an inevitable and fast-approaching catastrophe.

MORE TROUBLE FOR JAPAN

— BY E. ZHUKOV, Doctor of History

(War and the Working Class, March 1944)

The war in the Pacific Ocean has entered upon a new phase. The Anglo-American armed forces have completely seized the strategic initiative. For the first time since the beginning of the war Japanese possessions in the Pacific Ocean—the Marshall Islands—have become the immediate objective of an American counter-offensive. A considerable number of these islands have in fact already passed into American hands. On January 20th of the current year, while preparing public opinion for further possible territorial losses, Akivama, representing the Japanese War Press Bureau, "soothed" the Japanese with these words: "The existence of our first line of
defence makes it possible to set up a second line of defence.”

In the statement of the Japanese Prime Minister Tojo made on the 22nd February, it was pointed out that “the latest military events are a prelude to the approach of the decisive moment on which the nation’s future destiny actually hinges.”

In the year 1942, especially in its first half, Japan boasted of her “grandiose” military successes and some Japanese even revelled in a vision of an immediate and honourable peace based on the capitulations of England and the U.S.A. But the situation has now radically changed: there are at this hour but few in the country who believe in victory. The optimistic declarations of ministers are loudly contradicted by actual facts. However much they may try, Japanese official circles are unable to conceal from the people the signal defeats sustained by the Japanese armed forces during the last few months on practically all fronts of the Pacific theatre of war.

From the islands on the northern and north-eastern fringes of Australia, from the islands of New Guinea and New Britain, the Japanese have had slowly to withdraw under the pressure of General MacArthur’s army. On the Indian frontier, in Burma, the Allies have concentrated such considerable forces that the Japanese have been seriously disturbed over the possibilities of a strong British counter-offensive. Japan’s abortive attempts, made since the beginning of February 1944, to steal a march on her adversary and to pass over to the offensive on different sectors of the Burmese front, were in fact forced on her and it is now already evident that the Japanese plan to inflict a “preventive” blow on the Allied troops in Burma has, to all intents and purposes, miscarried.

In the Chinese theatre of war, there have been practically no big engagements during the last few months. At all events, nowhere have the Japanese been able to score any success whatsoever.

The Japanese fleet no longer ventures on active operations. It is content to perform much more modest and essentially defensive tasks, such as protecting the extended lines of communication linking Japan with territories temporarily seized by her. It is very significant that the Japanese fleet, at the beginning of this year, could not hinder the American fleet and air force from effecting landings on the Marshall Islands. The combined operations of American armed forces in the central sector of the Pacific Ocean bear testimony to a growing skill in executing operations and to the considerable “punch” and offensive power of American weapons. As the Japanese themselves admit, following the landing operations by Americans on the Marshall Islands and the air assault on the Caroline and Mariana group of islands, they should now expect large-scale military operations to be initiated by the Allies even in the immediate vicinity of Japan proper.

In the North Pacific Ocean, as far back as 1943, Japanese troops evacuated the Aleutian Islands which had been partially occupied by them, thus surrendering a most important base for operations against Alaska and Canada.

This complete change in the military situation was primarily caused by the fact that the Japanese aggressor had met with serious and ever growing resistance from the Anglo-American armed forces: Their numerical strength had increased, but, what is even more important, their quality had also improved. Consequently in a number of sectors the Americans and the English have now absolute technical superiority over the Japanese.

The Japanese man in the street, accustomed as he is to blatant victory propaganda, has become confused—he cannot make out how it could happen that the “despised” English or such a “non-martial nation” as the Americans could prove equal to the task of pressing the “Imperial troops” so hard.

It is difficult for the Japanese, intoxicated by the successes of the first year of the war, to reconcile themselves to the idea that those successes are now a thing of the past. The times have indeed changed.

The first stage of the war in the Pacific had much in common with the initial period in the development of the war in Europe in 1939-41, when Hitlerite Germany won rather cheaply her false reputation of “invincibility” in such countries as disorganized Poland, or in Daladier’s France undermined as that country’s power of resistance was. Japanese militarism, like German Fascism in Europe, gained at the outset considerable advantages by the suddenness of the assault and profited in some cases by isolated acts of treachery, and in others by the military unpreparedness and lack of coordination among its adversaries.

The weakness of the Japanese, as compared with their adversaries, prompted them to base their calculations on the effect of the first violent, lightning blows. The Hitlerian theory of “blitzkrieg” was extremely dear to the heart of the General Staff at Tokyo. The strategic plan of Japanese impe-
rialism was as opportunist as the strategy of Hitlerism. Apparently, this has now begun to be realized in Japan as well.

As soon as the favoursable but transient factors ceased to operate to Japan’s advantage, the military situation began at once to change to her disadvantage. The prolongation of the war now promises to Japan not an expansion of her colonial empire under the flag of “Greater East Asia,” but it threatens her with economic impotence and military as well as political defeat. The crisis in the Pacific theatre coincided with a time when Japanese war economy, which had in its day been so much boosted by propaganda, began to give way under pressure of heavy demands which it was beyond its power to meet. Whereas the economic war potential of the U.S.A. and England was not only not declining, but had considerably grown with the progress of the Second World War, the relative economic productive capacity of Japan as compared with that of her adversaries which even before the war had been very unfavourable to the former, now became even less propitious.

Modern war is a war of machines. The Japanese capacity for turning out vehicles and engines bears no comparison whatever with that of the Americans and the British. Japanese metallurgical capacity also cannot be compared with that of the Americans and British. It is enough to mention that while in the U.S.A., England and Canada tens of millions of people are engaged in the armaments industry, there are at present barely 2½ to 3 million workers engaged in all the Japanese heavy industries.

Japan is experiencing a grim metal famine. Her metallurgical and mechanical industries are unable to satisfy the growing demands of the Army and Navy. It is not without reason that a ceaseless propaganda drive is being made in Japan advocating the use of timber as a substitute for metal. Metalware is being forcibly taken from the people. In a number of towns even tramway posts are being replaced. The Government have persistently recommended and are already carrying out the large-scale production of wooden ships.

The problem of marine transport has become one of the acutest problems for Japanese imperialism. The losses in Japanese shipping in the course of the war have been so heavy that the task of replacing them is practically insoluble. In the words of President Roosevelt, the Allies are on an average sinking 130,000 tons of Japanese shipping every month, or one and a half million tons per annum. This is far in excess of the tonnage of shipping built in Japan, for at the utmost she can turn out only one million tons of new shipping per annum, that it to say, 20 times less than the U.S.A.

Japan’s efforts to solve the difficulty by rapidly building small transport vessels of a standard type with a displacement of 5,000 tons cannot produce the required result, for these vessels are too small to be profitably used for trans-ocean voyages. The campaign now being launched in Japan for the mass production of small wooden vessels with a displacement of 100—150 tons is even less capable of producing practical results. These vessels, which are suitable for coastal work cannot, of course, compensate for the loss of large merchant vessels. Japanese gains in the south are nullified by their inability to maintain a regular shipping service: they cannot procure anything from the occupied territories, or supply their troops there without an enormous transport fleet.

The salient feature of the war in the Pacific is the tremendous role played by sea-power in view of the immense stretches of open ocean that make up the main theatre of operations in this area. The Japanese Navy is, to a large degree fettered by the necessity of protecting extended lines of communications. This reduces its activities and adversely affects the general course of operations. The Japanese shipping industry cannot replace the very large losses suffered by the Navy. The balance of sea-power has now sharply changed in favour of the Allies and this refers only to the Pacific fleet of the U.S.A. and Great Britain. The unequal coefficient of sea-power will become still more threatening for Japan when considerable Allied naval forces now operating in the Atlantic are set free. The Japanese High Command does not even attempt to undertake, at present, any risky offensive naval operations and is husbanding its strength. This dooms Japan to a condition of relative passivity and wrecks the strategic initiative from her grasp.

The role of aircraft in the war in the Pacific is of peculiar importance. Towards the end of 1943 an official announcement was made at Washington to the effect that in the U.S.A. within a short time one aeroplane would be turned out every 6 minutes. This represents more than 8,500 machines per month. The actual production of aeroplanes in the U.S.A. has already considerably passed this goal, whereas the production of aeroplanes in Japan amounts to a maximum of 1,200 machines per
month. It is natural that this should evoke great alarm in that country.

The Japanese are likewise extremely worried over the condition of their anti-aircraft defences. The enforcement of the law passed by the 83rd Session of the Diet regarding the evacuation of cities and the decentralization of industries has met with considerable difficulties. During the whole period of the Pacific war, it was only once, in April 1942, that American aircraft bombed Japanese cities. But the effect—especially from the point of view of morale—was very serious. It is significant that the Japanese could think of no better expedient than to announce that they would shoot all captured American pilots taking part in air-raids on Japan. Some of them were actually shot.

The vain efforts of the rulers of Japan to grapple effectively with all the problems that have thus arisen have, for the most part, only led to a further exposure of the sharp contradictions in Japanese war economy.

The shortage of labour is an acute problem of Japanese wartime economy. The draconian measures to which the Government is resorting and which consist in a total mobilisation for labour purposes of every one from the age of 12 upwards, in the closing down of many schools and in the transfer of school children to industrial enterprises cannot meet the acute shortage of skilled technicians in the country.

Japan's financial difficulties are extremely great. Presenting to the Diet his budget for 1944 of 58 milliard yen, the Finance Minister glibly stated that "people should not spend more than 20% of their incomes on their own needs." General Tojo's Government has adopted the course of increasing taxation coupled with the issue of loans. As Japanese economists themselves admit, this is inseparable from the impoverishment of the people and an unprecedented growth of State indebtedness accompanied by the threat of inflation. The recently discharged Finance Minister Kayà tried to appease the people by saying that the higher the National Debt, the nearer would be victory and that "Japan would achieve victory when the National Debt amounts to 100 milliard yen." In his first broadcast speech on the 29th February of this year, Ishiwata, Kayà's successor in the ministerial portfolio, adopted his predecessor's argument and disposed of the problem of financial stringency with a sonorous phrase: "Victory will permit all increased taxes and the issue of loans to be discontinued."

Victory is, however, impossible, and the problem of financing the war is daily becoming for Japan more and more complicated. Even the temporary seizure of Chinese provinces and of the English, American, French, and Dutch possessions in South-East Asia is of little avail.

The official "Association for Assisting the Throne" is openly exhorting the people to a further "lowering of the standard of living" in the interests of national economy. It is, however, significant that this fascist "Association" has failed to become a mass political organisation. It has been subjected to endless reorganisation, a fact which reveals a profound internal crisis within its ranks and a disintegration that demonstrates the unpopularity of its "ideology."

The general attitude of the people shows that the Japanese are gradually beginning to realise the futile character of the war of conquest launched in alliance with Hitler. Reports of concrete instances of popular dissatisfaction with the war and with the regime of military dictatorship in Japan hardly ever get beyond the borders of the country. But there are indirect indications of the existence of such dissatisfaction. In January, 1944, the Japanese General Onishi made a public speech which contained threats addressed to those unwilling to conform to the wishes of the militarists. Onishi's actual words were as follows: "We know there are labourers in our country who think only of their own interests and hope for a return to conditions of free labour. Such people deserve...death."

The promulgation of a multitude of so-called extraordinary decrees imposing further serious restrictions on the living conditions and mode of existence of the civil population speaks eloquently of the great nervousness manifested by the Japanese Government. These decrees, passed "in connection with the growing acuteness of the war situation" since March 1944, provide only two days of rest a month for Government employees; restrict all tours of Government officers including those on business and require, on pain of severe penalties, the exercise of rigid economy in all spheres. The most serious significance is attached to the decisions on universal mobilisation for labour purposes of students of middle schools and universities and the extension of the law of compulsory labour to women. In connection with the mobilisation of students, "evacuated" buildings belonging to educational institutions are being handed over to military works or converted into military stores, hospitals and asylums. Government establish-
ments are being transferred from densely populated centres to the provinces or removed from buildings made of flimsy materials.

The slogan "simplification of the mode of life" is being very extensively used by the Japanese authorities.

Recently the Japanese Prime Minister Tojo said in an un-guarded moment that the key to Japan's victory was "total mobilisation." This mention of the Hitlerian "total mobilisation" could have had for the Japanese man in the street only the most unpleasant associations—associations equally to the disadvantage of the authorities.

In the first months of the war in the Pacific Ocean a turbid wave of chauvinism swamped Japan. Chauvinistic fanatics flourished in all its manifestations. This is now changing to a feeling of bitter disappointment. But, apparently, this has not yet been adequately realised by those Japanese circles, which, in spite of everything, are prepared to carry on the war regardless of loss, thus bringing fresh miseries to their country.

The re-organisation of General Tojo's Government and the recent changes in military administration in Japan leading to the amalgamation in the hands of the War and Navy Ministers of the functions of Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs lend emphasis to the efforts for the gearing-up of the Japanese war machine which has already shown signs of internal trouble.

Despairing of victory in battle, Japanese Imperialism is bestowing greater attention on political manoeuvres with the object of consolidating for itself territories seized by it and of preparing the ground on this basis for their so-called "peaceful offensive." The principal pattern of this "new policy" of Japanese Imperialism consists in its efforts to tie to its war-chariot the people of the countries of East Asia temporarily occupied by Japan. By using the demagogic slogan of "Pan-Asiaticism" Japan seeks to create a semblance of alliances voluntarily concluded between Japan and the Philippines, Japan and Burma and so on. With this end in view "pacts" are being concluded, "independent" puppet Governments are being organised and "national" armies are being formed in Japanese occupied territories. Unlike Germany, which enslaved free peoples and independent states in Europe, Japan has seized colonies or dependencies aspiring to independence. From this she seeks to extract the maximum advantage by exploiting, in her own interests, the legitimate aspirations of the peoples for freedom.

"Pan-Asiatic" propaganda is undoubtedly a definite trump-card in the Japanese political game. Japan wants to place before her adversaries the fact of the existence of "operating pacts", presumably regulating "normal" relations between the peoples of East Asia.

This is how Japanese diplomacy visualises its present task particularly now that the position of Hitlerite Germany is rapidly deteriorating. Japan is no longer counting on her ally and is therefore attaching greater importance to the utilisation in her war of the countries of East Asia. From this political-military reserve Japan is now evidently, expecting much more than from the famous Berlin-Tokyo "axis".

Japanese militarists are apparently dreaming of making the peoples of temporarily occupied countries pay for their slave-drivers. The use of "Pan-Asiatic" slogans and the farce of "independence" in the territories of China, the Philippines, Burma, Thailand etc., occupied by the Japanese armies are necessary for Japanese Imperialism in order to facilitate the conduct of their war of aggression. Japan is trying to mobilise, in her own interests and in order to prolong the war, not only the raw materials, but also the man-power of the countries of "Greater East Asia". The object in view is to utilise this labour-pool, but this is not all: Japanese militarists are preparing to use, as cannon-fodder, so-called Burmese, Filipino and Indian units which have been formed by them and consist of men duped by their agents.

At the 84th Session of the Diet, the Government spokesman stated in the Budget Committee that the Government intended to employ the man-power of China and Korea to supplement the dwindling ranks of Japanese labour. The seizure of the material wealth of the territories in Japanese temporary occupation is assuming such proportions that even the Vichy rulers of French Indo-China make attempts to protest.

Undoubtedly, in the first stage of the war the Japanese Imperialists did manage to dupe some people by spreading the lie that they were "liberating" the dependencies and colonies in East Asia.

With a view to encouraging a defeatist attitude among Indians and advertising the puppet "Free India Government", a title given to the agent of Japan and Germany—Subhas Chandra Bose, Japan has proclaimed that the Japanese occu-
pied Andaman and Nicobar Islands will be transferred to this Government at some future date.

The conference of "representatives of the peoples of Greater East Asia" convened by the Japanese in November 1943 adopted pompous resolutions about the close collaboration with Tokyo "for victory". Unlike the Chinese who have known the Japanese Imperialists too long and well, the peoples of the Philippines, Burma and Indonesia had not at the time the opportunity of knowing, from bitter personal experience, the true character of these uninvited liberators.

The Chinese struggling against the invaders of their country remain a veritable thorn in the flesh of the Japanese. That is why they are putting forth special efforts to bring about disintegration in the ranks of those fighting for the independence of the Chinese people, and to provoke internal treachery and treason, masking all their activities, of course, under "Pan-Asianic" slogans. The notorious Rash Behari Bose writes inviting, provocative letters to statesmen in China trying to persuade them to suspend their struggle with Japan and calling this "a return to the bosom of Asia."

There are, of course, definite and fairly narrow limits to any efforts aimed at deceiving the peoples of East Asia. Japanese Imperialists, who chaffer about the necessity of "delivering the peoples of the East from foreign exploitation" are plying with fire. They are evoking a spirit which they will not be able to control; for, in the long run it will be impossible, to confine within the framework of this demagoguery the aspirations for real freedom and independence which have been awakened among millions of people in the colonies in the East.

There are already symptoms that the Japanese themselves are afraid of the forces among the colonial peoples which they have released. They naturally do not contemplate reducing the strength of the army of occupation in the "independent" Philippines Republic. They are already "advising" the sponsors of the national movement in Indonesia to "wait" for the realisation of the promise of "independence" till the termination of the war. They have abolished Japanese civil administration in Burma on the pretext of giving her "independence," but have retained the military administration. In the occupied parts of China the Japanese are careful not to extend even the shadowy authority of their hireling Wang Ching Wei over all the territories controlled by them, and they maintain a "special regime" in North China. The official representatives of Japanese administration are now unceremoniously reminding the "liberated peoples" that as long as the war goes on, they must "forget about national frontiers" and only strengthen "collaboration" with Japan.

The heavy blows dealt at Hitlerian Fascism are having considerable effect on the position of all aggressive forces throughout the world. They are reflected in the position of Japan as well. The imminent destruction of Hitlerite Germany cannot but create exceptional difficulties for Japan in the Pacific Ocean.
History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik)

The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) is the textbook of Revolution. In it will be found all the experiences and lessons that lie behind the only successful socialist revolution that the world has yet seen.

It was written in 1937 by a special commission of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in order to fulfill a special need—to educate the members of the Party in the real spirit of Bolshevism and in the history of the Bolshevik Party.

It was Stalin who laid down the fundamental lines for the book and he personally took a leading part in writing it as its clear, concise and lucid style shows.

This textbook of Revolution is the history of the Bolshevik Party, the Party that led the Russian people through three Revolutions, that overthrew bourgeois rule and constructed a Socialist State, raising immeasurably higher the material and cultural level of one-sixth of the world. It is the history of a Party that to-day is leading the Russian people to victory in the greatest battles the world has ever seen.

It is not merely a history however. It is also a classic of Marxism-Leninism, of the science of the development of human society.

This epic has been translated into all the languages of the U.S.S.R. Within seven months of its first appearance in Russian, it was translated into 19 languages outside the Soviet Union, 100,000 copies are in circulation in the United States. The French version came out on April 11th 1939 and within three weeks 33,000 copies were sold. In little Sweden with only 6 million inhabitants, 50,000 copies have been sold and Holland with its 7 million inhabitants brought out a first edition of 25,000. In a number of countries, this history has already beaten all records as a best-seller; beating not only historical works but also in many cases novels.

In the Indian languages the history is already available in Hindi, Malayalam, Marathi, Bengali and Telugu. The Urdu edition is in the press and will come out very shortly.