Hegel’s Logic: An Essay in Interpretation. John Grier Hibben 1902

Chapter VI: A General Survey of The Logic

The Logic is divided into three parts –

I. The Doctrine of Being. (Die Lehre vom Seyn.)

II. The Doctrine of Essence, (Die Lehre vom Wesen.)

III. The Doctrine of the Notion, (Die Lehre vom Begrsiff.)

These divisions represent the successive stages in the progressive unfolding of our knowledge through which the various processes of thought come to their complete and final expression, They ore to he regarded as successive stages only in the sense that by our analysis we separate them in our thoughts, and think of one as following the other.

But in reality we should conceive of these elements of knowledge in such a manner on to regard one as lying within the other, and this in turn within the third. The progress indicated in their development is one not of advance so much as a deepening insight into more and more fundamental attributes and relations.

The doctrine of being is the result of an answer to the question as to what a thing is.

The doctrine of essence, in answer to the question of what is it composed and by what is it constituted.

The doctrine of the notion, in answer to the question, to what end is it designed and is it capable of progressing.

The complete knowledge of a thing, therefore, embraces the categories of its being, the ground of its being, and the purpose of its being.

It will he readily seen that the first category involves the second, in order to complete its meaning, and that the second involves the third in a like manner, and that the third underlies the other two. For the being of a thing becomes definitely known to us only when we are able to refer it to its appropriate ground, and when we possess some insight as to whence it came and by what processes its being is maintained and perfected; also the ground of its being finds its full significance only in the consideration of the end which it is realizing and which its being subserves.

Thus, the question what implies the question whence; and the question whence leads irresistibly to the question whither.

We may call the category of being the logic of description; that of essence, the logic of explanation; that of the notion, the logic of the final cause.

The first category, that of being, represents knowledge when reduced to its simplest terms. The affirmation of all others that possesses the least significance is that merely of being pure and simple when it stands without further qualification or specification, so that were anything less asserted of an object, knowledge would he reduced to zero.

There are certain terms by which Hegel is wont to characterize being, and an understanding of which will give as an insight into the meaning of the doctrine of being and at the same time prepare us for the appreciation of the fundamental distinction which he claws between being and essence. Being, for instance, is referred to by Hegel variously as abstract, as identity, as absolute identity; again as abstract identity, as immediate, as undetermined, acid as being in itself (an sich).

By “abstract” is meant that which is partial and is complete. The category of being is always spoken of as abstract, representing as it does the first rough draft of knowledge, and necessarily making the beginning of that which us yet is incomplete and undeveloped.

The term “identity” as applied to being means a uniform sameness or homogeneity, which shows no distinction of parts or diversity of elements within itself, and which sustains no relations, as far as known, to anything beyond itself. It is, therefore, a term used to imply that mere being as regards any definite characteristics or qualities which it may possess is colorless, and as regards any relations which it may sustain to other things, is completely isolated.

The phrase “absolute identity” is only an emphatic expression for the term “identity,” and is equivalent to the phrase “mere identity” or mere “sameness.” The phrase “abstract identity “is a combination of the two ideas, abstract and identity. It is equivalent to the phrase “an incomplete and colorless view of things.” The term “immediate,” as we have already seen, when applied to knowledge, signifies that which is given as a totality, without any reference to the elements which constitute it, or to the processes by which it is produced. Immediate knowledge is that which is not subjected to any analysis whatsoever, and such is the nature of mere being.

The word “undetermined” signifies the lack of any definite qualities or attributes, and has the force of the adjective “indefinite” when applied to being.

The phrase “in itself” (an sich) means that which is implicit or potential; it is used in distinction to the phrase “of itself” (für sich) which signifies that which is explicit. While the former applies to being, the latter applies to essence, indicating that the one is explicitly what the other is implicitly. Thus, being is to be regarded merely as a transition state of knowledge, the veriest beginning of knowledge in fact, inasmuch as that which may become definite and determined as essential being, is still indefinite and undetermined as mere being. It, however, does contain the potential of all that appears explicitly in essence, come now to consider the chief characteristics of essence in contrast to those of being.

The essence is the result of a deeper insight than is represented by mere being. The essence of a thing is what it is, regarded no longer as an isolated fact but as a part of a system of interrelated elements. The idea of system is closely associated with a technical term which Hegel uses constantly in connection with the category of essence; it is the word “reflection.” The essence of a thing is revealed only when we see the thing in its complete setting, and when we possess a thorough knowledge of the relations which it sustains to every part of the system to which it maybe referred. The thing, therefore, does not shine in its own light so much as in the light reflected from all the coordinate elements with which it is related. We know a thing only when it is in the focal point of the illumination due to its complete setting. It is in this sense that Hegel says that the essence of a thing is known by means of the category of reflection.

Moreover, in order to understand fully the essence of a thing we must analyze the total mass of surface appearances, and disclose the underlying elements and processes which have given rise to its being.

As mere being, the thing appears as an unanalyzed whole, a simple product without any reference to the processes which have produced it.

In this analysis into constituent elements and formative processes we employ in our thought the category of mediation. Mediation is the process by which a thing comes to he what it is as regards its inherent nature and essential characteristics; it emphasizes especially the means by which the end in question is attained.

Again, while being is always referred to as indefinite and undetermined, essence, on the contrary, is being which has become definite and determined, The definiteness which is characteristic of essence is reached through a process called negation. To make definite, means to mark off distinct limits, beyond which the thing in question ceases to he what it is. The process of negation is therefore the setting up of bounds about a thing, forming an enclosing line which we may call the line of negation, as beyond that line there is nothing which can he regarded as properly belonging to the essence of the thing which is thus limited. Mere being, as we have seen, is homogeneous throughout, lacking all characteristic color and determination, and this defect of being is obviated by disclosing its various parts and their reciprocal relations, but in doing this the several parts mast be distinguished one from another, and the accomplishment of this is one of the functions of the process of negation.

Negation, therefore, may he defined as the process of revealing the specific differences between things, or between the several elements and functions of one and the same thing. It is, in a sense, a twofold process, – the discrimination of a thing from all that is external to it, and also the analysis of a thing into its component elements and functions, It is a term, as used by Hegel, which is equivalent to the term “differentiation,” which has entered so largely into the terminology of biological investigation and theory. The differentiation, for instance, of an egg in the process of development is the breaking up of its initial homogeneity, which we might call its mere being, into the related parts revealed in the living organism of the bird newly hatched. It is in this differentiation that the essential nature of the bird is fully disclosed. The Hegelian idea of negation is embodied in the dictum of Spinoza: Omnis determinatis est negatis, that is, we determine the characteristic and essential feature of a thing by a sharp distinction between that which it is and that which it is not. When no line of distinction is drawn, knowledge is a blur. It is without definition; just as we say a photographic plate is without definition when we mean that the lines are not clear and clean-cut.

As essence may be regarded as the development and completion of the category of being, in like manner the category of the notion is the development and completion of that of essence. Each stage marks a deeper penetration, and a progress towards the fairness of knowledge. If we inquire as to the nature of the process which necessarily underlies anything regarded merely as a product, are have raised the question as to its essence; and if then we probe deeper and inquire as to the thought which has devised the process, and is at the same time both the dynamic source of the process itself and its complete realization as well, we have raised the question as to its notion, – that is, creative and sustaining reason. The notion, therefore, embraces the truth, both of being and of essence.

It has been before remarked that the category of being represents immediate knowledge, – that is, the acceptance of an object of knowledge as a fact merely while yet unanalyzed and unexplained; and that the category of essence represents mediated knowledge, – that is, knowledge analyzed and explained. The category of the notion, therefore, may he regarded as the combination of these two kinds of knowledge. It embraces immediate knowledge in the sense of comprehending, from the beginning, the end to be realized as a finished product; it is mediated knowledge as well, in the sense of its being the knowledge of the process, which is necessary in order to realize the end in question. It possesses at the some time the capacity of originating and directing that process.

Moreover, being has been represented as knowledge which is indefinite and undetermined, and essence as knowledge definite and determined; the notion, therefore, in this connections may be defined as the principle of reasons which has the capacity of determining itself, – that is, of transforming the indefinite and undetermined into the definite and determined, by its own inherent self-activity.

Again, being has been represented as homogeneous, without any differentiation of its parts, and essence as the breaking up this dull level of sameness into distinct parts; the notion, therefore, may he regarded as the capacity for self-differentiation or self-specification.

As being is the potential, and essence the actual, the notion maybe regarded m the capacity for effecting the transition from the potential to the actual, or the capacity of self-realization, These ideas of self-realization, self-determination, and self-specification, characterize the notion under the several aspects of development, freedom, and individuality. Such a principle as this, which is able freely to realize its own ends, is, according to Hegel, to be considered not so much in the light of a substance, underlying and constituting the essential being of all things, as a subject, because every manifestation of which it is the ground is a self-manifestation. The first and second parts of the logic, the doctrines of being and of essence, Hegel characterizes as objective, used the third, the doctrine of the notion, as subjective.

Being and essence represent the manifestation in the world of reality, the notion represents both the basis of that manifestation and the end of it as well.

It will he seen that the Hegelian system, as a whole, represents a progressive evolution, and it is of some interest to note that as a process of evolution it is characterized by Hegel in almost the same terms as Mr. Spencer employs inn his well-known definition of biological evolution.

“Evolution,” says he, “is a change from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, through successive differentiations and integrations.” The change which is indicated by the Spencerian definition occurs between two states of an organism; the first corresponds to that of mere being, the second to that of essence. The same terms, “indefinite” and “incoherent,” are used by Hegel to characterize the state of mere being.

The term “homogeneity” has a significance similar to the Hegelian phrase of abstract identity, that is, without distinction and characterization of its parts. So also tine opposite terms “definite” and “coherent” permit of an exact application to the state of essence. The term “heterogeneity “indicates, moreover, the state in which the initial sameness has been resolved into separate elements possessing distinctive characteristics, and may in all propriety he applied to the Hegelian conception of essence.

The transition from the one state to the other is regarded by Spencer as a process which is mediated through successive differentiations and integrations. “Differentiation” corresponds to the precess of mediation by negation in the Hegelian terminology, and “integration” to the synthesis which is the resulting product of such a process. As every integration, according to Spencer, implies a previous differentiation, so according to Hegel every so-called immediate element of knowledge moist be regarded as a product applying a previous mediation or process which has produced it, Or, to use another characteristic phrase of Hegel’s, while the Spencerian idea of differentiation corresponds to the process of negation, integration may be regarded as corresponding to the process which Hegel calls absolute negation, – that is, the negation of a former negation, which produces the effect of a new synthesis or affirmation.

There is, however, a marked point of departure in reference to the Hegelian conception of evolution in contrast to that of Mr. Spencer. The latter’s definition contains nothing which corresponds to the Hegelian category of the notion. As to what may underlie the series of never ceasing changes, as to the origin of the series itself and its final consummation, there is in the philosophy of Mr. Spencer only the great Unknowable, here, Mr. Spencer would insist, is reason’s barrier; beyond lies the region of conjecture of sentiment, and of hope but not of knowledge.

To an agnostic position such as this, Hegel would enter a vigorous protest and would urge that, given being and essence, the thing and its historical evolution, forming a part of the cosmic series of progressive development, the thought is then necessarily constrained to postulate a constructive and determining principle of reason, as the intelligent source and end of it all, Hegel maintains, moreover, that this principle of reason which is sufficient to account for the cosmic evolution from the beginning to the end, which is a self contained, free activity, creating and sustaining all things within its power, its wisdom and its goodness, can he no other than that which is the Absolute, which is God. When Hegel takes the position, as we have already noticed, that the underlying ground of all things must he regarded as a subject rather than a substance, thence the transition to the identification of this subject with the Absolute or God seems a most natural one. And it will he seen as we advance in the further exposition of the Logic that the momentum of the entire dialectical movement renders such a conclusion necessary.

Part I The Doctrine of Being

Das Seyn ist nicht zu empfinden, nicht anzuschauen und nicht vorzustellen, sondern es ist der reine Gedanke und als solcher macht es den Anfang. – Hegel.