

Selected
Works
of
**MAO
TSE-
TUNG**

Volume
Two

AUGUST
1937


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LONDON
LAWRENCE & WISHART LTD
1954

First Published 1954

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PRINTED AND BOUND IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY JARROLD AND SONS LTD, NORWICH

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ON CONTRADICTION

This philosophical essay was written as a companion-piece to *On Practice*, with the same object of combating the serious mistakes of doctrinairism existing in the Party at the time. It was originally delivered as a lecture at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College in Yen-an. On its inclusion in the present collection, the author has made certain additions, deletions and revisions.

The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the most basic law in materialist dialectics. Lenin said: "In its proper meaning, dialectics is the study of the contradiction within the very essence of things".¹ Lenin often called this law the essence of dialectics; he also called it the kernel of dialectics.² Therefore, in studying this law, we cannot but touch upon a wide range of subjects, upon a great number of problems of philosophy. If we can clear up all these problems we shall arrive at a basic understanding of materialist dialectics. These problems are: the two world outlooks; the universality of contradiction; the particularity of contradiction; the principal contradiction and the principal aspect of a contradiction; the identity and the struggle of the aspects of a contradiction; the role of antagonism in contradiction.

Great interest has been aroused among us by the criticism levelled at the idealism of the Deborin school in Soviet philosophical circles in recent years. Deborin's idealism has exerted a very bad influence in the Chinese Communist Party, and it must be admitted that doctrinaire ways of thought in our Party have something to do with this school's style in work. Thus the principal objective of our philosophical studies at present should be the eradication of doctrinaire ways of thought.

I. THE TWO WORLD OUTLOOKS

In the history of human knowledge, there have always been two views concerning the laws of development of the world; the metaphysical view and the dialectical view, which form two

NOTE

The work "On Contradiction", written as a companion piece to "On Practice" which appears in the first volume of the Selected Works, will in future editions also be included in the first volume.

mutually opposed world outlooks. Lenin said: "The two basic (or two possible? or historically observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of the one into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation)".³ What Lenin was referring to is these two different world outlooks.

For a very long period of history both in China and in Europe, metaphysics formed part of the idealist world outlook and occupied a dominant position in human thought. In the early days of the bourgeoisie in Europe, materialism was also metaphysical. The Marxist materialist-dialectical world outlook emerged because in many European countries social economy had entered the stage of highly developed capitalism, the productive forces, the class struggle and the sciences had all developed to a level unprecedented in history, and the industrial proletariat had become the greatest motive force in historical development. Then among the bourgeoisie, besides an openly avowed, extremely barefaced reactionary idealism, there also emerged vulgar evolutionism to oppose materialist dialectics.

The so-called metaphysical world outlook or the world outlook of vulgar evolutionism consists in looking at the world from an isolated, static and one-sided viewpoint. It regards all things in the world, their forms and their species, as for ever isolated from one another and for ever changeless. Whatever change there is, means merely an increase or decrease in quantity or a transplacement in space. Moreover, the cause of such an increase or decrease or transplacement does not lie inside things, but outside them, that is, propulsion by external forces. Metaphysicians hold that all varieties of things in the world, as well as their characteristics, have remained unchanged ever since the moment they came into being. Any subsequent change is a mere quantitative expansion or contraction. They hold that a thing can only be repeatedly reproduced as the self-same thing for ever and cannot change into something different. In their eyes, capitalist exploitation, capitalist competition, the ideology of individualism in capitalist society, and so on, can all be found in the slave society of antiquity,

or even in primitive society, and will exist for ever without any change. They trace the causes of social development to conditions external to society, like geography and climate. They naively seek outside the things themselves for the cause of their development and repudiate the theory advanced by materialist dialectics that it is the contradictions inside things that cause their development. Therefore they cannot explain the multiplicity of the qualities of things; nor can they explain the phenomenon of one quality changing into another. In Europe, this mode of thought existed as mechanistic materialism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and as vulgar evolutionism at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. In China, the metaphysical mode of thought that "Heaven changes not, and the Way too changes not",⁴ was for a long time supported by the decadent feudal ruling classes. Imported from Europe in the last hundred years, mechanistic materialism and vulgar evolutionism have been supported by the bourgeoisie.

Contrary to the metaphysical world outlook, the materialist-dialectical world outlook advocates the study of the development of things from the inside, from the relationship of a thing to other things, namely, that the development of things should be regarded as their internal and necessary self-movement, that a thing in its movement and the things round it should be regarded as interconnected and interacting upon each other. The basic cause of development of things does not lie outside but inside them, in their internal contradictions. The movement and development of things arise because of the presence of such contradictions inside all of them. This contradiction within a thing is the basic cause of its development, while the relationship of a thing with other things—their interconnection and interaction—is a secondary cause. Thus materialist dialectics forcefully combats the theory of external causes, or of propulsion, advanced by metaphysical mechanistic materialism and vulgar evolutionism. It is evident that purely external causes can only lead to the mechanical motion of things, that is, to changes in size and quantity, but cannot explain why things are qualitatively different in a thousand and one ways and why things change into one another. As a matter of fact, even a

mechanical motion of things propelled by some external force is also brought about through their internal contradictions. Mere growth in plants and animals and their quantitative development are also chiefly caused by their internal contradictions. Similarly, social development is chiefly due not to external but internal causes. Many countries exist under almost the same geographical and climatic conditions, yet they are extremely different and uneven in their development. Tremendous social changes take place even in one and the same country while no change has occurred in its geography and climate. Imperialist Russia changed into the socialist Soviet Union and feudal, insulated Japan changed into imperialist Japan, while no change has occurred in the geography and climate of these two countries. China, for long dominated by feudalism, has undergone great changes in the last hundred years and is now changing in the direction of a new China, liberated and free; yet no change has occurred in her geography and climate. Changes are taking place in the geography and climate of the earth as a whole and in every part of it, but they are very insignificant when compared with changes in society; in the former the changes manifest themselves in terms of tens of thousands or millions of years, while in the latter they manifest themselves in mere thousands, hundreds, tens, or even a few years or even months (as in times of revolution). According to the viewpoint of materialist dialectics, changes in nature are chiefly due to the development of the internal contradictions in nature. Changes in society are chiefly due to the development of the internal contradictions in society, namely, the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, the contradiction between the classes, and the contradiction between the old and the new; it is the development of these contradictions that impels society forward and starts the process of the supersession of the old society by a new one. Does materialist dialectics leave external causes out of account? Not at all. Materialist dialectics considers external causes to be the condition of change and internal causes to be the basis of change, external causes becoming operative through internal causes. In a suitable temperature an egg changes into a chicken, but there is no such

temperature as can change a stone into a chicken, the fundamentals of the two things being different. There is a constant interaction between the peoples of different countries. In the era of capitalism, especially in the era of imperialism and the proletarian revolution, interaction and mutual stimulation, political, economic and cultural, between various countries have been extremely great. The October Socialist Revolution ushered in a new epoch not only in Russian history but also in world history, exerting an influence on the internal changes in all countries of the world and, in a similar and yet particularly profound way, on the internal changes in China; such changes, however, arose from an inner necessity in those countries as well as in China. Two armies engage in battle; one is victorious and the other defeated; both victory and defeat are determined by internal causes. One is victorious either because of its strength or because of its correct command; the other is defeated either because of its weakness or because of its incompetent command: it is through internal causes that external causes become operative. In 1927 the Chinese big bourgeoisie defeated the proletariat, operating through the opportunism existing within the Chinese proletariat itself (within the Chinese Communist Party). When we liquidated this opportunism, the Chinese revolution resumed its advance. Later, the Chinese revolution again suffered severe blows from the enemy, because adventurism appeared within our Party. When we liquidated this adventurism, our cause once more resumed its advance. Thus, to lead the revolution to victory, a political party must rely upon the correctness of its own political line and the consolidation of its own organisation.

The dialectical world outlook had already emerged in ancient times both in China and in Europe. But ancient dialectics has something spontaneous and naïve about it; being based upon the social and historical conditions of those times, it was not formulated into an adequate theory, hence it could not fully explain the world, and was later supplanted by metaphysics. The famous German philosopher Hegel, who lived from the late eighteenth century to the early nineteenth, made very important contributions to dialectics, but his is idealist dialectics. It was not until Marx and Engels, the great men of

action of the proletarian movement, made a synthesis of the positive achievements in the history of human knowledge and, in particular, critically absorbed the rational elements of Hegelian dialectics and created the great theory of dialectical materialism and historical materialism, that a great, unprecedented revolution took place in the history of human knowledge. Later Lenin and Stalin have further developed this great theory. Introduced into China, this theory immediately brought about tremendous changes in the world of Chinese thought.

This dialectical world outlook teaches man chiefly how to observe and analyse skilfully the movement of opposites in various things and, on the basis of such analysis, to find out the methods of solving the contradictions. Consequently, it is of paramount importance for us to understand concretely the law of contradiction in things.

2. THE UNIVERSALITY OF CONTRADICTION

For convenience in exposition, I shall deal here first with the universality of contradiction, and then with the particularity of contradiction. Only a brief remark is needed to explain the former, because many people have accepted the universality of contradiction ever since the great creators and continuers of Marxism—Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin—established the materialist-dialectical world outlook and applied materialist dialectics with very great success to many aspects of the analysis of human history and of natural history, to many aspects of changes in society and in nature (as in the Soviet Union); but there are still many comrades, especially the doctrinaires, who are not clear about the problem of the particularity of contradiction. They do not understand that the universality of contradiction resides precisely in the particularity of contradiction. Nor do they understand how very significant it is for our further guidance in revolutionary practice to study the particularity of contradiction in the concrete things confronting us. Therefore, the problem of the particularity of contradiction should be studied with special attention and explained at sufficient length. For this reason, when we analyse the law of contradiction in things, we should first analyse the universality of

contradiction, then analyse with special attention the particularity of contradiction, and finally return to the universality of contradiction.

The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end.

Engels said: "Motion itself is a contradiction."⁵ Lenin defined the law of the unity of opposites as "the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society)".⁶ Are these views correct? Yes, they are. The interdependence of the contradictory aspects of a thing and the struggle between them determine the life and impel the development of that thing. There is nothing that does not contain contradiction; without contradiction there would be no world.

Contradiction is the basis of simple forms of motion (*e.g.* mechanical motion) and still more the basis of complex forms of motion.

Engels explained the universality of contradiction in these terms:

"If simple mechanical change of place contains a contradiction, this is even more true of the higher forms of motion of matter, and especially of organic life and its development. . . . Life consists just precisely in this—that a living thing is at each moment itself and yet something else. Life is therefore also a contradiction which is present in things and processes themselves, and which constantly originates and solves itself; and as soon as the contradiction ceases, life too comes to an end, and death steps in. We likewise saw that also in the sphere of thought we could not avoid contradictions, and that, for example, the contradiction between man's inherently unlimited faculty of knowledge and its actual realisation in men who are limited by their external conditions and limited also in their intellectual faculties finds its solution in what is, for us at least, a practically endless succession of generations, in infinite progress.

“... One of the basic principles of higher mathematics is the contradiction. . . .

“But even lower mathematics teems with contradictions.”⁷

Lenin likewise explained the universality of contradiction as follows:

“In mathematics: + and —; differential and integral.

In mechanics: action and reaction.

In physics: positive and negative electricity.

In chemistry: the combination and dissociation of atoms.

In social science: the class struggle.”⁸

In war, offence and defence, advance and retreat, victory and defeat are all contradictory phenomena. Without the one, the other cannot exist. These two aspects struggle as well as unite with each other, constituting the totality of the war, impelling the war's development and solving the war's problems.

Every difference in man's concepts should be regarded as reflecting objective contradictions. Objective contradictions are reflected in subjective thought, constituting the movement in opposites of concepts, impelling the development of thought, and ceaselessly solving the problems that arise in man's thinking.

Within the Party, opposition and struggle between different ideas occur constantly; they reflect in the Party the class contradictions and the contradictions between the old and the new things in society. If in the Party there were neither contradictions nor ideological struggles to solve them, the Party's life would come to an end.

Thus the point is already clear: whether in simple or complex forms of motion, whether in objective or ideological phenomena, contradiction exists universally and in all processes. But does contradiction also exist at the initial stage of every process? In the process of development of everything, is there a movement of opposites from beginning to end?

Judging from the discussions in Soviet philosophical circles, the Deborin school holds the view that contradiction does not appear at the very beginning of a process, but only at a certain stage of its development. Consequently, up to that moment, the development of the process is not due to internal causes but to external ones. Thus, Deborin returns to the metaphysical

theory of external causes and of mechanism. Applying such a view in the analysis of concrete problems, his school holds that under existing conditions in the Soviet Union, there are only differences but no contradictions between the kulaks and the peasants in general, thus agreeing entirely with Bukharin's view. In analysing the French Revolution, it holds that before the Revolution there were only differences but no contradictions in the Third Estate composed of the workers, the peasants and the bourgeoisie. These views are anti-Marxist. The Deborin school does not understand that every difference in the world already contains a contradiction, that difference implies precisely contradiction. Labour and capital have been in contradiction ever since they came into being, though at first the contradiction was not yet intensified. Even under the social conditions of the Soviet Union a difference exists between the workers and the peasants; this difference is a contradiction, though, unlike that between labour and capital, it will not become intensified into antagonism or assume the form of class struggle: in the course of socialist construction the workers and the peasants have formed a firm alliance and will gradually solve this contradiction in the process of development from socialism to communism. This is a question of distinction in the character of contradictions, not a matter of the presence or absence of them. Contradiction is universal, absolute, existing in all processes of the development of things and running through all processes from beginning to end.

What is the emergence of a new process? It is this: when the old unity and its constituent opposites yield place to a new unity and its constituent opposites, a new process emerges in place of the old. The old process is completed and the new one emerges. As the new process in its turn contains a new contradiction, the history of the development of its own contradiction begins.

Lenin pointed out that Marx in his *Capital* had given a model analysis of the movement of opposites which runs through the process of development of things from beginning to end. This is a method that must be applied in studying the process of development of all things. Lenin himself also correctly applied it and adhered to it in all his writings.

"In his *Capital* Marx first analyses the simplest, most ordinary, fundamental, most common and everyday *relation* of bourgeois (commodity) society, a relation that is encountered billions of times, viz., the exchange of commodities. In this very simple phenomenon (in this 'cell' of bourgeois society) analysis reveals *all* the contradictions (or the germs of *all* the contradictions) of modern society. The subsequent exposition shows us the development (*both* growth *and* movement) of these contradictions and of this society in the sum of its individual parts, from its beginning to its end."

Having said this, Lenin continued: "Such must also be the method of exposition (or study) of dialectics in general."⁹

Chinese Communists must master this method before they can correctly analyse the history and the present condition of the Chinese revolution as well as define its perspectives.

3. THE PARTICULARITY OF CONTRADICTION

Contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and contradiction runs through the process of development of each thing from beginning to end; this is the universality and absoluteness of contradiction which we have discussed above. Now we shall speak of the particularity and relativity of contradiction.

This problem should be approached from several angles. First, the contradiction in each form of motion of matter has its particularity. Man's knowledge of matter is a knowledge of the forms of motion of matter, because there is nothing in the world except matter in motion and the motion of matter must assume certain forms. In considering each form of motion of matter, we must take into account the points which each has in common with other forms of motion. But what is especially important and constitutes the basis of our knowledge of things is that we must take into account the particular points of the motion of matter, namely, the qualitative difference between one form of motion and other forms. Only when we have taken this into account can we distinguish between things. Any form of motion contains within itself its own particular contradiction.

This particular contradiction constitutes the particular quality which distinguishes one thing from all others. This is the internal cause or, as it may be called, the basis of the thousand and one ways in which things are different from one another. In nature many forms of motion exist: mechanical motion, sound, light, heat, electricity, decomposition, combination, and so on. All these forms depend upon one another as well as differ from one another qualitatively. The particular quality possessed by each form is determined by its own particular contradiction. This holds good not only of nature but also of society, and of thought. Every form of society, every mode of thought has its particular contradiction and particular quality.

The classification of scientific studies is based precisely upon the particular contradictions inherent in their objects. Thus a certain kind of contradiction peculiar to a certain field of phenomena constitutes the subject matter of a certain branch of science. For example, positive numbers and negative numbers in mathematics; action and reaction in mechanics; positive and negative electricity in physics; decomposition and combination in chemistry; productive forces and relations of production, classes and the struggle between the classes in social science; offence and defence in military science; idealism and materialism; the metaphysical outlook and the dialectical outlook in philosophy, and so on—it is because they each possess a particular contradiction and a particular quality that they are studied in different sciences. Of course, without recognising the universality of contradiction, we can in no way discover the universal cause or universal basis of the development of the motion of things; however, without studying the particularity of contradiction, we can in no way determine the particular quality of a thing that differs from those of other things, discover the particular cause or particular basis of the development of the motion of things, distinguish one thing from another, or mark out the fields of scientific study.

According to the sequence in man's process of knowing, there is always a gradual extension from a knowledge of the individual thing to a knowledge of things in general. Man can proceed to generalisations and know the qualities common to things only after he has known the qualities peculiar to each of

a great number of things. When man already knows such common qualities, he uses this knowledge as a guide and goes on to study various concrete things which have not yet been studied or have not yet been thoroughly studied, so as to find out their peculiar qualities; only thus can he supplement, enrich and develop his knowledge of the common qualities, and prevent such knowledge from becoming something withered and petrified. These are the two processes of knowing: one is from the particular to the general, and the other is from the general to the particular. Man's knowledge always proceeds in this cyclical, recurrent manner, and with each cycle (if it strictly conforms to scientific method) man's knowledge can be advanced and become more and more profound. Our doctrinaires make their mistakes because, on the one hand, they do not understand that we must study the particularity of contradiction and know the peculiar qualities of individual things before we can know adequately the universality of contradiction and the common qualities of various things; and, on the other hand, they do not understand that after we have known the common qualities of certain things, we must go on to study those concrete things that have not yet been thoroughly studied or have newly emerged. Our doctrinaires are lazybones; refusing to make any painstaking study of concrete things, they regard general truths as something emerging out of the void, and turn them into purely abstract formulae which people cannot grasp, thereby completely denying, as well as reversing, the normal order in which man comes to know truth. Nor do they understand the interconnection of the two processes in man's knowing, from the particular to the general and from the general to the particular; they do not understand at all the Marxist theory of knowledge.

It is not only necessary to study the particular contradiction and the quality determined thereby in every great system of forms of motion of matter, but also to study the particular contradiction and the quality of every form of motion of matter at each stage of its long course of development. In all forms of motion, each process of development that is real and not imaginary is qualitatively different. In our study we must emphasise and start from this point.

Qualitatively different contradictions can only be solved by qualitatively different methods. For example: the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is solved by the method of socialist revolution; the contradiction between the great masses of the people and the feudal system is solved by the method of democratic revolution; the contradiction between colonies and imperialism is solved by the method of national revolutionary war; the contradiction between the working class and the peasantry in socialist society is solved by the method of collectivisation and mechanisation of agriculture; the contradiction within the Communist Party is solved by the method of criticism and self-criticism; the contradiction between society and nature is solved by the method of developing the productive forces. Processes change, old processes and old contradictions disappear, new processes and new contradictions emerge, and the methods of solving contradictions differ accordingly. There is a basic difference between the contradictions solved by the February Revolution and the October Revolution in Russia, as well as between the methods used to solve them. The use of different methods to solve different contradictions is a principle which Marxist-Leninists must strictly observe. The doctrinaires do not observe this principle: they do not understand the differences between the various revolutionary situations, and consequently do not understand that different methods should be used to solve different contradictions; on the contrary, they uniformly adopt a formula which they fancy to be unalterable and inflexibly apply it everywhere, a procedure which can only bring setbacks to the revolution or make a great mess of what could have been done well.

In order to reveal the particularity of contradictions in their totality as well as their interconnection in the process of development of things, that is, to reveal the quality of the process of development of things, we must reveal the particularity of each aspect of the contradiction in the process, otherwise it is impossible to reveal the quality of the process: this is also a matter to which we must pay the utmost attention in our study.

A great thing or event contains many contradictions in the process of its development. For instance, in the process of

China's bourgeois-democratic revolution there are the contradiction between the various oppressed classes in Chinese society and imperialism, the contradiction between the great masses of the people and feudalism, the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the contradiction between the peasantry together with the urban petty bourgeoisie on the one hand, and the bourgeoisie on the other, the contradiction between various reactionary ruling blocs, etc.; the situation is exceedingly complex. Not only do all these contradictions each have their own particularity and cannot be treated uniformly, but the two aspects of every contradiction also have each their own characteristics and cannot be treated uniformly. Not only should we who work for the Chinese revolution understand the particularity of each of the contradictions in the light of their totality, that is, from the interconnection of those contradictions, but we can understand the totality of the contradictions only by a study of each of their aspects. To understand each of the aspects of a contradiction is to understand the definite position each aspect occupies, the concrete form in which it comes into interdependence as well as conflict with its opposite, and the concrete means by which it struggles with its opposite when the two are interdependent and yet contradictory, as well as when the interdependence breaks up. The study of these problems is a matter of the utmost importance. Lenin was expressing this very idea when he said that the most essential thing in Marxism, the living soul of Marxism, is the concrete analysis of concrete conditions.¹⁰ Contrary to Lenin's teaching, our doctrinaires never use their brains to analyse anything concretely; in their writings and speeches they always strike the keynote of the "eight-legged essay"¹¹ which is void of any content, and have thus brought about in our Party a very bad style in work.

In studying a problem, we must guard against subjectivism, one-sidedness and superficiality. Subjectivism, which I have discussed in my essay *On Practice*, consists in not looking at a problem objectively, that is, not looking at it from the materialist viewpoint. One-sidedness consists in not looking at a problem as a whole. For example: understanding only China but not Japan; understanding only the Communist Party but not the Kuomintang; understanding only the proletariat but not the

bourgeoisie; understanding only the peasants but not the landlords; understanding only the favourable conditions but not the adverse conditions; understanding only the past but not the future; understanding only the unit but not the totality; understanding only the defects but not the achievements; understanding only the plaintiff but not the defendant; understanding only revolutionary work underground but not revolutionary work in the open; and so on. In a word, not understanding the characteristics of each aspect of a contradiction. This is called looking at a problem one-sidedly. Or it may be called seeing only the part but not the whole, seeing only the trees but not the wood. Consequently it is impossible to find the methods for solving contradictions, to accomplish the tasks of the revolution, to carry out the assignments well, or to develop correctly the ideological struggle in the Party. Discussing military science, Sun Tzu said: "Know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster"; he was referring to the two sides in a battle. Wei Cheng of the T'ang dynasty said: "To hear both sides makes you enlightened, and to hear only one side makes you benighted";¹² he also understood that one-sidedness is wrong. Yet our comrades often tend to look at problems one-sidedly; such people will often run up against snags. In *Water Margin*,¹³ Sung Chiang launched three attacks on Chu village and was twice defeated because he had no clear knowledge of the conditions and applied the wrong methods. Later he changed his methods by first conducting an investigation into the situation and as a result he learnt about the intertwining roads; succeeded in disrupting the alliance between the Li, Hu and Chu villages; and won final victory in the third battle after secretly infiltrating his own soldiers in disguise into the enemy's camp, a stratagem similar to that of the Trojan Horse in foreign legends. There are numerous examples of materialist dialectics in *Water Margin*, and the episode of the three attacks on Chu village can be considered the best. Lenin said:

"In order really to know an object we must embrace, study all its sides, all connections and 'mediation'. We shall never achieve this completely, but the demand for all-sidedness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity."¹⁴

We should remember his words. Superficiality is evinced when a person considers neither the characteristics of a contradiction as a whole nor the characteristics of each of its aspects, denies the necessity of penetrating into the thing and studying minutely the characteristics of the contradiction, but takes a glance at a distance and, having roughly noticed some features of the contradiction, would proceed to solve it (to answer a question, to settle a dispute, to execute a task, or to direct a military operation). Such a way of doing things never leads to anything but trouble. The reason why our comrades suffering from doctrinairism and empiricism have committed mistakes is precisely that their way of looking at things is subjective, one-sided and superficial. One-sidedness and superficiality are also subjectivism and entail a subjective method because, while all objective things are in reality interrelated and have each an inner necessity, some people do not mirror such conditions as they are but only look at things one-sidedly or superficially, knowing neither their interrelationship nor their inner necessity.

In the movement of opposites in the whole process of development of a thing, we must notice not only the special features of the interconnections and conditions of its various aspects but also the special features of every stage in the process of development.

The basic contradiction in the process of development of a thing, and the quality of the process determined by this basic contradiction, will not disappear until the process is completed; but the conditions of each stage in the long process of development of a thing often differ from those of another stage. This is because, although the nature of the basic contradiction in the development of a thing or in the quality of the process has not changed, yet at the various stages in the long process of development the basic contradiction assumes an increasingly intensified form. Besides, among the numerous big and small contradictions determined or influenced by the basic contradiction, some become intensified, some are temporarily or partially solved or mitigated, and some emerge anew; consequently the process reveals itself as consisting of different stages. If people do not pay attention to the stages in the process of development of a thing, they cannot properly deal with its contradictions.

For example: when capitalism of the era of free competition developed into imperialism, there was no change in the character of the two classes in fundamental contradiction, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, or in the capitalist nature of such a society; however, the contradiction between these two classes became intensified, the contradiction between monopoly capital and non-monopoly capital emerged, the contradiction between metropolitan countries and colonies became intensified, and the contradiction between the capitalist countries, that is, the contradiction caused by their uneven development, manifested itself in a particularly acute way, thus bringing about the special stage of capitalism, the stage of imperialism. The reason why Leninism is Marxism of the era of imperialism and of the proletarian revolution is that Lenin and Stalin have correctly explained these contradictions and correctly formulated the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution for solving them.

An examination of the process of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China, which began with the Revolution of 1911, also reveals several special stages. In particular, the revolution in the period of its bourgeois leadership and the revolution in the period of its proletarian leadership are marked off from each other as two vastly different historical stages. That is, the leadership of the proletariat has basically changed the physiognomy of the revolution, and brought about a re-adjustment in class relations, a tremendous stirring of the peasant revolution, a thorough-going revolution against imperialism and feudalism, a possible transition from democratic revolution to socialist revolution, and so on. All these could not possibly happen when the revolution was under bourgeois leadership. Although there was no change in the nature of the basic contradiction of the whole process, in the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic-revolutionary nature of the process (with the semi-colonial, semi-feudal nature as its opposite), yet the process has gone through several stages of development in the course of some twenty years, during which many great events took place, such as the failure of the Revolution of 1911 and the establishment of the régime of the Northern clique of warlords, the establishment of the first national united front and the Revolution of 1924-7, the breaking up of the united front and the passing

of the bourgeoisie into the counter-revolutionary camp, the wars between the new warlords, the Agrarian Revolutionary War, the establishment of the second national united front and the Anti-Japanese War. These stages contain such specific conditions as: the intensification of some contradictions (for example, the Agrarian Revolutionary War and the Japanese invasion of the four North-eastern provinces); the partial or temporary solution of other contradictions (for example, the liquidation of the Northern clique of warlords and our confiscation of the land of the landlords); and the fresh emergence of yet other contradictions (for example, the struggle between the new warlords, the landlords' recovery of their land after our loss of the revolutionary bases in the South).

To study the particularities of the contradictions at every stage in the process of development of a thing, we must not only observe them in their interconnection and their totality, but must consider each aspect of the contradictions at each stage of its development.

Take the Kuomintang and the Communist Party for instance. In the period of the first united front the Kuomintang carried out Sun Yat-sen's three cardinal policies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communists and assistance to the workers and peasants, and therefore it was revolutionary and vigorous and represented an alliance of various classes in the democratic revolution. After 1927, however, the Kuomintang turned in the opposite direction and became the reactionary bloc of the landlords and the big bourgeoisie. After the Sian Incident in December 1936, it made another turn and began to move in the direction of cessation of the civil war and alliance with the Communist Party jointly to oppose Japanese imperialism. Such are the characteristics of the Kuomintang in its three stages. The formation of these characteristics is of course due to various causes. As to the Chinese Communist Party in the period of the first united front, it was a party in its childhood and courageously led the Revolution of 1924-7; but it revealed itself as immature so far as concerns its understanding of the nature, tasks and methods of the revolution, and consequently Ch'en Tu-hsiu-ism, which appeared in the last period of this revolution, was able to have its effect and caused the

defeat of this revolution. After 1927 the Communist Party again courageously led the Agrarian Revolutionary War and created the revolutionary army and revolutionary bases; however, it also committed mistakes of adventurism which brought serious losses to both the army and the bases. Since 1935 it has rectified these mistakes and led the new anti-Japanese united front; this great struggle is now developing. At the present stage the Communist Party is a party that has gone through the test of two revolutions and has acquired a rich store of experience. Such are the characteristics of the Chinese Communist Party in its three stages. The formation of these characteristics is also due to various causes. Without studying these characteristics we cannot understand the specific interrelations of the two parties at the various stages of their development; the establishment of the united front, the breaking up of the united front, and the establishment of another united front. But in order to study the various characteristics of the two parties we must—this is even more fundamental—study the class bases of the two parties, and the resultant contradictions between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and other forces during different periods. For example: in the period of its first alliance with the Communist Party, the Kuomintang stood on the one hand in contradiction to foreign imperialism and was therefore opposed to it; while on the other it stood in contradiction to the great masses of the people at home, and, though it verbally promised to give many benefits to the toiling people, in reality it gave them very few or even none at all. In the period when it carried on the anti-Communist war, it collaborated with imperialism and feudalism to oppose the great masses of the people, writing off all the benefits which the great masses of the people had won in the revolution and thus intensifying its own contradiction with them. In the present period of the Anti-Japanese War, the Kuomintang, standing in contradiction to Japanese imperialism, wants on the one hand to ally itself with the Communist Party, while on the other it does not slacken its struggle against, and its oppression of, the Communist Party and the Chinese people. As to the Communist Party, it always, no matter in which period, sides with the great masses of the people to oppose imperialism and

feudalism; in the present period of the Anti-Japanese War, because the Kuomintang shows itself in favour of resisting Japan, the Communist Party has adopted a mild policy towards it and the domestic feudal forces. These conditions have brought about, at one time, an alliance of the two parties, and at another time, a struggle; and even during the period of alliance, there also exists a complicated state of affairs in which alliance and struggle take place at the same time. If we do not study the characteristics of these aspects of the contradictions, we shall not only fail to understand the relation between each of the two parties and other forces, but also fail to understand the interrelation of the two parties.

From this it can be seen that in studying the specific nature of any contradiction—contradiction in various forms of motion of matter, contradiction in various forms of motion in every process of development, each aspect of the contradiction in every process of development, contradiction at the various stages of every process of development and each aspect of the contradiction at the various stages of development—in studying the specific nature of all these contradictions, we should be free from any taint of subjective arbitrariness and must make a concrete analysis of them. Apart from a concrete analysis there can be no knowledge of the specific nature of any contradiction. We must all the time bear in mind Lenin's words: the concrete analysis of concrete conditions.

Marx and Engels were the first to supply us with an excellent model of such concrete analysis.

When Marx and Engels applied the law of contradiction in things to the study of the process of social history, they saw the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production; they saw the contradiction between the exploiting class and the exploited class, as well as the contradiction produced thereby between the economic foundation and its superstructures, such as politics and ideology; and they saw how these contradictions inevitably lead to different social revolutions in different class societies.

When Marx applied this law to the study of the economic structure of capitalist society, he saw that the basic contradiction of this society is the contradiction between the social

character of production and the private character of ownership. It is manifested in the contradiction between the organised character of production in individual enterprises and the unorganised character of production in society as a whole. The class manifestation of this contradiction is the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

Because of the vastness of the scope of things and the limitlessness of their development, what in one case is universality is in another changed into particularity. On the other hand, what in one case is particularity is in another changed into universality. The contradiction contained in the capitalist system between the socialisation of production and the private ownership of the means of production is something common to all countries where capitalism exists and develops; for capitalism, this constitutes the universality of contradiction. However, this contradiction in capitalism is something pertaining to a certain historical stage in the development of class society in general; as far as the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production in class society in general is concerned, this constitutes the particularity of contradiction. But while revealing by analysis the particularity of every contradiction in capitalist society, Marx expounded even more profoundly, more adequately and more completely the universality of the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production in class society in general.

As the particular is connected with the universal, as not only the particularity of contradiction but also the universality of contradiction is inherent in everything, and as universality resides in particularity, so, when we study a certain object, we ought to try to discover both of these aspects and their interconnection, to discover both particularity and universality within the object as well as their interconnection, and to discover the interconnection of this object and the many objects outside it. When Stalin explained the historical roots of Leninism in his famous work, *The Foundations of Leninism*, he analysed the international situation in which Leninism was born, together with various contradictions in capitalism which had reached their extreme under the conditions of imperialism, and analysed how these contradictions made the proletarian

revolution a question of immediate action and how they created favourable conditions for a direct onslaught upon capitalism. Besides all these, he analysed the reasons why Russia became the home of Leninism, how Tsarist Russia represented the focus of all the contradictions of imperialism, and why the Russian proletariat could become the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat. In this way, Stalin analysed the universality of the contradiction in imperialism, showing how Leninism is Marxism of the era of imperialism and the proletarian revolution, and analysed the particularity of the imperialism of Tsarist Russia in the contradiction of imperialism in general, showing how Russia became the birth-place of the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution and how in such a particularity is contained the universality of contradiction. This kind of analysis made by Stalin serves us as a model in understanding the particularity and the universality of contradiction and their interconnection.

On the question of applying dialectics to the study of objective phenomena, Marx and Engels, and likewise Lenin and Stalin, have always instructed people that they should not be tainted with any subjective arbitrariness and must discover, from the concrete conditions inherent in the actual objective movements, the concrete contradictions in those phenomena, the concrete role of each of the aspects of the contradictions, and the concrete interrelation of the contradictions. Our doctrinaires can never be in the right, because they have not taken such an attitude in study. We must take warning from the failure of doctrinairism and learn to acquire such an attitude in study—there is no other method of study.

The relation between the universality of contradiction and the particularity of contradiction is the relation between the common character and the individual character of contradictions. By the former we mean that contradiction exists in and runs through all processes from beginning to end: contradictions are movements, are things, are processes, are thoughts. To deny the contradiction in things is to deny everything. This is a universal principle for all times and all countries, which admits of no exceptions. Hence the common character or absoluteness. But this common character is contained in all

individual characters; without individual character there can be no common character. If all individual characters were removed, what common character would remain? Individual characters are formed because each contradiction is a particular one. All individual characters exist conditionally and temporarily, hence they are relative.

This principle of common character and individual character, of absoluteness and relativity, is the quintessence of the problem of the contradiction in things; not to understand it is tantamount to abandoning dialectics.

4. THE PRINCIPAL CONTRADICTION AND THE PRINCIPAL ASPECT OF A CONTRADICTION

As regards the problem of the particularity of contradiction, there are still two sides which must be specially singled out for analysis, that is, the principal contradiction and the principal aspect of a contradiction.

In the process of development of a complex thing, many contradictions exist; among these, one is necessarily the principal contradiction whose existence and development determine or influence the existence and development of other contradictions.

For example, in capitalist society, the two opposing forces in contradiction, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, form the principal contradiction. The other contradictions—for example the contradiction between the remnant feudal class and the bourgeoisie, the contradiction between the rural petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie, the contradiction between the proletariat and the rural petty bourgeoisie, the contradiction between the liberal bourgeoisie and the monopolistic bourgeoisie, the contradiction between bourgeois democracy and bourgeois fascism, the contradiction between the capitalist countries themselves, the contradiction between imperialism and the colonies, etc.—are determined and influenced by this principal contradiction.

In semi-colonial countries like China, the relationship between the principal contradiction and non-principal contradictions presents a complicated situation.

When imperialism wages a war of aggression on such a country, the various classes in that country, apart from a small bunch of traitors, can temporarily unite to wage a national war against imperialism. At such a time, the contradiction between imperialism and that country becomes the principal contradiction, while all the contradictions among the various classes within that country (including the principal contradiction between the feudal system and the great masses of the people) are relegated temporarily to a secondary or subordinate position. Such was the case in China in the Opium War of 1840, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, the Boxer War of 1900, and it is the case in the present Sino-Japanese War.

But in another situation, the relative positions of contradictions undergo a change. When imperialism does not apply the pressure of war, but adopts comparatively mild forms, political, economic, cultural, etc., to carry on its oppression, the ruling classes in the semi-colonial countries will capitulate to imperialism; the two will form an alliance for the joint oppression of the great masses of the people. At such a time, the great masses of the people often adopt the form of civil war to oppose the alliance of imperialism and the feudal class, while imperialism often adopts indirect methods in helping the reactionaries in the semi-colonial countries to oppress the people without taking direct action: and the internal contradiction thereby becomes especially sharp. Such has been the case in China in the Revolutionary War of 1911, the Revolutionary War of 1924-7, and the ten years' Agrarian Revolutionary War since 1927. An analogous situation can also be found in the civil wars between the various reactionary ruling blocs in the semi-colonial countries, *e.g.* the wars between the warlords in China.

When a revolutionary civil war reaches the point of fundamentally threatening the existence of imperialism and its jackals—the domestic reactionaries—imperialism will, in an endeavour to maintain its rule, often adopt methods other than those mentioned above. It either tries to split up the revolutionary front from within or sends armed forces to help directly the domestic reactionaries. At such times, foreign imperialists and domestic reactionaries stand completely in the open at one

pole while the great masses of the people stand at another, thus forming the principal contradiction which determines or influences the development of other contradictions. The aid given by various capitalist countries to the Russian reactionaries after the October Revolution is a case of armed intervention. Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal in 1927 is a case of disintegrating the revolutionary front.

But whatever happens, there is no doubt at all that at every stage in the process of development, there is only one principal contradiction which plays the leading role.

Thus if in any process a number of contradictions exist, only one of them is the principal contradiction playing the leading and decisive role while the rest occupy a secondary or subordinate position. So in studying any process—if it is a complicated process in which more than two contradictions exist—we must do our utmost to discover its principal contradiction. Once the principal contradiction is grasped, any problem can be readily solved. This is the method Marx taught us when he studied capitalist society. When Lenin and Stalin studied imperialism and the general crisis of capitalism, and when they studied Soviet economy, they also taught us this method. Thousands of scholars and practical workers do not understand this method, and the result is that, bewildered as if lost in a sea of mist, they cannot find the crux of a problem and naturally cannot find the method of solving contradictions.

As said above, we cannot treat all the contradictions in a process as being equal, but must distinguish between the principal and the secondary contradictions, and pay particular attention to grasping the principal one. But, in any contradiction, whether principal or secondary, can we treat the two contradictory aspects as being equal? No, we cannot. In any contradiction, the development of the contradictory aspects is uneven. Sometimes there seems to be a balance of forces, but that is only a temporary and relative state; the basic state is unevenness. Of the two contradictory aspects, one must be the principal and the other secondary. The principal aspect is that which plays the leading role in the contradiction. The quality of a thing is mainly determined by the principal aspect of the contradiction that has taken the dominant position.

But this state is not a fixed one; the principal and the non-principal aspects of a contradiction transform themselves into each other and the quality of a thing changes accordingly. In a certain process or at a certain stage in the development of a contradiction, the principal aspect is A and the non-principal is B; at another stage of development or in another process of development, the roles are reversed—a change determined by the extent of the increase or decrease in the strength with which each of the two aspects struggles against the other in the development of a thing.

We often speak of “the supersession of the old by the new”. The supersession of the old by the new is the universal, for ever inviolable law of the world. A thing transforms itself into something else according to its nature and the conditions under which it finds itself and through different forms of leap; that is the process of the supersession of the old by the new. Everything contains a contradiction between its new aspect and its old aspect, which constitutes a series of intricate struggles. As a result of these struggles, the new aspect grows and rises and becomes dominant while the old aspect dwindles and gradually approaches extinction. And the moment the new aspect has won the dominant position over the old aspect, the quality of the old thing changes into the quality of the new thing. Thus the quality of a thing is mainly determined by the principal aspect of the contradiction that has won the dominant position. When the principal aspect of the contradiction which has won the dominant position undergoes a change, the quality of a thing changes accordingly.

In capitalist society, capitalism has changed its position from a subordinate one in the old era of feudal society into the dominant one, and the nature of society has also changed from feudal into capitalist. In the new era of capitalist society, feudal forces, originally dominant, have become subordinate, and then gradually approach extinction; such is the case, for example, in Britain and France. With the development of the productive forces, the bourgeoisie, from being a new class playing a progressive role, becomes an old class playing a reactionary role until it is finally overthrown by the proletariat and becomes a class which, deprived of privately owned

means of production and of power, also gradually approaches extinction. The proletariat, which is much more numerous than the bourgeoisie and which grows up simultaneously with the bourgeoisie, but is under its rule, is a new force; from its initial position of subordination to the bourgeoisie, it gradually grows stronger and becomes a class which is independent and plays a leading role in history, until finally it seizes political power and becomes the ruling class. At such a time, the nature of society changes from that of the old capitalist society into that of the new socialist society. This is the path that the Soviet Union has already traversed and all other countries will inevitably traverse.

Take China, for instance. In the contradiction which makes China a semi-colony imperialism occupies the principal position and oppresses the Chinese people, while China has changed from an independent country into a semi-colony. But this state of affairs will inevitably change; in the struggle between the two sides, the strength of the Chinese people which grows under the leadership of the proletariat will inevitably change China from a semi-colony into an independent country, whereas imperialism will be overthrown and the old China will be inevitably changed into a new China.

The change of the old China into a new China also involves a change in the situation between China's old forces of feudalism and her new forces of the people. The old feudal landlord class will be overthrown, and from being the ruler it will become the ruled and gradually approach extinction. The people under the leadership of the proletariat will, from being the ruled, become the rulers. At the same time, the nature of Chinese society will undergo a change, that is, the old, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society will change into a new, democratic society.

Instances of such mutual transformations are found in our past experience. The Manchu dynasty which ruled China for nearly three hundred years was overthrown during the Revolution of 1911, while the Revolutionary League under Sun Yat-sen's leadership won victory for a time. In the Revolutionary War of 1924-7, the revolutionary forces in the South representing the Communist-Kuomintang alliance, originally weak,

grew strong and won victory in the Northern Expedition, while the Northern clique of warlords, once all-powerful, was overthrown. In 1927, the people's forces led by the Communist Party became very weak under the attacks of the Kuomintang reactionary forces, but having eliminated opportunism within their ranks, they gradually became stronger once more. In the revolutionary bases under Communist leadership, the peasants, originally the ruled, have become rulers, while the landlords have undergone a reverse process. It is always in such a manner that the new displaces the old in the world, that the old is superseded by the new, that the old is eliminated and the new is brought forth, or that the old is thrown off and the new ushered in.

At certain times in the revolutionary struggle, difficulties outbalance advantages; then, difficulties constitute the principal aspect of the contradiction and advantages the secondary aspect. But through the efforts of revolutionaries, difficulties are gradually overcome, an advantageous new situation is created, and the difficult situation yields place to the advantageous one. Such was the case after the failure of the revolution in China in 1927 and during the Long March of the Chinese Red Army. In the present Sino-Japanese War China is again in a difficult position; but we can change this state of affairs and bring about a fundamental change in the situation of both China and Japan. Conversely, advantages can also be transformed into difficulties, if the revolutionaries commit mistakes. The victory of the revolution of 1924-7 turned into a defeat. The revolutionary bases that had grown in the southern provinces after 1927 all suffered defeat in 1934.

Such also is the contradiction in our studies when we pass from ignorance to knowledge. At the very beginning of our study of Marxism, our ignorance or scanty knowledge of Marxism stands in contradiction to knowledge of Marxism. But as a result of industrious study, ignorance can be transformed into knowledge, scanty knowledge into considerable knowledge, and blindness in the use of Marxism into the masterly application of it.

Some people think that this is not the case with certain contradictions. For example: in the contradiction between the

productive forces and the relations of production, the productive forces are the principal aspect; in the contradiction between theory and practice, practice is the principal aspect; in the contradiction between the economic foundation and its superstructure, the economic foundation is the principal aspect; and there is no change in their respective positions. This is the view of mechanistic materialism, and not of dialectical materialism. True, the productive forces, practice, and the economic foundation generally manifest themselves in the principal and decisive role; whoever denies this is not a materialist. But under certain conditions, such aspects as the relations of production, theory and the superstructure in turn manifest themselves in the principal and decisive role; this must also be admitted. When the productive forces cannot be developed unless the relations of production are changed, the change in the relations of production plays the principal and decisive role. When, as Lenin put it, "Without a revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement",¹⁵ the creation and advocacy of the revolutionary theory plays the principal and decisive role. When a certain job (this applies to any job) is to be done but there is as yet no directive, method, plan or policy defining how to do it, the directive, method, plan or policy is the principal and decisive factor. When the superstructure (politics, culture and so on), hinders the development of the economic foundation, political and cultural reforms become the principal and decisive factors. In saying this, are we running counter to materialism? No. The reason is that while we recognise that in the development of history as a whole it is material things that determine spiritual things and social existence that determines social consciousness, at the same time we also recognise and must recognise the reaction of spiritual things and social consciousness on social existence, and the reaction of the superstructure on the economic foundation. This is not running counter to materialism; this is precisely avoiding mechanistic materialism and firmly upholding dialectical materialism.

If, in studying the problem of the particularity of contradiction, we do not study these two conditions—the principal contradiction and the non-principal contradictions in a process,

as well as the principal aspect and the non-principal aspect of a contradiction—that is, if we do not study the distinctive character of these two conditions of contradiction, we shall then get bogged down in abstract studies and shall be unable to understand concretely the conditions of a contradiction, and consequently unable to find the correct method to solve it. The distinctive character or particularity of these two conditions of contradiction represents the unevenness of the contradictory forces. Nothing in the world develops with an absolutely all-round evenness, and we must oppose the theory of even development or the theory of equilibrium. At the same time, the concrete conditions of a contradiction and the change in the principal and non-principal aspects of a contradiction in its process of development, show precisely the force of new things in superseding the old. The study of various conditions of unevenness in the contradiction, the study of the principal contradiction and the non-principal contradictions, of the principal aspect and the non-principal aspect of a contradiction constitutes one of the important methods by which a revolutionary political party determines correctly its political and military, strategic and tactical directives. All Communists should note this.

5. THE IDENTITY AND STRUGGLE OF THE ASPECTS OF A CONTRADICTION

Having understood the problem of the universality and particularity of contradiction, we must proceed to study the problem of the identity and struggle of the aspects of a contradiction.

Identity, unity, coincidence, interpermeation, interpenetration, interdependence (or interdependence for existence), interconnection or co-operation—all these different terms mean the same thing and refer to the following two conditions: first, each of the two aspects of every contradiction in the process of development of a thing finds the presupposition of its existence in the other aspect and both aspects coexist in an entity; second, each of the two contradictory aspects, according to given conditions, tends to transform itself into the other. This is what is meant by identity.

Lenin said:

“Dialectics is such a theory: it studies how the opposites can be identical and how they become identical (how they change and become identical)—under what conditions they transform themselves into each other and become identical—why the human mind should not regard these opposites as dead, rigid things, but as living, conditional, changeable things which transform themselves into each other.”¹⁶

What is the meaning of this passage of Lenin's?

The contradictory aspects in every process exclude each other, struggle with each other and are opposed to each other. Such contradictory aspects are contained without exception in the processes of all things in the world and in human thought. A simple process has only one pair of opposites, while a complex process has more than one pair. Various pairs of opposites are in turn opposed to one another. In this way all things in the objective world and human thought are formed and impelled to move.

But if this is so, there is an utter lack of identity, or unity. How then can we speak of identity or unity?

The reason is that a contradictory aspect cannot exist in isolation. Without the other aspect which is opposed to it, each aspect loses the condition of its existence. Just imagine, can any of the aspects of contradictory things or of contradictory concepts in the human mind exist independently? Without life, there would be no death; without death, there would also be no life. Without “above”, there would be no “below”; without “below”, there would also be no “above”. Without misfortune, there would be no good fortune; without good fortune, there would also be no misfortune. Without facility, there would be no difficulty; without difficulty, there would also be no facility. Without landlords, there would be no tenant-peasants; without tenant-peasants, there would also be no landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there would be no proletariat; without a proletariat, there would also be no bourgeoisie. Without imperialist oppression of the nations, there would be no colonies and semi-colonies; without colonies and semi-colonies, there would also be no imperialist oppression

of the nations. All opposite elements are like this: because of certain conditions, they are on the one hand opposed to each other and on the other hand they are interconnected, interpenetrating, interpermeating and interdependent; this character is called identity. All contradictory aspects, because of certain conditions, are characterised by non-identity, hence they are spoken of as contradictory. But they are also characterised by identity, hence they are interconnected. When Lenin says that dialectics studies "how the opposites can be and how they become identical", he is referring to such a state of affairs. How can they be identical? Because of the condition of mutual sustenance of each other's existence. This is the first meaning of identity.

But is it enough to say merely that the contradictory aspects mutually sustain each other's existence, that is, there is identity between them and consequently they can coexist in an entity? No, it is not enough. The matter does not end with the interdependence of the two contradictory aspects for their existence; what is more important is the transformation of the contradictory things into each other. That is to say, each of the two contradictory aspects within a thing, because of certain conditions, tends to transform itself into the other, to transfer itself to the opposite position. This is the second meaning of the identity of contradiction.

Why is there also identity? You see, by means of revolution, the proletariat, once the ruled, becomes the ruler, while the bourgeoisie, originally the ruler, becomes the ruled, and is transferred to the position originally occupied by its opposite. This has already taken place in the Soviet Union and will take place throughout the world. I should like to ask: if there were no interconnection and identity of opposites under certain conditions, how could such a change take place?

The Kuomintang, which played a certain positive role at a certain stage in modern Chinese history, has, because of its inherent class nature and the temptations of imperialism (these being the conditions) become since 1927 a counter-revolutionary party; but, because of the intensification of the contradiction between China and Japan and the policy of the united front of the Communist Party (these being the conditions), it has been

compelled to agree to resist Japan. Contradictory things change into one another, hence a certain identity is implied.

The agrarian revolution we have carried out is already and will be such a process in which the land-owning landlord class becomes a class deprived of its land, while the peasants, once deprived of their land, become small holders of land. The haves and the have-nots, gain and loss, are interconnected because of certain conditions; there is identity of the two sides. Under socialism, the system of the peasants' private ownership will in turn become the public ownership of socialist agriculture; this has already taken place in the Soviet Union and will take place throughout the world. Between private property and public property there is a bridge leading from the one to the other, which in philosophy is called identity, or transformation into each other, or interpermeation.

To consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat or the people's dictatorship is precisely to prepare the conditions for liquidating such a dictatorship and advancing to the higher stage of abolishing all state systems. To establish and develop the Communist Party is precisely to prepare the condition for abolishing the Communist Party and all party systems. To establish the revolutionary army under the leadership of the Communist Party and to carry on the revolutionary war is precisely to prepare the condition for abolishing war for ever. These contradictory things are at the same time complementary.

As everybody knows, war and peace transform themselves into each other. War is transformed into peace; for example, the First World War was transformed into the post-war peace; the civil war in China has now also ceased and internal peace has come about. Peace is transformed into war; for example, the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation of 1927 was transformed into war, and the peaceful world situation today may also be transformed into a Second World War. Why? Because in a class society such contradictory things as war and peace are characterised by identity under certain conditions.

All contradictory things are interconnected, and they not only coexist in an entity under certain conditions, but also transform themselves into each other under certain conditions—this is the whole meaning of the identity of contradictions.

This is exactly what Lenin meant when he discussed, "... how they become identical (how they change and become identical) —under what conditions they transform themselves into each other and become identical. . . ."

Why should the human mind "not regard such opposites as dead, rigid things but as living, conditional, changeable things which transform themselves into each other?" Because that is just what objective things are. The unity or identity of the contradictory aspects in objective things is never a dead, rigid, but a living, conditional, changeable, temporary, relative matter; all contradictory aspects transform themselves, under certain conditions, into their opposites. Such a state of affairs, reflected in human thought, becomes the materialist-dialectical world outlook of Marxism. Only the reactionary ruling classes, past as well as present, and metaphysicians who are in their service, do not regard opposites as living, conditional, changeable things that transform themselves into each other, but as dead, rigid things, and propagate this erroneous view everywhere to delude the masses of the people, and thereby attain the aim of perpetuating their rule. The task of the Communists is precisely to expose such erroneous reactionary and metaphysical thought, to propagate the dialectics inherent in things, to hasten the transformation of things, and to attain the aim of the revolution.

In saying that contradictions become identical only under certain conditions we are referring to real and concrete contradictions, and also to real and concrete transformations of the contradictory aspects into each other. The innumerable transformations in mythology, for example, K'uafu's racing with the sun in the *Book of Mountains and Seas*,¹⁷ Yi's shooting down of nine suns in *Huai Nan Tzu*,¹⁸ Monkey's seventy-two metamorphoses in the *Pilgrimage to the West*,¹⁹ the numerous episodes in the *Strange Tales From the Carefree Studio*²⁰ of ghosts and foxes metamorphosed into human beings, etc.—the transformations of opposites into each other as told in these legends are a sort of childish, imaginary, subjectively fancied transformations that are called forth among men by the innumerable transformations of complicated, real contradictions into each other, and are not concrete transformations as

manifested in concrete contradictions. Marx said: "All mythology masters and dominates and shapes the forces of nature in and through the imagination, hence it disappears as soon as man gains mastery over the forces of nature".²¹ Although stories of endless metamorphoses in such mythology (and also in nursery tales) can delight people because in them man's conquest of the forces of nature, etc., is imaginatively embodied and, moreover, the best mythology possesses, as Marx put it, "eternal charm", yet mythology is not based on concrete contradictions and therefore does not scientifically reflect reality. That is to say, in mythology or nursery tales the aspects that constitute contradiction have only a fancied identity, not a concrete one. Marxist dialectics is that which scientifically reflects the identity in changes of reality.

Why can only an egg be transformed into a chicken but not a stone? Why is there identity between war and peace and none between war and a stone? Why can human beings give birth only to human beings but not to anything else? The reason is simply that identity of contradiction exists only under certain necessary conditions. Without certain necessary conditions there can be no identity whatever.

Why is it that in Russia the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917 was directly linked with the proletarian-socialist revolution of October of the same year, while in France the bourgeois revolution was not directly linked with a socialist revolution, and the Paris Commune of 1871 finally ended in failure? Why is it, on the other hand, that the nomadic system in Mongolia and Central Asia has been directly linked with socialism? Why is it that the Chinese revolution can avoid a capitalist future and can be directly linked with socialism without traversing the old historical path of the western countries, without passing through a period of bourgeois dictatorship? The reason is none other than the concrete conditions of the time. When certain necessary conditions are present, certain contradictions arise in the process of development of things and, what is more, these contradictions and all contradictions of this kind depend upon each other for existence and transform themselves into each other; otherwise nothing is possible.

Such is the problem of identity. What then is struggle? What is the relation between identity and struggle?

Lenin said:

"The unity (coincidence, identity, resultant) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute."²²

What does this passage from Lenin mean?

All processes have a beginning and an end; all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The stability of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute.

The movement of all things assumes two forms: the form of relative rest and the form of conspicuous change. Both forms of movement are caused by the struggle of the two contradictory factors contained in a thing itself. When the movement of a thing assumes the first form, it only undergoes a quantitative but not a qualitative change and consequently appears in a state of seeming rest. When the movement of a thing assumes the second form it has already reached a certain culminating point of the quantitative change of the first form, caused the dissolution of the entity, produced a qualitative change, and consequently appears as conspicuous change. Such unity, solidarity, amalgamation, harmony, balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, stability, equilibrium, coagulation, attraction, as we see in daily life, are all the appearances of things in the state of quantitative change. On the other hand, the dissolution of the entity, the breakdown of such solidarity, amalgamation, harmony, balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, stability, equilibrium, coagulation and attraction, and the change into their opposite states, are all the appearances of things in the state of qualitative change during the transformation of one process into another. Things are always transforming themselves from the first into the second form, while the struggle within the contradictions exists in both forms and reaches its solution through the second form. We say therefore that the unity of opposites is conditional, temporary and relative, while the struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute.

When we said above that because there is identity between two opposite things, the two can coexist in an entity and can also be transformed into each other, we were referring to conditionality, that is to say, under certain conditions contradictory things can be united and can also be transformed into each other, but without such conditions, they cannot become contradictory, cannot coexist, and cannot transform themselves into one another. It is because the identity of contradiction obtains only under certain conditions that we say identity is conditional, relative. Here we add: the struggle within a contradiction runs throughout a process from beginning to end and causes one process to transform itself into another, and as the struggle within the contradiction is present everywhere, we say the struggle within the contradiction is unconditional, absolute.

Conditional, relative identity, combined with unconditional, absolute struggle, constitutes the movement of opposites in all things.

We Chinese often say, "Things opposed to each other complement each other".²³ That is to say, there is identity of opposites. This remark is dialectical, and runs counter to metaphysics. To be "opposed to each other" means the mutual exclusion or struggle of the two contradictory aspects. To "complement each other" means that under certain conditions the two contradictory aspects become united and achieve identity. Struggle resides precisely in identity; without struggle there can be no identity.

In identity there is struggle, in particularity there is universality, in individual character there is common character. To quote Lenin, "there is an absolute even *within* the relative".²⁴

6. THE ROLE OF ANTAGONISM IN CONTRADICTION

"What is antagonism?" is one of the questions concerning the struggle within a contradiction. Our answer is: antagonism is a form of struggle within a contradiction, but not the universal form.

In human history, antagonism between classes exists as a particular manifestation of the struggle within a contradiction.

The contradiction between the exploiting class and the exploited class: the two contradictory classes coexist for a long time in one society, be it a slave society, or a feudal or a capitalist society, and struggle with each other; but it is not until the contradiction between the two classes has developed to a certain stage that the two sides adopt the form of open antagonism which develops into a revolution. In a class society, the transformation of peace into war is also like that.

A bomb, before the explosion, is an entity in which contradictory things coexist because of certain conditions. The explosion takes place only when a new condition (ignition) is present. An analogous situation exists in all natural phenomena when they finally assume the form of open antagonism to solve old contradictions and to produce new things.

It is very important to know this situation. It enables us to understand that in a class society revolutions and revolutionary wars are inevitable, that apart from them the leap in social development cannot be made, the reactionary ruling classes cannot be overthrown, and the people cannot win political power. Communists must expose the deceitful propaganda of the reactionaries that social revolution is unnecessary and impossible, etc., and firmly uphold the Marxist-Leninist theory of social revolution so as to help the people to understand that social revolution is not only entirely necessary but also entirely possible, and that the whole history of mankind and the triumph of the Soviet Union confirms this scientific truth.

However, we must study concretely the conditions of various kinds of struggle within a contradiction and should not inappropriately impose the above-mentioned formula on everything. Contradiction and struggle are universal, absolute, but the methods for solving contradictions, that is, the forms of struggle, differ according to the differences in the nature of the contradictions. Some contradictions are characterised by open antagonism, some are not. Based on the concrete development of things, some contradictions, originally non-antagonistic, develop and become antagonistic, while some contradictions, originally antagonistic, develop and become non-antagonistic.

As we have pointed out above, the contradiction between

correct ideology and erroneous ideologies within the Communist Party reflects in the Party the class contradictions when classes exist. In the beginning, or with regard to certain matters, such a contradiction need not immediately manifest itself as antagonistic. But with the development of the class struggle, it can also develop and become antagonistic. The history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union shows us that the contradiction between the correct ideology of Lenin and Stalin and the erroneous ideologies of Trotsky, Bukharin and others, was in the beginning not yet manifested in an antagonistic form, but subsequently developed into antagonism. A similar case occurred in the history of the Chinese Communist Party. The contradiction between the correct ideology of many of our comrades in the Party and the erroneous ideologies of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Chang Kuo-t'ao and others was also in the beginning not manifested in an antagonistic form, but subsequently developed into antagonism. At present the contradiction between the correct ideology and the erroneous ideologies in our Party is not manifested in an antagonistic form and, if comrades who have committed mistakes can correct them, it will not develop into antagonism. Therefore the Party on the one hand must carry on a serious struggle against erroneous ideologies, and on the other hand, must give the comrades who have committed mistakes sufficient opportunity to become aware of them. Under such conditions, struggles pushed to excess are obviously not appropriate. But if those people who have committed mistakes persist in them and increase the gravity of their mistakes, then it is possible that such contradictions will develop into antagonism.

Economically, in capitalist society (where the town under bourgeois rule ruthlessly exploits the countryside) and in the Kuomintang-controlled areas in China (where the town under the rule of foreign imperialism and the native big comprador bourgeoisie most savagely exploits the countryside), the contradiction between the town and the countryside is one of extreme antagonism. But in a socialist country and in our revolutionary bases, such an antagonistic contradiction becomes a non-antagonistic contradiction; and it will disappear when a Communist society is realised.

Lenin said: "Antagonism and contradiction are utterly different. Under Socialism, antagonism disappears, but contradiction exists".²⁵ That is to say, antagonism is only a form of struggle within a contradiction but not its universal form; we cannot impose the formula everywhere.

7. CONCLUSION

Now we can make a few remarks to sum up. The law of the contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of nature and society and therefore also the basic law of thought. It is the opposite of the metaphysical world outlook. It means a great revolution in the history of human knowledge. According to the viewpoint of dialectical materialism, contradiction exists in all processes of objective things and subjective thought and runs through all processes from beginning to end—this is the universality and absoluteness of contradiction. Contradictory things and each of their aspects have respectively their specific features—this is the particularity and relativity of contradiction. Contradictory things, according to certain conditions, are characterised by identity, and consequently can coexist in an entity and transform themselves each into its opposite—this again is the particularity and relativity of contradiction. But the struggle within the contradiction is ceaseless; it exists both when the opposites coexist and when they are transforming themselves into each other, and the struggle is especially manifest in the latter case—this again is the universality and absoluteness of contradiction. In studying the particularity and relativity of contradiction, we must note the distinction between what is principal and what is non-principal in contradictions as well as in contradictory aspects; in studying the universality of, and the struggle within, a contradiction, we must note the distinction between various forms of struggle within it; otherwise we shall commit mistakes. If, after study, we have really understood the essential points mentioned above, we shall be able to smash those doctrinaire ideas which run counter to the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and are detrimental to our revolutionary cause, and also enable our experienced comrades to systematise their

experiences so as to impart to them the character of principle and avoid repeating the mistakes of empiricism. These are a few simple conclusions we have reached in the study of the law of contradiction.

August 1937.

*PERIOD
OF THE WAR OF RESISTANCE
AGAINST JAPANESE AGGRESSION*

THE POLICIES, MEASURES AND PERSPECTIVES OF COMBATING JAPANESE INVASION

On July 7, 1937, the Japanese imperialists, attempting to annex the whole of China by armed force, staged the Lukouchiao Incident.¹ The Chinese people unanimously demanded war against Japan. Ten days elapsed before Chiang Kai-shek made a public statement at Lushan declaring a War of Resistance to Japan. He took this step under the nation-wide pressure of the people and in consequence of the serious blow Japanese invasion dealt to the interests of Anglo-U.S. imperialism in China as well as to those of the big landlords and the big bourgeois whom Chiang Kai-shek directly represented. But at the same time the Chiang Kai-shek government continued its parley with the Japanese invaders and even accepted their proposal to negotiate for so-called peaceful settlements with local authorities. It was not until August 13, 1937, when the Japanese invaders launched a large-scale offensive on Shanghai and thus endangered Chiang Kai-shek's dominant position in South-east China, that he was compelled to start the armed resistance; but even then, and right up to 1944, Chiang Kai-shek never ceased his clandestine attempts to make peace with Japan. Throughout the Anti-Japanese War his actions were utterly at variance with what he had declared in his Lushan statement: "Once the war breaks out, every person, old or young, in the south or in the north, must take up the responsibility of resisting Japan and defending the soil of our country". Chiang opposed the general mobilisation of the people for a people's total war, and adopted the reactionary policy of passively resisting Japan but actively opposing the Communists and the people. Comrade Mao Tse-tung's discussion of the two policies, two sets of measures and two perspectives in this article exactly illustrates the struggle between the Communist line and Chiang Kai-shek's line in the Anti-Japanese War.

I. TWO POLICIES

On July 8, the day after the Lukouchiao Incident, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a manifesto to the whole nation calling for armed resistance. The manifesto reads in part:

"Fellow Countrymen! Peiping and Tientsin are in peril! North China is in peril! The Chinese nation is in peril! A

war of resistance by the whole nation is the only way out. We demand that resolute resistance be put up immediately against the invading Japanese army and that preparations be made immediately for coping with all serious developments. The whole nation, from the leaders to the rank and file, must at once abandon the idea of living in a precarious peace with the Japanese invaders. Fellow countrymen throughout the nation! We must commend and support the heroic resistance of General Feng Chih-an's troops. We must commend and support the declaration of the authorities of North China that they will defend the soil of our country to the death. We demand that General Sung Che-yuan immediately mobilise the whole of his Twenty-ninth Army² and dispatch it to the front to go into action. Of the Central government in Nanking we demand the following: Give effective and substantial aid to the Twenty-ninth Army. Immediately lift the ban on the people's patriotic movement in order to enhance the people's enthusiasm for armed resistance. Mobilise immediately for action all the country's land, sea and air forces. Weed out immediately the collaborators and traitors as well as all the spies of the Japanese invaders, who are hidden inside China's borders, and thus consolidate our rear. We call on the people of the whole country to exert their utmost efforts to support the sacred Anti-Japanese War of self-defence. Our slogans are: Armed defence of Peiping, Tientsin and North China! Defend the soil of our country to the last drop of our blood! Let the people, the government authorities, and the armed forces of the whole country unite to build up the indestructible Great Wall of the national united front to resist Japanese aggression! Let the Kuomintang and the Communist Party closely co-operate with each other and resist the new attacks of the Japanese invaders! Drive the Japanese invaders out of China!"

That is a matter of policy.

On July 17, Mr. Chiang Kai-shek made a public statement in Lushan. Affirming as it did the policy of preparing for armed resistance, this statement was the Kuomintang's first

correct declaration on foreign affairs for many years, and consequently was welcomed by us and by all our countrymen. The statement listed four conditions for the settlement of the Lukouchiao Incident:

"(1) There must be no settlement which infringes on China's sovereignty and territorial integrity; (2) there must be no unlawful change in the administrative structure of Hopeh and Chahar provinces; (3) there must be no displacement, merely at anyone's request, of local officials appointed by the Central government; and (4) the Twenty-ninth Army must not be confined to the area in which it is now stationed."

The concluding remarks of the statement read:

"Concerning the Lukouchiao Incident, the government has decided on a policy and a stand to which it will always adhere. We realise that when the whole country goes into action, it will be a case of sacrifice to the very last, and we should not cherish the faintest hope of an easy way out. Once the war breaks out, every person, old or young, in the south or in the north, must take up the responsibility of resisting Japan and defending the soil of our country."

That is a matter of policy.

The above are the two historic political declarations on the Lukouchiao Incident made by the Communist Party and the Kuomintang respectively. The two declarations have the following points in common: the demand for a resolute armed resistance and opposition to compromises and concessions.

That is the first policy for coping with Japanese invasion, the correct policy.

But another policy may be adopted. In recent months the collaborators and the pro-Japanese elements in Peiping and Tientsin have become more active in their attempt to bring pressure upon the authorities of Peiping and Tientsin with a view to forcing them to acquiesce to Japanese demands, and to advocate compromises and concessions with a view to diverting them from the policy of resolute armed resistance. This is a grave danger.

This policy of compromises and concessions is fundamentally contradictory to the policy of resolute armed resistance. What deserves our serious attention is that if this policy of compromises and concessions is not speedily changed, Peiping, Tientsin and the whole of North China will fall into the hands of the enemy, and the whole nation will then be faced with a great menace.

All patriotic officers and men of the Twenty-ninth Army, unite to oppose compromises and concessions and carry out a resolute armed resistance!

All patriots of Peiping, Tientsin and North China, unite to oppose compromises and concessions and support the resolute armed resistance!

All patriotic countrymen, unite to oppose compromises and concessions and support the resolute armed resistance!

Mr. Chiang Kai-shek and all patriotic members of the Kuomintang, we hope that you will hold firmly to the policy you have announced, fulfil your promises, oppose compromises and concessions, carry out a resolute armed resistance, and thus answer the outrages of the enemy with deeds.

All the armed forces in the country, including the Red Army, support the declaration of Mr. Chiang Kai-shek, oppose compromise and concessions and carry out a resolute armed resistance!

All Communists are to a man earnestly carrying out their declaration and at the same time resolutely supporting the declaration of Mr. Chiang Kai-shek; they are ready, together with the members of the Kuomintang and all their countrymen, to defend their native soil to the last drop of their blood; they are opposed to any form of hesitation, vacillation, compromise and concession, and will carry out a resolute armed resistance.

2. TWO SETS OF MEASURES

Having adopted the policy of resolute armed resistance, we require a whole set of measures before we can achieve our aims.

What are these measures? The principal ones are the following:

(1) General mobilisation of the armed forces of the whole

country. Mobilise our standing land, sea and air forces of well over two million men, including the army of the Central government, the provincial armies and the Red Army, immediately dispatch their main forces to the country's defence lines while keeping some forces in the rear to maintain public order. Entrust the command on the various fronts to generals who are loyal to the national interests. Call a national defence conference to decide on the strategic directives and to assure unity of aim in military operations. Reform the political work in the army so as to achieve unity between officers and men and unity between the army and the people. Make it clearly understood that guerrilla warfare should account for a part of the strategic task in co-ordination with regular warfare. Weed out collaborators from the army. Mobilise an adequate number of reserves, and train and prepare them for the front. Replenish on a reasonable basis the equipment and supplies of the armed forces. In conformity with the general policy of resolute armed resistance, the above military plans must be mapped out. China's troops are not small in number, but unless the above plans are carried out, they cannot defeat the enemy. Given a combination of political and material conditions, our armed forces will be invincible in East Asia.

(2) General mobilisation of the people of the whole country. Lift the ban on patriotic movements, release political prisoners, annul the "Emergency Penal Law for Actions Endangering the Republic"³ and the "Press-Censorship Regulations",⁴ grant legal status to existing patriotic societies, expand the organisation of the patriotic societies among the workers, peasants, businessmen and intellectuals, arm the people for self-defence and for operations in co-ordination with the army. In a word, give the people the freedom to express their patriotism. The combined strength of the people and the army will be able to deal a deadly blow to Japanese imperialism. Beyond doubt, we can win no victory in a national war without relying on the great masses of the people. Let us be forewarned against the path that led Abyssinia to defeat.⁵ Whoever is to put up armed resistance in earnest must not neglect this point.

(3) The reform of the political structure. Admit into the government the representatives of all parties, groups and leaders

of the people to administer jointly the affairs of the state, and weed out the pro-Japanese elements and collaborators hidden in the government, so that the government can become one with the people. Resistance to Japan is a gigantic task which can never be performed by a few persons. If only a few persons strain themselves to fulfil the task there will always be delays and failures. If the government is a real government of national defence it must rely on the people and adopt democratic centralism. At once democratic and centralised, such a government is the most powerful. The National Assembly must be truly representative of the people; it must be the supreme organ of authority, and must handle the major policies of the state and decide on the policies and plans for resistance to Japan and salvation of the nation.

(4) Anti-Japanese foreign policy. Accord the Japanese imperialists no advantages or facilities, but on the contrary, confiscate their property, repudiate their loans, weed out their lackeys and expel their spies in China. Immediately conclude a military and political alliance with the Soviet Union, and closely unite with the state which is the most reliable, the most powerful and the most capable of helping China in the resistance to Japan. Strive to win the sympathy of Britain, the United States and France for our resistance to Japan, and, on condition that there is no loss of our territory or infringement of our sovereignty, strive to enlist their help and support. To defeat the Japanese invaders we should in the main rely on our own strength, but foreign aid is indispensable; an isolationist policy will only play into the enemy's hands.

(5) The proclamation of a programme for the improvement of the people's living conditions and its immediate implementation. Abolition of exorbitant assessments and miscellaneous taxes, reduction of land rent, restriction of usury, increase of the payment of the workers, improvement in the living conditions of soldiers and junior officers, improvement in the living conditions of junior office workers, relief for victims of natural calamities—these are the minimum requirements to start with. Such new measures will increase the purchasing power of the people, lead to commercial prosperity and financial briskness; they will by no means, as some people argue, place the country's

finances in a hopeless situation. These new measures will immeasurably increase our strength for resisting Japan and consolidate the basis of the government.

(6) Education for national defence. Radically reform the educational policies and systems of the past. Anything that is not urgent and any measure that is not reasonable must be discarded. The newspapers, books, films, plays, literature and art should all serve the interests of national defence. Collaborationist propaganda must be prohibited.

(7) An anti-Japanese financial and economic policy. Financial policy should be based on the principle of encouraging those who have money to give money and confiscating the property of the Japanese imperialists and Chinese collaborators, economic policy should be based on the principle of boycotting Japanese goods and promoting the sales of home products—everything must be done for the sake of resisting Japan. The drained treasury is the outcome of erroneous measures, and after the adoption of these new measures which serve the interests of the people, the treasury will no longer be drained. It is sheer nonsense to say that a country with such a vast territory and huge population can be financially and economically helpless.

(8) People, government authorities and armed forces of the whole country, unite to build up the indestructible Great Wall of the national united front. The realisation of the policy of armed resistance and the above-mentioned measures depends on this united front. And the central link is the close co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. The government, the troops, all the parties and groups, and the people of the whole country must unite on the basis of this bi-partisan co-operation. The slogan "Solidarity in good faith to meet the national crisis" should not only be beautiful words for the ear to listen to but also become beautiful deeds to witness. Solidarity must be genuine; mutual suspicion and distrust will never do. Things must be done in a more magnanimous manner and there must be no meanness in the style of work. Petty calculations, petty tricks, bureaucracy, and Ah Q-ism,⁶ are of no use at all. They are useless even against the enemy, and simply ridiculous if practised against one's own

fellow countrymen. There are major and minor principles underlying everything, but all the minor principles must be governed by the major principles. Our countrymen must ponder things over carefully in the light of the major principles underlying them, and only then will they be able to find the proper direction for their thoughts and actions. Today, anybody who fails to put some good faith into solidarity, even though he is not reproached by others will feel a little ashamed when examining his own conscience in the stillness of the night.

This set of measures for the realisation of a resolute armed resistance may be called the Eight-Point Programme.

The policy of resolute armed resistance must be accompanied by this set of measures, or else victory can never be achieved and Japanese aggression against China will never be ended, while China will always find herself helpless before Japan and will hardly be able to escape the fate of Abyssinia.

Those who have genuine faith in the policy of resolute armed resistance must put this set of measures into practice. To test whether a person has genuine faith in resolute armed resistance, we must see if he is willing to accept and practise this set of measures.

There is another set of measures contrary to this one in every respect:

Not the general mobilisation of the armed forces, but their immobilisation or withdrawal.

Not granting freedom to the people, but oppressing the people.

Not a national defence government based on democratic centralism, but an autocratic government of the bureaucrats, compradors, gentry and landlords.

Not a foreign policy of opposing Japan, but a foreign policy of cringing before her.

Not improving the people's living conditions, but oppressing and squeezing the people as of old, so that they groan under their sufferings and become powerless to resist Japan.

Not an education for strengthening national defence, but an education for colonial slaves.

Not a financial and economic policy that opposes Japan, but a financial and economic policy which, remaining the same

as of old or even becoming worse, will not benefit our own country but only the enemy.

Not building up the Great Wall of the Anti-Japanese National United Front but pulling it down, or ostentatiously declaring allegiance to the United Front while really repudiating it—talking a lot about “solidarity” without taking real action.

Measures ensue from policy. When the policy is one of non-resistance, all measures reflect non-resistance; we have learned this in the last six years. If the policy is one of resolute armed resistance, then we must apply the set of measures that suits it, and carry out the Eight-Point Programme.

3. TWO PERSPECTIVES

What are the perspectives? This is what everybody is anxious about.

If the first policy is adopted and the first set of measures applied, then the perspective will definitely be one of our driving out the Japanese imperialists and achieving China's freedom and liberation. Are there still any doubts on this point? None, I think.

If the second policy is carried out and the second set of measures applied, then the perspective will definitely be one of the Japanese imperialists occupying the whole country and reducing the Chinese people to beasts of burden and slaves. Are there still any doubts on this point? None either, I think.

4. CONCLUSION

We must adopt the first policy, apply the first set of measures, and strive for the first perspective.

We must oppose the second policy, reject the second set of measures and avert the second perspective.

All patriotic members of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, unite resolutely to carry out the first policy, apply the first set of measures and strive for the first perspective, and resolutely oppose the second policy, reject the second set of measures and avert the second perspective.

All patriotic citizens, patriotic troops, patriotic parties and

groups in the country, unite resolutely to carry out the first policy, apply the first set of measures and strive for the first perspective, and resolutely oppose the second policy, reject the second set of measures and avert the second perspective.

Long live the victory of the national revolutionary war!
Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation!

July 23, 1937.

STRUGGLE TO MOBILISE ALL FORCES FOR WINNING VICTORY IN THE ARMED RESISTANCE

This is an outline for propaganda and agitation which Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote in August 1937 for the propaganda department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It was adopted by the enlarged meeting of the Central Political Bureau at Lochwan, northern Shensi.

A. The Lukouchiao Incident of July 7 marks the beginning of the all-out offensive of Japanese imperialism on China proper. The resistance of the Chinese troops at Lukouchiao marks the beginning of China's nation-wide resistance. As a result of the Japanese invaders' ceaseless offensives, the resolute struggle of the people of the whole country, the national bourgeoisie's inclination towards resisting Japan, and the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front which, energetically advocated and resolutely carried out by the Chinese Communist Party, has won nation-wide support—as a result of all these, the Chinese authorities have, after the Lukouchiao Incident, begun to change their policy of non-resistance to Japan, adopted ever since the "Incident of September 18", to one of resistance, and the Chinese revolution, following the December 9 Movement, has developed from the stage of ending the civil war and preparing for resistance to the stage of carrying out resistance. The initial changes in the Kuomintang's policies—with the Sian Incident and the Third Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang as their starting point—Mr. Chiang Kai-shek's Lushan statement of July 17 on the question of resistance to Japan, and many of his measures for national defence all deserve commendation. All the troops at the front, the land and air forces and the local armed units, have carried on a courageous resistance and demonstrated the heroic spirit of the Chinese nation. With the greatest fervour, the Chinese

Communist Party salutes in the name of the national revolution our patriotic troops and fellow countrymen throughout China.

B. But on the other hand, after the Lukouchiao Incident of July 7 the Kuomintang authorities, resuming the erroneous policy they had pursued since the "Incident of September 18", have made compromises with and concessions to Japan¹ and suppressed the activity of the patriotic troops as well as the national salvation movement of the patriotic people. Relying on its own brutal military force, buoyed up by the encouragement of German and Italian imperialism and exploiting the vacillation of British imperialism and the estrangement of the Kuomintang from the broad toiling masses of the people, Japanese imperialism, after seizing Peiping and Tientsin, will undoubtedly persist in its policy of large-scale offensives and take the second and third steps in its premeditated war plan, *i.e.* launch fierce attacks on the whole of North China and various other places. In places like Chahar and Shanghai, the conflagration of war is already raging. To save our motherland from peril and subjugation, to resist the attacks of the powerful invaders, to defend North China and the sea-coast, and to recover Peiping, Tientsin and the North-east, the people of the whole country and the Kuomintang authorities must thoroughly learn the lesson of the loss of the North-east, Peiping and Tientsin, beware of the path that led Abyssinia to her doom and acquaint themselves with the history of how the Soviet Union defeated foreign enemies in the past² as well as the experience of how Spain is victoriously defending Madrid³ at present, and firmly unite together to fight to the end in defence of the motherland. Our task will henceforth be "to mobilise all forces for winning victory in the Armed Resistance", and the pivot here lies in a total and thorough change of the Kuomintang's policies. The progress shown by the Kuomintang on the question of resistance is commendable; to such a progress, which has been long expected by the Chinese Communist Party and the people of the whole country, we tender our welcome. But the Kuomintang has not changed its policies at all in matters like arousing the masses into action and making political reforms; basically the Kuomintang is still unwilling

to unleash the people's anti-Japanese movement, is still unwilling to make fundamental changes in the government apparatus, still has no plans for improving the people's living conditions, and is still not sincere enough in its co-operation with the Communist Party. If, at this critical moment when our nation is threatened with destruction, the Kuomintang still procrastinates, sticks to these policies and refuses to change them quickly, it will cause a great disaster to the Armed Resistance. Some Kuomintang members say: Let political reforms be carried out after the victory of the Armed Resistance. They think that the Japanese invaders can be defeated through a resistance by the government alone, but they are wrong. Through a resistance by the government alone we might win a few battles but can never thoroughly defeat the Japanese invaders. Only through a total national resistance can the Japanese invaders be thoroughly defeated. To carry out a total national resistance, however, requires that the Kuomintang's policies be completely and thoroughly changed, that the whole nation, from the leaders down to the rank and file, put into effect a thoroughgoing programme for resisting Japan, *i.e.* a national salvation programme proposed in the spirit of the revolutionary Three People's Principles⁴ and three cardinal policies drawn up personally by Dr. Sun Yat-sen when the Kuomintang and the Communist Party co-operated for the first time.

C. The Chinese Communist Party earnestly proposes to the Kuomintang of China, the people of the whole country, all parties and groups, all circles and all armed forces throughout the country a Ten-Point National Salvation Programme for thoroughly defeating the Japanese invaders. The Chinese Communist Party firmly believes that only by carrying out this programme completely, earnestly and resolutely is it possible to attain the goal of defending the motherland and defeating the Japanese invaders. Otherwise, the responsibility for allowing the situation to deteriorate must rest with those who procrastinate; and lamentations can be of no avail once the doom of our whole nation is sealed. The Ten-Point National Salvation Programme is as follows:

(1) Down with Japanese imperialism.

Break off diplomatic relations with Japan; expel Japanese officials, arrest Japanese agents and confiscate Japanese property in China; repudiate debts to Japan; abrogate treaties signed with Japan; abolish Japanese concessions.

Fight bitterly to a finish in defence of North China and the sea-coast.

Fight bitterly to a finish for the recovery of Peiping, Tientsin and the North-east.

Drive the Japanese imperialists out of China.

Oppose all kinds of vacillation and compromise.

(2) General military mobilisation throughout the country.

Mobilise the land, sea and air forces of the whole country to carry out a nation-wide armed resistance.

Oppose the passive operational line of pure defence and adopt the positive operational line of initiative and independence.

Set up a permanent council of national defence to discuss and decide upon plans of national defence and operational direction.

Arm the people and expand the anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare to carry on operations in co-ordination with the main forces.

Reform the political work in the armed forces to achieve complete solidarity between officers and men.

Achieve complete solidarity between the army and the people to call forth the activity of the army.

Give support and aid to the Anti-Japanese Amalgamated Armies of the North-east to disrupt the enemy's rear.

Place all troops carrying on the Armed Resistance on an equal footing as regards supplies.

Establish military districts in all parts of the country and mobilise the whole nation to join in the war, thereby effecting a gradual change from the mercenary system to conscription.

(3) General mobilisation of the people of the whole country.

In resisting Japan and saving the nation, all the people of the country, with the exception of collaborators, should enjoy freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association and armed resistance to the enemy.

Annul all old laws and decrees that restrict the people's

patriotic movement and promulgate new, revolutionary laws and decrees.

Release all patriotic and revolutionary political prisoners and lift the ban on the parties.

Let the whole Chinese people be mobilised, arm themselves and join in the Armed Resistance and let those who have labour power give labour power, those who have money give money, those who have guns give guns and those who have knowledge give knowledge.

Mobilise on the principle of national self-determination and autonomy, the Mongolians, the Mohammedans and all other national minorities to join in the common fight against Japan.

(4) Reform the government structure.

Convoke a national assembly genuinely representative of the people to adopt a genuinely democratic constitution, to determine the policies of resistance and national salvation and to elect the national defence government.

The national defence government must draw in the revolutionary elements of all parties and groups and mass organisations, and expel the pro-Japanese elements.

The national defence government shall adopt the system of democratic centralism which is at once democratic and centralised.

The national defence government shall carry out revolutionary policies for resisting Japan and saving the nation.

Carry into effect the principle of local autonomy, remove all corrupt officials and establish a clean government.

(5) Anti-Japanese foreign policy.

In so far as there is no infringement of sovereignty or loss of territory, form anti-aggression alliances and conclude anti-Japanese pacts for mutual military aid with all countries that are opposed to Japanese aggression.

Support the international peace front and oppose the front of aggression of Germany, Japan and Italy.

Unite with the worker-peasant masses of Korea and Japan to oppose Japanese imperialism.

(6) Wartime financial and economic policy.

Financial policy is to be based on the principle of letting those who have money give money and confiscating the property

of the collaborators to defray the expenses of the war. The economic policy consists in overhauling and expanding defence production, developing rural economy and assuring self-sufficiency in wartime supplies; encouraging the use of Chinese goods and improving home products; and completely boycotting Japanese goods, suppressing unscrupulous merchants, and banning speculation and the manipulation of the market.

(7) Improvement of the people's living conditions.

Raise the pay of workers, office workers, teachers and soldiers fighting the Japanese.

Take good care of the families of the soldiers fighting the Japanese.

Abolish exorbitant assessments and miscellaneous taxes.

Reduce rent and interest.

Relieve the unemployed.

Regulate food supplies.

Give aid to victims of natural calamities.

(8) Anti-Japanese educational policy.

Change the old educational system and curriculum and put into effect a new system and curriculum aimed at resisting Japan and saving the nation.

(9) Elimination of collaborators, traitors and pro-Japanese elements in order to consolidate the rear.

(10) National solidarity for resisting Japan.

On the basis of Kuomintang-Communist co-operation, build up an Anti-Japanese National United Front of all parties and groups, all sections of the people and all armed forces of the country to direct the Anti-Japanese War and, with genuine solidarity, meet the national crisis.

D. The line of a resistance by the government alone must be abandoned, and the line of a total national resistance must be carried out. The government must unite with the people, revive fully the revolutionary spirit of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and put into effect the above-mentioned Ten-Point Programme in order to win complete victory in the Anti-Japanese War. The Chinese Communist Party, together with the masses of the people and the armed forces under its leadership, will adhere resolutely to the above-mentioned programme and go to the front line of the

Anti-Japanese War and defend the motherland to the last drop of its blood. The Chinese Communist Party, adhering to its consistent policy, is willing to form a common front with the Kuomintang of China and other parties and groups throughout the country, unite with them hand in hand and build up a solid Great Wall of the national united front to defeat the infamous Japanese invaders and strive for a new China of independence, freedom and happiness. To achieve this end, we must resolutely oppose the collaborators' theories of capitulation and compromise, as well as that kind of national defeatism which considers it impossible to vanquish the Japanese invaders. The Chinese Communist Party firmly believes that, if the above Ten-Point Programme is put into practice, the goal of defeating the Japanese invaders can definitely be attained. If our four hundred and fifty million countrymen all exert themselves, the final victory will certainly belong to our nation.

Down with Japanese imperialism!

Long live the victory of the national revolutionary war!

Long live the new China of independence, freedom and happiness!

August 25, 1937.

COMBAT LIBERALISM

We advocate an active ideological struggle, because it is the weapon for achieving solidarity within the Party and the revolutionary organisations and making them fit to fight. Every Communist and revolutionary should take up this weapon.

But liberalism negates ideological struggle and advocates unprincipled peace, with the result that a decadent, philistine style in work has appeared and certain units and individuals in the Party and the revolutionary organisations have begun to degenerate politically.

Liberalism manifests itself in various ways.

Although the person concerned is clearly known to be in the wrong, yet because he is an old acquaintance, a fellow townsman, a school-friend, a bosom companion, a loved one, an old colleague or a former subordinate, one does not argue with him on the basis of principle but lets things slide in order to maintain peace and friendship. Or one touches lightly upon the matter without finding a thorough solution, so as to maintain harmony all around. As a result, harm is done to the organisation as well as to the individual concerned. This is the first type of liberalism.

To indulge in irresponsible criticism in private, without making positive suggestions to the organisation. To say nothing to people's faces, but to gossip behind their backs; or to say nothing at a meeting, but gossip after it. Not to care for the principle of collective life but only for unrestrained self-indulgence. This is the second type.

Things of no personal concern are put on the shelf; the less said the better about things that are clearly known to be wrong; to be cautious in order to save one's own skin, and anxious only to avoid reprimands. This is the third type.

To disobey orders and place personal opinions above everything. To demand special dispensation from the organisation but to reject its discipline. This is the fourth type.

To engage in struggles and disputes against incorrect views, not for the sake of solidarity, progress or improving the work, but for personal attacks, letting off steam, venting personal grievances or seeking revenge. This is the fifth type.

Not to dispute incorrect opinions on hearing them, and not even to report counter-revolutionary opinions on hearing them, but to tolerate them calmly as if nothing had happened. This is the sixth type.

Not to engage in propaganda and agitation, to make speeches or carry on investigations and inquiries among the masses, but to leave the masses alone, without any concern for their weal and woe; to forget that one is a Communist and to behave as if a Communist were merely an ordinary person. This is the seventh type.

Not to feel indignant at actions detrimental to the interests of the masses, not to dissuade or to stop the person responsible for them or to explain things to him, but to allow him to continue. This is the eighth type.

To work half-heartedly without any definite plan or direction; to work perfunctorily and let things drift. "So long as I remain a bonze, I go on tolling the bell." This is the ninth type.

To regard oneself as having performed meritorious service in the revolution and to put on the airs of a veteran; to be incapable of doing great things, yet to disdain minor tasks; to be careless in work and slack in study. This is the tenth type.

To be aware of one's own mistakes yet make no attempt to rectify them, and to adopt a liberal attitude towards oneself. This is the eleventh type.

We can name several more. But these eleven are the principal types.

All these are manifestations of liberalism.

In revolutionary organisations liberalism is extremely harmful. It is a corrosive which disrupts unity, undermines solidarity, induces inactivity and creates dissension. It deprives the revolutionary ranks of compact organisation and strict discipline, prevents policies from being thoroughly carried out and divorces the organisations of the Party from the masses under their leadership. It is an extremely bad tendency.

Liberalism stems from the selfishness of the petty bourgeoisie,

which puts personal interests foremost and the interests of the revolution in the second place, thus giving rise to ideological, political and organisational liberalism.

Liberals look upon the principles of Marxism as abstract dogmas. They approve of Marxism, but are not prepared to practise it or to practise it in full; they are not prepared to replace their own liberalism with Marxism. Such people have got Marxism, but they have also got liberalism: they talk Marxism but practise liberalism; they apply Marxism to others but liberalism to themselves. Both kinds of goods are in stock and each has its particular use. That is how the minds of certain people work.

Liberalism is a manifestation of opportunism and conflicts fundamentally with Marxism. It has a passive character and objectively has the effect of helping the enemy; thus the enemy welcomes its preservation in our midst. Such being its nature, there should be no place for it in the revolutionary ranks.

We must use the active spirit of Marxism to overcome liberalism with its passivity. A Communist should be frank, faithful and active, looking upon the interests of the revolution as his very life and subordinating his personal interests to those of the revolution; he should, always and everywhere, adhere to correct principles and wage a tireless struggle against all incorrect ideas and actions, so as to consolidate the collective life of the Party and strengthen the ties between the Party and the masses; and he should be more concerned about the Party and the masses than about the individual, and more concerned about others than about himself. Only thus can he be considered a Communist.

All loyal, honest, active and staunch Communists must unite to oppose the liberal tendencies shown by certain people among us, and turn them in the right direction. This is one of the tasks on our ideological front.

September 7, 1937.

THE URGENT TASKS AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF KUOMIN- TANG-COMMUNIST CO-OPERATION

As early as 1933, the Chinese Communist Party made a declaration that it was ready to conclude an anti-Japanese agreement with any section of the Kuomintang army under three conditions, namely, that attacks on the Red Army be stopped, that freedoms be granted to the people and that the people be armed. That was because after the Incident of September 18 in 1931, the primary task of the Chinese people was already to oppose the invasion of China by Japanese imperialism. But we did not attain our objective.

In August 1935, the Chinese Communist Party and the Red Army called upon all parties and groups and the people throughout the country to organise an anti-Japanese allied army and a national defence government to fight jointly against Japanese imperialism.¹ In December that year, the Chinese Communist Party adopted the resolution² on forming an Anti-Japanese National United Front with the national bourgeoisie. In May 1936, the Red Army sent a circular telegram³ to the Nanking government requesting it to stop the civil war and to fight jointly against Japan. In August that year, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party again sent a letter⁴ to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang requesting it to bring about the cessation of the war and form with the Communist Party a bi-partisan united front to fight jointly against Japanese imperialism. In September that year, the Communist Party passed a resolution⁵ on establishing a unified democratic republic in China. We not only made the declaration, sent the circular telegram and the letter and published the resolutions, but repeatedly sent delegates to negotiate with the Kuomintang; yet all this proved fruitless. It was only towards the end of 1936, after the occurrence of the Sian Incident, that the plenipotentiary of the Chinese Communist Party and the chief responsible personage

of the Kuomintang reached an agreement on a political issue of importance at that time, *i.e.* cessation of the civil war between the two parties, and brought about the peaceful settlement of the Sian Incident. That was a great event in Chinese history and provided the prerequisite for renewing the co-operation between the two parties.

On February 10 this year, on the eve of the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang's Central Executive Committee, the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee, with a view to actually bringing about bi-partisan co-operation, made a series of proposals in a telegram⁶ to the plenary session. In that telegram we demanded that the Kuomintang guarantee to the Communist Party five things: cessation of the civil war, granting of democratic freedoms, convocation of the national assembly, speedy preparations for resisting Japan and improvement of the people's living conditions; at the same time we pledged to the Kuomintang that the Communist Party would do four things: abolition of its rival régime, redesignation of the Red Army, enforcement of the new-democratic system in the revolutionary base areas and discontinuance of the confiscation of the land of the landlords. This was also an important political step, for without it the realisation of bi-partisan co-operation would naturally have been retarded, and that would have been entirely detrimental to the speedy preparation for resisting Japan.

Since then the two parties have moved one step closer to each other in their negotiations. The Communist Party has made more specific proposals on setting up a common political programme for the two parties, on lifting the ban on the mass movement and releasing political prisoners and on changing the name of the Red Army. Up to now, although the common programme has not yet been promulgated, nor the ban on the mass movement lifted nor the new system in the revolutionary base areas recognised, an order has been issued, about a month after the fall of Peiping and Tientsin, to the effect that the Red Army was to be redesignated as the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army (also called the Eighteenth Group Army in the battle array of the anti-Japanese front). The declaration of the Chinese Communist Party's Central

Committee on the realisation of bi-partisan co-operation, which had been conveyed to the Kuomintang as early as July 15, and Chiang Kai-shek's statement recognising the legal status of the Chinese Communist Party, which was, as had been agreed, to appear together with the declaration and, much to our regret, was released after a long delay, were finally made public through the *Central News Agency* of the Kuomintang respectively on September 22 and 23 when the situation on the front became critical. This declaration of the Communist Party and the statement of Chiang Kai-shek proclaimed the realisation of bi-partisan co-operation and laid the necessary foundation for the two parties to unite to carry out the stupendous task of saving the nation. The declaration of the Communist Party not only provides the principle of the unity between the two parties but also the basic principle of the great union of the people throughout the country. It is very good that Chiang in his statement recognised the legal status of the Communist Party throughout the country and pointed out the necessity of unity for national salvation, but we are not satisfied with it because he has not yet abandoned the self-glorification characteristic of the Kuomintang nor made the necessary self-criticism. In spite of all this, the signal is given that the bi-partisan united front has come into being. This has ushered in a new epoch in the history of the Chinese revolution. It will exert a vast and profound influence on the Chinese revolution and play a decisive role in defeating Japanese imperialism.

In the Chinese revolution, the relation between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party has played the decisive role ever since 1924. The revolution of 1924-7 was started owing to the co-operation of the two parties on a definite programme. In the national revolution to which Dr. Sun Yat-sen had devoted himself for forty years and which he had left unaccomplished, tremendous success was scored within the short span of merely two or three years, namely, the establishment of the revolutionary base of Kwangtung and the victory in the Northern Expedition. This was the result of the formation of a bi-partisan united front. But, unable to uphold the revolutionary cause, a section of people disrupted the

bi-partisan united front and courted failure for the revolution just when it was nearing completion, thereby leaving the door open for foreign aggression. This was the result of the disruption of the bi-partisan united front. Now that the two parties have once again formed a united front, the Chinese revolution has entered a new period. In spite of the fact that there are still people who do not understand the historical task and the great future of the united front and regard its formation as a temporary makeshift for want of a better, the chariot-wheel of history will, through this united front, bring the Chinese revolution to a completely new stage. Whether China can extricate herself from such grave national and social crises depends entirely on the development of this united front. Fresh, favourable evidences have already appeared. The first evidence is that as soon as the policy of the united front was initiated by the Chinese Communist Party, it won the approval of the people throughout the country. From this the people's will can be clearly seen. The second evidence is that after the peaceful settlement of the Sian Incident and the cessation of hostilities between the two parties, all parties, all sections of the people, and all armed units in the country immediately attained an unprecedented solidarity. This solidarity, however, still falls far short of meeting the needs of resisting Japan, especially as the problem of unity between the government and the people remains basically unsolved. The third and the most conspicuous evidence is that the nation-wide War of Resistance has started. The resistance in its present state falls short of our demand because, though national in character, it is still confined to the government and the armed forces. We pointed out long ago that Japanese imperialism cannot be defeated through such a resistance. Yet in spite of all this, we have, for the first time in a hundred years, put up a nation-wide resistance to foreign invaders, which could never have come about without internal peace and bi-partisan co-operation. If we say that the Japanese aggressors took the four North-eastern provinces without firing a single shot during the time when the bi-partisan united front was broken up, then, with the united front re-established today, the Japanese aggressors will never be able to occupy any more Chinese territory without paying the cost

in bloody battles. The fourth evidence is the influence exerted by the united front internationally. The masses of the workers and peasants and the Communist parties all over the world have given their support to the anti-Japanese united front proposed by the Chinese Communist Party. With the announcement of the co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the people of various countries, especially of the Soviet Union, will help China more actively. China and the Soviet Union have concluded a pact of non-aggression⁷ and it is expected that the relations between the two countries will be further improved. From the above-mentioned evidences we can assert that further development of the united front will lead China towards a great and brilliant future, *i.e.* the defeat of Japanese imperialism and the establishment of a unified democratic republic.

However, the united front cannot accomplish this stupendous task if it remains as it is. The bi-partisan united front must be further developed. The reason is that the united front established now is not yet solid or firm.

Is the Anti-Japanese National United Front confined to the Kuomintang and the Communist Party? No, it is a united front of the whole nation, the two parties forming only a part of it. The Anti-Japanese National United Front is a united front of all parties, all sections of the people and all armed units, a united front of all our patriotic fellow-countrymen, the workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals and businessmen. Up to the present, the united front has in fact been confined to the two parties, while the broad masses of the workers, peasants, soldiers, urban petty bourgeoisie and a great number of other patriotic fellow-countrymen have not yet been aroused, called into action, organised or armed. This is the most serious problem confronting us. Its seriousness consists in the fact that it makes victories on the front impossible. The grave situation on the front in North China and in Kiangsu and Chekiang provinces cannot and need not be concealed; the problem now is how to save the situation. The only way to save it is precisely to put into practice Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Testament, *i.e.* "to arouse the people". In this Testament made on his deathbed, Dr. Sun stated that, from the experience accumulated in forty

years, he was deeply convinced that only by doing this could the goal of revolution be achieved. What on earth is the reason for obstinately refusing to put this Testament into practice? What on earth is the reason for not making up one's mind to put it into practice at such a critical juncture of life and death? Everybody knows that the policy of dictation and repression runs counter to the principle of "arousing the people". Resistance by the government and the army alone can never defeat Japanese imperialism. Early in May this year we shouted our serious warning to the Kuomintang, the party in power, that unless the masses of the people rise for the war of resistance, we would be taking the same path that led Abyssinia to disaster. This has been pointed out not only by the Communists but also by progressive people throughout the country and many judicious members of the Kuomintang itself. But the policy of dictation remains unchanged. As a result, the government is still separated from the people, the armies from the people, and the commanders in the armies from the rank and file. Unless the united front is replenished by the masses of the people, the crisis on the war front will inevitably be aggravated rather than mitigated.

The present anti-Japanese united front has not yet got a political programme that is agreed upon and officially promulgated by the two parties to replace the Kuomintang's policy of dictation. The whole set of measures which the Kuomintang is now carrying out in relation to the people is still the same as in the last ten years; from government organisations, army system and the policy towards the people, down to financial, economic and educational policies, things remain on the whole as they have been for the last ten years without any change. There are things that have undergone changes and great changes too—cessation of civil war and solidarity against Japan. The civil war between the two parties has ceased and the nation-wide Anti-Japanese War has begun—these things constitute a tremendous change in the Chinese political scene since the Sian Incident. But up to now no change has taken place in the set of measures mentioned above: this means a maladjustment between the things that have changed and those that have not. Because the set of old measures was suitable

only to a policy of compromising with foreign powers and suppressing the revolution at home, it is ill-adapted in every respect and reveals all its weaknesses when used to cope with the invasion of Japanese imperialism. It would be another story if we did not want to resist Japan; but since we do and have actually started resisting Japan, and as furthermore a serious crisis is confronting us, the danger before us would be inconceivable if we still refused to change over to a set of new measures. The resistance to Japan requires a replenished united front; hence the people throughout the country should be mobilised to join the front. The resistance to Japan requires a strong united front and this requires a common programme. A common programme is a directive of action for the united front and will serve also as a binding force which, like a piece of cord, will tightly hold together all persons and organisations, all parties and groups, all sections of the people and all the armies that have joined the united front. Only thus can we speak of strong solidarity. We are opposed to the old binding force, because it is unsuitable to the national revolutionary war. We welcome the introduction of a new binding force to replace the old one, that is, the promulgation of a common programme and the establishment of revolutionary order. Only thus can we adapt ourselves to the War of Resistance.

What is the common programme? It is the Three People's Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the Ten-Point Programme for Resistance to Japan and Salvation of the Nation⁸ proposed by the Communist Party on August 25 of this year.

In announcing the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation, the Communist Party stated that "The Three People's Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen being what China needs today, our Party pledges itself to fight for their complete realisation". Some people were surprised that the Communist Party was willing to put into practice the Three People's Principles of the Kuomintang; Chu Ch'ing-lai⁹ of Shanghai, for instance, expressed doubt in a periodical published there. These people think that Communism and the Three People's Principles are incompatible. This is but a formalistic approach. Communism will be put into practice at a future stage of the development of the revolution, and at the present stage,

Communists do not dream of carrying it out, but consider it necessary to carry out the national revolution and democratic revolution as required by history; this is the basic reason why the Communist Party proposed an Anti-Japanese National United Front and a unified democratic republic. As to the Three People's Principles, at the time of the first bi-partisan united front ten years ago, the Communist Party and the Kuomintang had, through the Kuomintang's First National Congress, made a joint decision to put them into practice, and moreover, through the personal effort of every loyal Communist and every loyal Kuomintang member, did put them into practice during 1924-7 in large sections of the country. Unfortunately that united front broke up in 1927, and there followed the Kuomintang's opposition to the implementation of the Three People's Principles. But all the policies the Communist Party has pursued during these ten years are fundamentally in line with the revolutionary spirit of Dr. Sun's Three People's Principles and Three Cardinal Policies. Never does a day pass but the Communist Party opposes imperialism—this means the thoroughgoing implementation of the Principle of Nationalism; the system of worker-peasant democratic dictatorship means nothing but the thoroughgoing implementation of the Principle of Democracy; the agrarian revolution means the thoroughgoing implementation of the Principle of the People's Welfare. But why did the Communist Party announce the abolition of the worker-peasant democratic dictatorship and the discontinuance of confiscating the land of landlords? The reason, as we have explained long ago, is not that the system and the policy are bad in themselves, but that the armed invasion of Japanese imperialism has brought about a change in the class relations within the country, thereby making it necessary as well as possible to unite all classes of the whole nation to fight against Japanese imperialism. Not only in China but in the whole world it is necessary as well as possible to establish an anti-fascist united front for a joint fight against fascism. Therefore we proposed to establish a national and democratic united front in China. It is on this basis that we proposed to substitute a democratic republic based on the alliance of all classes for a worker-peasant democratic dictatorship.

The agrarian revolution based on the principle of "land to the tillers" is the policy proposed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen himself; we have now discontinued that policy because we want to unite larger numbers of people to oppose Japanese imperialism, and not because we think China need not solve her land problem. We have unequivocally elucidated the reason why this policy is changed in present circumstances and at the present juncture. It is precisely because the Chinese Communist Party has, in line with Marxist principles, consistently upheld and developed the common programme of the first Kuomintang-Communist united front, *i.e.* the revolutionary Three People's Principles, that the Communist Party was able, at the moment of national crisis when a powerful enemy was pressing on our frontiers, to put forward the timely proposal of forming a national and democratic united front, the only policy for saving the nation, and to put it into practice with unremitting effort. The question now is not whether the Communist Party believes in or is carrying out the revolutionary Three People's Principles, but whether the Kuomintang believes in them or is carrying them out. The present task is to revive throughout the nation the revolutionary spirit of Dr. Sun's Three People's Principles and to work out on this basis definite programmes and policies and put them into practice—sincerely and not half-heartedly, conscientiously and not perfunctorily, speedily and not tardily; this is really what the Chinese Communist Party prays for day and night. For this very reason, the Chinese Communist Party put forward, after the Lukouchiao Incident, the Ten-Point Programme for Resistance to Japan and Salvation of the Nation. This Ten-Point Programme is in line with Marxism as well as with the truly revolutionary Three People's Principles. It is the initial programme for the Chinese revolution at the present stage, *i.e.* the stage of the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war, and we can save China only by putting it into effect. If anyone persists in doing things contradictory to this programme, he will be punished by history.

It is impossible to put the programme into practice throughout the country without the Kuomintang's consent, because the Kuomintang remains today the biggest party in China and the party in power. We believe the day will come when judicious

Kuomintang members will agree to this programme. For if they reject it, the Three People's Principles will remain empty words for ever, the revolutionary spirit of Dr. Sun Yat-sen can never be revived, Japanese imperialism can never be defeated, and the Chinese people cannot escape the fate of becoming colonial slaves. No really judicious Kuomintang member would ever like that and our people would never just stand by and see themselves one and all turned into colonial slaves. Moreover, Mr. Chiang Kai-shek already pointed out in his statement of September 23:

"I hold that we who stand for the revolution should do away with personal grudges and prejudices and devote ourselves to the realisation of the Three People's Principles. At this critical juncture of life and death, we should all the more let bygones be bygones and make a fresh start, together with the whole nation, to work strenuously for solidarity in order to preserve the very life and existence of our country."

That statement is quite correct. The urgent task at the moment is to strive for the realisation of the Three People's Principles, to remove personal and factional prejudices, to change the old set of measures and to carry out immediately a revolutionary programme in line with the Three People's Principles, so as to make a fresh start together with the people. This is the only way today. If one still delays, one will rue it in vain.

But there must be instruments for carrying out the Three People's Principles and the Ten-Point Programme; hence the problem of reforming the government and the army. The present government is still under the Kuomintang's one-party dictatorship and not one of the national and democratic united front. Without a government of the national and democratic united front it is impossible to carry out the Three People's Principles and the Ten-Point Programme. The present army system of the Kuomintang, too, remains the system of the old days, and with troops organised under such a system we shall never be able to defeat Japanese imperialism. All our troops are now carrying on the War of Resistance; to them, and especially to those fighting at the front, we express our warm admiration and respect. But the lessons learnt in the War of Resistance

in the last three months prove that the Kuomintang's army system is unsuitable for executing the task of completely crushing the Japanese aggressors and for carrying out successfully the Three People's Principles and the revolutionary programme, and must therefore be changed. The change should be based on the principles of unity between officers and men, and unity between the army and the people. The present army system of the Kuomintang is fundamentally opposed to both principles. Large numbers of officers and men, though loyal and brave at heart, are prevented by the old system from putting forth their activity; hence we should start immediately to reform the old system. This does not mean that we should now stop fighting until the reform is complete; the system can be reformed in the course of the war. The central task here is to induce a change in the army as regards its political spirit and political work. An exemplary precedent can be found in the National Revolutionary Army during the Northern Expedition, in which there was on the whole unity between officers and men as well as unity between the army and the people, and a revival of that spirit is absolutely necessary. China should take lessons from the war in Spain, because the troops of the Spanish Republic were built up under extremely adverse circumstances. China is in a better position than Spain, but she lacks a replenished and consolidated united front, a government of the united front capable of carrying out the whole revolutionary programme and large numbers of troops organised under a new system. She should remedy these defects. The Red Army under the Chinese Communist Party's leadership can for the time being only play the role of the vanguard so far as the entire Anti-Japanese War is concerned, and cannot as yet play a decisive role of nation-wide significance; but friendly armies throughout the country may find some of its political, military and organisational qualities worth acquiring. At the beginning this army was not what it is at present; it, too, has passed through many reforms, chiefly the abolition of feudal practices within the army and the realisation of the principles of unity between officers and men as well as unity between the army and the people. This experience can serve as a lesson for the friendly armies of the whole country.

Anti-Japanese comrades of the Kuomintang, the party in power: we share with you the responsibility of saving the nation from extinction and ensuring its survival. You have already formed with us an anti-Japanese united front, which is very good. You have been carrying out a war of resistance to Japan, which is also very good. But we do not approve of your moving in the rut of your old policies. We should develop and replenish the united front by drawing the masses of the people into it. We should strengthen it and put into practice a common programme. We should make up our minds to reform the political and army systems. It is absolutely necessary to form a new government which alone can carry out the revolutionary programme and start to reform the armies all over the country. This proposal answers the need of the times. Many people in your own party also feel that it is high time to put it into practice. Dr. Sun Yat-sen once made up his mind and reformed the political and army systems, thereby laying the foundation for the revolution of 1924-7. The responsibility for effecting the same reform now falls on your shoulders. No loyal and patriotic member of the Kuomintang, we believe, would regard our proposal as inexpedient. We are fully convinced that this proposal meets the objective needs.

Now that our nation is at the juncture of life or death, let the Kuomintang and the Communist Party unite closely! All countrymen unwilling to become colonial slaves, unite closely on the basis of the alliance of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party! The urgent task in the Chinese revolution today is to carry out all necessary reforms in order to overcome all difficulties. With this task accomplished, we are sure to defeat Japanese imperialism. So long as we work hard, our future is bright.

September 29, 1937.

INTERVIEW WITH THE BRITISH CORRESPONDENT JAMES BERTRAM

Translators' Note: Text translated from the Chinese, not a reproduction of the original English version.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR

JAMES BERTRAM: What specific pronouncements has the Chinese Communist Party made before and since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War?

MAO TSE-TUNG: Before the war broke out, the Chinese Communist Party warned the whole country time and again that war with Japan was inevitable and that all public comments of the Japanese imperialists on a so-called "peaceful settlement" as well as the Japanese diplomats' high-sounding speeches were but a smoke-screen to camouflage their war preparations. We repeatedly pointed out that we must strengthen the united front and carry out revolutionary policies before we could wage a victorious war of national liberation. The most important point in this revolutionary policy is that the Chinese government must put into effect democratic reforms in order to mobilise all the masses of the people to join the anti-Japanese front. We repeatedly pointed out the mistakes of those who believed in Japan's "peace pledge", who thought that the war might be avoided, and who believed that it was possible to resist the Japanese invaders without mobilising the masses. The outbreak as well as the course of the war has proved our views to be correct. The day after the Lukouchiao Incident, the Communist Party immediately issued a declaration to the whole country, calling upon all political parties and groups and all classes to resist unanimously the aggression of the Japanese invaders and strengthen the national united front. Soon afterwards we announced the Ten-point Programme for Resistance to Japan and Salvation of the Nation, in which we put forward the policies that the Chinese government ought to adopt in the Anti-Japanese War. Upon the announcement of

Kuomintang-Communist co-operation we issued another important declaration. All these testify to the fact that we have firmly adhered to the line of carrying on the Anti-Japanese War by strengthening the united front and implementing revolutionary policies. In this period our basic slogan was "Total resistance by the whole nation."

THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR—ITS SITUATION
AND ITS LESSONS

QUESTION: In your opinion, what are the results of the war up to the present moment?

ANSWER: There are two main aspects. On the one hand, we see the Japanese imperialists capturing our cities, seizing our territory, raping, plundering, burning and massacring, and threatening the Chinese nation with the peril of extinction. On the other hand, most people in China have now come to understand profoundly that, unless they further unite themselves and put up a nation-wide resistance, the critical situation cannot be saved. Furthermore, the peace-loving countries in the world are awakening to the necessity of resisting the menace from Japan. These are the results the war has brought about.

QUESTION: What do you think are Japan's objectives, and how far have they been achieved?

ANSWER: In Japan's plan, the first step is to occupy North China and Shanghai and the second to occupy other sections of China. As to how far the Japanese invaders have realised their plan, the situation is that the Japanese have seized in a short time the provinces of Hopeh, Chahar and Suiyuan, while Shansi is also in danger, and this is due to the fact that China's resistance has hitherto been limited to a resistance by the government and the army alone. This critical situation can be saved only if resistance is carried out by the people and the government jointly.

QUESTION: In your opinion, has China made any achievements in the War of Resistance? What are its lessons, if any?

ANSWER: I would like to discuss this question with you in some detail. First we must admit that there are achievements,

and great achievements too. They can be seen in the following: (1) The present Anti-Japanese War has had no precedent since imperialist aggression against China began. Geographically speaking, it is a war that involves literally the entire country. This war is revolutionary in character. (2) The war has changed the situation of the whole country from one of dissension and division into one of relative solidarity. Kuomintang-Communist co-operation serves as the basis of this solidarity. (3) The war has called forth expressions of sympathy from world public opinion. Those who once despised China for her non-resistance now respect her for her resistance. (4) The war has inflicted considerable losses on the Japanese invaders. It is said that there is a daily consumption of their resources to the value of twenty million *yen*; the losses in their man-power must also have been very heavy, though no estimate is yet available. If the Japanese invaders may be said to have easily occupied the four provinces in the North-east without lifting a finger, now they cannot occupy any part of Chinese territory without fighting a bloody battle. The Japanese invaders expected to glut themselves on China, but China's protracted resistance will lead Japanese imperialism on to the road to ruin. In this respect, China has carried on resistance not only to save herself but also to discharge her great duty in the world anti-fascist front. Here the revolutionary character of the Anti-Japanese War is also manifest. (5) We have learnt our lessons from the war. This was done at the cost of our territory and blood.

Speaking of the lessons, they are of great significance indeed. Several months' resistance has disclosed many of China's weaknesses. They are first of all manifest in the political sphere. Geographically this war involves the whole country, but as regards the participants, it is not a war waged by the whole nation. The broad masses of the people are still, as in the past, restricted by the government and cannot take part in the war, and so the present war is not yet a war of a mass character. Devoid of a mass character, a war against the aggression of Japanese imperialism can never achieve victory. Some people say: "The war at present is already a total war." This only means that geographically all parts of the country are involved

in the war. But as regards the sections of the population participating in it, the war is still a partial one, because resistance is as yet made merely by the government and the army, and not by the people. Herein lies the chief cause of the loss of vast territories and the setbacks suffered by many of our troops in the last few months. Thus although the present resistance is revolutionary, its revolutionary character is incomplete precisely because it is not yet a mass war. This is also a problem of unity. Although the political parties and groups in China are more united than before, the requisite degree of unity is far from being attained. Most of the political prisoners have not yet been released, and the ban on political parties has not been lifted completely. Between the government and the people, between the army and the people, and between the officers and men, relations are still very strained and there is division instead of unity. This is the most fundamental problem. Unless it is solved, victory in the war will be out of the question. Apart from this, military blunders are also a major cause of the losses in men and territory. The battles fought have been mostly passive, in military terminology, battles of "pure defence". This sort of fighting will never enable us to win. In order to win we must adopt policies radically different from the present ones, in both the political and military fields. Such are the lessons we have learnt.

QUESTION: What, then, are the necessary political and military conditions?

ANSWER: In the political sphere, first, the present government must be remoulded into a united front government in which the representatives of the people take part. Such a government should be at once democratic and centralised. It should carry out the necessary revolutionary policies. Secondly, the people should be granted freedom of speech, press, assembly, association and of making armed resistance against the enemy, so that the war will take on a mass character. Thirdly, the living conditions of the people must be improved through such measures as abolishing exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous assessments, reducing rent and interest, raising the pay of workers, officers at lower levels and soldiers, taking good care of the families of soldiers fighting the Japanese, and extending

relief to the victims of natural calamities and of war refugees, etc. The government's finance must be based on the principle of a reasonable distribution of the economic burden, *i.e.* the principle that those who have money give money. Fourthly, there should be a positive foreign policy. Fifthly, cultural and educational policies should be reformed. Sixthly, the collaborators should be sternly suppressed. This problem has become extremely acute. The collaborators are wreaking havoc without any restraint. They are helping the enemy at the front and creating disturbances unchecked in our rear, and some of them even assume an anti-Japanese guise and arrest patriotic people by denouncing them as collaborators. Effective suppression of the collaborators is possible only when the people rise to cooperate with the government. In the military sphere, it is also necessary to carry out comprehensive reforms, above all changing the line of pure defence in strategy and tactics into that of actively attacking the enemy; the army of the old system into an army of the new system; the method of compulsory mobilisation into one of arousing the people to go to the front; the divided command into a unified command; indiscipline which alienates the army from the people into discipline built on a voluntary basis which forbids even the slightest violation of the property rights of the people; and the situation of the regular army fighting alone into the extensive development of people's guerrilla warfare co-ordinated with the regular army's operations, etc. All the above-mentioned political and military conditions have been listed in the Ten-Point Programme we announced. These policies are all in agreement with the spirit of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles, his Three Cardinal Policies and his Testament. The war can be won only when they are carried into effect.

QUESTION: What is the Communist Party doing to realise this programme?

ANSWER: Our job is tirelessly to explain the present situation and unite with the Kuomintang and all other patriotic parties in order to strive for the expansion and consolidation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and the mobilisation of all forces to win victory in the War of Resistance. The Anti-Japanese National United Front is at present still very limited

in scope and needs expansion, in other words, it is necessary to "arouse the people" as laid down in Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Testament, and to mobilise the people of the lower social strata to join this united front. By the consolidation of the united front is meant the carrying out of a common programme to which all parties will be committed in their actions. We agree to adopt Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary Three People's Principles, his Three Cardinal Policies and his Testament as the common programme of the united front of all parties and groups and all classes. But this programme has thus far not been accepted by various parties and groups, and above all the Kuomintang has not agreed to announce such an overall programme. The Kuomintang has now carried out in part Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Principle of Nationalism, as shown in its resistance to Japan. But it has carried out neither his Principle of Democracy, nor his Principle of People's Welfare; consequently a serious crisis has arisen in the present War of Resistance. The war situation is now so tense that it is high time for the Kuomintang to carry out fully the Three People's Principles; if the Kuomintang does not do it now it will repent too late. The duty of the Communist Party is to explain this tirelessly and in loud and urgent tones to the Kuomintang and the whole nation, and to persuade them to carry out fully and thoroughly and on a nationwide scale the revolutionary Three People's Principles, the Three Cardinal Policies and Dr. Sun's Testament, so that the Anti-Japanese National United Front may be expanded and consolidated.

THE EIGHTH ROUTE ARMY IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR

QUESTION: Please tell me about the conditions of the Eighth Route Army in which so many people are interested—for instance, about its strategy and tactics, its political work, and so on.

ANSWER: Since the Red Army was reorganised as the Eighth Route Army and dispatched to the front, an increasing number of people have indeed become interested in its activities. I shall now give you a general account.

First about its field operations. Strategically, the Eighth Route Army is centring in Shansi in its operations. As you know, the Eighth Route Army has scored many victories, as witness the battle of Pingsing pass; the recapture of Chingping, Pinglu and Ningwu; the recovery of Laiyuan and Kwangling; the capture of the Tzeching pass; the interception of the three main supply routes of the Japanese troops between Tatung and the Yenmen pass, between the county town of Wei and the Pingsing pass, and between the county towns of Suo and Ningwu; the assault on the rear of the Japanese troops south of the Yenmen pass; the recapture of the Pingsing pass and the Yenmen pass, each recaptured twice over; and the recapture of the county towns of Chuyang and Tang in the last few days. The Japanese troops that entered Shansi are now being strategically encircled by the Eighth Route Army and other Chinese troops. We may assert that the Japanese troops will in future meet with the most stubborn resistance in North China. If they run amok in Shansi, they will certainly encounter difficulties which they have not met with hitherto.

Next about strategy and tactics. We have begun to do what the other Chinese troops have not done, namely, to operate chiefly in the enemy's flanks and at his rear. This line of operation differs greatly from pure defence along front lines. We do not object to employing as is necessary a part of the forces along the front lines. But we must devote our main forces to the enemy's flanks and employ the tactics of encirclement and outflanking in order to attack the enemy independently and on our own initiative; only thus can we preserve our own strength and annihilate the enemy's. Furthermore, the employment of a certain portion of armed forces against the enemy's rear proves particularly effective, because it can harass the enemy's supply lines and his bases. Even forces operating along front lines must not adopt the line of pure defence but should in the main adopt that of "counter assault". A principal cause of the military setbacks in the last few months was the wrong method of fighting. The line of operation now adopted by the Eighth Route Army is, as we call it, guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare carried on independently and on our own

initiative. This line of operation is, in essentials, the same as the line we adopted during the civil war, but there are also certain differences. In the situation at the present stage, we have more occasions to divide up the forces than to concentrate them, in order to facilitate our surprise attacks on the enemy's flanks and his rear in an extensive area. In the case of all the other armies in the country, of which there are a vast number, a part of them should be used to defend the front lines and another part dispersed to carry on guerrilla operations, while the main forces should be always concentrated against the enemy's flanks. The first essential of military operations is to preserve one's own forces and annihilate the enemy, and to attain this end it is necessary to wage guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare independently and on one's own initiative and to avoid all passive and inflexible methods of military operations. If a vast number of armies wage mobile warfare with the Eighth Route Army assisting them through guerrilla warfare, our victory will be beyond all doubt.

Next about political work. The Eighth Route Army has yet another very significant and distinctive feature, namely, its political work. The basic principles of the Eighth Route Army's political work are three. First, the principle of unity between officers and men, *i.e.* eradicating feudal practices in the army, abolishing the practice of beating and bullying the men, building up a conscious discipline, and leading a life in which weal and woe are shared by all alike—as a result of which the whole army is perfectly united. Secondly, the principle of unity between the army and the people, *i.e.* enforcing such discipline in dealing with the masses as forbids the army from violating even in the slightest degree the property rights of the people, carrying out propaganda among the masses and organising and arming them, lightening the financial burden on the people, and dealing blows to the traitors and collaborators who undermine the army and the people—as a result of which the army and the people are perfectly united and the army is everywhere welcomed by the people. Thirdly, the principle of disintegrating the enemy troops and giving lenient treatment to prisoners of war. Our victory depends not only upon the operations of our troops but also upon the

disintegration of the enemy troops. Although our measures of disintegrating the enemy troops and giving lenient treatment to prisoners of war have not yet achieved conspicuous results, they will certainly bring success in the future. Besides, with the second principle as the starting point, the replenishment of the Eighth Route Army takes the form not of forcing the people but of encouraging them to go to the front, which is much more effective than compulsion.

At present, although Hopeh, Chahar, Suiyuan and a part of Shansi have been lost, we do not at all lose heart but resolutely call upon the whole army to fight to the bitter end in co-ordination with the friendly armies for the sake of defending Shansi and recovering the lost territory. The Eighth Route Army will, in concerted action with the other Chinese troops, keep up the resistance in Shansi; this is of great significance for the war as a whole, especially for the war in North China.

QUESTION: In your opinion, can these good points of the Eighth Route Army be also acquired by the other Chinese armies?

ANSWER: Entirely so. In the period from 1924 to 1927, the spirit of the Kuomintang army was on the whole similar to that of the Eighth Route Army today. At that time the Communist Party co-operated with the Kuomintang in organising an armed force of the new system which, beginning with only two regiments, rallied many armed forces round itself and scored its first victory over Ch'en Chiung-ming. The Northern Expedition did not come about until this armed force was subsequently expanded into an army and exerted its influence on a greater number of armed units. A sense of freshness prevailed in the armed forces; officers and men, the army and the people were in general united, and all the armed forces were filled with a revolutionary spirit of bravely marching forward. In these armed forces the system of Party representatives and of political departments was set up, a system never adopted in China heretofore, which gave these forces a new look. The Red Army founded in 1927 and the Eighth Route Army of today have taken over this system and developed it. In the case of the armed forces in the revolutionary period of 1924-7, which were imbued with a new spirit, the line of operation naturally

fitted in with their political spirit; hence the armed forces operated not in a passive and inflexible way, but on their own initiative, full of enthusiasm and the spirit of charging the enemy, and consequently they won victory in the Northern Expedition. On the anti-Japanese battlefields of today such armed forces would exactly meet our demand. They need not consist of several millions; with a nuclear force of a few hundred thousand men, we shall be able to defeat Japanese imperialism. The heroic sacrifices made by the armies throughout the country since the War of Resistance began command our high esteem, but certain lessons should be drawn from the bloody battles.

QUESTION: Japanese army discipline being what it is, would not the policy of giving lenient treatment to the prisoners of war prove ineffective? For instance, once they go back after their release, the Japanese authorities will kill them and the whole Japanese army would not at all understand the meaning of your policy.

ANSWER: This is impossible. The more they kill, the more sympathy will be aroused for the Chinese army among the men of the Japanese army. Such facts cannot be concealed from the rank and file. Our policy is a persistent one; for instance, the Japanese army has now openly declared that it will use poison-gas against the Eighth Route Army, but even in that case we shall not change our policy of giving lenient treatment to prisoners of war. We shall still give lenient treatment to captive Japanese soldiers and certain captive Japanese officers of lower ranks who fought under coercion; we shall neither insult them nor browbeat them, but explain to them the harmony between the interests of the people of the two countries, set them free and let them go home. Those who do not want to go home may work in the Eighth Route Army. If and when an "international brigade" appears on the anti-Japanese battlefield, they may join it and fight Japanese imperialism with weapons in hand.

CAPITULATIONISM IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR

QUESTION: As far as I know, Japan is simultaneously carrying

on the war and circulating peace rumours in Shanghai. What is Japan's real purpose?

ANSWER: Having successfully carried out some of their measures, the Japanese imperialists will once again drop a smoke-bomb of peace for a threefold purpose. That is: (1) to consolidate the positions already captured so as to use them as the strategic bases for further offensives; (2) to split China's anti-Japanese front; and (3) to break up the pro-Chinese front of various countries of the world. The peace rumours now circulated are but the first few smoke-bombs dropped. Where the danger lies is that some vacillating persons in China are even getting ready to swallow the enemy's bait, while the collaborators and traitors, intermingling with these people, are spreading all kinds of rumours in an attempt to make China capitulate to Japan.

QUESTION: As you see it, what would this danger lead to?

ANSWER: There can only be two courses of development: either the Chinese people will overcome capitulationism, or capitulationism will become dominant, plunging China into chaos and heading the anti-Japanese front towards a split.

QUESTION: Which of the two is more likely to happen?

ANSWER: All the Chinese people demand that the War of Resistance be fought to a finish; should a section of the ruling bloc take the road of capitulation, the rest who are firm in their stand will certainly rise in opposition and carry on the resistance together with the people. That would naturally be a misfortune for China's anti-Japanese front. But I am sure that the capitulators can never win over the masses and that the masses will overcome capitulationism, persist in the war and win victory.

QUESTION: May I ask how capitulationism can be overcome?

ANSWER: By means of words, we point out the danger of capitulationism and, by means of deeds, we organise the masses to check the movement for capitulation. Capitulationism originates from national defeatism, *i.e.* national pessimism, which holds that China, defeated once, has no strength left to fight Japan. It shows its ignorance of the fact that failure is the mother of success and that the lessons derived from failure form

a basis for future success. Pessimism sees only the failure but not the achievements in the War of Resistance, and it especially fails to see that in our case elements of victory are contained in failure, while in the enemy's case elements of failure are contained in success. We must point out to the masses of the people the victorious prospect of the War of Resistance, enable them to understand the temporary nature of the defeats and difficulties and that, as long as we keep on fighting in spite of hundreds of setbacks, the final victory will be ours. The capitulators, devoid of a mass base, will find no opportunity to play their tricks and the anti-Japanese front will be consolidated.

DEMOCRACY AND THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR

QUESTION: What is the meaning of "democracy" which the Communist Party has put forward in its programme? Does it not come into conflict with a "wartime government"?

ANSWER: Not at all. In August 1936 the Communist Party already put forward the slogan of a "democratic republic". The political and organisational significance of this slogan consists in the following three points: (1) Not a state and government of a single class, but a state and government excluding all collaborators and traitors and based on the alliance of all anti-Japanese classes, which must include the workers, the peasantry and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie. (2) The organisational form of the government is democratic centralism, which is at once democratic and centralised—a unity of the two seeming opposites, democracy and centralisation, in a definite form. (3) The government is to give the people all necessary political freedoms, especially the freedom of organising, training and arming themselves for self-defence. Viewed from these three aspects, democracy in no way conflicts with a wartime government, and it is precisely the system of state and government advantageous to the Anti-Japanese War.

QUESTION: Is not "democratic centralism" a self-contradictory term?

ANSWER: We must look not only at the words but also at the reality. There is no impassable gulf between democracy and

centralism, both of which are essential for China today. On the one hand, the government we want must be a government truly representative of the popular will; it must have the support of the broad masses of the people throughout the country and the people must be free to support it and be given every opportunity to influence its policies. This is the meaning of democracy. On the other hand, centralisation of administrative power is also necessary, and once a policy demanded by the people is adopted by their representative body and handed over to the government elected by themselves, it will be up to the government to carry it out; so long as the government does not go against the line adopted in accordance with the people's will, the policy will be carried out smoothly. This is the meaning of centralism. Only through the adoption of democratic centralism can a really strong government come into being—China's government of national defence in the Anti-Japanese War certainly has to adopt such a system of democratic centralism.

QUESTION: This does not correspond to a war cabinet, does it?

ANSWER: It does not correspond to some of the war cabinets in history.

QUESTION: Have there ever been any war cabinets which corresponded to it?

ANSWER: There have been. Wartime political systems may generally be divided into two categories as determined by the nature of the war—those of democratic centralism and those of absolute centralism. All the wars in history, according to their nature, may be divided into two categories; just wars and unjust wars. For instance, the Great War in Europe some twenty years ago was a war unjust and imperialist in nature. At that time the governments of the imperialist countries forced the people to fight for the interests of imperialism and thus went against the interests of the people; under these circumstances such a government as the British government headed by Lloyd George became necessary. Lloyd George repressed the British people, forbidding them to say anything against the imperialist war and banning any organisation or assembly that expressed such popular feelings; although Parliament remained, it was merely a parliament which endorsed by order the war budget and was

an organ of a batch of imperialists. Disunity between the government and the people in war gives rise to a government of absolute centralism, which adopts only centralism to the exclusion of democracy. But there have also been revolutionary wars, like those in France, in Russia, and in present-day Spain. In such wars the government has no fear that the people will disapprove of the war, because the people are entirely willing to wage such wars; and as the foundation of the government is built upon the people's voluntary support, it not only has no fear of the people but endeavours to arouse them and induce them to express their views so that they will take an active part in the war. As China's war of national liberation is fully approved by the people and the war cannot be won without the people's participation, democratic centralism becomes a necessity. In the Northern Expedition of 1926-7 victory was also achieved through democratic centralism. One may thus see that, if the aim of the war directly represents the interest of the people, the more democratic the government is, the better can the war be prosecuted. Such a government should have no fear that the people will oppose the war; what it should chiefly worry about is rather that the people may remain inactive or indifferent. It is a law of history that the nature of the war determines the relations between the government and the people.

QUESTION: Then what steps are you prepared to take for putting this new political system into effect?

ANSWER: The crux of the matter lies in the co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.

QUESTION: Why?

ANSWER: For the last fifteen years, the relation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party has been the decisive factor in China's political situation. The bi-partisan co-operation of 1924-7 resulted in the victory of the first revolution. The split between the two parties in 1927 resulted in the unfortunate situation of the last ten years. However, the responsibility for the split did not rest with us, because we were forced to turn to resisting the Kuomintang's oppression, while persistently upholding the glorious banner of liberating China. Now we have entered the third stage, in which the two parties

must proceed with a thoroughgoing co-operation on a definite programme in order to resist Japan and save the nation. Through our ceaseless endeavours, co-operation has eventually been officially announced, but the point is that both sides should accept a common programme and act upon it. An essential part of this programme is the establishment of a new political system.

QUESTION: How can the establishment of the new system be completed through the co-operation of the two parties?

ANSWER: We are proposing a reform in the governmental structure and the army system. To meet the present emergency we propose that a provisional national assembly be convoked. The delegates to this assembly should, in some such way as Dr. Sun Yat-sen suggested in 1924, be elected in due proportion from the various anti-Japanese parties and groups, the anti-Japanese armies and the anti-Japanese popular organisations and associations of industrialists. This assembly should function as the supreme organ of state authority to decide on the policies for national salvation, adopt a constitutional programme and elect the government. We hold that the War of Resistance has reached a critical turning-point and that only by speedily convoking such a national assembly, at once powerful and representative of the popular will, can domestic politics be given a new physiognomy and the crisis in the present situation be overcome. We are exchanging views with the Kuomintang about this and hope that we shall obtain its consent.

QUESTION: Has not the National Government declared that the national assembly is called off?

ANSWER: It is right to call it off. What has been called off is the national assembly which the Kuomintang had previously been preparing to convoke, a national assembly which, according to the Kuomintang's stipulations, would not have had the slightest power and whose election procedure disagrees fundamentally with the popular will. We and the people of all sections of society unanimously disapproved of such a national assembly. The provisional national assembly we now propose is essentially different from the one called off. As soon as the provisional national assembly is convoked, the whole country

will certainly take on a new physiognomy and an essential prerequisite will be secured for the reform of the governmental structure and the army and for the mobilisation of the people. We in fact depend on this for turning a dangerous corner in the War of Resistance.

October 25, 1937.

THE SITUATION AND TASKS IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR AFTER THE FALL OF SHANGHAI AND TAIYUAN

The following is the outline of a report made at a meeting of Party activists in Yen-an in November 1937. The Right opportunists in the Party immediately opposed this report and their Rightist deviation persisted until it was basically rectified by the plenary session of the Party's Central Committee (the sixth since the Sixth National Congress) in October 1938.

I. THE PRESENT SITUATION IS ONE OF TRANSITION FROM PARTIAL RESISTANCE TO TOTAL RESISTANCE

1. We support any kind of resistance, even though a partial one, to the invasion of Japanese imperialism. For a partial resistance marks one step forward from non-resistance, it bears a revolutionary character, and it is a fight in defence of the motherland.

2. But we pointed out long ago (at the meeting of Party activists in Yen-an in April, at the National Conference of Party Delegates in May, and in the Resolution¹ of the Central Political Bureau in August) that a partial resistance by the government alone and without mass participation will certainly fail. For it is not a completely national revolutionary war, not a war of the masses.

3. We advocate a completely national revolutionary war, or total resistance with the people mobilised throughout the country. For only such a resistance is a war of the masses and can attain the aim of defending the motherland.

4. Although the partial resistance advocated by the Kuomintang is also a national war and bears a revolutionary character, its revolutionary character is far from being complete. A partial resistance will certainly land the war in failure and can never successfully defend the motherland.

5. Herein lies the difference in principle between the Communist Party's stand and the Kuomintang's present stand with regard to the resistance. If Communists forget this point of

principle, they will not be able to guide the Anti-Japanese War correctly, they will be powerless to overcome the Kuomintang's one-sidedness, and they will lower themselves to a stand which is against their principles and reduce the Communist Party to the level of the Kuomintang. They will then commit a crime against the sacred cause of the national revolutionary war and the defence of the motherland.

6. In a completely national revolutionary war or a total resistance, we must put into effect the Ten-Point Programme for Resistance to Japan and Salvation of the Nation proposed by the Communist Party, and there must be a government and an army that will carry out this programme completely.

7. The situation after the fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan is as follows:

(1) In North China, the regular warfare in which the Kuomintang played the chief role has ended, and the guerrilla warfare in which the Communist Party plays the chief role has come to the fore. The Japanese invaders in Kiangsu and Chekiang, having broken through the Kuomintang's battle lines, are now advancing on Nanking and the Yangtze valley. It is already clear that the Kuomintang's partial resistance cannot last long.

(2) In their own imperialist interests, the governments of Britain, the United States and France have indicated their willingness to help China, but so far there has been only verbal sympathy and no practical aid whatsoever.

(3) The German-Italian fascists are doing everything to assist Japanese imperialism.

(4) The Kuomintang is still unwilling to make any change in principle in its one-party dictatorship and its policy of dictation towards the people, with both of which it is carrying on a partial resistance.

These constitute one aspect of the situation.

The other aspect manifests itself as follows:

(1) The Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army have spread their political influence widely and rapidly, and they are being acclaimed throughout the country as "the saviours of the nation". The Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army are determined to keep up the guerrilla warfare in

North China, to defend the whole country, to contain the Japanese invaders and to prevent them from attacking the Central plains and the North-west.

(2) The mass movement has developed a step further.

(3) The national bourgeoisie is tending towards the left.

(4) Forces for reform are growing within the Kuomintang.

(5) A movement to oppose Japan and aid China is expanding among the people of the world.

(6) The Soviet Union is preparing to give practical aid to China.

These constitute another aspect of the situation.

8. Therefore, the present situation is one of transition from partial resistance to total resistance. While partial resistance cannot last any longer, total resistance has not yet set in. This is a highly critical interval, a gap between two stages.

9. In this period, China's partial resistance may develop in one of these three lines:

The first line of development is that partial resistance comes to an end and total resistance takes its place. This is the demand of the majority of the nation, but the Kuomintang has not yet made up its mind about it.

The second line of development is that armed resistance comes to an end and capitulation takes its place. This is the demand of the Japanese invaders, the collaborators and the pro-Japanese clique, but the majority of the Chinese people are opposed to it.

The third line of development is that armed resistance and capitulation exist in China side by side. This would be the result of the intrigues and schemes carried out by the Japanese invaders, the collaborators and the pro-Japanese clique to split China's anti-Japanese front when they find it impossible to turn China's partial resistance in the second direction. They are now engineering this move. The danger now exists to a serious degree.

10. Judging from the present situation, the domestic and international factors which keep capitulationism from gaining ascendancy are predominant. These factors are: Japan's line of resolutely subjugating China, a line which places China in a position where she has no alternative but to fight; the existence

of the Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army; the demand of the Chinese people for resistance; the demand of the majority of the Kuomintang members for resistance; the worries of Britain, the United States and France about the damage the Kuomintang's capitulation would cause to their interests; the existence of the Soviet Union and its line of helping China; the high hopes (not illusory ones) which the Chinese people place in the Soviet Union, etc. If we co-ordinate these factors well, we can eliminate not only the factors of capitulation and a split but also those which arrest the situation at the stage of partial resistance.

11. Therefore, the prospect of a transition from partial resistance to total resistance does exist. To strive for the realisation of this prospect is an urgent task common to all Chinese Communists, all progressive members of the Kuomintang of China and all the Chinese people.

12. China's anti-Japanese national revolutionary war is now confronted with a grave crisis. This crisis may be prolonged, or may be overcome fairly soon. The decisive factors are, inside China, the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation and the Kuomintang's change of policy on the basis of this co-operation, the strength of the masses of the workers and the peasants, and, outside China, the aid from the Soviet Union.

13. It is both necessary and possible for the Kuomintang to reform itself politically and organisationally.² This is mainly due to Japan's oppression, the Chinese Communist Party's policy of the united front, the demand of the Chinese people and the growth of fresh forces inside the Kuomintang. Our task is to persuade the Kuomintang to carry out such a reform as a basis for reforming the government and the army. Such a reform undoubtedly requires the consent of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, and we are only in a position to offer suggestions.

14. Reform the government. We have put forward the line of convoking a provisional national assembly, a line both necessary and possible. Undoubtedly, this reform also requires the consent of the Kuomintang.

15. The task of reforming the army consists in building up a new army and reforming the old armies. If within six to twelve

months we can build up a new army 250,000 to 300,000 strong, imbued with a new political spirit, then the situation on the anti-Japanese battlefield will begin to mend. This new army will influence all the old armies as well as unite with them. It will be the military basis for the Anti-Japanese War to turn to a strategic counter-offensive. This reform likewise requires the consent of the Kuomintang. The Eighth Route Army ought to play an exemplary role in the course of this reform. The Eighth Route Army itself ought to be expanded.

II. WE MUST OPPOSE CAPITULATIONISM BOTH WITHIN THE PARTY AND THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY

1. *Within the Party, Oppose Class Capitulationism*

16. In 1927 Ch'en Tu-hsiu's capitulationism led the revolution to failure. No party member must forget this historical lesson written in blood.

17. Before the Lukouchiao Incident, the main danger within the Party as regards its policy for an Anti-Japanese National United Front was "Left" opportunism, *i.e.* closed-door sectarianism. This was mainly because the Kuomintang had not yet begun to resist Japan.

18. After the Lukouchiao Incident, the main danger within the Party is no longer "Left" closed-door sectarianism but Right opportunism, *i.e.* capitulationism. This is mainly because the Kuomintang has already begun to resist Japan.

19. Back in April, at the Yen-an meeting of Party activists, then again in May at the National Conference of Party Delegates, and especially in August at the meeting of the Central Political Bureau (the Lochwan meeting), we already raised the following questions: In the united front, is it for the proletariat to lead the bourgeoisie or vice versa? Is it for the Kuomintang to draw the Communist Party to itself or vice versa? For the present specific political task these questions mean: Should we raise the Kuomintang to the level of the Ten-Point Programme for Resistance to Japan and Salvation of the Nation and of total resistance that are advocated by the Communist Party, or should we lower the Communist Party to the level of the

Kuomintang's dictatorship of the landlord class and the bourgeoisie and its partial resistance?

20. Why should we have so pointedly raised these questions? It is because of the following:

On the one hand: the Chinese bourgeoisie's proneness to compromise; the Kuomintang's superiority in material strength; the manifesto and the decisions of the Third Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang which calumniate and insult the Communist Party and clamour for "putting an end to the class struggle"; the Kuomintang's heartfelt desire for and widespread propaganda of "the capitulation of the Communist Party"; Chiang Kai-shek's attempt to place the Communist Party under his control; the Kuomintang's policy of restricting and weakening the Red Army; its policy of restricting and weakening the democratic anti-Japanese base areas; the scheme put forward at the Kuomintang's Party Training Courses at Kuling³ in July "to reduce the strength of the Communist Party by two-fifths in the course of the Anti-Japanese War"; the attempts of the Kuomintang to entice the cadres of the Communist Party with the bait of a good career and easy money and an idle life of pleasure; the political capitulation of certain radicals within the petty bourgeoisie (represented by Chiang Nai-ch'i⁴), etc.

On the other hand: the unevenness in theoretical level among the Communists; the lack of experience on the part of many participants in the bi-partisan co-operation during the Northern Expedition; the existence of a large section of Party members of petty-bourgeois origin; the unwillingness of a section of the Party members to continue the life of bitter struggle of the past; the tendency of unprincipled accommodation to the Kuomintang in the united front; the rise of the tendency of new warlordism in the Eighth Route Army; the rise of the problem of Communist participation in the Kuomintang government; the rise of the tendency of accommodation to the Kuomintang in the democratic anti-Japanese base areas, etc.

On account of the grave situation in the above two respects we must pointedly raise the question of who is to lead and must resolutely oppose capitulationism.

21. For several months, especially since the Armed Resistance, the Central Committee and the Communist Party organisations at all levels have successfully conducted definite and resolute struggles and taken necessary precautions against the capitulationist tendency which has already emerged or may emerge.

On the problem of participation in the government, the Central Committee has issued a draft resolution.⁵

In the Eighth Route Army a struggle has been started against the tendency of new warlordism. Following the reorganisation of the Red Army this tendency is manifested among certain individuals who become unwilling to submit strictly to the leadership of the Communist Party, who are developing individualist heroism and who feel honoured on receiving appointments from the Kuomintang (*i.e.* to become officials), etc. Although both in origin (lowering the Communist Party to the level of the Kuomintang) and in result (alienating the masses) this tendency of new warlordism is similar to the old one of beating and bullying people, violating discipline, etc., yet as it has arisen in the period of the united front of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party it entails a particularly great danger and is therefore worth our special attention and must be opposed resolutely. Both the system of political commissars, abolished because of the Kuomintang's intervention, and the political department, renamed the "office of political training" for the same reason, are now restored. We have sponsored and resolutely carried out the new strategic principle of "carrying on independently and on our own initiative a guerrilla warfare in the mountain regions", thus basically ensuring the Eighth Route Army's successes in fighting and in carrying out other tasks. We have rejected the Kuomintang's request to appoint its members as cadres of the Eighth Route Army and have upheld the principle of the Communist Party's absolute leadership of the Eighth Route Army. In the revolutionary anti-Japanese base areas we have likewise sponsored the principle of "independence and autonomy in the united front". We have rectified the tendency of "parliamentarianism"⁶ (of course not the parliamentarianism of the Second International, which is not found in the Chinese Party) and persisted in our struggle against bandits, enemy spies and saboteurs.

In Sian we have rectified an unprincipled tendency (that of accommodation) in the relations between the two parties and have developed the mass struggle afresh.

In eastern Kansu the situation is on the whole the same as in Sian.

In Shanghai we have criticised Chang Nai-chi's line of "fewer calls for action, more suggestions", thereby making a start in rectifying the tendency of accommodation in the work for national salvation.

In various guerrilla areas in South China—these represent part of the fruits of our bloody battles with the Kuomintang over ten years, the strategic fulcra of the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war in the southern provinces, and the forces which the Kuomintang attempted even after the Sian Incident to extirpate by its policy of "encirclement and annihilation" and which it has, after the Lukouchiao Incident, again tried to weaken by shifting to a policy of "luring the tiger out of the mountain"—our attention is focused on (1) guarding against concentrating forces regardless of circumstances (which would only meet the Kuomintang's desire to remove these fulcra), (2) refusing admittance to the people sent to those areas by the Kuomintang, and (3) keeping ourselves on the alert against the danger of the recurrence of the Ho Ming Incident⁷ (the danger of being surrounded and disarmed by the Kuomintang).

In *The Liberation Weekly*⁸ we have resolutely continued to make severe and judicious criticism.

22. In order to keep up the armed resistance and win the final victory, to turn partial resistance into total resistance, we must uphold the line of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and expand and strengthen this united front. No recommendation for splitting up the united front of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party is to be tolerated. We still have to guard against "Left" closed-door sectarianism. But at the same time, we must closely link up all our united front work with the principle of independence and autonomy. Our united front with the Kuomintang and other parties is a united front based on the execution of a definite programme. Apart from this basis there can be no united front at all, and such co-operation would become an unprincipled action and a manifestation of

capitulationism. Thus to explain, to implement and to uphold the principle of "independence and autonomy in the united front" is the central link in leading the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war to the path of victory.

23. What then is our purpose in upholding that principle? In one aspect, it is to maintain the foothold that we have already gained. This foothold is the starting point of our strategy, and its loss would mean the end of everything. But the chief purpose lies in another aspect, namely, to expand our foothold, to realise the positive aim of "mobilising millions upon millions of the masses to join the Anti-Japanese National United Front and overthrow Japanese imperialism". Maintaining the foothold is inseparable from expanding it. In the last few months, broader sections of the left-wingers within the petty bourgeoisie have become united under our influence, the new-born forces in the Kuomintang camp have been growing, the mass struggle in Shansi has developed, and the Party organisations have expanded in many places.

24. But we must clearly understand that, generally speaking, the organisational strength of our Party is still weak in the country as a whole. The strength of the masses in the country as a whole also remains very small, for the basic sections of the masses of the workers and the peasants in the country are not yet organised. All this is due to the Kuomintang's policy of control and repression on the one hand and to the absence or inadequacy of our own work on the other. This is the basic weakness of our Party in the present anti-Japanese national revolutionary war. Without overcoming this weakness we cannot defeat Japanese imperialism. To defeat Japanese imperialism we must carry out the principle of "independence and autonomy in the united front" and overcome capitulationism or the line of accommodation.

2. *For the Country as a Whole, Oppose National Capitulationism*

25. The above remarks concern the tendency of class capitulationism. This tendency leads the proletariat to accommodate itself to bourgeois reformism and lack of thoroughness. Unless

we overcome this tendency, we cannot successfully carry out an anti-Japanese national revolutionary war, turn partial resistance into total resistance and defend the motherland.

But there is yet another kind of capitulationism, national capitulationism, which leads China to accommodate herself to the interest of Japanese imperialism, turns China into a colony under the rule of Japanese imperialism and turns the Chinese people into colonial slaves. This tendency has now appeared in the right-wing bloc in the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

26. The left-wing bloc in the Anti-Japanese National United Front is composed of the Communist-led masses, including the masses of the proletariat, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie. Our task is to exert our utmost to expand and consolidate this bloc. The accomplishment of this task is the basic condition for reforming the Kuomintang, the government and the army, for building a unified democratic republic, for turning partial resistance into total resistance and for overthrowing Japanese imperialism.

27. The middle-of-the-road bloc in the Anti-Japanese National United Front is composed of the national bourgeoisie and the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie. Those sections represented by the leading newspapers in Shanghai are now tending towards the Left,⁹ a section of the membership of the *Fu Hsing* Society is beginning to vacillate and a section of the C. C. Clique is also vacillating.¹⁰ The troops resisting Japan have learnt severe lessons, and certain people among them are beginning or preparing to make reforms. Our task now is to induce the middle-of-the-road bloc to become progressive and change their position.

28. The right-wing bloc in the Anti-Japanese National United Front consists of the big landlords and big bourgeois and forms the headquarters of national capitulationism. As these people fear on the one hand the destruction of their property in the war and on the other the rise of the masses, their tendency towards capitulation is inevitable. Many of them are already collaborators, many others have already joined the pro-Japanese clique, still others are preparing to join the pro-Japanese clique, and many are vacillating; only some of them,

owing to special circumstances, remain firm. Some of them have temporarily joined the national united front under compulsion and with reluctance. Generally speaking, it will not be long before they split off from the Anti-Japanese National United Front. At present many who are the worst people among the big landlords and big bourgeois are engineering a split in the anti-Japanese National United Front. They are the manufacturers of rumours, and such rumours as "the Communists are in insurrection" and "the Eighth Route Army is beating a retreat" will from now on multiply with every passing day. Our task is to oppose national capitulationism resolutely and, in this struggle, expand and consolidate the left-wing bloc and induce the middle-of-the-road bloc to change and become progressive.

3. *The Relation Between Class Capitulationism and National Capitulationism*

29. In the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war, class capitulationism is actually the reserve force of national capitulationism, the worst tendency that gives support to the right-wing camp and causes defeat in the war. In order to win the liberation of the Chinese nation and the toiling masses, to make our struggle against national capitulationism a resolute and powerful one, we must oppose the class capitulationist tendency within the Communist Party and the proletariat and extend this struggle in all spheres of our work.

November 12, 1937.

NOTICE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SHENSI-KANSU-NINGSIA BORDER REGION AND THE REAR HEADQUARTERS OF THE EIGHTH ROUTE ARMY

This notice was written for the Government of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and the Rear Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army with a view to counteracting the disruptive activities of the Chiang Kai-shek clique. Shortly after the announcement of Kuomintang-Communist co-operation the Chiang Kai-shek clique began to plot the disruption of the revolutionary forces under Communist leadership. The disruption of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region formed part of the plot. Comrade Mao Tse-tung maintained that in order to defend the interests of the revolution a firm stand had to be taken. This notice dealt a blow to the opportunist attitude towards the intrigues of the Chiang clique which was adopted by a section of Party members in the anti-Japanese united front.

Notice is hereby given: Since the Lukouchiao Incident, all our patriotic countrymen have been resolutely carrying on armed resistance. Officers and men at the front have sacrificed their lives and shed their blood. All the parties and groups have united in good faith. And all sections of the people have joined forces to save the nation from extinction. All this points to a bright path for the Chinese nation and affords a firm guarantee for victory in resisting Japan. All our fellow-countrymen must march forward along these lines. The army and people of our Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region¹ have followed the leadership of the Government and devoted their efforts to the cause of national salvation. All that they have done has been honourable and legitimate. They have carried on bitter struggles, tirelessly and uncomplainingly. The people of the whole country are singing their praise. This Government and this Headquarters will naturally encourage the people of the whole region to make further efforts to carry out their tasks. Nobody will be allowed to fail in his duty and nothing will be allowed that undermines the cause of national salvation. Recent investigations, however, have disclosed that in the border

region there are persons who, disregarding the public interest, resort to various means to force the peasants to return the land and houses that have been allotted to them, compel debtors to pay old loans that have already been cancelled,² coerce the people to change the democratic system that has been built up, or disrupt the military, economic, cultural and mass organisations that have already been established. Some persons even act as spies, conspire with bandits, incite our soldiers to mutiny, make surveys and draw maps of our region, stealthily collect information about our conditions, or openly make propaganda against the Border Region Government. All these activities evidently violate the basic principles of unity for resistance to Japan, run counter to the will of the people of the border region, and are undertaken to foment internal dissension, disrupt the united front, prejudice the interests of the people, undermine the prestige of the Border Region Government, and increase the difficulties of the mobilisation for resisting Japan. Investigation reveals that it is only a few die-hards who, ignoring the interests of the nation and the state, are doing damage without restraint. Some of them even serve as tools of the Japanese invaders, and resort to one pretext or another as a means of camouflaging their conspiratorial activities. For several months people in the counties have been sending in reports and requesting us to put a stop to such activities; every day the government organs are snowed under by such reports and requests. With a view to increasing the forces for resisting Japan, consolidating the anti-Japanese rear, and safeguarding the interests of the people, this Government and this Headquarters are dutybound to proscribe the above-mentioned activities. We find it proper and urgent to give the following notice in unequivocal terms:

(1) Within the areas which were under the jurisdiction of the Border Region Government at the time when internal peace was established, this Government and this Headquarters will safeguard the interests already secured for the people, forbidding any unauthorised alteration concerning the houses and lands allotted and the debts cancelled.

(2) This Government and this Headquarters will give protection to the activities of all military, political, economic,

cultural and mass organisations that were in existence at the time when internal peace was established and which have since been reformed and developed in accordance with the principle of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, will promote their progress, and will stop all intrigues and disruptive activities against them.

(3) This Government and this Headquarters, on the principle of resolutely carrying out the Programme of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction, will be glad to promote any undertaking that facilitates the resistance to Japan and the salvation of the nation. To all the people from various circles who give us their sincere co-operation we shall extend our welcome. But all those who, without securing the approval of this Government or this Headquarters and without obtaining credentials from this Government or this Headquarters, come to reside in the border region and engage in activities must, regardless of the nature of these activities, be proscribed, in order to guard against undesirables in disguise and to keep out traitors and spies.

(4) At this critical moment of the armed resistance, the people in the border region should report all those within the boundaries of the border region who are plotting to disrupt us, doing damage and creating disorder, enlisting agents and fomenting disturbances, or spying on our military secrets. The persons accused may, upon valid evidence, be arrested on the spot. When convicted, the offenders shall be severely punished without mercy.

The above-mentioned four regulations should be strictly observed by the army and people of the whole border region and must not be violated. Henceforth, in case any lawless persons should be foolhardy enough to plot disruption and disturbances, this Government and this Headquarters will enforce the regulations against them with all severity and no excuses pleading ignorance of the present notice will be taken into consideration.

May 15, 1938.

STRATEGIC PROBLEMS IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE GUERRILLA WAR

In the early days of the Anti-Japanese War, many people inside as well as outside the Party belittled the strategic role of guerrilla warfare and pinned their hopes on regular warfare, particularly on the operations of the Kuomintang troops. Comrade Mao Tse-tung refuted their view and at the same time wrote the following article to point out the correct course for the development of the anti-Japanese guerrilla war. As a result, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, totalling only a little more than 40,000 men in 1937, expanded to one million strong when Japan surrendered in 1945, established many revolutionary base areas, and played an important role in the Anti-Japanese War by making Chiang Kai-shek afraid to capitulate to Japan or launch a nation-wide civil war. When, in 1946, he did launch the nation-wide civil war, the People's Liberation Army formed out of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army had already built up enough strength to deal with his attacks.

CHAPTER I

WHY SHOULD THE STRATEGIC PROBLEMS IN GUERRILLA WARFARE BE RAISED?

In the Anti-Japanese War regular warfare plays the principal role and guerrilla warfare a supplementary one. We have already correctly settled this point. Thus apparently there remain only tactical problems of guerrilla warfare, and why should its strategic problems be raised?

If our country were a small one, and guerrilla warfare were only to play the role of directly co-ordinating at a short distance with the operations of the regular army in its campaigns, there would, of course, be only tactical problems and no strategic problems. Furthermore, if China were as strong as the Soviet Union and could quickly drive out the enemy when he came in, or if, though it would take her some time to do so, yet the enemy-occupied areas were not extensive, then guerrilla warfare would also merely play a co-ordinating role in the campaigns, and naturally there would be only tactical problems and no strategic problems as such.

The strategic problems in guerrilla warfare arise in these circumstances: China is neither a small country nor a country like the Soviet Union, but a country big and weak. The whole problem arises because this big and weak country which is in an era of progress is attacked by a small and strong country. In these circumstances the enemy has succeeded in occupying a very extensive area and the war has become a protracted one. Our enemy has seized an extensive area in this big country of ours, but as his country is small, his armed forces are insufficient, and he has to leave many places ungarrisoned in the occupied areas, so in the anti-Japanese guerrilla war our task is primarily not to co-ordinate with the regular troops in their campaigns on the interior line, but to fight independently on the exterior line; furthermore, owing to China's progressive character, *i.e.* the existence of a strong army and the fact that broad masses of people are under the leadership of the Communist Party, the anti-Japanese guerrilla war could not but be waged on a large and not a small scale, and consequently a whole series of problems crop up, like those of strategic defensive and strategic offensive. The protractedness and consequently the ruthlessness of the war bring it about that guerrilla warfare must undertake many unusual tasks; hence arise the problems of the base areas, of the development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare, and so on. Because of all this, China's anti-Japanese guerrilla war steps out of the bounds of tactics and knocks at the door of strategy, demanding that problems of guerrilla warfare be considered from a strategic viewpoint. What deserves our particular attention is that such an extensive as well as protracted guerrilla war is a quite new thing in the whole history of war. The crux of the problem lies in the very fact that the march of time has carried us to the thirties and forties of the twentieth century, and that there exist the Communist Party and the Red Army. Our enemy is probably still dreaming happily about repeating the Mongols' conquest of the Sung dynasty, the Manchus' conquest of the Ming dynasty, the British occupation of North America and India, the occupation of Central and South America by the Latin countries, etc. But such dreams have no practical value in present-day China because of the existence of certain

factors not found on those historical occasions, the novelty of guerrilla warfare being one of them. If our enemy neglects to take this into account, he will certainly come to grief.

These are the reasons why the anti-Japanese guerrilla war, though still occupying a supplementary position in the Anti-Japanese War as a whole, must be examined from a strategic viewpoint.

That being the case, why do we not apply the general strategic principles of the Anti-Japanese War to guerrilla war?

The strategic problems of the anti-Japanese guerrilla war are, of course, closely connected with the strategic problems of the entire Anti-Japanese War, because the two have many things in common. On the other hand, guerrilla warfare is distinguished from regular warfare and has its own characteristics, hence its strategic problems present quite a number of peculiarities; it is impossible to apply without modification the general strategy of the Anti-Japanese War to guerrilla warfare, which has characteristics peculiar to itself.

CHAPTER II

THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF WAR IS TO PRESERVE ONE-SELF AND TO ANNIHILATE THE ENEMY

Before discussing specifically the strategic problems in guerrilla warfare, it is necessary to say a few words on the basic problems of war.

All guiding principles for military operations proceed without exception from one basic principle, *i.e.* to strive as far as possible to preserve one's own strength and annihilate that of the enemy. In a revolutionary war, this principle is directly linked with the basic political principle. For instance, the basic political principle of China's Anti-Japanese War, *i.e.* its political objective, is to oust Japanese Imperialism and establish a new China, independent, free and happy. In terms of military operations this principle means the use of armed forces to defend our motherland and to drive out the Japanese invaders. To attain this end, the actions of the armed forces will assume two forms: on the one hand to strive as far as possible

to preserve their own strength and on the other hand to annihilate the enemy's strength. This being the case, how can we justify our advocacy of heroic sacrifice in war? Every war exacts a price, sometimes an extremely high price. But does not this contradict "preserving oneself"? In fact, there is no contradiction at all, or to put it more precisely, there is a unity of opposites. For such a sacrifice is indispensable not only for annihilating the enemy but also for preserving oneself—"non-preservation" (sacrifice or paying the price) in a partial and temporary sense is necessary for preservation in a complete and permanent sense. From this basic principle arises a series of so-called principles governing military operations as a whole, from the principle of marksmanship (taking cover and exploiting fire power, the former for preserving oneself and the latter for annihilating the enemy) to strategic principles, all of which are imbued with the spirit of this basic principle. All principles pertaining to military training, tactics, campaigns and strategy provide the conditions for the application of this basic principle. The principle of preserving oneself and annihilating the enemy is the basis of all military principles.

CHAPTER III

SIX SPECIFIC STRATEGIC PROBLEMS OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE GUERRILLA WAR

Now let us see what directives or principles should be adopted in the military operations in the anti-Japanese guerrilla war in order to attain the end of preserving ourselves and annihilating the enemy. Since the guerrilla units in the Anti-Japanese War (and in all revolutionary wars as well) generally grow out of nothing and expand from a small force to a big one, they should not only preserve themselves but also expand their forces. Hence the question is: What directives or principles should be adopted in order to attain the end of preserving or expanding our forces and of annihilating the enemy?

Generally speaking, the main directives are as follows: (1) on our own initiative, with flexibility and according to plan, carry out offensives in a defensive war, battles of quick decision

in a protracted war, and exterior-line operations within interior-line operations; (2) co-ordinate with regular warfare; (3) establish base areas; (4) undertake strategic defensive and strategic offensive; (5) develop into mobile warfare; and (6) establish correct relationship of commands. These six items constitute the strategic programme in the entire anti-Japanese guerrilla war and serve as the necessary means for preserving and expanding our forces, annihilating or ousting the enemy, and co-ordinating with regular warfare to win the final victory.

CHAPTER IV

ON OUR OWN INITIATIVE, WITH FLEXIBILITY AND ACCORDING TO PLAN, CARRY OUT OFFENSIVES IN A DEFENSIVE WAR, BATTLES OF QUICK DECISION IN A PROTRACTED WAR, AND EXTERIOR-LINE OPERATIONS WITHIN INTERIOR-LINE OPERATIONS

Here the problem may be further dealt with under four sub-headings: (1) relationship between the defensive and the offensive, between protractedness and quick decision, and between the interior line and the exterior line; (2) initiative in all operations; (3) flexible employment of forces; and (4) planning in all operations.

To start with the first point.

In the entire Anti-Japanese War, the fact that Japan is a strong country on the offensive while China is a weak country on the defensive has determined the fact that strategically our war is a defensive and protracted one. As far as the operational lines are concerned, the enemy operates on the exterior line while we operate on the interior line. This is one aspect of the situation. But the other aspect is just the reverse. The enemy forces, though strong (as concerns certain qualities and conditions of arms and men), are numerically small, whereas our forces, though weak (also as concerns certain qualities and conditions of arms and men), are numerically very big; this, in addition to the fact that the enemy is an alien nation invading our country while we are resisting an alien nation on our own soil, determines the following strategic principle:

It is possible and necessary to make, in a strategically defensive war, offensives in campaigns and battles; to wage campaigns and battles of quick decision in a strategically protracted war; and to wage campaigns and battles on the exterior line within the strategic interior line. This is the strategic principle to be adopted in the entire Anti-Japanese War. It holds true in both regular and guerrilla warfare. And guerrilla warfare is different from regular warfare only in degree and in the form of manifestation. Offensives in guerrilla warfare generally take the form of surprise attacks. In regular warfare, although surprise attacks should and can be adopted, there are relatively few cases of catching the enemy unprepared. In guerrilla warfare there is a great demand for quick decision but a very short exterior line to encircle the enemy in campaigns and battles. All these distinguish it from regular warfare.

Thus it can be seen that in guerrilla operations concentration of the biggest possible force, secret and swift actions, surprise attacks on the enemy and quick decision in battles are required, while passive defence, procrastination and dispersion of forces immediately before combat must be carefully avoided. Of course there is in guerrilla warfare not only strategic defensive but tactical defensive which includes, among other things, containing and picketing action during a battle; the dispositions for resistance at narrow passes, strategic points, along rivers or in villages to inflict attrition on the enemy and to wear him out; and rear-guard dispositions during withdrawal. But the basic principle of guerrilla warfare must be one of offensive, and its offensive character is even more pronounced than that of regular warfare; furthermore, such offensives must take the form of surprise attacks, and the exposure of oneself through display and showiness is even more impermissible in guerrilla warfare than in regular warfare. Although on some occasions guerrilla battles may continue for several days, as in a battle against a small, isolated and helpless enemy force, yet in operations in general a quick decision of the battle is more needed than in regular warfare; this is because the enemy is strong while we are weak. Because of its dispersed nature, guerrilla warfare can be spread wide, and the principle of dividing up the forces applies in many of its tasks, such as in

harassing, containing and disrupting the enemy and in mass work, but when a guerrilla detachment or corps is performing the task of annihilating the enemy and particularly when it is striving to smash an enemy offensive, its main forces must be concentrated. "Gather a big force to strike at a small enemy segment" remains one of the principles for field operations in guerrilla warfare.

Thus it can also be seen that, considering the Anti-Japanese War as a whole, it is only through the cumulative effect of many offensive campaigns and battles in both regular and guerrilla warfare, it is only by scoring many victories in offensives, that we can attain the aim of a strategic defensive and ultimately defeat Japanese imperialism. It is only through the cumulative effect of many campaigns and battles of quick decision, it is only when many victories are won in such offensive campaigns and battles through quick decision, that we can attain the aim of a strategy of protraction, gain time for strengthening our resistance, and simultaneously expedite and await the changes in the international situation as well as the enemy's collapse from within, so as to launch a strategic counter-offensive and drive the Japanese invaders out of China. For that purpose we must concentrate a preponderant force in every battle and adopt, whether in the period of strategic defensive or in the period of strategic counter-offensive, exterior-line operations in every campaign or battle to encircle and annihilate the enemy—we must encircle a part of the enemy, if not the whole, annihilate a part of the encircled, if not the whole, and inflict heavy casualties upon them, if not capture them. It is only by the cumulative effect of many such battles of annihilation that we can change the situation between the enemy and ourselves, thoroughly smash the enemy's strategic encirclement, *i.e.* his scheme of exterior-line operations, and finally, in co-ordination with the international forces and the revolutionary struggles of the Japanese people, encircle the Japanese imperialists and annihilate them at a single stroke. These results are to be achieved mainly through regular warfare, while guerrilla warfare only makes a secondary contribution. However, regular warfare and guerrilla warfare have one point in common, namely, to add up many minor victories into a major

victory. This is what is meant by the great strategic role of guerrilla warfare in the course of the Anti-Japanese War.

Now let us take up the question of initiative, flexibility and planning in guerrilla warfare.

What is initiative in guerrilla warfare?

In every war, the opponents strive with each other for the initiative on a battlefield, on a front, in a war zone and in the whole war, since the initiative means freedom of action for an army. Any army that loses its initiative will be forced into a passive position and deprived of its freedom of action, and will run the risk of being exterminated or defeated. Naturally, to obtain the initiative is more difficult in strategic defensive and interior-line operations and easier in offensive exterior-line operations. However, Japanese imperialism suffers from two basic defects, namely, possessing insufficient forces and fighting in a foreign country. Moreover, as a result of the underestimation of China's strength and of the internal conflicts among Japanese militarists, the enemy's military command has made many mistakes, such as its piecemeal reinforcement, its lack of strategic co-ordination, its dispersion of the main forces at certain times, its failure to utilise certain opportunities for military action, its failure to wipe out the forces it has encircled, etc.—all this may be considered the third defect of Japanese imperialism. Thus in spite of Japan's favourable offensive position and her operations on an exterior line, the Japanese militarists will gradually lose the initiative with each passing day, because Japan possesses only insufficient forces (namely, she is a small country with a small population, insufficient resources, and a feudal imperialist social system), fights in a foreign country (hence the imperialist and barbarous character of her war) and lacks flexibility in military command. At present Japan is neither willing nor able to conclude the war and is not calling a halt in her strategic offensive, but as a general trend her offensives are limited to a certain extent; this is the inevitable consequence of her three defects, and she cannot go on unchecked and swallow up the whole of China. Signs can be discerned even now that some day Japan will find herself in an utterly passive position. As to China, she was in a rather passive position at the initial stage of the war but, having

gained experience, she is now turning to a new policy of mobile warfare, a policy of launching the offensive, seeking quick decision and operating on the exterior line in campaigns and battles; these things, plus the policy of a widespread guerrilla warfare, help her to increase her initiative with each passing day.

The initiative is even more vital to guerrilla warfare. For a guerrilla unit usually finds itself in grave circumstances—the absence of a rear for its operations, its own weak force pitted against the enemy's strong force, and its lack of experience (in the case of newly organised guerrilla units) and of unity. Nevertheless, we can gain the initiative in guerrilla warfare, the essential condition being the utilisation of the enemy's three defects mentioned above. Taking advantage of the enemy's insufficiency in armed forces (as viewed from the war as a whole), the guerrilla units can have a free hand in occupying vast areas for their operations; taking advantage of his being an alien nation carrying out extremely barbarous policies, the guerrillas can have a free hand to win the support of millions upon millions of the people; and taking advantage of the lack of flexibility in his command, the guerrillas can allow free play to their resourcefulness. While the regular army should also seize upon and take advantage of all the enemy's defects in order to defeat him, the guerrillas should especially pay attention to them. The defects of the guerrillas themselves can be gradually overcome in the course of their struggle. Moreover, their defects sometimes turn out to be precisely the condition for gaining the initiative: for example, it is precisely because they are weak and small that they can appear and disappear mysteriously in the enemy's rear and completely baffle him—such great freedom of action is something that massive regular armies can never enjoy.

Confronted with the enemy's converging attacks, guerrilla units can keep the initiative only with difficulty and are liable to lose it. In such a case, if incorrect estimations and dispositions are made, the guerrillas are liable to get into a passive position and consequently fail to smash the enemy's converging attack. A similar situation may also occur when the enemy is on the defensive and we on the offensive. Thus the initiative

results from correct estimations of the situation (of both the enemy and ourselves) as well as correct military and political dispositions. Pessimistic estimations at variance with objective conditions and the passive dispositions which they entail will undoubtedly deprive one of the initiative and throw him into a passive position. Similarly, over-optimistic estimations at variance with objective conditions and the venturesome dispositions (an uncalled-for venturesomeness) which they entail will also deprive one of the initiative and eventually lead him to the same path as pessimistic estimations do. The initiative is not the natural gift of a genius, but something achieved by an intelligent leader who studies with a receptive mind and makes correct estimations of objective conditions and correct military and political dispositions. Therefore, it is something to be consciously striven for, not something ready-made.

A guerrilla unit should carry out the task of extricating itself from a passive position, when it is forced into one through some incorrect estimation and disposition, or some overwhelming pressure. How to extricate itself from it depends on circumstances. The circumstances are often such as to make it necessary to "run away". The ability to run away is precisely one of the characteristics of the guerrillas. Running away is the chief means of getting out of passivity and regaining the initiative. But it is not the only means. The moment when the enemy exerts maximum pressure and we are in the worst predicament often happens to be the very point at which he begins to be at a disadvantage and we begin to enjoy advantages. Frequently the initiative and an advantageous position are gained through one's effort of "holding out a bit longer".

Now we shall deal with flexibility.

Flexibility is a concrete manifestation of initiative. Flexible employment of forces is more indispensable in guerrilla warfare than in regular warfare.

The directors of guerrilla war must understand that the flexible employment of forces is the most important means of changing the situation between the enemy and ourselves and gaining the initiative. As determined by the special features of guerrilla warfare, guerrilla forces must be flexibly employed

according to conditions, such as the task, the enemy disposition, the terrain and the inhabitants; and the chief ways of employing the forces consist in dispersing, concentrating and shifting them. In employing the guerrilla units, the director of guerrilla war is like a fisherman casting a net which he should be able to spread out as well as to draw in. When a fisherman spreads out his net, he must first find out the depth of the water, the speed of the current and the presence or absence of obstruction; similarly when the guerrilla units are dispersed we must also be careful not to incur losses through an ignorance of the situation and mistakes in actions. A fisherman, in order to draw in his net, must hold fast the end of the cord; in employing the forces, it is also necessary to maintain liaison and communication and to keep an adequate portion of the main force to hand. As a fisherman must frequently change his place, so guerrillas should constantly shift their positions. Dispersion, concentration and shifting of the forces are the three ways of flexibly employing the forces in guerrilla warfare.

Generally speaking, the dispersion of guerrilla units, *i.e.* "breaking up the whole into parts", is employed mainly in the following circumstances: (1) when we threaten the enemy with a wide frontal attack because he is on the defensive and we are still unable to mass our forces to engage him; (2) when we widely harass and disrupt the enemy in an area where his forces are weak; (3) when, unable to break through the enemy's encirclement, we try to disperse his attention in order to get away from him; (4) when we are restricted by the condition of terrain or in matters of supply; or (5) when we carry on work among the population over a vast area. But in dispersed actions under any circumstances, attention should be paid to the following: (1) no absolutely even dispersion of forces should be made, but a larger part of the forces should be kept at a place conveniently situated for its flexible employment so that, on the one hand, any possible exigency can be readily met and, on the other, the dispersed units can be used to fulfil the main task; and (2) the dispersed units should be assigned clearly defined tasks, fields of operation, specific time limits and rendezvous, and ways and means of liaison.

Concentration of forces, *i.e.* the method of "gathering parts

into a whole", is adopted largely for the annihilation of an enemy on the offensive; it is sometimes adopted for the annihilation of certain stationary forces of the enemy when he is on the defensive. Concentration of forces does not mean absolute concentration, but the massing of the main forces in a certain important direction while retaining or dispatching a part of the forces in other directions for purposes of containing, harassing or disrupting the enemy, or for work among the population.

Although flexible dispersion or concentration of forces in accordance with circumstances is the principal method in guerrilla warfare, we must also know how to shift (or transfer) our forces flexibly. When the enemy feels seriously threatened by the guerrillas he will send troops to suppress or attack them. Hence guerrilla units should ponder over the circumstances they are in: if it is possible for them to fight, they should fight right on the spot; if not, they should not miss the opportunity to shift themselves swiftly to some other direction. Sometimes the guerrillas, for the purpose of smashing the enemy units separately, may, after annihilating an enemy force in one place, shift themselves immediately to another direction to wipe out another enemy force; sometimes the guerrillas, finding it inadvisable to fight in one place, may have to disengage themselves immediately from the enemy there and engage him in another direction. If the enemy's forces at a place are particularly strong, the guerrilla units should not stay there long, but should shift their positions as speedily as a torrent or a whirlwind. In general, the shifting of forces should be done secretly and swiftly. Ingenious devices such as making a noise in the east while attacking in the west, appearing now in the south and now in the north, hit-and-run and night action should be constantly employed to mislead, entice and confuse the enemy.

Flexibility in dispersion, in concentration and in shifting is the concrete manifestation of the initiative in guerrilla warfare, whereas inflexibility and sluggishness will inevitably land one in a passive position and incur unnecessary losses. But a commander proves himself wise not by understanding how important the flexible employment of forces is but by being able to disperse, concentrate or shift his forces in time according

to specific circumstances. This wisdom in foreseeing changes and right timing is not easy to acquire except for those who study with a receptive mind and take pains to investigate and think things over. In order that flexibility may not become reckless action, a careful consideration of the circumstances is necessary.

Lastly, we come to the question of planning.

Without planning it is impossible to win victory in a guerrilla war. The idea of fighting a guerrilla war at haphazard means nothing but making a game out of it—the idea of an ignominious in guerrilla warfare. The operations in a guerrilla area as a whole or the operations of a single guerrilla detachment or guerrilla corps must be preceded by the most comprehensive planning possible, which is the preparatory work for all kinds of activities. Questions of how to grasp the situation, to define the tasks, to dispose the forces, to carry out military and political training, to procure supplies, to make arrangements for equipment, to secure the help of the people, etc., should all be carefully considered and thoroughly worked out by guerrilla leaders and the results should be checked up. Without this there could be no initiative, flexibility or offensive. True, the conditions of guerrilla warfare do not permit so high a degree of planning as in regular warfare, and consequently to attempt highly comprehensive planning in guerrilla warfare is a mistake, but it is still necessary, so far as objective conditions permit, to make plans as comprehensive as possible; we must understand that fighting an enemy is no joke.

The above points serve to illustrate the first problem concerning the strategic principles of guerrilla warfare—how, on our own initiative, with flexibility and according to plan, to carry out offensives in a defensive war, battles of quick decision in a protracted war, and exterior-line operations within interior-line operations. This is the central problem concerning the strategic principles of guerrilla warfare. Once this problem is solved, guerrilla warfare will find in its military leadership a major guarantee of victory.

Although various things have been dealt with here, they all centre round offensive campaigns and battles. The initiative can be finally gained only after success has been scored in an

offensive. All offensives must be organised on our own initiative and not launched under compulsion. The flexible employment of forces centres round the endeavour to take the offensive, and likewise planning is necessary chiefly for victories in offensives. Tactical defensive measures become meaningless when divorced from their role of supporting an offensive directly or indirectly. Quick decision refers to the tempo of an offensive, and by the exterior line is meant the scope of the offensive. The offensive is the only means of annihilating the enemy as well as the principal means of preserving oneself, while pure defence and withdrawal can play only a temporary and partial role in preserving oneself and are utterly useless in annihilating the enemy.

This principle is basically the same for both regular warfare and guerrilla warfare, with only a difference in degree in their forms of manifestation. It is, however, important and essential to note this difference in guerrilla warfare. It is precisely because of this difference in the form of manifestation that the modes of operation in guerrilla warfare are distinguished from those in regular warfare and, should we confuse the two distinct forms of manifestations, victory in a guerrilla war would be impossible.

CHAPTER V

CO-ORDINATION WITH REGULAR WARFARE

The second strategic problem in guerrilla warfare is its co-ordination with regular warfare. That is, we must elucidate, according to the specific nature of guerrilla warfare, its operational relations with regular warfare. To understand such relations is a matter of paramount importance for effectively defeating the enemy.

There are three kinds of co-ordination between guerrilla warfare and regular warfare: in strategy, in campaigns and in battles.

The roles played by the entire guerrilla war behind the enemy's rear—crippling and containing the enemy, disrupting his supply line and raising the spirits of both the regular armies and the people of the whole nation—all point to its strategic co-ordination with regular warfare. For example, this problem

of co-ordination did not arise in the guerrilla war in the three North-eastern provinces before the nation-wide War of Resistance broke out, but after the war broke out the significance of co-ordination became manifest. Every additional enemy soldier the guerrillas succeed in killing, every additional bullet they make the enemy shoot to no purpose, every enemy soldier they halt in his southward advance through the Shanhai pass, counts as a new contribution on their part to the total strength of the Resistance. It is also obvious that they have produced a demoralising effect on the enemy's entire army and on his country and an enlivening effect on our entire army and people. And the role of strategic co-ordination played by guerrilla warfare along the Peiping-Suiyuan, Peiping-Hankow, Tientsin-Pukow, Tatung-Puchow, Chengting-Taiyuan and Shanghai-Hangchow railways can be seen even more readily. In co-ordinating with the regular army, the guerrillas not only play the role of strategic defensive at the present moment when the enemy is launching a strategic offensive, and will not only handicap the enemy defence when the enemy concludes his strategic offensive and turns to defend the areas he has occupied, but will also repulse the enemy forces and recover all the lost territories when the regular army launches a strategic counter-offensive. The great role of strategic co-ordination played by guerrilla warfare should not be overlooked. The leaders of the guerrilla units and the regular armies should clearly grasp its significance.

Moreover, guerrilla warfare also performs the function of co-ordination in campaigns. For example, in the campaign at Sinkow, north of Taiyuan, the guerrillas played a remarkable co-ordinating role both north and south of the Yenmen pass in wrecking the Tatung-Puchow railway and the motor roads running through Pinghsing pass and Yangfang pass. To take another example, after the enemy's occupation of Fenglingtu, the guerrilla war (mainly conducted by the regular army) all over Shansi played an even greater co-ordinating role in the defensive campaigns along the western and southern banks of the Yellow river in the provinces of Shensi and Honan. Again, when the enemy attacked southern Shantung, our regular army's campaign operations there received great help from the

co-ordinating actions of the guerrilla war in the five provinces of North China. In carrying out a task like this, the leader of each guerrilla base in the enemy's rear or the leader of each guerrilla corps on temporary assignment should, by properly disposing his forces and adopting different tactics according to prevailing local conditions, take positive action against the enemy's most vital and most vulnerable points so that they may succeed in crippling and containing the enemy, disrupting his transport and raising the spirits of our own armies engaged in interior-line campaigns, and thus fulfil their responsibility of campaign co-ordination. If each guerrilla area or guerrilla unit fights all by itself and neglects co-ordination in campaign operations, the co-ordinating role which, to be sure, it can still play in the general strategic operations would naturally be reduced in significance. This is a point worthy of the serious attention of all guerrilla leaders. To attain the end of co-ordination in campaigns, it is absolutely necessary to equip all larger guerrilla units and guerrilla corps with radio facilities.

Finally, co-ordination in battle, *i.e.* co-ordination in battlefield actions, is the task of all guerrilla units in the neighbourhood of the battlefield on the interior line, which is, of course, confined to the guerrilla units close to a regular force or those temporarily dispatched by a regular force. In such a case, the guerrilla units should take up the tasks assigned by the commander of the regular force, usually tasks to contain part of the enemy, disrupt his transport, spy on him and act as guides. Even without any direction from the commander of the regular force, the guerrilla units should carry out such tasks voluntarily. We must put an end to the attitude of sitting back and watching, "neither moving about nor fighting", or "moving about without fighting".

CHAPTER VI

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASE AREAS

The third strategic problem of the anti-Japanese guerrilla war is the establishment of base areas. It is necessary and important to raise this problem because the war is protracted and ruthless.

Since our lost territories cannot be recovered until a nationwide strategic counter-offensive is launched, the enemy's front will, prior to that, extend far into the central part of China and cut it lengthwise, and a part or even a greater part of our territories will fall into the hands of the enemy and become his rear. We must spread a guerrilla war all over this vast enemy-occupied area, converting the enemy's rear into his front and forcing him to fight ceaselessly throughout his occupied areas. As long as our strategic counter-offensive is not launched and our lost territories are not recovered, the guerrilla war in the enemy's rear must, beyond any doubt, be firmly kept up—though we cannot yet tell for how long: this is what we mean by the protracted nature of the war. At the same time, in order to safeguard his interests in his occupied areas, the enemy will certainly intensify every day his activities against the guerrillas, and he will certainly begin his relentless suppression of the guerrillas, especially after his strategic offensive has come to a halt. Thus, as the war is at once protracted and ruthless, it is impossible to sustain guerrilla war in the enemy's rear without base areas.

What, then, are the base areas for a guerrilla war? They are the strategic bases on which a guerrilla war relies for carrying out its strategic tasks as well as for achieving the goals of preserving and expanding oneself and annihilating or expelling the enemy. Without such strategic bases there will be nothing to depend on for carrying out all the strategic tasks and fulfilling all the war objectives. Operating without a rear is a characteristic of guerrilla warfare behind the enemy line, for it is detached from the nation's general rear. But guerrilla war could not be maintained and developed for long without base areas, which are indeed its rear.

There have been in history many peasant wars of the roving insurgents type, but they all failed. In the present age of advanced communications and technology, it is more than ever an entirely groundless illusion to attempt to win victory after the fashion of the roving insurgents. However, the idea of roving insurgents still exists among the impoverished peasants, and this idea, when reflected in the minds of leaders of guerrilla warfare, becomes the view that base areas are neither necessary

nor important. Therefore to rid the minds of leaders in the guerrilla war of such an idea is a prerequisite for formulating a definite policy of establishing base areas. The question whether to have or not to have base areas, to value or not to value them, or, in other words, the conflict between the idea of holding base areas and the idea of behaving like roving insurgents, arises in every guerrilla war and, to a certain extent, it has arisen in the anti-Japanese guerrilla war, which is no exception to this general rule. Therefore it is necessary to wage a struggle against the idea of roving insurgents. Only when the idea of roving insurgents is thoroughly eradicated and the policy of establishing base areas put forward and carried out can a long-sustained guerrilla war be facilitated.

The necessity and importance of base areas having now been made clear, the following problems must be understood and solved in the course of actually establishing them: types of base areas, guerrilla areas and base areas, conditions for the establishment of base areas, consolidation and expansion of base areas, and types of encirclement by enemy forces and by our own forces.

I. TYPES OF BASE AREAS

The base areas of the anti-Japanese guerrilla war are mainly of three types: those in the mountains, on the plains, and in the river-lake-estuary regions.

The advantage of setting up base areas in mountain regions is known to all, and the base areas which have been, are being, or will be established in the Changpai,¹ Wutai,² Taihang,³ Tai,⁴ Yen⁵ and Mao⁶ mountains are all of this kind. All these base areas are places where the anti-Japanese guerrilla war can hold out for the longest time, and are important strongholds in the Anti-Japanese War. We must develop guerrilla warfare and set up base areas in all mountain regions behind the enemy lines.

Plains are of course inferior to mountains, but one must not rule out the possibility of developing guerrilla warfare or establishing some sort of base area on the plains. That guerrilla war can be developed on the plains is proved by the extensive guerrilla war developing on the plains of Hopeh and northern

and north-western Shantung. As to the possibility of establishing on the plains base areas that can hold out for a long time, it is not yet confirmed; but the establishment of temporary base areas has been proved possible, and that of base areas for small units or for seasonal use ought to be possible. As on the one hand the enemy has not sufficient troops at his disposal and is pursuing a barbarous policy unprecedented in human history, while on the other hand China possesses a vast territory and a vast population fighting Japan, objective conditions are present for developing guerrilla warfare as well as setting up temporary base areas on the plains; with the addition of a correct command, the establishment of unfixed but long-term base areas for small guerrilla units should naturally be possible.⁷ Generally speaking, when the enemy has concluded his strategic offensive and entered the stage of holding fast his occupied areas, he will no doubt launch ruthless attacks on all base areas of guerrilla war, and the guerrilla base areas on the plains will naturally bear the brunt. When that happens, the large guerrilla corps operating on the plains will be unable to keep on fighting for long in the same places, and must gradually shift themselves to the mountain regions in a way suitable to the circumstances—witness the shift of the guerrillas from the Hopeh plains to the Wutai and Taihang mountains, or from the Shantung plains to the Tai mountain and to the Kiaotung peninsula. But under conditions of a national war, it is not impossible for numerous small guerrilla units to scatter themselves in various counties over the broad plains and adopt a fluid mode of fighting, *i.e.* to shift their base areas from one place to another. It is definitely possible to conduct a seasonal guerrilla war by taking advantage of the “green curtain”⁸ in summer and of the frozen rivers in winter. As the enemy has at present no energy to spare on us and will have not much energy to spare on us in future, it is absolutely necessary to decide on, for the present, a policy of expanding guerrilla warfare on the plains and of establishing temporary base areas; and for the future, a policy of preparing small units for keeping up a guerrilla war, or at least one of a seasonal nature, and of establishing unfixed base areas.

Regarding the objective conditions, the possibility of

developing guerrilla warfare and establishing base areas in the river-lake-estuary regions is greater than on the plains, only less so than in the mountain regions. In our history countless battles have been dramatically fought by "pirates" and "water-bandits", and in the Red Army days the guerrilla warfare round the Hung lake went on for several years; all these prove that it is possible to develop guerrilla warfare and establish base areas in river-lake-estuary regions. However, the anti-Japanese parties and groups and the anti-Japanese masses of people have so far paid little attention to this. Although the subjective conditions are not yet present, we should undoubtedly attend to it and proceed with it. As one aspect in the development of a nation-wide guerrilla war, such a war should be properly organised in the Hungtze lake region north of the Yangtze river, in the Tai lake region south of the Yangtze river, and in all river-lake-estuary regions in the enemy-occupied areas along the Yangtze river and the sea coast, and permanent base areas should be created right in them or close by them. To overlook this aspect is tantamount to facilitating the enemy's transport by water, and constitutes a defect in the strategic planning of the Anti-Japanese War; a defect to be remedied in time.

2. GUERRILLA AREAS AND BASE AREAS

In a guerrilla war conducted in the enemy's rear, guerrilla areas are distinguished from guerrilla base areas. Areas which are surrounded by the enemy but whose central parts are not occupied by him or have been recovered from his occupation, like certain counties in the Wutai mountain region (*i.e.* the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh border area) and in the Taihang and Tai mountain regions, are ready-made base areas where the guerrilla units can conveniently develop guerrilla warfare. But the situation is different in other sections in these base areas, like the eastern and northern parts of the Wutai mountain region—certain sections in western Hopeh and southern Chahar and many places east of Paoting and west of Tsangchow—which at the beginning of the guerrilla war the guerrillas could not completely occupy but could only constantly harass

and attack, which were recovered by the guerrillas only when they arrived and lost to the puppet régime as soon as they left, and which consequently are not yet guerrilla base areas but only guerrilla areas. Such guerrilla areas will be transformed into base areas when they have gone through the necessary processes in a guerrilla war, that is, when a large number of enemy troops have been annihilated or defeated, the puppet régime destroyed, the activity of the people called forth, popular anti-Japanese organisations formed, the people's armed forces developed, and an anti-Japanese political power established. By the expansion of base areas is meant the addition of these base areas to the original ones.

In the guerrilla war in some places, eastern Hopeh for instance, the whole field of operation formed from the beginning a guerrilla area. In eastern Hopeh, where there already existed a long-established puppet régime, people's armed forces that had grown out of local uprisings and guerrillas that had been dispatched from the Wutai mountains, the whole field of operation was a guerrilla area from the beginning. At the outset of their operations, the guerrillas could only select in this area comparatively suitable localities as their temporary rear or temporary base areas. Only when the enemy forces are annihilated and the masses aroused can these guerrilla areas be transformed into relatively stabilised base areas.

To convert a guerrilla area into a base area is therefore a painstaking process of creation, for whether a guerrilla area has been transformed into a base area depends on how far the enemy is annihilated and the masses of the people are aroused.

Many regions will remain guerrilla areas for a long time. In these regions the enemy, though exerting his utmost to maintain his control, cannot set up a stabilised puppet régime, and though we have developed a guerrilla war by every possible means, we cannot succeed in establishing an anti-Japanese political power, as witness the regions along the enemy-controlled railway lines, the environs of big cities and certain districts on the plains.

As the big cities, the railway stations and certain districts on the plains, which the enemy controls with strong forces are under a relatively stabilised puppet régime and hence in a

different situation, guerrilla war can be extended only to their vicinities but not right into them.

As a result of our erroneous leadership or the enemy's strong pressure, the above-mentioned state of affairs may change into its opposite, *i.e.* a guerrilla base area may change into a guerrilla area, and a guerrilla area may become an area under the relatively stabilised occupation of the enemy. This may occur sometimes and deserves the vigilant attention of the leaders of guerrilla war.

As a result of guerrilla warfare and the struggle between the enemy and ourselves, any of the enemy-occupied territories falls into one of the following three categories: first, anti-Japanese base areas controlled by our guerrilla units and our organs of political power; secondly, areas in the grip of Japanese imperialism and the puppet régime; and thirdly, intermediate zones contested by both sides, *i.e.* guerrilla areas. The duty of the leaders of guerrilla war is to exert their utmost to expand the territories of the first and third kinds and to reduce the territories of the second kind. This is the strategic task of guerrilla warfare.

3. CONDITIONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASE AREAS

The basic condition for the establishment of base areas is that there should be an anti-Japanese armed force employed to defeat the enemy and to arouse the people into action. So the first problem in establishing base areas is the problem of an armed force. Leaders in guerrilla war must exert their utmost to build up one or several guerrilla units and, in the course of the struggle, develop them gradually into guerrilla corps and eventually into regular units and regular corps. The build-up of an armed force is the most fundamental link in establishing a base area; without an armed force or with one that is not strong enough, nothing can be done. This is the first condition.

The second condition inseparable from the establishment of base areas is that the armed forces should be employed in co-ordination with the masses of the people to defeat the enemy. All places under enemy control are enemy base areas but not guerrilla base areas, and it is evident that the former cannot be

transformed into the latter unless the enemy is defeated. Even in guerrilla-controlled regions, if we do not repulse the enemy's attacks and defeat him, these regions under our control will become enemy-controlled ones, and then the establishment of base areas will also be impossible.

The third condition inseparable from the establishment of base areas is that all power, including the armed forces, should be employed to arouse the people to struggle against Japan. In the course of such struggles we must arm the people, *i.e.* organise self-defence corps and guerrilla units. In the course of such struggles we must form mass organisations; workers, peasants, youth, women, children, merchants and members of the free professions, according to the degree of their political consciousness and fighting enthusiasm should all be organised into the various indispensable anti-Japanese public bodies which are to expand gradually. If they are unorganised, the masses of the people will not be able to demonstrate their strength in fighting the Japanese. In the course of such struggles we must proceed with the elimination of the forces of collaborators in the open or under cover, a task which we can accomplish only by relying on the strength of the people. It is particularly important to arouse, through such struggles, the masses of the people to establish or consolidate the local organs of anti-Japanese political power. Where the original Chinese organs of political power have not been destroyed by the enemy we must, on the basis of the support of the broad masses, proceed to reform and consolidate them; where the original Chinese organs of political power have been destroyed by the enemy we must, on the basis of the effort of the broad masses, proceed to rebuild them. Such organs of political power must carry out the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and must unite all the forces of the people to fight against our sole enemy, Japanese imperialism with its jackals—the collaborators and reactionaries.

A base area for guerrilla war can be actually established only when the three afore-mentioned basic conditions have been gradually secured, *i.e.* the build-up of the anti-Japanese armed forces, the defeat of the enemy and the mobilisation of the masses of the people.

Furthermore, the geographical and economic conditions should be pointed out. In an earlier section on the types of base areas I have already touched on the question of geographical conditions and pointed out the three different cases; and I shall only mention here the major requirements, *i.e.* the extensiveness of the area. In places encircled by the enemy on four or three sides, mountain regions naturally offer the best conditions for establishing base areas where we can hold out for a long time; but the main thing is that there must be enough room for the guerrillas to manoeuvre, namely, an extensive area. With this condition—an extensive area—guerrilla warfare can be developed and sustained even on plains, not to say in river-lake-estuary regions. Owing to the vastness of China's territory and the enemy's insufficiency in armed forces, guerrilla warfare in China is generally provided with this condition. As far as the possibility of guerrilla warfare is concerned, this is an important or even the primary condition; in small countries like Belgium, the possibility is very little or nil, because this condition is lacking. In China, however, this condition is not an objective to be fought for or a difficulty to be solved but is something provided by nature for us to exploit.

The economic condition, viewed from its natural aspect, presents the same picture as the geographical condition. For now we are not discussing the establishment of base areas in a desert, where no enemy is to be found, but the establishment of base areas in the enemy's rear; wherever the enemy can go, there must have long been Chinese inhabitants as well as an economic basis for making a living, hence in establishing base areas the question of choosing them according to economic conditions simply does not arise. We should exert our utmost to develop guerrilla warfare and establish permanent or temporary base areas in all places where there are both Chinese inhabitants and the enemy, irrespective of the economic condition. But in a political sense the economic condition presents a quite different picture; in this respect there is a problem, namely, the problem of economic policy, which is of vital importance to the establishment of base areas. The economic policy for the guerrilla base areas must be based on the principles of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, *i.e.* reasonable distribution

of the financial burden and protection of commerce; neither the local political power nor the guerrilla units must violate these principles, for otherwise the establishment of base areas and the effort to keep up the guerrilla war will be adversely affected. To distribute the financial burden reasonably means to implement the principle of "those who have money give money"; the peasants, however, are required also to supply, within a certain limit, foodstuffs to the guerrilla units. Protection of commerce will be realised by the guerrillas' observance of a strict discipline; the confiscation of any stores, except those owned by confirmed collaborators, is to be strictly prohibited. This is a difficult matter, but it is also a determined policy that must be put into effect.

4. THE CONSOLIDATION AND EXPANSION OF BASE AREAS

In order to confine the enemy invading China to a few strongholds, namely, to big cities and main communication lines, it is absolutely necessary for the guerrillas in various base areas to endeavour to extend the war to all their environs, closing in on all enemy strongholds, threatening the enemy's existence and shaking his morale while expanding the base areas. Conservatism in guerrilla warfare must be opposed. Conservatism, which is either due to love of comfort or to an overestimation of the enemy's strength, can only bring losses to the Anti-Japanese War as well as harm to the guerrilla war and its base areas themselves. Furthermore, we should not overlook the consolidation of the base areas, in which the chief task is to arouse and organise the people as well as to train guerrilla units and local armed forces. Such consolidation is necessary for keeping up the war as well as for expanding it, for without consolidation no vigorous expansion is possible. If we only attend to expansion and forget about consolidation in guerrilla warfare, we cannot withstand the enemy's attacks, and the result is that not only is the territory gained in the course of expansion lost, but the very existence of the base areas is endangered. The correct principle is expansion through consolidation—a good method to attain a position where we can be on the offensive or the defensive as we choose. So long

as it is a prolonged war, the question of consolidating and expanding the base areas is one that constantly arises for every guerrilla unit. The specific solution of this problem depends, of course, on circumstances. In one period, emphasis may be placed on expansion, *i.e.* on expanding guerrilla areas and enlarging guerrilla units. In another period, emphasis may be placed on consolidation, *i.e.* on organising the people and training the troops. As the tasks of expansion and consolidation are different in nature, military dispositions and the execution of our tasks will differ accordingly; to shift the emphasis from one to the other according to the time and circumstances is the only way to solve the problem properly.

5. TYPES OF ENCIRCLEMENT BY ENEMY FORCES AND BY OUR OWN FORCES

Taking the Anti-Japanese War as a whole, we are no doubt in the midst of strategic encirclement by the enemy, because of his strategic offensive and exterior-line operations and our strategic defensive and interior-line operations. This is the first kind of encirclement the enemy imposes on us. Because we have, with numerically preponderant forces, adopted a policy for offensive campaigns and battles and exterior-line operations against the enemy forces which advance on us in several columns from the exterior-line, each of the separately advancing enemy columns will find itself within our encirclement. This is the first kind of encirclement we impose on the enemy. Furthermore, considering the guerrilla base areas in the enemy's rear, each isolated base area is surrounded by the enemy on four sides, like the Wutai mountain regions, or on three sides, like the north-western region of Shansi. This is the second kind of encirclement the enemy imposes on us. But if we look at the interconnections of the various base areas as well as the interconnections of these guerrilla base areas with the fronts of the regular forces, we shall see that we have in turn surrounded a great number of the enemy units; in Shansi, for instance, we have encircled the Tatung-Puchow railway area on three sides (the east and west flanks and the southern terminus of the railway) and the city of Taiyuan on four sides;

similar encirclements can also be found in provinces like Hopeh and Shantung. This is the second kind of encirclement we impose on the enemy. Thus the enemy and ourselves have each imposed two kinds of encirclement on the other, and this is roughly similar to a game of *weich'i*:⁹ campaigns and battles between us and the enemy are comparable to the capture of each other's pieces, and the enemy strongholds and our guerrilla base areas are comparable to the blank spaces secured to forestall encirclement. It is in the matter of securing the blank spaces that the strategic role of the guerrilla base areas behind the enemy lines reveals its great significance. To bring up this problem in the Anti-Japanese War is to demand that the nation's military authorities as well as the guerrilla leaders in various areas all put on their agenda the development of guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines and the establishment of base areas wherever possible, and carry these out as their strategic tasks. If on the international plane we could succeed in forming an anti-Japanese front in the Pacific region, with China as one strategic unit, and with the Soviet Union and perhaps some other countries which may participate in it each also as a strategic unit, we would impose one more kind of encirclement on the enemy than he has imposed on us and, operating on an exterior line in the Pacific region, would be able to encircle and annihilate fascist Japan. To be sure, this is of little practical significance at present, but it does point to a possible future development.

CHAPTER VII

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE AND STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE IN GUERRILLA WARFARE

The fourth strategic problem in guerrilla war is the problem of strategic defensive and strategic offensive. This is a problem of how to carry out concretely the line of making attacks which we mentioned in our discussion of the first problem when we are either on the defensive or on the offensive in the anti-Japanese guerrilla war.

Included in a nation-wide strategic defensive or strategic

offensive (to be more exact, strategic counter-offensive) are small-scale strategic defensives and strategic offensives in and round each guerrilla base area; strategic defensive refers to the strategic situation as well as the strategic directives at a time when the enemy is on the offensive while we are on the defensive, and strategic offensive refers to the strategic situation as well as the strategic directives at a time when the enemy is on the defensive while we are on the offensive.

1. STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE IN GUERRILLA WARFARE

After a guerrilla war has been started and considerably developed, especially when the enemy has ceased his strategic offensive against us on a nation-wide scale and adopted instead a policy of defending the areas under his occupation, he will inevitably attack the guerrilla base areas. It is essential to recognise this inevitability, for otherwise the leaders in guerrilla war, caught unprepared by serious enemy assaults, will certainly fall into panic and confusion and their forces will be routed by the enemy.

To eliminate the guerrillas and their base areas, the enemy will frequently resort to converging attacks: for example, four or five "punitive expeditions" have been directed against the area of the Wutai mountains, and each time the enemy advanced according to plan in three, four or even six or seven columns. The larger the scale on which guerrilla warfare develops, the more important the location of its base areas, and the graver its threat to the enemy's strategic base areas and important communication lines, the fiercer the enemy's attacks on the guerrillas and their base areas. Therefore, wherever the enemy's attack on a guerrilla area becomes fiercer, it is an indication that the guerrillas there have achieved greater results and played a greater role in co-ordinating with regular warfare.

When the enemy is launching a converging attack in several columns, the guerrillas should adopt the line of smashing the attack and turning to a counter-attack. Such a converging attack can be easily smashed if the enemy advances in several columns each consisting of only a single unit, big or small,

without reinforcements and if he is unable to man the route of advance, construct fortifications or build motor roads. For in such cases the enemy is on the offensive and operating on the exterior line while we are on the defensive and operating on the interior line. In our dispositions we should contain a number of enemy columns with our supplementary forces, and use our main force to attack a single enemy column by springing surprise attacks on it in campaigns and battles (mainly in the form of ambushes) and striking at it while it is on the move. The enemy, though strong, will be weakened by our repeated surprise attacks and will often withdraw half-way; by then the guerrillas may spring more surprise attacks during their pursuit of the enemy so as to weaken him further. We should encircle the county-towns or towns which the enemy generally occupies in the base areas before he stops his offensive or begins to withdraw, cutting off his food supply and communications; when he fails to hold out and begins to retreat, we should seize the opportunity to pursue and attack him. After smashing one column, we should shift our forces to smash another, thereby shattering separately the enemy's columns taking part in the converging attack.

In a big base area like that of the Wutai mountain, a military district is divided into four or five or even more military sub-districts, each with an independent combat force. With the above-mentioned tactics, these forces have often smashed the enemy's attacks simultaneously or successively.

In an operational plan for coping with a converging attack our main forces are generally placed on the interior line. In the case when we are superior in strength, it is necessary to use supplementary forces (such as county or district guerrilla units, and sometimes even detachments from the main forces) on the exterior line to disrupt the enemy's communication lines and contain his reinforcements. In the case when the enemy remains for a long time in our base area, we may reverse the aforesaid scheme, that is, leave a part of our forces in the base area to besiege the enemy while employing the main forces to attack the region whence the enemy has come and to intensify our activities there, so that the enemy long stationed in our base area may be enticed to come out and engage us—this is the

tactic of "relieving the Kingdom of Chao by besieging the Kingdom of Wei".¹⁰

In the operations for coping with a converging attack, the local anti-Japanese self-defence corps and all mass organisations should be mobilised to participate in the battle, to assist our troops and to fight the enemy in various ways. In fighting the enemy two things are important: to enforce local martial law and, as far as possible, to strengthen the bulwarks and leave no provisions outside. The former is aimed at suppressing collaborators and preventing the enemy from getting information, and the latter at rendering assistance to the operations (by strengthening the bulwarks) and cutting off the enemy's food supply (by leaving no provisions outside). Leaving no provisions outside means that the harvest should be reaped as soon as the grain is ripe.

During his retreat, the enemy often sets on fire the houses in the cities and towns he has occupied and in the villages along his route, with the purpose of destroying the base areas for guerrilla warfare; but in so doing he is depriving himself of shelter and food in his next offensive, and the damage will recoil upon himself. This is one of the concrete examples illustrating how one and the same thing consists of two contradictory aspects.

A leader in a guerrilla war should not think of abandoning his present base area and shifting to another, unless many attempts have been made to smash the enemy's vigorous converging attacks and it is conclusively shown that they cannot be smashed there. In such an event he must carefully guard against pessimism. So long as the leaders commit no blunder in principle, it is generally possible for the guerrillas to smash the enemy's converging attacks and hold on to the base areas in mountainous regions. It is only on the plains that confronted with the enemy's vigorous converging attack, the guerrilla leader should consider, in the light of the specific circumstances, the following measure: temporarily shifting the main guerrilla corps to some mountainous region while leaving numerous small units to operate in dispersion, so that he may go back and resume activities there once the main forces of the enemy move away.

Owing to the discrepancy between his insufficient armed forces and China's vast territory, the enemy, generally speaking, cannot adopt the policy of building blockhouses which the Kuomintang employed in the days of civil war. But we should reckon with the possibility that he may adopt such a policy up to a point in certain guerrilla base areas which constitute a particularly serious menace to his vital positions, and we should prepare to keep up guerrilla war there even under such circumstances. Since we have the experience of successfully keeping up guerrilla fighting even during the civil war, we are undoubtedly even more capable of keeping it up in a national war. Though in point of relative military strength the enemy can employ in certain base areas forces far superior both in quality and quantity, the national contradiction between the enemy and ourselves remains unsolved and the enemy's command cannot possibly be flawless. Our victory is based on thorough work among the population and flexible tactics in operations.

2. STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE IN GUERRILLA WARFARE

After we have smashed the enemy's offensive and before his new offensive starts, the enemy is on the strategic defensive and we are on the strategic offensive.

At such times our operational directive lies not in attacking enemy forces holding stoutly to their defensive positions which we may not be able to defeat, but in annihilating or expelling, according to plan, small enemy units and puppet forces in certain areas which our guerrilla units are strong enough to tackle, in expanding the areas under our occupation, in arousing the people for struggle against Japan, in replenishing and training our troops and in organising new guerrilla units. If the enemy still remains on the defensive when these tasks are already well under way, we should further expand our newly occupied area and attack the enemy's weakly garrisoned cities and communication lines and occupy them for a long or a short period according to circumstances. These are all tasks of the strategic offensive, tasks aimed at seizing the moment when the enemy is on the defensive in order to develop effectively our own military and mass strength, to reduce effectively the

strength of the enemy and to prepare ourselves to smash the enemy's new offensive through our systematic and vigorous operations.

It is necessary to give the troops rest and training, and the best time for this is when the enemy is on the defensive. Not that we shall do nothing but shut ourselves up to rest and retrain the troops, but that we must find time to take rest and retrain ourselves while expanding the areas under our occupation, annihilating small enemy units, and arousing the people into action. The difficult problems of provisions, bedding and clothing, etc. are usually also tackled at this time.

Large-scale destruction of the enemy's communication lines, interruption of his transport and giving direct assistance to the regular army in their campaigns are also things to be done at this time. By then all the guerrilla base areas, guerrilla areas and guerrilla units will be in high spirits and the regions devastated by the enemy will have gone through a process of rehabilitation and regained strength. The people in the enemy-occupied territories will also be in a cheerful mood, and the fame of the guerrillas will be reverberating everywhere. In the camp of the enemy and his jackals, the collaborators, panic will prevail and disintegration grow on the one hand, while on the other their hatred of the guerrillas and their base areas will increase, and preparations to deal with the guerrillas will be intensified. Therefore, during a strategic offensive, the leaders in the guerrilla war should not be so elated with success as to underrate the enemy and forget to strengthen internal solidarity and consolidate the base areas and the troops. On such occasions, they should watch carefully every move of the enemy and see if there is any sign of an offensive against us, so that the moment it comes we can properly bring our strategic offensive to a close, turn to the strategic defensive and thereby smash the enemy's offensive.

CHAPTER VIII

DEVELOPMENT INTO MOBILE WARFARE

The fifth strategic problem in the anti-Japanese guerrilla war is its development into mobile war, which is necessary and possible because the war is protracted and ruthless. If China

could defeat the Japanese invaders and recover her lost territories speedily, if the war were neither protracted nor ruthless, then it would not be necessary for guerrilla war to develop into mobile war. But as the actual situation is the reverse, *i.e.* the war is a protracted and ruthless one, it is only by developing itself into mobile warfare that guerrilla warfare can adapt itself to such a war. Since the war is protracted and ruthless, it becomes possible for the guerrilla units to go through the necessary process of steeling and to change gradually into regular armies; consequently, with their mode of operations gradually transformed into that of the regular armies, guerrilla warfare will develop into mobile warfare. Only by clearly recognising such a necessity as well as such a possibility can leaders in the guerrilla war uphold and systematically carry out the policy of developing guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare.

At present, guerrilla war in many places, such as the Wutai mountains, owes its development to the large and strong detachments dispatched by the regular armies. The operations there, though generally of a guerrilla character, contain from the very beginning an element of mobile warfare. And this element will gradually increase as the war drags on. This is an advantage the present anti-Japanese guerrilla war enjoys, an advantage that enables the guerrilla war not only to expand but to rise quickly to a higher level—these are conditions far superior to those of the guerrilla war in the three North-eastern provinces.

For the transformation of the guerrilla units now engaged in a guerrilla war into a regular army which can wage a mobile war, two conditions are required, namely, increase in their numbers and improvement in their quality. For the former we can, apart from directly mobilising the people to join the army, adopt the method of amalgamating small units; the latter depends on steeling the fighters and improving their armaments in the course of the war.

In amalgamating small units, we must on the one hand guard against localism which impedes such centralisation by paying exclusive attention to local interests, and on the other guard against the purely military approach which ignores local interests.

Localism exists in local guerrilla units and local governments which are often preoccupied with local considerations to the neglect of over-all interest, or, unaccustomed to a collective way of life, prefer to act each on its own. Leaders of the main guerrilla forces or guerrilla corps must take note of this and adopt measures to amalgamate the local units gradually and partially so that local units can retain sufficient strength to develop guerrilla war further, and they must adopt measures for amalgamating separate local units through concerted operations without disrupting their original organisation or reshuffling their cadres, so that a number of small groups may be integrated into a big group.

Contrary to localism, the purely military approach represents the erroneous viewpoint of those people in the main force who are bent on their own expansion while neglecting to assist the local armed units. They do not realise that the development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare does not mean the abandonment of guerrilla warfare, but the gradual formation, in the midst of an extensively developed guerrilla warfare, of a main force capable of conducting a mobile war, round which there should still be numerous guerrilla forces carrying on extensive guerrilla operations. These numerous guerrilla forces add powerful wings to the main force and also serve as an inexhaustible reserve for its continuous expansion. Therefore, if any of the leaders of a main force has erred by adopting the purely military approach and ignoring the interests of the local populace and the local governments, they must rectify it so that both the expansion of the main force and the multiplication of the local armed units may each find its proper place.

To raise the quality of the guerrilla units we must improve them politically and organisationally, and along the lines of their equipment, military training, tactics and discipline, gradually remoulding them on the pattern of the regular army and reducing their guerrilla style in work. Politically it is imperative to make both the commanders and the rank and file realise the necessity of raising the guerrilla units to the level of the regular army, to encourage all of them to strive towards this end, and to guarantee its realisation by means of political work. Organisationally it is imperative to establish step by

step such military and political set-ups, to have such military and political workers and such a series of military and political working methods, and to acquire such a regular system of supply and medical service as are required of a regular corps. In the matter of equipment it is imperative to improve its quality, acquire new types of arms and increase the indispensable means of communication. In the sphere of military training and tactics it is imperative for the guerrilla units to rise from what they used to practise to what is required of the regular corps. In the matter of discipline it is imperative to raise the guerrilla units to a point where uniform standards are observed, where every order and requisition is fulfilled without fail and where all laxity and unbridled independence are done away with. To accomplish all these tasks requires a prolonged endeavour and is not an overnight job, but they point to the necessary direction of development. Only thus can the main regular corps be built up in a guerrilla base area and mobile operations emerge to strike at the enemy more effectively. It is comparatively easy to reach this goal in places where there are detachments or cadres dispatched from the regular armies. Hence all regular armies have the responsibility of assisting the guerrilla units in their development into regular armed units.

CHAPTER IX

RELATIONSHIP OF COMMANDS

The last strategic problem in the anti-Japanese guerrilla war is relationship of commands. A correct solution of this problem is one of the conditions for the unhampered development of guerrilla war.

Since guerrilla units are armed bodies on a lower level characterised by dispersed operations, the high degree of centralisation in directing regular warfare is not permitted in directing guerrilla warfare. If we attempt to apply the method of directing regular warfare to guerrilla warfare, the high degree of elasticity of guerrilla warfare will inevitably be restricted and its vitality sapped. A highly centralised command is directly opposed to the high degree of elasticity of

guerrilla warfare; we should not and cannot apply a highly centralised command to guerrilla warfare with such a high degree of elasticity.

However, guerrilla warfare cannot be developed steadily if centralised command is done away with altogether. When extensive regular warfare and extensive guerrilla warfare go on at the same time, it is essential to co-ordinate their operations properly; hence the need for a command to co-ordinate the operations of regular warfare and guerrilla warfare, *i.e.* a unified command in strategic operations by the nation's general staff and the war zone commanders. Of a great number of guerrilla units in a guerrilla area or guerrilla base area there are usually one or several guerrilla corps (occasionally also regular army corps) as the main force, and many guerrilla units, big or small, as supplementary forces, in addition to the vast armed forces of the people who are at the same time engaged in production; the enemy forces there are usually united to deal with the guerrillas through concerted actions. Consequently, in such a guerrilla area or base area the problem arises of setting up a unified command, *i.e.* a centralised command.

Hence the principle of command in a guerrilla war is opposed both to absolute centralisation and to absolute decentralisation; it demands a centralised command in strategy and a decentralised command in campaigns and battles.

Centralised strategic command includes the planning and direction of the entire guerrilla war by the state, the co-ordination between guerrilla war and regular war in each war zone, and the unified direction of all the anti-Japanese armed forces in each guerrilla area or guerrilla base area. Here discord, disunity and decentralisation are harmful and we must try our best to ensure harmony, unity and centralisation. In regard to general matters, that is, matters of a strategic nature, the lower ranks should report to the higher-ups and follow their instructions so as to ensure co-ordination. Centralisation, however, stops here and it would be just as harmful to exceed this limit and interfere with the lower ranks in concrete matters, like the specific dispositions in a campaign or a battle. For such concrete matters must be settled in accordance with the


specific conditions, which change from time to time and from place to place, and are quite beyond the knowledge of the higher-ups at a great distance. This precisely means that decentralised command should be the principle in directing campaigns and battles. This principle generally applies also to operations in regular warfare, especially when means of communication are inadequate. In a word, it means a guerrilla war waged independently and on its own initiative under a unified strategy.

As a guerrilla base area constitutes a military district divided into several military sub-districts, each of which comprises several counties divided into districts, the relationship between the various levels from the military district command, the military sub-district command, the county governments, down to the district governments is that of consecutive subordination, and each of the armed bodies should according to its nature be placed under one of these commands. According to the above-mentioned principle, in the relationship of commands between these levels, general directing power must be centralised in the hands of the higher-ups and specific actions be carried out in the light of the specific circumstances by the lower ranks independently and on their own initiative. If the higher-ups have something to say about the specific actions to be taken by the lower ranks they may and should put it forward in the form of "directives" but not as irrevocable "orders". The more extensive the area, the more complex the situation and the greater the distance between the higher-ups and the lower ranks, the more advisable it becomes to allow greater independence and initiative to the lower ranks, to give their actions more of a local nature and make them more adapted to the demands of local conditions, so that we can cultivate in the lower ranks and among the local personnel the ability for independent work, tackle complicated situations, and develop a victorious guerrilla war. As for an armed unit or corps engaged in a single action, the principle of centralised command is to be applied in its internal relationship of commands, for the situation is clearly understood by the higher-ups; but the moment this unit or corps breaks up for dispersed action, the principle of centralisation in general matters and decentralisation in

specific matters should be applied, for then the specific conditions can hardly be understood by the higher-ups.

If centralisation is not effected where it should be, it would mean a neglect of duty on the part of the higher-ups and usurpation of power on the part of the lower ranks, and neither is permissible in the relationship between the higher and lower bodies, especially in military matters. If decentralisation is not effected where it should be, it is monopoly of power on the part of the higher-ups and lack of initiative on the part of the lower ranks, and neither is permissible in the relationship between the higher and lower bodies, especially in the command in a guerrilla war. Such a principle is the only correct directive for solving the problem.

May 1938.



ON THE PROTRACTED WAR

This is a series of lectures delivered from May 26 to June 3, 1938, at the Association for the Study of the Anti-Japanese War in Yen-an.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. It will soon be July 7, the first anniversary of the great Anti-Japanese War. All the forces of the nation have been heroically fighting the enemy for almost a year since they were rallied to persistently wage the war and maintain the united front. This war, unprecedented in the East and bound to be recorded as a great war in world history, concerns the people of the whole world. Every Chinese who is personally suffering from the calamities of the war and fighting for the survival of his nation is longing every day for the victory. But what will actually be the course of the war? Can we win it or not? Can we win it quickly or not? Many people are talking about a protracted war, but why will the war be protracted? How to carry on a protracted war? Many people are talking about the final victory, but how can the final victory be ours? How shall we strive for it? Not everyone has been able to answer these questions, and most people have not found the answers. Hence the defeatists have hastened to tell the people that China will be subjugated and that the final victory will not be hers. On the other hand certain over-zealous friends of ours have hastened to declare that China will win the war very soon without making any great effort. Are these opinions really correct? We have said all along that they are not. But most people have not yet grasped what we mean. This is partly because we have not done enough propaganda and explanatory work and partly because the objective events have not developed to a point where their inherent nature is so completely revealed and their features so clearly shown that people can fully realise their trend and prospect and decide on a complete set of policies and tactics. Now things are better, since the experiences in the ten months of the war are sufficient to explode the



completely baseless theory of national subjugation and to dissuade our over-zealous friends from holding the theory of quick victory. Under such conditions many people are demanding a summary explanation. Especially with regard to the protracted war, there are views opposed to it—the theories of national subjugation and quick victory—as well as a shallow conception of it. “Since the Lukouchiao Incident, four hundred million people have been making concerted efforts and the final victory will be China’s.” This formula has a wide currency among the broad masses. The formula is correct, but it needs qualification. Many factors have enabled us to persist in the war and the united front; all parties in the country, from the Communist Party to the Kuomintang; the whole people, from the workers and peasants to the bourgeoisie; the whole army, from the main forces to the guerrilla units; internationally, from the socialist country to the righteous people of various other countries; and on the enemy’s side, from people at home to soldiers at the front who oppose war. In short, all these forces have contributed in varying degrees to our War of Resistance. Everybody with a conscience should salute them. The only policy for the Communists and for other parties favouring resistance, as well as for the whole people, is to strive to unite all the forces to vanquish the devilish Japanese invaders. July 1 this year will be the seventeenth anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China. In order to enable every Communist to make a better and greater effort in the Resistance, we must make a serious study of the protracted war. So my lecture will be devoted to such a study. I should have liked to deal with all the problems connected with the protracted war, but I cannot touch on everything, because it is impossible to do so in a single series of lectures.

2. All experiences in the ten months of war have proved the following two views to be wrong: first, the theory of China’s inevitable subjugation; and second, the theory of China’s quick victory. The former gives rise to the tendency of compromise; the latter, the tendency of underestimation of the enemy. Both approaches to the problem are subjective and one-sided, in a word, unscientific.

3. Before the War of Resistance, there were various theories

of national subjugation. For example: “China’s weapons are inferior and she will certainly be defeated in a war.” “If China wages a War of Resistance, she will certainly become another Abyssinia.” Since the war began, the theory of national subjugation, no longer openly advocated, is being upheld secretly, and by quite a number of people, too. For instance, the noise made about compromise rises and falls from time to time and the advocates of compromise base themselves on the view that “further resistance spells inevitable subjugation”.¹

A student wrote from Hunan:

“Difficulties crop up everywhere in the countryside. Engaged single-handed in propaganda, I have to get into conversation with people where I can find them. By no means ignoramuses, the people I talk with all have some understanding about things and are quite interested in what I have to say. But as soon as I run into my own relatives, they invariably say: ‘China cannot win the war; she will be subjugated.’ How sick they make one! Fortunately they are not engaged in propaganda; otherwise it would be too bad. For the peasants naturally have greater confidence in them than in me!”

It is such advocates of the theory of China’s inevitable subjugation who form the social basis of the tendency of compromise. These people are to be found everywhere in the country; hence the question of compromise, which is liable to crop up at any time from within the anti-Japanese front, cannot perhaps be finally disposed of till the very end of the war. Now that Hsuechow has fallen and Wuhan is in peril, I think it not unprofitable to refute once and for all such theories of national subjugation.

4. During the ten months of the war there have also emerged various views which smack of impetuosity. For instance, at the outset of the war a number of people showed a tendency towards a completely groundless optimism by underestimating Japan and even saying that the Japanese could not penetrate into Shansi. Others belittled the strategic role of guerrilla warfare in the war and were sceptical about the following proposition: “In general, mobile warfare is the principal and

guerrilla warfare the supplementary form; in specific circumstances guerrilla warfare is the principal and mobile warfare the supplementary form." They disapproved of the following strategic directive of the Eighth Route Army: "Basically guerrilla warfare, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favourable conditions." They regarded this as a "mechanist" view.² During the battle of Shanghai some people said: "Hold out for only three months and the international situation is bound to change, the Soviet Union is bound to send troops, and the war will end." They pinned their hope for the future of the resistance chiefly on foreign aid.³ After the Taierhchwang victory⁴ some people came to hold that the Hsueh campaign should be a "quasi-decisive battle" and that the past directive for a protracted war should be changed. They would say: "This engagement marks the last desperate struggle of the enemy", or: "If we win this battle, the Japanese militarists, with their morale utterly sapped, can wait only for their doom."⁵ The victory at Pinghsing pass made some people dizzy; and another victory at Taierhchwang made more people dizzy. Thus they began to doubt whether the enemy would launch an attack on Wuhan. Many people thought that he "probably would not"; and many others, that he "definitely could not". Such doubts may affect all major issues. Let us take the question: Are there already enough forces for resisting Japan? Some people will answer in the affirmative, that our present strength is already sufficient to check the enemy's advance. Then why should we augment it? Let us take another question: Is the slogan for consolidating and broadening the Anti-Japanese National United Front still correct? Their answer will be in the negative, that the united front is already strong enough to repulse the enemy. Then why should it be further consolidated and broadened? Still another question: Should our diplomatic efforts and international propaganda be further intensified? Their answer will also be in the negative. Again a question: Should we proceed in earnest to reform the military and political systems, develop the mass movement, vigorously implement education for national defence, suppress collaborators and Trotskyites, develop the war industries and improve the people's living conditions?

One more question: Are the slogans for the defence of Wuhan, Canton and the North-west and for a vigorous development of guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear still correct? Their answers will all be in the negative. There are even some people who, the moment a slightly favourable turn occurs in the war situation, want to begin increasing the friction between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, thus diverting their attention from the external to the internal problem. This almost invariably occurs whenever we win a comparatively big battle or the enemy temporarily stops his advance. We class all this as military and political short-sightedness. Such arguments sound quite reasonable on the lips of their advocates but are actually groundless, empty sophistry. To end such empty talk will facilitate the prosecution of a victorious Anti-Japanese War.

5. The question now is: Will China be subjugated? The answer is: No, the final victory will belong to China. Can China win quickly? Answer: No, the Anti-Japanese War will be protracted.

6. We pointed out in general outline the main arguments relating to these issues as early as two years ago. As early as July 16, 1936, five months before the Sian Incident and twelve months before the Lukouchiao Incident, I, in an interview with an American correspondent, Mr. Edgar Snow, made a general forecast of the situation of the Sino-Japanese War and proposed various policies for winning the victory. The following excerpts may serve as a reminder:⁶

Question: Under what conditions can the Chinese people defeat and exhaust the forces of Japan?

Answer: Three conditions will guarantee our success: first, the achievement of the national united front against Japanese imperialism in China; second, the formation of a world anti-Japanese united front; third, revolutionary action by the people in Japan and the oppressed peoples at present suffering under Japanese imperialism. So far as the Chinese people are concerned, the most important of the three conditions is the great union of the Chinese people themselves.

Question: How long would such a war last?

Answer: That depends mainly on the strength of China's anti-Japanese united front, together with many conditioning factors in China and Japan, namely, the degree of international help given to China, as well as the rate of revolutionary development in Japan. If China's anti-Japanese united front is powerfully homogeneous, if it is effectively organised horizontally and vertically, if the international aid to China is considerable from the governments and peoples of those countries which recognise the menace of Japanese imperialism to their own interest, if revolution comes quickly in Japan, the war will be short and victory speedily won. If these conditions are not realised soon enough, the war will be very long, but in the end, just the same, Japan will be defeated, only the sacrifices will be extensive and it will be a painful period for the whole world.

Question: What is your opinion of the probable course of development of such a war, politically and militarily?

Answer: Now, the Japanese continental policy is already fixed and it is well known. Those who imagine that by further sacrifices of Chinese sovereignty, by making territorial compromises and concessions, they can halt the advance of Japan, are only indulging in utopian fancy.

But we know well enough that even the Lower Yangtze valley and our southern seaports are already included in the Japanese continental programme. Moreover, Japan aspires to seize the Philippines, Siam, Indo-China, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, cutting off China, and monopolising the seas of the south-western Pacific. These moves are included in Japan's plans of naval strategy. In such a period, it is beyond doubt that China will be in an extremely difficult position. But the great majority of Chinese people believe that such difficulties can be overcome; only the wealthy people in the big commercial centres are defeatists because they are afraid of losing their property.

Many people think it would be impossible for China

to continue her fight against Japan, once the latter enforced a blockade along the coast. This is nonsense. To refute it we have only to refer to the history of the Red Army.

In the Anti-Japanese War the Chinese people would have on their side greater advantages than those the Red Army has utilised in its struggle with the Kuomintang. China is a very big nation. If Japan should succeed in occupying even a large section of China, getting possession of an area with as many as one hundred or even two hundred million people, we would still be far from defeated. We would still have left a great force to fight against Japan's warlords, who would also have to fight a heavy and constant rear-guard action throughout the entire war.

Economically, of course, China is not unified. But the uneven development of China's economy also presents advantages in a war against Japan. For example, to sever Shanghai from the rest of China is not as disastrous to the country as would be, for instance, the severance of New York from the rest of America. Moreover, it is impossible for Japan to isolate all of China: China's North-west, South-west and West cannot be blockaded by Japan.

Thus, once more the central point of the problem becomes the mobilisation and unification of the entire Chinese people and the building up of a united front, such as has been advocated by the Communist Party long ago.

Question: If the war drags on for a long time and Japan is not completely defeated, would the Communist Party agree to negotiate a peace with Japan and recognise its rule in the North-east?

Answer: No. Like the people of the whole country, the Chinese Communists will not allow Japan to retain an inch of Chinese territory.

Question: What, in your opinion, should be the main strategy and tactics to be followed in this "war of liberation"?

Answer: The strategy should be that of employing our main forces in mobile warfare, over an extended, shifting and indefinite front: a strategy depending for success on a high

degree of mobility, and featured by swift attack and withdrawal, swift concentration and dispersal. It will be large-scale mobile warfare rather than the simple positional war of extensive trench-work, deep-massed lines and heavy fortifications.

This does not mean the abandonment of vital strategic points, which can be defended in positional warfare as long as profitable. But the pivotal strategy must be mobile warfare. Fortified warfare must be utilised, but it will be of auxiliary and secondary strategic importance.

Geographically the theatre of the war is so vast that it is possible for us to pursue mobile warfare with the utmost efficiency and with a telling effect on a ponderous slow-moving war-machine like Japan's, cautiously feeling its way in face of fierce actions. Deep-line concentration and the exhausting defence of a position or two on a narrow front would be to throw away all the tactical advantages of our geography and economic organisation, and to repeat the mistake of the Abyssinians. Our strategy and tactics must aim to avoid great decisive battles in the early stages of the war, and gradually to break the morale, the fighting spirit and the military efficiency of the living forces of the enemy.

Besides the regular Chinese troops, we should create great numbers of guerrilla detachments among the peasantry. What has been accomplished by the anti-Japanese volunteer units of this type in Manchuria is only a very minor demonstration of the latent power of resistance that can be mobilised from the peasantry of all China. Properly led and organised, such units can keep the Japanese busy twenty-four hours a day and worry them to death.

It must be remembered that the war will be fought in China. This means that the Japanese will be entirely surrounded by a hostile Chinese people. The Japanese will be forced to move in all their provisions and guard them, maintaining troops along all lines of communication, and heavily garrisoning their bases in Manchuria and Japan as well.

The process of the war will present to China the possibility of capturing many Japanese prisoners, arms, ammunition, war-machines, and so forth. A point will be reached where it will become more and more possible to engage Japan's armies on a basis of positional warfare, for, as the war progresses, the technical equipment of the anti-Japanese forces will greatly improve, and will be reinforced by important foreign help. Japan's economy will crack under the strain of a long, expensive occupation of China and the morale of her forces will break under the trial of a war of innumerable but indecisive battles. The great reservoirs of human material in the revolutionary Chinese people will be pouring forth men who are ready to fight for their freedom into our front lines.

All these and other factors will condition the war and will enable us to make the final and decisive attacks on Japan's fortifications and strategic bases and to drive Japan's army of occupation from China.

The above statement has proved correct in the experiences of the ten months of the war and will prove so in the future.

7. Early, on August 25, 1937, a little over a month after the Lukouchiao Incident, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party clearly pointed out the following in its *Resolution on the Current Situation and Tasks of the Party*:

"The Japanese invaders' provocation at Lukouchiao and their occupation of Peiping and Tientsin are but the beginning of their large-scale attacks on China proper. The Japanese invaders have begun their national mobilisation for war. Their propaganda that they have 'no desire to aggravate the situation' is only a smoke-bomb dropped to screen their attacks.

"The resistance made at Lukouchiao on July 7 marked the starting-point of China's nation-wide armed resistance.

"A new stage now begins in China's political situation, namely, the stage of actual resistance. The stage of preparation for resistance is already over. The centremost task of the present stage is to mobilise all forces to win victory in the armed resistance.

"... the pivot for winning victory in the armed resistance lies in developing the resistance already started into a total resistance by the whole nation. Only through such a resistance can final victory be won.

"Because there are still serious defects in the resistance, its future course will be beset with difficulties, such as setbacks, retreats, internal splits and betrayals, temporary and partial compromises, etc. Hence we must recognise that this armed resistance is going to be a bitter, protracted war. But we believe that the resistance already started will, through the effort of our Party and of the whole people, definitely break through all obstacles to continue its advance and development."

Experiences in the ten months of the war have likewise proved the correctness of this statement and the future will continue to prove it.

8. Idealist and mechanist tendencies on problems of war are the epistemological source of all erroneous views. People showing such tendencies approach a problem subjectively and one-sidedly. They either indulge in groundless and purely subjective talk or, fastening upon a single aspect or a temporary manifestation, magnify it into the whole of the problem. Erroneous views can be divided into two categories: one includes fundamentally and consistently mistaken views that are hard to rectify; the other includes incidentally and temporarily mistaken views that are easy to rectify. Since both are erroneous, both need rectification. Only by opposing idealist and mechanist tendencies on problems of war and adopting an objective and comprehensive viewpoint in examining them, can we arrive at correct conclusions about these problems.

THE BASIS OF THE PROBLEM

9. Why is the Anti-Japanese War a protracted war? Why will the final victory be China's? What is the basis for our assertions?

The Sino-Japanese War is none other than a war of life and death between a semi-colonial and semi-feudal China and an

imperialist Japan in the thirties of the twentieth century. Herein lies the basis of the whole problem. To speak of each in turn, the two warring parties possess the following contrasting features:

10. As for Japan, first, she is a powerful imperialist country which ranks first in military, economic and political-organisational power in the East and counts as one of the five or six outstanding imperialist countries in the world. These are the basic conditions for Japan's war of aggression; and the inevitability of the war and the impossibility for China's quick victory are precisely based on Japan's imperialist state system and her strong military, economic and political-organisational power. Secondly, however, from the imperialist character of Japan's social economy arises the imperialist character of her war, which is retrogressive and barbarous. In the thirties of the twentieth century Japanese imperialism was forced by its internal and external contradictions not only to engage in an unprecedented large-scale adventurist war but also to totter on the brink of final collapse. In terms of social evolution, Japan is no longer a prosperous country; the war will not lead Japan to the prosperity expected by her ruling classes, but to the very reverse—the doom of Japanese imperialism. This is the retrogressive nature of Japan's war. The peculiar barbarity with which Japanese imperialism wages the war derives from this retrogressiveness and its own military-feudal character. This barbarity will arouse most violent antagonism between the classes in Japan herself, between the Chinese and the Japanese nations, and between Japan and most of the countries of the world. The retrogressiveness and barbarity of Japan's war constitute the main basis of her sure defeat. Thirdly, in addition to that, although Japan conducts her war on the basis of her strong military, economic and political-organisational power, she does so also on the basis of her insufficient natural endowment. Strong as Japan is in military, economic and political-organisational power, her strength is quantitatively inadequate. Japan, a comparatively small country deficient in man-power, in military and financial strength, and in material resources, cannot stand a protracted war. Seeking to overcome by means of war the difficulty of insufficient natural

endowment, her rulers will once more get the very reverse of what they desire; that is to say, she has launched the war to solve this difficult problem, but in the long run war will only increase her difficulties by consuming even her original stock. Fourthly and lastly, despite the international support Japan has obtained from the fascist countries, she cannot but encounter a force of international opposition surpassing that of her international support. The force of international opposition will gradually grow, and eventually not only neutralise the force of international support but also bring pressure to bear upon Japan herself. This fact, illustrative of the law that the unjust can find little support, is a consequence of the very nature of Japan's war. To sum up: Japan's advantage lies in her great fighting capacity and her disadvantage in the retrogressiveness and barbarity inherent in her war, in the deficiency in her man-power and material resources, and in her lack of international support. These are the characteristics of Japan.

11. As for China, first, she is a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. From the Opium War, the Revolution of the T'ai-p'ing Heavenly Kingdom, the Reformist Movement of 1898,⁷ and the Revolution of 1911 down to the Northern Expedition, all revolutionary and reformist movements aiming at her liberation from a semi-colonial, semi-feudal status have met with serious setbacks, and China has remained a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. We are still a weak country, and, in striking contrast to the enemy, are inferior in military, economic and political-organisational power. Herein again lies the basis of the inevitability of the war and the impossibility of China's quick victory. Secondly, however, China's liberation movement which has developed through the last hundred years, is now quite different from what it was at any time in its previous history. Although the antagonistic forces both within and without have caused serious setbacks to the liberation movements, yet they have steeled the Chinese people. Although militarily, economically, politically and culturally the China of today is weaker than Japan, yet there exist within her factors more progressive than those in any period of her history. The Communist Party and the army under its leadership are representative of these progressive factors. It is precisely because

of this progressive basis that China's war of liberation can be carried on till the ultimate victory. In striking contrast to Japanese imperialism, which is on the decline, China is a country rising like the morning sun. China's war is progressive, and from this progressiveness follows its justness. Because her war is just, China can rally together the entire people in solidarity, arouse the sympathy of the people in the enemy country and win the support of most of the countries of the world. Thirdly, China is a very big country with a vast territory, rich resources, an enormous population and huge military forces, and is capable of keeping up a prolonged war; this forms another striking contrast to Japan. Fourthly and lastly, the abundant international support of China that ensues from the progressiveness and justness of her war is again exactly the reverse of Japan's lack of support and the unjustness of her cause. To sum up, China's disadvantage lies in her small fighting capacity and her advantage in the progressiveness and justness of her war, in a big territory and in the abundance of international support which she enjoys. These are the characteristics of China.

12. Thus it can be seen that, in spite of Japan's strong military, economic and political-organisational power, her war is retrogressive and barbarous, her man-power and material resources are insufficient, and internationally she is in a disadvantageous position. On the contrary, China's military, economic and political-organisational power is comparatively weak, but she is in an epoch of progress and her war is progressive and just; furthermore, the fact that she is a big country enables her to keep up a protracted war and most of the countries of the world will give her support. These constitute the basic contradictory characteristics of the Sino-Japanese War. These characteristics have been and will remain the factors that determine politically the policies and militarily the strategies and tactics of both sides, the factors that determine the protractedness of the war, and the prospect that the ultimate victory belongs to China and not to Japan. The war is a contest of these characteristics. They will evolve in the course of the war, each according to its own nature; and from such evolution all future developments will follow. These

characteristics actually exist, and we are not making them up to mislead people; they constitute all the basic elements of the war and are not incomplete fragments; leaving their stamp on all big and small problems and all stages of operations on both sides, they are not things that make no difference. If anyone examines the Sino-Japanese War without taking these characteristics into account, he will certainly come to wrong conclusions; even though certain views of his are apparently correct and for a time accepted by some people, the course of the war will eventually prove him to be wrong. On the basis of these characteristics we shall now proceed to explain all the problems that we propose to take up.

REFUTATION OF THE THEORY OF NATIONAL SUBJUGATION

13. The subjugationists, noticing the single factor of the contrast between the enemy's strength and our weakness, used to say, "resistance spells inevitable subjugation"; and now they say, "further resistance spells inevitable subjugation". We shall not be able to convince them by merely stating that the enemy country is strong but small while China is weak but big. They may quote the historical instances of the Mongols overthrowing the Sung dynasty and the Manchus overthrowing the Ming dynasty to prove that a small but strong country can vanquish a big but weak country, and, moreover, a backward country can vanquish an advanced one. If we say that these things happened in ancient times and cannot be taken as proofs, they may again mention the subjugation of India by Great Britain to prove that a small but strong capitalist country can vanquish a big but weak and backward country. Therefore, we must bring forward another point to seal the lips of all subjugationists and convince them, as well as to supply all propagandists with sufficient arguments to convince the unenlightened who are still wavering and to strengthen their faith in the War of Resistance.

14. What point should we bring forward? The characteristics of the epoch. These characteristics are concretely reflected in Japan's retrogression and lack of support and China's progress and abundance of support.

15. Our war is none other than a war fought in the thirties of the twentieth century between China and Japan. As for our enemy, Japan, she is first of all a moribund imperialist country in an era of retrogression, not only different from Britain at the time of her subjugation of India when capitalism was still on the up-grade but also from what she herself was at the time of the First World War of twenty years ago. The present war has been unleashed on the eve of the general collapse of world imperialism, and in the first place of the fascist countries—this is the very reason why the enemy has launched the present adventurist war, which is in the nature of a last desperate struggle. Therefore, inevitably and certainly, it is the ruling bloc of Japanese imperialism, not China, that will be destroyed as a result of the war. Moreover, the root cause why Japan has aroused, and is arousing more and more, the intense opposition of most of the countries and peoples of the world lies in the fact that she has launched the war at a time when these countries, confronted with war or about to be confronted with it, were already either fighting or preparing to fight against barbarous aggression, and also in the fact that China's interests are connected with the interests of these countries and peoples.

16. What about China? The China of today can no longer be compared to the China of any other era in her history. She is called a weak country because she is semi-colonial and semi-feudal. But at the same time she is in an historical era of progress: this is the main reason why she can finally defeat Japan. By the progressiveness of the Anti-Japanese War is meant not a progressiveness in a conventional, general sense, neither the kind of progressiveness of the Abyssinian war against Italy, nor the kind of progressiveness of the Revolution of the T'ai'ping Heavenly Kingdom or the Revolution of 1911, but the progressiveness of China today. Wherein lies the progressiveness of China today? It lies in the fact that China is no longer a completely feudal country, that in China there are already capitalism, a bourgeoisie and a proletariat, the broad masses of the people who have awakened or are awakening, the Communist Party and the politically progressive army, namely, the Chinese Red Army under the leadership of the Communist

Party, and a store of experiences accumulated in many decades of revolutionary tradition, especially experiences in the seventeen years since the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. These experiences have educated the Chinese people as well as the Chinese political parties and form the very basis of China's present solidarity against Japan. If it is said that without the experience of 1905 there could not have been the victory of 1917 in Russia, then we can also say that without the experience of the last seventeen years there could not be victory in the Anti-Japanese War. This is China's internal condition.

The fact that internationally China is not isolated in time of war is also unprecedented in history. In the past, whether in China or in India, wars were fought in isolation. It is only today that popular movements, unprecedented in breadth and depth, have arisen or are arising throughout the world and are giving help to China. The Russian Revolution in 1917 also received international support, which enabled the Russian workers and peasants to win; but that support was neither so great nor so profound as the support given to China today. The world-wide popular movements today are developing with an unprecedented breadth and depth. The existence of the Soviet Union especially is a vital factor in present-day international politics and the Soviet Union will certainly support China with the greatest enthusiasm; and this was something completely non-existent twenty years ago. All these factors have created and are creating important conditions indispensable for China's ultimate victory. Though large-scale direct aid is yet lacking and will come only in the future, China's progressiveness and huge size will enable her to prolong the war and to promote as well as wait for international support.

17. In addition to all this, there is the condition that while Japan is a small country with a small territory, limited resources, a small population and a small army, China is a big country with a vast territory, rich resources, an enormous population and huge military forces; thus apart from the contrast between strength and weakness, there is also the contrast between a small country, retrogression and lack of support on the one hand and a big country, progress and

abundance of support on the other: this is the reason why China will never be subjugated. Although the contrast between strength and weakness means that Japan will succeed in overrunning China to a certain extent and for a certain period, that China will inevitably go through difficult times, and that the Anti-Japanese War will be a protracted war and not a war of quick decision; yet the contrast between a small country, retrogression and lack of support on the one hand, and a big country, progress and abundance of support on the other, also means that Japan cannot overrun China for ever but will inevitably meet her ultimate defeat, while China will never be subjugated but will inevitably score the final victory.

18. Why has Abyssinia been subjugated? First, she was not only a weak country but also a small one. Secondly, not so progressive as China, she was an old country on the way from slavery to serfdom, with neither capitalism nor bourgeois political parties, let alone a Communist Party, nor such an army as China's, let alone an army like the Eighth Route Army. Thirdly, unable to wait for international support, she had to fight in isolation. Fourthly and chiefly, the Abyssinian leadership committed mistakes in the war against Italy. Thus Abyssinia was subjugated. But the Abyssinians are still carrying on a quite extensive guerrilla war which, if kept up, will enable them to recover their motherland when the world situation changes in the future.

19. If the subjugationists quote the history of the failure of liberation movements in modern China to prove their arguments that "resistance spells inevitable subjugation" or "further resistance spells inevitable subjugation", we shall answer again with the remark, "Times are different". China herself, the internal conditions in Japan and the international situation are now all different from what they were in the past. It is a serious matter that Japan is stronger than before while China, with her semi-colonial and semi-feudal status unchanged, is still fairly weak. It is also a fact that Japan can for the time being still control her own people as well as capitalise on international conflicts to invade China. But in the long course of the war, changes in the opposite direction will necessarily occur. This is not yet a fact but it will definitely become a fact

in the future. But the national subjugationists have left this point out of consideration. What about China? Not only are there today new personalities, new political parties, new armies and a new anti-Japanese policy, all very different from over a decade ago, but all this will of necessity develop further. Although the liberation movements in China's history have time and again met with setbacks, with the result that China has not been able to build up strength to a higher degree for the present Anti-Japanese War—by this very deplorable fact history has taught us a lesson and from now on we should never again trample upon any of our own revolutionary forces—yet on the present basis, by making extensive efforts, we shall be able to forge gradually ahead and increase our power of resistance. The great Anti-Japanese National United Front points to the general direction in which such efforts should be made. As to international support, though direct and large-scale aid is not yet in sight, it is in ferment because the international situation is fundamentally different from what it was. The countless failures of liberation movements in modern China were all due to subjective and objective causes, but the situation today is entirely different. Today, although many difficult conditions, such as the enemy's strength and our weakness and the fact that his difficulties are only beginning while our progress is far from sufficient, have caused the Anti-Japanese War to be a difficult one, yet we can overcome difficulties and win victory if we add our own efforts to the numerous conditions favourable to our defeating the enemy. So far as the favourable conditions are concerned, no period of history can be compared to today, and that is why the Anti-Japanese War will never fail, as did the liberation movements in our history.

COMPROMISE OR RESISTANCE? DEGENERATION OR PROGRESS?

20. It has now been explained as above that the theory of national subjugation is baseless. But there are many people, not national subjugationists but good, honest patriots, who nevertheless feel deeply worried about the present situation. The two things which worry them are fear of a compromise

with Japan and despair about any possibility of political progress. These two vexing problems have been discussed by many people and no basis for their solution has been found. Let us study these two problems now.

21. It has already been stated above that the tendency of compromise has a social basis; as long as such a social basis exists the tendency of compromise will inevitably arise. Attempts at compromise cannot, however, be successful. To prove this we again need not look for reasons elsewhere than in the three factors of Japan, China and the international situation. First, let us consider the Japanese aspect. At the beginning of the War of Resistance we estimated that the time would come when an atmosphere of compromise would be created, that is, as soon as the enemy occupied North China and Kiangsu and Chekiang; he would try to induce us to surrender. Later he actually played this hand; but the crisis was soon over, because among other things the enemy pursued a barbarous policy everywhere and practised open plunder. If China had capitulated every Chinese would have become a colonial slave. The enemy's policy of plundering or subjugating China can be divided into two aspects, material and spiritual, both of which are applied to all Chinese, to the people of the lower as well as of the upper strata—the latter are of course treated with some politeness, but there is only a difference in degree, not in kind. In the main the enemy is transplanting the old measures he has adopted in the three North-eastern provinces into the interior. Materially, he is plundering the food and clothing of the general population, thus subjecting the broad masses of the people to hunger and cold, and he is plundering the means of production, thus ruining and enslaving China's national industries. Spiritually, he tries to destroy the national consciousness of the Chinese people. Under the sun-flag the Chinese could only become submissive subjects working like pack-horses and draught-oxen, forbidden to retain a trace of the Chinese character. This barbarous policy on the part of the enemy will also be applied in the deeper interior of China. His appetite is ravenous and he is unwilling to stop the war. The programme announced by the Japanese cabinet in its statement of January 16, 1938⁸ has so far been, as it had to be, resolutely carried

out; and this has enraged all strata of the Chinese people. Because of the retrogressiveness and barbarity of Japan's war, the Chinese people, fearing that "they can hardly escape their doom", have arisen in absolute hostility to Japan. We estimate that at some future date the enemy will again attempt to induce us to capitulate and certain national subjugationists will again wriggle and squirm and will most likely conspire with certain foreigners (such people can be found inside Britain, America and France, especially among the upper strata in Britain) and form a cabal with them. But the general trend of events will not permit capitulation because the resoluteness and the unique barbarity of the Japanese in prosecuting the war has settled one aspect of the question.

22. Secondly, let us consider the Chinese aspect. Three factors in China are contributing to her perseverance in the War of Resistance. In the first place the Communist Party, which is the force that can be depended upon for leading the people to fight Japan. Next, the Kuomintang which, because of its reliance on Britain and the United States, will not capitulate to Japan unless they tell it to. Finally, the other parties, most of which oppose compromise and support the War of Resistance. These three unite with each other; whoever resorts to compromise must line himself up with the collaborators and everybody will have the right to destroy him. As all those unwilling to be collaborators are bound to unite for keeping up the war to the end, compromise is hardly possible.

23. Thirdly, let us consider the international aspect. Except for Japan's allies and certain people in the upper strata of the capitalist countries, the whole world is in favour of China's resistance, not of her compromise. This factor reinforces China's hope. The people of the whole country cherish today the hope that the international forces will gradually increase their aid to China. This is not a vain hope, and the existence of the Soviet Union has especially heartened China in her resistance. The socialist Soviet Union, never so strong as it is now, has always shared China's weals and woes. Radically opposed to the upper classes of all the capitalist countries who seek nothing but profit, the Soviet Union regards it as a duty to give aid to all small and weak nations and to revolutionary wars. That China

does not fight in isolation is demonstrated not only by world-wide aid in general but by Soviet aid in particular. China and the Soviet Union are geographically close to each other and this aggravates Japan's crisis and facilitates China's War of Resistance. The geographical closeness between China and Japan increases the difficulties of China's resistance. The geographical closeness between China and the Soviet Union, on the other hand, constitutes a favourable condition for China's resistance.

24. Hence we may conclude: The danger of compromise exists but it can be overcome. Even if the enemy modifies his policy to some extent, he cannot alter it fundamentally. There are social bases for compromise within China herself but those who oppose compromise constitute the majority. A part of the international forces are also in favour of compromise but the main forces are in favour of resistance. With these three factors combined we can overcome the danger of compromise and persist in resistance to the very end.

25. Now let us answer the second question. Reform of domestic politics is inseparable from perseverance in the War of Resistance. The better the political reform, the more enduring the War of Resistance; the more enduring the War of Resistance, the better the political reform. But basically it is on our perseverance in the War of Resistance that the political reform depends. Serious defects do exist in various departments of the Kuomintang and such undesirable factors, historically accumulated, are causing great worry and vexation to the broad sections of our patriots. But there is no ground for pessimism, since the experiences in the War of Resistance have already proved that the Chinese people have made as much progress in the last ten months as in as many years in the past. Although degeneration, a historical legacy, is seriously impeding the growth of the people's strength of resistance, thus reducing the extent of our victories and increasing our losses in the war, yet the over-all situation in China, in Japan and in the world will not allow the Chinese people to stop progressing. Our progress will be sluggish however, because it is hindered by degeneration. Progress and a sluggish progress are the two characteristics of the present situation and as the latter ill

accords with the urgent demands of the war, our patriots are much worried. But we are in a revolutionary war and a revolutionary war is an antitoxin which will not only repel the enemy's venom but also purge our own filth. All just, revolutionary wars contain a mighty force capable of remoulding many things or blazing the path for their remoulding. The Sino-Japanese War will remould both China and Japan; as long as China persists in the resistance and in the united front, the war will surely remould the old Japan into a new Japan, and the old China into a new China, and people and things in both China and Japan will be remoulded during and after this war. It is therefore proper for us to regard the War of Resistance and national reconstruction as interconnected. To say that Japan will also be remoulded is to say that the war of aggression waged by her rulers will end in defeat, which may lead to the revolution of the Japanese people. The day the Japanese people's revolution triumphs will be the time of the remoulding of Japan. This is closely linked with China's War of Resistance and is a prospect that we should recognise.

THE THEORY OF NATIONAL SUBJUGATION IS WRONG AND THE THEORY OF A QUICK VICTORY IS ALSO WRONG

26. We have already made a comparative study of the basic, contrasting characteristics of the enemy and ourselves in the matter of strength, size, progress or retrogression, and abundance of support or lack of it; we have refuted the theory of national subjugation; and we have explained why compromise is unlikely and why political improvement is possible. The national subjugationists over-emphasise the contrast between strength and weakness and magnify it into the whole basis of the issue, neglecting all the other contrasts. The fact that they bring forth only the contrast in strength indicates their one-sidedness, and the fact that they magnify this one aspect of the matter into the whole indicates their subjectivism. Therefore on the whole their arguments are groundless and erroneous. As for those who, being neither national subjugationists nor consistent pessimists, are nevertheless misled either by the contrast between the enemy's strength and our weakness at one

time and in certain respects or by the state of degeneration found in the country and thus become pessimistic for the moment, we should point out to them that their view also arises from one-sidedness and subjectivism. But it is relatively easy to correct them and they will see the point once they are reminded of it, for they are patriots and their error is only momentary.

27. On the other hand, adherents of the theory of a quick victory are likewise wrong. They either completely neglect the contrast between strength and weakness and notice only the other contrasts, or they exaggerate China's advantage out of all true proportion and beyond recognition, or with overweening confidence, take the relative strength at one time and one place for that in the whole situation, in the manner described in the adage: A leaf before the eyes blocks out the view of Mount Tai. At any rate, they lack the courage to admit the fact that the enemy is strong while we are weak. They often suppress this point and consequently suppress one aspect of the truth. Nor do they have the courage to admit the limited character of our own advantage, thus suppressing another aspect of the truth. Consequently they commit mistakes, big or small, and here again subjectivism and one-sidedness are the cause of the trouble. These friends mean well and are patriotic. But lofty as their aspirations are, their viewpoint is incorrect and we shall be knocking our heads against a brick wall if we act according to the way they look at things. This is because estimations not in conformity with reality will not lead action to the desired end; if we allow ourselves to act on them, the army will be defeated and the nation subjugated, the result being the same as with defeatism. Hence this theory of a quick victory will not do either.

28. Do we deny the danger of national subjugation? No, we do not. We recognise that China has two possible prospects: liberation and subjugation; and the two are in violent conflict. Our task is to achieve liberation and to avert subjugation. The basic condition for liberation is China's progress, supplemented at the same time by the enemy's difficulties and the world's support. We differ from the national subjugationists in that, recognising objectively and comprehensively the co-existence of

the possibilities of national subjugation and liberation, we point out with emphasis the predominance of the possibility of liberation and the conditions for its realisation and strive to secure them. The national subjugationists recognise subjectively and one-sidedly the possibility of national subjugation only, and deny the very possibility of liberation, let alone point out the conditions for liberation or strive to secure them. While admitting the tendency of compromise and the presence of degeneration, we see other tendencies and manifestations and point out that in a violent clash the possibility of liberation will gradually get the better of the possibility of subjugation; moreover, we point out the conditions for the realisation of the first possibility and strive to overcome degeneration and the tendency of compromise. Therefore, contrary to the people who do the very opposite, we are not pessimistic.

29. Not that we would not like a quick victory; anybody would be in favour of driving out the "devils"⁹ overnight. But we must point out that without definite conditions a quick victory can exist only in our mind but not in reality; it would be a mere illusion and falsehood. Therefore, having objectively and comprehensively appraised all the conditions of the enemy and ourselves, we point out that the only way to win ultimate victory lies in a strategically protracted war and reject the completely groundless theory of a quick victory. We maintain that we must strive to secure all the conditions indispensable to our final victory, and the more and the sooner they are secured, the surer shall we be of our victory and the earlier will be the victory. We believe that only this can shorten the course of the war, and we reject the theory of a quick victory, which is the product of a desire to get things on the cheap and of empty talk.

WHY IS IT A PROTRACTED WAR?

30. We now come to the problem of the protracted war. The question "Why is it a protracted war?" can be correctly answered only by examining all the fundamental contrasts between the enemy and ourselves. For example, if we merely say that the enemy is a strong imperialist power while we are a weak semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, we are in danger

of being tied to the position of the theory of national subjugation. For neither in theory nor in practice can protractedness come about simply by the weak being pitted against the strong. The same applies if we stress merely the bigness or smallness of a country, its progressiveness or retrogressiveness, the abundance or lack of support. The annexation of a small country by a big one and of a big country by a small one are both common occurrences. With countries as with other things, that which is progressive but weak has often been destroyed by that which is big and retrogressive. The abundance or lack of support is an important factor, but is a subsidiary one, and the extent of its effect depends upon the basic factors on the enemy's side and our own. Thus, through a study of the interconnections of all the factors on the enemy's side and our own, we have reached the conclusion that the Anti-Japanese War is a protracted war. The enemy is strong and we are weak, so we are facing the danger of subjugation. But in other respects the enemy has shortcomings and we have advantages. The enemy's advantages can be reduced, and his shortcomings be aggravated by our efforts. On the other hand, our advantages can be enhanced, and our shortcomings be remedied, by our efforts. Therefore, we can win our final victory and avert subjugation while the enemy, ultimately doomed to defeat, cannot avert the collapse of his whole imperialist system.

31. Since the enemy has only one advantage among a host of shortcomings and we have only one shortcoming among a host of advantages, why does this lead not to parity but to the enemy's superiority and our inferiority as at present? Quite obviously, the problem must not be approached in such a formal way. The fact is that the disparity in strength between the enemy and ourselves is at present so great that the enemy's shortcomings have not been and cannot yet be developed to the required degree to offset his strength, while our advantages have not been and cannot yet be developed to the required degree to compensate for our weakness; therefore there cannot yet be parity but only disparity.

32. Although our efforts in persisting in the War of Resistance and the united front have caused some changes in the enemy's strength and superiority and our weakness and

inferiority, yet no basic change has taken place. Hence in a certain stage of the war and to a certain point the enemy will win victory and we shall suffer defeat. But why is it that the enemy's victory and our defeat are each limited within certain bounds in this particular stage and cannot be developed further into a complete victory or a complete defeat? Because, first, in the *status quo ante*, the enemy's strength as compared with our weakness has been relative and not absolute; and secondly, our efforts in persistently carrying on the War of Resistance and maintaining the united front have made it all the more relative. Although the enemy is strong, his strength has already been reduced from what it used to be in the *status quo ante* by other unfavourable factors, but not to the degree required to offset his superiority; on the other hand, although we are weak, our weakness has already been compensated for by other favourable factors, but again not to the degree required to transform our inferiority. Thus it turns out that the enemy is relatively strong and we are relatively weak; the enemy is in a relatively superior position and we are in a relatively inferior position. The strength or superiority on either side is not absolute in nature and this, plus our efforts in persisting in the resistance and maintaining the united front in the course of the war, efforts which affect all the more the enemy's original relative strength and our relative weakness, confines both the enemy and ourselves to a certain measure of victory or defeat at a certain stage and brings about a protracted war.

33. But conditions are continually changing. In the course of the war, as long as we employ correct military and political strategy, avoid mistakes in principle and exert our best efforts, the factors unfavourable to the enemy and favourable to us will both develop as the war drags on, continue to affect the enemy's original strength and our weakness, and continue to alter the original relative position of the enemy's superiority and our inferiority. When a new stage is reached a decisive change will take place in the relative strength as well as in the relative position of superiority and inferiority, a change that will bring about the enemy's defeat and our victory.

34. For the time being the enemy, though handicapped, can still make use of his strength, because our War of Resistance

has not fundamentally weakened it. His deficiency in manpower and material resources is not yet serious enough to halt his advance; on the contrary, his manpower and material resources can still sustain his advance to a certain extent. The factor that can intensify the class antagonism in his own country and increase the opposition of the Chinese nation, namely, the factor of the retrogressiveness and barbarity of his war, has not yet created a situation which will fundamentally impede his further advance. The enemy's isolation in the world is still increasing but has not yet become complete. In many countries that have promised to support us, the capitalists dealing in munitions and war materials are still supplying Japan with immense quantities of war materials¹⁰ for the sole purpose of making profits, while their governments¹¹ are still unwilling to join the Soviet Union in applying practical measures against Japan. All this means that our War of Resistance cannot be quickly won and can only be a protracted war. As for China, although her weakness as manifested in the military, economic, political and cultural spheres has been overcome to a certain extent in the ten months of resistance, yet it is still far from having been overcome to the extent required to halt the enemy's advance and enable us to prepare for our counter-offensive. Moreover we have had to suffer losses. Although all the factors favourable to us are becoming operative, it will still need a great deal of effort to develop them so as to halt the enemy's advance and enable us to prepare for our counter-offensive. The elimination of degeneration and the acceleration of progress at home and the curbing of the pro-Japanese forces and the expansion of the anti-Japanese forces abroad—none of these has become a fact. All this again means that our war cannot be quickly won and that it can only be a protracted war.

THE THREE STAGES OF THE PROTRACTED WAR

35. Since the Sino-Japanese War is a protracted one and the final victory will be China's, we can reasonably imagine that this protracted war will pass through the following three stages. The first stage is one of the enemy's strategic offensive and our

strategic defensive. The second stage is one of the enemy's strategic defensive and our preparation for the counter-offensive. The third stage is one of our strategic counter-offensive and the enemy's strategic retreat. It is impossible to predict the concrete situations in the three stages, but certain main trends of the war may be pointed out in the light of present conditions. As the course of objective events is very varied and full of twists and turns, nobody can cast a "horoscope" for the Sino-Japanese War; but to make a rough chart of the trend of the war is necessary for its strategic direction. Hence, although our chart may not coincide with, but will be amended by, future developments, it is still necessary in formulating the strategic plan for carrying on a protracted war firmly and purposefully.

36. Up to the present, the first stage has not yet been concluded. The enemy's intention is to occupy Canton, Wuhan and Lanchow and link up these three points. To accomplish this aim the enemy would have to dispatch an army of at least fifty divisions, about one and half million men, spend from one and a half to two years and pour out more than ten thousand million yen. Penetrating so deep, the enemy will encounter immense difficulties, with consequences so disastrous that he cannot possibly imagine them. In order to occupy the entire line of the Canton-Hankow railway and the Sian-Lanchow highway, he will have to go through most perilous battles without fully achieving his aims. But our war plan should be one of a protracted war based on the possibility of the enemy's occupying the three points and even certain regions beyond them, as well as linking them up, so that we may be able to cope with him even if he succeeds in his attempt. The chief form of fighting for us to adopt in this stage should be mobile warfare, supplemented by guerrilla and positional warfare. Although in the first phase of this stage positional warfare was subjectively and erroneously assigned the chief role by the Kuomintang military authorities, it will nevertheless be supplementary from the point of view of the stage as a whole. In this stage, China has formed a broad united front and achieved unprecedented solidarity. Though, in an attempt to bring about a quick decision and to conquer the whole of

China on the cheap, the enemy has adopted and will continue to adopt base and shameless measures to induce her to capitulate, he has failed so far and will hardly succeed in the future. In this stage, in spite of considerable losses, China has made great progress, which will become the main basis for the resistance to continue into the second stage. In this stage, the Soviet Union has already given substantial aid to China. On the side of our enemy, the morale of his troops has begun to run low; the spearhead of his attacking army has become less sharp in the middle phase of this stage than in the initial phase and will be even less sharp in the concluding phase. His finance and economy are beginning to show signs of exhaustion; among the Japanese people and troops war-weariness is beginning to set in; and within the bloc that directs the war, "war worries" are beginning to be manifest and pessimism about the prospect of the war is growing.

37. The second stage may be termed the stage of strategic stalemate. At the end of the first stage, owing to the insufficiency in his own troops and our firm resistance, the enemy will be forced to fix a point as the terminus of his strategic offensive; halting his strategic offensive on reaching the terminus, he will then enter the stage of retaining the occupied territories. In this stage, the enemy will attempt to keep the territories he has seized and to perpetuate his occupation through the deceitful measure of establishing puppet governments while plundering, with all his might, the possessions of the Chinese people, but he will be confronted again by a stubborn guerrilla war. Since we take advantage of the enemy's unguarded rear, our guerrilla warfare will undergo an extensive development in the first stage, and since many base areas will have been created and will fundamentally menace his retention of the occupied areas, there will still be large-scale fighting in the second stage. In that stage, our form of fighting will be mainly guerrilla warfare, supplemented by mobile warfare. China will still be able to maintain a large regular army, but it will still be difficult for her to launch immediately the strategic counter-offensive because, on the one hand, the enemy will adopt a strategically defensive position in the big cities and on the main lines of communication under his occupation and, on the other hand,

China's technological requirements will be as yet unfulfilled. Except for the troops engaged in the defence at the front line, a large number of our forces will be switched to the enemy's rear in comparatively dispersed formations and, relying on the areas not occupied by the enemy and in co-ordination with the people's armed forces, these forces will launch an extensive, fierce guerrilla war against the enemy-occupied areas and, wherever possible, keep the enemy moving about and destroy him after the fashion of the mobile warfare which is being carried on in Shansi province at present. The fighting in this stage will be ruthless and the country will face serious devastation. But the guerrilla war will achieve victory and, if well conducted, will leave the enemy only about one third of his occupied areas, with the remaining two thirds back in our hands; this will be a great defeat for the enemy and a great victory for China. By then the entire enemy-occupied territories will be divided into three categories: the enemy base areas, the base areas for guerrilla warfare and the guerrilla areas contested by both sides. The duration of this stage will be determined by the increase or decrease in the relative strength of the enemy and ourselves and by the changes in the international situation; generally speaking, we should be prepared to hold out for a rather long period and should see to it that we get safely through this difficult stage. This will be a very painful period for China and she will be faced with the two big problems of her economic difficulties and the collaborators' subversive activities. The enemy will violently extend his activities to undermine China's united front, while various collaborators' régimes in all the enemy-occupied areas will merge into a so-called "united government". Within our own ranks, owing to the loss of big cities and the hardships of war, vacillating elements will loudly advocate a theory of compromise, and pessimism will grow seriously. Our tasks will then be: to mobilise the people of the whole country, to unite as one man and carry on the war unswervingly, to broaden and consolidate the united front, to sweep away pessimism and theories of compromise of all shades, to promote hard struggle, and to carry out new wartime policies, in order that we can get through this difficult stage in the journey. In this stage, we

must call upon the whole country resolutely to maintain a unified government, to oppose splits, to methodically improve our military technology, to reform our armed forces, mobilise the entire people and prepare for the counter-offensive. In this stage, the international situation will become even more unfavourable to Japan; although "realism" of the Chamberlain type that acquiesces in "accomplished facts" may raise its voice, yet the main international forces will take a step further in helping China. Japan's threat to South-east Asia and Siberia will become more serious than it was in the past and a new war may even be touched off. On the enemy's side, scores of his divisions bogged down in the mire can hardly be extricated. Wide-spread guerrilla warfare and the people's anti-Japanese movement will wear out this big Japanese force, annihilating it in large numbers on the one hand, and on the other breaking down its spirit by enhancing the homesickness and war-weariness of the troops, as well as their anti-war sentiment. Though it cannot be said that Japan will achieve absolutely nothing in her plunder of China, yet as she lacks funds and is harassed by guerrilla warfare, any quick and sweeping achievements will be impossible. This second stage is the transitional stage in the entire war as well as the most trying period, but it is also the pivot of change. Whether China will become an independent country or sink into a colony is not determined by the retention or loss of the great cities in the first stage but by the degree to which the whole nation exerts itself in the second. If we can persist in the resistance, in the united front and in the protracted war, China will in this stage acquire the power to shed her weakness and become strong. This will be the second of the three acts in the drama of China's War of Resistance. Through the efforts of the entire caste, a most brilliant final act can be excellently performed.

38. The third stage is the stage of our counter-offensive to recover the lost territories. The recovery of China's lost territories will depend mainly upon her own strength, nurtured in the preceding stage and continuing to grow in the present stage. As it is not enough for China to rely on her own strength alone, and as she cannot win without utilising the aid of international forces and the changes within the enemy country,

her international propaganda and diplomacy will become more important. In this stage, our war will be no longer one of strategic defensive, but one of strategic counter-offensive in the form of strategic offensive and we shall no longer operate on strategically interior lines, but shift to strategically exterior lines. The war cannot be said to have been concluded until our army has fought its way to the banks of the Yalu river. The third stage is the last stage of the protracted war, and keeping up the war to the end means going through the entire course of this stage. Our main form of fighting in this stage will still be mobile warfare, but positional warfare will also be raised to an important position. If it is said that positional defence in the first stage could not be regarded as important because of the conditions of that time, then attacks on positions in the third stage will become quite important because of changes in the conditions as well as the requirements of the task. Guerrilla warfare in this stage, unlike the second stage when it was the main form, will again become supplementary to, and strategically co-ordinated with, positional warfare and mobile warfare.

39. Thus, it is obvious that the war is protracted and, as a corollary, ruthless too. The enemy will not be able to gobble up the whole of China, but he will be able to occupy many regions of China for a relatively long period. China will not be able to oust the Japanese speedily, but the greater part of her territory will remain hers. Ultimately the enemy will be defeated and we victorious, but a difficult part of the journey must be traversed.

40. In the course of such a long and ruthless war, the Chinese people will receive excellent steeling. The political parties participating in the war will also be steeled and tested. The united front must be kept up; only by keeping up the united front can the war be kept up; and only by keeping up the united front and the war can final victory be won. Only thus can all difficulties be overcome. The natural logic of war is that after traversing the difficult path of the war we shall come to the smooth road leading to victory.

41. Throughout the three stages changes in the relative strength of the enemy and ourselves will develop along the

following lines. In the first stage the enemy is superior and we are inferior. It must be noted that from the eve of the resistance to the end of this stage the inferiority on our part will change in two different directions. One is a change for the worse. China's original inferiority will be aggravated by the war losses in the first stage, *i.e.* a diminution in territory, population, economic and military strength, and in the number of cultural institutions. They may be diminished to a quite considerable extent towards the end of the first stage, especially in the economic aspect. This fact will be exploited by some people as a basis for their theories of national subjugation and compromise. But the other kind of change, which is a change for the better, must also be noted. This refers to the accumulation of war experience, military and political progress, the mobilisation of the people, cultural development in a new direction, the emergence of guerrilla warfare, the increase of international aid, etc. In the first stage, what moves downwards is the old qualities and quantities of things, manifested mainly in a fall in quantities. What moves upwards is the new qualities and quantities of things, manifested mainly in a rise in qualities. The second kind of change affords the basis for us to keep on fighting and to win the final victory.

42. In the first stage two kinds of changes also occur on the enemy's side. The first is a change for the worse, which manifests itself in hundreds of thousands of casualties, consumption of arms and ammunition, decline of the morale of the troops, discontent of the people at home, shrinkage of trade, an expenditure of over ten thousand million yen, condemnation by world public opinion, etc. This aspect provides another basis for us to keep on fighting and win the final victory. But the second kind of change on the enemy's side, a change for the better, must also be reckoned with. That is, he has extended his territory and increased his population and resources. This point again forms the basis for the view that our War of Resistance is a protracted war and cannot be won quickly; and it will also be exploited by certain people as a basis for theories of national subjugation and compromise. But we must reckon with the transitory and partial character of this change for the better on the enemy's side. An imperialist power on the brink

of collapse, our enemy can only temporarily occupy Chinese territory. The vigorous development of Chinese guerrilla warfare will actually restrict his occupation zone to narrow strips of land. Moreover, the enemy's occupation of Chinese territory has given rise to and sharpened the contradiction between Japan and other foreign countries. Again, as the experience in the three North-eastern provinces shows, for a considerable time this occupation is a matter of capital outlay for Japan and not of reaping profits. All these things constitute yet another basis for us to explode the theories of national subjugation and compromise and to establish the theories of protracted war and final victory.

43. In the second stage, the above-mentioned changes on both sides will continue to develop and, though the exact conditions cannot be foreseen, there will be generally a continuous decline of Japan and a continuous rise of China.¹² For example, Japan's military and financial power will be heavily consumed by China's guerrilla war, her home population will become more discontented, the morale of her troops will decline further, and her international position will become more isolated. In China, there will be greater progress in political, military and cultural respects and in the mobilisation of the people; guerrilla warfare will be further developed; her economy will develop to a certain degree along new lines on the basis of the small industries and extensive agriculture in the interior; international aid will increase gradually and will be quite different from what it is now. The second stage may last quite a long time. During that time a great reversal will occur in the contrast in strength between the enemy and ourselves: China will gradually rise and Japan will gradually decline. Then China will shed her inferiority and Japan will lose her superiority, the two countries reaching first a state of parity and then a state in which the original superior and inferior positions are reversed. After that China will have generally completed her preparations for the strategic counter-offensive and will enter the stage of carrying it out to expel the enemy from the country. It should be repeated here that the change from inferiority to superiority and the completion of preparations for the counter-offensive imply the increase in China's own

strength, the increase of Japan's difficulties and the increase of international aid; the sum total of all these forces will bring about China's superiority and the completion of her preparations for the counter-offensive.

44. On account of the unevenness in China's political and economic development, the strategic counter-offensive of the third stage will not in the initial phase assume a uniform and even pace throughout the country, but will rise in one locality and fall in another. During this stage, as the enemy's efforts to adopt various disruptive measures to break China's united front will not be slackened, the task of internal solidarity in China becomes all the more important, and we must see to it that the strategic counter-offensive is not balked halfway by internal dissensions. In this period the international situation will become very favourable to China. China's task will be to take advantage of this international situation in order to attain her complete liberation and establish an independent democratic state, which means at the same time rendering help to the anti-fascist movement of the world.

45. China's shift from inferiority to parity and then to superiority and Japan's shift from superiority to parity and then to inferiority; China's shift from defensive to stalemate and then to counter-offensive and Japan's shift from offensive to defensive and then to retreat—this is the course of the Sino-Japanese War and its inevitable trend.

46. Thus the questions and answers are: Will China be subjugated? Answer: No, she will not be subjugated and the final victory will be hers. Can China win quickly? Answer: No, she cannot win quickly and the war must be a protracted one. Are these answers correct? I think they are.

47. At this point, the national subjugationists and advocates of the theory of compromise will again rush forward and say: To shift from inferiority to parity China needs a military and economic power equal to Japan's, and to shift from parity to superiority she needs a military and economic power greater than Japan's; but this is impossible, hence the above conclusions are incorrect.

48. This is the so-called theory of "weapons mean everything",¹³ which is a mechanist theory of war, a view arising

from a subjective and one-sided approach to problems. Our view is the opposite; we see not only weapons but also the power of man. Weapons are an important factor in war but not the decisive one; it is man and not material that counts. The contest of forces is not only a contest of military and economic power, but also one of the power and morale of man. Military and economic power must be controlled by man. If the great majority of the Chinese, of the Japanese and of the peoples of the world are on the side of the Anti-Japanese War, can one regard as superiority Japan's military and economic power which is arbitrarily controlled by a few persons? If this is not superiority, then, is it not China, with a relatively inferior military and economic power, that will become superior? There is no doubt that China's military and economic power will gradually increase so long as she persistently carries on the War of Resistance and maintains the united front. Our enemy, on the other hand, will be weakened by the long war as well as by internal and external contradictions, and a reversal will inevitably occur in his military and economic power. Under such conditions, is it not possible for China to emerge superior? Moreover, although at present we cannot openly or to any large measure count as on our side the military and economic power of other countries, does it necessarily follow that we cannot do so even in the future? If Japan's opponents are not confined to China alone, and if in the future there should be one or several countries spending a relatively large amount of their military and economic power in openly making a stand or launching an attack against Japan and in openly helping us, then, will not the superiority be more definitely on our side? As Japan is a small country and her war is retrogressive and barbarous, she will become more and more isolated internationally; as China is a big country and her war is progressive and just, she will enjoy more and more international support. After a long course of development, will not all these factors definitely change the relative position between the enemy and ourselves?

49. The advocates of the theory of a quick victory, however, do not understand that war is a contest of strength, that it is in vain for them to wish to wage strategically decisive battles

to hasten towards the path to liberation before definite changes in the relative strength of the warring parties have taken place. If they put such ideas into practice, they will inevitably run their heads against a brick wall. Or perhaps they are voicing these ideas for idle amusement and are not prepared to put them seriously into practice. But Mr. Reality will finally rush out and throw cold water on these chatterboxes and show them up to be nothing but gasbags who like to get things on the cheap and to have gains without pains. There was, and there still is, such empty talk, though it is not yet prevalent; there will be more of it when the war develops to the stage of stalemate and of counter-offensive. But in the meantime, if at the first stage China should incur a comparatively great loss and if the duration of the second stage is very much prolonged, the theories of national subjugation and compromise will be in great vogue. Therefore our fire should be trained mainly on the theories of national subjugation and compromise and only secondarily on the empty talk about a quick victory.

50. The protractedness of the war is predetermined, but nobody can predict exactly how many months or years the war will take, for this entirely depends upon the degree of change in the relative strength of the enemy and ourselves. Those who wish to shorten the duration of the war have no alternative but to strive to increase our own strength and reduce the enemy's. Specifically speaking, the only course is to strive to win more battles and wear out the enemy's armies; to develop guerrilla warfare so as to reduce the enemy-occupied territories to a minimum; to consolidate and broaden the united front and unite the forces of the whole nation; to build up new armies and develop new war industries; to expedite political, economic and cultural progress; to mobilise the workers, peasants, businessmen, intellectuals and other sections of the people; to disintegrate the enemy troops and to win them over: to engage actively in international propaganda in order to win foreign support; and to win the support of the Japanese people and other oppressed nations. Only when all these things are done can we shorten the duration of the war; there is no short cut or smooth course.

A WAR OF JIG-SAW PATTERN

51. We can affirm that the protracted Anti-Japanese War will make a splendid page unique in the war history of mankind. The "jig-saw" pattern of the war is one of its quite peculiar features, which follows from such contradictory factors as Japan's barbarity and insufficient armed strength and China's progressiveness and extensive territory. There have been other wars of this pattern in history, like Russia's three-year civil war after the October Revolution. But what distinguishes China's war is its peculiar protractedness and its peculiar extensiveness, both of which beat the record in history. Such a jig-saw pattern manifests itself in the following situations.

52. Interior and exterior lines. The Anti-Japanese War as a whole is fought on the interior line; but as far as the relation between the main forces and the guerrilla detachments is concerned, the former are on the interior line while the latter are on the exterior line, forming the spectacle of a pincers attack on the enemy. The same can be said of the relation between the various guerrilla areas. Each guerrilla area regards itself as on the interior line and the other areas as on the exterior lines, and forms with them numerous pincers-like firing lines round the enemy. In the first stage of the war, the regular army operating strategically on the interior line will beat a retreat; but the guerrilla detachments operating strategically on the exterior line will advance in all directions on the enemy's rear in great strides, and advance even more fiercely in the second stage, thereby forming a unique spectacle of both retreat and advance.

53. With and without a rear. It is the main forces that, relying upon the big rear of the country, extend their front to the very line which marks off the enemy's occupied areas. It is the guerrilla detachments that, separated from our big rear, extend the front into the enemy's rear. But in each guerrilla area, there is still a small rear for the guerrilla force upon which the establishment of fluid operational lines depends. Distinguished from these are guerrilla detachments dispatched from each guerrilla area which is also the enemy's rear, to engage in temporary activities; such guerrilla detachments have neither

a rear nor operational lines. "Operations without a rear" are a peculiar feature of the revolutionary war waged in a new era under the conditions of a vast territory, a progressive people, an advanced political party and an advanced army; in this there is nothing to fear but great benefits to reap, and we should not be sceptical about it but advocate it.

54. Encirclement and counter-encirclement. Taking the war as a whole, we are no doubt in the midst of the strategic encirclement of the enemy, because he has adopted strategic offensive and exterior-line operations and we strategic defensive and interior-line operations. This is the first kind of encirclement the enemy imposes on us. As we have, with numerically preponderant forces, adopted a policy for exterior-line operation in campaigns and battles against the enemy forces advancing on us in separate columns from strategically exterior lines, we can place into our encirclement one or several of the separately advancing enemy columns. This is the first kind of counter-encirclement we impose on the enemy. Furthermore, considering the guerrilla base areas in the enemy's rear, each isolated base area is surrounded by the enemy either on three sides, like the north-western region of Shansi, or on four sides, like the Wutai mountain region. This is the second kind of encirclement the enemy imposes on us. But if we look at the interconnections of the various guerrilla base areas as well as the interconnections of these base areas with the fronts of the regular forces, we shall see that we have in turn surrounded a great number of the enemy units; in Shansi for instance, we have encircled the Tatung-Puchow railway on three sides (the east and west flanks and the southern terminus) and the city of Taiyuan on four sides; similar encirclements can also be found in provinces like Hopeh and Shantung. This is the second kind of counter-encirclement we impose on the enemy. Thus the enemy and ourselves each have imposed two kinds of encirclement on the other, resembling in the main a game of *weich'i*:¹⁴ campaigns and battles between us and the enemy are comparable to the capturing of each other's pieces, and the enemy's strongholds (such as Taiyuan) and our guerrilla base areas (such as the Wutai mountains) are comparable to the blank spaces secured on the board. If a game of *weich'i* on a

world-wide scale is taken into account, then there will be yet a third kind of encirclement which we and the enemy impose on each other, namely, the relation between the front of aggression and the front of peace. The enemy encircles countries like China, the Soviet Union, France and Czechoslovakia with the former, while we counter-encircle Germany, Japan and Italy with the latter. But our encirclement is like the hand of Buddha which will be changed into the Mountain of Five Elements lying athwart the entire universe, and the modern monkeys—the fascist aggressors—will finally be entombed beneath it, never to rise again.¹⁵ Therefore, if we can by means of diplomacy bring about the formation of a Pacific anti-Japanese front, with China as one of the strategic units, with the Soviet Union and other countries which may participate in it each also as a strategic unit, and with the Japanese people's movement as another strategic unit, thus forming a world-wide net from which the fascist monkeys can find no escape, our enemy will be doomed. In fact, the day when this world-wide net is on the whole formed is certainly the day for completely overthrowing Japanese imperialism. This is not a joke, but the inevitable trend of the war.

55. The bulk and the bits. It is possible that the territories occupied by the enemy may constitute the major part of China Proper,¹⁶ while the section we keep intact in China Proper constitutes only the lesser part. That is one aspect of the situation. But within that major part, the enemy can, besides the three North-eastern provinces and certain other sections, hold only the big cities, the highways and certain sections on the plains—all of which may rank highest in importance, but, in area and population, constitute only a lesser part of the occupied territory, while the area of widespread guerrilla warfare constitutes the major part. That is another aspect of the situation. If we go beyond the boundaries of China Proper and count in Mongolia, Sinkiang, Tsinghai and Tibet, then, China's unoccupied section would still constitute the major part in area, while the enemy-occupied areas, including the three North-eastern provinces, still constitute the lesser part. That is yet another aspect of the situation.

The section kept intact is of course important, and we should

concentrate great efforts to cultivate it, not only in the political, military and economic aspects, but, what is also important, in the cultural aspect. The enemy has already transformed our cultural centres into cultural backwaters and we must transform the former cultural backwaters into cultural centres. Meanwhile the cultivation of the extensive guerrilla areas in the enemy's rear is also extremely important and we should develop them in various aspects, including the cultural. On the whole, China will turn the bulk of the rural areas into areas of progress and light while the small bits occupied by the enemy, especially the big cities, will temporarily become dark and backward regions.

56. Thus the protracted and extensive Anti-Japanese War is a war of jig-saw pattern in the military, political, economic and cultural aspects—a spectacle in the history of war, a splendid feat of the Chinese nation, a world-shaking achievement. This war will not only affect China and Japan, strongly impelling both to advance, but also affect the world, impelling all nations, first of all the oppressed nations like India, to march forward. Every Chinese should consciously throw himself into this war of a jig-saw pattern, which is the mode of war adopted by the Chinese nation in the struggle for its own liberation and the peculiar mode of war of liberation waged by a big semi-colonial country in the thirties and forties of the twentieth century.

FIGHTING FOR PERMANENT PEACE

57. The protracted nature of China's Anti-Japanese War cannot be separated from the fight for permanent peace for China and the world. In no historical epoch was war ever so near to permanent peace as it is today. For several thousands of years since the emergence of classes, man's life has been filled with wars; nobody knows how many wars each nation has fought, either wars among groups within a nation or wars among groups of nations. In the imperialist epoch of capitalist society, man who has been fighting all the time now wages wars on a particularly extensive scale and with a peculiar ruthlessness. The first great imperialist war of twenty years ago, though unprecedented in history, was not yet the final war. Only the

war which has now begun is near to the final war, that is to say, near to the permanent peace of mankind. At present one third of the world's population has entered the war; just consider: Italy and then Japan on the one hand, and Abyssinia, then Spain and then China on the other. The population of the belligerent countries now amounts to almost 600 million or nearly one third of the total population of the world. The peculiar feature of the present war is its uninterruptedness and its nearness to permanent peace. Why is it uninterrupted? After engaging Abyssinia, Italy engaged Spain, with Germany contributing her share to the fight; then Japan engages China. What next? No doubt Hitler will follow up and engage the great powers. "Fascism is war"¹⁷—this is perfectly correct. There will be no interval between the present war and the great world war it will develop into, and mankind cannot escape the calamity of war. Why do we also say that the present war is near to permanent peace? The present war has resulted from the development of the general crisis of world capitalism, a crisis which, starting with the First World War, is compelling the capitalist countries to enter into a new war, and above all the fascist countries to start on new war adventures. We can foresee that the result of this war will not be the salvation of capitalism, but its approach to collapse. This war will be bigger and more brutal than that of twenty years ago, inevitably involving all nations and dragging on for a very long time, and mankind will suffer greatly. But, owing to the existence of the Soviet Union and the heightened awakening of the peoples of the world, great revolutionary wars will undoubtedly emerge from this war to oppose all counter-revolutionary wars, thus giving this war the character of a war for permanent peace. Even if there should be another warring period after this, it will not be far from permanent world peace. Once man has eliminated capitalism, he will reach the age of permanent peace, and will never again desire war. Neither armies, nor warships, nor military planes, nor poison gas will then be needed. Thereafter man will never know war again. The revolutionary war which has already begun is part of the war for permanent peace. The war between China and Japan, between two countries with a total population of over 500

million, will occupy an important place in this war for permanent peace, and the liberation of the Chinese nation will be the consequence. The liberated new China of the future will be inseparable from the liberated new world of the future. Hence our Anti-Japanese War takes on the character of a fight for permanent peace.

58. Wars in history can be divided into two kinds, just and unjust. All progressive wars are just and all wars impeding progress are unjust. We Communists are opposed to all unjust wars that impede progress, but we are not opposed to progressive, just wars. As for wars of the latter kind, we Communists not only do not oppose them, but will participate actively in them. The First World War, an instance of the wars of the former kind, was fought by both sides in the interest of imperialism, and therefore was firmly opposed by the Communists of the whole world. The way to oppose a war of this kind is to prevent it by all means before it breaks out and, after it has broken out, to oppose war with war, to oppose unjust war with just war, whenever possible. Japan's war is an unjust war impeding progress, which the peoples of the world, including the Japanese people, should oppose and are opposing. In China all sections of the nation, from the people to the government, from the Communist Party to the Kuomintang, have all hoisted the banner of justice and carried on a national revolutionary war against aggression. Our war is sacred, just and progressive and aims at peace. We aim at peace not only in one country but also throughout the world, and we not only aim at temporary peace but at permanent peace. In order to achieve this objective we must wage a life-and-death war, must be prepared to sacrifice anything, and must fight to the last until our aim is achieved. The sacrifice may be great, and the time long, but there already lies clearly before us a new world of permanent peace and permanent light. Our faith in waging war is based upon this struggle for a new China and a new world of permanent peace and permanent light. Fascism and imperialism want to prolong the war indefinitely, but we want to bring it to a conclusion in the not distant future. To attain this end, the great majority of mankind must exert their utmost. The 450 million people of China constitute one quarter of the world's

population; if they can strive together to overthrow Japanese imperialism and create a new China of freedom and equality, their contribution to the struggle for permanent world peace will no doubt be extremely great. This is not a vain hope, for the whole world is approaching this point in the course of its social and economic development and, with the effort of the majority of mankind thrown in, our objective will surely be attained in a few decades.

CONSCIOUS ACTIVITY IN WAR

59. We have so far explained why the war is a protracted one and why the final victory will be China's, dealing on the whole with the questions of "what it is" and "what it is not". Now we shall turn to the questions of "what to do" and "what not to do". How shall we carry on a protracted war and how shall we win the final victory? These are the questions to be answered below. For this purpose we shall explain the following problems in order: conscious activity in war, war and politics, political mobilisation for the War of Resistance, war objective, offence in defence, quick decision in a protracted war, exterior lines within interior lines, initiative, flexibility, planning, mobile warfare, guerrilla warfare, positional warfare, war of annihilation, war of attrition, possibilities of exploiting the enemy's flaws, the problem of decisive engagements in the Anti-Japanese War, and the army and the people as the foundation of victory. Let us start with the problem of conscious activity.

60. When we say we are opposed to the subjective approach to a problem, we mean that we must oppose such ideas as are not based upon or do not correspond with objective facts because, being fancies and falsehoods, they will lead to failure if we act on them. But things are to be done by man; the protracted war and final victory will not take place without human endeavour. For that endeavour there must be people who, on the basis of objective reality, form ideas, arguments or opinions, and bring forward plans, directives, policies, strategies or tactics; only thus can the endeavour succeed. Ideas, etc., are subjective, while endeavours or actions are manifestations of the subjective in the objective, but both indicate the activity

peculiar to human beings. We term such activity "conscious activity", a characteristic distinguishing men from things. All ideas based upon and corresponding with objective facts are correct ideas, and all endeavours or actions based upon correct ideas are correct actions. We must develop such ideas and actions, such conscious activity. As the Anti-Japanese War is waged to drive out imperialism and to transform the old China into a new China, the people throughout China must be mobilised and their conscious activity in resisting Japan developed before this objective can be achieved. If one sits tight and takes no action, there would be only extermination but no protracted war or final victory.

61. Conscious activity is man's characteristic. This characteristic is most strongly manifested in man at war. Victory or defeat in a war is of course decided by the military, political, economic and geographical conditions, by the character of the war and of the international support on both sides, but not by these alone; these alone constitute only the possibility of victory or defeat, and do not in themselves decide the issue. To decide the issue, efforts must be added, efforts in directing and waging the war, *i.e.* man's conscious activity in war.

62. People who direct a war cannot strive for victories beyond the limit allowed by the objective conditions, but within that limit they can and must strive for victories through their conscious activity. The stage of action for these directors of war must be built upon objective conditions, but given this stage as the basis, they can direct the performance of many dramas, full of sound and colour, of power and grandeur. On a given objective material basis, a commander in the Anti-Japanese War should display his power and lead the whole army to crush the nation's enemy, transform our society and state now under aggression and oppression, and create a new China of freedom and equality; this is where our own ability in directing war can and must be exercised. We do not advocate that any of our commanders in the Anti-Japanese War should detach himself from objective conditions and become a rash and reckless hot-head, but we must encourage every one of them to become a brave and wise general. He should possess not only the courage to overwhelm the enemy but the ability to control the changes

and development in an entire war. Swimming in an immense ocean of war, a commander must not only keep himself from sinking but also make sure of reaching the opposite shore with measured strokes. Strategy and tactics as laws for directing the war constitute the art of swimming in the ocean of war.

WAR AND POLITICS

63. "War is the continuation of politics"; in this sense war is politics and war itself is a political action, and there has not been a single war since ancient times that does not bear a political character. The Anti-Japanese War is a revolutionary war waged by the whole Chinese nation, whose victory is inseparable from its political aim, namely, the ousting of Japanese imperialism and the building up of a new China of freedom and equality; and it is inseparable from the over-all policy of persistently carrying on the War of Resistance and maintaining the united front; from the mobilisation of the people of the whole nation; from such political principles as the unity between officers and men, the unity between the army and the people and the disintegration of the enemy forces; from an excellent carrying through of united front policy; from cultural mobilisation; and from the efforts to win the support of international forces, including the people of the enemy's country. In a word, war cannot for a single moment be separated from politics. Any tendency among the anti-Japanese soldiers to belittle politics, to isolate war from politics, and to become advocates of "war is everything", is erroneous and must be corrected.

64. But war has its special characteristics and in this sense it is not identical with politics in general. "War is simply the continuation of politics by other . . . means."¹⁸ When politics has developed to a certain stage beyond which it cannot proceed by the usual means, war breaks out to sweep away the impediments in the way. For instance, the semi-independent status of China has been an impediment to the political development of Japanese imperialism, and so Japan started her war of aggression to sweep away that impediment. What about China? Imperialist oppression has long been an impediment to

her bourgeois-democratic revolution, hence numerous liberation wars have been waged in an attempt to sweep it away. As Japan is now imposing a war on China to block completely the advance of China's revolution, China cannot but wage an Anti-Japanese War with the determination to sweep away the impediment. When the impediment is cleared away, the political aim will be attained, and the war concluded. But if the impediment is not cleared away, the war must continue to run its full course. Thus anyone is bound to fail who desires a compromise before the task of the Anti-Japanese War is fulfilled, because even if for certain reasons a compromise were reached, war would recur all the same and the broad masses of the people, who are sure to rise in protest, would continue the war until its political objective was completely achieved. It can therefore be said that politics are bloodless war while war is the politics of bloodshed.

65. From the special characteristic of war arise special organisations, a special series of methods and a special process. The organisations consist of the armed forces and all other things that accompany them. The methods consist of the strategy and tactics for directing the war. The process consists of the special form of social activity through which the opposing armed forces, for the purpose of defence or attack, adopt tactics and strategy favourable to themselves and unfavourable to the enemy. Hence war experiences are of a special kind. All participants in war must free themselves from ordinary habits and accustom themselves to war before they can win victory.

POLITICAL MOBILISATION FOR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE

66. Such a gigantic national revolutionary war as ours can not succeed without universal and thoroughgoing political mobilisation. It is indeed regrettable that China has already lost a move to the enemy, *i.e.* she did not undertake anti-Japanese political mobilisation before the War of Resistance. Even after the resistance to Japan began, political mobilisation was far from universal, let alone thoroughgoing. News about the war reached the great majority of the people through the medium of the enemy's shelling and bombing from the air.

That also constituted a kind of mobilisation, but it was done by the enemy and not by ourselves. People in remote regions who cannot hear the guns are leading a tranquil life even now. This situation must be changed, otherwise there can be no victory for our life-and-death struggle. We must not again fail to make the move against our enemy; on the contrary, we must fully exploit this move to vanquish him. Such a move is one of the highest significance, in fact a matter of paramount importance, while our inferiority in things like weapons is only secondary. With the common people of the whole country mobilised, we shall create a vast sea of humanity and drown the enemy in it, remedy our shortage in arms and other things, and secure the prerequisites to overcome every difficulty in the war. In order to achieve victory, we must persistently carry on the War of Resistance, maintain the united front, and keep up the protracted war. But none of these can be separated from the mobilisation of the common people. To aim at attaining victory while neglecting political mobilisation means "trying to drive one's chariot south by heading north", a step that would inevitably forfeit victory.

67. What is political mobilisation? First, it means telling the army and the people about the political objective of the war. Every soldier and every civilian should be made to understand why the war must be fought and how it concerns him. The political objective of the Anti-Japanese War is "the ousting of Japanese imperialism and the building up of a new China of freedom and equality"; we must tell all the people and armed forces about this objective before we can bring about a fervent anti-Japanese upsurge and have the hundreds of millions of people unite with one heart and contribute everything to the war effort. Next, it is not enough simply to explain the objective; the steps and policies to attain this objective must also be made clear, that is, there must be a political programme. We have a Ten-Point Programme for Resistance to Japan and Salvation of the Nation and, in addition, a Programme of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction; we should popularise the two programmes and mobilise all the armed forces and all the people to carry them out. Without a precise, specific political programme, we cannot mobilise all the armed

forces and all the people to resist Japan to the end. Next, how to mobilise? By word of mouth, by leaflets and bulletins, by newspapers, books and pamphlets, through theatrical performances and the films, through schools, through mass organisations and through cadres. What has been done so far in the Kuomintang-controlled areas is like a grain afloat on a vast ocean and moreover it has been done in a way ill-adapted to the taste of the people and in a spirit alien to them; this must be effectively rectified. Next, it is not enough to mobilise only once; political mobilisation for the Anti-Japanese War must be done regularly. Our job is not merely to recite our political programme to the people, for nobody would care to listen to such recitations; but we must link it up with the developments in the war and with the life of the soldiers and the people, thereby transforming the political mobilisation for the war into a regular movement. This is a matter of the first magnitude on which victory primarily depends.

THE WAR OBJECTIVE

68. Here we are not referring to the political objective of the war, because we have already defined the political objective of the Anti-Japanese War as "the ousting of Japanese imperialism and the building up of a new China of freedom and equality". We are here referring to the fundamental objective of war as man's politics of bloodshed, as the mutual slaughter of opposing armies. The objective of war is nothing but "to preserve oneself and to annihilate the enemy". (To annihilate the enemy means to disarm him or "to deprive him of his power of resistance", and not to annihilate him completely in a physical sense.) The spear and the shield were used in ancient warfare: the spear was used to attack and annihilate the enemy while the shield was used to defend and preserve oneself. The weapons of today are but a continuation of these two. The bomber, the machine gun, the long-range gun and poison gas develop from the spear, while the air-raid shelter, the steel helmet, concrete defence works and the gas mask, form the shield. The tank is a new weapon combining the functions of the spear and the shield. Attack is the chief means to annihilate

the enemy but defence cannot be dispensed with. To attack is directly to annihilate the enemy but at the same time also to preserve oneself, for, if the enemy is not annihilated, one will be annihilated by him. To defend is directly to preserve oneself but at the same time it is also a means to supplement attack or to prepare to turn to attack. Retreat belongs to the category of defence and is a continuation of defence, while pursuit is a continuation of attack. It should be pointed out that the annihilation of the enemy is the main objective of war, while the preservation of oneself is the secondary one, because it is only by annihilating the enemy in large numbers that one can effectively preserve oneself. Therefore attack as the chief means to annihilate the enemy is primary, while defence, as an auxiliary means to annihilate the enemy or as a means to preserve oneself, is secondary. Although in actual warfare the chief role is sometimes played by defence and at other times by attack, yet if the war is viewed as a whole, attack remains primary.

69. How do we explain our advocacy of heroic sacrifice in war? Does it not contradict "self-preservation"? No, it is not contradictory; sacrifice and self-preservation are opposed to each other and yet complement each other. War is the politics of bloodshed, which exacts a price, sometimes an extremely high price. Partial and temporary sacrifice (non-preservation) is made for the sake of general and permanent preservation. This is precisely the reason why we say that attack, which is basically a means to annihilate the enemy, functions at the same time as a means of self-preservation. This is also the reason why defence must be accompanied by attack and ought not to be pure defence.

70. The objective of war, *i.e.* the preservation of oneself and the annihilation of the enemy, is the essence of war and the basis of all war activities, and all war activities from technical to strategic are filled with this essence. The objective of war is the basic principle of war and all theories and principles relating to technology, tactics, campaign or strategy, cannot in the least be separated from it. What is meant by the principle of marksmanship, "taking cover and exploiting firing power"? The former is for self-preservation while the latter is for the

annihilation of the enemy. From the former arise various methods like utilising the terrain and objects on the ground, making a hopping advance, and spreading out the troops. From the latter arise various methods like clearing the firing range and organising firing networks. As to the storm troops, the containing force and the reserve force in tactical operations, the first is for the annihilation of the enemy, the second for the preservation of oneself, and the third kept in reserve to be used according to circumstances for either of the two purposes—either to reinforce the storm troops or to serve as a pursuit force, both for annihilating the enemy, or to reinforce the containing force or to serve as a covering force, both for preserving oneself. Thus all principles relating to technology, tactics, campaign and strategy as well as all such operations cannot in the least be separated from the war objective which applies to every part of the war from beginning to end.

71. Directors at all levels in the Anti-Japanese War cannot direct the war apart from the various fundamental factors forming contrasts between China and Japan or apart from the objective of this war. The unfolding of these factors in war activities becomes a struggle on each side to preserve itself and to annihilate the other. Our war consists in our striving in every engagement to score victory, big or small, to disarm a section of the enemy, and to inflict losses on a part of the enemy's men and *matériel*. We have to accumulate the results of these partial annihilations into major strategic victories in order to achieve the political objective of ultimately ousting the enemy, defending our motherland and building up a new China.

OFFENCE IN DEFENCE, QUICK DECISIONS IN A PROTRACTED WAR,
AND EXTERIOR LINES WITHIN INTERIOR LINES

72. Now let us study the specific strategic directives for the Anti-Japanese War. We have already said that our strategic directive for the Anti-Japanese War is for a protracted war and, indeed, this is perfectly right. But this is only a general directive, not yet a specific one. How is the protracted war to be actually prosecuted? This is the problem we are going to discuss now. Our answer is: in the first and second stages of the

war, *i.e.* in the stages of the enemy's offensive and his holding operations, our directive should be one for offensive campaigns and battles in a war of strategic defence, for quick decisions in campaigns and battles in a strategically protracted war, and for exterior-line campaigns and battles in strategically interior-line operations. In the third stage, our directive should be one for the strategic counter-offensive.

73. Because Japan is a strong imperialist power and we are a weak semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, she adopts the directive of strategic offensive while we adopt that of strategic defensive. While Japan attempts to adopt a strategy of quick decision, we should consciously adopt a strategy of protracted war. Japan employs scores of her army divisions (now numbering thirty already) whose fighting capacity is quite high, and a part of her navy to encircle and blockade China on both land and sea, and employs her air force to bomb China. Her army has now occupied a long front line stretching from Paotow to Hangchow and her navy has reached Fukien and Kwangtung, carrying on exterior-line operations on a vast scale. We on the other hand are placed in a position of interior-line operation. All this is due to the special feature that the enemy is strong and we are weak. This is one aspect of the situation.

74. But the opposite is true of the other aspect. Although Japan is strong, her armed forces are insufficient. Although China is weak, her territory is vast, her population enormous, and her military forces huge. Here two important consequences follow. First, the enemy, employing a small force against a big country, can occupy only a limited number of the big cities and main highways and certain tracts of the plains. Thus in his occupied territory extensive areas are left ungarrisoned, affording a broad theatre of operation for China's guerrilla war. In China as a whole, even if the enemy manages to occupy the line connecting Canton, Wuhan and Lanchow and the adjacent areas, he can hardly seize regions beyond it, thus providing China with a general rear or central base to carry on the protracted war to the final victory. Secondly, fighting a big force with a small force, the enemy is placed amid the encirclement of the big force. When the enemy attacks us in separate directions, he is placed on strategic exterior lines while we are

placed on strategic interior lines and he is on the strategic offensive while we are on the strategic defensive; it thus looks rather unfavourable for us. However making use of our two strong points, a large territory and a big force, adopting the flexible tactics of mobile warfare instead of positional warfare of dogged defence, we can pitch several divisions against one enemy division, scores of thousands of men against any ten thousand of the enemy, several columns against one enemy column, and we can encircle and launch sudden attacks upon one of the enemy columns from the exterior line of the theatre of war. Thus the enemy's exterior-line positions and attacks in strategic operations cannot but become interior-line positions and defences in campaign and battle operations. Our interior-line positions and defences in strategic operations become exterior-line positions and attacks in campaign and battle operations. This can be done to one of his columns as well as to the rest. Both points mentioned above arise from the special feature that the enemy has a small force and we a big one. Again because the enemy force, though small, is strong (in equipment and the training of officers and men) while our force, though big, is weak (only in equipment and the training of officers and men but not in morale), we should, in campaign and battle operations, not only employ a big force to attack from an exterior line a small force on the interior line, but also adopt the aim of quick decision. To achieve quick decision we should generally attack, not an enemy force holding a position, but one on the move. We should have concentrated beforehand under cover a big force along the route through which the enemy is sure to pass, suddenly descend on him while he is moving, encircle and attack him before he knows what is happening, and conclude the fighting with all speed. If the battle is well fought, we may annihilate the entire enemy force or the greater part or a part of it, and even if the battle is not well fought, we may still inflict heavy casualties. This applies to any and every one of our battles. If each month, to say the least, we can score one sizable victory, a victory comparable to those of Pinghsing pass and Taierhchwang, it would greatly depress the enemy's spirit, heighten our own morale and win us international support. Thus our strategically protracted war

becomes a battle of quick decision in field operations. The enemy's war of strategic quick decision cannot but be changed into a protracted war after his many defeats in campaigns and battles.

75. In a word, the operational directive in battles and campaigns mentioned above is for "exterior-line quick-decision attacks". It is contrary to our strategic directive for "interior-line protracted defence", but it is precisely an indispensable directive for the fulfilment of such a strategic directive. If the directive for campaigns and battles were also for "interior-line protracted defence", as in the initial period of the War of Resistance, it would be utterly ill-adapted to the two conditions that the enemy is small while we are big, and that the enemy is strong while we are weak; we should definitely fail to achieve our strategic objective and to bring about a general protracted war but would be defeated by the enemy. That is why we have always advocated the organisation of a number of large field armies for the whole country, each with a size two, three or four times that of its enemy counterpart, and the adoption of the above directive to engage the enemy in extensive theatres of war. Such a directive can and must be applied to both regular warfare and guerrilla warfare. It is suitable not only for one stage of the war but for the entire course of it. Even in the stage of strategic counter-offensive when we, with our technological improvement, are no longer in the unfavourable situation of fighting an enemy much stronger than ourselves, we still keep on employing numerically preponderant forces to launch attacks of quick decision from exterior lines so as to capture a greater number of enemy soldiers and a larger quantity of spoils than is otherwise possible. For instance, if we employ two, three or four mechanised divisions against one of the enemy's, we can annihilate it with greater certainty. It is a truth embodied in common sense that several hefty fellows together can easily win in a fight against a single man.

76. If we resolutely adopt "exterior-line quick-decision attacks" on a battlefield, we shall not only alter the contrasting situation of strength and weakness, of superiority and inferiority between the enemy and ourselves on the battlefield, but also gradually alter the general situation. Because on the battlefield

we shall be on the offensive and the enemy will be on the defensive; we shall operate with big forces on exterior lines and the enemy will operate with small forces on interior lines; we shall seek quick decisions and the enemy will not possibly be able to succeed in his endeavour to drag on the fight and wait for reinforcements—because of all this, on the enemy's side strength will become weakness and superiority inferiority, while on our side weakness will become strength and inferiority superiority. After many such victorious battles, changes will arise in the general situation between the enemy and ourselves. That is to say, through the cumulative effect of a number of victories of exterior-line quick-decision attacks on the battlefield, we shall gradually strengthen ourselves and weaken the enemy; then the general situation between strength and weakness, between superiority and inferiority will necessarily be affected and changes will take place. By that time, co-ordinating these changes with other conditions of our own and with changes inside the enemy camp and the favourable international situation, we shall turn the general situation first into our parity with the enemy and then into our superiority over him. That will be the time for us to launch the counter-offensive to drive the enemy out of our country.

77. War is a contest of strength, but the original state of strength changes in the course of war. Here the efforts one makes to score more victories and commit fewer errors are the decisive factor. Objective factors make the change possible but it requires correct directives and efforts on the subjective side to turn this possibility into actuality. At that time such efforts become decisive.

INITIATIVE, FLEXIBILITY AND PLANNING

78. The above discussion on exterior-line quick-decision attacks in campaigns and battles centres round attack: exterior-line refers to the sphere of attack and quick decision refers to the duration of attack; thus we term it "an exterior-line quick-decision attack". It is the best directive for a protracted war and it is also the directive for so-called mobile warfare. Yet to carry out this directive, we need initiative, flexibility and planning. Let us now study these three questions.

79. Why should we talk now about the initiative after we have dealt with conscious activity? By conscious activity we mean conscious actions and efforts, a peculiar quality that distinguishes men from things, as manifested most strongly in war; all this has been discussed already. By the initiative we here mean an army's freedom of action as distinct from a state of passivity into which an army may be forced. Freedom of action is the very life of an army and once this freedom is lost, an army faces defeat or annihilation. A soldier is disarmed if he, deprived of his freedom of action, is forced into a passive position. The same can be said of the defeat of an army. For this reason both sides in a war strive to gain the initiative and avoid passivity. We can say that the exterior-line quick-decision attacks, which we have proposed, as well as flexibility and planning in carrying out such attacks, are all for gaining the initiative in order to force the enemy into a passive position and to attain the aim of preserving ourselves and annihilating him. But initiative or passivity is inseparable from superiority or inferiority in fighting strength. And consequently it is also inseparable from correctness or incorrectness in command. In addition, there are also cases in which we can secure our initiative and force the enemy into passivity by taking advantage of his illusions and inadvertence. Let us analyse these points.

80. The initiative is inseparable from superiority in fighting strength, while passivity is inseparable from inferiority in fighting strength. Superiority or inferiority in fighting strength is the objective basis for initiative or passivity. It is natural that the strategic initiative can be better maintained and developed through a strategic offensive, but to have the initiative always and everywhere *i.e.* to have an absolute initiative, is possible only when absolute superiority is matched against absolute inferiority. In a wrestle between a strong, healthy person and an invalid, the former will possess an absolute initiative. If Japan were not riddled with insoluble contradictions, if, for instance, she could dispatch all at once a huge force of from several million to ten million men, if her financial resources were several times what they are, if no opposition had arisen from her own people or from foreign nations, and if she had not

pursued those barbarous policies which have aroused the death-defying struggle of the Chinese people, then she would be able to maintain absolute superiority and to have an absolute initiative always and everywhere. But, in history, while such absolute superiority has often existed at the conclusion of a war or a campaign, it is rarely seen at its beginning. For instance, in the First World War, the Allied and Associated Powers became absolutely superior and Germany absolutely inferior on the eve of Germany's surrender, with the result that Germany was defeated and the Allied and Associated Powers won; this is an example of absolute superiority and inferiority at the conclusion of a war. Again, on the eve of our victory at Taierhchwang, the isolated Japanese forces there were in an absolutely inferior position after bitter fighting while our forces had achieved absolute superiority, with the result that the enemy was defeated and we won; this is an example of absolute superiority and inferiority at the conclusion of a campaign. Wars or campaigns may also be concluded in a situation of relative superiority or parity; in that case the war would result in a compromise and the campaign in a stalemate. But in general, most wars and campaigns end in the victory of one side by virtue of its absolute superiority or the defeat of the other by its absolute inferiority. All this refers to the end, not the initial stage, of a war or a campaign. The outcome of the Sino-Japanese War can be predicted: Japan will be defeated because of her absolute inferiority and China will win because of her absolute superiority; but at present superiority or inferiority on either side is not absolute but relative. Because of the favourable factor that her military, economic and political-organisational power is strong while ours is weak, Japan enjoys superiority over us, thereby laying the basis of her initiative. But owing to the fact that her strength in military and other aspects is not quantitatively great and that there are other unfavourable factors, her superiority is weakened by the contradictions within herself. Upon her invasion of China, her superiority is even further reduced by China's vast territory, enormous population and huge military forces and stubborn nation-wide resistance. Hence, in the situation as a whole, Japan enjoys only relative superiority, and consequently her

initiative, which also becomes relative, can be maintained and exploited only to a limited extent. In China's case, although she is inferior in strength and therefore somewhat passive in strategy, yet she is superior in size of territory, population and army, as also in the morale of her patriotic people and army; this superiority plus other favourable factors mitigates her inferiority in military, economic and other aspects, and changes it into a relative strategic inferiority. Consequently, China becomes less passive and her strategic passivity is only relative. Passivity is nevertheless always disadvantageous and one must try to get out of it by all means. The way to achieve this militarily is to launch resolutely exterior-line quick-decision attacks and to start guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear to secure partial yet overwhelming superiority and initiative over the enemy in numerous campaigns of mobile and guerrilla warfare. It is through such partial superiority and partial initiative in numerous campaigns that we can gradually bring about strategic superiority and initiative and get out of strategic inferiority and passivity. Such is the relationship between initiative and passivity, or superiority and inferiority.

81. From this we can also understand how the initiative or passivity is related to direction. As has been stated above, we can rid ourselves of our relative strategic inferiority and passivity by repeatedly creating through our efforts partial superiority and initiative while repeatedly depriving the enemy of partial superiority and initiative and throwing him into inferiority and passivity. The sum total of these partial things will constitute our strategic superiority and initiative and the enemy's strategic inferiority and passivity. But such a change depends upon correct direction. Why? Because while we strive for superiority and initiative the enemy strives for them too; thus, war is in truth a contest in ability between the commanders of opposing armies in their struggle for superiority and for the initiative on the basis of material conditions like military forces, financial resources, etc. As a result of the contest there will be victory for the one and defeat for the other and, besides the contrasting objective material conditions, the victor inevitably owes his success to correct direction and the vanquished suffers defeat because of incorrect direction. We

admit that the phenomenon of war is more elusive and less certain than any other social phenomenon, in other words, it is more a matter of "probability". Yet war is nothing supernatural, it is one of the things in the world that follow the determined course of their development; hence, Sun Tze's law, "know your enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster",¹⁹ is still a scientific truth. Errors arise from ignorance about oneself and the enemy and owing to the peculiarities of war one often cannot know every thing about oneself and the enemy; hence the uncertainty of war conditions and activities, and hence also errors and defeats. But whatever the war conditions and activities, it is possible to know the general aspects and the essential points. It is possible to reduce errors and to give generally correct direction first through all sorts of reconnaissance and then through intelligent inference and judgment on the part of the commander. Armed with a "generally correct direction" we can score more victories and transform our inferiority into superiority and our passivity into the initiative. This is how the initiative or passivity is related to correct or incorrect direction.

82. That correct or incorrect direction affects the superiority-inferiority and initiative-passivity changes becomes all the more convincing when we look at the historical facts of the defeat of big and strong armies, *i.e.* of the victory of small and weak armies. There have been many such cases in Chinese and foreign history. In China there were the battle of Chengpu between Chin and Ch'u,²⁰ the battle of Chengkao between Ch'u and Han, the battle in which Han Hsin defeated Chao,²¹ the battle of Kunyang between Hsin and Han, the battle of Kwantu between Yuan Shao and Ts'ao Ts'ao, the battle of Chihpi between Wu and Wei, the battle of Yiling between Wu and Shu, the battle of Feishui between Ch'in and Chin, etc., and in foreign countries, most of the battles fought by Napoleon and the civil war after the October Revolution in the Soviet Union—in all those battles victories were won by the small force pitted against the big and by the inferior pitted against the superior. In all these battles the weaker force, matching its own partial superiority and initiative against the enemy's partial inferiority and passivity, defeated one of the

enemy's weak sections in the first battle and then turned on the rest of his forces and smashed them separately, thus transforming its whole position into one of superiority and initiative. The reverse was true of the enemy who originally maintained the superiority and held the initiative: because of his errors and internal contradictions, he may entirely lose his absolute or relative superiority and initiative, with the result that he becomes a general without an army or a king without his kingdom. Thus it can be seen that although superiority or inferiority in fighting strength is in itself an objective basis for the determination of initiative or passivity, yet it does not constitute actual initiative or passivity; a struggle and a contest of ability must be made before actual initiative or passivity can come into existence. In the course of struggle, correct or incorrect command may transform inferiority into superiority or passivity into initiative, and vice versa. The fact that ruling régimes have failed to vanquish revolutionary armies shows that mere superiority in certain respects does not determine initiative, much less final victory. The inferior and passive side can wrestle the initiative and victory from the side possessing superiority and the initiative by securing the necessary conditions through active endeavour in accordance with actual circumstances.

83. Illusions and inadvertence may deprive one of superiority and the initiative. Hence, deliberately to create illusions for the enemy and then spring surprise attacks upon him is a means, and an important means, of achieving superiority and seizing the initiative. What are illusions? "Even the woods and bushes on Mount Pakung look like enemy troops"²²—this is an example of illusion. And "making a noise in the east while attacking in the west" is a way of creating illusions for the enemy. When the people's condition is excellent, so that an information blockade can be enforced, it is often possible, by adopting all kinds of deceptive measures, effectively to drive the enemy into the pitfall of making erroneous judgments and taking erroneous actions, thus depriving him of his superiority and the initiative. What is inadvertence? It means unpreparedness. Without preparedness, superiority is not real superiority and there can be no initiative. Knowing this, an inferior force which is prepared

can often spring surprise attacks on its enemy and defeat a superior force. We say that it is easy to attack an enemy on the move precisely because he is then not on the alert, that is, he is inadvertent. These two things—creating illusions for the enemy and springing surprise attacks on him—are used to make the enemy face the uncertainties of war while securing for ourselves the greatest possible certainty of gaining superiority, the initiative and victory. The prerequisite for the attainment of all this is to have the masses well-organised. It is therefore extremely important to mobilise and arm all the common people who are opposed to the enemy, and to have them carry on widespread raids against the enemy as well as seal off his information and shield our own forces, keeping the enemy in the dark about when and where we will attack him and thus laying the objective basis for his illusions and inadvertence. The Chinese Red Army in the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War, owing largely to the organised and armed masses of the people, often won battles with weak and small forces. A national war should as a matter of logic win greater support from the broad masses of the people than the Agrarian Revolutionary War, but because of historical mistakes²³ the people have not been organised and cannot render service to us at a moment's notice and sometimes they are even made use of by the enemy. Only by resolutely and extensively rallying the whole people can inexhaustible and endless supplies for every item of war requirements be secured. The mobilised people will definitely play a great role in the application of our tactics of defeating the enemy by creating illusions for him and springing attacks on him. We are not Duke Hsiang of Sung and have no use for his stupid scruples about benevolence, righteousness and morality in war.²⁴ In order to win victory we must try our best to seal the eyes and the ears of the enemy, making him blind and deaf, and to create confusion in the minds of the enemy commanders, driving them distracted. All this also concerns the way in which the initiative or passivity is related to direction. This kind of direction is indispensable for defeating Japan.

84. On account of her military strength and her exploitation of our mistakes, past and present, Japan has, in the main, been

on the initiative in the stage of her offensive. But she is beginning to lose this initiative because of a number of factors unfavourable to her and certain mistakes she has committed in the war (which will be discussed in detail later) and also because of the favourable factors on our side. The enemy's defeat at Taierhchwang and his predicament in Shansi are clear proofs. The extensive development of our guerrilla warfare in his rear has driven his garrisons in the occupied territories into a completely passive position. Although he is still carrying on the strategic offensive on his own initiative, his initiative will come to an end when this offensive is concluded. His insufficiency in armed forces and his inability to carry on an offensive indefinitely constitute the first reason why he cannot maintain his initiative. Our offensive in campaigns and guerrilla warfare in his rear, together with other conditions, constitute the second reason why, having reached a certain limit, he cannot but stop his offensive and abandon his initiative. The existence of the Soviet Union and changes in the international situation constitute the third reason. Thus the enemy's initiative is limited and can be shattered. If tactically China can firmly carry out offensives by her main forces in campaigns and battles, vigorously develop guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear, and extensively mobilise the people politically, then her strategic initiative can be gradually established.

85. Let us now discuss flexibility. What is flexibility? It is the concrete realisation of the initiative in fighting; it is the flexible employment of armed forces. The flexible employment of forces is the central task in directing a war, a task most difficult to perform well. Besides organising and training the army and the people, etc., our business in war is to employ troops in action, and all these things are done to win the fight. It is of course difficult to organise and train the army, etc., but it is even more difficult to employ it, especially when the weak is fighting the strong. To handle such a matter requires exceedingly great ability; flexibility in command can be realised only through the discovery of order, light and certainty amidst such circumstances peculiar to war as confusion, darkness and uncertainty.

86. The basic directive for field operations in the Anti-Japanese War is one for exterior-line quick-decision attacks. To carry out this directive one can resort to tactics or methods like dispersion and concentration of forces, separate advance and convergent attack, offensive and defensive, surprise attacks and containment operations, encirclement and outflanking, advance and retreat, etc. To understand these tactics is easy, but flexibly to employ and change them is not easy at all. Here the three crucial links are time, place and man. No victory can be won unless the time, the place and the armed units are well chosen. If an attack on an enemy force on the move is made too early, we would expose ourselves and give the enemy force a chance to get prepared; and if it is made too late, the enemy may have come to a halt and concentrated his forces, and we would have a hard nut to crack. This is the problem of timing. If we fix the point of assault on the enemy's left wing which turns out to be exactly his weak point, we shall easily succeed; but if we fix it on the enemy's right wing, we might be running up against a snag and the attack would produce no result. This is the problem of place. It may be easy to score a victory when a particular unit of our forces is dispatched to undertake a particular task and hard to achieve success when another unit is dispatched instead. This is the problem of man. We should know not only how to employ tactics but how to change them. Attack may be changed into defence and defence into attack; advance may be turned into retreat and retreat into advance; containing forces may be turned into assault forces and assault forces containing forces; and encirclement and outflanking, too, may replace each other; and it is an important task for a flexible command to effect timely and proper changes of tactics according to the conditions of the units and of the terrain, both on the enemy's side and our own. This is true of battle command as well as of campaign and strategic command.

87. The ancients said: "Skilfulness in employing tactics lies with the mind"; this "skilfulness", which we call flexibility, derives from the talent of an intelligent commander. Flexibility does not mean headlong action, which must be prevented. Flexibility is a talent which enables an intelligent commander to adopt timely and appropriate measures after "examining the

signs of the time and sizing up the situation" (the "situation" refers to the enemy's condition and our own, the terrain, etc.) on the basis of objective conditions, *i.e.* a talent that gives one a "skilfulness in employing tactics". On the basis of this "skilfulness in employing tactics" we will, by exterior-line quick-decision attacks, win more victories, alter the superiority-inferiority situation between the enemy and ourselves, achieve our initiative over the enemy, and overwhelm him and smash him until we win the final victory.

88. Now let us come to the question of planning. Because of the peculiar uncertainty of war, it is more difficult to realise planning in war than in other spheres of activity. But as "preparedness ensures success and unpreparedness spells failure", we cannot win a war without planning and making preparations in advance. There is no absolute certainty in war, but this does not preclude a degree of relative certainty. We are more certain of ourselves. Though we are much less certain of the enemy, there are signs for us to observe, threads to trace and sequences of events to ponder. These constitute the so-called degree of relative certainty, affording an objective basis for war planning. Modern technological developments (telegraphy, radio, aeroplanes, automobiles, railways, steamships, etc.) have made war planning more feasible. However, owing to the fact that certainties in a war are rather limited and transient, it is difficult for war planning to be complete or fixed; it moves with the war's movement (or flux or shift) and varies in degree according to the scope of the war. Tactical plans, such as plans for offence or defence operations for a small corps or detachment, often change several times in a single day. A campaign plan or plan of action for a large operational formation can generally last until the conclusion of the campaign, but there are often partial and occasionally complete changes. A strategic plan, being based on the over-all situation of both sides, is more fixed, but applies only in a given strategic stage and must change when the war shifts to a new stage. Fixing and changing plans—tactical plans, campaign plans, strategic plans—in accordance with their respective scope and conditions are crucial links in the direction of a war; they are also the concrete realisation of flexibility in war, or skilfulness in

employing tactics in practice. Commanders of all ranks in the Anti-Japanese War should pay attention to this.

89. On account of the fluidity of war, some people deny fundamentally the relative fixity of a war plan or directive, calling such a plan or directive "mechanical". This view is wrong. As stated in the preceding section, we fully admit that, because war conditions are only relatively certain and the course of the war itself rapidly flows on (or moves or shifts), war plans or directives should be only relatively fixed, and timely changes or modifications must be made in accordance with changes in conditions and the fluidity of war; otherwise we would become mechanists. However, one must not deny the necessity of a relatively fixed war plan or directive for a given period; to deny it means to deny everything, including war itself and the very person who denies it. As both the conditions and actions in war are relatively fixed, relative fixity must also be given to the war plan or directive which accompanies them. For example, since both the fighting conditions in North China and the dispersed operational activities of the Eighth Route Army are relatively fixed within a given stage, it is entirely necessary to accord a relative fixity in that stage to the Eighth Route Army's strategic operational directive which is: "basically guerrilla warfare, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favourable conditions". A campaign directive is applicable for a shorter period than a strategic directive, and a tactical directive is applicable for an even shorter period, but each of them is fixed for a definite time. If this were denied, there would be no way to wage a war and the result would be a complete lack of settled views, a relativism in warfare for which one thing is just as wrong or as right as another. No one denies that even a directive applicable in a given period is itself fluid, otherwise there would not be the abandonment of one directive for another. But this fluidity is a restricted one, *i.e.* a fluidity in military tactics designed to carry out the directive, but not one in the fundamental nature of the directive; in other words, it is a quantitative, not qualitative, fluidity. Within a given period of time, the fundamental nature of the directive will by no means be in a fluid state, and this is what we mean by relative fixity within a given

period. In the great river of the entire war, which is absolutely fluid, there is relative fixity for each specific segment of it—this is our view regarding the fundamental nature of a war plan or directive.

90. Having dealt with strategically interior-line protracted defence and exterior-line quick-decision attacks in campaigns and battles, and having also dealt with initiative, flexibility and planning, we can make some summary remarks. The Anti-Japanese War must be planned. War planning means the concrete application of strategy and tactics; it must be flexible so as to be adaptable to the conditions of fighting. We should always attend to the task of transforming our inferiority into superiority and passivity into the initiative so as to change the position between the enemy and ourselves. All this is to be manifested in our exterior-line quick-decision attacks in campaigns and battles as well as in our strategically interior line protracted war of defence.

MOBILE WARFARE, GUERRILLA WARFARE AND POSITIONAL WARFARE

91. In a strategically protracted interior-line defence, the exterior-line quick-decision attacks in campaigns and battles, which constitute the substance of our war activities, assume the form of mobile warfare. Mobile warfare is that form of exterior-line quick-decision attack in campaigns and battles which is undertaken by regular army corps along an extensive front in a vast theatre of war. At the same time it includes so-called “mobile defence”, conducted on certain necessary occasions to facilitate the prosecution of such attacks; furthermore, it includes attacks on positions and positional defences that play a supplementary role. Its characteristics are: regular army corps, superior forces in campaigns and battles, the offensive and fluidity.

92. China's territory is vast and her forces are immensely numerous, but her troops are inadequately equipped and trained; the enemy's forces, on the other hand, are inadequate in number, but better equipped and trained. To fight the enemy under these circumstances we should beyond all doubt

resort principally to the offensive form of mobile warfare and supplement it with other forms so that the warfare as a whole is mobile. Here we must oppose so-called *flightism* which consists in “retreat without advance” and, at the same time, oppose so-called *desperadoism*, which consists in “advance without retreat”.

93. One of the characteristics of mobile warfare is its fluidity, which not only permits, but requires, a field army to advance and retreat in great strides. But this has nothing in common with Han Fu-ch'u's brand of *flightism*.²⁵ One of the basic demands of war is the annihilation of the enemy, and the other is the preservation of oneself. The aim of preserving oneself is to annihilate the enemy, and to annihilate the enemy is in turn the most effective means of preserving oneself. Therefore mobile warfare can never be used as a pretext by people like Han Fu-ch'u and can never mean only backward movement without forward movement; that kind of “movement” negates the basic offensive character of mobile warfare, and China, in spite of her vastness, would be “moved” out of existence.

94. But the other view, so-called *desperadoism* which advocates “advance without retreat”, is also incorrect. We advocate mobile warfare with exterior-line quick-decision attacks in campaigns and battles; it includes positional warfare, which plays a supplementary role, as well as “mobile defence” and withdrawal, without which mobile warfare cannot be carried out to the full. *Desperadoism* is a kind of military shortsightedness, originating often from the fear of losing territory. A desperado does not know that one of the characteristics of mobile warfare is its fluidity, which not only permits, but requires, a field army to advance and retreat in great strides. On the positive side, in order to draw the enemy into a fight unfavourable to him but favourable to us, we should often engage him when he is on the move and should look for such conditions favourable to ourselves as the advantageousness of the terrain, the vulnerability of the enemy, the presence of inhabitants who can blockade information, and fatigue and inadvertence on the part of the enemy. This means that we should allow the enemy to advance and should not grudge the temporary loss of a part of our territory. For temporary and

partial loss of territory is the price for the recovery and permanent preservation of our entire domain. On the negative side, whenever we are forced into an unfavourable position which endangers fundamentally the preservation of our forces, we should have the courage to retreat in order to preserve our forces and strike the enemy again when new opportunities arise. Ignorant of this, the desperadoes would keep on contesting a single city or a piece of ground even when they are obviously in a definitely unfavourable position; as a result, they not only lose the territory or the city but also fail to preserve their forces. We have always advocated the policy of "luring the enemy to penetrate deep" precisely because this is the most effective military policy for a weak army in strategic defence against a strong army.

95. Mobile warfare is the primary form of fighting in the Anti-Japanese War and guerrilla warfare should be considered secondary. When we say that in the entire war mobile warfare is the principal and guerrilla warfare the supplementary form, we mean that the issue of the war must be mainly decided by regular warfare, especially in its mobile form, while guerrilla warfare cannot assume this chief responsibility. It does not follow, however, that the strategic role of guerrilla warfare in the Anti-Japanese War is unimportant. Its strategic role in the entire war ranks next only to that of mobile warfare, for without its support we could not defeat the enemy. This statement implies that the strategic task for guerrilla warfare is to develop itself into mobile warfare. In the course of the prolonged, ruthless war, guerrilla warfare should not remain its old self but must develop into mobile warfare. Thus the strategic role of guerrilla warfare is twofold: supporting regular warfare and transforming itself into regular warfare. In view of the unprecedented extensiveness and protractedness of the guerrilla warfare in China's Anti-Japanese War, its strategic role should all the more not be underestimated. Guerrilla warfare in China, therefore, has not only its tactical but also its peculiar strategic problems. I have discussed this in my *Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War*. I have already mentioned the forms of fighting in the three strategic stages of the Anti-Japanese War: in the first stage mobile warfare is the

principal form and guerrilla warfare and positional warfare are supplementary forms. In the second stage guerrilla warfare will be raised to the principal position, supplemented by mobile warfare and positional warfare. In the third stage mobile warfare will again be raised to become the principal form, supplemented by positional warfare and guerrilla warfare. But mobile warfare in the third stage will not be undertaken entirely by the original regular forces; a part of it, possibly a quite important part, will be undertaken by the original guerrilla forces, who will by then have been raised from fighting guerrilla war to fighting mobile war. Taking all the three stages into consideration, guerrilla warfare is definitely indispensable in China's Anti-Japanese War. It will make a great chapter, the greatest so far, in the war history of mankind. Therefore it is absolutely necessary to assign at least several hundred thousands out of the millions of China's regular troops to spread all over the enemy-occupied areas to mobilise the armed masses and co-ordinate with them in guerrilla warfare. The regular forces thus assigned should consciously take up this sacred task; they should not think their status lowered because they fight fewer big battles and so cannot for the time being appear as national heroes. One cannot achieve such quick results and appear in such dazzling limelight in guerrilla warfare as in regular warfare, but as "a distant journey tests the strength of a horse and a long task proves the character of a man", guerrilla warfare will demonstrate its enormous power in the long course of the ruthless war; it is indeed a great undertaking. Moreover, a regular force, when dispersed, can conduct guerrilla warfare, and, when reassembled, can resume mobile warfare, just as the Eighth Route Army has been doing. The directive of the Eighth Route Army is: "Basically guerrilla warfare, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favourable conditions." This directive is perfectly correct, while the view of those who oppose it is not.

96. Defensive or offensive positional warfare is generally impracticable under China's present technological conditions, and this is where our weakness manifests itself. Moreover, the enemy is also utilising the vastness of our territory to get round our fortified positions. Hence positional warfare cannot be

employed as an important measure, let alone the principal measure. But in the first and second stages of the war, it is possible and necessary to employ localised positional warfare which lies within the scope of mobile warfare and plays a supplementary role in campaign operations. Semi-positional "mobile defence", for the sake of resisting the enemy at one point after another so as to wear him out and win sufficient time for ourselves, constitutes especially an indispensable part of mobile warfare. China should strive to increase her modern armament so as to carry out fully the task of launching attacks on positions in the stage of the strategic counter-offensive. In this stage positional warfare will undoubtedly play a greater role, for then the enemy will hold fast to his positions, and without powerful attacks on positions in co-ordination with mobile warfare we could not realise our objective of recovering our lost territories. Nevertheless, we should strive to make mobile warfare the principal form of fighting in the third stage. For in a positional war like the one fought in western Europe in the latter period of the First World War, the art of war direction and the mobility of man would be largely nullified. But as the war is fought over vast territories of China and, moreover, as China will remain technologically poor for quite a long time, "not to confine fighting to the trenches" is but a natural consequence. Even during the third stage, although China will be technologically improved, she can hardly surpass her enemy in that respect, and will thus be compelled to strive for a mobile war on a higher level, otherwise she cannot reach the goal of final victory. Thus throughout the Anti-Japanese War, China will not adopt positional warfare as the principal form; for her the chief and important forms will be mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare. In these two forms of warfare, the art of war direction and the mobility of man will be given opportunities for full play—what a piece of good fortune out of our misfortune!

WAR OF ATTRITION AND WAR OF ANNIHILATION

97. We have said before that the essence of war, *i.e.* the objective of war, is to preserve oneself and to annihilate the enemy. But as there are three forms of warfare for achieving

this objective—mobile, positional and guerrilla warfare, differing from one another in effectiveness, there arises the general distinction between a war of attrition and a war of annihilation.

98. We may state in the first place that the Anti-Japanese War is at once a war of attrition and a war of annihilation. Why? Because when the enemy can still exploit his strong points and when he still keeps his strategic superiority and initiative, we cannot effectively and speedily reduce his strength and impair his superiority and initiative without fighting campaigns and battles of annihilation. And, when we still have weak points and have not yet rid ourselves of strategic inferiority and passivity, we cannot, without campaigns or battles of annihilation, win time for improving our internal and international conditions and altering our unfavourable position. Hence a campaign of annihilation is a means to attain the objective of strategic attrition. In this sense, war of annihilation is war of attrition. It is with annihilation as the chief means to attain attrition that China can carry on a protracted war.

99. But a campaign of attrition can also achieve the objective of strategic attrition. Generally speaking, mobile warfare undertakes the task of annihilation, positional warfare, that of attrition, and guerrilla warfare, both; the three are distinguished from one another. On this basis, war of annihilation is to be distinguished from war of attrition. A campaign of attrition is supplementary as well as indispensable to protracted fighting.

100. To achieve the strategic objective of wearing out the enemy on a large scale, China in her defensive stage should, according to both theoretical considerations and actual needs, utilise the element of annihilation which is found mainly in mobile warfare and partly in guerrilla warfare, and supplement that with the element of attrition which is found mainly in positional warfare and partly in guerrilla warfare. In the stage of stalemate she should continue to utilise the elements of annihilation and attrition found in guerrilla and mobile warfare to further wear out the enemy on a large scale. All this is aimed at protracting the war so as gradually to alter the situation between the enemy and ourselves and prepare the conditions for our counter-offensive. During the strategic

counter-offensive, we should continue to wear down the enemy through annihilation so as finally to drive the enemy out.

101. But as a matter of fact, experiences over the last ten months indicate that many and even most of the campaigns in mobile warfare have turned out to be campaigns of attrition, and the effect of annihilation produced by guerrilla warfare has not been raised to the desired degree in certain areas. The good thing about such situations is that at any rate we have not shed our blood in vain because we have worn down the enemy, a fact which has significance for the protracted fighting as well as for our final victory. But the defects are: on the one hand the enemy has not been worn down sufficiently, and on the other our own losses have been quite great and the spoils rather scanty. Although we have to reckon with the objective causes of this situation, namely, with the disparity between the enemy and ourselves in technological conditions and in the training of the troops, it is nevertheless necessary in theory as well as in practice to advocate that our main forces should prosecute vigorously battles of annihilation whenever circumstances are favourable. Although the guerrilla detachments must engage in a pure war of attrition in order to carry out various specific tasks like sabotage and harassing, it is nevertheless necessary to advocate, as well as to prosecute vigorously, operations of annihilation in campaigns and battles whenever circumstances are favourable, so that they can attain the objective of at once inflicting heavy losses on the enemy and getting substantial replenishment for themselves.

102. "Exterior line", "quick decision" and "attacks" in the "exterior-line quick-decision attacks" and "movement" in "mobile warfare" consist, as manifested in the form of fighting, mainly in the employment of encirclement and outflanking tactics; hence the concentration of a superior force. The concentration of force and the employment of encirclement and outflanking tactics are therefore necessary conditions for carrying out mobile warfare or exterior-line quick-decision attacks. All these, however, are aimed at annihilating the enemy.

103. The superiority of the Japanese army lies not only in its armament but also in the training given to its officers and men—its organisation, and such traits as its self-confidence which

comes from its never having been defeated, its superstitious belief in the Mikado as well as in gods and spirits, its pride, its contempt for the Chinese people—these have resulted from years of indoctrination by the Japanese warlords and have become part of the Japanese national tradition. This is the principal reason why we have killed and wounded a great number of enemy troops, but have taken very few prisoners. This point has been underestimated by many people in the past. A long process is required to eliminate these traits from the enemy. We must first of all pay serious attention to this point, and then patiently and methodically work for their elimination along such lines as politics, international propaganda and the Japanese people's movement; and war of annihilation in the military sphere is of course one of the means. Here, pessimists may find a basis for the theory of national subjugation, and despondent military experts a basis for opposing a war of annihilation. But we hold, on the contrary, that this superiority of the Japanese army can be reduced and is already being reduced. The method for reducing it is mainly to win over the Japanese soldiers politically. Instead of hurting their pride, we should understand and humour it and, by giving good treatment to prisoners of war, induce the Japanese soldiers to awaken to the Japanese rulers' anti-popular policy of aggression. On the other hand, we should demonstrate to the Japanese soldiers the indomitable spirit and the heroic and stubborn fighting capacity of the Chinese army and the Chinese people, that is, give them blows through battles of annihilation. In operations, our experience in the last ten months has proved the feasibility of a war of annihilation; the Pinghsing pass and the Taierhchwang campaigns are clear evidence. The morale of the Japanese soldiers is beginning to be shaken—the Japanese soldiers do not understand their own war aims, they have become engulfed in the midst of the surrounding Chinese armies and the Chinese people, and their courage in assault combats has been much lower than that of the Chinese soldiers, etc.—all these objective conditions are favourable to our prosecution of battles of annihilation and will, moreover, develop with each passing day as the war drags on. Considered from the standpoint of undermining the enemy's pride through battles of

annihilation, annihilation operations also constitute one of the conditions for shortening the course of the war and accelerating the emancipation of the Japanese soldiers and the Japanese people. In this world, friendship exists only between one cat and another, not between a cat and a mouse.

104. On the other hand, it must be admitted that for the present we are inferior to the enemy in military technology and training. Thus engagements of the maximum annihilating effect, such as the capture of an entire enemy force or a great part of it, are hard to carry out in most cases, especially in a fight on the plains. Undue demands in this connection, such as are made by the advocates of a quick victory, are not justified. The proper demand of the Anti-Japanese War should be: to wage battles of annihilation wherever possible. On all favourable occasions we are to concentrate a superior force and employ the tactics of encirclement and outflanking in every battle—to encircle a part of the enemy force if not the whole, to capture a part of the encircled force if not the whole, and to inflict heavy casualties upon the part encircled if not to capture it. Whenever the occasion is unfavourable to battles of annihilation we should carry out battles of attrition. In the former, the principle should be the concentration of forces, and in the latter the dispersion of them. As to the relationship of commands in a campaign, the principle of centralised command applies in the former, and the principle of decentralised command applies in the latter. These are the basic directives for field operations in the Anti-Japanese War.

POSSIBILITIES OF EXPLOITING THE ENEMY'S FLAWS

105. Even in the enemy's own command a basis can be found for the belief that it is possible to defeat him. No infallible general has ever existed in history, and the enemy makes mistakes just as we cannot always avoid making them, so it is possible for us to exploit his flaws. In respect of strategy and campaigns, the enemy has already committed numerous mistakes in the ten months of his war of aggression. Among these there are five major ones. First, piecemeal reinforcement. This is due to the enemy's underestimation of China and also

due to the insufficiency of his armed forces. The enemy has always belittled us; after grabbing the four North-eastern provinces without any cost, he seized eastern Hopeh and northern Chahar—these may all be considered his moves of strategic reconnaissance. The conclusion he drew from them was: the Chinese nation is a heap of loose sand. Thus, thinking that China would crumble at a single blow, he mapped out a plan of "quick decision" and attempted to scare us into a rout with a very small force. He did not expect to find such great unity and immense power of resistance as China has shown during the past ten months, because he had forgotten that China is already in a progressive epoch and that in China there already exist an advanced political party, an advanced army and an advanced people. Having met with failure, he began to increase his force piecemeal from about a dozen to thirty divisions. If he wants to continue his advance he will have to increase this number further. Yet owing to his antagonism to the Soviet Union as well as his inherent deficiency in man-power and finance, there cannot but be a definite limit to the number of men he can dispatch to China and the point of attack he can finally reach. Secondly, dispersion of his main forces. Before the Taierhchwang campaign the enemy forces were on the whole evenly divided between North and Central China, and within each area again the forces were evenly distributed. For instance, in North China his forces were evenly distributed along the Tientsin-Pukow, the Peiping-Hankow and the Tatung-Puchow railways and, with the casualties suffered along each of these routes and the garrison forces required for the territories under his occupation, he had no forces left for further advance. The mistake can be said to have been temporarily corrected only after the Taierhchwang defeat, when the enemy reviewed the lessons he had learnt thus far and concentrated his main forces in the direction of Hsuchow. Thirdly, lack of strategic co-ordination. There is on the whole co-ordination within each of his two groups of armed units, the one in North China and the other in Central China, but there is a glaring lack of co-ordination between the two. When the forces in the southern section of the Tientsin-Pukow railway were attacking Siaopangpu, those in the north stood still, and

when those in the north were attacking Taierhchwang, those in the south stood still. When the enemy had suffered reverses at both places, the Minister of War came to inspect the forces and the Chief of General Staff came to assume the command, and it seemed that a temporary co-ordination had been achieved. However, within the landlord-bourgeois class and the group of warlords in Japan there are serious contradictions which are growing, and the lack of military co-ordination is but one of their concrete manifestations. Fourthly, missing strategic opportunities. This was glaringly manifested in the enemy's halt after the occupation of Nanking as well as of Taiyuan, chiefly because of his insufficient strength, his lack of troops for strategic pursuit. Fifthly, frequent encirclements but little annihilation. Before the Taierhchwang campaign, in the campaigns at Shanghai, Nanking, Tsangchow, Paoting, Nankow, Sinkow and Linfen, the enemy force broke the Chinese defences many times but took few prisoners, a fact which shows the stupidity of his command. These five defects—piecemeal reinforcements, dispersion of his main forces, lack of strategic co-ordination, missing of opportunities, and frequent encirclements but little annihilation—were characteristic of the incompetence of the Japanese command before the Taierhchwang campaign. Though there have been improvements since then, he can hardly avoid repeating such mistakes in consequence of factors like the insufficiency of his forces and his internal contradictions. Moreover, when the enemy gains at one point he loses at another. For instance, when he shifted his forces from North China and concentrated them at Hsuehchow, a great vacuum appeared in his occupied territories in North China, affording guerrilla warfare an opportunity for free development. The above were the mistakes committed by the enemy himself, not induced by us. On our part, we can deliberately cause the enemy to commit mistakes, that is, create illusions for the enemy through our intelligent and effective actions, such as making a noise in the east while attacking in the west under cover of the organised masses, thereby deceiving him into our designated field; this possibility has already been discussed. All this indicates that some of the bases of our victory can be found in the enemy's command

itself. It is true that we should not consider this an important basis for our strategic planning; on the contrary, the only reliable way of doing things is to base our planning rather on the presumption that the enemy will commit very few mistakes. Besides, while we can exploit the enemy's flaws, the enemy can just as well exploit ours; hence it is also the duty of our command to allow as few flaws as possible for the enemy to exploit. But the enemy's errors in command, which have occurred once and will occur yet again and can moreover be made to occur through our endeavour, must all be exploited by us, and all generals in the Anti-Japanese War should seize upon them by every means. However, although the enemy's strategic and campaign commands are defective in many respects, his command in battle, *i.e.* in the combat tactics of detachments and small corps, has quite a few points of excellence; these we should learn from him.

THE PROBLEM OF DECISIVE ENGAGEMENTS IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR

106. The problem of decisive engagements in the Anti-Japanese War should be divided into three aspects: to fight resolutely a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle when victory is certain; to avoid a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle when victory is uncertain; and to avoid absolutely a strategic decisive engagement which stakes the destiny of the nation. The characteristics that distinguish the Anti-Japanese War from other wars reveal themselves again in the problem of decisive engagements. In the first and second stages of the war, as the enemy is strong and we are weak, he will find it necessary to induce us to concentrate all our main forces for decisive engagements. But we find it necessary to do the opposite: we will concentrate a superior force under favourable conditions to fight a decisive battle or campaign only when victory is certain, such as the battles at Pinghsing pass, Taierhchwang and other places; we will avoid decisive engagements under unfavourable conditions when victory is uncertain, a directive we adopted in the battles at Changteh,²⁶ and other places. As for a decisive strategic engagement

staking the destiny of the nation, we will not undertake it at all, as witness our recent withdrawal from Hsuechow. Thus we have frustrated the enemy's plan for a quick decision and forced him into a protracted war with us. Such directives would be impracticable in a country with a small territory, and could hardly be carried out in a country which was politically too backward. As ours is a big country in an era of progress, they are practicable. If strategic decisive engagements are avoided—"as long as the green mountains are there, one shouldn't worry about firewood"—though certain parts of our territory may be lost, we shall still have plenty of room for manoeuvre, and can promote as well as await domestic progress, international support and the enemy's internal disintegration; this is the best policy for us in the Anti-Japanese War. If we took our cue from the impetuous advocates of a quick victory who, unable to endure the difficult course of a protracted war and anxious for a quick victory, clamour for strategic decisive engagements the moment any slight favourable turn appears in the situation, the entire War of Resistance would suffer immeasurably, the protracted war would receive its death blow, and we would fall plump into the enemy's deadly trap; it is certainly the worst policy imaginable. It is beyond doubt that the refusal to fight decisive engagements means abandonment of territory, and we must have the courage to abandon it when (and only when) conditions require us to do so. At such moments we should not in the least grudge the loss. This is the correct policy of bartering territory for time. In history, Russia made a courageous retreat to avoid a decisive engagement and then defeated Napoleon—the terror of those times. China should now do exactly the same.

107. But shouldn't we mind being denounced as practitioners of "non-resistance"? No, we shouldn't. Non-resistance means fundamental rejection of war and compromise with the enemy, which is not only culpable but absolutely impermissible. But while we are resolutely fighting a War of Resistance, it is also absolutely necessary for us to avoid the enemy's deadly trap and prevent our main forces from being annihilated by him at one blow in order to persist in the War of Resistance, in short, to avoid national subjugation. Scepticism in this respect reflects

short-sightedness on the problem of war, and will lead people to join the company of national subjugationists. We have criticised so-called *desperadoism* which consists in "advance without retreat" precisely because such a doctrine, if it became prevalent, could in the end render us unable to continue the War of Resistance and lead us ultimately to national subjugation.

108. We are for decisive engagements under all favourable circumstances, whether in battles or in major or minor campaigns, and no passivity on this question should be tolerated. Only by such decisive engagements can we achieve our objective of annihilating and wearing down the enemy, and every soldier in the Anti-Japanese War should resolutely take part in them. For this purpose partial and considerable sacrifice is necessary; to avoid any sacrifice whatsoever is the view of cowards and Japanophobes, which must be resolutely combated. The execution of such practitioners of *flightism* as Li Fu-ying and Han Fu-ch'u was justified. To advocate the spirit and practice of courageous sacrifice and heroic advance in war is something absolutely necessary in correct war planning, and is inseparable from our protracted war and final victory. We have severely condemned *flightism* which consists in "retreat without advance", and have supported a strict enforcement of discipline, because only through brave and decisive engagements that are correctly planned can we vanquish the powerful enemy; *flightism*, on the contrary, gives direct support to the theory of national subjugation.

109. Is it not self-contradictory to fight heroically first and abandon territory afterwards? Will not the blood of heroic fighters then be shed in vain? This is an incorrect way to put a question. One eats first and then relieves oneself; does one eat in vain? One sleeps first and then gets up; does one sleep in vain? Should questions be put in such a way? I think not. To keep on eating, to keep on sleeping and to keep on fighting heroically all the way to the Yalu river are all illusions born of subjectivism and formalism and do not exist in real life. Everybody knows that in our bloody combats to gain time and to prepare for the counter-offensive, though we can still hardly avoid abandoning certain parts of our territory, we have gained

time, realised our objective of annihilating and wearing down the enemy, obtained fighting experience, aroused hitherto inactive people and raised our international position. Has our blood been shed in vain? Not at all. Abandonment of territory is aimed at preserving our military forces and also precisely at preserving our territory, because if, instead of abandoning a part of our territory under unfavourable conditions, we blindly waged a decisive battle without any chance of victory, the result would be the loss of our military power, which would inevitably be followed by the loss of our entire territory, and the recovery of the territory already lost would become even more out of the question. A capitalist must have capital for his business, and he would not be a capitalist any longer if he went completely bankrupt. Even a gambler needs money to gamble with, and if he stakes all he has on a single throw of the dice and loses it through bad luck, he will not be able to gamble again. The development of things is full of twists and turns and does not go in a straight line; it is the same with war, and only formalists cannot understand this truth.

110. I think the same can be said of decisive engagements even in the stage of the strategic counter-offensive. Though by that time the enemy will be in an inferior position while we are in a superior position, the principle of "taking up favourable decisive engagements and avoiding unfavourable ones" can still be applied, and remains applicable until we fight to the Yalu river. In this way we can maintain our initiative from beginning to end, and unmoved by all the enemy's "challenges" and other people's "provocative schemes", we shall leave them unanswered and ignore them. In the Anti-Japanese War only generals with this kind of firmness can be considered courageous and wise commanders. This cannot be said of those who would "jump at a touch". In the first stage, when we are to a certain extent in a strategically passive position, we should try to maintain our initiative in all campaigns, and so should we do throughout the stages that follow. We are advocates of the theories of a protracted war and a final victory and, unlike reckless gamblers, do not advocate the theory of staking everything on a single throw of the dice.

THE ARMY AND THE PEOPLE ARE THE
FOUNDATION OF VICTORY

111. Japan's imperialist nature means that confronted with a revolutionary China, she will never relax aggression and pressure. If China did not resist, Japan would occupy all of China at her leisure without firing a single shot—witness the loss of the four provinces in the North-east. It is a law of necessity that when China resists, Japan will exert pressure on that force of resistance until her pressure fails to overcome it. The Japanese landlord-bourgeois class has great ambitions: in order to invade South-east Asia to the south and Siberia to the north, it has adopted the policy of a break-through at the centre by first attacking China. Those who think that Japan would be content with the occupation of North China and the provinces of Kiangsu and Chekiang completely fail to see that imperialist Japan, which has developed to a new stage and is on the brink of death, is quite different from Japan in past history. When we say that there is a definite limit both to the number of men Japan can dispatch to China and to the point of attack she can reach, we mean the following: Japan, to launch attacks in other directions as well as to defend herself against her other enemies, can, on the basis of her strength, employ only a given amount of her forces to penetrate into China to the limit she can reach; China, on the other hand, has shown her progress and offered stubborn resistance and one cannot imagine China not offering resistance to Japan's fierce attacks. Japan cannot occupy the whole of China, but in all areas her forces can reach, she will spare no effort to suppress China's resistance until she herself collapses in consequence of an immediate crisis arising out of the internal and external conditions. There are only two outlets for Japan's domestic politics: either that her entire ruling class collapses rapidly, with political power transferred to the people and the war thereby concluded—a possibility which does not exist at the moment; or that her landlord-bourgeois class becomes increasingly more fascist and keeps up the war until its final collapse—the very road along which Japan is now travelling. There is no third road. Those who hope that the moderate group among the

Japanese bourgeoisie will come out to stop the war are only entertaining illusions. For many years the state of affairs in Japan's practical politics has been that the moderate group has already become the captive of the landlords and the financial magnates. Once Japan has started her attack on China, if China's resistance has not yet dealt her a fatal blow, and if Japan still has sufficient strength, she will definitely attack South-east Asia or Siberia, or even both. She will play this hand as soon as war breaks out in Europe: the rulers of Japan have made vast plans with everything nicely calculated to their own satisfaction. Of course, on account of the strength of the Soviet Union and the serious weakening of herself in the war with China, Japan may be forced to abandon her original plan of invading Siberia and adopt towards the Soviet Union a fundamentally defensive position. But in that case she will not relax her aggression against China but intensify it, because by then there will be only one way left, *i.e.* to gobble up the weak. By that time China's task of persisting in the War of Resistance, in the united front and in the protracted war will have become all the more serious and all the more must she keep up her efforts without slackening.

112. Under such circumstances the chief condition for China's victory over Japan is that in her nation-wide solidarity and in other respects too she has made ten times or even a hundred times greater progress than in the past. China is already in an era of progress and has also achieved considerable solidarity, though it is still far from sufficient. That Japan has occupied such an extensive area is due as much to her strength as to our weakness, a weakness which is entirely the cumulative effect of various historical errors in the last hundred years, especially in the last ten years, errors which have restricted the factors of progress to what they are today. It is impossible to vanquish such a strong enemy unless we make extensive efforts for a long time. We have yet to exert ourselves along many lines, but I am going to deal only with the two most fundamental aspects: the progress of the army and the progress of the people.

113. The reform of our military system is inseparable from its modernisation, or the improvement of its technological conditions, without which we cannot chase the enemy to the other

side of the Yalu river. In the employment of troops we need progressive and flexible strategy and tactics, without which we cannot win victory. The basis of an army, however, is formed by the soldiers; without instilling a progressive political spirit into the minds of the troops and without progressive political activities to effect such instilling, genuine unity between officers and men cannot be attained, their enthusiasm for the War of Resistance cannot be aroused to its utmost, and all technological facilities and tactics will be deprived of the best foundation for developing their proper efficiency. When we say that Japan will be finally defeated despite her technological superiority, we mean that besides the blows we deal her through annihilation and attrition, the morale of her army will be inevitably sapped by our blows, and that her soldiers and their weapons are not well integrated. Our case is the opposite: our officers and men are agreed on the political objective of the Anti-Japanese War. This unity affords the foundation for the political work among all anti-Japanese troops. A certain measure of democracy should be put into practice in the army, chiefly the abolition of the feudal practices of bullying and beating soldiers and the sharing of amenities and hardships among officers and men. Once this is carried out, the aim of uniting officers with men will be attained, the army's fighting capacity will be greatly increased, and then one need not worry about whether the long, ruthless war can be kept up.

114. The deepest source of the immense power of war lies in the masses of the people. Japan dares to bully us mainly because China's masses are not organised. When this defect is remedied, the Japanese invaders will be confronted with the hundreds of millions of our people standing upright who, by a mere raising of their voice, can terrify the enemy; like a mad bull rushing into a conflagration, the invaders will inevitably be roasted to death. On our part, the army must have an uninterrupted flow of reinforcements; recruiting of men through "impressment" and "buying substitutes"²⁷, as is now being rashly done by the lower governments, must be forbidden at once, and be replaced by a broad and ardent political mobilisation, which will render it easy to get several million people to join the armed forces. Our war finance is at present extremely difficult, but

with the masses mobilised, it will prove no problem at all. Is it logical that a country so large and populous as China should find itself financially exhausted? The army must be at one with the people and be regarded by the people as their own: then that army will be invincible throughout the world, and will find a single imperialist power like Japan rather small game.

115. Many people think that it is wrong methods that make strained relations between officers and men and between the army and the people, but I have often said that it is rather a problem of basic attitude (or basic principle); which should be one of respect for the soldiers and for the people. From this attitude ensue policies, methods and approaches; departing from it, policies, methods and approaches become erroneous, and relations between the officers and men and between the army and the people cannot be at all satisfactory. The three major principles for the army's political work are: first, unity between officers and men; second, unity between the army and the people; and third, the disintegration of the enemy force. To implement these principles effectively, we must start from the basic attitude of respecting the soldiers, the people and the personal dignity of war prisoners who have already laid down their arms. Those are wrong who regard the problem not as one of basic attitude but one of technique, and they must have their view corrected.

116. At a moment when the defence of Wuhan and other places has become an urgent task, it is an extremely serious matter to call forth the activity of the whole army and the whole people to support the war. There is no doubt that the task of defending Wuhan and other places should be seriously put forward and carried out. But whether these places can definitely be defended does not depend on our wishes but on specific conditions. The political mobilisation of the whole army and the whole people for the struggle is one of the most important specific conditions. If efforts are not made to secure all the necessary conditions or if only one of such conditions is missing, then the disaster in Nanking and other places will inevitably be repeated. China's Madrid will be any place where the conditions are present under which Madrid was

successfully defended. There was in the past no Madrid in China, and we should strive to have a few Madrids from now on, but this all depends upon the conditions we can create. The most fundamental among these conditions is a broad political mobilisation of the whole army and the whole people.

117. In all our work we must resolutely uphold the general directive of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. For only this directive can enable us to persist in the War of Resistance or the war of protraction, to bring about a universal and profound improvement in the relationship between officers and men and between the army and the people, to call forth fully the activeness of the whole army and the whole people to defend all our territories that remain intact and fight for the recovery of those already lost, and to win the final victory.

118. The problem of the political mobilisation of the army and the people is indeed of the utmost importance. We dwell upon it at the risk of repetition precisely because we cannot win the war without political mobilisation. Of course there are many other necessary conditions without which no victory is possible, but political mobilisation is the most fundamental condition for winning the war. The Anti-Japanese National United Front is a united front of the whole army and the whole people, it is by no means merely a united front of the headquarters and members of a number of political parties; the mobilisation of the whole army and the whole people to take part in the united front is our sole basic objective in initiating the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

CONCLUSION

119. What are our conclusions? They are: "Under what conditions can the Chinese people defeat and exhaust the forces of Japan? Three conditions will guarantee our success: first, the achievement of the national united front against Japanese imperialism in China; second, the formation of a world anti-Japanese united front; third, revolutionary action by the people in Japan and the oppressed peoples at present suffering under Japanese imperialism. Of these, the central necessity is the union of the Chinese people themselves." "How long would

such a war last? That depends mainly on the strength of China's anti-Japanese united front, together with many conditioning factors in China and Japan. . . ." "If these conditions are not realised soon enough, the war will be very long, but in the end Japan will be defeated just the same, only the sacrifices will be extensive and it will be a painful period for the whole world." "The strategy should be that of employing our main forces in mobile warfare, over an extended, shifting and indefinite front: a strategy depending for success on a high degree of mobility. . . ." "Besides the regular Chinese troops we should create great numbers of guerrilla detachments among the peasantry." "A point will be reached where it will become more and more possible to engage Japan's armies on a basis of positional warfare, for, as the war progresses, the technical equipment of the anti-Japanese forces will greatly improve. . . . Japan's economy will crack under the strain of a long, expensive occupation of China and the morale of her forces will break under the test of a war of innumerable but indecisive battles. The great reservoirs of human material in the revolutionary Chinese people will still be pouring forth into our front lines men who are ready to fight for their freedom." "All these and other factors will condition the war and will enable us to make the final and decisive attacks on Japan's fortifications and strategic bases and to drive Japan's army of occupation from China." (*Interview with Edgar Snow*, July 1936.) "A new stage now begins in China's political situation. . . . The central task of the present stage is: mobilise all forces to win victory in the armed resistance." "The pivot for winning victory in the armed resistance lies in developing the resistance already started into a total resistance by the whole nation. Only through such a resistance can final victory be won." "Because there are still serious defects in the present resistance, many disadvantages may arise in the future course of the resistance, such as setbacks, retreats, internal splits and betrayals, temporary and partial compromises. Hence we must realise that this armed resistance is going to be a bitter protracted war. But we believe that the resistance already started will, through the effort of our Party and of the entire people, definitely break through all obstacles to continue its advance and development." (*Resolutions on the*

Current Situation and the Tasks of the Party, adopted by the Central Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party in August 1937.) These are our conclusions. The national subjugationists regard the enemy as a god and ourselves as trash, while the advocates of a quick victory regard ourselves as a god and the enemy as trash: both are wrong. Our view is different from both; the Anti-Japanese War is a protracted war, and the final victory will belong to China—this is our conclusion.

120. My lecture ends here. The great Anti-Japanese War is in progress, and many people are looking for a summary of our experiences to help us to win a complete victory. What I have dealt with is only the general experiences in the past ten months, and it may perhaps pass for a kind of summary. The problem of the protracted war demands the attention of broad sections of the people and should stimulate them to discussion; what I have given is only a sketch, and I hope you will study and discuss it as well as amend and amplify it.

May 1938.

THE ROLE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE NATIONAL WAR

This is a report to the Central Committee's plenary session (the sixth since the Party's Sixth National Congress). The meeting was of great importance because it endorsed the line of the Party's Central Political Bureau headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung. In this report the question of "the role of the Chinese Communist Party in the national war" was raised in order to enable all comrades in the Party to understand clearly and shoulder conscientiously the Party's great historical responsibility of leading the Anti-Japanese War. The plenary session laid down the line of persisting in the anti-Japanese united front and pointed out that there should be both unity and struggle within the united front and that the proposition of "everything through the united front" did not suit Chinese conditions. Thus it criticised the mistake of accommodationism on the question of the united front. Comrade Mao referred to this in *The Question of Independence and Autonomy Within the United Front* (this volume), which was part of his concluding statement at the session. The plenary session also affirmed that it was extremely important for the Party to organise the people's anti-Japanese armed struggle and decided that the Party's main fields of work were in the war areas and the enemy's rear. Thus it criticised such erroneous ideas as pinning hopes on the Kuomintang troops for a victory over the Japanese invaders and entrusting the people's fate to the legal struggles under the Kuomintang reactionary rule. Comrade Mao referred to this in *Problems of War and Strategy* (this volume), which formed another part of his concluding statement at the session.

Comrades, we have a bright future before us; we must defeat Japanese imperialism and build up a new China, and we can certainly attain these objectives. But between the present time and this bright future lies a course beset with difficulties. The Chinese Communist Party and the people throughout the country, fighting for a new China full of light, must methodically carry on the struggle against the Japanese invaders, who can be defeated only through a long-term war. We have already said a good deal about various problems relating to the war. We have reviewed our experiences since the War of Resistance, appraised the present situation, defined the urgent tasks for the whole nation, explained the reasons and the methods of supporting a long-term war through a long-term Anti-Japanese

National United Front, and analysed the international situation. Then what other problems are there? Comrades, there is yet one more problem, namely, what role the Chinese Communist Party should play in the national war, or how Communists should understand their position and strengthen and unite themselves so that they can lead this war to victory and not to defeat.

PATRIOTISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

Can a Communist, who is an internationalist, be at the same time a patriot? We hold that he not only can but also ought to be one. The specific content of patriotism is determined by historical conditions. There is the "patriotism" of the Japanese aggressors and of Hitler, and there is our own patriotism. Communists must resolutely oppose the so-called "patriotism" of the Japanese aggressors and of Hitler. The Communists in Japan and Germany are all defeatists in the wars of their respective countries. It suits the interests of the Japanese and German people to ensure by every means that the Japanese aggressors and Hitler are defeated in their wars, and the more complete the defeat, the better. The Japanese and German Communists should do this and they are doing this. For the wars launched by the Japanese aggressors and Hitler are, besides doing harm to the people of the world, doing harm to their own people as well. China's case is different because she is a victim of aggression. The Chinese Communists must therefore combine patriotism with internationalism. We are at once patriots and internationalists, and our slogan is to fight in defence of the motherland against the aggressors. For us defeatism is a crime, and to win the War of Resistance is a duty that we cannot shirk. For only by fighting in defence of the motherland can we defeat the aggressors and achieve national liberation. And only by achieving national liberation will it be possible for the proletariat and the toiling masses to achieve their own liberation. The victory of China and the defeat of the imperialists invading China will also be a help to the people of foreign countries. Thus patriotism is simply an application of internationalism in the war of national liberation. For this

reason every Communist must put forth all his activity, march valiantly and resolutely to the front of the war of national liberation, and train his gun on the Japanese aggressors. For this reason our Party, since the Incident of September 18, has issued the call for a war of national self-defence to resist the Japanese aggressors, and later on proposed an Anti-Japanese National United Front, ordered the reorganisation of the Red Army as a part of the Anti-Japanese National Revolutionary Army and its march to the front, and instructed its members to go to the forefront of the Anti-Japanese War and be ready to defend the motherland to the last drop of their blood. All these patriotic actions are proper; they are the application of internationalism in China and do not in any way run counter to it. Only people who are politically muddle-headed or who have ulterior motives will be so foolish as to call this a mistake or an abandonment of internationalism.

THE EXEMPLARY ROLE OF THE COMMUNISTS IN THE NATIONAL WAR

For the reasons stated above, Communists should in the national war show a high degree of activity, and show it in various concrete ways; in other words, Communists should play the exemplary role of the vanguard in all spheres of work. Our war is waged under adverse circumstances. The lack of national consciousness and national self-respect and self-confidence on the part of the broad masses of people, the unorganised state of the majority of the people, the insufficient military strength, the backward economy, the undemocratic political system, the presence of degeneration and pessimism, the lack of unity and solidarity within the united front, etc., all combine to create the adverse circumstances. Consequently, Communists have consciously to shoulder the great responsibility of uniting the whole nation in order to put an end to all undesirable phenomena. Here the Communists' exemplary role as the vanguard is of extreme importance. Communists in the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army should set an example in fighting valiantly, carrying out orders, observing discipline, performing political work and upholding internal

unity and solidarity. When they come into contact with friendly parties and armies, Communists should set an example in carrying out the tasks of the War of Resistance by adhering firmly to the stand of solidarity for resistance to Japan and to the programme of the united front; they should set an example in establishing friendly relations between various parties in the united front by keeping all their promises and taking resolute actions, by modestly and sincerely discussing problems and working together with friendly parties and armies. Communists engaged in government work should be exemplary in being absolutely incorruptible, free from favouritism in making appointments, and doing much work but taking little reward. Communists engaged in mass movements should act as the friends of the masses and not as their bosses; they should be indefatigable teachers and not bureaucratic politicians. At no time and in no circumstances should a Communist place personal interests first, but should instead subordinate his personal interests to the interests of the nation and the masses of the people. Hence, such things as selfishness and self-interest, inactiveness and negligence in work, corruption, degeneration and vainglory are merely contemptible; while the spirit of impartiality, of active and hard work, of self-denial in the interest of the public and of complete absorption in arduous work, commands respect. Working in harmony with all progressive people outside the Party, Communists should endeavour to unite the people throughout the country to remove everything undesirable. It must be understood that Communists form but a small section of the whole nation, while outside the Party there are large numbers of progressive and active people with whom we must work in harmony. It is entirely wrong to think that only we ourselves are good and everyone else is of no use. In their attitude towards backward people, Communists should not slight or look down upon such persons, but become friendly towards them, unite with them and persuade and encourage them to go forward. As to those who have committed mistakes in their work, with the exception of incorrigible ones, Communists should not take an attitude of excluding them, but of urging them to awake to the necessity of reforming themselves by renouncing their past and starting

again with a clean slate. Communists should set an example in seeking truth from the facts as well as in being far-sighted and sagacious. The reason is that only by seeking truth from the facts can one accomplish the tasks set, and only with foresight and sagacity can one keep one's bearings in the advance. Communists should therefore also set an example in study; they are every day the teachers of the masses as well as their students. It is only by learning from the masses, from the circumstances, from the friendly parties and armies, and by understanding them that we can, in our present work, seek truth from the facts and show foresight and sagacity with regard to the future. In the protracted war and in adverse circumstances, it is only when Communists work in harmony with friendly parties and armies and all the progressives among the masses of the people, and when they fulfil to the utmost degree their exemplary role as the vanguard, that the active forces of the nation can all be mobilised to struggle to overcome the difficulties, defeat the enemy and build up a new China.

UNITE THE WHOLE NATION AND OPPOSE THE
ENEMY AGENTS IN ITS MIDST

In order to overcome the difficulties, defeat the enemy and build up a new China, we have no alternative but to consolidate and expand the Anti-Japanese National United Front and mobilise all the nation's active forces. But in the ranks of our national united front there are already enemy agents who play a disruptive role, namely, the collaborators, Trotskyites and pro-Japanese elements. Communists must at all times be on the lookout for these agents, expose their crimes by means of factual evidence and warn the people not to be deceived by them. Communists must increase their political vigilance with regard to the enemy agents in the nation's ranks. They must understand that the exposure and elimination of enemy agents is indispensable for the expansion and consolidation of the national united front. It is entirely wrong to attend exclusively to one thing and forget the other.

RECRUIT TO THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND PREVENT
THE INFILTRATION OF ENEMY AGENTS

To overcome the difficulties, defeat the enemy and build up a new China, the Communist Party must expand its organisation by throwing its door open to the broad masses of workers, peasants and young and active people who are truly revolutionary, who believe in the Party's principles, support its policies and are willing to observe its discipline and to work hard, thereby making the Party a great party of a mass character. The tendency of closed-door sectarianism is impermissible. But at the same time vigilance towards the infiltration of enemy agents is necessary. The secret agencies of Japanese imperialism are endeavouring all the time to disrupt our Party, to make use of hidden collaborators, Trotskyites, pro-Japanese elements, degenerates and political speculators to sneak into our Party in the guise of active people. There must not be a moment's relaxation in keeping a sharp watch over these persons. We must not close the door of our Party for fear of enemy agents, and our determined policy is to expand our Party boldly. But we must not, while boldly expanding the Party, relax our vigilance towards the enemy agents and political speculators who may avail themselves of the opportunity to infiltrate into the Party. We shall commit mistakes if we attend exclusively to one thing and forget the other. "Recruit to the Party boldly but never allow a single undesirable person to sneak in"—this alone is the correct policy.

RESOLUTELY MAINTAIN THE UNITED FRONT AND
THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE PARTY

It is beyond all doubt that only by resolutely maintaining the national united front can we overcome the difficulties, defeat the enemy and build up a new China. At the same time, however, the ideological, political and organisational independence of any party that participates in the united front must be preserved, and this applies to the Kuomintang, the Communist Party and other parties and groups alike. When applied to the question of the relation between parties and groups, the

Principle of Democracy in the Three People's Principles means precisely that different parties and groups may unite with one another and at the same time exist independently. If we speak of unity alone and deny independence, that would be abandoning the Principle of Democracy, a thing to which neither the Communist Party nor any of the other parties or groups can agree. No doubt, independence within the united front can only be relative and not absolute; to regard it as absolute would undermine the general policy of unity against the enemy. But this relative independence must not be denied; whether ideologically, politically or organisationally, each party or group must have its relative independence, *i.e.* relative freedom. If this relative freedom is denied by others or given up by oneself, that would also undermine the general policy of unity against the enemy. This is what every member of the Communist Party as well as of all the friendly parties should clearly understand.

The same is true of the relation between the class struggle and the national struggle. It is a settled principle that in the Anti-Japanese War everything must be subordinated to the interests of resistance to Japan. Therefore the interests of the class struggle must not conflict with, but be subordinated to, the interests of the War of Resistance. But the classes and the class struggle do exist, and when some people deny this fact, deny the existence of the class struggle, they are wrong. The theory which attempts to deny the existence of the class struggle is utterly erroneous. We do not deny the class struggle, but adjust it. The policy of mutual help and mutual concessions which we advocate is not only applicable to the relations between parties and groups, but also to class relations. In order to unite against Japan we should carry out a suitable policy that can adjust the class relations; on the one hand we should not leave the toiling masses without any protection or guarantee politically and materially, and on the other hand we should also take into consideration the interests of the rich, in order to meet the demand of unity against the enemy. To attend exclusively to one thing and forget the other will be detrimental to the War of Resistance.

TAKE THE WHOLE SITUATION INTO ACCOUNT, AND ALSO TAKE THE MAJORITY INTO ACCOUNT, AND WORK TOGETHER WITH OUR ALLIES

In leading the masses to struggle against the enemy, Communists should view things by taking into account the whole situation, the majority and the allies who are working together. They should grasp the principle of subordinating the needs of a part to the needs of the whole. If a certain idea seems practicable from a partial view of the situation but is impracticable from the over-all view, we should subordinate the part to the whole. Conversely, if it seems impracticable from a partial view of the situation but is practicable from the over-all view, we should also subordinate the part to the whole. This is taking into account the whole situation. Communists must never separate themselves from the majority of the masses, leave out of consideration the condition of the majority, and lead a small number of progressives to attempt any venture-some advance; they must attend to forging the links which closely connect the progressives with the broad masses. This is taking the majority into account. Wherever there are democratic parties or individual democrats willing to co-operate with us, Communists must adopt the attitude of discussing matters with them and working together with them. It is an entirely wrong attitude to brush aside the allies and make arbitrary decisions and take preemptory actions. A good Communist must be adept at taking into account the whole situation and the majority and at working together with the allies. In the past we have had serious defects in this respect, and we must endeavour to remove them.

CADRES POLICY

The Chinese Communist Party is a party at the head of a great revolutionary struggle in a nation of several hundred millions of people and cannot fulfil its historical task without a large number of leading cadres who combine ability with character. Because in the last seventeen years our Party has nurtured quite a number of competent leaders, our members

have formed nuclei in every field—military, political and cultural work, Party affairs and the mass movement; this is a glory to the Party and a glory to the whole nation. But the present framework is not yet strong enough to support the vast edifice of our struggle, and we still have to rear large numbers of capable people. Since many active people have emerged and will continue to emerge from the great struggle of the Chinese people, our responsibility is to organise them, nurture them, take good care of them and make proper use of them. Once the correct political line has been determined, the cadres will become the decisive factor.¹ Hence to rear large numbers of new cadres according to plan is our fighting task.

We should be concerned not only about Party cadres but also about non-Party cadres. There are many capable people outside the Party and the Party should not leave them out of account. It is the duty of every Communist to get rid of insolent aloofness, to work in harmony with non-Party cadres, to help them sincerely and whole-heartedly, to adopt a warm, comradely attitude towards them and to enlist their energies for the service of the great cause of the War of Resistance and national reconstruction.

We must know how to judge cadres. We must not confine our view to a short period or a single incident in a cadre's life, but should look at his life and work as a whole; this is the principal method of judging cadres.

We must know how to employ cadres. The responsibilities of the leadership boil down chiefly to two things: to devise ways and means and to employ cadres. Things like making plans and decisions, giving orders and directives, etc., belong to the sphere of "devising ways and means". To realise all these "devices" we must unite the cadres and urge them to work for them, and this belongs to the sphere of "employing cadres". On the problem of employing cadres, there have been in our national history two opposing lines: the line of "employing only the worthy", and the line of "employing only the near and dear". The former is the practice of the honest and the latter that of the dishonest. In the cadres policy of the Communist Party the criterion should be whether a cadre is resolute in carrying out the Party line, observant of Party discipline,

closely connected with the masses, capable of working independently, active and hard-working and self-denying; this is the line of "employing only the worthy". The cadres policy of Chang Kuo-t'ao in the past was just the opposite: following the line of "employing only the near and dear", he gathered his personal favourites round him and formed a petty clique, with the result that he turned traitor to the Party and decamped; this was an important lesson. Taking warning from the historical lessons of Chang Kuo-t'ao and his like, the Central Committee and the leaders at all levels must, on the question of cadres policy, make it their major responsibility to continue firmly in the honest and fair practice and oppose the dishonest and unfair practice, so as to strengthen the Party's unity and solidarity.

We must know how to take care of cadres. There are several ways of taking care of them. First, to give them guidance. This means, on the one hand, to allow them a free hand in their work so that they will have the courage to assume responsibilities themselves and, on the other, to give them timely directions so that they can put forth their creative power on the basis of the Party's political line. Secondly, to elevate them. This means giving them opportunities to learn and educating them, so that they can raise their theoretical understanding and working ability to a higher level. Thirdly, to check up on their work, help them to sum up their experiences, encourage their achievements and correct their mistakes. To assign work to cadres without checking up on it, and to pay attention to them only when they commit serious mistakes, is certainly not to take good care of cadres. Fourthly, to employ generally the method of persuasion towards cadres who have erred and to help them to correct their mistakes. Only in the case of those who have committed serious mistakes and yet do not accept guidance should the method of struggle be used. Patience is necessary; it is wrong to label people "opportunists" or lightly to "start struggles" against them. Fifthly, to help them in their difficulties. When cadres are faced with difficult problems, such as illness, difficulties in living conditions or family problems, we must see to it that all possible help is given to them. Such are the ways to take good care of cadres.

PARTY DISCIPLINE

In view of Chang Kuo-t'ao's serious violation of discipline, we must affirm anew the discipline of the Party: (1) that individuals must subordinate themselves to the organisation; (2) that the minority must subordinate itself to the majority; (3) that the lower level must subordinate itself to the higher level; and (4) that the entire membership must subordinate itself to the Central Committee. He who violates any of these articles of discipline disrupts the Party's unity. Experience proves that some people violate discipline because they do not know what Party discipline is, while others, like Chang Kuo-t'ao, violate it knowingly and exploit the ignorance of many Party members to achieve their evil ends. Hence it is necessary to educate Party members on matters of Party discipline so that the general membership will on the one hand observe the discipline themselves and on the other see to it that the leaders observe it as well, thus preventing the recurrence of cases like that of Chang Kuo-t'ao. To ensure that relations within the Party will develop on the right path, we must, besides the above four most important articles, work out in some detail internal Party regulations which will serve to unify the actions of the leading organs at all levels.

DEMOCRACY IN THE PARTY

Confronted with the present great struggle, the Chinese Communist Party demands that all its leading organs and all its members and cadres fully put forth their activity; only thus can we achieve victory. This activeness must be concretely shown in the creativeness of the leading bodies, cadres and Party members; in their sense of responsibility; in the energy they put into their work; in their courage and ability to raise questions, voice opinions and criticise defects; and in the supervision of the leading organs or leading cadres by the rank and file on the basis of loving care. Without these, the so-called activeness will be devoid of content. And we depend on the democratic life within the Party to call forth such activeness. If democratic life is lacking in the Party, the objective of putting

forth activity cannot be attained. It is possible to rear large numbers of able people only in the midst of democratic life. Ours is a country of small-scale production and dominated by the clan system, and there is as yet no democratic life in the country as a whole; this situation, duplicated in our Party, leads to an insufficiency of democratic life. This phenomenon keeps the whole Party from fully putting forth its activity. And at the same time it leads to an insufficiency of democratic life in the united front and in the mass movement. For this reason education about democratic life must be carried on within the Party to make Party members understand what democratic life is, what relation obtains between democracy and centralism and how democratic centralism can be realised. Only thus can we on the one hand actually extend democratic life within the Party and on the other avoid the tendency of extreme democratisation or licence of action which undermines discipline.

Party organisations in our army must also have more of the requisite democratic life so as to enhance the activeness of Party members and raise the fighting capacity of the army. But there should be less democracy in the Party organisations in the army than in the local Party organisations. Whether in the army or in the local organisations, democracy within the Party is meant to strengthen discipline and raise fighting capacity, not to weaken them.

The extension of democracy within the Party should be considered a necessary step for consolidating and developing the Party, an important weapon with which the Party can become active and vigorous in the great struggle, prove equal to its tasks, bring forth fresh forces and break through the difficulties of the war.

OUR PARTY HAS CONSOLIDATED ITSELF AND GROWN
POWERFUL THROUGH THE STRUGGLE ON TWO FRONTS

In the last seventeen years our Party has in general learnt to use the Marxist-Leninist weapon of ideological struggle to combat incorrect ideas within the Party on two fronts—Right opportunism as well as “Left” opportunism.

Before the Central Committee's plenary session of January 1934 (the fifth since the Party's Sixth National Congress),² our Party fought the Right opportunism of Ch'en Tu-hsiu and the "Left" opportunism of Comrade Li Li-san. Victory in these two internal Party struggles has enabled the Party to make great progress. After the Fifth Plenary Session there were again two internal Party struggles of historical significance, *i.e.* the struggle at the Tsunyi meeting and the struggle which resulted in the expulsion of Chang Kuo-t'ao from the Party.

The Tsunyi meeting corrected the serious mistakes of "Left" opportunism—mistakes in principle committed in the struggle against the enemy's fifth campaign of "encirclement and annihilation"—united the Party and the Red Army, and enabled the Party Centre and the main forces of the Red Army to bring the Long March to a victorious conclusion, advance to the anti-Japanese forefront and carry out a new policy—the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. The Pasi meeting³ and Yen-an meeting⁴ (the fight against Chang Kuo-t'ao's line began at the Pasi meeting and ended at the Yen-an meeting) combated Chang Kuo-t'ao's Right opportunism and succeeded in rallying the entire Red Army and further uniting the whole Party to carry out the heroic struggle against Japan. Both kinds of opportunist mistakes occurred during the revolutionary civil war, and they occurred characteristically in connection with the war.

What are the lessons to be derived from these two internal Party struggles? The lessons are as follows: (1) The serious mistake in principle, resulting from an ignorance of the characteristics of China's revolutionary war and manifest in the struggle against the fifth campaign of "encirclement and annihilation", consisted in a tendency of "Left" impetuosity regardless of subjective and objective conditions, a tendency extremely detrimental to the revolutionary war as well as to any revolutionary movement. (2) Chang Kuo-t'ao's opportunism was Right opportunism in the revolutionary war, which was in content a summation of his line of retreat, warlordism and activities against the Party. It was only by overcoming this opportunism that large numbers of cadres and Party members in the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army, who have excellent

quality and a long record of heroic struggle, were liberated from the yoke of Chang Kuo-t'ao's opportunism and brought back to the correct line of the Central Committee. (3) In the ten years of the Agrarian Revolutionary War, the great organisational work which was undertaken produced striking results, alike in military reconstruction, in government work, in mass work and in Party building; and had it not been for the co-ordination of such organisational work with the heroic fighting at the front, the bitter struggle against Chiang Kai-shek could not have been maintained at that time. But in the latter part of that period serious mistakes in principle were committed in the Party's cadres policy and in its organisational policy, which showed themselves in sectarian tendencies, in severe disciplinary measures of punishment, and in excessive ideological struggle. This was the result of a failure to eliminate the remnants of Li Li-san's past line as well as the result of political mistakes in matters of principle committed at that time. When these mistakes were also corrected at the Tsunyi meeting, the Party was able to turn to a correct cadres policy and correct organisational principles. As to Chang Kuo-t'ao's organisational line, it means a complete deviation from all the principles of the Communist Party, the disruption of Party discipline and the development of factional activities into activities against the Party, the Party centre and the International. The Party centre made every possible effort to overcome the mistakes of Chang Kuo-t'ao's iniquitous line and his activities against the Party, and it tried to save Chang Kuo-t'ao himself too. But as Chang Kuo-t'ao not only persistently refused to correct his mistakes and resorted to double-dealing, but later on actually betrayed the Party and threw himself into the arms of the Kuomintang, the Party could not but resolutely expel him. The punishment meted out to him won the support not only of all Party members but also of all people loyal to the cause of national liberation. The Communist International also endorsed this punitive measure and pointed out that Chang Kuo-t'ao was a deserter and renegade.

The lessons and achievements mentioned above supply the prerequisites for us to unite the whole Party from now on, to strengthen its ideological, political and organisational unity,

and to carry on victoriously the War of Resistance. Our Party has strengthened itself and grown powerful through the struggle on two fronts.

THE PRESENT STRUGGLE ON TWO FRONTS

In the War of Resistance from now on, it is of paramount importance to combat Right pessimism in the sphere of politics, though we must also attend to combating "Left" impetuosity. On the problems of the united front and the organisation of the Party and of the masses, it is necessary to continue to combat the "Left" tendency of closed-door sectarianism in order to bring about co-operation among the various anti-Japanese parties and groups and to expand the Communist Party and the mass movement; but at the same time we must attend to combating the Right opportunist tendencies of unconditional co-operation and unconditional expansion; otherwise co-operation and expansion will be hindered and turned into capitulationist co-operation and unprincipled expansion.

The ideological struggle on two fronts must be conducted in a way suitable to the specific case, and we should never approach a problem subjectively nor permit any longer the bad old habit of "calling people bad names at random".

In the struggle against deviations, serious attention must be paid to opposing double-dealing. As the career of Chang Kuo-t'ao proved, the greatest danger of double-dealing lies in its possible development into factional activities. To obey in public but to disobey in private, to agree in words but disagree in heart, to speak plausibly to your face but to play tricks behind your back—these are the various forms of double-dealing. We must heighten the vigilance of cadres and Party members towards double-dealing, so that Party discipline can be strengthened.

STUDY

Generally speaking, all those members of the Communist Party who are fairly qualified to study must study the theory of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, the history of our nation and

the circumstances and trends of the present movement; moreover, with these comrades as the intermediary, we must organise education for Party members whose cultural level is relatively low. In particular, cadres should study the above-mentioned subjects with attention; members of the Central Committee and senior cadres should especially intensify their study. It is impossible for a party to lead a great revolutionary movement to victory if it has no knowledge of revolutionary theory, no knowledge of history and no profound understanding of the actual movement.

The theory of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin is a "universally applicable" theory. We should not regard their theory as a dogma, but as a guide to action. We should not merely learn Marxist-Leninist words and phrases but study Marxism-Leninism as the science of revolution. We should not only understand the conclusions about general laws which Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin derived from their extensive study of real life and revolutionary experience, but also study their standpoint and approach in viewing problems and solving them. Our Party has now a better grasp of Marxism-Leninism than in the past, but its knowledge is still far from being wide or deep. Our task is to lead a great nation of several hundred million people to carry on such a great struggle as was never waged before. Therefore the task of a wide and deep study of Marxism-Leninism is a big problem for us which must be promptly solved and which can be solved only through positive endeavour. I hope that, after this Plenary Session of the Central Committee, a competition in study will be started throughout the Party, and we shall see who really learns something, and who learns more and better. So far as the people shouldering the main responsibilities of leadership are concerned, if there are in our Party one to two hundred comrades who have acquired a knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, which is systematic and not fragmentary, practical and not abstract, the fighting capacity of our Party will be greatly heightened and our work in defeating Japanese imperialism will be accelerated.

Another task in our study is to study our historical legacy and sum it up critically from the Marxist approach. Our nation has a history of several thousand years, a history which

has its own characteristics and is full of treasures. But in these matters we are mere schoolboys. The China of today has developed from the China in history; as we are believers in the Marxist approach to history, we must not cut off our whole historical past. We must make a summing-up from Confucius down to Sun Yat-sen and inherit this precious legacy. This will help much in directing the great movement of today. Communists are internationalist-Marxists, but Marxism must be integrated with the specific characteristics of our country and given a national form before it can be put into practice. The great strength of Marxism-Leninism lies in its integration with the specific revolutionary practice of different countries. In the case of the Chinese Communist Party, it is a matter of learning to apply the theory of Marxism-Leninism in the specific circumstances of China. If the Chinese Communists, who form a part of the great Chinese nation and are linked with it by flesh and blood, talk about Marxism apart from China's characteristics, that will be only Marxism in the abstract, Marxism in the void. Hence how to turn Marxism into something specifically Chinese, to imbue every manifestation of it with Chinese characteristics, *i.e.* to apply it in accordance with China's characteristics, becomes a problem which the whole Party must understand and solve immediately. The foreign "eight-legged essay"⁵ must be banned, empty and abstract talk must be stopped and doctrinairism must be laid to rest to make room for the fresh and lively things of Chinese style and Chinese flavour which the common folk of China love to see and hear. To separate the content of internationalism from national forms is the practice of those who understand nothing of internationalism; we on the other hand must link up the two closely. In this matter there are within our ranks serious mistakes which should be conscientiously corrected.

What are the characteristics of the present movement? What are its laws? How to direct this movement? All these are practical problems. To this day we have not yet understood the whole of Japanese imperialism, nor the whole of China. The movement is developing, new things have yet to emerge, and they are emerging endlessly. To study this movement in its entirety and in its development is a great task forever claiming

our attention. If anyone refuses to study these problems seriously and carefully, then he will not be a Marxist.

The enemy of our study is self-complacency; anyone who wants really to learn something must first of all get rid of self-complacency. "To learn without satiety" in regard to ourselves and "to teach without weariness"⁶ in regard to others—that is the attitude we should adopt.

UNITY AND VICTORY

The unity within the Chinese Communist Party is the most fundamental condition for uniting the people of the whole country to win the Anti-Japanese War and build up a new China. The Chinese Communist Party has learnt through seventeen years' steeling many ways of uniting itself and is now much more seasoned than before. Thus we are able to form a strong nucleus among the people of the whole country in order to win victory in resisting Japan and to build up a new China. Comrades, if only we unite, we can certainly reach this goal.

October 1938.

THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENCE AND AUTONOMY WITHIN THE UNITED FRONT

This is part of the concluding statement made at the Party's Central Committee's plenary session (the sixth since the Sixth National Congress). The question of independence and autonomy within the united front was at that time one of the outstanding questions regarding the anti-Japanese united front on which Comrade Mao Tse-tung joined issue with Comrade Ch'en Shao-yu. The question is essentially one of the leadership of the proletariat in the united front. In his report of December 1947, entitled *The Present Situation and Our Tasks*, Comrade Mao Tse-tung gave the following brief summing-up of these issues:

"During the Anti-Japanese War our Party opposed ideas similar to this kind of capitulationism [referring to that of Ch'en Tu-hsiu in the period of the First Revolutionary Civil War], such as making concessions to the Kuomintang's anti-popular policies; placing greater confidence in the Kuomintang than in the masses; shirking from launching mass struggles with a free hand or expanding the liberated areas and the people's army in the Japanese-occupied areas; and entrusting the leadership in the Anti-Japanese War to the Kuomintang. Our Party waged resolute struggles against such cowardly and degenerate ideas opposed to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, firmly carried out the political line of 'developing the progressive forces, winning over the intermediate forces and isolating the die-hard forces', and resolutely expanded the liberated areas and the People's Liberation Army. This ensured that our Party could not only defeat Japanese imperialism during the period of its aggression, but also, when Chiang Kai-shek launched his counter-revolutionary war after the Japanese surrender, switch with success and without losses to the line of opposing Chiang's counter-revolutionary war with a people's revolutionary war and win great victories within a short time. All comrades of our Party must bear these historical lessons in mind."

ASSISTANCE AND CONCESSION OUGHT TO BE POSITIVE, NOT NEGATIVE

For the sake of long-term co-operation, all parties and groups within the united front should give assistance and make concessions to one another, which however should be positive, not negative. We should consolidate and expand our Party

and our army, but at the same time we should also encourage and help in the consolidation and expansion of friendly parties and armed forces; the people should urge the government to satisfy their political and economic demands, but at the same time they should help the government in every possible way to facilitate the resistance to Japan; the workers should demand that the factory owners improve their material conditions, but at the same time they should work hard in order to facilitate the resistance to Japan; the landlords should reduce rent and interest, but at the same time the peasants should pay rent and interest to the landlords and unite with them against foreign aggression. All of these are principles and directions of mutual assistance, positive directions, not negative and one-sided ones. The same is true of mutual concessions. Each party should refrain from seeking to undermine the other and from forming secret groups within the other's party, government or army; so far as we are concerned, this means that we form no secret groups inside the Kuomintang, its government or its army, so that the Kuomintang will be easy on this point, and the resistance to Japan will be facilitated. "Refrain from doing certain things and you will be able to do other things"¹—this exactly meets the case. Without the reorganisation of the Red Army, the change in the political system in the Red areas, and the abandonment of the policy of armed insurrections, the nation-wide Anti-Japanese War could not have become a reality. By giving way in the former we have obtained the latter; through negative means we have achieved positive ends. "First to go back and then get a better run for a bigger leap forward"² is precisely Leninism. Marxism-Leninism does not allow concessions to be regarded as something purely negative. There have been cases of purely negative concessions, such as the theory of collaboration between labour and capital advocated by the Second International, which even surrendered a whole class and a whole revolution to the enemy. In China there have been first Ch'en Tu-hsiu and then Chang Kuo-t'ao, both of whom were capitulators—we should oppose capitulationism with great vigour. Our concession, withdrawal, turning to the defensive or suspending action, whether in dealing with allies or enemies, should always be regarded as part

of the entire revolutionary policy, as an indispensable link in the general revolutionary line, as a segment in a curvilinear movement. In short, they are positive.

THE CONSISTENCY OF THE NATIONAL STRUGGLE
WITH THE CLASS STRUGGLE

To support a long-term war by a long-term co-operation, or in other words, to subordinate the class struggle to the present national struggle to resist Japan—that is the fundamental principle of the united front. In accordance with this principle, the independence of parties and classes should be preserved, that is, their independence and autonomy within the united front should be preserved; the essential rights of the parties and the classes are not to be sacrificed on the ground of co-operation and unity, but on the contrary, the rights, up to a certain limit, of the parties and classes are to be firmly upheld; only thus can co-operation be facilitated and can there be any co-operation. Otherwise co-operation would be turned into amalgamation, and the united front would of necessity be sacrificed. In a nation which is struggling against a foreign foe, the class struggle assumes the form of national struggle, a form indicating the consistency of the two. On the one hand, the economic and political demands of the classes during the historical period of national struggle should be based on the condition of not disrupting the co-operation of these classes; on the other, all the demands of the class struggle should start from the requirements of the national struggle (from the cause of resistance to Japan). Thus unity and independence within the united front, the national struggle and the class struggle, become consistent.

“EVERYTHING THROUGH THE UNITED FRONT” IS WRONG

The Kuomintang is the party in power, and up to now it has not allowed the united front to assume an organisational form. Comrade Liu Shao-ch'i rightly said that if “everything through” simply means “through” Chiang Kai-shek and Yen

Hsi-shan, then that will only be the submission of one side to the other, and not at all “through the united front”. In the enemy's rear, we can only, according to what the Kuomintang has consented to (*e.g.* the Programme of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction), do things independently and on our own initiative, and we have no means of getting “everything through”. Or calculating what the Kuomintang would consent to, we can “do things first and ask for approval afterwards”. For example, the installation of administrative commissioners and the dispatch of troops to Shantung province could never have been done if we had tried to get them “through” beforehand. The situation in China is that the Kuomintang, having deprived all other political parties and groups of equal rights, is attempting to compel all those parties to take its orders. If, by putting forward such a slogan, we mean to demand that “everything” the Kuomintang does should be done only “through” securing our approval, it would be impossible as well as ridiculous. If we wish to secure the Kuomintang's approval beforehand for “everything” that we are going to do, then what can we do if the Kuomintang withholds it? As the policy of the Kuomintang is to restrict our development, there is no reason whatever for us to put forward such a slogan, which merely binds us hand and foot. At present there are things for which we should secure the Kuomintang's approval beforehand, such as changing the designations of three divisions into those of three armies—this is asking for permission first and doing things afterwards. There are other things which we should first turn into accomplished facts and then inform the Kuomintang, such as expanding our troops to more than 200,000 strong—this is doing things first and asking for approval afterwards. There are still other things, like convening the Border Region Assembly, which we, believing that the Kuomintang will not give consent at present, shall for the moment do without asking for approval. But there are also other things which we will for the moment neither do nor ask for permission to do, *e.g.* things which, if done, would jeopardise the whole situation. In short, neither should we break up the united front nor should we bind ourselves hand and foot; hence the slogan of “everything through the united front” should not be put forward. If “submission to

the united front in everything" is interpreted as "submission in everything" to Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan, then that too is wrong. Our policy is for independence and autonomy within the united front, a policy which is at once for unity and independence.

November 5, 1938.

PROBLEMS OF WAR AND STRATEGY

This is part of the concluding speech delivered at the Central Committee's plenary session (the sixth since the Party's Sixth National Congress). In his *Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War* (this volume) and *On the Protracted War* (this volume), Comrade Mao Tse-tung had already settled the question of the Party's leadership in the Anti-Japanese War. But some comrades who had committed Right opportunist mistakes denied the Party's independence and autonomy within the united front, and so had doubts about or even opposed the Party's line on war and strategy. In order to overcome such Right opportunism, to enable the whole Party to understand more clearly the primary importance of the problems of war and strategy in the Chinese revolution, and to mobilise it to work conscientiously for the line, Comrade Mao Tse-tung again explained the problem, approaching it from the angle of the history of China's political struggles, and clearly pointed out how our military work had developed and how our strategic directives had undergone specific changes, thus ensuring the Party's unity in its guiding principles and its practical work.

I. CHINA'S CHARACTERISTICS AND THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR

The characteristic of China is that she is not an independent democratic state but a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, internally under feudal oppression for want of democracy and externally under imperialist oppression for want of national independence. Thus people have no legislative body to make use of, nor the legal right to organise the workers to strike. Basically the task of the Communist Party here is not to go through a long period of legal struggles before launching an insurrection or war, nor to seize the big cities first and then occupy the countryside, but to take the other way round.

When imperialism is not launching armed attacks, the Chinese Communist Party either wages, together with the bourgeoisie, a civil war against the warlords (the lackeys of imperialism), e.g. the war in Kwangtung¹ and the Northern Expedition in 1924-7, or unites the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie to wage a civil war against the landlord class and the comprador bourgeoisie (also the lackeys of imperialism)

e.g. the War of Agrarian Revolution of 1927-36. When imperialism launches armed attacks, the Party then unites all classes and strata in the country that are opposed to foreign aggressors to wage a national war against foreign foes, *e.g.* the present Anti-Japanese War.

In China the main form of struggle is war and the main form of organisation is the army. Other forms, like mass organisations and mass struggles, are also extremely important and definitely indispensable and must not be overlooked, but they are all for the sake of war. All organisational work and struggles before the outbreak of a war are undertaken as preparations for the war, as in the period from the May 4 Movement (1919) to the May 30 Movement (1925). All organisational work and struggles after the outbreak of a war, however, are co-ordinated with the war either directly or indirectly; for instance, in the period of the Northern Expedition all organisational work and struggles in the rear areas of the revolutionary army were directly co-ordinated with the war, while all organisational work and struggles in areas under the rule of the Northern clique of warlords were indirectly co-ordinated with it. Again, in the period of the War of the Agrarian Revolution all organisational work and struggles inside the Red areas were directly co-ordinated with the war while all those outside them were indirectly co-ordinated with it. Furthermore, in the present period of the Anti-Japanese War all organisational work and struggles in the rear areas of the anti-Japanese forces and in the enemy-occupied areas are likewise directly or indirectly co-ordinated with the war.

"In China, armed revolution is fighting against armed counter-revolution. This is one of the peculiarities and one of the advantages of the Chinese Revolution."² Comrade Stalin's statement is perfectly correct; it is correct whether in the case of the Northern Expedition, of the War of Agrarian Revolution, or of the present Anti-Japanese War. These wars are all revolutionary wars, directed against counter-revolutionaries and waged principally by the revolutionary people; the only differences between them are those between a civil war and a national war, between a war waged by the Communist Party alone and a war waged jointly by the Kuomintang and the

Communist Party. Of course, these differences are important. They indicate whether the scope of the main forces in the war is narrow or wide (whether an alliance of the workers and the peasants or an alliance of the workers, the peasants and the bourgeoisie), whether the target of the war is an internal or an external one (whether the war is directed against domestic or against foreign enemies, and in the former case, whether against the Northern clique of warlords or against the Kuomintang), and they also indicate that the Chinese revolutionary war is different in content at the different stages of its history. But all these wars are cases of armed revolution against armed counter-revolution, all are revolutionary wars, and all show the peculiarities and advantages of the Chinese revolution. The statement that the revolutionary war "is one of the peculiarities and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution" perfectly corresponds with China's conditions. Almost from the very beginning, the main task confronting the party of the Chinese proletariat has been to unite the largest possible number of allies and to organise, according to circumstances, armed struggles against internal or external armed counter-revolution and for national and social liberation. In China, without armed struggle the proletariat and the Communist Party could not win any place for themselves or accomplish any revolutionary task.

Our Party did not grasp this point fully during the five or six years from its foundation in 1921 to its participation in the Northern Expedition in 1926. At that time it did not understand the supreme importance of armed struggle in China, it did not conscientiously prepare for war and organise armed forces, and it did not stress the study of military strategy and tactics. In the course of the Northern Expedition it neglected to win over the armed forces but laid a lop-sided stress on the mass movements, with the result that all the mass movements collapsed the moment the Kuomintang turned reactionary. For a long time after 1927 many comrades continued to carry out as the Party's central task the preparation for insurrections in the cities and the work in the White area.³ And it was only after our victory in repelling the enemy's third campaign of "encirclement and annihilation" in 1931 that some comrades

changed fundamentally their attitude on this question. But the attitude of the Party as a whole did not change, and there were still some comrades who did not think as we do today.

Experience tells us that China's problems cannot be settled without armed forces. An understanding of this point will facilitate the progress of a victorious Anti-Japanese War from now on. The concrete fact that in the Anti-Japanese War the whole nation rises in armed resistance should teach the whole Party to understand better the importance of the problem, and every member of the Party must be prepared to take up arms and go to the front at any moment. Our present session has decided that the Party's main fields of work are to be in the war areas and in the enemy's rear, thus further providing an unequivocal direction for our efforts. This should be an excellent antidote prescribed for Party members who are only willing to do Party organisational work or engage in the mass movement but are unwilling to study war or fight in it, for schools which neglect to encourage the students to go to the front, and the like. The organisational work of the Party and the mass movement in most parts of the country are directly linked with armed struggle, and there is not, and cannot be, any Party work or mass movement that is independent and isolated. Even in some of the rear areas far away from the war zones (like Yunnan, Kweichow and Szechwan) or in some of the enemy-occupied areas (like Peiping, Tientsin, Nanking and Shanghai), the organisational work of the Party and the mass movements are also co-ordinated with the war, and they can and should comply only with the demands of the front. In a word, the whole Party must pay attention to war, learn military science and be ready to fight.

2. THE WAR HISTORY OF THE KUOMINTANG

It will be good for us to take a look at the history of the Kuomintang and see how the Kuomintang has paid attention to war.

Even at the early stage when he was organising a small revolutionary group, Sun Yat-sen staged several armed insurrections against the Manchus.⁴ The period of the Chinese

Revolutionary League was especially full of instances of armed insurrections,⁵ which continued until the Manchus were finally overthrown by force in the Revolution of 1911. During the period of the Chinese Revolutionary Party he carried out an armed campaign against Yuan Shih-k'ai.⁶ All subsequent events—the southward transfer of the navy,⁷ the northern expedition from Kweilin⁸ and the founding of the Whampoa Military Academy,⁹ were among Sun Yat-sen's military exploits.

Chiang Kai-shek succeeded Sun Yat-sen and brought about the heyday of the Kuomintang's military power. Through all the three periods, the Northern Expedition, the civil war and the Anti-Japanese War, he has looked upon the army as his very life. The Chiang Kai-shek of the last ten years has been a counter-revolutionary. He created a huge "Central army" for counter-revolutionary purposes. Whoever has an army has power, for war settles everything: he has firmly grasped this crucial point. In this respect we ought to learn from him. And in this respect both Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek are our teachers.

Since the Revolution of 1911, all the warlords have cherished their troops for dear life; they all set store by the principle, "Whoever has an army has power."

T'an Yen-k'ai¹⁰ was a clever bureaucrat who, rising and falling several times in Hunan, was never the civil governor pure and simple but always insisted on being at once the civil and the military governor. Even when he served as the Chairman of the National Government later in Canton and Wuhan, he was concurrently the commander of the Second Army. There are many such warlords in China who understand this characteristic of China's.

In China there are also certain parties which do not want an army, the Progressive Party¹¹ being the chief one; yet even this party knows that it cannot get government positions without some warlord to back it. Thus Yuan Shih-k'ai, Tuan Ch'i-jui¹² and Chiang Kai-shek (to whom the Political Science Group,¹³ formed out of a section of the Progressive Party, has attached itself) have become its successive patrons.

A few small parties with a short history, *e.g.* the Youth

Party,¹⁴ have not had an army, and so no amount of bustle and hustle can get them anywhere.

In foreign countries no bourgeois party needs armed forces under its direct command. But China presents a different case; owing to the feudal divisions in the country, whichever of the landlord or bourgeois blocs or parties has the gun has power, and whichever has more guns has greater power. The party of the proletariat that finds itself in these circumstances should see clearly to the heart of the matter.

Communists do not contend for personal military power (they should never do that, and let no one follow the example of Chang Kuo-t'ao), but they must contend for military power for the Party and for the people. As a national war of resistance is going on, we must further contend for military power for the nation. If we fall victim to infantilism on the question of military power, we shall get absolutely nothing. As the toiling masses have been for several thousand years a prey to the deceit and intimidation of the reactionary ruling classes, it is very difficult for them to awaken to the importance of having guns in their own hands. Now that the oppression of Japanese imperialism and the nation-wide resistance have pushed the toiling masses on to the stage of war, Communists should prove themselves the most clear-headed leaders in the war. Every Communist must grasp the truth: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun will never be allowed to command the Party. But it is also true that with guns at our disposal we can really build up the Party organisations, and the Eighth Route Army has built up a powerful Party organisation in North China. We can also rear cadres and create schools, culture and mass movements. Everything in Yen-an has been built up by means of the gun. Anything can grow out of the barrel of a gun. According to the Marxist theory of the state, the army is the chief component of the political power of a state. Whoever wants to seize the political power of the state and to maintain it must have a strong army. Some people have ridiculed us as advocates of the "omnipotence of war"; yes, we are, we are the advocates of the omnipotence of the revolutionary war, which is not bad at all, but is good and is Marxist.

With the help of guns the Russian Communists brought about socialism. We are to bring about a democratic republic. Experience in the class struggle of the era of imperialism teaches us that the working class and the toiling masses cannot defeat the armed bourgeois and landlords except by the power of the gun; in this sense we can even say that the whole world can be remoulded only with the gun. As we are advocates of the abolition of war, we do not desire war; but war can only be abolished through war—in order to get rid of the gun, we must first grasp it in our hand.

3. THE WAR HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

Although for a period of about three or four years, from 1921 (when the Chinese Communist Party was founded) to 1924 (when the First National Congress of the Kuomintang took place), our Party failed to grasp the importance of making immediate preparations for war and organising an army, and although it still did not understand the matter adequately in the period of 1924-7 or even later, yet with its participation in the work of the Whampoa Military Academy since 1924, it arrived at a new stage and began to see the importance of military affairs. Having helped the Kuomintang in the war of Kwangtung and the Northern Expedition, the Party got hold of some armed forces.¹⁵ The Party learnt a bitter lesson from the failure of the revolution and, with the Nanchang uprising, the Autumn Harvest uprising and the Canton uprising that followed, it entered into the new period of founding the Red Army. That was the crucial period in which our Party thoroughly understood the importance of the army. If in this period there had been no Red Army or if it had waged no wars, that is, if the Communist Party had adopted the liquidationism of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, it would have been inconceivable to have started the Anti-Japanese War today and to have kept it up for long.

The Party centre's emergency meeting of August 7, 1927, combated political Right opportunism and enabled the Party to take a big stride forward. The Central Committee's plenary session of January 1931 (the fourth since the Sixth National

Congress), though nominally combating political "Left" opportunism, really committed anew the mistake of "Left" opportunism. The two meetings differed in their content and historical role, but neither of them attached importance to the problems of war and strategy; this is reflected by the fact that war was not yet made the centre of gravity in the Party's work. After the Party centre moved into the Red areas in 1933, the situation underwent a radical change; but on the question of war (and on all other major questions), mistakes in principle were again committed, with the result that the revolutionary war suffered serious losses.¹⁶ The Tsunyi meeting of 1935, on the other hand, was mainly a fight against opportunism in the conduct of the war and placed the problem of war in the foremost position—a reflection of the war conditions of the time. We can confidently say that in the struggles of the past seventeen years up to now the Chinese Communist Party has forged not only a firm Marxist political line but also a firm Marxist military line. We have been able to apply Marxism to solve not only political problems but also military problems; we have reared, as a powerful framework, not only large numbers of cadres capable of running the Party and the state, but also large numbers of cadres capable of running the army. These are the flowers of revolution watered by the blood of countless martyrs, a glory that belongs not only to the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people, but also to the Communist Parties and the peoples of the whole world. There are only three armies in the whole world, led respectively by the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union, of China and of Spain, which belong to the proletariat and the toiling masses; hence our army and our military experience are all the more to be treasured.

In order to carry on victoriously the present Anti-Japanese War it is extremely important to expand and consolidate the Eighth Route Army the New Fourth Army and all the guerrilla forces led by our Party. On this principle, the Party should dispatch enough of its best members and cadres to the front. Everything must be for the victory at the front, and the organisational task must be subordinated to this political task.

4. CHANGES IN THE PARTY'S MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE CIVIL WAR AND THE NATIONAL WAR

It is worth studying the changes in the Party's military strategy. I shall deal separately with two courses of events: the civil war and the national war.

In strategy the course of the civil war can be roughly divided into two periods, the earlier and the later. In the earlier period, guerrilla warfare was the principal form and in the later period, regular warfare. But the regular warfare mentioned here is of the Chinese type, as shown by the concentration of forces for a mobile war and a certain degree of centralisation and planning in command and organisation; in other aspects it is still of a guerrilla character and on a low level, and cannot be spoken of in the same breath with the warfare of foreign armies and, in some ways, is even different from that of the Kuomintang army. Thus in a sense this type of regular warfare is only guerrilla warfare on a higher level.

The course of the Anti-Japanese War, so far as our Party's military tasks are concerned, can also be roughly divided into two periods of strategy. In the earlier period (including the stages of strategic defensive and strategic stalemate), guerrilla warfare is the principal form, while in the later period (the stage of strategic counter-offensive) regular warfare will be the principal form. However, the guerrilla warfare in the earlier period of the Anti-Japanese War differs considerably in content from the guerrilla warfare in the earlier period of the civil war, because we have the regular (regular to a certain degree) Eighth Route Army carrying out in dispersion the task of the guerrillas; and the regular warfare in the later period of the Anti-Japanese War will also be different from the regular warfare in the later period of the civil war, since we can expect that, given up-to-date equipment, a great change will take place both in the army and in its operations. The army will then attain a high degree of centralisation and organisation; the operations, with their guerrilla character greatly diminished, will attain a high degree of regularity; what is now at a lower level will then be raised to a higher level; and the Chinese type

will be changed into the world-wide type. That will be our task in the stage of strategic counter-offensive.

Thus we see that, throughout the two courses of events, the civil war and the Anti-Japanese War, or throughout the four periods in strategy, there have been three strategic shifts. The first is the change from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare in the civil war. The second is the change from regular warfare in the civil war to guerrilla warfare in the Anti-Japanese War. And the third is the change from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare in the Anti-Japanese War.

In introducing the first of these three changes, great difficulties were encountered. We had a twofold task. On the one hand we had to combat the Right tendency of localism and guerrillaism, which consists in cherishing guerrilla habits and refusing to turn towards regularisation, a tendency arising out of a failure by the cadres fully to appreciate the changes in the enemy situation and our own tasks. This tendency was gradually rectified in the Central Red Area only after much painstaking education. On the other hand, we had also to combat the "Left" tendency of over-centralisation and adventurism, of over-emphasising regularisation, a tendency arising from among a section of the leading cadres who made an over-estimation of the enemy situation, set themselves too big a task and applied the lessons of foreign countries mechanically, regardless of the actual conditions. This tendency was rectified in the Central Red Area only after we had paid in three long years (up to the Tsunyi meeting) the price of enormous losses and derived lessons from bloodshed. Its rectification was one of the achievements of the Tsunyi meeting.¹⁷

The second change took place at the juncture of two different wars—in the autumn of 1937 (after the Lukouchiao Incident). At that time our enemy was a new one—Japanese imperialism, and our ally was the Kuomintang—our former enemy (who still harboured hostile intentions against us), and the battlefield was the whole expanse of North China (which, temporarily the front of our army, was soon to be the enemy's rear and was to remain so for a long time). Introduced under such unusual circumstances, our strategic change was an extremely serious one. Under such unusual circumstances we had to transform

the regular army and the mobile warfare of the past into guerrilla units (in respect to their operation in dispersed formations, not in respect to organisation or discipline) and into guerrilla warfare, so that both could be adapted to the situation of the enemy and our own tasks. But such a change, to all appearances retrogressive, was necessarily very difficult to effect. A tendency to underestimate the enemy and Japanophobia, two things which are likely to be found at such a juncture, were actually found in the Kuomintang. When the Kuomintang shifted itself from the battlefields of the civil war to the battlefields of the national war, it suffered many unnecessary losses mainly due to an underestimation of the enemy and also to its Japanophobia (as represented by Han Fu-ch'u and Liu Chih¹⁸). But we effected the change fairly smoothly; we not only avoided losses but also achieved great successes. These successes were scored because the broad ranks of our cadres accepted in time the correct guidance of the Central Committee and adroitly sized up the actual situation, though serious controversy had arisen between the Central Committee and a section of the army cadres. The change has an extremely important bearing on keeping up, developing and winning the Anti-Japanese War as a whole as well as on the future of the Chinese Communist Party, as we can easily realise if we call to mind the historical significance of the anti-Japanese guerrilla war for the future of China's national liberation. In its unusual extensiveness and protractedness China's anti-Japanese guerrilla war is without precedent, not only in the East, but perhaps in the whole history of mankind.

As to the third change, the change from the anti-Japanese guerrilla war to the anti-Japanese regular war, it has to do with the development of the war in the future when new conditions and new difficulties will presumably arise, and we may leave it for the moment.

5. THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE GUERRILLA WAR

As regards the Anti-Japanese War as a whole, regular warfare is the principal and guerrilla warfare the supplementary form, for the fate of the Anti-Japanese War can be finally

decided only by regular warfare. As regards the country as a whole, of the three strategic stages (defensive, stalemate and counter-offensive) in the entire process of the Anti-Japanese War, the first and the last are stages in which regular warfare is the principal while guerrilla warfare is the supplementary form. Only in the intermediate stage, when the enemy will seek to hold on to the occupied areas while we are still unable to launch the counter-offensive and are just preparing for it, will guerrilla warfare emerge as the principal form to be supplemented by regular warfare; yet this stage is only one of the three stages in the whole war, though possibly the longest in duration. As regards the war as a whole, therefore, regular warfare is the principal and guerrilla warfare the supplementary form. If we do not understand this, if we do not know that regular warfare is the key to the final decision of one's fate in a war, if we neglect to build up a regular army and neglect the study and the direction of regular warfare, we shall not be able to defeat Japan. This is one aspect of the matter.

Guerrilla warfare, however, does play an important strategic role throughout the war. If there is no guerrilla warfare, if we neglect to build up guerrilla units and guerrilla armies, if we overlook the study and the direction of guerrilla warfare, we shall not be able to defeat Japan either. The reason is that, with the greater part of China turned into the enemy's rear, if there is not the most extensive and persistent guerrilla war, and if the enemy is allowed to entrench himself safely in our land with absolutely no fear of an attack from the rear, then our main forces on the main front will certainly suffer heavy losses, the enemy will certainly become more violent in his offensives, it will be hard to bring about a stalemate, and the continuation of the resistance may become uncertain; even if things do not turn out that way, such unfavourable conditions will arise as a deficiency of strength for our counter-offensive, lack of concerted action in the counter-offensive, the possibility of the enemy's making good his losses, etc. If these conditions do arise and no extensive and persistent guerrilla war is developed in time to remove them, it will likewise be impossible for us to defeat Japan. Hence, though guerrilla warfare plays only a supplementary role in the war as a whole, it does play an

extremely important role in strategy. To resist Japan and yet to neglect guerrilla warfare is undoubtedly a grave error. This is the other aspect of the matter.

Guerrilla warfare is possible wherever one condition is present, namely, a big territory; hence there was guerrilla warfare even in ancient times. But guerrilla warfare can be kept up only when it is led by the Communist Party. Thus most guerrilla wars in ancient times ended in failure, and only in the big countries of modern times where Communist Parties have emerged, like the Soviet Union during its civil war and China at present, can guerrilla wars achieve victories. In the matter of war, a division of labour between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in the Anti-Japanese War is necessary and proper under the present general conditions, with regular warfare carried on by the Kuomintang on the main front and guerrilla warfare carried on by the Communist Party in the enemy's rear; it is a matter of mutual need, mutual co-ordination and mutual assistance.

It can thus be understood how important and necessary it is to change our Party's line of strategy from the regular warfare in the latter period of the civil war to the guerrilla warfare in the earlier period of the Anti-Japanese War. The advantages of this change can be summed up in the following eighteen points: (1) reducing the areas occupied by the enemy; (2) expanding the base areas of our own forces; (3) in the stage of defence, pinning down the enemy by fighting in co-ordination with the operations on the main front; (4) in the stage of stalemate, facilitating the rehabilitation of the troops on the main front by firmly holding the base areas in the enemy's rear; (5) in the stage of the counter-offensive, taking co-ordinated actions with the main front to recover the lost territory; (6) expanding our forces in the most speedy and effective manner; (7) expanding the Communist Party most extensively so that a Party branch can be organised in every village; (8) spreading the mass movements most extensively so that all the people behind the enemy lines, except those in his strongholds, can be organised; (9) creating organs of anti-Japanese democratic political power on as large a territory as possible; (10) developing anti-Japanese cultural and educational work most extensively;

(11) improving the people's living conditions over the widest possible areas; (12) accelerating most effectively the disintegration of the enemy troops; (13) keeping up the courage of the people and heightening the morale of the country's troops over the widest areas and with the most enduring effect; (14) promoting the progress of as many friendly armies and parties as possible; (15) adapting ourselves to the condition that the enemy is strong and we are weak, so as to reduce our losses to a minimum and win all possible victories; (16) adapting ourselves to the condition that ours is a big country and the enemy's is small, so as to inflict the maximum losses on the enemy and reduce his victories to a minimum; (17) training large numbers of leading cadres in the most speedy and effective manner, and (18) solving the problem of provisions in the most convenient way.

It is also beyond doubt that in the long course of struggle guerrilla units and guerrilla warfare should not remain as they are but should develop towards an advanced stage, so that they will gradually change into a regular army and regular warfare. We shall, through guerrilla warfare, accumulate our strength and make ourselves one of the decisive factors in crushing Japanese imperialism.

6. PAY ATTENTION TO THE STUDY OF MILITARY PROBLEMS

All problems concerning the hostilities of two armies depend on war for their solution, and China's survival or extinction hinges on her victory or defeat in the war. Hence there cannot be a moment's delay in our study of military science, of strategy and tactics and of political work in the army. Though our study of tactics is inadequate, comrades engaged in military work have in the last ten years scored many achievements and have, on the basis of the conditions in China, made a number of discoveries; the only defect is that a general summing-up is still lacking. The study of the problems of strategy and the theory of war has so far been confined to very few people. In the study of political work we have achieved first-rate results—in the wealth of our experience and in our numerous and excellent innovations we are unsurpassed by any country

except the Soviet Union, but here the defect lies in the lack of synthesis and systematisation. To meet the demands of the Party and the whole country the popularisation of military knowledge is an urgent task. We must now pay attention to all these things, but the theory of war and strategy is the core of everything. I think it is necessary to direct the interest of the whole Party through the study of military theory to the study of military problems.

November 6, 1938.

NOTES

ON CONTRADICTION

1. V. I. Lenin, *Philosophical Notebooks*, Russian ed., p. 263.
2. V. I. Lenin said in his *On Dialectics*: "The division of the one and the cognition of its contradictory parts (see the quotation from Philo on Heraclitus at the beginning of Part III, 'Knowledge', in Lassalle's book on Heraclitus) is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristics or features) of dialectics. . . ."

He also said in his *Extracts From Hegel's "Logic"*: "Dialectics may be summed up as a theory of the unity of opposites. By so doing, the kernel of dialectics is grasped, but it needs explanation and development."
3. V. I. Lenin, *On Dialectics*.
4. A remark of Tung Chung-shu (179-104 B.C.), a well-known exponent of the Confucian school in the Han dynasty (208 B.C.-A.D. 220), in one of his memorials submitted to Emperor Wu.
5. Frederick Engels, *Anti-Duhring*, Part I, Chapter XII.
6. V. I. Lenin, *loc. cit.*
7. Frederick Engels, *loc. cit.*
8. V. I. Lenin, *loc. cit.*
9. *Ibid.*
10. See Note 8 to *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War*, Vol. I of the *Selected Works*.
11. For a detailed description see *Oppose the Party "Eight-legged Essay"*, Vol. IV of the *Selected Works*.
12. Wei Cheng (580-643) was a statesman and historian in the early period of the T'ang dynasty (618-906). The remark is found in *Tsu Chih T'ung Chien*, an ancient Chinese annual compiled by Szuma Kuang in the Sung dynasty (960-1276).
13. Cf. Note 19 to *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War*, Vol. I of the *Selected Works*. Sung Chiang is the leading character in the novel. Chu village was in the vicinity of Liangshanpo, the base where Sung Chiang conducted the revolutionary war against the ruling classes.
14. V. I. Lenin, *Once Again on the Trade Unions. Selected Works*, English ed., in twelve volumes, Vol. IX.
15. V. I. Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?*
16. V. I. Lenin, *Extracts From Hegel's "Logic"*.
17. *The Book of Mountains and Seas* was written during the Era of the Warring States (403-221 B.C.). In one of the legends, K'uafu is described as a super-human being who runs a race with the sun. Winning the game, he makes a tour in the sun but finally dies of thirst.
18. Yi is one of the legendary heroes of ancient China, particularly famous for his archery. According to a legend in *Huai Nan Tzu*, a book compiled under the auspices of Prince Liu An in the second century B.C., there were ten suns in the sky in the days of Emperor Yao. In view of the damage done to vegetation by the suns, Yao ordered Yi to shoot at them. In another legend

- recorded by Wang Yi (A.D. second century), the archer is said to have shot down nine of the ten suns.
19. *The Pilgrimage to the West* is a mythological novel written in the sixteenth century. Sun Wu-k'ung, hero of the novel, is a personified monkey. He has the mysterious power of changing himself into seventy-two forms, such as birds, animals, plants and stones. There is an abridged English translation by Arthur Waley entitled: *Monkey*.
 20. *Strange Tales From the Carefree Studio* is a collection of short stories written by P'u Sung-ling in the seventeenth century. It comprises 431 pieces most of which are stories of fairies, ghosts, and foxes collected from folklore. There is an English translation by Herbert Giles entitled: *Strange Tales from a Chinese Studio*.
 21. Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*.
 22. V. I. Lenin, *On Dialectics*.
 23. The quotation appeared first in the *History of the Earlier Han Dynasty*, written by Pan Ku, a celebrated historian in the first century A.D., and has ever since been a popular saying.
 24. V. I. Lenin, *On Dialectics*.
 25. V. I. Lenin's critical notes on Bukharin's *Economics of the Transitional Period*.

THE POLICIES, MEASURES AND PERSPECTIVES OF COMBATING JAPANESE INVASION

1. On July 7, 1937, the Japanese aggressors attacked the Chinese troops stationed at Lukouchiao, about ten kilometres south-west of Peking. Spurred on by the anti-Japanese upsurge of the whole nation, the Chinese troops resisted the Japanese. Thus began the heroic eight-year War of Resistance of the Chinese people.
2. Originally part of the Kuomintang's North-west army under Feng Yu-hsiang, then stationed in Hopeh and Chahar provinces (Chahar was an old province, one part of which is now in Shansi and the other in Hopeh). Sung Che-yuan was its commander and Feng Chih-an one of its divisional commanders.
3. Promulgated by the Kuomintang government on January 31, 1931, so that it could ruthlessly persecute and murder patriots and revolutionaries on the pretext of their "endangering the Republic".
4. This refers to the "Rules and Regulations for Press Censorship" issued by the Kuomintang government in August 1934 to suppress the voice of the people. As the regulations required that "all news copy must be submitted to censorship", the censorship officer could blue-pencil or withhold altogether anything intended for publication in the press in the Kuomintang-controlled areas.
5. See Section 8 of *The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan*, Vol. I of the *Selected Works*.
6. See Note 14 to *The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan*, Vol. I of the *Selected Works*.

STRUGGLE TO MOBILISE ALL FORCES FOR WINNING VICTORY IN THE ARMED RESISTANCE

1. Cf. Editor's Note to *The Policies, Measures and Perspectives of Combating Japanese Invasion*, (this volume).
2. Cf. *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*, Chapter VIII.
3. The defence of Madrid, starting in October 1936, lasted for two years and five months. In 1936 fascist Germany and Italy made use of their Spanish jackal, the fascist warlord Franco, to launch a war of aggression against Spain. The Spanish people, led by the People's Front Government, carried out a heroic war of resistance to defend democracy and repel foreign aggression. The battle of Madrid was the bitterest one in the whole war. As imperialist countries like Britain and France helped the aggressors through their hypocritical policy of "non-intervention", and the people's front itself disintegrated, Madrid finally fell in March 1939.
4. See Section 10 of *On New Democracy*, in Vol. III of the *Selected Works*.

THE URGENT TASKS AFTER THE ANNOUNCE- MENT OF KUOMINTANG-COMMUNIST CO-OPERATION

1. See Note 2 to *The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan*, Vol. I of the *Selected Works*.
2. See Note 3 to the above-mentioned article, Vol. I.
3. See Note 4 to the above-mentioned article, Vol. I.
4. See Note 7 to *A Statement on Chiang Kai-shek's Statement*, Vol. I of the *Selected Works*.
5. See Note 6 to *The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan*, Vol. I of the *Selected Works*.
6. See Note 7 to the above-mentioned article, Vol. I.
7. Concluded on August 21, 1937.
8. See *Struggle to Mobilise All Forces for Winning Victory in the Armed Resistance*, in this volume.
9. One of the leaders of the "National Socialist Party" (a small party organised by reactionary landlords, bureaucrats and big bourgeois), who later joined Wang Ching-wei's traitorous government.

THE SITUATION AND TASKS IN THE ANTI- JAPANESE WAR AFTER THE FALL OF SHANGHAI AND TAIYUAN

1. Referring to the "Resolution on the Current Situation and the Tasks of the Party", adopted by the Central Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party at its meeting in Lochwan, northern Shensi, on August 25, 1937. The text reads in full:

(1) The Japanese invaders' provocation at Lukouchiao and their occupation of Peiping and Tientsin are but the beginning of their large-scale attacks on China proper. The Japanese invaders have begun their national mobilisation for war. Their propaganda that they have 'no desire to aggravate the situation' is only a smoke-bomb dropped to screen their attacks.

(2) The Nanking government, under the pressure of the Japanese invaders' attacks and the people's indignation, has now made up its mind for armed resistance. Over-all arrangements for national defence and actual resistance in various localities have also been started. A general war between China and Japan is inevitable. The resistance made at Lukouchiao on July 7 marked the starting-point of China's nation-wide armed resistance.

(3) A new stage now begins in China's political situation, namely, the stage of actual resistance. The stage of preparation for resistance is already over. The central task of the present stage is to mobilise all forces to win victory in the armed resistance. In the past stage, because of the Kuomintang's unwillingness and the inadequacy in mobilising the masses of the people, the task of winning democracy was not accomplished, and it must be accomplished in the future course of winning victory in the armed resistance.

(4) In this new stage, the differences and controversies between ourselves on the one hand and the Kuomintang and other anti-Japanese groups on the other, hinge no longer upon whether armed resistance ought to be made but upon how victory can be won in the armed resistance.

(5) Today the pivot for winning victory in the armed resistance lies in developing the resistance already started into a total resistance by the whole nation. Only through such a resistance can final victory be won. The Ten-Point Programme for the Resistance to Japan and the Salvation of the Nation which our Party has now put forward denotes the specific path for winning the final victory in the armed resistance.

(6) In the armed resistance of today there lurks a great danger. That is mainly because the Kuomintang is still unwilling to arouse the whole people to take part in the resistance. On the contrary, it regards the resistance as the concern of the government alone, and in every respect fears and restricts the people's movement for taking part in the war, hinders the government and the army from becoming one with the people, refuses to grant to the people the democratic right to resist Japan and save the nation, and refuses to reform the political structure thoroughly so as to turn the government into a national defence government of the whole people. Such a resistance may achieve a partial victory but never the final victory. On the contrary, it may end in grievous failure.

(7) Because there are still serious defects in the resistance, its future course will be beset with difficulties, such as setbacks, retreats, internal splits and betrayals, temporary and partial compromises. Hence we must realise that this armed resistance is going to be a bitter, protracted war. But we believe that the resistance already started will, through the effort of our Party and of the whole people, definitely break through all obstacles to continue its advance and development. We ought to overcome all difficulties and resolutely fight for the realisation of the Ten-Point Programme for winning victory in the armed resistance, which our Party has put forward. Resolutely oppose all erroneous directives which run counter to this

programme, and at the same time oppose pessimistic, despairing national defeatism.

(8) Communists, together with the people and the armed forces under their leadership, must stand in the front line of the struggle, make themselves the nucleus of the whole nation in the armed resistance, and devote the greatest effort to expanding the anti-Japanese movement of the masses. Never slacken for a moment or let slip a single opportunity in making propaganda among the masses and organising and arming them. If millions upon millions of the masses are really organised into the national united front, the victory of the anti-Japanese War will be indubitable.

2. At the initial stage of the anti-Japanese War, the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek, under the pressure of the people, made a number of promises to introduce various political reforms, all of which were subsequently broken. Thus the "possibility" of the Kuomintang undergoing a reformation, which the people throughout the country had desired, was never realised. As Comrade Mao Tse-tung later stated in his *On Coalition Government*:

"All the people, Communists and other democratic parties then pinned great hopes on the Kuomintang government; they hoped that it would earnestly introduce democratic reforms and put into practice Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary Three People's Principles at the moment when the nation was in peril and the people's spirits were aroused. But such hopes came to nothing."

3. A training school set up by Chiang Kai-shek at Kuling, northern Kiangsi. Many of the Kuomintang's party and government officials, high-ranking as well as middle-ranking, were sent there for training to form the nuclear force of Chiang's reactionary régime.
4. At that time Chang Nai-ch'i proposed that there should be fewer calls for action, but more suggestions. But as the Kuomintang was oppressing the people, it was futile merely to make "suggestions" to it. To persist in armed resistance and combat the Kuomintang reaction, we had directly to call upon the masses of the people to rise and struggle against the Kuomintang. Gradually Chang Nai-ch'i realised his mistake.
5. This refers to the "Draft Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Party's Participation in the Government", drawn up on September 25, 1937. The text reads in full:

(1) The present situation in the armed resistance urgently calls for an all-nation government of the Anti-Japanese National United Front; only that can facilitate our leading the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war and defeating Japanese imperialism. The Communist Party is ready to participate in such a government, *i.e.* to shoulder directly and officially the administrative responsibilities in the government and play an active role in it. But such a government does not yet exist today. What exists today is still the government of the Kuomintang's one-party dictatorship.

(2) The Communist Party can participate in the government only when it is changed from one of the Kuomintang's one-party dictatorship into an all-nation government of the united front, *i.e.* when the present Kuomintang government (a) accepts the basic features of the Ten-Point Programme for Resistance to Japan and Salvation of the Nation which our Party has put forward and, on the basis of them, promulgates an administrative programme; (b) begins to show in actual practice that it sincerely wishes and endeavours to carry out this programme and achieve definite results; and

(c) permits the legal existence of the Communist Party's organisations and guarantees the freedom for the Communist Party to mobilise, organise and educate the masses.

(3) Before the Party's Central Committee decides to participate in the Central government, Party members in general are not to participate in any local government or in any administrative conference and committee of the administrative organs of the government, whether central or local. For such participation only blurs the features of Communists and prolongs the Kuomintang's dictatorship, and does harm rather than any good to the promotion of the establishment of a unified democratic government.

(4) But Communists can participate in the local governments of certain particular regions such as the war zones, where on the one hand the old rulers, unable to rule as before, are in the main willing to put into effect the proposals of the Communist Party and the Communist Party has obtained freedom of open activities, and on the other the present emergency has made Communist participation a necessity, in the opinion of both the people and the government. In areas occupied by the Japanese invaders, Communists should furthermore openly come forward as organisers of the political power of the anti-Japanese united front.

(5) Before the Communist Party openly joins the government, its participation in representative organs for discussing a democratic constitution and the lines of national salvation, such as an all-China national assembly, is permissible in principle. Thus the Communist Party should strive to get its members elected to the assembly so that they can make use of that forum to propagate the proposals of the Communist Party in order to achieve the aim of mobilising the people and organising them round the Communist Party and urging the establishment of a unified democratic government.

(6) Based on a given common programme and on the principle of absolute equality, the Central Committee and local headquarters of the Communist Party can form, with the Central Committee and local headquarters of the Kuomintang, united front organisations, such as various joint committees (*e.g.* national revolutionary leagues, committees for mass movements, committees for mobilisation in the war zones, etc.); the Communist Party should, through such actions taken jointly with the Kuomintang, achieve co-operation with it.

(7) When the Red Army is redesignated as part of the National Revolutionary Army and the organs of Red political power turned into governments of special regions, their representatives can, by means of the legal status they have acquired, join all military and mass organisations that facilitate resistance to Japan and the salvation of the nation.

(8) It is entirely necessary to maintain the Communist Party's absolutely independent leadership in what originally was the Red Army as well as in all guerrilla units, and Communists are not permitted to show any vacillation in principle on this issue.

6. This refers to the tendency then existing among some comrades within the Party, who proposed to turn the system of political power in the revolutionary base areas—system of the people's representative conferences—into a parliamentary system of a bourgeois state.
7. Following the northward shift of the Central Red Army in October 1934, the Red guerrilla units which stayed in fourteen areas in the provinces of Kiangsi,

Fukien, Kwangtung, Hunan, Hupeh, Honan, Chekiang and Anhwei carried on a guerrilla war in extremely difficult circumstances. When the Anti-Japanese War began, they, following the directives of the Party centre, entered into negotiations with the Kuomintang that civil war be stopped and that they themselves be organised into a single army and dispatched to the front to fight Japan (the army into which they were subsequently organised was the New Fourth Army which stubbornly fought the Japanese along the southern and northern banks of the Yangtze river). While negotiations were going on, Chiang Kai-shek plotted to seize the occasion to wipe out the guerrillas. Comrade Ho Ming, a leader of the guerrilla forces in the Fukien-Kwangtung border area, one of the fourteen areas, was not vigilant enough towards Chiang Kai-shek's intrigue. Consequently more than one thousand guerrillas under his command were encircled and disarmed by the Kuomintang after they had been assembled.

8. Organ of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, founded in Yen-an in 1937. It was superseded by the *Liberation Daily* in 1941.
9. This refers to a section of the national bourgeoisie whose interests were then represented by newspapers like *Shen Pao* of Shanghai.
10. The former refers chiefly to the junior and middle-ranking officers in the Kuomintang armies and the latter chiefly to those among the C.C. Clique who held no power. Representing the interests of the oligarchic régime of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, both the *Fu Hsing* Society and the C.C. Clique were fascist organisations within the Kuomintang, headed by Chiang Kai-shek and Ch'en Li-fu respectively. Many members of petty-bourgeois origin joined them under compulsion or through blandishments.

NOTICE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SHENSI-KANSU-NINGSIA BORDER REGION AND THE REAR HEADQUARTERS OF THE EIGHTH ROUTE ARMY

1. Originally a revolutionary base area built up in the course of the revolutionary guerrilla war in northern Shensi after 1931. When the Central Red Army arrived in northern Shensi after the Long March, it became the central base area of the revolution and the seat of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. With the formation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front in 1937, the area was given its present name. It included twenty-three counties on the borders of Shensi, Kansu and Ningsia.
2. By 1936 the policy of confiscating the land of the landlords for distribution among the peasants and of cancelling the old debts of the peasants had already been carried out in most parts of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region. Since then the Chinese Communist Party, in order to establish an extensive Anti-Japanese National United Front, substituted on a nation-wide scale the policy of reducing rent and interest for the policy of confiscating the land of the landlords, but it continued to protect resolutely the fruits which the peasants had already gained in the agrarian reform.

STRATEGIC PROBLEMS IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE GUERRILLA WAR

1. A mountain range on the north-eastern border of China. After the incident of September 18, 1931, it became an anti-Japanese base area of the guerrilla forces led by the Chinese Communist Party.
2. A mountain range on the borders between Shansi, Hopeh and the old Chahar provinces. In October 1937 the Eighth Route Army led by the Chinese Communist Party started building the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh anti-Japanese base area with the Wutai mountain region as centre.
3. A mountain range on the borders between Shansi, Hopeh and Honan provinces. In November 1937 the Eighth Route Army started building the anti-Japanese base area in south-eastern Shansi with the Taihang region as centre.
4. Situated in central Shantung, the Tai mountain is one of the leading peaks of the Taiyi mountain range. In the winter of 1937 the guerrilla forces led by the Chinese Communist Party started building the central Shantung base area with the Taiyi mountain region as its centre.
5. A mountain range on the border of Hopeh and Jehol provinces. In the summer of 1938 the Eighth Route Army started building the eastern Hopeh anti-Japanese base area with the Yen mountain region as its centre.
6. Situated in southern Kiangsu. In June 1938, the New Fourth Army led by the Chinese Communist Party started building the southern Kiangsu anti-Japanese base area with the Mao mountain region as its centre.
7. Experience in the Anti-Japanese War proved that it was possible to establish on the plains base areas which can be held for a long time or even permanently. This was due to the vastness of China's territory, the immensity of her population, the correctness of the Communist Party's policy, the extensive mobilisation of the people, the insufficient number of the enemy forces, etc. Comrade Mao Tse-tung clearly established this point in the specific directives he wrote afterwards.
8. Referring to the *kaoliang* fields where the guerrillas could easily hide themselves.
9. An old Chinese game of chess, in which each player tries to surround the pieces of his opponent. When a player's pieces are encircled by those of his opponent they are counted as captured. But if certain blank spaces are secured among the encircled pieces, then these pieces are "alive", *i.e.* in no danger of being captured.
10. In 353 B.C. the state of Wei laid siege to Hantan, capital of the state of Chao. The king of Ch'i ordered T'ien Chi and Sun Pin to lead an army to rescue Chao. Knowing that Wei had dispatched its crack forces to attack Chao and that its own territory was therefore weakly garrisoned, Sun Pin invaded Wei; thereupon the Wei troops returned to defend their own country. Taking advantage of the exhaustion of the Wei troops, the Ch'i troops engaged them at Kweiling (now north-east of Hotseh county in Shantung) and routed them. The siege of Chao was thus lifted. Hence Chinese strategists refer to similar tactics as "relieving the Kingdom of Chao by besieging the Kingdom of Wei."

ON THE PROTRACTED WAR

1. This theory of national subjugation represented the Kuomintang's view. The Kuomintang had never been willing to fight Japan and fought only under compulsion. After the Lukouchiao Incident (July 7, 1937), while Chiang Kai-shek's clique reluctantly joined the War of Resistance, Wang Ching-wei's clique, advocating the theory of national subjugation, prepared to capitulate to Japan and subsequently did so. This view, however, not only existed in the Kuomintang but also affected a section of the middle stratum of society and even some backward sections of the labouring masses. Pessimism prevailed among the backward section of the people, because the Kuomintang government, corrupt and impotent, lost one battle after another, while the Japanese troops advanced unchecked and reached the vicinity of Wuhan within a year.
2. During the first six months of the Anti-Japanese War, some people within the Communist Party tended to belittle the enemy and regard Japan as not worth a rap. They were aware of the fact that the troops and the organised section of the people under the leadership of the Communist Party were then not yet very strong, but they thought that the Kuomintang, then fighting in the War of Resistance, was quite powerful and, in co-ordination with the Communist Party, could deal effective blows to Japan. They saw only one aspect of the Kuomintang, that it was resisting Japan, but overlooked the other aspect, that it was reactionary and corrupt, and therefore made this erroneous appraisal.
3. Compelled to resist Japan, Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang reposed their hopes solely on prompt foreign aid. They did not believe in their own strength, much less in the strength of the people.
4. Referring to the victory which the Chinese won in March 1938 at Taierhchwang, a town in southern Shantung, by matching 400,000 troops against 70,000-80,000 Japanese invaders.
5. This view was expressed in an editorial in the *Ta Kung Pao*, then the organ of the Political Science Group of the Kuomintang. Opportunist in outlook, this group hoped that a few more victories like the one scored at Taierhchwang would halt Japan's advance. In that case it would be unnecessary to mobilise the forces of the people for a protracted war which would be a menace to the security of their own class. This opportunism prevailed throughout the whole Kuomintang.
6. The English text is based on Edgar Snow's version in his *Red Star Over China*, with some additions, deletions and alterations made according to the Chinese text.
7. Led by K'ang Yu-wei, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, T'an Szu-t'ung and others, this reformist movement stood for the interests of a section of the liberal bourgeoisie and the enlightened landlords. Although backed by Emperor Kuanghsu, it had no mass basis. When Yuan Shih-k'ai, with armed forces at his disposal, betrayed the reformists to the Empress Dowager, head of the die-hard clique, the Empress regained political power and had Emperor Kuanghsu imprisoned, and T'an Szu-t'ung and five others beheaded. Thus the movement ended in a tragic defeat.
8. In this statement the Japanese cabinet expressed its determination to subjugate China by armed forces. At the same time it attempted to intimidate and coax the Kuomintang government into capitulation, declaring that if the

- Kuomintang government "continued to conduct the War of Resistance", the Japanese government would no longer accept it as the party to negotiate with and would set up in China a new, puppet régime.
9. A popular Chinese label for the Japanese invaders.
10. Referring chiefly to the capitalists of the United States.
11. Referring to the governments of imperialist countries like Britain, France and the United States.
12. What Comrade Mao Tse-tung anticipated here took place in China's liberated areas under the leadership of the Communist Party. But in the Kuomintang-controlled areas, the ruling bloc headed by Chiang Kai-shek not only failed to make progress but gradually retrogressed as a result of its passive resistance to Japan and active opposition to the Communist Party and the people. Such a development, however, aroused the broad masses of the people to combat Kuomintang oppression. For a detailed analysis see *On Coalition Government*, Vol. IV of the *Selected Works*.
13. A view held by all the reactionary leaders of the Kuomintang, including Chiang Kai-shek. It predicted that China would face certain defeat in the Anti-Japanese War because she was poorly armed.
14. See Note 9 to *Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War*.
15. A metaphor from the famous fantasy, the *Pilgrimage to the West*, written in the sixteenth century. Sun Wu-k'ung, the hero of the novel, is a monkey who can cover the distance of 108,000 *li* by turning a somersault. Yet when he was induced to get on to the palm of the Buddha, he could not get out of it, however hard he tried. Eventually Buddha spread his palm and transformed his fingers into five big mountains with Sun immobilised under them.
16. See Note 6 to *On the Tactics of Fighting Japanese Imperialism*, Vol. I of the *Selected Works*.
17. The title of one of Georgi Dimitrov's articles published in July 1937. Early in August 1935, in his report to the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, entitled *The Fascist Offensive and the Task of the Communist International*, Dimitrov remarked that "fascism is unbridled chauvinism and predatory war". (Georgi Dimitrov, *Selected Speeches and Articles*, p. 44, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1951.)
18. Lenin, *Selected Works*, English ed. (*in 12 volumes*), Vol. V, p. 179. See also Lenin, *Socialism and War*, Chapter I and *The Collapse of the Second International*, Section 3.
19. This remark occurs in the third chapter of *Sun Tsu*. Cf. Lionel Giles's English translation (with the Chinese text), *Sun Tsu on the Art of War*, pp. 17-26.
20. Chengpu, situated in Pu, a county in Shantung province bordering on northern Honan, was in 632 B.C. the scene of a big battle between the states of Chin and Ch'u. At first Ch'u got the upper hand. The Chin troops, after making a retreat of 90 *li* (about 30 miles), dealt severe blows at the weak points of their enemy, *i.e.* his right and left flanks, and thus routed him completely.
21. The battle took place in 204 B.C. at Tsingsing, Shansi. The troops of Chao Hsieh, said to be 200,000 strong, were several times those of the Han. But the Han troops, under the command of Han Hsin, fought valiantly with their backs to the river. Meanwhile Han Hsin had dispatched one of his units to attack and occupy the enemy's weakly garrisoned rear. Thus caught between pincers, Chao's troops were utterly defeated.
22. A Chinese proverb used to describe groundless doubts and false alarms. In

- A.D. 383, Fu Chien, the ruler of Ch'in, making light of the forces of Chin, sent his troops to attack them. But presently the Chin troops defeated his advance units at Lochien of Showyang county, Anhwei, and proceeded farther both on land and by water. Ascending the city wall of Showyang, Fu Chien noticed the excellent alignments of the enemy forces and, mistaking the woods and bushes on Mount Pakung for enemy soldiers, became scared. Cf. Note 27 to *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War*, Vol. I of the *Selected Works*.
23. Referring to the fact that Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, having betrayed in 1927 the first national democratic united front of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, launched war against the people for ten years and thus made the extensive organisation of the Chinese people impossible. The Kuomintang reactionaries headed by Chiang Kai-shek should be held responsible for this historical blunder.
 24. Hsiang Kung was the Duke of Sung who reigned in the seventh century B.C. in the Era of Spring and Autumn. In 638 B.C., Sung fought with the powerful state of Ch'u. Having deployed his forces, the Duke saw that the Ch'u troops were just crossing the river. One of his officers suggested that, as the Ch'u troops were numerically stronger, this was the moment for an attack. But the Duke said: "No, a gentleman should never attack people who are unprepared." When the Ch'u troops had crossed the river but had not yet completed their battle alignment, the officer again proposed an immediate attack, and again the Duke said: "No, a gentleman should never attack an army which has not yet completed its battle alignment." The Duke ordered the attack only after the Ch'u troops were fully prepared. As a result, the Sung troops met with a disastrous defeat and the Duke himself was wounded. (See the chronicle of the twenty-second year of Duke Hsi, in *Tso Chuan*.)
 25. Han Fu-ch'u, one of the Kuomintang warlords, was for many years the ruler of Shantung. When, after occupying Peking and Tientsin in 1937, the Japanese invaders advanced southward along the Tientsin-Pukow railway to attack Shantung, Han took to flight all the way from Shantung to Honan without fighting a single battle.
 26. A county in Honan province.
 27. Referring to the Kuomintang methods of conscription. The former meant seizing people at random and pressing them into service, the unfortunate victims being bound with ropes and treated like convicts. The latter meant that anyone with money could bribe the Kuomintang officials and buy a substitute for himself.

THE ROLE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE NATIONAL WAR

1. In his *Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the Eighteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.)* in March 1939, Stalin said: "After a correct political line has been worked out and tested in practice, the Party cadres become the decisive force in the work of guiding the Party and the state." In his *Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.)*, delivered in January 1934, he also said, "Furthermore, after the correct political line has been laid down, organisational work decides everything,

- including the fate of the political line itself, its success or failure." In his *Address to the Graduates from the Red Army Academies*, delivered in May 1935 at the Kremlin, Stalin again put forward and elucidated the slogan: "Cadres decide everything." In this address J. V. Stalin also dealt with the question of "proper selection of personnel".
2. That is, dating from the emergency meeting held in August 1927 by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee elected at the Party's Fifth National Congress.
 3. A meeting called by the Party's Central Political Bureau in August 1935 at Pasi, north-west of the county town of Sungpan situated between north-western Szechwan and south-eastern Kansu. At that time Chang Kuo-t'ao took command of a section of the Red Army and broke away from the Central Committee, refusing to take orders from it and attempting to destroy it. At this meeting the Central Committee decided to leave the zone of danger for northern Shensi with those forces of the Red Army which obeyed its directions. Subsequently Chang Kuo-t'ao led the Red Army units deluded by him southward to the area of Tienchuan, Lushan, the Big and Small Chinchwan and Ahbah, where he established a bogus party centre and raised the banner of rebellion against the Party.
 4. An enlarged meeting of the Central Political Bureau of the Party held in Yen-an in April 1937. The large number of cadres and soldiers of the Red Army units under Chang Kuo-t'ao's leadership had already become aware of his deception and marched northward for the Shensi-Kansu border region. On their way, a section of them, misled owing to mistakes on the part of their leadership into switching westward to the area of Kanchow, Liangchow and Suchow, were mostly wiped out by the enemy, while the rest reached Sinkiang but later returned to the Shensi-Kansu border region. By then the other section had long since reached the Shensi-Kansu border region and joined forces with the Central Red Army. Chang Kuo-t'ao himself also arrived in northern Shensi and attended the Yen-an meeting which systematically and conclusively condemned his opportunism and rebellion against the Party. He pretended to acquiesce in the condemnation but actually made preparations for his final betrayal of the Party.
 5. For a detailed description see *Oppose the Party "Eight-Legged Essay"*, Vol. IV of the *Selected Works*.
 6. These are Confucius's words. See *Analects*, Chap. 7.

THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENCE AND AUTONOMY WITHIN THE UNITED FRONT

1. A quotation from *Mencius*.
2. From V. I. Lenin's, *Philosophical Notebooks: Excerpts from Hegel's "Lectures on Philosophy"*.



PROBLEMS OF WAR AND STRATEGY

1. In 1924 Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in alliance with the Communist Party and the revolutionary workers and peasants, defeated the "Merchants Corps"—an armed force of the compradors and landed gentry which, collaborating with the British imperialists, carried on counter-revolutionary activities in Canton. Early in 1925 the revolutionary army, formed on the basis of the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation, set out from Canton on an eastward expedition and, with the support of the peasants, defeated the troops of the warlord Chien Chiung-ming. Then it returned to Canton and overthrew the Kwangsi and Yunnan warlords who had entrenched themselves there. In the autumn of the same year the revolutionary army embarked on a second eastward expedition and finally annihilated all the remnant forces of Ch'en Chiung-ming. Members of the Communist Party and the Communist Youth League bravely stood at the forefront of these campaigns, through which political unity was brought about in Kwangtung and the foundations were laid for the Northern Expedition.
2. J. V. Stalin, *On the Perspectives of the Revolution in China*.
3. Cf. Section IV of the Appendix, *Resolution on Some Historical Problems*, Vol. IV of the *Selected Works*.
4. Dr. Sun Yat-sen formed a small revolutionary organisation, called the *Hsing Chung Society*, in Honolulu in 1894. With the support of the secret societies among the people, Dr. Sun Yat-sen staged two armed insurrections in Kwangtung against the Manchu régime, one at Canton in 1895 and the other at Hweichow in 1900. These insurrections took place after the Manchu régime was defeated in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895.
5. The Chinese Revolutionary League (the *T'ung Meng Society*) was formed in 1905 through the merging of the *Hsing Chung Society* and two other anti-Manchu groups—the *Hua Hsing Society* and the *Kuang Fu Society*. Being a united front organisation of the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie and a section of the anti-Manchu gentry, it put forward a programme of bourgeois revolution advocating "the expulsion of the Tartars [Manchus], the recovery of China, the establishment of a republic and the equalisation of land ownership". In the period of the Chinese Revolutionary League, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, allying with the secret societies and part of the new army of the Manchu government, staged a number of armed insurrections against the Manchu régime, notably those at Pingsiang, Liuyang and Liling in 1906, at Hwang-kang, Chaochow, at Chinchow, and at Chennan pass in 1907, at Hokow, Yunnan, in 1908 and at Canton in 1911. The last was followed in the same year by the Wuchang uprising which led to the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty.
6. In 1912, as a result of a compromise with the régime of the warlords of the Northern clique headed by Yuan Shih-k'ai, the Chinese Revolutionary League was reorganised into the Kuomintang. In 1913 Yuan's troops marched southward to suppress the forces which had arisen during the Revolution of 1911 in the provinces of Kiangsi, Anhwei and Kwangtung. Resistance was put up at Dr. Sun's instance but was crushed shortly. Realising the inadvisability of the Kuomintang's policy of compromise, Dr. Sun went to Japan in 1914 and formed in Tokyo the Chinese Revolutionary Party (*Chung Hua Ke Ming Tang*) as an organisation separate from the Kuomintang. This new party was

- actually an anti-Yuan Shih-k'ai alliance of the political representatives of a section of the petty bourgeoisie and a section of the bourgeoisie. Through the efforts of the Chinese Revolutionary Party, Dr. Sun Yat-sen staged a minor insurrection in Shanghai in 1914. In 1915, when Yuan Shih-k'ai proclaimed himself emperor and Ts'ai Ngo and other opponents to Yuan started a punitive expedition from Yunnan, Dr. Sun was a most active advocate and agitator for armed opposition to Yuan Shih-k'ai.
7. In 1917 Dr. Sun Yat-sen went from Shanghai to Canton at the head of a naval force which had been influenced by his revolutionary propaganda. Using Kwangtung as a base and allying with warlords of the South-west clique who were opposed to Tuan Ch'i-jui, warlord of the Northern clique, he organised an anti-Tuan military government.
 8. In 1921 Dr. Sun Yat-sen planned a northern expedition from Kweilin, Kwangsi. But his plan was frustrated by the mutiny of his subordinate, Ch'en Chiung-ming, who was in league with the warlords of the Northern clique.
 9. A military academy which Dr. Sun Yat-sen established in 1924 at Whampoa, near Canton, after the reorganisation of the Kuomintang and with the help of the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union. Before Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal of the revolution in 1927, the academy was run jointly by the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Among other Communists, Chou En-lai, Yeh Chien-ying, Yun Tai-ying and Hsiao Ch'u-nu held responsible posts at Whampoa at different times. Many of the cadets were Communists and members of the Communist Youth League, who formed the revolutionary core of the academy.
 10. A native of Hunan and member of the *Han Lin Academy* under the Manchu régime. An opportunist, he advocated constitutional monarchy, and then took part in the Revolution of 1911. He later joined the Kuomintang camp as a result of the contradiction between the landlords of Hunan and the warlords of the Northern clique.
 11. A political party which Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and his followers organised under the aegis of Yuan Shih-k'ai during the early days of the Republic.
 12. A follower of Yuan Shih-k'ai of long standing, he became the head of the warlords of the Anhwei group in the Northern clique. After Yuan's death, he seized power several times in the Peking government.
 13. An extremely rightist political group formed in 1916 by members of both the Progressive Party and the Kuomintang. Making political capital out of the situation existing between the warlords of the Southern and Northern cliques, members of the Political Science Group succeeded in grabbing government posts. During the Northern Expedition of 1926-7 its pro-Japanese members, including Huang Fu, Chang Ch'un and Yang Yung-t'ai, began to collaborate with Chiang Kai-shek and, with their reactionary political experience, helped him to build up a counter-revolutionary régime.
 14. Referring to the "Chinese Youth Party" or the "*Étatiste Group*". See note 1 to *Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society*, Vol. I of the *Selected Works*.
 15. Referring chiefly to the independent regiment led by General Yeh T'ing, a Communist, during the period of the Northern Expedition. See note 15 to *The Struggle in the Chinglang Mountains*, Vol. I of the *Selected Works*.
 16. See *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War*, Vol. I of the *Selected Works*, and fourth section of the Appendix, *Resolution on Some Historical Problems*, Vol. IV of the *Selected Works*.

17. See the third section of the Appendix, *Resolution on Some Historical Problems*, Vol. IV of the *Selected Works*.
18. Han Fu-ch'u was a Kuomintang warlord in Shantung. Liu Chih, a warlord commanding Chiang Kai-shek's personal troops in Honan, was responsible for the defence of the Paoting area in Hopeh at the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War. Both of them fled before the Japanese.