




SELECTED WORKS
OF
ZHU DE

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!



朱德

SELECTED WORKS OF ZHU DE

Translated by

The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation
of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin
Under the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of China

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EDITORIAL NOTE

Comrade Zhu De was a great Marxist, proletarian revolutionary and strategist and an outstanding leader of the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese people's army and the People's Republic of China. In China's democratic and socialist revolutions and in its socialist construction, he applied the universal truth of Marxism to the solution of practical problems China faced in the people's war, the building of the people's army, Party building and economic development. He made brilliant contributions to the formation and development of Mao Zedong Thought, especially of Mao Zedong's military thinking.

To assist our readers in their study of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, the history of the Chinese revolution and China's national construction and the life and thought of Comrade Zhu De, we have edited for publication the *Selected Works of Zhu De*. In his revolutionary career, Comrade Zhu De gained rich practical experience, and he wrote many works, especially on military issues. This volume contains the most important ones, many of which are published here for the first time.

Writings which were published during Comrade Zhu De's lifetime or whose manuscripts are available are reproduced here in their original form with a minimum of editing for language or to correct factual errors. Transcripts of speeches, however, have been edited.

Editorial Committee for Party
Literature, Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China

May 1983

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HOW TO FORGE AN INVINCIBLE RED ARMY

July 1931

Forging an invincible Red Army is one of the most urgent and vital tasks now facing the Party. Such an army must have the following six basic characteristics:

First, the class identity of the army should be safeguarded.

The Red Army is an army of workers and peasants, and can be considered the army of the entire labouring people. The historical task of the Red Army is to seize political power, establish and consolidate the workers' and peasants' Soviet regime¹ and liberate the proletariat and all other labouring people, both politically and economically. To fulfil this historical task, the class identity of the Red Army must be safeguarded, that is to say, only the labouring masses of workers and peasants are qualified to join.

The Chinese Red Army has grown with the expansion of the agrarian revolution. Most of its soldiers are farm labourers and poor and middle peasants who have benefited from this revolution. Its military cadres, and especially its leading political cadres, should come primarily from among the advanced urban proletarians. Farm labourers' unions and poor peasants' leagues in the countryside, and urban trade union councils in particular, should periodically send members who have a firm political stand to the Red Army in order to strengthen and expand it. This applies all the more to guerrilla and Red Guard activists who are experienced in struggle, as both present and past experience has shown.

Second, there should be unconditional leadership by the Communist Party.

This article, slightly abridged here, was first published in instalments in Nos. 2 and 3, July 1931, of the journal *Combat*, the organ of the Soviet Area Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

The Communist Party is the vanguard of the proletariat. Only under its correct leadership can the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army fulfil its great historical task. The guerrilla war waged before the emergence of the Red Army was also led by the Communist Party. By adopting the correct tactics of carrying out the agrarian revolution and winning over the masses, the Communist Party has gradually transformed the guerrilla forces into the Red Army, which it is expanding and strengthening step by step. It has begun to organize large-scale revolutionary warfare in order to put an end to the constant fighting among warlords, spread the Soviet movement, establish stable revolutionary base areas and set up a central government. Only under the leadership of the Communist Party can the Red Army determinedly fulfil this great and difficult task by correctly co-ordinating all the revolutionary forces in the country, acquiring a true understanding of the relationship between the world revolution and the Chinese revolution and working out a successful strategy.

The liquidationists² claim that the agrarian revolution owes its development to the peasants' leadership over the proletarians, that is, the leadership of those in the countryside over those in the cities. They even vilify the Red Army as "a gang of bandits and gangsters" that will soon be eliminated. They simply deny that the Red Army was established and has grown under the direct leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and that it is being further strengthened and expanded with the deepening of the agrarian revolution and the support of the poor rural masses. If the Kuomintang and the imperialists have realized that the Red Army is a great revolutionary armed force born under the direct leadership of the Communist Party, we, from our own class standpoint, should be all the more clear about this. We must ensure that the military command in the Red Army, and particularly political training and the system of political commissars, be under the undivided leadership of the Communist Party.

The vanguard of the proletariat — that is, the Communist Party — exercises its leadership in the Red Army through the Army's political commissars and political departments. The political departments, directed by political commissars, are part of our Soviet political apparatus and implement the Party's political line and discipline in the Red Army. Thus the work of Party organizations in the Red Army should be directed by the political commissars and political departments. It is clearly stipulated in the No. 1 directive issued to the Red Army by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist

Party that political commissars in the Red Army are representatives of the central Soviet regime and of the Party, and that they therefore bear the same responsibilities as military commanders for strengthening discipline, raising political consciousness and increasing combat effectiveness among the troops. The Party and Youth League organizations have as their main tasks the raising of the political consciousness of the Red fighters and of the masses, and the strengthening of the army's combat effectiveness and discipline. Because the political commissars bear overall responsibility for the army, they also bear responsibility for the Party organizations.

We can set up an effective system of political commissars in the Red Army and ensure correct Party leadership only by following the above-mentioned directive. Further, the Party should pay great heed at all levels to the selection of political commissars. They should be the most loyal, brave and firm Communists, with a high level of class consciousness; the best cadres of worker origin should be trained to serve as political commissars. Only by doing these things can we consolidate the correct leadership of the Party in the Red Army and build the Red Army into one of iron strength.

Third, importance should be attached to political training.

The fundamental difference between the Red Army's political training and that of the bourgeois army lies in the fact that the Red Army opposes the bourgeois practice of turning political training into a means of blurring class consciousness or into fine-sounding but empty phrases that transcend class. In the Red Army, political training is aimed at awakening and raising the proletarian consciousness of commanders and fighters so that they will be aware of their own interests, apply themselves to the political tasks of their own class and fight resolutely against the enemy, thus achieving the goal of destroying the enemy and liberating their own class. If we are to forge an invincible Red Army, we should first of all make the commanders and fighters fully believe in the leadership of the Communist Party; they should be made to understand that the Communist Party is duty-bound to guide the alliance of the workers and peasants, that the proletariat has to play the leading role in the revolution, that the class nature of the revolutionary war is the liberation of the workers, peasants and other labouring people throughout the country, and that their active fulfilment of the tasks in the war is for the purpose of achieving overall victory; they should be made to understand that the masses possess great strength and that the Red Army must keep close ties

with them; they should also be made to understand that complete victory in the present stage of the Chinese revolution depends on the co-ordination of the revolutionary efforts in four respects: expansion of the Red Army, and insurrections by the workers, by the peasants and by the soldiers. Above all, they should keep abreast of current developments in the Chinese revolution and be clear about its prospects and the current upswing in the Chinese and world revolutions. They should realize that political and economic tension and panic in the enemy camp as a whole are favourable to the Chinese revolution, and they should be fully convinced that the Red Army under the leadership of the Communist Party can defeat the counter-revolutionary Kuomintang and imperialism, which are now on the decline.

To acquire such a firm political belief is to grasp an invisible and invincible weapon and to lay the spiritual foundation for forging an invincible Red Army. When we have done this, we can overcome any difficulty in the course of the revolution, survive any fierce struggle and grow more courageous with each battle until we achieve final victory.

Fourth, there must be advanced military techniques.

Technology advances day by day, assuming an increasingly important role in warfare and requiring more sophisticated training. Moreover, developments in technology require changes in general tactics.

China, although it is technologically backward, began employing advanced military techniques more than half a century ago. Tactics learned from the Japanese and Germans have been applied for almost as long. It is true that for now the tactics and techniques employed by the Chinese warlords lag far behind those of the imperialists, but with the latter constantly giving military supplies and assistance to the former, the war in China has gradually been modernized. New weapons are being introduced from different countries and are becoming more and more sophisticated. It is, therefore, imperative for the Red Army to develop tactics superior to the enemy's and to learn to use new weapons so that we can wield them as soon as they are captured from the enemy.

In the course of protracted guerrilla warfare, the Chinese Red Army has gained a lot of tactical experience. It particularly learned a good deal in mountain combat in south China, and it developed a vigorous offensive spirit. But as the scale of the modern revolutionary war grows, it is no longer enough to charge forward bravely, and the

current level of our fighting experience is inadequate to meet objective needs. We must, therefore, make a special effort to speed up the development of tactics. We must prepare to fight on a nationwide scale and to fight directly against the imperialists. Actually, the Red Army has exchanged fire with the imperialists' cannons and planes on many occasions at Longzhou and Changsha and along the middle reaches of the Changjiang River.³

The decision of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Party Central Committee to change the organizational structure of the Red Army has strengthened its combat effectiveness. In the new edition of the Red Army manual, all formalistic contents have been removed and emphasis has been put on attacks on field fortifications. This has been done to meet the needs arising from the expansion of the revolution and to herald the development of tactics and techniques for an invincible Red Army.

Fifth, there must be voluntary observance of strict discipline.

The Red Army's code of discipline accords with the class interests, the interests of the revolution and the overall needs of the revolutionary struggle. Discipline in the Red Army applies equally to both commanders and soldiers. This is entirely different from discipline in the White army, which is meant solely to oppress the soldiers. In the Red Army, discipline is definitely not maintained by beating and swearing. It is established on the basis of proletarian unity and is voluntarily observed through mutual supervision and encouragement in the spirit of self-criticism and education. In struggles against the enemy, the Red Army men not only act in unison but also share the same determination; they do not jeopardize the interests of their class and the revolution, but struggle for them and even are prepared to lay down their lives for them.

By fostering and heightening the spirit of conscientiously observing discipline, we turn the loyalty, courage and sense of discipline of individual commanders and fighters into universal qualities throughout the army. The Red Army will be iron-strong if its discipline is conscientiously observed.

Sixth, there must be centralized command and unified training.

The Red Army is a special organization of the Soviet political power. It must not only fulfil the tasks of the workers' and peasants' democratic revolution but also serve as the mainstay in the building and safeguarding of socialism. It must fight not only the troops of the domestic warlords but also those of the imperialists, which are

armed with the most modern weapons and are better organized. The Red Army must, therefore, greatly improve its own organizational structure so as to adapt itself to the new circumstances under which it has to fight. We must institute unified training and centralized command. All actions taken by the Red Army should be as concentrated as possible in order to wipe out the armed forces of its class enemy. But here I would like to re-emphasize that the Red Army's combat effectiveness hinges not only on military techniques but mainly on its class consciousness and its political influence — on mobilizing the broad masses of workers and peasants to destroy the enemy troops.

Finally, I would like to emphasize that the forging of an invincible Red Army involves a process of struggle. It is now more necessary than ever for us to review and systematize the experience gained in the past period of the Red Army's struggle and, in accordance with the needs outlined above, build and expand an iron-strong Red Army and accomplish its great historical task.

THE GREAT VICTORY AND LESSONS OF THE HUANGBEI AND DONGBEI CAMPAIGNS

May 28, 1933

1. The campaigns.

The deployments of the enemy's "suppression" force were as follows:

Adopting the strategic principle of fighting on exterior lines and launching concerted attack by converging columns, commander-in-chief Chen Cheng was to direct his central route army (consisting of ten divisions in three columns) to encircle Lichuan, Jianning and Taining, centring around Fuzhou, and intercept us.

His plan of operations:

The 5th, 6th, 9th and 79th Divisions under Zhao Guantao, commander of the 3rd Column, marched on Lichuan from Jinxi for a frontal attack to block the Red Army's main force in the Jianning-Lichuan area.

The 14th, 10th and 90th Divisions under Wu Qiwei, commander of the 2nd Column, set out for Kangdu from Nancheng and Nanfeng to mount a flank attack on Lichuan, Jianning and Taining and cut off our retreat.

The 11th, 52nd and 59th Divisions under Luo Zhuoying, commander of the 1st Column, pushed on to Ningdu and Guangchang from Yihuang and Le'an to prevent our main force from retreating and to

In February and March 1935, the First Front Army of the Red Army under the command of Comrades Zhu De and Zhou Enlai defeated three enemy divisions in Huangbei and Dongbei of eastern Jiangxi by concentrating a superior force to destroy the enemy forces piecemeal in mobile warfare. In this article Comrade Zhu De summarized the experiences and lessons of these operations which broke the Kuomintang's fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaign against the Central Revolutionary Base Area. Here are six of its eight sections.

penetrate deep into the Central Soviet Area¹ to attack us from the rear.

The enemy devised this plan after we occupied Lichuan, Jianning and Taining and extended the Soviet area. The enemy thought an attack by converging columns on the new Soviet area would be the most advantageous.

This plan remained unchanged after our main force's attack on Nanfeng from Lichuan. After we abandoned our encirclement of Nanfeng,⁴ the 11th Red Army crossed the river at Xinfengjie to reach Lichuan. Its task was to pin down the enemy's 3rd Column, confuse his 2nd Column and continue to draw his troops towards Kangdu. Meanwhile, our main force advanced west towards Guangchang and Luokou. The enemy, unaware of our movements, kept to his original plan.

At this point, we ordered our main force to march west to attack the three divisions of the enemy's 1st Column. Since this column was the most threatening to our army, we decided to push towards Dongbei and Huangbei to engage it.

On February 27, our troops mounted a surprise attack on the 52nd and 59th Divisions at Dengxianqiao, Moluozhang, Huoyuan and Huangbei, scoring the unprecedented victory of wiping out the 52nd Division and four regiments of the 59th and capturing two divisional commanders.⁵

As a result, the enemy's central route army had to change its plan and transfer its 2nd and 3rd Columns to Yihuang as reinforcements. These forces arrived in Yihuang only to find that our army had withdrawn after its victory. The enemy then devised a new attack plan:

The three columns were regrouped into two and the strategy of converging attacks was changed into one of successive attacks by the two columns in an attempt to force a breakthrough in the middle.

Luo Zhuoying remained the 1st Column's commander, directing the 1st, 5th and 9th Divisions as a rear column.

Wu Qiwei remained the 2nd Column's commander, directing the 14th, 10th and 90th Divisions as a front column.

The 79th Division was to defend Yihuang and the 6th Division to defend Fuzhou. This would be done by sweeping down on Guangchang from Dongbei and Huangbei via Xinfengshi and Ganzhu.

The front and rear columns (consisting of six divisions) marched in succession, stretching over a line so long it was the equivalent of a three-day march. Failing to see this situation, the enemy attempted to break through the Red Army ranks in the middle, seize Guangchang

and make a political impact. Then he would order the left and right forces from Fujian and Guangdong provinces, respectively, to advance and converge on us.

Our plan was to smash the enemy's forces one by one. With the 11th Red Army tying down his front column and inducing it to move east, we were to allow the first four divisions to pass, then block the two rear column divisions (the 11th and the 9th). On March 21, when the enemy's front unit had reached Ganzhu, 45 kilometres away from the rear, and could not return to provide support, our forces at Dongbei, Caotaigang, Huangbaishan and Pilishan annihilated most of the 11th Division (with only one regiment left), part of the 9th and practically all the remaining troops of the 59th. On that night the remainder of these divisions withdrew to Huangbei, and the front column withdrew to Nanfeng. We thus frustrated the enemy's second attack plan and won another victory in the Dongbei campaign.

2. Successful application of the Red Army's main tactical principles — speed, secrecy and resoluteness.

After our forces withdrew from the encirclement of Nanfeng, the 11th Red Army moved east to confuse the enemy and reached its destination on time. As expected, the enemy mistook this army for our main force shifting east to Lichuan, when actually the main force marched south, then turned west and also arrived at its destination quickly. The enemy was unaware all along of our main force's whereabouts in the border area. The fact that several tens of thousands of manoeuvring Red Army troops were able to launch a surprise attack on the enemy indicates that secrecy was well maintained. This set a precedent of a large army mounting a surprise attack. The Red soldiers fought even more resolutely than before. They charged repeatedly at the Kuomintang forces with great courage until, after a dozen hand-to-hand battles, they took the highest enemy-occupied ridge. Here we have a superb example of Red Army tactics defeating, with comparative ease, enemy forces within a short time.

3. The guerrilla units, the independent divisions and regiments and the civilian authorities all acted in successful co-ordination with Red Army operations.

Our army has achieved much by focusing on guerrilla warfare. The 5th Independent Division was operating on a widening scale. The 4th Independent Division and the independent regiments and smaller guerrilla units at Yihuang, Le'an, Yongfeng and the Nanfeng-Guangchang area were also rather active. They did a good job of destroying

the enemy's transport lines, bridges and supplies, and in confusing the enemy and striking terror into his heart. Since the 21st Red Army marched north, there has been much better co-ordination between the guerrilla warfare and the operations of the Red Army's main force.

The guerrilla units played an important role both before and after the Dongbei and Huangbei campaigns. Many small guerrilla units harassed the enemy's 52nd and 59th Divisions from the front, rear and flanks, as the two divisions moved out of Le'an. When our main force launched an attack, these enemy units, which thought our operation was simply another guerrilla harassment, were wiped out.

During these two campaigns, our guerrilla forces attacked from the rear and both flanks, capturing many enemy troops, as well as many rifles, guns, ammunition and automatic weapons. They rejoiced over their victory which had struck terror into the enemy. After the campaigns, the enemy troops mistook the guerrilla units for the Red Army's main force and repeatedly set up camps and dug entrenched positions, reducing themselves to a state of utter exhaustion. All the while, the guerrillas were becoming more active.

Sovietization of the captured localities and the military area was done with some, though not very satisfactory, results. The masses stood on our side. And once Dongbei and Huangbei were occupied by the Yihuang County's Soviet and Independent Regiment, no information leaked out, and no reactionary forces embarrassed the Red Army in areas where decisive battles were fought. These were all favourable conditions for our army.

4. Lack of independent initiative remained a problem.

During the Huangbei campaign, we ordered the main force to fight its way from the left to the right in order to quickly finish off the enemy's 52nd and 59th Divisions, and then strike in the same direction at enemy reinforcements arriving from Yihuang, namely, to wipe out the 11th Division under Xiao Qian. Our instructions were clearly stated. But what occurred was that, during the encounter with the enemy on the 27th, our main force finished off part of the 52nd Division and captured its commander. By 9 a.m. on the 28th the battle was over. The one remaining regiment of the division withdrew to Dahua-shan, only to find itself encircled by our 21st Army. At this time, if part of our main force had swiftly launched a surprise attack on the enemy on the right by making a detour from the rear of his right flank, it would have been quite beneficial to us. Not only would the battle against the enemy force on the right have been completely finished

on the 28th, but we could have got the upper hand in meeting the enemy's 11th Division head-on on March 1. Regrettably, a unit of our main force sent only some of its men to help finish off the enemy regiment at Dahuashan, while the rest were assembled to await further orders. Another unit of our main force did act promptly at its own discretion to pursue the fleeing troops on the right, thus helping our units there. But it returned to regroup without cleaning up the remaining enemy force — a regiment, a radio unit and the military supply department of the 59th Division at Xiyuan. Because it took time to travel back and forth, a good opportunity was allowed to slip away.

On March 1, when our front army had finished off the enemy's two divisions, his 11th Division was arriving at Hekou to reinforce the troops at Huoyuan. This gave us an excellent opportunity to eliminate this division. However, due to a lack of independent initiative, our main force failed to move troops towards the right in advance. Meantime, the order for a general attack on the 11th Division at 11 a.m., March 1, did not arrive until the afternoon, when it was already too late. Because the reinforcements of the enemy's 2nd and 3rd Columns reached an area near Hekou on March 2, we could no longer spring an attack and thus had to disengage from battle.

The lesson in this campaign is that, though we have recently made progress in faithfully executing orders, our commanders at different levels failed to make the best use of their own initiative and undertake independent actions as expected by higher levels. Hence they did not completely fulfil their mission.

Obedying orders and displaying independent initiative are not contradictory. Functioning independently should never be mistaken for disobeying orders. It is also inadvisable to execute orders mechanically without exercising any independent initiative. Our combat manuals and field service regulations stress time and again that the Red Army must obey orders, but that it must also cultivate initiative and independently cope with specific situations. We must master this lesson if we are to achieve complete victory.

During the Dongbei campaign there was a similar lack of initiative and justifiable independent action. After the enemy's 11th Division was routed and mostly disarmed, the remaining regiment of the 59th Division was broken up by fleeing troops and partly disarmed. A reinforcing regiment from the enemy's 9th Division had the same problem and was later disarmed by us. While this threw the enemy into utter panic and confusion, our front-line commanders failed to

take the initiative to pursue, intercept and threaten the other parts of the enemy's retreating units. Even when the enemy troops were manoeuvring with great difficulty during their retreat by night, our commanders did not harass them with fire-power or send troops to pursue and defeat all of them. What a pity a good chance of beating the many with the few was completely lost. This made it possible for the remains of the enemy's 9th and 11th Divisions to escape to Yihuang.

5. Communications were not fully reliable.

Forces fighting on mountainous terrain experienced communication difficulties which we did not try to solve by making the best use of the equipment available. For example, although great efforts had been made to communicate by radio, the large numbers of telegrams to be sent and powerful static disturbances made it difficult to transmit the emergency orders on time. Since the transmitter-receiver was some distance from headquarters and was sometimes on the move, the order for the general attack on the enemy's 11th Division at 11 a.m., March 1, reached many of our units only in the afternoon. This delay was one of the reasons for their failure to co-ordinate actions to defeat that enemy division.

Recently we have communicated exclusively by radio and neglected alternatives. This is extremely dangerous because radio often breaks down and more often divulges secrets to the enemy.

Wired telephone is the most suitable means for commanding an operation. But the communications departments at various levels failed to install these devices on time, with the result that in the Dongbei and Huangbei campaigns transmission of orders from headquarters was often delayed. Flag signals, though rather useful on the mountainous terrain, were not employed because of inadequate training in their use.

Reports, orders and circulars, delivered by couriers, were seldom in writing and seldom reached the receivers on time.

6. Negligence in clearing the battlefield and dealing with other problems arising from battle.

Comrades charged with clearing the battlefield did not perform their duty in a systematic way: They picked up what they thought useful and ignored the rest, searched for light machine-guns and cast aside heavy ones, and gathered new-model supplies and discarded what they deemed outdated. Some even collected spare parts they needed personally, disregarding damage caused to the entire machine. We thus found some pieces of the captured equipment incomplete.

During the Huangbei campaign our troops on the right flank left uncollected some of the abandoned machine-guns, mortars and rifle bullet casings. True, the enemy's presence should be taken into account. But, given prompt attention, all the *matériel* could have been collected.

The day after the conclusion of the Dongbei campaign, various units reported that they had cleared the battlefield. Yet, a large group of people sent to the battlefield on the third day continued clearing for a week and collected more than 50,000 kilogrammes of war *matériel*, including rifles, carbines, pistols, Mausers, machine-guns and mortars, as well as countless bullets and bullet casings.

Thus it can be seen that most of our comrades have not yet realized that captured weapons and other equipment are the major source of supplies for the Red Army; and that we badly need even small spare parts or bullet casings.

Prisoners were also handled improperly. Since large numbers of prisoners were difficult to deal with all at once, the usual method was to give them some money and let them go. During the victorious Huangbei campaign, paid for with blood, more than 10,000 enemy troops were captured. All except some 3,000 were immediately released. Among those freed were many reactionary officers, including some brigade and regiment commanders. What a loss to us! These released captives were quickly reorganized and re-equipped by the enemy and sent back in two or three months to fight the workers and peasants. Our way of handling prisoners actually helped the enemy.

Having learned from the Huangbei experience, we did not release a single soldier or officer captured in the Dongbei campaign. The reactionary 11th Division was effectively destroyed. Most of its members were killed or wounded. Only a few fled. This made it impossible for the enemy to reactivate the division. We should step up our political work to induce prisoners to join the Red Army. Those who don't want to join should be transferred to other places and then released. This method can be more effective politically and can disrupt the enemy's military organization more thoroughly.

SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES CONCERNING TACTICS

1933

“Practice divorced from theory is like groping in the dark; theory divorced from practice is purposeless theory.” This is the slogan of the Soviet Union’s military academies, calling for the integration of theory with practice. Our Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, which emerged from the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal agrarian revolutionary war, does indeed have a rich fund of practical experience but, owing to the existing circumstances, it suffers from a general lack of theoretical study. It shoulders the great task of carrying out the agrarian revolution and the national liberation struggle, and of overthrowing feudalism and establishing Soviet political power nationwide.¹ Now, in the midst of large-scale offensives in the form of the four “encirclement and suppression” campaigns⁶ launched against us by the Kuomintang warlords at the instigation and with the support of the imperialists, and on the eve of a direct confrontation between the armed forces of the Chinese workers and peasants on the one hand and the imperialists on the other, our Red Army needs more than ever to improve its military capacity through practice and theoretical study. Its commanders and political commissars, in particular, should set an example in this respect. Proceeding from military theory and our practical experience in fighting, I would like to present some basic principles concerning tactics.

1. Red Army men should study and apply tactics from a materialist dialectical point of view. First of all, we should be aware that things change and so do situations. Therefore, hard and fast rules are impossible in commanding troops. Our battlefield decision depends

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on the specific task at hand, the enemy's situation and the terrain. Since all these change often, so must our decisions and, in particular, our tactics. For instance, swift action is necessary to check the enemy in an encounter, while for an attack on a defensive enemy, our tactics should cover the following stages: engaging the enemy, launching the attack, and charging forward. "Drinking soup" and "gnawing at a bone" (namely, attacking a weak enemy and a strong enemy), of course, require different tactics.

2. Whether you are using large armies or small detachments in your manoeuvres, you should choose the principal direction of assault and concentrate your maximum strength to engage the enemy in a decisive battle. It will be sufficient to deploy containing forces in the other directions, but you must actively attract the enemy's attention to yourselves to facilitate an assault in the principal direction. If you spread your forces out evenly in an attempt to cover all directions, you will not have the strength to hit out in any direction and you may even lose the battle altogether.

3. Generally speaking, strategy involves discovering the enemy's main strength, whereas tactics involves discovering his weak points. If you apply tactics by striking solely at his strong points, then his weak points will turn into strong ones, too. And if this prevents you from winning a tactical victory, it will be difficult for you to achieve your strategic objective. It should be understood that total victory is the aggregation of numerous small victories. If no effort is made to win small victories, where will the big victory come from?

4. To co-ordinate the actions of large troop formations, it is essential that each and every unit understand, when accepting an assignment, the essence of the superior's decision and what role its own task plays in carrying out that order. The deployed units should communicate with each other so as to co-ordinate their missions in executing the order. If the situation has changed and communications have been severed, they should function independently according to the superior's order and local conditions, which should not be interpreted as disobeying the superior's order.

5. The main goals of reconnaissance are to determine the enemy's precise situation and the terrain and to provide the commander with the relevant information so that he can issue appropriate orders. Commanders at various levels, therefore, should conduct reconnaissance in keeping with their particular missions. But only a limited amount of information can be gathered, and even less during battle. A com-

mander must not hesitate or give up a good opportunity because of inadequate reconnaissance. Often he must go among the outpost troops to get information more promptly so that he can make a quick decision and give timely orders.

6. When several paralleled columns operate together on mountainous terrain where paths are few and narrow and, moreover, do not run parallel to each other, they have to march in a long line and move very slowly. This will make it difficult for them to support each other by co-ordinated action, and especially to change the direction of the march. If an inferior army engaging a superior one on such mountainous terrain is well aware of the above features and operates secretly and quickly to wipe out the enemy forces piecemeal, and if it concentrates a superior force in a proper place and time for a decisive, lightning assault against the enemy columns — if it can do all this, the enemy forces will surely find it difficult to manoeuvre or get effective reinforcements. If our forces are caught in a pincer attack or encircled by several enemy columns and want to launch an assault against one of these columns, they should seek a wide interior arc where they can manoeuvre easily, and take advantage of a strategically important terrain to pin down the other columns. Otherwise it would be more advantageous to attack the exposed wing and rear of a single enemy column.

A LETTER TO CHEN JITANG⁷ ON THE QUESTION OF RESISTING JAPANESE AGGRESSION AND OPPOSING CHIANG KAI-SHEK

September 1934

Dear Mr. Bonan:

Your envoy Mr. Li has come and told me your intention. In recent years, Japanese imperialist aggression has intensified, while the traitors Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei have become increasingly open and shameless in their treachery. A vast portion of north China has already been lost to Japan, and the southeastern half of our motherland is in danger. No upright Chinese can shirk the urgent task of resisting Japan and saving the nation. There is no way out except to conduct a war of national revolution, and the prerequisite for victory in such a war is the uprooting of the Chinese traitors and collaborators. Over the past years, I and the hundreds of thousands of Red Army men have been fighting hard for the sole purpose of achieving the complete liberation of the Chinese nation, the restoration of its territorial integrity and the emancipation of the masses of workers and peasants. My comrades and I are deeply aware that to attain this objective we must fight jointly with other armed forces in China. Two years ago, the Chinese Soviet Government declared⁸ that the Red Army was ready to make an agreement on joint operations

During the operations against the Kuomintang's fifth campaign to "encircle and suppress" the Central Revolutionary Base Area, Comrade Zhu De and Zhou Enlai opened cease-fire talks with Chen Jitang aimed at forming a united front against Japan and Chiang Kai-shek. Comrade Zhu De sent this letter in the course of these talks which created favourable conditions for the Central Red Army to break through, at the initial stage of its Long March, the first blockade of the Kuomintang army.

against Japan with any unit which would stop attacking the Soviet areas,¹ give democratic rights to the people and arm them. Unfortunately, apart from Jiang Guangnai and Cai Tingkai,⁹ who last winter reached a preliminary agreement with the Red Army to fight jointly against Japan, in the past two years the Red Army has been the only force fighting Japan and opposing Chiang Kai-shek. Furthermore, there are quite a number of troops who are waiting for an opportunity to make an attempt on our rear and flanks. Recently you and your unit have declared the intention of collaborating with us in opposing Chiang Kai-shek and resisting Japan, an intention which my comrades and I naturally welcome. The situation, however, has become increasingly critical as the Japanese invaders are now preparing to have a try at south China, while Chiang Kai-shek is bending his knees before Japan, expanding his fascist organizations, contracting loans to purchase planes, and rushing reinforcements to Fujian and Jiangxi provinces. If we do not take quick action, not only will it be hard to preserve the temporary peace in Guangdong and Guangxi provinces, but the subjugation of the whole nation will not be far off. Therefore, the Red Army has decided to wage a decisive battle in October to smash Chiang Kai-shek's fifth campaign.¹⁰ By that time the vanguard detachment of our anti-Japanese troops¹¹ will have closed in on the city of Hangzhou, and our forces in Sichuan will have crossed the provincial border and be advancing eastwards to threaten Wuhan; the unit under Comrade He Long¹² and the units operating in Hunan will co-ordinate their action against the enemy forces there, while our main force, taking advantage of the enemy's panic, will deal with the troops under Chiang's direct control and fight a decisive battle to wipe them out. If your unit could then launch an attack on Zhangzhou and Longyan from Shanghang and Yongding, strike the front and rear of Jiang Dingwen's troops¹³ and then advance directly on Fuzhou while another unit makes a direct raid on Hengyang and Changsha from southern Hunan, then the traitor Chiang Kai-shek will find it hard to escape his doom. The task is urgent and any delay will make it too late. The battle in Fujian should serve as a warning to us.¹⁴ With a view to ensuring the speedy accomplishment of this task, I venture to put forward the following proposals, in accordance with the main ideas contained in our government declaration about two years ago:

1. Both sides should stop fighting and draw a demarcation line running along the river from Ganzhou to Xinfeng and Longnan, then passing through Anyuan, Xunwu and Wuping. The above cities, and

such suburbs as are within a five-kilometre radius of them, will all be under your jurisdiction. I hope you will instruct your troops beyond this line to move against Chiang.

2. Free trade between our two sides should be immediately restored.

3. In areas it controls at present as well as in the future, your army should ensure freedom of the press, speech, assembly and association, release all anti-Japanese and other revolutionary political prisoners, and make genuine efforts to arm the people.

4. Immediately start a political campaign against Chiang Kai-shek's treachery and his fascist conspiracy, and make serious preparations for military action against Japan and Chiang Kai-shek.

5. We would be grateful if you would purchase arms and ammunition on our behalf and make speedy delivery through Menling.¹⁵

If you approve of these proposals, I hope that you will make preparations to carry them out and that you will authorize and send a representative to Ruijin¹⁶ to discuss the plan of operations with us. In these few days I will send someone over to Divisional Commander Huang's¹⁷ headquarters at Menling to negotiate the matter at your convenience. To facilitate communications and contact, I hope we can agree on some special code, radio signals and wavelength and have the telephone lines between Huichang and Menling connected. As I am writing this letter in a hurry, I cannot go into more detail. I hope you will consider this matter and favour me with an early reply.

With best wishes.

Yours truly,
Zhu De

TELEGRAMS CONCERNING THE CAMPAIGN INVOLVING FOUR CROSSINGS OF THE CHISHUI RIVER

January-April 1935

I. PLAN OF OPERATIONS FOR THE FIRST CROSSING OF THE CHISHUI RIVER

03:00 Hours, January 29, 1935

1. The enemy troops we were fighting yesterday (the 28th) are Sichuan troops including three regiments of the Guo Xunqi brigade and three regiments of the Pan Zuo brigade. The brigade under Liao¹⁸ has arrived at the Xishui River, whereas the brigade under Mu¹⁹ has not. The last two brigades will probably draw close to the two brigades led by Guo and Pan. The brigade under Zhang,²⁰ in the area of the Chishui River, reached a point 2.5 kilometres from Hulunao yesterday. The brigade under Da²¹ is pressing close to Bingtan, while Fan Ziyong's brigade is reportedly moving from Xuyong to Gulin. The brigade under Liu²² is marching from Luzhou to Dashimu.

2. Our field armies are scheduled to disengage the enemy before dawn today (the 29th), cross the Chishui River and march west to the south of Gulin.

In January 1935, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held an enlarged meeting of its Political Bureau in Zunyi, Guizhou Province, which established Comrade Mao Zedong's leadership in both the Red Army and the Central Committee. After the Zunyi Meeting, the Red Army, under the command of Comrade Mao Zedong, with the assistance of Zhu De and other comrades, conducted the campaign involving four crossings of the Chishui River. Highly flexible

3. The division of labour among the various units, the routes they are to take and their operations today (the 29th) will be as follows:

a. The 1st Army Group,²³ the 9th Army Group,²⁴ the second and third echelons under the Military Commission and the Senior Cadres Unit of the Cadres Regiment²⁵ will be under Lin's²⁶ command, constituting the right column. Crossing the river at Yuanhou, this column will advance towards the south of Gulin by way of Huangniying and post guards according to the specific situation. However, the 9th Army Group must maintain, till the night of the 29th, security measures at Chuanfeng'ao and keep an eye on the enemy in the direction of the Chishui River.

b. The first echelon under the direct command of the Military Commission, the Cadres Regiment and the 5th Division, which last will remain under the command of Peng and Yang,²⁷ will constitute the central column. This column will cross the river by the pontoon bridge downstream from Tucheng and then advance by way of Jiaozitou, Sanjiaotang and Touchangba. When the withdrawal starts, the 4th and 5th Divisions will jointly dispatch a considerable force to cover the advance of the central and left columns, which have to cross the Chishui River by 12:00 hours today at the latest.

c. The 5th Army Group,²⁸ the related units under the direct command of the 3rd Army Group,²⁹ and the 4th Division will constitute the left column, which will be under the command of Peng and Yang. Crossing the river over the pontoon bridge upstream from Tucheng, it will march on Taipingdu via Touchangba. The 4th Division will dispatch one battalion to provide cover as soon as the withdrawal begins.

4. All these columns marching westwards will turn towards the southeast of Gulin at a point close to the bank of the Chishui.

5. After the columns have crossed the river, the rear guards of the 1st and 3rd Army Groups will be responsible for the destruction of the pontoon bridges.

6. While on the march, the columns should investigate the route leading to the south of Gulin, and report.

mobile warfare enabled the Red Army to move, at a crucial juncture of the Long March, from a passive position to one from which it could take the initiative. Comrade Zhu De was then Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee as well as Commander-in-Chief of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. Here are nine of the telegrams he sent to the field commanders during this campaign.

II. ORDERING THE 1ST AND 3RD ARMY GROUPS TO MOVE CLOSE TO ZHAXI

01:00 Hours, February 6, 1935

1. The Military Commission is now considering the feasibility of crossing the Changjiang River, given the current enemy situation and the difficulty of crossing the Jinsha and Dadu. If this is judged unfeasible, our field armies will stay on in the Sichuan-Yunnan border area to carry on the fighting and create a new Soviet area.¹

2. Therefore, the destination of our 1st and 3rd Army Groups for today (the 6th) should be close to Zhaxi. The most suitable location would be a point between Changning and Zhaxi, and the area northwest of Zhaxi (i.e., southwest of Changning). This would make it easy to assemble troops quickly and facilitate manoeuvrability.

3. Please wire the Military Commission promptly, giving your opinion, your destination for today and its distance from Zhaxi and Changning.

III. ORDERING THE VARIOUS ARMY GROUPS TO CROSS THE CHISHUI RIVER IN GOOD TIME AND PUSH FORWARD ON THE RIVER'S EAST BANK

20:00 Hours, February 11, 1935

1. The current enemy situation is as follows:

a. Most of the enemy's pursuing troops from Sichuan are concentrated along the Gaoxian-Gongxian-Changning line and the area to its south. Of them, the two brigades under Da and Yuan³⁰ arrived in Gaoxian County on the 10th; Liu's brigade has left Gongxian for Yunlian; the two brigades under Fan and Zhang are now at Gongxian; Zhang's brigade is going to advance towards Anbian. The main force of Pan's brigade is at Changning, while the rest of it is at Xingwen. Guo's brigade was at Luobiao on the 10th; Liao's brigade (minus one regiment) is at Luohai. Both are moving in the direction of Wangchang. Mu's brigade is marching towards Pingshan. Jiang's brigade³¹ is being deployed along the Tantou-Anbian line. Another two more brigades (the 2nd and the 3rd) were first at Yongning, but their present whereabouts are unknown.

b. The enemy brigade from Yunnan under An³² is building defensive works at Dawanzi, and the main force of Lu's brigade³³ may reach there today. Gong's brigade³⁴ arrived at Bijie yesterday and is likely to continue its advance towards Dawanzi.

c. The three enemy divisions of Guizhou under the command of He, Bai and Hou³⁵ seem to have stayed on the right bank of the Chishui, but their locations are not clear.

d. Enemy Xue's³⁶ "pursuit and suppression" unit, about two regiments, is moving from Erdu to Xuyong. There are signs that two divisions under Zhou³⁷ will be concentrated at Qianxi on the 12th and march on Xuyong by way of Bijie. The two enemy divisions under Wu³⁸ seem to be at Qianxi and Dading. The location of the rest of the enemy troops is not clear. Based on the above information, we can assume that almost all the Sichuan pursuers are moving westwards, that the Yunnan troops are trying to block our way into Yunnan Province, that the Guizhou troops have not yet joined the "pursuit and suppression" campaign, and that Xue's troops are not moving fast in pursuit.

2. Being prepared to engage the Guizhou forces under Wang Jialie³⁹ and Zhou Hunyuan and to try to move towards the east bank of the Chishui River, our field armies have decided to march on Gulin and the area south of it, and try to cross the river in good time. During our advance, we should be ready to encounter Xue's "pursuit and suppression" detachment and to capture the city of Gulin when conditions make that feasible.

3. With this objective in view, our plan will be as follows:

a. The 3rd Army Group should immediately reconnoitre the road conditions, distances and inhabitants along the path of our advance from Fenshuiling via Zhandi towards Gulin, as well as the enemy situation in the direction of Yongning.

b. The 1st Army Group should arrive at Fenshuiling and the area to the east tomorrow (the 12th), and then reconnoitre the road for advance towards Yingpanshan and Huilongchang.

c. The 5th and 9th Army Groups should build road and put up bridges for the advance on Yangmasi by way of Shixiangzi and Moni.

d. The column under the Military Commission plans to march between the 1st Army Group and the 5th and 9th Army Groups.

4. As for tomorrow's movements, we will send you another telegram.

IV. PLAN OF OPERATIONS FOR THE SECOND CROSSING OF THE CHISHUI RIVER

20:00 Hours, February 15, 1935

1. With the main objective of crossing the Chishui River and marching east to wipe out the Guizhou forces under Wang Jialie, our field armies have decided to cross the river in the Lintan-Taipingdu-Shunjiangchang sector and then to march separately towards the Tongzi area to annihilate the Guizhou enemy coming from Tongzi to Tucheng, or move directly to Tongzi to attack and destroy him.

2. In keeping with the above objective, we have decided to march on the Tongzi area in three columns: First, the right column (i.e., the 3rd Army Group) will move from Huilongchang via Yatiechang to Shunjiangchang up Taipingdu and cross the river there. After the crossing, it will march to Tongzi by way of Huilongchang and Jiangchang (on the right bank of the Chishui River). Second, the central column (i.e., the column under the Military Commission and the 5th and 9th Army Groups) will move from Baisha to Taipingdu by way of Yacha and Yucha. After crossing the river, it will choose its route on the east bank according to circumstances. Third, the left column (i.e., the 1st Army Group) will move from Songlin via Baisha, Guochangba, Zhenlongshan and Shijiakou to Yuelaichang and Lintan. After crossing the river there, it will capture Tucheng when there is an opportunity and then make a detour to Tongzi by way of Donghuangdian, Wenshui and Xinzhan.

3. Actions of various army groups for tomorrow (the 16th):

a. The 3rd Army Group will assemble near Huilongchang for rest and post guards along the road to Gulin.

b. The 1st Army Group will advance to the Guochangba-Xinzhai area by way of Baisha and Huilongchang and post guards along the road to Gulin.

c. The 5th and 9th Army Groups will each move from their present locations to the Baisha area and post guards along the road to Gulin and Yongning and along the route by which our units will come.

4. We will lead the units directly under the Military Commission to Baisha for rest tomorrow.

5. Each army group should report by telegraph how far it has advanced.

Hereafter the Military Commission will issue orders for the day-to-day implementation of the above plan.

V. INSTRUCTING THE 9TH ARMY GROUP TO CALL A MASS MEETING TO CELEBRATE VICTORY

12:30 Hours, March 1, 1935

1. In five days our field armies' main forces have taken Tongzi and Zunyi, routing eight regiments under Wang Jialie, wiping out Wu Qiwei's two divisions, seizing more than 2,000 rifles and capturing about 3,000 enemy troops. As a result, we have opened up a new prospect in northern Guizhou and created more favourable conditions for the establishment of a new Soviet area in the Yunnan-Guizhou-Sichuan border area, so that the enemy forces that surround us will think twice before advancing.

2. Hope you will put up as many notices as possible of this triumphant news in and around the city of Tongzi and ask the revolutionary committee there to hold a mass rally to celebrate the victory. This will extend the Red Army's influence and raise the people's courage and determination to resist, as well as increase panic among the enemy reinforcements.

VI. PLAN OF OPERATIONS FOR THE THIRD CROSSING OF THE CHISHUI RIVER

18:00 Hours, March 16, 1935

1. The enemy situation will be telegraphed separately.
2. We have decided that all our field armies will cross to the west bank of the Chishui River near Maotai between the night of the 16th and noon of the 17th, and seek opportunities for new manoeuvres there.
3. The different army groups will take action for crossing the river today and tomorrow as follows:
 - a. At 17:00 hours today the Cadres Regiment will dig in in the Maotai sector to cover the crossing. It will first send a battalion across

the river to the west bank to wait for the arrival of the Military Commission and cover its action. Chen and Song⁴⁰ will be the commander and political commissar, respectively, for the entire army during the crossing. When the 5th Army Group arrives, the Cadres Regiment will turn over to it the task of directing the crossing and providing cover. The crossing will be completed between 04:00 and 05:00 hours tomorrow morning. After crossing the river, our units will move 10 kilometres west, take cover for rest to the west of the Military Commission, posting guards on the road west.

b. The 1st Army Group should finish its crossing between 18:00 and 22:00 hours today. After crossing the river, it should proceed 15 kilometres northwest in the direction of Hetaoba and take a rest under cover, posting guards to the northwest and along the road to Erlangtan.

c. The Military Commission should complete its crossing between 22:00 and 24:00 hours today. After crossing, it should move 7.5 kilometres westwards and rest under cover, assigning one battalion of the Cadres Regiment to post guards to the west.

d. The 3rd Army Group should complete its crossing between 24:00 hours today and 04:00 hours tomorrow. After crossing, it should move 15 kilometres southwest and rest under cover, posting guards to the southwest.

e. The 5th Army Group should complete its crossing between 05:00 and 07:00 hours tomorrow. While advancing to Maotai for the crossing, it will keep one battalion and a scout company in the vicinity of Lianglukou and Yanjinhe, posting guards on the route to Guanyinchang until the 9th Army Group has passed Lianglukou. Then the two units will rejoin their army group. The 5th Army Group should take over the job of covering the crossing from the Cadres Regiment before 04:00 hours tomorrow and, once the 9th Army Group has crossed, destroy the means of crossing at all ferry points and guard the west bank.

f. The 9th Army Group should complete its crossing between 09:00 and 11:00 hours tomorrow, march five kilometres west and take a rest under cover.

4. In accordance with the deadlines set above, all the army groups should calculate when they are to set out from their present positions, so that they can reach the vicinity of Maotai 30 minutes before the fixed time for crossing, and send their chiefs of staff to the commander in charge of the crossing to receive instructions.

5. Each army group should report to the Military Commission by telegraph the place they have reached after the crossing.

6. The Military Commission, under my command, is to arrive at Maotai at 21:30 hours today (the two companies of the 9th Army Group under Regimental Commander Hong⁴¹ are moving along with us).

VII. PLAN OF OPERATIONS FOR THE FOURTH CROSSING OF THE CHISHUI RIVER

17:00 Hours, March 20, 1935

1. We expect that the enemy troops under Guo, who are in hot pursuit of us, will co-ordinate their action with the Sichuan troops at Xuyong and Gulin and the Yunnan troops at Bijie and in Chishui Township, who want to intercept us. This will not be favourable for our advance west.

2. Our field armies have decided to turn east secretly, determinedly and swiftly and to take the enemy by surprise. They must cross the Chishui River to the east bank in the Erlangtan-Lintan sector on the night of the 21st so as to be able to manoeuvre.

3. For these reasons, the movements of our various army groups today (the 20th) and tomorrow will be as follows:

a. The 5th Army Group will try to contain the enemy troops under Guo and draw them to Gulin to gain more time for us to cross the river. Its rear communication line will proceed from Lianghekou to Taipingdu via Dacun and Yudonggou. The 5th Army Group must hold the enemy east of Dacun tomorrow (the 21st) until nightfall, then march quickly to Yudonggou and Taipingdu and cross the river on the morning of the 22nd. The routes and ferries for the army groups follow:

b. The 9th Army Group will take the Hetaoba road and make its crossing at Erlangtan.

c. The Military Commission column will march by way of Yudonggou and make its crossing at Jiuxikou.

d. The 3rd Army Group will march by way of Yucha, Shijiakou and Zoumaba and make its crossing at Taipingdu.

e. The 1st Army Group will march by way of Shijiakou and

Zoumaba and make its crossing at Lintan; part of its men will cross at Taipingdu before the 3rd Army Group arrives.

4. Upon receiving this order, each of the army groups mentioned in items (b) through (e) should send an advance force to the point of crossing, with all its sappers and a radio set. Their main forces should cross to the east bank of the river and post guards along the road in the direction from which the enemy is likely to come. The bridges must be built between 12:00 and 16:00 hours tomorrow (the 21st), and the main forces should complete their crossing tomorrow night. The main forces of the 1st Army Group, however, must move quickly so as not to get in the way of the 3rd Army Group. The advance regiment of the 1st Army Group at Taipingdu will co-ordinate its movements with those of the advance regiment of the 3rd Army Group when the latter arrives.

5. In order to confuse the enemy troops from Sichuan and Yunnan, the main force of the 1st Army Group should keep one regiment at Zhenlongshan. This regiment will send men to harass the enemy at Gulin with guerrilla actions to give the false impression that our main forces are moving west. After completing its task, and before noon tomorrow, the regiment will join the main force of the 1st Army Group on the march and cross the river at Taipingdu tomorrow night.

6. After crossing the river, each army group will be responsible for destroying the bridge it has used, except for the one at Taipingdu, which will be turned over to the 5th Army Group for use and destruction.

7. I am to lead the Military Commission to Yudonggou tonight, reaching Jiuxikou by noon tomorrow.

VIII. INSTRUCTIONS TO THE 9TH ARMY GROUP ON OUR ARMY'S MARCHING SOUTH TO CROSS THE WUJIANG RIVER AND CARRY OUT NEW MANOEUVRES

March 28, 1935

1. The enemy situation will be telegraphed separately.
2. Tomorrow (the 29th), our 1st and 3rd Army Groups will continue to advance south and try to gain control of the Wujiang River for new manoeuvres. Before noon tomorrow, the 5th Army Group at

Xinglongchang will engage the enemy troops and pin them down at Fengxiangba to cover our southward advance.

3. The tasks for the 9th Army Group tomorrow (the 29th) will remain the same as stated in the order issued at 24:00 hours on the 27th.⁴² However, it must display slogans on red paper along the road northwest of Mazongling and burn firewood by the roadside to simulate smoke from cooking stoves. At the same time it should spread rumours and create the false impression that the main forces of our army want to lure the enemy into a trap to the north and wipe him out. This will enable our main forces to move south swiftly and secretly.

4. The Military Commission will arrive at Shatu tomorrow.

IX. INSTRUCTIONS TO THE 1ST ARMY GROUP ON OUR ARMY'S DECISION TO ADVANCE SOUTH ALONG A ROUTE BETWEEN GUIYANG AND LONGLI

18:00 Hours, April 7, 1935

1. We have learned that the Yunnan enemy has reached Guiding and will advance to Yangchang to carry out a "suppression" campaign.

2. As our field armies have decided to march south along a route between Guiyang and Longli, we ask that you promptly reconnoitre the road leading from Laobaxiang and Liujiashuang through Ximahe, Labang, Geshui, Gaobu and Longli to Maruochang, the road through Guanyinshan to Wangguan, Bimengchang and Jimingbu and the other roads running parallel to these, and estimate their distance. This will facilitate the march on the 8th of the 1st Army Group and the Military Commission column along these routes.

3. The security force you have sent to Shuiwei, Dumuhe and Hongyanhe may make a gesture of putting up bridges as if for a crossing to the east tonight (the 7th). It should post guards on the flanks and rear and then march on with the rear guard of the 1st Army Group.

4. The advance division of the 3rd Army Group should prepare to set out at 03:00 hours tomorrow and make a feigned attack on Longli.

NOTICE OF THE CHINESE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' RED ARMY*

May 1935

The mission of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is to emancipate the weak, minority nationalities. All the common people of the Yi and Han nationalities are as near to each other as blood brothers. But the hateful Sichuan warlords ruthlessly oppress the Yi people; they kill indiscriminately and impose exorbitant taxes and levies. The Red Army troops are making their Long March, smashing enemy resistance wherever they go. Now they have come to western Sichuan. They respect the customs of the Yi people. They observe strict discipline; They won't take a single grain or a single piece of thread from the people; they pay a fair price for the grain they buy, making full payment in cash. I hope all the Yi people will quickly unite, without doubt or fear, and fight together to drive out the warlords. We favour setting up a government of the Yi people so that they can govern their own affairs, win genuine equality and freedom, and no longer be bullied and insulted by others. I hope you will work hard to publicize all this, making it known to the people of western Sichuan.

Zhu De
Commander-in-Chief of
the Red Army

* This is a prose translation of the notice which was issued in verse. — *Tr.*

ON ANTI-JAPANESE GUERRILLA WAR

1938

GENERAL THEORY

Section 1

Importance of Guerrilla Warfare to the Self-Defence War Against Japanese Aggression

1. DEFINITION OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE GUERRILLA WAR — POPULAR OR MILITIA WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Anti-Japanese guerrilla war is a new term on the lips of people across China. Many are discussing and studying it, and publishing houses have printed numerous books on the topic. A great number of patriots and national heroes have been carrying out anti-Japanese guerrilla war, such as the Northeastern People's Revolutionary Army⁴³ and the Northeastern Volunteers.⁴⁴ Anti-Japanese guerrilla war has spread widely in northwestern Shanxi Province, in the Shanxi-Hebei-Qahar area, and in the provinces of Shandong, Hebei and Suiyuan,⁴⁵ as well as in the outskirts of Shanghai. This tells us that it is necessary to conduct a serious theoretical study of this particular war.

One of Comrade Zhu De's writings in the early period of the War of Resistance Against Japan (1957-45), parts of which were published in instalments in early 1938 in the weekly, *Frontline*, of the General Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army. A separate edition of the writing was published by the Liberation Press, Yan'an, in November the same year. The whole book contained three chapters subdivided into 17 sections. Here are its first chapter and the first two sections of its third chapter.

How could the anti-Japanese guerrilla war break out spontaneously and extensively? What is its essence? What is its correct definition?

Facts have shown that nobody could wilfully create such a war. Nor is there any force that can wipe it out. It is a product of the times. *How Do Guerrillas Operate?* published by the Soviet Union says, "A guerrilla force is a small irregular armed detachment that operates in the rear of an enemy who occupies a certain area. . . . In any war, the people, or a certain class of the people, have full reason to bitterly hate the enemy that occupies their territory. Therefore, war rouses the people to guerrilla activities." In the specific circumstances of China today, the anti-Japanese guerrilla war is triggered by Japanese imperialist aggression. The people in an area occupied by the Japanese invaders are unwilling to be slaves of a foreign power. Armed or unarmed, militarily trained or untrained, they go into action in or around the enemy's rear, or where the enemy is about to invade. The local anti-Japanese government or army may also systematically send regular troops to act as guerrillas and to organize the people for guerrilla warfare. Hence the anti-Japanese guerrilla detachments which consist of people from different walks of life and enjoy the support of all compatriots. The birth and growth of every detachment is an epic story, heroic and moving.

Thus the anti-Japanese guerrilla war came about under the specific historical conditions of the Japanese imperialist invasion of Chinese territory. In essence, it is the highest and most extensive form of resistance that our compatriots unwilling to be slaves of a foreign power adopt for their own survival. It is spear-headed against Japanese imperialism.

The definition of anti-Japanese guerrilla war, therefore, should be: a popular or militia war against Japanese aggression. It is different from any other guerrilla war because it is anti-Japanese; it is different from war waged by regular troops because it is launched by the masses or the militia.

At the same time, there is no unbridgeable gulf between anti-Japanese guerrilla war and regular anti-Japanese war. On the one hand, when an anti-Japanese guerrilla unit has grown strong or when several guerrilla units join forces, they can fight on a considerable scale. On the other, so long as a regular army keeps in close contact with civilians and enjoys their sympathy and support, it can send small or even large units to wage guerrilla warfare.

The anti-Japanese guerrilla war is part of the War of Resistance

Against Japan. It is a form of it and constitutes a stage in its development.

It deserves the sympathy and support of all our compatriots and all people who uphold justice. Operating in the enemy's rear, the anti-Japanese guerrillas have numerous difficulties, some of them having to fight the powerful enemy almost bare-handed. They win honour and dignity for our nation. All our compatriots should admire the hard-fighting anti-Japanese guerrillas, help them and encourage them.

We mentioned above that the anti-Japanese guerrilla war is a popular or militia war against Japanese aggression. Now we wish to list several incorrect views regarding such a war.

First, some people consider it a mystery. I have read a book that explains guerrilla war with examples of battles commanded by Zhuge Liang, a statesman and strategist in the Period of the Three Kingdoms (220-280). According to this author, the anti-Japanese guerrilla war seems to be an invention of some military genius like Zhuge Liang, not a popular movement. Such a conclusion betrays his ignorance of the subject. The anti-Japanese guerrilla war is absolutely not the secret of any talented strategist. Nor is it an unfathomable mystery. It is, in essence, a mass movement against Japanese aggression, a highest form of the anti-Japanese mass struggle. Without the masses, there could never be an anti-Japanese guerrilla war. Its sole secret lies in its being a mass movement, an armed self-defence struggle by the masses against the Japanese invaders.

Second, some people equate the anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare with peasant guerrilla warfare in Chinese history, or compare it to certain campaigns planned by such talented strategists as Zhuge Liang. There is some ground for that because the rebellious nature and some combat principles of our present-day anti-Japanese guerrilla war (such as making a feint to the east but attacking in the west, and staying clear of the enemy's main force, and striking at his weak points) are similar to those of many guerrilla wars in the historical past. But there is a great difference: guerrilla wars in the old days were fought with swords and spears, whereas today we have poorly-armed guerrillas fighting Japanese invaders armed with modern weapons. Thus, the anti-Japanese guerrillas primarily should draw experience and lessons from modern guerrilla wars, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870,⁴⁶ the Russian civil war following the October Revolution,⁴⁷ and the Chinese civil war of the recent decade. They should study their positive and negative experiences in the context of new circumstances

and adapt them to the nationwide resistance to Japanese aggression.

Third, some people regard the anti-Japanese guerrilla war as identical to the guerrilla warfare during the civil war of the past 10 years. They have some grounds for this because: (1) the growing anti-Japanese guerrilla war has indeed drawn much valuable experience from guerrilla warfare in the past decade; and (2) a number of the cadres conducting today's anti-Japanese guerrilla war have in fact been trained in the guerrilla war of the past 10 years. This view is not, however, completely correct. It contains a gross error. Its exponents fail to understand that the sole enemy in the current anti-Japanese guerrilla war is Japanese imperialism, which is a great difference from the previous guerrilla war. They also overlook the fact that previous guerrilla war did not enjoy the sympathy of the entire nation, that the guerrillas then consisted of workers and peasants only. In contrast, the present anti-Japanese guerrillas have gained the sympathy and support of all classes in China, and, although most of them are still workers and peasants, they include people from all social strata who refuse to be slaves of a foreign power. The anti-Japanese guerrillas are a product of the anti-Japanese national united front. They are armed forces that strive for the unity of all compatriots to defeat the Japanese invaders, not the same armed forces that fought for the Soviets¹ and agrarian revolution in the past. It is very important to understand the difference between the present anti-Japanese guerrillas and the guerrillas of the past.

Since the anti-Japanese guerrilla war is a mass movement, it can break out anywhere, with or without the help of the regular army. Because the anti-Japanese guerrillas are made up of people of all strata and strive to advance the interests of all of them, they can enlist the support and assistance of the entire nation and, as a result, they can spread their activities extensively.

2. THE ROLE OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE GUERRILLA WAR

The anti-Japanese guerrilla war is part of the War of Resistance Against Japan as a whole, and an indispensable part at that. It is one of the major factors contributing to a final victory in the anti-Japanese war.

Everybody knows that the guerrillas alone cannot bring the national self-defence war against Japan to final victory. To achieve

this, we must have a modern, regular national revolutionary army as the main force, an army of several million, which is politically strong, under unified command and well-equipped.

However, our national self-defence war against Japan is one in which a weak country is resisting aggression by a strong imperialist power. Since China is inferior in military technology, it depends primarily on political justice and an inexhaustible source of manpower to defeat the Japanese imperialist aggressors. That is why the anti-Japanese guerrilla war, a popular or militia war, has become an indispensable part of our self-defence war against Japan and one of the major factors for its final victory.

Let us cite some historical events to prove the importance of developing the anti-Japanese guerrilla war. During the Fatherland War of 1812 in Russia,⁴⁸ Russian guerrilla units jointly organized by peasants and small groups of regular troops or by the peasants alone completely disrupted the rear service of the French army and nearly starved the entire force to death. In the 1870 Franco-Prussian War, the German army occupied a large part of France. There were armed French volunteers known as "*francs-tireurs*" who were not part of the regular forces but who dealt heavy blows at the German army's rear and its independent detachments. During the civil war following the October Revolution in Russia, Red guerrillas operating in the Ural Mountains of Siberia and in the rear of General Denikin⁴⁹ and the Polish army⁵⁰ not only frequently disrupted or stopped the rear service of the enemy but time and again overcame his attacks. They even wiped out the fleeing troops of the retreating White generals. To engage these Red guerrillas, Admiral Kolchak,⁵¹ General Denikin and the Polish and Japanese armies then invading the Soviet Republic had to move crack troops from the front line, weakening their advance forces. In China, 10 years of civil guerrilla war brought forth a regular army, the Eighth Route Army.⁵² The People's Revolutionary Army and the Volunteers in northeast China, tens of thousands strong, often hold down hundreds of thousands of the Japanese and puppet troops, so that the Japanese and puppet rule there cannot be consolidated. As a result, the Japanese find it hard, and sometimes even impossible, to plunder the local resources.

What are the specific functions of the anti-Japanese guerrilla war?

First, the anti-Japanese guerrilla detachments are a popular anti-Japanese school. The guerrillas are the armed advocates and organizers of the anti-Japanese national united front. The guerrilla detach-

ments were born and have been growing as part of the mass anti-Japanese struggle. They are groups of national heroes and noble-minded patriots, who train themselves in practice. The guerrillas and the people are as inseparable as fish and water. If the guerrillas are divorced from the masses and fail to enlist their support, they can never move in and around the enemy's rear, and will sooner or later be wiped out. Therefore, for their own existence and growth, the anti-Japanese guerrillas must become advocates and organizers of the anti-Japanese national united front, mobilizing and uniting with the broad masses for defending the country against the Japanese aggressors. In doing this, they help educate the masses and turn them into anti-Japanese fighters, performing an invaluable service and adding immense strength to the anti-Japanese national united front.

Second, the anti-Japanese guerrilla war can recover part of the occupied territory and maintain popular morale there. The war breaks out and grows in and around the enemy's rear, where there are no regular Chinese troops or at least no main force of the Chinese army, where the territory is or will possibly be occupied by the enemy, where there are no Chinese government bodies or only those whose existence is in jeopardy, and where the enemy has rigged up puppet regimes or intends to do so. In such areas, the outbreak and growth of guerrilla war, the launching of guerrilla operations and the establishment of guerrilla bases make it possible for the local populace to see the glorious banner of their motherland again, to restore their own government and arouse their national consciousness. This imbues the populace with confidence, strengthens them, and thereby prepares a foundation for people in such areas to see the light of day once again.

Third, the anti-Japanese guerrilla war can prevent the Japanese invaders from obtaining manpower and other resources in occupied territories and using them in their attempt to conquer China. Japanese imperialism is vicious but has feet of clay. It lacks its own resources and has a small population. As soon as it occupies a part of China's territory, it wants to tap local manpower and other resources and monopolize the market in order to eventually seize all of China and even Asia. A widespread anti-Japanese guerrilla war will dispel this pipedream of the Japanese aggressors. The more extensive the anti-Japanese guerrilla war becomes, the harder it is for the enemy to exploit the human and material resources in the occupied territory and monopolize the market to commit further aggression. The enemy organizes a traitorous Chinese puppet regime to help maintain Japanese

rule in the occupied territory, but the puppets fear the spreading guerrilla warfare. The anti-Japanese guerrilla war thus helps deal a fatal blow to Japanese imperialism. The importance of the guerrillas cannot be underestimated.

Fourth, the anti-Japanese guerrillas can co-ordinate their operations with the regular army. Expanding guerrilla warfare saps the enemy's morale, thus helping the regular Chinese forces. Regular troops carrying out mobile warfare depend almost primarily on the spread of guerrilla warfare to win victory because the guerrillas can help cover their movements, reconnoitre enemy positions, mislead and harass enemy troops, pin down enemy reinforcements during an operation, or create other opportunities for the regular troops to attack and win. Guerrillas can also aid our regular garrison troops at strategic points by cutting off the enemy's rear lines so as to prevent him from obtaining reinforcements and replenishment of ammunition or food supplies, and by launching surprise attacks on his depots. As a result, the enemy's mechanized force is weakened, his rear areas suffer casualties and losses even heavier than the front line, and he has to employ as large a force in the rear as at the front to maintain communications. This creates a difficult dilemma for the enemy. An example of such co-ordination was the Xinkou Battle.⁵³ Generally speaking, because China is weaker than Japan, it is unusual for Chinese garrison troops, equipped as they are at present, to put up stubborn resistance and defeat the enemy by themselves. The co-ordination of positional warfare, mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare is essential to defeat the enemy. Every outstanding strategist should pay serious attention to this principle.

Fifth, the anti-Japanese guerrilla war can train fine reserve troops and corps for the regular army. It is an anti-Japanese school for the people, and a school of anti-Japanese armed struggle for them in particular. Thousands upon thousands of sons and daughters of the Chinese nation, most courageous and staunch, full of vigour and national consciousness, are being trained in guerrilla warfare. They fight almost bare-handed in the most difficult of circumstances, not for personal power or material gain, but for the survival of the whole nation. However vicious the enemy is, he can never shake their determination. Indeed, their spirit would shake heaven and earth and move the deities. This school can train indomitable fighters, outstanding commanders and political workers. Such arduously trained graduates will doubtless be fully competent once they are used to

replenish the National Revolutionary Army or form new army corps. The anti-Japanese guerrillas are a source of fresh strength for the regular army's war against the Japanese aggressors.

In summing up, we can see that developing extensive anti-Japanese guerrilla war is a vital goal for righteous Chinese. We sincerely hope that the government and other circles will take concrete, energetic measures to aid, commend, encourage and promote the widespread development of anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare.

3. AGAINST SLANDERING THE ANTI-JAPANESE GUERRILLA WAR

Although, as I have said above, the anti-Japanese guerrilla war is vitally important, it is misunderstood by some people. In particular, traitors, Trotskyites and pro-Japanese elements try by any means they can to slander it.

Having failed in his other plots, the Trotskyite Zhang Mutao is now trying to patch together his own "guerrilla detachment" by enlisting bandits and duping peasants with ultra-Left slogans into joining it. His detachment will be a traitorous armed unit at the service of the Japanese invaders. Some Trotskyites are helping the Japanese organize special detachments in Xuzhou. Others, like Ye Qing, vilify the anti-Japanese guerrillas as "bandits". The Trotskyites exaggerate things in order to scare people and create fear and ill-feeling towards the guerrillas in the past civil war. They have, indeed, succeeded in fooling some people who thus begin to misunderstand the true nature of the anti-Japanese guerrilla war.

And, of course, there are a few selfish persons who organize guerrilla units not for the national interest, but for their personal gain and advancement, or to deceptively secure commissions. Once these units are set up, the guerrillas in them can do nothing to harm the enemy but much to disturb local civilians, and they are naturally doomed to failure. These persons do not truly organize, but only disrupt, the anti-Japanese guerrilla effort.

There are many well-intentioned people who have certain misgivings about the anti-Japanese guerrillas because the composition of the guerrilla units is too diverse and includes a number of bad elements. We acknowledge that the guerrillas have certain persons of undesirable social background, and that if they are allowed to assume

leadership, our cause will be ruined. On the other hand, we should understand that it is difficult to prevent some undesirables from joining anti-Japanese guerrilla units in the rising tide of national resistance to Japanese aggression. What we must do is to remould, guide and educate them, so that they can turn over a new leaf and become soldiers striving for the national cause. The presence of such people should not make us close our eyes to the bright prospects of the anti-Japanese guerrillas or to the tremendous role of the anti-Japanese guerrilla war in the national self-defence war against Japanese aggression.

Section 11

Essential Elements of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War

No war is possible without these five essential elements: politics, economics, personnel, arms, and communications (including the factor of terrain). Concrete strategy and tactics should be worked out according to the specific conditions of these five elements and the relative strengths of the enemy forces and our own. Guerrilla warfare is no exception, either. Advocates of the theory that weapons alone decide the outcome of war make a fundamental mistake in seeing only the element of arms and neglecting the other four.

There is an opinion deriving from a purely military approach, which says that guerrilla warfare is nothing more than deft and flexible tactics. That is wrong. As in other warfare, the five elements mentioned above must be fully and properly developed in guerrilla warfare. Since the guerrillas are particularly weak in some of them (such as incomplete and inferior arms and economic difficulties), they should try to make better use of all five, so that they can utilize their own advantages to make up for their own disadvantages and defeat the enemy. There is an outstanding difference between guerrilla warfare and other warfare: In guerrilla warfare, politics is the primary element. This is because the anti-Japanese guerrilla war is essentially a political war. Let us now discuss how guerrilla warfare should properly employ each of the five essential elements.

1. POLITICAL WARFARE

There is a political aspect to every war, otherwise there would be no war at all. Japanese imperialism is using a modern army to invade China, which is equipped with inferior arms. Advocates of the theory that weapons alone decide the outcome of war would say that the Japanese imperialist aggressors should be able to conquer and enslave China without waging any political warfare. But the Japanese are not behaving in this way. They have assiduously advanced the aggressive theory that “Japan has a population surplus”. Everyone knows this. The Japanese imperialists also have made every effort to buy Chinese traitors and Trotskyites for sowing dissension, to “use the Chinese to control China” for Japan’s sake, to play on some Chinese’s excessive fear of Japan, and to flaunt the slogans “Coexistence and co-prosperity”, “For peace in East Asia”, “Suppress communism and annihilate the Kuomintang”, etc. Everyone knows this too. Anyone who has read Giichi Tanaka’s memorial to the throne⁵⁴ and Takayoshi Matsumuro’s secret report⁵⁵ knows that the Japanese aggressors have never neglected to employ the political element even though they have modern arms. They have never hesitated to try subjugating China politically in the past, nor do they do so today. They have never stopped seeking a way to divide the Chinese nation, to use the Chinese to control China for Japan’s sake.

The importance the Japanese aggressors attach to political warfare far outmatches the counter-measures of certain Chinese statesmen. For these statesmen think that to triumph over the Japanese it is not necessary to carry out extensive propaganda and education in self-defence against Japanese aggression.

Hence a clear conclusion: We must recognize the importance of the political element in war. Every statesman and every anti-Japanese soldier, every conscientious member of the Chinese nation, should contribute all they can to anti-Japanese political warfare. They should strive to expose the enemy’s aggressive policies and his plot to divide the Chinese nation and use the Chinese to control China for his own benefit. They should make efforts to strengthen and broaden the anti-Japanese national united front. Considering that China is weaker than Japan and that we are waging a progressive, revolutionary war, we must pay even more attention to political warfare.

If the anti-Japanese guerrillas, in particular, fail to bring their political weapon into full play and wield only swords and spears

against enemy aircraft and tanks, they will surely be wiped out. They must skilfully and correctly employ their political weapon and recognize it as their most valuable armament. They should understand that, although political warfare is invisible, it is as important as capturing a great many enemy rifles and artillery pieces — even more so.

The first important point in political warfare is to consolidate the guerrillas, to rid them of incorrect ideas and bad habits, so they can achieve rock-firm unity, capable of weathering any storm and never falling apart. The anti-Japanese guerrillas can never unite themselves if they seek only official promotion and money, extravagant food and drink, or personal glory. Only by having a single political purpose of defending the Chinese nation and by devoting their lives to the cause of final victory in the anti-Japanese war of national self-defence can the guerrillas weld themselves into strong detachments and execute orders as one man. Those who are selfish, who indulge in grumbling or factional activities, or seek promotion and riches cannot measure up to the glorious title of anti-Japanese guerrilla.

The second point in political warfare is to regard the masses as a fortress and to unite them with the guerrillas. There is no future for the anti-Japanese guerrillas who cannot unite the civilians, safeguard their interests and enlist their firm support. The relationship between the anti-Japanese guerrillas and the civilians is like that between fish and water: Just as the fish rely on water to live and grow, so the guerrillas rely on the civilians to exist and expand. Fish cannot live without water. Neither can the anti-Japanese guerrillas live without the masses. The anti-Japanese guerrillas grow among the masses. Even guerrillas sent by the regular army should make the local civilians regard them as their own troops and understand that both share a common lot. Only thus can the guerrillas survive and flourish.

The anti-Japanese national united front is the nucleus around which the masses are united. The Japanese aggressors have robbed China of half its territory. The whole nation is in danger of subjugation. In face of imminent disaster, all Chinese people must unite to fight their greatest foe and not harbour past enmities or grudges among themselves, no matter how strong, even those involving the death of one's parents. They should work together with one heart for their common interests, on the principle, "Resistance to Japan is above all; every effort is for resistance to Japan." There is no alterna-

tive. Not only should they forget past enmities; they should brush aside fear of the future as well. The problem today is whether or not China can survive. At this critical moment, unity means survival; division means subjugation. Only those who are prepared to be slaves of a foreign power fear the broadening and consolidation of the united front and the mobilization of the masses, and work instead for personal riches and honour, for their own private interests.

The most important thing in uniting with the masses is for the anti-Japanese guerrillas to display strict political discipline. They must not take even a single needle or piece of thread from their compatriots. They must pay close attention to the following eight points: Carry out propaganda among the civilians wherever they go; clean the places where they stay; return everything they borrow; pay for anything they damage; pay fairly for what they buy; speak politely; refrain from relieving themselves in improper places; and respect local customs.

The third point in political warfare is to bring about the disintegration of the enemy forces. We should know that the rank and file and some of the officers in the invading Japanese army, the puppet Mongolian and Manchurian troops and the “peace preservation corps” are unwilling to die for the Japanese conquest of China. They are either homesick or have the motherland in their minds. The anti-Japanese guerrillas should devise various ways — such as distributing leaflets among enemy troops, shouting propaganda at them in their own language, and establishing contacts with relatives and friends in the puppet armies — to expose the enemy’s deceitful political propaganda and explain that the Japanese invasion of China does no good, only harm, to them. The guerrillas should help them understand that they are assisting the Japanese warlords — their own enemy — to fight their own friends; that it is politically vital for us to wage a self-defence war against Japan; that we bear them no enmity; that they would suffer even if they won; and that only by practising revolutionary defeatism — turning their guns against the Japanese warlords and the Chinese traitors — can they emancipate themselves. All this will make them refuse to oppose our anti-Japanese self-defence war and even become sympathetic towards it; and will make them hate and even defy the vicious and brutal Japanese warlords who have launched this aggressive war, as well as the Chinese traitors.

The guerrillas should also get in touch with the worker-peasant

movement and anti-war movement in Japan and its colonies, so that both sides can help each other.

The anti-Japanese guerrillas should always bear in mind that it is impossible to defeat the powerful enemy if they ignore or give up political work and depend solely on crude, primitive weapons. This will make it impossible for them to survive and grow. We should, therefore, give primary importance to political warfare, an essential element in the anti-Japanese guerrilla war, so that every guerrilla can energetically carry out political work. We should turn every guerrilla into an advocate and organizer of the anti-Japanese national united front, and into a national hero ready to devote his life to the cause of his country. We hope that some of them will make outstanding, talented statesmen. All this is our extremely important task.

2. ECONOMIC WARFARE

We have said that the primary factor in anti-Japanese guerrilla war is politics, and that we should make a great effort to bring it into play. But we do not suggest that politics is everything in guerrilla warfare. No. We must keep the four other essential elements in mind. Let us now discuss the second one, economics, as the basis of politics.

One need only read Tanaka's memorial to the throne to know that, in invading China, the Japanese aggressors aim at seizing China's economic lifelines and its inexhaustible resources. On the one hand, these would enable the Japanese financial magnates to carry out wanton exploitation in order to overcome their economic crisis. On the other, they also need China's resources in their plot to seize the whole of Asia and conquer the whole world.

At present, the Japanese aggressors have occupied the four northeastern provinces⁵⁶ and the main parts of the five northern provinces,⁵⁷ as well as the richly-endowed areas in Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Anhui provinces. By covetously seizing these places, they want to (1) energetically extort riches from our local compatriots to overcome their economic crisis, (2) tap local resources to cover the military expenses of invading and occupying all China, and (3) weaken China's economic strength so that it cannot continue to fight and will have to

surrender. In the course of the war, the Japanese invaders have always seized our grain, arms and other military supplies (especially petrol) to strengthen themselves and weaken us.

Since the September 18th Incident,⁵⁸ China has lost the four northeastern provinces and eastern Hebei and northern Qahar provinces without engaging the enemy. The losses in natural resources amount to an enormous sum in three of the four provinces in the northeast alone. It is a pity that such tremendous resources and a market covering more than 30 million people have fallen intact into the hands of the Japanese invaders who can thus use them as an economic weapon in continuing their aggression. Fortunately our compatriots in northeast China have organized tens of thousands of people's revolutionary troops and volunteers, who prevent the invaders from safely exploiting the local resources and markets. To maintain "public order" in northeast China, Japan has to post a massive army and use large numbers of effectives there, and every month spend hundreds of millions of yen as military expenses. In the half year from the September 18th Incident to March 1932, it cost the Japanese army little more than 30 million yen to occupy northeast China. It has had to spend much more to deal with the guerrillas in the northeast. Between the September 18th Incident and March 1937, its military spending there amounted to billions of yen.

Since the Lugouqiao Incident,⁵⁹ China's central government has decided to mount a resistance against the Japanese aggressors. Although China has since suffered heavy economic losses, Japan has lost more than it has gained. Japan has spent 500 million yen per month to cover military expenses for invading China. This monthly sum is over a dozen times the military spending for its six-month war to seize the entire northeast of China after the September 18th Incident. In the provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shandong, in particular, the central government has pursued a "scorched earth policy" to destroy all the important industries in areas about to be occupied by the enemy. As a result, Japan not only failed to obtain vital Chinese industries, but suffered direct losses amounting to 200 million yen in Shandong alone. This was a heavy blow to crippled Japanese imperialism.

After occupying the major part of north China and the rich areas in Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Anhui provinces, the Japanese aggressors pressed the Chinese traitors and pro-Japanese elements to launch a "peace movement" calling on civilians to "live and work in peace and

contentment". This "peace movement" is mainly aimed at gaining a respite to exploit and plunder north China's economy. Although the Japanese invaders have suffered heavy losses in seizing north China, they believe they can conquer all of the country if they can maintain "peace" and tap the rich local resources in the north to buttress their national strength. China's supreme military and government authorities flatly rejected such a "peace" and decided to resist aggression to the end. They published a manifesto to the Chinese people on December 16, 1937, which has enjoyed wide support across the country. Chinese everywhere can now see clearly that we not only should prevent the Japanese invaders from getting an opportunity to "exploit north China", but should completely destroy any industries and other property we have left intact in the enemy-occupied areas, so that they become useless. It is impossible to achieve this without developing anti-Japanese guerrilla war extensively in and around the enemy's rear.

Experience from Spain tells us that it is both possible and necessary to build a national defence in the midst of war. Spain's economic situation is not much better than ours. But it has built its own national defence industry, turning out modern arms such as aircraft, artillery and tanks, enough for waging war against the Germans, the Italians and the Franco rebels. To defeat the Japanese invaders, the Chinese nation should construct a war industry as Spain has done. So we must first slow the enemy's advance. Extensive anti-Japanese guerrilla war will certainly play its part in delaying this advance and help us gain time to build a national defence industry.

In this economic aspect, the anti-Japanese war is aimed at draining the enemy's resources brought from Japan, destroying or seizing the greatest possible amount of enemy motor vehicles and ammunition, and wrecking his communications and service installations, etc. The Japanese aggressors are dependent on highly mechanized arms in their attempt to defeat China. But the more mechanized the troops, the more they must rely on rear-line services. Otherwise, they would run short of petrol, shells, etc., and not only fail to utilize their power but themselves become a burden to the army as a whole. All our civilian resources (such as grain, drinking water, fuels, kitchen ranges and implements) that can be of any use to the enemy should be stored away or moved to other places if possible. The anti-Japanese guerrillas must mobilize the people to fight unyieldingly and hide all useful things before the advancing enemy in order to wear him down and

mire him in hardships. Unable to seize over anything to reinforce his front-line troops, the enemy will gradually lose men, horses and *matériel*, so that he cannot wage war for long.

Operating in the enemy's rear, the anti-Japanese guerrillas should also urge civilians to boycott Japanese goods and prevent direct tax collection by the enemy.

We have discussed the part the anti-Japanese guerrilla war can play on the economic side. Now let us touch on the economic problems of the guerrillas themselves.

The best way for the anti-Japanese guerrillas to sustain a protracted war is to obtain ample provisions and reserves by disrupting the enemy's economy, or to obtain frequent aid from our government and people. But it is hard to do the latter in the guerrilla areas. They, therefore, should be ready to persevere under trying conditions, without outside assistance. They must depend on the following principles to sustain their effort economically:

First, confiscate Japanese property in the guerrilla areas and seize the invaders' supplies and equipment, including grain and other things.

Second, confiscate the property of the Chinese traitors and collaborators.

Third, seek economic aid from local civilians. Because the anti-Japanese guerrillas fight for the interests of the entire Chinese nation, they can get support and aid from all compatriots (except traitors and Trotskyites). Even poor people voluntarily supply the guerrillas with provisions. Sometimes they would rather feed the guerrillas than satisfy their own half-starved stomachs, or provide the guerrillas with warm clothing rather than keep themselves warm. Rich people are also ready to help the guerrillas. It is not unusual for a wealthy family to donate hundreds of *dan* (one *dan* equals 50 kilogrammes) of food grain to the anti-Japanese guerrillas, for they would rather provide help to them than be robbed by the Japanese invaders. In northeast China, quite a number of people forced to be puppet officials have secretly aided the guerrillas. The guerrillas should carry out the policy of the anti-Japanese national united front so as to win admiration and support from all compatriots.

Fourth, be frugal and be prepared to lead a hard life. The anti-Japanese guerrillas are fighting for national emancipation, for the defence of their homeland, for their nation and their compatriots. They have to persevere in their struggle even when they are half-starved. Guerrilla leaders should explain this clearly to every fighter, and they

should set examples themselves. All guerrillas should oppose corruption and waste, and officers should live like the ordinary soldiers, truly sharing weal and woe with them. The willingness of officers to lead a hard life is particularly important for the anti-Japanese guerrillas, often becoming a main factor affecting their future.

3. PERSONNEL

Every war involves the question of manpower, as regards both the quality and quantity of personnel. The quality of personnel is determined by political and physical factors.

Political quality is related to combat effectiveness and operational methods. Physical quality is also directly related to combat effectiveness.

Under the specific circumstances of the Japanese invasion, ours is a national war of self-defence, which coincides with the interests of the Chinese soldiers. Hence the patriotism, enthusiasm, devotion and initiative of our fighters, who refuse to become slaves of a foreign power. As a result of all this, our troops can achieve outstanding combat effectiveness. These objective conditions explain why our soldiers can fight the enemy on their own, using remarkable initiative, and why the anti-Japanese guerrilla war has mushroomed. Subjectively, we should do effective political work to ensure and improve the political quality of our troops. Political quality is related to physical quality. Although our troops are physically inferior to the Japanese, and although the cultural and technical level of our commanders and men are also lower, they enjoy a high political quality that spurs them on to improve their cultural level and their military capability.

Quantity, however, is the most important factor with regard to personnel in the anti-Japanese war of national self-defence. China has a population of 450 million, one-quarter that of the whole world, or more than seven times that of Japan. Every member of this population is useful particularly because the war is being conducted on Chinese territory. That is the main reason why China can triumph. The key to a protracted war and final victory lies in our ability to unite this immense population and bring it into full play.

How should we unite and employ such an inexhaustible force?

We will not discuss how to mobilize the masses behind our own front line because that is not within the scope of this book. (We only raise this question here.) It is the task of the anti-Japanese guerrillas to arouse and organize the masses in the enemy's rear to carry out the War of Resistance there.

All our compatriots must be aware that half of our population remains in the enemy's rear areas. The enemy there is extorting and exploiting the people, killing them and raping their womenfolk. He is also drafting young men there into puppet troops and "peace preservation corps", making them reserves or cannon fodder for the continuing invasion of China. He even collects Chinese children and ships them to Japan to bring them up and then force them to invade their own motherland. This is truly an extremely vicious plot: using the Chinese to attack China. Loyal Chinese who are determined to resist until the final victory, how can you not feel distressed to see such happenings in the enemy's rear areas? We should do all possible to prevent half the Chinese nation from sacrificing themselves for nothing, let alone sacrificing themselves to the enemy's plan of using the Chinese to attack China. How can we do this? There is no other way except to develop guerrilla warfare widely in and around the enemy's rear.

There are some well-intentioned people who, seeing how the Japanese invaders wantonly burn houses and kill civilians in areas alive with anti-Japanese guerrillas, believe that in order to safeguard our compatriots' lives and property, we had better refrain from developing guerrilla warfare. This is only "women's mercy", to quote an old Chinese saying. Let us ask them a few questions: First, have the Japanese invaders not set fire to houses and killed people in places where there are no guerrillas? Have they moderated their rampages there? The truth is, no. There were no guerrillas inside Nanjing, but the Japanese invaders massacred more than 50,000 people there in two days. When the Japanese occupied the provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Anhui, there were no guerrillas there either. But the enemy slaughtered more than 300,000 local people, according to estimates. This has aroused the masses, who think it is better to organize anti-Japanese guerrillas than be murdered in cold blood. They think it is worthwhile to risk their lives fighting the Japanese to escape this. That is why the guerrilla movement is spreading widely in areas south of the Changjiang River, where there are extensive plains and the people are known for their gentle and refined manners. The facts listed above provide

the answers for our well-intentioned sceptics. Second, even if the enemy did less burning and killing in areas where there are no anti-Japanese guerrillas, would he not press-gang people there to organize puppet troops to fight their own compatriots? If the Japanese are allowed to continue this, we will suffer a double loss. Third, we must point out that precisely in areas where there is a lot of anti-Japanese guerrilla activity, the civilians have become experienced and more confident. They have learned how to evade the enemy for their own safety, thus suffering fewer losses. It is well known that civilians like to join the anti-Japanese guerrillas. How could this happen if the guerrillas did more harm than good to their interests? Fourth, the Japanese aggressors do not hesitate to stake everything on invading China and East Asia, by driving four million young Japanese into an aggressive war and sacrificing their citizens so that a handful of warlords and financial magnates can gain power and get rich. If they do not hesitate to sacrifice their own people, why should they spare the Chinese civilians in the Japanese-occupied areas and decline to turn them into cannon fodder? So it is better for the Chinese masses to rise and fight than to die in humiliation.

Hence our principle regarding personnel: Ready to die for the motherland. Our national heroes and patriots should mobilize the broad masses of the people. They should unite and organize compatriots of various parties, groups, classes and religions to love their nation and fight for the motherland, or at the very least, refuse to help the enemy. Then, the entire people will have a common target, all compatriots fighting in their own way. Only by being unafraid of sacrifice can we survive. We should of course avoid worthless sacrifice. We should prevent the meaningless loss of even a single compatriot. We should avoid being foolhardy.

We should not only arouse the broad masses of our compatriots, but organize them well, so that each can play his most appropriate role, with everyone applying himself in practical work and not simply holding to an ideal. All people, young and old, men and women, should have their own tasks. Students, workers, peasants, businessmen, teachers and so on should all play a part.

We must be good at using the anti-Japanese national united front to win over backward people, so that they are not compelled to go over to the enemy but will turn into a force against him. So long as they are not traitors, we should win them to our side and help them in action.

We should practise this ancient saying: "Brothers may quarrel inside the walls, but they will oppose insult from without."⁶⁰ We should not fear and suspect each other, contend for hegemony or infringe on one another's interests, thus falling into the enemy's trap of dividing us. We must earnestly carry out this moral: "Be open and aboveboard and selfless, ready to compromise and show extreme forbearance." We should unite fully as brothers, so that the rich donate money, the strong offer energy, the learned provide knowledge, and those possessing arms share them with us.

In this way, we will be able to instil confidence in our troops, so they can make up for their shortcomings in other aspects and defeat the enemy.

As for the enemy, the anti-Japanese guerrilla war aims at depleting his personnel.

Japan has a small population, with a very small number of able-bodied men. It can mobilize and send to the battlefield four million people at most. The others are the old, the weak and women and children who are not of much help in China. Japan's weakest point is its shortage of personnel.

There are two ways to deplete enemy personnel: (1) demoralize them and win them over; and (2) kill or wound them or wear them out. The anti-Japanese guerrillas must seize every opportunity to attack the enemy and destroy his effective strength, wiping out entire units, large or small. We should distribute leaflets, post and shout slogans and so forth to rouse Japanese soldiers to action against their own war of aggression.

In addition, we should prevent the enemy from using our personnel.

If we can do all this, the enemy will be gradually drained of personnel and we will surely win.

4. WEAPONS

The enemy has superior weapons including artillery, aircraft, tanks, and even poison gas. Chinese weapons are inferior, especially those of the guerrillas. We have said earlier that anyone would have misgivings if the guerrillas were to fight the Japanese invaders by depending only on swords and spears and not on other things, especially political warfare.

Nonetheless, weapons are not all-powerful, for they can only play a limited part. Every type of weapon has its specific use under certain conditions, and there are always ways to counter it. For example, modern weapons such as aircraft, artillery and tanks are less useful or even useless at night. In a surprise night attack, they are no match for short-range weapons; they cannot be used effectively, and may even turn into a problem. Other examples: Artillery pieces are good for nothing if there is not enough time to deploy and fire them, or if they run out of shells. When bombers fail to discover targets, or when tanks come to mountainous terrain or use up their petrol, they are useless.

Even though the anti-Japanese guerrillas have poor weapons, they need not fear the enemy. They should do their best to avoid confronting the enemy's modern arms and, instead, launch surprise attacks. They should engage in night assaults, ambushes, surprise attacks, and cutting off enemy communications. They should never risk their lives against the enemy's weapons. They should fall on enemy effectives with lightning speed, using hand-to-hand combat. When the enemy's soldiers are killed, there will be no personnel to use his weapons, however modern they may be.

As we have said, the anti-Japanese guerrillas are equipped with weapons inferior to the enemy's, for they have only swords, spears, pistols, hand-grenades, rifles, light or heavy machine-guns, and at most mortars and small artillery pieces. Nevertheless, if the guerrillas are good at using them, if they can seize the right opportunity, take advantage of the terrain and fight with high morale, such weapons can be very effective. For instance, men of the 29th Army is well known for their skill in wielding swords against the Japanese. In addition, the guerrillas could have a greater number of weapons than the enemy, even though they may be inferior. They can also use home-made weapons such as bows and arrows, guns made of juniper trunks, land mines made of mortar shells, and gunpowder for blowing up bridges.

If the anti-Japanese guerrillas have faith in their own weapons and learn to employ them skilfully, they can defeat an enemy equipped with superior weapons. This is no illusion.

Although their weapons are backward, the anti-Japanese guerrillas should not be backward themselves. Apart from wielding what arms they have, they must add to their supply by capturing the enemy's. They should seize as many of the enemy's modern weapons as possible and learn to use them. They must not be fetishists holding on to prim-

itive weapons like the masters of the Society of the Red-Tasselled Spears⁶¹ who muttered incantations and swallowed “magic” pills before charging into the enemy’s artillery fire. That does only harm.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

In modern operations, an army’s rear is as important as its front line because various mechanized arms need large quantities of food, weapons, ammunition, motor vehicles, and so on. Severing the front line from the rear will greatly reduce the combat strength of a modern army, prevent it from holding out for long, and even help to defeat it. For modern troops, therefore, communications are a decisive factor for the outcome of war.

Communications include transport and liaison. Transport involves conveyance by motor vehicles, trains, ships right up to aircraft. A mechanized unit must have roads and adequate means of conveyance for transport of provisions, ammunition, petrol and medicines, and for evacuation of the wounded and sick from the front line. Liaison involves both wire and wireless telegraphy, and other means of land and air communication. All this constitutes the lifeblood of a mechanized army.

The enemy’s mechanized armies must have a good communication system and use and maintain it well before they can be effective. Difficult terrain, on the other hand, favours the anti-Japanese guerrillas.

But communications can be easily altered. They can be disrupted or blocked and they can be restored. We should disrupt the enemy’s communications frequently, spoiling his otherwise smooth operations. Our armies should mobilize both the guerrillas and the broad masses of civilians to subvert the enemy’s communications, with the possible exception of aircraft transport, which is not easy to sabotage. Operating in the rear areas, the guerrillas and civilians can render great service by interrupting the enemy’s communications so that his front-line troops have a difficult time and our frontal troops can win easy victories. The rear is as important as the front line in a war. Creating difficulties for the enemy in his communications between the front and the rear plays a decisive part in helping our frontal armies gain victory. Disrupting the enemy’s communications contributes no less than front-line fighting.

Topographically, mountainous terrain, gullies, depressions, broken ground and villages, where the mechanized army cannot move freely or traverse at all are favourable for guerrilla operations. To fight and triumph, the guerrillas must make the most of the favourable terrain. Where the civilians are well organized, the guerrillas can rely on them and fight on open plains such as those traversed by the Datong-Puzhou and Beiping-Hankou railways. However, they must be more alert and swifter than ever in these actions.

6. CONCLUSIONS

Summing up, we know that strategy and tactics for any type of warfare should be fashioned in the light of five essential elements — politics, economics, personnel, arms, and communications. Guerrilla warfare should place greater stress on all of these and be good at co-ordinating them closely. This is important for working out strategy and tactics that can bring victory.

Of course, as we have said, the guerrillas have poor weapons. But they can wield large numbers of various types. They also should make up for inferior weapons in an operation by taking advantage of favourable terrain, night action or special weather. They should choose terrain that permits them to bring their arms into full play. Their arms are more useful in close-range and hand-to-hand fighting as well as in a surprise attack. Thus they should move close to the enemy stealthily and quickly. They should not only take advantage of the specific terrain, but know the terrain well, including all roads and paths, the whereabouts of high or low ground, woods and villages.

Manpower is in our favour. We should, in particular, work among large numbers of the population, irrespective of sex, age, trade or profession, political affiliation or religious belief. We should win them over, so that they provide support, cover and help to the guerrillas, either actively or passively, openly or secretly. The anti-Japanese guerrillas can survive and grow because they rely primarily on the people as their fortress, not on arms and terrain alone. They must not think they cannot defeat the enemy without modern weapons. Because the people are a reliable fortress, we should attach primary importance to the political factor; it is vital to correctly carry out the policy of the anti-Japanese national united front. The enemy hatches

the plot of dividing us by “using the Chinese to control China” and ordering the traitors and Trotskyites to sow dissension. He attempts to profit from others’ conflict. We must not be taken in. With the help of the masses, a certain number of arms and a favourable terrain, the anti-Japanese guerrillas can win victory after victory.

As the guerrilla movement widens, the number of guerrillas grows and this begins to create financial difficulties. And it is not easy for a large guerrilla force to conceal itself. While undermining the enemy’s economy, the anti-Japanese guerrillas must also try to seize his supplies and equipment, including arms, money and food, to support themselves. They should lead a hard life, maintaining the lowest standard of living. They should persevere in the War of Resistance even without enough food and clothing, without pocket money or pay. Commanders and political leaders of the guerrillas must set examples and live as do the rank and file, truly sharing weal and woe with the soldiers. Anyone who longs for official promotion and riches must abandon that wish. However hard their lives, the anti-Japanese guerrillas must observe strict discipline and not take even a needle or piece of thread from the civilians. They should help maintain the people’s living standard and protect their interests. They must care for the civilians, regarding them as their own family members. Only thus can they become one with the masses and create the necessary conditions for their own existence and development.

Commanders and political leaders of the anti-Japanese guerrillas will meet with difficulties in all kinds of work. Adhering to their patriotic feeling and devotion to defending the Chinese nation, they should unite with the masses, collect weapons, overcome difficulties that may arise, and build up their force in practical work. Displaying such patriotism and devotion, they will certainly have the support of the people so that they can overcome all difficulties. In addition, the guerrillas are taught to observe strict discipline and protect civilians. All this makes it possible for them to win mass support and defeat the Japanese.

Leaders of the anti-Japanese guerrillas should not rely solely on military know-how, but be good at employing the five factors of politics, economics, personnel, arms and communications. They should be able to work out strategy and tactics against the enemy by taking into account these factors and the actual circumstances. At the same time, they should be well versed in politics and watch closely developments at home and abroad. They should direct and continual-

ly carry on political work among their men, among enemy troops and among civilians. They should, as far as possible, prepare written and oral publicity. They should cite political events, interpret them correctly and carry out propaganda work. In this sense, they are teachers of the people.

Anti-Japanese guerrilla leaders should know how to organize the people. If the latter simply hate the Japanese invaders but cannot get organized, they will be unable to put up effective resistance.

If every anti-Japanese guerrilla leader can do these things, their detachments will certainly thrive and become strong. Guerrilla leaders should be skilled in military affairs. However, if they only pay attention to military matters and fail to concern themselves with the other factors, if they depend, for instance, only on the government for subsidies, rifles, provisions and personnel, sooner or later they will find their supplies exhausted and no more forthcoming. If they seek promotion and riches and aim their rifles not at the enemy but at civilians, they will blacken for all time the honourable title of anti-Japanese guerrilla. That would be most despicable. It is impossible to organize guerrilla warfare that way.

In the first days of the anti-Japanese guerrilla units, not every commander, political worker or guerrilla can do a good job. Besides, there probably will be some selfish members, who come to advance their own fortune and not to fight for the motherland. This will be resented by the masses of the people. But this is not so dreadful and we should not, on that account, negate the anti-Japanese guerrilla war as a whole. We should not regard the guerrillas as saints. They are bound to commit certain errors. The guerrilla detachments will improve steadily so long as their members make progress in work, have good leadership, train themselves hard, enhance their national consciousness and political knowledge, and purge their ranks of the few bad elements. In the process of doing this, they will be able to develop their activities extensively so that anti-Japanese guerrilla units will mushroom everywhere and become a great school to raise the people's awareness and strike terror into the invaders' hearts.

As we have stated, there is nothing mysterious about the anti-Japanese guerrilla detachments. But neither are they similar to those who fought in the past civil war. They are popular armed organizations that patriotic people know how to organize, that fight for the people, that throw the Japanese imperialists into confusion.

The crux of the matter is whether we are loyal and devoted to

our nation, whether we are aware of the great strength of the people and, relying on them, work to fulfil our great mission of defeating the Japanese aggressors.

TACTICS OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE GUERRILLAS

Section I

General Principles

Anti-Japanese guerrilla units may be organized by the people, reorganized from local armed corps, police, “green forest men”⁶² or secret societies,⁶³ or founded with a group of regular troops as backbone. No matter how they are formed, most of them lack good weapons and adequate provisions and are small in number and not well trained. Yet they have to defeat an enemy well equipped and trained, large in number and adequately financed. Therefore, the anti-Japanese guerrillas must engage the enemy in a particular way if they are to achieve victory.

How should an anti-Japanese guerrilla unit fight? Briefly stated, it should fight with enthusiasm, take the initiative, concentrate its whole force and use all possible methods and means to attack the enemy.

First, why can the anti-Japanese guerrillas be enthusiastic? Because they are imbued with a patriotic hatred of the Japanese invasion, an emotion that invigorates them. Every guerrilla knows his role clearly. He is not a mercenary soldier, but a conscious champion of the national self-defence war against Japanese aggression. Only such awareness can foster enthusiasm for battle. This enthusiasm, in turn, helps the guerrillas overcome difficulties and fight unfalteringly in arduous circumstances. With regular troops, enthusiasm, initiative and manoeuvrability are sometimes restricted in various ways, although it is also necessary for them to go into action with enthusiasm and manoeuvrability, under a unified command and an overall plan. The guerrillas, however, can always bring their enthusiasm into full play.

Consequently, they can operate even in the most difficult circumstances, and they can make the best of their primitive weapons to inflict heavy losses on the enemy.

Why should the anti-Japanese guerrillas fight with enthusiasm? Because they often are subject to inferior conditions, and enthusiasm can make up for these and exploit the enemy's weaknesses. This, of course, does not mean evading the enemy, or moving around without attacking him. The guerrillas must seize every opportunity to strike at the enemy right away. Repeatedly missing the right opportunity will land them in difficulty and sap their morale. Guerrillas who are always on the defensive and are always being attacked by the enemy can never triumph. They can only suffer. Therefore, the anti-Japanese guerrillas must fight with enthusiasm.

Second, what does initiative mean? It means that no matter how large the enemy force is, the anti-Japanese guerrillas must continually harass, disrupt, wear down and destroy it, taking into account the location, size, quality and weaponry of the enemy and of ourselves, as well as considering the time element. As a result, the enemy will have to engage them, even if he is unwilling to do so. If the guerrillas are encircled by the enemy in his rear, or if he seeks to fight them, they might do better to evade him or slip away. The importance of keeping the initiative is shown in the following tactics: "Avoid the enemy's main force and strike at his weak points"; "Avoid a strong enemy and attack a weak one"; "Make a feint to the east but attack in the west"; "Rescue the state of Zhao by besieging the state of Wei";⁶⁴ "Be ready to advance or retreat when necessary"; and "Fight a quick battle to force a quick decision". If the guerrillas can carry out these tactics, they can triumph whenever they strike at the enemy. Even though they might occasionally suffer a little, on the whole they would always be in a position to gain.

Third, what does concentration mean? The guerrillas are often numerically weak, poorly armed and inadequately trained. If they are always scattered, it is difficult for them to deal blows at the enemy and make progress. Therefore, the main force of a guerrilla unit should always stay with its leaders. The commander of the unit should be a planner and should also take part in implementing a plan. After a plan is mapped out, it should be speedily carried out. He, therefore, has to concentrate his force at any given time not only to harass and disrupt the enemy, but to attack in one sector by surprise to destroy a part of the enemy force. That is effective tactics.

If the anti-Japanese guerrillas cannot concentrate force when necessary, it is better for them not to stick to the principle of “breaking up the whole into parts” unless under strong pressure from the enemy. They disperse only when it is necessary to send out groups to collect food grain, carry out mass work, or to mislead and confuse the enemy.

The basic method used by anti-Japanese guerrillas to achieve the above three qualities is surprise attack. Without this, it is impossible to win victory, to imbue the guerrillas with faith, or to meet their subjective requirements.

Some people ask: Since the guerrillas are always few in number and are poorly armed, how can they take the offensive? These people do not understand that it is precisely because the enemy is better equipped and greater in number that the guerrillas must take the offensive. The guerrillas do not stress regular positional attack, but surprise attack. They take the enemy unawares when he has not yet organized his fire-power or deployed his artillery, and when his men are crowded together. In this way, the guerrillas can often meet their objective, even with the most primitive arms.

When they are obliged to make a passive defence, the guerrillas should still be mobile rather than hold fast to their positions. When forced to retreat, they should always break through, or strike at, a certain sector of the enemy to cover their withdrawal. In face of unexpected changes, they can gain the initiative because they are always ready to strike with vigour.

If the guerrillas fail to take the initiative and maintain an offensive position, it is easy for them to lose heart. The loss of a few men and the shortage of ammunition or food might make some of them waver. It is most dangerous when the guerrillas meet an enemy unexpectedly and fail to deal with him successfully. It is no good adopting passive tactics to the neglect of surprise attacks. On the other hand, the guerrillas should not act recklessly and risk their lives in tough battles. That is not offensive because there is no condition for taking the initiative. For the guerrillas to attack recklessly under enemy pressure means only helping the enemy destroy themselves. That is no good, either. Guerrilla tactics are a unity of opposites. Employing them calls for art and skill.

In actual operations, how can the anti-Japanese guerrillas bring their enthusiasm into full play, win the initiative and concentrate all their forces to launch an effective surprise attack on the enemy? This depends on whether they can take action swiftly and secretly and

whether they are resolute. The basic principles of anti-Japanese guerrilla tactics are: speed, secrecy and resolve. Only by applying these three principles can a guerrilla unit triumph, survive and grow. Otherwise, it will be defeated, weakened and wiped out. Only through victory can an anti-Japanese guerrilla unit survive, and only through victory can it achieve astonishing development.

First, speed. This means not only a high degree of mobility, but flexibility and skill. A guerrilla force must act with speed in marching, assaulting, attacking, retreating, camping, and in all other movements. But mere speed is not enough; it must also change position frequently. This can help it disrupt, harass and destroy the enemy by surprise. It can also prevent it from being suddenly pin-pointed and attacked by the enemy. Guerrillas should cultivate the habit of quick action so they can move with skill and flexibility at high speed and thus not become trapped by the enemy, even when they are attacked by his cavalry or tanks.

Second, secrecy. This is decisive for the safety of guerrillas. Like speed, it is a vital condition of guerrilla activities. An anti-Japanese guerrilla unit should always be able to appear and disappear unexpectedly and to make a feint to the east but attack in the west, keeping the enemy in the dark as to the guerrillas' location. A guerrilla unit should be able to turn up in different places within a short time and fulfil its task wherever it is. As a result, the enemy will feel that there are guerrillas everywhere and hesitate about his actions. With the support of the broad masses, it is not difficult for the guerrillas to keep their whereabouts secret from the enemy. They should strive to achieve the following: When they are on the move, the enemy will fail to locate them; and when they strike, he will be surprised. Guerrillas who fail to act swiftly and secretly can never win the initiative. They will be beaten and even wiped out. If they let the enemy know they plan a surprise attack or an ambush, he will prepare his firepower beforehand, and the plan, however good, will come to nothing.

Third, resolve. This is a necessary condition for assuring victory for the anti-Japanese guerrillas. Having carefully drawn up a plan and assigned clear tasks, a guerrilla unit should immediately carry out the plan and destroy part of the enemy, or quickly destroy a target. Any lack of resolve, any hesitation in the face of danger could undo the plan and let victory slip by. So long as they take resolute action, the guerrillas can fight against heavy odds in a life-and-death battle, overcome the enemy's resistance and defeat him. The slightest hesi-

tation would let a golden opportunity slip and offer the enemy a breathing-space to prepare himself. Hence a failure that should have been a success. On the other hand, the guerrillas should resolutely disengage and withdraw their forces when it is clear that a battle will conclude fruitlessly.

The aim of guerrilla warfare is not only to disrupt the enemy's communications, seize his provisions and arms, exhaust and disperse his strength so that he becomes vulnerable. It is also necessary to concentrate the guerrilla forces to wipe out the enemy's effective strength. We can, therefore, regard ordinary guerrilla warfare as mobile warfare on a small scale. In fact, several guerrilla units often join forces and suddenly assault and destroy an attacking or moving enemy unit. That is virtually mobile warfare. On the other hand, regular army troops may carry out guerrilla warfare. In short, guerrilla warfare should be co-ordinated with mobile warfare, which in turn should be covered by guerrilla warfare. There is no Great Wall standing between the two.

There is a saying: "Guerrilla warfare is like the handicraft industry, whereas mobile warfare is like mechanized industry." Some persons interpret this statement as showing the respective roles of the two in military action. Actually, it also reflects the development of the anti-Japanese guerrillas. This is a complex course involving intricate and interlocked conditions. For instance, it is better for an anti-Japanese guerrilla unit to operate on rough mountainous terrain than on a wide plain; to take cover in forests instead of exposing itself in open fields; to take action on windy or snowy nights rather than on sunny days; to engage in activities in summer, autumn and winter rather than in spring; to work in places where enemy troops are scattered instead of where they are concentrated; and to operate in areas where anti-Japanese morale among the civilians is high rather than where it is low. A small anti-Japanese guerrilla unit might struggle hard on a plain where the enemy was strong and the anti-Japanese morale of the civilians was low. But that same guerrilla unit might grow into a force as strong as a regular army unit operating in and around a mountainous area where enemy troops were thinly scattered and the enemy's oppression had roused the civilians to hatred and vigorous opposition. By day, this strong guerrilla unit would only be able to harass a large enemy force on flat land. But in a storm after dusk or before dawn, it could operate on narrow mountain paths and wipe out an entire enemy unit. There-

fore, not only should guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare be coordinated in campaigns, but in fact each can often turn into the other.

Section II

Principles for Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Activities

The principles for anti-Japanese guerrilla activities in campaigns should play a major role in strategy and tactics. They can be described as the following seven points:

1. DISRUPTING COMMUNICATIONS IN THE ENEMY'S REAR, DESTROYING HIS WAREHOUSES AND RAIDING HIS AIRFIELDS

The Japanese invaders' modern weaponry, such as artillery and tanks, requires good communications to be effective. The absence of adequate roads will greatly reduce its strength. Once roads are damaged, Japanese mechanized units will find it hard to move about and their supply lines impeded. Modern mechanized armies require massive supplies. Cutting off their communications in the rear, even for a short period, has a serious impact on their front line.

During the Xinkou Battle, our guerrillas completely disrupted communications in the rear of the Japanese army. It had no roads to bring in supplies of food, ammunition and medicines, so it had to resort to aircraft. This greatly weakened its offensive strength.

Although the Japanese invaders are ferocious and are trying to occupy all of China, they have insufficient troops and often can guard only one communication line or sometimes only some necessary strongholds along it, barely maintaining transport. This provides a good opportunity for guerrillas to carry out their activities. For example, no matter how much the Japanese invaders tried to defend the Shanxi section of the Shijiazhuang-Taiyuan Railway,⁶⁵ there were vulnerable spots everywhere because the enemy troops were extended all along the line. It was continually damaged by the guerrillas and remained out of operation. In circumstances such as this, the enemy suffers serious transport difficulties.

2. EXPOSING THE ENEMY'S INTENTIONS

During frontal battle, it is hard for our regular troops to know the details of the enemy's operation. They have to depend on reconnaissance and espionage. But the guerrillas can easily expose the strength of the enemy and his deployment and, when circumstances are favourable, his intentions. When they assault the enemy's service groups and transport teams, they often capture enemy documents disclosing the designation of his units and their deployment. These documents are always valuable and should be sent to the staff department of the regular army for study. Also, the guerrillas can sometimes plant outposts on high ground in the enemy's rear, where they can count the number of enemy men and observe their movements.

3. STRIKING TERROR INTO THE ENEMY'S HEART

Every guerrilla operation is a sort of surprise attack. Even if it inflicts only limited material loss on the enemy or is an unsuccessful assault, it is always important inasmuch as it demoralizes the enemy troops and reduces their determination to win. When the enemy believes he is safe and is thus off his guard, the guerrillas suddenly appear. When he is careful and has made painstaking preparations, they choose not to come. Such unpredictable movements will strike fear into the enemy troops, whatever their number.

When the war first broke out, the Japanese invaders did not realize what a threat the Chinese guerrillas might be, and so did not take them seriously. After suffering many defeats, their attitude changed and they began to fear the guerrillas.

For example, a Japanese soldier wept one day before a Chinese civilian near Xiyang County in Shanxi Province. He drew a circle around himself on the ground to indicate that he was surrounded by Chinese guerrillas. Despite strict censorship by Japanese officers, a Japanese private named Chiba in Shimomoto's unit wrote a letter to his family containing the following lines:

"On March 17, our supply and equipment unit was attacked by more than 2,000 regular Chinese troops in co-ordination with guerrillas, and was almost totally destroyed. Our engineers rushed out 350 cremation caskets, and the army service station made nearly 200. . . . Now we no longer dream of victory. It is said that the first memorial

ceremony for consoling the spirits of the dead will be held in Shijiazhuang on May 3. Perhaps I might have gone home by that time.”

We have many guerrillas. They are always on the move, appearing and disappearing as they decide. The enemy is subject to their attack any time, but he is unable to engage them when he wishes and is always unsure how to deal with them. Even when he knows there are guerrillas present, he does not know their strength. When he thinks it is only a small guerrilla unit, a strong mobile force suddenly goes into action. And vice versa. “A fleeing army suspects danger at the slightest sound, and to it every bush or tree looks like an enemy.” This ancient saying is an apt description of the Japanese army in China. Our guerrillas will wear down the Japanese troops, who are scared out of their wits and have their hearts in their mouths day and night.

4. UNDERMINING THE ENEMY’S POLITICAL POWER AND RESTORING OUR OWN

In military operations, the anti-Japanese guerrillas keep secrets and may resort to stratagems. Politically, however, they are open and aboveboard. Not only should they expose the enemy’s deceptive propaganda. They should disrupt, disintegrate and uproot all the Chinese traitorous puppet organizations serving the Japanese, and destroy the enemy’s special-service, detective squads and “propaganda and pacification teams”,⁶⁶ thus thwarting his plan to control China through the Chinese. At the same time, the guerrillas should try to restore or establish our own political power and win over the broad masses of the people to actively join the anti-Japanese movement.

In Fanshi and Guangling counties in Shanxi Province, the anti-Japanese guerrillas often wipe out small Japanese units sent to the countryside to search for women. The helpless civilians, subject to Japanese bullying and humiliation, are delighted to see the guerrillas suddenly arrive and avenge them, and they do their best to help them. Today that area is a solid anti-Japanese base.

When deprived of their own government and subjected to enemy oppression, the civilians are like orphans at the mercy of others. The enemy burns their houses, beats and kills them, rapes their women, robs them of their property. He can treat them however he wishes. The presence of the guerrillas helps the masses understand what they

should do and imbues them with faith in victory. In these circumstances, even though the enemy occupies an area, it is hard for him to establish political power.

5. DISPERSING THE ENEMY'S STRENGTH

The guerrillas' operations threaten the communication lines in the enemy's rear, requiring him to station part of his troops at points along the lines, then send patrols to protect them. Thus, having to worry about the rear areas, the enemy cannot concentrate all his forces on the front line. Numerous pillboxes have been built along the Datong-Puzhou, Shijiazhuang-Taiyuan and Beiping-Hankou railways to guard against guerrilla activity. Some places bristle with pillboxes only one or two kilometres apart. Although the enemy deploys strong forces in this way, he finds it difficult to maintain transportation as the three railways are frequently cut, section by section, becoming as ineffective as dead snakes.

When regular Chinese troops wage frontal warfare against the enemy, the guerrillas can slow the enemy's reinforcements and pin down his flanks, again drawing troops from his front line. Even if such guerrilla operations fail to fully attain their goal, they can deflate the enemy troops' morale before a decisive battle and reduce their determination to win.

6. SABOTAGING THE ENEMY'S ECONOMY AND DESTROYING HIS SUPPLIES

Attacking the enemy's depots, his supply and equipment motor-cades and requisition and draft teams has an impact on the combat effectiveness of the enemy's regular troops and also provides the guerrillas with substantial aid. Operations of this kind replenish the supplies of the guerrillas, who are often short of food, weapons, ammunition and other necessities. The civilians are especially delighted at attacks on the enemy's requisition and draft teams.

Japan is a country lacking resources. When the Japanese army occupies an area, it is bound to exhaust the resources there to reinforce itself. Operating in the enemy's rear, the guerrillas can always prevent him from doing so. In enemy-occupied areas that cannot soon be

recaptured, the guerrillas should blow up tunnels in coal and iron mines, wreck water pipes and dynamite the enemy's machinery plants, so that the enemy is unable to exploit local resources. This will aggravate Japan's shortage of raw materials. For example, after the Japanese invaders seized the Jingxing Coal Mine, the guerrillas damaged all its water pipes, making continued production difficult. Even today, the enemy cannot run the mine at full capacity. One day he obtains some coal, the next day, none.

7. DESTROYING THE ENEMY'S EFFECTIVE STRENGTH

I have noted time and again that guerrilla warfare consists not only of harassing and disrupting the enemy, but also concentrating forces to wipe out part of the enemy through surprise attack. If the Japanese invaders wish to occupy an extensive area, they have to disperse their troops, thus thinning their military strength. This provides an opportunity for the guerrillas to destroy small enemy units here and there.

Although each guerrilla assault can annihilate only part of the enemy, which means only a small loss to him, countless ambushes and surprise attacks by many guerrilla units operating energetically and continually will combine to produce a major reduction in the enemy's effective strength.

In short, it is true that the operations of a single guerrilla unit do not play a decisive part in a campaign waged by our main group armies. But constant operations of numerous guerrilla units blend into a mighty force, like continuous water drops that can wear holes in stone. They can slow and disrupt the enemy's communications, expose his intentions, dishearten his men, shake the traitorous Chinese puppet regimes, exhaust the enemy's manpower, cut off his supplies, sabotage his economic resources, and weaken his effective strength. If all the guerrillas co-ordinate with the main armies in the course of the war, they can destroy the enemy's foundation like ants nibbling away at a bone and in the end destroy it. This will have an impact, in our favour, on the outcome of the War of Resistance Against Japan.

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE EIGHTH ROUTE ARMY IN THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR

July 7. 1939

The Eighth Route Army⁵² has been waging the War of Resistance Against Japan for two years. What have we learned in this period?

First, wherever the party, government and military authorities and the people unite as one, we will win victories; wherever there is friction, we will suffer unnecessary setbacks. How has the Hebei-Qahar-Shanxi border area been able to break successive sieges by the Japanese invaders? How has the Shanxi-Hebei-Henan border area been able to become an impregnable bulwark in the anti-Japanese war in north China? Similarly, how has the northwestern Shanxi base area been able to consolidate and expand? In each case it is because of the unity of the party, government and military authorities and the people. In each of these anti-Japanese base areas, the various political parties and groups have been able to make mutual concessions and help each other. Democratic anti-Japanese governments have been set up in most of these areas. There, the people's standard of living has been raised to a certain degree, and the masses have been helped to establish anti-Japanese national salvation organizations and provided with facilities to carry on the War of Resistance. The government authorities care for the people, and the latter respect the former; the government authorities help the various army units, and the latter, in turn, defend the former. The military and government authorities and the people are united as one. The various army units have settled their

The second part of the article "The Second Anniversary of the Eighth Route Army's War of Resistance Against Japan" which first appeared in the combined 11th and 12th issues (July 1939) of *Frontline*, a fortnightly published by the General Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army.

differences, and the various political parties and groups treat one another with sincerity. All this has guaranteed our rock-firm unity and ensured victory.

In the new phase of the war, north China will find itself fighting in harder conditions. Only with the solidarity and unity of the party, government and military authorities and the people can the anti-Japanese base areas be consolidated and our War of Resistance carried through to its end.

Conversely, if efforts are not made to consolidate and expand the anti-Japanese forces but, instead, the slogans, "Corrode the Communist Party" and "Restrict the Communist Party", are raised as an echo of the Japanese invaders; if the anti-Japanese government is discriminated against, its vital role overlooked and attempts are made to disband it; if efforts are made not to mobilize the masses but to restrict their freedom in fighting the Japanese; if some army units are encouraged to defy discipline and even urged to betray friendly troops who are shedding blood at the front — all this would amount to casting away one's sharpest weapon and chopping one's hand with one's own knife. In such cases, how can the Chinese people fail to suspect such persons of seeking personal gain at the expense of the public interest? Certain places in north China suffered unnecessary setbacks because of practices such as these.

Only by achieving greater progress and unity of all the people can we persevere in protracted war and win final victory. All backward practices must be got rid of, all cases of disunity rooted out, all wrong ideas rectified, and all friction eliminated.

Second, wherever the mass movement is successful, guerrilla war can be developed and the War of Resistance carried on successfully; wherever the mass movement is lagging behind or suffers reverses, the War of Resistance will run into unnecessary difficulties. To mobilize the masses, it is necessary to appropriately raise the people's standard of living and practise democracy. The people of the Hebei-Qahar-Shanxi border area have played a prominent part in smashing attacks by the Japanese invaders, thus making it possible for our troops to win one victory after another. The mass movement in southern Hebei was subjected to restrictions and the people had no freedom to fight the Japanese. Consequently, we suffered undue losses when the Japanese invaders launched attacks there.

Only by mobilizing all the positive forces in the country and developing guerrilla war extensively can we fundamentally change the

situation in which the enemy is strong while we are weak. Only thus can we tide over the stage of stalemate and then switch to the counter-offensive. All our people must be mobilized and all our mental and physical resources must be marshalled in the interest of the anti-Japanese war.

Third, whenever we adopt a flexible strategy and tactics in a campaign or battle, we usually emerge victorious. Whenever we simply take the defensive or attack blindly, we suffer defeat. Facts have proved beyond question that only mobile warfare, in which we strive to gain the initiative and exploit favourable conditions and avoid unfavourable ones, allows us to deal fatal blows to the enemy. The principles of mobile warfare in the anti-Japanese base areas are as follows: to advance and retreat in small groups, make harassing attacks with small contingents, concentrate the main force to attack the enemy's vulnerable points, rest in the day and move about at night, make a feint to the east and strike in the west, deliberately expose ourselves to attack, take cover in good time, avoid disadvantages, act unhesitatingly and switch to exterior-line operations at the right moment. The principles of mobile warfare on a nationwide scale are these: to mount mobile operations in the midst of exterior-line sieges by the enemy, refuse to fight in disadvantageous circumstances, switch from pure defence to offensive defence, change from a passive position to the initiative, and turn from poorly disciplined troops into regular and mechanized troops. It must be remembered that only with the effective co-ordination of the masses can the great role of mobile warfare be brought into play.

Only by refining our art of military command and greatly improving the quality of our troops can we defeat the enemy. We have to rely not only on political progress but on military progress as well. And the latter requires the former to ensure its success. Thus we must promote political progress in order to improve our strategy and tactics. We must gain the strategic initiative nationwide, and greatly accelerate the mechanization of our troops in all of China.

THE ART WORK IN NORTH CHINA'S PROPAGANDA WAR IN THE PAST THREE YEARS

July 24, 1940

I. THE GENERAL SITUATION OF NORTH CHINA'S PROPAGANDA WAR DURING THE PAST THREE YEARS

(1) The Japanese espionage agencies, through the *Xin Min Hui*⁶⁷ and the “propaganda and pacification teams”,⁶⁶ have placed the press and publishing houses under their control, set up various deceptive propaganda organizations and published a host of newspapers, magazines, pamphlets and leaflets to promote anti-Communist ideas and the concepts of “a New Order in East Asia”⁶⁸ and “co-operation among Japan, Manchukuo and China”. They have also conducted various kinds of propaganda to spread dissension.

(2) Through our armed forces' propaganda departments and with the co-operation of the anti-Japanese government and mass organizations, we have published large numbers of newspapers and books and a considerable amount of publicity materials. Every soldier has been mobilized to do propaganda work. The main content of our propaganda is to explain the necessity of persisting in the War of Resistance, maintaining unity and working towards a new-democratic China.

(3) Although we lag far behind Japanese imperialism in propaganda because of backward technology and other difficulties, truth is on our side and we maintain close ties with the masses. They have realized from their own experience that we are correct, and that is why they support us.

Outline of a report delivered at the Lu Xun Academy of Art and Literature in Yan'an.

(4) Had we done a better job in propaganda and linked it more closely with our art work, we could have achieved greater results.

II. THE ENEMY EMPHASIZES ART IN PROPAGANDA WORK

(1) The enemy makes full use of art in all his propaganda work.

He is good at using large posters and small cartoons as propaganda.

He often broadcasts music spreading the concept of “co-operation among Japan, Manchukuo and China”, trying, through Japanese music, to instil in people the idea of “integration of Japan, Manchukuo and China”.

The enemy’s theory of literature and art is: “The aim of literature and art is to help establish a new order in East Asia.”

(2) When utilizing art, the enemy takes particular care that it appears in Chinese forms.

For example, he used the story of Sima Guang⁶⁹ as the theme of a large poster entitled *Japan Saves China*.

Another example: Single-page calendars were used as propaganda by adding pictures to them.

III. OUR VIEWS ON THE ROLE OF ART IN PROPAGANDA WORK

(1) A propagandist may not necessarily be an artist; but a Marxist-Leninist artist should be a good propagandist.

(2) Our art works are not intended for the few, but for the broad masses of the people and for the soldiers. We must know our audience and cater to the needs of the masses and the soldiers.

(3) The question of audience brings up the question of the national and folk art forms, namely, the question of a popular, mass style.

(4) Important reasons for advocating a national and folk art form:

a. Because it can be easily understood by the masses. We should not reject it on the ground that it needs to be improved. We must realize that the enemy is using it to serve his purpose. We should make it a weapon of our own.

b. To create a new-democratic Chinese art, we need to assimilate and develop the best elements in our national cultural traditions.

(5) Before adopting the policy of a popular, mass style, we had given attention to this question and, consequently, made some achievements. For instance, some plays were created to reflect the life of Eighth Route Army's soldiers. Operas such as *Little White Dragon*⁷⁰ were performed. Since adopting this policy, we have achieved a lot more.

Pictures and woodcuts: The New Year pictures created by the woodcut artists' group sent to the front by the Lu Xun Academy of Art and Literature are very popular among the masses. They were sold out as soon as they came off the press.

Music: We have based our musical compositions, such as the song condemning the traitor Wang Jingwei,⁷¹ on folk songs.

Theatre: There are, among other things, skits in the form of Chinese song and dance, and plays reflecting Chinese family life during the anti-Japanese war. These have been well received by the masses.

IV. WHAT WE DEMAND AND EXPECT OF ART WORKERS

(1) A good artist should be politically-minded. In a class society, art serves definite classes and can never transcend them. An artist cannot excel in his work unless he cultivates his political understanding. Thus it is essential that he study Marxism-Leninism. He must on no account underestimate the importance of such studies.

(2) An artist should become involved in practical struggles and observe and learn from real life. Instead of standing aloof, he should identify himself with the masses; instead of being an onlooker, he should take part in their struggles. Only in this way can he truly understand life and create good, popular works.

We also hope art workers will accomplish the following:

(1) Unite with each other, get used to collective life and display collective strength. We are against individualistic heroism. In the great cause of communism, the effort of one individual alone, whoever he may be, is insignificant.

(2) Listen to the opinions of the people and learn from them with an open mind. Only in this way can you make progress. Drop the notion that "only my own article is good".

(3) You art workers should learn military affairs because we live in a great era of armed struggle, because military knowledge is required to depict this struggle and because you should — and are likely to — take part in it yourselves.

I am convinced that outstanding artists will emerge from among our fighters. Great, heroic fighters will also emerge from among the artists.

We depend on you to defeat Japan in cultural movement and propaganda war.

We also depend on you to create a brilliant new-democratic art.
Work hard, Comrades!

MAKE SCIENCE SERVE THE WAR OF RESISTANCE

August 3, 1941

Marxism-Leninism opposes ignorance and backwardness and respects science and culture. It is itself the highest achievement of science. Materialist dialectics is the crystallization of 5,000 years of scientific thought. By applying it, Marxist-Leninists can master all branches of science. They have already done so in regard to one hitherto unmastered branch, the history of the development of man and human society. But Marxism-Leninism, contrary to what some think, is not limited to the study of the social sciences or history. As it constitutes the highest of all scientific achievements, its viewpoint and method are naturally applicable to every branch of science. Its mastery should lead to new developments in all branches.

The Chinese nation is now in the midst of the great cause of the anti-Japanese war and national reconstruction. Success in each is dependent on science, both natural and social science. All our scientists and our scientific endeavours must serve the War of Resistance Against Japan and serve national reconstruction and strive for success in both. This is the only approach that can ensure victory over the Japanese fascists, and ensure a democratic republic based on the Three People's Principles.

Natural science is a powerful force. Only by making progress in natural science, expanding industry and agriculture, raising productivity, developing and correctly utilizing our natural resources, and properly managing our enterprises — only by doing all this can we add to our strength, improve the combat effectiveness of our army,

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bring prosperity to the people and raise their cultural and political level. This is the path to victory in the War of Resistance and success in national reconstruction. It would be wrong to ignore the force represented by natural science.

On the other hand, China's science will thrive only with victory in the War of Resistance and democracy. It is inconceivable that science can develop smoothly in a colonial country, which is its grave rather than its cradle. Any future for science is equally inconceivable under autocracy where it suffers the most severe repression and damage and scientists become mere tools of big capitalists.

The Japanese aggression has been a catastrophe for scientific development in China. It has left it in extremely adverse circumstances. The great cause of the War of Resistance, however, has opened a new way forward for science and given it impetus. In areas of study as yet unpenetrated by the light of natural science, our scientific workers have learned to overcome difficulties and have made quite a few achievements. For instance, they have discovered many new mineral deposits. This has filled us with hope and confidence, and convinced us that we do have enough scientific ability to build a new China. It has given us greater determination and courage, as well as more experience, to integrate scientific knowledge with the conditions of our country and its material resources in a way suited to its needs and the needs of the War of Resistance. These achievements may not appear very significant right now, but they are like a ray of the morning sun giving us a vision of unlimited possibilities for the future.

Thus, on the one hand, we should appreciate our achievements and reward those who have made contributions in science and technology. On the other, we should realize that the road ahead of us is long, our tasks are heavy and there are many obstacles and difficulties to overcome. Complacency is impermissible. We must not feel that we have already done enough and have solved all the problems that need to be solved. We must forge ahead, bend science to the service of the great cause of the anti-Japanese war and national reconstruction and contribute to its victory by scoring triumphs in scientific research.

THE SITUATION IN THE ENEMY'S REAR AND THE QUESTION OF MILITIA BUILDING

November 1941

I

The people's militia — a broadly-based, armed organization of the masses — is an important force that co-operates with and reinforces the regular army in maintaining the War of Resistance Against Japan behind enemy lines, and helps to protect and consolidate the base areas; it provides a powerful reserve force for sustaining the protracted and large-scale anti-Japanese war there. Since the start of this war, our army has used the militia in these ways and succeeded in creating anti-Japanese base areas in the enemy's rear and carrying on the resistance. By now, a general foundation has been laid for militia organizations there. In many places, model self-defence corps, young anti-Japanese vanguards and guerrilla units have become an indispensable force for protecting the base areas and continuing the War of Resistance.

But we should recognize that the War of Resistance in the enemy's rear has grown and that we still have serious shortcomings in this aspect of the struggle. The people's militia is far from being up to its mission: It should be strengthened both quantitatively and qualitatively.

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II

What changes have come about in the anti-Japanese war behind enemy lines?

The War of Resistance there may be roughly divided into two stages.

In the first stage, the enemy launched fierce frontal attacks while our army, taking advantage of his insecure foothold, took bold actions and drove straight into his rear, freely manoeuvring in vast areas of Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong, Henan, Jiangsu and Anhui provinces. It led the people there to create many large base areas while reinforcing and expanding the main troops. During this entire period, the enemy carried out frontal attacks and dispersed his troops in his rear area, thus making his rule there unstable. Meanwhile, our forces had the initiative. This was a period of rapid growth in the anti-Japanese guerrilla war behind enemy lines.

Great progress was made during this period in building anti-Japanese base areas in enemy-occupied territory. By following the correct policy of consolidating and expanding the anti-Japanese national united front and persevering in resistance behind enemy lines, we brought about unity among the people of all strata against Japan, established honest and efficient united front government, improved the people's living standards, and developed a self-sufficient economy in the base areas. Our army units, after their consolidation and expansion, improved greatly in both quality and quantity and armed large numbers of guerrillas to fight the enemy tenaciously. All this laid a solid foundation for our position in the base areas. These areas have become a serious danger for the enemy and Chinese traitors, who feel nervous and insecure. Some Japanese cabinet members have even clamoured for a "Hundred Years' War"⁷² against us. This is a clear indication that the enemy has now shifted his attention to our base areas in his rear.

In the second stage of the war, immediately following China's withdrawal from Wuhan, the enemy rushed troops to seize our base areas behind his lines. Over the past three years, Japanese rule has become comparatively stable in the occupied areas, where many puppet forces and regimes have been established. In addition, the enemy has built a network of communication lines, military strongholds and blockades. All this has strengthened his position, and has improved

conditions for his army. Taking advantage of his favourable position, the enemy has adopted measures for "tightening public security".⁷³ He is concentrating superior forces to launch large-scale "mopping-up" operations, and at the same time carrying out extensive political, economic and cultural activities of a conspiratorial nature in an attempt to destroy our base areas, annihilate our army units and gain control of the entire rear area. Therefore, the present situation in the enemy's rear is one in which both the enemy and we make use of fairly consolidated positions to carry out a protracted struggle for control of territory. In this struggle, we remain in a favourable position politically, but economically and militarily we must redouble our efforts to match the enemy so as to tip the scales in our favour. Under present conditions, developing militia forces is one of the important means of strengthening our military position.

III

Within one year we must build a large, powerful militia force in every base area. We must train the militia well, so that it becomes the backbone of the self-defence corps, the main force in guerrilla warfare waged by the masses and a powerful ally of the regular army and full-time guerrillas. At present, this force provides strong support for the main troops and the war effort in the enemy's rear. In the future, it will be a ready reserve for the counter-offensive against the Japanese invaders.

The organization and expansion of the people's militia should be accomplished primarily through political mobilization based on the indignation aroused among the masses in the ruthless struggle against the enemy. We should call on all able-bodied men who want to take up arms and fight the enemy to enlist voluntarily. The militiamen are volunteers who remain at their jobs while serving as members of popular armed organizations. In peace-time, they would not only continue to work the land but endeavour to be model peasants. They would undertake military drills during the slack farming seasons.

The basic military functions of the militia are to support the main forces during combat, to conduct mass guerrilla warfare, to maintain public order in the rear and to take on other assignments in the War of Resistance. Their tasks might include gathering intelligence, block-

ading enemy strongholds, sabotaging communication lines, raiding and harassing the enemy, and attacking any traitors and small groups of enemy troops that might appear. In addition, in enemy attack, they lead the self-defence corps in concealing everything useful from the enemy, covering the villagers' evacuation, keeping an eye on enemy and traitorous activities and protecting the local government and the lives and property of the masses.

We should make it possible for militia units at all levels to maintain a well-integrated, independent organization and to manage their internal affairs democratically. For instance, leaders should be elected at various levels, and militiamen's enthusiasm and initiative encouraged. Compulsory and official measures dampen enthusiasm and initiative and are thus undesirable. We should do our best to arm the militia forces with all kinds of weapons, old and new, including swords, spears, rifles, hand grenades, mines and home-made guns, and help them develop through constant action.

Party, government and military organizations as well as civilians in the base areas should realize the importance of creating a large, powerful militia force, and they should co-ordinate their efforts to make it a success. It won't be successful if we do a perfunctory job or if everyone goes his own way. We especially request that the regular army and the local armed forces regard militia building as an urgent and important mission. They should be ready to transfer some of their best cadres to help train and lead the militia, to arm the militiamen by every conceivable means, to attend to their combat effectiveness and to help improve it, and to strengthen their organization and discipline. Particularly in time of war, we should give special consideration to the militiamen. Such help is not only worthwhile but indispensable.

After the militia has been established, it should be helped to survive and grow. We must avoid any attempts to turn it into a regular force prematurely.

Working effectively and building a large and high-quality militia force — this is a major military task of ours in continuing the resistance behind enemy lines.

MOURN COMRADE ZUO QUAN

June 15, 1942

In mid-May 1942, the enemy's main forces 30,000 strong, including the 36th and 41st Divisions, launched from the vicinity of southeastern Shanxi a large-scale "mopping-up" operation against our Taihang area. While leading troops to counter the enemy at Matian on May 25, Zuo Quan, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Eighth Route Army,⁵² was killed in action. For more than a decade, Comrade Zuo Quan had fought for the liberation of the Chinese nation and the Chinese people, often under heavy fire and in total disregard of his own safety. He was one of the most outstanding generals of the Eighth Route Army. But now he has left us for ever! This is a great loss to our nation and to the Chinese people. We are deeply grieved at such a loss. Recalling the career of someone who was my comrade-in-arms for more than a decade, I cannot but feel sorrow at his death.

Comrade Zuo Quan was born in Liling, Hunan, 36 years ago. He joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925. He served as a platoon leader and then company commander in the Sixth Army of the National Revolutionary Army. Comrade Zuo Quan was one of the first cadets enrolled when the Whampoa Military Academy⁷⁴ was established. After graduation, he took part in the Dongjiang campaigns⁷⁵ for the unification of Guangdong. Later he was recommended by the Whampoa leadership for admission to a military academy in Moscow. He returned to China in 1931 to work in the Central Revolutionary Base Area, where he served successively as instructor at the Red Army School, chief of the operations section of the Red Army's Field Command, political commissar of its 15th Army, and then commander of that army. In 1933, he became chief of staff of the First Red Army Group. In 1936, following the Red Army's arrival in northern Shaanxi on its Long March, he was made acting commander of the army group.

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When, after the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan on July 7, 1937, the Red Army was redesignated the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army, Comrade Zuo Quan was appointed its Deputy Chief of Staff. In that capacity, he fought the enemy in place after place in north China until he laid down his life in battle.

Ever diligent and hardworking, Comrade Zuo Quan dedicated all his energies and his very life to the cause of the liberation of the Chinese nation and the Chinese people, rendering meritorious service to it. He served for a long time as chief of staff of a large army group, and participated in the planning and direction of many important battles and in the building of our army. Particularly since the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war, he worked indefatigably for the nation and the people in extremely grim circumstances behind enemy lines. Partly thanks to his contribution, the Eighth Route Army has grown into a formidable force several hundred thousand strong and north China has become an indestructible bulwark against the Japanese invaders as well as a protective screen for the rear areas. A rare talent in China's military circles, he made brilliant contributions to military theory, strategy and tactics, army building, and staff and logistic work. The meritorious services of Comrade Zuo Quan are indelible. A model soldier, he will be held in esteem throughout the ages by the Chinese nation and the Chinese people, by China's military circles.

We shall never forget Comrade Zuo Quan's boundless loyalty to the nation, the people and the revolution. He led a hard life and never sought personal gain. He ate the same food and wore the same clothes as common soldiers. He remained unmarried until he was 34. Since the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war, he had drawn only a five-yuan allowance each month. He had no private savings, no property of any kind. He worked tirelessly day and night for the liberation of the nation and the Chinese people. No matter how difficult and complicated the task and how dangerous the circumstances, he never sought an excuse to avoid taking part and never hung back. In grappling with the enemy of the nation and the people, he had the strength of steel and the bravery of a lion.

We shall never forget Comrade Zuo Quan's strong sense of responsibility, his enthusiasm, patience and care towards his work. He was a man of few words. For more than a decade he poured all his energy into his work. Even in fighting battles that continued day and night, and in times of excessive fatigue when he had not slept for

days on end, he never exhibited negligence or irritability, or a lax attitude. He was always ready to solve problems, warning his subordinates against something, drawing up orders and checking up on work. Sometimes when he was overtired, he even made telephone calls and gave out instructions in his dreams. Comrade Zuo Quan worked in this manner for better than a decade, never uttering a word of complaint, never asking for a day of rest.

We shall never forget Comrade Zuo Quan's honesty, simplicity, diligence and hard work. While studying in the Whampoa Military Academy and in the Soviet military academy, he was among the best students, earning excellent marks. He was strict and exacting with himself, immersing himself in hard work, caring nothing about fame. He was modest and amiable towards his comrades. He helped his subordinates with diligent persuasion and education, showing consideration for their difficulties and concern for their well-being.

Now Comrade Zuo Quan is dead. He died on the battlefield of resistance against Japan. His death is for a glorious cause. His name will live for ever. His heroism will go down in the annals of history. His personality and his moral qualities will for ever be a model for the living.

We mourn Comrade Zuo Quan with profound grief. We should learn from Comrade Zuo Quan, fulfil his wishes and avenge him. We are determined to carry the War of Resistance in north China through to the end, drive the Japanese invaders out of China, and liberate the Chinese nation and the Chinese people.

CONGRATULATE DIVISIONAL
COMMANDER LIU BOCHENG ON
HIS 50TH BIRTHDAY

December 16, 1942

December 4 was the 50th birthday of Comrade Liu Bocheng, commander of the 129th Division of the National Revolutionary Army. From the campaign against Yuan Shikai⁷⁶ and the campaigns for protecting the Republic⁷⁷ and upholding the Provisional Constitution⁷⁸ through the Great Revolution, the Nanchang Uprising,⁷⁹ the Soviet movement, the Long March of the Red Army to the War of Resistance Against Japan with its persistent struggle behind enemy lines — these three decades represent a great historical period. During this period, the Chinese nation has gone through untold hardships in pursuit of liberation, and Bocheng, working indefatigably, has given his all to the revolution. During most of these three decades, I have attended to military affairs and served the revolution with Bocheng. I am thus well aware of his personal qualities. I find many of the glorious deeds he has performed and his revolutionary qualities worthy of emulation by our Party's comrades and by all revolutionary soldiers.

Although Bocheng was still young during the campaigns to protect the Republic and uphold the Provisional Constitution, he had already won fame in Sichuan as a general because of his skill and bravery in battle and his resourcefulness. In fierce, complicated fighting, he demonstrated a tenacious revolutionary will to work for national liberation. During the protect-the-Republic campaign, the battle at Mianhuapo in Naxi, Luzhou, was decisive. Bocheng was then in the west of Kuimen. His men disrupted transportation on the Changjiang River and mounted flanking attacks on the troops of Zhang Jingyao⁸⁰

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and Cao Kun⁸¹ in support of Cai E's⁸² Protect-the-Republic Army, thereby making outstanding contributions to the victory of that campaign.

Bocheng's commitment to national liberation developed continuously. After the May 4th Movement,⁸³ Marxism began to spread widely in China and the Chinese Communist Party was founded. The Chinese revolution entered a period of co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party to carry out the Great Revolution. In this period, Bocheng accepted revolutionary ideas, joined the Party and reorganized his old troops in Sichuan Province in response to the Great Revolution. He took command of the Provisional 15th Army of the National Revolutionary Army, waged bitter combat in Sichuan for several months, but failed finally for lack of reinforcements. During the Nanchang Uprising, he was appointed chief of staff of the Revolutionary Council's staff officers' group. He then went to study in a military school and also in a military academy in the Soviet Union, where he deepened his knowledge of military and political affairs.

In the 10-year Soviet movement in the revolutionary base areas, Comrade Bocheng served as Chief of the General Staff of the Military Commission, and then, president of the Red Army Academy, assisting the Party Central Committee and the Military Commission in mapping out military strategy and training cadres. During the Red Army's Long March, he directed the Fifth Army Group,²⁸ sometimes serving in the vanguard, sometimes in the rear. He accomplished all the tasks assigned him, especially in the battles at the Wujiang, Jinsha and Dadu rivers, and at Anshunchang, in which he resolutely carried out orders under arduous circumstances and displayed his military genius. In the struggle against the Zhang Guotao line⁸⁴ in particular, he adhered to the correct line of the Party Central Committee and helped educate the cadres of the Red Army's Fourth Front Army⁸⁵ and rally them to the Central Committee's policy, thus aiding the joining of forces between the Fourth Front Army and the Central Red Army. This highlighted his political steadfastness and his adeptness in getting a job done.

After the start of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Red Army was made part of the National Revolutionary Army and Bocheng was appointed commander of its 129th Division. He has fought behind enemy lines over the past six years, won many important victories, established the southern Hebei anti-Japanese base area,

defended the Taihang Military Area and trained his 129th Division into an invincible force. To accomplish this he has endured untold hardships and given his all to the country.

Bocheng has the fine work style of a revolutionary soldier and the excellent qualities of a Bolshevik. He is a model cadre of our Party.

Bocheng is boundlessly loyal to the nation, the revolution, the Party and the proletariat. Before joining the Party, his patriotism led him to participate in the campaign against Yuan Shikai and those for protecting the Republic and upholding the Provisional Constitution. After he became a Party member, he gained a deeper understanding of what is required to liberate the Chinese nation and has devoted half a lifetime of struggle to the revolutionary cause of national liberation. Although he is scarred by bullet wounds and his hair has turned grey, he still exerts himself tirelessly to discharge his heavy responsibilities.

Bocheng has immersed himself in the masses and knows them well. He is modest and amiable, strict with himself but magnanimous towards others, setting an example to all. Small wonder that he has gained the people's love and become one of their leaders.

Politically, Bocheng is always willing to take on responsibility and capable of making independent decisions under difficult circumstances. During a long military career and the past six years of the War of Resistance in north China, he has never become dizzy with success or discouraged by failure. He calmly keeps abreast of complex situations and fulfils his revolutionary tasks despite all setbacks.

Militarily, Bocheng is not only brave, skilled in battle and experienced in strategy. He has achieved a great deal and made creative contributions to military theory. He has the soldierly qualities of benevolence, faith, wisdom, bravery and discipline, the style of ancient famous generals. He is a talented general, one who is hard to come by in this country.

In the matter of discipline, Bocheng has a high degree of political consciousness and an enduring sense of responsibility. He is a model of fortitude, respect for organization and firmness in implementing resolutions and observing discipline. In the struggle against the Zhang Guotao line, he displayed a Bolshevik's quality of irreconcilable struggle against all forms of opportunism.

Bocheng has many other strong points worthy of emulating and promoting. He is filled with revolutionary optimism. Comrades

who know him are deeply impressed that he is always happy and optimistic, frank, warm and sincere. No difficulty can discourage him. He studies diligently and helps others tirelessly. While at a senior military academy in the Soviet Union, he immersed himself in the study of the Russian language and of military and political sciences. Although in recent years he has been very busy in military work, he has never ceased studying military theories and Marxism-Leninism. He wrote, edited and translated many works. He tirelessly helped train large numbers of military cadres. He is engrossed in work, devotes himself to public interests, leads a simple and plain life and is always strict with himself. These qualities are well known to many comrades.

Fifty years is considered a somewhat advanced age in China, and veteran soldiers who for 30 years have been braving untold dangers on the battlefield are our invaluable assets. It is with great delight that I congratulate Bocheng on his 50th birthday. I wish him a vigorous old age and urge comrades of our Party and our officers and men to learn from his glorious example of consistent endeavour for the revolution.

REVOLUTIONARY ARMY DISCIPLINE

April 16, 1943

The strengthening of a revolutionary army depends on voluntary revolutionary discipline, which is based on the following: First, all soldiers are instilled with boundless loyalty and a spirit of self-sacrifice towards the revolution, the War of Resistance Against Japan and national reconstruction. They then are able to discard personal interests and accept the interests of the revolution as the basis for all they do. Second, the leadership and the rank and file within the army are united. Because of their ardent love for the revolutionary cause, they care for each other, obey orders and observe military discipline in order to achieve political unity and become of one heart and one mind. Outside the army, the soldiers are united with the people. Together they submit unconditionally to the Party's leadership, support the anti-Japanese democratic government, abide by government decrees and regulations, respect government personnel and take good care of everyone. As a result, nothing occurs that runs counter to Party policies, government decrees and regulations or the interests of the masses. Third, army commanders issue sound orders in battle, show concern for their subordinates, share both good and bad with them, work selflessly and set good examples, thus winning a devotion that ensures that everyone is ready to do all necessary to carry out orders. Only thus can the discipline of a revolutionary army be enforced on a voluntary basis and unity strengthened within the army and between the army and the people. Maintaining the discipline of revolutionary troops depends mainly on education. Rewards and punishments are used as forms of education. Rewards show our soldiers where efforts should be made, while punishments

Excerpts from "Administrative Principles of the Revolutionary Army", an article which was first published in its entirety in *Liberation Daily*, Yan'an, on April 16, 1945.

make them aware of mistakes to avoid. We must never be lax in our attitude towards those who have won rewards, but continue to educate them and urge them to make continuous progress. We must never be hostile to those who have been punished, but educate them with loving care and help them correct any mistakes. Traitors and saboteurs who may have wormed their way into the army should be court-martialled and dealt with according to law. A rule for maintaining discipline in a revolutionary army is to be strict and impartial in meting out rewards and punishments. Beating, swearing and other abuses have long been banned in our ranks. It is only in a revolutionary army that discipline can truly be maintained on a voluntary basis. Hence in our army we should not regard some people as near and dear to us and keep others at arm's length; we should not favour some people and hold prejudice against others; we should not love some people and detest others; and we should not regard some people as intimates and others as strangers. There should be no cliquish mentality or selfish departmentalism. Only by practising selflessness and treating all people equally, as though they were members of one family, can our discipline be enforced and the whole army united.

Concern for subordinates should, first of all, be political. All questions concerning their political honour and status and their opportunities for political education should not be ignored, but solved conscientiously and correctly. Secondly, concern should be shown for subordinates' work, such as guiding them in their efforts, assessing their achievements, commending their strong points and helping them overcome their shortcomings and solve any difficulties that arise in order that they may succeed and make progress. Finally, concern should be shown for subordinates' material welfare. This is necessary because, without a minimum material standard, work will be adversely affected. Material concern should be in line with the following principles: (1) maintaining our army's glorious tradition of hard struggle; (2) considering what is possible under the given material circumstances; and (3) making sure other units or departments are not adversely affected. This year we aim to produce "ample food and clothing" in our Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. The standard of living has, in general, been raised. On this basis, the management of our army can, by and large, be done easily and well. But all acts of graft, corruption and waste must be absolutely forbidden in our army at all times.

WE HAVE THE MEANS TO FIGHT ON TILL VICTORY

July 5, 1943

The fierce anti-Japanese struggle in the enemy's rear has entered its seventh year. But with victory around the corner we face even greater difficulties. They include: (1) The invading enemy has changed his policy of building blockhouses to one of preparing "prisoners' cages",⁸⁷ that is, constructing numerous strongpoints, blockhouses, trenches and walls to carve up our base areas (especially on the Hebei-Shandong plain). He is also intensifying his blockade of these areas while they are being carved up. This has forced our troops to disperse and made their manoeuvre increasingly difficult. (2) The enemy has switched from encirclement to "mopping-up" operations. These include the recent continuous and repeated "mopping-up" drives and surprise attacks on our rear. He attempts to destroy our forces and nibble away at our base areas. Although the enemy has suffered repeated setbacks, an increasing number of our forces are exhausted and we are capturing less booty. (3) The invaders have pursued a policy of "burn all, kill all, loot all". They have massacred our people and press-ganged our able-bodied men in an attempt to eliminate manpower in our base areas. At the same time, they have burned large numbers of houses and looted large amounts of grain as well as implements and other property in an attempt to exhaust our material supplies and other wealth in our base areas. We have concealed everything possible from the enemy and emptied all houses, which in turn has affected economic development in our base areas. (4) Over the past three or four years we

The third of a four-part article written to commemorate the sixth anniversary of the War of Resistance Against Japan. The full text was first published in *Liberation Daily*, Yan'an, on July 5, 1943.

have not been able to obtain any outside supplies of ammunition, clothing, bedding, medicines, grain, etc. We are a mighty army hundreds of thousands strong that has fought hard for several years despite incredible shortages. This may be unprecedented, but this really is how things are in our War of Resistance — a sort of miracle. We have overcome all our difficulties. Having arrived at a clear understanding of the arduous conditions in the enemy's rear, we have persevered in the War of Resistance there. To counter the enemy's policy of building "prisoners' cages" we have streamlined our administration and maintained dispersed guerrilla activity. Keeping close ties with the masses, we have been active and flexible in striking blows at the enemy and have broken his attempts to "preserve peace" and nibble away at our territory. We have dealt with the enemy's policy of "burn all, kill all, loot all" by developing close co-operation between soldiers and civilians, extensively organizing militia forces and armed work teams and thoroughly enforcing the measure of leaving no provisions for the enemy. By stepping up production and economic development in the base areas, we have endeavoured to achieve self-sufficiency to remedy the lack of ammunition, clothing, medicines and other provisions from the outside. In this way, we have kept up the resistance in the enemy's rear for six years, successfully protecting our main base areas and preserving our crack troops. We have struck harder and harder blows at the enemy, built better and better base areas and trained an indestructible anti-Japanese army. All this ensures our victory.

Why have we been able to overcome so many difficulties and persist in the War of Resistance in the enemy's rear? The reasons are as follows: First, we have maintained our resolve. For the sake of the Chinese people and nation as well as for our own survival, we have made up our minds that we prefer death to humiliation and, therefore, will keep up the fight. Because we have a clear view of circumstances at home and abroad, we firmly believe that the War of Resistance is bound to triumph and national reconstruction will certainly be achieved. Our leaders and the rank and file have made a concerted effort; our soldiers and civilians have been of one mind. They have gritted their teeth and endured suffering and hardships and devoted their lives to achieving victory. That is why we have been able to surmount our difficulties and persist in a hard-fought war. Clearly, our resistance in the enemy's rear would have ceased long ago if we had allowed pessimism and wavering sentiments to

influence us and had succumbed to our difficulties. Second, we have persisted in making progress. We have been staunch in carrying out the policy of anti-Japanese national united front and have persisted in uniting with people in all walks of life and with all armies. We have thoroughly exercised the “three thirds system” of democratic government⁸⁸ and pursued the policy of giving consideration to the interests of people from all walks of life. We have practised complete democracy, so that all anti-Japanese people can enjoy the freedoms of speech, the press, assembly and association and of arming themselves, and we have protected their human and political rights as well as their right to own land and other lawful property. Thus we have obtained the sympathy and support of people of all strata. Obviously, our base areas in the enemy’s rear would have disintegrated long ago if we had acted otherwise and practised a one-party dictatorship. Third, we have used our own hands. We have consistently held that self-reliance is primary and external assistance secondary. Although we have received no arms, ammunition, equipment, medicines, bedding, clothing, provisions or other aid from outside, we were able to rely on ourselves, on the army and the people who, with united purpose, are working with their own hands. We have launched a production movement, with the governments of various localities managing to help the people increase production and improve their livelihood. The army has cared for the people and the people have supported the army. They have helped each other in production to attain the goal of “developing the economy and ensuring supplies”. At the same time, we economized by cutting back expenses, opposing corruption and degeneration, and severely punishing embezzlers. Thus we have solved the problem of food and clothing for the army and the people. We have also produced a considerable amount of medicines and ammunition to maintain the War of Resistance. The Japanese invaders and the pro-Japanese traitorous groups expect to see the end of us because of our lack of provisions and ammunition, but we have survived through our own efforts. The fact that we can achieve self-sufficiency in the enemy’s rear by our own means despite severe enemy blockades and sabotage demonstrates that China, with its huge population and abundant natural resources and supply of talent, can overcome all difficulties, if it strives for self-sufficiency by carrying out a nationwide production drive and severely punishing embezzlers. It goes without saying that there are still many difficulties in our base areas behind enemy lines and that we

should try to enlist outside assistance. If we can get the necessary supplies from outside, we are certain we can deal more and heavier blows at the enemy. During this seventh year of resistance, we hope to improve co-ordination between battles at the front and operations in the enemy's rear and to assist the latter. Our country as a whole also has many problems and needs aid from friendly nations. If China can get more assistance, we will surely be able to carry out a strategic counter-offensive and, in co-ordination with our Allies,⁸⁹ defeat the Japanese fascists. We hope that the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union will be able to increase their aid to China, so that we can deliver timely blows to the Japanese invaders. Fourth, we have streamlined our administration and trimmed our personnel. Because we have correctly analysed the situation of the War of Resistance and circumstances in the enemy's rear, we have been able to formulate and carry out a policy of efficient and simple administration in Party, government, military and mass organizations. Our streamlined army is better suited to current military operations in the enemy's rear, while our Party, government and mass organizations have increased their efficiency and lightened the people's burdens. The simplified administration has freed considerable manpower to reinforce fighting units on the front line and to bolster production units in the rear. This has brought about a more rational use of manpower, shifting many persons to their most suitable positions. If we had not adopted these policies, our army units would have suffered even heavier losses and it would have been much harder for us to manage our economic affairs. Fifth, we have relied on the masses. All our strength comes from the masses. All our ways and means are created by them. By depending on the strength of the masses and of the rank and file in the army, we have defeated the enemy and overcome all difficulties. We are particularly good at linking ourselves closely with the masses. We know that if we divorce ourselves from them, we are bound to fail. That is the fundamental reason why we have been able to surmount all our difficulties and carry on this bitter War of Resistance for six years.

MILITARY TRAINING MUST BE REALISTIC

August 18, 1943

It is essential that our troops become better educated, improve their combat effectiveness and become a strong army of the nation, an invincible, ever-victorious army led by the Party. This is particularly important for forces in relatively stable circumstances.

Like everything else, military education must be based in reality. We must seek truth from facts. Otherwise, our efforts will be counter-productive. For example, what our troops should learn, how to teach them, who will teach them, etc., should be decided in light of actual conditions prevailing among the troops. If we are not clear about these points, or if we adopt the wrong approach, our efforts at education will fail.

The various units of our army were set up at different times. Some are superior in weapons and equipment, others are inferior. Some are shedding blood in the War of Resistance at the front, others are fighting behind enemy lines, while still others are guarding the river front in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region to provide a shelter for the Northwest. On the whole, however, they share a common characteristic, namely, they have all undergone long periods of fighting and training under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. They have fairly extensive combat experience and have attained a certain level of military accomplishment. However, many of the basics have not been systematically and substantially taught or practised well because of our unsettled circumstances, frequent combat and taxing military duties, and a number of weaknesses in past education. Our troops are not “cadres’ corps”, but neither are they raw recruits. Consequently, we cannot apply to them the methods we use in training new enlistees. Instead we should provide

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remedial education, that is, teach them whatever they need, and teach specifics, not generalities. This remedial education should not cover tactical principles or other abstract subjects. It should stress concrete fundamentals. First of all, each fighter must be taught to master his own speciality. Those who have rifles should learn thoroughly how to use and take care of them, becoming skilled in shooting and in using the bayonet. Those who use hand grenades should be expert in throwing. The same holds true for those who handle machine-guns and artillery. It is essential that weapons be used properly and that man and technique be closely integrated. We should teach the necessary skills to those who have weapons but do not know how to use them. Those who have already grasped the essentials should review what they have learned. Learning to use things is different from learning political theories or how to read and write or general tactical and strategic principles. What is required is not a lot of lectures but constant, repeated practice so that the technique may be explored thoroughly and accurately. The past mistake of stressing lectures rather than practice should be corrected. A few lectures on principles are sufficient in a soldier's technical education. The point is to master the technique by practising these principles. Knowing only the principles will not enable the technique to be brought into play effectively. For example, if you do not practise charging with the bayonet, you will not develop strength and will not be able to overpower the enemy. If you do not practise shooting, you will not aim accurately and will not kill the enemy. If you do not practise grenade throwing, your throw will lack distance and will not hit its target. If those who have skill cannot use it to inflict casualties on the enemy, they will not have full confidence in it nor develop their fighting capacity to the maximum. Bourgeois strategists like to stress the role of technique. "Only by mastering good technique can there be high morale", they say. We put it differently: High morale should be integrated with the mastery of good technique. This is because our revolutionary soldiers already possess high morale. They fear neither hardship nor danger. Always wanting to be the first to charge at the enemy and the last to retreat, they look death calmly in the face. But it also must be recognized that while our troops have high morale because of our political superiority, their technical foundation is weak. This latter aspect is not merely because our equipment is inferior to that of the enemy, but more importantly, because many of our comrades have not fully mastered the

use of what we have. As a result, many good comrades have died unnecessarily, and there have been so many instances in which enemy troops were not completely wiped out when they should have been. We should never forget this lesson written in blood. We may be certain that if we can better master the skills and combine them with a high morale, the general spirit of our troops will rise higher than it is now. Their confidence and fighting capacity will be further enhanced, and they will be able to inflict greater casualties on the enemy while suffering fewer losses themselves. What we call technical education does not involve new or modern technology. It consists of mastering techniques already in use to ensure that under present battle conditions each soldier can fight alongside others in his unit or fight on his own when separated from it. Of course, we hope very much that the Eighth Route Army⁵² and the New Fourth Army⁹⁰ will acquire some new equipment with which to inflict greater casualties on the enemy, thus contributing more to the nation. Indeed, we believe that one day they will have such new equipment, though we do not cherish the illusion that it will drop from the sky. There is no harm in teaching our troops, particularly the cadres, some elementary facts about new technology. But our main task is the mastery of what we have now. If each fighter can use his weapon skilfully, making full use of its power, our education will have achieved an unprecedented success.

Learning techniques, like anything else, must proceed systematically from a lower to a higher stage, from the easy to the more difficult. For instance, in learning to take aim in shooting practice, we should start with a target that is near, then move it progressively farther away. In learning to manoeuvre, we should start with simple movements and then proceed to complicated ones. When we study something we must do so solidly and master it. We must become proficient in one thing before turning to another. Only in this way can the movements referred to above be accurate, forceful and skilful, increasing the learner's confidence and courage. We must not work in a slipshod way, seeking quantity to the neglect of quality.

Two other things need to be done to assure successful technical training in the army: First, encourage wider participation in military sports to improve the physique and cultivate a martial spirit. Second, mount an organized campaign to promote military drill and practice. For instance, take a company or regiment as a unit, select a few of its best shooters, grenade throwers and bayonet wielders as models for

their comrades to emulate. They can be called “sharp shooters”, “He Long grenade throwers”, etc. The army should train these people in a planned way (such as giving them extra lectures), reward them (spiritually or materially, citing them at meetings or describing their deeds in newspapers) and promote them. We must see to it that all our soldiers feel that mastering techniques is a great honour and that they are willing to emulate these people. Thus we can create an atmosphere of competition. In doing this, it is important to take the company or regiment as a unit, set a minimum standard and make sure everyone reaches it. In shooting, for instance, fix a distance of 100 or 150 metres, set up a 50-cm. round target and require that every fighter achieve an accuracy rate of 50 to 70 per cent to pass the test. In organizing a campaign in this way, the achievement of the individual is linked to that of the collective and no undue prominence is given to any one particular person. Here, as in other work, those comrades who teach or learn well should be rewarded, those who are slack and refuse to learn conscientiously should without hesitation be criticized or even subjected to a group struggle session. It is essential that guerrilla habits are abandoned, that everyone attaches importance to study, shows concern for and takes an active part in it. Otherwise, it will be impossible to bring about an upsurge in education.

As for teachers, we should rely on the cadres available and not expect to find teachers elsewhere because that is both impossible and inadvisable. It is true that we should oppose the complacency, ignorance and incompetence of some comrades and make them understand that their knowledge is inadequate and that they need to learn. However, the argument that in-service cadres are not educated enough to teach is nonsense. It is true that many of our cadres have not attended military schools, do not have much formal education, and that they often speak and act in a “country bumpkin” way. They cannot teach from textbooks or expound on new technical knowledge that they do not have. But they are all battle-tested veterans with experience in fighting and in the use of weapons. Therefore, as long as the educational plan is realistic and the leadership helps provide instruction, we can have full confidence that our cadres not only can teach but can teach well. The question is whether our educational plan is realistic and its goals attainable. Experience proves that problems can only be solved by a realistic approach. This is true of other things, but it is particularly true of military training.

TRAINING AND LEADING THE TROOPS

October 16, 1943

I. TRAINING THE TROOPS

We must have a goal in military training. What is the criterion for a good soldier, or for success in training? He must be both brave and skilled. These two requirements are of paramount importance. If you are not brave, if you are afraid of death, you won't be able to fight. In the past, our Red Army soldiers were very brave — which is good — but insufficiently skilled. It is best to possess both bravery and skill, to achieve the integration of the two. In training soldiers our aim is to make them skilled as well as brave, so that they will be sure of themselves when they fight.

How is bravery acquired? The first thing is to have class consciousness. With class consciousness, a soldier will be courageous when he engages the enemy, however poor his material conditions. This is because he wants to serve his class by fighting the enemy. This kind of bravery, of course, is individual. But in the aggregate, it becomes the bravery of the entire army and the entire class. That is why our soldiers are so courageous and advance wave after wave in battle, with even the cooks and stockmen contributing their full share. This is not true of other armies. The second thing is to have physical strength. We must be physically fit and able to run. Without a strong constitution, courage alone is useless, however great it may be. Physical strength comes from training. Anyone can acquire it through training. This is true for refined intellectuals, and particularly so for workers and soldiers, provided they are willing to undertake the training.

Excerpts from the report, "On Army Administration", delivered at a conference of high-ranking cadres of the joint defence forces of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia and Shanxi-Suiyuan border regions.

What about skill, or technique? There are different branches of technique, which we should learn to master one by one. If we work hard, we can do it. In shooting, for instance, one year's practice brings results. As for grenade-throwing, practising for a year, even for five or six months, can also bring results. Each of our fighters should become a crack shot or an ace grenade-thrower. We should be able to aim and hit others who cannot hit us, be able to throw a grenade 50 metres when others can throw only 30. We must master these techniques. This will give us confidence and increase our bravery. We will achieve our goal in military training if we are able to combine skill with bravery, thus enabling even the most backward and timid among us to strike the enemy effectively.

How should we train our troops? There is no other way, except that our cadres become personally involved and set an example, which is most important. They are expected to do so in other matters, and all the more so in military training. Who should conduct the training of troops? First the squad leader, then the platoon leader, then the company commander. They should set an example in every act. Most of our platoon leaders and company commanders are Party members. Their political enthusiasm and class consciousness can influence the soldiers. Cadres who are politically conscious and want to make revolution should display virtues such as selflessness, mutual help and modesty — virtues by which they can influence others. Conversely, if cadres are politically unaware or selfish or even do bad things, that will be awful, for their subordinates may follow suit. Thus, subordinates may become good by following good examples, or become bad by following bad examples. In addition to workers and peasants, there are also loafers who join the revolution. Some of them do so only to get official promotion and grow rich. How can we transform them? The key lies in influencing them with our own class consciousness and political awareness. Should we give them lectures? Lectures, of course, are indispensable, but we cannot rely on lectures alone. We should influence such people by what we say and do when we are with them, when we are walking, talking or eating together with them. This will often produce better results than lectures. I say this out of my own experience. I was once a platoon leader and a company commander. In those days, I did not know the meaning of class solidarity or similar ideas. I knew only that we had to save our country because it was in grave danger, and I explained this to my subordinates, trying to influence them polit-

ically. In time they accepted what I said. This method may also be applied in military training. We should be the first to perform military acts well. If we show our men how to perform correctly, they will copy us and imitate whatever we do. This also will many times produce better results than regular lectures or planned education. In the days in the Jinggang Mountains, when others went to carry rice, I went too. Often when I got halfway up a mountain, my shoulders ached under the heavy load and I found it hard to go on. But because I offered to carry, the soldiers vied with one another to carry too. That shows that if you set an example, things will go well. In every aspect of training or leading troops, we should set an example. If you want your men to be good marksmen, you should first of all become a good marksman yourself. If you want your men to be able to throw grenades a long distance, you should first of all master the art of grenade-throwing yourself. By the same token, you should take the lead in doing all you want your soldiers to do. This is a best method of training in the army.

The most important thing in training an army is, as an old Chinese saying goes, to train the mind of the soldier. Feudal landlords want workers and peasants to serve in their army, but at the same time they want to oppress them. To the landlords, training the mind of the soldier means making him adopt their ideas so that he will forget his class origin and oppress other workers and peasants on their behalf. We are not like that. By training the minds of soldiers we mean that we should awaken their class consciousness, make them aware of their class origin, of how they were oppressed and exploited. We must tell them how they can unite, learn to master skills and free themselves from oppression and exploitation. Once they have understood this, once they are aware of the true state of affairs in society, they will close ranks, concentrate on the revolution and devote themselves enthusiastically to mastering skills so that they can strike the enemy effectively. In military training, therefore, we must proceed with politics first. Training the mind means doing political work, arousing the class consciousness of the soldiers and transforming them into educated fighters. Not understanding this, some of our comrades conduct military training in much the same way as the Kuomintang officers, believing that all they need do is apply coercion. This is not good. From now on our commanders, particularly our company commanders, must pay attention to this matter. Not only should company commanders train soldiers in military techniques. They should cultivate

the soldiers' minds by doing political work as well. This work should be in the hands of political instructors, of course. But company commanders, too, should assume responsibility for it. This is an important point.

Physical training and mastering skills are also necessary. How can we train ourselves physically? One way is by performing gymnastics (freestanding exercises, military exercises, gymnastics on apparatus, and gymnastic drill with guns). There is also the high jump and the broad jump. The more one exercises, the greater strength he gains and the more he wants to exercise. In this way one continues to build physical strength. You may get bodily aches and pains in the beginning. If you do, rest for three to five days before continuing training. If you feel aches and pains, it is because your physical strength is growing. You must not give up training. Instead, you must persist and the discomfort will gradually go away. What, after all, is so terrible about hardship? Physical strength comes from constant training. If one understands this, one will cease to fear the initial aches and pains, and will be eager to carry on. If we are to carry guns and fight, we must develop physical balance, so exercise on the bar is also a good way of training. Once we have physical balance, we will be able to apply our strength at will. We should learn from some of the Japanese military training methods. They begin with a one-month session of strength-building exercises of all types. Six months' training can achieve great results. Once you are physically strong, you will be able to hold your gun steady, climb mountains and engage in skirmishes. These are all important skills. Our veterans who are not skilled enough should do their best to learn and catch up. There is a wide variety of skills, and I am not going to elaborate on them one by one. In short, we should train large numbers of crack shots, top-notch artillery men and ace machine-gunners. We should see that our fighters master different skills.

We also should change the individual habits of our soldiers and inculcate the habits of collective life. It is difficult to become accustomed to collective life all of a sudden. It takes time to get used to it. But collective life is of great benefit in military training. Educating soldiers by involving them in lectures, drills, meetings and recreation is a merit peculiar to our army.

Our military training thus consists of four aspects. First, setting an example. Second, doing political work, namely, cultivating the mind. Third, building physical strength and learning the necessary

skills. Fourth, teaching the soldiers to live a regular, collective life. If we do all these well, we will achieve remarkable results in military training.

II. TROOP LEADERSHIP

How should we lead the troops? There are 12 points I want to make in answer to this question.

First, it is necessary for cadres to set an example. Since I have already dwelt on this question at length, I shall not discuss it further. As the old saying goes, "He is a famous general who can lead his men in a charge and share both good and bad with them." In history, few generals have done this. But the cadres in our Red Army are all "famous generals" because they are able to charge at the head of their men and share hard times with them as well as good.

Second, we must build up our "home economy". What do we mean by the "home economy" of the Communist Party? We now have a Bureau of Material Supplies, but it is not the major home economy of the Party. I refer instead to the weapons we have. Without weapons we can achieve nothing. The Chinese revolution relies on them. Other people want to deal with us today precisely because we control the border regions and because we are armed. Even our opponents recognize this. It would be too bad if our comrades didn't. The officers and men in our army must all come to understand this. A company commander should know that his company is his home economy. To lead his soldiers well, he has to build up this home economy and manage it effectively. Of what does our entire home economy consist? It consists of guns, bullets and hand grenades, and, more recently, we've got horses, pigs, sheep, etc. If we want to build up this home economy, we must cherish and take good care of our weapons. We must see that our guns, bullets and hand grenades work properly. Sabotage by enemy agents may, of course, turn our hand grenades into duds. In the absence of enemy sabotage, if grenades have been allowed to get wet they will not explode, either. If guns have not been cleaned for a long time, they will not work, either. We cannot blame enemy agents for that. Hereafter, each soldier in each company should take it as his duty to cherish his weapons and take good care of them. Every soldier in the ranks should take good care

of every weapon in his possession. So too with the company commander, the political instructor and the quartermaster. With well-kept weapons, we can fight the enemy to the finish and capture more from him to reinforce ourselves. The company commander, platoon leader and the rank and file should all look upon good care of weapons as the best means of revolution. Without weapons, we shall remain exploited and oppressed or even lose our heads. With them, we can overthrow the enemy and liberate all of China.

Third, we must have a political guarantee. There should be various guarantees of success in leading the army. The most important among them, however, is a political guarantee, which means raising the class consciousness of our soldiers. During the Agrarian Revolutionary War (1927-37), we raised the class consciousness of our soldiers to a very high level by telling them how the proletariat had suffered, how the workers and peasants had been oppressed and exploited. Not only commanders but also our fighters could discuss this. Indeed, some of our men were very good at it. When enemy soldiers were captured, they lost no time in explaining things to them and persuading them to join our ranks. Then the captured enemy soldiers would say, "Alright, I will stay with you here." Just see, comrades. This is how we persuaded them to join us in carrying our struggle through to the end. Political awareness brought in its wake class solidarity and a spirit of mutual help. As a result, the newcomers discovered that things were very bad in the enemy camp but were very good in ours. They came to understand that they had been mistaken in the past, that they had truly come home to a very happy family. In those days, many joined our army. Very few ran away. We had no guards posted at the gates of our barracks at that time. If they wanted to run away, they could do so. But they did not, because we had done a truly good job in leading the army. As already mentioned, training the army mainly involves awakening the class consciousness of the fighters. We lead the army also mainly by raising their class consciousness. Once a fighter has increased his consciousness and understands that his only way out is to remain with the revolutionary army, he will not run away. Instead, he will work for all he's worth. In this way, the army will be well led and our ranks consolidated. This is our political guarantee. Trying to achieve it should not be the job of political instructors only. It should be undertaken by all, with the encouragement of the Party organizations.

Fourth, we must have a military guarantee. If we do a poor job

in military training, we won't be able to lead the army well. Some people will desert and our casualties will increase. If we don't take precautions against air raids, a bomb dropped may kill dozens. If we don't take appropriate measures against enemy agents, they may incite our men to desert. And if we don't remain alert, an enemy attack may cause casualties. Casualties are, of course, unavoidable in battle, but we must avoid meaningless losses. A person charged with leading troops should not lightly allow the loss of even one man. For this reason, it is necessary through political awareness to guarantee that there is no running away and through military training to guarantee that casualties are reduced to a minimum. When we are not fighting a battle, we should make constant precautionary checks for the presence of enemy agents. In this way, we can avoid unnecessary loss of personnel.

Fifth, we must have a guarantee of material supplies. We should do a good job of production to ensure a good life. Soldiers will desert if they do not have a full stomach and warm clothing or if, as a result, they are physically weak. No problem of this sort has occurred this year, one reason being that we have shown concern for the men's welfare and supplied them with ample food and clothing.

Sixth, sanitary circumstances must be guaranteed. We must guarantee the health of our fighters and teach them elementary hygiene. For example, windows should be left open. When many people gather at a meeting all day behind closed doors, if you don't open the window to let fresh air in, a healthy man will fall ill, let alone a physically weak one. We should rise early in the morning, get up on time and go to bed on time. We should make a fire when the weather turns cold, eat cooked food and drink boiled water rather than unboiled. These are all elementary hygienic rules. We will not fall ill if we practise them. All this is also a point that merits our attention in the leading of troops. When a man falls ill, we should take good care of him. Company leaders should go to see him. This is good politically and will help strengthen class solidarity. When company leaders visit him, the patient feels better. This, plus the visit by a doctor, will enable him to get well. From now on, we should make it a regular practice to show concern for patients. All the more so for men wounded in battle. Everything possible should be done to supply their needs, and this should not be regarded as giving special privileges.

Seventh, efficient organization must be guaranteed. Party organizations are vital to achieving this. There are Party branches and Party

members in our companies. The Party branch should guarantee good administration and keep the unit informed of enemy manoeuvres. The company commander should treat the Party branch as the force at the centre of leading the troops. It is the core of our leadership. He must not pit himself against the Party branch. He must not be at odds with it. Co-ordinated efforts should be carried out by all to make the company's work a success. In the guerrilla war in the past, the political instructor acted as a political commissar, because many of the company commanders at that time were not strong politically. Indeed, some of them were of mercenary background. Today, the political instructor plays a somewhat different role from that of the political commissar in the guerrilla war period. It is now his duty to share with the company commander responsibility over the work of the entire company, particularly its political work. It is important that he and the company commander work well together. Each company must be made to operate like clockwork. The Party branch, the political instructor and the company commander must co-ordinate their efforts closely in order to provide good leadership.

Eighth, we must enforce strict discipline. Troops cannot be led well without it. What do we mean by discipline? Is it the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention?⁹¹ It involves these primarily, yet it is more than these. According to the Three Main Rules of Discipline, in relations with the masses, discipline means not impairing the interests of the people; economic discipline means turning in all things taken from local tyrants; military discipline means obeying orders. We've led the army effectively for the past years by relying on these three rules. What is the specific discipline I have in mind now? It is that we must, without fail, put into practice everything prescribed. That is our current discipline. If everyone follows rules, things will proceed in an orderly way. Cadres should set an example in observing discipline. No one is to violate discipline. Whoever violates discipline shall be punished. The Kuomintang follows the practice of "allowing only the magistrates to burn down houses while forbidding the common people even to light lamps". What we want is a discipline that officers and men alike observe voluntarily. By strictness in discipline we mean that the slightest violation should be dealt with promptly instead of allowing more violations and then making a final settlement of accounts. It is not good to wait, to eventually make a final settlement that might put an offender to death. Criticism is necessary for minor violations, and

punishment should be meted out to those who deserve it. Each case should be dealt with promptly on its merits. In this way, there will be a steady decrease in the number of discipline violations.

Ninth, we must be strict but fair in meting out rewards and punishments. Those who have done well should be rewarded and those who have violated discipline should be punished. There should be no partiality. Some people have become model workers or heroes in productive labour. How, then, can there be no heroes in our army, which has lost so many comrades in battle? We need all sorts of heroes, heroes in grenade-throwing, shooting, etc. Heroes of every type will come to the fore once mass military training is launched. In the last six years of the anti-Japanese war, a galaxy of heroes has emerged but we have not given them proper commendation and publicity. We have not properly rewarded or commended those who deserve it. These are my views on the necessity of rewards. As for the question of punishment, I have already discussed it above.

Tenth, we must clearly define duties. A clear distinction should be made between the duties of the commander and the political instructor in a company. The duties of its Party secretary should also be made clear. Other clarification of duties may be made in light of concrete conditions in each company. In defining duties, it is necessary to proceed from reality, to consider what needs to be done and whether it can be done. In short, each person should perform his duties in a manner that enables each company to administer its affairs on its own.

Eleventh, we must live a regular life. In army life, it is necessary to go to bed and to get up and work on schedule. I myself, for instance, have lived as a soldier all these past years. I feel called upon to get up when the time comes. And I rise at the usual time even if I might have been in a meeting until after midnight. This regular habit is hygienic and very helpful. Army life is strict. We must cultivate good habits. Our fighters should be taught the habits of collective life and be willing to live that way in the ranks of the revolution. Special efforts also should be made to encourage cultural pursuits. Those who can sing songs should be encouraged to sing and those who can sing traditional operas should be encouraged to do so. This too will help us lead the troops well.

Twelfth, we must organize study effectively. Our army is, so to speak, a school that is better than certain regular schools. Our army consists of very few proletarians. It is made up mostly of people of

peasant origin. Provided they study and remould themselves well, these comrades of peasant origin can become fine proletarian fighters and even shoulder important revolutionary tasks. After training for three, five, eight or ten years, they can gain a good understanding of the hows and whys of the Chinese revolution and the world revolution as well, and their knowledge in various fields will have increased. If they work hard, they will make daily progress. Many of our cadres have risen from the ranks and some of our divisional commanders have been promoted step by step all the way from orderly. Many of our most talented cadres have emerged from the companies. They have been tempered to become competent, efficient and knowledgeable. Our company commanders and political instructors should thus appreciate the importance of organizing study well. Organizations at all levels should make conscientious efforts to do this.

If the above 12 points are attended to and well integrated, the problem of leading the army will be as good as solved.

MEMORIES OF MY MOTHER

April 5, 1944

The news of my mother's death has saddened me deeply. I loved her and have many precious memories of her, especially of how hard she worked all her life.

I come from a family of tenant farmers, whose forefathers originally inhabited Shaoguan in Guangdong Province. During the mass migrations to Sichuan Province,⁹² they moved to Ma'an Chang, Yilong County of the province. For generations, our family tilled the soil for landlords and lived in poverty. All our friends were also impoverished peasants, simple and honest.

My mother bore 13 children, but because my family was too poor to feed them all, only eight survived. Those born later had to be drowned. Though unavoidable in the circumstances, it was a truly miserable ordeal for my mother. She raised the eight of us single-handed. But being occupied most of the time with work in the house and on the land, she was unable to really look after us and had to let us scramble about by ourselves.

My mother was a good worker. As far back as I can remember, she always rose before dawn. The womenfolk used to take turns preparing breakfast for our family of more than 20 people. Each turn lasted a year. After preparing a meal, my mother still had to work on the land and in the vegetable garden, feed the pigs and silkworms, and spin cotton. Because she was tall and strongly built, she was also able to fetch water and carry manure.

That was how my mother toiled all day long. When I was four or five years old, I naturally began to take my place beside her as she worked, and by the time I was eight or nine I could not only fetch and carry but also work in the fields. I remember returning often from the private village school and, seeing my mother cooking

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at the stove, sweat pouring down her face, I would quietly deposit my books and go to fetch water or put the cows out to pasture. At certain times of the year, I would study in the morning and work on the land in the afternoon. During busy seasons, I would work all day in the fields with my mother. It was during this time that she taught me a lot about farming.

Life among the family of a tenant farmer was, of course, very difficult, but we managed to pull through partly because my mother was capable and clever. We extracted a kind of wood oil for our lamps. Our main fare at meals was either peas, simple greens, sweet potatoes or food grains other than wheat and rice. Our only seasoning was home-made rapeseed oil. Landlords and other wealthy people would never have wasted a glance at such food, but my mother was able to turn it into a tasty meal for the whole family. Only when there was a good harvest could we make our homespun clothes. My mother spun the yarn and then asked others to help her weave it into cloth and dye it. This cloth, which we called “family-made”, was as thick as a copper coin. Clothing made from it could be handed down from child to child without wearing out.

Our family was industrious, well-organized and well-disciplined. My grandfather was a typical Chinese peasant. Even in his late eighties, he still insisted on working in the fields. Otherwise, he felt he would get sick. He worked nearly to the day of his death. My grandmother was the family organizer. She was responsible for assigning production tasks for the whole year, which she did on the eve of each Spring Festival. Every day, before dawn, my mother would be the first to rise. Then my grandfather could be heard stirring, followed by all the others. Each went about his or her task, feeding the pigs, chopping firewood or fetching water. Of all the family, my mother had the greatest ability to work hard without complaint. She had a kindly, gentle disposition and never scolded or beat us, or quarrelled with anyone. That is why, although our family was large, relatives and in-laws, young and old, all lived together in domestic harmony. My mother sympathized with poor people — that was a kind of simple class feeling. We were not well-off, yet she would help out and minister to needier relatives. She was very thrifty. Father would sometimes take a little tobacco or liquor, but mother saw to it that the rest of us did not. Her industriousness and frugality, her generosity and benevolence have left a deep impression on me to this day.

This does not mean, however, that calamity will not befall the Chinese peasants simply because they are industrious. Near the turn of the century, Sichuan Province was drought-stricken for several years in succession. Starvation and ruin struck multitudes of peasants, who were sometimes forced to band together to seize food from the wealthy. I personally saw 600 or 700 raggedly dressed peasants with their wives and children beaten and slaughtered by so-called official troops. The land was splattered with their blood for 20 or 25 kilometres around. Their cries pierced the heavens. During this time, my family was beset with greater difficulties. Through whole years we had to eat leafy greens and sorghum. We had no rice. In 1895, the landlord threatened us with eviction from the land. On the very eve of Spring Festival, he forced us out of our house. He did this after an unsuccessful attempt to bully tenant farmers by raising their land rent. Under these wretched circumstances, our weeping family was dispersed into the night. From then on we lived in two separate places and, because of a shortage of hands plus natural calamities, we were sometimes unable to bring in a harvest. It was one of our most miserable experiences. Mother, however, never lost heart. In fact, her sympathy for the poor peasants increased, as did her aversion for the callous rich. What my mother told me in a few bitter words and the injustices I witnessed myself awakened in me a youthful urge to resist oppression and seek enlightenment. So I made up my mind to find a new life.

Soon thereafter, I left home to go to school. As the child of a tenant farmer, I would not have had the money to study. But the harassment by landlords and bad gentry and the tyranny of yamen bailiffs made my parents resolve to scrimp on food and clothing so that they could provide for the education of one person who would become the family "pillar". I studied at the private village school and then, in 1905 (the 31st year of Emperor Guang Xu's reign in the Qing Dynasty), I passed the imperial examinations and went even farther away, to Shunqing⁹³ and then Chengdu, to continue my education. The money for my tuition, amounting to more than 200 dollars in all, was borrowed from many people, and it was not until I had become a brigade commander in the Yunnan Army that I was able to repay these debts.

In 1908, I left Chengdu to return to the county town of Yilong where several friends and I ran a primary school. I was able that year to go home two or three times to see my mother. Old and

new ideas were then in sharp conflict. Imbued with new ideas about science and democracy, we wanted to do something for our hometown. The conservative local bullies and despotic gentry opposed us. I therefore resolved to leave without telling my mother and go to far-off Yunnan Province to join the New Army⁹⁴ and the *Tong Meng Hui* (Chinese Revolutionary League).⁹⁵ After I had arrived in Yunnan, letters from home let me know that my mother did not oppose the action I had taken at all. She even sent words of comfort and encouragement.

Since 1909, the first year of the Qing Emperor Xuan Tong, I have never returned home. I did get my parents to join me in 1919. But they were used to working on the land and felt uncomfortable away from it, so they decided to go back. My father died on the way home and my mother continued to work until the very end.

My thinking continued to develop along with the progress of the Chinese revolution. Once I discovered the correct path, I joined the Communist Party of China. After the failure of the Great Revolution (1924-27), I completely lost contact with my family. Mother had to support the whole family by herself, relying on our 30 mu⁸⁶ of land. I was able to communicate with them by letter again only after the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan. Understanding the cause I was working for, mother hoped for the successful liberation of the Chinese nation. She was aware of the difficulties facing our Party. She continued to live the simple and hard-working life of a peasant woman. Over the next seven years, I sent home a few hundred yuan and some photos of myself. Although she was getting old, she always thought about me, just as I always thought about her. Last year I received a letter from a nephew that said: "Grandmother is 85 this year. Her spirits aren't as good as formerly, nor is her appetite, and she can't manage in her daily life as well as before. She would really like to see you and tell you all that has happened since you left home." But I was so busy myself working for the national war of resistance that, to the end, I was unable to gratify her wish.

My mother's life was characterized by unceasing labour. She was still at the stove just before giving birth to me. Even in old age, she loved working in the fields. Last year, another nephew wrote, "Because Grandmother is getting old, she isn't in such good health as before, but she never stops working. She especially likes to spin."

I am thankful to my mother for passing on to me her experience in struggling against difficulty. Because I had undergone plenty of hardship at home, more than 30 years of military life and revolution have not seemed hard to me. Nor have I been frightened by any difficulty that has cropped up. Because my mother gave me a strong and healthy body and taught me diligent habits, I have never felt run-down.

I am thankful to my mother for teaching me about farming, for giving me a strong revolutionary will and for encouraging me to take the revolutionary road. With each passing day that I have followed this road, I have become increasingly aware that those are my most precious assets.

My mother has left me now. I shall never see her again. It is a deep sorrow without remedy. She was an ordinary person, one of tens of millions of the Chinese labouring people. But it is these people who have created, and are still creating, Chinese history. How shall I repay my mother's great kindness? I shall be for ever loyal to our nation and people and to the Chinese Communist Party on which they have pinned their hopes, so that others like my mother will be able to live in happiness. This is something I can do — and will do.

May my mother rest in peace.

HEROISM OF THE EIGHTH ROUTE AND NEW FOURTH ARMIES

July 7, 1944

Depending on the strength of its imperialist military machine and in accord with its long-planned scheme of aggression, Japan launched an offensive against our country, bringing about a situation in the early days of the war in which Japan was advancing while we were retreating. The Japanese invaders boasted that they were “invincible”, “all-conquering”, were achieving “brilliant military successes”, etc. But before long, our Eighth Route Army⁵² and New Fourth Army⁹⁰ boldly attacked the invaders and drove into the areas behind their front lines. The battle at Pingxingguan⁹⁰ blunted the edge of the enemy’s advance for the first time, shattering the myth of his “invincibility” and establishing our people’s faith in pursuing a protracted war of resistance to victory. Since the loss of Wuhan and especially the Hundred-Regiment campaign,⁹⁷ the enemy has become deeply aware that our Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are a hidden danger to his imperial army. So he slowed down his frontal attack and put all his effort into “mopping-up” operations in the rear areas. For five and a half years, 64 per cent of the Japanese troops in China and more than 90 per cent of the puppet troops were concentrated on the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the people in the enemy’s rear. They built “prisoners’ cages” covering 11,000 kilometres with blockade walls and trenches, 10,000 strongpoints and 30,000 blockhouses; conducted operations to “mop up” and “nibble away at” our base areas and “comb the countryside”; perpetrated the “three alls” (killing all, burning all, looting all); and launched “prolonged exterminating mopping-up campaigns”, “total warfare” and campaigns for “tightened public security”.⁷³ Even though under

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these conditions the enemy and puppet troops enjoyed absolute superiority in numbers and equipment while we were isolated in their rear without any outside supplies of provisions and ammunition, our Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies not only held the enemy forces but switched from defence to attack, gained the initiative and defeated and destroyed large numbers of them. During the past seven years, our Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies have engaged in 92,000 battles, major and minor. They have killed, wounded or captured 1.1 million enemy and puppet troops, recovered vast areas of lost land, emancipated 80 million compatriots from enemy rule, established 15 anti-Japanese base areas of varying sizes in north, central and south China, and organized two million armed militiamen and tens of millions of civilians. All this has helped people around the world realize that the Chinese nation is a great unconquerable force. We have gained such unprecedented achievements not only due to the correct political line and strategy and tactics followed by our two armies, but also to the heroism of all our officers and men, who displayed the utmost fortitude and fought with utter disregard for their own personal safety.

It should be pointed out, however, that the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies have been far from adequately praised for their fortitude and heroism. Many persons fail to distinguish this new type of heroism from the old-type, individualistic heroism. They mistake heroes or heroism for cliché, a product of individualism, which is characterized by showing off, striving for personal gain and fame and seeking the limelight. They think that, because we are led by the Communist Party, all members of our Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies should be collectivists and, therefore, have nothing to do with heroism. Because of erroneous ideas such as these, many heroic — indeed earthshaking and heart-stirring — exploits as well as the heroes who performed them have been ignored or forgotten. Recognition of these heroic acts has not played the role it should, and this is a heavy loss indeed. People who are sceptical about this new type of heroism do not understand that revolutionary heroism is a product of the revolutionaries' dedication to the cause of revolution; it is a brand-new thing, essentially different from the old, individualistic heroism. They do not understand that revolutionary struggles call for revolutionary heroism and numerous revolutionary heroes, who cannot be subdued by force or corrupted by riches or shaken by poverty and who are loyal and devoted, always serving the revolution with heart

and soul, ready to sacrifice their lives. Those sceptics also fail to understand that the reason our army has been able to defeat the enemy is, in fact, the heroism of our units, the emergence of numerous heroes who are brave in battle, ignoring their own personal safety.

Heroism in the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army is not displayed for personal interest or to serve the reactionary forces, as is the old heroism. It is new heroism, revolutionary heroism, mass heroism.

The new, revolutionary heroes place revolutionary interests above all else, have a high sense of responsibility and a high degree of enthusiasm for the revolution, regard the joys and concerns of the revolution as their own, and work wholeheartedly for the revolutionary cause throughout their lives, thinking little of personal gain or loss. They are not only willing to sacrifice personal interests but are unhesitatingly ready to lay down their lives for the interest and needs of the revolution. Because the revolutionary cause belongs to the masses and is an undertaking of their own, revolutionary heroism is necessarily mass heroism. Mass heroism manifests itself in two ways: first, whatever one does is for the interest of the masses, to which one's own personal interest is unconditionally subordinated; second, one believes that mass strength — collective strength — is the mighty force in the making of history and in the creation of all social wealth while individual strength is merely a drop in the vast ocean of collective strength. The new hero emerges from the concerted action of the broad masses of the people in the course of common struggle, is appreciated and praised by them, is not self-styled and does not set himself above others. And a new hero knows that he is but one among the people, a drop in the ocean of mass strength. He never looks down upon those who lag behind him or envies those who are more advanced, but is imbued with the collective spirit of helping and learning from one another: one for all and all for one. This is the unmistakable difference between the new hero and the old-fashioned, individualistic hero. The latter seeks above all to gain personal fame, power and position instead of drawing a clear line of demarcation between revolution and counter-revolution. He considers himself to be above all others and always tries to advance himself. He looks down upon the masses and is divorced from them. He even goes so far as to hoodwink and enslave them. As a result, the old-style individualistic hero is bound to be spurned by the masses and mocked by history.

The new heroism is a product of the new times and new society and is inseparable from the leadership of the Communist Party. Only the fine qualities and bold vision of communism can produce a thoroughly revolutionary viewpoint and mass viewpoint and lead to a movement of new heroism. All old selfish exploiting classes have lacked the courage to face the revolution and the masses. They have stifled and ruined no one knows how many real heroes. They have aided many evil persons operating under the cloak of "hero". Under the leadership of the Communist Party, however, all persons are able to give full play to their talents and creativity in the cause of the revolution and for the masses. As a result, they are able to contribute more and more to the treasure-house of revolution. All mass heroes will be appreciated, commended and immortalized, along with the great cause of the revolution.

The Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army are patriotic forces led by the Chinese Communist Party. They enjoy all the necessary conditions for launching a new heroism drive. Although in the past we did not adequately carry out such a drive in the army, our forces made unparalleled heroic achievements and in fact produced many outstanding heroes of the new type. The three major tasks for all our army units at present are fighting, production and uniting with the masses; these also are the three main endeavours in which to achieve the new heroism. On the battle front there have been many engagements in which our officers and men have expressed great heroism, as in the victory of the famous Pingxingguan campaign, the burning of enemy planes at Yangmingbu,⁹⁸ the Hundred-Regiment campaign that struck terror into the enemy's heart, the five heroes' jumping off a cliff at Mt. Langya,⁹⁹ the martyrdom of an entire platoon in defending Macheng Village,¹⁰⁰ the defence of Huangyandong,¹⁰¹ the battle of Liulaozhuang north of Huaiyin in which an entire company — 82 in all — heroically gave their lives,¹⁰² the defence of Nandaigu and Beidaigu,¹⁰³ the ambush at Hanlue Village,¹⁰⁴ and the annihilation operation at Zhenjiazhuang.¹⁰⁵ Heroism has also been displayed in production. The units left behind in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region last year turned 206,000 mu⁸⁶ of barren mountain into farmland, harvesting 4.65 million kilogrammes of grain. This year they plan to harvest 15 million kilogrammes. They aim for complete self-sufficiency in food, clothing and housing, without asking the civilians for a single grain of rice, a single inch of cloth or a single cent. Although the army units on the front line are fighting hard,

they have also undertaken a production campaign. Labour heroes, some of them combat heroes as well, are appearing one after another both in the rear and on the front line. Our troops have also performed many touching deeds in supporting the government and cherishing the people as well as uniting with the masses. Large numbers of activists have taken the lead. Under their influence, our men have learned through practical education that the common people are like parents of the army and have come to understand the proper relations between the army and the government. Experience proves that our fighters can love the people and the government in the same way they love those near and dear to them. The example provided by large numbers of activists in battle, in production and in mass work has not only inspired the middle elements among our forces but also the backward ones. The mass movement propelled by these activists has achieved tremendous progress and brought about a new situation in all aspects of our army's work.

If someone asks me about the Communists in the army, about the special manifestations of their Party spirit, I point to heroism, or playing an exemplary role in fighting, production and mass work. The facts bear this out. All 12 of the brave fighters who distinguished themselves in the defence of Huangyandong were Communists. Up to 45 per cent of our total army casualties in Shandong in the past few years were Communists. Many combat heroes are Communists. This is also true in production and in mass work. Eighty per cent of the labour heroes among the troops staying behind in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region for garrison duty are Party members. These are concrete examples of the fine qualities and strong Party spirit among Communists. It is only in the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, which are led by the Communist Party and where Communists play an exemplary role, that the new type of heroism can be developed to strengthen and consolidate our army units and make them the armed forces of the people which are invincible.

Experience has proved that citing the new heroism is an important and effective method for advancing our work, training cadres and educating the masses. Therefore, revolutionary emulation and new heroism drive should be promoted in the Party, government, army, mass, cultural and educational organizations.

We have often called on cadres to play an exemplary role in our company work in the past, haven't we? Why, then, has it not been very effective? Why should a person be a model in one thing and

not in another? Why was someone a model yesterday and not today? The chief reason is that we failed to make the new heroism drive an essential means of advancing work, training cadres and educating the masses. We failed to do it in a serious and systematic way. Therefore, I deem it necessary to explain the significance of launching such a campaign and what we should pay attention to.

First, the new heroism drive is a mass movement which is aimed at achieving a practicable objective under correct guidance through extensive, friendly emulation among revolutionary comrades and by giving full rein to everyone's enthusiasm and initiative. It will bring about a stimulating atmosphere where bold progress will be the rule, with everyone trying to contribute to the revolutionary war as much as possible. Only when the masses have been fully mobilized to plunge into specific tasks can their mighty power be displayed, and can heroes emerge from among them in large numbers. If the masses are not fully mobilized and if the work is done only by a limited number of people, the function and significance of outstanding figures, even if a few appeared, would be insignificant.

Second, this is an important method for uniting with the masses and training cadres. In the course of a mass movement, the leading comrades should show great concern for their subordinates, make meticulous studies in order to understand them, and sedulously train them. When their subordinates need help, the leaders should go to them; when they achieve something, senior comrades should award or praise them to encourage them to advance further. It is only through such attention that heroes can be discovered among the masses and competent and qualified cadres be trained. This group of activists forms a core for uniting with the masses. And under their influence, the masses will enthusiastically plunge into action. This is a painstaking job. Neither bureaucratic practices nor indiscriminate commendation or attack can achieve anything.

Third, this is an important method for educating the masses and doing political work in the army. The masses are most familiar with and admire heroes and their deeds. Calling on the masses to follow the examples of these heroes from their midst will avoid empty dogmatic talk and achieve effective education. In our revolutionary army, everyone has an ardent desire to do better. It is the duty of the leaders to foster this desire and turn it into concerted effort in the revolutionary war. This has determined the educational method of our army, which lays stress on exemplary deeds and encouragement

instead of on passive reprimand or threatening reproach. If everyone becomes energetic, enterprising and keen to catch up with the pace-setters, our work will make giant strides and evil tendencies will be overcome in the course of its advance. Therefore, we should adopt this method as a form of regular and systematic work to raise national awareness and class consciousness and as an important way to carry on political work in our army.

The War of Resistance of the Chinese people enters its eighth year today. The Allied British and American troops have successfully landed in northern France. The summer offensive of the Soviet Red Army has swiftly smashed the German-Finnish defence line between the Karelian Isthmus and Byelorussia. In the Pacific Ocean, American navy forces have broken through the inner defence ring of the Japanese invaders. On the battlefields in the enemy's rear in China, our Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies have in the past year actively expanded the anti-Japanese base areas, increasing their population from 50 million to 80 million. As a result, the Japanese aggressors have a strong premonition that the general counter-offensive of the Allied forces in the Pacific Ocean is not far off. To extricate himself from doom, the enemy has put up a desperate struggle, sending part of his troops to make frontal attacks in China. China's Nationalist troops along the front were panic-stricken because they had long neglected military preparedness. Despite the Nationalists' numerical superiority — 10 times the enemy's strength — the greater parts of Henan and Hunan provinces were lost within two months and the Northwest and the Southwest were threatened. In these critical days, history has bestowed a greater mission on our Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. They have become an increasingly decisive force in the epic struggle to defend northwest and southwest China, check the enemy attack and prepare for counter-offensive. In the national War of Resistance Against Japan and the international anti-fascist war, our army has assumed an unusually heavy responsibility, performed great military exploits and become a heroic force. But the present military situation imposes on us heavier responsibilities and more difficult tasks. As the war enters its eighth year and with the movement for heroism under way, our courageous officers and men will undoubtedly redouble their efforts to conduct the movement in combat, production and mass work. Emulation in these fields among the fighters and commanders, among all personnel and all departments and units, will grow into a vigorous upsurge to

produce still more heroes and heroic deeds and thus to further improve our work and strengthen our struggle. This will enable us to fulfil the mission entrusted to us in this war — defeat and wipe out the Japanese aggressors!

SPEECH AT A FORUM ON THE WRITING OF THE HISTORY OF THE RED ARMY'S FIRST ARMY GROUP

1944

We are meeting today to urge you to start writing the history of the First Army Group of the Red Army.²³ Why must we do this? Because our Party is going to convene its Seventh National Congress¹⁰⁶ and we need to review our experience and lessons since the founding of our army. As an important component of the Red Army, the First Army Group has played its role in the past revolutionary struggles. Many comrades have laid down their lives and large numbers of cadres have been trained. The history of our First Army Group is a glorious one.

The origin of the First Army Group can be traced back to 1925 when the Guangdong Revolutionary Government was born.¹⁰⁷ The troops under its control were reorganized as the National Revolutionary Army, and our Party sent Comrade Ye Ting¹⁰⁸ to form the Independent Regiment,¹⁰⁹ which was attached for training to Zhang Fakui's 12th Division of the Fourth Army. During the Northern Expedition, the Independent Regiment had some 2,000 men and most of its cadres were members of the Communist Party. Comrades Lin Biao,²⁶ Zhou Shidi,¹¹⁰ Chen Yi,¹¹¹ Nie Heting¹¹² and Xiao Ke¹¹³ all came from this regiment. By the time of the Nanchang Uprising,⁷⁹ it had evolved into six separate regiments designated as the 11th Army. In addition, the Guards Regiment of the Wuhan National Government, commanded by Comrade Lu Deming¹¹⁴ and others, was organized by cadres from the Independent Regiment. This guards regiment later came under the leadership of Chairman Mao,

Excerpts from a speech delivered at a Yan'an forum.

participated in the Autumn Harvest Uprising¹¹⁵ and then went into the Jinggang Mountains. Before the Nanchang Uprising, Chen Duxiu's¹¹⁶ opportunist leadership had abandoned army building, handing troops over to the bourgeoisie and putting exclusive stress on mass movement. It was indeed stupid of them to have no Party members of our own to serve as army officers, only allowing them to assist others in political work! At that time we had only the one Independent Regiment, when in fact we could have formed more army units. At the later stage of the Great Revolution, Chiang Kai-shek turned reactionary, and members of our Communist Party and revolutionary people were slaughtered everywhere. We could have driven him out and carried out the revolution ourselves, if we had undertaken army building seriously and integrated the military movement with the mass movement. But we were ignorant of the importance of armed struggle and of creating our own army; consequently, when Chiang Kai-shek became reactionary, instead of our throwing him out, he had many of us driven off or slaughtered. This shows that he was cleverer than we in that he knew the importance of having armed forces. Hence a great and vigorous revolution was throttled.

Ye Ting's Independent Regiment eventually grew into the 24th and 25th Divisions, which were chiefly responsible for suppressing the Xia Douyin rebellion¹¹⁷ during the days of the Wuhan National Government. Why was this army unit so strong then? There are three reasons: 1. There was Party organization in the army. 2. The troops had political training. 3. The army enjoyed the support of the broad masses of peasants and other sections of the people in Hunan and Jiangxi provinces. These were also reasons why the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was so powerful subsequently.

Significant military victories were won during the Nanchang Uprising launched on August 1, 1927. The six regiments under Comrade Ye Ting and the seven regiments under Comrade He Long¹² made up the main force of our insurrectionary army. But we had only the experience of the Northern Expedition to go by in directing military operations. We had no experience with guerrilla warfare, and no idea of the need to disperse our troops to win over and arm the masses. Although we had a lot of rifles, we did not know what to do with them. The people around Nanchang supported us but we did not realize the need to arouse and organize them. Instead of penetrating the rural areas of Jiangxi, Hunan and Hubei to organize the local workers and peasants, we rushed south to attack Guangdong

and capture seaports through large-scale regular warfare. The summer days were hot and many fighters dropped out during the forced march. In addition, most soldiers in the insurrectionary army were Hunanese and would not go to Guangdong. What was fatal, however, was that our approach was wrong. We won many battles, but ended up in defeat. We reached Guangdong with only a few thousand left of the original 30,000-man insurrectionary army. The lesson is: Our army should have gone into the rural areas instead of trying to launch attacks on big cities.

During the southward drive of the insurrectionary army, I led the contingent on the right. Although we were defeated at Sanheba, we were not completely routed. We retreated through Fujian to Jiangxi and then were compelled to go into the mountains and engage in guerrilla warfare. This had an advantage: We began to adopt the right approach, that of guerrilla warfare. Instead of trying to occupy big cities as we had in the past, we became realistic and integrated ourselves with the masses, arousing them to take part in uprisings and establishing revolutionary base areas. Our tactics also changed: Fight only when we were sure of victory and move about to avoid any battle in which we were not sure we would win. Once we were on the right track, the revolutionary forces were able to survive and grow. In the wake of the Guangzhou Uprising,¹¹⁸ it was precisely because the Dongjiang Red Army¹¹⁹ did not know how to “move about”, only how to “strike out”, that it fought pitched battles down to the last man and suffered complete defeat.

After the Nanchang Uprising, we took the troops to the Shangyou and Chongyi mountain areas in order to rest, regroup and replenish the revolutionary army, as well as to bide our time. While conducting consolidation and stepping up training, we began to expropriate the local tyrants. At the same time, we joined forces with a battalion led by Comrade Wu Zhonghao¹²⁰ under the command of Chairman Mao. I also took advantage of my personal relationship with Fan Shisheng,¹²¹ who had been a schoolmate of mine, to discuss a united front with him. As a result of all this, we were able to recruit new soldiers and get new supplies of rifles, ammunition, clothing and medicines, and our troops got a good rest and regrouped. This was to play an important role in our later struggles. Indeed, as I look back today, I find the strategy of forming a united front with Fan Shisheng completely appropriate and correct.

After the failure of the Guangzhou Uprising in December 1927,

we recruited scores of cadres who had survived it. Having pulled our troops out of Shaoguan, we first attacked Renhua and then moved to Yizhang in southern Hunan, and sparked the Southern Hunan Uprising.¹²² After that our army became integrated with the peasant movement in Hunan. The lesson to be drawn is: We can survive a major defeat and grow only when we have reorganized our troops, regained our strength, changed our orientation, gone deep into the rural areas and won the support of the masses.

During the period of the Great Revolution, many military comrades rendered meritorious service to the founding of our army. They included Comrades Zhou Enlai, Nie Rongzhen, Li Fuchun and others who were in charge of the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee, and comrades of the secret military training class sponsored by the Party. Without the military activities carried out by these people, we could not have formed the Independent Regiment, nor would there have been the Nanchang, Autumn Harvest, Guangzhou and Southern Hunan uprisings. The Party's Military Commission had also sent cadres to study at the Whampoa Military Academy,⁷⁴ many of whom later became the backbone of the Red Army. But these comrades only experienced the Northern Expedition, not guerrilla warfare, so they did not know how to get their troops to strike roots among the masses, to "lay eggs" everywhere in order to expand their own ranks. As a result, these forces, although brave, were too often defeated.

In the Southern Hunan Uprising, we aroused the masses, which proved to be a move in the right direction. But the Hunan Provincial Committee and the Southern Hunan Special Committee of the Party pursued "Left" putschism, burning and killing at random. As a result, they were divorced from the masses, became isolated and finally were defeated even though they had occupied more than a dozen county seats in southern Hunan. After pulling back, they went into the Jinggang Mountains and joined forces with Chairman Mao. Henceforth, this contingent began to engage in organized guerrilla warfare. I had already had some experience in guerrilla fighting. Beginning with the Revolution of 1911,¹²³ I had fought against the northern warlords¹²⁴ in Sichuan and Yunnan for 10 years and we had always prevailed with an inferior number of troops. Militarily, we mainly adopted guerrilla tactics. I remember that when I was studying military affairs in Moscow, my instructor once tested me by asking how I would fight after my return to China. I answered that my methods would be:

“Fight when you can win, move away when you can’t win,” and “Pull the troops back to the mountains when necessary.” I was criticized at the time for this view. In fact, however, this is a principle of guerilla warfare. So on this score I have played a sort of leading role.

The Guards Regiment of the Wuhan National Government had planned to participate in the Nanchang Uprising, but before its arrival there, the insurrectionary army had moved southwards. This contingent participated later in the Autumn Harvest Uprising and, led by Chairman Mao, went into the Jinggang Mountains. The troops there joined hands with the remaining troops from the Nanchang Uprising and then all were reorganized into the Fourth Army of the Red Army¹²⁵ with Chairman Mao serving as Party representative and I as commander. The Jinggang Mountains became our base area. Thus we began in an organized way to expropriate the local tyrants, divide land and build up our revolutionary base. Under the leadership of Chairman Mao, our orientation became clearer. The founding of the Fourth Red Army consequently played a momentous role in the development of the revolution.

It should be pointed out here that Chairman Mao consistently believed in seeking truth from facts. He stated at that time that it was necessary to set up base areas in the countryside. And to establish base areas, we needed troops, government, Party organization, mass movement and appropriate topographical conditions. Many new methods had been developed in building the army such as economic democracy, the system of giving officers and men the same pay, with no one allowed to waste even one cent, etc. This was very revolutionary. Proceeding from the actual conditions, we also set up specific systems for political work in the Red Army. For instance, the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Six Points for Attention⁹¹ were laid down during the struggle in the Jinggang Mountains. It was explicitly stipulated that the Red Army’s mission was not confined to fighting. It also had to carry out propaganda among the masses and organize and arm them, establish political power and raise funds for the revolution. The policy of winning over prisoners of war was also established in those days. So, we would not hesitate to win over and use war prisoners, as well as to incorporate into our own forces troops of the old type who came over to our side. For instance, we boldly absorbed troops led by Bi Zhanyun¹²⁶ and some other comrades and, later, the troops led by Comrade Luo Binghui,¹²⁷ all of whom had crossed over. After reorientation, these troops fought hard and were highly combat-

worthy. Though not well disciplined at first, they gradually improved through education. Comrades Luo Binghui and Bi Zhanyun remain fine cadres of our army to this day. Our work in this regard was quite fruitful.

Many battles were fought during the days in the Jinggang Mountains, and fought brilliantly. The enemy had well over 100,000 troops but could not defeat us after more than a year's fighting. The local masses supported us. We knew how to lure the enemy troops in deep, and destroy them in the base areas. The 31st Regiment of the Jinggang Mountain forces in the Fourth Red Army grew out of mass struggle. It had a strong mass viewpoint and knew how to do mass work. The 28th Regiment of the Nanchang Uprising forces had great fighting ability but lacked a strong mass viewpoint. Later the two regiments shared their respective experiences, learned from each other's strong points and integrated them to make up each other's deficiencies. As a result, both became skilled in fighting as well as in doing mass work. With greater mass following, they fought many victorious battles. Since then, doing mass work became a fine tradition of the Fourth Red Army.

At a time when we had won many battles in the Jinggang Mountains, the Hunan Provincial Party Committee sent us representatives ordering our troops to storm Chenzhou. It was not right then to divide our forces for a rash advance, but since the provincial Party committee insisted, we could not but obey. Chenzhou was taken all right, but we suffered great losses because of wrong approach. Most of the 29th Regiment of the Fourth Red Army was broken up; one battalion of the 28th Regiment was separated from us and though it was later recovered, Comrade Wang Erzhuo¹²⁸ died in the effort, which was an enormous loss. This shows that the evil of subjective, dogmatic and arbitrary orders was already there, not something acquired later.

In early 1929, the main force of the Fourth Red Army came down from the Jinggang Mountains and advanced to southern Jiangxi to join forces at Donggu with the 2nd and 4th Independent Regiments of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. When it came down from the mountains, the Fourth Red Army had 4,800 men. When it reached Donggu there were 4,000 left. These were hard times in the guerrilla war. After regrouping and taking a short rest, the troops advanced towards Fujian. In mid-March, a victory was won in the battle at Changlingzhai, in which Tingzhou was occupied and the enemy brigade commander Guo Fengming was killed. This created a new situation.

The Fourth Red Army expanded, there were more men and more guns, and various policies and systems were initiated.

But there was disagreement in the Fourth Red Army in western Fujian over how the army should be built. This came up at its Seventh and Eighth Party Congresses. The contention centred on the need, arising from the growing number of troops, for a new set of methods such as those later adopted at the Fourth Red Army's Ninth Party Congress in order to go a step further and create a new proletarian force. The resolution adopted at the Army's Ninth Party Congress¹²⁹ outlined a programme for building the Red Army as a whole. Its implementation subsequently led to further expansion of our army and the establishment of a vast base area on the Fujian-Jiangxi border.

After the Fourth Red Army's Seventh Party Congress, the army advanced on central Fujian, then turned back to storm Shanghang. By that time, it had expanded to four columns. After the Army's Eighth Party Congress, the troops marched towards the Dongjiang area but the operation failed because, once again, the tactics were wrong. The Party Central Committee, then in Shanghai, ordered the Fourth Army to enter the Dongjiang area and attack Jiang Guangnai¹³⁰ and Cai Tingkai¹³¹ and to storm Meixian County to co-ordinate its action with Zhang Fakui's¹³² entry into Guangdong in the war against Chiang Kai-shek. We carried out this ill-advised order and as a result suffered defeat. However, the mistake was soon corrected. This was the second lesson learned from a defeat that was caused by accepting subjective, arbitrary direction.

Chairman Mao's thinking consists of seeking truth from facts, adopting a mass viewpoint, sowing seeds everywhere, arming the masses, and adopting the method of "hens laying eggs", thus facilitating the rapid growth of the revolutionary forces.

When the Li Lisan line¹³³ held sway, military mistakes were committed again, but it had little effect on the Red Army's First Army Group because Chairman Mao adhered to his principle of building and relying on revolutionary base areas. He disapproved of troops leaving the base areas too long and going too far in a bid to attack big cities.

The Red Army's First Army Group was formed in Tingzhou in June 1930 when the Party Central Committee sent Tu Zhenrong¹³⁴ to transmit the Li Lisan line. It was composed of four armies: the Third Army commanded by Huang Gonglue, the Fourth Army by Lin Biao, the 12th Army by Wu Zhonghao and the 20th Army by Hu Shaohai. Setting out from Tingzhou, the First Army Group marched northwards

in mighty contingents, first taking Zhangshu, then crossing the Ganjiang River to attack Gao'an, Shanggao and other places. It captured more than a dozen counties in a row. Actually it owed its victories to the fact that it was still fighting a guerrilla war. As the masses were aroused, the army grew considerably. It began with around 10,000 men and grew until there were 18,000. The Central Committee had ordered us to storm Nanchang but we knew we had no guarantee of victory. So on August 1 we sent Luo Binghui with a small contingent to demonstrate at the Niuhang railway station in memory of the "August 1" Nanchang Uprising which took place three years earlier. But the Third Army Group of the Red Army²⁹ had entered Changsha, then pulled out. So Li Lisan ordered us to co-ordinate with the Third Army Group to attack Changsha once again. I remember the Third Army Group had sent Yuan Guoping¹³⁵ at that time to inform us that it already had between 30,000 and 40,000 men and would undertake the capture of Changsha single-handed. The First Army Group was asked only to move into nearby areas to serve as reserves and boost morale. After entering Hunan, the First Army Group attacked Wenjiashi and defeated the troops of Dai Douyuan¹³⁶ in a brilliant victory (this was the first time we captured a radio transmitter-receiver from the enemy). The First Army Group and the Third Army Group then joined forces at Yonghe, Liuyang County, to form the Red Army's First Front Army.¹³⁷ We attacked Changsha three times without success. Chairman Mao was wise in that he knew beforehand that the order of the Party Central Committee in Shanghai would not work out and Changsha could not be taken easily. He had, therefore, prepared alternative plans.

Following our failure to take Changsha, we became down-to-earth again and calmly estimated the strength of the enemy relative to our own before deciding to return to Jiangxi. But the Central Committee did not endorse our plan and some cadres also opposed it. So, we were instructed to attack Wuhan and Jiujiang. Most comrades of the Third Army Group did not want to turn back either. We made a detour, finally bringing our troops back to Pingxiang. We proposed to raid Ji'an first and storm Jiujiang after the troops were reinforced, promising that we would achieve our purpose without fail. It was only then that the Central Committee approved our plan. Ji'an was captured in October as expected. The ranks of our troops swelled. The First Army Group had some 30,000 men when it left Ji'an and crossed the Ganjiang River. This was of great significance in our preparations

to smash the Kuomintang's first "encirclement and suppression campaign"¹³⁸ against the Central Soviet Area.

The first counter-campaign against the "encirclement and suppression" was fought brilliantly. In the Longgang battle on December 30, 1930, two enemy brigades under Zhang Huizan¹³⁹ were completely wiped out, 10,000 rifles were captured and Zhang and his own troops — 10,000 strong — were all taken prisoner. We then attacked Tan Daoyuan's¹⁴⁰ division and wiped out most of it as well. The enemy troops under Xu Kexiang,¹⁴¹ Mao Bingwen¹⁴² and Zhu Shao-liang¹⁴³ fled helter-skelter. Thus the enemy's first campaign of "encirclement and suppression" was smashed. This demonstrated that only by relying on the masses in the base areas and by luring enemy troops deep inside could large numbers of the latter be eliminated. The Li Lisan line was discredited by reality. We can thus see the power of Chairman Mao's thought. If the Li Lisan line had not been resisted and troops had been sent to attack Wuhan and Jiujiang, the results would not be hard to imagine.

After regrouping and resting for four to five months, the Red Army smashed the enemy's second "encirclement and suppression" campaign¹⁴⁴ in May 1931. This counter-thrust was also conducted smartly. But the situation was somewhat different this time because Xiang Ying¹⁴⁵ had arrived and some differences had cropped up. But the incorrect views did not prevail. The First Front Army was still under Chairman Mao's leadership and, therefore, a splendid victory was soon won. This victory was also gained by luring in the enemy forces and concentrating forces to wipe them out while relying on the masses and the base areas for support. In the battles at Donggu and Futian, troops under Gong Bingfan¹⁴⁶ and Wang Jinyu¹⁴⁷ were wiped out first. After that, our troops fought their way through Baisha, Zhongcun and Guangchang right up to Jianning. In 15 days, they swept through 400 kilometres of enemy land, winning five victories in as many battles, pulverizing 16 enemy divisions and taking large numbers of prisoners as well as capturing large quantities of weapons and ammunition.

The enemy's third "encirclement and suppression" campaign¹⁴⁸ was directed by Chiang Kai-shek himself. It started in July 1931. The enemy drove straight in from the north along three routes, making directly for Xingguo and Yudu in the Soviet area. The situation became critical. We withdrew and moved rapidly into the Xingguo base. Operating between the three invasion routes, we wiped out the enemy's 54th Division under Hao Menglin at Liangcun, and the 8th

Division under Mao Bingwen at Huangbei. We fought ingeniously, moving out of an area less than 10 kilometres wide between the two prongs of an enemy attack, advancing and retreating freely. This was because we had a superior mass base, making it possible to reduce the enemy to utter exhaustion. "Our stout men have worn themselves thin and our thin men have worn themselves to death", the enemy remarked. Finally at Fangshiling and Zhangjiabei, we completely put out of action the enemy's 52nd Division under Han Deqin and most of the 9th Division under Jiang Dingwen. This marked the end of our third campaign against "encirclement and suppression".

The first, second and third campaigns against the "encirclement and suppression" provided invaluable experience for the revolutionary war in China. The main lesson is: We must rely on the masses. We conducted all three counter-campaigns on behalf of the masses and in turn relied on them. With only 50,000 men and 30,000 rifles then, we broke all three "encirclement and suppression" campaigns which involved several hundred thousand enemy troops. Neither Chiang Kai-shek nor any foreigners knew the exact number of our troops, and even the Party Central Committee could not believe we had so few people.

After this last victory, the Party Central Committee became dizzy with success. With our victory in the Soviet area and following the September 18th Incident,⁵⁸ it adopted the "Resolution on the Urgent Tasks Arising from the Smashing of the Enemy's Third Campaign of Encirclement and Suppression' by the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and from the Gradual Maturing of the Revolutionary Crisis". It proposed "struggling for the victory of the revolution first in one or more provinces", abrogated the policy of guerrilla warfare and made plans to attack big cities. On January 10, 1932, the Central Committee ordered the Red Army to storm Ganzhou, but without success. This furnished added proof that we should not attack big cities. Earlier, Chairman Mao had proposed expanding to the northeast, spreading our troops to win over the masses, casting the net all the way to Zhejiang and extending the war to Chiang Kai-shek's hometown [in Fenghua, Zhejiang]. If this were done, I estimated that the Red Army could grow to 100,000 men and the Soviet area be expanded. Unfortunately, Chairman Mao's proposal was rejected. Soon afterwards, dogmatists took charge of military affairs, and the orientation went wrong again. Of the three major tasks of the Red Army, only combat was retained. Mass work and raising funds were discarded. As a result, we alienated ourselves from the masses and supplies were

jeopardized. Although the Red Army's First Army Group fought a number of victorious battles after that, many were unproductive in hindsight. Thanks to the experience gathered in the first three campaigns against the "encirclement and suppression", we scored a number of victories in the fourth counter-campaign.¹⁴⁹ But dogmatists had weakened the Red Army and finished off the guerrilla detachments. As for the army's composition, they blindly stressed "class background" and promoted cadres of worker origin to leading posts at divisional and army levels, disregarding their actual ability and experience. They were utterly ignorant that there were absolutely no large numbers of workers in the rural areas for them to recruit. The characteristics of dogmatists were that they proceeded not from actual conditions in China but from wishful thinking and conditions in the Soviet Union. They did not realize that it was impossible to turn an army such as ours into an exact replica of the Soviet Red Army.

Things were worse in the fifth campaign against the "encirclement and suppression"¹⁵⁰ because only foreign dogmas were applied and all experience gathered in the previous counter-campaigns in the Soviet areas were cast to the winds. The dogmatists mechanically applied rules from the First World War, waging blockhouse warfare, launching short, swift thrusts,¹⁵⁰ fighting rashly and recklessly with no idea of the extent of our own resources. Dogmatism in the military and other fields brought heavy losses to the revolution. It was not until the Zunyi Meeting,¹⁵¹ when Chairman Mao's leadership was established, that this wrong line was stopped. Only 7,000 men of the First and Third Army Groups of the Red Army survived the Long March. This was caused by the dogmatists' rejection of Chairman Mao's correct ideas and their subsequent wrong approaches.

After the start of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei Military Area, the Shandong Military Area and the New Fourth Army unit under Huang Kecheng,¹⁵² all of which originated in the Red Army's First Army Group, grew considerably. But during the present anti-Japanese war, some comrades have not learned conscientiously from the military experience and lessons in the past, and ideological controversies remain. At the Luochuan Meeting,¹⁵³ Chairman Mao espoused guerrilla war, waged independently and with initiative, taking guerrilla warfare as the main pattern of war and actively arousing the masses to expand our forces. But in some places this was not carried out satisfactorily, and some people still try to fight large battles. They do not realize that we should mainly engage in

guerrilla warfare and should boldly spread our forces out to win over the masses and increase our strength. A battle should be fought only when necessary. Unnecessary battles must be avoided. Among other things, we are in the countryside and are short of ammunition, so why fight large battles? How many of them can we afford? During the anti-Japanese war, our troops have grown enormously. This is because Chairman Mao has a firm grasp of the relevant matters and some of our mistakes were corrected in good time, which has benefited the growth of our troops.

Cadres of the Red Army's First Army Group have a fine tradition: You are brave and skilled in fighting, good at army administration and doing mass work. But you should know that your very success could work against you. You should guard against conceit and arrogance. Some comrades among you may regard themselves as model representative of the orthodox school. Wherever they go, they may apply themselves mechanically, in disregard of specific conditions. So they may not get on well with others and consequently may run into snags. Let me tell you that, when you go to work in other places, you have to respect others before you can improve yourselves and realize your ideals. We comrades of the First Army Group have followed Chairman Mao for many years. We must truly grasp Chairman Mao's thought. Only when we have mastered Chairman Mao's way of thinking can we handle matters well and deserve to be called his students. We must conscientiously learn from Chairman Mao's modesty and his approach of seeking truth from facts. Wherever we work, we must be open-minded at all times, appreciate other people's strong points and be good at learning from them.

Finally, I want to say a few words on what we call the "mountain-stronghold" mentality. We did come down from the Jinggang Mountains, which may objectively be said to be a sort of mountain stronghold. But we must not subjectively develop a "mountain-stronghold" mentality. We must not claim credit for ourselves. If there is credit, it should go to the rising masses, to the martyrs who laid down their lives. If divorced from the masses, we shall get nowhere. Take myself, for example. Both Chinese and foreigners know about me as if I had three heads and six arms. In fact, I'm merely one of the champions of the cause and the exploits of the broad masses. We must remember: All credit should go to the Party and the masses.

THE BATTLE FRONT IN THE LIBERATED AREAS

April 25, 1945

Comrades,

This Seventh National Congress of our Party¹⁰⁶ is being held at a time when the great Chinese people have waged their heroic War of Resistance Against Japan for nearly eight years. I feel it a great honour to speak to our Party Congress for the more than 900,000 men belonging to the Eighth Route Army,⁵² the New Fourth Army⁹⁰ and the South China Anti-Japanese Column¹⁵⁴ and the more than two million militiamen — anti-Japanese heroes all. There is one thing I ought to say at the start: that during these eight years our splendid Chinese people have formed a national united front against Japan. All the people, men and women, young and old, have been waging a tremendous, life-and-death struggle against the invaders on all fronts. No matter how brutal and ruthless the Japanese invaders have been, no matter how mistaken the policies of the Kuomintang government and its supreme command, the Chinese people have doggedly carried on this great patriotic war, brushing aside all obstacles. There can be no doubt that the Chinese people will achieve final victory. During these eight years, our great people's armies — the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Column — have fought shoulder to shoulder with all other anti-Japanese forces in defence of our motherland. And, alongside the rest of the Chinese people, we Communists have shed our blood unsparingly on battle fronts in the Liberated Areas in north, central and south China. We Chinese Communists can proudly claim to be the best sons and daugh-

Comrade Zhu De delivered this military report at the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. He reviewed its text and made some revisions in 1953, when the People's Publishing House in Beijing put out a third edition of it in booklet form.

ters of our nation because we have upheld the Chinese people's most heartfelt cause; and we shall steadfastly continue to do so.

I want to take this opportunity to pay homage to the memory of the soldiers of all the armed forces throughout the country who gave their lives in the War of Resistance Against Japan, to the memory of all members of the Communist Party and all other compatriots who made the supreme sacrifice for the anti-Japanese cause.

I should like to extend heartfelt greetings to all our countrymen fighting on the anti-Japanese fronts in China, to the officers and men of the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, the South China Anti-Japanese Column and the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army.¹⁵⁵

Comrades! This congress is meeting to review the experience of the War of Resistance, and to prepare ourselves to work in ever-closer co-operation and common struggle with the entire Chinese people and all friendly forces fighting the Japanese, in order to bring this war to final victory. I am in full agreement with the political report entitled "On Coalition Government" made by the leader of our Party, Comrade Mao Zedong. It is a great historic document, which embodies and sums up the experience gained in the Chinese people's bitter struggle for independence, freedom, democracy, unity and prosperity. It proposes a specific programme and practical measures for defeating the Japanese invaders and for building a new China. It maps a road that, followed by our Party and the whole Chinese people, will lead to victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan and shape the destiny of post-war China.

Without a correct political policy there can be no correct military policy. The people's war can achieve victory only if its course is guided by a correct political policy and only if it is conducted by a democratic coalition government with the people as the mainstay. For eight years now our great people's armies — the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Column — have waged a war of unparalleled heroism, fought bitter yet magnificent and triumphant battles, and become the leading force in China's anti-Japanese war. They have been able to do so because the political and military policies of Comrade Mao Zedong are correct. The application of his correct political policy in combination with his correct military policy has brought about the following: the creation of the armed forces of the people; the establishment of the Liberated Areas; the organization of a democratic coalition government based on the

“three thirds system”;⁸⁸ and the waging of a genuine people’s war in the Liberated Areas. All of this has enabled us to win one great victory after another on the battle fronts in the Liberated Areas. Now, as we prepare ourselves for nationwide victory in the War of Resistance, we must likewise follow the principles given in Comrade Mao Zedong’s political report and act on the guidance provided by his general political policy. It would be an obvious mistake to divorce military from political affairs, to discuss military affairs solely from the military point of view. The military report I am submitting to our Seventh Party Congress is based, in spirit and policy, on the political report by Comrade Mao Zedong.

I. EIGHT YEARS OF THE WAR OF RESISTANCE

Comrades! As I said earlier, we have waged the War of Resistance Against Japan for nearly eight years. During these eight years, the military situation has undergone complex changes. However complex, the developments have not gone beyond what Comrade Mao Zedong scientifically predicted in his *On Protracted War*. That is, that the War of Resistance would be marked by three stages: the enemy’s offensive; stalemate; and our counter-offensive. We have not yet passed through them all, for we are just about to enter the third.

The first stage of the War of Resistance Against Japan began with the July 7th Incident of 1937⁵⁹ and ended with the fall of Wuhan in October 1938. During this stage, the Kuomintang authorities were compelled to turn from non-resistance to resistance, and to adopt certain progressive measures in domestic policy. They were forced to do this as a result of the all-out offensive by Japanese imperialism, the growing demand for resistance from the entire Chinese people, and particularly our Party’s insistence on the formation of a national united front against Japan. During this period, quite a number of Kuomintang troops and forces under the provincial authorities put up active resistance to the invaders at the front, even though other Kuomintang units did not do so but fled in panic the moment they encountered the enemy. The change in policy pursued by the Kuomintang authorities at that time was welcomed and supported by us Communists and by the Chinese people as a whole. Unfortunately, the change did not go far enough. At the very start of the War of Resistance, our Party’s

Central Committee pointed out that without a people's war, a total war, it would be impossible to win the war against Japanese invasion. But because the Kuomintang authorities persisted in maintaining their anti-popular regime and standpoint, they were incapable of waging such a people's war — a situation the Japanese invaders took great advantage of to attack us. It was, in fact, by taking advantage of this weakness on the battle front in the Kuomintang areas that in a mere 15 months, the invaders were able to occupy Guangzhou and Wuhan and swallow up a large part of north and central China as well as key areas in south China. Of course the Japanese, too, have many weak points. The war they are waging is imperialist, aggressive, barbarous and unjust, and therefore theirs is an unpopular cause. Japanese imperialism has inherent weaknesses, and its manpower, military strength and financial and material resources are all inadequate. The calculations of the Japanese imperialists were one-sided. They considered only the strength of the Kuomintang authorities and overlooked the fighting will and strength of the great Chinese people and their armies — the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. Because of their weaknesses, the Japanese aggressors have to employ a principle in deployment and command that requires them to use their troops in a dispersed and piecemeal way. Although a powerful enemy, the Japanese aggressors are by no means invincible. Their weaknesses should have been exploited by the Kuomintang. Unfortunately, they were not. On the other hand, the Kuomintang's own major weakness — its one-party dictatorship — was exploited by the Japanese. The political system that militated against the people, with its defeatist reliance on defence, was such that within the first 15 months the several million troops under Kuomintang command suffered tremendous losses. This stupid strategy prevented those officers and men who did put up a heroic fight at the front from achieving the victories they deserved.

By contrast, it was in this first stage that our great people's armies — the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies — advanced in a direction opposite to that of Japanese attack and penetrated to areas in the enemy's rear. This move represented our counter-attack during the enemy's strategic offensive. While the enemy was attacking and the Kuomintang army was beating a mass retreat, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies launched counter-attacks behind enemy lines with unparalleled heroism and won victory after victory. They tied the enemy down, established strategic bases, created Liberated Areas and

raised the fighting morale of the whole Chinese people. Thus facts disproved the theory of national subjugation and demonstrated that a war waged by the people will surely triumph in the end. They also proved that the idea of our winning a quick victory was likewise erroneous. When the enemy is strong and we are weak, we must pursue a people's war to gradually turn the tide. That is why our War of Resistance is a protracted war.

The 15 months of the first stage of this war witnessed great changes in China as well as among the Japanese invaders. From the standpoint of resistance to Japan, the Kuomintang authorities had no good reason to be unhappy that the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies successfully opened new fronts and recovered vast stretches of lost territory in the enemy's rear. And yet they were. In fact, they were most annoyed. After the fall of Wuhan, they changed their policy. They changed to a policy of passive resistance to Japan but active opposition to the Communist Party and the people. On the Japanese side, the invaders had succeeded in occupying such large areas in our country that the last thing they expected was to encounter such powerful opponents as the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies in north and central China. Our recovery of so many of the places they had occupied was like pushing a dagger into their heart. As a result, the Japanese, too, changed their policy. They stopped attacking the Kuomintang fronts, contenting themselves with inducing the Kuomintang authorities to surrender. On the other hand, they focused their "mopping-up" campaigns on the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. We thus entered the stage of strategic stalemate. One thing is certain: With the enemy advancing and the Kuomintang forces defeated and retreating, this stage could never have been reached without the counter-attacks launched by our Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.

The second stage — strategic stalemate — began, as I have said, after the fall of Wuhan. Characteristic of this phase were the recurring waves of furious attacks by the enemy and fierce counter-attacks by troops in the Liberated Areas. What we mean by stalemate is that the enemy and our troops in the Liberated Areas fought each other to a virtual standstill. The truth is that the main Japanese forces in China were tied down in the fight against the Liberated Areas for the whole five and a half years from the fall of Wuhan in October 1938 till 1944, when they once more launched a strategic offensive on the Kuomintang battle front. Up to 1943, 64 per cent of all the Japanese forces in China and 95 per cent of all puppet troops were pinned down in the

Liberated Areas. During this entire period, not a single major battle was fought against the Kuomintang. These are the facts about the strategic stalemate stage.

The war launched from the Liberated Areas has been a great people's war, total in the true sense of the term. The incomparable doggedness and heroism displayed by the people of the Liberated Areas during this stage of the war will remain forever a glorious chapter in the history of the Chinese nation. If there had been no front in the Liberated Areas, if the fighting there had not been carried out over a long period under the most difficult conditions and finally reached a stalemate, the enemy would have continued to advance into southwest and northwest China; the Kuomintang, with its whole political machine and army directed against the people, would have been utterly incapable of halting the enemy's advance. In that case, there could have been no stage of stalemate, the situation in the War of Resistance would long since have become dreadful to conceive. After the fall of Wuhan, particularly, the Kuomintang authorities made the mistake of shifting the emphasis from external to internal problems. They became passive in conducting the War of Resistance and active in opposing the Communist Party and the people. They launched three anti-Communist onslaughts.¹⁵⁶ And their attack on the New Fourth Army during the Southern Anhui Incident¹⁵⁷ was a particularly heinous crime of theirs. If the Chinese people had failed to hold this onslaught in check and stem the tide of reaction, there would have been no Liberated Areas, no protracted fighting ending in stalemate and no possibility of sustaining the War of Resistance. The sweeping victories won by the Japanese during their renewed attacks on the Kuomintang areas in 1944 proved this beyond the shadow of a doubt. Moreover, had the strength of the Liberated Areas not been such a formidable obstacle to the capitulation and compromise to which the Kuomintang government was prone, the recurrent danger of capitulation could not have been avoided. Then the War of Resistance would have petered out prematurely. Facts, experience and enemy documents all prove this, but censorship imposed by the Kuomintang has prevented its becoming known to many people outside the Liberated Areas.

During these long five and a half years, there was ample opportunity for the Kuomintang government to prepare a counter-offensive and try to push ahead. Instead, it launched the three anti-Communist onslaughts. Instead of strengthening the anti-Japanese forces, it attempted to weaken them. Instead of taking a bold line in the War of

Resistance, it adopted the slogan, "Save the nation by a devious path", and flirted with the enemy. As a consequence, the Kuomintang troops in the enemy's rear could not stand the strain. They either failed to hold their own or became puppet troops of the Japanese. When in 1944 the invaders launched a series of attacks to open up lines of communication on the mainland, vast Kuomintang-held territories in Henan, Hunan, Guangdong and Guangxi provinces quickly fell into their hands. This created the most critical situation in the Kuomintang areas since the War of Resistance began. By contrast, it was at this time, when the Kuomintang was incapable of putting up any effective resistance to the enemy, that our forces in the Liberated Areas, having surmounted the severe difficulties of 1941-42, launched their own vigorous counter-attacks. When the enemy attacked the Kuomintang, we attacked the enemy from our fronts in the Liberated Areas. Thus, in 1944 we entered a second phase in the strategic stalemate.

Consequently, it is clear to every one that the Kuomintang authorities have left undone those things they ought to have done, and vigorously done those things they ought not to have. As a result, the Kuomintang armies have grown weaker and weaker. In the Liberated Areas, however, the position is precisely the reverse: In the course of fighting, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Column have become progressively stronger. They have recovered vast areas of lost territory, overcome their most serious difficulties, and as a result are now entering a new stage of growth. The centre of the War of Resistance is now on the front of the Liberated Areas, not on that of the Kuomintang.

As a result of the Chinese people's eight-year struggle, of the great Soviet army's triumphant march into fascist Germany and that country's imminent total collapse, of the successes of the American and British troops in the Far East (here the efforts of the American people require special mention) and also of the decisive position held in the Far East by the Soviet Union following its abrogation of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact,¹⁵⁸ there is no room for doubt that our War of Resistance is now about to enter the third stage, that of general counter-offensive.

How is this general counter-offensive to be prepared and launched? In his political report Comrade Mao Zedong discussed all the political aspects. The only point I wish to make here is that the prolonged, heroic fighting of the people of the Liberated Areas, combined with their constructive efforts in other fields, has laid the foun-

dation for this general counter-offensive on the Chinese mainland and provided its finest preparation. I said a little while back that, had it not been for the fact that military operations in the Liberated Areas protected the Kuomintang-controlled areas and long held up an enemy attack, the situation throughout China would be quite different. In the coming counter-offensive, the battle front of the Liberated Areas will be the strategic starting point as well as the foremost strategic base. In the Liberated Areas, there is an immense concentration of manpower (about 1 million regular troops, more than 2 million militia-men and nearly 10 million members of the self-defence corps); vast material resources have been preserved and developed (we have produced a considerable amount of foodstuffs and are operating public, private and home handicraft industries); there is a special geographical situation (large cities, railways and a long stretch of coastline occupied by the Japanese are encircled or dominated by the Liberated Areas); and we hold important strategic points (the mountainous regions and plains of north China and the central China plains are terrain favourable for our counter-offensive and, furthermore, north China is an important gateway to northeast China and Inner Mongolia). On top of all this, there are two other factors: the militant will of the people in the Liberated Areas derived from the tempering of protracted war, and the creation, through democracy in the Liberated Areas, of political conditions favourable to the launching of a general counter-offensive. It would be a gross blunder for anyone to overlook the signal achievements made on the battle front of the Liberated Areas or to fail to take into account the more than 90 million people heroically fighting there, and thus overlook the enormous significance of the Liberated Areas to the cause of the Chinese people's liberation and the common cause of the anti-fascist Allies.⁸⁹

I shall now speak in some detail about the battle front of the Liberated Areas.

II. THE BATTLE FRONT OF THE LIBERATED AREAS

OPENING THE FRONTS IN THE LIBERATED AREAS

Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out in his report that "from the very beginning there have been two fronts in China's War of Re-

sistance, the Kuomintang front and the front of the Liberated Areas". This is a special feature of that war. The battle front of the Liberated Areas was created by the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Column, on whom fell the unique responsibility of conducting the War of Resistance.

The Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Column are the armed forces of the Chinese people and successors to the Chinese Red Army. When our Party and Comrade Mao Zedong created this great people's army, they, embodying the will of the Chinese people, defined its sacred mission as service to the people and defence of the motherland, and defined its aim as the liberation of the Chinese nation and the Chinese people. Ever since the September 18th Incident,⁵⁸ this great people's army, roused to bitter indignation by the desecration of Chinese territory, has been straining to come to grips with the Japanese invaders. For several years, during which we waged many arduous and bloody struggles and completed the Long March, this army tried by every possible means to end the civil war and to fight as one against the Japanese invaders. On reaching the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, it made substantial preparations for the War of Resistance: the joining of forces by the three front armies of the Red Army,¹⁵⁹ the peaceful settlement of the Xi'an Incident,¹⁶⁰ the training of personnel and the establishment of contacts with many friendly forces all over China. All this was well done. Having learned about the outbreak of the July 7th Incident, the Central Committee of our Party issued, on the very second day, an appeal for resistance to Japan,¹⁶¹ and all officers and men of our great people's army demanded that they be sent to the anti-Japanese front. Not long afterwards, this people's army appeared on the front line of the war against Japan.

In September 1937, the Eighth Route Army, following the brilliant strategy worked out by Comrade Mao Zedong, marched to the enemy's rear in north China. Our 115th Division entered the Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei area; the 120th Division, northwestern Shanxi; and the 129th Division, southeastern Shanxi. In 1938, our army advanced further east, one part to the Hebei-Shandong-Henan plain and the Hebei-Shandong plain, another to the central Hebei plain, and yet another went still farther, reaching eastern Hebei to support the great anti-Japanese uprising, in which 200,000 people took part.¹⁶² The New Fourth Army opened its front soon after the Eighth Route Army, in the spring of 1938. It penetrated the enemy's rear in central China

and started guerrilla warfare against the Japanese on both banks of the Changjiang River. In the winter of the same year, the Dongjiang Column in Guangdong Province started an uprising in the Dongjiang area after the fall of Guangzhou. In 1939, when Qiongya (Hainan Island) fell, the local people, led by our Party, organized guerrilla forces to fight the Japanese. In its first engagement with the enemy at Pingxingguan, the Eighth Route Army achieved the first total victory in the national War of Resistance.⁹⁶

After the September 18th Incident, our Party systematically organized resistance to the Japanese in Beiping, Tianjin, Nanjing, Shanghai, Wuhan, Hongkong, Guangzhou and other large cities and in wide areas of the countryside, winning the goodwill of the people. Although such activities were ruthlessly suppressed throughout the civil war, the seeds of resistance to Japan spread in many places by our Party took firm root among the people and developed into a great potential force, no matter how difficult the situation. Worthy of special mention is the December 9th Movement of 1935,¹⁶³ which, led by our Party, played an important part in accelerating armed resistance to Japanese aggression. After north and central China fell into enemy hands, our local Party organizations worked with the people of all strata to organize armed uprisings or arrange for withdrawal to the countryside in order to foster wide-ranging anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear. Large numbers of young intellectuals and working people joined our army. In Shanxi Province, a League of Self-Sacrifice for National Salvation¹⁶⁴ and a "Daredevil" Corps were organized around refugee students from Beiping and Tianjin. This "Daredevil" Corps later became the New Army of Shanxi Province,¹⁶⁵ and we gave it our fraternal support. In central Hebei, an anti-Japanese detachment organized by the Hui people¹⁶⁶ joined the Eighth Route Army. We also gave energetic support to many other armed forces fighting the Japanese. These local units combined with the people's armies (the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies) to form a strong anti-Japanese force.

In this way, the war effort in north and central China, having collapsed following the disastrous defeat of the Kuomintang army, was quickly revived by our Party and the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies in co-operation with the people. Areas in the enemy's rear were transformed into front lines in the War of Resistance.

In this way, the purely defensive warfare sustained by the Kuomin-

tang before its retreat was replaced by people's guerrilla warfare led by the Communist Party behind enemy lines.

In this way, vast territories that had been lost by the Kuomintang and had fallen under despotic Japanese rule were, one by one, recovered and turned into huge Liberated Areas — the three Liberated Areas of north, central and south China — full of hope and promise. “The rise and fall of a nation is the concern of every citizen”, a Chinese proverb goes. Every Chinese has the duty of recovering territory lost by the Kuomintang. That is exactly what we have been doing.

In this way, from the early period of the War of Resistance Against Japan a considerable number of the Japanese invaders had been tied down on the battlefields of the Liberated Areas and prevented from making an all-out advance westward. Later, these areas became the main battle front in the war against Japan.

In this way, the battle front of the Liberated Areas assumed decisive strategic importance and became the focus of the War of Resistance. The reactionaries' shameless plan to use the Japanese invaders to wipe out the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies (a plot of “using others to eliminate one's own adversaries”) came to grief.

These are the achievements of the people's army, the people's war and the incomparable people's strategy of Comrade Mao Zedong.

THREE PERIODS IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE IN THE LIBERATED AREAS

Between the Pingxingguan victory in September 1937 and the great Hundred-Regiment campaign in 1940,⁹⁷ the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies began to thwart the “mopping-up” tactics of the Japanese expeditionary forces, who attacked a point by closing in from all directions. From 1939 onwards, our armies broke, one after another, every enemy attempt to apply new tactics devised by the Japanese commanding general, Tomobumi Yamashita,¹⁶⁷ and the Japanese divisional commander, Kuwaki. These combined, as they put it, “blockade, dismemberment and mopping-up”. Our successive victories resulted in the creation of Liberated Areas in north and central China. The Eighth Route Army grew from a force in five figures to 400,000 men and the population of the Liberated Areas grew to some 40 million. The New Fourth Army grew from 12,000 to 100,000

and liberated a population of 13 million. This, then, was the period of the creation and expansion of Liberated Areas in the enemy's rear.

In the autumn of 1940, alarmed by the resounding victory of the Eighth Route Army's Hundred-Regiment campaign, the enemy dismissed the commander-in-chief of his expeditionary force in north China and appointed Yasuji Okamura. Japanese plans for attacking our army were thoroughly overhauled and the establishment of "a New Order in Greater East Asia"⁶⁸ was proposed. In addition, to prepare for the Pacific war,¹⁶⁸ the enemy reaffirmed his aggressive intention, first announced in 1939, of effectively safeguarding "the rear-service bases of the Greater East Asian War" in north China. To achieve this, the Japanese invaders concentrated their forces for "total warfare" — military, economic and cultural as well as through espionage — against the Liberated Areas in north China. The methods they employed in the "mopping-up" campaigns were "iron-ring encirclement, surprise attack, mopping-up in length and breadth, lightning tip-and-run raids, and repeated combing-out". Wherever the enemy set foot, they burned and killed with the utmost ruthlessness, attempting to create a wasteland and destroy all means of sustenance for our army. The Japanese invaders often employed some hundred thousand troops against a single locality in their repeated "mopping-up" campaigns. Each campaign lasted as long as three or four months. This led to an extremely serious situation, particularly since famine broke out at that time in various parts of north China and both the army and the people were forced to exist on tree leaves and grass roots. But despite this, our army united with the people and waged a stubborn and heroic struggle. During this period, which lasted till 1942, the Liberated Areas shrank and their population fell to less than 50 million and the Eighth Route Army was reduced to 300,000 men. In the Central China Liberated Area, while the number of engagements was second only to that in north China, the New Fourth Army managed to grow in strength. Although our army as a whole and our population in the Liberated Areas decreased in number in this difficult period, their quality was steeled in battle. The Japanese invaders' "mopping-up" tactics were limited, but our army's measures of countering them were legion. During this period, we forged an even closer bond with the people and, as a result, learned many methods that enabled us to maintain our struggle against a powerful enemy and eventually defeat him. In this way, the Eighth Route and

New Fourth Armies successfully survived this most difficult period in the War of Resistance in the Liberated Areas.

In the winter of 1942, our work in the various Liberated Areas of southern, central and eastern Hebei Province began to revive, and the Liberated Areas in north China grew again. The anti-Japanese war in the Liberated Areas entered its third period. The Japanese invaders tried to maintain the savage “mopping-up” campaign they had begun earlier that year. But our army advanced as the enemy advanced and penetrated deep into his rear to open up new Liberated Areas and break the enemy attack. This strategy was most effective, and the Liberated Areas grew even faster than at the beginning of the war. During this period, in response to the great rectification movement¹⁶⁹ and the great production campaign started in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region by the Party Central Committee, the various other Liberated Areas swung into action, with magnificent results. The campaign to reduce rent and interest¹⁷⁰ progressed in many places, so that the masses became even more eager to fight the Japanese. The establishment of the new-democratic government, a coalition government based on the “three thirds system”, further strengthened unity in the Liberated Areas. From the military point of view, the continuous growth of the main force and local units and the widespread mobilization of the people’s militia reinforced the Liberated Areas. As a result, they attained an unprecedented strength.

Early in the first period, the relationship was fairly good between the Kuomintang troops in the enemy’s rear and the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. But after the fall of Wuhan when the Kuomintang reactionaries launched an anti-Communist policy and, in particular, promulgated restrictions against what they termed an “alien party” and an “alien army”,¹⁷¹ these Kuomintang troops actively opposed the Communist Party and the people and collaborated with the Japanese invaders in attacking the Liberated Areas, thus serving to actively wreck the battle front of these areas. However, in the second period, because of their activities against the people, the several hundred thousand Kuomintang troops in the enemy’s rear could not withstand the Japanese “mopping-up” campaigns and in 1941 they were defeated in the Zhongtiao Mountains. In 1942, the Kuomintang troops in Zhejiang and Jiangxi disintegrated, and in 1943 those in Shandong Province collapsed. All this proved that anti-popular armies could not hold their own in the rear of the enemy. From 1941 onwards, Kuomintang troops behind the enemy lines began to surrender in

large numbers. By the third period, after Pang Bingxun¹⁷² and Sun Dianying¹⁷³ went over to the enemy, nearly half a million Kuomintang troops and some 70 generals followed suit. This resulted in swelling the puppet army and helped the enemy intensify his “mopping-up” campaigns against the Liberated Areas.

GLORIOUS SACRIFICES, GREAT ACHIEVEMENTS

Comrades! So far I have dealt with the establishment of the front in the Liberated Areas and the different phases it went through. It is clear that, in this protracted war, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, the South China Anti-Japanese Column, the people of the Liberated Areas and the Communists have suffered and made sacrifices far too numerous to detail here. Indeed I do not intend to detail them. But I do want to quote you some rough figures to show what the Chinese people have gained from these bitter battles and heavy sacrifices.

In the seven and a half years from September 1937 to March 1945, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the South China Anti-Japanese Column fought more than 115,000 battles, large and small, killed or wounded more than 960,000 and captured more than 280,000 Japanese and puppet troops. On top of this, more than 100,000 were persuaded to surrender and come over to our side. All told, the losses sustained by the Japanese and puppet troops amounted to more than 1.36 million men. (Statistics are not available for the South China Anti-Japanese Column prior to 1943.)

The main booty captured by our army comprised 1,028 pieces of artillery, more than 7,700 machine-guns and more than 430,000 rifles and carbines. We captured more than 34,000 blockhouses and more than 11,000 strongholds.

Before the battle of the Central China Plains in 1944, as I mentioned in the first part of this report, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Column were engaging 64 per cent of the Japanese invading forces in China and 95 per cent of the puppet troops. Even today, out of the 40 Japanese divisions numbering some 580,000 men (Japanese forces in northeast China not included), 22½ divisions numbering 320,000 and representing 56 per cent of the Japanese troops in China are engaged by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the South China Anti-Japanese

Column. As far as the puppet troops are concerned, the situation remains unchanged. The fact that the Japanese invaders have stationed a large number of troops in north and central China explains the increasingly difficult task of our armies in the War of Resistance.

Even enemy disclosures reflect these remarkable achievements in the people's war against Japan. For example, in June 1943, the General Headquarters of the Japanese Expeditionary Army in North China issued a communique stating: "From January to May of this year, our army fought 5,524 engagements with a Communist army of 567,424 men." Its year-end communique reported:

"The greater part of the enemy are not Chiang Kai-shek's but Communist troops. Of our 15,000 engagements this year, 75 per cent were with Communist troops. And of the 2 million enemy troops we fought, more than half were Communist. Of the 199,000 bodies found on the battlefields, half were Chinese Communist troops. But of the 74,000 prisoners we captured, Chinese Communist troops formed only 15 per cent. This reveals the inferior calibre of Chiang's troops, and at the same time testifies to the growing fighting spirit of the Chinese Communist troops. . . . Therefore, the Imperial Army in north China from now on will have to take on an increasingly important task. Its vital mission is to annihilate the Chinese Communist troops — our deadly enemy in north China."

Is it not crystal clear that the accomplishments along the front of the Liberated Areas are those of an all-out people's war?

Is it not crystal clear that the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the South China Anti-Japanese Column and the people of the Liberated Areas, by their unparalleled, heroic resistance, by their matchless fortitude despite bitter hardships and heavy sacrifices, have displayed the most valour and produced the most heroic and immortal epic of the Chinese nation in the War of Resistance Against Japan?

Because of such great sacrifices, the Chinese people have gained the following: They have created the Liberated Areas, which extend over 19 provinces in north, central and south China and have a total population of 95.5 million.

Our Eighth Route Army, New Fourth Army and South China Anti-Japanese Column number 910,000 regulars, and there are more than 2.2 million militiamen. These figures bespeak the great development of the people's war in the Liberated Areas, in sharp contrast to the disastrous defeats suffered by the Kuomintang troops in theirs.

This strength of the Liberated Areas represents the strength of the whole Chinese people. Because of it the Chinese people now have great prospects of victory and democracy and a brilliant future.

EXPERIENCE GAINED BY THE LIBERATED AREAS IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE

People may ask: How can the Liberated Areas, in the midst of the most cruel fighting, grow stronger every day, despite the fact that our armies are short of weapons — especially modern weapons — and receive no outside assistance, and despite the fact that their flanks are exposed to pincer attacks by the Kuomintang reactionaries? The section in Comrade Mao Zedong's report on the people's war provides the answer. Here I shall say a little more about our experience in this connection.

What has the general experience been? In a nutshell, it is that, led by our Party and in line with Comrade Mao Zedong's policy of people's war, we have practised Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary Three People's Principles and the New Democracy in the Liberated Areas. As a consequence, we have been able to mobilize the people in the Liberated Areas to pursue the War of Resistance, to create a democratic coalition government, to bring about the great unity among the various classes and, in addition, to establish a unified leadership for the war effort. Without all this, the Liberated Areas could not have waged an all-out people's war; and without an all-out people's war, nothing at all could have been accomplished.

In the political field, the Liberated Areas have succeeded in mobilizing the people and forging national unity by bringing about democracy and raising the people's living standards. The hearts of millions beat as one in the fight against the common enemy; and so a genuine foundation for the conduct of a people's war has been laid. The Kuomintang areas bear witness that without genuine democracy and real improvement in the people's livelihood there can be no people's war. On the other hand, the Liberated Areas have proved that a people's war can be waged, given real democracy and improved living conditions for the people.

That is how, in the Liberated Areas, the people's enthusiasm in the War of Resistance and their confidence in their own nation have been brought to so high a pitch. That is why, despite the unparalleled

cruelty of the enemy's "burn all, kill all, loot all" policy, the fighting spirit of the people in the Liberated Areas has never faltered.

That is how the solidarity between the army and the people and between officers and men has reached such heights; why the campaigns to support the government and care for the people and to support the army and give special consideration to the anti-Japanese soldiers' families have spread far and wide; and why, despite attacks by Japanese and puppet troops from without and provocation from within by spies and agents of the Japanese and puppet authorities, this solidarity can never be shaken.

That is how we have achieved political unity, military unity and the integration of political and military affairs, thus thwarting the plans of the Japanese and their puppets to wage a "total war".

That is why, under extremely difficult conditions, we have been able to achieve "better troops and simpler administration"; how our combat units have been strengthened to cope with enemy encirclement and attack; and why, despite the changes in our base areas, all our organizations have been able to carry on the struggle together with the people, and also to direct such struggle.

That is why, by strengthening our political work, we can sap the Japanese army's morale and win over the puppet troops. Everyone knows that Japanese prisoners-of-war are pretty obstinate, but our work in this respect has gone well. We are particularly grateful to the Japanese People's Emancipation League led by Comrade Susumu Okano,¹⁷⁴ one of the leaders of the Japanese Communist Party, and to the Korean Independence League.¹⁷⁵ They have worked in the noble spirit of internationalism and their help to us has been of inestimable value.

That is how, through effective underground work, we can win over all people with national awareness in the enemy-occupied areas and foil enemy attempts to persuade them to surrender and "turn over a new leaf".

Economics is the very foundation of political, military and cultural affairs. When we talk about improving the people's living conditions, we mean, in the first place, reducing rent and interest while ensuring that the reduced rates are paid. This is necessary in order to guarantee a sound economic foundation for conducting the War of Resistance in the Liberated Areas, where the peasantry constitutes 80-90 per cent of the population.

That is how the peasants' interest in production has been stimu-

lated, how production has proceeded uninterrupted even during the enemy's repeated "mopping-up" campaigns.

That is how we have succeeded in mobilizing the peasants to organize mutual aid in labour (labour-exchange teams, groups, etc.), how general enthusiasm has been roused for increased production throughout the Liberated Areas. Productivity has been raised in this way to new heights. Not only agriculture (which is, in the present stage, the basic economic activity in every Liberated Area) but also cottage industries and handicraft workshops have been developed. So we are well on the way towards becoming self-sufficient, well-fed and well-clothed.

That, too, is why the publicly owned industries and the co-operative industrial and commercial enterprises are winning the genuine support of the people, and how a real foundation for their growth has been laid.

That is how co-operation in production between the army and people has been brought about — a co-operation that, coupled with the policy of "better troops and simpler administration" and of getting the army to take part in production and practising economy, is lightening the burden on the people, economizing manpower and available materials and reducing waste. All this eases the strain on the people and makes possible the accumulation of material resources for the long-term struggle.

That is how, in the economic sphere, the Liberated Areas have been able to pool their efforts, help each other when hit by natural calamities and thus save millions of lives. As a consequence, we have been able to do what we set out to do: carry on the struggle.

Military affairs are interrelated with political and economic affairs. The people's war is, in essence, a war of the masses, and only by means of the political and economic measures I have mentioned has the conduct of such a war been possible. As Comrade Mao Zedong says in his *On Protracted War*: "The mobilization of the common people throughout the country will create a vast sea in which to drown the enemy, create the conditions that will make up for our inferiority in arms and other things, and create the prerequisites for overcoming every difficulty in the war." That is the starting point of the strategy and tactics employed during the past eight years by the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Column, the basis for the entire system of strategy and tactics employed during the people's anti-Japanese war in the Liberated Areas. The

characteristic feature of this war of the masses is that the people help in military operations as well as give political and economic assistance. A war of this kind is not waged by the army alone but also by the people, who fight in skilful co-ordination with the army. The main forces fight in co-ordination with the local forces, and the regular army in co-ordination with the guerrilla forces, the militia and the people's self-defence corps.

Thus, in our pincer attacks on the enemy, we have adopted flexible fighting tactics on both exterior and interior lines.

In this way, we are able to counter the enemy's encirclement, his "mopping-up" campaigns, his "nibbling away" operations and his blockade measures.

In this way, we can steal the initiative from the enemy in strategic command and in directing a campaign, strive to extricate ourselves from a defensive position and force the enemy on to the defensive.

In this way, by making repeated thrusts we are able to repulse the enemy's "lightning tip-and-run raids", and, by scattering, concealing and moving our forces skilfully, seek out the enemy's weak points and break his encirclement.

In this way, we can annihilate scattered enemy forces by a concentration of our forces and, conversely, attack concentrated enemy forces by our scattered forces.

In this way, the enemy's blockade and dismemberment tactics can be disrupted by the destruction inflicted by our army and people; and the enemy's search and combing-out efforts can be smashed by land-mine warfare conducted by the militia together with scattered small armed units.

In this way, by co-ordinated attacks in several areas we can relieve neighbouring territory, smash the enemy's encircling, "mopping-up" campaigns, institute guerrilla warfare on the plains to aid guerrilla warfare in the mountains, and vice versa.

Thus the main force can move about freely and engage in or prepare for well-timed, successful counter-attacks, while the local forces carry on guerrilla warfare in the vicinity of their bases, engage the enemy in skirmishes and so harass and wear him out.

In this way, we have created armed work teams as a form of military resistance, using them as a keen weapon with which to begin or resume work in enemy-occupied areas. While the enemy extends his "mopping-up" campaign to our bases, our armed work teams are busy carrying out various forms of anti-Japanese activity in

the enemy areas themselves to keep the enemy in a state of mortal fear, and working out ways of combining unarmed with armed resistance.

During the eight years of the War of Resistance, what Comrade Mao Zedong in his *On Protracted War* calls “a war of a jig-saw pattern” has been employed to the full in the Liberated Areas.

The people’s army, the people’s war and the people’s strategy and tactics — these three things dovetail perfectly. They are the very flesh and sinews of the war in the Liberated Areas. They are, moreover, characteristic of the operations on every battle front there.

The various factors I have dealt with represent the sum total of experience gained in the people’s anti-Japanese war in the Liberated Areas — a war led by the Chinese Communist Party and Comrade Mao Zedong; and they all derive from the correct policy of the Party and Comrade Mao Zedong and from the people’s anti-Japanese war. Had we departed from Comrade Mao Zedong’s policy, had we divorced ourselves from the people, then, in the face of so powerful an enemy, none of these factors could ever have developed. And then, instead of crushing the enemy, we might long ago have been crushed by him.

III. THE MILITARY LINE ADOPTED BY THE CHINESE PEOPLE FOR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE

TWO DIFFERENT MILITARY LINES

Comrade Mao Zedong in his report rightly points out that there are two different lines in the War of Resistance Against Japan. “One,” he says, “leads to the defeat of the Japanese aggressors, while the other not only makes their defeat impossible but in some respects actually helps them and undermines our War of Resistance.” These two lines are evident in the military as well as the political field.

One of them rises out of oppression of the people and the treatment of soldiers as slaves; out of a policy of carrying on a passive war of resistance or acting as mere onlookers; out of relying entirely on foreign aid; out of sparing one’s main force in preparation for civil war; out of excluding people who hold different opinions and out of disrupting unity. This is a defeatist and purely defensive military

line directed against the people — a line that explains why the Kuo-mintang has suffered successive reverses on its battle fronts.

The exact opposite of this is the anti-Japanese military line taken by the Chinese people, the corner-stone of which is to fully mobilize the people, unite all anti-Japanese forces and actively strike at the Japanese aggressors. This line creates unity between army and people, and between officers and men. It creates unity among all friendly armies and gives rise to the strategy and tactics of hitting the enemy hard and making ourselves strong. This explains why victories have been won in the Liberated Areas.

The first line stands for the preservation of the old system, old habits and old tactics of the Chinese army. It opposes any reforms required by new conditions in the war against Japan. That explains why a handful of people have for so long been able to usurp control of the army and use it as an instrument for running a ruthless dictatorship and oppressing the people. The second line stands for reforming the Chinese army in the light of military experience gained in the Northern Expedition (1926-27) and the Agrarian Revolutionary War (1927-37) and in accord with Dr. Sun Yat-sen's principle: "Unite the armed forces with the people and turn them into the armed forces of the people."¹⁷⁶ That is the only way in which the army can be united with the people, the only way in which the army's morale can be raised and the enemy defeated.

The first line assumes that the War of Resistance can be won in a short time, that it is a war of quick decision. No effort, therefore, is made to rally the people's strength for resistance. On the contrary, any such efforts by the people themselves are deliberately suppressed. The second line, on the other hand, realizes that the War of Resistance cannot be won in a short time, that it is necessarily a protracted war and, therefore, that ever-greater effort must be made to rally and enhance the people's strength.

Champions of the first line argue that the War of Resistance falls into only two stages: the stage before the fall of Wuhan, when the enemy was winning and we were losing, and the stage since then, in which we move from defeat to victory. They deny the intermediate stage of stalemate. Those who uphold the second line, however, maintain that the war falls into three stages: strategic retreat, strategic stalemate and strategic counter-offensive. Stalemate is the most trying stage, with so many things crying to be done. In the first place, we must introduce democracy and improve the livelihood of the people

before we can organize them as a force. We must create all the necessary conditions for a counter-offensive before we can even talk about launching it.

The supporters of the first line, again, have all along pinned their hopes for victory on the war between Japan and the Soviet Union and in the Pacific. They do not pin their hopes of victory on their own political or military reforms and on their own efforts in the War of Resistance Against Japan. Naturally they have been disappointed. The Pacific front was opened, yet all last year they suffered heavier defeats than ever. By contrast, the supporters of the second line have steadfastly relied on the people's strength. Although they try to obtain foreign help, they do not depend on it exclusively. The victories in the Liberated Areas over the past few years have been won through our own efforts. We have had no outside help at all.

Again, supporters of the first line advocate and practise a passive strategy of pure defence, while those of the second favour an active strategy of offensive defence as a preliminary to general counter-offensive.

Upholders of the first line do not punish generals who surrender to the enemy. On the contrary, they connive in their actions and imprison those who, like General Ye Ting¹⁰⁸ and others, have performed meritorious service. Advocates of the second line oppose all versions of capitulation, commend meritorious fighters, demand punishment for generals and other officers who mutiny or surrender to the enemy, praise political integrity and build the people's morale.

Advocates of the first line employ a faulty recruitment system. Able-bodied men are press-ganged, and bribery is resorted to flagrantly. The best sons of the Chinese people are treated as "expendable" and persecuted. Under the second line, a system of militia and self-defence corps, which is what the people want, and a volunteer system genuinely based on individual choice are the rule. This meets the army's needs and at the same time makes best use of China's manpower.

The first line is the military line of the Kuomintang. The second is that of the Communist Party.

The two are completely different. Which is right and which is wrong has long since been demonstrated by what has happened over the past eight years on the two battle fronts — one becoming weaker and weaker and the other stronger and stronger.

As is well known, Comrade Mao Zedong's famous military trea-

tises such as *On Protracted War* and *Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan* represent the correct military line of the Communist Party.

Comrade Mao Zedong's military line is, in short, that of a people's army and a people's war. It is a line that will lead to victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan.

The military line of the reactionary clique in the Kuomintang is determined by its political line. Its military line follows its military theory; and Kuomintang military theory is saturated with German, Italian and Japanese fascist ideology. The outstanding feature of this ideology is that the army lords it over the people (through the special authority the army has over the people), and that the officers ride roughshod over soldiers (through the special authority the officers have over their men). With a powerful foe such as the Chinese nation has to face, this kind of military thinking amounts to disarmament and an invitation to defeat.

THE PRINCIPLES OF ARMY BUILDING

On the problems of army building, I fully agree with what Comrade Mao Zedong said in the sections of his report dealing with the people's war and the people's army. In those sections he raised certain questions and proposed solutions.

I want now to say a word or two about our aims in building an army. To do this, I would like to compare two different theories in China today on what an army should be formed for.

Think of the thousands upon thousands of troops, the thousands upon thousands of men with guns. Who are they? The people. The vast majority of them are peasants. But there are two kinds of armies, now as in the past. One kind organizes, arms and trains the people to protect their interests and serve them. The other also organizes, arms and trains the people; but it does so to protect the interests of the few — the big landlords, the big compradors and the big bankers — and to oppress, exploit and enslave the people.

There is no army that is not under the control of the state. There are, however, two kinds of state. One is the new-democratic state — a state that belongs to the people, to the workers, the peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry and other patriotic elements. The other is the feudal, fascist,

anti-popular state — a state that is under the dictatorship of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie. The people's army is an army that belongs to the new-democratic state. The army of the big landlords, big compradors and big bankers belongs to a state under the dictatorship of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie.

The people's army, for the very reason that it is at one with the people, can defend the country effectively against the foreign foe and can safeguard the people's rights to democracy and freedom inside the country as well. The army of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie, for the very reason that it is divorced from the people, is bound to be powerless to defend the country. It vacillates, becomes defeatist and may even betray the country (for instance, by becoming a puppet army). Domestically, it undermines and suppresses the people's rights to democracy and freedom.

The people's army practises democracy within its own ranks. Officers and men are as one. It is also democratic in relation to the people — people and army are as one. Because of this, it can sweep away the warlord system. The army of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie imposes a system of oppression and double-dealing within its own ranks. Otherwise, it cannot order its officers and men, the vast majority of whom come from the people, to act against the people. This kind of army is, of course, bound to oppress people. Otherwise, it cannot be a tool of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie for oppressing, exploiting and enslaving the people. So this army not only preserves the warlord system, but extends it. Even in controlling its own members, it employs the most savage and shameless fascist methods. That is just what the reactionary ruling clique inside the Kuomintang is doing for all it is worth.

To which of these two kinds of armies do the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the South China Anti-Japanese Column belong?

They belong to the first category and Chinese history has never before seen their like. As Communists, we can be proud that it is we who have built this army of the people.

Like their predecessor, the Red Army of the civil war period, both our Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, led by Comrade Mao Zedong, are national, popular and democratic in character. They are national because they have always opposed foreign invasion and displayed the utmost enthusiasm in defending their native land. They are popular because they come from the people and have always fought

hard for the liberation and well-being of the people. They are democratic because there is unity between army and people and between officers and men, because they have done away with the warlord system and made themselves an instrument of the struggle for people's democracy. It is because they have these three characteristics that they fight so well, indeed, that they are invincible. Thanks to the guidance of Comrade Mao Zedong's specific policy, these characteristics have become even more apparent during the War of Resistance and, as a consequence, our army has increased in strength and performed brilliant deeds in this costly war to defend our motherland.

The three characteristics of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are, in fact, our three principles of army building. In the final analysis, however, the most important one is: The army must start from the interests of the people and serve the people. Because such an army serves the people and belongs to the people, it takes it as a sacred duty to safeguard the motherland. That is why a high degree of democracy has developed in the army. A people's army of this kind is the army of a genuinely democratic country, an army that possesses a keen political awareness and the power to put up a real fight.

There is no doubt that the principles of army building adopted by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies should be adopted by all armies in China. They furnish a model on which all of China's armies should be transformed. They open up brilliant prospects for the whole Chinese army, a road to blessings for our whole country. If the Chinese people want to achieve victory in the War of Resistance, if they want to achieve democracy and liberation, they must exert every effort to organize and expand armies on the model of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. If, on the other hand, some people try to weaken the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies or reorganize them on the pattern of an anti-popular army, it means they really want to destroy our Great Wall. It means they will inevitably undermine the War of Resistance, jeopardize the country and serve as cat's-paws for the Japanese invaders. The Chinese people will never let them do this.

We want to see armies all over the country follow a bright path, changing themselves into people's armies, not into private tools for oppressing the people. As Comrade Mao Zedong says in his report, "Every patriotic officer in the Kuomintang army who has a conscience should set about reviving the Sun Yat-sen spirit and transforming his troops."

These, then, are our main principles of army building. Now let me go on to some specific problems that arise in the building of an army.

RECRUITMENT

Just as there are two kinds of armies, so there are two systems of recruitment. Officers and men of a people's army join of their own accord. The volunteer system now operated by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, as well as the system of obligatory military service that might be introduced by a coalition government of New Democracy, is based on the wishes of the people. The recruitment system of an army of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie must necessarily go against the wishes of the people — no one would join without compulsion. The present so-called recruitment system of the Kuomintang works against the will of the people. This compulsory system has degenerated into a particularly vicious one. Its recruiting methods are "buying", press-ganging and trickery. In areas controlled by the Kuomintang, recruiting officers take bribes, break the law at will, and show no regard for human life. Recruits are callously treated. They are roped together and forced to endure cold, starvation, flogging and imprisonment. They are not even allowed to attend to calls of nature except at arbitrarily fixed times. As a result, great numbers of them either die or escape to become bandits. Only about one in five actually reaches barracks.

By contrast, the system adopted by our Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies is a voluntary one. Those who join our army come of their own free will because they want to resist Japanese aggression, save their country and build a China of New Democracy. Some of them are Communists but the vast majority are not. Because the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies have this close contact with the people, they have an inexhaustible supply of manpower.

When in the future a coalition government and a joint supreme command are set up, a system of obligatory military service may be adopted. But any such system will be radically different from the present vicious conscription system of the Kuomintang government. Instead, it will be built on a voluntary basis, coupled with necessary persuasion.

MAINTAINING THE ARMY

Just as there are two kinds of armies, so there are two ways of maintaining them. An army which is antagonistic to the people rather than belonging to them, maintains itself by exploiting the people and, as a consequence, by exploiting its soldiers as well. The methods employed by a people's army are based on love for the people and, consequently, on love for its soldiers, too. The latter are the methods of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.

In addition to exploiting the people and the soldiers, the reactionary clique in the Kuomintang employs various schemes to extort military funds from the people on the pretext that "the state should maintain the troops". Not satisfied with extorting money at home, it also turns to foreign countries for loans in the name of the state. When the funds are collected, the reactionaries pocket the money by padding the payroll and other devices. Embezzlement among officers is rampant from top to bottom. The higher the officer's rank, the more money he can appropriate for himself. In consequence, even if ample military funds are available, the men remain haggard, thin and short of clothing. The Chinese warlords, most of whom very rich, usually roll in money — they get it from military funds. In reactionary Kuomintang circles, this ugly business goes even further. Nobody can make head or tail of military advanced-pay accounts. Nobody can even make a guess at the amount of "military allocations" the reactionaries have appropriated.

How do the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies maintain their troops?

Our soldiers are armed peasants in uniform. Our army consists of ordinary people under arms and in uniform. They want to be clothed and to eat, drink, rest and work the same as the common people. Their main material needs are clothing, food, housing and transport. Their spiritual need is education to resist Japanese aggression and to love the people. In maintaining the army, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies pay special attention to material needs and to needs of the spirit as well.

In the first place, the material upkeep of the army follows the principle that it shall not become too heavy a burden on the people; otherwise there will be a conflict of interests between the army and the people. If the people's life is made hard, army life will become hard as well and its capacity to fight the enemy will suffer. When a situation

develops that requires expansion of the army, the expansion must be accomplished without excessively increasing the burden on the people. When we encounter difficult times, as we did in 1942, our working principle is to consider the interests of both the army and the people: we apply the policy of “better troops and simpler administration” in the enemy’s rear. In the second place, our treatment of everyone in the army is based on the principle of equal treatment for officers and men. The officers set an example by taking the rough with the smooth in the same way as their men. Only those officers who have the interests of their men at heart, who take into account what their men have to put up with and do not stand apart from the rank and file can be considered good. That is the line we work on in maintaining our army. In this way the rotten practice of padding payrolls and exploiting soldiers in the army is rejected, and a new chapter is written in Chinese military history. In the third place, we have in recent years introduced a completely new principle into the army’s maintenance by enabling it to engage in productive work in the intervals between fighting and training, and thus help to meet the material needs of the army and lighten the burdens of the people. This innovation is extremely important for our army. Experience gained from the army’s participation in productive work in the border regions shows that, in the absence of fighting, we can in the first year become partly self-supporting; in the second, half self-supporting; and in the third, wholly so. In areas where fighting is going on, the army may, by taking part in production, become partly or half self-supporting. Personal participation by commanders in productive work is an important means of involving the army in it. When the army takes part in production, the people’s burden is lightened, ties between the army and the people become closer, army life becomes richer, the army becomes more consolidated, training is more effective, and fighting spirit is enhanced. An inexhaustible source of funds to maintain the army is also tapped.

We have taken a number of new measures in recent years to provide special consideration for the families of men fighting the Japanese and made new arrangements for disabled or demobilized soldiers. In addition to giving them pensions and getting neighbours to plough their land, we help them produce so that they can become economically independent. Indeed, many labour heroes have emerged from among them or their family members who are doing quite well now in their livelihood. Every Liberated Area should endeavour to do this work well and see that they live comfortably.

This method of maintaining the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies represents a reform unparalleled in Chinese military history. It is a reform characteristic of the internal life of the army and also of its external life, that is, its relations with the people. That is why these armies can maintain their soldiers and maintain them well without outside assistance.

LEADING THE ARMY

Just as there are two kinds of armies, so there are two methods of leading them. The method used by an army which is antagonistic to the people rather than belonging to them is to treat soldiers as slaves, whereas the people's army's method is to treat them as politically aware fighters. The latter is the method of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.

The big landlords and big bourgeoisie organize and arm the people to create an army which will be used against the people. That is of course no easy matter; and that is why an army of this kind resorts to all sorts of barbarities in leading its troops. The policy of the reactionaries is to keep soldiers in a state of ignorance, applying the maxim that "the most valuable quality in generals is wisdom, in soldiers ignorance". If soldiers were wise they would not act against the people. So the reactionaries devise a set of military codes and military orders and discipline, on the basis of which they impose a ruthless system of absolute dictatorship and absolute obedience. Those who fail to toe the line are punished. Those who do toe it get promotion and grow rich. On the one hand the reactionaries use threats, on the other they dangle bait. A whole system is built up of ill-treating soldiers, using secret agents to spy on them and even surreptitiously murdering them. What this means is that they have no regard for the human dignity of their subordinates and soldiers and they bully and cow them, through a rotten system of absolute obedience, into allowing dictators to use the army in any way they think fit. The big landlords and big bourgeoisie want to oppress, exploit and enslave the people. By what method except savagery can they command their army?

The Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies have completely wiped out the system of oppression that prevailed in the army for thousands of years. At the very birth of our people's army in 1927, we abolished

the system of brutality against soldiers. We regard officers and men alike as human beings on an equal footing. The only difference between them is in matters of duty. No officers are allowed to oppress the men, no senior officers to oppress their juniors. Our soldiers join the army to serve the people, not the officers. We call for extremely strict discipline, both in military affairs and in relations with the people. This kind of discipline is based on political understanding and is observed by officers and men alike without exception.

In recent years, we have developed a new way of leading soldiers. We started a campaign to educate soldiers to respect their officers and officers to care for their men. This movement has enormously strengthened unity within the army, greatly raised the morale of officers and men, and enabled the army to make rapid progress in all aspects of its work.

TRAINING THE ARMY

Just as there are two kinds of armies, so there are two methods of training them. The method employed to train an army which is antagonistic to the people rather than belonging to them puts ignorance and coercion first. By contrast, the method used in training a people's army is based on political understanding and voluntary acceptance. The second method is that used by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.

There are three aspects to the training of an army: training the mind, physical training, and training in military technique.

The first thing in training an army is to train the mind of the soldier. There will be no spirit of initiative in an army whose political understanding is low, which does not know what it is fighting for. In that case, no amount of training will get anywhere. Courage without political understanding is just brute courage. Conscious courage resulting from political awareness is true courage. To increase political understanding and military knowledge, soldiers must receive a basic level of education.

Since the army of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie has a policy of keeping its soldiers ignorant, the soldiers are not interested in physical and technical training and it proves ineffective. It is useless to equip such soldiers with modern weapons; they may simply hand them over to the enemy.

The Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies have achieved remarkable results in the cultivation of the mind. The political understanding of our army is high, which is why it is unconquerable. As a result of our fight in recent years against tendencies to be dogmatic or formalistic, political training has become more thorough and practical. Both officers and men have systematically improved their military knowledge and a considerable advance has been made in the study and application of strategy and tactics. With regard to general education, while we obtained some results at the very beginning, we have done much better in recent years. As far as cultivation of the mind goes, for the past year or so we have trained our troops for various productive jobs as well as provided political and general education. Training for production not only helps our production campaign, but fosters as well a sound attitude towards labour and prevents our men from becoming loafers or scoundrels in uniform. They will still be useful members of society when the war is over.

It should also be pointed out that we owe a great deal of our success in cultivating the minds of our soldiers to the many intellectuals and educated young men who have joined our army since the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan. I want to take this opportunity to express our sincere appreciation.

Now a word on physical training. Fighting involves hand-to-hand combat, a matching of strength. Physical training, therefore, is important. Building physical strength demands, first of all, a full stomach and warm clothing. Only then can we set about various forms of physical exercise. As the army of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie operates by exploiting the rank and file, naturally its soldiers cannot acquire a good physique. In the people's army, with its emphasis on consideration and care for the men, it is quite the reverse.

Next comes training in technique and tactics. In the past there was a tendency in our army to scoff at the idea of physical strength and technique. It was regarded as enough for the army to have political awareness. This is quite wrong. Did we win battles in the past? Yes, we did. But that does not mean that our technical skill was either adequate or good enough. If we had had greater physical strength and better technique, as well as political awareness, we might have won greater battles and suffered fewer casualties. But it is only fair to say that this wrong tendency has now been corrected. During the last couple of winters we carried out training on a large scale.

In some areas this developed into military training for all the people. Our regular troops have improved enormously, and large numbers of the militiamen have now learned how to lay mines. To have accomplished so much is very significant.

In recent years we have worked out a new method of training troops by replacing the "officer line" — which gave officers and instructors sole control over training — with the "mass line", the basis of which is co-operation between officers and men. In our army we have introduced a new educational method. It is to make teaching and learning complement each other. The officers teach the men and the men teach the officers. The officers teach one another as do the men. Those who are intellectuals and those who are of worker or peasant origin also help and learn from each other. Such an arrangement is just what is needed in the present war conditions. We place a high value on the lectures on special technical skills given by our officers or instructors. Since the outbreak of the War of Resistance, many military specialists have joined our army and played a fine part in raising our fighting capacity. We give them a warm welcome. At the same time officers must not overlook the fact that every one of the hundreds or thousands of men under their command has his individual strengths, that in our army there are highly skilled men from every trade. Officers should not be too proud to learn from them. We have changed the attitude of officers from one of conceit and superiority to one of untiringly learning from others and teaching others. Scarcely had this system of relying on the masses in training troops been adopted when we discovered not a few whose abilities had remained unknown among the hundreds of thousands of men in the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. In the course of troop training, new heroes and new skills have been discovered every day and our technique has been vastly enriched. This wave of study is the very basis on which our men can master new skills. In short, the classrooms and drill grounds that the men used to fear have been turned into places where military skill and knowledge are cultivated and tempered. The whole atmosphere is different, interest has been heightened and the barracks have been turned into schools.

We have certainly done a great deal in training troops. But can we be satisfied with this? No, we cannot. To prepare for the future counter-offensive, we must from now on learn to master new techniques; and the most important thing we have to learn is artillery warfare.

We have to improve our tactics by painstakingly reviewing the experience gained in battle and in field manoeuvres. The contents of the Four Main Courses¹⁷⁷ should be used only as reference material for tactical and technical education. We should take from them whatever is of practical value, but not study them mechanically. Our Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies cannot yet master completely every aspect of military science and technique. We still have a long way to go in this respect. It is most important that the entire army continue studying in order to master whatever new military techniques we need.

This principle of troop training ensures that the rank and file of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies will be courageous and resourceful fighters on the anti-Japanese battle front, and that tomorrow, after victory, they will form the hard core of a modernized national defence force, as well as being capable of leading in the work of production and education in the period of national economic construction. In this way, the demobilization of our army will not create any difficulty for the people or the government.

CONDUCTING THE WAR

Just as there are two kinds of armies, so there are two different methods of carrying on a war. An army which is antagonistic to the people rather than belonging to them is necessarily limited to fighting by cut-and-dried rules and formulas. But a people's army uses methods of great flexibility and constantly adapts itself to the actual situation; and this is true of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.

Because the army of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie oppresses the people and receives no help from them, because there is no community of interest between officers and men, such an army cannot, when engaged in war, rely on the initiative and enthusiasm of its junior officers and men. It is, in fact, compelled to expend great effort to prevent large-scale desertions. It is very difficult to wage war with such an army. The higher command issues orders based entirely on preconceived, cut-and-dried rules, without weighing the enemy's strength against one's own and disregarding special conditions of time and place. Consequently such orders are utterly impractical. When a unit receives orders that cannot be carried out,

it makes false reports to the higher command. Both superiors and subordinates try to pull the wool over each other's eyes. Can such an army win victories? Many incredible phenomena have occurred in the War of Resistance. Mutinous generals have never been brought to justice. Generals who surrendered to the enemy have been given important positions after their return. And some generals who defended cities in conditions of enormous difficulty have been shot! This is an odd system of rewards and punishments, isn't it?

With the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army things are entirely different. When we are fighting we are helped everywhere by the people. Since the militia was organized and tunnel-digging and mine-laying began, the scale and importance of the help the people have given us are incalculable. Within the army itself, because it has a high degree of political awareness and because there is mutual understanding and a feeling of solidarity between officers and men, everyone knows where he stands and can act on his own initiative. Having a single aim, the fighters are mobile and swift; they can fight bravely. As an ancient saying goes, for a general not to know how to use his soldiers is tantamount to delivering the nation to the enemy; and for the soldiers not to know the worth of their generals is tantamount to delivering them to the enemy. That is something that never happens in our army.

Our policy in conducting the war may be summed up like this: How we are to fight depends on the weapons we possess, the kind of enemy before us, and the specific time and place. This means that a battle has to be planned and fought on the basis of our own equipment, the strength of the enemy, and the factors of time, terrain, and so on. This new method of conducting war is both practical and materialist. It is of profound significance. Many a military expert, in China and abroad, both in the present and in the past, has failed disastrously in this respect. Some of our comrades who held "Left" ideas in the past failed to understand just this point. Earlier on, when the only weapons at our disposal were rifles, spears and broad swords, we simply had to study the specific conditions and make our decisions and determine our tactics accordingly. We didn't talk in high-flown terms about the tactics of a mechanized army. When we passed from the period of civil war to that of the anti-Japanese war, when the enemy we had to face was the Japanese army, we were not content to cling to experiences from the civil war period. We made necessary changes and improvements. We made the relevant

decisions and determined our tactics after a thorough study of the enemy's situation. And of course, in the Liberated Areas we have to devise tactics applicable to the particular time and place of this type of battle front. These general rules for the conduct of war contain a special feature — unity between the army and the people. On the one hand, the fight waged by the army serves to help the various struggles in which the people are engaged; and on the other, the people's efforts — political, economic, cultural and military, as well as the disruption of the enemy's communication lines — serve to help the army wage war. This co-operation between the army and the people in all spheres is practised thoroughly on our fronts, in every campaign and in every battle. This is the new method of conducting war that we have worked out in the course of the people's war. It is the method of Comrade Mao Zedong.

Officers, their men and the people all have one common objective: to attack the enemy in every way possible. Consequently, as long as orders issued by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies suit local conditions and are practical, they are carried out. Even if orders are occasionally impractical or arrive too late, no harm is done, because lower units are able to adapt themselves to circumstances, make judgements and act independently. That is why we are winning all along the line.

Last year the Kuomintang troops suffered a miserable defeat in Henan Province. Those who have studied the campaign have come to the conclusion that the defeat was due to five discordant factors: the various armies were at odds with each other; the officers were at odds with the men; the army was at odds with the government, as well as with the Kuomintang party, and with the people. This is all that can be expected. An army of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie runs into conflict at every turn, while the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies meet with agreement and harmony everywhere. That is the fundamental difference.

Now a word on military theory. Whenever this subject is raised, some people like to show off with a series of high-sounding military academy lectures, or by quoting at length from the military history of one country or another. What they say is all very profound, but unfortunately these theories are not necessarily of practical value to the Chinese people. Undoubtedly we must draw on the military theories and experience of all countries. We ought to learn from them. It will be bad for us if we do not. What we must not do,

however, is to apply such theories and experience mechanically; we must not accept them as immutable dogma. The Northern Expedition, the Agrarian Revolutionary War and the eight years of the War of Resistance Against Japan have given birth to a correct military science that best suits the needs of the Chinese people. It is a military science that combines theory with practice. Comrade Mao Zedong's many military writings are good expositions of this new military science. From the various battles fought in the revolutionary civil wars and from battles now being fought on the fronts of the Kuomintang and the Liberated Areas, we can see the soundness of the ideas set forth in these works. Experience gained in the War of Resistance is a yardstick against which the soundness of Comrade Mao Zedong's military theories can be tested. Everything I mentioned when dealing with the military experience in the War of Resistance in the Liberated Areas, as well as the whole strategy of people's war, comes from the successful application of Comrade Mao Zedong's methods.

In our persistent struggle behind the enemy lines we achieve victories by adopting the basic principles of strategy and tactics laid down by Comrade Mao Zedong. These basic principles are: oppose adventurism when on the offensive, oppose conservatism when on the defensive, and oppose flightism when moving from one place to another. These basic principles are based on the close fighting unity between the army and the people. It is this unity that makes their application possible.

POLITICAL WORK IN THE ARMY

The two kinds of armies conduct two kinds of political work.

The aim of political work conducted by the reactionary clique within the Kuomintang is to trick the officers and men. Otherwise the big landlords and big bourgeoisie would not be able to do as they please. Therefore, instead of anti-Japanese education, the reactionaries in the Kuomintang carry out anti-Communist education in the army. Instead of teaching officers and men to work for democracy, they demand their blind obedience. They set up a system of secret informers in the army. Officers and men with democratic ideas are labelled dangerous and kept under scrutiny, dismissed, arrested, or even secretly done away with. This sinister, merciless secret surveillance regime is aimed to blunt the political consciousness of the

soldiers, to encourage their ignorance, to spy on — and even murder — officers and men who hold democratic views, to isolate the army from the people and to use the army to oppress the people. If the men in an army are brutalized, that army will never serve the people, but inevitably will brutalize the people. In such an army spying on your own men is called “political” work; but it is poles apart from the political work in our army.

The aim of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies is to serve the people and safeguard the country, and therefore political work is; the life-blood of these armies. Our political work sets out: (1) to raise the political understanding of officers and men, to inspire them with love for their country and their people, and to fire them with a desire to re-educate themselves; (2) to bring about unity between our army and friendly army units; (3) to cement the unity between the army and the people, to make the people more politically aware of the necessity of safeguarding the country and democracy, and to help spread education and culture among the people; (4) to demoralize the Japanese and puppet troops by political and psychological means and sap their fighting strength; and (5) to consolidate and increase the fighting strength of our army, to guarantee that orders are carried out, and to help the army itself to make an intensive study of politics and military matters, to receive a general education and to master production skills. These five aspects of our political work are interrelated and complement each other. They characterize all our political work. Ours is a people’s army with unity between army and people, between officers and men. The war we wage is a people’s war. We apply the strategy and tactics of a people’s war; and we have won battles. All these are inseparably linked to our political work.

THE ARMY COMMAND

The two kinds of armies use two methods of command and two types of command organizations.

Because the reactionaries in the Kuomintang want to eliminate those who differ with them, they nominate their own divisional commanders. More often than not, these commanders take orders only from the supreme commander of the Kuomintang army, and pay no attention to anyone else. As a result, many army commands above

divisional level serve no purpose at all. In the course of a battle, myriads of orders are issued, often at variance with or flatly contradicting one another. The staff organizations, even the general staff at the headquarters of the supreme command, frequently become mere channels for transmitting orders.

By contrast, all levels of the commanding bodies of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies monitor and restrain each other. They have responsibility as well as authority. Harmony prevails in their ranks. There is unity in command, yet sufficient latitude for lower units to display initiative. Thus the army is united from top to bottom.

One of the special merits of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies is the ability of various units to co-operate with one another and to co-ordinate their actions. The lower units never try to shift responsibilities to some one else when they receive orders from higher authorities, and when no orders are forthcoming they voluntarily co-operate one with another. Excellent co-operation is also maintained between main forces and local, guerrilla, militia and self-defence forces. As a result, there is unity among all our forces.

The staff organizations of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are capable of truly effective work. That is the fundamental difference between them and the staff organizations of the Kuomintang army. During recent years, our staff work has improved due to the efforts of the staff personnel. It must be improved still further *to* prepare for the forthcoming counter-offensive. In modern warfare, large formations cannot be commanded by a single individual: they require a joint command. And effective joint command is impossible without effective staff work. Therefore, our army staffs must continue to improve their work. They must do this above all in reconnaissance and communications, in order to collect accurate and up-to-the-minute intelligence.

EQUIPMENT AND OTHER PROBLEMS

For several years the most difficult problem facing us in the Liberated Areas has been obtaining equipment and military supplies. We are solving this in several ways. First, we arm ourselves with weapons seized from the enemy. For several years now we have relied on this method of strengthening our forces and maintaining our

fighting power. Second, we make use of locally obtainable materials. The abundance of coal, iron and metal obtained from dismantled railway tracks in north China has greatly facilitated our manufacture of arms; this is how the greater part of the militia forces have been able to engage in mine-laying on an increasing scale. Third, we have set up small-scale ordnance factories by assembling odds and ends of equipment captured from the Japanese and puppet troops. Fourth, we disperse and camouflage these factories, which often become the target of enemy "mopping-up" campaigns. Greater armed protection must be provided for them so that ammunition can be produced without interruption to supply the front. As far as medical supplies go, we use both traditional Chinese and Western medicines. We manufacture only a small part of the medicines we use; the main sources of supply are purchase and seizure from the enemy. We are most grateful to overseas Chinese and friends who helped us with medical supplies at the beginning of the War of Resistance. These sources have dried up since 1939, when the Kuomintang authorities began a blockade of the Liberated Areas. But difficulties cannot daunt us. We can overcome them, thanks to the efforts of our military supply personnel.

STRONG MAIN FORCES AND STRONG RESERVES

The armed forces in the Liberated Areas fall into three categories: main forces, local forces, and militia and self-defence forces. The main job of the militia and self-defence forces is to protect their own villages while carrying on regular production. By protecting homes and defending themselves, no matter where they may be, they are fighting the war against Japan together with other districts and with the entire Liberated Areas. Local and national tasks in this war go hand in hand. In the entire history of our army, militia forces have never existed on such a scale as in the Liberated Areas. The very fact that we have learned to organize such a militia speaks volumes. Once the militia is organized, it can fight either alone or in co-ordination with the regular army. It has done a fine job of protecting the people in the Liberated Areas so that they can produce more. The recovery of many positions behind the enemy lines owes a great deal to the success of the militia in besieging the enemy troops. The militia's chief weapon is land-mines. They also have rifles and

hand grenades as well as a variety of primitive weapons, including improvised grenade-throwers. To secure arms through their own efforts, in many places the militia reclaim land to contribute revenue for the manufacture of ammunition.¹⁷⁸ The militia in many localities is organized in such a way that it can fight in co-ordination with the militia of other areas. In these cases, we see the militia starting to evolve into regular local forces. The militia and self-defence forces also take an active part in production. Their members are both fighters and producers, both a military and a labour force. That is something that radically changes the face of the countryside. Local forces occupy a place midway between the main forces and the militia. They are responsible for the defence of one or several counties. They are responsible not only for the important military task of launching counter-“mopping-up” campaigns, but for looking after the immediate concerns of the people. For example, they protect local people during the harvest and planting seasons. They also fight floods, drought and other natural hazards. The men who form these local forces naturally love the locality where they were born and brought up and where their forefathers are buried. That makes it possible for us to strengthen these forces so that they serve as local garrisons in the War of Resistance. As each local force becomes experienced and strengthened in carrying out this task, it becomes more similar to, more on the level of, a main force. Sometimes main forces are concentrated. At other times they are dispersed. So it is necessary for them to joint with local and militia forces to increase their own strength and strike at the enemy with greater impact. Working with one another, the main, local and militia forces become an organic whole. In a crisis, we can advantageously disperse the main forces and integrate them with the local forces, with the masses. When, on the other hand, the situation favours the expansion of our work, the militia and local forces can, in certain conditions, come together to co-operate with the main forces, or actually become part of the main forces themselves, in order to fulfil the more important tasks called for by expansion. By such measures, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies have created a militia of more than two million men to provide support and reserves. That is one of the reasons they can sustain protracted warfare. This is an enormous step forward in our army building in the Liberated Areas.

In his political report Chairman Mao Zedong said: “When a unit of the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army or any other armed

force of the people arrives at a place, it should immediately help the local people to organize forces led by the local cadres, including not only militia and self-defence corps but also local troops and regional forces. This will make possible the eventual creation of regular forces and regular army formations led by local people. This is an extremely important task. Unless it is accomplished, we can neither build stable anti-Japanese base areas nor expand the people's army." This, then, is our task.

BREAKING UP THE PUPPET TROOPS

In recent years our army has done a good deal to demoralize the puppet troops.

These puppet troops are Chinese. In helping the Japanese invaders to oppress and slaughter their fellow-countrymen, they have committed the worst of crimes. Unless they change their stand quickly, cross over to our side and render good service to atone for their crime, they will be liable to such severe punishment as the nation demands, and will be wiped out together with the Japanese invaders.

The composition of the puppet troops is very mixed. Among the 800,000 we face, half a million are former Kuomintang troops who surrendered to the enemy as a result of the Kuomintang reactionaries' ridiculous order to "save the nation by a devious path".

We cannot, therefore, apply one hard and fast rule to all puppet troops. There is only one thing to be done with the diehards who have worked hand in glove with the enemy and repeatedly turned a deaf ear to our advice — unhesitatingly destroy them. As for those puppet officers and men who do have national awareness but were temporarily fooled by the Kuomintang reactionaries and so surrendered to the enemy — we should win them over by propaganda, rescue them from crime and return them to the embrace of our motherland.

We must, however, give them a word of warning. Hitler has been vanquished, and it will not be long before the Japanese invaders meet the same fate. These puppets have committed many crimes. Unless they cross over to our side soon, they will not have time to serve their country and redeem themselves; and they will be punished as the nation demands. Any delay in coming over to our side will be at their own peril.

IV. OUR FUTURE MILITARY TASKS

Comrades! I have dealt with our military line in a fairly systematic way and explained how we should carry on our work in various fields. Now I want to say something about our future military tasks.

MILITARY TASKS THROUGHOUT THE NATION

In his political report Chairman Mao Zedong said: “. . . The urgent need is to unite representatives of all political parties and groups and of people without any party affiliation and establish a provisional democratic coalition government for the purpose of instituting democratic reforms, surmounting the present crisis, mobilizing and unifying all the anti-Japanese forces in the country to fight in effective co-ordination with the Allied countries for the defeat of the Japanese aggressors, and thus enabling the Chinese people to liberate themselves from the latter's clutches. After that it will be necessary to convene a national assembly on a broad democratic basis and set up a formally constituted democratic government, which will also be in the nature of a coalition and will have a still wider representation of people from all parties and groups or without any party affiliation, and which will lead the liberated people of the whole country in building an independent, free, democratic, united, prosperous and powerful new China. In short, we must take the line of unity and democracy, defeat the aggressors and build a new China.”

This proposal of Comrade Mao Zedong is the political guide to victory in China's War of Resistance, and to building the nation.

In carrying out this political line, our military task is to unite the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies with all friendly forces engaged in the War of Resistance in order to defeat the Japanese aggressors. To this end, the army and the people of the entire country urgently demand that the supreme command, now under the one-party dictatorship of the Kuomintang, be reorganized, and that it be replaced by a joint supreme command which, based on Dr. Sun Yat-sen's principle of democracy, is capable of exercising effective and unified command.

This joint supreme command should work in conformity with Dr. Sun's principle of identifying the armed forces so closely with the people that they become the armed forces of the people. Accordingly,

all corrupt practices existing in the Kuomintang command and army that divorce the army from the people and are contrary to the interests of the people must be eliminated or drastically changed. Military lines and policies not in the interests of the War of Resistance and of the people must be changed. High-ranking defeatist and pro-Japanese elements must be dismissed and military training improved. Democratic methods of work and political consciousness must be fostered in the army and secret surveillance within the army abolished for good. The conscription system, which harms both the people and the execution of the War of Resistance, must be radically changed. Discipline in accordance with national honour and interest must be enforced, and the treatment of officers and men must be improved. Only by taking these measures can relations be improved between the Kuomintang army and the people, as well as between officers and men in the Kuomintang army. Only in this way can real unity between the army and the people be achieved, and the armed forces improve their fighting capacity for the benefit of the War of Resistance. The establishment of such a joint supreme command as described above is therefore in the interests of the patriotic officers and men of the Kuomintang army.

Creation of such a joint supreme command is also in the interests of those officers and men in every provincial force who love their country, because it would do away with all unequal treatment that has divided the nation's armed forces, because it would put an end to the defeatist strategy of preserving one's own strength at the expense of others, because it would help the provincial forces make progress and do what the people expect of them, and because it would unite all armies throughout the country and radically change the war situation.

A joint supreme command of this sort is also needed in the Liberated Areas — which for eight years have borne the brunt of the fighting — and by all the armies engaged in bitter fighting behind enemy lines (the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the friendly forces) so that operations in both the Kuomintang areas and the Liberated Areas can be effectively co-ordinated and all forces in the Liberated Areas given far more vigorous assistance to defeat the Japanese aggressors.

It is specially necessary to emphasize that this joint supreme command must supply the modern weapons available to all forces, without exception, capable of fighting the enemy in order to wipe out the

enemy, speed up victory and liberate the nation. Such a joint supreme command should not withhold such weapons for the purpose of fighting a civil war and oppressing the people.

Members of the Communist Party themselves both inside and outside the army must collaborate with all democratic elements and all military units in China. In the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, Communist Party members are in the minority, because officers and men are not compelled to join the Communist Party (in the Kuomintang army they are compelled to join the Kuomintang). In actual fact, therefore, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are allied armies of Communists and other democratic elements; they are armies of the people.

All officers and men of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are willing to make common cause with all other anti-Japanese armies throughout the country, to work for the establishment of a joint supreme command and to defeat the Japanese aggressors. All past prejudices should be abandoned and all friction ended. It is our opinion that officers and men of all anti-Japanese forces have been fighting heroically in the War of Resistance and have rendered meritorious service to the country and the people. In reorganizing the Kuomintang command to create a basis for unity among all armies in the country, it is, above all, necessary to reinforce their united strength so that, in collaboration with our Allies, we can bring about the speedy defeat of the Japanese. This is not only what is expected by the army, the people throughout the country and democratic public opinion among the Allies. It is also what is expected by most of the patriotic officers and democratic elements within the Kuomintang.

OUR MILITARY TASKS IN AREAS UNDER JAPANESE OCCUPATION

Our military tasks in the areas occupied by the Japanese are: to intensify political work to win over the people; to intensify organizational work among them; to strengthen our political influence over Japanese and puppet troops and the police in order to get them to revolt against the Japanese and cross over to our side; to carry out more intensive work in cities in the rear of the enemy; and to organize our underground forces. If all these tasks are carried out in co-ordination with our army's actions, then the army can assuredly take the lead

in expelling the Japanese aggressors from the mainland of China when the great day arrives for the general counter-offensive.

Comrade Mao Zedong has often said: We ought to learn from the experience gained by the French underground forces in liberating France. All Chinese in the Japanese-occupied areas who love their country and all our comrades working in these areas should always bear Comrade Mao Zedong's advice in mind. They should be conscious of their great responsibilities and take practical measures to prepare themselves, so that when the time is ripe they can smash the Japanese bandits and recover their beloved land.

OUR MILITARY TASKS IN THE LIBERATED AREAS

As the spearhead of the general counter-offensive on the Chinese mainland, the army in the Liberated Areas has to shoulder the extremely important strategic task of defeating the Japanese aggressors by co-operating with all friendly forces throughout the country and the forces of our Allies.

Our military tasks in the Liberated Areas may be set out as follows:

1) We must expand the Liberated Areas and reduce the areas occupied by the Japanese. In conformity with the principle that "the rise and fall of a nation is the concern of every citizen", we should strive to recover every inch of enemy-occupied territory. Comrade Mao Zedong told us: "In the prevailing circumstances, the troops of the Liberated Areas should launch extensive attacks on all places that can be captured from the Japanese and puppets in order to expand the Liberated Areas and reduce the occupied areas." "But at the same time it should be borne in mind that the enemy is still strong and may launch further attacks on the Liberated Areas. The army and the people of our areas must be ready at all times to smash his attacks and must work in every way to consolidate these areas."¹⁷⁹

Last year our army recovered 16 county towns behind the enemy lines. In four months this year another 12 have been recovered. This has been possible because the Japanese invaders have had far too much on their hands, while we have been growing stronger and stronger through hardening in battle. In these circumstances, it would be advantageous for us, in compliance with Comrade Mao Zedong's instructions, to mass still stronger forces for an offensive against any areas that can be recovered. This would reduce the number of enemy

attacks and gradually pave the way for the change from guerrilla to mobile warfare. At the same time we must take into account the fact that for a certain period the enemy is still able to mount attacks against the Liberated Areas and we should make proper preparations to counter them. We should continue to avoid offensive adventurism and any concentration of forces for actions not warranted by circumstances.

2) We must expand the people's forces so as to break up and wipe out Japanese and puppet troops. If victory in the War of Resistance is to be won and the danger of civil war prevented, there must be an expansion of our main forces as well as our local, guerrilla and militia forces. But this expansion must be attained in such a way that it does not throw too heavy a burden on the people. As Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out, "The new China or the old China — these are the two prospects facing the Chinese people, the Communist Party of China. . . ." ¹⁸⁰ And he said that these two prospects will still confront us, even when Japanese imperialism is defeated. To bring the new China into being, to give the Chinese people the promise of a brilliant future, we must have strong people's forces. I have already explained how we must go about breaking up and wiping out the Japanese and puppet forces. Our job now is to work more effectively — and more quickly — in this respect.

3) We have to intensify the training of our existing forces — the regular troops, local forces and the militia and self-defence forces — in preparation for the counter-offensive. To prepare our main forces for mobile warfare, we must ensure that they are steadily toughened and provided the experience of properly-planned concentrated attacks on the enemy. We must also see that the militia get their training. They should manufacture large numbers of various types of mines, and learn various methods of detonation so that they can use them in the greatest number of ways.

4) We must improve technical skills. Strategic counter-offensive calls for modern equipment. From now on we must improve our technical skills so that we can handle such equipment when the opportunity arises. We have already captured some pieces of artillery. We must learn about gunnery and the tactics of modern warfare.

5) We must strengthen our command system. We must improve our staff work to make it equal to the task of commanding our troops under present conditions and at the same time get it ready for an

expansion of the war. We must make better preparations for a great counter-offensive. We must strengthen our political work, encourage our soldiers and enhance their morale and intensify military studies to ensure that we can successfully deal with the present situation behind the enemy lines. We must, moreover, make certain that should the situation undergo any radical change we would be able to take on any new battles. In our political task we have a new duty: to make proper arrangements to deal with the present situation and to work out far-sighted plans for the changes the future will bring. The work of the rear service must be strengthened in regard to supplies, health care, ordnance, and so forth. It should meet both current war needs and prepare to meet the needs of the future counter-offensive. Then we shall not be caught napping when the time of great need comes. We shall in the future need highly qualified personnel in vast numbers for our commands, and we should not hesitate to send large numbers of our best cadres into the army.

6) We must prepare a material base from which to launch the general counter-offensive. The whole army should be mobilized for productive work and mobilized to practise economy and lay in stocks of food and materials. In collecting the materials required for our counter-offensive we have to rely on our own efforts. And when the time comes for concentrated operations, we should be fully prepared for every exigency.

7) We must take better care of the families of anti-Japanese fighters. We must improve pension services for the wounded and the families of those killed in action; and we must make better arrangements for the disabled and demobilized soldiers.

8) In order to promote all this work and fulfil all these tasks, there must be complete unity within the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the other armed forces of the people. And, with this accomplished, we must work towards unity with the many friendly armies. Unity and progress are inseparable. Comrades must guard against conceit and pride, which contribute to a "mountain-stronghold" mentality. No matter how great the service rendered, credit should go not to any individual, but to the people. Not only should we avoid such faults. We should criticize ourselves every so often and learn from one another, so that we raise our abilities and do not fall short of the people's confidence and trust. If we practise self-criticism and refuse to allow ourselves to become conceited or arrogant, "moun-

tain-stronghold" mentality will decline, a stronger unity will be created both inside and outside our army, and we shall be invincible.

All these military tasks that will confront the Liberated Areas from now on, in other words, the central strategic task for which we must be prepared, correspond, generally speaking, to what Comrade Mao Zedong said in the early period of the War of Resistance: that the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies had to be prepared for a strategic change from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare in the later period of the war. It is now time for us to be prepared to make this change, step by step, in our practical work. All personnel in the army should be prepared to make fundamental changes in their outlook and in their practical work, so they will be ready for the general counter-offensive against the Japanese aggressors.

I have said before, and here I must stress again, that it would be a serious mistake to underrate the great importance of the Liberated Areas and of the struggle of their 90 million heroic, militant people for the cause of China's liberation and the general counter-offensive against the Japanese aggressors.

V. CONCLUSION

Soon victory will dawn over China and over the whole world, in all its glory. The great undertaking for which the Chinese people have striven these past eight years is approaching its moment of decisive triumph. The political report made by Comrade Mao Zedong shows the political direction the Chinese people are taking. My report summarizes their military experience — mainly that gained in the Liberated Areas — during the eight years of the War of Resistance. Its purpose is to discover a way of fulfilling militarily Comrade Mao Zedong's directives, of performing the great tasks he has set before the Chinese people in waging the War of Resistance and building the nation.

Comrades! The Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the other armies of the people were created by the blood and sacrifice of countless numbers of our comrades and of the Chinese people. Every comrade, every fighter who made the supreme sacrifice will be forever remembered. Here I should like to recall what Comrade Mao Zedong said in his report about the people's army:

“This army is powerful because all its members have a discipline based on political consciousness; they have come together and they fight not for the private interests of a few individuals or a narrow clique, but for the interests of the broad masses and of the whole nation. The sole purpose of this army is to stand firmly with the Chinese people and to serve them wholeheartedly.

“Guided by this purpose, this army has an indomitable spirit and is determined to vanquish all enemies and never to yield. No matter what the difficulties and hardships, so long as a single man remains, he will fight on.”

The conclusion that Comrade Mao Zedong has drawn is forthright and bold — and it is correct. It reflects the deep-rooted strength of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the other armies of the people. These armies embody the strength of the Chinese people, the quintessence of the strength of the Chinese people — and they have a boundless future. Their strength will continue to exist as long as the great Chinese nation exists. These armies will continue to strive, together with the Chinese people, to defeat the Japanese invaders, to surmount all obstacles that prevent China from becoming an independent, free, democratic, united, prosperous and powerful nation. The present congress of our Party, under the leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong, will lead us forward along the road to victory.

Comrades! For 24 years our great Communist Party of China, side by side with the entire Chinese people, has been engaged in a struggle for national liberation and social progress. In the course of this struggle we have worked out not only a powerful political line that can lead to the solution of China's political problems, but also a most powerful military line that can solve the problems of China's revolutionary war. The representative exponent of our political line and our military line is our leader, Comrade Mao Zedong. For the victory of the War of Resistance, I, here at this congress, would like to make a point of urging our comrades to study Comrade Mao Zedong's military writings just as seriously as they do his writings on politics, economics and culture. All units of the army, all military schools and all military training classes must make Comrade Mao Zedong's military writings their basic text, the living core of their studies. By so doing they will become better armed mentally and be able to defeat the enemy.

Long live the victory of the Seventh Congress of our Party!

Long live Comrade Mao Zedong, leader of our Party!

Long live the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Column!

Unite with all the friendly forces to defeat the Japanese invaders!

Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation!

Long live the independent, free, democratic, united, prosperous and powerful new China!

VIEWS ON SETTING UP MORTAR UNITS AND ON ARMAMENT PRODUCTION

August 6, 1945

At the opening ceremony of the Yan'an Artillery School¹⁸¹ on August 1, we¹⁸² watched the mortar firing practice and read Comrade Zhao Zhangcheng's suggestions.¹⁸³ We agree on the following:

1. In battles against enemy and puppet troops and troops of the diehard clique of the Kuomintang, our fighters often encounter pillboxes and temporary earthworks common in mobile warfare, which keep them from gaining victory.

2. During the year ahead, we should provide each full-strength regiment with a mortar battery and each under-strength regiment with a mortar platoon in order to better cope with the enemy.

3. Artillery units should be organized by leaders at all levels as a first step in building our army for the present stage. In the future, our army should have all types of artillery, beginning with mortars.

4. To organize artillery units, it is necessary first to define the tasks of our munitions factories at the front and in the rear. As we see it, what these factories are actually doing now is repairing weapons and manufacturing ammunition. They should be able to repair all kinds of artillery, machine-guns and rifles, and also to manufacture more mortar shells, which will help us destroy the enemy's pillboxes.

Please consider the above suggestions, including those of Comrade Zhao, and give us your opinions, so that we can discuss them and decide what to do.

A letter to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and Comrade Mao Zedong.

ORDER TO YASUJI OKAMURA TO SURRENDER

August 15, 1945

Nanjing

General Yasuji Okamura:¹⁸⁴

(1) The Japanese government has formally accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration¹⁸⁵ and announced its surrender.

(2) You are to order all the troops under your command to cease all military operations; all of them, except those encircled by the troops of the Kuomintang government, must surrender to us upon orders from the Eighth Route Army,⁵² the New Fourth Army⁹⁰ or the South China Anti-Japanese Column¹⁵⁴ of China's Liberated Areas.

(3) With regard to the surrender of the Japanese troops in north China, you are to order General Sadamu Shimomura¹⁸⁶ to appoint a representative to go to the Eighth Route Army's Fuping area to receive orders from General Nie Rongzhen;¹⁸⁷ with regard to the surrender of the Japanese troops in east China, you yourself are to appoint a representative to go to the Tianchang area, where the Headquarters of the New Fourth Army is located, to receive orders from General Chen Yi;¹¹¹ with regard to the surrender of the Japanese troops in Hubei and Henan provinces, you are to order your representative in Wuhan to go to the Dawu mountain area of the 5th Division of the New Fourth Army to receive orders from General Li Xiannian;¹⁸⁸ with regard to the surrender of the Japanese troops in Guangdong, you are to instruct your representative in Guangzhou to go to the Dongguan area of the South China Anti-Japanese Column to receive orders from General Zeng Sheng.¹⁸⁹

(4) All the Japanese troops in north, east, central and south China (except those encircled by the Kuomintang troops) must keep

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all arms and *matériel* intact, pending our army's acceptance of their surrender, and must not take orders except from the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army or the South China Anti-Japanese Column.

(5) All the aircraft and vessels in north and east China are to stay where they are, but the vessels anchored along the Chinese coast in the Yellow Sea and the Bohai Gulf should be assembled at Lianyungang, Qingdao, Weihaiwei and Tianjin.

(6) There must be no destruction of any *matériel* or installations.

(7) You and the commanders of the Japanese army in north, east, central and south China will be held completely responsible for the execution of this order.

Zhu De

Commander-in-Chief of the Anti-Japanese
Army of China's Liberated Areas

LETTER TO MISS AGNES SMEDLEY*

July 1, 1946

Dear Miss A. Smedley:¹⁹⁰

Your letter care of Comrade Dong Biwu¹⁹¹ in Oct. 1945 has reached me at the end of last year. Comrade Zhou Yang¹⁹² is going to the United States. So I take this opportunity to write to you.

First of all I must express my deep thanks for the concern and efforts of you and of all my American friends in the movement for peace and democracy in China. Since January this year, China has for a short period obtained a general peace, and seen the hope for democratization. This is largely due to the contribution of the American friends of China. American democratic activities have considerably strengthened the friendship between the Chinese and the American people, and made them strongly confident of its infinite development. Though the cause for peace and democracy in China has been undermined by the Chinese reactionaries (under the encouragement of and in co-operation with the American reactionaries), yet it is my firm belief and all my comrades' that it is only a temporary phenomenon. The reactionary plot, though it may be nominally successful for a certain time or at a certain place, will be finally defeated by the overwhelming army of the Chinese people. At present the Chinese people are bravely consolidating their forces from all sides to break the intrigue of the reactionary clique whose difficulty and crisis are increasing daily. Peace and democratization in China is certainly a titanic job, which would possibly follow a tortuous course. But the Chinese people will doubtless reach their goal. Therefore your wish to return to China can also be realized. It is only a question of time. I hope that you will not be disappointed in seeing the temporary darkness in some places in China. Believe in China and her

* Original English text.

people. Likewise, I believe in the American people. All the Chinese democratic parties and groups are watching the uniting and development of the American democratic parties and groups. The American reactionary forces are certainly stronger than those in China. They are trying to spread all over the world. But they can bring neither to the United States nor to the other nations any brilliant prospects. Thus, it is hopeless for them to check the resistance of the people of China and of all the other nations. This is their fatal point.

I am much obliged to learn that you intend to spend some energy in writing about my life, which, I should say, is merely a very small part of the life of the Chinese peasants and soldiers. I doubt if it is worth your time. As you are so persistent and have already started the work, I have to do what you want me to. With this letter I am sending you a part of the draft of "The Life of Zhu De" by Mr. Liu Baiyu,¹⁹³ (which is not published yet), two volumes of the stories about the "Long March", and some of my writings from the time of the War of Resistance to the present day. I should like to do more, if there is anything else you need.

We are all well in Yan'an. Comrade and Mrs. Zhou Enlai, Comrade Dong Biwu, and Comrade Zhang Hanfu¹⁹⁴ are still in Nanjing. Dr. George Hatem¹⁹⁵ is now in the Beiping Executive Headquarters for Military Mediation.¹⁹⁶ Please convey my best regards to my American friends: Captain E. Carlson,¹⁹⁷ Mr. E. Snow,¹⁹⁸ Mr. G. Stein,¹⁹⁹ Mr. H. Forman²⁰⁰ and Mr. I. Epstein.²⁰¹ My best wishes to General Stilwell.²⁰² The Chinese people all remember his righteous efforts. Many thanks to your friend Mrs. Ames. Ding Ling²⁰³ was ready to go abroad for the International Women's Conference²⁰⁴ in Paris. So she could not accept the invitation to the United States. But both she and Comrade Deng Yingchao²⁰⁵ are stopped by the Kuomintang. Thus, she was deprived of the opportunity to visit America. Comrade Zhou Yang will tell you more personally, for he knows Yan'an and things about me very well, though this time he does not start his trip directly from Yan'an.

Zhu De

GREETINGS TO GENERAL GAO SHUXUN ON THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF HIS REVOLT

October 30, 1946

There are two kinds of armies — with two kinds of soldiers in modern Chinese history. One is feudal, the army of the autocrats. The other is democratic, the army of the people. The first kind of army serves a handful of reactionaries and although its troops may swagger for a time, they are regarded as demons by the people. They are hated and resisted and in the end cannot escape extinction. The other kind of army serves the people and the nation. It may be numerically weak at the moment, but it is loved and praised by the people and will eventually emerge victorious. In the service of autocrats and foreign imperialism, the troops of the feudal warlords oppress and slaughter the Chinese people. This clearly runs counter to the interests of the people and the nation. Awakened to this fact, many officers and men among these troops will inevitably break with imperialism and feudal autocrats, refuse to serve as their tools and come over to the side of the people. This was true in the Revolution of 1911¹²³ which overthrew the Qing Dynasty, in the campaign against Yuan Shikai and for the protection of the Republic,⁷⁷ in the Northern Expedition against the northern warlords,¹²⁴ in the ten-year civil war following the failure of the Great Revolution (1924-27), and in the eight-year War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-45). It is even truer in today's struggle between the two lines: one for independence, peace and democracy, the other for national betrayal, civil war and autocracy. This has been demonstrated by the anti-civil war revolt of General Gao Shuxun,²⁰⁶ deputy commander of the 11th

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War Zone, on the southern Hebei front on October 30, 1945 and the subsequent formation of the Democratic National Construction Army. In addition to General Gao's revolt, there was the revolt by General Cao Youcan²⁰⁷ of the New 11th Brigade in Anbian on October 25 last year. In this year, there have been revolts by General Hao Pengju²⁰⁸ of the Sixth Route Army at Tai'erzhuang on January 9, 1946, resulting in the formation of the Central China Democratic United Army; by General Kong Congzhou²⁰⁹ of the 55th Division of the 38th Corps in Gongxian County on May 15, resulting in the formation of the 38th Army of the Northwest Democratic United Army; by General Pan Shuoduan²¹⁰ of the 184th Division of the 60th Corps in Haicheng on May 31, resulting in the formation of the First Army of the Democratic Allied Army; by Captain Liu Shanben²¹¹ of the Eighth Group of the Air Force, who flew a B-24 plane to Yan'an on June 26; and by General Hu Jingduo,²¹² deputy commander of the Northern Shaanxi Peace Preservation Corps, at Hengshan on October 13. These and countless other similar events have occurred one after another so that insurrectionary troops now account for 2 per cent of the total strength of Chiang Kai-shek's army. Their common demand is that they not be made slaves of U.S. imperialism and henchmen of the four plutocratic families.²¹³ The Gao Shuxun movement²⁰⁶ has become a rallying standard for all those officers and men of the Kuomintang army, navy and air force who are patriotic and have a conscience. It has become an important factor in the people's struggle to vanquish the reactionaries in the war of self-defence and to realize China's independence, peace and democracy.

At the present historical stage, the development of the Gao Shuxun movement has taken on particular significance. First, the offensive conducted by the reactionaries against the Liberated Areas is an extraordinarily unjust war. It constitutes a violation of the cease-fire order²¹⁴ signed by Chiang Kai-shek himself, as well as the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference.²¹⁵ People see ever more clearly that the offensive against the Liberated Areas is in essence a war of national subjugation and a traitors' war fought on behalf of U.S. imperialism. Second, many Kuomintang military men now find this kind of shameful war especially intolerable because most of them have just gone through the glorious War of Resistance Against Japan. After fighting a glorious anti-Japanese war, they have to fight a disgraceful civil war alongside puppet troops. After fighting Japanese imperialism, they have to don American caps and take up American

weapons in order to kill other Chinese under the command of U.S. imperialists. This ignominious fact is deeply distressing. Third, the Kuomintang troops had already admitted openly that for them the anti-Communist war was tantamount to "life imprisonment". Today, with the civil war barely begun, they have suffered successive major defeats and the annihilation of units. This has forced them to decide which road to take in the face of the impending doom. The reactionaries can rely on equipment and transport facilities furnished by the United States to capture a number of cities for the time being, but their military strength is becoming weaker with each battle while the Liberated Areas emerge increasingly stronger. This basic situation is now clearer than ever. Fourth, the reactionaries' policy to use the civil war to swallow up and eliminate the troops of miscellaneous brands has expedited the awakening of about half of the Kuomintang army. Fifth, after contact with the soldiers in the Liberated Areas, the Kuomintang troops have discovered that the anti-Communist propaganda drilled into their minds is nothing but humbug. The whole set of lies about Communists wantonly killing people and setting fires, about prisoners of war being skinned and buried alive, etc. immediately becomes counter-productive. These troops see with their own eyes how the soldiers in the Liberated Areas are faithful to the interests of the people and the nation, how they care for and respect the Kuomintang officers and men who have laid down their arms, and how they give preferential treatment to those who oppose the civil war and cross over to the people's side. All these practices are diametrically opposed to what the reactionaries have done. The reactionaries try to get rid of alien troops, while in the Liberated Areas all army units which adopt the common stand against national betrayal, civil war and autocracy are treated as friendly units and are respected and helped by the people. This has been proved beyond question by the experience of the Gao Shuxun movement in the past year. Because of the points I have made, I believe this movement will develop more extensively in the future and become a strong third force in our struggle, along with the resistance of the army and the people in the Liberated Areas and the people's democratic movement in areas controlled by the Kuomintang. The confluence of these three forces will directly bring about the military defeat of the reactionaries and effectively restore peace in the whole country.

In this great struggle, vital to the future of the nation, will officers and men of the Kuomintang army, navy and air force who are patri-

otic and have a conscience commit crimes against the people and the nation and be cursed by future generations? Or will they render meritorious service to both the people and the nation and be praised throughout the ages? Now it is high time for them to make up their minds and take action.

THE TEN MAJOR TASKS OF 1947

January 1, 1947

Today is New Year's Day, 1947. I wish the people and the officers and men in the Liberated Areas, people throughout the country and our compatriots overseas a happy new year.

This is the second New Year's Day since the victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-45). It may be recalled that soon after New Year's Day, 1946, people throughout the country were in high spirits because of the "January 10 cease-fire agreement"²¹⁴ and the success of the Political Consultative Conference. They hoped then that China would embark on the road of peaceful construction. If all the relevant agreements had not been sabotaged by the reactionaries and foreign aggressors, if, instead, they had been fully carried out, the entire country would be celebrating this New Year's Day in peace for the first time in decades. Unfortunately, the Kuomintang, aided by the United States, tore up the cease-fire agreement and the Political Consultative Conference resolutions²¹⁵ and unleashed a civil war unprecedented in Chinese and world history. They did this in an attempt to drench in blood the Liberated Areas, the bulwark of patriotism and democracy built by our people over eight years of bitter struggle. They hoped this would enable them to fully realize their traitorous dictatorship. To legalize their crimes, which have brought calamity to the country and the people, the reactionaries took a leaf out of the book of Yuan Shikai²¹⁶ and Cao Kun⁸¹ by unilaterally convening the illegal, divisive, one-party "national assembly" and fabricating a so-called constitution that actually protects their dictatorship. Thus the principle of political consultation was cast aside and the door to negotiations slammed. Of course, in an attempt to continue fooling the people, the reactionaries would say: We still want peace and democracy, want to

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introduce constitutional rule and safeguard the people's rights and want to resume negotiations and widen representation in the government, but the Communist Party will not join us, which shows that it is bent on making trouble, etc. But all Chinese as well as all foreigners are fully aware that the Communist Party desires peace and democracy, and that the cease-fire order and the Political Consultative Conference resolutions were all the outcome of its struggle. It may be recalled that when Chiang Kai-shek was holding a military conference in Beiping in December of the year before last, the Communist Party's delegation to the Political Consultative Conference arrived in Chongqing and proposed a cease-fire and the prompt convening of the consultative conference. Having reluctantly accepted these proposals, the reactionaries spread word that the cease-fire agreement and the Political Consultative Conference resolutions marked their own defeat and they would surely launch a counter-attack. Hence the Jiaochangkou Incident²¹⁷ in Chongqing in February last year and the various other unfortunate incidents after that. If the Kuomintang really wanted peace and democracy, we would heartily welcome it. We are frank people. We abhor suspicion, and particularly deceit. Our mottoes are "seek truth from facts" and "listen to what a person says and watch what he does". What are the facts currently? The facts are the reactionaries are mounting attacks everywhere. Right now they are attacking the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. Everywhere they conscript soldiers and requisition grain, with military spending accounting for 80 per cent of the state budget. Everywhere they impose a reign of terror and practise political and economic monopoly. Everywhere the people suffer from hunger and cold, their families broken up, their relatives dead. The reactionaries lay their knives on the necks of the Communists and the rest of the people. If you submit to their dictatorship, that is called "democracy". If you allow them to attack without hitting back, that is called "peace". One may ask: Is there such a peace, such a democracy in the world? The reactionaries know that their dictatorship and the civil war they have unleashed are not supported by our compatriots, so they sell out the national interests and ask the U.S. imperialists to shore them up, handing our territory, air space, territorial waters, military, administrative and financial power, industry, commerce and agriculture on a silver platter to U.S. imperialism. In Shanghai, Beiping and Tianjin, American soldiers run their cars over our compatriots, killing them, or beat them to death. They rape our women. But the people are not allowed to utter a word

of protest. And it is not only the United States that rides roughshod over us. Even Japan, under its aegis, bullies us. Yasuji Okamura,¹⁸⁴ top Japanese war criminal, is still serving as an official in Nanjing and his subordinates, when drunk, are allowed to beat Chinese people at will. In Tokyo, the killing of Chinese by Japanese police is not regarded as a criminal offence. Fellow-countrymen! If things remain as they are today, will we not have shed our blood in vain during the War of Resistance? The facts tell us that this is a critical moment for our motherland. The beautiful lies of the reactionaries are sugar-coated poison. Our present task is to take concrete action to oppose the national betrayal, dictatorship and civil war of the reactionaries and restore independence, peace and democracy to the country. The best way to do this is through negotiations to dissolve the illegal “national assembly” and abrogate the dictatorial constitution, restore the line of the Political Consultative Conference, remove the Kuomintang troops that have invaded the Liberated Areas, and return to the *status quo* when the cease-fire order was issued in January of last year. Only when this is accomplished will the reactionaries realize that there is nothing to be gained by making further trouble. Only then can peace and democracy in China be assured and the country’s independence guaranteed. Until now this has been the plan in which we have invested our greatest hope, but the reactionaries have adamantly refused to pursue it with us. They pay lip-service to independence, peace and democracy while they continue to wage civil war, practise dictatorship and sell out the country. Thus the reactionaries have left us only one way to survive: to rise in self-defence and make every sacrifice necessary to smash their military attacks. This is a sinister scheme on the part of the reactionaries, but it cannot discourage us over our motherland’s bright future. Because we are convinced that if we crush these attacks by the reactionaries, we can still achieve genuine independence, peace and democracy, still form a genuine coalition government, convene a genuine national assembly, institute a genuinely democratic constitution and build the motherland into a prosperous, strong and independent country enjoying freedom and equality.

Although many unfortunate events occurred in the past year and many compatriots live today in the depths of misery, darkness after all cannot shut out light and New Year’s Day this year is still worth our warm celebration. This is because over this past year, the people’s political awareness has increased, their strength has grown, the national

patriotic and democratic fronts have become broader and the Liberated Areas, through universal agrarian reform and through tempering in the war of self-defence, have emerged stronger. By contrast, the dictatorial rule of the reactionaries has become weaker and more isolated. They have suffered heavy blows militarily, politically and economically and have met insuperable difficulties. U.S. imperialism, the Chinese reactionaries' only patron, will be hit by economic crisis this year or next, and its expansionist policy is arousing opposition throughout the world. The true allies of the Chinese people are growing swiftly in strength through the movement of the peoples of various countries for peace, democracy and progress and through the world united front against the U.S. policy of aggression. Reviewing the past and looking to the future, we believe the reactionaries' dictatorial rule cannot last long and the Chinese people's cause of independence, peace and democracy will triumph. Although we have serious difficulties to surmount in our struggle this coming year, we can certainly win greater and more decisive victories than in the last. This year will mark a turning point in the Chinese people's struggle.

What should we do in the coming year to turn these bright prospects into reality?

First, the soldiers and people in our Liberated Areas must crush the reactionaries' attacks and recover lost territory. In the last six months or less, we wiped out about 45 brigades of reactionary troops. This brilliant victory has greatly lifted the hearts of people throughout the country while deflating the arrogance of the warmongers. But the reactionaries are still regrouping their forces to continue attacking the Liberated Areas on a certain scale. Moreover, they are stepping up conscription and the requisitioning of grain, and are buying arms from the United States and Canada in preparation for a protracted war. All the soldiers and people in our Liberated Areas, primarily all the commanders and fighters of the various main force units, should thwart the reactionaries' scheme for a protracted war. If we can win the same victory in the first half of this year as we did in the second half of last, namely, to wipe out another 40 to 50 brigades of reactionary troops, we will be able to check their offensive and begin to recover our lost territory. Although we have relinquished a number of cities in the course of battle during the past six months, our military strength has not been weakened. We have gained experience in large-scale warfare, reinforced our troops and replenished our equipment through repeated victories. What has happened to

the reactionaries? Their troops are dispersed, their defence and supply lines are overextended, large numbers of their men and huge quantities of equipment have been lost, resupplying grain and ammunition has become more difficult, and the low morale and fighting capacity of the overwhelming majority of their officers and men have fallen even lower. Their problems of insufficient troop strength and low combat capability are insoluble, whereas we can certainly meet our mission.

Second, it is necessary to strengthen local armed forces and guerrilla and militia units and intensify guerrilla action, particularly in the occupied areas. In the past war of self-defence, many local forces and guerrilla and militia units accomplished glorious tasks. In many places the reactionaries occupied a number of points which they have linked together, but vast rural areas are still in the hands of the people because of heroic guerrilla efforts. The importance of persisting in guerrilla warfare is as great as that of wiping out large numbers of enemy in battles at the regular front. This arduous struggle deserves to be admired by all Chinese. In some places, however, guerrilla warfare has not been maintained and, as a result, the people there suffered savage oppression. This is something that should never have happened. We must strive this year to launch guerrilla warfare in all the occupied areas. This is of great importance to the fighting of our main forces and the recovery of our lost land.

Third, all forces, be they main units, local forces or guerrilla and militia units, must make use of every interval between battles to carry out military training and political education to raise their fighting capacity and the political consciousness of their officers and men. This is especially necessary in units that have not paid sufficient attention to these matters in the past and thus have achieved less in combat and suffered a lower political quality.

Fourth, no unit can relax for a moment its support of the government and its care for the people, and all units must help the peasants carry out agrarian reform. This is an important condition in winning the people's long-term support. We must publicize repeatedly the fact that the people are the source of all our strength. We must strictly implement and constantly monitor the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention,⁹¹ promote at all times and in all places what is beneficial to the people and do away with what is not, help them fight traitors, local tyrants and despotic gentry, and distribute land and pay close attention to the economical use of their re-

sources. We must assist the people in production and help them solve any difficulty arising from the war. Troops in the rear areas should try to engage in production for themselves in order to maintain the characteristics of the people's army, which engages in fighting and production and also does mass work. It is precisely because the war is cruel that the people need our help and care, and it is thus all the more necessary for us to make them understand for whom we are fighting.

Fifth, everyone in the Liberated Areas must do more to support the front. We must increase military production to make sure adequate supplies reach our troops there. We must also take better care of our sick and wounded and look after soldiers disabled in the revolutionary war as well as families of fighters currently in active service, making sure that they obtain land. This is an important task in the war of self-defence.

Sixth, we must support the peasants' demands in the Liberated Areas and complete the agrarian reform, which is the basis not only for victory in the war of self-defence in the Liberated Areas but also for genuine nationwide democratic reform. This is in line with public opinion throughout the world. In the Liberated Areas where the agrarian reform has already been carried out, we must make sure it has not been done in name only and, further, that no one has used public office for private gain. We must make absolutely sure that in these areas the peasant masses, especially the poor peasants and farm labourers, have benefited from the agrarian reform on the basis of equal distribution. Where such reform has not been carried through, efforts must be made to speed up the process so that it is completed before spring sowing.

Seventh, after the basic completion of the agrarian reform, the next urgent task in the rural areas is to assist the peasants who have obtained land to overcome their difficulties and carry out mutual aid in production. We must also help the landlords take part in production. Then everyone in the Liberated Areas can work together with one heart and one mind to surmount their difficulties, develop production, improve their livelihood, support the front and resist the reactionaries' attacks and their attempts at suppression. Apart from agricultural production, efforts should be made to promote a handicraft textile industry and to see to it that — insofar as it is possible — each family spins yarn and each village weaves cloth. As long as our people and army are adequately fed and clothed, we will triumph.

Eighth, to solve the problem of money supply in the war of self-

defence, we must increase production and at the same time make strenuous efforts to straighten out our finances, reduce personnel where at all possible, and eliminate all unnecessary spending. Responsible cadres at higher levels should set an example by lowering their standard of living, commending those who adopt the style of hard struggle, and strictly prohibiting extravagance and waste, embezzlement or corruption. Violators must be severely dealt with. Only in this way can we guarantee a long, persistent struggle in the base areas.

Ninth, we must support the movement for independence, peace and democracy among the people in the Kuomintang-controlled areas, and express our solidarity with their struggle for survival. In those areas, people from peasants to ordinary landlords, from workers to run-of-the-mill businessmen and capitalists, from students to professors, from unemployed soldiers and soldiers' families to government employees and professionals — all are subject to oppression and threats and all are demanding an independent, peaceful and democratic China as well as their simple right to live. Most of them place their hopes on those of us in the Liberated Areas, and we must not disappoint them.

Tenth, although the Kuomintang authorities are trying to destroy the Communist Party by every means, we should enter into any kind of possible co-operation with all the patriotic forces within the Kuomintang. Many people in it disapprove of the policy of national betrayal, civil war and autocracy and they suffer as much in their hearts as they do materially. This is also the case with the Kuomintang officers and men who have been forced to attack the Liberated Areas. I would like to appeal to them sincerely: You should contribute your precious lives to the cause of the nation. Your blood should be shed for all the Chinese people. You should not be making meaningless sacrifices for a handful of unscrupulous big landlords, capitalists, bureaucrats and warlords. You should act resolutely and stop fighting the civil war. If you are courageous enough to do this, the war will end automatically, the motherland will thus be saved and you will change from guilty persons into persons who have rendered outstanding service to our country. As for the Kuomintang authorities, so long as they retain a shred of conscience and the slightest sincerity for peace and are willing to restore the military *status quo* of January 13 last year and the line of the Political Consultative Conference, we will let bygones be bygones and solve all problems by means of peaceful

negotiations. We are determined, however, to oppose all their deceptions to the end.

In short, all soldiers and people in the Liberated Areas and all patriotic fellow-countrymen should have a deep understanding of their sacred duty to the nation, have unswerving faith in victory, oppose pessimism and blind optimism, unite as one, work hard, struggle arduously and make heroic sacrifices to overcome current difficulties and greet the approaching dawn. The merging of two mighty forces — the victory of the war of self-defence in the Liberated Areas and the rise of the popular movement in the Kuomintang-ruled areas — can surely save the motherland from her crisis, foil the reactionaries' policy of national betrayal, civil war and autocracy and bring about an independent, peaceful and democratic new China.

Long live the Chinese nation!

Long live the independence of the motherland!

Long live a peaceful and democratic China!

ON THE QUESTION OF CADRES

June 10, 1947

Among us veteran cadres there are a number of Gorlovs²¹⁸ who flaunt their seniority and are conceited and arrogant because of their more than two decades of revolutionary experience and their having helped liberate many places and build up the Party and the army. They forget that Marxists can never learn enough and that as long as they work they will have to continue to learn. Society advances ceaselessly and so we must bear firmly in mind Chairman Mao's caution about "guarding against conceit and impetuosity". We must be modest and prudent.

There are not many veteran cadres among us. Only a few hundred are left from the period of the Great Revolution (1924-27) and only a few thousand have gone through the Long March. These comrades are our assets. The society respects them and the Party prizes them. But we must be concerned that they do not put on the airs of a veteran, become complacent and refuse to make progress. Otherwise, they will lag behind and forfeit their prestige.

The leaders of some organizations still regard as new those cadres who joined the revolution during the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-45) and have been Party members of about a decade's standing. This is wrong. These comrades are the core of our cadres. We must train them well in preparation for the liberation of our whole country. On their part, these comrades should also be mentally prepared for this task.

In your region there are at least tens of thousands of cadres, not merely a few thousand. Yet you still cry out for lack of them. This is because you have not thought through your ideas on the question of cadres. Failure to promote them from the ranks stifles many talents.

Part of a speech made by Comrade Zhu De at a cadres' meeting of the Central Hebei Military Area after his inspection of central Hebei.

You are unwilling to let good cadres be transferred to other places where they are needed. And yet you don't appreciate their real worth. You praise them only when they have laid down their lives for the revolution. This is a manifestation of selfish departmentalism. Cadres should be promoted from below. You must not always expect to get them from above. You also must not be afraid that your subordinates will try to "usurp power". All of our people should train their deputies so that work will be done well not only when they are at their posts but also when they have left. If the work breaks down when you have left, can it be said that you are very capable? If we train successors at each level, we don't have to worry about a lack of cadres at all.

In the course of the agrarian reform, the rising masses will drive out a number of bad cadres. This is a good thing because it will make the other cadres more careful. This is supervision by the masses. We lead the masses, who in turn supervise us, and we learn from and criticize each other. Only in this way can we advance.

We must train cadres in large numbers. Organizations should be streamlined, and schools reinforced. In preparation for the future, we must reserve and train a number of cadres according to plan. This is a highly important task.

SPEECH AT THE OPENING CEREMONY OF THE NATIONAL LAND CONFERENCE²¹⁹

July 17, 1947

Our Party has been in existence for **26** years. For more than a decade now it has led the people in carrying out the agrarian revolution. In doing so, it has accumulated a lot of experience, which in the past year or so has been enriched by our work in the agrarian reform. This conference has been called to analyse and exchange experiences gained in various places so that we may further perfect our policies, which, when carried out, will facilitate the completion of our agrarian reform.

During the past century and more, the Chinese revolution — whether it be the old- or the new-democratic revolution — has centred around the agrarian problem. This may be seen by examining the struggle of China's **360** million peasants during this long period. And yet, we may ask, have there been people in our ranks who opposed the agrarian revolution? Yes. During the period of the Great Revolution (**1924-27**) Chen Duxiu¹¹⁶ and some others feared the peasants would rise in revolution, and once the peasants had, Chen and his followers would then not know what to do. They feared that as a consequence there would be a falling out with the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, and that there would be a breakdown of the united front. In fact, they opposed the peasants. What was the result? Chen Duxiu was discredited, and so were all the others who feared the agrarian reform and the rise of the peasants. But there were also large numbers of comrades in our Party who firmly backed the agrarian revolution, particularly Comrade Mao Zedong, who had always advocated it. After the failure of the Great Revolution, our Party, under his leadership, set up the Red Army, the worker-peasant democratic regime and revolutionary base areas and then launched a thoroughgoing

agrarian revolution. Thereafter the Chinese revolution proceeded along a correct path.

From its birth, the Red Army has always fought an enemy several times and even scores of times stronger than itself. It suffered many defeats but has never been destroyed. Why? One important reason is that we have persisted in carrying out the agrarian revolution, we helped the peasants to obtain land or reduce rent and interest payments.¹⁷⁰ The peasants support us in order to defend the fruits of this struggle. Comrade Mao Zedong has always had a clear understanding of this. He pointed out that the agrarian revolution could not succeed without armed forces, and that indeed it was necessary to establish armed forces first. Once this was done it became possible to launch the agrarian revolution, which, in its turn, supported the armed struggle. This was the case both before and during the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-45) in the course of which our specific policy was one of reducing rents and interest payments. Such a policy proved to be correct and fruitful. After Japan's surrender, however, the revolutionary situation underwent tremendous changes. Both the enemy and our allies changed and the tactics of the revolution had to be changed in accordance with objective circumstances. Therefore, we went from the policy of rent and interest reduction to that of confiscating the landlords' land to distribute to the peasants. To accomplish this, the Party Central Committee issued the "May 4th Directive",²²⁰ which marked a momentous change.

The principle of the "May 4th Directive" is to boldly arouse the peasant masses to carry out the agrarian reform by distributing land to the poor peasants and farm labourers. In the year or more since the publication of the directive, all the Liberated Areas have roused the masses to carry out this reform, and generally speaking, it has been successful. In places where the reform was satisfactorily carried out, the Party organization was consolidated, the army became stronger than before and military victories were won. In some other places, however, the reform was far from deep-going. This was mainly because the Party organizations there, whose membership had grown enormously during the anti-Japanese war, were not very pure ideologically or organizationally. A number of landlords, rich peasants and hooligans had wormed their way into Party ranks. In addition, due to objective limitations (negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party had not yet finally broken down at the time), the policy set forth in the "May 4th Directive" was inadequate in some aspects.

In the Liberated Areas the agrarian reform has been more thorough in some places than in others, but the important thing is that we have political power in our hands. The Party is still not pure enough, but we have many faithful, steadfast cadres and Party members. And even though there are difficulties, no one dares to openly oppose the agrarian reform policy. Thus, the implementation of the reform has been relatively easy. It will be more difficult to introduce agrarian reform in newly liberated areas, but it must and will be done. There are 360 million peasants in the whole country. Of these, 140 million are in the Liberated Areas and 220 million are in areas currently controlled by the Kuomintang. Peasants in the Kuomintang areas live in greater hardship than those in our own areas. I hope representatives to this conference will suggest how agrarian reform is to be carried out in areas that are newly liberated.

This conference will also sum up the experience and lessons gained in implementing agrarian reform in the past. During the agrarian revolution we committed “Left” errors by giving no land to the landlords and giving only bad land to the rich peasants. In this way, we tended to deprive the landlords and rich peasants of a livelihood, which was tantamount to driving them into the bosom of the Kuomintang. Later there was a check-up on land distribution,²²¹ which was even more “Left” and in which almost none of the rich peasants were left with a means of livelihood. Many comrades present here lived through this period and I think it will be helpful for them to review it. The Party Central Committee attached great importance to these lessons when the policy of reducing rents and interest payments was implemented during the anti-Japanese war and, later, in the course of drawing up the “May 4th Directive”. This directive clearly stipulates that a proper amount of land must be left to the landlords for them to maintain a livelihood. There are “Left” or Right deviations in the agrarian reform in many places, and this requires that we sum up in earnest the many valuable experiences — both positive and negative — from the past decade or more and use them as a guide in the implementation of the current agrarian reform throughout the country.

Agrarian reform must proceed according to specific conditions in various localities. Conditions in one village will be different from those in another. Take the nearby villages of Xibaipo, Dongbaipo and Chenjiayu, for instance. Because the population, number of landlords and targets of struggle in the three villages are different, different agrarian reform methods must be used. They cannot be copied me-

chanically. Some of our comrades read of a case in the newspapers and immediately follow suit. This is liable to cause trouble. Again, we have accumulated a lot of experience from expropriation of the local tyrants and distribution of land during the agrarian revolution, the rent and interest reduction during the anti-Japanese war, and in the implementation of the "May 4th Directive". Would it be correct for us to apply these experiences to areas currently under Kuomintang control? If we applied them mechanically in disregard of specific conditions, I'm afraid it would again lead to trouble. In the decade since the beginning of the War of Resistance Against Japan, we have made gradual progress in solving the agrarian problem. When we consider the Kuomintang-controlled areas today, we find the situation has again changed and it is likely that agrarian reform there will proceed faster. We must, therefore, devise at this conference new methods of rapidly rousing the masses and properly distributing land.

After the failure, in 1927, of the Great Revolution, our Party shifted its attention to the rural areas to lead the agrarian revolution and build the army and, in the course of armed struggle, it preserved and swelled its ranks. We preserved the largest number of Party members in the army. This does not mean that only the army is revolutionary. But it does show that, in conducting the agrarian revolution in China, it is necessary to have armed forces. Without armed forces, our comrades who were engaged in secret work were tracked down everywhere and arrested by the reactionaries. Wherever the armed forces withdrew, the land was again seized by the landlords and the masses were again suppressed. Comrade Mao Zedong expounded this point clearly when he said, "Without a people's army the people have nothing."²²² Thus, to gain victory, our Party must pay special attention to the question of armed forces. Many comrades at this conference are from the army. As the main force of the revolution, the army must conscientiously study the principles and policies of agrarian reform. This fact must be made known to all the army comrades, and the comrades in command should be all the more clear about it. When the battle is joined, it is the army that meets the peasants first. It is also the army that helps the peasants acquire land. Once our army men have mastered the principles and policies of agrarian reform, land distribution will be relatively swift and easy.

An investigation made after our arrival in the Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei area shows that a large proportion of its Party members come from middle peasant families. Our Party, however, is a political party of the

working class and represents the latter's interests. Farm labourers are workers in the rural areas. Poor peasants are semi-proletarians there. Thus the Party in the rural areas mainly represents the interests of the farm labourers and poor peasants. But education on this basic point of Party policy is not yet widespread, and many people who have been in the Party for many years do not understand it. As a result, an abnormal situation has developed in the Party. Those who come from middle peasant families represent the interests of the middle peasants and those who come from landlord and rich peasant families represent the interests of the landlords and rich peasants. For that reason we must educate everyone in the essentials of Party policy, consolidate the Party organization and make clear whose interests the Party truly represents. All Party members, whether they come from landlord, rich peasant or middle peasant families, must have a clear understanding of this point. In the agrarian reform, whoever disapproves of or opposes the interests of the poor peasants and farm labourers must be criticized or punished, as the case warrants. Once the basic principle is understood, everyone must act on it and not against it. Party organizations at all levels must do this work well. Only thus can the Party's agrarian reform policy be successfully carried out.

The essential task of this conference is to work out a satisfactory policy on agrarian reform. I hope comrades present here will make it a success, so that the entire Party and army, united behind a correct policy, will succeed in accomplishing the historical task of agrarian reform.

ARMY WORK MUST FOLLOW THE MASS LINE

September 7, 1947

I would like to say something on the question of the mass line in the army.

First, we must follow the mass line in military education. Since we adopted the practice of officers teaching soldiers, soldiers teaching officers and soldiers teaching one another, the military skills of our commanders and fighters have improved considerably. Formerly some people sent repeated requests to the Military Commission, asking it to provide them with instructors. We refused to send a single one. Instead, we told them to look for instructors among their own ranks and ask whoever had a skill to teach others his speciality. There are lots of capable persons in our ranks. When serious searches were made, all kinds of experts would be found, such as outstanding gunners and machine-gunners. We must ask each man to teach whatever he is skilled in. This is the mass line in military education. If everyone learns to follow the mass line, it will be a remarkable achievement.

Second, we must follow the mass line in the application of tactics. After each campaign, fighters should be organized by squads to examine their respective merits and demerits during the operation and then there should be unit-wide discussion of the tactics used. In this way the tactical level of our army can be raised immensely. In the past our cadres followed the mass line by showing loving care for the fighters, fearing that they might be hungry or cold. All this was very well. But soldiers in Chen Geng's²²³ unit recently asked their commanders: "If you work out better tactics and reduce our casualties, isn't that better than merely showing concern about our food and

Part of the fifth section, "On Army Consolidation", in a report on international and domestic situation Comrade Zhu De delivered at the National Land Conference of July-September 1947.

clothing?" This is a realistic, thought-provoking question. Some of our comrades say, "I've been fighting all my life and I've never learned tactics. If only you dare to charge and fight, you can win all the same." If you are fearless of death and very brave, that's good. But if a lot of your comrades-in-arms fall in battle, that's not good. If, while showing bravery, you also have better tactics and fewer casualties, isn't that better? Cadres who really care for the fighters should do better in the study of tactics. That is the mass line in its true sense. Only by relying on the masses and following the mass line can tactics be more readily mastered.

Third, we must follow the mass line in political work. Now we have what we call "three-in-one" squads in our army, composed of three types of fighters: "liberated" fighters who were formerly in the Kuomintang army, veteran Eighth Route Army fighters, and new fighters who joined our army after the agrarian reform. Each of the three types has its own merits and its own shortcomings. The "liberated" fighters are somewhat lower in class consciousness, the veteran fighters have the fine style and tradition of the Eighth Route Army, and the new fighters joined the army voluntarily to defend the fruits of the agrarian reform. We should put members of the three types in one squad and hold meetings at which they can pour out their grievances, each telling about his own suffering. In this way they will have more common language. They will learn the sufferings of the peasants in the Kuomintang-controlled areas, the fine style and tradition of the Eighth Route Army, and the way in which agrarian reform is carried out in the Liberated Areas. After one or two days of meetings such as these, the class consciousness of the whole squad will be raised considerably. This kind of education must be carried out by our field armies. Even if we are terribly busy, we must take time out to conduct such education. This is the mass line in political education.

Fourth, we must also follow the mass line in meting out rewards. The campaign to render and report on meritorious service is a recent innovation of ours. We believed formerly that the Communist Party and the Red Army fought in the service of the people and so there was no need to recount their contributions. Recently, however, a campaign to render meritorious service has been instituted and it has done much good. Our armymen are full of vigour and vie with each other to distinguish themselves. This will lead us to more victories. We should apply this experience to all sorts of work and encourage people to make contributions of varying degrees to the revolution. Both

fighters and cadres should be rewarded when they perform meritorious service. In this way army units will gradually be trained into better troops. We did not do this in our political work in the past because for many years we failed to discover its usefulness. It is very nice that we have discovered it now. Fighters in the army should be mobilized to report meritorious service to the performers' families which in turn should put up posters announcing the event, just as in the old days when people congratulated a successful candidate in the imperial martial examinations. This is a marvellous thing. In the past when troops moved away, the villagers had nothing further to do with them. Now, through this method, the army remains linked with all quarters, the rear areas as well as the government authorities. New, veteran and "liberated" fighters close ranks. When someone performs a meritorious service, everyone else respects and learns from him. This is a kind of mass movement.

In the past when we did something we gave only a few cadres the responsibility instead of mobilizing a whole army unit. The results were not impressive. But if the masses are mobilized and every fighter takes part in a task, it can be accomplished swiftly and done well. Don't think our troops only know how to fight. They have high political consciousness and are capable of doing many other things. If army comrades constantly enhance their mass viewpoint and follow the mass line and integrate themselves with the masses in all things, and if they eat and march with rank and file so that there is unity in both thinking and action, we will surely be able to lead our troops well and create model units.

TELEGRAMS ON THE SHIJIAZHUANG CAMPAIGN

October-November 1947

I. TELEGRAM PROPOSING THAT THE MILITARY COMMISSION OF THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMIT- TEE ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL OF NIE RONGZHEN AND OTHERS FOR ATTACKING SHIMEN²²⁴

October 23

We think the telegram of Nie, Liu, Huang and Luo²²⁵ dated October 22²²⁶ has reached you. We, too, hold that it is advantageous to attack Shimen. The city has no surrounding walls, and is guarded by only three regiments with a battle-line extending 20 kilometres around. As its commanding officers have been captured,²²⁷ there is vacillation among the enemy and conditions there are easy to ascertain. Advancing in the flush of victory, we can possibly take the city. It is also possible to prompt the enemy at Beiping and Baoding to send reinforcements southwards. Then we may look for a chance to wage large-scale mobile warfare between Baoding and Shijiazhuang. What is your view? We expect your prompt reply. Zhu De is going to the headquarters of the two Yangs²²⁸ today.

In November 1947, the Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei Field Army launched the Shijiazhuang (Shimen) campaign under the direction of Zhu De. Wiping out 24,000 Kuomintang troops, it liberated the city. These are Comrade Zhu De's four telegrams concerning the campaign, the first two of which were signed jointly with Comrade Liu Shaoqi

II. TELEGRAM REPLYING TO NIE RONGZHEN AND OTHERS, ACCEPTING THEIR PROPOSAL FOR ATTACKING SHIMEN

October 23

Having read your telegram dated October 22, we agree that you attack Shimen now in the flush of victory. There is the possibility of taking the city. Even if you can't capture Shimen, it is possible to cause Li Wen and Yuan Pu²²⁹ to send reinforcements southwards. Then you may seek large-scale mobile warfare between Shijiazhuang and Baoding, which will be to our advantage. Please prepare provisions and *matériel* in advance. You are expected to go all out for this campaign upon approval of the Military Commission. Zhu De is going to the field army headquarters soon.

III. TELEGRAM TO NIE RONGZHEN AND OTHERS ABOUT THE PLAN FOR ATTACKING SHIMEN AND ABOUT MATTERS FOR ATTENTION

November 1

I have inspected the artillerymen since my arrival here. I called officers of the artillery and sapper units to a meeting to discuss the technical matters on attacking Shimen. Then I convened a meeting of officers at and above the brigade level to jointly discuss and work out the plan for the attack. We decided as the main method to employ the offensive tactics of positional warfare and attack methodically step by step, approaching the enemy fortresses through tunnels, blowing them up with explosives and then shelling and destroying them one by one. In short, we should advance steadily and strike telling blows. And please pay attention to the following matters:

1. Be sure to prepare enough military supplies, especially explosives and shells. The arsenal must do a rush job (in November and December) and work around the clock. Send personnel there to mobilize the workers in co-ordination with the front, and prepare large quantities of supplies needed after the start of the attack on Shimen.

2. Regarding reinforcements, please send top officers leading

Party and government representatives together with medical and morale-raising teams to tour the hospitals; the wounded should be treated quickly and, once discharged from the hospitals, they must go back to their units. This is easier than mobilizing new recruits.

3. Officers' dependent families who cannot support themselves must be issued living allowances.

IV. TELEGRAM COMMENDING ALL OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE SHANXI-QAHAR-HEBEI MILITARY AREA

November 13

In one week of fighting, you have liberated Shimen and wiped out the enemy defenders. This is a great victory which sets an example for taking large cities. Here is my message of commendation to your entire army.

VIEWS ON THE ECONOMIC WORK IN CENTRAL HEBEI

November 1947

I. ON THE NEED FOR A LONG-TERM PLAN

The transition from a new-democratic to a socialist society is a historical period. As the present new-democratic construction lays the foundation for future socialist construction, work in all fields requires a long-term plan. Every one of us should keep his mind on his work and do well in economic construction.

Some of our comrades, however, haven't settled down to economic or production work and don't want to make long-term plans. I should like to tell them: Economic construction is the foundation. What are we fighting for, after all? For production and construction. And what is the agrarian reform for? Also for production and construction. That is to say, we must break the fetters that feudalism has placed on the productive forces and mobilize and organize our forces to produce. If we do a good job of agrarian reform everyone will have the means of production and be able to produce. War is temporary, while production is permanent. After completion of the agrarian reform, in all our work — work in the Party, government and mass organizations — we should pay attention to production and construction. Making this point clear will enable our comrades to feel at ease in concentrating their effort on the production and construction work and doing it well as a way of serving the people wholeheartedly.

In developing the economy, we must encourage the masses to become self-reliant in production; it's no good to rely on the public alone. It is essential to organize the masses to develop production after the

Summary of talks given to responsible comrades of the economic departments in the Central Hebei Liberated Area.

agrarian reform. It isn't right for the peasants to slaughter a pig or fell a tree as soon as they receive it in the reform. We should encourage them to make long-term plans for developing production. We should explain this to them at length, so that they understand it. The private economy should be developed, and so should the public economy. Public funds must be properly accumulated. The mass viewpoint doesn't mean that the people should be a drain on public funds. The government authorities are not immortals. They have to live on something. So all our publicly owned enterprises should develop and expand. Our business must make profits and our industry must grow. This will not only benefit the people at present, but will help to ensure the defeat of private capitalism and our future development towards socialism. If private capital alone expands while public enterprises stagnate or become steadily weaker, how can we guarantee the future of socialism?

After the agrarian reform, you should choose your best cadres to perform economic work and bring about an upsurge of production and construction like that of the agrarian reform itself.

II. ON AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

Agriculture is the first thing to develop after agrarian reform. There must be an overall expansion of grain, cotton and livestock production, of water conservancy projects and sideline occupations. During slack seasons, the peasants should be organized to develop sideline production, plant trees, sink wells, build houses and repair roads. Cotton is a treasure of central Hebei. If all the cotton were woven into cloth for sale, all the people would have work to do. The cloth should wear well and be as thick as the "patriotic cloth" that used to be manufactured in Tianjin and that, when made into suits, lasted as long as seven or eight years. It should be forbidden to fell forest trees; trees should be planted to prevent sandstorms.

Publicly owned factories must be expanded. We don't have many capitalists in the Liberated Areas. In newly liberated areas, quite a few of them ran away as soon as our army arrived. How will we be able to manage if we don't develop public industry? The existing publicly owned factories should all go on producing so long as they

suffer no losses. They must not be damaged. Many of your factories are poorly managed because, first, you don't know how to manage them and, second, the wages are much too high. All these problems must be solved. Since you don't know much about management, you have to learn. Wages should be paid on a wartime basis. Now your workers' movement is not going in the right direction, because you only mobilize the workers to improve their livelihood but don't encourage them to do well in production. You shouldn't treat publicly owned factories the way you do capitalist ones. If you cause a public factory to close down, what will happen? When wages are too high, all the factory can do is close down. To maintain extraordinarily high wages is a suicidal policy in industrial development. Arouse and organize the workers to learn technical skills, lower production costs and raise labour productivity, and you will bring about a production upsurge as you have done in the production campaign following the agrarian reform. In this way workers and peasants will advance together and our Liberated Areas will no longer be like a man limping along.

While publicly owned industry grows, we should also assist the private industry in its development. Our banks can grant loans to the latter to meet its needs.

III. ON DEVELOPMENT OF CO-OPERATIVES

Co-operatives must be greatly developed. In villages where the agrarian reform has been completed, co-operatives must be formed in addition to organizing the masses for increased agricultural production. On the principle of voluntary participation, a multi-purpose co-operative may be organized in each village. No one should be allowed to hold more than one share, and the price of shares should not be high. The primary task of the co-operative will be to ensure the supply of goods to the masses and provide them with marketing outlets and to enhance their productive activities and everyday life. In this way we can gradually reduce and eliminate the exploitation of peasants by landlords, rich peasants and merchants. Our trade organizations can sell goods to the co-ops wholesale to be retailed to the peasants. On the other hand, the trade organizations can purchase farm and sideline products from the co-ops. All they need do is give

them an order and pay them appropriate prices plus a commission. With this kind of co-operative, more public reserve funds should be accumulated, and not much dividend is distributed among the shareholders so that capital continues to grow. What the masses expect is that the co-operative will work for them, not that it pays them more and more dividends. In this way a co-operative can grow into a semi-public, semi-private economic organization. If large dividends are paid, the managerial personnel will be encouraged to seek only profit and may even be tempted to speculate. When a co-operative is divorced from production, it will soon collapse. The co-operatives run in the past were in the nature of a joint-stock company. They were unable to compete with ordinary shops because, when they made a profit, the money was distributed as dividends; they were bound to collapse when they ran at a loss.

The publicly owned shops should guide and assist the co-operatives, which are rooted in the masses.

IV. ON TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

Repair the roads by organizing surplus manpower in slack seasons. The present problem in central Hebei is that no one attends to this work. It is true that road repairs take labour, but the benefits derived from them are tremendous. If the roads were in good shape, everyone could save lots of time every day for production, and output could be enormously increased. Motor vehicles could also economize large quantities of petrol.

Dredge the Grand Canal. When our ancestors dug the canal, it was an event of world significance. Properly dredged, it can be used for both transport and water conservancy.

Try to build a transport network covering the Eastern Hebei and Central Hebei Liberated Areas. Develop shipping on a large scale. Organize all boats, big and small. Purchase a large number of wooden and rubber-tyred carts. Even 10,000 to 20,000 would not be too many for central Hebei. Organize civilian carts on a large scale to transport goods for hire. Open more inns with sheds for carts and horses on major routes to ease transportation and provide accommodation for traders and other travellers.

We must follow the mass line in developing transport and com-

munications. Transport teams should adopt the profit-sharing system as the co-operatives. According to our experience in the Yan'an days, that is the way to run them. Both private transport teams and public transport fleets should be developed. Without public fleets, private teams will manipulate the price of transportation and the public will suffer. Public transport fleets play a leading role. When organizing transport teams, some comrades emphasize private transport because it is cheaper, and neglect the importance of public transport. That is wrong. It is correct to develop private transport but public transport must also be developed. It is possible that for a time public transport won't run well. That is because we haven't followed the mass line; it doesn't mean that public transport is bad in itself. We should consider the problem from the point of view of establishing and developing revolutionary businesses.

V. ON COMMERCIAL WORK

Develop public trade energetically. In the past there were people in our government who did not support the establishment of government trade organizations. They reasoned that, with such trade organizations, there would be a scramble between them and the people for profits. This view is incorrect. Our trade organizations serve the people and do not compete with them, because the profit they earn will all be used for the latter's benefit. We should set up a trade bureau to handle outgoing and incoming commerce. A large trust should also be established in central Hebei. If the government doesn't set up a trade organization, no one else can. Since there is no large commercial organization in the Central Hebei Liberated Area as yet, we have to establish one. Why were there once so many shops run by government offices and other public institutions? Because society needed them. It is good that you have brought these shops under unified control, but you should open more of them. Otherwise, you won't be able to meet the demand of the masses, who will then be exploited by merchants. Government trade organizations are very important, but at present you don't pay enough attention to them and they are not well run, so they haven't shown very good results. Publicly owned shops should develop and make profits. Their capital should be constantly accumulated. I have heard that some of your shops now organize the

processing of cotton into cloth. The balance sheet shows that half a kilogramme of cotton is subsidized by more than 10,000 yuan.²³¹ Naturally, this is good for the masses, but can you afford it? This, in a way, resembles the double-pay system practised in Zhangjiakou; it is incorrect.

Publicly owned shops should serve the development of production by the masses. Supply and marketing should be ensured according to the people's needs. They should assist the co-operatives. They should serve as the people's "supply department", buying whatever the people want to sell and selling whatever they want to buy. To run specialized shops, or shops which are rigidly divided according to the type of goods sold, does not suit the complicated conditions of the countryside. Shops should be set up everywhere.

VI. ON BANKING

Banking should also be developed. Bank funds should be accumulated, staffs increased and management improved.

Your banks have issued quite a few banknotes, while failing to build up assets. That is a very bad practice. The Bank of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region used to be like that, having no funds of its own. Later, interest was required on loans from the bank, which then turned from a "pauper" into a "wealthy proprietor" with enormous capital.

Our banks should be invested with great authority. At present they are only auxiliary organizations. This should be changed in the future, for their role should be greatly strengthened. They should issue notes in accordance with actual needs. Financial receipts should be deposited in the bank. So should all gold, silver and other idle capital. Shops may borrow money from the bank for business dealings and later return it when profits are made. Whenever they have any surplus money, they should deposit it in the bank. In the future a national bank will be established, which will become the state treasury and perform the function of regulating the funds of the entire country. In this way the banks will develop and grow in strength.

The banks should provide good deposit and loan services and grant production loans from the money taken in so as to compete with private money shops and gradually force them out of business. If these

shops are around, they will certainly compete with you because they aim to exploit the peasants and workers. Banks, like commercial establishments, should be set up everywhere. A county with a population of hundreds of thousands must have banks and shops. Banks can be opened at any place where banking services can be developed and profit can be made. You should work out a plan to satisfactorily integrate banking with industrial and agricultural production.

In extending farm loans, banks must see to it that they are granted to poor peasants and farm labourers. There should be correct priorities and things should be made convenient for the masses. The term of the loan may be one to two months. Turnover should be quick, because our funds are limited. The forms of the loans need not be too rigid. A loan can be granted and repaid in kind. Banks must be good at helping to organize production. Credits must be handled properly and funds shouldn't be misused or allowed to lie idle. Banks must help peasants to develop sidelines through credits. At the same time they should help cities and towns to organize unemployed workers for production. Money can be lent to those who lack capital.

In granting loans, banks should separate those involving large sums (such as farm credits) from ordinary deposit and lending services. Large credits should carry lower interest.

VII. ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUPERVISORY SYSTEM

A supervisory system should be established in all economic departments of central Hebei, including the industrial and commercial bureaus, banks, shops, etc. Its purpose will be to ensure that the Party's policies are correctly carried out in each unit, to educate all staff members and see that they do a good job, and to strictly guard against corruption, waste, the falsifying of accounts or submitting of false reports. Something like the Three Main Rules of Discipline⁹¹ should be practised in the economic departments. Also, the political and supervisory staff should undertake vocational studies.

Last, I wish to express my sincere hope for central Hebei — a vast plain with fertile soil, abundant resources and an enormous population. It is really a promising place. I hope you will work out a careful plan for work in your Liberated Area and make it exemplary. I hope to see even greater achievements here six months from now.

THE CAPTURE OF SHIJIAZHUANG: ITS SIGNIFICANCE AND OUR EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS

December 1, 1947

The capture of Shijiazhuang has great significance. In the past people said we were unable to take large cities. Your Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei Field Army had seized Zhangjiakou,²³² but some people refused to concede this, saying that its capture was due to the help of the Soviet Red Army. Some time ago Dong Xiguang, director of the Press Bureau of the Kuomintang government, stated that it had been a long time since the Communists announced the start of their general offensive, but so far they had not taken even a single large city. Not long after, we captured Shijiazhuang, shaking the enemy's faith in his ability to defend major cities. The enemy in Baoding and Beiping are now panic-stricken, while we have increased our confidence in the taking of such cities. Soon, we will capture a second and then a third city the size of Shijiazhuang, and there are many more to come.

We have seized a lot of booty in this victorious campaign, but the greatest gain for us is that we have improved our tactics and learned to storm strong fortifications and attack large cities. This has both military and political significance. It is also of great significance economically, for the capture of Shijiazhuang will link two large Liberated Areas — the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan and the Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei. This will make it possible to develop our transport service, industry and commerce and increase production to support the war.

It was not sheer luck that we captured Shijiazhuang in a matter of one week. The enemy garrison neither surrendered nor made way for us. We took the city according to our own plan. Why could we

This is part of a talk at a meeting of cadres of the Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei Field Army. The text used here is based on a transcript which was slightly edited to conform to the speaker's outline.

take it? What experience have we gained and what lessons have we learned?

1. We made adequate preparations. It took us almost one year to prepare for the attack on Shijiazhuang. We conducted meticulous investigation and became fairly familiar with the enemy situation. We planned to spend as long as two months in battle. We massed a strong force, four times the enemy's. We were ready to attack the enemy's heavily fortified points as well as strike at his reinforcements. We were even prepared to make the destruction of his rescue troops our main task. In fact, our Second Column stood by, ready to fall on any enemy reinforcements.²³³ After the battle of Qingfengdian,²³⁴ we sent a number of captives back to Shijiazhuang. This served to shake the enemy's morale.

We also laid in adequate supplies. We had ample weapons for storming the city. By the end of the battle we found that we had explosives and shells to spare.

2. We did a good job of mobilization. Regular troops, militiamen, demolition heroes and the masses were all prepared for the attack on Shijiazhuang. Before the campaign started, mobilization meetings were held by Party branches in most companies, at which observance of the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention⁹¹ was stressed. Then some Party branches made concrete arrangements and, when their troops arrived at the point of departure for assault, they called meetings for further mobilization. I have learned that all company units whose Party branches had held mobilization meetings fought very well. Since the Qingfengdian battle, the Party branches in general have played such a role. A number of companies did this earlier. Thanks to adequate mobilization by the Party branches, the troops fought resolutely. When some men lost contact with their own units, they joined other companies to fight with equal bravery, obeying orders there as they did in their own units. This was an excellent experience indeed, and should be popularized. The Red Army men also acted this way in the past and thus each soldier could fight on his own when necessary. In street fighting, when it was sometimes hard to relay the command, squad or combat team leaders took over, or individual men even fought on alone. During the Shijiazhuang campaign, there was one squad leader who divided his men into three groups. One marched the prisoners, another guarded captured artillery pieces and the third stood sentry. Meanwhile, he and two other men went out to scout ahead. Thus, his

squad captured an entire enemy battalion. This is an example of everyone performing his part.

3. We paid serious attention to tactics. During this campaign, the fighters were brave and they combined bravery with the fruitful use of techniques.

a. Before the assault, fortifications were built where the assault was to start, so that the distance of the charge was shortened and casualties reduced. At a short distance from the enemy, our troops spread out and first dug individual foxholes. Next, they dug horizontal communication trenches, then vertical ones. Finally, they had them all connected. These fortifications were built under covering fire which reduced casualties to a minimum.

b. Explosives were well used on an extensive scale. Many companies knew how to blast fortifications and open a way forward. When artillery pieces are not enough, the use of explosives should be put in the first place in storming cities. The skill of throwing hand grenades is also very important. In beating back the enemy's counter-charges during this campaign, especially in street fighting, hand grenades displayed a tremendous effect.

c. The artillery played an important role. The method used in this campaign was to shell a single point with dozens of guns to force a breakthrough. In doing this, our men learned how to make the best use of artillery in co-ordination with explosives to open a breach. Then, there was co-ordination among the artillerymen, demolition squads and infantrymen in occupying forward positions and reinforcing the breakthrough points.

d. Our troops have mastered the tactics of first concentrating their fire-power for a breakthrough at one point, then expanding the breach on both sides. As soon as they broke through, they lost no time in digging trenches so that they could be as firmly embedded there as nails before pressing ahead on either side. This is the proper way to conduct street fighting. It would be unfortunate to fight one's way in and then out of the city.

e. Each squad was divided into three combat groups to cover each other and advance separately. This is a good method. In street fighting, it doesn't make sense for our men to crowd together, for that only makes movement more difficult.

f. Street fighting was carried out with great skill. Apart from making full use of hand grenades, explosives and tommy-guns, our men learned to advance by digging holes in walls.

Before the campaign, a meeting was held at Anguo, at which I told you to pay attention to tactics. Many comrades did so. Some combat heroes missed the meeting, but they did just as I had explained. I have heard that some comrades are still sceptical about tactics. If they do not give up this scepticism, they will suffer. You badly need tactics — they are your tonics, so to speak. You have had lots of fighting experiences, but they are scattered like coins in a basket. Tactics are like a string that threads the coins together. When you want to use them, you can take off whichever you like. Don't let your experiences be there like scattered coins. They will become a burden and be useless. Some experiences dating back thousands of years have been incorporated into tactics and theories, yet some of you are still ignorant and conceited, denouncing tactics as "dogmas". During the battle north of the Daqing River,²³⁵ our men suffered heavy casualties before they engaged the enemy because they did not stress tactics. How to engage an enemy? There are two ways — either to advance under cover of night, or to advance in daytime with fire-power support, by utilizing favourable terrain or by digging trenches. But some comrades simply refused to do so, as though they were bullet-proof. During the recent Shijiazhuang campaign, many companies and platoons suffered no casualties at all when they engaged the enemy, thanks to proper tactics.

4. Make good use of captives. During the recent campaign, some companies were very good in making use of captives. I told you earlier how a squad leader with two fighters captured a battalion of enemy troops. The method they adopted is to make use of captives. That night they edged their way to the enemy battalion and first captured an enemy scout. Then they talked him into joining them by explaining our policies. This scout helped win over an enemy platoon leader, who disarmed his unit. Then they made use of the platoon leader to disarm a whole battalion. When comrades of another company captured an enemy tank, they won over the tank crew, who turned their gun around to bombard the enemy position.

There were many other favourable factors contributing to the capture of Shijiazhuang. The enemy troops were outnumbered and isolated, and they were low in morale. Some laid down their arms when we entered the city and shouted propaganda at them. Although the enemy fortifications were solid, Shijiazhuang had no city walls. Besides, we had people operating from within in co-ordination with us — there were more than 400 underground Party members inside the city.

The quick victory of the Shijiazhuang campaign was by no means accidental. Don't be conceited. You should analyse and systematize your experience, and study and develop it. In this campaign you showed great progress compared with your behaviour during the battles fought north of the Daqing River and at Qingfengdian. You should continue to improve your tactics, develop your strengths and correct your weaknesses.

During this campaign, a movement for rendering meritorious service was carried out that aroused the masses and played an important part in gaining the victory. But it is bad that some people scrambled for credit. What's the use of making the contributions of others appear to be one's own? Don't scramble for booty. Don't make false claims on others' merits. The war we are fighting now is a class war in which we make attacks on enemy classes. To whom should the merits go? To the fighters, workers and peasants without whom no leaders could contribute anything at all. The Chinese workers and peasants have shed a great deal of blood in the revolutionary war. People all over the world know well the courage of the Chinese workers and peasants, but they do not know their names or the details of their countless deeds. Sometimes they can only remember the names of leaders. This means that the leaders represent the workers and peasants. For instance, I am the commander-in-chief. At times I was taken as their representative and their deeds were referred to under my name. Wouldn't it be ridiculous for me to brag about these deeds? How can anyone make any contribution without the effort of the masses of workers and peasants?

Discipline is also very important. I was told that our troops maintained pretty good discipline before the end of the battle, but there was some disorder for a time after the battle was over. In addition, the battlefield was not cleaned up well. This is a lesson for us to learn. Later on when a large city is taken, military control should be exercised there for a period of time.

I was also told that in general you turned in things that were captured, but there were some who did not want to turn in everything. If you didn't turn in the booty after the Shijiazhuang campaign, the public would suffer. What is the booty used for? For the building of our nation. We should build up the nation's wealth in the course of the revolutionary war. A new-democratic country must be built this way. Everything captured must be kept in good condition and, then, turned in to the public and not taken as one's own.

Now we have learned to attack cities, and the agrarian reform has ensured us a constant source of recruits for our army. Our revolution is bound to succeed. But China is so large a country that it takes six months or even a year for us to march from the north to the south and Chiang Kai-shek's rule in the south will not be overthrown before our troops' arrival there. We are prepared to fight for several years. And while the war goes on, there will be no interruption in our construction work. We shall achieve great undertakings with our own efforts. This much is certain.

A LETTER TO THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND COMRADE MAO ZEDONG

December 10, 1947

After the Land Conference²¹⁹ was over, I travelled to the Headquarters of the Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei Field Army and central Hebei and then returned to the Working Committee of the Party Central Committee²³⁶ from Shijiazhuang. Here is a report on my trip and what I saw.

Now that reorganization and consolidation are completed, the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Columns under the Headquarters of the Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei Field Army are united internally and full of vigour. During the campaign north of the Daqing River,²³⁵ we originally wanted to fight a major battle, but we could only “gnaw” at blockhouses. We encircled too many enemy strongholds and could only take one or two and had to withdraw from the others. While we were attacking Xushui, the enemy’s 3rd Corps came to the rescue.²³⁷ This gave us a chance to carry out mobile warfare. At this juncture, while supporting the attack on Xushui and blocking the enemy reinforcements from the north, our army sent most of its troops south to surround and destroy the enemy’s 3rd Corps Headquarters and his 7th Division at Qingfengdian.²³⁴ Our Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei Field Army set a good example in the campaign of how to fight a war of annihilation. Our men then attacked Shijiazhuang and again scored a victory. The morale of our troops rose even higher. Although our men suffered some casualties in these battles, they are in high spirits.

In the course of these battles, we learned how to carry out mobile and defensive warfare and to seize strong fortifications. However, most cadres did not want to learn new tactics and fought in their old ways. This was a serious shortcoming on their part indeed. Before

Written after an inspection tour of the Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei Field Army and central Hebei.

the attack on Shijiazhuang, study meetings of senior and junior cadres were held at Anguo to discuss how to take the city. Such meetings were held again and again after the attack started and when no progress was being made. Even at the forefront of the fighting, small meetings were held in groups of three to five soldiers. Above all, Party branch meetings played a major, leading role in the battle. Veterans taught raw recruits who learned quickly. As a result, the fighters pooled their wisdom and effort and each and every one of them could fight independently. Hence our victory.

After the victory of the Shijiazhuang campaign, I went again to the Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei Field Army Headquarters to analyse the experience and lessons gained. Enclosed herewith is the summary which, I am sorry to say, is not thorough enough. I have entrusted Comrade Yang Dezhi²³⁸ to add some more material to what I have collected so that he could compile a reference booklet for our army for attacking cities in the future. Although what has been concluded cannot be applied in all cases, it can be of some use for attacking strong city fortifications under the same or similar conditions. The Field Army has expanded recently and a 6th Column has been newly formed. The Field Army Headquarters also has been reinforced.

Battles to take cities cannot be prepared overnight. But as long as preparations are adequate, we can take any city. In China it is still impossible for the enemy to build impregnable defence works around a city.

Since the agrarian reform, there is no longer a shortage of recruits. The practice of pouring out grievances against the exploiting classes has markedly raised the class consciousness of prisoners of war who have joined our army. Most of them have fought well.

A conference on arms production is now in session, attended by representatives from Shandong, the Taihang region, the Shanxi-Suiyuan area and central Hebei. They are doing their best at this meeting to work out a plan for producing more and better arms to be used by the field armies in breaking strong fortifications next year. Experience of the recent battles at Shijiazhuang and Yuanshi indicates that, in attacking fortifications, it is very effective to use hand grenades as the main weapon supplemented by explosives and artillery. With good supplies of these three plus adequate co-ordination and preparation, any enemy fortifications, however strong, can be destroyed. Arms production is expected to further increase next year.

I spent about half a month in the Headquarters of the Central

Hebei Military Area and the Party Committee of the Central Hebei Liberated Area, where I met Comrade Zhang Yunyi²³⁹ and learned something about the situation in Shandong. Comrade Chen Yi¹¹¹ is going to report to you in person on conditions in Shandong, so I won't write about them here. Below is a brief report on the situation in central Hebei:

After the liberation of Zhangjiakou by our army,²³² the workers' movement there took a wrong track. Workers received double pay as standard wages, enough to support four family members. The unfortunate effects of this mistake are apparent even to this day. Wages are unusually high, yet the quality of products is poor and the cost of production enormous. The price gap between manufactured goods and farm produce grows wider and wider. In Hejian County there is a fairly modern flour mill, which can turn out 900 sacks of flour in 24 hours. In this mill the skilled workers eat food prepared in small canteen pots, the ordinary workers eat food prepared in medium-sized ones, and the general staff members eat food prepared in large canteen pots. The highest wage for workers amounts to 300-350 kilogrammes of millet. This has given rise to conflict between the workers and management. I've talked face to face with the leaders of its trade union and told them this policy is suicidal. I said that so long as we can eke out a living in the current war, we should do our best at work. Should the workers, who are the class exercising leadership in the revolution, care only for improving their own living at the expense of the war effort and the overall situation, I added, most of the public and private factories would shut down and the workers would lose their job. This is harmful to the fundamental interest of the working class, I reminded them. When I asked whether such a policy could be changed in a short time, they said yes. In Shijiazhuang I found the trade union comrades there repeating the same mistake, but they were helped to rectify it promptly. For the time being, each worker receives 2.5 kilogrammes of relief millet a day. The highest monthly wage does not exceed 100 kilogrammes. This will ensure industrial development in the future and prevents unemployment. I propose that the Party Central Committee send competent comrades to take care of the trade union movement and to guide the workers in taking an active part in the revolutionary war and creating prosperity for a new-democratic state so that the working class can really play a proper role as its master.

THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE BUILDING OF OUR ARMY

May 14, 1948

Comrades,

On behalf of the Party Central Committee and its Military Commission and Chairman Mao, I have come here to see you and attend your meeting. I should like to extend my greetings to you and say a few words.

I

Your three columns²⁴⁰ have a glorious history. After the main force of the Red Army left the Central Soviet Area for the Long March northward, Comrades Chen Yi,¹¹¹ Deng Zihui,²⁴¹ Tan Zhenlin,²⁴² Su Yu²⁴³ and Ye Fei²⁴⁴ stayed behind to lead the remaining Red Army men in guerrilla warfare. Confronted with the ruthless suppression of the Kuomintang and under the most difficult conditions, they fought hard for three years and succeeded in preserving the Party organizations and the Red Army's guerrillas — the basic force of the revolution. This is highly commendable and marks an illustrious chapter in the annals of the Chinese revolution. At the beginning of the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-45), we formed a united front with the Kuomintang and tried every means to bring together all our guerrilla units to form the New Fourth Army.⁹⁰ During the eight years of the War of Resistance, this army achieved splendid results and greatly expanded its strength. After the outbreak of the war of self-defence, you were the first to score repeated

Speech at a meeting of cadres at regimental rank and above in the First Army of the East China Field Army.

victories in central Jiangsu and then in Shandong, wiping out large numbers of enemy troops and further expanding your own units. Then you went over to the offensive, created a new liberated area in the Central Plains and destroyed more enemy troops. During the last two years, your three columns, together with the other columns and the entire East China Field Army, have learned to fight battles in huge formations, to use modern arms, and to attack powerful mechanized enemy units. You have achieved splendid military successes. You have carried on the various aspects — especially heroic fighting and hard struggle — of the main force of the Red Army. You have made great contributions to the Chinese people, for which you are worthy of citation. These achievements were obtained by all officers and men fighting courageously and working hard under the leadership of Comrades Chen Yi, Rao Shushi,²⁴⁵ Zhang Yunyi,²³⁹ Zhang Dingcheng,²⁴⁶ Deng Zihui, Tan Zhenlin and Su Yu as well as commanders of the various columns and many other leading comrades. They were made at the sacrifice of many of our comrades. While praising your achievements, I hope you will persevere in your efforts.

II

Concerning the current situation. The international situation is characterized by a universal democratic upsurge never seen before. The people's forces grow rapidly. The Soviet Union has healed its war wounds. People's Democracies have been founded in Eastern Europe. The united front for defending national independence and people's freedom and opposing imperialism has been established. In the East, not only China has powerful revolutionary forces, but many such other countries as Korea, Viet Nam, Indonesia and Burma also have built their own revolutionary armed forces. In short, the people's democratic forces in the world are growing stronger and becoming ever more consolidated. To avert their own economic crisis and hold back the people's democratic movement and the national liberation movement, the imperialists have been launching frenzied attacks on the democratic forces, fostering the reactionary forces of various countries, ruthlessly suppressing the people's democratic movement in the world and plotting a third world war. However, the

scheme of the U.S. monopoly capitalists will be very difficult to bring off. The American people do not want war. They stage strikes to defend democracy and oppose their government's reactionary policy. U.S. imperialism is a paper tiger; it is nothing so terrible. Stubborn as the Japanese imperialist army was, we beat it back. Should the troops of U.S. imperialism attack the Chinese revolutionary forces, we would likewise beat them off. Imperialism is doomed and final victory will certainly be ours.

Next, the domestic situation. We have achieved tremendous military victories. This has been especially true since July last year when we switched from the defensive to the offensive and from interior-line to exterior-line operations so as to carry the war into the areas under Chiang Kai-shek's control. This has expanded the Central Plains Liberated Area and brought dramatic changes in the relative strength between the enemy and us. At the beginning of our war of self-defence, Chiang Kai-shek had 4.3 million troops, of which 2 million were regulars. At present he has only 3.6 million men, of which 1.8 million are regulars. Among his regular troops, 1.63 million are deployed at the first line, and only 170,000 at the second line (including several divisions in Xinjiang). In the vast area south of the Changjiang River, he has no regular army at all. During the period of one year and nine months between July 1946 and March 1948, we wiped out more than 160 enemy brigades, totalling more than 2.24 million men. Apart from Chiang's 16 brigades at the second line in Xinjiang and some other areas, all of his units have been beaten by us. Some have even been defeated two or three times. With repeated replenishments, the enemy still looks fairly strong in number, but he has been much weakened in quality. Because of this change, our army at present has a new task, which is to advance more boldly into the areas under Chiang Kai-shek's control and to dispatch crack troops to fight our way into them. Troops that fight on the exterior line should be able to act independently without a rear. They should be able not only to achieve victories and defeat the enemy but also to implement the Party's policy and build new base areas. You comrades have moved about in Henan, Anhui and Jiangsu and wiped out large numbers of enemy forces. The success you have achieved is great. By striking out you draw away large numbers of enemy troops so that fighting on the interior line will become much easier. Since July last year, we have eliminated many enemy strongholds, large and small, in Shandong, the Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei area,

Shanxi and northern Shaanxi. That is because the enemy has been weakened and has no reinforcements. Our troops striking out on the exterior line must make further efforts and fear neither attrition, nor sacrifice, nor hardship. They should not depend on the rear, or waste manpower or material resources in the new areas. They must do a good job. The units that remain on the interior line in the rear should keep up their efforts, pull out all the “nails” (enemy strongholds) and mobilize the people for production to support the front. These are the tasks confronting our Liberation Army.

In the political field, Chiang Kai-shek has convened the bogus national assembly²⁴⁷ and become bogus president. Consequently, he is more isolated. Yuan Shikai²¹⁶ remained on the throne for only 83 days before his death. Now that Chiang has become “president”, I think he is not much different from Yuan and cannot remain in his presidency for long. In the cities controlled by Chiang Kai-shek, workers’ and students’ movements are rising everywhere, while the peasants everywhere organize guerrilla units and oppose conscription and grain requisition. On our side, the national democratic united front has been further broadened. The landlord class and other feudal forces have been overthrown. With the exception of the bureaucrat-comprador bourgeoisie represented by the four big families²¹³ who are to be overthrown, all the rest are welcome to join this anti-Chiang united front.

Economically, Chiang Kai-shek relies mainly on the assistance of U.S. imperialism, which, however, can’t solve his problems. Both his financial and overall economic crises are already very serious. He is opposed by the people throughout the country. Mass movements have broken out everywhere against hunger, civil war and persecution.²⁴⁸ The longer he continues the civil war, the sooner he will collapse. As for us, after two years of major battles, some areas have suffered much, especially Shandong Province and northern Shaanxi. But since you have fought your way out, the burdens on the Liberated Areas have been lessened. Production has increased since the agrarian reform. In addition, the weather has been favourable this year. All this means that our difficulties can be overcome after the wheat harvest. Economic crisis is unknown in our areas. In particular, with the formation and implementation of our urban policy and the policy to protect industry and commerce, production will expand considerably. Naturally, we still have difficulties, but they can and will be overcome.

III

Concerning policy and discipline. The Party Central Committee has recently issued a number of documents on policy and discipline. I hope you will study them well and carry them out in earnest. The agrarian reform policy is an important matter and pertains to the success or failure of the Chinese revolution. It is most closely related to our war effort. As regards the urban policy and the policy on industry and commerce, mistakes committed in the past must be corrected. Hereafter whenever you capture a city, you must first of all protect its factories and shops well and really act in accord with the ancient saying, "A righteous army will not violate the people's interests in the slightest." The united front policy is very important; the anti-U.S. and anti-Chiang national democratic united front will continue to expand. In addition, there are the policies on intellectuals and on captives, both of which must be correctly carried out.

To ensure correct implementation of policies by our army, we must strengthen its discipline which helps guarantee their enforcement. Our discipline includes the Three Main Rules of Discipline.⁹¹ First of all, don't encroach on the interests of the masses. You didn't do well enough in this regard in the past, but recently you've made great progress. Second, turn in everything captured. Third, obey orders in all your actions. You're rather good at practising this rule, but there are also shortcomings. For instance, there is still the practice of neither asking for instructions in advance nor submitting reports afterwards. Some like to do whatever they please. This work style is tainted by anarchism. From now on, orders must be obeyed level by level and our comrades must ask for instructions beforehand and report back afterwards. Things will be easier when this is properly done by comrades at all levels. Don't fall victim to a cliquish or "mountain-stronghold" mentality. Don't bargain when you are given a task to fulfil. All this will eliminate many unnecessary difficulties and greatly benefit the revolution. Now that our people are many and our units are large, special emphasis must be placed on centralized, unified leadership. Policy and discipline cannot be well enforced unless our comrades urge each other to voluntarily observe discipline and look seriously into all policy and discipline violations. Only when all this is done can victory be won earlier and construction work done faster. We should be good at fighting on the one hand and be able to implement policy and observe discipline on the other. Unless

we work in this way, we will not meet the goal of uniting with more than 90 per cent of people throughout the country. Only when more than 90 per cent of them support us can we win victory.

IV

Concerning army building.

1. Political construction. You have generally fought very well in the past. You've maintained the tradition of the Red Army. But you fail to fully appreciate the importance of political leadership and political work. Hereafter not only political departments and political cadres should do political work, but military departments and military cadres should do it, too. The combat effectiveness of our troops depends on the power of our Party and our politics. Commanders must realize that only when political leadership has been strengthened and solid political work done can army units be consolidated, the morale of troops heightened and battles won. You must raise the class consciousness of the armymen and enable them to understand that they are troops of the proletariat, troops of the working people, and that both officers and men should serve the people. This knowledge will help improve relations between the army and the people, and make the people cherish the army all the more; make the cadres enhance their sense of responsibility to the people and fighters; and make the fighters fight bravely of their own accord, observe discipline voluntarily, maintain good relations with the masses, respect and love the cadres and have esteem for the government. With such internal unity, we will be able to concentrate on fighting the enemy. Since September last year, Liberation Army men all over the country have completed the "three check-ups"²⁴⁹ and then left for the front. They have all fought very well, winning victories everywhere. This proves that if we strengthen Party leadership over the army and improve its political work, our army will be invincible.

Military work and political work are two important aspects of army building. Both should be well done; neither should be neglected. Military and political cadres must unite; they should not declare "independence" of each other. Good unity presupposes criticism and self-criticism. In the past some comrades lacked the spirit of

criticism and self-criticism; they found criticism unbearable. This is no good. One should be aware that once he recognizes his mistake and corrects it, the mistake is no more. If he makes a mistake and refuses to admit and correct it, then he adds to his mistake. Besides, there are some comrades who have succumbed to individualistic heroism. They think that they have rendered great service and so they swell with pride. They want the Party to accommodate itself to them. Where indeed have your merits come from, if any? They have come by relying on the power of the Party and the masses, haven't they? It is the rank-and-file fighters who actually did the fighting. They fought bravely and laid down their lives, while you take credit for their deeds. How can that be justified? For instance, when our People's Liberation Army has won a signal victory in a battle and many people say it is to my credit, I know that they are taking me as representative of our army. I should know personally that the victory of the People's Liberation Army means the merit of all our comrades, and I shouldn't exaggerate my ability. As a matter of fact, my ability is limited and I should have done more. How can I accept such a great honour? Thus when others attribute the credit to me, all I can do is ascribe it to the lower ranks. I think it is good for you to do likewise. We oppose individualistic heroism and advocate revolutionary heroism. There are many real heroes among the two million and several hundred thousand men of our whole army. When revolutionary heroism is extensively promoted among the masses, individualistic heroism will become less popular and internal unity will be achieved. Then the mental burden of "seniority", "hero" and what not can be cast away and defects such as unprincipled resentment and intolerance of criticism can be overcome. Every comrade should further his ideological cultivation and foster the communist morality characterized by unselfishness. I hope you will all try hard in this respect.

2. Military construction. In military construction, comrades are required first of all to learn tactics. Every nation has its own tactics. Because we have conducted revolutionary wars for two decades, we also have ours. As a matter of fact, we already have a whole set of tactics that, however, has so far not been totally set down in writing because it has not been systematically summarized. Now we have translations of courses in tactics: one book is entitled *Tactics*, and another is *General Tactics*. Published in the Soviet Union, both books are very well written and may be used as reference material. I hope you

will study them closely. We should not only learn from the Soviet textbooks, but also begin compiling the whole set of tactics developed in our own revolutionary struggle. We have examined the operations at several battle fronts. Generally speaking, very good results have been achieved in all battles. But many tactical shortcomings have been exposed in major battles, especially in large-scale campaigns involving the co-ordinated actions of a number of army formations. For instance, there have been faults in intelligence on enemy activity, in the organization of operations, in the co-ordination of different units, in communications and liaison, and in battlefield services. You have won seven victories in as many battles in central Jiangsu,²⁵⁰ but you have not made a systematic summary of your experience. You comrades must attend to this. Because you have fought for so long against Chiang Kai-shek's mechanized forces, you have learned many combat techniques and you know how to deal with the enemy facing us now. But you should go a step further and study the enemy in order to improve your tactics against him. You mustn't think that since the enemy is going to collapse, he will not change his tactics. He has suffered so many losses that he is forced to make some changes. We should regularly examine his tactics and study how to fight him and how to avoid his strong points and discover his weak points in order to attack him and thoroughly defeat him.

Of the several main Kuomintang army units, some (for instance, the Reorganized 74th Division) have been destroyed by us; some have been almost destroyed, such as the New 1st Corps and the New 6th Corps; others have suffered serious casualties at our hands, such as the 5th Corps and the 11th Division. We should try to find ways to eliminate the enemy's remaining army units. Once we do, the problem will be more than half solved. You should study especially how to cope with such main enemy units as the 5th Corps and the 11th and 7th Divisions. I have thought out a method for you, namely, the method of catching big fish. When you have hooked a big fish, don't be so impatient as to try to pull it out of the water immediately. The reason is that the fish that has just swallowed the bait can still struggle hard and if you try to drag it out at this moment, the line will probably snap. So you'd better give it more line in the water until its energies are spent. In this way the big fish will end up in your hands. Similarly we should deal with the enemy's 5th Corps by the method of "inducement". When the corps comes to attack, we should retreat. When condi-

tions are favourable for us, we should intercept it; otherwise we should not. In this way, the enemy troops will be exhausted by our manoeuvres and their ammunition will almost be depleted. Then we should rush a huge force to attack and annihilate them. You must make up your mind to catch one or two big fish like the 5th Corps.

I don't mean that we never fight tough battles, but that we should correctly assess our target. The type of battle we are going to wage is determined by the specific enemy unit before us. If the enemy troops are weak, we'll go ahead and charge at them so that, before they can spread out and dig in, they will be overcome with fear and the fighting will end quickly. The "three-fierce tactics"²⁵¹ devised by the First Army Group of the Red Army²³ are one of the Red Army's basic sets of tactics and are still applicable today. However, if we are dealing with a stubborn enemy, these tactics may not be effective; they might even be costly to us. In that case, it is better to adopt the tactics of "angling for the big fish", which conforms to dialectics. Let me repeat once more: From the different methods for catching large or small fish, we can see the differences in the methods for fighting a weak or a strong enemy, a small or a large enemy unit. To fight a weak or a small enemy, we can use a comparatively simple and direct method, whereas to fight a strong or a large enemy, we have to work out systematic guidelines and, as soon as the battle starts, we must be able to manipulate him by detouring tactics. This is a truth which you must study and bear in mind.

Besides, there are other important tactical principles which deserve our intensive study, such as fighting different kinds of battles in accordance with differing weather, terrain or enemy. There are other things to take into account. For instance, when fighting on the interior line with the support of the rear and the masses, we can carry out manoeuvring operations of annihilation; and when we fight our way out to the exterior line where conditions are less favourable, it is better for us to wage mobile warfare. In the future, when conditions have changed, we should learn tactics for taking strong enemy fortifications and carrying out positional warfare. The relative strength between the enemy and us will undergo even greater changes. We must take this into account and make the necessary preparations. In the past the Kuomintang troops enjoyed unusually favourable conditions, for they had planes in the air, automobiles

and trains on the ground, and steamers and warships in water. They had many additional long “legs” and moved quickly, so they looked quite arrogant. It was good for us, therefore, to abandon some places instead of fighting the enemy recklessly. Since switching over to the offensive last year, we have cut off a few of these “legs” of theirs and thus slowed their pace. We will strive to chop off all their additional “legs” so that they can only race with their two normal legs as we do. Then, they will never be able to match us. In the future we will also have additional long “legs”. The North-east Liberated Area has more than 5,000 kilometres of railways. That means that our Liberation Army men there have much longer “legs” than those of the Kuomintang troops. Thus the war there is much easier for us to fight.

I hope all of you will understand the importance of learning tactics and be modest enough to learn them from others. Comrades who are chiefs of staff should pay even more attention to this matter. I have been told that some comrades in your units say that staff work is unimportant. This is wrong. The staff department is one of the leading offices of an army unit and those who work in it should be men of talent and learning. The chiefs of staff should be chosen from among outstanding persons. As staff work is very important to the army, it should be strengthened. I hope all our comrades will respect the staff organizations. Staff officers should keep their minds on their job and have long-term plans. They should analyse their experience, especially their experience in organizing battles. In organizing battles, we have done very well in some and very poorly in others. We fought some battles badly due to our inability to organize operations. If we held meetings before a battle to conduct careful discussions and then the different units involved made effective deployments, we would achieve better results in operations. To organize a battle, we should, first of all, know all the circumstances and, secondly, make meticulous plans and carefully deploy forces. It is said in *Master Sun's Art of War* that “meticulous plans bring victory”. This is quite true. If we work out a good plan, give the right orders and help our subordinates thoroughly understand our intentions, we will win in battle.

There is another important question, namely, that we should firmly bear in mind the situation as a whole, or always have an overall point of view. Tendencies towards a “mountain-stronghold” mentality, guerrilla-ism in work style, selfish departmentalism and warlord-

ism should be eliminated. From now on, we should have standard practices for troop replenishment and for care for the sick and wounded as well as for the old, the weak and the disabled. Many other logistical tasks should also gradually come under unified control. Some offices might be merged, and all field armies should be under the unified command of the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee. I hope that all of you will realize the importance of exercising centralized, unified control and removing the various "mountain strongholds", large and small. We can't achieve victory unless we bring together all our forces. It is only natural that we shall encounter difficulties in the process of centralization, but I am confident that they will be surmounted.

Military democracy has been a long-standing tradition of the Red Army. For instance, in the past there was the soldiers' committee. We should give full play to its function now. But democracy must be combined with leadership; that is, we must practise democratic centralism. To develop democracy means that subordinates should regularly make comments on their superiors and that superiors should constantly solicit and study the comments and suggestions of their subordinates and summarize what are practicable and bring them to the lower ranks for implementation. This is the method of leadership Chairman Mao has set forth: Concentrate the ideas of the masses and then carry them through, and "from the masses, to the masses". Practising democracy while abandoning leadership constitutes tailism and anarchism. We should be good at analysing ideas generated at the lower ranks to discover which are correct and which are not. We should lead the masses in carrying out correct suggestions; if some comrades have some wrong ideas, we should explain things to them and help them correct those ideas. If you leaders fail to help correct them and make work suffer, you will be held responsible. On the other hand, we oppose warlordism and commandism. When assigning tasks to subordinates, we should consider whether they can accomplish them or not. If they cannot fulfil the tasks, we had better not give the impracticable order at all. Leaders should have a high sense of responsibility and pay attention to tactics so as to minimize casualties. They should give their subordinates practical help while, on their part, the latter should try to understand the intention of their superiors. We shall be invincible if the higher and lower ranks can be of one mind.

Lastly, I want to say a few words about the question of despising the enemy or fearing him. Chiang Kai-shek is now at the end of his

rope. No matter how ferociously imperialism acts now, it cannot save him from his doom. Thus we have good grounds to despise the enemy strategically. We should have the political courage to do so. This is a view of historical materialism. Basing our analysis on the law of social development, we can conclude that the cause of the proletariat will thrive and the Chinese revolution will triumph, while the feudal and counter-revolutionary forces are doomed. In addition, tremendous changes in our favour have taken place in international affairs. Given all this, why shouldn't we be optimistic and confident? Yet when the enemy is before us at the battle front, we can't afford to despise him in the least. We should fight a weak enemy as though he were strong; otherwise, we will make mistakes. Because once you despise the enemy, you will tend to make no preparations before battle. Commanders would say, "How can we fail to beat him and take his fortress?" The fighters would respond, "We are sure to make it." Thinking that no sooner had they started the battle than they would capture the enemy stronghold, they would neglect making the necessary preparations. Very often they would run into snags and fail to take the stronghold. Furthermore, they were likely to suffer heavy losses. But this doesn't mean we should be afraid of the enemy. Some comrades say, "The revolution will succeed. I have no doubt about that. What I have misgivings about is death, which is a common occurrence in war." This shows that they have not cultivated a revolutionary outlook on life. On the very first day when we joined the Communist Party, we pledged to devote our lives to the revolution. Once we have determined to join the Party to make revolution, why should we worry about life or death? To sacrifice one's self for the revolutionary cause is to die a worthy, an honourable death.

Since the unfolding of the agrarian reform movement, especially through conducting the "three check-ups", our army units have made progress in all aspects and have taken on a new look. This is, however, only the beginning. I hope you will continue to make progress in practical struggles. I am confident you will achieve more and greater victories and fulfil the glorious historical mission entrusted to you by the Party and the people.

FOUR TALKS AT THE WAR BRIEFING MEETINGS HELD BY THE OPERATIONS BUREAU OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY HEADQUARTERS

August-November 1948

I. THE TALK OF AUGUST 23

1. The Central Plains battlefield has been the scene of decisive battles. Since ancient times, those who have triumphed in the Central Plains have become the final victors. For instance, in their rivalry for power between 206-202 B.C., Liu Bang of the state of Han and Xiang Yu of the state of Chu fought their decisive battle in this part of the country. The reason Liu's general Han Xin could adopt the principle, "the more the better", in commanding troops is that the Central Plains has a large area and a huge population.

2. Great victory was achieved in operations in July this year, or the first month of the third year of the War of Liberation. August will soon be over, leaving only 10 months for this third year. Militarily we hope that during these 10 months we can finish off the troops of Fu Zuoyi,²⁵² capture Jinan and Taiyuan, and then concentrate our forces for continued advance so as to carry out Chairman Mao's directive on bringing the war further into areas under Chiang Kai-shek's rule. At present the enemy is organizing many large army formations in an attempt to fight a decisive battle with us. However, we won't fight that battle, for the opportune time hasn't come yet. A premature decisive battle would not be to our advantage. Thus we now are only carrying out some manoeuvres against the enemy in the Central Plains. We will do our utmost to develop production to prepare the material conditions (mainly shells and explosives) so that, when conditions are ripe, we will wage a decisive battle with the Kuomintang

troops in the Central Plains. By that time we will have to “gnaw” at what seemingly can’t be “gnawed” at and “remove” what seemingly can’t be “removed”.

3. What has worried us militarily over the last 20 years has been our incapability to take strongly fortified enemy cities. As a result of what we have learned in the last six months, however, we are now able to attack and capture fairly large and strongly fortified enemy cities. The capture of Shijiazhuang is the first successful experiment. Then in succession we attacked and captured Luoyang, Weixian, Kaifeng, Yanzhou and some other cities. If we work hard at arms production, there will be no cities that we cannot take in the future. The U.S. imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek underestimated our capability in this respect. We are sure we can capture Taiyuan and Jinan.

4. We must not allow the enemy troops in northeast China to march south through Shanhaiguan. Chiang Kai-shek said that his troops would hold Changchun and Shenyang. This is very good because, when he stations so many troops in such distant areas, he has to transport supplies by air, which means increased attrition and other troubles for him. If his troops are allowed to come south of Shanhaiguan to reinforce those in either north or central China, that will add much to our trouble.

5. Judging from present circumstances, we are closer to victory than ever. But we may fail if we make mistakes in carrying out policies, whether on agrarian reform, industry and commerce, the suppression of counter-revolutionaries, production or on winning over prisoners of war. Militarily, for us to have succeeded in winning over prisoners of war is a great victory. (At present, 60-70 per cent of our troops are “liberated” fighters, namely, prisoners of war who have joined our army.) Policy problems concerning agrarian reform, industry and commerce have been almost totally solved. From now on we should stress increasing production. We should all do our best to bring greater results in this connection.

II. THE TALK OF OCTOBER 1

In the past we were afraid the enemy would come to this side of Shanhaiguan. If he did, no matter where he turned up, it would be to our disadvantage. It is now impossible for the enemy to come

to this side of Shanhaiguan, so we can defeat him in the Northeast. His troops at Changchun may try to escape, but we have eight manoeuvring divisions to annihilate them.

The last problem in north China is to dispose of Fu Zuoyi's troops. He has learned some Japanese tactics as well as some of ours. It is fairly difficult to fight his forces in north China because they are still stronger than ours. Nevertheless, we surely will be able to dispose of them.

Hu Zongnan²⁵³ has over 200,000 men, a stronger force than our Northwest Field Army. We can't wipe them out for now, and have to bide our time.

The capture of Jinan is of great help to us, because we can use its industry for production. With its railways and the Grand Canal, Shandong Province has good transport facilities and it will be an important rear area to support our military operations involving large formations. This also frees more than 100,000 men who, together with several tens of thousands of "liberated" fighters, will be able to take on the enemy in the south. The revolt of the Kuomintang corps commander Wu Huawen,²⁵⁴ which played a considerable part in our capture of Jinan, should not be underestimated. We need this kind of revolt for our future operations. Of course, even if Wu Huawen had not come over to our side, we could have taken Jinan. At Xuzhou, we can wipe out any of the three armies of Qiu Qingquan,²⁵⁵ Huang Botao²⁵⁶ and Li Mi.²⁵⁷

Our task this year is to eliminate 100 enemy brigades. In three years, the People's Liberation Army will grow to five million strong. This year is decisive for the outcome of the war. With its abundant grain supplies and a flat terrain suitable for operations involving huge formations, the Central Plains will be the place for the decisive battle. Our advantages in this area are: first, the people are on our side; second, we have a larger force than the enemy's; third, we have better transport facilities than before; and fourth, we have an arsenal of our own to produce large quantities of ammunition. The enemy's arms production is inferior to ours because he depends mainly on U.S. aid.

With the capture of Jinan, we have seized a great quantity of explosives, which are very useful to us. In central Hebei, we produce each year more than five million kilogrammes of nitre that can be used to make explosives. Enemy troops dare not use explosive packages, for they are afraid of killing themselves. Explosives are,

however, of great use to us, for they prove more effective than artillery.

Transport is a very important question for our present operations involving hundreds of thousands of men. There was some waste in the use of transport facilities in the past; today it is still not very well organized to meet current requirements. This does not matter much for interior-line operations, but it has a close bearing on exterior-line operations. From now on we should organize our transport better. We also should do a good job of organizing hospitals and stretcher-bearer teams. At present six people carry a stretcher. With better organization, two men will be able to do the job and manpower will be conserved.

People's state of mind counts for much in current battles. Peasants defy death to protect the land and property of their native places, but when they leave their homes to liberate other places, they may not be so determined. That is why we should educate them ideologically. Apart from our field armies, the people of each region naturally should rely on themselves for liberation. Also, since "liberated" fighters make up a very big proportion of our army, we should intensify their education so that they will play a greater role.

The enemy is now trying to defend "one triangle, four sides and thirteen points".²⁵⁸ Devised by the Americans, it is a fairly long-term plan. We should think of a way to thwart this enemy plan.

III. THE TALK OF OCTOBER 16

Concerning northeast China, the Americans have told Chiang Kai-shek to withdraw his troops stationed there instead of defending it in isolation and inviting disaster. Although Chiang Kai-shek has also realized the true situation, as a representative of the reactionary ruling classes he is unwilling to pull out; he has decided to make a last desperate struggle there. Now that we have taken Jinzhou, he could not withdraw even if he wanted to. Jinzhou is strategically important as a supply base and a transit point between the area south of Shanhaiguan and the Northeast. Our enemy made desperate efforts to defend it, but all in vain. Now we have two choices. One is to attack Jinxi, and this is the easier one. The other is to attack the enemy troops coming out from Shenyang. It is better to seize Jinxi so as to further isolate enemy forces in the Northeast. The enemy troops in

Changchun also want to withdraw. With our quick capture of Jinzhou, however, our forces are ready to deal with them, so their withdrawal is now difficult. Since our capture of Jinan, Chiang Kai-shek has made some changes in his strategy — he has abandoned several isolated points. Since we took Jinzhou, we have gained more experience in attacking strongly fortified points and large cities. The major operations are now fought in the Northeast. Because the situation is in our favour, we can fight a few more successful battles and settle the Northeast problem this winter. Then our troops can move south of Shanhaiguan and finally dispose of Fu Zuoyi's troops. Fu mainly relies on the 94th, 92nd and 16th Corps and some other units,²⁵⁹ while his own troops are no good. Our attack on his long line of troops will cut it into several sections. What he fears most is our attack on his Zhangjiakou. Suiyuan⁴⁵ is also his important rear area, but he does not want to keep the Beiping-Shenyang Railway. That is why his forces are now deployed on the west. But Chiang Kai-shek whose strategy is to hold Beiping and Tianjin doesn't like to see Fu Zuoyi's main forces continue advancing west.

If successful, the liberation of Taiyuan would be of great strategic importance. Even if we don't capture it for some time, a prolonged siege of the city would starve the enemy to death. With the exception of the 8th Column of the Taiyue Military Area, our other army units to attack Taiyuan are all newly formed. Tactically, they are not so skilled in attacking heavily fortified enemy positions. It will, therefore, be marvellous for them to attack a city as large as Taiyuan.

The condition of Commander Peng's area²⁶⁰ is more difficult than others. We can't send reinforcements to him because there isn't enough food for more men. In case Taiyuan is taken, Peng Shaohui's²⁶¹ column can be transferred there.

The Shandong problem has been solved except for Qingdao, which is not only a strategically important place in China but also one attracting world attention. We are not going to attack it now because there are American troops stationed there. We'll attack it with concentrated forces some time in the future. Large forces have been drawn out of Shandong, but the troops under Su Yu,²⁴³ Xu and Tan²⁶² may converge for major battles. It is more difficult to attack Xuzhou, where three enemy armies are stationed close together. It will be easier to solve this problem if one or two of these armies can be disposed of first. Although several major battles have been fought in Shandong, the decisive battle is yet to come.

Recently Chiang Kai-shek has also learned from us to abandon cities, conduct manoeuvring operations, not to rely on the rear area, and manoeuvre with large formations. But he has no support among the masses and thus has no food for his troops. Besides, it is already too late for him to learn from us. His withdrawal from isolated cities is to our advantage, for this will help consolidate our rear area. The Americans told him to withdraw to the south of the Changjiang River. If he acts upon this advice and concentrates his two million troops in one place, we will have trouble.

You should pay more attention to the tactics of storming heavily fortified points, make a good study of it and compare what you have learned in textbooks with what you have experienced in practice to see whether they correspond with each other. Manpower reinforcement is an important factor for our winning more victories. The fighters we have absorbed this year are better trained than those of the past. We also got some reinforcements with the capture of several cities. Now there are 100,000 captives reinforcing our army. The task for us in the coming months is to do a good job of their enlightenment. In addition, efforts should be made to pool materials and step up arms production in preparation for the decisive campaign. Another thing, we should strengthen political work and oppose neglect of organization and discipline, anarchy and each going his own way.

In the past we had no experience in administering captured cities. Now it is different. We have a good sense of appropriate policies and we are experienced. When Shijiazhuang was liberated, shops did not open until two months later. When we recently took Jinan, however, shops there resumed business within one week. At present the enemy is incapable of recovering whatever place he has lost. We should step up our preparations for a sudden change in the situation — the collapse of the enemy.

IV. THE TALK OF NOVEMBER 26

We are now fighting an all-out decisive battle with the enemy. During the past two decades of our revolutionary war, it was always the enemy who sought decisive battles with us. Today the situation has changed so that it is we who now concentrate our main forces to seek decisive engagements with the enemy. We defeated the enemy

in the Northeast in a decisive campaign. Another such battle is now being waged in the Xuzhou area,²⁶³ and the decisive Beiping-Tianjin campaign²⁶⁴ will start soon.

Xuzhou has been the scene of decisive battles since ancient times because it has an extensive terrain and a dense population and can supply ample food and shelter for large armies. Now we are concentrating there the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th and 13th Columns of our East China Field Army plus the Guangdong-Guangxi, Special Arms, Central-South Shandong and Bohai Columns as well as the 11th Column of the Central Plains Field Army — 17 columns in all. In addition, there are the six Central Plains Field Army columns under Liu and Deng.²⁶⁵ With these forces, we outnumber the enemy by a small margin,²⁶⁶ while qualitatively we are by far superior to him. We also are not second to him in arms. We have prepared eight figures for the basic load of ammunition.²⁶⁷ These are the material foundations for us to wage a decisive battle with the enemy. Liu Zhi's²⁶⁸ command is of great help to us, for he is not so cunning as Bai Chongxi,²⁶⁹ who knows how to take to his heels. Liu Zhi had thought that we would attack him from the west of Xuzhou, but it turned out that we attacked from the east. When he discovered this, it was too late and he hastily changed his original deployment. The revolt of Feng Zhi'an's units²⁷⁰ had a great impact on the war situation, because it threw the enemy's original deployment into confusion. This is what strategists dread, especially when they are commanding large army units, because prompt redeployment is impossible. Thus the defection of Feng's units came at an opportune moment. This is the result of planned, organized activities on the part of our comrades. Simultaneously with the annihilation of Huang Botao's army, we had intended to lure Qiu Qingquan's out of Xuzhou, and that is why our units assigned to check the enemy's rescue troops deliberately withdrew a little. Liu Zhi mistook our action for running away and ordered his men to pursue us, but they dared not. The Central News Agency made big propaganda of it. But the rear part of Qiu's army remained in Xuzhou and did not leave despite that Huang's army was being annihilated in its vicinity. The armies of Qiu and Li nevertheless suffered considerable losses due to our interception. Xuzhou is now not to be taken easily due to the concentration of the three armies of Qiu, Li and Sun.²⁷¹ Thus our main forces have moved south to attack Huang Wei's army.²⁷² Huang Wei, in spite of his seniority, is not remarkable in commanding troops. Bai Chongxi is wiser, because he re-

fuses to be drawn in for a losing battle. Huang Wei's army came a long way and in a hurry, crossed many rivers and was harassed by our guerrillas. It left behind its supplies and gear on the way. Without oil, mechanized units become a nuisance. Huang has little information about us, not knowing the whereabouts of our units under Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping. This is because our proletarian armies have the full support of the people. Huang Wei's army has 11 divisions. With such a huge force, he thinks we dare not attack him. As a matter of fact, however, more troops are more liable to cause confusion. He has no fortified position to rely upon. (Huang Botao's tactical merit lies in his orderly command — he never gets confused. Each village is defended independently. If one is lost, no rescue troops are rushed there. This has caused us some losses.) The original direction of Huang Wei's advance is Xuzhou. If we attack his flanks, he will be unable to link up with Li Yannian²⁷³ and Liu Ruming²⁷⁴ when he turns east. Once his army is thrown into confusion, it will be easier for us to dispose of it. Will Li Yannian and Liu Ruming move north? We expect them to do so, but they may not be keen on it. Among their troops, those who have withdrawn from the Northeast are in low spirits. We plan to employ four or five columns to monitor the movements of the enemy in Xuzhou. We are determined to wage continuous battles despite casualties, and are ready to replenish our forces with prisoners of war. This is the key to victory. Only our proletarian army can do this. After the three units of Huang Wei, Li Yannian and Liu Ruming are finished off, the enemy forces in Xuzhou will be unable to escape because they have neither food nor rescue troops.

Fu Zuoyi is wiser than they, but his military strength is limited to what he has now. It is impossible for him to escape by sea, because Tanggu Harbour is ice-bound. It would take too long to flee southwards along the Beiping-Hankou and Tianjin-Pukou railways. In addition, because the masses are organized in the Liberated Areas through which the two railways run, they will inflict heavy casualties on his forces even if they cannot wipe out all of them. By that time our mighty army from the Northeast will for certain follow on their heels in hot pursuit, and our troops in the south can also intercept them. So it is possible that Fu Zuoyi will put up a stubborn defence where he is. He was well known in the past for his defence of Zhuozhou, which the Northeastern Army failed to capture. As he sees that Yan Xishan²⁷⁵ is holding Taiyuan for the time being, it is highly probable for him to hold on to Beiping and Tianjin. However, his troops

cannot escape annihilation. After wiping out the enemy at Xuzhou and the forces of Fu Zuoyi and Yan Xishan, there will be only the units of Ma Hongkui,²⁷⁶ Ma Bufang²⁷⁷ and Hu Zongnan to deal with. Our Northwest Field Army is not numerically strong. Later on we will send some reinforcements there so as to wipe out Hu Zongnan's army in Shaanxi. There will be some trouble for us should he withdraw his forces to Sichuan. If our mighty army is to enter Sichuan, there must be an excellent supply line. We must go there when necessary. Where the broom does not reach, the dust won't vanish of itself. In addition, if the troops of Bai Chongxi's Guangxi clique retreat to their province, it will also be a headache for us. As to Chiang Kai-shek's troops, we have no reason to worry. At most they will retreat to Guangdong to rebuild their strength there.

Our victory is assured, but there are still difficulties. We should organize the masses quickly in the newly liberated areas to restore production to support our mighty army on its advance southward for the liberation of all of China. We should not be carried away by our victories and fail to see the difficulties.

SPEECH AT THE WOMEN'S WORK CONFERENCE IN THE LIBERATED AREAS

September 20, 1948

In its 27-year history of revolutionary struggle, our Chinese Communist Party has gone through the periods of the Great Revolution (1924-27), the Agrarian Revolution (1927-37) and the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-45), and is now leading the People's War of Liberation. Countless women comrades have taken part in the revolution in each historical period. The Chinese women's movement under the leadership of our Party has made continuous progress during the prolonged, difficult and complicated revolutionary process. Large numbers of women have displayed lofty revolutionary integrity and even shed blood and died for the revolution on the battlefield, in prisons and in many other circumstances of the struggle against the enemy. Such staunchness and heroism bring glory both to Chinese women and to our Party. Chinese women have made great contributions to the cause of the Chinese revolution.

As the revolution develops, workers in the women's movement confront even weightier tasks. This is especially true now that revolutionary political power has been established in large, medium-sized and small cities, where there are tens of thousands of women workers. This situation calls for widened scope of our work among women. As you all know, due to specific revolutionary conditions in the past our Party worked in the countryside for a long time, and our women's movement was largely confined to rural working women. Things are different now. Our Party has again entered the cities and rejoined the ranks of our own class. As a political party of the working class, our Party fights for the interests of this specific class. In the cities there are many women workers who have been toiling all along at various posts. They suffered constant and ruthless persecution under the Kuomintang regime. Although they have now been emancipated from the reactionary state power, they have a number of immediate interests

and demands that they eagerly want us to help realize. You comrades in the women's movement should strive to familiarize yourselves with their lives, their feelings and their needs and serve these members of the working class with boundless enthusiasm. This is the task the new revolutionary situation sets before you. The conference we are holding now is to analyse the experience of the women's movement, to decide what is to be done, what work needs to be speeded up and what set aside. It is to adopt a resolution to advance our work among women, for which there should be more effective methods suited to the new revolutionary situation and which should be done in co-ordination with the people's liberation movement. This is the objective this conference should attain.

Revolutionary women comrades should first of all serve women among the masses. No matter what posts they occupy, they should mobilize and guide the women masses. It goes without saying that not only women comrades should work among the women masses; our men comrades should also attend to it. But the emancipation of women depends mainly on their own effort. There are quite a few women comrades, however, who do not want to work in the women's movement either because of their position or personal preference. Such an attitude is incorrect. Revolutionary women comrades should not only strive for their own progress, but should help raise the awareness of other women who may lag behind. There are also some men comrades who look down on the women's movement, thinking that women are incapable. This view, of course, is also wrong. The experience of the Soviet Union in socialist construction shows not only that women can work in society just as well as men, but that they can do better in many jobs than men. More and more women have taken on work in many departments in the Soviet Union. That huge numbers of women have taken up different jobs is an indicator of the progress of a socialist country. The fact that the overwhelming majority of Chinese women were barred from public work in old China is an unmistakable proof of its backwardness.

With the impending nationwide triumph of the revolutionary war of the Chinese people, large numbers of people will be required for the building of a new China. We will suffer tremendously if we cannot organize women, who form about half the nation's population, for active participation in this work.

Since there is no armed enemy inside our Liberated Areas now, it is fully possible for us to carry out construction. We should first of

all organize production. This task includes organizing the broad masses of women. Their active participation in material production is not only necessary for the building of a new-democratic China but fully corresponds with their demands for emancipation. The first prerequisite for women's emancipation is economic independence without which their genuine emancipation is impossible. Under the feudal patriarchy in old China, women had no economic independence at all, which resulted in women having a dependent mentality. In capitalist countries, women enjoy a comparatively independent economic status, and both husband and wife can be employed. Because both men and women work, they share the financial burdens of the family. Thus women in capitalist countries have less feeling of dependence and have a higher social status than women in feudal society. However, because the masses of the working women there are exploited by the capitalist class, genuine emancipation of women is still out of the question. Only in a socialist country can women take part in social construction and production as fully as men do; they can, therefore, achieve a status of complete equality with men and be liberated from the mental fetters of the old traditions. In our Liberated Areas, rural women have received the same share of land as men in the agrarian reform. This provides the condition for women to achieve independent economic status. But this won't happen if women do not till the land that is now theirs. Only when women become active in construction and production can they gain economic independence, and only then can there be a solid material foundation for the cause of women's emancipation.

Once the principle of organizing women for material production has been established, the next thing is to implement it through the co-operatives which may serve as a very good organizational form for advancing work among women. Not only can the co-ops organize the women masses for production and solve the problems of the supply of the raw materials they need and the marketing of their products, but they can also transform step by step the present form of production with the family as a unit into one of co-operative undertakings. Literacy classes can be organized in the process of production to heighten the women's educational level and enhance their political consciousness. Such organizational work will enable the women's organizations to be consolidated instead of remaining mere formality. The experience of the South District Co-operative in Yan'an is worth learning. To mobilize women to spin and weave during the War of

Resistance, it did painstaking organizational work. As a result, several hundred women took part in the enterprise, which benefited them materially and raised their social status. The women and the co-operative established close economic ties and the co-operative was very highly regarded by them. When many localities planned meetings to mark Women's Day (March 8) in 1943, they had to send people to mobilize the peasant women to attend. In the South District of Yan'an, however, its co-operative issued a notice and more than a hundred local women turned up at the local meeting. This is an excellent example showing that the co-operatives can organize and lead women in production and at the same time encourage them to participate in social activities, thus gradually raising their economic and political status. In this work, educated cadres in the women's movement should be ready to serve the worker and peasant women masses wholeheartedly. They should learn about production and agricultural and industrial techniques. As Comrade Mao Zedong has said, there are two kinds of knowledge, knowledge of class struggle and of the struggle for production. In the building of a new-democratic China, the latter knowledge will become increasingly important to us. What production skills should we acquire? Naturally, it is very important to learn to produce with machines. At present, however, we should also learn handicraft skills, for we have very few machines. It is wrong to think that, with nationwide victory, which is now just around the corner, modern industry will dominate and handicraft industries will be eliminated, and thus to wait with folded arms for the development of large industry and refuse to learn handicraft skills. This is not the right attitude. As a matter of fact, after the revolutionary war, neither the development of new industry nor the restoration of the existing industry will be realized immediately. To supply people with industrial products of daily use, it will be absolutely necessary, for a given period, to help develop rural sideline and handicraft production. As everyone knows, China was a backward agricultural country that suffered imperialist aggression. The imperialists plundered its raw materials at cheap prices and processed them into finished products which were then dumped onto the Chinese market. In the future this situation must change. While continuing to export some raw materials under favourable conditions, we will try to export some finished or semi-finished products. Before we can export industrial products, we will have to depend on our handicraft industry for exquisite articles that can be exported in exchange for foreign machines.

In this way we won't suffer any losses. Therefore, we should look into handicraft industries and rural sidelines, such as spinning and weaving, silk filature, embroidery and the making of straw-plaited hats, carpets, laces and foodstuffs. We should master their production techniques, lower costs and raise the quality of the products. You comrades working in the women's movement should also be familiar with handicraft production. The development of household handicrafts as a necessary sector of the national economy has become a mass undertaking that offers widespread employment. Co-operatives should be used in the production campaign to organize women for various productive activities which can increase social wealth.

Political, cultural and educational work or work among women should all promote production. Otherwise they will be meaningless. If a county head fails to promote production, he has not done his job well. It goes without saying that, in keeping with the developing revolutionary situation, work should be carried on by varied methods and through different organizational forms, but developing production should remain the fundamental goal.

It is possible that our new China will develop rapidly into an industrial country. As Chinese society progresses, manpower will be increasingly replaced by machines whose improvement will lighten the existing heavy manual labour. All this will provide more and more opportunities for women to work in the various production departments. Care for women is necessary in the social division of labour. At present some countries in the world cannot do this as yet. The new-democratic China will stipulate that, as far as possible, women should be given light jobs such as those in the banking, trade, communications, light industrial and educational departments. Not only can women replace men in these departments but, because of their meticulous and patient work style, they can do better. In addition, we have drawn up regulations concerning prenatal and postnatal leave for women and their right to equal pay for equal work as men, as well as other necessary and rational measures.

Our new-democratic state should do whatever is necessary to raise women's social status, and it should protect their special interests. Nonetheless, it has to be understood that women must emancipate themselves through their own efforts. To this end, they should first of all be enthusiastic in learning, especially production skills, continuously raise their cultural and vocational levels and join production departments and public undertakings. Only when women work hard

and learn to work independently and thus improve their economic status can they cast off for good the fetters imposed on them by China's feudal society and free themselves from the influence of the backward traditional ideas such as the tendencies to depend on men and others' help and to seek ease and comfort. Despite the collapse of the Kuomintang regime, if women are interested only in ease and comfort and not hard work, they will have to depend on men for a living. In that case, they will not be able to enjoy the fruits of women's emancipation, which will then remain a mere ideal.

THE DOMESTIC SITUATION AND POINTS FOR ATTENTION AFTER CROSSING THE CHANGJIANG RIVER

April 11, 1949

I. Domestic situation.

The domestic situation has never been so good as at present. You have cleaned out all enemy forces in the Northeast and joined the First, Second and Third as well as the North China Field Armies in liberating Beiping and Tianjin. The enemy's main forces have been wiped out one after the other. His remaining troops now total about two million, of which combat forces account for no more than 1.4 million. Moreover, these combat forces belong to diverse cliques. Each goes its own way, lacks the power to resist and has low morale. That is why the Kuomintang government has asked to hold peace talks with us in an attempt to play for time, revamp its army and repair its defence along the Changjiang River for a desperate struggle. We must not be taken in but must actively prepare for an early crossing of the Changjiang River and a southward advance for the liberation of the whole country.

From now on there will be roughly three patterns for disposing of enemy troops.

The first is to follow the Tianjin pattern, i.e., resolutely annihilate any enemy troops refusing to surrender and putting up stubborn resistance. Our whole army must be ready at all times to dispose of the enemy by this method.

The second is the Beiping pattern, i.e., compel enemy troops to reorganize peacefully into units of the People's Liberation Army. This is highly possible.

Outline of a speech to senior cadres of the Fourth Field Army then in Beiping (Beijing).

The third is the Suiyuan pattern, i.e., allow part of the Kuomintang troops in remote areas or those of no strategic importance to stay there for the time being, waiting for reorganization later on.

In case the peace talks break down, we will have a mighty army over two million strong to cross the Changjiang River and advance south. You are an important part of it, being entrusted like the others with the glorious task of liberating the whole country. If our army does cross the Changjiang River and then thrust south, it will face the following advantages and disadvantages.

1. Advantages:

1) We have a big and powerful army with good morale, while the enemy is weak and small, divided and demoralized.

2) Because the Liberated Areas have been extended to the banks of the Changjiang River, there now are 200 million liberated people to give our army all-out support.

3) The broad masses of people south of the Changjiang River are eagerly expecting us to liberate them. So long as we make no mistakes in carrying out policies, they will support us. Another thing, they have had the experience of the Great Revolution (1924-27) and the agrarian revolutionary movement.

4) We have our guerrilla units (at present they have more than 50,000 men south of the Changjiang River) to co-ordinate with us.

2. Disadvantages:

1) Since our army is penetrating deep into the enemy areas far from its own rear, transportation and supply problems will be much more serious than in the past.

2) In the south there are more mountains, rivers, paddy fields and lakes, and our troops from the north generally lack combat experience on such terrain.

3) As the overwhelming majority of our troops are northerners, they will not easily adjust to life in the south. They will be susceptible to diseases such as malaria, sunstroke, beriberi and scabies. It will also be easy for them to get homesick, feel content with the liberation of their own home places and become reluctant to risk their lives for the liberation of other areas.

4) The continuous victory of our army may have made some fighters conceited so that they will underestimate the enemy. Weak though our enemy is, he will still try to put up a last, desperate struggle.

All the above conditions, favourable and unfavourable, must be

fully explained to our officers and men. We must not stress only the favourable factors and say nothing about the unfavourable ones. Only such public and detailed explanation can make the whole army conscientiously seek ways to surmount its difficulties, and only in this way can you fulfil the task entrusted to you by the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee.

II. Several points for attention after going to the south.

1. Policy and discipline.

1) Implementation of Party policies.

a. Agrarian reform policy. This is an important question, on which rests the success or failure of the Chinese revolution. We must carry out this reform thoroughly, but must not act impetuously in the newly liberated areas. We should first mobilize and organize the masses for reduction of rents and interests. Only after our army has gained a firm foothold there and the local people have increased their political awareness and become organized should thorough land distribution be carried out. Landlords and rich peasants should receive a share of land just as the peasants do.

b. Policies concerning urban industry and commerce. After we have crossed the Changjiang River, we will first capture cities and then villages. In the past many mistakes were made in carrying out policies concerning urban industry and commerce. Corrections were undertaken later on, and great progress has been made recently. All of China will soon be liberated and all the cities will come under our control. They should therefore be neither destroyed nor damaged. This will speed construction. From now on when a city is taken, we should first effectively protect its industry and commerce so that we can quickly restore and develop production. After capturing a city, we must rely heart and soul on the working class, unite with the other labouring masses and win over the intellectuals and also the largest possible number of the national bourgeoisie and their representatives who are ready to co-operate with us, or at least make them remain neutral — so that we can wage a resolute struggle against imperialism and the feudal and bureaucrat-capitalist classes and defeat these enemies step by step.

c. United front policy. We should broaden the anti-U.S. and anti-Chiang united front to win over the majority of the people and isolate the reactionary diehards, who are in the minority. But we must adhere to the principle of proletarian leadership. The Party Central Committee has stipulated that except for the property of bureaucrat-

capitalists headed by the big four families,²¹³ the property of all other capitalists will not be confiscated; furthermore, these latter capitalists will be permitted to develop those of their industries and commercial enterprises that are beneficial to the national economy and the people's livelihood. This will help extend the united front.

d. Policy to win over intellectuals. It is highly important to educate and win over intellectuals so that they will join the revolution and serve the people.

e. Social policy. It is forbidden to beat or kill indiscriminately. Our agrarian reform is aimed at eliminating the landlord class and feudal forces as such, not at physically annihilating the landlords themselves. Even those with towering crimes should be punished according to legal procedures, and no indiscriminate beating or killing is permitted. This policy assumes even greater significance in the newly liberated areas.

2) Strict observance of discipline.

Correct policy implementation requires strict observance of discipline to guarantee their enforcement. First, mass discipline. In carrying out mass discipline, there are many good examples to be seen in the emerging model squads, companies, regiments and divisions. These model units see to it that the interests of the masses are not infringed upon, and they observe rules such as the "three won't leaves" [won't leave before the water vat of the owner of the house they use is filled, won't leave before the floor is swept clean, and won't leave before the borrowed articles are returned] and the "four won't enters" [won't enter the inner rooms of the owner of the house they use, won't enter the women's latrine, won't enter any house not reserved for army use, and won't enter fields with standing crops] and do publicity when coming to and leaving a place. They also visited the poor, asking about their bitterness of the past, and they organize joint army-civilian meetings for pouring out grievances against the old society. Second, economic discipline. This means we do not scramble for war trophies, we turn in everything captured, and we do not search the pockets of captives. Third, discipline relating to command. This means obeying orders in all actions and resolutely fulfilling assignment.

There are still problems in enforcing discipline, especially as regards the masses and turning in of all things captured. In addition, there have been cases of disobeying orders and of withdrawing from designated positions without permission. Such lapses should not occur in the future.

Good enforcement of policies and discipline will help bring earlier victory. We should be good both in fighting and in enforcing policies and discipline. Only in this way can we unite with more than 90 per cent of the population and achieve nationwide victory.

3) How can we guarantee the implementation of policies and discipline?

a. By strengthening education in both policy and discipline among cadres and fighters. Reasons for enforcing policies and observing discipline should be explained. Efforts should be made to heighten the class awareness of the rank and file, mobilize them to carry out policies and observe discipline voluntarily and encourage and supervise each other in doing so.

b. By having cadres at all levels play an exemplary role and carry out strict control and inspection. In the past quite a number of cadres violated policies and discipline; some of them even took the lead in doing so. Where this was the case, how could they be expected to exercise strict control and supervision?

c. By seriously determining responsibility for specific policy and discipline violations, and by being strict but fair in meting out rewards or punishments. Hereafter, such violations should be seriously investigated and criticism made or disciplinary measures taken. Comrades or units that carry out policies and observe discipline exemplarily should be commended or rewarded.

2. Concerning our army's role as a working force.

The People's Liberation Army is not only a fighting force but a working force. Why?

Of course, in the present or in the historical period ahead (that is, as long as the imperialist system still exists), the People's Liberation Army is undoubtedly a fighting force. But there is now an increasing possibility of settling problems in the south by following the Beiping or the Suiyuan pattern. With the gradual decrease in hostilities, the army's function as a working force will increase correspondingly.

The areas to be liberated are vast, accounting for roughly three-fourths of the country's total territory. We do not have enough cadres. Although 53,000 cadres are ready to go, they are far from enough for the task lying ahead. Thus we must prepare to create a work force out of the more than two million field army men crossing the Changjiang River and advancing south. In this way we will have enough cadres to do the work in the vast southern areas, and you will be able to fulfil your task there. With their more than two million men, the related

field armies constitute an enormous school for cadres to learn how to carry out their new task.

You comrades should instruct your subordinates not only to be good fighters but good members of the work force as well. All comrades going south should be taught that in addition to fulfilling combat tasks, they should learn earnestly to do a good job as members of the work force, including mass work, work in connection with the building of the new state and administering the liberated cities.

3. Military democracy.

1) Military democracy is an important method for exercising good leadership. Its correct practice and the encouragement of criticism and self-criticism will improve relations between officers and men, between army and civilians and between different units of our army, thus promoting unity. They will bring the masses' initiative and creativity into play, help overcome various difficulties and raise combat effectiveness.

2) Military democracy in our army is a fine tradition that should be carried forward.

3) During intervals between training and fighting, our army units often hold various kinds of meetings, such as "meetings of Zhuge Liangs" (to pool the wisdom of the collective), "meetings for devising solutions to problems", "meetings for reviewing casualties" and "meetings to evaluate fighting skills". More importantly, since the start of the new-type ideological education movement in the army,²⁷⁸ there have been widespread mass activities such as the "three check-ups",²⁴⁹ "pouring out grievances", and "appraising merits". These have greatly heightened the class consciousness of officers and men in the entire army. The present relations between officers and men are much better than in the past so that commanders say it is now easier to direct troops and our fighters say the cadres have improved their work style. At the same time, relations between the army and civilians as well as relations between different units of our army have improved tremendously. This kind of military democracy must be further developed and the rich experience we have gained summarized for dissemination.

4. Concerning study.

Study should be carried out in two ways.

First, learn from practical struggle. This is indispensable. For instance, you comrades have developed skills on the battlefield and in actual work. This is a very practical and excellent form of study, but

it must now be elevated. You should analyse your experiences in practical struggle and take the further step of systematizing them.

Second, theoretical study. Our cadres are far from having carried out adequate theoretical study, which is as important as learning from practical struggle. If we ignore or have no such study at all, we will become blind in our actions. Lenin has a famous saying, "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement."²³⁰ Theory is the compass for our actions. Should we fail to grasp theory, we will be in danger of losing our orientation. Thus it is extremely hazardous not to study theory. Our comrades must study Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought to heighten our theoretical level and political awareness. Only in this way can we effectively fulfil our glorious revolutionary task.

Last, I hope all comrades will collect and systematize as a new course for our army the rich experience it gained in the Agrarian Revolutionary War (1927-37), the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-45) and the current War of Liberation. I hope you will all work hard to fulfil this task.

A FEW QUESTIONS CONCERNING TRADE UNION WORK

July 23, 1949

Comrades,

Marked success has been achieved in trade union work in various places since the Sixth All-China Labour Congress of August last year²⁷⁹ and the subsequent re-establishment of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. Today, when the Chinese people's democratic revolution has all but achieved nationwide victory, the convening of a national conference on trade union work is of great significance. It has tremendous tasks to fulfil.

(1) We must first of all have a clear understanding of the present status of the working class. In new-democratic China, the working class has already achieved political liberation, and the workers themselves have personally experienced this. They are no longer the ruled, but the ruling class, the leading class in the new-democratic state power. They are masters of the new-democratic country. The workers and staff of enterprises owned by the new-democratic state have achieved economic as well as political liberation. They have been freed from exploitation because, instead of working for the capitalists, they now work for the country, the people and the working class itself. State-run enterprises belong to the state, to the people and, first and foremost, to the working class. Workers and staff in private capitalist enterprises have not yet gained full economic liberation. They are still subject to capitalist exploitation, which can only be kept within certain limits, and not eliminated, in the new-democratic period. However, these privately owned capitalist enterprises are under the control of the new-democratic state power. They can only operate within the guidelines set by this new state power led by the

Speech at the National Conference on Trade Union Work, which was first published in *Renmin Ribao* (*People's Daily*) on July 25, 1949.

working class. Workers and staff in privately owned capitalist enterprises under the new-democratic state power, therefore, must voluntarily accept the economic policy of benefiting both labour and capital. This policy of permitting the existence of private capital and benefiting both labour and capital will remain a necessity for a long period of time. Only when the Chinese working class has exercised effective leadership in new China, carried out successful national construction and gradually transformed our agricultural country into an industrial one, will it be possible for us to effect the transition of New Democracy to socialism and for the working class to achieve complete liberation of its own. Herein lies the fundamental interest of the working class. To this end, the voluntary acceptance of limited capitalist exploitation at the present stage means subordinating limited and immediate interests to fundamental and long-term interests. We Communist Party members and trade union people must educate the workers and lead the trade unions in this spirit. Otherwise, we will become infatuated with economism and “tailism” not worthy of the vanguard of the proletariat, and we will be unable to correctly organize the workers and guide them in accomplishing the historical new-democratic mission of realizing the transition to socialism. Why must we do this? Because in the present stage it is politically necessary for the working class to unite with the national capitalists who are willing to co-operate with us in a joint struggle against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism. And because China is still economically backward, as can be seen from the fact that modern industry contributes only about 10 per cent and agriculture and handicrafts about 90 per cent of the national economy. As Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out, “this is our basic point of departure for all questions during the period of the Chinese revolution and for a fairly long period after victory.”²⁸⁰

(2) Precisely because the working class is the leading class in the new-democratic state, it exercises not only political leadership over the bourgeoisie but also economic leadership over the private capitalist economy through the state power it leads and the state economy it guides. It does this so that, in accord with the principle of considering both public and private interests and benefiting both labour and capital, the private capitalist sector will contribute to the development of production and the national economy. Private capital must be restricted so that it cannot dominate the nation’s economy and the people’s livelihood but, instead, function in a way not harmful but

beneficial to the national economy and the people's livelihood. At the same time, however, we must keep in mind Comrade Mao Zedong's instruction: ". . . In the interest of the whole national economy and in the present and future interest of the working class and all the labouring people, we must not restrict the private capitalist economy too much or too rigidly, but must leave room for it to exist and develop within the framework of the economic policy and planning of the people's republic."²⁸¹ In the current stage, the private capitalist economy that operates within the framework of the economic policy and planning of our people's republic is an indispensable part of our national economy as a whole, a force that cannot be ignored. As the leading class in the new-democratic state, the working class should not only regard the state economy as part of its wealth but also regard the private capitalist economy as part of the social wealth of the state under its leadership.

(3) In addition to engaging in production, therefore, members of the working class in state-run enterprises should learn management and administration and improve their cultural knowledge and political understanding. Workers in these enterprises are part of the working class, and so are their administrative cadres. There should be no conflict whatsoever between the two. Certain disharmonies that now prevail result either from a tendency among the workers towards economism or from a bureaucratic tendency among the administrative cadres. Trade unions in state-run enterprises should recognize the existence of these tendencies as an ideological trend among a section of their members and should correct them through criticism and education. It is, of course, wrong for these trade unions to set themselves against the administrative cadres by supporting the tendency of economism among backward workers; it is not correct, either, for them to adopt an antagonistic approach in trying to combat the bureaucratic tendency among these cadres. On their part, the administrative cadres should value trade union work and give it all possible support, thus enhancing the prestige of trade unions among the workers. It should be understood that production management under New Democracy is fundamentally different from that under bureaucrat-capitalism in that we rely on the workers' voluntary will whereas bureaucrat-capitalism resorts to their coercion and oppression. That is why democratic management and the democratic work style of the administrative cadres assume particular significance. Good trade union work will make it easier to practise democratic management

and give scope to the labour enthusiasm of all the workers and staff for increased production. In short, the administrative cadres in state-run enterprises who manage production on behalf of the state, the workers in these enterprises who are directly engaged in production and the trade union cadres there — they all belong to the working class. Their tasks are identical, that is, to do a good job of production. The working class requires this as well as the state.

In privately owned enterprises, there exist two antagonistic classes, the capitalists and the workers. As an organization of the working class, the trade unions should unswervingly protect its interests. The interests of the working class, however, do not mean unlimited increases in wages and unlimited raising of living standards, which reflect economism and the demands of backward workers, not the real interests of the working class. In the new-democratic state, trade unions in private capitalist enterprises should so educate their workers that they will know what is the fundamental, long-term interests of their own class, devote themselves to the development of production in line with the principle of benefiting both labour and capital, and learn through productive activities and improve themselves. Of course, government decrees and supervision alone are not enough to ensure the implementation of the principle of benefiting both labour and capital in private enterprises. The capitalists use every means to cheat the workers and intensify their exploitation. The above principle can be implemented only through certain appropriate forms of struggle by the workers. In this struggle between the workers and the capitalists, the trade unions should act firmly on behalf of the workers.

(4) Does this mean the trade unions should not seek any possible improvement in the livelihood and welfare of the workers? No. The Party, the trade unions and, above all, the People's Government must ensure a minimum livelihood for the workers and, where possible, seek to improve it. But such improvement is feasible only when production has increased. Although we have liberated many large, medium and small cities, generally speaking we cannot yet improve the workers' livelihood very much apart from ensuring the satisfaction of their minimum requirements. (Of course, their political life has changed fundamentally, now that they are emancipated and free.) The reason is twofold: First, the cities in old China, particularly the large ones, owed their "prosperity" to an imperialist-colonialist economy built on the cruel feudal exploitation of the peasants. Generally speaking, it will take a fairly long time to transform them into new-

democratic, productive cities and they are now in a transition period. Second, in addition to the war devastation over the past decade and more, the cities ruled by the reactionaries were encircled and blockaded by the countryside where the revolutionary forces were based. Now these cities have been liberated, but it will take quite some time to restore the long-disrupted economic ties between these cities and the countryside and establish a new, mutually helpful urban-rural relationship. We are now going through a transition period as far as this objective is concerned. For these major reasons, we have found it rather difficult to resume and sustain industrial production in the many newly liberated cities, let alone plan for any development. Many state-run enterprises are barely able to maintain production with state subsidies. Because of high costs, the products of many enterprises cannot compete with foreign goods at all, and these enterprises can survive only thanks to current import-export controls. It is essential to guarantee a minimum living standard for the workers under present circumstances, and we should persuade them to work hard to tide over the present difficulties. How can we afford to take any further steps and improve the workers' conditions and increase their pay? Of course, where the situation is better (in the Northeast, for instance), the workers' livelihood can be slightly improved when conditions permit. At the same time, it should be noted that some special profits gained under special circumstances are not the kind of surplus value the workers created with their labour under normal conditions. Such profits should go to the state in the form of taxes and then used to support the war effort and contribute towards our investment in industrialization. In no way should they be turned into profits of the capitalists or be used to increase the wages of some workers so that their living standards rise conspicuously compared with that of the others. The Kuomintang bureaucrat-capitalist practice of paying conspicuously high wages to workers in the mills under the China Textile Corporation is designed to buy them off and disrupt the unity of the working class. We should never do this. Our policy is to develop production and, on this basis, improve the workers' livelihood to the extent possible. The fact is that, with the growth of production, the wealth of the people will increase and, as a consequence, the living standards of the people — including the workers' — will rise. To make workers' higher incomes a precondition for the growth of production is to put the cart before the horse. It would be suicidal to attempt to

improve their livelihood at the expense of the development of production.

In summary: The ultimate aim of the revolution is to develop production. This is necessary in order to support the on-going War of Liberation. It will become all the more necessary, particularly in industry, when we build a new China and transform it from an agricultural country into an industrial one, from a new-democratic country into a socialist one. Thus it is the desire of our Party, the working class and the entire Chinese people to develop production, and industry in particular.

As an organization of the working class, the trade unions in a new-democratic state should direct their primary efforts towards increasing production. In private enterprises struggles against the capitalists should serve the principle of benefiting both labour and capital and developing production. In state enterprises, it is all the more imperative to unite the workers and staff and overcome bureaucracy in order to increase production.

The trade unions should also serve as a kind of school for the working class — a school to teach production management and impart class education to the workers.

Finally, the trade unions are an indispensable pillar of the new-democratic state, and a transmission belt between the Party and the workers. Through the unions, the Party's industrial policies and planning as well as policies concerning wages and labour-capital relationship become known among the workers and are then implemented through their effort. Comrades in the trade unions should, therefore, strive to make their organizations a most important lever by which the Party, through its link with the worker masses, implements its policies in industry and among the workers themselves.

I've made the above remarks for your reference during discussions.

CLOSING SPEECH AT THE FIRST PLENARY SESSION OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE

September 30, 1949

Fellow Delegates,

The work of the First Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)²⁸² has drawn to a successful conclusion. We have unanimously proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China. We have passed the Organic Law of the CPPCC, the Organic Law of the Central People's Government and the Common Programme,²⁸³ and elected the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen of the Central People's Government, members of the Central People's Government Council and the National Committee of the CPPCC. We have adopted the national flag, decided on the seat of the capital of our People's Republic and adopted the national anthem and a new chronological system. All we have done conforms to the will of the people.

Throughout the session, all our delegates were united with one will. This bodes well for the prosperity of our country. Since we can unite as one in founding the People's Republic of China, surely we can unite as one in building our country and leading it to prosperity.

During the session, a stream of congratulatory telegrams has reached us from people throughout our country and from people's organizations of various other countries. This shows that our cause enjoys the support of our international friends as well as of the people across our country. We extend our heartfelt thanks to them for their good will. We shall certainly not fail them.

Hail the complete success of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference!

Hail the birth of the People's Republic of China!

Long live the Central People's Government!

Long live Chairman Mao Zedong!

First published in *Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)* on October 1, 1949.

ORDER OF THE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

October 1, 1949

Comrade fighters, commanders and political work and rear service personnel,

Together with the rest of the people throughout our country, the armed forces of the People's Republic of China are today celebrating the establishment of its Central People's Government.

The armed forces of our People's Republic have won a great victory in the revolutionary war against the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek government backed by U.S. imperialism. Most of the enemy troops have been annihilated and the major part of our national territory has been liberated. This is the result of the concerted effort and heroic struggle of all our fighters, commanders and political work and rear service personnel. I hereby express my warm greetings and thanks to you all.

Our combat task, however, remains to be completed. Remnants of enemy forces are still colluding with alien aggressors in their counter-revolutionary activities against the People's Republic of China. We must continue to exert ourselves to achieve the ultimate objective of the People's War of Liberation.

Hereby I order all commanders, fighters and other personnel of the Chinese People's Liberation Army to resolutely execute all orders of the Central People's Government and of the great people's leader, Chairman Mao Zedong, and swiftly wipe out the last remaining reactionary Kuomintang troops and liberate all territory not yet liberated and, at the same time, clean out the bandits and all other counter-revolutionary brigands and suppress their resistance and any kind of subversive acts.

Eternal glory to the people's heroes who fell in the People's War of Liberation!

Long live the great unity of the Chinese people!

Long live the People's Republic of China!

Long live the Central People's Government!

Long live Chairman Mao Zedong!

Zhu De
Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese
People's Liberation Army

SPEECH AT THE JOINT CONFERENCE ON WATER CONSERVATION IN THE LIBERATED AREAS

November 8, 1949

Honourable Delegates and Comrades,

This joint conference on water conservation in the Liberated Areas is a very important gathering. Present are water conservation specialists and other personnel long engaged in this work. Filled with great enthusiasm, all the participants are ready to contribute more to the country and the people. This promises an infinitely bright future for water conservation in China.

Everybody knows that ours has been a backward agricultural country long plundered and exploited by imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism. Agriculture and the handicraft industry made up about 90 per cent of our national economy. In recent years, the reactionary Kuomintang regime damaged the rural economy even more and ruined construction projects of all types. In particular, its perverse use of water bodies as defence works for reactionary military purposes brought about large-scale destruction of river control, afforestation, water storage and other anti-drought and anti-flood facilities. With the exception of those in the old Liberated Areas, almost all the bridges, culverts and dykes in the country were deliberately destroyed by the Kuomintang reactionaries prior to the arrival of our People's Liberation Army. As a result, there have been serious droughts and floods across the country this year. Preliminary statistics show that more than 100 million mu⁸⁶ of cultivated land were struck by such calamities in north, east, central, northeast and northwest China, and the resultant reduction of grain output was estimated at 7.15 billion kilogrammes (including 15 million kilogrammes of cotton

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from the Northwest, which were calculated as the equivalent of 150 million kilogrammes of lesser grains). What appalling figures these are! Our cadres in charge of water conservation, comrades in the Party and government organizations and in the army as well as other sections of the population in the areas concerned did their utmost to protect embankments against flood waters this summer. When the Guantai section of the Huanghe River dyke²⁸⁴ was in danger during the summer flood period, leading members of the Huanghe River Water Conservation Committee and all the engineering personnel in charge of that section together with the local people worked for 25 straight days and nights, finally averting disaster. In other areas there were people, including cadres, who laid down their lives or sacrificed their homes and other property in order to protect threatened dykes. Their heroic deeds were indeed too many to enumerate. Today, combating droughts and floods and building water conservation projects are urgently demanded by people throughout the country. How to meet these demands, that is, how to conquer droughts and floods to benefit farm production and how to best exploit the available hydraulic resources and achieve the greatest results in water conservation in order to help develop agriculture, industry and transport — this is precisely the main item on this conference's agenda.

To realize the above objective, we must work hard and do the following in a planned way:

1. Accomplish flood control, drain inundated fields and dig irrigation networks. These tasks are the most urgent. In flood control work, priority should be given to reinforcing dangerous dyke sections while routine repairs should also be done on other sections. In this way, we hope to eliminate or at least reduce the possibility of flooding next year. Draining fields that are still inundated should be completed in preparation for next spring's ploughing. Where funds and technology are available, all possible effort should be made to dig channels, sink wells and build other irrigation projects so as to prevent possible droughts and increase agricultural production next year. When conditions permit, we should also actively prepare for trial building, at selected points, of larger water conservation projects for permanent use.

2. Dredge canals, irrigation channels and harbours to facilitate navigation and farmland irrigation. This will help promote trade and general economic growth.

3. Utilize the hydraulic resources available to develop industry. We must take active and planned measures to resume and redouble our effort in this connection in order to make our agricultural country an industrial one.

4. Be practical and realistic, and undertake projects commensurate with our capability. On the one hand, we should construct projects in the right order of priority and in light of actual conditions, considering the availability of human and financial resources, technical competence and the existing technical data. On the other hand, surveys and investigations should be made and plans for permanent control of the various river systems worked out so that actual construction can be gradually started once conditions permit.

5. Build our country by the use of technology and carry out our projects by relying on the masses. Experience suggests that for every project we must make the best use of technology, mobilize and rely on the masses, integrate the effort of the technical personnel and that of the masses, make the projects serve production needs, and provide the masses with technical instruction and guidance. Improving our technical competence by drawing on the renovative efforts of the masses is a necessary condition for completing each project. It is also the best way to pool the wisdom of the technicians and the masses.

6. Define a division of work between the water conservation departments and the agricultural, forestry and transport departments, and effectively co-ordinate the activities of all. To avoid wasting human, material and financial resources, hydraulic and water conservation projects on the major river systems should be undertaken in an organized and systematic way and with unified planning and management.

7. Unify planning and guidance. There should be unified planning for water conservation within one and the same river system so that its water can be put to the most rational and efficient use. This is how to carry out water conservation. It is wrong to act on one's own, selfishly scramble for more water or shift one's problem onto others.

Honourable delegates and comrades! Water conservation is an important and yet difficult task in developing our new-democratic economy. To do a good job in this sphere, we must mobilize all forces and overcome all difficulties in the spirit of responsibility to the country and the people. We hope that the scourge of floods and famine will

be banished from China in the not too distant future once its hydraulic resources and water conservation possibilities are fully utilized, and we hope that this will help our country become prosperous and developed.

BUILD A POWERFUL PEOPLE'S AIR FORCE

March 10, 1950

Having seized political power, we are now beginning to build an air force for our own country.

What are the tasks of our Air Force? First of all, it should, in co-ordination with our other armed forces, liberate Taiwan and Hainan Island and establish initial control over part of China's territorial waters and air. Then, on this basis, we will gradually build a completely modern and powerful people's air force that is capable of fully controlling all our territorial waters and air space and of repulsing all possible aggressors. Each member of the Air Force should understand manifestation of bureaucratism deserves our close attention.

We are confident that we can build such an air force. When we began to build the Army, we did so under extremely adverse conditions, but we finally overcame all sorts of difficulties and established a strong Army of more than four million men. The domestic and international situations are now much better than at that time. Although we don't have many planes now, are short of personnel and face other difficulties, we are fully confident that we can overcome the difficulties and build a strong people's air force.

A key to our effort's success is mastering appropriate skills which, in a sense, can be decisive. If we are good at everything except technical skills, we cannot complete our task. In air battles, victory or defeat is more often than not decided in a minute or even a second. Only by being professionally competent can we defeat the enemy. Otherwise we will lose. Therefore, everyone should master the appropriate skills. Political personnel should also familiarize themselves with these skills because you yourselves should know something about

Speech at a conference on political work in the Air Force of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

the skills you require others to learn. Most of the cadres in the Air Force have been transferred from the Army and are not yet familiar with the relevant skills. It doesn't matter. Hard study will lead to their mastery. We should strive to learn what we don't know and make constant efforts to perfect what knowledge we have already acquired. We should learn not only how to fly and repair planes, but also how to make them. We must conscientiously learn science in order to put our aircraft industry on a solid basis. Within three to five years we must change from non-professionals to professionals and, in time, be able to come up with inventions and innovations. This is not an exacting requirement. You political workers must ensure that it is met. You must ensure not only that members of our Air Force are politically faithful, reliable and courageous and firm, but also that they master the necessary skills. In other words, they should be competent both politically and professionally.

I understand that some of you have not yet settled down in your jobs. This is wrong. When the situation was unstable, cadres were frequently transferred and they suffered ideological uncertainties. Now that the overall situation has been stabilized, there will no longer be many job transfers. Everyone should be clear on this issue and make long-term plans instead of cherishing illusions of one sort or another. Yours is an excellent profession that entails a high level of proficiency. You should settle down, work hard, become professionally competent and perform your duties well. The question now is not whether there is a future in this job but how to master the appropriate skills. We are going to train a large number of pilots to meet our needs. This will require all of you to study with concentration and not give up after a few days. The people place great hopes on our Air Force and have spent a lot of money on it. If we fail to study hard we will let them down. This must be made clear to all members. If they master the appropriate skills and are clear about their glorious task, they will naturally settle into their work.

We must not only enable the cadres to work single-mindedly but also enable the cadets to keep their minds on their studies. Constant effort should be made to improve study conditions. We must make sure that we do a good job of remoulding individuals ideologically, so as to foster and fortify their revolutionary world outlook of fearing no self-sacrifice and wholeheartedly serving the people. Organizationally, we promise to transfer qualified people to you, but this alone

is not enough. It is also necessary to ensure their ideological calibre, and herein lies an important task of all of you political workers.

Now that our forces are expanding and schools have been set up, the number of new cadres and young intellectuals has increased and will continue to do so. We should make every effort to unite with and take good care of them. They may be inexperienced politically and ideologically, but they are warmhearted and enthusiastic, open to what is new and eager to improve. They are, in short, young and promising. We should, therefore, set great store by them. As for the small number whose general education is poor and who are not professionally skilled, we should help them patiently. Some people are faint-hearted and afraid of fighting. That doesn't matter. Bravery is not something innate. It builds up through constant practice. Let them be tempered step by step in practice and, once they become highly competent, they will be brave.

With recent developments, we have enlisted a large number of the Kuomintang's technical personnel. This has confronted us with an important political task: We must win them over and remould them. Generally speaking, those who revolted against the Kuomintang and came to us have a certain degree of political awareness. They took this action because they could not stand the corrupt practices of the Kuomintang, or because they realized that its end was near. Take, for example, Liu Shanben²¹¹ and some others who came over to our side. Through political studies, they have all become excellent comrades and are now very active in their work. We should unite not only with those who have already come over to us, but also with those who are coming over now or will do so in the future. This is an important part of our political work. It is true that they bring with them some ideas and habits from the old society, but, instead of rejecting or discriminating against them, we should painstakingly educate them. Only if we do this can they be helped to gradually rid themselves of their old ideas and habits and gain a new ideological consciousness and a new work style characterized by wholehearted service to the people. Political workers should set an example and conscientiously follow the policy of uniting with, educating and ideologically remoulding the personnel in question. For the Air Force alone, we will have to take over some ten thousand people after nationwide liberation. This is not a small figure. These people are professionally competent to a certain extent. If we are conscientious and do well in uniting with, educating and ideologically remoulding them

and if we make proper use of their ability, they can contribute to the development of our Air Force.

Running an air force is a precise military science. It cannot be done well unless we streamline its organizational structure and personnel, which can improve efficiency and save money to be used more appropriately elsewhere. The organization of the Air Force need not be the same as that of the Army, which includes headquarters and political, logistical and health departments and so on and so forth. Since most of you are stationed in the suburbs, you can use regular urban facilities. In employing people, choose the best. Under no circumstances accept unqualified persons. We don't stress numbers. We stress ability, proficiency and efficiency. If our organization is unwieldy and there are too many unqualified people, too much time will have to be devoted to personnel matters, which will reduce efficiency or even be counter-productive. That is to say, you will have to carry a heavy burden.

We have set up the Air Force Headquarters, and now we have a certain number of planes, airfields and maintenance shops. We should do our best to manage them well. These alone, however, are far below our requirements. We must also set up air divisions and corps, and build more planes, airfields and maintenance shops. You should, therefore, run things well, learn scientific management, use your minds better, work creatively and economically and strive to do a good job. All this will help transform our wishes into reality at an early date.

Of course we don't mean that we face no difficulties whatsoever. We lack experience and material resources, and the United States and Chiang Kai-shek are plotting sabotage. We should not be afraid of difficulties, however, but try to surmount them. The Chinese revolution shows that all successes are achieved by overcoming difficulties. Do not expect to reap where you have not sown. Do whatever needs to be done. We cannot afford to lose any time in building our Air Force. We must do the job well, whatever the basis we have to build on and whatever the difficulties we face. Ours is a vast country with abundant resources and a population of 475 million. And we have the correct leadership of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and of Comrade Mao Zedong. We shall be able, provided we work unrelentingly, to overcome diverse difficulties and succeed in building a powerful, modern air force.

STRENGTHEN INSPECTION OF PARTY DISCIPLINE

May 6, 1950

Comrades,

Since the promulgation last November of the Central Committee's "Decision on Establishing Commissions for Inspection of Party Discipline at the Central and Other Levels",²⁸⁵ such organizations have been set up in various localities and in various army units, and they have begun working. Commissions for the inspection of Party discipline have also been set up in the central Party, government, army and mass organizations and in their subordinate units, and they too have begun their activities. In order to improve their work, we are holding this joint meeting today of all these commissions. Let me take this opportunity to discuss the following points:

(1) On the importance of discipline and the inspection of discipline.

Our Party has a 28-year history. Our experience shows that it is vitally important to observe iron discipline within the Party. Everybody knows that under the guidance of Comrade Mao Zedong, we corrected some grave mistakes in this 28-year period and, as a result, surmounted a variety of difficulties and smoothed the implementation of the Party's correct line, policies and resolutions and won a great historic victory in the Chinese revolution, as we recognize today. Without Party discipline or without its strict observance, our Party would have been like a heap of loose sand and would have been unable to lead millions upon millions of the masses in their struggle or to achieve the great victory we enjoy today. Lenin said, ". . . Absolute centralization and the strictest discipline of the proletariat

A slightly abridged version of a speech at a joint meeting of commissions for inspection of Party discipline in the central Party, government, army and mass organizations and in their subordinate units.

constitute one of the fundamental conditions for victory over the bourgeoisie.”²⁸⁶ And Comrade Mao Zedong said, “Discipline is the guarantee for the implementation of the line.”²⁸⁷ These are irrefutable conclusions drawn from protracted revolutionary struggle. Within the Party as a whole, no one at present has any doubts on such major questions as the Party’s line and policies, for we have the strong and correct leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong and the Central Committee. The question before us is how to guarantee the smooth enforcement of the Party’s line and policies and how best to forestall any actions or tendencies — whether deliberate or not — that undermine the Party’s line and policies. Thus in the interest of Party centralization and unity, it’s essential to enforce iron discipline and fortify the sense of discipline within the Party.

The Party is highly regarded by non-Party people because it has led the Chinese people in achieving a decisive victory and in establishing a state of the people’s democratic dictatorship, and now has become the party that leads in the exercise of such state power. The scope of co-operation between the Party and non-Party people is broadening and more and more issues are involved. Because of this, what our Party says and does exerts a great influence on the people throughout the country. If a group, or even a few, of our Party members are indiscreet in word or deed, it weakens the Party’s fighting capacity and lowers its prestige among the masses. Therefore, it is now particularly important to maintain iron discipline and strengthen the sense of discipline in the Party.

Our comrades in charge of inspecting discipline should investigate whether there are any bureaucratic or other actions or tendencies among Party organizations and Party members that run counter to the political line, policies, Constitution, discipline and decisions of the Party as well as to state laws and decrees, and that jeopardize the interests of the masses and divorce our Party from them. We should do our best to stop or prevent all these bad things. If we do so, we will help guarantee the correct implementation of the Party’s line, policies and decisions, and we will play the role of an able assistant to the Party committees in carrying out policies and decisions. All comrades concerned should, therefore, understand the importance of the inspection of discipline, and strive to fulfil the glorious task assigned to them by the Party.

(2) On Party cadres’ violation of Party policies and discipline.

Since the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee,²⁸⁸ the revolutionary cause led by the Party has developed swiftly and extensively. We won a decisive victory in the past year, liberating all of the country except Tibet and Taiwan, and Party membership has increased from 3 million to 4.5 million or more. Generally speaking, our Party cadres work hard and have achieved a lot under the guidance of the correct policies of the Central Committee. That is the only explanation for our present accomplishments. But quite a number of our Party cadres have violated Party policies and discipline on many occasions in carrying out such policies and performing other tasks. This has caused discontent with our Party among the masses and unless we put a stop to it, we shall divorce ourselves from them to a serious degree. The following are the more striking manifestations of the violation of Party policies and discipline:

The first is serious coercion and commandism and a resulting alienation from the masses. In their effort to collect grain and other taxes, to ensure the purchase of government bonds, and to reduce rent and carry out agrarian reform, quite a few Party cadres, especially those at the lower levels, have resorted to arbitrary means, such as arresting and beating people or inciting bad elements to do the same. They were merely concerned with fulfilling the tasks at hand, caring little about the consequences of their acts. This has become a rather common phenomenon. These comrades don't understand that in order to carry the revolutionary war through to the end and stabilize prices and finances, the state has already imposed a heavy burden on the people in the form of grain and other taxes and subscriptions to government bonds. We should conduct effective propaganda and explain these matters to the masses and devise good work methods so that we can work smoothly and fulfil our tasks. Otherwise, the people will complain or even oppose us. The comrades concerned have failed to heed these points or the Party's repeated exhortation that we should keep in close contact with the masses and rely on them, and that we should explain things clearly to the masses and consult them in solving problems. Comrade Mao Zedong has also advised us again and again to be modest and prudent, to guard against conceit and impetuosity, to be good at uniting and co-operating with non-Party people, and to identify ourselves with the masses rather than stand above them. However, the comrades I've referred to who regard themselves as privileged and who are accustomed to over-simplified work methods or coercion and commandism — these comrades are unmindful of the

Party's instructions. They don't study them conscientiously. Instead, they always consider themselves in the right and act wilfully. This explains the recurrent violations of Party policies and discipline, which have caused grave political losses to our Party.

The second manifestation is the increasingly bureaucratic style of work. Some Party cadres pay no attention to state affairs or the well-being of the people. They do not understand that the constant and important task of Party members is to know and change the world. These comrades are slack at work and simply drift along. As a result, they have gradually lost the fine qualities of a Party member. Take for example boosting production to help areas hit by natural disasters. Many Party cadres have neglected this problem, which has a vital bearing on the well-being of tens of millions of people. There have been serious shortcomings and errors in reporting actual conditions to higher levels and organizing related work, thus adding to the people's suffering and losses to the Party and the state. Had our Party cadres paid attention to these problems earlier, had they made more accurate reports and more practical arrangements, we could have done better relief work by promoting production and thus reducing or in part preventing the suffering and losses sustained by the people. This manifestation of bureaucratism deserves our close attention.

Also, some of our Party cadres take an indifferent and irresponsible attitude towards revolutionary work and state property. This has extremely grave consequences. For instance, there have been successive accidents resulting in death on railways and in mines. Factory equipment and materials have been ruined or damaged. Many warehouses have been destroyed and their materials either stolen or left to deteriorate. The losses incurred in such instances are appalling. One can imagine how much more terrible our losses would be if we also counted those resulting from waste. In the country's present financial difficulty, it should be considered a crime to the Party, the state and the people for some of our Party cadres to have such a bureaucratic work style and to take such an indifferent and irresponsible attitude towards revolutionary work and state property. Unless they correct their mistakes sincerely, these comrades will not be forgiven by the Party, by the state or by the people. To effectively help these comrades rectify their erroneous thinking, actions and style of work, we should enhance their sense of Party organization and discipline in addition to constantly strengthening ideological education and making regular criticism and self-criticism. Only by so doing can we further mobilize

the masses and help these Party cadres raise their political consciousness and overcome their cursed bureaucratism by dint of mass supervision.

The third manifestation consists of the glaringly backward ideas of some of our Party cadres who put on the airs of veterans and ask to be rewarded for having rendered “meritorious service” to the people. Regarding themselves as meritorious persons who have won state power for the people, they demand that the Party and the people give them high positions and preferential treatment. They look down upon non-Party people and the masses in general and show contempt for Party organization and discipline, for the government, and for state laws. Regrettably, the backward ideas and acts of these comrades show only that they are losing the qualities befitting Party members.

True, basic victory has been achieved in the Chinese revolution. “Who overthrew the reactionary regime in China and to whom should we attribute this victory?” Comrades, if you ask this question, I would reply that it is the entire membership of the Party and the masses who together overthrew the reactionaries, and that this victory should first be attributed to the people and, as far as our Party is concerned, to Comrade Mao Zedong. Countless martyrs have laid down their lives over nearly 30 years of severe struggle against the reactionaries. Without their heroism and sacrifice our present victory would have been inconceivable. Likewise, without the correct leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong and without our constantly correcting our shortcomings and mistakes under the guidance of Mao Zedong Thought, the rapid expansion and final victory of the revolutionary cause of the Party and the people would have been impossible. No comrade is justified in assuming that his service has been so extraordinary that the Party and the people owe him a high position and preferential treatment. We Communists are duty-bound to change society and the world. Even if you’ve done the best job and made the greatest contribution, that’s no more than what is expected of you. What is there to be proud of? We Communists should be broad-minded, make stricter demands of ourselves than of others, attribute achievements first to the masses and be willing to shoulder responsibility for any mistakes. To quote an ancient classic, “We should give all the credit to others and put all the blame on ourselves.”²⁸⁹ We behaved in this manner in the past, and we should do so at present. I hope that those comrades who claim undue credit for themselves will learn to be more modest and honest and concentrate their energies on revolutionary work instead of worry-

ing about position and material benefits. Otherwise, the Party and the people will forsake you and you'll fall behind in the revolutionary ranks, unable to advance shoulder to shoulder with other comrades.

Another extremely naive, backward and erroneous way of thinking is to belittle non-Party people and others. The comrades in question don't understand what an influence non-Party people can have among the broad masses, nor do they understand that it is the people, and the people alone, who are the heroes in the making of history. We must understand that no state power can be won through the efforts of a small number of people, and that there is no individual in history who, alienating himself from the masses, can bring about the collapse of a reactionary regime all by himself. If you think you are superior and so extraordinarily capable that you can overthrow the reactionary regime without the effort of the masses, try it and see what happens. I think there will be only one possibility: You will be spurned by the masses. We must, therefore, do our best to unite with non-Party people, maintain close contact with and rely on the masses and have faith in them. Only thus can we do our work and build our country well. Any other way will get us nowhere and, moreover, we'll commit mistakes and inflict grave losses on the Party and the state.

It is equally wrong to despise Party organization and discipline, or to despise the government and the law. If you have anything to say, say it to the Party organization, which will accept your proposals if they are right. Some comrades don't believe in the Party organization, saying, "So-and-so is no good", or "So-and-so means nothing to me at all". To them, there's no distinction between an individual and the Party organization. Others fail to understand the importance of discipline, believing that it is for ordinary Party members to observe while they themselves are exceptions. Still others belittle the government and the law. To them the government means nothing and can't interfere with their business because they are veteran Party members. They think that state laws apply only to ordinary people, not to them. All these are manifestations of the ideas and behaviour of the exploiting classes, and are a shame to us Communists. To be a good Party member, one should subordinate oneself to the organization, observe discipline, respect and cherish the government and abide by the laws and decrees of the state.

In short, our only purpose in repeatedly admonishing those comrades who put on the airs of a veteran is to help them turn back from the wrong path so that they will not drop out of the revolutionary

ranks but will be able to continue advancing with us towards a more ideal society, a society of a higher order.

The fourth manifestation is increased corruption. According to a report from the Beijing Municipal Party Committee, 182 Party cadres violated policies and state laws in the past year. In Jinan city in Shandong Province, between January 1948 and January 1949, 58 Party cadres were punished for violating Party discipline, three-fourths of them for Right-deviationist errors, pleasure-seeking and corruption. What happened in these two cities indicates that, since entering the big cities, quite a number of our Party members have become more interested in a life of pleasure, which has led to increased corruption. This must arouse our high vigilance. To stem this trend, we'll propose to the government that it work out and promulgate regulations for the punishment of corrupt elements. Our aim is to make it impossible for any person guilty of embezzlement to escape the punishment he deserves.

The above is the main situation concerning violation of policies and discipline by Party cadres.

Why is it that there are more cases of policy and discipline violations now? Why is it that this problem has grown particularly serious today? There are both objective and subjective causes.

Objectively, it is because, with the victory of the revolution, many bad things are liable to emerge among us, such as lowering political vigilance, becoming slack ideologically and growing complacent. Also, we have to reckon with the influence of our surroundings, such as the other classes with which we co-operate, the old personnel who have been kept in their jobs since Liberation, and urban life with its myriad temptations. Although the powerful enemies of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism have largely been overthrown or are soon to be overthrown by us for good, their lingering and degenerate ideologies, ways of life and habits can be eliminated only gradually and through arduous, protracted and tenacious struggle. It is to be expected that these deep-rooted evils will continue to influence, invade or corrupt us through various channels now and for a long time to come. This is, then, the objective environment in which we find ourselves after victory. Unless we rid ourselves of its influence, we will be hindered by it. For instance, some comrades, now that they are working in the cities, have succumbed to the temptations of urban life and begun to seek pleasure in food, clothing, living quarters and transportation. Some comrades have been complaining that their

houses are too small and too poor. When we were working in the mountain gullies, hundreds of people lived in a hamlet and nobody felt crowded. But now that they've become residents of major cities such as Beijing, they complain about a lack of living space. This seems a mere trifle, but it reflects a serious ideological problem to which we should give close attention. If not, there is a danger that the comrades concerned will become corrupt.

In addition to these objective causes of the current, acutely serious policy and discipline violations by some Party cadres, there are subjective causes. I include among these many serious shortcomings in intra-Party education, intra-Party political life and work systems, and especially in the enforcement of Party discipline. More specifically, I mean the following: Intra-Party education is not conducted regularly, earnestly or very realistically. Intra-Party political life is not as regular or satisfactory as it ought to be, either, especially in the various government departments and the lower-level organizations. Some units do not implement intra-Party work systems strictly enough, as witness their failure to conscientiously carry out the system of asking for instructions beforehand and submitting timely reports afterwards; and there is the serious phenomenon of a few units not applying this system at all. What's worse, enforcement of Party discipline is, in general, far from strict, and this has made violations of Party discipline and state laws by Party cadres a rather common occurrence. We must overcome these shortcomings in order to advance the cause of the Party and people one more step.

(3) On how to rectify the Party cadres' error of violating Party policies and discipline.

The Central Committee has taken measures to rectify the practice by some Party cadres of seriously violating Party policies and discipline. It recently proposed Party consolidation and issued an instruction on it.²⁹⁰ The purpose of Party consolidation is to help the Party cadres concerned eradicate from their work style coercion, commandism and alienation from the masses and get rid of their pleasure-seeking or degenerate ideas and actions. Party committees at all levels are required to train Party cadres and help them improve themselves, all in the spirit of the Central Committee's recent instruction on Party consolidation. This involves arduous, long-term education, during which we should monitor the work of the Party cadres and help them analyse their experience so that they can constantly enhance their understanding of policies, raise their ideological level and overcome

their shortcomings and correct their mistakes. To this end, we should draw on our experience in previous rectification movements and in the Party consolidation campaign during the agrarian reform. Our past rectification movements were conducted mainly through education, the chief aim being to remould people's thinking. Guided by Comrade Mao Zedong's correct principle, "Learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones and cure the sickness to save the patient", such movements yielded significant results in changing the thinking of Party cadres, especially those who had been petty-bourgeois intellectuals. The achievements of these movements were unprecedented and their influence was profound. Their common shortcoming was that Party organizations in many places had a one-sided understanding of ideological remoulding. Consequently, discipline was not observed as it should be and some comrades with undesirable thinking always tried to justify their violations of the decisions of Party organizations and Party discipline, their pretext being that they had yet to straighten out their thinking. This is a lesson to remember. We also achieved notable results in Party consolidation during the agrarian reform. Specifically, coercion and commandism on the part of some Party cadres were seriously criticized, Party organizations in the rural areas were purified and consolidated and Party members, cadres and the masses received a good education. However, in the course of such Party consolidation, some localities tried to solve problems in an overly simple way and put undue stress on disciplinary measures, so that too many Party cadres were punished, including some whose mistakes were not serious and so did not deserve the punishments they received. This is another lesson to be learned. Thus, to repeat: we should draw on the successful experiences of past rectification movements and the Party consolidation campaign in the agrarian reform and avoid their shortcomings and mistakes. We should make ideological education primary and disciplinary sanction secondary. Necessary disciplinary measures must be taken against those Party cadres who still violate policies and discipline regardless of prior admonitions by the Party and against those who refuse to mend their ways after violating discipline.

It is true that in the central Party, government, army and mass organizations, there are few such serious cases of coercion, commandism and alienation from the masses as described above. But can we say that there are no policy and discipline violations there? No, we cannot. There are still many instances of bureaucratism, liberalism, re-

luctance to unite and co-operate with non-Party people, irresponsibility towards revolutionary work and state property, as well as individualism characterized by flaunting seniority, haggling for position and pursuing pleasure. Therefore, in accordance with the Central Committee's instruction on Party consolidation, the central organizations should also examine carefully whether their Party cadres have unhealthy ideas and bad work styles, and whether they have violated Party policies and discipline. Each comrade should voluntarily make a self-examination. All the negative things cited above must be overcome wherever they are discovered. This is a very arduous task. All comrades present here should take it up in earnest and, with a great sense of responsibility, do their utmost to help their Party committees fulfil it.

What methods should we employ to accomplish this task? In my opinion, we should mainly employ the following three: The first is to combine constant inspection of discipline by the leadership from top to bottom with extended democracy inside and outside the Party and with criticism and self-criticism. With efforts from these two directions, wrong ideas and acts will be exposed and comrades who have made mistakes will be given the necessary help. The second is to combine intra-Party education with enforcement of discipline. Intra-Party education, which is primary, should aim to constantly heighten the political and ideological level of all Party cadres so as to help them avoid and correct mistakes. At the same time, disciplinary measures must be taken against those comrades who refuse to mend their ways. That's what I mean by combining intra-Party education with enforcement of discipline. Of course, the former should be primary and the latter supplementary, and we should be clear about this and never punish Party cadres at will. The third is to solve problems immediately when they are discovered, to analyse experience in good time and publicize it through Party or other newspapers and journals to educate the entire Party and the people at large. This third method is very important. We must make a point of solving problems and correcting mistakes as soon as they are discovered instead of letting them accumulate for package settlement. If we don't, the Party cadres concerned will make ever more serious mistakes until their problems start threatening their political career. We should regularly review our experience in dealing with such cases and publish it in the Party press or other newspapers and periodicals. This would be very useful as it would enable us to educate the entire Party and

the people in general as well as effectively help the erring Party cadres themselves. Some people do not care the least about their mistakes until they are made public, and so it is hard for them to mend their ways. Once their mistakes are published in the newspapers, everybody knows about them and they can no longer cover them up. We must, however, see to it that only cases of major educational significance are published, and we should not overdo it. Otherwise, we'll hurt the feelings of Party cadres and bring about the opposite of what we want.

In the interests of our work, we ask every comrade engaged in discipline inspection to do the following: First of all, they should understand the importance of their task and go about their regular work in accordance with the duties, functions and powers of the discipline-inspection commissions as stipulated by the Central Committee, with reference to the detailed rules for work of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and in the light of the specific conditions of each unit. Second, comrades doing discipline-inspection work should be honest and upright, public-spirited and law-abiding, and exemplary in observing discipline, subordinating themselves to the Party organization and uniting with the masses. Otherwise, what they say will carry no weight and they will find it difficult to do their work well. Third, they should distinguish between right and wrong and adhere to principles. By the former we mean that they should judge correctly whether policies and discipline are really violated and, if so, what specific policies and discipline are involved, what the nature of the problem is and how serious. By adhering to principles we mean not being afraid of offending people and not committing the error of liberalism. They should expose and take measures to rectify all acts that violate policies and discipline, no matter which organizations or individuals are involved. But not being afraid of offending people does not mean that charges can be brought against people rashly or their cases dealt with carelessly. Instead, all cases should be handled, from start to finish, with justification and great care. Comrades engaged in inspecting discipline should bear in mind Comrade Mao Zedong's principle, "Learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones and cure the sickness to save the patient", and should oppose exclusive stress on punishment. They should be politically-minded and pay close attention to matters of policy and principle rather than pick on others for their faults or describe trifles as involving principles. Fourth, led by the committees, general branches or

branches of the Party, they should work more effectively by relying on Party activists and winning mass support.

Of course, we have difficulties in our work of inspecting discipline because it is new to us. Since we lack experience, we have to learn on the job and discover our own path. Moreover, we are not adequately equipped either organizationally or with regard to personnel. Most of the comrades engaged in inspecting discipline do it part-time in addition to their regular heavy load. Also, some leading bodies haven't paid due attention to this work. Because of all this, our work has not progressed fast enough. We've got to take all these difficulties into account. After this meeting, we should have further discussions in order to acquire an adequate understanding of the importance of discipline inspection and do it more satisfactorily. Now that the Party and the people have entrusted us with this task, we should not shirk our responsibility. Otherwise, we will ourselves commit the mistake of flouting Party organization and discipline. Where necessary and possible, we'll gradually expand the discipline-inspection organizations and enlist more and more personnel. I hope that, instead of relaxing their efforts in face of temporary difficulties, all comrades charged with inspecting discipline will advance courageously and indomitably, surmount whatever difficulties they find in their path and do their work well. They will thus be able to accomplish the significant task the Party and the people have assigned them.

GLORIOUS TASKS OF THE COMBAT HEROES AND MODEL WORKERS

September 25, 1950

Honourable Combat Heroes and Model Workers,

Today you are gathered here in the capital of our People's Republic for your grand conferences of combat heroes and of model workers, both of which are of a mass character. That these conferences are taking place is due to the long struggle waged by the Chinese working people under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, to your heroic deeds and exemplary achievements and to the efforts you made together with the rest of the Chinese people. Therefore, your conferences are of very great significance and should be written down in the history of the Chinese people's struggle as exceptional and memorable occasions.

Some of you are combat heroes from the field armies; some are heroes from the local people's militia units and model figures from the various localities in supporting the army fighting at the front; others are model workers from factories, mines and the rural areas. You have inherited the brave and industrious traditions of the Chinese people. In the great People's War of Liberation (1946-49) and in our difficult national construction, you have yourselves worked tirelessly, displaying patriotism, revolutionary heroism and creativeness, and you have led the broad masses in fulfilling whatever tasks assigned by the state. Your efforts have been crowned with significant successes and have produced remarkable results. Here we extend to you our welcome — and our thanks.

Although we have won great victories in the Chinese revolution, our War of Liberation remains unfinished and our construction work

A speech delivered at a joint meeting of representatives of combat heroes and model workers in industry, agriculture and the army who were attending their respective national conferences. Its text first appeared in *Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)* on September 26, 1950.

has just begun. So we are still faced with great and difficult tasks: We must wipe out the remaining bandits in the country, liberate all our territory including Taiwan and Tibet and build a modern army of national defence to oppose aggression and safeguard peace. At the same time, we must increase production and work for economic prosperity in order to turn a backward, agricultural China into a highly-productive industrial country. In face of such arduous tasks, we cannot in the least afford to relax our efforts. On the contrary, all of us — and our politically aware heroes and model workers in particular — should voluntarily take on these great and glorious tasks that have been made so much heavier for us.

At present the U.S. imperialists are frenziedly waging an aggressive war in an attempt to dominate the entire world and enslave all people of good will. A few months ago, they launched an aggressive war against our friendly neighbour Korea and encroached on our territory Taiwan that awaits liberation. More recently they belligerently sent planes to violate our sacred air space and strafe our innocent and peaceful inhabitants. This series of events indicates that the U.S. imperialists are not going to slacken their aggression against the Chinese people. In such circumstances, although we Chinese people are a consistently peace-loving people, we must, for the independence of our motherland and the freedom and development of our nation, remain unfailingly vigilant against the adventurist acts of the imperialists and be amply prepared at all times to defend our territory and sovereignty. The experiences China and other countries have gained in their revolutions during the past decades fully support the truth that only by building powerful people's armed forces and resolutely opposing counter-revolutionary wars launched from inside or outside a country can the freedom of a nation and the peaceful life and well-being of a people be secured. The task before us, therefore, is to build a modern army of national defence, an army that is powerful enough to repulse the attacks of any aggressor. Only thus can we defend the fruits of our victory and the peaceful construction now in progress.

To build a modern army of national defence, we must create adequate material and political conditions. The material conditions are to be guaranteed mainly by our country's planned production and the strong support of our entire people, while the political conditions are to be provided by our comrades in the military. Being armed forces of the people's revolution with firm revolutionary and mass view-

points, our People's Liberation Army always enjoys high combat morale and its ranks are filled with revolutionary heroism. Countless heroes have sprung from among them, heroes who are staunch, courageous, and unswerving in the face of difficulties, faithful at all times in serving the people and ready to sacrifice their lives for the revolution. They have performed numerous moving and immortal deeds of heroism. We should fully study and publicize their deeds and conduct a more intensive education in patriotism and revolutionary heroism in our army by citing these stirring deeds. On this basis we should launch a widespread campaign for rendering meritorious service so as to further improve the quality of all our fighters and accelerate the development of our army. This is a most important task that must be fulfilled in building our army. It should be understood that, if our army has modern equipment and if its men who use such equipment are heroes utterly devoted to the revolution and possessing revolutionary heroism, then it will be worthy of being called a rock-firm, invincible army. With such an army we can protect the peaceful life and well-being of the Chinese people and ultimately eliminate war.

We are now undertaking a great national construction. We are going to build a new, prosperous and powerful country on the ruins of the past reactionary regime. We are going to rehabilitate and increase our industrial and agricultural production. We are going to produce steel and iron, machinery, grain and cotton and other daily necessities to meet our needs. During the past year, our government has exerted great efforts in organizing this work and our model workers have worked out different ways for advancing and improving it. Our efforts have achieved results, but they are still far from equalling the actual demand. We have to achieve more and better results. For this purpose, we must popularize this movement of model workers extensively, making it a movement with a much broader mass basis. Only thus can we achieve greater successes in production and construction.

Honourable combat heroes and model workers! Your efforts have won the respect of the people and the love of the nation. Glory is yours. But you must not become conceited or relax your efforts. The cause of people's liberation requires protracted and arduous struggle. To preserve your glorious titles of hero and model worker, you will need to fortify your revolutionary will to serve the people all your lives, always follow the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman Mao Zedong, be on guard against conceit and impetuosity, learn from the

masses with an open mind, continue to raise your abilities and always remain close to the masses while leading them in doing their work well and fulfilling with flying colours the tasks assigned by the state.

Success to your conferences! Good health to you all!

MARCH INTO TIBET, CONSOLIDATE NATIONAL DEFENCE

May 25, 1951

(1) It is a great and glorious task to march into Tibet and consolidate our national defence.

(2) Make preparations for the march, taking into careful consideration everything, such as food, clothing, shelter and transportation.

(3) Fear neither difficulty nor danger. We will encounter high ridges, snow-capped mountains and vast grasslands, but we can carve paths through the mountains and build bridges where necessary. Nothing can obstruct the advance of our People's Liberation Army.

(4) When there is fraternal unity and mutual help, with everyone using his head and offering suggestions, we can overcome any difficulty.

(5) Carry forward the spirit of hard work and plain living of the People's Liberation Army and maintain its tradition of strictly observing discipline.

(6) It is most glorious to help the Tibetan people. Respect their customs and learn their language. Be modest and prudent, guard against conceit and impetuosity, and keep in close contact with our Tibetan compatriots.

(7) Take a long-term view in regard to army building and try to perfect military skills to defend our nation. Increase production to guarantee provisions. Ours is both a fighting force and a force for production.,

Written at the request of the troops of the Chinese People's Liberation Army who were to enter Tibet in accordance with an agreement reached between the Central People's Government and the local government of Tibet in May 1951 on measures for the region's peaceful liberation.

(8) Learn to battle the elements. Offer more ideas and make more suggestions. Produce more grain and breed more cattle and sheep. Let us gradually turn the plateau into fertile land through our diligent labour.

Let us do our best, Comrades! We shall certainly accomplish the historic task assigned us.

BUILD THE NAVY, DEFEND OUR COASTS

September 11, 1951

Our Navy was established only two years after the founding of the People's Republic of China. Although not yet strong enough, it has been built along modern lines. Our Army, which is now a powerful force, has grown from small to large, from weak to strong. So we believe that with time and effort the Chinese people will similarly build a navy as powerful as the Army, one that will be equally brave and skilled in battle.

It is not that China had no navy in the past, but that the country had no effective coastal defence to speak of. Today, we have a people's navy. Though newly established with very few warships and inadequate equipment and though much has to be done from scratch, our Navy has assumed the glorious task of safeguarding the Chinese coasts. It is now our primary job in national defence to safeguard our coastline and defend our territorial waters. This is a difficult task requiring the effort of the commanders and fighters of the whole Navy and its co-ordination with the Army and the Air Force. During my current visit I have seen the great progress you comrades have made in all areas through concerted effort.

Though newly established, our Navy has a sound foundation because of its close connection with the Army in its groundwork. Now a powerful force, our Army has fully demonstrated its might in overthrowing the reactionary Kuomintang rule and driving the imperialists out of China. Our new-born Navy adheres to the fine traditions of the Army because a large number of competent people have been transferred to it from the latter, a factor that has been a great help to the building of the Navy. The one disadvantage is that many of our Navy comrades know little about naval techniques. Therefore, they must work hard to learn. Those of you whom the Party has transferred

Speech at the First Conference on Political Work in the Navy of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

to the Navy should regard your present work as a glorious mission and be prepared to remain with the Navy for a long time. Every commander or fighter should learn anew and try to master modern naval techniques, adapt himself to life at sea and develop himself into a stalwart sailor.

Our present conference is concerned with political work in the Navy. The primary thing in such work is to ensure the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party over the Navy and see that all its servicemen are faithful to the people and the motherland and strictly observe revolutionary discipline. It is important to make sure that all commanders and fighters master modern technical know-how. For instance, I have observed the technical training in the Artillery School, where an advanced method has been adopted. This is a concrete and practical training method that is very good and should be widely popularized. Political work should play a role in this, raising everyone's enthusiasm for study and helping everyone to master the use of artillery as quickly as possible.

We had no artillery at all during the guerrilla war, nor did we properly value captured artillery pieces. However, we began to value them when their effectiveness became evident in the major campaigns at the later stage of the War of Liberation (1946-49). Navy being quite different from the Army, artillery plays a particularly important role in war at sea. Artillery is extensively used while hand-to-hand combat is rare or even not needed. If we have coastal guns, torpedoes, and warships equipped with appropriate types of artillery, along with cover by the Air Force, we can defeat any enemy attack from the sea. We must, therefore, pay attention to the training of naval artillerymen. At the same time, the coastal artillery positions must be resolutely defended. In ground wars of the past, our Army did not take the seizure of cities as its main objective because it wanted to wipe out the enemy's effective strength first. The Navy, however, is different, its tasks being to safeguard the front line of our national defence and to annihilate the enemy at sea. The coastal naval artillerymen must, therefore, have solid and permanent fortifications. In addition to their routine drills, these men must constantly reinforce their fortifications. Indeed, construction of the strongest defence fortifications for long-term use should be left to the coastal artillerymen and marines, because in peace-time they do not participate in many troop manoeuvres, nor do they have many combat duties. This will enable us to build good coastal defence works at less cost. Some peo-

ple have said — and rightly — that artillery is the “God of War”. Stress should continue to be laid on artillery in modern warfare. Political work in our Navy must, therefore, ensure the training of skilled artillerymen of a high political calibre.

Is the Navy required to do mass work? The answer is Yes. Since its main contacts are with the large numbers of fishermen, the Navy should do good political work among these people and try to raise their political and cultural levels so that they can serve as scouts and guerrillas when necessary. Remember that in addition to mastering combat skills, you must keep close contact with the masses and win their respect and support. Only thus can you achieve victory in war.

The Navy has another task in political work, that is, to ensure the success of its war production, mainly the manufacture of warships. Though we are not yet able to make heavy warships, we should learn to make gunboats and small warships. We can do this because we have both workers and shipyards. Results may not be up to par at the outset, but the experience we gain will facilitate further development.

For some years to come, our Navy will not have heavy landing craft, heavy warships or aircraft carriers. As a result, we can only adopt the policy of strategic defence. Of course we don’t want pure defence. There should also be offensive tactics in defence. Speedboats and submarines working with aircraft and artillery cover are most powerful on both the offence and the defence. Possessing strong coastal fortifications, our comrades in the Navy should have confidence and make determined efforts to wipe out any invaders in co-ordination with both our ground and air forces.

Our country has rich natural resources and a large population. Our people are wise, diligent and courageous. We must do our utmost to safeguard our great and beloved motherland and our people. The imperialists provoked the First and Second World Wars. If they dare to start another, they will meet with even more ignominious defeat.

UNIFY THE TRAINING PLAN AND SPEED UP THE BUILDING OF A MODERN AND REGULARIZED ARMY

September 24, 1951

The 1952 national plan for the training of our ground force has been formulated. We have invited you to this conference to familiarize you with the plan so that it can be carried out to the letter.

Here I am going to discuss the following five questions.

(1) The training plan for 1952 is mainly designed to modernize and regularize the army. This is to be done from bottom up, with the division as the basic unit. From the infantry through the specialized branches and public security troops, all will be trained under this unified plan.

We must carry out this training because current circumstances and the war we are fighting are totally different from those of the past. Without it, we shall be unable to achieve genuine modernization even if we have modern equipment. I would like to deal with this question by touching on the following points.

With regard to the enemy, we are now fighting U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. They are different from the enemy we fought during the civil war periods. They have complete services and all the necessary branches using highly sophisticated weapons. We should work out effective counter-measures against the organization and tactics of the U.S. aggressor troops and, according to the actual needs, build on the valuable experience we gained in the revolutionary war. By so

Speech at a conference on the implementation, in 1952, of a unified national training plan for the ground force. The conference, called in September 1951 by the Military Training Department of the People's Revolutionary Military Council under the Central People's Government, was attended by commanders and chiefs of staff from the various army branches and by chiefs of staff and heads of the training departments in the military areas.

doing, we can defeat the enemy. This truth has been borne out by our experience in the past year in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea.²⁹¹ We are faced now with the new tasks of analysing our experience, reorganizing and consolidating the army and learning methods of modern warfare.

With regard to friends, the socialist and People's Democratic countries not only maintain profound friendship with us, but provide us with direct aid. With these friends joining us on the anti-imperialist front, our position is stronger and our victory more assured.

With regard to weaponry and equipment, since we enjoy assistance from fraternal countries and now have big cities with industries on a fair scale, we are beginning to equip our army with modern weapons. We have set up our naval, air, tank, engineering, air defence, railway and massive artillery forces. This variety of services and branches and the large-scale use of complex weaponry are indicative of the degree of our modernization. The modern weapons we are now using rank with those used in the rest of the world, some being fairly sophisticated. To master the technical use of sophisticated weapons and military equipment in the various services and branches and to learn how to conduct combined operations involving such services and branches, we must have a standard and unified training plan.

With regard to schedules, in 1952 most of the troops will be able to undergo a full year of regular training. In the past, we were more than satisfied to get one or two months' time for training. Now that we can devote an entire year to this activity under stable conditions, we must take full advantage of this in our effort to make our army a modern and regularized force.

With regard to logistics, both transport and supplies should be modernized because our material conditions have changed. Transport by men and pack animals should be continued, but we must learn to use trains, lorries, ships and planes. As for supplies, they should suit the needs of war and our troops must become accustomed to eating cold food such as bread and canned goods. We should do our utmost in all these respects.

Health care needs to be improved in light of the new situation. Logistical and administrative staff need to be cut back as far as possible and combat personnel increased. Consequently, it's been decided to increase combatants and reduce noncombatants.

It follows that along with modern weapons, equipment and organization, we need standardized training.

(2) We must carry on our fine traditions. We have won victory in a sustained war, and we have acquired a fine tradition in army building and gained rich experience in fighting, but such undesirable practices as guerrilla-ism and decentralism resulting from our protracted activities in the rural areas must be abandoned. All our work should be oriented towards encouraging initiative at all levels while ensuring centralized leadership. In the course of modernization and regularization, we must not abandon our fine traditions. Neither should we allow ourselves to be fettered by past experience.

(3) We should be firm in implementing the 1952 plan for training the ground force. It is a unified plan for modernizing and regularizing our army on the basis of our best traditions in army building. It is designed to unify command, work systems, organization, discipline and training. It means, in short, co-ordinating the acts of millions of people. In the past, army training plans were worked out independently by various units. Simple crash courses were conducted during intervals between battles and campaigns to carry out one or more types of technical or tactical training to meet immediate combat needs. This proved to be the best training method in the midst of a sustained war without extensive rear areas. It will also be the preferred method of wartime training now and in the future. It is not, however, a regular method. Now that conditions for standardized training exist, the wartime method, although it has played a great role in the past, must be changed. If it is not, it will be impossible for us to carry out modern, standardized training. The plan for 1952 is completely new. Vertically, it embraces individual training, division-wide training and large-scale joint exercises. Horizontally, it covers comprehensive training in a number of subjects, including tactics, skills, regulations and standard drills. Training curricula take into account co-ordinated activities and the appropriate teaching principles, ensuring that the various subjects support one another, that their vertical and horizontal relationships are maintained and that theory is integrated with practice. Stress is laid on field exercises for mastering the basic skills. No more than 12 months of such training will enable all our officers and men to acquire knowledge needed both in peace-time and wartime and to gradually achieve regularization. Rich and complete in content as it is, the plan may appear to be too crammed and to contain too many unfamiliar, complicated things to be put into practice. Such a first impression is natural, for training of this kind is not an easy job in the present circumstances, and there are

bound to be difficulties. However, all difficulties can and must be overcome. The essential thing is for our officers to strive to master new training methods. If we make up our minds to learn anew, I believe next year's training plan will be fulfilled.

(4) To ensure the proper implementation of our training plan, the following two things are imperative:

(a) Commanders must take charge and become personally involved.

In the past, our army lacked strict, unified training. Work in this respect was done mainly by staff officers. Some commanders concerned themselves only with fighting and neglected training, or only gave general directions. This should not have occurred in the past, and it certainly shouldn't today. If left unchanged, this practice will become a serious obstacle to our modernization and regularization. As future wars will involve massive use of military technology and equipment as well as large numbers of personnel, we shall not be able to defeat any enemy if we fail to master sophisticated technology and cannot direct combined operations involving the various services and arms. For the entire army to acquire this capability, commanders at all levels must attend to the matter themselves and make it a success. It is true that victory in future wars will depend on bravery, but bravery alone is not enough. All members of our army must be highly skilled. Commanders at all levels should master the modern art of command and be good at organizing planned warfare, in order to combine bravery and skill. Bravery and skill together will make us invincible. In the future, a commander who cannot conduct training will be unable to successfully direct any battle. Every commander must, therefore, learn to conduct training. Officers should be able to teach their men. Officers at different levels should take the responsibility to teach their subordinates. For instance, a divisional commander should teach regimental commanders, who in turn should teach battalion commanders, and so on. Training should become the primary task in peace-time. The fact that the newly-staffed divisions and regiments have no training officers does not imply that training is not important. On the contrary, it means that commanders should personally take charge of such work, and all of them should be able to serve as training officers. Implementing the 1952 training plan is a political task for the entire army. It is the central task to which all other work should be subordinated. Once this central point is grasped, our work as a whole will get moving.

A commander should provide leadership to the military training department, giving it regular, specific guidance and periodically supervising its work so that it will function efficiently. The Military Training Department of the Military Council is in charge of training the army as a whole. It will issue the training plan for the next year and its Military Training Department will be directly responsible for implementing it.

(b) Political and logistical departments must guarantee the plan's success.

As I've said above, training is the central task for the army in the coming year. It is aimed at building a modern, regularized army through strict, unified training. All other activities should be subordinated to this task. Party committees and political departments at various levels should all work towards this end.

In addition to providing troops with adequate provisions and clothing, the logistical departments, too, should endeavour to assure the success of the training plan. Material conditions are essential to its implementation. Ammunition and all other supplies budgeted for training should be guaranteed.

Meetings should be reduced and there should be none during class or drilling hours.

(5) Work of the military schools.

All military schools approved by the Military Council should have regular and unified plans and work systems, and should be well equipped. They should offer long-term courses of study (except for crash training courses). Cadets will be required to take entrance examinations and term and graduation examinations. Particularly strict requirements should be set for the graduation examination. There should be comprehensive and systematic curricula so that graduates will acquire comprehensive knowledge and skills for their future career. Therefore, regular military schools must improve the quality of teaching, and the course offerings and enrolment should be streamlined.

Regular schools run by the military areas must follow the plan of the Military Council and should not arbitrarily change syllabi or alter regulations. The Military Training Department is exclusively responsible for supervising teaching in both regular and advanced infantry schools. No other matters which are the responsibilities of the military areas should be referred to it.

THE DECISIVE ROLE OF SKILLS IN BUILDING THE ARMOURED FORCE

October 26, 1951

The armoured force is a new force in our army. Tanks are its main component. Our tankmen, however, are transfers from the infantry and artillery forces and so they are not familiar with the use of tanks. Everyone, from the commander to the other officers and the rank and file should master knowledge relating to tanks. In particular, officers must personally learn tank-driving and shooting. Such skills are decisive in the building of this new force. Political work should ensure improvement of skills on which the accomplishment of military tasks depend. We must, therefore, work wholeheartedly to acquire them.

Combined operations involving the different services and branches will be characteristic of future wars, and tank troops will play an important role in achieving victory. Tankmen, who function as artillerymen under cover, are the backbone of the ground force. In order to destroy the enemy's pillboxes, pursue and attack his troops and his effective strength, it is imperative that we master the use of tanks and bring their power into full play. If our men are not skilled, they will not be able to manoeuvre their tanks or hit the targets, or repair their weapons when they break down. Every officer, especially those at and above the regimental level, should master the relevant skills. Those who have not yet done so must learn. It is unacceptable for those at the higher levels to lack these skills themselves but require those at the lower levels to master them. An officer will be considered qualified only when he can teach his subordinates. In future, there must be no one on the battlefield who does not know how to fight. Everyone, not only commanders but political and logistical personnel, must know how to use weapons. The current Korean war²⁹¹ has

Speech at a conference of officers of the Armoured Force of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

taught us an important lesson. The enormous size of our forces has made it difficult to supply provisions not only to fighters but to non-combatants. In the future, tank troops should carry their own provisions so as to reach and destroy the enemy sooner. In combined operations deploying different services and branches, it is extremely important to gain time. Every minute — indeed every second — counts. A delay of only a few seconds due to lack of skill may bring disaster. Our comrades must, therefore, resolve to train hard to increase their proficiency, mounting the tanks to learn how to drive them, how to aim and fire their weapons and how to operate their radios. They must persevere and learn everything not yet within their grasp.

Without highly-developed skills, there can be no good tactics. Indeed, highly-developed skills make learning tactics easier. We must, therefore, learn skills first, then tactics. Only after this can one undertake the study of the co-ordinated actions of various forces. One must become highly proficient in order to manoeuvre one's tank at any desired speed. Skilled use of tanks is complicated, so tankmen must acquire the necessary technical knowledge, buckle down to learn how the tank functions, as well as how to manoeuvre and shoot. Officers in particular must acquire a high degree of skill before they can take command of a number of tanks and co-ordinate them with other forces in battle. In the final analysis, the question is how to successfully train and educate troops. We hope that in six to twelve months you will learn the technical structure of a tank and its weaponry as well as how they function, and acquire all the skills required, including communications. Officers should join their men in learning. You must not feel embarrassed in doing so or put on airs. When you don't know something, just say so and learn it, or else you will suffer. You should concentrate all your energy on learning skills.

Future wars will consist of combined operations involving the air, tank and other forces. The tank force will be required to put the enemy out of action promptly. To this end, tankmen must do their best to master skills to meet actual needs, and then they will be able to manoeuvre tanks and strike at the enemy accurately. Otherwise, there will be trouble. Every Party member should pledge to perfect his skills and attain professional proficiency with wholehearted effort. It is essential that we build on what has already been achieved and do a good job of running our schools and training qualified personnel in order to promote the swift building of our armoured force.

STUDY IS THE MAIN TASK FOR OUR YOUTH

July 2, 1953

Comrades,

Your congress is drawing to a close today. I congratulate you on your success!

Our great leader Comrade Mao Zedong has given important instructions on this congress. The Youth League must work in accordance with them and call on all our young people to take an active part in the construction of our great motherland and guide them onto the path of communism as well.

Your congress has been fruitful. Through discussion, you have arrived at a unified understanding of the tasks and the principles guiding the League's work. I believe this congress will furnish a great impetus to the work of the League and help it in better performing its glorious role in the period of national construction as the assistant to, and the reserve force of, the Chinese Communist Party.

As you know, study is of utmost importance for our Youth League members. Young people will gradually take over from the older generation and become masters of the country and society. That's why study is of such enormous significance for them and why time and again Comrades Lenin, Stalin and Mao Zedong instructed them to make study their primary task. If they fail to study diligently and grasp the laws of social development and of revolutionary movements and if they fail to master scientific knowledge, our revolution will not proceed smoothly. This is self-evident. If the League, for its part, fails to organize and guide its members in study and help them progress, it will be unable to serve as an able assistant to the Party in revolution.

Delivered at the closing ceremony of the Second National Congress of the New-Democratic Youth League of China, this speech first appeared in *Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)* on July 3, 1953.

Lenin said that the main task of the older generation was to overthrow the ruling classes, while the younger generation was confronted with a much more complicated task, that of building a new, communist society. Our young people are living through exactly this historical period that Lenin had in mind, that is, a period of building an industrialized new China and effecting our motherland's gradual transition to socialism. Therefore, our Youth League members must not only have a high level of political consciousness and communist morality, but must also acquire specialized knowledge and technical skills. To build and defend our country, it is completely necessary for our youths to have a substantial body of general and scientific and technical knowledge. On top of this, they must be in good health. Only thus will they be able to fulfil, in the complex and rigorous struggles to come, the tasks assigned them by the Party and the state.

I should also add that, guided by the Party, the Youth League must educate the young people in Marxism-Leninism. Only then will they be able to attain a lofty morality and serve the people wholeheartedly. Only then will they come to understand the laws of social development and not lose their bearings on their path forward.

Comrades! The Youth League has a lot to do in order to get all our young people united and organized for fruitful study and work. It is essential that you adopt effective work methods and a good work style. You should be good at uniting the young people by persuasion and refrain from the indiscriminate use of "struggle" as often practised by some League organizations. Working by persuasion means that in our work we must know how to convince people by reasoning things out, in other words, we must base ourselves on facts instead of arbitrariness. This is the only effective way in which the League can draw the young people close to it. In order to be able to present facts and make their arguments convincing, our League members must become more knowledgeable by studying hard.

Comrades! It is the hope of our great motherland that our youths will temper themselves into active, politically conscious builders and defenders of our motherland. This requires that, under the Party's leadership, the New-Democratic Youth League of China help educate the young people, which is one of the fundamental tasks of the Party. I believe that you will live up to the expectations of our motherland and that, after this congress, you will become more united and more confident in advancing under the glorious banner of Mao Zedong.

TASKS OF INSPECTION OF PARTY DISCIPLINE IN THE TRANSITION PERIOD

November 11, 1953

Comrade Mao Zedong has pointed out the following: The period between the founding of the People's Republic of China and the basic completion of socialist transformation is one of transition. The Party's general line or general task for the transition period is to accomplish step by step and over a fairly long period of time the country's socialist industrialization and the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce. This general line should be the beacon illuminating all our work, and wherever we deviate from it, we shall make Right or "Left" mistakes.²⁹² This statement is a guideline for setting forth and carrying out the Party's policies and tasks in all fields. It is likewise a guideline in regard to the tasks of inspection of Party discipline. If we should deviate from this general line in such work, we are bound to make Right or "Left" mistakes.

Party discipline helps ensure the implementation of the Party's line. Party discipline-inspection commissions assist Party committees at corresponding levels in the enforcement of Party discipline. These commissions are administrative organs in charge of investigating and settling cases of violations of discipline by Party members or organizations. Specially, they are responsible for examining all cases involving discipline violations and taking appropriate measures, and for guiding Party organizations at the grass-roots level in discipline enforcement. Through discipline inspection, these commissions help ensure the implementation of the Party's general line as well as its tasks, plans and policies for different periods; they also conduct education among Party members on observance of discipline. With the adoption of the

Report at the Second National Conference of the Chinese Communist Party on Discipline Inspection.

Party's general line for the transition period, the basic task of the discipline-inspection commissions is to help ensure its smooth implementation through the handling of violations of Party discipline occurring in the course of carrying out this general line or general task, and through preventing or overcoming all acts and tendencies detrimental to it. To be specific, they should do the following:

1. Help ensure production and the thorough fulfilment of state plans.

In the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57) formulated in accordance with the Party's general line, our basic tasks are to concentrate our effort on developing heavy industry as the foundation for the country's industrialization and for the modernization of our national defence; train the necessary personnel, expand communications and transport services and develop light industry, agriculture and commerce; promote step by step the co-operative transformation of agriculture and handicrafts and continue the socialist transformation of private industry and commerce while allowing individual farming and handicrafts and individual private industry and commerce to play their proper roles; and further consolidate the alliance between workers and peasants, ensure the steady growth of the socialist sector of the economy in relation to the other sectors and, on the basis of increased production, ensure the gradual improvement of the people's material and cultural life.

The whole Party must make preparations and strive to carry out the foregoing tasks in an orderly, planned way. We must in the process exploit all our potentials and check the negative factors that hinder change. At the same time, we must make a correct appraisal of both subjective and objective conditions and oppose impetuosity and rashness. Naturally, tasks of such magnitude have to be carried out by the entire people under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party, the Party committees and the people's governments at various levels. The responsibility of the discipline-inspection commissions, under the leadership of the Party committees at various levels, is to co-operate with all relevant departments in safeguarding the Party's policies regarding development of production and in guaranteeing the thorough fulfilment of state plans. To this end, they must make timely investigation into violations of the Party's policies and decisions, deceptions or even sabotage in the implementation of the five-year plan or annual plans; falsifying of work reports to deceive the Party; any violations of the laws and decrees of the state; and

acts of any Party organizations or cadres that hamper production and thereby bring losses to the Party and the state. They must report the results of their investigation to Party committees at the corresponding or higher levels so as to set things to rights. Appropriate disciplinary measures must be taken against those Party organizations and cadres who have made grave errors and caused serious harm. In dealing with such cases, the discipline-inspection commissions should conduct systematic education on Party discipline and see that no Party organizations or cadres act in contravention of the Party's general line or state plans and that they fulfil their allotted tasks. In this way, the Party's policies on the expansion of production can be correctly implemented and the five-year plan and annual plans of the state can be carried out smoothly.

2. Oppose and prevent corruption of the Party by the bourgeoisie and capitalist ideology, and further consolidate and perfect the Party organization.

In recent years, our Party has been tempered in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea,²⁹¹ in the Agrarian Reform,²⁹³ in the movement to suppress counter-revolutionaries,²⁹⁴ in the movement to consolidate the Party,²⁹⁵ in the movements against the "three evils"²⁹⁶ and the "five evils",²⁹⁷ and in other struggles. The ideological level of large numbers of Party cadres has thereby risen remarkably and the Party organization greatly improved and consolidated, with a number of counter-revolutionaries, alien class elements and degenerates having been expelled. But the enemy has not been completely eliminated. Neither the imperialists nor the overthrown classes in China will take their defeat lying down. They will attempt a come-back by taking every opportunity and using every possible means to undermine our cause and the unity of the Party. Moreover, for a long time to come we will be in a complicated situation in which we both co-operate with and carry out struggles against the bourgeoisie. We must, therefore, maintain unrelaxed revolutionary vigilance and further consolidate and perfect the Party organization.

The historical experience of our Party has proved that "Left", adventurist errors are liable to occur among our Party cadres when there is a split between our Party and the bourgeoisie, while Right errors characterized by slackened vigilance are more likely when there is co-operation between the two. In the socialist transformation of private industry and commerce, agriculture and handicrafts, resistance on the part of some members of the bourgeoisie is only to be expected.

and one of their methods is by using their ideology to influence us, lower our guard and even attack us in the political and economic spheres. It will therefore be our Party's important task for a long time to come to prevent and oppose corrosion by the bourgeoisie and capitalist ideology.

Henceforth, along with working in close co-operation with the Party's organization and propaganda departments to understand the general ideological state of Party cadres and step up intra-Party education in discipline, it will be of special significance for the discipline-inspection commissions at various levels to conduct the above-mentioned struggle in a serious yet cautious and effective way, using typical examples. At the same time, they should continue to weed out of the Party counter-revolutionaries, alien class elements and degenerates. Only by consolidating and improving the Party both ideologically and organizationally will it be possible to keep the Party organism healthy and ensure the correct implementation of its line, policies and decisions.

3. Cement the ties between the Party and the masses.

To fulfil the tremendous task of socialist industrialization and the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce, it is necessary constantly to cement the ties between the Party and the working people and to oppose all intra-Party activities detrimental to them. Only with mass support and supervision can our Party become strong, overcome all obstacles and other difficulties and push our cause forward.

In the past few years, the Party successfully dealt with a number of major cases in addition to launching movements to rectify and consolidate the Party, the struggle against bureaucratism, coercion and commandism and violations of the law and of discipline, and the struggles against subjectivism and the "five excesses" in the rural areas.²⁹⁸ These actions have been of enormous significance, being aimed at cementing the ties between the Party and the masses; at rectifying the Party cadres' erroneous ideas and ways as manifested in using defective work methods, ignoring the interests of the masses, failing to heed their opinions and alienating oneself from them, and suppressing democracy; and at remedying gross violations of the law and of discipline. Our general objective is to make the Party a leading force truly worthy of the trust and support of the masses. Facts have shown that, as a result of the said effort, the ideological and political level of our Party cadres has been raised, their style of work has markedly

improved, and the Party and the masses have become much closer. In implementing the Party's policies and decisions, therefore, Party organizations and Party cadres at all levels must henceforth strive to improve their methods of work, show real concern for the interests of the masses, listen attentively to their opinions, be resolved to protect their democratic rights and oppose violations of the law and of discipline so as to further cement the ties between the Party and the masses.

The discipline-inspection commissions at various levels should cooperate with the organization and propaganda departments to discover, examine and remedy acts of Party cadres that infringe upon the people's interests, carefully to deal with complaints, accusations and appeals involving them, and do a good job of attending to letters and visits from the people, so that the ties between the Party and the masses can be cemented, and so our Party can win their wholehearted support at all times and remain firm and invincible.

4. Ensure centralized and unified Party leadership.

Centralized and unified Party leadership is a principle the Party Central Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong have long since stressed and adhered to. Experience has shown that this is vital if we are to overcome the erroneous tendencies towards anarchy as well as towards neglect of organization and discipline, and if we are to prevent a small number of Party organizations or members from asserting independence, prevent decentralism, and avoid or reduce possible errors in all our work. Under the leadership of the Party, the people of all our nationalities have entered a new era characterized by planned national construction. In order to industrialize the country and modernize our national defence, all aspects of our construction work must be put under the Party's centralized and unified leadership, whether it be in industry and national defence, or in financial and other economic matters, or in culture and education. Otherwise it will be impossible to materialize the Party's general line or general task for the transition period. Therefore, it is of particularly vital significance to emphasize and to adhere to the principle of the Party's centralized and unified leadership.

To ensure such leadership, it is imperative that the discipline-inspection commissions at all levels oppose decentralism, see if any of the Party organizations or cadres has violated the Party Constitution, discipline, policies or decisions or state laws and decrees and, upon discovery of such violations, make timely and truthful reports to

Party committees at the corresponding or higher levels for remedial purposes.

At the same time, on the basis of giving full play to democracy, practising criticism — especially criticism by the lower levels — and self-criticism, and strengthening the collective leadership of the Party and the ties between the Party and the masses, we should enhance the unity of the Party and step up education in discipline, so that the entire membership will be united as one and be able to carry out, under the leadership of the Party Central Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong, the general line or general task for the transition period.

The major tasks mentioned above constitute the basic ones for the discipline-inspection commissions during the transition period. They will indeed be their routine work for a considerably long period to come. In carrying out these tasks correctly, the discipline-inspection commissions at all levels must closely integrate their daily work with the carrying out of the general line or general task set forth for the transition period, and enhance their understanding of the stated policies in the course of their work. They must plan their main work in the light of the central tasks of the Party committees at corresponding levels, concentrate the efforts of their personnel on closely examining how the Party organizations and cadres execute policies and observe discipline in fulfilling such central tasks, and deal in good time with violations of Party discipline so as to help the Party as a whole to improve its work and facilitate the smooth implementation of the general line. So long as we carry out these basic tasks correctly, we will be able to make our work of discipline inspection a success and to help ensure the thorough implementation of the Party's general line for the transition period.

It is necessary to point out that the discipline-inspection commissions are confronted with heavy tasks whose fulfilment will not be easy. On the one hand, our work of Party discipline inspection is still weak; the related organizational structure leaves much to be desired and our cadres, inexperienced as they are, cannot yet meet the requirements of the work. In addition, many new and complex situations and problems will arise. In the course of investigating and settling specific cases, it is quite possible that a small number of Party organizations and cadres will refuse to co-operate or even offer resistance, lest the shortcomings and mistakes in their own work should be exposed. Of course, our Party has a uniform discipline. It never allows any "independent kingdom" to exist that defies Party

discipline. So long as we are modest and prudent, adhere to principles, seek truth from facts, keep contact with the masses, constantly strive to enhance our ideological and political levels and professional competence and resolutely grapple with all difficulties, I am convinced that we can appropriately perform our tasks under the leadership of the Party's Central Committee and committees at all other levels.

HELP THE HANDICRAFTSMEN ORGANIZE AND TAKE THE SOCIALIST ROAD

December 4, 1953

The handicraft producers' co-operatives in China have achieved a great deal and accumulated much experience since their formation. Both their achievements and their experience will play a tremendous role in socialist transformation of the handicraft industry.

Handicraft production plays an important role in our national economy. According to last year's survey by the State Statistical Bureau, China's more than 10 million handicraft workers provided a total output value of more than 100,000 billion yuan.²⁹⁹ They produce most of the manufactured goods used by peasants. Only a small part is produced by machine. Handicrafts provide from 60 to 80 per cent of the peasants' needs. Manufactured goods provide only 20 to 40 per cent. Our handicraft techniques are fairly advanced. Quite a few products sell well in both domestic and foreign markets. The various handicraft trades turn out a great variety of products. According to data presented at this conference, there are more than 40 trades in southwestern China alone. In one way or another these trades involve production of ceramics, household hardware, bamboo and wooden articles, lacquerware, farm tools, and weighing and measuring instruments. They engage in sugar refining, wine making and flour milling and turn out leather and furs. They undertake spinning and weaving, carving and embroidery, and make cosmetics, stationery and musical instruments. In short, they contribute almost every kind of daily necessities used by the people. Despite the fact that some of these handicraft trades have or will become outdated with the growth of industry, there are still many that need to be expanded. At this initial stage of our industrial development when

Speech at the Third National Conference on Co-operative Handicraft Production.

the supply of light industrial products falls far short of the increasing needs of the people, the handicraft industry takes on even greater importance. Those handicraftsmen whose products are indispensable to the national economy and the people's livelihood will play a significant role in the economic development of our country, if we help them get organized, give them systematic guidance in production and help them increase labour productivity. This does not mean, of course, that we can afford to neglect the development of modern industry. Rather, we must attach due importance to the development of the handicraft industry while at the same time stimulating the growth of modern industry.

Socialist transformation of the individual handicraft industry is an integral component of the Party's general line or general task in the transition period. We should gradually change the handicraft economy from individual to collective ownership by organizing co-operatives. Co-operatives are the only form of organization by which we can transform the individual handicraft economy and help it in its transition to socialism.

Handicraftsmen are both labourers and private owners of the means of production. If we leave them out of our socialist transformation, they might go capitalist. Of course not all of them could become capitalists. Only a few could get rich, while the majority would go bankrupt and be unemployed. Thus handicraftsmen would have no future if they went capitalist. In China today, they still have many difficulties in their work and life because of their scattered productive activities, meagre funds and the small number of outdated tools. They produce in an erratic way and have both busy and slack seasons. Moreover, they are subject to exploitation by middle men in buying raw materials and selling products. Therefore, it is necessary to help them organize co-operatives, which will make possible the collective purchase of raw materials and the collective marketing of their products, thus preventing their exploitation by capitalists. This will also enable them to engage in normal production so that they can better serve agricultural and industrial production and the daily life of the people.

Handicraft producers' co-operatives are needed in the cities, but even more urgently in rural areas. China has more than 225,000 townships, the smaller ones of which each have several thousand people and the larger ones more than 10,000. If handicraftsmen are organized in all of these townships, they will constitute a considerable

force in expanding production. As for the actual method and the chief organizational form to be used, they can pool their shares, use their own tools, divide labour and co-operate with one another on the merit of their specific skill and distribute income according to work. The Party and government should provide active guidance and, where necessary and possible, the government should grant loans and other forms of assistance. In this way, not only will exploitation be eliminated, but production will grow and life improve. With increased production, they will be able to buy machines with money out of the public accumulation fund and move gradually from manual labour to partly or even fully mechanized production. This will enable them to turn out more and better products at lower cost.

We should redouble our efforts to organize handicraft producers' co-operatives in order to build socialism. Generally speaking, we should work from the lower to the higher level, from primary production groups step by step to producers' co-operatives. Where conditions are ripe, producers' co-operatives may be organized right away. However, it is necessary to avoid undue stress on concentrated production, indiscriminately merging small co-operatives into large ones, seeking premature mechanization or adopting too many complicated regulations, lest these impede the overall development of co-operatives. The Beijing Confectionery Producers' Co-operative was set up by three unemployed workers who only intended to secure a livelihood for themselves. Already it has developed into a fair-sized factory with more than 100 workers. Similarly, the Shanghai Iron Bed Producers' Co-operative originally was started by 30 or so unemployed workers. In the beginning they had no funds, no workshops, no tools or machinery. Often they had to work in the rain. But now this co-operative has become a large enterprise with more than 200 workers. Its balance sheet at the end of last September put its profits and accumulation fund at 2.5 billion yuan. It has allocated 600 million yuan for building new workshops and 100 million yuan for purchasing new equipment. These examples show that co-operatives are the type of organization that meets the urgent needs of handicraft workers. Usually, these co-operatives start from scratch and grow only gradually. Our task is to organize them and provide guidance so that they may steadily expand. There should be no unrealistic demands on them in the beginning. We should be flexible and adopt whatever organizational forms are necessary and possible and suit the requirements of the handicraftsmen involved. Under no circumstances should

we impose a rigid and uniform formula, for that will only hinder co-operative development. As for the admission of small handicraft proprietors to co-operatives, I believe that if they have skills, no longer engage in exploitation and are willing to work and accept government guidance, they should be allowed to join. There is no harm in admitting them so long as they accept government guidance and do not take positions of leadership in the co-operatives. As for those who have never employed full-time workers but have only taken on apprentices, they should, in keeping with Government Administration Council regulations, be classified as self-employed labourers rather than proprietors.

The handicraft industry covers a wide range of trades and professions, and cadres will be needed for getting the handicraftsmen organized. We cannot meet the shortage of cadres solely by running schools and training courses. Cadres can be selected from among the handicraftsmen themselves. In China there are more than 10 million handicraft workers, many of whom play an essential role and are activists in the co-operative movement. We can explain to them the prospects of co-operatives as well as how to run them and let them organize themselves. It is not always necessary for us to send people to serve as co-operative directors. But we can send them some accountants after their co-operatives have expanded.

Once established, co-operatives should be consolidated. Those which meet the needs of the national economy should be allowed to exist permanently. Producers' co-operatives already in existence should not be dissolved rashly. If the original method of organization was faulty, it can be improved step by step. Co-operative members who have made mistakes may be educated or, if necessary, punished according to law. Impurities within the ranks of the co-operative members should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. A co-operative should not be allowed to disintegrate merely because of some problems. It is wrong to let some established co-operatives go out of existence, as happened in the past.

Some handicraft co-operatives may exist for a considerably long time, not only during the period of transition but also once the socialist society is fully established. This is because co-operatives have unique characteristics. In the first place, they can make use not only of indigenous raw materials but of waste material from large factories. China abounds in resources. It has indigenous raw materials such as rattan, bamboo, twigs from shrubs, reeds, timber, silk and bast fibres.

There is also a lot of waste material from large factories (scraps of iron and steel, remnants of cloth, etc.). These can be turned to good use after being reprocessed or recycled by handicraftsmen. Not only can their products meet local needs, some can be exported as well. Secondly, workers in handicraft producers' co-operatives possess skills that cannot be duplicated in modern, mechanized industries. For instance, some traditional and special arts and crafts, such as carvings, engravings and embroidery, cannot be produced solely by machines. Some comrades have said, "There will be no need for a handicraft industry when the state-owned industry has developed." This view is wrong. Thirdly, products from the handicraft producers' co-operatives mainly serve local needs, so a lot of money is saved on their transportation. The co-operatives are closely tied in with the rural economy. They can exchange their goods needed by the peasants for grain and raw materials and so do their share in helping solve the unemployment problem. It is thus clear that development of handicraft producers' co-operatives is indispensable to socialist construction and is of great importance in the consolidation of the worker-peasant alliance. They are not merely "for the purpose of creating jobs for some people". Still less are they a "burden".

Now China has more than 4,800 handicraft producers' co-operatives, with a membership in excess of 290,000. Their capital totals more than 260 billion yuan, of which only a little over 60 billion is share capital. The value of their combined total output this year will exceed 5,000 billion yuan. Clearly, this is no small achievement. In the days ahead, however, we should make greater effort to study and solve the problems that arise so as to ensure even greater development of our handicraft producers' co-operatives.

SPEECH AT THE NATIONAL EXAMINATIONS HELD IN THE PLA MILITARY ACADEMY

April 25, 1954

Comrades,

The first group of students in the Combined Arms Department³⁰⁰ and the Intelligence Department of the Military Academy of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) will soon graduate after three years and four months of hard studies. According to the Academy's reports, you have an average grade of 4 or above in all your tests and examinations and in the national examinations on politics and scenario.³⁰¹ This shows that you have done well. On behalf of the People's Revolutionary Military Council of the Central People's Government, I congratulate you on your achievements. I hope you will also do well in the national examinations on military theory.

In the three years and more since its founding, the Military Academy has trained a group of cadres with advanced knowledge in military science. This is a major contribution to the building of a modern, regularized army. It has been achieved under the direct leadership of the People's Revolutionary Military Council and through the concerted efforts of the Academy's staff in charge of training, political work, material supplies and administrative affairs as well as through the efforts of the students and, particularly, through the generous help of the military scientists. I would like to express our thanks to all of you.

In late March 1954, the People's Revolutionary Military Council of the Central People's Government set up a national examination committee, with Comrade Zhu De as chairman, to check on the performance of the first group of students graduating from the Combined Arms Department and the Intelligence Department of the PLA Military Academy. Here is the text of his speech to the students at the national examinations.

At present, the Party is leading the entire nation in socialist revolution, namely, socialist transformation, the goal being to turn China into a great socialist country over a considerably long period. In order to ensure the security of our country, defend our socialist construction and safeguard peace in Asia and the rest of the world, the PLA must learn the advanced military science of the Soviet Union and draw on its experience in army building (at present special attention should be paid to staff and training work) and make itself a modern, first-rate revolutionary force.

The realization of this historical task will mark a new stage in the constructive effort of the Chinese people in the military sphere. It will represent a transition from a lower stage of army building to a higher one in which our army is equipped with modern military science and technology. It was impossible to realize this transition in the past when the Chinese people's revolutionary war had not yet achieved nationwide victory. Now we can train large numbers of cadres required for a modern army because we have the basic conditions for doing so. This fact is of great significance. We cannot build a powerful modern army without a large number of military commanders and political cadres who meet the requirements of such a force. Hence, all institutes or schools should have a clear idea of their weighty responsibility for training cadres for the modernization of our national defence. Our cadres must have both political integrity and professional competence. In other words, they must have a strong sense of dedication, work loyally in defence of the socialist cause and, through hard study, grasp the basics of Marxism-Leninism as an ideological system. They must have the cultural level necessary to master modern military science and technology and thereby achieve professional excellence. With a large number of cadres in the Army, Navy and Air Force possessing both political integrity and professional competence and with every member of the PLA making great effort under the leadership of the Party, a powerful, modern revolutionary army will assuredly come into existence.

Party unity is the fundamental guarantee that the Party will lead our revolution to victory. In the past it was precisely because we had the unified leadership of the Party Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Zedong and the unity and solidarity of the entire Party and because we united with and led the entire nation on the strength of Party unity that we were able to overcome various difficulties and obstacles in the course of the revolution, defeat both domestic and

foreign enemies, complete the new-democratic revolution and found the People's Republic of China. Now that our Party is leading the entire nation in socialist construction and socialist transformation and domestic class struggle is deepening, our undertaking has assumed added significance and become more arduous. The struggle we are waging will become more intense and complicated. The key to victory in the revolution, therefore, is heightened revolutionary vigilance on the part of all Party comrades and ever greater Party unity, especially increased unity of senior cadres in the Party and the army.

The individualism, arrogance and conceit some cadres exhibit hurt Party unity. These cadres are now preoccupied with personal gains and losses, with personal position and honour. They exaggerate their own roles and stress personal prestige. Styling themselves veterans who have rendered "meritorious service", they accept only flattery and praise, not criticism and supervision by other comrades. They have gone so far as to entertain the extremely dangerous — and totally wrong — idea that it was the army that created the Party and our state power. Unless resolutely checked by the Party, instead of being allowed to exist and develop, their individualism, arrogance and conceit, along with the erroneous ideas that result, will become serious enough to undermine Party unity and impair the Party's cause. And in order to overcome individualism, arrogance and conceit and to strengthen Party unity, the whole Party and the whole army, each and every Party member, especially senior Party and army cadres, must realize that Party unity and the success of the socialist revolution represent the Party's supreme interests and that doing any harm to Party unity is tantamount to helping the enemy and jeopardizing the revolution. Every comrade should regard safeguarding and consolidating Party unity and striving faithfully for the socialist cause as the criteria for all his thinking, words and deeds. Every comrade should regularly conduct criticism and self-criticism, remain modest and prudent, guard against rashness and arrogance, and be resolute in overcoming individualism, arrogance and conceit. Every Party member and every cadre in the army should clearly understand that it was under the leadership of the Party that the army was built and has developed and that it was likewise under the leadership of the Party that the army was able to defeat the enemy. The Party leads the army. The army is the Party's instrument in developing the revolution and consolidating its victory. Without the Party's leadership, our army would not be able to exist. This means that all comrades in

the army, especially its senior cadres, should faithfully follow the Party's leadership, firmly unite under the leadership of the Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Zedong and make our army an instrument of the Party and the people. Only thus can all members of the Party and the army achieve closer unity for the fulfilment of our colossal historical task.

You — the first group of graduates from the Combined Arms Department and the Intelligence Department of the Military Academy and other comrades who are still engaged in studies — have acquired or are acquiring an amount of advanced knowledge in military science. You will become the major leading personnel in our army building. This does not mean, however, that you are entitled to be arrogant and conceited. We should be aware that scientific knowledge keeps advancing. Therefore I hope you will continue to learn and apply your knowledge of military science creatively in your endeavour for modernizing our national defence, defending our motherland and safeguarding peace in the Far East and the entire world. You will succeed in defeating any enemy that dares to invade our country and in fulfilling the glorious historical task of our army.

SPEECH AT THE THIRD COMMENDATION MEETING OF THE PLA RAILWAY ENGINEERING CORPS

May 14, 1954

Comrades,

You have rendered meritorious service in the great cause of defending and building our motherland and have become exemplary workers and heroes of the people. I'm here today to offer you my congratulations.

In the last five years or so since its formation, the PLA Railway Engineering Corps has completed various projects in emergency repair and in restoring old railways and building new ones. These projects, which you have undertaken in the Northeast and other provinces all the way down to Guangdong and Guangxi, have played an important role politically and economically, as well as in the war. You have achieved remarkable results in your work.

The Railway Engineering Corps is a technical unit of our army, and it will be an indispensable component of a modern national defence force. Your task in the current endeavour to build a modern and regularized army is to step up the building of your corps and make it a staunch, major force capable of defending the motherland and supporting her economic construction. For this purpose, you are required to master skills and technology and become professionally competent so that in peace-time you can play an active part in railway building and in wartime make emergency repairs to ensure uninterrupted military transport. In modern warfare, rapid troop transport to the front and the deployment of large formations require railways. Your task is arduous yet glorious in both war and peace. Comrades, your work has just begun. You will face more and still harder tasks in the days ahead. I hope you will do your utmost to fulfil the heavy tasks assigned to you by the Party and the people of our motherland.

As a well-organized and well-trained unit of the army, the Railway Engineering Corps stood the test of war. The Party has dispatched you to critical areas to undertake the most difficult projects. Some of the projects have been very difficult and are hardly known in the rest of the world. In the construction of the Sichuan-Yunnan, Gansu-Xinjiang and Jiangxi-Fujian railways in the future, part of the most difficult work will be assigned to you. The Party and the people believe that you have both the capability and the courage to fulfil your tasks. You are honoured to have their trust. Of course, these tasks will entail a great deal of hardship. Take for instance, the construction of the Baoji-Chengdu Railway. Our comrades are working in wild country and big mountains. Because there are no houses there, they have to put up straw huts and dig caves. They neither sleep nor eat well. They certainly face difficulties. And yet these difficulties do not amount to much when compared with those encountered during the war years. Our army has a glorious tradition of fighting in adverse conditions, fearing neither hardship nor sacrifice, and it enjoys the support of the broad masses of the people. No difficulties can deter us.

Ours is the people's army and each and every one serving in it loves our motherland. I remember that during the Long March we passed through many sparsely populated and desolate areas. Although they can by no means match the Northeast or Shanghai, they are good and useful places all the same. Even the marshes, even remote Tibet, are good places. There is no part of our territory that is not of some use. Such being the case, we should defend and develop the entire country. Are we going to build a railway to Tibet, which is so far away from us? Definitely. If we indulge ourselves in a comfortable life in prosperous places and forget the border areas and areas inhabited by our fraternal nationalities, it will be difficult for us to build socialism. Therefore, in the cause of building our motherland into a more beautiful and prosperous nation and ensuring a happier life for our people, all army units engaged in national construction should work hard and the Railway Engineering Corps in particular should redouble its efforts.

In building our country, we must energetically study politics and acquire general knowledge and technology. We are working to build socialism, working for our motherland and the people, and for the realization of communism. If we are politically aware and abide by our convictions, we will be able to withstand any hardship and give no

thought to personal comfort or personal gain and loss. We will have in mind only the great cause of building our motherland, with all her magnificent prospects. Essentially this is the politics we are talking about, and this is what we should study. As I have already said, we should also acquire general knowledge. Without it commanders and fighters in the technical units will get nowhere. They will be unable to read, or to learn how to use new machines. Possessing it, they can learn various branches of science and technology. Our society is advancing every day and we ourselves must do likewise. This means we must study. Otherwise, we will fall behind while society advances.

In building our country, we should also strengthen unity among different units of the army and between the army and the people. We have a glorious tradition of uniting as one. In the past, we fought in unity under the leadership of the Party and Comrade Mao Zedong and achieved victory in the revolution. In the future, we should do the same and strive for further victories. Above all, you must keep up the glorious tradition of unity between the army and the people, unite with the people in your areas and succeed in your work with their help. At the same time, you should unite with the other units in the army as well as with the Railway Engineering Bureau and the railway construction teams. Army units and civilian teams should emulate and encourage each other in order to do a good job of railway construction.

Comrades! You have shown great collective heroism in defending and building our motherland. You should carry forward this spirit. There are thousands upon thousands of heroes and model workers in our army. The spirit they have displayed is collective heroism, not individualistic heroism. We oppose the idea of individualistic heroism. No one in this world can accomplish much without the support of the masses. "Great heroes" divorced from the masses, as advertised by those who try to make up history and deceive people, are non-existent. Taken in by the exploiting classes, some people in the old days couldn't see the truth and worshipped such "heroes". Our heroes are different. Our heroes and model workers have become such because they have fulfilled their tasks by relying on the strength of the collective and the broad masses of the people. In war, for instance, victory presupposes good leadership, good commanders. Yet it can never be achieved unless the companies and the soldiers fight bravely and in unity. If an army suffers one defeat after another, there can be no heroes to speak of. It is precisely because of its unity and its collective

effort that our army is victorious. We therefore oppose individualistic heroism and encourage collective heroism.

Comrades! Now that you have become heroes and model workers, you should never forget to give credit to other comrades. If you claim all the credit for yourselves and forget the contributions of others, you will become arrogant and fall victim to the idea of individualistic heroism.

It is an honour for a unit to have produced heroes. The more it has, the better. The unit concerned should feel equally happy if heroes emerge in others. How can socialism be built by only a few people? Our socialist construction will be accelerated if heroes and model workers emerge everywhere as a result of hard work.

Comrades! There aren't many railways in the vast territories of our motherland. We must build more to meet the needs of socialist construction. This is a long-term, difficult but glorious task. I hope you are resolved to work in the Railway Engineering Corps for a long time, make railway construction a true lifetime undertaking and so contribute all your talent and ability to our socialist construction.

I hope all of you, our heroes and meritorious model workers, will take the lead and play an exemplary role in this great cause. I hope you will keep up your honour and achieve greater success in the future. Success to your meeting and your work!

HANDICRAFT PRODUCERS' CO-OPERATIVES MUST BE WELL RUN

December 24, 1954

Over the past year, progress has been achieved in the co-operative transformation of the handicraft industry. The number of handicraftsmen who have joined the co-operatives has grown from 300,000 to more than one million and the gross output value of their industry increased from more than 5,000 billion yuan²⁹⁹ to 11,000 billion yuan.

When I visited your exhibition last month, I saw clearly that in the past year the general line of the Chinese Communist Party for the transition period has been conscientiously carried out in the sphere of the handicraft industry. Both new and improved farm tools, in addition to quantities of older ones, have been produced to aid in agricultural production. Many daily necessities and household items of practical use have been manufactured to improve the life of the people in urban and rural areas. Considerable achievements have also been made in promoting the nation's industrialization and capital construction. As a result of technical innovations, some manual work processes have gradually become partly or fully mechanized. The exhibits in the arts and crafts gallery, so exquisitely done, are the artistic creation of our labouring people through hard work. The increase of art-craft products and their export in exchange for machinery have benefited our socialist industrialization. Your exhibition is well organized and is a most practical way to provide an overview of your work. Exhibitions of this sort should be held in all parts of the country. They should not only provide artistic enjoyment, but also offer products for the public to buy. I am told that you have opened an arts and crafts shop in Wangfujing Street in Beijing and another one in

Excerpts from a speech at the Fourth National Conference of Representatives of Handicraftsmen.

Shanghai. That's very good. I think shops of this kind should be set up all over the country.

The state should give great assistance to the handicraft industry. Indeed, the industry has received diverse forms of state assistance over the past year. A large quantity of materials has been allocated to handicraft co-operatives by the State Bureau of Materials and Equipment and the various industrial departments. Necessary financial investment has been made, preferential treatment has been provided in taxation and low-interest loans have been granted by the People's Bank. These kinds of assistance are available only in a socialist state. The government's purpose in aiding the handicraft industry is to help the workers overcome their difficulties, take an active part in the co-operative movement and in the socialist construction of our country.

Handicraft co-operatives must be well run. Low-priced quality goods and honest service for customers, old and young, should be promoted, and shoddy workmanship and manufacture opposed. The co-operatives may apply piece-rate wages and the principle of distribution according to work. Thrift should be practised and waste eliminated. Co-operatives should accumulate their own capital. Public accumulation, which is socialist public property, must be cared for and protected by all members. When you earn some money, you should not pursue a "three-all" policy: sharing all, eating all and spending all. You should conduct education in collectivism and oppose selfishness and the practice of benefiting oneself at the expense of others or seeking personal gains at the collective's expense. The cultural and welfare services in the co-operatives should be managed well so that their members will benefit from the superiority of the socialist system and refrain from withdrawing and going it alone.

The various trades in arts and crafts must be protected and developed. Those highly-skilled master workers who have acquired their skills through diligent work should enjoy the love and esteem of the state and the people and be accorded preferential treatment. These experienced workers have a glorious task entrusted to them by the new society, which is to pass on their superb craftsmanship to the younger generation. We hope that they will not keep their skills to themselves. Otherwise, their unique craftsmanship will die out with them. I'm afraid some of the finest folk craftsmanship in China has already been lost, which is a great pity.

Handicraft co-operatives should be run by relying on the masses. Work should not be monopolized by a few. Cadres should be trained

from among the rank and file and through the practice of productive labour. There are a lot of talented people at lower levels yet to be discovered. You will certainly be successful in all your work so long as you rely on the working masses. To run co-operatives well, it is also imperative to rely on the Party's leadership, establish competent leading bodies and adopt rules and regulations for everyone to follow. As the Chinese saying goes, "Without rules, there would be no squares or circles."

STRENGTHEN UNITY AND BUILD SOCIALISM

September 17, 1956

I fully endorse the political report of the Central Committee made by Comrade Liu Shaoqi, the report on the Proposals for the Second Five-Year Plan for Development of the National Economy made by Comrade Zhou Enlai, and the report on the revision of the Party Constitution made by Comrade Deng Xiaoping.

The history of our Party's work during the 11 years since the Seventh Congress¹⁰⁶ is a summary of the victories won by the Chinese people. During this period the Chinese people, united under our Party's leadership, achieved victory in the great democratic revolution through arduous and complex struggles; and, following this, they gained, in the main, victory in the great socialist revolution and achieved major results in the fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57) for socialist construction.

All this has brought about a fundamental change in the direction of China's historical development and in the face of Chinese society. On the basis of our achievements, namely, complete national liberation, unity and people's democracy together with equality, solidarity, fraternity and mutual help among the various nationalities in our country, we are forging ahead energetically along the socialist road. Our economic and cultural work is progressing with each passing day; our people are freeing themselves from extreme poverty and cultural backwardness, and their material and cultural well-being has improved markedly from year to year.

I am, therefore, convinced that our congress, all comrades of our Party and the people throughout the country will appraise the work

Delivered at the Eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, this speech first appeared in *Renmin Ribao* (*People's Daily*) on September 19, 1956.

tionals overseas. The unity of 600 million people is a mighty force. Relying on the unity of our people, we achieved the great victory in the bourgeois-democratic revolution. Once again relying on this unity, we have achieved the great victory in the socialist revolution. Thanks to the correct political leadership exercised by the working class through our Party and to the boundless faith placed by the broad masses of peasants in the working class and our Party, the close worker-peasant alliance has become the most important factor to account for the rapid success of the socialist transformation of our agriculture. And this rapid success has in turn consolidated the worker-peasant alliance on a new basis and provided a reliable guarantee for the cause of socialism. At the same time, the socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce has been carried out under conditions of our continued alliance with the national bourgeoisie and through consultation with them. In this way, the said revolutionary change has been achieved by peaceful means. Moreover, our alliance with the national bourgeoisie enables them to serve socialism with their knowledge of modern culture and technology. Obviously this is a great advantage. Now that our socialist transformation has largely been completed, the great unity among the people of all our nationalities, which is based on the worker-peasant alliance, has become firmer and broader in scope. Our 600 million people, united as one under the leadership of our Party and the People's Government, are developing the productive forces with great initiative and creative ability. This is the most essential and favourable factor in the building of a highly industrialized socialist country at a fairly rapid rate.

Our task is to make full use of this factor and give full play to the superiority of the socialist system, so as to strengthen the great unity of all the people and enhance their initiative and creative ability for the building of socialism. To achieve this, we must correctly handle the relations within the ranks of our people, primarily the relationship between the working class and the peasantry, the relationship between the working class and the bourgeoisie who are being transformed into working people, and the relationship between the people of the various nationalities; we must continue to consolidate and extend the people's democratic united front and closely rally to the Communist Party all nationalities, all strata of the people, all democratic parties and groups, all democrats without party affiliation and all Chinese nationals residing abroad; and we must successfully remould all those who in the past belonged to the reactionary classes, transforming them from a

negative into a positive factor in socialist construction. To achieve this, we must also handle well the relationship between the interests of the state, the co-operatives and the individuals, and the relationship between the central and the local authorities, between industry and agriculture, between heavy industry and light industry, and between industry in the coastal regions and industry in the interior. We must do this because our handling of these relationships will ultimately have a bearing on the unity within the ranks of the people and on the enthusiasm of the masses. Lastly, for all the above purposes, we must continue to consolidate the people's democratic dictatorship and further enhance democratic life in our country, because these are the most important guarantees for strengthening the great unity of the people and bringing into full play their initiative and creative ability.

Another important and favourable condition for the successful building of socialism in China is that our country has a vast territory, rich resources and a large population. China is rich in industrial resources. In respect to heavy industry, deposits of coal, iron-ore and various non-ferrous metals are especially rich, and raw materials for light industry are fairly adequate and their output can be greatly increased, and there are extensive markets. Our country has excellent geographical conditions (some of *which* are seldom known in other parts of the world) for the development of a diversified agricultural economy: it grows crops suited to tropical, subtropical and temperate zones, and it produces valuable special local products such as silk, tea, medicinal herbs and fruits. These rich resources and natural advantages are far from being fully utilized as yet. Constituting a most important factor in our country's productive forces, our large population is a most precious asset. China needs not worry about manpower.

It is our task to make full and rational use of our country's enormous supply of full-time and part-time workers to tap our rich resources. To this end, the central and local departments in charge of economic development should make repeated investigations and studies and constantly improve their overall planning; and the state for its part should pursue a policy that would facilitate an enormous expansion of production, bring into full play the enthusiasm of all the central and local authorities as well as the enthusiasm of the agricultural and handicraft producers' co-operatives and of the families of their members. In short, on the basis of giving full play to the superiority of our socialist economic system, one of our basic policies in the

building of socialism should be to make the most of our advantages — a vast territory, rich resources and a large population — to vigorously promote production, so as gradually to turn the human, land and other material resources to best account.

We are living in a period of accumulating wealth for our socialist state. How are we to do this? Through hard work and thrift, which are the long-standing virtues of our labouring people. “Be industrious and frugal, and you will succeed in starting a career” — this motto should be the principle for all state functionaries and economic workers to constantly keep in mind and adhere to. The Party Central Committee has all along made it imperative that all comrades maintain the fine work style characterized by hard, persistent struggle. It has led the whole Party in more than one campaign for practising strict economy and combating waste. Much has been achieved in these campaigns, but it is to be regretted that serious cases of ostentatiousness and extravagance and of squandering the people’s money still occur now and then. We must call on all Party members to resist these obnoxious tendencies.

I am convinced that we can overcome all difficulties and reach our goal of building a great socialist China, provided that our Party is capable of uniting the forces of our 600 million people and that we turn to good account all aspects of the superiority inherent in the socialist economy, make use of all other favourable conditions existing in our country and assiduously apply the principle of managing things in an industrious and economical way.

We are also faced with the task of liberating our sacred territory Taiwan and ultimately reunifying our motherland. As pointed out in the Central Committee’s political report, we shall strive to bring about the liberation of Taiwan by peaceful negotiations and, as far as possible, not by means of war, because this accords with the interests of the Chinese people (the people of Taiwan Province included) and with the interests of military and political personnel in Taiwan. It is our hope that these Taiwan personnel will boldly take the stand of patriotism and return to the embrace of the motherland. If they act in this way, they can be assured of a bright future. Taiwan must be liberated one way or another. The liberation of Taiwan is an absolutely just cause in which the Chinese people exercise their sovereign rights, a cause that is sure to be crowned with victory.

Apart from internal conditions, the current international conditions are also favourable for our socialist construction.

We can all see what immense and profound changes have come about in the international situation since our Party's last national congress. During the intervening 11 years, the people of various countries have achieved signal victories in their struggle against imperialism. Socialism has gone beyond the confines of a single state. Geographically, the socialist countries, which embrace more than 900 million people, form a contiguous expanse of territory and constitute one great family of friendship and co-operation headed by the Soviet Union. The tremendous developments and successes in the movements for national independence have served to burst asunder the shackles of imperialist colonial oppression in vast areas of Asia and Africa. The recent heroic move on the part of Egypt to nationalize the Suez Canal Company has been greeted with strong support by the people in Asia, Africa and other parts of the world, and this shows that the widespread struggle against colonialism is surging like powerful tides. On the other hand, because its policy of war runs counter to the peaceful aspirations and interests of the people and because it follows a policy of aggression and expansion directed against all countries, the reactionary clique of the United States, which is vainly trying to dominate the world, is exposing itself more and more as the most ferocious enemy of the people throughout the world and has thereby landed itself in increasing isolation. All this has helped the relaxation of the tense international situation. Of course, we must not lessen our vigilance against the danger of war. If the socialist countries and all the peace-loving countries and peoples of the world continue to strengthen their solidarity and wage resolute struggles in defence of world peace and the just cause of humanity, it is possible that the present relaxation of tension may lead to a lasting peace.

From what I have said above we can see that the present internal and international conditions are extremely favourable for our socialist construction. The question now boils down to one of the leadership of our Party and its unity. If our Party is able to give correct, Marxist-Leninist leadership and avoid serious mistakes, and if it can maintain the strong solidarity and unity within its ranks based on Marxism-Leninism, then it will certainly be able to unite our 600 million people for the successful completion of the great task of socialist construction.

In his political report, Comrade Liu Shaoqi has already given detailed explanations as to how to ensure that our Party will make fewer mistakes and avoid serious ones, with which I am in full agreement. We shall be able to do so provided that, drawing lessons from

our past mistakes and from the experience gained in correcting them and adopting the methods used in the rectification campaigns, we do the following: consistently observe the principle of integrating theory with practice and oppose subjectivism; adhere to the mass line whereby the leadership is combined with the masses, and oppose bureaucratism; adhere to the principle of democratic centralism and to the principle by which collective leadership is combined with personal responsibility, and combat all tendencies towards decentralism and ultra-democracy that go against democratic centralism, and combat the tendency towards making arbitrary decisions by individuals, which runs counter to the principle of collective leadership; persistently foster democracy and conduct criticism and self-criticism in the Party and among the people and oppose all tendencies towards suppressing democracy and criticism; in inner-Party struggles adhere to the principles of “learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the sickness to save the patient”, of “achieving clarity in ideology and unity among comrades” and of “starting from unity to attain unity through criticism or struggle”, and oppose liberalistic attitudes towards mistakes in the Party as well as rigid, crude and excessive inner-Party struggles; and resolutely maintain the unity of the Party and the people, and oppose the tendency towards sectarianism. In short, if under the new circumstances we can correctly draw upon the rich experience gained in Party building over the last 35 years, we shall be able to avoid serious mistakes, quickly correct mistakes that are made, prevent minor mistakes from developing into major ones and temporary mistakes from developing into long-lasting ones. In this way, we shall be able to ensure correct Party leadership and Party solidarity and unity.

From now on, in our strenuous endeavour to build socialism in China, we must unceasingly foster the unity of all Party members. For only by firmly uniting all our Party members on the basis of Marxism-Leninism can we unite the people of the whole country and turn their initiative to full account. Our unity is what our enemies fear most and are incessantly scheming to destroy. This makes it imperative that all revolutionaries dedicated to the cause of communism look upon upholding the Party’s solidarity and unity as one of their most important tasks. It must be pointed out that as a matter of fact, whether we can maintain the Party’s strong solidarity and unity has a bearing on the very outcome of the revolution. In order to overcome negative factors in our march forward, we must call on all

comrades to further strengthen unity on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles and to combat all that works against the Party's solidarity and unity. In the draft of the new Party Constitution, the safeguarding of the Party's solidarity and the strengthening of its unity have been laid down as a sacred duty and obligation for all Party members. This is entirely correct. The adoption of the new Party Constitution will certainly greatly facilitate the removal of any phenomenon in the Party that may harm its solidarity and unity.

In all our relationships within the Party we must oppose sectarian sentiments of every kind. Every comrade must learn to unite with others, particularly with those who hold views different from his own. It is not difficult to unite with comrades who generally agree with you — this is not the issue; what is really difficult and essential is to unite with those who frequently differ with you. Communists should be free of selfish motives, and there is nothing we cannot sacrifice for the supreme interests of the people. We are Communists armed with Marxism-Leninism, and there is nothing whose right and wrong we cannot judge in the light of principle. If we all commit ourselves to truth, a reasonable conclusion can be arrived at in any dispute. What, then, can prevent us from achieving unity? Controversies do arise in our work and there is nothing wrong about that, for they are inevitable in the progress of our work. The point is that we must not allow the clash of different opinions to affect our unity.

Comrades! Ours is a great, correct and glorious party. In the past 35 years we have finally succeeded in bringing unity to the great Chinese nation that had been divided and oppressed but has now taken its destiny into its own hands. People throughout China are watching us; what we are doing is much in the thoughts of the working people all over the world. Ours is a very great responsibility. We must exert ourselves and guard against conceit and impetuosity. The basic tasks that this congress will set the Party may be difficult, but if only we can strengthen Party unity and our unity with the entire nation, we shall certainly be able to fulfil them, we shall certainly be able to unite with all the forces at home and abroad that can be united with, make the best use of all the conditions that are in our favour and build a great socialist China.

IN COMMEMORATION OF DR.
SUN YAT-SEN, GREAT TEACHER
OF CHINA'S DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

November 11, 1956

Tomorrow is the 90th anniversary of the birth of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Let us honour the memory of this great teacher of China's democratic revolution with esteem and admiration.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen began to devote himself to the revolutionary cause in the late 19th century. He organized revolutionary groups, launched uprisings and was held in high respect by all patriots. In the beginning of the 20th century, the imperialists intensified their political, economic and cultural aggression against China. At the same time, the imperial Qing government became increasingly dependent on the imperialist powers in maintaining its feudal rule. The nation was on the verge of collapse and the people lived in misery. All patriots wanted to make a revolution to save the nation. In 1905, by uniting many patriots and revolutionary groups, Dr. Sun Yat-sen organized the *Tong Meng Hui* (Chinese Revolutionary League).⁹⁵ Its members then set up revolutionary organizations in various parts of the country to unite the patriots in preparation for revolutionary uprisings. They thus became the organizers and leaders of the people's revolutionary movements throughout the country.

The Revolution of 1911¹²³ was launched in response to Dr. Sun Yat-sen's call and proceeded under his leadership. It ended in victory, thanks to the establishment of a united front that included all anti-Qing forces, with the *Tong Meng Hui* as its core. From the very beginning, the *Tong Meng Hui* advocated armed struggle. Armed force was used by the revolutionaries to destroy the troops of the *Lü Ying* (Green Battalions)³⁰² and *Xun Fang Ying* (Patrol Battalions).³⁰³

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The rebel troops observed strict discipline and refrained from harassing the people, yet they neglected to mobilize them. Members of the *Tong Meng Hui* were enthusiastic about the revolution and worked for armed uprisings, but they neglected education in revolutionary ideas. Thus, many people relaxed their efforts soon after the Qing emperor was dethroned in the Revolution of 1911 and a nominal republic was established. Thinking that the revolution had triumphed for good, they failed to see the need to further organize the revolutionary forces for continued struggle against the old forces. This gave the counter-revolutionary forces headed by Yuan Shikai²¹⁶ an opportunity to launch an attack on the revolution and, by 1913, to take control of the whole country.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen sent a message of congratulations to Russia after the victory of its October Socialist Revolution of 1917, and in 1921 he decided on a policy of alliance with Russia. In a lecture to troops from Yunnan, Guangdong and Jiangxi in December of the same year, he said that the Russian revolution “broke out after our Revolution of 1911, but it achieved better results . . . because all their soldiers have political conviction as well as a definite purpose, which enable them to unite with the peasants and workers in order to transform the old country into a new one.”³⁰⁴ He declared that the Chinese revolution should emulate the Russian revolution.

Fighting heroically for China’s national independence for 40 years, Dr. Sun Yat-sen came to realize that only a socialist country would give support to the Chinese revolution and that the imperialist powers would never help (although individual foreigners did). In December 1923, he made the following comment on a letter sent to him by Deng Zeru and others:³⁰⁵ “The Chinese revolution is always regarded with disfavour by some countries, which are trying to help our opponents wipe out our party. The capitalist countries will not sympathize with our party; only Russia and the oppressed nations and people will.” Integrating his nationalism with Lenin’s socialism, Dr. Sun Yat-sen set to reorganize the Kuomintang in January 1924, and adopted the Three Great Policies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party, and assistance to the peasants and workers at the First National Congress of the Kuomintang. After forming a united front, the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party strove together to realize the revolutionary programme stipulated in the declaration of that congress.

Once Dr. Sun Yat-sen began to co-operate with the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese revolution took on a new aspect. Although the revolution of 1925-27 failed, it exerted a profound influence on the Chinese people. Under the new conditions the Chinese revolution continued to develop and in 1949 it finally triumphed throughout the country. As the Chinese saying goes, when you drink water, think of its source. So let us honour the memory of Dr. Sun Yat-sen for the enormous role he played in the Chinese revolution.

Throughout 40 years of revolutionary struggle, Dr. Sun Yat-sen showed a staunch and courageous revolutionary spirit. He feared neither difficulty nor failure. After suffering a setback, he would reorganize the revolutionary ranks and then resume the struggle. He was capable of keeping pace with the progress of historical events, advancing from advocating the overthrow of the Qing emperor and establishing a democratic republic in his early years to adopting the Three Great Policies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and workers in the later years, and from advocating a democratic revolution to calling for Great Harmony in the world. His revolutionary spirit continued to grow throughout his life.

Led by the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese people took over and carried on Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary cause. After nearly 30 years of effort, they have completed the first stage of the revolution — that is, the bourgeois-democratic revolution. With regard to the principle of nationalism, China has achieved full emancipation from imperialist oppression with the exception of Taiwan and there is now equality among all nationalities within our country. With regard to the principle of democracy, “a democratic system shared by all the common people” is now applied. All individuals and organizations that genuinely oppose imperialism are entitled to, and in fact enjoy, complete freedom and all other rights. With regard to the principle of people's livelihood, the programme of “land to the tiller” and no domination of the national economy by private capital has been carried out during the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. Thus, all the ideals of the national and democratic revolution which Dr. Sun Yat-sen ardently pursued all his life have materialized owing to the effort of the Chinese Communist Party fighting in unity with the Chinese people in this first stage of the revolution. For several years now they have been striving to complete the second stage of the revolution — to build a socialist motherland.

A decisive victory has already been won in the socialist transformation.

Having triumphed in the revolution, the people of our country cannot forget Dr. Sun Yat-sen and all the revolutionary martyrs. In commemorating this great teacher of the democratic revolution, we draw inspiration for our new cause, socialism.

REPORT ON AN INSPECTION TOUR

April 18, 1957

I just toured Guangxi, Guangdong (Hainan Island and the cities of Zhanjiang and Guangzhou), Yunnan, Sichuan and Shaanxi traveling by way of Hubei. I was impressed by the good results in agricultural production I saw. There has been a considerable increase in grain output in these provinces with the exception of Guangxi, which failed to register an increase because of drought last year. Great achievements have been made in the co-operative transformation of agriculture. Some 75 to 90 per cent of the co-operative members have increased their income. Progress has also been made in local industry and handicrafts, and the transformation of capitalist industry and commerce has yielded remarkable results. Better and more fruitful work has been done in these provinces in the past year, although some problems remain to be solved. In addition to what I have reported to the Central Committee by cable, here I would like to offer a few personal observations on the following topics.

ON FOREIGN TRADE

The past few years have witnessed progress in the foreign trade of Guangxi, Guangdong, Yunnan and Sichuan provinces. A breakthrough has been made in exports, with an annual increase in both variety and value. In 1956 the four provinces fulfilled an export quota valued at 1.22 billion yuan and this year's quota can be increased somewhat. Mild in climate, abundant in natural resources and easy

Part of a report to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and Comrade Mao Zedong on an inspection tour of Guangxi, Guangdong, Yunnan, Sichuan and Shaanxi provinces and some other places.

of access, these provinces should be developed into important bases for foreign trade.

At present, the essential problem with foreign trade lies in the difficulty in obtaining goods. There are two reasons. One is that, although production has increased, domestic market demand has also grown. Supplies of grain, oil-bearing crops, meat, etc. are inadequate. The other lies in the fact that, owing to poor organization in the flow of goods, defective pricing and taxation, over-elaborate operational procedures and neglect of the development of the mountainous areas, it is hard to obtain local specialities such as medicinal herbs, animal skins and hides and miscellaneous goods, although there is no scarcity of them at all.

Shortfalls in such promising export products as grain, oil-bearing crops and meat will continue in the next few years. Curtailing exports, however, is not the way to solve the problem of shortages, for it will only add to the difficulties in our foreign trade. The real solution lies in promoting production and appropriately reducing our own consumption of export goods by finding substitutes. Strains on grain supply will be eased to a certain extent if there is a bumper harvest this year. Substitutes for oil-bearing products can be found. Guangxi alone, for instance, grows 90 kinds of woody oil-bearing crops. There is no scarcity of such substitutes in other provinces either, and their production can be expanded substantially. Pork supplies will be gradually increased as a result of this year's efforts in pig-raising. Therefore, we can possibly set aside as much as possible of the above-mentioned products. To make up for the loss of foreign exchange earnings due to reduced export of grain, oil-bearing products and pork, we should try to increase the export of mineral products such as coal, salt, rare metals and asbestos. Success in doing this will open up broad prospects for the future. For example, coal and salt can be exported to Japan and some other countries. It is, therefore, necessary to plan and develop a large number of small coal pits in various localities in order to save coal from mines in Kailuan and Fushun for export. Large mechanized salt fields can be opened at Yinggehai on Hainan Island. These will bring large returns with modest investment. A considerable amount of rare metals and asbestos is available in various parts of China, and large profits can be derived from exporting them. All this calls for good planning and organization so as to speedily ensure a sufficient supply of export products and also to gradually

equalize the proportion of industrial and agricultural products in the total volume of export.

As for the export of medicinal herbs, animal skins and hides, miscellaneous items and other local specialities, the main effort should be put into improving the system of supply. Management and operation should be streamlined to allow grass-roots units in the producer areas to establish direct contact with the foreign trade authorities. Efforts should also be made to change the irrational purchasing practices such as accepting goods only in large quantities and dry condition; to organize the purchase of goods by travelling tradesmen and peddlars from mountainous areas in a planned and guided way; to restore the brokers' storehouses for mountain products and construct processing centres at selected points; to make proper readjustments in the price and taxation policies; and to repair and build roads and improve transport by using investments from local authorities and domestic and foreign trade departments and by pooling the efforts of the masses, and thus do everything possible to help promote production in the mountainous areas. The above measures will lead to a steadily increasing flow of products from such areas. They will not only ensure a supply of export materials and redress the shortage of certain raw materials for domestic industrial production but, more importantly, enliven the economy in the mountainous areas and better the livelihood of the local inhabitants who now still lead a hard life. The problem of the mountainous areas is a national one which cannot be solved by agricultural loans or relief from the civil affairs departments alone. Thus we should become aware that economic development in the mountainous areas through price regulation and other measures by the foreign trade departments is an important means of solving these areas' problems. Success in this respect will, therefore, be doubly beneficial.

Ours is a big country with a mild climate and abundant resources, a large population and cheap labour. Our handicrafts are known throughout the world for their good quality and reasonable prices. Moreover, our country is playing an increasingly important role in international affairs. Whether for our socialist construction or for expanding our international exchanges, our import and export trade must be greatly increased. Before exports can be increased, however, we must be sure that we have a large stock of goods. Adequate supplies for export will be ensured with the growth in the production of coal, salt, rare metals, asbestos and so on, with the development of

the mountain economy, and with the nationwide growth of agricultural production to boot. This will help change the current situation in foreign trade in which our exports consist solely of agricultural products. During my recent tour, I discovered the true export situation and I am not at all pessimistic. I'm convinced that it will not be too difficult for us to secure materials for export so long as we adopt effective measures and do our work well. The target for this year's exports is valued at 5.8 billion yuan, and we must try to surpass it. Starting with the period of the Second Five-Year Plan, there should be a considerable annual increase in the volume of export, and the minimum target by 1962 should be 10 billion yuan. In this way we will be able to obtain a large number of imports in return to stimulate our economic development and increase our political and diplomatic influence.

ON INDUSTRY

The greatest problem I encountered on my recent tour is how to combine military with civilian production. This problem exists not only in Chongqing, Chengdu, Yunnan and Guangzhou, but also in the rest of the country. Generally speaking, ordnance factories are characterized by larger investment and staff, better buildings and newer equipment, higher technological levels and greater production capacity. Last year, these factories operated below capacity and the situation is even more serious this year. Some now have to canvass business orders to find a way out of this quandary while others, failing to do so, have to leave part of their equipment and staff idle. Prolonged idleness of this sort will mean heavy losses. Sooner or later, a way must be found for ordnance factories to partly engage in civilian production in peace-time or for them to combine their production with that of civilian factories. In my opinion, the earlier we solve this problem, the lower our losses will be. Of course this is a complicated problem involving various quarters and calling for overall consideration and planning. But time is running out and further procrastination will bring no good. We've got to define the principle first. For instance, as an initial step, the following two proposals might be considered: One is to merge the Second Ministry of Machine-Building with the First and with the Ministry of Electrical

Equipment, placing the equipment and manpower of all three under unified control for production of more civilian goods in peace-time and mostly of military goods in wartime. Before the merger, the First Ministry of Machine-Building should build as few new factories as possible and the foreign trade departments should reduce the import of mechanical and electrical equipment as much as possible. Factories under the Second Ministry of Machine-Building should use their surplus capacity to build new factories and to produce such equipment, thus bringing all existing capacity into full use. The other proposal is simply to reduce the scope of activity of the Second Ministry of Machine-Building and have it specialize in the production of atomic and other special weapons and divert its excess capacity to civilian production. If neither of these proposals is feasible, it would be best to ask the State Planning Commission, the National Economic Commission and the National Construction Commission to work together with the departments concerned in promptly formulating a rational and workable programme to be finalized after discussion by the Party Central Committee. In any case, efforts should be made to put into full use the existing equipment in all the factories under the Second Ministry of Machine-Building and thus enable it to play a greater role in our national construction.

A second problem is how to make more effective use of our mineral resources. According to data gathered from Guangxi, Guangdong, Yunnan and Sichuan, these provinces are fairly rich in such resources. Gold, silver, copper, iron, tin and rare metals are available there. The problem lies in overly rigid government control, restricting the initiative of the local authorities and the people. Unified state planning for extraction is necessary and correct and is in the interest of the state and the people in cases where there are rich deposits and special rare metals suited to mining with modern equipment. But I believe that the local authorities should be allowed to extract in a planned and guided way those small and scattered deposits beyond the state's extraction capacity, on condition that state mineral resources are not damaged or wasted. Local governments might also be allowed to organize the handicraft, agricultural or supply and marketing co-operatives for extraction with their own surplus manpower and funds. The finished or semi-finished products of these co-operatives would in turn be purchased by enterprises or the local authorities according to contract. Free markets might be opened, when appropriate, for certain products such as coal in order to meet the needs of all

concerned. In this way, resources can be put to more effective use and the supply of coal, rare metals, asbestos and other export materials to a certain extent ensured. Meanwhile, the labour force would be utilized in a more rational way, so that a number of handicraft workers and peasants would be able to make a living, while the state would be able to economize on investments. In short, the advantages of such an arrangement are many. Take Sichuan for example. There were a total of 1,200 small coal pits in the whole province. The cost of coal produced by county or prefectural pits was 3 yuan per ton (the cost of that produced by the masses was even cheaper), the per-ton production cost in the provincial pits was 7 yuan, while that of coal under unified marketing by the China Coal and Building Material Company reached 12-13 yuan. In the interest of the state, the local authorities had to close down 1,000 small coal pits. This caused coal to be in short supply in the whole province and those pits had to be reopened. Take for another example the Huili area south of Xichang, which used to be a gold producer. Before Liberation, the inhabitants there reportedly had to extract 20,000 ounces of gold to be delivered to the *tusi* headmen of the area.³⁰⁶ Now that democratic reform has been carried out and the local people no longer have to make such deliveries, they have stopped digging gold altogether. If we allow the people to resume the undertaking and meanwhile strengthen guidance and organizational work, several hundred thousand ounces of gold can be excavated every year, which will mean considerable wealth. Clearly, it would be beneficial to both the state and society to make rational utilization of scattered mineral resources and allow the local governments and inhabitants to do the extraction.

A third point is that it is inadvisable for the central authorities to exercise much too rigid control over the local machine-building enterprises by placing under their management all the relatively well-equipped plants. Nowadays not a single such plant is to be found under the Guangxi, Yunnan or Sichuan provincial authorities, and, therefore, there is no way to meet the production needs of local industry, handicrafts and agriculture and it is sometimes even difficult to have machines repaired. In my view, the central authorities should transfer a couple of the well-equipped machine-building plants to each provincial government so that they can turn out products needed by local industry, handicrafts and agriculture and also do some machinery repairs. Another way is for some centrally administered machine-building plants to transfer part of their assignments to the

local authorities to fulfil and so carry out co-ordination according to the needs of local industrial and agricultural production. Only thus can the difficulties in local industrial development be overcome.

THIRTY GREAT AND GLORIOUS YEARS

July 31, 19 57

Comrades,

In celebrating the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army today, I, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the Government of the People's Republic of China and Chairman Mao Zedong, extend warmest greetings to all comrades of the People's Liberation Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers, to comrades who are now demobilized servicemen, to comrades of the people's militia and to the young people who are ready to be called up for military service.

The Chinese People's Liberation Army is an armed force whose sole aim is to help achieve the complete liberation of the people and to resolutely protect the fruits of the people's revolution. Over the past 30 years it has gone through glorious and great, arduous and tortuous struggles and exerted its utmost and rendered meritorious services to the people, which the latter will never forget. It was mainly by relying on this armed force that the Chinese people won victory in their revolution. In the future, they must continue to rely on it to safeguard their socialist motherland.

Thirty years ago Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei³⁰⁷ betrayed the revolution, and the national bourgeoisie and the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie deserted it. On August 1, 1927, at a critical moment when the revolution suffered defeat, the Chinese Communist Party led the 30,000 troops of the Northern Expeditionary Army under its influence in launching an armed uprising at Nanchang.⁷⁹ From then on, the banner of the democratic revolution was held aloft by the Communist Party alone.

Delivered at a rally of people from all walks of life in Beijing to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, this speech first appeared in *Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)* on August 1, 1957.

It is true that the troops taking part in the August 1st Uprising of 1927 failed in reversing the defeat of the First Great Revolution (1924–27) and that, neglecting to integrate themselves with the local revolutionary peasant movement, most of them were routed after arriving in eastern Guangdong Province in their southward march from Nanchang. Nevertheless, this uprising was of great significance in that it served to chart a clear political orientation for the Chinese revolution and marked the beginning of independent Communist Party leadership over the revolution and the armed revolutionary struggle. The small number of troops that had survived the uprising later became an initial source of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, predecessor of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

The August 1st Uprising in Nanchang was no isolated event. It was one of a number of uprisings led by the Chinese Communist Party following the unsuccessful First Great Revolution. Immediately after this uprising the Party Central Committee held the August 7th Meeting³⁰⁸ that called for autumn harvest uprisings by the peasants. Afterwards, the Party led the peasants and some troops in launching several uprisings in Hunan, Jiangxi, Hubei, Henan, Shaanxi and Guangdong provinces; and it launched the Guangzhou Uprising in December of the same year.¹¹⁸ Although most of these uprisings ended up in defeat, what was left of the insurrectionary troops, like the survivors of the Nanchang Uprising, became the initial components of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

The time between the Nanchang Uprising of August 1, 1927 and the Ninth Party Congress of the Fourth Army of the Red Army held in December 1929 may be called the incipient period of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. The most important gain in this period was the experience acquired in the Jinggang Mountains area by the worker-peasant revolutionary armed forces led by Comrade Mao Zedong. In October 1927, Comrade Mao Zedong led a detachment that had taken part in the Autumn Harvest Uprising to the Jinggang Mountains area and began to establish rural revolutionary bases and carry out the agrarian revolution. In April 1928, a detachment that had participated in the Nanchang Uprising reached the same area after organizing and participating in the peasants' uprisings in southern Hunan.¹²² The two detachments joined forces to form the Fourth Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army,¹²⁵ which later became the mainstay and nucleus of the Red Army. This further intensified the struggle in the Jinggang Mountains area and laid the

foundation for the Chinese Red Army and the armed revolution in China.

Articles written by Comrade Mao Zedong during this period, such as *Why Is It That Red Political Power Can Exist in China?*, *The Struggle in the Jinggang Mountains* and *On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party*, are summaries of the experience of the Red Army's Fourth Army gained in its struggle in the Jinggang Mountains area and in southern Jiangxi and western Fujian. In these documents Comrade Mao Zedong creatively applied the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism to the actual practice of the Chinese revolution and laid down the correct political and military lines for the Chinese Communist Party. From then on, the Chinese revolution entered a new historical era; a new situation was brought about and the foundation laid for the victory of the revolution. Guided by these lines, the Chinese People's Liberation Army, traversing a tortuous path in the past 30 years, achieved one victory after another, growing from small to big and from weak to strong.

Now this army is already a modern people's armed force, shouldering the glorious task of safeguarding our socialist construction and our national security and actively preparing for the liberation of Taiwan. It also has the great task of defending world peace together with the fraternal armed forces of our great ally the Soviet Union and of the People's Democracies and with the peace-loving people the world over. Events in the past 30 years have proved that the Chinese People's Liberation Army is capable of carrying out the Party's political and military lines and of inheriting and carrying forward the fine traditions and work style of the people's armed force, and that it is good at studying Marxism-Leninism and advanced military science and technology. I am confident that, by making unflagging effort and guarding against conceit and impetuosity, it can assuredly build itself into a more powerful and invincible force capable of fulfilling the new historical task entrusted to it by our Party and our people.

Long live the Chinese People's Liberation Army!

Long live the Chinese Communist Party!

Long live the People's Republic of China!

ATTENTION MUST BE PAID TO STEPPING UP THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE MOUNTAINOUS AREAS

November 18, 1957

The question of socialist economic development of the mountainous areas being discussed at this forum is a vital current issue. The meeting has been successful because the participants have been full of enthusiasm and have raised all the questions that should be dealt with. This is very satisfying. During my inspection tours, conducted in the first half of this year, of Guangxi, Guangdong, the southwestern provinces and the three provinces in the Northeast, I became convinced through discussions with responsible comrades and through my own observations that there is great potential for socialist construction in the mountainous areas. Because I grew up at the foot of the Bashan Mountains in Sichuan Province, I personally feel that there are advantages unique to the mountainous areas. We waged guerrilla warfare for a couple of decades in those places, and we should on no account underestimate their value.

Over the past few years, as in the areas on the plains, socialist transformation of the private ownership of the means of production has largely been accomplished in the mountainous areas (with the exception of Tibet). As a result, considerable progress has been achieved there in economic construction, with marked improvement in the people's clothing, food, housing conditions and transportation. Yet when compared with the plains, life in such areas is still difficult. The rich resources there have not yet been fully exploited and quite a

Speech at the National Forum on Production in the Mountainous Areas, sponsored by the Department of Rural Work under the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

few problems remain unsolved, the main reason being that many comrades have failed to pay enough attention to work in these areas. They do not understand that without exploitation of the rich resources there, it will be difficult for China to build socialism.

Why is development of the mountainous areas so important? Because geographically they make up about two-thirds of our entire territory, although their population, cultivated land and grain output only account for about one-third of the national total. Moreover, they possess inexhaustible natural wealth, including wood, bamboo, mountain products and medicinal plants, as well as rich and varied minerals. Thus there is immense untapped potential for production in the mountainous areas. Let me begin with the example of Hainan Island. It has the Wuzhi Mountains rising in the centre, some plains surrounding it, but most of its territory is mountainous with a tropical climate. The mountains there are covered with dense bush and with trees and rattan of high economic value. At the foot of the mountains, grass grows to a man's height. Put to full use, this mountain vegetation can be turned into pulp for making paper or into high-quality furniture. The grass can be utilized for raising cattle and sheep. All kinds of tropical plants such as coffee, cocoa, rubber and coconut are also grown in these areas. A few agricultural crops can be harvested within a year and rice planting is possible there when the North is experiencing the coldest winter days. Among the minerals found on the island are high-grade iron ore and rock crystal. We will benefit greatly from all valuable local resources when they are fully exploited. Then there are the provinces of Guangxi, Guizhou and Yunnan. Located in the subtropical zone, they also have mountainous areas with favourable natural conditions. Most of the crops and other plants that grow on Hainan Island can be grown in these areas as well. They are also fairly rich in mineral resources. In short, the mountainous areas in the provinces south of the Changjiang River all have very high economic value, while Lushan, Huangshan and Mogan mountains, with their world-renowned picturesque scenery, can be developed into excellent tourist attractions and summer resorts. The mountainous areas in the northern provinces, although less advantageous due to lower rainfall and temperatures, are nevertheless suitable for developing a forest industry and producing local specialties. The mountainous areas in the Northeast are no less productive. Although some mountains in Qinghai, Tibet and Xinjiang are practi-

cally barren and snow-covered all year round, they possess a variety of rare minerals.

Many of the products from the mountainous areas are not only needed at home but are important exports. For example, asbestos, mica, borax and certain rare metals are in high demand on the world market. According to statistics compiled by the foreign trade departments, mountain products now account for a considerable proportion of China's total exports. This is a most favourable condition, allowing us to develop the mountainous areas using local resources.

Unlike the plains, the mountainous areas are characterized by vast territory and small populations. Development of these areas can thus create job opportunities for people from the cities and the plains. People in the mountains will naturally support the efforts to develop their areas.

What policy should we adopt for developing the economy there? The National Programme for Agricultural Development (1956-67) (Revised Draft) stated that we should "develop farming, forestry, animal husbandry and production of all kinds of local specialities in accordance with the principle of promoting a diversified economy in a manner appropriate to local conditions". This policy is entirely correct. Economic development of mountainous areas is of course not confined to farming, forestry, animal husbandry and local specialities. It also includes mining and small industries, especially processing industries with promise, such as brewing, oil pressing, rice husking, flour milling and drug making, as well as industries using locally available raw materials and even the chemical-fibre industry. In many cases, transport costs are much lower for products processed locally than in the cities.

Here I want to place special stress on one thing, that development of the mountainous areas should be aimed at changing their self-contained economy into an integral part of the unified national economy, thus involving them economically with other parts of the country. Once the mountainous areas are developed, more and more of their rich resources will be tapped to contribute to the building of our country as a whole. This constitutes a long-term objective in developing those areas. It is completely wrong for anyone, not comprehending this bright future, to consider the Party's decision to develop the mountainous areas a mere expedient.

Improvement of communications and transportation in the mountainous areas is of great significance to mobilizing national support for developing these areas and to enabling the latter, with their rich resources, to provide assistance to other parts of the country. Only with such improvement can goods from other parts of the country be sent in and local materials shipped out. Since there are numerous rivers running through the mountainous areas, the transport departments should seriously consider how to make the best use of them. In the past, some local authorities exercised overly rigid control over river transport, not allowing privately owned junks to ply the rivers or rafts to carry goods. This only hindered the exchange of goods and other materials between different regions and created too many inconveniences in people's lives. We must also build highways for motor vehicles and simpler roads for animal-drawn carts and travellers so that all means of transport can be utilized. Dealing with the development of rural communications and transportation, Article 34 of the National Programme for Agricultural Development³⁰⁹ is of special importance and urgency for the mountainous areas because facilities there are scarce and backward. Waste caused by transporting the same materials in opposite directions in those areas should be avoided as much as possible. On the Sichuan-Tibet Highway, trucks returning from Tibet are often empty because our comrades don't see the need to bring anything back. In fact, Tibet's borax sells for a good price of 3,000 yuan per ton. It would help both national construction and the local economy if some of it were trucked out.

In developing commerce and trade in the mountainous areas, special attention should be given to the role of supply and marketing co-ops at the grass-roots level. Since mountain villages are scattered and local production is on a small scale, there is no need yet to set up state-owned commercial agencies there. Instead, the above-mentioned co-ops should provide market for local products and specialties and purchase and transfer them as well as guide their production. Meanwhile, they should help organize handicraftsmen and surplus labour in the rural areas for processing and marketing products.

The development of the mountainous areas involves not only the agricultural departments but also the industrial, commercial, financial, tax, cultural and educational, scientific and public health departments. In short, this development needs the co-ordinated efforts of all departments concerned. With the country's overall interests in mind, these

departments should give serious attention to supporting the development of the mountainous areas and truly rely on the broad masses in the endeavour. If this is done, the mountainous areas will surely develop rapidly, giving great impetus to nationwide socialist construction.

DEVELOP HANDICRAFT PRODUCTION TO MEET THE PEOPLE'S NEEDS

December 16, 1957

Our handicrafts have long been famous throughout the world. Our craftsmen turn out a great variety of fine-quality products that are appreciated by both domestic and foreign consumers. The handicraft industry is important to our national economy. Take the year 1956. Its output value accounted for 9.1 per cent of China's total industrial and agricultural output value, and 16.6 per cent of the country's total industrial output value. Handicraft industry plays a tremendous role in serving agricultural and industrial production, capital construction, communications and transport; in satisfying the needs of urban and rural consumers; in supplying part of the country's exports; in providing jobs; and in helping create capital for national construction. It has been an indispensable auxiliary to our state-owned industries and will remain so for a long time to come. Many traditional handicrafts will be preserved and developed. Last year, the socialist transformation of handicrafts was basically completed, as was that of agriculture and capitalist industry and commerce. Now China has 8 million full-time handicraft workers. The figure will reach 20 million if we include those in fisheries, the salt industry and transportation and those concurrently engaged in farming. Last year, over 90 per cent of the handicraft workers joined handicraft co-operatives or co-operatives in fisheries, the salt industry, transportation and agriculture. Others have joined state-owned or joint state-private enterprises. This is a great revolution in the ownership of the means of production in our handicraft industry.

During the First Five-Year Plan period (1953-57), total output value of handicrafts will rise by an estimated 76.5 per cent, or 70.5

Speech at the First National Congress of Handicraft Co-operatives.

per cent over the annual peak pre-Liberation figure reached in 1936. In 1956, handicraft labour productivity was 47.9 per cent higher than in 1952, or almost thrice as much as in 1936. Thanks to increased production and labour productivity, the average wage of the handicraft co-operative members was 66 per cent higher in 1956 than in 1952, and more than 90 per cent of them enjoyed higher incomes. What is especially significant is that, with the founding of the People's Republic of China and the formation of co-operatives, the handicraftsmen, who had suffered in the old society from imperialist, landlord and capitalist oppression and exploitation, have truly arisen and, along with the workers and peasants, become the true masters of the country.

In order to run handicraft co-operatives well, it is essential to operate them democratically with diligence and thrift and, in line with the principle of overall consideration and proper arrangement, to harmonize the relations among the state, the collective and the co-op member. It is also essential to handle correctly the contradictions between state-owned enterprises and handicraft co-operatives as well as between agricultural co-operatives and the latter. All co-op members should be aware that their income can rise only when production increases, otherwise their own long-term interests and our national construction will be adversely affected. In line with the principle of running the co-operatives with diligence and thrift, proper stress should be placed on accumulation of funds in order to expand production. We should make every effort to develop those handicraft trades which benefit the national economy and the people's livelihood and also have an extensive world market. The state organs at various levels should see to it that handicraft co-operatives remain under collective ownership for a long time to come. They must not turn them into state-owned enterprises, with the exception of a small number of those which have to be made such out of utmost necessity and with approval of the appropriate provincial or municipal people's government. This is in the interest of the consolidation of the handicraft co-operatives and their further development.

The handicraft co-operatives also have the responsibility of assisting the government in uniting with, educating and remoulding the individual handicraft workers. Because the co-operatives have yet to become fully consolidated and developed, it is natural that some handicraft workers still remain outside them and that some new individual producers have appeared. They should be permitted to en-

gage in individual production provided they do not violate the law. We should resolutely struggle against those who break the law but, at the same time, should consistently work to unite with and educate all individual handicraft workers and thus help them take the socialist road sooner.

Handicrafts being an important part of local industry, local Communist Party committees and the people's governments at all levels should provide better leadership and administration of the handicraft co-operatives. We should strive to consolidate all of them within three to five years, so that they can increase production faster in the period of the Second Five-Year Plan (1958-62) to meet the varied needs of the people. As was pointed out in the proposals concerning the Second Five-Year Plan put forward at the Eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party,³¹⁰ handicraft co-operatives should pay attention during this five-year period not only to consolidating their organization, but to maintaining and carrying forward the traditional strengths of China's handicrafts and to increasing variety and improving quality. Where necessary and possible, some handicrafts can be partly or fully mechanized step by step in order to expand production. It should be pointed out in particular that all co-op members should try to improve their skills and proficiency and that the young should learn from the veteran craftsmen so as to acquire and enrich fine techniques. In order to increase handicraft production and raise productivity, it is also necessary to gradually move to specialized production and co-ordinate with the other departments.

The 20 million handicraftsmen who have taken the socialist road are an important component of our contingent of workers for socialist construction. Their work is as glorious as that of the workers and peasants. With victory of socialist transformation in 1956, our people have become more united on the basis of socialism and are working hard to build a prosperous and thriving socialist country. By relying on their hard work and thrift, we shall turn this vast oriental country of ours, which has been very backward and poor, into an advanced, prosperous and powerful socialist nation.

MANAGING THE HOUSEHOLD WITH DILIGENCE AND THRIFT

December 17, 1957

Recently the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and Comrade Mao Zedong issued a call for managing individual households with diligence and thrift as an important supplement to our policy of building our country by the same principle. Proceeding from the conditions prevailing in China, this call is of considerable significance to each individual household and to our national construction.

Although China has a vast territory, abundant resources and a large population, it is backward economically and technologically and the living standard of its people remains quite low. Led by the Party, the Chinese people have exerted themselves over the past few years to change this situation and have greatly accelerated production and construction. And yet, generally speaking, our country is still backward and poor. It is no easy job to build a prosperous and powerful socialist country with modern industry, agriculture, science and culture on such a base. To achieve this magnificent goal, we must rely on the concerted effort of our 600 million people, bring into play every positive factor and conscientiously adhere to the principle of running the household and building the country with diligence and thrift.

The Chinese have always been thrifty and diligent. For thousands of years, they have maintained the tradition of “eating to assuage the appetite, and dressing to cover the body”. During the decades of revolutionary wars in the past, both the army and the large number of cadres under the leadership of our Party carried forward this tradition. Living a simple life and sharing good and bad alike with the masses — these virtues were emulated by every revolutionary. Because of this, even while under siege or heavy attack, our

An article first published in *Zhongguo Funü (Women of China)*, No. 1, 1958.

Party and the people under its leadership were able to overcome their difficulties and finally triumph over the enemy. Since entering the cities from the countryside, we have brought about a change in the lingering habits of luxury and extravagance characteristic of the old bourgeois-dominated cities. However, with an initial improvement in living standards and an atmosphere of peaceful construction, some people have fallen victim to the decadent ideas and life style of the bourgeoisie and have adopted luxurious and wasteful ways, seeking luscious food, showy dress and handsome dwellings and ostentatiousness at weddings and funerals and in entertaining and seeing off guests. They believe that only this will command the respect of others. It should be acknowledged that this is an unhealthy practice. It was repudiated in the movement against the "three evils" in 1952,²⁹⁶ and was corrected to some extent. In recent years, however, it has somewhat revived. We must see that it is got rid of.

The call for hard work and for managing the household with diligence and thrift is readily accepted by the working people who know what life was like in the old society and by revolutionary cadres who have been tempered in struggle. Having experienced hardship and misery in the old days, they can compare today with yesterday and tell how greatly life has improved since Liberation. Knowing that they can create a bright future for their motherland and a happy life for the people only through hard work, vast numbers of young people are vigorously striving to build a new society. Some of our youths, however, especially those influenced by bourgeois ideas, are incapable of appreciating their present happiness because they are ignorant of the hard times of the past. They even go so far as to say, "You lived in the old society, so naturally you had to suffer. We are living in the new society, so naturally we ought to enjoy life." Consequently, they haggle over wages, considering nothing but their narrow, personal interests and pushing out of their minds the important fact that our country has just begun its difficult socialist construction and that the living standard of the people can only be improved gradually with the development of the economy. This is most dangerous. I hope all our young people will be resolved to overcome individualism, foster collectivism and plunge into the great struggle to build socialism by performing exemplary deeds. In educating our youngsters, especially those from rather well-off families, we should also stress the need for diligence and thrift.

We advocate running the household with diligence and thrift. By “diligence” we mean working to increase production in all possible ways. Family members not engaged in production should do some work whenever they have time. For instance, they can take up some farm work, which is a major activity, or perform light sideline jobs such as raising poultry and livestock, or help with household chores. By “thrift” we mean practising economy by all means possible. We should avoid unnecessary expenditures on food, clothing, shelter, transportation and other daily needs and conserve resources. This will enable us to save money and material resources. If we do this day by day and month by month, we will eventually save a great deal. As the saying goes, “Save a little each day, and you will be able to buy a horse in ten years.” This will make it possible for people not only to save enough to pay for such exigencies as weddings, funerals and medical care, but also help accumulate capital for national construction. All in all, in managing the household with diligence and thrift, we must do the following three things: be industrious in production, strictly practise economy, and maintain a family budget. It is everyone’s responsibility to manage the household with diligence and thrift. This is especially true of women who ordinarily take care of the domestic affairs. By running the household with diligence and thrift, women can contribute a lot to the socialist construction of our motherland.

Due to inadequate propaganda and education on our part, many people have gained the false impression that they can rely on the state and the collective to solve all their difficulties now that we have entered the period of socialism following the changeover from an individual to a collective economy. They say, “In production, we listen to the sound of the gong for going to the fields together. For our livelihood, we turn to the co-op director.” This idea is wrong. Under socialism, we practise the principle of distribution, “to each according to his work” and “he who does not work neither shall he eat”. There should be no practice of “everyone eating from the same big pot”. We should create an atmosphere in which thrift is encouraged among people throughout the country, and in our daily lives such things as weddings and funerals are kept simple and economical as are all other aspects of social life. At the same time, we should advocate storing grain against natural calamities and saving money for emergencies. We should also encourage mutual assistance in line with the traditional virtue of our working people as expressed in the

maxim, "Help your neighbours." All this is of great importance to the interests of the individual, the family and the whole country.

China has a population of 600 million. As a member of a given family, everyone has or will have the bounden yet glorious duty to provide for or look after the aged and the young. But some glaringly selfish people regard this as an extra burden which they try to shift to the state or the collective. This is absolutely wrong. To Marxists, socialism and communism mean a happier and more harmonious family life, not the dissolution of the family. The centuries-old admonition to provide for and look after parents and educate children still applies now — and it will in the future.

Building socialism means a tremendous and long-term effort. When all our 600 million people and the more than 100 million families in our country become politically conscious and united and practise diligence and thrift in managing the household as well as in building the country, we surely will be able to overcome any difficulties in our national construction and in our daily lives. And China, which is still rather backward and poor, surely will become a socialist and then a communist country that is advanced, prosperous and powerful.

REMARKS ON RURAL CANTEENS

February 1959-May 1961

I

It is a bit too arbitrary to require rural people to run canteens where everyone has to eat the same food as armymen. The army feeds combat troops composed of young people. If rural commune members are fed the same way for long, problems will arise. This is a major issue affecting several hundred million people.

(From a talk with leading comrades of the Jiangmen Prefectural Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Guangdong Province, on February 17, 1959)

II

Providing free meals is impractical. Grain should be distributed to individuals, who can regulate its consumption by adding vegetables and potatoes to it. There was no obvious problem with food grain in the past because it was distributed to commune members on a household basis and put at their own disposal. The setting up of canteens was bound to result in enormous waste. If we had refrained from the practice of “everyone eating from the same big pot”, a lot of grain could have been saved that in turn could have been used for export in exchange for iron and steel or machinery. The enthusiasm of commune members can be aroused only when they possess their

Excerpts from several talks and a letter.

own means of livelihood and can use them at their own discretion. Some people are afraid this might give rise to capitalism. This concern is unwarranted, because the basic means of production remain in the hands of the collective and the state. The higher the living standard of the people, the better.

(From remarks made on June 16, 1959,
at a briefing given by leading comrades
of the Jilin Provincial Committee
of the Chinese Communist Party)

III

I have always been worried about the practice of “everyone eating from the same big pot”. It is no easy task to be a good manager of a “household” consisting of so many people. Surely a lot more food grain could have been saved for export if it had not been for last year’s faddish practice.

(From a talk with Comrade Tao Zhu,
First Secretary of the Guangdong
Provincial Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party, on July 9, 1959)

IV

If not dissolved, the canteens should be made a matter of voluntary participation. Allotting grain to each household and saving grain — these should go together. Peasants are labourers and they also own some private property. After last year’s experience, they have come to realize that eating at home is better than eating at canteens, for by eating at home they can save grain with which to feed pigs and poultry. Obviously, this means a certain amount of private ownership is allowed to remain, which in fact is a complement to public ownership. For a couple of years, we have been stressing that

it would be best to eliminate private ownership. As things stand now, however, the peasants are willing to produce more for the market only when a bit of private enterprise, such as household sideline occupations, is allowed to exist. Otherwise, they will not produce as much. A lot of food grain was wasted last year as a result of “everyone eating from the same big pot”. That is an important lesson.

(From a talk with Comrade Zhou Xiaozhou, First Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, on July 11, 1959)

V

The principle of voluntary participation should be applied to rural canteens. Those who want to eat at home should be allowed to do so. There should be no discrimination against them, nor any political labels put on them. Having a plot of land for personal needs ensures that people eating at home have a better supply of vegetables, potatoes and grain than they would if everything were left to the commune. Even if all the canteens were broken up, it would not destabilize the commune. The commune will grow stronger when people cease to go to it for food and clothing. Let the peasants eat at home, build up their own households, manage their own affairs and take care of their old people and their children. The commune would only create trouble for itself if it tried to take all these matters into its own hands. Eating at home, people can develop sideline occupations and can warm their brick beds when cooking. The peasants would have fared well if the advanced co-operatives had been allowed to continue for a few more years instead of our switching to the practice of “everyone eating from the same big pot” last year. At the very least, meat, eggs and chickens would not have been in short supply. This year will witness another leap in agricultural production, yet we have to tighten our belts as we did when we were poor, in order to save a little. If the “eat-from-the-same-big-pot” practice continues, I am afraid we will get nowhere. Since Party and

Youth League members took the lead in setting up the canteens, they should do likewise in withdrawing from them.

(From a talk with Comrade Wu Zhipu, First Secretary of the Henan Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, on July 16, 1959)

VI

We had a good harvest last year, but there is still a grain shortage. Why? Mainly because so much grain was wasted by “everyone eating from the same big pot”. Fine grain was consumed while coarse grain was left to rot. Because the peasants are used to private ownership, consumption on a household basis may be more economical.

(From remarks made on July 23, 1959, at a group meeting during the Lushan Conference)

VII

When I was in Chengdu, comrades on the Sichuan Provincial Party Committee did not yet have a clear understanding of the problems concerning canteens, because they had not yet received Comrade Hu Qiaomu’s report being circulated according to Chairman Mao’s instruction.³¹¹ As we observed in the rural areas, meals were cooked twice. That is, canteens first cooked them for distribution to the commune members who then warmed up their portions at home. This meant much waste in both manpower and material resources. In Xi’an I noticed that comrades on the Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee felt very strongly about the canteens. According to them, most people preferred cooking meals by themselves at home while only a few wanted to eat in the canteens. People listed five disadvantages of having meals in the canteens: (1) commune members were not given their proper share; (2) waste of manpower; (3) waste of time; (4) inconvenience when it rained; and (5) nothing but porridge all year round. In other matters concerning the canteens,

the cadres cited 11 excesses: (1) eyes becoming bloodshot from overwork; (2) too many meetings; (3) too much criticism; (4) offending too many people; (5) higher levels excessively deceived; (6) too many difficulties for the masses; (7) too much waste of manpower; (8) an excessive number of trees felled for firewood; (9) too much fodder used up as fuel; (10) too many cauldrons damaged; and (11) too many abuses on the part of the canteen management personnel.

Members of the Henan Provincial Party Committee conducted a survey of the Dayantan Production Team of the Jiayu Commune, Yingyang County. The Dayantan canteen was well run, having won a silk banner awarded by the county Party committee and having hosted several on-the-spot meetings called by the commune. A thoroughgoing discussion among the masses there, however, revealed that, of the 36 households in the village, 32 households wanted to have meals at home; only two families and two bachelors preferred eating at the canteens. These two families enjoyed the "five guarantees" (food, clothing, medical care, housing and burial expenses guaranteed by the commune to childless and infirm elderly persons). As the peasants saw it, the canteens had these drawbacks: (1) They used too much manpower and too many work-points, and diverted the attention of the leadership. The work-points accruing to the canteens alone accounted for 47.3 per cent of the team's total allotted for collective undertakings. Hence each work-point carried less value, which meant a corresponding decrease in the income of team members. (2) It was impossible to take care of the sick, the elderly, children and visitors. Zhu Suishan, a former poor peasant, said, "Eating at the canteen is really inconvenient. We old folks, for instance, cannot swallow some of the food served there, which really upsets us. There is nothing we can do when we are ill or have visitors. Little children cry when they get hungry before mealtime, and we feel sorry for them." (3) It was not convenient for other people, either. Because this production team is situated in a mountainous area with rugged paths and the villagers live far from one another, people found it difficult to go to the canteen for meals when there were high winds or rain. Cadres in Yuxian County told us that running canteens took up much of their energy and they were having a hard time, always being blamed and cursed. Poor management of the canteens affected production. But the higher-ups insisted on running them, even though the rank and file kept complaining. On the question of canteens, the Henan Provincial Party Committee is determined to do as

the people wish. That is to say, they will spare no effort to run them well where the people want them, but will allocate food grain to those who prefer to eat at home. Appropriate arrangements will be made for households enjoying the “five guarantees” as well as for bachelors, and production of cooking utensils will be attended to. Ample preparations will precede the planned, decentralized undertaking of this work. As shown by a survey in eastern Henan, cases of dropsy have gone down by 40-50 per cent in less than one month since people have been allowed to cook at home.

(From a letter to Comrade Mao
Zedong dated May 9, 1961)

REMINISCENCES OF THE REVOLUTION OF 1911

October 10, 1961

Today is the 50th anniversary of the Revolution of 1911.¹²³

The bourgeois-democratic revolution in modern China spanned 109 years, beginning in 1840 with our struggle against the British aggressors who launched the Opium War³¹² and ending with the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949. As Comrade Mao Zedong has said on many occasions, these 109 years fall into two periods. The old-democratic revolution led by the bourgeoisie constituted the first period, which lasted 80 years until the May 4th Movement of 1919.⁸³ The new-democratic revolution led by the proletariat (through the Communist Party) constituted the second, which covered the subsequent 30 years until 1949. The older generation of the Chinese people have personally experienced both periods of China's democratic revolution and, since 1949, have taken part in the great socialist revolution.

In comparison with those that preceded it, the 1911 Revolution was a more fully realized bourgeois-democratic revolution in the sense that it was a further extension of the old-democratic revolution that began with the Opium War. It was of major historical significance. It succeeded in overthrowing the last dynasty of the autocratic feudal monarchy, which lasted over 2,000 years, and in founding a bourgeois republic — the Republic of China. It stirred the enthusiasm of the entire nation for democratic revolution and paved the way for further development of the Chinese revolution as a whole. However, this revolution fell far short of overcoming imperialism and feudalism, and the so-called Republic of China soon became nothing more than an empty phrase. What came to replace the feudal rule of the Qing Dynasty was the reactionary rule of the northern warlords,¹²⁴ who

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were lackeys of imperialism, and subsequently the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang. It is, therefore, of immense significance for us to recall the course of the 1911 Revolution, learn from the invaluable historical lessons it offered and carry forward its glorious tradition.

The Revolution of 1911 was a nationwide bourgeois-democratic revolutionary movement that was in the making long before its outbreak. As Comrade Mao Zedong stated, "From the time of China's defeat in the Opium War of 1840, Chinese progressives went through untold hardships in their quest for truth from the Western countries. Hong Xiuquan, Kang Youwei, Yan Fu and Sun Yat-sen were representative of those who had looked to the West for truth before the Communist Party of China was born."³¹³ The popularly acknowledged leader of the 1911 Revolution was the great democratic revolutionary Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Towards the end of the 19th century, two factions arose among the bourgeois political activists who wanted to learn from the West. One, led by Kang Youwei, was reformist. The other, led by Sun Yat-sen, was revolutionary. The failure of the Reform Movement of 1898³¹⁴ meant the collapse of the reformist faction, which had been under the illusion that the Qing government would carry out certain reforms. At the same time, the strength and influence of the revolutionary faction of the bourgeoisie grew apace. In 1905, the *Tong Meng Hui* (Chinese Revolutionary League)⁹⁵ was founded. At its inauguration, Sun Yat-sen put forward a bourgeois revolutionary programme that included "the establishment of a republic and the equalization of landownership".³¹⁵ It was a programme adopted from the Western bourgeoisie. In it he advocated overthrowing the rule of the Qing Dynasty and establishing a republic by means of revolution. This corresponded with the demands and wishes of people throughout China.

Soon after the setting up of the *Tong Meng Hui* in Tokyo, its members returned separately to China and went about the country organizing revolutionary groups and uniting with patriots in preparation for an uprising. There was an upsurge of revolutionary fervour throughout the country. In Yunnan Province where I was studying at the time, the Yunnan-Viet Nam Railway built by France had reached Kunming³¹⁶ and the French had already seized mining rights from seven prefectural governments. The British were awaiting their chance to grab Pianma (Hpimaw)³¹⁷ and other places on China's border with Burma. People all over the country were enraged by these stepped-up acts of aggression perpetrated by the French and

British imperialists. The people of Yunnan, who felt even more urgently the need to strengthen the country and defend it against powerful foreign foes, took an active part in resistance. In 1906, members of the *Tong Meng Hui* in Yunnan launched the magazine *Yunnan*. In the introductory note, they called on their fellow provincials to “act with one heart and one mind, pool their wisdom and strength and be prepared to risk their lives to resist the powerful enemy”. For a time the Kunming and Tengyue³¹⁸ branches of the *Tong Meng Hui* served as centres for contacting patriotic revolutionaries and they formed many revolutionary groups. Thus Yunnan became one of the major provinces in initiating the revolutionary movement.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen attached importance to the role of armed forces and to work within the enemy army. This was of vital importance in the 1911 Revolution. In 1908, he sent Huang Xing³¹⁹ to Hekou in Yunnan Province to direct an uprising.³²⁰ Unfortunately it failed. Then, Yang Qiufan,³²¹ another *Tong Meng Hui* member, along with others planned an uprising in Yongchang,³²² which did not come about, either. Despite these failures, the revolution was gaining support in the province. It was under the influence of Sun Yat-sen’s democratic revolutionary ideas that I joined the *Tong Meng Hui* in 1909 at the Yunnan Military Academy.

Set up in 1909 by Shen Bingkun, acting viceroy of Yunnan and Guizhou provinces, this Academy was meant to train military personnel for the Qing government. That winter, when the newly appointed viceroy, Li Jingxi, arrived in Kunming to assume office, he incorporated into the Yunnan Military Academy the mobile army school of the 19th Division of the New Army.⁹⁴ The head of the Academy was Li Genyuan, and its instructors included Fang Shengtao, Zhao Kangshi, Li Liejun, Luo Peijin, Tang Jiyao, Liu Zuwu and Gu Pinzhen. Most of them were members of the *Tong Meng Hui*. Other instructors either were its members or were under the influence of the revolutionary propaganda conducted by the *Tong Meng Hui*. There were more than 500 students, many of whom were dissatisfied with existing conditions. Before long a *Tong Meng Hui* branch was set up in the Academy, and the books and magazines it published on the revolution began to circulate secretly. An oft-discussed topic was how to launch a revolutionary uprising. Thus, the Yunnan Military Academy became an important stronghold of the revolutionary forces in the province. Upon the recommendation of Li Genyuan and Luo

Peijin, Li Jingxi appointed Cai E⁸² commander of the 37th Brigade of the New Army's 19th Division. Cai was not a member of the *Tong Meng Hui*, nor did he have any formal connection with the Yunnan Military Academy. But he was a true patriot imbued with democratic ideas and he maintained secret links with the *Tong Meng Hui*. He did much to cover up the revolutionary activities at the Academy at a time when the revolutionary forces were being brutally suppressed by the imperial government.

When the first group of 100 cadets graduated from the Academy ahead of schedule in 1911, 18 were made officers under Cai E, and they carried out revolutionary propaganda among their men. I was sent to the 2nd Battalion of the 73th Regiment to serve as a platoon leader in the Left Detachment. Luo Peijin was our regimental commander and Liu Cunhou our battalion commander. The soldiers, all peasant conscripts, were bitterly resentful of the tyranny and corruption of the Qing government, of the harsh exploitation by the landlord class, of the beating and cursing practices as well as the pocketing of part of the soldiers' pay by the officers in the old army. We carried out revolutionary propaganda among the soldiers, sowing the seeds of revolution.

On October 10, 1911, an uprising broke out in Wuchang, which was very encouraging to the Yunnan people. The revolutionaries stepped up their activities among the soldiers. The Qing government was thrown into panic, and the Yunnan-Guizhou viceroy Li Jingxi set about building fortifications inside and outside his yamen. He also issued orders to arrest revolutionaries and dismissed Luo Peijin, commander of the 74th Regiment, from his post. In addition, he assembled a guards battalion, an army service battalion and two machine-gun companies to defend his yamen. Yet our people operated among these very forces. Li Fenglou, commander of the machine-gun battalion, secretly informed the revolutionaries of Li Jingxi's criminal plot to assassinate them. The time was ripe for revolutionary action.

On the night of October 30 (the ninth day of the ninth lunar month), the revolutionaries in Kunming launched an uprising. The New Army's 73rd Regiment revolted at the suburban North Drill Ground outside the city, and the 74th Regiment under Cai E took action at Wujiaba near the suburban South Drill Ground. Students from the Military Academy and the elementary army school and Li Jingxi's guards also participated in the uprising. I was serving in

the 74th Regiment at the time. Prior to the uprising, the civilian and military officials of the Qing government had stopped issuing bullets to the soldiers of the New Army because they feared an insurrection. So we had to stash away four or five cartridges each during target practice. The uprising was originally planned for 11 o'clock that night, but a little before 9 gun-fire was heard from the North Drill Ground. In the midst of the ensuing disorder, General Cai E arrived at the South Drill Ground and calm was quickly restored among the troops. Li Jingxi had also heard the gun-fire and, as though living in a dream world, phoned Cai E for help. The latter put the telephone receiver back in its cradle, walked to his troops, who were awaiting orders, and solemnly declared the outbreak of the Yunnan Uprising.

Under Cai's command, the mighty insurrectionary troops soon set out to attack the city gates. I was appointed company commander. Inspired by revolutionary propaganda, the 19th Artillery Regiment stationed near us joined the uprising, too. When we began the attack on Kunming, the defending cavalry regiment deployed by Li Jingxi did not try to stop us. Instead, most of the men joined our ranks. The city gates were opened from within by students of the Military Academy there. By midnight, all our troops had entered and before dawn they controlled all the city gates. I then took part in the assault on the viceroy's yamen. Because we had maintained covert links with the guards battalion and I myself had once carried out revolutionary activities in it, its men laid down their arms as soon as the insurrectionary troops started the assault. Li Jingxi fled in panic. On October 31, the Wuhua Hill and the Ordnance Bureau, two other enemy strongholds within the city, were successively taken and Zhong Lintong, commander of the 19th Division, was killed on the spot. Shortly afterwards, troops of the New Army stationed in Dali and Lin'an³²³ also mutinied. Enemy patrol troops in other places outside Kunming were defeated and the recovery of Yunnan Province was then proclaimed. On November 1, the Yunnan Military Government came into being.

Following the Yunnan Uprising, the Qing government moved to initiate a counter-attack against the revolution. Before the imperial forces attacked Wuhan, Qing troops led by Duan Fang³²⁴ had already entered Sichuan Province, whose viceroy, Zhao Erfeng, still commanded quite a large counter-revolutionary army. The Yunnan revolutionaries decided to send troops to reinforce the insurrectionary

troops in Sichuan. Cai E dispatched two brigades comprised of eight battalions, which set out from Yunnan in the ninth lunar month. I was still a company commander at the time. The reinforcements followed two routes, one in the direction of Xuzhou Prefecture³²⁵ via Zhaotong and the other in the direction of Luzhou via Bijie of Guizhou Province. We overcame a number of the Qing Patrol Battalions³⁰³ *en route* and were warmly welcomed by the people. After taking Xuzhou Prefecture, we turned to attack Ziliujing,³²⁶ which was defended by a Patrol Battalion formerly under Zhao Erfeng, and Zizhou³²⁷ where one of Duan Fang's regiments was stationed. As soon as our forces attacked, the troops at Ziliujing fled in disarray. Just as we were taking Ziliujing, news reached us that Duan Fang had been killed by the insurrectionary forces in Zizhou. Before long, the Sichuan Military Government³²⁸ was established and we returned to Yunnan.

Yunnan was then an extremely poor province, where people were starving due to prolonged oppression and exploitation by feudal rulers and barbarous plunder by the imperialists. There was no money to pay the insurrectionary troops returning from the front. At that time, even radical bourgeois revolutionaries failed to see the need to do away with the feudal economic system and carry out agrarian reform before the old imperial order could be eradicated and feudal rule abolished. This was true even of Cai E. He did institute certain reforms but only within the existing framework of state power. He dismissed a number of county magistrates who were bent on getting promoted and becoming rich and replaced them with young intellectuals who could work selflessly in the public interest. He also replaced officers from the old army with young ones. In this way, new blood and democratic thinking were injected into both the government and the army. In financial matters Cai E was a strong advocate of thrift and he himself set a good example. The monthly salary of officers at the level of battalion commander and above was set at 60 yuan. As a result of these contributions of Cai's, conditions in Yunnan began to improve.

The Revolution of 1911 was launched at the call of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and carried out under his leadership. He united all the anti-Qing forces, with the *Tong Meng Hui* at the core. This revolutionary alliance helped bring about the success of the revolution. But the Chinese people were soon to discover that, in no time, the fruits of the revolution had fallen into the hands of counter-revolution-

aries. Aided and abetted by foreign aggressors, Yuan Shikai,²¹⁶ chieftain of the northern warlords, took over power from the Qing government while professing his support for the establishment of the republic. Simultaneously, he dispatched troops south, demanding that the provisional revolutionary government in Nanjing also hand over power to him in order to bring about “peace” between the north and the south. The “North-South Peace Negotiations”³²⁹ were concluded on Yuan Shikai’s terms, which meant the failure of the 1911 Revolution. It is true that the revolution failed because, objectively, the strength of imperialism and domestic reaction was still quite formidable. But subjectively, the revolutionary forces led by the bourgeoisie had certain serious — and incurable — weaknesses. The *Tong Meng Hui*, which led the Revolution of 1911, was an alliance of people of various political shades. Those under Sun Yat-sen’s leadership represented the revolutionary leanings of the bourgeoisie and constituted its revolutionary faction. But even these very people were incapable of leading the Chinese revolution to genuine victory if only because they failed to understand that its arch enemy was imperialism or to take a clear-cut anti-imperialist line and wage an uncompromising struggle against the feudal warlords by relying on the masses. The conciliatory faction within the *Tong Meng Hui*, along with the anti-Manchu landlords of the Han nationality who attached themselves to the organization, readily accepted the negotiating terms put forward by the counter-revolutionaries, thus obliging Dr. Sun Yat-sen to yield his provisional presidency to Yuan Shikai. As a result, Song Jiaoren³³⁰ was assassinated by Yuan, large numbers of Kuomintang parliamentary members were persecuted, the Kuomintang itself was banned and the national assembly was dissolved. With the British, American and Japanese imperialists backing him, Yuan announced the restoration of the monarchy, jettisoning the Republic.

In an attempt to save the revolution, Sun Yat-sen launched a punitive campaign against Yuan Shikai,⁷⁶ a campaign to protect the Republic⁷⁷ and a campaign to safeguard the Provisional Constitution.⁷⁸ In 1913, he called on the revolutionaries to rise against Yuan Shikai. Answering Sun Yat-sen’s call, Li Liejun³³¹ raised troops in Hukou, Jiangxi Province, and Huang Xing also responded in Nanjing. There was some response from other provinces as well. But because of a lack of firm unity within the revolutionary ranks as well as inadequate mental preparation and insufficient armed forces, the anti-Yuan campaign ended in defeat.

In 1915, Yuan Shikai accepted the "Twenty-one Demands"³³² presented by the Japanese imperialists and, in December that year, he announced his own accession to the throne. Earlier, Cai E had secretly left Beijing for Yunnan where, relying on the accumulated revolutionary strength and by virtue of his own prestige, he launched a punitive uprising against Yuan Shikai to protect the Republic. At this point under force of circumstances, Tang Jiyao³³³ proclaimed the independence of Yunnan, and Cai E, Luo Peijin, Li Liejun, He Guojun and some others established the Protect-the-Republic Army. Cai was commander-in-chief of its First Army, and Luo Peijin chief of staff. They were to go north through Sichuan to attack Wuhan. Li Liejun was commander-in-chief of the Second Army, and He Guojun chief of staff. They were to march through Guangxi and Guangdong, wait for an opportunity to take Hunan and Jiangxi before joining forces with the First Army in Wuhan. The First Army consisted of three brigades and six detachments. As commander of the 3rd Detachment, I marched with the troops into Sichuan. Due to strict discipline, the Protect-the-Republic Army won the warm support of the people and it had considerable fighting capacity. With a force only 6,000 strong, the First Army entered Sichuan and became locked in a stalemate with more than 100,000 troops of the "Punish-Yunnan Army" under the northern warlord Cao Kun,⁸¹ somewhere between Xuzhou Prefecture and Luzhou. Relying on the support of the people and taking advantage of the mountain terrain, the Protect-the-Republic Army won many battles, defeating a numerically superior enemy.

After Yunnan rose in revolt under General Cai E, other provinces followed suit. Nationwide opposition forced Yuan Shikai to abdicate and shortly thereafter he died of illness. With Yuan's overthrow, however, the ranks of the opposition split. Not only did the Revolutionary Party break with the Progressive Party, but signs of division began to appear within the Revolutionaries' own ranks. Many so-called Revolutionaries now became new warlords, interested only in expanding their own forces. They completely disregarded Dr. Sun Yat-sen's words, "The various parties should work together to benefit from pooling their collective wisdom and effort . . . so that we can rid the country of traitors and lay the foundation for the Republic."³³⁴ That is why the campaign to protect the Republic did not save the revolution although it succeeded in overthrowing Yuan Shi-

kai. In the end, other northern warlords replaced him, inheriting his traitorous rule against the people.

One of these warlords, Duan Qirui,³³⁵ took over Yuan Shikai's mantle to rule as a national traitor and autocrat in violation of the Provisional Constitution.³³⁶ In 1917, Sun Yat-sen called for upholding the Provisional Constitution and convened an extraordinary session of the national assembly in Guangzhou to set up the Military Government to Uphold the Provisional Constitution.³³⁷ He was supported by the troops in Yunnan and Sichuan. But the campaign to uphold the Provisional Constitution failed because of the divisive activities of Tang Jiyao and others against Sun Yat-sen. Tang wanted to become "King of Yunnan" and attempted to take control of both Sichuan and Guizhou, much to the dissatisfaction of both provinces. Consequently, the bourgeois revolutionary forces further disintegrated. The essential reason for failure, however, lay in the fact that the masses had not been mobilized or relied upon as the mainstay of the revolutionary movement.

The final defeat of the 1911 Revolution fully demonstrated the impracticability of setting up a bourgeois republic in China, because, in the epoch of imperialism, China was suffering imperialist oppression and the Chinese revolution had as its arch enemy powerful international imperialism. In the main, the 1911 Revolution and the subsequent campaigns to save it were all defeated by warlords with the full backing of the imperialists. As Lenin said, without a series of revolutions it is impossible, in the era of imperialism, for an oppressed nation to win genuine freedom. Clearly, in order to prevail over imperialism, it is imperative to mobilize the masses in depth and breadth and carry out protracted revolutionary struggle. The bourgeoisie was definitely incapable of assuming this kind of leadership. It had to be done by the proletariat. Comrade Mao Zedong has said: "In the epoch of imperialism, in no country can any other class lead any genuine revolution to victory." He added, "Why did forty years of revolution under Sun Yat-sen end in failure? Because in the epoch of imperialism the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie cannot lead any genuine revolution to victory."³³⁸

Sun Yat-sen and all those who remained loyal to the cause of the Chinese revolution, including myself, were perplexed and disheartened by the failure of the 1911 Revolution and of the subsequent punitive campaign against Yuan Shikai and the campaigns to protect the Republic and uphold the Provisional Constitution. We were search-

ing in vain in the dark for a genuine way out. As Comrade Mao Zedong said, "Imperialist aggression shattered the fond dreams of the Chinese about learning from the West. It was very odd — why were the teachers always committing aggression against their pupil? The Chinese learned a good deal from the West, but they could not make it work and were never able to realize their ideals. Their repeated struggles, including such a countrywide movement as the Revolution of 1911, all ended in failure. Day by day, conditions in the country got worse, and life was made impossible. Doubts arose, increased and deepened. World War I shook the whole globe. The Russians made the October Revolution and created the world's first socialist state. . . . The salvoes of the October Revolution brought us Marxism-Leninism. The October Revolution helped progressives in China, as throughout the world, to adopt the proletarian world outlook as the instrument for studying a nation's destiny and considering anew their own problems. Follow the path of the Russians — that was their conclusion."³³⁹ This was Comrade Mao Zedong's profound summary, in accordance with Marxist-Leninist theory, of the protracted revolutionary struggle in China. The practice of the Chinese revolution has fully borne out the correctness of his conclusion.

Due to the influence of the October Revolution, I, too, embarked on a new road to revolution. As a brigade commander in the Yunnan Army, I was then in Sichuan. Just as I mentioned previously, the conflict between the Sichuan and Yunnan armies helped me realize it was impossible to achieve our revolutionary goal by continuing the old methods of military struggle. Due to the impact of the October Revolution, I also became firmly convinced that we must learn from Russia's new revolutionary theory and methods and start all over again to make our revolution. In 1921, the Yunnan Army returned to its home province, and I left it in August of the same year. The following year, Luo Peijin was assassinated by Tang Jiyao and I left Sichuan for Shanghai in preparation for going abroad to study in either Russia or Germany. In Shanghai, I met Dr. Sun Yat-sen, whom I had long held in high esteem, and shortly afterwards I set out for Germany, where I studied Marxist-Leninist works and joined the Communist Party of China. It was the beginning of a new revolutionary career for me. At the Party's instructions, once again I took part in the activities of the Kuomintang.

With the assistance of the Chinese Communist Party, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, a bourgeois-democratic revolutionary, also drew lessons from

the failure of the Revolution of 1911. He valiantly decided to co-operate with the Communist Party, the workers and peasants, and the socialist Soviet Union. He proved himself a truly outstanding revolutionary who forged ahead unswervingly. After Chiang Kai-shek betrayed the revolution, many who remained loyal to the revolutionary cause and to Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary spirit adopted the correct attitude of co-operation with the Communist Party and the people and, since the founding of the People's Republic of China, they have taken part in socialist construction and become invaluable friends of the people.

The cause left unfinished by the heroes of the Revolution of 1911 has been carried through by the Chinese people under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Not only have we achieved victory in the bourgeois-democratic revolution bequeathed us by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, but also, in the main, achieved victory in the socialist revolution. New China is moving swiftly along the socialist road. We must continue to step up our socialist revolution and construction. We should also unite with international revolutionary forces in the struggle to safeguard peace and to promote human progress. Let us win new victories to commemorate the heroes who gave their lives to the revolutionary cause of the people.

CORRECT “LEFT” DEVIATIONS, RESTORE AND DEVELOP PRODUCTION

February 3, 1962

Everyone has expressed his opinions freely at this conference, saying all he knows without reserve. Thus full communication has been achieved between the higher and lower levels. I am very happy about this.

During the last few years the scope of inner-Party struggle has been unduly broadened and has hurt us. Too many people were attacked and many feelings injured in the movements in this period. At times, inner-Party struggle was confused with the ferreting out of counter-revolutionaries. I think that through this conference rehabilitation work can be performed well so that more people can be united. Party organizations in Shandong Province have a glorious history. An excellent role was played by Party members there in the Agrarian Revolutionary War (1927-37), in the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-45) and in the War of Liberation (1946-49). The Shandong cadres have been resolute and courageous in their struggle against the enemy and have achieved much in their work. Given such an understanding, serious deviations are unlikely to occur in a movement. It often happens that when an erroneous tendency appears in a mass movement, it may get worse and worse if it is not duly brought under control. A “Left” tendency of a more or less mass character often develops beyond control. It cannot be checked until the movement fails and we suffer losses. There are some people who maintain that in an anti-Right movement it is correct to set

Summary of a talk delivered at a meeting of comrades from Shandong Province who were attending an enlarged working conference of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held in Beijing from January 11 to February 7, 1962. At the conference a preliminary analysis was made of the experience and lessons of the Great Leap Forward in 1958, and criticism and self-criticism were conducted.

high production targets and that one is in danger of going Right oneself if one does not do so. Thus it is impossible to check this tendency. But it is easier to combat a Right tendency because bourgeois ideas are easier to distinguish in our Party and so are easier to check. A “Left” tendency, however, is not so easy to distinguish or check.

It is easy for a Right deviation to crop up in the process of combating a “Left” tendency, and vice versa. Leaders should be aware of this point. “Left” deviations should be combated where they are discovered; so should Right deviations. In short, we should fight either deviation when it appears, and we should not fight if there isn’t any. When fighting a deviation, we should never organize any extensive campaign to be conducted from the top down.

Internal Party problems should preferably be solved by the method of “a gentle breeze and a mild rain”, that is, through correct criticism and self-criticism. If leaders are ready to make a self-criticism for an error they committed in their work, the rank and file will withdraw their complaints. I hope you will adopt the spirit of self-criticism and correct your mistakes, if any, one by one at all levels. First of all, clarify the matter in dispute; then make a self-criticism if there has been a mistake. Comrade Mao Zedong often says that if democracy is to be developed inside the Party, there must first of all be a spirit of self-criticism. If one makes a mistake and, due to fear of being exposed, adopts repressive measures against the masses, who will dare to speak up? In the contrary case, when your subordinates see that you have made a self-criticism, they will follow your example. When you have made a mistake, don’t be afraid or try to cover it up.

Why do the people have affection for Red Army veterans? It is because these veterans stand for class unity and fraternity. Only when we ourselves are united can we overthrow the enemy. We should at the least unite with more than 90 per cent of the masses. For cadres, however, it is not enough to unite with 90 per cent of them — we should endeavour to unite with 100 per cent. It is not easy to train a cadre, for it takes at least 10 years, perhaps dozens of years. We should try to make a person a good cadre all the way through his old age, right to the end of his days. This is our goal in training cadres. Wang Ming’s “Left” line³⁴⁰ advocated waging “ruthless struggle” against cadres and dealing them “merciless blows”, taking disciplinary measures against them or even expelling them

from the Party. That bad style of work inflicted heavy losses on our revolution. In the rectification movement in Yan'an¹⁶⁹ we concluded that the correct attitude towards cadres is "curing the sickness to save the patient", again by the method of "a gentle breeze and a mild rain". In this way our style of work was set right. We should always rely on Party unity and on criticism and self-criticism. When a comrade has made a mistake, we should "cure the sickness to save the patient" and should not resort to mere punishment or dealing him merciless blows. We should take good care of cadres and respect the rights of Party members. If some one lacks experience, we should help him through proper education; and if he has made a mistake, we should help him correct it. Do we still need struggle? Yes, we do. There can be no unity without struggle. A heated debate may be called a sort of struggle. However, struggle must proceed from a desire for unity and achieve the goal of unity. There are relevant stipulations in the Party Constitution and we should abide by them. Decisions should be implemented once they are made. Some evil trends have occurred during the last few years, but despite this, enthusiasm for production and other work should be protected and socialist construction carried out. The essential point is that things should be done in a steady and down-to-earth manner; that way, enthusiasm will grow. We should not undertake a new task until the one under way is finished. Don't try to stir up misguided enthusiasm — that is, don't force the masses to do what is beyond their ability by coercion and commandism and even by the threat of punishment. The evil "Left" practices must be thoroughly rectified. Comrades at this conference have summarized their experience and worked out a set of practical rules and regulations. These should be carried out among the masses in a planned and organized way and under guidance.

Consisting of dozens of households, a production team should also have rules and regulations, which should be worked out by the member households themselves. If they are allowed to do this, they will work harder and their attendance rate will be higher. When production teams are run well, the county administration will be easy and everyone will have enough to eat. The question of food is vital. It is unacceptable to allow people to be underfed. Of course, natural calamities may occur. But even if they occur measures should be worked out to provide people with enough to eat. It is a good idea to organize people to fight drought and tide themselves over dur-

ing any natural disaster. We must make a success of the production teams and the allocation of privately farmed plots of cropland. Among other things, regulations should be drawn up for the effective management of brigade-run enterprises. If the above-mentioned measures are taken, we can expect a good harvest this year. Can the situation actually be improved? I think so. If everything is done in a proper way this year, the situation will change for the better. Heighten your enthusiasm and have confidence. Office staff can also open up wastelands and build irrigation works, making use of every bit of available time or space. Since the peasants no longer eat in public canteens, they can save some grain at home because they may eat whatever else is available. They can save enough surplus grain to feed the aged and the children. In the last few years, the wealth of peasant families, accumulated over a long time, has all been spent. They should be allowed to accumulate their family wealth again. This doesn't mean turning back the clock because, after all, production teams remain the foundation of our agricultural economy. When they are in good shape and the peasants have once again built up their family wealth, everything else will be easy to do. In agricultural production, we should take related measures in the light of natural conditions. You should have a clear idea about the kind of land you have, about whether it is hilly or alkaline, and make plans accordingly. It is necessary to analyse your experience in order to do a good job. We cannot ignore our past, or else we'll suffer.

In industry, conditions in Shandong are good and comparatively advanced. The city of Qingdao has a good foundation from the past. Zibo also is an industrial city. During the last two years, however, some people have gone a bit too far because they think that the faster industry is developed, the better. But they are mistaken. Sometimes people are unable to have a correct understanding of things for lack of experience, and they do not realize their mistakes until it becomes impossible to go on.

The small handicraft industry has been restored at a comparatively fast pace. Our comrades spent three or four months, beginning last May, tackling this problem. As a result, some products are now in ample supply, and the customers no longer need to queue up; some other articles are now sold to other provinces or exported to foreign countries. How has the Chinese nation sustained itself for thousands of years? By depending mainly on agriculture and the handicraft industry. This industry should continue to be developed. It can pro-

vide jobs and income for both young and old. Some products can be exported in return for grain and steel products. At present our industrial production is still insufficient, so handicrafts are badly needed.

You should spur the masses' initiative in agriculture as well as in industrial and handicraft production, and also lead them in the fight against nature. But you must on no account start a mass movement by mobilizing hundreds of thousands or even millions of people. That is no good. You should go about it in an organized and planned way. Peasants must be able to live and work in peace and contentment. This is the basic guarantee of increased production. How can production be increased without this guarantee? All people should live and work in peace and contentment. Peasants, workers, businessmen and people in cultural and educational circles should all formulate dozens of regulations for this purpose. When people have enough to eat and their living standard is improved step by step, they will cease complaining. Work will proceed smoothly if leaders of Party committees all the way down to Party branches in the provinces, prefectures and counties are willing to solicit the opinions of the masses, hold democratic discussions and concentrate the good ideas and carry them through. Party committees should not take everything into their own hands. They must understand that peasants are good at farm work. What's the point of taking over everything yourselves? After assignments have been made, you need only do regular check-ups. Many things can be left to the people's governments, which will be held responsible if work is not done well. How can you manage if you want to have a finger in every pie? You must do a good job this year. It appears that the light and handicraft industries may develop because more raw materials are available this year than last. In undertaking economic development in accordance with the priorities of agriculture, light industry and heavy industry, we should proceed from our present foundation and not impose an ambitious plan from above. Plans should be feasible and targets can only be steadily increased in the process of fulfilling the plans. Attempting the impossible will get us nowhere, no matter how hard we try. We will only discourage Party members and lose the faith of the masses. Objective laws are inviolable. If everyone in our Party learns to act according to such laws, we can assuredly put ourselves on firm ground and keep advancing.

To put it in a nutshell, Shandong Province has a vast territory and a long coastline. Hence it has a great future in terms of development. There will be fewer problems if we follow a correct principle in inner-Party struggle. To solve contradictions among the people, we should not use methods for solving contradictions with the enemy. It goes without saying that enemies do exist, and alertness is necessary. But excessive alertness, which does not conform with objective reality, can only cause trouble.

I am very happy to be attending your meeting. I am also very optimistic about the situation in Shandong. I hope you will leave in high spirits, seek unity in ideology, study your experiences, overcome your shortcomings and make a concerted effort to combat nature and achieve more in production and other work.

FROM THE NANCHANG UPRISING TO THE JINGGANG MOUNTAINS

June 1962

I

When speaking about the Nanchang Uprising,⁷⁹ it is necessary to go back and review the history of the First Revolutionary Civil War (1924–27).

At the Party's Third Congress, held in 1923,³⁴¹ it was decided that the Party work in co-operation with the Kuomintang. In 1924, with the help of our Party, the Comintern³⁴² and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Kuomintang under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen adopted the revolutionary policies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party, and assistance to the peasants and workers; it was reorganized into an alliance of all democratic classes. Thus Kuomintang-Communist co-operation was established for the first time, setting in motion the Great Revolution. All this happened at a time when the Kuomintang, having almost hit rock bottom, had to be rebuilt with our co-operation and assistance.

During the period of the Great Revolution, the Central Committee of the Party set up a military commission and the Soviet Union sent us military advisors. With our Party's support, the Kuomintang established the Whampoa Military Academy,⁷⁴ began to reform its armed forces and established the National Revolutionary Army, which at the initial stage of the Northern Expeditionary War had six component armies³⁴³ in Guangdong. Large numbers of Communist Party members were sent to do political work in the Military Academy and the Army. In some cases, Communist Party representatives were found from the company up to the army level. Thus, at that time our Party had already begun to pay attention to military

Summary of a talk with Chen Qihan, Yang Zhicheng and other comrades.

affairs, conducting revolutionary political work in the army and trying to integrate armed forces with the people and armed revolutionary struggle with mass struggle. It was for this very reason that the Northern Expedition could progress so swiftly and score such important victories. None of this was accidental. Our Party was guided by Marxist-Leninist theory and we had the example of the Soviet Red Army. Even though at this time the Party had not yet paid sufficient attention to, and was still inexperienced in, leading revolutionary armed forces, it was, in fact, confronted with this question and had begun tackling it. Thus, research into the military side of the Party's history should begin with this period, when its roots were established.

II

In April 1927, Chiang Kai-shek openly betrayed the revolution, having plotted a series of incidents by exploiting the errors of the Right opportunist leadership of our Party. He massacred large numbers of workers, peasants and Communists. Wang Jingwei³⁰⁷ did the same in July when he came out against the Communist Party. Kuomintang-Communist co-operation broke down completely. A great number of Party members were purged from the Northern Expeditionary Army. In such a perilous situation, revolt became imperative. Our Party decided to launch the Nanchang Uprising on August 1 in order to save the revolution, and we had only a short time to move from decision to action. In retrospect, we must acknowledge that our decision came a little too late.

After the uprising, the insurrectionary troops moved south towards Shantou, Guangdong Province, in hope of finding outside help, but they were routed in the Chaozhou-Shantou area. The main lesson to be derived from this defeat is that, instead of going to Guangdong, our troops should have remained in Jiangxi Province and joined forces with the peasant movement there. Had they taken advantage of the contradictions among the warlords, launched peasant movement across the province to solve the land problem and build revolutionary base areas while remoulding their own forces, they would have been able to hold their ground in Jiangxi.

When they reached Guangdong, the insurrectionary troops took separate routes: most of them got as far as the Shantou-Jieyang area; the remainder reached Sanheba under my command. Learning that our army had been attacked in the Chaozhou-Shantou area, we rushed south to co-ordinate with it. When we marched to Raoping we met about 200 of our withdrawing troops and learned from them that our army had suffered a setback and been dispersed. Together, we now had a force of approximately 2,000 men. We turned north and engaged one enemy division in the old city of Wuping before turning towards Tianxinxu, Anyuan County, Jiangxi Province. By this time our troops had become rather demoralized. We were a disorganized conglomeration of forces of three sources, that is, the troops under Zhou Shidi,¹¹⁰ the troops that had retreated from the Chaozhou-Shantou area, and those under my command. Some ran away *en route* and some of those remaining wanted to leave. Given the circumstances, we conducted a preliminary consolidation of our forces at Tianxinxu. To raise morale and fortify their confidence, we called a meeting of officers and men, at which we explained the situation and the tasks of the revolution, pointing out that final victory would assuredly be ours. Then we continued to march westwards, passing Xinfeng and reaching Dayu at the end of October, where we reorganized. We put the Party and Youth League organizations in order and set up Party branches, while combining all the troops into one column consisting of three detachments. After that we made for Shangbao in Chongyi County.

It was in Shangbao that our troops that had survived the Nanchang Uprising were able to be consolidated and trained in earnest. We regained our bearings after the three months of marching and fighting since the uprising. So we used this opportunity to consolidate and train our troops. We first tightened discipline, stipulating that all funds raised and materials captured be turned in. We then conducted military training. Classes were held every day without fail, and general lectures were given every two or three days. To meet objective needs, we explored new tactical questions such as how to switch from large- to small-scale warfare, that is, guerrilla warfare, and how to change from fighting in a straight-line formation to an inverted "V" formation. Of course, we only made a beginning. It was Chairman Mao who later provided a systematic and satisfactory solution to the question of overall strategy as well as guerrilla tactics.

Consolidation and training enhanced the unity of our troops, heightened their sense of discipline and increased their combat effectiveness. We were joined at the time by Wu Zhonghao's battalion¹²⁰ from the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army under the direct command of Chairman Mao.

III

Prior to the Nanchang Uprising, our Party had maintained a united front with the 16th Army under Fan Shisheng, which was stationed in southern Hunan and in which we maintained an organization of our Party. Fan himself had intended to join us in marching to Guangdong Province. When we began shifting southwards after the uprising, Comrade Zhou Enlai gave me a letter of introduction from the Party organization for use if and when we came into contact with Fan's troops on our way. Fan was an old acquaintance of mine, for we had been schoolmates in the Yunnan Military Academy and had together taken part in the Revolution of 1911.¹²³ When we reached Shangbao, he took the initiative by sending Wei Bocui, a Communist Party member working under him, to contact us and convey his desire for co-operation. Upon approval by the Party organization, we accepted Fan's proposal and signed an agreement with him. Our troops then got to Rucheng in southern Hunan, where we entered into formal co-operation with him and were thus able to disguise our troops as one of his regiments.

Our co-operation with Fan Shisheng was not unconditional. In the previous negotiations between the two sides, it was agreed that, ours being an army unit led by the Communist Party, we would leave whenever the Party wanted us to; that all replenishments allotted to us should be put at our disposal; and that we were entitled to handle all our own organizational matters, training and other work without outside interference. As it was, Fan Shisheng complied with all these conditions. For instance, when we reached Renhua in Guangdong Province, we continued our former practice of expropriating local tyrants and executed a few despotic landlords. Again, in Rucheng, we called a meeting of secretaries of all the county Party committees in the Hengyang area to discuss and arrange for uprisings in southern Hunan. Also, when Huang Shaohong³⁴⁴ was going to attack Fan's

troops, the latter asked us to serve as rear guard, and consequently we came into possession of a large quantity of *matériel* left behind by his units, thus supplying ourselves. These examples indicate that we were acting on our own initiative, subject to no restrictions by Fan Shisheng.

It was to our advantage to co-operate with Fan at the time. First, we were able temporarily to conceal ourselves from the enemy (I then went by the name Wang Kai), thus gaining a respite for consolidation pending action at an opportune moment. Second, we were able to get more supplies. During the period of co-operation, Fan issued our soldiers two months' pay as well as some clothing and ammunition, and prior to our departure he gave us several tens of thousands of silver dollars for use in transportation. In December 1927, we received a Party directive ordering us to go to reinforce the insurrectionary troops taking part in the Guangzhou Uprising.¹¹⁸ When we learned on our way that the uprising had failed, we stopped at Shaoguan. Shortly afterwards, we separated from Fan Shisheng's troops and turned towards southern Hunan to organize uprisings there. Before our departure, we received a letter from Fan in which he expressed his sincerity. As far as I can recall, the gist of this letter was: 1) "Who can unite [the country]? He who has no pleasure in killing man can unite it."³⁴⁵ 2) To avoid losses, you should keep to the highways instead of side roads. 3) Final victory will be yours. I wish I could be of help.

IV

From Shaoguan we headed north, planning to set up a base area somewhere in southern Hunan. Gong Chu,³⁴⁶ who had by then joined our troops, led us to a village named Yangjiazhaizi in Yizhang County. Yang Zida, who was chairman of the county peasant association and lived in the village, also did much in helping us station ourselves there.

The first thing we did after arriving at the village was to organize an uprising in the county. There was a man named Hu Shaohai, who had once served as battalion commander under Cheng Qian³⁴⁷ and whom was well known among the local gentry. One day in mid-January 1928, we asked Hu to lead our troops into the Yizhang county

town, disguised as National Revolutionary Army men. As we expected, hearing that their friend Hu was coming back with his troops, all members of the gentry turned out at the city gates to welcome him, and they honoured us with a feast. While the feast was in progress, we rounded up all the evil gentry and officials present, and then proceeded to carry out the Yizhang uprising. Soon afterwards, we set up the Yizhang County Soviet Government and the 1st Division of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army. This was the first volley of the uprisings in southern Hunan.

Following our Yizhang action, Xu Kexiang,¹⁴¹ the butcher in the May 21st Incident of 1927,³⁴⁸ led his troops to attack us from Pingshi. The people, like our comrades, hated him to the very marrow of their bones and, learning that we were going to engage him, they became particularly enthusiastic and vied to join us. Xu deployed his six regiments in a single-line battle formation, which facilitated our trouncing them piecemeal. Soon after battle was joined, we made short work of their advance regiment. We followed this up by pursuing the remaining five regiments which were also destroyed one after another. When they were driven to Pingshi, Xu's troops were totally routed. Pingshi was situated in a mountain gully with only one outlet, so the enemy could only flee in one direction while we gave chase all the way to the Lechang River. This battle was a marvellous success, in which we captured many prisoners, some of whom later joined our ranks. In Pingshi, we seized everything in Xu Kexiang's rear warehouse so that we were able to add to our supplies and arm ourselves, not just with machine-guns, but with mortars and other artillery pieces as well. In a sense, Xu helped us in our development.

The news of our success in routing Xu Kexiang's army spread rapidly throughout southern Hunan. Party organizations in the various counties there contacted us, asking us to help build local armed forces, which we did. First of all, we helped Yizhang County set up a local regiment. After taking Chenzhou, we did the same there. Then we took Leiyang, Zixing, Yongxing, Guidong, Rucheng and some other county towns. Uprisings were carried out in Chaling, Anren and Lingxian counties, too. Altogether, the people of 11 counties went into action, organizing their own armed forces and, under the leadership of the local Party organizations, overcame the local tyrants and evil gentry and replaced the reactionary political power with Soviet governments.¹ This was how the southern Hunan

uprisings came about in the early days of 1928. (These events were also collectively known as the Year-End Uprising since they occurred towards the close of the lunar year.)

Just then, war broke out between warlords Bai Chongxi and Tang Shengzhi, and the situation became favourable to us. Had we followed a correct political line and correct policies, we would have won more victories and gained a firm foothold in some places. However, the erroneous “Left” putschist line alienated the masses, thus isolating us. Consequently, we had to withdraw from southern Hunan shortly after the uprisings.

V

On April 28, 1928, in Longshi of Ninggang County, Jiangxi Province, the remainder of the troops that had taken part in the Nanchang Uprising and the local armed forces in southern Hunan linked up with the Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Army under the direct command of Chairman Mao. To mark the occasion, a rally was held on May 4, at which the establishment of the Revolutionary Army’s Fourth Army (later renamed the Fourth Army of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army)¹²⁵ was proclaimed. Directly led by Chairman Mao, this mainstay of the Red Army grew daily in strength, size and combat-worthiness. It scored many major victories in the struggle to consolidate and expand the base areas in the Jinggang Mountains.

After the merger, we won a first victory in early May 1928, when part of the Fourth Army set out from Huang’ao and wiped out a battalion under Yang Ruxuan’s 27th Division. We followed this up by defeating a regiment of the same division in the fighting at Wudoujiang. Giving chase to the routed soldiers, we occupied the county town of Yongxin for the first time. Three enemy regiments were put out of action or wiped out in this battle.

In late May, Yang Ruxuan’s troops attacked from Yongxin. Our 28th Regiment was on its way to meet a battalion that had been dispatched to Chaling, Hunan Province, to collect our newspapers and magazines. Hearing of the attack on its way back to the Jinggang Mountains, it immediately turned to make a forced march for Cao-shi’ao, situated 7.5 kilometres from Yongxin, and struck the enemy

in the rear, destroying one battalion of the 79th Regiment and killing the regimental commander nicknamed “Whiskered Liu”. The enemy troops fled in disorder, and we pursued them to Yongxin. Yang Ruxuan, it is said, was enjoying a tune on his phonograph at the time. Our troops charged into the county town and killed his dog of foreign breed. Yang himself was wounded by a stray bullet while fleeing over the city wall. During this second taking of Yongxin, we captured quite a lot, the silver dollars alone amounting to 50,000 or more. The next morning we pulled out of the city on our own initiative.

In June 1928, Chiang Kai-shek organized nearly 10 regiments from Hunan and Jiangxi provinces to encircle and attack our bases in the Jinggang Mountains. Yang Ruxuan’s three regiments which served as the main assault force, attacked our position at the Old Qixi Mountain. Two regiments under Yang Chisheng³⁴⁹ serving as the auxiliary force attacked our position at the New Qixi Mountain. Our 28th Regiment defended the former position and our 29th Regiment together with a battalion of the 31st Regiment defended the latter. Fighting lasted from the dawn of June 22 till nightfall. (That day was the traditional Dragon Boat Festival, which falls on the fifth day of the fifth lunar month every year.) Around noon, our 28th Regiment was the first to overwhelm the enemy, drubbing Yang’s three regiments and sending his remaining troops fleeing towards Yongxin. Just then, our forces defending the New Qixi Mountain began their counter-attack. The enemy troops tried to flee via Longyuankou where they were outflanked by our 28th Regiment. Their retreat was cut off and nearly all of them were wiped out. We pursued to Yongxin the few who escaped and then we occupied the county town for a third time. Thus Chiang Kai-shek’s plan fell through. This was the well-known battle of Qixi Mountain and our resounding victory at Longyuankou.

NOTES

¹ The revolutionary regimes set up in various places by the Chinese Communist Party during the Second Revolutionary Civil War (1927–37) were called Soviets, patterned on the Russian organs of state power set up after the October Revolution of 1917. The areas under their jurisdiction were known as Soviet areas.

11, 18, 24, 28, 32, 44, 403

² Known in full as “the Trotskyite Chen Duxiu liquidationists”. After the failure of the revolution in 1927, a small number of capitulationists represented by Chen Duxiu adopted a Trotskyite stand. They held that the Chinese bourgeoisie had prevailed over the imperialist and feudal forces, that the bourgeois-democratic revolution had been completed, that the Chinese proletariat would have to await some future point to carry out the “socialist revolution”, and that for the time being the proletariat would have to relinquish all revolutionary activity and conduct, instead, legal movements centred around the call for a “national assembly”. 12

³ In 1930, the Red Army exchanged fire with French, British, Japanese, American and other imperialist interventionists at Longzhou, Changsha and along the middle reaches of the Changjiang River. In February that year, following the Longzhou Uprising in Guangxi, the French imperialists ordered air strikes against the place, meeting with returned fire from the Red Army’s Eighth Army. In July and August, when the Red Army’s Third Army Group captured Changsha in Hunan Province, British, Japanese and other imperialist warships then anchored in the Xiangjiang River shelled the city. The Red Army immediately fired back with artillery and forced them to flee downriver. In July, after the Red Army’s Third Army Group occupied Yuezhou (now called Yueyang City), British, American and Japanese warships in the Changjiang River bombarded the coastal area of the city. The Red Army fired back and hit the enemy warships, preventing them from approaching the shore. 15

⁴ In early 1933, on the eve of the fourth counter-offensive against the Kuomintang’s “encirclement and suppression” campaign directed at the Central Revolutionary Base Area, the Party Central Committee and its Soviet Area Bureau repeatedly cabled Zhou Enlai and Zhu De ordering them to lead the First Front Army in stealing a march on the Kuomintang troops and taking the heavily guarded towns of Nancheng and Nanfeng in Jiangxi Province. Zhou Enlai and Zhu De knew from experience that such an order made little sense given the prevailing conditions. So they proposed to the Central Committee and its Soviet Area Bureau that troops be concentrated to destroy the enemy’s forces one by one in mobile warfare. On February 4 of the same year, the Soviet Area Bureau again insisted that the Red Army attack Nanfeng. In the circumstances, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De drew up their own, more flexible plan and submitted it to the Party Central Committee and its Bureau. According to this plan, they would storm Nanfeng but be prepared to strike at enemy reinforcements in case the attempt failed. On February 9, the Red Army set out towards Nanfeng from Lichuan and the nearby assembly area. On the 12th, it encircled Nanfeng and, after dusk, launched a general assault on the enemy’s defending troops. After fierce fighting throughout

the night, they took less than a battalion in enemy lives while suffering more than 300 casualties themselves. At this point, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De changed the planned assault to a feigned attack, assuming — and correctly — that the enemy garrison would hold to its position in hope of reinforcements and that these reinforcements would come by three routes. On the night of the 13th, the Red Army's main force lifted its siege of Nanfeng and moved in secret to the west of the Nanfeng-Litaxu area to ambush the enemy reinforcements. On the 22nd, they moved again to the Dongshao-Luokou area. This important decision led to the victory in the Huangbei campaign at the end of February, in which the enemy's 52nd and 59th Divisions were ambushed and annihilated. 18

⁵ Referring to Li Ming, commander of the Kuomintang 52nd Division, and Chen Shiji, commander of the 59th Division, both conducting a combined operation against the Central Revolutionary Base Area at the time. 18

⁶ Referring to the first four campaigns launched by the Kuomintang army against the revolutionary base areas during the Second Revolutionary Civil War. 24

⁷ Chen Jitang (1890–1954), courtesy name Bonan, was a native of Fangcheng in Guangdong Province (now the Fangcheng Multi-national Autonomous County of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region). He was then director of the Kuomintang's pacification headquarters in Guangzhou as well as commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang Eighth Route Army and of the Southern Column of the Jiangxi-Guangdong-Fujian-Hunan-Hubei "Bandit Suppression" Army. 27

⁸ See "The Declaration of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic and the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army" of January 17, 1933. 27

⁹ Jiang Guangnai (1887–1967), a native of Dongguan County in Guangdong Province, was then Kuomintang governor of Fujian Province. Cai Tingkai (1892–1968), a native of Luoding County, Guangdong Province, was then commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang's 19th Route Army and director of the pacification headquarters of Fujian Province. On October 26, 1933, under the influence of the Chinese Communist Party's anti-Japanese policy and encouraged by anti-Japanese sentiment among the common soldiers and junior officers, Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai and other Kuomintang generals signed a preliminary agreement with the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army to resist Japan and oppose Chiang Kai-shek. 28

¹⁰ During the Second Revolutionary Civil War, the First Front Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army fought the Kuomintang army's fifth military "encirclement and suppression" campaign against the Central Revolutionary Base Area. In September 1933, Chiang Kai-shek assembled some 500,000 troops and adopted a new strategy of protracted warfare and building blockhouses in an attempt to besiege this revolutionary area. At the time, the Communist Party leadership, influenced by Wang Ming's "Left" adventurism, erroneously practised positional instead of guerrilla and mobile warfare. They were too adventurist when on the offensive, then mistakenly conservative when on the defensive. As a result, the Red Army lost many battles, fell into a passive position and failed to break the "encirclement and suppression" after a year of arduous fighting. In October 1934, the main force of the Red Army's First Front Army was forced to withdraw from the Central Revolutionary Base Area and began the Long March. 28, 139

¹¹ Referring to the vanguard detachment of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, that was marching north to resist the Japanese invaders. It was at the

same time a forward unit sent by the Chinese Communist Party to break through the Kuomintang army's "encirclement and suppression" against the Central Revolutionary Base Area. At first the unit was formed by the Red Army's Seventh Army Group led by Xun Huaizhou, Su Yu and other comrades. In July 1934, it moved north from Ruijin, Jiangxi Province. In November, it joined forces with the Red Army's 10th Army led by Fang Zhimin in the Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi base area to form the Red Army's 10th Army Group, and then a military and administrative commission was established under Fang. Afterwards the vanguard detachment continued north in the face of the intercepting Kuomintang troops. Xun Huaizhou died heroically in battle. On its return to the Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi base area for rest and reorganization in January 1935, it was attacked by overwhelmingly superior Kuomintang forces in the Huaiyu Mountains of northeastern Jiangxi Province. This revolutionary army suffered heavy losses and Fang Zhimin, who was taken prisoner in the battle, later died a martyr's death in Nanchang in August. The surviving troops persisted in guerrilla war and were incorporated into the New Fourth Army after the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan in 1937.

28

¹² He Long (1896-1969), a native of Sangzhi, Hunan Province, was commander of the 20th Army of the National Revolutionary Army before the 1927 Nanchang Uprising and was commander-in-chief of the insurrectionary troops during the uprising. In 1934, he served as commander of the Third Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

28, 130

¹³ Jiang Dingwen (1895-1974), a native of Zhuji, Zhejiang Province, was then commander-in-chief of the Eastern Column of the Kuomintang's Jiangxi-Guangdong-Fujian-Hunan-Hubei "Bandit Suppression" Army.

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¹⁴ In November 1933, Jiang Guangnai and Cai Tingkai, generals of the 19th Route Army, in alliance with people in the Kuomintang including Li Jishen, established the People's Revolutionary Government of the Republic of China in Fujian and publicly renounced Chiang Kai-shek. In December, Chiang mustered massive troops to attack Fujian. The People's Revolutionary Government fell in January the following year.

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¹⁵ Also known as Yunmenling, a town in Huichang County, Jiangxi Province.

29

¹⁶ Ruijin, Jiangxi Province, was then seat of the Chinese Soviet Republic's Provisional Central Government.

29

¹⁷ Referring to Huang Yanzhen, commander of the 7th Division of the Third Army under Chen Jitang that was then stationed in Yunmenling.

29

¹⁸ Referring to Liao Ze, commander of the 3rd Brigade of the Model Division of the Kuomintang's "Bandit Suppression" Army stationed on the south bank of the Changjiang River in Sichuan.

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¹⁹ Referring to Mu Suzhong, commander of the 2nd Route Frontier Army (corresponding to a brigade) of the Kuomintang's "Bandit Suppression" Army stationed on the south bank of the Changjiang River in Sichuan.

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²⁰ Referring to Zhang Anping, commander of the 1st Brigade of the Training Division of the Kuomintang's "Bandit Suppression" Army stationed on the south bank of the Changjiang River in Sichuan.

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²¹ Referring to Da Fenggang, commander of the 13th Brigade of the 5th Division of the Kuomintang's "Bandit Suppression" Army stationed on the south bank of the Changjiang River in Sichuan.

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²² Referring to Liu Zhaoli, commander of the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Division of the Kuomintang's "Bandit Suppression" Army stationed on the south bank of the Changjiang River in Sichuan. 30

²³ The reference is to the First Army Group of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. In June 1930, the Fourth Army, the Sixth Army (renamed the Third Army soon afterwards) and the 12th Army of the Red Army were combined to form the Red Army's First Route Army in Tingzhou (now Changting), in Fujian Province. Afterwards, it was redesignated the Red Army's First Army Group with Zhu De as commander-in-chief and Mao Zedong as political commissar. During the campaign involving four crossings of the Chishui River, Lin Biao was its commander and Nie Rongzhen its political commissar. 31, 129, 245

²⁴ In October 1933, the 3rd Division of the First Army Group, the 14th Independent Division and other troops combined to form the Ninth Army Group of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army at Jiangle in Fujian Province, with Luo Binghui serving as commander and Cai Shufan as political commissar. During the four crossings of the Chishui River, Luo Binghui remained commander and the position of political commissar was first filled by Cai Shufan and then by He Changgong. 31

²⁵ When the Central Red Army started the Long March in 1934, the Academy of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, the First and Second Infantry Training Schools and the Red Army's Special Technical Training School were combined to form the Red Army's Cadres Regiment, in which members of the academy were collectively designated the Senior Cadres Unit. 31

²⁶ Referring to Lin Biao (1907–71), a native of Huanggang, Hubei Province, who had served as a platoon leader in the Independent Regiment under Ye Ting during the Northern Expeditionary War. 31, 129

²⁷ Referring to Peng Dehuai (1898–1974), a native of Xiangtan County, Hunan Province, who was then commander of the Third Army Group of the Red Army's First Front Army; and Yang Shangkun (1907–), a native of Tongnan County in Sichuan Province, who was then political commissar of the Third Army Group. 31

²⁸ The Fifth Army Group of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was formed by troops from the December 1931 Ningdu Uprising with Ji Zhentong serving as commander-in-chief and Xiao Jingguang as political commissar. During the four crossings of the Chishui River, Dong Zhentang was its commander and Li Zhuoran, its political commissar. 31, 93

²⁹ The Third Army Group of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was established in Liurenba, Daye County, Hubei Province, in June 1930 and had under its command the Red Army's Fifth and Eighth Armies. Peng Dehuai was its commander-in-chief and Teng Daiyuan, its political commissar. During the four crossings of the Chishui River, Peng Dehuai served as its commander and Yang Shangkun, its political commissar. 31, 136

³⁰ Referring to Yuan Rujun, commander of the 14th Brigade of the 5th Division of the Kuomintang's "Bandit Suppression" Army stationed on the south bank of the Changjiang River in Sichuan. 32

³¹ Referring to Jiang Shangpu, commander of the 1st Brigade of the Model Division of the Kuomintang's "Bandit Suppression" Army stationed on the Changjiang River's south bank in Sichuan Province. 32

³² Referring to An Enpu, commander of the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Column of

the Second Route Army of the Kuomintang's "Bandit Suppression" Army. 33

³³ Referring to Lu Daoyuan, commander of the 5th Brigade of the 3rd Column of the Second Route Army of the Kuomintang's "Bandit Suppression" Army. 33

³⁴ Referring to Gong Shunbi, commander of the 7th Brigade of the 3rd Column of the Second Route Army of the Kuomintang's "Bandit Suppression" Army. 33

³⁵ Referring to He Zhizhong, commander of the 1st Division of the 25th Army of the 4th Column of the Second Route Army of the Kuomintang's "Bandit Suppression" Army; Bai Huizhang, commander of the 2nd Division; and Hou Zhidan, commander of the Training Division, and his deputy Hou Hanyou. 33

³⁶ Referring to Xue Yue (1896–), a native of Lechang County, Guangdong Province, who was then front-line commander of the Second Route Army of the Kuomintang's "Bandit Suppression" Army. 33

³⁷ Referring to Zhou Hunyuan, then commander of the 2nd Column of the Second Route Army of the Kuomintang's "Bandit Suppression" Army. 33

³⁸ Referring to Wu Qiwei (1890–1953), a native of Dapu County in Guangdong Province, who was then commander of the 1st Column of the Second Route Army of the Kuomintang's "Bandit Suppression" Army. In an open telegram from Hongkong in February 1949, he announced his insurrection. Later he was elected to the First National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. 33

³⁹ Wang Jialie (1893–1966), a native of Tongzi County, Guizhou Province, was then Kuomintang governor of Guizhou Province and commander of the 4th Column of the Second Route Army of the Kuomintang's "Bandit Suppression" Army. 33

⁴⁰ Referring to Chen Geng (1903–61), a native of Xiangxiang County, Hunan Province, who was then commander of the Cadres Regiment of the Red Army; and Song Renqiong (1909–), a native of Liuyang County in Hunan Province, who was then political commissar of the regiment. 36

⁴¹ Referring to Hong Yuliang, commander of the 7th Regiment of the Red Army's Ninth Army Group. 37

⁴² A reference to the order issued by the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee on March 27, 1935. It asked the Ninth Army Group to "send [on the next day] its main force to the Changgan Mountains while having part of its troops feign an attack on Fengxiangba so as to draw the enemy troops to the north and prevent them from going southwards". 39

⁴³ The Northeastern People's Revolutionary Army was one of the popular anti-Japanese armed forces in northeast China led by the Chinese Communist Party. From September 1933 to January 1936, its First through the Sixth Army were formed from local guerrillas. From February 1936, this and other anti-Japanese armed forces were renamed the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army. 41

⁴⁴ After the September 18th Incident of 1931, the Chinese Communist Party called upon the people to resist Japan by means of armed struggle, and the people in the Northeast and some of the patriotic Kuomintang troops stationed there immediately responded to the call and organized themselves into anti-Japanese armed forces, such as volunteer forces, national salvation corps and self-defence corps, which all came under the general appellation of the Northeastern Volunteers. 41

⁴⁵ Suiyuan Province was abolished in 1954 and its territory came under the jurisdiction of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. 41, 253

⁴⁶ The Franco-Prussian War was waged in 1870–71 between the French and Prussian ruling cliques, who contended for territorial expansion and hegemony in Europe.

France was defeated and forced to sign the Treaty of Frankfurt, ceding Alsace and eastern Lorraine and paying an indemnity of 5 billion francs. During the Prussian army's occupation of the northeastern part of France, the French people rose in armed resistance. Groups of armed volunteers called the "*francs-tireurs*" developed guerrilla warfare in enemy-occupied areas and attacked small Prussian units and their supplies and gear, striking heavy blows at the invaders. 43

⁴⁷ During the civil war, which took place in 1918-20, following the October Revolution, the Soviet people smashed foreign armed intervention and domestic counter-revolutionary rebellion and defended Soviet political power. In guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear, they disrupted and severed enemy supply lines, foiled enemy attacks and pursued and cleaned out pockets of enemy troops, lending considerable support to the Red Army. 43

⁴⁸ The Russian people waged the Fatherland War against Napoleon's invading army in 1812. In guerrilla warfare co-ordinating with the regular troops, they waylaid the invaders and buried and hid food and animal feed, subjecting the French to hunger and cold. As a result, Napoleon's army of 500,000 men was reduced to 20,000 by the time it withdrew from Russia. 45

⁴⁹ Denikin (1872-1947), a general of tsarist Russia, was commander of the western front and then of the southwestern front in 1917. After the October Revolution, he fled south and organized counter-revolutionary "volunteers". Later he became commander-in-chief of the "armed forces of southern Russia". In the summer of 1919, he led rebel troops from the south against Moscow, who were routed by the Red Army in November of the same year. He fled abroad in April 1920. 45

⁵⁰ Referring to an armed force of Polish landlords which invaded Soviet Russia from April to October 1920. 45

⁵¹ Kolchak (1874-1920), a Russian admiral, was commander of the Black Sea Fleet in 1916. After the October Revolution, he relied on the support of foreign armed interventionists in launching a rebellion in the area between the Urals and the Far East, where he established a military dictatorship and proclaimed himself "supreme ruler of Russia". He was captured by the Red Army in January 1920 in its effort to put down the rebellion and was shot the following month. 45

⁵² The Eighth Route Army was one of the main forces of the people's army led by the Chinese Communist Party during the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-45). In August 1937, the Chinese Communist Party redesignated the main force of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (which was founded in the Second Revolutionary Civil War period) the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army in keeping with an agreement negotiated with the Kuomintang. Zhu De was made commander-in-chief, Peng Dehuai deputy commander-in-chief, Ye Jianying chief of staff and Ren Bishi director of its political department. It had under it the 115th, 120th and 129th Divisions. In September of the same year, the Eighth Route Army was redesignated the Eighteenth Group Army of the National Revolutionary Army, with Zhu De as its commander-in-chief and Peng Dehuai, deputy commander-in-chief. In August and September 1937, it marched to the front in north China to fight the invading Japanese troops. It waged independent guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear and established the Shanxi-Suiyuan, Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei, Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan and Shandong anti-Japanese base areas. In the course of arduous, protracted struggle, it smashed the Japanese and puppet armies' repeated "mopping-up" operations and repulsed frequent attacks by troops of the Kuomintang diehards. When the Japanese imperialists

surrendered in 1945, the Eighth Route Army had grown to one million strong. Later, in the Third Revolutionary Civil War period (1946–49), it was reorganized into the Chinese People's Liberation Army. 45, 76, 89, 104, 121, 141, 192

⁵³ The Xinkou Battle took place in the Xinkou area in northern Shanxi Province between Chinese troops and the invading Japanese army from mid-October to early November 1937. During the battle, the Eighth Route Army launched extensive guerrilla warfare in the rear and flanks of the enemy, disrupting his communication lines in close co-ordination with other Chinese troops. 47

⁵⁴ In June and July 1927, the Japanese government convened an "Eastern Conference" in Tokyo, which discussed and adopted the aggressive "guiding policies towards China". Both Chinese and foreign newspapers of the time disclosed that soon after the conference the Japanese Prime Minister Giichi Tanaka wrote a secret memorial to the throne. Under the guise of "a mutual coexistence and co-prosperity sphere of China and Japan" and "developing trade", he outlined a plan for aggression and expansion in the memorial, claiming that "it is imperative to subjugate Manchuria and Mongolia first if China is to be conquered" and that "it is imperative to subjugate China first if the world is to be conquered". 50

⁵⁵ Major General Takayoshi Matsumuro, head of the invading Japanese army's secret service office in Beiping, wrote a secret intelligence report to the Japanese "Kwantung Army" in northeast China, which was discovered in the spring of 1937. The report had six parts, ending with the following tactics for invading China: "(1) Threaten and keep submissive all power groups so that we can triumph without fighting; (2) Don't use force to crush these groups at the expense of unnecessary losses; (3) Keep close watch on the power groups and prevent them from achieving moral unity, self-reliance and consciousness leading to joint action against Japan; (4) Take strict precautions against Chinese authorities forming an alliance with the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States to resist Japan; (5) Prevent an anti-Japanese alliance among the forces of Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan, Zhang Xue-liang and the Red Army in northern Shaanxi; (6) Enlist members of the power groups who most fear Japan and support them so that they can help suppress the anti-Japanese elements." 50

⁵⁶ The then four northeastern provinces were Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang and Rehe. 53

⁵⁷ The five northern provinces of the time were Hebei, Qahar, Shanxi, Shandong and Suiyuan. 53

⁵⁸ On September 18, 1931, the Japanese "Kwantung Army" stationed in north-east China launched an attack on Shenyang. The Chinese troops at Shenyang and elsewhere in the Northeast (the Northeastern Army) obeyed Chiang Kai-shek's order of absolute non-resistance and consequently the Japanese forces rapidly occupied the three provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang. 54, 138, 149

⁵⁹ The Lugouqiao Incident is also known as the July 7th Incident of 1937. Lugouqiao, over 10 kilometres southwest of Beijing, is a gateway to the city. On July 7, 1937, the Japanese invading forces attacked the Chinese garrison at Lugouqiao. Influenced by the vigorous nationwide anti-Japanese movement and encouraged by the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese troops there rallied to resist Japan. The incident marked the beginning of the Chinese people's eight-year heroic War of Resistance Against Japan. 54, 143

⁶⁰ The author here quotes a line from the ode *Chang Di*, in the classical *Book of Songs* (*Minor Odes* section). 60

⁶¹ This was a popular armed cult, believed to be a branch of the White Lotus Religion. Wielding red-tasselled spears as weapons, they were active mainly in north China. 62

⁶² In A.D. 17, Wang Kuang and Wang Feng of Xinshi (northeast of modern Jingshan in Hubei Province) incited famine victims to rebellion against the Western Han Dynasty. They occupied Lulin (Green Forest) Mountain (northeast of modern Dangyang in Hubei) and designated themselves the "Green Forest Army". Since then, the Chinese have called any armed peasants who gathered in mountains and forests to oppose feudal rule "green forest men". Sometimes brigand bands are also called such. 66

⁶³ Secret societies in old China included such popular, clandestine organizations as the Triad Society, the Society of Brothers, the Big Sword Society, the Rational Life Society and the Hongmen. Their membership consisted mainly of impoverished peasants, unemployed handicraftsmen and *lumpen*-proletarians. They were often drawn together by religion or superstition, and some groups armed themselves. Although some of the secret societies conducted struggles against oppression by bureaucrats and landlords, such feudalistic and backward organizations could easily be utilized by the reactionary ruling classes and the imperialist forces. In the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Chinese Communist Party adopted towards some of these groups the strategy of alliance and winning over in order to unite all anti-Japanese people into a united front. 66

⁶⁴ In the Warring States Period (475–221 B.C.), the army from the state of Wei laid siege to Handan (in modern Hebei Province), capital of the state of Zhao. Responding to Zhao's appeal for help, the king of the state of Qi sent an army headed by Tian Ji and Sun Bin. Knowing that the crack forces of Wei had entered Zhao and left their own territory weakly garrisoned, Sun Bin attacked Wei, whose troops withdrew to defend their own country. On their way home, the troops marched into the ambush laid by Sun Bin at Guiling (northwest of modern Changyuan in Henan Province) and were routed. The siege of Handan was thus lifted. Since then Chinese strategists have referred to similar tactics as "rescuing the state of Zhao by besieging the state of Wei". 67

⁶⁵ The Shijiazhuang-Taiyuan Railway was formerly known as the Zhengding-Taiyuan Railway. The project was originally planned to run from Liulinpu of Zhengding in Hebei Province to Taiyuan in Shanxi Province. When construction started, however, it was changed into a line running between Shijiazhuang in Hebei and Taiyuan. 71

⁶⁶ These teams were organized by the Japanese troops to carry out reactionary propaganda and slavish education among the people in the areas they occupied during their aggression of China. 73, 79

⁶⁷ The *Xin Min Hui* (New People's Association) was an organization through which the Japanese invaders and their puppet regime indoctrinated the Chinese people to accept their enslavement and engaged in espionage in the Japanese-occupied areas in north China during the War of Resistance Against Japan. It was founded in December 1937 in Beiping, with branches set up later in various northern provinces, cities and counties. 79

⁶⁸ "A New Order in East Asia", a scheme for invading and enslaving China, was proposed by Japanese Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe on November 3, 1938 in the "Statement by the Imperial Government". It prescribed that Japan, Manchukuo (the puppet state the Japanese imperialists created after their occupation of China's northeast in 1931) and the Kuomintang government join in opposition to

communism to put China under Japan's political, economic and cultural control.

79, 152

⁶⁹ Sima Guang (1019–86) was a high official and historian of the Northern Song Dynasty, who earned the posthumous title, the Duke of Wen. When he was young he saw a child fall into a large water vat. Showing resourcefulness in an emergency, he broke the vat and saved the child from drowning. 80

⁷⁰ *Little White Dragon* was the title of a Peking opera performed in 1939 by the propaganda team of the political department under the 386th Brigade of the Eighth Route Army's 129th Division. It portrayed the heroic deeds of Little White Dragon and other soldiers of the Northeastern Volunteers during the war against the Japanese invaders. 81

⁷¹ A folk song popular in the Taihang Mountains area. 81

⁷² Here used as a metaphor for protracted war, the Hundred Years' War refers to the war from 1337 to 1453 between the French and British feudal rulers for possession of the richly-endowed Flanders and the British fiefdoms in France. France won the war. 86

⁷³ A reference to the fascist measures imposed by the Japanese imperialists to expand and strengthen their rule in north China. From spring 1941 to winter 1942, the Japanese aggressors conducted five "campaigns to tighten public security" in this part of China, intensified "mopping-up" operations in the anti-Japanese base areas and carried out "mass exposures" in guerrilla zones, implemented the "neighbourhood guarantee system" and checked household registers in areas under their occupation, and reorganized and expanded the puppet troops, all in order to suppress the anti-Japanese forces. 87, 121

⁷⁴ The Whampoa Military Academy, an army academy located in Huangpu (Whampoa), Guangzhou, was established by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1924 with the help of the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union. It was run jointly by the Kuomintang and the Communist Party before Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal of the revolution in 1927. The Communist Party assigned Zhou Enlai, Yun Daiying, Xiao Chunü, Nie Rongzhen, Xiong Xiong and others to work there. Many cadets were Communists or members of the Communist Youth League. 89, 132, 398

⁷⁵ These were the two eastern campaigns conducted by the revolutionary army in Guangzhou during the First Revolutionary Civil War (1924–27). In spring 1925, in order to unify and consolidate the Guangdong revolutionary base, the revolutionary army which was organized by the Guangdong Revolutionary Government with the Whampoa Military Academy cadets as its core, set out eastwards from Guangzhou and defeated the main force of warlord Chen Jiongming entrenched in the Dongjiang area. In May, the Eastern Expeditionary Army returned to Guangzhou and put down the rebellion of the Yunnan warlord Yang Ximin and the Guangxi warlord Liu Zhenhuan. In September, the remnants of Chen Jiongming's army recaptured Chaozhou, Shantou, Haifeng, Lufeng and some other places in the Dongjiang area and launched an attack on Guangzhou. In October and November, the Guangdong Revolutionary Government conducted a second eastern campaign, wiping out Chen Jiongming's forces once and for all. 89

⁷⁶ After the Revolution of 1911, Dr. Sun Yat-sen declared war against the autocratic rule of Yuan Shikai, which became known as the "Second Revolution". In March 1913, Yuan Shikai had Song Jiaoren, acting council chairman of the Kuomintang, assassinated. Soon afterwards, he obtained huge loans from the imperialist countries to finance a civil war. In June, he dismissed the Kuomintang

military governors of Jiangxi, Guangdong and Anhui provinces and sent troops southwards. Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Huang Xing called on all forces in the southern provinces to rise up against Yuan Shikai. In July, anti-Yuan armies were established in Jiangxi and Nanjing. Then Anhui, Shanghai, Guangdong, Fujian, Hunan, Chongqing and other provinces and municipalities declared independence. However, the campaign against Yuan Shikai lasted only two months before it was defeated. The provinces that answered the call against Yuan Shikai renounced independence, and Dr. Sun Yat-sen and others were forced to go into exile abroad. 92, 387

⁷⁷ In 1915, Yuan Shikai, who had grabbed the fruits of the 1911 Revolution, stepped up his attempts to restore imperial rule, which aroused strong opposition among the people. Members of the *Zhong Hua Ge Ming Dang* (Chinese Revolutionary Party) led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen organized armed uprisings in Shanghai, Shandong, Guangdong and other places. On December 12, Yuan Shikai flagrantly proclaimed himself emperor and changed the name of the “Republic of China” to the “Chinese Empire”. On December 25, Cai E, Tang Jiyao, Li Liejun and others announced their insurrection by telegram from Yunnan. They organized the Protect-the-Republic Army and launched the campaign to protect the Republic and oppose Yuan Shikai. In the following year, Guizhou, Guangxi, Guangdong, Zhejiang and other provinces declared their independence. In March, Yuan Shikai was forced to abrogate his dynasty. The campaign ended with Yuan’s death in June. 92, 196, 387

⁷⁸ This refers to the campaign launched by Dr. Sun Yat-sen to oppose the northern warlords and uphold the Provisional Constitution. In July 1917, Duan Qirui, chieftain of the northern warlords, who resumed his reign in the Beijing government, refused to restore the Provisional Constitution and convene the parliament. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, first of all, issued the call to uphold the Provisional Constitution. After arriving in Guangzhou from Shanghai with navy forces he controlled. Dr. Sun, in alliance with the southwestern warlords who were against Duan Qirui, set up a military government committed to the Provisional Constitution. In September, Sun Yat-sen was elected generalissimo of the military government and launched a northern expedition, thereby starting the war in defence of the Provisional Constitution. In May 1918, he was forced to resign due to the compromise achieved between the northern and southwestern warlords. In 1920, Sun Yat-sen, backed by forces under Chen Jiongming, returned to Guangdong and set up an extraordinary government still under the banner of “upholding the Provisional Constitution”. He became the Extraordinary President in 1921. Shortly afterwards, Chen Jiongming collaborated with the northern warlords and the imperialists in staging a coup. Sun Yat-sen had to leave Guangzhou again and the campaign to uphold the Provisional Constitution ended in complete failure. 92, 387

⁷⁹ On August 1, 1927, the Communist Party launched an armed uprising in Nanchang in order to combat the counter-revolutionary forces led by Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei. The insurrectionary army, commanded by Zhou Enlai, secretary of the Front Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, He Long, Ye Ting, Zhu De and Liu Bochong, seized Nanchang after a fierce fight. This uprising represented the first blow of the Chinese people’s armed opposition against the Kuomintang reactionaries. It ushered in a new period marked by the independent leadership of the Chinese Communist Party over the armed revolutionary struggle. The insurrectionary troops headed south for Guangdong following their withdrawal from Nanchang. In early October it was attacked from all sides by superior enemy forces in the Chaozhou-Shantou area and defeated. Later, part of the surviving

army arrived in the Haifeng-Lufeng area and continued to fight. Another part, commanded by Zhu De and Chen Yi, marched to southern Hunan and launched the Southern Hunan Uprising. It arrived in the Jinggang Mountains in April 1928 and joined up with the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army led by Mao Zedong. 92, 129, 360, 398

⁸⁰ Zhang Jingyao (1881-1933), a native of Huoqiu County, Anhui Province, served as commander of the 7th Division of the Northern Army in 1914. In January 1916, he was under orders of Yuan Shikai to lead his troops to Sichuan to fight the Protect-the-Republic Army. 92

⁸¹ Cao Kun (1862-1938), a native of Tianjin, was one of the chieftains of the Zhili clique of the northern warlords. After Yuan Shikai usurped power in 1912, he became commander of the 3rd Division of the Northern Army and then garrison commander for the upper Changjiang River. In January 1916, he was ordered by Yuan Shikai to lead his troops to Sichuan to fight the Protect-the-Republic Army. The Zhili clique seized power in Beijing after its first war against the Fengtian clique in 1922. In October the following year, he had himself elected "president" by bribing many members of parliament. At the same time, he persuaded them to rig up a constitution, which came to be known as the "Constitution of the Republic of China". 93, 200, 388

⁸² Cai E (1882-1916) was a native of Shaoyang County, Hunan Province. During the 1911 Revolution, he launched an uprising in Kunming, Yunnan Province, and was elected commander-in-chief of the insurrectionary army. After victory of the uprising he served as governor of the Yunnan Military Government. In December 1915, he rose against Yuan Shikai in Yunnan and served as commander-in-chief of the First Army of the Protect-the-Republic Army. In 1916, he led the army into Sichuan Province and afterwards became military superintendent and governor of Sichuan Province. 93, 384

⁸³ The May 4th Movement of 1919 was a patriotic movement against imperialism and feudalism. The victors of the First World War — Britain, the United States, France, Japan, Italy and other countries — convened a peace conference in Paris in 1919, at which it was decided to transfer to Japan the special rights previously obtained by Germany in Shandong Province. China was one of the victors, but the delegation sent by its warlord government was prepared to accept this decision. On May 4, students in Beijing held demonstrations to protest the imperialists' unjust decision and the warlord government's compromise. The student movement evoked an immediate response throughout the country. By June 3, it had developed into a nationwide patriotic anti-imperialist and anti-feudal mass movement embracing the working class, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. The May 4th Movement was also a movement for a new culture as against the feudal culture. With the inauguration of the magazine of *New Youth* as its beginning, this new cultural movement promoted democracy and science. It advocated a new morality and a new literature as opposed to the old. The advanced elements of the movement who embraced Marxism helped transform the new cultural movement into a Marxist ideological movement. They were devoted to integrating Marxism with the Chinese workers' movement, thus laying the foundation for the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party both ideologically and organizationally. 93, 381

⁸⁴ Zhang Guotao (1897-1979), a native of Pingxiang, Jiangxi Province, attended the First National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. Later, he served as member of the Central Committee, of its Political Bureau and the Bureau's

Standing Committee. In 1931, he became secretary of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Sub-bureau of the Central Committee and vice-chairman of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic. In June 1935, when the First and Fourth Front Armies of the Red Army joined forces in Maogong, Sichuan Province, he became the Red Army's general political commissar. He opposed the Central Committee's decision to have the Red Army continue its northward march. He worked to split the Party and the Red Army, and set up a separate "party central committee". Zhu De, Liu Bocheng and the large numbers of cadres and soldiers of the Fourth Front Army resolutely opposed him on this. Having been forced to dissolve this "second party central committee" in June 1936, he joined the Second and Fourth Front Armies of the Red Army on their northward march, reaching northern Shaanxi in December. From September 1937, he was vice-chairman and then acting chairman of the Government of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. In April 1938, allegedly on a trip to attend a ceremony to sweep the grave of Huangdi (Yellow Emperor), he fled the region, went to Wuhan via Xi'an and joined the Kuomintang secret police. He thus became a renegade from the Chinese revolution, and was subsequently expelled from the Party. He died in Canada in 1979. 93

⁸⁵ The Fourth Front Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was formed by the Red Army's Fourth and 25th Armies from the Hubei-Henan-Anhui revolutionary base area at Huang'an (now Hong'an) in Hubei Province in November 1931. Xu Xiangqian was its commander-in-chief and Chen Changhao, its political commissar. 93

⁸⁶ One mu equals one-fifteenth of a hectare. 119, 124, 280

⁸⁷ This was a cruel policy adopted by the Japanese imperialists to eliminate our people's armed forces operating behind enemy lines and destroy the anti-Japanese base areas. With railways as pillars, highways as chains and blockhouses as locks and supplemented by blockade walls and trenches, the policy was designed to construct a network for tightening the encirclement of the army and people of the anti-Japanese base areas. 98

⁸⁸ In accordance with the Communist Party's anti-Japanese national united front policy, the anti-Japanese democratic governments were based on the "three thirds system", composed of one-third Communists, one-third non-Party Left progressives and one-third middle-of-the-road and other forces. 100, 143

⁸⁹ A reference to the Allied powers — the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, France and a number of other countries — which, together with China, fought against the Axis powers of Germany, Italy and Japan during the Second World War. 101, 148

⁹⁰ The New Fourth Army was a main force of the people's army under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party during the War of Resistance Against Japan. In October 1937, in accordance with an agreement with the Kuomintang, the Communist Party decided to concentrate the Red Army guerrilla forces in Jiangxi, Fujian, Guangdong, Hunan, Hubei, Henan, Zhejiang and Anhui provinces, and to reorganize them into the "New Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army". Ye Ting was appointed commander, Xiang Ying deputy commander, Zhang Yunyi chief of staff and Yuan Guoping director of its political department. In January 1938, the New Fourth Army, which had four detachments, established its headquarters. It soon penetrated into areas behind enemy lines, carrying out anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare and setting up an anti-Japanese base area in central China. In 1941 when the Kuomintang engineered the Southern Anhui Incident (see

Note 157) and declared the cancellation of the official designation of the New Fourth Army, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party retaliated against the Kuomintang diehards and reorganized the New Fourth Army, appointing Chen Yi as its acting commander, Zhang Yunyi as deputy commander, Liu Shaoqi as political commissar, Lai Chuanzhu as chief of staff and Deng Zihui as director of the political department. Now having seven divisions, it persisted in the War of Resistance, established, expanded and consolidated anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines in southern, central and northern Jiangsu, both north and south of the Huaihe River, in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui border area, and in central Anhui and eastern Zhejiang. In 1945, on the eve of the surrender of the Japanese imperialists, the New Fourth Army had approximately 300,000 men. It was reorganized into the Chinese People's Liberation Army during the Third Revolutionary Civil War.

104, 121, 141, 192, 237

⁹¹ The Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention were the rules of discipline laid down by Mao Zedong and others for the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army during the Second Revolutionary Civil War. They went through a process of formulation. In 1928, they were the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Six Points for Attention. The Three Main Rules were: (1) Obey orders in your actions; (2) Don't take anything from the workers and peasants; and (3) Turn in all things taken from local bullies. The Six Points were: (1) Put back the doors you have taken down for bed-boards; (2) Put back the straw you have used for bedding; (3) Speak politely; (4) Pay fairly for what you buy; (5) Return everything you borrow; and (6) Pay for anything you damage. After 1929, two more Points for Attention were added: "Don't bathe within sight of women" and "Don't search the pockets of captives". Hence The Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention. These varied slightly in content at different times and in different army units. In October 1947, the General Headquarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army issued a standard version as follows: The Three Main Rules of Discipline: (1) Obey orders in all your actions; (2) Don't take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses; and (3) Turn in everything captured. The Eight Points for Attention: (1) Speak politely; (2) Pay fairly for what you buy; (3) Return everything you borrow; (4) Pay for anything you damage; (5) Don't hit or swear at people; (6) Don't damage crops; (7) Don't take liberties with women; and (8) Don't ill-treat captives.

113, 133, 204, 227, 229, 241

⁹² In the late Ming and early Qing dynasties, owing to successive wars and other reasons, the population decreased in Sichuan and much land lay wasted. Many people immigrated there from Hunan, Hubei, Guangdong, Shaanxi and other provinces. During the Kang Xi reign of the Qing Dynasty, in order to increase tax income to bolster its feudal rule, the imperial regime provided incentives to migration into Sichuan which then lasted for more than a century. Because those from Hunan and Hubei (then Huguang) constituted the majority of the immigrants, there arose the popular expression: "Mass migrations from Hunan and Hubei provinces to Sichuan Province".

116

⁹³ Shunqing is the present Nanchong city in Sichuan Province.

118

⁹⁴ The New Army was organized by the Qing government following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 along the lines of the military system of the Western capitalist countries.

383

⁹⁵ *Tong Meng Hui* is a revolutionary party of the Chinese bourgeoisie. In August 1905, members of the *Xing Zhong Hui* (Society for China's Revival), the *Hua*

Xing Hui (Society for China's Regeneration) and other revolutionary organizations jointly organized the *Tong Meng Hui* (Chinese Revolutionary League) in Tokyo, which adopted a programme of bourgeois revolution accepting "the expulsion of the Tartars (Manchus), the revival of the Chinese nation, the establishment of a republic and the equalization of landownership" put forward by Sun Yat-sen. Sun Yat-sen was elected its director-general. Under his leadership, the *Tong Meng Hui* actively propagated revolution and allied itself with the secret societies and part of the New Army and launched a number of armed insurrections. The Wuchang Uprising broke out in October 1911 and it immediately developed into the Revolution of 1911, which overthrew the Qing Dynasty. After Yuan Shikai's seizure of power, the *Tong Meng Hui* was reorganized as the Kuomintang in August 1912.

119, 349, 382

⁹⁵ On September 25, 1937, the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army ambushed the Japanese invading troops near Pingxingguan, northeastern Shanxi, wiping out over 1,000 men of the 21st Brigade of the crack Japanese Itagaki Division and capturing a large amount of military supplies. This was the first major victory of the War of Resistance Against Japan.

121, 150

⁹⁷ This was a large-scale campaign conducted by the Eighth Route Army behind the enemy lines in north China during the War of Resistance Against Japan. From August 20 to December 5, 1940, it deployed more than 100 regiments of 400,000 men, with the support of the broad masses and militia, in launching an attack on the main communication lines in the enemy's rear in north China and co-ordinating with the armed forces and people of various base areas in their operations against enemy "mopping-up" drives. The campaign lasted three and a half months, in which over 1,800 battles were fought, more than 2,900 enemy strongholds captured and over 46,000 Japanese and puppet troops annihilated.

121, 151

⁹⁸ A reference to a surprise attack by the Eighth Route Army on the Japanese airport in Yangmingbu, Daixian County, Shanxi Province. On the night of October 19, 1937, the 3rd Battalion of the 769th Regiment of the Eighth Route Army's 129th Division, supported by the 1st and 2nd Battalions and the local people, secretly crossed the Hutuo River and slipped into the Japanese airport in Yangmingbu. They mounted a sudden attack and, during one hour of fierce fighting, burned down 24 airplanes and killed over 100 Japanese aggressors.

124

⁹⁹ A reference to the heroic deeds of five Eighth Route Army soldiers in the battle to intercept the Japanese invaders at Mt. Langya in Yixian County, Hebei Province. On September 25, 1941, when more than 3,000 Japanese aggressors attacked Mt. Langya from all sides, the 7th Company of the 1st Regiment of the Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei Military Area was ordered to check the enemy's advance in order to cover the withdrawal of the main forces, the local government organs and people. After a day's fierce fighting in which they killed more than 90 enemies, five men — the leader of the 6th Squad under the 7th Company Ma Baoyu, his deputy Ge Zhenlin and the soldiers Hu Delin, Hu Fucai and Song Xueyi — lured the enemies to a steep cliff. When their ammunition was exhausted, they, preferring death to surrender, jumped from the cliff. Ma Baoyu, Hu Delin and Hu Fucai died heroically. Ge Zhenlin and Song Xueyi, who were caught by branches half way down the mountain, returned wounded to their unit.

124

¹⁰⁰ A reference to the battle fought by a platoon of the Eighth Route Army to hold Macheng Village in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan border area in 1942. On March 3, over 1,000 Japanese aggressors, supported by tanks and armoured cars,

encircled the village. After half a day of fierce fighting, the Eighth Route Army men destroyed several enemy tanks and killed a large number of enemy soldiers before they all died heroically, their ammunition exhausted and without reinforcements.

124

¹⁰¹ The battle fought by the Eighth Route Army in defence of the Huangyandong Ordnance Repair Shop in Licheng, Shanxi Province. On November 9, 1941, nearly 5,000 Japanese aggressors besieged and assaulted the Huangyandong-Shuiyao area. A special task regiment of the Eighth Route Army garrisoning the repair shop, helped by more than 1,000 local workers and staff members, took strategic positions in the mountains and fought many bayonet battles with the enemy before repulsing scores of enemy attacks. After a bloody battle which lasted eight days and nights and took heavy enemy casualties, they withdrew. Several days later, with the assistance of other troops and the militiamen, they recaptured the place. Altogether, over 1,000 enemy troops were killed.

124

¹⁰² A reference to the battle fought by the New Fourth Army against the Japanese aggressors in Liulaozhuang, north of Huaiyin, in Jiangsu Province. In February 1943, when over 14,000 Japanese and puppet troops launched a “mopping-up” campaign in the area of Huaiyin, the 3rd Division of the New Fourth Army started a counter-campaign and forced the enemy to withdraw. On March 18, the 4th Company of the 19th Regiment of this division’s 7th Brigade was attacked from all sides by over 1,000 enemy troops. The 82 company officers and soldiers fought fiercely for a whole day, killing more than 170 enemy troops. In the end, under the enemy’s heavy gun-fire they all died heroically.

124

¹⁰³ The battle fought by the Eighth Route Army against the invading Japanese troops at Nandaigu and Beidaigu, in the Yishan-Mengshan Mountains area, Shandong Province. In November 1943, over 10,000 Japanese and puppet troops staged a “mopping-up” campaign against the anti-Japanese base area in central Shandong. The 93 men of the 8th Company of the 11th Regiment of the Eighth Route Army’s Central Shandong Military Area who were conducting an interior-line operation seized a strategic position in the mountainous Nandaigu-Beidaigu area, northwest of Yishui River, and held it for 18 days against successive attacks by 2,000 Japanese and puppet troops who were supported by bombers and artillery. They ended up killing 300 enemy troops at very small cost to themselves, which lent great support to the troops conducting exterior-line operations.

124

¹⁰⁴ The battle fought by the Eighth Route Army which ambushed the Japanese aggressors in Hanlue Village, northeast of Linfen, Shanxi Province. In October 1943, the Japanese Army assembled large numbers of troops and launched a “mopping-up” campaign against the Taiyue anti-Japanese base area in the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan border area. It even organized a “field observation group” of 100 officers from various parts of north China to observe the Taiyue battle. But in Hanlue Village, the 16th Regiment of the Eighth Route Army’s Taiyue Military Area ambushed the 13 automobiles carrying the observation officers. After three hours of fierce fighting, all but three of them were killed.

124

¹⁰⁵ The battle of annihilation fought by the Eighth Route Army which encircled and wiped out the Japanese aggressors at Zhenjiazhuang, Xingxian County, Shanxi Province. In September 1943, 2,000 Japanese troops of the 3rd Mixed Brigade and the 59th Brigade launched repeated “mopping-up” campaigns against Xingxian and Baode counties. On October 5, the troops of the Eighth Route Army’s Shanxi-Suiyuan Military Area laid siege to the 85th Detachment of the enemy’s 59th Brigade in the area of Zhenjiazhuang. The battle lasted seven days and nights with 800

enemy troops killed and a great amount of weapons captured. 124

¹⁰⁶ The Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Yan'an from April 23 to June 11, 1945. At the congress, Mao Zedong delivered a political report entitled "On Coalition Government", Zhu De gave a military report entitled "The Battle Front in the Liberated Areas", Liu Shaoqi made the "Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution" and Zhou Enlai made an important speech entitled "On the United Front". The congress reviewed the tortuous development of our democratic revolution over the previous 20 years and more, laid down a correct strategy and tactics, put an end to erroneous ideas in the Party and unified the understanding of the Party membership on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, which led to unprecedented Party unity. This congress laid the foundation for the nationwide triumph of the new-democratic revolution. 129, 141, 341

¹⁰⁷ On July 1, 1925, based on proposals of the Chinese Communist Party, the Kuomintang reorganized the Guangzhou-based Supreme Army and Navy Headquarters (otherwise known as the Generalissimo's Headquarters), established by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, into the National Government which was commonly referred to as the Guangdong Revolutionary Government. 129

¹⁰⁸ Ye Ting (1896-1946), a native of Huiyang, Guangdong Province, was a graduate from the Baoding Military Academy in Hebei Province. He joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925. In the winter of the same year, he became commander of the Independent Regiment of the Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army. Following the National Revolutionary Army's occupation of Wuchang in October 1926, he became commander of the 24th Division and of the Wuchang Garrison Headquarters. In 1927 he helped lead the August 1st Nanchang Uprising, serving as both commander-in-chief of the front headquarters and commander of the 11th Army. In October 1937, he became commander of the New Fourth Army. In the Southern Anhui Incident of January 1941 (see Note 157), masterminded by Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang, he was captured and imprisoned. After his release on March 4, 1946, he rejoined the Communist Party on March 7. But on April 8, he died in an airplane crash on his way back to Yan'an from Chongqing. 129, 162

¹⁰⁹ Commanded by Ye Ting, a Communist, the Independent Regiment of the Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army was organized in the winter of 1925 at Zhaoqing in Guangdong Province. With Communists and Communist Youth League members as its nucleus, the regiment became famous during the Northern Expeditionary War for the bravery and skilfulness of its officers and men in battle and had outstanding military exploits to its credit. After the National Revolutionary Army occupied Wuchang, the regiment was reorganized as its 25th Division's 73rd Regiment. 129

¹¹⁰ Zhou Shidi (1900-79), a native of Qionghai in Guangdong Province, was battalion commander, chief of staff and then acting regimental commander in Ye Ting's Independent Regiment during the Northern Expeditionary War. After the 1927 Nanchang Uprising, he became commander of the 25th Division of the 11th Army of the National Revolutionary Army. When the main force of insurrectionary troops advanced on Chaozhou and Shantou, Guangdong Province, the 25th Division remained at Sanheba, Dapu County, under the command of Zhu De. 129, 400

¹¹¹ Chen Yi (1901-72), a native of Lezhi, Sichuan Province, was Party representative assigned to the 73rd Regiment of the 25th Division of the National Revolutionary Army's 11th Army after the 1927 Nanchang Uprising. (The 73rd Regiment

had as its predecessor the Independent Regiment under Ye Ting.) When the Red Army began its Long March in 1934, he stayed behind to persist in guerrilla warfare in the Jiangxi Soviet area and serve as director of the Central Administrative Office of the Chinese Soviet Republic. He was acting commander of the New Fourth Army at the time of the Japanese surrender in August 1945. After the outbreak of the War of Liberation (1946-49), he became commander of the East China Military Area and later both commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army.

129, 192, 236, 237

¹¹² Nie Heting (1905-71), a native of Funan in Anhui Province, served as platoon leader in Ye Ting's Independent Regiment during the Northern Expeditionary War.

129

¹¹³ Xiao Ke (1908-), a native of Jiahe in Hunan Province, was company political instructor in February 1927 of the 71st Regiment of Ye Ting's 24th Division under the National Revolutionary Army.

129

¹¹⁴ Lu Deming (1905-27), a native of Shuangshipu (now part of Zigong City) in Yibin County, Sichuan Province, served as company commander and later battalion commander in Ye Ting's Independent Regiment during the Northern Expeditionary War. He became commander of the Guards Regiment of the Wuhan National Government (also known as the Guards Regiment of the National Revolutionary Army's Second Front Army) when it was formed in June 1927. He led his regiment to participate in the Autumn Harvest Uprising which took place in September 1927 on the Hunan-Jiangxi border, serving as commander-in-chief of the insurrectionary army.

129

¹¹⁵ The Autumn Harvest Uprising, led by Mao Zedong, was launched in September 1927 in Xiushui, Pingxiang, Liling, Pingjiang and Liuyang counties on the Hunan-Jiangxi border. Later the worker-peasant armed forces taking part in the uprising and the Guards Regiment of the former Wuhan National Government combined to form the 1st Division of the First Army of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army. Under the leadership of Mao Zedong, this force fought its way to the Jinggang Mountains in October, where it established the first rural revolutionary base.

130

¹¹⁶ Chen Duxiu (1879-1942), a native of Huaining County in Anhui Province, began editing the magazine *Youth* (later renamed *New Youth*) in September 1915. In 1918, together with Li Dazhao, he founded the *Weekly Review* and advocated the new culture. He was one of the main leaders of the May 4th new cultural movement. After the May 4th Movement, he accepted and propagated Marxism. He was one of the main founders of the Chinese Communist Party and served as its principal leader for the first six years after its founding. In the later period of the First Revolutionary Civil War, he committed the serious error of Right capitulationism. Afterwards, he lost faith in the future of the revolution and accepted Trotskyite views. He formed a faction inside the Party, engaged in anti-Party activities and was consequently expelled in November 1929. Then he was actively involved in a Trotskyite organization. In October 1932, he was arrested and imprisoned by the Kuomintang and released in August 1937. In 1942, he died of illness in Jiangjin, Sichuan Province.

130, 210

¹¹⁷ At the prompting of Chiang Kai-shek, Xia Douyin, commander of the 14th Independent Division of the Wuhan National Government, organized an armed rebellion on May 17, 1927. At that time, the main forces of the National Revolutionary Army had moved north to the battle front in Henan. Xia took advantage of this opportunity and led his troops towards Wuhan in an attempt to overthrow the

Wuhan National Government. Under the command of Ye Ting, the Wuhan garrison force and workers' pickets made short work of Xia's troops. 130

¹¹⁸ The Guangzhou Uprising, launched by the Chinese Communist Party, was intended to strike back at the reactionary Kuomintang forces after the failure of the revolution in 1927. On December 11, led by Zhang Tailei, secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee, and Ye Ting, Yun Daiying, Ye Jianying, Yang Yin, Zhou Wenyong and Nie Rongzhen, the Officers' Training Corps of the National Revolutionary Army's Fourth Army and the workers and peasants in Guangzhou jointly occupied most of Guangzhou city after fierce battle. Later, the Guangzhou Soviet was established. On the following day, under the cover of gun-fire from the imperialist warships, the reactionary Kuomintang troops launched a counter-attack on Guangzhou from which the insurrectionary troops were forced to withdraw on December 13. During the battle, Zhang Tailei died heroically. The rebel troops joined the revolutionary armed forces in the Dongjiang area and southern Hunan and kept up the armed struggle. 131, 361, 402

¹¹⁹ The Dongjiang Red Army refers to the 2nd Division (later called the 2nd Red Division) of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army, formed from the surviving forces of the 24th Division that reached Haifeng and Lufeng, Guangdong Province, after taking part in the Nanchang Uprising; and to the 4th Division (later called the 4th Red Division) of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army, formed from the troops who withdrew to Haifeng and Lufeng after the unsuccessful Guangzhou Uprising. In spring 1928, the two divisions combined forces and continued fighting in the Dongjiang area, Guangdong Province. They failed due to attacks by superior enemy forces and errors in command. 131

¹²⁰ Wu Zhonghao (1903-30), a native of Leiyang, Hunan Province, was then serving as deputy commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Regiment of the 1st Division under the First Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army. 131, 401

¹²¹ Fan Shisheng (1887-1939), a native of Hexi (now part of the Eshan Yi Autonomous County), Yunnan Province, was then commander of the Kuomintang's 16th Army. 131

¹²² See "From the Nanchang Uprising to the Jinggang Mountains", pp. 402-04 of this volume. 132, 361

¹²³ The Revolution of 1911, led by the *Tong Meng Hui*, a bourgeois revolutionary party headed by Sun Yat-sen, overthrew the autocratic regime of the Qing Dynasty. On October 10 of that year, a number of revolutionaries inspired the New Army to stage an uprising in Wuchang, Hubei Province. It evoked enthusiastic response from various provinces, and very soon the reactionary rule of the Qing Dynasty, which was supported by imperialist powers, crumbled. In January 1912, the Provisional Government of the Republic of China was established in Nanjing, with Sun Yat-sen as the provisional president. Thus, China's feudal monarchic system, which had lasted more than 2,000 years, was brought to an end. The idea of a democratic republic had struck root into the hearts of the people. But the bourgeois revolutionary forces were too weak and conciliatory to make a thoroughgoing revolution against imperialism and feudalism by extensively mobilizing the masses. The fruits of the 1911 Revolution were soon seized by the northern warlord Yuan Shikai and China remained a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. 132, 196, 349, 381, 401

¹²⁴ In the last years of the Qing Dynasty, a feudal warlord clique was formed by Yuan Shikai in several northern provinces. In 1895, the Qing government ordered

him to organize and train the New Army in Xiaozhan, Tianjin, which was to be under the control of the minister in charge of the northern coastal provinces. In 1901 Yuan was appointed viceroy of Zhili Province and minister in charge of the northern coastal provinces. He gathered his henchmen to form his own clique. After the 1911 Revolution, he usurped the provisional presidency of the Republic and ushered in a period of reactionary northern warlord rule. After his death in 1916, this network split into the Zhili, Anhui and Fengtian cliques, supported respectively by British, Japanese and other imperialist powers. Successive battles broke out as the warlords scrambled for power and profit. In 1926, Duan Qirui, warlord of the Anhui clique, stepped down. In 1927, the warlords of the Zhili clique were overthrown by the National Revolutionary Army. And in 1928, the warlord government of the Fengtian clique toppled, thus ending the reactionary rule of the northern warlords. 132, 196, 381

¹²⁵ A reference to the Fourth Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. In April 1928, Zhu De and Chen Yi led the surviving troops from the Nanchang Uprising and the army of peasants who participated in the Southern Hunan Uprising to Jinggang Mountains, where they joined forces with the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army led by Mao Zedong. On May 4, the two forces were combined to form the Fourth Army of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army at Longshi, Ninggang, in Jiangxi Province, and later this new force was renamed the Fourth Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, with Zhu De as its commander and Mao Zedong as its Party representative. 133, 361, 404

¹²⁶ Bi Zhanyun (1903–77), a native of Guang'an, Sichuan Province, served as battalion commander in the Kuomintang army in 1927. In September 1928, he led his troops in revolt in Guidong, Hunan Province and joined the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. In October of the same year, he joined the Chinese Communist Party. He was deputy commander of the Eastern Hebei Military Area in 1944. 133

¹²⁷ Luo Binghui (1897–1946), a native of Yiliang, Yunnan Province, was head of the Kuomintang's pacification detachment at Ji'an, Jiangxi Province, in 1929. He joined the Chinese Communist Party in July of the same year. In October, he staged an uprising with his troops and joined the forces of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. He was commander of the 2nd Division of the New Fourth Army in 1944. 133

¹²⁸ Wang Erzhuo (1897–1928), a native of Shimen, Hunan Province, then served both as chief of staff of the Fourth Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and commander of its 28th Regiment. 134

¹²⁹ This resolution, also known as Resolution of the Gutian Meeting, was adopted at the Ninth Party Congress of the Fourth Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, held at Gutian, Shanghang County, in Fujian Province, in December 1929. Mao Zedong wrote it by analysing the Fourth Army's situation, summing up the rich experience acquired in the two years since the Red Army's founding and drawing on the essence of the letter of instructions to the Fourth Army's Front Committee issued by the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee on September 28, 1929. It is a programmatic document concerning the building of the Chinese Communist Party and the Red Army and has played an important role in the development of the Party and the army. 135

¹³⁰ Jiang Guangnai (1887–1967), a native of Dongguan, Guangdong Province, was then commander of the Kuomintang's 61st Division. After the founding of the Peo-

pie's Republic of China, he once served as Minister of Textile Industry. 135

¹³¹ Cai Tingkai (1892–1968), a native of Luoding, Guangdong Province, was then commander of the Kuomintang's 60th Division. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he served as member of the Central People's Government Council, vice-chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and vice-chairman of the National Defence Council. 135

¹³² Zhang Fakui (1896–1980), a native of Shixing, Guangdong Province, became commander of the Kuomintang's 4th Division in May 1929. In September of the same year, allying with the Guangxi clique, he declared his opposition to Chiang Kai-shek and shortly afterwards became commander-in-chief of the Third Route Army of the Defend-the-Party-and-Save-the-Nation Army. 135

¹³³ On June 11, 1930, under the leadership of Li Lisan, the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee adopted a resolution entitled "The New Revolutionary High Tide and the Winning of Victory First in One or More Provinces", which advocated preparations for immediate armed insurrections throughout the country. He drew up an adventurist plan to organize such insurrections in the key cities and to amass all the forces of the Red Army to attack them. He subsequently combined the leading organs of the Party, the Youth League and the trade unions at all levels into action committees for insurrection. These "Left" mistakes became known as the "Li Lisan line". In September the same year, the Third Plenary Session of the Party's Sixth Central Committee corrected those "Left" mistakes. 135

¹³⁴ Tu Zhenrong was then special representative from the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee. 135

¹³⁵ Yuan Guoping (1905–41), a native of Shaoyang, Hunan Province, then served as director of the Political Department of the Third Army Group of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. 136

¹³⁶ Dai Douyuan (1890–1930), a native of Fenghuang, in Hunan Province, was then commander of the 47th Brigade of the Kuomintang's Fourth Route Army. 136

¹³⁷ The First Front Army of the Red Army, also known as the Central Red Army, was one of the main forces of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. It was formed by the First and Third Army Groups of the Red Army at Yonghe in northeastern Liuyang, Hunan Province, in August 1930. At the same time, the General Front Party Committee of the First Front Army was established. Zhu De served as the army's commander-in-chief and Mao Zedong as its general political commissar and secretary of the Committee. 136

¹³⁸ This refers to the first "encirclement and suppression" campaign launched by the Kuomintang army against the Central Revolutionary Base Area during the Second Revolutionary Civil War. In December 1930, Chiang Kai-shek appointed Jiangxi provincial governor Lu Diping as director of the Nanchang provisional headquarters of the commander-in-chief of the army, navy and air force, appointed commander of the Kuomintang's 18th Division Zhang Huizan as field commander and employed 100,000 men to advance south from the Ji'an-Jianning line on the Central Revolutionary Base Area. Under the command of Mao Zedong and Zhu De, the Red Army's First Front Army lured the enemy in deep and ambushed two of the enemy's brigades and the headquarters of the 18th Division, annihilating nearly 10,000 men and capturing Zhang Huizan in the Longgang area on December 30. The Red Army then pursued Tan Daoyuan's 50th Division and wiped out more than one of his brigades in the Dongshao area on January 3, 1931. These

victories frightened the enemy troops into fleeing in disorder and so ended the Kuomintang's first "encirclement and suppression" campaign. 137

¹³⁹ Zhang Huizan (1885–1931), a native of Changsha, Hunan Province, was then commander of the Kuomintang's 18th Division. 137

¹⁴⁰ Tan Daoyuan (1889–1946), a native of Xiangxiang, Hunan Province, was then serving as commander of the Kuomintang's 50th Division. 137

¹⁴¹ Xu Kexiang (1891–1967), a native of Xiangxiang, Hunan Province, became commander of the Kuomintang's 2nd Independent Division in early 1928 and commander of the 24th Division in 1930. 137, 403

¹⁴² Mao Bingwen (1891–1970), a native of Xiangxiang, Hunan Province, was then commander of the Kuomintang's 8th Division. 137

¹⁴³ Zhu Shaoliang (1891–1963) was a native of Wujin, Jiangsu Province. He was then commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang's Sixth Route Army. 137

¹⁴⁴ This refers to the second "encirclement and suppression" campaign launched by the Kuomintang army against the Central Revolutionary Base Area during the Second Revolutionary Civil War. In February 1931, Chiang Kai-shek appointed his minister of war He Yingqin as director of the Nanchang provisional headquarters of the commander-in-chief of the army, navy and air force and deployed 200,000 men. An attack was mounted on the Central Revolutionary Base Area on April 1, following the strategy of steady, cautious attacks and entrenching at every step. Under the command of Mao Zedong and Zhu De, the Red Army's First Front Army adopted the strategy of luring the enemy in deep and concentrating forces to strike at the enemy's vulnerable units and eliminating them one by one in mobile operations. From May 16 to 31, the Red Army swept across 350 kilometres, fought five successful battles all the way from Donggu and Futian in Jiangxi Province to Jianning in Fujian Province, annihilating more than 30,000 enemy troops, and thus smashed the second Kuomintang "encirclement and suppression" campaign. 137

¹⁴⁵ Xiang Ying (1898–1941), a native of Wuhan, Hubei Province, was then acting secretary of the Soviet Area Bureau and chairman of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Party Central Committee. 137

¹⁴⁶ Gong Bingfan (1902–82), a native of Fufeng, Shaanxi Province, then served as commander of the Kuomintang's 28th Division. 137

¹⁴⁷ Wang Jinyu (1884–1951), a native of Wucheng, Shandong Province, was then commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang's Fifth Route Army. 137

¹⁴⁸ This refers to the third Kuomintang "encirclement and suppression" campaign against the Central Revolutionary Base Area during the Second Revolutionary Civil War. In July 1931, Chiang Kai-shek personally took the field as commander-in-chief and mustered 300,000 troops to advance southwards on the Central Revolutionary Base Area, following the strategy of driving straight in. Under the command of Mao Zedong and Zhu De, the Red Army's First Front Army adopted the strategy of luring the enemy in deep, avoiding the enemy's main forces and striking at the enemy's weak spots. From the beginning of August to mid-September, the Red Army won three battles in a row in Liantang, Liangcun and Huangbei. It took advantage of the enemy's general retreat to attack his forces in Laoyingpan, Gaoxingxu and Fangshiling, wiping out a large number of his troops. Altogether, it annihilated more than 30,000 enemy soldiers, thus smashing the third Kuomintang "encirclement and suppression" campaign. 137

¹⁴⁹ A reference to the campaign launched by the First Front Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army to smash the fourth Kuomintang "en-

circlement and suppression” of the Central Revolutionary Base Area during the Second Revolutionary Civil War. In late 1932, Chiang Kai-shek assembled 400,000 to 500,000 troops against the Central Revolutionary Base Area in a concerted attack by converging columns. From February to March 1933, drawing on the experience gained in the previous three campaigns against “encirclement and suppression”, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De commanded the Red Army’s First Front Army by adopting the strategy of concentrating forces to wipe out the enemy units one by one in mobile warfare. The Red Army annihilated nearly three enemy divisions in two ambushes at Huangbei and Dongbei, thus smashing the enemy’s fourth “encirclement and suppression” campaign. (See Note 4.)

139

¹⁵⁰ “Short, swift thrusts” was a tactical principle advocated by Li Teh (Otto Braun, a military advisor from the Communist International) during the fifth campaign against the enemy’s “encirclement and suppression”. They meant that whenever the enemy built blockhouses and entrenched his forces at every step, the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army also built blockhouses to defend its positions. And whenever the enemy troops left the blockhouses to advance, the Red Army would make swift thrusts at them from a short distance. This tactical principle served leaders who were then making “Left” errors and following a purely defensive strategy.

139

¹⁵¹ The Zunyi Meeting was an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held at Zunyi, Guizhou Province, in January 1935. It focused on rectifying the “Left” errors in military affairs, ended the domination of the “Left” adventurist line in the central leadership, established the leadership of Mao Zedong in the Red Army and in the Party’s central leading body and saved the Red Army and the Party from destruction at that most critical juncture.

139

¹⁵² Huang Kecheng (1902–), a native of Yongxing, in Hunan Province, was both commander and political commissar of the New Fourth Army’s 3rd Division.

139

¹⁵³ This refers to the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held at Luochuan, northern Shaanxi, in August 1937. At this meeting, Mao Zedong delivered reports on military affairs and the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. The meeting adopted the “Decision on the Present Situation and the Tasks of the Party” and the “Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation”. It analysed the political situation since the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan, pointing out that the differences between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang were no longer about whether to wage a war of resistance but how to win it, and that the key to victory lay in carrying out the policy of total resistance advocated by the Communist Party and opposing the policy of partial resistance advocated by the Kuomintang. Therefore, it was concluded that the Party should boldly launch an independent guerrilla warfare in the enemy’s rear and set up anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines; that in Kuomintang areas it should boldly launch anti-Japanese mass movements and secure the political and economic rights of the people throughout the country; and that reduction of rents and interest should be its basic policy for solving the peasants’ land problem during the War of Resistance Against Japan.

139

¹⁵⁴ In autumn 1938, the Japanese aggressors occupied Guangdong Province. Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, the Dongjiang, Qiongya, Zhujiang and Hanjiang Columns, the Central Guangdong People’s Anti-Japanese

Liberation Army and the Southern Route (Leizhou Peninsula) Peoples' Anti-Japanese Guerrillas were set up to wage guerrilla war in various places of Guangdong Province. The South China Anti-Japanese Column mentioned in the text refers to these armed forces. 141, 192

¹⁵⁵ This was a people's armed force against Japanese aggression in northeast China led by the Chinese Communist Party. On February 20, 1936, the main anti-Japanese armed forces in the Northeast jointly issued a "Declaration on Unifying the Organizational System of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army". They then designated these armed forces the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army. Later on, it grew to have 11 armies and sustained heroic resistance to the enemy under extremely difficult circumstances. 142

¹⁵⁶ This refers to three anti-Communist onslaughts launched by Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang from 1939 to 1943. In the first campaign, from winter 1939 to spring 1940, Kuomintang troops occupied Ningxian, Zhenyuan and other counties in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. Yan Xishan instigated the December Incident by attacking the "Daredevil" Corps and other troops of the New Army in Shanxi Province. Shi Yousan's and Zhu Huaibing's troops mounted attacks on the Eighth Route Army in the anti-Japanese base areas in southern Hebei and the Taihang Mountains. In the second campaign, from autumn 1940 to spring 1941, about 70,000 to 80,000 Kuomintang troops surrounded and attacked the New Fourth Army units when they were moving north from southern Anhui Province. This became known as the Southern Anhui Incident that shocked China and the rest of the world. For the third campaign, from spring to autumn 1943, Chiang Kai-shek published his *China's Destiny*, which was a diatribe against communism and the people. Taking advantage of the dissolution of the Communist International, he instigated his secret agents disguised as members of mass organizations to clamour for "disbanding the Communist Party" and "abolishing the special region of northern Shaanxi", while diverting many of his Huanghe River defence forces for a lightning attack on the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. The Chinese Communist Party and its armed forces repulsed all these anti-Communist onslaughts and overcame the crisis it faced. 146

¹⁵⁷ In October 1940, the Kuomintang military authorities ordered all the units of the New Fourth and Eighth Route Armies stationed north and south of the Changjiang River and south of the Huanghe River to move north of the Huanghe River. While denouncing this unreasonable demand, the Chinese Communist Party agreed to move the units of the New Fourth Army in southern Anhui north of the Changjiang River to benefit the general interest. In January 1941, with the consent of the Kuomintang authorities, more than 9,000 officers and men of the New Fourth Army in southern Anhui started on their northward journey. But when they approached the Maolin area, Jingxian County, Anhui Province, they were ambushed by 70,000 to 80,000 Kuomintang troops. After a bloody battle which lasted seven days, the New Fourth Army ran short of food and ammunition and most of the men died heroically in the fighting. Only a few broke through the enemy lines and survived. Army Commander Ye Ting was arrested and imprisoned while his deputy Xiang Ying was murdered. 146

¹⁵⁸ On April 13, 1941 the Soviet Union and Japan signed a neutrality pact in Moscow. The pact provided that both nations should maintain peaceful and friendly relations and respect each other's territorial integrity and inviolability. It also stipulated that should one of the Contracting Parties become the object of hostilities

on the part of third powers, the other Contracting Party would observe neutrality. On April 5, 1945, the Soviet Government abrogated the pact. 147

¹⁵⁹ The First, Second and Fourth Front Armies of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army joined forces at Huining, Gansu Province, in October 1936. 149

¹⁶⁰ The Xi'an Incident is also known as the December 12th Incident of 1936. At the critical juncture when the Japanese imperialists were stepping up their aggression to colonize China, the Kuomintang's Northeastern Army, headed by General Zhang Xueliang, and its 17th Route Army, headed by General Yang Hucheng, having been inspired by the Chinese Communist Party's policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and the people's anti-Japanese movement, demanded that Chiang Kai-shek stop the civil war and unite against Japan. Chiang not only refused to comply but hurried to Xi'an to make active preparations for "suppressing the Communists". Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng took joint action and detained Chiang Kai-shek on December 12, 1936 in suburban Lintong. This became known as the famous Xi'an Incident. The pro-Japanese faction in the Kuomintang, headed by He Yingqin, tried to exploit this incident to launch a large-scale civil war and to oust Chiang Kai-shek in favour of himself. The Chinese Communist Party insisted that the incident be settled peacefully. Due largely to the arduous efforts of representatives of the Chinese Communist Party, Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu (Qin Bangxian) and Ye Jianying, a peaceful settlement was reached, thus facilitating the formation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. 149

¹⁶¹ This refers to "An Open Telegram from the Chinese Communist Party on the Japanese Attack on Lugouqiao" issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on July 8, 1937, the day following the Lugouqiao Incident. The telegram called on all the Chinese citizens and armed forces to unite and build a national united front as the solid Great Wall of resistance to Japanese aggression. 149

¹⁶² In July 1938, while the 4th Column of the Eighth Route Army was marching towards eastern Hebei to resist Japanese aggression, the Chinese Communist Party's Special Committee of the Hebei-Rehe Border Area mobilized and led more than 200,000 men in an armed uprising against Japan in 21 counties, including Fengrun, Luanxian, Qian'an and Zunhua in eastern Hebei Province and in the Tangshan mining area. From July to October, the number of armed guerrillas grew to over 100,000 within the area from Tongxian in the west to Shanhaiguan in the east, from Xinglong in the north to Bohai Gulf in the south, laying the foundation for the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning anti-Japanese base area. 149

¹⁶³ On December 9, 1935, several thousand students in Beiping held a patriotic demonstration under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party shouting such slogans as "Oppose the autonomous movement in north China!" "Stop the civil war and unite to resist foreign aggression!" and "Down with Japanese imperialism!" The demonstration was suppressed by the Kuomintang government. On the following day, students of all schools in Beiping declared a general strike. On December 16, over 10,000 students and other city residents held a second demonstration. The movement won a warm response from people throughout the country and brought about a new upsurge in the Chinese people's movement against Japanese aggression and for national salvation. 150

¹⁶⁴ The League of Self-Sacrifice for National Salvation was a local anti-Japanese mass organization in Shanxi, formed in September 1936 with the encouragement and help of the Chinese Communist Party. The league, which played an important

role in fighting the Japanese in Shanxi, was supported by Yan Xishan in its early days. Later, following the lead of Chiang Kai-shek, Yan adopted an attitude of appeasement towards the Japanese and of active opposition to the Communist Party. He ordered the dissolution of the league in December 1939. A great number of its officers and other progressives were brutally killed. The members of the league who firmly stood for a war of resistance continued their struggle against Japan under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. 150

¹⁶⁵ Referring to the people's anti-Japanese army of Shanxi which emerged under the influence and leadership of the Communist Party. The Shanxi Youth Resistance "Daredevil" Corps was its main force. 150

¹⁶⁶ This was an armed force led by the Chinese Communist Party. After the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan in 1937, the Hui people in central Hebei organized an anti-Japanese armed force to defend their homeland. Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, they also set up a cadres' training corps and a general-purpose training corps of the Hui people. In July 1938, these were combined to form the Hui People's General Training Corps which was renamed, in summer 1939, the Central Hebei Hui People's Detachment, with Ma Benzhai as commander. 150

¹⁶⁷ Tomobumi Yamashita (1885-1946), a Japanese career army officer, was then-chief of staff of the North China Front Army of the invading Japanese forces. 151

¹⁶⁸ The Pacific war refers to the conflict in the Pacific region between the anti-fascist Allied nations and Japan during the Second World War. On the morning of December 7, 1941, without declaring war, Japan employed a huge naval and air force for a surprise attack on Pearl Harbour, the main Pacific base of the U.S. navy and air force, inflicting disastrous losses on the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The following day, the United States and Britain declared war on Japan, while Germany and Italy declared war on the United States. Thus the Pacific war started. The Japanese troops occupied many countries and regions in Southeast Asia and some islands in the Pacific Ocean. Later, under the heavy blows dealt by the armed forces of the anti-fascist nations in the Pacific region, Japan met with one defeat after another. In August 1945, it surrendered unconditionally, thus ending the war. 152

¹⁶⁹ The rectification movement was a Party-wide Marxist-Leninist ideological education movement launched by the Chinese Communist Party in 1942. The main content was: fight subjectivism to rectify the style of study, fight sectarianism to rectify the style in Party relations, and fight Party stereotypes to rectify the style of writing. Through this movement, the whole Party became more conscious of the basic orientation of integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. 153, 394

¹⁷⁰ The reduction of rent and interest was an agrarian policy of the Chinese Communist Party during the War of Resistance Against Japan. A 25 per cent reduction was the policy pursued in land rents under all forms of tenancy. Interest should be reduced to 15 per cent or lower, a rate acceptable to the public. 153, 211

¹⁷¹ A reference to the "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties" which were secretly issued by the Kuomintang central authorities in spring 1939. These measures included the adoption of fascist rule and imposed severe restrictions on communist and all other progressive ideas, speeches and activities in order to disrupt all the anti-Japanese organizations of the people. They also stipulated that in places where, in the opinion of the Kuomintang reactionaries, "the Communists were most active", the "law of collective responsibility and collective punishment"

was to be enforced and an “information network”, or counter-revolutionary secret service, was to be established within the *bao-jia* organizations to supervise and restrict the people’s activities. (*Bao* and *jia* were then the basic administrative units of the Kuomintang’s fascist regime. Ten households formed a *jia*, and ten *jia* a *bao*.) 153

¹⁷² Pang Bingxun (1879–1963) was a native of Xinhe, Hebei Province. In 1940, he became Kuomintang governor of Hebei Province and commander-in-chief of the 24th Group Army. In 1943, he surrendered to the Japanese aggressors. 154

¹⁷³ Sun Dianying (1889–1947), a native of Yongcheng, Henan Province, became commander of the Kuomintang’s New 5th Corps in 1939. In 1943, he surrendered to the Japanese aggressors. 154

¹⁷⁴ The Japanese People’s Emancipation League was a progressive organization set up in April 1944 by the North China Federation of the Anti-war Leagues of Japanese Nationals in China. Its goals were to bring down Japanese militarism and achieve an early end to the war and build a peaceful and free new Japan. 157

¹⁷⁵ The Korean Independence League, an organization of the anti-Japanese national united front of the Korean people who were living south of the Great Wall, was established in the anti-Japanese base area in southeastern Shanxi Province in July 1942. Its goals were to mobilize the Korean people to achieve national liberation, to overthrow the Japanese imperialist rule of Korea, to establish a self-determining, independent, powerful and prosperous Korean democratic republic. The organization moved to Korea after the Japanese imperialists surrendered in 1945. 157

¹⁷⁶ See “Declaration on the Situation” (November 10, 1924), *Selected Works of Sun Yat-sen*, Chin. ed., People’s Publishing House, Beijing, 1981, p. 953. 161

¹⁷⁷ The Four Main Courses were those on tactics, topography, fortification works and weaponry. 173

¹⁷⁸ This refers to the reclamation of public land by the militia in order to raise money for the manufacture of ammunition, a practice adopted in a number of anti-Japanese democratic base areas during the War of Resistance Against Japan. The land was usually reclaimed by the militia and masses through labour exchange and mutual aid and most of the income was used for the said purpose. 180

¹⁷⁹ “On Coalition Government”, *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1975, Vol. III, p. 261. 185

¹⁸⁰ “China’s Two Possible Destinies”, *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 1975, Vol. III, pp. 201–02. 186

¹⁸¹ The Yan’an Artillery School, which started in April 1945, was formally inaugurated on August 1 of the same year. Zhu Rui was its acting principal and Qiu Chuangcheng its political commissar. 191

¹⁸² Referring to Zhu De, Ye Jianying, Xiao Jingguang and others who attended the Yan’an Artillery School’s inauguration. 191

¹⁸³ Zhao Zhangcheng (1905–69), a native of Luoyang, Henan Province, was then director of the artillery department of the Yan’an Joint Defence Headquarters and worked in the mortar department of the Yan’an Artillery School. In his letter to Zhu De and Ye Jianying, he presented several proposals on building up our artillery troops and war industry. He suggested that we should manufacture more light mortars and increase the training of middle-ranking infantry commanders in the function and use of mortars. 191

¹⁸⁴ Yasuji Okamura (1884–1966) was commander-in-chief of the Japanese invading forces in China when Japan surrendered in August 1945. He headed the list of the Japanese war criminals published in Yan'an. During the War of Liberation, he served as a secret military advisor to Chiang Kai-shek. In January 1949, the Kuomintang government declared him not guilty and set him free, and then he returned to Japan. 192, 202

¹⁸⁵ From July 17 to August 2, 1945, the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain held a conference at Potsdam, Germany. During the conference on July 26 China, the United States and Britain issued a declaration requiring Japan to surrender unconditionally. This was known as the Potsdam Declaration. On August 8, the Soviet Union also signed the declaration. 192

¹⁸⁶ Sadamu Shimomura (1887–1968), a career Japanese army officer, was then commander of the Japanese North China Front Army. 192

¹⁸⁷ Nie Rongzhen (1899–), a native of Jiangjin, Sichuan Province, was then commander of the Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei Military Area. 192

¹⁸⁸ Li Xiannian (1909–), a native of Huang'an (now Hong'an), Hubei Province, was then commander of the 5th Division of the New Fourth Army. 192

¹⁸⁹ Zeng Sheng (1910–), a native of Huiyang, Guangdong Province, was then commander of the Dongjiang Column of the South China Anti-Japanese Column. 192

¹⁹⁰ Agnes Smedley (1894–1950), was a progressive American writer and journalist. She came to China at the end of 1928 as a special correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and took part in the progressive Chinese cultural movement in Shanghai. After the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan, she went to Yan'an as a reporter and helped provide medical care at the battle front. She died of illness in Britain in 1950. In accordance with her will, her ashes were buried in China. She wrote *The Great Road — the Life and Times of Zhu De* and other books. 194

¹⁹¹ Dong Biwu (1886–1975), a native of Huang'an (now Hong'an), Hubei Province, was then a member of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee and a member of the Chinese delegation to the United Nations charter conference in San Francisco. 194

¹⁹² Zhou Yang (1908–), a native of Yiyang, Hunan Province, was a theoretician on literature and art. He was president of the Lu Xun Academy of Art and Literature in Yan'an. He was invited by the U.S. Department of State in 1946 to give lectures in the United States, but was barred from going by the Kuomintang government. 194

¹⁹³ Liu Baiyu (1916–), a native of Beijing, was then correspondent of the *New China Daily*. 195

¹⁹⁴ Zhang Hanfu (1906–72), a native of Wujin, Jiangsu Province, was then deputy secretary of the Shanghai Working Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. He edited the weekly magazine *The Masses* and did preparatory work for the publication of the *New China Daily* in Nanjing. 195

¹⁹⁵ George Hatem, also known as Ma Haide (1910–), was born in America of a Lebanese family. In 1933, he came to Shanghai to practise medicine. In 1936, he arrived at the northern Shaanxi revolutionary base area and, in February 1937, joined the Chinese Communist Party. He then served as medical advisor to the Chinese Communist Party delegation at the Beiping Executive Headquarters

for Military Mediation. He became advisor to the Ministry of Public Health after the founding of the People's Republic of China. In 1950, he became a Chinese citizen. 195

¹⁹⁶ The Beiping Executive Headquarters for Military Mediation was formed under the cease-fire agreement signed by representatives of the Kuomintang government and the Chinese Communist Party on January 10, 1946. It consisted of one representative from the Kuomintang government, one from the Communist Party, and one nominated by the U.S. government. Within the headquarters were several field teams composed of staff members from the three sides, who were to mediate any military clashes and help ensure fulfilment of the cease-fire agreement. After its establishment, the United States continued to supply large quantities of ammunition and other *matériel* to the Kuomintang troops whom it helped transport for attacks on the Liberated Areas. In August 1946, the United States announced the failure of its "mediation" efforts and gave a free rein to the Kuomintang to unleash an all-out civil war. This meant the closing down of the Beiping Executive Headquarters. 195

¹⁹⁷ Evans Carlson was an American Marine officer. After the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan, he went to Yan'an as a military observer. 195

¹⁹⁸ Edgar Snow (1905–72), a progressive American writer and journalist, came to China in 1928. He visited the northern Shaanxi revolutionary base area in 1936. He died of illness in Switzerland in 1972. In accordance with his will, some of his ashes were buried in China. His works include *Red Star Over China*. 195

¹⁹⁹ Gunther Stein was an American journalist who visited Yan'an in 1944 as a member of the Chinese and foreign press corps visiting northwest China. 195

²⁰⁰ Harrison Forman was an American journalist who visited Yan'an in 1944 as a member of the Chinese and foreign press corps visiting northwest China. 195

²⁰¹ Israel Epstein (1915–) was an American journalist who visited Yan'an in 1944 as a member of the Chinese and foreign press corps visiting northwest China. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, he has worked for the magazine *China Reconstructs*, which was founded by Soong Ching Ling, and became its editor-in-chief in 1979. He became a Chinese citizen in 1957. His works included *From the Opium War to Liberation*. 195

²⁰² Joseph Stilwell (1883–1946), a career American army officer, was military attaché at the American embassy in China. After the outbreak of the Pacific war, he became commander of the U.S. troops in the China-Burma-India theatre and chief of staff of the war zone in China. He was recalled by the United States government in 1944 because of his differences with Chiang Kai-shek. He later became commander of Army ground forces of the United States in charge of training and, then, commander of the 10th Army. 195

²⁰³ Ding Ling (1904–86) was a native of Linli, Hunan Province, and a writer. She was then an alternate member on the Executive Committee of the Women's International Democratic Federation. Agnes Smedley once invited her to America to write there. 195

²⁰⁴ The conference held in Paris by the Executive Committee of the Women's International Democratic Federation from June 25 to July 1, 1946. The women's organization in China's Liberated Areas assigned Deng Yingchao to attend the conference, but she was prevented from going by the Kuomintang government. 195

²⁰⁵ Deng Yingchao (1904–), a native of Henan, was born in Nanning, Guangxi Province. At this time she was an alternate member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and a member of the Executive Committee of the Women's International Democratic Federation. 195

²⁰⁶ Gao Shuxun (1898–1972), a native of Yanshan, Hebei Province, and both deputy commander of the Kuomintang's 11th War Zone and commander of the New 8th Corps, rebelled along the civil war front in Handan, Hebei Province, and came over to our side with one corps and one column in October 1945. Later, these troops were reorganized as the Democratic National Construction Army with Gao as its commander-in-chief. The revolt had a great impact throughout the country. To intensify the work of dividing and fragmenting the Kuomintang troops and encouraging them to revolt, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party decided to start a propaganda campaign calling upon other Kuomintang officers and soldiers to follow the example of Gao Shuxun and his troops and come over to the side of the people. This was known as the Gao Shuxun movement. 196, 197

²⁰⁷ Cao Youcan (1901–70), a native of Hengshan in Shaanxi Province and commander of the Kuomintang's New 11th Brigade, rebelled with his troops in Anbian (now part of Dingbian County), Shaanxi Province, in October 1945. He then became commander of the New 11th Brigade of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. 197

²⁰⁸ Hao Pengju (1903–47), a native of Wenxiang (now Lingbao), Henan Province, was governor of Huaihai Province under the Wang Jingwei puppet regime as well as commander-in-chief of the Sixth Route Army during the War of Resistance Against Japan. After the war, the Kuomintang appointed him commander-in-chief of the New Sixth Route Army. In January 1946, he rebelled under the military pressure and political persuasion of the People's Liberation Army. In January 1947 when the Kuomintang troops launched attacks on the Shandong Liberated Area, he led his troops in defection, rejoining the Kuomintang. In February, the People's Liberation Army in east China attacked Hao's troops, destroying his headquarters and two divisions and capturing Hao. 197

²⁰⁹ Kong Congzhou (1906–), a native of Chang'an, Shaanxi Province, deputy commander of the Kuomintang's 38th Corps, rebelled with his troops at Gongxian County, Henan Province, in May 1946. Afterwards, he became commander of the 38th Army of the Northwest Democratic United Army. 197

²¹⁰ Pan Shuoduan (1901–78), a native of Weixin in Yunnan Province, and commander of the 184th Division of the Kuomintang's 60th Corps, revolted with his troops at Haicheng, Liaoning Province, in May 1946. Afterwards, he became commander of the First Army of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army. 197

²¹¹ Liu Shanben (1915–68), a native of Anqiu, Shandong Province, and staff officer of the Kuomintang Air Force with the rank of captain, defected in his plane in June 1946. He later became principal of the First Aviation School of the Air Force of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, deputy director of the Military Training Department of the Air Force and a member of the National Defence Council. 197, 286

²¹² Hu Jingduo (1914–77), a native of Fuping, Shaanxi Province, deputy commander of the Kuomintang Northern Shaanxi Peace Preservation Corps, rebelled with his troops at Hengshan, Shaanxi Province, in October 1946. He then became

commander of the 6th Cavalry Division of the Northwest Democratic United Army. 197

²¹³ This refers to the four big bureaucrat-comprador families: Chiang Kai-shek, Song Ziwen, Kong Xiangxi, and the Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu brothers. 197, 240, 267

²¹⁴ A cease-fire agreement was concluded on January 10, 1946 between representatives of the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang government. It stipulated that both sides' troops should cease military operations as of midnight, January 13. On the same day, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang government issued a cease-fire order to their respective troops. But, at the same time, Chiang Kai-shek covertly ordered the Kuomintang troops "to seize strategic points". He subsequently continued to manoeuvre his troops for attacks on the Liberated Areas. In June of the same year, he openly scrapped the cease-fire agreement and launched an all-out offensive on the Liberated Areas. 197, 200

²¹⁵ With the entire nation pressing for peace and democracy, Chiang Kai-shek was compelled to convene a political consultative conference in Chongqing in January 1946. Representatives of the Kuomintang, the Communist Party and other political parties and public figures participated. The conference lasted from January 10 to 31 and adopted five resolutions, namely, the Agreement on Government Organization, the Programme for Peace and National Reconstruction, the Agreement on the National Assembly, the Agreement on the Draft Constitution, and the Agreement on Military Affairs. Collectively, these were known as the "resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference". 197, 200

²¹⁶ Yuan Shikai (1859-1916) was a native of Xiangcheng, Henan Province. In the last years of the Qing Dynasty he was governor of Shandong Province, viceroy of Zhili Province and minister in charge of the northern coastal provinces. He became head of the northern warlords. When the 1911 Revolution broke out, he was premier of the Qing government. In 1912, supported by the imperialist powers of Britain, the United States and Japan, he usurped the provisional presidency of the Republic of China and organized the first government of the northern warlords, which represented the big landlord and comprador classes. In May 1914, he abrogated the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China and replaced it with the Constitution of the Republic of China, thus establishing his autocratic dictatorship. In May 1915, he accepted the Twenty-one Demands with which Japan aimed at subjugating China. In December, he proclaimed himself emperor. Nationwide opposition, however, forced him to abdicate in March 1916. 200, 240, 350, 387

²¹⁷ On February 10, 1946, people from about 20 mass organizations in Chongqing held a rally in Jiaochangkou Square to celebrate the success of the Political Consultative Conference. Kuomintang special agents harassed the participants, beating and injuring more than 60 persons, including the noted public figures Li Gongpu and Guo Moruo and a number of journalists. 201

²¹⁸ Gorlov is a battle front commander-in-chief in the Soviet play *The Front*. He is conservative, arrogant, and conceited. 208

²¹⁹ Directed by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, its Working Committee convened the National Land Conference in Xibaipo Village, Pingshan County, Hebei Province from July 17 to September 13, 1947. Liu Shaoqi, secretary of the Working Committee presided over the conference and delivered a

report and a concluding speech. Among the stipulations of the Outline Land Law of China it adopted were “abolition of the exploitative feudal and semi-feudal land system and its replacement with the system of land to the tillers”. 210, 234

²²⁰ The “May 4th Directive”, also known as the “Directive on the Land Question”, was issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on May 4, 1946. 211

²²¹ Check-up on land distribution refers to the mass movement launched after the land had been distributed in the Central Revolutionary Base Area in 1933. The purpose was to find out the landlords and rich peasants who had escaped being classified as such and to confiscate their land and property for distribution in accordance with the Land Law. To rectify the “Left” errors made in the movement, in October of the same year the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic issued “Decisions on Questions Concerning the Agrarian Struggle” and approved a document “How to Differentiate the Classes in the Rural Areas” written by Mao Zedong to establish criteria for determining class status in the rural areas. 212

²²² “On Coalition Government”, *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 1975, Vol. III, pp. 246–47. 213

²²³ Chen Geng (1903–61), a native of Xiangxiang, Hunan Province, was then commander of the Taiyue Army of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army. 215

²²⁴ Shimen was the old name of Shijiazhuang City, Hebei Province. 218

²²⁵ Nie refers to Nie Rongzhen who was then both commander and political commissar of the Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei Military Area. Liu, Huang and Luo refer to Liu Lantao, Huang Jing and Luo Ruiqing respectively, all deputy political commissars of the military area. 218

²²⁶ This refers to the telegram to the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee proposing the capturing of Shijiazhuang. 218

²²⁷ The captured officers were Luo Lirong and others. (See Note 234.) 218

²²⁸ Referring to Yang Dezhi, commander of the Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei Field Army, and Yang Chengwu, its second political commissar. 218

²²⁹ At the time, Li Wen was commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang’s 34th Group Army, and Yuan Pu was commander of the 16th Corps under Li, stationed near Baoding. 219

²³⁰ V. I. Lenin, “What Is To Be Done?” *Collected Works*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1978, Vol. V, p. 369. 270

²³¹ Calculated in the currency issued in the Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei border area. 226

²³² On August 23, 1945, our Hebei-Qahar troops recovered Zhangjiakou, a city of strategic importance in north China which had been occupied by Japanese and puppet troops. 228, 236

²³³ On November 1, 1947, acting in accordance with the plans for the Shijiazhuang campaign, the leaders of the Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei Field Army ordered the 2nd Column’s main forces to march, on the 6th, to the area south of Dingxian County, east of Xinle and on the north bank of the Shahe River. They were to take up defensive positions and build fortifications so as to prevent enemy forces from Baoding from reinforcing the troops in Shijiazhuang. Later, the enemy forces in Baoding didn’t dare go south to reinforce the Shijiazhuang troops and the city was captured by the People’s Liberation Army. 229

²³⁴ This refers to an important battle which took place in Qingfengdian, Dingxian County, Hebei Province, during the War of Liberation. The Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei Field Army's tactic was to "besiege a city to annihilate enemy reinforcements." On October 11, 1947, the main forces of the Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei Field Army and the local armed forces marched to north of Baoding for a converging attack on Xushui to lure the enemy's relief force. Then in the area between Xushui and Rongcheng a part of our army's main forces came face to face with the enemy's reinforcements coming down from the north. Chiang Kai-shek urgently ordered the main force of the Kuomintang's 3rd Corps, stationed in Shijiazhuang, to march north for a pincer attack on our army near Xushui. On the 18th, the Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei Field Army deployed four brigades to continue checking enemy reinforcements coming from the north while mustering six other brigades to march south at double speed, surrounding the enemy's reinforcements on the south front near Qingfengdian early on the 20th. On the 22nd, our army annihilated all these enemy troops, capturing Luo Lirong, commander of the 3rd Corps, and Yang Guangyu, the corp's deputy commander. Altogether, our army wiped out more than 21,000 enemy troops on both the south and north battlefields. This was our army's first major victory after its switch to strategic offensive on the Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei battlefield.

229, 234

²³⁵ This refers to the campaign launched by the Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei Field Army north of the Daqing River within the Beiping-Tianjin-Baoding triangle in September 1947.

231, 234

²³⁶ After the People's Liberation Army withdrew from Yan'an on March 19, 1947, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Ren Bishi, members of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, remained in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region directing the nationwide War of Liberation, while a Working Committee of the Central Committee was set up, its members including Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De of the Secretariat and some other Central Committee members, with Liu Shaoqi as the head. The Working Committee went to Xibaipo Village, Pingshan County, Hebei Province, to carry out Central Committee assignments. It concluded its work in May 1948, when the Central Committee and Mao Zedong arrived there.

234

²³⁷ See Note 234.

234

²³⁸ Yang Dezhi (1910-), a native of Zhuzhou, Hunan Province, was then commander of the Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei Field Army.

235

²³⁹ Zhang Yunyi (1892-1974), a native of Wenchang County, Guangdong Province, became deputy commander of the East China Military Area after the outbreak of the War of Liberation.

236, 238

²⁴⁰ This refers to the 1st, 4th and 6th Columns of the First Army of the East China Field Army. Su Yu was then the army's commander and political commissar, Ye Fei its deputy commander and Jin Ming its deputy political commissar.

237

²⁴¹ Deng Zihui (1896-1972), a native of Longyan, Fujian Province, remained in south China to continue the guerrilla warfare after the main force of the Red Army's First Front Army evacuated the Central Revolutionary Base Area for the Long March in 1934. He served as director of both the financial affairs and mass movement departments of the Military and Administrative Commission of Southwestern Fujian and later vice-chairman of the commission. After the outbreak of the War of Liberation, he served as deputy secretary of the East China Bureau of the Cen-

tral Committee of the Chinese Communist Party as well as deputy political commissar of the East China Military Area. 237

²⁴² Tan Zhenlin (1902–83), a native of Youxian County, Hunan Province, remained in south China to continue the guerrilla warfare after the main force of the Red Army's First Front Army evacuated the Central Revolutionary Base Area for the Long March in 1934. He served as director of the military affairs department of the Military and Administrative Commission of Southwestern Fujian and then vice-chairman of the commission. After the outbreak of the War of Liberation, he served as deputy political commissar of the East China Military Area. 237

²⁴³ Su Yu (1907–84) was a native of Huitong County, Hunan Province. Under orders of the Party Central Committee, he organized in January 1935 an assault division comprising units of the vanguard detachment of the Red Army to resist the Japanese invaders in the north. (These units had just effected a breakthrough.) This division moved to southern Zhejiang and the Fujian–Zhejiang border area to wage guerrilla warfare. Su Yu served as commander of the assault division of southern Zhejiang and commander of the Fujian–Zhejiang Military Area. After the outbreak of the War of Liberation, he served as deputy commander of the East China Military Area. 237, 253

²⁴⁴ Ye Fei (1914–), a native of Nan'an County, Fujian Province, remained in south China to continue the guerrilla warfare after the main force of the Red Army's First Front Army evacuated the Central Revolutionary Base Area for the Long March in 1934. He served as secretary of the Eastern Fujian Special Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and political commissar of the Eastern Fujian Independent Division. 237

²⁴⁵ Rao Shushi (1903–75), a native of Linchuan County, Jiangxi Province, was then secretary of the East China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party as well as political commissar of the East China Military Area. 238

²⁴⁶ Zhang Dingcheng (1898–1981) was from Yong'an County, Fujian Province. After the outbreak of the War of Liberation, he became commander of the Central China Military Area and member of the Standing Committee of the East China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party as well as director of the bureau's organization department. 238

²⁴⁷ The Kuomintang reactionaries held a bogus national assembly in Nanjing from March 29 to May 1, 1948, during which Chiang Kai-shek and Li Zongren were "elected" "president" and "vice-president", respectively. 240

²⁴⁸ The student movement against hunger, civil war and persecution broke out in many large and medium-sized cities in the Kuomintang areas in May and June 1947. On May 4, 1947, the Shanghai students demonstrated against civil war under slogans such as "We want food from gun muzzles!" This patriotic movement soon spread to many cities including Nanjing, Beiping, Hangzhou, Shenyang, Qingdao and Kaifeng. The Kuomintang reactionaries resorted to brutal measures to suppress it. On May 20, more than 100 students in Nanjing were wounded and more than 20 arrested. More than 50 students were wounded in Tianjin. This was the "Bloody May 20th Incident". Since then student strikes and demonstrations under the slogan "Against hunger, civil war and persecution" swiftly spread to more than 60 large and medium-sized cities, winning the sympathy and support of people from all walks of life. 240

²⁴⁹ The "three check-ups" constituted a movement for Party consolidation and

for ideological education in the army which was carried out by our Party in conjunction with agrarian reform during the War of Liberation. In local organizations, the “three check-ups” meant checking on class origin, ideology and style of work. In the armed units, the check-ups were on class origin, duty performance and fighting will. 242, 269

²⁵⁰ The Central China Field Army (which became the East China Field Army when merged with the Shandong Field Army in January 1947) won all seven battles it fought in central Jiangsu at the initial stage of the War of Liberation. In July 1946, 15 brigades of five reorganized Kuomintang divisions numbering 120,000 men launched a large-scale offensive against the liberated areas in central Jiangsu. The main force of the Central China Field Army, with about 30,000 men, used the tactic of advancing and withdrawing in big strides and concentrating a superior force to destroy the enemy one by one in the seven battles it fought between July 13 and August 27 in Rugao, Taixing, Hai'an and Shaobo and won every one of them, wiping out six enemy brigades and five battalions of the enemy's communications police corps, totalling 50,000 men. 244

²⁵¹ The “three-fierce tactics” are a fierce attack, charge and pursuit. Fierce attack means that we secretly approach the enemy as close as possible and concentrate our fire on the main targets. Fierce charge means that when the enemy is at a loss what to do and has no time to rush in reinforcements after we have launched a fierce attack, we charge him violently. Fierce pursuit means that we hotly pursue the enemy when he has been routed until he is completely wiped out. 245

²⁵² Fu Zuoyi (1895–1974), a native of Linyi County, Shanxi Province, was then commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang's North China “Bandit Suppression” Headquarters. In January 1949, he led his troops in accepting peaceful reorganization, thus making a contribution to the peaceful liberation of Beiping and Suiyuan Province. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he served as a member of the Central People's Government Council, vice-chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, vice-chairman of the National Defence Council, minister of water conservancy and later minister of water conservancy and electric power. 249

²⁵³ Hu Zongnan (1896–1962), a native of Xiaofeng County (now part of Anji County), Zhejiang Province, was then director of the Kuomintang's Xi'an Pacification Headquarters. 251

²⁵⁴ Wu Huawen (1904–62), a native of Yexian County, Shandong Province, was then commander of the Kuomintang's Reorganized 96th Corps. He joined the side of the people in September 1948 during the Jinan campaign. Then he served as commander of the 35th Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. 251

²⁵⁵ Qiu Qingquan (1902–49), a native of Yongjia County, Zhejiang Province, was then commander of the Kuomintang's Second Army. 251

²⁵⁶ Huang Botao (1900–48), a native of Meixian County, Guangdong Province, was born in Tianjin. At this time he was commander of the Kuomintang's Seventh Army. 251

²⁵⁷ Li Mi (1901–73), a native of Lianshan County (now part of Yingjiang County), Yunnan Province, was then commander of the Kuomintang's 13th Army. 251

²⁵⁸ The plan for defending “one triangle, four sides and thirteen points” was the tactic devised by the Kuomintang army in autumn 1948. To prevent the People's Liberation Army from advancing south, the Kuomintang amassed 65 reorganized

divisions (corps) with one million men in the Central China, East China and Henan-Shaanxi theatres to hold the triangle within Xuzhou, Hankou and Xi'an; the four sides, the outlines of a square formed by the entire length of the Longhai Railway, the Yanzhou-Pukou section of the Tianjin-Pukou Railway, the Beiping-Hankou Railway south of Zhengzhou and the Baoji-Chengdu Highway; and the 13 strong-points of Kaifeng, Zhengzhou, Jinan, Shangqiu, Nanyang, Xiangfan, Queshan, Xinyang, Hanzhong, Ankang, Zhongxiang, Yichang and Hefei. 252

²⁵⁹ All these were Chiang Kai-shek's own troops stationed in and around Beiping and Tianjin. 253

²⁶⁰ Peng Dehuai (1898-1974), a native of Xiangtan County, Hunan Province, was then commander and political commissar of the Northwest Field Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. 253

²⁶¹ Peng Shaohui (1906-78), a native of Xiangtan County, Hunan Province, was then commander of the 7th Column of the Northwest Field Army. 253

²⁶² Referring to Xu Shiyu (1906-85), a native of Xinxian County, Henan Province, who was then commander of the Shandong Army of the East China Field Army; and Tan Zhenlin (1902-83), a native of Youxian County, Hunan Province, who was then political commissar of the Shandong Army of the East China Field Army. (See Note 242.) 253

²⁶³ This refers to the Huai-Hai campaign fought against the Kuomintang army from November 6, 1948 to January 10, 1949 by the East China and Central Plains Field Armies of the Chinese People's Liberation Army over a vast territory centring on Xuzhou and extending as far as Haizhou in the east, Shangqiu in the west, Lincheng (now Xuecheng) in the north and the Huaihe River in the south. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party formed a General Front Committee consisting of Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yi, Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin, with Deng Xiaoping as secretary, to direct all military operations on the Huai-Hai front. During this campaign, enemy army commanders Huang Botao and Qiu Qingquan were killed. Du Yuming, deputy commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang's "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters at Xuzhou, army commander Huang Wei and deputy army commander Wu Shaozhou were captured. A total of 550,000 enemy troops were put out of action, and a vast area north of the middle and lower reaches of the Changjiang River was liberated. Chiang Kai-shek lost all his crack forces, while such centres of reactionary rule as Nanjing, Shanghai and Wuhan were exposed to the direct threat from our army. 255

²⁶⁴ The Beiping-Tianjin campaign was fought against the Kuomintang army from November 29, 1948 to January 31, 1949 by the Northeast Field Army and two armies of the North China Field Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army over an area extending from Zhangjiakou in the west to Tanggu and Tangshan in the east, encompassing Beijing and Tianjin. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party formed a General Front Committee consisting of Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan and Nie Rongzhen to direct all military operations on the Beiping-Tianjin front. During this campaign, the enemy forces in Xinbao'an, Zhangjiakou and Tianjin were put out of action and Chen Changjie, commander of the Tianjin Garrison Headquarters, was captured. Owing to our efforts to win them over and through negotiations, the defending enemy forces in Beiping, commanded by Fu Zuoyi, commander-in-chief of the enemy's North China "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters, accepted reorganization by our army, and Beiping was liberated peacefully. During this campaign, over 520,000 enemy troops were put out of action or reorganized, and north China was largely liberated. 255

²⁶⁵ Referring to Liu Bocheng (1892–), a native of Kaixian County, Sichuan Province, who was then commander of the Central Plains Field Army and of the Central Plains Military Area; and Deng Xiaoping (1904–), a native of Guang'an County, Sichuan Province, who was then political commissar of the Central Plains Field Army and of the Central Plains Military Area. 255

²⁶⁶ More than 600,000 People's Liberation Army troops took part in the Huai-Hai campaign. In the first stage, the Kuomintang deployed about 600,000 troops from the "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters at Xuzhou, just under the strength of the People's Liberation Army. Later, Chiang Kai-shek mustered reinforcements from other areas to save the critical military situation in Xuzhou. So, altogether he deployed more than 800,000 troops. 255

²⁶⁷ This is a unit for calculating the amount of ammunition needed for various kinds of weapons. 255

²⁶⁸ Liu Zhi (1892–1971), a native of Ji'an County, Jiangxi Province, was then commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang's "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters at Xuzhou. 255

²⁶⁹ Bai Chongxi (1893–1966), a native of Guilin, Guangxi Province, belonged to the Kuomintang's Guangxi warlord clique and was then commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang's Central China "Bandit Suppression" Headquarters. 255

²⁷⁰ This refers to the revolt launched by He Jifeng and Zhang Kexia (underground Communist Party members), both of whom were deputy commanders of the Kuomintang's Third Pacification Zone under Feng Zhi'an, in the Jiawang sector northeast of Xuzhou on November 8, 1948. 255

²⁷¹ Referring to Sun Yuanliang (1904–), a native of Huayang County (now part of Chengdu), Sichuan Province, who was then commander of the Kuomintang's 16th Army. 255

²⁷² Huang Wei (1904–), a native of Guixi County, Jiangxi Province, was then commander of the Kuomintang's 12th Army. He was captured by the People's Liberation Army in December 1948 during the Huai-Hai campaign. Since he was granted special pardon in 1975, he has served on the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and in other posts. 255

²⁷³ Li Yannian (1904–74), a native of Guangrao County, Shandong Province, was then commander of the Kuomintang's Sixth Army. 256

²⁷⁴ Liu Ruming (1895–1975), a native of Xianxian County, Hebei Province, was then commander of the Kuomintang's Eighth Army. 256

²⁷⁵ Yan Xishan (1883–1960), a native of Wutai County, Shanxi Province, was a local warlord in that province then serving as director of the Kuomintang's Pacification Headquarters in Taiyuan. 256

²⁷⁶ Ma Hongkui (1892–1970), a native of Linxia County, Gansu Province, was then Kuomintang governor of Ningxia Province and deputy director of the Kuomintang's Northwest Military and Administrative Commissioner's Office. 257

²⁷⁷ Ma Bufang (1903–75), a native of Linxia County, Gansu Province, was then Kuomintang governor of Qinghai Province and deputy director of the Kuomintang's Northwest Military and Administrative Commissioner's Office. 257

²⁷⁸ This movement was carried out by the Chinese Communist Party in conjunction with the agrarian reform during the War of Liberation. The main goals of the movement were for commanders and soldiers to study Party policies, to conduct

class education by pouring out grievances and by the “three check-ups” (on class origin, duty performance and fighting will), to develop political, economic and military democracy and to unfold a training campaign of a mass character. 269

²⁷⁹ The Sixth All-China Labour Congress was held in Harbin from August 1 to 22, 1948. It urged workers throughout the country to unite closely with the rest of the people and support vigorously the People’s Liberation Army to accelerate the historical mission of overthrowing the reactionary Kuomintang rule and establishing a new China. It adopted the “Resolution on the Current Task of China’s Labour Movement” and decided to re-establish the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the unified national organization of the Chinese working class. The previous five All-China Labour Congresses were held in 1922, 1925, 1926, 1927 and 1929, respectively. 271

²⁸⁰ “Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China”, *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 1975, Vol. IV, p. 366. 272

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 368. 273

²⁸² The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference is an organization of the people’s democratic united front under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Its Preparatory Committee met in Beiping in June 1949. In September of the same year, it held its First Plenary Session at which, exercising the functions and powers of a national people’s congress, it enacted the Common Programme of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the Organic Law of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and the Organic Law of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, elected the Central People’s Government Council and proclaimed the founding of the People’s Republic of China. With the convocation of the First Session of the First National People’s Congress in September 1954, the CPPCC ceased to exercise the functions and powers of a national people’s congress. However, it has continued to play an important role in China’s political life as an organization of the people’s democratic united front. 277

²⁸³ This refers to the Common Programme of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference adopted at the First Plenary Session of the CPPCC, on September 29, 1949. It was a programme for building the country under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and was enacted by representatives of all democratic parties and groups, people’s organizations and people of all walks of life and nationalities. It laid down the common goals which the Chinese people would strive to attain within a definite period and which formed the political basis of united action. It served as a provisional constitution until the promulgation of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China in 1954. 277

²⁸⁴ Guantai section of the Huanghe River dyke was then a dangerous section near Guantai Village in Fengqiu County, Henan Province. It was in the charge of the Fengqiu County maintenance section. 281

²⁸⁵ Issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on November 9, 1949, this decision stipulated that the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection would be under the leadership of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. Zhu De served as secretary of the commission. 288

²⁸⁶ V. I. Lenin, “*Left-Wing*” *Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 1975, p. 6. 289

²⁸⁷ Mao Zedong, *On the New Stage*, Chin. ed., Northeast Bookstore, 1947, p. 103. 289

²⁸⁸ This session was held by the Seventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in Xibaipo Village, Pingshan County, Hebei Province, from March 5 through 13, 1949. Mao Zedong delivered a report at the session. The session discussed such topics as total defeat of the Kuomintang regime to achieve nationwide victory, the shift in emphasis in Party work from the countryside to the city and the necessity of making production and construction the central tasks. In particular, it analysed the situation in different sectors of China's economy and what policies the Party ought to adopt. It determined the general tasks and main course for transforming China from an agricultural into an industrial country and from a new-democratic into a socialist society after victory was achieved. The entire Party was called upon to remain modest, prudent and free from arrogance and rashness in work and to preserve the style of plain living and hard struggle after victory was won. 290

²⁸⁹ "Rites of Sacrifice", *Book of Rites*. 292

²⁹⁰ This refers to the "Directive of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Conducting a Rectification Movement Throughout the Party and Army" issued on May 1, 1950. It was pointed out in the directive that after the nationwide victory, there was a great increase in Party members, many of whom were weak in ideology, whereas many veteran Party members had become conceited and prone to commandism. A small number of them had even become corrupt and degenerate and violated discipline and the law. The entire Party and army were required to carry out a rectification movement by studying selected documents and making criticism and self-criticism in conjunction with the summing-up of work in order to rectify the style of work of the Party membership in general and of the cadres in particular. 295

²⁹¹ Immediately after the outbreak of a civil war in Korea on June 25, 1950, the U.S. imperialists sent troops to intervene in Korea's internal affairs. At the same time, they dispatched troops to invade China's territory of Taiwan. On September 15, under the banner of United Nations Forces, they had their troops land at Inchon on the west coast of Korea. Then they crossed the 38th Parallel *en masse* and pushed northwards, bombing and strafing the frontier cities and villages of northeast China and thus presenting a serious threat to China's security. To support the Korean people in their war of resistance against U.S. aggression and for national salvation and to defend the newly-born China, the Chinese people, in response to Chairman Mao Zedong's call to resist U.S. aggression, aid Korea and safeguard the homeland, organized the Chinese People's Volunteers with Peng Dehuai as commander and concurrently political commissar. The Volunteers arrived at the Korean battlefield on October 25 and fought shoulder to shoulder with the Korean People's Army against the U.S. aggressors. On November 4, China's democratic parties issued a joint declaration expressing firm support for the Volunteers' just action. The people of China gave all-out support to the war effort in Korea by increasing production and practising economy, signing up for the Volunteers and donating arms. Under the heavy blows by the Chinese and Korean people's armies, the U.S. imperialists suffered one defeat after another and finally had to sign the Korean Armistice Agreement on July 27, 1953. The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea waged by the Chinese people thus achieved a great victory. 310, 314, 320

²⁹² Mao Zedong dealt with the Party's general line for the transition period on several occasions in 1952 and 1953. This quotation represents the final version of the general line published in a summary for study and publicity under the title "Mobilize All Forces and Strive to Build China into a Great Socialist Country". This summary was approved by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist

Party in December 1953 and distributed by its Propaganda Department. 318

²⁹³ The agrarian reform here refers to the revolutionary movement to abolish feudal landownership and bring about peasant landownership, which was conducted by the peasants under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in the early days of the People's Republic. In June 1950, the Central People's Government promulgated the Agrarian Reform Law of the People's Republic of China. Beginning with the winter of the same year, agrarian reform movements were launched successively in the newly liberated areas. By winter 1952 agrarian reform was basically completed throughout the country, except in Taiwan Province and some minority nationality areas. About 300 million landless or land-poor peasants received some 700 million mu (one mu is 1/15 hectare) of land and other means of production. 320

²⁹⁴ The movement to suppress counter-revolutionaries was launched throughout China from 1950 through 1953. In the early years of the People's Republic, there were still many bandits, local tyrants, secret agents of the U.S. imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek, hard-core Kuomintang reactionaries and other counter-revolutionaries. They engaged in all kinds of sabotage against the people's revolutionary and constructive programmes. In order to establish and consolidate revolutionary order, the movement to suppress counter-revolutionaries was unfolded throughout the country in accordance with the "Directive on Suppressing Counter-Revolutionary Activities" issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and with the "Regulations of the People's Republic of China Regarding Punishment of Counter-Revolutionaries" promulgated by the Central People's Government. This movement dealt a severe blow to the remaining counter-revolutionary forces and consolidated the people's democratic dictatorship. 320

²⁹⁵ The Party consolidation movement was conducted from 1951 through 1954 in accordance with the "Resolution on Consolidating Party Organizations at the Grass-roots Level" adopted by the First National Conference on Organizational Work, convened by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in March and April of 1951. The resolution pointed out that, to unite with and lead the Chinese people in fulfilling the new historical task, it was necessary to consolidate all Party organizations at the grass roots by educating Party comrades in the eight requirements for Party membership, and thereby overcoming certain weaknesses found in the organization and ideology of the Party. 320

²⁹⁶ The movement against the "three evils", namely, corruption, waste and bureaucratism, was carried out from late 1951 to October 1952 in government departments, army units and state-owned enterprises. 320, 372

²⁹⁷ The movement against the "five evils", namely, bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts and stealing economic information, was launched in 1952 in China's capitalist industrial and commercial enterprises. 320

²⁹⁸ The "five excesses" consisted of excess of assignments, of meetings and training courses, of documents, written reports and statistical forms, of organizations and of part-time work for activists. 321

²⁹⁹ Calculated in Renminbi in circulation at this time. The People's Bank of China issued a new Renminbi on March 1, 1955 to replace the old one, one yuan equalling 10,000 yuan of the latter. 325, 338

³⁰⁰ Its task was to train regimental and divisional commanders of combined arms units. 330

³⁰¹ Dealing with the basic posture, aims of operations and actions to be taken

by imaginery belligerents, scenario is a paper on the organization and guidance of campaigns and tactical exercises. It is drawn up according to the subjects and aim of training and the organizations and operational characteristics of the belligerents and in conjunction with the actual terrain. 330

³⁰² Green Battalion troops, also known as Green Banner troops, belonged to the standing army of the Qing Dynasty, which was patterned on the troop structure of the preceding Ming Dynasty. It was called Green Battalion because the standard of the troops composed of Han people was green in colour. 349

³⁰³ Patrol Battalions were provincial troops in the last years of the Qing Dynasty. 349, 386

³⁰⁴ Sun Yat-sen, "Moral Education of the Servicemen", a lecture given in Guilin of Guangxi on December 10, 1921. 350

³⁰⁵ This refers to the joint letter of November 29, 1923 to Dr. Sun Yat-sen from Deng Zeru (who was then member of the provisional central executive committee of the Kuomintang and head of its Guangdong provincial branch), Lin Zhimian and nine other Kuomintang right-wingers, in which they opposed reorganizing the Kuomintang and wantonly slandered the Chinese Communist Party. Dr. Sun repudiated their views in his comment on the letter made on December 3. 350

³⁰⁶ This was a general term referring to the hereditary official post the feudal courts of the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties conferred upon the headmen of minority nationalities inhabiting southwest and northwest China. The *tusi* were required to pay assigned tribute and deliver requisitioned supplies and manpower to the central authorities while maintaining the traditional rule and authority within their jurisdiction. Under the Kuomintang regime the *tusi* system survived in certain areas. It was abolished with the introduction of democratic reform after Liberation. 358

³⁰⁷ Wang Jingwei (1883-1944), whose family was originally from Shanyin (now Shaoxing), Zhejiang Province, was born in Panyu County, Guangdong Province. He joined the *Tong Meng Hui* (Chinese Revolutionary League) in his youth and, in 1925, became president of the Guangzhou National Government. On July 15, 1927 he launched a counter-revolutionary coup in Wuhan. After the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan in 1937, he served as deputy director-general of the Kuomintang. At the end of 1938 he surrendered to Japanese imperialism and later became chairman of the puppet government in Nanjing. 360, 399

³⁰⁸ Held by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in Hankou on August 7, 1927, this emergency meeting analysed the failure of the First Revolutionary Civil War, ended the rule of Chen Duxiu's Right capitulationism in the Central Committee, laid down the general principles of the agrarian revolution and armed resistance to the reactionary Kuomintang rule and made mobilization of the peasants for the Autumn Harvest Uprising the Party's most important task at the time. 361

³⁰⁹ The gist of this article reads: "Roads of various kinds suited to local means of transport should gradually be built by relying on the efforts of the masses, in accordance with growing local requirements for transport services and the principles of realistic consideration of actual conditions, suitability to local circumstances, use of local materials, economy and practicality in use, and no waste of land. At the same time, all roads must be well maintained. Special attention must be paid to road construction in the mountainous areas." 366

³¹⁰ The Eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held in

Beijing from September 15 to 27, 1956. It analysed the situation following the basic completion of the socialist transformation of the private ownership of the means of production and laid down the task of the all-round construction of socialism. At the congress, Mao Zedong made an opening address, Liu Shaoqi delivered the political report of the Central Committee, Zhou Enlai gave the "Report on the Proposals for the Second Five-Year Plan for Development of the National Economy" and Deng Xiaoping gave the "Report on the Revision of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China". Other important speeches included those by Zhu De, Chen Yun and Dong Biwu. The congress adopted a resolution on the political report, the Constitution of the Communist Party of China and the proposals for the Second Five-Year Plan (1958-62), and elected a new Central Committee. The Eighth National Congress of the Party defined a correct line pointing out the direction for the development of the socialist cause and for Party building in the new period.

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³¹¹ On April 14, 1961, Hu Qiaomu, alternate member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, submitted a report to Chairman Mao Zedong on his investigation into the question of public canteens. He said, "Judging from people's reaction, most canteens have virtually become an obstacle to the development of production and have adversely affected the relationship between the Party and the masses. Therefore, the sooner the problem is solved, the better." On April 26, the Central Committee had this report circulated on Mao Zedong's instruction.

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³¹² This refers to capitalist Britain's war of aggression against China from 1840 to 1842. Beginning with the end of the 18th century, Britain smuggled great quantities of opium into China. This not only subjected the Chinese people to drug addiction but also massively plundered China's silver reserves. At the end of 1838, the Qing government sent Lin Zexu as an imperial commissioner to Guangzhou to ban opium-smoking and the opium trade. In June 1839, Lin Zexu ordered the public burning of more than 1.15 million kilogrammes of opium confiscated from British and American merchants engaged in illegal activities. In 1840, under the pretext of safeguarding its trade with China, Britain attacked China. The Qing government vacillated and made compromises during the war. Only the people and a part of the Chinese troops rose in resistance. The British army harassed and invaded Guangdong, Fujian and the coastal areas of Zhejiang. Moreover, it occupied Wusong, pushed towards the Changjiang River and threatened Nanjing. The Qing government was forced to sign the humiliating "Treaty of Nanjing" in August 1842. After that, China gradually became a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country.

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³¹³ "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 1975, Vol. IV. p. 412.

382

³¹⁴ The bourgeois Reform Movement of 1898 took place at a time when China was faced with partitioning by the imperialist powers. Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Tan Sitong and others, with the support of Emperor Guang Xu, tried to avert the national crisis through such reforms from above as the gradual institution of a constitutional monarchy with joint rule by the landlord class and the bourgeoisie, and the development of national capitalism. But this movement lacked popular support and was strongly opposed by diehards with Empress Dowager Ci Xi at their head. Three months or more after the Reform Movement began, the Empress Dowager staged a coup and had Emperor Guang Xu placed under house arrest

and Tan Sitong and five others beheaded. Thus the movement ended in defeat.

³¹⁵ “General Programme of the *Tong Meng Hui* (Chinese Revolutionary League)”, *Collected Works of Sun Yat-sen*, Chin. ed., Zhonghua Book Company, 1981, Vol. I, p. 284.

³¹⁶ The reference is to the Kunming-Hekou section within Yunnan Province. Connected to the railways of Viet Nam, it was built by France at the beginning of this century in an attempt to expand its sphere of influence in southwest China.

³¹⁷ An integral part of China from ancient times, Pianma is located on the west side of the Gaoligong Mountains in Lushui County, Yunnan Province. In 1911, the British army stationed in Burma seized Pianma and the neighbouring Gulang and Gangfang, attempting to occupy this area for ever. In 1961, it was returned to China by the Government of the Union of Burma under the “Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Burma on the Boundary Question Between the Two Countries”.

³¹⁸ Now Tengchong County, Yunnan Province.

³¹⁹ Huang Xing (1874–1916), a native of Shanhua (now Changsha County), Hunan Province, organized in 1904 the *Hua Xing Hui* (Society for China’s Regeneration), an anti-Qing revolutionary group. In 1905, members of the revolutionary groups such as the *Hua Xing Hui* and the *Xing Zhong Hui* (Society for China’s Revival) jointly organized the *Tong Meng Hui* (Chinese Revolutionary League) in Tokyo, with Huang Xing as administrative director of its executive department. He took part in many armed uprisings launched by the *Tong Meng Hui* and served as one of the leaders. After the Wuchang Uprising in 1911, he became wartime commander-in-chief of the military government and commander-in-chief of the Army of the Nanjing Provisional Government. In 1913 he was made commander-in-chief of the Jiangsu punitive troops against Yuan Shikai.

³²⁰ This refers to the uprising launched in April 1908 at Hekou, Yunnan Province, by Huang Mingtang, member of the *Tong Meng Hui*, and others. The insurrectionary troops quickly occupied the town of Hekou because the Qing government soldiers stationed there rebelled and crossed over one after another. In May, Huang Xing was appointed commander-in-chief of the National Army of Yunnan by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and went to Hekou to assume command of the insurrectionary troops there. But the uprising soon failed because of a siege by several Qing military units and a mutiny by those who had surrendered earlier.

³²¹ Yang Qiufan, also known as Yang Zhenhong (1874–1909), was a native of Kunming, Yunnan Province, and a member of the *Tong Meng Hui*. He helped found the magazine *Yunnan* and some other publications and took an active part in revolutionary propaganda.

³²² An uprising against the Qing regime which was planned by Yang Qiufan and others for December 1908 in Yongchang, Yunnan Province.

³²³ Lin’an, now Jianshui County, Yunnan Province.

³²⁴ Duan Fang (1861–1911), a Qing official charged with the building of the Guangzhou-Hankou and Chengdu-Hankou railways, led troops into Sichuan to suppress the popular movement for safeguarding railway rights.

³²⁵ Now Yibin City, Sichuan Province.

³³⁴ Sun Yat-sen, "Cables to Tian Tong in Hankou, Ju Zheng in Shandong and Zhu Zhixin in Hongkong" (May 23, 1916). 388

³³⁵ Duan Qirui (1865-1936), a native of Hefei, Anhui Province, was head of the Anhui clique of northern warlords. After Yuan Shikai usurped the post of provisional president of the Republic of China in 1912, Duan was appointed commander-in-chief of the Army. From 1916, when Yuan Shikai died, to 1926, he served as premier and provisional chief executive of the Republic and more than once controlled the Beijing government. He cruelly oppressed the people and pursued a traitorous and capitulationist policy in foreign affairs. 389

³³⁶ This reference is to the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China issued in the name of the Provisional President Sun Yat-sen on March 11, 1912. It was modelled on the constitution of a bourgeois republic and was abolished by Yuan Shikai in May 1914. 389

³³⁷ The Military Government to Uphold the Provisional Constitution was organized in 1917 by Dr. Sun Yat-sen with the southwestern warlords in the movement to uphold the Provisional Constitution. In August and September of that year, some members of parliament convened an extraordinary session of it in Guangzhou and established a military government. Sun Yat-sen was elected its generalissimo and Tang Jiyao and Lu Rongting its marshals. In May of the following year, the southwestern warlords compromised with the northern warlords and the extraordinary parliament reorganized the generalissimo system into an institution administered by a seven-member directorate. Later Cen Chunxuan became the director-general. Sun Yat-sen, now pushed out of the supreme post, had to leave Guangdong for Shanghai. Thenceforth, the Military Government to Protect the Provisional Constitution came under the complete control of the warlords and bureaucrats. 389

³³⁸ "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 1975, Vol. IV, pp. 421 and 422. 389

³³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 413. 390

³⁴⁰ Wang Ming's "Left" line is a reference to the error of "Left" adventurism represented by the dogmatist Wang Ming during the period of the Second Revolutionary Civil War. With the support of the Communist International and its representative Pavel Mif, Wang Ming and his followers gained the leading positions in the Central Committee at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Party's Sixth Central Committee held in January 1931. Politically, they blurred the distinction between democratic revolution and socialist revolution and placed the struggle against the bourgeoisie on a par with the struggle against imperialism and feudalism. They ignored the marked change in China's class relations after the September 18th Incident of 1931 (Japan's invasion of northeast China) and regarded the intermediate forces as "the most dangerous enemy". They continued to advocate the "theory of making cities the centre of the Chinese revolution" and held that the Red Army should seize key cities in order to achieve victory first in one or more provinces which would then add up to nationwide victory. Militarily, they first practised adventurism and, later, lapsed into flightism and the doctrine of holding onto what territory they had. Organizationally, they practised sectarianism and followed a policy of "ruthless struggle and merciless blows" against those who disagreed with their erroneous views. The "Left" adventurism of Wang Ming dominated the Party for four years and brought heavy losses to the Party and to the revolutionary cause in general. In January 1935, the Political Bureau of the Party Central Com-

mittee held a meeting in Zunyi, Guizhou Province, which established the leading position of Mao Zedong in the Red Army and the Central Committee, thus ending the domination of Wang Ming's "Left" adventurist line in the Party's central leading organs. 393

³⁴¹ The Third National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Guangzhou from June 12 to 20, 1923. Its discussions focused on forming a revolutionary united front with the Kuomintang led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The congress correctly assessed Sun Yat-sen's democratic stand against imperialism and feudal warlords and the possibility of transforming the Kuomintang into a revolutionary alliance of the workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie, criticized the "Left" viewpoint of distrusting Kuomintang-Communist co-operation and the Right viewpoint that "all work should be led by the Kuomintang", and decided that part of the Communists should join the Kuomintang in a personal capacity while maintaining the political and organizational independence of the Communist Party. The congress laid the groundwork for Kuomintang-Communist co-operation in conducting the First Revolutionary Civil War. 398

³⁴² Comintern, or the Third International, was established in March 1919. It was an organization uniting the Communist Parties of different countries. The Chinese Communist Party became one of its affiliates in 1922. In May 1943, the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International decided to dissolve the International, and its dissolution was proclaimed in June of the same year. 398

³⁴³ In early 1926, the National Revolutionary Army had six component armies. By July 1926, when it set out on the Northern Expedition, it had eight. 398

³⁴⁴ Huang Shaohong (1895-1966) was a native of Rongxian County in Guangxi. He was then the Kuomintang governor of Guangxi as well as deputy commander-in-chief of its Eighth Route Army. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he served as member of the Government Administration Council. 401

³⁴⁵ *Mencius*, Book I, "King Hui of Liang", Part I. 402

³⁴⁶ Gong Chu (1901-), a native of Lechang, Guangdong Province, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925 but broke with the revolutionary ranks in May 1935 and then became a renegade. 402

³⁴⁷ Cheng Qian (1882-1968) was a native of Liling, Hunan Province. From 1924 to 1927 he served as commander-in-chief of the army attacking Hubei, and commander of the Sixth Army and commander-in-chief of the Fourth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army. 402

³⁴⁸ After Chiang Kai-shek staged the counter-revolutionary coup in Shanghai on April 12, 1927, the reactionary military officers in Hunan and Hubei betrayed the revolution. Instigated by He Jian, commander of the 35th Army, Xu Kexiang, who was commander of the Kuomintang's 33rd Independent Regiment in Changsha, staged a counter-revolutionary coup on May 21. He ordered a raid on the Hunan provincial headquarters of the trade unions, the peasant associations and other revolutionary mass organizations, arresting and massacring Communists and revolutionary workers and peasants. 403

³⁴⁹ Yang Chisheng (1891-1962), a native of Shiping, Yunnan Province, was then commander of the 9th Division of the Kuomintang's Third Army. 405

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