RACE TO POWER
THE STRUGGLE FOR
SOUTHERN AFRICA
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The Struggle for Southern Africa

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Published by the Africa Research Group, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
This book was written with the memory that popular ignorance about the Vietnam situation once allowed massive government commitments to go unchallenged until it was too late. We have written this in the hope that Americans will never have to say “It was a mistake to get involved in Southern Africa in the first place, but now that we are there...”

The war in Indochina was the world’s major conflict in the 1960’s. The growing crisis throughout Southern Africa may come to claim that distinction for the 1970’s. Continued White minority domination of that region rigidly confronts the struggles of oppressed African peoples to regain control over their lives and homelands.

This book is about power relationships in Southern Africa. It therefore focuses on those who have power — how they got it, how they use it, and how they hope to preserve it. Such an approach necessarily excludes a systematic cultural and political history of African peoples and their traditional states in Southern Africa.

Part I is a survey of life under apartheid and colonialism in Southern Africa. We have described the most obvious social, political, and economic effects of these two systems. The more intangible psychological and cultural destruction inflicted on Africans is a story best told by Africans themselves.

It is not possible to fully understand Southern Africa by looking only at each country or territory separately. The Republic of South Africa is the most widely-known stronghold of White power in Africa. Yet it is not the only white supremacist state in Southern Africa; nor does the power struggle end at its borders. Part II examines the regionalization of conflict, illustrating the relations between the struggles in each part of Southern Africa and the particular role of South Africa in the process of regionalization.

This section also views Southern Africa in a larger continental and global perspective. The role of foreign interests, both private and governmental, is considered in light of the changing political scene in Southern Africa. We have examined many of the issues which confront policy makers and raised questions about how policy is made. We do not know all the answers, but we have tried to ask the right questions. What is the basis of African nationalist assertions that white minority domination is perpetuated by support from the United States, Britain, Japan, and other powerful countries? What is at stake for these countries if conflict in Southern Africa assumes the proportions of another Vietnam?
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PART ONE: THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA
CHAPTER ONE

SOUTH AFRICA:
LIFE UNDER APARTHEID

At one time or another, most Americans have heard or read about South Africa and its policy of apartheid, or complete separation of the races. The word apartheid (pronounced apart-hate) comes from the Afrikaans language spoken by the descendants of the Dutch settlers in South Africa. It literally means separation. The system of apartheid determines the conditions of life in South Africa. It has to be the starting point for any discussion of that country.

Today this system has become too complex to describe in full detail; this chapter is only an introduction to the conditions of life in South Africa. It traces the gradual development of White control of both the country and its Black majority.

Separation of the races was enforced by Whites from the earliest encounters between Africans and Europeans, but it became more and more rigidly defined as the economy grew in prosperity and the population grew in size. Europeans conquered and enslaved the first Africans they met on their arrival in South Africa. Later, Whites were able to mine the country's minerals profitably only by forcing large numbers of Africans to work for low wages. The system of requiring Africans to live in areas where they could support themselves only by working for Whites became even more highly refined with the development of industry in South Africa and the subsequent need for a large unskilled or semi-skilled labor force.

Largely because of superior weapons, Europeans won the continual wars against Africans which died down only in the 20th century. But although White domination of Blacks was a centuries-old fact, there were only a few laws to define apartheid until 1948. In that year, the Whites elected the Nationalist Party to govern the country on a platform of White superiority. Legislation passed by that government made apartheid a legal system. The Nationalist government has passed more discriminatory legislation in the last several years. Today White control is the most complete it has ever been.

The system of apartheid now defined by South African law was created and passed only by Whites. Africans have no representation in the South African Parliament and have never been consulted about making separation of the races into the legal policy described in this chapter.
I. What is Apartheid?

Apartheid starts from the premise that people of different races should be kept apart. In South Africa, every person is classified by race—that is, by the color of his or her skin. The different racial groups are segregated from each other as much as possible. These two facts are the cornerstones of apartheid as a legal system.

A. Race Classification

Skin color governs every single aspect of life in South Africa: where people live, what employment they may seek, where they can travel, what political rights they have, who can attend school, who can own property, whom they can marry, where they may be buried. Whites have the most rights and privileges. Africans have the least.

Final authority to decide a person’s race rests with the government-appointed Race Classification Board which is made up only of Whites. The classification is sometimes quite arbitrary, relying mostly on ‘looks’ and heritage. A brother may be classified as a Colored, for example, while his sister is classified as an African. Under apartheid laws they would not be allowed to associate with each other or live in the same house. Enforcement of racial separation is rigid even to the point of breaking up families.

B. Geographical Segregation: The Group Areas Policy

The physical separation of people of different races is the most observable fact of life in South Africa. It applies to the country’s land as well as its people.

Legislation introduced by the Nationalist Government in 1950 divided the entire country into areas for Whites and separate areas for Africans called “Reserves” or “Bantustans”. This term gets its title from the word Bantu which is actually the name of the family of languages spoken by Africans in Southern and Eastern Africa. The South African government refers to all Blacks in South Africa as Bantu, or Natives; it calls the areas reserved for them Bantustans. Most Africans, however, despise being called “Bantu” and would rather be known as “Blacks” or “Africans”, terms which acknowledge their race, their history, or their claim to land.

Although Africans are 70 per cent of the population, only 13 per cent of the land of South Africa has been “reserved” for them. These Reserves contain few industries and no important sources of employment. The land, from which most of the reserve inhabitants derive their income, is very poor—eroded in most parts, desert in others. The areas of the country reserved for Whites include all the large cities, the seaports and airfields, the gold, diamond, and other mineral mines. There is no land set aside for Indians and Coloreds.

The South African government recognizes four main racial groups:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africans — persons of African descent</td>
<td>15 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites — persons of European descent</td>
<td>4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloreds — persons of racially mixed descent</td>
<td>2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asians — persons of Asian (mostly Indian) descent</td>
<td>½ million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White (Europeans)</th>
<th>Black (Africans)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per capita income (1968)</td>
<td>$3,144.00</td>
<td>$117.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average wage in mining (1968)</td>
<td>4,740.00</td>
<td>$285.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ages subject to tax</td>
<td>21-60</td>
<td>18-65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income exempt from tax</td>
<td>$840</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education expenditure per pupil</td>
<td>$159</td>
<td>$18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality per 1,000 births</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of population</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of land reserved</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

African township in South Africa.
The Bantustans are similar to Indian Reservations in the United States in many ways. In both cases the land given back to the indigenous people of the region is only a small proportion of the area taken by the European invaders. In both cases the inhabitants are supposed to be able to develop their societies independently of the dominant White civilization, despite the limitation of space and the poverty of available natural resources. But there is one important difference: When Indians leave the reservations, they have citizenship rights and legal privileges in the rest of the United States; Africans leaving the Reserves have no rights in the rest of South Africa. In spite of this, large numbers of Africans have to come into White areas to find work.

All Africans, Asians, and Coloreds living outside the reserves must have official permits to stay in any “White” region of the country. Even if they have lived in such an area all their lives, they can be “endorsed out” (ordered to leave) at any time. Here is the case of one such eviction order.

The Trial of Mr. Nana Sita

For 44 years Mr. Nana Sita, an Indian, and his family lived in Pretoria, the capital of South Africa. His house was in an area which had been inhabited primarily by Indians for many years. Most of the Indians in South Africa were brought there as indentured servants and after fulfilling their contracts worked to establish small businesses. Mr. Sita was one such merchant.

On June 6, 1958, the Government issued a proclamation declaring the whole of Pretoria a “White area.” No Indians were to be allowed to continue living there. Residences and businesses had to move. Mr. Sita refused. For over ten years he fought lengthy court battles, spending months in prison. In the meantime his home and business were destroyed; his community dispersed. Found guilty of breaking a law that had destroyed his life, he made the following statement at his trial:

"Those of us on whom the axe has fallen are undergoing untold hardships through having been uprooted from business and residences, causing misery, suffering, and unhappiness resulting in financial loss and insecurity for the future... Implementation of this policy (apartheid) brands us as inferior people in perpetuity, degrades our self-respect as human beings, condemns us as uncivilized barbarians. It degrades and humiliates my race to which I am proud to belong, a race which has produced eminent men in all walks of life... It has branded the 14 million Non-Europeans of South Africa, Africans, Indians, and Coloureds as inferior lest their proximity and shadow contaminate and pollute the members of the ruling race..."
More than a million Africans have been uprooted and sent to resettlement villages since 1959. Morsgat is only one of many resettlement camps.

more than 300 families are living there in tents and shacks after having been moved off “White” land.

—the first people were taken there in December, 1968. Nine months later, and only after a public outcry, did the Government start building some crude houses.

—some people were moved from slate quarries where they worked, others came from locations in White towns.

there is no employment and the men have to leave the camp to find work. Most breadwinners earn no more than $5.00 a week.

—round-trip bus fares to work vary from $1.54 to $2.52 a week. Most men can only afford to pay these fares for week-ends — and not even every week-end.

—Before coming to Morsgat, the men lived with their families near their work. Now they can no longer live with their families.

there is one water tank for the whole community — over 1200 people. The water is bad.

—there are no latrines and subsequently there is much disease.

—the stink is terrible after the rains.

there is evidence of malnutrition.

—there are no medical facilities available there.

—people complain of diarrhea and serious body sores.

—the people are allowed to build houses for themselves.

—“At a meeting they told us the bricks cost $112. We can barely afford food.”

There are many Morsgats in South Africa. They exist because under the design of apartheid everyone has to be moved off the land belonging to another race. But unlike Africans, Indians, and Coloreds, Whites have never been forcibly evicted. Those few who have moved have been well compensated by the Government.
C. Migratory Labor and the Pass Laws

Two-thirds of the Africans and all of the Coloreds and Indians in South Africa live in White areas where they can be evicted, resettled, or ordered to move at any time. Most of these people who live in White areas have to come either to the mines or to the cities and towns to find work.

In the large cities, Africans have to live in ghetto-like areas called townships which are physically separated from the rest of the city. Men who come to the cities seeking employment are not allowed to bring their wives and families with them. As a result they move constantly between the cities and the rural areas. Sometimes they work for a year or more before returning home for a short time.

Africans are also required to have special permits to enter a city to find work. They lose their permit if they leave the city to return to their family, and have to re-apply for a new permit the next time they need to find work there. The Government uses this system of permits to regulate the labor force in different cities. If there are few jobs available in a city, few Africans will be allowed to enter it. This often puts Africans in the position of having to choose between keeping their jobs or seeing their families.

By depriving them of the right to settle in one place and the right to own property, the Government makes Africans (and to a lesser extent Indians and Coloreds) into a vast pool of "migratory labor" that can be easily channeled to satisfy the needs of the South African economy. Prime Minister Vorster recently expressed the Government's view of this situation:

The fact of the matter is that we need them (Africans) because they work for us, but after all we pay them for their work... But the fact that they work for us can never entitle them to claim political rights. Not now, not in the future, under no circumstances can we grant them those political rights in our own territory, neither now nor ever.

This system of migratory labor destroys family life for the majority of Africans. It forces them to live as isolated individuals in a permanent state of uncertainty. And it deprives them of their cultural heritage. Traditional ways of associating with friends and relatives, wives and children, traditional ways of cooking, of dressing, of worshipping, traditional arts are made impossible in the modern industrial environment of the cities where Africans are often isolated strangers who stay but a short time before having to move somewhere else.

But while the system of migratory labor destroys the traditional African culture, and with it their ties to their past, Blacks are not allowed to participate in the dominant White culture. They are completely prevented from having access to the benefits that living in a city normally brings.

The physical separation of the races that is the basis of migratory labor is effectively enforced by a system of pass laws. All Africans, men and women, have to carry a pass (something like a passport) on their person at all times. The pass books contain personal biographies, details of employment, and records of permits to travel or reside in a certain place. They have to be always kept up to date: in practice, this means hours of standing in line every few weeks to be photographed or to get the signature of employers and of the petty government officials who are in charge of keeping track of the movement of individuals.

Africans may be stopped by any policeman at any time, even in their proper residences; and if they are found to be without a pass they are automatically arrested. If the pass book does not contain the necessary permits to reside or work in the place they are stopped, if any of the required information in the pass is out of date, or if some required signature is missing, they are also arrested. Over 3,000 Africans are arrested each day for pass offenses.

This large number of arrests is the government's most obvious method of regulating the movements of the population. Even without the arrests, the Pass Laws are a continuous harassment that prevents the African population of South Africa from ever feeling secure. The fear of being arrested, the long waits to obtain required certification, and just the necessity of carrying a pass book at all times are only more subtle measures that make the Nationalist Government's extensive control of people possible.

Africans who are arrested without being able to show that they have permits to work in a particular city are sent back to the reserves. The following case is typical of millions of others:
Mrs. Bukane left Lady Frere, a small village, where she was born, in 1946 and had never been there since. She joined her husband in Paarl (a large town) where he worked and lived with him there for 12 years — until 1958. Then his firm transferred him to Cape Town and she was allowed to accompany him and lived with him in temporary housing in Guguletu, an African “location” on the outskirts of the city. They lived there until 1966 when she was suddenly “endorsed out” after 21 years of marriage. By then she had 5 children, all of whom had been born either in Cape Town or Paarl and who had gone to school in Guguletu. The youngest had polio and was being regularly treated at the Guguletu clinic. She and her children were told to return to Lady Frere. By leaving Paarl and moving to Cape Town she had lost all her ‘rights’ to live in an urban area. The law demanded that she leave her husband and return to her “home.” When she refused to go, she was arrested, found guilty, and sentenced to prison. Her attorney said at her trial: “Nothing the court can do can punish her as severely as the prospect she faces of having to leave her husband.” If she remained in Cape Town she would be arrested again. Her husband could not follow her as there was no possibility of his finding work in Lady Frere. Their marriage of 21 years was destroyed.

Thousands of Africans are arrested everyday for 'pass' offences.

Because most Africans, Indians, and Coloreds are not allowed to settle in one area or own property, they are prevented from developing their own businesses or industries or other ways of supporting themselves. This forces them to take whatever jobs are available, regardless of the location or the wages. The system of separation of the races thus in practice ensures that there is a constant supply of cheap African, Indian, and Colored labor. The need to have a pool of cheap labor available, first for large-scale agricultural production, then for mining operations, and now for industrial manufacture, has been one of the primary reasons for the development of apartheid.

There are other important reasons. The Whites who were the architects of apartheid believed that only complete separation of the races would allow them to survive—politically, economically, and culturally—in a country where they were a small racial minority. Furthermore, they viewed apartheid as a just and morally responsible policy—as part of the responsibility that Whites had to lead Africans to self-government.
II. White South Africans: The Minority Rulers

The complex social relations that have emerged in South Africa derive in part from the earliest contacts between Europeans and Africans. The first White settlers arrived in the Cape in 1652 and within 50 years several hundred Europeans had decided to settle permanently in this new land. Whites have lived in South Africa from that time—longer than most Americans have lived in the United States. Their ‘home’ is no longer England, Holland, or France, which were the countries of their forefathers. They no longer think of themselves as “settlers” but as White Africans.

Before the Whites arrived at Cape Town and began to move northwards, South Africa was inhabited by migratory or stationary African nations. The area around Cape Town itself was occupied by the Khoi people, who were conquered by the European settlers and enslaved. There was miscegenation between these two groups from the beginning. The descendants of this racial intermixture are the Colored population of South Africa who still live primarily around the Cape area.

In those early days most Whites were farmers of Dutch descent, living isolated and difficult lives. These Boers, as they were called (Boer means farmer in Dutch), were similar in many ways to the American frontiersmen. They were rugged individualists who had to rely mainly on their own resources for survival. When the Cape was annexed by the British after the Napoleonic Wars, most of the Dutch farmers moved inland to escape British rule. This northern migration—the Boer Trek—intensified racial hatred. Leaving the settled areas of the Cape, these trekkers saw the attacks of the Africans as the greatest danger to their own survival, just as the American pioneers moving westward feared the attacks of Indians. The African nations of the region, however, just like the Indians in America, saw the White invaders as a threat to their existence.

Colonist attempts to take over the land and cattle of the indigenous Africans led to a series of almost continuous wars. Although they only had arrows and spears to throw against the Boers’ rifles, Africans frequently routed the invaders. The powerful Zulu Empire, for example, led by King Tshaka, one of the most outstanding military leaders of the 19th century, cut off the Boers’ eastward expansion and forced them to migrate north instead. Tshaka’s successor, Dingane, also led such fierce resistance that the day he was finally defeated (Dingaan’s Day, Dec. 16, 1838) is still a National Day of Thanksgiving for the descendants of the Dutch. The Boer trekkers, who called themselves Afrikaners as if to justify their claim to the land, were able to defeat Africans in the end only with the help of British military efficiency and equipment.

The two republics (the Transvaal and the Orange Free State) the Afrikaners finally established were heavily influenced by their hatred and fear of Africans as a formidable enemy. Survival depended on “keeping the Black man in his place.” The constitutions of the two republics spelled out not only the separation of the races but the subservience of Africans to Europeans.

Nineteenth century Boer expansion north.
By the mid nineteenth century Europeans had established four independent states in what is now the Republic of South Africa. The two southern states were under the control of Britain, the two northern controlled by Afrikaner trekkers. The British states had outlawed slavery, and allowed some Africans and Coloreds the right to vote (those who had property or educational qualifications). The Afrikaner states insisted on segregation, with only Whites having the right to vote.

The discovery of diamonds and then gold in 1887 in the Afrikaner states led to British intrusion in the North. Relations deteriorated until the end of the century when the Afrikaner states declared war on Britain, which was attempting to take over the Boer territories. The Boer War (1899-1902) as it was called, was one of the most bitter wars of its time. It is still remembered today through the familiar song, “Marching to Pretoria” which came from this war. British soldiers sang the song on their way to Pretoria, the capital of the Afrikaner state of Transvaal (and the present capital of the Republic of South Africa). Superior British military strength finally prevailed and the Afrikaners signed a peace treaty, but their antagonism toward the British remained strong.

In 1910 Britain united the four states into the Union of South Africa and granted it independence as a Dominion country of the British Empire. The government of the new country gradually worked to bridge the conflicts between the Afrikaners and the English-speaking South Africans. The descendants of the English settlers in South Africa viewed Africans differently than the Afrikaners. Even though they created the first reserves to guarantee African labor for British-owned mines and although they dominated the African population living in their areas, the English were not committed to the idea of complete separation of the races. But at the insistence of the Afrikaners, racial separation was written into the new nation’s constitution. One of the most important reasons the English-speaking Whites did not oppose this demand was because the system of low-paid African labor had proven so lucrative. It would be difficult to maintain a steady supply of cheap Black labor if Africans, Asians, and Coloreds were to be granted citizenship rights.
B. The White View of Apartheid

Successive English-Afrikaans coalition governments passed more and more legislation restricting the rights of Africans, Asians, and Coloreds. These laws applied to specific situations as they arose; but there was no system of apartheid legislation until 1948. In that year the Nationalist Party (made up almost entirely of Afrikaners) campaigned on the promise to enact an all-encompassing program of apartheid. The Nationalist Party won by a very small margin. The English-speaking population's protest against the racial policies of the new government, vigorous at first, gradually relaxed in the 1950's.

The program of apartheid legislation enacted by the Nationalist Party formalized and refined a system of practices that had been in operation in South Africa since the coming of Europeans. From their first meeting Europeans looked on Africans as savages devoid of culture and religion. Whites in South Africa have always used the derogatory term Kaffir (unbeliever) to refer to Blacks, while calling themselves true Afrikaners. Moreover Europeans believed Africans to be inferior beings because their skin was black.

With the missionary sentiments of a people convinced of their superiority, White South Africans believed it was their duty to govern or “care for” Africans. This idea that they had to “take up the White man’s burden,” as Rudyard Kipling put it, helped White South Africans rationalize the way they subjugated the peoples of other races. White South Africans, English and Afrikaner alike, were convinced that their control of Africans was a just, responsible, and even Divinely-directed program.

From the 17th century to the present the Dutch reformed Church, to which nearly all Afrikaners belong, has played an important role in supporting and justifying apartheid. The theology of this Christian Church maintains that all Negroes are descendants of Ham (Genesis 9:22) and like him have been cursed to be “hewers of wood and drawers of water” — eternal servants of all other men. This interpretation of the Bible has long been at the root of Afrikaners’ belief that they are right to control Africans.

English-speaking White South Africans, who do not accept this theological justification of White superiority, nevertheless, also believe that apartheid — at least in theory — is a morally responsible policy. Today, most White South Africans explain the design of apartheid this way: Whites and Africans are two different races which cannot live together in one political state without one group destroying the other. The language and culture of both races would be destroyed by intermingling. The pride of both races in their language and culture makes this undesirable. Therefore, the different races must develop separately, and to do this must be physically separated.
This policy of "separate development" demands that Africans have their own states. To meet this need the South African government has designated 13 per cent of the total area of South Africa as "African Homelands" or Bantustans. According to the official plan, the entire African population is someday to be relocated in these "Reserves." There, the argument continues, Africans will have full human rights and will be able to govern their society as they see fit. They will be granted no rights, however, if they leave the Bantustans to travel in White areas.

The Nationalist Government has stipulated that it will have to act as Trustee over the Bantustans until Africans reach a level of civilization sufficient for self-government. Whites must also assume the responsibility of helping the Bantustans industrialize. Only eventually will the Reserves become completely independent states within greater South Africa.

C. Is the Bantustan Policy Meant to Work?

The Nationalist Government claims that the Bantustans are the traditional homelands of Africans. The majority of Africans, however, do not live in Bantustans and never have. Many Africans have lived for generations in the cities.

The Bantustan policy means that Africans will someday have political and economic rights — but only in 13 per cent of their country. And even then the White President of South Africa will continue to have the final constitutional control over the affairs of the reserves.

The promised independence to be granted to the Bantustans leaves the Whites in a commanding position in another way as well. According to the government's African Homeland policy, land will be set aside for eight separate African states; and each state will be divided into several territorial areas for each of the many ethnic groups of African people in South Africa. This divides the economic and political power of the African population into isolated units and thus puts Africans in a weaker bargaining position with the unified White South African nation.

More importantly, the Bantustans do not and never will possess the economic resources to support the entire African population of South Africa. They occupy some of the most desolate parts of the country and have a very limited potential for either agricultural or industrial development.

The Bantustan policy ignores the fact that as South Africa's industrial economy continues to expand, more and more Africans are drawn into the White urban areas. The South African economy is totally dependent on African labor. It is impossible to permanently separate Africans and Whites without destroying the economy. This realization is at the root of continuing conflict between groups of Whites over the policy of apartheid.
D. Signs of Strain in the Policy of Apartheid

Apartheid legislation reserves jobs classified as "skilled labor" for Whites only. But if South Africa's modern industrial economy is to expand, it needs more skilled labor than South Africa has White workers. Big industrialists constantly pressure the government for permission to employ Africans in positions that have up to now been reserved only for Whites. This is one area of tension in the present application of apartheid.

Another concern is the enforcement of migratory labor. Because African workers have to move in and out of towns frequently, it is difficult for employers to find people to work at one job for any length of time. Productivity suffers because migrant laborers generally do not stay at one job long enough to develop expertise, and because industrialists are constantly having to train new people. Consequently, many big employers feel that Africans should be allowed to settle in one place. But this is against the apartheid policy.

Finally, because Africans are paid so little, they have hardly any buying power. South African businesses, on the other hand, have more products to sell today and need more consumers than just the country's wealthy White population can provide. Many businessmen would like to pay Africans, Indians, and Coloreds higher wages so that they could then buy more and keep the South African economy expanding.

These contradictions in the South African economy — for example, the fact that the working of the country's social system denies businesses the skilled labor they need to expand — are a significant challenge to the stability of the policy of apartheid. If the country is to continue to develop along its present industrial line, growth of these contradictions could someday force the government to relax some of its present discriminatory laws.

The conflict between the needs of the economy and the ideology of apartheid also creates conflicts between groups of White South Africans. The industrialists, whose interests lie in the expansion of the economy, continuously pressure the government to relax the application of apartheid laws to allow more flexibility in how the African population can be regulated. They clearly favor a less rigidly defined system of laws which would allow Africans more freedom but guarantee continued White economic and political control. Most of the big businessmen and other Whites who favor this proposal are English-speaking.

The Afrikaners, on the other hand, are generally very reluctant about easing discriminatory legislation — though they are divided on the issue. Today there are many successful Afrikaner businessmen who realize that apartheid interferes with the economic growth of South Africa if it is applied too rigidly. But there are still many Afrikaners in rural areas removed from the needs of a modern industrial, predominantly urban economy who fear any liberalization of apartheid.

This division of opinion among different sections of the White population, and the other signs of strain in what otherwise appears to be a firmly entrenched social system, all revolve around the South African economy. The next section will discuss some of the specific details of this engine that makes South Africa go.
Unlike other African countries, South Africa is highly industrialized. It has several large cities similar in size to San Francisco, Boston, and Dallas. Up to the late 19th century, both European settlers and Africans were engaged primarily in agricultural production. Africans grew mainly what they needed for survival and relied on barter; Europeans, using African labor, produced cash crops for sale on a market based on money exchange. The growth of this money-based agricultural trade led to the development of cities and towns.

The South African economy mushroomed with the discovery of diamonds, gold, copper, and an extensive wealth of other minerals at the end of the 19th century. The mining industry, which has been largely under British control since the Boer War, created some fabulous fortunes and generated the financial power South Africa needed to further industrialize.
A. Labor

The South African mines could be worked only by using vast amounts of labor. But they could be operated profitably only when labor costs were low. This meant paying African laborers low wages. To persuade Africans to work for low wages, the South African government, in cooperation with the English-speaking mine owners, did two things. It imposed taxes on Africans that had to be paid in cash, thus forcing Africans to work for wage instead of continuing to produce only what they needed for survival. And it classified any African outside a Reserve not working for a European as a vagrant liable to prosecution, thereby coercing many African men to accept whatever work Whites provided.

This system of forced labor still furnishes the South African mines with their labor force today. South Africa also imports Africans from other Southern African countries to work in the mines as well. These temporary immigrants are forced to work for the same reasons that South African Blacks are. They do not go to South Africa because working conditions there are good, any more than Southern Blacks in the United States go to live in ghettos in the Northern U.S. cities because conditions there are good. They go only because it is the only possibility they have of earning wages.

Most Africans work in the mines on nine-month contracts. Because it is more efficient, the mining companies provide some minimal housing and food. But no miners are allowed to bring their wives or families to live in these mine compounds which are usually just bunkrooms crowding 16 men into a 20 ft. by 30 ft. space. This forced separation of African miners from their families keeps Africans moving constantly from the mines back to the countryside. Under apartheid legislation, the Pass Laws regulate this population flow to provide for the labor needs of the South African mines and industries.

An abundance of cheap labor and the profits from selling its mineral wealth helped South Africa develop from a mineral-exporting outpost into a modern manufacturing economy. Few Africans were originally involved in big business operations, but when South Africa began to industrialize rapidly in the 1950’s, more and more Africans were needed in the factories. White workers, fearing competition for jobs from other racial groups, pressured the Government to enact measures that would safeguard the position of Whites. The Government was further induced to apply apartheid laws to labor policies by big mining and industrial employers who argued that both Black and White workers would be easier to govern if they could be dealt with separately in racial groups instead of collectively as workers, regardless of race.

The recent laws that have applied apartheid to labor policies have some important historical precedents. The Cape Masters and Servants Law of 1865, for example, defined the relation of master to servant and servant to master in quasi-legal terms and set the tone for successive legislation. The Mines and Works Act of 1911 was passed to satisfy white miners' demands that skilled positions be reserved only for them. The most important modern apartheid labor legislation includes:

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**Workers in all occupations, 1968**

**Workers in skilled occupations, 1968**
Trade Unions. Multiracial trade unions were prohibited in 1956; successive laws now prevent Africans from belonging to any trade union at all. This means Africans have absolutely no bargaining power with their employers. All details of employment such as working conditions and wages are controlled by the employers or by government committees. The low wages Africans are paid result partly from this lack of representation.

The right to strike. White and Colored workers have some rights to strike, but African workers are denied the right altogether. Africans who strike or participate in any work stoppage or slowdown face a three year jail sentence and a fine of $1,500. Despite the penalties, Africans have continued to strike. The police have opened fire on striking Africans several times.

Job reservation. These laws specifically reserve certain occupations for Whites only. The intention of this Act is to keep skilled positions in general open for Whites. This had led to a shortage of skilled labor; but rather than allowing Africans to move into some of the "reserved" positions, the government is attempting to solve the shortage by bringing in immigrants from Europe.

Employment Superiority. Under apartheid no African may occupy a position senior to any White in a company. Africans may never give orders to Whites. The few African doctors, for example, are not allowed to work with White nurses because they would have to give them instructions.
There are many more such laws. One rough measure of how this apartheid labor legislation affects the people of South Africa is wages. In the mining industry, wages for Whites are 16 times greater than wages for Africans. In manufacturing, the average monthly salary for Whites is over five times that of Africans.

The discrepancy between wages paid to Whites and those paid to Africans has increased over the last fifty years. The benefits of South Africa's increased economic prosperity in that time have gone mainly to Whites. South African Whites have one of the highest standards of living in the world. Although there is some poverty among them, they own more material wealth—cars, houses, or swimming pools, for example—per person than any other group of people in the world.

But Africans in South Africa have to struggle just to subsist. Surveys conducted by the South African Institute of Race Relations in 1970 found that an average urban family of five, even with two wage earners per household had a monthly income that was 10 to 15 per cent short of what they needed just to buy basic necessities. Many Africans are malnourished—those in the Reserves as much as those in urban areas. Housing is uniformly bad. No African may own a house, and the government's housing projects offer only shoddy, usually very small units in desolate townships. Streets are neither lit nor paved. Electricity is uncommon, and the water supply for African living areas is minimal. These are the conditions that exist on the outskirts of some of the most prosperous and modern cities in the world.

African township - Johannesburg. No house electricity or running water.
The government has made no effort to force employers to pay a living wage even though it is well aware of the chronic underpayment in the country. The Minister of Labour summed up the Government's attitude this way:

"To plead that you must pay the Natives who are employees a civilised wage means only one thing in this country—White wages. To want to pay Natives White wages fails in the first place to take account of their productivity; in the second place it does not take their living standard into account."

C. The Educational System

Education plays a major role in preparing Whites to lead the economy and in simultaneously preventing Blacks from having influential positions in the labor force. Apartheid applied to education means that schooling for Whites is free and compulsory until the age of 16. White schools have excellent facilities; and a large percentage of the White population complete diplomas in higher education at the government's expense.

At the other end of the scale, apartheid means that educational opportunities for Africans are very limited. In 1953 the Nationalist Government brought all education of Africans under State control. Even private schools are now illegal for Africans. The government itself spends nine times more per pupil for the education of White children than it does for the education of Africans. And unlike Whites, Africans must pay even to go to public school. Although there are a few Blacks in South African universities, a lot of Africans never get to school. Most who do start in Grade One do not have more than three years of schooling. And in the last several years, government expenditure per capita for "Bantu" education has decreased. When the State took complete control of Black education, the Minister of Education put the government's case this way:

"Education will be suitable for those who will become the industrial workers of the country.... What is the use of teaching a Bantu child mathematics when it cannot be used in practice? That is quite absurd. Education must train and teach people in accordance with their opportunities in life..."
The South African government often says in its defense that more Africans in South Africa attend school than in any other African country. This comparison is misleading, not only because it attracts attention away from actual opportunities for Africans to attend school in South Africa, but because it does not contrast African education to White education in South Africa.

A White school in South Africa. Education is free and compulsory.

A Black school in South Africa. Parents pay for much of the costs.

Today South Africa is one of the most prosperous modern industrial countries in the world. Its economy has been expanding so rapidly that almost 1000 corporations in the United States and West Europe have decided to invest there to take advantage of the low labor costs and high profit rates.

But South Africa’s economic prosperity depends on discriminatory labor and educational policies and on the general control of the population apartheid makes possible. The government has had to increase its control in recent years because resistance to its exploitative racial policies still continues strong. The next section examines how making the country a financial success has meant creating a totalitarian state in South Africa.
IV. Resistance, Repression, and the Police State

White South African society has been built up on the expectation of warfare. The townships where Africans live have been physically separated from the cities so they can be easily surrounded. Pillboxes and road blocks have been built all over the country. Expenditures for Defense and Police have increased every year; South Africa now has more military might than almost all other African nations—except Egypt—combined. Even White women have been trained in shooting.

The present tension in South Africa has a long history. Ruling South African Whites have had to fight every inch of the way to establish themselves in power and to maintain their position against continuous opposition.

A. Resistance to White Invasion

The first Europeans found Africans willing to coexist peacefully with them. They responded by enslaving the indigenous peoples and claiming their land. In the next hundred years as the Afrikaners gradually expanded away from the coast by plundering Africans, taking over their land and often burning their villages, Blacks mounted a fierce resistance to defend their land. Black South Africans have never submitted willingly to White rule.

The advance of first the Dutch and then the British into the interior of the country precipitated almost continuous fighting. Africans' determination to keep control of both their land and their people presented the colonists with much more than skirmishes; nine full-scale wars were fought between 1779 and 1879. Even without guns, different groups of Blacks often routed the invaders and in some cases made them respect Africans' territorial rights until the 20th century.

When the Boers began their Trek away from the Cape they were turned back from Natal in the East after being severely defeated by the Zulu nation. They were forced North by successive defeats at the hands of King Mshoeshoe in the area of Lesotho and King Sekhukuni in what is now the Transvaal. The Boers were able to defeat the Africans only with the military help of the British. And the British, even with their phenomenally superior fire power (including the machine gun for the first time), had to rely on playing rival ethnic groups off against each other to finally establish military control over Africans.

B. Protest Against Continued Occupation

By 1910, when the Union of South Africa was formed as a British Commonwealth nation, Whites controlled most of the land of the country and had been successful in making many Africans dependent on jobs offered by Whites. The act of union further united all Whites in South Africa; by 1913, the White government had enough power to deprive Africans of the right to own land and to reserve 87 per cent of the country's land for Whites.

Africans, who were excluded from voting in the new nation's government, turned to protest. When petitions before both the South African
government and the British government met with no success, Blacks formed the African National Congress (ANC). In 1912, Africans from almost every ethnic group and every region of South Africa met together on the question of White domination. Dr. P. I. Seme, one of the founders of the A.N.C., declared: "The demon of racialism, the aberrations of Xhosa-Fingo feuds, the animosity that exists between Zulus and the Tongas, between the Basuto and every other Native, must be buried and forgotten... We are one people."

...conducted several major strikes. Trade unions united Africans and made them a significant political force, but the election of the Nationalist Government in 1948 slammed the constitutional door on their appeals for a lessening of racial discrimination. Africans are no longer allowed to belong to trade unions.

The extension of apartheid after 1948 was opposed by many Whites as well as Africans, Indians, and Coloreds. Most English-speaking South Africans had long been willing to grant

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Year after year the protests against apartheid continued. To the left Africans demonstrate against the pass laws. To the right supporters of a bus boycott walk the fifteen miles from their homes in the township to work in Johannesburg.

Since that time, the A.N.C. has been one of the major leaders of African resistance to White domination. In 1913, the A.N.C. organized protest against the Land Act. It has conducted continual demonstrations against the government, involving hundred of thousands of Africans at one time or another, and has been especially active in opposing the Pass Laws.

In the 1920's, 30's and 40's, Africans organized their own trade unions. One of the biggest and most successful of these was the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union (I.C.U.) which Africans more freedom than Afrikaners would allow—as long as their own political and economic position was secure. They felt that the best way to guarantee their position was to treat Blacks more liberally, allowing them more freedom of movement, the right to own property, and at least token representation in government. The rigidly enforced apartheid voted in by the Afrikaners did not make sense practically, they argued: it could only lead to violent racial confrontation. Besides, it was too obviously inhumane; it it went against all the notions of civilization that had been hammered out in
Europe, and especially England. It had to be opposed.

The Whites who did participate in the vigorous demonstrations against the government found that their White skin, which was usually their passport to extensive privilege, no longer made so much difference. Many were arrested, some tortured and sent to long prison sentences, just like all other serious opponents of apartheid.

The government reacted to the anti-apartheid protest with the *Suppression of Communism Act* in 1950. This legislation entitles the Minister of Justice to ban any person who is active in opposing apartheid. Thousands of people have been banned, many on the pretence that they were Communists. The government is not required to prove that the banned people are actually communist, and is seldom able to do so. The effect of the legislation, however, is to define anyone who is seriously against apartheid as a communist.

People who receive a banning order, which is usually in effect for 5 years but can be extended, are placed under the following restrictions:

They may not belong to any organization (including, for example, even sports clubs) or hold any public office. They may not attend any gathering, social or political. Banned people may not attend weddings or funerals, as well as political rallies.

They may not communicate in any way with another banned person. This restriction has only been lifted when a husband and wife were both banned. It is illegal to take a message from one banned person to another.

They may be forbidden to receive any visitors. Banned people can only be with one other person at the same time.

They must report to the police once a week.

They may not teach in a university, and are frequently forbidden to attend a university as a student.

They may not work as an attorney. By banning many lawyers who defend people charged with political crimes, the government has made it almost impossible for such people to be defended.

They are restricted to a particular town, or part of a town if it is a large city. They may not leave at any time.
By banning people, the government forces them to be prisoners in their own homes. This has proven to be an extremely effective way of stopping political opposition. Banning orders are arbitrary; they may not be appealed, and the police do not need a court order to apply them. Bannings are punishments without trial for 'crimes' that the government cannot prove.

White opposition to apartheid declined during the 1950's, but that of Africans, Indians, and Coloreds did not. In 1950, the few Coloreds in the Cape who were allowed to vote were removed from the voter roles, and the four representatives of Africans in Parliament (who were White) were removed as well. In response to these new restrictions, organized Africans decided that they would defy those laws that administered unequal treatment to them instead of only protesting them. The Defiance Campaign, as it came to be known, started in June, 1952. Before the end of the year thousands of African men and women were arrested for entering “Europeans Only” post offices, railroad stations, and other facilities. No-one resisted arrest: the idea was to fill the jails with passive resisters.

The government responded swiftly by banning African, Indian, and Colored leaders. It also passed new legislation making passive resistance illegal, thereby giving police more effective measures with which to deal with resisters. The grievances of the Africans, Indians, and Coloreds were never considered.

In 1955, the A.N.C. called for 50,000 volunteers to collect *freedom demands* from all sections of the South African people. The thousands of demands that came from virtually every economic and racial sector of the country were incorporated into a Freedom Charter for South Africa. The government's response to this showing of anti-apartheid sentiment was to arrest over 100 people in 1956 and charge them with High Treason for their role in the Freedom Charter campaign.

Gathering at Kliptown for signing of the Freedom Charter - part of which is below.

*"We, the people of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to know: "That South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of all the people; that our people have been robbed of their birthright to land, liberty and peace by a form of government founded on injustice and inequality;"

"That our country will never be prosperous or free until all our people live in brotherhood, enjoying equal rights and opportunities; "That only a democratic state, based on the will of all the people, can secure to all their birthright without distinction of colour, race, sex or belief."

The Freedom Charter,
Kliptown, Johannesburg, 1955*
One of Africans' major grievances has always been the system of pass laws which are responsible for the daily arrests of thousands of Blacks. In early 1960 a series of “stay at homes” were organized to challenge these laws, and all over the country there were large-scale protests. In the township of Sharpeville, not far from Johannesburg, several thousand Africans gathered in one such peaceful demonstration. Although no order to disperse was given, the police opened fire on the crowd without warning, killing 69 and wounding several hundred. The country was outraged. Protest—including a highly successful general strike—was so intense that many foreign businessmen believed that a major civil insurrection would break out.

The government responded immediately by declaring a State of Emergency, banning all meetings, curtailing the press, and arresting several hundred people without bringing charges against them. But the government's most important action by far was to ban the two major African political parties—the A.N.C. and the Pan Africanist Congress (P.A.C.). From that time there has been no way for Africans to legally voice their political opinions.

March 1960, SHARPEVILLE. Top: adults and children run to escape the bullets. Bottom: the scene after the shooting. Sixty nine people were killed.
An Agony

by Joyce Sikhakane.

My head is heavy, my shoulders shrug,
because despite
all my eyes have seen
my head has said
my heart has felt,
I do not believe
that White, Black and Yellow
cannot talk, walk, eat, kiss and share.

It worries me to think
that only people of my colour
will liberate me.

You mustn’t trust a White man
my grandfather used to tell me
when I was a child.
You mustn’t think a White man cares for you
my people caution me.
You know when a White man wants to know you?
When you bring him money!

The Indians? He’s black as you.
But, not as poor as you.
He knows his trade—cheating you.
He’s happy to lend you money
just forgets to mention
the twenty per cent interest!
until you have to pay it.

And the Coloured? I ask.
Ag! Him, they say.
He doesn’t know where he stands,
But he prefers his skin whitest
And his hair straightest.
And somehow forgets the second names
of his black and kinky cousins!

I know of Whites, Coloureds and Indians
who are not like that, I say.
But, I’m told they are only a few.

Now, what about you my fellow African.
We are intimidated, they say
Modimo, we’re very very busy, they say.

not losing
our passes,
our birth certificates,
our train tickets,
our rent receipts
our urban residential permits,
(not to mention our money, our husbands and our lives).

My head is heavy, my shoulders shrug,
because despite
all my eyes have seen
my head has said
my heart has felt,
I do not believe
that White, Black and Yellow
cannot talk, walk, eat, kiss and share.
C. Repression

There have been many massacres of Africans in South Africa, and innumerable political murders. But as the world watched Africa in 1960—the year many Black states were granted independence from colonial rule—Sharpeville finally made people see that a massacre in South Africa was not an aberration, an accident. Maintaining apartheid has always meant government by violence.

The South African army is the ultimate enforcer of the government’s apartheid policies. A former Minister of Defense (and now State President of South Africa) made this quite clear when he declared: “Do not think we are arming to fight a foreign enemy, we are not. We are arming to shoot down the Black masses.”

All White males receive compulsory army training for at least two years. The entire White male population is thus equipped to be a citizens’ militia which can be quickly mobilized. The army enforces martial law (such as imposed after Sharpeville, for example), and is increasingly trained in anti-guerrilla actions. There are no Africans or Asians in the army.

As apartheid has been more and more strictly enforced in recent years, South African Defence expenditures have skyrocketed. The government spent $61 million on Defence in 1960; and $356 million in 1968. South Africa’s arsenal includes three brand new French nuclear submarines, French Alouette helicopters and Mirage jet fighters with air-to-surface missiles; 36 F-86 Sabrejet interceptors, Sikorsky helicopters, C-47 and C-130B transports from the U.S.; and armored cars, machine guns, and over 500 airplanes (including both short- and long-range bombers) from Great Britain. In addition, Prime Minister Vorster has said recently that, “South Africa does not need one penny’s worth of gunpowder to attack any Black state in Africa...we can manufacture enough weapons of our own to deal with any of these countries.”

South Africa’s police expenditures have increased, too: from $50 million in 1960 to $120 million in 1968. The police and the Security Branch (similar to the F.B.I.) have extremely wide powers. The police, for instance, control all the following things: the right to hold public meetings, or public and private protests; what an individual may say; what they may read, where they can travel, who they can visit; who can attend university, and what can be studied at the university. The police may enter and search anyone’s home at any time of day or night. They may arrest anyone without bringing charges against them. They may keep people in solitary confinement without allowing anyone, even a lawyer, to visit them. They may send people to live in remote parts of the country, and may forbid people to either enter or leave an area. The police may forbid teachers to teach and prevent writers and journalists from writing. They may wiretap telephones, open and scrutinize all letters, and in countless other ways keep any given individual under close surveillance.

The laws which give the police these wide powers are called repressive legislation; they deny all citizens fundamental human rights. The government has outlawed freedom of speech and of assembly, for example, and has provided for punishment without trial. The Security Branch which enforces these laws is actually a political police force. It is extremely efficient in finding and physically eliminating all opposition to the government. The system the Security Branch uses to force people to be informants and to maintain a network of spies is very similar to that of the Gestapo under Hitler in the 1930’s. And like the Nazis, the Security Branch is ruthless in exercising its powers; its use of
torture has been documented in thousands of cases. It is for these reasons that South Africa is called a police state.

Throughout most of the 20th century all opposition to apartheid, whether strikes, rallies, or petitions, has had to evade the growing power of the police. Finally in 1960, with apartheid more rigidly enforced than ever, the government outlawed all opposition. By making peaceful demonstrations, strikes, pickets, and lobbying illegal, and by banning the A.N.C. and the P.A.C., the government forced Africans either to give up all opposition to apartheid or to make war against the state.

For the preceding twenty years Africans had repeatedly warned the government against forcing them into the position of having either to submit or to fight. But faced with that decision in 1960, Africans did not submit. In 1961, the A.N.C., now underground, formed a guerrilla army called Umkhonto We Sizwe (The Spear of the Nation). At his defense in a political trial in 1964, Elias Motsoaledi explained his reason for joining:

"When I was asked to join Umkhonto We Sizwe it was at a time when it was clear to me that all our years of peaceful struggle had been of no use. The Government would not let us fight peacefully any more, and had blocked all of our legal acts by making them illegal. I could see no other way open to me. What I did brought me no personal gain; what I did I did for my people and because I thought it was the only way left for me to help my people."

Many A.N.C. and P.A.C. members left South Africa secretly to train as guerrilla fighters in Black African countries. The ones who stayed initiated planned acts of sabotage against government buildings and electrical installations. At his trial for political offense, Nelson Mandela, one of the main leaders of the outlawed A.N.C., explained that this policy had been undertaken to pressure the government to change its policies of apartheid: "Umkhonto, by its policy of controlled sabotage, hoped to bring the Government and its supporters to their senses before it was too late." The A.N.C.'s creed, Mandela explained, was based on a "concept of freedom and fulfillment for the African people in their own land, but not of driving Whites into the sea." And he continued that:

"During my lifetime I dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against white domination and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony, and with equal opportunities."

The pressure of these sabotage incidents did not move the government one inch from its committed path; it only introduced even more severe legislation. The Sabotage Act, passed by Parliament with only one dissenting vote, allows for the arbitrary arrest of any suspect for an indefinite period of time, makes people accused of sabotage guilty until they prove themselves innocent, and defines sabotage so broadly as to include painting slogans on walls.

Throughout South Africa's history apartheid has been more and more harshly enforced. There has never been even any minor liberalization of the policy. The government has responded to popular pressure and protest only by enacting ever more repressive measures. As a result, the government today has wide control over all South Africans, Black and White.

But in spite of this extreme level of repression, in spite of the police state and this government by force and fear, the struggle for freedom in South Africa remains strong. When the acts of sabotage in the early 1960's failed to change White opinion and repression increased, the oppressed people of South Africa were left with no alternative but to forcibly regain their freedom. South Africans continue to train abroad as guerrilla fighters, and at home African men and women have built up a large underground resistance organization. They sing, Mayibuye l' Afrika—Africa must come back to us.
CHAPTER TWO

LIFE UNDER PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM

I. The Overseas Provinces: The Last of the Colonies

Portugal was the first modern European country to invade Africa and it is the last remaining colonial power today. Four hundred and fifty years have gone by since the Portuguese first landed in Africa in search of better trade routes to Asia. Today, the Portuguese are still holding tight to colonies in West and Southern Africa.

The Portuguese do not call their holdings in Africa "colonies". Since 1952, Portugal has referred to them as "Overseas Provinces", maintaining that they are an integral part of the Portuguese nation. This change in terms was designed to avoid U.N. resolutions which apply to colonized territories. Now Portugal refuses to debate questions relating to colonialism on the grounds that the African territories are an integral part of the Portuguese nation.

To the Africans under Portuguese rule, however, it makes little difference what the label is. What a colonial governor said 25 years ago remains true today:

Natives are Portuguese subjects under the protection of the Portuguese nation—which is considered as a cultural unity or as a political unity.

"For Africans, the present relationship between Portugal and the "Provinces" is just an alternative form of the old colonial relationship, where an outside government imposes its rule on a local people; the Portuguese have political, administrative, economic and social control over the lives of Africans."

Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands are geographically set apart from the other Portuguese colonies in Southern Africa. However, they operate under the same colonial policy: in each area land, labor, educational and administrative policy has been similar.
II. Portugal and the Colonies

A. Economic and Political Relations

Portugal is the poorest nation in Western Europe. It has been governed by a dictatorship since Antonio de Oliveira Salazar seized power in 1926. Portugal imposes on the colonies a rigid administrative structure which is designed to extract economic benefits for Portugal from its African "possessions".

The colonies themselves are agricultural societies. Traditionally most Africans engaged in subsistence farming, growing just what was needed for family or community consumption. There was little production for market exchange.

Portuguese colonialism has changed this pattern, however, because Portugal's industry is heavily dependent on raw materials produced in the colonies. The colonial system has been geared toward extracting certain crops from Africa which are needed in Portugal. Africans have been forced to change the kind of farming they do in order to meet these Portuguese demands.

Colonial authorities frequently compel Africans to produce a certain crop. Millions of Africans have been pushed off their land by Europeans who want it for plantations. Often these same farmers have been forced to work the land they once owned for the minimal wages paid by plantation owners.

Cotton production in Mozambique illustrates how the Portuguese control African production. Portugal's textile industry employs over one third of all Portuguese labor. Cotton is Mozambique's largest crop; 82 per cent of it is bought by these textile mills in Portugal. For Africans, who can neither use it themselves nor make a profit from it, there is little incentive to grow cotton; the Portuguese have had to force them to cultivate it. A young Mozambican, Gabriel Mauticio Nantombo, describes how this was done in the Cabo Delgado Province:

"When the company came to exploit our region, everyone was forced to cultivate one field of cotton.... The time of cotton growing was a time of great poverty, because we could only produce cotton; we got a poor price for it, and we did not have time to grow other crops. We were forced to produce cotton. The people didn't want to; they knew cotton is the mother of poverty, but the company was protected by the government. We knew that anyone who refused to grow it would be sent to the plantations on Sao Tome where he would work without any pay at all. So as not to make our poverty any greater, then; so as not to leave the family and leave the children to suffer alone, we had to grow cotton. The company and government work together closely to enforce the system."

African cotton producers are legally bound to sell what they cultivate to concessionary companies. By contrast, Europeans who produce cotton in Mozambique can sell theirs on the open world market at much higher prices. The companies which buy African-produced cotton have a monopoly in each region and can set prices as low as they wish. They then supply the Portuguese textile industry, assuring Portugal of getting the raw material it needs at low prices.
Subsistence farming
Most other crops are produced on plantations, where Africans are paid for their labor rather than for what they produce. The company and the government work together, assuring products for the government, profits for the company, and low wages for the workers. Labor recruitment is based on force, either direct or indirect.

Africans are made to work for Europeans indirectly in order to earn money to pay taxes levied by the colonial regime. Subsistence farming involves no cash, so Africans must turn elsewhere to get money. They have the choice of either producing the cotton which the Portuguese want to buy or hiring themselves out to work on plantations. If they are not able to pay taxes, they can be sentenced to forced labor, with no pay at all.

Legalized forced labor followed a long period of slavery which lasted in some cases into the 20th century. One of the first things Salazar did when he came to power was to ensure that forced African labor was written into law. This was done by making it illegal to be "idle". The Portuguese defined "idleness" as any work which did not benefit them (e.g., subsistence farming).

By the mid-20th century, unfavorable world opinion induced the Portuguese to change the forced labor law. Under a new law Africans could be forced to work only if it was in the "public interest" to do so. But the Portuguese define "public interest" and, in effect, perpetuated the old system after it was illegal. An American businessman who worked for years in Angola wrote anonymously:

"According to law, it is only in cases where the "public interest" is involved that labor may be requisitioned and such requisitioning must be done by the government, operating through the chefes de posto.* Under this heading falls the forced labor on roads, which is done without benefit of wages. Most of the local road work in a given district is performed by women, who are taken from native villages nearby. It is a common thing in the interior to pass gangs consisting of twenty or thirty women of all ages, some in pregnancy, raising and letting fall their mattocks in unison as they clean ditches or repair the roads. For major government projects, men and boys are customarily recruited, often spending six months or a year many miles from home. (Harper's, 1961)"

Today labor can be extracted from Africans in many ways, some more subtle than direct coercion but having the same effect:
1) CORRECTIONAL LABOR: one may be forced to work instead of serving a prison sentence for non-payment of taxes.
2) OBLIGATORY LABOR: until 1961 all "natives" had to work six months of the year for the state, a company, or an individual. Since then, the law allows such labor to be used to "redress economic ills". The workers receive minimal pay.
3) CONTRACT LABOR: a contract between employer and employee. If the employee does not fulfill some part of the obligation, he can be forced to do correctional labor.
4) FORCED CULTIVATION: the farmer is paid for what he produces rather than for his labor. Most of the earnings go towards taxes.
5) EXPORT LABOR: Africans work in South African mines. South Africa pays Portugal a recruitment fee of six dollars per worker. Over 200,000 Mozambicans are recruited this way every year. In 1960 nearly one third of all Mozambican males worked in South African mines.

* local Portuguese administrator
In addition to forcing Africans to work for them, the Portuguese often claim land which has been occupied by Africans for centuries. In Angola, the average land occupied by Europeans is six times that owned by Africans. A Mozambican woman, Natacha Deolinda, describes this system.

"At Buzi the Portuguese bought all the land. There were some villages on the land, and the people in them were driven out and had to leave their homes, their land, and look for another place to live. They received no compensation for their houses; they were just driven out. In our area we were forced to leave, abandoning our fields, and the Portuguese planted sugar cane everywhere. We were not allowed to use the wells we had dug; all the water was reserved for the cane. If one of us was found with some sugar cane, they arrested us and made us pay fifty escudos for a tiny piece of it. They said we had stolen it, and if we didn't have any money the administration made us work for a week in the plantation, supposedly to pay for the bit of sugar cane."

Thus, the Portuguese can force Africans to work, force them to do a particular kind of work, regulate the amount they get paid for their work and take their land away from them. The effect of this system has been to totally disrupt the normal economic and social life of the African. In Southern Mozambique, more than half the Mozambican males live away from their families, working on plantations or mines. The forced production of cash crops has severely limited the amount of crops grown for food, causing frequent famines.
A Mozambican peasant, Joachim Maquizal, tells how Portuguese colonialism affected his life:

...the company paid money to the...government, and then the government arrested us and gave us to the company. I began working for the company when I was twelve... The whole family worked for the company; my brothers, my father — my father is still there. My father earned and still earns 150 escudos a month ($5.30). He had to pay 195 escudos tax yearly. We didn't want to work for the company, but if we refused the government circulated photographs and a hunt was started. When they caught them they beat them and put them into prison, and when they came out of prison they had to go and work but without pay; ... Thus in our own fields only our mothers were left.... All we had to eat was the little our mothers were able to grow. We had to work on the tea plantations but we didn’t know what it tasted like. Tea never came to our homes.
B. Social Relations

1. The Policy of Assimilation

The Portuguese say that, unlike in South Africa, there is no racial discrimination in the Portuguese colonies. Instead, they claim, there is equal social and economic opportunity for anyone who is assimilated into Portuguese culture, regardless of color. This policy of assimilation is based on the assumption of the superiority of Portuguese civilization. According to this philosophy, it is the mission of the Portuguese to "civilize" the Africans, which is to be accomplished by the spread of Portuguese culture in the colonies. In the words of the late Prime Minister Salazar:

"We should organize more and more efficiently the protection of the inferior races whose call to our Christian civilization is one of the most daring concepts and sublime tasks of Portuguese civilization."

In this philosophy, it is culture, rather than color which determines the rights and status of an individual. Unless an African gives up his own culture and adopts the Portuguese culture in full, he is not considered worthy of equal rights.

Until 1961 there was a legal distinction between those who had assimilated (assimilados) and those who had not (indígenas). For most Africans, the effect of this classification system was the same as South Africa's classification by race. Indígenas got lower wages, were restricted in job opportunities, political rights and property rights. All Europeans in the colonies were automatically classified as citizens in Portugal. But Africans had to prove that they were "civilized" to become citizens. They had to show that they could read, write, and speak Portuguese fluently; that they had sufficient means to support their families; that they were of good conduct (as defined by the Portuguese); that they had the necessary education and social habits to fit into Portuguese culture; and in addition they had to get approval from the local administrative authority and the district governor to get assimilado status. Some governors required that Africans stand in the public square of their villages and denounce their African heritage and ancestry. In essence, becoming assimilated meant rejecting one's people and one's past. An African high school student tells about the pain he felt at having to denounce his African identity and yet not being accepted as a White:

"By the end of secondary school, I was almost the only African left in class. I used to get lower marks than the Portuguese boys for the same work. My white companions could not see anything wrong with this. At the same time they used to talk in front of me about "those ignorant blacks", referring to unassimilated Africans, and they could not see how this might be painful to me as an assimilado."

The assimilation system was a false hope to most Africans. In order to become assimilated, one had to be educated, but in order to gain access to the educational system, one had to speak Portuguese (which presupposed in most cases, coming from an assimilado background). By 1960, after five centuries of the influence of Portuguese culture, only .08 per cent of the population of Mozambique, .7 per cent of the population of Angola, were assimilated.

### WHAT YOU EARN DEPENDED ON WHO YOU WERE

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33
Today the legal distinction between assimilado and indígena has been abolished but the philosophy behind it remains. Assimilation into Portuguese culture is still a goal offered to Africans by the Portuguese, and the prize is still higher wages, greater job opportunities, and elevated social status. In the last decade, the Portuguese have realized the psychological importance of offering upward mobility to Africans. New schools have been opened, more Africans have been given administrative posts, new jobs are being made available and more Africans are being integrated into the social structure. These developments are a direct response to growing discontent and organized resistance by Africans. The Portuguese realize that they can only hold on to their colonies if they promise concrete improvements in conditions to Africans. The campaign for reform is directed toward creating a class of Africans who are loyal to Portugal, and who will serve the needs of Portuguese interests in Africa. As such, it is an attempt to pacify Africans who might otherwise turn against the Portuguese. The effects of the campaign are, however, largely limited to urban areas. The masses of rural Africans remain uneducated, outside of the administrative structure and unable to change their economic position. For them the changes are paper reforms.

Thus, the assimilation philosophy is a strategy designed to give Africans the illusion that they can gain equal status to the Portuguese, and that conditions for them are improving. It is used to keep Africans quiet by offering them hope.
2. Education in the Colonies

The education system in the Portuguese colonies has traditionally reinforced the differential status of Europeans and Africans. Until recently, there were few public schools and these were attended primarily by Europeans. The education of Africans was left in the hands of missionaries. The number of Africans who actually got any education at all was very small. In 1950 in Angola, for example, there were a total of 737 African primary school students; the number who went on to secondary school was negligible. The fees for attending secondary school were high and advancement in school depended on knowledge of Portuguese (since all classes were taught in Portuguese). An indication of the impact of the educational system is the fact that in 1960 the rate of illiteracy in Mozambique was over 95 per cent; in Angola it was 99 per cent.

What education Africans did get is designed to make them good workers and loyal servants of Portugal. A Portuguese Cardinal described the goals of African education as follows in 1960:

"We try to reach the native population both in breadth and depth to (teach them) reading, writing and arithmetic, not to make 'doctors' of them... To educate and instruct them so as to make them prisoners of the soil and to protect them from the lure of the towns,... the path of good sense and of political and social security for the province....Schools are necessary, yes, but schools where we teach the native the path of human dignity and the grandeur of the nation which protects him."

Josina Muthemba, a Mozambican girl who was at technical school only a few years ago, talked about her school experience:

"The colonialists wanted to deceive us with their teaching; they taught us only the history of Portugal, the geography of Portugal; they wanted to form in us a passive mentality, to make us resigned to their domination. We couldn't react openly, but we were aware of their lie; we knew that what they said was false; that we were Mozambicans and we could never be Portuguese."

The new educational reforms do not change the basic fact of African education: that it is designed to create the kind of citizens who will serve the needs of Portugal. The Portuguese realized the need for a broader base of middle class Africans (for reasons outlined in the preceding section) and expanded the educational system accordingly, but the ultimate goal—maintaining the Portuguese in a position of power—remains the same.

III. Resistance to Colonialism

Africans have resisted Portuguese penetration since the initial contacts between them in the 15th century. Portugal was able to establish itself firmly along the coasts because of its superior naval power. Traditional African states and kingdoms organized the defense of the interior; they were usually able to hold off Portuguese efforts to conquer inland territory. But the lack of unity between African states sometimes enabled the Portuguese to benefit from divide and rule tactics. Portuguese forces, sometimes in alliance with Africans, engaged in extensive inland warfare to capture many thousands of slaves for export to the Americas. During four centuries of such sporadic warfare, Portugal was never strong enough to effectively conquer and control all of Angola and Mozambique, but had sufficient power to prevent any African states from restoring peace and unity to the area. By the early 20th century, the old Portuguese history, geography and culture, Christian morals, agriculture and handicrafts. African history and geography are ignored.
African states were demoralized and weakened beyond recovery, and traditional forms of resistance collapsed.

With the passing of the old order, new organizations developed among people who joined together on the basis of common suffering under Portuguese colonialism rather than the old ethnic and regional relationships. People began to understand their common oppression through tax collection, forced labor, and land seizure.

Resistance took several forms in the early decades of the century. In rural areas people tried to counter Portuguese exploitation by setting up cooperatives, but such new economic structures were soon crushed by colonial authorities. In the cities, Africans had closer contact with the Portuguese and weaker ethnic ties between themselves. In these urban conditions the seeds of African nationalism germinated. In 1920, urban Africans organized the African League, whose goals included national unity, unity between the peoples of different colonies, and unity of oppressed Black people everywhere. Other nationalist organizations crystallized during the 1920's in Angola and Mozambique. When Salazar came to power, however, these organizations were outlawed and broken up.

After World War II there was a general movement for independence and an end to colonialism throughout Africa. In the Portuguese colonies, three groups of Africans were struggling against Portugal through secret political organizing and actions.

The first of these were intellectuals, usually assimilados, who had come to regard the Portuguese notion of "national unity" as hypocritical. Many were students who met at Portuguese universities and through these early associations laid the groundwork for later political organizations. Their political consciousness took the form of cultural expression, since overt political action was illegal. Through poetry and prose they played on three main themes: 1) reaffirmation of Africa as their mother country and cultural heritage, 2) the call to revolt of Black people all over the world and, 3) the sufferings of ordinary Black people throughout Portuguese Africa.

I am coal!
You tear me brutally from the ground
and make of me your mine, boss

I am coal
and you burn me, boss
to serve you forever as your driving force
but not forever, boss

I am coal
and must burn
and consume everything in the heat of my combustion

I am coal
and must burn, exploited
burn alive like tar, my brother
until no more your mine, boss

I am coal
and must burn
and consume everything in the fire of my combustion

Yes, boss
I will be your coal.

José Craveirinha
The second group were secondary school students, who, for example, in Mozambique, formed an organization called NESAM and worked to build a sense of pride in their African heritage and Mozambican nationhood. NESAM was banned in 1964, but from it came many of the nationalist leaders who are today fighting the Portuguese.

Workers from the towns and plantations formed the third group. In 1947 and 1948 they conducted a series of strikes on Mozambican docks and plantations. Several hundred people were deported in retaliation by the Portuguese. In 1956 the police killed 49 striking dock workers. In Angola, three nationalist leaders were arrested in that year. Hundreds more were arrested, secretly tried, and sentenced to prison in 1959.

By the late 1950's it became clear that sporadic local resistance would result only in repression and death, and that it was necessary to organize into larger political units. Nationalist political parties were formed in all of the Portuguese colonies by 1960. The founders of these parties had come from a common political background, had studied together in Portugal and later worked together to establish organizations in their respective homelands.

In June of 1960 an Angolan nationalist party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), sent a memorandum to Portugal requesting a peaceful solution to the colonial question. The Portuguese responded by arresting 52 Africans, including MPLA leader Agostinho Neto. When villagers from Neto’s region went to demand his release, they were fired upon. Thirty were killed; many more were wounded.

In early 1961, a group of cotton workers protested low wages and bad working conditions in Southern Angola. The Portuguese responded by bombing their villages. More Africans were killed. By mid-March a nationalist organization called UPA led laborers of the North of Angola in a revolt against their employer after he had killed their fellow workers. The protest spread. In the months that followed, 20,000 Africans were reported killed by the Portuguese in a systematic campaign of repression. When a police station in Luanda (the Angolan capital) was attacked by Angolans, the Portuguese responded by killing 3000 in that city alone.

In Mozambique, over 500 Africans were killed on June 6, 1960 in a peaceful gathering outside a government official’s office in the town of Mueda. The story of that massacre is told by an eye-witness:

"How did that happen? Well, some of these men had made contact with the authorities and asked for more liberty and more pay... After a while, when people were giving support to these leaders, the Portuguese sent police through the villages inviting people to a meeting at Mueda. Several thousand people came to hear what the Portuguese would say.

Then the governor invited our leaders into the administrator’s office. When they came outside, the governor asked the crowd who wanted to speak. Many wanted to speak, and the governor told them all to stand on one side.

Then without another word he ordered the police to bind the hands of those who had stood on one side, and the police began beating them. When the people saw what
was happening, they began to demonstrate against the Portuguese, and the Portuguese simply ordered the police trucks to come and collected these arrested persons. So there were more demonstrations against this. At that moment the troops were still hidden, and the people went up close to the police to stop the arrested persons from being taken away. So the governor called the troops, and when they appeared he told them to open fire. They killed about 600 people. Now the Portuguese say they have punished that governor, but of course they have only sent him somewhere else."

By the early 1960's it had become clear to nationalist leaders that their struggle would have to go beyond appeals to the U.N. and protest demonstrations which ended in massacre. Political organization by itself was not sufficient. In the words of the leader of the Mozambican independence movement, Eduardo Mondlane:

"By 1961 two conclusions were obvious. First, Portugal would not admit the principle of self-determination and independence, or allow for any extension of democracy under her own rule, although by then it was clear that her own 'Portuguese' solutions to our oppressed condition, such as assimilation by multi-racial colonatos, multi-racial schools, local elections, etc., had proved a meaningless fraud. Secondly, moderate political action such as strikes, demonstrations and petitions, would result only in the destruction of those who took part in them. We were, therefore, left with these alternatives: to continue indefinitely living under a repressive imperial rule, or to find a means of using force against Portugal which would be effective enough to hurt Portugal without resulting in our own ruin."


Right: leaders of liberation movements (from top to bottom) Amilcar Cabral (Guinea-Bissau), Agostinho Neto (Angola), Marcelino dos Santos (Mozambique).
Nationalist leaders spent several years making political preparations for this new stage of struggle. They studied the specific characteristics of every region of the country. They talked at great length with the people in each region to convince them that by working together they could defeat their foreign rulers. They explained that their enemies were those who opposed the freedom of the colonies rather than the Portuguese people or all white people in general. In a message to the Mozambican people, the Mozambican Liberation Front explained:

"The purpose of our struggle is not only to destroy. It is first and foremost aimed at building a new Mozambique, where there will be no hunger and where all men will be free and equal. We are fighting with arms in our hands, because in order to build the Mozambique that we want we must first destroy the Portuguese colonial system...only after this will we be able to use for ourselves our labor and the wealth of our country..."

The liberation movements have now been involved in armed struggle for nearly a decade. These wars have been fought by the entire populations of the colonies. Everyone is not armed, but the few people who have weapons are supported by the rest of the people. Unarmed people help by raising food, giving shelter for those fighting, transporting supplies and most important, by changing their own society.

In the liberated areas, the people administer their own villages. Schools, health clinics, and stores have been set up. In the liberated areas of Guinea, four times as many children are attending school than were able to under colonial rule. Social patterns are also changing. People rely less on magico-religious practices to cure diseases or to protect themselves from bullets. Rival tribes are now working together. Women are moving out of their subservient positions and are taking part in all aspects of building the new society.

A "schoolroom" in liberated Guinea-Bissau.
In Angola, the eastern half of the country is no longer under the control of the Portuguese. In Mozambique, the three northern provinces are free. In Guinea-Bissau, the entire country except for the coastal cities is ‘liberated territory’ controlled and administered by the people. These victories reflect the determination of the people who have fought under incredible hardships with few supplies or weapons from the outside. They have had to rely on themselves.
In the preceding chapters emphasis has been placed on South Africa and the two Portuguese-controlled territories, Angola and Mozambique. This is because South Africa and Portugal are the two major powers that dominate the whole of Southern Africa. There is, however, a third bastion of White supremacy—Rhodesia, or Zimbabwe as it is referred to by the Africans of that country. Zimbabwe is like South Africa and the Portuguese territories in that a small minority of Whites exercise complete control over a large majority of Africans. It differs in that Whites have only occupied Zimbabwe for comparatively short period of time (around 7 years); and the White regime there is not nearly as powerful or influential as either South Africa or Portugal. In fact, Rhodesia is heavily dependent on South Africa for support—economic, military, and political.
I. White Conquest

Zimbabwe is a landlocked country. To the South the “great grey green greasy Limpopo River” (made famous by Rudyard Kipling) separates it from South Africa. The northern border with Zambia is marked by the Zambesi River. The land in between is a flat plateau, covered with scrubby bush and outcroppings of huge, smooth rocks. Several hundred years ago (probably around the 15th century) a major civilization controlled the plateau, but the only remains of its sophistication are the magnificent stone ruins of Zimbabwe. The history of Zimbabwe which concerns us here, however, does not begin until the late 19th century, the time of the first conflicts between Whites and Blacks.

It was into the land between the Limpopo and Zambesi Rivers that King Mzilikazi led his people in the early nineteenth century, to avoid subjugation to Whites advancing from Cape Town into the North. He established his court at Bulawayo (now one of the largest cities in Zimbabwe), from which his people, the powerful Matabele nation, dominated the territory between the two rivers. In 1869 the King died and was succeeded by his son Lobengula. The new king took charge of a rich and thriving nation respected for its military might. When he died 25 years later his land had been invaded by Whites, the strength of the Matabele nation broken.

The man primarily responsible for this was an Englishman, Cecil John Rhodes, after whom Rhodesia was named. Rhodes was Prime Minister of the Cape Colony from 1890. His financial dealings in South Africa had made him one of the richest men in the world. He was president of De Beers, the huge diamond mining and marketing conglomerate, as well as a partner in one of the largest gold companies exploiting the mines around Johannesburg. Rhodes was an ambitious man. His dream was to extend British influence from “Cape to Cairo”, linking Southern Africa with the North. He needed to invade and conquer Central Africa to accomplish this. In addition he believed that the land occupied by the Matabele nation had some of the richest deposits of gold in the world. Rhodes wanted to be the only person with access to mineral rights in that country. By 1888 the court of Lobengula was besieged with Whites requesting permission to mine the Matabele territory. But Lobengula was not prepared to give away such valuable concessions. Rhodes outwitted his White competitors by tricking Lobengula into signing a concession that granted “complete and exclusive charge over all minerals situated and contained in my
He did this by bribing the missionary on whom Lobengula relied for translation of the concession document. Lobengula could not read English. He was persuaded to sign the concession, believing it to be something quite different than it was. When Lobengula discovered his mistake he sent a letter to Queen Victoria renouncing the document. Rhodes maintained that the letter was a forgery.

The British government did not want to annex territory north of the Limpopo as it was too costly—but after the concession was signed, it granted a charter to Rhodes for his British South Africa Company. The company won the right to both mine and "protect" its interests in Matabeleland. Rhodes knew that Lobengula would not accept White miners invading his country. So Rhodes was determined to have a military showdown to finally break the power of the Matabele. In 1893 an incident arose over some cattle that were stolen by Whites. The White officer in charge refused to return the cattle to Lobengula's representatives. Rhodes seized the opportunity to mount a volunteer army, promising each volunteer land and riches should they win. Lobengula appealed to the Queen and to the English government at the Cape but his ambassadors were arrested and shot. Bulawayo was attacked by a White volunteer army which mowed down the Matabele soldiers with machine guns, rifles, and cannons. The Matabele had only spears with which to fight. About five Whites were killed and over five thousand Africans died in the fighting. Lobengula fled with some of his people and died of smallpox and malaria in 1894.

II. Zimbabwe Under White Minority Rule

The history of White occupation of Zimbabwe covers only about 75 years. Today, there are some 200,000 Whites living among an African population of well over four million. Most of the White settlers arrived only in the twentieth century: three quarters have lived in Zimbabwe less than 20 years, and one quarter have been there less than 10 years. When African nationalists talk about "settlers" in Zimbabwe they are talking about the present, not something that happened in the distant past.

Even after the victory of the volunteer army over Lobengula, the British government did not step in and Zimbabwe was ruled by the British South Africa Company until 1923. In that year the White minority population was granted self-government by the British Parliament, while
Britain retained control over foreign affairs and a veto on discriminatory legislation. The latter was intended as some protection for the African population, but Britain never exercised the power of that veto even though many laws were passed by the White government that specifically discriminated against Africans. In the early days Rhodes had laid the foundation of self-government for Whites. The franchise excluded Africans from power (voting depended on financial and educational qualifications to which Africans had little access). An educational system was established based on race discrimination. Between 1928 and 1964 only 94 Africans had completed high school, although schooling was compulsory for all Whites. And, like South Africa, the land was divided into White areas and Black areas in order to ensure economic prosperity for the Whites.

For some forty years Whites continued to administer Zimbabwe as a self-governing territory under the ultimate jurisdiction of Britain. Throughout that time there was steady opposition from Africans to White rule, sometimes in the form of petitions to the British government, at other times in the form of major demonstrations or uprisings. But the British government never interfered with the steady consolidation of White rule.

There was however, always the possibility that Britain could interfere in the affairs of Zimbabwe. By the early 1960's the White settlers there were agitating for complete independence from Britain. Britain refused to grant Zimbabwe independence until the White government agreed to initiate steps that would lead to "majority rule" in the country—that is, until steps were taken that would give everyone, both White and Black, the right to vote. This was emphatically refused by the Whites, who had no intention of handing over even limited power to Africans. In the election of 1962(in which very few Africans had the right to vote) an extreme right-wing political party, campaigning on a platform of White supremacy, swept into power. The party, called the Rhodesian Front, is led by Ian Smith. Relations between Britain and the Rhodesian Front deteriorated steadily, with the latter pushing for independence from Britain while refusing even to consider majority rule. Finally, when it became obvious that Britain would not "grant" independence, the Rhodesian Front issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). This was an illegal act and was immediately condemned throughout the world.
world. South Africa and Portugal are the only countries anywhere which have openly supported the Smith regime since 1965. All other countries closed their embassies and consulates and have refused to recognize the Smith government as the legitimate government of Zimbabwe.

To bring about the downfall of the illegal government, Britain appealed to the United Nations to impose sanctions against Zimbabwe. This was done in an attempt to cut off all supplies in and out of the country. Sanctions were adopted, but the United Nations did not support a blockade of Mozambican and South African ports, through which all Zimbabwean exports and imports must pass. South Africa and Portugal were only too pleased to support the new White regime and so, although the economy suffered, the Smith government has survived.

Further legislation has been passed enforcing segregation of schools, public facilities, and land (including cities and suburbs). Major political parties have been banned and there is strict censorship of the press, radio and all other publications. Citizens may be deprived of their citizenship if the Government feels that they have acted in a way that is "detrimental to Rhodesia". What all of this means in effect is that there is only one opinion allowed in Zimbabwe—support for continued White supremacy.

African opposition to White settler rule has never been eliminated. Dating back to the government of Mzilikazi, Africans have made many and constant efforts to regain control of Zimbabwe. For many years African leaders relied on Britain for support, but the success of the Rhodesian Front in declaring independence has finally shattered that one hope of constitutional change. Today the African nationalist parties recognize that the Rhodesian regime is not as strong as South Africa and will increasingly rely on its powerful southern ally for support. There is already close collaboration between the South African and Rhodesian police forces—and South Africa maintains a permanent military presence in Zimbabwe.

White minority rule in Zimbabwe is another link in the chain of White domination of Southern Africa. Guerilla fighters trained outside the country have returned and have engaged in open battles with both Rhodesian and South African forces. African nationalist leaders recognize that the struggle against White domination is not limited to their own country, and so there is close cooperation between Africans from Zimbabwe and South Africa, as well as from Angola and Mozambique.

Since UDI, the Front has moved on all levels to consolidate White control. Taking an example from South Africa, several laws have been passed that make it impossible to carry out any political opposition without fear of police repression. Many political leaders are in jail or in detention camps in isolated areas of the country, forbidden to communicate with anybody. The White regime has detained almost all African leaders, such as Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole. Nkomo was arrested nine years ago and has never been brought to trial. Sithole was sentenced in 1969 to life imprisonment. In Zimbabwe, as in South Africa, any opposition to the government is severely dealt with.

Rhodesia: Army uses weapons such as this 25-pounder gun against African Guerrillas.
PART TWO

SOUTHERN AFRICA IN WORLD POLITICS
A note on terminology:

Terminology is an often unnoticed form of bias. This problem arises in finding a suitable designation for the United States and its allies. American politicians often use the term “Free World.” This usage generally refers not only to the industrial countries of Western Europe and America but to all countries outside the Communist bloc. Thus “Free World” includes such totalitarian states as Portugal, Brazil, Nationalist China, and Greece. Such countries may be “free” from Communist rule, but they hardly qualify as states whose citizens enjoy any political freedoms.

Another common label is simply “The West.” Since the world is round, this term is arbitrary. It developed among European peoples, from whose perspective Turkey and China appeared to the East. To a Vietnamese, Los Angeles would be in the East, while the Philippines would be West to a person in Oregon.

In common usage, “The West” connotes not so much a geographical concept but a social system based on private enterprise. Its corollary, “The East,” refers to a system in which the state controls the means of production. Japan is a leading Capitalist country, but it is obviously located in the “East.” Cuba is a Communist country in the “West.”

The only neutral terms seem to be those which refer to the social systems directly. Therefore, this pamphlet uses “Capitalist powers” to indicate what are often called simply “the leaders of the Free World.” The terms “West” or “Western powers” is used for purposes of variation, but they should be understood as a social rather than a geographical designation.
I. Portugal’s Dilemma

Today African movements in the Portuguese colonies are fighting for their independence. Over the past ten years Portugal has had to face increasingly expensive wars in attempting to defeat these nationalist movements. It spends a higher percentage of its Gross National Product on defense than any other Western country except the United States. But America is the richest country in the world; Portugal is the poorest country in Europe. Half of the population remains illiterate. The average yearly income for a Portuguese citizen is $360. Ten percent of that meager income must be paid to the government as defense tax. Portugal has an annual defense budget of $400 million. This represents half of the country’s state revenues.

African revolts in the early 1960’s caught Portugal unaware. In 1961 it had only 3,000 troops stationed in Angola. During the next six months Portugal sent 50,000 soldiers there and spent 15 per cent of its gold reserves in emergency expenditures. Revolts in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau brought a dramatic increase of troops to these colonies as well. But Africans responded by strengthening their opposition to the Portuguese—resistance continued to grow each year.

Like Portugal, Britain and France had both faced demands for independence in their colonies. But their influence in the former colonies was not automatically threatened by decolonization and they chose to leave the continent. The mother countries had trained an administrative elite to oversee the commercial operations established under colonial rule. When the Europeans withdrew the newly independent states continued to sell their produce and minerals to Europe, and buy necessary manufactured goods in return.

Portuguese Soldiers on parade in Luanda, the capital of Angola.
Portugal, on the other hand, doesn't have the financial resources of Britain or France. Without the protection of colonial trading relations with the colonies, Portugal would be squeezed out of its business in Africa. For example, the Portuguese textile industry cannot compete with foreign companies buying cotton from Angola or Mozambique at higher prices. Portugal would have no basis for continued economic domination of the colonies if they were to be granted independence.

Furthermore, Africans were never raised to managerial positions in the colonial administration. In recent years the Portuguese have conceded some social benefits to the Africans. But in spite of these measures, no client class of Africans has emerged which could carry out the present administrative functions. While the French and British made colonial reforms in times of relative peace, social reforms in Portuguese Africa are now being instituted in a time of war. Africans cannot trust that the Portuguese have the welfare of the people in mind when for every new school built, ten villages are destroyed by bombs. At this point, decolonization would mean the loss of Portugal's political influence in Africa.

Portugal chose not to follow the wave of decolonization in Africa and is firmly committed to defending its colonies in Africa. It now has 160,000 well-equipped troops in the colonies. The cost of maintaining these forces has drained Portugal's economy. Unable to cope with the financial burden of a sustained war effort, Portugal has had to turn to other Western countries for assistance.

At the outbreak of the wars Western countries were hesitant to aid Portugal. This was a time when anti-colonial movements were growing elsewhere in Africa and Western powers saw no future in the perpetuation of an old style colonial regime. So Portugal had to offer attractive reasons for Western support.

A. Portugal Looks for Help

In the early sixties Portugal passed a series of laws which gave foreign companies generous incentives to invest in the colonies. Prior to then, Portugal had virtually sealed off the colonies from any economic relations with other Western countries. The following account helps to explain this reversal:

"In a kind of last minute panic Portugal has in the past few months opened wide its hitherto almost hermetically closed doors to foreign investments. The reason for this changed course is...the knowledge that Portugal will inevitably lose the struggle now beginning for its colonial empire if it is not able in time to win powerful allies for itself in the struggle...in this dangerous situation Salazar has radically changed his economic policy without much noise, with a minimum of publicity even, he set out economically to internationalize, to the greatest possible extent, his empire. It is in particular the Americans, the Germans and the Japanese who are called upon in connection with the industrial development in Portugal's underdeveloped African possessions. Today this policy is securing the intended results...lately there has been a growing realization that the involvement of foreign capital in Portuguese Africa has its effects on the attitudes of foreign governments to the nationalist revolts."—from the German paper, Die Zeit, 1961

The inflow of Western capital into the colonies has provided Portugal's weak economy with foreign exchange necessary to cover its military expenditures. Portugal receives part of the profits of every company that is given permission to operate in the colonies. The Portuguese share of the profits comes from surface rents, income taxes, concession rights, and royalties which each corporation must pay to the local administration where it is doing business.

This accumulation of foreign capital allows Portugal the flexibility to import military supplies as they are needed.

In the interest of maintaining their lucrative operations in the colonies, corporations have lent financial backing to the Portuguese war effort. In this way Portugal has implicated Western corporations in its policies and derives political support for continuing the wars.

As Portugal began to solicit Western support by opening the colonies to foreign investment, some Western powers were still reluctant to take an unpopular stand on the side of colonialism and aid the Portuguese. The Angolan revolts in 1961 and the ensuing bloody Portuguese reprisals brought international condemnation to the Portuguese regime. In January 1962 the United Nations passed a resolution confirming Angola's
right to independence. This blow to Portugal's image in the world was sharpened by the fact that the United States voted in support of the resolution.

In an effort to pressure the U.S. to reverse its policy on the Portuguese colonies, Portugal threatened to cut off U.S. military base rights in the Azores. During this period U.S. strategists viewed the Azores bases as indispensable for American security in the region. Nearly eighty per cent of U.S. military transport en route to Europe refueled there.

The Portuguese threat elicited the intended response from the U.S. In December 1962 the U.S. voted against a United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning Portuguese policy and calling for a ban on the sale of arms to Portugal. The following year the American Under Secretary of State for Africa, Mennen Williams, stated that: "It is neither in our interest to see the Portuguese leave Africa nor to curtail their influence out there." Ever since then, the United States has voted in the U.N. against resolutions demanding that measures be taken against Portugal.

Owing to the development of longer-range aircraft, the strategic value of the Azores to the U.S. has been declining steadily since the crisis of the early sixties. But U.S. business interests in the colonies have increased tremendously over the same period. Although strategic considerations have ceased to dictate U.S. policy towards Portugal, the future stability of American business operations in the colonies has demanded that the U.S. maintain favorable relations with the Portuguese regime. Perhaps this second consideration helps to explain why the U.S. has not chosen to return to its former anti-colonial stance in the United Nations.

For years the Portuguese complained that the U.S., their ally in Europe, worked against them in Africa. There is less of that kind of talk now and the Portuguese expect the relationship to keep on improving under Nixon."—U.S. News and World Report, 1969

In 1969 Portuguese Foreign Secretary Noqueira confirmed that this change in attitude towards Portugal was not unique to the U.S. but applied to the rest of the Western world as well:
"For a long time it seemed as though the big powers had united against Portugal; meanwhile however the Western big powers have recognized the value of Portugal’s Africa policy...I can confirm that we have information from reliable sources that the military leaders of the Western big powers would become very anxious should Portugal’s position in the world be impaired."

But along with this pledge of political support from the West, Portugal has had to accept further external control over its domestic economy. In order to hold on to its colonial “Overseas Provinces”, the Portuguese regime has become dependent on those countries supporting it. Members of the anti-colonialist movement in Portugal wrote about this development as early as 1962.

"West Germany is now, even more than the U.S.A. and Great Britain, the country from which Salazar is trying to get economic support for his barbarous policy in Portugal and the colonies. This support, as usual, is acquired in exchange for important concessions—which are placing Portugal more and more in the absurd position of having to be a colony in order to keep on being a colonialis country."

The financial invasion of the colonies is an extension of the situation in metropolitan Portugal. For years foreign capital in Portugal has permeated all but the agricultural sector of the economy. The major banks are dominated by foreign capital and they in turn control the most important economic activities.

Portugal is one of the world’s largest producers of uranium, but the sixty most important uranium mines are owned by British and American interests. The major iron mines belong to a German steel trust. Another critical industry, tungsten production, is controlled by British capital. In the service industries, the production and distribution of electricity is dominated by a U.S. firm while the urban transport, radio and telephone systems are run by British companies.

Portugal’s Minister for Industry voiced his concern for this situation in 1969.

The gap between the economically advanced countries and underdeveloped countries is increasing. The good wishes formulated by governments are not followed by the private activities of those who hold economic power. And the main question is still to know if, within the pure logic of a market economy, it is possible to find a solution to that problem...Recently some foreign investments have been made in our country, mostly to take advantage of the relatively cheap labor force, which is rare and expensive in industrialized countries. There is therefore no implementation of productive techniques, design, commerce, or management techniques. Business is dominated in all its aspects by foreign investors, and all that remains Portuguese is the range in occupational hierarchy from shop floor to assistant foreman."

Portuguese colonialism survives today because Western powers have offered the economic and political support necessary to sustain the war effort. But by allowing intense Western involvement in its economy, Portugal has sacrificed a large measure of control over both its domestic and colonial economies.

B. New Plans for the Colonial Economies

Since 1960, the Portuguese military presence in the colonies has pumped large amounts of new money into the local economies. This money has been concentrated in the development of roads and other communications networks in order to increase the mobility of the Portuguese army and also to pave the way for foreign investment. In Angola, for instance, the 1961 overseas development expenditure was $40 million. Two years later $164 million was allocated for “development”, half of which was spent on a crash program for roads, airports and communications. Of the remaining funds, $10 million was spent on geological and scientific surveys to determine raw material potential.

This allocation of development funds points to a change now taking place in the economies of both Angola and Mozambique from agricultural production to mineral extraction. In 1968 agriculture accounted for sixty per cent of Angola’s exports, while diamonds, oil and iron ore accounted for only 28 per cent. In 1969
however, while ninety per cent of the population was still engaged in agricultural production, the total value of mineral exports exceeded that of agricultural exports.

The mining industry in the colonies is being rapidly developed by the joint effort of Western corporations and the Portuguese government. Portugal has had to prepare the colonies for investment by determining the potential for mineral extraction and by building facilities such as roads leading to valuable mineral reserves. This kind of preparation has absorbed a large portion of development funds. Foreign companies in turn have provided the capital, equipment and know-how to develop the industry. A portion of the profits are then paid to the Portuguese government, but the largest part remains in the hands of foreign corporations. The colonies have no control over their foreign currency earnings. While the colonial economies have been radically altered by this development, the people of Angola and Mozambique receive none of the natural resources of their land.

II. Western Involvement Takes Many Forms

A. Trade

The U.S. has played a prominent role in absorbing agricultural produce from the colonies. It buys more than 80 per cent of Mozambique’s major cash crop, cashews. The U.S. buys 60 per cent of Angola’s coffee crop—which is to say nearly half of the country’s agricultural produce. This trade in coffee makes the U.S. the second largest consumer of Angola’s total exports.

Angola’s External Trade in 1968

% imports from % exports to

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>Other</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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The U.S. became Angola's second largest source of imports only five years ago after Britain held that position for years. The U.S. and West Germany have replaced Britain because of huge purchases of equipment for their new mining and oil enterprises in Angola.

B. Investments

More and more companies have been attracted to invest in the colonies as rich and untapped reserves of oil, minerals and hydroelectric power have been discovered. Already thirty U.S. companies are operating in Angola.

In 1957 Gulf Oil Company received a concession for exploration off the northwestern tip of Angola, in an area called Cabinda. A rich oil strike was finally made in 1966. Portugal will receive 50 per cent of the profits, providing it with much needed revenue. In 1970 Gulf's payments to the Portuguese government reached $16 million. Only about $5 million was in the form of royalties on actual 1970 oil production. But due to expanding military expenditures Portugal requested advance cash payments. So Gulf complied by granting the Portuguese $11 million in payment for future royalties and taxes on anticipated oil production. In the preceding year Portugal had received $11 million from Gulf most of which had also been in the form of advance payments.

The Gulf operation also makes Portugal self-sufficient in oil and Angola may become the fourth largest oil producer in the world. In 1970 it began to export oil, primarily to Japan and a few northern European countries. The Cabinda oil discovery is of special importance to South Africa, which has no oil of its own. If sanctions were applied against South Africa, the cut-off of oil could cripple its economy. But thanks to Gulf, South Africa could continue to get oil from its Portuguese ally to offset the impact of such sanctions.

A ready supply of oil is crucial for the maintenance of Portugal's modern war machinery. Angolan liberation movements have attacked the Gulf installations several times. Because of this, the Portuguese government has forced all Africans who were living in the Cabinda area to leave. The Gulf camps are surrounded by barbed wire fences and spotlights and are well patrolled. This enables Gulf to continue expansion of its activities protected from attacks. As the Johannesburg Star, a South African newspaper said:

"It is probably the prevailing peace that has made it possible for the American Cabinda Gulf Oil Company to step up its production from 745,000 tons to 2,457,000 tons in the past year. Nobody says it out loud that possibly Americans have found that a few dollars a day keep the terrorists away."
(South Africans refer to African guerillas as "terrorists")

An interpretation of Gulf's role in the colonies by the Committee of Returned (Peace Corps) Volunteers.

Dave Bragin
West Germany has taken a prominent posit in Angola's trade because of the Cassinga iron ore center, which was built by the Krupp firm at the head of an international consortium. Germany has had connections with Angola since World War II, when about 1,100 German landowners moved there. They strongly influence German policies in Angola.

A Portuguese company owns the mines but Krupp took over the financing of investments, delivered the equipment for the mining plant, and generally coordinates the project. A 130 mile railway line was built with help from Krupp along which the ore reaches the coast. Most of the ore is then exported to Krupp steel mills in Germany.

C. Law and Order and the Corporations

All companies with mining rights in the colonies have a contractual obligation to help "maintain law and order" by contributing to the national defense. For example, a huge diamond consortium, DIAMANG, extracts 40 million carats a year in an area in northeastern Angola. All foreign investors have to pay a special defense tax initiated in Angola in 1963, amounting to 28 per cent of their earnings. In addition DIAMANG has its own private mercenaries led by South African professionals. In 1963 and again in 1964 DIAMANG spent $600,000 on these "security personnel and facilities."

ANGOLA: Concessions for Mining held by Companhia Miniera do Lobito and Sociedade Miniera do Lombico

NOTE: This map shows only the two most important mining companies' holdings; much of the rest of Angola has also been conceded to mineral-extracting concerns.
A wave of terrorism which treacherously attacked the North of Angola imposed heroic sacrifices on the Armed Forces and the people.

Mobil, which has served the province since 1914; which pioneered in bringing in all places the petroleum products so important for its development; which, in the good hours and the bad, always joined in the destiny of Angola and its people — Mobil could not be absent from these sacrifices.

Mobil has participated with pride in the struggle for the defense of the province, pledging itself to assure the supply of fuels and lubricants necessary for the Armed Forces and the people.

MORE THAN HALF A CENTURY AT THE SERVICE OF THE COUNTRY
D. Loans and Aid

Revenue provided from foreign companies in the colonies is only one source of Western support for the war effort. Portugal also relies on direct loans for military assistance. A large portion of Western loans are booked as "development aid". In 1969 the Portuguese Prime Minister, Caetano, admitted the close connection between the colonial wars and international financing:

"All the military effort overseas has been and will go on being supported from the ordinary income which before was largely used to cover development expenses. Now we have to face many of these expenses with money obtained by loans."

Development expenditures in the colonies have consistently been used to support the military. Of all the development funds allocated to the colonies, half is contributed by the Portuguese government while the other half is derived from foreign loans.

E. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The most significant amounts of military aid to Portugal have been delivered in the name of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 1949, at the instigation of the United States, fifteen European countries signed an agreement stipulating that member countries would grant protection to each other from internal and external attacks against their governments. NATO military integration includes operational planning and joint management of supplies and communications. NATO countries supply each other with weapons for mutual forces. This defense treaty gives Portugal access to the advanced weaponry and sophisticated techniques of its more powerful allies. In return for this, other NATO countries secure rights for strategic military bases in Portugal and the colonies. They also get preferential trading agreements with the colonies.

Portugal has never paid its share in the NATO alliance. It has also consistently broken the terms of the alliance by using NATO arms in the "Overseas Provinces" which are outside the NATO defense area. Here again Portugal has defended its breach of the treaty by playing upon the strategic value of the territories for the West. Portuguese foreign policy statements continuously stress the importance of Angola and Mozambique in securing Western control over the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. To implement this control Portugal has called for an extension of the NATO defense area to cover the colonies. In practice this demand has been met. NATO assistance continues:

"Portuguese Guinea is the last territory in West Africa possessed by a NATO power and should be considered in relation to the vital Cape route and to the strategy of Western resistance to tricontinental subversion."—NATO's Fifteen Nations, 1968

Western powers have attempted to abdicate responsibility for assisting Portugal in its colonial wars in Africa by denying that arms furnished by NATO are used in Africa, but are kept in Portugal for internal defense. But this argument is based on the assumption that the role of Portugal's military in Europe is separate from its role in Africa, so that cooperation in one area has nothing to do with cooperation in the other. It ignores the fact that arms supplied by NATO can free other arms for use in Africa by guaranteeing the defense of Portugal itself. The Portuguese make no distinction anyway since they claim that the wars in Africa are being waged in defense of national territory which includes the "Overseas Provinces".

Portugal's relationship to NATO as depicted by Angola-Comite, a Dutch anti-colonial organization.
After the outbreak of the colonial wars, Portugal began a major expansion of the navy as a part of a long-term overseas defense program. In addition to its crucial function of transporting troops between Portugal and Africa, the navy has an important role in controlling the colonies by patrolling the long coastlines and many navigable rivers and lakes. One of the first steps in building up the navy was an agreement with France under the auspices of NATO for a long-term loan of $125 million for the construction of twenty vessels. In 1967, a new agreement with France granted the navy $4,740,000 for installations and training centers. Generally Portugal builds its own small patrol ships and is supplied with larger transport ships by NATO allies.

In Angola and Mozambique where there are few roads and long distances for troops to cover, the airforce is a crucial part of the war machinery. Portugal is dependent on its NATO allies for all its aircraft and heavy weapons. It is able to produce its own light weapons in its NATO supported armaments industry. Portugal's airforce is composed of a variety of transport aircraft and jetfighters supplied primarily by the U.S. and West Germany. It receives helicopters from France and South Africa. The U.S. also supplies napalm as documented by Professor John Marcum:

"By January 1962 outside observers could watch Portuguese planes bomb and strafe African villages, visit the charred remains of towns like Mbanza M'Pangu and M'Pangala, and copy the data from 750-pound napalm bomb casings from which the Portuguese had not removed the labels marked "Property of U.S. Air Force.""

Portugal uses the income derived from military bases leased to France, Germany, the U.S. and Britain as a part of the NATO alliance to defray its military expenditures. NATO installations alone are valued at $30 million with Portugal's contribution less than three million. As the Minister of Defense commented:
"Although Portugal did not contribute on a large scale to the work of NATO due to our struggle in the overseas territories, our allies always show much comprehension for our position."

Right: Vestiges of American napalm in Angola.
F. Training the Army

The U.S. plays an important part in the training of the Portuguese army through its Military Assistance Advisory Group stationed in Portugal. 133 Portuguese received training under this program in 1969 and a similar number in 1970. In addition, Portuguese officers come to the U.S. to train. In 1968, 107 men were trained in the U.S. at the expense of $120,000. In 1970 there were 33 officers training in the U.S., some of whom were at Fort Bragg studying psychological warfare and counter-insurgency. To date, Americans have trained nearly 3,000 Portuguese soldiers in the U.S. and in Portugal.

In the summer of 1965 West Germany, Portugal and South Africa signed a military agreement providing for West Germany to train officers from Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia. In Lisbon, the “Permanent German Military Mission” offers military trainers and advisors and is also an important voice in the utilization of the Portuguese military budget.

III. South African Involvement in the Colonies

In the interests of consolidating its political and economic control in all of Southern Africa, South Africa has become increasingly involved in the Portuguese territories. Economic links between South Africa and Mozambique have always been strong, yet they have been played down until recently because of theoretical differences in racial policies and a history of colonial rivalry between Portugal and South Africa. Since 1903, South African mines have used cheap migrant labor from Mozambique in exchange for hard currency payments to Portugal. South Africa also pays for agreements extending its use of Mozambique’s port, Lourenco Marques. In the past few years the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa has acquired sizeable oil interests along the coast.

South African involvement in Angola is more recent. The Anglo-American Corporation has participated in several consortiums financing the development of Angola’s fast growing mining industry. Angolan surplus coffee production has found a ready market in South Africa. In 1964 Portugal and South Africa signed eight separate agreements to hasten economic development in the colonies. In 1965 additional agreements were made to increase trade between the two regimes.

In 1968, Salazar’s successor Prime Minister Caetano defined his policy of alliance with South Africa:

"There is often talk in the UN General Assembly of a secret alliance between Portugal and the Union of South Africa and Rhodesia. Needless to say, there is no alliance whatsoever, either secret or open, linking these three countries. In any event, we practice different racial policies and the extent to which we are committed to pursuing and perfecting our policy of non-discrimination and good relations is well known. However, in many respects our interests in Southern Africa coincide, in that we are convinced that progress in that part of the continent requires the stable presence of the white man, who establishes roots, adapts and becomes attached to the African land and is associated with the native there. That is why, for example, we cannot remain indifferent to the destiny of Rhodesia, whose principle outlet to the sea is Beira. (a port in Mozambique)"

South Africa has gone to great expense to solidify this alliance with Portugal and is already participating in the colonial wars. South African troops are active in the southern districts on Angola and in 1968 a large South African base was established there in the district of Moxico. Bases in Namibia also give logistical support to the Portuguese forces operating in the south of Angola. The South African Minister of Defense announced that South Africa is setting up rocket launching bases 72 miles from the Mozambican border.

In the interest of strengthening white rule in Southern Africa, Portugal and South Africa have established a symbiotic relationship: South Africa needs water, power, cheap mining labor and oil while the Portuguese territories lack sufficient capital, know-how, organization, and military power.
Cabora Bassa: Powerhouse of Southern Africa

The Cabora Bassa scheme is comprised of a huge dam and powerhouse to be built on the Zambezi river at the Cabora Bassa rapids plus a transmission line running through Mozambique into South Africa. The first phase of the project, to be completed by 1974, includes the construction of the main dam and generating plant at the cost of $360 million. The dam will produce almost twice as much power as Egypt's Aswan dam currently produces.

The project is to be financed by an international consortium, ZAMCO headed by the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa. West German, French, Canadian and South African companies are participating in the consortium. Widespread public protest in Sweden forced a Swedish electro-manufacturing combine to withdraw from the consortium. An Italian firm has also withdrawn under pressure of protest. It is to be replaced by the Transmission Lines Construction Company (TLC) of South Africa. This entry of TLC into the project will bring combined (government and corporate) South African participation in the scheme up to two-thirds of the total financing. The US Export-Import Bank has been asked to finance the transformer system of the project at the cost of $55 million. Some liberal US diplomats warn against involvement. General Electric is nevertheless pressing to furnish the equipment.

The financing of the dam rests heavily on export credits to be granted by the governments of the participating firms. And additional $123 million will be provided by South African official sources. The Portuguese contribution amounts to $96 million.

One of the objectives of Cabora Bassa is to associate European economic interests with the maintenance of Portuguese control over the area. The African liberation movement, FRELIMO, now controls the northern third of Mozambique. This includes the area surrounding Cabora Bassa, where Portuguese and South African troops are currently fighting to regain control. In an attempt to subvert the struggle, white settlers are being introduced into the region. They will be expected to defend their privileges there and subjugate the local African population. The projected settlement of one million Europeans becomes a second crucial objective for Portugal. The South African director of the scheme said: "It will transform more than 100,000 square kilometers of jungle, swamps, and bush into fertile land for hundreds of thousands of peasant families." Over 24,000 Africans will have to move from that land to make room for the 150 mile-long lake, which will be formed by the waters backed up by the dam.

Representatives of the ZAMCO consortium examine a model of the Cabora-Bassa Dam.
The Cabo Bassa hydroelectric project

Damming the river will make it navigable across the continent to Angola; linking Rhodesia, Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique even more closely with South Africa. Hydroelectric power produced will be important to South Africa, which has no natural source of power. In the process of financing this project South Africa assures itself a source of power, and binds the economy of Mozambique more closely to its own. Cabo Bassa is an economic reinforcement of white minority rule in Southern Africa.

The site of the dam with proposed construction sketched in; the circled boat gives an idea of the scale of the project.
Liberation movements in Southern Africa have forced the question of how Portugal is to maintain control over its “Overseas Provinces”. The expansion of the war effort over the past ten years has not solved Portugal's dilemma in the colonies. The war has been widened at great cost to the Portuguese. Beyond the economic crisis, the wars have cost the Portuguese popular support at home and in Africa.

The war has become increasingly intolerable for the Portuguese people. The draft, inflation and unemployment have forced half of Portugal’s men from the age of 18 to 45 to emigrate over the past decade. Draft evasion and desertions from the army are now widespread. Students and sectors of the Catholic Church have organised their opposition to Portugal’s colonial policy. Thousands of political prisoners are incarcerated in Portugal’s jails. The war effort has also been impeded by the plunging morale of troops stationed in Africa. Young soldiers do not feel that they are defending their national territory and don’t know why they have been forced to risk their lives thousands of miles from their homeland.

In the colonies, the war has involved more and more Africans each year. Portugal’s military presence in Africa has not curbed resistance to colonialism. Instead, it has further alienated Africans from their Portuguese colonisers. The Portuguese have sacrificed a measure of political control in the colonies in an attempt to consolidate their control militarily. In the words of a South African journalist, Al Venter, who travelled with the Portuguese in Angola:

It is here where the Portuguese in Africa have a similar problem to the Americans in Vietnam. Both Portugal and America are trying their best to win over the bulk of the civilian populations to their respective ideals. Both nations however are encountering opposition in this field from their guerrilla opponents — the Americans from the Vietcong and the Portuguese from the MPLA.

‘That is why the war in Angola is so different to what it was in 1961’, Captain de Campos pointed out. ‘You cannot kill or imprison everyone who disagrees with you — you must win their confidence for they are your future allies,’...

This sign has been posted on the walls of Lisbon by anti-colonial forces. It reads: We are deserting with our arms. Against the colonial war! For the people's war! The three small figures are: Caetano, a general and a capitalist.
In order to win the confidence of the African people, the Portuguese have taken several measures to liberalize their colonial policy. Caetano has suggested the "concession of a progressive and adequate administrative autonomy" to the colonies. He was not speaking of granting independence, but establishing a mechanism of control which would be a less overt form of colonial rule. This means the strengthening of the local administration in each of the colonies, by training a black elite of professionals to work in conjunction with the present administration of white settlers. It means broadening a sector of the population which is allied with Portuguese interests by offering administrative positions, professional and educational opportunities to more Africans. These measures have met with little success in terms of winning the support of the local population, for the reforms have been limited in scope and instituted at a time when the war is involving a growing portion of that population.

Caetano has also advocated large scale settlement of Whites in the colonies. But despite the massive exodus of Portuguese from their country each year, relatively few have chosen to settle in Africa. In order to encourage emigration to the colonies, Portugal has recently offered high incentives for settlers around the projected dam sites.

In attempting to defeat the independence movements in Africa, Portugal has had to recognize its subordinate role in the capitalist world. Powerful American, British, West German and Japanese corporations are already involved directly in metropolitan Portugal and the colonies and indirectly through their interests in South Africa. In the short run, these business interests would like to see the liberation movements suppressed by Portuguese colonialism. In the long run, they have no interest in Portugal retaining its colonial presence in Africa. Because Portugal is dependent on continued Western support for the colonial wars, it is looking for a political framework in the colonies which will form a satisfactory base for the activities of international capital but would still leave Portugal with some kind of advantageous relationship with Africa.

In light of South Africa's economic expansion in Southern Africa, the increased absorption of the territories into the South African sphere of interests appears inevitable. But Portugal is not an unwilling partner in this alliance to preserve white minority rule. Recently relations between Portugal and South Africa have improved.

Vorster's unprecedented visit to Lisbon in 1969 is an indication that these two regimes are anxious to cooperate for their mutual benefit. The progressive integration of the Southern African economy around South Africa serves the interests of Western business as well. Western corporations have long demonstrated their willingness to cooperate with apartheid and white settler regimes so long as they are able to maintain the profitable conditions of the status quo.

As Austin Coates, a British journalist writing for the Anglo-American Corp., S.A. has noted:

"On the European side there is no longer the confidence in the African (it was also rather casual acceptance of him) that there once was. Though the concept of apartheid is generally unpalatable to Portuguese, there is a perceptible veering towards what may be called South African thinking, a sense that with so much at stake Europeans in Southern Africa, in defense of their own civilization, must put themselves and their children first, and never mind the outside clamor if to do this is regarded as an admission that all men are not quite equal."
CHAPTER FIVE

APARTHEID TAKES THE OFFENSIVE:
THE REGIONALIZATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

I. Military Regionalization

A. South Africa and the Portuguese Colonies.

There has never been much love lost between Portugal and South Africa during the centuries of their mutual presence in Southern Africa. White South Africans dislike Portuguese pretensions of multi-racialism. South African Afrikaners in particular often speak of the Portuguese people as the "scum" of Europe, and treat those Portuguese who have emigrated to South Africa accordingly. In addition South Africa has a history of distrust for possible expansionist tendencies of Portugal in Southern Africa.

In recent years there has been a marked growth of South African military assistance to Portugal for the maintenance of Portuguese colonialism. This is a response to several changes over the last decade. The emergence of independent African states pledged to the liberation of Southern Africa, the birth of liberation movements themselves, and pressures on the South African economy to expand have all forced South Africa to play down its differences with Portugal. Their common interest in preserving White minority rule has drawn them closer together in defense of the status quo.

South Africa intends to maintain a buffer zone of friendly states in Southern Africa between itself and African-rulled states to the North. Maintenance of this zone makes it more difficult for Black South Africans trained abroad in guerrilla warfare to slip back into the country. Also, such a buffer zone keeps plenty of distance between the oppressed Black South African majority and free Africa.

Should the liberation movements in either Angola or Mozambique defeat Portugal and come to power, the area of White minority rule in Southern Africa will be substantially reduced. The very presence of African nationalist states on the borders of South Africa would provide further encouragement to the Black South African majority. And there is little doubt that an MPLA or FRELIMO government would allow South African guerrillas to cross into South Africa from Angolan or Mozambican soil. (Zambia and Tanzania already permit this to happen.)

In the years ahead South Africa is likely to send more arms and troops to assist the Portuguese war effort. But support for Portuguese colonialism is only a strategy to achieve the goal of creating a buffer zone. Should Portugal’s position seriously deteriorate in spite of South Africa’s help, the strategy could change; but the goal would remain the same.

Whatever strategy South Africa pursues in the future, it is determined to use its strength to win one overriding objective—to prevent an African nationalist movement from coming to power in "Portuguese" Africa. If and when Portugal is finally routed by the forces of the liberation movements, the guerrillas are going to find that South Africa will intervene rather than allow an African government hostile to South Africa to come to power right on its very borders.

B. Settlers and Satellites.

South Africa also views the white minority settler areas of Namibia / South West Africa*and

* South West Africa is the term used by White South Africa. The United Nations has decreed that the official name of the country is Namibia — the term also used by the liberation movements.
SOUTH AFRICA'S Buffer States
Zimbabwe/Rhodesia and the satellite states of Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland as component parts of the buffer zone.

Namibia was a German colony until World War I. The League of Nations then declared the territory to be a trusteeship of South Africa. Today, despite the U.N. resolutions, South Africa rules it outright as a colony. South Africa has imposed the apartheid system wholesale, to the benefit of those white South Africans who have emigrated there. From the South African viewpoint, Namibia is the most secure area of the entire buffer zone sphere.

Zimbabwe was a British settler colony until 1965, when the small White settler minority of 200,000 defied Britain and declared a unilateral independence. Outnumbered twenty to one by a subordinated African population and faced with a world trade boycott, its shaky, isolated regime relies heavily on South Africa for economic and military support. Since 1965 the Whites have rushed to imitate the South African apartheid system to consolidate their control.

Africans from both these settler territories have formed liberation movements pledged to end "Whites only" rule. These movements control no territory as yet although guerrilla fighters from both Namibia and Zimbabwe have been engaged in fighting. In Zimbabwe South African troops (called 'special police') have joined Whites there in operations against the guerrillas. There have been casualties on both sides.

Zimbabwean and Namibian nationalists face the same hard truth as do MPLA and FRELIMO. Their aspirations are going to come into sharp conflict with South African intentions in Southern Africa. They too will have to deal with the power of South Africa before they can win back control of their countries from settler minority rule. By attempting to establish a buffer zone north of South Africa, the struggle in each of the five countries has become a common one. All will ultimately have to deal with South Africa.

The last sector of the Southern African buffer zone consists of three former British territories now governed by Africans. Lesotho is entirely within South Africa, comparable to the location of West Berlin inside of East Germany. This is almost true for Swaziland as well, while land-locked Botswana shares common borders with three White minority regimes.

All three states have populations of less than a million people. Their economies are heavily dependent upon South Africa, leaving little choice for their governments but to support the South African government. In actuality they are "independent" in name only and have little viable basis as nation-states.

South Africa is content to leave these states under African rule, controlling their affairs only indirectly. Former Prime Minister Dr. Henrik Verwoerd once said:

"It is in our interest to see that the people in these three territories have a sober outlook....It is important that we give our friendship to such parties in these territories, especially when, as now, they are also the ruling parties."

Reduced to satellite status, they dare not challenge South African policies in Southern Africa. When the U.N. votes on resolutions to condemn apartheid, the representatives of these tiny states either abstain or discretely stay away. Their African leaders have denounced the liberation movements in the region. They cooperate with South African police in apprehending South African guerrillas who try to travel through or seek sanctuary in their countries. South Africa decides who may leave and enter these states, and planes bound for Lesotho must first land in South Africa to be searched. In light of their desperate situations, it is difficult to imagine that these states could do anything but cooperate with South Africa's buffer zone strategy.

This strategy is already paying dividends to South Africa. Minister of Information Dr. C. P. Mulder said in a 1969 speech:

"Thanks to our good relationship with our neighbors in the North, North-west, and North-east, we have been able to foil terrorist attempts and we have been able to block escape routes by terrorists to these countries."
II. Economic Regionalization

A. The Politics of Free Trade

The South African government disclaims any intentions of further territorial acquisition in Africa. Indeed, the buffer zone strategy is essentially a defense of the status quo. But while territorial conquest is not a current policy, economic expansion throughout Southern Africa and beyond certainly is.

In recent years South African imports have greatly exceeded exports. Because South Africa is ‘buying’ more than it is ‘selling’, the Government is anxious to change this, as South Africa is losing money. Exports must be increased. However South Africa has difficulty in selling its manufactured goods on European or American markets—for one thing they are far away and transportation costs are high, making the goods too expensive. The goods cannot always be sold in South Africa because under apartheid Blacks are paid low wages so they cannot afford to buy many manufactured goods. South Africa has thus been looking for new markets elsewhere.

Since 1963 South Africans have been pushing for a “free trade area” which would include every country in the buffer zone area. A “free trade area” means that there are no customs duties or tariffs on goods that are traded between the countries of that area. Since South Africa would be the most developed partner in such an arrangement, it would benefit the most. Highly developed South African industries would have a guaranteed market for their manufactured goods. The absence of customs and tariffs would make it difficult for newly established industries elsewhere within the region because they would have no protection from South African competition.

Trade patterns might therefore resemble a classic colonial pattern, with South Africa in the role of industrial mother country while other members produced only raw materials. Zimbabwe and Portuguese Africa are reluctant to enter a free trade scheme. A recent article in the British trade journal African Development helps explain why:

"For South Africa the era of economic imperialism has scarce begun. One of its paramount aims is to stabilize its neighboring states and build a firm defensive block. The well-known ‘outward-looking’ policy also implies the desire to dominate the southern half of the continent economically."

South Africa has a favorable balance of trade only in Africa, where exports are triple imports. There is mounting pressure to expand exports further to the rest of Africa while holding down imports. In the near future, therefore, it will have to put more pressure than ever on the rest of Southern Africa, and perhaps some African states further North, to join with South Africa in a new free trade common market complex.

Nearly all nations desire trade, but when desire becomes necessity it generates tendencies for a strong nation to impose trade agreements on a weaker country, usually on terms more favorable to itself. When one nation compels another to trade and then dictates the terms, it constitutes an economic form of domination. For the weaker Southern African neighbors, membership in a common market may well become the price of continued South African protection against the liberation movements.

B. The Politics of Investment

South Africa also promotes capital investment throughout the region. Already South African public and private investment totals over one billion dollars. South African capital is especially concentrated in Zimbabwe, where it controls six of the ten largest firms. In recent years, South African companies have been sinking capital into oil and mineral extraction in both Angola and Mozambique. They also have investments in all three satellite states.

South African capital and exports are playing a major role in the three hydroelectric dam projects currently under construction in Southern Africa. These dams will serve as a major source of both water and electric power. South Africa will become the principal customer for both.
Overtures to independent Africa since 1967 have met with some success so far. By 1970 African leaders throughout the continent were openly engaged in a bitter debate about whether or not to change their earlier posture of hostility to South Africa to a more conciliatory one. President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast urged African states to abandon the isolation strategy and called for a "dialogue" with South Africa. Some of the responses to his proposal follow:

**FOR A DIALOGUE**

Isolation and boycott will not solve things, we have got to start talking. You come here and see the way we live, and we can visit you to learn about your ways. This might not solve problems immediately, but I believe, honestly and strongly, that in the end it is the only solution to our problems.

Dr. Hastings Banda, President of Malawi (in a toast to South African Prime Minister Vorster at a Malawi state banquet given in his honor)

![Prime Minister Vorster and Dr. Banda]

Let us show ourselves exactly as we are to the South Africans and we shall effectively contribute to the welfare and emancipation of our black brethren.

Philibert Tsiranana, President of Malagasy Republic

Economic sanctions and guerrilla war won’t work. We should begin to negotiate with South Africa while encouraging constitutional and moral change.

Dr. Kofi Busia, President of Ghana
AGAINST A DIALOGUE

We cannot have a dialogue with someone who thinks of Black people by word and deed only as hewers of wood and drawers of water for other races. I cannot see how, we, being placed in this category by South Africa, can initiate a conference of dialogue without having placed ourselves in a position of accepting the implications and surrender to this policy. The same thing applies to Rhodesia and Portugal.

William Tubman, President of Liberia

It is not surprising that the Ivory Coast leader wants to surrender to South Africa even before any dialogue takes place. He is a satellite of France, and his country’s economy is controlled by the French. And since the French government supplies the arms to South Africa, contrary to the resolutions of the United Nations, the French satellite can see nothing wrong with it.

General Gowon, President of Nigeria

Our quarrel is not about frontiers, but oppression; if South Africa ceases her oppression, then her peoples will have no need of support from Free Africa. But in the meantime you cannot have a non-aggression treaty with aggression, and the whole basis of apartheid is aggression and violence against the human spirit.

Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia

This present proposal probably arises from dissatisfaction with the rate of progress of decolonization during the 1960’s, and an ever-increasing awareness of the cost of wars of liberation in human and resource terms. It is probably also connected with a fear that the conflicts in Southern Africa could drag our continent into the cold war, which every free African nation has been concerned to stand aside from... But in the absence of an internal dialogue between the minority government and the people of South Africa, it would be a very grave betrayal for free African states to participate in a dialogue with that regime.
As investments increase there, defense of the buffer zones becomes no longer just a military strategy to insulate apartheid — it provides protection for economic expansion as well. Should any liberation movement come to power in some part of this sphere, the new government would demand control over its own resources. This potentiality gives South Africa yet another motive to commit its strength to the destruction of the liberation movements.

C. The Politics of Migrant Labor

South Africa has long taken advantage of the severe poverty of its neighbors by employing about a million migrant workers from these countries at any given time. Most of this labor is used in the mines, where some 65 per cent of the work force is foreign. While wages are rock-bottom, these jobs are the only alternative to chronic unemployment back home. Most of the workers come from Lesotho, Malawi, and Mozambique.

South Africa gets several benefits from this abundant source of cheap labor. It can pay the lowest wages because of the scarcity of jobs. Migrant competition is one more device to keep wages down within the black South African work force (and contributes to domestic unemployment). Furthermore, the migrant workers send back badly needed foreign currency as savings, which their governments use to pay for imports. This dependency gives South Africa another lever of influence over its neighbors — it can threaten to expel or bar migrants from any neighboring area that opposes its policies. Such a measure would both cut off a source of foreign currency and swell the ranks of the unemployed back in the workers’ country.

South Africa looks to Southern Africa as a vital area to increase exports and expand capital investment, as a source of cheap water and power, and as a vast labor pool. It stands to benefit most from further economic integration of the region. The more this proceeds, the greater will be South Africa’s determination to preserve the political status quo throughout the area. A pro-government Afrikaner newspaper commented in 1969:

"South Africa can pack a lot of economic, technological, and cultural power into her good neighbor policy....There has been no such sweeping vision of South Africa’s potential role in Africa since Cecil Rhodes’ old-time imperial dreams."

III. South Africa Looks Across the Buffer Zone

A. The Dialogue Issue

"We as a small state have not only the knowledge but the experience, because we understand the soul of Africa and Africa’s people, and therefore I say we have a mission to Africa and the world."

These words come not from one of Africa’s many nationalist heroes of the struggle for independence, but from South Africa. From White South Africa. From no less than Prime Minister Balthazar Vorster. 1967.

Over the last decade or so, African-ruled states replaced European colonial rule throughout most of Africa north of the Zambezi River. These new states established in 1963 the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.), a kind of United Nations for independent Africa. Its members pledged to work for the end of White supremacy and colonialism in Southern Africa by means of a trade boycott, vigorous international diplomacy, and support for liberation movements.

These policies obviously have not rid Africa of apartheid, but they did serve to isolate South Africa from the continent and much of the world. At first, South Africa responded to the newly independent African states with contempt and arrogance, contending that Africans were incapable of governing themselves. In recent years, however, it has toned down such attitudes in preference for what high officials call the “outward” policy. This shift is essentially a strategy to win new friends on the other side of the buffer zone with the South African version of open door diplomacy — a handshake and the Rand.*

The outward policy initially developed when the satellite states of Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland won independence from Britain in 1966. Despite some protest from die-hard White supremacists, South Africa offered the new states friendship and assistance. The leaders of these three States accepted these gestures, promptly denounced the liberation movements, and proclaimed a policy of peaceful co-existence with apartheid. The stage was now set for expanding the outward policy to selected countries on the other side of the buffer zone.

* The South African currency. R1=$1.40
B. South Africa's Response to Africa

1. The Carrot

The strongest support for Houphouet-Boigny's proposal has come from Malawi, which is the only African country that has established full diplomatic relations with South Africa. It argues that this step has led to many benefits for the country: increased trade; South African tourists; over $25 million in aid; more employment for Malawian migrants; and South African private investment. In return the South African Air Force will use as a base the airport now being built with South African aid. A white South African has become head of Malawi's Information Services.

The outward policy has also caused some complications for Malawi. Much of Africa has branded Malawi president Dr. Hastings Banda as an "Uncle Tom". Malawian diplomats in South Africa have suffered humiliation from apartheid. South African tourists are demanding segregated facilities.

Malawi's position in international politics has shifted dramatically. It systematically abstains on all U.N. and British Commonwealth resolutions against White supremacy in Southern Africa. President Banda is encouraging other African states to break with the O.A.U. trade boycott and denounce the liberation movements. He refers to his White neighbors as "my friends" and argues that they have every right to be in South Africa, while calling the Arabs in North Africa the real intruders on the continent.

Elsewhere on the continent there are other breakthroughs for the outward policy. Despite the trade boycott, independent African states imported well over $100 million of South African goods in recent years. South Africa does not name specific African countries in its trade statistics so as to save its new partners embarrassment. But in a number of countries goods with a South African label are openly sold in stores. South African fruit juices have even been served at government parties in the Congo. South African goods are much cheaper than those imported from America or Europe, which partly explains this continuing trade.
There are reports of South African capital finding its way into numerous countries which profess to have no relations with South Africa, including Kenya, Ghana, and Sierra Leone. Ghana now welcomes White South African visitors without requiring that they denounce apartheid. Gambian ports have been opened to South African ships and planes, and both trade and tourists are publicly encouraged.

A 1969 editorial in the Rand Daily Mail, a major South African newspaper, made this assessment of the outward policy up to then:

"Decolonization has left a vacuum in Black Africa which South Africa is quietly moving to fill. South Africans are playing an important role as expatriate experts vital to newly independent nations. Their companies are busy in such lands as Malawi and Mozambique. Their money is financing these projects. And their intelligence men are building a chain of listening posts across the continent. This ‘outward-looking’ policy has been spectacularly successful in countries like Malawi, Swaziland, Botswana, and Lesotho, but bridges are now being built to nations like Malagasy, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Congo—even Kenya and Uganda."

Those African leaders who are supporting the call for a dialogue with South Africa argue that increased contact will lead to modifications of the apartheid system. There is no evidence to date that any such changes are taking place. If anything, the reverse is true. Some critics of the dialogue approach argue that those who favor it are simply trying to justify the economic benefits they hope to get by establishing ties with South Africa. Comments from South Africa itself support this argument:

"There must be no misunderstanding about my outward policy. Diplomatic links with other African states would not in any way interfere with South Africa’s policy of separate development. In fact the establishment of the links is a guarantee towards the continuation of the White man’s position in South Africa."—Prime Minister Vorster, 1970

2. The Stick

Nearly all those African leaders who have favored the dialogue proposal have also expressed futility about the chances of liberating Southern Africa through armed struggle. Those states which are developing closer ties with South Africa will undoubtedly be pressured into ending whatever support they may have given to the liberation movements in the past. And a weakening of African solidarity for the liberation movements is, of course, one of South Africa’s principal objectives for adopting the outward policy in the first place.

The African National Congress of South Africa viewed with dismay the support among some African countries for proposing a dialogue:

"The decision to opt for armed struggle was not taken lightly in South Africa....We knew that many of us would pay a heavy penalty for daring to rise up in anger against our oppression. But the choice of how to conduct our struggle was our own and it must remain so. If some states find it difficult to support us in our course then let them not, at least, treat with the enemy. This is our urgent plea from one African nation to another."

Most African states continue to pledge support for the uncompromising O.A.U. position on South Africa. A few are particularly firm in their solidarity with the liberation movements, notably Tanzania and Zambia. For these states, South Africa uses the back hand of its outward policy.

There is considerable evidence that South Africa has promoted conflict and division in free Africa, particularly within the most powerful states that are potential rivals to South African power on the continent. A good number of White South African mercenaries fought in the Congo during its turbulent years of civil war and insurgency. South Africa sent arms to both sides in the Nigerian Civil War, seeing advantage in having Africa’s largest country tearing itself apart.

In recent years South Africa has concentrated on threatening Tanzania and Zambia. Its planes regularly violate the air space of both countries. Zambia claims to have caught South African sabotage agents. South African and Portuguese troops have harassed Zambian border villages to discourage people there from helping guerrillas fighting in neighboring Zimbabwe. South African money has turned up in the coffers of the
political opposition in both Tanzania and Zambia. Vorster has warned President Kaunda of Zambia:

"If you want to try violence, as you have advised other states in Africa, we will hit you so hard that you will never forget it."

IV. South Africa: Savior of the Free World

A final aspect of the outward policy concerns South Africa's relations with the rest of the world, and the Western capitalist states in particular. The breakup of African unity around the issue of South Africa has significance far beyond African shores, according to Minister of Information Dr. C. P. Mulder:

"because it knocks out one of the cornerstones of the persistent attacks on South Africa in so many other countries."

And Foreign Minister Dr. H. Muller:

"Thus when Dr. Kaunda tries to incite the West against us he does not speak on behalf of all the African states and I hope the world realizes this, if it has not already appreciated the position."

As the West becomes aware of our fruitful cooperation with other African states, their attitude towards us improves. I believe that it will happen to an increasing degree because we must simply accept that our relations with the rest of the world are largely determined by our relations with the African states.

South Africa is evidently anxious to convince the West that it has good relations with its African neighbors. If African countries are willing to deal with South Africa, this will give added justification for continued contact with South Africa by countries outside the African continent. The U.S., Britain, and France have all supported Houphouet-Boigny's proposal for a dialogue. Its implementation would make it easier for the major capitalist powers to continue "business as usual" in South Africa.

South African propaganda is directed especially at winning favor with the United States by appealing to the American pre-occupation with Communism. Again, Dr. Mulder:

"South Africa will have to do her best to prevent the spread of Communism to the North of her borders if the leaders of the West are unwilling or unable to do so. South Africa is called upon to protect Western interests in Southern Africa and as far North as she can."

A government broadcast in 1968 noted:

"We are still part of the Western culture and in essence we are Western but at the same time we are an undetachable part of Africa, and to win African states for the West in its struggle against Communism, South Africa is the key and not the fly in the ointment. The sooner the West realizes this the better it will be for all concerned."
South Africa's claim to be an outpost of Western civilization has deep historical roots. The White supremacist regime which exists today is a legacy of the continuous expansion which has characterized Western Europe since the Renaissance.

White South Africa began as a settler society of Europeans moving into an area already occupied by a less technologically developed people, like similar invasions into Australia, Siberia, parts of North and East Africa, and the Americas. Initially Europeans settled along the Cape of Good Hope to set up a strategic way station at the Southern tip of Africa. European ships stopped there for provisions en route to the plunder of East African city states, the conquest of India, and the capture of the rich East Indian spice trade.

The settlement colony had originally been a Dutch venture, but passed to British control during the Napoleonic Wars early in the 19th century. England emerged from these wars as the world's leading naval power. Its "national interests" consequently demanded control of the key passageway to the riches of Asia.

British concern for the South African interior rose sharply in the 1880's with the discovery there of the richest deposits of gold and diamonds ever found anywhere in the world. Suddenly South Africa was no longer just a strategic route to Asia. British capital poured into South African mines. Englishman Cecil Rhodes urged his country into new imperialist adventures inland. The potential of this great wealth developed a second British "national interest" in South Africa. One result was the very bloody and destructive British-Boer War from 1899-1902 (see Chapter 1).

That war soon led to the formation of an independent South Africa in 1910. But British capital maintained economic control of the country as before. British investment in and trade with South Africa has been a major pillar of British prosperity ever since.

During the last several decades, economic power in South Africa has become more diversified. The Great Depression and World War II reduced both trade and investment coming from a preoccupied Britain. This economic decline of Britain overseas began to open South African doors to newcomers from France, West Germany, Japan, and above all, the United States.

During this same period, White South Africans themselves assumed a more active role in promoting the industrial growth of the country. Severe disruptions in the international economy caused by both depression and war stimulated a drive within South Africa to build a more self-sufficient economy. The government established numerous state industries to guarantee that South Africa would produce essential commodities such as steel, thereby lessening its dependence upon imports during years of crisis. For the first time, South African private entrepreneurs began investing heavily in mining and manufacturing.

Since 1652, this European settler community has occupied a strategic location for Western economic expansion into the Indian Ocean network. For a century now, this same White minority has acted as a broker for Western capitalist access to a cheap African labor supply and vast reserves of precious metals. Since the Great Depression, foreign investors have combined with public and private South African capital to generate one of the most rapid industrial growth rates anywhere in the world. Foreign corporate cooperation with government economic policies has made South Africa today virtually self-sufficient in almost every sector basic to a modern industrial society. All the
major capitalist countries conduct a heavy volume of trade with South Africa. These same countries have helped it to become one of the most powerful military forces on the African continent, despite an arms embargo adopted by the United Nations.

This chapter examines in considerable detail the nature and extent of contemporary ties between South Africa and the West. The first section surveys private Western economic interests in South Africa and the principal issues arising from this extensive involvement. The second section outlines the relationships between South Africa and the industrial capitalist world at the governmental level. As the struggle between White minority rule and African liberation intensifies, the policies of Western countries tomorrow will be shaped largely by the stakes they have in South Africa today.

Part One – Corporate Interests and South Africa

I. A Survey of Corporate Involvement

A. Trade

Foreign corporations from the leading capitalist countries dominate almost all of South Africa's international trade. British firms account for about a fourth of South Africa’s imports and exports. American and Western European companies account for another half. Japanese firms have now become South Africa’s most enthusiastic trading partners. In the past four years, South Africa’s trade with Japan increased three times faster than its trade with other countries. To avoid discriminatory embarrassment to Japanese businessmen now in South Africa, the government has classified them as “honorary Whites” rather than as Asians.

![South African Exports, 1968 (total: $2,104,000,000)](image1)

- All of Africa: $1,186 million
- Great Britain: $661 million
- West Germany: $541 million
- U.S.A.: $146 million
- Other European countries: $308 million
- Japan: $286 million

Main exports: manufactured goods; food and live animals; raw materials (especially minerals, including chromium, uranium, vanadium, platinum, asbestos, manganese, iron ore, and gold.)

Source: UN, 1970

![South African Imports, 1968 (total: $2,619,000,000)](image2)

- All of Africa: $1,262 million
- Great Britain: $679 million
- U.S.A.: $654 million
- West Germany: $575 million
- Japan: $173 million
- Other European countries: $469 million

Main imports: heavy machinery and transport equipment, 43.6% manufactured goods, 25.0% mineral fuels, 7.0%

(source: UN, 1970)
B. Investment

Foreign investors had a total of $6.4 billion in South Africa by 1968, representing a 15 per cent increase over 1967. If the growth of foreign investment continues at that rate, the total value will rise to $9.3 billion by the end of 1971.

Foreign corporations accounted for $5.6 billion of the 1968 total—the remainder came from governments and international financial institutions as loans. This figure represents only the "book" value of foreign investment—it does not include profits which were re-invested in South Africa nor any increase in value of the original investment due to appreciation. The actual value of foreign corporate investments by 1968 was therefore much higher than the $5.6 billion figure would indicate, but the statistics for book value are the only ones available.

More than two-thirds of all foreign investment in South Africa is in British hands. The US and a few West European countries dominate the other third of such investment.

This large bloc of foreign money plays a major role in the South African economy. For example, foreign firms control 25 per cent of South Africa's manufacturing capacity. To help evaluate the impact of this foreign investment in South Africa, consider the following case history of the Union Carbide Corporation.
C. Union Carbide: A Case Study

In the 1930's, Union Carbide took a portion of its profits from operations in the United States and used them to buy chrome ore mines in South Africa. It sold the ore it mined to Western European nations. These sales added to South Africa's exports, bringing foreign currency into the country. The South African government took a portion of the company's profits as taxes.

Union Carbide had two choices concerning the profits it made: it could have sent them back to the United States, or it could have kept them in South Africa to expand its operations in that country. Because of low labor costs and the rapid growth of the South African economy, Union Carbide decided, as many other foreign firms have done, to use its profits to start another business in South Africa.

This time it built a new factory to produce plastics and insecticides. It relied heavily on South African labor and financing from South African banks to build its new facility. It bought South African raw materials. It advertised its products in South African magazines and distributed them to South African businesses and individuals. Its profits added new wealth to the South African economy that was not there before. This new wealth is called surplus, and as it circulates in the economy, it can be used to finance other new businesses. Thus, while adding to the absolute size of the economy, foreign investment also adds to its ability to expand more rapidly than ever.

Union Carbide's contributions to the South African economy need not stop there. To increase its own profits, the company may bring some of its administrative and technical experts to South Africa to ensure that the latest techniques of management and production are used. It may offer such expertise to other South African corporations to help them grow. This assistance could in turn create more demand for Union Carbide products, or perhaps lower the cost of purchasing raw materials. It may encourage other American firms to invest in South Africa.

Like any corporation, Union Carbide has to be concerned with labor prices and policies, interest rates on financial transactions, government taxes, inflation—in general, with the outlook for economic stability and profitability. Union Carbide invested in South Africa because it had confidence in the viability of its economy.
Total American investment in South Africa is only a fourth of British investment there, but it tends to have more value than the figures alone would indicate. Since 1950, Americans have invested heavily in those industries which are most crucial to a modern economy. This strategic investment has played an important part in the rapid industrialization of South Africa since World War II.

By 1958, Ford and General Motors controlled 70 per cent of the total assets of South Africa's auto industry. Automobile production is often one of the key industries in generating industrial growth because it stimulates related industries such as glass, oil, rubber, and steel production. At the insistence of the South African government, American automobile companies have helped to make the auto industry in South Africa close to self-sufficient—almost all the component parts are now produced locally. These same investments have saved South Africa millions of dollars in foreign exchange by eliminating the need to import cars. Furthermore, U.S. auto subsidiaries help to build up South African military potential, such as in the manufacture of trucks for troop and supply transport. A General Motors plant has been designed specifically to allow conversion to military production if necessary.

At this point in South Africa's economic development, high technology industries such as data processing appear to be the ones that will grow most rapidly, providing the foundation for more sophisticated industrialization. American companies like IBM have a near monopoly on computer and computer-related industries in South Africa.
Despite its great wealth of natural resources, South Africa lacks oil, without which its military and industrial machinery cannot move. The government has been anxious to avoid dependence on imports from the Middle East because of the threat of an international boycott of oil exports to South Africa. Some 17 American companies have joined the South African government in efforts to make South Africa self-sufficient in oil production. After considerable exploratory work, they have begun drilling some

EXPLORATION LEASEHOLDERS
SOUTH AFRICA: ONSHORE
1 SOEKOR
2 SOEKOR Sub-leaseholders
3 Argus Exploration
4 Karroo Basin
5 Royden Development
6 HM Mining
7 Karroo Petroleum
8 CF and IIE Slabbert
9 JJ Van den Herve
10 GT Raydon
11 Midlands Oil
12 Zululand Oil
13 Zitzikamma Oil
14 (Transkei)
15 (Game Reserve)

SOUTH AFRICA: OFFSHORE
SOEKOR Sub-leaseholders
16 Esso Exploration and Production
17 Karroo Basin
18 Capricorn
19 Karroo Petroleum (West)
20 Amoco
21 Atlantic Richfield
22 Caltex
23 Placid International
24 Superior Highland Tenneco Cities Service
25 Total (CPP)
26 Mobil Total Shell BP
27 Karroo Petroleum (East)
28 American Pacific

SOUTH WEST AFRICA
29 SWAKOR
30 SWAKOR Sub-leaseholders
31 Shell BP
32 Gulf Oil
33 Chevron Diamond Mining
34 HM Mining, Syracuse, Woodford
35 De Beers Consolidated Mines SNPA
36 Etosha Petroleum
37 Consolidated Diamond Mines

SOUTH WEST AFRICA
29 SWAKOR
30 SWAKOR Sub-leaseholders
31 Shell BP
32 Gulf Oil
33 Chevron Diamond Mining
34 HM Mining, Syracuse, Woodford
35 De Beers Consolidated Mines SNPA
36 Etosha Petroleum
37 Consolidated Diamond Mines

Despite its great wealth of natural resources, South Africa lacks oil, without which its military and industrial machinery cannot move. The government has been anxious to avoid dependence on imports from the Middle East because of the threat of an international boycott of oil exports to South Africa. Some 17 American companies have joined the South African government in efforts to make South Africa self-sufficient in oil production. After considerable exploratory work, they have begun drilling some off-shore sites. In addition to the search for local deposits of oil, U.S. companies like Caltex, Mobil, and Esso dominate the refining and marketing of imported crude oil. Caltex ran this advertisement in numerous South African publications:

"Ahead of Caltex lies many years of search and perhaps disappointment—or the discovery which will free South Africa for all time from dependence on outside oil supplies."

The Power Seekers

Everyone is conscious of South Africa's need for its own supply of crude oil—and Mobil is doing something about it.

From Cape Agulhas to the Mocambique Channel, wherever off-shore drilling is taking place, Mobil is there.

As a member of a consortium, Mobil is drilling for oil in a concession stretching from Cape St. Francis to the Kei River mouth. Where other off-shore drilling is underway, as far north as Beira, Mobil is there providing fuels, lubricants and service.

Mobil is a power in the oil business in South Africa - a leader for over 70 years.
E. Technical Assistance

South Africa relies extensively on other capitalist countries to keep its industrial operations efficient and up-to-date. Each foreign corporation investing in South Africa brings its own expertise with it. This practice has become South Africa's major source of industrial technology. In some cases, American corporations serve South African industry without investing in the economy directly. For example, the Chemical Construction Company of New York helped construct six acid plants for the South African government-owned chemical industry.

South Africa has apparently demonstrated its ability to control its volatile situation to the satisfaction of over 1000 foreign firms. Mr. J. J. Palmer, representative of a group of New York and Chicago investors, put it this way in a 1964 speech:

"South Africa is the only country in Africa with a stable government. Every businessman wants a strong government to back him up and South Africa has it."

South Africa has what businessmen call a "good investment climate". Return on investment is very high. The rate at which Americans have been investing in South Africa has been steadily rising. Increasingly, U.S. corporations plan to use South Africa as a base from which to expand elsewhere in Africa. Consequently, there is much support from American corporate interests for South Africa's outward policy. The future plans of both in regard to the rest of Africa seem to be converging.

II. Corporations and Apartheid

"What's good for General Motors is good for the country."

For years most Americans accepted the above cliche as part of the definition of the American way of life. Today, the assumptions underlying this statement are being challenged by more and more people. Numerous issues have been raised questioning the belief that corporate power necessarily serves the public welfare. Corporate pollution has ruined much of our air and water resources. Corporate tax privileges increase tax burdens on the average citizen. Corporate expansion around the globe pressures the American government to make more political and military commitments abroad.

The American people are making the challenge to corporate power in numerous ways. The investigations of crusaders like Ralph Nader are followed with widespread interest. Hard questions are being raised about the influence upon government of what former President Eisenhower once called "the military-industrial complex." And even some stockholders now go to annual meetings weighing their understandable concern for high profits against the social responsibility of the corporation in which they share ownership.

One of the issues in this public challenge to corporations has been the matter of extensive American corporate involvement in Southern Africa. Students at Cornell, Princeton, Wisconsin, and elsewhere have demanded that their universities avoid investment in corporations that are involved in Southern Africa. Workers in companies like Polaroid and IBM have demanded that their employers stop doing business there. Church groups have challenged corporations such as Gulf, General Motors, and the Chase Manhattan Bank. People and organizations in America's Black communities have begun to speak out. The central issue in all these cases is whether American corporate presence in Southern Africa reinforces or undermines White minority rule.

This section examines the conflict between private American economic interests in South
Africa and that sector of the public in this country which opposes U.S. corporate involvement there. The four principal arguments for and against this presence are summarized. It should be remembered that other foreign corporations have extensive involvement in South Africa also. In Britain, which has the largest economic stakes of any country, the debate over whether corporations support apartheid is far more intense than in the United States. Similar controversies are taking place in countries like Sweden, West Germany, and Italy. This chapter, however, limits itself to the debate taking place in the United States because this book has been written for an American audience.

**Argument A:**

**American Investment Creates Jobs**

Many U.S. corporations have defended investment in Southern Africa by pointing out that their presence provides more jobs for everyone—Black and White. No one disputes that foreign investment creates more employment, but critics argue that American participation in the South African economy helps to reinforce and legitimate the apartheid system.

African workers are not allowed to engage in collective bargaining and strikes, but White workers can. African workers are paid far less than White workers, and are forbidden promotion to all sorts of jobs reserved by law for "Whites only." American corporate profits in South Africa, inevitably benefiting from employing an African work force that has no right to bargain for improved conditions, are more than double the average profits made back in the U.S. An American executive of Chrysler South Africa recently told an interviewer:

"The African doesn't want a trade union. He isn't used to democracy, he is used to an authoritarian hierarchical tribal structure. He accepts the White man as his guardian."

Outside a Chrysler (South Africa) plant
Argument B:  
American Corporations Undermine Apartheid

Some American corporations involved in South Africa contend that their employment practices are more enlightened than those of other firms. They maintain that by taking the initiative in improving benefits for African employees, they are quietly undermining the apartheid system.

One way of evaluating this argument is to look at the impact of American investment in South Africa to date. In 1950 American investment there totalled $148 million. In the last twenty years it has risen to nearly a billion dollars—a sixfold increase. During that time, the gap between White and African income has widened considerably. Africans lost what representation they had in Parliament before. The African press, leadership, and political parties were banned. Laws were enacted permitting arrest and punishment without charges, trial, or appeal. Other laws broke up families and forcibly removed Africans from areas where they had lived all their lives. The evidence available so far indicates that increased American investment has failed to "liberalize" apartheid.

In late 1970, employees at the American headquarters of the Polaroid Corporation demanded that their employer stop doing business in South Africa. The company responded by announcing a new experimental program. It intends to raise the salaries of Africans employed by its distributor in South Africa. Also, it has pledged to contribute funds to African educational advancement.

Critics have responded that Polaroid's gestures to improve conditions of its distributor's African employees clearly violate South African labor laws. A similar experiment some years ago by the Anglo-American Corporation was abruptly ended by South African government intervention. A broader criticism comes from Rev. George Houser, Executive Director of the anti-apartheid American Committee on Africa:

"The fundamental danger of the Polaroid approach is that it ignores the real dynamics of the struggle in South Africa. Here is a country where 19 per cent of the population control all political, economic, and military life, a country where the great mass has no

right of political expression, no political parties, no representation in Parliament, no constitutional way in which to bring about change. John F. Kennedy said, 'Those who make peaceful change impossible make violent change inevitable.' As concerns South Africa, it is not surprising that a violent clash is in the making."

Argument C:  
American Corporations Defend Apartheid

Polaroid has asked for a year's time before people judge the effects of its experiment. In the meantime, it has publicly denounced apartheid as a "repugnant" system. This action puts it in a minority position among American corporations, many of which defend their investments in South Africa by defending the apartheid system as well. A survey conducted by Newsweek in early 1971 revealed that only 14 per cent of American businessmen having investments in South Africa were opposed to apartheid.

According to another survey by visiting American clergymen in 1970, 63 per cent of American businessmen in South Africa would vote for either the Nationalist or the United Party, both of which strongly support the apartheid system. The Managing Director of Union Carbide Southern Africa told the delegation that he opposed majority rule in South Africa because it would be bad for both the economy and Union Carbide. The great majority of American management in South Africa made similar statements in the survey.

Milton P. Higgins, Chairman of the Norton Company of Massachusetts, recently told a White South African audience:

"I think South Africa is going to remain a strong country, led by White people. I think foreign countries should leave South Africa alone. If they leave you alone you will get on and do a great job."
Finally, spokesmen for corporations operating in South Africa often argue that their activities are "apolitical". They claim that companies like Union Carbide are in South Africa solely to conduct business there and do not or cannot influence the political system in that country, however immoral that system may be in the view of many people. The 3M Company of Minnesota responded to an inquiry about its South African investments this way:

"In all phases of our international operations, we keep in mind, and try to instill in each of our employees, that when we do business in other countries we are guests in those countries and try to conduct ourselves accordingly. This means that we tend to follow local customs and refrain, as foreigners, from attempting to impose our views and policies—which, in our case as an American company, involve the active promotion of the equal opportunity concept."

This argument raises the important issue of defining what constitutes a "political" act. If one means making campaign contributions and voting in elections, then foreign corporations are probably correct to claim that they are "apolitical" in South Africa, assuming that they do not engage in such activities.

Those who argue that foreign corporations should withdraw from South Africa generally use a broader definition of politics. For example, many American corporations (Union Carbide, General Motors, International Harvester, to name a few) make contributions to the South Africa Foundation, which conducts world-wide propaganda and lobbying activities in defense of apartheid. Opponents of apartheid view such subsidies to the Foundation as a clearly political act.

American corporate officials frequently express political opinions about the situation in South Africa while in that country and when they return to the United States. The evidence suggests that a great majority express support for White minority rule there. Such statements in defense of apartheid influence the South African government, executives in the home office, and American politicians, government officials, and public opinion.

Foreign corporations in South Africa often point with pride to the contributions they have made to developing a strong and viable economy there. The following quote is from a company news release:

"General Motors South African has made a major contribution to the growth and development of the Republic."

American corporations in particular have done much to develop both strategic industries and economic self-sufficiency in South Africa, as was discussed earlier in this chapter. Regardless of the motives of these corporations, their investments have the effect of increasing South Africa's military strength, its chances of withstanding international sanctions, and its technological capability to repress the majority African population.

Critics therefore argue that if the apartheid system is strengthened by the results of American corporate activities, it is misleading to claim that those activities are politically neutral. If Polaroid's condemnation of apartheid was a "political" act (as claimed by the South African government), then it is difficult to maintain that the far more numerous corporate statements and actions which support apartheid are "apolitical".

Perhaps the most serious accusation of all concerning the political impact of American corporate activities in South Africa revolves around a series of events which occurred in 1961. In that year, South Africa experienced a severe economic crisis after the Sharpeville Massacre. Fearing an outbreak of revolution and more international sanctions, foreign investors withdrew large volumes of capital. South African exports declined sharply. Its stock market plunged. The country's foreign exchange holdings dropped to a dangerous level, and the very survival of the regime was in doubt. Many of its strongest supporters began to consider the necessity to make some changes.

During that year of panic, American corporations increased their investments by $23 million and their imports from South Africa by $50 million. U.S. financiers made emergency

This massive infusion of financial and moral support from American corporations during the 1961 crisis helped apartheid to survive its most serious challenge to date. The South African regime was able to weather the storm without having to make any basic changes in the society. It has been tightening the screws of repression ever since.

III. South African Views on Foreign Corporations

A. African Opinions

Those who favor the continuation or expansion of foreign corporate activities in South Africa usually assert that a boycott or economic withdrawal would hurt Africans there first and foremost.

Given the severe restrictions on African freedom of speech in South Africa, it is difficult to determine African opinion on this crucial issue. By law it is a treasonable offense, carrying a maximum penalty of death, to advocate foreign economic withdrawal from South Africa.

The two largest African political parties are the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress, whose leaders have been forced underground or into exile by government repression. Both organizations are on record favoring economic sanctions as a means to weaken apartheid. The Organization of African Unity also holds to that position, despite violations by some member states who are seeking a “dialogue” with South Africa.

The late Chief Albert J. Luthuli, Nobel Peace Prize winner and President-General of the African National Congress, once said:

"The economic boycott of South Africa will entail undoubted hardship for Africans. We do not doubt that. But if it is a method which shortens the day of bloodshed, the suffering to us will be a price we are willing to pay. In any case, we suffer already, our children are often undernourished, and on a small scale (so far) we die at the whim of a policeman."

B. White Opinions

The South African government strongly welcomes foreign investment, regarding it as a vote of confidence in the viability of South African society. Government officials and White political leaders often express gratitude to foreign corporations for their contributions towards making South Africa strong and self-reliant. This same government is rigidly committed to maintaining the apartheid system. If foreign investment is undermining that system, the South African government does not seem to believe it. On the contrary, White South Africa regards foreign corporations as one of its strongest allies.

The government appears confident that it can contain whatever liberalizing tendencies there might be on the part of foreign investment. In 1966 Ford's Canadian subsidiary refused to sell the South African government four-wheel drive trucks in deference to the U.N. arms ban. South Africa retaliated against the Ford subsidiary in South Africa by boycotting all Ford vehicles for three years. Ford got the message and reversed its original decision. In the meantime, the original order for trucks was filled by Vauxhall, a British subsidiary of General Motors. In this instance, as in many others, South Africa backed up its frequent assertion that foreign enterprises...
can do business in South Africa only by cooperating with government policies.

South Africa is equally enthusiastic about expanding its extensive international trade. Beyond the strategic value of certain imports and the money value of an increased volume of business, there is a political consideration. An editorial in South Africa's Financial Gazette put it this way in July, 1970:

"Through trade, South Africa can offer formidable resistance to any efforts to isolate her from the rest of the world. Foreign trade is in fact the means of ensuring a continued role for South Africa in world politics. Its political importance should, therefore, never be underestimated."

The South African government also values foreign corporate involvement because of its effects on the home governments of those corporations. When hundreds of major corporations in a capitalist country develop commitments in a foreign country, the government of that home country usually lends its diplomatic and even military support to the protection of those commitments. Corporate interests tend to become "national interests". South Africa reasons that it can assure continued American, French, Japanese and British government support if the corporations of those countries maintain a heavy economic stake in perpetuating the status quo in South and Southern Africa.

IV. Corporations and Foreign Policy

The conflict between corporations and various sectors of the public over involvement in South Africa is ultimately a fight to influence the shaping of American foreign policy. This conflict in turn raises the issue of corporate power in the American political system.

Most social studies textbooks describe political power in the American system in terms of the ballot box—each person has one vote. The citizen influences the formulation of government policies by voting for the politician whose views he agrees with.
By this definition, the political power of a Mississippi sharecropper or a waitress in Indiana would be equal to that of the president of General Motors. But the sharecropper and the waitress do not get invited to White House dinners, nor does the President phone them for advice on an important decision.

In the real world of American politics, large corporations have much influence on government decision-making. They contribute heavily to campaign funds of politicians. Corporations themselves are not permitted to make political contributions. But in practice, corporate executives often make large donations to political campaigns and then get re-imbursted by the company through such devices as a “bonus”. In these ways, corporations have become the main source of funds for most politicians running for office.

This dependency on corporate funding provides the politician with much reason to solicit and represent the views of corporate officials, despite the relatively few votes big businessmen have on election day. Many Senators and Congressmen have the reputation in Washington as a lobbyist for a certain industry or corporation. The sharecropper may still have a vote, but he cannot afford to make financial contributions to enable a politician to run for office in the first place. There is no politician in the nation’s capital who is popularly regarded as representing sharecroppers.

Furthermore, politicians tend to come from the upper-middle class. In the Senate, to which the Constitution delegates the responsibility of foreign policy, nearly half the members are millionaires. The vast majority in both houses of Congress are lawyers with corporate interests of their own. Even more than elected politicians, appointed government officials come from the ranks of business executives. One finds, consequently, a continuous flow of similar types of people back and forth between positions in government and in the corporate world.

 Corporations use their vast political power to influence the shaping of foreign policy every day. Most big companies maintain an office in Washington solely for the purpose of lobbying among government leaders in order to influence decision-making. Often one corporation or industry will discover that the policy it favors is opposed by other business interests. But in most cases, corporate interests do not have to compete with sectors of public opinion seeking different foreign policies. Most of the public concerns itself only with the most critical matters of foreign affairs, such as the Vietnam War or the Middle East situation. On many lesser issues, however, public opinion is not organized to influence foreign policy. South Africa is becoming a major issue in American society today because growing sectors of public opinion are organizing just such a countervailing force to try to influence American foreign policy on South Africa.

Part Two—National Interests and South Africa

It would be a great oversimplification to think that foreign policy simply reflects the views of either corporations or the public on specific issues, whether in the United States or in other Western capitalist countries. While these views must be taken into account by those who actually determine and implement foreign policy, a government has considerations of its own to put forth. These considerations are usually referred to collectively by a country’s leaders as “national interests.”

In formulating foreign policy towards South Africa, policy-makers evaluate the importance of world public opinion, military and strategic factors, relationships with allied countries, existing ties with South Africa, and the maintenance of national prosperity.

I. World Opinion

World public opinion has repeatedly condemned White minority rule in Southern Africa, and South African apartheid in particular. The principal forum for this issue has been the United Nations, which has passed resolution after resolution in opposition to apartheid.
The United States, Britain, and France have usually joined with the majority of the world's nations to vote for resolutions which condemned apartheid verbally. American foreign policy has stated its opposition to apartheid forthrightly, as in this official State Department release:

"The U.S. Government is unalterably opposed to the racial, or apartheid, policies of the South African Government. We fear that South Africa's present course, unless soon moderated, can lead only to disaster for all of its people. Our spokesmen at the United Nations and from many other platforms have repeatedly denounced the policy of apartheid."

On the matter of implementing concrete actions against South Africa, the United States and its major allies have consistently vetoed or abstained from resolutions put forth by the Afro-Asian and Socialist countries. The American government says it is applying "moral pressure" on the Afrikaners to change their ways, but it opposes any measures such as trade or investment sanctions. U.S. Ambassador to South Africa John G. Hurd said in October, 1970:

"We hope to continue dialogue with this country — hopeful dialogue so that, in friendship, we understand this country, and South Africa would understand why other countries oppose its policies. Our views should be seen as friendliness, not as direct criticism."

II. Military Ties

The one U.N. resolution calling for action which the major capitalist countries did endorse was the 1963 embargo on sale of arms to South Africa. The ways in which these countries have circumvented the resolution in practice, however, suggest that they endorsed the embargo more to appease world opinion rather than to make a decisive impact on South African military strength.

France has openly defied the embargo since 1963 by selling to South Africa the latest jet fighter-bombers, missiles, nuclear submarines, helicopters, and other war material. The French government justifies these violations by claiming that the heavy armaments which it supplies are for external defense only. But there is nothing to prevent South Africa from using these same weapons for further suppression of its own African majority. The more likely explanation is that these sales are too lucrative to the French arms industry for the French government to pass up.

While France has the largest share of the South African arms market, other Western countries have made similar sales from time to time, including West Germany, Italy, and Belgium. Britain and the United States have claimed to obey the arms embargo since 1964. But the newly-elected Tory government in Britain announced in July, 1970 its intention to resume open shipments of arms to South Africa. Meanwhile, some doubts have been raised about the truth of American compliance. The British Guardian declared editorially on March 30, 1970:

"In spite of the arms embargo, Mr. Vorster still receives about 35 million dollars worth of military supplies from the United States annually, mostly in Lockheed transport aircraft."

Nearly all the NATO countries permit their corporations to invest in the South African armaments industry. They place no restrictions on the transfer of military know-how, including the sale to South Africa of blueprints and patents for military production. For example, the entire South African army and police force are equipped with NATO FN rifles, manufactured in South Africa under license from NATO. All these governments permit their citizens to accept jobs in the South African arms industry. Both Britain and the U.S. continue to export spare parts for the large quantities of British and American military hardware sold to South Africa before 1964. Every one of these activities is explicitly forbidden by the July, 1970 U.N. Security Council Amendment to the Arms Embargo Act of 1963. Both Britain and the United States abstained in that vote.

Furthermore, the American definition of "military item" is a narrow one. For example, the Beechcraft Corporation is permitted to export light aircraft to South Africa on the grounds that they will be used for civilian transportation.
But some of the same models in question are used by the American military for counter insurgency in Vietnam. They could easily be adapted for internal military maneuvers in South Africa as well. Similar loopholes exist for other American exports to South Africa, such as Ford trucks and Kaiser jeeps. American investment in South Africa also has obvious military potential, such as the convertibility of General Motors and Ford plants to the production of weapons.


While the South African government is interested in nuclear power as an energy source to overcome its shortage of petroleum, South African scientists have recently perfected a new process for creating isotopes of enriched uranium similar to those necessary for explosive warheads. Should South Africa convert its nuclear development to military purposes, American assistance will have helped make that country the only nuclear power south of the Equator.

III. Strategic Considerations

The historically strategic value of South Africa to European expansion still figures in Western intentions to maintain its presence in the Indian Ocean. South Africa rarely loses an opportunity to remind the Western powers that it is a willing and necessary ally because of its crucial location at the juncture of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. To maximize its appeal to the West, South Africa portrays itself as a bastion against communism in the Southern Hemisphere.

A friendly South Africa means protection of Western Europe’s critical sea route to Middle Eastern oil. In addition to the value of South African ports as stopovers for commercial shipping, South Africa’s location is also of military value. Both Britain and the United States have free access to South Africa’s Simonstown Naval Base. The United States also maintains missile tracking stations on South African soil. Commenting on the increased importance of South Africa because of the closure of the Suez Canal and the build-up of the Soviet Navy, British Foreign Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home wrote in 1969:
"The policing of the South Atlantic end of the
west of the Indian Ocean becomes important
both to Britain and to Western Europe.
These areas are in effect (although they may
not formally be made so) an extension of
NATO's responsibility for the security of
Europe."

As British commitments East of the Suez are
reduced, the United States is taking on more of
the defense of Western interests in the Indian
Ocean sphere than ever before. The strategic
value of South Africa, long a principal "national
interest" of British foreign policy, is becoming of
equal importance in the calculations of
American global strategies. Perhaps these
considerations help explain why the United
States and its principal allies have not enforced
the U.N. arms embargo more effectively.

IV. Economic National Interests

Extensive foreign corporate interests in South
Africa constitute a major consideration of their
home governments in the formulation of foreign
policy towards that country. A trade volume of
nearly $5 billion, investments of well over $6
billion, and the rich natural resources of South
Africa have a direct effect on the prosperity of
the Western world. Since these governments are
pledged to maintain that prosperity, national
interests tend to coincide with corporate inter-
ests.

A. Trade

Trade regulations are an important in-
strument of foreign policy. The United States
does not buy sugar from Cuba, for example,
because it disapproves of Cuba's policies and
hopes to disrupt its economy by imposing a trade
boycott. On the other hand, preferential trade
agreements are usually extended between
countries which enjoy friendly relations.

Like its major allies, the United States
government places no restrictions on American
trade with South Africa, except for the ban on the
more obvious types of military hardware. Since
exports to South Africa exceed imports by more
than three times, U.S. trade with South Africa
helps to ease the chronic American balance of
payments deficit. When the U.S. revoked Cuba's
sugar quota after the 1959 Revolution there, it
reassigned part of it to South Africa. The quota
guarantees South African sugar producers a
constant volume of American business at a fixed
price, above the average world market price. In
effect, the American taxpayer subsidizes South
African sugar growers.

Western governments are anxious to maintain
access to South Africa's vast reserves of mineral
resources. These countries import large
quantities of antimony, chromium, uranium,
corundum, lithium, vanadium, platinum,
asbestos, manganese, and diamonds, all of
which are strategic raw materials for industrial production. The United States government has a policy of buying raw materials abroad in order to conserve resources at home. To help large American corporations plan far in advance, the government keeps stockpiles of nearly 100 minerals in case of a future shortage. In a sophisticated industrial society, a shortage of any one basic raw material could disrupt large segments of the economy.

The most important raw material historically in South Africa has been gold. South Africa based its rapid economic growth in the 20th century on the wealth generated by the sale of billions of dollars worth of this most precious of all metals. South Africa accounts for 75 per cent of gold production for the capitalist world’s monetary needs. For decades, its gold has backed up the major currencies of the international monetary system — the dollar, the pound, the mark, and the franc.

B. Investments

Every country in the world has to weigh strategic and military considerations in the formulation of its foreign policy. Similarly, every country has at least some foreign trade to take into account. But unlike the Socialist and underdeveloped states, the industrial capitalist nations alone export large volumes of capital for investment in other countries.

American investment abroad has increased at a staggering pace since World War II. Today, American-owned companies in foreign countries produce a total of $200 billion dollars a year in goods and services. If the operations of these companies abroad were considered as a separate economy, they would have a higher Gross National Product than any other country in the world except for the domestic American and Soviet economies.

American economic growth abroad is increasing twice as fast as at home. Nearly every major American corporation depends on its foreign operations for 10 to 50 percent of its total sales. American economic expansion abroad has now reached a point where events all over the world influence whether there is prosperity or depression in the United States. Corporate interests abroad have become, more than ever before, vital national interests in order to protect the affluent American standard of living.

American corporations have more investments in South Africa than in any other country in Africa. In 1967, the average profit on all U.S. corporate investments there averaged 19.2 percent, compared to 10 percent elsewhere and still less on domestic American investment. Similar investments in the other White minority-rulled countries of Southern Africa are rising sharply. Many American companies want to expand elsewhere in Africa from a solid industrial base in South Africa. All of these factors provide ample reason for the American government to support American corporate activities in South and Southern Africa.

Still, were American corporations to withdraw or be forced out of South Africa, the effects on the American economy would not be substantial. The government might oppose such changes to prevent setting a precedent for elsewhere, but not because it would plunge this country into another depression. U.S. corporate investments in South Africa are only 1.2 percent of total American investment abroad.

The British situation is a different story. Britain is an island poorly endowed with natural resources. Its prosperity has always depended upon vigorous economic expansion, which was the fundamental reason for the creation of the British Empire. Adjusting for the difference in size of economy, Britain exports four times more goods and twice as much capital as does the United States.

Total British investment in South Africa — worth about four billion dollars counting both corporate and public interests — is 10 percent of total British foreign investment. While British investments in Canada and Australia are even greater, investments in South Africa bring home the most earnings because profits are so high there. British profits from South Africa, averaging about $240 million a year, contribute much to offset Britain’s balance of payment deficit, caused by a surplus of imports over exports.

The British have invested four times more than the Americans in South Africa. Since the British economy is only one-tenth the size of America’s, British investments in South Africa are forty times more important to its economy than American investments in South Africa are to the United States.
British economic interests in South Africa are enormous. In contrast to the United States, the loss of British investments in and trade with South Africa would bring catastrophe to the British economy.

Britain is America’s oldest ally. Since World War II, support for a healthy British economy has been a principal tenet of American foreign policy. American corporations are more involved in the British economy than in any other country in the world except for Canada. A depression in Britain would in turn have serious economic repercussions in the United States.

Directly to some extent, but indirectly through Britain to a far greater extent, American national interests have a substantial stake in the South African economy.
PERSPECTIVES ON THE SEVENTIES

South Africa has become a giant power on the African continent and the principal bulwark against African freedom everywhere in Southern Africa. It could never have attained its present position without the help it has received from the West—all kinds of military and technical assistance, vast amounts of investment to solidify its industrial base, and refusal to endorse international sanctions which would effectively isolate South Africa in world affairs.

Western capitalist interests in South Africa are far greater than they ever were in Vietnam. As detailed as the preceding chapter might have seemed, it surveyed only the most important forms of involvement. Despite their posture of verbal protest, powerful arguments can be made that strategic, military, and economic considerations deeply implicate Western capitalist countries in the perpetuation of White minority rule in Southern Africa. Waldemar Nielson, a prominent American policy advisor on Africa and long-time President of the “establishment” African-American Institute in New York, warned the United States government in his book African Batteline:

"...there is a considerable degree of truth in the designation of the United States as one of South Africa’s chief allies. For the fact is that although the United States has repeatedly expressed criticism of apartheid in recent years, it has simultaneously appeared to contradict its statements by other actions, with the result that it has now almost totally destroyed both its persuasiveness with the government of South Africa and the confidence of the African nationalists and the Afro-Asian states in the sincerity of its moral and political assertions.

After criticizing South African racial policy, (the United States) has continued to deal with that government on a normal diplomatic basis, accommodating itself in many ways and with little protest to South African practices of discrimination. The United States has inadvertently but implicitly become an agent and spokesman in defense of South Africa in many international discussions and debates."

There are indications that American foreign policy is moving still closer toward the White minority regimes of Southern Africa under the Nixon administration. The White House has warmly endorsed Mr. Vorster’s “outward policy”, even though the South African government has made clear its belief that this policy will strengthen, not undermine, apartheid. There have been a series of relaxations recently in American adherence to the arms embargo. The United States remained silent in 1970 when Britain reversed its own policy on exporting arms to South Africa. White House aides are said to be re-evaluating the strategic importance of South Africa to the American presence in the Indian Ocean, along with the political consequences of acknowledging South Africa more openly as an American ally. There has been some discussion in NATO of admitting South Africa or else of setting up a complementary South Atlantic Treaty Organization to include South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, and Portuguese Africa.
Portuguese and South African response to Western policies confirms a current “thaw” in relations. Government leaders and the heavily-censored press in both countries have praised the Nixon and Heath (British) administrations for having a more sympathetic outlook towards their regimes. Portuguese officials claim confidently that the United States now supports a continued Portuguese presence in Southern Africa as a buffer zone between South Africa and independent Africa. When President Nixon outlined Southern African policy in his 1970 State of the World Message, Prime Minister Vorster characterized the speech as “realistic” and “refreshing.”

The Nixon position again reiterated American opposition to apartheid. But he also warned that the U.S. could only support peaceful efforts towards a solution of the Southern African conflict. The African majorities have tried every form of non-violent protest for decades, only to see their political situation deteriorate. Peaceful protests are no longer even legal. It is difficult to understand how President Nixon expects meaningful change to occur in the future by using these same methods.

In that same speech, President Nixon made clear that the American government disapproves of the African movements currently engaged in or planning guerrilla warfare to liberate their homelands. While he justified this position by stating a preference for non-violent change, there can be little doubt that he views these movements as a threat to American “national interests” in Southern Africa.

For the African populations in this area, centuries of contact with European expansion have been a bitter experience. They see capitalism, built on highly exploited labor and virulent racism, as the source of their oppression. They increasingly resent what they regard as Western contributions to and benefits from the harsh conditions under which they are forced to live.

Unlike the current regimes, therefore, the African nationalist movements, once in power, would not offer their territories as a base for future Western military strategies. They would offer no guarantee that the vast natural resources of Southern Africa would continue to be available to Western Capitalism. In an effort to regain control over their own countries, future African governments in this region might move to nationalize the many billions of dollars in foreign investments there.

The African nationalist movements, in their disillusionment with capitalism, are inevitably sympathetic towards a socialist system of development. In addition, they have watched the established Socialist governments of the world consistently oppose White minority rule in their countries over the years. While the United States supports only peaceful reform and moral persuasion as a means of change in Southern Africa, the Socialist countries are providing concrete assistance to these same movements in the struggles now going on. For all these reasons, one can anticipate that if these movements come to power some day, their position in international politics will be closer to Socialist than to Capitalist countries.

These potential strategic, economic, and political threats to American “national interests” posed by African nationalism suggest that the United States might intervene in Southern Africa during the 1970’s. The West genuinely dislikes
the policies of the current government there. But the alternatives under African nationalist rule could be far more damaging to Western interests than the embarrassment resulting from acceptance of South African, Portuguese and Rhodesian offers to join hands in a "crusade against communism."

Such intervention might take the form of a massive military commitment to crush the guerrilla movements, but only at the risk of enormous racial tensions within the American military. Considering the current disillusionment over Vietnam, it would be difficult to win popular support for a similar type of commitment elsewhere. And the effects on American prestige throughout the world would be disastrous.

Intervention could also take a political form. The United States might choose not to reinforce White minority rule while still working to prevent today's nationalist movements from coming to power. In such an eventuality, efforts would be made to find a suitable third party of moderate Africans who would guarantee the protection of Western interests in Southern Africa. Such a solution is risky, however, because a government set up under these circumstances would have a hard time establishing legitimacy in the eyes of its people. The origins of the Vietnam War, after all, lie in the failure of a similar strategy.

A more likely type of intervention would be similar to the precedent established by the Sharpeville crisis of 1960-61. American financial transfusions saved the South African regime when it appeared in danger of collapse. American investments, trade, and strategic interests throughout Southern Africa have since increased dramatically. If the United States was willing to intervene economically then, it would have still more incentive to do so in the future.

Whatever that future may bring, American policy today continues to be essentially one of anti-apartheid and anti-colonial rhetoric while maintaining normal relations with the regimes of Southern Africa. It is a policy which hopes against hope that everything will work out for the better in South Africa without any turmoil and bloodshed. How long will the United States be able to cling to this policy as the situation continues to polarize? Waldemar Nielson makes this forecast in his latest book, The Great Powers and Africa:

"Can the United States, in a revolutionary world, commit its future and its interests not only to the status quo, but in Southern Africa to a status quo which by every avowed principle of the United States is indefensible? Can the fabric of American society itself stand the consequences of another protracted situation in which major elements of U.S. society deeply feel that the nation is committed to a fundamentally immoral line of policy? For, let it be plainly recognized: The issues of Southern Africa, once the Viet Nam agony is finished, are going to be the next foreign policy focus of the moral indignation of youth, the Negroes, and the American left. A policy of passivity and compromise now — though it may seem to some a prudent course for the moment — can only reap another terrible harvest of bitter division in the United States in the future."
FOR FURTHER READING

American Committee of Africa (A.C.O.A.) *Allies in Empire: The US and Portugal in Africa*. Available from A.C.O.A. (see address below) or the Africa Research Group, Box 213, Cambridge, Mass. 02138. An excellent analysis of Portuguese colonialism and the American role in supporting it. 50 cents.


Thompson, Leonard and Monica Wilson, ed., Oxford History of South Africa. (Oxford University Press). London. 1970. An up-to-date history of South Africa which is thorough, well-documented and interesting to read.

Other sources of information on Southern Africa

American Committee on Africa
164 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10016

University Christian Movement, Southern Africa Committee
475 Riverside Drive
New York, N.Y. 10027
(Publishes “Southern Africa,” a monthly newsletter with best information on current developments)

United Nations
Unit on Apartheid
New York, N.Y.
(has documented reports on every aspect of life under apartheid, eg. “Industrialisation, Forced Labor and Foreign Capital in S.A.,” “Repressive Legislation in S.A.,” “Foreign Investment in S.A.”)

Liberation Support Movement
P.O. Box 15210
Seattle, Washington 98115
(publications on the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies).

South African Information Service.
655 Madison Ave.
New York, N.Y. (or check the consulate in your area)

Penguin African Series
Penguin Books Inc.
7110 Ambassador Rd.
Baltimore, Md. 21207
(an excellent series of paperback books on Africa, many of them by Africans; for complete list, write above address)

U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa. Transcripts of hearings of this committee (concerned with U.S. policy in Africa) and special reports of study missions to Southern Africa are available from the Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
RACE TO POWER was prepared in consultation with experts on South Africa and the Portuguese colonies, Southern Africans, and high school teachers and students. The text was prepared by:

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Cover by Coby Everdell

Lettering and maps by Mike Prokosch

Drawings by Coby Everdell and Carol Bengelsdorf

This book is only the first part of an Africa Research Group series on Southern Africa. The African Nationalist perspective on the situation in Southern Africa will be presented in a series of pamphlets on the liberation movements in the region designed to complement this book. The pamphlets, which explain the Nationalist movements' programs and problems in their own words, will appear consecutively beginning in July, 1971. They will be available by mail for $.50 each.
Africa Research Group is an independent, non-profit research and educational organization based in Cambridge, Massachusetts. It prepares materials on Africa, especially on African-American relations for distribution in the United States and Africa. The Group contributes regularly to newspapers and magazines in the United States and Africa, and offers a range of publications on issues relating to the development of Africa. A complete literature list is available on request.

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