FOR British imperialism Egypt means primarily three things. First, it means a source of raw cotton and a market for cotton piece goods. Second, it means a highly profitable field for investment and financial operations of all kinds. Third, it means the Suez Canal. Ever since Mohammed Ali introduced the culture of fine cotton into Egypt four years after the battle of Waterloo, British commercial interests have driven an extremely lucrative trade at Alexandria in this important raw material: about the middle of the century the Egyptian Government began to be wrapped more and more firmly in the toils of European financiers—English, French, and Greek: finally, with the development of imperialism, it became increasingly evident that British imperialism was intent on securing the monopoly in exploitation of Egypt. It is true that for many years critical relations subsisted between British and French imperialism in Egypt, and this period of crisis was not finally liquidated till the Anglo-French agreement of 1904, by which France found her quid pro quo in Morocco. In fact, however, the ultimate dominance of British imperialism in Egypt had been secured by Disraeli's notorious coup of the purchase of the Suez Canal shares in 1875. This acute stroke of imperialist policy arose very simply out of the needs of the political situation: for a glance at the map will show that, with sea communication between the Mediterranean and Red Seas, Egypt is the key position of the British Empire. It is unthinkable that British imperialism should lose control of Egypt and yet maintain its grip on India. And the imperialists of Britain realise this with perfect clearness. Egypt has been variously described as the "coping stone" or the "occipital nerve" of the British Empire; and either metaphor will serve. Further, Egypt is the centre from which British imperialism can dominate the Sudan, the Hedjaz and Arabia, Palestine, Mesopotamia—and from which, too, it can exercise an effective surveillance
over the operations of French and Italian imperialism in northern and eastern Africa, to say nothing of the French Syrian mandate. But in Egypt itself the solidarity of the different imperialisms is complete. They group themselves naturally round British imperialism, as the one with the strongest hold, and nothing illustrated this more vividly than the way in which, on the outbreak of the 1919 mass revolts, the foreign commercial communities in Egypt unanimously took their stand behind Britain in the struggle with the rising. Those sections of Egyptian nationalism who still nourish hopes of a return to the dual control, whereby they may be enabled to play off Britain against France to the advantage of the nationalist cause, are indeed embracing a chimera. The struggle against British imperialism is for Egypt the struggle against all imperialism.

It should be noted that Egypt has achieved a more advanced stage of capitalist development than any other country in the Near East: the differentiation of classes on the basis of the class struggle is appearing in a very marked way. Of course, feudal relations still subsist, and anyhow the Nile Valley is likely to remain agrarian. But the British imperialist regime has meant that from a typical self-sufficing agrarian country Egypt has been transformed into (largely) a cotton plantation for the benefit of Lancashire cotton capitalists. This, although Egypt is eminently capable of developing economically on European industrial lines: for with the development of hydro-electric technique the potentialities of Egyptian water power become immense. However, it is clearly not to the interest of British imperialism to permit such a technical development to be utilised in Egypt. So the structure of British imperialism is here most plainly acting as a curb on the productive forces of Egyptian society. The fight for economic self-determination at once becomes an integral and vital part of the nationalist and anti-imperialist struggle.

There is no need here to trace in detail the course of the nationalist agitation against the British occupation which has occupied the last forty years. From the days of Colonel Arabi to the outbreak of war in 1914, this agitation changed very little, either in content or in the people engaged in carrying it on. It fluctuated in intensity from year to year and decade to decade with an almost completely moribund period in the early eighteen-nineties. The nationalists
were large landowners, officials, professional men, lawyers, intellectuals, and so forth—the so-called Pasha class. In 1906, when hopes of help from France in the carrying on of nationalist agitation had disappeared, a party known as the Khizb-el-Uma, or People’s Party, was organised. It was essentially composed of the elements mentioned above, and was moderate to the pitch of loyalism in character. The more radical Left Wing formed the Khizb-el-Watani, or Nationalist Party, which took up the nationalist struggle as a revolutionary struggle against British imperialism, at the same time recognising the important part the masses of workers and peasants were destined to play in this struggle. In fact, as might have been expected, the leadership of the Khizb-el-Watani coming from the rising native capitalist class and the professionals, it dared not give the masses a fighting lead when the moment came for action.

With the war came the declaration of the British Protectorate over Egypt—“for the duration.” At first the Egyptians were assured that they were only desired to maintain a benevolent neutrality in the struggle of imperialisms: but it was not long before requisitions of farm beasts and food supplies were in full swing, and the young fellaheen were forced to “volunteer” for the Egyptian Labour Corps by the most rigorous martial law brutality. The martial law regime roused the keenest resentment and fury among the Egyptian masses: and in addition their economic position grew steadily more deplorable. The first months of the war were accompanied by an acute fall in prices. The crops were not worth the cost of reaping them, and were left to rot; the distressed fellaheen wandered up and down the country in famine-stricken crowds, and the workers in the towns suffered considerably. After a time prices began to recover, and then swept upward to an unheard-of height. In 1919 prices were in many cases ten times more than they were in 1914: the average wage had only increased three times. When, on the cessation of the war, the British Protectorate and the hated martial law regime continued to exist without the least sign of abolition, the temper of the masses reached boiling point. The objective situation was undeniably revolutionary—but the masses were leaderless and unorganised. Who was the eagerly awaited leader to be?
It was hardly to be expected that the culturally backward masses would throw up their own leaders. Besides, Egypt had not yet experienced the bourgeois revolution. It was, therefore, not surprising that the man who came forward was a representative of the interests of the progressive capitalist class—an ex-Minister of Education, Zaghlul Pasha. Zaghlul organised the Egyptian deputation to the Peace Conference—the Wafd-el-Mosri—and applied to the British military authorities for passports, which were refused: at once the whole nation ranged itself behind Zaghlul, and virtually gave him a mandate to speak in the name of the nation. The subsequent deportation of Zaghlul and his companions led directly to the mass uprising of March, 1919. The workers struck, the civil servants struck, women demonstrated, students demonstrated, the fellaheen cut telegraph wires and tore up railway tracks. Repression, with all its accompaniment of imprisonment, exile, floggings, hangings, did not stop the revolt. The British Government was forced to allow the Wafd to come to London for negotiations: and out of these negotiations one vitally significant fact emerged, namely, that the Wafd, while using the mass revolt as a means of forcing a compromise on the British Government, while adopting the revolutionary slogans of the Nationalist Party to this end also, was essentially and fundamentally opportunist. The Wafd was a centre group, and formed a rallying point for the capitalist Right Wing of the Nationalist Party. Zaghlul himself, it should be noticed, retained his membership of the old People's Party. The initial negotiations of the Wafd with the British Government resulted in an impasse—the Zaghlulists declaring that the British terms meant a continuation of a veiled protectorate, while the more conservative followers of Adly Pasha were prepared to compromise to the fullest possible extent, in order to put an end to the (to them) unpleasantly tense political situation. The Zaghlulists, in thus affecting intransigence, were but swayed by the determined pressure of mass revolt.

Meanwhile the Milner Mission had visited Egypt, ostensibly to inquire into the causes of the "late disturbances," and had issued its report. One sentence in that report stands out: it is in the place where the Mission go out of their way to say polite things about the "moderate nationalists," who, it is said, are perfectly willing
to recognise special British interests in Egypt; why, then, is there any need for a formal protectorate?

Would not an orderly and friendly Egypt, in intimate association with Great Britain, serve British purposes as well, or even better, while removing all sense of grievance and all spirit of revolt on the Egyptian side?

This admirably expresses the aim of enlightened imperialism: it is the classic policy of "rallying the moderates;" and the report went on to observe that this aim might best be secured by a treaty between Britain and Egypt, which would secure the protection of (a) imperial communications, and (b) all "legitimate" foreign interests in Egypt. To get an Egyptian Government which would sign and operate such a treaty became the object of British imperialist policy in Egypt right through the year 1921. Supported by the British power, Adly Pasha formed a Ministry. Zaghlul returned to Egypt, receiving a hero's welcome from the masses of the population, and the political issue that at once arose was—would Zaghlul come to some agreement with Adly, and would the Zaghlulists agree to support Adly's government? In other words, would there be a consolidation of the thin upper strata of feudal lords and the bureaucracy represented by Adly and the progressive capitalists and professionals represented by Zaghlul? As it happened, neither the Zaghlulists nor the British power were convinced that the time was ripe for such a step. More, the reactionary elements in British imperialism—Lord Curzon most notably, seconded by Field Marshal Allenby, the real ruler of Egypt—were not at all convinced that their policy of repression, of the maintenance of direct imperial rule over Egypt, was in any sense bankrupt. Popular feeling in Egypt against Adly was growing in intensity, and negotiations in London between Adly and Lord Curzon broke down. Adly resigned, and the formation of a new Ministry proved quite impossible. Zaghlul Pasha was again deported in December, 1921. This new crisis led to the gradual realisation that the policy of repression had failed, and at the end of February, 1922, the formal restoration of Egyptian "independence" was announced. It was a very formal restoration indeed, as the most important questions, such as the Suez Canal and the protection of foreign interests, were absolutely reserved for future discussion between the British Government and the Egyptian
Parliament, when elected. Practically, British imperialism, by this “Unilateral Declaration,” was proclaiming to the world its monopoly-interest in Egypt, was crying “Hands off Egypt!” to the other imperialist Powers in order to tighten its own grip.

A Ministry was formed by Sarwat Pasha, a member of the Adly group. This Ministry dragged out an existence for several months, without being able to achieve anything that either the Egyptian bourgeoisie or the British power wanted. Suddenly, after the acting president of the Wafd had had a mysterious interview with King Fuad, and the Wafd had published a violent manifesto attacking the Government, Sarwat resigned. His resignation was virtually a dismissal, and in his stead Tewfik Nessim Pasha formed a Ministry. Nessim was pro-Zaghlulist, and his Ministry meant an alliance between the Palace—and hence the British power—and the forces of native progressive capitalism organised in the Wafd. At last it seemed that British imperialism had realised the necessity for striking a bargain with the nationalists, of rooting itself more deeply in the organism of Egyptian society than it could by an alliance with the Adly-Sarwat feudal-bureaucratic elements. The struggle between the two classes, the old aristocracy and the new capitalists, as to which should share the exploitation of Egypt with British imperialism, now appeared definitely resolved by the victory of the latter. In future it appeared quite certain that imperialist exploitation would be carried out through the medium of the native bourgeoisie; the basis of British imperialist rule in Egypt had been significantly widened.

As it happened the alliance between the Palace and the Wafd was far from being a permanent one. The British power remained unconvinced of the immediate necessity of striking a bargain with the nationalists in order to make Egypt safe for imperialism. Consequently, from December of last year up to date a peculiarly tortuous series of political intrigues has been taking place in Egypt. The Nessim Ministry was forced by Lord Allenby to resign, early in February, nominally over the Sudan question (which nationalist opinion desires to unite with Egypt), and Adly Pasha once more was discreetly pushed to the front of the political scene by the British power. Meanwhile, the growth of mass unrest was symbolised by the increase of bomb outrages and terroristic
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Attentats on British troops and civilians. British martial law, still the only reality of Egyptian government, grew daily more brutal. Whole districts were held to ransom for outrages committed in their areas. Even The Times correspondent admitted that Egypt was suffering from:

a martial law regime severer than in any previous period, not excepting in some respects the critical days of 1919.

After much hesitation Adly refused to form a Ministry: but there was no gainsaying Lord Allenby, and rumours soon began to spread that Adly was reconsidering his decision. Just at this moment of crisis, the anti-Adly polemic of the Wafd became mysteriously mild. Adly made advances to the Wafd, which were rejected, it is true, but in a manner that was far from precluding the possibility of such a union in the future. While a particularly violent series of outrages in late February and early March was horrifying imperialist opinion, the British power delayed the arrest of the leaders of the Wafd (which had earlier been threatened if the outrages continued), hoping against hope for a rapprochement between the Wafd and Adly Pasha. In a most revealing dispatch on March 5, The Times correspondent declared (a declaration the significance of which was only heightened by the very disingenuous "recantation" published, obviously under pressure from the British Residency, a few days later):

In view of the apparent bankruptcy of martial law, a solution may be found in a new orientation of policy—possibly in entrusting the maintenance of order and security to the Egyptian Government. If this policy were developed it would seem that the only possible course to take would be to release Zaghlul Pasha, the sole Egyptian strong enough to inspire a Government with sufficient power to maintain order without the British support given under martial law. . . . Zaghlul Pasha, or a Government enjoying Zaghlulist support, would also alone be able to "deliver the goods" the British Government requires—namely, an Indemnity Act, the settlement of the conditions of retirement of British officials, &c.

However, repression remained the order of the day: and a stop-gap "Ministry of Affairs" was formed by Yehia Ibrahim Pasha (previously Minister of Education), to deal with the vast amount of administrative business that had accumulated since Nessim’s fall. Both the Adly-ites and the Wafd received the new Ministry with suspicious reserve: and the Wafd severely criticised the
(doubtless intentional) vagueness of Yehia Pasha’s official utterances. Again the persistent rumour spread that Adly was making advances to the Wafd, which was alleged not to be meeting these advances with much enthusiasm. But the fact is now clear, beyond a doubt, that a consolidation of the feudal-bureaucratic elements under Adly with the bourgeoisie of the Wafd is a political possibility of the fairly near future. Adly has declared against the continuance of martial law, and has won thereby the approval (albeit guarded) of the Zaghlulist Press.

Yehia Pasha’s Ministry is unlikely to live long: there have already been rumours of a crisis. The enlightened sections of imperialist opinion are calling (as The Times dispatch above) for the release of Zaghlul and for a compromise with the Wafd as the only way out of the impasse. The Manchester Guardian correctly summed up the whole business by saying:—

With the release of the nationalist leaders and the resumption of normal law we can probably still get a representative Egyptian Cabinet willing to promulgate the new constitution in a form that will satisfy Egyptian aspirations, while reserving essential British interests.

It is with statements of this kind that the release of Zaghlul on March 30 (officially for reasons of health) must be related. The tide of imperialist opinion has now, it seems, finally turned. And the Wafd are fully aware of this: in a manifesto issued on the release of Zaghlul, expressing their satisfaction with the action of the British Government, they state that:—

The aspirations of Egypt are not in contradiction with the protection of foreign interests.

This, then, is the end of the opportunist centrism of the Wafd, of the nationalism of the Egyptian bourgeoisie—“independence” plus safeguards for imperialist interests, the very formula of the imperialists themselves!

The fact that emerges from the foregoing analysis of the nationalist movement is clear enough, namely, that a purely nationalist movement can never give real national independence to the Egyptians. When we turn to examine the nationalism of the Left Wing of the Khizb-el-Watani, depending on the discontented small traders and shopkeepers, lower grade civil servants, students, &c., substantially the same fact appears. Under the leadership of Dr. Hussein Pasha the Left Wing nationalists pursued
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a revolutionary nationalist propaganda among the town workers and the peasant masses; but it was typical petty bourgeois revolutionary nationalism—high-sounding revolutionary slogans and phrases, with a shrinking from the actual revolutionary struggle. And further, it was still, though anti-imperialist and to that extent revolutionary, concerned (like the similar Indian movement) with boycotts and non-co-operation—which could be carried to a certain point and then led nowhere. There was no fundamental appreciation of the impossibility of achieving a purely nationalist revolution: no realisation that only a revolution at once social and political, a revolution of the Egyptian labouring masses, led by the organised working class of the towns, could liberate those masses from both their foreign imperialist and their native bourgeois exploiters. Without such a liberation national independence must be either the shallowest trickery or the most hopeless illusion. The masses of the Egyptian people, in their struggle for national independence, are fighting, and will have to fight, both the forces of British imperialism and the combined forces of Egyptian feudalism and bureaucracy and the Zaghlulist bourgeoisie. It is in this respect that the development of an organised Labour Movement in Egypt in the years since the war is of the first importance.

There are 2,000,000 workers (strictly speaking, an urban proletariat) in Egypt, 4,000,000 "unclassified occupations and unemployed"—chiefly agricultural labourers—1,000,000 poor peasants (with holdings of less than half an acre) and half a million only slightly less poor peasants (with holdings averaging just over two acres). These masses of workers and peasants were the driving force of the 1919 revolt. The spirit of mass revolt, lacking conscious direction as it did, forced nationalism into a revolutionary channel. The nationalists on their side, as has already been remarked, simply exploited the mass revolt in the hope of frightening British imperialism into a compromise satisfactory to the aspirations and interests of the Egyptian bourgeoisie. But gradually a working-class movement began to appear as an independent political force. The revolt of 1919, and the strikes of that year and of 1920, produced a great crop of trade unions, mostly small and local. A number of these federated in the General Federation of Labour in 1921, which body was stated to comprise 60,000 members. In
1921, too, had been formed the Egyptian Socialist Party (actually the Egyptian Communist Party), which itself was responsible for organising certain unions, and has considerable influence in the General Federation of Labour.

That the party is making itself a power in Egyptian politics is witnessed by the recent arrest of its secretary and several leading members while they were taking part in a strike demonstration at Alexandria. The police attacked the demonstration as it was leaving the offices of the General Federation of Labour, wounding several workers. The party offices, as also those of the General Federation of Labour, were closed by the police—acting, it is said, under the orders of the British military authorities—after all papers and documents had been removed. This was on March 18, though the news did not leak out in Europe till ten days later. No protests have been heard from the nationalists or from the British Labour Party.

The party is working to unite the forces of the town workers, and through this union to gain for itself a leading position among the masses of agricultural labourers and peasantry. The analogy of the Russian Revolution is evident.

The party has formulated a "popular and concrete" programme for the everyday struggles of the workers and the peasantry. For the town workers the programme includes:

(a) Labour protection laws.
(b) Factory inspection.
(c) The eight-hour day.
(d) Recognition of trade unions and working-class political organisations.
(e) Equal pay for Egyptian and European workers.
(f) Establishment of industrial committees.
(g) Formation of producers' and consumers' co-operatives.

The agrarian question is, undoubtedly, the most urgent of all the questions confronting the Egyptian working-class movement and the Socialist Party: everything turns upon it. The proposed agrarian programme of the party includes:

(a) Suppression of farm tenure, by which the landowner secures the larger half of the products of the soil.
(b) Cancellation of debts of peasants owning less than thirty feddans.¹

¹ 1 feddan = 1.036 acres
(c) Total exemption from land taxation for all peasants owning less than ten feddans.

(d) State confiscation of all land holdings over 100 feddans (including Crown and Shrine lands)—the surplus land to be divided among the landless peasants or used to inaugurate communal farms. (It should be noted that 13,000 landowners own nearly half the cultivated land of Egypt.)

(e) Organisation of committees of poor peasantry and agricultural labourers in the villages to agitate for these demands.

At the same time it must be emphasised that these are all provisional half measures. The full demand of the working class and the poor peasantry is the entire socialisation of the land.

In the matter of immediate political demands the Socialist Party stands uncompromisingly for the revolutionary nationalist struggle, recognising that insofar as the nationalist movement is anti-imperialist it is fulfilling an historically revolutionary rôle—and that also the bourgeois revolution, that the nationalist movement implies, represents an historic advance on the existing social condition of Egypt. The immediate political demands of the party are therefore :—

(a) Union of the Sudan with Egypt.
(b) Nationalisation of the Suez Canal.
(c) Cancellation of the national debt.
(d) Abolition of the capitulations.

The bourgeois character of these demands is not denied: they are put forward (for instance, the nationalisation—that is, the return to Egypt—of the Suez Canal) because of their anti-imperialist nature. It would be a profound misconception of the tasks of an Egyptian fighting working-class party to consider the nationalist struggle as one with which the party had no concern.

What is the attitude of the Labour Party towards the Egyptian nationalist struggle against British imperialism? Has this, the premier political party of the British working class, realised the true significance of the nationalist movement, and the movement, as yet unorganised and unled, of the Egyptian masses that lies behind it? A few statements taken at random of representative leaders of the Labour Party will provide the answers to these and similar questions.

In November, 1920, Mr. Arthur Henderson, concluding an
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article on Egypt in the *Daily Herald*, laid the gravest emphasis on the dangers to the British Empire resulting from a policy by which:

a key position of imperial commerce and strategy (may be) made, instead of the home of a friendly, co-operating people, a centre of sedition and revolution.

This statement needs no comment. It is frankly and unashamedly imperialist. A year later, in the same paper, Mr. H. N. Brailsford wrote a long article in which he stressed the ease with which “we” (the British imperialists) might come to an agreement with the Zaghlulists. He felt that “we” could not satisfy Egyptian claims to the Sudan, though he admitted that “we” only held it by right of conquest—and the rule there of “our” officials was more enlightened and efficient than the rule of Egyptian officials. But his main contention was contained in the words:

The temper of the Egyptians makes it possible for the Imperial Power to do a seemingly generous thing at surprisingly little cost to itself. None of the real interests of British imperialism incur the slightest risk. It is hard to say whether we occupied Egypt chiefly because it is a rich field for investment, or still more because it is the half-way house to India. There would be under an alliance recognising the independence of Egypt ample recognition of both these interests.

This statement also requires no comment. Mr. Brailsford, author of “The War of Steel and Gold,” was as imperialist as Mr. Henderson. In January, 1922, the General Council of the Trades Union Congress and the Executive of the Labour Party issued a joint manifesto, in the course of which they mournfully deplored that the report of the Milner Mission (to judge from the tone of the manifesto, quite the last word in far-seeing statesmanship, so far as Egypt was concerned) was never adopted by the Government. The Milner report, they said:

explicitly recognised the right of the people of Egypt to independence, and proposed measures “in order to establish the independence of Egypt on a secure and lasting basis.” It was incumbent upon the Government to take immediate steps to act upon the report of this commission and to establish Egyptian independence through a treaty negotiated between itself and a duly-elected Government of the Egyptian people.

It was a favourite expression on Labour Party platforms at this time—that the policy of the British Government was making a “second Ireland” of Egypt. When British imperialism achieved
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its masterstroke of the Irish Free State, it was followed with blind adulation by the Labour Party. If British imperialism attempts, by a bargain with the Zaghlulists, to make a "second Ireland" of Egypt in this newer—and, perhaps, more sinister—sense, there can be no doubt whatever that the leaders of British labour will come to heel as blindly as before. Mr. Ben Spoor, who was taking his holiday in Cairo this spring, declared, as a result doubtless of his observations on the spot that:

No solution of the Egyptian question is possible until militarist control has been replaced by diplomatic control.

Could there be a more concise and perfect expression of the views of enlightened imperialism on the problem of Egypt?

Mr. E. D. Morel, that valiant exposé of the iniquities of imperialist exploitation of backward races, described Zaghlul Pasha quite accurately in an interview with the Manchester Guardian as an "Anglophile constitutional agitator," who was persona grata with Lords Cromer, Kitchener, and Milner: he went on to say that he was convinced that it would be perfectly easy for "us" to reach agreement with Zaghlul on the "reserved points" (Suez Canal, protection of foreign interests, &c.). He did not approve of giving up the Sudan to Egypt, but thought this a matter that could be amicably settled between "our" Government and a Zaghlulist Government. He concluded with these words:

We should adopt towards Egypt the same policy so signally successful in the case of South Africa under the inspiration of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. To keep down Egypt by force would be a costly and difficult, dangerous and, above all, stupid policy.

The Labour Party have crowned their imperialist record in the matter of Egypt by the publication of a letter in The Times of March 29 signed by the best part of a hundred Labour M.P.s (including one or two "independent" minded members of other parties). This letter, while praising Lord Milner, and appealing (not in vain, for he was released a couple of days later) for the release of Zaghlul, could actually say that:

Among the signatories to this letter are many who had hopes of the success of Lord Allenby's policy in Egypt. There are none who question his sincerity and patience in endeavouring to make it succeed.

After which astounding piece of soft talk over reactionary imperialism at its worst, the letter, with scrupulous courtesy, points
out the failure of the Allenby policy—and draws the moral on the
approved Zaghlulist lines.

The leaders of the Labour Party have, then, no conception of
the true significance of the Egyptian nationalist movement. They
do not even seem to have heard of the existence of an Egyptian
working-class movement. They cannot view the rapidly advancing
agreement between the British power and the Wafd as a part of the
process of imperialist development. They cannot see that such an
agreement, though it is a widening of the basis of imperialist rule,
is at the same time an abdication of imperialism, is, in fact, a stage
in imperialist decline, which offers a magnificent opportunity for
the organisation of the further step in the Egyptian revolution—
the revolution of the Egyptian toiling masses. The statesmen of
His Majesty’s Opposition follow all the time in the track of British
imperialism. They do not view the Egyptian question as part of a
universal struggle—the class struggle. But then the very outlook
of the leaders of the Labour Party is itself a product of the imperialist
stage of capitalist development. And those same leaders would be
the first to deny that it is a party of the class struggle.