African Élites—
a Study of Ghana

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COMING on the rapid succession of numbers of independent African states to independence, the present setbacks to some of the democratic and progressive forces which were in the forefront of national independence movements have come as a shock to many people, producing bewilderment and even cynicism. There is, understandably, great disquiet at the way in which some leaders of national movements have quickly come to terms with imperialism as soon as independence has been won, and there is concern at the way in which in other states the army, backed by civil servants and other sections of the intelligentsia, has intervened to overthrow progressive Governments or to forestall the arrival to power of radical parties.

The armies, civil servants, and some educated sections have moved rapidly to the forefront of political life to prevent radical social changes. They are in important strategic positions in the state and political life of their countries and it might be useful to examine some of the factors which lie behind their present political moves, and how their outlook has been conditioned.

The examples used in this article refer to Ghanaian experience with which the writer is most familiar, but they have general application to other countries at similar stages of development.

A vital question now hangs over the future of the newly independent countries. Will they go forward to the next stage of their liberation, throwing off economic domination, or will they remain dependent victims of neo-colonialism?

The first perspective strikes at the very heart of imperialism and holds important implications for the future of socialism on a world scale. A policy for thorough-going social reconstruction requires economic programmes, true, but these in turn demand basic changes in the political, state and ideological sectors of national life, which have been handed on from the period of colonial rule. Foreign imperialism is seriously threatened and will take steps to protect itself, but it has an ally in the internal forces, created and nurtured by it against the day when independence would have to be granted.

Classes in Africa

For Marxists examining the class structure of African societies there are considerable problems. Not the least of them is the lack of reliable statistical data. This is increasingly being collated and it is possible to arrive at some conclusions and estimate the characteristics of various classes and sections.

A second difficulty is that we are faced with the oft repeated assertion, from Africans as well as non-Africans, that there are no classes in Africa. Usually this reflects lack of knowledge about the Marxist theory of classes, linked with a fear that Marxists want to "introduce" class war into the continent. (This is an echo of the belief that Marx "invented" the class war.) It is not necessarily reactionary diehards who believe this; there are even very militant anti-imperialists who support this classless view of African society. There are some rather special features which lend support to their opinions.

Modern classes are small in number and relatively new. Class divisions are not firmly delineated, nor is class consciousness so marked as in older industrialised countries in Western Europe and the United States.

Class struggle in Africa has taken a different form. The African worker—the gold miner, docker, railwayman—is not generally employed by an African capitalist but by a foreign monopoly capitalist firm. His struggles for better wages and conditions bring him into conflict with a foreign employer usually represented by a European manager. His fight for the right to organise trade unions has brought him into conflict with a foreign government. His class fight has so far been inextricably bound up with the struggle for political independence, as part of a broad, united movement which cut across latent class divisions between Africans themselves.

The petty-bourgeois sections...the peasants and intelligentsia, small traders and capitalists, also faced the same foreign enemy. The farmer was denied a fair price for his crop, the intellectual denied the full right to education or to apply his skills responsibly, the trader and capitalist subjected to the pressures of foreign monopoly organisations.
With a powerful common enemy against which to unite, it is hardly surprising that the fight for national independence was rarely seen as a class question.

The Family

There are other unifying factors in African life which need to be considered in more detail than can be done here. The working class is often migratory, and is relatively new. The worker is only recently from the village and does not necessarily see himself as a worker for the remainder of his life. His loyalties and feelings of solidarity are likely to lean towards his extended family which can comprise hundreds of people, sometimes in quite different occupations and varying class positions. Ask a Ghanaian where his home is, and he may well tell you the name, not of the town or village where he is living, but of a place where his family originates, but which he may never have visited. Most of us have had difficulty in understanding what is meant by “a brother” or “sister” or even “father”, in African terms of kinship, which reflects the force of the family system still in operation. This system and the traditional communal society of which it is a part still play a powerful part in African life providing for an ethos of mutual help and support, for each of its members, linking the townsman, the intellectual, the farmer, the worker, in bonds of loyalty and frequently obscuring class divisions.

Power and influence derive from a place in the tribal structure, or from a position in the state or political life, and not from the ownership of the means of production. In developing societies, the state initially acts as an accumulator, and intense struggle continues for the ultimate ownership of the means of production thus acquired. If the petty bourgeoisie win this battle, then in the short term, they will, having used the state for their purposes, obtain control of the means of production for themselves. If the working class moves into the leading position, the basis will have been laid for further development and for socialism.

These are only one or two of the reasons why we must approach the problem of African class structure in a careful and flexible way. Increasingly African Marxists are making what must be the vitally important contribution to this question, as may be seen from the discussions at the recent Seminar of African Marxists in Cairo.

Struggles for Leadership

This is an important formative stage in African political life. The national unity created in the struggle for independence is undergoing intensely severe strains as different sections advance conflicting claims on the new states. The character of political life is changing with the movements for national independence being transformed into political parties. In many of them there are bitter struggles for leadership going on, while the organisation is trying simultaneously to fulfil the role of being a ruling party.

In Kenya, the national movement has split; in Ghana the attempt to create a revolutionary, vanguard party, out of the Convention People’s Party has been set back by the military coup. In Nigeria, the Federation threatens to fall apart. This political instability which has come as a shock to many staunch anti-imperialists, supporters of the national liberation movements, is being used by reactionaries and racists to “prove” their claim that Africans cannot rule. Their arguments are easily answered, but those who urgently wish to see Africa throw off imperialist domination in all its forms should recognise that there are powerful advances taking place in other states, such as the United Arab Republic, Mali and Guinea, though not without difficulties, and that the setbacks in the other states, while serious, are not in any way final. From these temporary defeats new political alignments and forces will be created.

To safeguard their right to extract raw materials, establish a favoured market for their industrial products, and guarantee safe areas of investment, the imperialists exported a state apparatus and an ideology. One of their most necessary aids was a small section of the indigenous population which could be won over to assist them in ruling the country, keeping the mass of the people docile, and which would, in the independence period, safeguard the interests of foreign capital and align their countries with the imperialist world.

This careful provision for the future, the existence of a reliable co-operative privileged section, is now being put to the test; in Ghana it appears, temporarily, to have paid off.

The Chiefs

There are two important “élite” sections. The traditional élite which derives its power from its position in tribal society, in the forms of communal land holding which still persist, and the modern élite, virtually created by imperialism, which derives its power from its privileged education, which in turn gives its members positions of influence in the state and politics.

The British ruled their colonies wherever possible through the system of indirect rule. European traders of necessity dealt with the chiefs in the coastal areas particularly and when the West African territories became colonies the British Government installed them in the system of government. The main concern of the British authorities was to maintain “law and order”, which alone could ensure
conditions most favourable to trading, and later to safe investments. The chiefs were the most powerful people in their respective tribes and the vast majority of the people, who were attached to a "stool", came under their influence. The chief’s function was adapted by the British who made him responsible for keeping law and order and for managing his people, in return for which he received payment and political support from the colonial authorities.

In the words of a British administrator of 1871:

“It is the worst possible policy to lower or belittle the native kings or chiefs in the estimation of their dependants. They can at a small cost be made the best and cheapest supporters of law and order...”


The British authorities intervened in the election of chiefs and could and did de-stool the unsatisfactory ones. Prempeh I, King of the Ashantis, was exiled to the Seychelles for over 20 years.

The chiefs were important, mainly in local government and in an advisory function. In the event of any form of representative government being established they were looked to as providing an upper house.

They were dependent on British rule. Their chieftancy derived no longer mainly from the consent of the people, or from the paramountcy, but from the British crown.

They were consequently often regarded as traitors by the more advanced sections of the national movements, but so long as the mass of the people are linked through their labour, through cultivation, to the traditional forms of land ownership and usage, then the chiefs will retain some influence over them.

With a vested interest in both colonial rule and a backward-looking traditional land-holding system, the chiefs in general played a reactionary part; in particular they resisted threats to their influence which came from new types of leaders, in the independence movements. Initially these leaders were drawn from the intelligentsia. One of the reasons for the success of the Convention People's Party was that it appealed successfully to the people over the heads of their chiefs; it appealed to them as Trade Unionists, progressive youth, market traders, and not as members of particular tribes.

Other Sources of Élite

From the very beginning the colonial authorities were plagued by the emergence of a group which it itself created. It was necessary to have interpreters and negotiators between the European traders, then the colonial administrators, and the chiefs. These men, more educated than the chiefs, acted as translators and often as advisers. They were mistrusted and resented as a potential threat to colonial rule.

Already in the mid-19th century, their presence and influence was feared.

“It is with kings and chiefs, not with irresponsible natives, however clever or well educated, that Her Majesty's Government must deal” (Metcalfe, op. cit., page 379).

The modern elite grew from different groups, essentially the product of the presence of Europeans and their rule.

We have already mentioned the intermediaries between Europeans and chiefs. Many of them were children of European fathers and African mothers. Speaking English well, familiar with a European way of life, yet essentially African, they were able to play an important part in negotiations with the chiefs.

A further section which provided skilled administrators, for a period for the colonialists, consisted of the freed slaves, returned from the West Indies to Freetown, Sierra Leone.

With the growth of urbanisation, especially on the coast, Africans themselves took to trading and commercial activity. Their relations with the traditional rulers inevitably weakened and they came to form a coherent and well-organised section which gave leadership to a variety of organisations over a period of a century, such as the Fante Confederation, the Aborigines Protection Society, the British West African Congress.

Imperialism Defends the Chiefs

The introduction of cocoa growing, with production for the first time of a cash crop, resulted in considerable litigation about land ownership and use, corroding much of the traditional land-holding customs, and it encouraged the development of a new professional class of lawyers acting on behalf of a plentiful flow of litigants. This is a profession which still attracts large numbers of young people who hope to enter not only the legal profession but politics and business.

The British Government did everything it could to prevent any alliance between the urbanised, commercial élite and the chiefs. Such a combination of traditional and modern élites would have presented a formidable problem for the colonial Government, even in the last quarter of the 19th century.

The British always protected the claims of the chiefs as against the political activity and demands of the intelligentsia or businessmen. They insisted on assuming that the rights of the ordinary African were vested irrevocably in the chiefs, and that their duty was to prevent any undermining of this system.

In 1918 the following important statement of the principle was made by Sir Hugh Clifford speaking in a debate in the Legislative Council:
"I do not consider that the bulk of even the urban population is, or for a long time to come will be, educated to the pitch of taking an intelligent interest in such a thing as an election. So few people could do so at the present time, that the grant of the franchise would quite certainly result in Members of this Council being elected by a small specialised class, whose ideas had been borrowed from the political atmosphere of Europe, without any regard to local conditions in the Gold Coast, and the members so elected would possess no possible claim to speak for the bulk of the population, who would not, as a matter of fact, have had any hand in their election.

"For these and other reasons, I feel that the political development of the Colony, is such, that if you were to attempt, at the present time, to give the right of election to the native population, that right would be exercised only by the classes who have obtained an European education, and who have with it imbibed ideas of government which are peculiar to Europe, but which, at the present stage, make no appeal whatsoever to the man in the palm grove, whose interests, under such a system, would not secure the same attention as is accorded today . . ." (Metcalfe, op. cit., page 571).

Even as late as the 1920s a petition of the British West African Congress was rejected on the plea that the signatories were representative only of themselves, whereas the chiefs represented the whole of the people.

By 1934 some progress in united action can be recorded, the chiefs and politicians combining in a petition and deputation on Bills concerning water-works and sedition.

The uncertain love-hate relationship growing between the chiefs and some of the intelligentsia is revealed in the following speech made in the Legislative Council in 1936 by Nana Ofori Atta:

"If I listen to these barristers, I often wonder what they really think of the Chiefs. One day they would say to the Chiefs 'you are our Almighty God' and the next day the Chiefs would not be worthy of the respect due to a scavenger . . . it pleases some of the members of the educated classes to see that the Chiefs are ruined."

**Elites in Alliance**

The alliance between the chiefs and a section of the intelligentsia came in 1950 as the answer to the formation of the Convention People's Party by Kwame Nkrumah. The new Party rejected the exclusiveness of the politicians of the United Gold Coast Convention led by the "élite" politicians. These latter based themselves on the concept of an aristocracy of intellect, who had the right to rule because of their attainments and educational background. They tried to work their way out of isolation after the formation of the CPP by allying themselves with the chiefs and their tribal parties.

It was interesting to see how, immediately after the coup, the theories of this group re-emerged, arguing that popularly elected Governments were not a suitable form for Africa, and that rule by specialists and chiefs was more suited to conditions there.

The nationalism of this section of the intelligentsia often found expression in an appeal to Ghana's traditional customs and culture, but rather from the point of view of antiquarian interest than from one of inspiring the movement to proceed from a glorious history to an even more dynamic future.

This reactionary alliance, an expedient in the face of the mass appeal of the Convention People's Party, has re-emerged within the protective framework of the military dictatorship. At present talks are going on about a future constitution. If, finally, the soldiers and policemen can be persuaded to give up power, there will be a reflection of this alliance in some proposal to govern through two houses, a lower one popularly elected possibly, and an upper, elected from chiefs.

**Élite Education**

The modern élite derives its initial power from its exclusive, European-type education. Present-day education in Africa bears very clearly the marks of its origin in Christian missionary education.

The first missionary on the Gold Coast, Reverend Thomas Thompson, arrived in 1751. Other missions established themselves and their schools in the 19th century. The Government gave grants to them for education and gave them the main responsibility in this field. The education given varied of course, but in general there was little attempt to adapt courses, lifted straight from Europe, to local needs and conditions. By 1942 in British West Africa, 99 per cent of primary education was still being run by the missions. The main emphasis was on Christianity, reading and writing, with a great deal of memory work. It was, of necessity, based on an idealist outlook, non-scientific, with heavy emphasis on the humanities. Secondary school examinations were linked with British University Matriculation Boards to provide a basis for the more privileged student to enter a British University without difficulties.

The courses did not in general stimulate a spirit of enquiry or a challenge to accepted beliefs, but inculcated obedience and the acceptance of mission values.

Education tends still to be dominated by these traditions, even in the Universities. It is difficult to break through the cycle of teachers educated in a particular spirit producing students like themselves, especially in the absence of a strong political party based on a clear ideology. Great prestige attaches to book learning, and manual, practical studies tend still to be despised. There are difficulties in getting
enough students to enter the science faculties. There is still a mistrust of local University education, fostered by teachers educated abroad, and "the been-tos" (the students who have graduated overseas) still command inordinate respect compared with the local graduate.

The prestige symbols of the older British universities are often adopted, with students wanting to wear gowns and the members of Senior Common Rooms passing the port (in the correct direction of course!).

Anti-Communism is a very powerful force to be reckoned with in the intellectual and political life of the African states. Given the kind of education, and the character of those directing it, this might be expected, but it often comes as a surprise to Communists themselves. Marxist ideas are very new in the African states in general, and the colonial authorities did their best to exclude Marxist publications and journals. After the coup in Ghana, the military régime tried to stimulate a campaign for the burning of Marxist books.

The kind of idealist, indeed rather quaint and old-fashioned ideas which some of the leaders of the new régime in Ghana express can be seen in the following passage from the speech delivered by the Chairman of the Council of the University of Ghana, appointed after the coup:

"A University is after all a universal institution, and it will (sic) be absurd to think that the purpose of a University should change with its location and time. Throughout the ages all great centres of learning have kept as a sacred trust the role of pursuing truth, even to the bitter end."

Those sections of the intelligentsia which have not broken free from this kind of static, idealist based philosophy, can scarcely begin to grasp the real character of the problems facing their new states. Raised in a generally exclusive atmosphere of a secondary and higher education which is available only to a very few, they come to regard themselves as an aristocracy of talent to whom society owes special privileges.

**Achimota College**

This is not to say that as individuals they have not worked very hard for their education. Many of them have made tremendous sacrifices to get through school and university, but if they accept the predominant philosophy of their education, this serves to complete their isolation.

Educational developments in the 1920s did not change the content of the curriculum. The British wanted to administer their colonies more cheaply and the educated Africans were pressing for the right to work in the administration.

In 1925, Guggisberg founded Achimota College and soon after introduced target figures for Africanisation of the service. He said "This [i.e. Achimota, JB] will be an institution at which the African youth will receive, first and foremost, character training of such a nature as will fit him to be a good citizen; and secondly the higher education necessary to enable him to become a leader in thought, in the professions or in industry, among his fellow countrymen".

Lugard introduced education in Nigeria based on the same principles. Both men echoed the principle laid down almost a century before by Macaulay in relation to education in India which he said should aim "to create a class of persons, Indians in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinion, in morals and in intellect".

**“Africanisation”**

Some of the students at Achimota failed to fulfil Guggisberg's hopes. They became active in the national independence movement, assisted by their higher education to take a leading part. Among these were such leaders as Dr. Nkrumah who, in his preface to *Consciencism,* has a most valuable description of the processes by which colonial students were trained. He writes:

"Many of them had been handpicked, and, so to say, carried certificates of worthiness with them. These were considered fit to become enlightened servants of the colonial administration. The process by which this category of student became fit usually started at an early age, for not infrequently they had lost contact early in life with their traditional background. By reason of their lack of contact with their own roots, they became prone to accept some theory of universalism, provided it was expressed in vague, mellifluous terms. "Armed with their universalism, they carried away from their university courses an attitude entirely at variance with the concrete reality of their people and their struggle."

He then describes the other kind of reaction:

"Finally, there were vast numbers of ordinary Africans, who, animated by a lively national consciousness, sought knowledge as an instrument of national emancipation and integrity. This is not to say that these Africans overlooked the purely cultural value of their studies. But in order that their cultural acquisition should be valuable, they needed to be capable of appreciating it as free men."

It was this last group, leading the national movement and mobilising the power of working-class action, of the youth, of the small trader and farmer, who were accepted by the people. It was the "aristocrats" prepared to compromise with the colonial rulers who were rejected by the electorate.

The targets for Africanisation of the Civil Service included an aim of 319 European officers and 229 African by 1945-46. In fact by then, only 89 Africans
held senior posts and by 1952 only one Ghanaian headed a department.

For the educated the Africanisation demand was a vital part of their perspective for independence. In the House of Lords in 1942, Lord Hailey expressed their aspirations in the following way:

“There is no doubt that where we promise self-government to the colonial peoples the first criterion that many of them will apply in judging our sincerity is the extent to which we admit them to our administrative services. Here, in their view, is the substance of power, and it appeals to them . . . and in particular to the educated classes . . . as of more importance than the slow evolution of popular institutions.”

(Cited Symonds, The British and Their Successors, Faber & Faber, 1966.)

The employment of Africans in the administration was not without precedent. Between 1830 and 1898 Africans had held responsible posts but were then excluded and only people of “pure European descent” could qualify.

In 1942 this requirement was abolished and some appointments were made during the Governorship of Sir Alan Burns. It is perhaps interesting to note that Dr. Busia, recalled from exile by the military regime, after the coup, and bitter opponent of the Convention People’s Party, was made an Assistant District Commissioner by the British in 1946.

Africanisation, linked with parity, provided difficult problems for the new states, once independence was established. The African Civil Servant is employed on conditions which originally applied to the European, colonial civil servant. The high standards of living and many additional benefits were a feature of colonial rule which Hobson described as a vast system of outdoor relief for the younger sons of the ruling class. These living standards were accepted, indeed, demanded, by the African Civil Servant as of right. For the higher grades salaries reach the upper £2,000 brackets, a house is provided. Long paid leave, travel home, and easy loans for a car, are all important subsidiary benefits, in a society where the average per capita annual income is £90, and where the minimum daily wage for a labourer is 6s. 8d.

Civil Servants in Ghana

It is not necessary to develop this argument further to prove how easy it is for the Civil Servant, and the professional workers who have parity with him, to become quite divorced from the problems of the country.

The general character of the Civil Service brings difficulties. The negotiated clauses in the Ghana Constitution relating to the Service aimed to ensure, in Nkrumah’s phrase, that Ghana would have “the pattern of civil service obtaining in Great Britain”.

This is not what a developing country requires. Economic and welfare programmes call for an increase in the numbers of specialists and administrators. Where the state plays the major role, new demands are made on the Civil Service itself. Skilled people are in terribly short supply, and promotion is relatively quick. The educated sections find their influence and power increases as these developments take place. An acute contradiction arises because the personnel are not in general in favour of a dynamic, anti-imperialist policy or of the necessary democratic changes which need to take place in the state apparatus if these reforms are to be carried through successfully. Tensions grow between the Civil Service and the politicians.

In Britain the role of the Civil Servant as policy maker is carefully underplayed. In the colonial administrations the Civil Servant appeared as administrator, but also as policy maker, as extraordinarily powerful, and indeed he was. It is to this latter aspect that the African looks and consequently resents the power of the politicians who formulate policies, of which he usually disapproves in any case. This resentment is exacerbated because the educated Civil Servant looks down on the politician who often has no formal educational qualifications.

It is the dream of many African Civil Servants to be left to get on with ruling and administering the country, without the impediment of popularly elected politicians.

“Ready-Made” Army

The new state takes over a “ready-made” army from the colonial country which presents problems as complicated as that of the Civil Service.

The first Africans were recruited to the British colonial army at the beginning of this century. It is perhaps of some significance that with one exception, every member of the present military regime joined the Colonial Army or Police Force.

The first African was commissioned during the Second World War. More became officers after 1950, and from 1953 they were admitted to Sandhurst.

William Gutteridge in Military Institutions and Power in the New States (Pall Mall, 1964) describes them as follows:

“They are part of a small élite, they have close contacts amongst civil servants and many of them have enjoyed the same common but in a sense unique experience of training in a closed institution overseas. They are typical in some ways of the new men in their own countries, but are at the same time inheritors of an especial kind of foreign tradition which has come down through the agency of a foreign army and been consciously adapted to the conditions of a defence force under colonial administration.”
The British preferred to recruit illiterates to the colonial army because it was easier to discipline them. They wanted to keep the soldiers separate from the people so that the former could carry out their policing role with as few complications as possible. The main force in the Gold Coast was recruited from the Northern Territories, predominantly Muslim and with a high illiteracy level. Army officers do not generally have a high level of academic qualifications as perhaps the Civil Servants may discover when disagreements develop. The officers on the ruling committee in Ghana have School Certificates. This small army, heirs of a colonial tradition, is a tightly knit cohesive force, out of sympathy with anti-imperialist policies which weaken their ties with Britain. There were frequent changes of command, as part of an attempt by the Nkrumah Government to weaken the cohesion. There was the decision to diversify training and cadets were sent to the Soviet Union. This led to the crisis in which General Alexander was dismissed. He wrote in a recent letter to The Times, "Ever since I left Ghana in 1961 I have been in private correspondence with officers and other ranks of their armed forces".

A new Military Academy was set up at Teshie near Accra, to train officers at home, and the Workers’ Brigade was set up as a para-military trade training organisation, though this latter never fulfilled its proper function. The army has a powerfully developed sense of discipline, a quality not shared by many other organised elements of Ghanaian life. Efficiency for its own sake attracts many of the younger inexperienced officers. For these new members of the Ghana army, the next period is likely to be full of lessons. They were not generally against Nkrumah’s policies, but they resented inefficiency and corruption. If they thought the coup would retain the essential features of this policy but get rid of the political problems attached to operating it, as many Ghanaians did, they will soon develop opposition to their older officers now in control who have allied themselves with the most reactionary politicians and who have apparently come to terms with some of the corrupt sections of the CPP.

If, in common with the forward-looking sections of the intelligentsia, these young officers can be won for a firm alliance with the small left forces, with the organised workers and the small farmers, then the coup can be defeated. If they see the problems simply in terms of personalities and not of policies, then one coup is likely to succeed another. The discipline and fire power of a western trained, reactionary-led army is a formidable force, and the most powerful political weapon that can be opposed to it is a determined, disciplined political party, united by a revolutionary ideology, working with all progressive sections of the people.

**Party and People**

At present the chiefs, the reactionary intelligentsia, the army officers, have formed a political alliance, based only on their opposition to the Convention People's Party. It is thoroughly opportunist and self interested and splits and divisions along many lines are clearly possible. Certainly its policies and the philosophy on which they are based can never solve Ghana’s problems which she shares with all the developing states.

There is an important responsibility facing that section of the modern elite which worked for progressive development, for the transformation of the CPP into a new type of vanguard party, and for a new alignment of forces. Their training does enable them to give leadership, formulate demands, organise and negotiate, but on certain important conditions. The petty-bourgeois leaderships of the national independence movements became a powerful political force only when they turned to the masses of the people, and especially to the organised working class, small as it was. Many of these young men and women are attracted to scientific socialist ideas, and they can bring the power of Marxist ideology into the mass movement. The danger is that they will not see the need to fight for this democratic alliance, without which they can never strike their roots deep into the political life of their country. The interests of the vast majority of the people of the new states lie still in a determined anti-imperialist course. National unity based on such policies, with the working class playing a leading force and moving towards a scientific outlook, is a necessary prerequisite to the next stage of the national liberation advance. Such an alliance will overthrow reactionary régimes which have been able to take advantage of mistakes and difficulties, and take up the struggle for profound social changes which alone can free the people from poverty, deprivation and dependence.