The Zimbabwe Revolution and the Internal Settlement
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On March 3, 1978, Ian Smith the Rhodesian leader signed what has now come to be known as the Internal Settlement Agreement with Bishop Abel Muzorewa of the United African National Council (UANC), Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole of the then African National Council-Sithole (now ZANU-Sithole), and Chief Jeremiah Chirau of the Zimbabwe United Peoples Organisation (ZUPO). The agreement was called “internal” to emphasize that it had been reached with moderate African leaders inside Rhodesia as opposed to the militant Patriotic Front of Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo who are waging a guerrilla war against the Rhodesian regime from the neighbouring states of Mozambique and Zambia respectively. It soon became obvious that the purpose of the settlement was to perpetuate the repressive regime through the cosmetic involvement of some Africans in a government in which the Rhodesian Front wielded all power.

The aim of this article is to attempt to demonstrate in what way the existence of certain social strata and forces among the Africans in Rhodesia made the March 3 agreement possible and also to indicate why it has failed.

UANC

The majority element in Bishop Muzorewa’s UANC leadership are African intellectuals most of whom have only their education with no wealth of their own.1 They are allied with businessmen, both black and white, who have money and jobs to offer and have declared themselves supporters of African majority rule. Connections are also forged with large multinationals who look forward to reactivating their massive economic interests in Rhodesia in the event of United Nations sanctions being lifted.2 The intellectuals and the businessmen need each other; the African intellectuals rationalise the position of the business community to the rest of the African people so that business gains acceptance and respectability.3 The business community reciprocates by rewarding the elite with good jobs and high wages which the elite uses to maintain a life above and apart from the masses of Zimbabwe.

The relatively large following which the UANC often attracted in urban areas owed its origin to the way in which the party arose. The party traces its beginnings to the Pearce Commission of 1971 when Africans, long denied opportunities for political expression, were asked to say whether or not they wanted majority rule. For a discussion of some of the major characteristics of the African educated elite in Zimbabwe, see A. K. H. Weinrich, Black and White Elites in rural Rhodesia. (Manchester University Press, 1973), especially Chapter 8; also her article, “Rhodesian African Elites,” Society: Bulletin of the Sociological Association. (University of Rhodesia), No. 1, October-November 1969; M. B. Lukhero, “The social characteristics of an emergent elite in Harare,” in P. C. Lloyd (ed.) The New Elites of Tropical Africa. (O.U.P., 1966), pp 126–138.

were agreeable to the independence plan worked out without African participation between Ian Smith and Sir Alec Douglas-Home, then Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. Ever since registering their massive “No” vote, many Africans tended to channel their political views through coming out in support of the Bishop, who soon made what had previously been essentially a pressure group into a regular political party. The UANC party leadership soon learnt that they could sustain an organisation through carefully exploiting the receptiveness of the Zimbabwe masses to revolutionary ideas. With the failure of the internal settlement has come the realisation that their adherence to the principle of majority rule was a tactic to gain advantages for themselves from an unchanged exploitative system.

ZUPO

The position of Chief Jeremiah Chirau’s ZUPO is also interesting. Being led by chiefs who are paid employees of the Rhodesian government, ZUPO finds itself maintaining a difficult existence. The chiefs never regained the respect which they lost through collaboration with the settler regime right from its inception. The outstanding exception to this is Chief Rekayi Tangwena, who in recent times has led his people in the fight to regain their land which was seized and given to a tea estate concern. When the nationalist struggles of the 1960s were gaining momentum, the settler regime sought to frustrate them through various means including the formation of a council of chiefs which it was hoped would help prevent political work among the peasants. When this failed, the regime decided to introduce another tactic. They elevated the organisation of chiefs to the level of political parties. When ZUPO was formed on December 29, 1976, it was on the initiative of the Rhodesian government which suggested to Chiefs Chirau and Ndiweni, both senators in the Rhodesian parliament and at that time also members of the Rhodesian government, to lay down their cabinet portfolios and start a political party. Chirau became president and Kaiser Ndiweni, a man with a long history of collaboration with the settler regime, became vice-president. These two men, who had been prison guard and policeman respectively before becoming chiefs, understood well the concern of the regime to maintain law and order. The purpose of ZUPO was thus not only to provide the Rhodesian government with a ready-made source of “moderate African opinion”, but to present a countervailing force to the UANC which the regime at that time feared might use its apparently wide support to advance radical demands.

ZUPO is led by chiefs because very few self-respecting African intellectuals want to be seen having anything to do with a group which has little respect among the people. This largely explains why the chiefs have to come out and champion their own reactionary interests. One of the results of ZUPO’s relative lack of intellectual membership is that it finds it difficult to articulate its political position. Not only do they fail to explain coherently their long-standing collaboration with the regime, but they also cannot even avail themselves of the ready-made argument of majority rule, used ad nauseam by the other two parties, because the chiefs have not been associated with it right from the beginning. Their position is made worse when it is remembered that ZUPO was formed on the initiative of the Rhodesian government whose philosophy it amply reflects. Under the heading “Law and Order” in the party’s Principles and Policies, it is stated that “The first priority of the Organisation will be the maintenance of law and order.”

The leaders of ZUPO however know that it is important also to have other bases of power besides their tenuous connections with African customary law which they devalued as a source of authority by collaborating. Thus ZUPO also counts among its membership those African businessmen who, although they never went far in school or not at all, have managed to amass wealth for themselves and are part of the rural bourgeoisie. ZUPO members are also allied to the other two parties in various ways. Some of the intellectuals in the UANC are in fact sons and relatives of members of ZUPO. Furthermore many of the functionaries in the other parties actually look forward to one day owning a farm and settling down. When this happens, they too will become part of that rural bourgeoisie which at present is found in ZUPO. In fact this has already happened in the case of the UANC’s first vice-president, James R. D. Chikerema, who just recently bought a £20,000 farm in the Zvimba area. He has not only joined that class which exploits the labour of African peasants, but has effectively become part of the backbone of settler Rhodesia, the agricultural bourgeoisie.

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3 For a sampling of the praises which members of the internal settlement have poured on capitalism, see the speech of Ernest Bulle, UANC second vice-president and co-minister of finance, when he opened the ACCOR Congress at Victoria Falls, Rhodesia, on May 17, 1978 reprinted in The Rise (Salisbury), May 28, 1978; also James R. D. Chikerema’s address before the Bulawayo Chamber of Commerce, Zimbabwe Report, Vol. 2, No. 1, April–May 1978, pp. 18–19.


5 In the party’s “Principles and Policies” the “Aim” of ZUPO is laboriously stated as follows: To establish a majority rule form of Government suited to needs and circumstances of Zimbabwe and its people.

6 The Times, April 22, 1978.
Sithole

The position of Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole is also of interest. His party, the former African National Council-Sithole renamed the Zimbabwe African National Union-Sithole (ZANU-Sithole), depends largely on the same group as that of Muzorewa's UANC. What makes Sithole's ZANU different from the UANC is that the former is composed of people who no longer want to be identified with the articulation of radical views such as one man one vote and so on. Sithole's number two man, Dr. Elliot Gabelliah, used to be Muzorewa's number two man in the UANC. He belongs to the old guard which was the first to taste the fruits of western education and actually flirted with the principles of majority rule at one time in their lives. This group is now joined by those who say that they were once involved in the guerrilla war, such as K. Malindi and John Kadzviti.² Sithole himself never tires of saying that he pioneered the guerrilla war, and is the real leader of ZANU, not Robert Mugabe. The aim of all these people is to claim that they represent the embodiment of sound experience. They seek to say to the people of Zimbabwe that because they "have been through it all", they are best qualified to judge that Ian Smith's acceptance of the principles of majority rule is genuine. However, the problem with these "has beens" is that a rejection of majority rule is difficult, if not impossible, to articulate to the relatively highly politicised masses of Zimbabwe so that a party such as Sithole's cannot exist by itself. It has to be in the ring with others. Sithole knows this and has in addition, forged links with British, American, South African and Belgian capitalists, to name a few, in order to further buttress his position.

Dependence on the Status Quo

Because racial discrimination in Rhodesia excluded Africans from participating in any but the most peripheral areas of the economy, a weak and dependent assortment of African petty bourgeois developed consisting of intellectuals, students, small traders, artisans and agricultural small holders much in the same way as elsewhere in Southern Africa.³ The weakness of this elite evidences itself in the enthusiasm with which its members support the present system which sustains and guarantees their existence and privileges.

An outstanding Rhodesian example of this fact is to be found in the April/May 1978 issue of the Zimbabwe Report, the official organ of the UANC, which contains an address given by its first vice-president, James R. D. Chikerema, to the Bulawayo Chamber of Commerce. In it he "spelt out the economic guidelines for a future independent Zimbabwe under the UANC." The economy, he said, must serve the people and a UANC government would provide proposals on how this service could be performed. One of these would be a council of economic advisers who would be called upon to advise the government. Chikerema went on to reveal the extent of his party's dependence on the existing economic structure by stating that the members to advise the government would be drawn from both the public and private sectors, for example from commerce, industry, mining, agriculture, banking and finance, all areas in which Africans have traditionally been excluded from managerial and decision-making positions. The vice-president was at pains to emphasize the social responsibilities of a majority rule government. He called for the scrapping of the racial aspects of the old economy so that everyone could be involved. Credit facilities would also have to be made available to everyone on an equal basis. Before ending his address, the vice-president left no one in any doubt as to what type of economy Zimbabwe's would be. "Private enterprise," he said, "shall be welcome in Zimbabwe." He went on to spell out in no uncertain terms what were the "normal expectations of a UANC government."

Where the state wishes it to boost employment, we expect private enterprise to respond accordingly. Where the state wishes to see accelerated development of indigenous manpower, then private enterprise must cooperate."³

A Mediating Role

Chikerema's address was a succinct expose of the mediating role which not just the UANC but any African government would perform in the unchanged circumstances of present-day Rhodesia. Its task will not be to transform the present set-up for the benefit of the people. Chikerema said that while the UANC government would see to it that the people's aspirations were met, it would also insure that "investors whether they be government or private... must obtain a fair return on their investment." Anyone reading Chikerema's address would easily get the impression, obviously intended, that the UANC would perform the role of a group of neutral referees whose job was to see that optimum

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² The Daily Telegraph, April 12, 1978, p. 3. John Kadzviti is reported as saying, "I am one of them (i.e. guerrillas) and they trust me and I will do my best to get them what they have been fighting for."

conditions existed for everybody. Nothing could be further from the truth. As already pointed out, the UANC, ZANU-Sithole and ZUPO are led by actual or aspiring petty bourgeoisie who exploit the workers and peasants as the case of the UANC’s first vice-president demonstrates. The people whom Muzorewa led to the negotiations which resulted in the signing of the internal settlement agreement of March 3, 1978, were all members of the African elite in Rhodesia and who identified with the interests of that elite: James R. D. Chikerema, first vice-president; Ernest Bulle, second vice-president and university lecturer; Edward Masaivara, secretary-general and former inspector of schools; Enoch Dumbutshena, lawyer and former supporter of Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU; Ahrn Palley, lawyer and doctor; Francis Zindoga, national chairman and businessman; Stanlake Samkange, writer and professor; Solomon Nenguwo, former principal of schools. Professor Samkange recently returned to Salisbury from the USA and bought a five turret castle in front of which he likes to pose for photographs with his 1965 Rolls Royce. This is the group which pledges itself to bring about democracy for the struggling masses of Zimbabwe.

In many African countries, it is precisely this group which is making possible the existence of a neo-colonial state. Big business shields itself behind this class of indigenous petty bourgeois who use state power in defence of capitalism and the furtherance of their own interests. The social responsibilities which Chikerema talked about find expression in the creation of state enterprises which are then held up as evidence of the state’s concern with the interests of the people. The truth is that these enterprises, or parastatals as they are sometimes known, not only facilitate the exploitation by imperialism of the country’s resources, but also help towards the embourgeoisment of the indigenous elite which usually start off with nothing but their education. As executives of parastatals, they enrich themselves at public expense and when they finally leave their posts, they start their own businesses with the money, experience and connections which they acquired from their previous positions.

Racism

If it were in any other African country, the transition to independence through a neo-colonial mechanism in Rhodesia would have been virtually automatic. However, as Dr. David Owen always points out, the colonial history of Rhodesia was different from that of many colonies. The decisive factor in Rhodesia is the white settler community, whose opposition to sharing power with even the African petty-bourgeoisie has been the cause for the delay in the coming of so-called majority rule government. Much against the will of many settlers, the petty bourgeoisie have been brought in mainly for the purpose of preventing socialism from gaining a foothold in Zimbabwe. Because the African elite participating in the internal settlement agreement identifies with capitalism, its presence enables the minority regime to claim to “accept” the principle of majority rule while largely retaining the basic structure of capitalist exploitation and western influence.

One of the contradictions which confronts Rhodesia today is the issue of racism. The first vice-president of the UANC in his chamber of commerce address strongly called for the elimination of racial discrimination in order obviously to make the alliance between the settlers and the African petty bourgeoisie work. In agreeing only to scrap the minor aspects of racism in the country, leaving untouched residential areas, schools, hospitals and so on, the whites in power have demonstrated the inability of the present structure to accommodate any but the most innocuous demands of majority rule. Even before the announcement of the composition of the proposed parliament in which the power of the Africans will be far from assured, the method of its election already revealed the weakness of the African members meaningfully to influence matters. It had earlier been announced that for that parliament, the whites were going to elect their representatives under the existing franchise, while the Africans would elect theirs on the basis that the rest of the country not covered by the white franchise was to be treated as one constituency. On the day on which that parliament would meet, one fact would be abundantly clear: that the members would be coming from different systems. The whites would obviously want things to remain like that and the Africans would be powerless to oppose.

Another struggle

The appearance on the Rhodesian political scene of the African members of the internal settlement has given rise to a new dimension in the liberation war. When the guerrilla war began in the middle 1960s, it was for the aim of regaining the country from the colonialists. This is the position of ZANU and ZAPU which, as the Patriotic Front, are waging the guerrilla war. Zimbabwe News, the official organ of ZANU, in answer to the question, “Why was ZANU formed?” states “ZANU was formed by the

people of Zimbabwe out of the realisation that the independence of Zimbabwe would not come out of constitutional conferences but through 'direct confrontation' by our own efforts.” As to “Who is the enemy?” Zimbabwe News continues, “The immediate enemy is imperialism represented in Zimbabwe by British and American interests. The agents of this imperialism are the Rhodesia white settlers who have used their political power to entrench British and American capitalism. To do this effectively, they have introduced racism as a state doctrine. The long-term enemy is the African petty-bourgeoisie that has been produced by colonial capitalism, and uses tribalism, sexism, religion and even nationalism to perpetuate capitalism in Zimbabwe.”

From the above excerpt, it will be seen that the struggle in Zimbabwe has been conceived in terms of two definite stages. The first involves the defeat of the agents of colonialism and the takeover of state power. The second stage involves the use of that state power to advance the interests of the working masses against imperialism and the elements which make its existence possible, i.e., the petty bourgeoisie. The problem now is that the two stages have coalesced. The white settlers who are the agents of colonialism and imperialism have allied themselves with the African petty-bourgeoisie in order to protect themselves and imperialism. Many enterprises in the country have followed the example of the executive council’s inclusion of Africans and have begun to employ Africans in high places. The Bank of Rhodesia, the Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation and the Salisbury Bus Company are a few of the many concerns which now have Africans on their boards of directors.\(^\text{11}\)

**Struggle on Two Fronts**

It has become imperative therefore that the guerrilla war be waged together with the class struggle. If the so-called majority rule government comes, it will be defended by the same military forces which used to defend the all-white government. Besides joining the regime which is stepping up the killing of the very people who they claim to lead, the African members of the internal settlement have actively alienated the masses by joining in the propaganda of the regime such as awarding medals to white pilots for distinguished service in village bombing raids. Dr. Elliot Gabellah, the co-minister of foreign affairs in the Rhodesian transitional government, recently invited Rhodesians, on the occasion of the resignation of the South African premier John Vorster, to “join me in wishing Mr. Vorster well in his retirement.” What gave rise to these feelings of warmth was his knowledge that “Rhodeans are well aware of the close ties of friendship which have traditionally existed between Rhodesia and South Africa.” The guerrilla war will thus have to be waged along with a campaign to expose the class character of the collaborationists. The mechanism for this already exists in the form of the “genevas”, gatherings at which many peasants are given political education by the liberation forces. As conditions in the country change, these gatherings are destined to play an even wider role in deepening the consciousness of the Zimbabwean masses.

**Obstacles**

One of the obstacles militating against waging the struggle in the field and against the collaborationists is that the liberation movements are largely equipped to wage a nationalist effort. The consequence of this, as of all liberation movements elsewhere, is that all Africans without class distinction in the Patriotic Front are united in the effort to defeat colonialism, one of whose aspects, racism, makes this unity imperative. The minority regime’s minor relaxation of racism has attracted away many petty-bourgeois both in and out of the liberation movements, because they now see opportunities for pursuing their individualistic interests in the basically unchanged exploitative conditions of Rhodesia. When outsiders speak of the prospect these days of wrecking the Patriotic Front, they do so in the belief that if the proper approaches are made, some of its members will realise that their interests do not lie with the Front. These outsiders point to the various connections that some PF members have with interests inside and outside Rhodesia and advance the argument that the PF cannot last for long.

These efforts at wrecking the PF, some of which have recently come to light, are evidence that the Front is not well equipped to wage the struggle on both fronts. The rapidity with which the guerrilla war scored successes, however, helped to expose these efforts as largely aimed at benefitting the internal deal through neutralising the liberation movements’ fighting capacity. It would therefore appear to be dangerous and unwise to suggest a weeding-out campaign inside the liberation forces. Firstly, the liberation war is its own cleanser. Secondly, the fate of the Africans in the internal settlement lies with that of the settlers and as the latter’s defeat has looked imminent, so has that of the collaborators, who therefore do not merit a special effort in the struggle. Finally, the campaign, if it must, has to take place in the context of objective forces. Two of these may be a departure from the party line, which will be evidence of someone showing their true colours, and behaviour in the liberated zones. As FRELIMO discovered through the course of their struggle against the Portuguese colonialists in

\(^{13}\) *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 9, Nos. 5–6 (July–December 1977), p. 46.

Mozambique, it became more and more possible to gauge concretely the commitment of their members to socialism following the creation of FRELIMO-run institutions in the liberated areas.\footnote{FRELIMO. Central Committee Report to the Third Congress. (Maputo, February, 1977), Chapter 1, p. 3.}

**Internal differences**

The differences which plague the internal alliance are many although what brought the parties together in the first place are their fundamental interests and the common threat which they see as emanating from the PF. The latter has spelt out on numerous occasions what fate awaits the parties to the March 3 agreement.\footnote{Zimbabwe News, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 1; ZIPA Combat Diary, op. cit.} Some of the differences are specific to the parties themselves while others, the more important, owe their origin to the war being waged by the guerrilla forces. Ian Smith and his RF group made public their disillusionment at the failure of Bishop Muzorewa and Reverend Sithole to fulfill their earlier promises of working to bring about support for a ceasefire among the guerrillas. Sithole, claiming to have pioneered the armed struggle, had been the loudest in declaring that guerrillas would be persuaded to lay down their arms once majority rule had been conceded. The mounting casualty figures in the war, which included those killed on so-called peace missions, were early indications that the deal would fail. In desperation, Sithole initially went to the extent of manufacturing false evidence of guerrilla support by getting unemployed youths to pose as freedom fighters.\footnote{The Observer, May 7, 1978.} Their lack of support among the guerrillas was soon matched by the peasants who largely stayed away from meetings at which members of the internal alliance attempted to sell their agreement.

For their part, the African members of the alliance have stressed to Smith and the RF the need to eliminate racial discrimination so as to make it easier for Muzorewa and company to campaign for the deal to the African people. Muzorewa’s UANC has not bothered to do his homework with a view to discovering the relative strengths represented by the forces within his party. On many occasions, the Bishop has made pronouncements which he changed afterwards. Before the Geneva conference in October 1976, Muzorewa sought to make his attendance conditional upon the release, among others, of Edson Sithole, the UANC publicity secretary, who had disappeared in mysterious circumstances which the UANC believed to be connected with the regime.\footnote{The Daily Telegraph, April 21, 1978.} Days went by and nobody including Dr. Sithole was released. Bishop Muzorewa went to Geneva and in a curious move, sat next to a chair which he said he was leaving empty for Edson Sithole, who has not shown up to this day. More recently, following the expulsion of Byron Hove from his post as co-minister of justice, law and order, Muzorewa announced that a meeting of the UANC would be held to decide whether or not to remain part of the internal alliance. For those not used to these happenings, the prospect of the UANC actually leaving the March 3 agreement seemed a definite possibility. The news of the party’s decision came: the UANC had decided that it was in the best interests of the country to remain part of the alliance.

**Differences in Leadership**

The make-up of the parties’ leadership is another source of the differences among them. The relatively large concentration of intellectuals in the UANC is the cause of the party’s more frequent flirtation with radical views which originally led Smith to sponsor the formation of countervailing forces to it. Some UANC members have voiced militant views which have been openly contemptuous not only of the other parties, but also of the UANC itself. As a result, there have been resignations more frequently from the UANC than the other parties. However, the UANC still retains a powerful element which has been in nationalist politics since the late 1950s. The core of this element is represented by such figures as Chikerema and Nyandoro, both of whom have been in the nationalist business since the formation of the first modern-day nationalist party in Zimbabwe, the African National Congress of 1957. This element also exists in Sithole’s ZANU, and is the source of conservatism there as it is in the others.

It is clear from various instances that Muzorewa has not bothered to do his homework with a view to discovering the relative strengths represented by the forces within his party. On many occasions, the Bishop has made pronouncements which he changed afterwards. Before the Geneva conference in October 1976, Muzorewa sought to make his attendance conditional upon the release, among others, of Edson Sithole, the UANC publicity secretary, who had disappeared in mysterious circumstances which the UANC believed to be connected with the regime. Days went by and nobody including Dr. Sithole was released. Bishop Muzorewa went to Geneva and in a curious move, sat next to a chair which he said he was leaving empty for Edson Sithole, who has not shown up to this day. More recently, following the expulsion of Byron Hove from his post as co-minister of justice, law and order, Muzorewa announced that a meeting of the UANC would be held to decide whether or not to remain part of the internal alliance. For those not used to these happenings, the prospect of the UANC actually leaving the March 3 agreement seemed a definite possibility. The news of the party’s decision came: the UANC had decided that it was in the best interests of the country to remain part of the
agreement. What was not revealed was that the powerful conservative element had won the day. This erratic behaviour on the part of the UANC, itself the consequence of competing forces within the party, coupled with the party's earlier unwillingness to exude as much public enthusiasm for the agreement as the other parties, led to public denunciations from the other leaders to the deal and to the appearance of what the UANC called a "ganging up" against it. However these differences, being specific to the parties, are not by themselves the cause of the failure of the internal deal; this must be seen as the guerrilla war.

Western Aims
The western powers know that if the liberation forces triumph in Zimbabwe against the internal settlement forces it will mean the end of the prospect of retaining a western foothold in the country. As a result, they are anxiously seeking to end the war while retaining something of what the internal settlement stands for. At first, the west, convinced by the expressions of confidence on the part of Sithole and Muzorewa that they could mobilise support for the deal among the guerrillas, welcomed the March 3 agreement as "a step in the right direction." Suggestions on how to implement the Anglo-American proposals from then on, however, evolved within the context of trying to bring together, if not the internal settlement parties and the Patriotic Front, then some other variant which involved much the same concept. The plan has so far failed because the liberation forces know that its aim is to benefit the internal deal and to protect western interests in Zimbabwe.

Although this plan, which can be called "official" has failed, it appears that another "unofficial" one is in the making. There exist in Britain, United States and West Germany powerful opposition groups which are calling for the recognition of the March 3 agreement. In Britain the Conservative Party has made it known that it will stop supporting the Labour government on the issue of renewing sanctions on Rhodesia if a majority rule government is installed there. In America, where Ian Smith and Sithole were invited by 23 congressmen, much the same attitude has prevailed. The "official" parties in power, with some vacillation, have tended to go along with the "unofficial" moves. It is possible that the two trends may come together to form the basis for a "Camp David" initiative in which the western powers recognise the Salisbury agreement against the suitably labelled "militant" and "pro-Marxist" forces of the Patriotic Front.

However, such a "Camp David" move is bound to fail in Zimbabwe. Egyptians may have been tired of going to war for a cause situated outside their borders, but in Zimbabwe the war has gone on long enough for the people to understand the issues involved. They know that it is only through the war that true freedom will come and they will not stand by any moves coming from Washington as they will know their true aims.

The Armed Forces in Britain
Jack Woddis

Anyone seriously concerned with fundamental democratic change in Britain and with opening up the road to socialism must have a policy for dealing with the State institutions, including the coercive as well as the non-coercive ones.

While the British Labour and progressive movement has, with some exceptions, neglected the role of the army—and this criticism can be fairly levelled at the Communist Party, too—ruling circles in Britain, with their acute awareness of the realities of political power, have thought ahead and taken a number of steps to prepare the army for the future. The new role for which the army is being groomed has been expressed both in military/political theory and in training and practice.

The results of such training have, to a large and painful degree, been witnessed now for ten years in Northern Ireland. This army engagement and "blooding" in "counter-insurgency" operations has provided the British army with technical expertise and experimentation in coping with urban guerrillas, and in the employment of new tactics for such warfare. But that is only part of the task which the army is carrying out in Northern Ireland. It is also being employed to control and curb the political activities

1 A more comprehensive examination of the role of armed forces in systems of political power is contained in Jack Woddis's *Armies and Politics* (Lawrence & Wishart), now available in paperback price £2.95. The above article has drawn considerably on the final chapter of this book.