The question about Portugal and its territories was noticeably avoided during the loud debate over Rhodesia. In January 1966, the Lonrho-Beira pipeline was but a temporary solution, and in April of the same year the Joanna V became the headline issue. More recently, however, the bonds between Rhodesia and Mozambique, as well as those between Portugal and Great Britain, were kept as silent as possible by the latter’s government and the press, even if next to South Africa it is the Mozambican colonial government which is the most important support of Smith’s regime, the one which enables it to survive even today.

The following are some of the facts which have a tendency to be overlooked:

**The Economic Alliance**
Portugal has largely complained over the fact that it has lost 15,000,000 pounds sterling in Mozambique as a result of sanctions, which illustrates sufficiently well the closeness of the Rhodesia-Mozambique interdependence. This leads us to ask what is the significance of what Portugal does not lose and of what these bonds provide once again Rhodesia with.

**Transportation of Goods**
Ten per cent of the gross national revenue of Mozambique comes from the transportation of goods forwarded to Rhodesia, or coming from Rhodesia. Actually, since Mozambique lies between Rhodesia and the sea, it has always been the main outlet of Rhodesia’s commerce. Beira is by far the closest port to Salisbury and Bulawayo. These cities are connected to Beira by means of roads or railways. A railway line connects them also with Lourenco Marques.

**Manpower**
Even if the largest emigration of Mozambican workers is toward South Africa, that towards Rhodesia still is significant. In 1963, 119,871 Mozambican workers were at work in Rhodesia and 6,387 of them were employed in (U.N. statistics). Mozambique profits from the taxes sent back by these emigratn workers.

Rhodesia thus gains from having a supplementary manpower source which is even more vulnerable to police operations than its own manpower due to continuous threats of deportation. The importance of this fact could increase if the Zimbabwe people become involved in the economic war, in the future.

It is in Mozambique that one can find the beaches closest to Rhodesia...
Each year nearly 80,000 white Rhodesians spend their vacations in Mozambican seaside resorts. It is probable that Mozambique may see its popularity increase now that neither money or Rhodesian passports are valid in a number of countries. Mozambique, however, still accepts them. Its friendly relations with Rhodesia thus softens considerably the effects of the sanctions war.

Finances
Since Mozambique accepts Rhodesia's illegal money, it can be utilized in a more general way as an outlet of Rhodesia's finances.

Commerce
In 1965 commerce between both countries was not significant; Rhodesia accounting for only 1.9% of Mozambican imports and 3.1% of its exports. In the past two years commercial relations have become more significant, and certain signs lead one to think that they will develop considerably in the future.

In 1964 a pact was signed which would come into effect in 1965 according to which Rhodesia was granted the status of most favoured nation. The consequences of such an agreement should not appear in the 1965 figures. In 1966 a group of envoys made up of Portuguese bankers and industrialists came to Rhodesia to check the possibility 'of an increase in industrial and commercial exchanges between Portugal, its colonies, and Rhodesia' (Tribuna, 20 November 1966).

B.H. Musette, Rhodesian Minister of Commerce and Industry, had previously declared, in July, at the time of the Mozambique's commercial fair, that 'the main object of the Rhodesian minister's visit was to stimulate economic relations between Mozambique and Rhodesia.' (Diario Popular, Lisbon, 8 July 1966).

The Political Alliance
If the Portuguese authorities do their best in Mozambique to help Rhodesia blunt the impact of avoiding sanctions, it is for clear economic reasons, but this co-operation is also based on a similarity of political interests.

In 1965 Le Monde stated that 'according to information received from Lisbon's diplomatic circles, an agreement had been secretly concluded among Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa, for the defence of white Africa... The agreement foresees the organization of a common defence against nationalist and Communist subversion.' (Le Monde, 14 September 1965).

Such fraternal co-operation has certainly evolved since U.D.I., and both the PIDE (the Portuguese secret police) and the Rhodesian police work together.

If the British Government really wanted the fall of the Smith regime, it would seek among other things to separate Smith from such a useful ally. The surest way of arriving at such a goal would be to help the formation of a nationalist government in Mozambique.

However, while a clear majority supports the will to independence of the
Anatomy of Colonialism

Mozambican people at the United Nations, Great Britain persists in voting against the resolutions pertaining to this question.

In its relations with Portugal, England, Smith's main ally after South Africa, has been satisfied with minimal reprimands on the subject of pipelines and tankers. Besides this, both commercial and diplomatic relations are still maintained as cordially as ever. It seems that Portugal will remain as England's oldest ally, its partner in EFTA, and in NATO; and protected in this way by so-called ties of friendship, Portugal will continue to make sanctions inoperative and make Smith's dictatorship a success.

Even if Great Britain pretends to overlook the Smith-Salazar bonds, the real enemies of both dictatorships do not. We, in FRELIMO, we are quite aware that our fight against Salazar is closely associated with that against Smith, and that a blow directed at one dictator is one brought against the other. While those who call themselves champions of Western democracy pretend otherwise, and support and appease the rising forces of Fascism in Southern Africa, the peoples of Africa are fighting and will continue to fight.

South Africa's Stake in Angola

ANC

*Article in Sechaba (ANC), III, 2, February 1969.*

Since the armed struggle in Southern Africa began gathering momentum, South Africa has shown unusually keen interest in the anti-guerilla operations of Rhodesia and Portugal. Whereas her stake in Rhodesia is widely known, her interest in the Portuguese colonies is less well known and understood.

Examples of this concern are many. Some months ago United Party Leader, Sir De Villiers Graaff, issued a policy statement which warned that, if the Portuguese troops failed in their operations in Angola and Mozambique, South Africa could be faced with a guerilla war within weeks. He then urged that the Portuguese be given help since 'in a sense they are fighting our battles and they are acting as most effective buffers for us.' *Sunday Express*, 4.8.68.

Was the U.P. man exaggerating or was he trying to outflank Vorster?

The fact is that he did not do his homework well. Vorster and Co. have long advocated this line. Since last year, one of Vorster's close associates has been prominent in this respect. In November 1967, Theo Gerdener, the Administrator of Natal, initiated the Mozambique Soldiers' Comfort Fund. Using the same words as Graaff, he said that, if Portugal withdrew her 80,000 soldiers, South Africa could become involved in a 'terrorist' war within weeks.

How does this concern apply to Angola? First of all, Angola is the fascist Republic's next-door neighbour because Namibia (South West Africa) is