ANGOLA

in the whirlwind of permanent revolution
The importance of the events in Angola cannot be doubted by anyone. Certainly not by Imperialism and not by the Russian and Chinese bureaucracies who clearly realise this to be so. The task facing Revolutionary Marxists is to understand the precise nature of this importance, not only to ensure the victory of socialism in Angola but indeed for the whole of Africa. The following articles are a contribution to such an understanding.

These articles all embody a specific theoretical approach, which all have as their basis an understanding of the imperialist epoch. That is an epoch dominated by world politics and economics. It is in this epoch that the Marxist law of combined and uneven development becomes pronounced, and it follows from this is the theory of permanent revolution. Briefly stated, this theory denies the stageist conception of revolution any validity. It asserts that in the imperialist epoch the national tasks of the revolution cannot be carried out independent from the socialist revolution.

Hence the choice facing an inschoate revolution is either to break with the imperialist world economy and begin to construct socialism or to adapt in one form or another to imperialism. In a backward economy the problems of socialist construction are of course immense and can only be decisively resolved with the world-wide victory of socialism.

The problems associated with the former course seem so great to many militants that it does not appear to be an actuality; in which case they are ultimately driven back into the arms of imperialism. In the final analysis imperialism will always impose its priorities over the masses no matter what short-term manoeuvres are permitted within this framework. This must clearly be seen as a false alternative. There is no example of any country which has not broken decisively with imperialism being able to solve the problems confronting the masses. There can only be one choice for Angolan militants and that is to build the revolutionary party in the fight for socialism. Any retreat from such a position will inevitably lead to defeat and despondency.

It is only by building the revolutionary party that the self-activity of the masses can be developed and strengthened. One of the most striking aspects of the Angolan struggle was the exemplary level of the development of workers committees, neighbourhood committees, etc., as compared with previous African struggles.

The Angolan events cannot be considered in isolation from the rest of Southern Africa. Due to the interconnected nature of Southern Africa, other constituent countries are decisively affected. Most important of these are Zimbabwe and Namibia where the reality of these struggles is now a reality. Although the imperialist powers might be able to afford the loss of Angola, this is not the case with South Africa; the sheer volume of investment forbids it. It is in this context that the present struggles must be seen. Imperialism will go to enormous lengths to prevent the present struggles threatening South Africa. Militants must realise that with the increasing threat to South Africa the stakes in Southern Africa are decisively raised.

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the liberation struggle in the Portuguese colonies

--- decisive hour ---

by C. GABRIEL

Most analyses of the struggle of the Portuguese African colonies, even when critical or written in support of these struggles, are content to locate the liberation movements in the center of a triangle bounded by the metropolis, the colonial army, and imperialism. Everything is handled as though Portugal’s three African colonies stood completely outside the history of the African continent. We believe it is necessary to place these struggles in the framework of the African continent and the African revolution, for we want to combine our support to the MPLA, FRELIMO, and the PAIGC with an analysis of the direction of their political development. The Portuguese coup has opened a decisive period. The liberation movements are now confronted with complex problems of negotiation that they go beyond empiricism and more precisely grasp the role of reformism in Portugal and even more important - the nature of the neocolonialist regimes’ interest in “support” to, and manipulations with, the liberation movements.

The Portuguese bourgeoisie and imperialism are seeking a neocolonial solution. But is this possible? Can a so-called “liberation policy” be applied under different historical conditions and achieve the same results? Mario Soares, the leader of the Portuguese SP, is fond of repeating that “what unites us is much stronger than what divides us.” But he cannot turn the clock back 15 years. The neocolonialist trap will not be sprung through a crude seduction of the liberation movements through mortalizing declarations from the general secretary of the Portuguese Socialists party. But the neocolonialist danger cannot be reduced to a question of good or bad morals. It could gain a foothold by using the illusions in a “democratic” and “national state,” or it could simply develop on the basis of certain multinational investments that have been plundering Angola and Mozambique for a decade and about which the Portuguese reformists have become suddenly silent. Silent about the private army of Gulf Oil in Cabinda in Angola. Silent about the sales of Cabo Verde’s energy sources to South Africa. Lisbon’s present policy is aimed at shunting the liberation movements to the sidelines by stimulating the emergence of “third forces” capable of breaking the Intransigence of the PAIGC or FRELIMO.

The Portuguese Communist and Socialist parties, for whom the government of national union is an end in itself, are not above stooping to blackmail, saying in effect: “In order for the negotiations to go on, the present government must stay in power; and for it to stay in power, it must obtain a minimum number of concessions from you, the liberation movements.”

The period that has now opened up will thus reveal either the depth or the limits of the political sophistication of the liberation movements. It will also test their cohesion. Will the crisis now shaping up in the MPLA facilitate the maneuver of imperialism? The united front with the ANL/LZ that was envisaged by a faction of the MPLA would amount to a front with N’Gosabé, Mobutu, Kaunda, and Nyerere (respectively the heads of state of the Congo-Brazzaville, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania). That is, it would amount to a neocolonialist front. It is only with an authentically anticolonial program that the vanguard of Angola, as well as that of Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, will be able to frustrate imperialism’s neocolonialist plan.

-- SUPPORT TO THE PAIGC, FRELIMO, AND THE MPLA!
-- IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE!
-- AGAINST NEOCOLONIALIST SOLUTIONS!
-- THE STRUGGLE GOES ON, SUPPORT MUST GO ON TOO!

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At the end of the 1950s, when the struggle against Portuguese colonialism took a decisive leap forward, the political situation on the Black continent was marked by a deep downward of mass struggles and by the integration of a good part of the nationalist movement into the framework of neocolonialist solutions. In the space of five or six years, nationalist parties nearly everywhere had enthusiastically accepted positions as imperialist lackeys. The urban petty-bourgeoisie, which had developed widely within the colonial administration, raised itself to the status of ruling class after having made use of the mass movement as a means of pressuring the imperialist governments.

The contradictory content of formal independence was a consequence of a twofold process. For the European bourgeoisie, breaking with classical economic colonialism in order to move to a higher stage of plunder in accordance with the contemporary development of capitalism was an empirical political response to the rise of the colonial revolution. For the African masses, it was a matter of the first generalized offensive against imperialist barbarism occurring within a social framework fashioned by colonialism, that is, under the political leadership of the “bureaucratic” petty-bourgeoisie. The neocolonial economy is not at all a “supreme” stage of imperialist rule, as Nkrumah claimed. The transition did not open up a new era of bourgeois rule, but was rather a last resort allowing for a qualitative increase in plunder while at the same time temporarily easing the revolutionary pressure. In this light neocolonialism appears not as an objective development determined by the system of domination, but essentially as a defeat for the nationalist movement, which by its nature was unable to transform the independence struggle into an anticolonialist struggle.

In his book Les Fleurs du Congo, G. Althabe explains exactly the ideological game played by African nationalism: “The nationalist party as it was built during this period was for a section of the bureaucratic elite simultaneously an instrument
of struggle against foreign rulers and a framework through which to establish a relationship with the mass of the population, a vehicle through which the bureaucratic elite succeeded in mobilizing the mass of the population around itself." (p. 236.)

"The nationalist party was thus built as a counterinstitution whose model of existence was wholly determined by the adversary it was facing." (p. 240.) "The aim of the struggle was to tear the population loose from the bureaucratic structure represented by the administration controlled by Belgians in order to reintroduce them into a new bureaucratic institution: the party, controlled by so-called nationalist politicians." (p. 241.) "The sequel to the confrontation was simple: The nationalist party became the administration and the duality between the two bureaucratic institutions was erased." (p. 241.)

And we may add that the era of the duality was executed either through the integration of the nationalist movement into the neocolonialist framework or by the repression of the most radical elements (the UPC in the Cameroon, Soweto in the Congo, etc.).

It was, then, primarily by these means that neocolonialism was able to institute a realistic policy for the colonial bourgeoisie. To estimate the possibilities for a neocolonialist policy in the Portuguese colonies therefore implies examining factors like those in the context of a continental and international situation that is in all aspects different from that prevailing in past years. The analysis of nationalism in the Portuguese colonies must therefore integrate two factors:

- The consequences of the character of the political period on the formation of the nationalist movements in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau at the end of the 1950s;
- The importance and the limits of their break with the traditional nationalisms of this period and their own balance sheets on the countries that were granted independence.

**Formation of the nationalist movements**

The PAIGC was founded in September 1956. A little more than six years later, in 1963, the armed struggle was launched -- after a process of political and military preparation. But between 1956 and 1963, this region of Africa was marked by a significant decline in mass struggle and by the stabilization of a relationship of forces favorable to imperialism. The Senegalese regime came to power in 1958 and, after the imprisonment of Mamadou Dia, a strong state was set up that for several years was to harass the PAIGC's rear areas along Guinea's northern border and lend its support to a right-wing spoiler, the FLING.

In Senegal itself, there was repression against the PAI, which resulted in the disappearance of a potential source of support for the PAIGC from within the colonial society. In Guinea-Conakry the failure of the first economic plan was to bring about an initial right-wing reaction from the Toucoure regime. To be sure, this episode scarcely affected Conkry's attitude toward the nascent PAIGC; to be sure, from a quantitative standpoint alo from Conkry remained large over the years. But from the standpoint of the birth of a revolutionary leadership in Guinea-Bissau, the political path followed by the Guinean regime played a not insignificant role, both in terms of the ideological relationship of forces and in terms of direct political influence on the young cadres of the PAIGC.

The impasse of Guinean nationalism could not prevent a process of radicalization within the PAIGC, but it nevertheless was not conducive to going beyond Guinean nationalism on a theoretical level, as Vasco Cavalo's statements about the "party-state" attest to.

In reality, a complex jostling of political influence was going on, and its outcome would depend on the ability of the PAIGC to theorize its own struggle and to give it a class content.

The MPLA was created in December 1956 by the fusion of various small urban groups. The Luanda revolt broke out on February 4, 1961. It was followed by a peasant insurrection in the north. This occurred while the Congo crisis was at its height. American imperialism was determined to make the Congo the turning point for the counterrevolution in central Africa. The American bourgeoisie had always taken an ambiguous attitude toward African nationalism. U.S. imperialism wanted simultaneously to break the rising revolution and to exploit the crisis of European colonialism in order to win new markets that were inaccessible to Washington in the existing colonial economic framework. Toward this end, Washington began aiding the most right-wing elements of African nationalism, the tactic being carried out especially through the trade unions affiliated to the International Federation of Free Trade Unions (1). In Angola, the emergence of a movement of the "peoples of the north" (the UNPA), a predominantly ethnocratically organized organization, was a windfall for Washington. It emerged, however, independent of direct American action. The crystallization of a right-wing nationalist movement, a potentially valuable interlocutor with Lisbon and a possible "border army" with political-ethnic links to the Kinshasa regime, could only have come about through a coming together of this movement and American policy, even if their relationship went through ups and downs.

The victory of the counterrevolution in the Congo resulted in the expulsion of the MPLA from Kinshasa and the recognition by the Organization of African Unity of the Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile. Nevertheless, the "three glorious days" in Brazzaville in 1963 represented a conjunctural revolutionary upsurge that the MPLA was to exploit. The new, ambivalently nationalist regime of Massamba-Débat accorded asylum to the MPLA after the overthrow of F. Youla. This was done not only out of the revolutionary convictions of some of the regime's supporters. It was also a reaction by right-wing elements (like Débat himself) to the threat of the formation of a Bakongo association under the leadership of Kinshasa. (2) On the basis of this situation, the MPLA was able to open front in the enclave of Cabinda (a section of Angola separated from the rest of the country by a strip of Zaire). The MPLA came out of this period in a weakened condition, caught between Portuguese repression and Kinshasa's support for the ANLF, which had its bases along the northern border.

The relationships between the MPLA and Congolese nationalism are not easy to establish. It is probable that between the time of Lumumbaism and the Brazzaville Civil Defense, the MPLA had plenty of opportunity to draw a balance sheet. But, by this balance sheet -- which was not very explicit -- extended to cover the experience of the N'Gouabi regime, the Dawaana struggle, and the left wing of the Tanzanian Communist party? The question is important. For while the political influence of Congolese nationalism appears to have been weak, it is no less true that the political situation on Angola's northern frontier plays a decisive role for military perspectives in the economically developed regions.

In May 1966 the MPLA came out of the crisis by opening up a new front on the Zambian border. There again, the "socialism" of Kaunda scarcely had any influence on the ranks of the MPLA(3). But the political squabbles within the MPLA may parallel those within the Lusaka regime. We have recently seen the coincidence of events that may have existed between the Chipenda tendency of the MPLA and a faction of the Zambian regime. If there was no direct ideological influence, there was at least a political intervention through the bureaucratic structures of the organizational apparatus, especially in the delegations sent to foreign countries.

FRELIMO was formed in 1962 through rapprochement of the MANJU, the UDENAMO, and the UNAMI. It also included small groups of emerging nationalists in Tanzania, Zambia, and Malawi. The nationalist movement in East Africa has been heavily influenced by the personality of Julius Nyerere. But in spite of that, and in spite of the importance of the Tanzanian-Mozambiquan border, a relationship that may have existed between the Chipenda tendency of the MPLA and a faction of the Zambian regime. If there was no direct ideological influence, there was at least a political intervention through the bureaucratic structures of the organizational apparatus, especially in the delegations sent to foreign countries.
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organizations, FRELIMO was the one whose earliest development was least affected by the crisis of nationalism in the neighboring countries. Nevertheless, for all three movements, the struggle began in a situation of general downturn on a continental scale. They were thus extremely isolated in their early years, and this isolation is not unimportant in understanding their difficulties of political clarification and the absence of a real theorization of the revolutionary process.

The limits of a political evolution

The three movements, then, were initially made up of young nationalists, members of the urban petty-bourgeoisie. They were more or less influenced by the struggles in the French or British colonies. Through the Portuguese Communist party they discovered the existence of the Western workers movement, which they viewed (unconsciously) through a Stalinist and social chauvinist prism. Heterogeneous and lacking a political past, the young leaderships were content for a time simply to raise a series of slogans that come down to the demand for independence. The content of the struggle, its strategy and historical perspectives, were scarcely detailed. But is there any larger body of written material today? To be sure, we have Mandela's book, The Struggle for Mozambique, as well as Cabral's writings between 1961 and 1969. These works already indicate a break with the traditional analyses of an Nkrumah or a Sekou Toure. But in reality, it is mainly through interviews and speeches that progress in analysis and development of the specification of detail can be seen. The leadership's production of theoretical works - the educational and propaganda function of which is decisive in speaking to the world anti-imperialist movement - has been meager. A comparison with the Vietnamese leadership is revealing. On the one hand we have soldiers who have become a large production of political analyses indicates their historic ties with the international workers movement; on the other hand, we have the African liberation movements, which, having been built in the stifling framework of Portuguese domination, have a thousand difficulties in breaking with empiricism and discovering the tools of Marxism in order to formulate a theoretical structure for their struggles. And need we add that these efforts can be abortive if they are attempted through the application of sterile Stalinist concepts?

Cabral himself recognized the empiricism that prevailed at the beginning of the struggle.(4) For his part, Dos Santos (a leader of FRELIMO) recognized the extent of pragmatism and the difficulty of heterogeneity. In an interview with The African Communist (Issue no. 23) he declared: "So right from the start in 1962 different ideological reflections were at the top. But the tasks facing us in those early days demanded that we create a collective that would accommodate all those who were prepared to work together to get the basic struggle off the ground. So, the nature of the political, social, and economic realities of the situation as it was then demanded a pragmatic attitude." (p.47.)

Empiricism asserted itself first of all on the question of forms of struggle and on the analysis of the forms of colonial domination. Confronted by an adversary that, unlike French or British colonialism, lacked the political and economic means to alter the form of its domination at the end of the 1950s, the liberation movements saw the necessity of armed struggle after going through the experience of legal mass mobilizations that were met with repression that blocked any possibility of their development into national independence movements. Thus, Cabral declared at the twenty-seventh session of the United Nations: "The Pajiiupit massacre committed by the Portuguese colonialists on August 3, 1939, against the striking dock workers of Bissau and the workers of the river transport boats cost us fifty strikers dead and more than a hundred wounded. It was a painful lesson for our people. We learned that there was no question of choosing between peaceful struggle and armed struggle against the Portuguese colonialists.... We then decided... to suspend all demonstrations for demands in the cities and to prepare ourselves for armed struggle."

In Lorenzo Marques (in Mozambique) anti-Portuguese demonstrations were savagely repressed in 1956 and 1962. In 1960 in Mueda and in 1962 at the cane plantations in Xinavane peasant demonstrations were repressed at a cost of hundreds dead. It was through the experience of dealing with the Portuguese government that the workers of Guine-Bissau understood the struggle had been going on for several years, that FRELIMO little by little came to discard its demand for "negotiations" and turned to preparing the armed struggle, which was proclaimed on September 25, 1964.

Empiricism remained the method: empiricism to win the sympathies of a village in the heart of the bush country; empiricism to resolve conflicts between two ethnic groups within which the movement had to win a base; and empiricism to structure the guerrilla organization. Up to that time, such questions had been posed nowhere else in Africa. And the responses the liberation movements gave to these problems, even if they were only partial answers, constituted a fundamental gain for the future development of the African revolution.(5)

But certain questions are not merely subjective ones. The ethnic question, for example, has historical, economic, and social foundations that pragmatic good will is insufficient for resolving. To be sure, the PAIGC, which was working in a limited geographic area, was able to forge a national consciousness through slow preparation and a varied approach to the ethnic groups. FRELIMO also made some experiments in this field, especially with the Mioando group in the north. But the MPLA was functioning in the worst conditions for resolving this matter. The geographical conditions of Angola, its history of being divided between the Congo and Ovamboland, made the conditions for developing a "national consciousness forged in struggle" very difficult. The Bakongo population in the north, whose cohesion and "legitimacy"
will continue even after independence, although the fundamental elements of nationality are already in existence and in the process of being further developed in Mozambique." (p. 42.)

The armed struggle and the desire for national unification in struggle against the Portuguese oppressor have been two factors permitting a decisive break with the capitulationist and ethnocolonial elements that arose in the nationalist current in the French and British colonies and nourished a polity of diplomatic pressure and border warfare. It is not by accident that the FLING was supported for several years by the Senghor regime. Nor is Moçambique's support for the ANLF surprising. But because of the heterogeneity of the organizations, especially the ANLF, this break has not been absolute. That is why we should not underestimate the threats of deviations being introduced by compromises between the various tendencies. In the African context, such threats will not disappear so long as a definitive break with nationalist ideology has not been made.

To be sure, from the very beginning organizations were formed that unambiguously crystallized the most right-wing sectors of nationalism, the FLING and the ANLF being the two clearest examples. But the story was not always so simple. In Angola there were people who "passed" from the ANLA to the ANLF well after the struggle had been launched. There was also a split within the ANLF which was directed by Savimbi and was to result in the formation of the UNITA. In Mozambique, where FRELIMO was an association of various groups right from the start, the purge was carried out in the very course of the struggle. That was the case for the two main splits, that of Lourenço Kavundamé and that of Uria Simango. In an interview with the Jornal de 24 de Julho 1977, Uria Simango, leader of the ANL-UDM, explained these events this way: "The essential contradiction concerned general line. On the one side there was a purely nationalist position that reduced liberation to only one of its aspects, namely driving the Portuguese out. On the other side, there was the position by the great majority: Liberation must be linked to the transformation of the colonial, native, and tribal structures." The two expelled members were aiming at definitively establishing fields in which they could exert their power in the framework of traditional structures. Machel continued: "But the conflict really broke out when vast territories of Mozambique had been liberated and the question arose as to how to organize these territories in order to turn them into the driving elements of the development of the liberation struggles. "... If we want to drive the Portuguese out and then replace them with Africans who function under the same economic system as the Portuguese did and therefore exploit other Africans, then the struggle is for naught. Instead, after driving out the Portuguese, we must act so that the popular struggle remains permanent."

**The break with reformist nationalism**

So it is with the Simangos and the Kavunameres that Sipili has to work today if his neocolonialist operation is to succeed. A decisive break has thus been made with the traditions of reformist nationalism that mocked most of the first movements in the French and British colonies. With the new situation in Portugal and the proposals for a government of national union, an immediate capitulation under the spell of the neocolonialist charm is therefore improbable. There are certainly some genuinely right-wing tendencies in the ANLA that could get some support from outside the movement. But in general the dynamic set in motion by the specific features of Portuguese colonialism and by the years of struggle have incontestably separated this revolutionary nationalism from the swamp of rightism and reformism.

But while the neocolonialist solution has not been put into effect through a sudden and premature liberation of the movement or through the impact of the Portuguese coup, it is nevertheless true that neocolonialism can be nurtured by the myth of the national democratic state. The liberation movements have adopted a fluid and deliberately imprecise position on the social goals of their struggle. This inaccuracy can be explained by the absence of a theorization of the revolutionary process. But that is not sufficient to account for such a "refusal" to define precisely the historic goals of the strug-
gle. The major cause of this attitude is the heterogeneity of the leaderships. To be sure, everyone rejects neocolonialism of the Senghor or Mobutu variety. But it must not be forgotten that between Touré and the revolutionary Marxists there is an "impressive selection" of neocolonialists on the African continent! This is the question that must be discussed with the comrades of the PAIGC, the MPLA, and FRELIMO.

In the cases of Angola and Mozambique, a preliminary observation must be made before the scope of the negotiations is discussed. The guerrilla zones, especially in Angola, have made only very small inroads into the economically rich regions. Imperialist investments are especially large in these regions, and would represent a second-level stronghold for the Portuguese bourgeoisie in a neocolonialist framework. The first zone the Portuguese bourgeoisie will try to play will be to seat groups representing the urban African petty-bourgeoisie and the "democratic" sector of the Portuguese population at the negotiating table. Thus, the "Democratic Movement of Guinea" has suddenly appeared, along with the multifractal GUMO of Mozambique. And to this it should be added that the international press has suddenly started writing about the FLING, despite the facts that only a few weeks ago everyone was reporting that this group had disappeared. The attempt here is to shunt the liberation movements to the sidelines in the name of bringing a "representative of the whole nation" to the negotiating table.

An urgent response from the liberation movements about the future of the capital owned by Krupp, the mines owned by Senguela, and the holdings of Gulf and other oil companies is therefore a necessity. If the negotiations should lead to freezing the current situation, granting FRELIMO and the MPLA only partial authority, it would be impossible to counteract the neocolonialist tendencies that would inevitably be bolstered by an economy that is largely dependent on imperialist investments.

Thus, the only solution in Angola and Mozambique is to continue the fight to win a more solid base in the economically developed regions. Everyone knows that if such a base is won, it would soon lead to a test of strength between the present Portuguese government and the colonial hardliners. The hardliners, who have temporarily taken a wait-and-see attitude, would soon win hegemony among the white population, whose clearest desire is to remain in Africa. (A party has just been formed in Mozambique called Fico, which means, "I shall remain.") A Rhodesian type solution is a constant point under discussion among the white colonial population. In Mozambique the tendency favoring such a solution is supported by not insignificant economic forces, such as the Chambalindj Industrial group and Jardim.

This threat of a break with the white population in Africa -- which would produce a deadly crisis that would definitively compromise their government of national union -- is the thing that really terrorizes the reformists of the Portuguese Communist and Socialist parties. It is obvious, then, that those parties will put maximum pressure on FRELIMO and the MPLA to accept the compromise that we described earlier. A. Almeida Sanda, a representative of the white democrats in Mozambique who is close to the SP has just been named minister of interterritorial coordination. And less than a month ago he declared: "The dialogue with FRELIMO should be easy for us... But we have to move fast, because all Africans with even a minimum of political consciousness are now or soon will be with FRELIMO."

Footnotes

1. In 1957 Nixon declared: "The future interests of the United States in Africa are so vast that they entitle us not to hesitate in aiding the departure of the colonial powers from Africa."

2. Fulton Youlu was a Lari, a group connected to the Bakongo. Within the Mbesemba Débat regime, there was a wing that favored aiding the MPLA for really internationalist reasons. But the leadership, and especially Débat himself, quickly proved to be a new tribalist and regionalist tendency. It was not long before repression began falling on the most radical elements, who believed they had discovered the key to "the nationalistic and democratic revolution."

3. Kaunda, like Senghor and others, utilized the phraseology of "African socialism," whose essence and goals were quite clearly reactionary.

4. Cabral seems to have believed that this empiricism would not last beyond the period of stabilization of the armed struggle.

5. The threat of militarist deviations in the PAIGC came to the surface in 1964 with the emergence of small local potentates. The PAIGC congress settled this question by purging several military leaders and by redefining the relationship between the political and military wings. Once again, the PAIGC had resolved a problem on the fly.

6. Calls for the neutralization of the Bakongo people regularly come out of the Congo and Zaire, usually on the initiative of right-wing politicians seeking a regional base. Let us also recall that during the Congo crisis, Kasavubu, one of the Imperialist stooges, founded his credibility on the fact that he "represented" most of the Bakongo in the area.

7. On June 1, 1974, Peking sent 112 instructors to Kinshasa to train the ANLF. This was done following the signing of a Sino-Zaire agreement.

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In these writings Cabral does begin an analysis of the social structure, but it clearly seems that this analysis has been of the state and the function of the party? If the PAIGC unites "all the social layers of the people," it is a pretty fair bet that the Party-State does not represent simply the "viewpoint of the revolutionary worker." At least, not until the "suicide" is complete.

To be sure, the liberation movements do not today represent fully-formed multiclassist movements. PELIMAO, the PAIGC, and the MPLA are movements with a multiclass conception, but the movements have not yet fulfilled their frontist aspirations, because their stable spheres of influence are limited to the countryside and because the weak layers of petty-bourgeois businessmen in the cities have already linked up with the "democratic" sectors of colonialism (the GUMO in Mozambique or the Democratic Movement in Guinea).

These insufficiencies of analysis of social structure and class struggle have corollaries on the level of the analysis of the nature and role of the party as well as of the kind of state that should be set up. For the party, Cabral merely observes that the PAIGC has the function of a "movement." Thus, after the death of Cabral, the Executive Committee of the Struggle declared that the PAIGC united in its ranks "all the social layers of our colonized peoples." Standing mute on the question of the vanguard party, the PAIGC becomes flatly ambiguous on the question of the state: "Our party is erecting a Party-State by ensuring its central and political-administrative management of the liberated regions." (Vasco Cabral, January 31, 1973.) This conception of the Party-State, which was developed to its highest point by Sekou Touré and Kwame Nkrumah, suggests the bonapartist function of the leader's personality and amounts to an old nationalist mystification that has been extensively utilized by the Mobutu and their ilk. Would it then perhaps be necessary to detail the nature of the state and the function of the party? If the PAIGC unites "all the social layers of the people," it is a pretty fair bet that the Party-State does not represent simply the "viewpoint of the revolutionary worker." At least, not until the "suicide" is complete.

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with one aim of eliminating oppression. Everybody -- whether he is involved in the capitalist or traditional sector -- is suf-
fereing humiliation because of racism and economic exploitation, even the tribal chiefs." (p.35) "Of course, within almost every national movement there are different types of nationalism. There is the elementary primary one -- what is called primitive nationalism. Some people who take part in the struggle for Independence do not to realize or to satisfy the interests of a small group... So I would say that it does not not a question of pitfalls or limitations but of the character-
istics of some types of nationalism." (p.49) "As always, the task of building a society economically passes the problem of the type of production and distribution, and especially who is going to benefit from what the society produces." (p.45) "Gwenjero, Manuka, and Simango were not taking these posi-
tions (before their expulsion from FRELIMO -- INPERCO) openly along these lines, but they were driven by a desire for individual political power, by a bourgeois ideology and a desire to build a capitalist type system." (p.46) "If we do not follow collectivist attitudes, we will not be able to face the enemy successfully... If our organization main-
tains a true revolutionary leadership, the special circumstances of the process of our liberation open up real possibilities for an advance from liberation to revolution... This must be the defense until the situation has been achieved where the truly revolutionary classes dominate all levels of power." (pp.49-49)

The road is tortuous. To be sure, it is still not known whether FRELIMO the multiclass front has the objective of winning over the layers that Dos Santos denounces here. But all this... comes down to an approach to the evolution of the struggle that, although it is the fruit of an empirical approach, nevertheless is beginning to be theorized.

Likewise, in 1964 Cabral made a long analysis of neocoloni-
alism, which he defined as "defeat for the international workers movement."
He ended up by stating that such a sit-
uation as neocolonialism "calls for a socializar solution."
But it remains true that these tentative approaches to the the-
rorization of the revolutionary process in no way constitute a guarantee. The generally significant heterogeneity of the leadership must be taken into account, as well as the fact that the political direction of the liberation movements will not be determined by internal factors alone. The whole continental political situation bears down on the movements, and they maintain an opportunistic attitude toward that political situation that may well bamboozl them.

**Internationalism**

In southern Africa FRELIMO and the MPLA have been faced with a growing military intervention from South Africa and Rhodesia and have found natural allies in the ZAPU, the ZANU (Rhodesia), and the SWAPO (Namibia). They have responded to the internationalization of the conflict that im-
perialism has provoked by strengthening the relations among the liberation movements. To be sure, the political character of the various movements differs, but as Dos Santos said, "It is an elementary part of the tactics of a struggle such as ours always to disperse the enemy."

The real question lies in the relations among the three move-
ments and the African regimes, as well as in these regimes' "diplomatic practices." African diplomacy bears down very heavily on and strangely preoccupies the leaders of FRELIMO, the PAIGC, and the MPLA. The neighboring countries play an especially important role in this game in which the tactical interests of the liberation movements, the ideological mystifi-
cations of superclass pan-Africanism, and the attempts to im-
prison the liberation movements in the revolutionary straitjacket of the OAU are all intermixed. Three examples would be suf-
ficient to illustrate the importance of the neighboring coun-
tries. In the conflict between the FRELIMO leadership and the Makonde faction led by Kawandame the mediating presence of a representative of TANU, the governmental party in Tan-
zania, was required at the FRELIMO congress. The MPLA-
ANL agreement and the allocation of African aid to the two movements are controlled by a trust composed of N'Gouabi, Mutumba, and Nyamweya to decide the heads of state of the Congo (Brazzaville), Zaire, Zambia, and Tan-
zania. Finally, in the conflict within the MPLA between Neto and Chipanda, the latter was openly supported by a faction of the Zambian government. In an interview with the
able to save their triumphant revolution! Some questions could be asked about the "sister republic," the unconditional friendship, or even the "triumphant revolution." Is Guinea-Conakry the model? As for the Senegalese aspect, the presence of Amilcar Cabral at the congress of the UPS (the revolutionary and sole party in that country) was more serious. Still more disturbing was a joint PAIGC-Senegal communiqué reporting the "perfect similarity of views" from the "sub-delegates" on all subjects raised during the discussions: bilateral links and the situation in Africa and throughout the world. This is in contradiction with the filthy practices of a Senghor, who proclaims his desire for a Portuguese-speaking (that is, neocolonial) country. Was Senghor among those who the PAIGC was attacking in this context? Nevertheless, the letter degenerated into a demand for the "former commander of the Portuguese colonial war in our country a well-intentioned man capable of orienting Portugal in the direction of neocolonialism." It does not seem that this was the case, for Senegal played an important role in opening the London negotiations. On the other hand, it must be noted that since the beginning of May the radio station of the "sister republic" of Guinea has only been attacking Sinoia, the Interlocutor of Senghor, with whom the PAIGC "has no disagreement!" In such a business what becomes of the talk of clarification that Cabral was aiming at during the OSPPAAPA conference when he attacked neocolonialism? But this time Cabral declared in the name of the liberation movements at the eighth conference of African heads of state: "Addis Ababa -- the new flower of the bastion of African independence that is Ethiopia. ... We want to express all our admiration for His Majesty (Haile Selassie). ... We have followed his splendid work for the liberation and preservation of his people." As for the Chad regime, which is fully supporting the French intervention against FROLINAT: "In the name of the liberation movements we extend to his excellency President Tombalbaye our own condolences and those of all our people for the human losses already suffered ... and we hope that Tombalbaye will continue with unflagging determination in the social, economic, and cultural progress of his people."

The traditional propaganda of African puppets never misses an opportunity to castigate "foreign ideologies," a code word for anything that bears a resemblance to Marxism. Nevertheless, at the same conference Cabral declared: "We must also affirm before you that we well understand your concern about "foreign ideologies." We who have taken up arms to fight to liberate our people from any form of foreign domination will never accept anyone's domination, no matter what alien we may receive from abroad." A PAIGC pamphlet reprinting the speech notes that this remark was met with "prolonged applause." On the international level, the PAIGC ... has not been free of opportunism. F. Mendes declared in Lahore at the second Islamic summit held in February 1974: "We are also certain of the victory of the just cause that is dear to our hearts, the liberation of Jerusalem. For our part, we are prepared to make any sacrifice to achieve this goal. For it would be in the interests of men of all faiths in our country and elsewhere who have always seen the faithful of Islam as the guardians of the City of Peace."

And there was a bit of shifting about in Cabral's declaration at the United Nations on December 12, 1962: "In struggling and dying for the liberation of our country, we are giving our lives in the current context of international law for the ideal that the UN itself has defined in its charter and resolutions, especially its resolutions on decolonization. For us, the only way between the Indian soldier, Italian pilot, or Swedish official who died in the Congo and our comrade who died in Guinea or the Cape Verde Islands is that in acting in his own country in the service of the same ideal; our comrade is but an anonymous fighter for the cause of the United Nations." Such opportunism augurs ill for the possibility of transcending the national framework of the struggle being led by the PAIGC. In effect, if we hope to institutionalize the above lines, at Lahore, Mendes kept quiet about the social future of Palestine so as to please on audience of assorted Muslim dictatorships; at the UN Cabral kept quiet about what remains one of the greatest counterrevolutionary blows so as to please the delegates who had voted for the intervention of the UN troops, etc. On the other hand, the most cautious subjects that most of the neocolonial regimes did not want to hear about so as to reassure a bunch of puppets. Towards what end? Most likely because of many immediate concerns: diplomatic recognition, UN votes, perhaps a certain neutrality from the most reactionary regimes. But at the same time, all African anti-imperialists were left to see in the PAIGC as the advance guard of the anti-imperialist struggle. What lesson does the PAIGC draw for them by making such compromises with these hated regimes? What is the best long-term guarantee of the victory of the Guinean revolution, the African regimes that support the PAIGC like a rope supports a hanging man or the rise of the African revolution? For us the answer is obvious. But what logic motivates this sort of international policy? Finding an answer is not easy. The liberation movements are in no way integral parts of the Stalinist movement, but their international post was not strongly corrupted by Stalinism. Insufficiently critical of nationalism, they remain especially vulnerable to the diplomatic games and opportunistic conceptions that Stalinism peddles in the name of "pragmatism."

The question of Stalinism

The ties of the liberation movements with Stalinism have been woven in two ways.

Some present leaders of the liberation movements movement about Marxism through the distorting prism of Stalinism because of their contact with the Portuguese Communist party when they were students in Portugal. But the Portuguese CP has not discarded its social identification passed at its Fifth Congress in 1957 declared: "Today, comrades, the problem of the Portuguese colonies that did not possess the preconditions for an independent life is no longer passed." (Ramiro was the reporter.) And in May 1961 the Beira leadership published a manifest that has never been repudiated by the national leadership, and that declares: "Workers, show the employers that only the independence of Angola will serve their interests, for once it is Independent Angola will really become a market for our produce." (Révolution populaire, No. 6, December 1965.) So there is nothing astonishing in the fact that Cabral declares that "Portuguese democrats will never effectively reveal the truth about the just demands of our peoples so long as they are not convinced that the thesis of the 'lack of maturity for self-determination is false.'"

It is therefore obvious that the relations with the Portuguese CP vary according to the individual. The PAIGC fraternity received the support of the Revolutionary Brigades (who had managed to capture some maps of the general staff by an armed action) in spite of the Stalinist slanders against the Portuguese far left. But Stalinist pressure can be exerted most easily through the military support from the workers states, through the military training given young cadre, and through the ideological build up because of the importance of material aid to the armed struggle. It is through these two methods that a "Stalinist" conception of international politics has little by little crept in -- a result of opportunism and pressure, but without the liberation movements losing organizational independence. In fact, the liberation movements have been able to diversify their sources of support, particularly by addressing both Moscow and Peking. But the rotten attitude of the Stalinists partially limits the sympathetic responses that the military aid from the workers states could generate within the liberation movements. We could mention, for example, the trade between Portugal and Poland, in which the latter has delivered boats, among other things, to the former. Or the current attitude of Peking, which, in the grip of its support to Mbovutu, has just extended its "good wishes" to the ANLF after a trip by Holden to China.

In fact, the weight of Stalinism is exerted above all by the
central role of the workers states in a diplomatic game that the liberation movements play only with difficulty.

Both for objective reasons of African social development during the 1970s and for subjective reasons relating to Moscow's foreign policy, the Stalinists did not establish real Communist parties that were Stalinist in their organizational functioning, political line, and ties with the Soviet bureaucracy (except in South Africa). Whether it be the PAI in Senegal, the Mauritanian CP composed of a few merchants and registered in the book of trademark of a soap powder, the AKFM in Madagascar, the CP of Réunion, or the CP influence of the UPC in the Camaroon, in no case (whatever the differences among all these examples may be) is it possible to speak of the existence of a real Stalinist organization or tendency. And so this must be added the systematic coincidence of Stalinist politics (democratic and national revolution) and the preoccupation of petty-bourgeois nationalism (national union for real independence). There is every reason to believe that organizations like the AKFM in Madagascar representing the interests of the Merina petty-bourgeoisie are sufficient for Moscow's defense of its diplomatic interests in Africa. Thus, in our view the "penetration" of Stalinism into the liberation movements of the Portuguese colonies (revolutionary nationalist movements) corresponds to a certain vision of the world political field and to an isolated appreciation of the state of the world revolutionary process.

Finally, in the future it will be important to trace the roles of the leaders of the liberation movements and the policy of the Portuguese Communist and Socialist parties in relation to the work of the Portuguese for the left on the colonial question. It is in fact quite possible that a section of the liberation movements will become increasingly sensitive to the themes developed by the Portuguese revolutionary movement if the latter takes up its responsibilities against any neo-colonialist liquidation. That is why the construction of the Liga Comunistas Internacionais (Internationalist Communist League), the Portuguese sympathizing group of the Fourth International, is not unrelated to our discussions with the militants of the liberation movements.

Nevertheless, on such an important question as this, the heterogeneity of the liberation movements play an important role. The Stalinist schemas of Stalinism will be able to find a resonance with the multicultural conceptions of the left nationalist tendencies, while the more conscious elements will begin to approach the revolutionary workers movement, either through analyzing the Portuguese situation or by becoming conscious of the internationalist tasks in Africa. Many other elements will come into play in the future. We can analyze only the main ones. Some, in the present situation, can only be mentioned. Thus, it will be necessary to make an analysis of the UNITA group, which has a base in southern Angola and, on the basis of rather impracticable, opposes the MPLA as "led by half-breeds and petty-bourgeois elements." It will also be necessary to detail the role and importance of groups like the GUMO in Mozambique that could well play a third-force role.

There is also the question of the white community, and especially the fate of the layer of "white workers." The MPLA has already taken a position for a multi-racial Angola, a position that UNITA immediately attacked as "objectively neo-colonialist." Ignoring the white community and the Marxist petty-bourgeoisie would be absurd. But these layers could opt for a Rhodesian-type solution just as easily as for independence with an African majority. They will definitely choose the solution that in their view guarantees their remaining on African soil without losing their small property. The MPLA has already addressed these layers with a view to avoiding their being swept into the camp of the hardliners. But it remains true that these layers occupy a special place in social relations, and sooner or later this position will be challenged by the African majority. Such a challenge will force the MPLA to detail exactly what it means by "a society in which exploitation of man by man no longer exists."

Finally, there is also the question of the Cape Verde Islands, which has been at the center of the London negotiations. As imperialist bases, these Islands do not yet have a military implantation by the PAIGC, which must be in position to impose a common status for Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands. The fate of this small archipelago will play a decisive role during the negotiations, and the PAIGC has until now taken a position for indissoluble links between Guinea and the Islands.

A conclusion

In this article we have stressed certain features of the liberation movements:

* their decisive break with the right-wing and reformist nationalism that held sway in the British, Belgian, and French colonies;
* their unpenetration by Stalinist theses;
* the revolutionary-nationalist character of their multi-classist conceptions;
* their heterogeneity as to the social goals of the struggle;
* their deep empiricism, which opens the door sometimes to right-opportunists positions, sometimes to a non-theoretical approach to the process of the socialist revolution.

To this must be added the profound poverty of international support extended to the liberation movements by the humanists, Social Democrats, and Stalinists. Such a situation can only bolster erroneous analyses of the international political field among the liberation movements.

In the final analysis, then, the MPLA, the PAIGC, and FRELIMO constitute specificities in the history of the African revolution. Given the backdrop of the particularities of Portuguese colonialism, political movements have been constituted within the confines of petty-bourgeois nationalism and on the outskirts of the revolutionary workers movement.

The period now opening up will accelerate the tendencies we have described above. The clarification will be uneven, intensified by the current heterogeneity. Undoubtedly, during the revolutionary process now unfolding only a part of these movements will take the definitive step to a Marxist formulation of their struggle and will come to an integrated conception of the African revolution. Reconfigurations, divisions, splits, and regrouping -- perhaps even after independence has been achieved -- will mark the construction of the vanguard party of the African socialist revolution.

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ANGOLA: toward what independence?

by F. CAZALS

A long road has been traveled since last June, when António Spinola was still able to assert: "We are doing everything so that peace may return to overseas Portugal." Since then, the mobilization of the laboring masses of Angola and Mozambique has swept away Spinola's plan for a neocolonial federation. In Angola, where the "process of decolonization" appeared to be blocked by the extent of imperialist interests at stake, by the division among the nationalist movements, and by the putchist attempts of the white colonists, we quickly saw a spectacular "reconciliation" of the liberation movements, the signing of the Alvor accords with the Portuguese government, and the establishment of a quadripartite government (composed of representatives of the three nationalist movements and of the Portuguese regime) charged with administering the country until independence, planned for November 1975. But above and beyond the "publicity" statements of the Portuguese leaders about their "genuine will to decolonize," factors are building up to enable imperialism to maintain its hold over all southern Africa. For the import of the struggles in Angola extends well beyond the borders of the country itself. And it is clearly the defense of the general interests of imperialism in the region that are at issue when the "social-realist" Mario Soares indicates his desire to establish "friendly and normal relations between Lisbon and Kinshasa," for "there is a 1,250-mile common border between Zaire and Angola." That is known as "extending a hand" — in order to assure the best conditions for carrying out the neocolonial program. And the foreign policy of China, which in the name of the "struggle against the two superpowers" has made the Soviet Union the main enemy and supports the sinister game of Mobutu by sending military advisers to train the FNLA (Franche Nacional de Libertação de Angola - National Liberation Front of Angola), contributes to this equally as much as the complicity of silence of the Portuguese reformists about the future of Portuguese and imperialist investments in Angola.

Imperialism's «great maneuvers» in southern Africa

The recent acceleration of the "process of decolonization" in Angola and Mozambique has given an impetus to the turn of imperialist policy throughout the region. For example, South Africa, the bastion of capitalism, is now adopting a "benevolent" attitude toward its new "neighbor" Mozambique, while in Rhodesia discussions have begun between Ian Smith and the nationalists, unified in the African National Congress (ANC).

To believe the commentators of the bourgeois press, the hour of "peace" and "détente" has sounded in southern Africa. The African neocolonial puppets are rejoicing to see dialogue (finally!) take the place of armed struggle in "settling the colonial question," while the American secretary of state for "African affairs," who is somewhat more adroit, recognizes that the interest of South Africa (and the U.S. capital invested there) lies in "encouraging a rapid and ordered move toward achieving settlements in both Rhodesia and Namibia." In effect, the impossibility of indefinitely perpetuating the current conditions of capitalist exploitation in face of the rise of the liberation struggles, the dangers of the conflict spreading throughout the region, and the progressive deterioration of the economic and political situation in Rhodesia have compelled the imperialists to seek solutions that would permit the beginning of a process of political stabilization throughout the region effectuated on the basis of diverting the struggles of the African masses in the bastions of neocolonialism. This is an objective to which the neocolonial African states fully subscribe, for they are all interested in containing the revolutionary dynamic of the mobilization of the masses of the region.

This, then, is the twofold objective of imperialism's political realignment in southern Africa: to limit the dynamic of the struggles and to reorganize the process of imperialist exploitation by assuring the transition to a new regional economic and political integration. Such a recasting of the economic and political physiognomy of the region is, however, heavy with social implications and with contradictions that herald social confrontations of great scope.

In Angola, given the radicalization of the struggles of the workers in face of the racist barbarism of the
white colon, a rapid solution had become necessary. Thus, under the aegis of Mabutu (deputy policeman of the region) and with the aid of the Portuguese government, an attempt was made to effect a rapprochement between Zaire and Angola (including, of course, the Angolan enclave of Cabinda with its oil) in the form of an economic and political bloc (and why not a federation?) that would be both the embryo and mediator of a future central African economic community that would guarantee sufficient political stability to permit a simultaneous reconversion of the regimes in Rhodesia, Namibia, and, to a lesser extent, South Africa.

A potential neocolony?
The features most often mystified by the analysts of Portuguese reformists and by smug apologists for the "process of decolonization" — Angola's strategic position at the crossroads between central Africa and the southern subcontinent, the importance of its economic wealth and exploitable potential, and the massive presence of imperialist investment — are nevertheless the fundamental premises for a neocolonial option. For in spite of the existence of an agricultural sector having a precapitalist economy, and above and beyond the presence of significant colonial interests, Angola is a capitalist country largely dominated by imperialist capital.

The imperialist presence in Angola dates back, partially at least, to the granting of the first prospecting concessions to the Portuguese in the nineteenth century. The Anglo-South African company Diamang, for example, was able to prospect for diamonds throughout three-fourths of the territory of Angola beginning in 1920. But the systematic opening of the country to foreign capital, which followed the launching of the armed struggle by the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola — People's Liberation Movement of Angola) in 1961, entailed the preponderant installation of American interests in the petroleum, mining, and banking sectors. At the present time, the United States is the largest customer and third-largest supplier of Angola, buying in particular 54.9% of Angola's coffee and 40.9% of its oil. This U.S. interest weighs heavily on the economic and political future of the future independent state, as has already been seen in the support extended by the Gulf Oil Corporation to the so-called Cabinda Liberation Front (the FLEC). In 1971, Gulf Oil, one of the most powerful of American trusts, took in the equivalent of $70 million by exploiting Cabinda's oil. This little trifle constitutes a serious "motivation" for maintaining the American economic grip.

All the imperialist countries have "interests" in one or another sector of the Angolan economy, from the Belgian diamond companies to the French and South African oil companies (ELF-ERAP), not to mention English, German, and Japanese capital. The economic map of Angola today is a veritable checkerboard of multiple imperialist concessions.

Portuguese capital still holds an important position in this race for profits. In fact, through association with foreign capital and through the colonial trade monopoly, a Portuguese finance capital has developed in symbiosis with the imperialist investments. These are the "grand families" like Melo (of the CUF — Companhia União Fabril), Champalimaud, Espírito Santo, Borges and Irmão, the recent nationalization of whose interests make the Portuguese government a "direct shareholder" in the imperialist exploitation of Angola.

Moreover, the expansion of the white colon population (which stood at 600,000 in 1973) and the swelling of profits drawn from the coffee plantations have stimulated the emergence of a small local manufacturing industry linked to satisfaction of the needs of the colonial market; this provides the basis of accumulation by the colonial bourgeoisie through the superexploitation of the Angolan proletariat.

This process has led to a social differentiation within the colonial bourgeoisie itself, the linchpin of the ruling class in Angola and the major base of support for any reactionary project. The differentiation is threefold:

* A big industrial, commercial, and landed bourgeoisie (owners of small industries, large-scale traders, plantation owners, etc.), which controls the secondary economic sectors and is grouped around the Commercial and Industrial Association of Angola. Structurally tied to the Portuguese bourgeoisie, this layer commands only a weak degree of political independence and has rallied to the neocolonial project with the perspective of extending its field of activity (through expanding the internal market among the black population and through investment projects in the neighboring neocolonial countries) and of thus entering into close relations with Zaire and the right-wing nationalist movements, the FNLA and UNITA (União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola — National Union for the Total Independence of Angola). Thus, Mabutu made an overture to the owners of the coffee plantations, promising them guaranteed profits in Zaire if they would agree to support the FNLA.

* A middle bourgeoisie linked to the colonial administration (top managers and liberal professionals).

* A commercial and administrative, petty bourgeoisie. It is especially among this layer of "small whites" that the most reactionary elements are found.

With the aid of the Portuguese bourgeoisie and the racist regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia, these social forces have formed a number of reactionary organizations:

* The FUA (Angolan United Front), led by the engineer Fernando Falcão, president of the Commercial and Industrial Association of Lobito, who protested against his exclusion from the Alvor negotiations.

* The PCDA (Christian Democratic party of Angola), whose chief, Garcia Dongola, sees the FNLA and UNITA as "the real material and political strength of the country" and considers strikes to be "prejudicial" both to the workers and to the "national economy."
The FRA (Resistance Front of Angola), a paramilitary formation of reactionary colonists whose representatives openly compare it to the OAS (Organisation de l'Armée Secrète — Secret Army Organization, the reactionary terrorist organization of French colonists in Algeria).

The opportunism of these parties, and their lack of political independence as well, has been revealed by their adoption of each of the various proposals successively advanced by the representatives of the Portuguese bourgeoisie to settle the colonial problem. After first advocating the neocolonial federation and then "self-determination," they now proclaim their support for independence and are orienting toward a rapprochement with the FNLA, under the aegis of Mobuto. They thus indicate their progressive integration into the neocolonial plan to "destabilize" the transition government by strengthening the reactionary axis formed by the right-wing nationalist movements, Zaire, and the reactionary colonial parties.

The rapprochement is being effected on the field of struggle, by means of denouncing strikes, exacerbating racism, and utilizing the sadly famous strategy of tension.

Thus, Angola nearly experienced a "truckers' strike." At the end of November the truck owners announced their desire to go on strike against the "lack of security on the roads." Not satisfied with being granted escorts, they demanded the resignation of Rosa Coutinho (head of the government junta), who was called a "communist" and nicknamed "the red admiral" at the time that the FNLA was denouncing him as being pro-MPLA. The maneuver was crude, and the strike did not take place (because of its unpopularity and because of the defection of the small-scale truckers); but imperialism and its agents were already trying to create a Chilean-type situation.

In face of the existence of such social and economic forces, it is necessary to analyze both the MPLA's dangerous illusions about "the unity of the Angolan nation" and the criminal silence of the reformists about the role of the colonial bourgeoisie in Angola. This also means that the debate on the obtaining of Angolan nationality is not a simple matter of "style" when approached in class terms and that it is urgent to offer clearly anticapitalist perspectives to the growing mobilization of the Angolan toilers.

The stakes in the struggle

During the past several years the center of gravity of the struggle of the Angolan masses has shifted from the rural regions (within which the armed struggle and liberated zones of the MPLA had been confined) to the urban centers, where workers combativity has asserted itself, particularly during the Luanda strike of September 1973. Even though the MPLA was experiencing serious difficulties (internal divisions, military problems, etc.), there appeared in the urban centers a young, heavily concentrated, and combative proletariat, the direct product of capitalist exploitation. This proletariat, while lacking organizational links to the armed struggle, was strongly affected by the prestige of the MPLA and entered the political scene by combining economic demands and an advanced anticolonial consciousness in its struggles, in spite of the colonial repression. But the principal victory of the Angolan proletariat over the shilly-shallying of the Portuguese government was the virtually spontaneous reaction of the laboring masses to the racist crimes committed by the colonists. As marked in Revolução Socialista, organ of the revolutionary Marxist militants of Luanda: "The struggle that was developed in the musseques (slums) of Luanda by the laboring masses, who burned out and expelled the merchants in response to the massacres committed by the most reactionary forces of the bourgeoisie — even though it was ill-organized and spontaneous (which resulted in the products of the pillage not being fairly redistributed to the most needy) — compelled the Portuguese bourgeoisie, which had wanted to end the colonial war while maintaining its colonialism by means of a federation after a referendum, to recognize the right of the peoples of the colonies to independence."

To the reformists who deny the social role of the "small whites" of Angola and confine themselves to denouncing the "racism" of the black urban masses, we answer that the struggle of the urban masses against those who symbolize capitalist exploitation most directly in their eyes (small merchants, loan sharks) represents the first stage of a class reflex; further, whether these "emotional" reactions will avoid being wrecked on the reef of racism and instead take on their full anticapitalist significance will depend on the emergence and organization of a revolutionary vanguard. Already, some advanced experiences in self-organization by the workers (the establishment of rank-and-file committees in the neighborhoods and factories) testify to the radicaliza-
tion of the movement. At the very moment of the inauguration of the transition government, for example, the coordinating committee of these rank-and-file bodies in Luanda announced a "national week of action for people's power," calling on "the progressive student organizations and the workers' commissions and associations" to solidarize with the initiative and to discuss the slogan of "people's power" in general assemblies in the factories and neighborhoods. Vigorously denounced by the FNLA and UNITA, both of which saw this "pseudo people's power" as an incursion upon the competences of the coalition government and as "the germ of the break-up of Angolan society," this week of action was concluded with a combative popular assembly of more than 100,000 people (chanting "Poder popular!") and by a meeting of a national assembly of the rank-and-file committees.

Thus, the question of the seizure of power by the toilers as the outlet for the current struggles has been posed by the development of the outlines of a situation of dual power. But the MPLA, which holds hegemony over the workers of the urban centers, fundamentally bases its policy on a strategy of making agreements at the top, of holding a "dialogue" with "all the parties," and of placing all its bets on the future of the "democratic process" in Portugal; the role assigned to the mobilization of the masses is that of "exerting pressure to influence the relationship of forces within the government."

In face of the breadth and the dynamic of the mobilization, the MPLA has been constrained to adopt an ambiguous attitude. For example, Neto himself (the president of the MPLA) — who at Benguela supported the principle of "people's power" and in a popular meeting in Luanda denounced the "lackeys of imperialism" who want to prevent the "people from assuming power" — sanctioned the inclusion of the FNLA and UNITA in the transition government, stating that he desired the closest collaboration with them in the name of "the unity of the Angolan nation," just at the moment when the provocations committed by the armed bands of the FNLA were the most violent.

In this situation, the political response of the MPLA has been very insufficient. In its desire to be "realistic" so as to block the path of the ultras, the MPLA is preaching an alliance with the democratic sectors (an alliance that it already maintains with the MDA, the Angolan Democratic Movement), refusing to take up the tasks of preparing the masses for the inevitable confrontation with reaction, and thus tracing out a path of development leading toward the ebb of the mass mobilization under the blows of counterrevolutionary attacks. Mere tactical reference to "people's power" is not sufficient to open the road to the seizure of power by the laboring masses. Central anticapitalist perspectives are necessary in order to avoid the struggle's being eroded by localist retreats. This is all the more true in that the neocolonialist framework set by the Alvor accords is beginning to suffer the initial attacks of the masses, as is indicated by the demonstration of several tens of thousands of workers in Luanda against the government's decision to "mili-

tarize" labor in the port of the capital and by the proliferation of strikes affirming the workers' will to get rid of racist employers and managers.

Since it has placed itself within the strict framework of the "agreements that have been reached," the MPLA is finding itself torn between its link at the top with the reactionary forces within the government and the participation of its rank and file in the mobilization of the Angolan toilers.

Transition government - toward what independence?

The Alvor accords with the Portuguese government, while silent on the future of imperialist capital, are quite explicit about the need to "respect the links and legitimate interests of Portuguese living in Angola." The transition government thus finds itself being the privileged instrument of a neocolonial solution that is henceforth implicit in the facts of the situation. The exclusion from the government of direct representatives of the colonial bourgeoisie, of the Chipenda faction of the MPLA, and of the FLEC of Cabinda appears to be a provisional measure aimed at staggering over time the implementation of the various elements of the neocolonial plan. In fact, Chipenda has now joined the FNLA and it is envisaged that he will participate in the coalition government; meanwhile Neto (of the MPLA) is proposing to "discuss with those who want Cabinda to separate (from Angola)" and to "find the best solution" (perhaps an Angola-Zaire-Cabinda "oil" federation?). For his part, Roberto Holden (president of the FNLA) is proposing a "nonexclusive dialogue" in the name of the "higher interests of the Angolan nation" (including all classes and all capital, of course).

Thus, all the mediators of the neocolonial project were present at the negotiating table in Alvor; behind them lurked the shadow of the capitalist interests in Angola.

The role of the Portuguese government in all this is limited to that of intermediary defending the interests of the colonists and of capitalist investment in Angola. For, as has been noted by Almeida Santos, the minister of "decolonization": "Portugal is not rich enough to nurture the slightest neocolonial inclination" (on its own, obviously!). The recent nationalization of the banks in Portugal nevertheless directly implicates the Portuguese government in the economic exploitation of Angola.

The surest pawn in the imperialist strategy is the FNLA, whose links with imperialism through the aid it receives from Mobutu's Zaire (bastion of capitalist investment in central Africa) are obvious. Fundamentally, regionally based (in the Bakongo stronghold in the North) and rightist in character, this organization has created a veritable border army that today occupies the rich agricultural region of Ulage in northern Angola, in close collaboration with the colonial planters. In Dala, capital of the Cufo Norte district, the FNLA recently opened a "house of the people" and a hospital located in the very offices of the Santos Dinis coffee company, which amicably donated the facili-
ities. The return the firm receives in the form of the "moderating" role played by the FNLA in the struggles of the agricultural workers on the colonial plantations is easily imagined.

Through the CAAT (African-American Labor Center), which includes the trade unions of Zaire, the FNLA is linked to the pro-imperialist trade-union outfit, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. As long ago as 1973 a seminar on trade-union training was held in Zaire organized by the CGTA (General Conference of Angolan Workers), the General League of Angolan Workers, and the FNLA, in collaboration with the CAAT. It is not surprising that the FNLA is now denouncing the "campaign for people's power" on the grounds that it is leading the country "to a people's dictatorship" and is claiming that "the people, who are believers, energetically reject atheistic communism," and is opposing any unification of the trade unions.

In face of the development of struggles, the FNLA is issuing manifold appeals for the "unity, responsibility, and discipline of all Angolans" and is denouncing "the campaigns of agitation, subversion, and ideological aggression being waged among the people." The FNLA is thus putting itself forward as the motor force of repression, resorting to the most violent provocations against the radicalized militants of the MPLA, as in Luanda, where about fifty militants were assassinated. At the same time, the FNLA's border army increasingly appears as the central pillar of the reactionary military potential.

Last month, for example, an armed FNLA commando sacked the installations of the Luanda radio station, maltreating the workers and torturing an announcer close to the MPLA who was accused of giving too much play to the "campaign for people's power."

Similarly, a motorized column of 500 FNLA troops has just set itself up in the capital, thus overturning the military relationship of forces with the MPLA in preparation for very violent social conflicts as independence approaches.

The UNITA group, led by Jonas Savimbi (who came out of the FNLA), has long collaborated with Portuguese troops against the MPLA. Despite the support it received until 1970 from Peking (and now seems to be receiving again) and despite the support it has received from Mao-Stalinist groups in Europe (because of its Maoist verbiage), UNITA appears to be a central piece in the neocolonial strategy. This is attested by the support it gets from certain white colonists (especially Falcao's FUA). Its current tactic in deceiving the Angolan masses consists in "playing down" its embarrassing contacts with the white colonists and in affirming its will "to construct a socialist society," for the Angolan people are "extremely intransigent" at the present time and are suspicious of organizations subject to "external influences." This organization claims that it is playing a "mediating role in the government alliance," but the natural bent of rightist nationalism is pushing it into close collaboration with the FNLA. UNITA defines itself as a "force for union, peace, and harmony among the races and the various sectors and layers of the population"; it deploys its efforts "in the direction of maintaining order" (capitalist order, that is), as was expressed in Savimbi's behavior when he exhorted striking workers in Luanda to return to work and himself went to work in their place.

In this context, the essential function of the transition government is to prepare the neocolonial juridico-political framework for guaranteeing that when independence comes, there will be a transfer of power without any popular anticapitalist mobilization of any scope. The initial measures taken last February perfectly attest to this concern. For example, after the clashes in Luanda "all popular assemblies" were prohibited, while the council of ministers called on "the workers and the trade-union bodies to suspend all strikes until the transition government takes the measures necessary for arranging to safeguard the rights of the laboring classes."

As for the MPLA, which we do not place in the same category with the FNLA and UNITA, its heterogeneity, political weakness, and bureaucratic deviations are the factors serving to integrate it into the colonial process. Its acceptance of the Alvor "compromise" — an act that falls within the general lines of the opportunist decisions that have been bureaucratically made by the leadership under the pressure of the neocolonial states — is the direct product of its political weaknesses (and secondarily of Stalinist influence). This iron collar prevents the MPLA as a whole from going beyond its present policy of strictly tactical reliance on the mass movement in the framework of a reformist project with only a narrowly national dimension. This is especially ominous in that a disquieting process of unification is going on among the FNLA, UNITA, and the most rightist elements of the MPLA around the denunciation of "strikes that place the national economy in danger" and around the call for collaboration with "the political formations that were not present at Alvor," thus laying the basis for broadening the transition government to the right.

This policy of the leadership of the MPLA, far from permitting the reduction of the intensity of the inevitable social clashes between the laboring masses and the various representatives of capitalist interests in Angola, instead lays the groundwork for a capitulation to those interests.

**For a revolutionary alternative**

Neverthless, the mobilization on which the MPLA
has been forced to base itself is engendering a dynamic of struggle that is entering into opposition with the leadership's opportunist policy toward the petty bourgeoisie and the 'liberal' fraction of the colonial bourgeoisie, thus accentuating the internal contradictions of the movement. The bureaucratic practice of the leadership and the limits it has set on the mobilization of the workers are factors that permit the radicalization of rank-and-file militants who are in direct contact with the popular mobilization. Further, the MPLA's participation in the state apparatus intensifies the neocolonial pressures on the organization, while at the same time the leadership's political independence of the militant rank and file is growing.

This organization is the object of a twofold evolution: On the one hand, the Neto current is growing in strength and the other two tendencies that emerged at the last congress have been eliminated; on the other hand, there has begun a radicalization of the rank and file and a fragmenting within the local committees, which are permeated by many political currents. This twofold evolution was expressed in the latest decisions of the MPLA central committee (February 1975). While a reorganization was planned so that the MPLA "would follow a mass line more consistently" and so that "a close link between the rank and file and the top leadership" might be established, the MPLA's support for the transition government and its willingness to "collaborate with it closely" was reaffirmed. This organization, with its multiclassist aspirations, has always hidden its lack of debate and internal democratic life behind the vague terms "real independence" or "national and democratic government" (and today, "people's power"). This absence of debate and democratic life within the organization is now being expressed in the organization's extreme heterogeneity and in the omnipotence of a political leadership representing a reformist nationalist current.

The strengthening of the Neto current because of its "historic" prestige among the Angolan masses and because of the support it receives from local reformists is permitting the development of collaboration between the MPLA and the MDA (an organization with "liberal" conceptions, composed of lawyers and other members of the liberal professions; it is rather close to the Portuguese Communist party) and a recomposition of the internal political lineup of the MPLA.

Thus, the discussions that have been initiated between the Neto leadership and Mario and Pinto de Andrade and Gentil Viana, representatives of the "active revolt" tendency, seem to be oriented toward an individual reintegration of these elements, as is indicated by the retention of Pinto de Andrade as vice-president of the MPLA. The heterogeneity of the "active revolt" tendency was, it is true, very great. But above and beyond the "family regroupment" around the Andrades, Moasitic elements have organized and have denounced the "penetration (into the MPLA) of social imperialism through Neto."

Having only an empirical grasp of the Stalinist pressure being exerted on the Neto leadership, these elements seem to have no future, as they are cut off from the mobilization of the workers and lack alternative perspectives. Moreover, a good number of these militants either have simply "dropped out" or have individually rejoined the MPLA.

The case of Chipenda's "Revolt of the East" tendency is different; here the dispute was settled much more energetically. The MPLA launched a military operation against the representatives of this faction in Angola, who appeared more and more openly as a major element in a reactionary plan for civil war. In any case, this group is reported to have recently received arms and mercenaries trained in Brazil.

But this "military operation," undertaken in the absence of any appeal for the mobilization of the workers, was justified in an MPLA communiqué on the basis of imposing respect for the Alvor accords, which were presented as the "political and constitutional bases . . . of the decolonization of our country!" And today it is through the FNLA (and soon through the government?) that Chipenda can integrate himself into the imperialist strategy, under the "cover" of the Alvor accords. This policy of bargaining at the top and of constant reference to the Alvor accords (the disguised neocolonial framework) can only strengthen the aggressiveness of the reactionary forces and the cohesion of the rightist currents within the MPLA itself.

In addition, it is above all outside the MPLA, in the local committees, that we are seeing the emergence in the urban centers of various political currents, among them small revolutionary Marxist nuclei, which still have indistinct outlines but which are trying to work out a strategy of anticapitalist struggle linking the battle of the Angolan masses to the struggle for the socialist revolution internationally:

- The Amilcar Cabral committees, which are publishing a journal called Revolução Popular and some supplements under the title Libertação Nacional. The twofold title of their press is itself an indication of the stigmat and Maoist conceptions of these groups, which are struggling for "complete independence" and "people's democracy." Their empirical comprehension of the embryonic development of a situation of dual power in Angola (a situation they see as opposing the "bourgeois-regime of the palace" to the "popular regime of the country") does not enable them to offer alternative perspectives tracing out the road to the seizure of power by the toilers; they limit themselves to issuing general propaganda in favor of "the consolidation of people's power" and of "people's democracy."

- The Unity committees, a creation of militants of the Portuguese Communist party; they include some members of the MPLA.

- The Hnda committees, named for one of the heroes of the armed struggle of the MPLA; they include Maoist militants influenced by the MRPP (a Portuguese Maoist group); these committees appear to have a base in some of the slums of Luanda.

Nevertheless, all of these groups remain within the framework of radical nationalism overlaid with gradualist Maoist formulations. They restrict themselves to lining up behind the MPLA in a tail-endist man-
The only journal to assert that the battle for the socialist revolution is on the agenda in Angola right now, Revolução Socialista supports the MPLA in its mass initiatives, on the basis of an analysis of the internal contradictions of this organization and of its relationship to the mass movement; at the same time, it asserts the maintenance of the political independence of its propaganda.

Thus, the journal calls upon the militants of the MPLA and all the Angolan workers "to go beyond the phase of national democracy and to undertake the building of a revolutionary party, vanguard of the struggle of the toilers for the seizure of power, for the socialist revolution."

In spite of its still limited theoretical and material strength, Revolução Socialista is fighting to clarify the stakes of the present struggles of the Angolan workers by carrying on propaganda for self-organization and self-defense, by popularizing exemplary workers strikes, by denouncing the reactionary parties and their collusion with the rightist nationalist movements, and by calling for the formation of class trade unions of the workers, the only social force capable of really carrying out the tasks of national liberation by going beyond them in the struggle for the power of the workers and peasants, by forging the "revolutionary union" of the Angolan proletariat and peasantry, and by ultimately integrating their struggle into the battle of the oppressed masses of the entire African continent for the socialist revolution.
in the whirlwind of permanent revolution

Because of its strategic position and economic potential, Angola represents an important prize for the entire African revolution. Its economy has many ties with the other countries of the region: The hydroelectric project in the Cunene basin, which involves South African interests and concerns northern Namibia too, the coffee production linked to imports from Zaïre, and the Benguela railroad, export route for Zambian and southern Zaïre mining production are illustrations of these ties. The existence of ethnic groups divided over borders (Bakangas in the north, Cumbas in the south) further strengthens these ties by involving the neocolonial governments of the entire region.

Moreover, neocolonial reaction has clearly understood the stakes represented by Angola for the future stability of the Congolese, Zairian, Zambian, and even Tanzanian regimes.

Mobutu's regime in Zaïre is confirming its function as strong link in the imperialist chain by arming, training, and financing the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Liberação de Angola — Angola National Front of Liberation), a rightist organization originally founded on a Bakanga regionalist basis. Zaïre and the Congo have stepped up their factional manipulations within the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Liberação de Angola — People's Liberation Movement of Angola), as was especially clear during the Lusaka congress of this organization, held in August 1974.

From another angle, the oil companies — acting through the good offices of Brazzaville (the Congo) and Kinshasa (Zaïre), the two cities that harbor two factions of the so-called FLEC (Frente de Libertação do Enclave Cabinda — Liberation Front of the Cabinda Enclave) — covet Cabinda and its oil. In addition, African diplomacy as a whole, through the intermediation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), weighs on the Angolan situation, especially in the direction of a neocolonial solution, with Kenya acting as a go-between for the FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA (União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola — National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), as it did at the time of the Mombasa accord and during the latest negotiations in Nakuru.

The Angolan situation thus plays a decisive role in the framework of the modification of imperialist tactics in southern Africa. South African diplomacy, which is temporarily aiming at achieving a consensus with the neocolonial regimes and the PRLIMO in Mozambique, is disturbed by an Angolan situation that could not only threaten South African economic interests in Angola, but more importantly could trigger a political and social crisis throughout the region.

Thus, all the imperialist and proimperialist factions and forces are seeking to intervene in the Angolan situation in order to preserve their share of the profits; the intervention extends all the way through to Brazil, which is playing the game of "humanitarian" aid, in the name of the interest of all Portuguese speakers.

Concurrently, it is the duty of the proletariat and the international revolutionary movement not to abandon Angola to imperialist appetites without a struggle. From this point on, the revolutionary lessons that must be drawn from the mobilization of the laboring masses of Angola — a mobilization that is occurring through workers' struggles and the exemplary forms of organization developing among the urban masses — go well beyond the narrow national framework and concern the whole of the African revolution.

It is therefore indispensable for African youth and the international anti-imperialist movement to become conscious both of the continental dimension of the Angolan crisis and of the necessary tasks of support that this implies.

Against the neocolonial holy alliance it is crucial to organize the revolutionary elements of the Congo, Zaïre, and Zambia in a framework of permanent militant support to the Angolan masses in struggle for their emancipation.

But the Angolan situation is also important for all European and North American revolutionary forces, for it involves large investments by the various European bourgeoisies and the American bourgeoisie, and what happens in Angola also affects the relationship of forces in Portugal.

Thus, international solidarity with the Angolan masses will become an important factor in the future evolution of the relationship of forces in the country.

This is especially true because the Maoist policy of supporting Mobutu's sinister game in the framework of maintaining good Sino-Zaïrean relations and of supporting the FNLA (Chinese military advisers are training the FNLA's aggression troops) contributes to bolstering the imperialist project of creating a neocolonial Kinshasa-Luanda axis. In the meantime, the Soviet Union and the "people's democracies" of East Europe are content to provide only eye-dropperIZED aid to the MPLA, the aim being to safeguard their future relations with Homen Roberto (the FNLA).

The evolution of the political situation in Angola will thus condition the future relationship of forces in central Africa and the southern subcontinent to a large extent; the future of the new independent state of Mozambique will be especially affected.

The political tasks of Angolan revolutionary Marxists must be worked out within the framework of a conception that integrates the evolution of Angola into the entire African revolutionary process.

This policy of bargaining at the top and of constant reference to the Alvor accords (the disguised neocolonial framework) can only strengthen the aggressiveness of the reactionary forces and the cohesion of the rightist currents within the MPLA itself.

In addition, it is above all outside the MPLA, in the local committees, that we are seeing the emergence in the urban centers of various political currents, among them small revolutionary Marxist nuclei, which still have indistinct outlines but which
are trying to work out a strategy of anticapitalist struggle linking the battle of the Angolan masses to the struggle for the socialist revolution internationally:

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Nevertheless, all of these groups remain within the framework of radical nationalism overlaid with gradualist Maoist formulations. They restrict themselves to lining up behind the MPLA in a tail-endist manner and combine this with a warped notion of the "maximum program" reflected in propaganda in favor of "people's democracy." In face of the affirmation of the necessity of going beyond the MPLA with the perspective of a resolute struggle for the socialist revolution, these currents make an abstraction of the tasks of developing struggles of the laboring masses with the perspective of a revolutionary seizure of power; they cling to an almost "more" conception of the unity of the MPLA and thus deny the profound heterogeneity of this organization.

*On the basis of the rapid spread of revolutionary Marxist ideas in Portugal itself and of the new situation created by the April 25, 1974, coup, a small revolutionary Marxist nucleus has formed in Luanda around the journal Revolução Socialista. In the editorial of its September 1974 issue, the journal explained the reasons for its existence this way:

"Angolan workers and toilers!"

"No, it is not yet another party cropping up! It is only a journal, one that owes its allegiance to the workers and is for the workers; it wants to be with them in their struggles and in their daily life, to help them overcome the obstacles on the road to a truly free Angola, to an absolutely complete independence in which any sort of exploitation will once and for all be banished from our territory, for a socialist Angola.

"All power to the toilers! For an independent and socialist Angola!"

The only journal to assert that the battle for the socialist revolution is on the agenda in Angola right now, Revolução Socialista supports the MPLA in its mass initiatives, on the basis of its notion of the internal contradictions of this organization and of its relationship to the mass movement; at the same time, it asserts the maintenance of the political independence of its propaganda.

Thus, the journal calls upon the militants of the MPLA and all the Angolan workers "to go beyond the phase of national democracy and to undertake the building of a revolutionary party, vanguard of the struggle of the toilers for the seizure of power, for the socialist revolution."

In spite of its still limited theoretical and material strength, Revolução Socialista is fighting to clarify the stakes of the present struggles of the Angolan workers by carrying on propaganda for self-organization and self-defense, by popularizing exemplary workers' strikes, by denouncing the reactionary parties and their collusion with the rightist nationalist movements, and by calling for the formation of class trade unions of the workers, the only social force capable of really carrying out the tasks of national liberation by going beyond them in the struggle for the power of the workers and peasants, by forging the "revolutionary union" of the Angolan proletariat and peasantry, and by ultimately integrating their struggle into the battle of the oppressed masses of the entire African continent for the socialist revolution.

From Spinola to the transition government

The essential aim of the reorientation of imperialist strategy in southern Africa that has occurred in the recent period is to limit both the impact of the "decolonization" of the Portuguese territories in Africa and the dynamic of the popular mobilizations that have followed that decolonization, thus assuring the transition to a new regional economic and political integration based around South Africa.

Thus, in Angola an attempt was made to set in motion a neocolonial solution under the auspices of Mobutu and with the participation of the Portuguese government. The Portuguese bourgeoisie and imperialism counted on settling the thorny problem of the colonial war and simultaneously maintaining capitalist exploitation in Angola by implementing Spinola's neocolonial plan, which called for a slow and complex "decolonization" project including an immediate cease-fire, the formation of a coalition government, and a referendum to be held in the framework of a federation with Portugal.

This process was based on the exclusive recognition of the rightist nationalist forces (FNLA and UNITA) and on the drafting of "independence" agreements in association with the direct representatives of the colonial bourgeoisie (Angolan Unity Front, Angolan Christian Democratic party, etc.) with a view to their participation in the transition government. The secret talks on Sal Island in Cape Verde between Spinola and Mobutu, who presented himself as a spokesman for Chipenda (at the time on MPLA dissidents), holden (FNL), and Savimbi (UNITA), were clearly part of this project, which was aimed at shunting aside the MPLA at a time when it was backed by a grave internal crisis that was not unrelated to the approach of impor-
tant political events. (The Chipenda tendency later left the MPLA and joined the FNLA; the “Active Revolt” tendency, led by the Ambundza brothers, remains in the MPLA.)

But the MPLA’s relative intransigence on the principle of independence, its popularity among the urban masses, and political developments in Portugal itself (with the ouster of Sá Carneiro) altered the unfolding of the initial neocolonial process. It was above all the entrance onto the political scene of the Angolan laboring masses through workers strikes and broad mobilizations in the urban centers that forced the Portuguese bourgeoisie to recognize the right of the peoples of the colonies to independence.

After Spinola’s departure, however, the main lines of his neocolonial plan were reaffirmed by his successor, Caetano Gomes. On October 10, 1974, a new meeting was held between Fonseca de Melo, Mabute, Holden, and Chipenda, while in Angola itself the racist fury of the white colonels was unleashed against the African masses.

Nevertheless, the deepening of the MPLA’s influence among the urban workers, the growing radicalization of the struggles, and the violent, virtually spontaneous reaction of the popular masses of the metropoles (urban slums) to the racist aggression forced the recognition of the MPLA and marked the end of the federalist pretensions of the Spinolists; the imperialist strategy was thus partially frustrated.

We then saw an acceleration of the “process of decolonization,” with a spectacular “reconciliation” of the three liberation movements in Mombaça (Kenya), the signing of the Alvor accords with the Portuguese government, and the establishment of a quasiparliamentary transition government charged with administering the country until elections, scheduled to be held just before legal independence in November 1975.

Thus, the initial neocolonial project was very much altered by the development of the revolutionary struggles of the workers of Angola and Portugal. Nevertheless, the context in which the recognition of the MPLA occurred (in association with the rightist nationalist movements FNLA and UNITA) corresponded to the imperialist desire to “neutralize” the revolutionary dynamic of the independence struggles by incorporating the MPLA into the neocolonial process through the transition government.

The Alvor accords, although silent on the future of imperialist interests in Angola, are very explicit as to “respect” for the interests of the colonial bourgeoisie. They thus set the general framework for a neocolonial solution, which is now implicit in the facts of the situation, the major instrument of that solution being the transition government. The absence from this government of the Chipenda faction of the MPLA (which had not yet joined the FNLA when the government was formed) and the direct representatives of the colonial bourgeoisie thus appears as a temporary measure aimed at triggering the incorporation of the various elements of the neocolonial plan. In fact, Chipenda’s participation in the government is now envisaged (he was part of the FNLA delegation in Nakuru).

The central task of the transition government is to prepare the neocolonial juridico-political framework to guarantee them in virtue of “electoral legitimacy,” that the transition of power will take place without any anticolonialist popular mobilization of any scope. The first measures taken by this government (the banning of “pop-

ular assembling,” the appeals to workers to return to work, the “militarization” of labor in the ports) clearly attest to this concern. The transition government today appears as a “legal” cover for the anti-working-class measures that have been proposed by the FNLA, UNITA, and the Portuguese high commissioner and sanctioned in effect by the MPLA, which is increasingly squeezed between its collaboration with reactionary forces at the top and its tactical support of the mass movement.

The Nakuru conference decided to create the Angolan national armed forces, disarm the civilian population, promulgate an electoral law on July 15, and conduct a census with a view toward holding elections to a constituent assembly in October 1975. The plan to disarm the urban masses corresponds to the FNLA and UNITA’s broader desire to deal a blow to all the structures of workers self-organization “not provided for” in the Alvor accords.

The attitude taken by the MPLA in Nakuru further reveals the opportunistic character of the leadership of this organization, which is prepared to cling to governmental power at any price. Nevertheless, if the disarmament of the urban masses is actually carried out, it will represent a new and decisive change in the relationship of forces in face of the imperialist counteroffensive, a factor that would deepen the internal contradictions of the MPLA. Such a policy could well be suicidal, even for the elements of the MPLA who most respect the unity of the government. If a partial defeat for the masses can be imposed by selective massacres, the Angolan laboring masses would be beaten and the petty-bourgeois leadership of the MPLA, rendered inoperative, could well be swept out of the government.

But the formation of a Zaire-Angola neocolonial axis under the auspices of Mobutu and the FNLA, an axis that might later be in position to take excessive advantage of its role as policeman of the region, could appear.

22 November; Kinshasa — Mario Soares with Holden Roberto (FNLA), Savimbi (UNITA) and Chipenda (then in MPLA and now in FNLA)
dangerous for certain imperialist interests. The recent rumors of a coup in Zaire could be an expression of the fear of certain imperialist sectors of the formation of such a bloc. In this context, UNITA could try to offer a way out of the scrape by coming forward as a miracle solution, with the support of the most right-wing elements of the MPLA. That was certainly what UNITA was aiming at in sending its representatives on a tour of European governments recently.

The workers mobilization

In recent years the center of the struggle of the Angolan masses has shifted from the rural regions (to which the armed struggle and the liberated zones of the MPLA had been limited) to the urban centers, where workers combativity has been forcefully asserted, as was demonstrated by the Luanda general strike of September 1973. While the MPLA was experiencing serious difficulties (internal divisions, military problems), there emerged in the urban centers a young, strongly concentrated, and very combative proletariat, the direct product of capitalist exploitation. Although it lacked organic links to the armed struggle, this proletariat was much impressed by the MPLA's prestige and burst onto the political scene, combining in its struggles economic demands and an advanced anticolonialist consciousness.

The new situation created by the April 25, 1974, coup in Portugal and the relative liberalization that followed gave the signal for an offensive of struggle. The combativity of the Angolan proletariat, long contained by colonial repression, exploded in many local strikes that clearly attested to the workers' desire to expel the fascist employers and managers and put an end to capitalist superexploitation. But the first significant victory of the Angolan proletariat over the stalling of the Portuguese government came with the nearly spontaneous response of the laboring masses to the racist crimes committed by colonial reaction. The relationship of forces between the laboring masses and the ruling class in the urban centers was suddenly transformed, enabling tens of thousands of workers to go through the experience of mobilization and struggle. The period of isolated economic strikes severely repressed by colonial reaction then gave way to a period of struggle for elementary democratic rights in the factories.

Through these mobilizations the Angolan workers gradually became familiar with forms of organization and struggle that were wholly new for them. Advanced experiences of workers self-organization through the formation of rank-and-file committees in the neighborhoods and factories illustrate the radicalization of this movement. Thus, exactly during the period of the establishment of the transition government, the coordinating body of the neighborhood committees of the capital initiated a "week of national action for people's power," proposing that "progressive student organizations, workers committees, and workers associations" hold general assemblies in the factories and neighborhoods to discuss the slogan "consolidate people's power."

In the most recent period there has also been a proliferation of strikes and a conjunctural decline in the productivity of important economic sectors. In face of this situation the transition government passed a decree pro-

Agostinho Neto (MPLA), Holden Roberto (FNLA) and Jonas Savimbi together at Nekhuri.
Against the reactionary offensive—workers self-defense

The recent provocations by the armed gangs of the FNLA are expressions of the desire to overturn the relationship of forces as the date of the independence elections approaches in a situation of growing radicalization of the struggle of the Angolan workers. After a lively campaign denouncing the structures of popular power, the strikes, and the forms of independent workers mobilization, the FNLA in March 1973 launched a real military offensive against the militias of the MPLA and the radicalized elements of the workers mobilizations. These murderous operations—which have killed several thousand civilians—are characterized by a determined desire to intimidate the popular masses (machine-gunning of demonstrations, murders in the pro-MPLA urban slums, etc.).

Initially localized in the capital, the attacks later spread to all the urban centers of the country. They have been combined with a vast military occupation of the northern regions of Angola near the Zaire border, carried out by the FNLA with the collaboration of the colonial planters; MPLA militias have been systematically driven out of these areas. In the meantime, the Chipendo faction in the east and UNITA in the central-south are trying to occupy the countryside in order to counter MPLA hegemony in the urban centers.

At first, these attacks, which call into question the holding of elections before independence, enjoyed the passive complicity of the Portuguese authorities. But the offensive was thwarted by the military reaction of the MPLA and the armed mobilization of some neighborhood committees, which guaranteed the defense of popular neighborhoods against the military attacks of FNLA forces. Far from bringing the popular mobilization to a halt, these attacks openly revealed the counterrevolutionary character of the FNLA, led to the development of elementary forms of armed self-defense in some popular neighborhoods, and thus became a threat to the smooth functioning of the "process of decolonization."

The Portuguese authorities, particularly High Commissioner Silva Cardoso, thus broke their silence to denounce the participation in the clashes of civilian militiamen fighting side by side with the MPLA. A new agreement, the stokes of which will be the very existence of these advanced forms of mass self-organization, then became necessary. That is what was discussed in Naku, Kenya.

It is thus clear that the FNLA today is the most reliable pawn in imperialist strategy in Angola. Its ties to imperialism are obvious; they are reflected in the aid the organization receives from Mobutu in Zaire (the bastion of capitalist investment in central Africa) and in the relations it has established with the African-American Center of the International Confederation of Free (sic) Trade Unions. Fundamentally nationalistic (founded on the basis of the Bakongo ethnic group in the north) and rightist, this movement has recruited a genuine border army among Angolan emigrants in Zaire; it is this army that is now occupying northern Angola.

The FNLA, which has asserted itself as the motor force of the repression, increasingly appears as the central axis of reactionary military potential. Strengthened by the recent incorporation of the Chipendo faction, the FNLA is the essential instrument in a strategy that is moving forward by means of successive hammer blows against popular mobilizations, the aim being to inflict significant defeats on the laboring masses before independence comes. But so far the repeated attacks of the FNLA have not only failed to reduce workers combative activity significantly, but have even permitted the strengthening of the mobilization and the vigilance of the working masses.

Nevertheless, the anti-working-class repression being carried out by the FNLA against the radicalized elements of the MPLA and the mass movement, combined with the absence of a central alternative perspective, could in time give rise to phenomena of demoralization and localized retreats in an ongoing situation of tension. This is especially possible because the repression is becoming more selective. The political commissioner of the MPLA general staff, commander "Jika," was murdered in an ambush in Cabinda; the leader of the MPLA youth, M. Pereira Dos Vandunen, was gunned down while driving in his car; and the FNLA has denounced the presence in Luanda of a Brazilian "death squad" composed of individuals who "worked for the CIA in Chile."

As for the UNITA of Jonas Savimbi, who for a long time collaborated with Portuguese troops against the MPLA, it is an organization founded on a regional basis (the center-south, around Nova Lisboa). In spite of the support it has been receiving from China since 1970, its regional character resulted in its being integrated into the imperialist project very early on. After April 24, 1974, UNITA enjoyed the support of some white colonists in the center-south region, and Savimbi established fruitful contacts with the FUA (Angolan Unity Front), led by the engineer Fernando Palaço. His past collaboration with the Portuguese colonial army and his recognition by a not insignificant portion of the white colon population gained UNITA entrance into the Alvor negotiations as an indirect representative of the interests of the colonial bourgeoisie.

After its incorporation into the transition government, UNITA made an effort to obtain a minimum implantation in the urban centers by "suspending" its embarrassing contacts with the white colonists and affirming its position as a mediator between the FNLA and the MPLA during the recent clashes. Through this attitude UNITA hopes to expand its influence by taking advantage of the FNLA's discredit among the urban laboring masses; it intends to do this with the aid of calls to "peace and unity." Nevertheless, far from being a "third force," UNITA, by virtue of the ties it has established with the colonial bourgeoisie and the support it seems to be receiving from the European imperialist sector, appears as a complement to the FNLA and a possible alternative solution for imperialism.

The current massive departure from Angola of white colonists who are heading back to the colonial metropolis has deprived UNITA of an important part of its social base. The organization is therefore trying to reconstitute
that social base, seeking to extend its influence on the basis of regionalist propaganda. Utilizing the feelings of insecurity that the actions of the FNLA are generating in Luanda, UNITA is promoting demonstrations in Luanda by workers from central and southern Angola to demand that they be repatriated to their regions of origin. Paradoxically, the "rigid position of not permitting the exodus" of workers from the capital that has been adopted by the Angolan government may serve to reinforce the impact of the regionalist propaganda. UNITA is conducting and in time could permit the growth of its influence among the most backward layers of the Angolan masses.

Ambiguous response of the MPLA

In face of the existence in Angola of social and political forces especially committed to the maintenance of imperialist domination through the stabilization of a neocolonial regime, the responses of the MPLA, which is caught up in participating in the government and in the agreements signed with the reactionary forces of the FNLA and UNITA, are not sufficient to trace out the road to real independence. By not preparing the laboring masses for the inevitable confrontation with reaction and by sowing illusions about the possibility of a "democratic process of decolonization" in such a context, these responses trace out the potential lines of a retreat of the workers' mobilization under the blows of the counter-revolutionary attacks.

The MPLA's acceptance of the Alvor "compromise" thus tallies with the general line of the opportunist decisions that have been taken bureaucratically by the MPLA leadership under neocolonialist pressure. The crudest example of this was the MPLA congress in Lusaka in August 1974; because of the approach of important political events (the negotiations with Portugal), the manipulations of African diplomacy carried the day and created the general staff of the MPLA. The neocolonial pressure, combined with the gradualist illusions of the organization, are now preventing the MPLA as a whole from going beyond its policy of tactically supporting the mass movement in the framework of a reformist program of narrow national dimensions.

Just after April 25, 1974, when its participation in the negotiations with Portugal was not yet certain, the MPLA, acting from Brazzaville, raised the slogan of the formation of movement action committees in the urban centers of Angola. This call, which coincided with the spontaneous eruption of the urban laboring masses onto the political scene, permitted the proliferation of rank-and-file movement structures and the massive adherence to the MPLA of a whole current of radicalized workers who were later to form the core of the MPLA's middle cadres in the urban centers.

But the MPLA adopted an ambiguous attitude in face of the radicalization of these mobilizations. Beginning from a conception that views the mass movement as an instrument for improving the relationship of forces at the top, the MPLA supported the mobilizations in order to break its way into the government. Later, beseeching itself on the narrow framework of the "agreements that have been reached," the MPLA presented the electoral perspective set out by the Alvor accords as the only outlet for the workers struggles. Thus, in an attempt to be "realistic" so as to block the path of the extremist colonels, the MPLA declared itself in favor of an alliance with "democratic" sectors, an alliance that was put into practice by collaborating with the Angolan Democratic Movement (MDA). On the one hand, the MPLA called for closer collaboration within the government in the name of "national unity"; on the other hand, it upheld the theme of "people's power" in popular meetings and in the neighborhoods. But the mere tactical reference to "people's power" is not enough to open the way to the seizure of power by the laboring masses, especially since the slogan reflects multiclassist conceptions. Thus, for Augustino Neto, president of the MPLA, "people's power" means the power of "all social layers of society," while the central function of independence is to make "all the social layers of society share political power."

These frontist illusions are at the very heart of the political limitations of the MPLA.

A heterogeneous movement founded on the basis of the urban petty bourgeoisie, the MPLA inherited the frontist and gradualist illusions characteristic of petty-bourgeois nationalism, illusions that were further reinforced by the Stalinist conceptions of the Angolan Communist nucleus. Nevertheless, the orientation toward armed struggle and the mobilization of the peasantry, conceived on the basis of an empirical approach to the specific character of Portuguese colonialism, represented a real break with reformist nationalism. Thus, the MPLA, a revolutionary nationalist movement, may be located somewhere between the limits of petty-bourgeois gradualist nationalism and an empirical revolutionary approach with a socialist dynamic. Nevertheless, this evolution occurred without any profound political clarification, especially with respect to frontist illusions.

The MPLA thus developed into a movement with a multiclassist bent unable to actually create a broad interclass front in the context of the Angolan social structure of the 1960s. In reality, the urban petty bourgeoisie of the cities had partially hooked up with the "democratic" sections of the colon population, while the proletariat remained numerically weak. Angolan social structure of the 1960s thus provided a favorable basis for the development of interclassist illusions within the MPLA, particularly because the organization's influence was essentially restricted to rural areas where social differentiation is slight. However, under the impact of the evolution of colonial rule and imperialist pillage, Angolan social structure in the urban centers has become largely differentiated since that time. The opening to imperialist capital beginning in the 1960s stimulated the development of a proletariat that was young and strongly concentrated, although it was not very skilled and lacked traditions of struggle. Later, beginning in the 1970s with the development of a transformation industry linked to the colonial market, a real industrial proletariat emerged. In 1973 manufacturing production employed about 130,000 wage-earners, mainly concentrated in the industrial zones of Luanda and Lobito. The Angolan capital city included half the skilled labor force employed in manufacturing industry. Furthermore, the economic ramifications of the colonial presence, combined with Portuguese neocolonial inclinations, fostered the development of an indigenous petty bourgeoisie, both commercial and administrative. Today the political limitations of the MPLA do not enable the organization to grasp the fundamental importance of the emergence of a proletarian social force in the heart of the imperialist industrial apparatus; this results in the MPLA's inability to put forward political responses in class terms or to go beyond its original multiclassist positions.

Nevertheless, although the MPLA's expressed desire to "put an end to the exploitation of man by man" and to establish a "democratic and popular regime" did not constitute proof of any really profound radicalization...
when this perspective was advanced within the liberated zones (which were essentially rural and characterized by only a slight social differentiation), such references have totally differing implications when they are asserted in the urban centers today. For the laboring masses in the urban centers today, references to people's power and the end of exploitation of man by man have a very immediate and precise class content: the power of the workers and poor peasants and the end of capitalist exploitation.

A prisoner of gradualist conceptions, the MPLA as a whole is incapable of offering the laboring masses a central anticapitalist perspective able to lead to workers and peasants power. But the anticapitalist dynamic of the workers struggles urgently requires such a perspective. In face of this urgency, the MPLA finds itself torn between its links with reactionary forces at the top and the rank-and-file's participation in the mobilizations of the workers. This is especially the case in that the first must assault against the anti-working-class measures of the transition government are now beginning to take shape.

Thus, in spite of the radicalization of workers struggles, the MPLA is clinging to the electoral perspective provided for in the Alvor accords and reaffirmed in Nakuru. But in the present Angolan context one must have the greatest doubts in the possibility of these elections taking place "democratically." The northern part of the country, for example, is "occupied" by the troops of the FNLA, who are hunting down MPLA militants, while UNITA is doing the same thing in the south. Moreover, the example of Portugal itself shows that given laboring masses who are on the whole little politicized and still subject in certain regions to tribalist pressure exacerbated by the FNLA and UNITA, the possibilities of reactionary manipulation of the electoral game in order to prevent the real relationship of forces from being reflected electrolytically must not be underestimated.

Nevertheless, it is certain that the electoral campaign for an MPLA majority in the constituent assembly will be an important focus and an object of broad mobilization of the urban workers. This could be the occasion for the workers to advance a whole set of demands taking up all the demands put forward during current struggles, centralizing them in a clearly anticapitalist perspective and forcing the constituent assembly that comes out of the elections to implement them.

But the real revolutionary alternative to class collaboration with reactionary forces is to be found in the centralization and unification of the workers struggles. This is especially true since there is evidence that a disturbing unification process is going on between UNITA and the most right-wing elements of the MPLA. This process is based around denunciation of "strikes endangering the national economy" and calls for collaboration with the "political formations not present at Alvor," thus laying the basis for broadening the transition government to the right.

Thus, the factors that are in fact acting to incorporate the MPLA into the neocolonial process are the heterogeneity and political limitations of the organization, its bureaucratic deviations, and its integration into the game being played by African diplomats. These factors have been expressed in the MPLA's acceptance of the Alvor accords, its collaboration with the FNLA and UNITA in the government, and its recent acceptance of the Nakuru accords.

For a revolutionary alternative

But the mobilization the MPLA is tacitly supporting gives rise to a dynamic of struggle that comes into conflict with the MPLA leadership's opportunistic policy toward the petty bourgeoisie and the "liberal" section of the colonial bourgeoisie, thus intensifying the internal contradictions of the organization. On the other hand, the bureaucratic practices of the leadership and the limits it has set on workers mobilization are the factors that prepare the ground for the radicalization of the rank-and-file militants who are in direct contact with the popular mobilization. The MPLA's participation in the state apparatus intensifies the neocolonial pressure on the organization; at the same time, the leadership's political independence from the rank-and-file militants is increasing. The recent FNLA attacks have had a twofold effect on the MPLA. On the one hand, they have stimulated the emergence of armed popular militias and accelerated the radicalization of MPLA militants in contact with these mobilizations; on the other hand, they have made the necessity of a compromise with UNITA more credible in the eyes of the leftist elements of the MPLA. Thus, the MPLA youth published a communiqué denouncing the union with "reactionary forces who, behind the mask of a false nationalism, are only spreading horror among the Angolan people and committing indiscriminate massacres"; meanwhile, in Nakuru the MPLA leadership decided during the "peace conference" with the FNLA and UNITA to disarm the civilian population. The MPLA now is undergoing a twofold internal reposition. On the one hand, the Neto current is growing in strength; the two other tendencies that came out of the last congress have been eliminated, and an increasingly assertive rightist tendency is developing; on the other hand, a rank-and-file radicalization and a flowering of local committees permeated by many political currents has begun. The latest decisions of the MPLA Central Committee (February 1975) clearly illustrate these developments. On the one hand, a reorganization of the movement was planned in order to ensure that the MPLA would "more consistently follow a mass line" and that "a close link between the rank and file and the leadership" would be established; on the other hand, the organization's desire to "closely collaborate" with the government was reaffirmed.

The strengthening of the Neto current, a result of Neto's "historic" prestige among the Angolan masses and the support he receives from local reformists, has been effected through the integration into the MPLA of some members of the Angolan Democratic Movement, an organization with "liberal" conceptions composed of lawyers and members of the liberal professions who are rather close to the Portuguese Communist party.

Moreover, the two tendencies that emerged from the Lusaka congress have been eliminated.
The negotiations that have been opened between the Neto leadership and Mario and Pintd de Andrade and Gentil Viana, representatives of the "Active Revolt" tendency, seem to be oriented toward an individual reintegration of these elements. Cut off from the mobilization of the workers, these people now seem to have no future. Moreover, a good number of them have either simply left politics or rejoined the MPLA individually already.

The case of the "Revolt of the East" tendency led by Chipenda is different; it was settled much more energetically. The MPLA launched a military operation against the representatives of this faction, which was more and more openly emerging as an element in a reactionary plan for civil war. But this "military operation" — undertaken without any call for the mobilization of the workers — was conceived by the MPLA in the context of respecting the Alvor accords, which are described as the "political and constitutional basis . . . for the decolonization of our country." And today Chipenda is able to participate in the general staff negotiations as a member of the FNLA and has been incorporated into the imperialist strategy for which the Alvor accords are a cover. This policy of wheeling and dealing at the top can only encourage the reactionary forces to become more aggressive and increase the cohesion of the rightist currents within the MPLA.

Such a tendency is now emerging within the leading bodies of the MPLA. Fundamentally anti-communist, it calls for a special alliance with UNITA against the FNLA. Lacking any base in the rank and file, this tendency is represented in the Central Committee by Luico Lara. It does not have any real political independence, and its essential function is to enable Neto to play a balancing role between the right and left elements of the MPLA and thus to push the organization to all sorts of compromises in the name of the unity of the movement. The absence of debate and democratic life within the organization, in addition to its political limitations, is now being manifested in an extreme heterogeneity and in the omnipotence of a political leadership representing a reformist nationalist current.

The most radicalized elements of the urban workers are assembled primarily in the rank and file local committees of the MPLA, an integral part of the workers vanguard that has emerged from the struggles of the urban masses since April 23, 1974. Because of the position it occupies in the process of capitalist exploitation, this vanguard is the driving lance of the entire revolutionary process today.

But many of these committees remain locked into a radical nationalism cloaked in gradualist Maoist formulations and limited to tailing the MPLA leadership; a leftist pinching of "maximum program" expressed in the form of propaganda for "people's democracy" is added to spice things up. These Maoist groups are somewhat embarrassed by their international reference point, given China's present attitude toward the Angolan crisis. In face of the necessity to go beyond the MPLA within the perspective of a revolutionary struggle for the socialist revolution, these currents, disregarding the tasks of centralizing the workers struggles with the perspective of a revolutionary seizure of power, cling to a virtually moralistic conception of the unity of the MPLA; in the process they deny the extreme heterogeneity of this organization.

In face of the emergence of a workers vanguard in the urban centers — a vanguard that is organized in the rank-and-file bodies of the MPLA (the action committees), UNTA, and the pro-trade-union commissions — the political responses these groups offer are insufficient. The question that is now being posed by the various ongoing struggles is whether or not capitalist exploitation is to continue. The Angolan workers refuse to bear the burden of a "process of exploitation that remains unchanged." For them, the only real independence will be one that permits their total emancipation and puts an end to capitalist rule. Angolan revolutionary militants must determine their positions in light of this necessary transformation of the struggle for independence into a struggle for the social emancipation of the workers, into a struggle for the socialist revolution.

The necessity for such a transformation is not the product of any intellectual imagination; on the contrary, it is the central question that has been posed by the tens of thousands of workers struggling in the factories, companies, and ports of Angola. Thus, contrary to what the reformist leadership of the MPLA likes to suggest, the time is certainly ripe for the class struggle in Angola — a struggle whose stakes are decisive for the future of revolutionary struggles throughout the region.

There are already elements within the MPLA who are aware of these stakes and who define themselves around a class-struggle position and fight for the emergence of an overall anticapitalist alternative. These revolutionary militants have set themselves the task of elucidating the full dimensions of what is at stake in the present struggles of the Angolan proletariat; they are doing this by developing propaganda for self-organization and self-defense, popularizing exemplary workers strikes and assuring them militant solidarity, denouncing the reactionary parties and their collusion with the rightist nationalist movements, and calling for the formation of class trade unions for the proletariat, the only social force capable of actually carrying out the tasks of national liberation through going beyond the struggle for the power of the workers and peasants, through the "revolutionary union" of the Angolan proletariat and poor peasantry, and finally, through making their struggle part of the fight of the oppressed masses of the entire African continent for their total emancipation, for the socialist revolution.

As against the ambiguous responses of the MPLA, this is the only strategic response capable of preventing the erosion of workers combativity under the blows of reaction and of countering the road of workers power in Angola to any neocolonial solution.

THE ARAB REVOLUTION

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TOWARD CIVIL WAR?

By C. GABRIEL

Since the conference held at Nakuru, Kenya, during which the leadership of the MPLA, the FNLA, and UNITA made an agreement to "disarm civilians" as a sort of amendment to the Alvor accords, there has been a sudden acceleration in the development of the political situation in Angola.

It was only the leadership of the MPLA that had any illusions in the Nakuru conference, which was a sort of ritual battle aimed at saving the coalition government. Neither Holden Roberto of the FNLA nor Jonas Savimbi of UNITA considered the coalition government to be the stable form of political regime after independence, which is scheduled to take effect on November 11, 1975. (See INPRECOR, No. 31, July 31, 1975.)

The strength of the mass movement in the urban areas rendered illusory any attempt to establish a government within which a nationalist organization under pressure from its rank and file and two organizations acting as the fifth column of imperialism could coexist.

It was in the framework of this illusion that the leadership of the MPLA had been "making use of" the mass movement, seeking to utilize it tactically in an attempt to influence the relationship of political forces within the government and to wage political battles. The appeals for moderation, the proclamations calling for "increasing production," and the Nakuru agreement itself all illustrated this right-wing line, which the MPLA leadership had been following ever since the Alvor accords were signed. (For more details, see INPRECOR, No. 31.)

"The Alvor accords" were signed on January 15, 1975, in Alvor, Portugal. The signatories were the Portuguese government, the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola - Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola - National Front for the Liberation of Angola), and UNITA (União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola - National Union for the Total Independence of Angola). The accords set up a coalition government composed of representatives of the three Angolan organizations and a representative of the Portuguese government (General Silva Cardoso at the time), who was assigned to be "arbitrator" and chief of defense and security.

Then came the MPLA decision to expel the FNLA from Luanda, thus opening a new period of confrontation and civil war. Does this mean that there has been a change in the character of the MPLA leadership? Undoubtedly not. But the relationships between this petty-bourgeois leadership and the masses are extremely complex in the present social conjuncture.

MPLA: Past and present

In origin and training, the MPLA leadership comes from the urban petty-bourgeoisie. (See INPRECOR, No. 2, June 20, 1974, and No. 3, July 4, 1974.) Its move to the rural armed struggle allowed the MPLA leadership to build itself a peasant base resting on small-scale village production in areas of extremely backward social development. In this social context, talk of "the end of exploitation of man by man" did not at all have the same sort of repercussions as it does in an urban setting. During the last several years of struggle, while bureaucratic tendencies were rapidly developing within the apparatus, the cities were being swollen with new wage earners, a result of new trends of investment and industrialization.

During the phase following the April 25, 1974, coup in Lisbon, a very important phenomenon arose: the entrance into the MPLA of youth from urban milieu that had radicalized during the recent period; this was especially the case for students returning to Angola from Lisbon. These elements rapidly took charge of some of the middle level responsibilities in the organization, acting in the framework of "people's power" and the neighborhood commissions. Because of their links with the masses, they constituted a force of considerable pressure on the leadership of the MPLA. Despite their insufficiencies, the Maoist influences to which they are subject, and their reference to "people's democracy," these elements sought to express the anticapitalist potentials of the urban mass movement. For them, "the end of the exploitation of man by man" has a precise anticapitalist meaning, a meaning they have been able to teach the workers movement to some extent.

That is why pressure on the leadership of the MPLA inevitably intensified, both before and after the Nakuru
accords. For example, there was the communiqué of the workers of Síga, issued after the announcement of the Nakuru conference, which said: "But we, as members and sympathizers, progressives of Síga, we demand that our president and all the comrades of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau refuse to agree to the summit's being held outside the country; on the contrary, they should demand that it be held in the country, in the capital. That is why we workers of the Síga factory support and encourage our dear president Dr. Agostinho Neto, to refuse to give an inch on the question of holding the summit outside the country and outside the capital."

In fact, all indications are that the heterogeneity of the MPLA has strangely increased since April 25. There must be many wrinkles today, particularly between this new layer and the cadres formed in the armed peasant struggle. This type of conflict comes on top of many others, which, within the bureaucracy itself, involve relations with the African states, relations with UNITA, the Portuguese situation, and so on.

But nothing can be explained solely by "pressure from the rank and file." In reality, for a whole period the leadership's attitude toward the mass movement will be determined by the social conjuncture. In fact, in spite of its multiclassist line, for the moment the MPLA leadership has no bourgeois support at all, whether Angolan or colonial. The negotiations and political battles with the FNLA and UNITA cannot be regulated by intermediates circles. Today, the mass movement is the MPLA's only decisive argument. This situation can certainly change, either radically through the MPLA suddenly receiving support from bourgeois circles, or not so radically, through the vehicle of an MPLA-UNITA agreement. UNITA, which senses the winds of change in the military situation, could effectively come forth as the "winning horse" by maintaining pressure on the right wing of the MPLA leadership.

A person like Lucelo Lara represents the right-wing component of the MPLA leadership and tolerates forms of mass self-organization only because he has no political means with which to oppose them. But such a prospect remains improbable, or at least dangerous for the cohesion of the movement. The civil war will thus play a decisive role in determining the relationship of political forces within the MPLA.

**MPLA counteroffensive**

While the Nakuru conference was quietly going on, the FNLA, naturally, took advantage of the MPLA's respect for the mythical "legality of Alvor" to open up a real offensive.

On June 15 it attacked the northern villages of Forte Republica, Brito Godins, Coamba, Duque de Braganca, Cuino, and Cangola. On June 18 the FNLA moved on to other villages, among them Quinzuònglo, Samba-Cavu, and Barra do Dande. Supported by its rear areas in Zaire, the leadership of the FNLA then tried to transform the Angolan provinces of Zaire and Uige into real independent and impermeable bastions. At the same time, the FNLA again initiated its practice of intimidation and terrorism in Luanda.

On July 4, after several days of quiet observance of the famous Nakuru accords, the FNLA again took to the attack, striking at the villages of Tongo and Kasumba Kamba in the Cuanza-Norte district.

On July 9 in the capital, the FNLA opened up with machine guns on the headquarters of the National Union of Angolan Workers, a mass trade-union with a strong implantation (and tied to the MPLA), and on the funeral procession of a woman militant of the MPLA. At 9:00 a.m. on July 10 it attacked the headquarters of UNITA and then moved to attack the MPLA headquarters.

The FNLA then concentrated a large number of troops in Luanda and was prepared to take all power and settle accounts with the mass movement. It was under these circumstances that the leadership of the MPLA decided to launch a counteroffensive aimed at driving the FNLA out of Luanda.

The operation lasted only a short time (two or three hours) and resulted in complete victory. The July 16 communiqué issued by Paolo T. Jorge of the Algiers office of the MPLA presented the FAPLA (Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola — People's Liberation Armed Forces of Angola, the armed forces of the MPLA) as the main protagonist in these clashes and was content merely to mention that the population of Luanda had "hallowed" the FAPLA troops and helped them empty the offices of the FNLA.

Was this another purely military operation? Probably. But this time the consequences directly involve the population's future ability to resist an FNLA offensive to recapture the city. It is thus now that the question of the armed forces of the people, of armed militias, and of military potential is really posed. That is why the Portuguese army is not neutral.

**The Portuguese army**

Much more than in Mozambique, and vastly more than in Guinea-Bissau, the colonial army in Angola is a divided army.

Of course, some of the troops, disgusted by the unending war and sensitized by April 25, have made common cause with the MPLA, which they see as "the ally of the MFA." But the existence in Angola of a significant bourgeoisie, combined with the pressure of an urban life that is rather far removed from the scene of combat, has permitted extensive assimilation between the army and the colonial bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie.

Coutinho had difficulty keeping control of his troops, especially the air force. Later, General Cardoso threw in with the FNLA and UNITA. Today Macedo, Cardoso's right-hand-man, who is more favorable to the MPLA, has taken over.

But whatever the top commander may be, the Portuguese army is divided, and a large fraction of it is prepared to oppose the MPLA. Some Portuguese troops attacked the MPLA headquarters in Luanda (Villa Alice), killing nearly thirty people. In the wake of the latest clashes, the Portuguese army has begun a general retreat toward Luanda and the big cities, thus abandoning the northern part of the country and making it easier for the Zairian army to provide unrestricted aid to the FNLA. In the course of this retreat, the Portuguese army has compelled the entire white population to move into the big cities, to abandon plantations and commercial establishments, and to demand repatriation to Portugal. The Portuguese army has remained neutral in the actual fighting between the FNLA and the MPLA, being content to offer its good offices for possible negotiations.

In such a situation, the presence of Portuguese troops is pernicious. In the worst of cases it raises the danger of a stab in the back to the MPLA; in the best of cases it maintains the worst illusions among the mass movement and retards the movement's desire for self-defense. (1) Thus, the only slogan to raise in this regard must be: Portuguese troops out of Angola, all arms and material to the MPLA and the popular committees! Although it has been announced that South African troops have entered the southern part of Angola and have dislodged the MPLA
from Pereira Deco, the Portuguese general staff in Angola has yet to take a position on this intervention. Those in Portugal who are fighting for the pure and simple boycott of metropolitan troop transports to Angola are doing only half the work that has to be done. The arming of the popular militias and of the MPLA must be included in this battle. And refusal to go to Angola "against imperialism and social imperialism" obviously amounts to refusal to support the MPLA, which is implicitly designated as the "agent of Moscow."

On the other hand, to say nothing at all about the presence of Portuguese troops under the pretext that if they are on the scene they can offer a bigger helping hand to the MPLA is also a grave error. The present situation and the nature of the Portuguese army in Angola excludes such a possibility.

Counterrevolution on the March: FNLA and UNITA

The FNLA today benefits from a favorable relationship of forces that it lacked on April 25, 1974. Because of this, it has increased its credibility in the eyes of the imperialists factices that support it. Fundamentally tied to and decisive on the Zaire regime, the FNLA depends in part on the relations between Zaire and world imperialism. Mobutu is not a puppet on a string. He is now a dictator who takes advantage of the colossal riches of his country to sell his counterrevolutionary role in central Africa to the highest bidder among the various factions of imperialists. Various alliances and conjunctural influences may be formed and re-formed around the Mobutuist regime and around the squabbles among competitive interests.

While recognizing the current privileged alliance between Mobutu and North American interests, we can say that in the future other pressures may come into play; French President Giscard d'Estaing's trip to Kinshasa could be a harbinger of this sort of development. The FNLA has denounced the existence of an American aerial bridge linking Zaire to an airbase in Angolan territory that was graciously abandoned to the FNLA by the Portuguese general staff. The Paris daily Le Monde has also noted the possible existence of French arms deliveries to the FNLA and the presence of a French officer on the scene. At a time when South African troops have penetrated into southern Angola to take cities held by the MPLA, there is no longer any doubt that the trip of FNLA vice-president Daniel Chipenda to Namibia several weeks ago was decisive in the simultaneity of the military operations. The leadership of the FNLA will thus have to draw together and calculate the careful support it receives from here and there, from day to day.

The encroachment into Angola of thousands of refugees who had moved to Zaire creates an insoluble problem of food shortages in the zones controlled by the FNLA.

The refusal of the conference of the Organization of African Unity to approve a Zairian motion condemning Portugal's attitude toward Angola demonstrated the precariousness of the FNLA's African diplomatic support; this precariousness is a result not of any sympathy for the MPLA but rather of fear of the economic and military power that a Kinshasa-Luanda axis under the oegis of a Mobutu and a Halden Roberto would represent.

For its part, UNITA has been playing the game of apparent neutrality between the MPLA and FNLA since April 25.

Its main priority during this period has been to seek support from reactionary sectors of colonos, including the Angolan Unity Front (FUA — Frente de Unidade Angolana) of the fascist Falçao, all in the name of a multi-racial Angola. But the flight of the colonos back to Portugal has cut the ground from under the feet of UNITA. (2) That development, combined with the repeated clashes between the MPLA and the FNLA, compelled Jonas Savimbi's organization to make a change in tactics.

Basing itself fundamentally on regionalism, UNITA set about to construct its own fief. Implanted south of the Cuanza river, it sought to prevent the war from becoming generalized throughout the South. Savimbi encouraged economic activities in "his" zone. He affirmed that he would guarantee the security of the lives and property of the European population. Rumors were floated that this region might succeed under UNITA rule in the event that a generalized conflict broke out in the country. In fact, the southern region is the richest in the country, and the one most heavily penetrated by European interests (the Benguela railroad, the Cassinga mines, etc.). Support from European Common Market circles, especially from French and German interests (Krupp holds the majority of shares in the Cassinga iron mines) is a "rump card" that Savimbi does not want to lose.

But the generalization of the conflict makes it difficult for UNITA to implement this regionalization. That is why we are now witnessing an incredible poker game between the MPLA and the FNLA, with UNITA as the stakes. While Savimbi's troops were making common cause with FNLA forces against the MPLA, the MPLA announced that it was opening negotiations with UNITA.

On Sunday, August 17, there was a big mass demonstration in Luanda in support of the MPLA. Lopo de Nascimento, a member of both the MPLA and the coalition government, took the opportunity to tell Agence France-Presse that an alliance between his organization and UNITA was necessary. At that very moment, the two organizations were clashing in Luso in the Southeast; in Lobito the MPLA was surrounded by troops of the FNLA and UNITA acting jointly.

Lopo de Nascimento's remark provides a good illustration of the opportunism of the MPLA leadership, which has publicly recognized UNITA's implantation in the South. (See the interview with UNITA leader Agostinho Neto in the May 3 issue of the Lisbon weekly Sempre Fixo.)

But it also points out the conflict-ridden character of the FNLA-UNITA alliance, which forces UNITA to utilize its regional "representativeness" for all it's worth. Since UNITA is rather weak militarily, it is prepared to rally to the MPLA depending on the fluctuations of imperialist support to the FNLA. But this in no way eliminates its counterrevolutionary character; it does not wipe out its attacks on the self-organization of the workers and on strikes; it does not eliminate its alliance with certain imperialist sectors.

The FNLA and UNITA today constitute the only forces imperialists commands for imposing a neocolonial solution in Angola. Given the already considerable presence of foreign investors in the country, the convergence between the interests of the investors and the ambitions of the FNLA and UNITA place these two organizations in the center of the negotiations.

The urban mass movement was making no mistake when it sacked the FNLA's "house of the people" (sic) in Luanda and found a series of well-equipped torture chambers and dungeons in which dozens of victims were locked up.

That is why, once again, the leadership of the MPLA is offering responses that are inadequate to the future needs of the struggle.
MPLA leadership maintains its line

In his statement of July 16, Paulo J. Jorge, a member of the MPLA foreign relations commission, set the tone for the organization when he claimed that the prime cause of the new situation was "lack of respect for the Alvor accords, fundamentally on the part of the FNLA, but often in collusion with UNITA." And he added, going a bit further: "In the legitimate concern for overcoming the armed conflicts and arriving at a new common platform for the MPLA, the FNLA, and UNITA - in spite of the political and ideological differences and the varying historic antecedents among the three movements - and in order to permit a harmonious development, in order and calm, of the process of decolonization, the leaders of these three organizations met in Nakuru, Kenya, in June 1975 and signed a new protocol more or less reaffirming the fundamental clauses of the Alvor accords. But, once again, the FNLA was not going to respect the new accords, despite (sic) the obvious good faith of the leaders of the MPLA."

That is how an important member of the apparatus describes the recent history of his country! In the July 19 issue (No.14) of its journal, Victoria Cerio, which appeared at the height of the counterafensive, the MPLA published a short article on people's power in which the necessity of developing this power was expressed this way: "The organizational forms of people's power must be strengthened and amplified so that the people may freely express and defend their interests, which are, fundamentally, the interests of the workers and peasants. These classes must be broadly represented in the popular organs, independently of the liberation movements, the tribes, or the races. The people must express themselves in an organized way; they must struggle and freely choose their vanguard."

In a communiqué broadcast by Luanda radio, the Political Bureau of the MPLA "launched a vehement appeal to the popular neighborhood commissions to form vigilance groups in all the neighborhoods, composed of conscious and disciplined citizens, with the objective of preventing marginal groups, whether in the pay of reaction or not, from committing acts of banditry such as murder, theft, vandalism, and violence." The MPLA called on the coordinating body of the popular neighborhood commissions to act "together with the Luanda municipality to study how to offer a practical solution to the problems of burying cadavers, of the lack of water and light, and of other problems within their competence."

(A Capital, July 17, 1975.)

These statements on people's power remain broadly ambiguous in that they define people's power as simply having a practical function and not as a strategy for the development of self-organization and self-defense as the first form of state power of the toiling masses. The relationship between the MPLA and the state apparatus remains especially obscure because respect for the Alvor accords is asserted repeatedly, and that means respect for a form of bourgeois government. That is the fundamental contradiction that injects the worst illusions into the mass movement. If MPLA troops today are surrounded by FNLA troops in Lobito, Luso, and Nova Lisboa, hundreds of miles from the FNLA's base area in Zaire, and if UNITA has made the South its focal point, these developments have occurred because of the formal equality conferred on the three organizations by the Alvor accords. In the midst of a civil war, at a time when the fate of the Angolan revolution is at stake, it is irresponsible to cite the Alvor accords as the backdrop for the political battle of the MPLA.

This confirms as strangely as possible the nationalist choices of the MPLA leadership.

The MPLA leadership launched its counteroffensive only because its very survival was threatened by the FNLA. Every member of the leadership knows that since the MPLA has no support except that of the masses, it could rapidly be physically eliminated by the FNLA.

But the analyses of the MPLA leadership have completely disregarded the fact that the present unstable relationship of forces is a result precisely of a year and a half of rotten compromises with these agents of imperialism.

The leadership continues to offer the masses a moralistic analysis that speaks in terms of "wicked people who refuse to keep their word."

In order to struggle against the FNLA, the battle of the Angolan masses must be situated in the framework of the entire African revolution. The masses of the neocolonial countries must be awakened, and one must not be content simply to wage a battle of words in the councils of the Organization of African Unity.

As far as UNITA is concerned, here is the analysis Agostinho Neto presented in the interview published in the May 3 Sempre Fixe: "UNITA today is following the same road as the FNLA, and that is why there is no possibility of our working together within the government. It cannot be said that UNITA is neutral. Of course, the main clash is not with UNITA; but we nevertheless have good reason to think that if UNITA was alone on the scene, its attitude would not be different. Even under these conditions, we still hope that UNITA will take the path of conciliation, the path to real peace."

A curious conception of conciliation and peace, after having placed UNITA and the FNLA on the same footing. This sort of reasoning does not help to educate the mass movement. Just the opposite; each statement is carefully measured so as to satisfy everybody and to leave the door open for new rotten negotiations to establish some kind of "government of unity."

It is certainly true that UNITA has now carved itself out a base in the South. But the clock cannot be turned back by making a tactical alliance behind the back of the urban mass movement. What is primarily needed to expose UNITA is a body of slogans directed at the peasantry and petty-bourgeois sectors. And if this is being prepared, everything could be called into question once again by polishing up Sovimbi's image with a last-minute alliance.

Peking and the Angolan counterrevolution

For months the Soviet bureaucracy was content to support the MPLA without taking a clearly hostile attitude toward the FNLA. Soviet diplomacy was guided partially by respect for the Alvor accords, but above all by the need to keep all options open in face of an uncer-
taint future. But for some time now the tone has changed. On August 17 Pravda accused the FNLA of being supported by "Peking, the racists of South Africa, and the multinational monopolies that want to maintain control of the natural resources of Angola."

Support to the MPLA, which is designated as "the tested revolutionary vanguard in the country" (Krasnaya Zvezda, August 17), is decisive for Soviet diplomacy in southern and central Africa. The defeat of the MPLA would lead to a decisive penetration by U.S. diplomacy and to a retreat from the positions that have been won by the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia and by the African National Council (ANC) in Rhodesia, which represent the best hopes of Kremlin diplomacy.

Nevertheless, the Kremlin has already gotten a big assist from the openly counterrevolutionary attitude of the Chinese leadership. It is known that Peking sent more than 200 instructors to the FNLA after the signing of the Zaïre-China accords. A comrade of the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (French section of the Fourth International) who recently returned from a visit to Angola has reported that an FNLA prisoner revealed the presence of Chinese in the advanced front lines, in Cuito Cuanavale.

The explanations of the Angolan situation in the Chinese press today contain implicit denunciations of the MPLA. The July 26 issue of Chine Nouvelle wrote that there is "no conflict of interest" among the various liberation movements in Angola and that the clashes among these movements are due essentially to the "maneuvers of dis- sension" carried out by the Soviet Union: "On the eve of the independence of Angola and just after the signing of the Nakuru accords by the three Angolan organizations, the Soviet social imperialists flagrantly provoked an armed conflict in Angola in order to undermine the independence of this country and gain control of it because of its strategic geographical position."

Chine Nouvelle accused the USSR of sending "large quantities of heavy weapons" to Luanda (which means, implicitly, to the MPLA). "Although the OAU recognizes the three Angolan liberation movements," Chine Nouvelle wrote, "Soviet social imperialism has viciously classified them in three categories: revolutionary, non-revolutionary, and counterrevolutionary... and this despite the fact that the three movements have persisted in the armed struggle for years."

On July 12, Shai Tse-min, president of the Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, received an FNLA delegation in Peking. The delegation was headed by Hendrik Vell Neto, secretary of state for information in the coalition government. This individual is the same man who in February had personally led an FNLA commando in an attack on the Luanda radio installations, kidnapping and torturing an announcer who was a sympathizer of the MPLA and mistreating the workers because they had given too good a response to the campaign for people's power. The reception in Peking (broadcast by Hsinhua and monitored in Tokyo) took place just at the time that the MPLA was driving the FNLA out of Luanda.

**For an anticapitalist struggle!**

One cannot remain neutral among the three liberation movements under the pretext of a gradualist conception that regards the struggle of "Angolan nationalism" against the Portuguese presence as a first stage in a longer struggle. The international penetration of capital into Angola makes the question of "Portuguese neocolonialism" totally dependent on the submission of the Angolan economy to the imperialist interests that hold shares in the various concessions. That is why the priority task must be to expose the connection between forces like those of the FNLA and UNITA and the interests of the various imperialist factions. (See, for example, INPRECOR, No.31, July 17, 1975.) That is a strong and pertinent critique of the Portuguese reformists who pronounce themselves against any neocolonial solution but remain silent about the agreements Lisbon has entered into with a multitude of imperialist companies, agreements aimed at plundering Angola. The divisions within "Angolan nationalism" are very clearly reflections of the conflicts between the upholders of an immediate neocolonial solution and a mass movement that has made the first experiments with self-organization and is partially controlled by a petty-bourgeois nationalist leadership.

When we talk about support for the MPLA, it is the Angolan masses we are talking to, and we tell them: "We support the MPLA because today it is the political and military force in which you place confidence and whose ranks you fill. We support the MPLA because today it is the only military force that is opposing the most brutal reaction that the African revolution has ever seen. But the MPLA will not be able to definitively satisfy the demands for which you are fighting — for the end of all exploitation, for an Angola that is really free of all imperialist constraint. Your leadership believes it can conciliate your struggle with African diplomacy and 'national unity' by not carrying out a real socialist revolution. When we support the MPLA it is your struggle that we are supporting, the struggle of the workers and poor peasants, of the militants and revolutionary cadres of the MPLA. But we warn you against the zigzags of the national leadership, against its illusions and hesitations."

Convinced that a class line passes through this movement, we believe that the road that leads to a radicalization of the struggle and to its transformation into a social revolution passes through the construction of an authentic communist leadership. It is thus that the conscious elements of the movement must be able to organize and put forward their own perspectives.

In the present period, a class struggle tendency would assert itself by rejecting any new political accords with the FNLA and UNITA, by drawing a critical balance-sheet of the previous accords, and by denouncing the formula of coalition government. Such a tendency would go beyond the vague formulas of Maoist elements about "people's democracy" and would formulate the concrete tasks of the socialist revolution. The development of neighborhood committees and popular militias as preparatory forms of the state power of the masses; the expropriation without compensation of the capitalists; a body of slogans aimed at the peasantry; clear responses on the self-determination of ethnic groups, the use of national languages, the destruction of the present property forms in the coffee-growing zones, etc. — all this would contribute to relaunching a mass movement that has already been tired out by famine and massacre.

Break down nationalistic illusions by denouncing the masquerade of African diplomacy, by calling upon the Congolese, Zairiens, and Zambian masses to mobilize, and by calling for militant solidarity from African revolutionaries and the international revolutionary movement — that is the best response to the appeals for unity issued by a Kaunda (the Zambian president).

Such a regroupment of the vanguard would not only lay the basis for a recognized revolutionary leadership, but would also represent the only alternative to the present MPLA leadership, which threatens to break up into factions at any point, over the question of negotiations
with UNITA, the question of a unilateral declaration of independence, or many other issues. The risks of the internationalization of the conflict have not disappeared.

There is already talk of a South African military intervention to “protect the Coloque dam on the Cunene River, a region which is claimed by Namibia and in which South Africans have heavily invested in the production of hydroelectric energy. South Africa is also reported ready to assume responsibility for the transport of Zambian and Zairean copper that could no longer be carried by the Benguela railroad.

All these factors converge to lend the struggles of the Angolan people a decisive role in determining the future relationship of forces throughout southern Africa at a time when the Rhodesian regime is negotiating its last card and when Pretoria is planning to lock the Namibian people into concentration Bantustans.

The MPLA today is fighting for control of the coasts. Mopamedes, Benguela, and Lobito are the scenes of battles that are decisive for supply and logistics. The clashes at Caxito, thirty-five miles north of Luanda, the most advanced point held by the FNLA, prove that Holden’s troops have at least temporarily failed in their attempts to retake Luanda.

On August 15 General Antonio Ferreira Macedo, General Cardoso’s successor as Portuguese high commissioner in Angola, declared the coalition government incapable of carrying out its responsibilities and decided to assume

In face of the shilly-shallying of Portugal, we must now demand all power to the MPLA, sole executive power. It was in face of this decision that the MPLA, the sole real master of Luanda, mentioned the possibility of a unilateral declaration of independence. But this juridical formula is not decisive, especially since in the minds of the leaders of the MPLA it could imply new negotiations for diplomatic recognition from a series of African states.

PORTUGUESE, SOUTH AFRICAN, AND ZAIRIAN TROOPS OUT OF ANGOLA!

FOR INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY WITH THE STRUGGLES OF THE ANGOLAN WORKERS AND PEASANTS! HANDS OFF THE ANGOLAN REVOLUTION!

August 22, 1973

Footnotes:
1. The question of air power is decisive in the current relationship of military forces. The first organization that gains access to any aircraft will have every opportunity to turn the situation in its favor fundamentally.
2. For several weeks thousands of Portuguese have been waiting at the airports in Luanda and Nova Lisboa to fly back to Portugal. Some are driving in columns of hundreds of cars toward Namibia, where South Africa lodges them temporarily before transporting them to Portugal. There are anticommunist and anti-MFA demonstrations in Luanda nearly every day. The question of these reactionary repatriats is not unimportant for the internal Portuguese situation.
A few days before independence, November 11, the military situation suddenly deteriorated for the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola — Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola). On the northern front the forces of the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola — National Front for the Liberation of Angola) have stepped up their pressure on Luanda, although they have not reached the area around Quilungo, where the water-treatment plant for the capital is located. For several weeks the FNLA has been intent on taking this village in order to break the resistance of the population. The major weapon being used in these encirclement operations is the Panhard tank equipped with 60 mm mortar and 75 mm recoilless cannon mounted on jeeps. The defense by the FAPLA (the armed forces of the MPLA) is being waged through two main tactics: bombardments with Soviet 122 mm missiles and counterattacks by light units equipped with grenade launchers and AK-47 rifles. The stagnation of the Luanda front is bad for the MPLA.

It restricts an important part of MPLA forces to a very small part of the territory, tires and discourages the population of the city, and, finally, permits the FNLA to advance toward Malange and solidify its apparatus in the northern part of the country.

At the same time, the military situation in the South has changed qualitatively. Several weeks ago, the MPLA controlled the entire coast and part of the province of Huila. UNITA (União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola — National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), barred from Nova Lisboa and Silao Porto, hardly extended beyond the provinces of Huambo and Bié. In the past several days, however, the relationship of forces has been turned around. Sa da Bandeira fell, then Massanudes, and finally Benguela and Lobito. For the first time since July, UNITA and FNLA reinforcements in the center and south command a broad opening to the sea, which allows them to bring in supplies and use a pincer strategy against Luanda.

Apart from these military aspects of the situation, it must be noted that Lobito is the country’s second major port after Luanda and that Benguela is the terminal of the famous railroad line that carries copper from Zaire and Zambia. Thus reorganized in the South, the forces of UNITA and the FNLA will be able to attack South Kwanza province and try to take Malange from the north.

What has happened to make such a turnaround of the situation possible? The first cause, and this is undoubtedly the major factor, is the massive military support imperialism has given the reactionary forces during the past period. Sa da Bandeira was retook with the aid of South African troops and Portuguese mercenaries supplied by the BLP (Portuguese Liberation Army, a far-right paramilitary group). Several weeks earlier, UNITA president Jonas Savimbi had revealed that his organization would soon acquire exceptional heavy weaponry. And that happened.

In the North, the training of FNLA forces by troops from Zaire has not diminished, and Zaire itself has received increased military assistance from the United States and France. As a sort of warning, France has just delivered the first Mirage jet fighters to the Zairian air force.

While South Africa is taking an increasingly decisive part in the conflict, and while Zaire is massively supporting the FNLA and Zambia is doing the same for UNITA, the military aid to the MPLA from the so-called progressive African countries is a bluff. Granted, the People’s Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) is aiding the MPLA in the transfer of material, and Guinea, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique are giving diplomatic support to the Nito leadership of the MPLA. But when Congolese President Mobutu threatens an intervention by his army, one can only smile, given the instability of this regime and the discriminatory internal function of this army. Once again, the Organization of African Unity is demonstrating its counterrevolutionary function. Once again, the grotesque illusion of a “progressive Africa” is crumbling. Against the nationalist rhetoric of “progressive Africa,” “a very real world is organizing, a world composed of the strong links in the imperialist chain in the region: the South African and Zairian armies.

Nevertheless, the reverses of the MPLA cannot be accounted for solely by the intrinsic military power of its enemies. Other factors come into play. The immensity of the country makes it impossible for a small political-military apparatus emerging from a rural guerrilla war to control the country militarily and administratively. The distances involved, combined with transport difficulties, have made the logistical factor decisive, and the FARNA has no air force. It is certainly on this level that the Soviet aid to the MPLA has been especially inadequate; massive supplies of helicopters are needed. Moreover, the duration of the battles and their civil-war character have accelerated the decomposition of Angolan society, particularly in the cities. Centrifugal ethnic forces have massively reappeared and a section of the population has preferred to return to its region of origin, thus increasing social disorder and adding the control of the population by tribal notables cultivated by the FNLA and UNITA.

The industrial investments of the past several years had permitted the development of a proletariat that was young and concentrated, although little skilled and...
lacking in traditions of struggle. In 1973 about 130,000 wage earners were employed in manufacturing production, mainly in the industrial zones of Luanda and Lobito. But because of its youth this proletariat could not avoid the traditional pressures of its rural origins. The MPLA itself was not shielded from this weakness of the "universal point of view" conferred by the urban milieu on the proletariat cut off from its peasant origins. The reduction of the MPLA's anti-imperialist ideology slogans did not help to raise the consciousness of the most backward sectors. UNITA's control of the most important agricultural region is causing a food shortage that is giving an impetus to the exodus of the population. In Luanda, lines form in front of the stores early in the morning. The food departments are almost empty; oil, salt, sugar, and meat have become scarce. A kilogram (2.2 pounds) of rice now costs 20 or 25 escudos; the previous price was 9 escudos a kilo. The price of salt has risen from 1 to 3 escudos. Manioc, which is the basic foodstuff for the African populations, has risen in price threefold, and the MPLA is trying to reduce this inflation by organizing distribution by "neighborhood commissions." Finally, the departure of the Portuguese is intensifying the disorganization of the trade networks.

Such a situation generates apathy among the masses and is now affecting the structures of "popular power," provoking a decline in dynamism and increasing talklamism of the MPLA leadership on the part of these structures.

Internationalization

The South African intervention has now become official. The Americans are no longer hiding the aid the CIA has given the FNLA and UNITA. An article by Leslie Golb in the September 25 New York Times asserted that reliable sources in the CIA considered Holden's FNLA a possible alternative to Portuguese colonialism as long ago as 1962. Nevertheless, the imperialist commitment in Angola was not deliberately set on provoking civil war. After April 25, 1974, when the Salazarist regime was overthrown, the divisions of the MPLA and the weakening of the organization rendered quite credible the Spinollian operation based around the FNLA and the organizations of the Portuguese colonos. What imperialism totally underestimated was the urban mass movement and its immediate adherence to the MPLA, which, despite its weakened condition, conserved great prestige.

It was too late to take advantage of the political weakness of the MPLA. It was too late to integrate the leadership or a faction of the leadership into the neocolonialist project. The Alvor accords and the coalition government came too late.* The mass movement was placing its trust in the MPLA. The right was no longer able to counterpose itself to the MPLA. Lucio Lara of the MPLA declared, "Part of the population has been armed, but that was done in July 1974 to resist aggression from reactionary whites. These self-defense units have since placed themselves under the MPLA banner, but we do not control them."

The MPLA leadership, which in spite of its divisions is on the whole a petty-bourgeois nationalist leadership, than had no choice but to rely on the mass movement for "self-defense" against the FNLA; the MPLA leadership thus decided to develop this movement while maintaining control over it. No imperialist group placed any trust in the MPLA, because of the mass movement that remained attached to it. The provocations of the FNLA in Luanda and its physical attacks in the muquecas (the urban slums) turned out to be insufficient to break down the activity of the masses. It thus became necessary to opt for civil war; otherwise there was a risk of losing the last trump cards for negotiations with the Nato leadership of the MPLA.

But the internationalization of the conflict meant not only the reaction of imperialism against the movement of the Angolan masses. It also meant inter-imperialist conflicts exacerbated by the eclectic links maintained by the FNLA and UNITA throughout the world. Thus, the intervention of South Africa is also an Intervention aimed at strengthening UNITA; the aim is to stabilize a zone in direct contact with Namibia, mainly the Omvambo region and the Caprivip strip, which constitute the key regions in Pretoria's strategy.** Zambia, which is now on a honeymoon with the South African regime based on the mutual desire to preserve stability in southern Africa, is involved in this because UNITA can assure Zambia that the Benguela railroad will continue to function and thus to carry Zambian copper to the sea. Thus, the southern counteroffensive also represents a political conflict with the FNLA aimed at guaranteeing a fair regional balance for the future neocolonial Angola so as to preserve the markets for the development of the Cunene valley. The Cassinga mines, which are owned by Krupp, and the European and South African investments increase the interest of the Common Market in aiding Savimbi's UNITA.

Savimbi has implicitly recognized that without this "mandate" he would be unable to play such a political role. On October 19 he stated (in the Camerons): "Neto will not be able to create an African Cuba as he announced, because Angola, regardless of the sentiments of the population, is located in a zone that is too sensitive politically and strategically." In other words, what the Angolan people have to understand is that the lasts of imperialism will be stronger than their own mobilizations!

The same Savimbi, in Paris once again, told Agence France-Presse on October 27 that "if Africa can do nothing, no one will be able to prevent the United Nations from sending in troops." And he recognized, without protest, that South Africa was effectively occupying the province of Huila in the South.

The final battle?

The FNLA and UNITA, armed wings of Imperialism, prepared for November 11 as one prepares for a stage in a struggle; but they did not consider this to be the final battle. The battle will continue, regardless of what form it takes. The MPLA has decided on a "general mobilization" to repel the invaders. Such an initiative could give new strength to the mass movement, provided it is accompanied by a clear political definition of the stakes involved. But the leadership has now announced that it will establish a "government of national union" including "independent patriotic personalities." It is not very precise, but it maintains the "nationalist" and frontist formulations of the MPLA.

* The "Alvor accords" were signed in Alvor, Portugal, on January 15, 1975. They set up a coalition government composed of representatives of the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA, with a representative of the Portuguese government acting as "arbiter."

** Namibia, just south of Angola, is occupied by South Africa in defiance of United Nations resolutions and the will of the country's inhabitants. Omvambo, the territory of the Omvambo tribe, is in the northern region of Namibia and is used by the South African regime as a source of forced labor for mines in Namibia. The Caprivip Strip, a 300-mile-long, 40-mile wide band, is an extension of northeast Namibia separating Angola and Zambia on the north from Botswana on the south.
In a recent issue of the MPLA's newspaper, Vitoria é Certo, the leadership explained how it sees the situation:

"Our movement has raised the slogan 'Let us construct a broad anti-imperialist front, let us defeat the lackeys of imperialism and create a democracy of a new type!'... In that sense, this is a just struggle that will contribute to strengthening the camp of the progressive forces on a world scale, the camp of the exploited in struggle against the exploiters. It will aid in the inevitable fall of imperialism.... Now, this struggle against imperialism can be victorious if it draws together all the anti-imperialist forces of our fatherland. Among these forces will be the workers, peasants, revolutionary intellectuals, and the anti-imperialist layers of the Angolan bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, our revolutionary vanguard must be prepared to create a government of a democracy of a new type in our country. This government represents an alliance of all the anti-imperialist classes, which must be led by the most consistently revolutionary class.... Democratic centralism and discussion will occur among the organized popular masses on all the national problems and on the application in practice of the conclusions reached by the government.... To achieve its aims, this government will have to struggle for the nationalization of the big industrial, commercial, and banking enterprises. But since this government represents an alliance of various classes, it will not eliminate the existence of private property, nor will it prohibit the development of capitalist production. In relation to the Angolan peasants, this government will have to design a consistent agrarian reform in its program. Land abandoned by the colonists will remain the property of those who till it."

Obviously, such rhetoric is used in order to satisfy everybody within the MPLA. It is symbolized by Agostinho Neto, who is a sort of Bonaparte standing above tendencies. "Democracy of a new type" is nothing but the concept of the party-state formulated in a situation characterized by pressure from the mass movement. Let this movement retreat, and the concept will become reality, as was the case in Guinea under Sokou Touré and as is now happening in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. The leadership team, drawing its legitimacy from the nationalist struggle, bases itself on holding the masses strictly in check through powerless committees in which bureaucratism and careerism are cultivated, committees that supposedly represent "mass control over the party."

In such a political context, revolutionary Marxists support the MPLA against imperialist reaction, against the FNLA and UNITA, and against the Zairians and South African allies of these organizations, but they also address themselves to the mass movement so that the "organs of popular power" may become real instruments of the power of the masses. They work for real independence of the mass organizations and committees from the MPLA. They work for the future state to guarantee democratic rights, the right of political organization for all anti-imperialists, for the right to publish literature, hold meetings, and so on. They work not for an MPLA government with people like Lucio Lara under the cover formula "democracy of a new type" (with the class content ignored), but instead for a government of a new type, a workers and peasants government responsible to assemblies of delegates. To do this, there cannot be a "new course" on paper aimed at winning over the leadership of the movement. The vanguard must be regrouped and the construction of the revolutionary party must be prepared. In the political resolution of the Tenth World Congress of the Fourth International (February 1974) it was pointed out that "in the context of the readjustment of imperialist strategy in southern Africa, the development of the process of permanent revolution on the basis of the internationalization of the conflict throughout this region (southern Africa – INPRECOR) will be able to be achieved mainly through a clarification within the MPLA and FRELIMO, revolutionary nationalist movements with multiclassist conceptions." The "mainly" meant that a section of the urban movement, in which the MPLA was not all implanted at that time, would also make an important contribution to the political recomposition. Now, after April 25, the totality of the radical urban elements have joined the MPLA, particularly through the organs of "popular power." That is why it is more correct today to consider that the political recomposition will take place through a clarification within the MPLA toward the regroupment of an anticapitalist tendency, for the construction of a revolutionary party.

**International support**

It is this point that is forgotten by those who believe that for revolutionary Marxists to support the MPLA is heresy. We must not support any particular group, we are told, because all three adversaries are nationalists with very similar programs and there is, after all, no revolutionary party. Thus, the Fourth International should pose the question of the roads that lead to the building of such a party. What would Angolan political life be like if Holden's kind of order reigns in Luanda? What would become of the hundreds of militants working in the museums and in the university around anticapitalist slogans? They would be the first victims, as is attested to by the attitude of the FNLA before July 10.

In several communiqués the FNLA declared that "the people themselves have objectively delegated popular power to the liberation movements" and that it is because of "the infiltration of certain bodies (among them the neighborhood committees) by anarchist elements and agitators... that the FNLA has always opposed any form of Angolan organization outside the liberation movements."

That is what is involved in supporting the MPLA. On the eve of November 11 it is regrettable to observe that international support is scarcely any greater than it was during the fourteen years of the armed struggle. The committees in Europe slowed down their activity after April 25 because these committees, most often controlled by reformists, had illusions in the anti-neocolonial character of the new Portuguese regime. Today this past weighs heavily against relaunching international solidarity. The lack of massive and permanent support to the MPLA and to the Angolan people will in turn weigh heavily on the relationship of forces with the counterrevolution and on the prospect of a social transformation of the struggle, which is still possible. It will not be possible for anyone to demonstrate that support to the Angolan socialist revolution could avoid the necessity of supporting the MPLA when the whole of the anti-imperialist youth are assembled around the MPLA and the counterrevolution is embodied in the FNLA and UNITA.

November 9, 1975
ANGOLA,
THE INTERNATIONAL STAKES

The current situation in Angola has been presented to public opinion as the direct consequence of a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The "détente" is said to be "in danger" as the Angolan Marianas have been plunged, despite themselves, into a "fratricidal war," having become cannon fodder for a conflict between two superpowers. Clearly, such a presentation of the "facts" fulfills a political function for the mass media. The point is to look back to the good old days of the Alvor accords, when there was a coalition government and "peaceful" coexistence among the MPLA, FNL, and UNITA.* The partisan thrust of this sort of position becomes clear in the light of the campaign of the government of Zaire according to which "only the Angolan people must decide their fate, and according to the road already traced out by their leaders during the Alvor conference." (Declaration of the Zaire press agency, AZAP, January 6.)

To some extent, the internationalization of the Angolan conflict has obscured perception of the struggles between the MPLA and the FNL-UNITA coalition, at least in the international press. But this is just the opposite of what ought to happen, for each group is now busy arguing, justifying, and negotiating its position. The masks are falling off. Hence, there is every opportunity to examine and nail down the analysis of factors as important as the nature of the American interests, African diplomacy, the reasons for the Soviet intervention, the projects of the MPLA, and so on.

A new Vietnam?
The frankest American argumentation, apart from Kissinger's, was presented by Daniel Moynihan, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, who asserted on January 12 that "the Angolan conflict is a practically inevitable consequence of the détente... You must see détente as a situation in which tensions will increase, or you've missed the point altogether... The United States has taken a severe setback in Southeast Asia and has gone into what I've called a failure of nerve. If in fact we are in a condition where we won't stand up to the ideological attacks, then we're not well advised to have détente." (Newsweek, January 19.) For some time now Moynihan has been known for his forthright statements. And that was another one. Thus, it is under the heading of not suffering a "failure of nerve" that the United States has been sending arms and money to the FNL since 1962 and voting against most of the UN resolutions condemning Portuguese colonialism. It appears that Nixon decided to ease off this support around 1969, probably under the joint effects of Portuguese and South African requests. Nevertheless, the material support shot up again after the overthrow of the Salazarist regime in Portugal on April 25, 1974. In January 1975 a meeting of the White House high-level intelligence coordinating body decided to send $300,000 to Holden. (New York Times, December 19, 1975.) In mid-July of the same year CIA was authorized to send $50 million in material to the FNL and UNITA.

Since then, support has remained at a high level. During the debate that broke out in Congress in December, some Senators complained essentially about the secrecy surrounding U.S. activities in Angola. But it was not only this formal aspect of things that was involved in the conflict. In Congress, Senator Hubert Humphrey, who called for a halt to U.S. commitment without demanding reciprocity from the USSR, subtly formulated his view of the conflict. "If the Soviet Union persists (in aiding the MPLA)," he said, "it will find itself isolated. This has happened before in Africa. Angolan nationalism will probably turn out to be a more powerful force (in Africa) than Soviet communism. Even if the USSR wins some immediate tactical advantage, it will probably be of short duration." For Humphrey, then, the American intervention will only radicalize the struggle, while the present nationalist line of the MPLA constitutes a last line of defense against anticapitalist struggles. The Soviets responded to Humphrey through the TASS press agency, which on January 12 asked the United States to apply the policy of peaceful coexistence with a more "consistent spirit." And the Moscow newspaper "United States: Economy, Politics, Ideology," estimated that "in general, Soviet-American relations are still tending to improve" in spite of existing "complex problems" and all the "unresolved questions." In this regard, the Soviet newspaper called for rounding out the political détente with a military détente and stressed that "the question of the normalization of Soviet-American economic relations remains a current one." American imperialist interests in Africa are not homogeneous. Some representatives of U.S. imperialism view their policy within the overall framework of the continent and reconcile themselves to the most diverse forms of political power here and there. For them, the United States has to preserve a certain image throughout the continent, reconciling the exigencies of their investments in South Africa with the needs of their investments in the independent states. American investors in Guinea-Conakry, for example, are not prepared to support the FNL and UNITA unconditionally.

On the other hand, other imperialist factions base their attitude on unconditional support to the southern bloc and the regime in Zaire. Even so, the American commitment in Angola is not the result of a deliberate and premeditated choice. Everything indicates that the Alvor accords represented a highly acceptable solution for the United States. But subsequent events tore these accords to pieces. The confrontation between the MPLA and the FNL, had it resulted in a defeat for Holden's troops, would have left a clear field for the political and economic projects of the MPLA, with the immediate prospect of nationalizations. Thus, South Africa could not accept the American government's allowing the establishment in Angola of a regime whose first act would be to set up a state economic sector at the expense of some investors. This would have been a direct threat to South African investments in the Cunene River valley and in the Cassinga mines, for example.

Apart from the question of investments, an Angola controlled by the MPLA would be a serious obstacle to the South African perspective of a Balkanization of Namibia
into autonomous Bantustans and would have aided the forces struggling for immediate and total independence of the country. The expansionist South African state, taking advantage of a large degree of independence of imperialist capital, decided on a direct intervention in Angola. While this blocked the advance of the MPLA, it forced the hand of the American government, pushing Washington into unconditional alignment behind the FNLA and UNITA. Roberto Holden described this situation perfectly when he launched an appeal to the West to "save Africa from communism." "I ask the West to save itself. I am astonished to have to cry this in the desert." "Without considering the United States as the policeman of the world, I believe that it is the guardian of world liberty." And he hailed the intervention of the South Africans, who "came to fight the fire when the house of their neighbor was burning. Perhaps they do not do this out of love for their neighbor, but simply to prevent their own house from catching fire later on. The Western nations should draw the conclusions." (Newsweek, December 22, 1975.)

Thus, during the conference of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) a diplomatic trial balloon was launched around the theme of a possible withdrawal of the South African troops, the suggestion being that South Africa would be satisfied by an agreement among the three organizations. Washington put pressure on Pretoria to try to get the South Africans to make a deal with the OAU in exchange for a return of the coalition government. Such a possibility still seems to be far off, since the MPLA has reiterated its rejection of a new coalition and since there has been some conflict between the FNLA and UNITA. In Huambo (formerly Nova Lisboa) there have been murderous clashes between UNITA troops and FNLA troops commanded by Chipenda. Incapable of infusing their troops with even a minimum of national consciousness, the general staffs of the FNLA and UNITA have been reduced to cutting down their differences to the scale of tribal conflicts, of grudges and confrontations among fighting troops. African diplomacy thus remains relatively paralyzed. Since the return of a coalition is a premature perspective, the Democratic opposition is insisting that in any case the American commitment is unjustified and that the stakes involved are in no way comparable to those in Vietnam. Washington was content to make sure that the majority of the OAU conference would not vote to recognize the People's Republic of Angola proclaimed by the MPLA.

**African diplomacy put to the test**

The essential function of the Organization of African Unity is to preserve a consensus among all the African bourgeois leaderships in face of the twists and turns of continental political life and also in face of revolutionary struggles. The clause of the OAU charter stipulating noninterference in the internal affairs of each member state is the supreme hypocrisy of these leaderships, who know very well how extensively their interests are linked and how much their economies interpenetrate. The fetishization of petty-bourgeois pan-Africanist themes traditionally serves as an ideology for the big shots otherwise known as OAU assemblies. In the Angolan conflict, for the first time, the old routine of unilateral motions lost its effectiveness. Zaire is directly and publicly intervening in the conflict. The South African army has also intervened, forcing each African regime to take a stand on its "sensitivity" to the racist regime in Pretoria.

The governments most susceptible to following the lead of Soviet diplomacy, those that are committed to a line similar to that of the MPLA (Guinea-Bissau, for example), those for whom an FNLA victory would represent a direct threat because of internal opposition (the Congo). Others, clever tacticians, became convinced that it was unrealistic to support the FNLA-UNITA bloc. Nigeria, Malawi, Ethiopia, and Burundi may be listed among these. Thus, a total of twenty-two countries recognized the People's Republic. The draft resolution was presented by Nigeria; it was worded so as to represent a consensus among this group. The document proposed recognition of the People's Republic but also expressed its confidence in this government to "continue to bring about an atmosphere of reconciliation of all Angolans willing to work to strengthen national unity."

The opposing camp was scarcely any more homogeneous. Along with the group of "hardliners" like Zaire and the Cameroon, there were UNITA backers who are for a new coalition government (Senegal) and the most hesitant, who were content simply to call for unity. Twenty-two countries (each one) on a delicate balance. The abstention of Uganda preserved the balance of the delicate equilibrium. They all condemned South Africa and then referred the whole affair to the regular bodies of the OAU.

The direct protagonists in the conflict all considered this OAU conference as a partial defeat. Several weeks before, the MPLA had believed that it would win recognition. Zaire had hoped for a decision that would change the situation inasmuch as the present dynamic has reflected itself in a succession of defeats for the FNLA on the northern front, ever since the fall of Ambizu. But the conference decided nothing and the FNLA continues to retreat. The function of the OAU had never been so badly bungled. Will those elsewhere on the continent who still have illusions in African diplomacy understand the lessons?

**The Soviet intervention**

The reasons for the massive Soviet aid to the anti-imperialist fighters basically go back to a desire to break down the unconditional American support for the South African intervention. The USSR decided to spectacularly bolster its aid shipments and diplomatic activities after the South African intervention and the U.S. aid to the FNLA had threatened the diplomatic balance in black Africa. Zambia is increasingly close to the South African policy, which in itself represents a significant shift in the region. An FNLA victory, which would strengthen the centrifugal forces among the Bakongo ethnic group, would give a second wind to the opposition of Bakongo notables to the Nguabbi regime in the Congo. But this regime represents a not unimportant element in the Soviet position in central Africa. The attempts at official dialogue between black Africa and the South African racist are becoming increasingly credible because of the concrete advantages Pretoria is gaining before the neocolonial regimes. Finally, an FNLA victory would permit the constitution of a Zaire-Angola axis whose anticommunist weight would be quite formidable for the future of Soviet policy throughout Africa. For the Soviet bureaucracy, the aim is to preserve its diplomatic clientele, among which must be placed the Congo, Somalia, Tanzania, Guinea, Algeria, and now Guinea-Bissau. Nevertheless, it is out of the question to equate the intervention with the American intervention. Whatever the diplomatic reasons for the Soviet military aid to the MPLA, we must consider this aid positive and reject the hypocritical attitude of those who call for "noninterference by the great powers."

The consequences of this aid on the political course of the MPLA remain to be measured. In any case, the MPLA
needed no Soviet pressure to oppose any overly impetuous development of the mass movement. Apart from that, the consequences will probably be as follows:

a) a greater credibility for the MPLA’s state capitalist projects, which will be backed up by Soviet economic support;

b) a development of Stalinist currents within the MPLA, without this necessarily giving rise to a Stalinist faction with a political program of its own to counterpose to the rest of the MPLA leadership.

The conjunction of these two elements has already produced an astonishing mixture in the Luanda press: nationalist declarations, declarations on “the Paris Commune by Marx,” and statements on “Marxism-Leninism.” And the Cuban intervention? Is it purely a matter of the Cubans in Angola serving as cannon fodder for Soviet policy? We do not think so. The Cubans have a traditional presence within the ranks of the liberation movements, especially the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau. Moreover, it seems that Cuba strongly fears a Brazilian penetration of this part of Africa. Further, and this is an extremely important factor, the Cuban leadership, speaking through Vice-Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, has affirmed that it would continue to extend military aid to the MPLA regardless of the decision of the OAU: “We will not take heed of any appeal by the OAU.” This breaks clearly with the OAU diplomatic game, which is at the center of the Soviet motives.

Finally, what about China? It seems that the Chinese instructors have left the ranks of the FNLA. Nevertheless, Chinese policy has preserved its tone. Let us recall that the two regimes in the region toward which Peking has been directing its charm and whose presidents have been invited to China during the past few years are Zaire and the Cameroons. These two countries were in the leadership of the anti-MPLA camp during the OAU conference, and everything suggests that Chinese diplomacy will maintain its links with these regimes. Hence, Maoist policy in Angola will preserve its cautious attitude toward and even complicity with the UNITA-FNLA camp.

The Angolan far left

The petty-bourgeois nationalist character of the MPLA leadership stands in direct opposition to an anticapitalist development of the mass movement and real forms of self-organization.

The events of the past several months confirm this analysis. While the MPLA had waged the national liberation struggle essentially in the rural areas, after April 25, 1974, the urban milieu nurtured anticapitalist currents that emerged from the student youth, over whom the MPLA had no direct control. Thus, groups emerged like the Amilcar Cabral Committees (CAC), which were linked to the Portuguese UDP (União Democrática Popular — Popular Democratic Union, Maoist), as well as some forces upholding a revolutionary Marxist orientation, such as the distributors of the newspaper Revolução Socialista.

The CAC, which held a generally major position within this far left, were able to play a decisive role in pressuring the MPLA for a whole period, particularly on the question of the neighborhood committees and their coordination and on the question of the self-defense militias. The militants of the CAC penetrated rather far into the ranks of the MPLA, taking on positions in military training and posts of responsibility. The MPLA leadership made a de facto accommodation with these currents so as not to frontally oppose a sector of the masses that was developing a spontaneous movement during the year 1975.

When the civil war began to take a different course and it became necessary to prepare for a genuine protracted war, it became that much easier for the MPLA leadership to control the neighborhood committees and isolate the far left. The first objective was to break the weight of the CAC in the neighborhood committees. For example, Nito Alves declared that after “the FNLA and UNITA, the struggle will have to be waged against the ultraleftists.” The radio broadcast speeches against “partisans of Trotsky and Bakunin” and the Maoist newspaper Poder Popular was banned. Isolated and weakened, the far left was open to a death blow. In October the neighborhood committee of São Paulo was occupied by the FAPLA (the military forces of the MPLA) and nine committee members were arrested, along with eleven militants of other neighborhood committees. A wave of intimidation spread. In November these militants were released; some were deported to Portugal. The CAC were very much weakened and the MPLA leadership was easily able to bring the structures of “popular power” under control.

Clearly, attempting to use these forms of self-organization to support the anti-MPLA content provided an opportunity to wage a battle against the MPLA leadership. This battle was lost by the far left during a conjuncture of the war for which these currents offered only insufficient responses. The CAC developed opportunistic and entrist conceptions in regard to the leadership of the MPLA, while others made mistakes in the abstract character of their propaganda.

This far left, which generally emerged from the Portuguese far left, was politically and organizationally insufficient. It was Maoist in its majority and hence suffered the effects of the miserable Chinese policy in Angola.

Faced with the mass movement, these Maoist currents broke empirically with the traditional “popular national democratic revolution,” but without presenting any clear alternative strategy. They were up against the prestige of a leadership that had come out of the armed struggle and they overestimated their real base among the masses. The fact that the repression against them did not bring the MPLA into conflict with the masses is proof of the mass movement’s increasing reliance on the MPLA.

Nevertheless, this must no way diminish our solidarity with these militants, especially those who oriented their work toward a socialist transformation of the Angolan revolution. Some of these militants, such as Salvador Catão and José Ingamba, members of the Revolução Socialista group killed in Nova Lisboa, died fighting the FNLA and UNITA, giving sterling proof of their anti-imperialist courage. The political battle of these militants is still not over. The December 20 issue of the MPLA newspaper Virêia e Certo had a headline reading “The Struggle Against the Rightists and Ultraleftists” and the editorial was devoted to the struggle against ultraleftism. This shows that the “normalization” of Luanda is not at all settled.

A fight must be waged around the themes of freedom of expression and the right of organization for all anti-imperialists. The broadest democracy must be demanded for those who are fighting reaction. The MPLA representatives who are traveling around the world and speaking at support meetings organized by the international far left must be confronted with questions about the repression. If the South African aid to the FNLA and UNITA must serve as a lesson to the “neutralists” who see the current struggle purely as a fight among counterposed petty-bourgeois leaderships, the repression against the far left must serve as a lesson to the most varied centrist groups who have so far refused to make the slightest criticism of the MPLA.
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