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
# IKWEZI

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**Special International Issue**

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Reply to Bettelheim**

**Background to Vietnamese  
Attempts to Colonise Kampuchea**

**USA: Declining Superpower**

**China – Vietnam**

**Critique of Albanian Critique**

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**Soviet Exploitation of Third World**

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## Support IKWEZI: Build the Azanian Marxist-Leninist Party!

IKWEZI is a Marxist-Leninist Journal which bases itself on Marxism-Leninism-Mao-Zedong Thought, the highest revolutionary ideology of our time. Mao Zedong Thought which synthesises the wisdom and profound revolutionary experiences of the Chinese Revolution, has made qualitative developments to the body of Marxism-Leninism in the fields of political economy, culture, military affairs, philosophy, etc. and is today an integral part of the international communist movement and cannot be omitted.

**"Without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement."** Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought is the revolutionary theory of our epoch. It is the integration of this theory to the concrete conditions of the national/class struggle in Azania that can enable us to unite the Azanian Black masses and revolutionaries on the basis of a correct political line and to overthrow white settler colonialism and the two imperialist superpowers, the main contradictions in Azania. Socialimperialism which is contending with U.S. Imperialism for world domination is knocking at our door to re-colonise us. To ignore social imperialism because we think it has no imperialist economic investments in our country would be foolhardy. Its way is to use its military muscle to install its puppets – like the ANC-CP – into power by flying the flag of "natural ally" of liberation movements and the anti-imperialist struggle.

The national struggle against white settler colonialism for the re-possession of the country and the land by the indigenous African people must also be a thorough-going anti-imperialist struggle. The national struggle must be the prelude to the social revolution to wipe out all capitalist and imperialist structures that suck the blood of our oppressed peoples. Without a thorough – going social revolution that puts an end to national oppression and class exploitation in the country there can be no meaningful liberation. For such a revolution to succeed there must be the leadership of a skilled and courageous Marxist-Leninist Party consisting of the most advanced cadres in the struggle, emerging from the mainstream of the national liberation movements and groups themselves, overcoming sectarianism, dogmatism and a narrow-minded approach to one another. Petit bourgeois radicals who play with Marxist phrases in order to con the international Marxist-Leninist movement must not be confused with the genuine Marxist-Leninists who take the historical mission of the proletariat seriously, whose politics begin from the class struggle and who are genuine communists.

Such a Party must win the leadership in the national struggle and unite all who can be united; such a Party must combine theory with practice to the concrete conditions of the national/class struggle in Azania.

Building a mature and skilled Marxist-Leninist Party that is thoroughly integrated with the masses, will be a long and painstaking task, and can only be done in the concrete and practical struggle. All sorts of mistakes and false starts will be made, but such a Party can only be built step by step. **It must begin now, not tomorrow**, as some opportunists would like us to believe, because now we are occupied with the national struggle and tomorrow after the national struggle is over the socialist revolution will begin. The more experience we have in Marxist-Leninist Party building and leadership and organisation in the struggle the greater can be our successes against the class enemy.

Such a Party must be built in strict opposition to the ANC-CP mercenaries, agents of social imperialism in the country and its global ambitions to dominate the world. At the same time we must unite with those forces in the ANC-CP who are opposed to the machinations of their leadership – and they are a whole army.

## Editorial

Despite the pressing importance of events in Zimbabwe and Namibia where the old style imperialism is coyly attempting to impose a neo-colonial situation while keeping a watchful eye on its rival, social-imperialism, we have devoted this issue of IKWEZI almost wholly to international questions centring around social imperialism and China. These questions concerned with the conflict between Vietnam – Kampuchea, Vietnam – China, Albania and the Theory of the Three Worlds, the situation in China itself after the death of Mao and the fall of the “Gang of Four”, have tended to confuse many people while at the same time they have posed new, urgent questions to the Marxist-Leninist movement. Key amongst them is the question of revisionism, not only as it affects internal developments in China, but as it also relates to Vietnam and Albania. What was the Cultural Revolution all about and how did the Gang of Four betray socialism, what is the meaning of the struggle against capitalist restoration during the period of the transition to socialism, how do we judge whether a country is keeping to the socialist road or not, how has Vietnam abandoned socialism and taken the road of revisionism. All these and many more questions in a greatly complicated world situation has worried many people.

It would be presumptuous of us to say that we have given convincing answers to these questions, (we are aware we have covered some of the issues) but we have certainly presented a body of information on a number of issues that cuts across the lies of the imperialist and social imperialist mass media, and can help one to take a more sober look. Nobody can defend

the position of Vietnam or be bamboozled by the fact that it fought a great and magnificent war against U.S. Imperialism that was a great contribution to the struggles of the peoples of the world, when its own behaviour to Kampuchea is no different to that of U.S. Imperialism's towards it a few years ago. Nobody can look at the pros and cons of the “polemic” between China and Albania on the interpretation of the world situation today from the point of view of the class struggle and the interests of the international proletariat and not see who is principled in argument and behaviour and who is not. Nobody can glibly accept the exaggerations of Bettelheim without understanding the great problems of economic development that China is faced with in a country just emerging from feudalism and faced with a population of 800,000,000 people, and the dialectical relationship between revolution and production that has manifested itself since the Chinese CP won power in 1949. Nobody can deny the ultra leftism of the Gang of Four or say, that the present Chinese leadership betrays Mao Zedong. Nobody can deny too that the Chinese themselves are grappling with problems about which we merely ask question and which can only be solved in practice. Only those whose socialism is in their heads or learnt from books see quick and easy solutions to problems that are herculean in the tasks and difficulties they pose.

We ourselves realise that our knowledge of revisionism is rudimentary, that the struggle to keep to the socialist road requires the utmost and most thorough going determination and resoluteness, that while the future beckons brightly the road is long and tor-

tuous, that “communism is not the goal of the movement but the movement itself” (Marx, German Ideology), that is that the proletariat does not have ready made solutions but has to develop them in the teeth of the class struggle, in the concrete and practical struggle in situations where opportunism, disguised in all forms constantly rears its head. That is what at least we learn from the degeneration of the revolutions in Vietnam and Albania, and that while in these countries the flag of proletarian dictatorship and revolution has been temporarily lowered, others like China and Kampuchea hold it high and inspire millions. Marxist-Leninists have dialectics on their side which reflect from an idealistic viewpoint the struggle between truth and falsehood, between the old and the new, between what is just and unjust, between what is rising like a bright star and what is dying, all of which finds its concrete expression in the class struggle.

Our age is the struggle against imperialism in all its manifestations and the struggle for communism. That struggle will go on until that goal is attained whatever betrayals we experience on the long, hard road to that goal.

The articles in this issue speak for themselves and there is no need for us to introduce them here, except to say that the article on the Soviet Theory of the Non-Capitalist Path for the Third World countries reveals that the social imperialists have picked up the tattered banner of the Trotskyite white chauvinist position that the Third World countries cannot build socialism because of their backwardness and the smallness of the working class in their countries and that they need the support of the co-called “socialist camp” to do that. Yes it is also racism!

# Soviet Economic Exploitation of the 3rd World

Konrad Melchers

Soviet officials describe trade with the Third World in glorious phrases. The head of the "Committee for International Economic Co-Operation of the Ministerial Council of the USSR", S. Skatchkov, writes: "The truly historic significance of the co-operation between the USSR and the young states lay in the fact, that it has promoted and promotes in the most fabulous manner the achievement of economic self-reliance through undermining the typical imperialistic monopolistic economic relationships between the former colonies and dependent countries. This is the promotion of qualitatively new principles of cooperation applied internationally: the principle of equality, of mutual benefits, of respect for independence and national sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs." (Communist, No. 12, 1973, p. 42, Moscow). But what is the reality?

## Soviet Trade with 3rd World Increases.

Compared to the trade of the Western countries that of the USSR is small, that of Eastern Europe with the Third World does not exceed 5% of total world trade. But the growth rates indicate the economic aggressiveness of a latecomer. Between 1955 and 1975 Soviet-Third World trade quadrupled. Soviet exports increased from 6,1% in 1960 to 18,6% in 1973 dropping to 13,8% in 1975 but still reflecting an increase. Soviet imports increased from 9,5% in 1960 to 11,2% in 1975. Africa provided the SU with 1% of its total imports but in 1971 this figure exceeded 5%. Some African countries have become dependent on Soviet trade as with Egypt in the seventies which had 50% of its trade with the SU, and Mali which has 13% of its total trade with the SU.

## The SU finances its trade deficit with the West from Trade Surpluses from 3rd World.

Upto 1960 the Soviet trade balance with the Third World was negative. By 1974 it was turned into a surplus of

7,14 roubles. Since the SU finances part of its exports on the basis of development-assistance credits this figure has to be reduced by the amount of net development aid in the respective period. The flow of net aid disbursements are estimated at about 1,9 billion roubles from 1961-1971 (N. K. Chandra: USSR and the Third World: Unequal Distribution of Gains, „Economic & Political Weekly, Bombay 1977, p. 375). This leads to 2.3 billion roubles balance of payment surplus for this period. This figure is probably still too high as military grants are included into Soviet-export statistics and some of the debts of the Third World later had to be deleted. Chandra and others (OECD, "Flow of Resources to Developing Countries," Paris 1973) estimate that upto 1967 the SU did not reach a hard currency benefit through its trade with the Third World but thereafter the surplus gained contributed greatly to fill the deficit of Soviet trade with hard currency countries. Some may question this, arguing that the SU carries out its economic co-operation with the Third World on the basis of barter agreements. This is true, but in order to overcome this limitation she concludes with almost a Third World countries clearing agreements, which provide that the trade-balance has to be cleared regularly with gold or other international liquidities.

## The Soviet Union Benefits from unequal Exchange.

The largest profits for the SU comes from its unequal trade with the Third World. Since the world-market prices for most goods are flexible it is impossible to calculate the precise cost of the unequal exchange. One therefore can only take particular examples in 1969 the developing countries had to export two tons of cocoa to the SU in order to buy one truck; in 1971 it cost three times as many tons for the same item. In 1955 1.8 tons of coffee was equivalent to one Soviet metal-cutting machine; in 1974 it was 4.2 tons (Beijing Review, No. 20, 1974, p.29 and

No. 7, 1976, p.17). These examples show the low Soviet purchase prices in the Third World. From Algeria it imported wine at 8 pence per litre, tea from Morocco at 85 pence per kilo, when the normal world prices were much higher. (figures from Marches Tropicaux, Paris, 25.12.71). Ghana's average export price for cocoa between 1960 and 1970 was at 443 New Cedis per ton. In the SU it could only fetch an average price of 413 New Cedis. Mali could sell its groundnuts for an average price of 123 dollars; in the SU it could only fetch 104 dollars (Stevens, SU Policy in Black Africa, 1976, p.59). From Angola it was reported that the SU bought coffee at 180 escudos per bag when world prices ranged from 467-472 escudos per bag. (Rote Fahne, Cologne, No. 23, 8.6.76). Several studies estimate that on average the SU purchases 10-15% cheaper in the Third World than its imperialist rivals. In addition the SU has developed a considerable switch trade. Despite official denials it re-sells imports from the Third World countries, thus obtaining hard currencies to the detriment of the developing countries. In order to get badly needed hard currencies it re-sells at much lower prices which diminishes the export revenues of the developing countries further. Additionally the SU takes the imports on stocks when seasonal prices are the highest. Well known in the sixties was the re-sale of cocoa from Ghana and cotton from Egypt. Then there was the scandal of the Soviet oil bargain with Iraq in December 1973 when the Arab oil producing countries were boycotting Western supporters of Zionist Israel. The SU bought 77 barrels of oil from Iraq for 6 Million Pounds and sold them in West Germany for 18 Million Pounds. Similarly the SU sells oil and gas from Iran and Afghanistan in Europe at profit rates of 22% (Chandra, ibid. p.370). From the steel-mills it built in India it bought pig-iron at 30.5 roubles and re-sold it to Africa at 169 roubles per ton! From its Heluan-project it bought sheet-steel at 118, 118, 109 and 135 roubles per ton between 1971-74 and re-sold them at 134, 123, 157 and 171 roubles per ton. (Chandra ibid.). Other known cases of such re-diverted Third World goods sold at great profit are sugar from Cuba, rice from Burma, cashew-nuts and tobacco from India, caviar from Iran und Karakul sheep wool from Namibia. (M.I. Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid, New York, 1967, p.110).

The SU also makes the exporting country importer of its own goods. In the import-statistics of a number of African countries fish-imports have appeared in recent years but this fish does not come from the SU but from the coasts of the African countries themselves!

Often the prices of Soviet exports to Third World countries exceed that of West for the same products. Mali for example buys sugar from the SU (which the SU gets from Cuba) at 200 dollars per ton when it could get it from other sources at 145 dollars per ton (Stevens, *ibid.* p.56). The SU sold cast-iron 214% and pit coal 218% higher price to Egypt, than to West Germany (Radio Tirana, Monitor, Hamburg No. 15, 1977, p.26). In 1973 the SU increased the price for its coke-exports to Algeria from 19,5 roubles per ton to 28 roubles per ton. The price differences between Soviet and Western exports to the Third World are revealed by the following two examples (calculation in roubles).

Years	1971	1972	1973	1974
<i>Motor cars</i>				
Third World	1400	1205	1408	1569
W. Europe	617	615	654	805
<i>Trucks</i>				
Third World	6151	6112	6203	6988
W. Europe	1091	1612	696	1551

A study of 43 export products shows that the Western countries paid 34,7% of the price paid for by the developing countries. (J.R. Carter, *The net costs of Soviet Foreign Aid*, Washington, 1969 and *Beijing Review*, No. 20, 1974, p. 29). Chandra calculates that the Third World countries bought from the SU at a higher price of 71% in 1971, 70% in 1972, 172% in 1973 and 70% in 1974 than paid for by the Western industrialised countries. Do not these figures reveal that the SU participates in the exploitation of the Third World within the framework of the "normal" uneven trade patterns between the imperialist countries and the Third World and even exceeds it.

### Gains from the Manipulation of currency exchange rates.

The functioning of the imperialist world market depresses the currencies of the Third World countries compared to the "hard currencies". For instance, Karvis calculates that the Indian rupee in 1970 was undervalued

against the US dollar by 25%. This means that an Indian worker theoretically has to work 2.5 harder than his American equivalent (the same labour-productivity assumed) to produce the same dollar value. A country which devalues its currency has to produce and export more at the same rate in order to receive the same real import value. At the same time the old debts – fixed in hard currencies – rise at the same rate. In 1975 and on other occasions India devalued its rupee by 40% as against the rouble which meant that it had to export 40% more in real terms in order to get the old import-value and to pay for its debts with the SU. Not only does the SU follow all the devaluations of Third World currencies forced by the IMF (an indication of imperialist domination) but it also pressurises governments where it can to devalue, as in the case of India and Egypt.

### Soviet trade relations with southern African racist regimes.

The SU pretends to observe international-boycott regulations against the racist regimes in Southern Africa and makes a great deal of propaganda about the violation of them by the Western imperialist governments. But those who live in glass houses should not throw stones. In the case of Rhodesia for example it violated UN sponsored sanctions against the racist regime there. It bought tobacco from Rhodesia and sold chemicals in exchange through the Rhodesian company Michelle Enterprises Ltd and to conceal the business intermediary mail-box companies (Comaisa, Tobatrade and Contrex) were established in Geneva. The Rhodesian tobacco was camouflaged as American products namely Pall Mall, Lucky Strike and Chesterfield.

Again in February 1973 the UN Security Council praised Zambia for its sacrifices during the Rhodesia embargo and put forward a resolution calling upon member states to support Zambia financially. The SU refused to vote stating that it was not prepared to pay for the damage caused to the Zambian economy.

**Namibia:** In the fishing grounds along the Namibian coast the SU takes the biggest haul. In 1975 it caught 209.320 tons of fish almost 42.6% of the total caught. Poland, Cuba and Bulgaria took another 15%. They got their fishing permission from the South

African government and of course also paid royalties to the racist regime.

As already mentioned the SU purchases high-quality Karakul sheep wool from Namibia. In 1970 it was third after the FRG and Denmark purchasing wool for 16.8 million dollars. The SU itself is the biggest karakul wool-producer. It buys the Namibian wool in order to strengthen its position on the world market (W.S. Barthold, *Namibia's Economic Potential and existing economic ties with the RSA*, Berlin).

**Azania:** In 1976 it was reported that guns from the SU and Czechoslovakia were big sellers in South Africa (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14.2.76). In March 1977 it was reported that an official Polish delegation visited the South African installations to produce gasoline from coal in order to investigate possible technological cooperation. (*African Contemporary Record 1976/77*, p. B 851).

The SU also sells half of its diamond-production to the South African De Beers mines. When De Beers raised the prices for diamonds in 1977, "Business Week" commented: "De Beers raises the prices for raw-diamonds in order to transfer the profits to the Russians." Asked about this collaboration with racist South Africa the representative of Novosti-Press in Stockholm, Nikolai Neiland barked: "De Beers is a multinational company." (*New Africa News*, No. 11, Sept. 1978, Australia).

### Long-term production co-operations – a new form of neocolonialist plunder by SU

The SU reply to the demands of the Third World for a new world economic order is to promote its own "international socialist division of labour" under the guise of long term production cooperations. Upto 1960 most Soviet economic aid was to help develop the infrastructure, to strengthen selfsufficiency, and thus the economic independence of the developing countries. But then under the pretext of greater "effectiveness" the emphasis was changed to the securing – and sometimes industrial processing – of raw materials for export to the Soviet Union, called "production cooperation". (see L. Zevin: *Some trends in the division of labour between socialist*

and developing countries, *voprosy economic* No. 2 1965, p. 349).

In 1965 the Soviet expert Prokhorov said:

"In this relationship the SU will profit from the low cost of labour in the developing countries." (G.M. Prokhorov, "The two world systems and the liberated countries.", *Economica*, 1965, p.205)

Today about 90% of Soviet trade with the Third World consists of long-term cooperation and trade treaties. The SU has concluded such cooperation and trade agreements with more than 50 developing countries, half of which are African.

Production cooperation means that the SU builds up a company for the exploitation or processing of raw materials on a credit basis, and the production of the company is integrated into the Soviet Union's long-term treaty with the developing country, i.e. the largest part of the production is used to repay credit to the SU. Thus the SU risks practically nothing and gains many advantages. Firstly the SU can dictate the enterprise's economic policy just like a capitalist owner – even if it is only through terms and instructions fixed by the treaty. Profit, is guaranteed by fixed production targets to repay Soviet credit, the fixed prices of the products and the price of Soviet equipment, as well as technical and management-service. At the same time the SU remains the creditor of the enterprise with additional reinsurance from the country which is merely the formal owner. Secondly, the products can be made to suit the needs of the SU as far as type, marketability, quantity and above all, price is concerned. As a rule the prices are set down for the entire period of cooperation, so that the developing countries have hardly any opportunity to match them with the general price changes in the world market, or to bring them into the struggle for a New International Economic Order. It is most favourable for the Soviet Union when the cost of the credit for the building and running of the "cooperative enterprise" and the price of the products i.e. the proceeds of the enterprise, are arranged in such a way that at the time when the credit has been paid back the installations are at least already worn out so that new debts for replacement investments are due. In this way the "production-cooperation" can be continued as re-

quired or until the raw materials are exhausted. Thirdly, the SU can bring "production cooperation" into its long-term world wide planning. *This is the most important and decisive advantage for the SU, because it must be borne in mind that the SU has a unique steering system which makes the multinational companies of the US and other capitalist countries green with envy.* Practically the whole foreign trade of the SU is carried out by a few specialized state monopolies. These "export complexes" (Neftekimpoexport, Prommaskexport, Selkhozpromexport, Tekhnoexport and Tyazhpromexport, to mention the most important ones), which together with corresponding import complexes make up the Committee for Foreign Economic Relations of the USSR Council of Minister, carry out the export of goods and development aid i.e. also the creation of cooperative enterprises with the Third World. *This unique state monopoly concentration opens up for the SU extraordinary opportunities for world wide economic manipulation.*

At present long-term cooperation and trade treaties are the main link in this system. Already today, as in the case of India, Vietnam, Cuba, Angola, Ethiopia and others, they are being extended through joint economic planning commissions, i.e. through the development and control of entire long and medium-term economic plans. This ends up with full membership of the Comecon. The most comprehensive example in Africa is the bauxite-production cooperation scheme in Guinea-Conakry. We therefore describe this project more in detail.

The USSR has its own extensive supplies of bauxite and other aluminium-bearing volcanic rock for the production of aluminium. Deposits at Tikhin, east of Leningrad, in Karelia and in the northern Urals are being used. The GDR-magazine "horizont" praises the Soviet bauxite and aluminium production as follows:

"The USSR holds a developed aluminium industry, which relies on vast national resources. Internationally it is one of the five leading raw material producers and ranges second in aluminium production due to its gigantic smelterfoundries in the rich Siberia."

(horizont, No. 34, 1978, p. 25) But still it endeavours to produce cheap bauxite from outside the SU.

Formerly the USSR's main suppliers were Yugoslavia, Greece, Hungary, France and the USA. Since 1973 Guinea, where 30% of the world's bauxite deposits are found, has become the main supplier. The negotiations for this giant project dragged on for many years. When Sekou Toure, the president of Guinea visited Moscow in 1960, Khrushchev had already pledged to build a dam at the Konkourè river in order to provide Guinea with the facilities to smelt the huge bauxite deposits near the river into aluminium. During another visit in 1965 the offer was repeated. The negotiations still took another five years. With the argument that the dam and the processing of bauxite in Guinea were not economic because electricity was much cheaper in the USSR, the SU was able to bully the Guinean government in 1971 into an agreement which can be compared with another similar neocolonial arrangement in Ghana when the American Kaiser company obtained a licence from the Nkrumah government to work bauxite with a promise to organize the financing of the volta dam. The dam was in fact financed and built, chiefly with World Bank funds. But nonetheless Kaiser did not process the bauxite in Ghana, but shipped it to Canada with the argument that electricity was cheaper there.

The argument of cheaper electricity in the USSR is false because the SU's great electric power stations and the Soviet aluminium smelters are thousands of miles away from Soviet ports. For this reason the SU has begun the construction of a huge processing industry and large new harbours on the Black Sea.

The cooperation treaty lays down that for about 90 million rubles (US dollars 100-conditions: 12-year term and 2.5% interest) the SU will dig a mine and build the transportation and transshipment installations, a settlement for mine workers, a 100 km long branchline from the capital Conakry to the mine, and its own loading areas at Conakry harbour. Guinea is bound to supply the USSR with 75% of the amount mined for 30 years – until the mine is depleted – as repayment of the original and follow up credits and many times to raise the level of the price which was set in 1969 and which in 1977 was about US dollars (10) per ton below the world market level, and to introduce an export tax for bauxite.

But Moscow refused. The concession made by the USSR was that further "aid" for the development of the Guinean bauxite industry would be allocated. In other words, Guinea should slake its thirst with poison. Nonetheless in January 1976 a treaty was signed, under which Soviet geologists would prospect further. They very soon found more large deposits north of Fria and east of Boke. Further pressure which the Guinean government could raise in the meantime against the SU and the worsening image of the self-styled "natural ally" of the national liberation movement, eventually after much quarrelling made the SU, according to press reports, to raise the price in 1978.

In yet another way the cooperation treaty, especially of prices and quantities to be supplied, has had a very damaging effect on Guinea. In 1973, Guinea issued invitations to the first conference of Bauxite-exporting countries, in order to establish an organization similar to OPEC. In 1974 the International Bauxite Association (IBA) was officially formed. 11 bauxite exporting countries joined IBA, which in 1976 produced 73% of total world production. Two different comments on the IBA document the cynical attitude of the SU to this organization. In 1977 the GDR magazine "horizont" wrote:

"Since in the IBA imperialist (it refers to Australia, which has joined it) and anti-imperialist interests (Yugoslavia and developing countries) clash in the organization, one has to wait, how far IBA will succeed in the future to achieve more (!) than price-raises so far enforced." (horizont No. 49, 1977, p. 25)

Less than a year later the same journal cynically stated:

In the recent times the bauxite-countries of the 'Third World' brought radical changes in the international power structure, which is gained by the influence of socialism - bringing them vigorously greater gains from their natural resources." (horizont, No. 34, 1978, p. 25)

The Soviet production-cooperations undermine the aims of IBA. Similar to Western monopolies the SU tries to venture into non-IBA-countries. In 1976 it concluded a cooperation agreement with Algeria to develop bauxite interest (Neue Zürcher Zeitung

7.3.1974). According to Soviet sources it should "only" be 50% of the production which the Soviet Union will take as debt service. (cf. Berezin: "The Soviet Union's economic and technical co-operation with the countries of tropical Africa, in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, Moscow, No 5, 1973) A further 35% will be used as payment for other Soviet supplies. But this as well is economically monstrous, since it means that at least 50% of the production must be used solely to service debts for the foreign financing of the project. All other costs - running costs, wages repairs and re-equipment, not to mention investment in expansion - must be financed from the remainder. It is evident from the figures how little of the value created by the project will stay in Guinea. The majority of the maintenance requirements, replacement equipment and fuel has to be imported into Guinea. Further the mechanization of this open-shaft mine is so advanced that for a long time a large number of highly-paid Russian engineers and specialists will be employed in the project, but only a relatively small number of miserably low-paid Guinean workers. Thus the contribution of the project to the balance of payments and its contribution to the accumulation of capital in Guinea will be in any case very small. If the project makes a loss in the end, which - because of the demonstrably "unhealthy" financial structure - can be expected even at top of its capacity, then Guinea will even have to pay up as well. It looks quite certain that after the 12 years repayment period of the original credit during which most of the mechanical equipment of the project has to be renewed, this replacement cannot be financed by accumulated reserves but by new credit arrangements, perpetuating the Guinean dependency on the SU.

For all these reasons the Guinean

government has tried production and aluminium procession worth 315 million dollars. Further projects it develops in Turkey, Egypt, India and Greece. Also in Jamaica the SU is trying to get a share in the bauxite business. In addition the USSR is trying to strengthen its market position using third countries. Yugoslavia has set up a "mixed enterprise" together with the government of Guinea for the exploitation of a bauxite mine in Dabola whose total capacity is about 400 million tons, of which 5 million tons are to be quarried annually. For a long time there existed a long-term bauxite supply treaty between the SU and Yugoslavia, which will be extended with the exploitation of the Dabola project. This means that the SU has made itself a beneficiary of this huge project - apart from the advantages it provides the Soviet Union's world market position - without putting up any initial capital, and will obtain further trading profits through it.

In the meantime the Guinean government has become quite sober about this "natural ally". It rejected the eager claims of the SU to exploit another huge iron-ore-mine with a deposit of 600 million tons of the best iron-ore in the world (70% iron) and instead has concluded a joint agreement with Algeria, Nigeria, Rumania, Spain, France and Japan. This project may become a good example for intra-Third-World and Third World-Second World industrial cooperation against the two superpowers.

Additionally the Guinean government has ended military base facilities of the SU in Guinean harbours as well as air-ports. At the 15. OAU meeting 1978 in Khartoum Sekou Touré warned against the two superpowers and called for collective self reliance of African countries and for better cooperation framework in the African-Caribbean-Pacific and EC agreements.

# The Soviet Theory of non-capitalist Development

Konrad Melchers

In the context of strategies for liberation and development in the Third World the Soviet theory of non-capitalist development has become a controversial issue of great and acute importance. Due to the importance the Soviet Union attaches to this theory in its relationship with Afro-Asian countries a whole library has been filled by Soviet and other writers during the past twenty years. Indeed this theory is a clue to the character of the present-day relationship of the Soviet Union with the Third World.

In this paper we neither can give a complete description of the theory and its application in the various social, economic and political fields nor do we give an account of the present state of theoretical approval and criticism of the Soviet Theory. (1) We rather limit our analysis to the overall assertions of the theory. Methodically our approach is to find out inconsistencies within the theory itself and with regard to the real historical development. From there and by comparing the theory with the general task of national liberation of the Third World and with the views of marxist-leninist classics we try to draw some conclusions about the character of the theory and the character of Soviet-Third World-relations.

## Marx and Lenin on non-capitalist development

Karl Marx dealt with the question whether precapitalist societies had to pass through all stages of capitalist development in order to achieve the conditions of socialist transformation. Marx referred mainly to the Russian society in the 19th century. In a letter to V.I. Sassulitch he stated his conviction that:

„The collective ownership of the land provides the (Russian rural community) with the basis for collective appropriation and simultaneously with the capitalist production readily provides it with the material conditions of collective labour on a large scale. Therefore it can incorporate the positive achievements of the capitalist sys-

system without the necessity to pass through its caudine yoke (humiliation)” (2)

With the rise of the national liberation struggle in the Afro-Asian colonies after World War I the question became an important issue in the discussions within the Third Communist International. In his report of the commission on the national and the colonial question of the second congress of the Comintern, 1920, Lenin stated,

“that with the aid of the proletariat of the advanced countries, backward countries can go over to the Soviet system and, through certain stages of development, to communism, without having to pass through the capitalist stage.” (3)

At the sixth Comintern-congress, 1928, the question was discussed at length. The congress approved

“eight tasks in order to achieve the transformation from a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasants into a dictatorship of the proletariat.”

The most important task was to “overthrow foreign imperialism, feudalism and landlord-bureaucracy”. (4) The congress summarized, “that in the colonies and semicolonies where the proletariat plays the role of the leader and hegemon, the bourgeois-democratic revolution develops into a proletarian one.” (5) It was also stated, that “the alliance with the Soviet Union and the revolutionary proletariat of the imperialist countries enables the working masses of China, India and all other colonial and semicolonial countries to develop independently and freely, economically as well as culturally, bypassing the stage of the domination of the capitalist order or rather capitalist conditions in general.” (6)

50 years later we realize that the Communist International was too optimistic about the immediate possibilities to set up “peasant soviets” and to achieve quickly the stage of “democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasants” let alone the “dictator-

ship of the proletariat”. Already the VIIth Comintern-congress, 1936, criticized earlier hopes for a fast transformation of the Afro-Asian countries into socialist societies. The congress emphasized the clear distinction between the stage of the national-democratic and of the socialist revolution and generally blamed “national nihilism”. (7) Today it is obvious that the predominance of imperialism does not end with political independence of the colonies but still and as long as imperialism lasts worldwide it remains the overall contradiction in the Third World.

## The modern theory of non-capitalist development

After World War II Asian and African colonies of the European imperialist powers achieved independence, a few like China, Vietnam, Algeria or latterly the former Portuguese colonies as a result of protracted people's war, the majority as a result of the weakened position of the old colonial powers and the influence of the successful Chinese and other revolutions in the Third World. In this situation the modern Soviet theory of non-capitalist development arose.

The theory comprises two spheres from where the non-capitalist development is determined, the internal and the external spheres of the developing countries.

The general definition of the non-capitalist road, now applied to a varying number of Afro-Asian independent countries, usually reads as follows:

“(it) is a special form of progression of some countries towards socialism without the direct state-leadership of the proletariat, but based upon the socialist countries and in alliance with the international communist and worker's movement.” (8)

The internal sphere refers to the internal class contradictions. Here it is generally argued that because of the low level of the development of the productive forces in the developing countries, which at the same time means that the “working class numerically is small or even non-existent” (9), the working classes in the Third World cannot assume the leading role in the non-capitalist development. Therefore in the coun-



tries of the non-capitalist road the position of the proletariat is taken by a "broad class alliance which is lead by non-proletarian petty bourgeois forces". (10)

At the time of Khrushchev the leaders of these nationalist forces such as Nkrumah, Ben Bella, Modibo Keita, Sekou Touré, Nasser, Sadat or Sukarno were termed socialists who are 'capable of bringing socialism' (11).

At the peak of this euphemism almost every leader of Afro-Asian countries was styled as socialist and their respective countries were seen in the midst of socialist transformation. The founding conference of OAU for instance was appraised in the following way: "from 32 heads of state 25 have decided for one or the other way of socialist construction" (12).

The political developments in Africa and Asia completely falsified this theory. In the middle of the sixties the position even of revolutionary nationalism in Africa was visibly weakened. The wave of military puches signified this trend. Most striking was how easily the nationalist governments of Nkrumah and Keita were brought down.

### Changes from Khrushchev to Breshnev

With the fall of Khrushchev discussions about his contradictory assumptions arose again among Soviet theoretical circles and of course in the Soviet leadership. Now the second sphere of the theory of non-capitalist development was stressed.

In the above mentioned definition, which dates from 1972, it is stated that the non-capitalist development is not based on proletarian leadership "but upon the socialist countries". What does that mean? First we may notice that paradoxically the "proletarian line" seems to be rediscovered but at the same time the weakness of the working class in the Third World is further emphasized in order to explain the earlier shortcomings to keep in line with the real historical development. The following description of the working class in Africa and Asia is typical: "One of the peculiarities of the situation of this part of the world is the relatively small strength of the working class numerically. With respect to broad segments of the workers in Asia and particularly in Africa, the low level of culture, petit-bourgeois, tribal

and religious prejudices which are created by village life are characteristic." (13)

After having "proved" the incapability of the working class in the Third World in such a way the Soviet theoreticians start cleaning their image again. The cleaning force they introduce is nobody else than the Soviet Union itself. The authors of the above cited description of the working class continue:

The successes of the international workers movement and the growing might of the socialist world system have created the prerequisites in order to improve the reputation of the working class independent of the numerical strength in each country. The influence of the local working class merges with the influence of world socialism." (14)

The head of the international department of the central committee of CPSU, Ponomarev, puts it even stronger. He writes:

"In many developing countries the proletariat as a class is presumably non-existent or for some time not an independent leading force... (Therefore) one of the decisive factors (in these countries) is the alliance between the working class and the peasantry on world scale." (15)

The authors also can refer to Brezhnev, who stated that

(1) We may mention an article by R. Wagner in: *Befreiung* (liberation), No 6, Mai 1976, Berlin (West), our first analysis on the issue was published: in *Africa kämpft*, No 21, November 1975, Berlin (West). A good critical analysis is given by the Ethiopian Students Union in North America (member of WWFES) in their journal *Combat*, Vol VII, No 2, January 1978

(2) Karl Marx, MEW, Vol 19, p. 405, German edition, 1969, Berlin (GDR)

(3) V.I. Lenin, Sel. Works, Vol 3, p. 459, Moscow/New York, 1967

(4) Protokoll des 6. Weltkongresses d. Komintern, Vol 2, Hamburg/Berlin 1928 (German edition)

(5) *ibid.*

(6) *ibid.*

(7) Protokoll d. 7. Weltkongresses d. Komintern, Vol 1, Hamburg/Erlangen 1969

(8) W.W. Sagladin (ed.) *Die kommunistische Weltbewegung - Abriß der Strategie und Taktik*, Frankfurt 1973 (German edition) p. 268f.

(9) See for instance V. Solodovnikov, *Non-capitalist development*, Moscow, 1974, K.

"under the present conditions the problem of the relationship between the working class and the peasantry in the former colonies is largely of international character. It is a matter to tighten the alliance of the whole international working class with the peasantry, with all labouring people in the young states, which are liberated." (16)

The role designed to the partners of the "alliance" we may quote from Mirskiy, who writes:

"The world system of socialism which enables militarily and economically a steady development of the national liberation revolution and fosters the struggle of the recently liberated countries from the rapacious mechanism of the capitalist world economy, therefore takes over the function of the proletarian vanguard with regard to the peoples which are oppressed by imperialism." (17)

Another prominent Soviet theorist on the national liberation movement, Uljanowski, frankly reveals:

"It is the international dictatorship of the proletariat in the person of the socialist world system that ... can develop the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship into a dictatorship of the proletariat. (18)

From these assertions we can summarize that today the Soviet Union considers itself as the hegemonial force

Grishetchkin in *New Times*, Moscow, No 41, 1963, p. 8

(10) L. Rathmann und H. Schilling, *Probleme des nichtkapitalistischen Weges der Völker Asiens und Afrikas in der gegenwärtigen Etappe der nationalen Befreiungsbewegung*, in: *Nichtkapitalistischer Entwicklungsweg, Aktuelle Probleme*, in *Theorie und Praxis*, Berlin (GDR), 1972, p. 25

(11) Khrushchev in an interview with Afro-Asian journalists, Dec. 1963, cit. from *The current digest of the Soviet press*, London, Vol 15, No 51, 1963, p. 13. It is interesting to note that Khrushchev rushed to call the journalists in the Kremlin to make this assertion when Tschu en Lai made his tour in Africa, 1963/64, cit. from *Peking Review*, 1.5.1964

(12) K. Grishetchkin op. cit. p. 5

(13) W.W. Sagladin op. cit. p. 278

(14) *ibid.*

(15) cit. from R. Wagner op. cit. p. 41

(16) W.W. Sagladin op. cit. p. 285

(17) G. Mirskiy in *New Times*, Moscow, No 39, 1969

(18) R.A. Uljanovskiy, *Scientific socialism and the liberated countries*, in *Communist*, Moscow, No 4, 1968

in the Third World. As a second conclusion we see that the Soviet leaders consider bourgeois class forces as the social base of the Soviet Union in the Third World. This is confirmed if we more closely look at the new Soviet conception concerning the relationship between the stage of the national-democratic and the socialist revolution.

### **The Soviet Union Pretends to Break the Wall between the Stage of National-democratic Revolution and Socialist Revolution.**

On the background of the above assertions it is not surprising that the Soviet theoreticians today blur the distinction between the two stages of Revolution and mix their separate tasks. Mirskiy wrote in 1964:

"The national liberation revolution can immediately break out of the framework of bourgeois democratic revolution and begin the transition to socialist revolution . . . If the conditions for proletarian leadership have not yet matured, the historic mission of breaking with capitalism can be carried out by elements close to the working class. Nature abhors a vacuum." (19)

How close these forces are to the working class, we may state from another later article, in which Mirskiy writes:

"We are concerned with a unique historical situation: the former colonies actively and quite fast enter the 20th century. They integrate with today's world and find themselves faced with the all influence of the two antagonistic social systems. But none of them has got a social base in the respective countries, which would be strong enough. However the objective conditions force the countries, which became liberated to take a choice between capitalism and socialism. The weakness of the potential main classes has resulted in a situation whereby the intelligentsia, mainly of petty bourgeois origin, has become the social force, which for a time is predominant in most developing countries and which enjoys relative freedom of action. From amongst these forces new peculiar forces develop, which march in the forefront towards either capitalism or socialism." (20)

Looking at the development in the Third World we can readily see that these "peculiar forces" after assuming state power have generally developed into bureaucratic state bourgeoisies, their size and strength depending mainly on the remaining or new positions of imperialism and the "economic size" of their states. Even feudal forces are "peculiar" enough in this "unique situation" to come into close alliance with the Soviet Union and its transitional impact. To make sure that the choice of system will be in favour of the Soviet Union, Mirskiy adds:

"With the development of the socialist world system the national liberation revolutions generally proceed beyond bourgeois democracy, their tasks merge with the tasks of the socialist revolution." (21)

Sagladin and his collaborators write:

"The change of the class relationship in the world towards democracy and socialism has created favourable conditions and possibilities to deepen the content of the national liberation revolutions." (22)

To further clarify what this means, we may quote Sadorow who thinks, that

"a tendency, which . . . directly affects the history of the alliance between the forces of socialism and the forces of the national liberation derives from the fact that the conformity of aims in the anti-imperialist struggle which cement the alliance are complemented by the approximation of social or in other words class interests." (23)

The force which in the view of the Soviet theoreticians merges the two stages of revolution and their tasks is none else than the Soviet Union itself and its "world system". Iskenderov pronounces:

"In the presence of the socialist world system the revolutionary democratic forces, based on this international power, have obtained the real possibility to deepen the social content of the national liberation movement and to direct it not only into the antiimperialist but as well into the anticapitalist struggle. This possibility results . . . from the fact, that the socialist countries render more and more moral and political support and

more and more economic, technical and military assistance." (24)

### **The means of non-capitalist transition – from peaceful transition to military putchism and military intervention.**

In correspondence with the described new trends we find similar ideological changes with regard to the means by which non-capitalist transformation is supposed to be achieved.

As everybody knows Khrushchev declared peaceful coexistence with US-imperialism as the main political strategy of the Soviet Union. Accordingly peaceful transition towards socialism was supposed to have become the main form of historical development. In particular the development in Africa was considered as proof of the new peaceful era. In order to propagate this conception the journal World Marxist Review in 1966 organized a big seminar in Cairo, attended from all over Africa. The then chief editor of the journal, Sobolev, stated in his contribution to the seminar:

"In the present democratic phase of the social revolution in Africa it is by far in most cases possible to avoid civil war between the antagonistic classes by isolating the hostile class elements and compelling them to bow to the will of the democratic majority by peaceful political and economic means. . . It can be pointed out that the gradual character of revolution and the wide application of the reform method provide an extremely specific character to the revolution in Africa." (25)

(19) G. Mirskiy, The proletariat and the national liberation revolutions, New Times, Moscow, No 18, 1964, p. 8f.

(20) G. Mirskiy, New Times, No 39, 1969

(21) G. Mirskiy and T. Potakajeva, Meimo, Moscow, No 3, 1966, p. 57

(22) W.W. Sagladin op. cit. p. 263

(23) Sadorow, World Marxist Review, Prague (German ed.), October 1974, p. 1360

(24) Iskenderov, New Times, Moscow, No 25, 1972, p. 24

(25) A. Sobolev, in World Marxist Review, Prague (German edition) January 1967, p. 21

(25 a) *ibid.* of. also P. Meyns, Nationale Unabhängigkeit und ländliche Entwicklung in der Dritten Welt, Das Beispiel Tanzania, Berlin 1977, p. 81ff (a critical review of the subject)

One of Sobolev's African followers, the secretary of the Sudanese Union Party (Mali), Idrissa Diarra, exclaimed at the seminar: "we want to make our societies socialist by peaceful means." (25a) Here it should also be remembered that in Azania Abram Fischer, then chairman of the SACP, declared in the fifties, after the SACP was banned, "civil war is by no means a solution for South-Africa." (26)

*This Soviet reformism basically* meant to achieve socialism through the development of the productive forces. In a Pravda leader one could for instance read with respect to the Third World: "In earlier times the struggle was mainly carried out in the political fields, today the economic question already has become the central task and the main path to carry forward the revolution." (27) Tyagunenکو bluntly stated: "There is an economic transition to socialism." (28)

For this purpose even imperialist capital was welcomed. The Russian economist Tjulpanow for instance writes: "It is the state capital of imperialist countries, which has enabled many countries which have chosen the independent development to procure the preconditions in order to break through unequal positions in the international division of labour." (29) These positions signify that in the fifties and sixties the Soviet theoreticians blurred the national-democratic and the socialist tasks in order to water down the national contradiction between imperialism and the Afro-Asian countries to certain reforms like the introduction of cooperative marketing and farming or the nationalization of industry, banks, insurances, public services etc., which consequently were termed socialist.

This line two was obviously inconsistent with historical development. Peaceful coexistence could not prevent US-imperialism from escalating aggressions and wars in the Third World. Nowhere peaceful transition succeeded. After Khrushchev a new trend emerged. Today we find a quite different pattern of arguments. Sagladin and others for instance put peaceful means at the bottom of their list of "forms to seize power". (30) Instead of peaceful coexistence and peaceful transition "proletarian internationalism" or "the international dictatorship" of the Soviet Union and "class struggle" is emphasized today. Sagladin writes: "The further advance

of revolutionary processes, which leads towards a more and more intensive internationalization of the class struggle ... determines the growing importance of internationalism." (31) And with regard to the Third World he imagines: "In this vast area of the world the ideas of internationalism inevitably will achieve an enormous expansion. This will multiply a hundredfold the strength of these ideas and their real political influence." (32)

In order to clarify these phrases we look at the military strategy of the Soviet Union. It also drastically has changed in the past twenty years and a new appraisal of the armed forces in the developing countries appear. In his book, the "seapower of the states", the chief of the Soviet navy, admiral Gorshkov, describes at length the change of strategy from the old "continental thesis", which mainly was oriented to defend the Soviet Union against military aggressions towards the "doctrine of balanced growth", which aims at developing the Soviet navy and complementary forces to the same level as the rival forces. With regard to the aims of this new strategy Gorshkov is quite outspoken. He points out, that "the Soviet navy always adheres to the position, that the contention for hegemony over the seas is not a task for itself, (but) a precondition to dominate the world." (33)

With respect to the position of the Soviet Union towards the armed forces in the Third World the class content of the Soviet theory of non-capitalist development is particularly relevant. Due to the petty-bourgeois character of the army, especially its middle and lower officer ranks, the Soviet experts draw a progressive role for the armies in the Afro-Asian countries today. Mirskiy writes: "As the center of the new leadership the military patriots represent the politically most motivated part of the petty-bourgeoisie..." (34) Ivanov states similarly: "The army officers can form the backbone of the revolutionary democratic forces in the African and Asian states." (35) In addition to that the armed forces are not determined as part and parcel of the state apparatus, which is dominated by the ruling forces but they are supposed to be an independent social force. Gawrilow tells us: "In a society, in which the process of class formation is not completed ... the army is going to be an autonomous force." (36) Mir-

skiy points out: "... it would be wrong to assess that the army in the developing countries automatically and completely expresses the interests of the class, which participates in power ... In the transitional stage from colonial subordination to independent existence the political power (of the army) can come off from its class background and can prevail for a certain time without being the direct representative of the interests of a certain class." (37)

It is interesting to see the Soviet passion for the Afro-Asian armies grow after progressive governments in Africa like Nkrumah in Ghana were overthrown by military coups d'états. The conclusion the Soviets drew from this experience was to adapt their policy to military putchism. We may also remember here that the Soviet press usually reports about certain putches in the Third World which may be beneficial to the Soviet interests, such as several attempted coups against the Numeiri-government in Sudan or the two invasions of the old Katangese police force in Zaire as if they had been "revolutionary mass uprisings". This bears out the new rhetorical emphasis Soviet authors put on "class struggle" in reality is a cover for military putchism.

It is not surprising to meet in this field as well the "vanguard role" which Soviet authors ascribe to the Soviet Union. Mirskiy writes:

"Revolutionary democratic military leaders can head the pro-

(26) R. Gibson, African liberation movements - a survey, preprint in l'Actuel, Brussels, 1977, p. 9

(27) Pravda 17.9.1963

(28) Tyagunenکو, in Principles of scientific socialism, Vol 1, Moscow, 1963, p. 123

(29) S.J. Tjulpanov, essays in political economy, developing countries, Moscow, 1969, p. 69f. (German edition)

(30) W.W. Sagladin, op. cit. p. 135

(31) W.W. Sagladin, Die Entwicklung des proletarischen Internationalismus unter den gegenwärtigen Bedingungen, Dokument der "Wahrheit", Berlin (West), 22.3.1977, p. 2

(32) ibid. p. 6

(33) cit. from extracts in Institute for Strategic Studies, Survival, Jan./Feb. 1977, p. 28

(34) G. Mirskiy, The national liberation movements, Leipzig, 1965 (German translation)

(35) K. Ivanov, in International Affairs, Moscow, No 3, 1965, p. 63

(36) N. Gawrilow, in Mezhdunarodnaja Shisn, No. 7, 1966 p. 62

(37) Mirskiy ibid.

cess of transition to the non-capitalist road of development, but only when the regime is free of close ties with capitalism, is not swayed by domestic reactionary interests, and can rely on the support of the world socialist system." (38)

Here we have the link between putchism and Soviet hegemonism.

### **The Soviet Conception of non-capitalist Development against non-alignment**

Despite certain official lip-service, Soviet leaders usually bestow on the movement of non-aligned countries, due to the growing strength of this movement, it is not surprising from all what we have asserted that the Soviet Union is against this movement as well. Uljanowskiy most openly reveals that the Soviet conception of non-capitalist development is against this movement. He writes:

"The objective necessity of a cooperation between the socialist countries and national democracy makes also certain demands on the latter. The positions, on which the international policy of the countries of the "Third World" is based, have to be made precise. Today positive neutralism and non-interference don't meet anymore the demands which have to be made on the foreign policy of the young national states. A non-capitalist development on such a foundation is impossible. In the interest of the joint struggle against imperialism it requires a rapprochement with the socialist community." (39)

There is no need to add to this.

### **Criticism of the Soviet non-capitalist Development from the national-revolutionary position**

Before we make a critical appraisal of the modern Soviet theory of non-capitalist development we may summarize our above findings. During the time of Khrushchev in Soviet theory and propaganda the national-democratic movement was identified with socialism, its leaders were considered socialists. Nowadays the Soviet Union pretends to carry the national-democratic revolution and its leaders towards socialism. During the time of Khrushchev peaceful transition was propagated. Today the Soviet leaders design the Soviet Union and its world system as the vanguard of the Afro-

Asian peoples and they claim the right to exercise international dictatorship with the consequence that positive-neutralism of the Third World and the principle of non-interference are incompatible with the Soviet strategy of non-capitalist development. Openly Soviet leaders declare their intention to dominate the world. Accordingly, non-peaceful means more and more prevail in Soviet foreign policy.

In our view both, Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's positions contradict the aims of the Third World to achieve and consolidate national independence, which we consider the overall task of the peoples of the Third World as long as imperialism exists. Khrushchev's line to play down the imperialist contradiction meant in fact collaboration with imperialism in particular with the then main imperialist power, USA, against the national liberation struggle. To claim the vanguard role in the Third World as well is against the principle that only the Third World peoples themselves have to carry out and lead their own struggles. Nature may "abhor a vacuum", but to consider the Third World as a social and political vacuum is pure imperialist metaphysics. The national revolutionary position in Africa is expressed in ZANU's slogan "we are our own liberators!" Nyerere and others focus their nationalist policy around the principle of "selfreliance". The idea of "collective self-reliance" of the Third World has become one of the central policy issues of Third World-unity.

The line of "international dictatorship" and the claim to the right of interference which is followed by concrete political and military actions go beyond the policy of betrayal of the national liberation struggle. The Soviet Union itself has become a direct target of the national liberation struggles. The Soviet Union fights under the anti-imperialist flag. But from what we have seen, the contradiction between the Third World and the old imperialist powers is used by the SU for its own purposes. It is not within the scope of this paper to analyze the relation between the two main contending powers and the possibilities to instrumentalize the contradiction between them in the interest of the national revolution. We agree with the late Steve Biko, who declared in his last interview:

"while critical of the economic selfinterest of American capitalism

I have no illusions about the Soviet Union. This is evident in its internal history as well as in the role it plays in countries like Angola. But the Russians have a less dirty name: in the eyes of the Third World they have a clean slate. Because of this they have a better start in the power game. Their politics seem to be acceptable to revolutionary groups. They are not "taboo". Here we are probably faced with the greatest problem in the Third World today. We are divided because some of us think that Soviet imperialism can be accepted as purely an interim phase while others - like myself - doubt whether the Soviet Union is really interested in the liberation of the black peoples." (40)

### **Soviet theory of non-capitalist development and marxist-leninist principles**

The Soviet leaders always insist that their theory is a creative development of marxist-leninist theory which takes into account changes of objective conditions but which firmly adhere to the principles of marxism-leninism. This has to be taken very seriously since many people, and we as well, believe that marxist-leninist theory is the theory of the oppressed to overcome oppression and exploitation.

The Soviet pretensions to develop the national democratic revolution into the socialist revolution by means of international dictatorship is not in line with Marx. He pointed out in his criticism of the Gotha-programm of the German Social Democrats that the content of proletarian class struggle is international, but its form is national, because "in order to be able to struggle, the working class must organize as a class at home . . . The homeland is the direct arena of its struggle." (41) In this short sentence Marx lays the fundamental meaning of proletarian internationalism, which certainly does not mean to carry out "class struggle" beyond the national borders.

But is the Soviet modern theory not

(38) G. Mirskiy, The army and politics in Asian and African countries, Moscow, 1970, p. 315

(39) R. A. Uljanovskiy, The socialism and the liberated countries, Berlin (GDR), 1973 (Russ. orig. 1972), p. 367

(40) Christian Science Monitor, 21.2.1977

(41) Karl Marx, Criticism of the Gotha programme, Berlin (GDR), 1969 (reprint), p. 27

in line with Lenin and the Comintern, which stated, as quoted above, that the "aid of the proletariat" (Lenin) or the "alliance with the Soviet Union" enable the working masses of the colonial and semicolonial countries to develop independently and to bypass the capitalist order. (Kuusinen at the 6th Comintern congress, 1928) In his draft thesis on the national and the colonial questions for the 2nd Comintern congress Lenin stated:

"The urgency of the struggle against ... the most deep-rooted petty-bourgeois national prejudices, looms ever larger with the mounting exigency of the task of converting the dictatorship of the proletariat from a national dictatorship (i.e. existing in a single country and incapable of determining world politics) into an international one (i.e. a dictatorship of the proletariat involving at least several advanced countries, and capable of exercising a decisive influence upon world politics as a whole)." (42)

Even if one would arrive at an assessment that imperialism does not play a decisive role in the world, which we think is a wrong assessment, the international dictatorship which Lenin envisaged still is needed as a form of international solidarity, of proletarian internationalism. Therefore Lenin continued in his draft thesis:

"... proletarian internationalism demands first, that the interests of the proletarian struggle in any country should be subordinated to the interests of that struggle on a world-wide scale, and, second, that a nation which is achieving victory over the bourgeoisie should be able and willing to make the greatest national sacrifices for the overthrow of international capital." (43)

In other words, Lenin called for sacrifices to support and not to take over or consummate the struggles of the suppressed nations. It is impossible to justify with Lenin's thoughts an identification of assistance with dictatorship or alliance with control of one partner of the alliance over the others. But this precisely has happened with the theory and practice of the Soviet Union today.

What is the position of marxism-leninism with regard to the relationship between the stages of the national democratic revolution and the socialist revolution?

China was the first semicolonial country to carry out successfully the national democratic revolution and then to bypass the capitalist order. Therefore the experiences of the Chinese revolution are the most relevant to this question. In his essay "on new democracy", Mao Zedong criticized those who claimed to jump over the stages. He wrote:

"Without a doubt, the present revolution is the first step, which will develop into the second step, that of socialism, at a later stage ... The present task of the revolution in China is to fight imperialism and feudalism, and socialism is out of the question until this task is completed. The Chinese revolution cannot avoid taking the two steps, first of New Democracy and then socialism... Certain malicious propagandists, deliberately confusing these two distinct stages, advocate the so-called theory of a single revolution ... Their real purpose is to root out all revolution, to oppose a thoroughgoing bourgeois-democratic revolution and thoroughgoing resistance to the Japanese aggressors... it is an utopian view rejected by true revolutionaries to say that the democratic revolution does not have a specific task and period of its own but can be merged and accomplished simultaneously with other tasks, i.e., the socialist task (which can only be carried out in another period), and this is what they call 'accomplishing both at one stroke' ... The 'theory of a single revolution' is simply a theory of no revolution at all, and that is the heart of the matter." (44)

Finally, what is the marxist-leninist position with regard to the class leadership in the non-capitalist development?

The Soviets arguments against the abilities of the Afro-Asian working classes refer, as we have seen, to their numerical weakness and their "cultural backwardness". Assuming this as the basic factors of revolution, the Russian October Revolution or the Chinese Revolution couldn't have taken place since the Russian proletariat was relatively small as against the peasantry and was also very young. During the time of the Chinese revolution the Chinese proletariat was comparatively one of the smallest in the whole of Afro-Asia. The Soviet authors completely neglect the subjective

factors, i.e. the ability of the working class to assume the leading role in the national class struggle.

As we already quoted above, the 6th Comintern congress envisaged the possibility to bypass the capitalist order, "where the proletariat plays the role of the leader". This means that according to the view of the Comintern a non-capitalist transition was never secured, where the working class is not in the leading position. The thoughts of the leader of the first successful non-capitalist transition, Mao Zedong, on this question are put forward as well in his essay "on new democracy". He writes:

"Although such a (new democratic) revolution in a colonial and semi-colonial country is still fundamentally bourgeois-democratic in its social character during its first stage or first step, and although its objective mission is to clear the path for the development of capitalism, it is no longer a revolution of the old type led by the bourgeoisie with the aim of establishing a capitalist society and a state under bourgeois dictatorship. It belongs to the new type of revolution led by the proletariat with the aim, in the first stage, of establishing a new-democratic society and a state under the joint dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes." (45)

Marxism-leninism basically assumes that there is no real socialist transition, if non-proletarian class-forces are leading. This doesn't mean that bourgeois forces in the Third World and even feudalist patriots can't to a certain degree lead the antiimperialist struggle or in other words the national-democratic revolution for quite some time. Every step in the direction to overthrow world imperialism coincides with the aims of the working class and improves in the perspective of the stages of the revolutions its conditions of struggle. A recent example for this dialectical relationship we see in Iran, where the efforts of the Shah to carry on a more independent economic development objectively improved the conditions for the popular mass uprising.

(42) V. I. Lenin, Sel. Works, Vol. 3 p. 425 f.

(43) *ibid.* p. 426

(44) Mao Zedong, Sel. Works, vol. II, Peking 1967, p. 358 ff.

(45) *ibid.* p. 344

The proletariat, which by its position in the production process pursues no selfish interests against the other exploited classes and incorporates the most developed ways of production and therefore is in an irreconcilable contradiction with imperialism, sooner or later will assume the leadership in the national democratic struggle, unless the bourgeoisie in the Third World like in Japan reach the stage of imperialist monopol-bourgeoisie, which can contend with the old imperialist powers. But this is unreal and far away from any foreseeable future.

We now can summarize our findings. The Soviet theory of non-capitalist development is despite marxist-leninist phraseology not in conformity with marxist-leninist principles. It is a revisionist theory and in fact an ideological rationalization for the domination of the Third World by the Soviet Union.

### Is there non-capitalist Development in the Third World?

From our above expositions it is clear that as in China there is the possibility for non-capitalist development in the Third World. At the end of our analysis we try to give some hints on how we view the question of non-capitalist transition today. We also think that a distinction has to be drawn between the internal sphere and the external or more precisely the international sphere.

With regard to the internal sphere we don't need to add more to what we have said above. We think that those critics of the non-capitalist development, who in essence say that there is capitalist development, wherever commodity production is not controlled by the working class with the further aim at abolishing the capitalist commodity production, are one-eyed. They don't understand that capitalism or more precisely its higher stage, imperialism is a political system on a world scale.

The abolishment of this world system is not done with one revolutionary stroke but by a complicated long range process. Capitalism as a world system is also not abolished by the socialist revolution in one country, which due to the law of uneven development of imperialism is possible and is the concrete historical process. If we apply a structural view towards the question, which country by degree of nationalization of production-

means and other similar standards is on the non-capitalist development or is socialist or not, we immediately find ourselves in a mess. This has become apparent in the recent years following growing antagonisms between countries, which by structuralist standards may be seen as "socialist". The structural approach obviously is of no use to explain such contradictions. The clue to answer the problem is in our view to take as the decisive criterion the overall strategic aim to overthrow world imperialism. In this respect Stalin stated:

"In the past it was usual to speak of a proletarian revolution in this or the other developed country as a single entity based in itself, which was set against a single national front of capital, its antipode. Now this position is already insufficient. Now one must speak of the proletarian world revolution, because the single national frontlines of the capital have developed into links of a single chain, called the world frontline of imperialism against which the general front of the revolutionary movements of all countries have to be raised. In the past one has considered the proletarian revolution exclusively as a result of the internal development of the respective country. Now one must view the proletarian revolution above all as a result of the development of contradictions in the world system of imperialism, as a result of the fact, that the chain of the imperialist world frontline breaks in this or that country." (46)

Mao Zedong applied this realization to the national-democratic revolutions in the Third World. He wrote:

"Since (the Russian October Revolution) the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution has changed, it has come within the new category of the new-democratic revolutions and, as far as the alignment of revolutionary forces is concerned, forms part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution. Why? Because the first imperialist world war and the first victorious socialist revolution, the October Revolution, has changed the whole course of world history and ushered in a new era. . . In this era, any revolution in a colony or semi-colony that is directed against imperialism, i.e. against the international bourgeoisie or international capitalism, no

longer comes within the old category of the bourgeois-democratic world revolution, but within the new category. It is no longer part of the old bourgeois, or capitalist, world revolution, but is part of the new world revolution, the proletarian-socialist world revolution." (47)

At the time Stalin and later Mao Zedong made these assertions, they could not foresee that the Soviet Union itself would break away from the world socialist revolution and become itself an imperialist world power, as we have shown above. Does this mean that the international frontline between imperialism and the antiimperialist forces has again fallen into pieces of single national fronts? Obviously not. The independence of the former colonies has even brought about new possibilities to build and strengthen the worldwide antiimperialist front. A new form of struggle based on the international unity of *independent* states has emerged, quite different from the kind of "internationalism" the Soviet Union tries to apply. The movement of nonaligned countries, the group of 77 and other forms of unity on state level are the concrete expression of this new form of struggle. It is in our view wrong to state that the former colonies have become politically independent, but still are part and parcel of the world capitalist economy. Certainly, as long as world imperialism exists, there exists the world imperialist economic order with its all-around exploitative impact on the Third World. But the struggle against this imperialist economic order and all steps forward to the "new economic world order" cannot be seen within the old order. This can be correctly called an overall process of non-capitalist development. All participants in this process on the side of the Third World, irrespective of their class nature objectively belong to this non-capitalist development, as long as and in as much as they struggle against imperialism. This overall development of course does not remove the necessity to overcome the internal contradictions within the single national fronts in order to fully achieve non-capitalist development and socialist transition. Here the final leadership of the pro-

(46) J. W. Stalin, Foundations of Leninism, CW, Vol. 6 p. 85 f. (German ed.), Berlin (GDR), 1952

(47) Mao Zedong *ibid.* p. 343

letariat in the respective Third World-countries is indispensable.

### Summary

The aim of the paper is to find out, whether the modern Soviet theory of non-capitalist development is in conformity with the national liberation struggle and designs a strategy for socialism or for new dependence on the Soviet Union. Methodically our approach is to find out inconsistencies within the theory itself and with regard to the real historical development. From there and by comparing the theory with the general task of national liberation of the Third World and with the views of marxist-leninist classics we try to draw the conclusions about the character of the theory and the character of Soviet-Third World-relations.

Our findings can be summarized as follows. During the time of Khrushchev the national-democratic movement was identified in the Soviet theory and propaganda with socialism, its leaders were considered socialists. Today the Soviet Union pretends to carry out the national-democratic revolution and its leaders towards socialism. During the time of Khrushchev peaceful transition was propagated. Today the Soviet Union designs itself and its 'world system' as the vanguard of the Afro-Asian peoples and it claims the right to exercise 'international dictatorship' with the consequence that positive-neutrality of the Third World (non-alignment) and the principle of non-interference are incompatible with the Soviet strategy of non-capitalist development. Accordingly, non-peaceful means to seize power in Soviet theory rank on top, which conforms with Soviet foreign policy today.

The conclusion of these findings are that the modern Soviet theory of non-capitalist development is not in conformity with the aim of the Third World to achieve and consolidate national independence. Despite marxist-leninist rhetorics it is as well not in agreement with the principles of marxism-leninism and therefore is a revisionist theory designed to rationalize ideologically the aim of the Soviet Union to dominate the Third World.

At the end of our analysis we raise again the question of non-capitalist development under present conditions. We draw the notion that taking into

account the new imperialist character of the Soviet Union the movement of non-alignment, the struggle for a new world economic order and other movements of Third World-unity design a non-capitalist development on world scale. This overall development

does not substitute the necessity to overcome the internal contradictions within the single national states in order to fully achieve non-capitalist development, which has and in the long run will be led by the working classes in the Third World.

## East Germany's Role in Africa

### From "Observer Syndicate"

East Germany's leader Erich Honecker is a man to watch in the deployment of Soviet strategy in Africa.

The role played by the German Democratic Republic (GDR) has hitherto escaped the attention it deserves because it has been so secretive in the past about many of its activities. Now, while it is still secretive about its military role, it has come more fully into the open about the part it has been playing for more than a decade as the main agency for the Warsaw Pact in building up close relations with the African liberation movements – and more particularly in helping to train and finance pro-Moscow Marxist cadres in those movements.

The GDR's African policies are complementary to Cuba's – but unlike Fidel Castro, Honecker can be relied upon by Moscow to follow its lead without any deviation.

Honecker appears to have made a number of important commitments to liberation movements and frontline States bordering on South Africa and Rhodesia during his recent highly successful visit to four key countries – Mozambique, Zambia, Libya and Angola.

East Germany fulfils three major roles as Moscow's ally. Its prime role is to finance and train liberation movements. Its own special national interest role is to spearhead a campaign to discredit West Germany in African eyes. Its least-known but increasingly more important role is to provide substantial military training for a number of African countries and liberation movements.

East Berlin is now the most important centre in Eastern Europe for the liberation movements of Southern Africa.

The Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) maintains a substantial solidarity fund to finance liberation

movements. It maintains editorial offices for, and finances *Sechaba*, the well-produced official organ of the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa. It bears the entire cost of the monthly *African Communist*, the organ of the exiled South African Communist Party. And it provides funds for the South-West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia and for Joshua Nkomo's wing of the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front.

During his recent visit to Zambia and Mozambique Honecker had meetings with the ANC President-General Oliver Tambo, with SWAPO secretary-general Sam Nujoma and Joshua Nkomo. With a fine sense of occasion he presented each of these leaders with a solidarity "donation" of five million East German Marks. He also gave 15 million Marks to President Samora Machel of Mozambique as a mark of "solidarity".

Not surprisingly the East German-financed publications of these liberation movements keep up a campaign of vitriolic denunciation of West Germany – whose leaders are accused of seeking to play "NATO's imperialistic game in Africa".

Their successful propaganda has done considerable damage to Bonn's standing in many African countries. This campaign has been considerably helped by the attitudes displayed by certain West German circles – particularly through the assistance they gave in the past in helping South Africa to develop its nuclear capacity.

The result is that in a number of African countries East Germany now enjoys a higher standing than West Germany. The latter, for example, has not yet succeeded in establishing diplomatic relations with countries like Angola and Mozambique where the East Germans now enjoy a favoured relationship.

During his visit to Mozambique Honecker had the pleasure of hearing President Machel say: "Our two countries form each in its region the frontier between two different social systems. They are defenders of democracy and peace against imperialism and its most aggressive forces."

A treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed between Mozambique and the GDR. Their communique welcomed the recent declaration of the Warsaw treaty States as "serving the fight of the African people for their liberation from imperialism, racism and apartheid."

While the GDR leader could expect to receive an enthusiastic welcome in Mozambique and Angola in view of the support the East Germans gave to the anti-Portuguese liberation struggle, his biggest political success came during his visit to Zambia – a country with which the GDR has not been on particularly good terms in recent years.

Honecker promised his country's full support to Zambia in its stand against "racist Rhodesia and South Africa". No mention was made of possible military assistance but a number of treaties covering economic, trade and cultural relations were signed.

There was, however, one significant omission in the joint communique signed between President Kaunda and Honecker. There was no condemnation of China as "an aggressor" in Vietnam. At all his other African stops the GDR leader succeeded in getting endorsement for bitter attacks against China: as well as support for the victory of the "People's Republic of Kampuchea" and for the new "progressive revolutionary regime in Afghanistan".

Joshua Nkomo too voiced condemnation of "the disgraceful attack by China against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam".

The GDR Solidarity Committee – which is under the chairmanship of Kurt Seibt, a veteran Communist Party official – gave 40 million Marks to African countries in the first half of 1978. The committee has brought many guerrilla fighters wounded in Namibia and Rhodesia for treatment in East German hospitals. Twenty young Namibians were brought to the Berlin-Buch Clinic after an attack on their camp by South African forces.

But the Solidarity Committee does not limit its help to liberation fighters. Every year hundreds of African and Asian children are brought to spend their holidays in the GDR with German children of their own age.

More than 600 Asian and African patients have been treated in East German hospitals since the beginning of 1978.

While the East Germans are open about these activities they are much less forthcoming when it comes to providing details about their military and police aid to African countries. Their two biggest military aid programmes are in Angola and Ethiopia. Estimates of the number of East German military instructors in these two countries vary between 3,000 to 5,000.

A West German analyst of East Germany's role in Africa, Dr. Henning von Lowis, has estimated that GDR military and security advisers are presently working in 13 African countries. He estimated the annual cost of GDR military assistance to Africa at around 200 million Marks.

The East Germans seem to specialise in providing security service personnel

for Third World countries. They helped to run Zanzibar's prisons at the height of the late President Karume's regime. They still help to run the prison service in South Yemen.

The GDR *Staatssicherheitsdienst* (State security service) helped to organise Mozambique's secret police (SNASP). A West German paper, *Die Welt*, has reported that there are 430 officers of the *Volksarmee* in Mozambique.

General Eichorn, the GDR Chief of Police, was the host to Angola's police commander, Santana Andres Petroff, when he visited East Berlin. According to the party paper *Neues Deutschland*, the Angolan police commander came to "acquaint himself with the experience of the *Volkspolizei* about the reliable protection of the power of the workers and peasants, and about the maintenance of public order and security."

After his visit to East Berlin the SED member responsible for military and security affairs, Werner Lamberz, visited Luanda to advise Angola on its national security problems.

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- **Why does China import foreign capital and technology?**
  - **What is the background of the modernizing campaign in China?**
  - **Is it possible for a socialist country to learn something from capitalism?**

This are some of the items discussed in this interview with a member of the AKP who visited China last autumn. The interviewee makes clear that he has never studied Chinese economy thoroughly and welcomes criticisms on his viewpoint.

## Where does China's Economy go?

From "Rode Fane" – Journal of AKP (M-L), Norway

**Rode Fane:** From Beijing Review and other sources we learn that the Chinese are discussing the use of the bonus system, greater freedom for the single factory, etc. Some people say that this and the import of machinery from capitalist countries are signs that China has turned capitalist. What is your view?

**R.K.:** Yes and no. It is nonsense to say that Hua Guofeng has made a counter-revolutionary coup. The smashing of the "Gang of Four" does not mean the victory of capitalism but does on the

contrary secure socialism. Anybody who studies the „Gang of Four" and their policies knows this. On the other hand I am not capable of giving any single answer for the economic discussions and changes taking place in China today. To do that we must understand some of the weaknesses in the socialist economy.

**Rode Fane:** You mean that the capitalist economy that we have in Norway has strong points that a socialist economy can learn from?

**R.K.:** Without any doubt the



Norwegian economy produces some goods better than the Chinese. It is in some fields better organised. It is more effective in the systematical development of new and better products, etc.

What I say is not very new. The Communist classics emphasised this many years ago.

In his well known work, "Anti-Dühring" Engels says: "The fact that the socialized organisation of production within the factory has developed so far that it has become incompatible with the anarchy of production in society."

Here Engels speaks about the reasons for capitalism's crisis. It is evident that we can learn from the capitalists when they develop organised social production within the factory. Of course we do not keep the private ownership of the means of production which leads to the crisis itself. We must learn from capitalism at the same time as we wish to abolish exploitation.

Lenin was even more explicit. In Vol. 12 of his Selected Works he says: "We must not be satisfied that there are responsible and good communists in all the state trusts and mixed companies. This is of no use, because these Communists do not know how to manage the economy. In this sense they lack the ordinary capitalistic functions of trade that has been taught in the great factories and firms."

These quotations show us that we should learn from capitalism what is right and scientific.

### **Development of new and Effective Machines:**

**Rode Fane:** You must say something more about this. Is capitalist effectiveness in production to be linked with stress, damage of nature and the environment, unemployment and repression?

**R.K.:** I will explain more precisely. Norway is capitalist. The capitalists own the factories and most of the means of production. It is a hard competition between the capitalists in most sections of the economy. The law of supply and demand operates. Lets take an example.

In the sale of newspaper printing machines there is keen competition in the Norwegian market. Conditions being so, the producer being able to produce effective and technically good

machines at an approximately low price will not have anything sold. The buyer not being satisfied with the offer from a special producer can refuse to buy print machines from this firm.

This is simplified but it illustrates all the same the differences in the economy of China and Norway. In China all the factories making printing machines and all the places where these machines are used, are owned by the state. We say they belong to the state sector. How does distribution take place within the state sector.

The producer of printing machines has been given the task to produce a certain number of machines. The state planning commission has decided quantity and quality. I do not know the complicated plan mechanism so well, so I am not able to say how they reach the number. This is not necessary for us here.

The result is however the same. There has been produced a certain number of machines. At the same time there is a great lack of other kinds of machine in China. The demand for printers is greater than the offer. It will be difficult to distribute the little one has. Many will not get what they asked for.

Here at once we see the great differences between Norway and China. Under capitalism the producers must always be on the look out for making a better and more effective printing machines. In China the producers always get rid of what they have made. In Norway a buyer can refuse to buy if he is not satisfied. In China the state printing houses must accept what they get, even if they had not asked for it and are dissatisfied. If they have asked for a 4 colour deep print machine but get a more simple and primitive machine, they must accept it.

They also have to pay the fixed price. Here we see another difference in China. The price is fixed. In Norway the factory can compete by putting down prices. It is also possible for them to increase the prices if they monopolise the sale, or to make a machine that is much desired. This again is an impulse so they make more of these machines.

### **Socialism is superior**

**Rode Fane:** In other words under the conditions of secure capitalistic competition good products are developed while socialism is like a bureaucracy

hindering such development. This sounds like the worst kind of false praise of capitalism.

**R.K.:** I have not said that. Capitalist competition leads to the development of few effective printing machines. That is a fact. On the other hand it leads to greater exploitation, crisis of over-production, mass unemployment, etc. This means that capitalism hinders the development of the productive forces. These contradictions are built in into capitalism and it will lead it into greater and greater difficulties and make it collapse.

Socialism hinders free competition between factories in the state sector. The working class in power will not tolerate crisis of over-production, inflation or unemployment. These are the merits of socialism and make it develop the economy in a harmonious and planned way.

Socialism is superior to capitalism. When the capitalist countries in the thirties were in a great economic crisis with millions unemployed, the poor Soviet Union under Stalin's leadership made great advances in economic development.

The advances made by China after 1949 one can best understand by comparing it to India or other countries in the Third World.

China is a country of the Third World. It is underdeveloped and poor. Therefore it is not strange that machines and products in a developed capitalist country like Norway is far better and varied.

To put it bluntly the state factories in China make the same old fashioned and bad machines year after year and there is no quick development of more advanced products.

**Rode Fane:** You mean that this is one of the problems being discussed in China today, how to stimulate the state factories into developing new and more rational machines.

**R.K.:** Yes, this is one of the things being discussed. There is of course the possibility for those who receive bad machinery to protest. There are channels of protest. But it is a fact that that is not an effective stimulation for better production as the capitalist hunt for profits and competition.

There is also another aspect to this question. As I said, Norwegian producers must compete in quality as well as in price. I also said that in China

where industry is marked by few, worn out and old-fashioned machines and where the products in the state sector are being distributed according to plan, all products are being sold. It is not the situation where one working more expensively, that is using more workers, raw materials, time and machines, that is more socially necessary working time than others, is not able to sell his products. Everybody gets rid of everything. The state takes over everything and distributes it. This means that there is no great pressure on the factory to produce more cheaply and more effectively. And of course bankruptcies and unemployment are not accepted. This is bit complicated as there are scales of profit to reach. Before I talk about that I want to illustrate problems in Chinese industry more closely by looking at the production and distribution of consumer articles.

### Production of Consumer Articles

In Norway during the past 10–15 years there has taken place a rapid development of sports equipment. There has developed new and better bags to carry on the back, sleeping bags, etc. There is keen competition between the firms. There is huge profits in this field. This leads to great investments for the development of new materials, new designs etc. The stimulant is the competition and the fight for the market and profit ...

In China this stimulant in the consumer section does not exist. Here conditions are marked by shortage of goods. The typical situation is that not all the light industry articles are being sold. In China articles are sorted out according to quality. Let's call the best quality A-goods, the second best, B-goods, etc. Let's say that B-sorting out of a mechanical toy, a horse – is done on the basis that the horse cannot move. In Beijing I saw the B-goods being sold for a quarter of the ordinary price of A-goods. This is typical for a market where there is a lack of goods. Everything produced is being sold. The conditions in this section are not the same as that in heavy industry and the production of machines. Because in small industry people themselves can deny to buy the articles. The problem is that often there is nothing else to buy. Therefore they have to accept the second best.

Producers of consumer goods are also more open to pressure from

buyers than those of heavy industry. People protest. Therefore factories send out groups to find out what people wish to buy in clothing, shoes, toys, etc. But this done to a small extent, and it is evident that it does not function as an equally effective stimulant under socialism as the fight for profits and competition does under capitalism.

The third point I wish to make is productivity in Chinese industry. Here we must consider lots of things. I have already said that my impression of the machines is that they are old and of little effect. This means a great deal for productivity. But also other things play a part, the organisation of the process of production and how intensively workers work.

### Weakness in Organisation and Leadership

Shanghai is the most industrialised city in China. When I was there I got the impression that there was not a reliable built-in system to secure parts and people repairing things quickly enough if things broke down. There was no central service organisation in the city planning. If a machine broke down they tried to repair it themselves. It is clear that this is not rational. These are weaknesses in the organisation of production that has bad results.

I was at one of the big breweries in China. Here they had a small old repair shop that did all the repairs, even big repairs. I saw many factories where parts of production had stopped because of repairs being done.

But in the individual factory also, according to my view, the organisation of the work is not rational. I visited a factory making transformers. Here they put the transformer in the middle of the factory hall so that all transport through the factory came to an end. Trucks had to drive widely round to come from one section of the factory to the other.

Transport passages in the hall were rare, and it was unlike as in Norway where tools were within reach. Much labouring time was therefore wasted in finding and fetching tools.

Here is one of the great problems of the Chinese economy. There are many reasons for this. One of them is that it takes time to learn how to organise production in the most rational way. In Norway this lasted over 100 years. Another reason is that the leadership in

the factories in China and the leadership of industry in city planning have not been sufficiently stimulated to go ahead and make improvements.

The workers can work so hard that they can collapse, but if the machines come to a stand still because of no reserve parts, or if they are not being quickly repaired, or if the products are being moved in hand-carts in a round about way in the factory, all this is of little help.

**Rode Fane:** You mean that production would become more effective if the leadership did a better job.

**R.K.:** Yes, but that is not enough. The reason I put forward the question of leadership is that I find that the discussion going on in China has a weak side. They emphasise that the workers do not work effectively enough, have a bad discipline, etc. This they hope to solve by implementing a system of material incentives as bonuses. Surely one can obtain in this way much by stimulating the workers into greater effort, but I think there is equally much to gain in spurring the leadership and renewing the organisation of production.

Having said that I will not deny that the intensity of work in China is low.

Under capitalism work is a commodity. Price is determined by the law of supply and demand and class struggle. We know that the intensity of work under capitalism is maintained by threats of reduction in wages and sackings. Its intensity of work is kept up by all kinds of abuses against the worker. In "Capital" Marx says that the capitalists use the industrial reserve army, that is the army of the unemployed to keep wages down and the tempo up.

In China this of course is different. The working class has made revolution to be rid of exploitation in society and in the factory ... under socialism power is in the hands of the working class and everybody is guaranteed work. This is good but there are certain elements to take into account.

Under socialism it is possible to stay away or to work with little energy and take life easy. You do not lose income or work because of that. Under socialism the work discipline is built upon discussions and conviction.

The readiness in discipline in China today does not increase the tempo sufficiently. A Japanese worker has said

that no Chinese worker would keep his job in the Japanese heavy industry. The tempo in China is too slow.

We were also told that an iron factory in Japan with 3,000 employed produced as much as the iron factory in Wuhan employing 100,000. Much of this difference is due to bad machinery in China but also to a slow speed and bad organisation. This we could see for ourselves.

**Rode Fane:** In other words do you wish that Chinese workers must enter the hell in which Japanese workers are.

**R.K.:** Of course neither I nor the Chinese working class wish the same stress as in the capitalist factories. But hard and effective work is necessary for the working class and socialism in China.

I know that there are many illusions as to how socialism ought to be. Many will perhaps approve of low effectiveness in Chinese industry, wasted time and people just walking around.

But no real friend of China and no true revolutionary can have this viewpoint. China needs articles to improve the living standards of the people. To build socialism they need machines and tractors. They need weapons to secure the future. They need a great surplus in production to be able to offer greater resources to health services, art and culture, and to give support to countries and liberation movements.

### Health Service and teaching

**Rode Fane:** It is as if capitalism is superior in all areas, when you compare the economy in China to the capitalist economy in Western Europe and U.S.A. Do you really mean this?

**R.K.:** I have analysed the following items: production of the means of production (printing machine, etc.) production of consumer articles, organisation of work and effectivity. I have pointed out that capitalism develops products and keeps up a high speed in production through the hunt for profits. At the same time I have said that socialism hinders crisis, unemployment, inflation, exploitation, repression and bankruptcies. Seen through the eyes of the working class of course socialism is superior. At the same time socialism must advance quickly within the areas I have mentioned.

But there are other sectors in society in which capitalism appears less advan-

tageous. It is a fact that there are areas that are not well regulated through competition and the hunt for profits. In these fields socialism is superior, as in health services, education, culture, etc.

In the USA the health service is to a great extent regulated by supply and demand. This leads to great contradictions and problems for capitalism creating bitterness and severe criticism of the system. Of course the working class and the labouring people feel it mostly. It is evident that old people and invalids need much medical care. At the same time most of the old people have very small incomes. There is no conception here between people's needs and the ability to pay. When medical service is based upon profit, it will neglect the interests of the poor and concentrate upon luxury clinics for those being able to pay.

In the USA this leads to the grotesque situation where they look into the credit card of the injured person before he is driven away to some clinic.

Norway is less marked by this. But even here the means are used to first cure younger people who can be used again in production. Capitalism cares a damn for old people, mentally insane, invalids, etc. . . .

Within these areas socialism is absolutely superior. Socialism acknowledges and registers the great demands and can concentrate great efforts and attempts without being concerned about profitability. Therefore medical services in a developing country like China can serve as a model even for a country like Norway even if in certain fields in Norway we do have an advanced medical technology.

**Rode Fane:** You mentioned in passing mistakes in Soviet economic planning under Stalin and mistakes in the Chinese economic planning today. Can you define this?

**R.K.:** The socialist economy in the Soviet Union under Stalin and the economy in China is what one can call "primitive economy". They started at a fairly low level. The most important aspects of the planning was the development of great iron and steel factories, railways and sources of energy. The centralised resources were concentrated upon producing such projects rapidly; thus development was quickly advanced. In my opinion it is much more difficult to plan the development of an economy that

already has this economic base, these factories.

Agriculture based upon hoes and spades has fairly simple demands that are easy to measure. Agriculture based upon complicated machinery is more difficult to plan. They need lots of special attention. The more developed the socialist economy is the more difficult to plan what to produce and the more difficult to distribute what is being planned. When one has to produce and distribute millions of products new problems arise.

The capitalist countries solve this through the market. There is competition. People buy and sell. This is a kind of regulation with the advantages I mentioned before. When there is a shortage of goods or when a new demand develops, then because it is profitable to the capitalists it is produced. There is of course lots I could say about this; the capitalists create demands, etc.

Some years ago when I was in Tirana in Albania I could not find a single paper clip in the whole capital. This is sadly not an isolated case in a socialist country. To some extent it is due to certain priorities. The resources are being preserved for some special product. But it is also due to the fact there is not a flexible system advising it if there is a need for such an article.

With all its defects the market is a kind of warning mechanism for the capitalists. I cannot see that socialism has any kind of mechanism for this.

The Soviet system under Stalin was a state plan where everything was "locked in" and decided. This system was taken over by the Chinese. It is the Central Planning Committee whose task it is to register needs and that shall decide upon production concerning 900 million people.

My impression is that the factories must stay very close to the calculations made for them in the plan even if they feel that production should be a little more flexible to meet a burning demand.

Mao Zedong mentioned this problem in his "Ten Major Relationships". He points out the contradiction between the central state plan and local initiative. He says that local initiative must be developed and central planning and local initiative must be combined.

A problem closely related to what I

have discussed here is the relationship between fragile small scale industry and heavy industry.

Under capitalism the small industry that is profitable will automatically obtain much investment. It will be able to develop quickly. The reason is that capital comes where profits is the greatest.

Under socialism there is no such automatic mechanism and there is not meant to be any. In the Soviet Union under Stalin it was rather the situation that profitable small scale industry was starved for investments. Nearly everything went into heavy industry. This brought advances but it also had defects.

Mao Zedong has shown that it is important to develop profitable small scale industry to meet the needs of people and to create a surplus that can be used in heavy industry.

From a purely material point of view, if lots of foods and articles that people need to sustain life is not produced it is neither possible to feed a great industrial population nor is it possible to put aside means for heavy industry that is needed later.

How to secure the profits from small scale industry in such a way that it is possible to build up such funds. That is a big question.

**Rode Fane:** Now that you have mentioned the defects in the Chinese economy can you tell us about the things they do to straighten them out?

**R.K.:** I am sorry to say that I cannot say much about this for two reasons. I have not studied it well enough. Further the discussion itself has just started in China and few concrete things have been "worked through" until now. What I hope to make clear here is that there exists real problems in the Chinese economy. These real problems are now being discussed in China. This is very good.

**Rode Fane:** You can all the same comment upon something. It is clear to everybody that they have started introducing bonus, started to discuss about judging the factory according to their profit, etc. Earlier we had said that it is a proof of the Soviet Union being capitalist that production was being ruled by profit.

**R.K.:** Yes that is correct. It is evident that if the *greatest possible profit* is the absolute central working principle as in the Soviet Union then it is a sure sign

that capitalism has been established. When the factories themselves are allowed to keep the whole or most of the profit and can use it for investments to increase the ability of competition, and when competition is free, as in Yugoslavia, then it is clear that the country is capitalistic.

It will always be so that profit is one of the targets for production in a socialist society. It is a target for the state sector as a whole to have a great surplus. Measuring the surplus profit is a way in which to control the effectiveness of production. State organs are able to regulate disorder in the factories first by finding out if the factories have a surplus or not.

It is evident that the working class and the working people in China are interested in such a control. They are interested in the factories being worked satisfactorily.

The factories in China, the machines and the raw materials are the property of the working class and the people. It is the people who created the factories through their hard work. Should they not be interested that the results of their work are being treated well. They who question the factories making a profit or not into a trivial or dubious point do not take the standpoint of the working class.

Today they discuss what is the best way to assess the surplus in terms of accounting. There were great defects with earlier accounting. They only estimated book-kept incomes against expenses. This implied that the use of machinery was not kept in books as an expense . . . leading to an incorrect view of the reality and leading to waste of invested capital . . . the changes taking place in this area will stimulate the management in the factories and the workers to use raw materials, work and machines in the best possible way.

In China there are many targets for factories to attain, concerning quantity, quality, etc. If one uses wrong targets there will be bad results. If only profits count there will be capitalism.

In the Soviet Union under Stalin there was too much emphasis put upon quantity. Most people know the caricature drawing showing the proud leader of a nail factory who had met his target. Besides him lay an enormous nail. The measurement was in tons . . . as far as I know the plan for car production was also estimated in tons . . .

That is why I see the discussion in China about what targets the factories shall have for production as positive. I also consider it wise that they emphasise assessing surplus and that they do so realistically.

To stimulate the workers to more effective and harder work they have also started a little to use piece rates and the bonus system. This I consider correct and good.

**Rode Fane:** Under the Cultural Revolution there was much criticism of the bonus system and other types of material incentives. It was said that this would heighten the selfishness of the working class.

**R.K.:** It is well known that the "Gang of Four" tried to prevent all material incentives during the Cultural Revolution. This was not correct. In China there is differential system of wages. This the "Gang of Four" did not change . . . What the "Gang of Four" did was to prevent bonus and piece rate systems and they prevented increase in wages for the workers for several years. They themselves were rich and they gave their supporters rewards in the forms of high wages and privileges.

**Rode Fane:** You mean that it is impossible to increase production through political consciousness.

**R.K.:** That is not my opinion. I mean that in no country in the world today is it possible to push the economy through political stimulants. I say that political stimulants are of great importance. In the Cultural Revolution they meant much because lots of the economic incentives were taken away. If there is neither material advantages for working hard, or a political motivation for it, everything would end in chaos and anarchy. I also mean that a socialist society must emphasise educating the working class and making it enthusiastic for socialism. There should be encouragement of voluntary work apart from the working hours. Lenin called this communist work and regarded it as a model for everyone. In spite of this the political incentives have not succeeded in producing effectiveness of labour upto the level where it should be. That is why they need material incentives on the basis of he who works more gets more. If one only develops this aspect and the working class puts an end to political and ideological education then socialism is

of course in danger. But I little believe that the material incentives in themselves constitute a danger. Nobody can, however hard he works and saves get rich. Further it is not possible to own the means of production in China ...

It is in accordance with the teachings of Marx and Lenin to emphasise increase in production through material incentives. The reason for this in one aspect is political. People are still scarred with the marks of the old society, but there is above all a material question. Under Communism everyone shall work according to his ability and receive according to his needs. But not in any society in the world today is it possible for the working class to receive according to its need and less so in China. The reason for this is quite simply that production is not so highly developed, that production is so abundant that everybody gets his needs. There has to be another method of distribution. In capitalism it is that the working class gets paid for the value of his work ability and even less. Under socialism they help development by rewarding those giving most.

This is a system benefitting workers and cannot be compared with conditions under capitalism where the capitalist bureaucrat who corners high rates of interests are parasites who never do any production work, are the ones who get the most and the ones who work most are the ones who get less.

**Rode Fane:** Can you mention other efforts to solve the problems you have mentioned.

**R.K.:** As far as I know they are now considering ways of establishing a contract system between factories. This is being done to stimulate production of better machines. Two factories are in direct contact with one another, they can discuss in detail what kind of machine is needed. They can also make sure that the machine arrives in due time. To stimulate production of better consumer articles and to enable more flexible production they have begun giving the single factory more freedom. How it is done practically I do not know but I believe they are trying different ways.

**Rode Fane:** Do you not see any danger that capitalist elements might grab power in China?

**R.K.:** Of course there is danger that capitalist elements can make a coup d'etat in China as has happened in the Soviet Union. There is always the danger of capitalism being restored.

We must however pay attention to one thing. The leaders in China admit that there are real problems of development. They put their cards on the table. This is good. Marxism is not a dogma. It is a guide to action. Concrete analysis of the concrete situation is the living soul of Marxism. This means that there is no ready made recipe for the solution of the new problems. They have to experiment. They have to discuss openly what is right and what is wrong. What is taking place, as I see it, is the expression that socialism is not a ready made system but one that must be built.

Under Stalin, in Albania, under the "Gang of Four" socialism was put forward as being without any problems. This gave people all over the world false hopes in socialism. When it became clear that there were problems many became disillusioned and turned away from socialism. Many ordinary people lost faith in communism because of such propaganda.

China today shows that it is not enough to have conferences to solve problems. Neither is there a great saviour, a great theoretician sitting at his writing desk to solve them. They must be solved through practice and

with time. In future this will certainly be summed up theoretically – but practice must come first.

Naturally there are different views about developments in China today. Wrong views are also there, if there were no wrong views there would be no debate.

It is also evident that people in China wishing to establish capitalism will try to fish in muddy waters and attempt to force through their viewpoint and line.

Sooner or later there will be class struggle about how the economy should be developed. Some of the concrete actions coming from the discussions will certainly create damage and will be criticised.

But what is strange in this. There is at least an assurance that there is a big discussion. I am happy when I see that the leadership in the CPC fortifies democracy, that the newspapers are open for discussion and the wall-posters put forward people's viewpoints.

The working class in China with its rich experiences will certainly be able to judge what is in their interest and in the interests of socialism in the discussion now going on. If the leadership in China had denied discussion and maintained that there were no problems then there would be reason to worry.

## When an Idealist explains Counter-Revolution.

### Comments on Bettelheim's "Great Leap Backwards" From "Rode Fane"

Today the Chinese are discussing how they can increase productivity, work capabilities and production efficacy.

The background for this discussion is that the Chinese economy is not effective compared to industry in capitalist countries in the West and Japan. The "Gang of Four" did not accept the fact that there were weakness in China's economy. They branded everyone who tried to change this situation as "economist". Bettelheim follows truthfully in the tracks of the "Gang of Four". He sneers at sayings like "rules and regulations will never be taken away. With the development

of production and technique rules and regulations will increase."

He is scornful of those who are of the opinion that certain aspects of organisation in capitalist institutions are scientific and that it is important to learn from them.

Let's see what the Marxist classics have to say about this:

**Engels:** "When human beings by help of inventing genius and science has made himself master of the forces of nature then these will revenge themselves upon him. To the extent that human beings use them they subject him to a true despotism that is in-

dependent of every social organisation. Wishing to abolish authority in heavy industry means wishing to abolish industry itself . . . that is to return to the spinning wheel."

**Lenin:** "To teach oneself to work – that is a task that in its entirety has to be put to the people of Soviet power. Capitalism's last words applying to this, the Taylor system is – like all capitalistic steps forward a union of the bourgeoisie's exploitative refined barbarism and a great deal of wonderful scientific victories, as in the analysis of mechanical movements during work, elimination of unnecessary movements, working out of the right methods of work, putting into function the best system for registration and control, etc.

"The Soviet Republic must at every cost take over the merits within scientific and technical achievements in this area. The possibilities of turning socialism into a reality will be decided by our steps forward in the question of uniting Soviet power and Soviet organisation of administration with the advanced achievements of capitalism."

**Mao:** "We must firmly reject and criticise all the decadent bourgeois systems, ideologies and ways of life of foreign countries. But this should in no way prevent us from learning the advanced sciences and technologies of the capitalist countries and whatever is scientific in the management of their enterprise. In the industrially developed countries they run their enterprise with fewer people and greater efficiency and they know how to do business. All this should be learned well in accordance with our own principles in order to improve our work."

What has Bettelheim to put up against this compact wall. Not very much. He, who in his earlier works interpreted and turned inside out the smallest saying of the classics rejects them now with the following remarks: "Engels has allowed himself to be carried away by polemics. Lenin's teachings only applied to the period 1918-21 in the Soviet Union." (Commentary in the book: "Cultural Revolution and Industrial Organisation in China") Hua Guofeng has falsified Mao, etc.

This is not convincing. That he surely knows himself. That is why he uses the same method as the magicians. He babbles at the same time as he tries to snap things away with his fingers.

### **On Capitalist and Socialist Technique**

We get a view about the class conditions of science and technology. If American techniques come into China then there would also be capitalist conditions in Chinese factories. There are capitalist truths and socialist truths, capitalist technique and socialist technique. I had nearly said capitalist sunshine and socialist sunshine.

This is of course absolute nonsense. If Sony in Japan can produce many and good color TVs in a short time then Chinese workers must be able to do the same if they get the know how of production in Japan and if they get the possibility to use the same machinery and raw materials, etc.

If Japanese capitalism has achieved a highly effective way of organising work in the factory their unnecessary time and anarchy is eliminated. This will be truths for everybody, that one can benefit from in the USA, Norway and China.

In the USA, Japan and Norway the working classes are being repressed and exploited. But will Chinese workers automatically be exploited if they produce more effectively? Will they be exploited if they learn from the methods and techniques that are used in the USA and Japan?

### **Discipline in Production**

Bettelheim's opinion is that discipline in industry and authority in production is a proof that workers are being suppressed.

But can heavy industry today even if it is in USSR or China be managed without discipline and well planned organisation. No!

This the Marxist classics fully realise. This is implied is Engel's formulation about human beings being subject to a despotism independent of social organisation.

Lenin says very directly: "However it turns out to be submission without any conditions under one single will is absolutely necessary for the progress of the processes of labour being organised according to the model,"

"As to the railways these conditions are doubled and even trebled if necessary. But today the same revolution demands just to safeguard itself and fortify itself in the interests of socialism that the masses without con-

dition submit to the single will of the leader of the labour processes."

This Lenin did not say because he wished the Soviet workers to become slaves. He said this because conditions have to be so for heavy industrial production to be effective. All normal persons understand that a person attending to operating a collective machine can't quite suddenly start reading a novel without this affecting others involved in the same operation. Spontaneous reading of novel will read to chaos if it spreads.

Bettelheim of course does not argue from concrete conditions within industrial production. That would expose him. He goes on gabbling with great words.

### **Production = Class Struggle**

The reasoning that discipline in production means oppressed workers is the following: Mao Zedong has said that one shall not blindly obey a directive. One must make investigation, judge for oneself, utter criticism, etc. Yes, of course so it has to be when it is not a special situation and so it also has to be when one is discussing what and how to produce. But when it is agreed with what and how to produce, when the political discussions are over then one must produce effectively, and one must not stop because of a new agreement.

Political discussions are a sort of class struggle and are ruled by other laws than that of production, as production is the struggle against nature. But Bettelheim wishes to believe that class struggle and production are the same and being submitted to the same laws.

### **About Campaigns, etc.**

What else has Bettelheim to offer us. He is against organised campaigns and applauds spontaneous campaigns. When the Communist Party is being inspired by spontaneous campaigns in parts of the working class and tries to spread it to the whole working class then such a campaign according to Bettelheim can only "take away from the workers the control over the conditions of work, i.e. expropriate them and exploit them even more." He is against adoption of foreign technique, he is against accumulation and large factories. He is extremely taken up by the spontaneous, small producing industries manufacturing clothes and

sandals. He is against too fast mechanization in the countryside, etc. Where does this lead to. The conclusion would be that he is against the development of the forces of production. Why is he against the development of the forces of production.

### **Conditions of Production**

He is against the development of the forces of production because he is an idealist and has turned Marxism upside down. Let him speak for himself: "In the combination, Forces of production / conditions of production the latter play the major part through the way they charge the forces of production, the conditions for their own reproduction." (Bettelheim: Cultural Revolution and Industrial Organisation in China).

Let us pit this against Marx: "The conditions in society are closely knitted to the forces of production. When people acquire new forces of production they change their way of production, and by changing their way of production, and by changing the means of sustenance of life, they change all the conditions in society. When we use the hand it was a society of feudalism. When we use the steam engine we have the society with industry." (Marx - Poverty of Philosophy).

Mao Zedong has developed this even further: "True, the productive forces, practice and the economic base generally play the principal and decisive role; whoever denies this is not a materialist. But it must also be admitted that in certain conditions, such aspects as the relations of production, theory and the superstructure in turn manifest themselves in the principal and decisive role. When it is impossible for the productive forces to develop without a change in the relations of production, then the change in the relations of production plays the principal and decisive role."

Under socialism one must try ways of organising production and have laws and rules in society that fortify the development of the productive forces instead of keeping them down.

Before the Cultural Revolution there were many rules than hindered the creativeness of the masses, that hindered the development of the forces of production. Such rules were called irregular. They were criticised and rejected. In this way the Cultural Revolution was able to fortify the productive forces.

But the Gang of Four created chaos out of these conditions. Under cover of the struggle against wrong and rigid rules and laws they rejected all rules concerning production and discipline. This created a great wave of liberalism, chaos, disorder and stagnation in production. This policy in form was "left", was leading in the same direction as the policies of the Right, stagnation in the development of the forces of production. But the idealism of Bettelheim makes him support conditions that in reality hinder the productive forces. In addition to this Bettelheim has an in-built fear of developing the productive forces. He retreats in fear and is convinced that in developing the productive forces the environment will be infected with capitalism.

### **The Productive Forces must be developed**

I do not think that Bettelheim is a counter-revolutionary just wishing socialism in China to lose. But in reality he is spokesman for counter-revolutionaries in China and the whole world. He is a spokesman for the class enemy's wishes to crush socialist China. Why?

Because China cannot consolidate socialism without developing the productive forces and increasing production.

Without an enormous increase in production, without possibilities for securing welfare to the increased population, without developing the backward rural areas, developing backward areas in China, secure higher education for the working class to eradicate the differences between mental and manual work, to make it possible to develop the medical services, education, culture, etc. it will neither be possible for China to give great help to under-developed countries and nations.

Last but not least it will not be possible for China to build up a strong and modern defence that today must follow most closely the movements of the Soviet Army.

### **The Book is of little worth**

One can learn from Bettelheim because he is an interesting example of how not to think and analyse. Apart from that there is little to get from the book. There are lots of bourgeois and extremely reactionary authors one can

learn from because they are bringing forward facts. Bettelheim does not belong to this group of bourgeois politicians. One of his main points is that the Gang of Four did not damage the economy of China with their politics. This he tries to prove with some figures. He points to increases in the production of corn, coal-mining, etc. But this tells us little. Bettelheim does not make any attempt to point out increases per head each year. If rural production does not increase faster than population there will not be any surplus. If rural production decreases in ratio to population increase there will be hunger and famine in China, and this might lead to the decline of socialism. American calculations show a tendency towards rural production increasing as fast from 1958-71 (2.1%) (Source: Congress Report 1975).

On steel production Bettelheim says for example that it increased from 12.5 million tons in 1965 to 23.8 million tons in 1974. And then he forgets to say that in 1973 the total steel production was 25 million tons; in other words a decline in one million tons from 1974-75. (Source: China's Industry, Planning, People, Regional Geographic Analysis - Danish Gyldendal, p. 77).

According to official Chinese information Bettelheim's figures relating to industry are too high. (Chinese production in many fields since the fall of the Gang of Four has risen considerably - Editor).

He takes his examples at random in the attempt in his analysis to make them fit into the picture he is painting of counter-revolution and exploitation. On several occasions his attempts are so distorted that they are almost comical.

He speaks about a small collective unit in which parts of their machines are missing. They wrote to the factory without getting an answer. After much trouble they obtained a contract. The factory sent two technicians to the collective unit to find out what was missing. At last everything was sold and everybody was satisfied.

What kind of conclusion does Bettelheim draw from this.

Does he criticise the bureaucracy whose fault it was that it took a long time before the problems were solved? No, he criticises the fact that the factory sent technicians to the collective

unit and says: "one will observe how such an incident give the leaders and technicians of the People's Commune and the factories an opportunity to travel out of their respective units to where they are free from working several days ... this shows the way class conditions have developed."

**Moral:** Do not send technicians down to the place where the problems are to solve concrete practical problems. That is proof of capitalism!

### About Foreign Policy

In the beginning of the seventies Bettelheim sometimes functioned positively in the international struggle against social imperialism. In the great discussion with the American intellectual, Sweezy, and the Trotskyite Mandel, he emphasised that the Soviet Union was not socialistic, even if the state owned nearly all the means of production. He said that we must consider which class

is in power in society and which class has power in the single factory.

Today he is a runner for social imperialism in the international class struggle.

He ends his book with some clumsy attacks on China's foreign policy. In line with the Norwegian revisionists he says it was a mistake to support Mobutu in Zaire. When he draws conclusions he says that Mobutu, Amin and Pinochet are the worst reactionaries in Africa and Latin America. We do not hear a single word of what he has to say about Castro. But even in this situation where he writes as a liberation fighter he cannot stop himself from putting forward the following magical formula:

"The CPC's recent international practice damaged China's prestige among the people, especially in the Third World. In reality China's foreign policy serves the purposes of social-imperialism."

## Another Reply to Bettelheim

### The Question of China – Correction or Betrayal. By Alain Bouc

Until the end of 1976 Alain Bouc was the correspondent in Peking of the French daily newspaper, "Le Monde". He is the author of two well documented books about the development of China since the cultural revolution: "La Chine a la Mort de Mao" and "La Rectification". Both of these have been translated into English.

Books about China fall into two large groups: the one presents China as completely red, the other as completely black. Authors who want to paint China in a somewhat less definite colour are a small minority only. Anyway, they are not deserters of one of the aforementioned two groups: whoever stops seeing completely red, sees completely black. It is a kind of law and Bettelheim is no exception.

Of course a few distinguished passages can be found in these pamphlets but they are as if set in the concrete of stubborn claims, and there are passages which are not – or only to a very small extent – confirmed by the facts. One can feel, that behind the well-stressed scientific language, personal, ideological accounts are being settled.

In fact, without further debate, the basic themes which are set out:

1. The new Chinese leadership has seized power after Mao Zedong's death, by a coup d'état.
2. It represents the interests of a new

class of a state capitalist bourgeois, a bourgeois which sits in the party.

3. It plans to get rid of all the achievements of the cultural revolution and to return to the situation of 1965.
4. It blatantly betrays the line of Mao Zedong.

The whole text is based on these assumptions. If they are false the whole thing collapses.

### Bettelheim's wrong views

If one thinks that Bettelheim is wrong, one should in no way assume, therefore that the complete opposite of his thesis is true.

2. It is just as evident that one must refrain from judgment for as long as basic facts are lacking, which are necessary for an examination.

3. A political line can be judged only on its practical effects and its events. It is dangerous to pass judgment in advance – whatever the kind. It is dangerous to cheer the Chinese Communist Party as others enthuse over the

choice of a Pope whose intention they do not know.

4. One cannot judge the line on decisions bound up with the circumstances – whereby concrete problems are to be solved, "A false line can cover another" and the correction of an extreme radical position implies sooner or later – but not at the same moment – a correction of correct tendencies.

But back to Bettelheim and his hypothesis.

1. One can scarcely speak of a coup d'état in October 1976. The expression does not fit a situation in which the majority of a political force decided to separate from four of its members of whose judgment and actions it disapproves.

One only needs to look at the facts to see that there was no "seizing of power". Hua Guofeng has been the chief governor since January 1976. In the Chinese system this means nomination for party leader which Hua obtained in April.

These appointments since the beginning of 1976 are a renunciation of the radicals by the government. According to the hierarchy Zhang Chunqiao should have become the first representative chairman of the Central Committee. To allow no misunderstanding the Central Committee had just created the first representative chairman, a position which had previously not existed; clearly this accords with the title of a chosen follower of Mao (such a title has not been used since the Lin Biao affair). One could go further back and establish that Hua Guofeng had been chosen as leader ever since autumn 1976: the leader who would ensure that the government would stick together, the government which was deeply divided on the question of the conclusions to be drawn from the cultural revolution.

The meaning which was given at that time to the journey of Hua to Tibet, where he spoke in the name of Mao Zedong, the role he played both in September 1975 and October at the National Conference of Learning at Dachai confirm this. One only needs to read Hua's report of 15th October 1975 to see that here he speaks with the authority and power of a government leader. Jiang Jing and Deng Hsiao-ping also held talks in Dachai. The contents were not published, however.

Without question, the conflict inside the government after the death of Mao



in September 1976 has developed. Nothing, however, justifies the statement that the radicals had previously had the full trust of Mao Zedong.

2. It is quite true that the radicals – and Zhang Chungqiao in particular – have brought the image of the new rise of the bourgeois in socialism a step further. It is also true that this bourgeois has its basis in the division of work, in the opposition of intellectuals and manual workers, in the unequal division of power, of consequence, of authority, income and knowledge.

This does not at all mean that the radicals were models of democracy and selflessness. Even less does it mean that a balance was found between exaggerated specialisation and the division of labour with a resultant narrow-mindedness on the one hand and a verbal democracy ending with individual and collective irresponsibility on the other.

### **Mao calls for Stability and Order**

From Paris one cannot pass judgement on this last point. Everyone who has spent sometime in China could see at the same time some production units in which the people chattered continuously about revolution, others in which the directors (the leaders of the Revolutionary Committee) were all powerful and yet others where there was clearly a close tie between the basic workers and the management, and production was efficiently organized.

I can only say that in the years I spent in China there was in this sphere a certain amount to be corrected, and that the most "left" speeches often masked the greatest laziness when it came to acting and joining the theory with practice.

3. The correction of this laziness did not begin with the death of Mao. One must be quite malicious not to see already in the speech of Zhou Enlai to the Congress in January 1975 all the great themes of economic development which today direct trade – above all the aim of the four great modernisations by the end of the century.

The introduction of foreign technology does not begin in October 1976 either. The great contracts with the French petro-chemical and machine building concerns originate in the years 1973-74. There would have been more such contracts if the radicals had not opposed this policy, the direction however was clearly given.

One can wonder whether Bettelheim doesn't ignore a lot of information, to facilitate his arguments. Would he then dare to speak of a "band of three" (Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Committee, Zhou Enlai, Prime Minister, Zhu De, Chairman of the People's Congress) who had represented the interests of the bureaucratic bourgeois since the death of Lin Biao (1971)?

4. He makes the same mistake with his allegations concerning the change in leaders: not after the death of Mao, but since the death of Lin Biao five years earlier, one could see numerous leaders who had lost their position during the cultural revolution, returning to responsible posts. The great "return from holiday" took place in 1972 and the beginning of 1973, and the return of Deng Hsiao-ping was greatly noticed at the time.

In other respects one should not exaggerate the meaning of this re-instatement to construct a betrayal of the cultural revolution from it: a good majority of the government – at least 16 out of 26 members – were active in this revolution – started by Hua Guofeng – between 1966-69. It would be astonishing if they were to condemn this movement to which they mainly owed their fame and power.

5. Bettelheim does not dare to criticise Mao Zedong. One wonders why – for surely Mao just as any other revolutionary – could be mistaken. At least – and Bettelheim must have known it – it was none other than Mao who in autumn 1974 gave his opinion that after 8 years one must make an end of the fight for power, and from the Central Committee he gave the watchword "stability and order".

"For the last years we had the proletarian cultural revolution ... Now we need stability. One must ensure the unity of the party and the army." This citation is no justification. It makes it impossible, however, to claim that the later, following correction is a betrayal of Mao.

In this short pamphlet one could point out many more gross misjudgments. Some of them are astonishing in an author who has followed the developments in China so closely. It is therefore, for example, amusing to read that the cultural revolution had begun to lose its strength in January 1967, when in Shanghai the newly installed power

stalled power was denied the title of "peoples communists".

### **Maos Ideas on Revolution and Production Implemented**

The extremism of Bettelheim turns heads over heels: at this time the cultural revolution – apart from Shanghai – had not yet reached the phase where workers took part. Just from 1967 and 68 it was taking effect: in the reorganisation of management by the revolutionary committees, the reform of regulations, the propaganda for the industrial agreement of the Anshan Iron and Steel Works and the five principles of management, the education of technical workers at their place of work, the development of the militia, the connection between the industries and the universities, the drastic reduction of unproductive work, etc. To see the revolution of the summer 1966, the revolution of the students and scholars, is like mistaking the touch-paper for the explosive. To see the start of the decline of the cultural revolution in 1967 reminds one of the imagination of the people who in seeing an embryo a few weeks old, sheds tears over its dreadful ageing and its loss of energy.

Bettelheim mistakes what the cultural revolution should be and its true length. According to some of the texts of the Central Committee of 1966, it should have lasted about two years: shortly afterwards some leaders spoke of three years. The Party was to be rebuilt for the 1969 Congress. In no way however, was this revolution concerned with its duration. It would last for a while, and later one would start afresh. For most Chinese this revolutionary phase concerning power, was finished in 1969 or 1972. The fact that the time of the new distribution of the cards was officially declared as ended in 1976 in no way means that one opens fire on the past, but only simply that the line was rejected which furthered and organised the continuation of agitation in the state, industry and government.

... There are many problems in China. There is verbal socialism, paternalistic slavishness to authority, laziness and negligence, routine and an unusual peasant like clumsiness, there is favouritism and narrow-mindedness, and all kinds of tricks are used.

All this requires and demands correction. And it is this, it seems to me, the people in China are now busying

themselves with. The central watchword today is the joining of theory and practice and it is difficult to see in this an anti-Marxist slogan.

There are more important things to do than play with the word "profit" ... the winning of trade for the state does not mean that one makes gains which should be distributed in trade, nor does it mean that one is copying the Soviet Union.

To raise the technical level, to modernise industry, to increase production in a poor and ill-equipped country is not necessarily counter-revolutionary. The training of workers, and the improvement of their grasp of technology does not oppose the demand that industry should be in the hands of workers. Quite the opposite, it is a pre-requisite that they can really take it into their own hands.

I see no opposition between the stressing of the revolution and the stressing of production. I was often shocked to see that for the press for quite some time the revolutionisation of behaviour and spiritual insight seemed to come exclusively from the literature of Mao ... while no one explained how the grasp of new techniques or machines had contributed to this, to the overcoming of the spiritual jog and the broadening of the horizon, which had given him the feeling the better to master his life.

Mao remains true to Marx when he joins together the class struggle with production, as ingredients of the revolution, and when he adds to them scientific experiment. One can even come to the conclusion that the whole of Marxist thinking turns round the necessary reconciliation of these two parts, which becomes possible through the overthrow of bourgeois power.

### **Ideas come from Practice not Books**

To accuse China of economism, of production fetishism, of revisionism, because it speaks of production, as does Bettelheim, is over-hasty. It is less dialectic to refuse to recognise that production has its own requirements which differ from those of the class struggle.

It is impossible to understand Chinese texts if one ignores the reality to which they relate. Attention is paid to the directing of industries as too many industries live on subsidies.

Order and civilisation are spoken of as great China is still too anarchistic and confused. The joining of theory and practice is spoken of for too many meetings are like evening recitals. Rules regarding university acceptance are made slightly more flexible, as it is urgently necessary to take in students – the number of students is far too low ...

Must one cast aside the calculation of the cost price, the return of investments and the threshold of loss, to make the revolution better.

One can discuss the theory of the Three Worlds ... one can demand that one should undertake to prove it, but one can scarcely call it absurd. Still less can one say it turns its back on the ideas of Mao. The Third World played

a particular decisive role in all the ideas of Mao since the war ...

At the same time the overall leadership of the land, party and government rests in the hands of Hua Guofeng, a man who has come forward out of the cultural revolution, who claims to defend the principles of the result of the cultural revolution, who stands for the narrowing of bourgeois rights, who challenges the workers to fight managers of industry who misuse their power and whose main role – to which he has held fast till 1976 – remains to "rule the land with the class struggle as the key link".

Is it asking too much from the specialists of thought to ask them not to say what to them seems obviously right, but to seek truth in deeds and not in their heads or in their books.

## **Strengthening Ideological and Political Work**

### **From Peking Review**

Many fear that with the emphasis upon the four modernisations China will preoccupy itself with production goals to the exclusion of the type of the political class struggles and rectification campaigns that has characterised the dialectical relationship between revolution and production in the course of the Chinese revolution. Here we produce an article from "Peking Review" which makes it abundantly clear that while the shift in the focus of the CCP is on the four modernisations, the ideological and political struggle will in no way be abandoned, on the contrary strengthened. Our own view is that in the course of the new "Long March" the CCP will integrate the two in practice and with its rich experience of revolutionary struggles, the most profound in the history of mankind's struggle against oppression.

Ideological and political work occupies a place of prominence in all the work of the Party. With the shift in the focus of the Party's work, there must, first of all, be an ideological shift. To promote what is proletarian and liquidate what is bourgeois is a long-term task on the ideological front. Ideological and political work must be integrated with economic work.

What role will ideological and political work play after the whole Party has shifted the focus of its work to socialist modernization? Will it be strengthened? How? A correct resolution of this problem is of great importance both to the present shift in the focus of work and to the four modernizations in the long period ahead.

### **Pay Attention to Ideological Education**

Regardless of what we are doing, there is one thing we Communists always stick to, that is, paying attention to ideological education and raising people's political consciousness. Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement. Unless people are armed with revolutionary thinking, principles, ideals and spirit, there can be no revolutionary action. This job of arming people with revolutionary thinking and spirit is what we call ideological and political work. It occupies a place of prominence in all the work of the Party. Paying attention to such work is a tradition of our Party. In the revolutionary war years,

we succeeded in overcoming our formidable enemies and winning victories under the most trying conditions by relying on intensive ideological and political work to mobilize and organize the masses to take an active part in the wars. As we entered the period of socialism, we continued to fully utilize ideological and political work to ensure the successful fulfilment of our tasks in economic construction.

Our experience in the last few decades has shown that every revolutionary struggle and every revolutionary task led by our Party owed its success to ideological and political work. It is all the more necessary to strengthen ideological and political work at a time when history has come to a turning point and when a herculean and complex task is confronting us.

Now that the Party is shifting the focus of its work, some comrades, however, think that since production is to become the central task and since there will be no more political movements in the future, ideological and political work is no longer that important but something that can be either preserved or done away with. And, they argue, there is no role for ideological and political work since from now on what we emphasize is doing things according to economic laws and managing the economy by economic measures. Some people have begun to question the effectiveness and importance of ideological and political work as if it has become a problem. The Party's ideological and political work in some places and departments has, in fact, become weakened and this has adversely affected the shift in the focus of work. All this indicates that the pernicious influence of Lin Biao and the "gang of four," who disrupted the Party's tradition of political work and twisted the role of political work and the relationship between politics and economics, has yet to be eliminated. It also indicates that some of our comrades do not have a complete understanding of the necessity and importance of doing a good job in ideological and political work in this new historical period.

The four modernizations, while calling for greatly increased productive forces, are calling for some changes in the relations of production and the superstructure that are not in harmony with the productive forces. They are also calling for a change in all the inap-

propriate ways of management, activities and thinking. Such a change involves every aspect of social life – economic, political and cultural – and involves people from every walk of life and every single individual. It is an extensive and deep-going great revolution in every sense. In such a new historical period, many new conditions, problems and contradictions are bound to crop up and they will inevitably find expression, one way or another, in people's thinking. So ideological and political work is certainly not something that can be either preserved or done away with; on the contrary, it is very important and must not be weakened but be further strengthened.

(...)

### A Shift in Ideology first

Ours is a socialist country; in the course of modernization, we must stick to the four fundamental principles: the socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, Communist Party leadership and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. Without intensive ideological and political work there can be no guarantee of our adherence to the four principles. In this new historical period, our ideological and political work must continue to stick to the principle of fostering proletarian ideology and eliminating bourgeois ideology. We are opposed to magnifying the class struggle and opposed to Lin Biao's and the "gang of four's" nonsense that class struggle tends to become increasingly acute, but it does not follow that class struggle no longer exists.

When admitting that in our society there really is a small handful of counter-revolutionaries and criminals who hate our socialist modernization and try to undermine it, we must also understand that the class struggle still exists in the ideological field; that in the struggle between the two ideologies each is trying to win our youth to its side; that, with increased contacts with the outside world, the influence of bourgeois ideas and the bourgeois way of life will grow; and that some people in society will invariably spread thoughts sceptical of or opposed to the four fundamental principles mentioned above.

The contradictions between the two classes and the two roads are an objective reality which must be acknowledged and dealt with accordingly. Of

course, only a very small part of these contradictions fall within the category of contradictions between ourselves and the enemy, and dictatorship must be resolutely exercised over the enemies whose crimes have been proved by conclusive evidence. Most of these contradictions are among the people themselves, and have to be settled by means of intensive ideological and political work. To promote what is proletarian and liquidate what is bourgeois is still a long-term task on the ideological front; we must in no way relax our political and ideological education of the masses.

### Political work and economic Measures

With a view to rapidly developing the national economy, it is imperative to abide by laws, expand the role of economic measures, adhere to the principle of "to each according to his work" and adopt a reward system to ensure more pay for more work. This is entirely necessary and will remain our unshakable principle. But the adoption of economic measures and a reward system certainly does not mean that ideological and political work can be dispensed with or weakened. Only when ideological and political work is merged with economic measures can people's enthusiasm for production be fully aroused.

We must insist on remuneration being paid according to work done and on more pay for more work. At the same time we stress "from each according to his ability" and encourage people to foster a communist attitude towards labour – working oblivious to the number of hours and the amount paid. To deny the principle of material interests and ignore material awards is not Marxist; to deny the moral strength and the part it plays and pay no attention to arousing the masses with advanced ideology is not Marxist either.

Men must have some spirit, some ideals and a style. Ideological and political work means instilling revolutionary ideas into the minds of people, broadening their visions, elevating their spiritual world to a much higher plane so that they can look farther from a higher place and consider things in the overall situation, as an entity, from long-term and fundamental interests.

In a country like ours, with a weak economic foundation and a huge pop-

ulation, it is certainly a very arduous and heavy task to translate the four modernizations into reality within a not too long period of time. We still need to tell people to think of the motherland, to work hard, to strive to make our country strong, to brace themselves up with a revolutionary spirit, to shoulder heavy tasks, to scale heights courageously, to fear no sacrifices and surmount all kinds of difficulties ahead. Only when ideological and political work is merged with economic measures can men's ideological consciousness be elevated to ensure that economic measures can be correctly applied with good results.

Stalin said: In real life, in practice, politics and economics are inseparable.

The two exist side by side and play a part together. Whoever tries to separate economics from politics in our real work and strengthen economic work at the cost of weakening political work or strengthen political work at the cost of weakening economic work will surely go to the wall.

The new historical period has new and greater demands to make on ideological and political work. This work must be carried out in connection with economic work and be integrated with it. "There is absolutely no doubt about the unity of politics and economics, the unity of politics and technique. This is true now and will always be true." This is the only correct principle we must adhere to.

## USA: A Threatened Superpower

By Ellen Brun and Jacques Hersh

The difficulty of assessing the situation of the contemporary world revolves around the problem of how to understand the complex historical process which has taken place since the end of the Second World War.

During this period a conjunction of changes has taken place which is having qualitative repercussions on the workings of the international system of capitalism and in the last instance on the question of war and peace.

In this paper, the attempt will be made to analyze the evolution of the leading nation of the capitalist world since 1945, namely the United States of America which has been confronted by distinct though interrelated developments:

- 1) The liberation struggle of the colonial and semi-colonial world;
- 2) The growth of the economies of the allies and former enemies of the United States, placing them in a position of competitors to US world economic interests;
- 3) The growth of the military capability of the Soviet Union - which although having lost its ideological appeal - nevertheless makes it a challenger for a position of world leadership.

The common denominator for these trends - which have unfolded at an unequal pace - is the relative decline

of the United States which has become apparent in the 1970s. This gives a fluidity to international politics which was not in the same degree present during the first two post-World War II-decades. Although the entire foundation of the imperialist division of labor is currently being called into question by the efforts of the Third World for political and economic emancipation, the emphasis in this paper will be put on the inter-imperialist rivalry of the leading contenders of the system. As such the economic struggle of Western Europe, and Japan against United States dominance as well as the Soviet politico-military challenge are to be seen as only indirectly connected phenomena. The reason for this is that conflicts of interest would almost per definition have arisen between industrial capitalist powers in their search for markets for capital and exports. Although the Soviet Union isn't as of yet a competitor in this sphere, its military build-up and global vocation already makes it a potential challenger to the weakening position of America.

Although the various specific diplomatic, military and political aspects of the relationship between the United States and its "allies" have been avoided in the discussion below, we are aware of the fact that the economic impact of their competition has had, and will continue to have, consequences in these spheres as well.

The same applies to the politico-military role of the Soviet Union which will also come to influence future international economic relations. The limits imposed by a magazine article required this concentration on the economic aspect of the ties between the U.S. and its capitalist partners and competitors as well as on the political aspect of the U.S.-USSR relationship.

### USA after World War II

In order to understand the evolution which we're attempting to describe as well as the future perspective, a certain understanding of recent modern history can be of help. In a certain sense, the present international situation resembles the situation leading to the Second World War. It will be recalled that, besides resolving the acute economic crisis of world capitalism at the time, this conflict had other important elements. As Paul M. Sweezy has described it, this was a three-in-one war:

"The first of these three wars is a war of redivision on the 1914-1918 pattern with Germany, Italy, and Japan on one side and Great Britain and the United States on the other; the second is a war between capitalism and socialism with Germany on one side and the Soviet Union on the other; the third is an anti-imperialist war of national independence waged by China against Japan." (1)

The result of the conflict, as far as the two last aspects were concerned, was that neither the socialist "enemy" nor the national liberation movements were defeated.

Although both the survival of socialism and the upsurge of national liberation movements did serve to weaken capitalism on the international level, the fact that the production apparatus of various industrialized countries in Europe and Japan had been destroyed created the conditions for the assumption of undisputed leadership of the capitalist world by the United States, a country which had been untouched by actual warfare. The situation in Europe and Japan gave American capitalism outlets and markets for its production and investments in order to rebuild these economies as well as access to these countries' colonies. This was the

1) Paul M. Sweezy, *The Theory of Capitalist Development*, (New York 1964), p. 324.

period when the dollar was king, as it could buy products which could only be produced by the United States. Politically, diplomatically and economically, the supremacy of the United States within the capitalist world system was nearly absolute. The dimension of this leading position is described in the following terms by an American political scientist:

"By every index, the United States was far and away the most powerful nation in the world, the preponderant nation in the international system, the 'freest' in the choices it could make. It was truly a global power, the hegemonic leader of the coalition of industrial democracies, possessing worldwide capabilities and networks of interest. On its side of the confrontation with the Soviet Union, the United States shaped and managed almost single-handedly the political and economic rules, norms, and procedures that constituted the 'order' in which interacted the Western industrial nations, as well as most of what became known as the Third World." (2)

This "American era of international relations" as it has been called (3) was not fundamentally challenged during the first two postwar decades. However, for those who were aware of the "law of unequal development" it was only a question of time before this subordination to American dictate would be refused. Speaking of this future prospect at the time, Joseph Stalin had the following to say on what he predicted would affect inter-imperialist rivalry:

"Outwardly, everything would seem to be 'going well': the U.S.A. has put Western Europe, Japan and other capitalist countries on rations; Germany (Western), Britain, France, Italy and Japan have fallen into the clutches of the U.S.A. and are meekly obeying its commands. But it would be mistaken to think that things can continue to 'go well' for 'all eternity', that these countries will tolerate the domination and oppression of the United States endlessly, that they will not endeavour to tear loose from American bondage and take the path of independent development." (4)

And Stalin went on to hint that even though contradictions between social-

ism and capitalism were stronger than those among capitalist countries, war could break out because of the latter. On this question, Mao Zedong had predicted as early as 1946, that a conflict between the USSR and the United States depended on the American ability not only to control Europe and Japan, but also the colonial world. According to that view, these two areas represented the intermediate zone between the two powers which had to be secured by the United States before it could envisage any action against the Soviet Union. In the words of Mao:

"The United States and the Soviet Union are separated by a vast zone which includes many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia and Africa. Before the U.S. reactionaries have subjugated these countries an attack on the Soviet Union is out of the question." (5)

The one contradiction which was ignored by the Soviet leader was, of course, the one opposing the colonial nations to the imperialist powers which as a matter of fact led to numerous conflicts in this period. Furthermore, this opposition to imperialism in this region of the world contributed to strengthen the dominance of Washington as the industrial powers under American hegemony needed the direct and indirect intervention of the United States in this area, in order to secure the survival of the international division of labor.

### Decline of Dollar

During this period, resistance to the American project of world domination came primarily from the so-called socialist camp and the anti-colonialist movement. Thus, what was actually going on was a process whereby the United States, as undisputed leader of the capitalist system, was exhausting itself in preventing national liberation movements from reaching their goals. The first and most important defeat for this strategy was, of course, the victory of the Chinese Communists, followed a few years later by the set-back during the Korean War. A conflict, which gave Germany and Japan a great economic stimulus to develop their economies as a response to the war-generated demand for industrial goods. While the United States was thus actively making military efforts to keep anti-imperialist forces down,

American capital was busy creating competing industries on the European continent. A trend which was accentuated by the formation of the Common Market. This dual tendency heightened during the engagement of the United States in Indochina, which brought about a literal boom to Western economies. While the United States government could not get its allies to support its action in Vietnam, the overheating of the American economy was absorbing a greater and greater portion of the production of foreign countries. The course and results of this evolution is seen as follows by Daniel Yergin:

"In the 1960s, however, a process of erosion began, at first visible only to those with a professional interest in such matters as the balance of payments, but by now revealed to all. Indeed, by the end of the 1970s, the American-shaped and -dominated order had been subjected to four severe challenges: the attainment of "near economic parity" by Western Europe and Japan; the rapid rise of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); the call by the Third World for a radical transformation of the entire order; and the prospect of nuclear proliferation." (6)

Thus during the great economic expansion years of Western capitalism, the process of "unequal development" was beginning to assume qualitatively new dimensions.

While US capital export created new industries abroad and a market for Europe's and Japan's production, the latter countries concentrated themselves on internal investment with, until the 1970s, relatively limited capital export. The details behind this relative decline of the economic strength of the United States in relation to its partners and allies is summarized in the follow-

2) Daniel Yergin, "Order and Survival," in *Daedalus* (Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences), Winter 1978, p. 263.

3) Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation*, (New York 1975) p. 5.

4) Joseph Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.*, (Moscow 1952), here quoted from 1972 edition (Peking) p. 33.

5) Mao Zedong, *Talk With the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong*, (Peking 1961) p. 5.

6) Daniel Yergin, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

ing manner by the French analyst, Roger Bernos:

"In less than twenty years, Japan passed from 5% to 20% of the American GNP, and Europe from 55% to 80%. Between 1959 and 1970, the average annual growth of the United States fluctuates around 3.5% but Europe's almost reached 5%, and Japan's 10%. The improvements of productivity for ten years reach 150% in Japan and 65% in Europe, but only 32% in the United States. As far as world trade is concerned, while for the same period Japan's share doubles from 3.2% to 6.2% and Europe's progresses from 40% to 44%, the United States sees its relative positions regress from 16% to 13.7%. It should be noted that in 1972, the Japanese foreign currency reserves exceed those of the United States by 50% while those of Europe are five times higher." (7)

The main consequence of this evolution was that America's political allies were slowly becoming its rivals as the search for markets was bound to intensify. This could not but affect the United States' role as guarantor of the international order for the operations of capitalism. In the words of Daniel Yergin:

"The United States was finding the costs of hegemony too great. It no longer felt inclined to 'allow' the Europeans and the Japanese the dispensations that it denied itself. The dollar-based system was proving inadequate to the growth of world trade, the effects of inflation, and the costs of the Vietnam War, and was increasingly ill adapted to the new parity among Western nations. The United States had depended upon its trade surplus to balance off the costs of maintaining troops abroad and the export of capital. In the 1960s, that trade surplus disappeared. In 1970, the United States ran a deficit on the official reserves transaction balance of 10 billion dollars; in 1971, it reached 30 billion dollars." (8)

The American response to this state of affairs came in the form of President Nixon's "New Economic Policy" in relation to USA's economic partners. This aggressive "NEP" course consisted in imposing the end of the convertibility of the dollar into gold – as the system of international finance

had functioned since the Bretton Woods agreement –, and placing a 10% tax on American industrial imports. This was followed by the first dollar devaluation in December 1971 and a second one in February 1973. The consequence of the depreciation of the dollar was that those countries with large American-currency reserves were now getting penalized financially, while the United States acquired an advantage by making its products more competitive in relation to the industrialized nations with strong currencies. For the producers of raw materials who are also paid in dollars this meant a decrease of their earnings.

The loss of value of the dollar which has affected the world in the last few years called forth different reactions – which all tend to aggravate the difficulties of the international system of capitalism. Thus the increase of oil-prices by the oil producing countries (OPEC) in 1973 was primarily a measure of protection. Although an advantage to financial capital in Western Europe and Japan who are able, with stronger currencies, to increase their export of capital, the industrial nations are nevertheless feeling the need to protect themselves in order to guarantee internal employment levels. Confronted with the plunge of the dollar in the last year, French President Giscard d'Estaing and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt met, prior to the Bonn meeting of the five leading capitalist countries, to discuss plans about establishing a European monetary system independent of the dollar. The meaning of such a step was seen as follows by the *New York Times*:

"The subject matter is technical but the import is highly political. And while Americans have tended since World War II to favor any development that represent a step forward in the greater economic and political cohesion of the European allies, the proposed initiatives may turn out to divide the industrial democracies. Whatever the consequences, the lead cause is plain: a lack of confidence in American economic leadership. Whether they support or resist the Europeans' plan, Americans need to recognize it as the most fateful notice yet that the United States' world position requires new signs of American economic discipline and determination to regain a leading role in alliance politics." (9)

## Challenge of Japan

The oil-exporting countries were also debating the question of abandoning the dollar as the means of payments for their export and going over to a basket of different currencies. As an added measure of protection against the downfall of the dollar and the flood of it brought about by the US deficit in its balance of payments account, many countries and multi-nationals have gone over to acquiring gold – which has meant a stupendous rise in the value of the precious metal. At the same time we witness an increase of foreign investments in the United States where labor costs have become reasonable in comparison to the level in Europe. This also gives access to the American market just in case protectionism and commercial warfare should develop further. Thus in 1977, foreign investments in the United States increased by 34,5 billion dollars to reach a total of 131,6 billion dollars. At the same time the number of foreign banks in America has gone up from 54 in 1972 to 89 in 1976, to reach 114 at the end of 1977. American property is becoming cheaper for European, Japanese and OPEC business interests who are buying up firms not only within the United States but also without. The most notable transfer of multinational ownership was the recent purchase by the French Chrysler Corporation. Furthermore non-American controlled multinationals are in fact growing faster than their American counterparts.

This trend has become so pronounced that Japan is said to be building an economic empire on the American West coast. According to a report by the *Washington Post* "Japanese interests, enriched by a huge trading surplus with the United States and the skyrocketing value of the yen, are quietly buying billions of dollars' worth of Western land, timber, fish, agricultural products and industrial facilities." (10) According to the same report, Japan has emerged in the five Pacific states of Alaska, Hawaii,

7) Roger Bernos, "Les rapports Etats-Unis/Europe: un conflit pour la croissance," in *Politique étrangère*, 1973/No. 2, p. 215.

8) Daniel Yergin, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

9) *International Herald Tribune*, July 31, 1978.

10) *International Herald Tribune*, August 3, 1978.

Oregon, Washington and California as "both prime international trading partner and investor, establishing an economic sphere of influence unprecedented in recent times in the often xenophobic West." Critics of this development fear that a quasi-colonial relationship is emerging between these Western states and Japan whereby the latter imports US raw materials from this area in exchange for industrial products.

At the recent Bonn summit meeting it seems that the Japanese and West German negotiators showed a greater confidence and aggressivity towards the United States by demanding trade concessions and reductions of US energy consumption levels. According to an American official present at the conference this demonstrated the fact that "after 30-odd years, the war is finally over. The losers have become the winners economically and they are no longer reluctant to throw their weight around." (11)

This doesn't mean, however, that in global economic terms, the United States is at the mercy of its competitors. But what we're witnessing is a definite decline in the relative economic strength of America vis-à-vis Western Europe and Japan, as well as a contradictory struggle to counter this tendency. Thus, although the fall of the dollar is a method for the United States to pass on its difficulties to the producers of raw materials and to its own competitors, it represents a symptom of weakness. This is so because it allows non-American financial groups to expand their interests at the expense of American interests in the longer run. This trend to economic problems, of course, affects the internal state of affairs of the country. In this connection it will be recalled that after the defeat in Indochina and the Watergate scandal, one of the main internal tasks of the Carter presidency has been the restoration of a certain degree of credibility to the American system in the face of mounting cynicism towards politicians. But the economic difficulties are bound to accentuate the tendency towards internal contradictions. Even in the most stable period of American capitalism, the question of the Afro-American minority was left *unresolved*, and it may explode any-time again as it is the underprivileged sections of the population which suffer most under the hardships of inflation and unemployment. In the coming

years additional pressure will have to be applied on the American working class – who until recently identified itself with the capitalist system. The point is that in order to regain its supremacy, US industry has to redress the tendency towards decrease of productivity which has been evident in the last few years. As the *Washington Post* put it in an editorial on this question:

"The immediate consequence of no productivity gains is that inflation will become harder than ever to control. But if the present pattern continues, it will also ignite uncomfortable political questions about dividing the pie in a country that has come to expect, and to count on, steady increases in public and private wealth." (12)

One reason for the decline of U.S. industrial productivity is that the appeal of higher profits abroad led to a decrease in domestic investment which resulted in a lack of renewal of the means of production.

What we may be seeing is that the solidity of the entire American system may be put into question in the future as never before. In the above mentioned report on Japanese penetration of the US Far West, it is revealed that many of the business and political communities of these states are encouraging interdependence with Japan in order to expand the economies of their states. The director of the California office of International Trade is thus quoted as saying:

"We don't want to rely any more on the establishment of the Eastern states. They're Europe-oriented, and our future is with Japan and the Pacific rim. The Japanese see California as part of their 'Pacific prosperity sphere', and we'd better be responsive to that." (10)

The solidarity of the different regions of the United States is growing thin. It is well known that all major cities of the country are near bankruptcy and that there are no signs of substantial action from state and federal authorities to relieve their plights. Also on another level, the different states are competing with each other in offering rather important incentives – including tax holidays – to major firms in order to attract the establishment of these enterprises. As Jonathan Steele of the English paper *The Guardian* notes:

"Corporations which first learned to play one developing country off against another, and then used similar tactics among investment-hungry nations in Western Europe, are now doing the same among neighboring states in the North-east and the Mid-west." (13)

In this situation where corporations are avoiding the payment of taxes, local governments have had to rely more on personal income taxes. The result has been the beginning of a tax revolt. The response of home owners to rising property taxes has been the so-called Proposition 13 which threatens to become a mass movement which the American right has been quick to exploit.

### Global Challenge of SU

Two areas where there seems to be a certain consensus in American public opinion is the current fear of inflation and a general lack of interest for external problem-areas such as the search for a Middle East solution or a settlement in Southern Africa. What interests most Americans – as far as foreign affairs is concerned – is the relationship to the Soviet Union. A growing distrust of the Soviet Union and apprehension at the increasing Soviet military strength is making itself felt. According to an analyst:

"This is the great covert issue of 1979 and 1980 – whether to add billions to the military budget. People feel we no longer have the muscle to control international events." (14)

Whereas public opinion is moving in a direction of anxiety towards the Soviet engagement in the world, influential political figures are active in warning about the Soviet threat and trying to encourage stronger efforts in the sphere of arms spending. In the American Congress, a new group calling itself "Coalition for Peace Through Strength" and consisting of 148 members of both parties, is highly critical of the Carter administration's defense policies. It also calls for complete military superiority over the Soviet Union.

11) International Herald Tribune, July 20, 1978.

12) International Herald Tribune, August 1, 1978.

13) The Guardian (London), August 4, 1978.

14) International Herald Tribune, August 5-6, 1978.

The reason for this trend is that also in the area of Soviet-American relations too, the initiative appears to be escaping Washington. In the last few years, a sharpening of the relationship between these two global powers has undoubtedly taken place. In order to comprehend this latest evolution, it may be helpful to have an idea as to know the two superpowers conceived their mutual relationship in the past. It was already under the Eisenhower administration in the 1950s that the United States realized that it would be to its advantage to reach some sort of accommodation with the USSR in order to alleviate some of the strains which the leadership-role of the capitalist world system implied. The resulting relaxation of tension – which was not unilinear – was based on the recognition, on the part of both countries, of the superiority of the United States in the military and economic spheres. As far as the Soviet Union was concerned, this led to the special interpretation of the policy of “peaceful coexistence” which had the effect of discouraging movements of national liberation in the colonial world. This was the time when Nikita Khrushchev expressed the fear that local wars could degenerate into a worldwide conflict and therefore should be avoided. In the developed world, the Soviet Union spread the line of “peaceful transition to socialism” which was adopted by practically all pro-Moscow CPs in the sixties. This Soviet posture was evolving at a time of extreme activism by the United States on all continents. Furthermore, it may be said to have been one of the main divergences between China and the Soviet Union which led to the great schism.

But just as the other industrialized nations had been able to increase their economic strength relatively to that of the United States, the Soviet Union was able, during the same period too, to build up its military capability so that by the early 1970s it reached the level of parity with that of the United States. While the relaxation of tension between these two powers in the 1960s, thus had been based on America’s military and economic superiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the relative decline of American strength was bound to affect their future relationship. Taking advantage of this evolution, the Kremlin began to emphasize competition rather than collusion as had been the case in the preceding period of US

superiority. Collusion was still prominent in the late 1960s when Soviet troops invaded Czechoslovakia, with the tacit consent of President Lyndon B. Johnson, while the Soviet Union kept a relatively low profile concerning American policy in Indochina. But with the gradual transformation in the balance of power between the two countries, Soviet leaders began to take advantage of the situation and give the process of detente an interpretation which US politicians had not foreseen. The American defeat in Indochina was, in this relation, an important contributing factor to this development. In the Russian view, “detente” was now essentially to be seen as a bilateral relationship between the two superpowers, aimed chiefly at controlling the arms race and avoiding direct military hostilities between them; but not precluding active competition outside both countries’ spheres of interest. Thus while in the face of US antagonism, the Soviet Union was not very active in supporting the Allende regime in Chile, it has adopted a militant stance in Africa. Also in their criticism of “Euro-Communism”, Soviet ideologues now accuse Western Communist parties of having gone too far in their conversion to the parliamentary road. However, this new militancy is nothing else but the continuation of the policy of promoting the so-called national interests of the Soviet Union by other means. As Irwin Silber of the US paper *Guardian* notes:

“To be sure, these shifts in Soviet policy – ironic though they may seem in light of the origins of the Sino-Soviet dispute when China charged the Soviet Union with attempting to ‘appease’ U.S. imperialism – hardly signify a return to Marxism-Leninism in Moscow. Rather, they serve to underscore that in pursuit of its hegemonic aspirations, the Soviet regime is prepared to shift ideological poses as the situation warrants.” (15)

It is in this hostile environment (16) that US policy has to find a way of preserving the capitalist world order as well as the American predominance. The challenge facing the United States in the 1970s has revolved around the following critical aspects of the world situation:

- 1) the internal American political and ideological crisis;
- 2) the difficulties of the US economy which threatens the social contract;

- 3) the economic rivalry of its economic partners which threatens the function of the entire capitalist system;
- 4) the para-military contest with the Soviet Union on a global scale;
- 5) last but not least, the demand for a “New Economic World Order” by the members of the Third World, which is a menace to the present international division of labor.

### The Trilateral Commission

It was in realisation of the seriousness of this situation and the inability of the Nixon/Ford administrations to cope with it, that the financial banker David Rockefeller and his adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski took the initiative to establish the so-called *Trilateral Commission*. This semi-official organism was launched in 1973 at a time of crisis for American and world capitalism. It comprises not only some of the most powerful and influential American, but also Western European and Japanese business interests, political figures and opinion makers. As such it has been called “the executive committee of transnational finance capital.” (17) Of course it acquired world-wide significance with the advent of the present US government after the 1976 election, as the American section of this body had a direct connection to the presidency. This relationship was described as follows by *Le Monde diplomatique* at the time:

In reality, the candidacy of Mr. Jimmy Carter had been prepared by long arms and supported until victory by men who represented the highest levels of power. Among them, the presidents of Chase Manhattan Bank, Bank of America, Coca-Cola, Bendix, Caterpillar, Lehman Brothers, Sears & Roebuck, Texas Instruments, Exxon, Hewlett-Packard, C.E.S., etc. These men, together with a few academicians, syndicalists (steel and automobile) and only ten politicians – among them, of course, Mr. Jimmy Carter and the new vice-president Mr. Walter Mondale, – constitute the

15) *Guardian* (New York), July 12, 1978.

16) This is how the world is viewed from Washington. See: Zbigniew Brzezinski: “America in an Hostile World”, in *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1976.

17) Jeff Frieden: “The Trilateral Commission: Economics and Politics in the 1970s”, in *Monthly Review*, December 1977, p. 11.



American branch of the "Trilateral Commission." (18)

Although only 10 US politicians belonged to this organism, it is interesting to note that almost all the most influential members of the Carter administration are members of the commission. The selection of Jimmy Carter as the candidate to his present post was principally due to internal reasons. As a relatively unknown entity on the national plan, he had the advantage of not belonging to the discredited world of Washingtonian politicians. His "moralism" was thus an effort to make politics acceptable again to a more than sceptical American people. Externally, the task of the new administration was to help stabilise the capitalist world, while regaining the leading position for the United States. As an American journalist has put it, this external strategy distinguished itself from the foreign policy of the former administration more in form than with regard to content:

Trilateralism can thus be considered as a more elaborated, better prepared, more diplomatic reedition of the attempt to regain the leadership of the "free world" which had been too abruptly announced by Mr. Kissinger in 1973 ("the year of Europe") and even brutally by the former Treasury Secretary John Connally. (19)

But whereas American foreign policy under Henry Kissinger emphasized the bilateral Soviet-American relationship at the expense of other aspects of international affairs, the trilateral strategy aimed at resolving the contradictions among leading capitalist nations and avoiding economic warfare – in the form of protectionism –, in order to create a front to take up the different challenges of the Third World and the Soviet Union. The selection of members of the administration showed very clearly a certain uneasiness at the prospects of arriving at one-sided solutions. As a realization of the limits to American power, and for the sake of not putting all US eggs in one basket, opposing tendencies were built-in within the government. Thus, the appointment of the hardliner and specialist on the Soviet Union, Zbigniew Brzezinski – as national security adviser to the president – was counter-balanced by a more moderate secretary of state, in the person of

Cyrus Vance, and US Ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young. Although all these personalities are members of the *Trilateral Commission*, their differences have given a certain ambivalence to American foreign policy in the last few years. This is of course connected to the objective difficulties in finding solutions to the complex problems facing the United States. As has been seen in the course of the past two years, the trilateral attempt to surmount divergent national interests of the partners of the Western alliance has not been very successful.

Making matters worse for the project of „trilateralism“ is the fact that the increasing internal difficulties of the United States, combined with the external pressures have weakened the administration to such an extent that there is even talk in Washington that Jimmy Carter might not run for reelection when his term expires in 1980. Prior to the Camp David conference on the Middle East he had been getting the poorest ratings in popularity any president has had since the Truman presidency. And it is rather doubtful whether the Middle East initiative of the United States can have a lasting positive influence on American public opinion. Until the meetings between presidents Sadat, Carter and Prime-Minister Begin, only 22% of Americans approved the foreign policy of their government, making it rather difficult for the present administration to build a consensus around its conduct of foreign affairs. Even though the contradictions and inconsistencies in the American conduct of foreign policy are apparent, it is more than questionable whether they could have been avoided by any other government. On the one hand, the world capitalist crisis is being sharpened by a series of contradictions, while on the other hand the United States is approaching a moment of painful decision. This is a complicated matter for a nation which has only known ascendancy since its creation. In the view of the political scientist, Stanley Hoffman, American strategy is unprepared for the evolution which the world has gone through since the Second World War:

"The president is torn between domestic pressures and external imperatives. The former demand toughness, both against the Russians and against successful economic competitors. The latter

require careful choices, a will to forego short-term spectaculars in favor of long-term interests, and a complex balancing act aimed at reconciling these interests that often go in opposite directions. This world raises a formidable challenge to the diplomacy of a country with no other experiences than isolation or supremacy." (20)

This is of course the result of the functioning of the system of imperialism. During its period of supremacy, the United States was only active in preserving the international division of labor and trying to get most of the benefits out of it. But the fundamental problems which this division creates were not solved, in the best of cases they were simply postponed. Furthermore, it is in a climate when the leading imperialist nation is beginning to decline in relative strength that others come up to challenge its leadership by fishing in troubled waters. Although nuclear dissuasion is certainly a limiting factor to the danger of direct military hostilities between modern world powers, it is debatable whether such a deterrent will always be operating. As two French geo-politicians note:

"... we do not live in a period of solution to problems, but in an era of accumulation of tensions and latent conflicts which risk breaking loose with unsuspected violence the day when bellicose pressures will prevail over the dissuasive effect of the nuclear risk." (21)

Since the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States is global, besides being based on military parity, it is especially in this very sensitive area of international affairs that potential dangers exist. In their response to the challenge of the Soviet Union, American politicians seem to be divided and undecided. This results often in various and sometimes contradictory statements coming from different members of the same administration. Although all American politicians are anxious to preserve U.S.

18) "Les puissances économiques qui soutiennent J. Carter", in *Le Monde diplomatique*, November 1976.

19) Diana Johnstone, "Une Stratégie 'trilatérale'", in *Le Monde diplomatique*, November 1976.

20) *International Herald Tribune*, August 5-6, 1978.

21) Jacqueline Grapin and Jean-Bernard Pinatel, *La Guerre civile mondiale*, (Paris 1976), p. 12.

supremacy and holding the Soviet expansionism back, they are divided over the course to follow. Thus, one wing within the current administration thinks that quiet diplomatic means ought to be applied, while another believes in counter-intervention. As the French paper *Le Monde* sees it this apparent lack of determination in Washington is not without certain risks: "The greatest danger in situations of this kind – world wars have shown it – is the underestimation of the strength of the rival or adversary, and indecision." (22) This is related to the fact that the Soviet leadership itself becomes uncertain as to the limits of its activism in such a climate.

### Super Power Rivalry Supreme

Since the Second World War, the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union has gone through different phases. The first immediately following the war was the period of the "cold war", which was replaced by the climate of "detente" symbolized in the signing of the 1963 treaty prohibiting atomic experiments in the atmosphere. In the 1970s, however, due principally to the militancy of Soviet policy, we may be approaching a qualitatively new era. Although the two adversaries will certainly be careful to avoid direct hostilities, their relationship will evolve somewhere between the two previous phases. In the words of *The Economist*:

"('Detente') reached its limits when it was realised, too slowly and in the teeth of much wishful thinking, that Russia wanted to scoop up the lion's share of the benefits of cooperation while cheerfully and hyper-competitively pursuing the bid to change the correlation of forces in the world, its phrase for the balance of power. The new third stage, yet to be christened, will lie somewhere between the two (cold war and detente); an attempt to hold on to the war-preventing parts of detente, while finding new ways of stopping that 'correlation of forces' swinging any further into Russia's favour." (23)

At the present stage of international relations characterized by the sharpening of contradictions in the world, the competition for hegemony and domination between both superpowers is carried out at the expense of the rest of the world and does threaten world peace. This was the essence of a speech

given by Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu to higher cadres of his party, when he warned against the attempts to redivide the world into spheres of interests. While the United States, after its defeat in Vietnam, utilizes principally economic means to expand its influence, he said, others – with inferior economic levels – make use of military force in order to reach the same ends. Although not specifying which powers he had in mind, the Romanian president was obviously referring to the international role of the Soviet Union. (24) The point is, however, as we have seen above, that the economic influence of the United

States is being challenged by its allies.

Thus, the argument may be made that in a period witnessing the decline of American imperialism, the arising of a new hegemonic center poses a threat, not only to the independence of nations but equally to the peace of the world. This is so, because sooner or later, the United States will have to set a limit to these Soviet ambitions in order to retain its dominant position.

22) *Le Monde*, June 2, 1978.

23) *The Economist*, June 3, 1978.

24) cfr. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, August 5, 1978.

## China – Vietnam

### Background to the Events (By Ellen Brun and Jacques Hersh)

(This article was written before the outbreak of hostilities)

Since World War II, Asia in general and Indochina in particular have received worldwide attention. With a view to the strategic importance of the area, the former US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, made the following statement on the 24th of March, 1954:

"The imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally by whatever means would be a grave threat to the whole free world community. The United States feels that the possibility should not be passively accepted." ("American Foreign Policy 1954-55", Department of State Publication, no. 6446, Dec. 1957 pp. 2373-81).

Disregarding the interests of the peoples of the area, the prime motive of US policy evolved toward the prevention of such an "imposition" of socialism. However, what began as an anti-socialist struggle soon turned out to be an attempt to retain Asia within the imperialist division of labour controlled by the USA. For the Vietnam War was only one – however important – aspect of a greater pattern of American aims. Among these was the policy of "containing" China, the most populated country in the world. Already during the Korean War several politicians in Washington had expressed the opinion that US war activities

ought to be expanded in order to provoke China in this way. Consequently the American engagement in Indochina could be seen as a continuation of the inimical US attitude and a direct threat against China. (1)

The response to this American course came in the form of a people's war carried out by the peasant population of Southeast Asia against history's most modern war machine. This struggle was supported by, what at the time was termed "the socialist camp". Beyond the ideological differences between the various countries within this "bloc", which appeared at an early date (first and foremost between China and the Soviet Union), there were also latent potential conflicts of interests, which especially in the case of Indochina had their roots in the historical heritage and the upsurge of nationalism.

In the American world outlook of the time there was not room for such "secondary" factors! The so-called "theory of falling dominoes" rested entirely upon the idea of having to face up to what was seen as a monolithic bloc with one and the same ideology. (2)

1. According to the Pentagon Papers, Washington had in the 60s plans which included an attack on China.

2. The "domino theory" was one of the American arguments for the engagement in

Within the socialist camp the role of China very early appeared to be of paramount importance for the Vietnamese struggle – first against French colonialism and later on against American imperialism. Peking's stand was both due to ideological and national affinities, which were shared with the nationalist current all over Asia, namely the endeavour to prevent a new imperialist penetration into the area. With regard to the Soviet Union it was at the time mainly preoccupied with the situation in Europe. Until the beginning of the Korean War in 1950 the Soviet interest in Vietnam had therefore been rather limited. An American specialist described the results of these two different attitudes in the following manner:

“After Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in 1945, it took Moscow a full five years to recognize the DRV, and by 1950, Ho had already been dispossessed of his capital, Hanoi and was fighting a war against the French from the bush ... with Chinese help.” (Donald S. Zagoria, *Vietnam Triangle – Moscow, Peking, Hanoi*, New York, 1976, pp.99-100).

### Close Vietnam-China Relations

Under these circumstances a rather close relationship developed between the Vietminh (Vietnam's National Liberation Organization) and the Communist Party of China. At a time when the socialist camp was more or less in agreement upon a course of resistance against the American global offensive, this situation could be looked upon as the result of a kind of division of labour which was apparently acceptable to all parts. In fact some Vietnamese Communists had participated in the Long March in China and naturally a close relationship had been forged between these two Asian Communist Parties. This evolution had taken place even though part of the Vietnamese leadership – including Ho Chi Minh himself – had had close relations to the Soviet Party and the 3rd International.

Even though a certain distrust between China and Vietnam could not entirely be avoided, the attitude towards American imperialism in Asia was the unifying factor for the Asiatic Communist Parties promoting mutual solidarity. However, the traditional

contradictions between the two former feudal states were a heavy heritage to overcome. At the same time this traditional antagonism was influenced by the new dynamics of nationalism which the two countries had developed into a strong ideological weapon in the anti-colonial struggle. Furthermore Vietnam probably felt the need of protecting itself against a too strong ideological and political influence from China. This was particularly the case after the Vietnamese land reform in 1953 which is said to have been a copy of the Chinese. The problems which emerged during the Vietnamese agrarian reform resulted in a cooling down of relations to China and a loss of prestige for the so-called pro-Chinese elements within the Vietnamese Workers' Party.

Also affecting Vietnamese sentiments towards its northern neighbour was the evolution of its national liberation. By the end of the 50s it became obvious that the Geneva-Agreement – which had ended the Vietnamese war against France – would be sabotaged through the US support of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime's refusal to hold free elections; this regardless of the fact that this had been a precondition for the agreement. (4) The two great allies of North Vietnam had also been co-guarantors for the upholding of the agreement but remained passive. In the face of this situation a discussion took place within the leadership in Hanoi: While one fraction deemed it necessary to give priority to the economic reconstruction of North Vietnam, another wanted first and foremost to support the anti-Diem struggle in South Vietnam. With time the Soviet Union, which was about to make “peaceful co-existence” with the United States its main political line, supported the first mentioned fraction, while China supported the protagonists of the struggle in South Vietnam. Under these circumstances some leaders in North Vietnam could supposedly not but be rather irritated by China's stand of promoting an international campaign against American imperialism and of support for the struggle in South Vietnam. In Hanoi the eagerness of the Chinese could be interpreted as an attempt of interference in the internal affairs of Vietnam. According to Jean Lacouture this dissimilarity resulted in the following differences:

“One of the reasons for what one

might call Hanoi's reservation towards Peking was the almost permanent attempts on the part of the Chinese leaders to gain influence within the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (FLN). Well before the North Vietnamese leaders had shown their undisguised hospitality towards the Front, Peking gave them a sensational reception (in September 1962). And several months before namely in September 1964.” (“Hanoi entre Pékin et Moscou”, *3 Continents*, no. 2, April – May – June 1967).

On the level of ties with her allies, various experts have outlined the following phases in Hanoi's relations with China and the Soviet respectively: 1949–54 a certain dependency on Chinese help (military and political); 1954–57 a pronounced pro-Chinese line in internal political development; 1957–60 following the difficulties of the land reform a pro-Soviet attitude begins to make itself felt. But the above mentioned Soviet policy towards the US meant also a reduction of the support for national liberation movements in the 60s and became the reason for a new Vietnamese approachment to China – of course upholding full political independence. In a Vietnamese criticism of the Soviet Union at the time, an important member of the politbureau in Hanoi, Nguyen Chi Thanh (supposed to be the leader of the struggle in South) wrote in 1963:

“We do not have any illusions about the United States. We do not underestimate our opponent – the strong and cunning U.S. imperialism ... If on the contrary, one is afraid of the United States and thinks that to offend it would

Indochina. The “logic” behind it was, that if Vietnam was “lost” (to the Communists) then all of the Southeast Asian countries would “fall”.

3. In China Liu Shao-chi had had similar close relations to Comintern. In the show-down during the Cultural Revolution he was criticized, among other things, for views he promoted during the 1920-30s which at the time he had had in common with the majority opinion within the Comintern, but which according to the Chinese experiences were considered to be wrong. His removal from power was evaluated as a negative event by orthodox Vietnamese Communists.

4. The Geneva Agreement 1954 ended the French Indochina-War (1945-54) following the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu.

court failure, and that firm opposition to United States imperialism would touch off a nuclear war, then the only course left would be to compromise with and surrender to United States imperialism." (Nguyen Chi Thanh "Who Will Win in South Vietnam", Hoc Tap, July 1963, reprinted in Peking 1963).

### Soviet Opportunism in Vietnam

Under the pretext that more active support might touch off a nuclear war, the Soviet position on the Vietnamese question, during the years of Nikita Khrushchev's leadership, was one of compliance to US aims. Among other things this attitude was one of the reasons for his downfall. Already in the middle of the 60s, several influential members of the Soviet leadership realized, that this kind of policy would give China the possibility of influencing the future development in South East Asia. From this moment on, the Soviet Union started to show increasing interest for Vietnam – first and foremost in order to diminish Chinese influence and to a lesser degree in order to combat the United States. As far as the Vietnamese were concerned, however, the split between China and the Soviet Union gave them greater political freedom of movement and made it possible for them to remain neutral in the great ideological conflict. In those years the Vietnamese often deplored the Sino-Soviet split but they must have realized that had China been in agreement with the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 60s. Vietnam would have remained very much alone in her anti-US struggle.

However with the frustration of the US plans in Southeast Asia and the decline of that country's global power – as a result, among other things, of her defeat in Indochina – real divergences appeared between the two countries and the two parties, who had been among the most militant opponents of American imperialism.

It is a known fact that the new situation resulted also in disagreements within the Chinese leadership itself as to which political line should now be followed. For the Vietnamese it was not so easy to understand the new international context particularly as long as the struggle against the United States was still going on. But with the final victory in all of Indochina a

qualitative new state of affairs emerged.

Now that the US forces had been completely withdrawn, divisions arose due to traditional latent contradictions within the area. But as a result of another global power's policies, these became acerbated. The question as to how to react to these new regional problems has been the primary reason for the deterioration of the Sino-Vietnamese relations in the last few years. The essence of the dispute between these two former allies concerns the role of Vietnam and its extra-regional ally, the USSR, in Indochina after the defeat of the Americans.

As seen above the relations between China and Vietnam were rarely without shadows.

Nevertheless, by the end of the 60s the two countries were in extremely different situations. While Vietnam was completely preoccupied with the war against American aggression, China's attention was concentrated on the threat of revisionism both within and without the country. To the Vietnamese, the Cultural Revolution was a completely unintelligible event which also was considered to be harmful to their war effort against the Americans. This added to the already existing possibilities of misunderstanding.

In 1964, the Communist Party of Japan had suggested the establishment of a united front of support for Vietnam with the Soviet Union. China's refusal to join this front became an early source of discomfort between Hanoi and Peking. At the time, the majority of the leadership of the CCP had hardly any confidence as to the sincerity of the Kremlin on this question. It will be recalled that to a great extent, a major part of the ideological disagreements between China and the Soviet Union had to do with the latter's policy of cooperation and compliancy towards the United States. The front proposed, also included several extreme Soviet demands, for example almost extra-territorial rights in connection with the transport of Soviet material through China. Peking's stand was, that both sides should aid Vietnam as much as they could and wished, and that China's transportation network would still be available for transport of Soviet goods and equipment to Vietnam. (5)

It will be recalled that China had been directly involved in the Korean

War 1950-53, and did not want now to be unnecessarily directly drawn in the Southeast Asian war. Relations between the USSR and the US not only went on undisturbed through these years, but the relationship was even getting closer in spite of the Vietnam War.

### China defies US nuclear Threat over Vietnam.

The main content of all Chinese propaganda, from the end of the 50s through the next 10 years, was directed against US imperialism. *In spite of American nuclear threats as early as in 1953 and 1954, the Chinese continued to help the Vietnamese. In 1961, Peking declared that it would use its military forces if major American units were sent into Laos. In 1965, China let Washington know that 50000 Chinese soldiers were temporarily stationed in the Northern part of North Vietnam, in order to frustrate American plans of further escalation. And in May 1966, after the Chinese had successfully carried out their biggest nuclear test, Prime Minister Chou En-lai set forward a 4-point statement to make China's stand towards the United States clear. According to this policy statement China wanted, firstly, to avoid a war with America over Vietnam; secondly, China would maintain its aid and support commitments to North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam; thirdly, if America attacked China on the ground or with nuclear weapons, she would be sucked into an endless war; and fourthly, if America decided to attack China with air and naval weapons, the Chinese would counter-attack on the ground. (The New York Times, May 10, 1966)*

The Chinese view was that only a firm stand could limit and decrease the American involvement was expressed in, among other ways, the implicit Chinese scepticism when the Vietnamese started negotiations with the United States in the midst of the May-upheavals in Paris 1968. On the other hand, there can hardly be any doubt that Mao Zedong and the circles close to him could, already in the middle of the 60s in their analysis of world af-

5. This transport was in fact a great strain on China's underdeveloped infrastructure. During some of the Cultural Revolution's stormy events, transportation in some cases was delayed or obstructed.

fairs, foresee that the American global offensive was receding and that a new world situation was in the making.

### Decline of US Imperialism

It was in the year 1968, that most of the important elements which influenced the development in the 1970s became apparent. The international financial crisis in January, showed that the United States was relatively weakened, economically speaking, compared to the other industrial countries. Shortly thereafter, the Têt-offensive in South Vietnam showed that even half a million American troops were not sufficient to guarantee control of Saigon itself; a much larger intervention was required that would be so costly that no American president could take the responsibility for such a decision. Finally, in August, the Warsaw Pact-countries invaded Czechoslovakia and the Brezhnev-Doctrine of "limited sovereignty" within the socialist community was formulated. It was from this moment on that the Chinese began to describe the Soviet Union as "social-imperialist". From their point of view, this opinion was further confirmed during the Soviet-Chinese border incidents of 1969. *While many pro-Moscow parties in the West protested against the invasion of Czechoslovakia, it was accepted by Hanoi.*(6)

These developments accentuated Sino-Vietnamese divergences. Thus, while the Chinese, in their political strategy, tried to adjust to the qualitatively new world situation the Vietnamese perception remained unchanged.

The Chinese realization of the relative weakening of the United States and American politicians' gradual understanding that the split between the Soviet Union and China was irrevocable made contact between the two former arch-enemies, the US and China, feasible. Thus in the context of international politics, the big shifts in power relations began to make Vietnam of less decisive importance.

Also the Kremlin was recognizing the historical retreat of the United States and this gave way to a gradually more aggressive policy on the part of the Soviet Union; a course which was in stark contrast to that country's attempts of the 60s to neutralize liberation movements and of compliance towards the US. The emerging qualita-

tive new Sino-American relationship also resulted in the Soviet attempt to profit from the situation by showing more interest towards Vietnam and began escalating their military supplies to Vietnam.

*As far as the Sino-American discussions were concerned, China did not try to bargain with regard to the war in Southeast Asia, but demanded a US withdrawal.* Even so the new relations between Washington and Peking was viewed with anything but enthusiasm in Hanoi. Furthermore it may be taken for granted that although the Chinese supported the liberation of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, they were not altogether happy about North Vietnam's large-scale military offensive in the spring of 1975. The way victory was achieved might imply a weakening of the resistance of the Southeast Asian countries towards Soviet influence due to the vacuum which the Americans were leaving.

*Actually, the fact is that this way of liberating South Vietnam created great problems for the country and pressed Hanoi into greater economic and military dependency of the Soviet Union. However, even though the reunification of Vietnam was carried through in a manner which China disapproved, and even though China, already in 1973 (if not earlier), had begun to question Vietnamese intentions in Indochina, Peking continued to give Vietnam economic assistance.* After liberation in 1975, Hanoi had also asked for Chinese military aid, but this was refused on the ground that the war against the Americans had come to a close. According to Peking, what should now have been on the agenda for Vietnam, was the peaceful reconstruction of the country. Furthermore the Vietnamese had "inherited" enormous amounts of military hardware from the American imperialists.

During the Le Duan visit to Peking in November 1977, the ideological and political differences between the two parties manifested themselves clearly. In his speech, the Vietnamese leader summed up his Party's world view in the following terms:

"At present, the revolutionary currents of our times – the socialist countries, the national liberation movement and the workers' movement in the capitalist countries are in an offensive position and capable of repelling US-headed imperialism, and step by step winning

victories for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism." (Peking Review, no. 48, 1977)

On the same occasion Chairman Hua Kuo-feng drew attention to China's anti-hegemonistic policy within the framework of the "Three World Theory":

"The Chinese people are determined to act according to Chairman Mao's theory of the differentiation of the three worlds, uphold proletarian internationalism and firmly implement Chairman Mao's revolutionary line in foreign affairs. We will strengthen our unity with the other socialist countries, with the proletariat and the oppressed people and nations of the world and with the other countries of the third world, and ally with all countries subjected to imperialist and social-imperialist aggression, subversion, interference, control or bullying to form the broadest possible united front against superpower hegemonism." (Peking Review, no. 48, 1977)

### Vietnam's Hypocrisy

Thus while China, in this manner, tries to build a front against the superpowers – of which they regard the Soviet Union as the most dangerous – Vietnam now actively pursues the course of drawing members of the third world closer to the so-called "socialist camp", lead by the Soviet Union.

In spite of these marked differences neither of the two parts had any real interest in a clear-cut break.

However, the conflict between Kampuchea and Vietnam created a precarious situation for the Sino-Vietnamese relationship. China operates with certain criteria in order to distinguish whether a policy is socialist or not. In his report to the National People's Congress in February 1978, Hua Kuo-feng said:

6. At the time analysts believed that Hanoi's acceptance of this event was the result of strategic considerations dictated by the need to remain neutral between China and the Soviet Union and in order not to harm the struggle against the United States. When we now hear that the doctrine of socialist countries' "limited sovereignty" is being eagerly discussed in relation to Kampuchea the question without doubt has reached a new dimension.

"Whether a country treats others on an equal footing or seeks hegemony is a major criterion by which to tell whether or not it follows the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and whether it is a genuine or sham socialist country. A socialist country should set an example in treating others as equals." (Peking Review, no. 10, 1978).

Of course, Peking's attitude is in agreement with China's own national interests. As far as the Chinese are concerned, they are indeed reluctant to see all of Indochina under Vietnamese domination; especially if this control risks involving the whole area in the Soviet scheme of encircling China. This latter perspective doesn't seem to be far from the Vietnamese way of thinking. It will be recalled that during the long US war of intervention, American politicians were not only preoccupied with the Indochinese countries, but also concerned with 'containing' Chinese influence. Ironically, the Vietnamese leaders now lament the changed American policy. In an otherwise pro-Vietnamese article, politbureau member and chief editor of the party newspaper "Nhan Dan", Hoan Tung is quoted as having stated:

"In the past the Americans fought against us in order to 'contain' China. Today when we represent a direct obstacle to Chinese southern expansion, the United States tries to prevent us from playing this role." (Paul-Quin-Judge in *Le Monde diplomatique*, Sept. 1978).

As it's relations to Kampuchea became exacerbated, Vietnam accused China more and more openly for being the cause of the trouble. China was now spoken about as though she were the main enemy of Vietnam; and at the same time Hanoi has revived an old Soviet accusation by casting doubt on the Chinese minority in Southeast Asia for allegedly playing the role of Peking's "fifth column". (See Nguyen Khac Vien in the Danish daily, *INFORMATION*, 18-19/11 1978). Considering the tradition for anti-Chinese programs in the history of East Asia, this is a particularly nasty method of propaganda. When it is recalled that in 1976 all China-friendly members of the *Vietnamese Party's leadership* were purged and that the media have produced daily horror-stories about the Cambodian front (which China is said to be backing), it takes very little im-

agination to realize the psychological pressure the Chinese minority in Vietnam is being subjected to. It is an accepted fact that 95% of the some 160.000 refugees who went into China in 1978 originated from North Vietnam and had been workers, peasants, small-scale craftsmen and the like. A not unimportant number of them were even members of the Vietnamese Communist Party (7).

Taking all these aspects into consideration, it becomes less difficult to comprehend the evolution of the relations Vietnam-China-Soviet Union during 1978. It is of course obvious that compared to China, Vietnam is a small country, and this makes many people better disposed toward Hanoi's version of the dispute with China. Furthermore, because of our sympathy for the long, valiant Vietnamese people's struggle against imperialism, many of us are ready to give Hanoi the full benefit of the doubt. But similarly Kampuchea ought to receive the same solidarity for in it's conflict with Vietnam it is Cambodia that is the small country!

Reducing the credibility of the Vietnamese case in their propaganda-war against China is the fact, that Hanoi shows an increasing tendency toward discrepancy between theory and practice. In theory, the United States is still regarded as the main enemy and Sino-American detente is often mentioned as the source of Vietnam's problems, while in practice, Vietnam itself has attempted a rapprochement with the United States. On another level, while national liberation movements are, according to Le Duan, one of the "currents" Vietnam must support, during his visits to Southeast Asian countries, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong engaged his country to stop all aid to the guerilla movements in the area. This is something the Chinese have not been willing to promise and serves to explain

the lukewarm reception Teng Hsiao-ping was offered in the autumn of 1978 in Malaysia and Singapore. (*Le Monde*, 15.11.78)

In the summer 1978, Vietnam became a full-fledged member of the Soviet dominated COMECON and shortly thereafter signed a treaty with the Soviet Union for a 20-year period, which, among other things, contained a clause on mutual aid in case of a military conflict. *This is something neither the Soviet Union nor Vietnam had been willing to do during the many years Vietnam was the subject of American aggression.*

The present conflict in Indochina can be gauged as a step backwards. As a Yugoslavian commentator suggested, it cannot benefit anybody but the Soviet Union and the United States. However, the apparent success of Soviet policy in Vietnam may in the long run turn out to be a Pyrrhus-victory as it can mean an enormous economical burden. For Hanoi as well this marriage of convenience may not be advantageous in the long run. As Jean Lacouture observes:

"If we look a little closer into the matter, it is possible, that Vietnam, through her actions, may actually run the risk of losing her independence and that the successors of Ho Chi Minh will regret some day that they lost the prestige which they had succeeded in upholding through struggle, namely real, practical non-alignment." (*Le Nouvel Observateur*, No.715, 22-28 of July, 1978)

7. The latter information was given by members of a Danish-Vietnamese Association's friendship delegation that visited Vietnam in autumn 1978. (At a hearing in Copenhagen on "Southeast Asia three years after", 11th-12th of November, 1978).

"During the Vietnamese war it was vital for Vietnam that both China and the USSR helped North Vietnam to the full. Today it is no longer vital for this country to follow that policy. The rapprochement with the USSR plays a very important role for Vietnam today. There is a tangibly strong Soviet interest co-inciding with Vietnamese interests - to reduce Chinese influence in this part of the world. We begin more and more to lean towards the USSR." (Hoang Tung, Central Committee member of Vietnam Worker's Party and editor of "Nan Dhan" - 1976)

# The Conflict between Kampuchea and Vietnam

by Heinz Kotte

We publish this article for its useful background and historical information about the Vietnam-Kampuchea conflict. It was written at the beginning of the conflict. It is wholly clear now that Vietnam's behaviour is totally reprehensible and an abandonment of revolutionary socialist principles degenerating into national chauvinism.

Today's Kampuchea with 7.8 million inhabitants (Vietnam: 47 million inhabitants) is the result of centuries of territorial infringement and cuts in its territory. The main population of Kampuchea, the Mon Khmer, are different racially as well as linguistically and culturally from their constant oppressors, the Siamese (today Thais) in the North, and the Annamites (today Vietnamese) in the East. Kampuchea goes back to the Kingdom of Kambuja from which is derived the modern word Kampuchea. Kambuja was the Kingdom of the mighty kings of Angkor, a Kingdom that existed from the beginning of the 9th century through to the 15th century. At the height of its power it controlled the Indochinese subcontinent from the frontiers of today's Burma to the Southchinese Sea including Cochinchina, the southern part of today's Vietnam. Thus Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh-City) was originally founded by the Khmer (Prey Nokor) on the northern fringe of the lower Mekong-Delta area. In the Vietnamese part of the Mekong-Delta, called Khmer Krom (Khmer-"Netherlands"), there are today about 500,000 inhabitants of Kampuchean origin. However, Kampuchea does not demand the return of these "lost territories". But these historical territorial losses are used as an argument in the border conflicts with Vietnam and Thailand. The new administrative map of Kampuchea, which was published in August 1976 in Phnom Penh, follows strictly the colonial frontiers as left by the French in 1954, including the so-called Brevié Line, which attributes the largest island in the Gulf of Thailand to Vietnam, although it is situated directly in front of the Kampuchean mainland.

The Kampucheans are afraid that the submission of their country and annexation of their territory through

Thailand and Vietnam in the 18th and 19th centuries may be resumed.

Ironically enough it was the French colonial power which preserved Kampuchea in the mid of the 19th century from being fully absorbed by its Western and Eastern neighbouring states. In 1863 the country was declared the French protectorate "Le Cambodge" (from this colonial denomination the name of Cambodia is derived) and in 1887 it was grouped together with the protectorates of Tongking (North-Vietnam), Annam (Central-Vietnam), Laos and the colony of Cochinchina (South-Vietnam) into the Union d'Indochine (Indochina is a colonial construction and the colonial name for these three separate countries).

France ceded the Western provinces of Kampuchea, namely Battambang, Sisophon and Siam Reap, including the old ruins of the historic capital of Angkor to the king of Thailand; they were given back in 1907 but again annexed by Thailand for some time during the 2nd World War. Some minor border conflicts have occurred in the last decades also and have caused tensions between those neighbouring countries. They are part of a dread of encirclement, rooted deeply in historical experience, which in the main dominates Kampuchea's foreign policy.

A fear of being encircled by the Vietnamese side, has been still stronger and in this point there was hardly a difference whether Vietnam was ruled from Saigon or Hanoi. The French colonial administration had cut incessantly into Kampuchean territory and had expanded the frontiers of Cochinchina towards the West and North into Kampuchean territory.

Further the colonial enterprise in Cochinchina had a stronger organiza-

tion and had the better lobby in the colonial administrations of both Hanoi and Paris. This lobby was interested to get large sized rice-fields with favorable irrigation conditions especially in the North-West of Saigon the Province Svay Rieng of today's Kampuchea. The so-called "larrots Peak" West of Saigon which protrudes into Vietnamese territory has been left over from this territorial expansion of Vietnam.

With the growth of the automobile-industry in Europe at the beginning of the century there was a run for the rubber plantations in Indochina because the "red earth" in the area of the Vietnamese province Tay Ninh, 80 kilometers North-West of Saigon was especially suited for this purpose. Kampuchea had its greatest loss of territory in this area in 1914 when the large rubber plantations of Michelin were established around Loc Ninh, about 100 kilometers North of Saigon. The French having lost colonies in Africa transferred their coffee and tea plantations to Indochina between the two World Wars. The fertile plains of the Kampuchea provinces Ratanakiri and Kratie, about 200 - 250 kilometers in the North-East of Phnom Penh, were therefore added in 1929 to the colony of Cochinchina.

Every frontier adjustment or occasional territorial exchange along the 1,100 kilometer frontier between both countries was in the end a loss of territory for Kampuchea.

The frontier according to Brevié (the French Governor General) served the interests of the French colonial enterprises and served to arbitrate their territorial disputes. It therefore favored today's Vietnam to the detriment of Kampuchea. It has to be added that even these colonial frontiers were not respected, maps were forged and the colonial laws were always interpreted in favour of the colony and the detriment of the protectorate. The territorial divisions cut through the people living in this area and left minority groups on both sides, who's fate was deplorable due to the mutual distrust and dislike. Thus it can be understood that all governments of Kampuchea have regarded the arbitrary front drawn to their detriment. The French colonial power added fuel to the fire by installing Vietnamese in Laos and Kampuchea as administrative clerks and exploiting the contradictions between the three peoples in this region.

### The political tensions and differences between Kampuchea and Vietnam

During the long liberation struggle of the three peoples of Indochina against the French colonial powers until the victory of Dien Bien Phu 1954 (in so-called 1st Indochina War) and against the American aggression until the complete liberation of all three countries (in the so-called 2nd Indochina-War from 1970 through 1975) there was some dispute concerning the question of the leadership of one unified communist party of Indochina (CPI) or three independent national communist parties in Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam as avantgarde of their respective national liberation fronts.

The Kampuchean side claimed the right of self-determination of small people against a tendency "one party, one people, one country" in Indochina. Already in the thirties there was some controversy over this question within the communist movement. In February 1930 Ho Chi Minh organized a conference in Macau with the aim of uniting the existing communist circles. Ho Chi Minh was probably the first to attach attention to the problem of national and ethnic minorities in a communist organization and to see the importance of a national base.

The official history of the Workers Party of Vietnam says, that this conference was designed to "unite" the Vietnamese circles "into the Communist Party of Vietnam". The same history writes, two pages later, without further explanation:

In October 1930 the first plenum of the central committee decided to give our party the new name of Communist Party of Indochina".

Thus in the history of the CP of Vietnam there is the definite identification of the CP of Vietnam with the CP of Indochina. As has been shown by P. Rousset, Ho Chi Minh was not present at this October plenum; the eighth plenum of this central committee on the other hand decided the following in 1941 under the presidency of Ho Chi Minh:

"The plenum proposes to solve the national problem in the framework of the individual national states of Indochina; it replaced the demand to install a federal government of the democratic republics of Indochina by the demand for the foundation of the democratic

republic of Vietnam." (quoted in: Ho Chi Minh: Eine politische Biographie. Köln 1976.)

The leadership of the Communist Party of Indochina warned its activists as it is said in a letter of the party leadership "to the comrades in Cambodia" against "the national deviations of Ho Chi Minh". In the same paper of the official organ "Bolshevik" it is said:

Cambodia has no right to a separate Communist Party". "There is no way we can envisage a separate Cambodian revolution. There can only be one Indochinese revolution." And for Kampuchea there could only be "the right of self-determination of minority populations" within the "Union of Soviet Republics of Indochina". (P. Rousset: Cambodia, background to the revolution. In: Journal of Contemporary Asia, No. 4, 1977, p. 520.)

Already 1936, when the liberation struggle in Indochina against the French colonial power was having a very hard time, it was Ho Chi Minh who came to the conclusion that liberation would come neither from the CP of France, nor from the international Communist movement, nor from a union on the highest level, but only from the suppressed peoples themselves in their national context. The dissolution of the CP of Indochina which was decided upon in favour of three national parties was only realized after the 2nd World War in 1951. There was an open break between the Kampuchean and Vietnamese CP in 1954, when the Vietnamese leadership signed the Geneva Agreement with the government in Phnom Penh under Norodom Sihanouk and dropped the Kampuchean CP and the patriotic left of this country. The revolutionary forces went underground or to Vietnam into exile.

The underground was strongly reinforced by a new generation of Association of Khmer-students from France; most of the leadership of today's Kampuchea come from this association. In September 1960 under the leadership of Pol Pot they formed from the old Kampuchean peoples Party Pracheachon the new national CP of Kampuchea. The CP of Kampuchea today is based on this organisation and not on the forces of the old CP of Indochina which had existed under the name of the Issarak-front since the

liberation struggle against the French. This organization was closely allied with the Vietnamese, who regarded it together with the Vietminh-front in Vietnam and the Neo Lao Haxat-front in Laos, as the oldest and legitimate organization of national and democratic forces in Indochina. It is presently strongly favoured from the Vietnamese side. (Radio Hanoi, 13.1. 78, in: Foreign Broadcasting International Service, FBIS, Washington 14.-15.1.78)

The Geneva Indochina Conference guaranteed the independence of a Kampuchean state, but did not fix its frontiers. This represented for Kampuchea a continual threat to her national territory. When in 1954 North-Vietnamese troops occupied Kampuchea's North-Eastern province Stung Treng, Sihanouk succeeded only through massive pressure and a threat to change his political orientation to get the Vietnamese to withdraw. The frontier problems have become the problem of Kampuchea's sovereignty and therewith the determining factor of the foreign policy of this country. The quasi-neutrality during the Vietnam War was bought with the price of silently permitting the logistic transport system of the Ho Chi Minh trail through Eastern-Kampuchea, transports through the port of Kompong Som (Sihanoukville) and the installation of logistic positions with Vietnamese administration in Kampuchean territory along the frontier. When the violations of Kampuchean territory became more massive and lead in the years 1968-69 to armed conflicts between Sihanouk's army and units of the FNL, Sihanouk took a pragmatic position in the border question in order to secure his national territory. He gave up all "lost" territories under the condition that Thailand and Vietnam would recognize a Kampuchea within the colonial frontiers of 1954 as sacrosanct territory and would never again demand talks concerning the delineation of the frontier.

The "unilateral" acceptance and respect of the "present frontiers" became the Sihanouk-doctrine governing the relationship with neighbouring states and all countries wishing diplomatic relationships with Kampuchea. Through the unilateral acceptance of the frontiers Kampuchea won without recognizing any territorial claims of neighbouring states, the guarantee that its territory would not



be touched. This position which has been the position of the new leadership since the liberation of 1975 has earned Kampuchea in some corners the reputation of impudence and obstinacy. In view of the large territorial gains of the Vietnamese in the course of history one has to admit however, that this position is correct and the Kampuchean diplomacy has established it successfully in the international field.

The US-backed governments in Bangkok and Saigon refused this unilateral acceptance but in 1964–67 the FNL and the DRV (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) have gradually accepted this demand. In a government report to the national assembly in June 1964 Vietnamese primeminister Pham Van Dong confirmed that the government and the people of Vietnam accept and respect "the present frontiers between Vietnam and Kampuchea". (Radio Hanoi, 13.6.67, quotes an editorial of Nhan Dan) During the so-called frontier-talks of 1966 between Sihanouk, the FNL and the DRV, Kampuchea's sovereignty over all islands west of the Brevié-line was accepted. Because of Sihanouk's demand for a unilateral acceptance of the "existing frontiers" the talks were broken off without success at the end of 1966. Only on May 31st 1967, the FNL moved towards acceptance of the Kampuchean demands with a three-point-declaration. The FNL declared that

1. it accepts and respects the territorial integrity of Kampuchea within its present borders,
2. it accepts and respects the present frontier between South-Vietnam and Kampuchea,
3. it denounces all acts of aggression from US-imperialists and their protegies in South-Vietnam and Thailand against the Kingdom of Kampuchea and protests against every attempt to change the present borders of the Kingdom of Kampuchea. (Radio Hanoi, 8.6.67. In: FBIS, 9.6.67)

The declaration of the FNL was confirmed by the DRV on June 8th 1967, and was accepted as the official position of Vietnam in a communiqué broadcast over Radio Hanoi. (Radio Hanoi, 12.6.67. In: FBIS, 13.6.67.) In commentaries on this communiqué the DRV and the FNL declared Saigon's claim for new border talks to be a "reckless lie" and therewith came down in favour of the indisputable

character of Kampuchea's borders. During the American Indochina-War the DRV and FNL protested against all violations of Kampuchea's borders via through South-Vietnamese or American troops and supported the position of Sihanouk, who demanded the return of disputed border-areas to Kampuchea. According to Sihanouk the Vietnamese recognized all villages in the disputed areas as Kampuchean agglomerations as long as they have been under Kampuchean administration in the past and were inhabited mainly by Kampucheans. (Radio Phnom Penh, 24.7.67. In: FBIS, 28.7.67.)

Despite the solidarity between the three peoples in the 2nd Indochina War and the efficient military cooperation between the "three fronts" it is an objective fact there was never a political coordination, not to mention any unanimity, between the Vietnamese leadership and the Kampuchean CP. The deep cleavage was again visible at the Paris Peace Agreement of 1973, when the Vietnamese delegation urged the GRUNK to accept a compromise with Lon Nol and the USA in order to get a better basis for the talks for Vietnam. After the agreement the Vietnamese were hesitant to deliver arms to the liberation forces of the FUNK in order to avoid any claim that they had not acted in accordance with the agreement. Kampuchea had to pay a bitter price for the Vietnamese position in the Paris Peace talks, because after the agreement, which only forbade the bombardment of Vietnam, the US air force could switch over to Kampuchean territory. During the time from January 27th to August 15th, 1973, they extensively bombarded every imaginable target in this country. In these seven months four times more bombs rained on Kampuchea than fell in the entire Korean-War, the human toll was heavy, at least 200,000 people lost their lives (from a population of 7.8 million inhabitants).

The FUNK/GRUNK was forced to rely during the 5 years of liberation struggle mainly on its own forces and could not count on Soviet military and economic aid like Vietnam, since the Soviet Union supported Lon Nol. The small amount of foreign aid which came, came from China, North-Korea and some countries from the movement of non-aligned nations.

It was this consciousness of having to rely on one's own forces in the ques-

tion of national sovereignty and independence which led the Kampuchean leadership immediately after the liberation from US-aggression to claim from the Vietnamese the respect for the national territory which they had agreed on during the liberation struggle. Since 1975 there were occasional news of armed clashes; on December 31st, 1977 diplomatic relations were broken off and both sides made the conflict known to international public opinion.

During the dry season from Fall 1977 to Spring 1978 fighting strongly increased and claimed many lives and devastated newly reconstructed villages and rice-fields.

In view of the dimensions of military conflicts between those countries the question arises, what are the basic political differences between both countries? This conflict can hardly be declared a dispute about some square-kilometers of paddy-fields.

The relocation plans within the Vietnamese five-year-plan 1976 through 1980 indicate that four million people are to be resettled into the thinly populated areas of the Mekong-delta and the high plateau of the central highlands, which is in a way a continuation of the historic southward migration of the Vietnamese people which has constantly threatened the Kampuchean state. In addition the plan indicates that 100,000 Vietnamese are to be settled in the province Tay Ninh, where the most contested border areas are situated. The large irrigation and road-building projects in the disputed border area, which are carried out by pioneer units of the Vietnamese armed forces, not only create faits accomplis in the border question, they are also seen by Kampuchea as a threat to national territory.

The dispute concerning the territorial waters in the Gulf of Siam has reached a new dimension as natural gas and oil have been found in the area. When Vietnam and Thailand established a 200 mile economic zone in the coastal waters, on May 25th, 1977, without consulting Kampuchea, and further came to an agreement on air-transit rights, then Kampuchea's age-old trauma of encirclement by both big neighbouring states returned. The trauma of encirclement was again activated by an agreement between Vietnam and Thailand to resume the Mekong irrigation and hydro-electricity

project originally planned by the US in the Sixties.

This regional project for Thailand, Laos, Vietnam and Kampuchea authored by the US and the United Nations with its extensive and technologically sophisticated use of the Mekong river with a water-capacity thrice that of the Nile and a drainage area half the size of Europe, can only be realized with a participation of international concerns and foreign capital and personnel. Vietnam and following them also Laos advocate a development strategy with foreign investments and a high level of foreign debt, but not so Kampuchea. The project demands a unified regional planning, which would end in the establishment of a Vietnamese hegemony over Kampuchea, economically the project would be unfavourable to Kampuchea as is mentioned in the report of the World Bank.

Kampuchea is building its national economy in a different manner to Vietnam. The main emphasis is on the development of agriculture to ensure the livelihood of the population and to produce surpluses for export. The Vietnamese development strategy calls for a simultaneous development of industry even giving priority to industry with foreign capital even with direct-investments from the United States and the Common Market.

The Mekong-project as planned now again by Vietnam, Thailand and Laos requires the depopulation of large inhabited areas and the building of large scale irrigation systems. The dams of Pa Mong in Laos and Stung Treng in North-Eastern Kampuchea alone demand the resettlement of about 700,000 peasants. One is not amazed that Kampuchea sees here a threat to its development strategy of relying on its own forces and is irritated by the prospect of seeing her national independence sold out through development aid. It should be remembered that on the very day when Thailand, Vietnam and Laos formed an interim committee for the Mekong-project that is on December 31st, 1977, Kampuchea broke off its diplomatic relations with Vietnam.

The special relations between Vietnam and Laos which have been institutionalized in the 25-years "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation" dated July 18th, 1977 have raised the spectre of an Indochinese federation under

Vietnamese hegemony for Kampuchea in a still more threatening way. (FEER, Yearbook 1978, p.232) There is indeed reason to suspect that a full parallelism of all political structures and economic development programs would end up in tributary relationships and a "limited sovereignty", which the Laotian leadership seem to have accepted. The treaty even provides the legal basis for the presence of Vietnamese troops in Laos.

The government of Kampuchea is very sensitive and obstinate in questions of national sovereignty and a Vietnamese dominated Indochinese federation while the Vietnamese side absolutely refute the charge of planning such a federation. Any form of a Indochinese federation (even if sovereignty were respected and it would bring advantages) is strictly ruled out, because in Pol Pot's judgement it aims only at "reducing the people of Kampuchea to the status of national minority". (Interview with four Yugoslavian correspondents in March 1978 in Phnom Penh, Frankfurter Rundschau, 12.4.78) The "special relations" and "special solidarity" offered by Vietnam on the basis of the "common struggle" against the US will lead in the eyes of Kampuchea directly to dependency and submission. One does not trust the "big brother" Vietnam, whose embrace would suffocate the smaller brother. The statements of the Kampuchean leadership show that this implies a criticism of Vietnamese socialism. *The Vietnamese Communist Party is charged with "begging from the imperialists and selling out socialism". Annexionist tendencies of Vietnam are traced back to a revisionist deformation of socialism where revisionism will lead to imperialism and vice versa.* Radio Hanoi and the Vietnamese daily Nhan Dan (The People) on the other hand speak of "reactionary Kampuchean authorities" and they attack the emphasis on agriculture as "brutal and infantile peasant equalitarianism". (Quote in FEER, 13.1.78 and 31.3.78)

### **The conflict in the framework of the political developments in South East Asia**

The conflict between Kampuchea and Vietnam cannot be analyzed in isolation from the political developments in South East Asia after the break-down of the old South East Asia strategy of the United States. Since the liberation

of the country on April 17th, 1975 Kampuchea has systematically developed relations with all states in the area on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co-existence as developed by the non-aligned nations, hoping above all to secure the sovereignty and the existence of the national territory through good relationships.

Since March 1977, when the relations with Thailand under the regime of prime minister Thanin deteriorated and tensions with Vietnam increased, Kampuchea has reinforced relations with Burma, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. It was at this time, that Ieng Sary attracted widespread attention in Kuala Lumpur with his announcement that Kampuchea would be able to export its first 150,000 tons of rice in 1977. Kampuchea envisages a close cooperation with the association of South East Asian nations Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines in order to reach better prices on the World Market through cartels of raw-material producing countries as is the case with the Association of Rubber Exporting Countries, of which Kampuchea is a member. The fact that the country is able to provide its population with basic food-stuffs and a development concept to build the economy without foreign help give a high degree of mobility in foreign policy to this country.

Vietnam on the other hand is forced through its complicated foreign relation and economic entanglements through development credits and compensation-trade with the Soviet Union and the COMECON-countries to resort to different tactics. Vietnam did not have relations with ASEAN because its members were thought to be too closely allied with the US, and this alliance was more decisive for Vietnam than the relative independence of this alliance. Since 1977 however the South East Asia strategy of Vietnam has fundamentally changed. First of all, relations with China further deteriorated which was only too visible at the last visit of party-secretary Le Duan in November 1977 in Peking. On the other hand ASEAN as an alliance has increased its importance and has developed good relations with China. China is interested in a strong independent South East Asian alliance of states in order to have a neutral area on its Southern flank against the interests of the Soviet Union in this area. The independence

of this alliance is considered to have a greater importance than the social structure of these countries. *On the other hand each independent liberation movement, CP or liberation front against the dictatorships in the South-East-Asian states can count on Chinese support.* Relations between China and Vietnam are negatively influenced by the strong economic ties of Vietnam with the Soviet Union. China is afraid that Vietnam may be drifting through economic indebtedness into a political dependency and that Soviet influence in South East Asia may be growing. Also Vietnam has hitherto followed the principles of the non-aligned nations in not permitting the establishment of military bases to the Soviet Union on its territory, however its entry into the Soviet dominated COMECON is a step in the other direction which has already been taken by Cuba and Angola, and is announced for Afghanistan and Ethiopia, both countries under strong Soviet control.

Tensions have been growing in different areas. There are first of all the Spratley-island in the South-China sea claimed by China and Vietnam but also by the Philippines and Thailand.

The Vietnamese CP follows the ideology of the Soviet leadership.

According to Le Duan the main goal of the socialist revolution is to enlarge the socialist camp, which necessarily is under the domination of the Soviet Union. The liberated countries accordingly can only claim a "limited sovereignty".

Kampuchea is afraid to become a victim of such a policy which is heavily opposed by the Kampuchean CP, Kampuchea has sided with China, against the Soviet-Vietnamese version of socialism because of this identity of interests.

Presently Vietnam is trying to break the isolation between ASEAN and the Chinese foreign policy. As the US are still continuing to refuse the establishment of normal relation and as the European states are partly following this US-policy (e.g. the Federal Republic of Germany) and partly do not have the economic standing for a large scale cooperation, there was only a small pass between a direct dependency on the Soviet Union and an independent foreign policy.

But perhaps it will be mainly the way in which the conflict with Kampuchea will be handled, that the specific

features of Vietnam's future foreign policy will become distinct: Soviet-socialist expansion or cooperation on the basis of peaceful coexistence.

If the armed conflict between Kampuchea and Vietnam were nothing but a simple border conflict it certainly would already have been solved through negotiations. The Vietnamese Government on February 5th, 1978 made an offer for negotiations: 5 kilometers of no-mens-land on the frontier, an international commission and border talks always sounds plausible and the refusal of this offer has again earned Kampuchea the name of obstinacy and fanaticism. This is overlooking that the Kampuchians as much as the Vietnamese are basically willing to enter talks but they are not willing to enter talks on a new borderline. This is due to Kampuchea's bad experiences with losses of territory as a consequence of border-talks. Obviously more is involved than borders: It is the apprehension of a small nation to

lose its sovereignty and its territory to a strong neighbour. Is it not in such a case the neighbour's duty to dispell this apprehension by making concessions, and this especially when he is incessantly repeating that it does not represent a threat to the smaller neighbour? Kampuchea will stop relying on its arms only if it does not feel threatened by Vietnam anymore.

It is still more complicated to find a solution when bloody clashes are accompanied by contradicting political convictions, because this may take the form of a religious war. There can be no compromise between wrong and right, no arrangement but only coexistence. Should the Vietnamese work for the integration of Kampuchea into an Indochinese federation out of their political conviction that it is necessary to expand the "socialist camp" even if this involves the limitation of the sovereignty of a nation, the Vietnamese CP is making a mistake.

## Whither Albania?

We also find ourselves forced to publicly criticise the ideological and political manoeuvres of the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labour. The leadership of the Albanian Party of Labour has taken steps to interfere in the internal affairs of Marxist-Leninist parties, and this on an international scale. Since the VIIth Party Congress of the Albanian Party of Labour hardly a day has gone by without fierce attacks being directed against the Communist Party of China, Comrade Mao Tsetung and other Marxist-Leninist Parties from one forum or the other. Ideology and politics of the Communist Party of China are ranked together with modern revisionism and social imperialism. "Chinese revisionism" is characterized as a "great danger to the cause of the revolution", which is the main reason why the main orientation of the ideological struggle of the Albanian Party of Labour must be directed against the Communist Party of China and especially against Mao Zedong Thought. Comrade Mao Zedong's theory of the three worlds is slandered as being "counterrevolutionary", his theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat as being "revisionism",

the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution as being "fractional struggle" and "chaos"; on the political plane the Communist Party of China is accused of hegemonism; in the meantime the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labour has characterized China as a "social imperialist power" on a level with the Soviet Union, calls it an "instigator of a third world war" etc. In contrast Albania itself is "a single radiant island in the middle of a capitalist and revisionist ocean", whose first and foremost duty now lies in building an international front against the Communist Party of China and other Marxist-Leninist parties.

How did this come about?

### **Incapable of analysing the international situation concretely**

At the VIIth Party Congress of the Albanian Party of Labour (1st-7th November 1976) the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labour examined the relationship between US imperialism and Soviet social imperialism in detail and arrived at the following contradictory result:

"Now as before it (US imperialism - Author) remains

politically and economically the main bulwark of the capitalist system of exploitation, the great defender of colonialism and neo-colonialism, the backer of racism and superintendent of world reaction".

In the summarizing statement, however, the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labour names no main enemy, but equates USA and SU:

"The superpowers are, alone or together, to the same degree and on the same level the main enemy."

He had refused to differentiate between Soviet social imperialism and US imperialism by using the following term: "the greatest counterrevolutionary force confronting the peoples struggle for freedom and socialism is the Soviet-American alliance". This "alliance" was emphasised to such an extent as to suggest the conclusion that cooperation and not rivalry made up the main aspect of the relationship between the SU and the USA.

### European Community and Superpowers are put on a same Level

In assessing the world situation at the VIIIth Party Congress E. Hoxha completed the line of main enemies by adding the European capitalist countries:

"United Europe, which has been hatched out by West European capital, is intended to become a new imperialist superpower with identical hegemonist presumptions as the United States of America and the Soviet Union" ...

### False views on the danger of war

In his speeches and articles E. Hoxha makes clear that he does not deal with the question of the danger of war in connection with the uneven development of imperialism or in connection with the sharpening of *all* fundamental contradictions in the world.

On the contrary he stresses:

"As our party has taught and teaches every day, the world is revolutionary. In such a world situation imperialism is in danger. That is why it is preparing for war."

Lenin stated fundamentally that the international bourgeoisie in the age of

imperialism is forced to fight out a struggle for "the division of the world" if it is to continue to achieve maximum profits. This struggle can take on all sorts of different forms ("peaceful" and unpeaceful) but in the end it takes on the form of war – as the continuation of politics. Division and redivision of the world, says Lenin, results "not from the particular malice for instance" of the capitalists but from economic necessities, from the pressure of imperialist competition.

But not only the contradictions inherent in the *capitalist world*, which of necessity lead to a bitter struggle among the imperialist states, mean war, but for instance also the development of the contradiction between the oppressed nations and imperialism (to take just one of the fundamental contradictions of today's world as an example). *All* fundamental contradictions are sharpening, even if to different degrees. That is why it is inadmissible to consider the development of only one contradiction in isolation; absolutely inadmissible is E. Hoxha's practice of maintaining at its own discretion that imperialism only leads to war *because* it is "endangered" by a revolutionary world situation.

The Albanian leaders take a further step along this way of departing from the elementary insights of Leninism, as we can see from the following assessment of the danger of world war:

"In contrast to Lenin, who called warmongering a crime, because the peoples had to pay for war with their blood, the pseudo theory of the 'three worlds' incites world war instead of trying to smash the imperialist war plans."

How can one maintain such nonsense? Mao Zedong and the Communist Party of China have always emphasized that they are against a world war which will "without doubt bring mankind a catastrophe" and that nobody wants this war "except for a few warmongers, who want to grab world rule".

Is such a development to be expected at present or in the near future? Certainly not. On the contrary it is a fact that the rivalry between the two superpowers SU and USA is sharpening from day to day and that this rivalry cannot be resolved peacefully. That is why China is following a policy of "delaying the outbreak of war" and

strengthening the defence potential of the peoples. This policy also includes making use of the contradictions between the superpowers tactically so as to ensure that "neither of them set up, expand and divide up spheres of influence or rivalise anywhere in the world." (See PR No.45, 1977)

The leadership of the Albanian Party of Labour cannot prove the opposite and is only spewing out infamies. For instance it notes in connection with the recently concluded Treaty between China and Japan: China "is trying to transform this treaty into a barrier against the Soviets in East Asia as well as into a means for a possible march by China against the Soviet Union." On the one hand, it is quite correct to state that the treaty is a barrier against the Soviet Union – why, if not because the Soviet Union is expansionist? But why are the tables then turned so as to insinuate that the same applies to China? Does the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labour believe that China will try to commit suicide and lead a war of aggression against a superpower? Does E. Hoxha believe, that China could accomplish the tremendous tasks posed by the four modernisations and lead such a war at the same time?

### Albanian and Soviet analyses – confusingly alike

Since the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labour has departed from the foundations of Marxist analysis, no longer respects the facts and disregards the truth, it is landing up in the arms of Soviet social imperialism. A comparison of their statements regarding the policies of the PR China shows that the central assertion common to both consists in talking about "Peking's plans for world rule" and the "warmongering" of China.

At this moment in time this campaign of slander against the PR China has reached a new climax. In the so-called "Friendship Treaty" between the Soviet Union and the SR Vietnam there is a formulation about "Peking's expansionism" against which the SU and Vietnam must unite. Vietnamese films are shown in Soviet television which are supposed to prove that Chinese soldiers are attacking Vietnam. Keeping step with this massive slander campaign being run by the Soviet social imperialists, the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labour is intensifying its anti-Chinese attacks,

accuses the PR China of expansionism, supports the policies of Vietnam in Southeast Asia with remarkable openness, and keeps silent equally remarkably as to the role of Cuba in all regions of SU expansion!

Where is the proof that the social system in China gives rise to a drive towards expansion? Where is the proof for the assertion that China is "socialimperialist"? Is there a relationship of dependence between China and any other country in the world, or has it tried to place any other country under pressure?

### **The APL leaders mix up objective and subjective, the general and the particular**

At the VIIth Party Congress Hoxha said of the non-aligned movement:

"The slogan of the non-aligned states gives rise to the false impression that a group of states has been formed that it is possible to confront the blocks of the superpowers; one gains the impression that these countries are without exception antiimperialist, against war, against the diktat of foreign countries, that they are all democratic, or even socialist."

By no means is this impression created; if one examines what the Communist Party of China says on this a little more closely, one discovers that the theory of the three worlds proceeds from their being considerable differences in the individual countries.

"Some are revolutionary ... Others are progressive or stand in the middle and have differing points of view. A few are reactionary. There are even individual agents of imperialism or social imperialism. Such phenomena are inevitable as long as classes exist, as long as proletariat, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie, different sorts of bourgeoisie, the class of landowners and other exploiting classes exist."

However: is the movement of non-aligned countries, despite its internal differences, an advance over and against the times when imperialism could do as it wished in these countries, or not? Is imperialism strengthened or weakened when it can no longer reckon with the loyalty of a whole row of countries? Does this make the potential of imperialism bigger or smaller?

The statement of the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labour on the non-aligned countries is no isolated, chance utterance. This example however shows clearly how the APL leaders equate the objective significance of these countries in their weakening of imperialism with a subjective revolutionary attitude and political strategy on the part of the governments of these countries.

### **Non-aligned Countries – subjectively and objectively revolutionary?**

The viewpoints of the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labour are a departure from dialectical materialism and the Marxist-Leninist method of making "a concrete analysis of a concrete situation"! How can two powers be the main enemy to the same degree and on the same level? That would mean that there were a balance of power between them, but this balance of power contained in the contradiction between the superpowers can only be a temporary one.

Lenin had already used materialist dialectics to analyse imperialism and concluded that the law of uneven development was fundamental. Speaking of the relationship of individual monopolies and countries to one another Lenin analysed:

"The strength of the participants however develops unevenly, for it is impossible for there to be an even development of individual concerns, trusts, industrial branches of countries under capitalism."

True the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labour does not use Lenin's statements so as to make a concrete analysis of the present situation – that is why the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labour does not answer the question as to which is the declining and which is the rising imperialism. The Albanian leaders do not understand Marxism-Leninism, materialist dialectics. Fundamental Marxist-Leninist tenets (such as there being four major contradictions in the world in the present epoch) are seen by the Albanian leaders as being the concrete analysis of a concrete situation and nothing else is needed; they do not understand that it is necessary to take the existence of these four fundamental contradictions as a starting point from which one must proceed to a concrete analysis of the contradictory pro-

cess in which the power relations in the world develop. There is a continual confusion of the universal and the particular, of the fundamental point of view and concrete analysis, of the basic contradictions and their concrete expression.

What does Leninism demand? Analysing the world situation from the standpoint of the proletariat in relation to the world revolution. After the October Revolution Lenin said that the "division of the nations into oppressors and the oppressed must make up the central point in the social democratic programmes", that "this division represents the essence of imperialism..." Does this division mean denying that there are bourgeois capitalist countries and socialist countries? Did Lenin depart from the class standpoint when he made this division of the forces in the world?

It is precisely this confusion of the universal and the particular which characterizes the "scientific method" of the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labour, for instance, when it has nothing else to say about such an important question as the evaluation of the various imperialist countries than the following:

"Every imperialism is by nature always a fanatical enemy of the proletarian revolution, from a strategic point of view it is therefore false to distinguish between more or less dangerous imperialism."

These statements stamp not only Lenin but also Stalin and Mao Zedong as "revisionists"; it is a well-known fact that Stalin differentiated between aggressive and non-aggressive imperialist states before the Second World War and developed on this basis the strategy of the worldwide united front against facism! Mao Zedong did the same when he made the following statement in 1940:

"Although the Communist Party is against imperialism of any sort, it must make a difference between Japanese imperialism which is carrying out an act of aggression against China and the other imperialist powers which are undertaking no such acts of aggression at present..."

The basis for all these mistakes is that the in itself correct insight into the irreconcilability of reaction and revolution, capitalism and socialism, capital-

ist class and proletariat is considered to be the analysis of the concrete situation, and that this way of looking at things ignores the many sided differentiation of the class forces on a world scale. Taking the abyss dividing the opposing sides as the decisive definition of the existing situation means counting only those with a revolutionary programme on the "revolutionary" side, and not those forces which at present objectively propel the world revolution forward; all forces which do not represent or advocate the rule of the proletariat or the people are placed on the side of the reactionaries.

### **The Relationship of the Leaders of the Albanian Party of Labour to modern Revisionism**

As represented in its publications in the last two years in particular, the Albanian Party of Labour appears to be the sole pioneer which consistently fights against modern revisionism. The CPC is slandered as a vacillating force and most recently as being revisionist itself. Let us examine the "antirevisionist" positions taken up by the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labour at their last Party Congress and let us then consider a few historical facts concerning the struggle against modern revisionism.

### **The VIIIth Party Congress on capitalist restoration and modern revisionism**

Mao Zedong examined the objective laws of development of socialist society according to the basic theory of Marxism-Leninism in the light of the historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union in his work "On the correct handling of contradictions among the people" and elsewhere. In the process he came to the conclusion that even after the completion of the socialist transformation of ownership of the means of production class contradictions and class struggle continue to exist in socialist society and that the struggle between the socialist and the capitalist road lasts the whole period of socialism. He pointed to the existing economic problems in socialist society, for instance the different wage levels in the working class, and to the necessity of completing the socialist revolution in the political, economic, ideological and cultural fields. He particularly emphasised the two categories of social

contradiction in socialist society, namely the contradictions among the people and the contradiction over and against the enemy, whereby the contradictions among the people are the more numerous, and underlined that only by clearly differentiating between the different sorts of contradictions and correctly handling them with the appropriate methods can the Communist Party unite with more than 90% of the population and consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat, it can prevent new bourgeois elements spreading out and gaining influence in society and in the party. With regard to the Communist Party Mao Zedong stated definitively that the class struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie must inevitably also be reflected in the party itself where it takes on the form of the struggle between the bourgeois and the proletarian line.

For their parts, the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labour do not go beyond the following statement when making their class analysis: "Together with the completion of the establishment of socialist relations of production the process of liquidating the exploiting classes as classes also comes to an end. Our society now consists of two friendly classes, the working class and the collective farmers as well as the strata of the people's intelligentsia. The fundamental characteristic of the present class structure in our country is the alliance of the working class with the collective farmers under the leadership of the working class and the fact that the unity of the people has been raised to a qualitatively higher level."

### **Innerparty struggle: not for the correct line, but against its manifestation**

The leadership of the Albanian Party looks on the relationships within the party in the same way as it comments on the emergence of single bourgeois individuals within the society. It admits that the emergence of isolated deviationists also leads to ideological struggle, but on no account to a two line struggle, the proletarian against the bourgeois. The party "had and has the only line, the Marxist-Leninist line, which it has defended faithfully and followed with determination". Without exception deviations are labelled as "alien manifestations". And since there can only be one line, the struggle against inimical trends within the party is treated as a question of

leadership methods and not as a question of the *line* to be followed with regard to socialist economy and politics. For this reason it is impossible to demask revisionists in the struggle for the correct *line*, it is only possible to criticise the manifestation (appearance) of their revisionist line; as if they have been infected by "bureaucratism" and "liberalism". The "correct" line is equated with the fulfillment of existing principles and the execution of resolutions that have been decided upon; it is impossible to find out where the origins of revisionism really lie because deviations from the principles and resolutions are not criticised with regard to their true content as the expression of non-proletarian points of view on the background of the class struggle in society and because the mere existence of deviations is considered to be „proof" of "revisionism".

As a result the leadership of the Albanian party of Labour does not deliberate at all about questions such as unfolding democracy among the people in the process of unfolding the class struggle, handling the contradictions among the people or involving the people in the struggle against a counterrevolutionary line within the party. That is the reason why the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labour is consistent in its rejection of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution which developed new forms of bringing mass initiative to the fore and made the defence of socialism a matter of concern for the masses of the people. Because innerparty struggle is not understood as a reflection of the struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie which must be led by relying on the masses so that they continually learn how to distinguish between the bourgeois and the proletarian line, innerparty struggle is primarily fought by organisational means which go so far as to include the physical liquidation of members who have deviating opinions.

### **Modern revisionism without capitalist restoration?**

It follows from what has already been said that the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labour cannot have understood the lessons to be drawn from the victory of modern revisionism and the transformation of proletarian dictatorship into a bourgeois dictatorship in the Soviet Union. E. Hoxha finds the whole thing quite simple:

"By diverging from the principles of the dictatorship of the proletariat revisionism . . . stepped on to the stage and led to the destruction of the socialist social system (there)."

He does not see the coming to power of revisionism as being the coming to power of the bourgeoisie.

In 1963 the CPC had already stated that one of the reasons for the emergence of new bourgeois elements lay in Comrade J. Stalin's wrong handling of the relationship between proletariat and bourgeoisie in socialist society.

"Stalin emphasised one-sidedly the harmony within socialist society and neglected its contradictions. He did not rely on the working class and the broad masses of the people in the struggle against capitalist forces. He considered a restoration of capitalism to be possible but only in connection with an armed attack on the part of international imperialism. That was theoretically and practically incorrect."

But the Albanian Party of Labour says:

"Our party is of the opinion that J.W. Stalin was and is not only one of the most outstanding leaders and personalities in the Soviet Union but also one of the most ardent defenders and the *greatest theoretician* of Marxism-Leninism in his *entire* theoretical and practical activity."

### **Hoxha: No difference between Soviet revisionism and Social imperialism!**

The Albanian Party of Labour does not pose itself the question as to the inevitability of social imperialism arising out of the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union and makes no attempt to materialistically analyse the qualitative leap which took place between Khrushchev revisionism and the policies of the superpower Soviet Union. Thus social imperialism is consistently depicted as "Khrushchev-Revisionism".

True the APL does talk of the imperialist character of the Soviet Union. But without taking into account the emergence of a bureaucratic monopoly bourgeoisie of a new type in the Soviet Union.

It is impossible to understand the particular danger emanating from "up and coming" imperialist big power Soviet Union which is heightened still more by the existence of the most concentrated form of state, economic and military control apparatus in the hands of a monopoly bourgeois of a new type. This leads to Soviet social imperialism being underestimated; in consequence it is impossible to recognize the true role of the modern revisionists in the CPSU and their world wide ambitions.

It is only consistent to deny the role other modern revisionist parties play as agents for social imperialism; the theory of the APL as to the revisionist parties of the West "fusing" with social democracy flies in the face of the facts and prevents a truly effective weapon against these parties being forged.

All this shows quite clearly that there is a close ideological relationship between the assessment of modern revisionism in the Soviet Union, the treatment of the question of capitalist restoration in the Soviet Union and the handling of corresponding problems in Albania society itself. This close relationship takes on the shape of refusing to analyse concrete contradictory developments from the standpoint of dialectical materialism, replacing analysis with quotations of universal dogma. If one doesn't carry out such an analysis problems take on a subjective or idealistic character. Taken as a whole E. Hoxha and other APL leaders practise dogmatism in solving concrete problems.

### **Some historical facts on the struggle of the CPC and the APL against modern revisionism**

According to information provided by the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labour E. Hoxha was the only one to have combatted modern revisionism "consistently and with determination" "from the very start"; according to them the CP China agreed with his positions "in a superficial way" and directed their efforts towards "reconciliation with the Soviets" and towards "stifling the Polemic". We shall see that in fact precisely the opposite was the case and demonstrate what methods the APL leaders use to falsify history in an unscrupulous way.

### **CPC and APL in the Struggle against modern Revisionism before 1960**

First of all it is a falsification of history (we shall see later what ends this was to serve) for the APL leaders to claim that the Bucarest Conference of the Communist Parties (1960) and the Moscow Conference of the same year were the beginning of the "open polemic" against Khrushchev revisionism. (It is a known fact that the open polemic began with the Open Letter of the CC of the CPSU dated July 14th 1963).

Let us assume that the "open polemic" did begin in 1960: what took place in the year before that? Is it not strange that there is not a single document available showing how the APL leaders combatted modern revisionism fundamentally, "consistently" and with "determination" during this time? Quite a contrast to the "vacillating" and "superficial" writings and statements made by Mao Zedong and the CP China?! Here, the most important of them

– "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" (April 1956) in which Khrushchev's "peaceful road" and "peaceful coexistence" are criticized.

– "On the Ten Major Relationships" (April, 1956)

– "Once again on the Historical Experiences of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" (Dec. 1956; which was even reprinted in "Zeri i Popullit" on 30.12.56)

– "On the correct handling of the contradictions among the people" (Feb. 1957) in which important conclusions are drawn from the mistakes of the CPSU.

– Mao Zedong's stand at the Moscow Conference 1957 thanks to which no principally incorrect theses propagated by Khrushchev were included in the final document.

All these and other writings criticised Khrushchev's ideological and political positions in a *fundamental* way. Now that the 5th Volume of Mao Zedong's Selected Works has appeared Marxist-Leninists have the opportunity to learn from the criticism Mao Zedong made of modern revisionism in the 50's. They can see for themselves that Hoxha's assertion that "the opposition of the CP China was based on tactical considerations" is quite unbelievable!

Let us look at a few examples of the

“anti-revisionist struggle” of the APL leadership in contrast! A decisive criterion for distinguishing between Marxist-Leninists and revisionists is their attitude towards the XX. Party Congress of the CPSU (Feb. 1956), towards the question of “peaceful transition” and the question of the danger of war. Let us review E. Hoxha’s assessment:

– “The APL has always declared and still does today that the experiences of the CPSU, the experiences of its Party Congresses including the 20th and the 22nd have always been and always will be a great help on our road to build a socialist and communist society”!

– “Although we say that we only disagree with a few of the theses of the 20th Party Congress the Soviet leaders like to round it off and say we disagree with the whole Party Congress”.

The History of the Albanian Party of Labour which was published in 1971 writes of the assessment made by the IIIrd Party Congress of the APL with regard to the 20. Party Congress of the CPSU:

“All conclusions and resolutions passed at the III Party Congress were infused with a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist spirit in fundamental contradiction to the revisionist spirit which characterized the conclusions and resolutions passed at the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU”.

With this in mind, how was it possible that E. Hoxha could speak in such praise of it as is evidenced in the above quote some 6 years after the 20th Party Congress, despite the fact that it was characterized by such a “revisionist spirit? He never did!

1½ years after the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU E. Hoxha still said the following:

“As you know the 20th Party Congress, an important occurrence in the history of communism and the international communist movement, did not only develop a great number of Marxist-Leninist theses, such as the thesis of peaceful coexistence, the thesis of the possibility of avoiding wars, of the roads which assure the working class of achieving power etc., it also proposed the magnificent programme of transition from socialism to communism ...”.

It is hard to believe that E. Hoxha sav-

ed the CP China from “capitulating” on the basis of such assessments. Had that been the case, then it would have taken place at the most important international conferences at which the Marxist-Leninist parties combatted Khrushchov – at the Moscow Conferences in 1957 and 1960.

Did the CP China also fail to take up a “firm stand against the Khrushchevites” at the Moscow Conference of 1960, as the APL claims today? “The History of the APL” still saw the situation as follows:

“By approving the attitude taken up by its delegation at the Moscow Conference and taking it as an example the APL honoured the revolutionary, principled and emphatic struggle of the delegation of the CP China as a decisive contribution to the victory Marxism was able to win over revisionism at this Conference”.

And at the 21st Plenary Session of the CC of the APL E. Hoxha himself said:

“The CP China is following the Marxist-Leninist road unswervingly and presents them (the revisionists, the author) with an extremely serious obstacle. One of the main reasons which forced them to make a withdrawal at the Moscow Conference was the correct and principled stand of the CP China”.

These are just some of the examples of how the APL assessed the delegation of the CP China which stood under the leadership of Comrade Deng Hsiao-ping. We can only wait and wonder what will soon appear in the “revised” versions of these documents!

### **The APL leaders falsify history and equate their line of “one against” with anti-revisionism**

*Proceeding from their central thesis:*

*“The Bucarest Conference and the subsequent conference of 81 communist and workers’ parties in Moscow represents the definite split between the Marxist-Leninists and the Khrushchev revisionists and the beginning of the open polemic between them.”*

The APL leadership is forced to conceal the position it actually did take up at that time which was identical with the position taken up by the CP China: that the socialist camp still existed and that the struggle for unity of the inter-

national communist movement should be continued against Khrushchev.

*Consequently E. Hoxha’s speech at the Moscow Conference is now published in a “revised” version in which 10 omissions are identified and contains a further 19 omissions which are not identified at all! All these omissions touch on the existence of the socialist camp and affirm the leading role of the Soviet Union!*

The APL leaders are trying to kill two birds with one stone with all their falsifications of history: by “proving” that the CPC has always been “opportunist” and followed a policy of “reconciliation” with modern revisionism they also want to depict the conception of the worldwide united front against US imperialism as being incorrect and to defame the “Proposal concerning the general line”! Does that justify the conclusion that the APL leaders have always been against the line followed by the CPC and only agreed to it hypocritically, so as to at least have some allies in the world? Lenin recognized that the struggle against imperialism ends in defeat if it is not tied up with a thorough and correct criticism of revisionism – and the development of history has proved this. To take up a dogmatic attitude in this struggle and to depart from dialectical materialism leads to capitulation to imperialism. With the growing pressure exerted by social imperialism in Europe, the growing influence of this most dangerous of the imperialist powers the vacillating and uncertain forces are capitulating at an increasing speed. But this pressure and influence will certainly come against Marxist-Leninist forces which are growing in strength, if these analyse reality soberly and apply Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong thought to the concrete conditions.

J.H.

Several of the articles in this issue are based on translations from foreign Journals, amongst them from “Rode Fane” of the Norwegian Marxist-Leninist Party, AKP (M-L). We apologize for any errors in translation.



## “Two Lines in the Party are like Gasoline in the Dinner”

From “Rode Fane”, AKP (M-L), Norway

(Interview of the Swedish author, Thomas Nydahl, with the editor of “New Albania”, Ymer Minxhozhi, last summer. The latter explains why the Albanian leaders are against the Eritrean struggle for freedom. The article confirms the criticism made in the previous article and shows that while the Albanians concentrate their criticism against a supposed “Chinese Hegemonism”, in reality they are in the camp of social imperialism, in spite of the phrases condemning it. Nydahl himself, once sympathetic to the Albanian position, now takes a critical attitude. — Editor, IKWEZI).

*I think we must begin this interview with the question of the Soviet Union (SU) as it is of vital importance. We would like to know the attitude of the Party of Labour of Albania (APL) towards the Soviet and Cuban intervention in Africa. What is the Soviet role there?*

Our policy towards the Soviet Union is well known. Soviet policy is imperialistic . . . It has been revealed as an imperialism on an equal footing with U.S. Imperialism. It is a fact that the SU used Cuba to intervene in Africa. These actions must not hide the fact that another imperialist intervention is taking place. To fight one superpower one cannot unite with another. There is a lot to be said about Cuba's intervention in Africa. It is a fact that it does exist, but as a parallel to the Cuban intervention there are others. We can see that the USA is intervening in the same way as French, Belgian and German imperialism. They fight to obtain new spheres of influence. Our policy is that we condemn every act of imperialistic intervention in the continent. We do not support the status quo. This is an area we disagree with the Chinese. The Chinese condemn the SU and Cuba at the same time as they support other imperialist interventions. At the same time they give support to reactionary groups like Mobutu. We oppose the Chinese position. If we did not do that it would mean betraying the people.

In many African countries the regimes are reactionary. Some are progressive but most of them are reactionary. Nobody can say that a socialist state can support these regimes.

We now see that some imperialist powers are trying to create a reactionary all-African force that will be used under the guise of fighting Cuba. This is to oppose one intervention to another. We see China's military intervention. They act in the same way as the SU and the USA. Does the people's enemy consist of one or two superpowers. Both superpowers are the enemies. Their behaviour is the same. What does it matter if you are occupied by one or other of the superpowers.

*Question: What is your view of the Eritrean situation. The Soviets say that the struggle is a fight for separatism.*

To have a position on the national liberation struggle now in Eritrea, one has to ask a great many questions as who is supporting the national liberation struggle. It looks as if there is in Eritrea a movement for independence. Historically there is a continuity in the struggle for independence. But in our opinion in spite of this the movement has fallen into the trap of the superpowers. The SU is supporting Ethiopia to get support for their policies in Africa. Therefore they work against Eritrea. But who is supporting Eritrea? They are being supported by the other superpower through its allies. Saudi Arabia, Somalia — since Somalia is in conflict with Ethiopia — Sudan and Sadat. This support is doubtful as it does not come from strong countries. This is why we believe it comes from the USA which is passed onto Eritrea. The movement for freedom is strongly linked with reactionary forces. Officially our Party has not given its views on this question as we are looking at these contradictions. We can

support Eritrea but the movement is strongly connected with reactionary forces. The problem is rather delicate. One thing is clear both superpowers are intervening.

*Question: But the question remains. Is Eritrea a part of Ethiopia or is the struggle there a justified one for national independence?*

It is wrong to maintain that Eritrea is part of Ethiopia. The problem of Eritrea's liberation is that one has chosen a bad means of obtaining it. One is all the time seeking support from reactionary forces. Here is the contradiction.

*Question: What does your Party think is happening in Vietnam and Kampuchea. What is your viewpoint with regard to the relations of these two countries to the superpowers and China. What is happening here. Why did Vietnam enter Comecon?*

We can start with the conflict between Vietnam and Kampuchea. We have little information about what is happening there. But the trouble between the two countries has been created by “outsiders”. As time passes the question will become clear. In “Zeri Popullit” we expressed our deepest regrets that the two countries which fought side by side with one another were now at war with one another. Not so long ago China was friend to both countries, but now they have started another conflict with Vietnam under the pretext of protecting the Chinese living in Vietnam. China gives protection to many capitalist elements among the Vietnamese Chinese. Vietnam has taken precautionary measures towards them as they wish to unite the country. They wish to get rid of these capitalist elements and so the Chinese capitalist elements suffered. They have lived there for long, these rich Chinese. We can say they are more Chinese than Vietnamese. The problem is in fact a symptom of something else. China is upset that Vietnam does not have her policies. This is the main issue. That is why China uses great power policies against Vietnam, in collaboration with the USA. The conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam serves the same interest. The situation also serves other superpowers. China is acting in such a way that Vietnam gets closer to the USSR. That is the background to Vietnam's membership of Comecon. Vietnam's policy is to defend herself against one superpower by

relying on another. We do not agree with her here but we condemn great power policies against her.

**Question:** *What does the APL make of Mao Zedong?*

We cannot exclude Mao from what is happening in China now. You reap what you sow. A wrong line does not come in one day. Mao has been in the leadership of the CPC for very long. He himself has admitted that there are two lines in the Party, one bourgeois and one proletarian. But within a CP there cannot be two lines. One is either a revolutionary or one is not. If one drops gasoline into a dinner one cannot eat it. The same with beer, if you put water into it it is neither beer nor water.

So it is when one mixes two lines within a Party. As Mao formulated the policy about two lines, I cannot forget that he is behind many of the bad things in the policies of the CPC. He himself had great faults. Recently there has been published a speech by Mao called "Ten Major Relationships". It is full of false Marxism. Look at Mao's opinion to important events in China, his attitude to the bourgeois. It can be everything but it is not Marxism. I have lived in China for two years. The bourgeois has been treated very liberally from a wrong point of view, I shall give you an example.

I visited a textile combine in China. After some hours when I returned home the Chinese guide said to me: "Did you notice the man who told you everything about the factory." "Yes," I said "he is the chief engineer of the factory." "Yes", said my Chinese guide but he also owns the factory." He was indeed a straightforward capitalist. But how is it possible, I asked, that you keep a capitalist. Then he started to explain. I was very surprised at what I heard. In the evening I was visited by the vice-editor of the Shanghai newspaper. "I want to explain to you our policy towards the bourgeois," he said. "Stop that," I said, "I do not wish to know anything about your bourgeois. I came here to write about socialism. He gave me the following explanation: the national bourgeois in China has contributed greatly to the revolution. It was due to the genius of Mao that one used the bourgeois in this way. It was Mao himself who said we should give the bourgeois not only wages but also 10% of the income. I told him that the

bourgeois now has a better time than in old days. Now they are free from strikes and other troubles from the working class. I understood that the bourgeois in China did not need to make class struggle as they lived very well.

I explained to him that we had another attitude towards the bourgeois. We followed Marx. The bourgeois had stolen the capital and the working class had the right to take it back without compensation . . . We do not allow the bourgeois into the state . . .

These liberal tendencies were in Mao's works and this has lead China to where it is today.

In China they have been publishing Khrushchev's speeches, and other revisionists, so that people can see how wrong they were. It seems these publications have had the opposite effect. Probably Khrushchev's ideas have got into the heads of many. For many years in China there has not been the expression "Khrushchev's revisionism".

**Question:** *I want to speak about the danger of a Third World War. The CPC says that the source of such a war will be the Soviet Union as it is the rising super power. They say US Imperialism is on the retreat. But does not the danger of war lay in the rivalry between the two superpowers? It is not possible that the SU alone can be the source of war. What is the APL view on this serious matter?*

Let us look at some historical facts. They teach us something. How many years has passed since the Second World War? 34 – 35 years. During this period, the USA started 25 wars, mainly against socialist countries . . . USA has 3,000 military bases all over the world . . . in nearly all countries in Europe there are American bases. 45% of the American Navy operates abroad. Therefore we cannot say that the USA has given up her plans for war. Why have they not withdrawn from the Middle East, from Africa, from Europe?

I think the Chinese government is the only one in the world to say that the USA is on the retreat. Maybe there is a treaty between the USA and China that she shall say so. China says this about the USA when she is not even diplomatically acknowledged by the USA. China's attitude is not political. It is a criminal action towards the peoples of the world. The SU behaves

in the same way as the USA, but this does not mean that the USA is on the retreat. In fact it is China who is in retreat from her earlier foreign policy. We hear many other absurd things. The USA used to say that the greatest military threat comes from the SU. But in reality the SU has all her troops concentrated on China's border. Come now. Where is the danger? Where the troops are or where they are not?

Of course there are great dangers to Europe, because the superpowers have a large military presence there. But the Chinese emphasise this because they wish to support NATO.

We do not think a new world war is inevitable. It is our belief that there is the danger of war and we must be prepared against it. But the war is not inevitable . . . on this question we oppose the revisionists and especially the Chinese revisionists who say that a third world war is inevitable. That is a macabre prospect to offer. Since this war is inevitable the proletarian's and revolutionaries' duty according to them is to enlist in the bourgeois armies, to fight for the bourgeois. From this they draw the conclusion that NATO is very good. They ask people to die for imperialism. They talk about defence of the fatherland, about defence of national independence. The same happened with the 2nd International. One urged the working class to defend national independence, to support war credits, etc. And then the workers went out to kill one another in the name of the bourgeois fatherland. Now you see how history repeats itself. Deng Xiaoping said that China serves as NATO's east flank. You see for yourself in what company you are.

The Chinese will reveal themselves. China has refused to support certain liberation movements. China makes treaties with governments not with people. This is an important matter you must know. But liberation movements will develop without their support. Not even the revolution in China will stop because of Deng Xiaoping . . .