


# SECHABHA

OFFICIAL ORGAN  
OF THE AFRICAN  
NATIONAL CONGRESS  
SOUTH AFRICA



VOLUME 2

NUMBER 5

MAY 1968

## THE ARMED STRUGGLE SPREADS

by Joe Slovo

Southern African Struggle – ANC-ZAPU Alliance – S. A. Guerillas – Political Prerequisites – Objective and Subjective Conditions – Militancy in Towns and in Rural Areas – Objective Difficulties – Guerilla Tactics

## OUR REVOLUTION WILL BE A COMPLETE SUCCESS!


Interview with George Nyandoro, Secretary-General of ZAPU (the Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union)



# TANZANIA SETS THE PACE

During January-February 1968, for a period of two weeks, the United Republic of Tanzania once again set the pace which other independent countries of Africa could emulate. This was when 11 members of the Cabinet, Area Commissioners and MPs joined the Tanzania National Service — a step taken to impress upon the people of the United Republic of Tanzania the importance of the National Service both as a protector and builder of the new and young Republic.

Led by the Second Vice-President, the Hon. Mr Rashidi Kawawa, the group included Cabinet Ministers, Junior Ministers and MPs from the mainland and Zanzibar. Among the new recruits were the Speaker of Parliament, Chief Adam Sapi; Mr Abdurrahman Mohamed Babu, Minister of Lands, Settlement and Water Development; Mr Hasnu Makame, Minister for Informa-



President Nyerere on reviewing stand. Behind him in uniform are (left to right) Mr L. Sijaona (Chairman, Tanu Youth League), Second Vice-President Mr Rashidi Kawawa, and Mr Joseph Nyerere (T. Y. L. Secretary-General).

tion and Tourism; Mr Ali Sultan Issa, Tanzania-Zanzibar Minister of Education and Culture; and Mr Job Lusinde, Minister of communications and works.

The period of training included a course in fire-training, marching drill, ploughing, etc., and the leaders also held discussions with other trainees on various aspects of Government, the Arusha Declaration and other matters

of national and international interest. The leaders lived, worked and were treated as ordinary recruits.

## PASSING-OUT PARADE

At the passing-out parade of 895 National Servicemen on 8 February, which included the group led by the second Vice-President, His Excellency President Julius K. Nyerere, in National Service uniform, called on leaders in factories, villages, offices and elsewhere to stop calling upon the people for more and harder work, and instead set examples of the kind of work that is required in Tanzania themselves.

The President emphasized: "What is required now is for leaders to direct the peoples' energies and show them what is required to be done." He told the National Servicemen that while in the force they had learnt two important lessons. The first was equality. While in the camp for whatever period, all the National Servicemen were treated with complete equality irrespective of whether they were Ministers, educated or uneducated. The second lesson was discipline. He reminded them that they had been taught to respect and obey their leaders.

The Second Vice-President's group received a standing ovation from the crowd as they marched smartly across the National Stadium to the Reviewing Stand to greet the President.

Contingent of the Peoples' Defence Force passes the reviewing stand.



TANZANIA SETS THE PACE	<i>facing</i>
Leaders Undergo Defence Training	
THE ARMED STRUGGLE SPREADS	2
by Joe Slovo. What are the objective and subjective conditions regarding the struggle?	
FROM THE FRONT	3
Powerful guerilla operation in Zimbabwe	
OUR REVOLUTION WILL BE A COMPLETE SUCCESS!	7
Interview with George Nyandoro, Secretary-General of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union	
LIFE UNDER APARTHEID	10
News Items demonstrating oppression in daily life	
LETTER TO THE EDITOR	11
Violence or non-violence? The ANC Youth Section replies to a letter.	
REPORT AND COMMENT	12
'Portrait of a Killer.'	
'You Must Not Take a Man's Home Away.'	
TRADE UNIONS IN TRAVAIL	15
Evidence of persecution of workers and their trade unions. From a Memorandum submitted to the United Nations.	
NEWS ITEMS	16
1. West German-South African Trade Soars.	
2. West Germany Exploiting Southern Africa.	

Articles in *Sechaba* may be re-printed in part or in full. No permission is required. It would be appreciated however if a copy of the material, as used, is sent to The Editor.

*Sechaba*                      Publicity Director - Alfred Kgokong  
49 Rathbone Street      Managing Editor - Joe Matthews  
London W. 1                Editor-in-Chief - Mandla Nkosi

## SUBSCRIPTIONS

*Sechaba* is the official organ of the African National Congress of South Africa, vanguard organization in our national liberation struggle. It is published monthly. As production costs far exceed the amount received through sales, we appeal to all democrats to contribute towards costs.

MINIMUM SUBSCRIPTIONS: - Africa £ 1 per year.  
Europe £ 1½ per year. Asia £ 2 per year. America 6 dollars per year.


All postal orders and cheques should be made out to SECHABA and crossed. *Sechaba*, 49 Rathbone Street, London W. 1.

# ADDRESSES

*Sechaba* may be obtained from the following bookshops, addresses and ANC Offices.

<b>TANZANIA</b>	African National Congress of South Africa P. O. Box 2239 Dar es Salaam.	
	African Bookshop P. O. Box 20837 Dar es Salaam.	
<b>ZAMBIA</b>	African National Congress of South Africa P. O. Box 1791 Lusaka.	
<b>ALGERIA</b>	African National Congress of South Africa 5 rue Ben M'hidi Larbi Algiers.	
<b>U.A.R.</b>	African National Congress of South Africa 5 Ahmad Hishmat Street Zamalek, Cairo.	
<b>INDIA</b>	African National Congress of South Africa A 66 South Extension Part 1 New Delhi 3.	
<b>ENGLAND</b>	African National Congress 49 Rathbone Street London W. 1	Collet's London Bookshop Ltd 66 Charing Cross Rd London W. C. 2
<b>USA</b>	Jefferson Bookshop 100 East 16 Street New York, N. Y. 10003	
<b>IRELAND</b>	Anti-Apartheid Movement 173 Barton Road East Dundrum Dublin 14.	
<b>HOLLAND</b>	Boekhandel PEGASUS Tijdschriften Leidsestraat 25 Amsterdam.	Boekhandel PEGASUS Hoogstraat 143 Rotterdam.
<b>NORWAY</b>	Mr Lars Allden Holtegt 24 Oslo 3.	
<b>JAPAN</b>	Far East Booksellers Kanda P. O. 72 Tokyo.	Maruzen Co Ltd P. O. Box 605 Tokyo Central Tokyo.
<b>GUYANA</b>	Michael Forde Book Shop 41 Robb Street Georgetown.	
<b>MEXICO</b>	Libreria Fomento Cultura P. Sanchez 325 Guadalajara Jal.	
<b>CANADA</b>	Book World 72 Gerrards St. West Toronto.	The Peoples Co-Op Bookstore 341 West Pender Street Vancouver.





# THE ARMED

## A discussion article armed struggle in National Student

Congress (ANC) and Rhodesia's Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) have been involved in armed clashes with South African and Rhodesian military forces<sup>5</sup>. The official admission of government losses of 8 dead and 14 wounded in these early engagements is disputed by the ANC and ZAPU, and appears to be an underestimation in the light of the reported number of casualties which filled Rhodesian hospitals. Despite early attempts to denigrate the calibre of the guerilla forces, the scale of the fighting, the tenacity of the guerillas in hand-to-hand combat, and the effectiveness and sophisticated quality of some of the ambushes even at this early stage, were a pointer to future possibilities<sup>6</sup>.

The whole of that part of Southern Africa which is controlled by racial minorities is experiencing either consistent and regular guerilla activity or is faced with advanced preparation for its commencement.

Angola<sup>1</sup> was followed by Mozambique<sup>2</sup> and they by South West Africa<sup>3</sup>. For Portugal (already extended by the brilliantly successful operations PAIGC in its West African colony of Guinea Bissao) the problem of guerilla operations in its territories is beginning to assume the proportions of a major crisis. Early this year Salazar, speaking of Angola and Mozambique, conceded that "if the troubles there continue very much longer, they will diminish and destroy our ability to carry on."<sup>4</sup>

And now the guerilla front against foreign and minority rule has been extended to Rhodesia where since 13 August 1967, guerilla units of South Africa's African National

### ANC-ZAPU ALLIANCE

According to press announcements, the collaboration between ANC and ZAPU guerilla forces was not coincidental but was part of joint planned action in the sense that "the fighting that is presently going on in the Wankie area is indeed being carried out by a combined force of ZAPU and ANC which marched into the country as comrades-in-arms on a common route, each bound to its destination. It is the determination of these combined forces to fight the common settler enemy to the finish, at any point of encounter as they make their way to their respective fighting zones."<sup>7</sup> This alliance has its historical roots in a situation which, in many fundamental respects, is common to both peoples. Rhodesia under Smith is more and more embracing the South African type political framework. Its survival in the face of a moderate amount of international pressure is almost undoubtedly due to the considerable bolstering up of its economy by South Africa. This same role of saviour of "white civilization" in Rhodesia is being played by South Africa in the military field.

It is reasonable to infer that if the Smith group could have avoided calling in South African troops to cope with the first batch of guerillas it would have preferred to do so. As it is, it lays itself open to the charge that its capacity to muster sufficient internal support to deal with this type of

1. First outbreaks of organized violence occurred in March 1961. Various factors including division in the guerilla ranks, and events in the Congo (which accommodated considerable guerilla reserves) enabled the Portuguese temporarily to render ineffective a movement which at its height had thousands of guerillas in the field and had gained control of considerable territory in the North. In the last few years a re-grouping has taken place and once again there is evidence of guerilla activity on a number of fronts. The premier organization leading the struggle in Angola is the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) led by Dr Agostinho Neto and Mario Pinto de Andrade. Roberto Holden's G. R. A. E. is in disfavour with the OAU. In a recent interview in Bamako, Mali, Dr Neto announced that MPLA's headquarters were being moved from Brazzaville to one of the regions "under our control in Angola." He also claimed that "MPLA militants now control one-third of Angolan territory which carries one-fifth of the population." There are reported to be 30,000 Portuguese troops in Angola.

2. The armed struggle in Mozambique was launched in September 1964, by Frelimo, an amalgamation of several earlier movements. Dr Eduardo Mandlanc, the President of Frelimo, claims to control a fifth of the country (Northern districts of Niassa and Cabo Delgado). There are reported to be 30,000 Portuguese troops in Mozambique.

3. According to evidence which emerged in the recent trial in Pretoria, South West African guerillas under the control of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) established a training camp in the territory in 1961 which operated undetected for close on a year.

4. Quoted in an editorial in the Johannesburg *Rand Daily Mail*, 6 January 1966.

5. According to press reports the main areas of operations appear to have been at Wankie, Zambesi River Valley, Northern Matabeleland, and the District of Bulawayo, West of the Livingstone-Bulawayo railway, Urungwe district and the Siplilo district. The biggest clash lasting 48 hours appears to have been at Tjolutje. The usual ploy of describing the joint efforts of the Vorster-Smith armed forces as a 'police action' is open to question when regard is had to facts like the use of Hunter jets, armed helicopters etc.

6. Report of Lawrence Fellows, *New York Times*, 5 October 1967.

7. Statement issued on 19 August 1967 by Oliver Tambo, Deputy President of the ANC, and J. R. D. Chikerema, Vice-President of ZAPU.

# STRUGGLE SPREADS

by JOE SLOVO, on the prospects for South Africa. First submitted to the Conference held in Oxford in March 1968

situation is suspect. And indeed it is inconceivable that, in the long run, this micro-community of 200,000 whites could muster either sufficient resources or morale to cope with a growing guerillas movement which would in varying degrees gain the allegiance of the politically deprived 4 million Africans.

The presence of the S. A. regime's armed forces on Rhodesian soil is an indication (if another is really needed) that the minority regimes in the whole of Southern Africa have come to regard the survival of white rule as indivisible. In this sense South Africa's strategic borders are more and more conceived as extending to the northernmost parts of Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia.<sup>8</sup> In this sense too there must be an extremely important strategic connection between the efforts of the guerilla forces in every part of occupied Southern Africa; and we can therefore expect increasing collaboration between all the organizations in the area which stand at the head of people's armed units.

The enormity of the task facing ANC guerillas within South Africa itself gave rise previously to suggestions that the liberation of Southern Africa should be approached as a project to be achieved in geographic stages — first Mozambique, then Angola and in the end South Africa. This strategy appears never to have found favour in the ANC or in any of the other liberatory movements: and for good reason. There can be little doubt that when Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique reaches a crisis point, Salazar's friends in South Africa (looking to their own future) will intervene on a massive scale. Their capacity to do so, and their capacity to meet mounting military pressures in Rhodesia, will in part be dependent upon events within their own country and in particular, on the extent to which the South African guerilla probes take root and menace internal stability. Similarly, every victory in Angola, Mozambique, South West Africa and Rhodesia, brings with it untold psychological and material advantages for armed units operating within the Republic of S. A.

8. FRELIMO has for long claimed that South Africa has been helping to arm and train the Portuguese; also that whites from South Africa have been fighting in the Portuguese units. In October 1967 the South African Foreign Minister spoke of 'mutual security arrangements' between South Africa and the other states in Southern Africa. Also a clear pointer of things to come is contained in the report (Johannesburg *Sunday Times*, 26 November 1967) of a speech by the Administrator of Natal, Mr T. J. A. Gerdener, on the occasion of the establishment of the Mozambique Soldiers' Comfort Fund, in which he said that to fob off terrorism as the actions of a few thousand disorganized and ill-trained insurgents was dangerous and irresponsible and that it was time South Africans realised that if the 80,000 soldiers whom Portugal had in Mozambique and Angola had to be withdrawn tomorrow, South Africa would become involved in the 'terrorist war' within weeks. He said further that South Africa would have the fullest justification "to extend its Rhodesian fight against terrorists to the two Portuguese territories."

## SOUTH AFRICAN GUERRILLAS

The ANC has not attempted to hide the fact that its guerillas are in the process of making their way to their own fighting zone. An underground leaflet — "We Are At War" — distributed recently by the ANC's illegal apparatus within South Africa, talks of the Rhodesian battles and states: "Soon there will be battles in South Africa. We will fight until we have won, however long it takes and however much it will cost."

Is this idle talk? The inherent weakness of the Smith group and the Portuguese and their vulnerability to organized military insurrection is patent. Can the same be said of South Africa at this stage? Is it not being too sanguine to expect a successful outcome to armed confrontation between the very considerable resources and weapons of the white-controlled South African state and the inexperienced lightly-armed guerillas? Where are the sanctuary-providing and logistically important friendly borders? Where are the Sierra Maestras, the jungles, the swamps, the paddy fields?

These questions have reference to the sort of model which has been built up over the years in people's minds of the ideal and classical type set of conditions which make guerilla operations a feasible proposition and they undoubtedly have an important place in any serious assessment of its prospects. But we must not overdo historical analogy. There is in fact no classical type model of physical conditions to which successful guerilla struggle conforms. Different geographical factors call for different methods and forms of guerilla struggle.<sup>9</sup> I shall return to this.

## POLITICAL PREREQUISITES

The only universal prerequisites are to be sought in the general political situation rather than in physical or geographic factors. Given a colonial-type situation, armed struggle becomes feasible if and only if the following political conditions are present.

*Firstly*, a disillusionment on the part of the majority of the people with the prospect of achieving its liberation by traditional and non-violent processes.

*Secondly*, a readiness on the part of the people to respond in varying degrees and ways to the call for armed confron-

9. Che Guevara, "Guerilla Warfare," Chapter 1.



tation — from actually joining the guerillas, to making their path easy and that of the enemy hard.<sup>10</sup>

Thirdly, the existence of a political leadership capable not only of gaining the organized allegiance of the people for armed struggle but having also the ability to carry out the painstaking process of planning, preparation and overall direction of the conduct of operations.

A final judgment on the extent to which the present South African situation conforms to these requisites needs a little more than formal statistical and analytical equipment. It requires assessments by indigenous political activists who know and understand not only the demonstrable facts but who, in addition, have a "feel" for their people, a sensitivity to their mood and the sort of revolutionary instinct which enables them at every given stage to differentiate between the possible and the fanciful.

These qualities are nurtured by years of intimate political nexus between a leader, a people and a situation. We must approach with extreme caution the attempts of outsiders (however well-motivated) whether it be in Africa or Latin America, to legislate for others in this respect. In South Africa, as in all other countries, a true assessment of these factors is primarily the function of the liberatory organizations and their leaders.

## OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE CONDITIONS

Of course favourable conditions for armed struggle ripen historically. But the historical process must not be approached as if it were a mystical thing outside of man which in a crude deterministic sort of way sets him tasks to which he responds. In this sense to sit back and wait for the evolution of objective conditions which constitute a "revolutionary situation" amounts in some cases to a dereliction of leadership duties. What people, expressing themselves in organized activity, do or abstain from doing, hastens or retards the historical process and helps or hinders the creation of favourable conditions for armed struggle. Indeed in one sense the process of creating favourable conditions for military struggle does not end until the day of victory. Given the sort of minimum preconditions I referred to above, the actual commencement and sustaining of guerilla activity operates as an extremely important factor in creating more favourable conditions for eventual victory. But it is not the sole factor<sup>11</sup>. Other forms of mass activity, including those inspired by the successes of the guerilla units, also play a vital role.

Of course no political struggle (and this is what guerilla struggle essentially is) can be taken up only on condition of infallibly favourable chances<sup>12</sup>. It does not however follow that licence must be given for every act of adventurism, irresponsibility and 'trying your luck'.

10. Leaflet, "We Are At War," issued by the ANC in South Africa.

11. Debray, "Revolution in the Revolution," tends to proceed from the proposition that "the most important form of propaganda is military action," to a conclusion that in most of Latin America the creation of military skilled guerilla foci is sufficient to bring about favourable conditions for an eventual people's military victory. Thus he underrates the vital connection between the guerilla struggle (which in its early stages must of necessity be of a limited magnitude) and other forms of militant mass activity. He sees the FOCI (which in terms of his approach must assume overall political as well as military leadership) as having (certainly in the initial phases) to cut itself off from the local population. There are many indications, including the increasing devotion of resources to mass illegal propaganda throughout the country, that the ANC's approach on this important question is different.

12. "World history would indeed be very easy to make if the struggle were taken up only on condition of infallibly favourable chances" — Karl Marx in a letter to L. Kugelmann, 17 April 1871.

There is not a single serious segment of the organized liberatory movement which does not believe that, in a general sense, political conditions in South Africa are favourable for the commencement and development of armed struggle. This does not necessarily imply a belief that there exists at the moment a classical-type revolutionary situation, with an all-round revolutionary insurrection as an immediate possibility.

## MILITANCY IN THE TOWNS

Is there evidence that the course upon which the ANC has embarked has a political basis in the existing South African situation?

There is, I believe, abundant evidence that it has.

The Africans of South Africa have a history which is rich in resistance to alien rule, not only in the initial period of colonization but also in the last few decades when it reached new heights. The people have over and over again demonstrated their capacity to act at a most sophisticated political level.

The 50s and the early 60s witnessed four impressive nationwide general strikes all called by the ANC and its allies. The significance of these strikes should not be underestimated. On each occasion, hundreds of thousands of urban workers risked their jobs and their consequent right to remain in an urban area, in quest not of reforms, not for better working conditions, but in response to a purely political call to demonstrate a demand for votes, opposition to racial laws, and so on. In the face of repression Trade Union organization was minimal — and the above responses were important pointers to the high level of political consciousness which a half-century of urbanization combined with vigorous political leadership had inculcated into the townspeople. There are many more examples to be found in the 50s and 60s which illustrate the capacity of those in the urban areas to react impressively to calls for action involving both tenacity and sacrifice: the Defiance Campaign of 1952—53, the bus boycotts of the late 50s, women's resistance against the extension of pass laws to women, the pre-Sharpeville anti-pass campaigns.

## MILITANCY IN RURAL AREAS

And what of the people in the countryside, which is the focal point of guerilla activity in the initial stages? Here too there is convincing evidence of a peasantry which despite centuries of intensive repression, lacks submissiveness. In the very recent past and in many important areas it has demonstrated a capacity for action to the point of armed resistance. In Sekhukhuniland (Transvaal) in the late 50s the peasantry, partly armed, doggedly resisted the attempts by the authorities to replace the traditional leaders of the people with government-appointed servants, so-called Bantu Authorities. In Zululand similar resistance was encountered. The most intense point of peasant resistance and upsurge was amongst the Pondo in the Transkei. By March 1960 a vast popular movement had arisen, unofficial administrative units were set up including people's courts. From the chosen spots in the mountains where thousands of peasants assembled illegally came the name of the movement — 'INTABA' — The Mountain. Although this revolt had its origin in local grievances, the aim of the resistance soon became the

attainment of basic political ends and it came to adopt the full programme of the ANC<sup>13</sup>.

What is also significant about many of these actions in the countryside is that despite the traditionally strict legal sanction against the possession by non-whites of any arms or ammunition, they always manage on appropriate occasions to emerge with an assortment of prohibited weapons in their hands.

These then are pointers to the validity of the claim by the ANC that the African majority of the country can be expected to respond in growing numbers to a lead which holds out real prospects of destroying white supremacy, albeit in a long and protracted war. The conviction held by all African political groupings (except those sponsored by the government) that the white state can be shifted by nothing short of violence, reflects what is today both an incontrovertible objective fact and a belief held by a majority of ordinary people both in town and countryside.

### OBJECTIVE DIFFICULTIES

If then all these subjective elements in the situation tend to argue in favour of the ANC decision, what about some of the formidable objective difficulties? On the face of it the enemy of the guerilla is in stable command of a rich and varied economy which, even at the stage when it is not required to extend itself, can afford a military budget of £ 186 million. He has a relatively well-trained and efficient army and police force. He can draw on considerable manpower resources because he has the support of the 3½ million privileged whites who can be expected to fight with great ferocity and conviction (albeit one that is born of economic aggrandisement).

In addition South Africa has very influential and powerful friends. In a situation of crisis these friends may well lose their existing public inhibitions to openly associate with and bolster up the racist regime.

If there is one lesson that the history of guerilla struggles has taught, it is that the material strength and resources of the enemy is by no means a decisive factor.

Witness the resources at the disposal of the French in Algeria; at the height of the fighting 600,000 troops were supplied and serviced by a leading industrial nation whose economy was quite outside the reach of military operations. In terms of pure material strength and almost limitless resources, can anyone surpass the USA in Vietnam? And no amount of modern industrial backing, technical know-how or fire power appears to sway the balance in favour of the invaders. What about the spectacle of Grivas and his Cyprus group challenging the British Army with 47 rifles, 27 automatic weapons and 7 revolvers? ("It was with these arms and these alone, that I kept the fight going for almost a year without any appreciable reinforcements")<sup>14</sup>

The answer lies in this. Guerilla warfare, almost by definition, posits a situation in which there is a vast imbalance of material and military resources between the opposing sides. It is designed to cope with a situation in which the



## FROM THE FRONT

March saw yet another large-scale battle between Zimbabwe freedom-fighters and Smith/Vorster forces in Rhodesia. Several groups of guerillas already established within the country, attacked, and caught the Rhodesian regime completely by surprise, as did the operation of autumn last year and other smaller operations since. Only the day before the latest battle, fascist rebel Ian Smith told newsmen: "There are no terrorists operating here." That same evening, notices were flashed on cinema screens in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) ordering troops to return to their units, while military police patrols combed other spots to find off-duty men.

After the recent illegal and inhuman hangings of Zimbabwe Nationals accused of "terrorism," ZAPU (the Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union) warned that they would strike back at the Smith murderers.

It will be recalled that the last heavy clashes (reported in Sechaba Volume 1 Number 11) occurred in August last year, beginning in the Zambesi Valley and spreading south. Many of the freedom-fighters engaged in these clashes were members of the military wing of the African National Congress of South Africa. These freedom-fighters were making their way home to South Africa.

<sup>13</sup> A detailed description of these events and their significance is contained in "South Africa: The Peasants' Revolt" by Govan Mbeki; Penguin African Library.

<sup>14</sup> "The Memoirs of General Grivas" (Longmans), page 22.



enemy is infinitely superior in relation to every conventional factor of warfare. It is par excellence the weapon of the materially weak against the materially strong.

## GUERRILLA TACTICS

Given its popular character and given a populace which increasingly sides with and shields the guerilla whilst at the same time opposing and exposing the enemy, the survival and growth of a people's army is assured by a skilful exercise of tactics. Surprise, mobility and tactical retreat make it difficult for the enemy to bring into play its superior fire-power in any decisive battles. No individual battle is fought under circumstances unfavourable to the guerilla. Superior forces can be harassed, weakened and, in the end, destroyed.

"There is a saying: 'the guerilla is the maverick of war'. He practises deception, treachery, surprise and night operations. Thus, circumstances and the will to win often oblige him to forget romantic and sportsmanlike concepts . . . Some disparaging people call this 'hit and run'. That is exactly what it is! Hit and run, wait, stalk the enemy, hit him again and run . . . perhaps this smacks of not facing up to the enemy. Nevertheless it serves the goal of guerilla warfare: to conquer and destroy the enemy."<sup>15</sup>

The absence of an orthodox front, of fighting lines; the need of the enemy to attenuate his resources and lines of communication over vast areas; his need to protect the widely scattered installations on which his economy is dependent (because the guerilla pops up now here now there): These are amongst the factors which serve in the long run to compensate in favour of the guerilla for the disparity in the starting strength of the adversaries. I stress the words '*in the long run*', because it would be idle to dispute the considerable military advantages to the enemy of his high level of industrialization, his ready-to-hand reserves of white manpower and his excellent roads, railways and air transport which facilitates swift manoeuvres and speedy concentration of personnel.

## UNFAVOURABLE FACTORS BECOME FAVOURABLE

But we must also not overlook the fact that over a period of time many of these very same unfavourable factors will begin to operate in favour of the liberation force: —

(a) The ready-to-hand resources including food production depend overwhelmingly upon non-white labour which, with the growing intensity of the struggle, will not remain docile and co-operative.

(b) The white manpower resources may seem adequate initially but must become dangerously stretched as guerilla warfare develops. Already extremely short of skilled labour — the monopoly of the whites — the mobilization of a large force for a protracted struggle would place a further burden on the workings of the economy.

(c) In contrast to many other major guerilla struggles (Cuba is one of the exceptions) the enemy's economic and manpower resources are all situated within the theatre of war and there is no secure external pool (other than direct intervention by a foreign state) safe from sabotage, mass action and guerilla action on which the enemy can draw.

(d) The very sophisticated character of the economy with its well-developed system of communications makes it a much more vulnerable target. In an underdeveloped country the interruption of supplies to any given region may be no more than a local setback. In a highly sensitive modern economic structure of the South African type, the successful harassment of transport to any major industrial complex would inevitably inflict immense damage to the economy as a whole and to the morale of the enemy. (The South African forces would have the task of keeping intact about 30,000 miles of railway line spread over an area of over 400,000 square miles!)

## TERRAIN AND FRIENDLY BORDERS

One of the more popular misconceptions concerning guerilla warfare is that a physical environment which conforms to a special pattern is indispensable — thick jungle, inaccessible mountain ranges, swamps, a friendly border and so forth. The availability of this sort of terrain is, of course, of tremendous advantage to the guerillas especially in the early non-operational phase when training and other preparatory steps are undertaken and no external bases are available for this purpose. When the operations commence, the guerilla cannot survive, let alone flourish, unless he moves to areas where people live and work and where the enemy can be engaged in combat. If he is fortunate enough to have behind him a friendly border or areas of difficult access which can provide temporary refuge, it is of course advantageous, although it sometimes brings with it its own set of problems connected mainly with supplies<sup>16</sup>. But guerilla warfare can, and has been, waged in every conceivable type of terrain, in deserts, in swamps, in farm fields, in built-up areas, in plains, in the bush and in countries without friendly borders.

*The sole question is one of adjusting survival tactics to the sort of terrain in which operations have to be carried out.*

In any case in the vast expanse that is South Africa, a people force will find a multitude of variations in topography; deserts, mountain forests, veld, and swamps. There might not appear to be a single impregnable Sierra Maestra or impenetrable jungle, but the country abounds in terrain which in general is certainly no less favourable for guerilla operations than some of the terrain in which the Algerians or the resistance movements in occupied Europe operated. Tito, when told that a certain area was "as level as the palm of your hand and with very little forests," retorted: "What a first-class example it is of the relative unimportance of geographical factors in the development of a rising."

In particular South Africa's tremendous size will make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the white regime to keep the whole of it under armed surveillance in strength and in depth. Hence, an early development of a relatively safe (though shifting) rear is not beyond the realm of possibility. The undetected existence of the SWAPO training camp for over a year and, more especially, the survival for years in the mountains and hills in the Transkei of the leaders of 'Intaba' during the military occupation of the area after the 1960 Pondo Revolt, are both of importance in this context.

16. Introduction to "Guerilla Warfare" — Mao Tse Tung.

16. Che Guevara, "Guerilla Warfare," pages 120-125.





# OUR REVOLUTION WILL BE A COMPLETE SUCCESS!

Interview with **GEORGE NYANDORO**,  
Secretary-General of the  
Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU)

Comrade Nyandoro, there was a time when you were a frequent visitor to London, voicing the demands of your organization that the British Government discharge its responsibilities in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). Nowadays, you seldom leave your headquarters in Lusaka. Can you tell us why you have come to London now?

You mention your organization's commitment now to fighting for freedom, and since August 1967 the world has been aware of an armed struggle in Zimbabwe.

What stage would you say has now been reached in that struggle, and what perspectives do you see for the future?



The main purpose of my coming is to reorganize the ZAPU office in London, following the executive's decision to appoint Mr K. L. Dube as their representative in the UK, Europe and the United Nations. The truth is that we seldom come to London because the Executive no longer sees the London office as having the importance it had in the past, as we no longer look to Britain or to the calling of a Constitutional Conference to solve the Zimbabwe problem. We are committed to fighting for our independence against British settler imperialism. To put it bluntly, either we are in the bush with our guns and hand-grenades, or Mr Nkomo and his people are in power in Salisbury.

First I must say that resistance to foreign rule in Zimbabwe started not in 1967, nor in the post-war period, but when the first British settlers invaded the country; and this resistance has continued in one form or another, with varied intensity, through 70 years. And we have always regarded our struggle as in the end, inevitably, an armed struggle. The reasons which have inhibited us from taking up arms in the past — in the 1940s and the early 1950s — were merely logistic reasons. Imperialist forces were still dominant throughout Africa, and there was no room for movement in one direction or another, for acquiring supplies or training-facilities. This is a historical fact. But the feeling of the people even at that time was that in order to get freedom and independence from the foreigners dominating our country, there was no other way except by armed struggle. The people of Zimbabwe are wholly committed to liberating themselves, and they have no other choice but to intensify the fight against the British imperialist settler forces, and to dedicate ourselves to fighting together with our brothers, who are in similar circumstances in South Africa. What gains have we made? Our forces have fought valiantly, and forced the Rhodesian regime to call for aid from South Africa, since white Rhodesia alone was unable to contain our patriots. And this in turn has exposed Britain's repeated lie that it would intervene directly in the event of a breakdown of law and order. Instead, the British made a secret agreement with South Africa to assist Smith, and thus avoided the embarrassment of sending British troops to Zimbabwe to fight the liberation forces of ZAPU. And I must mention here that ZAPU is quite aware that if Britain should send any troops into Rhodesia, they would be there to fight against the African people and to defend the white settlers — we are prepared for this, we are prepared to fight British troops and any other foreign troops brought in to help the settlers.

There are also gains in terms of support for our struggle from the progressive peoples of the world, and of course from our comrades-in-arms in FRELIMO, MPLA, PAIGC, SWAPO — and the ANC, with whom we have already concluded an alliance. This alliance is particularly important, because in the past we have found ourselves confronted with an alliance of our enemy: successive regimes in South Africa, Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola have been working together, and continue to work together, to fight against the forces of liberation in Southern Africa. Our patriots in Zimbabwe and in South Africa found themselves facing a common enemy. Besides, for the South African liberation forces to enter South Africa to fight, they have to pass through Zimbabwe; and where the South Af-

rican forces were already in logistical positions it was logical that our forces should move in, as comrades-in-arms, whether destined to fight in Zimbabwe or South Africa. This is an alliance to which we all, in both organizations, are absolutely committed, it is here to stay, and I wish to tell both our friends and our foes that we need no advice from anybody now, except on how best to consolidate our efforts to dislodge the settlers of Southern Africa.

**What are the prospects for revolution in Zimbabwe? How confident are you of being able to dislodge the Smith regime?**

What are the chances of revolution? Our revolution will be a complete success! There is no question about it — we shall go on fighting until we are in complete control of our own affairs. One need only look back at history, and see how the Algerians fought for their independence against 400,000 French troops in occupation. Today, Algeria is independent. The total settler population of Zimbabwe is only 250,000, but time and again we have been told that the Rhodesian and South African defence forces would prove invincible. We have already disposed of this fallacy forever, in the battlefield in the autumn of last year. Like all peoples fighting for their own liberation, we are armed not only with weapons, but with our own inner, immovable determination to liberate ourselves whatever the odds. Compared with this, our enemies' forces are little better than mercenaries. Our comrades in FRELIMO, MPLA and PAIGC have already shown what revolutionary soldiers can do: Portugal is spending *forty per cent* of its budget suppressing Mozambique and Angola and Guinea-Bissau, yet its forces are retreating at every point.

**ZAPU's executive is based outside the country. How close are you to the ordinary people of Zimbabwe? How do you know that they are behind you, that their mood corresponds with your strategy?**

We know because ZAPU's machinery is functioning inside the country. It is as complete as it was when functioning normally on the surface, and our liaison has been maintained in spite of the enemy's increasing terror. We know that we are reading the mood of the people correctly, because of the welcome our people have given to the alliance with the ANC, as something not only necessary but long overdue. We know because of the welcome and practical assistance that they have given at every turn to the liberation forces. Our guerillas could never survive inside Zimbabwe without the support and protection of the people — and this in the face of death penalties, torture and mass arrests in various parts of the country.

**In what way do you see resolutions of the United Nations, in particular the selective mandatory sanctions imposed against the Smith regime, as helping the struggle?**

We have repeatedly made it clear that economic sanctions just do not work, for the very countries that put forward the idea from time to time violate the UN resolutions themselves! Britain is one of the culprits. Ever since taking the case of Rhodesia to the UN and asking for mandatory sanctions, Britain's own companies, operating from London, have been able to continue trade with Rhodesia. Banks are still operating in Rhodesia, insurance companies, oil companies such as Shell, B. P. and Caltex, and mining organizations are still carrying on, undertaking international trade in many ways; and the British Government has not even made the least gesture towards prosecuting these companies for violating

# GEORGE NYANDORO

**Secretary-General  
of ZAPU**

**A Biographical Note**

George Nyandoro has been a leading figure in the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe for twenty years. He came into public politics through trade unionism, and through the Southern Rhodesia African Association, which, with trade union backing, formed the short-lived All African Peoples' Convention in 1951—53. But the AAPC leadership soon revealed itself as corrupt, and Nyandoro, together with many of the younger members, felt that it was time to set up a more dynamic political organization, capable of uniting the peoples of Zimbabwe behind the objective of *liberation from white rule*.

They formed the Southern Rhodesian African National Youth League, with R. J. D. Chikerema as President and George Nyandoro Vice-President. The Youth League set about establishing branches throughout the country as preparation for the formation of an African National Congress, which was formally set up on 12 September 1957. Joshua Nkomo became its first President, R. J. D. Chikerema Vice-President, and George Nyandoro Secretary-General.

The ANC found spontaneous support among the people, and branches were formed throughout the country. But in 1959 Edgar Whitehead's govern-





You mention the armaments reaching the Smith regime. What dangers do you see in the arms race now developing in Southern Africa, and in the continued supply of weapons to South Africa and Portugal by the western powers?



ment banned the organization, and for a year there was no political movement. Nyandoro, Chikerema and many other leaders were detained and not finally released until 1963. Nkomo was abroad, in Africa, and, says Mr Nyandoro, "we who were in detention felt that he should not come back because he would be detained and we would have no spokesman to the outside world." Mr Chikerema smuggled a letter out of jail, asking Joshua Nkomo to stay abroad until such time as he was called back. During their incarceration, Nyandoro, Chikerema and others kept the fires of freedom burning; and in prison they drafted

the UN resolutions. To illustrate the farce that Britain has made of the whole question of the Smith regime's "rebellion," I will tell you a story. Only last year, in 1967, the Chief of the Rhodesian Police, a man named Barfoot (who has since retired) was allowed to come to this country and receive medical treatment in a London hospital for brain injury. The British government did not arrest him, a senior official of a rebel regime, either at the airport or thereafter, and he went back to Rhodesia — free to continue and sustain an illegal regime!

Is there then anything to hope for from the international community? Apart from acting as a constant reminder of the hypocrisy of the British, there is nothing we can expect of the United Nations as an organization. But we do expect individual members of the UN to increase their assistance to our liberation struggle, materially, financially and morally. We call upon all the progressive and freedom-loving peoples of the world to assist us in many directions; by exposing the hypocrisy of the British, by campaigning to prevent further arms and other support reaching the settler regime, and we particularly ask sympathisers to give us all the material assistance they can. (We can be contacted through our headquarters in Lusaka, Box 1657).

We see a very great danger, which we call upon Africa in particular to recognise. In our view, the imperialist forces are all out to *re-colonise* Africa, and they are using the fascist reactionary forces on the soil of South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal. We are witnessing day by day South African forces in Rhodesia, and in Angola, South West Africa and Mozambique. Some are also in Malawi. These forces are poised in strategic positions to pounce on independent Africa. Their targets are Zambia, Tanzania and Congo (Kinshasa). The South African Minister of Defence, Botha, threatened only a few months ago to move into the copperbelt, occupy the area, and negotiate from a position of strength! This is the danger — and an imminent danger, which we call upon Africa to take active steps to avert before it is too late. Africa has to give increased aid, on a massive scale, to the liberation forces of the oppressed peoples of Southern Africa, to enable them to engage and finally dislodge the agents of the imperialists. The enemy will stop at nothing, they are devoid of any morality, they are a gang of bandits determined to plunder and exploit Africa . . . look at France, running with the hare and hunting with the hounds, and openly supplying arms to the regimes of Southern Africa. And Britain, which in spite of its recent confirmation of an arms embargo against apartheid, refuses to restrain a company selling leg-irons to South Africa, and continues to supply spare parts to the aircraft and the Saracen tanks which are being used against our freedom forces in Zimbabwe! And the United States and West Germany, who between them have provided apartheid with the technical know-how to build its own rockets, and even make its own atomic bomb!

We know what we are up against. But we also know that whatever the imperialist enemy may be prepared to do, in the end we must win, because the people are behind our struggle, and they will settle for nothing less than their complete freedom.

the Constitution and policy of the National Democratic Party, which was formed on 1 January 1960, with Mr Nkomo as its President. He himself returned to Zimbabwe soon afterwards, in response to calls from the people.

The NDP too was banned, on 9 December 1961, and its successor, ZAPU, was formed 8 days later. In September 1962, ZAPU was banned, and George Nyandoro with Joshua Nkomo, J. R. D. Chikerema and all other members of the leadership were placed under restriction. They were released in 1963.

The executive then decided that five

of its members should be stationed outside the country to conduct the organization in the open, while the rest would stay to organize underground. Soon after this decision, however, the President and all the executive members remaining in Zimbabwe were arrested and detained. Thus Vice-President Chikerema, together with George Nyandoro, Jason Moyo, George Silundika and Edward Ndhlovu — then stationed in Tanzania — were charged with the responsibility of running ZAPU both externally and internally, that is, of co-ordinating the external operations of the movement with its internal underground activities.



# LIFE UNDER APARTHEID

## Constables Hunt As Pack

Five police constables, Ephraim Stander, Jacobus Ernst Kotze, Rudolph Andries Wallis, Johannes Lodewikus du Preez, and Gabriel Johan van Broekhuizen, all aged between 19 and 21, and all resident at the Auckland Park Police Barracks, were found guilty on two charges of assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm and two charges of crimen injuria.

Mr Justice Nicholas said they "hunted as a pack," and that they set out to look for a victim to engage in what they considered to be "a sport, a brutal sadistic game."

They took a White man (a German immigrant) and a Coloured woman whom they found in a car, to the Emmerentia Dam, where they hit them with their fists and a sjambok and forced them to unclasp the upper parts of their bodies. They then left with their clothes. Five days earlier they assaulted a non-white woman in Doornfontein and knocked out four of her teeth.

The prosecutor, Mr J. J. Viljoen, said that if incidents like these should come to the attention of the overseas Press, it could do South Africa great harm.

## Policeman Thoroughly Untruthful

The remarks of a judge who criticized police methods of interrogation and who labeled a senior police officer as a "thoroughly untruthful and untrustworthy witness," are being investigated by the South African authorities. Mr Justice Friedman made the remarks in a judgment in the Natal Supreme Court regarding the admissibility of certain alleged statements supposed to have been made by Phillip Otto (aged 27), who was charged with murder.

## No Entry

A Johannesburg Indian doctor, Dr Aziz Kazi, who has three surgeries in

Soweto (the large Johannesburg African township), appeared before Mr C. G. de Lange at the Kliptown Magistrate's Court on a charge of entering the township without permission. (In terms of the Group Areas Act and general S. A. government policy, all race groups are to be separated more and more from each other — Editor.)

## Race Classification Plea

Mrs Catherine Taylor, United Party MP for Wynberg, has written to a British MP asking whether he can help to find work in Britain for two families who want to emigrate from South Africa because of the race classification laws. She said the 1967 Population Registration Amendment Act abolished the right of third parties to object to race classification on behalf of the people concerned. But neighbours or other busybodies could still lodge complaints against a person's race classification and start witch-hunts.

The new Bill debated in the House of Assembly provides for race classification at birth. In terms of the Bill, a local registrar would be able to attach a note to the Birth Certificate if he thought the parents were not stating the correct race group and send it to the Registrar-General.

The couple could be legally married, but, because definition of race in the Mixed Marriages Act differed from the definition in the Population Registration Act, it would be possible for a child to be classified differently from its parents. If the registrar's note stated that a wrong classification had been stated on the birth certificate, the child would not necessarily know this until it turned 16 and applied for an identity card. Then after having lived all its life, say, as a white child in a white suburb attending white schools, it could suddenly be re-classified as a Coloured person. As a result, officials could start an enquiry into the racial origins of the whole family and the family itself could then be re-classified.

By 19 May 1967, when the Population Registration Amendment Act was passed, there were 477 appeals pending of which 233 were third-party objections lodged on behalf of people who felt they had been wrongly classified.

## No Coloured Shops

Mr Graham Eden MP has called on the SA Government to force the Town Council of George to allow Coloured shopkeepers and businessmen to trade in their own areas.

The Council, by a majority vote of 6 to 3, has rejected an application by the Coloured Development Corporation to establish a shopping complex, including a supermarket, in a Coloured township falling under the jurisdiction of the George Municipality. The Corporation is a Government-appointed body.

Those that voted against the projected shopping complex argued that they feared white-owned business would suffer if the Coloureds were allowed to have their own businesses.

## Pirates

The Johannesburg Operatic Society is to be the first dramatic group in South Africa to invoke the "piracy clause" of the Copyright Act. They have applied to the special Copyright Tribunal to perform three plays whose authors have boycotted South Africa. If they receive permission from the tribunal they will be able to put on plays without the permission of, and without paying royalties to, the authors. The plays are: "West Side Story," "Fiddler on the Roof," and "Man of La Mancha."

## No Social Mixing

In spite of a warning from the chairman of the Automobile Association, Sen. R. D. Pilkington-Jordan, that there was no chance of the AA being opened to non-whites, a motion that non-whites should be admitted as members was carried by 92 votes to 30 at a meeting of the Cape Western Area branch of the Automobile Association. Mr John Preston who proposed the motion said there would be no social mixing of members, and stressed the point that road safety was important to all users of the roads.

Senator Jordan said that admitting non-whites to the Automobile Association would run counter to the organization of society in South Africa. A heckler wanted to know: "How many separate roads are there in South Africa?"



# VIOLENCE AND NON-VIOLENCE

Dear Mr Nkosi,

Thank you for the copies of Sechaba. However, while on the South African Commission of the National Committee of Young Liberals, I am the odd one out in continuing to advocate non-violence. I do not consider that it (non-violence) has been attempted with sufficient external support and will, to be adjudged a success or failure.

Violence and non-violence have not been attempted on a meaningfully large scale. At present I am for non-violence still. Thus, I do not share this aspect of your views, and also I am broke and unable to contribute.

Yours sincerely,  
David Mumford.  
22 Fandon Road  
Oxford.

*The above letter was shown to members of the ANC Youth and Students Section, who have replied to Mr Mumford as follows.*

Dear David,

Your letter to Nkosi chanced to fall into our hands. We therefore thought that we should reply to it. Though we cannot swear to it, we think that you will continue to get Sechaba, particularly because you are broke.

What we want to do is to take up the matter of violence/nonviolence that you raise. We do this because we are convinced that there is more that unites us rather than divides us. In arguing our case, we hope that in the end you will be more aware of the condition of our people, and being aware of that, understand why our organization, if it was to remain faithful to its position as leader of the majority of the people, had to resort to arms.

We cannot agree that the non-violent policy which our people and organization stuck to for 50 years, was not stuck to sufficiently long enough. True,

the mere accumulation of years — fifty — does not necessarily mean anything qualitative. It may be that in those years, there was relative absence of struggle. A man, in these circumstances, could not therefore claim that what he has failed to do has not succeeded. We shall deal with the question of "sufficient external support" later.

It therefore remains that we must base our position on the argument that there has been non-violent struggle enough. Enough to show that there has been struggle.

In 1913, 70,000 African mineworkers refused to go back to work unless they were paid what they said was a week's wage (backpay) which the mineowners owed them. They were paid. In 1913 African women organized massive demonstrations against passes for women in the Orange Free State. The Government brought out troops. The passes were not issued.

In 1922, the mines on the Reef shut down for weeks because the white mineworkers were out on strike. A Soviet was declared in the main working class area. The government brought out troops etc and the strike was finally broken. There are lots of other stories. In 1946, 75,000 African mineworkers came out on strike for a higher wage. They were shot back to work. In 1952, 8,500 people went to jail in a campaign in Defiance of Unjust Laws — non-violent direct action par excellence. In 1953 the government passed a law making this sort of thing virtually illegal. In 1950 there had been May Day demonstrations — 18 Africans died as a result, result of government action. In 1953 independent schools were set up in opposition to the government's racist educational system. Government action forced them out of existence. And so on and so on.

Today there are near enough 10,000 political prisoners in South Africa. Non-violent action has become illegal. The oppression is more intense. Can you imagine Hitler Germany? What

are all those deaths in aid of — this comrade jumped from the fourth floor of the Special Branch building, that other was found hanged by a cord in his cell, dead. That other is now mad — when he hears the roar of traffic he hides under the bed. One of them is permanently deformed — he that yesterday was strong and straight; now his mouth has switched round to the side of his face and his right leg, arm, body are inert. The little boy has started stealing, at the age of nine. He does not steal sweets; he steals food to feed his sisters because his father is in jail and his mother cannot cope. The one that stood up and said she thinks the government was rotten got visited by the police who talked to her nicely that what she was saying was bad. Two weeks later she was in — after all, there was something to charge her with. A brilliant mind rots in jail for life. Only death saves you from that fate.

Can one say that this government can be met with non-violence? It rules by force, not in a philosophic sense, but in a very real one, with the police, police dogs, guns. All that came exactly because the people dared to move — in all the demonstrations, all those strikes, all those sit-ins, all that non-violence made the government pass all those laws. The government got terrified and polished up the state machinery to increase the efficiency of its repression. They went to Algeria to learn how to torture — at least they went when the French were there. They picked up some information from the Portuguese about how to torture — all in reaction to the non-violence.

You may have seen the report in the Press about the commission appointed in the USA to investigate last year's Newark riots. It has reported and said that the American police hates the Negro, or has less regard for his life. Thus the police in Newark shot around — they provoked the people to self-defence. Moreover, the city administration is corrupt, and so on. In South Africa, a judge reported on

something similar that had happened in 1963. He said the riots were caused by agitators and communists. He did further say that the African disliked the administration of the laws which keep him in subjection — not the laws themselves. Twenty years ago a commission (like the one above) would have said that the people have got genuine grievances, poverty, disease, oppression, etc. A new commission will recommend the full-scale shooting of further 'trouble-makers'.

The African National Congress is illegal in South Africa. It therefore has to work as the resistance did during the war, underground. That in itself is a violent position. To defend myself from arrest when caught with illegal pamphlets in my hands, I should have to punch the policeman in the nose and run. Tomorrow he will be able to identify me and I will have to serve many years. If I kill him he cannot identify me. I am not saying this is happening or has happened; the position is logical.

The interned in concentration camps in Hitler Germany were such as ourselves — constantly policed, watched, starved and reduced further towards an animal position. I should never have asked these people to fight non-violently against their SS guards because for that they would get killed. If they wanted to fight and knew they would get killed, I should say take the butcher's knife and dispose of as many guards as possible. That exactly is the situation at home. To make the mutual killing less protracted and to give us a chance of succeeding, we have to organize that armed resistance.

As for the rest of the world, you know as well as I do the stakes involved, economic and other. The pace has to be set in South Africa. Then the rest of the world will follow. It cannot be done the other way around.

We have already dealt with the situation at home. What it means is that we are forced to arms to defend ourselves. We cannot wish this on ourselves; we shall after all suffer most, die most and starve most. We take up arms not because we have less respect for life, but exactly because we want to restore life to those that remain after the holocaust, and to the children.

— *Thabo Mbeki*  
for African National Congress (Youth and Students' Section)  
49 Rathbone Street, W 1.

## REPORT AND COMMENT

### COMMENTS ON SOME RECENT ISSUES IN THE WHITE SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS

## PORTRAIT OF A KILLER

Ex-Sergeant J. J. 'Nick' Arlow, dismissed from the South African Police force in 1961 after a series of court cases, is back in uniform as a "special constable" being employed on "special duties."

This was revealed recently in the S. A. House of Assembly when an MP asked: "Has J. J. Arlow, who was previously a sergeant in the South African Police and was dismissed in February 1961, been re-employed by the police force? If so, in what section, in what rank, on what salary, on what dates and at what place is he employed?"

The Deputy Minister of Police replied that Arlow had been re-employed as a special constable since 1 September 1967, on the salary scale R 2280 rising to R 3000 per year (£ 1,330 rising to £ 1,750 per year). He was being employed on special duties "which it would not be in the public interest to disclose."

Arlow is the man who has boasted that he has killed 13 Africans and arrested more than 100,000 in the course of his 12 years as a policeman.

In March 1960 he was charged with culpable homicide as the result of his killing of an African whom he decided was the so-called Panga Man — an African who had assaulted several couples in parked cars on the outskirts of Pretoria.

Arlow was alleged to have said in his evidence, "I speak once to a kaffir and then shoot." "I only speak once to a native and then my revolver speaks." At the trial, Defence Counsel asked another police witness: "Isn't it an average sort of joke among young constables in the barracks to say that they want to shoot a kaffir?" To which the answer was: "Yes."

A wife had lost her husband and a child his father — yet Arlow was fined £ 75 and sentenced to one year

imprisonment, suspended for three years. He was condemned in court by a judge, found to be a liar, yet the white press and the white public acclaimed him as a public hero; his only hope was that he be allowed to remain in the police force, and his only fear was that his suspended sentence would prevent him from taking a shot at the next "dangerous criminal" he happened to tangle with.

At that time he was facing other charges connected with the death of an African in police cells. In May 1960 he was charged again, this time with defeating the ends of justice, and was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment in June 1960 — yet 15 months later he was reported released on parole.

The then Minister of Justice, Vorster, told the press: "Arlow's release was purely a matter of routine." He had been given the usual remission for first offenders.

As a result of these convictions, Arlow was dismissed from the police force at that time, no doubt because he was considered a disgrace to his uniform and unfit to serve as an officer of the law.

The Vorster Government, however, has chosen to ignore his past and reinstate him. Possibly they find his attitude as a "kaffir-killer" something they can make use of at this time. It is even possible they have sent him to Rhodesia.

The world should know the type of man on whom the South African regime depends to defend their "way of life." There is no room in South Africa today for decent men who are prepared to live in peace and equality with their fellow citizens, irrespective of race and colour.

But for "kaffir-killers" there are jobs aplenty, with good pay, and probably even a pension — if he is lucky to live long enough to earn one.



# YOU MUST NOT TAKE A MAN'S HOME AWAY

*This is what home and hearth amounts to at Limeville. See sub-head 'Dumped in the Bare Veld'.*

*"I want to say to the world: You can push people around, you can fight them and you can insult them. They will take all this to a certain point, but you must not try to take a man's home away from him. You must not even think you will go unpunished if you estrange a man's fatherland from him."*

Who said these words?

Prime Minister B. J. Vorster — engaged in his usual task of warning the world not to 'interfere'.

*Meanwhile: the ruthless removal of settled non-white peoples of South Africa goes on!*

## SUICIDE

Twice convicted for living illegally in a White area, Mr Chagan Sooka, father of six, sat in his tailor's shop and drank a fatal dose of caustic soda. He was cremated on the day on which he should have appeared in court for the third time. At Coronation Hospital, they told his daughter that his last words were: "The court, the court."

Mr Sooka's tragic death, the result of 'the court' implementing the infamous provisions of the Group Areas Act, is, alas, just one case among thousands of cases of anguish and deprivation caused, day by day, steadily, unrelentingly, utterly ruthlessly.

In the area set aside for the Indian community to which Mr Sooka 'belonged', Lenasia, 20 miles from the centre of Johannesburg, more than



20,000 people now live. All of them have been forced to live there, moving in most cases from areas in Johannesburg and on its perimeter now defined as 'White'.

There is no hospital in Lenasia. There are no parks or public sportsgrounds. There is no police station. Pleas for these facilities to the responsible authority, the Peri-Urban Health Board, are met by the reply that there are insufficient funds for these amenities. There is no chance that Lenasia can ever become self-supporting, yet the Department of Community Development speaks of increasing its population to 73,000.

This envisages that the Indian people will be forced (as the Africans have been for so long) to become migrant labourers, may need permits to enter Jo'burg soon.

The word 'ghetto' is a good one for Lenasia. For instance, Mrs N's children have not been out of the area for 1½ years. In that time they have attended no entertainment, have not spoken to African, Coloured or White children. Indian society is being stultified.

## SLUM CONDITIONS

If we take a look at conditions in a typical area of Lenasia, we might choose Tomsville where for six years people have been living in barrack-like shacks with no running water, no sanitation, no electricity. Two taps and four lavatories have been planted in the centre of the garbage-strewn waste around each block of 16 houses.

Interviewing a reporter, a spokesman for the Department of Community Development tried to pretend that 'circumstances' had made Tomsville into a slum. "They do it themselves. They are a dirty nation," he said. The truth came out when he added: "How can you take them out of slums and give them luxuries? Then the Whites would have to pay for it."

Look at the story of a family typical of Tomsville. They were one of the first seven families to move into the original army camp at Lenasia fifteen years ago. (This camp has only recently been evacuated.) They had spent almost ten years there when they were moved to Greyville, from where they were summarily evicted after five months. (Greyville is a slightly superior neighbouring area.) They were sent to Tomsville, a hundred yards from the barracks where they'd lived originally. They've been in Tomsville for five years now and have a feeling of utter hopelessness.

## COMMON CAUSE

Even those who were skeptical among the Indian and Coloured people, and were driven from their homes, are coming to realise that the time has come to declare common cause with the Africans whose ghetto conditions they are coming more and more to experience themselves. This is what Congress has been telling them through the years and what the numerous members of the Indian and Coloured Peo-





*The old home demolished, one takes all one can carry to the new area.*

ples Congresses have recognised long since.

### DUMPED IN THE BARE VELD

Meanwhile the oppression of the Africans in the field of housing also intensifies. The latest brutal instance is the start of the removal of 12,000 Africans from their lifelong homes in Meran, Natal, to what is termed a 'Bantu homeland' at Limeville, twenty miles away.

Limeville! Limeville isn't a town or even a village. When the Government lorries brought the people there, they dumped them in the blazing sun without shelter. Archbishop Hurley of Durban has described how it happened.

"The people were told that they could not take their cattle or goats and that no crops would be allowed to be grown at the new settlement. Limeville was not to be a rural area.

"The people were told to take the roofs, doors and windows of their old homes, what furniture and belongings they had. Women and children huddled with their few possessions and cooking utensils in what shade they could find under tables and near cupboards. Franciscan fathers started to pitch tents. About an hour later the Bantu Commissioner for the district arrived with official tent pitchers and completed the job.

"Two bags of mealie meal had been provided on the site. The people were told to build their own homes of mud and thatch, but usually the menfolk do the building: most of them are away as migrant workers in the cities.

"Some of them do not even know their homes have been dismantled and their families moved."

### WHO CARES?

Who cares? That's the question asked by columnist Molly Reinhardt in a courageous article in the Johannesburg Sunday Times. Some churchmen have protested — and T. F. Coertze, Natal Bantu Affairs Commissioner, has launched a venomous attack on Roman Catholic priests for "butting in."

Molly Reinhardt refers also to a speech recently made to the Institute of Race Relations by Dr Malherbe, former principal of the University of Natal.

*Mrs Makda, 75 years old and too ill to go to court, lived in a property her family owned since 1905. The Makda family — 15 in all, in two branches of the family — were given notice to move. "Lenasia?" asked Mrs Makda. "Why should I go there? What about this home, my home."*

He compared to Nazi Germany the way that South Africans (Whites) increasingly showed docile acceptance of the early stages of political and cultural totalitarianism. He referred specifically to the absolute supremacy of the State over the individual. Molly Reinhardt goes on to develop this comparison.


"South Africans," she says, meaning the Whites, "cannot come up with the excuse which was offered to me by scores of Germans when I visited their country twice in post-war years. With a few rare exceptions, I was told that they did not know anything about what was being perpetrated. But one German stopped me in my tracks. As I stood before a communal grave of 12,000 concentration camp victims I turned to the woman who had reluctantly accompanied me on this macabre visit.

"Why in God's name didn't you Germans do something before it was too late?" I asked. She looked me squarely in the eye and replied: "What would you have done?"

### CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

Looking at Tomsville and Limeville, at the filthy conditions and the brutal removals, the ANC asks South Africa's ruling race the same question. When are the White people going to dissociate themselves from the crimes being committed daily by their representatives? The time is coming when that question is going to demand an answer; and no-one is going to tell us they 'didn't know'.

And, Mr Vorster, it was you who said "you must not try to take a man's home away from him. You must not even think you will go unpunished..."





# TRADE UNIONS IN TRAVAIL

**Abridged version of a Memorandum concerning persecution and discriminatory treatment of African and other trade unionists, prohibition of Trade Unionists for Trade Union activities. Submitted to the Secretary, Working Group, United Nations by The African National Congress, India Office.**

Until less than a century ago, South African Africans in employment were engaged mainly as farm labourers or in other non-industrial areas of employment. It was not until the last quarter of the 19th century, with the discovery of rich mineral deposits, that Africans entered the industrial complex in large numbers. Indeed, it would have been impossible to exploit either the mineral wealth or the infant secondary industries which resulted from these discoveries without an abundant source of cheap labour.

The discovery of gold and diamonds marked a watershed, not only in economic, but in social and political terms. The transition to an urban, mining and industrial society led to increased prosperity for all — but also consolidated and emphasized the pattern whereby whites abrogated unto themselves the major share of this prosperity.

## RE-GROUPED SOCIAL FORCES

However, even more important than the increased prosperity, of deeper significance than the economic upturn, was the radical regrouping of social forces that resulted from the movement to the industrial, urban areas.

We can distinguish four major groups of migrants.

- (a) Immigrants from Europe, chiefly from the British Isles, who brought with them not only the technical skills required for a newly developing industrial society, but also the habits and traditions of trade union organization in the metropolitan countries.
- (b) Displaced whites, mainly from the *platteland* (rural farming areas). These were without skills, and were perforce relegated to the bottom of the common economic ladder.
- (c) Displaced tribal Africans and migrant peasants who were often coaxed, but more generally coerced by a combination of economic necessity and legal stricture, into industry, as a source of cheap, heavy manual labour.
- (d) A fourth group, the Indians, entered Natal to work the sugar cane plantations. Among these were a small but significant group of craft workers and traders.

## DISCRIMINATORY LEGISLATION

It must be stated in advance that discrimination on the grounds of race is not always explicitly so stated, particularly in the earlier legislation, but the operations of these acts contain, by their very nature, not only a discriminatory character, but a discriminatory intent. It must also be clearly understood that such discrimination has been a notable feature of South African legislation, particularly since the inception of the (then) Union of South Africa in 1910. This was made possible by the South Africa Act, passed by the British Parliament on 2 December 1909. Its provisions, subject only to certain so-called entrenched clauses, read together with the Statute of Westminster of 1931, afforded absolute sovereignty to the South African Parliament. But even before then, legislation which can be considered as repugnant to the Law of England was passed.

We shall limit ourselves only to a chronological list of the more obvious laws, and only insofar as they have a direct bearing on the infringement of trade union rights.

1. *THE MINES AND WORKS ACT* prevented Indians and Africans from performing skilled work in the mines. Hereby the colour-bar as it had hitherto existed in the (prior to 1910) South African Republic and in the structure of the Mineworkers' Union, became elevated to a national principle.

2. *THE NATIVE LABOUR REGULATION ACT* further deprived the African of his freedom of movement as a potential employee.

3. *The Railways and Harbours Regulation, Control and Management Act* aimed at the reduction and restriction of the number of Africans "ministering to the needs of white men" in urban areas and made provision for their concentration in certain segregated living quarters.

4. *The Masters and Servants (Transvaal and Natal) Act* made it a criminal offence for African tenants on white farms not to adhere to the terms of a written, oral or implied tenancy-contract.

5. *The Native Administration Act* authorized the Governor-General to rule Africans by Proclamation, without reference to Parliament. Under Section 29 of this Act, the Minister may deport any African to any prescribed place, if this African, according to the Minister's opinion, "promoted hostility between white and black."

6. *The Native Service Contract Act* empowers a white farmer on whose land an African or his dependants live, to refuse that African a permit to seek work elsewhere than on his farm.

7. *The Industrial Conciliation Act* excluded Africans from the term 'employees', prohibited strikes by Africans, and declared absenteeism from work by Africans a criminal offence.

8. *The Apprenticeship Act* made apprenticeship obligatory in the skilled trades and vocations, yet at the same time debarred non-whites from competing, since they were expressly excluded from the apprenticeship system.

9. *Native Urban Areas Consolidation Act* undertook to satisfy the labour requirements of white employers, restricted residence of Africans to locations, prohibited the purchase of land by Africans and adopted the pass-control system.

10. *The Unemployment Insurance Amendment Act* discriminated by excluding Africans from the definition 'contributor' if they earned less than £ 180 per year.

11. *The Native Building Workers Act* prohibits the employment of Africans as skilled labour in building industries outside "native areas".

12. *The Native Laws Amendment Act* imposed rigid discipline on Africans in respect of their attitudes to instructions given by their superiors. Under this Act, tribes or parts of any designated group may also be moved from one geographical area to another.

13 *The Natives (Abolition of Passes and Co-Ordination of Documents) Act* restricts the freedom of movement of Africans rigidly and reinforces the pass system.

14. *The Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act* prohibits African trade unions and strikes by Africans.

15. *Industrial Conciliation Act* provides for hitherto racially mixed membership in unions to be abrogated. The 1959 amendment expressly forbids any African from being appointed as a representative of employees, or as an alternative to such a representative. Nor may an African be appointed to represent the employee parties in a dispute that is referred to a conciliation board for settlement.

(1) The Mines and Works Act No. 12 of 1911, as amended by the Mines and Works Act 1911 Amendment Act 1926, Act 28 of 1956. (2) The Native Labour Regulation Act No. 15 of 1911, as amended by Acts No. 56 of 1949, No. 54 of 1952. (3) The Railways and Harbours Regulation, Control and Management Act, No. 21 of 1923, as amended by Acts No. 25 of 1930, 1934; No. 46 of 1937, 1941, 1942; No. 36 of 1944; No. 25, 38, 43 of 1945; No. 42 of 1946; No. 45 of 1947; No. 56 of 1949; No. 54 of 1952; No. 16 of 1955; No. 69 of 1956. (4) The Masters and Servants (Transvaal and Natal) Act, No. 26 of 1926, as amended by Act No. 24 of 1932. (5) The Native Administration Act, No. 36 of 1927, as amended by Acts No. 9 of 1929; No. 42 of 1942; No. 21 of 1943; No. 36 of 1944; No. 54 of 1952; No. 67 of 1952; No. 42 of 1956. (6) The Native Service Contract Act, No. 24 of 1932, as amended by Act No. 67 of 1952. (7) The Industrial Conciliation Act, No. 36 of 1937, as amended by Act No. 48 of 1953; No. 28 of 1956. (8) The Apprenticeship Act, No. 37 of 1944. (9) Native Urban Areas Consolidation Act, No. 25 of 1945, as amended by Act No. 42 of 1946; No. 45 of 1947; No. 54 of 1952; No. 67 of 1952; No. 16 of 1955. (10) The Unemployment Insurance Amendment Act, No. 41 of 1949, as amended by Act No. 9 of 1957. (11) The Native Building Workers Act, No. 27 of 1951, as amended by Act No. 38 of 1953; No. 60 of 1955; No. 56 of 1959. (12) The Native Laws Amendment Act, No. 54 of 1952, as amended by Act No. 36 of 1957. (13) The Natives (Abolition of Passes and Co-Ordination of Documents) Act, No. 67 of 1952, as amended by Act No. 79 of 1957. (14) The Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act, No. 48 of 1953, as amended by Act No. 89 of 1955. (15) Industrial Conciliation Act, No. 9 of 1956, as amended by Act No. 41 of 1959.

## RESISTANCE AND S. A. C. T. U.

Two interwoven patterns emerge about trade union activity in this period. The first is that of the growth in strength and in resistance on the part of African workers against government legislation; the second is the manner in which white workers invariably sided with the government against their fellow African workers.

With regard to the above, see, *inter alia*: —

B. P. Bunting, *The Rise of the South African Reich*, especially pp. 252-274, London 1964.

B. P. Bunting, *The African in Industry*; *Africa South*, Vol. 4, No. 1, Oct-Dec 1959.

A. Hepple, *Labour and Labour Laws in South Africa*; *Africa South*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Oct-Dec 1956.

A. Hepple, *African Trade Unions and the New Powers*; *Africa South*, Vol. 1, No. 4, July-Sept 1957.

A. Hepple, *Job Reservation - The Achilles Heel*; *Africa South*, Vol 3, No. 1, Oct-Dec 1958.

A. Hepple, *Trade Unions in Travail*, Johannesburg, 1954.

Leon Levy, *African Trade Unionism in South Africa*; *Africa South In Exile*, Vol. 5, No. 3, April-June 1961.

E. Hellman, *Racial Laws vs Economic & Social Forces*, Johannesburg, 1955.

G. M. Carter, *The Politics of Inequality, South Africa Since 1948*; 1958.

E. H. Brookes & J. B. Macaulay, *Civil Liberties in South Africa*, 1958.



Only the most menial jobs are available to African workers, as part of enforced Government policy.

It becomes abundantly clear from the evidence presented that the South African government found it increasingly essential to resort to an acceleration of discriminatory legislation against African trade unions and their leadership as their resistance mounted. In recent years the nature of legislation seems to have undergone a change, however. Not only are leaders and workers subjected to the more specific sanctions imposed by legislation directly affecting them as workers, but they are now dealt with in terms of general legislation.

A case study to support this thesis is afforded by the history of the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). Sactu is the only non-racial co-ordinating trade union body in South Africa. Formed in 1955, it has over 55,000 members, the majority of these being African. Not only is it non-racial in its membership, but it is deliberately so, despite the laws of the country.

(Here followed a list of 49 constituent trade unions in Sactu — Editor.)

SACTU has four major and specific objects:

- (a) For the legal recognition of all trade unions.
- (b) The abolition of the Industrial Colour Bar and racial discrimination in all spheres of social, economic, cultural and political life.
- (c) The abolition of the pass system.
- (d) The right of all workers to choose the best job on the best market.

For the espousal of these objects, SACTU and its leadership have been subjected to continuous harrassment by the South African government. For, by virtue of its position as the only principled opposition to the government on the part of organized labour, in 1956 no less than 23 of its officials were arrested and charged with High Treason. In 1958 many were convicted of incitement. In 1960 many were detained during the 'State of Emergency', and since 1963 more than 60 leading officials were either arrested under the General Law Amendment Act, or banned from holding positions in the Trade Union Movement. The government has also found it advisable to invoke the provisions of the Suppression of Communism Act and the Riotous Assemblies Act to silence opposition.



According to the Minister of Justice (*Hansard, 18 Sept. 1953, Col. 3674*), by 1953 no less than 33 trade union officials had been removed from their posts and forbidden to attend meetings of any kind. Some of the more prominent were as follows: —

R. H. Fleet (*S. A. Hairdressers' Employees Union*), Miss Joey Fourie & W. Kalk (*Leatherworkers' Union*), Mike Muller and Arnold Selby (*Textile Workers' Industrial Union*), I. Wolfson (*Tailoring Workers' Industrial Union*), E. Weinberg (*National Union of Commercial Travellers*), Miss E. S. du Toit & D. J. du Plessis (*National Union of Laundering, Cleaning and Dyeing Workers*), Miss Roy Alexander (*Food and Canning Workers' Union*), S. Rosenblatt (*National Baking Employees' Union*), Miss H. le Roux (*Sweet Workers' Union*), Miss J. Wolfson (*Jewellers' and Goldsmiths' Union*), Miss N. Dick (*Textile Workers' Industrial Union, Cape*), J. Gomas (*Chemical & Allied Workers' Union*), J. Phillips (*Garment Workers' Union*), A. T. Mati, W. Kodesh and T. H. Gwala (*S. A. Railway and Harbours Employees (Non-European) Union*), S. V. Reddy (*Howick Rubber Workers' Industrial Union*), I. E. Bhoola and G. X. Tshume (*S. A. Tin Workers' Union*), J. J. Marks (*African Textile Workers' Union*), D. Tloome (*Council of Non-European Trade Unions*), P. J. Huyser (*Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers*).

**SANCTIONS AGAINST SACTU**

In terms of a Proclamation dated 28 December 1963, and effective from 31 January 1963, some of the most prominent and militant Sactu leadership have been prohibited from holding office. A partial list reveals the following names: —

- Leon Levy - *National President of Sactu.*
- Mark Shope - *General Secretary of Sactu.*
- John Gactsewe - *General Secretary of Sactu elected after the ban on Mr Shope.*
- Phylis Altmann - *Assistant General Secretary of Sactu.*
- Viola Hashe - *Vice-President of Sactu and Secretary of the National Clothing Union of S. A.*
- George Monare - *National Treasurer of Sactu and National Organizer of the National Clothing Union of S. A.*
- Mabel Balfour - *National Executive Committee Member of Sactu and Secretary of the Transvaal branch of the African Food and Canning Workers' Union.*
- Eddie Heynes - *National Treasurer of the Textile Workers' Industrial Union.*
- L. Diedericks - *Member of the Port Elizabeth Sactu Local Committee.*
- L. Ndzanga - *National Executive Member of Sactu and Secretary of the Railway Union of the Transvaal.*
- M. Ramitloa - *Secretary of the Shop and Office Workers' Union of the Transvaal.*
- Mary Moodley - *Organizer of the African Food & Canning Workers' Union of the Transvaal.*
- Melville Fletcher - *Organizer of the Textile Workers' Industrial Union, Durban.*
- A. Mosata - *President of the African General Workers' Union, Kimberley.*
- Frances Baard - *Secretary of the African Food & Canning Workers' Union, Port Elizabeth.*
- A. Bennie - *Secretary of the General Workers' Union, Port Elizabeth.*
- L. Kukulela - *Secretary of the Hospital and Laundry Workers' Unions, Cape Town.*
- P. Vogel - *Chairman of the Sactu Local Committee, Port Elizabeth.*
- R. Takalo - *Secretary of the Metal Union of the Transvaal, National Executive Member of Sactu.*
- F. Manamela - *Organizer of the Transvaal Metal Workers' Union.*
- E. Cindi - *Secretary of the Transvaal Printing Workers' Union and National Executive Member of Sactu.*
- S. Naidoo - *Sactu Local Committee typist.*
- F. Lekoto - *Member of the Shop and Office Workers' Union.*
- C. Ntuli - *Organizer of the Metal Workers' Union of the Transvaal.*

**IMPRISONMENT AND DETENTION**

Once again we do not intend to offer an exhaustive list of trade unionists and workers who have been sentenced to imprisonment. Our object is, rather, to present a pattern of

**1. West German - South African Trade Soars**

West Germany increased its trade with South Africa by 32% during the first nine months of last year, reports ADN. Imports from South Africa rose by 14.3% compared with the same period in 1966.

According to the West German-South African Chamber of Trade and Industry in Johannesburg, South Africa remains far and away West Germany's most important trade partner in Africa.

Important items on the exports to South Africa include West German plant for the S. A. armaments industry. In exchange West Germany receives, among other things, uranium.

**2. West Germany Exploiting Southern Africa**


Dr Eduardo Mondlane, President of the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), Dr Agostinho Neto, President of the Popular Movement for Angolan Liberation (MPLA), and Amilcar Cabral, Secretary-General of PAIGC (Guinea-Bissao and Cape Verde Islands African Independence Party), in an interview with the ADN correspondent in Conakry, sharply condemned Bonn's neo-colonialist policy in Africa and its participation in the suppression of the peoples of Africa struggling for their liberation.

They pointed out West German infiltration in Angola and Mozambique. For example, representatives of West German monopolies and of the Bonn Government had come to agreements with Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia on the joint exploitation of the uranium deposits in Mozambique.

Dr Neto emphasized that Bonn was playing a decisive part in equipping South Africa as the gendarme of racism and colonialism. South Africa had been assigned the task of establishing a neo-colonialist bloc in the southern part of the continent.

The MPLA President said: "The danger emanating from South Africa is extremely grave. Since it is already supplying Portugal with weapons, it may be expected that South African troops will be employed against our liberation movements."

The liberation movement leaders said they were confident that the independent African states and the socialist states would continue to support them. "We greatly appreciate the comprehensive aid of the German Democratic Republic and wish to express our gratitude to its Government and people," said Dr Mondlane.



*African mine-workers at work. They are denied all trade union rights, earn £ 8 a month against £ 130 earned by whites.*

suppression and persecution in all its inexorable viciousness. *Mr Billy Nair* and *Mr Curnick Ndhlovu*, sentenced to 20 years imprisonment each on 28 February 1964. *Mr Nair* was the provincial secretary of Sactu until banned, was one of the accused in the 1956 Treason Trial, and detained during the 1960 State Of Emergency. *Mr Ndhlovu* was Secretary of the Durban Railway Workers' Union, an affiliated Sactu union.

*Mrs Mildred Lesica* (Secretary of the Brick, Cement and Quarry Workers' Union) and *Mr Elijah Loza*, were charged with 37 others in Goodwood, Cape Town, in 1964. *Mr Loza* was sentenced to six years' imprisonment and *Mrs Lesica* to three years.

*Mr John Ferris* was detained on 1 October 1963, released on 30 December 1963 after he was charged with sabotage, and granted bail. The government, however, dropped the charges in January 1964.

The Johannesburg *Sunday Express* reported on 9 February 1964 that since October 1963 no less than 30 banned people had been forced to leave their jobs because of restrictions placed on their movements by their banning orders. *Mrs Viola Hashe*, a mother of three, was confined to the Magisterial district of Roodepoort, and was forced to give up her position as National Secretary of the Clothing Workers Union, a position she had held with distinction for 17 years. *Mr Paul Joseph*, father of three, was constrained from entering any factory premises, which forced him to resign from his job as a storeman-clerk, a job he had held for 9 years. *Mrs Phyllis Altman* had to resign as Assistant General Secretary to Sactu, and could not find alternative employment. The paper quoted a Johannesburg social worker as stating: "They (the banned) are in a desperate plight. Many have tried for weeks to get work, but employers reject them immediately they find they are banned."

Often, since a banned person cannot find work, he is subjected to house arrest. This happened, for instance, in the cases of *Mr Paul Joseph*, *Mr Lekoto*, *Mr Gaetsewe* and *Mr Tami Bonqa*, a clerk with the Industrial Council for the Clothing Industry.

In August 1966, in the Grahamstown Supreme Court, Messrs *Eric Xuma*, *Llewellyn Yawa*, *Daniel Magongo*, *Milton Baleni*, *Alfred Zambetha*, *Matthew Mpolongwana*, *Amos Zambetha*, *Richard Klaas*, *Arnold Nbanhana* and *Welcome Duru*, each had their sentences reduced, on appeal, from four and a half years' imprisonment to one year's imprisonment for being members of the ANC and for participating in the 1960 Port Elizabeth bus strike.

Below we give the names of some members of Sactu who are at present serving terms of imprisonment for various offences.

**ON ROBBER ISLAND** Billy Nair. Steven Dlamini. Gordon Makgothi. Lanek Loabele. Nathoo Barbenia. M. Mapumulo. Mandlenkunzi Ndhlovu. Terence Makwabe. George Sinkankanka. George Mbele. Samson Fadana. Selborne Maponya. Elias Solomon. Cauzibe Ngixiki. Jackson Mdingi. Lizo Sithotho. Livingstone Mancoko. Llewellyn Yawa. Ahmed Kathrada. Raymond Mhlaba. Caleb Mayekiso. Mulner Ntsangani. Charlton Ntuli. Riot Mkwanzazi. Israel Ndimande. Benson Ndimba. Zola Ngini. Danial Magongo. Milton Baleni. Matthew Mpolongwana. Welcome Duru. Wellington Sobandla. Tandekile Manube.

**PRETORIA CENTRAL PRISON** Norman Levy. Eli Weinberg.

**UNDER HOUSE ARREST** N. T. Bardieu. J. Ferris. John Gomas.

**BANISHED** Joseph Morolong has for some years been banished to a remote and inhospitable part of the interior. Indeed, he was one of the first to suffer this iniquitous reprisal for his trade union activities.

### KEEP BANNER ALOFT!

We believe that while this Memorandum is not exhaustive, it nonetheless gives an accurate picture of the nature and scope of repressive legislation affecting trade unions in South Africa. We also believe that we have conveyed some idea of the integrity, sacrifice and steadfastness of those ordinary men and women who have kept and will continue to keep the banner of trade unionism aloft and unsullied in South Africa.

We thank the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts for their invitation to submit this Memorandum, and assure them of our deep appreciation for their continued interest and efforts.