


APRIL 1987



SECHABA

official organ of the african
national congress south africa



**ARCHIE GUMEDE,
CO-PRESIDENT OF UDF**

SECHABA

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EDITORIAL

DEMOCRATIC FORCES SMASHING THE WHITE LAAGER

Each and every political move and reform plan the Whites-only National Party makes leads to further deep crisis. The grand counter-insurgency plans of the SADF generals have failed to crush the struggle for a united, non-racial democratic South Africa. The oppressed and exploited masses of our people have equated life with freedom, nothing less. It is as White domination is confronted with this courageous decision that it is cracking at every turn. The news media on the other hand engages in a great speculating game of who is verkrampt and who is verlig. Perhaps the National Party will win more seats or the Progressive Federal Party will increase its minority, they would say. Or they would play the extreme right-wing bogey, about the Herstigte Nasionale Partei of Jaap Marais will unite with the Konserwatiewe Partei of Andries Treurnicht and Terreblanche's Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging or maybe they will not.

Or that the right wing will unite and the liberal opposition unite to halve the National Party majority? This Whites-only election farce usually, in our view, ends with the National Party leaders giving themselves more power and increasing repression on our people.

But this time, to the shock and dismay of Piet Botha, it is the Blacks who are really voting in genuine elections of democracy over fascism. It is the liberation movement, led by the ANC, who are voting in strikes by their trade unions, rent boycotts, school boycotts, in their civic associations, street committees and in other forms of struggle. It is the democratic movement which is determining the mood, the direction and final outcome of

the real political contest between the oppressor and the oppressed. Clearly power is slowly, and at a great cost, changing hands. But changing hands all the same. The Whites-only ritual is fast developing into a small, miserable side-show.

What then is one to make of the baloohuhaa about Dennis Worrall, the Stellenbosch academics, the restive Afrikaner business people and the declaration that Afrikanerdom has got a left wing? Is the long-predicted cracking of Afrikanerdom and the laager in general finally taking place?

The Dennis Worrall phenomenon as a political development produced by the struggle of the democratic forces shows the realignment of forces arrayed against us. Our enemy is shifting positions, forced to do so by our struggle. Afrikaner businessmen are feeling the heat of the struggle by the Blacks in their factories, farms and businesses and the groundswell of revulsion against apartheid from the international community. Their base is threatened at home and abroad. That is what makes them restless. The central issue to these developments is that all people, Black and White, must, as these people have done, abandon the politics of White domination and bantustanism and then throw in their lot with the future South Africa of a non-racial, democratic and united country.

We, and we alone, the democratic forces, are the only force which can smash the White laager of apartheid. It is our own armed struggle, mass mobilisation and resistance that will bring down apartheid and bring fundamental change in South Africa.

TOWARDS PEOPLE'S WAR AND INSURRECTION

By Mzala

In line with the decision adopted by the National Executive Committee of the ANC in August 1979, which constituted the main starting point in determining our strategic perspectives, and which defined the main content and the principal immediate policy on our line of struggle during that phase of our revolution, armed struggle was regarded as secondary to the principal task of building up political revolutionary bases. This meant that the main purpose of military activities that took place in that three-year period was:

- To stimulate political activity and organisation of the masses;
- To keep alive the perspective of people's revolutionary violence as the ultimate weapon for the seizure of power by the democratic majority under South African conditions.

What political developments took place during that three-year period which demonstrated that we had taken the right strategic decisions?

The beginning of the 1980s transformed the political and revolutionary organisational situation in South Africa beyond ordinary imaginations. Never before, at least not since three decades previously, when our movement was still operating legally inside the country, had the vast masses of the oppressed people so arisen as one, "uniting in action and acting in unity" (Tambo), under the guiding principles of the African National Congress, increasing in the process their revolutionary consciousness, and, in mind-defying feats of political mass actions, challenging the legitimacy of the apartheid regime, as well as virtually unbanning their own organisation, the ANC.

Another Mass Uprising

1980 saw the development of another mass uprising in South Africa.

An estimated 10 000 secondary school pupils took part in a successful campaign for the boycott of classes in Cape Town, Durban, Bloemfontein, East London, Port Elizabeth, the Western Cape, Kimberley, Johannesburg and other areas, which

forced more than 100 schools to close down; and, more than that, caused 2 000 matriculation students not to write their examination. Violent clashes took place between the students and the police, resulting in deaths on both sides. Violence was the characteristic feature of the uprising.

As distinct from the 1976 uprising, the 1980 events involved greater numbers of the working class, acting either independently or in community with the students.

Civic associations made the students' grievances their own, while branches of COSAS and AZASO involved themselves in community problems such as rents and bus fares in their areas of operation. While publicists and theoreticians debated in various journals about the relationship between factory-floor action and community organisations, the people in struggle resolved the debate by practice, and demonstrated that now there can be no Chinese Wall in the theatre of people's struggle.

Workers Make Demands

In the Cape, Natal and the Transvaal, there were huge strikes involving many thousands of workers, in spite of police harassment (police intervention in strikes was recorded on 94 occasions). These strikes demonstrated the level of political consciousness and the prevailing fighting mood among this most vital sector of the population.

In a paper entitled, *Strikes as a Social Phenomenon*, Dr Loet Douwes-Dekker of the Graduate School of Business Administration, University of the Witwatersrand, suggested in his conclusions that the widespread strikes which characterised 1980 "cannot be perceived as riots; they are a challenge to the existing order of control ... (they) serve as a notice to all concerned that the status quo cannot be recovered."

Meanwhile, Release Mandela Committees mushroomed in many districts of the country, accompanied by a signature campaign. Throughout the political activities of the year, the Freedom

Charter, the basic policy document of the ANC, served as the rallying banner of the people's demands.

The year 1981 was greeted by a country-wide campaign to boycott the Republic Festival activities that were being planned by the apartheid regime. Trade unions, local community organisations, churches and students joined hands in a massive wave of political demonstrations and protest, during which the racist republic was exposed as undemocratic and the basic cause of Black misery.

The Racist Flag Burned

In several instances the people publicly burned the flag of the racist republic. The regime then introduced the Republic of South Africa Constitution Second Amendment Act, No 101 of 1981, which provided that anyone found guilty of maliciously destroying or of mutilating the "National" flag, or of holding it in contempt, or of having removed it without permission from a place where it was being displayed by order of any authority, would be liable to a fine not exceeding R10 000 or imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years.

At the same time, this activity was accompanied by the growth in the popularity and


prestige of the African National Congress, which manifested itself in the raising of its flag in the place of the destroyed flags of the regime. There were numerous other manifestations of this development, among which was the attendance by thousands of people at a service at Regina Mundi Cathedral, Soweto, in memory of 12 ANC members killed in January by racist armed forces in Matola, near Maputo, Mozambique.

The funerals of fallen guerrillas of Umkhonto We Sizwe were attended by thousands of mourners, and so also were those of known ANC members, as in the case of Sebina Letlalo in January, a founding member of the ANC, who was buried by more than 6 000 mourners.

In another campaign, the ANC underground political machinery called publicly for a boycott of the South African Indian Council elections, which proved strikingly successful. Only in one Natal constituency was there a reasonable turnout of voters, which was 40.1%. Generally, however, the poll was under 20%. In the Fordsburg constituency, precisely 70 people voted out of a possible total of 3 987.

The schools boycott of 1980 continued in some areas into 1981.

There were more strikes — in the motor industry in the Eastern Cape and at Wilson



Civic Associations: Are they real people's power?

Rowntree, and in Pretoria over management recognition of the National Union of Motor, Rubber and Assembly Workers (NUMARWOSA).

Prestige of the ANC

In 1982, the year of the 70th anniversary of the ANC, the prestige of the ANC reached its peak. The anniversary was commemorated in various cities and towns by mass meetings. Moved by these events and revelations, the official opposition in South Africa, the Progressive Federal Party, argued in parliament (according to the *Rand Daily Mail* of May 21st) that "the ANC is a popular political movement with which the government will have to come to terms."

The Star newspaper of January 9th supported this view by noting that the country-wide marking of the 70th anniversary showed that: "the ANC has become an increasingly revolutionary force, and these are facts with which White South Africans have to reckon." The previous year the same newspaper had taken a poll and revealed that the ANC had emerged as "the most popular political movement in South Africa," with Nelson Mandela chosen as their leader by 76% of the sample.

COSAS, AZASO and The Federation of South African Women (Fedsaw) held meetings commemorating and 30th anniversary of the Defiance Campaign, and women's organisations all over the country observed South African Women's Day on August 9th.

The response of the regime to this widespread development was none other than its military attack on ANC refugees in Lesotho, during which 42 people, including Basotho nationals, were killed.

According to the statistics given by the Minister of Manpower, there were 342 strikes and work stoppages during this year, involving more than 84 000 African workers.

Planning for People's War

It is these events among others which called for the search for a new approach in our military planning and activities. The basic and most fundamental strategic question asked within the ranks of our movement was: "Has the time come for the arming of the masses?"

A document of military strategy entitled, *Planning for People's War*, was drafted in 1983 by the Political-Military Committee under the in-

structions of the National Executive Committee of the ANC, and was later discussed within all political and military structures of our movement as well as during the 1985 Second National Consultative Conference. The document acknowledged the significance of this debate, and the centrality of the question of arming of the masses in the new phase of armed struggle, when it stated:

"A considerable amount of discussion has been taking place recently in our ranks on the concept of an armed people as the vital element in the pursuit of people's war. As a general proposition this concept is correct. But we have to be a little more clear about what exactly we mean in practice."

The debate was precisely about what was the practical meaning of the policy of "arming the people" in the context of the South African revolution.

In South Africa, the development of our military strategy has been conditioned by a detailed study of the specific South African conditions. The aspect of the colonial context of our struggle confronts us on numerous occasions, when we find that in fact we share with the formerly oppressed people of Cuba, Vietnam, Mozambique, Angola and so on, precisely those conditions which made them and make us a colonised people. Whenever we have made reference to the experiences of these countries, it was not because we denied the industrial development of South Africa but because there exist concrete common features of some fundamental aspects of our struggles, despite certain distinctions as well as differences.

Two South Africas

As a result of this colonialism, there exist two South Africas. One is that of the Whites, who live in advanced capitalist conditions in both town and countryside, in the same way as the Portuguese and French lived in Portugal and France in relation to Angolans and Vietnamese respectively. The other South Africa, however, is that of the Blacks, particularly Africans, who are characterised by land dispossession, political enslavement, absence of basic democracy, absence of economic leverage for progress, experiencing cultural suffocation, living in bantustans and urban ghettos far from the cities, and who are kept unarmed.

These conditions give the Whites in South Africa the character of an alien group in reference to the living conditions and ways of life of the Blacks. Put in other words, Black South Africa is the colony of White South Africa itself; White South Africa is France and Black South Africa is Vietnam, but all situated within the same territory. It is this feature of South Africa as well that determines our military strategy.

Proceeding from this recognition, the *Planning for People's War* discussion document states that:

"... the policy of 'arming the people' cannot mean that we begin now to distribute arms to whosoever wishes to receive them among the oppressed. In the first place, we have neither the capacity nor the means to do this on any meaningful scale. In the second place, it would be completely wrong to engage in a policy of merely distributing weaponry to people, trusting to luck that they will use them on the side of the revolution.

"The policy of 'arming the people' has completely different meanings in different phases of revolution ... In other words, if the concept of 'arming the people' is to become anything more than a nice-sounding cliché, **it must become part of a policy to involve more and more armed people as organised contingents in support of our struggle and acting under our leadership.**"

In this regard, then, the document concludes:

"If there is a short way of defining what the main emphasis of our strategic line should be, it is: we must plan for a protracted armed struggle in which the foundation of a people's war must be urgently organised, and we must be ready to accept all the sacrifices and the patient dedication which such a perspective entails."

In a way, the approach to armed struggle that confines our military strategy within a perspective of a purely protracted guerrilla warfare, is traceable to our 1969 *Strategy and Tactics* document. Looking at our struggle by the conditions of that time, our strategists could not have planned for anything more than what was the prevailing situation at the time. The whole 1969 document looked at things in this strict category:

"Guerrilla warfare, the special, and **in our case the only form in which the armed liberation struggle can be launched**, is neither static nor does it take place in a vacuum."

The political situation, however, has equally not been static. The objective as well as subjective factors have changed radically during the decade of the 1980s, giving birth, for the first time in our history, to mass insurrectionary zones in numerous Black districts of our country. The masses of our people have made a transition in their struggle from simple political demonstrations of a peaceful nature to a semi-armed uprising (in the sense of being armed with rudimentary weapons), some kind of partial insurrection. And we must be able to adapt our tactics and immediate tasks to the concrete features of every given situation.

Armed Insurrection Now Possible

In 1969, the realistic military perspective was to wage only a protracted guerrilla struggle, but in the 1980s we have seen our struggle take a leap forward, and the situation today has within it the seeds and concrete possibility for an insurrection. The person who now speaks only of protracted guerrilla war is behind the times; such a person is reiterating old approaches senselessly learned by heart, instead of studying the specific features of the new and living reality.

The question of insurrection has already become a possibility in the South African revolution, manifesting itself at this stage only in partial forms. The actual struggle has thrown it from the realm of theory into the realm of practicality. And insofar as the masses of our people have acted in an insurrectionary way, despite the absence of modern arms in their hands, a new and additional task now faces our military strategists: to prepare ourselves for partial and general insurrections.

A conservative approach to armed struggle in South Africa has at times manifested itself in the inability to accept this new development of insurrectionary conditions, and in the failure to reckon with the fact that the only scientific approach to military strategy under the present circumstances will proceed from the fact that we have in South Africa today, side by side, existing together, simultaneously, the possibilities of preparing both for protracted guerrilla warfare and armed insurrection.

In view of this present-day reality, it is necessary, in addition to our other general tasks:

- To begin to promote among our people, especially the working class, the new insurrectionary dimension to the perspective of our armed struggle.

- To begin to recruit, train and arm combat units in factories, mines, farms and bantustans, and organising in their neighbourhood secret arms and ammunition depots which can be used instantly in the event of a sudden and unexpected combination of mass battles that may add up to an insurrection.

- To work politically within the armed forces of the enemy, with the aim of organising political sympathy for political change, leading up to the neutralisation, or even the winning over, of significant sections of the enemy forces to the side of the revolution.

During the Second National Consultative Conference of the ANC in 1985, the Commission on Strategy and Tactics put the relationship between people's war and insurrection in the following succinct way:

"By People's War we mean a war in which a liberation army becomes rooted amongst the people, who progressively participate actively in the armed struggle both politically and militarily, **including the possibility of engaging by partial or general insurrection.** The present disparity in strength between the enemy's forces and our own determined the protracted nature of the struggles in which we need to reduce the enemy's resources, reserves and endurance, whilst gathering our own strength to the point where we are capable of seizing power.

"Such a struggle will lead inevitably to a revolutionary situation in which our plan and aim must be the seizure of power through a general insurrection (or whatever ways might present themselves). What will count in such a situation will be our capacity to take advantage of that revolutionary situation. Unless we have the necessary forces and means under our command and at our disposal, there is no way we can succeed, and the opportunity will pass us by.

"As for the question of how long we have to wait for such a situation to mature, this is impossible to state. **The crisis in our country is such that we must be ready to respond to the most**

dramatic turn of events which might bring the whole situation to a decisive turning point. Already the present explosive situation in the townships is pregnant with such possibilities, and demands our decisive action, irrespective of our current strength ...

"Whilst we emphasise the need to purposefully and patiently build up the forces and means for the revolutionary seizure of power, waging People's War as we do so, it is necessary to stress that an insurrection cannot be mechanically planned on a drawing board to take place at some prescribed date in the future. It could occur as a result of a chain of events which trigger off widespread initiative from the people themselves or as a result of a call from a revolutionary movement in the development of our revolutionary situation, or as a result of a combination of both. We must see to it that we are, in every respect, ready for any of these eventualities in future."

For the present, it is essential that we grasp the incontestable truth that a revolutionary strategist must take cognisance of the developing revolutionary situation, and accommodate it in planning, and not merely cling to a theory of a decade ago, which like all theories was only outlining the general situation of that period. A dialectical method of appraising the revolution requires precisely the recognition of theory, not as dogma, but as a guide to action; it requires of us a strictly exact and objectively verifiable analysis of the concrete features peculiar to each historical situation.

Let me say, in parenthesis, that the outstanding success of the African National Congress also consists in its ability to perceive of the emergence of a historic turn of events and opportunity to develop the revolution to higher levels in order to achieve victory within the shortest possible time. After our study of the recent political developments, we have pointed to the fundamental turning point in the balance of forces between the revolution and counter-revolution as well as the new advantages we find in the political situation after the creation of revolutionary political bases, the defeat of the apartheid organs of administration and the birth of structures of people's power. The National Executive Committee's *Call to the Nation* is a precise indication of this truth.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL PRESS: **SELF — CENSORED, BIASED, BOUND BY LEGISLATION**

By Tony Holiday

Late last year, the Botha regime added new and terrifying dimensions to the censorship already in force under the emergency. Promulgated on December 11th, the new regulations force all sections of the media to seek ministerial permission before discussing or reporting on: unrest anywhere in the country, action by the security forces, boycotts, the treatment of detainees, the release of any detainee, people's courts, street committees and statements critical of compulsory military service. Newspapers are even forbidden to leave blank spaces on their pages to indicate that a report has been censored.

This action was followed on December 19th by orders issued under the emergency by Major-General C A Swart, divisional commissioner of police for the Western Cape. These banned activities which could encourage support for the release of detainees, the unbanning of the ANC or any other banned organisation or the withdrawal of troops or police from any area "where they perform functions in connection with the state of emergency."

It makes no difference whether some or all of these restrictions are tightened, loosened or lifted. The stark truth is that the very fact that they have been imposed means that the legal opposition press, as White liberalism conceived of it, will never be the same again. From now on, the barons of the Newspaper Press Union and the shadowy giants that lurk behind them in the form of the mining house and banking conglomerates, will be aware that what was done to the media before can be done again; that the rightist political forces they once thought to control, or at least keep in check, have outgrown them, just as Hitler's Nazis outgrew the restraints the German industrialists, who began by supporting them for their own ends, sought to impose. Inevitably, and even if the emergency is lifted before this article is published, what has happened will mean that the legal press will practice a degree of self-censorship undreamed of even a few years ago.

Its readers may expect to be told the correct stock-exchange prices, the actual cricket and rugby scores. But they can be certain of being informed accurately of precious little else.

Pretoria Plots Further Murders

The immediate motives behind this latest example of state terrorism are not far to seek. They have very little to do with curbing armed actions to mark the anniversary of the founding of Umkhonto we Sizwe. Given the powers the army and police already possess, it is hard to see how further ravagings of the right to free expression could assist the regime in that respect. They have everything to do with masking the genocidal acts whereby Botha and his henchmen — particularly the Defence Minister, Magnus Malan, and the Police Commissioner and former head of the Security Police, Johann Coetzee — hope to crush further mass resistance to apartheid.

To say this is not to sound hysterical false alarms. The indications are undeniably real. They are to be seen in the murders of UDF activists by the 'death squads' which roam the townships, in the rise of the police-backed 'witdoek' and 'Russian' vigilante squads. Most of all are they to be seen in the detainee deaths and in the murderous volleys fired each day by troops and police.

The experience the regime has of the effect of newspaper reporting of the deaths in 'resettlement' camps during the early 1970s have taught it that even its allies in Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States have little stomach for mass murder on this scale and of this type. If it is indeed plotting butchery on an even more horrific scale than we have so far witnessed, then it makes perfect sense for it to apply just those measures against the media that it has in fact applied.

The NPU Censors Itself

Suspicious that the regime is intent on just such expedients gain substance from the fact that the

Clamps on the Press

These are the emergency clamps on the Press:

- No pictures or drawings of unrest, strikes or boycotts;
- No pictures or drawings of the conduct of security forces in the maintenance of public order;
- Detention without a warrant for 14 days is legal. This period can be renewed by the Minister of Law and Order;
- Detainees may be held incommunicado;
- Detainees may be subjected to dietary or corporal punishment by prison officers or a magistrate;
- No publication of the names of detainees without official permission;
- The Minister of Law and Order may ban newspapers.
- Fines of R20 000 or 10 years in jail for infringements of the clamps.
- The courts may not challenge any of the clamps.
- Journalists may be banned from any area.
- News reports on the conduct of the security forces may be banned.
- Dissemination or publication of a wide range of activities defined as "subversive" are banned.

NPU undoubtedly offered Pretoria a compromise in the form of self-censorship — something they have done during similar crises in the past — but that even this was insufficient to stave off the new curbs. What other explanation could there be for the fact that the regime was not appeased by the servility of the Newspaper Press Union (NPU), other than that Pretoria has things on its agenda of such breathtaking criminality that even some figures in the NPU could not be counted on to play along?

So much for the immediate intentions behind the new restrictions. The important question is what is to be done about them. Must the silencing of the liberal and semi-liberal press mean that no dissenting media is to exist in our country: that South Africans are to be deprived of all objective reportage, comment and analysis? Can the underground structures and external missions of the ANC, and the sources available to the UDF and the popular resistance generally adequately fill the role that was played by elements of the legal, professionalised South African press? In order to answer these questions, we need to reflect for a moment on the history of the South African newspaper industry in order to under-

stand the strengths and weaknesses which have contributed to its present predicament.

Colonialist Press Tradition

Battles with authority have always been a prominent feature of the life of the South African press. The first independent newspapers took some 170 years to appear after the first Dutch settlement in 1652. When they did appear, their editors and proprietors defended their right to carry free and critical comment and objective reportage with arguments derived from the ideology of British liberalism. Thus Thomas Pringle's confrontation with Lord Charles Somerset over the Governor's determination to censor the *South African Journal* in 1824, was in part a clash between ideas concerning individual rights of free citizens to express themselves, on the one hand, and aristocratic and absolutist notions of state power and Crown prerogative on the other.

It is important to note that liberalism — certainly in the versions of it expounded by the English philosophers, John Locke and John Stuart Mill — is by no means a revolutionary ideology. Nor were the early pioneers of an independent press in South Africa in any sense

revolutionary radicals. Pringle, Fairbairn and those who followed them did not question the basic assumptions underlying European colonisation. Still less did they criticise the property relations and ideas about ownership which were basic to nineteenth century capitalism and the imperialism which had grown out of it. Papers like *De Zuid Afrikaan* might publish Karl Marx's analysis of the approaching Crimean War in 1854, but their owners and readers were, for the most part, soaked in colonial and capitalist values.

It was, therefore, no accident that Francis Dormer, founder of the Argus Company which today dominates the newspaper publishing scene in South Africa, should also have been the architect of the Newspaper Press Union, which brought together newspaper proprietors from all over South Africa at its founding conference in Grahamstown in 1882.

Racist Mentality in the English Press

This fatal combination of capitalism and colonial perspectives was bound to breed a racist mentality within the innermost ranks of the allegedly liberal English press. The 1905 congress of the NPU was the last of its kind to be attended by one of South Africa's greatest pioneering journalists, John Tengo Jabavu, editor of the country's first African newspaper, *Imvo Zabantsundu*. At its 1912 Congress, the NPU, blind to the contribution made by Jabavu and other Black journalists, barred all Black newspaper owners and editors from its membership. Significantly, this move was instigated by an immigrant New Zealander, G H Kingswell, founder of the *Sunday Times*, who represented the *Rand Daily Mail* at the Congress. It is doubly significant that the ban was not rescinded until 1975. As De Kock* points out, moreover, the 1912 congress marked the launching of the South African press as a modern capitalist industry embodying "a new spirit of purpose and competitiveness." So it was that the entrance of the Establishment press into a new industrial era was marked by an act of flagrant racism from within its own ranks.

This reactionary tendency remained a prominent feature of the Establishment's media, and was in evidence even in the inner sanctums of the opposition press, being exacerbated after the Nationalists came to power in 1948. It is true that, after that time, the racism of most White South

Africans was whipped up further by National Party mouthpieces like *Die Burger* and *Die Transvaler* and by radio and television controlled by the regime. It is also true that many journalists and editors on opposition newspapers bravely resisted and continue to resist these tendencies. But there is insufficient realisation of how much racism, reaction and general backwardness was and is still to be found in the newsrooms and boardrooms of that section of the English press which still claims to be fighting apartheid.

Such attitudes grew more prevalent as the battle for circulation and advertising grew among the press giants. By 1982, newspapers provided a living for more than 36 000 workers, and South Africans were buying more than nine million newspapers and magazines. But already in the late 1960s it was clear that the country had a media market that was among the most over-saturated in the world. The situation was worsened by the late advent of television. The competition for advertising and readership became a battle for commercial survival.

Inevitably this brought changes in the atmosphere of many newsrooms and in the content of the news and comment columns. Elements in the top management of both South African Associated Newspapers and the ever-growing Argus Company held the view that not only could the market not carry so many English-language newspapers, but that such newspapers as hoped to survive could no longer afford to employ journalists or adopt political stances which would make them unpopular competitors for the loyalty of White readers. Among the upshots of this view were the dismissal of the liberal political commentator, Allister Sparks, from the editorship of the *Rand Daily Mail* and the demise later of the newspaper itself. Of course, compliance of this sort did nothing to appease the regime, but was merely interpreted as what it was — a sign of weakness. The press curbs of December 11th, 1986 are — at least in part — a result of the Botha dictatorship's estimate of the newspaper owners' unwillingness to resist them.

Need for a Revolutionary Press

The lesson of all this is that, if there is to be meaningful resistance to the terroristic stifling of our country's news media, then it will have to come from broad movements and organisations which

are untainted by racist and colonialist prejudices. The present economic and political crisis has now reached the point where only the revolutionary forces, comprising the ANC and its allies, can fulfil that role. There simply are no other instances with the moral, political and organisational capacity to accept this immense responsibility.

Awesome as this task seems, it also represents a magnificent and challenging opportunity. For, in undermining press freedom to the extent that it has done, the apartheid regime has also undermined the credibility of all legalised media in South Africa, not least its own mouthpieces, the Afrikaans press and the South African Broadcasting Corporation. People are rapidly ceasing to believe what they read in the legal newspapers, hear on the radio or see on television, especially when it relates to politics, the economy, foreign affairs, 'unrest' in the townships and rural areas and the operations of Umkhonto We Sizwe. The regime itself has told them that it can no longer afford to let them hear, read or see anything other than its own version of events. In this way it has created a huge credibility gap for itself.

How can we best seize the advantage Botha's terrorists have offered us? Many of the instruments for doing so are already in our hands in the form of the underground editions of our journals which circulate among the masses, our pamphlets and the radio broadcasts beamed into the country from our external missions. What is needed is a sophisticated overall strategy aimed at increasing the quality and quantity of the underground media. The following eight-point plan is intended to serve as a discussable skeleton of such a strategy.

- The established journals of our movement must be made to serve as the central theoretical and policy-determining basis for the whole operation. They will be the forums of debate and the medium of political education, dealing with broad national, international, cultural and philosophical issues in clear precise language. These must create a form of mass-consciousness, a communal understanding, capable of grasping the meaning of day-to-day events. The underground editions of these journals must be expanded and their content must constantly improve in quality.

- The volume of journals and newsheets writ-

ten and produced at home by cadres of the movement in legal or semi-legal conditions must increase, and their primary task must become that of conveying truthful, accurate and crisply written information to the public of the sort the Establishment press is no longer able or willing to print. Special newsheets to serve community, trade union, student and other needs must be set up. They will take their political line from the journals already referred to. The work of these newsheets can be supplemented if our external broadcasts place more emphasis on transmitting newsworthy and relevant political facts.

- In the past, our movement has often had successful recourse to whispering campaigns to get its message across. We must intensify such campaigns and train cadres to initiate campaigns which combine agitational work and calls to action with the transmission of factual information.

- Agitational work must improve in quantity and quality. We must flood the townships, campuses and factories with pamphlets, make more use of pamphlet bombs and tape-recordings. These must be well-written and well prepared.

- More use must be made of video-technology to counter the influence of the state-controlled television networks. Our people must be given the chance to see, as well as hear, Mandela, Tambo, Nzo and Slovo talking to them. Through videos we can give them visual instruction in arms-making and street-fighting techniques.

- We must study and deepen our understanding of the uses of armed propaganda, coordinating it as far as possible with the other activities already listed. Our armed actions should speak as clearly as our words, directing people's attention to specific issues and places in the enemy's armour which need to be attacked.


- In all this we must not neglect the struggle against censorship that still goes on in some areas of the legal media. We must continue to try to win journalists of goodwill to our cause. The degree of free expression allowed to the Establishment media will very probably wax and wane for a long time to come, thus creating opportunities for ANC sympathisers among the reporters and leader writers to serve our movement.

- The creation of an underground media network presupposes an intelligence-gathering and

intelligence-dissemination policy which can meet changing conditions and changing needs. The enemy is increasingly making use of disinformation against the ANC and its allies. To counter this effectively with genuine information we will need to know more and more about the enemy, his secret weaknesses, plans and policy-making procedures. Like our armed forces and underground organisation, our intelligence apparatus can never be 'good enough'.

In carrying out all these eight tasks, we must be guided by revolutionary principles of trust in the intelligence of our compatriots and respect for the truth. We must claim no false victories, make no wild promises and always aspire to keep the people's trust.

* Wessel de Kock, *A Manner of Speaking, The Origins of the Press in South Africa*, Saayman and Weber, Cape Town, 1982, pp. 118-119.



Demonstration against media clampdown, Johannesburg 1986. (Left) Winnie Mandela.

THE SOLOMON MAHLANGU FREEDOM COLLEGE: DOORS OF LEARNING AND CULTURE

By Teacher Freda and Teacher Anna

This month, it is eight years since Solomon Mahlangu was murdered by the South African regime. A hero of the South African people, he was the first member of Umkhonto We Sizwe in the 1976 generation to die on the gallows. His name is now given to the large and rapidly growing ANC educational complex in Tanzania. By educating our youth, by helping them develop into full human beings and cadres of our movement, we remember him.

This article is written by two teachers who taught at the primary school. It is not their intention to present an analysis or evaluation of the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College, to assess to what extent it is successful in carrying out ANC education policy, or even to state what its major problems are and its attempts to solve them. Their intention is simply to give readers a general view, and a feeling of what it is like to live and work there.

Situated in Mazimbu, on an old sisal estate given to the ANC by the Tanzanian Government, is an educational complex different from all others. It is called the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College (SOMAFCO) after a young freedom fighter who was hanged by the South African regime in 1979.

The place is a living memorial to Solomon Mahlangu. It also enshrines the names of other South African heroes and heroines. In the Primary School, there is a Mandela Bush Club in which children learn the skills of the bush. Various buildings and sectors are named after Lilian Ngoye, Charlotte Maxeke, Kate Molale, J B Marks and Eli Weinberg. Part of the Mazimbu complex is called Kliptown. The name of Ruth First is commemorated at the Development Centre, run by the ANC at nearby Dakawa.

SOMAFCO was conceived after the 1976 student uprisings, and was originally intended as a secondary school to provide for some of the young people who had left South Africa — many of them with the expressed purpose of seeking an education and training they could not receive

at home. Classes began late in 1977, the building of the school and dormitories began in 1979, and only a few years later, President Tambo described the complex at Mazimbu as "a picture of modern Africa."

Rapid Development

Mazimbu is in one of the most fertile parts of Tanzania. There are a few streets, the buildings are one-storeyed — school buildings, dormitories, offices, neat new houses in garden plots, or yellow and whitewashed buildings dotted through the complex as reminders that the site was originally a sisal estate. To the south and west are mountains, craggy and misty enough to hold your gaze at all times; to the north and east is flat open space; and there are acres of sky. Its African beauty, dominated by the mountains, is powerfully mirrored in the children's art and poetry.

Apart from the secondary school, there is now a Primary School; the Charlotte Maxeke Children's Centre, incorporating the Nursery School and the Day Care Centre; the Kate Molale



Mother and Baby Home. In this short time, the whole Mazimbu complex has developed — dormitory blocks, staff housing, several halls, including the J B Marks Hall and the Lilian Ngoyi Hall, the ANC Holland Solidarity Hospital, a library, administration offices, the Eli Weinberg photographic laboratory and various workshops have been constructed. There are small industries and a horticultural section. A large farm has also been developed. All these sectors make a substantial contribution to meeting the needs of the community.

The people of Mazimbu are not helpless refugees — their aim is to become as self-sufficient as possible. Nevertheless, without the tremendous solidarity and support that has come from sympathetic governments, organisations and individuals, the complex could not have been built. And this help is still needed.

It is here in Mazimbu, and in Dakawa, that our people learn the job on the job, and so receive training and experience which helps to equip them to be cadres of the movement.

Education for Liberation

On the formal academic side, the secondary school aims at providing the qualifications which enable students to take up scholarships all over the world. They then return to sections of the movement — perhaps to Mazimbu itself — to continue to play their part in the struggle for liberation.

Learning at Mazimbu at all levels, from day care to adult education, is based on the Freedom Charter, and consequently involves complete rejection of Bantu Education. ANC policy states that education will be revolutionary, dynamic and universal. It will bridge the gap between mental and manual work, and it aims at creating a new type of South African, dedicated to serve the interests and needs of the South African people as a whole, both before and after liberation.

In a speech in Mazimbu in 1983, in which he commemorated the death of Solomon Mahlangu, O R Tambo said:

"SOMAFSCO ... will not be an institution of superhumans, but it will be an institution in which

we have developed in our students a profound commitment to our cause, and therefore a very high level of discipline, efficiency and capability. To be here, for you, students of SOMAFCO, is to be on a mission. The mission is to qualify, to do your work, to pass your examinations, to move on as required. The basic consideration is: what are the needs of our struggle today and tomorrow?"

The programme is being put into practice throughout the complex, beginning in the Children's Centre, where the little ones learn traditional songs and dances as well as those reflecting the struggle for freedom. They listen to folk tales, and to other stories, stressing co-operation, friendship, justice and self-reliance, and they participate in celebrating national days with the rest of the community. At a graduation ceremony of teachers, three-year-olds stood up and sang, "Solly Mahlangu, you are a hero of South Africa." And they are also encouraged to work and play together, to help each other in every way, and to take part in the care of the environment.

A Corner of South Africa

SOMAFCO, and indeed the whole Mazimbu complex, are unique for many reasons. There is the physical situation — in a way, a landlocked island in exile. The complex is surrounded by Tanzania — small villages, a town nearby — but most of the people are confined to Mazimbu most of the time. They live in a situation quite different from that of the Tanzanians, and have their own languages and culture. Although an increasing number of children have Tanzanian mothers, and speak Kiswahili fluently, they spend most of their lives in what the ANC Secretary of Education, Comrade Henry Makgothi, has called: "a little corner of South Africa (which) has emerged in Tanzania."

To Mazimbu have come people of different ages and nationalities. The majority are South Africans. There are cadres of our movement who left South Africa many years ago to carry on the struggle in Tanzania and the Front Line States. There are their children and their families. There are the more recent arrivals and there are volunteers — the solidarity workers from Scandinavia and other European countries, from Africa and from the socialist countries, including Cuba.

Apart from the philosophy on which the educa-

tion is based, there are other factors that make SOMAFCO different from other schools. Many pupils have been through horrendous experiences; some are survivors of the massacres at Matola, Maseru and Gaborone; some remember suffering at the hands of the South African police at home. The majority are without their parents. Some are so unhappy and distracted that learning can be virtually impossible. At all ages, they need a great deal of understanding and tender, loving care.

There is the additional factor of the frequent shortage of teachers, especially trained ANC teachers. The position is improving in all the sectors, and the Primary School has been particularly fortunate in that SIDA, the Swedish international aid agency, has set up a special one-year course for ANC teachers, and the teaching practice is done at SOMAFCO. But it is in the nature of the place that people are called to different tasks or sent to study abroad. Most of the children live in dormitories, far away from their parents — if they have parents — and there can be a high turnover of adults coming into and out of their lives suddenly and uncertainly. However, teachers, social workers and the community try to tackle these problems, and one of the tremendous rewards is to witness the healing process. There are some dramatic cases of severely damaged children who eventually settle into normal school life.

"To Love their People and their Culture"

Everyone is conscious of the political reasons for the existence of SOMAFCO. All learn the history of the ANC, and they are reminded in many ways, every day, that they are ANC cadres who have a duty to their country and people. The children learn and write revolutionary poems, poems about death and war, poverty and loss, freedom, liberation and peace. They quote the words of their leaders, and write letters about their lives and beliefs to others all over the world.

The children are very interested in world news and events. The death of Olaf Palme, for instance, started an avalanche of poems, letters and pictures. They have a great vitality and an enormous capacity for enjoyment of words, music and dance. They have a voracious appetite for books and information, especially about their homeland. Apart from reflecting the African landscape around them, the art work is of a highly political nature. There are some strikingly good

artists and poets — some of a young age — whose work has been used in the struggle, and exhibited internationally — recently in Japan, for instance.

The Freedom Charter declares that: "The doors of learning and culture shall be opened ... and people shall learn "to love their people and their culture."

National Days Commemorated

Culture plays a very important part in the life of the people of Mazimbu. It is integrated into the curriculum, especially of the Nursery and Primary Schools, and there are many cultural events, including those which form part of the celebration of South African national days. Tanzanian national days are also celebrated. Celebrations can begin with a *toi toi* — the morale-building dawn jog around the complex — followed by the raising of the flag. On occasions such as the celebration of Nelson Mandela's 67th birthday, there is a *Letsema* — a communal labour programme.

Last year marked the tenth anniversary of the Soweto Uprising. Several teachers at Mazimbu had been directly involved. They spoke to all the pupils from six to 16 years old, and a powerful message came through of the importance for our struggle of education, and therefore of SOMAF-
CO. One young woman teacher had read about SOMAF-
CO in South Africa, and came out to complete her high school education. She joined the Primary School while waiting for a scholarship. She told a group of children aged 9 to 13:

"With your pens and your paper, with your English and maths, with your culture, you can fight apartheid."

The youngest children acted out the Uprising of June 16th, the oldest held serious political discussions with their teachers and others in the community who had been involved in the Uprising — and at all ages, there was the usual flood of prose, poetry and art.

Hard, Rewarding Work

Teaching at SOMAF-
CO is not easy. The frequent shortage of suitably qualified ANC teachers, the psychologically and emotionally damaged children, the shortage of some of the necessary teaching materials, are not the only problems. English is the medium of teaching throughout the schools, and English is the second or third language for all the younger children and many

of the older students and teachers. In one primary class of 20 children, 13 different spoken languages were identified.

Then there is the enormous range of educational background within any age range. Teachers have to prepare a good deal of their own materials. There is ongoing discussion amongst those in the educational sector about how best to overcome the difficulties there and provide the sort of education that is needed.

Teachers are also involved in running clubs for their students, and in dormitory, evening study and other duties. Like all members of the community, they have to share household duties. Some teachers have their own young children to care for. There are ANC meetings, as well as those for the whole community, including the solidarity workers. A young primary school teacher said that at the end of a day's work she felt as if she had carried three bags of mealies — but she found it rewarding and worth while. She knew she was playing her part in the struggle.

Busy Community Life

Secondary school students have regular nightly news briefing sessions — they take turns in monitoring the daily news. They have a Students' Council and are active in their own student affairs. Teachers have regular staff meetings and political discussions covering a wide range of topics. There are regular Production Unit meetings for all working sectors. It is no wonder that it can feel like carrying three bags of mealies!

As yet there is no social centre on the complex. Leisure time is spent in sporting activities, watching videos, in cultural activities and in meeting friends at home. The houses are shared by ANC members of the community, as well as the solidarity workers, and they reflect traditional African hospitality. The Nursery boarding section, the Primary and Secondary dormitories, hold parties, discos and video shows. As in any community, there are birthday parties, weddings and funerals. As at home, the funerals can be moving political events.

Visitors from all over the world come to see this "window into a future South Africa," as SOMAF-
CO has been called. SOMAF-
CO, Mazimbu and Dakawa are part of our struggle. There are considerable problems which have to be faced, and solutions sought. The struggle continues, and victory is certain.

SOLOMON MAHLANGU FREEDOM COLLEGE



Dear Comrade Nyerere,

I am Pholo. I say to you, Thank you for saying to us welcome to Mazimbu. I am not going to forget you because you said to us welcome and I think when we are in South Africa we will also say to you welcome to visit us too and thank you for the nice Mazimbu. You must also come to visit us when South Africa is free.

— *Written by an eight-year-old.*



When I see Mazimbu, when I see its mountains, I remember South Africa.



SOWETO UPRISING

*Children have lost mothers
and fathers*

*Mothers have lost children
Fathers have lost wives.*

*All of that means something
In the ear of Mother Africa.
She feels the pain*

*which pricks her soul.
We shall fight back for
Those who have fallen.*

— *Nana, aged 13 years*



— *From a poem by a 12-year-old.*

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UNITA: MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC DEFEAT

By Marga Holness

The writer of this article is a worker in the Angolan information service.

It has now become clear that in 1981, when the current administration took office in the United States, it believed that joint South African and UNITA military activity would be sufficient to overthrow the Angolan Government. That same year, South Africa's persistent aggression against Angola was stepped up, resulting in the occupation of a substantial part of the country's southern Cunene Province for more than three years. This occupation not only obliged the Angolan army to concentrate on the South African menace in the south, but enabled the SADF to infiltrate their UNITA surrogates further to the north of Angola, where they carried out a number of publicity-seeking attacks and kidnappings. By 1983, they hoped to be able to take Luanda.

However, the Angolan army was being reorganised and re-equipped, with new commandos trained for what are known as 'anti-bandit operations'; not the same kind of war as that against the regular SADF forces. The first big victory against UNITA forces infiltrated up through eastern Angola from bases in Namibia was at Cangamba, in Moxico Province bordering Zambia, in August 1983. An attempt by the terrorist group to take the small town was completely defeated and the South African air force for the first time openly intervened in the defence of UNITA, bombing the positions of FAPLA, the Angolan armed forces.

By 1985, FAPLA anti-terrorist operations were gathering further momentum, and in July that year conservative members of the US Congress succeeded in securing the repeal of the Clark Amendment, the legislation officially banning US military assistance to anti-government forces in Angola. It was during the big FAPLA offensive in Moxico and Kuanda Kubango provinces later that year, when South African radio

broadcasts were referring to "the gravity of UNITA's position," a trip to Washington was organised for Savimbi.

Pretoria Pleads for US Help

The position of UNITA was indeed grave. South African Defence Minister Magnus Malan appealed for western intervention. South African Foreign Affairs Department officials went to Washington to plead for US assistance for their proteges.

The *Windhoek Advertiser* on 19th September 1985 carried the headline, "UNITA aided by massive SA airlift?" and went on to say:

"An extensive aid air-bridge seems to have been established between northern Namibia and beleaguered UNITA rebels fighting to withstand a massive Angolan Government assault, senior United States officials in Washington maintain."

Commenting on the death in Moxico Province of a South African medical orderly, Lance-Corporal Bruce Andrews Fidler, the *Windhoek Advertiser* reported the SADF claim that his presence so far north was a result of the apartheid army's "humanitarian" aid to UNITA. However, the paper added, "the American government opinion is that South Africa's aid in the face of the FAPLA onslaught is much more extensive."

Therefore, it is abundantly clear that the support the Reagan administration gives UNITA is support for the Pretoria regime's attempts to overthrow the Angolan Government, just as it is seeking to overthrow, or at least seriously destabilise, all the independent governments in the region, with a view to postponing the inevitable day when the apartheid system is swept away by the South African people.

The US Colludes With Pretoria

When they met in Washington in February 1986, Reagan promised Savimbi to provide the UNITA



FAPLA soldiers in Cunene Province

terrorists with 'effective' military assistance. A second option, in view of the failure of UNITA to seize power by force, is to use military means to try to force the Angolan Government to negotiate with the terrorists. Time is running out for the apartheid regime and its allies. The irreversible character of the struggle inside South Africa today means that the regime cannot survive, notwithstanding the time or the sacrifices it may need to abolish it. South Africa has indeed become ungovernable, and this spells doom for all Pretoria's proxy forces throughout Southern Africa. Hence the hasty and desperate attempts to try to continue to use UNITA as an instrument to push back the frontiers of independent Africa.

The Washington Post reported on March 30th 1986 that CIA director William Casey, of 'Irangate' notoriety, "visited Africa this month to meet with Savimbi and assure him that 'effective' anti-aircraft weapons were on the

way." The same newspaper revealed the following day that Casey's visit had in fact been to South Africa, where he reportedly also discussed with officials of the apartheid regime how South Africa could be "hermetically sealed off" from the US programme of supplying Stinger missiles to UNITA. The US does not wish to be seen breaking the South African arms embargo. *The Washington Post* concluded: "that makes Zaire, a long-time friend of the United States, the necessary gateway for the new weapons ..." Top-level representations to President Mobutu of Zaire by leaders of Front Line countries (Zairean minerals transit Zambia and Zimbabwe on their way to South African ports) indicate that the route through Zaire, as well, is fraught with problems for the United States.

UNITA: Continual Military Failures

Savimbi announced in 1983 that he would take Luanda by Christmas, and failed to do so. In 1984

he again stated that he would take Angola by Christmas, and again failed to do so. In late 1985, far from contemplating an attack on the capital, he was desperately calling for assistance from Washington to prevent FAPLA from overrunning his propaganda base, called Jamba, in the remote south-east of Angola bordering on Namibia. In the event, the SADF intervened with its air force and infantry to save its UNITA proteges from destruction.

Although a continuing western press campaign gives the impression that UNITA is making military advances, the opposite is true. And the various military reverses it has sustained explain Savimbi's current pleas for negotiations.

In the speech he made on the anniversary of independence in November 1985, President dos Santos said:

"... the UNITA puppets decided to change tactics and to appear to the world as people interested

in peace. They hope, through this step, to distract the attention of all their members who are becoming tired of fighting an unnecessary war against their own people ... The US administration is having contacts with the UNITA puppets and sending repeated invitations to meet representatives of the Angolan Government ..."

He added:

"It is not right that the administration should make demands of the Angolan Government when it does not even formally recognise it."

Speaking to Italian journalists in December 1985, President dos Santos elaborated on this theme. He said that to agree to negotiate with the racists' proxies would violate a governing principle of the international community, since:

"... it would be to accept that any state could organise a group of terrorists, give them arms and destabilise another state, and then insist that this state accept the group in its government."



Villagers liberated by FAPLA from UNITA.

This was the background to Savimbi's trip to Europe in 1986. It was an attempt to salvage the terrorist group at a time when it has suffered serious military setbacks, and to muster increased European support for the group's destabilising activities in Angola.

The red carpet treatment afforded him early in 1986 in the United States seemed to have gone to his head. He obviously expected to be publicly received at the same high level in Western Europe, particularly in Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany, closely allied with the US and strongly resistant to sanctions against South Africa.

Relations Between EEC and Angola

However, the visit — during which Savimbi reportedly travelled on a South African passport — did not go as planned. In Strasbourg, seat of the European Parliament, he was not allowed to address the parliament, and Jacques Delors, President of the EEC Executive Commission, wrote to Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos to say that Savimbi would not be received at any level whatsoever by the Commission.

The ACP — Africa Caribbean and Pacific group — had protested at the visit, as had the OAU. It was particularly condemnable in view of the fact that in 1985 Angola signed the Lomé III Convention, which links the ACP group of countries with the European Community, and the EEC is becoming increasingly actively involved in development projects in Angola. An EEC delegation headed by Dieter Frisch, Development Director-General, had visited the country earlier that month to discuss co-operation in the five-year period 1986-90, during which Angola is to receive EEC assistance amounting to about US\$95 million.

Savimbi finally had to content himself with addressing an informal meeting of about 100 Euro MPs, most from ultra-right-wing parties, and the Pan-African News Agency reported that 415 of the 518 members of the assembly "chose to go fishing" rather than meet him.

During the visit, a plenary session of the European Parliament adopted a resolution condemning the United States for supporting UNITA, and calling on EEC member states "to entertain no relations with this terrorist organisation, which supports the South African regime by continu-

ing to destabilise Angola and Southern Africa generally."

An Embarrassing Guest

In Paris, he was received by Jacques Chaban-Delmas, President of the National Assembly, and Francois Leotard, Minister of Culture and Secretary-General of the Republican Party.

Yet the terrorist chief had seriously miscalculated the situation in Paris too, for notable among those who had invited him to Europe were representatives of Jean-Marie le Pen's National Front Party. The South African paper, the *Daily News*, commented that UNITA had failed to realise how damaging a connection would be with the European Far Right. Savimbi had failed to take into account the embarrassment he could cause to governments which have diplomatic and growing economic relations with Angola and are also under public pressure to distance themselves from the Pretoria regime that sustains him.

He was told that a possible meeting with French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac would have to be cancelled. This in turn led to the definite cancellation of other possible meetings with government leaders of Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Angolan Embassy in Paris issued a statement describing the Chaban-Delmas meeting as an "unfriendly gesture towards the People's Republic of Angola," and President Jose Eduardo dos Santos called off plans to attend the Franco-African Summit in Lomé. A visit to France by President dos Santos, put off because of the death of President Samora Machel, was postponed indefinitely. The Southern African Front Line States and Nigeria officially protested at the reception given to Savimbi in France.

An editorial in the influential French daily, *Le Monde*, summed up the situation succinctly and put Savimbi in his proper context:

"Indeed, Paris is currently welcoming an embarrassing guest, Mr Savimbi, head of the Angolan UNITA guerrillas; is preparing to receive another, Mr Pieter Botha ... and has been rid of a third one, the former Centrafrican emperor, Mr Bokassa."

The British Foreign Office had already publicly announced that Savimbi would not be officially received, and he cancelled his visit to Britain.

There is no doubt that the adulation lavished on him by Pretoria, Washington and most of the western press has given the terrorist chief a grossly inflated view of his own importance. Just like any traitor used by foreign aggressors anywhere, he is expendable. Even Washington and Pretoria will drop him without a second thought when he no longer serves their designs.

During his stay in Paris, Savimbi had a meeting with Chester Crocker, United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. They are said to have agreed on "a process of reconciliation among all Angolans." This does not mean that the US wishes UNITA to stop its massacres of Angolan men, women and children. It means that the Angolan Government should be pressured into negotiations and 'power-sharing' with UNITA.

Savimbi Appeals for 'Negotiations'

Indeed, the most significant aspect of Savimbi's European trip was the fact that on every possible occasion he appealed for western pressure on the Angolan Government to persuade it to negotiate with him. "We have fought long enough and the time has come for dialogue," he told *Le Monde*. "We are ready to negotiate a ceasefire right away and without conditions." The true import of this becomes clear if it is recalled that only a few years ago he was very noisily proclaiming that he would seize power by military means.

UNITA's strategic offensive has been defeated, but with SADF support its acts of banditry and terrorism continue. Significantly, UNITA massacres and atrocities have been most horrific in the Central Highland provinces of Huambo and Bié, home of the Ovimbundu people who, according to propaganda claims, support UNITA. No one who has seen the women and children victims of UNITA mine-laying in Huambo hospital, or spoken to the survivors of UNITA massacres there and elsewhere, can honestly believe this.

The Forming of Nations

Although this would be the subject of another article, it is interesting to note here the role played in the historical process of nation-formation by the liberation movements in Southern Africa. Whether it be the MPLA in power in Angola, or the ANC leading the struggle in South Africa,

they have sought to unite their peoples, irrespective of racial, tribal or other factors, to build a new type of society based on justice. A substantial part of pro-UNITA propaganda assumes that since Savimbi was born in Bié Province all the people of his ethnic and linguistic group support him. This type of assumption is a legacy of colonial thinking about Africa. It is a legacy in keeping with the thinking of the Pretoria regime, which defines and divides people along purely ethnic lines. This is one of the ideological meeting points of Botha the racist and Savimbi the tribalist.

The massacres and military defeats are also taking their toll within UNITA's ranks. Members who are captured or who give themselves up to the Angolan authorities speak of the demoralisation affecting the terrorists, many of whom are tired of fighting a war against their own people. Dissent among them has led to the disappearance and reported execution of many former UNITA leaders, including Jorge Sangumba, once its very vociferous secretary for foreign affairs, and Samuel Chiwale, the former military chief. As President dos Santos has said:

"Time is passing, people are getting older and most of UNITA's cadres and members have already understood that Angola is really independent and that our country has a very big sea, lots of fish, lots of forests, lots of wealth and, above all, very good people. What we are beginning to see is repentance for mistakes made, but they do not yet have the courage to face reality and lay down the bloodstained weapons of the South African racists they so shamelessly took up."

The Angolan Government's policy of clemency has offered a way out to all those formerly led astray who give themselves up and wish to work for national reconstruction. Many have already taken advantage of this. The US administration, were it serious in calling for "national reconciliation" in Angola, should use its considerable influence with UNITA to press it to take this course, instead of arming it to kill more Angolans.

Angola's sovereignty and independence continue to be threatened by the military operations of the mightiest army in Africa, the SADF, assisted by its UNITA hirelings and supported by the biggest Western power, the United States. Continual aggression has caused untold suffer-

ing to the Angolan people, including hundreds of thousands of displaced persons, countless dead, widows, orphans and disabled people, to say nothing of the disastrous effects on efforts to rebuild an economy emerging from colonial exploitation and the years of the independence struggle.

FAPLA Confronts the SADF

It is also true, however, that the Angolan armed forces are the only ones in Africa to have faced up, increasingly successfully, to the onslaughts of the apartheid regime's regular forces, not in guerrilla warfare but countering the conventional strategy and tactics of a modern war. Not only have FAPLA operations forced Savimbi to plead for negotiations, desperately seeking Western support for those pleas, but there is every indication that the balance of military power has also changed in martyred southern Angola.

During Pretoria's previous acts of aggression against Angola, particularly its 1981 invasion and occupation, it was South Africa's air superiority which proved decisive, so-called 'softening-

up' bombing raids preceding SADF ground troop operations. In January 1987, the South African major-general, George Meiring, officer commanding the so-called territorial forces in Namibia, complained that the Angolan air force now believed it could challenge South African air superiority in the region, and spoke of Angolan air defence systems 200 miles from the Namibian border.

In line with Pretoria's persistent propaganda, Angolan defensive measures were naturally presented as a threat to South Africa. Statements such as Meiring's have also, in the past, always been a prelude and pretext for the stepping up of South Africa's undeclared war against Angola. This may well be the motive for them. They may also be aimed at uniting the White electorate in the face of a purported external threat. Yet the major-general's complaints, when analysed in conjunction with Angolan reports of SADF attacks repulsed, indicate that the murderous machinery of the apartheid regime can no longer simply impose its dictates in the Front Line any more than it can in South Africa itself.



UNITA bandits captured by FAPLA

ARCHIE GUMEDE SPEAKS

Archie Gumede, co-president of the UDF, was in Britain for two weeks in February. He met leading politicians, public figures including members of the government. He held a press conference at the House of Commons where he answered questions from journalists.

What is the reaction of the UDF to the suggestion by the the current chairman of the OAU president of Congo that a constitutional conference or national convention should be convened on South Africa?

In regard to the suggestion of the Congolese President, I will say that a development of that nature would save a lot of bloodshed. Provided of course, the people involved are relevant people, men of courage, men of dedication, men of intelligence such as Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo and others who are presently in prison or in exile. Here is M B Yengwa with us. There are many others of that calibre who would be an essential part of such a conference. Those men, the men who are there, must have the opportunity to place their views before the people and receive a mandate from the people to act and speak for them at such a conference.

What is your reaction to the resignation of Dennis Worrall? Is it a positive thing for your struggle, has he got any contribution to make to the struggle against apartheid?

I regard his resignation as positive in so far as the National Party regards it as negative. I don't know what support he has in the country. I do know that he was held in high esteem by the whole of Afrikaners for the role he played when the South African government refused to return the four or five men who had been released on bail on a charge of smuggling weapons from Britain. And I do believe that to those who do wish to substitute their minds for their hearts in determining this question, they will find it necessary to re-examine their attitude and act accordingly.

Could you say something about the UDF after the emergency; do you still have good channels of communication throughout the country? If so, could you tell us the level of resistance in the townships?

I think you can read between the lines. Would the state of emergency continue if the resistance to apartheid had been broken completely? What I would say in so far as channels of communication are concerned, the nature of the organisations that were involved in the UDF were such that not all of them were political organisations, as a result they have not received the attention which the political organisations have received. But the contact between political organisations and those organisations has not decreased and therefore that contact is serving a purpose in keeping the spirit and existence of the organisation alive.

What is the relationship between your organisation and the ANC?

The relationship with the ANC is that of organisations having more or less similar aims, independently and independent of each other. The aim being to resist apartheid which affects everybody. Apartheid has been called a crime against humanity. If it's a crime to oppose a crime, then there is a crime being committed by the UDF. I believe the ANC also is determined to destroy apartheid in South Africa.

What is the relationship between the so-called vigilantes and Inkatha and the SADF?

I will say definitely there have been instances where the SADF personnel in police vehicles have accompanied Inkatha-mabutho to gatherings of people. They have not intervened, they have not tried to stop any attacks on the people. For instance, at the memorial service for Mrs Mxenge at a cinema at Umlazi. The police were present and assisted the mabutho by firing teargas

into the hall where the audience was assembled, giving an opportunity to Inkatha-mabutho led by Mr Sabela, a member of the parliament (KwaZulu), who on that occasion killed 13 people. Afterwards when a funeral was being held in Umlazi the mabutho came again and seven more people were killed. This was done openly. Not a single one of those people has been prosecuted, charged or anything. These things have been done in broad daylight. This is not an isolated incident; there have been many cases where this has taken place. The last incident was

when 13 people died after a house had been attacked. This was the home of an activist of the KwaMakutha Youth League, affiliated to the UDF. These people arrived in a car and were shooting; people saw them but there has been no prosecution, no follow up. Later, the son of the man who was killed in that house was pursued by members of the Inkatha Youth Brigade. It was alleged that they wanted to kill him. So that we have no doubt as to the role of Inkatha in these vigilantes.



*(Left to right): Neil Kinnock, Leader of the British Labour Party,
Archie Gumede, Co-President of the UDF
and Dennis Healey, Labour Party Spokesman on Foreign Affairs.*

ATTACKS ON DEMOCRATIC FORCES: INJUSTICE AND THE COURTS

By Jean Middleton

At the time this is being written, there are 21 people awaiting execution in South Africa on charges directly related to the vicious repression in the country today, to the war the regime is waging against the people of the townships and the countryside, and to the people's resistance. All 21 were convicted of murder, and of other charges as well, such as 'public violence.' Their trials and sentences arise directly out of the political situation.

The Black townships are ungovernable now, and organs of apartheid government are being replaced by organs of people's power, representative of the people themselves, and answerable to them. The regime is making desperate efforts to regain control — the police use armoured cars, fire power, rubber bullets, sjamboks, armed vigilantes — and in the last year or two it has been using charges of murder, together with such charges as armed robbery, arson, and public violence.

The old laws concerning 'public violence' have been massively used by the police, and monitoring organisations in the country have given up trying to keep count of public violence trials. It was estimated that there were 25 000 in 1985, but there is no estimate for 1986. Charges of public violence are brought — for example — after demonstrations, against people who are found to have what the police call 'riot-related injuries' — wounds from lead bullets and rubber bullets and sjamboks — that is, injuries that have been inflicted by the police themselves.

Charges of public violence seem, in fact, to arise from occasions when the police, and not the public, have been violent. A notable instance of this is the police action that followed the notorious 'Trojan horse' massacre, when 13 children who had been throwing stones were charged with public violence, though the charges were dropped against those who had been shot

dead. Those who shot them dead were not charged at all, neither with public violence nor with murder.

Policemen, Spies and Traitors Attacked

The murder charges come as a consequence of occasions when the people have turned against representatives of the regime and traitors collaborating with it. Security policemen have been killed; Josiah Tsawane and Daniel Maleke were sentenced to death in September 1986, alleged to have killed a security policeman. Community councillors have been killed, such as Sam Dlamini of Sharpeville, for whose death the Sharpeville Six now await the death sentence, and Benjamin Kinikini of Kwanobuhle. Some regarded as spies for the regime have died, and so have 'vigilantes,' those agents of the police who do much of their murderous work for them.

The trial of Moses Mnyanda Jantjies, aged 21, and Mlamli Wellington Mielies, aged 22, of Kwanobuhle near Uitenhage, is typical of the political trials now taking place as a result of such events. On November 28th 1986, twenty months after the two were first arrested, they were sentenced to death on six charges of murder and one of public violence. Three minors, accused and convicted with them, escaped the death sentence because of their youth, and were sentenced to 20, 16 and four years respectively. All had pleaded not guilty to killing a Kwanobuhle community councillor named Benjamin Kinikini, four other members of his family and a friend.

Paid Servants of the Police

Benjamin Kinikini owned a supermarket and an undertaker's business. He was the only community councillor left in Kwanobuhle, the others having all resigned. As a councillor he was despised by the people of the township. Much

more than that, he and his whole family were hated, because, together with a man named Jimmy Claassen (who was frequently mentioned in court, but who never appeared), they formed the core of an armed vigilante group known as the 'Peacemakers.'

The name of the Peacemakers had come up before in trials related to people's resistance in the area of Uitenhage; they 'arrested' people, 'tried' them, 'punished' them and handed them over to the police. Counsel for the defence said in court it was well known that they were in the pay of the police. One of the Kinikini family was facing a murder charge at the time of his death (though the police were not holding him in custody) and it was generally believed that the Peacemakers had been responsible for petrol-bombing the house of Fikile Kobese, a community leader whom the police later detained.

The funeral parlour (generally called the "barracks") was well known in the township as a place where the Peacemakers held their prisoners. A 16-year-old girl testified at the trial that she had once been abducted by one of the Kinikini men together with some others, handcuffed, beaten up, raped and then shut all night in a coffin, before being asked to give the names of people who had stoned Kinikini property.

The People Demand Their Children

The killings took place on March 23rd 1985, two days after the Uitenhage massacre, when the police shot 17 people dead. Anger and indignation were running high in Kwanobuhle. Very early that morning, Jimmy Claassen and some others (including at least one of the Kinikinis) kidnaped four youths at gunpoint from their homes. People assembled, and later moved to the funeral parlour to demand the release of the youngsters. Police witnesses were later to disagree on the size of the crowd, but there were at least a thousand people.

The young men had been held captive for a while in the mortuary (they called it the "fridge" when they told the story afterwards) but by the time the crowd arrived they were no longer there. They had been taken to the bush, where they were beaten with sjamboks, and then to the police station, from which they were later released.

The crowd, meanwhile, attacked the undertaker's building and set it alight; the six men, who had been trying to defend themselves with

firearms, met with a violent death.

Where Were the Police?

The police were not present at the time of the attack, though they had been there earlier, tried unsuccessfully to disperse the crowd with buckshot, helped to secure the mortuary windows, and had then gone back to the station. They didn't return until after the men were dead. Perhaps they feared for their own skins; perhaps they thought the Kinikini men, armed as they were, would be able to fend off the attack; perhaps they had decided to sacrifice the Kinikini family in order to get convictions and death sentences. At all events, they made no serious effort to explain their strange behaviour when they gave evidence in court; Constable April said they had left because it was time for their meal break, and Major Theron gave no reason at all, simply saying he had returned by helicopter and had watched the crowd from above.

Though the police were not there, they must have left at least one well-equipped spy behind them, for a video film of the crowd was shown in court. It doesn't seem to have incriminated anyone by showing any killing taking place, though it showed the bodies. According to the press, it showed Mnyanda Jantjies "shouting and spitting on" one of the bodies, but the chief state witness said he was surprised at this, because when he had seen Jantjies in the crowd, Jantjies had been "standing at a distance, impassively."

Where is the Evidence?

There was no satisfactory evidence to show that it was the five men eventually convicted who had killed the six vigilantes. The crucial evidence against Mlamli Mielies was a 'confession' he was alleged to have made to the police after his arrest. There was legal argument in court over whether this was admissible evidence, but in the end the court found the police who testified to the statement to be honest and reliable witnesses.

This was strange in view of the vague and contradictory nature of the testimony given by the other police witnesses in the trial. These disagreed with each other over the size of the crowd — Constable April said it was 1 000 strong, Major Theron said 3-4 000 — and when one of the young men who had been kidnaped said he had shown his sjambok wounds to the police at the station, the police said they had no

record of the incident, and could not remember it.

The police seem to take little trouble about putting their evidence together and getting their stories straight.

Sometimes they are exposed in court as liars. In the case of the Vaal Six, the court found the evidence of some state witnesses to be conflicting and untrue, and in the Duduza trial the judge described a magistrate who gave evidence as an "untruthful" witness.

Generally, however, the courts have taken the position of the police, and too often give credence to the police case, shaky as it is. In December 1985, the Sharpeville Six were sentenced to death on the basis of evidence from two chief state witnesses, both of whom had clearly been beaten up and threatened in detention until they agreed to testify, and one of whom contradicted evidence given by a third witness. The court that tried Jantjies and Mielies believed the police.

What made the police select Jantjies, Mielies and 11 others out of the huge crowd that stormed the funeral parlour? What made them choose to charge the Sharpeville Six out of the many thousands of people out on the streets the day of the demonstration against rent increases, when Sam Dlamini enraged the crowd by firing on it?

The Police Out for Blood

Their carelessness with evidence may show how much they are stretched; it is undoubtedly a sign that they believe they have the courts in their pockets. It certainly shows clearly that they are not particularly interested in whether or not their victims actually did what they are accused of having done. What the police want is convictions, either to intimidate others, or to get rid of local community activists by framing them on serious charges. Mielies had only recently faced a charge of being in possession of a petrol bomb, and there had been discrepancies in the evidence given by the investigating officer in that case. There were originally 13 accused in the Kwanobuhle case, and charges were dropped along the way; the police evidently spread their nets as wide as they can on the principle that the more people they charge the more they will get.

The coupling of charges is perhaps the most sickening feature of these murder trials; the intention is clearly that those who slip through the net of one charge may be caught in the next one. The wicked cynicism of this policy is clearly

demonstrated in the case of another of the 21, Paul Tefo Setlaba, whose trial arose out of an incident in October 1985, when a woman was killed. He was sentenced to death, but (presumably because he had a chance of being acquitted on appeal) also to two years for public violence, one year to be suspended for five years.

The Accused Are Saluted

During the period of the Kwanobuhle trial, the people of the township more than once showed their feelings about the regime, about its servants the Kinikinis, and about the accused. The accused, when they first appeared in court, were greeted with clenched fist salutes from a crowded public gallery. They were given clenched fist salutes again, during an inspection in loco in Kwanobuhle itself, when they were handcuffed and in a police van, and a crowd that gathered "welcomed" them, according to a press report, "almost as heroes." By contrast, at the inspection in loco, the chief state witness was described by the press as having "trembled visibly" at the sight of the crowd.

The feelings of the people were also clear to Benjamin Kinikini's widow. Called as a witness, she wept in court, and denied she had behaved arrogantly. She had gone to London in 1985 to demonstrate against "terrorism" outside the ANC offices there; but after her husband's death she told the press she was tired of being ostracised and "on the run." Significantly, she went to apologise to the Eastern Cape UDF, thereby acknowledging the political role of the Peacemakers, and the part they had played in state persecution of the growing community organisations.

Such trials as that of Jantjies and Mielies, and the circumstances surrounding them, are part of the growing and bitter struggle for liberation. The series of trials known to the press as 'unrest-related' trials, so far the cause of 21 death sentences, are yet another form of repression. The 21 sentenced to death are political prisoners, and we demand their release.

We demand the release of all political prisoners and detainees. We demand the dismantling of apartheid. We shall replace its institutions with institutions of democratic government, chosen by the people and answerable to them.

DEATH SENTENCES: SAVE THEIR LIVES!

The following people are at present in the death cells in Pretoria Central Prison. Sentenced as a result of people's resistance to the regime, they are political prisoners.

The Sharpeville Six, sentenced December 1985:

1. Mojalefa Reginald Sefatsa (30)
2. Reid Malebo Mokoena (22)
3. Oupa Moses Diniso (30)
4. Theresa Ramashamola (24)
5. Duma Joshua Khumalo (26)
6. Francis Don Mokhesi (29)

Two from Tzaneen, sentenced June 1986:

7. Solomon Mankopane Maowasha (20)
8. Alex Matshapa Matsepane (23)

Three from Oudtshoorn, sentenced September 1986:

9. Patrick Manginda (23)
10. Desmond Majola (27)
11. Dickson Madikane (26)

Two from Sebokeng, sentenced September 1986:

12. Josiah Tsawane (29)
13. Daniel Maleke (19)

One from Jansenville:

14. Elile Webushe

Two from Uitenhage, sentenced November 1986:

15. Moses Mnyanda Jantjes (21)
16. Umlamli Wellington Mielies (22)

One from Colesburg, sentenced December 1986:

17. Paul Tefo Setlaba (22).

Four from the Eastern Cape, sentenced January 1987:

18. Mziwoxolo Christopher Makaleni (22)
19. Makheswana Menze (43)
20. Ndumiso Silo Siphenuka (26)
21. Similo Lennox Wonci (22)

WOMEN FIGHT STATE OF EMERGENCY

Tsebanang Bagaetsho, an executive member of Federation of Transvaal Women (FED-TRAW) and United Democratic Front (UDF) is presently visiting Sweden. We asked her around what issues were women being organised and how the women's movement was affected by Botha's state of emergency. She started by linking the present organisations of women to the Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW) of the 1950s, saying:

"Their demands of 1954 ... the abolition of apartheid, the pass system, even if the boers claim it is abolished, is still there, Influx Control is even more intense now. So when the Federation of Transvaal Women was formed in 1980, actually I am one of the people who formed it. It started in Diepkloof, Soweto. The first meeting was not far from the home of Marcus Motaung, Mofoko, Mkhubu (members of MK who fell in Silverton and other areas) and all those guys. Basically the meeting was just on that street. We called ourselves Women's Federation of South Africa, even if we were only in the Transvaal, basically because we wanted to take the form and feature, the method of organising of the old Federation of South African Women.

Veterans Lead the Resistance

"There are women who were active in the 1950s and 60s. Originally they are the first people who started it jointly with other women. I can mention a few like Greta Ncapayi, Albertina Sisulu, Thoko from Alexandra, Frances Baard, Sihlangu, Lisiya, Florence Mkhize, Winnie Mandela and many others. They are still there giving guidance to the new generations. And they are still very active.

"We are organising all women, Black, White, green, yellow. The objective is still the same. The old demand is — we want to see the end of apartheid. We have specific demands, that are broadly demands in alliance with other groups like the Congress of South African Students,

(COSAS) which is now banned, youth groups under UDF, COSATU — those are practical demands that are being advocated by a whole range of people.

"We organise women around issues such as rent. We move into all the townships of the Transvaal, looking into things that affect them from grass roots. We organise street committees, area committees, block committees, women are being organised from all angles. They are being drawn into the Women's Federation. We also organise around the issue of education. Students are boycotting education, so we take it up as mothers.

"We organise women in all areas, even in rural areas around the issue of education. We also organise women on high fares and the cost of living. The past year the regime increased taxes, the General Sales Tax on basic commodities. Obviously that money is feeding defence. So we are campaigning against this sales tax. We are saying we can't be subsidising our own death. They are being drawn into the Federation.

"They are also being organised on militarisation, that is White women, because we don't only organise Blacks. We also organise White women. We organise them around militarisation and conscription of their children. You know lots of White children at the age of 17-18 are conscripted into the army. This is a real problem in the White families. It affects women a lot. They really are against that. The reality in South Africa is a war situation. White soldiers when they come back, some have no arms, some die in Angola or Namibia wherever they are sent to fight. Some of them are breadwinners. Women have to struggle when the person is away. Even if industry pays them and pays insurance, that does not cover all the costs, I mean taking into consideration the high inflation.

Soldiers Must Leave Townships

"Also there is the question of soldiers occupy-

ing the townships. We really organise around soldiers occupying the townships because it is a burning issue in the townships. Even in the rural areas lately, you see the whole range of Hippos moving full of soldiers. Women are being organised around that. We say we don't want the army in the townships. They are occupying the townships. They are also harassing students and residents. They cause friction.

"At some stage the soldiers were forcing the teachers to teach in schools. Even asking the students, when they go to the toilet, what are you going to do. And if you say, "I am menstruating" they say, "let me see." So the Federation of Transvaal Women takes this issue just there right in the school. It is an issue affecting women.

"We have branches in the rural areas. In the north-east Transvaal, although the state of emergency has done some damage, at least we can still count on those branches. We have women in Tzaneen, who were working in the fields and still attending conferences and contributing. Besides that we have women in Lebowa, in the northern Transvaal, in the western Transvaal, right in Boputhatswana. In Mabopane those areas, in Winterveldt. We actually even have a project, a crèche right in Winterveldt which is run by women.

"The state of emergency has affected us. That is why I am here. Some of our organisers are in detention now. Even if some of the leadership are still around like Mrs Sisulu and others they can't really organise as before. Basically because it is difficult. The more people come in trying to organise, the more they pick them up. But people still devise ways of organising. Despite the state of emergency women are organising around retraining for nurse-aides, so that when police shoot people, they should at least help in their houses with first aid. And also they are providing the political education. We know that it is important for women to have political consciousness, otherwise we will not be able to march forward. There are small groups organising and training women politically. They debate, they talk, a very good thing to happen.

"Black Consciousness under AZAPO, I would say academically is there. We can't ignore it. Although it is a very, very small group. They started what was called Women Unite, that was when we started our Women's Federation in 1980, to be against us. But it didn't survive

because they haven't got history, they haven't got programmes, theirs is not what the people want. They are just liberating the mind. In August, one group came, I can't call it Black Consciousness, except that it involved some members of Black Consciousness. It had a meeting in one of the rich hotels, where anybody who attended the congress had to pay R150. They had fashion shows and so on. I would say it is petty bourgeois women trying to come together.

We Organise All Women

"There are a lot of welfare approach groups. Like the one under Bridget Oppenheimer, the wife of Harry Oppenheimer, Women for Power, for Peace I think they call themselves, Young Women's Christian Association, Women's League of Sally Motlana, Zamani Sisters and Ikageng Women's Group. Among these groups, especially those which are grassroots organisations like Zamani Sisters, Young Women's Christian Association, Ikageng Women's Group, where you find women like Mrs Kotane, wife of Moses Kotane, they are not political groups. They are not antagonistic to the Federation of Transvaal Women. Some members of FED-TRAW are members of these groups on welfare basis. They have working relations with FED-TRAW. They are not antagonistic towards FED-TRAW but then FEDTRAW has to devise ways of winning them over. And FEDTRAW on the ground has similar projects which are welfare projects. Like Orlando East crèche, Orlando East Old Age Home. We have an old age home in a church in Orlando East under Mrs Mkhwayi, the wife of Wilton Mkhwayi which is run on welfare basis and is similar to the programmes of these women's groups. It is up to FEDTRAW to win them over rather than antagonise them.



Working Under South African Occupation — Labour in Namibia, IDAF Fact Paper No 14, International Defence and Aid, London, 1987, £1.

This fact paper is a timely reminder of the oppression of Namibian workers under the colonial rule of the apartheid regime.

SACTU recognises the strong and unbreakable bonds we have with our Namibian comrades. We view the struggle of the Namibian workers as the same struggle that we wage. We face many of the same bosses; we face the same troops as a colonising power. Many SACTU leaders have shared imprisonment with their Namibian colleagues.

Like South African workers, the people of Namibia were driven from the land and coerced into the barbaric practice that is now known as migrant labour. The paper documents the colonisation process and the brutal laws that were developed to enslave the Namibian people, the extremes of degradation to which the regime has sought to drive them. What must be shocking to all those who read the fact paper is the extent of repression of genuine trade union organisation in Namibia today.

Every aspect of the lives of Namibian workers is controlled. It is ironic that the so-called scrapping of the pass laws came much earlier in Namibia than in South Africa. This act was viewed as a 'major' reform in the Western world. Yet the 'removal' of influx control has gone hand in hand with a tightening of movement to the cities. African workers need official permission from labour bureaus, and are placed in the impossible position of first having to find housing in the overcrowded Black townships.

Namibian comrades face high unemployment and inflation and are forced to live in extreme poverty, while multinationals continue their illegal exploitation of Namibian wealth. Workers in smaller companies, on farms and in domestic service, face extreme racism and slavery; they are assaulted by the bosses and attacked by the occupying racist military. Workers on Namibian mines have seen little improvement in wages and conditions, and, at Rossing, uranium mine, workers are exposed to intense radiation levels,

with radioactive waste being dumped irresponsibly, thus spreading the risk to the neighbouring areas where Black miners are forced to live.

Worker militancy in Namibia has a proud history, going back to the earliest days of colonial rule. Each attempt at establishing trade union organisations met with brutal repression.

In 1971, Namibian workers staged their historic National General Strike, which was met with untold violence by the racists. The strike was followed by continued resistance, with workers taking action against the pass system, bantustan policies and work conditions. Workers increasingly identified themselves with the national liberation movement, led by SWAPO.

By the end of 1978, the National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW) had firmly established itself nationally. During the sham elections in December 1978, the regime swooped on NUNW organisers, detaining many under the Terrorism Act. By early 1980, NUNW offices in Windhoek were closed by the regime, property and records seized and NUNW funds frozen.

Over the past year, the NUNW has been steadily re-establishing itself. During 1986, two NUNW industrial unions were launched — the Namibian Food and Allied Workers' Union and the Mine Workers' Union of Namibia. Namibian workers are increasingly demonstrating their full commitment to the struggle waged by SWAPO.

This fact paper is a vital document which we hope will arm Namibia's friends abroad against the lies perpetrated by the regime. It is clear that the Multi-Party Conference (MPC) is nothing but new clothing for the apartheid colonial master. On the labour front the MPC has been as vicious as in all its other actions. Through the National Labour Council it seeks to isolate and crush genuine democratic unions, while promoting the puppet White unions and staff associations.

What becomes even clearer is that NUNW represents the genuine wishes of the Namibian workers in their struggle against colonialism and exploitation. This alone guarantees the future of NUNW.

SACTU

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
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31 m. band,
Tuesday, Thursday & Saturday,
6.15 a.m.

Published by the

**African National Congress of South Africa
P.O. Box 31791, LUSAKA, ZAMBIA
Printed by the Druckerei 'Erich Weinert',
2000 Neubrandenburg, G.D.R.**



**Mandela and Sisulu
led a pass-burning campaign
in 1960.**

