


JULY 1990



SECHABA

official organ of the african
national congress south africa

DEFIANCE CAMPAIGN
FOR RACIAL EQUALITY ON THE MINES
CONTINUES INTO 1990



JULY 1990

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CONTENTS:

EDITORIAL	1
REPEALING A LAW ALREADY DEFIED	2
THE TIMES MISCOVERS THE ANC	
By Dennis A Mumble	3
A POLICEMAN SPEAKS OUT	
Interview with Gregory Rockman	6
A PRISON WARDER SPEAKS OUT	
Interview with Randolph Fortuin	9
NUM CAMPAIGN FOR RACIAL EQUALITY	
By Jean Middleton	11
A NON-RACIAL DEMOCRACY	
By Albie Sachs	15
INTERNATIONAL	22
CELEBRATING A NEW DAWN IN SOUTH AFRICA	
The Zabalaza Festival	23
VILLAGES FOR FARMWORKERS	
By Kulukazi Mzamo	26
DUAL POWER	
By Linda Khumalo	29
LETTER TO THE EDITOR	30
BOOK REVIEW	32

Graphic design by Hylton Alcock

EDITORIAL

VIOLENCE BEGETS VIOLENCE

Commitment to ending the spiral of violence in South Africa certainly does not only refer to ending the so-called black-on-black violence typified by that in Natal. It means getting rid of all the violence whose basic cause is the apartheid system, which in turn relies on this violence for its existence.

To make the point clearer, when the people of Natal say they have had enough of the apartheid system and refuse to bow to the dictates of Gatsha Buthelezi and his Inkatha, the latter unleashes violence on them. When F W de Klerk says that South Africa has to move away from the apartheid system, white extreme right-wing forces gather their forces and attack the victims of apartheid. Therefore there can be no denying that the apartheid system can only be defended through violence.

During the last week-end of May, about 40 000 extreme right-wing whites came together in Pretoria to pledge themselves to defend the apartheid system. To any casual television viewer they looked a pathetic crowd trying to reenact a scene from the American Deep South in the fifties. Their expected crowd of over one 100 000 had failed to materialise. This rally, advertised as a show of strength, was predictable from groups whose vehemence has been whipped up by people who continually say De Klerk must be spared haste lest there be an extreme right-wing revolt. What we are saying here is that the extreme right-wing elements are acting on cue from people like Margaret Thatcher and other apartheid apologists who are in fact saying, "we will forgive you your violent reaction because it is expected of you if you are going to lose all the comforts you have enjoyed all along."

Such encouragement is dangerous, just as the justifications for Buthelezi's Inkatha violence are unpardonable. We are encouraged by the words of F W de Klerk speaking on the same day as the extreme right-wing rally when he said that no-one, no group can halt the process of change in South Africa. **But that is not enough.** His government has the power to halt the extreme right-wing madness that has already led to situa-

tions such as we have experienced in Welkom. The actions of white vigilantes could have been nipped in the bud by disarming those racists and stopping them from being a law unto themselves.

By not doing anything the regime is saying that whites have a right to violence as long as it is directed at blacks. It would be justified to conclude that white violence is being tolerated as a lever to get as much as possible for whites in the negotiating process. It means that for the violence to end, we would be expected to agree to some form of a revised white domination that would pacify the incensed extreme right-wing racists.

The trouble with toying with such schemes is that more and more lives are being lost daily. They put the prospect of a mutually agreed upon cease-fire between the ANC and the regime further away. And, in doing so, they put in jeopardy the commitment to a peaceful negotiated settlement mutually agreed upon in Cape Town in May.

Right-wing violence from any quarter, black or white, which tries to halt the process that has been set in motion must be halted immediately. If the South African rulers say that they also want change and peace, they have at their disposal the biggest means to this end — doing away with their own creations.

There are cases where it may be argued that a creature can become so big and threatening that the creator loses control of it. Fortunately that situation has not come into being in South Africa. The apartheid system created the bantustan armies and police forces, and the present rulers can strike them off by the same pen that signed them into existence. The uncontrolled sale of arms to whites and rights to vigilantism were all part and parcel of the apartheid dream of a thousand-year rule, and they must now awaken from that dream by legislating on gun ownership and proclaiming white patrols illegal, such as those in towns controlled by the Conservative Party.

On its part, the ANC has struggled for the national liberation of the oppressed masses, which is the real key for peace in South Africa. We are still on that course.

REPEALING A LAW ALREADY DEFIED INTO INEFFECTIVENESS

Towards the end of 1989, when it became clear that the United Nations General Assembly would welcome, and possibly adopt, the OAU Harare Declaration just as the Non-Aligned Movement had done in September, the Pretoria regime announced that it would scrap discriminatory laws such as the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953.

The world was made to believe that this would be done during the white Parliament's ninth session in February, 1990. It was therefore partly with these expectations that the UN adopted its Declaration on South Africa which gave the regime up to July 1 1990 to set out on the road to the total dismantling of the apartheid system.

In spirit, the UN Declaration on South Africa welcomed the Harare Declaration and reflects almost all its positions. In point (d) of its *Programme of Action* it states that it needs to "ensure that the international community does not relax existing measures aimed at encouraging the South African regime to eradicate apartheid, until there is clear evidence of profound and irreversible changes, bearing in mind the objectives of this declaration."

Thus when De Klerk went to Europe the looming date of July 1 was foremost in his mind. He promised Thatcher, Mitterand, Kohl and the EC in general, that he was going to scrap all discriminatory laws as soon as he came back to South Africa. On June 1 a Bill to repeal the Separate Amenities Act was published. On October 15 it is expected to come into effect and thus officially end racial segregation in public amenities.

As part of the measures that are helping to change the face of our country's racist past, the measure is welcome. But we must ask ourselves why it comes at this time and not in February or earlier. The only reason we can find is that the pressure of the sanctions movement has become so great that it has frightened the regime to begin to move its feet, albeit in a dragging manner. The Separate Amenities Act is the easiest of the laws

for the regime to repeal because, in effect, it has already been defied out of existence by our mass political action, especially in 1989.

Clearly, the Act was singled out because it would give political credit to De Klerk's regime while at the same time letting it off the hook from a situation it has already lost. Reality about the impossibility of holding on to such legislation has long faced it squarely in the face.

In terms of timing, how is the United Nations expected to react over this long overdue announcement? De Klerk expects the UN to extend the time period for his "irreversible" changes to beyond July 1. At that time the regime would remove another law, say, the Group Areas Act which has also begun to lose its overall effect as "grey" areas spring up in many parts of the country. Again the international community would be expected to extend the time period.

But why should the world extend the time period? We cannot deny that there are many powerful voices in the world which are pleading for a respite for the De Klerk regime but that should not force everyone to change their minds about the evil nature of the apartheid system. The same voices that are elevating this regime to a greatest-reformer pedestal that must be treated with kid gloves, are the same voices that were loudest about the need for fundamental change in Eastern Europe. Yet when they have to deal with a regime that has legislation which makes one race superior to the rest, the only one in the world, they caution against rushing it into change lest its feelings be hurt.


What the world is being subjected to is an attempt by the regime to change apartheid at its own pace and direction. For it, the primary objective remains the protection of white minority domination.

For this reason, and the slowness with which obstacles to serious negotiations are being removed, the member states of the United Nations must continue to exert pressure on the racist regime.

THE TIMES MISCOVERS THE ANC

By Dennis A Mumble

Has the attitude of some of the world's pro-apartheid media writers changed with the new situation in South Africa? Through the articles by some journalists of the *New York Times*, the author shows us that in many respects it has not.



Through decades of brutal repression, the South African apartheid regime has developed its own truth that consigns the African National Congress and all other anti-apartheid forces to shadowy basements where terrorists and communists plan devious deeds against the law-abiding and god-fearing white master race.

Historically the South African government utilised Cold War rhetoric, gaining tacit support from the West for its world view, which required cloaking the anti-apartheid movement in red flags. With very few exceptions, its western allies and their media were all too eager to accept the apartheid myth, and actively helped maintain this structure for almost two generations.

But the explosive growth of the South African liberation movement and its powerful world-wide counterpart, elevated the struggle from apart-

heid's basement to the top floor of international popular legitimacy through sanctions and defiance campaigns.

The subsequent exposure of apartheid rocked the regime to its very foundations. The ANC and other organisations were "unbanned" in a futile attempt to temper their militancy.

In a highly paternalistic fashion, the National Party leader, F W de Klerk, has belatedly sought to restore authority by developing a five-year plan to discard the old-style system while retaining its material and political privileges. De Klerk's entire 1989 election platform pivoted on the establishment of this alternative path.

While the reality of a failed system has engulfed the ruling party, this fact has apparently escaped *The New York Times*, which still covers South Africa through the prism of apartheid's

view. Journalistic balance and objectivity assume new meanings in the *Times*' coverage, which considers the apartheid infrastructure (police, army security personnel, journalists, etc) as primary sources for information on the rebellion while minimising exposure to the forces opposing the system.

Anti-apartheid organisations are constantly depicted as eerie and "shadowy" bodies. For example, in *A Hard Road for Mandela*, (April 5, 1990, p. A1), Christopher Wren actually quotes the traditional anti-ANC *Business Day*: "The ANC remains, despite its unbanning, a shadowy organisation of uncertain stature and questionable authority."

Another theme that has been constant in Wren's coverage of the ANC is one of perceived deep divisions among its members, at a time when the ANC's unity is at its highest. He constantly harps on divisions between a generation of "impatient" youths and an older generation of leaders out of touch with the ideals of the youth. Every story he has written about the ANC in the last year touches on this theme. In a recent article, *Mandela Agrees to Talk with De Klerk on Violence in Townships* (April 3, 1990, p. A10), Wren loses all sense of journalistic responsibility: "The South African press speculated today that the (ANC) had pulled out of the talks because it was unprepared and wracked by internal disagreements." No names, no quotes, no rebuttals from the ANC, which said it had cancelled the talks because the police were killing protesters. It should be noted that, editorially, the *Times* was even more scandalous. It said (April 6, 1990, p. A34), "Black politics also was the cause of Mr Mandela's decision (to postpone the talks). He was plainly sensitive to the outcry over police killings of black protesters ..." Not sensitive to the killing of people, but playing politics, sensitive only to the outcry over the killings.

Wren had reiterated his unsubstantiated claims of internal division the day before, in *A Hard Road for Mandela*. In the opening paragraph, he posited that "doubts persist about the readiness of the (ANC) to undertake serious negotiations ... and about Mr Mandela's ability to consolidate the widest black support." His

definitive sources were: "speculation in the press here, as well as among diplomats and politicians." One can easily imagine what press, which diplomats, and which politicians Wren is referring to.

Other *Times* writers also reveal a pattern of vintage kowtowing to and promotion of the National Party propaganda which depicts the ANC as divided and with a soft base of support. John F Burns's April 1, 1990 article (p. 14), *Understanding De Klerk: Party Man with a Twist*, just the latest in a series of flattering profiles on De Klerk, is a deft piece of propaganda. The story is superbly complimentary of De Klerk and his efforts to improve the National Party's image. It is at the same time highly schizophrenic in its characterisation of apartheid, commenting that:

"Mr de Klerk's broad formula acknowledges that he considers apartheid a dead-end street and that majority rule in some form is inevitable. But Mr de Klerk has left no doubt, either, that he will strive to protect what the five million whites here have built up ... including their property rights."

This is an attempt to rationalise the machinations of the regime by posing a two-sentence contradiction. On the one hand it is intended to convey the complexity of emotions within the regime — a subliminal appeal for time to allow it to clarify its position. And on the other, it conveys a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of apartheid, which is, first and foremost, a system for the accumulation of wealth buttressed by the ideology of white supremacy, leading to staggering inequalities of wealth and power. The two are not separable, as the passage would suggest.

Dropping overt white supremacist themes has struck sympathetic chord at the *Times*, which has been meticulously crafting an image of De Klerk as the reluctant administrator caught between two widely divergent poles, with the ANC on the left and the white conservatives on the right. This white-knight theme is taken even further by Burns, who says it is De Klerk's "profound religious commitment to ideals of justice that sets him apart from his predecessors," and juxtaposes his position against that of Nelson Mandela and the anti-apartheid movement:

"While Nelson Mandela and other black leaders have said that Mr de Klerk's vision appears to encompass limitations on black political authority that they could not accept, many South Africans who favour far-reaching political change say they believe that the real hope for the future may lie not in Mr de Klerk's current pronouncements but in his probing, pragmatic cast of mind and instinct for reaching out for new solutions."

The phrasing puts the ANC in the position of extremists asking for too much, too soon; and De Klerk as the religious man of justice, seeking the best practical route. It is lost on the *Times* that the real threat to peace in South Africa is any pragmatism that requires — in whatever form — the continuation of apartheid and its intolerable injustices. The passage also creates a strange division between "Nelson Mandela and other black leaders" on the one hand and "many South Africans who favour ... change" on the other. If these unnamed "many" are from the white minority, that is one thing; but if they are black, the statement is simply untrue.

In *African Congress Faulted on Unrest* (March 9, 1990, p. A3), Wren featured numerous statements by South African government officials blaming the ANC for "orchestrating the rising violence" in South Africa's ethnic communities. A terse denial from the ANC is buried in the story. Indeed, Wren tends to accept government assertions of innocence at face value. In *South Africa Sends Army to Halt Strife* (April 4 1990, p. A10) he says that "much of the violence that has erupted in the last two months has not directly involved government repression, but fighting between rival black factions." He notes that "South African police have denied that officers have taken sides in the conflict" and states that Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, the leader of the anti-ANC Inkatha, had charged that the police were — of all things — siding with the pro-ANC United Democratic Front in the violent clashes in Natal province. Wren never mentions the South African Council of Churches report (*Statement on Ad Hoc Crisis Meeting*, March 29, 1990) describing eyewitness testimony that the police were throwing boxes of ammunition over

the sides of their trucks to Inkatha fighters in Pietermaritzburg. Even in an editorial, the *Times* has called the fighting "a virtual civil war rag(ing) between black factions" (April 6, 1990, p. A34), with no mention of police participation. Yet the *Washington Post's* Allister Sparks was able to meet with independent monitors of the violence and report their observation that "the police have openly colluded with Inkatha" (*Natal's 'Valley of Death' Goes to War*, April 8, 1990, pp. A29, A35).

From this brief review of the *Times's* coverage of the ANC and the anti-apartheid movement generally, it appears quite clear that the paper has very little consideration for those opposing the system. It considers the custodians of apartheid sufficiently acceptable to work closely with them and to promote that new, softer image. This was also evident in its benign treatment of the apartheid election in which the great majority of the population was not permitted to vote.

The liberation of South Africans from apartheid cannot be achieved by the creators of that system. That was made clear in De Klerk's remarks to Parliament on April 17. Wren's article on the speech, with the wildly misleading headline "De Klerk Endorses Sharing of Power", and the subhead "But South African President is Adamant in Opposing Domination by Blacks" (April 18, 1990, p. A5), opens: "President F W de Klerk said today that his government would not agree to majority rule ..." (Other papers have more honest headline writers; the same day's *Washington Post* (p. A1) said: "De Klerk Rejects Majority Rule," with the subhead "Detail Offered on 'Power Sharing'; Plan Seen Unacceptable to Blacks"; the *Philadelphia Inquirer* (p. 2) said: "De Klerk Rejects Rule by Majority.") So much, incidentally, for Burns's statement two weeks earlier that De Klerk acknowledges "majority rule in some form is inevitable."

To suggest, as *The Times* continually does, that De Klerk be highly rewarded for being less repressive than his predecessors is to fail or refuse to grasp the fundamental implications of the continuing absolute economic, political and social domination of the majority by the minority, which is apartheid.

A POLICEMAN SPEAKS OUT

Gregory Rockman is president of the recently-formed Prison Officers and Police Civil Rights Union. He was a lieutenant in the South African Police, but was discharged after he had openly condemned methods used by the police in handling demonstrations in the Cape. He spoke to Sechaba about the way he believes a police force should work.



Gregory Rockman

You told the Press that you originally joined the police force because you wanted to serve your community. Were you young and idealistic then?

Yes, I was young, very idealistic, and I am still in that very same idealistic mood of serving and protecting. It happened to me quite strangely, because I wanted to become a teacher at first, and then one day in 1977, after school, I saw a black policeman — the government in South Africa would term him 'coloured.' He was very neat and tidy, and he walked up to about six gangsters. In our vicinity, Arcadia in Port Elizabeth, gangsterism was the order of the day; everybody feared gangsters, including myself. This policeman went up to those six guys and he spoke to them very politely, and then they left, you know, tails between their legs. I said to myself, "Boy, a policeman, he has got power."

Immediately it went through my mind how the community was trapped in the violence of gangsterism, and that I could play a positive role in protecting them against this criminal and violent element. It just grew inside me, and a few months later I applied to become a cop.

You joined the police force because you thought you could protect and help, and you left it because you found you were blocked. What happened?

I will not say I left. I was kicked out by the government, which does not agree with the ideals I have about how the police should behave and police the community. My attitude has not changed.

How did you become disillusioned?

Over the years, some of my subordinates were called up for special duties, and they would come back and tell me the bad things that went on and how people were shot and so on. The time I saw it, it was just enough for me.

That was when I decided that I should speak out. I said to myself, "If you say you are a Christian, Greg, then you need to speak out against injustice." And I had nightmares about what I had seen from August 1st up until November 5th last year, and then on the 6th I decided this is where I would draw the line, and I would speak out against the atrocities of government.

What did you see that gave you nightmares?

On the night of the 5th I could not sleep. The

whole scene was playing in front of me, when the police actually moved in upon peaceful students demonstrating there, and how they were beating them up, and people running and rushing to get out of the way of the police, and the police eager to beat up those people.

There was a young lady, and there were four hefty policemen around her. They were enjoying hitting her with those sjamboks that they have, and she was jumping up and down, up and down, and then eventually she started running. They followed her, and one, out of eagerness, even fell over his own feet, but he got up and chased after her. She disappeared there amongst the people, and they after her, and I could not see what happened further. That is how eager they were to beat up people.

I could not believe that my own white colleagues actually came and overrode my decision, and they could not care whether they hurt me through that, or what. Then I decided that they do not have pure motives in policing.

I decided that with everything I have I would speak out against the brutality and racism in the police. You are forbidden by law to do this.

What law?

They have got police regulations that say you cannot speak out against the Department, or give people your political perceptions about anything. They can charge you for it.

And this made such an impression on you that you could not sleep?

Yes, because I never did that to people. I had so many policemen under my command, and it was never necessary for me to command them to fire on people or to beat them up. So why should another policeman come and do it?

What I would have done — I would leave my men on one side, and I would move up to about 20 metres away from the crowd. They would throw stones at me, but eventually they would see that I was serious in dialogueing with them, and they would stop throwing stones at me, and we would dialogue. I would listen to them. I

understand their political perceptions; I understand that they are oppressed people in South Africa. People who are deprived of certain rights will always try to stand up and to achieve those rights.

I think most policemen need to have a better education, better training, a change in attitude. But it must come from the top; it must come from the government side; government must change, and then the policemen will change too.

What is the status of the police in the black community? Is it changing?

It is still the same if you are black in South Africa. People reject you. They do not want to socialise with policemen; they do not want to be seen with policemen. My own family — at first my mother and father were quite mad at me, but they accepted it afterwards.

They did not like your joining the force?

No, they did not like it at all. I had to beg them, because they had to sign my papers, as I was under 21. Within the black communities, people are not eager to socialise with policemen, but all the difference came when I started to speak out, and POPCRU was formed. Then there was a real attitude change, not towards black policemen but towards POPCRU's policemen. There may be more potential POPCRU members, too, and we should win black policemen over to the side of the oppressed people.

What about morale in the SAP?

In the SAP in general, morale is very very low. I would even say it's lower among blacks than among whites.

Whites are not happy with what is happening now in the country. Some of them are not happy with their working conditions, others are not happy with the political changes.

I think for most of them, their great concern is that their white paradise world is crumbling, the land of milk and honey for whites is going

to be shared now amongst all people, and that is not a nice sign for them. "Baasskap" is dying out in South Africa. They must be concerned; if I was a white person and saw my days of milk and honey going by, I would also be disappointed. If I was repressing other people, I would feel threatened, and if I had bad ideals like the Conservative Party, AWB, and Nationalist Party ideals, then I would definitely feel threatened.

What about morale in the black sections of the SAP?

The morale there is very low too. Because of the racism in the department, most of them are deprived of development. They want to join POPCRU, but they are scared of what will happen to them; they first want to see what is happening to us. Some right-wingers in Port Elizabeth stated in the newspaper that there is no morale in the police in the Eastern Cape. Look at this recent case where those guys actually stole firearms from the Air Force headquarters in Pretoria. Police tried to help them escape from prison, and no white policemen want to investigate the case. In the whole police force, there is no morale.

Why are they going about beating up people? It is because they don't have morale. Vlok is crying out, "We are going to clamp down on demonstrators and activists." Why? He himself does not have any morale. He's got no hope for his force.

You were talking about racial discrimination in the force, about being deprived of development.

If you are a black man you have to prove yourself ten times better than white people. If you are black and you are outspoken, you must forget about being promoted. If you do not side with the apartheid regime, you can forget about promotion.

Take myself. Because of outspokenness I stayed as a lieutenant. Junior guys were promoted above me, to prove to me that if you are outspoken you will never be promoted. The guys

who were crawling, and collaborating with the apartheid regime, they were promoted for their collaboration. I say, good luck to them, bad luck to me, because justice must prevail.

What about racial attitudes in the police force? You once used the term, "boere attitude."

I have mentioned that word so many times, and I still say that most of them come with their *boere* attitude. They come with that racist, white-dominant type of role, and they want to play it over you, as another human being. I cannot stick that kind of thing.

Take the incident on September 5, when I was in charge of the situation. This white policeman just came and overrode my decision. Then they phoned this general, and he called me in. When I got there, he started yelling at me, "Why did you mess in Brazell's work?" I stopped him in his tracks and said, "No, wait, you are not going to try this with me." I said to him that I had been the man in charge there, I was first on the scene and took charge, and they came and overrode my decision without consulting me.

Now that is a *boere* attitude. If a white man complains and you are black, you have got no chance. There are plenty of them in the police force. Round every corner you find them.

What about the aims of POPCRU, and its growth?

The aims of POPCRU are quite clear. We want to serve and protect; we want to play the role of true policemen, the community police type of policemen, not a police force that has to enforce politics upon people.

We fight for recognition of basic human rights for our members: benefits and facilities.

We uphold and fight for the basic human rights of all the people that we come in contact with, that is, the police and the whole of South Africa; all its inhabitants that we come in contact with, the prison population. The police should not infringe on human rights, because they are the upholders of law, and the ones who can best protect the human rights of people.

INTERVIEW WITH RANDOLPH FORTUIN

A PRISON WARDER SPEAKS OUT

Randolph Fortuin is a warder at Pollsmoor Prison in the Cape, and a national executive member of the Prison Officers and Police Civil Rights Union (POPCRU). He spoke to Sechaba about the POPCRU campaign for equal rights for black prison officers in South Africa, and better conditions for prisoners in the gaols.

Will you describe the situation in the prisons that led to the strike action POPCRU took a few weeks ago? What was the protest about?

A lot of different things led to the sit-in. There was the incarceration of kids from the age of eight years — we do not want that. We also feel that conditions for prisoners in general should be better. For example, there are communal cells where 40 and even 50 people are being kept. We say it is not good for them; we say they have got no privacy within the prison. And another thing — there are white prisons and black prisons, so if you are a white criminal you will not be put in a gaol where there are black criminals. The government must think white crime is different from black crime.

Then there is the discrimination within the Department of Prisons, the fact that we as blacks could not get promotion as easily as our white colleagues, even though we have the potential to go up the ladder. We are always working under white command; a black officer will never be in charge with a white man under him. We say we do not want that. If we have got the potential, let us do the job.

Whites occupy the offices. After we went and complained about it, a few, only a few, of our black members were put in offices. Where there are seven whites in an office, they will put one black in that office also, just to show us there is no colour discrimination. POPCRU says no to this.

There is also the housing problem, the housing shortage at Pollsmoor. Our white colleagues stay in cottages that are like palaces compared

with the buildings that we are staying in. To give you an example: I am staying in a government house provided by the Department. It used to be an old prison, and has been renovated. Nineteen families live there. Our homes consist of three rooms: one bedroom, one lounge and one kitchen. The bathroom is on the verandah. Our wives and families stay there with us, and there are POPCRU members who have got kids in high school. They have all got to share that one bedroom. We say it is not good for children to sleep in their parents' bedroom. And where must those kids study?

Then there are the facilities they have got at Pollsmoor — rugby fields, tennis courts, a crèche — but they are not open to us. We cannot use those facilities, but white people from the public, they can come in and enjoy them. We say no to that: the Department must open those facilities. We want to use them too.

These are the things we could not take any longer, and that is why we formed the union.

We went to our officers, the people in command. We tried to talk to them, we wrote them letters, we used their channels, but nothing was done about our problems. They would not listen to us; they would not talk to us. We decided that if they were not prepared to talk to us, then we had to do something drastic. We could not take it any longer. That is why we embarked on the sit-in.

You mentioned children being incarcerated. Are there little kids imprisoned in Pollsmoor?

Yes, even in the maximum security prison at

Pollsmoor, kids from the age of eight years. They are kept behind bars and doors, like the hardened criminals. They cry — we force them to go in, crying. To me, it is heartbreaking to put kids in a cell. Your heart goes out to them. You can start crying yourself. There was one small one of eight years — we used to take him out, carry him on our shoulders.

Some are there for a week, others for a month — it can be up to a year, because when they go to court they can be remanded. There is no place for them to go and play. They have an hour a day exercise outside this cell — if we can, we give them half an hour in the morning and half

an hour in the afternoon. For the rest of the time, if they want to play, they have got to play within that cell. And the cells are overcrowded. Kids of eight to ten years are put in the same cell, and the older ones beat up the younger ones.

They are in contact with hardened criminals, not in the same cell, but in the cell opposite, and when they go to court they are transported in the same vehicle. We say we do not want that.

Only black children are being kept in these prisons. They come from our society. We say we reject that. We do not want them there.



Members of the Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union at a recent meeting during their strike

NATIONAL UNION OF MINeworkERS CAMPAIGN FOR RACIAL EQUALITY

By Jean Middleton

Since mining first began in South Africa, the mining companies have used race discrimination to divide the workers and to create a cheap labour force of the black workers. Now that it is campaigning against practices of race discrimination, the National Union of Mineworkers is confronting the mining companies and the basis of the apartheid state.

Last year, all over South Africa, people were challenging the injustices of apartheid. The protest had a profound effect on events in the country. Black mineworkers added their organised force to this massive expression of militancy, and their actions were among the most famous of the Defiance Campaign.

These actions included washing in changing rooms reserved for whites, organising demonstrations in segregated canteens, boycotting kitchens because of the quality of the food and protesting over access to shaft lifts. Unarmed, defying mine security forces, the police, and racist whites they knew were probably carrying guns, the mineworkers showed a courage that places them among the heroes of our struggle.

Before the campaign began, the employers tried to neutralise it. The Chamber of Mines suggested a "working party" to investigate discriminatory practices. The director of industrial relations at Anglo-American stated that the segregation remaining on Anglo mines was based on rank and not race — Anglo has not abolished discriminatory practices, but nevertheless is anxious to present itself as a progressive and enlightened employer. Management at Vaal Reefs, an Anglo mine, urged employees not to take any actions that would "lead to the polarisation of racial attitudes," by which it meant any action in protest against racial discrimination.

The mineworkers were not deceived by this soft talk. They went ahead, and though the protest actions were not, for the most part, organised through union structures, they had unqualified union support. Cyril Ramaphosa, General

Secretary of the NUM, called the suggestion for a "working party" a "delaying, evasive tactic," and said that violence and polarisation on the mines were caused by the system of labour control, which separates black miners from both white miners and white management. He said:

"NUM has to oppose those structures which insult and degrade its members; which depress and destroy their economic position, create reservoirs of cheap labour and hamper the process of unity."

During the campaign, management often intervened in support of the *status quo*. President Steyn No 4 Mine in Welkom banned all meetings to discuss the Defiance Campaign or any other political issue, and Impala Platinum, a Gencor company, locked whites-only toilets, and gave keys to the white workers. When NUM members down No 2 shaft at Vaal Reefs refused to accept white priority in the use of the shaft lifts, and insisted on one queue, Anglo called in the police. Eleven workers were charged with intimidation, and were later dismissed at an internal disciplinary hearing so hastily arranged that shaft stewards complained there had been not enough time to prepare a defence. The NUM accused Anglo of racism.

White workers intervened too. They felt their position seriously threatened. Their racist unions, continually watchful over the racial privileges they enjoy, have openly opposed any forms of racial equality, such as the granting of blasting certificates to black mineworkers, the sharing of amenities with blacks, and even a Chamber of

Mines proposal, made in 1989, to integrate mine hospitals said to be "under-utilised."

The murder of Jeffrey Njuza, shaft steward at Rustenburg Platinum Refinery, was one example of white worker response to the black workers' campaign. After his death, Njuza was described by the NUM as having been "a courageous participant in the Defiance Campaign." Since defiance activities at the plant had first begun, he had been engaged in them, and he had earlier been charged with using a chair reserved for whites in the refinery canteen.

At ten o'clock at night on Saturday, September 2, a white supervisor, Ockert Vermeulen, pulled a revolver and shot Jeffrey Njuza dead at point blank range. A few minutes later, he turned the gun on himself. The NUM said Vermeulen had murdered Njuza "because he could no longer tolerate workers' defiance ... of facilities reserved for whites." Johannesburg Consolidated Investment, which owns the refinery, told the press that no reason had been established for the suicide.

Four days later, the whites of South Africa went to the polls. At the end of the day, it appeared that Rustenburg had returned a Conservative Party member to Parliament. On that day, knowing the danger to themselves, a group of black mineworkers entered the grounds of a white high school in a white suburb and began playing football. Police arrived with dogs and sjamboks; the workers were assaulted, forced into vans and taken to the police station. Some took refuge in the local NUM offices, and the police then arrested everyone they found there, including some who had not been on the football field at all.

The murder of Njuza brought to public attention the fact that, while black workers on the mine are searched before they go on shift, white workers are not, and some, at least, go down bearing firearms. In March this year, the Welkom branch of the white Mine Workers' Union called on its members not to arm themselves before going underground, but at the same time Eugene TerreBlanche of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging was calling on the white miners of Welkom to arm themselves, so this dangerous question is not yet resolved.

When the Central Committee of the NUM met in April 1990, it reviewed the situation and decided that defiance on the mines should continue. It called on the mine employers to abolish discrimination. It identified no less than 59 areas of discrimination, and commissioned the National Executive Committee of the union to do further research into the matter.

The search when they go on shift is only one of the many indignities black mineworkers are subjected to and white mineworkers are exempt from. There are also the toilets underground — white workers have cubicles, but black workers complain that their toilets are primitive, that they provide no privacy and that there are not enough of them. There are the exhausting and apparently pointless "heat tests" which black recruits and black mineworkers returning from leave are forced to undergo, stripped naked, for up to four hours at a time, for five days.

The discrimination in hoisting procedures is a serious grievance. When NUM members at Vaal Reefs demanded one queue for the lifts, they were opposing a system in which certain lifts, or sometimes certain decks on the lifts, are reserved for whites. This means a delay of three or four hours for black miners before they reach the surface, and it means that black miners must start queueing at least two hours earlier than whites before the morning shift. This is why the NUM has sought wage compensation for time spent travelling to the workplace.

Worse, the rules over reserved space in the lifts remain in force at the time of an accident, so there is a delay before black workers can get away from danger. At the time of the Kinross disaster in 1987, when flames and poisonous fumes filled the tunnels, the white mineworkers who rushed the lifts, leaving black workers to die, were following procedures laid down by the employers.

Medical services are another area of inequality. The NUM has called mine medical stations "accident-orientated," asserting that they do not provide adequate treatment for illness and disease. Shortcomings in mine medical services mean serious deprivation for black mineworkers, who have no alternative sources of medical attention. White miners belong to private medical

schemes outside the mines, and so are not dependent on the mines for the care of their health.

Black miners' dissatisfaction over the food served up to them is bound up with their dissatisfaction over their living conditions and the hostel system. Black workers may not visit friends in other hostels, nor may they receive visitors — and the facilities provided for 'conjugal visits' is so limited as to make very little difference to the workers' lives. White workers can eat at home, but black workers have little alternative to mine food, for they are generally not permitted to bring in food they have bought outside, and in any case the mine food is regarded by management as part of their wages. Black miners complain that they are not allowed to eat down the mine, but white workers bring lunch boxes from home.

Wages paid to white and black mineworkers are the most stark example of discrimination. In May 1989, according to the NUM, the basic monthly wage for black workers was R360, and R1 000 for the lowest-paid white.

In the coal industry, the low wages paid to the vast majority of South African mineworkers have effects that go far beyond the borders of the country. These wages make it possible for the mine owners to sell their coal at a lower price and still make a profit, and South African coal is the cheapest in the world. In Britain, the local council of North-East Derbyshire, concerned at retrenchments in its area, placed the following advertisement in the June 1990 issue of *Anti-Apartheid News*, the paper of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement:

"Black miners in South Africa are paid only one-sixth of the wage of white miners and British miners, leading to cheap South African coal.

The South African coal price is the marker price on the international coal market. Coal from other countries has to meet this low level to be competitive.

The need to keep the price of British coal down has driven pit incomes down. This is the motor behind the British pit closure programme.

Six out of ten pits in North-East Derbyshire

District Council's surrounding area have been closed in the last ten years.

Congratulations to Anti-Apartheid on its 31st birthday. Continue the struggle!"

Wage negotiations between the NUM and the Chamber of Mines have been protracted and beset with problems.

For one thing, South African mineworkers face retrenchment, too, as the employers close less profitable mines. 17 000 jobs were lost in 1988 and the first half of 1989, and more losses were threatened as the Chamber of Mines announced the possibility of more closures. The NUM said the announcement was an attempt "to pressure workers to accept starvation wages in the face of annual wage negotiations."

The price of gold is falling, and that of coal is rising. It was on these grounds that the Chamber was pushing in 1989 for separate wage negotiations for gold and coal mines — an attempt to divide the workers and also to make black workers subsidise flagging profits. The Chamber offered 11% increase, which the NUM said was not enough. In any case, the NUM wanted an increase in money and not percentage terms, for, as trade unionists know, percentage increases strengthen inequalities that already exist, widening a gulf that will widen still further with the next percentage increase. The difference between white and black wages will be even greater since the white miners' 13.5% increase that took effect in May.

The discrepancy between white and black wages is based on the nature of the jobs white and black workers do. The battle the NUM is fighting is for unskilled workers, for white mineworkers still have a virtual monopoly of skills. In August 1989, after a Supreme Court judgment had nullified potentially discriminatory legislation in mining, the NUM commented that, after years of educational discrimination, black miners would still find it difficult to get the more skilled jobs. The NUM is trying to address this problem now by instituting training schemes in conjunction with mineworkers' unions in Australia, Canada, the German Federal Republic, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe.

When the NUM enters into battle with the Chamber of Mines, it knows well that it confronts no ordinary employer. The South African mining industry is a many-headed monster, which, defeated in one place, can rise somewhere else. Anglo and De Beers have both been preparing to pull out of South Africa entirely should the going get rough, and in March 1990 De Beers felt strong enough to cancel its agreement with the NUM. The threatened closures have been accompanied by the possibility of new mines in the Transvaal and the Eastern Cape, near or within the bantustans. Some mining houses — notably Anglo — have diversified into other industries. All have grown in size and strength through their drive for profits. The demand for equality threatens these profits.

The NUM is a giant, and its great campaigns have had a significant impact on the policies both of the mine bosses and of the regime, but there are social and economic factors that, alone, the NUM cannot control. Apartheid, and specifically apartheid education, holds black workers back from acquiring skills. The economy of the apartheid state creates undeveloped rural areas in South Africa and neighbouring states, and pools of unemployed and desperate people, flowing into the system of migrant labour and single-sex hostels.

Interviewed in the June 1989 issue of *Labour Bulletin*, the President of the NUM, James Motlatsi, spoke about this in relation to the strike of 1987:

"The strike ... became political ... in the sense that it involved sovereign neighbouring states which oppose apartheid. We should have made political consultations with these states. Within the country it should have involved the entire mass democratic movement, so that it could mobilise people in the rural areas where scabs could come from.

What we underestimated, to be quite honest, was the presence of the Chamber in the neighbouring states ... in the rural areas. That kind of action required us to man each and every institution of the enemy.

It suits the bosses to have many experienced mineworkers without work in the rural

areas and neighbouring states. Then, whenever there is a strike they can dismiss workers and find scabs who have experience of the mining industry."

Retrenchments in the mining industry are even now adding more experienced mineworkers to the pool of unemployed.

There can be no justice, no decent life, for South African mineworkers except under a people's government that keeps control over the mining industry. The trade union struggle cannot be seen in isolation from the political struggle.

The strategy of the NUM is based on its understanding of all these factors. It sees itself as part of the struggle for liberation. Its support for sanctions is uncompromising. In April 1990, it stated its support for the ANC policy of talking with the Pretoria regime. At its Central Committee meeting in April, it made Nelson Mandela its honorary president for life, greeting him with a banner that bore the words: "NUM welcomes our beloved honorary president and commander, Nelson Mandela."



In April, 1990, in an article in *The Sowetan*, Cyril Ramaphosa wrote:

"If ever there is any cardinal clause in the Freedom Charter that appeals to us most, it is: The people shall share in the country's wealth.

With the adoption of the Freedom Charter by our congress in 1987, we consciously took a political step towards our freedom from national oppression and exploitation.

The ANC, in alliance with the SACP, as the leader of the liberation struggle enjoys our unqualified support."

WHITE SOUTH AFRICANS IN A NON-RACIAL DEMOCRACY

By Albie Sachs

This is the second instalment of Albie Sachs's draft paper intended to provoke thoughts about aspects of a future constitution and what should be done now to prepare the way for change in South Africa. The first instalment appeared in the May issue of *Sechaba*. Certain sections have been condensed owing to lack of space. It is titled, *White South Africans in a Non-Racial Democracy*, and under this topic deals with the question of identity, the question of property and the conclusion — Freedom for all. The last part is titled, *The Last Word — Freedom*.

The virtues of non-racial democracy would seem to be self-evident in South Africa, and yet experience shows that they have to be spelt out. The basic scheme is a simple one. It represents the application in South Africa of universally held views and corresponds to the vision long projected in the Freedom Charter.

In essence, it presupposes a constitutional structure based on the following inter-related principles:

1. Equal rights for all South African citizens, irrespective of race, colour, gender or creed;
2. A government accountable at all levels to the people through periodic and free elections based on the principles of universal suffrage on a common voters' roll;
3. Political pluralism, a multi-party state and freedom of speech and assembly;
4. A mixed economy;
5. Protection of fundamental rights and freedoms through a justiciable Bill of Rights;
6. A separation of powers including an independent and non-racial judiciary entrusted with the task of upholding the rule of law and the principles of the constitution.

In the light of the pro-democracy upsurge in many parts of the world, such positions should be regarded as axiomatic and unassailable. Yet, against the background of what can only be described as racist assumptions, all manner of excuses are offered for departure from these principles in the case of South Africa.

For the purposes of analysis, it will be accepted that the prospect of majority rule, even if subject to a justiciable Bill of Rights, is alarming to the great majority of those who choose to classify themselves as whites in South Africa today. The argument will be that the best way to allay these fears is to ensure that democracy and its institutions are firmly planted in South Africa; the worst way is to undermine democracy from the start and subvert it with a complicated and unworkable set of institutions based on notions designed to keep racially-defined groups locked in endless battle.

From a purely moral point of view, it is not easy to accept that the fears of the white minority in South Africa should merit special attention. It is they who made the bed in which they are now so unwilling to lie. If they are cut off from their fellow South Africans, it is because this was their choice. If they feel exposed because of their conspicuously high standard of living in the midst of much poverty, homelessness and hunger, this was the gap they passed laws to maintain. If they are concerned at the tendency to solve political question by force, they should recall that it was they who seized the country by forceful invasion, ruled it by force and then outlawed peaceful protest and opposition.

Nevertheless, if we are to build a new nation on the ruins of apartheid, we have to address ourselves seriously to all the preoccupations of all the people, whatever their past roles might have been. The abstract defence of democracy

is easy; its concrete application is difficult, especially in a country where it has been much talked about and little practised.

When racists and democrats meet it is difficult for the racists not to be authoritarian and for the democrats not to be patronising. Bearing that in mind, three areas will be selected out for discussion on the basis that they are the most sensitive, controversial and difficult. They are:

- ★ loss of identity,
- ★ collapse of the economy,
- ★ loss of freedom.

Political rights and cultural rights

We are struggling in South Africa for the right to be the same. We are also fighting for the right to be different. No question has caused so much confusion as this one, perhaps because in the past the issues have been deliberately obscured.

The struggle for the right to be the same expresses itself as a battle for equal citizenship rights, as a struggle against being treated differently because one is black or brown or white or Christian or Moslem or Jewish or Hindu or female or male or Tswana-speaking or Afrikaans-speaking. We are all South Africans, human beings living in and owing loyalty to the same land. The country belongs equally to all of us, and we belong equally to the country. There should be no differentiation whatsoever of citizenship or nationality between us. Nobody is worth more or less than anybody else because of his or her appearance, or origin, or language, or gender, or beliefs.

This is the principle of equal rights for each and every individual. In affirmative terms, it gives each South African the right to vote, to be educated, to travel and to take part in the life of the nation. Expressed negatively, it is the right not to be discriminated against. No individual may be treated advantageously or disadvantageously because she or he belongs to a certain racial, linguistic or religious group, or is of a certain gender. The protection applies not only to individuals but to groups; they shall neither be discriminated against nor shall they receive

the benefits of discrimination against others.

The constitution must expressly and unequivocally guarantee the fundamental equality of all citizens, and establish appropriate mechanisms to make this guarantee a reality. The law must ensure that in all spheres of public life — education, health, work, entertainment and access to facilities no-one is discriminated against because of colour, language, gender or belief.

Equality, or the sameness of political rights, does not mean homogeneity or cultural blandness. As feminists and others have pointed out, to be equal in a hegemonic culture means to take on the culture of your oppressors. Non-racial democracy presupposes just the opposite. Political equality becomes the foundation for cultural diversity. Once the problem of basic political rights is solved, cultural questions can be treated on their merits. Liberated from the blockages and perversions imposed by their association with domination and subordination, the different cultural streams in South Africa can flow cleanly and energetically together, watering the land for the benefit of all.

Language is a good example of an area where the principles of equality and diversity need to go together. No citizen should be entitled to more or subjected to less favourable treatment because of the language that he or she speaks; no language should be regarded as inferior or superior to any other language; there should be a policy of encouraging the development of South Africa's many languages.

It will not be necessary for the constitution to attend directly to all the myriad problems associated with a democratic language policy. There will be questions relating to language use in Parliament, the courts and the public service, in the police force and army and at the level of local government. There will be the matter of medium of instruction at schools and universities, of the language of broadcasting, books, films and newspapers, of place names and street signs.

The new South African constitution will accordingly favour diversity and an open society. It will recognise that the emerging South African nation will be made up of many different groupings with a multiplicity of languages and historical experiences. Cultural diversity and

political pluralism are both desirable constitutional objectives. Each is important in itself, and each complements the other. What should be avoided at all costs, however, is the merging or conflation of the two. Basing political rights on cultural formation is to guarantee that the voting public will fragment themselves into warring racial and ethnic blocs. It is also to ensure that true cultural expression is subordinated to shallow and opportunistic posturing of a chauvinistic kind.

The public domain and private rights

There is another dimension to the question of the right to be the same versus the right to be different, and that is in relation to where the public domain ends and the private sphere begins. In constitutional language, this means determining the point of intersection between the fundamental right to equal protection and the fundamental right to personal privacy.

We cannot imagine a constitution which sought to prescribe whom people should marry or not marry, or whom they should have as their friends or dinner guests or companions. Nor should it permit any state official to dictate such matters. These are questions that belong exclusively to the individuals concerned, and the constitution will guarantee to him or her such rights of privacy. At the same time, a democratic constitution could not acknowledge a right to bar people from hotels or restaurants or taxis or sports facilities because of the personal prejudices of the managers. In the former case the right to privacy would take precedence; in the latter the right to equal protection would prevail. What would be disastrous in South Africa would be to convert the right to privacy into an instrument for permitting organised discrimination.

La difference — the gender question

The question of the constitutional rights of women and men is a complicated one that requires extensive and special treatment. Suffice it to say at this point that the issue of the right

to be the same and the right to be different would appear to be fundamental in any analysis. In terms of general political and civil rights men and women have the right to be treated in the same gender-free way. The equal rights clause in a new South African constitution should be unambiguous in outlawing any discrimination or exclusion based on gender.

The new ideologues

What is at issue in South Africa today is not whether to have a market economy or a centrally planned one, capitalism or socialism. The basic problem is what to do about the fact that as a result of apartheid the whites today own 87 per cent of the land and 95 per cent of the country's productive capital; that as a consequence of generations of legally segregated schools and hospitals, health and education services for whites are vastly superior to those of blacks; that in a country where tens of thousands of whites have private swimming pools, millions of blacks do not even have piped water.

Once the principle of a mixed economy is accepted, as it has been by all the major components of the broad democratic movement, the constitutional issue falls away. What remains is the question of what to do about apartheid-induced inequality. Economic clauses, apparently designed merely to guarantee the continuation of a system of free enterprise, in fact have the effect of preserving a system of grossly unjust division of access to economic goods, that is, much enterprise and little freedom.

At a constitutional level, then, the real issue is the competence of Parliament to deal with the totally skewed property relationships produced in South Africa by centuries of colonial dispossession and apartheid law.

It is suggested, then, that the constitution should neither require nor foreclose specific economic policies. It is not necessary or even desirable for the constitution to be committed to any particular economic programme or philosophy. What the constitution should do, and this is the task of constitutions, is guarantee as much general fairness as possible, whatever

economic policies are followed.

Guarantees could then comfortably be given that personal property, which has so much meaning in the day-to-day lives of the people, would be immune to any form of expropriation other than that normally authorised by law.

What about the workers?

It is not necessary to speculate about what workers' rights should be in a democratic South Africa — the workers themselves are speaking, and a clear set of principles is beginning to emerge. South Africa has a long and complicated history of workers' struggles, the last decade having been particularly rich in experience. The demand has now gone up for the elaboration of a Charter of Workers' Rights which would consolidate the advances made by the workers especially in this recent period, and set out their perspectives for the future.

The possibility therefore exists of a hierarchy of legal provisions relating to workers' rights in a democratic South Africa. The foundation would be the constitution, which would guarantee the right to form trade unions, the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike.

As citizens, the workers would be able to campaign for socialism and support existing organisations dedicated to socialism, or form new ones, if that were their wish. The Charter could re-state this right, or it could be left to the general clauses of the Bill of Rights, which, would, of course, permit workers or anyone else to campaign against socialism.

Finally, there could be specific statutes and regulations dealing with the concrete aspects of implementing the Charter. These could all be collected together in the form of a Code of Labour Law.

Affirmative action

In a sense we already have affirmative action in South Africa, but it is affirmative action in favour of the whites. The state today spends about five times as much on the education of each white

child as it does on each black child, and the disproportion in the sphere of health services is the same. The Land Bank advances billions of rands to white farmers in terms of loans that are not called in, while the amount available to black farmers is paltry. Figures have been produced to show that the inhabitants of Soweto are in fact subsidising municipal services for the luxurious white suburbs of Johannesburg.

Thus before we even arrive at affirmative action for the dispossessed, there is a lot of equalising out that can be done (in a sensible and orderly way, of course) simply by removing such subsidies in favour of the privileged.

In essence, affirmative action in the normal understanding of the term is a strategy which sets out a series of special efforts or interventions to overcome or reduce inequalities which have accumulated as a result of past discrimination. It acknowledges that the ordinary processes of law or of the market or of philanthropy or benevolence are insufficient to break the cycle of discrimination, which replicates itself from generation to generation. Sometimes it is called positive discrimination, sometimes corrective or remedial action. The most widely employed phrase, however, is affirmative action.

Considerable attention will have to be paid to the question of harmonising affirmative action with non-racial democracy. Non-racism presupposes a colour-blind constitution; affirmative action requires a conscious look at the realities of the gaps between the life chances of blacks and whites. The right to be the same takes on an additional meaning — it is the right to have the same opportunities, and if these are blocked because of the heritage of past discrimination, then it includes the right to special intervention to remove the disadvantages.

In fact it is difficult to see how a truly non-racial society can be built in South Africa without at least one generation of accelerated progress being achieved under the principles of affirmative action. The promulgation of a non-racial constitution will clearly be vital, both at the symbolic level and in terms of guaranteeing equal political rights. Yet a non-racial society cannot be declared. It has to be built up, over the years, so that all vestiges of inequality on the basis of

race etc. are removed.

Freedom for all

The one theme that unites all the above discussion is that the guarantees referred to are really not guarantees to the whites at all, but guarantees to the whole population. This really is the guarantee of guarantees. What is being suggested is not a set of privileges for one section of the community to be defended by special constitutional mechanisms, and ultimately by force of arms or by outside intervention. Rather it is a constitutional arrangement created by South Africans for South Africans in a common determination to move away from the hatreds, divisions and injustices of the past. A justiciable bill of rights becomes central to the defence of liberty for all.

It is in the interest of everybody to feel free and at home throughout the length and breadth of the country. It benefits everybody to have the vote and the right of free speech and assembly and the possibility of throwing out a government that no longer commands respect. It is to the advantage of all to be able to worship freely, speak one's language and express oneself in the way one feels most comfortable. Everyone gains if the process of bringing about true equality is an orderly and peaceful one. The rule of law helps everybody.

This is really the guarantee of guarantees for the whites, as for everyone else, namely that their deepest interests coincide with the deepest interests of their fellow citizens. What all South Africans should be trying to do is to strengthen the institutions of non-racial democracy, so that they become deeply implanted in the country and part of its general culture. Only in this way can the conviction grow in the whole population that the constitution is their shield, since it enshrines the principle at the heart of all democratic constitutions namely that an injury to one is an injury to all.

The last word — Freedom

We give the last word to freedom, yet we do not know what it is.

This is the central irony of the deep and passionate struggle in South Africa — that it is for something that exists only in relation to what it seeks to eliminate.

We know what oppression is. We experience it, define it, we know its elements, take steps against it. All we can say about freedom is that it is the absence of oppression. We define freedom in terms of the measures we need to take to keep its enemy, tyranny, at bay.

Tyranny in South Africa means apartheid. That is the form that oppression takes. It is also the negative indicator of freedom; freedom is what apartheid is not.

When the call went up in the 1950s: "**Freedom in our lifetime**" it signified the end of something very specific, colonial domination in Africa and apartheid tyranny in South Africa. The Freedom Charter adopted in 1955 was conceived of as the reverse of apartheid. A product of struggle rather than of contemplation, it sought in each and every one of its articles to controvert the reality of the oppression the people were undergoing. Its ten sections were based on the demands that a suffering people sent in, not on any ideal scheme created by legal philosophers of what a free South Africa should look like.

Any new constitution in South Africa must be first and foremost an anti-apartheid constitution. The great majority of the people will measure their newly-won freedom in terms of the extent to which they feel the arbitrary and cruel laws and practices of apartheid have been removed. Freedom is not some state of exaltation, a condition of instinctive anarchy and joy, it is not sudden and permanent happiness (in fact, some of the freest countries have the most melancholic and stressed people).

Freedom means being able to do what formerly was unjustly forbidden. If the majority of the people can vote where they could not vote before, this will be freedom. If they can move as they wish, live where they want, feel at home everywhere in the country, this will be freedom. If they can speak openly and say what they believe, support the organisations they agree with, criticise those in authority, this will be freedom. If they can feel comfortable within themselves, have a declared pride in who they

are and a sense that they are recognised by the world they live in, then they will be free.

Freedom is indivisible and universal, but it also has its specific moments and particular modes. In South Africa the mode of freedom is anti-racist, and anti all the mechanisms and institutions that kept the system of racism and national oppression in place.

Yet if anti-apartheid is the foundation of and essential pre-condition for freedom in South Africa, it is not of itself and on its own a guarantee of freedom.

The very thing that brings joy to the oppressed majority, namely, the end of the system they have always known, is exactly what induces apprehension in the oppressors. Those who traditionally have supported apartheid, and who today might concede, happily or reluctantly, that apartheid is wrong and doomed, are alarmed at what might happen to them when the structures they have lived by are destroyed.

The constitution has to be for all South Africans, former oppressors and oppressed alike. It expresses the sovereignty of the whole nation, not just a part, not even just of the vast majority. If it is to be binding on all, it should speak on behalf of all and give its protection to all. In the past, rights for the one has meant tyranny for the other. Does that imply that the freedom of the oppressed can only be achieved by means of a new form of domination, this time of the majority over the minority, of black over white? Will freedom be guaranteed for all, or only for most South Africans? Or will the principle be followed that the constitution does not see majorities and minorities, as apartheid has always done, but only citizens, each as important as the next?

To be effective, the constitution must be rooted in South African history and tradition. It must draw on the traditions of freedom in all communities, not just those who at this historical juncture are in the forefront of the freedom struggle.

There is in fact not a section of the population, whatever its position today, that has not at some time in its history fought for freedom. Many of the foreparents of the whites who live in the country today were refugees from persecu-

tion — the Huguenots who fled from massacre because of their faith in France, the Jews who escaped from pogroms and then from Nazi terror. Thousands of English-speaking whites presently occupying important positions in the professions and public life, volunteered for military service against Nazism and fascism in Europe and later marched in the Torch Commandos against the extension of racist rule in South Africa.

South Africa has had an unusually large number of bishops who have been willing to go against the tide, usually stronger in their own churches than outside, as well as of writers and journalists and lawyers and academics and medical people, (even at least one freedom-fighting dentist and two road engineers).

There is not an Afrikaans-speaking white family that was not touched by the struggles over the right to speak Afrikaans and have an Afrikaner identity; Boer heroism against the might of the British Empire became legendary throughout the world, and is part of South African patrimony, just as the concentration camps in which thousands of civilians died are part of our shame.

Workers from all over the world, driven by hunger and unemployment, came to work on the mines in South Africa, where they died in huge numbers of lung disease; hundreds fell at the barricades, gun in hand, as they fought against reduction in wages, and the tradition of singing freedom songs as patriots faced execution was started by four trade unionists who sang the Red Flag as they mounted the gallows.

Many South African women joined the suffragette movement and challenged the physical, legal, and psychological power of male rule.

Apartheid has distorted this history, subordinating each and every action to its racist context, suppressing all that was noble and highlighting all that was ugly. The ideals of democracy and freedom are presented as white ideals, the assumption being that blacks are only interested in a full stomach, not in questions of freedom. Daily life refutes this notion.

It is the anti-apartheid struggle, not the white presence, that has kept democracy alive in South Africa. Anti-apartheid in South Africa has come to mean pro-democracy. The principles of non-

racial democracy have for decades now become part and parcel of the anti-apartheid movement, and through it, have emerged as strong themes in South African life. It is not just the number of organisations that have indicated support for a document such as the Freedom Charter that proves this, but the growth of a powerful, alternative democratic culture in the country. The culture of democracy is strong precisely because people have had to struggle for it.

In the last resort, the strongest guarantee of freedom in South Africa lies in the hearts of the oppressed. It is they more than anyone who know what it is like to have their homes bull-dozed into the ground, to be moved from pillar to post, to be stopped in the streets or raided at night, to be humiliated because of who their parents are or on account of the language they speak. Inviolability of the home, freedom of movement, the rights of the personality, free speech — they fight for these each and every day. If the constitution is suffused with the longing of the ordinary people for simple justice and peace, then freedom in South Africa is ensured.

For many years, supporters of majority rule looked with suspicion on the idea of a Bill of Rights and the rule of law. On the other hand, proponents of entrenching fundamental rights and freedoms balked at the notion of one person one vote. Two currents that for a long time tended to flow in different directions are now joined together. In turn, solving the questions of political rights and of fundamental liberties makes it possible to give guarantees in relation to the aspect of cultural diversity. All taken together make it possible to contemplate manifestly fair procedures for regulating the process of eliminating the inequalities created by apartheid.

Spelt out in terms of constitutional principles, one can envisage the following cluster of entrenched guarantees:

The constitution will be designed in such a way as to ensure full and equal participation in political and civil life for all South Africans, irrespective of race, colour, gender or creed.

Discrimination on the basis of race etc. will be outlawed, and machinery created to prevent

insult, abuse, or ill-treatment on such grounds.

There will be a multi-party system with freedom of speech and assembly and periodical elections to choose Parliament and the government.

There will be a Bill of Rights guaranteeing fundamental human rights and liberties to all citizens. This Bill of Rights will be entrenched in the constitution and will be justiciable, that is, persons alleging infringements of their rights will be able to seek a remedy by recourse to the courts. Provision should be made to ensure equal access to the courts independently of financial means.

The application of the doctrine of the separation of powers will establish a system of checks and balances between Parliament and the executive, and guarantee that the judiciary is independent in fulfilling its functions of upholding the rule of law and defending the principles of the constitution.

Steps will be taken to ensure that there is vigorous government at the local and regional levels subject to the principles of permanent accountability and active community participation.

Within the context of a single citizenship and a common patriotism and loyalty, the diversity of the South African population will receive constitutional recognition through provisions guaranteeing the free expression of religious, cultural and linguistic rights.

The opening up of equal opportunities for all and the process of redistribution of wealth in the country will be conducted according to constitutionally-defined principles covering public interest, affirmative action and fair procedures, with the courts having the power of judicial review in relation to the defence of these principles.

These are not provisions for black South Africans or for white South African, but for all South Africans; the last word goes to freedom.

INTERNATIONAL MANDELA LEADS DELEGATION TO ANGOLA

An ANC delegation, led by the Deputy President, Nelson Mandela, visited the People's Republic of Angola from May 10-13 at the invitation of the MPLA Workers' Party and the government (writes **Luca Tefo**). The delegation included Comrades Thomas Nkobi, Treasurer-General of the ANC, Joe Modise, commander of Umkhonto We Sizwe, and Winnie Mandela. On their arrival at the 4th February International Airport, they were received by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, members of the Central Committee of MPLA and of the diplomatic corps accredited to Angola, and thousands of Angolans and members of the ANC.

Shortly after their arrival, Comrade Mandela led the delegation to the People's Palace, where he laid a wreath on the grave of the late President Agostinho Neto. From there, he went on to address a rally at the First of May Square.

In his speech, he reiterated to the people of Angola that the struggle will continue until apartheid is abolished in South Africa. He spoke of the political ties existing between the ANC and the MPLA since the early '60s, and the generous support of the MPLA that enabled the June 16 youth to undergo training in Angola. He paid tribute to socialist Cuba and the Soviet Union for their support to Angola, which made it possible for Namibia to gain its independence.

On the second day, the delegation visited the ANC centre at Viana, where Comrade Winnie congratulated MK militants on their role in the present situation in South Africa. She said that MK had made it possible for the ANC leaders to negotiate with the South African government with pride and respect.

Comrade Mandela gave a briefing on the recent talks between the ANC and the racist government, explaining that these were not

negotiations but discussions aimed at removing obstacles for negotiations. He reiterated the need to maintain sanctions against the Pretoria regime until the regime meets all the demands set out by the ANC and its allies. He said that the ANC was ready to consider a ceasefire, but not the abandonment of the armed struggle.

On the third day, Comrade Mandela met with the African Diplomatic Mission in Angola. He outlined the situation in South Africa, reiterating that the movement still stands by the Harare Declaration, adopted by the OAU and supported by the UN, calling for a peaceful settlement to the country's problems. He described the problems faced by the movement in resettling the exiles who are to return to the country. He appealed for funds to assist a Trust Fund that the ANC has initiated inside the country.

Later that day, President dos Santos awarded Comrade Mandela the country's highest award, the Agostinho Neto Medal. President dos Santos praised the ANC Deputy President for his firmness during the 27 years he spent in prison. He said he was moved by the fact that Comrade Mandela had refused to be released on the condition that he renounced violence, but on the day of his release had made a statement that showed his love for humanity, equality and justice.

On the last day, shortly before he left for the airport, Comrade Mandela addressed a press conference where he again explained recent developments in South Africa, stating the ANC standpoint again.

Members of the Angolan government, led by President do Santos, saw the delegation off. Hundreds of ANC militants and sympathisers were also present, singing freedom songs, as the delegation boarded a plane inscribed with the letters: **N Mandela**.

CELEBRATING A NEW DAWN IN SOUTH AFRICA

One of the most exciting events on the South African cultural calendar this year will be the Zabalaza Festival that will take place in London from July 2 - 15. In the light of the developments in South Africa towards a non-racial and democratic society, one cannot but agree that the theme of this festival, "Celebrating a New Dawn in South Africa," is most appropriate.

In May, an event which brought together the trustees of the festival, artists and the media was held in London. The main co-ordinators, Moira Levy and Wally Serote spoke about the nature and aims of the festival, while Archbishop Trevor Huddleston spoke at length about the origins of the cultural boycott. What we produce below are part of their views expressed on this occasion about the significance of Zabalaza, the cultural boycott and the role of cultural workers in the struggle for national liberation.

Moira Levy

When we look back on three months of dramatic change in our country, we realise now, more than ever, that "Zabalaza" (struggle) is an appropriate and fitting term for this festival. We celebrated the releases of ANC leaders and the unbanning of many organisations and now we look forward to and realise that more work, more effort, more commitment and unbending determination is required to further our cultural aspirations in a new South Africa.

In that sense Zabalaza takes on a new meaning — a struggle to stand firm to face the future. In July we will have 95 South Africans arriving in London in that very spirit I have spoken about. They will be coming from all walks of life, from across the country, from all regions. Most of them are young and not well-known. They all have two things in common — talent and determination to further our culture.

Wally Serote

I want to talk about the cultural situation in our country, its development over the years and the

event that is about to take place in July.

First, I would like to give a brief background about how we, in the African National Congress, understand cultural work in South Africa. In 1982, in Gaborone, about 1 000 cultural workers from South Africa attended a festival — a conference — on culture and resistance. One of the resolutions taken there was that cultural workers want to become part and parcel of the struggle for liberation in South Africa. A year later, the ANC established its Department of Arts and Culture. Through this department, the ANC has kept contact with cultural workers inside the country and encouraged them to organise themselves to play their part in the struggle for a non-racial, democratic South Africa.

There was another conference in Amsterdam in 1987, where resolutions were made relating to cultural work in South Africa and how it relates to political work. We have not been able to implement most of those resolutions. And I think that it is here that Zabalaza comes in.

Zabalaza has been advertised mainly as a festival but its emphasis is going to be on workshops and the discussions that people from

home, together with those of Britain and other South Africans in exile are going to engage in. Discussions will centre on our understanding of the role of culture in the struggle and in society and also on understanding how other people have struggled and used culture in their struggles, and what they have done after liberation.

Trever Huddleston

As a British citizen, I want to state that the government of this country has no conception whatsoever of the meaning of the struggle in terms of culture, a culture which today we realise is going to be a major part of the struggle.

In 1954, which is a very, very long time ago, I wrote my first aggressive article for the British Press. In it I was challenging the churches to wake up and recognise that they were doing nothing in the struggle that could be called effective witness to the ideals that they were supposed to stand for. I called that article "*The Church sleeps on.*" That drew me a lot of heavy artillery from two Archbishops — those of Canterbury and Cape Town. What I was doing in that article was to try and create some anger, but I wanted to be positive also in getting a response from Great Britain — from those people who could understand what I was speaking about.

Of course, in 1954, for most English the only thing they understood about South Africa was that it played cricket and rugby football and it didn't go much further than that. So I was trying to find some kind of positive and effective response to what I was saying. I ended that article by appealing for a cultural boycott of South Africa. What I meant then is something very different from what has developed over the years, but it had the germ of what it is today in it.

Wally Serote

I would like to speak about the cultural boycott against South Africa in the present context.

In 1987, Comrade President Oliver Tambo, when delivering the Cannon Collins Memorial Lecture, made mention of the fact that there is, in South Africa, a democratic culture which needs nurturing. In the same breath he said that it is extremely important for all of us to inten-

sify the cultural boycott and isolate apartheid culture. We have not changed this position. We are, through Zabalaza, creating a platform where it will be possible for people in the international community to support a mass democratic culture that is emerging in South Africa.

Who will be taking part in Zabalaza?

Wally Serote

The people coming to London are from different parts of South Africa. They are from different organisations and come with different art forms. Some are experienced cultural workers, others have used only the basics of whatever art form is available in the struggle. Many of them will be people who have experienced the struggle in its various forms. Because of their various experiences, different understandings and exposures, we will have a chance to experience a future South Africa.

In terms of these issues stated above and what people's visions are about their futures, we have, in organising Zabalaza, had to answer various questions from those outside and those inside South Africa. The key question that has been asked is why Zabalaza is not being held in Pretoria or Johannesburg. The second question has been whether it is possible to learn anything from mainstream culture in Britain, and from Britain we have been asked if it is possible that there can be a structured culture, a democratic culture.

There is something called the First World. I think people who will come here, to Britain, will absolutely cherish the idea of meeting people from the First World who have had opportunities enough over many, many years, to discuss and rediscuss culture and society. So, Zabalaza will be an attempt to create a platform where people who are outside Africa will contribute to our understanding of their cultural experience. ANC and non-ANC South Africans will meet and discuss culture, discuss their future and how their culture will become part of the world.

Moira Levy

Through the workshops, training programmes and lectures, the participants from South Africa

will have access to the kind of skills and resources that this city has to offer. Most South Africans do not have an access to these. They will have access to other workers — cultural workers involved in the struggle. More important, they will have access to South African cultural workers to whom they have not had access because of years of exile.

In turn, they bring with them their experience of forging a new culture in the political struggle. Hopefully, they will take back with them skills and knowledge to the community structures, cultural organisations, the individuals, the dance groups, the theatre companies — all the places where a new anti-apartheid and post-apartheid culture is being formed.

Some of the origins of the cultural boycott recalled

Trevor Huddleston

When I was in Sophiatown in the fifties, I realised that South Africa was able to pay very large sums of money to distinguished performers — chiefly, leading musicians from Britain who were under contract to perform exclusively to white audiences. Amongst them was the violinist Yehudi Menuhin and various other distinguished classical musicians, among them the Amsterdam String Quartet. I was able to persuade them to come and play in the church in Sophiatown and they were simply overwhelmed by the musicality of their audiences.

That was the origin of my involvement in the whole cultural boycott structures which led me to the sports and economic boycotts at different stages. They were all aimed at the same thing, namely, to isolate the regime in Pretoria from the world. They were meant to hurt the regime and ensure that because it was rich and powerful in its own land, it could at least be deprived of these advantages in the world.

The reasons for the existence of the cultural boycott remain. The danger is that the euphoria generated outside South Africa as a result of this year's events might have the effect of lessening

the response to the boycott.

We are up against this problem of sustaining the hope that apartheid will soon be finished, yet at the same time we naturally want to celebrate what is being achieved and what has been achieved over the years, in terms of culture. It is a celebration and also a challenge. It is a celebration of commitment to the struggle. In this regard, time is one of the elements we have to take very seriously because every day that apartheid continues to survive, it destroys and destroys, as it has done over the whole of this half century, not just values — whether they are cultural or otherwise — but also human beings. This waste cannot be allowed to continue. Zabalaza will confront the people of Britain with the immediacy of the struggle in a way which they cannot but understand.

As a last word on Zabalaza

Wally Serote

In preparing for Zabalaza, we have been exposed to many issues of the past and many others which are current. We have to answer to all these. Many issues we will have to present to those who will participate.

The people who are coming here are defenders of non-racialism. They are also defenders of human rights. One of the issues about this is that non-racialism or democracy in South Africa will not survive if a majority of the people do not have the skills or the expertise, and have not had exposure to understanding the experiences of other people.

We must use Zabalaza as a means of contributing to, and arming some of our people to make correct decisions, and to be able to implement those decisions. They must be able to identify who their allies are in the world.

VILLAGES FOR FARM WORKERS ARE A NECESSITY

By Khulakazi Mzamo

The forces of change which charted a new approach to health care met in Alma Ata in 1978 and adopted the Alma Ata Primary Health Care Declaration, which has had a far-reaching impact on both thought and action of health workers ever since. There has been a dramatic expansion of community health infrastructures and personnel in many countries, and a widespread increase in awareness of the social and economic forces which affect the distribution of health and medical care, so often inequitable among peoples.

In setting the target of achieving "Health for All People of the World by the Year 2 000," the World Health Organisation defined health as "the state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, and not just the absence of disease and infirmity." Under this definition, the health of the black majority of South Africans is a matter of grave concern, especially as we are left with only ten years to the year 2 000. It cannot be doubted that the apartheid structures imposed by the South African regime were designed to impede rather than to promote the well-being of the black population.

Most agricultural workers in the country live in farming areas which are owned by white farmers. These people have no houses nor land on which to build houses. Mr de Klerk's winds of change seem to swirl around the existing property dispensation, which has had an adverse effect on the health conditions of agricultural workers. When he was interviewed by Brian Walden for London Independent Television (ITV) on Sunday, April 22 1990, he stated that blacks did not own land before, as the land was under the chiefs. That meant that black people are not entitled to any land, and that gives us a clear idea whose property rights National Party spokespersons have in mind when they are fac-


ed with the question of land redistribution. They are of course speaking about whites, or rather, the preservation of the same inequalities and the same destitute housing conditions for farm workers.

We differ with that view. In the first place, before the colonisers came to South Africa, land belonged to all the people and was not sold nor bought. It was definitely not a private possession of the chief nor anyone else. De Klerk's misleading statement indicates once again the degree of misrepresentation, distortion and denigration of our cultural heritage that has gripped the white man's thinking ever since he set foot in South Africa. But this discussion is not about social administration.

At present, conditions for people living and working on the farms are worse than those of other people living in the main centres of South Africa. Job opportunities are scarcer, and living conditions dismal, while health services are almost non-existent. People are forced to sell their labour to the white farmers for wages that are very low, with accommodation offered as part of their contract.

The houses that are provided by the farmers are appallingly shabby, built either of earth and grass, old plastic material, cardboard, wood, jute sack, old canvas, or corrugated iron sheets, with no sanitary services. They are often miles away from all other public services like, for instance, health clinics. Public transport is unavailable, which leaves the employer the sole provider for all services required. This isolation makes the workers vulnerable to exploitation and abuse.

Owning livestock, or even chickens, is greatly discouraged, and having small gardens to supplement or reduce dependence on the miserly low income is, of course, totally unacceptable to the farmers.



This house speaks for itself about the housing conditions of black farm workers.

Once a worker is dismissed, or dies, his family has to leave the farm, and may end in the street having drifted to the overburdened urban areas. Interestingly, the old custom takes over from there, with relatives providing temporary accommodation to the destitute family and even breaking the housing regulations of a municipality.

This state of affairs means that the actual producers of South African food are exposed to abominable conditions that produce ill-health. Pastoralists, for example, interact with animals and are exposed to diseases such as anthrax; they work in environments that harbour the vectors of parasites that cause schistosomiasis and bubonic plague. They are also exposed to agro-chemicals which are used on the farms to increase the productivity of the land, without proper medical preventative measures having been taken.

South Africa's health system, with its large infrastructure, should be able to deal with the health problems of the agricultural producers, but because this infrastructure is built to cater for the well-being of the whites, black South Africans suffer ill-health, which includes malnutrition and infectious diseases. The last-mentioned account for a large number of deaths each year. The health services do not address the factors that cause the ill-health, underdevelopment and poverty, which have resulted from such condi-

tions — insufficient production and unequal distribution of food, inadequate water supplies, poor sanitation facilities and poor housing.

As ill-health is a result of many factors, solutions must be inter-sectoral. Property rights should be defined to conform with the black people's realities. This means that the concrete conditions of production, and workers' health situation, should be taken into consideration. If a new South Africa is to be built, a new approach to the health of the people who do not own land should be considered. For example, if the concerns of social epidemiology, which are the health problems of social groups rather than those of individuals, are introduced into the concept of health, then the apartheid traditional approach should be abolished; a new approach should address economic, social, political and technical realities. Housing is one of the most pressing needs, but it should not be left to individual employers.

The health of the people depends on their socio-economic conditions. Therefore, it would be necessary for the government to establish institutional mechanisms for co-ordinating health requirements with other aspects of development.

The Primary Health Care approach, which South Africa claims to be practising, embodies three basic ideas:



Retired farm labourer Sergeant Yende and his wife. Yende was evicted from his homestead on the Roodekraal farm in the Wakkerstroom district eight times in terms of the Tenant Farmers Act

1. That promotion of health depends fundamentally on elimination of poverty and underdevelopment.
2. That the entire health care system should be restructured to support health activities at primary level, and must respond to the overall health needs of the people.
3. That the mass of the people should be both activists and the main beneficiaries of health programmes.

Health cannot be delivered; it must be generated within a society. It is the outcome of several social processes, such as housing, sanitation, water supply, employment and the availability of food. Agricultural workers are a group to be singled out for priority attention, for they are, at the moment, the worst off, both economically and health-wise. People in these areas should be defined to include both the productively active (that is, the employed workers) and the dormant groups, that is, workers in subsistence — school children, those engaged in domestic work (including the wives of the farm workers themselves) and the unemployed.

These people need land to build their own

houses so as not to rely on farmers. The government will have to provide residential areas within the farming districts for agricultural workers, weaning them away from dependence on the farmers for accommodation. Farm workers also need property rights. It is our responsibility to create conditions which will guarantee those rights.

In the destruction of discriminatory laws regarding land ownership and property rights it must be remembered that blacks do not have any guarantees to land and property rights under the present system. This must be redressed.

Dependency on employers for accommodation has contributed as greatly to the poor health of the workers and their families in the farming areas, as the low wages have. Lack of other facilities, such as education, welfare, health clinics, etc. have exacerbated an already squalid existence which cannot and should not be left to individual farmers to improve. They have neither the capacity nor the will to do it.

The Freedom Charter lays the ground for future housing policies in a free South Africa. We now have to grapple with the specifics.

DUAL POWER — FROM A DIPLOMATIC ANGLE

Linda Khumalo seeks to revive the discussion on dual power, but from a different angle this time.

In the mid-80s there was a heated discussion as to whether we had reached the stage where we could claim the status of dual power with the regime in South Africa. Of course, this discussion was speeded up by the political events in our country at that time, namely the defeat of the so-called 'black city councils.' The defeat they suffered can be attributed squarely to the then well-organised street committees, yard committees, area committees and so on.

Thus some of us dared to speak about dual power. We were even talking about liberated zones. The question arose as to whether we could really claim dual power without controlling the police force, let alone the army. (I do not mean Umkhonto we Sizwe, the People's Army, but the army in the other camp). The conclusion was that, when we were talking about liberated zones, for instance, we were referring to the defeat of all apartheid structures represented by the black pseudo-city councils.

I must confess that I belonged to the group that strongly believed in the existence of dual power in our country. I would like to revive this discussion, this time from a diplomatic point of view, given the new political situation in our country.

Chronology

When F W de Klerk announced in parliament, on February 2 1990 that the ANC, SACP and many other political organisations were unbanned, the first thing that struck my mind was that we now have an enormous task before us: that of showing South Africans and the world at large what we stand for, what type of government we envisage and, above all, that we are capable of setting up a new government.

Two days later F W de Klerk announced that Comrade Nelson Mandela was to be released. On his release, Comrade Mandela demonstrated his capabilities, not only as a politician but also as a statesman. Comrade Mandela appeared on the balcony of the City Hall in Cape Town, and from that day onwards it became vividly clear to me that we have now entered a new era in South African history and a new diplomatic phase.

Dual diplomacy

Who can dispute the fact that today in South African politics nothing can take place without the ANC and the MDM?

For example, recently the Nationalist government announced that it was to cut the military budget by 30% and that the money is to be channelled into upgrading black housing and bettering the standard of living for blacks. What is significant is not the announcement but the manner in which this money is going to be distributed and administered. The government has suggested that the MDM must be party to administering the R7.2 billion, and, as far as I know, the MDM has agreed that little touch-ups here and there be made.

I will give a further example of what I mean by this diplomatic duality. When Comrade Mandela was released, he received invitations from more than 40 countries. These invitations were meant to appease the solidarity groups in those countries, and to demonstrate the dual nature of political power in South Africa.

Which head of state can afford to come to South Africa today without seeing the ANC or the MDM? Which head of state today can afford

to invite F W de Klerk without inviting Comrade Mandela?

In Africa we have won the upper hand in terms of diplomacy. I am looking forward to the next summit conference to see what status they are now going to accord us. That's another topic, which deserves special attention.

Government within a government?

Have we, in our protracted struggle, reached a stage where we can claim to possess a certain diplomatic power? I will dare to say yes, we have. In the last four years or so we have managed to open offices and embassies — embassies because some of our missions have been accorded diplomatic status.

My concern is, are we now functioning as a government within a government? — or are we forced by circumstances to react like one? To justify what I say, it will be wise to give examples. During the Namibia independence celebrations we witnessed an unprecedented occasion, where Comrade Mandela was not only hailed jubilantly and ecstatically by the people of

Namibia, but was also welcomed as a head of state by more than 60 heads of state. That is not all. He even had talks with Shevardnadze, the Soviet Foreign Minister, James Baker, United States Secretary of State, and many others.

The interesting thing was that F W de Klerk also had talks with Shevardnadze and Baker. Currently, Comrade Mandela and F W de Klerk are both overseas on diplomatic missions.

It is against this background that I am posing the question: are we already functioning as a government within an illegitimate government?

Conclusion

I am now convinced that the path ahead for our struggle lies mainly in the diplomatic successes the movement still has to achieve, and the farther we proceed the more the question of dual power will be apparent to most of us. It is going to be forced on us by political events, above all international events. Today we know that the relaxed atmosphere between East and West has played an important role in the political situation we find ourselves in.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Dear Comrade

It pleases me very much that the events of May 1990 have forced me to speak about the divisive, and sometimes irrational, attitude of some 'resistance organisations' towards the ANC. I am a supporter of the ANC, but have personally not been able to participate in its armed struggle. However, I have taken an active part in my union activities and those organised by the community.

In one of my contacts with an ANC under-

ground worker, I was told to try and work closely with all organisations opposed to apartheid, that I must not allow my ideological beliefs to cloud my judgment whenever there was activist work to be undertaken. Since then, I have done my level best to judge people by their commitment to a free South Africa.

What has continuously gnawed at my conscience is whether I have not done this to the detriment of the struggle. I have stood by when some people claiming to be PAC have tried to

disrupt action on the factory-floor, simply because they disagreed with COSATU. We have been called "white ****lickers" because some of our union officials are white. The cruellest of these taunts was when one man, with a particularly caustic tongue, exhorted us to go and march and die in the name of the ANC, but he and his comrades knew when they would "catch the train."

I say I am free to write now because I can no longer believe that by our keeping quiet and working towards our liberation, others will necessarily join us to strengthen our liberation forces. This was clearly displayed to me when the PAC, AZAPO and NACTU continuously referred to the ANC as a "sell-out" for speaking to the South African government. I recalled how many times all these organisations have had a chance to speak to Nelson Mandela, the Deputy-President of the ANC, on issues related to a united approach. I know full well, as does everyone else inside and outside South Africa, that Nelson Mandela and his colleagues in the ANC have spoken of the need to form the broadest front of anti-apartheid fighters. Why then do these organisations begin now to speak about the need to strengthen people's organisations to achieve maximum unity to seize power?

There are issues on which it may be permissible merely to posture, because they would not be involving people's lives, their future, their happiness or their freedom. But the one in which the ANC is involved is not one of those. Future generations will sit in judgment on those who, seeking to carve out a name for themselves in the history books, chose the wrong way of doing it. I am appealing to those who consider themselves genuine liberation fighters to refrain from criticising for the sake of criticising.

The statement by AZAPO: "Even at this late hour we call upon the ANC to refrain from meeting the De Klerk regime. We urge the ANC to abandon De Klerk and embrace the revolutionary forces," should really be examined. Which revolutionary forces, and what methods of struggle do they employ? I mentioned that I have not participated in armed struggle, but what I know is that it is only the ANC and the SACP that have done so. What are these fronts on which

the struggle has to be maintained? As far as I know, the ANC has abandoned none of the fronts.

I must say that I was impressed by AZAPO's participation in the Conference for a Democratic Future and other actions by the community, but I cannot understand where the line is drawn. I am hoping that a clear-cut policy can emerge in the newspapers about what it wants to participate in and what not. To me, the statement beginning with, "Even at this late hour ..." should have been phrased differently. It should have said, "Even at this late hour, despite the years of differences with the ANC, we are prepared to join hands with it and see how we can together pressurise the regime to go the whole way on the road it professes to have chosen." In that way, I believe, we would be able to call De Klerk's bluff if he has any tricks up his sleeve.

In concluding my letter, which I hope will be appreciated in its simplicity and attempt to understand the dynamics of resistance politics, I think it is naive to believe that the experienced politicians who lead the ANC are embracing De Klerk without their protective gloves on. They have been brave to adhere to their armed struggle and call for sanctions even though everyone else (on De Klerk's side or not far from him) wants them to reject these strong tactics they have used so effectively so far.

I may not be wrong in believing that when the fruits of the ANC's pioneering ventures are borne, many of those who do not want to be within 'spitting' distance of it will be ahead of it, rushing forward to eat the fruit. The way I have followed events, and the way in which Nelson Mandela has shown no bitterness against his gaolers of many years, make me believe the ANC will still be able to work with its present critics. My only wish is that these critics, unless they have fundamental tactical ideas no one is aware of as yet, should move quickly to stave off any further delay in the dawning of the day of our liberation.

Yours
Rooi Hare

Johannesburg.

BOOK REVIEW

Mafekeng Diary: A Black Man's View of a White Man's War, by Sol T. Plaatje. Published by James Curry Publishers, London, 1990. Price: £7.95 paperback; £19.95 cased.

This recent, updated edition of South African writer Sol Plaatje's *Mafekeng Diary* offers some fascinating insights into the siege of Mafekeng during the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902.

Plaatje's writing casts a new light on this episode of British imperial history, so often cloaked in gung-ho adventurism. Plaatje explodes the myth that the siege of Mafekeng was purely a white man's affair, and details the role played by the black population of the town. He reveals the extent of the suffering imposed on the local population through the exploits of the warring sides.

Plaatje's account is not without humour, and his clear, crisp prose makes good reading. His tongue-in-cheek descriptions of characters involved in the siege effectively debunk romantic misconceptions about the whole incident. His entries are clear and detailed and have provided historians with new information about the siege, as well as Plaatje's life and career.

The diary is also of particular interest to us, in the ANC, because it provides insight into the development and personality of Plaatje, who was a founder member and the first secretary of the ANC. Plaatje was an outstanding political writer and journalist, and was an active participant in the struggle against the injustices imposed upon blacks after the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, and especially by the Natives' Land Act of 1913.

Plaatje was born on October 9 1876 at Doornfontein, a farm in the Boshof district of the Orange Free State. His parents were adherents of the Berlin Missionary Society. Shortly after Plaatje's birth they moved to the Society's mission at Pniel, not far from the diamond fields at Kimberley, then part of the Cape Colony. Plaatje received most of his formal education at Pniel, attending a church school. He remained at Pniel

until 1894. By then he was employed as a pupil teacher at the mission. He then accepted a job as a messenger at the Kimberley Post Office.

The four and a half years Plaatje spent on the diamond fields were crucial in shaping his personality and talent. In 1899 Plaatje married Elizabeth M'belle and later that year, when a post as clerk and court interpreter became available in Mafekeng, he applied for and was offered the job. His duties began on October 14 1898.

In 1899 Mafekeng was surrounded by Boer forces — the British imperial government and the two Boer republics were at war.

Plaatje kept his diary throughout the siege, while working as court interpreter. Around this time he also assisted Reuter's correspondent in Mafekeng during the siege, Vere Stent. Stent later became the editor of the Pretoria News.

Plaatje's career as a public figure began in 1902, when he assumed the editorship of *Koranta ea Becoana* (*The Bechuana Gazette*), a bilingual newspaper. Over the following decade he emerged as a leading spokesman for black opinion and, in 1912, became the first secretary of the South African Native National Congress (the forerunner of the ANC). He campaigned actively against the Natives' Land Act, which he said made the black man a "pariah in the land of his birth." He led two delegations to Britain to protest the Act, but despite reminders of black loyalty during the Anglo-Boer War and former British assurances of political protection, Britain did not intervene. Plaatje later led a delegation to the United States, but few were interested in the plight of his people. Yet, throughout his life, Plaatje continued to speak out in defence of black rights.

So Plaatje's *Mafekeng Diary* is well worth reading for enthusiasts of South African literature, and particularly of South African history. His interpretation of the Mafekeng siege is refreshing, sharp-sighted and humorous. The diary also provides new insights into the life of a talented South African who fought tirelessly for the rights of his people. DMS

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