

Volume 11 Number 8


SOUTHERN AFRICA

\$1.25

November/December
1980

South Africa

- Guerrilla Chronology
- Strike Leader Interviewed
- Community Protests



**Reagan's Africa
Advisors**

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Volume XIII Number 8
November/December 1980



Front Cover: Ford Workers vote to strike. South Africa's coal-to-oil Sasol project in flames.

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Special thanks for their assistance to: *Africa News*, Mark Beittel, Tony Cavin, Anne Crane, Paddy Colligan, Ruben Cordova, Kevin Danaher, Steven Goodman, Allen and Barbara Isaacman, Jennifer Link, Catherine Macdonald, William Minter, Lystra Mulzac.

Typesetting by Liberation News Service
Cover and layout by The Letter Space

CONTENTS

SPECIAL REPORT

- 3 Angola: South Africa's Hidden War
- 5 Culture:
Boxers Belt Boycott,
Protests Silence Singer

SOUTH AFRICA

- 6 Strike Leader Interviewed
- 8 Guerrilla Chronology
- 10 Promises, Promises . . .
- 11 Broederbond Front Receives Soweto Funds

NAMIBIA

- 12 Guerrilla Sympathizer to Die
- 13 Editor Flees

MOZAMBIQUE

- 14 Inside Mozambique's Re-education Camps
- 15 Combating Drought
- 15 It's Not What You Say . . .

ZIMBABWE

- 16 Zimbabwe's Slow Consolidation
- 18 Strange Bedfellows

UNITED STATES

- 19 Regan's Africa Arsenal
- 21 US Synfuels: The Sasol Connection
- 23 Namibia Lobby Gathers Steam
- 24 Black Leaders Allege Conspiracy

DEPARTMENTS

- 1 Update
- 24 Washington Notes
- 28 Book Review
- 31 Action News and Notes
- 32 Newsbriefs

Subscriptions: Individual (domestic)/\$10.00; Institutional/\$18.00; Individual (foreign)/\$13.00; Institutional/\$21.00; Airmail: Africa, Asia, Europe/\$22.50; South and Central America/\$19.50.

Southern Africa is available on microfilm through University Microfilm Zerox Company, Ann Arbor, Mich. 48104, and is listed in the Alternative Press Index.

Distributors: New York, NY: Emeka; Washington DC: Liberation Information Distribution Co.; Boston, MA: Carrier Pigeon, Third World Distributors. Chicago: Guild News Agency; Minneapolis, MN: Rainbow Distribution; Atlanta, GA: Guild News Agency, Cabel R. News; Detroit, MI: New Directions Enterprises.

ISSN 938-3775

Southern Africa is published monthly except for July-August, when bi-monthly, by the Southern Africa Committee, 17 West 17th Street, New York, NY 10011.

update

Mugabe-Machel Meet

Zimbabwe's Prime Minister Robert Mugabe arrived in Quelimane Mozambique on October 18 for a meeting with Mozambican President Somora Machel.

According to Mozambique's *Tempo* magazine, one of the principal topics of conversation was relations with socialist countries. President Machel recently visited the German Democratic Republic, Romania and Bulgaria, while Mugabe has been to Pyongyang and Beijing.

The two nations have expressed the intention of remaining non-aligned—with respect both to East-West tensions and with respect to divisions in the socialist camp. But relations between Zimbabwe and the Soviet Union are still strained due to the historical Soviet links with Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU.

Closer to home was renewed discussion of military cooperation between the two countries against the Mozambique "resistance movement," formerly backed by the Smith regime and now under the patronage of South Africa. The group is reportedly receiving air dropped supplies, training, and other military aid from South Africa and has carried out several attacks on Manica province. In one incident, the rail line between Umtali in Zimbabwe and the Mozambique port of Beira was reported damaged and service was shut down temporarily in October. Mozambican and Zimbabwean officials are concerned that continued attacks could hamper efforts by both states to reduce economic dependence on South Africa. Machel and Mugabe reportedly discussed joint military operations against the dissident groups.

South African sponsorship for the movement has the potential to escalate and serves as a continuing warning to both Zimbabwe and Mozambique against more active backing for the military phase of the liberation struggle in South Africa.

Setting New Terms for Migrant Labor

Labor ministers from seven southern African countries met in Mbabane, Swaziland in October and formed a southern African labor commission de-

signed to change the system of migrant labor between their countries and South Africa. Involved in the organization—which will hold a follow-up meeting in Mozambique in November—are Swaziland, Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and Botswana.

The countries do not expect to be able to eliminate the migration of labor in the near future, the press was told, although Zambia enacted a ban on migrants going to South Africa some years ago. But by coordinating their efforts and working out uniform policies, they do hope to change the present situation in which South Africa "dictates the rules of the game."

Raid Marks Visit of United Nations Team

On October 20, South African troops raided south-western Angola in the first major cross border attack that Pretoria has acknowledged since June. The Defence Forces claimed to have killed 28 people, including Angolan soldiers and guerrillas of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). The escalation came only one day before a UN negotiating team, headed by UN undersecretary Brian Urquhart, began new talks in Pretoria with the South African regime.

Reports emerging after that meeting were contradictory, but included rumors that a direct meeting between SWAPO and the South African government would be arranged soon. Further credence was added to these rumors when Reuters reported in early November that SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma had told the Angolan newspaper, the *Jornal de Angola*, that negotiations between SWAPO and South Africa could start soon.

Most observers are still skeptical, however, that South Africa has actually decided to permit elections under UN auspices, especially in the wake of the election victory of US president-elect Ronald Reagan. Reagan's administration is expected to take a position generally more sympathetic to South Africa. Speculation about Reagan's policies towards southern Africa heightened in mid-November when Henry Kissinger—an unofficial advisor to the president-elect during his election campaign—announced that he would meet with his "old friend" South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha later that month.

South Africa did hold elections in Namibia on November 13 within the framework of separate "representative authorities" for the different ethnic groups. Initial election returns from the "ethnic area" designated to represent whites, however, provided a slight embarrassment to the South African regime: the

Democratic Turnhalle Alliance—the part Pretoria has installed via the "council of ministers"—failed to win a majority of the votes. In the final tally, Aktur—a far right white party—won eleven of the eighteen seats in the second tier legislature, leaving only seven seats for the DTA.

Zimbabwe Trial Begins

The trial of Cabinet minister Edgar Tekere opened in Salisbury on November 4, in a court room that contained some sharp reminders of the period of white minority rule. Tekere and seven other defendants are accused of murdering a white farmer and of attempting to murder five Black soldiers of the former regime.

The white trial judge, like so many members of the police and judicial hierarchy, is a holdover from the previous white minority regime. The courtroom itself still bears all the trappings of the colonial system—down to the judge's powdered wig. This setting and the images it evokes—a Black guerrilla before a white colonial court—is likely to be as much on trial as Tekere and bodyguards, but with a bizarre twist.

By far the strongest flash-back to the colonial period is Tekere's ironic plea that he is exempt from prosecution on the basis of the Indemnity and Compensation Act of 1975. When originally passed by the Smith regime, the law was condemned by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and former federal Chief Justice Robert Fredgold, among others. The Act gave security forces free rein to use any methods—including torture—against the guerrilla movement without fear of prosecution.

Tekere is specifically attempting to gain immunity from prosecution by claiming that he was engaged in "suppressing terrorism" during the armed attack last August 4 that culminated in the death of white farmer Gerald Adams. Before the trial began, defense counsel Louis Blom-Cooper attempted both to remove from the proceedings a High Court Justice appointed under the white regime, and to obviate a criminal trial by virtue of the Indemnity and Compensation Act.

Both of these efforts having failed, the trial is now under way. The defense is arguing that the conflict stemmed from the attempt of an armed and drunken former

UPDATE this month was jointly prepared by *Southern Africa* and *Africa News Service*, which publishes a weekly digest available to individuals for \$25.00. Address correspondence to *Africa News*, P.O. Box 3851, Durham, NC 27702.

Rhodesian Army soldier to gate-crash a social affair attended by Tekere and other high members of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF party at a site next to Adams's farm.

Tekere and the seven other accused returned to the area the following day and mounted what the minister describes as a "military operation" on the Adams farm. The prosecution says Adams was shot while radioing for help; the defense claims a Tekere body-guard fired in self-defense when the farmer drew his pistol.

Extensive international press coverage of the trial has led to widespread speculation about its effect on Zimbabwe's fragile transition to independence. According to *Africa News* correspondent Julie Frederikse, "Sources close to the ZANU-PF Central Committee say that Prime Minister Mugabe and top party members feel that the best verdict would be one that imposed some kind of sentence on Tekere." Frederikse goes on to say that party officials are worried that otherwise the situation might look like Tekere was getting special treatment because of his position in ZANU.

Yet Mugabe has studiously avoided any interference in the case although under the terms of the Indemnity and Compensation Act, the government has the power to prevent the case even coming to trial.

Kaunda's Troubles Won't Go Away

In its latest move to control internal and external opponents the Zambian government, in early November, confiscated the passports of three trade union leaders and decided to step up surveillance of the unions to identify any leaders who might be involved in "subversive plots."

The action came in response to trade union calls for a general strike to protest a government regional decentralization plan. The government plan was apparently aimed at diluting union influence in local governments in the copper belt area.

Earlier, on October 15, President Kenneth Kaunda imposed a nation-wide curfew in towns and cities along the northern rail line where at least 40 percent of Zambia's population is concentrated. By the end of October, more than 3,000 people had been arrested for curfew violations.

Kaunda publicly accused South Africa of backing a plot to overthrow him a week after the curfew was imposed. The plot, he says, involved a coup planned for October 16 with the aid of more than 100 Zambians trained by South Africa. Several days later, however, the Zambian president told a rally of his supporters in Lusaka that security

forces had captured 45 of the band now estimated to number as many as 200. All of them, he said, were apparently from Zaire's Shaba province, carrying French-language maps of key targets in Lusaka.

Though there have been occasional disputes between Zambia and Zaire over minor border incidents, Kaunda did not blame Zaire's President Mobutu. Instead he said the "Katangese" had been brought into the plot in conjunction with Zambian dissidents.

South Africa has repeatedly attacked southern Zambia in retaliation for its support of SWAPO guerrillas in Namibia. The Zambian version of the coup plot, therefore, while undoubtedly incomplete, is not entirely unbelievable.

But it is also undoubtedly true that President Kaunda faces significant and mounting internal discontent. The struggle in Zimbabwe has been a major cause of Zambia's economic difficulties virtually since Zambia's independence in 1964. And until Zimbabwe's independence this year, Kaunda could always point to his commitment to African liberation as one source of the nation's difficulties. But Zimbabwe is now independent and that excuse is wearing thin. The destruction to transport routes from Rhodesian attacks late last year has still not been completely repaired, and the country still faces hostility from South Africa over the Namibian war. But these conditions, while serious, can no longer obscure Zambia's structural economic problems—which show no sign of having diminished.

Kaunda's inability to break the country away from overwhelming dependence on the mining of copper and cobalt, a persistent neglect of the agricultural sector, a top heavy and unwieldy bureaucracy, and a widening gap between rich and poor have brought criticism from the left and the right. Prominent figures arrested on suspicion in connection with the latest plot include Elias Chipimo, former chairman of the Standard Bank of Zambia, Patrick Chisanga, chief of the state energy corporation, and Air Force Commander Major-General Christopher Kabwe, who was suspended from his position as commander on October 11, only two days after being promoted to the post.

This time Kaunda is clearly hard-pressed to maintain his balancing act. He is faced with escalating labor unrest—an average of seven strikes per month in 1979 and early 1980—and now discontent is reportedly taking an ethnic orientation among the Bemba, who are prominent both among mineworkers and among the educated elite. As many analysts have noted, however, there does not yet appear to be any coherent political alternative with a prescription for solving the nation's problems, and Kaunda is likely to weather the storm.

Zimbabwe Rivals in Bloody Clash

Heavily armed units of the former guerrilla armies nominally loyal to Zimbabwe Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and Home Minister Joshua Nkomo squared off in Bulawayo on Saturday, November 10 in a major battle involving rocket, mortar and automatic weapons fire. By the time the new Zimbabwean army and air force had ended the day-long firefight, 43 people—mostly civilians—lay dead, and over 300 were wounded.

According to initial press reports, the fighting began after a series of ZANU-PF rallies held in Bulawayo, tradition a PF-ZAPU stronghold. Several of the main speakers at the ZANU rallies, Finance Minister Enos Nkala among them, are alleged to have made strongly partisan speeches attacking Nkomo and ZAPU, and urging the creation of a ZAPU-dominated one party state. In response, 1500 ZAPU troops based in nearby Entebane township, are reported to have attacked an equal number of ZANU troops living only one half mile away.

The following night, Mugabe addressed the nation on television, warning: "I cannot allow hooliganism and lawlessness to establish a reign of terror in this country. The war is over." But political tension continues to run high, with Mugabe blaming anti-ZAPU elements in the new government.

Guinea-Bissau Coup

The government of Guinea-Bissau, headed by President Luis de Almeida Carbral, was overthrown November 14 when troops loyal to Prime Minister João Bernardo Vieira took over the capital city of Bissau.

Currently under arrest, Carbral had been a strong advocate for unification of Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands. Both countries had been linked by a common political party, the African Party of the Independence of Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau.

Vieira, a former guerrilla leader during the 11-year war that preceded independence from Portugal in 1974, was opposed to the proposed unification. A radio statement by the new ruling Council of the Revolution described the coup as "a reaffirmation of our nationality and a consolidation of our independence." □



United Nations

Still under the gun. Thousands of Namibian refugees have fled into Angola to escape South Africa's widening war.

Angola: South Africa's Hidden War

Angola, potentially one of Africa's richest and most productive nations, celebrated its fifth anniversary of independence on November 11 amid conditions that all too closely resembled those that existed in 1975 when the country was at war and when the ruling MPLA was fighting for its life. War is still an everyday occurrence for the people of southern Angola on Namibia's northern border. And for Angolans in the remaining provinces, distribution problems, food shortages, and severe malnutrition in some areas are still chronic problems.

The two overwhelming difficulties, war and dislocations in the economy, are of course not unrelated. Angola has never really had a day of complete peace since the full-scale war ended in April 1976. For several years skirmishing continued on both Angola's northern and southern flanks. The 1978 accord with Zaire finally left only South Africa in a position to hurt Angola militarily. And that's just what Pretoria has continued to do, attacking with heightened intensity since mid-1980.

The continued war in Angola might be the only unreported war—real war with helicopter gunships, armored cars, battles for villages—on the face of the globe. But

the three thousand-strong South African force that went into southern Angola in June was real enough. It stayed a full month and returned in July and August for more battles. At the same time there have been major air raids on the southern city of Lubango and on the road and rail links to the port of Mocamedes. Angolan officials estimate that the South African raids between May 1978 and July 1979 cost the country \$100 million in damages; 1980 costs will run much higher.

Behind the Attacks

Why does South Africa continue to hammer away ceaselessly at Angola? Lucio Lara, general secretary of the MPLA, commented recently that he believes the primary reason for the South African attacks is the continuing unresolved conflict in Namibia. South Africa, says Lara, has been attempting to infiltrate elements of the anti-MPLA rebel movement UNITA—led by Jonas Savimbi—into those areas of southern Angola, particularly Cunene province, that Pretoria's forces have invaded. Such a UNITA presence along the Namibia border—on the Angolan side—would give South Africa ammunition to claim internationally that UNITA must be included in

any negotiated settlement in Namibia, a perfect pretext to delay even further such a settlement.

Lara also points out that Pretoria has been obsessed with Angola's railways ever since the war in 1976; he believes that South Africa has been at the center of the long-time effort to sabotage the Benguela and Mocamedes rail lines. While the Benguela railway has been out of commission, Zaire and Zambia have been forced to use South Africa's own lines to transport their considerable copper and other strategic mineral exports.

The attacks in Cunene province have also disrupted the economy of the cattle-rearing south, making the already nagging problem of food distribution all the more difficult to solve.

Winning the People

South Africa's most recent efforts to install UNITA in southern Angola come at just the moment when, according to several outside observers who have recently traveled to Angola, MPLA's army, FAPLA, has been achieving some real success in mopping up UNITA's operations in the heavily populated southern-central provinces of Huambo and Bic. These were the

provinces in which UNITA's Savimbi scored his greatest successes during the struggle to decolonize Angola, and it has taken MPLA a long time to win the grudging loyalty of much of the areas population.

But a combination of a successful military operation against UNITA in the area and patient programs to begin the reconstruction of the area has had some effect. The campaign against UNITA began last December, and by April hundreds of thousands of peasants were streaming into villages in Huambo and Bie provinces that were under the control of MPLA. "It seems that UNITA has been reduced to small isolated bands without a command structure," said Paul Fauvet of the Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau information center in London recently, on his return from a trip to the region. Fauvet traveled with other British observers, sometimes moving along lonely dirt roads in the south at night, without meeting any UNITA opposition. "UNITA is cattle-raiding to keep themselves going."

Fauvet said that a flood of people is now streaming out of the countryside. "They were emaciated, diseased, and in rags," he told reporters in London. "They are putting a severe strain on the social services of these areas, and the central government is calling in the Red Cross to assist. It is clear that UNITA can no longer provide basic supplies for them."

MPLA officials estimate that in the two provinces alone, more than 800,000 people have fled UNITA-controlled areas in recent months. But with UNITA on the verge of disappearing as a serious political force in south-central Angola, South Africa has taken the offensive in attempting to keep Savimbi's movement alive in southern-most Angola.

Beating Back Invaders

Even there, the South Africans have not operated at will. In June South African forces attempted to capture the town of N'giva to install Savimbi, but fierce fighting at Mongua stopped the South African advance. What must be even more encouraging from the point of view of MPLA's leaders is that their own forces, FAPLA, did all the fighting, without any help from the large contingent of Cuban soldiers still in Angola. "The Angolan government quite deliberately decided that in view of the Afghanistan situation, they did not want to internationalize the conflict," Colin Foy, of England's Keele University, told reporters. Foy also has recently visited Angola.

Still, UNITA's activities have not ceased altogether. In August a fire broke out at the Angolan state oil company installations in Lobito, the port that is the Western-most

terminus of the Benguela Railway, and in Paris, UNITA claimed credit for the sabotage.

Fragile Recovery

The Benguela Railway itself, long a target of UNITA sabotage, is running, although not on as regular a schedule as it did before independence. Black piles of manganese from Zaire are heaped on the piers at Lobito, and Zairean wagons can be seen in Huambo. But the sabotage has had an effect: of the 25 diesel engines running at independence, only five were still in service by January of this year. At the moment the railway carries less than half the tonnage it did in colonial times—48,000 tons a month compared to 100,000 tons a month in 1973.

New diesels are on their way from UN and EEC sources, though, which should improve the service on the line. The railway's administration hopes that by next year the line will be carrying 70,000 tons a month, with a target of 96,000 tons by 1982.

Recovery has been even slower in most other areas of the economy, particularly those economic sectors not involved with the operation of foreign companies. In many factories, production is still less than half its 1973 level, and according to Paul Fauvet, production in the manufacturing industry as a whole has dropped in the first half of 1980.

Many factors contribute to low production levels. Poor stock keeping, cuts in water and electricity, and the lack of spare parts can easily bring a factory to a standstill.

But the single most important immediate factor behind the fall in production appears to be the high rate of absenteeism in many factories. In Textang, Luanda's giant textile factory, absenteeism reached 11 percent in May and 16 percent in June.

This crippling rate of absenteeism cannot simply be ascribed to laziness or indiscipline. The problem is symptomatic of the malaise that the whole economy is struggling under. Some of the workers face great difficulties in just getting to work, with Luanda's transport system overcrowded and too small to meet the demand of its riders.

Food shortages also contribute to absenteeism. With general rationing in the city, and some items such as fresh vegetables still a rarity, many workers will take off for days to go into the countryside to seek food at reasonable prices.

Where there are shortages, there is usually a black market, and Luanda is no exception. In many cases the black market is actually encouraged by the practice many manufacturing firms have of permitting workers to buy more of the firms' products each month than they can actually con-

sume. This is a way of supplementing workers' salaries, because the surplus products are quickly sold on the black market, but the practice is clearly detrimental to the working of a planned economy.

Low industrial production has its worst consequences in the countryside. If there are not enough consumer goods to supply the needs of peasants in the villages, then the peasants will simply refuse to sell—or even to produce—surpluses of food staples, such as corn. "The marketing of peasant produce is the main economic problem," Minister of Planning Roberto de Almeida told Fauvet. Peasants don't want to sell their produce for money if there is nothing to spend the money on, which in Angola is all too often the case.

So the government has initiated schemes to barter basic goods for staples. There have been modest successes. In 1976 and 1977 the peasants hardly brought any corn to market, and in 1978 a mere 1,000 tons was marketed. In 1979 the figure jumped to 10,000 tons. The trend is bringing some satisfaction to government officials, but even during a bad agricultural year before independence, 40,000 tons of corn were marketed each year.

Foreign Companies

Angola has had greater success in dealing with the foreign corporations that dominate the country's foreign currency-generating sectors. Oil production is up to 160,000 barrels a day, and the government of Angola now owns 51 percent of Gulf's Cabinda subsidiary. Relations between Luanda and Gulf remain cordial, and the two are engaged, in some cases with other foreign oil companies, in the search for and exploitation of other oil fields.

So, despite its other economic woes, Angola does register a surplus on its balance of trade, thus allowing it to escape the debt trap that many other developing nations face. Oil accounts for 70 percent of foreign exchange.

Diamonds are Angola's second most important mineral resource, and here too the government has had some success in gaining control of the industry. Before independence Angola enjoyed an 8 percent share of the world diamond market, but production slumped from 2.2 million carats in 1973 to .75 million in 1975. In 1977 the government stepped in, taking over eventually a 77 percent shareholding in Diamang, the diamond mining company, from a number of Portuguese investors. Some Belgian and British interests continue to maintain holdings in the company and the losses of the mid-1970's have now been wiped out, with gems making a strong contribution to the state budget because of a jump in the world market price of

Continued on page 27

Culture:

Boxers Belt Boycott, Protests Silence Singer

One boxing biggy scored a knockout.
 One tennis biggy stayed home.
 One singing biggy faced a boycott.
 And one acting biggy got stoned.

With the appearances in South Africa of boxer Mike Weaver and singer Ray Charles, with the non-appearance of tennis star John McEnroe, with the visit and and drug bust of actor David Carradine, the campaign to isolate South Africa culturally and athletically has been much in the news lately. And while efforts to build the boycott from abroad took something of a beating from Weaver and Company, the Ray Charles visit revealed a new ability to enforce the boycott from inside the apartheid state itself.

The biggest headlines in the US definitely went to the body blow Black American boxer Weaver dealt to the boycott by defending his fragment of the world heavyweight crown in Sun City Bophuthatswana. Sports writers climbed into South Africa's corner with lead paragraph references to the "independent Black republic" in which the fight was staged, followed by a round by round description of the fight. Only persistent readers of newspapers where the editor's scissors spared the final sentences learned that South Africa alone recognizes the "independence" of its Black bantustan.

At least Weaver won the fight. South African Blacks generally deplored the boxer's decision to fight in Sun City, according to a snap survey conducted by the *Post*, South Africa's leading Black-read newspaper. But many also admitted that they enjoyed the prospect of Weaver pummeling South Africa's "great white hope," Gerrie Coetzee.

When Weaver did flatten Coetzee, South African police showed they also attached some symbolic significance to the event. They shot down three Blacks in the townships outside Cape Town. Black activists in the US noted a parallel. Ku Klux Klan lynchings were at one time the predictable aftermath when Joe Louis knocked out white opponents.

Weaver's decision to fight in Sun City was at least partially offset by tennis star John McEnroe's veto of a proposed Sun City glamor match with Bjorn Borg. Partly at the urging of Black tennis great Arthur Ashe, whose own visit to South Africa convinced him of "the horror of apartheid," McEnroe spurned the largest purse ever of-



Ray Charles, second from left, with Ami Artzi and two young admirers.

fered for a tennis match. His stand was hailed at a UN press conference, where Ashe joined ANC representative Johnstone Makatini, several US boycott organizers and South African singer Bea Benjamin in calling on "athletes and entertainers . . . [not to] be used by the South African Government for its own evil purposes."

Just a few days later, however, Weaver showed that he had turned a deaf ear to that appeal. And singer Ray Charles, who was already in South Africa at the time of the press conference, ignored Makatini's call "to stop collaborating . . . and stabbing the aspirations of the people of South Africa in the back and come home."

Charles and Israeli promoter Ami Artzi refused to cut short the concert tour, just as they had refused to bow to similar appeals before it began. But that doesn't mean the tour went off according to schedule.

Even before Charles set out for South Africa, groups inside the country began mobilizing opposition at home and abroad. The Azanian People's Organization

(AZAPO) contacted members of the Black Consciousness Movement in the US and asked them to contact Charles. "I spoke with a man in the office of Ray Charles Enterprises," reported BCM representative Andrew Lukele, "but they were evasive. They said they would get back to us but they never did."

Nevertheless, Charles did get the message loud and clear once he arrived in South Africa. AZAPO leaders contacted his entourage and urged him to cancel or "lose the respect of his Black fans," as publicity secretary George Wauchope explained. AZAPO leaders were particularly outraged by a concert scheduled to take place in Soweto on October 19. Since the apartheid regime banned eighteen Black organizations and jailed more than fifty leading activists three years ago, that date has been known as Black Wednesday. AZAPO and COSAS had planned nationwide events to commemorate the day. And when Charles refused to cancel his appearance, he became

Continued on page 27

Only in South Africa! In few other countries in the world could events combine to create a political leader like 32-year-old Tozamile Botha and then hurl him along the 12-month trajectory that landed him in New York in mid-October.

Botha arrived in the US to speak at the United Nations and launch a nationwide speaking tour. Just a year earlier, he had been virtually unknown even in his own country. Then, in October 1979, he helped form and became the first president of the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organization (PEBCO). Within weeks he was regularly addressing crowds numbering 10,000 or more. A few weeks more and he had become the central figure in a walkout by Black workers at Ford's Cortina assembly plant outside Port Elizabeth, a strike labeled in the South African press as "the opening of a new chapter in South African labor relations," led by a man suddenly being called "a national figure fast assuming international status." In reward for this the South African government promptly conferred upon Botha the status of an outcast—detention, house arrest, a banning order that prevented him from returning to work or attending and addressing public meetings.

Three months later, having been reduced to peddling fruits and vegetables in the street to make a living, Botha fled secretly across the border into Lesotho. Thus began a new opportunity to speak for the political aspirations of his people, this time in the international arena associated with the African National Congress (ANC).

It was in this capacity that Tozamile Botha arrived in New York and spoke with *Southern Africa*, sharing his perceptions of the present situation inside his country and his hopes and analysis of its future course.

While inside South Africa, Botha rose to prominence as the leader of a mass organization, publicly committed to a struggle for "peaceful change in South Africa." Since arriving in Lesotho, he has emerged as the most prominent and articulate recent exile in a liberation movement driven underground two decades earlier and committed for almost as long to



South African labor leader Tozamile Botha

Strike Leader Interviewed

a strategy of armed struggle.

Botha does not consider these two allegiances in the least bit contradictory. He sees the goals as identical, the strategies as complementary.

"These are intertwined," Botha said, explaining the relationship between armed actions such as the dramatic ANC bombing of South Africa's vital coal-to-oil SASOL plants and the everyday battles of boycotts, strikes, and demonstrations. "The people inside the country right now believe that

their liberation will come through armed struggle and also through economic struggle.

Concessions Rejected

"When the workers mobilize themselves against the monopoly capitalists, that is how they will achieve their goal," Botha continued. "Also, the students now are completely up in arms against the enemy, demanding total scrapping of 'Bantu Education' which is not only an educational

demand but a political demand. The fact that there were celebrations after the SASOL explosions is a sign that people approve of such operations and they need more to take place. In other words, this is one struggle with different tactics but quite closely related."

Despite the many years that the organization has been banned in South Africa, its statements and even its name outlawed from print, Botha maintains that the ANC retains "a lot of popular support inside the country." As evidence of this, in addition to the celebrations that greeted ANC's bold attack on SASOL, he points to the current campaign for the release of Nelson Mandela and other imprisoned leaders.

"At least it's a sign," he explained, "that people recognize the fact that their leaders are in Robben Island and others are in exile. And therefore they cannot rest until a meaningful change has been secured in South Africa. A meaningful change in South Africa would be the total scrapping of all the apartheid policies. All the other concessions that the government is making are seen as a means of deceiving Blacks and the outside world to believe that there is change in South Africa."

Now that he must number himself among the South African leaders in exile, Botha has taken on the task of countering that campaign of deceit in the outside world. It would be difficult to find anyone much better qualified for the job. The political activities that thrust him first into the headlines and then into exile constituted a frontal challenge to several of the "reforms" offered as evidence of change by South Africa and the US corporations investing there.

Local Organizations

PEBCO was formed specifically, he explained as "a body alternative to the Community Councils which are imposed by the government on the people." The Ford strike erupted at a plant that had already seen many of the labor reforms advocated by the government's Wiehahn Commission (see *Southern Africa*, June, 1979) and the "Sullivan Principles" of US corporations.

Even before PEBCO was founded, the Black people of Port Elizabeth had shown what they thought of the government's Community Councils. They had demonstrated their appreciation for this token vehicle of Black political expression mainly by having nothing to do with it. Less than 10,000 people, a scant four percent of the 250,000 eligible voters, bothered to cast ballots for the first Community Council in 1978. Within four weeks of its formation a year later, PEBCO was regularly drawing crowds larger than that for most of its rallies. The new organization overshot its goal of 10,000 paid-up members in the first

month by over 100 percent.

Starting with a protest against "unsightly electricity sub-stations erected in residents' yards" in the Zwide township, PEBCO's political goals grew as rapidly as its membership. Soon it was calling for "one municipality for the whole of Port Elizabeth [Black and white]," for "an end to all discriminatory and oppressive legislation," for Black participation "in decision-making on all matters affecting people in South Africa." It was leading the fight to prevent removal of the entire population of a 60-year-old Black township to an isolated site more acceptable to apartheid strategists. It was battling against proposed increases in rents and bus fare. And Botha was talking about establishing some of the types of community service organizations previously espoused by Steve Biko—"for instance starting clinics, open classes, drama and poetry reading."

To win PEBCO's demands, "we rely on our numbers and our economic strength," Botha told a hall packed with residents of the threatened Walmer township. If I [the Black South African] don't go to work tomorrow, the country will be in trouble. If I don't buy at their shops, the country will be in trouble. I am a human being and I will be treated as such—not as a piece of furniture, to be moved around at will."

Ford Strike

When the Ford Motor Company that had hired Botha as a trainee draughtsman decided to move him off the payroll, charging that he was spending too much time on his political activities, the company quickly learned what Botha was talking about.

Ford, which had long prided itself as being "in the forefront of enlightened industrial relations even before Wiehahn," suddenly found it had a strike on its hands. Nor did its past efforts to cultivate a working relationship with the United Auto Workers (an unregistered Black union) pay off in a painless settlement. When the UAW demonstrated its allegiance to the government's stricture against mixing unions and politics, Ford's Black workers took their allegiance elsewhere. They turned to PEBCO, to which most of them already belonged in any case.

"PEBCO maintains that the problems of workers do not end at the workplace door," Botha explained to *Southern Africa*. "That is why during the strikes, when the union refused to participate even to support the workers financially, PEBCO took upon itself the duty to raise funds for the workers and also to take actions. For instance, it called shop boycotts and boycotts of Ford products."

The strike dragged on for eight weeks before Ford agreed to reinstate all the workers who had walked out. Portentous

headlines declared that Ford's "better idea" had been shattered, that the "first flashpoint of the '80s" foretold "new Black worker power."

"While many employers still hope to avoid dealing with representative black trade unions," wrote a *Rand Daily Mail* labor reporter, "Ford faced a problem one step down the road—black workers turning to political organization because they felt the union was not doing enough for them."

And as soon as they returned to work, Ford workers dealt another blow to the company and to the Wiehahn Commission's implicit promise that unions could become a mechanism for channeling rather than expressing Black protest.

"Immediately after the strike," Botha recalled, "the Ford workers passed a vote of no confidence in the leadership of the UAW. When the union leaders refused to give over the office, the Ford workers decided this October to form their own union, the Motor Assembly and Component Workers' Union (MACWU)." Leaders of the new union stated from the outset that they would confront broader issues such as housing and living conditions, and implementation of the Sullivan Code.

Sullivan Code—Not Enough

This last demand by no means indicates acceptance of the Sullivan Principles as a genuine program for breaking down apartheid, according to Botha. It merely reflects an understanding that Ford's failure even to live up to the Code's pallid promises offers valuable leverage.


"The fact that the strike started at Ford, despite the fact that Ford is one of the 'progressive American companies,' showed the complete inadequacy of the Sullivan Code," Botha explained. "There is still job reservation at Ford [reserving certain jobs for 'whites only']. There is still reservation on promotions and they still won't put Blacks in positions where they supervise a single white. Blacks still are not trained for some technical jobs."

In sum, Botha contends, although Ford is proud of its record as a front-runner in the implementation of the Sullivan Code, "the strike was enough to say that Ford does not do enough." And there is little reason to expect that it will in the future. A report by a team from the South African Institute of Race Relations completed just before the strikes broke out offers similar conclusions.

"The evidence from the company figures," the report said of Ford, "as well as from union officials, clearly indicates that the position of the majority of non-white workers has deteriorated substantially since 1971 in real terms." And a Black jour-

Continued on page 26

Guerrilla Chronology



This history of reported guerrilla attacks has been prepared by Richard Leonard for his forthcoming book, *South Africa at War* (Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill); it is based on a chronology that appeared in Glen Moss' book, *The Wheels Turn* (Geneva, Switzerland, IUEF), with the addition of several other reported incidents and an updating to include more recent events.

The incidents fall into a range of different categories: from attacks on police stations and sabotage of railway lines, to clashes with police in the rural areas. The very nature of "reported" incidents, however, restricts the scope of this chronology. Reports in the press are often based on information provided by the police and there are indications, including statements by police officials, that not all incidents are publicly reported.

We list below incidents reported from October 1976 through June 1980:

—October 24, 1976: A "petrol bomb" attack extensively damaged the Jabulani police station in Soweto.

—October 24, 1976: An explosion at the railway station at Mzimhlope, near Johannesburg.

—November 30, 1976: Two police seriously injured by a hand grenade while apprehending four ANC guerrillas near Bordergate on the border with Swaziland; the guerrillas escaped, but one, Mosima Sexwale, was later caught and convicted in the Pretoria twelve trial and sentenced to eighteen years imprisonment.

—December 7, 1976: Isaac Seko suffers the loss of one hand and injures several people in the detonation of a bomb in a Johannesburg restaurant; it was, he testified, an individual act carried out in anger at the police shootings in Soweto. He was sentenced to a twelve year prison term.

—January 1, 1977: A bomb exploded in a house, said to be a "bomb factory," in Soweto, killing one person and injuring five (see the following incident).

—January 7, 1977: A bomb exploded on a railway line near Soweto. John Phala and five others charged and convicted in this and the incident above as ANC adherents. One of the six, ANC veteran Elmon Malele, age 61, died from a head blow while under police detention.

—January 19, 1977: A railway worker killed and another injured in a bomb explosion near Krugersdorp, west of Johannesburg.

—January 28, 1977: Police discover an explosives cache in Soweto.

—February 22, 1977: Police discover an arms cache at Graaf Reinet in the Cape.

—March 7, 1977: A Pretoria restaurant destroyed in a bomb explosion.

—June 13, 1977: Two men killed and two injured in a warehouse on Goch Street, Johannesburg, by ANC guerrilla Mondy Motloaung fleeing from police; Motloaung suffered brain damage from being beaten at the time of arrest and was declared unfit to stand trial. Solomon Mahlangu was later hanged for "common cause" in the attack, and another guerrilla escaped.

—June 14, 1977: Arms and pamphlets seized by police in Soweto.

—June 15, 1977: A bomb exploded on the railway line between Umlazi and Durban.

—June 27, 1977: Police report the capture of three guerrillas with arms and explosives when a truck overturned in the Transvaal.

—July 26, 1977: Two police wounded in a shootout with an ANC guerrilla (identified as Nicholas Molokane, a teacher) in a house in Dobsonville, east of Johannesburg, and the guerrilla was killed.

—September 9, 1977: Leonard Nkosi, a former ANC member turned Security Policeman, shot and killed at his house near Durban in what was said to be ANC retaliation.

—September 27, 1977: Arms and grenades found by police near Swaziland and two guerrillas arrested.

September 28, 1977: Two guerrillas captured near Mafeking (near the border with Botswana in the western Transvaal) and an arms cache discovered nearby.

—November 2, 1977: Police clash with an ANC group near Pongola (on the Swaziland border in northern Natal): one guerrilla, identified as Toto Skhosana, killed and one policeman injured; another guerrilla, Aaron Siphon Madondo, cap-

tured and sentenced to twelve years in prison after trial.

—November 25, 1977: A bomb exploded at the Carlton Centre, a modern office complex in central Johannesburg; seventeen people injured and damage estimated at \$65,000.

—November 30, 1977: A bomb exploded on a Pretoria-bound train.

—December 12, 1977: A bomb exploded at the Germiston police station, southeast of Johannesburg.

—December 14, 1977: A bomb exploded at the parking lot at the Benoni railway station, east of Johannesburg, damaging a number of cars.

—December 22, 1977: An unexploded bomb found in the OK Bazaars department store in Roodepoort, west of Johannesburg.

—January, 1978: A former ANC member and state trial witness shot and seriously wounded in Durban; ANC retaliation suspected.

—February 2, 1978: Bomb exploded at the Daveyton police station, east of Johannesburg.

—February, 1978: Police and guerrillas clash near the Swaziland border and two police reported killed. Police minister Kruger reports similar, undisclosed battles in the eastern Transvaal.

—February, 1978: A large bomb discovered in a Johannesburg office block.

—March 3, 1978: A man killed in Port Elizabeth by a bomb that he was apparently carrying.

—March 10, 1978: A bomb explosion outside the Port Elizabeth Bantu Affairs Administration Board offices; one woman killed, three people injured.

—April, 1978: Police announce that Abel Mthembu, once an ANC member, who was a state witness at the Rivonia trial, 1964, when Nelson Mandela and other ANC leaders were sentenced to life imprisonment and in other ANC trials since, was shot and killed in Soweto; ANC retaliation suspected.

—April, 1978: Lloyd Ndaba, a right-wing KwaZulu politician suspected of links with the Bureau of State Security, killed in Soweto.

—June 25, 1978: Detective Sergeant Orghan Chapi killed in Soweto; described in the press as "Soweto's Most Feared Policeman" he allegedly played a leading role in assaults on students in protests.

—June, 1978: Bhekithemba Mayema, a black employee of the Bureau of State Security (BOSS), found shot to death in Durban.

—August 1, 1978: Clash between at least three ANC guerrillas and an elite police counterinsurgency unit aided by Bophuthatswana police near the Botswana border; one guerrilla reported killed. The ANC reported ten police killed in the clash and that police used napalm and defoliants.

—October 27, 1978: Security forces clash with three guerrillas in Bophuthatswana; two guerrillas reported killed, one escaped, and large arms cache reported found.

—November 22, 1978: Farm in the Tshipse area, in northern Transvaal, attacked by an armed man and the owner wounded; alleged attacker later killed by police.

—November 30, 1978: A police sergeant seriously wounded in a clash with three guerrillas in the district, in northern Transvaal; guerrillas escaped.

—December 5, 1978: Alleged PAC member Kenneth Mkwanazi shot and killed by police, reportedly when trying to detonate a hand grenade during a police raid on a house in Soweto.

—December 7, 1978: A bomb exploded at the Urban Bantu Council chambers in Soweto.

—December 16, 1978: Railway line between Berlin and Fort Jackson in the Eastern Cape sabotaged by a bomb blast.

—December 27, 1978: Police find a small arms cache in Bochaville township near Bloerfontein.

—January 13, 1979: Gun battle between police and guerrillas in the Derdepoort area, western Transvaal, near the Botswana border; one guerrilla reported killed, one captured, others escaped; arms cache found nearby.

—January 22, 1979: Bomb explosion near the New Canada station on the rail line to Johannesburg.

—January 24, 1979: Unexploded bomb found at Pierie station in the Eastern Cape.

—April 23, 1979: Unexploded bomb found on the railway line between Vereeniging and Johannesburg.

—May 5, 1979: ANC guerrillas attack the Moroka police station in Soweto; one policeman killed, others wounded, police records destroyed.

—May 15, 1979: Bomb explodes partially in the Supreme Court in Cape Town; police announce an ANC guerrilla is being held in the incident.

—May 16, 1979: A large number of pamphlets distributed in Soweto calling for support for the ANC's guerrilla struggle.

—November 2, 1979: ANC guerrillas attack the Orlando police station in Soweto; two black policemen killed.

—November 12, 1979: Grenades thrown into the home of a Black member of the Security Police in Ermelo, eastern Transvaal.

—January 26, 1980: Three ANC guerrillas take 25 hostages in attack on a Volkskas Bank branch at Silverton, outside Pretoria; all three guerrillas and two hostages killed, one policeman wounded, when police retake the building.

—February, 1980: Police station at Soekmekaar, northern Transvaal, attacked with small arms, reportedly AK 47, fire.

—February 19, 1980: Police report the discovery of a large arms cache in Natal Province.

—April 4, 1980: Eleven ANC guerrillas attacked the Booysen police station, outside Johannesburg, with rockets and automatic weapons; no injuries reported.

—June 1, 1980: ANC guerrillas launched simultaneous sabotage attacks against the SASOL oil-from-coal plant and the NATREF refinery at Sasolburg, outside Johannesburg, the SASOL II plant at Secunda, and offices of the Fluor Corporation (US) near Johannesburg; \$7.3 million damage reported at the Sasolburg installations, slight damage at SASOL II, and two bombs defused at the Fluor offices.

Holiday Gift Problems?
Give Southern Africa.

Promises, Promises . . .

by Catharine Macdonald

Residents of Soweto protested outside the township's council chambers on October 15, expressing their anger over the visit of Pieter Koornhof (a.k.a. "Piet Promises"), the Minister of Race Relations, and also over the council's decision to impose a steep rent hike.

But the day's activities did not begin when Koornhof's helicopter touched down at the council chambers. Early that morning, at 3:56 a.m., two bombs exploded, severing the main rail line that links Soweto to Johannesburg. Train service for approximately 150,000 commuters was suspended for several hours.

South African police claimed they defused eight other explosive charges filled with Russian-made TNT, and that they found ANC literature near the scene of the blast. To date, neither ANC nor any other group has taken responsibility for the bombings.

The explosion disrupted commuter service on the same day as the planned demonstration and helped in a dramatic way to publicize and enforce the work stayaway called for by the Women's Federation of South Africa (which is backed by the Azanian Peoples Organization, Azapo).


"Koornhof, return to your country"

By early afternoon, after several clashes between angry demonstrators and riot police, the crowd outside the chambers where Koornhof was scheduled to speak had swelled to 3000.

Apparently that convinced officers to cancel a planned motorcade through Soweto streets. Instead Koornhof arrived by helicopter, with riot police clearing a landing area by charging into the crowd swinging clubs and using attack dogs to push the people away from the community council building. As Koornhof stepped out of his helicopter, police immediately fired tear gas cannisters into the crowd, opening a path so that the minister could make his way into the building. During his speech, Koornhof was seen to wipe tears from his eyes, caused less by emotion than the liberal amounts of tear gas used a short distance away.

Koornhof had come to receive the "freedom of Soweto" (equivalent to honorary citizenship in the township) from the "mayor." But the demonstrators

Soweto's "Mayor" David Tebehali was also a target for protesters



challenged the right of Soweto Mayor David Tebehali, or the controversial community council he heads to speak for Soweto. The council was sponsored and installed in office by the government after an election boycotted by more than 90 percent of Soweto's qualified voters, and has very minimal authority, unlike white city councils. In population terms Soweto is the largest city in South Africa—with well over one million residents. But it has almost no services, most houses have no piped in water or electricity, there is not a single department store or factory in this "city." It was built, in fact, simply as a labor camp, whose residents are expected to service the very prosperous white city of Johannesburg—the largest white city in Africa.

Echoing the feeling of many Soweto residents, one demonstrator asked, "How can he be made an honorary citizen if we who live here are not even citizens?"

Koornhof's agenda while in Soweto also included the unveiling of his plans for community improvements as part of Pretoria's overall strategy for the removal of "petty" apartheid. The plans, which Koornhof described as the removal of "irritating, unnecessary and hurtful discrimination from the statute books," are a further implementation of the Riekert Commission findings.

Koornhof's promises included a \$200,000 allocation to be used in a "short term development plan for the upgrading of services in greater Soweto." Construction of new hospitals was mentioned along with the creation of "services industrial zones" for

the Soweto, Diepmeadow and Dobsonville areas. Black entrepreneurs would be aided by the government through the creation of a development bank, with its aim specifically to encourage the growth of a black entrepreneurial class.

The frustration evinced by the October 15 demonstration was caused to a considerable degree by the whopping 76 percent raise approved by the community council. Adding to anger over the increase was the information that some of that money would be funnelled through the administering boards to help finance rapidly pro-apartheid South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA), a Broederbond front organization (see separate article this issue).

Protests against increased rents have erupted in other areas of South Africa as well as Soweto.

Paralleling actions taken in Port Elizabeth, the Soweto Civic Association (SCA), represented by the Committee of 10, has gone to court to block the rent hikes. An extract from their court statement reads, Soweto Council or the West Rand Administration Board cannot act arbitrarily by locking houses and throwing people out. People have to be given the opportunity to make their representation to the township manager and the Housing Committee. The trial will be heard in November.

Additionally the SCA has promised to contest in court any threat of eviction due to a refusal to pay the extra amount charged for rent. To fund the legal costs, an Anti-Rent Fighting Fund has been created,

to be handled by Committee of 10 member Leonard Mosala.

The court actions are in concert with resolutions passed by the SCA on August 25, not to pay the increased rents or to ride the buses if fares are raised by the transit company, Putco. These resolutions were approved by all major Black organizations operating in Soweto with the exception of Inkatha—the ethnically based organization run by Chief Buthelezi of Kwazulu.

"The racist regime and the puppet community councils are not going to solve our problems," explained secretary general George Wauchope of Azapo. "Let us galvanize our forces and mobilize and act not only with one voice but with one action to resist the pending increases."

Coupled with the announced rent rise, residents of Soweto and other townships throughout South Africa were hit last spring with bus fare increases. Bus riders boycotted transit companies so successfully that the increase was temporarily suspended in some areas. Most commuters continue in the boycott effort, vowing to resist until fares are dropped back to pre-May levels. The Bus Action Committee of Nyanga, Langa, and Guguletu, outside Cape Town felt impelled to call off the boycott in that area recently. Organizers explained they feared people might get killed in fighting between boycotters and commuters who continued riding the buses. They did win some concessions before cancelling the boycott. The company promised to seek subsidies from other sources as a way to hold fares down and to extend lines further into the communities being served. Meanwhile, after sixteen weeks, at least half of the Black commuters who normally ride the bus system in Port Elizabeth were continuing to share rides, walk, or sleep overnight at the workplace rather than break the boycott.

"Equal education for all in the country"

The popular anger manifested in Koorhof's reception and the ongoing bus boycotts is also reflected in the schools.

Student protests have mounted through 1980 and by midyear some 100,000 students were refusing to attend classes. The protest was continued after a winter break in July. Most "colored" students returned to classes since some of their demands had been met. But African students announced that they would continue their boycott of classes until demands presented by various parent and student councils had been met.

On September 9, Ferdie Hartzenburg, Minister of (Black) Education and Training, responded to the renewal of the boycott by announcing that he would shut down indefinitely schools where protests persisted. By October 1, 58,000 students

were still out and 77 schools had been closed, most of them in the Cape area, but including eighteen in Kimberley, three in Bloemfontein, and one in Soweto. Boycott activity also continued in the Ciskei and began to increase in some of the lower grade schools.

Following the shutdown, a confrontation between students and police occurred outside Kimberley, South Africa's diamond producing center in the northern Cape Province. Students attempted to meet face to face with the Education minister so that their demands would be heard. Many students were arrested and injured in the clash, and students angrily denounced Hartzenburg's continued use of police to arbitrate differences, instead of agreeing to meet with the student and parent committees. Hartzenburg justified his actions by making veiled references to "certain individuals and pseudo committees" who were inciting the students and interfering with the chance of conciliation.

One such "pseudo committee" is the Parents' Action Committee in Port Elizabeth. In complete agreement with the boycott, the committee sent the education minister a list of short term demands: that students who had participated in the boycotts be reinstated without penalty; that the government release all detainees associated with the boycotts; that official recognition be granted to student and parent councils; that school facilities be improved and repaired; and that the government declare its intention to abandon the separate education system.

Hartzenburg refused to recognize the Parents' Action Committee and would not meet with its representatives or consider their demands. "What we are trying to impress on the government is that this is not like any other previous strike," one parent said. "The students are much more determined."

The government still budgets eight times as much for each white student as it does for each Black. So protestors are not easily mollified by promises that new schools will be constructed and that someday whites will not be the only ones to receive education and textbooks free of charge. As one student explained, this is "too little, too late."

For the future, Hartzenburg has stated that schools will only be reopened in 1981 if communities provide assurances, such as a promise to end the boycott.

Meanwhile, the government continues its strongarm tactics, relying on the police to intimidate students, force people out of their homes and harass commuters for finding alternate ways of getting to work when the transit costs are too high. And the protests also continue, halted neither by the threat of force nor by Piet Promises and his pledges of reform. □

Broederbond Front Receives Soweto Funds

by Tony Cavin

South Africa's exclusive Broederbond has been making headlines recently—not all of them favorable. First the organization—made up exclusively of male Afrikaners—elected a new president, Professor Carel Boshoff, in early September. Then the secret society found itself embroiled in a scandal involving misuse of funds.

Boshoff, takes over the post from outgoing Administrator General of Namibia, Gerrit Viljoen, who has been appointed to Prime Minister P.W. Botha's cabinet. According to South African press reports, Boshoff criticizes Botha's government for having made what he feels are too many moves towards integration. "The next logical step," says Boshoff of the prime minister's reforms, "would be [for Blacks] to claim full freedom of movement, full land ownership and full voting rights."

Boshoff was recently elected chairman of another Broederbond organization, the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA), a think tank that does pro-apartheid research in Pretoria. SABRA has been identified with the extreme right wing of Afrikanerdom since the period when it was headed by Verwoerd himself.

It seems that some officials in the government departments that administer Black affairs are also members of the Broederbond, and have been allocating a portion of the rents and other money collected from Blacks living in urban townships (about \$52,000) to SABRA—in all, the funds allocated provide about one-quarter of SABRA's yearly income. When this was revealed, reactions ranged from opposition member of parliament Helen Suzman terming it "disgraceful," to Ntatho Motlana, leader of a Soweto campaign against proposed rent increases, saying "you must be joking," but adding that he knew "that most of our rent goes to pay the salaries of the horde of white officials who are appointed to run our lives." South African law requires that money from the rents paid by Blacks in the urban townships may only be used for programs that aid Blacks. Some Afrikaner officials say that SABRA's work has been to promote better race relations

Continued on page 27

Guerrilla Sympathizer to Die



Markus Kateka, received the death sentence for the "crime" of having SWAPO sympathies.

In early November, the Fourth Committee, the Trusteeship Committee, of the United Nations General Assembly held hearings on "The Question of Namibia." Focusing on the status of Namibia as an international territory illegally occupied by South Africa, the committee heard testimony from a wide range of experts discussing the present UN negotiations, the internal situation and South Africa's occupation of the Territory. William Johnston, president of the Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa presented the following testimony at those hearings:

by William Johnston

A Namibian man, Markus Kateka, has been sentenced to death under terms of South Africa's Terrorism Act by a South African court sitting in the International Territory of Namibia.

Markus Kateka is a farm laborer. He was found guilty in the Supreme Court in Windhoek on October 13, 1980. His "crime": he did not inform his employer of the presence of armed men on the property. A fellow worker, Hendrik Kariseb, received a 10-year sentence for the same "offense."

An attack had occurred on the farm owner's house in the Grootfontein district of northern Namibia last February 17. No member of the family was injured. At the trial the final witness called by the State prosecutor was a South African Police major from the security branch. He was allowed to recount the chronicle of insurgent attacks on farms in the Territory, going back to December 1975, none of which had any relation to the defendants. *The Windhoek Advertiser* reports: "Farmworkers must be made to realise that it is their duty to report the presence of armed insurgents and that they may not get involved with SWAPO," said Justice J J Strydom." The *Windhoek Observer* says in relating Judge Strydom's

pronouncement: "It was axiomatic to expect farm workers not to associate with insurgents. Farmers were also entitled, he said, to such protection as the Courts could provide in the form of a deterrent."

On October 15, Ida Jimmy, a SWAPO activist, was found guilty by another Windhoek court of inciting or encouraging people to harbor or aid terrorists. She was given seven years imprisonment because of an address she gave at a rally. *The Windhoek Advertiser* reports: "In summing up, magistrate E Brandt said that the speech had to be seen as a whole in the context of the conflict situation in the Territory at the moment."

The exercise of South Africa's illegal laws in Namibia is nothing new. Pretoria has detained, tortured, banned, imprisoned, shot and hanged Namibians throughout the course of its rule in the International Territory. But these savage sentences coming at this particular time are meant to drive home a lesson. In a completely unrelated case at this moment, the defendant in a murder case in Windhoek has been granted leave to appeal. Markus Kateka has been denied

permission to appeal. His imminent hanging is a political act. It is the deterrent, the supreme deterrent, aimed to warn Namibians that they can expect no other rule but that of Pretoria.

The death sentence pronounced on Markus Kateka, the punitive measures against Ida Jimmy and Hendrik Kariseb are arrogant assertions by the gang in Pretoria that it has no intention of relinquishing its control over Namibia. These perpetrations and all the other acts visited upon the people of Namibia are messages aimed at the lawful authority over the Territory, the United Nations. Even as the UN negotiating team was engaged in discussions in Pretoria two weeks ago, the South African Defence Force struck again into southern Angola, killing both SWAPO and Angolan soldiers—underscoring Pretoria's defiance.

So far little has been forthcoming about the results of the very recent talks in Pretoria. Confusing leaks give the impression that something was accomplished. An official South African press release states that Pretoria's foreign minister "believed although no substantive progress has been made in the talks in the sense that the implementation of the settlement plan was any closer—he nevertheless felt there could be some progress towards United Nations meeting some of South Africa's demands regarding UN impartiality."

Pretoria has been harping on the issue of "impartiality" for months. It is an effort to deny SWAPO its standing as sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia—a status granted by the United Nations itself. "Impartiality" serves as yet another stalling tactic. "Impartiality" is the watchword in a campaign to browbeat the UN into wavering in its decisiveness as the lawful authority over Namibia. (What indeed does the South African foreign minister mean when he says "progress

towards United Nations meeting some of South Africa's demands regarding UN impartiality?") "Impartiality" is a manoeuvre to draw attention away from the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435, away from the very heart of the matter which is South Africa's illegal occupation of the Territory.

All the while Pretoria is strengthening its grip and that of its surrogates in the Territory. It is accelerating its promotion of its hand-picked Democratic Turnhalle Alliance and has installed the Council of Ministers as a quasi-government in Windhoek. This outfit has recently retained attorneys to represent it in Washington, DC and caused to be set up a US-South West Africa/Namibia Trade and Cultural Council in the US capital.

Pretoria has too established a military entity for the Territory called the South West Africa Defence Force. A proclamation by the South African President last month stated that all males 16 to 25 years of age must register for military service. Those who have applied for identity documents under a law imposed last year are deemed to have been registered. There is no distinction by "ethnicity," so that there will be after January 1, 1981 another efflux of young men from Namibia to avoid the draft. Brother will not fight brother.

Another theme has become evident. Pretoria and its friends are pushing the idea of an all-parties conference on Namibia. The purpose is to obtain "equality" for the thoroughly unrepresentative DTA chieftains—and to demote SWAPO. Such a conference has another aim: to work out a binding constitution for the future Namibian state in order to entrench white minority and South African and other international business, industrial and mining interests. This scheme is inspired by last year's Lancaster House conference. A fixed constitution would strait-jacket the Namibian nation before it is born. It is a method devised by Pretoria or by its friends who know full well that SWAPO's support among the Namibian people is growing stronger by the day despite increased repression by the South African Defence Force, the South African Police and Pretoria's administrative apparatus in the International Territory. A constitutional conference is directly counter to the United Nations plan which calls for UN-supervised and controlled elections, after which the people of Namibia would work out their own form of government.

It is three-and-a-half years since the world was started down the garden path of "delicate negotiations" about Namibia's independence. Enough is enough. The people of Namibia have suffered far too long. The world must act decisively to assure their freedom. □

Editor Flees

Africa News Service

"The intensity of the war and the amount of the subsequent bloodshed are always on the increase," Namibian Bishop Kleopas Dumeni recently told the Lutheran World Federation executive committee. "Many church members are in jail all over the country."

Dumeni noted that "the bulk of struggle for Namibia is being waged" in the home area of the Evangelical Lutheran Ovambo-kavango Church, which he heads. He deplored South Africa for creating a ministerial council to govern the territory, and for refusing to agree to United Nations supervised independence elections.

In June, Dumeni's name appeared on a "death list" of prominent Namibians allegedly targeted for assassination by a squad organized by or supported by the South African government. The list was first published by an Ovambo-language newspaper, Omukwetu, and subsequent accounts were carried by a missionary newspaper and the Windhoek Observer, an independent English-language weekly. Last month, Omukwetu editor Ambrosius W. Amutenja fled to Namibia, and the Observer carried the following story on his escape and the events surrounding it:

Lubango, Angola—A newspaper editor from South West Africa [Namibia], Mr. Ambrosius W. Amutenja, 29, has arrived here after a dramatically successful escape bid.

Sipping a farewell drink in the Windhoek Press Club, the bearded journalist was a troubled man who had already then, unknown to his colleagues, laid his plans for the big escape. In his pocket he had documents which were taken from a corpse and which reportedly contain the names of those prominent people who are on the death list of an execution squad, code-named "Koevoet," or "One-Way."

The full escape story was given to the *Observer* here after Amutenja first had a talk with Mr. Peter Nanyemba, Secretary of Defense for SWAPO [South West African People's Organization]. When the editor of *Omukwetu*, one of the most widely-read publications in South West Africa, faced Mr. Nanyemba, the two of them shook hands warmly.

Amutenja knew that his time was up when he published, as the *Observer* did

later, a death list of names of about 50 prominent people to be eliminated. According to the allegations contained in these documents, such people as Mr. David Sheehama and Mr. Matheus Elago, as well as many other prominent business, professional, and church personalities, had to be assassinated.

Mysteriously enough, Sheehama and Elago were killed shortly afterwards. Sheehama was a millionaire.

After leaving Windhoek, Amutenja took refuge with SWAPO guerrillas inside of South West Africa for about ten weeks. He told SWAPO's war newspaper, the *Combatant*, that he could not be taken into Angola immediately, for at that time South Africa was in the process of launching its big invasion in the south of Angola.

Related Amutenja: "I was escorted by nine soldiers before we went to collect three other civilians, being one man and two women. From there the number of soldiers increased to 11. After covering a distance of about 30 kilometers (18 miles), they increased to 30, then to about 200 later on.

"In our journey, which took nine days, we did not come across a single South African soldier. One of the guerrillas assured me that they would see that we reached our destination safely.

Amutenja published a reprint in *Omukwetu* which suggested the existence of an execution squad [comprised of] policemen and soldiers. According to his information, the South Africans [were using] an impostor known as Leevy Naftali Amadhila. This impostor led a band of people supposed to have been guerrillas, but who, in fact, were not. Amadhila, who is generally known by the name of Kamongwa, died in a road accident. One of the hospital personnel at Oshakati, took the list from the corpse and handed it over to Amutenja.

Recently the court conducted an enquiry into the death of Mr. Matheus Elago. Right in Oshakati, and during the night, a landmine was placed behind one of his vehicles. The court never heard evidence as to what type of landmine it was, and could not arrive at a finding.

In the case of Mr. David Sheehama, a millionaire businessman of Ombalantu, his attackers had struck on the night of March 13. He was made to lie on the floor and six rounds were fired into him. As yet, no enquiry has been held. □

Inside Mozambique's Re-education Camps

Barbara and Allen Isaacman are long-time observers of Mozambique's political development. Frequent visitors, Barbara, an attorney, and Allen, a professor of African history, returned to Mozambique for six weeks this summer. They travelled widely throughout northern Mozambique, visiting re-education centers that are being transformed into communal villages. The Isaacman's worked in Mozambique in 1978 and 1979, Barbara as a teacher of law and consultant to the United Nations on the status of Mozambican women, Allen as a professor of African Studies at the University.

Sebastiao Facucane and Azarias Nyantumbo were typical of the men we met at the Msawize re-education center. We were the first foreign journalists to visit Msawize, or any other of the centers housing persons detained for political offenses; we talked to many of the inmates, without interpreters, and people spoke openly about their past and their present.

Facucane told us he had served in the Portuguese secret police (PIDE) for more than fifteen years interrogating Mozambicans accused of nationalist sympathies. Nyantumbo had volunteered for the elite Portuguese commando force responsible for numerous atrocities against the civilian population, including the notorious massacre at Wiriyamu.

We had heard rumors and read Western press allegations about harsh conditions and brutality in Mozambique's re-education centers. Conditions which invited comparison, it was said, with Siberian labor camps. What we actually saw at Msawize, when we arrived there after a long dusty ride by Land Rover, was completely unexpected. The sentries at the rope gate were detainees, and the only weapon we noticed throughout our visit was in the hands of a camp resident going off to hunt for the center's food. The center had no armed guards, no dogs, no barbed wire fences, and no cells.

The center's thirty-three year old commandant and his eight assistants mingled easily with the detainees and expressed no concern that their families lived less than 300 yards from the prisoners' barracks. When we pressed him about the lax security, he acknowledged that when the center had first opened in 1977, there had been a



Sentries at the rope gate entrance to Msawize

number of unsuccessful escapes. The remoteness of the center and the speed with which neighboring peasants reported fugitives to authorities soon convinced the residents of the futility of such attempts.

The political background of the prisoners at Msawize makes it unique. When we spoke with detainees who had been held at other centers, we learned that most had been arrested for theft or related crimes. Ramon Sainda, a merchant caught selling stolen property, and Ricardo Mungoy, accused of embezzling \$12,000 from the factory he managed, were typical of the residents at the Chibutu center, while at Inhassane most were "marginals"—unemployed petty criminals—detained for theft, adultery and vagrancy.

Co-operative Brigades

Nevertheless, conditions at the various centers are remarkably similar. Inmates are organized into a series of brigades. Brigade members live and work together, are responsible for each other's health and welfare and for deciding how fellow members who infringe the camp codes should be disciplined.

A typical day, according to interviews with thirty residents from seven centers, begins at 4:30 am. After an hour of exercise followed by breakfast, detainees working in brigades start their assigned tasks. Most residents farm, but we observed smaller groups constructing houses, forging hoes,

weaving, and repairing roads. All the brigades, including those clearing fields a few kilometers from the camp, are unsupervised, although each had a "responsible" elected from among its members. The two hours before lunch are devoted to literacy classes and political education. The afternoon includes a work stint, showers and supper. After dinner there are sports and cultural activities until 9:00pm. This schedule is repeated without variation Monday through Saturday morning.

Living conditions are harsh. The food, primarily corn porridge and relish, is not terribly interesting by Western standards, but it is no worse than the diet of most rural Mozambicans. Similarly, housing and health facilities are rudimentary although comparable to those we observed in rural communities throughout the country.

The most startling aspect of all the re-education centers is the lack of coercion. None have barbed wire, high walls or even gates, and all the detainees we spoke with indicated that they had never suffered or witnessed corporal punishment. When we expressed our skepticism one day, Mario Balate, a resident and veteran of several camps, angrily interrupted, "I am describing what happened. I am not trying to defend the government. If they hit us I would say so." Problems, such as petty theft, fights, and laziness are resolved at weekly brigade meetings where members recom-

Continued on page 26

Combating Drought

by Ruben Cordova

From Ethiopia to South Africa, large areas of east and central Africa are besieged by drought. And Mozambique, which has some of the driest regions south of the Sahara, is suffering its worst drought in twenty years.


Conditions are most severe in the provinces of Tete, Inhambane, Gaza, Maputo, Sofala, and Manica. According to a recent government report, nearly half of the nation's twelve million people are directly affected and in late August, 1.6 million Mozambicans were estimated to be on the verge of starvation.

Over the past two years the Mozambican economy has faced a series of crucial shortages leading up to the desperate situation that developed late last summer. Despite repeated plantings, crops failed to take hold in the sunbaked soil, which normally yields millet, corn, and beans. Food production is only half that predicted by the agriculture department earlier this year and portions of the countryside have had no substantial rainfall in two years. In the hardest hit areas, all surface water has been exhausted; the lakes and rivers reduced to sandbars. In these regions, motorized wells which reach deep into the earth are the only certain sources of water. But many wells are inoperative because of wear, poor maintenance, and the lack of technical expertise to service the aging pump motors.

Urgent Appeal

The government issued an urgent appeal for help in alleviating the effects of the drought in late August, noting that: "The population needs immediate assistance in

Continued on page 27



Drought stricken areas of Mozambique

It's Not What You Say . . .

Millions of dollars in aid to Mozambique—from both the East and the West—hinges on the use of a single word found in a Federal Republic of Germany (West) trade agreement.

At issue is the particular word used to describe the status of West Berlin. The West Germans insist that Mozambique sign

an agreement which contains a reference to West Berlin as "land Berlin." The word "land" in German can also mean state, which in this context would support Bonn's view that West Berlin is a state of West Germany.

The German Democratic Republic (East Germany) strongly opposes this view, and the Mozambicans, closely aligned to the East Germans economically, have respected their position. The Mozambicans have said that they could only sign an agreement which uses the word "west" instead of "land" to describe West Germany.

"West" is used in treaties West Germany has signed with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. In 1978, Mozambique chose to forego a West German aid package worth over eleven million dollars in a dispute over the wording of the Berlin clause.

Mozambique's position in support of East Germany has also prevented it from joining the Lome Convention, the EEC's trade assistance agency for Third World nations. Once again, words got in the way when the federal republic declared that the

Continued on page 27

Zimbabwe's Slow Consolidation

SEVEN MONTHS after achieving independence from Britain, Zimbabwe remains a nation in flux, beset with economic problems, political rivalries and episodes of violence that are apparently symptoms of the painful shifts being made from colonialism to sovereignty and from war to peace.

Much is being made of the social upheavals now evident in Zimbabwe—in the South African press in particular and in the Western press in general. As a result, a clear and balanced picture of events is difficult to obtain. One indication that the press has been distorting the nature and extent of Zimbabwe's problems did come in mid-October, however, when the Information Ministry announced its decision to accredit foreign journalists for one-month intervals—thus enabling the government to deny official access in specific cases.

In reporting the move, Western wire services made strong comparisons with press censorship under the former white-minority administration—although little attention was drawn to the Smith government's press controls while it was still in power. The real import of the administration's handling of the press, however, lies in what it indicates with regard to available news accounts. In announcing the moves, Information Minister Nathan Shamuyarira said that as a result of "misrepresentations and distortions of news, the government is taking measures to control undesirable and irresponsible reports in the overseas press."

Problems Abound

There is no question that the Mugabe government is facing real social and economic problems. Some of these are the direct result of the devastation caused by many years of war. Some are the legacy of the settler/colonial system, now ending politically, but still dominant in the economic and administrative structures of the country. Perhaps the most important problems flow from the nature of the revolutionary movement that achieved the destruction of the settler state. It was a broad alliance, that united small farmers,

landless peasants, factory workers, teachers, traders and many others, all with very different goals, behind the one goal they could all agree was absolutely primary—the elimination of the racist white-minority controlled state.

In the coming period that unity may well disappear, as the various groups begin to assert their own agendas, and the struggle over the future direction of Zimbabwe enters a new stage.

Among the most urgent problems facing the government:

- Unemployment, as had been predicted by economists and other analysts at the time of independence, is rising. It is now reported to be more than one million, due mostly to the release of hundreds of thousands of Zimbabwe citizens formerly kept in the strategic hamlets known as "protected villages during the war years, to the return of 350,000 political refugees from camps in surrounding countries, and to the demobilization of nationalist army soldiers.
- The effort to forge a single national army from combined units of the guerrilla movements and the former Rhodesian Security Forces has proven painfully, even dangerously, slow and difficult. To date, four battalions of integrated ZANLA and ZIPRA troops have completed their retraining with British instructors. But according to observers, attempts to combine these units with elements loyal to the previous white minority government have ended in almost total failure. In the meantime thousands of former guerrillas remain in isolated camps, armed, and with nothing to do.

Over sixty percent of the white officer corps has resigned rather than serve the new, democratically elected government. Their former commander, general Peter Walls,

was sacked from his position as overall commander of the integration process in September and then barred from re-entry into Zimbabwe after revealing his personal effort to persuade Britain to abrogate the results of the April elections. The government's tough action against Walls, and Mugabe's public insistence that "The vanquished must sincerely accept defeat if reconciliation is to be realized," would suggest growing official impatience with continued obstruction and sabotage of government policy by whites entrenched in the civil service.

- White emigration, ostensibly a key measure of confidence among bureaucrats and business executives—and, perhaps, potential foreign investors, as well—has been rising to the level of nearly 2,000 monthly, close to its war peak and a peacetime record. The state's vigorous campaign to desegregate educational and health facilities and the firing of Walls have undoubtedly played a role in causing the mounting exodus. Committed to a multiracial society and dependent, for the time being, at least, on the skills of white managers and workers, the new government could suffer seriously on the economic front if the emigration, now estimated to total 10,000 since independence, continues. Nevertheless, the government does not appear alarmed at the current rate of white flight. Few farmers appear to have left and cabinet ministers say privately that Zimbabwe is better off without many of those who are going. Labor officials claim that early leavers have included racial misfits incapable of adjusting to life in the new order or disgruntled army personnel with few peace-time skills. Officials estimate that Zimbabwe can afford to lose up to 20,000 whites each year over the next few years



ZAPU troops. Integrating the armies and deploying the former guerrillas on reconstruction projects has proceeded slowly—perhaps too slowly

without serious economic dislocations. Any resulting shortage of skilled workers is expected to be only temporary as training programs for Africans begin to take effect in skilled labor fields.

Industry has experienced some difficulties in reconnecting with former customers now that sanctions are dropped and trade is legal. Tobacco, for instance, once the leading foreign exchange earner, is suffering from a poor-quality crop and a glut in world supplies. Former customers for Rhodesian tobacco, moreover, are in some cases maintaining alternative trading relationships formed when sanctions were declared. Together with the poor showing of the Western countries with regard to aid and the failure thus far of the government to attract a significant level of foreign investment, these problems are adversely affecting the amount of money the government can spend—and at what rate—on economic reconstruction. Inevitably, social tensions will rise further as reconstruction spending is slowed.

Violence Again

By far the most serious of these issues concerns the violence that now appears to have peaked in late September and the first weeks of October. Many of the incidents took place in the countryside near the assembly points where upwards of 30,000 guerrillas have been stationed for the last nine months. Much of the rural violence has come in clashes between armed

guerrillas and police and police paramilitary units associated with the former regime. Goromonzi, a predominately white farming and mining district near Salisbury, has been the scene of a serious outbreak of violence involving some of the 600 guerrillas based on nearby farms. One white farmer was shot dead while repairing a tractor, and a former guerrilla was shot and killed during an apparent assault of a white farmhouse.

At the Gladstone mining complex nearby, a major incident was narrowly averted when a group of guerrillas entered the mine compound in search of a police vehicle. A number of windows were smashed during the search, and the alarmed mine manager called in a para-military police support unit. At that point dozens of guerrillas emerged from the bush and demanded the immediate withdrawal of the police detachment. The police left the mine without further trouble, and military liaison officers persuaded the guerrillas to return to their camps. Following these incidents, the government disarmed about 800 former guerrillas, but police stations and vehicles across the country have continued to come under sporadic attack in recent weeks.

Widespread clashes between former guerrillas and the police underscore the danger posed by continued white control of the state apparatus. Under the terms of the Lancaster House agreement, the same white officials who deployed the police against the African majority under the white

minority regime have kept their positions under the new government.

The Mugabe government has begun to move some of the guerrillas into the urban areas near Salisbury and Bulawayo. In Chitungwiza alone, about twelve miles from the capitol, over 17,000 former ZANLA guerrillas will be settled in modest two room houses. The first group of 1100 guerrillas to enter Chitungwiza received a jubilant welcome from thousands of supporters. "These are the boys, these are the boys who fought for us," said one resident as the crowd chanted "Welcome comrades, you have come for good." About 5,000 former members of Joshua Nkomo's ZIPRA force will settle in Entumbane township near Bulawayo.

But significantly, the government was forced to retreat from its original plans to disarm the returning former soldiers after strong resistance from the soldiers and their commanders. In turn, this crucial concession has raised fears that the wave of what is apparently political violence sweeping the urban areas, will continue or even intensify. Two people died and over twenty were injured in a grenade and machine gun attack on a Salisbury bar frequented by ZANU-PF officials. The identity of the assailants is unknown, but the attack was only the most serious in a spate of rifle and grenade attacks in Salisbury and Bulawayo. Some of the attacks involve former guerrillas and members of the old Security Forces. But ominously, some also involve partisans of

the two nationalist parties.

Early in October, Prime Minister Mugabe launched campaigns to stem the violence. "Armed dissident elements and undisciplined party militants have become a scourge to our society," he said in announcing the measures. Army units were dispatched to the three most critical areas—in the townships around Salisbury, in Bulawayo, and in the Sinoia region northwest of the capitol. The move indicated clearly the seriousness of the situation confronting the Mugabe government. "But it is a long way from this to a civil war or organized insurrection," a Washington-based analyst said in an interview with *Southern Africa*. "Given the government's ambitions to turn their society around, it would be surprising if their were no such problems."

Mugabe and PF-ZAPU leader and Home Minister Joshua Nkomo have repeatedly denounced political violence as the work of dissidents and "evil elements." The two leaders and such widely respected figures as Mozambican President Samora Machel have vigorously urged unity and reconciliation on the populace in speeches and public appearances.

Progress Being made

Yet even in the face of the awesome problems confronting Zimbabwe's young government, there are encouraging aspects as well. Thirty-one agricultural schemes covering over 320,000 acres of land are now operating under the land resettlement program. An additional 750,000 acres will be redistributed during the coming fiscal year. The settlers have received seed, fertilizer, and tools from the resettlement ministry, and will receive food aid until the first harvest. This is welcome news to hundreds of landless farmers in Manicaland near the Mozambique border, who have already begun squatting on cultivated land near Umtali and Odzi.

Mugabe followed this announcement with a major speech on land policy given at the national congress of the predominantly black National Farmers Union in Salisbury. He declared that the days of economic zones drawn along color lines "are dead and gone" and pledged to eliminate what he termed "agricultural apartheid."

Another encouraging sign of Zimbabwe's political consolidation can be seen in the recently completed local elections. The elections will extend popular control over regional and municipal authorities, still dominated by the appointees of the former regime. Despite the briskly partisan atmosphere of the elections, where both ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU fielded candidates, the elections were held on schedule, and with virtually no violence. Many of the candidates for local office were women, and many were reported to have won. P.L. □

Strange Bedfellows

Under a brilliant spring sky, the two men on the speakers platform led 20,000 cheering Zimbabweans in chants of "Pamberi ne Zimbabwe (forward with Zimbabwe) Pamberi ne Robert Mugabe," a favorite revolutionary slogan of Zimbabwe's ruling ZANU-PF party. None of this would be at all unusual, had the cheerleaders not been Terry Goss and David Bromfield, top executives in one of Zimbabwe's largest white-owned private corporations, the Triangle Limited sugar corporation.

Both the ceremony—and the occasion, the opening of Africa's first sugar cane to ethanol motor fuel plant—reflect the curious often contradictory relationship between the newly independent socialist government and the foreign multinationals that dominate the Zimbabwean economy. The plant was built largely with South African capital, and was originally intended to bolster the ability of the white minority government to fight its war against the guerrilla forces headed by Prime Minister Robert Mugabe. Mugabe's presence at the opening ceremony served only to heighten the irony. When fully operational the plant will save Zimbabwe about \$15 million in imported oil. Most importantly, perhaps, the government is interpreting the opening as a corporate vote of confidence in the government's cautious economic policies.

In Other Economic News:

● Zimbabwe became the sixtieth member of the Lome Convention, which regulates trade between the African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries (ACP) and the European Economic Community. After some hard bargaining with France—another sugar producer—over sugar quotas, Zimbabwe will export 25,000 tons of sugar to the EEC at guaranteed prices, in addition to 8100 tons of beef. Zimbabwean tobacco may also enter EEC markets duty-free, provided export levels don't disrupt the market.

● Agriculture Minister Denis Norman announced that this year's maize harvest,

hard-hit by the ravages of war and drought had exceeded predictions by over 100,000 tons. Zimbabwe normally a major exporter of this staple food grain, had previously expected to import 200,000 tons of South African maize this year to make up the shortfall.

● Zimbabwe and the People's Republic of China have initialled a technical and economic aid package worth \$11 million.

● Delegations from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund visited Zimbabwe in October to assess Zimbabwe's economic requirements following Zimbabwe's earlier admission to the two international organizations in late September.

In Foreign Policy:

● After several months delay, Zimbabwe has invited the Soviet Union to establish an embassy in Salisbury. The delay stems from ZANU-PF's unhappiness with the Soviet Union's long-standing support of Joshua Nkomo's rival PF-ZAPU during the long war for independence. As of early November, the Soviet Union has not responded to the official invitation.

● If Zimbabwe-Soviet relations have been chilly, the Mugabe government has moved quickly to establish good relations with other east European socialist states, including Romania, Yugoslavia and East Germany. Mugabe recently announced the appointment of ambassadors to these countries as Zimbabwe takes its place among the non-aligned nations.

● In New York, in late September, Zimbabwe's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Simon Muzenda announced that Zimbabwe would support economic sanctions against South Africa "if this is the weapon the world or the OAU thinks will help South Africa be free." Zimbabwe has severed diplomatic relations with its white-ruled neighbor, but in recognition of its continuing economic ties, recently agreed to exchange trade missions. □

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Reagan's Africa Arsenal

Enter stage right. President-elect Ronald Reagan

by Robert Lawrence

The election of Ronald Reagan as President of the United States raises immediate questions about the future course of US policy in southern Africa. Political prediction, particularly in such a transitional situation, can give no guarantees of accuracy. But it is useful to examine the background and records of some of the men and women who are likely to play important roles in shaping policy in the period ahead. In this article Robert Lawrence looks at several of the think-tanks and individuals associated with foreign policy in the Reagan ranks.

Reagan's views with regard to defense and foreign policy issues are both extreme and simple. As *Fortune* magazine put it, "Foreign policy in a Reagan administration can be summed up in one word—strength." Reagan believes that the US is second to the Soviet Union in military strength and therefore argues for the abandonment of the SALT II Treaty and the immediate build-up of the US military sufficient to achieve superiority over the Soviets. In the Third world, Reagan's tunnel vision sees the Soviets at the end of every tunnel. In June Reagan told the *Wall Street Journal*, "the Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If they weren't

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engaged in this game of dominos there wouldn't be any hotspots in the world."

Reagan's understanding of foreign policy issues is, by his own admission, negligible. Even among the business community, whose members rated Reagan the "most capable" of handling the economy, there is concern over Reagan's conduct of foreign affair. Dupont chairman Irving Shapiro told *Fortune* magazine, "I'm frightened by Reagan's inability to address or even know what the foreign policy issues are."

To counter his lack of experience and expertise in foreign affairs and to attempt to broaden his understanding of the issues so that he will not, as close adviser William Simon put it, "be called shallow or jingoistic as he has been," Reagan began

RONALD REAGAN'S SOUTHERN AFRICA POLICY: A DRAMATIC SHIFT?

appointing groups of foreign and defense policy advisers in April. He is likely to draw heavily on their views in the months ahead.

These advisers, described by the *Washington Post* as "almost a Who's Who of leading rightist theoreticians and activists," share a number of common traits. Most are drawn from conservative think tanks or universities. Few have been members of the foreign policy "establishment" which has been the source of government thinking on diplomatic and defense matters for the past several decades.

Nearly a third of Reagan's advisers come from what has been described as the "Republican government-in-waiting." In the same way that the Brookings Institute fed Democratic administrations with key men and ideas, there are several core conservative groups which aim at playing this role for the Republicans. Prominent among these are: the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), The Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University (CSIS), the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace and the relatively new Heritage Foundation founded by right-wing businessman Joseph Coors.

AEI, CSIS and Hoover have been closely associated with one another since the early 1960s when they began to transform themselves from havens for a variety of marginalized right-wing causes into centers able to provide intellectual resources for political forces able to command a place in the mainstream of American political life.

Until the early 1970s, funding for these groups came primarily in the forms of gifts from family foundations like the J. Howard Pew Trusts or from business foundations like the Lilly Endowment. Pew had been an early backer of the John Birch Society and numerous other right wing groups. The Lil-

ly Endowment contributed handsomely to Fred Schwartz' Christian Anti-Communist Crusade. The Pew and Lilly foundations were listed among the 15 richest in 1969.

The trio's close association with the Republican party began with the Goldwater and Nixon campaigns in the 1960s. William Baroody and Karl Hess of AEI were close advisers to Goldwater. All three contributed personnel to advisory groups that assisted the Nixon/Agnew campaign. Watergate testimony given by Patrick Buchanan confirmed that in 1968 Defense Secretary Melvin Laird launched a \$25 million drive by heavy weight GOP fund-raisers to make AEI a haven for out of office Republicans. Laird's principal assistant then was Baroody's son William Jr. After his resignation, Laird took a post at AEI. Later Baroody became director of AEI after serving as the White House Director of Public Liaison in the Ford Administration. Ford is now the "Distinguished Fellow" at AEI which has the largest budget of the three—nearly \$8 million per year.

It came as no surprise then that Reagan turned to these institutions when he began staffing important advisory posts in his campaign. They are likely to continue providing many of the President's men in the future. Chief foreign policy adviser Richard Allen headed projects at CSIS and Hoover. Defense Adviser Fred Ikle is a member of the Advisory Council of AEI's "Project on the Future Conduct of American Foreign Policy." Reagan's chief economic adviser, Milton Friedman, is on leave from the Hoover Institution where he serves as senior research fellow.

Few Africa Experts

Less than a handful of Reagan's advisers have backgrounds that would identify them in any way with southern Africa concerns, but those that do tend also to be linked to the same institutions. Peter Duignan is head of the Africa and Middle East section of Hoover, and along with his colleague Lewis Gann, has authored many books and articles on southern Africa. With a total disregard for any Black South African agenda these two experts recently concluded that South Africa could best liberalize itself from within, that "urban blacks should be given more self-government and political power should be shared in some measure by all the whites with all the peoples of South Africa" (our emphasis). To achieve these goals they recommend a US policy that would "promote trade, economic co-operation and cultural exchanges . . ." In their view the US should lend "cautious support" to South Africa "for their efforts to maintain a modicum of regional security." Both Duignan and Gann received expense paid trips to South Africa in 1977, courtesy of

the South Africa Foundation, an organization supported by South African businessmen.

Past Lobbyists

Two of the men who form part of Reagan's innermost circle have had specific links to southern Africa which cast ominous shadows for the future. William Casey, director of the Reagan presidential campaign and now chairman of the transaction team acted as a lobbyist for the South African government in 1974 while practicing law in New York. Richard V. Allen, who assembled Reagan's team of foreign policy advisers, held down the job of lobbyist on behalf of the white Portuguese colonies in Africa during 1972. Hired by the Overseas Companies of Portugal, Allen's job was to convince American policy makers that the people of Angola and Mozambique really liked being under Portuguese rule. As one of his tasks during this period, Allen repeatedly denied that the well-documented 1972 massacre of villagers in the Mozambique hamlet of Wiriyanu even occurred. To this day Allen has denied that the massacre occurred and in August 1980 he told the *Washington Post* that it "appears to have been a Czech disinformation report." Allen also ran a visitors program which sponsored trips to Angola and Mozambique by the aforementioned Gann and Rep. Philip Crane (R-IL), a staunch defender of Portuguese colonialism and white Rhodesia.

Allen was frequently reported to be Reagan's first choice for the role of National Security adviser, until exposés in *Mother Jones* and the *Wall Street Journal* revealed that apart from close links with super-swindler Robert Vesco, Allen had also frequently used the prestige and information gained as a government official to feather his private nest. These allegations led to Allen's withdrawal from prominence during the last days of the election campaign. Immediately after the Reagan victory, however, the President elect announced that Allen was being appointed to an important position on the transition team.

After heading the Education About Communism through Refugees program at CSIS in the mid-1960s, Allen was, then recommended to Nixon by the Hoover Institution and went on to direct foreign policy research for the Nixon/Agnew campaign in 1968. Some observers believe he was already hoping for the top National Security Council job at that point, but he was edged out by Nelson Rockefeller's candidate, Henry Kissinger. He only stayed in a secondary NSC slot for a brief period before moving on to the White House and then to the \$60,000 a year Portuguese lobbying post.

Allen's announced view that the US

should take the "politically courageous act" of publicly recognizing South Africa as an ally, comes as no surprise, given his past ties with colonialism. Recently he has become more cautious, telling the *New York Times* that he sees no special relationship developing with South Africa.

Various voices in the Reagan camp have consistently advocated sympathetic involvement with the minority regimes of southern Africa. Several publications of AEI and CSIS have, in the past two years, addressed the need "where appropriate" for military assistance to countries in sub-saharan Africa.

On June 12 of this year, Dr. Joseph Churba, president of the Center for International Security and a defense policy advisor to Ronald Reagan, created a considerable stir when he told a press conference in Johannesburg that if Reagan were elected he would order a "fundamental re-evaluation" of Carter Administration policy toward South Africa and that South Africa's strategic importance should be the "overwhelming factor" in the relations between the two countries.

Churba—in Johannesburg as a guest of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs—explained that if Reagan were elected he would urge him to: end the US arms embargo against South Africa, establish an American military presence at the Simonstown naval base and strengthen South Africa's capability to defend the Cape Sea route by providing South Africa with helicopter gunships.

Churba's statements were swiftly challenged by Chester Crocker, director of African Studies at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies and the recently appointed head of Reagan's "Africa working group."

Said Crocker, Churba's view had "no standing" as a statement of Reagan's position. In their place he offered what amounted to a watered-down version of Carter administration policy without the human rights rhetoric or any threats of sanctions. Crocker reiterated US interests in strategic access to the area and the wealth of minerals, trade and investment in the country. He characterized disinvestment campaigns as "politically naive and morally bankrupt" and as a policy "based on self-hatred." Instead he advocates what he calls a "serious sustainable US policy" favoring "evolutionary change toward a non-racial society."

It is not clear at this point that a Reagan administration would immediately pursue an active military relationship with South Africa.

Displaying some concern about the possible domestic reaction to overt support for white racism in South Africa, Crocker has argued that "There is no way that the US can develop or be seen to develop a military

with South Africa . . . at this stage. The US cannot . . . endure situations or conditions that appear to be racist."

Angola Intervention

What does emerge as a distinct possibility in a Reagan administration is that the US could become involved in covert military effort against Angola in a replay of the CIA efforts in 1975-6. Any initial actions by the Reagan administration would probably be in the form of some type of covert assistance. There is a possibility, however, that at some point the Reagan administration might choose to intervene in a more overt manner. This action would satisfy a number of the elements of a Reagan policy, and Reagan has already declared that he favors sending arms to Savimbi to "free" Angola from what he termed outside forces.

Military action in Angola is far enough away from the borders of the Soviet Union to avoid the risk of a nuclear exchange between superpowers, yet for Reagan it would demonstrate to our allies our "resolve" in dealing with the Soviets. It would also provide a *de facto* military relationship with South Africa which is assisting Savimbi's UNITA forces. Finally with the installation of a friendly regime in Angola and access to its oil, South Africa would be able to further extend its control over mineral rich Namibia and neutralize a key component in the frontline states' plan for economic self-sufficiency.

In June 1980, long time Reagan ally Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) proposed an amendment to the FY 1981 Foreign Assistance Act that would have lifted the Congressional ban on covert actions in Angola enacted in 1975. Helms is reportedly willing to resubmit the same proposal next year when it will have the full-weight of a Reagan administration behind it.

Whether or not the interventionist sentiments of Reagan and his advisors are translated into a reality can only remain a matter of speculation at this point. Once in office Reagan may find it difficult to make the choice of writing off important trading partners like Algeria and Nigeria in pursuit of some elusive "stability" in South Africa. Military assistance to South Africa in violation of the arms embargo would bring quick world-wide condemnation and hopefully, strong domestic protest.

At best, Reagan's southern Africa policy seems likely to be articulated within two narrow extremes. One consists of carrots to the white minority regime to encourage them to find a solution to the perpetuation of white-minority rule that can be legitimated to the outside world. This is the mildly accomodationist approach advocated by Crocker. Should this fail, Reagan may well listen to interventionists like Churba, and others who advocate a military presence in southern Africa. □



US Synfuels: The Sasol Connection

US synfuels program: Made In South Africa?

"Of the first \$100 million allocated by the United States Department of Energy for design work on synfuel projects, \$60 million will go to projects with which Sasol is involved either as a consultant or potential licensor." So says D.P. de Villiers, chairman of Sasol, South Africa's state-controlled coal-to-oil corporation, in his yearly review of the company's operations.

South Africa, which has no domestic oil, but plenty of coal, set about developing an oil from coal capacity some 25 years ago for political reasons. Set on continuing with its apartheid policy, it was determined to find ways to protect itself from effective international sanctions, such as an oil embargo.

In those days the Sasol project was often scoffed at as a "white elephant." Now it is proving something of a coup, as it finds itself the sought after advisor to US energy projects.

How important is South African know-how to the growing US synfuels industry? Will the investment of as much as \$88 billion in synthetic fuels projects in the US between now and 1990 be an economic and propoganda windfall for the apartheid regime? The answers to these questions will depend on the strength of the opposition to synthetic fuels projects within the US, and on the extent to which anti-apartheid forces can make collaboration with South Africa an issue within this opposition.

The chairman of Sasol, together with other South African government, industry, and media groups, appears keen to stress the crucial importance of the company's experience to Western nations concerned with energy supplies. He told the Johannesburg *Sunday Times* in late September that "Nobody in the Western World will build any coal liquefaction plants without at least

talking to Sasol."

Southern Africa interviewed several US Department of Energy (DoE) officials to determine how far South African "involvement" in the US synfuels program has progressed beyond the talking stage (for background on this point, see "Swapping Energy Know-How," *Southern Africa*, September 1979). Although officials were reluctant to talk about Sasol's role, since the company has no direct contracts from the US DoE for synfuels projects, a rough picture of the company's role in the current round of synfuel plant feasibility studies did emerge from the interviews.

Projects Underway

The clearest case of Sasol involvement is in a \$3.5 billion coal-to-oil plant which the Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. of Houston and the Texas Gas Transmission Corp. of Owensboro, Kentucky propose building in Henderson County, Kentucky. The DoE has awarded \$24.3 million to the two firms to continue feasibility studies for the plant. Ronald Saunders of the Kentucky Department of Energy testified before the Kentucky Environmental Quality Commission that the Henderson County plant "will be essentially a duplication of Sasol II, a coal conversion facility which has just been completed on South Africa." The exact nature of Sasol's role in this project is difficult to pin down. It appears likely that the links may be indirect, via Fluor Corporation, the US based construction firm which built the Sasol II plant and is scheduled to design the Henderson County plant.

Another US project cited by DoE officials for a likely Sasol role is a Wycoalgas Co. (a subsidiary of Panhandle Eastern



Pipeline Co.) coal gasification project planned for Douglas, Wyoming. That project has also been awarded a \$13 million DoE grant for a feasibility study. The proposed plant will use the "Lurgi" coal-to-gas process, which has been used in South Africa since the inception of that country's synthetic fuel program in the 1950's.

A third project with which Sasol will be involved "probably as a consultant," according to the DoE, is the proposed \$1.5 billion American Natural Resources' Great Plains Gasification Project in North Dakota, which has received \$22 million from DoE for advanced design and engineering studies. While the process for the American Natural Resources plant is "not exactly" the process used by Sasol, there is "lots of similarity in the process" involved, according to the DoE spokesperson. Sasol has already been test-running US coal through its South African plants for American Natural Resources and other US firms (see September 1979 *Southern Africa*).

A complete listing of US projects with Sasol links and the exact nature of that involvement, was not forthcoming from the DoE. One indication of the extent of Sasol involvement comes from the September 29 *Business Week*, which asserts that in the first round of DoE synfuel awards, "Fluor beat out all comers, getting Energy Dept. money for seven projects totaling \$44 million." Since Fluor and Sasol have an agreement to jointly market Sasol coal-to-fuels technology in the US, it is likely that all of these projects involve the South African firm to some degree.

Alternatives Available

Evidence of Sasol's involvement in the early stages of the US synfuel program does not imply that South African technology is indispensable to that program. A DoE spokesperson stressed that the Sasol process "is really a slightly improved version of the old German technology." He argued that US multinationals have since developed "second and third generation" improvements on this process. Does this mean that the Sasol Chairman was exaggerating his firm's importance for propaganda purposes? Not totally, said the DoE official, since, "in terms of commercial scale plants that are actually in existence, these [Sasol I and Sasol II] are the most advanced coal conversion plants in the world . . . They

have a lot of experience that can be very useful to us."

Much more needs to be known about South Africa's role in US synfuels development, from how much income it is yielding for the apartheid regime to how much of the know-how from US development efforts is being shared with Sasol directly or through the Fluor Corporation. Access to cheaper techniques for synfuels development would have great value for South Africa. The synfuels effort is taxing the apartheid regime's resources, as evidenced by the 1979 move to make the formerly State-owned corporation a semi-public company, with 65 percent of its shares now owned by private interests.

A Propaganda Plus

Aside from monetary or technological benefits, the apartheid regime sees the synfuels program as a lever to build political influence within the US. Typical in this regard was a visit to South Africa early this year by Rep. James Wright, Democrat of Texas, in which he praised developments at Sasol, arguing that "South Africa has provided the leadership and inspiration which we in the US should follow." South Africa may also be making important friends in other areas where synfuel projects are proposed, particularly in Kentucky where Governor John Y. Brown and the state Department of Energy are pressing for a Sasol plant in Henderson County because it is a "proven technology" which can get Kentucky out of the starting blocks quickly on the race to cash in on the synfuels bonanza.

Community Reaction

Developments in Kentucky also indicate the potential for questioning synfuels projects and opposing South African involvement in them. The Henderson County area is slated for two synfuel plants in addition to the near replica of Sasol II planned for the town of Geneva.

Jean Trigg lives on a farm adjacent to the Geneva site and is active with Citizens for Responsible Growth, a local group which has questioned the effect of synfuels projects on Henderson County. She told *Southern Africa* why she opposes the project: "Our reasons for being against it started with its proximity to our land . . . The idea of this monster being next to us frightening."

As the group looked further, they found other reasons to challenge the development plans, from the "boom and bust" effect on the local economy to the threat to agriculture posed by the condemnation of prime farm land to increased air and water pollution. And the group is still investigating the possible ramifications of the "severe socio-economic trauma" the new plants might cause.

According to Trigg, local sentiment toward the proposed synfuels plant is hard to gauge. "So far the official mood is all in favor of it, that is among the people who run things. It's not a popular sentiment to be against it, but it's easier than it was a few months ago." One sign of the shifting mood was a resolution of the Henderson County Medical Society urging that "All interested parties private and public defer the development of these plants until it can be proved that adequate technology exists to protect the health of the people of this community."

The nature of the state of Kentucky's foreign "partner" in the proposed Geneva plant has also received some criticism from Citizens for Responsible Growth, who cite South Africa's "tightly controlled workforce paid subsistence wages" and its willingness to "put up with health and safety hazards which America is not" as reasons why a plant which may be economically viable in South Africa may not be so in the US. More specifically, the Henderson County group cites South Africa's status as a police state as a reason for doubting claims that the economics and safety aspects of Sasol technology can be in any way "proven" by reference to South African experience.

The US synfuels program is still in its early stages, but the groundwork has been laid for a rapid acceleration in coming years. A Synthetic Fuels Corporation has been formed to fund commercial scale demonstration projects. It has \$6 billion available for its initial round of funding. Proposals from projects such as the Texas Eastern/Texas Gas Transmission Sasol project in Kentucky may start being considered as early as this December. But activists like Jean Trigg, and her allies in the anti-apartheid movement seem determined to stop the giant projects before they start. In her view "We don't need them. We haven't even tapped the potential of energy conservation."

B.H.

Namibia Lobby Gathers Steam

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Efforts by South Africa's recently-installed Namibian "council of ministers" to gain international legitimacy took a step forward in late September with the arrival in the US of Ben Africa, vice-chairman of the council, and Faniel Kozonguizi, described as director of foreign affairs. The pair, who were given high marks by observers for their intelligence and polished performance, visited Washington and New York to lay the groundwork for what promises to be a major campaign to win support in both private and government circles for Pretoria's "internal solution" in Namibia.

In Washington, Africa and Kozonguizi met with low-level State Department officials and with more than a dozen members of Congress, among them Republican Senator Howard Baker. They also attempted to put their views across to the press at a breakfast which, though free, failed to draw more than a handful of journalists. According to one American who attended, Africa and Kozonguizi emphasized their independence from South Africa in their remarks, while acknowledging that South Africa has *carte blanche* to invade Angola from Namibian territory.

Probably the most important event that Africa and Kozonguizi attended in Washington was a private reception at the Georgetown Club, put together by the council's newly-hired Washington law firm, Shipley Smoak and Akerman. According to Carl Shipley, a partner in the firm, the reception provided Africa and Kozonguizi with an opportunity to talk to a number of military officials, whom they found "way ahead" of other officials in appreciating Namibia's strategic importance.

"Military people understand the importance of Namibia's deepwater port," said Shipley. "And they know that probably 80 percent of NATO's oil comes via the Cape route." Pentagon officials are also aware of Namibia's uranium deposits, Shipley says, and are con-



Benjamin Africa, more help for Pretoria's Namibia plan.

. . . a mailing is being prepared which will go to between 50,000 and 100,000 leaders of American unions, universities, and other institutions . . . the council will attempt to emphasize that it is the true representative of the Namibian people.


cerned about they regard as Russian efforts to gain a foot-hold in the area.

Shipley describes the mandate of his politically well-connected firm (Marion H. Smoak, another partner, served briefly as chief of protocol in the Nixon administration) as being both to lobby in Washington and to find ways of getting the council's case across to the country as a whole. "Our plan is to put more emphasis on direct communication and on personal contact," he says. "They [Africa and Kozonguizi] found that American leaders without exception have been brainwashed by the UN."

According to Shipley, plans call for regular US visits by leaders of the council, or "interim government" as he describes it, and regular mailings to selected influential Americans. At the moment, he says, a mailing is being prepared which will go to between 50,000 and 100,000 leaders of American unions, universities, and other institutions. In all these efforts, the council will attempt to emphasize that it is the true representative of the Namibian people and, as such, should participate directly in any negotiations with the UN or Western countries.

The Shipley and Smoak firm, whose other clients, according to Shipley, have included Egypt, Iraq, and Paraguay, is also helping the Namibians to set up an office in Washington to be known as the U.S./South West Africa Namibia Trade and Cultural Council. The office will be small, says Shipley, with its main purpose being to serve as a base for council officials during their US visits.

Shipley declines to put a price tag on his firm's efforts, explaining they will be paid on a work-performed, rather than on a fee basis. Africa and Kozonguizi told a Washington-based South African journalist that the council has set aside \$3 million for its world-wide public relations efforts. □



Black Leaders Allege Conspiracy

Documents purported to be the Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC 46

Documents purporting to be a secret National Security Council memorandum that urges official US government action to divide and subvert African and Afro-American nationalist movements, were released in New York in September. A coalition of Black organizations ranging from the National Black Pastors Conference to the Patrice Lumumba Coalition was responsible for the release of what was described as an internal National Security Council memorandum, number 46.

The documents included an alleged March 17, 1978 "Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC 46" issued by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, and addressed to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the CIA. The second document, designated AF/NSC-IG 78 and dated June 12, 1978, was labeled the "National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa" action on the directive.

The documents called on the CIA to thwart efforts by Africans and Afro-Americans to co-ordinate political activities and for the FBI to "mount surveillance operations against Black African representatives and collect sensitive information on those, especially at the UN, who oppose US policy toward South Africa."

At the press conference called to announce the release of the documents the


Black leaders reacted with outrage, demanding Brzezinski's resignation, a "public apology" from President Carter to Africans and Afro-Americans, and a congressional investigation under the auspices of the Black Caucus. William A. Jones, convener of the National Black Pastors Conference, termed the documents "a cynical attempt to divide the African people throughout the world."

The Carter administration, obviously alarmed that the furor over the documents would further alienate Black voters late in the presidential campaign, went to great lengths to deny the authenticity of the alleged secret memos. At a special press conference in Washington, a White House official even went so far as to produce what he claimed was the cover of the "real" NSC 46, purported to be a study of the US policies in central America.

There is evidence of previous efforts by the US government to harass, infiltrate, and monitor the activities of pan African and solidarity organizations. In addition to the massive cointelpro operation against the Black Panther Party in the late 1960's and early 70's, organizations like the African Liberation Support Committee were also subject to government campaigns to disrupt the creation of strong links between Africans and Afro-Americans. M.B.□

washington notes

Nigeria Pressures US



Nigerian President Shehu Shagari

Nigerian President Shehu Shagari used his first state visit to the United States to warn that Nigerian oil may be used as a weapon in retaliation against continued US support for South Africa. His warnings were gentle and intentionally vague, and did not upset the generally friendly trip which Carter Administration officials timed to coincide with the election campaign.

As the second largest supplier of oil to the United States (Saudi Arabia is the largest), Nigeria does have some leverage. Nigerian oil sales to the United States this year will account for 16 percent of all US imports, and will leave Nigeria with an \$11 billion trade surplus with the United States.

President Shagari told the Foreign Policy Association in New York that Nigeria "shall use all means at our disposal, including oil" to persuade the United States to cut economic links to South Africa. "The United States apparently believes that it can persuade South Africa to stop its nefarious practices against mankind by talking to them," he said. "I don't believe that. If you oppose a thing, you have to fight it. To do otherwise seems to many Africans to be double dealing."

Although Shagari emphasized on his trip that he preferred to use "words of persuasion," his government has proved that it is prepared to back up threats with action. In August 1979 the Nigerian government took over British Petroleum's remaining 20 percent ownership of the Shell-BP Petroleum Development Corporation of Nigeria—a corporation which accounts for about half of Nigeria's oil production. At the time, the British government controlled firm, British

Petroleum was engaged in a complicated "swap" arrangement whereby crude oil from BP's North Sea fields was sold to South Africa, and Nigerian oil imported to cover the shortfall to other consumers created by the South African purchases. The Nigerian government pointed to the "swap" arrangement as the rationale for the nationalization move. But the Nigerian action, coming on the eve of the critical Commonwealth Nations summit at Lusaka, was widely interpreted as a thinly disguised threat to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher not to make good on campaign promises to recognize the Rhodesian "Internal Settlement" regime headed by Bishop Abel Muzorewa. British public opinion was outraged, but Thatcher proved to be unexpectedly flexible over the explosive Rhodesia issue, and the Commonwealth conference eventually produced an agreement for a negotiated transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe.

While President Shagari reiterated the threat of a possible cut-off of oil to the US, one of his senior advisors, Chuba Okadigbo, introduced the prospect of Nigeria developing nuclear weapons to counter South Africa. "We won't allow Africa to be subjected to nuclear blackmail" by South Africa, he said. "If [building a bomb] is what it takes to bring them to the negotiating table, then as the leader of Africa that is what we must do." □

South Africa Hires Democrats

Senator Paul Tsongas said at the end of last year that the 1980 session of South Africa's Parliament would show whether Pretoria was prepared to make more than cosmetic reforms. But the reforms that Prime Minister P.W. Botha proposed for the 1980 session were at best cosmetic—revising the Immorality Act and the Mixed Marriages Act, and proposals for a President's Council with a separate council of Africans. By the end of the 1980 parliament, no significant changes had been considered and the token reforms that Botha had proposed were floundering.

But the rhetoric of reform was enough to convince a new batch of American lawyers to represent South Africa in the United States, based on the rationale that "one feels that one is really serving the cause of peace itself." So says James Symington, a Democratic former member of the House of Representatives from Missouri who began work in April as a foreign agent for the South African government. Symington was hired along with his law partner George Smathers, another Democrat who is a former Senator from Florida. The two of them bring to the job a combined total of 26 years experience in Congress.

For \$300,000 a year plus expenses, Symington and Smathers will be trying to con-

vince Americans that the Botha government is initiating a "transition process" in South Africa. Their job is much like that of Donald de Kieffer, whose contract with South Africa was terminated in 1979 as part of the demise of the South African Department of Information. The two new foreign agents, partners in the law firm of Smathers, Symington and Herlong, say they are acting as lawyers for the Department of Foreign Affairs, but their contract on file with the Department of Justice makes it clear that their main duties are lobbying Congress, government officials and corporate executives. It is here that their Democratic party contacts can be of service to South Africa.

Although Symington's and Smathers' activity hasn't been very visible, they have met with a number of Democrats on the Hill, and Symington reportedly lobbied members of the House Interior Committee's Subcommittee on Mines and Mining in a recent series of hearings on US reliance on foreign sources of strategic minerals. The Chairman of that Subcommittee, James Santini of Nevada, released a report this summer advocating more US "dialogue" with the South African government because of South Africa's mineral riches. □

Zimbabwe Aid.

Despite what most observers view as a highly successful trip to the US in late August, the government of Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe has not received aid from the US that is anywhere near the \$350 million that Mugabe projected would be necessary for rural reconstruction and refugee resettlement. The Carter administration, according to AID official Ted Morse, has spent \$54.8 million on aid for Zimbabwe so far.

Aid to Zimbabwe in FY1980 has consisted almost entirely of funds redirected from other programs. The money has been spent in the following areas: \$22 million in grants for reconstruction; \$6.6 million for refugee repatriation and subsistence; \$750 thousand for science and technology assistance; \$150 thousand for "labor development activity;" \$145,000 in "self-help" grants to community organizations; \$137,000 for judicial training; and \$35,000 for family planning programs. An additional \$25 million has been committed in loan guarantees for commercial housing

loans. Agricultural assistance and Export-Import bank financing are currently being considered.

In the wake of Robert Mugabe's trip to the US, however, there has been a chorus of calls for increased aid: former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance recently called for a tenfold increase in aid to Zimbabwe in testimony before Congress. The *Christian Science Monitor* termed the aid "paltry," and the *New York Times* called the administration's efforts "stingy."

But increased aid to Zimbabwe has not been forthcoming. The Fiscal Year 1981 foreign aid bill was introduced to Congress in January 1980, three months before Zimbabwe's April elections. For this reason, the authorizing bill contained no appropriation request for Zimbabwe. Furthermore, Congress has been unable to pass a new foreign aid bill for the past two years. Instead, the US aid program has been funded at only 1979 levels by a "continuing resolution" of Congress, a less difficult but also less flexible form of legislative approval.

"continuing resolution" of Congress, a less difficult but also less flexible form of legislative approval.

At the moment, Congress is considering shifting \$30 million from other southern Africa assistance programs into Zimbabwe. In addition, House Africa subcommittee chairman, Stephen Solarz, in conjunction with Rep. Julian Dixon is trying to add a \$20 million appropriation for Zimbabwe to the stalled foreign aid bill. Solarz has also introduced a bill under the "Economic Support Fund" (a type of foreign aid not linked to particular development projects) that could bring Zimbabwe \$200 million over several years.

But it is unlikely that the congressional liberals will succeed in finding more aid money for Mugabe's administration. Solarz's \$200 million aid bill is widely held to be unpassable by the current "lame-duck" Congress this year. And in the unlikely event that the 1981 foreign aid bill does pass congress this year, there still are procedural problems with the attempt to add a new \$20 million program onto the bill at this stage of deliberation. Beyond these meager efforts, with Ronald Reagan on the horizon, the future for increased aid to Zimbabwe is cloudy. □

Interview

Continued from page 7

nalist who followed this up learned that Ford offered an excuse but little hope for change. "The Ford Motor Company claims that it is forced to pay Black workers starvation wages because the profits of its South African operation are so low," Mike Norton reported. And the profits are so low, the company explained, because "they have saturated the white market." A visiting American diplomat reported that Ford officials "appeared non-plussed" when it was suggested that the first step toward creating a Black market "was to pay their own Black workers a wage that would enable them to purchase motor cars."

Building Solidarity

Such attitudes do not bode well for the Wiehahn Commission's hopes of creating a Black middle class with a stake in the existing system. Nor did the events at Ford during the strike, Botha contends.

A number of Black foremen did ignore the strike call and "sided with management," Botha conceded. But other than that, the Black workers and the Black community showed remarkable unity. After the strike, Government Zini, one of the foremen who did go out, was immediately promoted. But he refused the offer because he saw they were trying to buy him, to separate him from the other workers." Zini instead became one of the leaders in the formation of MACWU.

Even while citing this sort of Black solidarity across class lines as a bulwark against government and corporate divide and rule tactics, Botha emphasizes an analysis that holds out the possibility of building class unity among Black and white workers. "In South Africa, the struggle is twofold," he explains. "It is a national struggle as well as a class struggle."

At times, however, the juxtaposition of analyses jars somewhat. "The struggle of the worker is a class struggle," Botha asserts. "Workers must control the means of production and this is exactly what the workers are struggling for today."

But if the Ford workers were ultimately "fighting the whole capitalist system," their immediate demands called for an end to racial oppression—no job reservation, promotion to managerial positions, training programs. Botha's description of the white response at Ford when their Black fellow workers were reinstated for the first time, also indicates the distance yet to go before class unity becomes an immediate possibility.

"They called a meeting of the trade union for whites and made all sorts of inflammatory statements. They said that Blacks were smelly and dirty and they

didn't want to have to share their canteen (cafeteria) with them." The Blacks ended up walking out again and boycotting the canteen.

Despite such experiences, Botha insists on the importance of non-racial trade union bodies and voices disagreement with those in the Black Consciousness Movement who espouse "Black exclusivism." At the same time, he cautions that "politics inside are slightly different from politics here," that such ideological disputes do not preclude cooperation within a struggle such as the Ford strike or an organization such as PEBCO.

"Black Consciousness itself is divided," he explains. "There are people who fully subscribe to the policies of the ANC within it. And there are those who believe in Black exclusivism."

"People inside make slogans that could be interpreted from here to mean they support one group or another. But that might not be the case. For instance, all the people who belong to AZAPO and AZASO (The Azanian People's Organization and Azanian Student Organization) certainly are not necessarily supporters of the Pan Africanist Congress [just because they use the name for South Africa advocated by the PAC]. It is just a name that has been adopted and people follow this as the only organization operating legally."

Although he attended university at a time when Black Consciousness thinking and its South African Student Organization were sweeping the campuses, Botha says "I was not actively involved: I was never a member of Black Consciousness. But I was never hostile to Black Consciousness ideology."

Since he became more politically active, he retains a belief that "Black Consciousness inside the country did tremendous work in trying to mobilize people," while maintaining, "I don't think it is good that it should be established as a separate organization outside the country."

On the other hand, Botha does not prescribe the ANC as the only organization capable of forging unified resistance inside South Africa. Asked specifically how he saw organizational unity emerging on a national scale and how the ANC as a banned, clandestine organization could contribute to that process, he responded, "Those organizations operating legally at home are doing exactly what people want them to do. A confederation or an all-embracing body would emerge as time goes on, as people continue embarking on action."

Shortly before he spoke with us, the South African government had announced that it was closing down 77 schools indefinitely because of continuing protests and boycotts. The affected schools stretched from Cape Town through the Orange Free State and on up to Soweto in the Transvaal. Similarly, Botha noted, "during a recent

strike at a Cape Town meatpacking plant, when the workers called for a boycott of red meat, it spread from the western provinces all the way to the Transvaal." And "people continue embarking on action." A.M.□

Re-education

Continued from page 14

ment appropriate action to the commandant, who makes the final decision. Extra work, in one form or another, on Saturday afternoon or Sunday is the typical punishment.

Correspondence is unrestricted and uncensored and inmates with whom we spoke said that they are periodically allowed to go to the provincial capitals to spend up to two weeks with their families. The only proviso being that they must report daily to local government authorities.

Literacy and Political Education

Instead of coercion the organizing principle of the centers, according to their staffs, is rehabilitation with the aim of reintegrating the detainees into Mozambican society. The twin mechanisms are literacy training and political education. The daily literacy classes provide the first access to education for many of the camps' residents (at the time of independence it was estimated that 95 percent of the population was illiterate). Political education occurs in formal classes, informal discussions, daily news announcements and cultural events. FRELIMO officials believe that the daily experience of working jointly, developing self-reliance, and participating in collective decision-making within the brigades reinforces and adds meaning to the new values instilled in the classroom.

Phasing Out

Although exact statistics are unavailable, according to high-level Justice Ministry officials, the re-education centers are in the process of being phased out. They emphasize that the re-education centers were established as a temporary measure to fill a vacuum created by the paralysis of the colonial legal system and the flight of almost all judges on the eve of independence. During the past year at least three centers have been closed, and 2000 inmates, including several hundred political offenders, have been reintegrated into Mozambican society. This represents close to 50 percent of all detainees.

More than 600 former re-education center members and their families have joined together to establish the new "city" of Unango in Niassa province, while hundreds of others have been reintegrated into their home communities.

Justice officials concede that there were

abuses in the uncertain period after independence. Local vigilance groups, police, soldiers, and rural administrators sometimes overstepped their authority. Direct intervention by President Machel in 1977 ended most of these abuses but not before a number of Mozambicans were arbitrarily arrested and sent without trial to the centers for an indefinite period.

New procedures have been developed since the establishment of the popular tribunals in 1978. The re-education camps are likely to soon be completely closed and all but a few detainees, including those associated with the death of Eduardo Mondlane, will be released. Mozambique appears to have very few criminals—there are currently 3800 people in jail, either convicted or awaiting trial, out of a population of twelve million. Since 1978, those accused of crimes have been publicly tried and if found guilty have been given determinate sentences which are served in Mozambique's prisons. □

Angola

Continued from page 4

diamonds. Production is recovering although it has not yet reached 1973 levels. In 1980 Angola will probably produce about 1.4 million carats.

Iron ore production may also begin soon, after a lapse of five years. Angola has been rehabilitating the mines in the southern town of Kassinga, but the mines may be too close to the Namibian border to depend on them for significant production, given the constant attacks from South Africa. The presence of iron ore in southern Angola, coupled with a source of cheap hydroelectric power from the dams on the Cunene River and good port facilities not far away at Mocademes, does give Angolan officials hope that some day Angola will develop an indigenous steel industry, possibly in cooperation with Zambia, an independent Namibia, and even Zaire. This may provide the Luanda government with some incentive for co-operating with the West and the UN in the pursuit of a negotiated settlement of the Namibia conflict.

There are also more mining possibilities. Phosphates are being produced in the north, and quartz and black granite are being exported from the south. Copper is another potential export although none of it is currently being produced.

But the continued threat of war from the south always casts doubt over any plans that the Luanda government has for the reconstruction and development of what could eventually become one of the foremost industrial nations in Africa. For the time being South Africa appears able to

strike whenever it fancies, and while the US and other western nations refuse to pressure Pretoria into a settlement on Namibia, the people of Angola will almost certainly continue to suffer largely unheard by most of the rest of the world. M.S. □

Broederbond

Continued from page 11

but Motlana disagreed, saying that the money was being used "to support a discredited organization like SABRA and the dated concepts of Professor Boshoff."

What has SABRA done recently in the field of race relations? The group's most notable achievement has been the appointment of a committee to study the creation of a "whitestan," an all white homeland for Afrikaners. □

Mozambique Aid

Continued from page 15

Convention extends to "land' Berlin."

Although Mozambique wants to keep good relations with East Germany, its fourth largest trading partner, it also wants to increase the aid it receives from West Germany and the Common Market. To do this requires that Maputo tread more lightly over the matter of East-West semantics.

With so much money at stake, it seems Mozambique is considering a more delicate course of diplomacy. It appears that FRELIMO will now allow the word "land" to be used if Bonn agrees to add an "explanation" that land does not mean state, but something else. What that something else means is, of course, only a matter of semantics. □

Drought

Continued from page 15

basic foodstuff. A major portion of the population depends exclusively on subsistence crops for their existence. Thus help will be needed until the next harvest in April-May 1981."

The response to this appeal, according to one government spokesperson, was good. Church agencies, international relief organizations and a number of foreign governments sent shipments of food, seeds, automobiles, and money to aid in the relief effort. The Mozambican Women's Organization, workers in factories and a broad range of organizations from across the country contributed materially to the relief effort. But more aid is urgently needed.

Following the initial appeal, a United Na-

tions Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) team visited some of the areas affected by the drought and confirmed the government's findings. Independent estimates, according to the FAO team, predict that the overall food deficit for this year will be approximately 290,000 tons. In assessing the causes of the drought, the FAO team specifically criticized the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture for ignoring reports from the national meteorological service and pointed to serious deficiencies in the transportation and marketing of food in the urban areas.

In September the government announced additional measures to deal with the effects of the drought including increased imports of farm equipment such as hoes and tractors; greater efforts to increase production in areas not affected by the drought; and transfers of surplus supplies to drought stricken areas. According to the Mozambique Information Agency, "renovating existing water supply facilities, improving the local meteorological network, and selecting crops most suited to local conditions," were also considered important short-term goals. Over the long term, the government is continuing to encourage the establishment of communal villages in the best available areas as the most efficient way to utilize scarce resources. In the same report, Mozambican President Samora Machel also announced the establishment of a coordinating council to prevent and combat natural disasters.

Mozambique hopes that a combination of short and long term methods can deal with a situation that officials readily admit would not have been a disaster but a mere inconvenience and economic hinderance in a more affluent nation. □

Culture

Continued from page 5

a target of the protests.

AZAPO issued a call for a boycott of the performance. When it was time for the show to begin, only 30 people had showed up. The concert was cancelled and the handful who had come to hear Charles were given a refund. Although a Cape Town concert later went off without a hitch ("the attendance was all white," Lukele noted), another performance in Welkom fell through under pressure from the local AZAPO branch.

The success of these boycotts and the coordination between protesters inside South Africa and abroad may give a boost to the campaign to isolate the apartheid state. Certainly it reveals widespread support for Wauchope's charge that athletes and performers who make the trip are "actually supporting apartheid and its oppressive economic system." A.M. □

BOOK REVIEWS

INTRODUCING NAMIBIA: A Basic Reading List

Sometimes it has seemed that even people concerned about southern Africa pay attention to Namibia only as the most persistently recurring item on the United Nations agenda, the subject of innumerable diplomatic comings and goings. Now perhaps, with Zimbabwe independent, this sparsely populated but strategic territory may receive more of the attention it deserves. The following list of pamphlets and books was compiled primarily to help those just beginning to learn about the people of Namibia and their struggle; hopefully it may also be of use to others now focusing more intensely on issues long dealt with in passing.

Getting One's Bearings

There appears to be no one pamphlet that is both current and comprehensive. For a very brief introduction, the six page pamphlet by the Washington Office on Africa entitled *Free Namibia* is quite useful. The International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF) has announced the forthcoming publication of a new study entitled *Namibia: The Facts*. Given the general quality of IDAF pamphlets this one is likely to be very valuable. In the meantime probably the best bet is Peter Fraenkel's *The Namibians of South West Africa* (London: Minority Rights Group, 36 Craven St., London WC2N 5NG). Originally published in 1974, a revised edition of this pamphlet came out in 1978 (available for \$2.00 from the Africa Fund). Containing much essential material, this second edition is more attractively written and better organized than the first; a 1980 updated edition will be available shortly. Very well written, but by now considerably out of date, is Randolph Vigne's *A Dwelling Place of Our Own: The Story of the Namibian Nation* (London: International Defense and Aid Fund, 104 Newgate St., London EC1), which was published in 1973. Either of the two would be well supplemented by *Namibia: A Unique UN Responsibility* (UN Department of Public Information

DPI/631, 1979), which has a detailed chronology of UN actions from 1966 to 1979. Although apparently not available as a separate publication any longer, SWAPO leader Toivo ya Toivo's statement in his 1967 trial is essential reading. It can be found on pp. 416-421 in John Dugard's *the South West Africa/Namibia Dispute* (see below); in Mary Benson's *The Sun Will Rise: Statements from the Dock by Southern African Political Prisoners* (International Defense and Aid Fund, 1974; 95¢ from the Africa Fund) or in the appendix to Colin Winter's *Namibia* (see below).

For somewhat greater detail, still in relatively inexpensive and available pamphlets, one can turn next to Gillian and Suzanne Cronje's *The Workers of Namibia* (International Defence and Aid Fund, 1979) and the Liberation Support Movement's *Namibia: SWAPO Fights for Freedom* (1978; Liberation Support Movement, P.O. Box 2077, Oakland, CA 94604). The Cronje pamphlet provides a solid and well-written treatment of the subject, drawing on a variety of sources and tying together the situation of workers with the prominent role which they have played in modern Namibian nationalism. LSM gives a unique background resource on SWAPO, with a blend of interviews, life histories and party documents. Both pamphlets are available from the Africa Fund, for \$4.50 and \$2.95 respectively.

For getting a feel for a sophisticated South African perspective, as well as fairly lavish illustrations, graphics and a variety of details, it is worth checking libraries for Olga Levinson's *Story of Namibia* (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1978; a 1976 edition was called *South West Africa*) and *Namibia/SWA Prospectus* (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 1980). The Levinson book covers history, geography, economics and the current situation from a perspective sympathetic to the *verligte* Afrikaner viewpoint. The Africa Institute publication has some useful graphs, statistics and excerpts from documents—the perspective here being sympathetic to South African government views.

The Personal Touch

For readers seeking a better feel for Namibian reality through the written word, several personal accounts maybe helpful. The most impressive was published by Liberation Support Movement in 1974, in their "Life Histories from the Revolution" series, and is entitled *Breaking Contract: The Story of Vinnia Ndadi*. His story gives a

personal view of the contract labor system, and of the emergence of SWAPO among Namibian workers. One also has *Namibia* by Colin O'Brien Winter, the Anglican Bishop who was expelled from Namibia in 1972. His time in Namibia, from 1964 to 1972, included both the beginning of the armed struggle in 1966 and the contract workers' strike of 1971, and his memoir of the period shows the breadth of SWAPO's support, and the reasons behind the decision for armed struggle. *Namibia* was published in 1977 in Grand Rapids, Michigan by Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

A third personal account is rather hard to find today, since it was published by the East African Literature Bureau in Nairobi, Kenya, in 1975, and never got wide distribution overseas. But it is in some libraries, and makes interesting reading because of its unusual perspective. *Passport to Truth* is the story of Georg von Konrat, a water engineer of German origin and a former Nazi who obtained a contract directing construction on the Cunene project in northern Namibia. Hardly someone to be suspected of radical sympathies, he nevertheless got in trouble with the South African authorities for his contacts with black workers, was arrested, and eventually escaped across the border and through Angola to the British consulate in Luanda.

History and the Mandate

For a more extensive look at the historical background, the best first book remains Ruth First's *South West Africa*, originally published in the Penguin African Library, and fortunately still available in many libraries. The Penguin edition has now gone out of print, but a reprint is available for \$5.50 from Peter Smith, Publisher, 6 Lexington Ave., Magnolia, MA 01930. This short book (less than 250 pages) is well written, and covers the conquest, experience under German and South African rule, and the dispute with the United Nations through the early 1960s.

On the period of German rule, there is a solid study by Helmut Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule, 1894-1914*, published in English translation in 1971 by Heinemann Books in London and Northwestern University Press in Evanston, IL. More analytical and up-to-date is Gervase Clarence-Smith and Richard Moorsom's article "Underdevelopment and Class Formation in Ovamboland, 1844-1917," in Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons, eds., *The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa* (Berkeley: University of California

Press, 1977). The same article appears in the *Journal of African History* (1975), and other articles by Moorsom linking the history of migrant labor with the 1971 strike appear in the *Journal of Southern African Studies* (1977) and the *South African Labour Bulletin* (1978; see below).

The most comprehensive view of the long legal dispute over South West Africa/Namibia is the book of almost 600 pages edited by John Dugard, *The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute: Documents and Scholarly Writings on the Controversy Between South Africa and the United Nations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973). Dugard ties together his documents with a running narrative, and if they read selectively, non-lawyers as well as lawyers can get a good deal out of this book.

Current Economics and Politics

On economic developments, in addition to the Cronje pamphlet already referred to, three recent publications are particularly worth mentioning: Robert J. Gordon, *Mines, Masters and Migrants: Life in a Namibian Compound* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1977; distributed by Hans Zell Ltd., P.O. Box 56 Oxford, England); Roger Murray, *The Mineral Industry of Namibia: Perspectives for Independence* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, Marlborough House, Pall Mall, 1978); and South African Labour Bulletin, *Focus on Namibia* (Durban: South African Labour Bulletin, 4 Central Court, 125 Gale St., Jan-Feb 1978). Gordon's book describes the conditions in one copper mine, where he served as personnel officer, and gives a convincing picture of how workers cope under extreme exploitation. The special issue of the South African Labour Bulletin has such features as interviews with black workers and deals with laborers on farms as well as in the mines. Murray's survey, prepared at SWAPO request, gives a comprehensive and detailed account not only of mineral production and the foreign companies involved, but also of the legal and fiscal status quo with which any future government will have to deal.

It is much less easy to make recommendations for reading on current political developments. Current sources include *Southern Africa* magazine and *Africa News*, the *Namibia Bulletin* published quarterly by the United Nations, the International Defence and Aid Fund's bimonthly *Focus* (with much detail on political prisoners and repression), and

communiques from the SWAPO Observer Mission to the UN, 801 Second Ave., Room 1401, New York, NY 10017.

Longer analytical pamphlets or books, however, are rare. The Liberation Support Movement pamphlet on SWAPO mentioned earlier is good, but far from comprehensive. The war in Namibia is dealt with briefly in the new International Defence and Aid pamphlet, *The Apartheid War Machine*. What is missing is an overall political analysis which would discuss both the South African efforts to set up Bantustan governments and arrange "internal settlements," with a guide to the bewildering number of ethnically defined political groups and the national political, military and social base for SWAPO (which, a recent South African intelligence report says, would probably win over 80 percent in a free election).

So far attempts to deal with the political reality in detail seem to have been confined to two writers who have functioned within the South African context but then moved to critical, if not entirely consistent, perspectives. J.H.P. Serfontein's book *Namibia?* (Randburg, South Africa: Fokus Suid, 1976) is the most detailed treatment of Namibian politics in book form, concluding with a description of the Turnhalle strategy and a skepticism about any solution which does not come to terms with SWAPO. Gerhard Totemeyer, writing on *Namibia Old and New: Traditional and Modern Leaders in Ovamboland* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), uses data for his Stellenbosch dissertation research on Ovambo elites (1971 questionnaires). In spite of the limited theoretical perspectives—a contrast between 'traditional' and 'modernizing' elites—he clearly shows the alienation of church and other educated leaders from South African-backed institutions, and their strong ties with SWAPO. William Minter

Many of the publications listed above can be obtained from either the **Africa Fund** or the **International Defence and Aid Fund (US)**. For more information on prices, availability, etc. write for literature lists from:

Africa Fund
198 Broadway
New York, NY 10038

International Defence and Aid
P.O. Box 17
Cambridge, MA 02138

Publications Received

Closing Date: 10/10

Africa & General

Phillip AGEE & Louis WOLF (eds.), *Dirty Work II: The CIA in Africa*. Secaucus, NJ: Lyle Stuart (120 Enterprise Ave., Secaucus, NJ 07094), 1979. 544pp. \$29.95 hb.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, *The Military Balance 1980-1981*. London: IISS (23 Tavistock St., London WC2E 7NQ), 1980. 119pp. \$11.00 pb, including p&h.

Martin A. KLEIN (ed.), *Peasants in Africa: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*. Sage Series on African Modernization and Development, Vol. 4. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications (275 South Beverly Dr., Beverly Hills, CA 90212), 1980. 319pp. \$9.95 pb.

Greg LANNING with Marti MUELLER, *Africa Undermined: Mining Companies and the Underdevelopment of Africa*. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin (Harmondsworth, Middlesex), 1979. 592pp. £3.50 pb. Note: According to Penguin U.S.A., this book is not presently available in the U.S. It must be ordered direct from England.

John SAUL, *The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa*. New York: Monthly Review (62 West 14th St., New York, NY 10011), 1979. 464pp. \$16.00 hb, plus 50¢ p&h.

Sub-Sahara Africa: Its Role in Critical Mineral Needs of the Western World. A Report Prepared By the Subcommittee on Mines and Mining of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the US House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office (Division of Public Documents, Washington, DC 20402), 1980. 29pp. No price listed.

Michael TANZER, *The Race for Resources: Continuing Struggles over Minerals and Fuels*. New York: Monthly Review (address above), 1980. 285pp. \$16.00 hb, plus 50¢ p&h.

U.S. Interests in Africa. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 1st Session. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office (address above), 1980. 540pp. No price listed.

Mozambique

Castling New Molds: First Steps toward Worker Control in a Mozambique Steel Factory. By Peter SKETCHLEY and Francis Moore LAPPÉ. San Francisco: Institute for Food & Development Policy (2588 Mission St., San Francisco, CA 94110), 1980. 60pp, ill, bib. \$2.25, plus 10% p&h, bulk discount available.

Maria-edy CHONCHOL, *Guide bibliographique du Mozambique: environnement naturel, développement et organisation villageoise*. Paris: Librairie-Editions L-Hartmann (18, rue des Quarte-Vents, 75006 Paris), 1980. 135pp, maps.

No price listed pb.

Francis Moore LAPPÉ & Adele BECCARVARELA, *Mozambique and Tanzania: Asking the Big Questions*. San Francisco: Institute for Food & Development Policy (address above), 1980. 128pp, ill., bib. \$4.75 pb, plus 10% p&h, bulk discount available.

Namibia

Free Namibia! Washington, DC: Washington Office on Africa (110 Maryland Ave., NE, Washington, DC 20002), 1980. 6pp, bib. 15¢, plus 20% p&h, bulk discount available.

The Rossing File: The Inside Story of Britain's Secret Contract for Namibian Uranium. By Alun ROBERTS. London: Campaign Against the Namibian Uranium Contracts (188 North Grover St., London NW1), 1980. 68pp. £0.60.

South Africa

The Apartheid War Machine: The Strength and Deployment of the South African Armed Forces. Fact Paper on Southern Africa No. 8. London: International Defense & Aid Fund (available from IDAF—North American Office, P.O. Box 17, Cambridge, MA 02138), 1980. 75pp. \$1.25, plus 70¢ p&h, bulk discount available.

M. Gatsha BUTHELEZI, *Power Is Ours: Buthelezi Speaks on the Crisis in South Africa*. New York: Books in Focus (P.O. Box 3481, Grand Central Station, New York, NY 10017), 1979. 198pp. \$12.95 hb, plus 80¢ p&h.

Nancy CHARTON (ed.), *Ciskei: Economics and Politics of Dependence in a South African Homeland*. London: Croom Helm (available from Biblio Distribution Center, 81 Adams Dr., Totowa, NJ 07512), 1980. 253pp. \$32.50 hb.

Children Under Apartheid: In Photographs and Text. London: International Defense & Aid Fund (address above), 1980. 120pp, 110photos. \$6.00, plus \$1.00 p&h.

Jacklyn COCK, *Maid and Madams: A study in the Politics of Exploitation*. Johannesburg, South Africa: Ravan Press (409-416 Dunwell, 35 Jorissen Street, Braamfontein, Johannesburg 2001), 1980. 410pp, ill., bib. No price listed pb.

The Fight in South Africa and What It Means for Workers in the United States. By the BOSTON ORGANIZING COMMITTEE. Boston: Red Sun Press (51 Bristol St., Boston, MA 02118), 1980. 44pp, ill, bib. \$1.50, plus \$1.00 p&h, bulk discount available.

Stanley B. GREENBERG, *Race and State in Capitalist Development: Studies on South Africa, Alabama, Northern Ireland & Israel*. New Haven: Yale University Press (92A Yale Station, New Haven, CT 06520), 1980. 489pp. \$11.50 pb.

Ernest HARSCH, *South Africa: White Rule, Black Revolt*. New York: Monad Press (available from Pathfinder Press, 410 West St., New York, NY 10014), 1980. 352pp. \$6.95 pb.

William F. LYE & Colin MURRAY, *Transformation on the Highveld: The Tswana and Southern Sotho*. Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble (81 Adams Dr., Box 327, Totowa, NJ 07511), 1980. 160pp, ill. \$19.50 hb.

Jordan K. NGUBANE, *Conflict of Minds: Changing Power Dispositions in South Africa*. New York: Books in Focus (address above), 1979. 334pp. \$10.95 hb, plus 25¢ p&h.

Elizabeth SCHMIDT, *Decoding Corporate Camouflage: U.S. Business Support for Apartheid*. Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies (1901 Que St., NW, Washington, DC 20009), 1980. 127pp, bib. \$4.95 pb, plus 15% p&h (USA), 20% (outside USA), bulk discount available.

South Africa's Nuclear Capability. By Dan SMITH. London: World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa (available from the Africa Fund, 198 Broadway #402, New York, NY 10038), 1980. 32pp. \$1.50, plus 15% p&h, bulk discount available.

Speeches of Mangaliso Sobukwe from 1949-1959 and Other Documents of the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania. New York: PAC Observer Mission to the UN (211 East 43rd St., Suite 703, New York, NY 10017), no date listed. 66pp. \$1.50 suggested donation per copy.

The Sullivan Principles: No Cure for Apartheid: A Public Statement. New York: Africa Fund (address above), 1980. 4pp. 25¢, minimum order \$1.00, plus 15% p&h, bulk discount available.

Thoughts on South Africa. By Kris SAVAT. Brussels, Belgium: Kommissie Rechtvaardigheid en Vrede (vzw Tweeckerkenstraat 17, 1040 Brussels), 1980. 43pp. \$2.00.

U.S. Corporations in South Africa: A Summary of Strategic Investments. Southern Africa Perspectives No. 1-80. By Truman DUNN. New York: Africa Fund (address above), 1980. 6pp. 30¢, minimum order \$1.00, plus 15% p&h discount available.

Using Films on South Africa: An Activation Kit on Investments. By Larry ADELMAN. New York: Africa Fund (address above), 1980. 45pp. \$3.00, plus 15% p&h, bulk discount available.

Hendrik W. VAN DER MERWE et al (eds.), *Toward an Open Society in South Africa: The Role of Voluntary Organizations*. Cape Town: David Philip (available from Rowman & Littlefield, 81 Adams Dr., Totowa, NJ 07512), 1980. 140pp. \$10.00 pb.

Frederick VAN ZYL SLABBERT and David WESH, *South Africa's Options: Strategies for Sharing Power*. New York: St. Martin's Press (175 Fifth Ave., New York, NY 10010), 1979. 196pp. \$17.95 hb.

Voices from the Dock: South African Political Trials: 1976-1979. Geneva, Switzerland: International University Exchange Fund (Southern Africa Information Program of IUEF, P.O. Box 108, 1211 Geneva 24), 1979. 11pp. No price listed.

The Wheels Turn: South African Political Trials: 1976-1979. By Glenn MOSS. Geneva, Switzerland: International University Exchange Fund (address above), 1979. 77pp. No price listed.

You Have Struck a Rock: Women and Political Repression in Southern Africa. London: International Defense & Aid Fund (address above), 1980. 24pp, ill. 60¢, plus 70¢ p&h, bulk discount available.

Zimbabwe

Duncan C. CLARKE, *Foreign Corporations and International Investment in Zimbabwe*. London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, Cambridge Ter., London NW1 4JH, 1980. 275pp. £4.00 pb.

Education for Employment. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe No. 9. London: Catholic Institute for International Relations (available from Africa Fund, address above), 1980. 72pp. \$1.50, plus 15% p&h, bulk discounts available.

Fire Force Exposed: The Rhodesian Security Forces and Their Role in Defending White Supremacy. London: Anti-Apartheid Movement (89 Charlotte St., London W1P 2DQ), 1979. 58pp. £1.95.

The Food Problem. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe No. 8. By Vincent TICKNER. London: Catholic Institute for International Relations (available from Africa Fund, address above), 1979. 78pp. \$1.50, plus 15% p&h, bulk discount available.

W.H. MORRIS-JONES (ed.), *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Behind and Beyond Lancaster House*. Totowa, NJ: Frank Cass (c/o Biblio Distribution Center, address above), 1980. 123pp. \$25.00 hb.

The Struggle for Health. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe No. 7. By John GILMURRAY, Roger RIDDELL and David SANDERS. London: Catholic Institute for International Relations (available from Africa Fund, address above), 1979. 60pp. \$1.50, plus 15% p&h, bulk discount available.

(Inclusion in this list of publications does not preclude later review.)



action news notes

LUTHERAN CHURCH VOTES FOR DIVESTMENT . . . The American Lutheran Church (ALC) voted to divest more than \$20 million from corporations doing business in South Africa. Voting 447-331, delegates at the October bi-annual meeting voted heavily in favor of the resolution despite opposition from the church leadership which had advocated a less stringent resolution.

In addition, the ALC called on the US government to implement economic sanctions against South Africa and for the development of new ways for its organization to "more effectively" support the Black population of South Africa.

The vote comes as the culmination of a year-long campaign by the Lutheran Coalition on Southern Africa. According to Kim Zalant, an organizer for the campaign, "The decision to divest is due to grass roots work done by the coalition in the regional districts of the church over the past year." This regional work was aided by an early decision of the church that had established opposition to apartheid as a matter of faith, or *status confessionis*.

SOUTH AFRICAN PRESENCE AT BOOK FAIR SPARKS BOYCOTT . . .

The theme of the annual mid-October Frankfurt Book Fair was Black Africa. But when some participants realized that white South African publishers were also in attendance, a resolution was passed by twenty African writers protesting South Africa's appearance. "This presence of racist South Africa," the resolution stated, "is an insult to the personality and dignity of the African . . . This fair contradicts its theme 'Africa—a continent asserting itself.' If the South African exhibition does not close, the African writers and publishers will refuse to continue in their participation in the 32nd Frankfurt Book Fair and will leave Frankfurt to return home."

Sesmene Ousmane of Senegal eventually announced that a one-day boycott by all Africans would be called, since some publishers did not agree with the initial resolution. Ousmane said, "One day lost is nothing compared with the suffering of

Blacks in South Africa."

Peter Randall, the white South African owner of Ravan Press, who has been banned for publishing anti-apartheid Black writers, supported the boycott as did Said Mzee of Tanzania who spent eighteen months organizing the Africa hall for the book fair.

SOUTH AFRICAN CONSUL MOVE PROTESTED . . .

The Los Angeles City Council recently voted against the relocation of the South African Consulate from San Francisco to Los Angeles. This decision is a small victory for the Ad-Hoc Committee to Stop the South African Consulate. The committee, a coalition of approximately 35 groups including labor, church, civil rights and civic organizations, sees this as a small victory because the consulate has been resettled on Wilshire Boulevard in Beverly Hills (outside Los Angeles' city limits); their objective is to have the consulate moved out of the Los Angeles vicinity entirely. The committee holds a weekly vigil at the consulate and has vowed to continue doing so until the consul is moved.

One major function of the consulate, according to a committee spokesperson, is the promotion of trade. Los Angeles is an ideal location for trade promotion because of the city's importance as a center for international trade (such trade has increased 450 percent over the last decade).

But the Ad-Hoc Committee fears that the regime's presence would severely destabilize the social, economic and political life of Los Angeles residents. Corporations such as Ford, Good Year and Purex have all closed plants in Los Angeles but "continue or expand production in South Africa."

ZANU SUPPORT GROUP MEETS FUNDRAISING GOAL . . .

The National Campaign in Solidarity with the ZANU Women's League succeeded in raising \$20,000 in the past three months toward the building of the National Institute of Women in Zimbabwe. The committee travelled to thirty cities in seventeen states attracting and gaining the support of individuals and organizations across the country.

The National Campaign culminated in a regional forum on October 10, in New York City. Speaking at the forum were representatives of the Zimbabwean Mission to the UN, the Congolese National Liberation Front (FLNC), the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the Republic of New Afrika (RNA), and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC).

The fundraising effort is the beginning of what organizers hope will be a nationwide

network in support of Zimbabwe. A spokesperson for the campaign explained that this activity had "laid the basis for ongoing work to heighten political and material solidarity with the liberation struggle in southern Africa."

BRITISH PRINT UNION CALLS FOR STRIKE IF IMPORTS ARE NOT STOPPED . . .

British trade unions have been fighting the use of imported newsprint by British newspapers, but have had to accept the need for some imports due to the high fuel costs involved in producing paper.

In September the union learned, however, that the London *Daily Mail* had purchased a newsprint shipment from South Africa, instead of the traditional suppliers in Canada and Scandinavia. In response, Bill Keys, general-secretary of the Society of Graphical and Allied Trades (SOGAT), instructed union members to not handle any of the South African newsprint.

Keys considered the shipment "highly provocative" and threatened to halt production of the *Daily Mail* if any more newsprint was bought from South Africa.

Another spokesperson for SOGAT explained, "The position of the newsprint industry in Britain is so precarious that thousands of jobs have been lost and still more are threatened. We are opposed to any new countries sending shipments here. The fact that this latest lot was from South Africa simply rubbed salt into the wound."

IAN SMITH FORCED TO CANCEL LECTURE AT MCGILL . . .

Student protests and lack of funds cancelled plans for Ian Smith to lecture at McGill University in Montreal in late October. Smith's lecture was to have been, in essence, a "defense of his role in the war and the revolution in Zimbabwe," according to Peter MacArthur chairperson of the debating union. The union sought Smith as a lecturer because he was "at the center of one of the major political controversies in the world" and his experience would serve to heighten the conscience of the average student on the question of apartheid. But Barbara Jenkins of the South Africa Committee saw this choice as a move calculated to create controversy and sell tickets.

Smith did speak before a gathering of 600 corporate guests in Montreal, who received an unexpected surprise. One-hundred chanting demonstrators, organized by the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa, greeted the guests as they entered the Sheraton Hotel.



SOUTH AFRICA'S "KEY points" industrial security program has taken a new and embarrassing turn for US multinational corporations operating in South Africa. The white minority government has ordered strategically important industries, including Ford and General Motors, to organize and arm all-white military units to defend their plants against Blacks struggling to end apartheid. Failure to comply with the new laws is punishable by fines of up to \$25,000 and/or imprisonment of company officials for up to five years.

US businesses have always been willing participants in South Africa's defense strategy. For instance, virtually all information about the activities of US companies in South Africa is classified under that country's stringent security legislation. Security documents released by *Southern Africa* in June 1978 revealed details of General Motors' contingency plans to cooperate with the South African Defense Force (SADF) in order to quell internal unrest. But whereas previous plans called for US business to come under SADF protection, the new regulations shift a significant military burden onto the corporations themselves, including the stockpiling of arms on company premises.

Major-General Denis Earp, chairman of the official key points committee underlined the shift in security policy saying, "security should not be seen as the function of the SADF. Private enterprise, and industry in particular, has a major role to play in this field . . . that includes taking the required countermeasures against sabotage, espionage, and subversion."

Corporate activities in South Africa have come under increasingly careful scrutiny from a spectrum of domestic critics ranging from student activists to the Congressional Black Caucus, who are demanding that the companies get out of South Africa completely. And corporations are not eager to have to defend open military cooperation

with the ruling white-minority government. As one executive moaned, "How can we even try to justify a white militia?"

Some US business executives have balked at meeting South Africa's new security laws. The managing director of General Motors South Africa, Louis Wilking, when asked about the new requirements said, "I do not foresee any other kind [of plant security] than what we have." Another company's representative noted that "We are in fact less than eager to cooperate with the SADF on this issue."

But corporate "eagerness" or domestic embarrassment is not likely to matter much to the white government. In a society where "total mobilization" against the "total onslaught" has become a cliché, corporations are likely to have a choice between complying or leaving. Given their past record, said one anti-apartheid activist, "that is not choice at all." As one US oil company executive noted, "The government has certain concerns and we have to take these into consideration."

South Africa has been making a lot of noise recently about what it terms "huge" increases in wages for Black miners. The Chamber of Mines, citing what it claims is a 660 percent increase in wages paid to Black miners since 1971 says, "Few, if any, workers anywhere in the world have had their incomes increased so rapidly." These statistics are misleading. If the effects of inflation are taken into account, the increase plunges from 660 percent to 225 percent—still impressive but not nearly as high. In addition, the biggest wage increase came in 1974 and 1975 so that while the total for the eight year period is high, the figure for the last five years is not.

What about the gap between the wages paid to Blacks and those paid to whites? According to the Chamber of Mines, this disparity is narrowing, with white workers now taking home only seven times as much as Blacks; ten years ago they brought home twenty times as much. While this is true it ignores the fact that the gap between actual wages paid to Blacks and whites has increased and that even with the raises, minimum wages for Blacks have only just reached the poverty level in the Transvaal. Notably, one figure the chamber never mentions when talking of mine wages is the price of gold; it has increased almost 2000

percent in the past ten years.



NAMIBIA'S WHITE RULERS

are becoming alarmed at the implications of rising anger and frustration being generated by the unemployment rate. One Black man who has been out of work said, "For six months I walked the streets of this town, from workshop to workshop looking for a job. I have no bad record, have never been in Court, or charged with any offence, but I cannot find a job."

Like many others, he found himself in a situation where he was allowed to freely enter the urban areas of Namibia and has been allowed to stay indefinitely. But once there, he must still obtain official permission to seek or accept work. Worse, the competition for jobs is incredible with an economically active workforce estimated at about 320,000 fighting for a small number of jobs. As reported in the *South African Financial Mail*, unemployment is running at 30 percent of the economically active workforce, of about 95,000 people. And with the workforce growing at about 2.6 percent per year the problem will not go away.



MOZAMBIQUE'S CASHEW-

nut farmers will receive a higher price for their produce beginning this year. The increase raises the price of a kilo (2.2 pounds) of raw cashews from 3.5 meticals (12 cents) to 5 meticals or about 17 cents. The price hike is the most important in a series of measures taken by the Mozambican Ministry of Internal Trade to encourage cashewnut growers to increase production of this valuable export crop.

Cashewnut exports account for over thirty percent of Mozambique's total exports; far and away the largest single foreign exchange earner.

According to the Mozambique mission in New York, Mozambique earned over \$47 million in 1978 from the sale of some 36.6 million pounds of cashew kernels. Since only about one fourth of each raw cashew is marketable, Mozambique's cashew harvest in that year must have exceeded 77.5 million kilos, earning growers over \$9 million. A similar harvest at this year's higher prices would bring farmers about \$13 million.

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As a result of rising oil prices, Iraq is Mozambique's number one trading partner according to statistics recently published by the Frelimo government and reported in *Africa Economic Digest*.

In 1979, Mozambique's main exports remained cashew nuts and sugar—goods which are primarily exported to the US. Prawn exports are also rising and cotton exports, which had been severely depressed, are rising again.

The largest single recipient of Mozambican exports is the US, which received \$61 million, or 23.5 percent of that east African country's exports in 1979.

Oil, machinery, and food top the list of goods that Mozambique imports. Over half of these imports come from the EEC (19 percent), Iraq (17.7 percent), and South Africa (14.4 percent).

Combining exports and imports, Mozambique's main trading partners in 1979 were: Iraq (12 percent), South Africa (11 percent), US (10 percent), East Germany (9 percent), Portugal (8 percent) and the UK (6 percent).

Trade with the EEC accounts for 20 percent of the total while the figure for trade with Comecon is 14 percent.



LANDLOCKED ZAMBIA MAY

finally be on the way to solving some of the problems that have plagued the Tazara railway for so long. The railway, which was built with a \$680-million interest-free loan from China in the mid-1970s, provides transportation between Zambia and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

The total weight of Zambian imports and exports carried on the line in 1979 was down 47 percent from 1978 figures, and according to Zambian Minister of Transport General Kingsley Chinkuli, the Tazara lost \$15.4 million in its first four years. In a recent report to the Tazara Council of Ministers, the directors reported that the railway's major problems are land formation failures, the performance of locomotives, shortages of spare parts, materials and skilled staff—all of which contributed to the low traffic. Adding to these problems, the railway suffered heavily during the period before Zimbabwe's independence: Rhodesian commandos targeted the line in the hopes of undermining the Zambian economy and forcing concessions from this front line state.

Now this troubled rail link may be in for a breath of new life. China has agreed to provide Zambia and Tanzania with materials, technicians and loans to help improve the ailing line's performance. In addition, they have agreed to send staff and materials to repair embankments and bridges, and to make available \$14 million to pay for spare parts urgently needed for the some 97 locomotives on the railway.



ANGOLA, THE SIXTH LARGEST oil producer in Africa, has worked carefully but surely towards steadily increasing its oil production over the last four years. According to the influential monthly magazine *Africa Business*, daily oil output has increased from 135,000 barrels a day (b/d) or 37.1 million barrels for the year 1976, to 143,000 b/d or 52.2 million barrels for the year 1979. Already this year the average daily output has climbed to 147,000 b/d and, according to Petroleum Minister Jorge Morais, Angola expects output this year to reach 160,000 b/d. Next year's average is projected to reach 200,000 b/d because of gains realized from the introduction of modern techniques for oil extraction.

Seventy-six percent of Angola's oil comes from the major oil producing region off the coast of Cabinda although other petroleum is being produced from land around Luanda and in the northwest part of the country.

Since independence Angola has taken steps to assume control over oil production, and to increase exploration and output. In 1976 the Angolan oil company, Sonangol (Sociedade Angolana de Combustiveis), was formed. The company immediately initiated studies learn more about the petroleum production process and in 1977, Sonangol took over the Portuguese controlled company Angol. But it was not until 1978 that specific laws were enacted giving Sonangol control over oil exploration.

From this point on the major thrust of Angolan oil policy involved Sonangol entering into joint enterprises with foreign oil companies. In October, 1978, Angola announced Sonangol's take-over of 51 percent of Cabinda Gulf Oil, a subsidiary of the American Gulf Oil Corporation. The agreement, which was finalized in July, 1979, provided that a 16 percent royalty and a tax of 65.75 percent (based on realized prices) would be charged on Gulf's 49 percent share in the venture.

Then, in January 1979 Sonangol announced plans to assume control over all domestic oil distribution. At that point Angola took over the distribution network administered by the Belgium company Petrofina.

Since the initial agreement with Gulf Oil, however, deals have been made with other oil companies under slightly different terms. According to *Africa Business*, Angola's preferred model of agreement follows the pattern laid out in a 1979 agreement with Texaco.

In the September 1979 agreement, Texaco was given a 40 percent share in a joint venture with Sonangol, and the US-based company became operator of the venture. Development costs and production proceeds are to be shared until the initial investment has been recovered. At that time,

Sonangol will take 70-95 percent of the "profit oil" with the rest going to the joint venture. Total and Petrobras, were admitted into the Texaco agreement in March, 1980 with a 17.5 percent share going to each. Sonangol then retained a 25 percent share.

The French company, Elf Aquitaine, has also signed similar agreements with Sonangol in October 1979 and in the summer of 1980.

Angola's is also attempting to gain more control over petroleum processing. The state's one oil refinery, outside Luanda, had an annual throughput of 12 million barrels in 1979—a rate which makes it the fourth largest refinery in Africa.

Diamang, the Angolan diamond mining company, produced 675,000 carats in the first six months of this year and expects to reach its 1980 production target of 1.4 million carats, the Angola news agency Angop reports.

Last year Angola produced 341,000 carats, compared to a pre-independence output of 2.4 million carats in 1974. Diamang plans to raise production to two million carats a year in 1983.

Almost all diamond mining in Angola is now reported to be mechanized, except in the Andrada area, where manual methods are still used.



MALAWI'S ARMY MAY BE

receiving a new boost. The US Department of Defense has plans to provide military training for Malawi's army officers. The Pentagon, calling Malawi, "a southern African state which shares the US goal of peaceful change in southern Africa," has proposed the creation of an International Military Education and Training program for Malawi. A few of Malawi's officers would receive training at the Command and General Staff College in the US and a defense attache would be established in Malawi's capital, Lilongwe.

The Socialist League of Malawi, LESOMA, has accused Hastings Banda, Malawi's president-for-life, of cooperating militarily with South Africa. Attati Mpakati, LESOMA's chairman, charges that, "the South Africans have military access to the airport [in Lilongwe], and some of their men are garrisoned at the Kamuza barracks there. They man a listening and surveillance post from where the operations of anti-Frelimo forces in Mozambique are directed." LESOMA opposes the US proposal, saying that it is, "forced to question the motives of the United States government in authorizing a program involving Malawi's junior officers." [1]

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