NOTE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO
THE INDIAN EMBASSY IN CHINA

Peking, December 26, 1959

Embassy of the Republic of India in China,

Peking.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Republic of India in China and has the honour to make the following observations on the Sino-Indian boundary question, which the Embassy is requested to transmit to the Indian Government:

On September 8, 1959, Premier Chou En-lai wrote to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, giving an overall account of the historical background and the present actual situation of the Sino-Indian boundary question and the stand and policy of the Chinese Government. Afterwards, Premier Chou En-lai and the Chinese Government received Prime Minister Nehru’s letter of September 26 and the Indian Ministry of External Affairs' note of November 4. In the said letter and note, the Indian Government indicated that it could not agree to Premier Chou En-lai’s account of the facts regarding the boundary.

The Chinese Government is desirous at all times of maintaining friendship with the Indian Government and people, and, on the boundary question, of holding discussions with the Indian Government calmly and amicably and with an attitude which is fair both to itself and to others so as to seek a rapprochement of the views of the two sides. In view of the fact that the Sino-Indian boundary question is rather complex and that it would be extremely difficult to bring about a settlement through the exchange of letters, the Chinese Government has always maintained that face-to-face talks should be held speedily between the representatives of the Governments, first of all between the Prime Ministers of the two countries, so as more effectively to exchange views and reach agreement. But since the talks between the two Prime Ministers are yet to be decided on through consultations between the two sides, and the Indian Government has moreover complained that the Chinese Government has given no reply to the parts of the above-mentioned letter and note concerning facts about the boundary, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China is instructed to make further observations on the major questions concerning the facts about the boundary, with reference to Premier Chou En-lai’s letter of September 8, Prime Minister Nehru’s letter of September 26 and the note of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs of November 4.

China and India are two peace-loving, big countries with a long history of mutual friendship and with many great common tasks both at present and in the future. Friendship between China and India is in the interests not only of the two peoples, but also of world peace, particularly of peace in Asia. The Chinese Government is therefore very reluctant to engage in arguments with the Indian Government over the boundary question. Unfortunately, the Sino-Indian boundary has never been delimited, Britain left behind in this respect a heritage of certain disputes, and moreover the Indian Government has made a series of unacceptable charges against China, thereby rendering these arguments unavoidable. Because the Indian Government has put forth a mass of detailed data on the boundary question, the Chinese Government feels sorry that, though trying its best to be brief, it cannot but refer in this reply to various details so as to clarify the true picture of the historical situation and the views of the two sides.

For convenience’ sake, in the following paragraphs the section of the boundary between China’s Sinkiang and Tibet on the one hand and Ladakh on the other will be termed the western sector, the section of the boundary from the southeastern end of the western sector to the converging point of China, India and Nepal the middle sector, and the section of the boundary east of Bhutan the eastern sector.

Question One: Has the Sino-Indian Boundary Been Formally Delimited?

The reason for the present existence of certain disputes over the Sino-Indian boundary is that the two countries have never formally delimited this boundary and that there is a divergence of views between the two countries regarding the boundary. According to the Indian maps, the boundary line in the western sector cuts deep into Chinese territory, including an area of over 33,000 square kilometres in India; the boundary line in the middle sector is relatively close to the delineation on the Chinese maps, but still a number of areas which have always belonged to China are included in India; and in the eastern sector, the whole boundary line is pushed northward, including in India an area of 90,000 square kilometres which originally belonged to China. The Chinese Gov-
ernment, therefore, considers it necessary to conduct friendly negotiations to bring about a reasonable settlement. The Indian Government, however, holds that the greater part of the Sino-Indian boundary line as shown on current Indian maps is defined by international agreements and therefore sees no reason to hold overall boundary negotiations. Thus, the negotiations themselves have run up against difficulties and there is the danger of the boundary disputes remaining deadlocked for a long time. The Chinese Government considers that to say that the greater part of the Sino-Indian boundary has been formally delimited by international agreements is totally inconsistent with the facts. The Chinese Government wishes to make the following explanations:

(1) Concerning the western sector. The Indian Government holds that the boundary line it claims was fixed by a treaty concluded between the authorities of the Tibet Region of China and the Kashmir authorities in 1842.

But firstly, this treaty merely mentioned that the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet would be maintained as it had been and that both sides would hold to their confines and refrain from encroaching on each other. The treaty contained no provision or hint whatsoever about the concrete location of the boundary. None of the arguments advanced by Prime Minister Nehru in his letter of September 26, 1959, to Premier Chou En-lai to the effect that the location of the boundary has been long established can prove that the boundary line now claimed by the Indian Government is well founded.

Secondly, the 1842 treaty was concluded between the authorities of the Tibet Region of China and the Kashmir authorities, but the greatest part (about 80 per cent) of the area now disputed by the Indian Government is part of China's Sinkiang which was no party to the treaty. It is obviously inconceivable to hold that, judging by this treaty, vast areas of Sinkiang have ceased to belong to China but have become part of Ladakh. The British Government proposed in 1890 to delimit the boundary between Ladakh and Kashmir on the one hand and Sinkiang on the other, but nothing came of it. It is also inconceivable to hold that the territory of another country can be annexed by a unilateral proposal.

Thirdly, there are many indisputable positive evidences to show that the western sector of the Sino-Indian boundary is not delimited. For instance, (a) Between 1921 and 1927, the British Indian Government made many representations to the authorities of China's Tibet Region, asking to delimit the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet, but without any result. This is testified by many documents exchanged between the two sides at the time, and is also confirmed by Sir Arthur Lothian, the Briton who acted as the representative of India, in his letter to the London Times published on December 11, 1938. (b) According to data now available to the Chinese Government, no boundary line was drawn at all in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border on the official map published by the Survey of India as late as 1943. On the official Indian map of the 1950 edition, the present version of the boundary line was shown in a most equivocal way, but was still marked by the words "Boundary Undefined."

It is only since 1954 that this undelimited sector of the boundary has suddenly become a delimited boundary. (c) Referring to this sector of the boundary in the Lok Sabha of India on August 28, 1958, Prime Minister Nehru declared that: "This was the boundary of the old Kashmir state with Tibet and Chinese Turkestan. Nobody had marked it." All the above-mentioned facts are absolutely incompatible with the allegation that this sector of the boundary was delimited long ago. It is unthinkable that the Indian Government which held that this sector of the boundary had explicitly been delimited in 1842 or 1899 would, between 1921 and 1927, still ask continually for negotiations to delimit it; that it would in 1943 still admit the absence of any determined boundary; that it would in 1950 still declare the mere existence of a boundary undefined; and that it would in 1959 still proclaim that nobody had marked the boundary.

(2) Concerning the middle sector. The Indian Government considers that the specification in Article IV of the 1954 Sino-Indian Agreement of six passes in this area as passages for traders and pilgrims of both countries indicates that the Chinese Government has already considered in the Indian Government's opinion about this sector of the boundary. The Chinese Government holds that this allegation is untenable both factually and logically.

The question of the boundary between the two countries was not touched on at all in the 1954 Sino-Indian Agreement or during its negotiations. The Chinese side's draft wording for Article IV of the Agreement was that "The Chinese Government agrees to open the following mountain passes in the Ari district of the Tibetan Region of China for entry and exit by traders and pilgrims of both parties." The Indian side disagreed with the Chinese draft; its own draft wording was that "Traders and pilgrims from India and western Tibet may travel by the routes traversing the following localities and passes." Later on the two sides agreed to change the wording into: "Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes and routes." The concession made by the Chinese Government was only to adopt a wording which does not involve the ownership of these passes. Nobody can draw from this the conclusion that this sector of the boundary between the two countries has thus been fixed. On the contrary, the Chinese representative, Vice-Foreign Minister Chang Han-fu, in his talk with the Indian representative, Ambassador Mr. N. Raghavan, on April 23, 1954, clearly stated that the Chinese side did not wish, in those negotiations, to touch on the boundary question. And Ambassador N. Raghavan agreed forthwith. The Chinese Government therefore maintains that there is no ground to say that this sector of the boundary has been delimited and that there is no need to conduct negotiations for its delimitation.

(3) Concerning the eastern sector. The Indian Government holds that the so-called McMahon Line is the product of the 1914 Simla Conference jointly attended by Britain, China and the Tibet Region of China, and is therefore valid. The Chinese Government holds that the so-called McMahon Line is wholly illegal, and the Indian Government's assertion is utterly unacceptable to the Chinese Government.
Firstly, it is known to the world that the Simla Convention itself is void of legal validity. The Chinese representative Ivan Chen attending the Simla Conference not only refused to sign the Simla Convention, but acting under instructions from the Chinese Government formally declared at the conference on July 3, 1914, that the Chinese Government would not recognize any treaty or similar document that might then or thereafter be signed between Britain and Tibet. Similar declarations were made in formal notes delivered to the British Government on July 3 and 7 the same year by Minister of the Chinese Government in Britain Lew Yuk Lin. All Chinese governments since then persisted in this stand. Many dirty unequal treaties signed by the past Chinese governments under imperialist oppression have already been proclaimed null and void. The Chinese Government feels perplexed why the Government of India, which has likewise won independence from under imperialist oppression, should insist that the Government of its friend China recognize an unequal treaty which the Chinese Government has not even signed.

Secondly, the Indian Government asserts that the boundary between India and Tibet was discussed at the Simla Conference, that the Chinese Government never objected at the time or afterwards to the discussion of the boundary between India and Tibet at the conference, and that therefore the agreement which resulted from the conference in regard to the McMahon Line boundary between India and Tibet must be regarded as binding on China. But this line of argument, from beginning to end, is inconsistent with the facts. As a matter of fact, the Simla Conference only discussed the boundary between the Tibet Region and the rest of China and the boundary between so-called Outer and Inner Tibet, it never discussed the boundary between China and India. The so-called McMahon Line boundary between China and India was the result of the exchange of secret letters at Delhi on March 24, 1914, between the British representative and the representative of the then Tibet local authorities. It was in no way made known to China. It also means that it was never placed on the agenda of the Simla Conference. A section of the red line shown on the map attached to the Simla Convention corresponds with the so-called McMahon Line, but that red line was presented as the boundary between Tibet and the rest of China, and it was never stated that part of the red line was the boundary between China and India. Since the so-called question of Sino-Indian boundary never existed at the Simla Conference and in the Simla Convention, the Chinese Government naturally would not refer to this question or the question of the so-called McMahon Line in its memorandum and suggestions for the revision of the Simla Convention. The Indian Government has pointed to the fact that the Chinese Government at the time did not raise any objection to the so-called McMahon Line. But this fact only shows that the Chinese Government was completely unaware of the existence of the question of the so-called McMahon Line, and can in no way prove that the Line was legal or was accepted by the Chinese Government. It can thus be seen that the so-called McMahon Line is more unsavoury and more unrepresentable than the Simla Convention, and it is indeed all the more strange to assert that it is binding on the Chinese Government. The Chinese Government would like to ask the Indian Government whether, among all the proceedings of the Simla Conference, it can point to any particular date of the conference or any particular article of the Convention when and where the Sino-Indian boundary question, and particularly the question of the so-called McMahon Line, was referred to.

In addition, it must also be pointed out that it is beyond doubt that Britain had no right to conduct separate negotiations with Tibet. Indeed, the Chinese Government made repeated statements to this effect; as to the British Government, it too was strictly bound by the 1907 agreement on Tibet concluded between it and the old Russian Government not to enter into negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government. Therefore, judging by this treaty obligation alone which was undertaken by the British Government, the secret exchange of letters in 1914 between the British representative and the representative of the Tibet local authorities behind the back of the Chinese Government is void of any legal validity.

Thirdly, the assertion that China did not raise any objection to the so-called McMahon Line boundary between China and India is also inconsistent with the fact. It was during the most difficult period of China's War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression that the so-called McMahon Line gradually and unofficially appeared on Indian maps; and after 1943 the Tibet local authorities were under the firm control of British imperialism and their relations with the Chinese Central Government steadily deteriorated. Nevertheless, on learning that Britain had gradually encroached on Chinese territory south of the so-called McMahon Line, the Kuomintang Government four times protested by addressing notes to the British Embassy in China after the conclusion of the Anti-Japanese War, in July, September and November of 1946 and January of 1947. Since Britain shifted its responsibility onto India, the Kuomintang government protested by note with the Indian Embassy in China in February 1947. Even up to November 18, 1949, Lo Chia-lun, Ambassador to India of the Chiang Kai-shek clique which then still maintained diplomatic relations with the Indian Government, delivered a note to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, repudiating the Simla Convention which the Indian Government held to be valid. The Government of the People's Republic of China, since establishing diplomatic relations with the Government of India, has repeatedly stated the fact that the Sino-Indian boundary has not been delimited. During Prime Minister Nehru's visit in China in 1954, Premier Chou En-lai made it clear that the Sino-Indian boundary was yet to be delimited. Premier Chou also said that the reason why the delineation of old maps was followed in Chinese maps was that the Chinese Government had not yet undertaken a survey of China's boundary, nor consulted with the countries concerned, and that it would not make changes in the delineation of the boundary on its own. This was reiterated in the memorandum delivered to the Indian Embassy in China by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 3, 1958. Besides, even the local authorities of Tibet did not regard as reasonable the so-called McMahon Line, which was the product of underhand schemes; they repeatedly objected to this line and
asked for the return of occupied Chinese territory south of the Line. This fact is not denied even by the Indian Government.

Fourthly, not only the so-called McMahon Line boundary between China and India has never been recognized by the Chinese Government; its validity was for a long time questioned by the Indian and the British Governments. The so-called McMahon Line was not adopted on the official map Tibet and Adjacent Countries published by the Survey of India in 1938, nor on the map "India" in the sixth edition of the Oxford Advanced Atlas, 1940, compiled by John Bartholomew, cartographer to the King of Britain. Neither was the so-called McMahon Line followed in drawing the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian boundary on the map "India 1945" attached to the 1951 3rd edition in English of The Discovery of India, written by Prime Minister Nehru himself and first published in 1946. Although the so-called McMahon Line was drawn on the official maps of India published by the Survey of India in 1950, 1951 and 1952, it was still marked as undemarcated. Up to 1958, on the map "China West and Tibet" in the Times Atlas of the World edited by John Bartholomew, cartographer to the King of Britain, the traditional Sino-Indian boundary line and the so-called McMahon Line were both drawn with the words "Disputed Area" marked between the lines. All these authoritative facts squarely refute the Indian Government's argument that this sector of the boundary has been delimited. The Indian Government contends that Britain withheld the publication of the Simla Convention for years in the hope that there would be an agreement about the status and boundary of Inner Tibet. That this assertion cannot help the Indian Government out of its difficulties is already explained as above, the assertion moreover adds to its difficulties. What meaning can the Simla Convention have, when the British Government also admitted that no agreement was reached on it? And since the Convention itself has not acquired validity, what can be said for the so-called Sino-Indian boundary line which was never proposed to the Chinese Government and which the British unilaterally meant to smuggle into this Convention? In fact, British officials who once held posts in India, though by no means pro-Chinese, also admitted that the McMahon Line is legally untenable and actually ineffective. For instance, Henry Twynham, who was Acting Governor of Assam, India, in 1939, testified in his letter to the London Times published on September 2, 1959, that this line "does not exist, and never has existed."

From what has been said in the above, the following incontestable conclusion can be drawn: The entire Sino-Indian boundary, whether in its western, middle, or eastern sector, has not been delimited. The 1842 Treaty, on which the Indian Government bases itself, did not define any boundary line for the western sector of the Sino-Indian border; and moreover, China's Sinkiang Region, which is most concerned with this sector of the boundary, was no party to this treaty. The 1954 Agreement, on which the Indian Government bases itself, did not involve the middle or any other sector of the Sino-Indian boundary. The 1914 Convention, on which the Indian Government bases itself, is itself void of legal validity, and the Sino-Indian boundary was never discussed at the 1914 Conference. That the Sino-Indian boundary is yet to be delimited has been recognized by the Indian and British Governments over a long period of time, and is borne out by indisputable evidences. In order to achieve a reasonable settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute satisfactory to both sides, there is no other way except the holding of friendly negotiations.

Question Two: Where Is the Traditional Customary Sino-Indian Boundary Line?

Although the Sino-Indian boundary has not been formally delimited, both sides acknowledge the existence of a traditional customary line, that is, the line formed by the extent of jurisdiction exercised historically by each side. The present question is that the two sides hold very different conceptions of the position of the traditional customary line. In drawing the boundary (mainly the eastern and western sectors) on its maps, the Indian Government has gone far beyond the extent of its original actual jurisdiction; it asserts that this is not only based on international treaties, but is the traditional customary line itself. The Chinese Government holds that the delineations of the Sino-Indian boundary on current Indian maps, which differ greatly from those on Chinese maps, are not based on any international treaty, as stated above, and, what is more, are not based on tradition and custom.

(1) Concerning the western sector. The area of over 33,000 square kilometres now disputed by India has always belonged to China. This is conclusively borne out by Chinese official documents and records. Except for the very small area of Parigas which has been occupied by India in recent years, the remaining broad area has always been under the effective control of the Chinese Government. The major part of this area is under the jurisdiction of Hotien County of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region of China, while the minor part under that of Rudok Dzong of the Tibetan Autonomous Region of China. Though sparsely populated, this area has all along been a place for pasturage and salt-mining for the Uighur and Kirghiz people living in the southwestern border of Sinkiang and a part of the Tibetan people living in the northwestern border of Tibet. Many places of this area are named in the Uighur language. For instance, Aksai Chin, which is part of Hotien County of Sinkiang, means "the desert of white stones" in the Uighur language; while the Karakash River which flows through this area means "the river of the black jade" in the Uighur language.

This area is the only traffic artery linking Sinkiang and western Tibet, because to its northeast lies the great Gobi of Sinkiang through which direct traffic with Tibet is practically impossible. Therefore, since the middle of the 18th century, the Government of the Ching Dynasty of China had established Kurens (check-posts) to exercise jurisdiction over and patrol this area. In the decades from the founding of the Republic of China till the liberation of China, there were troops constantly guarding this area. After the liberation of Sinkiang in 1949, the Chinese People's Liberation Army took over the guarding of the frontier in this area from Kuominhtang troops. In the latter half of 1950, it was through this area that the Chinese Government dispatched the first units of the Chinese
People's Liberation Army to enter Tibet. In the nine years since then, the Chinese troops stationed in the Ari district have regularly and frequently brought up indispensable supplies from Sinkiang through this area. From March 1956 to October 1957, the Chinese Government built along the customary route a motor-road from Yehecheng of Sinkiang to Gartok of Tibet of a total length of 1,200 kilometres, of which a section of 180 kilometres runs through this area, and over 3,000 civilian workers took part in its construction.

These unshakable facts should have been sufficient to prove beyond dispute that this area is Chinese territory.

The Indian Government asserts that this area "has been associated with India's culture and tradition for the last two thousand years or so, and has been an intimate part of India's life and thought." But firstly, the Indian Government fails to give any concrete facts to support its contention. On the contrary, Prime Minister Nehru said in the Rajya Sabha of India on September 10, 1959, that this area "has not been under any kind of administration." On November 23, 1959, he said again in the Rajya Sabha of India: "During British rule, as far as I know, this area was neither inhabited by any people nor were there any outposts." Though Prime Minister Nehru is in no position to judge correctly the conditions prevailing on the Chinese side, his words do prove authoritatively that India has never exercised control over this area.

Secondly, the Indian Government says that it has been sending regular patrols to this area, and that this is one way India exercises its jurisdiction. According to data available to the Chinese Government, however, armed Indian personnel intruded only three times into this area to carry out reconnaissance, namely, in September 1958, July 1959 and October 1959, and on each occasion they were promptly detained and then sent out of China by Chinese frontier guards. Apart from these three intrusions, they have never been to this area. It is precisely for this reason that the Indian Government has been so unaware of the long-term activities of the Chinese personnel in this area that it declares that it was in 1957 that Chinese personnel first entered this area.

Thirdly, the Indian Government has referred to a number of maps to corroborete what it has claimed to be the traditional customary line. But the situation in this respect is not favourable to India's arguments either. Despite slight discrepancies at some places, the delineations of the western sector of the boundary on the maps published in China in the past one to two hundred years have in the main been consistent. The Indian Government says that the delineation of the western sector of the boundary on an official Chinese map published in 1893 approximates to that of the Indian maps. The Chinese Government does not know what map is referred to here and, consequently, is unable to comment on it. As to the atlas published in 1917 by the British-owned paper, the *North China Daily News and Herald*, it can only represent the British view but not the Chinese, and there is no need to discuss it here.

By contrast, there have been considerable contradictions and confusion in the delineations of the boundary on maps published in Britain and India in the past century and more. This is because, after occupying Kashmir, Britain actively tried to use it as a base for aggression against China's southern Sinkiang and northwestern Tibet and, therefore, it continually made arbitrary changes in the traditional customary boundary line in the western sector and sent surveying parties to intrude into China for this purpose. Prime Minister Nehru says that "accurate" maps, that is, maps in agreement with the current Indian maps, became possible only from 1865 after surveys. But, even so, some reputed surveyors did not wish to misrepresent the facts at will. For instance, the delineations of the boundary on the *Sketch Map of Eastern Turkestan* of 1870 by G. W. Hayward and on the *Sketch Map of the Country North of India* of 1871 by Robert Shaw — both surveyors being referred to by Prime Minister Nehru in his letter of September 26 — are close to the traditional customary line as shown on Chinese maps. In his article in the *Journal of the British Royal Geographical Society*, Vol. XI, 1870, Hayward stated explicitly that the boundary ran along the main chain of the Karakoram Mountain to the passes in Changchenmo, that is to say, it is the Chinese maps, rather than the current Indian maps, that have correctly delineated this sector of the boundary. What is of special significance is the fact that no boundary line, let alone an "accurate" boundary line, was drawn at all for this sector on the official map compiled by the Survey of India as late as the 1943 edition. On its 1950 map, though the same colour for Kashmir was painted in the area disputed by India, still no boundary line was drawn, and there were marked the words "Boundary Undefined." This fact has already been pointed out above.

Fourthly, the Indian Government says that the traditional customary line claimed by it possesses, in addition, distinct geographical features, that is, it runs along the watershed. However, to begin with, the principle of watershed is not the sole or main international principle for the delimitation of boundaries. It is particularly impermissible to use the watershed as a pretext for seeking a boundary line within the territory of another country. Next, the traditional customary line claimed by the Indian Government, instead of separating the Hotien River system from the Indus River system, actually cuts across the Hotien River system. On the contrary, the traditional customary line as shown on Chinese maps truly reflects the geographical features of this area, that is, having no steep slopes in the north-south direction, the area is easily passable and, therefore, naturally forms the only route linking Sinkiang and western Tibet. To the west, however, there lies between this region and Ladakh the towering Karakoram Mountain range which is extremely difficult to pass through. The Indian Government also admits that this area is extremely difficult of access from Ladakh.

It can thus be seen that judging by the actual administrative jurisdiction at all times or by the maps and geographical features referred to by India, the line claimed by India to be the traditional customary boundary line in the western sector is without any foundation; while the traditional customary line for which China stands is truly well founded.

(2) Concerning the middle sector. The disputed areas involved here owing to difference of conception
between the two sides regarding the traditional customary line — Chuva, Chuje, Shipki Pass, Sang, Tsungsha, Puling-Sumdo, Wuje, Sangcha and Laphal — are all traditional Chinese territory. Except Sang and Tsungsha which were invaded and occupied by Britain earlier, they were all occupied or intruded into by India only after the signing of the 1954 Sino-Indian Agreement.

The local authorities of the Tibet Region have kept up to now the land-conferring documents or land deeds concerning these places issued in the past few centuries. For example, the mandate issued in the name of the 7th Dalai Lama in the 18th century stated specifically that Wuje was within the territorial limits of Daba Doong of Tibet. Furthermore, the local authorities of the Tibet Region have all along been collecting taxes in these places, and the census record and taxation papers of some of these places have been well preserved down to the present time.

Nearly all those who have lived long in these places are of the Tibetan nationality of China. Despite foreign occupation of their places of residence, they still did not wish to be separated from their motherland. For instance, after Sang and Tsungsha were occupied by Britain, the local population still considered themselves Chinese nationals, and on more than one occasion pledged their allegiance to the local government of the Tibet Region of China in statements made to the local authorities of the Tibet Region.

It must be pointed out in particular that among the above-mentioned places, Puling-Sumdo is one of the ten places which the Chinese Government agreed to open as markets for trade in the Ari district of Tibet as specified in Article II, Section 2 of the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954. It was opened together with the nine other markets in compliance with request made by Mr. N. Raghavan, representative of the Indian Government and Indian Ambassador, at the first meeting of the negotiations. Puling-Sumdo, however, was occupied by India soon after the signing of the 1954 Agreement.

The Indian Government claims that it has all along been exercising jurisdiction over the above-mentioned places. However, in the note annexed to Prime Minister Nehru’s letter of September 26, 1959, apart from some extremely strained arguments in connection with Sang and Tsungsha, there are no concrete facts whatever to show that jurisdiction has always been exercised over the seven other places.

The principle of watershed put forward by the Indian Government cannot be applied here either, as it does not conform with the jurisdiction actually exercised by each side.

The maps published by the two sides also show that it is China, not India, which has abided by the traditional customary line. The delineations of this sector of the boundary on past Chinese maps, though leaving a few very small pieces of Chinese territory outside of the Chinese boundary, on the whole reflected the correct traditional customary line. On the other hand, no boundary line was drawn for this sector on official Indian maps even as late as 1950, and only the words “Boundary Undefined” were marked.

(3) Concerning the eastern sector. The area between the so-called McMahon Line and the boundary line at the southern foot of the Himalayas as shown on Chinese maps has always belonged to China, and was until recently still under Chinese jurisdiction. This is proved by a mass of facts.

As early as the middle of the 17th century, the local government of the Tibet Region of China had begun to exercise jurisdiction over this area comprising Monyul, Loyul and Lower Tsayul. Take the Monyul area for example. In the middle of the 17th century, when the 5th Dalai Lama unified Tibet, he sent his disciple Mera Lama and tribal chief Namka Drukdra, Dinpon of Tsona, to the Monyul area to establish their rule there. By the beginning of the 18th century, the local government of the Tibet Region had unified the whole of Monyul and divided the area gradually into thirty-two “iso” (a few named “din”). At Tawang, the capital of Monyul, an administrative committee known as “Tawang Shidrel” and a non-permanent administrative conference of a higher level known as “Tawang Drudrel” were set up to direct the affairs of the whole area. The local government of the Tibet Region used always to appoint the officials of the administrative organs at various levels in Monyul, collect taxes (mainly grain tax, twice a year) and exercise judicial authority in all parts of the area. Monyul was included in every census conducted in Tibet in the past and was not treated as an exceptional case. The religious, economic and cultural life of the local people, the Monbas, has been deeply influenced by the Tibetan nationality; they believe in Lamalms, can speak the Tibetan language, and used Tibetan currency. It is from the Monyul area that the 6th Dalai Lama, Tsanyun Gyaltso, hailed, and his house there received for all generations the mandates conferred by successive regimes of the Tibet Region.

In addition, it must be pointed out that even after the so-called McMahon Line was defined and made public, the local government of the Tibet Region continued to exercise extensively and for a long period of time its jurisdiction over this area. For instance, the Tibetan administrative institutions in Monyul had been almost kept intact until 1951. In Loyul and Lower Tsayul, up to 1946, the administrative organs of “iso” and “din” were maintained quite extensively, and the people continued to pay taxes and render corvée to the Lhasa authorities.

Therefore, the allegations of the Indian Government that “the Tibetan authorities have not exercised jurisdiction at any time in this area,” that the local “tribes have not been affected in the slightest degree by any Tibetan influence, cultural, political or other,” and so on are incredible.

The Indian Government claims that it has always exercised jurisdiction over this area. However, in Prime Minister Nehru’s own words, Indian administration had “gradually moved up” to this area; the tribes had generally been left “more or less to look after themselves” until around 1914; and British political officers only “visited
these areas.” And what did the British officers who had visited this area say? The Captain Bailey referred to by Prime Minister Nehru in his letter of September 26, 1959, who was specially sent by the British Indian Government in 1913 to southeastern Tibet to conduct illegal exploration and survey for the purpose of defining the so-called McMahon Line, described the jurisdiction of the Tibet local government over the Monyul area at the time in his book *No Passport to Tibet* published in 1957; he further stated in his letter to the London Times published on September 7 this year that, “When we reached Tawang (i.e. capital of Monyul), we found a purely Tibetan administration in force.” Even Christoph Von Führer-Haimendorf, then Special Officer of the Indian External Affairs Department in Subansiri, who was sent by the Indian Assam authorities in 1944, that is, thirty years after the so-called McMahon Line was defined, to explore this area, also testified in his book *Himalayan Barbery* published in 1955, that the frontier in this area was undefined and unsurveyed, and remained unadministered by the Indian authorities. It can thus be seen how untenable are the assertions that the area has belonged to India for tens and hundreds of years, that the current boundary has always been the historical boundary, etc., etc.

The Indian Government says that the British concluded a number of agreements with some of the local tribes between 1844 and 1888 and that these agreements are evidence of Indian jurisdiction. However, the 1853 agreement with the Monbas cited by Prime Minister Nehru begins with the statement by the Monbas: “We . . . being deputed by the Daba Rajas to carry letters of friendship to the Agent, Governor-General, North-East Frontier, desiring that the former friendly relations which existed between the Government of India and our Lhassa Government . . . should be again resumed. . . .” This passage proves exactly and indisputably that the Monbas belong to Tibet, not India, and that it was under the premise of recognizing them as belonging to Tibet that the Indian Government concluded the agreement with them. The Daba Rajas referred to here was the Regent of the local government of the Tibet Region. As to the agreements with the Abors and the Akhas cited, it can also be seen clearly from their texts that the areas of those tribes were not British territory. Some of the agreements even stated explicitly that British territory “extends to the foot of the hills (i.e. southern foot of the Himalayas).” And these peoples were not British subjects.

It can be seen from the above historical data provided by the Chinese and Indian sides respectively that this area always belonged to China, not to Britain or India.

This conclusion is further confirmed forcefully by the authoritative maps published in the two countries. The maps published in China as a rule include this area in Chinese territory, that is, marking the boundary line along the true traditional boundary at the southern foot of the Himalayas. According to material now available to the Chinese Government, the same delineation was followed on the official maps published by the Survey of India up to and including the 1938 edition. After 1938 and up to 1952, the Survey of India changed its delineation by marking the boundary in accordance with the so-called McMahon Line, but still using the marking for undemarcated boundary. Since 1954, it has again changed the undemarcated boundary into demarcated boundary. By these successive changes, it shifted from its original position of recognizing this area as Chinese territory to that of claiming this area as India’s lawful territory at all times. Nevertheless, the delineation on current Indian maps has not been accepted internationally. As stated above, the atlas edited by John Bartholomew, cartographer to the King of Britain, and published in 1958 still considered it a disputed area, while the delineation on the map “India 1945,” attached to Prime Minister Nehru’s book *The Discovery of India*, was still the same as that on Chinese maps.

In the face of these authoritative facts, the *Atlas of the Chinese Empire* published in London in 1906 by the China Inland Mission, a British church organization, to which the Indian Government referred, is obviously without significance.

It can be seen from what has been said in the above that the Chinese Government’s view of the traditional customary line is based on objective facts and confirmed by a mass of factual data in all its sectors, western, middle and eastern. On the other hand, the boundary line marked on Indian maps, with the exception of the middle sector which for the most part conforms to reality, does not represent at all the traditional customary line. The eastern and western sectors of this boundary line, it can in particular be seen beyond any shadow of doubt, are the product of the British policy of aggression and expansion in modern history.

It should not have been necessary to discuss the British policy of aggression and expansion in modern history, as the history of India itself, the history of India’s adjacent countries which had once been a part of British India or its dependency, the history of China, and, in particular, the history of China’s Tibet Region adjoining India, all bear witness to this policy. While embarking on armed aggression against Tibet and conspiring to cause Tibet to break away from China, Britain also nibbled at the frontiers of Tibet both on the maps and in deed, which resulted in this boundary line that was later inherited by India and is marked on current Indian maps. Of course, the great Indian people, who treasure peace, can in no way be held responsible for all the acts of aggression committed by Britain with India as its base. It is, however, surprising that the Indian Government should claim the boundary line which Britain unlawfully created through aggression against Tibet and which even includes areas to which British authority had not extended as the traditional customary boundary line, while perversely describing the true traditional customary boundary line pointed out by the Chinese Government on the basis of objective facts as laying claim to large tracts of Indian territory. How would the Indian Government feel, if it were in the position of the Chinese Government? If this assertion is maintained, the inevitable conclusion to be derived would be that the British colonialists were most fair-minded while oppressed China was full of undisguised ambitions; that the powerful British imperialism was, for the past one hundred years and more, invariably upholding the traditional Sino-Indian boundary, while the weak China was ceaselessly encroaching upon British territory! The Chi-
Chinese Government believes that no one would accept this conclusion.

Question Three: What Is the Proper Way to Settle the Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute?

The Chinese Government, starting from the above-mentioned facts that the Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited and that there is difference of conception between the two sides regarding the boundary, has consistently held that an overall settlement of the boundary question between the two countries should be sought by the Chinese and Indian sides, taking into account the historical background and present actual situation, in accordance with the Five Principles and through friendly consultations; that pending this, as a provisional measure, the two sides should maintain the status quo of the border, and not seek to change it by unilateral action, let alone by force; and that as to some of the disputes, partial and provisional agreements could be reached through negotiations.

The Indian Government disagrees with the Chinese Government’s statement that the boundary has not been delimited and an overall settlement of the question should be sought through negotiations, and only acknowledges that certain minor, partial adjustments could be made. Yet the Indian Government agrees that the two sides should maintain the status quo of the border, avoid the use of force and settle the disputes through negotiations. Thus, although there are differences between the two sides, the tranquillity of the border and the friendship of the two countries could have been ensured. Contrary to the expectations of the Chinese Government, the Indian Government has time and again asserted that the Chinese Government had previously agreed that the boundary had been delimited and accepted the Indian Government’s claim regarding the boundary and that the Chinese Government changed its stand only recently. At the same time, the Indian Government has also made incorrect interpretations of the status quo of the border, repeatedly violated the status quo in actual deeds and even resorted to force, thus creating tension on the border. In these circumstances, the Indian Government has perversely charged that the Chinese Government should be held responsible for all this and said that China harboured ambitions of “aggression” and “expansion.” The above-mentioned attitude of the Indian Government has made the boundary question all the more difficult and complicated.

Therefore, the Chinese Government deems it necessary to clarify the following points:

(1) Whether the Chinese Government has ever agreed that the boundary was delimited and accepted the Indian Government’s claim regarding the boundary and changed its stand afterwards.

The Indian Government has referred to the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954, holding that this agreement has dealt with all the outstanding issues between India and the Tibet Region, and that therefore the boundary question should be considered settled.

As a matter of fact, the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954 is an agreement on trade and intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India and has nothing to do with the boundary question and no provision concerning the boundary can be found in any article of the Agreement. It may be recalled that at that time, the question which the two countries were most concerned about and which called for urgent solution was the establishment of normal relations between India and the Tibet Region of China on a new basis. During the negotiations, neither side asked to discuss the boundary question; this was intended to avoid affecting the settlement of the most urgent question at the time. Both sides were clear on this point. At the very beginning of the negotiations, Premier Chou En-lai made it clear to the Indian Government Delegation that the task of the negotiations was “to settle those outstanding questions between the two countries which are ripe for settlement.” Afterwards, at the fourth meeting held on January 8, 1954, the two sides jointly defined the task of the negotiations as settling those outstanding questions between the two countries which were ripe for settlement in accordance with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. On April 23 of the same year, the Chinese representative further pointed out that the negotiations would not touch on the boundary question. The Indian representative agreed to this view of the Chinese side. There was, therefore, no fact whatever to show that the Chinese Government agreed to the Indian Government’s conception of the boundary or that it would not bring up the boundary question for discussion afterwards.

The Indian Government has also referred to the talks between the two Prime Ministers in Peking in October 1954, expressing the view that Premier Chou En-lai’s remarks about Chinese maps implied that the Chinese Government would revise its maps in accordance with Indian maps, that is to say, the Chinese Government had accepted the Indian Government’s claim regarding the boundary.

The fact is that at that time Prime Minister Nehru took exception to the delineation of the Sino-Indian boundary line on Chinese maps and therefore Premier Chou En-lai explained that the delineation of the boundary on Chinese maps followed that of the old maps and that it would not be fitting for the Chinese Government, on its own, to change the delineation of the boundary before conducting surveys and consulting with the countries concerned. In particular, Premier Chou En-lai pointed out at the time that China has undelimited boundaries with India and some other south-western neighbouring countries. Prime Minister Nehru said, however, that he considered that no boundary question existed between China and India. It can be seen from this conversation that there was an obvious difference of views between the two sides regarding the boundary, and that Premier Chou En-lai clearly expressed his disagreement to any unilateral revision of maps.

The Indian Government has also referred to the talks between the two Prime Ministers held in India at the end of 1956, considering that Premier Chou En-lai’s remarks made at the time about the so-called McMahon Line implied that the Chinese Government recognized this line.
In fact, when Premier Chou En-lai referred to the so-called McMahon Line, he said that it was illegal and had never been recognized by the Chinese Government. He explained at the same time that despite this, in order to ensure the tranquility of the border and out of consideration for the friendship of the two countries, Chinese military and administrative personnel would strictly refrain from crossing this line and expressed the hope that a proper way to settle the eastern sector of the boundary might be found at a later date. This statement of Premier Chou En-lai can by no means be interpreted as recognition of this line by the Chinese Government.

It can thus be seen that the Chinese Government has been consistent in its attitude that the boundary has not been delimited and is yet to be settled through negotiations between the two countries. The Indian Government's implication that the Chinese Government has changed its original stand does not accord with the facts.

(2) Whether the Chinese Government scrupulously respects the status quo of the border.

It is a principle agreed upon by both sides that pending an overall settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question, the status quo of the border should be maintained.

The Chinese Government has faithfully abided by this principle. In the ten years since liberation, Chinese military and administrative personnel have been under orders not to go beyond the areas which have always been under Chinese jurisdiction, and even not to cross the so-called McMahon Line in the eastern sector.

The Indian Government's interpretation of the status quo of the border, however, is based not on the actual scope of jurisdiction of the two sides, but on the unilaterally fixed boundary line shown on Indian maps that includes large areas where Indian jurisdiction has never reached. Thus armed Indian personnel have repeatedly violated the status quo of the border and, step by step, extended the scope of its occupation by encroaching on Parigas, Chuva, Chuje, Shikpi Pass, Puling-Sumdo, Sangcha and Laphal, and intruded into Aksai Chin, Luke Pangong, Kongka Pass and Wuje. But the Indian Government describes all these actions as maintenance of the status quo. In the eastern sector, after the outbreak of the rebellion in Tibet in March this year, armed Indian personnel even overstepped the so-called McMahon Line, at one time occupied Longju and Tamaden, and is now still in occupation of Khinzemane, all of which are situated north of that line.

Although the Indian side has occupied Puling-Sumdo, one of the Chinese markets specified in the 1954 Agreement and once occupied Tamaden which India itself admits to be Chinese territory, yet the Indian Government has all along denied having violated the status quo of the border. Moreover, basing itself on the boundary line shown on its own maps, the Indian Government accused China of violating the status quo of the border. To this the Chinese Government cannot agree.

(3) Whether the Chinese Government has earnestly avoided using force.

Recently, two armed clashes which neither side wished to see occurred in the Migyitun area and the Kongka Pass area. This was extremely unfortunate. But it is not China that should be held responsible for them. The Migyitun area incident of August 25 was caused by the action of the armed Indian personnel who had invaded and occupied Longju in advancing further to the southern vicinity of Migyitun and attacking a Chinese patrol. Armed Chinese personnel never attacked the outpost established illegally by India at Longju; on the contrary, it was the armed Indian personnel from the Longju outpost who opened fire on an even larger scale on the following day, but the Chinese troops stationed at Migyitun never returned fire. The allegation that Chinese troops drove armed Indian personnel out of their outpost at Longju by superior force is not true. Armed Chinese personnel entered Longju only on September 1, that is, the sixth day counting from August 27 when the armed Indian personnel withdrew.

The case of the Kongka Pass incident of October 21 is even more obvious. On the day after three armed Indian personnel were detained on their intrusion into Chinese territory more than 60 armed Indian personnel carrying light and heavy machine guns and other weapons intruded further into Chinese territory, and launched an armed attack on a Chinese patrol numbering fourteen only and carrying light arms alone. Both before and after the Indian party opened fire, the Chinese patrol gave repeated warnings not to shoot. The Chinese deputy squad leader, Wu Ching-kuo, waved his hands to the Indian personnel and called on them not to shoot, but this esteemed comrade was the first man to be hit and killed. Only after this was the Chinese patrol forced to return fire.

That China has consistently refused to use force is further borne out by the following facts:

a. When a situation of the armed forces of the two sides facing each other first appeared on the Chinese territory of Wuje in 1955, the Chinese Government took the initiative in proposing that neither side should station troops in Wuje pending a settlement through negotiations.

b. With regard to Chinese territories of Parigas, Chuva, Chuje, Shikpi Pass, Sang, Tsungha, Puling-Sumdo, Sangcha, Laphal and Khinzemane, which have been occupied by the Indian side, the Chinese Government has never tried compelling the armed Indian personnel to withdraw by force of arms. Even in regard to such an area as Tamaden, which the Indian Government itself admits to be Chinese territory, the Chinese Government also patiently waited for the Indian troops to withdraw of their own accord and did not resort to force.

c. With regard to armed Indian personnel who intruded into the garrison areas of Chinese frontier outposts, the Chinese frontier guard units first of all invariably advised them to leave Chinese territory and it was only when they refused to listen to such advice were they disarmed and afterwards sent out of Chinese territory together with their arms.

d. All the Chinese frontier guards are under strict orders absolutely to refrain from using their arms unless they are already subjected to armed attack.
e. After the occurrence of the unfortunate Kongka Pass incident, the Chinese Government immediately ordered its troops guarding the Sino-Indian border to stop patrolling the entire border.

e. In order completely and effectively to prevent any border clashes, the Chinese Government has recently proposed time and again that the armed personnel of the two sides on the border respectively withdraw 20 kilometres or some other appropriate distance.

The above-mentioned facts prove that the Chinese Government has adopted all possible measures to maintain the tranquillity of the border and to prevent the use of force and the occurrence of armed clashes.

After the Kongka Pass incident, the Indian Government also instructed its frontier guards to stop patrolling and indicated to the Chinese Government that in any event neither side should resort to force except as a last resort in self-defence. This is undoubtedly worthy of welcome. Prior to the occurrence of these two clashes, however, the Indian Government in its note dated August 11 this year had informed the Chinese Government to the effect that Indian frontier guards had instructions "to resist trespassers and to use minimum force necessary for this purpose if warning given by them remains unheeded." The Indian Government's note also stated that "if any Chinese troops are still within Indian territory, they should be immediately withdrawn as otherwise this may lead to avoidable clash." Even after the occurrence of the first clash, the Indian frontier guards, according to the note sent by the Indian Government to China on August 27, 1959, still had instructions to "use force on the trespassers if necessary." It must be pointed out that since there are divergences both between the two countries' conceptions of the boundary and between their maps, and since the Indian Government regards large tracts of Chinese territory which have always been under Chinese jurisdiction as Indian territory, Chinese military and administrative personnel stationed on the soil of their own country would inevitably be called "trespassers" by the Indian side. In this way, Indian subordinates in carrying out these instructions, could use force more or less freely according to their own judgment. Obviously, it cannot be said that the occurrence of the two unfortunate border incidents was unrelated to such instructions.

(1) Whether China wants to engage in "aggression" and "expansion."

Centring around the Sino-Indian boundary question, there has recently appeared in India a great deal of anti-Chinese pronouncements, which in cold war language slander China as "imperialism," "expanding into India" and "committing aggression." The Chinese people cannot but feel deep regret at such malicious attacks against China, which simply fly in the face of facts.

The Chinese Government has noted that there is at present in India a rather prevalent observation that China has now grown strong and, like certain Chinese rulers in history or modern imperialists, would seek expansion abroad. Apart from those who are obviously hostile to China, the great majority of those who spread this obser-
China and many of its neighbouring countries, but China has never taken, and will never take, advantage of this situation to make any changes in the actually existing state of affairs on the borders by unilateral action. Whether or not the boundary has been delimited, China is always prepared to work in close co-operation with its neighbours for the creation of the most peaceful, secure and friendly border zones so that there will be no mutual misgivings or clashes over the border questions.

With regard to Bhutan and Sikkim, some explanation may be given in passing. China has no other intentions than that of living with them in friendship without committing aggression against each other. Concerning the boundary between China and Bhutan, there is only a certain discrepancy between the delineations on the maps of the two sides in the sector south of the so-called McMahon Line. But it has always been tranquil along the border between the two countries. The boundary between China and Sikkim has long been formally delimited and there is neither any discrepancy between the maps nor any disputes in practice. All allegations that China wants to "encroach on" Bhutan and Sikkim, just like the allegations that China wants to commit aggression against India and other southwestern neighbouring countries, are sheer nonsense.

This basic stand of the Chinese Government towards its neighbours has long been defined time and again and there should have been no need to deal with it at length. It is, however, unfortunate that recently, particularly since the putting down of the rebellion of the reactionary serf-owners in the Tibet Region of China, India has in various ways distorted and attacked the Chinese attitude. In the interest of friendship of the two countries, the Chinese Government does not wish to answer attack with attack, but would rather assume that the Indian Government really has some misunderstandings about China's intentions. It may be that, for certain reasons, the campaign against China would still continue. Even if unfortunately that should be the case, the Chinese Government absolutely refuses to think that the misunderstandings about China of those who harbour no ill will would likewise continue for long. Because, if China were really committing aggression against and posing threat to India or any other country, ten thousand denials would not alter the fact; if it is otherwise, although ten thousand propaganda machines tell the whole world about China's "aggression" and "threat," they will only discredit the propagandists themselves. "The strength of a horse is known by the distance travelled, and the heart of a man is seen with the passage of time." China's peaceful and friendly attitude towards India will stand the test of time. The Chinese Government is convinced that, though the truth of a matter may be hidden for a while, it is impossible to hide it up for long.

(5) Where lies the key to the settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question?

There exist important differences between the Governments of China and India in their stand on the boundary question and there is still tension between the two countries on the border. But the Chinese Government has never had any doubt that the tension will eventually pass away and a reasonable settlement of the boundary question will be reached through friendly consultations.

The confidence of the Chinese Government is based on the following: There is friendship of thousands of years' duration but no irreconcilable conflict between the two countries; both sides urgently need to devote themselves to long-term peaceful construction at home and are willing to work for the defence of world peace; and it is uncalled for as well as unthinkable to go on arguing like this without end. On the boundary question, both sides have indicated their willingness to maintain the status quo of the border and to settle the boundary dispute by peaceful means. This shows that a basis exists for China and India to live together in friendship and that the boundary question could be settled in a reasonable way. Besides, looking at it the other way round, there is no alternative. It is impossible for the two sides to change the geographical reality of their being neighbours or to break off all contacts along the lengthy boundary line. It is particularly impossible to entertain the absurd idea that our two great friendly neighbours with a combined population of more than one thousand million might start a war over such temporary and local disputes. Therefore, a friendly settlement of the boundary disputes by peaceful means is the only logical answer.

What are the key questions which demand an urgent solution right now? The Chinese Government has the honour to present the following opinions to the Indian Government:

a. The Chinese Government is of the opinion that no matter what views the two sides may hold about any specific matter concerning the boundary, there should no longer be any difference of opinion about the most basic fact known to the whole world, that is, the entire boundary between the two countries has indeed never been delimited, and is therefore yet to be settled through negotiations. Recognition of this simple fact should not create any difficulties for either side, because it would neither impair the present interests of either side, nor in any way prevent both sides from making their own claims at the boundary negotiations. Once agreement is reached on this point, it could be said that the way has been opened to the settlement of the boundary question. Although up to now each side has persisted in its own views on the concrete disputes concerning the different sectors of the boundary, provided both sides attach importance to the fundamental interest of friendship of the two countries and adopt an unprejudiced attitude and one of mutual understanding and accommodation, it would not be difficult to settle these disputes. If India's opinions prove to be more reasonable and more in the interest of friendship of the two countries, they should be accepted by China; if China's opinions prove to be more reasonable and more in the interest of friendship of the two countries, they should be accepted by India. It is the hope of the Chinese Government that the forthcoming meeting between the Prime Ministers of the two countries will first of all reach agreement on some principles on the boundary question so as to provide guidance and basis for the future discussion and the working out of a solution by the two sides.
b. Pending the formal delimitation of the boundary, the status quo of the border between the two countries must be effectively maintained and the tranquillity of the border ensured. For this purpose, the Chinese Government proposes that the armed forces of the two sides along the border respectively withdraw 20 kilometres or some other distance considered appropriate by the two sides, and that, as a step preliminary to this basic measure, the armed personnel of both sides stop patrolling along the entire border.

The Chinese Government believes that if agreement can be reached on the two points mentioned above, the situation on the Sino-Indian border will undergo an immediate change and the dark clouds hanging over the relations between the two countries will quickly vanish.

The Chinese Government earnestly hopes that the views it has set forth here at great length on the past, present and future of the Sino-Indian boundary question would receive the most good-willed understanding of the Indian Government, thereby helping to bring about a settlement of this question satisfactory to both sides and a turn for the better in the relations between the two countries. Although some arguing cannot be helped in order to make reply to unfair charges, the intention and aim of the Chinese Government is not to argue, but to bring arguing to an end.

China and India are two great countries each with its great past and future. Guided by the great ideal of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the two countries have over the past few years joined hands and co-operated closely in defence of world peace. Today, history again issues a call to the peoples of the two countries asking them to make still greater contributions internationally to the cause of peace and human progress, while accomplishing tremendous changes at home. The task falling on the shoulders of the Chinese and Indian peoples of the present generation is both arduous and glorious. The Chinese Government wishes to reiterate here its ardent desire that the two countries stop quarrelling, quickly bring about a reasonable settlement of the boundary question, and on this basis consolidate and develop the great friendship of the two peoples in their common cause.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the Republic of India in China the assurances of its highest consideration.