Great and Decisive Strategic Battles
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The Dunes a short story by Wang Wen-shih about life in a people’s commune. It features two young brigade leaders of different temperaments, a young slacker, a stubborn, complacent team leader and a crochety old man who knew everything about farming.

Three Poems by Marshal Chen Yi, an accomplished poet of the older generation who writes chiefly in the classical style.

Essays by Po Chin and Liu Pao-yu, two outstanding writers, on their recent trip to Tokyo where they took part in the Emergency Meeting of the Afro-Asian Writers’ Conference.

Spring in a Small Town, a story by Hsiao Hung (1911-1942), a gifted woman writer of the last generation.

A Princess Gets Smacked, a well-known traditional Shansi opera.

On the Question of Beauty, a report on discussions about one of the subjects now being heatedly debated in Chinese literary, artistic and philosophical circles.

Notes on Art, Book Notes and Information

Plates in Colour by artists from the Kiangsu Studio of Traditional Painting with an article by its director, Fu Pao-shih.

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**Dragon Beard Ditch**  A Play in Three Acts

by Lao Sheh

The Dragon Beard Ditch of Lao Sheh’s play was a notorious open sewer in pre-liberation Peking. Always noisome, the summer rains sent its filth flooding into the hovels of the poverty-stricken people who lived along it. A menace to health and life, it caused suffering and tragedy, yet the Kuomintang regime did nothing about it. Its officials even pocketed money raised to cover it in.

Immediately after liberation, the People’s Government took matters in hand here. Within a few months the ditch was covered over and a tree-lined avenue appeared in its place. No less radical were the changes which took place in the lives of the people who lived along it.

The old and new life around Dragon Beard Ditch is the theme of Lao Sheh’s play told with realism and great humanity and humour. Lao Sheh is widely known for his plays and the novel *Camel Hsiang-tse* (translated into English as *Rickshaw Boy*). Not surprisingly, he is active too in municipal affairs in Peking.

Illustrated with photographs from a Peking production of the play.

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ROUND THE WEEK

China's Army Day

The 34th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army was marked with manifold activities. Celebration meetings and parties were held both in the cities and in the countryside.

In Peking, on July 30, the eve of the anniversary, more than 8,000 officers and men of the P.L.A. and people from all walks of life attended a gala celebration in the spacious halls of the Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Museum.

Marshal Chen Yi and Li Hsien-nien, both Members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and Vice-Premiers, Marshal Yeh Chien-ying, Vice-Chairman of the National Defence Council, Senior General Lo Ju-i-ching, Vice-Premier and Chief of the General Staff of the P.L.A., and Hsi Chung-hsun, Vice-Premier, were among the high-ranking government leaders present.

The programme of entertainments included songs and dances, stage plays, quyi shows, gymnastic exhibitions and films. The most popular item was a choral selection of the time-honoured songs of the Chinese Red Army. They set both officers and men humming and their thoughts back to memories of life and struggles in the early revolutionary days.

At the Peking Reception

On August 1 Vice-Premier Senior General Lo Ju-i-ching gave a reception in honour of Army Day. Military attaches and other members of the diplomatic corps in Peking and friends from Cuba and Viet Nam now visiting China were among the guests.

In his speech at the reception the Chief of the General Staff described how with Marxism-Leninism as its ideological weapon, and with the correct guidance of the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the P.L.A. has received energetic support from the Chinese people, has grown from a small and weak force into the mighty force it is today. The history of the P.L.A., he said, demonstrates a truth: no reactionary force, no matter how strong it seems to be, is ever able to block the victorious advance of the just cause of the people fighting for freedom and liberation. A single spark can develop into a great prairie fire. So long as it persists in the struggle, a progressive force, though it may appear to be weak at the outset, will surely be able to overcome all obstacles and win final victory.

General Lo denounced the Kennedy Administration for stepping up its war policy while playing “peace” tricks. Ample facts have proved that Kennedy is worse and more dangerous than Eisenhower.

The U.S. imperialists, General Lo added, are stepping up their “two Chinas” scheme in the vain hope of legitimizing its permanent occupation of Taiwan. This, the general stressed, will absolutely not be tolerated by the Chinese people. This imperialist scheme can never be realized. The P.L.A. stands ready at all times to liberate China’s territory of Taiwan, to finally accomplish the great task of unifying the whole country and it stands ready to deal with the aggressive war that may be launched by the U.S. imperialists.

In conclusion, the Chief of the General Staff expressed confidence that Taiwan will surely return to the bosom of the motherland, that U.S. imperialist schemes for aggression and war will surely fail, and that world peace and human progress will surely triumph.

Nationwide Celebrations

Factories, people’s communes, government offices and schools all over the land invited P.L.A. officers, old revolutionaries and combat heroes to give reports on the achievements of the people’s army, its glorious past and fine traditions. Gay get-togethers were held in many places where P.L.A. units are stationed. Big gala celebra-
tion parties were given in cities and towns and even on the Fukien front.

The honouring of the families of servicemen, revolutionary martyrs, disabled soldiers and demobilized personnel was another major activity on Army Day. Special parties were organized for them. In Peking, more than 3,000 attended a party in their honour given by the municipal people’s government in the music hall of Zhongshan Park.

Throughout the week, the newspapers and radio featured articles on the Nanchang Uprising which gave birth to the people's army, memoirs of old revolutionaries and accounts of the fighting history of the P.L.A.

On August 1 the Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily) published an editorial calling on officers and men of the P.L.A. to unite together with the whole nation, to work industriously and struggle assiduously so as to make new contributions to the cause of China's socialist construction, to the further development of the revolutionary character of the army and the acceleration of its modernization and to the struggle for the liberation of Taiwan, as well as to the cause of guarding against imperialist aggression and safeguarding the motherland and the peace of Asia and the world.

Early Rice Harvest

The centre of the nation's productive activity these days is still in the countryside. As summer ripens, life on the farms becomes busier yet. Throughout last week members of the people's communes in the southern provinces were reaping their early rice harvest while their brothers up in the north were bringing in their spring wheat crop. In some areas where the weather was up to its tricks again the peasants after a tough struggle proudly gathered in their fruits of victory.

By July 21 people's commune members in Kwangtung Province in the south had already reaped their early rice crop on 15 million mu, which is more than half of the total area sown to this crop. In the fertile Chaohow-Swatow plain harvesting has been completed and the crop is safely in the barns. This summer's harvest here was characterized by efficient organization of the labour force and better co-ordination between the production brigades of the communes.

In places where the harvest has already been brought in, commune members got together to review their work and exchange views on how to win a still better crop of late rice.

In Szechuan, the famous granary of the southwest, harvesting the early rice is in full swing, moving quickly from south to north. Across the plains along the banks of the Yangtze, the sickles are flashing. Undismayed by a long drought which hit most of Szechuan's early rice, the peasants turned out in full force to transplant the late rice. Many city folk—factory and office workers and students—went to the countryside to lend the communes a hand in harvesting the summer crop and planting out the late rice seedlings.

By early last week more than 50 per cent of the early rice crop had been brought to the floors for threshing in parts of Yunnan Province. In Kiangsi Province in central China the early rice crop on more than 80,000 mu had been cut and bound by July 12.

Chekiang Province in the east and Kwangsi in the south have also begun to harvest their early rice.

Up in the north, it's time to cut the spring wheat. In Liaoning in the northeast, the peasants cut the wheat crop aided by urban residents who volunteered to do short spells of work on the farms. In some of the key wheat areas 50 per cent of the crop has been gathered. Liaoning peasants who have grown more wheat this year than ever before have high expectations.

In Heilungkiang, one of China's major spring wheat areas, combine-harvesters, tractors, reapers as well as draught animals are ready for the word "go" to reap the wheat on state farms and people's communes.

Reaping of both winter and spring wheat is imminent in the fields in Sinkiang in the far west. The peasants are in high spirits. The summer wheat harvest usually accounts for a considerable portion of the annual food crop of the year. What's more, the acreage under wheat this year has been extended. In Tibet, the qingke barley is being cut and the crop looks lovely.

Commune Democracy

Aside from harvesting and planting, "other business" too claims the attention of the people's commune members. On these starry summer nights while resting after the day's work they meet to discuss two main questions of common concern. In places where the summer crop has been reaped, a main item on the agenda is how best to divide up the fruits of labour. This is discussed by members' delegate meetings or general meetings of the people's commune members. Distribution in all people's communes throughout the country is governed by the fixed socialist principle of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work" and "he who works more is paid more." But exactly how much a member should get in accordance
with this principle and the actual size of the harvest, and how much should go to reserve, to welfare, etc., is a question that needs to be figured out carefully and decided by the members themselves. Another major question of current interest is the autumn production plan. What should be done, what should be sown next and how much? This, too, must be decided in a democratic way.

A people’s commune has three levels. It is composed of several smaller units called production brigades (a production brigade is more or less equivalent in size to the former advanced agricultural producers’ cooperative), which in turn are divided into a number of production teams. Meetings of delegates of the commune members (or general meetings of commune members) are held at all three levels, and it is at these meetings that all important questions must be discussed and decided. These meetings also elect the managerial staff—the managerial committees and supervisory committees—of the teams, brigades and the commune as a whole.

Usually the meeting of commune members’ delegates is held twice a year, the delegate or general members’ meeting at the production brigade level is held four times a year while general meetings of the production teams are held once a month. Delegates, men and women who are regarded by the rank and file members as the most trustworthy and best able to voice their wishes, are elected by members from various sections of the membership—veteran peasants, young farmers, women, etc. It is no wonder, then, that these meetings constitute an important aspect of the democratic life of the people’s communes today.

Last week in Hunan Province, central China, like many other people’s communes elsewhere, the Yuchi Production Brigade of the Chengkuan People’s Commune held a members’ delegate meeting to discuss the distribution of income. A number of its teams had reaped a bigger harvest than their production plan called for and the question was how to divide this surplus. After a first-round exchange of views the meeting recessed for two days. The delegates reported back to their groups for comments and suggestions. When the meeting reconvened agreement was quickly reached and the plan thus decided on won the general approval of members.

Like commune members everywhere, Hunan’s peasants have plenty of warm words for their delegate meetings; they call them “unity meetings,” “democratic meetings,” “house-managing meetings,” or “the meetings through which everybody carries part of the common load.”

**Coalmines Expand**

China’s mines are opening up new work faces to increase production. Recent reports indicate that coal cutting areas in more than 150 shafts are being expanded in collieries in various provinces. Work on about half of these extensions is scheduled for completion by the end of this year.

Two-thirds of this expansion is being carried out in big and medium-sized pits. Main galleries and transport lines are being extended and shafts deepened; new seams are being opened and ventilation systems improved.

Meanwhile technical reform in the smaller mines continues. Technical improvements are being made at more than 30 pairs of shafts in Heilongjiang alone. These small mines, sunk in 1958 and afterwards, play no small role in that province’s coal industry. The new improvements will increase their lifting capacity, and improve transport and ventilation facilities. When completed, output in these small pits will be raised considerably and their productive life will be prolonged. Similar improvements are being made in the many other small collieries in other parts of the country.

**Vacation Time**

Last weekend, as soon as the classroom bells rang out school Peking’s children joyously tucked away their satchels and swamped the city’s swimming pools or spent the rest of the day in the cinemas. That evening beneath the lights many a family discussed how best their young members should spend a happy six-week summer vacation. It’s a difficult question of choice since Peking, like many other cities across the country, is offering its students a lavish and diverse programme to fill the long summer days.

The city’s cinemas have billed special holiday programmes of 166 outstanding films both Chinese-made and imported. Many theatres are giving two special showings a day for their young customers at cut rates. There are special concerts too. The Peking Youth Opera Company is presenting several productions with an accent on action especially selected for young opera fans. Parks have lowered the admission fee for students to a penny.

In Peking and elsewhere the doors of the Pioneer Palaces are thrown wide open. There young vacationers can play table-tennis, chess and other games or join the choruses and bands or various hobby circles and scientific activities. Public libraries have hung out welcome signs. At the swimming pools are special training classes giving expert coaching to young beginners.

Then, of course, there are summer camps, sports events and boating excursions without which holidays wouldn’t seem to be holidays. College students whose vacation started early this week are setting out on tours, going to summer resorts, and visiting relatives. The railways, as usual, charge only half fare for vacating students.

For faculty members there are free trips to summer resorts and numerous sight-seeing tours. Faculty members of the China People’s University, Tsinghua University and the Peking Teachers’ College will leave shortly for a stay in the rest homes of the Western Hills and the Summer Palace.

A group of faculty members and students of the Central Institute of Fine Arts in Peking have just left for a trip to study the famous murals and sculptures of the Tunhuang grottoes in Kansu Province in the northwest.

Their trade union is arranging to send many holidaying school teachers to the famous beach resort of Peitaiho in north China. Peitaiho is already playing host to several thousand vacationers from other professions and fields of work. Among the early arrivals are coalminers, railway and geological workers. It is expecting 50,000 people this season. Some 60 trade unions and other organizations maintain sanatoria and rest homes there.

Vacationers are enjoying fine days in Talien, Lushan, Taihu Lake, Lishan and at many other famous summer resorts.
Great and Decisive Strategic Battles

by YEH CHIEN-YING

This article by Marshal Yeh Chien-ying, Vice-Chairman of the National Defence Council, was carried in "Hongqi" in the early part of this year. We present this translation to our readers on the occasion of the 34th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Following is the first instalment.— Ed.

AFTER the Third Revolutionary Civil War (1946-49) entered its third year, Comrade Mao Tse-tung organized the three major campaigns of Liaohsi-Shenyang, Huai-Hai and Peiping-Tientsin in good time, and directed the People's Liberation Army in launching decisive strategic battles against the Kuomintang troops. In these campaigns which, commencing September 12, 1948, lasted 4 months and 19 days, 144 divisions (brigades) of regular troops and 29 divisions of irregulars of the enemy, totalling more than 1,549,000 men, were wiped out.* During this period, the People's Liberation Army (P.L.A.) also launched offensives on other fronts, destroying large numbers of enemy troops. By this time, enemy troops destroyed each month by the P.L.A. averaged 38 brigades, as against about 8 brigades during the first two years of the war. These three major campaigns practically wiped out the Kuomintang's crack units on which it relied for waging its counter-revolutionary civil war, and greatly speeded the advent of victory in the liberation war throughout the country.

The victories gained in the great and decisive strategic battles of these three major campaigns were victories for Comrade Mao Tse-tung's ideas concerning decisive strategic battles and strategy. The ideas of Comrade Mao Tse-tung on decisive strategic battles constitute an important component part of the whole body of his military science. A serious study of the rich experience acquired in these three major campaigns will, therefore, help us to obtain an all-round understanding of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's ideas on strategy and to get a comprehensive grasp of his military science. This article attempts, from several aspects, to expound Comrade Mao Tse-tung's ideas on decisive strategic battles and describe his art of command as demonstrated in these three major campaigns.

Seize the Opportunity for Fighting Decisive Battles in Good Time, Correctly Determine the Direction of Decisive Battles

During the Third Revolutionary Civil War, when we had passed from the stage in which the enemy was on the strategic offensive while we were on the strategic defensive to the stage in which these roles were reversed, by August 1948, thanks to the P.L.A.'s continued elimination of large numbers of enemy troops, a still more marked change had taken place in the relative military strength of the enemy and ourselves. The P.L.A. grew from 1,200,000 men in June 1946 to more than 2,600,000 while the Kuomintang troops were reduced from 4,300,000 to 3,650,000 men, of whom only 1,700,000 were deployed as front-line troops.

At this time, though the P.L.A. was still inferior to the Kuomintang army in numbers and equipment, it had greatly increased its combat effectiveness in the two years and more of fighting on both interior and exterior lines. It had wiped out large numbers of enemy troops, captured large quantities of modern arms, added to its equipment, established powerful artillery and engineering units and enhanced its ability to capture strongly fortified positions. In the battles for Shihhchichuang, Szapingkai, Kaifeng and other cities, it got experience in storming heavily fortified points, and was able to conduct both mobile and positional warfare. At the same time, taking advantage of intervals between battles, it carried out a new type of army ideological education movement, using the methods of "pouring out grievances" (the wrongs done to the labouring people by the old society and by the reactionaries), and the "three check-ups" (on class origin, performance of duty and fighting spirit) and unfolding a mass movement for training. This strengthened the internal unity and improved the political quality, military technique and tactics of its units. The emancipated peasants in the Liberated Areas continued to join the Liberation Army with great enthusiasm and waged a resolute struggle to safeguard their land and homes. Captured soldiers from Chiang Kai-shek's army, after receiving political education, also flocked to join the P.L.A. of their own accord, so enabling it to replenish its manpower constantly.

By this time, the various major Liberated Areas had been linked up one after another into one contiguous territory, being able to give direct strategic support to the fighting. The Liberated Areas were expanded to cover 2,350,000 square kilometres, one-fourth of the total area of the whole country, with a population of 168 million, or more than one-third of the national population. In the Liberated Areas, land reform was completed or basically completed, production was developed and the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses further enhanced. This further consolidated our army's rear and provided an inexhaustible source of manpower and material support for the war. The people's revolutionary united front was further expanded and consolidated and the people's revolutionary forces grew stronger than ever throughout the country.

Though the Kuomintang army still surpassed the P.L.A. in numbers and equipment at this time, and though...
THE LIAOHSI-SHENYANG CAMPAIGN

The first of the three major campaigns of the Chinese People’s Liberation War (1946-49) analysed in the accompanying article

The Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign was a gigantic campaign fought by the Northeast People’s Liberation Army in the western part of Liaoning Province and in the Shenyang-Changchun area between September 12 and November 2, 1948.

On the eve of the campaign, the total strength of the Kuomintang forces in northeastern China consisted of 4 armies, made up of 14 corps, or 44 divisions. These forces had shortened their lines and dug themselves in at three sectors isolated from each other: Changchun, Shenyang and Chinehow. With the aim of completely wiping out the enemy troops in the northeast and quickly liberating the whole of the northeast, the People’s Liberation Army in this region, supported by the broad masses of the local people, began the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign in September 1948 with a main force of 12 columns, 1 artillery column and regional armed forces, altogether totalling 53 divisions or over 700,000 men. Chinehow, on the Peiping-Liaoning Railway, was the strategic link between northeastern and northern China. The enemy forces garrisoning the Chinehow sector consisted of 8 divisions, with more than 100,000 men under Fan Han-chiieh, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang’s Northeast “Bandit Suppression” Headquarters. The capture of Chinehow was the key to the success of the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign. Acting on the directives of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the Northeast People’s Liberation Army used 1 column and 7 independent divisions to continue the siege operations against Chinehow; 6 columns, 1 artillery column and 1 tank battalion to surround and attack Chinehow; and 2 columns, placed in the Tsahan-Kao-chiao sector southwest of Chinehow, along with 3 columns in the Heishan-Tahushan-Changwu sector to intercept any reinforcements the enemy might send from Chinsih and Huluoao and from Shenyang to relieve Chinehow.

The fighting in the Chinehow area started on September 12. Just as our army was mopping up the enemy in the outskirts of Chinehow after “taking Ihsien, Chiang Kai-shek hurriedly flew to the northeast to take personal charge of the operations and urgently summoned 5 enemy divisions from the Northern China “Bandit Suppression” Headquarters on the Peiping-Liaoning Railway and 2 divisions from Shantung Province to join the 4 divisions in Chinsih; all these 11 divisions began a furious attack on our positions at Tashan on October 10 but could not break through. Meanwhile, the Kuomintang 9th Army under Liao Yao-hsiang, with 11 divisions and 3 cavalry brigades, which had sailed out from Shenyang to rescue Chinehow, was intercepted by our army northeast of Heishan and Tahushan.

Our army began the assault on Chinehow on October 14 and, after 31 hours of fierce fighting, completely wiped out the defending enemy forces, capturing 3,300 men, 7 Han-chiieh, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Northeast “Bandit Suppression” Headquarters. Lu Chun-chun, Commander of the 6th Army, and more than 100,000 men under their command. The liberation of Chinehow impelled part of the enemy forces at Chinehow to revolt against the Kuomintang and the rest to surrender. The complete collapse of the Kuomintang troops in the northeast then became a foregone conclusion.

However, Chiang Kai-shek, still dreaming of recapturing Chinehow and of reopening the line of communications between northeastern and northern China, gave strict orders to the army under Liao Yao-hsiang to continue its advance towards Chinehow. After taking Chinehow, the People’s Liberation Army immediately swung back to the northeast and closed in on Liao’s army from the north and south of Heishan and Tahushan. On October 26 the People’s Liberation Army succeeded in surrounding the enemy in the Heishan-Tahushan-Halmin sector and, after stiff fighting lasting two days and one night, completely wiped them out, capturing army commander Liao Yao-hsiang, corps commanders Li Tao, Pai Feng-wu and Cheng Ting-chi, and more than 100,000 men. Our army vigorously followed up this victory and liberated Shenyang and Yingkow on November 2, wiping out over 140,000 enemy troops. The whole of the northeast was thus liberated. A total of more than 470,000 enemy troops were wiped out in the campaign.

The Kuomintang reactionaries still ruled over three-fourths of the nation’s territory embracing two-thirds of its population, the Kuomintang reactionary regime was already tottering because of the fact that the counter-revolutionary war its army had launched was unjust and its reactionary rule was rotten to the core. It was at this time that the enemy, in an attempt to defend strategically important points or railway lines with what manpower and military installations it had, was forced to abandon its plan for “defence on all fronts” and switch instead to what it called “defence of key points.” To avoid annihilation, it massed its troops to form defensive “hedgehogs,” with crack units forming their cores, hoping by this means to prevent the P.L.A. from “swallowing them up or gnawing away at them.” At the same time, the enemy merged its so-called “pacification” areas, enlarged its armies, incorporating various miscellaneous forces into its ranks, and whittled down the number of its organizations in an effort to augment its manoeuvrable forces. To regroup and replenish its forces for a desperate last ditch struggle, the Kuomintang press-ganged huge numbers of people in areas under its control to reinforce its second-line units. Confronted by the P.L.A.’s large-scale offensives, however, the enemy forces could no longer extricate themselves from their strategically passive position on all fronts. The five strategic groups of the reactionary Kuomintang army were pinned down by the P.L.A. in five theatres of war on the southern and northern fronts, i.e., in northwestern China, the Central Plains, eastern China, northern China and northeastern China.

The strategic group commanded by Wei Li-huang was in the northeastern China theatre of war. It had more than 480,000 men, deployed in the three isolated areas of Changchun (enemy troops there had by that time been encircled for two months), Shenyang and Chinehow, and relied on the Chinehow-Shanhaikuan section of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway for communication by land and water with areas south of the Great Wall.

The group commanded by Fu Tso-yi was in the northern China theatre. Its force of more than 600,000 men was deployed in Kweisi and Changchiakou on the Peiping-Sulyuan Railway (land communications between Kweisi and Changchiakou were severed after the P.L.A. launched its Sulyuan-Chahar campaign) and in Peiping, Tiensin, Tangshan, Shanhaikuan and other key points on the Peiping-Liaoning Railway; they relied on the port of Tangku for supplies by sea. Enemy troops defending the isolated city of Taiyuan were already encircled.

August 4, 1961
The group commanded by Liu Chih was in the eastern China theatre, with a force of more than 600,000 men (not counting reinforcements of one army and other units it later received). When our army attacked Tsianan, this Kuomintang army group did not dare send reinforcements to the north. After Tsianan was liberated, in an effort to stop our Eastern China P.L.A. from moving down southwards, it concentrated troops along the Lunghai Railway, centring round Hsuehho and extending from Shangchih in the west to Liyenyang in the east, and along the Tientsin-Fukow Railway with Pengpu as its southernmost point of defence.

The group commanded by Pai Chung-hsi was in the Central Plains theatre, with some 750,000 troops deployed along the southern section of the Peiping-Hankow Railway and in the areas centring round Hankow.

The group commanded by Hu Tsung-nan was in the northwest theatre, with about 300,000 men tied down in the Kuanhungh area centring round the city of Sian.

Apart from the five theatres of war mentioned above, the enemy had in its rear areas only 36 brigades, or more than 230,000 men; these troops were hardly manoeuvrable at all because of the growth of the people’s guerrilla warfare. The Kuomintang reactionaries were thus left without a single intact battleline. They only had a few units in some areas which they could use for strategic manoeuvres, while most of the Kuomintang troops, sunk in a state of indecision and paralysis, were in a passive position and were taking a beating.

This balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves indicated that the time had come for the People’s Liberation Army to fight decisive strategic battles with the reactionary Kuomintang troops. In order to continue wiping out enemy troops in large numbers and completely overthrow the reactionary Kuomintang government, the P.L.A. would have to storm the large strongly fortified cities held by the enemy and engage its strong mobile formations. Therefore, the question of whether or not our army dared to fight battles on a larger scale than it had ever fought before, take large enemy cities by storm, wipe out powerful enemy formations and win still greater victories became, at that time, a question of vital importance in strategic decisions.

It was at this very time that the Kuomintang, at a military conference held in Nanking in August 1948, discussed a plan to withdraw from northeastern China, ensure the defence of central China, and maintain its hold on Shenyang until the end of October to see how the situation developed—not abandoning the city in principle but making preparations for withdrawal.

Should we, in these circumstances, let the opportunity slip and allow the enemy to put through its plan of withdrawing such troops as it had at the time into areas south of the Great Wall or south of the Yangtse River, and so add difficulties for our army in future battles? Or should we, before the enemy had time to come to a decision to flee, make a rapid decision, seize this excellent opportunity and organize decisive strategic battles to wipe out these powerful enemy strategic groups one by one?

Opportunities must not be missed; time, once gone, does not return. Basing himself on a scientific analysis of the war situation, Comrade Mao Tse-tung resolutely

--- For Your Reference ---

THE HUAI-HAI CAMPAIGN

The second of the three major campaigns

The Huai-Hai campaign was a campaign of decisive importance fought by the People’s Liberation Army over a large territory in Kiangsu, Shantung, Anhwei and Honan Provinces, centring on Hsuehho, and extending as far as Haichow in the east. Shangchih in the west, Linchung (now renamed Hucheng) in the north and the Huai River in the south.

The Kuomintang forces massed in this theatre of war consisted of 5 armies and the troops of three Pacification Zones—the 4 armies and the troops of three Pacification Zones under Liu Chih and Tu Yu-ming respectively Commander and Deputy Commander of the Kuomintang’s “Bandit Suppression” Headquarters at Hsuehho and the army under Huang Wei, which was later dispatched there from central China as reinforcements. On the side of the People’s Liberation Army, a force more than 600,000 strong took part in the campaign—it included 16 columns from the Eastern China Field Army, 7 columns from the Central Plains Field Army and regional armed forces from the Eastern China Military Area, the Central Plains Military Area and the Hopei-Shantung-Henan Military Area (then a part of the Northern China Military Area). The campaign lasted 65 days, from November 6, 1948 to January 10, 1949; 22 corps, or 56 divisions, of the Kuomintang’s crack forces, comprising 450,000 men, were completely wiped out (including 45 divisions which revolted and came over), and 2 armies under Liu Ju-ming and Li Yen-nien (reinforcements from Nanking) were repulsed. As a result of the campaign, those parts of the eastern China and Central Plains areas north of the Yangtse River were almost entirely liberated.

The campaign took place in three stages. During the first stage, November 6-22, the Eastern China Field Army, in co-ordination with the Central Plains Field Army, surrounded and wiped out the army under Huang Po-tao in the Hainan-nen-Chenhuang sector east of Hsuehho, killing Huang Po-tao and liberating large territories on both sides of the Lunghai Railway east of Nien-chang, on both sides of the Hucheng-Pengpu section of the Tientsin-Fukow Railway, and to the west and north of Hsuehho. In the Taierzhuchang-Tao-chuang sector, 34 divisions of the Kuomintang 3rd Pacification Zone, totalling over 23,000 men, revolted and came over to us.

During the second stage, from November 22 to December 15, the Central Plains Field Army, in co-ordination with the main force of the Eastern China Field Army, surrounded and wiped out the army under Huang Wei at and around Shuangtulie, southwest of Su-hsin, capturing Huang Wei and Wu Shao-chou, the commander and deputy commander of the army; 1 division of this army revolted and came over to us. At the same time, our forces wiped out the army under Sun Yuan-liang which was fleeing westward from Hucheng. Only Sun Yuan-liang managed to escape.

During the third stage, from January 6 to 10, 1949, the Eastern China Field Army, in co-ordination with the Central Plains Field Army, surrounded and annihilated in the Chinglung-chi-Chenkuangchun sector, northeast of Yungcheng, 2 Kuomintang armies which were fleeing westward from Hucheng and were commanded respectively by Chiu Ching-chuan and Li Mi, under the personal command of Tu Yu-ming. Tu Yu-ming was captured. Chiu Ching-chuan was killed and Li Mi barely escaped. This marked the successful end of the great Huai-Hai campaign.

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and unhesitatingly seized this opportunity to wage decisive strategic battles and successively organized the three major campaigns of Liaohsi-Shenyang, Huai-Hai and Peiping-Tientsin. In "The Concept of Operations for the Liaohsi-Shenyang Campaign," he pointed out to the commanders of our army in the northeast theatre that they should "be firmly determined to fight a battle of annihilation on a scale larger than you have ever fought before, that is, dare to fight all Wei Li-huang's army when it comes to the rescue."

Comrade Mao Tse-tung said: "Since both sides are struggling for superiority and initiative, war becomes a contest in ability between the commanders of the opposing armies in their struggle for superiority and initiative on the basis of material conditions like military forces and financial resources. As a result of the contest there will be victory for the one and defeat for the other and, apart from the contrasting objective material conditions, the victor owes his success to correct direction and the vanished, his defeat to incorrect direction."

He also pointed out that, after the outcome of one or several campaigns was decided, "the defeated side, no matter which, will immediately have to make a new effort, an effort to save itself from disaster, to extricate itself from the newly arisen unfavourable conditions and situation, and to recreate conditions and a situation favourable to it so that it can put pressure on its opponent." He further said: "The effort of the winning side will be just the opposite. It will strive to expand its victory and inflict greater losses on the enemy, to multiply the conditions and further improve the situation favourable to itself, and to prevent its opponent from achieving his aim of extricating himself from the unfavourable situation and averting disaster."*

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All quotations in this article are from the works of Mao Tse-tung.


† "Strategic Problems of China’s Revolutionary War."

††ibid.

This was exactly the situation after the Third Revolutionary Civil War entered its third year. After suffering a series of defeats, the Kuomintang army struggled desperately to extricate itself from disaster. Resorting to the so-called "defence of key points," it tried to get rid of the extremely unfavourable situation which had already arisen at that time, vainly hoping to re-create a situation that was favourable to it and unfavourable to us and to launch a counter-attack at the opportune moment. On the other hand, the People's Liberation Army, under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, after scoring a string of victories, made energetic efforts to expand its victories in the people's revolutionary war and wipe out still greater numbers of enemy troops, doing its utmost to develop the extremely favourable situation that had already arisen for it and prevent the enemy from realizing its plan of getting itself out of the unfavourable situation and saving itself from disaster. This contest in ability manifested itself at that time, first and foremost, in the choice of the opportune moment. In our case, it was to seize the opportunity and launch decisive battles; while in the case of the enemy, it was to seize the opportunity to organize strategic withdrawals and avoid decisive strategic battles. In its editorial on October 30, 1949, the New York Herald Tribune said that the loss of Manchuria [northeastern China] was inevitable, but that the only serious blunder was the choice of the wrong moment for withdrawal. The enemy's indecision in effecting a strategic withdrawal also served to confirm Comrade Mao Tse-tung's sound judgment in seizing the opportunity to wage decisive strategic battles.

While firmly seizing this opportunity for decisive battles, Comrade Mao Tse-tung also correctly determined the direction of the decisive battles. At that time, though the situation in the various theatres of war throughout the country was, in varying degrees, favourable to the operations of the P.L.A., strategically the enemy tried its utmost to prolong its defence of several isolated key points in the northeast, to tie down units of the Northeast People's Liberation Army there and prevent them from...
moving into areas south of the Great Wall to join other units in battle; at the same time, the enemy was preparing to withdraw its troops in the northeast to central China to strengthen defences there. Under these circumstances, if we had pointed the direction of the decisive strategic battle to the northern China theatre of war, our troops would have been attacked from both flanks by the two large Kuomintang strategic groups under the command of Fu Tso-yi and Wei Li-huang respectively and would thus have fallen into a passive position; if we had pointed the direction of the decisive strategic battle first to the eastern China theatre of war, this would have caused the enemy to withdraw its troops quickly from the northeast and so realize its attempt to effect a strategic shortening of its defence lines. The northeast theatre was, therefore, of crucial importance to the development of the war situation throughout the country. The situation there was particularly favourable to us at the time. The enemy troops were isolated and scattered; and they held exposed salients; they occupied only small and narrow areas and had supply difficulties; Changchun was encircled and there was no way of saving it; the enemy was undecided whether to evacuate it or to defend it. Our army, on the other hand, was superior in manpower and equipment; we occupied wide and extensive areas that had been linked into a contiguous whole; land reform was completed and our rear was consolidated; support could be sent from all areas south of the Great Wall.

If the Northeast People’s Liberation Army could wipe out the enemy troops in the northeast, we would be able to shatter the enemy’s attempt to effect a strategic shortening of its lines; undertake strategic manoeuvres favourable to operations in the northern and eastern China theatres of war; make it possible for industries in the northeast to support the war throughout the country and provide a general strategic rear area for the P.L.A. On the basis of the above-cited conditions, Comrade Mao Tse-tung directed the decisive strategic battle first and foremost against Wei Li-huang’s group in the northeast theatre of war. This placed the winning of initial victories in the decisive strategic battles on firm and reliable ground. This was an excellent move in the magnificent plan and grand strategy of Comrade Mao Tse-tung who had a firm grasp of the whole situation. The decisive battles opened with the winning of superiority in one locality, and went on to the winning of still greater superiority in the situation as a whole. The victory so smoothly and rapidly gained by us during the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign produced a radical change in the war situation throughout the country and made the duration of the war much shorter than originally estimated.

Adopting Different Operational Concepts Suited to the Differing Features of the Three Theatres of War

Before the start of the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign, the enemy in the northeast theatre of war held and defended three isolated areas—Changchun, Shenyang and Chinchow. The key problem in directing the campaign was to decide what should be the main direction of our forces’ initial attack most helpful to the development of the campaign, to the complete annihilation of the enemy troops in the northeast and to the war situation throughout the country.

If one considered the local situation alone, then it was the isolated enemy force at Changchun, long encircled by us, that was the enemy’s weak point in the northeast theatre and whose elimination would relieve us from any worry about our rear. The enemy, however, was attempting to use Changchun to pin down our army and shield its forces at Shenyang and Chinchow, enabling them to improve their situation and make all necessary preparations for withdrawal. If our operations were first directed against Changchun, we would have played into the enemy’s hands; moreover, the capture of Changchun could also quickly frighten away the enemy from Shenyang and Chinchow and so adversely affect the development of the campaign and the military situation throughout the country.

The situation at Chinchow was entirely different. The enemy forces at Chinchow were larger than those in Changchun and they held a number of points around Chinchow; if we attacked Chinchow, enemy troops in northern China might come to their rescue and the enemy might also send reinforcements by sea. If we failed to take Chinchow quickly our troops might find themselves in a passive position. Moreover, our main forces would face some difficulties as they would be moving south to the battlefield over a long distance from the northern part of northeastern China. On the other hand, the enemy troops strung out in the section between Chinchow and Shanhaikuan were isolated at various scattered points, making it fairly certain that we would be successful in attacking and wiping them out. Fighting along the Peiping-Liaoning Railway might entice enemy troops to come to the rescue from Changchun and Shenyang and this would help the development of the campaign. It could also split apart the enemy’s two big strategic groups in the northern and northeastern China theatres of war; at the same time, reinforcements from the enemy troops in northern China could be weakened since our Northern China People’s Liberation Army could tie them down. To the enemy troops in the northeast, Chinchow was their gateway to the areas south of the Great Wall. Our capture of this important strategic point would mean that the front door of the northeast would be slammed shut and Wei Li-huang’s group would be caught like “a turtle in a jar.” Moreover, the manoeuvring of our forces and their operations along both flanks in accordance with the development of the war situation would be further facilitated by our control of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway.

The foregoing analysis showed that it was Chinchow that was the real and vital weak point of the enemy forces in the northeast. Comrade Mao Tse-tung, therefore, pointed out in “The Concept of Operations for the Liaohsi-Shenyang Campaign”: “In order to wipe them out, you must now prepare to employ your main force on this line, leaving the enemy forces at Changchun and Shenyang alone. When you are attacking Chinchow, be prepared also to wipe out the enemy forces that may come to its rescue from Changchun and Shenyang.”* If the enemy at Changchun and Shenyang dared come to the rescue, “then, without leaving the Chinchow–Shanhaikuan–Tangshan line, you can follow up immediately with large-scale annihilating attacks on the enemy reinforcements and strive to wipe out all Wei Li-huang’s

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troops on the spot."** At the same time, he also pointed out that the capture of Chinchow was the decisive step for the victory of the whole campaign and demanded that the Northeast People's Liberation Army centre its "attention on the operations in Chinchow and strive to capture this city as quickly as possible. Even if none of the other objectives are attained and Chinchow alone is captured, you will have won the initiative which in itself will be a great victory."**

The Northeast People's Liberation Army resolutely carried out the operational concepts of Comrade Mao Tsetung, destroyed 470,000 enemy troops and won a great victory in the decisive battle of the northeast. This, plus the victories of the People's Liberation Army in other theatres at that time, made the People's Liberation Army superior to the Kuomintang army in numbers as well.

While the Liaoeh-Sheyang campaign was still in progress, and after the Eastern China People's Liberation Army's victories in the Tsinan campaign, Comrade Mao Tse-tung also organized the Huai-Hai campaign. The Liu Chih group of the enemy forces in the eastern China theatre of war concentrated huge numbers of troops in and around the Hsuchow area. Here they disposed themselves in a so-called "one-point-and-two-line" position† in an attempt to shield Nanking by preventing our forces from advancing south. With this heavy concentration of troops the enemy could conveniently manoeuvre their forces and rapidly move up reinforcements. If we wanted to attack and wipe out any part of the enemy forces here, it was only by first checking the advance of enemy reinforcements that we would gain time and hold the initiative. This was a feature of the eastern China theatre that was entirely different from that of the other theatres.

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*ibid., p. 263.
**ibid., p. 265.
†i.e., deployed their troops in Hsuchow and along the Lunghai and Tsientsin-Pukow Railways.

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this was also the decisive factor affecting the outcome of the campaign.

At that time, Huang Po-tao's army was deployed along the Lunghai Railway over an area bordering Lienyunkang in the east and close to Huachow in the west, reaching Huaiyin and Huai-an in the south and Shantung Province in the north. It was the crack force of the Liu Chih group's right wing. The annihilation of Huang Po-tao's army would mean the loss of Liu Chih's right arm. This operation could also entice the enemy at Hsuchow to send reinforcements to the east and we would be able to wipe out a part of them while they were on the move. At the same time, it could link up our Shantung and Northern Kiangsu Liberated Areas, cut connections between Hsuchow and Haichow and create a situation in which we could encircle Hsuhochow and advance our forces to Huaiyin and Hualian. Comrade Mao Tsetung, therefore, pointed out in "The Concept of Operations for the Huai-Hai Campaign": "In the first stage of this campaign, the central task is to concentrate forces to wipe out Huang Po-tao's army, effect a breakthrough in the centre and capture Hsinan, the Grand Canal Railway Station, Tsaopachi, Yihsien, Tsaochoung, Lincheng, Hanchuang, Shuyang, Pihsien, Tancheng, Taierchhuang and Linyi."**

To utterly eliminate Huang Po-tao's army, Comrade Mao Tse-tung, taking into account the features of the enemy dispositions in the eastern China theatre of war, made a skilful deployment of our forces and gave instructions to our army that "before the objective of annihilating the three divisions of Huang Po-tao's army can be achieved, more than half our total force has to be employed against the two armies under Chiu Ching-chuan and Li Mi to tie down, check and destroy part of them."**

"Otherwise it will be impossible to achieve the objective

**ibid., p. 279.
THE PEIPING-TIENTSIN CAMPAIGN

The third of the three major campaigns

The Peiping-Tientsin campaign, fought by the Northeast Field Army and two armies of the Northern China People’s Liberation Army under the command of Lin Piao, Lo Jung-huan, Nieh Jung-chen and other comrades, began early in December 1948, immediately after the victorious conclusion of the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign in the northeast.

Acting upon Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s instructions, the Northeast Field Army, immediately after it had victoriously fulfilled its task of liberating the whole northeast, swept south of the Great Wall and joined the armies of the People’s Liberation Army in northern China in co-ordinated actions to encircle and wipe out the Kuomintang troops in northern China. Greatly alarmed by the victory of the People’s Liberation Army in the northeast, more than 600,000 Kuomintang troops under Fu Tso-yi, Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang’s Northern China “Bandit Suppression” Headquarters, hurriedly shortened their lines of defence with the intention of fleeing south by sea or west to Suiyuan Province. Our army, moving with lightning speed, cut apart the enemy forces and surrounded them separately at five strong-points—Peiping, Tientsin, Chang-chiakou, Hsinpao-an and Tangku — thus blocking their escape routes to the south and west.

On December 22, the enemy’s main force at Hsinpao-an (the headquar-
ters of his 35th Corps and 2 divisions) was surrounded and wiped out. On the 24th, Changchikou was taken and a corps headquarters and 7 divisions of the enemy’s 11th Army, over 54,000 men in all, were wiped out. On January 14, 1949, our troops surrounding Tientsin launched a general offensive against the city after Chen Chang-chih, commander of the enemy garrison, refused to surrender. The city was liberated after 29 hours’ fierce fighting, the enemy garrison of over 130,000 men was wiped out and Chen Chang-chih was captured. As a result, more than 200,000 enemy troops garrisoning Peiping were tightly surrounded by our troops and their fate was sealed. Owing to the efforts we made to win it over, the enemy’s Peiping garrison, commanded by General Fu Tso-yi, accepted peaceful reorganization. On January 31, our troops entered Peiping, the city was proclaimed peacefully liberated and the Peiping-Tientsin campaign came to a victorious close.

During this campaign, with the exception of the enemy garrison of over 50,000 men in Tangku, which fled by sea, over 520,000 Kuomintang troops were put out of action and reorganized by our army. In September 1949 the Kuomintang troops in Suiyuan Province declared by telegram that they had revolted and come over to the people and that they would accept reorganization. This enabled the Huai-Hai campaign to achieve a greater success than originally planned, so that it destroyed more than 555,000 enemy troops, won a great victory in the decisive battle on the Central Plains and placed Nanking, capital of the reactionary Kuomintang government, under the direct threat of the People’s Liberation Army. From that time on, the reactionary Kuomintang regime was in a crisis of disintegration.

While the Huai-Hai campaign was still raging, Comrade Mao Tse-tung also organized the Peiping-Tientsin campaign. Tied down and attacked by our Northern China People’s Liberation Army and greatly alarmed by our victories in the two major Liaohsi-Shenyang and Huai-Hai campaigns, the enemy forces in the northern China theatre of war were, at that time, like birds startled by the mere twang of a bow-string. Fu Tso-yi’s group was, by then, the only force which the Kuomintang reactionaries could use strategically for manoeuvre. That was why Chiang Kai-shek, on the one hand, attempted to use this group to check the southward advance of our forces and so cover the reorganization of his forces south of the Yangtse; on the other hand, he also intended to inveigle this group into shipping its troops south of the Yangtse by sea via Tangku to reinforce the eastern China battlefronts so as to relieve Liu Chih’s group from our encirclement or defend the Yangtse River in a desperate struggle. As for Fu Tso-yi’s group itself, it cherished the notion of withdrawing west along the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway to Suiyuan Province. Both the enemy’s withdrawal and its shortening of its defence lines would be unfavourable to the development of the war situation. Therefore, preventing the enemy from withdrawing and shortening its lines of defence became a matter of key importance in the Peiping-Tientsin campaign.

Exploiting the miscalculation made by the enemy in northern China that after the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign the Northeast People’s Liberation Army would inevitably need rest and consolidation and could not quickly move south of the Great Wall, Comrade Mao Tse-tung ordered the Northeast People’s Liberation Army, immediately upon the conclusion of the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign, to advance secretly and rapidly south of the Great Wall without rest and consolidation and, in coordination with two armies of the Northern China People’s Liberation Army, effect a surprise strategic encirclement of the enemy in northern China in an effort to ann-

of annihilating the three divisions of Huang Po-tao’s army.” Comrade Mao Tse-tung also repeatedly stressed this principle of disposition in all later stages of the campaign.

Generally speaking, an army’s main force should be concentrated to achieve the objective of attacking and wiping out the enemy. But, in a situation in which we had sufficient troops and the enemy forces were concentrated. Comrade Mao Tse-tung adopted an opposite method; he creatively handled the dialectical relations of both unity of and distinction between the goal and the means of the campaign and flexibly applied the principle of concentrating forces. Thus, we were in a position to smoothly tie down and check the powerful enemy armies at Hsuchow from moving to the east to the rescue, win the victory of wiping out Huang Po-tao’s army and cut the road along which the enemy might flee to the sea, and thereby created extremely favourable conditions for all successive stages of the campaign. Later, as a result of Huang Wei’s army moving northward to the rescue and the flight of the enemy at Hsuchow to the west, the campaign did not develop in an easterly direction, that is, in the areas of Hsinpu, Hialchung, Lienyunkang, Huaylin and Huai-an, but moved to the west where Huang Wei’s army and Tu Yu-ming’s group were wiped out. This

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*ibid., p. 280.
nihilate the enemy utterly on the spot. In “The Concept of Operations for the Peiping-Tientsin Campaign” Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out: “If these two points, Tangku (the most important) and Hsinpao-an, are captured you will have the initiative on the whole chess board.”** “The main or the only concern is that the enemy might flee by sea. Therefore, in the coming two weeks the general method should be to encircle without attacking or to cut off without encircling.”*** In order to prevent the enemy from fleeing, he also emphasized: “In particular, you must not wipe out all the enemy forces at Changchihkou, Hsinpao-an and Nankow because that would compel the enemy east of Nankow to make a quick decision to bolt. Please make sure you understand this point.”†† To lead the enemy to miscalculate and thus prevent Chiang Kai-shek from quickly deciding to shift his troops in the Peiping-Tientsin area southward by sea, our troops in the eastern China theatre of war were ordered not to make dispositions for the final annihilation of the remnant forces of Tu Yu-ming’s group for two weeks, our troops in Shantung were also ordered to mass certain forces to control key points and to prepare to prevent the enemy forces from fleeing towards Tsingtao. Thus, we made the enemy stay where they were, completed our strategic encirclement and tactical splitting up of the enemy forces and thereby put Tu Tso-yi’s group in a blind alley in which it could neither satisfactorily shorten its lines of defence nor find a way to flee.

The military principles of “speed” and “surprise” are known to the ordinary military experts, but the adept way in which Comrade Mao Tse-tung made use of them was superb and unique. The operational concepts — “to encircle without attacking” and “to cut off without encircling” — and the directive to postpone dispositions for the final annihilation of the remnant forces of Tu Yu-ming’s group in the eastern China theatre of war further reflected his superb art of command and was far beyond ordinary military experts.

As a result of our forces’ carrying out the foregoing principles, the head and tail of Tu Tso-yi’s group was crushed by our troops and its forces were eliminated section by section. The Peiping-Tientsin campaign wiped out or reorganized a total of more than 520,000 reactionary Kuomintang troops, won a great victory in the decisive battle in northern China and practically liberated that area.

In the light of the concrete conditions in all theatres of war throughout the country and grasping the various key problems, Comrade Mao Tse-tung correctly determined the direction of the decisive battles and formulated various operational concepts, organically linking up the three major campaigns and the various stages in each campaign, guiding the progress of the war link by link and from one victory to another, and winning great victories in the decisive strategic battles. As Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out: “The commander in charge of the whole situation should pay all due attention to taking the whole war situation into account.

The main point is that he should, in the light of actual circumstances, consider the most difficult problems of the grouping of his military units and formations, and the relations between campaigns, between various operational stages, and between the enemy's entire activities and his own; if he ignores such problems and is preoccupied with secondary matters, he can hardly avoid setbacks.”** “The commanding officer at any level should centre his attention on the most important and most decisively significant problem or action in a whole situation he is handling and not on lesser problems or actions.”*** “The importance or decisive significance of a thing is not to be determined according to circumstances in general or in the abstract, but according to the actual circumstances.”††

When the most important and most decisively significant problem is grasped, all problems can easily be solved. In organizing decisive campaigns, the problem of the first battle is the most important one. The first battle should be planned by proceeding from the whole war situation and the whole campaign situation. The outcome of the first battle is, in turn, of decisive significance to the outcome of the whole war situation and the whole campaign situation. This is the dialectical relationship between the two. Therefore, the first battle must be conducted on the basis of sure victory and at the same time this victory must be beneficial to the development of the whole situation; this is a most difficult problem of taking into account relations between the parts and the whole. In short, without a concept of the whole situation, there can be no effective plan for the first battle.

Though military experts have always mapped out first battles with care, Comrade Mao Tse-tung has, in theory and practice, raised the art of guiding first battles to a highly skilled level. It was only after consideration of the interests of the whole situation that it was decided that the three major campaigns would start first in the northeast, that in the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign the first attack would be launched against Chinchow, in the Huai-Hai campaign the first efforts would be directed to wiping out Huang Po-tao’s army, and in the Peiping-Tientsin campaign Hsinpao-an and Tientsin would first be captured. The three operational concepts of the three major campaigns all embodied a close linking of the first battles with the plan of the whole campaign. Consequently, after victory in the first battles, the three major campaigns achieved their respective victories very rapidly. The victories in the first battles of the three major campaigns fully reflected the guiding principles for first battles put forward by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, namely, “We must win the first battle, we must take into consideration the plan of an entire campaign as well as the strategic phase that immediately follows.”††† Comrade Mao Tse-tung has set us a brilliant example of how, in directing a war, to take into account relations between the parts and the whole and how to find out and master the key problems under complex circumstances.

(To be continued)

*ibid., p. 291.
**ibid., p. 292.
†ibid., p. 291.

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**“Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War.”
††ibid.
†††ibid.
"A single spark can start a prairie fire."

The spark first kindled on Chingkang Mountain flared up into a beacon; it lighted the advance of the Chinese people in their struggle for liberation. It gave them hope and confidence at one of the darkest moments in their struggle. The revolutionary fire it lit spread throughout the country, demolished the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang and brought to birth a new China under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

Thirty-four years ago — on August 1, 1927 — following Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal of the revolution, the Communist-led armed uprising broke out in Nanchang, Kiangsi Province. The revolutionary troops fought their way to the south. In October that year when the tide of revolution ebbed, Comrade Mao Tse-tung led a contingent of the newly formed workers' and peasants' revolutionary army to Chingkang Mountain on the Kiangsi-Hunan border. Later, they were joined there by the revolutionary forces led by Comrade Chu Teh. China's first revolutionary base was thus established. Fighting against great odds with spears, muskets and whatever other arms were at their disposal, the Red Army fighters on Chingkang Mountain successfully repulsed repeated Kuomintang attacks, defended the base area and tirelessly spread the revolutionary struggle. The unswerving determination with which the Red Army battled the Kuomintang troops, inspired by a firm conviction that it would ultimately defeat an enemy that was so vastly superior in numbers, equipment and material reserves, has since become a legend with the Chinese people. Chairman Mao Tse-tung's poem Chingkang Mountain, written during the Second Revolutionary Civil War (1927-36), brims with that indomitable spirit, optimism and confidence characteristic of the Red Army. It runs:

Below the hill were our flags and banners,
To the hilltop sounded our bugles and drums.
The foe surrounded us thousands strong,
But we were steadfast and never moved.

Our defence was strong as a wall already,
Now did our wills unite like a fortress.
From Huangyangchih came the thunder of guns,
And the enemy army had fled in the night!

After the Red Army left Chingkang Mountain in 1934 on its Long March to the north to fight against the Japanese invaders, the reactionary Kuomintang army swarmed into the mountain area. In the ensuing white terror, thousands of people there were butchered in cold blood, homes were gutted and the entire region devastated. Tzuping, the political centre at that time, was razed to the ground; for years the town was deserted until liberation gave it a new lease of life.

Now a new town has risen on its ruins. Two- or three-storey buildings have been built on the sites where the Chinese Communist Party's local committees and the revolutionary government organizations formerly worked. Tzuping now boasts an institute of higher learning, a hospital, a cinema and a cultural palace, a department store and several restaurants, besides the newly built government offices and residential areas. A post and telegraph office has been built on the ruins of a house where Chairman Mao Tse-tung once lived. Nearby is a laurel tree, a silent witness to those years of hardships and glory. On the hilltop opposite is a monument to the revolutionary martyrs; its sculptured Red Army soldier, alert with rifle in hand, recalls the valour and legendary exploits of the Red Army in defending this revolutionary base against savage Kuomintang onslaughts.

Roads of Happiness

Tzuping is now a prosperous town with a population of five thousand, and surrounded by agricultural, livestock and poultry farms. Formerly accessible only by narrow paths, it is now linked with nearby towns and cities by four highways cut out of the steep rocky cliffs. The people on Chingkang Mountain call them "roads of happiness." The timber, bamboo, ores and other hitherto untapped resources of the mountain are taken out by lorry to eager markets which need them for socialist construction. Riding comfortably in a car to Tzuping today, the visitor catches glimpses of the footpaths of old zigzagging over the mountain slopes and disappearing into the forests — paths that bear the footprints of Chairman Mao and other revolutionary fighters.

The big changes that have taken place in the Chingkang Mountain region started in the winter of 1957 when several hundred government workers volunteered to go there and set up a reclamation centre. Since then they have been joined by many more young volunteers. Formerly barren areas have been brought under cultivation; terraced fields step the mountain sides. The area sown to rice has been greatly enlarged, and the average yield is more than double what it was before. The Chingkang Mountain dwellers used to buy their rice in the nearby towns; now they have more than they need themselves and are marketing their surplus grain in other places. The building of a farm tool factory and a chemical fertilizer works has done much to help them raise their grain output.

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In developing the mountain region, the reclamation teams have afforested large tracts of land and planted others with various kinds of fruit trees. They have introduced selected strains of grapes, pears, apples and peaches. Several livestock and poultry farms have also been set up. They are rearing Angora rabbits, Yorkshire pigs, and Sinkiang sheep which produce a fine grade of wool. When the first team of volunteers came to the region, it had only a few blacksmiths’ shops making simple farm tools. Now over a score of factories have been built, including an engineering works, a paper mill, a fibre board factory, a sawmill, a brick kiln and a winery, most of them using hitherto untapped local resources. Besides these, there are workshops turning out resin, essential oils and chemical products. The building of a 640-kilowatt hydro-electric station in 1959 was an important event for the inhabitants on Chingkang Mountain. It not only supplies much needed power to the factories and farms but has also brought radio and telephone services to the region for the first time in its history.

Relics Preserved

So heroic Chingkang Mountain marches on. But the past is cherished. This “revolutionary mountain,” as Chairman Mao once called it, has a special place in the hearts of the Chinese people. Its many relics associated with its revolutionary past are carefully preserved in a museum built there, in accordance with a directive recently issued by the State Council.

Since liberation, the Chingkang people have brought and presented many revolutionary relics to the local people’s government. They include documents, seals, flags, tools, and directives and orders issued by the Communist Party committees in the Chingkang Mountain region, the Red Army and the local revolutionary govern-
ments. These relics are priceless, the local people kept them hidden at the risk of their lives when the white terror stalked the land. The newly built museum’s collection includes spears, old rifles and other weapons with which the Red Army, forerunner of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, fought the Kuomintang troops. The cotton-padded clothes, quilts and utensils used at the time show the hard and simple life the revolutionaries led on Chingkang Mountain.

Many places of historic interest on the mountain have been repaired or rebuilt in their original style. Among these is a house in one of the villages in which Chairman Mao Tse-tung once lived. Prior to reconstruction, only part of a wall had survived Kuomintang destruction. This has been preserved and built into the new walls. The rebuilt house is now looked after by Chou Wen-chieh, an old peasant who was a member of the Red Guards in those stormy years. Visitors are always thrilled to hear his eyewitness accounts of the Red Army’s heroic Chingkang exploits.

In a nearby village is another small brick house rebuilt just as it was when Chairman Mao stayed here. Climbing a ladder, the visitor reaches the room once occupied by Chairman Mao. It is furnished as it was more than thirty years ago, with the few pieces of simple furniture which the local inhabitants had carefully preserved over the years. By a window is an oblong desk at which Chairman Mao used to sit when he charted the early course of China’s revolution. It was here that he wrote his important work “Why Can China’s Red Political Power Exist?” That political power not only continued to exist, as Chairman Mao prophesied then, but waxed strong under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and with the support of the people throughout the country, till it finally overthrew the reactionary Kuomintang regime and founded the People’s Republic of China.

August 4, 1961
U.S. War Preparations Mania

by “RENMIN RIBAO” COMMENTATOR

The following is a slightly abridged translation of a “Renmin Ribao” commentary published on July 30, 1961. Subheads are ours.—Ed.

FOR the past two months, certain U.S. politicians and the U.S. propaganda machine, using the so-called “Berlin crisis” as a pretext, have been clamoring for stepped-up arms expansion and war preparations. Lately, President Kennedy himself has come out to boost U.S. plans for war preparations to a record peacetime height.

Kennedy’s New Arms Race

In his bellicose radio-television speech to the nation on July 25, Kennedy did his best to impress the American people with the grave nature of the so-called “Berlin crisis” and seized the opportunity to whip up war hysteria. He announced a series of new measures of frenzied arms expansion and war preparations. The following day, Kennedy sent a formal message to Congress, requesting increased military appropriations for speeding up war preparations in every field. These actions show clearly that the Kennedy Administration is bent on starting a new arms race to aggravate international tension.

The budget for fiscal 1962 prepared by the Eisenhower Administration shortly before it left office provided for Department of Defense military expenditures running as high as $42,900 million. This is $1,400 million more than that for the previous fiscal year, and no mean figure, for it is the highest peacetime military budget in United States history. The Kennedy Administration, however, considers even this inadequate. Beginning from last January it has time and again asked for additional military appropriations; now it is requesting another increase of some $3,400 million, bringing additions to a total of $6,000 million. As a result, direct U.S. military appropriations for the current fiscal year have run up to $47,500 million. Kennedy once declared that in armaments the United States must not restrict itself to any fixed budgetary quota and that the United States “should be prepared to pay whatever this costs.” The situation over the past six months is precisely what he has said.

The Kennedy Administration has repeatedly asked for these additional military appropriations for obvious reasons. On the one hand, it aims to step up its arms expansion programme both for an all-out nuclear war and for local conventional wars, to resuscitate U.S. “strength” and to push forward the U.S. policy of war and aggression. On the other hand, it also aims to solve the economic problems confronting the United States by putting further reliance on arms expansion. The price of stocks of the U.S. arms industries soared immediately after the Kennedy Administration’s moves to step up all-round arms expansion.

But things are not as simple as that. This “spending spree” of the Kennedy Administration will inevitably deepen the financial crisis in the United States. It has long caused anxiety among some members of the U.S. ruling circles. Republican Senate leader Everett Dirkksen and Republican House leader Charles Halleck have both openly criticized Kennedy, charging that if this way of spending went on unchecked, the United States would be led into a financial catastrophe. However, Kennedy too has his own principle, that is, not “to place fiscal security ahead of national security,” not to tailor “our strategy and military requirements to fit our budget.” He would sooner take the risk of financial bankruptcy than risk failure in his policy of war and aggression. Kennedy wants to overcome his difficulties by squeezing ever more people of the United States; he has repeatedly urged them to make “sacrifices.”

Besides speeding up war preparations in his own country, Kennedy is also forcing the “allies” of the United States to do the same, stressing the speedy fulfilment of the tasks the North Atlantic “allies” have set themselves. In other words, Kennedy is attempting to yoke the Western countries more firmly to the U.S. war chariot so that they can make bigger “sacrifices” for U.S. “global strategy.”

New Version of Brinkmanship

To these ends, Kennedy has been clamouring about the “Berlin crisis” and declaring his readiness to defend West Berlin with force. He distorts the truth about the West Berlin question and slanderously describes the reasonable Soviet proposals for concluding a German peace treaty and normalizing the West Berlin situation as trying to drive the Western countries out of Berlin by force, which, he says, is a “challenge” and a “threat” to the Western countries. However, such slanders which try to turn black into white, cannot deceive anyone with some knowledge of the real state of affairs.

As is well known, the Soviet Government has consistently advocated convening a peace conference without delay to conclude a German peace treaty and on this basis turn West Berlin into a free city. But the Western countries headed by the United States have flatly refused to conclude such a treaty, opposed normalization of the situation in West Berlin, insisted on the total occupation of West Berlin and even made a hue and cry about their readiness to have a “showdown” with the Soviet Union over this question. This shows clearly that the so-called “Berlin crisis” is created by the Western countries headed by the United States. They have objected to turning West Berlin into a free city because they want to continue their occupation of it. So it is not surprising that the Western countries have gone to such lengths in delaying the conclusion of a German peace treaty.
It is crystal clear that there is absolutely no justification at all for the stand taken by the Western countries, headed by the United States, on the questions of Germany and West Berlin. The so-called "Berlin crisis" is nothing but a pretext deliberately created by Kennedy and his followers for stepping up arms expansion and war preparations and heightening international tension. The much-talked-about new plan to "defend Berlin," as the New York Times recently points out, "is not directed primarily at the defense of the former German capital but at improving the ability of the Western alliance to wage all kinds of war in any part of the world." And it is precisely this adventurist policy pursued by the Kennedy government which has posed a grave threat to world peace.

The Enlarged Geneva Conference

An International Hearing

by OUR CORRESPONDENT

BY last weekend the enlarged Geneva Conference had met seven times in restricted session for substantive discussions on the draft declaration on Laotian neutrality. A unanimity of views has been reached by the participating countries regarding general undertakings to respect the independence and neutrality of Laos. The conference has also adopted a schedule of listed items for discussion and a five-member drafting committee consisting of China, the Soviet Union, India, the United Kingdom and France has been set up to prepare formulations of what has been agreed upon. This committee started work on July 27.

In spite of the progress made, however, one can clearly see from the three-day discussion which started on the afternoon of July 26 that a serious obstacle still stands in the way of solving the question of respecting the independence and neutrality of Laos. That obstacle is the hypocritical attitude of the United States. Although in the negotiations on substantive matters, the United States has agreed to recognize and respect the independence and neutrality of Laos, not to undermine the peace and neutrality of Laos, not to interfere in its internal affairs directly or indirectly and not to drag Laos into any alliance incompatible with its neutral status, nevertheless, it refuses to remove the SEATO military bloc's "protection" of Laos. This is tantamount to a declaration that the United States still insists on using SEATO to intervene in Laos.

This three-day discussion centred on abrogation of the provision in the SEATO military bloc treaty concerning the "protection" of Laos. At these meetings, the delegates of the socialist countries, of Laos and of the neutral countries, have spoken out one after another, and solemnly and justly denounced both SEATO and this provision in the SEATO treaty. This is the first time in recent years that this Southeast Asian military bloc has been subjected to such a concentrated and universal denunciation at an international conference. These three days of the conference were, in fact, a court trial of the U.S. policy of using SEATO for intervening in Laos and other Southeast Asian countries and also of this military bloc itself.

Chinese Delegate Speaks

In his July 26 speech, Chang Han-fu, Acting Head of the Chinese Government Delegation, mentioned three reasons why this aggressive military bloc must be abolished. "First," he said, "our conference has discussed the general undertakings not to involve Laos in military alliances incompatible with the status of neutrality of Laos, and reached agreement in principle," and "it is unthinkable that we, on the one hand, undertake not to involve Laos in any military alliances or other alliances incompatible with its status of neutrality, while on the other, permit the continued existence of present treaties and agreements relating to Laos and conflicting with its neutral status."

Second, there was already a corresponding provision on this in the Zurich communiqué of the three Laotian princes.

Third, the Southeast Asia collective defence treaty which was signed solely because of the machinations of the United States, has violated the relevant provisions in the 1954 Geneva agreements by flagrantly and unilaterally including the three states of Indo-China, including Laos, in its so-called zone of "protection." The prolonged instability in the situation in Laos over the past seven years and the recurrence of civil war in Laos have been caused by the United States making use of this treaty organization to interfere crudely in the internal affairs of Laos. This military bloc has all along been the source of crises in Laos. There will be no tranquillity for Laos if this bloc is not abolished.

Chang Han-fu said that "SEATO is a one hundred per cent aggressive military bloc; no matter how one wishes to invert the truth and call black white, it is impossible to say that it is defensive. And even if it should August 4, 1961
be arbitrarily described as defensive, of what avail would it be? Would anyone venture to say that it is permissible to involve Laos in a so-called defensive military alliance?"

In another speech made in the debate on the third day, Chang Han-fu reaffirmed the stand of the Chinese delegation: the SEATO treaty and its so-called "protection" over Laos must be abolished and this is considered as a key question at the conference.

A Question Hard to Answer

Throughout the discussion the United States has failed to answer the following question: "The Laotian people want none of your protection, why do you insist on it?"

The delegates of the United States and other member states of the SEATO military bloc have kept on saying that their "protection" of Laos has to be applied for by Laos. The fact is that far from asking for it, Laos has firmly rejected such "protection." The communiqué of the Zurich meeting of the three Laotian princes explicitly states that Laos is "not to recognize the protection of any military alliance or coalition." By "any military alliance or coalition" it is actually referring to the Southeast Asian military bloc; this is clear to everyone. Both the delegates of the Royal Laotian Government and the Neo Lao Haksat have said at the conference that Laos does not need the "protection" of the Southeast Asian military bloc. The delegate of the Royal Laotian Government Quinim Pholsena also emphatically demanded that the Southeast Asian military bloc countries take away their "protective umbrella" from Laos. He especially stressed the fact that he was expressing the unanimous sentiments of the Laotian people as a whole, including overseas Laotians.

The Thai delegate said that when his government joined SEATO it was exercising Thailand's sovereignty. But people will find it difficult to understand why Thailand, while setting great store by its own sovereignty, shows no respect for that of others. The Laotians say they do not want protection whereas the Thais say that the Laotians must be protected. Can it be that Laos has no sovereign rights of its own? The Thai delegate cited the March 29, 1961 communiqué of the council of ministers of the SEATO bloc in an attempt to prove that that bloc was an organization safeguarding peace. But, it may be asked, who has vested in SEATO members the right to adopt what they call "appropriate action" under certain "circumstances" with regard to the civil war in Laos?

During the three-day debate, an overwhelming majority of the participating countries advocated the abolition of the provision in the SEATO military bloc treaty concerning this so-called "protection" of Laos. The Soviet draft proposal for a provision abolishing the relevant clause in the SEATO treaty has won the unanimous support of the delegates of the other socialist countries, the Royal Laotian Government and the Neo Lao Haksat. The Burmese delegate pointed out in his speech that the article concerning "protecting" Laos in the SEATO treaty was incompatible with Laotian neutrality. He said that the Burmese stand was this: steps should be taken to abrogate all provisions in existing treaties and agreements violating Laotian neutrality. The Indian delegate in his speech thought it very strange and abnormal to ignore the will of a sovereign state and insist on "protecting" it. The views and stands of the overwhelming majority of the participating countries show clearly how unpopular is the United States' attempt to use the SEATO military bloc to intervene in Laos under the pretext of "protection."

Harriman's Magic of "Finding a Way Out"

At the discussions, the U.S. delegate Harriman adopted a let-them-laugh-but-I do-as-usual attitude. Only on the first day of discussion on this question did he make bold to speak briefly in defence of SEATO. All the arguments he could muster were completely refuted by the acting head of the Chinese delegation.

During these three days, the delegates of only three other SEATO members—Thailand, France and Britain—attempted a flimsy defence of SEATO. The only delegate of a non-SEATO state to defend SEATO was the south Viet Nam delegate who serves as a kind of flunkey for the United States. But all these speeches failed to provide any new arguments for Harriman or improve his situation. Such is the picture of the international hearing on SEATO by the Geneva Conference.

Harriman tried hard to find a way out at this international hearing. "No discussion" is the magic panacea he used: asserting that the matter could not be discussed at the Geneva Conference. "No signature" is another trick of his: getting the Thai delegate to indicate that he would not put his signature to the declaration on Laotian neutrality if the above-mentioned provision in the Soviet draft was included in it. The attitude taken by the United States only shows that it still stubbornly hopes to keep its Southeast Asian military bloc and use it for aggression, intervention and subversive activities against the Southeast Asian countries. It also shows that the United States will stick to its I-do-as-usual attitude in defiance of condemnation by world opinion. The U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk darkly declared a month ago that an alternative existing side by side with the Geneva talks was SEATO intervention.

It could also be seen from recent reports from Vientiane that while the United States verbally agreed in Geneva to respect Laotian independence and neutrality and not to interfere in Laos' internal affairs, it has been instructing the Phoumi-Boun Oum clique in Vientiane to sabotage the Zurich agreement and illegally convene a "national congress," to adopt a so-called "bill of amendments" to the constitution so as to prepare conditions for opposing Prince Souvanna Phouma as premier of the future provisional coalition government and for obstructing formation of such a government. Meanwhile, the United States has stepped up its military assistance to the Nosavan troops. The Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Army in the Pacific, Francis Collins, is now "visiting" Thailand. Military circles in Bangkok have disclosed that the Laotian rebel troops and Thai troops stood ready just in case fighting resumed in Laos.

The struggle to liquidate SEATO and the "protection" it imposes on Laos has only reached the end of a stage. The hypocritical attitude of the United States has been exposed once again. It will be further exposed at the Geneva Conference and by the development of events in Laos. Its ulterior motives will be exposed through its own actions.
Son of the People's Army. Within a year of joining the P.L.A., General Wang Tung-pao's son, young Wang Hsiao-lei, was elected the “Five Best Fighter” of his company.

He had made exceptional progress in raising his political understanding, in military training, in carrying out assignments, in the “Three-Eight” working style,* and in bodybuilding — the five most important things asked of a P.L.A. man today. There was no doubt in the minds of the other fighters in the company: ever since young Wang had come, modest but determined, they had seen him throw himself heart and soul into whatever he did and always come out on top. All through the year he had been cited on each individual count.

It was no accident that Hsiao-lei had made good. His father had joined the Red Army at 15; his mother joined the revolution at the start of the War of Resistance Against Japan. He was born on the north Kiangsu battlefront and in his mother's arms had travelled over half of China with the Liberation Army. From boyhood his parents had told him of the revolution, of the heroic history of the Red Army; had taught him to love the masses, to love labour, to be modest and upright. When he was still in the fourth form at school, his mother had handed him a packet of needles and thread. From then on he did his own sewing and washing. Living in the countryside, his father taught him to work in the fields.

Hsiao-lei had always remembered his father's words: “Whatever your mother and I have done for the revolution, you must never put down to your own credit.” He was told again and again never to tell his friends that his father was a general. When Hsiao-lei left to join the army, his parents solemnly gave him two family

“heirlooms”: one, a volume of Mao Tse-tung's works, the other, a packet of needles and thread. At school or in the army, Hsiao-lei has striven to be the sort of person his parents could be proud of.

*This working style of the P.L.A. is summarized in the three moitoes: keep firmly to the correct political direction, maintain an assiduous and simple working style, be flexible and Roble in strategy and tactics; and the eight words: be united, keep on your toes, be earnest, be lively.

On Their Toes. When China staged its own Swan Lake for the first time in 1958, it was thought fresh and charming. Performed by youngsters (averaging 16) most of whom four or five years ago didn’t know the first thing about ballet, it was justifiably rated exceptional. Most of the cast, students of the Peking School of Dancing set up in 1954, have graduated and are dancing professionally on the stage. Pai Shu-hsiang, who first danced the lead in Swan Lake, is becoming a ballerina of some renown. Another graduate, Chao Ching, daughter of the well-known screen artist Chao Tan, is now dancing the leading role in Precious Lotus Lantern, the classical ballet in national style which is a big hit on the Chinese stage.

Now, three years later, the school is sending out its second graduating class of 60 students from its two main departments of ballet and national dancing. They have completed a six-year course which includes the general curriculum of a senior high school and a solid experience of stage work. All have taken part in well-received public performances of ballets and traditional dances. Among them is Chiang Chun, the son of a peasant in a suburban people's commune in Peking and Chen Nung-pu, 17-year-old overseas Chinese from Malaya.

The Dumb-bells. The rebellion was put down in Tibet, the serfs had gained their freedom and received land, and for the first time in its history the little village on the Tibetan highlands had set up its own primary school. On opening day, the newly freed peasants happily brought their children to school. They looked over the classrooms and grounds with pride, and asked the school principal if there wasn’t something special they could do for the school.

Said the principal: "The hawk needs powerful wings to fly swiftly in the air. Our children need to grow fit and strong. Could you make us some dumb-bells for physical training?"

The peasants were rather put out. Just emerged from the appalling misery of servitude, where even an iron-tipped plough was a rarity, where could they get a chunk of iron to make dumb-bells? An old man suddenly explained with an idea. The peasants put their heads and efforts together. A few days later, they brought the dumb-bells. They were made from the iron shackles ripped out of the dungeons of the ex-serf-owners, shackles whose cold clasp most of these peasants had felt in the recent past.

"Studio of a Thousand Bricks." It is well known that ancient Babylon had libraries of clay tablets inscribed in cuneiform characters; but it is still little known that China too has a library of inscribed bricks and tablets. It is in Ningpo, Chekiang Province, housed in the Tien Yi Ko Library, the oldest library extant in China.

Here are over 1,000 bricks most of which were found in and around Ningpo. The earliest dates from the Han Dynasty of over 2,000 years ago and the latest from the Ching Dynasty, China’s last imperial dynasty. Each brick has an inscription or engraving on it giving valuable data concerning its period. A scholar, Ma Lien, at the turn of the century, brought them together and named the place where he kept them the "Studio of a Thousand Tsin Bricks," since Tsin Dynasty (265-420 A.D.) bricks made up a large part of the collection. Later his descendants gave the whole studio to the Tien Yi Ko Library. Most of the research work done on these valuable bricks was undertaken after liberation. The collection is being continually enriched with inscribed bricks or stone tablets discovered in other parts of the country.

Papercut by Shen Pei-nung
August First Film Studio

With Army Day (August 1) here thoughts cinematic turn naturally to the doings of the August First Studio, popularly known as the "Army Studio," and one of the most productive of China’s major film units. Set up nine years ago, on August 1, 1952, it has grown from a small documentary studio into an all-round unit producing full-length features and documentaries. In 1955 it still hadn’t got a single director with experience in feature films; now it has trained more than a score of directors and assistants with a long list of popular features to their credit. Most of the studio’s actors and actresses were drawn from cultural troopes of the People’s Liberation Army and there was no denying that their first screen appearances still showed a decidedly “stagey manner of acting.” That phase, however, is now well passed. The studio today has a first-rate group of film actors who have starred in a number of memorable productions. Most of the studio’s corps of cameramen, artists, and technicians were also raw recruits trained on the job by the studio.

On a visit to the studio in Peking’s western suburbs not far away from Lukiouchao (Marco Polo) Bridge, you are sure to be shown around the excellent new sound stages, laboratories and technical departments and told that nine years ago “there was nothing here but kao liang fields!” You will also be introduced with even greater pride to a camera, inscribed with the characters Guang Rong Hao (Glory) in red. It is a cherished relic of the studio, a symbol of the dedicated spirit of its workers. A group of the studio’s cameramen were in Korea in 1952 filming a commemorative meeting in honour of Lo Sheng-chiao, a member of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, who gave his life while saving a Korean boy from drowning. U.S. bombers made a sudden raid. Kao Chingsheng, an assistant-photographer and a member of the Youth League, covered the camera with his body. He was killed in the raid but he saved the film and camera from damage.

Kao’s comrades-in-arms later took the camera all over the Korean battlefield. It played a worthy part in making the first batch of documentaries and newsreels produced by the young studio: The Unbeatable Transport Line, Medical Workers on the Korean Front, Long Live Friendship! . . . it recorded for all time the feats of the Chinese and Korean people fighting shoulder to shoulder against U.S. imperialism, as well as devastating exposures of the crimes committed by the U.S. imperialists and their accomplices in Korea. These films taught millions the truth and lessons of the Korean war.

That tradition of going into the thick of life, of being one with the workers, peasants and soldiers, has been followed steadfastly by the men and women of the studio. It shows itself in the integrity and authenticity of their art, the close rapport they have with their audiences.

Ever since it started, the studio has been greatly helped by others with more experienced workers and better equipment. The August 1 Athletic Meet, one of the first of its films, was a joint production with the Peking Film Studio and the Central Newsreel and Documentary Film Studio. Several who then worked as assistant-directors or assistant-cameramen, are now directors or cameramen doing good independent work. Studios of the fraternal socialist countries have also lent a helping hand. Forest Trail, a full-length documentary of jungle wild life in south China, was produced jointly with the Moscow Popular-Science Film Studio. August First Studio workers cherish the most grateful memories of how the Soviet experts who worked with them enthusiastically and patiently passed on their knowledge to them. The same was true of the experts from Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria who joined the August First Studio in producing The Road of Happiness to Lhasa and The Visiting Bulgarian Art Ensemble. Road of Happiness to Lhasa was winner of a prize for documentaries at the 9th International Film Festival at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, and The Forest Trail was awarded a certificate at the 13th International Festival of Popular-Science Films.

In 1955, the August First Studio produced its first short feature, Footprints. It was not an artistic success but it set the studio on a new path that has led steadily forward. Of the earlier productions, The Story of Liupao Village, The Unfailing Beam and Darkness Before the Dawn were not only popular favourites among Chinese audiences, but also very warmly received abroad. More recent successes—On the Long March, Fighting Detachment of the Huai, describing how that detachment under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party grows into a veteran force in the struggle against the Japanese invaders, and Tracks in the Snowy Forest, set in the earlier period of the War of Liberation in the mid-forties, have set an even higher standard of achievement. Feature films are now the most important part of the studio’s output.

Technically, too, the studio is also making headway. A Trip to Likiang and Acrobatics, the first colour widescreen stereoscopic films ever made in China, were August First Studio productions.

China’s cinema industry has come a long way in the past eleven years, especially since the big leap forward in 1958. In 1957 there were only 10 film studios in the country. By the end of 1959, there were 33. The course of development of the August First Film Studio in one way or another pioneers the road being taken by the newcomers.

—KAI HSIEH

ARCHAEOLOGY

Old Stone Age Cave Found In Anyang

A cave once inhabited by men of the latter part of the Palaeolithic (Old Stone) Age and rich in archaeological treasure trove has been found in Honan Province.

The find is at Hsiaonanhai, some 30 kilometres to the southwest of Anyang and was discovered in March last year when stone was being quarried for a nearby reservoir. Hsiaonanhai, a Honan beauty spot of rocks and clear springs, has been known hitherto chiefly for its grottoes with Buddhist stone sculptures. Some of these date back to the 6th century A.D. No hint of primitive man had ever been spotted here before. When news of the discovery of the cave was brought to the group of archaeologists working
cores, blades, points and scrapers have been found. They are all of characteristically small size and crudely done. Their forms resemble those of the typical palaelithic Ordos industry discovered earlier in Inner Mongolia.

Along with the tools was also found a flat oval limestone pendant, with a smooth surface; as in a bead a natural perforation extends throughout its length. Most likely used as an ornament at the time, this is a rare find for a palaelithic site in this country.

The large quantities of mammal fossils found in the deposit are all very fragmentary. Some bear marks of burning, indicating that they are the remains of human food. Preliminary examination shows them to be the remains of rhinoceroses, deer, antelopes, badgers and egg shells of ostriches, evidently the spoils of the chase. Many fragments of the rhinoceros fossils show that the animals had milk teeth. All this indicates that these men were still quite weak in their ability to contend with nature and had to prey on weak and young animals and the eggs of birds for food.

Such are the initial findings at the Hsiaoanhai site. They lead archaeologists to believe that it will eventually yield a wealth of material. Already it can be described as a discovery of major importance. It is not only the first cave of the late palaelithic found in Honan, but also the only one made in north China since the discovery of the Upper Cave Man in the Choukoutien area to the southwest of Peking in 1939. (The Upper Cave Man of the palaelithic era lived about 50,000 years ago.) It provides fresh material strengthening the link between the Palaelithic and Neolithic Ages, and testifying to the continuity of the growth of primitive society in China.

— AN CHI-H-MIN

SHORT NOTES

Chorus of Japan Coming. Led by Inoue Yoritoyo, the 27-member Chorus of Japan is scheduled to arrive in Peking on August 3 where it will give two public performances. Its programme includes Japanese songs and dances, modern Japanese folk songs, the Chinese song Cantata of the River of Happiness, Soviet, Korean and Cuban songs.

Coming to China for a month’s tour at the invitation of the Chinese People’s Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the chorus will give its first performance on August 6. The second, a joint recital with the Chinese Central Philharmonic Symphony Orchestra and Chorus, will take place the following evening.

“Selected Chinese Paintings, 1949–59,” is now on sale. This handsome album (767x1092mm.) brings us some of the best works done by China’s artists during the first decade since the founding of the Chinese People’s Republic. Published by the People’s Art Publishing House in Peking, it contains 96 paintings in oil and the traditional Chinese style, water colours, New Year pictures, examples of graphic art and drawings by more than 80 artists. Fifty reproductions are full colour.

As the introduction says, these works of art show the progress and achievements of Chinese artists from 1949 to 1959. During this period, they have gone deep into life, forged closer links with the people and actively put their art at the service of socialism. In a wide range of forms and styles, their works show the Chinese people in their revolutionary struggles and in building socialism, and depict the beauty of the Chinese land.

New Recordings. Production Cantata by Hsien Hsing-hai, pioneer of modern Chinese music, and Red Guards of Hunghu, a modern opera produced by the Hupeh Experimental Opera Theatre, are among the new discs issued by the China Record Corporation of Shanghai in June and July. The list also includes 25 winners in last year’s nationwide song contest; Defend Yenan, a symphonic poem; Mu Kwei-yang Takes Command, a newly composed symphony; the violin concerto Liang Shan-po and Chu Ying-tai; light music, both from China and from other lands, and many items in China’s various traditional operatic styles. Seventy items are long-playing discs.
Swiss National Day

Chairman Liu Shao-chi sent a message of greetings to Friedrich Wahlen, President of the Swiss Confederation, on the occasion of Switzerland's National Day. The message expressed hopes for further development of friendly relations between China and Switzerland and for still greater successes in the common efforts made by the two countries in the cause of international peace.

At the reception given by the Swiss Ambassador to China Rene Naville in Peking, Vice-Premier Chen Yi praised the efforts that Switzerland has made in promoting international peace and co-operation, and reaffirmed China's stand on the Laotian question. "The Chinese Government is ready to exert its utmost efforts jointly with all the other participants in the enlarged Geneva Conference to reach international agreement on the peaceful settlement of the Laotian question," he declared.

Referring to the friendly relations between China and Switzerland, the Vice-Premier said that during his recent stay in Switzerland, he felt deeply how friendly and co-operative was the Swiss Government towards the Chinese Government and people. He expressed heartfelt thanks to the Swiss Government and people for the assistance and warm welcome they accorded the Chinese delegation.

Dahomey Independence Day

Chairman Liu Shao-chi sent a message of greetings to Hubert Maga, President of the Republic of Dahomey, extending warm congratulations on the first anniversary of Dahomey's independence. He wished prosperity to that country and happiness to its people.

China at World Conferences

Through the voice of their delegates at various recent international conferences the Chinese people have expressed their resolute opposition to imperialist and colonialist aggression and their support for the struggle of the world's peoples for national independence.

Speaking at the Conference of the International Trade Union Committee for Solidarity with the South African Workers and Peoples held in Accra, Huang Min-wei, representative of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, pointed out that racial discrimination is a product of colonialism. Without the complete liquidation of the colonial system, he declared, it is impossible to uproot racial discrimination; therefore, the struggle of the South African people is an important component part of the great struggle of the people of all Africa against colonialism and for national independence.

He drew attention to the double-dealing tactics of the U.S. imperialists: while supporting the old colonialists in suppressing and disrupting the struggles of the African peoples, the U.S. imperialists make a show of "sympathy" for the national independence of the African peoples as a cover for stepping up their penetration and infiltration in Africa on a wide scale in the political, economic, military and cultural fields. The enemies of the South African people, he said, are not only the South African authorities but also the U.S. neo-colonialists.

China's delegates are also taking part in the World Youth Forum which opened on July 25 in Moscow, and is attended by 700 delegates representing more than 300 youth organizations from 91 countries. Speaking at its plenary session the head of the Chinese Youth Delegation Wang Chao-hua declared that the great Soviet Union and other socialist countries had set a brilliant example in solving questions of the vital rights of young people. China's youth, like the youth of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist camp, are enjoying the political, economic, cultural and educational rights accorded them by the people's regime. He expressed the support of China's youth for the struggle of the youth in Asia, Africa and Latin America for national liberation, democratic liberties, and for the youth in Western Europe, North America and Australia defending peace, democratic liberties and their vital rights.

Speaking at the World Peace Conference of Religious Believers Chao Pu-chu, leader of the Chinese delegation, voiced the opposition of China's people to aggressive wars and their determination to defend peace. This conference, held in Kyoto from July 25 to 28, was attended by 39 delegates from 14 countries and 200 Japanese delegates. The "Kyoto Declaration" adopted at the conference appeals for the setting up of de-nuclearized zones in Asia and Central Europe and eventually all over the world. It supports the national independence movements of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples and resolutely opposes oppression and aggression, as well as racial discrimination in any form.

More U.S. Military Intrusions

U.S. military intrusions have continued during the past month. On July 19, a U.S. military plane intruded into the airspace over the area south of Pinghai and Swabue, Kwangtung Province, between 10:00 and 10:11 hours. On the same day, between 13:15 and 14:18 hours, a U.S. warship intruded into China's territorial waters south of Wuchiu, Fukien Province.

On July 20, a U.S. warship intruded into China's territorial waters south of the Pinghai area, Kwangtung Province, between 6:23 and 9:01 hours. Two U.S. military planes intruded into China's airspace over Yungings Island in the Hsishan Islands and over areas to the south of Pinghai and Swabue, Kwangtung Province, between 12:44 and 12:55 hours, and between 13:03 and 13:15 hours respectively on the same day.

A spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued the 161st and 162nd serious warnings against these military provocations.

Cultural Briefs

At the Second Moscow International Film Festival held in mid-July, the Chinese actress Yu Lan, heroine in the picture A Revolutionary Family, a Peking Studio production, received a silver medal award for the best actress' performance in the films shown at the festival.

The drama group of Havana University has presented a classical Chinese opera adapted for the modern stage in Spanish. It is about how the wise judge Pao Cheng settled a dispute between two women making rival claims to a child. Wearing colourful traditional Chinese costumes, the troupe gave a skilful rendering of the play.
Japanese Expansion in Southeast Asia—New Trends

To keep pace with its high-speed industrial development, Japan is trying hard to find markets in Southeast Asia and in other underdeveloped countries for its heavy industrial goods and chemical products, says an article in *Da Gong Bao* of July 18.

A review of recent events, the article points out, shows that Japanese expansion in Southeast Asia is marked by three trends: (1) Japan is coordinating its efforts with U.S. war policy and uses economic expansion to strengthen the anti-communist forces in Southeast Asia and prevent Indo-China from going neutral, (2) it is using every available means to export commodities and capital to Southeast Asia and, (3) it is plundering the raw materials of Southeast Asia so as to serve its ever increasing industrial needs.

Southeast Asia has always been a central target of Japanese foreign expansion. Taking their cue from the way the United States is endeavouring to step up its intervention in Laos, suppress the south Vietnamese people’s struggle and strengthen the anti-communist forces in Southeast Asia, the Japanese Foreign Ministry and other ministries, under Ikeda’s instructions, have formulated proposals to coordinate their efforts with U.S. war policy. Early in June, the Japanese Foreign Ministry called a conference of Japanese diplomats accredited to countries in Asia and the Pacific, to discuss the question of providing economic and technical aid to the Southeast Asian countries. In the course of the discussion it was urged that since Thailand, Burma and south Viet Nam are facing a “mounting threat of communism,” Japan should aid these countries out of political considerations.

The main emphasis of Japanese expansion in Southeast Asia has always been placed on India and Pakistan. Japan has given aid to these two countries to the amount of $120 million in the past five or six years. Recently it decided to provide India with a direct loan of $80 million to be used for the first two years of India’s Third Five-Year Plan. It has also planned to give Pakistan a loan of $30 million. Japanese press reports say that in the future, the Ikeda government plans to concentrate its efforts on Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, the three countries which are susceptible to the effects of the Laotian question. To this end, Japan will speed up the solution of the Burmese claims for reparations and consider granting 9,600 million yen to Thailand free of charge—an outstanding issue between the two countries—in an attempt to undermine the neutrality of Burma and prevent Thailand from going neutral.

Last year, the article adds, witnessed the most energetic Japanese economic expansion in Southeast Asia which takes 25 per cent of Japanese exports and 66.7 per cent of its exports of capital. By 1960, the deferred loans made by Japan in Southeast Asia amounted to $400 million, 40 per cent of the total amount of deferred loans ($999 million), the biggest single item in Japanese foreign investments and loans. Southeast Asia also holds first place in shipping export loans made by the Japanese Export and Import Bank. The largest number of Japanese technical personnel overseas are working in this area. In addition, more than $1,000 million in reparations and nearly $900 million out of “economic co-operation” funds are concentrated in Southeast Asia. This shows what an important place Southeast Asia holds in Japanese exports of capital.

This year, the article notes, the Japanese Government has adopted many measures for boosting its economic expansion in Southeast Asia. The “Fund for Foreign Economic Cooperation,” with Southeast Asia as its main sphere of action, for instance, has doubled its capital to a total of 10,000 million yen. To back up its trade offensive, the Japanese Government is stepping up its economic diplomacy. It has devoted particular efforts to solving the problem of concluding treaties of commerce and navigation with the Southeast Asian countries so as to place Japanese trade with Southeast Asia on a firmer basis.

Japan, the article says, has penetrated every part of Southeast Asia in order to turn that area into its stable market and base providing it with cheap raw materials.

But today, when the national independence movement is mounting and the neo-colonialist policy pursued by U.S. imperialism is everywhere suffering setbacks, the article concludes, the Japanese plot to rely on the United States to realize its expansionist ambitions in Southeast Asia can never succeed. The Southeast Asian countries which suffered from Japanese aggression and whose people have strong feelings against Japanese imperialism, are keeping a vigilant eye on every Japanese move. The attempts of the Japanese reactionaries to expand in Southeast Asia, to enslave and launch aggression against the people there in co-ordination with U.S. war policy can only arouse their greater resistance and end in frustration.

August 4, 1961

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