CHRONICLE

May 14
- Premier Hua Guofeng met with Mohammad Saifur Rahman, Special Envoy of President Ziaur Rahman of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. At the meeting, Premier Hua said: “Relations between China and Bangladesh are fine. We have a common language on many international issues. The interests of our two countries coincide."

- Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping met with the Count and Countess of Barcelona, parents of the Spanish King. Vice-Premier Deng expressed the hope that more Spanish friends would visit China.

May 15
- At the U.N. Disarmament Commission, the Chairman of the Chinese Delegation, Lai Yali, put forward a comprehensive programme for disarmament.

May 16
- Vice-Premier Deng met with the delegation of Jiji Press of Japan led by its director Tadayoshi Ohata. At the meeting, Vice-Premier Deng gave his views on the realization of the four modernizations in China and on some important international questions. He pointed out that the current readjustments in the national economy concerned the proportionate development of agriculture and industry in the national economy and within industry itself. They will be conducive to developing the economy in a planned and proportionate way and to stepping up the tempo of modernization.

May 17
- At a meeting with American physicist Tsung-dao Lee and his wife, Premier Hua said that China should continue its efforts to raise the whole nation’s scientific, cultural and technical levels.

May 18
- Premier Hua met with Col. Amadou Baba Diarra, Vice-Chairman of the Military Committee for National Liberation, Deputy Secretary General of the Malian People’s Democratic Union and Minister of Finance and Commerce. Premier Hua said that China and Mali have the political basis for further co-operation.

- The first round of the Sino-Vietnamese negotiations at the vice-foreign minister level ended in Hanoi.

May 19
- Premier Hua met with Agha Shafi, Adviser for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan.
A Hundred Schools of Thought Contend

To mark the 60th anniversary of the May 4th Movement of 1919, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences held an eight-day symposium in Beijing, attended by 260 scholars from various parts of the country. They discussed such topics as emancipating the mind, promoting democracy, and adhering to the scientific attitude. Altogether 156 papers were submitted.

Zhou Yang, Vice-President of the academy, delivered a report (see p. 9) at the opening ceremony. It was highly appraised by all the participants who agreed that the current movement to emancipate the mind was a continuation and development of the May 4th Movement and the 1942 rectification movement in Yanan.

The May 4th Movement demolished the old, feudal dogmas as well as the bourgeois dogmas of the West, thus paving the way for the dissemination of Marxism-Leninism in China. The Yanan rectification movement opposed dogmatism which blindly followed Marxist-Leninist tenets and Soviet experience without the least consideration for China's actual conditions. Both movements helped promote the cause of the Chinese revolution. The current movement to emancipate the mind will surely help expedite China's socialist modernization.

Social scientists in China are determined to continue to work under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and push this great movement to a new high.

Participants in the symposium agreed that the Chinese Communist Party has consistently advocated emancipation of the mind. They held that Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, which opposes all dogmas, prejudices and attempts at establishing an ultimate ideological system, is the most liberated thinking of mankind. Upholding Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought means upholding the unity of theory and practice, which is the basic and most important thing. Through the test of practice, theory is continually being corrected, supplemented, enriched and developed. At present, emancipating the mind means upholding the spirit of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee held last December. This calls for closely integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought with the new practice of socialist modernization and, in the course of this practice, blazing a trail for accomplishing the Chinese way of modernizing the country.

Democracy and Science. The participants discussed the slogan — democracy and science — put forward during the May 4th Movement. It gave a big fillip to the thought-emancipation movement at that time. Later on, the Chinese Communist Party took over and carried forward this slogan and made it part of its own fine tradition. Several years ago, however, this tradition was blown to the winds, and so great efforts have to be made to restore and develop it.

Opinions were unanimous that a prerequisite for science to flourish is to promote democracy which, academically, means letting a hundred schools of thought contend and creating conditions for free and unrestricted discussions. Everyone must bow to the truth instead of demanding that the minority should be subordinate to the majority or forcing people to obey the dictates of the high-ups. At the same time, democracy also means that there should be no restriction whatsoever on the subjects of scientific research.

Evaluation of Historical Figures. There was also a lively discussion at the symposium on the appraisal of some major figures living in the period of the May 4th Movement, such as Li Dazhao (1889-1927), Chen Duxiu (1880-1942) and Hu Shi (1891-1962). All held that it is necessary to respect history and analyse and appraise those men in an objective and matter-of-fact way. The metaphysical tendency that regards what is good is always good and what is bad is always bad must be discarded.

Lu Xun Study Society

The image of Lu Xun (1881-1936), the standard-bearer of the May 4th new cultural movement in 1919, was distorted by Lin Biao and the "gang of four." They garbled history and made use of his works which they quoted out of context to serve their own ends.
An outstanding example was the so-called struggle Lu Xun waged against the "four villains"—Zhou Yang, Tian Han, Xia Yan and Yang Hansheng who were leaders of the League of Chinese Left-Wing Writers, an organization of revolutionary writers set up in Shanghai in the 1930s under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Because they failed to have a correct understanding and evaluation of Lu Xun and because of their serious sectarianism and dogmatism, they committed mistakes in their relations with him. Nevertheless, they were Lu Xun's comrades-in-arms, with the common revolutionary aim of changing the old society and creating a new one.

Few would have imagined that 30 years later Lin Biao and the "gang of four" who were careerists pure and simple would go so far as to make use of Lu Xun to attack influential writers and leading comrades in literary and art circles. They misrepresented Lu Xun and his works and tried to give others the impression that his great achievement was not his determined struggle against imperialism and feudalism or his laying a foundation for China's new culture, but his opposition to the "four villains." This was misleading and brought chaos to the study of Lu Xun.

Re-evaluating and learning from Lu Xun, a great man of letters, thinker and revolutionary, is an important task on China's cultural front today.

In early May, a preparatory meeting was held in Beijing for the setting up of a society for the study of Lu Xun. The meeting was co-sponsored by Mao Dun, noted writer and chairman of the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles and chairman of the Union of Chinese Writers, and Zhou Yang, noted literary critic and vice-chairman of the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles.

Speaking at the preparatory meeting, Zhou Yang stressed the need to use dialectical materialism and historical materialism to study Lu Xun's ideological development. Lu Xun was not a born sage. He never stopped searching for the truth. At first he believed in the theory of evolution, but later espoused the theory of classes; he grew from a democrat to a communist and from a believer in enlightenment to a proletarian revolutionary. Only by studying these changes in his ideology can we really understand his greatness which manifested itself in his uncompromising struggles against old ideas, old forces and old customs and habits so as to clear the way for the new things to sprout and flourish. Lu Xun always made self-examinations which enabled him to carry on the revolution without interruption and press ahead with a will.

Lu Xun made immortal contributions to the cause of the Chinese people's liberation and left us a rich literary legacy. Chairman Mao gave him a high appraisal and scientific evaluation and called on the Chinese people to learn from him.

In the Lu Xun Museum in Beijing, a study centre has been set up in charge of compiling and writing a biography and a chronicle of his life as well as related material. Another study centre has been set up under the State Administrative Bureau of Museums and Archaeological Data which, apart from publishing from time to time books on the study of this great writer, recently brought out a collection of 1,300 letters in Lu Xun's handwriting.

In the past few years, Lu Xun study groups have been organized in departments of Chinese literature in many colleges and universities. Not long ago the Literature Research Institute under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has established a special department for studying Lu Xun. Academic discussions on special subjects concerning this great writer were held in many cities.

First Round of Sino-Vietnamese Negotiations Ends

The first round of Sino-Vietnamese negotiations which lasted 30 days ended in Hanoi on May 18 after five plenary meetings.

At the 5th meeting on May 18, Chinese Government Delegation leader Han Nianlong stated that the failure to achieve progress in this round of negotiations was the result of a lack of good faith on the part of the Vietnamese side and that it must bear the full responsibility.

He continued: "At the five plenary meetings of the Sino-Vietnamese negotiations, each side put forward its proposals, elucidated its views and made clear its position. In keeping with the agreement between the Chinese and Vietnamese sides that the negotiations be held
alternately in Hanoi and Beijing, we suggest that the next round of negotiations be held in Beijing. Matters concerning concrete arrangement may be discussed and decided upon by the two sides through diplomatic channels."

From the very outset, the Vietnamese side deliberately poisoned the atmosphere and undermined the negotiations. Taking the negotiation conference as a place of carrying out an anti-China campaign, the Vietnamese representative in his speeches unscrupulously attacked and slandered China’s domestic and foreign policies and its state leaders. Concerning the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations, the Vietnamese representative distorted the facts, fabricated groundless charges and spread rumours to mislead the people, without showing the slightest serious attitude towards the negotiations.

Han Nianlong expressed the sincere hope that the Vietnamese side would give up its peremptory attitude and show good faith in the negotiations, that Viet Nam would consider China’s eight-point proposal earnestly, seriously and realistically, and make due efforts for progress in the negotiations.

During the negotiations, Han Nianlong refuted the Vietnamese side’s lies that China had "warned south Viet Nam against waging armed struggle in the 1960s" and "undermined the unity of the people of the three Indochinese states." He said that China’s all-out support to Viet Nam in its wars of resistance against France and the United States and especially her support to the south Vietnamese people in their struggle against aggression was known to the whole world. Up till a few years ago, Vietnamese leaders told Chinese leaders on many occasions that Viet Nam could not have won victory without China’s support and assistance. China’s consistent support to the anti-imperialist struggle of the Kampuchean and Lao peoples is also common knowledge, and no amount of lies can distort the facts. The chief culprit responsible for wrecking the revolutionary cause of the Indochinese peoples is none other than the Vietnamese authorities.

Regarding the Vietnamese charge that the Chinese side set preconditions for the negotiations, Han Nianlong said that "if relations between China and Viet Nam are to be normalized, the Vietnamese authorities must stop their anti-China hostility and abandon their policy of expansionist nationalism and regional hegemonism." This is most practical and is aimed at a fundamental solution of the issues between China and Viet Nam and truly restoring normal relations between the two countries. If the Vietnamese authorities persist in their hostile attitude against China and continue to push the policy of expansionist nationalism and regional hegemonism, how can Sino-Vietnamese relations be normalized? The Chinese side has urged Viet Nam to stop its anti-China hostility and abandon its policy of expansionist nationalism and regional hegemonism, and it has justly called on Viet Nam to withdraw its troops from Kampuchea, but the Vietnamese side described this just Chinese position as "setting preconditions for the negotiations." This is a sheer distortion of facts.

Han Nianlong also advised the Vietnamese side not to use the Sino-Vietnamese negotiations and its three-point proposal as a camouflage for its acts of aggression and expansion aimed at stamping out the armed resistance of the Kampuchean army and people to defend their motherland against Vietnamese aggression, tightening its all-round control in Laos and setting up an "Indochinese federation."

The Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister pointed out that outside the conference room the Vietnamese authorities were whipping up an anti-China hysteria, aggravating tensions along the border and poisoning the atmosphere of the negotiations. From March 17 to early May, there have been nearly 400 cases of Vietnamese armed provocations and incursions resulting in dozens of casualties among Chinese frontier guards and border inhabitants. More than 20,000 Vietnamese citizens and Chinese nationals were driven by the Vietnamese authorities into China in April alone. Meanwhile, the Vietnamese authorities are continuing their massive anti-China campaign, and an anti-China war atmosphere prevails throughout Viet Nam. That the Vietnamese side should keep on stressing in these circumstances the "urgency" of the first point in its three-point proposal and insisting that this be made the first item on the agenda cannot but make people doubt its real motives.
It was because of Soviet backing that the Vietnamese authorities had the audacity to play tricks during the negotiations. The first round of Sino-Vietnamese negotiations has now come to an end and the next round will be held in Beijing. In the coming negotiations, the Chinese side will, as always, continue to take the principled stand of solving disputes between the two countries through peaceful negotiations and, looking to the future, forget old grievances and do its level best to achieve satisfactory progress in the negotiations.

China Releases First Group Of Captured Vietnamese Armed Personnel

On May 21 China released 120 wounded or sick Vietnamese armed personnel who had been captured in China's self-defensive counterattack.

Delegations of the Chinese and Vietnamese Red Cross Societies met and went through the formalities at the Zero Kilometre Mark on the road from Youyiguan to Dong Dang.

During their custody in China, the Vietnamese armed personnel were given meticulous medical treatment by Chinese medical personnel and were well looked after. Upon their release, they repeatedly expressed their thanks to the Chinese medical personnel.

After releasing the captured Vietnamese armed personnel, the Chinese Red Cross Society delegation received 43 wounded or sick Chinese personnel released by the Vietnamese side. At the invitation of the Chinese Red Cross Society, Dominique Borel, representative of the Red Cross International Committee, witnessed the exchange of captured personnel.

Sino-U.S. Trade Agreement: A Significant Step

Following U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Michael Blumenthal's visit earlier this year, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Juanita Kreps' visit to China in May was to continue the talks on concrete problems of economy and trade between the two countries.

During her ten-day visit, a trade agreement between China and the United States was initialled. The two sides also signed agreements on the settlement of claims on assets, a question left unsettled for 30 years, and on holding trade exhibitions in each other's country. Departments of science and technology of the two countries signed protocols on co-operation in the atmospheric, marine and fishery science and technology, in metrology and standards, and in technological management and technological information. Related departments from both sides had fruitful talks on navigation and aviation in preparation for the finalization of agreements, while the managements of enterprises from both countries also started beneficial contacts.

The agreement on Sino-U.S. trade is the most important document concluded between the two countries during Juanita Kreps' visit. It is of special significance to the future development of Sino-U.S. economic and trade relations.

In his meeting with Secretary Kreps, Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping explicitly pointed out that, with the policy of self-reliance as the basis, China's policy of introducing capital and advanced technology and equipment from abroad would not be changed because of readjustments in its domestic economy. The reason was that this policy would help quicken China's pace of socialist modernization. He expressed the view that economic and trade relations between China and the United States would continue to develop.

During Secretary Kreps' stay in China, both sides reviewed the growth of Sino-U.S. trade in the last few years. The total volume of Sino-U.S. trade in 1978 was about 1,000 million U.S. dollars, three times the amount for 1977. It is estimated that this year's figure will double that of 1978. Both sides also gave serious consideration to the problems facing the expansion of economic and trade relations between them.

With the initialing of the trade agreement, one of the problems that must be quickly solved now is that of most-favoured-nation treatment. China is a developing country and should enjoy generalized preferential tariff treatment in trading with the United States. While Sino-U.S. trade has developed rapidly in recent years, China's trade deficit has
been increasing. Unless this situation is changed, it will not be possible to maintain the present rate of growth of Sino-U.S. trade. If the United States wants to expand trade with China, it must boost China's exports to the United States in order to increase China's ability to buy U.S. products. By settling the question of most-favoured-nation treatment, both China's exports to and imports from the United States will surely increase.

**Lawyers' Association Set Up**

A lawyers' association was set up recently in Beijing, with the noted jurist Professor Chen Shouyi as its chairman. Chen is head of the law department in Beijing University and a member of the legal commission of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.

Three or four legal advisory offices will be set up under the association, staffed by about a hundred full- or part-time lawyers. The overwhelming majority of the full-time legal advisers today are experienced lawyers who practised the law before 1956.

The main task of the lawyers' association is to guide the work of the legal advisory offices which will answer legal inquiries, draft legal papers on request, handle lawsuits, arrange for defence counsel in criminal cases and act as representatives in civil cases as well as cases involving foreign interests such as maritime accidents and foreign trade disputes.

A preparatory committee for the setting up of a lawyers' association and legal advisory offices was established back in 1956, and provisional regulations for the association were drafted and the concrete professional work of the lawyers was laid down in accordance with the Regulations for Lawyers promulgated by the former Ministry of Justice.

During the Cultural Revolution, however, the system of legal defence was abolished by Lin Biao and the "gang of four."

Now with the fall of these counter-revolutionaries, the Beijing Municipal Party Committee has decided to restore the system of legal defence and re-establish legal advisory offices in line with the provision in China's Constitution which says: "All cases in the people's courts are heard in public except those involving special circumstances as prescribed by law. The accused has the right to defence." Lawyers have recently appeared in courts to defend the accused in some criminal cases, and this practice is drawing increasing public attention.

**Slander Against Good People Censured**

Lianning Ribao, organ of the Lianning provincial Party committee, praised the leading comrades of Jinxian County for having properly handled a case of using the big-character poster to slander good people, thereby safeguarding the citizens' right of person, which is guaranteed by the Constitution.

Not long ago, a meeting of labour models was held in Jinxian County in the northeastern province of Liaoning. During the meeting, a big-character poster signed anonymously as "a section of the masses" appeared outside the meeting hall. It attacked one of the participants Dong Shuting, Party branch secretary of a rural production team, as a "despot" and listed 20 charges against him.

This Party branch secretary is known for his fine leadership and conscientious work over the years, and his production team has been cited as an advanced unit in the county.

To verify the charges, the county Party committee promptly carried out an investigation and found that some of them were sheer fabrications while others were shortcomings in Dong's methods of work which had been wilfully exaggerated. The man responsible
for this big-character poster was an accountant who had been dismissed from office because of corruption. Nursing feelings of revenge, he had written the poster with the help of a handful of supporters.

When everything was clear, the secretary of the county Party committee called members of the production team to a mass meeting in which he made known the results of the investigation and severely criticized the accountant and the others for their false accusations.

China’s Constitution provides that citizens have the right to write big-character posters. The Party and government stress that leading cadres should listen modestly to criticisms by the people, even though they do not wholly tally with the facts and strong language was used. But this does not mean that anyone with an axe to grind can vilify others at will and encroach upon other people’s rights. People writing slanderous big-character posters should be persuaded or prevented from doing so; if the false accusations were of a serious nature, legal sanctions should be taken against those concerned.

**Dovetailing Production With Market Demand**

Towards the end of last year many factories in Henan Province’s Kaifeng had to cut or stop production owing to stock-piling of unwanted products, resulting in heavy losses. Of the city’s 400 large factories, 110 were operating under capacity or stopped work altogether.

The main reason for this was that, in the past few years, some factories developed production in a blind way, turning out unwanted products. Others produced high-priced but bad-quality products due to poor technique. Still others failed to take necessary steps when there was a drop in demand.

To remedy the situation, leading industrial departments in Kaifeng have taken the following measures:

- Organizing factories which formerly turned out unwanted products to manufacture goods needed in construction and by the masses. For instance, the woodwork machines turned out by a factory had had no market for a long time. Later, subsidies were given to this factory to make the necessary changes to its machines so that they could produce steel window-frames for the construction units.

- Organizing factories operating under capacity to trial-produce new products. One example is the Kaifeng No. 2 Electrical Engineering Plant which turned out small motors and transformers. Last year it succeeded in trial-manufacturing refrigerators for scientific research departments. Since then the plant, with a long list of orders, has been operating at full capacity.

- Reverting to traditional products. Costumes and other stage properties for local operas produced in a Kaifeng factory used to enjoy a good name throughout Henan Province. In the years when traditional operas were banned, this factory was forced to produce other goods and it incurred losses every year. Now, with the reappearance of traditional operas on the stage, it has gained a new lease of life by reverting to traditional products.

- Restoring and expanding repair shops. Local industries were developed rashly in the past few years at the expense of repair shops, to the great inconvenience of ordinary consumers. Now, these services have been restored, and there are stores all over the city for repairing bicycles, clocks and watches, plastic products, radio and TV sets and typewriters.

China is a country with a planned economy. When there is imbalance in the economy, efforts are made to achieve balance again by readjusting production, instead of resorting to free competition among enterprises as is the case with capitalist countries, which often results in some enterprises going bankrupt and an increased number of unemployed. In China, enterprises which operate under capacity or have to stop production for the time being do not sack the workers. They always work out plans to restore and develop production under the guidance of the state plan.
The Third Movement to Emancipate the Mind

by Zhou Yang

Vice-President Zhou Yang of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences at a symposium held recently to mark the 60th anniversary of the May 4th Movement made a long report entitled “Three Great Movements to Emancipate the Mind.”

The first two parts of the report gave an account of the historic significance of the May 4th Movement of 1919 and the 1942 Rectification Movement in Yanan, both of which were aimed at emancipating the mind. The former initiated the dissemination of Marxism in China and paved the way for the founding of the Communist Party of China. The latter laid the ideological foundations for winning the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-45) and the people’s War of Liberation (1946-49). (See “Emancipate Our Minds and Blaze Our Own Road” published in our last issue.)

Below are excerpts from the third part of Zhou Yang’s report discussing the causes, the central task and the trends of development of the ongoing third movement to emancipate the mind. Subheads are ours.—Ed.

The current movement we are engaged in is a great movement aimed at emancipating the mind, the third of its kind in the contemporary history of the Chinese revolution. Its central task is, under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, to thoroughly destroy the contemporary blind faith created by Lin Biao and the “gang of four,” to break, without compromise, their religious, neo-obscurantist fetter that “every sentence is the truth,”* and to effect a close integration of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought with the new revolutionary practice of bringing about socialist modernization in this country.

Contemporary Blind Faith

The contemporary blind faith spread by Lin Biao and the “gang of four” is a reaction to the Yanan Rectification Movement which swept away the pernicious influence of the obscurantism propagated by the “Left” dogmatists over a period of many years and enabled our Party to establish its fine tradition of seeking truth from facts. This spirit of seeking truth from facts is the spirit of opposing blind faith, opposing the practice of blindly following others and ideological rigidity.

In retrospect, we went through the Yanan Rectification Movement of 1942, the War of Resistance Against Japan and the War of Liberation, achieved countrywide liberation, and carried out the basic completion of the socialist transformation of the ownership of the means of production in 1956 and the large-scale socialist construction in a matter of a dozen years or so. The revolutionary situation in our country developed rapidly and numerous were the new issues which surfaced and were solved continuously. We probably would have been unable to move an inch and would have got ourselves into an awful mess during the practice of revolution, but for the fact that the Yanan Rectification Movement had established the Party principle of “seeking truth from facts,” that we Communists have been able to make swift changes to meet changes in the situation, and

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that we have been emancipating our minds and seeking truth from facts instead of being ideologically rigid and sticking to what is written in books.

After the founding of the People's Republic, Comrade Mao Zedong had on many occasions repeatedly and profoundly expounded the importance of doing away with blind faith and emancipating the mind. But deplorably, this fine Party tradition was wantonly wrecked by Lin Biao and the "gang of four" with their ultra-Left slogans and their all-out advocacy for contemporary blind faith. They took advantage of Comrade Mao Zedong's high prestige inside the Party and among the people at large, of the rigid thinking of some of the comrades in our ranks, and of the naivete of some of the young people. They founded idolatry and completely negated the spirit of the Yenan Rectification Movement. This made it possible for such contemporary manifestations of blind faith as "every sentence is the truth" and "must be acted on accordingly" to become a vogue and poison the whole country.

This kind of blind faith was the major ideological weapon of Lin Biao and the "gang of four" in their attempt to usurp Party and state leadership. On the one hand, they used this to disguise themselves, to deceive the world and create the false impression that they were the ones who were "most loyal" to Chairman Mao. On the other hand, it was also used as a big stick to cudgel people and, as an instrument to build up their feudal autocracy, to cruelly persecute our cadres and people, especially the revolutionaries of the older generation upholding the Party's fine tradition, and to exercise "all-round dictatorship."

This blind faith created by Lin Biao and the "gang of four" at first succeeded in taking in a lot of people because they practised a "Left" line and put forward "Left" slogans. But, as the struggle grew progressively more profound, their true features were revealed bit by bit. After the Lin Biao clique was smashed, the "gang of four" could no longer continue to keep the lid on their own perversities. The whole weight of disastrous consequences for our country and nation brought about by the ultra-Left line that had been pushed for years by Lin Biao and the "gang of four" were fully felt, and the entire national economy was on the brink of collapse. Our great motherland, having entered the socialist stage, actually found itself once again poised on the edge between life and death. Wrecking the national economy also meant wrecking the material premise on which socialism is built.

In early 1975, in line with Comrade Mao Zedong's instructions, Comrade Zhou Enlai once again emphatically put forward before the Fourth National People's Congress the grand programme of the "four modernizations" so as to reverse this grave trend and lay a solid material foundation for the socialist system.

Modernization: A Focus of the Struggle

However, the contradiction between the Party and the "gang of four" became much more acute the moment the "four modernizations" programme was brought up. This was because the interests of the gang were completely in conflict with the aim of building a modern socialist society. Their despotic rule could survive only in a political environment without culture, science and socialist democracy, but steeped in backwardness, ignorance and slavishness. This explains why the "gang of four" regarded the "four modernizations" as a major menace threatening their very existence and, were so fearfully and bitterly against modernization. They resorted to every moth-eaten thing they had — feudal autocracy, sealing off the country from the outside world, and the obscurantist policy of destroying culture and education — to launch a full-scale counter-attack on the programme. For or against the
"four modernizations" became a focus of struggle between the Party and the "gang of four."

As the struggle meant either victory or defeat for the socialist cause and the existence or the extinction of the Chinese nation, it could not but arouse the deepest concern of every Chinese with revolutionary consciousness and a love for their country. After Comrade Zhou Enlai passed away in early 1976, the struggle reached flash point. A decisive battle was unavoidable. Through their so-called campaign to "criticize Deng Xiaoping and beat back the Right deviationist wind to reverse correct verdicts" and through continuing to use their contemporary blind faith, the "gang of four" tried their utmost to topple the revolutionaries of the older generation who, with Comrade Deng Xiaoping as the exponent, firmly advocated the "four modernizations." The gang suppressed revolutionary opinion and tried to extinguish the raging revolutionary flames that were about to destroy them. But, contrary to their expectations, the cadres and masses long educated by the Party already saw clearly what was right and what was wrong in the course of taking part in the struggle. The gang's modern incantations no longer worked.

On April 5 that year, the masses of people, even as they were paying tribute to the memory of the late Comrade Zhou Enlai whom they loved and held in high esteem, angrily hoisted the militant banner of denouncing the "gang of four." This mammoth mass movement at Tian An Men Square presaged the advent of another great movement to emancipate the mind in the history of our revolution. Though this revolutionary mass incident was suppressed by the "gang of four," the struggle against the gang nevertheless won a great victory under the leadership of the Party Central Committee headed by Comrade Hua Guofeng.

Movement Vigorously Unfolded

Over the past two years or so after the downfall of the "gang of four," through the struggle to expose and criticize Lin Biao's and the gang's criminal deeds, through many important Party and government meetings, especially through the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee held last December and the central working conference which preceded it, the Party Central Committee has been leading us in unfolding this movement to emancipate the mind with great vigour.

The Party Central Committee has worked out correct general policies for the movement and is providing it with correct leadership. Over the last two years and more, the Party Central Committee has time and again called on the whole Party and the whole people to understand Mao Zedong Thought as a scientific system in a comprehensive and accurate way, to do away with blind faith and emancipate the mind, to break down all the taboos placed by Lin Biao and the "gang of four," and to get rid of the pernicious ideological influence they had spread over the years. It also has urged comrades whose thinking is ossified or semi-ossified to correct their stand, keep abreast with the situation, abandon all outdated and obsolete ideas and habits, such as bureaucracy and the force of habit of small producers, and to study new situations and solve new issues and problems which have appeared in the new historical conditions. The Third Plenary Session has given a high appraisal to the discussions on practice being "the sole criterion for testing truth" and has earnestly cautioned the whole Party that "for a party, a country or a nation, if everything had to be done according to books and thinking became ossified, progress would become impossible, life itself would stop and the Party and country would perish."

The reason why the Party Central Committee has elevated the significance of emancipating the mind to such a high plane is because socialist modernization of our country is possible only when minds are emancipated. In line with the development of the situation both at home and abroad, the Third Plenary Session decided to shift the focus of the whole Party's work to socialist modernization, a turn of great historic significance. As revolutionaries, we
must see things in the light of this turn. The purpose of socialist modernization is to lay a solid material premiss for the socialist system. It is a great revolution of immense magnitude that promises profound changes and involves many heavy tasks. We are confronted with numerous “old, big and thorny problems” left by Lin Biao and the “gang of four.” We are also confronted with numerous new issues we are not familiar with. This makes it all the more necessary for us to firmly encourage people to emancipate their minds, study hard and be bold in creating. We must thoroughly get rid of such unwholesome things as cowardice and knuckling under to difficulties, ignorance and blindly following others, getting into a rut and conservatism, especially the pernicious influence of the contemporary blind faith spread by Lin Biao and the “gang of four.”

Oppose the Two Erroneous Tendencies

For this movement to emancipate the mind to proceed in a healthy way, we should firmly oppose two erroneous tendencies:

First is the erroneous tendency of failing to come out of the state of ossified thinking, or, even still being mentally fettered by the contemporary blind faith created by Lin Biao and the “gang of four,” and thus being unhappy with or opposing the strategic shift of the focus of the whole Party’s work. This wrong tendency, like the “Left” dogmatism of the past, treat bits and pieces from the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Chairman Mao as sacrosanct and dogmas. This tendency is opposed to emancipating the mind and doing away with blind faith and even regard the creative new principles and policies drawn up by our Party in the light of the new conditions as grave mistakes and regard it as a breaking away from Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. This “Left” erroneous tendency is inseparable from the influence of Lin Biao’s and the “gang of four’s” ultra-Left line and is the chief obstruction to our emancipating the mind and the main resistance to our socialist modernization.

The second erroneous tendency stems from the Right. In the name of “emancipating the mind,” it picks up tattered fragments of bourgeois jargon as new weapons to oppose Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, the revolutionary legal system and discipline, Party leadership and the socialist road. This is anything but emancipating the mind. People with this tendency have actually made themselves captives of the bourgeois ideology. They think they have become “emancipated” when they are actually captives! Isn’t it pitiable! This bourgeois, individualist ideological trend frequently merges with the anarchist trend of thought fanned up by Lin Biao and the “gang of four” and is extremely destructive.

Upholding the Four Basic Principles

Let there be no mistake that our movement to emancipate the mind does not mean giving up but adhering to the socialist road; it does not mean liquidating but upholding the dictatorship of the proletariat; it does not mean turning away from but upholding Party leadership; and it does not mean breaking away from Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought but upholding it. In other words, the reason why our Party stresses to such an extent the need to get rid of blind faith and emancipate the mind is that it desires to keep more closely to the socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, Party leadership and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought in the light of the new conditions in the new historical period. It is for the purpose of realizing better the grand programme of socialist modernization. There must be no vagueness and no wavering where this question of principle is concerned.

We must keep resolutely to the socialist road. On the one hand, we must present facts and reasons in our determined effort to repudiate those absurd assertions denying the superiority of the socialist system, and explain to the people of the whole country clearly why socialism alone can save China. On the other hand, we must be aware of the fact that socialism is still in the course of construction so there are many problems which we still cannot fully understand. Weren’t there people who, for a while, took the pseudo-socialism of everybody living in poverty as advertised by the “gang of four” under the ultra-Left cloak as genuine socialism? Weren’t there people once who considered the socialist principle “from each according to his ability, to each according to his work” as bourgeois and wanted to renounce it? It must be admitted that our understanding of socialism is rather inadequate. Socialism is still something new in human history. Beginning from the victory of the October Revolution, it has only a history of a little over 60 years, which is merely a moment in the development of history. Furthermore, socialism has met with many twists and turns in these years. Socialism as a system is itself ever changing and developing, with new conditions
and problems cropping up now and then that need to be continuously studied and summed up, reformed and readjusted. Moreover, it is impossible to work out answers beforehand to solve these new problems. All this demonstrates that socialism, to a large extent, is still something to be studied, explored and put into practice. In this case, the important thing is to overcome smug complacency and inertia. So let us broaden our vision, keep our minds alive, be good at discovering and accepting new things and, through a comparative study of the various forms of socialism, find out the best road to socialism.

Socialist modernization is a great revolution to fundamentally change our economic and technological backwardness. As it will to an enormous extent change the existing backward productive forces, it will inevitably also make corresponding, many-sided changes in the relations of production, in the superstructure and in the structure and form of management in economic undertakings and, accordingly, will inevitably change the minds of the people. Emancipating the mind is more than to meet the needs of socialist modernization, it is also the prerequisite to socialist modernization. Ideological changes have always preceded vast social changes.

**Restoring Fine Tradition**

In order to emancipate the mind, to “start up the machinery,” i.e., to make good use of the organs of thought, and to study new problems in a down-to-earth manner, it is necessary to completely rectify the wrong method of treating Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought as a ready-made formula to be applied randomly and it is also necessary to do away with the erroneous idea that all which is written in books must not be changed. The founder of Marxism had repeatedly warned in his lifetime against vulgarizing, oversimplifying and dogmatizing Marxism and to this end Marx personally declared that he was never that kind of “Marxist.”

Lin Biao and the “gang of four,” however, completely destroyed this fine tradition of Marxism. On the one hand, they split Mao Zedong Thought off from Marxism-Leninism and, on the other hand, tampered with Mao Zedong Thought and manufactured spurious thoughts of Mao Zedong at random, vulgarizing, oversimplifying and dogmatizing it to the point of endowing it magical qualities. Their adulteration of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought attained fantastic proportions. They wrecked our Party’s style of work, our style of study, our style of writing and the social values of our nation. The contemporary blind faith, neo-obscurantism and ultra-Left trend of thinking spread by Lin Biao and the “gang of four” are very harmful and their pernicious influence is rather extensive; we must never underestimate this. To make a clean sweep of this influence, it is imperative to unfold a large-scale movement to educate people in Marxist ideas.

This ideological education movement should be conducted according to the Party’s fine tradition.

One, there should be free discussions. Publicizing policies and doing scientific research are two different and yet interrelated things. The former must be done within the confines of policies decided on by the Party and Government, and there should be freedom in carrying on scientific and theoretical research. Nothing is tabooed in science. Scientific thinking must not take orders from the authorities and the question of the minority subordinating to the majority does not arise. Everyone should be allowed to speak out his mind and say what he wants to say and be ensured the freedom of bringing up questions and discussing them, the freedom to criticize and counter-criticize. We must encourage the spirit of boldly making explorations and creating new things.

Two, tests in practice should be respected. All theories and doctrines, including Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, can be enriched
and developed only through constant testing in practice. Where things are proved to be incompatible with the new conditions, or wrong in the process of practice, they should be corrected; new discoveries made in the course of practice should be accepted as amendments.

The policy of emancipating the mind is our Party’s consistent policy. It is a long-term policy, not a temporary expedient. To put it in a popular way as Comrade Mao Zedong had put it, it is the policy of “opening wide.” Its application in literature and art and science is the policy of “letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend.” Our Party has always advocated the policy of “opening wide” and has been opposed to the policy of “restricting.” As Comrade Mao Zedong said: “Two alternative methods of leading our country, or in other words two alternative policies, can be adopted — to ‘open wide’ or to ‘restrict.’ To ‘open wide’ means to let all people express their opinions freely, so that they dare to speak, dare to criticize and dare to debate; it means not being afraid of wrong views or anything poisonous; it means to encourage argument and criticism among people holding different views, allowing freedom both for criticism and for counter-criticism; it means not coercing people with wrong views into submission but convincing them by reasoning. To ‘restrict’ means to forbid people to air differing opinions and express wrong ideas, and to ‘finish them off with a single blow’ if they do so. That is the way to aggravate rather than to resolve contradictions. To ‘open wide,’ or to ‘restrict’? We must choose one or the other of these two policies. We choose the former, because it is the policy which will help to consolidate our country and develop our culture.” (Speech at the Chinese Communist Party’s National Conference on Propaganda Work, 1957.)

Right now, the tremendous task of socialist modernization calls on us to further emancipate our minds. As long as we keep to the socialist road, uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat, uphold Party leadership, uphold Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, and as long as we skilfully use the correct method to lead this movement to emancipate the mind, we can certainly triumph over all kinds of difficulties and dangers in our way and complete our great new Long March.

The Truth About the Sino-Vietnamese Boundary Question

Confounding right and wrong, the Vietnamese side recently alleged that China’s proposals for solving the Sino-Vietnamese boundary question and dividing the sea area in the Beibu Gulf (known internationally as Gulf of Tonkin) “contravened” the Sino-French boundary accords and that the Xisha Islands and Nansha Islands were Vietnamese territory. Who is the real violator of the Sino-French boundary accords? Who has provoked boundary and territorial disputes and even armed conflicts between China and Viet Nam? Who has practised expansionism? To help our readers understand the truth about these questions, we are publishing excerpts from the speech delivered on May 12 by Han Nianlong, Head of the Government Delegation of China, at the fourth plenary meeting of the Sino-Vietnamese negotiations at the vice-foreign minister level, and two commentaries by the Xinhua News Agency. — Ed.

Han Nianlong’s Speech

1. How Did the Boundary and Territorial Disputes Between China and Viet Nam Arise?

The boundary between China and Viet Nam is a determined boundary, delimited by the accords signed between the Chinese Qing Dynasty Government and the French Government during the period from 1885 to 1897 and jointly surveyed and indicated on the ground by boundary markers. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, the Sino-Vietnamese boundary line being clearly defined on the whole, there were no boundary disputes between the two sides. Only on a few sectors were there some differences of view left over from history waiting to be settled by the two sides.

The Government of the People’s Republic of China has always taken the position that
boundary questions left over from history should be settled in a fair and reasonable manner through friendly consultations in a spirit of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation, and that pending a negotiated settlement, the status quo on the border should be maintained and conflicts avoided. Acting on these principles, the Chinese Government worked out negotiated settlements of its boundary question and signed new boundary treaties with its neighbours—Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the People’s Republic of Mongolia.

Regarding the Sino-Vietnamese boundary question, the Central Committees of the Chinese and Vietnamese Parties exchanged letters in 1957-1958, in which the two sides agreed that the boundary line delimited by the Sino-French boundary accords should be respected, that the status quo of the border should be strictly maintained pending a negotiated settlement of the boundary question by the two Governments, and that the local authorities are not empowered to settle any questions of territorial ownership. Acting in line with the principles affirmed in the letters exchanged between the two Parties, the local authorities of the two countries in the border areas managed to deal satisfactorily with all kinds of issues that arose along the border. So the Sino-Vietnamese boundary was for many years a peaceful and friendly boundary.

In the two decades and more prior to 1974, the Chinese and Vietnamese sides respected each other’s territorial sea and sovereignty in the Beibu Gulf sea area. There was a relationship of friendly co-operation on such matters as shipping, fishery, scientific research and resistance to imperialist aggression, and no disputes occurred.

After 1974, however, the Vietnamese authorities made an about-turn in its position. Relying on their sharply increased military strength accumulated during the years of war and with the backing of Soviet social-imperialism, they went in for regional hegemonism in a big way and adopted a policy of aggression and expansion. They constantly created incidents and disputes along the border, nibbled at and encroached upon Chinese territory, and used the boundary question to whip up nationalist anti-China sentiment. Moreover, the Vietnamese authorities sought expansion on the sea and wanted to occupy the greater part of the sea area in the Beibu Gulf. Brazenly going back on their own word, they laid territorial claims to China’s Xisha and Nansha Islands and even sent forces to occupy some of China’s Nansha Islands.

That was how boundary and territorial disputes arose between the two countries.

2. Who Has Departed From the Principles Affirmed in the Letters Exchanged Between the Chinese and Vietnamese Parties?

In November 1956, representatives of China’s Guangdong and Guangxi Provinces met representatives of Viet Nam’s Hai Ninh, Lang Son and Cao Bang Provinces to discuss questions relating to border management. Their discussions touched on issues relating to the boundary. The two sides agreed to refer these to their respective central authorities for resolution. In November 1957, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Viet Nam Workers’ Party proposed, in a letter to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, that “the national border question, in view of its importance, must be settled in accordance with the existing legal principles or with new ones defined by the two Governments. Local authorities and organizations are strictly forbidden to enter into negotiations on setting up new boundary markers or on ceding territory to each other.” In April 1958, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party expressed its agreement to this view in a letter of reply. This meant that both sides would respect the boundary line delimited by the Sino-French boundary accords, that they would strictly maintain the status quo of the boundary pending a negotiated settlement of the boundary question by the two Governments, and that the local authorities were not empowered to settle questions pertaining to territorial ownership. These letters exchanged between the Chinese and Vietnamese Parties constitute the common basis for dealing with boundary issues prior to a negotiated settlement of the boundary question. The Chinese Government has faithfully adhered to the principles affirmed in the letters exchanged between the two Parties and has respected the boundary line delimited in the Sino-French boundary accords. In the few sectors where there were issues left over from history, the Chinese Government has strictly kept to the jurisdiction along the border prevailing at the time of the exchange of letters, that is to say, in the early days following the liberation of China. We made no attempt to change the state of jurisdiction even in those areas which clearly belonged to China according to the provisions of the Sino-French boundary
accords but which had been under Vietnamese jurisdiction for many years. In so doing, we proceeded entirely in the spirit of the agreement between the two Parties, namely, to maintain peace and tranquility along the border. This does not mean that during future boundary negotiations, ownership over such disputed areas will be decided in accordance with the line of actual jurisdiction. The Chinese side holds that if it is ascertained in future negotiations that certain areas under the jurisdiction of one side are situated beyond the boundary line delimited in the Sino-French boundary accords, these should, in principle, be returned to the other side unconditionally. The Vietnamese side is well aware of the above Chinese position, for it was stated explicitly on many occasions in our official documents and in the statements of Chinese leaders.

After 1974, in order to nibble at Chinese territory, the Vietnamese authorities, while expressing willingness to respect the letters exchanged between the two Parties, vigorously denied the principle of maintaining the status quo on the border affirmed by that exchange of letters and tried to negate the boundary line delimited by the Sino-French boundary accords. For this purpose, they produced specious arguments, at one time claiming that “a historical frontier has existed between Viet Nam and China for a long time,” then that “the two sides have agreed to respect the historical boundary line,” and calling for “maintaining the status quo on the borderline left by history” or “restoring the status quo of the historical line,” and so on and so forth. When you speak now of this line and then of that, what you are really after is to supplant the boundary delimited in the Sino-French boundary accords by your unilateral “historical borderline.”

Numerous indisputable facts prove that it is none other than the Vietnamese authorities themselves who have violated the principles affirmed in the letters exchanged between the two Parties and have constantly upset the status quo on the border in an attempt to alter the boundary line fixed by the Sino-French boundary accords. The serious deterioration in the situation along the Sino-Vietnamese border is wholly the making of the Vietnamese authorities.

3. Why Did the Previous Two Rounds of Negotiations Fail to Yield Results?

In August 1974, negotiations were held between China and Viet Nam at the vice-foreign minister level on the division of the Beibu Gulf sea area. In October 1977, negotiations at the same level were again held between the two sides on the boundary question and the division of the Beibu Gulf sea area. No results were achieved at either round of negotiations, mainly because the Vietnamese side disregarded the historical facts, distorted the Sino-French boundary accords and tried to impose on the Chinese side a so-called “sea boundary line in the Beibu Gulf,” which was a pure figment of its imagination.

Back in December 1973, a Vietnamese Vice-Foreign Minister clearly stated that “the Beibu Gulf sea area has not been divided between the two countries because Viet Nam has been at war all the time.” But when negotiations started in August 1974, the Vietnamese side suddenly asserted that in the Beibu Gulf “the boundary line was delimited long ago,” alleging that the 1887 Sino-French Convention on the Delimitation of the Frontier Between China and Tonkin made longitude 108 degrees 3 minutes 13 seconds E the “sea boundary line” between the two countries in the Beibu Gulf. It asserted that for the last century all governments of the two countries had “exercised sovereignty and jurisdiction” according to this line and that the Beibu Gulf was a “historical gulf” belonging to China and Viet Nam. By making these assertions, the Vietnamese side aimed at taking possession of two-thirds of the Beibu Gulf sea area for itself.

It is stipulated in the paragraph about Guangdong in the Chinese text of the 1887 Sino-French convention that “as for the islands in the sea, those to the east of the southward red line drawn by the commissioners of two countries, passing through the hill at the east tip of Tra-Co (Wanzhu in Chinese, which is to the south of Mong Ca and southwest of Zhu-shan), belong to China, and those to its west, Jiutoushan Island (Co To Island in Vietnamese) and the other islands, belong to Annam.” The French text of the convention describes the red line as the meridian of Paris 105 degrees 43 minutes of east longitude, which is Greenwich longitude 108 degrees 3 minutes 13 seconds E. Clearly, this red line only indicates the ownership of the islands but is no “sea boundary line” between the two countries in the Beibu Gulf. Moreover, the term “Gulf of Tonkin” does not occur at all in the convention, nor is the Gulf of Tonkin included in its entirety in the map attached to the convention. Furthermore, in the historical circumstances at the signing of the convention in the late 19th century, when the
"doctrine of the freedom of the seas" was in vogue, it was inconceivable that China and France should regard such an expanse of the high seas as the Gulf of Tonkin as an inland sea and divide it. The Vietnamese side's fantastic interpretation of the convention in disregard of its terms and the actualities of history is indeed a rare case in the history of international relations.

As for the Vietnamese side's assertion that for nearly a hundred years the governments of the two countries have always exercised their sovereignty and jurisdiction in accordance with the above-mentioned longitude, it is not at all based on facts. Everyone knows that the previous governments in China and the French colonial authorities observed the three-nautical-mile principle in regard to the territorial sea. The Government of the People's Republic of China declared a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea in September 1958. China has never exercised sovereignty over or jurisdiction in the Beibu Gulf sea area beyond its territorial sea. In September 1964, the Vietnamese Government also declared its territorial sea to be 12 nautical miles wide and published a map showing its territorial sea boundary in the Beibu Gulf. If, as the Vietnamese side claims, the vast sea area in the Beibu Gulf west of 108 degrees 3 minutes 13 seconds E was its inland sea long ago, why did it draw another territorial sea boundary within its own inland sea? The Vietnamese assertion is absurd from the viewpoint of international law and is illogical and self-contradictory. Has any ship had to ask for permission from the Vietnamese authorities for entry into the sea west of 108 degrees 3 minutes 13 seconds E? The "sea boundary line," a brain-child of the Vietnamese authorities, has never existed either in historical agreements or in reality. As for the assertion that the Beibu Gulf is "a historical gulf" belonging to China and Viet Nam, it is really news to us. We have no knowledge at all about such a declaration by previous governments of the two countries at any time. Vietnamese insistence on this unreasonable proposition prevented any results in the negotiations, which went on for three months in vain. The division of the Beibu Gulf sea area between the two countries is still an unresolved issue.

After 1975, the Chinese side proposed on many occasions to hold negotiations on the boundary question, but the Vietnamese side always found excuses to put them off until June 1977 when it reluctantly agreed as Vice-Premier Li Xiannian personally made the proposal in a meeting with Premier Pham Van Dong. It was agreed that the division of the Beibu Gulf sea area be included as a topic in the boundary negotiations.

Negotiations started in Beijing in October 1977. The Chinese delegation suggested that the boundary question should be the first item for discussion and put forward a proposal consisting of five principles for the settlement of the boundary question. The following are the main points:

- Since the Sino-Vietnamese boundary is a determined boundary, the two sides should base themselves on the Sino-French boundary accords in rechecking the alignment of the entire boundary and settling all boundary and territorial disputes;
- areas under the jurisdiction of one side which lie beyond the boundary line should, in principle, be returned to the other side unconditionally;
- the two sides should settle through friendly consultations any differences they may have as to the alignment of the boundary line in certain sectors;
- the two sides should then conclude a Sino-Vietnamese boundary treaty to replace the Sino-French boundary accords, and delimit the national boundary and erect the boundary markers anew.

The Vietnamese side did not show interest in the fair and reasonable Chinese proposals. It clung to the unreasonable view that the sea boundary in the Beibu Gulf "was delimited long ago," and linked the question of dividing the Beibu Gulf with the boundary question. Insisting that "a borderline between Viet Nam and China on land and in the Bac Bo Gulf has been delimited" in the Sino-French boundary accords, it claimed that "this is the most basic principle for the settlement of all kinds of boundary questions between the two countries"; since it was the "basis" for the entire negotiations, it must be discussed first. This was tantamount to raising a precondition which placed a great obstacle in the way of the negotiations. Although the Vietnamese side later agreed that the two sides should first discuss questions relating to the boundary, it played a new trick by submitting a "draft agreement on the national land border," insisting that the two Governments shelve their boundary disputes and first conclude an official boundary agreement. Obviously, the Vietnamese side harboured
ulterior motives when it showed no interest in settling boundary disputes and easing the tension along the border while wanting first of all to conclude "a boundary agreement."

Desiring to facilitate the negotiations, the Chinese side gave full consideration to the Vietnamese views and, working on the basis of its original five-point proposal, presented for consultations with the Vietnamese side a comprehensive proposal listing nine principles for the settlement of the boundary question. The nine-point Chinese proposal provided in the main the following:

The two sides check the alignment of the entire boundary line between China and Viet Nam, basing themselves on the documents with attached maps relating to the delimitation of the boundary concluded by the then Chinese and French governments and on the boundary markers erected according to these documents and maps. To facilitate the work of checking the alignment of the boundary, the two sides should exchange maps showing the boundary line between the two countries. During the process of checking the boundary alignment, if the two sides did not agree on the alignment of the boundary line in certain sectors, they should seek a fair and reasonable settlement through friendly consultations in a spirit of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. After a joint check, the areas either side administers beyond the boundary should, in principle, be returned to the other side unconditionally; with due attention to the interests of the local inhabitants, readjustments on a fair and reasonable basis may be made in a small number of cases where both sides agree. Where the boundary follows rivers, it shall follow the central line of the main channel in the case of navigable rivers and the thalweg of the main channel in the case of unnavigable rivers; the ownership of the islands and sandbars in these rivers shall be determined accordingly. After checking the alignment of the entire boundary and settling the boundary and territorial disputes, the two sides shall conclude a Sino-Vietnamese boundary treaty, set up a joint commission for delimiting the boundary on the ground and erecting boundary markers, sign a boundary protocol and draw up maps of the boundary. Pending the coming into force of the Sino-Vietnamese boundary treaty, the two sides shall respect the principles affirmed in the letters exchanged between the Central Committees of the Chinese and Vietnamese Parties in 1957-1958, maintain the status quo of the border and make no unilateral attempts in whatever form and on whatever pretext to change the extent of actual jurisdiction so as to maintain tranquillity along the border and the friendly and good-neighbourly relations between the two countries.

To our surprise, however, the Vietnamese side deliberately distorted this sincere and reasonable Chinese proposal, picked faults with it and levelled the groundless charge that it sought to "alter the historical boundary line." The negotiations lasted more than ten months, yet in all that time the two sides failed even to reach agreement on the procedure for conducting negotiations on the boundary question.

The above facts clearly show that the responsibility for the failure of the previous two rounds of negotiations to yield results rests squarely with the Vietnamese side. Frankly speaking, the basic reason why there has not been a negotiated settlement of the Sino-Vietnamese boundary question is that the Vietnamese authorities want to use this question as a means internally to fan up nationalistic anti-China sentiments and divert the discontent of their people and, externally, to cover up their aggression in Kampuchea and control over Laos in pursuit of regional hegemonism to suit the needs of the Soviet southward drive strategy. We cannot but point out that you are following a dangerous course.


The eight-point proposal on the handling of the relations between China and Viet Nam, which the Chinese Government Delegation put forward at the second plenary meeting, has laid a solid foundation for a fundamental solution of the disputes between the two countries and for a real improvement in their bilateral relations.
Moreover, it provides guiding principles for a definitive solution of the boundary and territorial disputes between the two countries. A fair and reasonable solution of the boundary question can be achieved only by honouring the Sino-Vietnamese boundary delimited in the Sino-French boundary accords. Otherwise, there will be no common basis for a solution. Prior to the holding of negotiations on the boundary question by the two Governments, border disputes could have been avoided and armed conflict averted if the Vietnamese side had respected the principles affirmed in the letters exchanged between the Central Committees of the Chinese and Vietnamese Parties in 1957-1958, namely, maintaining the status quo of the border and refraining from attempting forcibly to change the extent of actual jurisdiction. The Chinese proposal includes fundamental measures to eliminate tension and ensure peace and tranquillity along the border. The Vietnamese side professes to be most concerned about ensuring peace and stability in the border areas, but in practice rejects the basic principle of "maintaining the status quo on the border." This fully shows that the Vietnamese side is aware of its untenable position and has ulterior motives. As to the division of the sea area in the Beibu Gulf, it is natural and indisputable that the two countries should define their respective economic zones and continental shelf in the Beibu Gulf in a fair and reasonable way in accordance with relevant principles of present-day international law of the sea. As regards the Xisha and Nansha Islands, I have already cited many hard facts to show that the Vietnamese side had before 1974 explicitly recognized the Chinese Government’s sovereignty over these two island groups. Our demand is that the Vietnamese side revert to its previous position of recognizing this fact and respect China’s sovereignty over these two island groups and withdraw all its personnel from those islands in the Nansha Group which it has occupied. In what sense can this demand be considered “unreasonable and peremptory”? It is the Vietnamese side that is unreasonable and peremptory when it shifts positions in a perfidious manner with a view to seizing and occupying China’s islands and laying claim to China’s territory. In a word, China’s eight-point proposal is directed at the root cause leading to the deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations and made in the light of the facts of the disputes between the two countries. It is a fundamental solution to these disputes and sets forth basic principles for handling the relations between the two countries. It is reasonable and practicable. We still earnestly hope that the Vietnamese side will give it careful study and make a positive response so that there may be progress in our negotiations.

How Did the Sino-Vietnamese Border Dispute Come About?

The Vietnamese authorities are raising a hue and cry about the alleged presence of Chinese troops on Vietnamese territory and demanding their withdrawal to the Chinese side of "the historical border-line which the two sides have agreed to respect." In fact, the so-called "historical border-line which the two sides have agreed to respect" is a "border-line" the Vietnamese authorities have themselves invented, and one which they have repeatedly changed with every step they took to nibble at Chinese territory.

What is the history of the delimitation of the Sino-Vietnamese border-line? How did the Sino-Vietnamese border dispute arise?

Peaceful Border

In the 20-odd years following the establishment of diplomatic relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, no major boundary dispute occurred between the two countries because:

First, the Sino-Vietnamese boundary line, 1,347 kilometres long, was jointly surveyed and delimited with markers set up in accordance with the boundary agreement officially signed over 90 years ago between the Qing Dynasty Chinese Government and the then ruling French government in Viet Nam. Though China did not suffer defeat in its war of resistance against French aggression in 1885, the Qing Dynasty Government accepted France’s humiliating conditions and signed an unequal treaty — the "Sino-French Tianjin treaty." In accordance with this treaty the two countries clearly delimited the Sino-Vietnamese boundary line in the years from 1886 to 1897. They concluded, in 1887, the Sino-French Convention on the Delimitation of the Frontier, and signed, in 1895, the Supplement to the Sino-French Convention on the Delimitation of the Frontier. More than 300 boundary markers were erected along the border by the two sides.

When dealing with the history of the said period in its memorandum on the Sino-Viet-
namese boundary issue on March 15 this year, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry, bent on pursuing a course for territorial expansion, asserted that the Government of the Qing Dynasty strove to "bring pressure to bear on France" and France "thus conceded to the Qing Dynasty" a number of places "to the detriment of the Vietnamese people." Such an allegation is not true to historical facts. How could the Qing Dynasty Government, corrupt and submissive to foreign powers as it was, "bring pressure to bear on France" and make the latter "concede" land?

Second, after the revolution triumphed in China and Viet Nam, both sides expressed their willingness to respect the existing boundary line. Although the two sides had different views on certain sections of the boundary line, the disputed area was not large and the question would not be difficult to settle.

In 1957-58 the Central Committees of the Chinese and Vietnamese Parties exchanged letters expressing willingness to respect the Sino-Vietnamese boundary line as defined in the Sino-French boundary accords, and affirming the principle that the status quo of the border would be maintained and the boundary question be settled by the two Governments, with the local authorities having no power to do so.

Third, the Sino-Vietnamese boundary was for years one where friendship prevailed. Before liberation, the revolutionaries of both countries respectively carried out their activities in the Chinese and Vietnamese border areas. After liberation, the border inhabitants and border guards of the two countries lived in amity and helped each other, and through friendly negotiations, the local authorities of the border areas reached agreements on problems of border security, border control, trade, economic construction, and contacts among border residents. They also settled a number of disputes between border inhabitants. The relations in the border areas, like those between the two countries, were amicable and co-operative.

The Vietnamese authorities, in their attempt to stir up anti-China feelings, are trying to tamper with history and write off the cooperative relations between the two countries.

**Situation Has Changed**

After the 1973 armistice in Viet Nam, and especially since 1974, noticeable changes have taken place on the Sino-Vietnamese boundary. The Vietnamese leaders have decided that since the war has ceased "it is no longer so vital" for them to follow the policy of friendship towards China, and they openly asserted that in dealing with China, "we have begun more and more to lean towards the U.S.S.R." They also maintained that the Sino-French boundary agreements "are now too old and cumbersome to give guidance in defining the frontier" (according to Hoang Tung, Member of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party). On a number of occasions, they expressed in high-sounding phrases their respect for the Sino-French boundary agreements, but in practice they actually went back on their word, and stirred up disputes over the Sino-Vietnamese boundary.

From that time on the Vietnamese authorities have arbitrarily redefined the boundary alignment. They claimed now this particular plot of land, now that one. After a "boundary investigation" the Vietnamese authorities made territorial claims on 13 places in the Wenshan area, Yunnan Province.

They have occupied land by force and unilaterally sought to alter the status quo along the boundary.

The Shuining area in Napo County, Guangxi, had been recognized as Chinese territory by the French colonialists. Armed Vietnamese security men repeatedly forced their way into the Shuining Primary School and smashed the equipment, proclaiming that it was on Vietnamese territory. They also attempted to lower the national flag of China in front of the school and fiercely demanded that Chinese residents get out.

The Vietnamese authorities repeatedly sent armed security men into a number of areas including Puyingding, near Youyiguan in Guangxi, where the peoples of the two countries were in frequent contact.

They harassed the normal work and production activities of local Chinese inhabitants. They occupied these areas by force. The Vietnamese authorities think that the Sino-Vietnamese border should be delimited as they unilaterally claim, regardless of what the Chinese side has to say.

In 1975 when the Chinese and Vietnamese sides agreed to lay an oil pipeline as part of Chinese aid to Viet Nam near border marker No. 23 on the east sector of the border-line with
Viet Nam in Guangxi, the Vietnamese side arbitrarily changed the boundary line there and claimed a piece of Chinese territory. They sent engineering units to penetrate deeper into this part of Chinese territory to build reinforced concrete constructions and demanded that the Chinese fix the site for linking up the pipeline on the line unilaterally claimed by them as the boundary and refused to carry out this work on the site already agreed upon by the two sides. The Vietnamese authorities now falsely charge that China refused to link up the pipeline on the so-called boundary line, and blame China for “giving up the project.”

The Vietnamese authorities have tried on various pretexts to alter those sectors of the boundary which they had formerly recognized. In 1974 they said that during the joint reconstruction of the Hanoi-Youyugian railway in 1954, “due to misunderstanding, the railway workers did not place the joint points of the railway track of the two countries correctly on the border-line left over by history, but they placed them over 300 metres inside Vietnamese territory.” This is a fabricated pretext for the annexation of Chinese territory. It was of course rejected by the Chinese side.

On several subsequent occasions, the Vietnamese authorities sent armed personnel across the joint points into Chinese territory, forcefully interrupted the normal work of the Chinese railway workers and resorted to large-scale violence against them. They provoked a series of incidents which forcibly obstructed railway construction work on the Chinese side of the border. In one incident on May 4 in 1977, they sent over 500 troops and wounded 51 Chinese workers, six of them seriously.

When trying to occupy Chinese territory, the Vietnamese side resorts to all kinds of trickery. Once, when they found a broken boundary marker, they furtively moved it into Chinese territory in the Nongxin area of Jingxi County in Guangxi, and then took photos of it. Later, under the excuse of examining boundary markers, hundreds of armed Vietnamese personnel were sent into the area in an attempt to bite off more Chinese territory with the help of the removed marker.

Xiaobazi commune is in Maguan County, Yunnan, separated from Viet Nam by a strip of water. On the Chinese side of the main channel there are three small islands — Chinese territory since ancient times. The Vietnamese authorities constructed a dam in the upper reaches of the river, causing 90 per cent of the water flow to run between the Chinese river bank and the small islands, thus changing the course of the main channel. The local Chinese inhabitants protested but Vietnamese armed personnel drove them away with gunfire and occupied the three islands by force.

Since 1978, when the Vietnamese authorities started to whip up an anti-China and anti-Chinese campaign and force Chinese residents to move out en masse, the Sino-Vietnamese border has become the scene of many incidents, a scene of constant Vietnamese armed provocation.

The Vietnamese authorities have sent large numbers of security personnel, militia and regular armed forces to nibble at China’s territory. They erected fortifications, dug trenches and bunkers, planted bamboo spikes and laid mines in Chinese territory. Vietnamese armed personnel used machineguns, sub-machineguns, rifles, mortars and rockets to fire at the Chinese border regions, sometimes for over a dozen hours at a stretch. Houses, schools, hospitals, kindergartens and farm buildings in Chinese villages in the border areas are pitted with bullet holes. Some are seriously damaged. Women washing clothes on river banks, children on their way to school, and commune members working in the fields were their targets. Chinese trains running near the border-line were subjected to constant attacks by gunfire from across the Vietnamese side of the border. In the first six weeks of this year, more than 100 Chinese civilians and frontier guards were killed, many Chinese residents in the border area were unable to reap their crops, their children could not go to school. They were compelled to leave their homes to live in mountain caves.

The Vietnamese authorities have made the following number of attacks on the Chinese border: 1974 — 121; 1975 — 439; 1976 — 988; 1977 — 752; 1978 — 1,108; 1979 (up to February 16) — 129.

From these figures, it is clear that the more energetic the Vietnamese authorities became in their opposition to China, the more frequent the border incidents and the tenser the border situation.

China Wants Negotiations, Not War

In these years, the Chinese Government has all along made efforts to try to settle the Sino-
Vietnamese boundary issue in a fundamental way through negotiations. Following the Sino-Vietnamese negotiations on the division of the waters of Beibu Gulf in 1974, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China took the initiative on March 18, 1975 in proposing talks between the two countries to resolve the boundary dispute. Meanwhile, it proposed that, pending the settlement of the boundary question, both sides should strictly maintain the status quo of the boundary and take effective measures to prevent the recurrence of disputes and conflicts. Since then, China has many times urged, through diplomatic channels, the Vietnamese Government to respond to this proposal.

The Vietnamese side reluctantly acceded to this proposal in June 1977 when Chinese Vice-Premier Li Xiannian renewed it at a meeting with Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong. Boundary negotiations between the two countries at a vice-ministerial level were held at long last in Beijing in October 1977. But the Vietnamese side, lacking sincerity at the very beginning, brought up side issues by confusing the question of division of the Beibu Gulf with the boundary question. It wanted in this way to impose on China its imaginary “sea boundary line on the Beibu Gulf,” which runs so close to China's Hainan Island that it incorporates two-thirds of the sea area of the Beibu Gulf into Vietnamese territory. Following a stern refutation by the Chinese side, the Vietnamese side was compelled to agree to shelve the Beibu Gulf question. But it played another trick by dishing up a “draft boundary agreement” instead of first discussing the principles governing the boundary question. It insisted on signing an official boundary agreement based on its own draft, which would solve no practical problems. In the summer of 1978 it suspended the negotiations under the pretext that its representatives were “too busy” to negotiate.

In the course of the representations being made between the two sides, the Vietnamese side insisted on its absurd contention that there has never been a disputable area on the border between the two countries except the problem of “restoring the status quo ante of the historical border-line.” It means that all its territorial claims on China are just and indisputable. It also means that when the Vietnamese side accused the Chinese side of “intruding into Vietnamese territories,” or “altering the historical borderline,” China must “restore” it at once without the right to defend itself. This was a downright attempt to forcibly impose its territorial demands on the other side. There was not an iota of sincerity for negotiations. Recently, the Vietnamese side has continued its line by arrogantly demanding that Chinese troops withdraw to the Chinese side of “the historical border-line which the two sides have agreed to respect.” In fact, it wants the Chinese frontier troops to withdraw to the Chinese side of the so-called “border-line” created by Viet Nam at will. This unreasonable act, which tramples upon the norms of international relations, is rarely seen in the history of modern international relations.

It is clear from the above factual report that there had been no serious problems regarding the Sino-Vietnamese border—a border of peace and friendship—before the end of the Viet Nam war. However, the Vietnamese authorities decided afterwards that they were no longer so much in need of China’s friendship, support and assistance and that it was their pressing need now to solicit the support of the Soviet superpower so as to realize their dream of establishing an “Indochina federation.” Consequently, they began to adopt an anti-China and anti-Chinese policy. They fanned up nationalistic sentiment, fabricated lies against China on the boundary issue, and engaged in anti-China activities in a big way.

Since there are boundary disputes between China and Viet Nam, there is every reason for
the two sides to negotiate on an equal footing to settle the boundary problem. In the proposal put forward by the Chinese side on April 27 on the principles for handling the relations between China and Viet Nam, the third point is that the Sino-French boundary accords shall serve as the basis for a negotiated settlement of the boundary and territorial disputes between China and Viet Nam. Pending a settlement of the boundary question, each side shall strictly maintain the status quo of the boundary at the time when the Central Committees of the Chinese and Vietnamese Parties exchanged letters in 1957-58. Out of their policy requirements both at home and abroad, the Vietnamese authorities resorted to armed force on the border and committed military provocations and intrusions against China. They were treading a perilous path to alter the boundary line by force of arms. We hope the Vietnamese side will draw lessons from this, give up its militarist policy, stop its tricks and machinations, and work earnestly and sincerely for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Vietnamese boundary problem through negotiations.

(Xinhua Commentary, May 13)

Xisha and Nansha Islands Belong to China

The Vietnamese Government Delegation to the Sino-Vietnamese negotiations and the mass media in Hanoi have recently concentrated their anti-China propaganda on China's suggestion concerning the Nansha and Xisha Islands contained in its eight-point proposal for handling Sino-Vietnamese relations.

They accused China of being "extremely unreasonable and peremptory" and "arrogantly asking Viet Nam to give up sovereignty over its own territory" when China demanded that Viet Nam respect China's sovereignty over the Nansha and Xisha Islands and withdraw all its personnel from those Nansha Islands which it occupies. Are there any grounds for this accusation? Let facts speak for themselves.

China's Territory

Formerly there was no dispute between China and Viet Nam over the jurisdiction of these islands. However, as the Vietnamese war of resistance against the United States was ending, the Vietnamese authorities, counting on the strength of their huge army and their formidable arsenal, became more ambitious of territorial expansion. In 1974, after China drove the south Vietnamese puppet troops out of its Xisha Islands, the Vietnamese authorities claimed the islands when they asserted that "territorial and border disputes between neighbouring countries should be studied carefully and thoroughly." In April of the following year, they flagrantly dispatched troops to invade six islands in China's Nansha Island Group. Since then, they have indulged in propaganda both inside and outside the country, alleging that the Xisha and Nansha Islands are Vietnamese territory. They have even altered maps to incorporate the islands into Viet Nam.

By claiming that the "Hoang Sa" and "Truong Sa" Islands (China's Xisha and Nansha Islands) are "Vietnamese territory" and that "the map...is verified by the history of the past several thousand years," the Vietnamese authorities are simply ignoring historical realities.

A host of historical records and cultural relics unearthed in modern China give ample proof that the Xisha and Nansha Islands have been part of China's territory since ancient times. Books published in Britain, Japan and France also cite ancient facts about the life and work of Chinese labouring people on these archipelagoes and their efforts to develop them. Viet Nam's historical records, too, confirm that these islands belong to China, not Viet Nam.

Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese Government has issued statements, affirming China's sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea. On August 15, 1951, Zhou Enlai, the then Chinese Foreign Minister, declared in his statement on the U.S.-British draft peace treaty with Japan and the San Francisco Conference that the islands in the South China Sea, including the Xisha and Nansha Islands, "have always been China's territory. Although they were occupied by Japan for some time during the war of aggression waged by Japanese imperialism, they were all taken over by the then Chinese Government following Japan's surrender."

The Chinese Government made statements in 1956, 1958, 1959, 1974 and on many occasions in recent years, reiterating China's full and
legitimate sovereignty over the Xisha and Nansha Islands.

China's above-mentioned stand has won respect and recognition from most of the countries in the world. At the San Francisco Conference in 1951, the then Soviet representative Gromyko (now foreign minister) proposed that the restoration of the Xisha, Nansha and other islands to China should be written into the peace treaty with Japan. He said, "it is indisputable that the age-old territories of China, such as the island of Taiwan, Pescadores [Penghu Islands], Paracel Islands [Xisha Islands] and other Chinese territories severed from her should be restored to the People's Republic of China.” For several decades prior to the Vietnamese claim to these islands, all the official world atlases and encyclopedias published by the Soviet Union designated the Xisha and Nansha Islands as China's territories. So did books and maps in other parts of the world, including atlases and encyclopedias published in the 60s and the 70s in France, West Germany, Japan, the United States and the countries in Eastern Europe.

Viet Nam's Original Position

From the founding of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam until 1974, Viet Nam time and again recognized China's sovereignty over the Xisha and Nansha Islands in its notes, statements and confidential documents as well as in its publications, textbooks and official maps, and in the speeches of its leaders.

On June 15, 1956, a Vietnamese Vice-Foreign Minister formally said to the Chinese side that “from a historical point of view, these islands are Chinese territory.”

On September 4, 1958, the Chinese Government issued a declaration on China's territorial sea in which it clearly stated that the territory of the People's Republic of China "includes the Chinese mainland and its coastal islands, as well as Taiwan and its surrounding islands, the Penghu Islands, the Dongsha Islands, the Xisha
Islands, the Zhongsha Islands, the Nansha Islands..." On September 14 of the same year, Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong made it clear in his note to Premier Zhou Enlai that "the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam recognizes and supports the declaration of the People's Republic of China on China's territorial sea made on September 4, 1958" and that "Viet Nam respects this decision." At that time, the Vietnamese paper Nhan Dan also gave detailed reports on the declaration of the Chinese Government and expressed support for it in a commentary.

In a statement of May 9, 1965 on the U.S. President's designation of the "combat zone" of the U.S. armed forces in Viet Nam, the Vietnamese Government recognized the Xisha Islands as belonging to China. The statement said: "U.S. President Lyndon Johnson designated the whole of Viet Nam, and the adjacent waters which extend roughly 100 nautical miles from the coast of Viet Nam and part of the territorial waters of the People's Republic of China in its Xisha Islands as 'combat zone' of the United States armed forces."

Vietnamese official maps published before 1975 called the Xisha Islands and Nansha Islands by their Chinese names and supplied notes to show that they belonged to China. For example, the world maps drawn and published by the Map Department of the General Staff of...
the Viet Nam People’s Army in 1960 clearly were marked in the Vietnamese language with “the Xisha Islands (China)” and “Nansha Islands (China).” The Vietnamese maps published by the Vietnamese Department of Cartography in May, 1964, the world maps printed in May, 1972 and the second edition of the world political maps printed in March 1974, both by the Vietnamese National Survey and Drawing Bureau, contained the Xisha Islands and the Nansha Islands in their Chinese names in the Vietnamese language. They never were called “Hoang Sa” or “Truong Sa” Islands as they are now named by the Vietnamese authorities.

A lesson on “China” in a ninth grade geography textbook published by the Viet Nam Educational Printing House in 1974 says, “The arc made up by the Nansha and Xisha Islands, Hainan Island, Taiwan, the Penghu Islands and the Zhoushan Islands forms a ‘great wall’ to protect the Chinese mainland.” There have been many similar descriptions in earlier Vietnamese textbooks.

Who Is Unreasonable and Peremptory?

An episode four years ago involving the Vietnamese authorities is significant.

On May 15, 1975, less than a month after the occupation of six of China’s Nansha Islands by the Vietnamese troops, the Vietnamese daily Guan Doi Nhan Dan carried a Vietnamese map, marking the Nansha Islands as part of Vietnamese territory and stating that the easternmost point of the Vietnamese territory is at 109 degrees and 29 minutes east longitude. Clearly, the attempt was to justify Viet Nam’s occupation of China’s islands.

However, the Vietnamese Natural Geography and Natural Geographical Areas of the Vietnamese Territory published respectively in 1970 by the Viet Nam Educational Publishing House and the Viet Nam Scientific and Technological Printing House clearly stated that the easternmost point of the Vietnamese territory is at 109 degrees and 21 minutes east longitude and not 109 degrees and 29 minutes.

Moreover, the arbitrary extension of Vietnamese territory 8 minutes eastward still fails to incorporate the Nansha Islands which are located east of 109 degrees and 30 minutes E.

The Vietnamese authorities have occupied six of China’s Nansha Islands with armed forces and covet the whole of China’s Nansha Islands and Xisha Islands. This is a serious step to further poison the relations between China and Viet Nam. The Vietnamese troops are illegally occupying part of the Nansha Islands and Hanoi’s warships have repeatedly encroached upon China’s territorial waters surrounding the Xisha Islands. There should be no dispute on sovereignty over the Nansha and Xisha Islands, but it has been made the subject of a major dispute in Sino-Vietnamese relations by the Vietnamese authorities.

The Vietnamese authorities claim that they set great store by maintaining and promoting the fine relations between the Vietnamese and Chinese peoples. But one practical move is more convincing than a dozen high-flown speeches. If Viet Nam really has a desire to settle disputes, it should not evade the eight-point proposal put forward by the Chinese Government for handling problems in Sino-Vietnamese relations. On the question of sovereignty over the Nansha and Xisha Islands, it should return to its original position, respect China’s sovereignty over these islands, pull out all its personnel from the six of the Nansha Islands it has illegally occupied, and refrain from making intrusions and provocations in the waters off the Xisha Islands.

(A May 14 commentary by Xinhua Correspondent)

Beijing Review, No. 21
THAILAND

Facing War Threat

The Vietnamese authorities have spread the war to the Kampuchean-Thai border, posing a direct threat to the security of Thailand and arousing the alertness and uneasiness of Thailand and other ASEAN countries.

In early April, 12 Soviet transports airlifted 30,000 Vietnamese troops to the Kampuchean-Thai border, bringing the number of Vietnamese aggressors fighting the Kampuchean Revolutionary Army in the western part of the country near the Thai border to about 50,000. On May 3, puppet troops of the Phnom Penh regime encroached on Thai territory and fired at Thai frontier troops. And again on May 8, three artillery rounds were fired into Thailand from Kampuchea. Four fully armed Vietnamese troops who slipped into Thailand from Kampuchea recently were seized by Thai inhabitants and self-defence personnel in the border area.

Confronted with the threat of war, Thailand was compelled to warn Viet Nam against extending the war to the Thai-Kampuchean border. The Vietnamese authorities disregarded this warning and instead instigated their puppets in Phnom Penh to issue a statement claiming that Thailand had fired into Kampuchea in support of the Pol Pot troops, and threatening that Thailand must bear full responsibility for all the consequences arising from this action.

In response, the Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak Chomanan declared: “The accusations are absolutely false.” An official of the supreme command of the Thai armed forces also refuted these charges, saying that the Thai troops had not opened fire, but rather that Thailand had been fired upon. According to Thai public opinion, these accusations and slanders by the Soviet-Viet Nam-backed Phnom Penh puppet regime might well be used as a pretext for expanding the aggressive war.

But Thailand and other ASEAN countries are not intimidated by Viet Nam and its puppets. The Thai leaders have continually pledged that Thailand has the ability to check the threat from any expansionist. Prime Minister Kriangsak affirmed that Thailand would use force in dealing with any intruder. The Thai armed forces along the eastern border have been placed on full alert.

JAPAN

For Stronger Defence

There has been a widespread debate in Japan over the question of national defence following the break with the postwar taboo on debating defence. The debate focused on the question of how to deal effectively with the growing Soviet military threat. Public opinion as well as official circles are for stronger defence to ensure Japan’s security.

Meeting last month with newsmen from Western news agencies, Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira said: “It is worth noting that the Soviet Union is building up its military forces in the Far East. Japan must increase its reconnaissance ability and have as big a deterrent force as possible.” Director-General of the Defence Agency of Japan Garri Yamashita also worries over the Soviet military build-up in the area. Speaking on May 9 at the defence forum held in Tokyo, he pointed out that Soviet ground forces were building up military bases on the islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu. He said: “This has been identified. Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda has lodged a protest with the Soviet Union. But the Soviet authorities have made no response.” In view of the increased Soviet military forces in the Far East, the Defence Agency last March
declared its intention to restudy the outline for defence adopted in October 1976. Military expenditure in the fifth defence plan (1977-81) will be twice that of the fourth plan. Emphasis is on building an independent, comprehensive defence system, with the Soviet Union in mind. This calls for stepping up anti-submarine, anti-aircraft and escort capabilities, introducing sophisticated weaponry and military technologies from the United States, and vigorously developing Japanese arms production.

Japanese Defence Agency officials revealed that it is currently necessary to "make an all-out effort to raise the quality of defence," and follow the "basic pattern of defence forces" on the assumption that Moscow may take action against Japan in the form of a "direct invasion of Japan, air strikes, or destruction of maritime communications." The main task of the ground self-defence forces is to "defend the north," guard against a surprise Soviet attack from Sakhalin Island and Japan's four northern islands under Soviet occupation, or a large-scale invasion from a flotilla of landing craft. The task of the sea and air self-defence forces is to strengthen air control as well as anti-submarine and escort capabilities so as to ensure safe maritime communications.

A number of farsighted Japanese have pointed out that the Soviet Union's military threat against Japan is part of its Asian strategy for hegemonism. A government public opinion poll shows that about 90 per cent of the people want to maintain a self-defence force and most have a strong desire to defend their motherland. This is a new trend in Japan's defence affairs.

The Soviet hegemonists are extremely annoyed by this. Their propaganda machine has attacked Japan for spreading "the myth of a Soviet threat," accusing it of being a "hotbed for dangerous plans" and as being "militarist." But Soviet truculence can only enable the Japanese people to see more clearly the true colours of the Soviet hegemonists and reinforce Japan's determination to strengthen its defence.

THE CARIBBEAN

Wary of Soviet-Cuban Infiltration

Many Caribbean countries have recently shown uneasiness over the political situation in Grenada and expressed the fear that the Soviet Union and Cuba might make use of the turbulent situation in the region to stretch their sinister hand of intervention deeper into the Caribbean region.

After the coup d'état in Grenada on March 13, word went round the Caribbean countries that ten Cubans had taken part in the coup and that a ship loaded with Cuban arms had arrived in Grenada. Then the new Prime Minister of Grenada, Maurice Bishop, clearly stated on April 8 at a mass rally that he was going to seek military aid from Cuba and other countries. He expressly said that Cuba, besides being a neighbouring Caribbean country, was at present "aiding the liberation struggles" in Africa and other parts of the world. On April 23, the Cuban daily Granma published the text of the Cuba-Jamaica joint communiqué which stated that the two sides highly appraised the recent developments in Grenada and expressed the need for urgent international aid and support for the new government. TASS took particular note of this and played it up, stressing that some political parties in the region which had ties with the Soviet Union welcomed the coup.

Such developments naturally aroused the concern of the Caribbean countries. The ministers of the Caribbean Community held an emergency meeting for more than nine hours and heard the representative of the new government in Grenada, a member of the community, pledge his government's observance to the community's integration movement and such principles as support for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. After that, they decided whether their countries would recognize the new government. Guyana, Jamaica and Barbados decided on recognition but St. Vincent, Antigua, St. Kitts, Montserrat, St. Lucia and the Commonwealth of Dominica decided not to do so. On March 20, the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the West Indies Associated States, which includes the Commonwealth of Dominica, Antigua and four other self-governing countries in the West Indies, decided not to recognize the new government in Grenada until "there is a return to the constitutional process" in that country. The meeting also unanimously agreed to set up a regional police force to defend their countries against the activities of armed and trained elements.

The press of some Caribbean countries has sounded the alarm. The Jamaican Daily Gleaner in a commentary warned people against the Soviet Union and Cuba setting up a new infiltration centre in the Caribbean region.
MODERN DRAMA

Brecht in China

For the first time Beijing’s theatre fans have the opportunity to see a Bertolt Brecht production on stage, for China’s Youth Art Theatre is now performing The Life of Galileo. Opening at the end of March, the three-hour drama depicts how Galileo, a medieval Italian scientist who proved Copernicus’ theory that the sun is the centre of universe, was forced to recant under threat of torture by the Inquisition. Later towards the end of his life, he reproaches himself for this decision and continues his scientific research in an effort to contribute his last years to the progress of human society.

The play is directed by Huang Zuolin, the 73-year-old head of the Shanghai People’s Art Theatre who has studied foreign dramas for 40 years, and Chen Yong, a talented and incisive woman. Huang explained their purpose for directing The Life of Galileo, his 101st production: “We try to keep to the playwright’s idea of the scientist’s responsibility to society and of science easing the hardship of human beings. And at the same time we want to play up the ideas of breaking through superstition and of developing democracy.”

The two directors cut the original 15 scenes down to 12, while striving to retain as much as possible of the original script’s characterization and staging. Similarly, they attempted to cater to the Chinese actors’ and actresses’ style of acting and to the tastes of their audiences. The directors adopted the Brechtian half curtain and introduced two folk singers to provide linking music between scenes. Coupled with the simple colour decor and stark white lighting, the total effect is quite unique and stimulating for Chinese audiences.

These two veteran artists and China’s Youth Art Theatre selected The Life of Galileo because they wanted to try for the first time to employ Brecht’s theatrical theory — emphasis on reason — in presenting his play and to act according to his principle: Let the audiences think, judge and reach their own conclusions.

They were nevertheless apprehensive when rehearsals began that they wouldn’t be able to successfully embody the characteristics of Brecht’s play and make themselves understood, because when Brecht’s Mother Courage and Her Children was first staged in Shanghai in 1958, the audiences had reacted rather coldly. Such doubts were so common that when Huang Zuolin was boarding the plane for Beijing to begin directing the play, his daughter nicknamed him “Father Courage.”

To test whether this foreign play with deep philosophical ideas and a unique artistic style would be appreciated by ordinary citizens, the troupe invited the workers who had made the costumes and built the stage set to a dress rehearsal. They seemed captivated as the theatre hall was extraordinarily quiet throughout the performance and an enthusiastic applause broke out at the end. Chen Yong recalled that their reactions made her feel as if a huge rock had suddenly been lifted off her shoulders. Then she immediately felt a rush of exhilaration, for now it was clear their efforts to introduce such a novel Western drama had not been in vain. Any lingering doubts were dispelled by the terrific response to the premiere performance. The Life of Galileo has proved to be a very popular and thought-provoking drama for a theatre-going audience from all walks of life whose familiarity with Western art forms is quite varied.

Notably, the play was included in a national theatrical festival dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the founding of New China. Suggestions and comments which are now coming in from all parts of the country as a result of these performances will be used to make further improvements on the script.

The script was translated from the 1957 German edition by a teacher at the Central Drama Institute who was helped by a West German expert in Beijing and a Chinese German-language teacher. They strove to make their translation faithful and natural.

More Than a Play

Bertolt Brecht was a sincere friend of the Chinese people as
well as a student of Chinese culture who was particularly interested in philosophy, poems, operas and Chairman Mao’s writings. He was eager to visit China and had accepted an invitation, but he died in 1957 before he could fulfil this wish.

China’s artists and theatre fans have felt the need to understand and study Brecht’s theatrical art. Six of his plays were translated in the 1950s. While making efforts in creating Chinese proletarian drama, China can benefit from and be enlightened by different foreign theatrical schools. A verse from *The Life of Galileo* has expressed the sentiment of the Chinese people: “We should learn to keep our eyes wide open. What we know is very little. This is only the beginning.”

**REVOLUTIONARY RELIC**

*The Story of a Banner*

Among the many exhibits in Beijing’s Military Museum of the Chinese People’s Revolution is an old, faded triangular banner. It is not very eye-catching, but the story behind this banner is moving.

In 1947 the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries supported by the imperialists attacked the liberated areas in east Shandong Province. Yu Fenglan, a newly wed peasant woman in Chishan area, backed her husband’s decision to join the People’s Liberation Army to defend their homeland. Pregnant though she was at that time, she did all she could to support the front. Before long, the Liberation War moved over to the offensive. Inspired by the slogan “Press on to Nanjing (then the capital of the Kuomintang government) and bury the Chiang dynasty,” another 500 young people of Chishan area enlisted in the army within a few days. They were all put in the same battalion — the Chishan Battalion.

On the eve of their departure, Yu Fenglan thought of presenting a banner to them. But she had no suitable material. She remembered her red wedding quilt-cover. Without any hesitation she cut out a piece and she and her friends embroidered by the light of flickering oil-lamps the following words: “To the Chishan Battalion — Forward to the front, kill the enemy and perform meritorious deeds!”

The men of Chishan carried that banner with their beloved ones’ words from the Shandong Peninsula to southern Jiangsu Province. They fought bravely until the war ended with nationwide liberation.

Yu Fenglan’s husband did not live to take part in the victory celebrations. His wife and his son whom he never saw have always been active in supporting the army. Drawing inspiration from the heroic deeds of the revolutionary martyrs, they and the other people of Chishan are working selflessly to build a socialist new countryside.

**CALLIGRAPHY**

*A Promising Novice*

Twelve-year-old Lou Zhenggang has won acclaim from Chinese and Japanese calligraphers for her excellent calligraphy.

In recognition of her exceptional skill the Chinese People’s National Committee in Defence of Children asked her to write an inscription for the ten Chinese entries to this year’s International Year of the Child Painting Competition. Her bold inscription “Chinese children’s drawings — my life in the year 2000” exquisitely sets off the paintings.

At the invitation of the Chinese Academy of Military Science, Lou has also inscribed the sentence “The Red Army fears not the trials of the Long March” from Chairman Mao’s poem The Long March in a cursive style. Her characters are large, powerful and full of vitality.

Lou Zhenggang began writing and painting quite a few years ago under the influence and direction of her father, a trade
commendable that this adept cursive style was brushed by a little girl.”

Lou’s calligraphy first received great attention in calligraphy circles last October when it was displayed at an exhibition in Harbin, capital of Heilongjiang Province. Then the provincial museum sent her to Shanghai, Hangzhou, Beijing and other cities to learn from calligraphic experts. The Central Institute of Art has decided to accept her as a student at its affiliated middle school so that her talents in calligraphy and painting arts can be further developed.

Chinese calligraphy, like traditional Chinese painting and seal cutting, is widely admired. Such works are frequently displayed at museums or exhibition halls. People appreciate on-the-spot writings by professional and amateur calligraphers at festival get-togethers, painting shops as well as on television. In recent years, a great many amateur calligraphers have emerged from among workers, teachers, functionaries and students.

A “Selection of Contemporary Chinese Calligraphy,” which contains 105 outstanding works of New China, will soon be published. A film is being made on the formation and evolution of Chinese calligraphy as well as the main schools in different periods and their representative figures.

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**ON THE STAGE AND SCREEN**

- **Xiang Lin’s Wife.** A Pingju opera adapted from the novel The New Year Sacrifice by Lu Xun (1881-1936) in 1924. It is about a peasant woman’s sorrows and sufferings in a world governed by feudal ethics.

- **Thunderstorm.** A four-act tragedy by the famous playwright, Cao Yu. It is an expose and denunciation of feudalism and capitalism. The story unfolds through the complicated squabbles and love affairs of members of two families.

- **The Death of a Famous Actor.** An actor dies during a performance after a life humiliation. On the Night the Tiger Was Captured. The love of a rich hunter’s daughter and a poor orphan ends in tragedy. Both plays were written by Tian Han, founder of China’s revolutionary drama.

- **Three one-act plays by Ding Xilin: A Wasp, a satirical play about the hypocrisy and dishonesty of members of the upper class. Oppression, the difficulties of a nobody trying to rent a room in the old society. Three Yuan, a rich landlady forces a servant to pay for a broken vase. All three were produced in the 1920s and 1930s to expose and condemn social inequalities and venality and cruelty of the rich.

- **The Peach Blossom Fan.** A beautiful and cultured courtesan of the 17th century, the late Ming Dynasty, gave her love to a talented but impoverished scholar-poet. When the Ming Dynasty falls, the young man betrays his people for wealth and rank. Li Xiangjun, the courtesan, renounces him and commits suicide. The opera became a symbol of national consciousness in the 1940s when China was devastated by foreign imperialists.

- **The London Festival Ballet presented Giselle, The Sanguine Fan, a fairy tale, Greening, a contemporary German ballet, and Etudes, a ballet adapted from Czerny’s work of the same title.**

- **Yuzuru, a Japanese opera.** This popular Japanese folk tale depicts how those who are carried away by their desire for money commit unforgivable crimes. The opera was presented jointly by Japanese singers, directors, conductors and a Chinese orchestra, pupil players and theatrical workers.

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"The Life of Galileo."

Sketch of a scene from the Japanese opera Yuzuru. by Zhao Shiyong

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