THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY FORCES IN THE OCTOBER EVENTS IN HUNGARY

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INTRODUCTION

The propaganda in favour of bourgeois restoration before the October events and for the most part also during these events was characterized by a hypocritical dissimulation of its actual aims. This hypocrisy represented a well-considered, underhanded means of misleading the socialist-minded masses. The demands and programmes that appeared in the Press during the period of the armed uprising lagged far behind the orally proclaimed demands and, behind what had already been carried out by the counter-revolutionary agitators. When considering the contents of these demands, we must keep in mind a characteristic feature of the period, namely, that the deeds went far beyond the written and the printed words.

For instance, no slogan was ever printed to the effect that all state and municipal functionaries in leading positions, all factory managers, etc. who were Communists or co-operated with the Communists were to be relieved of their offices, but in practice this is what actually began to take place in various administrations, institutions and enterprises. Many honest, devoted and highly respected leaders were replaced and their posts, one after the other, occupied by the representatives of bourgeois restoration.

In print, the counter-revolutionaries did not demand the banning of the Communist Party and the arrest of leading Communists, but the district Party buildings were occupied by armed groups, the building of the Budapest Party Committee was assaulted, numerous leading Party functionaries were murdered. Organized armed groups in Budapest went from house to house and arrested hundreds of Party members. Lists of others to be arrested were prepared. The White Terror also spread over the countryside.

In connection with the Soviet Union, the counter-revolutionaries wrote about equal rights and friendship, while, in reality, they outraged the monuments of Soviet heroes, tore down the red stars,
and made bonfires of Russian-language books, including the works of Lenin, Tolstoy, Dostoevski, and burning even the Russian edition of Petőfi.

If the counter-revolution had from the beginning displayed its actual purposes, revealed its real face in the Press too, it would soon have found itself opposed by the mass of the people, including the socialist students.

The published demands and slogans with which the Government was faced were in general of a provisional character. As soon as the Government had accepted some points, the counter-revolutionaries at once set up new claims, threatening that they would not trust the Government unless it fulfilled the new demands. This is illustrated by the continuous change in the demands concerning the composition of the Government: in the beginning, Imre Nagy was to be included in the Government; this being accomplished, the demand arose that the Communist Ministers should be sacked and Mrs. Kéthly and others admitted; and in the first days of November, there already appeared the slogan “Down with Imre Nagy!”

The tactics of increasing demands was suggested by the mouthpiece of the American imperialists, the infamous “Radio Free Europe.”

On October 31, a certain Colonel Bell demanded over Radio Free Europe that the portfolio of National Defence should be given to the “freedom fighters,” and Maléter soon became Minister of National Defence. On the same day, Radio Free Europe trumpeted: “Cancel the Warsaw Pact and proclaim that Hungary is no longer a Party to the Treaty” — and the next day, on November 1, Imre Nagy complied. Radio Free Europe made no secret of its intention of placing the Hungarian people at the mercy of a Government composed of émigrés with an “iron fist,” who would have carried out the mission of restoring the old order in Hungary. This was, at the time, a constant topic also in the foreign Press.

In evaluating the demands, we must take into account also the fact that in this period even the American propaganda centre, which directed the entire counter-revolutionary movement, gave the tactical instructions not yet to reclaim the factories, mines and landed estates on behalf of their former proprietors. There can be no doubt that as soon as the one-time capitalist elements would have seized political power, the American propagandists and their agents in Hungary would “not have insisted” on maintaining the socialization of the big enterprises.

Although the circumstances set forth above prevented any frank manifestation of the aspirations aimed at the restoration of the old order, they nevertheless found expression in a subdued and confused form. Thus the followers of the vanished Horthy regime, feeling that they had secured political power, abandoned some of their restraint and to a certain extent departed from the tactics prescribed by the American ideologists of Radio Free Europe. In several places the former landowners showed up and reclaimed their estates; Otto Hapsburg put in his claim to the Hungarian Crown; exiled counts turned up in the most expensive hotel in the frontier town of Sopron; the Prince of Löwenstein also found his way into Hungary. Cardinal Mindszenty similarly unmasked himself.

The bourgeois restoration had its ready-made recipe from the American agents. According to this scheme, the first step to be taken was to destroy the organs of state power of the People’s Democracy, to outlaw and compel the Party of the working class to go underground, as well as to pry Hungary loose from the camp of the socialist countries, under the pretext of “neutrality,” and to align her with the bloc of the western capitalist countries. In the beginning, of course, the people were not told that once Hungary would be dominated by the Americans, the “U.N. troops” from the West and their Hungarian agents, the power of big capital would be restored without difficulty. There was also a slurring over of the fact that this step would revive the conflicts between Hungary and her neighbours and that our country would thus become the hotbed of a new war. The ultimate aim was to convert Hungary into an eastern bridgehead of western imperialism. The dangers involved were so obvious that even bourgeois politicians of some perspicacity could not be blind to them. For instance, Nándor Bilkei-Gorzó, in the so-called “Metropolitan National Committee,” warned against the “dangerous game” of violating the Warsaw Treaty.

One of the advance symptoms of bourgeois restoration was the re-appearance in public life of political parties of the former Horthy regime. In the Budapest Town Hall there appeared a “Hungarian Christian Party” and a “Christian Youth Association”; in addition,
there were three further groups which set up "Christian" parties: the Christian Democratic People's Party, the Christian Youth Society and the Christian Democratic Party. Through the Press and through other means, these revived "Christian" parties of the Horthy regime and their allies immediately proceeded to whip up the muddy waves of anti-Communist, anti-Soviet, anti-Semitic and irredentist, chauvinistic propaganda.

Other parties were formed, whose organizers aimed at a bourgeois restoration of a non-Horthyite character, through replacing socialist power by a bourgeois-democratic or liberal bourgeois regime. The actual military and political command of the counter-revolution, however, was in the hands of political and military representatives of Horthy fascism. Numerous groups of bourgeois restorationists represented compounds of bourgeois democratic, liberal, as well as "Christian" and fascist tendencies. An important "cohesive element" of these hybrids was their subservience to the western imperialists.

In the course of these days, several unknown or hardly known persons and party groups applied to the Press Department of the Prime Minister's Office for permission to publish newspapers. The Hungarian Independence Party's application, made on November 1, presented in its annex the party programme, which, among other things, rejects the socialist regime, and unequivocally professes "the realization of a pure, eternal and Hungarian bourgeois democracy" and "the inviolability of private property."

The fascist forces among the bourgeois restorationists also formed a so-called "National Bloc of non-Party Members." Their draft programme, submitted to the Nagy Government, says: "Those partisans who remain at liberty after the liquidation of the AVO* (State Security Authority) shall be placed under police surveillance," and further: "The Communist Party offices, Trade Union offices and labour planning departments in all enterprises, factories, offices and institutions shall be dissolved with immediate effect..."

The "Fraternal Association of Hungarian Political Prisoners," which included, among others, condemned Arrow-Cross murderers,

* AVO: abbreviation for State Security Department, later, State Security Authority (AVH).
was formed also under fascist leadership. This organization wished to publish the newspaper “Ébresztő” (Awakening), the title of which recalls the notorious fascist organization of the 1919 counter-revolution, known as the “Ébredő Magyarok Egyesülete” (Union of Awakening Hungarians).

An evident and characteristic feature of the Horthyite restoration in the Budapest Town Hall was the formation of the “Metropolitan National Committee” on November 1. This Committee declared itself to be solely competent in the disposing of Town Hall appointments. According to the minutes, Károly Zaigóvári, a lawyer, said: “The National Committee shall declare that all leading functionaries from department heads on upwards are considered as dismissed.” On November 2, the Committee “set to work.” A delegate of the non-existent “Hungarian Christian Party” at once proposed a Piarist priest as head of the Municipal Department of Education and suggested that the Horthyites who had been dismissed in 1945 or later should, without exception, be reinstated in the Town Hall.

Numerous facts concerning the trend towards restoration were revealed in various towns and villages. The present publication includes an account of some characteristic episodes.

One of the most typical representatives of this trend was Cardinal Mindszenty. On the evening of November 3, he explained his political views in a radio address. Despite its nebulous character, the essence of the speech was unambiguous.

Mindszenty set forth his conception of Hungary’s future social structure in the following imperative words: “We wish to be a classless society in a constitutional state, a nation and country developing its democratic achievements, resting on a foundation of private property rightly and justly limited by social interests, and inspired by cultural nationalism.”

In defending private property restricted by “just” and “social interests,” Mindszenty reverted to the demagogy of the “Christian regime” and of Nazism. But history has taught us that in practice all this is equivalent to the unlimited power of capital.

Socialist society is based upon social, common property of the means of production. In his speech, Mindszenty proclaimed the defeat of this social order and sought to bury it. Of course, Mindszenty refused to acknowledge the Imre Nagy Government, and expressed his refusal in his arrogant manner by saying: “The participants in the defeated regime (sic) and their successors (meaning, Imre Nagy and the members of his Government) are equally and separately responsible for their own activity, for any negligence, delay or incorrect measure.”

Mindszenty directly threatens Imre Nagy and his colleagues in declaring: “… the legal calling to account must take place in every respect through an independent and impartial court.”

Mindszenty also called for new elections in which “all parties may compete” — “under international control”, at that. The Cardinal stressed the slogan issued by Radio Free Europe a few days earlier, concerning “independence” under western control, thereby insuring free activity for all parties of bourgeois restoration, while suppressing, in effect, the activity of the Communist party and compelling it to go underground.

The Cardinal concluded his speech with the demand that the Church should be given back its “institutions,” which would, of course, include the landed properties as well.

Mindszenty delivered a funeral oration over the “defeated regime” of People’s Democracy. The funeral oration, however, was premature. The regime and the Hungarian working people will remedy both the damage done by the Rákosi policy and the ravages caused by the defeated counter-revolutionary uprising.

This volume contains numerous data of a political character concerning the attempted capitalist restoration, as well as new material on the counter-revolutionary massacres. It is hoped thereby to provide a clearer picture of the counter-revolutionary revolt.

In this connection, the collected material permits us to draw a number of irrefutable conclusions:

1. The instigators and organizers of the armed uprising were foreign agents, Horthyite émigrés and leaders of the underground organizations in the country, who took an organized part in the mass demonstrations and increasingly assumed a leading role in them.

2. Those representatives of the Horthy regime who had remained in Hungary began to restore the old order in the capital and in numerous towns, villages and districts in the countryside, while the émigrés abroad, with the aid of their agents at home, were already prepared for the complete seizure of power.
3. The subversive broadcasts of Radio Free Europe — backed by dollars, directed from America, and functioning on the territory of West Germany — played an essential role in the ideological preparation and practical direction of the counter-revolution, in provoking the armed struggle, in the non-observance of the cease-fire, and in arousing the mass hysteria which led to the lynching of innocent men and women loyal to their people and their country. The directors of Radio Free Europe carry a particularly heavy responsibility for the bloodshed between Hungarians and for the subsequent defections to the West, as well as for the tragedies they caused among many thousands of Hungarian families.

4. After October 29, the aim of the counter-revolutionary rebels became more and more evident: to overthrow the socialist popular regime and to spread the sphere of influence of western capitalism over Hungary — in other words, bourgeois restoration.

The only way for the Hungarian people to avoid the dark era of a new counter-revolution was to strike down the counter-revolutionary revolt.

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The Siege of the Radio on October 23 and 24

Starting point of the armed uprising

(Related by K.I.)

On the morning of October 23, I heard that the students of the Builders' Technical College were organizing a silent demonstration of sympathy at the statue of General Bem, to commemorate the events in Poland. On hearing that the demonstration had been prohibited, meetings were held at the Universities and, as far as I know, with the exception of the University of Political Economy, it was decided to demonstrate inspite of the prohibition. I heard that the organizers at the Builders' Technical College persisted in their plans on the grounds that the procession would be entirely silent, that they would go to the statue of Bem and then immediately return to the University.

I watched the demonstration in the Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Street. The procession marched by for approximately an hour. The demonstration was, of course, anything but silent. The participants — especially those who marched under the banners of various Universities — were overwhelmingly students. This was particularly true of the first part of the procession. Here they rhythmically and merrily cried their slogans, which — as I got to know later — had been distributed in leaflet form by the DISZ (Union of Working Youth). Some of the slogans proclaimed Polish-Hungarian friendship, or Soviet-Hungarian friendship on the basis of equality; others were directed against Rákosi and called for the inclusion
of Imre Nagy in the leadership. They mostly emphasized the unity of workers and students. Later on, when the procession became more mixed, anti-Soviet slogans were increasingly to be heard: “We do not want Russian tunics,” etc. As far as I can recall, the withdrawal of the Soviet troops was not yet asked for at that time, although demands to this effect were posted on the walls throughout the capital. The demonstrators urged that the houses display the national flag, and where this was done it was noisily applauded. Later on, they demanded flags with the Kossuth arms, or, at least, that the arms of the People’s Democracy be cut out of the existing flags. The passers-by looked on with relative passivity, though smiling for the most part. No disapproving remarks were to be heard, those who disagreed remained silent, their opinion was at best reflected in their faces. But already here in the street, I occasionally heard the remark that occurred more often in the evening: “At last, after twelve years, we have lived to see this.”

At half past eight I learned that the Radio Building had been encircled by the demonstrators. I arrived by bus at the Ady Cinema at nine or a quarter past nine. Here I became aware of the fact that the evening life of the city was not normal. The crowd at the corner of Museum Boulevard and Rákóczi Street was far greater than usual. At first I tried to get closer to Radio Headquarters from Museum Boulevard, but I could not get farther than Bródy Sándor Street, where two cars were in flames. The way was blocked by a huge crowd. Rifle-shots could be heard. People rushed out of the garden of the University, they took ball-cartridges out of newly opened boxes, shouted: “this is what the AVO-men are firing with,” and put cartridges and rifles in the hands of young people. It was then about a quarter past nine. Mrs. Benke and a number of other colleagues of mine, who got stuck in the Radio Building, say it was not until midnight that the militia for the first time fired ball-cartridges.

I tried to come nearer to the Radio from Pushkin Street, but without success. The road was covered with broken bricks, obviously coming from the pile of bricks before a house under construction at the street corner. In the street groups of passers-by were gathering and then dispersing. In one of these groups someone was explaining that the bricks had been thrown at the AVO-men who had come to the aid of the Radio and had run towards the Studio without offering resistance. Another person asserted he would not give in if he were pelted with bricks. But the crowd soon silenced such opinions, and one heard more and more frequently such exclamations as “scoundrels,” “they are firing at Hungarians.” No one thought of asking whether anybody — whoever he might be — was justified in attacking the Studio, or what was the duty of the armed forces in such a case.

Among the passers-by there were many people who remained only out of curiosity, and they too turned against the AVO-men. In Rákóczi Street, around Sip Street, there were empty buses. From the top of one of the buses a young man spoke to the crowd filling the road. I did not hear what he said, he announced various demands, and every sentence he pronounced was loudly acclaimed and applauded. Motorcyclists rode on the drive-way, some of them stopped at the sidewalk, were surrounded by noisy groups, and then drove away again. Here I heard the regularly reiterated shouts of “they are firing at Hungarians” and “at last, after twelve years.”

More and more motor-lorries now began to arrive, packed with young people and bearing the national flag. At this time there was already a huge crowd around the building of the Szabad Nép, and shots could be heard from there too. A young girl cried from one of the lorries: “We have already demolished the Stalin statue.” “When was that?” asked somebody from among the crowd. The young girl cast a glance at her watch and said: “It is now 9:36. It was six minutes ago.”

From the Great Boulevard, a mass of people flowed towards the Café Emke. A long row of trams stood there, some of them with broken windows.

Someone in Rákóczi Street said the Csepel workers were on the march. People visibly took fright, but the workers did not come. In the course of the evening, one could see ever more clearly the contradiction between the acceptable slogans, previously proclaimed, and the succeeding actions, and at the same time a certain progression in the slogans. At first, they had been directed against Stalinism and Rákosi, and demanded an independent, free Hungary. At the same time the seizing of the TEFU (Lorry Transport Enterprise) lorries, the flag-bearing motorcyles racing here and there, the transport and delivery of arms, the attack on the Radio were.
all indicative of an action which had been organized well in advance and was not directed against Rákosi, the absent, deposed Party secretary.

In the Studio

(Related by M.L.)

After the nervous tension which overcame the people in the Radio, it was a relief to hear the two o'clock announcement that the ban on public gatherings had been lifted. Plans were discussed concerning where to go and what to record. Judging from the mood of the radiomen and the demands of the most loud-mouthed elements, however, there was little good to be expected. The more sensible people grumbled on hearing some of the absurd demands, but the atmosphere was such that there could be no hope of a triumph of common sense today.

About five o'clock, we received the news of a demonstrating crowd coming towards the Radio. At about half past five, Bródy Sándor Street was overrun to such an extent that one could not approach the door from that side. The street continuously reverberated with chaotic shouting, and the atmosphere was hostile and aggressive. Soon they began to burn red flags. Mrs. Valéria Benke, the director of the Radio, and the sports reporter, Szepesi, went onto the balcony to try to find out what the crowd wanted. The salutation "Comrades" was answered by booing lasting for minutes and by shouts of "we are Hungarians!" The situation was becoming dangerous.

The first delegation, which included several students and some arrogant young guttersnipes, as well as one or two unpleasant-looking persons of more advanced age, perhaps twelve persons in all, behaved in a very aggressive manner. They demanded the interruption of the regular programme in order to read their 16 points before a microphone to be placed in the street.

Mrs. Benke answered: "We are ready to read the 16 points with certain modifications, for we have already broadcast similar resolutions adopted by University meetings this morning and last night. However, we cannot interrupt the programme, but shall read these points on our next news broadcast or along with our account of the demonstration. We cannot place the mike in the
street, nor can we allow the crowd to come into the Studio, because it would involve, at best, a veritable confusion of Babel, anarchy in the street, or ravages in the Studio.” Thereupon a very young fellow of neglected appearance sprang to his feet and heaped coarse insults on Mrs. Benke, stressing that “they would not give way until the Radio were in the hands of the people.” Asked what he meant by that, he replied: “Put the mike into the street so everyone may say into it whatever he wants.”

After a heated debate, those delegates who spoke more soberly and in a more cultured manner — probably students — took the lead and accepted our conditions. The only more serious discussion arose over the demand for the withdrawal of the Soviet Army. As I remember, even on this point, they agreed on a wording that spoke of complete independence on the basis of equal rights with the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile the false rumour was spread in the street that the delegates were being detained and maltreated. Our windows had previously been pelted with stones. The hail of stones was steadily increasing. It was risky to stand near the window or on the balcony. When the delegation went out and tried to make the agreement known, they were received with the same hostile cries and stone-throwing as the employees of the Radio. The mob would not listen to the delegation they themselves had chosen. It was broken up, and its members are even said to have been pummelled. After this, the same scene was again and again repeated for a period of hours: a delegation would come, we would arrive at an agreement with its well-disposed members, but they could make no impression outside. The very last delegation, seeing the fate of its predecessors, did not venture to go back. Mrs. Benke broke off the negotiations with them after the “peaceful demonstrators” had shot down the Army major who was on guard duty.

At eight o’clock the speech of Gerő was on the air, but the crowd before the Radio did not hear it, because we had nothing to transmit it with. It is not true, therefore, that this speech was the motive for the attack on the Radio, for the assault had begun several hours earlier. Balázs Nagy, the historian, told us later that, wandering near the Radio in the early evening hours, he noted an elderly man of soldierly bearing but in civilian dress, who launched the slogan: “Let’s take possession of the Radio!” — “Why?”

asked some university students who stood there. He did not answer, but arrayed the young people in groups of eight or ten and directed them with various instructions to different places.

Earlier, at about seven o’clock, Géza Losonczy, Miklós Vásárhelyi, and later Zoltán Szántó came to the Radio. Losonczy went out on the balcony, looked around and then came back in. The people in the street wished to hear Imre Nagy. Losonczy rang up Imre Nagy and asked whether he would come. Imre Nagy said he would not come unless the Party asked him to. Later we learned that Imre Nagy had spoken to the demonstrators before the Parliament Building: the radiomen had recorded the speech and would bring in the magnetophone record. We hung out a loudspeaker over the street. On hearing the first sentence pronounced by Imre Nagy, the crowd calmed down, but then it started to shout and boo, and smashed the loudspeaker. In short, it did not want Imre Nagy either. Losonczy and Vásárhelyi went away between eight and nine.

The first shots were fired at the Radio Building at nine o’clock. Between nine and ten, there was only sporadic firing, but there must have been some excellent marksmen, for they managed to hit the heads of three security policemen who showed up at a window. After ten o’clock, the building was under constant fire.

Various comrades, whom we knew or did not know, from the Szabad Nép, the Writers’ Association, the Association of Journalists, rang us up one after another; some people from the Szabad Nép blamed us, others only asked whether it was true that over here the security police were shooting and massacring peacefully demonstrating students. We stated that we were the ones being fired at. The Radio was not shooting, because there had been no order to fire. Those inside were doing their utmost to induce the, for the most part unarmed, crowd to disperse; and therefore they did not yet want to open fire at the armed attackers. All their efforts were in vain, however.

The defenders were already making use of their supply of tear-gas bombs, but in doing so they only harmed themselves, because the gas penetrated into the rooms through the broken windows. They asked the fire-brigade for a fire-engine, and when it did not come, they set up their own garden hose. It proved ineffective, because the hand of the soldier who held the water-hose was soon shot off together with the spout.
We learned subsequently that the demonstrators before the building had been augmented by a huge crowd brought to the Radio through the false rumour that “the students were being shot there.” In various places of the capital — as eyewitnesses later related — certain individuals kept showing bullet cartridges and saying: “the AVO-murderers are shooting with these.” And the cartridges in their hands served as “evidence.”

The armed guard had a varied composition: there were state security policemen, members of the signal corps, army officers, tank men, etc. They were not prepared for an armed struggle, their number was small and they were especially short of ammunition. Seeing that the demonstrating mob completely encircled the building (the only exit available was the garage door which civilians could pass through one by one; at that time, the rebels did not yet know this door belonged to the Radio) and that there was an imminent danger of incursion, they asked for reinforcement. The dispatch of two groups of soldiers, 600 men strong each, was announced, but they never arrived. Once we saw a motor-lorry full of soldiers coming into the street, but it was hemmed in by the crowd and people began to climb on it, asking the soldiers for their arms or simply seizing them. The Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of National Defence gave uncertain answers to our queries and requests. We urged that infantrymen be sent out in considerable number in order to secure the clearing of the street by the mere impact of their mass and without the use of weapons. We could not understand why we did not get any assistance.

In the meantime, we learned of armed attacks being launched against the József Telephone Exchange, against Police Headquarters, several printing houses and other public buildings. From time to time György Fazeekas rang us up from Police Headquarters and told us of other places where fighting had begun. When the armed struggle began, two student members of the delegation which got stuck with us asked for weapons and fought on the side of the guard against the attackers until morning.

After ten o’clock, the attack increased in strength. The Radio was systematically besieged; firing positions were set up on the roofs of the houses right across the street. There was firing from garrets, from behind chimneys, and later from the windows. Some
time afterwards we were fired at also from the roof of our own building.

In the course of the fight, our telephone central was riddled with bullets so that telephone connections within the house were cut. The broadcasting apparatus was operated by Hartai and Láng, we brought them the instructions concerning the broadcasts by hand. In view of the increasing firing, this was not without danger. We did it several times, nevertheless, because the Central Committee sent us communiqués and then successive corrections. (For instance: "The Central Committee has been convened for October 31." This was corrected to "for the immediate future," then to "immediately.") The broadcasting programme was, just the same, carried out as planned right up to our regular closing-time.

By midnight, it became obvious to all of us that we were faced not with an ill-advised and short-lived attack of a few fascists, but with a well-organized, large-scale armed action. The mob did not disperse and all efforts to this end were ineffective; it was not possible to wait any longer, so the commander of the guard asked his headquarters what to do. Exactly at 35 minutes after midnight, he got the order to open fire.

Army Colonel Ferenc Konok came upstairs at the moment when the order was made known. He suggested not to open fire, and requested Mrs. Benke to try to find some other agreed solution. He had just come from outside, where he had talked with the young people at the gate; they only wanted their demands to be read into the microphone — and were anxious to go home. At first, Mrs. Benke rejected the suggestion, saying this game had been going on already since half past five: whenever we came to terms with the delegates, the crowd in the street would not listen to them, because they were directed by others who had other aims. Comrade Konok opposed the fight, nonetheless; he did not feel pity for those who were firing at us from their secure shelters, but for the unarmed youth wedged in the street, who would be most endangered by the fight. Mrs. Benke and we radio people, as well as the other commanders who were present, agreed with him in this. However hopeless it appeared, another, last attempt was made.

Comrade Konok once more went out into the street, and returned with an adult who appeared to be a worker and two young men. Mrs. Benke took upon herself to broadcast the text they had with them; we no longer objected to the text and they, too, were very compliant. Even this last effort was unsuccessful, however, though this delegation did all it could, especially the adult worker who shouted himself hoarse trying to get the crowd to move off.

This episode is of importance because it shows how the defenders of the building made every effort to avoid an armed struggle. The hostility against the AVO among the population was incited by false rumours and not by the behavior of the AVO itself.

About one in the morning, the commanders, seeing that there was no other solution, gave their units the order to open fire.

We expected that once the street had been cleared of civilians — as was shortly the case — the armed units who defended the Radio would soon liquidate the rebels, who were supposed to be few in number. But it turned out that they were attacking with far greater forces than had been assumed; apparently they also had arms and reserves in plenty, while our men in the building got nothing but promises.

At about three o'clock, the situation of the defenders became critical. They hardly had any ammunition and only a small number of men left. In the building there were many killed and wounded; reinforcements or relief — for we were encircled — did not arrive. Our defenders continuously signalled to headquarters that in absence of assistance they could not hold the Radio any longer. Aid was always promised and the defence endeavoured to carry on.

At dawn, it became clear that the wing on Bródy Sándor Street could not be held any longer. For hours we had stayed in a back room, except that from time to time one of our leaders would go to the telephone. The director's room, where the phones were, was kept under heavy fire. Telephone connections with the outside world were also difficult to maintain. The leading collaborators of the Radio resolved to go to the amplifier (technical centre) in order to maintain broadcasting as long as possible. On October 24, at 4:30 a.m. we began our regular programme. After 6 a.m. we set off for the transmitting station, but some of us were unable to get there because of the heavy shooting. The amplifier was also under fire, but the shooting was not as heavy as against the Bródy Sándor Street wing. From a quarter past seven on, the indicator board also was so heavily damaged that broadcasting from there had to be stopped. From this time onwards, broadcasting was carried on at
the Lakihegy station (outside town). At 8 a.m. we once again got a phone connection — as far as I know, it was with Ernő Gerő — and we explained that we should have to give up the Radio in a few minutes. Even at that moment we were promised reinforcements.

At 9 a.m., the few surviving soldiers decided to lay down their arms. They hardly had any more ammunition. They joined us in the dressing-room, we gave them overcoats and waited for the rebels to reach us. The amplifier was set up at the end of a corridor and we were caught, as it were, in a mousetrap which made our situation perilous. A lot of women, and even children (the nursery-school children, who on the preceding afternoon had not been able to leave the building because of the huge crowd) were also with us, thus creating a panic atmosphere. We could hear heavy firing, but nobody came near us. It was to be feared that, once the rebels reached this narrow corridor, they would throw in a hand-grenade, thus killing those who were in the room. Benke and Szécsi therefore decided that we should go out and disclose our willingness to surrender. On the staircase we came across armed men who, on seeing civilian radio employees (charwomen and technicians) coming down and recognizing neither Mrs. Benke nor the other leaders of the Radio, surrounded us, led us to the street and let us go. Those AVOM-en who had not succeeded in hiding their uniforms were detained.

This is how the group to which I belonged got out of the besieged Radio Building on the morning of October 24.

How the Attack Was Organized

(Related by N.I.)

...In order that they might express their wishes, the guard let in a ten-member delegation of the demonstrators in the early evening hours. Their first demand was that the 16 points should be included in the programme immediately. One also heard such vague demands as: "This is the people’s radio, therefore, let us give it to the people," or "let us run the radio in common," etc.

Characteristic of the aggressiveness of the crowd was the fact that about eight or nine o’clock in the evening they stopped several cars passing through Bródy Sándor Street and Calvin Square and set them afame. The attack grew steadily stronger, and the commander of the guard reported several times that it was impossible to resist the pressure. But each time he was ordered to keep back the crowd without firing.

In spite of the fact that the guard had received some reinforcements, the situation became ever more dangerous.

About half past eleven, a volley was discharged from the street through the main door at Bródy Sándor Street into the courtyard. A major and another officer, who were in the courtyard, were killed at that time. Even then, the guard did not retaliate in kind.

Later the firing became ever keener. As was established from bullet marks on the building coming from several directions, armed rebels had completely surrounded all the five buildings of the Radio. During the course of the night, as the shooting obliged us to flee from room to room, it became clear that we were being fired at from every surrounding building. The attackers hid in several apartment houses on Bródy Sándor Street, further in the National Museum, on the upper floors of the houses in Szentkirályi Street and Museum Street. The intensity of the firing surprised even the demonstrators, and panic-stricken people could be seen running away from the streets.

The firing from the house floors revealed itself by the flashes from the muzzles. This very heavy shooting went on incessantly throughout the night.

The attackers began to penetrate into the buildings through the attic, the cellars and by way of other buildings at about seven in the morning and, with the aid of well-organized methods, they occupied the Radio completely by 10 a.m.

From the course of the events, we established that we had to do with a purposeful armed attack which had been prepared and organized well in advance. The firing positions of the attackers were set up in such a way that they could shoot into almost every room of the five buildings that could suitably be reached from outside.

When the shooting began, I and several colleagues of mine were in the building on Pushkin Street. As the intensity of the firing increased, we had to seek safety from the bullets by going from room to room. The attack was particularly violent from the direction of the building at the corner of Bródy Sándor Street and Pushkin Street, because this offered an opportunity of firing into the garden, where — as far as we know — there were many casualties.
At half past eight in the morning we were captured in an inner room of the Studio Building and, together with the guards who had been disarmed in that part of the building, were escorted to the garage as prisoners amidst coarse threats and beating.*

The armed group which captured us was for the most part composed of older elements that displayed a threatening attitude and apparently belonged to the criminal underworld. There was a single young man of student-like appearance, who was ready to save us but could not do so because of the menacing attitude of the others. We were led among the 50 to 60 disarmed AVO-men who were in the garage. Another armed man who also looked like a student saved us from this hopeless situation. He came to us civilians (there were three of us) and said: “Sorry, this is not what we wanted,” and pointed to the corpses of those who had been killed in the fight at night and were lying in the courtyard. At our request he pointed his Tommy gun at us and led us into the cellar, whence we escaped from the Radio Building through the courtyard of the neighbouring house.

(From the recollections of N.N.)

The main question — assuming that this really is the main question — is when and from which side the firing around the Radio premises first began. To establish this, I am trying to compile a chronology of events. Of course, I cannot assume responsibility for the accuracy of each instant, since the night appeared to be extremely long, and terrible events took place every minute, so that the importance of these minutes, at least for the eyewitness, was enormously magnified. But let us look at the chronology:

Half past five. — Beginning of demonstration before the Radio.
Between 6 and 7 p.m. — Efforts from above to calm down the crowd, to speak to them from the balcony, or from the top of the cutters’ car out in the street; selection of delegations, arrival of military reinforcements by way of the garage door in Museum Street.

Between 7 and 8 p.m. — Negotiations with the delegations, new efforts to appease the crowd from the balcony, attempts to make use of the influence of Losonczy, Gimes and possibly of Imre Nagy; infiltration through the windows of the Radio; smashing of the Bródy Sándor Street door. The security policemen on guard drive back the demonstrators from the doorway bare-handed, by main force.

Between 8 and 9 p.m. — The pressure in front of the Sándor Street façade increases, and we learn that the building is threatened also from the direction of Pollák Mihály Square. Tear-gas bombs are exploding, the crowd before the door is held back by means of a garden hose, the demonstrators are throwing bricks, exploded tear-gas bombs, and probably bottles filled with petrol into the rooms on the first floor; the furniture in one of the rooms takes fire. The security policemen clear Sándor Street up to the corner of Pushkin and Szentkirályi Streets, and set up a cordon around the corner. All this takes place without either direct firing, or warning shots, but a great number of defenders are wounded through the hail of stones. I do not know whether there are any wounded on the side of the demonstrators, or, if so, how many.

Between 9 and 10 p.m. — Arrival of new military reinforcements. The crowd which has been driven back from Sándor Street is making an attempt from the direction of Pollák Mihály Square, pressure is increasing there, the cracking of firearms can already be heard. According to orders received, the armed forces may only fire warning shots. Soldiers say they have been fired at from the garden of the Museum. Cars parking in the street are set afire. The cutters’ car, which was used in breaking the door, has been dragged into the courtyard. From Museum Boulevard two armoured cars arrive, behind which the demonstrating “infantry” flows back towards the Sándor Street front. The armoured cars have parked just before the door and serve as cover, from behind which the door will later be kept under fire throughout the night.

Between 10 and 12 p.m. — The only weapons used by the units defending the Radio are still tear-gas bombs and the water-hose. In the street, however, the cracking of firearms is increasing. But at this time only rifle and revolver shots can be heard, the attackers have no hand-grenades, machine guns and submachine guns. Now and then we already hear the fire of Tommy guns. Among us Major Magyar of the State Security Authority is the first to be killed. Magyar went out before the door, trying to induce the crowd to

* Major Fehér, one of the commanders of the armed forces, after having been captured, was beaten to death in the director’s office.
disperse. His revolver was in his pistol-case, not in his hand. Someone in the crowd shot him dead. When he was brought in, the other officers checked the magazine of his revolver to establish whether he had fired. The magazine was untouched. This was at about half past ten. As far as I can remember, it was at that time that the soldiers were ordered to fire warning shots into the air.

In any case, it is a fact that at that time we were already under steady fire from various weapons. Firing occurred especially through the Sándor Street entrance from behind the armoured car, and time and again attempts were made to enter by force, under cover of fire. Heavy crackling could be heard also from the direction of Pollák Mihály Square, and shorter rounds were fired at the Museum Street façade. I do not know what the situation at the Szentkirályi Street façade was at that time. The windows looking on the street could not be approached, and we all retired to the courtyard side, most of us into the room of Mrs. Benke.

Our expectation that they would soon run out of ammunition and that the situation would calm down by midnight, was a vain hope. As time went by, the firepower of the attackers continued to increase. About eleven o'clock explosions of hand-grenades and later rounds of machine-gun and submachine-gun fire were heard.

Since the defence units did not fire and remained generally passive, the attackers were able undisturbedly to occupy the most favourable positions. Thus, on the Bródy Sándor Street side, they took up firing positions on the street. By about twelve o'clock, we were completely encircled and kept under increasingly heavy fire. Sándor Street also began to become less crowded, those demonstrators who did not want to take up arms dispersed.

The actual, armed, systematic attack on the Radio began about midnight. From that time onwards, it became difficult to leave even through the door of the Museum Street garage. A group consisting mostly of women still managed to go away at half past twelve, the rest got stuck in the house until the surrender of the Radio.

I realize the controversial nature of the question: who fired first? A great number of vague and tendentious rumours and atrocity tales regarding the fight around the Radio have been circulating. I know that already at about 8 p.m. sundy individuals and various groups on lorries were rushing throughout the capital, shouting: "The AVO-men are massacring people around the Radio." Those who spread this false rumour did it with the obvious intention of drawing an ever increasing crowd to the Radio and to incite the passions to the point where bloodshed would be bound to take place. In short, this was the work of the counter-revolutionaries. The units defending the Radio were ordered by their headquarters to open fire at half past twelve. At half past twelve, the demonstrators somehow managed to send up another larger delegation into Mrs. Benke's room. Here the soldiers told the delegation they had been ordered to fire. They requested it to go back and report that in twenty minutes the units defending the Radio would start the fight against the attackers. I remember the pale and alarmed faces of the delegates. They explained that they could not prevent the attackers from firing, they could not influence them. Mrs. Benke later related that two members of the delegation had declared that, since they could do nothing more in the street, they would remain in the building and defend the Radio together with the soldiers...

Though I am no military expert, I can confirm also as a layman that the military action against the Radio was well prepared. He or those who directed it knew the terrain well and correctly indicated the best firing positions. The overwhelming majority of those who fought around the Radio probably had no idea how to move and which posts to occupy as key positions in this labyrinth of buildings, where sundry reconstruction work had produced an extremely complicated system of corridors. But the leaders were able to issue orders on the basis of previously elaborated military plans. The tactics followed were: to drive back the defenders into an ever smaller circle, or, more exactly, to reduce the formations defending the Radio to ever smaller, isolated units. These tactics were successful. In the evening, the siege began from the neighbouring houses, in the early morning hours, firing positions were already being taken up on the roofs and floors of the buildings belonging to the Radio. The passage-ways and the corridors leading from one section of the building complex to another were kept under fire, as were the staircases, so that the defenders could not get from one floor to another. The rebels had at their disposal arms and ammunition in apparently unlimited quantities, that is, their supplies were steadily replenished in an organized manner. We who were in the Radio were short of ammunition ever since half past twelve, i.e., from the very beginning of the siege. I can affirm that the military command of
the besiegers was more united and better conceived than that of
the defenders. For the defence units were recruited, aside from the
reinforced security police guard, from various formations. Charac-
teristic of the military weakness of the defence was that they “se-
cured” only the building itself, but — in spite of repeated sugges-
tions of such outsiders as myself — made no effort to occupy the
roofs, let alone the neighbouring houses. In other words, they
allowed themselves — we allowed ourselves — to be driven into a
mousetrap...

From the Statement of One of the Commanders
of the Radio’s Defence Forces

I arrived with a company of the armed forces at the Bródy Sán-
dor Street Building of the Radio at 3 p.m.

As long as the procession lasted, there was quiet and calm in
the building. The first demonstrating groups in Bródy Sándor
Street appeared at about six or half past six in the afternoon. The
crowd grew ever bigger and became more and more aggressive.
It did not move off in spite of warnings and, therefore, we began
to disperse it by forming a “wedge” and using tear-gas bombs.
Later we fired warning shots, whereupon the Bródy Sándor Street
became empty on two occasions. But seeing that we were only
firing into the air, they came back and thereafter refused to give
way.

The first sporadic shots with ball-cartridges were fired by the
rebels from Bródy Sándor Street and almost simultaneously from
the direction of the National Museum through the Palota Garden
at 7:30 p.m. They were aimed at the upstairs windows at which
many people were standing at that time.

This first attack with firearms caused several victims. Over
twenty of the guard had been killed by the time we received the
order to fire.

As a result of our heavy volleys, the street became empty for
a while, but by then the houses and roofs opposite were occupied
and we were fired at from there. Machine guns were in action not
only from Bródy Sándor Street, but from housetops in Szentkirályi
Street as well... Infantry fire continued until 3 a.m. Then there
was a brief lull. Rebels who had infiltrated through the railing of

the Palota Garden began to assault the interior of the building.
The remaining members of the guard were forced into the cellar.
We stayed there until Friday morning. On Thursday night the
building was assaulted by tanks. Armoured troops of the Govern-
ment under the command of Lieutenant-General Solymosi recap-
tured the building by 6 a.m.

In the Studio Building the rebels broke open the cupboards,
plundered the offices and carried away the valuable technical
installation. The garden and the floor of the guard-room were
strewed with the remains of the preceding days of struggle, corpses,
remnants of uniforms and weapons, thousands of metres of tape
recordings, broken gramophone records.

At 3 p.m., upon orders from my superiors, I withdrew the
reinforced guard and handed the building over to a government unit
composed of pupils from the Dózsa Infantry Officers’ School.

Major K.N.

How Major of the Army Kovács Was Killed in the Course
of the Attack Against the Studio

(related by Captain Z.E., lecturer at the Petöfi Military
Academy)

About 10 p.m. two Hungarian tanks arrived one of which
stopped before the entrance to the Studio, right at the door. After
that, there was relative calm for an hour or an hour and a half
(shot and explosions were heard now and then). For reasons
unknown to me, the tank left its position before the door at about
half past eleven. The crowd in the street then began to pour in.
We, who were standing in the doorway — about ten in all — sprang
forward to block their path, without using our weapons, with bare
hands. Then already I saw Tommy guns in the hands of two civilians
who stood in front. One of them fired at us immediately, and Major
Kovács, who stood by my side, was killed. On seeing the murder,
the crowd came to a sudden stop, two or three of the civilians
came in, picked up Major Kovács and carried him into a small
room in the courtyard of the Studio, where they laid him down.
When Kovács died (his death was instantaneous owing to a shot
in the head), there were already several wounded among the AVOMen. (They were hurt partly by stones, partly by shots.) Somewhere behind, on the Museum side, civilians were also firing at about half past eleven. This was when the organized siege of the Studio began, lasting until half past nine in the morning. It must be admitted that from the military point of view the defence of the Studio was miserably bad. In the cellar of the Studio there was a back door, which was not defended, and the rebels flocked in through it later. A proper defence would have required the occupation of the surrounding houses. But these fell into the hands of the rebels. They kept the whole building of the Studio under fire from the opposite and neighbouring houses. It was apparent that those who had organized the attack on the Studio had a thorough knowledge of the premises. The rebels had a huge quantity of arms, including machine guns, and heaps of ammunition...

**Role of the National Museum in the Siege of the Radio**

As eyewitnesses relate, on October 23, the day of the attack on the Radio, a great many armed men invaded the garden of the Museum already at half past six in the afternoon. The doorkeeper guarded the Bródy Sándor Street door of the Museum, and though the armed men tried several times to enter by force, he prevented them from doing so. While fulfilling his duty, he also was fired at through the window of his lodge, facing the garden. He was able to hold the building until midnight, but after that time, the rear gate of the Museum, which looks onto Museum Street, was broken open by the armed men, and the building was overrun. They might have been led by someone familiar with the place, for they went straight to the backstairs and right up into the secluded Archaeological Library, the windows of which look out on the Radio Building. From there they began to shoot at the Radio. Thus, the counter-revolutionary groups used the massive buildings as a strategic position and were thus directly responsible for the ravages in the Museum. After the events, basketfuls of empty cartridges, grenade fuses and hand-grenades were collected in the Archaeological Library, in the exhibition rooms, etc. In one of the rooms two bottles filled with petrol were found. A breach was made in the shutters of one of the windows facing the Radio, to serve as a firing position. Here also there were heaps of all sorts of empty cartridges.

On October 24 at dawn, a new group dressed in Hungarian soldiers' uniforms took possession of the building. At half past one in the afternoon of the same day the building was discovered to be in flames. Because of the fight raging around the building, the fire-brigade could set to work only the next morning. But the struggle against the fire met great difficulties owing to the continued street fighting. The fire-brigade was several times compelled to retire because of the heavy firing. Snipers fired at the fire-brigade in order to hinder their work.

By Thursday night the fire had been mastered by the heroic efforts of the fire-brigade. Meantime the world-famous collection of minerals, the palaeontological collection, and the very popular African Exhibition had been destroyed; collections and libraries of inestimable value had become the prey of the flames.
The Attack on the
József Telephone Exchange

Report of the Eyewitness O. K.

On October 23, I reached home at 6:30 p.m. In the streets, I had encountered unusually many people and I had noticed gathering crowds on the Ferenc and József Boulevards. At the corner of Baross Street and József Boulevard, exceptionally large numbers of people were standing around, engaged in loud conversation. The scene, as compared to the usual circumstances, was very conspicuous. As my conference at the University Correspondence School was fixed for October 25 and 26, I turned my back on the crowd and went home. I studied until about seven or eight o'clock and then went down to buy beer in the refreshment room at the corner of the Boulevard. I never got as far as buying beer, because here at the Square of the 32nd Regiment I ran into a large mass of people; the special edition of the Irodalmi Ujság (Literary Gazette) was being sold, and there was a general scramble for it. Finally the remaining numbers were snatched away from the newsboy and distributed among the crowd. The special edition consisted of a single page, but I still do not know what it contained. After that I returned home. Between eleven and twelve, my neighbour, P.J., awakened us, and I and my wife went over to P.J.'s flat. Two windows of his flat looked out on Horváth Mihály Square. We posted ourselves at the two windows and from there watched the events which took place before our eyes.

At first we saw only 30 to 40 armed men running about. They stopped and seized all sorts of vehicles passing by.

It happened also that this or that chauffeur refused to drive the car, in which case he was chased away. One or two counter-revolutionaries got in each car and rode away in various directions. Several passenger cars and motor-lorries, as well as two ambulances were seized in this manner. At one o'clock in the morning — the Telephone Exchange was already surrounded since 11 p.m. — three lorries arrived with armed civilians wearing grey steel helmets. Each lorry was packed with about 40 people standing close side by side. The newly arriving armed men were received by those who had been there for some time and were directed by them towards the main entrance of the Telephone Exchange and towards the trellis iron-gate. The armed men were thus divided up between these two places. National flags appeared one after another and various slogans could be heard. Large crowds began to throng before the two entrances. This chaos continued for approximately one hour, but in the meantime we heard one of the counter-revolutionaries say: "Throw in a tri-two, and the door will immediately open." Meanwhile a black BMW passenger car appeared time and again; it came to the Horváth Mihály Square every 10 or 15 minutes; after a short stop it went away through Futó Street and then came back again. It always stopped for a short while — very likely those who were inside were giving instructions — and then drove away. On top of the car there was a large national flag. The Telephone Exchange was occupied by the counter-revolutionaries at about 2 a.m. Of this action we saw only how two soldiers and one policeman were disarmed and sent off in the direction of Futó Street. In addition, five civilian employees, who in our opinion had been sent out from the Telephone Exchange, also went towards Futó Street. Then two of the three lorries, packed with armed men, went away through Baross Street in the direction of Calvin Square. Thus, the Telephone Exchange remained occupied by about forty armed people, in addition there also remained those who were previously in the street and continued to stop the cars that passed by there.

On October 24, at about 5 a.m., a small state security group recaptured the Telephone Exchange with a couple of shots, and kept it occupied for three or four additional days. This group not only held the Telephone Exchange itself, but also maintained order on the square. Day and night the counter-revolutionaries carried out sporadic assaults against the Telephone Exchange. Their gathering places were at the corner of the Mátra Restaurant on Kisstáció Street and an empty lot on Futó Street. From here, groups of eight
or ten kept firing at the Telephone Exchange for an hour at a time. But the security police did not return their fire. The armed groups would then disappear by way of Futó Street.

On October 25, at 4 p.m., two groups again began to fire at the Telephone Exchange from the two places mentioned above. Each group had a German "lightning" machine gun, and used up two boxes of ammunition. Then they too went off through Futó Street. This process kept on continuously. When the Government dissolved the formations of the State Security Authority, the security policemen were relieved by soldiers wearing arm-bands. But what is of interest is the fact that this formation also was constantly attacked by counter-revolutionary groups. On Horváth Mihály Square, one man was killed in the fight. He had jumped upon a tank and opened the fuel container, but a member of the guard before the gate of the Telephone Exchange fired a round at him and killed him. In Kisstáció Street a woman was shot dead. Who killed her, I do not know. On the Square of the 32nd Regiment lay the corpses of a security policeman and two civilians. At the time of the attack on the Party House at "Republic" (Köztársaság) Square, some 50 or 60 armed men came out of Futó Street, provided with machine guns and Tommy guns, and went off to József Boulevard in the direction of Rákóczi Square.

* * *

The attack on the Telephone Exchange took place simultaneously with the attack on the Radio. The tactics were the same. A misled and excited crowd, which had been organized well in advance, was induced to demonstrate before and around the building to be attacked. Taking advantage of the confusion, some small armed groups set to work, stopping and commandeering all sorts of cars. In the meantime, organized armed groups took their place around the building to be attacked, and then, before midnight, began to fire volleys at the Radio and the Telephone Exchange — almost simultaneously. From all this it is clear that the uprising was well organized and militarily prepared and directed.

Leaders of the Buda Insurgents

The military leaders of the counter-revolutionary uprising also organized the rebel units in Buda. The investigation has established that on October 24 they disposed of the following units:

1. the Óbuda group,
2. the Rózsadomb group,
3. the Széna Square group, and
4. the Gellért Hill group.

The command over "the Buda units" was exercised by a certain Emánuel Buttkovszky, a demobilized lieutenant of the People's Army, who had been appointed to this post by a centre calling itself the "Revolutionary Union." His deputy was Dénes Kovács, a former lieutenant of the Horthy army. One of the rivals of Buttkovszky was a certain Kemal Ekren, an émigré from Yugoslavia, who headed the group at Széna Square. Another leader of the Széna Square group was János Szabó. Both Ekren and Szabó belonged to the organization directed by the "National Revolutionary Committee" of Dudas.

The area of activity of the particular groups was divided into "districts." In each "district" there was a band of 80 to 350 members. Each "district" had a commander and a deputy commander. This structure was later modified in harmony with the changing situation and as a result of rivalry and differences between particular groups and their leaders.

The group on Gellért Hill was in contact with the rebel units in Rákóczi Street and Múzeum Boulevard, enabling them to keep the area between them under co-ordinated fire. The group at Óbuda was similarly in contact with the rebel units on Róbert Károly Boulevard.
The most important of the units in Buda was that at Széna Square. Its sphere of activity extended from the Margaret Bridge up to the Buda end of the Suspension Bridge, including a considerable part of Castle Hill, the area of the Vérmező, the Városmajor and Marcibányi Square.

Before the beginning of the uprising the whole group in Buda disposed of approximately two hundred trained armed men, whose number is said to have increased to 1,200 in two days. They received and, in part, procured their arms in different ways. On October 24, they got hold of weapons near the Margaret Bridge in the following manner: In the company of two armed "military patrols," they stopped several military lorries approaching the bridge, whereupon at the sound of a whistle armed rebels in civilian clothing assaulted the lorries, pointed their guns at the soldiers sitting in them and disarmed them. The weapons seized in this manner were carried to their base at Széna Square.

This particular action on October 24 was directed by Dénes Kovács in person. He asked Major D., who was on duty in the Bem barracks, for "at least 20 or 25 soldiers" to assist in actions of this kind. In order to give more weight to his request, he promised: "If you do me this favour, Major, I can assure you that by tomorrow you will no longer be Comrade D., but a real gentleman in the true sense of the word." (Major D. rejected this offer.) Undoubtedly, a considerable part of those who joined the uprising did not wish the old Horthyites and their henchmen once more to lord it over the people as "gentlemen." A good many of them were caught in the meshes of this net, nevertheless.

Negotiations with the Rebels at Széna Square

On October 27, Major D. was ordered to approach the rebels at Széna Square and negotiate their surrender, granting free departure to those who would lay down their arms. Major D. first contacted Buttkovszky and Dénes Kovács, and went in their company to the rebels at Széna Square. Buttkovszky and Dénes Kovács attended the negotiations in their capacity of representatives of the "Revolutionary Union."

The morale of the rebels had been largely undermined by that time. An ever increasing proportion of those who had joined in good faith, became sceptical about the real aims of the uprising and about their real leaders, and a great number of them deserted. In this situation Buttkovszky and Kovács, seeing that further bloodshed was useless and believing that the group under Béla Király which was already directing the newly formed armed units of the Government would soon gain the upper hand, accepted the guarantee of free departure and supported the surrender. They could do it all the more confidently because the organs of the government's armed forces, i.e. Béla Király and his associates, were already rearming those who had laid down their arms, as members of the "National Guard."

The majority of the leaders of the Széna Square group — Major D. reported — were prepared to lay down their arms. But Ekren and his associates declared they had "definite instructions from leaders higher up to continue fighting." There was a clash between Ekren and Buttkovszky. The latter declared that only he had the right to give instructions to the units in Buda. On the other hand, Ekren declared that Buttkovszky could not give him orders because he "received his instructions through the Budapest legations of the Western Great Powers." Ekren even named the three legations he received his instructions from. He declared the legations had assured him: "By tomorrow reinforcements will have arrived from Western Germany." His group also hoped for the arrival of UN troops. Ekren further declared that they did not recognize the Government of Imre Nagy — as the representative of which Major D. was carrying on the negotiations. He told Major D.: "We have no need of a single minister in the whole Government, not even of Béla Kovács, because we already have suitable men for all portfolios."

The whole Széna Square "general staff" were unanimous in not recognizing the Imre Nagy Government, but the majority of them protested against Ekren's plan of forming a separate government.

The surrender negotiations had not yet been concluded, when about three-fourths of the insurgents had already laid down their arms and had used the opportunity to withdraw freely. Those who still pinned their hopes on the arrival of reinforcements from the West continued the fight, and, violating the truce which served as the basis for negotiations, one of their detachments opened fire on a
Soviet patrol and a Soviet medical detachment which had come to remove wounded Soviet soldiers. The Soviet troops, however, did not retaliate against this provocation. The disarming of the insurgents continued. The students turned in their arms in the student hostel beside the Mátyás Church. The insurgents who had taken up positions in the vicinity of the Tárogató Street Trade Union School also laid down their arms. The units of the Bem Square barracks liquidated the base of the Széna Square group.

The Cease-fire and Its Consequences.

The reinforcements promised in the West — the speedy arrival of which Ekren had stressed — actually came. The arming of a large part of the political and common criminals released from the prisons and their assignment to the various insurgent detachments constituted an appropriate and more “reliable” reinforcement for the counter-revolutionaries than the well-intentioned students, however useful they might be for the purpose of misleading the young people. The Ekren group received their most important aid, however, from the Imre Nagy Government’s “cease-fire policy,” which, in practice, meant capitulation to the insurgents. The consequence was that during the afternoon of October 28, the military guard sent from the Bem Square barracks was withdrawn from the Széna Square base of the insurgents, which was again taken over by the Ekren group, thus enabling the Ekren-Szabó detachment to resume its activities without interference.

Then Ekren and his associates went into the Bem Square barracks to conclude an agreement concerning the cease-fire. Ekren began his negotiation thus: “Let us be brief in our negotiations, because if I do not return by 11 p.m., my men will open fire on the military units.” He declared that the terms would be dictated by them, since the cease-fire “has been requested by the Government, and this is a sign of the Government’s weakness.”

One of the main points of the cease-fire terms was that the insurgents — in keeping with Maléter’s appeal — should transform themselves into a “national guard.” They debated about the composition of the patrols. The representatives of the army wanted patrols consisting of one insurgent, one soldier, and one policeman, each. Ekren, on the other hand, demanded that the patrols should contain two insurgents and one soldier or one policeman, that is, his men should be in the majority. Finally they compromised on a one to one basis (one insurgent and one soldier, or one insurgent and one policeman). Upon Ekren’s demand, the agreement also provided that food and medical consignments sent for them from the International Red Cross should be delivered to them directly and without hindrance.

On October 29, the Széna Square detachment — reduced in numbers, but armed with various automatic weapons manufactured in the West — once more took up the firing positions which they had been forced to give up earlier. Then Ekren and Szabó again went to the Bem barracks as representatives of their group and demanded that the cease-fire agreement be annulled. Ekren explained that he had visited one of the Western legations, where he had been “seriously rebuked” for accepting such terms. Szabó, on the other hand, proposed, as supplementary terms, that the arms and ammunition confiscated before the cease-fire be returned to them. No new agreement was concluded, but Ekren’s detachment worked out extensive plans for the seizure of Communist functionaries and they set about carrying them out. The Ekren—Szabó group occupied the Maros Street barracks of the State Security Authority and brought to this base everybody assigned to the State Security Authority as well as Party functionaries whom they captured. The Buttkovszky detachment made the building of the Military Tribunal and Prison in Fő Street its main headquarters. On November 4, the Soviet troops released about 150 AVO-men and Communist functionaries from the Maros Street barracks and 107 Party functionaries and several hundred AVO-men from the Fő Street Prison. The intervention of the Soviet troops prevented the counter-revolutionary detachments from carrying their terrorist plans to completion.
Counter-revolutionaries in the Hospitals

Counter-revolutionary Centre in the Péterffy Sándor Street Hospital

On November 17, a militia detachment discovered a group of about 150 persons of dubious reputation in the air-raid shelters of the Péterffy Sándor Street Hospital. Among them were 28 individuals, convicted for various crimes, prostitutes who frequented the "Sportsarnok" Coffee House and the "Fehér Ókör" Tavern, notorious tavern loafers, two foreign citizens and numerous juvenile delinquents.*

In the emergency exit of one of the air-raid shelters of the Péterffy Sándor Street Hospital a disguised radio transmitting and receiving set was found. The radio was tuned to Salzburg and was in contact with Radio Free Europe. In one of the rooms not far from this emergency exit, traces of mimeograph ink were discovered, from which it was assumed that seditious leaflets had been produced in the basement. In the course of further investigation, four mimeograph machines, two typewriters, one typewriter with Cyrillic letters, ink and other mimeograph equipment were found, concealed under hospital records. In this room there was a stock of about 4 1/2 quintals of mimeographing paper.

The counter-revolution made up its seditious leaflets in this air-raid shelter and the persons hiding here were used to distribute them. These leaflets carried sundry signatures. Leaflets inciting to strike action were fraudulently issued in the name of the youth of Újpest and Kőbánya, of the Csépeli workers, the building workers and the steel workers. The militia thus discovered and liquidated in this hospital one of the counter-revolutionary propaganda centres in Pest.

But there was more here than just a propaganda centre.

In the air-raid shelters of the hospital an enormous quantity of clothing was found, which had been stolen during the looting of the Divatcsarnok (Fashion Department Store), although, according to witnesses, a large part of the stolen goods had already been removed.

The group hidden in the hospital had also established a cache there, from which they distributed arms and ammunition. In cars disguised with red crosses, they carried arms, food and seditious leaflets to various sections of the capital. Part of the arms were found in a fuel-retailing store at Péterffy Sándor Street 19, opposite the hospital. Here were concealed a number of submachine guns, hand-grenades, rifles and a small pistol. Another part was hidden in the neighbouring premises of the Fitting Industry Enterprise at Garai Street 10. The arms were kept under the stage of the auditorium belonging to the enterprise. In this hiding place the militia found 142 loaded submachine guns ready for use, four automatic rifles, 70 rifles, 14 pistols, nearly 350 hand-grenades fitted with percussion caps and 4 1/2 quintals of ammunition.

During the investigation, further clues led to a student hostel across the road, in which were found a number of discarded soldiers' uniforms and some looted clothing. In the building behind the hostel at Baross Square 19, a huge quantity of explosives, arms and nearly 15 quintals of mimeographing paper, typewriters and mimeograph machines were found.

One of the armed branches of the Péterffy Sándor Street centre established contact between the Péterffy Sándor Street Hospital and Baross Square 19 by cutting passage-ways through the walls; the latter was the centre of the so-called Baross Square resistance group.

Counter-revolutionary groups also had lodged themselves at Garai Square, in a workers' hostel on the corner of Landler Jenő and Murányi Streets, and in a tavern on the corner of Landler Jenő and Dózsa György Streets. The director and military leader of this group was a signal corps officer who called himself First Lieutenant Tóth. His lieutenants were convicts and former members of the

* Among the criminals, József Németh had been convicted on 12 occasions for burglary, theft, etc.; István Mészáros for theft; Irén Szöllősi for embezzlement and fraud; Béla Majoros and Benjámin Herczeg for embezzlement; Zoltán Vörös for theft and forgery, and Erzsébet András, prostitute, for fraud and theft. József Harlait, an escaped convict, had a long record of previous convictions.
Arrow-Cross Party. For example, one of them — Mihály Pavel — was a drunkard with a criminal record whose task it was to round up and do away with the Communists in the territory in which the group operated.

* * *

Counter-revolutionary sub-centres were established in other hospitals as well, among others in the Újszentjános Hospital, and the Budakeszi Korányi Hospital. The latter, like the one in Péterffy Sándor Street, had at its disposal a number of stolen passenger cars and lorries, under the general direction of a demoted and discharged army officer, Béla Losonczi. From the Péterffy Sándor Street Hospital, the insurgents were provided with false identification documents which enabled them easily to make their way about town with cars displaying Red Cross signs. Under the pretext of conveying wounded men, they hauled food from the kitchen of the hospital, arms and ammunition from the arms cache (in the fuel-retailing store) as well as misleading and seditious leaflets from the basement of the hospital.

**Portrait of a Counter-revolutionary Sadist**

Ilona Gizella Tóth, a hospital intern, became the director of the Péterffy Sándor Street Hospital’s temporary infirmary in Domonkos Street on November first. Already in the early days of the uprising, this young woman physician had gathered about her several armed persons who, led by Miklós Gyöngyösi, a Budapest resident with a criminal record, “hunted” Communists in the neighbouring streets. (After the liberation, Gyöngyösi had spent three and a half years in prison as a war criminal.) As the investigation revealed, Gyöngyösi — whom the counter-revolutionaries nicknamed “Piri” — and his accomplices, on the evening of November 18, intercepted a worker named István Kollár, who had observed them pasting up leaflets in the street. Fearing he would report them to the police, they decided to put the defenceless man to death whereupon Ilona Tóth insisted on doing the job herself. First she put her victim to sleep with chloric ethyl, and, when he was already unconscious, injected benzine into his jugular vein. In her nervousness, the murderess bungled the injection, and the anticipated instant death did not occur.
She then enlisted the aid of her accomplices. Miklós Gyöngyösi and Ferenc Gönczi stepped on the victim's throat and tried to strangle him. When they saw that their victim was still alive, they dragged him into an adjoining room, where the woman physician stabbed him in the heart several times.

The sadistic murderers wrapped the body of their victim in a blanket, carried it down to the Domonkos Street Church and buried it under a large stone slab on the right-hand side of the church. The terrible murder was subsequently discovered and Ilona Tóth and her accomplices were arrested.

* * *

The Péterffy Sándor Street group of counter-revolutionaries continued their activities even after November 4. They printed counter-revolutionary leaflets, published an illegal, seditious newspaper, edited by the journalist Gyula Obersovszky and the writer József Gáli, and tried to murder a graphic artist, László Jagicza, because he opposed the counter-revolutionary activities, inflicting serious wounds.

Firing Positions in the Hospitals

In the hospitals on Üllői Road and in the Rókus Hospital on Rákóczi Street, the insurgents established firing positions against the Soviet troops assisting in putting down the counter-revolution. They set up machine-gun posts in the Bókai János Children's Hospital and the neighbouring square whence they fired on Soviet armoured units.

Armed counter-revolutionaries occupied the roof of the Korányi Hospital on Alsóerdősőr Street also and dominated the neighbourhood with their fire. When the hospital was searched, large quantities of arms and ammunition were found, as well as goods which the counter-revolutionaries had looted from the Divatcsarnok Department Store.

N.J., a patient in the Korányi Hospital, on November 3, related how the insurgents assembled in the ward to listen to the broadcasts of Radio Free Europe, and then held a war council on how best to carry out the instructions received from Radio Free Europe.

A firing position was also established in the Hajnal Clinic on the corner of Üllői Road and Szentkirályi Street. N.B., a patient, related the following about the events there:

"On October 22, the Korean students working at the clinic left it in a group. We do not know the causes which led to this step. (The actual reason was the prevalent nationalist, counter-revolutionary incitement against the Korean students. — Editor) On October 23, a meeting, held for the hospital staff, was addressed by an unknown individual. From then on, Associate Professor S. ceased to attend to his duties and maintained no contact with the patients; in my opinion, he was the chief practical organizer of the armed conspiracy going on in the hospital, although its spiritual author was Associate Professor B.

"About the third day of the armed uprising, a large number of strange persons of disreputable appearance came into the hospital, all of whom received white coats and remained in the building. Women also came in frequently — as far as I know from Corvin Alley — and acted the part of patients. Some of them would occasionally stay overnight, but always left the next day.

"The Soviet troops were fired at from the fourth floor of the hospital. The quarters of the doctors and hospital staff are situated on the fourth floor. It was my impression that the insurgents in the hospital collaborated with insurgents in the neighbouring house. They generally opened fire on the Soviet troops from two sides at once. Collaboration between the two attacking groups could be deduced also from the fact that Associate Professor S. once issued a very emphatic warning to the patients in the ward not to light any cigarette near the window. Presumably the striking of a match may have been an agreed signal, since smoking in the wards is prohibited and is not customary."

* * *

Reports, investigations and eyewitnesses all go to prove that the insurgents deliberately abused the red cross symbol by using it to disguise their hostile activities and looting. They frequently made hospitals the scene of armed resistance, and converted them into storehouses for looted goods and centres of the counter-revolution.
The Insurgent Group at the Continental Hotel

Opposite the Continental Hotel is the army recruiting centre for the VIIth District. The officers on duty here remained on the premises day and night from October 23 on.

Captain V., one of the higher-ranking officers at the centre, described the happenings as follows:

"After the attack on the Radio at about 10 o'clock, we noticed for the first time that arms were being carried to the Hungária Baths in lorries. (This bathing establishment is next to the Continental Hotel.) After the arrival of the first lorries, unarmed groups came and, a few minutes later, departed equipped with arms, in the direction of the Radio. The establishment is in Dohány Street, in a rather cramped area, so that the hastily established arms cache was easily secured against attack. The hauling of arms and the arming of groups went steadily from then on. This traffic was carried on not only by lorries of the TEFU transport agency. On the first night we already saw a car marked with red crosses which stopped time and again at the corners of Dohány and Kazinczy Streets, and Dohány and Sip Streets, and from which ammunition and arms were distributed to groups gathered round it.

"The food supply of the newly formed armed groups was also quickly organized. Beginning with October 24, they were regularly supplied with food and drink.

"But the insurgents looked to their needs on their own initiative too. At dawn on the 25th, a lorry drove into Nyár Street carrying 16 armed persons. A detachment from the recruiting centre launched a sudden attack on them and succeeded in capturing a number of them. One of those captured was Tamás Bindler, resident of Solyomárh, who had previously been convicted for burglary. The captured persons were under the influence of drink and each of them had on three or four trousers, new shoes, new coats, new underwear, etc. They even had provisions for the future. In the lorry were found nylon goods, gloves, scarves, children's gloves, caps, balloon-cloth coats, overcoats, shoes and boots. The recruiting centre detachment also found a sizable quantity of wine and brandy.

"The insurgents used not only the Hungária Baths but also the Rókus Hospital and Rókus Chapel as arms caches. The hauling of arms to these places began in the early days of the uprising, and the tower of the Rókus Chapel was turned into an observation point. The Rókus Chapel lies in a strategic position. Its thick old walls offer protection, the surrounding area can be easily observed from its tower and several streets can be held effectively under fire from weapons placed in the tower. The insurgents made good use of this possibility. On the 24th already, they fired on armoured cars passing by. It was then that the tower received its first hit.

"There was organized co-operation and planned co-ordination between the individual groups. Each operated as far as possible within its own area, but it would venture into other districts now and then on a pillaging foray.

"On October 27, when the organization of the National Guard began, the high command established contact with the individual groups in order to recruit them. The leaders of the groups, however, were unwilling to negotiate. They did not recognize any higher authority. Thus all negotiations were fruitless.

"After the 30th the activities of the armed groups became more and more uninhibited. They felt that the power was now theirs.

"After November first, their number was increased by a new group. A company of 80 or 90 men and women came from the VIIIth and IXth districts. These people had hardly established themselves, when they already went into action. They broke open and looted a state food store on the corner of Nyár and Rákóczi Streets and distributed part of the goods among the passers-by. Later they robbed the premises of a Handicrafts Co-operative shop producing for export and set fire to it in order to conceal the evidence. Although the flames endangered the apartments on the floors above the shop, occupied by numerous families, with some 70 children, who were threatened with homelessness at the approach of winter, the incendiaries repeatedly fired on the unarmed civilians attempting to put out the blaze. Within two days, they set fire to the
premises of the Handicrafts Co-operative shop four times, but thanks to the efforts of the neighbouring residents the rest of the building was saved.

"The Quality Department Store was also seized. The marauders hauled goods to the Continental Hotel for several days, and on November 4, they set fire to the store in four places and used their weapons to prevent every effort to save it.

"On the morning of November 5, the Garment Store not far away was set on fire. Most of the goods having been carried off during the night, a barrel of gasoline was thrown into the shop and set ablaze by means of incendiary bullets.

"The insurgents held grand orgies in the hotel and generously distributed the looted goods to the disreputable women accompanying them.

"On November 8, an armoured car went past the hotel and was fired on from the building. Not long afterwards, tanks and infantry arrived at the hotel. The infantry was met with bursts of fire. Then the tanks fired several shots into the building, and the advancing infantry no longer encountered any resistance. The insurgents had escaped through a rear entrance and through basement windows, leaving their loot behind. The police found two and a half million forints worth of looted goods."

Counter-revolutionary Activity at the University of Arts and Sciences

During the last days of October, the "Revolutionary Committee of the Hungarian Intelligentsia" carried on a vigorous campaign at the Law Faculty. It is not the purpose of this report to describe and characterize the activities of this body. Undoubtedly, there were members — perhaps the majority — who did not understand the slogan of "revolution" as a mask for counter-revolution, who rejected the restoration not only of a Mindszenty type of capitalism but even of a bourgeois democratic system. It is also certain that using this body of mixed composition as a screen, all those who saw eye to eye with the adherents of Mindszenty and the Western imperialists conducted their activities more and more openly.

The activities of the counter-revolutionary elements operating under the cover of the "Revolutionary Committee of the Hungarian Intelligentsia" are brought to light by the report of Major Sz., a member of the Department of Military Instruction at the Law Faculty, as well as by other reports.

The lecturers at the Department of Military Instruction at the Law Faculty split into two camps. "The principal political leader," reported the major, "was First Lieutenant Decsi. First Lieutenant Decsi had suffered on account of his father who had been classified as a kulak. He had been previously assigned to the chief of staff, but had been reassigned as first lieutenant to lecture at the university, a position of lesser importance. (On the 25th we learned that his father had owned 180 holds of land as a manorial steward.)" On the situation that developed at the Department of Military Instruction, the major reported the following:

"On the 28th, as I was entering, a man in civilian clothes, whose name I do not know, went into the office of the department. He greeted Lieutenant Colonel J. warmly and Lieutenant
Colonel J. introduced him as a former classmate of his and of Béla Király's from the old Horthy military academy, a colonel of the general staff. He added that Béla Király had summoned several of his former colleagues. They would come to the department, and we were to make room for them, so that they could work. Later, another man of about 60 years of age arrived and introduced himself as a quartermaster colonel. The two men began to type identification papers for each other, indicating where each had fought, without regard for his own life, and how many men each had had under his command."

Attached to the "Revolutionary Committee of the Hungarian Intelligentsia", a military group was set up. The extent reports give no details as to who organized it and for what purpose. This group evidently became a centre for Horthyite and other elements. Their main slogan was struggle against the Soviet troops. Under this nationalistic slogan representatives of every shade of bourgeois restoration strove to assert themselves. The directing role was in their hands.

The military group organized the university students for participation in the uprising. Mindszenty's clergy also collaborated in this. They did their share in fomenting anti-Soviet and anti-Communist sentiment, by providing the insurgents with food and "inspiration." One participant, army officer N., stated in his report that a guard was organized at the university. The commander of the guard at the Faculty of Arts was G.T., a student. The writer of the report relates that on the evening of the 28th — having become hungry — he inquired about the possibility of getting something to eat, because he had no food with him and did not know where to get any. "G. told me not to worry," he writes, "because the priests had undertaken to feed the university youth and there would be delicious grub." And G. immediately accompanied him to the mess hall. "When we arrived in the mess hall," he continues, "we were surrounded by girls who asked us whether we wanted roast duck or roast goose. I laughed and said I had never been such a big lord, and I didn't care what I got, they should just give me anything. They brought trays with whole roasted ducks and geese sent by the priests. A slip of paper about 3 cm. wide and 15 cm. long was pinned with a toothpick on the back of each duck or goose, and typed on each slip was this message: 'Dear university students, we beg you not to lay down your arms, fight to the last drop of blood and win sacred freedom.' I asked G.T. what this great generosity on the part of the priests meant. I had noticed during the evening that two priests were very busy in the office of the 'Revolutionary Committee of the Hungarian Intelligentsia.' G.T. said: 'The priests told us they had a cold-storage plant, where they could preserve food supplies. The university students were consequently assisting the priests by stopping the lorries which were bringing fattened ducks and geese from the provinces and redirecting them to the priests. There is wine galore,' G.T. said, 'and lemons too, I can take home whatever I like. And cigarettes, any kind I please. The priests have really outdone themselves.'"

**Dr. Guttmann Appears on the Scene**

The spies and agents of the Western imperialists also put in their appearance. On the evening of the 28th, a delegation from Bonn led by a certain Dr. Guttmann, a lawyer, arrived at the Szerb Street building of the University of Arts and Sciences. Guttmann sought one of the officers of the Department of Military Instruction and made the following request:

"I was to go to Vienna with a group of 50 armed men," the officer writes in his report, "and escort the materials he was sending from Vienna to Budapest. I asked him what these materials were, red cross consignments or what? He said yes. I asked him why they had to have an armed escort? The lawyer said he did not want to risk any harm being done to them. I did not undertake to do this job. I referred to the military regulations, to my duties, but the doctor said: 'My good man, everything has been arranged with Béla Király, all you have to do is get started, we have even brought you a passenger car.' What would I do with the driver, I protested, where would I put him, I was never such a big gentleman that I could afford my own car. Dr. Guttmann replied: 'You know how to drive and this will not be a service car, but your private car. Take your pick, we have three Pobedas and a Hudson.' I objected and said, or rather, I asked him not to talk this over with me. I had a commanding officer and he should talk it over with him. Besides I had a family, and I could not leave the country as a soldier. To this he replied I could take my family too, quarters would be provided..."
for us in Vienna. In view of my refusal, he came at least three
times in the evening and tried in every way to persuade me to go. When
he came in at 10:30 p.m., an AVO lieutenant entered the guard
room and reported for guard duty. The lieutenant was in civilian
clothes. He and G.T., the commander of the guard, embraced each
other in greeting, and G.T. immediately signed him up for guard
duty. When I inquired how it happened that they regarded the AVO-
men as enemies, and yet they signed up this lieutenant for guard
duty, G.T. said this man was his close friend. When Dr. Guttmann
arrived at 10:30, he and this lieutenant greeted each other with very
warm affection. I asked Dr. Guttmann to tell me who he was.
He replied: 'Now I can tell you, I am an official of a Western
Intelligence Service.' The AVO lieutenant added that he himself
had been sent to work in AVO and had 'worked at the military
court as an examining prosecutor.'"

Officer N., who wrote this report, then stated that he asked
Dr. Guttmann, since he held such an important position, to tell
him just what the general line of Western policy was. Guttmann
replied:

"Our aim is to establish a neutral zone around the Reds in order
to isolate them, because otherwise they are capable of talking for
half a century about the peaceful coexistence of capitalism and
Communism. This zone would consist of Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary and so forth."

Guttmann also expressed the following opinion:

"The red regime is not in itself the only danger to the civilized
world; if China and India come to terms, then the Arab states might
easily join them, and this would constitute a peril to Western civil-
ization. This prospect is in the forefront of international politics,
and has to be circumvented."

Such then were the elements which obtained greater and
greater influence behind the backs of even the best-intentioned
groups participating in the "Revolutionary Committee." The
Dr. Guttmanns, the Deesi kulaks and their scions, Mindszenty
supporters, all united to utilize the misguided section of the univer-
sity youth, by means of anti-Soviet and nationalistic propaganda,
for their sinister restoration plans.

The "Metropolitan National Committee"
in the Service of the Counter-revolution

In the wake of the helplessness and rapid swing toward the
right of the Imre Nagy Government, the various groups advocating
bourgeois restoration hurriedly made use of the situation to grab
control of the Budapest Municipal Council. As representatives of the
various newly formed and reconstituted parties they formed a so-
called "Metropolitan National Committee." This self-appointed
body proclaimed the dissolution of the lawfully elected Municipal
Council and its Executive Committee and took over power in the
offices of the Municipal Council. Similar events took place in the
individual district councils.

In the formation of the "Metropolitan National Committee,"
two representatives of each of the following parties participated:
1. the Smallholders' Party, 2. the Social Democratic Party, 3. the Hun-
garian Christian Party, 4. the Peasant Party, 5. the Democratic Party,
6. the League of Christian Youth, 7. the Communist Party. Also
included in this "National Committee" was some sort of separate
"youth" representative — not belonging to the League of
Christian Youth.

The inclusion of the Communists in this municipal body of
bourgeois restoration was similar in character to the provisional
tolerance of the Communists in the Imre Nagy Government.

Beside the old coalition parties, the emergence of the Horthyite
"Hungarian Christian Party" was a typical phenomenon in this
organ of restoration. This party would have liked to take up the
heritage of the Christian Party of Budapest during the Horthy regime.
It had barely begun to "organize" itself as a party and occupied a
few office rooms of the Municipal Council (making use of the
typewriters and typists) in order to organize its "national head-
quarters." It assisted the equally new League of Christian Youth,
The November 1 Session

This "National Committee" held its first session on November 1 and its last session on November 2. At both sessions, the right-wing social democrat Péter Bechtler presided. The initial decision of the first session was to restore the office of mayor in place of the Executive Committee of the council, and the old "general assembly" in place of the plenary council. On the motion of the Smallholders' Party, the Committee "elected" as mayor one of the former representatives of the right wing of the old Smallholders' Party, József Kóvágó, and as deputy mayor, Péter Bechtler.

Then Dr. Károly Zajgóvári of the Christian Party hastily moved that "the National Committee should declare that all leading functionaries from department heads upwards should be considered as dismissed." After debating the matter, it was decided to dismiss those "whom the National Committee does not confirm." A subcommittee was elected to examine each case. The subcommittee included a representative of the Smallholders' Party, the Social Democratic Party and the Peasant Party, while no Communist was included. In any case, the purpose was to remove the Communists.

At its first meeting, the "National Committee" debated the "political resolution." Zajgóvári provided the keynote by demanding the cancellation of the Warsaw Treaty. Speaking of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the entire country, he declared: "This is impossible to achieve under international law at this moment, unless the Hungarian Government — bearing in mind that there have been greater violations of treaties in the history of the world and that, in cases of absolute necessity, international law also recognizes the right to violate a treaty — I say, unless the Hungarian Government cancels the Warsaw Treaty with immediate effect." Zajgóvári also dealt with the strike question. "The strike will kill us all," he said, "and if we are unable to break it and to persuade the workers to end the strike, I don't know who among the members of the National Committee can shoulder the responsibility." He added, however: "We can demand that the workers end the strike only if ... the Government cancels the Warsaw Treaty with immediate effect and at the same time declares the neutrality of Hungary."

Nándor Bilkei-Goró (Democratic Party) said of the Warsaw Treaty that its cancellation in the given international situation would be a dangerous step, it would lead to a catastrophe "to which not even Mohács could be compared; we must therefore play very cautiously with this firebrand."

Kálmán Potoczki (Smallholders' Party) declared he had no mandate to speak in the name of his party about such a serious question. He requested a delay of 24 hours in order to clarify this question with his party. On these grounds, it was decided to postpone a decision.

It was on the same day that a decision was reached by the disintegrating Imre Nagy Government and — following the instructions of Radio "Free Europe", which broadcast Zajgóvári's demand — it declared the Warsaw Treaty invalid.

The November 2 Session

The "National Committee" of the capital again dealt first of all with the question of dismissing the Communist leaders. The chairman of the session, Péter Bechtler, declared:

He had held a conference with the department heads. He had said everybody was to continue working and not to worry about anything else. He had not said that all positions from department heads upward were cancelled — he had not said so because this would influence working morale. Naturally, if the leading offices become vacant, the National Committee will see to it that they are filled. The educational department had reported to him that the department head and his deputy had resigned. In view of this situation, it was proposed that Szoboszlai be entrusted with heading this post. Szoboszlai was in other respects an outstanding teacher and had previously headed this department — he had been removed only because he did not toe the line and had subsequently been interned.

Károly Zajgóvári had a separate recommendation to make:

Up to now, not a single department head had been dismissed. All department heads and their deputies had received their appointments from the accused Hungarian Working People's Party.
If the position in question had become vacant, he would propose, on behalf of the Christian Party, that, for the area of the capital, the head of the department should be Dr. István Magyari, Piistar professor, in which case the Christian Party would lodge no objection to making Szoboszlai his deputy. The revolution did not take place so as to allow the same spirit to prevail in the education of our youth that had prevailed up to now.

János Baranyai (Communist Party) supported the appointment of Szoboszlai because it would also mean Szoboszlai’s rehabilitation.

Károly Zajgóvári: In connection with the rehabilitations, there was another proposal to the effect that the many thousands of people who had been removed should all be returned to the capital. However, he regarded the leadership of the education department as extremely important, because the transformation of the entire spiritual outlook was intimately related to it and inseparable from it. He asked that, inasmuch as there was another motion, they should put the question of filling the position to a vote.

Péter Bechtler: He would maintain his motion. Szoboszlai had not been a member of the Hungarian Working People’s Party, nor of the Communist Party. He had been a member of the Social Democratic Party, but he had not been active and had made no speeches — he had only been a sympathizer. The Christian Party would have enough opportunities for its members to obtain leading positions, but we should not start like this, for if we were to begin in this manner, then we shall bear too strongly on the matter, which will disturb our mutual cooperation.

Károly Zajgóvári: The Hungarian Working People’s Party was born of the fusion of the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party. It was from this that Department heads derived their power. Therefore, if the Christian Party requested a position, then he considered it an act of disloyalty to deny it.

Kálmán Potoczki: If the filling of this position is delayed for one day, it is not of decisive importance. He announced that his colleague, who was well informed on the affairs of the capital, was not present; he himself did not know either of the candidates and was therefore unable to take a stand with a clear conscience. Since he considered public education in the capital a very important question, he requested that a decision be taken at the earliest opportunity; meantime, he would obtain the necessary information.

Péter Bechtler, as chairman, said that they would delay the decision until the Monday (November 5) session.

Together with the plan to remove the Communists, Zajgóvári immediately advanced the demand that all the Horthyites removed after the liberation be reinstated in the municipal administration and in the management of factories in the capital. He did not yet demand the return of former Arrow-Cross Party members and of those “who still give rise to misgivings” (common war criminals); he was evidently saving this for later, inasmuch as it was not possible calmly to bring back the Arrow-Cross men together with the Horthyites. The minutes of the meeting have this to say on the subject:

“Károly Zajgóvári declared that he wished to make a proposal on behalf of the Christian Party. He proposed that the National Committee should decree the return of all working people to the jobs in the administration and in the factories from which they had been ousted since 1945 on account of their political attitude. Since this could not be done so simply, he amended his proposal so as to provide that, for the time being, the National Committee should call upon them — since there might be some who found better jobs elsewhere, or had died, or did not care to return to their old jobs — to make their applications to the National Committee without delay, indicating the file number of their case and the reason for their dismissal. The National Committee should appoint one person from each party to the committee which would review this question — and, to the extent that they were not outright Arrow-Cross members and did not give rise to certain misgivings still existing in the old capitalist world, they should be returned by the National Committee, with due consideration for the time elapsed since then, to the rank they might through honest service have reached in the meantime.

“He asked the National Committee to take this to heart, for it would give evidence of a revolutionary spirit and show that a change had actually taken place...”

Chairman Bechtler announced that a number of persons who had been dismissed between 1945 and 1948 had called on him and requested that they be rehabilitated... In his opinion, all interested persons should turn to the National Committee with written requests.

Károly Zajgóvári: How this would be done was a question of detail; on the other hand, he asked the National Committee to
adopt a decision in principle to the effect that all employees dismissed since 1945 on account of their political attitude would be taken back by the municipal administration and its enterprises.

The Chairman: “One could not go as far as to speak of ‘political attitude’ — because, after all, there had been such a thing as Arrow-Cross men!”

Zajgővári stressed that he was adding a clause saying “with the exception of those dismissed because of Arrow-Cross conduct . . .”

The Chairman formulated the decision in principle as follows: For those who had since 1945 been dismissed for political reasons, the National Committee considers it necessary to affirm the possibility of rehabilitation. The question of giving publicity to this issue should await its practical solution, and the Committee should therefore not decide the matter now. He called on those participants in the session who accepted the proposal to raise their hands.

Károly Zajgővári offered an objection against the expression “rehabilitation.” His proposal stated that the institutions of the capital were required to take back those who had been dismissed since 1945 for political reasons (with the exception of those who were dismissed because of Arrow-Cross conduct, or crimes against the people). “Rehabilitation” was another problem, he said.

The Chairman: Either the municipality or one of its institutions gives them a job and there the matter ends. This is the most feasible way. He stated this by way of a decision. He requested the Committee not to decide on the question of publicity. This question would have to be discussed with József Kővágó too.

Károly Zajgővári declared that proposals would be submitted in this matter to the National Committee at its next session. But no further session ever took place. Following the formation of the Revolutionary Workers’ and Peasants’ Government and the return of the Soviet troops, this municipal organ of power of the bourgeois restoration fell apart and went out of existence.

New Facts on the White Terror in Budapest

A Street Lynching

Office of the Central Police Bureau, Department I
Minutes of Evidence

Recorded at the Central Police Office on December 20, 1956, in the presence of József Nemes and Police Lieutenant Attila Gergely.

József Nemes (born 1934 in Budapest, mother’s name: Eszter Békeffi; residing at Fáy Street 5, Budapest XVIII), third-year student at the University of Economic Science, made the following statement, after acknowledging the admonition to tell nothing but the truth:

On October 23, 1956, coming from the Rózsadomb (Rose Hill) in Buda, I arrived at the Margaret Bridge between 11:30 and 12 p.m., where I saw the following happening:

At the Buda end of the Margaret Bridge large groups of people had gathered for the purpose of checking car traffic across the bridge. I noticed that they permitted only those vehicles to cross the bridge whose drivers said the password “Petőfi,” while they made the driver and even the passengers of other cars get out on the plea that they might possibly serve to maintain communications with, or to give assistance or news to, the State Security Authority. When I reached the Pest end of the Margaret Bridge, I saw a large group checking traffic towards Buda. About 50 metres before the end of the bridge, a man had stationed himself with a brick in his hand for the purpose of preventing those cars from continuing which the checking group had signalled to stop. A dark Hudson Eight, coming from the Boulevard — I did not notice its licence
number — drove onto the bridge. I can still recall that on the back of the car was a large "H." This car did not stop at the signal of the previously mentioned group; the driver, on the contrary, stepped on the accelerator and attempted to get away. Thereupon, some people in the crowd shouted to the man with the brick — who was waving his arms — ordering him to stop the car. The man threw his brick at the windshield of the car just as it reached him, and the car stopped. The driver was dragged out, and I saw nothing more of him. He probably got lost in the crowd, which had gathered round the car. The passenger, a first lieutenant of the State Security Authority, was dragged from the rear seat. He was wearing an overcoat and a leather belt and must have been between 26 and 28 years of age. The crowd began to question him about what the AVH was doing at the Radio. A number of people made threatening remarks and shouted that he should be thrown into the Danube. The first lieutenant, pale and nervous, repeatedly begged to be allowed to proceed. By this time, however, he was surrounded so closely that he could hardly move. A woman in the crowd struck the AVH officer on the head with an iron bar, as a result of which he collapsed. Then some of those surrounding him — part of them wearing municipal transport workers' uniforms, part of them women — seized him and dragged him towards the railing of the bridge. Meanwhile the above-mentioned woman continued to beat him with the iron bar. Upon reaching the bridge railing, they threw the man, who by this time was certainly unconscious, into the Danube. They overturned the car, but about an hour and a half later, when I passed by again, I did not see it there any more. There is nothing more I can say about the matter. The minutes have been recorded in keeping with the facts and, after reading them, I here-with affix my signature.

József Nemes

Attila Gergely

The Murder of Ferenc Brodorits

From the Police Record

At the Central Police Station of the First District, Mrs. Ferenc Brodorits, resident of Széna Square 1/a, Budapest I, lodged a complaint in which she reported that her husband, Captain Ferenc
Brodorits of the AVO, who was assigned to Department VI of the Ministry of the Interior, was sent out on Thursday, October 25, to Práter Street, Eighth District, to assist in breaking up a demonstration. The mob attacked him, tore off his clothes and, after finding his service identification booklet, they threw him from the third storey of a building on Práter Street. Ferenc Brodorits died of his injuries.

Sándor Gáspár of the "National Guard" and His List
From the Police Record

On December 1, 1956, the Police of District XVI arrested Sándor Gáspár, a resident of District XVI and former manager of a catering enterprise. He was deputy commander of the national guard in his district. At the time, Gáspár still possessed a list of names of district Communist functionaries, intended to serve as a basis of deportation and, in part, of execution. As deputy commander of the national guard he forced open the premises of the Hungarian Working People's Party organization in District XVI, whence he stole various valuable objects. At his orders, the former president of the district People's Front Committee, Mázi, the former agitation-propaganda secretary of the Ikarus Factory's Party Committee, and the commander of Precinct 36, Police Sergeant-Major Sándor Som, were carried off from their homes. On November 1, 1956, Gáspár also appeared with his accomplices at the home of István Gáll, Rádió Street 24 in Cinkota, called him to account as an AVO-man and wanted to have him taken away. At the point of his gun, he wanted to force Mihály Erdei, first secretary of the Party Committee of District XVI, to make up a list of Communist Party functionaries, so that he might arrest and execute them. Erdei refused to do so.

The Events of October 26–27, 1956, in Tompa Street
Eyewitness account by Engineer L.F.

During these days, it was no rare sight to see armed young people, singly and in groups, walking around in this region, since many of them kept in touch with the Corvin Alley group.
Early on the 26th, however, we noticed that 3 or 4 persons armed with submachine guns remained posted in the street. Later we saw that they were engaged in searching cars and their passengers. At first, we thought this to be some sort of security measure, connected with the defence of the Kilián barracks.

During the morning, while searching the passengers of a car belonging to some enterprise, the armed group found a red Party membership book. They shot its owner on the spot, administered a few slaps to the rest of the passengers, chased them away and took over the car.

Budapest, December 20, 1956.

The Murder of Police Major Károly Jakab
From the Police Record

Károly Jakab, 33 years old, came from a family of miners. He was one of five brothers, all of whom were workers. The father, a miner, had died early. He, Jakab, grew up under very difficult material circumstances. In his boyhood, while he went through the eight grades of primary school, he worked as delivery boy for a baker, pasted posters and ran errands for a gardener. Later he became a lathe apprentice at the Danuvia Factory and worked there until 1945. That year, at the proposal of the workers, he was selected to serve in the new democratic police force. In 1947, he was enrolled in the Officers' Academy, where he graduated as a first lieutenant. He became a major in 1956. During his 11 years of service as a policeman, he also carried on political work. In connection with the October events, he was detailed to guard the food supply depots on Gorky Avenue. On October 28, when the Soviet troops left the capital, he was about to return home from the police hospital on Gorky Avenue, and as he stepped out into the street, he was shot and killed by a sniper. The hospital personnel who picked him up, removed from his body a large black-bordered paper, on which were written the words: "That's what happens to the people's enemies." The husband of Jakab's sister was killed in a similar manner.

Budapest, December 15, 1956.
The Murder of Kálmán Turner

On November 24, 1956, the militia battalion of the Budapest Central Police Authority arrested István Micsinai (born at Perbete, 1917, mother’s name: Hermina Bajda; former Horthyite policeman, not a Party member, semi-skilled fitter, Hungarian citizen), resident of Budapest XX (Pesterzsébet), Erdő Street 32, on suspicion of murder.

The investigation established that István Micsinai had reported to the District XX police station, on November 2, 1956, for the purpose of serving in the national guard. On November 4, 1956, he met his friend, Sándor Láng, resident of Pesterzsébet, Patak Street 7. (Láng — aged about 45 or 46, Horthyite policeman and one-time sergeant — had also served in the democratic police force till 1949, when he was dismissed.) Láng gave him a 7.65 mm. Walter pistol and asked him to go along with him, because he wanted to arrest Kálmán Turner, a resident of Pesterzsébet, Rákóczi Street 2.

Together they went to Sándor Láng’s lodging, where they manhandled and wanted to shoot Károly Barcza, a retired policeman living in the same house. Láng’s wife prevented the murder.

From there they went to Micsinai’s flat at Erdő Street 32. They dragged police investigator József Lázár and his wife out of their lodging, which opens on the same courtyard, and manhandled them. Láng wanted to shoot both of them, but was stopped by Micsinai’s wife.

Following this, they both went to the house at Rákóczi Street 2. They looked for Turner, who was in the cellar. In the yard, Láng fired several shots from his submachine gun and Micsinai from his pistol, shouting: “Come on out, Turner! Come on out, block warden! Come, Comrade Turner, and we’ll found the Communist Party!” Then they went into the cellar, chased out Mrs. Turner and her children, as well as her neighbour, Mrs. József Kelemen, and shot Turner dead. The shot entered Turner’s heart and killed him instantly. There were no witnesses to the murder; according to Micsinai’s testimony, Láng shot Kálmán Turner. The available evidence (opinion of the ballistic expert) indicates that Micsinai also took part in the shooting. After the murder, both of them left the scene of the crime. Later Micsinai went to his home and concealed his weapon (subsequently seized in the course of a house search). Láng, according to our information, has left the country.
The findings of the inquiry are supported by the testimony of witnesses and the opinions of medical and ballistic experts.

Budapest, December 13, 1956.

First Lieutenant László Kollár,
Police Investigator

Testimony of Police Corporal István Dánóczi on the Práter Street Murders

Extract from the minutes
Office of the Central Police Bureau, Department I

On October 24, 1956, I was passing in my car in front of the house at Práter Street 14, when we were attacked by "insurgents." Together with my companion Pál Szabó, I sought refuge in a flat on the second floor of the Práter Street 14 house. In the flat there were two persons who appeared to be students, as well as a man and a woman. Through the window of the water closet, we let ourselves down into the air shaft and climbed through the window of a bathroom in the first floor into the flat — as we learned later — of a former Horthyite lieutenant-colonel. There was nobody at home. Shortly thereafter, several people called to us from the corridor to give ourselves up. They shouted that if we refused to surrender, they would blast us out with petrol or with hand-grenades. The owner of the flat, who was outside, pleaded with them to spare his home, he would open the door for them. As he opened the door, I fired. The insurgents returned my fire and then went away.

We stayed in the above-mentioned flat until 3:30 on October 28.

From the window of the flat, we could see that in the Ilona Zrínyi Secondary School across the street there was an armed group consisting mostly of young people of about 18—20. They had a machine gun, submachine guns and automatic rifles, and several of them were carrying petrol bottles.

On October 28, with the assistance of the occupants of the house, we went down into the basement. In the meantime, the insurgents learned from a 9-year-old child that we were in the basement. They came for us and took us across the street into the Ilona Zrínyi school building, where they locked us in the coal cellar.

In the Ilona Zrínyi Secondary School, the following events took place:

At 10 p.m. on October 28, they took me together with about ten other persons — who were also imprisoned in the cellar — out into the yard, where they made us stand in a row. Several in the group must have been AVH officers, as I concluded from the officers' boots they were wearing and from remarks they made. I alone was not bound, allegedly because I was a policeman; the hands of the others were tied together and it could be seen that they had been tortured. Talking was forbidden, therefore I could gain no further information about my companions.

One of the group, a former first lieutenant of the AVH, was picked out and, with bound hands, was made to stand in the middle of the yard. Amidst a flood of sadistic remarks, they began to torture him. First they kicked his feet and then beat him so violently that he fell down. After that, they suspended him by his feet from a telephone pole in the yard. Then an army first lieutenant (to judge by his coat) began to stab him in the abdomen and waist with a knife 30 to 40 cm. long. Later on, he cut off his right ear and slashed his feet above the ankles. The tortured comrade had hardly died, when a group of some 10 insurgents brought a young woman, about 28 years old, into the yard. She burst into tears at the sight of the murdered comrade and pleaded with the insurgents to consider her three children and to spare her since she had never harmed anyone. The first lieutenant stood over to her and said: "So we finally have you, you filthy spy! You and your 16 identification books and 9,000 forints!" Then he stabbed her with the knife in his hand. The woman fell and a man in convicts' clothes grabbed her by the hair and turned her over, while the first lieutenant stabbed her again several times. In my judgement, the woman comrade was no longer alive by that time.

After this, they took us back into the coal cellar.

On the afternoon of the 24th, while we were hiding in the house at Práter Street 14, the insurgents, searching for us, shot and killed a 42-year-old man, because he did not tell them where we were hiding.

I have told the whole truth in my testimony, knowing the penal consequences of false testimony.

December 18, 1956.

István Dánóczi
Testimony of Klára Sz., Librarian

On the evening of November 1, 1956, at a quarter past ten, three young men armed with submachine guns called at my home. After searching the house, they told me I was their prisoner and took me off in a car to a school building in the neighbourhood of the Corvin Cinema. During my interrogation they informed me I was arrested because someone in the house had told them I was employed by the AVO. They refused to believe my two identification booklets proving this was not the case, claiming that, even if I did not belong to the AVO, I was an unreliable person as far as they were concerned. Following this, they took me into a schoolroom, where 15 men had been confined for days and a woman since the night before. Most of the men had at one time served in the AVO — but the majority of them had not been on active duty in the AVO for years. My feminine fellow sufferer was a nurse employed at the Korvin Ottó Hospital; she had been taken away from her two small children at home, with nobody to look after them. Three young men of about 18 years of age, armed with submachine guns, guarded us. The number of prisoners increased, they brought in two Party workers and several alleged members of the AVO. We sat on chairs; sometimes they allowed us to stand up, and we were given food.

Those captured earlier said that now it was much easier than the previous days, when some of them had been tortured and executions had taken place. At brief intervals someone would come in and individually question the prisoners about their work and make sarcastic and rude remarks about their occupation. For example, among others there was a translator who answered that he turned French texts into Hungarian. “Yes, you probably turned skins inside out,” they told him. Later they brought in a boy of about 14 who had shot and killed his friend while playing.

Thus the hours passed and I began to fear more and more for my life. To my good fortune, a journalist from the Néphadsereg editorial staff came in and confirmed that he had known me for years and that I had nothing to do with the AVO, and asked them to release me. In an hour and a half I was free. I later learned that those I had left behind also were set free. The leaders of the command, upon hearing that Soviet troops were approaching, began to escape
one by one, until only the youngsters remained. After the arrival of the Soviet troops, they released their prisoners.

Testimony of József Szobácsi

Extract from minutes

Budapest, December 1, 1956

József Szobácsi

Born in Mindszent in 1908

The insurgents captured First Lieutenant József Szobácsi and his two companions on October 30, 1956, when they stopped his car. The following is his testimony regarding this event:

The insurgents captured Horváth, Valde and me and searched us. They took all three of us to the building of the so-called “Revolutionary Committee” in Ujpest. On the way the insurgents beat me. On the Committee premises they searched us again. They took away my Party book, personal identification booklet and a list of names of thirty people under my command — colleagues at the Ministry of the Interior — my Partisan Federation membership booklet; they divested me of my uniform and dressed me in a threadbare civilian suit. They did the same with Valde. From Horváth, they took only his personal identification booklet. Then they put Horváth, Valde and me in a small room in the Committee building, stationed armed guards there and prohibited us from talking to each other.

Five minutes later the so-called investigation began. They took me in first for interrogation. In the room into which they brought me sat Kósá behind the table, to the left of him was a tall thin man of about 30 with a long, narrow, pale face and a little goatee. They seated me on a chair. Around me were 15 men with submachine guns. I do not recall for certain, but apparently it was Kósá who asked me, where we were going and why?... The interrogators accused me of lying. Several of those with submachine guns struck me a number of times in the back of the neck and head. They shouted they would turn me over to the mob to be judged. Then one of those present ordered me to remove by boots. I did as I was ordered, I took off my boots. They ordered me to put my bare feet on the table. I did this also. Then the man who had ordered me to remove my boots began to beat my toes with his gun-cleaning rod, endeavouring to strike my nails and tear them off my toes. The pain was terrible and I began to sob. As a result of the torture my feet went numb. I cannot think of it without shuddering. Even now I cannot keep from crying when I recall those horrors. Then they forced me to put on my boots. My swollen feet did not want to go into my boots, but they forced me to it, and, enduring the pain, I carried out their order and with great difficulty got to my feet. One of the men behind me with a submachine gun ordered me to turn and face the wall so that my nose touched the wall. He struck me from behind so hard that blood began to run from my nose and mouth, and I was not permitted to wipe it off.

Instead, they placed a plate in the middle of the floor and told me to bend over, support myself by placing my forefinger against the plate and walk round it in this manner. I tried to wipe off the blood with my left coat sleeve, but I received a powerful blow for my trouble. They forced me to walk around the plate like this until I collapsed, unconscious. Then the one with the goatee threw water on my face and I revived. They forced me to continue supporting myself against the plate and walking around it. I again lost consciousness. They threw water on me again and made me continue to walk around the plate.

While this went on, the one with the goatee called the XXIth District police office twice and demanded that they check and report to him what my duties in the Ministry of the Interior were. This terrible torture lasted from 9 in the evening till 11. They took me down into the basement of the building and informed me I would be shot. I was locked into a cell by myself. I do not know where Horváth and Valde were during this time.

At midnight the same persons came for me. The interrogation began again and lasted until 5:30 the next morning. I might be mistaken in my judgement by a few minutes, but I declare that this “interrogation” lasted for about 5 hours. This was no interrogation, but constant physical torture. They beat me for allegedly having been a section leader in the state security police; they beat me because during my long term of service since 1945 not a single Party or official disciplinary action was taken against me; they beat me for being a first lieutenant; they beat me because I paid a high Party member-
ship fee every month (I paid a monthly fee of 50 forints, representing a fixed percentage of my pay). They demanded that I reveal to them the contents of a message I was bearing as a courier to units in the provinces, they also demanded that I tell them the contents of conversations I had overheard between commanders of the Ministry of the Interior. When I did not do as ordered, because I did not know about these matters, they struck me again. In the midst of the torture, they took me out into the yard several times and threatened to turn me over to the insurgents who were waiting by the gate of the Committee and already had a rope to hang me with. Finally they beat me for not giving them the kind of confession they demanded and because they did not sleep all night on account of me.

Around 5:30 in the morning, they took me down into the basement. They threatened to shoot me if I did not find the way down by myself. They promised to do away with me and that the Soviet soldiers would not save me from death.

This was how I ended my first night in the building of the so-called “Revolutionary Committee” in Ujpest. I was beaten mostly by the man with the goatie, the sailor and the thin one who made me take off my boots. The other armed individuals also beat me. When they took me down into the basement they gave me cold compresses, that is, they put them on me. I thought that with this the atrocities had ended. But I was mistaken. Now the members of the guard began to torture and taunt me. Various armed men came down into the basement and ordered me to stand on my heels and to crouch and rise again and again. They beat my head against the wall a number of times, they tied my hands to the wall and said they would shoot off each of my fingers. A young man named Tóth struck my hands several times with his pistol.

They permitted a few common criminals to come into my cell who told me sarcastically I would be shot and asked what was my last request. I replied: “Please give my regards to my wife and two children.” They told me they had been to my home and seen my wife and daughter. They gave me such an accurate description of my wife and daughter that I had not the slightest doubt they had been to my home.

When they left my cell I noticed a piece of rubber hose lying on the floor. I made a noose from it, threw it over my head and tied the other end to the waterpipe. But when I wanted to hang myself the rubber hose broke. I resolved to take this step because the cruelties and tortures had shattered my nerves and I lost all hope of saving my life.

I cannot now relate the further events accurately by days and hours, because my imprisonment in the basement of the “Committee” in Ujpest was a ghastly and harrowing experience. I sat in the dark cell and lost all sense of time. New individuals kept coming into my cell to strike and beat me. As nearly as I can remember, three men visited my cell, on November 2, among them the young man named Tóth whom I mentioned earlier. Tóth declared that if I loved my own children I should agree to become the executioner of Communists and Party workers, for then they would release me immediately. In my tortured state, I agreed to their proposal. Not for a minute did I believe I would actually become an executioner. I agreed only because I thought they would give me a pistol and I could put an end to my life. But they did not give me a weapon. They did not believe that I had really agreed and began to torture me again. On the evening of November 2 a very tall man in a leather coat came into my cell. He had a wrinkled face, a large head and a small moustache. He brought a rope and threw it to me. He said I had better do away with myself by morning because that would be easier than if they were to finish me off. This did not particularly impress me; for earlier a man with an army cap had come in and asked me who had interrogated and beaten me, and then told me I would be freed. Fearing that if I acknowledged anything, the tortures would be resumed, I did not tell this man who had tortured me.

On November 3, 1956, I noticed some sort of confusion in the “Committee.” They brought a broom into the cell and I swept the floor. In the evening two men came and released part of the prisoners in the basement.

At 9 o’clock in the evening they took me with 17 other persons to the building of the public prosecutor in District IV.

... We remained in this room until November 5, then an old man engaged the attention of the insurgents with conversation while his wife let us out into the street by two’s and three’s. For four days I hid in the basements and streets of Ujpest and only went home after the Soviet troops occupied Csepel. At home I found that bandits had broken in four times, they had smashed the lock and stolen my belongings...
“Headhunters” in the Headquarters of Szabad Nép

Extract from the report of the investigation

There were several groups in the Dudás gang of counter-revolutionaries who occupied the headquarters of Szabad Nép. One of these was the so-called “Uncle Feri” group. This “Uncle Feri,” whose real name was Ferenc Pálházi, was a former Horthyite officer. Three “legionnaires” from the West were also members of his group, who had come armed to Hungary in cars marked with red crosses. These three “legionnaires” had German-made rifles with telescopic sights and a machine gun manufactured in Germany. “Uncle Feri’s” group was known as the “headhunters” because their special task was to take into custody members of the State Security Authority, as well as leading state and Party functionaries, and to execute them.

It was they who, on the evening of November 4, murdered István Sarkadi, public prosecutor, First Lieutenant Pál Fodor and a captured Soviet soldier. “Uncle Feri” and the other members of his group had previously interrogated them and, in the middle of the night, taken them into the street behind the Corvin Department Store. There they stood the three prisoners against the wall and shot them.

The detachments of counter-revolutionaries massacred several hundred Hungarian workers, peasants, employees, and intellectuals and made mass arrests of those with whom they wanted to settle scores.

On the morning of November 4, they held more than 1,500 Communists, former employees of the State Security Authority, Party employees and state officials prisoner in the jails of the capital and in the custody of various armed groups. For instance, 400 persons assigned to the State Security Authority and 104 Party employees were imprisoned in the Kőbánya Concentration Prison; at the Central Police Station 107 Party employees and several hundred persons assigned to the State Security Authority were incarcerated; on November 4 about 100 prisoners were released from Corvin Alley.
It should be borne in mind that during this whole period there were still Communists in the Government and Soviet troops in the country; as a result the organizers of the white terror were induced to be cautious, and they did not yet dare openly to bare their teeth. They were preparing for a more bloody settling of accounts later. This is indicated by the fact that various counter-revolutionary organizations and groups had made up lists of names of persons to be arrested and executed. In certain districts of Budapest — for example, in Landler Jenő Street, in Buda around Naphegy and elsewhere — they marked the homes of Communists with crosses.

From all this, it is apparent that the counter-revolution was preparing sanguinary reprisals on a large scale which were prevented only by the return of the Soviet troops on November 4.

New Facts on the Siege of the Budapest Party Committee Building

In the first volume of our publication we described the attack against the Budapest Party Committee Building. We consider it necessary to supplement the published facts with details from two reports and the record of a deposition. The first report is from one of the commanders of the guard, another from the caretaker of the Party building, and the police record is the testimony of a female clerk who was tortured.

From the Report of Lieutenant István Tompa,
Commandant of the Guard at the Party and DISZ Buildings on Republic Square

On the afternoon of October 23, 1956, I arrived at the building on Republic (Köztársaság) Square at 6 p. m. accompanied by Sub-Lieutenant Várkonyi and 45 soldiers of the State Security Authority. The soldiers were all youths between 20 to 22 years of age, who had been called up for military service in 1955. I was in command of the guard. My orders were to take over the defence of the Party building and to protect the building and persons working in it with all the force at our disposal. Prior to the events of October 23, only three police sub-officers had guarded the building.

My first duty was to report to Comrade Mező and the woman secretary of the Party Committee, Comrade Nagy. After conferring with them I began to organize and post the guard. My men were provided with the usual weapons. The enlisted men carried rifles, the section leaders submachine guns and the officers pistols. I stationed myself on the first floor and Comrade Várkonyi on the second... On the morning of the 24th, a Soviet armoured detachment came to reinforce us (three tanks commanded by a captain)
The special November edition of Life carried these three pictures of the murder of six young soldiers. These soldiers were taken and shot by the counter-revolutionaries, after they had captured Party headquarters on Republic Square

and an armoured car with a mixed complement, consisting of Soviet soldiers and Hungarian signal corps candidate officers commanded by an artillery officer who acted as interpreter. The soldiers stayed there till Sunday, October 28, as did the tanks...

... During these hours the morale of the men in the guard deteriorated steadily. They did not understand the meaning of the decree broadcast by the radio that the State Security Authority would be liquidated. I made them realize that this concerned only the operative units, and that there was now a greater need for security forces than ever before — whereupon the soldiers resolved to defend the Party building by every means, at the cost of their lives if necessary.
On October 30, around 9 o'clock in the morning, it was reported that armed individuals were beginning to assemble. A little later, several armed men inquired about members of the AVO from policemen on duty outside, who were members of the old guard. They forced their way in and wanted to examine the identification papers of the guard. We forced the intruders out and arrested their leader. I took him to Comrade Mező who questioned him and gave orders to guard him.

Up to this time there had been no shooting, but the preliminaries boded no good for the future. The armed gang grew noisier and noisier and increased swiftly in size.

The siege began with regular volleys from infantry weapons. In my opinion it was well organized, and there can be no doubt that the assailants had trained military leaders.

Outside the building, the "front" remained stationary until noon. They were unable to approach the Party building. One of the army officers in the Party building, Colonel Asztalos, told me that the Ministry of Defence had promised aid and that we should hold out until the "relieving" force arrived. Aid was also promised by the Szamuelly barracks of the security forces, but neither arrived.

Around noon, the artillery fire began. First one, then three tanks turned their big guns on the Party building, firing in salvoes. By this time we had several wounded. The crowd grew larger and larger on the square and began firing on us from the tops of the surrounding buildings.

As to what happened after the siege, when the defenders had ended their resistance, Lieutenant Tompa reported the following:

The armed counter-revolutionaries swarmed into the building, in a state of chaos and anarchy. There was no longer any organized leadership or direction, only destruction, wrecking and smashing, brutal ill treatment of women, shouting and beating-up of Party workers.

An elderly, grey-haired worker also came in with the insurgents and when the mob wanted to throw themselves on us, he tried to calm them. Later, he brought us civilian clothing and helped the few members of the guard trapped inside to escape.

There was tremendous confusion on the square in front of the Party building. People appeared to be rushing about aimlessly, there was no leader to direct them, they only listened to whoever happen-
ed to shout the loudest. The tanks were no longer there, in their place were luxurious cars whose occupants were taking snapshots.

Their motif was the lynching of Army Colonel Papp, which occurred in the most brutal manner. The rabble poured petrol on his face and the upper half of his torso, hanged him by his feet and set fire to his body...

When I left the Party building late in the afternoon of the day of the siege, in civilian clothing, the odour of burnt flesh permeated the square; heavy looting was going on, and there lay the bodies of our companions. And the armed “insurgents” were kicking the slaughtered Communists and spitting on them.

The guard remained true to their pledge, they stood their ground but were overcome. Only a few of them escaped with their lives. Sub-Lieutenant Várkonyi and most of the enlisted men were massacred.

Report on the Search for the Secret Cellar

The report was written by the caretaker of the Party Committee Building, who was taken away from his home on November 2 to show where the entrance was to the — non-existent — secret cellar:

The work on Republic Square (the provocative excavations which were started to locate the non-existent “secret underground cellar” — Editor) was directed by a lieutenant-colonel and a smooth-mannered civilian. A large mechanized apparatus was set up here (drilling tower, excavator, etc.). The main theme of the “conversation” lasting approximately three hours was the entrance to the cellar. They were very familiar with the buildings; from their acquaintance with the blueprints and with the scene itself, they knew every nook and corner of the cellar better than I did.

As to what evidence, apart from hysteria, there was of the existence of a secret cellar and of people in it, I asked:

1. If you people are technical experts, and all technical means are at your disposal, how do you explain the fact that you cannot find a cellar with people in it 20—30 metres deep, when oil and coal, etc., can be located at a depth of hundreds of metres?
2. Why do you not call the architect and builder of the premises?
3. Why do you not follow the electric cables and other lines?

They gave evasive answers to these questions and began to talk about something else. During our conversation, the leader of
Torturing of a victim of the counter-revolutionary terror in Republic Square, taken from Die Deutsche Woche for November 14.
the drilling crew came and reported to the lieutenant-colonel that first they drilled through a layer of clay and then through a layer of marl; he insisted that it was no use drilling any further there. "Move the drilling tower five metres further!" was the answer. Occasionally some other officers would break into the conversation.

They carried out excavations and drillings in front of the building, in the park, on the square, in Rákóczi Boulevard, on Baross Square and behind the theatre, and nowhere did they find the slightest trace of a cellar or tunnel.

These people clearly saw the utter senselessness of their labours, but they declared several times that "this affair has already developed beyond the borders of the country." The one in civilian clothes said: "Let us suppose that you are right and there is no secret cellar. We ought to wind up the affair, but how can we do so without compromising ourselves. Give us some help."

Answer: "Take the workers who are digging the ditches to each of the excavations and prove to them that no sounds whatsoever can be heard there; then do the same with three journalists and let the newspapers publish the fact that there is no underground tunnel."

The reply to this was: "It's not a bad idea, but we can't use it. The hysteria is so great that they would not believe us and there would only be trouble for us because of it — we have to continue drilling."

Budapest, December 15, 1956.
István Kertész
Caretaker of the Party Building of Republic Square

The Torturing of Ágnes Kelemen, Clerical Worker
Report
Budapest Section of the Ministry of Internal Affairs,
Central Police Station, District VII

Budapest, November 30, 1956

Ágnes Kelemen (born at Győrszentiván, March 12, 1930, mother's name: Gizella Király), residing at Baross Square 17, Budapest VII. Member of administrative staff, Secretariat of the Council Ministers.

I wish to make the following statement:

I went to the Party building on October 28, 1956. My brother worked there as an instructor of the Central Committee. Earlier, from 1949 to 1952, I too had worked there, first in the Cadre Department, then as Comrade Mező's secretary. I thought I might be of some help to the comrades if I went to the Party building, they might have some administrative work to do. During the attack on the Party building, I was in one of the rooms on the second floor with comrades Éva Kállai and Ida Chajesz and one of the workers of the Party Committee whom I did not know by name. After the occupation of the Party building, when the insurgents were already on every floor, we went out into the corridor where one of the counter-revolutionaires singled me out and remarked, "I'll do away with this AVO wh... e." They led me out into the street and up to about ten people mutilated in various ways, to show me what would happen to me. A large part of the crowd which went by, kicked me, knocked me down, trampled on me, pulled me up again and threw me a policeman's cape. They told me to stand beside the wall in it, where they would shoot me. I refused to accept the policeman's cape and then, at the suggestion of a woman, they tore off my skirt and drawers as an example of the fate of every stinking AVO wh... e. I was unable to defend myself or even make myself heard, because the mob was howling constantly and moving towards the Party building from where they were steadily bringing or throwing the comrades to the crowd. After I had half lost consciousness, somebody shouted that my identification booklet should be examined. They took away my handbag and the purse in it with 400 forints, and looked at my identification papers. The one who took my identification booklet meantime pushed me towards an ambulance, and two men got out and helped me in. This was how I was taken to the Kolói Anna Hospital. I had minor injuries, bruises on my elbows and knees, my lips and ear were split and my legs and arms were full of black and blue welts... At the hospital I asked for a skirt and said I lived not far away and would go home. A woman physician or nurse there, I don't know what she was exactly, told the others not to give me one because I might possibly be needed. The nurse assisting in the ambulance asked this woman doctor to give me a sedative, because my pulse was 240. But the woman doctor paid no attention to her request... Later, when the insurgents came for me to the
hospital, she turned me over to them without hesitation. In fact, I heard her answering somebody's protest that this was not in order: "Why did she come here, who sent her? We shall not turn the hospital into a battlefield, let her go out and answer for her deeds." Two young fellows (whom I can recall) took me from the hospital to the Práter Street School, where they looked for some sort of "big chief." He was not there, so they took me to the Corvin Alley, where two individuals (I distinctly remember their faces) interrogated me. In the Corvin Alley, they tried with threats to learn from me how many members of the AVO there were in the Party building and what sort of cellars existed there. I did not give them any information in saying that I happened to be in the Party building by pure chance and, if I had known there was a cellar there, I would surely have gone down into it.

In the evening they released me, that is, I asked them to escort me home, because although I had received a skirt at the hospital, I was without stockings and my coat had been left in the Party building. I was not properly dressed and my pullover was in shreds. They escorted me as far as the "Divatsarnok" (a big department store). I went home alone from there.

I wish to note the following: I was deprived of my office card and personal identification booklet. While I was being manhandled in front of the Party building, I noticed they were taking photographs.

There is nothing more I wish to say, the foregoing record is in accordance with the facts. After reading this statement, I hereby approve it through my signature.

Lajos Vem

Ágnes Kelemen
Counter-revolutionary Events in the Provinces

In Part One of “Counter-revolutionary Forces in the October Events in Hungary,” we described the acts committed in numerous provincial towns and villages by the white terror. In the following, we wish to supplement them with further facts concerning acts of terrorism, atrocities, robberies, etc., of the counter-revolutionaries.

Who Infiltrated into the “Revolutionary” Organs?

During the last days of October and the first days of November, in numerous towns and villages new municipal administrations were organized, new local organs of power came into existence. The political representatives of the counter-revolution, together with common criminals, entered into these organs in order to push into the background and intimidate the supporters of socialism. All those elements who like to fish in troubled waters put in their appearance. Here are a few examples:

In Csongrád they elected as mayor a certain Piroska, who after 1919 was commander of a white terrorist detachment, like the notorious Mihály Franczia-Kiss and Iván Héjjas. One of his actions in Csongrád at that time — the throwing of a bomb into a ballroom — resulted in 13 deaths. Piroska was mayor of Csongrád for three days in 1956.

The chairman of the so-called Revolutionary Committee of the parish council in Sátoraljaújhely was Prágai, a Horthyite notary public, and among its members were Dr. Hantos, tax clerk, Dr. Holló, landlord, etc.

At Nyíregyháza the leader of the “County Workers’(I) Council” was László Szilágyi, of kulak extraction, who had been trained in a Gestapo reconnaissance school. His “fellow workers” were: the kulak Dezső Kabai; Dr. Antal Lengyel, who had been imprisoned for crimes against the people; the Horthyite officer György Lupkovics; the son of the former Horthyite Lord-Lieutenant of Szabolcs-Szatmár County, András Tomasovszki, etc.

At Nyíregyháza István Pintér, graduate of a notorious sub-officers’ school under Horthy and member of the crown-guard, donned his old dress uniform and all his decorations and, shouting the battle cry “this is the day I’ve been awaiting for 12 years,” he marched to the barracks to “procure arms.” Then with the assistance of his friends, he quickly organized the local militia.

In the so-called “Socialist Revolutionary Committee” of Debrecen, there were — side by side with several honest workers and intellectuals who supported socialism — such characters as László Dede, assistant professor, one of the chief organizers of the counter-revolutionary elements, and Gyula Kálló, bus conductor, commonly known in Debrecen as a swindler and a drunkard without any morals, who was always looking for a quarrel. An important part was played in the committee by Lajos Egri, a writer with anarchist tendencies who, because Imre Nagy’s government “did not suit him,” began to organize a new counter-government in Debrecen, headed by himself. This Committee formed an “Internal Security Council” of Horthy officers, lawyers and other Horthy elements. Its task was to round up the Communists, search houses, do other so-called reconnaissance work, and prepare and execute a programme against the Communists. At the Debrecen town hall, power was usurped by the “Debrecen Office Council,” led by reactionary lawyers. This Council removed department heads of communistic conviction and distributed their jobs among its own members. It even “procured” a candidate for the mayoralty in the person of a certain Mayor Kölcséy, former fascist mayor of Debrecen. These different Debrecen committees were actively supported by the most diverse elements, such as Gyula Kovács (known in the underworld as Pompilius), whose reputation in Debrecen was that of a loaf; Imre Oroz, son of the former proprietor of one of the largest taverns in Debrecen, a secondary school student and one of the gay spivs of the Debrecen cafés, who, incidentally, defected to the West after November 4; etc., etc. Kálman Toma, former fascist deputy sheriff, also showed up before the Debrecen committee to file a claim for the resumption of his pension as deputy sheriff.
In the workers' councils of many Debrecen enterprises, hostile element infiltrated into the ranks of the honest workers. For example, the chairman of the Workers' Council of the Debrecen Electric Tramways, Sándor Dobi, was a former Arrow-Cross gendarme, at the Agricultural Machine Factory the chairman was a smuggler and currency speculator named Gál, who had been convicted several times and just released from prison. One of the first tasks of the provisional council of the Factory Catering Enterprise was the "rehabilitation," with a 15,000 forint compensation, of the former chief bookkeeper of the enterprise, who in 1944 was an SS officer and later, as chief bookkeeper, had embezzled considerable funds. The provisional workers' council of the Slaughterhouse was formed largely of former kulak butchers; this council forced the Communist Party members working there to throw their membership books into the fire, threatening, if they failed to do so, to murder them.

In Debrecen, Endre Villányi, a burglar who had previously been sentenced to 18 months and later, in June 1956, to another three and a half years in prison, was sworn in as a member of the national guard. After his "release" had been duly verified, he was accepted and entrusted with guarding state property.

In Nagykálló, a former Horthyite officer, Károly Nagy, took over the command of the armed units, with the assistance of another Horthyite police officer, Menyhért Vás.

At Csenger, a former chief magistrate, Dr. Pál Ecsedi, and the former Horthyite chief police councillor, Dr. Gedeon Ecsedi, took the local administration into their hands.

In the community of Káll, the so-called "Christian Hungarian National Revolutionary Committee of Káll" was formed. Its leaders included a former candidate and canvasser of the Barankovics Party, Károly Tompa, a former administrative board member of the local Arrow-Cross Party, János Iglódy (as chairman of the Revolutionary Committee), and András Bánhegyi, also a former Arrow-Cross Party member.

In the "Revolutionary Committee" of the district of Eger, a Horthyite chief magistrate, Dr. István Szombati, became chairman; his associates, Lajos Vérös, Lajos Szabó and Lajos Kelő were captains under the Horthy regime.

A so-called "Revolutionary Committee" was formed in the community of Polgár too. Among its members were István Palotás, who had been sentenced to three and a half years in prison for embezzlement and illegally crossing the border, Ferenc Kovács, who had served four months for stealing wood; Rezső Borsodi, former railway storekeeper, who had served 5 years for pilfering freight cars.

The political representatives of the past and other criminals did not simply infiltrate into these pseudo-democratic bodies. The release from prison of these riff-raff elements and their recruitment into the counter-revolutionary units was carried on in an organized manner. At a street meeting in Dunapentele, the command was heard: SS officers, NCO's and former gendarmes, fall in! It goes without saying that László Kócsa, the secretary of the city Party committee, was not allowed to speak at this meeting.

In the community of Besenyőtelek, Heves County, János Vizi, a convict under sentence for life from the Vác prison, took an active part in the counter-revolution.

Illegal Arrests and Opening of Jails

The elected leaders of the councils and other democratic bodies naturally represented obstacles on the path of the counter-revolutionaries. Countless numbers of them were consequently arrested in the provinces as well. This happened to Fekszl, Council President of Szabolcs County, and to Sándor Varga, first secretary of the Szabolcs County Committee of the Hungarian Working People's Party. This was the fate of János Ménès, Debrecen municipal council president, and Lajos Tatár Kiss, council president of Hajdu County. The news of these arrests appeared in heavy type in the November 3 issue of the Debreceni Hirlap, stating that they were the result of a "decision by the Workers' Councils and Revolutionary Councils." On the same basis, 29 other Communists were taken into custody, a number of whom were beaten and manhandled during the "interrogation." László Dede, assistant professor and deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Committee, arrested the secretary of the university Party committee. At Besenyőtelek, they arrested the chairman of the executive committee, László Vadnai; at Dunapentele, the commandant of the garrison, Captain Nagyvári; at the Zalaegerszeg army unit, János Gyarmati Horváth and László Horváth, both of them officers; at Sátoraljaújhely they carried off as hostages István Szűcs,
parish Party secretary, and army Captains János Papp and László Kömüves.

The counter-revolutionary and criminal groups, pushing aside the democratic and progressive forces in this manner, committed terrible crimes and political outrages in many parts of the country. And so as to enlist the support of as many misguided people as possible, in more than one place they, on the one hand, made use of Radio Free Europe for the purpose of receiving instructions and encouragement for themselves, and, on the other, employed terrorist methods to insure that ever broader masses should hear their subversive appeals to support their counter-revolutionary aims. The “National Committee” in Makó, for example, ordered the local postmaster in writing to make the local closed circuit radios carry the programmes of Radio Free Europe instead of those of the Budapest Radio. The postmaster obeyed. The same thing happened in the community of Káll in Szabolcs County, where the order was given by the “Christian Hungarian National Revolutionary Committee of Káll.”

In order to have enough arms and “armed forces” at their disposal, the various “revolutionary” organs also carried out numerous “actions” in the countryside. They released 140 convicts from the Nyíregyháza prison, on the plea that “the political prisoners must be set free.” True, only two of the 140 were political prisoners, the rest were common criminals like László Tabu, sentenced to 6 years for burglary, Béla Szép, sentenced to 10 years for assassination, etc. They took these jailbirds to the Sóstó Resort Hotel to provide them with suitable housing, and organized them into armed detachments. Certain members of the county “Revolutionary Council” came out to visit them here and wild orgies took place in their company.

Counter-revolutionaries of Kecskemét released the convicts from the local jail, raided the prison arsenal and carried the arms in an ambulance to their main headquarters in the secondary school they had occupied. In order to escape the attention of passers-by, they carried their mysterious goods from the ambulance into the building on covered stretchers. Then the insurgents, the released convicts and a number of hastily armed residents of the Gypsy quarter combined to carry out terroristic acts and robberies. The Gypsies shot six soldiers of the local garrison, who tried to disarm them.
Robberies and Armed Terroristic Acts

At many places in the countryside, the buildings of Party organizations and councils were assaulted and wrecked. In the community of Domaszék, Csongrád County, the windows and doors of the council building were smashed on October 28, and the premises set on fire.

In Jászszentlászló, the insurgents, led by Béla Zombor, resident of Jászszentlászló, and István Csinekész of Kiskunmajsa, after smashing the windows of the Party building, forced open a chest reinforced with iron bands and stole money belonging to the treasury. Only the intervention of the militia prevented them from carrying out their planned acts of terrorism, murders, robberies, etc.

In Debrecen, with the approval of the “Revolutionary Committee” and under the leadership of an officer named Szabó, the Party headquarters were occupied and wrecked. Several thousand forints in cash, as well as thirteen typewriters, carpets and curtains were stolen.

In Makó, under the leadership of the deputy national guard commander from Szeged, Kendi, an armed detachment of forty persons attacked the district and town Party buildings, fired shots into the rooms, scattered papers and documents; later, a search of the premises revealed that many objects were stolen — among them money set aside for salaries.

The armed gang in Sátoraljaújhely closely rivalled that in Makó. It was led by Balázs, a landlord’s son — who spoke in the name of a so-called “parliament of students.” He forced his way, with his armed group, into the building of the district Party Committee and arrested one of its members. Led by Károly Tasli, a former produce merchant and candidate of the Barankovics Party, an armed gang wrecked the Party building in the community of Káll, removed the files, tore down a picture of Lenin and the party flags, etc.

In the villages, the activities of the counter-revolutionaries were in many places directed mainly at scattering and wiping out the assets of co-operative farms and at the restoration of former kulak and other properties. At Cigánd, under the leadership of a kulak named József Fodor, they “distributed” the lands of the Petőfi Co-operative Farm and handed its sawmill over to a kulak.

At Sárospatak, they set fire to 100 quintals of hay of the Dózsa Co-operative Farm.

In Káll, they returned the building of the local handicrafts co-operative, which had been legally purchased by the co-operative, to its former kulak owner, Béla Farkas.

At Dombrád, one of the first acts of the “Revolutionary Committee” was to prepare the restoration of former church lands: it hastily made up a cadastral list of the old church lands.

Ordinary thefts and robberies also checkered the activities of the counter-revolutionary leaders and their janissaries and “revolutionary” organs. Under the leadership of Piroška, “mayor” of Csongrád, they ravaged 32 homes and seriously manhandled many of the persons they found in them. They wrecked the home of Sándor Ziegenheim, manager of the furniture factory. He himself escaped with the assistance of the factory’s workers, who hid him in the shop.

At Sátoraljaújhely, under the leadership of Károly Kummer, ex-convict and embezzler, “national guardsmen” looted many shops.

One of the first acts of the Debrecen “Revolutionary Committee” was to secure a loan of 800,000 forints from the National Bank to cover its own “expenses”; this sum melted away and was charged to the “account of the revolution.”

At the village of Szentes, Béla and Sándor Herling, István Apatovszki, Sándor Dére and Sándor Vass, at the village of Polgár, Gábor Vigh, Gyula Harváth, Mihály Székreyesi and others, members of the “Revolutionary Committee” or “Commission,” pillaged the food collections intended for Budapest. Those in Szentes “made” so much money that two of them purchased 250 cc. “Pannonia” motorcycles, while those in Polgár acquired several carpets, 18 curtains, large quantities of potatoes, 288 kilograms of meat, 90 kilograms of lard and bacon, 50 kilograms of sugar and other supplies; they organized collections of money in 14 factories and enterprises, which netted them 6,900 forints.

At Tiszaszederkény, Károly Otokár and Béla Illés, residents of Tiszapalkonya, put on Soviet uniforms and threatened many people of the community with execution or deportation.

Counter-revolutionary Murderers

The armed counter-revolutionaries carried out countless acts of terror against Party and state functionaries and against members of co-operative farms and many others.
On October 29, in the community of Kakucs, four persons, named Rizmájer, Harazin, Feller and Gáspar, forced their way into the home of József Bagló, former council president and later Party secretary of a co-operative farm, attacked him and stabbed him to death with a knife.

In the village of Bugyi, on October 30, Benjámin Szmarek, who came from another village, shot and killed László Lengyel, president of the New Life Co-operative Farm.

In Cegléd, the counter-revolutionaries shot and killed János Békesi, assistant clerk of the police station.

At Dány, István Hangodi, a local resident, ambushed Police Sergeant-Major Flórián Lázár, who was on his way home, and shot him to death.

Report of the Chief Public Prosecutor on the Özd Atrocities

On October 29, 1956, István Török, the commander of the Özd National Guard, arrested and disarmed, with the aid of a guard unit, the members of the local police and stood them up against the wall.

In order to pacify István Török and to give the policemen an opportunity to escape, the members of the workers’ council requested his presence in another room of the central police station. Before leaving, Török ordered the national guard unit to shoot the policemen as soon as he should give the signal by a shot from his pistol.

During his conversation with members of the workers’ council, István Török behaved in such an agitated manner that several of those present tried to seize him. In the struggle, Török managed to grab a pistol and fired it. After the pistol shot, confusion broke out among the members of the national guard unit in the yard and shooting began. Believing that they were being fired upon from the central police building, they directed their fire at the roof. The policemen who had been standing at the wall used this opportunity to escape.

While the shooting was going on, somebody brought the news to the workers of the Özd Metallurgical Works that the police and the AVO had attacked the national guard unit, and that part of the assailants were on their way to the factory. The factory loudspeak-
ing system announced this fable to the workers and called upon them to arm themselves and go to the police station. Soon the factory fire sirens sounded the alarm. The misguided and excited masses of workers left the factory, armed with hammers, crowbars, steel cables, shovels, etc. Part of the workers broke into the factory’s air-raid shelter and seized the arms and explosives stored there.

The enraged mob poured out into the streets. A unit of the national guard surrounded the police station and barred all roads leading to it. It was then that they stopped Ferenc Horning, an investigator of the prosecutor’s office, who was on his way to the railway station to travel to his place of work in Miskolc, and demanded that, being a stranger in Ózd, he identify himself. The national guard members examining his papers and identifying him as a member of the staff of the prosecutor’s office, refused to credit them and said he was “probably an AVO-man.” They found Horning’s service pistol and, threatening him with their weapons, they wanted to take him away with them. In self-defence, Horning tried to push aside the barrel of one of the guns pointed at him, following which its bearer fired it, and the shot went in the direction of a nine or ten-year-old child. No one was injured by the shot, yet the national guardsmen, on their way to the office of the workers’ council, spread the rumour that the “AVO-man” they had captured had shot a child. Later a story was circulated among the crowd that Horning had shot several children.

Suffering a hail of blows, Ferenc Horning was taken into the office of the workers’ council. The raging mob demanded that Ferenc Horning be handed over to them. Giving way to the demand after a few minutes, the workers’ council turned Ferenc Horning over to the crowd which fell upon him and began to beat and kick him. Two ringleaders in the lynching of Horning were Lajos Miskovics, a chimney sweeper, and Bertalan Kanyó. The latter beat Horning on the head with a small axe as he was trying to escape. Miskovics also struck Horning on the head with his iron hook.

After the mob, led by Kanyó and Miskovics, had practically trampled Horning to death, they tied his feet together and dragged him to the factory in order to throw him into the steel furnace or hang him from a crane. The workers did not permit the body to be dragged into the territory occupied by the plant because “it would defile the factory.” The crazed mob then dragged the lifeless body of Horning back to the square in front of the workers’ council office, and obtaining ropes by breaking into a locker containing the fire-fighting equipment, they hanged him by his feet from a chestnut tree before the office.

The lynching of Horning did not pacify the mob. Armed groups roamed about town searching for policemen and other “suspicious” persons. This opportunity was seized by a group of former gendarmes, living in Széna Valley, to get into action. Not far from their homes lived József Horváth, an AVO lieutenant. On this particular morning he happened to be at home. József Horváth, nearly 50, the father of three children — according to the records he was about to be demobilized — waved aside the warnings of his well-wishers who urged him to hide himself in the forest and said he had committed no crime and therefore had no reason to leave his family and run away.

The ex-gendarmes went for József Horváth in a light green Skoda car. Part of them watched Horváth’s home and the rest helped to drag him away. Because of the tremendous crowd, they were unable to bring József Horváth to the square before the workers’ council office. They consequently dragged him from the car with his feet tied; one of them broke the stock of his rifle on his head. (The smashed stock could be seen on the street for days afterwards.) Horváth was killed instantly by the blow. The mob which had hanged the body of Ferenc Horning now dragged the corpse of József Horváth to the square by its feet and also hanged it from the chestnut tree.

After the foregoing terrible events, individuals of still undetermined identity seized Zsigmond Cs. Nagy, police detective captain, in the street and dragged him before the mob. When Zsigmond Cs. Nagy saw the two victims hanging from the tree, he turned towards the mob and implored them to let him go, since he had done no wrong. Despite his pleading, he was dragged along by his hair, then thrown to the ground and hanged alive by his feet from the chestnut tree beside the two other victims.

A leading part in the torturing of Zsigmond Cs. Nagy was played by József Kocka, a resident of Hangóny. Kocka pierced Zsigmond Cs. Nagy repeatedly with a pitchfork. After several attempts to penetrate the body of the victim hanging from the tree had failed, Kocka ran into the factory to sharpen his pitchfork.
Upon returning, he again drove the pitchfork into the body of Zsigmond Cs. Nagy, cursing wildly as he did so. József Kocka’s particularly sadistic act can best be explained by the circumstance that about a year earlier he had, while hauling freight, stolen a wristwatch from his victim, who later learned about the theft.

These are but an insignificant part of all the acts of terror that were perpetrated in Hungary’s towns and villages during those few days of unbridled counter-revolution. Ordinary people like László Lengyel, co-operative farm chairman, Mihály Bene Sr., ex-member of a land-reform committee, József Gabló, a village Party secretary, Ferenc Horning, an officer of the public prosecutor’s office, and many others fell victim to the ruthless and bloodthirsty white terror. This was an attempt made by fascists, former chief constables, gendarmerie officers and Arrow-Cross men, allied with common felons, against the Hungarian people, against their liberty and against many outstanding and brave sons of the Hungarian nation.

József Dudás and His Gang

An armed gang of political adventurers, headed by József Dudás, emerged from obscurity at the beginning of the October events and soon succeeded in playing a leading role.

Dudás, aged forty-four, was born in Transylvania. He was allegedly an engineer — but where, when and how he required his diploma remains a mystery. As a young man, he joined the workers’ movement in Transylvania, but later he acted as informer for the Rumanian secret police, the Siguranta.

In 1940, he left Rumania and came to Budapest. Towards the end of the war, he tried to worm himself into the resistance movement. Although he actually never resisted the German occupation forces, the fascist Lakatos cabinet, in 1944, commissioned Dudás, among others, to participate as “representative of the resistance” in a delegation sent by Miklós Horthy to Moscow to negotiate Hungary’s surrender with the Soviet Government.

After the liberation, Dudás became a member of the municipal authority of Budapest, representing the Smallholders’ Party. At the end of 1946, he was suspected of being involved in a counter-revolutionary plot to overthrow the regime and was put under arrest. He was later handed over to the Rumanian authorities, who sentenced him to prison for his pre-war activity as a police informer. He was in prison until 1954, and, upon his release, returned to Budapest, where he worked in a factory until the October events.

In the course of the uprising in Budapest, Dudás reappeared on the scene, in search of a political career as leader of the counter-revolution. He and his associates set up the so-called “Revolutionary National Committee” of the Second District of Budapest, presided over by Dudás. They organized elements of the mob and the youth into armed detachments, and proclaimed Dudás their “commander-in-chief.” His lieutenants were former Horthy officers and other fascist individuals. These gangs committed acts of violence against
the government and public order with the aim of extending Dudás' power. The first such gang was set up by the Dudás group in the Second District, with János Szabó, who had a criminal record, as one of its leaders. During the cease-fire, an armed band occupied the headquarters of the Communist daily, Szabad Nép; here additional detachments were organized, led by former Horthy officers; many of those who joined up were escaped convicts. From then on, Dudás acted as the self-styled representative of a non-existent country-wide "Hungarian National Revolutionary Committee." In the name of this Committee, his gangs assaulted unarmed men, primarily Communists, plundered the Corvin Department Store and committed a number of murders.

In the first days of November, Dudás already felt himself to be master of the situation. He later confessed to having met Maléter to discuss with him the joint command of the revolutionary forces. He also negotiated with the Writers' Association and other organizations, as the representative of a central authority.

The testimony of witnesses proved that his recent activities cost the life of many an innocent person.

In political and economic crimes, gravely endangering the interests of the people's democracy, it is the Chief Public Prosecutor who, in the first instance, acts as accuser. In such cases, the law (Criminal Code section 23/a, captions 1, 2 and 3) provides for hearing in camera. Accordingly, the case of Dudás and his associates was tried behind closed doors. The main charge against Dudás and his associates was: attempt to overthrow the people's democratic regime.

The indictment outlined the main charge as follows:

"On October 28, 1956, Dudás drew up a subversive pamphlet containing 25 points, and forced the printshop of Szabad Nép to print it together with other pamphlets of fascist tendency. The pamphlets were spread all over the country in several hundred thousand copies.

"Dudás rose against the lawful government. He declared in his pamphlet that he and his gang did not recognize the government. After the cease-fire was declared, he stated in the October 30 issue of Magyar Függetlenség (Hungarian Independence) that 'there will be no laying down of arms, the freedom fighters will remain armed and carry their weapons openly. Licences to bear arms are issued by the National Committee, and police squads or members of the armed forces have no right to demand identification papers from the freedom fighters, except when they disturb public order. Armed individuals bearing the identification papers of the National Committee can be arrested only by their own detachments.'"

Dudás' idea — which he tried to implement by force, relying on his armed gangs — was that he, Dudás, and the "Revolutionary National Committee" should take control over the state. Right from the start, Dudás demanded six ministerial posts for the Committee, among them the key posts of Defence and Internal Affairs. The Dudás newspaper, Magyar Függetlenség, issued after the successful raid on the Szabad Nép headquarters and printing office, asked the U.N. to recognize Dudás and his committee:

"The Security Council is requested to recognize the Hungarian National Committee" (the members and president of which consisted of Dudás — Editor) "and the Command of the Freedom Fighters" (with Dudás in the supreme command — Editor) "as belligerent parties, and to send an armistice commission to Hungary."
Point 10 declares: "We do not recognize the actual government," that is, the cabinet of Imre Nagy.

Dudás, of course, did not confine his activity to claims and threats. Taking advantage of the government's impotence, he took action with his armed forces, the bulk of which consisted of escaped convicts. He promptly set up court in the Szabad Nép premises, where he received Western journalists and photo-reporters in a Napoleonic pose, issued statements to the Press, distributed high appointments or signed warrants of arrest. On the night of November 2, he organized an attack on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in an effort to occupy the building and seize the portfolio for his "Committee."

His pamphlets and the paper he edited contributed considerably to inciting and spreading counter-revolutionary hysteria and pogrom atmosphere.

The terrorist acts of Dudás' gangs and their looting, which latter alone caused many million forints worth of damage, were committed with the "chief's" knowledge and approval, and not seldom on his initiative. These facts played a relatively large role at the trial. The defendants were unable to deny the principal armed actions committed by them for the purpose of seizing power, nor could their press activity be disclaimed, and they were obliged to admit them. They endeavoured, however, to plead not guilty of the robbery, plunder and murder charges, by shifting the blame on those of their companions who had escaped. The guilt of the accused was, however, irrefutably established under the weight of material proof and the evidence of witnesses.

Dudás commanded two armed gangs. One was stationed at Széna Square—Maros Street, under the command — among others — of the János Szabó mentioned above. The other gang had its "headquarters" in the Szabad Nép building, and Dudás put a former Horthy officer, András Kovács — who also had a police record — in charge of this detachment.

János Szabó, aged 59, had served a sentence for illegal border crossing and espionage. He admitted that he joined the rebels on October 25, and that three days later Dudás put him in charge of the Széna Square—Maros Street detachment, appointing him lieutenant-colonel.

The spirit ruling in the Szabó group as well as several murders committed by them were revealed by the trial evidence of István Kovács, of Pilisvörösvár, aged 18:

"I knew Szabó to be the commander. I got involved in the October events when, on October 27, I came up to Budapest and could no longer go back home. So I and some others went to Széna Square, where we were given weapons. I was a guard at the gate all the time. Once I was posted at the door of Uncle Szabó's room at Maros Street. I know nothing about instructions. I know that a boy was killed, because he was said to have denounced us to the Soviet forces. A girl by the name of Erzsi told me about that. She said Uncle Szabó's men killed the boy for having denounced them. Once a young AVO chap came to Széna Square looking for Uncle Szabó. He was arrested, for he was said to have come to spy on us. He was locked in the cellar, and later he was killed.

"In Maros Street, the commander of the 1st company was also killed, allegedly for attempting to mislead us.

"There were instructions to capture AVO members. The patrols told me, on Uncle Szabó's instructions they had brought in AVO people, altogether 51, two of whom were women.

"On November 4, Szabó warned us not to lay down our arms. There was a special group of 48, but I don't know under whose command they were. They belonged to Uncle Szabó's group."

Queried by the Deputy Public Prosecutor, the witness replied:

"I personally saw the corpse of the man who had come to Széna Square as an AVO member."

Answering a question of defendant János Szabó, the witness said:

"The man was taken to the cellar alive, and was brought out under a blanket, but at that time he was already dead. We even looked at his face."

Teréz Guszman, aged 16, a dressmaker's apprentice who also belonged to Szabó's armed group, confirmed the deposition of Kovács as follows:
“An AVO-man was said to have been murdered in the Maros Street barracks. I heard about the case from a certain István Kocsis. The man had allegedly misled those who were looking for high-ranking AVO officers. Others told me that he was shot upon Uncle Szabó’s instructions. I also heard that they killed a lame man who was said to be a Soviet informer. A girl by the name of Erzsi told me about this.”

Tibor Szőfert, aged 36, born in Nagyszeben, a statistician and one of the Dudás gang’s officers, whom Dudás had appointed lieutenant-colonel, conducted the attack on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He gave the following evidence concerning János Szabó and his group:

“It was not so much lack of discipline, but gangsterism that characterized the Szabó group. They held up motorcars and shot at them. The Szabó group brought AVO people to us too, but I either let them go, or had them taken over to Fő Street.

“I was told by one Antal Hübel — after the 5th — that at Széna Square Szabó shot two fellows riding motor bicycles. Szabó would not obey anybody. Even during the cease-fire, he kept on firing at passenger cars.

“I heard from members of the Szabó group that several AVO members had been shot on Vörös Hadsereg Road.

“The group at Széna Square was a rabble. Szabó kept running about the whole day with a machine gun about his neck; he was like a man who had gone out of his mind.”

Concerning the other gang that had its headquarters in the Szabad Nép building, the indictment of the Chief Public Prosecutor reads as follows:

“Dudás set up his headquarters in the former Szabad Nép building. The members of the armed group under his command committed murder, carried off Party executives and other citizens, some of whom disappeared.”

The armed rebels concentrated at Szabad Nép headquarters were under the operative control of a former Horthy officer, András Kovács, one of Dudás’ deputies. Another leading officer was a man known as “Uncle Feri,” who operated under the assumed name of First Lieutenant Tóth. Actually he was Ferenc Pálházi, another Horthyite officer.

Although their activity has by no means yet been fully disclosed, some of the witnesses and records have already revealed the essentials.

J.V., a printing office employee, deposed as follows:

“As far as I could see, there were about 200 armed bandits in the Szabad Nép building who — I understood — had been instructed by József Dudás that, as from November 1, no outsiders were to be allowed to stay in the building overnight, whoever they might be, including even printers; should anyone appear, the guard had instructions to fire without warning. I also know that the bandits forced open the lockers of the printers and stole their work clothes. I know, furthermore, that escaped criminals changed clothes there. This could be established also from the fact that striped prison garb was scattered all over the house.”

The rebels who set up their headquarters in the Szabad Nép building conducted regular raids on the Corvin Department Store across the street.

Here is an extract from the deposition of G.N., an employee of the Corvin Department Store:

“On November 4 and thereafter, armed bandits came from Szabad Nép headquarters into the Corvin Department Store . . . They entered in small groups and demanded that we open the store so that they might get clothes. As far as I can remember, a man called ‘Uncle Feri’ was at the head of those who penetrated into the department store . . . In addition to a vast quantity of clothes and boots, the bandits also looted the available watches and cameras.”

The following is quoted from the deposition of I.B.:

“Several of the armed bandits . . . that had come over from the Szabad Nép building wore prison garb; they were obviously convicts who had been freed from prison. These ex-convicts and the rest of the armed gangsters stole a great many clothes. As far as I can judge, about 300 armed bandits changed clothes
in the department store... The damage sustained by the department store as a result of the looting by armed counter-revolutionaries is estimated at roughly three million forints."

The armed counter-revolutionaries took their victims to headquarters, and held them there. In this connection, an elderly woman employee of the department store stated the following:

"On the morning of October 31, 1956, I was warned that counter-revolutionaries had looked for me at the department store and that I had better go home. I got dressed and was about to leave the building. As I came out of the staff entrance, I noticed five armed youths standing about with two dismissed employees of the department store, Péter Sárpataki and István Podhonoiczky by name. (Others deposited that these men had been dismissed for theft and defalcation.) As I stepped forward, Sárpataki rushed at me, gripped my hair and threw me to the ground... They then pushed me across the street to the Rökk Szilárd Street gate of the Szabad Nép building, piling insults and abuse on me all the while. I was conducted to a room on the second floor, where one András Kovács was in command, a deputy of József Dudás. After I had entered, they searched me and took away everything I had on me. I never got back the canvas handbag, my fountain pen, my ever-sharp pencil and some food. They set me up against the wall, made me fold my hands behind my back, and so my interrogation began. It was conducted by András Kovács.

"Later several others were brought into the room. As far as I remember, there were twelve of us towards evening, three of them women, including myself. As far as I could judge, the persons brought in were officials of the State Security Authority, as well as members of the army and of the police. There were guards in the room armed with machine guns and hand-grenades. Several times during the interrogation, the 'lieutenants' of the armed gang dropped in and asked questions. Among them there was a person called 'Uncle Feri' and a young man with sandy hair who wore glasses. At about 9 p.m. a commotion arose in the room, everybody was evidently nervous, expecting the commander, József Dudás, to enter the room. Dudás wore black riding breeches, laced top boots and a civilian jacket. He behaved obviously as one in command, giving instructions to the others."

The acts of terror committed by the "man-hunters" of the Szabad Nép building are revealed by the deposition of witness G.S.:

"On Monday (November 5th), at 7 a.m., I noticed that on the right-hand side of the gate (meaning the Stáhly Street 13 entrance), at a distance of some 5–6 metres, there were three dead bodies, two of them in civilian clothes, and one wearing a Soviet uniform. From the way they were lying there, it was clear that they did not die on the spot, but had been dragged there. The route through which they had been lugged could be traced clearly by following the blood stains, which led to the tree on the corner of Rökk Szilárd and Stáhly Streets. The tree stood at the corner of the Corvin Department Store, facing the first window of the Corvin Restaurant."

Defendant Resső Varga, born in 1938, a resident of Rákosszentmihály, with a police record, confirmed the above statement and told about other murders as well.

"I had been under arrest at the Markó prison, suspected of embezzlement. We were freed on November 2. On hearing that rebel headquarters were at the Szabad Nép building, I reported there. The commander was András Kovács; it was he who gave me arms. On the same night, they brought in an attorney by the name of Sarkadi. We guarded him and another person. Later we took them out behind the Corvin, where both were executed." (Note: The "other person" was First Lieutenant Pál Fodor. Their dead bodies were seen by witness G.S.)

"The prisoners were taken to the police station at Hárfsa Street. Some of them were allowed to leave, but not the AVOMen.

"The group executed three Russians on Köztársaság Square, and a Soviet officer in the Day and Night Delicatessen Shop. Kovács personally carried out the executions.

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"On the 6th, we went over to the Corvin Department Store. A man called 'Uncle Feri' brought in two men, whom he killed in the Corvin courtyard. Next day he did the same to a man called Béla Szabó, who was said to have denounced us. Once, Uncle Feri boasted of having stabbed two men in a flat with his own knife. His clothes were bloodstained.

"On Baross Square, one day, we captured six AVO-men. Two of them who were wounded I myself took to the Athenaeum Printing Office. One of the four who remained was shot in the head, Kovács led away one, and Uncle Feri took two. Sarkadi and the one with him were executed on the evening of the 4th, the others after that date."

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The trial material shows that József Dudás built up his power on armed gangs recruited from Horthyite officers and convicts. These bands committed numerous common crimes, they plundered and murdered to intimidate the population and to assist in destroying the people's democratic system and establishing the rule of Dudás.

The military council of the Supreme Court of the Hungarian People's Republic sentenced József Dudás and János Szabó to death. The verdict was carried out on the morning of January 19, 1957.

**Western Capitalism and the Hungarian Events**

*Western Press Review*

**I**

Stirring up the Fire

The West's meddling in the domestic affairs of the People's Democracies, its unrelenting struggle with every available means against the people's democratic system has, in essence, been going on for years. Senator McCarran, in a speech before the U.S. Senate on August 6, 1951, published in the Congressional Record of that date, emphasized the importance of the aggressive fight against the countries building socialism. In the course of his address, he stated that he advocated:

"Maximum support for underground insurgent groups inside the Communist sphere of control; open and effective co-operation with the hundreds of thousands of fugitives from Communism now living miserably in Western Europe and on the fringes of the Asian Continent... Similarly, there is no reason why our own offensive should be limited to governmental action. There are things a government in peace-time cannot do openly which can be done through private groups. Some such things are being done on our side. An example is the Free Europe Committee, which has already set up a radio system addressed to the satellite areas. But this is only a small beginning. The possibilities are infinite."

The "possibilities" referred to by Senator McCarran included the preparation, organization and unleashing of armed plots and
revolts. In the spring of 1955, a detailed programme was elaborated in
the United States for "a political campaign against world Commu-
nism." This plan envisaged the preparation of armed actions involv-
ing the traitors who had abandoned from the people's democracies.
In outlining what was to be done, David Sarnov, President of the
Radio Corporation of America, is reported by the American press
to have said that mass use should be made of those human forces
to be drawn from the well-organized and well indoctrinated anti-
Communist groups. In his opinion, they should in the coming
critical period be given the possibility of returning to their countries
as leaders. Officers' detachments should be formed from emigrant
circles; numbering anywhere from ten to a hundred, they should
be placed in readiness in expectation of the appropriate circum-
stances and the suitable moment.

Organizational preparations were supplemented by ideological
preparations. One proof — among others — is a lecture by Adolf
Berle, board member of the Free Europe Committee, outlining the
ideological preliminaries of revolts. Mr. Berle is an American ex-
diplomat, who was Assistant Secretary of State from 1938 to 1947.
The lecture in question was delivered at the so-called Free Europe
University, maintained near Strasbourg by the Free Europe Com-
mittee, an American organization, and representing, in essence,
a training school for the intelligence service. The students at this
"university" are persons selected from the ranks of those who ab-
sconded from the People's Democracies. The December 1, 1951,
issue of the Manchester Guardian reveals that:

"... the student must undertake to return to his native
country as soon as circumstances permit. He is indeed being
trained as a member of the new élite that will take over the
People's Democracies upon their 'liberation'."

On March 13, 1952, the New York Times wrote about the stu-
dents of this "university" as follows:

"Some of them express hopes for an early outbreak of war
as the most likely means of reopening their homelands."

It was the students of this "university" whom Mr. Berle addressed.
The contents of the lecture and its subsequent dissemination in
Hungarian through the channels of the Institute for International
Cultural Relations show that Mr. Berle considered it to be part of
his professional duties to assist in undermining the socialist states of
Europe.

In his lecture, Mr. Berle defined the supreme task as the
simple removal of Communism as an obstacle to the new and
grand goal, which was the basis of the 20th century revolution.

In Mr. Berle's opinion, America should, of course, play a
leading role. America, he said, having succeeded in socializing
capitalism, had the right to tell a country rescued from the yoke of
Communism: "We know just how to go about it."

The main ideological tactics in the present struggle against
Communism is to play down the crucial differences, and to obliterate
as far as possible the chasm dividing capitalism and socialism.
It was altogether irrelevant -- Mr. Berle insisted -- whether, in
Poland or Czechoslovakia, the railway system and the factories would
be controlled by private companies or socialist organs, so long as
they had freedom of speech and freedom of thought, and everybody
could freely aspire towards wellbeing. It was not so much the out-
ward form as the inner content of the socialist regimes which con-
cerned "us," he added.

Mr. Berle pretended that it was immaterial whether the system
was nominally socialist or capitalist, as long as it was to their liking.
He announced that most of the preparatory work had already been
accomplished, but he was not free to name the persons who would
do the work when the proper time came.

Mr. Berle's lecture, a translation of which was circulated also
in Hungary, beyond doubt amounts to interference in the domestic
affairs of other countries. But there are proofs of an entirely differ-
ent nature concerning Western interference in Hungary. Thus
for example Major D. of the Hungarian armed forces, who, on Octo-
ber 28, negotiated with the armed groups at Széna Square concern-
ing their surrender, reported:

"Most of the leaders were in favour of downing arms and
freely departing. A minor, but extremely stubborn part of
the leaders insisted on continuing to fight. A man called Ekren
spoke in behalf of this group and declared that they had definite
instructions from higher up to continue the struggle ... "There-
fore — Ekren said turning to me — we shall go on fighting, and
you may tell those who sent you that tonight, the . . . (here, the
original text listed the name of three Western legations) and
other legations assured me that reinforcements would arrive from
West Germany to-morrow.' Several persons then remarked
that the armed resistance was not organized on October 23,
but back in the autumn of 1953 . . . On the next day, October
29, we saw how the Széna Square detachment, although its
numerical strength had melted considerably, took up its old
positions, this time, however, equipped with German and other
western automatic weapons. I recall that early in the morning
of the 29th, Ekren and 'Uncle Szabó' called on us, with German
automatic rifles slung over their shoulders, and demanded that
we cancel the armistice agreement. I asked Ekren what he had
against the agreement this time? He replied that he had been
to the legation and had been severely reprimanded for accept-
ing the conditions.”

Similar data were revealed by Major Sz., who reported that at a
University — where he had been a professor — he was called on by
a delegation from Bonn. His statement is quoted in an earlier chapter.

Characteristic evidence of the abuse of Red Cross transportation
facilities for purposes other than the delivery of weapons, was fur-
nished in Le Soir Illustre by the Belgian journalist Raymond Darolle,
who wrote:

“Coming from Győr, the best way to reach the capital
was to get a lift on one of the numerous Red Cross cars coming
from Austria, with sorely needed medical supplies and food. We
got on the first lorry that stopped for us. Three kilomètres
further on, the driver stopped in front of a printing establish-
ment. My fellow-travellers quickly loaded the car with anti-
Soviet pamphlets and newspapers, after which we started off
again — though, I have to admit, in a far from happy mood —
distributing the dangerous material in the villages along the
road to Budapest, under the very noses of the Soviets.”

Aside from countless numbers of fascist émigrés, newspaper-
men, radio reporters, etc., other foreigners of "greater weight"
also walked in and out across the Hungarian frontier — and that

for obvious purposes. Thus several U.S. newspapers reported that
General Donovan, who during the Second World War became the
head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) — the principal
American intelligence agency during World War II and the in-
mediate post-war period — was in Austria during the Hungarian revolt,
representing an organization called “International Rescue Commit-
tee.” According to the Washington Daily News, General Donovan,
at the end of November, returned to Washington from Hungary,
the borders of which he had traversed many times during his Austrian
stay. In Washington, Donovan told the press that the best way to
help the Hungarian counter-revolutionary forces was to provide those
who were still fighting with weapons. When queried whether the
U.S. was helping to continue the fight, General Donovan replied
that this was a matter of course.

The front-page headline in General Franco’s news-
paper reads: "Spain would contribute troops to inter-
national military control of Hungaty's territory"
Upon leaving the legation, Countess Széchenyi and her aristocratic companions drove straight to the residence of Cardinal Mindszenty.

The Knights of Malta interfered in Hungary's affairs in the most diverse ways. It was with their aid that the two young Counts Hoyos, offsprings of one of the wealthiest aristocratic families actively engaged in politics in Austria, came to Hungary. Both were busy smuggling men and arms into Hungary, via the Austrian village of Rechnitz and other places. One may well wonder what sort of "aid" these blueblood "knights" can have rendered, and what made them rush head over heels into Hungary?

The Vatican did not remain idle either. The December 13 issue of the Journal de Genève carried the following lines:

"Some Hungarians apparently reproach the Vatican for having failed to give adequate help to their national insurrection. This opinion is utterly unfounded... The Vatican sent its representatives (to Hungary). Thus Monseigneur Rodhain, a delegate of the Vatican, travelled to the Hungarian capital and there conferred with Cardinal Mindszenty, who had just been released from prison by the Nagy cabinet. After sizing up the situation and handing to the Cardinal a sum of money sent by the Pope for the benefit of Hungarian catholics, he returned to the Vatican bringing valuable secret documents with him. Shortly thereafter, the same trip was undertaken by Monseigneur Zágon, rector of the Papal Hungarian Institute, who returned to Rome with messages from the Hungarian bishops. Later, special observers were stationed at the Austrian border. They conferred in writing with the (papal) State Secretariat."

The most prominent role abroad, both as regards inciting to revolt and the issuance of organizational, tactical and other instructions, was played by Radio Free Europe. A good many Western papers agreed on this point, and there were some that found that Radio Free Europe went too far. The Abendzeitung of Munich even demanded the suppression of the broadcasting station, the seat of which likewise is in Munich.

"Ever since the tragic events in Hungary, our paper keeps receiving requests, letters, cables and telephone calls, sharply protesting against the broadcasting station operating from Munich... Radio Free Europe has for years been inciting Hungary to revolt, and in recent weeks, it has encouraged the rebels to hold out. The station promised help to the insurrectionists... and is responsible for the bloodshed in Hungary. Radio Free Europe is financed by the U.S. State Department, to which the American officials of the station are accountable... If there ever was a reason for the existence of the Free Europe broadcasting station, its mission has been accomplished. The Federal Government must immediately inform Washington of the tension and indignation provoked by the broadcasts of Radio Free Europe not only in Germany, but also all over Europe."

On November 14, the New York Herald Tribune, discussing the protest of the Government of West Germany against the activity of the Free Europe broadcasting station, wrote that:

"Newspapers in West Germany and France have been pounding RFE with charges that it stirred the Hungarian rebels to revolt, and by promises of help, kept the fighting going after all hope was lost."

However, Michel Gordey, correspondent of France Soir who recently returned from Budapest, wrote:

"We were able to listen to the foreign radios, which was our only source of information from the outside world. We heard a lot of false news about what was going on inside Budapest."

"We also heard on Radio Free Europe, broadcasting from Munich toward the satellites, programmes whose impassioned tone and desperate calls to revolt certainly did a lot of wrong."

"During those last days, numerous Hungarians told us: 'these broadcasts have provoked much bloodshed'."

In a detailed analysis published in the New Statesman and Nation by Mendelson, an expert on East European questions, — a further quotation from whose letter appears on a later page — we read:
“At the same time, Radio Free Europe actively intervened. It sent a team of broadcasters to Győr, one of the provincial towns held by the revolutionaries, and issued continuous appeals to fight from its main radio station in Munich. It broadcast, according to reliable sources, many promises of military help from the West.”

According to the November 13 issue of Die Presse:

“What they have been preaching in Munich, London, Paris and New York, sitting over hot dogs and whisky to kill time, the brave but thoughtless Hungarian people took for the gospel truth… As late as Thursday, they sent a young officer from the Kilián barracks, which at the time was under heavy attack, to the Western legations to enquire when the airborne UN police squads were expected to land in Budapest… He was completely crushed when they explained to him that there was no question of either paratroopers or police squads.”

Radio Free Europe was, in practice, the organ for issuing instructions to the insurgents and for organizing a movement that developed into a counter-revolution. The broadcasts were not confined to propaganda slogans, but also gave definite strategic instructions. They advised the underground wireless stations on what wave lengths and how to broadcast messages. They urged the armed groups to continue their resistance. For example, as soon as the Imre Nagy cabinet proclaimed a cease-fire, Free Europe began to incite the insurgents to break it. According to Colonel Bell, military advisor and commentator of Radio Free Europe, the cease-fire was “as dangerous as the Trojan horse.”

“Imre Nagy and his associates” — he stated on October 29 — “wish to repeat the story of the Trojan horse in a tricky, modern form. The cease-fire as a Trojan horse is needed by the Budapest government to enable it to maintain power as long as possible… The freedom-fighters must not for a moment lose sight of the government’s scheme, for if they do, the tragedy of the Trojan horse will repeat itself.”

As we know, the cease-fire was actually violated as a result of the prodding by Radio Free Europe and the intolerable intervention of certain Western legations. On the next day, a few hours after the broadcast referred to above, the brutal attack against Party headquarters at Republic Square and other organizations began, as well as the murderous man-hunt to which hundreds and thousands of Communists and democratically minded people fell victim.

In a Hungarian broadcast on October 31, Colonel Bell gave more explicit instructions:

“The Communist leaders, who never had any business to be there, must give up their posts in the army! Comrades fighting for freedom! Demand the posts of Minister of Defence, of Commander-in-Chief and of Chief of Staff for yourselves! That would be your supreme guarantee!”

The counter-revolutionary forces, as we know, obeyed these instructions too: the demand was promptly met.

On the same day, Radio Free Europe broadcast the following comment:

“The portfolios of the Interior and of Defence are still in their hands. Don’t let that be, freedom fighters! Don’t hang your rifles on the wall! Don’t give a lump of coal, nor a drop of oil to the Budapest government, until you have taken charge of the country’s interior affairs and of its defence!”

On the same day, news commentator “Janus” broadcast political directives over Radio Free Europe, urging resistance to the newly formed “small cabinet.” A few days earlier, after the formation of the broader cabinet, the “revolutionary” puppets governed by Radio Free Europe had rejected it, but now that a “small cabinet” had been formed in line with their previous demands, American propaganda was ready with fresh instructions to oppose it and push the Government still further to the right:

“The small cabinet is no guarantee whatsoever! The situation is so absurd that it is utterly inadmissible even as a temporary solution! The most important thing to do — as demanded by the free broadcasting stations — is immediately to form a new, provisional national cabinet which should take
matters in hand! This cabinet should only include the genuine representatives of the political parties and the actual leaders of the freedom fight" — such were the instructions of the American agent.

And so that there might be no doubt as to the detailed political programme that was envisaged, Radio Free Europe, in the form of an appeal of the "National Council" of Szentgotthárd, broadcast the demands for the withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty, for elections under international (meaning, Western) control, for the dissolution of Hungary's diplomatic missions abroad, etc., etc.

II

Washington's Hand in Hungary

Extracts from an article by the American journalist, Albert E. Kahn*

It is a fact that, for several years, certain mysterious and powerful government organs, together with semi-official organizations controlled by various military leaders and industrial magnates have been busily endeavouring to organize "revolts" in the "satellite states." In my archives, there are several files labelled "U.S. espionage abroad" and containing a pile of clippings and other documents, which are particularly interesting to read in the light of recent events in Hungary. Permit me to present a bunch of them.

Pulling the Strings

On April 9, 1948, the U.S. News & World Report published an article concerning American intelligence and sabotage activities abroad. Among other things, the article says that there was a school of thought, in Washington as well as abroad, which desired that "Operation X" employ similar tactics behind the Iron Curtain to those applied by the Office of Strategic Services during the war. According to this conception, ruthless means, including murder where necessary, should be used to keep the Russian part of the

world in unrest. The underground movements in the satellite countries should be supplied with funds.

On October 30, 1949, the Associated Press reported on the Central Intelligence Agency, which had been organized to co-ordinate and advance the work of the various American espionage services, stating that the American spy network, although hardly out of its swaddling-clothes, is already strong and growing steadily. The despatch adds that the American spies are now working silently and invisibly throughout the world.

In June 1950, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. — the future head of the U.S. delegation in the UN — presented a bill to Congress to permit the U.S. Army to recruit up to 10,000 foreigners for the purpose — as the New York Times reported — of eventual deployment near and beyond the "iron curtain." Congressman Dewey Short, in an access of frankness, called this scheme a "dirty business."

In the December 12, 1951, issue of the New York Times, Anthony Leviero, commenting on the propaganda in Eastern Europe by Americans and foreigners collaborating with them in "critical" areas, classified this propaganda under three headings: white, black and grey. He defined them as follows:

"White propaganda is straightforward overt activity, as the broadcasts of the Voice of America... Black propaganda conceals or falsifies its source, and may include violence, placing false rumours, the manufacture and propagation of scandals, and other activities designed to sow confusion and distrust. Grey propaganda is employed in the twilight zone between white and black..."

In October 1951, Congress adopted an amendment to the Mutual Security Act, providing for funds up to 100 million dollars for financing the activity of "selected individuals who are residing in or escapees from... (here follows a list of East European countries of the Socialist Camp, including Hungary), either to form such persons into elements of the military forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for other purposes."

In February 1952 — according to the New York Times — a two-day conference was convened in Washington, attended by

* Retranslated from the Hungarian.
Congressmen, refugees from behind the "iron curtain," teachers, diplomats and "ex-Communists." The paper says that the subject discussed was the new technique of psychological warfare against the Soviet Union and its "satellites." Proposals were discussed for organizing an underground group running into a million members to foster the growth of a "revolutionary atmosphere."

One of the protagonists of the conference was Robert A. Vogeler, vice-president of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, who had recently served a term of 17 months in a Hungarian prison, after having confessed to engaging in espionage and sabotage in Hungary.

Six months after the conference, an organization called American Liberation Center was set up, headed by Vogeler; it declared its task to be to provide 45,000 East European refugees with arms and to assist the underground network in the states behind the "iron curtain," an activity that would allegedly lead to a "revolution."

In an article published in the April 1952 issue of the Nation's Business, Anthony Leviero — a staff member of New York Times — wrote that, while no government official would admit it, spies, saboteurs, and experts were being trained in the more ruthless forms of "psychological warfare." They were being taught how to penetrate into the Russian system on their own and to disrupt it. They were learning how to blow up bridges, trains and war plants and were being trained to handle all sorts of weapons.

Risking a Little Bloodshed

At the beginning of 1955, Allan Dulles, brother of John Foster Dulles, was appointed director of the Central Intelligence Agency. During the Second World War, Allan Dulles directed the European section of the American intelligence and sabotage agency, known as Office of Strategic Services. According to the New York Times, Allan Dulles — a partner in the law office of Sullivan & Cromwell, which, in 1930, collaborating in the organization of Nazi cartels — became involved in intelligence work almost immediately after his graduation from Princeton College.

In 1953, after President Eisenhower's inauguration, the American magazine Newsweek stated that, despite all denials, the Eisenhower Administration, in the course of the anti-Soviet struggle, was planning to rely strongly on subversion and sabotage. The reason for hushing this up, according to Newsweek, was the fear of official Washington that the revelation of the employment of such dirty means by the United States would shock public opinion. We have small reason to doubt that these dirty methods achieved the desired results in Hungary.

On November 8, Drew Pearson, the popular American journalist, related an interesting story. Back in 1950, he was told by the Hungarian emigrant Dr. Béla Fábíán about the "underground preparations" in Hungary, with which the latter was in close contact. The Hungarian people wanted to revolt, he told Pearson. Hungary would be the first to defy her Soviet masters. He knew the unrest among the peasants very well and, if America would but help a little, there would be a conflagration in Hungary. Pearson asked Fábíán how he thought the American Government might help. The United States, Fábíán answered, could not win, unless it was prepared to take a risk, and added that it might have to risk a little bloodshed.

The facts have proved, however, that when it actually came to the shedding of blood, the American intelligence organs were inclined to risk only Hungarian blood.

III

The Role of Hungarian Defectors

The most active forces engaged in interference in Hungarian events were, of course, the Hungarian politicians, officers, gendarmes, etc., who had defected in the past. The competent capitalist organs saw to it that these absconders were able to carry on their activities without hindrance. The Berlin paper Der Morgen reported that

"in the last days of October, the management of the Eschweiler Mining Company granted leave to those of its employees who were Hungarian émigrés and Horthy fascists to enable them to take part in the Hungarian counter-revolution... The Eschweiler concern is owned by West German, Luxembourg and Belgian shareholders."
Neues Deutschland announced that similar action was taken by the boards of many other West German concerns as regards their Hungarian employees, following urgent recommendations to that effect...

"At the same time, all Hungarian emigrants serving in the American labour camp at Vogelweh, most of whom belonged to the illegal Arrow-Cross organization, were dismissed, and are reported to have vanished into thin air."

On November 9, Drew Pearson reported in the Daily Mirror that almost all prominent émigrés from the People's Democracies had recently held a meeting in Paris, sometime before the October events. Major A. Jackson, of the U.S. Armed Forces in West Germany, also attended the gathering. Referring to the "accidental" meeting between Major Jackson and the émigré "leaders" of Central European states, primarily of Hungary, at this particular time, Pearson raised the question as to whether the participants in the conference may not have been given advance notice of events to come.

A board of five Hungarian generals, representing the main military body of the Hungarian refugee organization, was also present at the meeting. The appeal of this board, calling itself the Hungarian Defence Council, was released in the West German paper Nation Europa, a "monthly in the service of the European renaissance" — actually the periodical of former members of SS-detachments. The appeal asks the entire "free" world to support the cause of "Hungarian freedom." Among the signatories of the appeal are not only persons like Ferenc Kisbarnaki Farkas, an ex-Nazi general, but also Archduke Joseph of Hapsburg himself!

Countless reports have been published on the activities of the Hungarian defectors to the West. On October 29, the Austrian Bild-Telegraf wrote:

"An officer of the freedom fighters who had come across the frontier near Nickelsdorf said that he was going to Salzburg to contact certain Hungarian émigrés living there."

The October 31 issue of Neues Deutschland published a report from Ottawa, Canada, as follows:

"According to Western press agencies, the Hungarian Legion of Freedom, an organization of émigrés who sought refuge in Canada at the end of the Second World War, after the collapse of the fascist Horthy regime, has been recruiting volunteers to take part in the Hungarian struggle. Up to date, 3,000 Hungarian fascists have volunteered; they will be transported by air to Hungary with full military equipment."

In Salzburg, a centre of espionage and of émigré organizations, the Salzburger Tagblatt, on October 31, reported — among other things — as follows:

"There is a two-way traffic across the Austro-Hungarian frontier, and the 'Liberty Radio Stations' that call for a 'Western type of democracy' from Hungarian soil are not actually located in West Hungary, but are mobile American stations.

"In Salzburg, as usual, dollars are rolling towards the so-called 'Hungarian Bureau' in Hellbrunner-Strasse, which has never made a secret of the fact that it depends for its existence on American dollars. At present, the Bureau has started a movement among the Hungarian refugees to send 'manpower' left over from the Horthy regime clandestinely to Hungary.
"Hundreds of Hungarian refugees gather at the railway station of Salzburg, awaiting transportation to the Hungarian border, where they are to be readied for 'work' in Burgenland. The nature of the job awaiting them is clear from the fact that the gentlemen who received the so-called 'freedom fighters' at the frontier spoke English . . ."

The Hungarian refugees recruited for "work in Burgenland," of course, lined up at the Hungarian frontier in order to join the fight in Hungary, and it was for that purpose that they crossed the border. There were several centres for organizing them. Aside from the above-mentioned Hungarian bureau, a prominent part was played by the Hungarian Caritas organization at Ignaz-Harrer-Strasse 2, Salzburg — led by a refugee named István Barta. It was a busy place in the critical days of October. Sundry individuals showed up in cars with American and German licence plates and negotiated with notorious Hungarian absconders. Especially on October 27, but even before and after that, large groups of refugees set out from the main railway station at Salzburg. Others joined them at the stations of Attnang-Puchheim and Wels. In the first days, about 200 émigrés started from the refugee camps at Kematen, Hungerburg and Reichenaue. The Zindorf camp near Nuremberg was largely depleted. Organizing also went on in the Rositten camp of Salzburg (near Neutorgasse), where those who had similar plans among the recently escaped Hungarians were concentrated. This camp was also the headquarters of the general staff of the former Hungarian émigrés.

Most of the Hungarian émigrés residing in Salzburg "happened" to leave during those very days. For example, Oszkár Jekelfalussy (Wolf-Dietrich-Strasse 10, Salzburg), ex-colonel of the Horthy army and, for several years, an agent of the Americans, disappeared from Salzburg a few days before the outbreak of the Hungarian uprising. This particular gentleman had regularly met with other former Horthy, Wehrmacht and SS officers. Péter Szalay shuttled back and forth between Austria and Hungary. For some time, he had been a resident of camp No. 1001 at Wels run by the CIC, the American counter-intelligence corps, often referred to as a "school for murderers."

Hungarian and other refugees are given systematic training in a number of camps. Saboteurs are trained in radio and other classes before being sent to the People's Democracies. One of the directors of the training courses is an engineer of Linz, S. Wiesental, and the Hungarians are recruited by a colonel by the name of Náday. Náday's headquarters are at Kufstein. In the weeks preceding the October events, Wiesental and Náday visited the Hungarian frontier to inspect the width of the strip from which the technical obstacles had been removed. Both Náday and Wiesental "work" for the Americans, and, as in many other cases, their meeting place was in Vienna, at the Hotel Regina (Rooseveltplatz 9). It was there that

This photograph — without the square in the middle — appeared in the November 17 issue of Paris-Match with the caption "Hungarian Refugees." The face enclosed within the square has been ascertained to be that of José Luis Gomez Tello, Spanish falangist and ex-member of the Blue Division, which fought on the side of the Nazis in Russia during the last war. On learning about the Hungarian events, he turned up in Hungary where he established contact with the Horthyites. One may well wonder what his motive was!

numerous matters concerning intervention in Hungary were agreed upon. After the collapse of the counter-revolutionary attempt in Hungary, Wiesental once more went back to the business of training émigrés. He agreed with the competent organs in Innsbruck to reopen simultaneous special training courses in three groups during the month of January. The courses were to be directed from Munich. A Hungarian woman, Mrs. Ambrus, leader of the Höttingen camp, was also to share in the programme. Bruno Bukovic, her lover, was commissioned to pick from the different camps the Hungarian and other refugees best suited for the diverse training courses.

In the hope of victory and getting ready to squabble over the spoils, the entire Hungarian emigration got into action. Armed troops lined up for the fight and were set in motion. Mobile radio stations crossed the frontier. Hosts of petty and big agents swarmed in Eastern Austria and Western Hungary. The ground had already been prepared. Thus, according to a French account, Béla Varga,
the leader of the Hungarian fascists in the USA, admitted at a New York press conference that he had established contact with the illegal Hungarian centre early in October. Among the names that again rose to the surface, some of the most prominent were those of Ferenc Nagy, Archduke Joseph of Hapsburg, Tibor Eckhardt, General Sónya, Miklós Horthy and son, the son of Gyula Gömbös, and the "crown prince" Otto of Hapsburg. The latter even made a statement for the Spanish Catholic paper Ya, urging Western intervention, for "only a fool would fail to take advantage of the enemy's hour of weakness." Count Pál Eszterházy, who had been imprisoned at the same time as Cardinal Mindszenty and was released with him, also stepped into the limelight.

Numerous Hungarian and other counter-revolutionaries entered Hungary as journalists and in other guises. Among them was the Spaniard José Luis Gomez Tello, Spanish Falangist, who may be seen in the above photograph amidst a group of Hungarian refugees. Baron Tibor Collas, fascist landlord, undersecretary of state in the Ministry of Finance under Horthy, who left the country before 1948 and is now residing in Stuttgart, came to Hungary with a West German passport in the company of Countess Beatrix Széchenyi. This is also how the Britisher, Jackson Graham Stewart, got into the country: on the frontier, he identified himself as a journalist, but his identification papers proved him to be a professional soldier with the rank of colonel. The Austrian councillor, Franz Strobl, and Dr. Kurt Werner, attorney at law, also paid a visit to Hungary and returned to Austria — in the company of the Duke and Duchess Eszterházy.

Before and after October 23, countless Horthy officers, gendarmes, Arrow-Cross men and such-like characters were sluiced into Hungary. They were first briefed by various information organizations — working sometimes overtly, sometimes in the guise of welfare societies — and after adequate training, they were sent into Hungary. About the end of October, they were openly instructed to join the armed revolt. For instance, János Derián and Béla Kohut, two electric fitters, aged 20, absconded into Austria on October 2, 1956, to evade military service. In the Austrian border village of Maschendorf, they were arrested by the Austrian police. From October 6 to 15, they were detained in the Güssing prison. On October 15, they were released, provided with papers and sent to the "Hungarian Bureau" in Graz, to a man called László Szentgyörgyi. This man introduced them to the local representatives of the Free Europe broadcasting station and to those of a Catholic "welfare organization." On October 19, they reached Salzburg, where they were interviewed again by several representatives of the Free Europe organization and by a man of the CIC. They were promised light work and easy money. Finally, on October 27, they were sent back to Hungary to take part in the revolt, without having had time to undergo any "training."

On October 28, a meeting of Hungarian émigrés took place in the Park Hotel of Salzburg. Among the speakers were László Horváth, a Horthy officer, and Colonel Balla of the former gendarmerie, who heaped abuse on the Hungarian People's Democracy and invited the émigrés to join in the revolt with the aid of American weapons that were to arrive soon. Those who showed their willingness were taken to the Austro-Hungarian border on the 29th and given fifty schillings each. The Austrian border police made no objection to letting them pass through the frontier. They soon arrived in Szengotthárd and took a Red Cross train that brought them to Budapest. Once there, they contacted the Hungarian National Revolutionary Committee of Dudás and the "National Guard," which enlisted them without further ado.
The camp of the Hungarian deserters — as we have shown — vigorously set to work, in the spirit set forth by "Prof. Dr. Dominikus Glicker O.P." on November 9, in the course of a lengthy article in the Munich weekly Új Hungária (New Hungary).

"In days of great crises, the national spirit is safeguarded by those who have become dispersed in foreign lands!"

The magazine leaves no doubt as to what is meant, in essence, by the "national spirit": it is the restoration of capitalism and landlordism in Hungary.

IV

In the Eyes of the West

Western political and military circles were perfectly aware of what was at stake in Hungary. They knew all about it at a time when in Hungary itself one could at best only have an inkling of it. Western observers, therefore, had no hesitations in recognizing the essentially counter-revolutionary and anti-Communist character of the armed actions, and their hostility to the system of People's Democracy. From the very start, they only meant to take advantage of the progressive movement of Hungarian youth and of a section of the intelligentsia, based on well-meaning and justified claims. This fact is most clearly expressed in J. Mendelson's letter to the New Statesman and Nation, already previously referred to:

"The beginning of the revolution was undoubtedly the work of students and workers... Gradually, as the days went by and particularly after the Russian army had left Budapest, other political forces were taking a hand.

"There appeared, first of all, the book burners. Book-burning is not usually associated with the political demonstrations of trade unionists and social democrats. Then, perhaps more important, the political demands of the demonstrators indicated, according to Leslie Bain in the Reporter, a rising tide of extreme nationalism... Then... the old uniforms of the pre-1945 Horthy army were brought out again..."

"Gradually the authority of the Nagy government was reduced to zero..."

"The leadership of the revolution daily... shifted further to the right... As reported in the conservative German paper Die Welt, officers and soldiers of the Hungarian army distributed leaflets in Budapest, demanding... the transfer of all government executive power into the hands of the army... A crowd under the leadership of extreme nationalists stormed the Foreign Office and ignored the pleas of the Nagy-Tildy government, not to go on with the bloodshed.

"On Thursday, November 1, at the height of the rebellion, an attempt was made by Zoltán Tildy, himself a Christian and a moderate, to enlist the help of Cardinal Mindszenty in stabilizing the situation... The cardinal turned them down and thereby encouraged, according to Der Spiegel, those who wished to go on with the formation of the 'Cardinal's Party'. According to the same source, this decision by Cardinal Mindszenty completed the isolation of the Nagy-Tildy government and made its fall quite certain."

APRÈS LA RÊVOLUTION

LE GOUVERNEMENT NAGY
pourrait bientôt céder la place
à une formation anticommuniste

De nombreux policiers stalinistes sont abattus ou pendus

De notre correspondant particulier JEAN ROMAN

Le Monde headlines its report: "Nagy Government soon likely to yield to anti-Communist regime." Sub-head reads: "Many Stalinist policemen knocked down or hanged." The report begins with the sentence quoted in this book: "The revolution or, if you prefer, the counter-revolution, has won the day in Hungary."
The Western press does not doubt that the ultimate aim of the Hungarian insurrection was the overthrow of the ruling system or, at least, that this became its aim. Numerous extracts from Western papers can be gathered to support this statement. For example, Le Peuple, a Brussels newspaper, had this to say on November 1:

"On the pretence that Hungary and Poland were becoming de-Stalinized and refused to play the part of the obedient satellite any longer, certain individuals, not squeamish about their choice of means, were already attempting to make these nations relapse into the darkness of their past and to divert them from the roads leading to socialism."

The French Le Monde, which can hardly be accused of sympathizing with the People’s Democracies, still wrote on October 27:

"It becomes more and more clear that the insurrection is not directed so much against the manner in which the system works, but against the very system itself."

In the November 2 issue, Jean Roman, correspondent of Le Monde, begins his despatch, dated November 1, with the words:

"The revolution or, if you prefer, the counter-revolution has won the day in Hungary."

On October 29, the organ of the French socialist party, Populaire de Paris, reported:

"The insurgents who are commanding like masters — as illustrated by Imre Nagy’s subservience — are no longer satisfied with de-Stalinization as practised in Russia, nor with desatellitization as in Poland: they insist on de-Communication."

Most Western papers agreed with their owners in assuming that the Hungarian People’s Democracy was liquidated. Although they still argued about the next moves, they had no doubt as far as the “final issue” was concerned, they believed that Hungary was already theirs. At the same time, they calmly and coldly registered the simultaneous unleashing of the counter-revolution — the pogroms, the lynchings, the massacres.

Early in November, the Westdeutsches Tagblatt wrote:

"Unimaginable horror — this is what the events have resulted in; the victims included guilty and innocent alike. Lynch law ruled the country, steeping it in blood."

The Deutsche Volkszeitung, a Düsseldorf paper, declares that

"as soon as the Soviet tanks left Budapest, appalling butchery, a veritable St. Bartholomew’s Night ensued."

At the inception of the white terror, the Western press, hoping for the emergence of a bourgeois system, accurately outlined the role assigned to Imre Nagy and his cabinet. On November 2, L’Aurore wrote:

"Nagy certainly still has a role to play, and has been entrusted with playing it by the non-Communist members of his cabinet. He is more qualified than they to negotiate with the Russians and to bring about their withdrawal."

The West German Die Welt wrote on November 3:
Deutscher wrote in the British Scotsman that the anti-Communist advance reached its theatrical climax in Cardinal Mindszenty's triumphal march on Budapest to the accompaniment of pealing bells, which the entire world could hear over the radio. Owing to the force of circumstances Mindszenty became the spiritual head of the uprising. His words had more weight than any appeal of Imre Nagy's.

The press claimed that Mindszenty had taken appropriate steps towards organizing his party. On November 2, L'Aurore wrote as follows:

"The Cardinal desires the formation of a Christian-Democratic party in Hungary, on the pattern of those already existing in Italy, Germany, France and Belgium. He pointed out that the Hungarian Christian-Democratic party — like Adenauer's party in Germany — should unite the country's Catholic and Protestant elements."

The writer, Arthur Corvenne, who was granted an interview by Mindszenty, reported that

"he (Mindszenty) confirmed that he desired the organization of a Christian-Democratic party. He appeared to be relatively confident regarding the possibility of bringing it into being. 'Would Your Eminence take a leading part in the next cabinet?' 'That is possible.' At any rate, it is uncertain whether the Cardinal himself would be at the head of the provisional government. The post might be filled by a politician to whom the Cardinal as Minister of State would be ready to lend his moral support."

The West German Deutsche Woche likewise published an interview with Mindszenty, in its November 14 issue.

"On November 2 — it writes — in the presence of press representatives, the Cardinal publicly appealed to the West, demanding political support and assistance in the existing very difficult situation.

"Before the interview, he spoke by telephone with a former collaborator, Father Jaszowsky, now living in San Francisco.
LE CARDINAL MINDSZENTY EST PRÊT À PARTICIPER
au gouvernement qui rétablira l'ordre à Budapest

(De notre envoyé spécial, Arthur CORVENNE)

BUDAPEST, ler novembre. — Libéré injustement depuis 18 heures, le cardinal Mindszenty est accueilli par l'homme le plus important de son pays.

La République y a reçu la libération.

L'Aurore.

The report in L'Aurore for November 2, which is quoted in this book, was headlined as follows: “Cardinal Mindszenty prepared to participate in a government which will restore order in Budapest.”

Through him, Mindszenty conveyed a personal message to the President of the United States, requesting him to support the Hungarian people in their fight for freedom, and to make arrangements to have the Austrian frontier thrown open for the supply of weapons and materials.”

The above is not the only evidence of Mindszenty’s direct relations with the United States. In the Új Hungária, referred to earlier, Countess Beatrix Széchenyi quoted these words of Mindszenty’s secretary:

“There are hardly any telephone lines working in town, and you can’t communicate at all with the provinces, but this morning we have already twice talked with Washington.”

Obviously, what the Cardinal, in his brief broadcast message, had indicated as still being needed, was: Contact with the Vatican and with Washington. Two days later, he was ready with his longer statement, which was broadcast over the Budapest Radio on November 3.

Even from the Vatican’s point of view, Mindszenty overreached himself. That is why the Pope considered his November 3 address “ill-considered.” On December 13, the Swiss Journal de Genève, commenting in this subject under the heading “Vatican disapproves of Cardinal Mindszenty’s inflexibility,” wrote as follows:

“The Cardinal has lost touch with reality. The Pope followed Cardinal Mindszenty’s personal tragedy with anxiety . . . He had spent the past eight years in prison, secluded from reality. Thus, immediately upon his release, he believed that the red system had come to an end in his country. He stated so in letters addressed to the Pope, to President Eisenhower and to Cardinal Spellman, Archbishop of New York. Moreover, in a message broadcast over the radio, he invited his compatriots to abandon Communism, to restore private property, to demand free elections, to restore Church property, freedom of the press and of education, and to form a Catholic party. He turned against the Nagy Government . . . He then appealed to the free world, declaring that any kind of coexistence with Communism was impossible, and asked that the armed forces of the West

Cardinal Mindszenty after his liberation from house-arrest. This portrait appeared in Look with the caption: “Cardinal Mindszenty welcomed in Budapest.”
liberate Hungary as soon as possible. Finally, he bluntly declared to an American journalist that messages of solidarity were of little use to a dying people."

The press of the bourgeois world — at times, no doubt, unintentionally — gave a clear picture of the counter-revolutionary forces at work in the Hungarian uprising. Western reports and newspapers and, last but not least, the activity of Radio Free Europe clarified the important role played by the capitalist West in the counter-revolutionary events in Hungary.

The Counter-revolution Released Them from Prison

The counter-revolutionaries found one of their main reserve forces among the many thousands of political prisoners and common criminals whom they released from gaol. More than 13,000 convicts, including nearly 10,000 common criminals, were freed from various prisons throughout the country — 1,080 from Vác gaol; 1,538 from one of the Budapest gaols; 348 from Márionisztra; 292 from Sátoraljaújhely; 1,150 from Oroszlány; 1,631 from Páralma; 248 from Szombathely; 123 from Kalocsa; 692 from Csílnok — to mention only a few. The majority of the convicts thus released were recruited into the armed detachments of the counter-revolution.

Here is a random list of released convicts, a great number of whom played an active role in the ensuing counter-revolutionary events:

_Béla Alföldi_, a former wholesale-dealer. In 1944, he promised shelter — at a price — to twelve persecuted individuals, whom he subsequently turned over to the Svábhegy police station.

_Arisztid Atkári_, son of the representative in Hungary of I.G. Farbenindustrie, under a 15-year sentence for espionage. On his release, he became the leader of an armed group in Budapest.

_József Bakos_, former member of Iván Héjjas’ white terrorist detachment in 1919. Participated in the brutal executions at Orgevány.

_Mihály Balogh_, ex-gendarme. As member of the ill-famed Juhász Detective Group in Horthy Hungary, he tracked down and arrested many members of leftist movements, among them István Dobi and Péter Veres.

_Károly Baricz_, an officer of Horthy’s gendarmerie. Was in command of the gendarmerie unit at Atkár, which, in 1935, fired into a demonstration killing eight people.
József Beé and Gyula Bokor, detectives. Both had participated in the torturing of several leaders of the labour movement, including Ferenc Rózsa and Zoltán Schönherz.

Albert Begre, sentenced to 13 years imprisonment for robbery.

Dezső Bertóthy who, in 1944, sent hundreds of prisoners from the Szolnok County internment camp to extermination camps in Germany.

Emil Csapókóczzi, son of an army colonel under Admiral Horthy, sentenced in 1955 for sedition.

Dr. Ákos Csikvári, colonel of police under the Horthy regime, convicted of several murders.

Lajos Nagy Dövényi, one-time editor-in-chief of the Arrow-Cross journal Magyar Futár.

Lajos Duhony, sentenced to 20 years imprisonment for murdering a woman (Júlia Nagy).

Róbert Enyedi, magistrate under Admiral Horthy.

Count Pál Eszterházy, formerly one of Hungary’s biggest landed proprietors, owner of several factories and flour mills. Participant in a counter-revolutionary conspiracy.

Denes Gálfi, an American secret agent.

Gábor Király, ex-member of the Héjjas detachment, sentenced for the brutal murder of 11 persons.

György Lakhegyi and Barnabás Rimaszécsi, sentenced for heading a counter-revolutionary underground organization, called “The White Partisan.”

Col. Zoltán Litomericzky, former attorney of a special tribunal under Horthy.

Zoltán Mesko, well-known Arrow-Cross leader and one-time Arrow-Cross minister.

Lajos Mészáros, who had eighty suspected partisans executed in Buchin, killing ten with his own hand.

János Nagy, who played a leading part in the ruthless Novi-Sad massacre of 1942.

Duke Péter Odascalchi, arrested in 1956 as agent of the US espionage organization C.I.C.

Emil Szakváry, former Minister in the Arrow-Cross government.

Richard Szentoléry (Schiwny), lieutenant-colonel in Horthy’s gendarmerie.

Rezső Varga, convicted of speculation. After his release, he took part in two murders (those of István Sarkadi, prosecutor, and of Pál Fodor) committed by the detachments led by József Dudás, with headquarters in the Szabad Nép building.
Casualties and Damages

Hospital Data

A total of 12,971 wounded received medical treatment in all hospitals, dispensaries and temporary Red Cross Medical Stations, between October 23 and December 1, 1956. The actual number considerably exceeds this figure, since numerous light cases were treated at home. The overwhelming majority of the above national total was registered in Budapest.

During the above period, 11,513 wounded received hospital or ambulatory medical treatment in the hospitals, dispensaries and temporary Red Cross Medical Stations of Budapest while the respective figure for the rest of the country is 1,458.

Of the wounded treated in Budapest hospitals, 6,731 were bedridden, 559 of whom died.

Budapest Death Toll

A total of 1,191 deaths resulting from the fighting or from assassinations was registered with the district councils of Budapest up to November 30. This figure includes those who died of their wounds in hospital. However, the actual number of people killed in Budapest is greater. During this period, the Municipal Undertakers interred 1,230 dead in the public cemeteries. In addition, an estimated 500 corpses are still buried in temporary graves in public squares and on empty lots. A great number of these corpses are believed to be those of people from the countryside. A search is still going on to discover the bodies of many members of the State Security Authority and of Party officials who were murdered and secretly buried. Taking the above into account, the number of those killed in Budapest — excluding Soviet casualties — is estimated at about 1,800.

Damages

The fighting which resulted from the counter-revolutionary uprising caused considerable damage to buildings and installations. Looting assumed large proportions. Industrial production incurred particularly heavy losses as a result of the disruption of the transport system.

The decline in the value of industrial production because of the strikes and the disruption of traffic amounts to 9,000 million forints, representing a corresponding decline in the national income for 1956. Eventually, the total losses are bound to be even higher, because for several months in 1957, the output level is likely to continue to be much lower than before October 23, 1956, owing to the persistent shortage of coal and electric power.

The government stocks of goods, stores and warehouses, the provisions of many restaurants and hotels, the supplies and installations of the transport companies and many industrial companies suffered heavily from looting and wrecking. The loss in goods under this head amounts to 530 million forints, while the damage to equipment or installations reaches 229 million forints, or a total of 759 million forints.

The Hungarian State Railways have suffered a total damage valued at 400 million forints.

Looting of military supplies accounts for a total damage of approximately 100 million forints.

Other major losses have been registered with regard to the raw material and goods supplies of food companies and other enterprises, especially those producing consumer goods.

The total national damage as a result of looting and wrecking amounts to about 1,500 million forints.

The counter-revolutionaries, abusing the honest intentions of the dissatisfied masses, made conscious efforts to bring about looting on a large scale. The same fascist tactics were applied by the Horthy detachments in 1919-21 and, to an even greater degree, by the Arrow-Cross men in 1944. The looting by the counter-revolutionaries, following the October rising, was aimed at dispersing or destroying state property. In addition, the homes of members of the State Security Authority, Party officials and local councillors who had been carried off were sacked. These acts of vandalism were carried out almost exclusively by the counter-revolutionary detachments, and,
mainly, by their "special details." In some places, there was persecution of Jews and looting of Jewish homes.

A number of buildings were seriously damaged during the fighting in Budapest, and lesser damages were caused in the provinces. The damage to buildings is estimated at 1,000 million forints.

The decline in production, the looting and wrecking, and the damage to buildings represent a total reduction of 11,500 million forints in Hungary's national income for 1956.
The white terror claimed hundreds of victims — hundreds of people who were not killed fighting, but were murdered. We have selected fifteen of these martyrs, and here present brief sketches of their lives, showing that it was the most loyal sons of the people who fell victim to the counter-revolution.

The occurrences of last October and November claimed many more victims: ordinary working people, soldiers, policemen, Party workers, people who by misadventure were caught up in the maelstrom of events, or who had been misled. Our nation is profoundly shocked and grieved by the tragic loss of every true son and daughter of the people.

Born in 1905, at Ramocsaháza. His mother, a poor peasant woman, was widowed early and compelled to undertake all sorts of work in order to feed and clothe her ten children. The older ones went to work, too, to help make both ends meet.

Imre left the maternal home at a tender age, and became a tailor’s apprentice. It was only during his apprenticeship that he had the opportunity to learn his three R’s. In 1927 he emigrated, and went to Belgium, where he joined the Communist Party in 1929, and soon became one of the leaders of its Hungarian section. Between 1936 and 1939, he joined the International Brigade, and fought the fascists in Spain, where he was twice seriously wounded. After the defeat of the Spanish Republic he fled to France, was interned and, later, deported to a forced labour camp. He came back to France in 1944, and joined the resistance movement there.

In the spring of 1945, Mező returned to his native Hungary. To begin with, he worked for the Budapest Party Committee, first in the agitation department, then as Secretary of the Party Committee. In 1952, he was put in charge of the production department at the Trade Union National Council (SZOT). His removal from the Buda-
pest Party Committee was due to the fact that he had been labelled "suspicious" — in line with the disgraceful atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust which the Rákosi—Gerő clique created around veteran Communists, among them the valiant participants in the Spanish war of freedom. However, Mező's loyalty to his Party and people was a matter of common knowledge.

Between 1949 and 1953, Mező was a Member of Parliament. But the Rákosi faction would not consent to his being a candidate at the 1953 elections. June 1953, however, initiated political rehabilitations on a large scale, and 1954 found Imre Mező back on the Budapest Party Committee, which elected him one of its secretaries. He relentlessly fought the tendency to procrastinate the rehabilitations, and urged a correction of the errors in Party leadership and government. In July 1956, after Rákosi's dismissal, he became a member of the Central Committee of the Party.

On October 30, 1956, when the counter-revolutionaries attacked the Budapest Party Committee headquarters, Imre Mező organized its defence and spent the last hours of his life in armed struggle on behalf of the people's power. The degenerate fascist killers murdered him at the close of the siege, as he and two high-ranking army officers, carrying the white flag of truce, were leaving the building for a parley with the assailants.

Imre Mező's life and death will ever remain an unforgettable lesson for the Hungarian working people, and his martyrdom is a grave indictment of the counter-revolution.

JÓZSEF KALAMÁR
Chairman of Csepel Town Council

Born on October 16, 1895, at Seregélyes. His father was a road maintenance worker. József, after finishing the sixth grade of the primary school, became a joiner's apprentice. In 1913, he came to Csepel; in 1915, he was called up for service. He became a contributor to the socialist newspaper Népszava, for which he had to face a court-martial in 1917.

At the end of the First World War in 1918, he actively joined the labour movement. In the Manfréd Weiss Works at Csepel, he became first a shop steward, then member of the M. W. Workers' Council. In 1919, he was elected to the Csepel Municipal Directorium. During the imperialist onslaught on the Hungarian Soviet Republic, he joined the Hungarian Red Army, and fought with the Csepel infantry regiment.

After the downfall of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, he was imprisoned in Margit Kőrút Penitentiary, Budapest, and, later, was sent to an internment camp at Zalaegerszeg until 1921, when he returned to Csepel. On four occasions, in 1922 and 1923, he took part, as member of the strike committee, in ironworkers' strikes, lasting four weeks each.
The year 1927 saw him once more an organizer of a four-week strike. In 1933, he was arrested by the Horthy police, along with the editorial staff of Társadalmi Szemle (Social Review) — József Madzsár, Sándor Schönstein and the Újvári brothers. After his release, he never again found a job in the iron-working industry, since he had been blacklisted by the GYOSZ (National Association of Manufacturers).

For several months in 1935, he worked at the Mihályi oil drillings. After another period of unemployment, he was given a job with the Hungarian Worsted Mills. In 1942, he was once more arrested and then jailed in the Nádasdy barracks. After his release, he remained under police surveillance. He would hardly spend a few weeks on a new job, before being given the sack as soon as his identity was discovered.

The liberation of Hungary found him at Csepel. He at once joined the builders of a new, a people’s Hungary, and was appointed magistrate of Csepel. After an absence of six years, he went back to Csepel in 1954, and there held the post of council chairman until his death.

József Kalamár joined the Communist Party in 1922 and later, its successor, the H.W.P.P. He was a member of the Central Control Committee of the Communist Party and of the Csepel Party Committee.

The working-class movement had brought him up to be a real man — in the best sense of the word — who divided his life between the labour movement and the family he so dearly loved.

On October 26, 1956, he was murdered by counter-revolutionary bandits at Királyerdő, who trampled on his dead body and filled his mouth with sand. His burial was kept a secret, and his 17-year-old granddaughter Edith was the only member of the family who stood beside his grave.

His wife — she had been his loyal helpmate since he was 19 — three grown-up children and five grandchildren, as well as the wider family of his fellow-fighters curse the murderers who put an end to his militant and humane life.

ANDRÁS BORDÁS
Turner, Kossuth Prize winner

Born April 25, 1921, at Prázsmér, a village in Rumania. His father was a railwayman. When András had finished the seventh grade, he left school and became a turner’s apprentice. After completing his apprenticeship, he worked in his native village. Coming to Hungary in 1941, he found a job at the Manfréd Weiss Works in Csepel.

András Bordás acquired a very high skill in his trade, and work was truly a matter of honour with him. After the liberation of Hungary he won a number of awards, Stakhanovite certificates and other honours for his outstanding work. On March 15, 1954, the Government awarded him the Kossuth Prize in recognition of the fact that for years his output had been of a uniformly high standard, and therewith emphasized the importance of Bordás’ watchword: Not quantity only, but also highest quality.

On October 26, Bordás went to the factory to get his pay. On his way back, he bought a loaf of bread and some grapes. He was passing by the Calvinist church, not far from his home, when, suddenly, he was surrounded by a mob. Someone flung at him the slanderous cry, “This is the AVO-man who shot a kid to death...
yesterday!”, whereupon the lock of a pistol clicked, and turner Andráš Bordás, Kossuth Prize winner, slipped to the ground, lifeless. The bread and the grapes dropped from his hand: the hero of labour had fallen victim to loathsome murderers.

His aged parents in their far-away village, his inconsolable wife, his nine-year-old son Andráš and baby Julika will never forgive this assassination. Nor will the Hungarian working class ever forgive the foul murder of one of its most loyal and hard-working representatives.

Born at Karcag, January 14, 1923, as the son of a clerk. Because of the illness of his father, the family was obliged to move to Budapest, where, at the end of a five-year period of continuous illness, the elder Kovács died in 1943. László was a mechanic’s apprentice in the Ganz Waggon Works. Here he found his way into the labour movement and, as early as 1941, worked on the National Youth Committee as educational secretary of the Tenth District youth group. Meantime, he finished secondary school in his off-time. He joined the Communist Party in 1943, and proved to be a self-sacrificing fighter for the ideals of Communism.

After the liberation he became MADISZ (Hungarian Democratic Youth Federation) organizer for the Tenth District of Budapest, and, later on, worked for its national headquarters and for the MINSZ (National Federation of Hungarian Youth). During this period — in 1946 — he entered the Ruggyantagyár (Rubber Factory) as a mechanic, a job he subsequently quit to become an office worker at the Ganz Waggon Works.

In 1948, he volunteered as an officer of the People’s Army, and carried on educational work at the Petőfi Military Academy.
In the meantime he also enrolled as a student in the mechanical engineering department of the Polytechnical University, and, after completing two years, transferred to the University of Economics where he took a correspondence course.

On October 23, 1956, he was on duty in the Hungarian Radio Building on Bródy Sándor Street. At 11:30 p.m. the rabble besieging the Radio forced the street door. László Kovács and several other officers faced the onrushing crowd in an attempt to stop it with their bare hands, whereupon a number of armed men among the crowd fired several shots from machine pistols, and Major Kovács dropped dead on the flagstones of the courtyard, one of the first victims to the counter-revolutionary rising.

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SÁNDOR SZIKLAI
Director of the War History Museum

Born at Torny, December 27, 1895, the son of agricultural labourers. At the age of 13, he was engaged as a farm-hand on Gyula Juszt's grange, where he was employed until World War I. In 1914, he was called up for service in the Austro-Hungarian army and, a year later, was taken prisoner by the Russians. In the early days of the October Revolution, he joined the Red Army and fought as a partisan through the entire Civil War. He fought for the power of the Soviets in the Urals, in the middle reaches of the Volga, in Central Asia and in Fergana, and was wounded at the Caspian front.

In his boyhood, as the son of poor peasants, Sándor lacked the means for a higher education. In the Soviet Union, however, he succeeded in acquiring a secondary and even a university education, and, by 1924, he had become a teacher. With boundless energy, he plunged into the study of languages, mastering, in addition to Russian, also Rumanian, Spanish, German and French.

In 1936, Sziklai went to Spain to join the antifascist struggle of the Spanish people and fought in the International Brigade until 1939. Following the debacle, he was interned in France and later in North Africa, for four years. In 1943, he returned to the Soviet Union,
where he lectured at the antifascist courses for Hungarian war prisoners. He came back to Hungary in 1944, and was put in charge of a P.O.W. bureau here. He joined the People’s Army in 1948.

On October 26, 1956, depraved Volksbund-men (Horthyite organization of Hungarians of German origin) in Budakeszi snuffed out a distinguished life, replete with hardships and successes.

LAJOS KISS
President of the Budakeszi Committee
of the Patriotic People’s Front

Born at Makó, November 4, 1900. His father, a tailor’s assistant, died early, and his widowed mother took in washing to earn a living for herself and for her two daughters and five sons. Four of the five sons became ironworkers; Lajos became a tool-maker. All of them were organized. His elder brother, Pál, took part in the Russian Revolution and fought throughout the Civil War in Siberia. He himself and his brother, Árpád, saw service with the Hungarian Red Army, and were taken prisoners by the Rumanians near Makó. Lajos Kiss was successively imprisoned in Arad, Temesvár, and Braila. He managed to escape and to flee to Austria, where he joined the Austrian Communist Party. Later on, he went to Yugoslavia, and was active in the workers’ movement there.

In 1925, he married, settled down at Szabadka, and had two daughters. In 1944 the family left Szabadka for Kistelek, where Lajos Kiss, that same year, joined the Hungarian Communist Party. In 1945, he helped to carry out the land reform. Afterwards he went to live at Szeged, and from there moved to Budapest.

In 1946, he was appointed a member of the National Committee of Budakeszi, the suburban district where he lived. He was also
a member of the Budakeszi Party Executive and, from 1953 onwards, president of the local committee of the Patriotic People’s Front.

Beginning with 1950, Lajos Kiss worked in the Forged and Wrought Iron Factory. He was an untiring worker. He loved his Party and his people, and instilled this love into his children and grandchildren. On October 26, 1956, he and his son-in-law met with a martyr’s death under the axe strokes of the counter-revolutionary bandits of Budakeszi.

JÁNOS ASZTALOS
Colonel of the Army

Born April 6, 1918, at Pozsony (Bratislava). His father was a journeyman shoemaker who, because of his appointment as works manager during the time of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, was subsequently kept in prison by the counter-revolution for a number of months. János Asztalos was apprenticed to a goldsmith in 1932.

He joined the labour movement as a young boy of 17, became a member of the ironworkers’ gymnastic club in the same year, and an active collaborator of the “Red Aid” in the next. It was likewise in 1936 that he joined the trade union of the precious-metal workers to become a member of the executive committee in 1937. He was imprisoned in May, 1942, on account of his participation in the independence movement and had to serve a term of eighteen months. On leaving the prison he was interned at Nagykanizsa and later liberated by the Soviet Army.

Asztalos worked as a Party instructor from 1945 to 1947, and became secretary of the Party Committee in the First District of the Capital in 1947. He joined the People’s Army in 1948 as political instructor and organizer. Wherever he happened to work, he was appreciated as a man of rare qualities whose knowledge, simplicity and noble character never failed to command respect.
After the attack on the building of the Budapest Party Committee, he was cruelly murdered by the counter-revolutionary rabble on the 30th of October, 1956. His passing is bewailed by his wife and four young children; and the death of a dear brother-in-arms, of a man who devoted his whole life to the cause of his people, is mourned by all his fellow-combatants.

József Papp
Artillery Colonel

Born in Újpest (Budapest), in 1917. Both his father and mother have been active participants in the labour movement for the last forty years. His father, a turner by profession, was the commanding officer of a battalion in the Red Army in 1919, an appointment for which he was punished by the white terrorists with a long-term internment; upon his release, he (the father) was placed under police surveillance. The mother was one of the founders and organizers of the “Friends of Children” Movement in Újpest.

József Papp entered the Ganz Shipyard in 1932 as an engine-fitter’s apprentice. Having served his apprenticeship, he found no employment for two years, after the lapse of which he succeeded in securing a job in the United Incandescent Lamp Factory. He did active military service from 1939 to 1941, following which he became a radio-telegraphist in the Post Office. He held this job till 1949. Papp was appointed secretary of the local section of the MADISZ in Újpest after the liberation, and worked in this capacity from 1946 to 1948. He joined the Army in 1950, where his sense of justice and his readiness to help soon secured the affection of his subordinates.
Papp was in the building of the Budapest Party Committee on October 30, 1956. It was in front of the building that the raging counter-revolutionary murderers killed him after the siege. Two young children have been orphaned by this heinous crime, which so abruptly terminated a militant and fruitful life.

Born at Miskolc, on December 17, 1913. His mother was an unskilled worker. Admitted to an asylum for destitute children, young Lajos had to share the sad lot of foundlings in the villages around the town of Kassa (Kosice). He was 13 years old when he became the apprentice of a baker; on completing his apprenticeship in Prague, he joined the trade union there, and, in 1929, became a member of the Youth Organization of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and of the Proletarian Sports Club. As a self-taught student, he passed the first four examinations in a Prague secondary school.

Recurrent unemployment forced him to go job-hunting in Hungary, France and Poland. Returning to Hungary in 1937, Lajos Szabó became active in the trade union of the bakery workers at Miskolc, his birthplace. In 1940, he secured a new job as clerk at the headquarters of the "Levente," a semi-military youth organization. He organized an armed detachment in 1944 for the purpose of fighting the Arrow-Cross men with the aid of the "Levente"-boys in his charge. Supported by his "national guard," he was able to prevent the forced removal to the West of several hundred "Levente" boys. After the liberation, he first became a policeman, then secretary
of the Communist Party at Szerencs, and later inspector of the Food Office.

Admitted to the Kossuth Academy (Officers' Training School) in 1947, he finished his studies there with eminent results. He became a talented officer and performed tasks of the utmost importance in the People's Army.

Szabó was in the Party House on Republic Square on the fatal day of October 30, 1956. After the siege he was killed, in front of the building, by counter-revolutionary bandits. Two young girls have become orphans by his untimely death.

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KÁLMÁN TURNER
Welder

Born at Székesfehérvár, on October 5, 1914. His father was a mason's help, an organized worker of old standing. After finishing the elementary school, Turner became a chimney-sweep's apprentice; he worked as such for three years and, having completed his apprenticeship, came to Budapest in 1934 to work in the building trade. He participated in the big strike of the building workers in 1935. Turner served his military term from 1937 to 1939. After his discharge from the army, he found a job as unskilled labourer in the Manfréd Weiss Works, where he was later promoted to the position of welder.

Turner joined the Hungarian Communist Party in 1945, became first a member and later secretary of the local Party branch in the welding shop. In 1950, he was appointed head of the personnel department attached to the foundry. A year later, he was transferred to the Department of Local Councils in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. His outspokenness and courageous criticisms made it impossible for him to remain in this position, and so he took up physical work once more in 1952. He was accepted by the National Worsted Mills as welder.
When a District Party Committee was attacked on October 24, 1956, Turner took an active part in its defence.

S. Láng and I. Micsinai, former members of Horthy's police force, sought him out at his dwelling on November 4 and killed him, thus finishing the life of a simple welder, a faithful and devoted fighter of the labour movement.

Mihály Bene, member of the "Dózsá" Co-operative Farm at Szentmártonkáta, was born in 1895. As a young soldier, he was made prisoner of war by the Russians in 1916. Liberated by the Russian revolution, he immediately joined the ranks of the socialist revolution.

Returning as an invalid, Bene was confined to his sick-bed for many years. He never ceased to be a faithful champion of the cause of his comrades in misfortune, the poor peasants, whose full trust he always enjoyed. Bene participated in the work of the land-reform committee in 1945 and was appointed chairman of the Farmers' Co-operative formed at that time.

He joined the Party in 1945 and remained a member of the local executive committee until his death. Enjoying the undivided confidence of the Party, he also became a member of the local Party Committee.

It was in 1949 that he joined the "Dózsá" Co-operative Farm.

His house was invaded by counter-revolutionary bandits on October 26, 1956, who came to do away with his son, the third secretary of the Nagykáta District Party Committee. The invaders
failed to find their quarry, marched off, and the family abandoned the house on the day following the assault. Only old Bene remained at home. The ruthless gangsters returned the following night, dragged the old warrior of the Hungarian peasantry out of his house and drowned him in the well with bestial cruelty.

**PÉTER LAKATOS**

Party-school teacher

Born at Pusztaottlaka on March 3, 1924. His father was a poverty-stricken agricultural labourer, who received a few acres of land after the liberation.

Péter Lakatos followed the occupation of this father: an agricultural labourer from 1938 to 1945, he worked for a number of years as a farm-hand in the service of the richest "kulak" of the village.

Lakatos joined the Hungarian Communist Party in 1945. He became chairman of the land-reform committee and secretary of the Party’s local branch. In 1946, he was made a member of the Mezőkovácszáza District Party Committee and, in 1948, became a functionary in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Party. Having attended the Party High School for two years and taken his degree there, he was first employed in the agricultural department of the Party Centre and later, from March, 1953, in the Ministry of Agriculture. In April, 1954, he received his appointment as teacher in a Party school. During this period, Lakatos qualified as an agronomist, and later continued his agrarian-economic studies at the University.
He happened to be in the building of the Budapest Party Com-
mittee when it was attacked. Dragged to the street after the assault,
he was shot in the abdomen. Taken to the hospital, he could not be
operated upon for some time, as any attempt at operation was
prevented by the insurgents. When, at last, it became possible to
lay him on the operating table, he had lost so much blood that
every effort of the doctors to save his life were doomed to failure.
Two orphans lament his tragic and untimely death.

Born at Munkács (Munkačev) in 1922. His father ran a book-
shop and barely earned enough to maintain his family. Being unable
to continue his formal education at the end of six years of secondary
school, Sarkadi turned to the art of cookery and worked in a number
of restaurants. He joined the trade-union movement in 1939.
Coming to Budapest in 1942, Sarkadi was detailed to forced labour
service in 1943. The following year he deserted to the Red Army,
as a member of which he participated in the liberation of Poland
and Czechoslovakia. Repeatedly wounded, Sarkadi was invalided in
September, 1945, and came back to Budapest.

A Party member since 1945, Sarkadi worked at police head-
quarters from 1946 and was later transferred to the legal department
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Availing himself of evening classes, he took his final examination
at the secondary school, continued his studies at the University,
took a degree as Doctor of Laws in 1950, and subsequently passed
the examinations for barrister and public prosecutor, resulting in his
transfer to the public prosecutor's office.
On the fatal day of November 1, 1956, Sarkadi set out from his home for his place of work at the Office of the Chief Public Prosecutor. Before reaching it, he was overwhelmed by counter-revolutionaries and taken to one of the Capital’s military barracks. On November 4, he was transferred to the building of the newspaper Szabad Nép that had already been occupied by the “special detail” of the notorious József Dudás. They shot him that same evening. Sarkadi has left a widow and a child of six.

Born at Dorog on May 21, 1924. His father was a miner, his mother first a domestic servant, later a nurse. Having lost two husbands, both of them miners, she had to struggle hard to bring up six children. Károly was obliged to earn his bread from early childhood: first an errand boy in a baker’s shop, then again an errand boy in a gardener’s establishment, he later became a bill-poster. On the death of his father, when Károly was 15 years of age, an allowance made by his eldest brother enabled him to learn the craft of a turner.

He worked in the “Danuvia” factory till 1945, when he joined the democratic police force. Beginning as an aspirant, he rose in the course of eleven years to the rank of major. Besides doing work as a police officer, he was studying law during the last three years of his life.

Jakab married in 1949; of this marriage, an unusually happy one, two daughters were born.

During the riots in October, 1956, Jakab was detailed to guard a food depot in Gorky Avenue. On October 29, the day on which the Soviet troops evacuated Budapest, he went to the police hospital on Gorky Avenue and from there set out for his home. Stepping
out of the door, a bullet from the rifle of a sniper penetrated his heart. A piece of paper was found on his body with the inscription: “That’s what happens to the people’s enemies.”

The people must take revenge on his murderers, who went forth to slaughter and defame such faithful sons of the people.

Born at Sepsimogyorós (Transylvania) in 1925. The son of poverty-stricken petty peasant proprietors, Fodor finished his studies at a higher elementary school and came to Budapest as the help of an instrument maker in 1942. After completing his apprenticeship, he was employed by a tobacco factory, where he worked till 1949. It was in this year that he began to take an active part in the work of the Party Committee of the Ninth District of the Capital. In 1950 he entered into the service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

On October 31, 1956, counter-revolutionary forces dragged him from the flat of a friend to one of the military barracks, whence he was taken to the building of the newspaper “Szabad Nép.” Here he was grilled and tortured for four days and then, together with István Sarkadi, murdered by the “special detail” of Dudás, in the small street behind the Corvin Department Store in the evening of November 4.

Pál Fodor, the tender husband, the loving father, the upright and generous man, will never return to his wife and his young son.
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