THE
SINO-INDIAN
BOUNDARY
QUESTION

(ENLARGED EDITION)

FOREIGN LANGUAGES PRESS
PEKING
THE SINO-INDIAN BOUNDARY QUESTION

(ENLARGED EDITION)

FOREIGN LANGUAGES PRESS
PEKING 1962
CONTENTS

STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
October 24, 1962

PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI’S LETTER TO THE LEADERS OF ASIAN AND AFRICAN COUNTRIES ON THE SINO-INDIAN BOUNDARY QUESTION
November 15, 1962 (Appendices: Maps and Reference Maps) 6

STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
November 21, 1962 39

PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI’S LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER NEHRU
November 7, 1959 47

NOTE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO THE INDIAN EMBASSY IN CHINA
December 26, 1959 51

MORE ON NEHRU’S PHILOSOPHY IN THE LIGHT OF THE SINO-INDIAN BOUNDARY QUESTION by the Editorial Department of “Renmin Ribao”
October 27, 1962 93

Printed in the People’s Republic of China
Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China

October 24, 1962

Serious armed clashes have recently taken place on the Sino-Indian border. This occurrence is most unfortunate. The Chinese and Indian peoples have always been friendly to each other and should remain so from generation to generation. That China and India should cross swords on account of the boundary question is something the Chinese Government and people are unwilling to see, it is also what the peace-loving countries and people of the whole world are unwilling to see.

The Sino-Indian boundary question is a question left over by history. There is a traditional customary boundary between the two countries, but the boundary between the two countries has never been formally delimited. The so-called McMahon Line in the eastern sector is a line which the British imperialists attempted to force upon China by taking advantage of the powerlessness of the Chinese and the Indian peoples. It is illegal and has never been recognized by the Chinese Government. After the independence of India, and especially around the time of the peaceful liberation of the Tibet region of China, the Indian side gradually extended its scope of actual control in the eastern sector northward from the tradi-
tional customary line to the vicinity of the so-called McMahon Line. In the middle and western sectors, up to 1959 the extent of actual control by China and India in the main conformed to the traditional customary line, except at individual places. Although India occupied more than 90,000 square kilometres of Chinese territory in the eastern sector, provoked two border clashes in 1959 and made claim to large tracts of Chinese territory, the Chinese Government has always stood for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question through negotiations and held that, pending a peaceful settlement, the extent of actual control by each side should be respected and neither side should alter the state of the boundary by unilateral action.

Seeking a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question, Premier Chou En-lai went to New Delhi in April 1960 to hold talks with Prime Minister Nehru, and tried hard to reach a preliminary agreement conducive to a settlement of the boundary question. Regrettably, the sincere effort of the Chinese side did not evoke a response from the Indian side. Following that, the meeting of the officials of China and India likewise failed to yield results as it should.

The Chinese Government has always held that, even though China and India cannot for a time reach agreed opinions on the boundary question, this should not lead to border clashes. As early as 1959, the Chinese Government repeatedly proposed that the armed forces of each side withdraw 20 kilometres all along the border and stop frontier patrols so as to disengage the armed forces of the two sides and avoid conflict. After the Indian side rejected these proposals, China unilaterally stopped patrols on its side of the boundary in the hope that this might help ease the border situation. Contrary to our expectations, the Indian side, taking advantage of this circumstance, pressed forward steadily and penetrated deep into Chinese territory, first in the middle and western, and then in the eastern, sectors of the Sino-Indian boundary, set up scores of military strongpoints and continually caused armed clashes, thus making the border situation increasingly tense.

In the past year and more, the Chinese Government has again and again asked India to stop changing the status quo of the boundary by force and return to the table of negotiations. In the last three months, the Chinese Government three times proposed negotiating the Sino-Indian boundary question without any pre-conditions, but all three times met with the refusal of the Indian Government. The Indian Government insisted that negotiations cannot start until China has withdrawn from vast tracts of China’s own territory.

Especially shocking to China is the fact that the Indian Government, after rejecting China’s peaceful proposal, on October 12 ordered the Indian forces to “free” Chinese frontiers of Chinese troops. Then, on October 20, Indian forces started a massive general offensive in both the eastern and western sectors of the Sino-Indian border. In these serious circumstances, the Chinese frontier guards had no choice but to strike back in self-defence.

Fierce fighting is now going on. The occurrence of this grave situation pains the Chinese Government and people and disturbs the Asian and African countries and people. After all, what issue is there between China and India that cannot be settled peacefully? What reason is there for bloody clashes to occur between China and India? China does not want a single inch of India’s terri-
tory. In no circumstances is it conceivable for the Sino-Indian boundary question to be settled by force. China and India are both big countries of Asia having a major responsibility for peace in Asia and the world. They are initiators of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and participants of the Bandung Conference. Although the relations between China and India are presently very tense, there is no reason to abandon the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and the spirit of the Bandung Conference. The Chinese Government holds that both the Chinese and Indian Governments should take to heart the fundamental interests of the 1,100 million people of China and India, the common interests of the people of the two countries in their struggle against imperialism and the interests of Asian peace and Asian-African solidarity, and try their best to seek a way to stop the border conflict, reopen peaceful negotiations and settle the Sino-Indian boundary question.

In line with its consistent stand for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question, the Chinese Government now solemnly puts forward the following three proposals:

(1) Both parties affirm that the Sino-Indian boundary question must be settled peacefully through negotiations. Pending a peaceful settlement, the Chinese Government hopes that the Indian Government will agree that both parties respect the line of actual control between the two sides along the entire Sino-Indian border, and the armed forces of each side withdraw 20 kilometres from this line and disengage.

(2) Provided that the Indian Government agrees to the above proposal, the Chinese Government is willing, through consultation between the two parties, to with-
create disputes among us newly independent states. The Chinese Government therefore considers that, in dealing with such boundary questions, we should clearly discern that these are issues between Asian and African countries which are not the same as issues between Asian-African countries and the imperialist powers; we should be on guard lest we be taken in by the imperialist attempt to sow discord among us.

Inasmuch as the boundary questions are a legacy of history, neither New China nor the other newly independent countries concerned should shoulder the blame. Hence the Chinese Government holds that, in dealing with the boundary questions, both the historical background and the actual situation that has come into being must be taken into account, and that, instead of trying to impose its claims on the other party, each of the parties concerned should seek a settlement that is reasonable and fair to both parties through friendly consultations and in a spirit of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and the Ten Principles adopted at the Bandung Conference.

In this spirit China and Burma have settled in a friendly way their boundary question, which was in fact much more complicated than that between China and India. Similarly, a friendly settlement of the Sino-Nepalese boundary question was brought about not long ago. In regard to the Sino-Indian boundary question, the Chinese Government has, in the same spirit, striven for a friendly and peaceful settlement with India. Notwithstanding every conceivable effort on the part of China during the past three years or more, the question remains unsettled, and indeed has developed into the
sanguinary border conflict of today. Why this is so is a question that deserves serious thought. For this reason I deem it necessary here to review the background of the Sino-Indian boundary question.

(2) Historically, the Chinese and Indian peoples have always lived together in peace and amity. Although the boundary between China and India has never been formally delimited, no border dispute had ever arisen between them before the British colonialists came to the East. This was so because a traditional customary boundary line had long taken shape on the basis of the extent of each side’s administrative jurisdiction in the long course of time during which the two peoples lived together in peace. This line was respected by the Indian as well as the Chinese peoples. The eastern sector of this traditional customary boundary runs along the southern foot of the Himalayas, the middle sector along the Himalayas, and the western sector along the Karakoram range (see attached Map 1).

In the eastern sector, the area disputed by the Indian Government north of the traditional customary line has always belonged to China. This area comprises Monyul, Loyul and Lower Tsayul, which are all part of the Tibet region. It covers a total area of 90,000 square kilometres and is equivalent in size to three Belgiums or nine Lebanons. The inhabitants who have long lived in this area are either Tibetans or peoples closely akin to them. A case in point is the Monba people, who speak the Tibetan language and believe in Lamaism. Most of the geographical names here are in the Tibetan language. For instance, a river is called “chu” here, hence the Nyamjang River is called Nyamjang Chu; a mountain pass is called “la,” hence the Se Pass is called “Sela”;

a district is called “yul,” hence the Mon district is called “Monyul.” The administrative set-up here was the same as that in the other parts of Tibet; the basic administrative unit was called “Dzong,” as in the case of Senge Dzong and Dirang Dzong. Up to the time when the British colonialists and the Indians came to this area, the local authorities of China’s Tibet region had always maintained administrative organs, appointed officials, collected taxes and exercised judicial authority here. This administrative jurisdiction was never called in question.

In the middle sector, the places disputed by the Indian Government east of the traditional customary line have always belonged to China. They cover a total area of 2,000 square kilometres. The inhabitants are nearly all Tibetans. The Tibet local government had all along exercised jurisdiction over these places, and its archives to this day contain documents pertaining to this exercise of jurisdiction.

In the western sector, the area disputed by the Indian Government north and east of the traditional customary line has always belonged to China. This area consists mainly of Aksai Chin in China’s Sinkiang and a part of the Ari district of Tibet. It covers a total area of 33,000 square kilometres and is equivalent in size to one Belgium or three Lebanons. Though sparsely inhabited, this area has always served as the traffic artery linking Sinkiang with Ari in Tibet. The Kirghiz and Uighur herdsmen of Sinkiang are in the custom of grazing their cattle here. The name Aksai Chin is the Uighur term for “China’s desert of white stones.” To this day, this area remains under Chinese jurisdiction.

The traditional customary boundary was not only respected by both China and India over a long period of
time, but also reflected in early official British maps. Before 1865, the delineation of the western sector of the Sino-Indian boundary in official British maps coincided roughly with the traditional customary line (see Reference Map 1), and before 1936 their delineation of the eastern sector similarly coincided roughly with the traditional customary line (see Reference Map 2 A and B).

(3) The Sino-Indian boundary dispute is a legacy of British imperialist aggression. After it had completely brought India under its domination, British imperialism, taking advantage of the powerless state of the Indian people, turned its spearhead of aggression and expansion towards China’s southwestern and northwestern frontiers, using India as its base. From the second half of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth, British imperialism was actively engaged in conspiratorial activities of aggression against China’s Tibet and Sinkiang. Its attempt to force open China’s back door was designed to co-ordinate with its aggression along the coast and in the heartland of China. In 1911 there occurred the revolution which overthrew the absolute imperial rule in China. Seizing upon this as an opportune moment to detach Tibet from China, British imperialism sought to negate China’s sovereignty in Tibet by recognizing merely China’s so-called suzerainty there. It was against this historical background that the Simla Conference was convened in 1914. But even at that Conference the British representative dared not openly demand that China cede large tracts of its territory. It was outside the Conference and behind the back of the representative of the Chinese Central Government that the British representative drew the notorious "McMahon Line" through a secret exchange of letters with the representa-

tive of the Tibet local authorities, attempting thereby to annex 90,000 square kilometres of China’s territory to British India. The then Chinese Government refused to recognize this illegal McMahon Line. So have all Chinese Governments since then. That is why even the British Government dared not publicly draw this Line on its maps before 1936.

The illegal McMahon Line was wholly imposed on the Chinese people by British imperialism. Although it contrived this Line, for quite a long time afterwards it dared not intrude into the area lying south of this illegal Line and north of the Sino-Indian traditional customary line. It was not until the last phase of the Second World War that British imperialism, utilizing the opportunity afforded by the then Chinese Government’s inability to look after its southwestern frontiers, seized a small part of this area.

In the western sector of the Sino-Indian border, British imperialism, seeking a short-cut for invading the heart of Sinkiang, laid covetous eyes on the relatively flat Aksai Chin in the eighteen sixties and dispatched military intelligence agents to infiltrate into the area for unlawful surveys. In compliance with the will of British imperialism, these agents worked out an assortment of boundary lines for truncating Sinkiang. The British Government did try at one time to alter according to its own wishes the traditional customary line in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border, but was promptly rebuffed by the Chinese Government.

Britain’s attempt was to obliterate the traditional customary boundary line formed between China and India over a long period of time, and to attain its imperialist aims of aggression by carving up China’s terri-
tory and expanding the territory of British India. Yet it dared not completely negate the traditional customary boundary line between China and India or bring out in their entirety the illegal boundary lines it had contrived. From 1865 to 1953 British and Indian maps either did not show any alignment of the boundary in the western sector at all, or showed it in an indistinct fashion and marked it as undefined. It was only from 1936 onwards that the illegal McMahon Line in the eastern sector appeared on British and Indian maps, but up to 1953 it was still designated as undemarcated (see Reference Map 3).

(4) India and China attained independence in 1947 and 1949 respectively. Friendly relations were developed by the two countries on a new basis. However, owing to causes from the Indian side, there has been a dark side to the Sino-Indian relations from the very beginning.

Thanks to their mutual efforts, China and India established diplomatic relations quite early, jointly initiated the famous Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, and signed the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse Between the Tibet Region of China and India. This brought about a definite development in the friendly relations between the two countries. China and India ought to have cast away the entire legacy of imperialism and established and developed their relations of mutual friendship on a completely new basis. The Indian Government, however, inherited the British imperialists' covetous desires towards the Tibet region of China and persisted in regarding Tibet as India's sphere of influence, or sought at least to transform it into a buffer zone between China and India. For this reason, the Indian Government tried its best to obstruct the peaceful liberation of Tibet in 1950. When these attempts proved of no avail, India pressed forward in an all-out advance on the illegal McMahon Line in the eastern sector of the border and completely occupied China's territory south of that illegal Line and north of the traditional customary line. In the middle sector of the Sino-Indian border, apart from long ago inheriting from British imperialism the encroachment on Sang and Tsungsha, India further encroached on Chuva, Chuje, Shipki Pass, Puling-Sumdo, Sangcha, and Lapthal after 1954. After 1954, India also encroached on Parigas in the western sector of the border.

While it was occupying large tracts of Chinese territory, India suddenly made a unilateral alteration of the Sino-Indian traditional customary line in its official map published in 1954. It presented in its entirety the version of the Sino-Indian boundary insidiously contrived by British imperialism and tried to impose this version on China as the delimited boundary between China and India (see Reference Map 4).

The Chinese Government did not accept Indian encroachment on large tracts of Chinese territory, nonetheless it took the position that an amicable settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question should be sought through peaceful negotiations, and that, pending a settlement, the status quo of the boundary should be maintained. China does not recognize the so-called McMahon Line, yet in the interest of settling the Sino-Indian boundary question through negotiations, it refrained from crossing this Line. As for maps of the two parties showing the boundary, they can be brought into conformity only after the boundary question has been settled through negotiations between the two parties. This was the procedure by which maps of China and Burma and maps
of China and Nepal showing the boundary lines between them were brought into conformity. The delineation of the Sino-Indian boundary on maps published by China has its historical and factual basis. But in view of the fact that the Sino-Indian boundary has not been formally delimited, China has never imposed its maps on India; at the same time, China will under no circumstances accept the maps unilaterally altered by India.

From 1950 to 1958, tranquillity generally prevailed along the Sino-Indian border because China adhered to the policy of seeking an amicable settlement of the boundary question through peaceful negotiations, although even in that period India was already sowing seeds for provoking future boundary disputes and border clashes.

(5) After the rebellion in Tibet, the Indian Government formally laid claim to large tracts of Chinese territory. In March 1959 a rebellion of serf-owners broke out in the Tibet region of China. The Indian Government not only aided and abetted this rebellion, but gave refuge to the remnant rebels after the rebellion had been put down, and connived at their anti-Chinese political activities in India. Soon after the rebellion broke out in Tibet, Prime Minister Nehru formally presented to the Chinese Government a claim to large tracts of Chinese territory. He asked the Chinese Government not only to recognize as legal Indian occupation of Chinese territory in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border, but also to recognize as part of India the Aksai Chin area in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border which India had never occupied (see attached Map 2).

India's territorial claim to Aksai Chin was conjured up and is devoid of any basis whatever. China has always exercised its jurisdiction in this area. In 1950 it was through this area that units of the Chinese People's Liberation Army advanced from Sinkiang into Ari, Tibet. And it was through this area that between 1956 and 1957 the Chinese side constructed the Sinkiang-Tibet Highway, a gigantic task of engineering. As a matter of fact, up to 1958, India had never disputed the fact of China's exercise of jurisdiction over this area. But now the Indian Government asserted that this area had always belonged to India, and that it was not until 1957 that the Chinese had entered it clandestinely. If India had always exercised jurisdiction over this area, it is beyond comprehension how India could have been unaware of the passing of the Chinese People's Liberation Army units through this area to Tibet and of the construction of the gigantic highway. It was only from a pictorial magazine published in China that the Indian Government came to know that China had built the highway. In September 1958 the Indian side sent patrols to intrude into this area, but they were immediately detained by Chinese frontier guards. How could this have happened if India had really exercised jurisdiction over this area? In point of fact, Prime Minister Nehru himself said in the Indian Rajya Sabha on September 10, 1959 that this area "has not been under any kind of administration." On November 23 of the same year, he further stated in the Indian Rajya Sabha, "During British rule, as far as I know, this area was neither inhabited by any people nor were there any outposts." Though Prime Minister Nehru was in no position to assess correctly the situation on the Chinese side, his words nevertheless demonstrate authoritatively that India has never exercised jurisdiction over this area.
Having occupied 90,000 square kilometres of Chinese territory in the eastern sector and 2,000 square kilometres of Chinese territory in the middle sector of the Sino-Indian border, India now wants to occupy another 33,000 square kilometres of Chinese territory in the western sector. In other words, India views both the parts of Chinese territory it has occupied and the other parts of Chinese territory it has not yet occupied as belonging to India. This represents a demand which even the overbearing British imperialists dared not put to semi-colonial, old China. That a newly-independent India should have made such a demand came as a complete shock to China.

The gravity of the situation lies not only in India's extensive claims to Chinese territory, but also in its subsequent use of force to change unilaterally the state of the boundary that had emerged, so as to realize Indian territorial claims. Indian armed forces crossed the illegal McMahon Line in the eastern sector, invaded and occupied Tamaden, Longju and Khinzemane north of the Line; and in August 1959, in the course of invading Longju, provoked the first sanguinary border clash. In October 1959 Indian armed forces crossed the traditional customary boundary line in the western sector and provoked a sanguinary border clash of an even graver nature at Kongka Pass. These two border clashes were omens that India would further aggravate the situation on the Sino-Indian border.

(6) The Chinese Government held that, in order to avert conflict along the border, ways must be found to effect a disengagement of the armed forces of the two sides, and at the same time negotiations must be started quickly to seek a peaceful settlement of the boundary question. The Chinese Government was determined to take every possible measure within its power to prevent a deterioration of the situation.

On November 7, 1959, the Chinese Government proposed to the Indian Government that the armed forces of each side withdraw 20 kilometres from the line of actual control along the entire Sino-Indian border and halt patrols. The line of actual control referred to here coincided with the traditional customary line in the western and middle sectors except for the parts of Chinese territory which India had invaded and occupied as referred to in Section (4) above; in the eastern sector, the line of actual control coincided with the illegal McMahon Line except for Khinzemane which was then still under Indian occupation (see attached Map 3). The Chinese Government also proposed that the Prime Ministers of the two countries hold talks to discuss the Sino-Indian boundary question. But these proposals were rejected by the Indian Government. On November 16, 1959 the Indian Government put forward a counter-proposal which would require all Chinese personnel in the Aksai Chin area of China's Sinkiang to withdraw to the east of the line which India claimed to be the international boundary, and all Indian personnel in this area to withdraw to the west of the line which China claimed to be the international boundary. Since Indian personnel had never actually come into this area, the Indian proposal was tantamount to demanding the unilateral withdrawal of Chinese personnel from vast tracts of their own territory. The Chinese Government then put this question to the Indian Government: Since the Indian Government held that each side should withdraw behind the line claimed by the other side in the western sector of the Sino-Indian
border, did this mean that the Indian Government agreed that in the eastern sector as well, each side should withdraw behind the line claimed by the other side? — in other words, that India should withdraw to the south of the traditional customary line pointed out by China, while China should withdraw to the north of the so-called McMahon Line claimed by India? The Indian Government was at a loss to answer this question and merely kept insisting that its proposal was only applicable to the western sector. Very clearly, the Indian Government had no interest in an amicable settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question through peaceful negotiations on a fair and reasonable basis, nor had it any interest in separating the armed forces of the two sides on the basis of the line of actual control with a view to forestalling border clashes. What it was after was only to use armed forces to edge Chinese personnel out of Chinese territory in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border.

Despite this, the Chinese Government still maintained that it was of paramount urgency to avert conflict along the border. Hence, after the Indian Government had rejected the Chinese Government’s proposals that each side withdraw its armed forces 20 kilometres from the line of actual control and stop patrols, China unilaterally discontinued patrols on its side of the boundary. The Chinese Government hoped that, by so doing, at least a disengagement of the armed forces of the two sides could be effected which would be conducive to avoiding border clashes and maintaining tranquillity in the border region.

(7) With a view to seeking a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question, the Chinese Premier visited New Delhi in April 1960 and held talks with Prime

Minister Nehru. In the course of the talks, I repeatedly explained that the boundary question should be settled peacefully on a fair and reasonable basis; that if there could not be a settlement for the time being, the state of the boundary that had already emerged should be maintained; and that the armed forces of the two sides should be disengaged in order to forestall clashes. At the conclusion of the talks, I summed up the following six points as points of common ground or of close proximity emerging from the talks, namely:

1. There exist disputes with regard to the boundary between the two sides.
2. There exists between the two countries a line of actual control up to which each side exercises administrative jurisdiction.
3. In determining the boundary between the two countries, certain geographical principles, such as watersheds, river valleys and mountain passes, should be equally applicable to all sectors of the boundary.
4. A settlement of the boundary question between the two countries should take into account the national feelings of the two peoples towards the Himalayas and the Karakoram Mountains.
5. Pending a settlement of the boundary question between the two countries through discussions, both sides should keep to the line of actual control and should not put forward territorial claims as pre-conditions, but individual adjustments may be made.
6. In order to ensure tranquillity on the border so as to facilitate the discussion, both sides should
continue to refrain from patrolling along all sectors of the boundary.

I suggested that these points of common ground be affirmed so as to facilitate further discussions by the two Governments. These six points are entirely equitable and involve no demands imposed by one side on the other. They include views expressed to me during the talks by Prime Minister Nehru himself. Yet Prime Minister Nehru refused to confirm these six points. His refusal in fact meant that the Indian Government was unwilling to recognize the existence of a line of actual control between the two countries, unwilling to agree to observe this line pending a settlement of the boundary question through negotiations and refrain from putting forward territorial claims as pre-conditions to negotiations, unwilling to disengage the armed forces of the two sides so as to forestall border clashes, and even unwilling to recognize the objective fact that there exist disputes between the two sides with regard to the boundary. In those talks, Prime Minister Nehru took the position that the Chinese Government must unconditionally accede to India’s territorial claims and refused to leave any room for negotiation. These were claims which even British imperialism dared not put before the Chinese Government. Prime Minister Nehru was fully aware that the Chinese Government would in no circumstances agree to these claims. By pressing them he was clearly seeking, out of unrevealed motives, to keep the boundary question unsettled and the border situation tense indefinitely.

Subsequently, during the meetings between officials of the two countries held from June to December in 1960, the Chinese side proved with a large volume of conclusive data that the traditional customary boundary line as pointed out by China had a historical and factual basis. But the Indian side, mainly relying on obviously valueless material from British travellers and adventurers, insisted that the illegal McMahon Line was the traditional customary line in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border, and that Aksai Chin over which China had always exercised jurisdiction belonged to India. Thus, the meetings between officials of the two countries also failed to yield results.

(8) The sincerity for conciliation demonstrated by the Chinese Government during the talks between the two Prime Ministers was taken by the Indian Government as an indication that China was weak and could be bullied, and China’s unilateral halting of border patrols was taken as an opportunity to take advantage of. Therefore, after the meetings between the officials of the two countries had concluded, Indian troops crossed the line of actual control first in the western and then in the eastern sector of the border, occupied more and more Chinese territory and engaged in ever more serious armed provocations.

In the western sector of the border, beginning from 1961, and particularly from last April on, Indian troops made repeated inroads into Chinese territory, and set up additional military strongpoints. Prior to the recent general outbreak of clashes on the border, India had established a total of 43 strongpoints encroaching on Chinese territory in the western sector of the border (see attached Map 4). Some were set up only a few metres away from Chinese posts, others even behind Chinese posts, cutting off their access to the rear. As Prime Minister Nehru put it in addressing the Indian Lok Sabha on June
20, 1962, "India had opened some new patrol posts endangering the Chinese posts and it was largely due to movements on our side that the Chinese had also to make movements. It is well known in knowledgeable circles in the world that the position in this area had been changing to our advantage and the Chinese are concerned about it." The Indian weekly Blitz openly boasted at the time that India had occupied 2,500 square miles of territory there, which the weekly described as a "unique triumph for an audacious Napoleonic planning" worked out by Defence Minister Krishna Menon. Invading Indian troops again and again launched armed provocations against Chinese frontier guards. Indian aircraft again and again violated China's air space and recklessly carried out harassing raids. As a result of these increasingly frequent acts of provocation on the part of India, the situation in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border grew sharply in tension and gravity.

Because China exercised great self-restraint and forbearance, India's encroachments in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border were not seriously resisted, whereupon India went further to extend its encroachments to the eastern sector of the border. From last June onwards, Indian troops crossed the illegal McMahon Line, intruded into the Che Dong area north of the Line, incessantly expanded their scope of occupation (see attached Map 4), and launched a series of armed attacks on Chinese frontier guards, inflicting forty-seven casualties on them. Thus, before the recent full-scale border conflict broke out, the Indian side had already created in both the eastern and western sectors of the Sino-Indian border a grave situation in which an explosion might be touched off at any moment.

(9) While the Indian encroachments and provocations increased in gravity and the border situation worsened day by day, the Chinese side maintained maximum self-restraint and forbearance throughout. Chinese frontier guards were ordered not to fire the first shot under any circumstances, nor to return fire except as a last resort. On the one hand, the Chinese Government sent protests and warnings to the Indian Government, declaring that it would never accept the Indian encroachments and firmly demanding that India evacuate Chinese territory. On the other hand, it did not relax in the least its efforts to seek an improvement in Sino-Indian relations and a peaceful settlement of the boundary issue through negotiations.

The Chinese side held that any steps conducive to improving Sino-Indian relations would without doubt also help promote a peaceful settlement of the boundary question. In view of the fact that the 1954 Agreement Between China and India on Trade and Intercourse Between the Tibet Region of China and India was due to expire in June 1962, the Chinese Government, from December 1961 to May 1962, proposed three times the conclusion of a new agreement to replace the old one. Although the conclusion of such a new agreement would have nothing to do with the boundary question, it would undoubtedly have helped to improve Sino-Indian relations. In advancing this proposal China had the best of intentions. But the Indian Government demanded China's acceptance of India's territorial claims as the pre-condition for the conclusion of such a new agreement, and unjustifiably rejected the proposal.

It was precisely because the Sino-Indian border situation was growing steadily more acute that the Chinese
Government pointed more emphatically than ever to the necessity for a peaceful settlement of the boundary question through negotiations. But the Indian Government persisted in a negative attitude. It was not until July 26 this year that it expressed in vague terms a desire for further discussions on the boundary question on the basis of the report of the officials of the two sides. The Chinese Government responded promptly and positively in its note of August 4, and suggested that such discussions be held as soon as possible.

The Indian Government, however, suddenly adopted a different tone in a note dated August 22 and insisted that China must first evacuate large tracts of its own territory in the western sector of the border before any further boundary discussions on the basis of the officials' report could be held. This was a unilaterally posed pre-condition by which India sought to force its territorial claims on China. In its note of September 13, the Chinese Government pointed out that no pre-conditions should be set for further boundary discussions on the basis of the officials' report. It suggested, moreover, that representatives of the two sides begin discussions on the boundary question on October 15, first in Peking and then in Delhi alternately. At the same time, with a view to easing the border tension, the Chinese Government once again proposed that the armed forces of each side withdraw 20 kilometres along the entire border.

But the Indian Government, in its note of September 19, rejected China's proposals for separation of the armed forces of the two sides and for holding discussions on the boundary question without pre-conditions. It merely agreed to the date and sites for the discussions proposed by China, while insisting that the discussions should be confined to China's withdrawal from large tracts of China's own territory in the western sector of the border. The Chinese Government, in its note dated October 3, repeated the proposal that the two sides should speedily enter into boundary discussions on the basis of the officials' report, and that in the course of the discussions neither side should refuse to discuss any question that might be raised by the other side concerning the boundary. This proposal was fair to both sides.

Nevertheless, the Indian Government in its reply note dated October 6 not only rejected the above-mentioned fair proposal of the Chinese Government, but added a new pre-condition to the old one, demanding that Chinese troops evacuate the Che Dong area, which is Chinese territory, north of the illegal McMahon Line. Thus, by going back on its own word and putting forward one pre-condition after another, the Indian Government finally blocked the door to negotiations on the boundary question.

(10) Making a series of miscalculations concerning China, India not only turned down China's peaceable proposals, but finally embarked on the road of military adventure. India thought that China's economic difficulties were so grave that it would not be able to overcome them, and that China's southwestern defences must have been weakened owing to the fact that its national defence forces were tied down by the attempt of the U.S.-supported Chiang Kai-shek clique to invade China's southeastern coastal areas. Therefore India considered the opportunity ripe for launching massive armed attacks along the entire Sino-Indian border. On October 5 the Indian Ministry of Defence announced the establishment of a new corps under the "Eastern Command" for the sole purpose of
dealing with China, and the appointment of Lt.-General B. M. Kaul as its commander. On October 12 Prime Minister Nehru declared that he had issued orders to “free” what he termed invaded areas, in reality Chinese territory, of Chinese troops. On October 14 the then Indian Minister of Defence, Krishna Menon, called for fighting China to the last man and the last gun. On October 16, upon returning from abroad, Prime Minister Nehru immediately summoned a meeting of high-ranking military officers to accelerate combat preparations. On October 17 Indian troops in both the eastern and western sectors simultaneously began heavy artillery attacks on the Chinese side. On October 18 officials of the Indian Ministry of Defence declared that the Chinese had been “driven back two miles.” Finally, in the early hours of October 20, Indian troops, on Prime Minister Nehru’s orders, launched massive attacks all along the line. It was only when they had been repeatedly subjected to frenzied attacks by the Indian troops and had suffered heavy casualties that the Chinese frontier guards, pressed beyond the limits of forbearance and left with no room for retreat, struck back in resolute self-defence.

(11) **All relevant facts show that the current grave Sino-Indian border conflict was wholly engineered by the Indian Government, deliberately and over a long period of time.** At a mass meeting held in New Delhi on November 11 last, Prime Minister Nehru openly revealed that two years ago India had already drawn up a “plan of operations” against China, which had even worked out such details as the scale of the operations and how advance or falling back was to be made when the battle got under way. But the Indian Government turning facts upside down, falsely accused Chinese frontier guards of crossing the western end of the illegal McMahon Line on September 8 and thereby touching off the current general border conflict. This accusation is an out-and-out lie. Actually, it was Indian troops which had crossed the western end of the illegal McMahon Line long before September 8. This is a fact that cannot be denied. The Chinese Government is in possession of the original 1914 map of the so-called McMahon Line. According to that map, the western extremity of the Line is clearly at latitude 27°44.6’N (see Reference Maps 5 and 6). The Indian Government, in order to justify its occupation of the Che Dong area north of the Line, insists that the western extremity of the Line is at 27°48’N and that the boundary between China and India in this area follows the so-called Thagla ridge watershed. But the co-ordinates on the original map of the so-called McMahon Line are there and cannot be altered, and the name Thagla ridge does not even appear on the map. Moreover, the Indian military sketch maps captured by China during the current border clashes also clearly show the Che Dong area to be north of the illegal McMahon Line. The fact that India intentionally crossed the illegal McMahon Line, occupied the Che Dong area to its north, and publicly declared that India would “free” this area of Chinese frontier guards serves precisely to demonstrate that the current border clashes were solely and deliberately created by India.

The Chinese Government’s stand on the illegal McMahon Line is a consistent one. China does not recognize the illegal McMahon Line, yet it refrained from crossing it in the interest of a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question. The fact was that India first crossed to the north of the illegal McMahon Line and,
using places south of the Line as its base, launched ma-
ssive armed attacks on Chinese frontier guards. Thus, with
its own hands the Indian Government finally destroyed
the restrictive effect of this Line. In order to prevent
the Indian troops from staging a come-back and launching
fresh attacks, the Chinese frontier guards, fighting in
self-defence, naturally need no longer be restricted by
the illegal McMahon Line. China has consistently striven
for the settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary ques-
tion by peaceful means. The Chinese frontier guards
have crossed the illegal McMahon Line because they had
no alternative. But when China is compelled to strike
back now in self-defence in the border conflict, it still
aims at promoting a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian
boundary question, just as it did in exercising forbearance
and self-restraint over the past three years. The Chinese
frontier guards have crossed the illegal McMahon Line
and advanced to certain points, yet the Chinese side does
not wish to rely on such a move to settle the question of
the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian boundary. As in
the past, the Chinese Government holds that only through
peaceful negotiations can a settlement reasonable and
fair to both sides be found not only for the eastern sector,
but for the Sino-Indian boundary question as a whole.

(12) On October 24, that is, four days after the Sino-
Indian border conflict broke out, the Chinese Government
issued a statement putting forward the following three
proposals with a view to stopping the border conflict,
reopening peaceful negotiations and settling the Sino-
Indian boundary question:

1. Both parties affirm that the Sino-Indian boundary
question must be settled peacefully through negotia-
tions. Pending a peaceful settlement, the Chinese Gov-
ernment hopes that the Indian Government will agree
that both parties respect the line of actual control be-
tween the two sides along the entire Sino-Indian border,
and the armed forces of each side withdraw 20 kilo-
metres from this line and disengage.

2. Provided that the Indian Government agrees to
the above proposal, the Chinese Government is willing,
through consultation between the two parties, to with-
draw its frontier guards in the eastern sector of the
border to the north of the line of actual control; at the
same time, both China and India undertake not to cross
the line of actual control, i.e., the traditional customary
line, in the middle and western sectors of the border.

Matters relating to the disengagement of the armed
forces of the two parties and the cessation of armed
conflict shall be negotiated by officials designated by
the Chinese and Indian Governments respectively.

3. The Chinese Government considers that, in order
to seek a friendly settlement of the Sino-Indian bound-
ary question, talks should be held once again by the
Prime Ministers of China and India. At a time con-
sidered to be appropriate by both parties, the Chinese
Government would welcome the Indian Prime Minister
to Peking; if this should be inconvenient to the Indian
Government, the Chinese Premier would be ready to
go to Delhi for talks.

As explained in the statement of the Chinese Govern-
ment, the line of actual control referred to in the three
proposals does not mean the line of actual contact be-
tween the armed forces of the two sides in the present
border clashes, but means the line of actual control which
existed along the entire Sino-Indian border at the time when the Chinese Government mentioned it to the Indian Government on November 7, 1959. This shows that, while it will never accept the Indian encroachments on Chinese territory since 1959 by crossing this line of actual control, the Chinese Government will not impose any unilateral demands on India because of the advances it gained in the recent counter-attacks in self-defence.

The essence of the first of China's three proposals is to restore the state of the Sino-Indian boundary in 1959, that is, before complications arose in the border situation over the past three years, and to have the armed forces of each side withdraw 20 kilometres from the 1959 line of actual control. The obligations of both sides under this proposal would be equal. If the Indian Government agrees to this proposal, the Chinese frontier guards would have to withdraw from their present positions south of the so-called McMahon Line not only to the north of the line, but 20 kilometres further northward. The Indian troops, on the other hand, would only have to withdraw 20 kilometres southward from this line. If measured from Tawang and its vicinity south of the so-called McMahon Line, which Chinese frontier guards have now reached, they would have to withdraw about 40 kilometres, while Indian troops would need to withdraw only one to two kilometres, or need not withdraw at all (see attached Map 5).

The reason why China has reiterated and emphasized its proposal for a 20-kilometre withdrawal by the armed forces of each side from the line of actual control is that, through its bitter experiences of the past three years, the Chinese Government has become acutely aware that it is very difficult to avoid clashes in border areas under dispute if the armed forces of the two sides are not disengaged. At the same time, it must be pointed out that the line of actual control is not equivalent to the boundary between the two countries. Acknowledging and respecting the line of actual control would not prejudice each side's adherence to its claims on the boundary, but would create a favourable atmosphere for the reopening of peaceful negotiations to settle the boundary question.

(13) The Chinese Government had hoped that the Indian Government would give careful consideration to China's three proposals before making a response. But on the very day they were put forward by the Chinese Government, the Indian Government hastily rejected them and slanderously termed them deceptive. The Indian Government stated that no negotiations were possible unless the state of the entire boundary as it prevailed before September 8, 1962 was restored, and declared that the Indian Government was only prepared to hold negotiations "on the basis of decency, dignity and self-respect."

What is the implication of the Indian Government's proposed restoration of the state of the boundary as it prevailed before September 8? In the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border, it would mean that Indian troops again invade and occupy Chinese territory north of the illegal McMahon Line; in the western sector it would mean that they again invade and occupy the military strongpoints they set up on Chinese territory after 1959. And what kind of a state of affairs would this be? This would again be the state of affairs on October 20 when Indian troops, utilizing the advantageous military positions they had seized, launched large-scale armed attacks against Chinese frontier guards. It would be a state of affairs pregnant with so grave a danger as to make border
clashes inevitable. It would not be fair, nor would it bring peace, to revert either to the state of the boundary as of September 8, or to that of October 20.

The fact that the Indian Government refuses to restore the state of the boundary of November 7, 1959 but wants to restore the state of the boundary of September 8, 1962, proves that since 1959 the Indian Government has seized by force large tracts of Chinese territory. What India proposes to restore is the situation that resulted from the Indian troops’ crossing the line of actual control and encroaching on Chinese territory over the past three years; whereas the situation which China proposes to restore is one in which tranquility was basically maintained along the Sino-Indian border three years ago. According to the Indian proposal, only China would withdraw, while India would not withdraw, but advance and again invade and occupy Chinese territory. According to the Chinese proposals, both sides would withdraw, and in the eastern sector the distance the Chinese frontier guards would have to withdraw would far exceed the distance the Indian forces would have to withdraw. Looked at from any angle, India’s proposal is a one-sided one by which it attempts to impose its will on China and make China submit; while China’s proposals are equitable and in the spirit of mutual accommodation and mutual respect. Furthermore, the Chinese side proposed talks between the Prime Ministers of the two countries, expressed welcome for Prime Minister Nehru to come to Peking and stated that should the Indian Government find it inconvenient, the Chinese Premier was prepared to go to New Delhi once again. Clearly, full consideration had been given to India’s prestige and sense of decency when China put forward these conciliatory pro-

posals. The Indian Government has stressed that it is prepared to enter into negotiations only “on the basis of decency, dignity and self-respect.” However, its proposal shows that it only considers its own decency, dignity and self-respect, but wants to deny decency, dignity and self-respect to the other party.

(14) After my first appeal was rejected by Prime Minister Nehru, I appealed to him a second time, hoping that he would return to the conference table. However, judging by present indications, the Indian Government, far from being ready to conduct peaceful negotiations, is resolved to continue the use of force. The Indian Government has publicly stated that India is in fact in a state of war with China. It presented in the Indian Parliament a resolution to “drive out the Chinese aggressors from the soil of India,” and this resolution has been adopted. The President of India has proclaimed a “state of emergency” throughout the country. A wartime cabinet has been set up in India; military mobilization has been in motion; war bonds have been issued; and India’s economy has begun to go on “a war footing.” War hysteria enshrouds the whole of India. Setting no store by the friendship of the Chinese and Indian peoples, Prime Minister Nehru has publicly spread seeds of hatred for the Chinese people and used every forum to call on the Indian people to wage a long drawn-out fight against the Chinese people. The Indian Government has stepped up its persecution of Chinese nationals in India, arbitrarily ordered the closure of branch offices of the Bank of China in India, cruelly restricted the movement of staff members of the Chinese Embassy and Consulates in India, and is even considering severing diplomatic relations with China. Casting off the cloak of “non-align-
ment,” the Indian Government has openly begged for military aid from the United States of America and is receiving a continuous supply of U.S. arms. Large numbers of Indian troops and huge quantities of U.S. munitions are being rushed to the Sino-Indian border areas. Indian troops on both the western and eastern sectors of the Sino-Indian border have not ceased attacking the Chinese frontier guards. The Indian press has been trumpeting that India is about to launch a big counteroffensive. All this indicates that the threat of border conflicts on a bigger scale is growing perilously.

(15) There is no reason whatsoever for China and India to fight on account of the boundary question. In the past three years the Chinese Government has made every possible effort to prevent the emergence of such an unfortunate situation. From the very beginning the Chinese Government has stood for an amicable settlement of the boundary question through peaceful negotiations. In the past three years, nearly all the proposals for negotiations were initiated by China. For the purpose of negotiation, the Chinese Premier went to New Delhi, and is prepared to go again. However, in the last three years the Indian Government usually refused to negotiate, or, after reluctantly agreeing to negotiate, would not settle a single question capable of being settled. The Chinese Government stood for maintaining the state of the boundary which had taken shape, pending a peaceful settlement; concretely speaking, this means maintaining the line of actual control that existed between China and India in 1959. The Indian side, however, started off by crossing the line of actual control in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border, and finally even violated the so-called McMahon Line which it claimed itself to be the boundary in the eastern sector. China sought to disengage the armed forces of the two sides, while India persisted in keeping them in contact. To avoid border clashes, the Chinese Government proposed separating the armed forces of the two sides and halting patrols. After these proposals were rejected by India, China unilaterally stopped patrolling on its side of the border. Taking advantage of China’s unilateral cessation of patrols, however, India’s armed forces intruded into Chinese territory, set up military strongpoints and pressed steadily forward, thus eventually making border clashes between China and India unavoidable. Had the Indian Government entertained the slightest desire to settle the boundary question peacefully, the situation on the Sino-Indian border would never have deteriorated to the unfortunate degree it has. The present unfortunate situation has been brought about solely by the Indian Government. The reasons for these actions of the Indian Government are to be found not so much in the boundary question per se as in its designs of utilizing this situation to whip up an anti-China campaign by which it seeks internally to divert the attention and increase the burden of the people and suppress the progressive forces, and externally to obtain more U.S. aid.

(16) Your Excellency, it is with a heavy heart that I have presented to you the history of the Sino-Indian boundary question in its entirety. But Your Excellency may rest assured that the Chinese Government is not discouraged, but will look ahead. However complicated the situation may be now, the Chinese Government will never waver in its determination to seek a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question. So long as there remains a ray of hope, it will continue to seek a
way to conciliation, and take the initiative to create conditions favouring the cessation of border clashes. There is no conflict of fundamental interests between China and India, and it is utterly unthinkable to the Chinese Government that the present border clashes should develop into a full-scale war between the two countries. The border clashes must and will eventually be settled peacefully.

Ever since the Sino-Indian border issue arose, leaders of many Asian and African countries have exerted great efforts to promote its peaceful settlement. Almost unanimously they hold that the arch enemy of us Asian and African countries is imperialism and colonialism, that our countries all face urgent tasks of reconstruction to transform the backward state of our economy, and that China and India, the two big Asian countries, should settle their boundary question peacefully, restore Sino-Indian friendship, enhance Asian-African solidarity and together cope with the main enemy before us. They appeal to China and India to halt the armed border clashes and immediately enter into negotiations, and they oppose foreign intervention. Both China and India are big Asian countries. It is only through direct negotiations between China and India that a mutually satisfactory settlement of the boundary question can be secured. The Chinese Government heartily welcomes and sincerely thanks the leaders of friendly Asian and African countries for their fair-minded endeavours to promote direct negotiations between China and India, without themselves getting involved in the dispute. I sincerely hope that Your Excellency will uphold justice and continue to exercise your distinguished influence to promote a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question on a fair and reasonable basis.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) CHOU EN-LAI
Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

Appendices: Maps and Reference Maps
Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China

Peking, 00:00 hours, November 21, 1962

In the past two years, first in the western and then in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border, Indian troops crossed the line of actual control between China and India, nibbled Chinese territory, set up strongpoints for aggression and provoked a number of border clashes. Relying on the advantageous military positions they had occupied and having made full preparations, the Indian troops eventually launched massive armed attacks all along the line on the Chinese frontier guards on October 20, 1962. This border conflict deliberately provoked by India has been going on for a month.

The Chinese Government served repeated warnings in regard to the increasingly serious Indian encroachments and provocations, and pointed out the gravity of their consequences. The Chinese frontier guards all along maintained maximum self-restraint and forbearance in order to avert any border conflict. However, all these efforts by China proved of no avail, and the Indian acts of aggression steadily increased. Pressed beyond the limits of endurance and left with no room for retreat, the Chinese frontier guards finally had no choice but to strike back resolutely in self-defence. After the present large-scale border conflict broke out, the Chinese Government
quickly took initiative measures in an effort to extinguish the flames of conflict that had been kindled. On October 24, that is, four days after the outbreak of the current border clashes, the Chinese Government put forward three reasonable proposals for stopping the border clashes, reopening peaceful negotiations and settling the Sino-Indian boundary question. The three proposals are as follows:

(1) Both parties affirm that the Sino-Indian boundary question must be settled peacefully through negotiations. Pending a peaceful settlement, the Chinese Government hopes that the Indian Government will agree that both parties respect the line of actual control between the two sides along the entire Sino-Indian border, and the armed forces of each side withdraw 20 kilometres from this line and disengage.

(2) Provided that the Indian Government agrees to the above proposal, the Chinese Government is willing, through consultation between the two parties, to withdraw its frontier guards in the eastern sector of the border to the north of the line of actual control; at the same time, both China and India undertake not to cross the line of actual control, i.e., the traditional customary line, in the middle and western sectors of the border.

Matters relating to the disengagement of the armed forces of the two parties and the cessation of armed conflict shall be negotiated by officials designated by the Chinese and Indian Governments respectively.

(3) The Chinese Government considers that, in order to seek a friendly settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question, talks should be held once again by the Prime Ministers of China and India. At a time considered to be appropriate by both parties, the Chinese Government would welcome the Indian Prime Minister to Peking; if this should be inconvenient to the Indian Government, the Chinese Premier would be ready to go to Delhi for talks.

On the very day it received them, the Indian Government hastily rejected the Chinese Government's three proposals and insisted that the Chinese Government should agree to restore the state of the boundary as it prevailed prior to September 8, 1962, that is to say, India wanted to reoccupy large tracts of Chinese territory so that the Indian troops might regain the position from which they could launch massive armed attacks on the Chinese frontier guards at any time. In his reply to Premier Chou En-lai dated November 14, Prime Minister Nehru put forward even more unreasonable demands, which, on the one hand, required the Chinese Government to agree to the Indian troops reverting to their positions prior to September 8, and, on the other hand, required the Chinese frontier guards not only to withdraw to their positions as on September 8, but to retreat farther in the western sector to the so-called positions of November 7, 1959 as defined for them by India unilaterally, that is, requiring China to cede five to six thousand square miles (thirteen to fifteen thousand square kilometres) more of Chinese territory. In the meantime the Indian Government, relying on large amounts of U.S. military aid, again launched powerful attacks in the eastern and western sectors of the Sino-Indian border in an obstinate attempt to expand the border conflict.

It is by no means accidental that the Indian Government has taken such an extremely unreasonable attitude. To meet the needs of its internal and external politics, the Indian Government has long pursued the policy
of deliberately keeping the Sino-Indian boundary question unsettled, keeping the armed forces of the two countries engaged and maintaining tension along the Sino-Indian border. Whenever it considered the time favourable, the Indian Government made use of this situation to carry out armed invasion and provocation on the Sino-Indian border, and even went to the length of provoking an armed clash. Or else, it made use of the situation to conduct cold war against China. The experience of many years shows that the Indian Government has invariably tried by hook or by crook to block the path which was opened up by the Chinese Government for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question. This policy of the Indian Government runs diametrically counter to the fundamental interests of the Chinese and Indian peoples and the common desires of all the peoples of the world, and serves only the interests of imperialism.

The Chinese Government's three proposals are most fair and reasonable; they are the only proposals capable of averting border clashes, ensuring border tranquility, and bringing about a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question. The Chinese Government perseveres in these three proposals. However, the Indian Government has so far rejected these three proposals and continued to expand the border conflict, thus daily aggravating the Sino-Indian border situation. In order to reverse this trend, the Chinese Government has decided to take initiative measures in order to promote the realization of these three proposals.

The Chinese Government hereby declares the following:

(1) Beginning from the day following that of the issuance of the present statement, i.e., from 00:00 hours on November 22, 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will cease fire along the entire Sino-Indian border.

(2) Beginning from December 1, 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw to positions 20 kilometres behind the line of actual control which existed between China and India on November 7, 1959.

In the eastern sector, although the Chinese frontier guards have so far been fighting back in self-defence on Chinese territory north of the traditional customary line, they are prepared to withdraw from their present positions to the north of the line of actual control, that is, north of the illegal McMahon Line, and to withdraw 20 kilometres farther back from that line.

In the middle and western sectors, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw 20 kilometres from the line of actual control.

(3) In order to ensure the normal movement of the inhabitants in the Sino-Indian border area, forestall the activities of saboteurs and maintain order there, China will set up checkpoints at a number of places on its side of the line of actual control with a certain number of civil police assigned to each checkpost. The Chinese Government will notify the Indian Government of the location of these checkposts through diplomatic channels.

These measures taken by the Chinese Government on its own initiative demonstrate its great sincerity for stopping the border conflict and settling the Sino-Indian boundary question peacefully. It should be pointed out, in particular, that, after withdrawing, the Chinese frontier guards will be far behind their positions prior to September 8, 1962. The Chinese Government hopes that,
as a result of the above-mentioned initiative measures taken by China, the Indian Government will take into consideration the desires of the Indian people and peoples of the world, make a new start and give a positive response. Provided that the Indian Government agrees to take corresponding measures, the Chinese and Indian Governments can immediately appoint officials to meet at places agreed upon by both parties in the various sectors of the Sino-Indian border to discuss matters relating to the 20-kilometre withdrawal of the armed forces of each party to form a demilitarized zone, the establishment of checkpoints by each party on its side of the line of actual control as well as the return of captured personnel.

When the talks between the officials of the two parties have yielded results and the results have been put into effect, talks can be held by the Prime Ministers of the two countries for further seeking an amicable settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question. The Chinese Government would welcome the Indian Prime Minister to Peking; if this should be inconvenient to the Indian Government, the Chinese Premier would be ready to go to Delhi for the talks.

The Chinese Government sincerely hopes that the Indian Government will make a positive response. Even if the Indian Government fails to make such a response in good time, the Chinese Government will take the initiative to carry out the above-mentioned measures as scheduled.

However, the Chinese Government cannot but take into account the following possible eventualities: (1) that the Indian troops should continue their attack after the Chinese frontier guards have ceased fire and when they are withdrawing; (2) that, after the Chinese frontier guards have withdrawn 20 kilometres from the entire line of actual control, the Indian troops should again advance to the line of actual control in the eastern sector, i.e., the illegal McMahon Line, and/or refuse to withdraw but remain on the line of actual control in the middle and western sectors; and (3) that, after the Chinese frontier guards have withdrawn 20 kilometres from the entire line of actual control, the Indian troops should cross the line of actual control and recover their positions prior to September 8, that is to say, again cross the illegal McMahon Line and reoccupy the Kechilang River area north of the Line in the eastern sector, re-occupy Wuje in the middle sector, and restore their 43 strongpoints for aggression in the Chip Chap River valley, the Galwan River valley, the Pangong Lake area and the Demchok area or set up more strongpoints for aggression on Chinese territory in the western sector. The Chinese Government solemnly declares that, should the above eventualities occur, China reserves the right to strike back in self-defence, and the Indian Government will be held completely responsible for all the grave consequences arising therefrom. The people of the world will then see even more clearly who is peace-loving and who is bellicose, who upholds friendship between the Chinese and Indian peoples and Asian-African solidarity and who is undermining them, who is protecting the common interests of the Asian and African peoples in their struggle against imperialism and colonialism and who is violating and damaging these common interests.

The Sino-Indian boundary question is an issue between two Asian countries. China and India should settle this issue peacefully; they should not cross swords on account
of this issue and even less allow U.S. imperialism to poke in its hand and develop the present unfortunate border conflict into a war in which Asians are made to fight Asians. It is from its consistent stand of protecting fundamental interests of the Chinese and Indian peoples, strengthening Asian-African solidarity and preserving world peace that the Chinese Government has, after considering the matter over and over, decided to take these important measures. The Chinese Government calls upon all Asian and African countries and all peace-loving countries and people to exert efforts to urge the Indian Government to take corresponding measures so as to stop the border conflict, reopen peaceful negotiations and settle the Sino-Indian boundary question.

Premier Chou En-lai’s Letter to Prime Minister Nehru

November 7, 1959

Peking, November 7, 1959

His Excellency Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru
Prime Minister of the Republic of India
New Delhi

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Your Excellency’s letter dated September 26, 1959, has been received. It is most unfortunate that subsequently another unexpected border clash took place on October 21 within Chinese territory in the area south of the Kongka Pass. Regarding this clash, the Chinese and Indian Governments have already exchanged several notes, including the November 4 note of the Indian Government to the Chinese Government. Most regrettably, this note of the Indian Government not only disregards in many respects the basic facts of the question of boundary between the two countries and the truth of the border clash, but adopts an attitude which is extremely harmful to the friendly relations between the two countries. Obviously, it is in no way helpful to a settlement of the question to take such an attitude. Under the present circumstances, I consider that the most important duty facing us is, first of all, to take effective steps, speedily
and without hesitation, to earnestly improve the disquieting situation on the border between the two countries, and work for the complete elimination of the possibility of any border clash in the future.

As the Sino-Indian boundary has never been delimited, and it is very long and very far or comparatively far from the political centres of the two countries, I am afraid that, if no fully appropriate solution is worked out by the two Governments, border clashes which both sides do not want to see may again occur in the future. And once such a clash takes place, even though a minor one, it will be made use of by people who are hostile to the friendship of our two countries to attain their ulterior objectives. There is a history of long-standing friendship but no conflict of fundamental interests between our two countries, and our Governments are initiators of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. We have no reason to allow the tension on the border between our two countries to continue.

Your Excellency’s letter of September 26 contains many viewpoints to which the Chinese Government cannot agree. Regarding these, I would like to state my views on another occasion. I am glad, however, that this letter reiterates that the Indian Government attaches great importance to the maintenance of friendly relations with China and agrees to the view consistently held by the Chinese Government that the border disputes which have already arisen should be settled amicably and peacefully, and that pending a settlement the status quo should be maintained and neither side should seek to alter the status quo by any means. In order to maintain effectively the status quo of the border between the two countries, to ensure the tranquillity of the border regions and to create a favourable atmosphere for a friendly settlement of the boundary question, the Chinese Government proposes that the armed forces of China and India each withdraw 20 kilometres at once from the so-called McMahon Line in the east, and from the line up to which each side exercises actual control in the west, and that the two sides undertake to refrain from again sending their armed personnel to be stationed in and patrol the zones from which they have evacuated their armed forces, but still maintain civil administrative personnel and unarmed police there for the performance of administrative duties and maintenance of order. This proposal is in effect an extension of the Indian Government’s proposal contained in its note dated September 10 that neither side should send its armed personnel to Longju, to the entire border between China and India, and moreover a proposal to separate the troops of the two sides by as great a distance as 40 kilometres. If there is any need to increase this distance, the Chinese Government is also willing to give it consideration. In a word, both before and after the formal delimitation of the boundary between our two countries through negotiations, the Chinese Government is willing to do its utmost to create the most peaceful and most secure border zones between our two countries, so that our two countries will never again have apprehensions or come to a clash on account of border issues. If this proposal of the Chinese Government is acceptable to the Indian Government, concrete measures for its implementation can be discussed and decided upon at once by the two Governments through diplomatic channels.

The Chinese Government has never had the intention of straining the border situation and the relations between
the two countries. I believe that Your Excellency also wishes to see the present tension eased. I earnestly hope that, for the sake of the great, long-standing friendship of the more than one thousand million people of our two countries, the Chinese and Indian Governments will make joint efforts and reach a speedy agreement on the above-said proposal.

The Chinese Government proposes that in order to further discuss the boundary question and other questions in the relations between the two countries, the Prime Ministers of the two countries hold talks in the immediate future.

Respected Mr. Prime Minister! The peoples of our two countries desire that we act promptly. I think we should satisfy their desires and not let those who seek every chance to disrupt by all means the great friendship between China and India attain their sinister objective. I await an early reply from Your Excellency.

I take this opportunity to express to you my cordial regards.

(Signed) CHOU EN-LAI
Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

---

Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China to the Indian Embassy in China

December 26, 1959

Embassy of the Republic of India in China, Peking.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Republic of India in China and has the honour to make the following observations on the Sino-Indian boundary question, which the Embassy is requested to transmit to the Indian Government:

On September 8, 1959, Premier Chou En-lai wrote to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, giving an overall account of the historical background and the present actual situation of the Sino-Indian boundary question and the stand and policy of the Chinese Government. Afterwards, Premier Chou En-lai and the Chinese Government received Prime Minister Nehru's letter of September 26 and the Indian Ministry of External Affairs' note of November 4. In the said letter and note, the Indian Government indicated that it could not agree to Premier Chou En-lai's account of the facts regarding the boundary.
The Chinese Government is desirous at all times of maintaining friendship with the Indian Government and people, and, on the boundary question, of holding discussions with the Indian Government calmly and amicably and with an attitude which is fair both to itself and to others so as to seek a rapprochement of the views of the two sides. In view of the fact that the Sino-Indian boundary question is rather complex and that it would be extremely difficult to bring about a settlement through the exchange of letters, the Chinese Government has always maintained that face-to-face talks should be held speedily between the representatives of the Governments, first of all between the Prime Ministers of the two countries, so as more effectively to exchange views and reach agreement. But since the talks between the two Prime Ministers are yet to be decided on through consultations between the two sides, and the Indian Government has moreover complained that the Chinese Government has given no reply to the parts of the above-mentioned letter and note concerning facts about the boundary, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China is instructed to make further observations on the major questions concerning the facts about the boundary, with reference to Premier Chou En-lai's letter of September 8, Prime Minister Nehru's letter of September 26 and the note of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs of November 4.

China and India are two peace-loving, big countries with a long history of mutual friendship and with many great common tasks both at present and in the future. Friendship between China and India is in the interests not only of the two peoples, but also of world peace, particularly of peace in Asia. The Chinese Government is therefore very reluctant to engage in arguments with the Indian Government over the boundary question. Unfortunately, the Sino-Indian boundary has never been delimited, Britain left behind in this respect a heritage of certain disputes, and moreover the Indian Government has made a series of unacceptable charges against China, thereby rendering these arguments unavoidable. Because the Indian Government has put forth a mass of detailed data on the boundary question, the Chinese Government feels sorry that, though trying its best to be brief, it cannot but refer in this reply to various details so as to clarify the true picture of the historical situation and the views of the two sides.

For convenience' sake, in the following paragraphs the section of the boundary between China's Sinkiang and Tibet on the one hand and Ladakh on the other will be termed the western sector, the section of the boundary from the southeastern end of the western sector to the converging point of China, India and Nepal the middle sector, and the section of the boundary east of Bhutan the eastern sector.

**Question One: Has the Sino-Indian Boundary Been Formally Delimited?**

The reason for the present existence of certain disputes over the Sino-Indian boundary is that the two countries have never formally delimited this boundary and that there is a divergence of views between the two countries regarding the boundary. According to the Indian maps, the boundary line in the western sector cuts deep into Chinese territory, including an area of over 33,000 square kilometres in India; the boundary line in the middle...
sector is relatively close to the delineation on the Chinese maps, but still a number of areas which have always belonged to China are included in India; and in the eastern sector, the whole boundary line is pushed northward including in India an area of 90,000 square kilometres which originally belonged to China. The Chinese Government, therefore, considers it necessary to conduct friendly negotiations to bring about a reasonable settlement. The Indian Government, however, holds that the greater part of the Sino-Indian boundary line as shown on current Indian maps is defined by international agreements and therefore sees no reason to hold overall boundary negotiations. Thus, the negotiations themselves have run up against difficulties and there is the danger of the boundary disputes remaining deadlocked for a long time. The Chinese Government considers that to say that the greater part of the Sino-Indian boundary has been formally delimited by international agreements is totally inconsistent with the facts. The Chinese Government wishes to make the following explanations:

(1) Concerning the western sector. The Indian Government holds that the boundary line it claims was fixed by a treaty concluded between the authorities of the Tibet region of China and the Kashmir authorities in 1842.

But firstly, this treaty merely mentioned that the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet would be maintained as it had been and that both sides would hold to their confines and refrain from encroaching on each other. The treaty contained no provision or hint whatsoever about the concrete location of the boundary. None of the arguments advanced by Prime Minister Nehru in his letter of September 26, 1959, to Premier Chou En-lai to the effect that the location of the boundary has been long established can prove that the boundary line now claimed by the Indian Government is well founded.

Secondly, the 1842 treaty was concluded between the authorities of the Tibet region of China and the Kashmir authorities, but the greatest part (about 80 per cent) of the area now disputed by the Indian Government is part of China’s Sinkiang which was no party to the treaty. It is obviously inconceivable to hold that, judging by this treaty, vast areas of Sinkiang have ceased to belong to China but have become part of Ladakh. The British Government proposed in 1899 to delimit the boundary between Ladakh and Kashmir on the one hand and Sinkiang on the other, but nothing came of it. It is also inconceivable to hold that the territory of another country can be annexed by a unilateral proposal.

Thirdly, there are many indisputable positive evidences to show that the western sector of the Sino-Indian boundary is not delimited. For instance, (a) Between 1921 and 1927, the British Indian Government made many representations to the authorities of China’s Tibet region, asking to delimit the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet, but without any result. This is testified by many documents exchanged between the two sides at the time, and is also confirmed by Sir Arthur Lothian, the Briton who acted as the representative of India, in his letter to the London Times published on December 11, 1959. (b) According to data now available to the Chinese Government, no boundary line was drawn at all in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border on the official map published by the Survey of India as late as 1943. On the official Indian map of the 1950 edition, the present version of the boundary line was shown in a most equivocal way, but was still marked by the words “Boundary Undefined.”
It is only since 1954 that this undelimited sector of the boundary has suddenly become a delimited boundary.

(c) Referring to this sector of the boundary in the Lok Sabha of India on August 28, 1959, Prime Minister Nehru declared that: “This was the boundary of the old Kashmir state with Tibet and Chinese Turkestan. Nobody had marked it.” All the above-mentioned facts are absolutely incompatible with the allegation that this sector of the boundary was delimited long ago. It is unthinkable that the Indian Government which held that this sector of the boundary had explicitly been delimited in 1842 or 1899 would, between 1921 and 1927, still ask continually for negotiations to delimit it; that it would in 1943 still admit the absence of any determined boundary; that it would in 1950 still declare the mere existence of a boundary undefined; and that it would in 1959 still proclaim that nobody had marked the boundary.

(2) Concerning the middle sector. The Indian Government considers that the specification in Article IV of the 1954 Sino-Indian Agreement of six passes in this area as passages for traders and pilgrims of both countries indicates that the Chinese Government has already concurred in the Indian Government’s opinion about this sector of the boundary. The Chinese Government holds that this allegation is untenable both factually and logically.

The question of the boundary between the two countries was not touched on at all in the 1954 Sino-Indian Agreement or during its negotiations. The Chinese side’s draft wording for Article IV of the Agreement was that “The Chinese Government agrees to open the following mountain passes in the Ari district of the Tibet region of China for entry and exit by traders and pilgrims of both parties.” The Indian side disagreed with the Chinese draft; its own draft wording was that “Traders and pilgrims from India and western Tibet may travel by the routes traversing the following localities and passes.” Later on the two sides agreed to change the wording into: “Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes and route.” The concession made by the Chinese Government was only to adopt a wording which does not involve the ownership of these passes. Nobody can draw from this the conclusion that this sector of the boundary between the two countries has thus been fixed. On the contrary, the Chinese representative, Vice-Foreign Minister Chang Han-fu, in his talk with the Indian representative, Ambassador Mr. N. Raghavan, on April 23, 1954, clearly stated that the Chinese side did not wish, in those negotiations, to touch on the boundary question. And Ambassador N. Raghavan agreed forthwith. The Chinese Government therefore maintains that there is no ground to say that this sector of the boundary has been delimited and that there is no need to conduct negotiations for its delimitation.

(3) Concerning the eastern sector. The Indian Government holds that the so-called McMahon Line is the product of the 1914 Simla Conference jointly attended by Britain, China and the Tibet region of China, and is therefore valid. The Chinese Government holds that the so-called McMahon Line is wholly illegal, and the Indian Government’s assertion is utterly unacceptable to the Chinese Government.

Firstly, it is known to the world that the Simla Convention itself is void of legal validity. The Chinese representative Ivan Chen attending the Simla Conference not only refused to sign the Simla Convention, but acting under instructions from the Chinese Government formally
declared at the conference on July 3, 1914, that the Chinese Government would not recognize any treaty or similar document that might then or thereafter be signed between Britain and Tibet. Similar declarations were made in formal notes delivered to the British Government on July 3 and 7 the same year by Minister of the Chinese Government in Britain Lew Yuk Lin. All Chinese Governments since then persisted in this stand. Many dirty unequal treaties signed by the past Chinese Governments under imperialist oppression have already been proclaimed null and void. The Chinese Government feels perplexed why the Government of India, which has likewise won independence from under imperialist oppression, should insist that the Government of its friend China recognize an unequal treaty which the Chinese Government has not even signed.

Secondly, the Indian Government asserts that the boundary between India and Tibet was discussed at the Simla Conference, that the Chinese Government never objected at the time or afterwards to the discussion of the boundary between India and Tibet at the conference, and that therefore the agreement which resulted from the conference in regard to the McMahon Line boundary between India and Tibet must be regarded as binding on China. But this line of argument, from beginning to end, is inconsistent with the facts. As a matter of fact, the Simla Conference only discussed the boundary between the Tibet region and the rest of China and the boundary between so-called Outer and Inner Tibet, it never discussed the boundary between China and India. The so-called McMahon Line boundary between China and India was the result of the exchange of secret letters at Delhi on March 24, 1914, between the British representative and the representative of the then Tibet local authorities. It was in no way made known to China. It also means that it was never placed on the agenda of the Simla Conference. A section of the red line shown on the map attached to the Simla Convention corresponds with the so-called McMahon Line, but that red line was presented as the boundary between Tibet and the rest of China, and it was never stated that part of the red line was the boundary between China and India. Since the so-called question of Sino-Indian boundary never existed at the Simla Conference and in the Simla Convention, the Chinese Government naturally would not refer to this question or the question of the so-called McMahon Line in its memorandum and its suggestions for the revision of the Simla Convention. The Indian Government has pointed to the fact that the Chinese Government at the time did not raise any objection to the so-called McMahon Line. But this fact only shows that the Chinese Government was completely unaware of the existence of the question of the so-called McMahon Line, and can in no way prove that the Line was legal or was accepted by the Chinese Government. It can thus be seen that the so-called McMahon Line is more unsavoury and more unpresentable than the Simla Convention, and it is indeed all the more strange to assert that it is binding on the Chinese Government. The Chinese Government would like to ask the Indian Government whether, among all the proceedings of the Simla Conference, it can point to any particular date of the conference or any particular article of the Convention when and where the Sino-Indian boundary question, and particularly the question of the so-called McMahon Line, was referred to.
In addition, it must also be pointed out that it is beyond doubt that Britain had no right to conduct separate negotiations with Tibet. Indeed, the Chinese Government made repeated statements to this effect; as to the British Government, it too was strictly bound by the 1907 agreement on Tibet concluded between it and the old Russian Government not to enter into negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediacy of the Chinese Government. Therefore, judging by this treaty obligation alone which was undertaken by the British Government, the secret exchange of letters in 1914 between the British representative and the representative of the Tibet local authorities behind the back of the Chinese Government is void of any legal validity.

Thirdly, the assertion that China did not raise any objection to the so-called McMahon Line boundary between China and India is also inconsistent with the fact. It was during the most difficult period of China's War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression that the so-called McMahon Line gradually and unofficially appeared on Indian maps; and after 1943 the Tibet local authorities were under the firm control of British imperialism and their relations with the Chinese Central Government steadily deteriorated. Nevertheless, on learning that Britain had gradually encroached on Chinese territory south of the so-called McMahon Line, the Kuomintang government four times protested by addressing notes to the British Embassy in China after the conclusion of the Anti-Japanese War, in July, September and November of 1946 and January of 1947. Since Britain shifted its responsibility onto India, the Kuomintang government protested by note with the Indian Embassy in China in February 1947. Even up to November 18, 1949, Lo Chia-lun, Am-

bassador to India of the Chiang Kai-shek clique which then still maintained diplomatic relations with the Indian Government, delivered a note to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, repudiating the Simla Convention which the Indian Government held to be valid. The Government of the People's Republic of China, since establishing diplomatic relations with the Government of India, has repeatedly stated the fact that the Sino-Indian boundary has not been delimitated. During Prime Minister Nehru's visit in China in 1954, Premier Chou En-lai made it clear that the Sino-Indian boundary was yet to be delimitated. Premier Chou also said that the reason why the delineation of old maps was followed in Chinese maps was that the Chinese Government had not yet undertaken a survey of China's boundary, nor consulted with the countries concerned, and that it would not make changes in the delineation of the boundary on its own. This was reiterated in the memorandum delivered to the Indian Embassy in China by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 3, 1958. Besides, even the local authorities of Tibet did not regard as reasonable the so-called McMahon Line, which was the product of underhand schemes; they repeatedly objected to this line and asked for the return of occupied Chinese territory south of the line. This fact is not denied even by the Indian Government.

Fourthly, not only the so-called McMahon Line boundary between China and India has never been recognized by the Chinese Government; its validity was for a long time questioned by the Indian and the British Governments. The so-called McMahon Line was not adopted on the official map Tibet and Adjacent Countries published by the Survey of India in 1938, nor on the map "India" in the sixth edition of the Oxford Advanced Atlas, 1940,
compiled by John Bartholomew, cartographer to the King of Britain. Neither was the so-called McMahon Line followed in drawing the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian boundary on the map “India 1945” attached to the 1951, 3rd edition in English of The Discovery of India, written by Prime Minister Nehru himself and first published in 1946. Although the so-called McMahon Line was drawn on the official maps of India published by the Survey of India in 1950, 1951, and 1952, it was still marked as unde-marcated. Up to 1958, on the map “China West and Tibet” in the Times Atlas of the World edited by John Bartholomew, cartographer to the King of Britain, the traditional Sino-Indian boundary line and the so-called McMahon Line were both drawn with the words “Disputed Area” marked between the lines. All these authoritative facts squarely refute the Indian Government’s argument that this sector of the boundary has been delimited. The Indian Government contends that Britain withheld the publication of the Simla Convention for years in the hope that there would be an agreement about the status and boundary of Inner Tibet. That this assertion cannot help the Indian Government out of its difficulties is already explained as above, the assertion moreover adds to its difficulties. What meaning can the Simla Convention have, when the British Government also admitted that no agreement was reached on it? And since the Convention itself has not acquired validity, what can be said for the so-called Sino-Indian boundary line which was never proposed to the Chinese Government and which the British unilaterally meant to smuggle into this Convention? In fact, British officials who once held posts in India, though by no means pro-Chinese, also admit that the McMahon Line is legally untenable and actually ineffective. For instance, Henry Twynam, who was Acting Governor of Assam, India, in 1939, testified in his letter to the London Times published on September 2, 1959, that this line “does not exist, and never has existed.”

From what has been said in the above, the following incontestable conclusion can be drawn: The entire Sino-Indian boundary, whether in its western, middle, or eastern sector, has not been delimited. The 1842 Treaty, on which the Indian Government bases itself, did not define any boundary line for the western sector of the Sino-Indian border; and moreover, China’s Sinkiang Region, which is most concerned with this sector of the boundary, was no party to this treaty. The 1954 Agreement, on which the Indian Government bases itself, did not involve the middle or any other sector of the Sino-Indian boundary. The 1914 Convention, on which the Indian Government bases itself, is itself void of legal validity, and the Sino-Indian boundary was never discussed at the 1914 Conference. That the Sino-Indian boundary is yet to be delimited has been recognized by the Indian and British Governments over a long period of time, and is borne out by indisputable evidences. In order to achieve a reasonable settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute satisfactory to both sides, there is no other way except the holding of friendly negotiations.

Question Two: Where Is the Traditional Customary Sino-Indian Boundary Line?

Although the Sino-Indian boundary has not been formally delimited, both sides acknowledge the existence of a traditional customary line, that is, the line formed
by the extent of jurisdiction exercised historically by each side. The present question is that the two sides hold very different conceptions of the position of the traditional customary line. In drawing the boundary (mainly the eastern and western sectors) on its maps, the Indian Government has gone far beyond the extent of its original actual jurisdiction; it asserts that this is not only based on international treaties, but is the traditional customary line itself. The Chinese Government holds that the delineations of the Sino-Indian boundary on current Indian maps, which differ greatly from those on Chinese maps, are not based on any international treaty, as stated above, and, what is more, are not based on tradition and custom.

(1) Concerning the western sector. The area of over 33,000 square kilometres now disputed by India has always belonged to China. This is conclusively borne out by Chinese official documents and records. Except for the very small area of Parigas which has been occupied by India in recent years, the remaining broad area has always been under the effective control of the Chinese Government. The major part of this area is under the jurisdiction of Hotien County of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region of China, while the minor part under that of Rudok Dzong of the Tibetan Autonomous Region of China. Though sparsely populated, this area has all along been a place for pastureage and salt-mining for the Uighur and Kirghiz people living in the southwestern border of Sinkiang and a part of the Tibetan people living in the northwestern border of Tibet. Many places of this area are named in the Uighur language. For instance, Aksai Chin, which is part of Hotien County of Sinkiang, means “the desert of white stones” in the Uighur language; while the Karakash River which flows through this area means “the river of the black jade” in the Uighur language.

This area is the only traffic artery linking Sinkiang and western Tibet, because to its northeast lies the great Gobi of Sinkiang through which direct traffic with Tibet is practically impossible. Therefore, since the middle of the 18th century, the Government of the Ching Dynasty of China had established Kares (check-posts) to exercise jurisdiction over and patrol this area. In the decades from the founding of the Republic of China till the liberation of China, there were troops constantly guarding this area. After the liberation of Sinkiang in 1949, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army took over the guarding of the frontier in this area from Kuomintang troops. In the latter half of 1950, it was through this area that the Chinese Government dispatched the first units of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army to enter Tibet. In the nine years since then, the Chinese troops stationed in the Ari district have regularly and frequently brought up indispensable supplies from Sinkiang through this area. From March 1956 to October 1957, the Chinese Government built along the customary route a motor-road from Yehcheng of Sinkiang to Gartok of Tibet of a total length of 1,200 kilometres, of which a section of 180 kilometres runs through this area, and over 3,000 civilian workers took part in its construction.

These unshakable facts should have been sufficient to prove beyond dispute that this area is Chinese territory. The Indian Government asserts that this area “has been associated with India’s culture and tradition for the last two thousand years or so, and has been an intimate part of India’s life and thought.” But firstly, the Indian Government fails to give any concrete facts to support
its contention. On the contrary, Prime Minister Nehru said in the Rajya Sabha of India on September 10, 1959, that this area “has not been under any kind of administra-
tion.” On November 23, 1959, he said again in the Rajya Sabha of India: “During British rule, as far as I know, this area was neither inhabited by any people nor were there any outposts.” Though Prime Minister Nehru is in no position to judge correctly the conditions prevail-
ing on the Chinese side, his words do prove authoritatively that India has never exercised control over this area.

Secondly, the Indian Government says that it has been sending regular patrols to this area, and that this is one way India exercises its jurisdiction. According to data available to the Chinese Government, however, armed Indian personnel intruded only three times into this area to carry out reconnaissance, namely, in September 1958, July 1959 and October 1959, and on each occasion they were promptly detained and then sent out of China by Chinese frontier guards. Apart from these three intrusions, they have never been to this area. It is precisely for this reason that the Indian Government has been so unaware of the long-term activities of the Chinese personnel in this area that it declares that it was in 1957 that Chinese personnel first entered this area.

Thirdly, the Indian Government has referred to a number of maps to corroborate what it has claimed to be the traditional customary line. But the situation in this respect is not favourable to India’s arguments either. Despite slight discrepancies at some places, the delineations of the western sector of the boundary on the maps published in China in the past one to two hundred years have in the main been consistent. The Indian Gover-
ment says that the delineation of the western sector of

the boundary on an official Chinese map published in 1893 approximates to that of the Indian maps. The Chinese Government does not know what map is referred to here and, consequently, is unable to comment on it. As to the atlas published in 1917 by the British-owned paper, the North China Daily News and Herald, it can only represent the British view but not the Chinese, and there is no need to discuss it here.

By contrast, there have been considerable contradic-
tions and confusion in the delineations of the boundary on maps published in Britain and India in the past century and more. This is because, after occupying Kashmir, Britain actively tried to use it as a base for aggression against China’s southern Sinkiang and northwestern Tibet and, therefore, it continually made arbitrary changes in the traditional customary boundary line in the western sector and sent surveying parties to intrude into China for this purpose. Prime Minister Nehru says that “accurate” maps, that is, maps in agreement with the current Indian maps, became possible only from 1865 after surveys. But, even so, some reputed surveyors did not wish to misrepresent the facts at all. For instance, the delineations of the boundary on the Sketch Map of Eastern Turkestan of 1870 by G. W. Hayward and on the Sketch Map of the Country North of India of 1871 by Robert Shaw — both surveyors being referred to by Prime Minister Nehru in his letter of September 28 — are close to the traditional customary line as shown on Chinese maps. In his article in the Journal of the British Royal Geographical Society, Vol. XL, 1870, Hayward stated explicitly that the boundary ran along the main chain of the Karakoram Mountain to the passes in Changchenmo, that is to say, it is the Chinese maps, rather than the current
Indian maps, that have correctly delineated this sector of the boundary. What is of special significance is the fact that no boundary line, let alone an “accurate” boundary line, was drawn at all for this sector on the official maps compiled by the Survey of India as late as the 1943 edition. On its 1950 map, though the same colour for Kashmir was painted in the area disputed by India, still no boundary line was drawn, and there were marked the words “Boundary Undefined.” This fact has already been pointed out above.

Fourthly, the Indian Government says that the traditional customary line claimed by it possesses, in addition to distinct geographical features, that is, it runs along the watershed. However, to begin with, the principle of watershed is not the sole or main international principle for the delimitation of boundaries. It is particularly impermissible to use the watershed as a pretext for seeking a boundary line within the territory of another country. Next, the traditional customary line claimed by the Indian Government, instead of separating the Hoten River system from the Indus River system, actually cuts across the Hoten River system. On the contrary, the traditional customary line as shown on Chinese maps truly reflects the geographical features of this area, that is, having steep slopes in the north-south direction, the area is easily passable and, therefore, naturally forms the only route linking Sinkiang and western Tibet. To the west, however, there lies between this region and Ladakh the towering Karakoram Mountain range which is extremely difficult to pass through. The Indian Government also admits that this area is extremely difficult of access from Ladakh.

It can thus be seen that judging by the actual administrative jurisdiction at all times or by the maps and geographical features referred to by India, the line claimed by India to be the traditional customary boundary line in the western sector is without any foundation; while the traditional customary line for which China stands is truly well founded.

(2) Concerning the middle sector. The disputed areas involved here owing to difference of conception between the two sides regarding the traditional customary line—Chuva, Chuje, Shipki Pass, Sang, Tsungsha, Puling-Sumdo, Wuje, Sangcha and Lapthal—are all traditional Chinese territory. Except Sang and Tsungsha which were invaded and occupied by Britain earlier, they were all occupied or intruded into by India only after the signing of the 1954 Sino-Indian Agreement.

The local authorities of the Tibet region have kept up to now the land-confering documents or land deeds concerning these places issued in the past few centuries. For example, the mandate issued in the name of the 7th Dalai Lama in the 18th century stated specifically that Wuje was within the territorial limits of Daba Dzong of Tibet. Furthermore, the local authorities of the Tibet region have all along been collecting taxes in these places, and the census record and taxation papers of some of these places have been well preserved down to the present time.

Nearly all those who have lived long in these places are of the Tibetan nationality of China. Despite foreign occupation of their places of residence, they still did not wish to be separated from their motherland. For instance, after Sang and Tsungsha were occupied by Britain, the local population still considered themselves Chinese na-
tionals, and on more than one occasion pledged their allegiance to the local government of the Tibet region of China in statements made to the local authorities of the region.

It must be pointed out in particular that among the above-mentioned places, Puling-Sumdo is one of the ten places which the Chinese Government agreed to open as markets for trade in the Ari district of Tibet as specified in Article II, Section 2 of the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954. It was opened together with the nine other markets in compliance with request made by Mr. N. Raghavan, representative of the Indian Government and Indian Ambassador, at the first meeting of the negotiations. Puling-Sumdo, however, was occupied by India soon after the signing of the 1954 Agreement.

The Indian Government claims that it has all along been exercising jurisdiction over the above-mentioned places. However, in the note annexed to Prime Minister Nehru’s letter of September 26, 1959, apart from some extremely strained arguments in connection with Sany and Tsungsha, there are no concrete facts whatever to show that jurisdiction has always been exercised over those other places.

The principle of watershed put forward by the Indian Government cannot be applied here either, as it does not conform with the jurisdiction actually exercised by each side.

The maps published by the two sides also show that it is China, not India, which has abided by the traditional customary line. The delineations of this sector of the boundary on past Chinese maps, though leaving a few very small pieces of Chinese territory outside of the Chinese boundary, on the whole reflected the correct traditional customary line. On the other hand, no boundary line was drawn for this sector on official Indian maps even as late as 1950, and only the words “Boundary Undefined” were marked.

(3) Concerning the eastern sector, the area between the so-called McMahon Line and the boundary line at the southern foot of the Himalayas as shown on Chinese maps has always belonged to China, and was until recently still under Chinese jurisdiction. This is proved by a mass of facts.

As early as the middle of the 17th century, the local government of the Tibet region of China had begun to exercise jurisdiction over this area comprising Monyul, Loyul and Lower Tsayul. Take the Monyul area for example. In the middle of the 17th century, when the 5th Dalai Lama unified Tibet, he sent his disciple Mera Lama and tribal chief Namka Drukdra, Dinpon of Tsona, to the Monyul area to establish their rule there. By the beginning of the 18th century, the local government of the Tibet region had unified the whole of Monyul and divided the area gradually into thirty-two “tso” (a few named “din”). At Tawang, the capital of Monyul, an administrative committee known as “Tawang Shidrel” and a non-permanent administrative conference of a higher level known as “Tawang Drudrel” were set up to direct the affairs of the whole area. The local government of the Tibet region used always to appoint the officials of the administrative organs at various levels in Monyul, collect taxes (mainly grain tax, twice a year) and exercise judicial authority in all parts of the area. Monyul was included in every census conducted in Tibet in the past and was not treated as an exceptional case. The religious, economic and cultural life of the local people,
the Monbas, has been deeply influenced by the Tibetan nationality; they believe in Lamaism, can speak the Tibetan language, and used Tibetan currency. It is from the Monyul area that the 6th Dalai Lama, Tsanyun Gyalts, hailed, and his house there received for all generations the mandates conferred by successive regimes of the Tibet region.

In addition, it must be pointed out that even after the so-called McMahon Line was defined and made public, the local government of the Tibet region continued to exercise extensively and for a long period of time its jurisdiction over this area. For instance, the Tibetan administrative institutions in Monyul had been almost kept intact until 1951. In Loyul and Lower Tsayul, up to 1946, the administrative organs of “iso” and “din” were maintained quite extensively, and the people continued to pay taxes and render corvée to the Lhasa authorities.

Therefore, the allegations of the Indian Government that “the Tibetan authorities have not exercised jurisdiction at any time in this area,” that the local “tribes have not been affected in the slightest degree by any Tibetan influence, cultural, political or other,” and so on are incredible.

The Indian Government claims that it has always exercised jurisdiction over this area. However, in Prime Minister Nehru’s own words, Indian administration had “gradually moved up” to this area; the tribes had generally been left “more or less to look after themselves” until around 1914; and British political officers only “visited these areas.” And what did the British officers who had visited this area say? The Captain Bailey referred to by Prime Minister Nehru in his letter of September 20, 1959, who was specially sent by the British Indian Government in 1913 to southeastern Tibet to conduct illegal exploration and survey for the purpose of defining the so-called McMahon Line, described the jurisdiction of the Tibet local government over the Monyul area at the time in his book No Passport to Tibet published in 1957; he further stated in his letter to the London Times published on September 7 this year that, “When we reached Tawang (i.e., capital of Monyul), we found a purely Tibetan administration in force.” Even Christoph Von Führer-Haimendorf, then Special Officer of the Indian External Affairs Department in Subansiri, who was sent by the Indian Assam authorities in 1944, that is, thirty years after the so-called McMahon Line was defined, to explore this area, also testified in his book Himalayan Barbary published in 1955, that the frontier in this area was undefined and unsurveyed, and remained unadministered by the Indian authorities. It can thus be seen how untenable are the assertions that the area has belonged to India for tens and hundreds of years, that the current boundary has always been the historical boundary, etc., etc.

The Indian Government says that the British concluded a number of agreements with some of the local tribes between 1844 and 1888 and that these agreements are evidence of Indian jurisdiction. However, the 1853 agreement with the Monbas cited by Prime Minister Nehru begins with the statement by the Monbas: “We . . . being deputed by the Daba Rajas to carry letters of friendship to the Agent, Governor-General, North-East Frontier, desiring that the former friendly relations which existed between the Government of India and our Lhassa Government . . . should be again resumed . . .” This passage proves exactly and indisputably that the Monbas belong to Tibet, not India, and that it was under the
premise of recognizing them as belonging to Tibet that the Indian Government concluded the agreement with them. The Daba Rajas referred to here was the Regent of the local government of the Tibet region. As to the agreements with the Abors and the Akas cited, it can also be seen clearly from their texts that the areas of those tribes were not British territory. Some of the agreements even stated explicitly that British territory "extends to the foot of the hills (i.e., southern foot of the Himalayas)." And these peoples were not British subjects.

It can be seen from the above historical data provided by the Chinese and Indian sides respectively that this area always belonged to China, not to Britain or India.

This conclusion is further confirmed forcefully by the authoritative maps published in the two countries. The maps published in China as a rule include this area in Chinese territory, that is, marking the boundary line along the true traditional boundary at the southern foot of the Himalayas. According to material now available to the Chinese Government, the same delineation was followed on the official maps published by the Survey of India up to and including the 1938 edition. After 1938 and up to 1952, the Survey of India changed its delineation by marking the boundary in accordance with the so-called McMahon Line, but still using the marking for undemarcated boundary. Since 1954, it has again changed the undemarcated boundary into demarcated boundary. By these successive changes, it shifted from its original position of recognizing this area as Chinese territory to that of claiming this area as India's lawful territory at all times. Nevertheless, the delineation on current Indian maps has not been accepted internationally. As stated above, the atlas edited by John Bartholomew, cartographer to the King of Britain, and published in 1958 still considered it a disputed area, while the delineation on the map "India 1945," attached to Prime Minister Nehru's book The Discovery of India, was still the same as that on Chinese maps.

In the face of these authoritative facts, the Atlas of the Chinese Empire published in London in 1906 by the China Inland Mission, a British church organization, to which the Indian Government referred, is obviously without significance.

It can be seen from what has been said in the above that the Chinese Government's view of the traditional customary line is based on objective facts and confirmed by a mass of factual data in all its sectors, western, middle and eastern. On the other hand, the boundary line marked on Indian maps, with the exception of the middle sector which for the most part conforms to reality, does not represent at all the traditional customary line. The eastern and western sectors of this boundary line, it can in particular be seen beyond any shadow of doubt, are the product of the British policy of aggression and expansion in modern history.

It should not have been necessary to discuss the British policy of aggression and expansion in modern history, as the history of India itself, the history of India's adjacent countries which had once been a part of British India or its dependency, the history of China, and, in particular, the history of China's Tibet region adjoining India, all bear witness to this policy. While embarking on armed aggression against Tibet and conspiring to cause Tibet to break away from China, Britain also nibbled at the frontiers of Tibet both on the maps and in deed, which resulted in this boundary line that was later inherited by
India and is marked on current Indian maps. Of course, the great Indian people, who treasure peace, can in no way be held responsible for all the acts of aggression committed by Britain with India as its base. It is, however, surprising that the Indian Government should claim the boundary line which Britain unlawfully created through aggression against Tibet and which even includes areas to which British authority had not extended as the traditional customary boundary line, while perversely describing the true traditional customary boundary line pointed out by the Chinese Government on the basis of objective facts as laying claim to large tracts of Indian territory. How would the Indian Government feel, if it were in the position of the Chinese Government? If this assertion is maintained, the inevitable conclusion to be derived would be that the British colonialists were most fair-minded while oppressed China was full of undisguised ambitions; that the powerful British imperialism was, for the past one hundred years and more, invariably upholding the traditional Sino-Indian boundary, while the weak China was ceaselessly encroaching upon British territory! The Chinese Government believes that no one would accept this conclusion.

**Question Three: What Is the Proper Way to Settle the Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute?**

The Chinese Government, starting from the above-mentioned facts that the Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited and that there is difference of conception between the two sides regarding the boundary, has consistently held that an overall settlement of the boundary question between the two countries should be sought by the Chinese and Indian sides, taking into account the historical background and present actual situation, in accordance with the Five Principles and through friendly consultations; that pending this, as a provisional measure, the two sides should maintain the status quo of the border, and not seek to change it by unilateral action, let alone by force; and that as to some of the disputes, partial and provisional agreements could be reached through negotiations.

The Indian Government disagrees with the Chinese Government’s statement that the boundary has not been delimited and an overall settlement of the question should be sought through negotiations, and only acknowledges that certain minor, partial adjustments could be made. Yet the Indian Government agrees that the two sides should maintain the status quo of the border, avoid the use of force and settle the disputes through negotiations. Thus, although there are differences between the two sides, the tranquillity of the border and the friendship of the two countries could have been ensured. Contrary to the expectations of the Chinese Government, the Indian Government has time and again asserted that the Chinese Government had previously agreed that the boundary had been delimited and accepted the Indian Government’s claim regarding the boundary and that the Chinese Government changed its stand only recently. At the same time, the Indian Government has also made incorrect interpretations of the status quo of the border, repeatedly violated the status quo in actual deeds and even resorted to force, thus creating tension on the border. In these circumstances, the Indian Government has perversely charged that the Chinese Government should be held
responsible for all this and said that China harboured ambitions of "aggression" and "expansion." The above-mentioned attitude of the Indian Government has made the boundary question all the more difficult and complicated.

Therefore, the Chinese Government deems it necessary to clarify the following points:

(1) Whether the Chinese Government has ever agreed that the boundary was delimited and accepted the Indian Government's claim regarding the boundary and changed its stand afterwards.

The Indian Government has referred to the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954, holding that this agreement has dealt with all the outstanding issues between India and the Tibet region, and that therefore the boundary question should be considered settled.

As a matter of fact, the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954 is an agreement on trade and intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India and has nothing to do with the boundary question and no provision concerning the boundary can be found in any article of the Agreement. It may be recalled that at that time, the question which the two countries were most concerned about and which called for urgent solution was the establishment of normal relations between India and the Tibet region of China on a new basis. During the negotiations, neither side asked to discuss the boundary question; this was intended to avoid affecting the settlement of the most urgent question at the time. Both sides were clear on this point. At the very beginning of the negotiations, Premier Chou En-lai made it clear to the Indian Government Delegation that the task of the negotiations was "to settle those outstanding questions between the two countries which are ripe for settlement." Afterwards, at the fourth meeting held on January 8, 1954, the two sides jointly defined the task of the negotiations as settling those outstanding questions between the two countries which were ripe for settlement in accordance with the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. On April 23 of the same year, the Chinese representative further pointed out that the negotiations would not touch on the boundary question. The Indian representative agreed to this view of the Chinese side. There was, therefore, no fact whatever to show that the Chinese Government agreed to the Indian Government's conception of the boundary or that it would not bring up the boundary question for discussion afterwards.

The Indian Government has also referred to the talks between the two Prime Ministers in Peking in October 1954, expressing the view that Premier Chou En-lai's remarks about Chinese maps implied that the Chinese Government would revise its maps in accordance with Indian maps, that is to say, the Chinese Government had accepted the Indian Government's claim regarding the boundary.

The fact is that at that time Prime Minister Nehru took exception to the delineation of the Sino-Indian boundary line on Chinese maps and therefore Premier Chou En-lai explained that the delineation of the boundary on Chinese maps followed that of the old maps and that it would not be fitting for the Chinese Government, on its own, to change the delineation of the boundary before conducting surveys and consulting with the countries concerned. In particular, Premier Chou En-lai pointed out at the time that China has undelimited boundaries with India and some other southwestern neigh-
bouring countries. Prime Minister Nehru said, however, that he considered that no boundary question existed between China and India. It can be seen from this conversation that there was an obvious difference of views between the two sides regarding the boundary, and that Premier Chou En-lai clearly expressed his disagreement to any unilateral revision of maps.

The Indian Government has also referred to the talks between the two Prime Ministers held in India at the end of 1956, considering that Premier Chou En-lai's remarks made at the time about the so-called McMahon Line implied that the Chinese Government recognized this line.

In fact, when Premier Chou En-lai referred to the so-called McMahon Line, he said that it was illegal and had never been recognized by the Chinese Government. He explained at the same time that despite this, in order to ensure the tranquillity of the border and out of consideration for the friendship of the two countries, Chinese military and administrative personnel would strictly refrain from crossing this line and expressed the hope that a proper way to settle the eastern sector of the boundary might be found at a later date. This statement of Premier Chou En-lai can by no means be interpreted as recognition of this line by the Chinese Government.

It can thus be seen that the Chinese Government has been consistent in its attitude that the boundary has not been delimited and is yet to be settled through negotiations between the two countries. The Indian Government's implication that the Chinese Government has changed its original stand does not accord with the facts.

(2) Whether the Chinese Government scrupulously respects the status quo of the border.

It is a principle agreed upon by both sides that pending an overall settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question, the status quo of the border should be maintained.

The Chinese Government has faithfully abided by this principle. In the ten years since liberation, Chinese military and administrative personnel have been under orders not to go beyond the areas which have always been under Chinese jurisdiction, and even not to cross the so-called McMahon Line in the eastern sector.

The Indian Government's interpretation of the status quo of the border, however, is based not on the actual scope of jurisdiction of the two sides, but on the unilaterally fixed boundary line shown on Indian maps that includes large areas where Indian jurisdiction has never reached. Thus armed Indian personnel have repeatedly violated the status quo of the border and, step by step, extended the scope of its occupation by encroaching on Parigas, Chuva, Chuje, Shipki Pass, Puling-Sumdo, Sanga-cha and Lapthal, and intruded into Aksai Chin, Lake Pangong, Kongka Pass and Wuje. But the Indian Government describes all these actions as maintenance of the status quo. In the eastern sector, after the outbreak of the rebellion in Tibet in March this year, armed Indian personnel even overstepped the so-called McMahon Line, at one time occupied Longju and Tamaden, and is now still in occupation of Khinzemane, all of which are situated north of that line.

Although the Indian side has occupied Puling-Sumdo, one of the Chinese markets specified in the 1954 Agreement and once occupied Tamaden which India itself admits to be Chinese territory, yet the Indian Government has all along denied having violated the status quo of the border. Moreover, basing itself on the boundary
line shown on its own maps, the Indian Government accused China of violating the status quo of the border. To this the Chinese Government cannot agree.

(3) Whether the Chinese Government has earnestly avoided using force.

Recently, two armed clashes which neither side wished to see occurred in the Mijigutün area and the Kongka Pass area. This was extremely unfortunate. But it is not China that should be held responsible for them. The Mijigutün area incident of August 25 was caused by the action of the armed Indian personnel who had invaded and occupied Longju in advancing further to the southern vicinity of Mijigutün and attacking a Chinese patrol. Armed Chinese personnel never attacked the outpost established illegally by India at Longju; on the contrary, it was the armed Indian personnel from the Longju outpost who opened fire on an even larger scale on the following day, but the Chinese troops stationed at Mijigutün never returned fire. The allegation that Chinese troops drove armed Indian personnel out of their outpost at Longju by superior force is not true. Armed Chinese personnel entered Longju only on September 1, that is, the sixth day counting from August 27 when the armed Indian personnel withdrew.

The case of the Kongka Pass incident of October 21 is even more obvious. On the day after three armed Indian personnel were detained on their intrusion into Chinese territory more than 60 armed Indian personnel carrying light and heavy machine-guns and other weapons intruded further into Chinese territory, and launched an armed attack on a Chinese patrol numbering fourteen only and carrying light arms alone. Both before and after the Indian party opened fire, the Chinese patrol gave repeated warnings not to shoot. The Chinese deputy squad leader, Wu Ching-kuo, waved his hands to the Indian personnel and called on them not to shoot, but this esteemed comrade was the first man to be hit and killed. Only after this was the Chinese patrol forced to return fire.

That China has consistently refused to use force is further borne out by the following facts:

a. When a situation of the armed forces of the two sides facing each other first appeared on the Chinese territory of Wuje in 1955, the Chinese Government took the initiative in proposing that neither side should station troops in Wuje pending a settlement through negotiations.

b. With regard to Chinese territories of Parigas, Chuvu, Chuje, Shipki Pass, Sang, Tsungsha, Puling-Sumdo, Sangcha, Lapthal and Khinze line, which have been occupied by the Indian side, the Chinese Government has never tried compelling the armed Indian personnel to withdraw by force of arms. Even in regard to such an area as Tamaden, which the Indian Government itself admits to be Chinese territory, the Chinese Government also patiently waited for the Indian troops to withdraw of their own accord and did not resort to force.

c. With regard to armed Indian personnel who intruded into the garrison areas of Chinese frontier outposts, the Chinese frontier guard units first of all invariably advised them to leave Chinese territory and it was only when they refused to listen to such advice were they disarmed and afterwards sent out of Chinese territory together with their arms.

d. All the Chinese frontier guards are under strict orders absolutely to refrain from using their arms unless they are already subjected to armed attack.
e. After the occurrence of the unfortunate Kongka Pass incident, the Chinese Government immediately ordered its troops guarding the Sino-Indian border to stop patrolling the entire border.

f. In order completely and effectively to prevent any border clashes, the Chinese Government has recently proposed time and again that the armed personnel on the two sides on the border respectively withdraw 20 kilometres or some other appropriate distance.

The above-mentioned facts prove that the Chinese Government has adopted all possible measures to maintain the tranquillity of the border and to prevent the use of force and the occurrence of armed clashes.

After the Kongka Pass incident, the Indian Government also instructed its frontier guards to stop patrolling and indicated to the Chinese Government that in any event neither side should resort to force except as a last resort in self-defence. This is undoubtedly worthy of welcome. Prior to the occurrence of these two clashes, however, the Indian Government in its note dated August 11 this year had informed the Chinese Government to the effect that Indian frontier guards had instructions “to resist trespassers and to use minimum force necessary for this purpose if warning given by them remains unheeded.” The Indian Government’s note also stated that “any Chinese troops are still within Indian territory, they should be immediately withdrawn as otherwise this may lead to avoidable clash.” Even after the occurrence of the first clash, the Indian frontier guards, according to the note sent by the Indian Government to China on August 27, 1959, still had instructions to “use force on the trespassers if necessary.” It must be pointed out that since there are divergences both between the two countries conceptions of the boundary and between their maps, and since the Indian Government regards large tracts of Chinese territory which have always been under Chinese jurisdiction as Indian territory, Chinese military and administrative personnel stationed on the soil of their own country would inevitably be called “trespassers” by the Indian side. In this way, Indian subordinates in carrying out these instructions could use force more or less freely according to their own judgement. Obviously, it cannot be said that the occurrence of the two unfortunate border incidents was unrelated to such instructions.

(4) Whether China wants to engage in “aggression” and “expansion.”

Centring around the Sino-Indian boundary question, there has recently appeared in India a great deal of anti-Chinese pronouncements, which in cold war language slander China as “imperialism,” “expanding into India” and “committing aggression.” The Chinese people cannot but feel deep regret at such malicious attacks against China, which simply fly in the face of facts.

The Chinese Government has noted that there is at present in India a rather prevalent observation that China has now grown strong and, like certain Chinese rulers in history or modern imperialists, would seek expansion abroad. Apart from those who are obviously hostile to China, the great majority of those who spread this observation probably do so because they lack an accurate understanding of New China. In these circumstances, the Chinese Government deems it useful to explain China’s stand once more to the Government and people of India.

Although the Chinese people have begun to score some achievements, China is still very backward economically
and culturally and it will still take the Chinese people decades or even over a hundred years of arduous efforts to overcome such backwardness. But at no time in future will China become a threat to its neighbouring countries, just as China does not believe that India, after it has grown strong as China fervently hopes, would become a threat to China. To say that the growth of China’s population and industry would constitute a threat to its neighbours is utterly incomprehensible to the Chinese people. China’s social system is a socialist one under which political and economic powers are in the hands of the working people and the people and Government of socialist China have not, nor can they have, nor should they have, any intention of threatening others. Moreover, the following facts must be taken note of: Firstly, although China’s population has increased at a higher rate since liberation, yet the average annual rate of increase is only 2 per cent, while the average annual rate of increase in China’s grain output has reached 9.8 per cent, the highest annual rate of increase being 35 per cent. In the future, the per unit area grain output and agricultural labour productivity in China will still be greatly raised. Apart from that, China has a vast territory, more than half of which is sparsely populated and will take great efforts to develop. Therefore the Chinese people absolutely do not need to seize the territory of other countries to feed themselves. Secondly, although China’s industry has undergone some development, it still by far cannot satisfy the needs of the people at home. China is rich in natural resources and has a huge domestic market; its industry neither needs to grab raw materials from abroad nor needs to dump its products in foreign countries. Thirdly, the development of China’s industry and agriculture has led to a shortage, not surplus, of labour power in China. Therefore, China has no surplus population to send abroad.

In order to attain their great goals in peaceful construction, the Chinese people are in urgent need of a long-term peaceful international environment. Therefore, in conducting its foreign relations the Chinese Government has consistently pursued a policy of peace and is desirous of living in friendship with all countries, big and small, on the basis of the Five Principles. With regard to the outstanding issues between China and other countries, the Chinese Government has consistently stood for their fair and reasonable settlement by peaceful methods without resorting to force. It is not only impossible, improper and unnecessary for China to commit aggression against its neighbours, rather it is its earnest hope that they would all grow prosperous and strong rapidly. Because only thus can we altogether more effectively prevent imperialist war and aggression and maintain peace in this area; only thus can we better meet each other’s needs and help each other in construction work.

So far as the question of boundary is concerned, China absolutely does not want one inch of another country’s territory. There are undelimited boundaries between China and many of its neighbouring countries, but China has never taken, and will never take, advantage of this situation to make any changes in the actually existing state of affairs on the borders by unilateral action. Whether or not the boundary has been delimited, China is always prepared to work in close co-operation with its neighbours for the creation of the most peaceful, secure
and friendly border zones so that there will be no mutual misgivings or clashes over the border questions.

With regard to Bhutan and Sikkim, some explanation may be given in passing. China has no other intentions than that of living with them in friendship without committing aggression against each other. Concerning the boundary between China and Bhutan, there is only a certain discrepancy between the delineations on the maps of the two sides in the sector south of the so-called McMahon Line. But it has always been tranquil along the border between the two countries. The boundary between China and Sikkim has long been formally delimited and there is neither any discrepancy between the maps nor any disputes in practice. All allegations that China wants to “encroach on” Bhutan and Sikkim, just like the allegations that China wants to commit aggression against India and other southwestern neighbouring countries, are sheer nonsense.

This basic stand of the Chinese Government towards its neighbours has long been defined time and again and there should have been no need to deal with it at length. It is, however, unfortunate that recently, particularly since the putting down of the rebellion of the reactionary serf-owners in the Tibet region of China, India has in various ways distorted and attacked the Chinese attitude. In the interest of friendship of the two countries, the Chinese Government does not wish to answer attack with attack, but would rather assume that the Indian Government really has some misunderstandings about China’s intentions. It may be that, for certain reasons, the campaign against China would still continue. Even if unfortunately that should be the case, the Chinese Government absolutely refuses to think that the misunderstandings about China of those who harbour no ill will would likewise continue for long. Because, if China were really committing aggression against and posing threat to India or any other country, ten thousand denials would not alter the fact; if it is otherwise, although ten thousand propaganda machines tell the whole world about China’s “aggression” and “threat,” they will only discredit the propagandists themselves. “The strength of a horse is known by the distance travelled, and the heart of a man is seen with the passage of time.” China’s peaceful and friendly attitude towards India will stand the test of time. The Chinese Government is convinced that, though the truth of a matter may be hidden for a while, it is impossible to hide it up for long.

(5) Where lies the key to the settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question?

There exist important differences between the Governments of China and India in their stand on the boundary question and there is still tension between the two countries on the border. But the Chinese Government has never had any doubt that the tension will eventually pass away and a reasonable settlement of the boundary question will be reached through friendly consultations.

The confidence of the Chinese Government is based on the following: There is friendship of thousands of years’ duration but no irreconcilable conflict between the two countries; both sides urgently need to devote themselves to long-term peaceful construction at home and are willing to work for the defence of world peace; and it is uncalled for as well as unthinkable to go on arguing like this without end. On the boundary question, both sides have indicated their willingness to maintain the status quo of the border and to settle the boundary dis-
pute by peaceful means. This shows that a basis exists for China and India to live together in friendship and that the boundary question could be settled in a reasonable way. Besides, looking at it the other way round, there is no alternative. It is impossible for the two sides to change the geographical reality of their being neighbours or to break off all contacts along the lengthy boundary line. It is particularly impossible to entertain the absurd idea that our two great friendly neighbours with a combined population of more than one thousand million might start a war over such temporary and local disputes. Therefore, a friendly settlement of the boundary disputes by peaceful means is the only logical answer.

What are the key questions which demand an urgent solution right now? The Chinese Government has the honour to present the following opinions to the Indian Government:

a. The Chinese Government is of the opinion that no matter what views the two sides may hold about any specific matter concerning the boundary, there should no longer be any difference of opinion about the most basic fact known to the whole world, that is, the entire boundary between the two countries has indeed never been delimited, and is therefore yet to be settled through negotiations. Recognition of this simple fact should not create any difficulties for either side, because it would neither impair the present interests of either side, nor in any way prevent both sides from making their own claims at the boundary negotiations. Once agreement is reached on this point, it could be said that the way has been opened to the settlement of the boundary question. Although up to now each side has persisted in its own views on the concrete disputes concerning the different sectors of the boundary, provided both sides attach importance to the fundamental interest of friendship of the two countries and adopt an unprejudiced attitude and one of mutual understanding and accommodation, it would not be difficult to settle these disputes. If India's opinions prove to be more reasonable and more in the interest of friendship of the two countries, they should be accepted by China; if China's opinions prove to be more reasonable and more in the interest of friendship of the two countries, they should be accepted by India. It is the hope of the Chinese Government that the forthcoming meeting between the Prime Ministers of the two countries will first of all reach agreement on some principles on the boundary question so as to provide guidance and basis for the future discussion and the working out of a solution by the two sides.

b. Pending the formal delimitation of the boundary, the status quo of the border between the two countries must be effectively maintained and the tranquillity of the border ensured. For this purpose, the Chinese Government proposes that the armed forces of the two sides along the border respectively withdraw 20 kilometres or some other distance considered appropriate by the two sides, and that, as a step preliminary to this basic measure, the armed personnel of both sides stop patrolling along the entire border.

The Chinese Government believes that if agreement can be reached on the two points mentioned above, the situation on the Sino-Indian border will undergo an immediate change and the dark clouds hanging over the relations between the two countries will quickly vanish.

The Chinese Government earnestly hopes that the views it has set forth here at great length on the past,
present and future of the Sino-Indian boundary question would receive the most good-willed understanding of the Indian Government, thereby helping to bring about a settlement of this question satisfactory to both sides and a turn for the better in the relations between the two countries. Although some arguing cannot be helped in order to make reply to unfair charges, the intention and aim of the Chinese Government is not to argue, but to bring arguing to an end.

China and India are two great countries each with its great past and future. Guided by the great ideal of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, the two countries have over the past few years joined hands and cooperated closely in defence of world peace. Today history again issues a call to the peoples of the two countries asking them to make still greater contributions internationally to the cause of peace and human progress while accomplishing tremendous changes at home. The task falling on the shoulders of the Chinese and Indian peoples of the present generation is both arduous and glorious. The Chinese Government wishes to reiterate here its ardent desire that the two countries stop quarrelling, quickly bring about a reasonable settlement of the boundary question, and on this basis consolidate and develop the great friendship of the two peoples in their common cause.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the Republic of India in China the assurances of its highest consideration.

More on Nehru's Philosophy in the Light of the Sino-Indian Boundary Question

by

The Editorial Department of "Renmin Ribao"

October 27, 1962

For several years past, Nehru has obstinately rejected the Chinese Government's proposals for settling the Sino-Indian boundary question peacefully through negotiations, and has moved troops to make incursion after incursion into China's territory. On October 12, 1962, haughtily disregarding the consequences, he publicly ordered Indian troops to "free" the Chinese frontiers of the Chinese troops stationed there. Soon afterwards, aggressive Indian troops launched large-scale armed attacks in the eastern and western sectors of the Sino-Indian border, thus bringing about unprecedentedly serious military clashes between China and India.

China has always hoped to avert a conflict. Though we have every time exercised forbearance and self-restraint, what we least wished to see happen has come to pass. China has at no time occupied or intruded into any part of India; but the Indian side, which has occupied vast tracts of Chinese territory, has been using force deliberately to change the status quo of the boundary
and extend its aggression. China has proposed again and again to the Indian Government that negotiations be held at once without pre-conditions, but Nehru wants the Chinese troops to withdraw from large tracts of their own territory as a pre-condition for negotiations, thereby rejecting negotiations without any reason whatsoever.

Even after Indian troops had intruded time and again into Chinese territory in the western and eastern sectors of the Sino-Indian border, China’s frontier guards strictly observed the People’s Government’s order to avoid conflict. They never fired the first shot even when under their very eyes they saw their territory being occupied by Indian troops, their links with the rear being cut off by Indian troops and strongpoints for aggression being set up by Indian troops only a few hundred metres, a few dozens of metres or only a few metres away. It was in these circumstances that many of our soldiers were killed or wounded by Indian troops. The Nehru government took our forbearance and self-restraint as an indication that we are weak and can be bullied. Indian troops pressed forward steadily and penetrated deep into Chinese territory, set up more and more strongpoints for aggression and advance positions. After completing their dispositions for attack, the Indian troops finally launched a large-scale general offensive on October 20, 1962.

This series of facts, these recent developments in the Sino-Indian border situation, all add up to the inescapable conclusion: the present serious armed conflict is entirely due to deliberate provocations and aggression by the Nehru government.

The whole world is now closely following the Sino-Indian border incidents. It is now more than three years since the ruling circles of India, headed by Nehru, started the Sino-Indian boundary dispute. Why have they balked at a peaceful settlement and insisted on provoking China, going so far as to launch a large-scale armed attack against China? In order to lay bare the essential truth of the matter and elucidate the root cause and background of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute, one needs to proceed from an extensive coverage of the facts and make a comprehensive historical analysis of them.

More than three years ago, this newspaper published an article entitled “The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru’s Philosophy” which discussed Nehru’s “philosophy” in the light of intervention in China’s Tibet by the Indian ruling circles. Now we propose to make a further inquiry into Nehru’s “philosophy” in the light of the Sino-Indian boundary question.

I

Just like their interference in China’s Tibet, the provoking of Sino-Indian border incidents by India’s ruling circles headed by Nehru, leading to their large-scale armed invasion of China, is no accident. Both are determined by the class nature of India’s big bourgeoisie and big landlords, whose interests are closely connected with those of the imperialists.

To explain this point, let us recall some history.

Readers are invited first to read the following passage written by Nehru in his book The Discovery of India in 1944.
Though not directly a Pacific state, India will inevitably exercise an important influence there. India will also develop as the centre of economic and political activity in the Indian Ocean area, in southeast Asia and right up to the Middle East. Her position gives an economic and strategic importance in a part of the world which is going to develop rapidly in the future. If there is a regional grouping of the countries bordering on the Indian Ocean on either side of India,—Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, India, Ceylon, Burma, Malaya, Siam, Java, etc.,—present-day minority problems will disappear, or at any rate will have to be considered in an entirely different context.

... the small national state is doomed. It may survive as a cultural autonomous area but not as an independent political unit. (Meridian Books Ltd., London, 3rd ed., 1951, pp. 510-511.)

This enables one to understand two things clearly:

First, the goal pursued by this ambitious Nehru is the establishment of a great empire unprecedented in Indian history. The sphere of influence of this great empire would include a series of countries from the Middle East to Southeast Asia and far surpass that of the colonial system set up in Asia in the past by the British empire.

Secondly, this ambitious Nehru believes that when the “regional grouping” with India as “the centre of economic and political activity” is set up, or, in other words, when the great empire conceived by Nehru comes into existence, “minority problems will disappear” in this region. According to Nehru, “the small national state is doomed,” “it may survive as a cultural autonomous area but not as an independent political unit.” In a word, it can only be a vassal in Nehru’s great empire.

These remarks of Nehru were written 18 years ago. Nehru was dreaming of a great Indian empire long before India’s proclamation of independence. This is real “discovery” of the expansionism of the big bourgeoisie and big landlords of India!

These reactionary, expansionist ideas of India’s big bourgeoisie and big landlords form an important part of Nehru’s philosophy.

India was for a long time under the colonial rule of British imperialism. The Indian big bourgeoisie is a parasitic class fostered by British imperialism. Its close relations with the British monopoly capitalist class are clearly seen in Nehru. Nehru said: “In my likes and dislikes I was perhaps more an Englishman than an Indian.” (Michael Brecher: Nehru, a Political Biography, Oxford University Press, London, 1959, p. 50.) Fostered by the British imperialists, the economic forces of the Indian big bourgeoisie began to develop already under British rule. They developed further, especially after World War I and during World War II. As a large country, India was regarded by British imperialism as the economic and political centre of its colonial system in the East, and was called “the brightest jewel in Britain’s imperial crown.” This view of India held by the British imperialists was an insult to the great Indian people. However, the Indian big bourgeoisie which depended on British imperialism took over from the British imperialists this concept of India as “the centre of Asia,” and this has led to Nehru’s idea of a great Indian empire.

After India’s proclamation of independence, the Indian ruling circles headed by Nehru inherited and have tried their best to preserve the bequests of the British colonialist rulers; they have become increasingly brazen in carrying out their chauvinistic and expansionist policy. India is the only country in Asia that has a protectorate. The Indian ruling circles have used every means to
interfere in the internal and external affairs of countries around India, to control their economy and trade and demand their absolute obedience. This is no secret. An article carried recently in the Nepalese weekly Naya Samaj says:

Nepal has always been friendly towards India, but India on the contrary has always looked with a threatening eye on the independence of Nepal. India does not favour Nepal's survival and progress as an independent nation. It has been India's wish that Nepal should surrender to India and agree to act in accordance with Indian directions and India is working towards this end.

It is not an isolated case, or towards Nepal alone, that the Nehru government adopts this chauvinistic and expansionist policy.

It is precisely from this expansionist viewpoint that the Indian ruling circles regard China's Tibet region as an Indian sphere of influence. In 1950, the fourth year after India's declaration of independence, the Nehru government interfered with the Chinese people's liberation of their own territory of Tibet; later they instigated and backed up the treason and rebellion of the reactionary clique of the upper social strata in the Tibet region. It was from this series of concrete facts that we began to understand Nehru's expansionist "philosophy."

Nehru's policy on the Sino-Indian boundary question and the whole process by which he engineered the Sino-Indian border clashes have shed new light on the expansionist philosophy of the Indian big bourgeoisie and big landlords.

It is a well-known fact that the Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited, but that there is a traditional customary line which was formed long ago in the course of history. While it ruled over India, British imperialism continuously nibbled away at China's Tibet region, and so boundary disputes were of constant occurrence.

After India's declaration of independence, the Indian ruling circles regarded as India's both those Chinese territories which the British imperialists had occupied and those which they had wanted to occupy but had not yet succeeded in occupying. Taking advantage of the fact that in the period soon after its founding New China had no time to attend to the Sino-Indian boundary and that China's security was seriously threatened by the U.S. imperialist war of aggression in Korea, the Indian ruling circles brazenly did what the British imperialists had not dared to do. They forcibly pushed India's northeastern boundary up to the vicinity of the so-called McMahon Line which China has never recognized, and occupied more than 90,000 square kilometres of China's territory. Following on this, they further crossed the so-called McMahon Line at several points.

Again and again, the Indian authorities arbitrarily and unilaterally altered their map of the Sino-Indian boundary to incorporate large areas of Chinese territory into India. On March 22, 1959, that is, the fourth day after the reactionary clique of the upper social strata of the Tibet region started its rebellion and attacked the People's Liberation Army units in Lhasa, Nehru hastily wrote to Premier Chou En-lai, making territorial claims on China based on the map arbitrarily altered by the Indian Government. He demanded that there should be incorporated into India not only the more than 90,000 square kilometres of Chinese territory in the eastern
sector and the about 2,000 square kilometres of Chinese territory in the middle sector, but also the over 33,000 square kilometres of Chinese territory in the western sector which had always been under Chinese jurisdiction. The total area so claimed is about the size of China’s Fukien Province, or four times as large as Belgium or three times as large as Holland.

Over the past three years and more, Nehru has insisted that China should accept these preposterous demands, and has persisted in the use of force continually to invade and occupy Chinese territory. Nehru’s expansionist “philosophy” boils down to this: “The places I have occupied are mine, and so are those I intend to occupy. Since I was able to occupy an inch of your territory yesterday, I certainly can occupy a yard of your territory today.” This is downright unreasonable, not to say utterly outrageous!

The Chinese Government has consistently held that since China and India suffered the common experience of being subjected to imperialist aggression, with India having gained her independence and New China founded, they ought to live together amicably and settle their differences through peaceful negotiation. After the Indian side provoked border clashes in 1959, the Chinese Government, on its own initiative, proposed that talks be held between the Prime Ministers of the two countries. In April 1960, Premier Chou En-lai visited New Delhi with the desire to settle the Sino-Indian boundary question, held talks with Indian Prime Minister Nehru and made earnest efforts to reach a preliminary agreement that would help settle the boundary question. However, there was no response from the Indian side to the sincere efforts of the Chinese side. The subsequent meeting of Chinese and Indian officials also failed to produce the results as it should.

The Chinese Government has always held that even if the two sides cannot for the time being achieve a meeting of minds on the boundary question, this should not lead to border clashes. As early as in 1959, it repeatedly proposed that the armed forces of each side withdraw 20 kilometres all along the border and stop border patrols so as to disengage the armed forces of the two sides and avoid clashes.

After the Indian side rejected these proposals, China unilaterally stopped patrols on its side of the border in the hope of helping to ease the border tension. The adoption of this measure by China led for a certain period to some relaxation in the situation along the Sino-Indian border. If the Indian side had agreed to the Chinese proposal about the withdrawal of 20 kilometres by each side, it would certainly have been possible to avert the military clashes between the armed forces of the two sides. Even when the Indian side did not agree to withdraw, these clashes would have been prevented if the Indian side had respected the situation of the unilateral Chinese cessation of patrols, instead of taking the opportunity to invade China.

Contrary to our expectations, the Nehru government, taking advantage of the unilateral cessation of patrols by the Chinese frontier guards, pressed forward steadily all along the Sino-Indian border, penetrated deep into China’s territory, built scores of aggressive strongpoints and continuously provoked armed clashes, first in the western and middle, then in the eastern, sectors. It is easy for everybody to see that China has tried by every means to disengage the armed forces of the two sides...
along the Sino-Indian border, while the Nehru government, bent on maintaining military contact, has again and again adamantly rejected China's reasonable proposals.

Disengagement of the armed forces of the two sides would not prejudice the stand of either side on the boundary question; it is a practical and most effective method of avoiding border clashes. In the process of settling their boundary questions, both China and Burma and China and Nepal, employed various ways to disengage the armed forces of the two sides and thus facilitated the peaceful and friendly settlement of the Sino-Burmese and Sino-Nepalese boundary questions. Why can't this method be applied to the Sino-Indian border as it was to the Sino-Burmese and Sino-Nepalese borders? For what reason has the Nehru government adamantly rejected the Chinese proposals and insisted on maintaining military contact? Does it not prove that the Nehru government is deliberately prolonging tension along the Sino-Indian border? Does it not prove that the Nehru government intends to provoke armed clashes at any time in order to attain its ulterior aims?

While pushing ahead with his policy of expansion into China, Nehru has continually used the boundary question to fan the anti-China campaign. A rough count shows that in the past three years Nehru has made more than 300 speeches on the Sino-Indian boundary question on various occasions. He used the most malicious language in attacking and vilifying China; he talked about Chinese "incursions into Indian territory," creation of "a clear case of aggression," "aggression being added to aggression," "expansion at the cost of India," "trying to flaunt her strength in a crude and violent way," "to keep a foot on our chest," and described China as being "imperialist," "expansionist" and "aggressive," and so on and so forth.

In addition to slandering China noisily on the boundary question, Nehru has mounted a series of attacks on China on much broader terms than the boundary question; he has also tried in the most despicable and sinister way to sow dissension between China and other countries.

Witness the following statements made by Nehru:

... a strong China is normally an expansionist China. Throughout history that has been the case. ... [China's] population problem itself, the vast population and the pace of growth greater than almost any in the wide world ... is likely to create a very novel and very dangerous situation not so much for India, but for India also. (November 27, 1959)

Even if we are a hundred per cent friendly with them, the fact remains that here is a mighty power sitting on our borders. That in itself changes the whole context, the whole picture. ... So, we face each other there and we face each other in anger at the present moment and we are going to face each other, not today or tomorrow but for hundreds and hundreds of years. (December 9, 1959)

Basically, the truth is that China has been expansionist whenever it is strong. But the present push also comes from rapid developments inside China, in military and industrial fields. (December 12, 1959)

A tremendous explosive situation is being created by the rapid growth, industrially, and in the population of China. (May 2, 1960)

China is at present affected by bad harvests, which is a terrible thing considering the growing population of China. ... The continuous failure of harvest has created an explosive situation. (May 2, 1962)
What was Nehru driving at in these utterances? The meaning is:

(1) China should not become a strong country, but should remain a poor and weak one, with an impoverished people beset with internal and external troubles, as it was under the rule of imperialism, feudalsim and bureaucrat-capitalism before liberation.

(2) China should not develop its industry rapidly but should continue to be a backward, agricultural China.

(3) China should not have the necessary military strength to consolidate its national defence, though it is faced with aggression and the threat of war by U.S. imperialism.

(4) China should not have so large a population, still less increase its population.

(5) When China develops its industry rapidly, this will create "an explosive situation"; when China is affected by bad harvests, this too will create "an explosive situation."

(6) China should not be India's neighbour but should change its geographical location.

In short, it seems to Nehru that, unless China ceases to exist or moves to some other place, China and India are bound to "face each other in anger... not today or tomorrow but for hundreds and hundreds of years."

We would like to ask: Whose spokesman is Nehru? Is he speaking for the Indian people? By no means. The Indian people, including the Indian workers, peasants, politically conscious intellectuals, oppressed national bourgeoisie elements and open-minded public men and women, that is, the overwhelming majority of Indians, wish to have as their neighbour a powerful, prosperous, industrialized and populous China, where the people are the masters of the country, just as the Chinese people wish to have as their neighbour a powerful, prosperous, industrialized and populous India, where the people are the masters of the country.

The Chinese people have achieved complete emancipation and have taken the great path of socialist construction. A socialist China is, and will always be, a peace-loving country. How is it possible that we, who have eliminated the social roots of exploitation and oppression of man by man at home, should go abroad to invade and plunder others?

Our industrialization is socialist industrialization, industrialization for the well-being of all the people; besides, we have inexhaustible resources and the world's biggest domestic market. How is it possible that our industrialization should initiate a "push" for expansion?

Our army is a people's army, an army dedicated to a just cause; it regards wars of aggression as crimes. Its purpose is to safeguard the interests of the people and consolidate the national defence. How is it possible that this army should invade other countries? And how is it possible that this army should invade our neighbour India?

China is indeed a country with a large population. But why should this constitute a menace to India? As a result of the victory of the people's revolution, China's social productive forces have been liberated completely, and so we can solve the so-called population problem and gradually raise the people's living standards by developing production on a large scale. Under the socialist system the problem of "overpopulation" simply does not exist. If there should be talk of a "population problem,"
then India is also one of the countries with the biggest population in the world. Moreover, while the density of the population of China is 67 per square kilometre, that of India is 148, more than double China’s. We would like to ask Mr. Nehru: According to your logic do you or do you not think that India’s huge population is also a menace to other countries?

It is true that historically China had been powerful and had invaded other countries, but that occurred under the rule of the feudal landlord class. China today is a people’s China, a socialist China; its social system is fundamentally different and its domestic and foreign policies are fundamentally different. A powerful and prosperous socialist China can only benefit peace and the fight against aggression, can only be of benefit to its neighbours and to friendship among nations. It will be a disadvantage only to the imperialists, who are aggressive by nature, and their lackeys. People throughout the world who love peace and uphold justice hold this view, and they believe that the more powerful and prosperous socialist China is, the better. Since Nehru so hates to see a powerful and prosperous socialist China, where does he stand? Has he not put himself in the very position of a lackey of the imperialists?

China has all along pursued a foreign policy of peace and stood for peaceful co-existence on the basis of the Five Principles with all countries having different social systems. China has signed treaties of friendship and mutual non-aggression or treaties of peace and friendship with the Yemen, Burma, Nepal, Afghanistan, Guinea, Cambodia, Indonesia and Ghana. Similarly, China has always wanted to live in friendship with India. But Nehru, on the contrary, holds that India cannot live in friendship with China. This runs diametrically counter to the wishes and interests of the Indian people.

China has had boundary questions left over from history with a number of its neighbours. For example, with Burma and Nepal too, China has very long boundaries which were not formally delimited in the past. But on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, in the spirit of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation, and through full consultations, boundary treaties have been signed between the Governments of China and Burma and between the Governments of China and Nepal, thus bringing about a reasonable and friendly settlement of the complicated questions left over from history. Why then should it be impossible to settle the Sino-Indian boundary question? If Nehru really wanted to settle the boundary question, it should not have been difficult to do so. And even if it were to remain unsolved for the time being, this should not prevent the two countries from maintaining the status quo of the boundary and living in peace with each other. And what need could there be to slander and attack China endlessly and even to cross swords with China?

Nehru has his ulterior motives for refusing to make it up on the Sino-Indian boundary question over a long period of time and continuously creating tension. To understand this, we must examine the class nature of the Indian big bourgeoisie and big landlords, represented by Nehru, whose interests are closely connected with those of the imperialists; we must examine the needs of the Indian reactionary ruling circles, represented by Nehru, in domestic and international politics; and we must broadly examine the background, both inside India and in regard to its international relations.
Everybody knows that before India attained independence, Indian society was colonial and feudal. The task facing the Indian people then was to carry out a national and democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism. The great Indian people waged a prolonged and heroic struggle for the complete overthrow of the colonial rule of British imperialism in India and for the genuine independence and liberation of their homeland. After World War II, the national-liberation movements carried on by the people of the Asian and African countries rose to unprecedented heights and the anti-British struggle of the Indian people forged ahead. The Chinese people have always had a deep sympathy and high respect for the national-liberation struggle of the Indian people.

The Indian bourgeoisie has a blood relationship with the British bourgeoisie and the Indian landlord class. But in its own class interests, it participated in the Indian people's anti-British movement in varying degrees at different stages. However, as determined by its economic position, it had from the very beginning a strong tendency towards compromise in the anti-British movement. In the national-independence struggle, the Indian bourgeoisie, on the one hand, carried on the non-co-operation movement against British colonial rule and, on the other hand, used the slogan of "non-violence" to paralyse the people's struggle and restrain their revolutionary movement.

In his Autobiography Nehru himself shows this characteristic of the Indian bourgeoisie. He writes that the Indian national movement "has been not a change of the social order, but political independence. . . . It is absurd to say that the leaders betray the masses because they do not try to upset the land system or the capitalist system. They never claimed to do so."

In the course of the Indian people's movement for national independence, the British colonialists reached a compromise with the big bourgeoisie and big landlords of India and turned over their rule to the latter on conditions which basically kept the economic interests of the British colonialists intact. Thus, the fruits gained by the Indian people in their anti-British struggle were seized by India's big bourgeoisie and big landlords.

After India proclaimed independence, Nehru, who once represented to a certain degree the interests of the Indian national bourgeoisie, gradually, as the class struggle developed at home and abroad, became a loyal representative of the interests of the big bourgeoisie and big landlords of India. The Nehru government has substituted reactionary nationalism for the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution, and tied up ever more closely with the imperialist and feudal forces. Of course, certain contradictions exist between the big bourgeoisie and big landlords of India and foreign monopoly capital; their interests are not in full conformity. Therefore, when the contradictions between imperialism and the Indian nation sharpened, the Nehru government, under the pressure of the masses of the people, showed a certain degree of difference from imperialism. But the class nature and economic status of the Indian big bourgeoisie and big landlords determine that the Nehru government depends on and serves imperialism more and more.

India did not gain economic independence after its proclamation of independence. Imperialism still retained its economic influence in India. Foreign capital still controlled many vital branches of the country's economy. According to statistics submitted to the Indian Prime Minister by the secretariat of the Indian Cabinet in 1951, foreign capital controlled 97 per cent of India's petroleum industry, 93 per cent of the rubber industry, 90 per cent of match manufacture, 89 per cent of the jute industry, 86 per cent of the tea-processing industry and 62 per cent of the coal-mining industry. Even in the cotton textile industry, which used to be called the national industry of India, 21 per cent was controlled by foreign capital. Although in the early days of independence, the Indian Government nationalized a few enterprises run by British capital by paying large sums in compensation, the fundamental interests of imperialism in India were not touched.

In recent years, foreign investments in India have increased rapidly. In June 1948, foreign investments in Indian enterprises (not counting bank investments) totalled 2,560 million rupees. This sum increased to 6,550 million rupees in 1960, that is, increased by more than 150 per cent within thirteen years. In 1948, foreign capital amounted to 34.8 per cent of the paid-up capital of Indian joint-stock companies. By 1960 this figure had increased to 38 per cent.

At the same time, the number of enterprises which are jointly owned by Indian monopoly capital and foreign capital but are actually under the control of the latter has also grown rapidly. According to a report in the Indian journal Economic Times of July 23, 1962, such jointly owned enterprises increased by 103 in 1958, 150 in 1959, 380 in 1960 and 403 in 1961. By March 1962, the total number of such jointly owned enterprises had reached 1,240. It is the amount of U.S. capital that has increased most rapidly. From 1948 to 1959, British investments in India doubled but U.S. investments increased seven times. From 1948 to 1960-61, the proportion of India's imports from Britain decreased from 22.8 to 19.8 per cent, while the U.S. share increased from 16 to 27 per cent (not including the grains imported from the United States), thereby surpassing Britain.

What is particularly noteworthy is the fact that the Nehru government has become increasingly dependent on foreign aid. Foreign aid accounted for 9.6 per cent of total expenditure under India's first "Five-Year Plan," and for 20.6 per cent under its second "Five-Year Plan"; it will account for 30 per cent under its third "Five-Year Plan." According to the October 1961 and April 1962 issues of the Foreign Aid of the U.S. International Cooperation Administration and other U.S. official material, the "aid" which the U.S. extended or promised to extend to India between 1949 and the end of July 1962 amounted to U.S. $4,754.2 million. If to this is added the "aid" extended to India during the same period by international financial organizations controlled by the United States, the grand total will reach U.S. $6,598.2 million.

The overwhelming proportion of the large amount of foreign aid received by the Nehru government consists of loans repayable with interest and the annual interest rates of these loans run as high as 6 per cent. As a result, India's foreign debt burden grows heavier and heavier, and it becomes more and more difficult for India to extricate itself from its economic dependence on foreign monopoly capital. The Indian weekly Link
wrote in its August 15, 1962 issue, "... instead of helping India to move ahead towards the goal of independent development, these foreign loans will for a long time remain a halter round the country's neck."

These facts prove that economically India has not freed itself from dependence on imperialism. What is different from the past is that U.S. imperialism is gradually taking over British imperialism's monopoly position in India.

The Nehru government has established a number of state-run enterprises in India which are nothing but state-capitalist enterprises dominated by the big bourgeoisie and big landlords and actually dependent on foreign monopoly capital. Such enterprises serve the interests of both the Indian big bourgeoisie and big landlords and of foreign monopoly capital. They are in essence Indian bureaucrat-monopoly capital. This bureaucrat-monopoly capital is developing. It develops at the expense of the Indian working people and even of the capitalist owners of small and medium-sized enterprises.

In 1960 Nehru openly called on the Indian people to "tighten their belts" in order to carry through his "industrial revolution." The living standards of the masses of the Indian working people have been deteriorating in recent years. Prices have been mounting continuously and taxes increasing. The number of unemployed has become ever greater, and the life of the peasantry has become increasingly hard.

India's basic domestic problem is the peasant problem.

When they ruled India, the British imperialists, to serve their predatory ends, supported the feudal landlord class. The broad masses of the peasants were subjected to all kinds of exploitation in the form of rent, taxes and usury, and agricultural production was at a very low level.

After India's proclamation of independence, what policies did the Nehru government adopt in regard to the feudal land system?

In the initial period of India's independence, the Nehru government, in order to meet the needs of the big bourgeoisie and big landlords to concentrate power in their own hands, abolished the political privileges of some of the local feudal princes and the zamindari (tax-farming) privileges of some landlords, but the Indian feudal land system as a whole was preserved. According to the national Sample Survey of 1954-55 published by the Indian Ministry of Finance in 1958, land distribution in India was as follows: Poor peasants and farm labourers, comprising 75 per cent of all agricultural households, owned 17 per cent of all cultivated land; lower middle peasants, comprising 12.5 per cent, owned 16.5 per cent of the land; the better-off middle peasants, rich peasants and landlords working their own farms, comprising 8.5 per cent, owned 32.5 per cent of the land; while the feudal landlords and the more wealthy rich peasants, comprising only 4 per cent, held as much as 34 per cent of the land. As a result of large-scale evictions by feudal landlords in recent years, the concentration of landholdings has become even greater, and the ranks of the poor peasants and farm labourers have grown.

According to a survey of agricultural labour published by the Indian Ministry of Labour, in 1951-52 the number of peasant households which were in debt was 44.5 per cent of the total number of peasant households, and in 1958-57 the figure increased to 64.5 per cent. An official
survey in 1960 showed that peasant indebtedness had grown to a total of 9,000 million rupees. Yojana, a biweekly published by the Indian Government, admitted in its October 1, 1961 issue that there had been no improvement in the status of the rural proletarians — the landless farm labourers; in fact, if there was any change, it was a change for the worse, as prices were all rocketing up.

In view of the economic conditions mentioned above, the prestige of Nehru’s Congress Party is steadily declining and dissatisfaction and opposition among the broad masses of the people are growing day by day. Big-scale strikes and struggles for land have flared up one after another. The victory won by the Indian Communist Party in Kerala in India’s second general election in 1957, the struggle against hunger in West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh in 1958, the struggle against taxation launched by the Punjabi peasants in 1959, the struggle for food waged by the one and a half million people of West Bengal in 1959, the great strike staged by 500,000 employees of the central government in 1960, the struggles against taxation which swept the whole country and the struggles for land in many places in 1961 and 1962 — all these are important indications of India’s ever-sharpening class contradictions and social contradictions and of the deepening of the political crisis facing the Nehru government in recent years.

Nehru constantly slanders Marxism as being “out of date,” and trumpets his philosophy of “tolerance,” “non-violence” and “peaceful means.” But the realities in India are a great mockery of Nehru’s philosophy. Nehru is indeed tolerant of imperialism and the feudal forces, but he is not “tolerant” of the people and the progressive forces, nor “non-violent” towards them. Since coming to power, Nehru has used violence to suppress the masses of the people and the progressive forces; he has become an old hand at opposing communism and the people.

According to Indian official statistics, in the three years from the date of India’s independence to August 1950, Indian troops and police opened fire on the masses on as many as 1,982 occasions, killing 3,784 people, wounding 10,000 and throwing 50,000 into jail. In the past few years, there has been an increasing number of incidents in which the Nehru government used violence against the masses. Nehru openly encouraged the reactionary forces in Kerala to use violence to overthrow the Communist-led government of Kerala in July 1959. His government has adopted large-scale measures of repression against the masses’ struggles for the right to live; in the struggle for food in West Bengal in August and September 1959 alone, 80 people were killed, 3,000 wounded and more than 20,000 arrested. Rajendra Prasad, the former President of India, at the Conference of Indian Governors of States held in Delhi on November 9, 1960, admitted that in the previous thirteen years, the number of incidents in which the police had opened fire surpassed the number under British rule.

The Nehru government has used extremely brutal measures of repression against many minority nationalities in India. Available information indicates that over many years Indian troops have killed tens of thousands of the Naga people in the northeastern part of India, and detained tens of thousands more in concentration camps. Even the Observer of London pointed out in a recent
article that the Indian Government was carrying out a policy of “genocide.”

Nehru wrote in his book Glimpses of World History in 1934 that “so long as capitalism can use the machinery of democratic institutions to hold power and keep down labour, democracy is allowed to flourish. When this is not possible, then capitalism discards democracy and adopts the open fascist method of violence and terror.” (Lindsay Drummond Ltd., London, 4th ed., 1949, p. 826.) At that time Nehru did not know that these words, after a number of years, would serve as an apt description of his own policy.

In view of the actual economic and political conditions in India, is not the building of a “socialist pattern of society” in India, as advertised by Nehru, an out-and-out hoax? Commenting on Nehru’s “socialism,” Harriman, spokesman for the U.S. monopoly groups, said on May 4, 1959:

I think it is a good thing that they [Nehru and his like] use this word [“socialism”]. It is a highly popular word among the Asian peoples, where capitalism has become closely identified — almost synonymous — with colonialism. The Indians [Nehru and his like] have taken it away from the Communists.

Harriman’s remarks serve to show what Nehru’s “socialist pattern of society” is really worth.

With any country, a given foreign policy is necessarily the continuation of a given domestic policy. Like its domestic policy, the foreign policy of the Nehru government reflects its reactionary class nature.

At one time some actions of the Nehru government were helpful to world peace. It refused to join imperialist military blocs, turned down the imperialists’ request to establish military bases in India and declared its adherence to the policy of “non-alignment.” It stood for peaceful co-existence with socialist countries and joined with China in initiating the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. The Nehru government played a positive role in sponsoring the first Asian-African Conference.

However, even in that period, Nehru seldom voiced opposition to the major acts of aggression by imperialism, especially U.S. imperialism, but constantly came out against the just struggles of the people of various countries, and against the socialist countries. On many important, key international questions, Nehru always stood on the side of imperialism, adopting in the main a policy of “criticizing in a small way and helping in a big way” towards imperialism. For instance, during the war of U.S. aggression in Korea, the Indian Government put forward a proposal in the United Nations in November 1952 supporting the forcible retention of prisoners of war by the United States. In the counter-revolutionary event in Hungary in 1956, Nehru maliciously slandered the Soviet Union and attacked the Hungarian Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Government.

When the U.S. and British imperialists sent troops to Lebanon and Jordan in 1958, Nehru openly spoke up for the U.S. and British aggressors, characterizing their act as “protecting their own interests.” Nehru said that “he was sorry” about the death of Faisal, the common enemy of the Iraqi people. In 1958, in his article “The Basic Approach,” Nehru vilified the Soviet Union for using “violence.” He distorted the criticism of Yugoslav modern revisionism by the Communists of various countries as “interference in the internal affairs of other
countries” and described the execution of the traitor Nagy by the Hungarian people as “contributing to world tensions.”

With the changes in India’s domestic situation and in the international situation in recent years, Nehru’s foreign policy has leaned more markedly towards imperialism. In addition to intensifying its suppression and exploitation of the people, the Nehru government has relied more and more on imperialism as a major means of coping with the economic and political difficulties and crisis in India. On the other hand, in order to counter the influence of socialism, particularly that of China’s socialist revolution and socialist construction, to obstruct the national-liberation movements, and to fight for control of the intermediate zone, U.S. imperialism now attaches greater importance to the part played by Nehru. As the general crisis of capitalism deepens daily, U.S. monopoly capital is trying all the harder to penetrate into India and turn it into an important market for the export of U.S. commodities and capital. As a result, the United States in recent years has made an obvious shift in policy towards the Nehru government, from opposition to its policy of “non-alignment” to vigorous aid to it; from refusal to supply machinery and technical knowledge to the Indian big bourgeoisie to co-operation with the Indian big bourgeoisie in joint exploitation of the Indian people. In a word, U.S. imperialism pursues a policy of paying a high price to buy over the Indian big bourgeoisie represented by Nehru.

An analysis of the figures of the “aid” granted to India by the United States and U.S.-controlled international financial organizations in the past ten years and more shows that their “aid” to India is a barometer of the foreign policy of the Nehru government, and particularly its policy towards China. Statistics show that in the period from 1949 to the end of the first half of 1956, their “aid” to India amounted to U.S. $789.1 million, averaging U.S. $105.2 million a year. In the period from the second half of 1956 to the end of the first half of 1959, when the foreign policy of the Nehru government gradually turned to the right, their “aid” to India was U.S. $1,936.7 million, averaging U.S. $645.5 million a year. And in the period from the second half of 1959 to the end of July 1962, that is, after the Nehru government had stirred up the anti-China campaign, their “aid” to India was U.S. $3,372.4 million, an annual average of U.S. $1,290.8 million.

It is precisely in these circumstances that over the past few years Nehru has practically thrown away the banner of opposition to imperialism and colonialism in international affairs, suited himself to the needs of U.S. imperialism, become a busy spokesman for U.S. imperialism, and even openly made Indian troops serve as an international policeman for U.S. imperialism in its suppression of national-liberation movements.

Nehru neither supported nor sympathized with the great struggle of the Japanese people against the U.S.-Japan military alliance treaty in 1960, saying “it is not for me to discuss the issue.”

After U.S. mercenaries invaded Cuba in April 1961, Nehru said that “India could not judge, nor was she in a position to judge, the international conditions of Cuba—who was right and who was wrong.”

In March 1961, when Mali, the United Arab Republic, Ceylon, Indonesia, Morocco, Burma, Guinea and other Asian and African countries announced one after another
the withdrawal of their troops from the Congo in protest against the use of the United Nations by imperialism for intervention in the Congo, the Nehru government, on the contrary, agreed to send a contingent of 3,000 Indian troops (afterwards increased to 6,000) as reinforcements for the “United Nations Forces” in the Congo to suppress the national-liberation struggle of the Congolese people and assist U.S. imperialism in its attempt to swallow up the Congo. The Nehru government is in a way responsible for the fact that, after the murder of the Congolese national hero Lumumba, his successor Gizenga was imprisoned.

In September 1961 at the conference of the heads of state of the non-aligned countries, Nehru, going contrary to the opinions of the heads of many countries, held that the question of opposing imperialism and colonialism should occupy “a secondary place”; he disagreed with the adoption of “brave declarations” condemning imperialism and colonialism, and thus helped in a big way the Western countries, especially U.S. imperialism.

On May 29, 1961, the U.S. News and World Report in an article entitled “A Close Look at the Man U.S. Is Betting On in Asia” said that “Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, is turning out to be a top favourite of the Kennedy administration among statesmen of the world.” But public opinion in Asia and Africa indicates that the role played by Nehru in international affairs has given him “a bad name.” Even the Ananda Bazar Patrika admitted in its September 14, 1962 editorial that the Indian Government is “in an isolated position in international relations” and that “India has almost no friend in Asia.” On September 22, 1962, the Indian weekly Blitz also said regretfully that among the Asian and African countries, “we Indians [read Nehru and his like] are becoming conservative, if not reactionary.”

Thus it can be seen that the policy of “non-alignment” publicized by Nehru has obviously become more and more a mere facade behind which he is actually carrying out a policy of opposing the national revolutionary movements of various countries, opposing socialism, and serving imperialism.

It is at a time when their entire home and foreign policy has become increasingly reactionary that the Indian ruling circles headed by Nehru have instigated the Sino-Indian boundary dispute, provoked China and finally launched large-scale armed attacks on China. They have done so because they persist in their expansionist policy and, by sabotaging Sino-Indian friendship and stirring up reactionary nationalist sentiment, attempt to divert the attention of the Indian people, intensify their exploitation and oppression of the people, and strike at the progressive forces. They have done so, too, because they seek to make use of the anti-China campaign to curry favour with U.S. imperialism and get more U.S. dollars. In a word, in the effort to satisfy their own needs and meet the demands of U.S. imperialism, the Indian ruling circles headed by Nehru have become pawns in the international anti-China campaign. This is the root cause and background of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute.

III

Marxism-Leninism points out that bourgeois nationalism under different conditions plays different historical roles. Marxism-Leninism has always drawn a distinc-
tion between the nationalism of the oppressed nations and the nationalism of the oppressor nations, between progressive nationalism and reactionary nationalism, and has taken different attitudes to nationalism in accordance with this distinction.

In modern times, the national bourgeoisie of the colonial and semi-colonial countries, because of their contradictions with imperialism and the feudal forces, can take part in the revolutionary anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle during certain historical periods and to a certain extent and therefore play a progressive role in history. As Lenin said: "Bourgeois nationalism . . . has an historical justification." During the period of the bourgeois national-democratic revolution in China, Dr. Sun Yatsen's policies of alliance with the Soviet Union, co-operation with the Communist Party and assistance to the workers and peasants provide an outstanding example of progressive nationalism.

On the other hand, however, the bourgeoisie of the colonial and semi-colonial countries, because of their class status, are inclined to compromise with imperialism and feudalism and are liable to waver in the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution. One section, the big bourgeoisie, whose interests are closely connected with those of imperialism and domestic feudalism, are the reactionaries among the bourgeoisie. Under certain circumstances, they may join in the national-independence movement, but, when the broad masses of the people have really stood up, when class struggle becomes acute, and when bribed by the imperialists, then they will betray the revolution, suppressing the people, the Communist Party and the progressive forces at home and selling out to imperialism and opposing the socialist countries abroad.

The Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries who have been overthrown by the Chinese people furnish a particularly glaring example of this.

Since the end of World War II, a number of newly independent countries led by bourgeois nationalists have emerged in Asia and Africa. Many nationalist states in Asia, Africa and Latin America have a common desire to oppose imperialism and colonialism and defend world peace, because they still suffer from aggression and intervention by imperialism and are victims of control and plunder by the new and old colonialists. They continue to struggle against imperialism and new and old colonialism, establish and develop relations of friendship and co-operation with the socialist countries, and thus make positive contributions to world peace.

The Chinese people and the peoples of the nationalist countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America have all suffered from brutal oppression and plunder by the imperialists. China is now still subjected to aggression by U.S. imperialism, and its territory of Taiwan is still under the occupation of U.S. imperialism. It is only natural that the Chinese people should cherish a profound sympathy and concern for the peoples of the nationalist countries.

The basis of China's policy towards the nationalist countries is this: Firstly, the primary common task of China and all nationalist countries is to oppose their common enemy, imperialism and colonialism, especially the U.S. imperialism. They must support one another in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism. China has consistently given active support to the struggles waged by the various nationalist states against imperialism and colonialism. Secondly, it is necessary and entirely pos-
sible to establish and develop, between China and these countries, relations of friendship and co-operation on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. It is necessary and fully possible to bring about, through friendly consultations, a reasonable settlement of all outstanding disputes among them in accordance with the Five Principles and the Bandung spirit.

Similarly, China stands firm in its desire to live forever in friendship with India. The relations of friendship between the Chinese and Indian peoples have a long history. There is no conflict of vital interests whatsoever between the peoples of our two countries. In 1954 the Chinese and Indian Governments jointly initiated the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, and Sino-Indian relations built on this basis were once good. The Chinese people, like the Indian people, cherish the memory of the years when the two countries were on friendly terms.

But even in the period when Sino-Indian relations were good, the Indian ruling circles headed by Nehru repeatedly interfered in China’s Tibet and harboured expansionist designs against it, thereby revealing their policy of reactionary nationalism. Then in 1959, when the rebellion of the reactionary clique of the upper social strata of the Tibetan region instigated by Nehru was defeated and Nehru’s expansionist dream about Tibet was shattered, and when he took a more reactionary line in all his home and foreign policies, Nehru immediately turned against his friend, switching from professions of friendship for China to frantic hostility to China.

Nehru believes that his fickle and erratic behaviour is in keeping with his “philosophy of life.” In his book The Discovery of India Nehru said, “Life is too complicated... for it to be confined within the four corners of a fixed doctrine.” (Meridian Books Ltd., London, 3rd ed., 1951, p. 16.) He also said, “It is never easy to reconcile a strict adherence to truth as one sees it, with exigencies and expediencies of life, and especially of political life.” (Ibid., p. 421.) He held that to take expediencies as a criterion of action was “the universal rule” in politics.

In a word, his expressions of friendship for you at a certain time conform to his philosophy; his ambition to face you in anger “for hundreds and hundreds of years” conforms to his philosophy; and his intention to get rid of you also conforms to his philosophy. This is the sort of “philosophy” Nehru has used in guiding his reactionary policy. Both his reactionary policy and erratic behaviour serve the interests of the big bourgeoisie and big landlords of India and in Nehru’s own words, are to bring “rich dividends” to them.

What stand should the Marxist-Leninists take on this policy of reactionary nationalism followed by Nehru?

Here a review of an episode in Chinese history of more than thirty years ago may be useful.

The Chinese people still remember that when the Soviet Union was the only socialist state in the world it was provoked and attacked by China’s reactionary big bourgeoisie and big landlords represented by Chiang Kai-shek. At that time, despite the fact that the Soviet Government had given vigorous support to the Kuomintang of China, the Kuomintang reactionaries headed by Chiang Kai-shek, immediately after their betrayal of the revolution and their surrender to imperialism, whipped up a frantic anti-Soviet campaign simultaneously with their unbridled anti-Communist, anti-popular moves. In December 1927, the Kuomintang reactionaries forcibly and outrageously closed
down Soviet consulates in various cities of China, arrested and killed Soviet diplomatic officials and broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. A year and more afterwards, in July 1929, the Kuomintang reactionaries, in violation of the Sino-Soviet Agreements of 1924, manufactured the “Chinese Eastern Railway Incident” and arrested more than 300 Soviet nationals.

Although the Soviet Union repeatedly showed forbearance and proposed the holding of a meeting to settle the Chinese Eastern Railway question peacefully, Chiang Kai-shek took the self-restraint of the Soviet Union to mean that “the Soviet Union meekly submits, not daring to make the slightest resistance.” In October of that year the army of the Kuomintang reactionaries attacked the Soviet border, stirring up an armed conflict between China and the Soviet Union. Thus, the Soviet Union was compelled to act in self-defence and defeated this military provocation of the Kuomintang reactionaries.

Did the socialist Soviet Union do the right thing at the time? History has long since rendered its verdict: It was the perfectly right thing to do. The Soviet Union’s resolute counter-blow to the military provocation of the Kuomintang reactionaries not only defended the interests of the socialist state but also accorded with the interests of the Chinese people and of the revolutionary people of the world.

Sino-Indian relations today bear certain similarities to Sino-Soviet relations of more than thirty years ago.

The principles of China’s foreign policy and of its policy towards India have been consistent. Despite incessant provocation by the Nehru government, China has still maintained an attitude of maximum restraint. It was only when the Nehru government had recently launched large-scale attacks that China was compelled to hit back in self-defence to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity and to repulse the attacks of the Indian reactionaries. It is fully necessary and perfectly just for China to do so, and it is the least a sovereign state should do. It is precisely for this reason that China has won the sympathy and support of the people of the world who cherish peace and uphold justice.

After the Nehru government started the Sino-Indian boundary dispute, the Yugoslav modern revisionists, renegades to Marxism-Leninism and lackeys of the imperialists, in utter disregard of the truth about the Sino-Indian boundary question, openly shielded and supported the outrageous anti-China policy of the Nehru government. On the Sino-Indian boundary question, Tito and his ilk have always hurled shameless slanders against China and become an echo of the imperialists and the Indian reactionaries. Moreover, Tito said that the Soviet Union should play a “pacifying” role in relation to China on the Sino-Indian boundary question. Does the Tito clique think that when a socialist country is invaded by the bourgeois reactionaries of a foreign country, another socialist country should stand by the bourgeois reactionaries and play a “pacifying” role in relation to the invaded socialist country? By this fallacy the Tito clique has further exposed itself as a group of renegades betraying socialism, hating socialist China and sowing dissension among the socialist countries.

Marxism-Leninism always points to the fact that bourgeois nationalism and proletarian internationalism are two different world outlooks which represent two different classes and are fundamentally antagonistic to each other. While supporting progressive bourgeois national-
ism, Communists must draw a clear-cut line between themselves and bourgeois nationalism and must combat reactionary bourgeois nationalism.

More than thirty years ago, when the Kuomintang reactionaries launched that anti-Soviet campaign, the Chinese Communists were not caught in the toils of the reactionary nationalism of the big bourgeoisie. The Chinese Communists and progressives strongly protested against the anti-Soviet crime of the Kuomintang government. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a declaration on December 24, 1927, in which it solemnly stated:

The reactionary Kuomintang government absolutely does not represent revolutionary China and its orders to sever diplomatic relations with Russia absolutely do not represent the public opinion of the great majority of the Chinese people. The reactionary Kuomintang government regards the Soviet Union as an enemy, but we, the masses of the people, continue to regard the Soviet Union as a good friend of China and will always unite with it in fighting for the Chinese revolution and the world revolution.

Soong Ching Ling, leader of the reactionaries in the Kuomintang, also sent a cable to the Kuomintang authorities at that time denouncing them as “criminals ruining the party and the nation.” In July 1929, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued another declaration, resolutely calling on “the broad masses to rise against the war on the Soviet Union.” In response to this call, the Chinese Communists and the broad masses of the people, despite ruthless repression and persecution by the Kuomintang reactionaries, courageously held mass meetings and demonstrations in resolute opposition to the anti-Soviet military provocation of the reactionary Kuomintang clique. For this, many Communists, workers, peasants, students and progressives laid down their lives with glory. Did the Chinese Communist Party do the right thing in resolutely opposing the Kuomintang reactionaries and supporting the socialist Soviet Union? Undoubtedly, it was perfectly right. It was none other than the Chinese Communists who thoroughly exposed the false propaganda of narrow nationalism fanned up by the Kuomintang reactionaries in their anti-Soviet campaign. It was none other than the Chinese Communists who upheld the truth and resolutely safeguarded the friendship between the Chinese and Soviet peoples under extremely difficult conditions. Even today we feel proud that under those adverse conditions the Chinese Communists by their deeds during that incident proved themselves genuinely loyal to the interests of the Chinese people and to the principle of proletarian internationalism.

Today, the Communists and progressives of India are in a situation somewhat similar to that of the Chinese Communists and progressives more than thirty years ago. As a result of the reactionary policy of the Nehru government, the Indian Communist Party and progressive forces are subjected to persecution. Each time the Nehru government stirs up an anti-China campaign, he simultaneously mounts an attack on the Indian Communist Party and progressive forces. But large numbers of Indian Communists and progressives, large numbers of politically conscious workers, peasants, intellectuals and fair-minded people have not been deceived by the reactionary propaganda of the Indian ruling circles, nor have they knuckled under to their attacks. In the interests of the Indian people, they have, under extremely difficult conditions, stood firm for truth, justice and Sino-Indian
friendship and waged unflinching struggles. History will prove that it is they who really represent the interests of the great Indian nation and people.

No matter how clamorous the anti-China hullabaloo stirred up by the Indian reactionary clique and its supporters both at home and abroad may sound for a time, the just voice of the Indian people cannot be drowned. Here we should like to give an example and refer our readers to a letter to the editor, published in the Calcutta paper Jugantar on May 16, 1962. This ordinary Indian wrote:

... If China has become an aggressor by occupying 12,000 square miles according to the Indian map, India also has become a greater aggressor by occupying 38,000 square miles according to the Chinese map. It would not be justified to hope that the other party would throw his map into the waste-paper basket and draw his boundary exactly according to our map...

The most unfortunate aspect of the India-China boundary problem is that this has today become a weapon to fulfill political objects, not only delaying its solution, but possibly also leading the internal politics of the country onto an evil path by maintaining the problem. As a result of the second general elections [1957] there was an increase in strength of the left-wing forces and an Indian state went to the Communists. Since then we have been experiencing a gradually increasing trend of the Government towards the right. A considerable time before the appearance of the boundary problem Nehru called China undemocratic because China had solved its unemployment problem and made comparatively rapid progress. Later, warm praise of land reform in China by the Malaviya Commission sent by the Government naturally alarmed the domestic feudal elements. Finally when the industrial goods of China became a hindrance to the Indian industrialists in reaping high profits on the east and west markets, it was almost to be presumed that relations would be aggravated on any pretext.

After that the boundary problem came along as a boon. It was not only that an opportunity was found to distort everything concerning China, but an easy path was opened for censuring the gradually increasing progressive movements in the country. Within a very short period the boundary problem was first turned into border penetration and afterwards border aggression. Since then we have been experiencing its application everywhere—in the interim elections of Kerala, in food movements of West Bengal, in the strikes of government employees, and finally in the third general elections [1962]. Probably many people still remember that during the food movement the walls of Calcutta were covered with posters “Don’t make any movement, China is deploying her forces on the border with a view to conducting aggression!”. This propagated Chinese aggression is one of the main reasons of the rise of the utter rightist force today in central and northern India after the third general elections...

The issue becomes most clear when we study the newer reports of Chinese penetration. Nowadays, in most cases, these new posts are either not found afterwards, or even if they are detected, it is found afterwards that they were a few yards within Chinese territory [Nehru’s speech in Rajya Sabha about Chinese “aggression” just on the eve of the election]. Or, it is found that the report is published in bold type on the first day and after two days it is published in small type that the report is “officially unconfirmed.”

If China were expansionist how could she settle her boundary disputes with Nepal and Burma? Now it is prohibited even to raise these questions. It is being openly announced from all sides that not to call China an aggressor is treachery to the country. ... But what are we, the ordinary Indian people, getting from this? Probably we shall get a little more U.S. aid from the budget to secure “democracy” in the East. But what next? What will be our answer to history? Peoples of newly awakened Asia and Africa from the Yangtse to the Nile-Congo have been advancing today at
tremendous speed. Shall we be able to participate in the procession of peace and friendship by drowning this bitter cry from the past in the current of new life?

This Indian reader is but one among the millions of Indian people. How clearly he sees through Nehru’s trick of deliberately using the boundary question to whip up the anti-China campaign! Furthermore, how ardent is his hope that the Indian people will remain friends with and march alongside the other peoples of Asia and Africa!

It is quite clear that the Indian people are clear-sighted. No deceit on Nehru’s part can fool the broad masses of the Indian people.

But it is surprising that in India some self-styled Marxist-Leninists, such as S.A. Dange, trail closely behind Nehru and falsely accuse China of “encroachment” on Indian territory, alleging that “China has committed a breach of faith,” that one must “support the Indian Government,” etc. How far these so-called “Marxist-Leninists” have lagged behind the ordinary Indian people in their understanding! How far have they departed from the interests of the Indian people, from the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and from proletarian internationalism!

The Chinese people are by no means opposed to India, nor are the Indian people opposed to China. It is the common wish and in the common interests of the people of China and India that they should respect each other, live together in friendship, and unite and co-operate with each other. As to how India should solve its economic and political problems, that is entirely the Indian people’s own affair, and China has never interfered.

In this article while we touch upon certain aspects of the Indian situation in order to elucidate the truth, we are not in any way gloating over the difficulties facing the Indian people. On the contrary, we note with profound concern that since the Nehru government has ignored the sufferings of the Indian people and has aggravated the tension on the Sino-Indian border and extended the armed clashes, the Indian people will have to shoulder heavy military burdens in addition to the exorbitant taxes which are weighing down on them. Indian soldiers are being used as pawns by the selfish ruling circles; they are making meaningless sacrifices in the border clashes, while India’s big capitalists and big landlords are taking the opportunity to feather their own nests. The Chinese people have the greatest sympathy for the broad masses of India’s working people who are facing such sufferings. The Chinese people sincerely hope that the Indian people will free themselves from this lot, that India will soon become prosperous and strong, and that the Indian people will be able to lead a happy life. We hope to see a progressive, democratic and strong India on the continent of Asia.

We are firmly convinced that all complicated questions between China and India left over from history can be settled, provided friendly negotiations are conducted in accordance with the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. Like the Sino-Burmese and Sino-Nepalese boundary questions, the Sino-Indian boundary question can be settled in a friendly way through peaceful negotiations. The Chinese people have never wavered in this conviction. We are willing to do everything possible and, together with the Indian people and all countries and people concerned with Asian peace and Afro-Asian solidarity, continue to work for the cessation of the border clashes, for the reopening of peaceful negotiations and for the settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question. The Nehru
government should make corresponding efforts on its part if it still has some respect for India's national interests and for the aspirations of the Indian people, and if it does not want to bruise its head against a stone wall in further expanding the border clashes to the advantage of the imperialists.

To safeguard and strengthen the friendship between the Chinese and Indian peoples not only accords with the common interests of the 1,100 million people of the two countries but also conforms to the common wish of the peace-loving people in Asia and throughout the world. No force can undermine or shake this great friendship. Nor can the clashes provoked by the Indian reactionary circles on the Sino-Indian border in any way undermine or shake the true friendship between the people of China and India. It can be said that those people, whether inside or outside India, who whipped up anti-China campaigns in an attempt to sabotage Sino-Indian friendship, can never gain anything from it; they will only expose their reactionary features and meet with utter defeat.

May the Himalaya and Karakoram Mountains bear witness to the great friendship between the peoples of China and India. Sino-Indian friendship which dates back to the immemorial past, though beclouded for the time being, will tower for ever like the Himalaya and the Karakoram.
中印边界问题
（增訂本）

外交部出版社出版（北京）
1962年11月第一版 1967年11月第二版（增訂）

THE BELLMAN BOOKSHOP,
155. FORTRESS ROAD,
TUFNELL PARK,
LONDON, N.W.5.