Let the Red Flag of Naxalbari
Fly Still Higher

by “RENMIN RIBAO” COMMENTATOR

THE revolutionary peasant forces in Naxalbari* and elsewhere in the Darjeeling District have won their first-round victory in the struggle against the “encirclement and suppression” campaigns launched by the reactionary Indian troops and police. The Indian reactionaries’ initial repressive actions have failed.

Since July 6, the “non-Congress” government in West Bengal has sent large numbers of troops and police to attack the revolutionary peasants in Naxalbari, but they have found no way of putting down the peasant armed forces, nor have they been able to control the area.

Bravely and skilfully, the peasant armed forces led by revolutionaries in the Indian Communist Party have launched guerrilla activities in this area. They are able to take the initiative and attack; they also can instantly move away when confronted by an enemy with superior forces. On July 13, the armed peasants attacked the reactionary troops and police near the police camp in the Kharihari area. Six days later, they opened fire on the police near Tukuria forest, and then easily left the area. A July 23 report in the United News of India confessed that the peasant armed forces in the Naxalbari area “can move from place to place within the belt evading police action,” adding that the Indian reactionaries could not understand this state of affairs and “has got no answer.”

In fact, the answer is very clear. It is that the peasant revolutionary armed forces in Naxalbari have won the support of the peasant masses. In contrast, the reactionaries are extremely isolated from the masses. Provided that the peasants are fully mobilized, the revolutionary armed forces will be entirely able to smash any “encirclement and suppression” by reactionary troops and police and thus carry on their struggle.

Establishment and expansion of the peasant armed forces is a primary condition for persisting in revolutionary peasant struggle. Speaking of the peasants’ forces armed with spears in his masterly work Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan, our great leader Chairman Mao says, “This multitude equipped with spears... is a new-born armed power the mere sight of which makes the local tyrants and evil gentry tremble. The revolutionary authorities in Hunan should see to it... that every peasant, whether young or in his prime, possesses a spear...” The peasant armed forces in the Naxalbari area today are equipped with bows and arrows, long spears and other locally made weapons. If this “power of bows and arrows, and long spears” is built up on a more extensive scale, it will be able to make the landlord forces and the reactionary troops and police in the rural areas shiver at its sight. The armed peasants not only can safeguard their own survival, but they can also equip themselves with weapons captured from the enemy.

To continuously defeat the enemy’s “mopping-up” operations and “encirclement and suppression” campaigns and to win military victories, the peasant armed forces, while still in a position of weakness, must adhere to mobile and flexible guerrilla tactics. So long as these revolutionary forces are good at employing the tactics of “the enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue” (known as the 16-character formula), they will be able to gather strength and exhaust the enemy’s effective. This is an effective method for persevering in armed struggle over a long period and for defeating the enemy and winning victory.

To gain a firm footing and to stick to long-term armed struggle, the revolutionary peasant armed forces must set up and expand their base areas in the countryside. This is an important task for the present Indian peasant revolution.

In their struggle against the reactionary troops and police, the armed peasant forces in Naxalbari have withstood the first rigorous test. This shows that the revolutionary forces in the countryside have ample

* Naxalbari is located in the strategic mountainous district of Darjeeling in West Bengal of India.

August 11, 1967
space to manoeuvre in and are quite capable of growing and expanding from small to big in the course of struggle.

The Chinese revolution from the very beginning was tested in battle by repeated "encirclement and suppression" and "counter-encirclement and suppression" campaigns. It was only through a protracted struggle that a powerful people's army and vast rural base areas were established and final victory was won. The Indian revolution will naturally be the same. The peasant's revolutionary struggle in Naxalbari will be long and arduous. It still has to carry out intense struggles to smash one enemy "encirclement and suppression" campaign after another. It will meet with all kinds of difficulties and setbacks. However, so long as the revolutionary peasant armed forces in Naxalbari persevere in following the road of China's revolution and hold high the red banner of armed struggle, they will certainly push the Indian revolution towards victory step by step.

(August 7.)

**Historical Lessons of Telengana Uprising**

by “RENMIN RIBAO” COMMENTATOR

The torch of armed revolution once lit by the peasants of Telengana and later quenched by the revisionists in the Indian Communist Party has been rekindled today by the peasants of Naxalbari in Darjeeling under the leadership of the revolutionaries in the Indian C.P. That red torch lights the road to victory for the Indian revolution; it points the way the Indian revolution has to take.

No sooner had the storm of revolution arisen among the Naxalbari peasants than the renegade S.A. Dange group, E.M.S. Namboodiripad and other revisionists shamelessly rushed forward to attack and vilify the revolutionary peasants' great undertaking. The revolutionaries in the Indian Communist Party, on the other hand, are leading the peasants resolutely to take the road of armed struggle. This is the continuation of the protracted struggle between the two lines in the Indian Communist Party.

Since the end of World War II, there has been a constant, sharp and complicated struggle in the Indian Communist Party between these two diametrically opposed lines. On the one side is the revolutionary line of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought. That is, the line of following the road along which the Chinese revolution advanced to victory, the road of boldly arousing the peasants to revolution, building a people's army, establishing rural revolutionary base areas, waging a protracted armed struggle, encircling the cities from the countryside and eventually winning nationwide victory. The other is the revisionist line pursued by Dange, Namboodiripad and their like. They preach the theory of India being an "exception" and maintain that the parliamentary road of "peaceful transition" should be followed. They oppose violent revolution and want the revolutionary people who have taken up arms to lay them down and abandon their struggle. This is an out-and-out capitulationist line, a counter-revolutionary line.

The history of the Indian revolution proves that wherever the revolutionary line of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought, is dominant, a lively revolutionary situation will emerge. On the other hand, wherever a revisionist line gains the upper hand, the revolutionary people will be betrayed and the revolutionary cause will suffer a setback.

The peasants' armed struggle in Telengana from 1946 to 1951 was the result of the triumph of the revolutionary line of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought. At that time, the revolutionaries in the Indian Communist Party, closely relying on the peasants, succeeded in establishing a base area for armed struggle in Telengana. Peasant armed struggles also broke out in Kerala, West Bengal and many other states. However, this excellent situation for the Indian revolution was undermined and finally put an end to by the revisionist line enforced by Dange and his followers. By shamelessly calling for "a negotiated settlement of the Telengana issue," they forced the revolutionary peasants to lay down their arms, and so strangled this vigorous revolutionary movement.

The failure of China's great revolution in 1925-27 resulted from betrayal by opportunism and revisionism represented by Chen Tu-hsiu. Our great leader Chairman Mao has pointed out that as a result of Chen Tuhsiu's opportunist capitulationist line "in 1927, within the space of a few months, the people lost all the rights they had won." In similar fashion, India's Chen Tu-hsiu pursued a policy of capitulation and betrayal at this critical juncture in the Indian people's revolution, and in a short space of time threw to the four winds the gains won by the Indian people in their revolutionary struggle. This is a painful historical lesson for the Indian people.

Peking Review, No. 33