

The Indian Revolution and Ghandi's Manoeuvre

By O. W. Kuusinen.

The great revolutionary upsurge in India is proceeding at a tempestuous pace. And in this situation Ghandi comes forward in order, in the name of the slavish principle of "non-violence", to summon the people to boycott the salt monopoly of the British-Indian government. It is not difficult to see the meaning of this manoeuvre.

Ghandi does not put the question of a **victory** in the fight against the British yoke. He puts the question otherwise: violence or non-violence to British imperialism. He preaches absolute "non-violence". He describes all Indian **revolutionary** organisations as "parties of violence", and openly writes in his newspaper that he fears these more than the English Viceroy! What is the meaning of that?

Hundreds of millions of Indians are still groaning under the terrible yoke of the real party of violence, of British imperialism, but Ghandi does not fear these predatory, bestial suppressors of India as much as he fears the Indian revolutionaries.

What does he therefore do? He undertakes a national-reformist **manoeuvre**. He submits an ultimatum to the Viceroy. He organises an anti-imperialist sham fight "involving a mad risk", as he himself declaims. For what purpose? In order not to lose all influence over the great national mass movement; in order to secure hegemony in this movement for the **bourgeoisie**. Without an anti-imperialist sham fight it is impossible at present for anybody in India to approach the broad masses of the people if he wants to obtain a hearing. Hence Ghandi's flag of passive resistance. But even this passive (at any price "non-violent") resistance he wishes to limit in a double manner: 1. to limit it territorially in order that the movement shall not be able to spread, and 2. to limit the boycott to the salt monopoly of the government in order to exclude the risk of the boycott extending to all taxes, to the ground rent payable by peasants etc., and growing into revolutionary fighting.

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The "insane risk" consists in Ghandi's playing with the driving forces of the revolution. He wishes to do everything possible to avoid the risk of revolution. The revolutionary mass movement of the workers and peasants of India is to be split and scattered both territorially and in regard to its slogans. It is to be diverted into suitable side-channels, and in any case held up half-way. Instead of rallying and organising the many millions of toilers, who are in a ferment, in a firm revolutionary front, and instead of taking up the real fight with these huge masses against imperialist violence, the development of the revolutionary mass struggles is to be actually stifled and quenched in an impotent cry of pain of the million masses.

That is the objective meaning of the boycott campaign introduced by Ghandi, against the salt monopoly. The Ghandiist boycott is, at bottom, **boycott of the Indian revolution**, and is thereby calculated to help the triumph of the British colonial power in India.

Against this Ghandiist line of the Indian bourgeoisie the young **Communist Party of India** lays down its own line. For the C. P. of India the deciding question in the anti-imperialist fight is: victory or defeat? It is as clear as daylight that in the event of a collision between imperialist violence and colonial "non-violence", the latter can have no hope of victory. India can emancipate itself only by **revolution**. Therefore, the fundamental slogan of the Communist Party of India, for which it is conducting agitation among the masses, is: **Drive out the British imperialists by the democratic revolution of the working class and peasantry of India!**

What is now the immediate, urgent and unpostponeable main task of the revolutionary workers' and peasants' movement of India?

In the fight against the British colonial regime the victorious strength of the Indian revolutionary movement can lie only in its enormously great masses. It can achieve victory by the overwhelming mass power, not by boycott, not by passive resistance, nor by empty noise. The enormous mass power of the Indian workers and peasants is, at present, very little organised. Therin lies its greatest and most dangerous weakness. Hence the immediate practical task is to **organise the mass forces of the workers' and peasants of India for the approaching gigantic revolutionary fights.**

This is not by any means a task of mere organisational petty work. This is now an extremely important political task in India. All mass actions, all great collisions which are taking place there at present, must be made use of in order with the greatest energy to extend and strengthen the revolutionary mass organisations in town and country, before all the **class trade unions** and the organisations of the revolutionary youth, at the same time increasing the recruitment of active workers for the Communist Party. Just as the Bombay textile workers, during their strike, accomplished wonders in the way of organising the masses by building up the "Girni Kamgar" Union, so it is necessary to perform similar and even greater things in other places and in other spheres. It is necessary to organise revolutionary workers' demonstrations with independent class slogans. Workers must be sent into the villages in order to help the peasant masses to take up the fight for the refusal to pay taxes and ground rent, everywhere to form peasant committees and to develop mass education for driving out the landowners and government officials. The striking railway workers must visit all the railway lines, conveying the summons to prepare for the political general strike.

Whoever really desires victory in the fight for the independence of India must now help with all means the proletariat and the masses of the Indian peasantry to organise their revolutionary forces and their mass actions. Whoever sabotages this organisation exposes himself, like Ghandi, as a strategist of the counter-revolution. Ghandi has himself admitted in his "ultimatum" that he could not wait any longer because the revolutionary upsurge in India is growing so threateningly. He fears the revolution — hence his campaign, and behind him stands the **All-India National Congress**, the representative body of the national bourgeoisie. The strategy of the National Congress is, at bottom, nothing else but the counter-revolutionary strategy of Ghandi, whoever may come forward as advocate of this strategy, whether he be Ghandi

or Javarharlal Nehru or anybody else. The attitude of the Indian Communists to them can only be: **determined fight against the National Congress.**

This does not exclude but presupposes the utilisation of even the sham fights of the Indian bourgeoisie, the utilisation of its narrowly restricted conflict with British imperialism by the Communist Party for the purpose of mobilising the broad toiling sections of the population, and further developing the revolutionary mass movement. But the more the national bourgeoisie attempts to develop its campaign with seemingly "general-national" slogans, the more ruthlessly must the Communists expose the counter-revolutionary class character of the campaigns and slogans of the national bourgeoisie. Only by maintaining complete political independence and a sharp revolutionary class line can the Communist Party successfully lead the Indian proletariat on the way to securing its hegemony in the national emancipation movement, and thereby also secure the victory of the revolution.

The government of Great Britain—the Labour Government as the representative of the imperialist bourgeoisie—is proceeding to arrange, through its authorities in India, the vilest provocations and bloodiest mass slaughters. The English Communists must in good time make the broad working masses of Great Britain aware of the criminal plans and summon them to determined courageous support of the Indian revolution.

POLITICS

The United States at the London Naval Conference.

By P. Lapinsky (Moscow).

The majority of the London newspapers are endeavouring to make France responsible for a possible breakdown of the London Naval Conference. But the "blackmailing policy" and the "sabotage" of the French imperialists could only for a time conceal the quarrel between the most important actors in the tragi-comedy of London, the quarrel between Great Britain and the United States.

When Mr. Stimson, the United States Foreign Minister, hastened to publish his Programme Memorandum, it was only at the first moment that it evoked a favourable response from the British side.

Stimson proposed complete parity in aircraft-carriers and destroyers, and only in regard to submarines confined himself to a more vague expression of the desire to fix a "lowest possible standard of tonnage". In return for this the United States make a certain concession in the question of large cruisers. The question left unsolved at the negotiations which took place between MacDonald and Hoover and Dawes, whether the United States should possess 21 or 18 large cruisers, has been decided by Stimson in favour of Great Britain: The United States demands for itself only 18 large cruisers as against 15 British. All this appeared at first sight to be acceptable "in principle".

But suddenly there was revealed the real differences of opinion. The Memorandum, extracts only from which were handed over for publication, was set against the original Memorandum. It was ascertained that the actual concrete demands of the U. S. A. imperialists were not at all included in the published Memorandum.

Since the abortive Three-Power Naval Conference at Geneva in 1927, the questions of cruisers and the calibre of their guns has been regarded as the most important question in dispute between Great Britain and the United States. As is known, the principle of "parity" in regard to capital ship fleets was already laid down at the Washington Conference in 1921 and 1922. The question of cruisers, however, which led to the failure of the Geneva Conference, was in the main solved in the preliminary conversations which MacDonald had with Hoover and Dawes, and still more concretely in the Stimson Memorandum at the London Conference. It appeared, therefore, as if everything were going smoothly. Then, however, there arose in an unexpected manner the dispute in the question of capital ship fleets!