

PROBLEMS AND CRISES OF INDIAN REVOLUTION

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A lesson of the history of the international communist movement is that the genuine communist movement has to advance by waging struggle against the two kinds of deviation, the "Right" and the "Left". From the history of the international communist movement it is again found that after the "Right" errors are corrected, the "Left" errors are liable to crop up. Whenever an individual or the Party advances from one success to another there is the danger of "Left" deviation. This is because arrogance may develop in the wake of enthusiasm caused by success. On the other hand, in times of failure, there may be a trend towards pessimism and depression.

During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China, it has been found that even when the struggle against "Right"

deviation continues, some persons raise "ultra-Left" slogans with an ostentatious play of words, try to create disunity of the proletariat with classes which are its allies and thus try to lead the entire struggle astray.

From the history of the international communist movement it is found that in general the centre from which these two deviations originate lies within the Party leadership. From the history of our Party also we know that our experience is no exception to this.

So Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung thought teaches us that the members of the Communist Party should remain ever vigilant and alert in this regard. All the ordinary members of the Party must use their brains and must always exercise careful supervision over the leadership. In the question of leadership, Chairman Mao's teaching is that the leadership must always be modest ; the higher the post, the greater the modesty required of an incumbent. In case of leadership it is a question of principle whether one is modest or arrogant ; because to err is human.

Right from the aggression of China by India in 1962 when the Party at the manoeuvring of the leadership deviated from proletarian internationalism, many an ordinary member in our Party started becoming conscious of the danger of revisionism.

This generated a feeling amongst many of us that we must start armed struggle. After March 1967 when the historic peasant struggle burst forth in Naxalbari, this awareness within the ordinary Party members as well as the struggle against revisionism were raised to a new level. Throughout the country the communist revolutionaries severed connections with revisionists and neo-revisionists and began asserting themselves. On the one hand, they went to the villages and devoted themselves to the task of rousing the peasants ; on the other hand, for the reorganisation of a genuine Communist Party they took initiative in establishing contacts and holding discussions with one another. Through this process was formed the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist).

However, in different States of the country a number of communist revolutionaries continued to maintain their independent group existence and to make efforts to build up armed struggle. The Party declared that the ideological differences with them will be non-antagonistic in character.

As soon as the Naxalbari peasant upsurge took place it was greeted and blessed by Mao Tsetung, the leader of the international communist movement, and the great Communist Party of China.

Immediately after its formation, the CPI(M-L) earned recognition of the international leadership. For natural and justifiable reasons, the communist revolutionaries of Darjeeling district earned respect of the communist revolutionaries throughout the country for these successes. Naturally in all these successful developments the leading role of Comrade Charu Majumdar earned recognition within the Party. Right at the moment of the formation of the Party he was respectfully chosen for the highest post without any dissent.

The peasant struggle of Naxalbari did not only inspire the revolutionary members of the Party, it also enthused and inspired the sympathisers and a large section of people under the Party's influence.

After the formation of the CPI(M-L) they assembled under its banner. After the formation of the Party the peasants' armed struggle began to expand rapidly with the help and co-operation of these sympathisers and the people.

Groups of communist revolutionaries outside the Party too developed armed peasant struggles in some areas of the country.

In May 1970, the Party Congress of the CPI(M-L) was held with success. The successful holding of the Party Congress even in the face of policies of severe repression pursued by the exploiting classes and their government aroused much enthusiasm amongst the Party members, people and sympathisers throughout the country. A large number of guerilla units were formed. In the real sense, the phase marking

the beginning of guerilla war was reached. Its influence spread to the urban areas. In particular it generated new initiative and activity amongst students and youth. This successful development has been brightened with new examples of self-sacrifice set by Party members from martyr Babulal to Comrades Panchadri and Nirmala and by the peasant masses.

Today the ruling classes and other political parties are passing sleepless nights because of the CPI(M-L). It has become the focus of the new hope for the common man throughout the country. The task before us is to raise our struggle to a new phase—to advance along the path of the most arduous struggle for developing base areas. In other areas our responsibility is to intensify the class struggle of the peasants and to raise the armed struggle to a higher phase.

It is a matter of deep regret that at this moment of our success, in the name of developing Mao Tsetung Thought, such principles and policies are being introduced in our State and such ideas are being circulated as are nothing but ultra-adventurism. Unless the ordinary members of the Party become aware of these ideas and policies and make an effort to change them, the progress of revolution as a whole will suffer.

What are the concrete manifestations of these adventurist ideas and policies? The line, policies, strategy and tactics of people's war formulated by Chairman Mao Tsetung are interconnected and constitute an integral whole. These are applicable to and have relevance for all countries.

“Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of people's war is not only a product of the Chinese revolution, but has also the characteristics of our epoch.....Mao Tse-tung's thought is a common asset of the revolutionary people of the whole world.” (Lin Piao : *Long Live the Victory of People's War* P. 116)

Explaining the theory of People's War, Comrade Lin Piao showed that these (lessons) are : (a) Go on fighting with the people's war in perspective ; (b) Correctly apply the policy of the united front ; (c) Establish base areas in the countryside,

relying on peasants ; (d) Develop the People's Army of a new type ; (e) Apply the strategy and tactics of people's war in all spheres of work ; (f) Grasp the principle of self-reliance.

The class enemies of the people are organised ; the state machinery is in their hands. In the beginning the strength of the people is unorganized. The protracted war is a process of organizing the people, rallying them and arming them. Long-drawn efforts are necessary to weaken the enemy forces gradually and to expand gradually the people's forces.

Quite correctly our activities began in the perspective of this protracted war. "In India this revolution can triumph only if we wage protracted and arduous struggle. Citing the fact that imperialism and social-imperialism will come forward to arrest the revolution in India, it is contended that it is nothing but a blind flight of imagination to think of easy victory in this situation." (*Deshabrati*)

But at one time suddenly an idea began to be circulated that our struggle would not be that much protracted. In the manner of an astrologer it was forecast that we need not wait beyond 1975 for the success of the revolution. Undoubtedly, the style of work that established itself under its impact was one of getting quick results.

At the commencement of the Second Civil War in China, Chairman Mao wrote : "Who are the enemies ? Who are our friends ? This is a question of the first importance for the revolution. The basic reason why all previous revolutionary struggles in China achieved so little was their failure to unite with real friends against the real enemies." (*Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society*, March 1926). In explaining the theory of people's war, Comrade Lin Piao has first shown : "In order to win a people's war it is imperative to build the broadest possible united front and formulate a series of policies which will ensure the fullest mobilization of the basic masses as well as the unity of all the forces that can be united." (Lin Piao : *op. cit.* P. 25) In explaining the theory of people's war

Comrade Lin Piao has given the first place to the task of building the united front.

It is on the basis of this teaching that we have determined the allies and enemies of our revolution. The enemies are imperialism, social-imperialism, big comprador bourgeoisie and the big landlord class.

In our *Programme* we have defined the objective of our revolution : "This revolution will establish the dictatorship of the working class, the peasantry, the petty-bourgeoisie and even a section of the small and middle bourgeoisie under the leadership of the working class." As regards these classes we have said : "They, together, constitute the overwhelming majority of the Indian people." As the condition for the success of revolution, we have stated in the *Programme* : "Thus, in order to carry the democratic revolution through to the end it is necessary that a democratic front of all these classes is built up under the leadership of the working class."

The united front does not develop overnight. The formation of the front is but a process. As conditions for the successful building of the democratic front we have correctly stated : "This front, however, can only be built up when worker peasant unity is achieved in the course of armed struggle and after Red political power is established at least in some parts of the country."

Chairman Mao teaches us that the aim and object of the revolution are at one with the general principle which will regulate all the activities of the revolutionary party. This is known as the political line. This general principle must have to be reflected in all the policies of the party.

Then it is clear that from the beginning to the end the policies cannot be allowed to go against the Party's general principle. Otherwise a deviation from the political line occurs. But what sort of attitude is being taken towards the ally classes in our activities ? "They will be forced to come to us". "We need not bother about them." Frequently without any second thought such policies are being adopted as are hitting

them also. The so-called principle of annihilation is being applied to many traders, teachers and many individuals of such types.

Chairman Mao has repeatedly said : “The revolutionary war is a war of the masses ; it can be waged only by mobilising the masses and relying on them.” (‘Be concerned with the Well Being of the Masses, Pay Attention to Methods of Work’, January 27, 1934). He has further said : We are against issuing orders by depending only on a handful of persons.

In starting people’s war the first question that has to be faced is how the people, especially the peasant masses, can be aroused within the shortest possible time. This rousing involves developing the initiative of the peasants in regard to different aspects of waging people’s war.

Chairman Mao teaches us : Every comrade should be taught to arouse and develop the consciousness of the people in conformity with their levels of consciousness, to help them get organised gradually on the principle of sincere voluntariness, and to help them conduct step by step all the necessary struggles warranted by the internal and external conditions of definite time and place.

Our correct policy was given as follows : “Guerilla war is basically the higher stage of class struggle and class struggle is the sum total of economic and political struggles. While propagating politics, comrades working in peasant areas should never minimise the necessity of raising a general slogan on economic demands. Unless the broad peasant masses are involved in the movement it will not be possible to bring the backward peasants to the stage of grasping political propaganda, and their hatred against the class enemies cannot be kept alive.” (*Deshabrati*, August 1, 1967)

The first lesson to remember, therefore, is : we must not impose anything upon the masses against their wishes. By forgetting this principle we shall land ourselves in many deviations. Such deviations may be called sectarianism, Castroism etc.

“Unless the peasants are made to participate in broad-based mass movements, it will naturally take time for the politics of seizure of power to strike firm roots in the consciousness of the peasant masses. As a result there may be a trend towards putting arms instead of politics in command. Areas of peasants’ armed struggle can be developed only by successfully applying, under political leadership, the four weapons—the peasants’ class analysis, class struggle, investigation and practice”. (*Deshabrati*, October 17, 1968)

“There are advanced and backward sections even within the revolutionary classes. The advanced section grasps the revolutionary principles quickly and the backward section naturally takes longer time to absorb political propaganda. That is why the necessity of waging economic struggles against the feudal class exists and it will be there in future also. Hence the need for the movement for seizure of crops. The form this struggle will take in an area will depend on its political consciousness and organisation”. (*ibid*)

From the above quotations from *Deshabrati* it is seen that at this phase the ideological concepts that guided our policies were briefly as follows :

Guerilla war is basically a higher form of class struggle and class struggle is the sum total of economic and political struggles. As a condition to make the peasants conscious of the politics of seizure of political power, efforts must be made to develop the peasants’ mass struggles and mobilise the broad peasant masses (in these struggles). Various economic and political struggles must be waged. Simultaneously with that we must propagate Mao Tsetung Thought ceaselessly. Only then will it be possible to begin the guerilla war and build up base areas and peasants’ armed struggle.

In the process of striving to build up peasant movement with the object of developing (raising it to the level of) armed struggle, ideological concepts entirely opposed to the ones mentioned above were smuggled in. Their manifestations were :

Guerilla units have to be formed “in a completely secret manner,” “by a wholly conspiratorial method”; we must begin with elimination of the local class enemies by such guerilla units adopting “the method of guerilla action”. True, mention was made of the need for propagating the politics of seizure of power prior to actions; “but it would be wrong to put too much stress on the importance of carrying on an intensive propaganda before starting the guerilla attacks”. In this way will be created the initiative (of the masses) and mass actions, “and the flames of people’s war will engulf the whole of the countryside”.

This meant that there could be only one meaning of ‘annihilation’ or ‘elimination’ of class enemies—an interpretation, undoubtedly, opposed to Chairman Mao’s Thought.

Those who have gone through Chairman Mao’s works attentively will have observed that in his various writings, the words ‘annihilation’, ‘wiping out’ and ‘to destroy’ are used synonymously. ‘Annihilation’ may mean ‘to kill’ in particular circumstances, but not always. Chairman Mao says: “..... to destroy the enemy means to disarm him or ‘deprive him of the power to resist’ and does not mean to destroy every member of his forces physically.” (*On Protracted War*, May 1938)

However, on the basis of ideological concepts inspiring it, the movement since Naxalbari has been divided into two phases. If the concepts of these two phases are compared, the change becomes clear:

(1) Instead of mobilising the broad peasant masses in broad-based mass movements, form guerilla units by a conspiratorial method.

(2) Previously it was said that once class struggles were developed by forming the Party units, these Party units would be transformed into guerilla units. In the second phase it was said on the contrary that the intellectual comrade would form a guerilla unit by recruiting some one (poor peasant) without any knowledge of the Party unit. Instead of carrying

on political propaganda for a long time and striving to build up class struggles, it was argued that it would be wrong to put too much stress on the importance of intensive propaganda.

If only the four weapons—class analysis, class struggle, investigation and practice—were applied successfully, it was said previously, peasants' guerilla action would create mass initiative and mass action and kindle the flames of people's war. But only a little later, guerilla action itself came to be regarded as guerilla war. Whenever any action took place in any district or any State, it was suggested that guerilla war had spread.

Such statements naturally had adverse effects on the minds of the comrades. A leaflet distributed by a local committee in an important rural area even went to the extent of suggesting that "We shall be organised first then we shall fight—this is wrong." This leaflet contained such impractical slogans as : "Annihilate all the class enemies." Of the two—"political propaganda" and "annihilation of class enemies"—the former was given up at one stage in the process. It came to be argued that "action itself is propaganda." Thus there was infiltration of bourgeois thinking. Previously it was written in '*Deshabrati*' (September 4, 1969) : "Another manifestation of bourgeois thinking (i.e. revisionism—S.R.C) is to exaggerate the importance of actions and to deny the importance of political propaganda. This is what Chairman Mao has called 'militarism'."

Exactly the same outlook was reflected in the activities in the urban areas. True, activities in urban areas are not detailed in the *Programme*. But from the theory of people's war it is evident that for a long time the Party's task will be to build up base areas in the countryside and make use of them for encircling, and finally, capturing the cities. This is the path of the Chinese Revolution. Our policy in regard to the cities was determined in conformity with this path. "In the enemy-occupied cities and villages, we combined legal with illegal struggles, united the basic masses and all patriots, and divided and disintegrated the political power of the enemy

and his puppets so as to prepare ourselves to attack the enemy from within in co-ordination with operations from without when conditions were ripe." (Lin Piao : *op. cit.* P. 53)

Moreover, the line laid down by Chairman Mao in regard to the work in urban areas is as follows : To build up the proletarian base of the Party, to build up all mass struggles which are just and advantageous for us, to conduct all these struggles with restraint and thus to preserve our strength and wait.

In our *Programme* we have said : "It (the working class) also performs its vanguard role by launching struggles on political issues, both national and international, by solidarity actions in support of the revolutionary classes, mainly, the revolutionary struggles of the peasantry and by sending its class conscious vanguard section to organise and lead the peasants' armed struggle."

From what has been said above, anyone with commonsense will realise that our first major tasks in towns should be :

(a) to conduct extensive mass work among the proletarian masses in towns so that cadres from among workers may be sent to the villages ;

(b) to build up solidarity movements in towns with workers' participation ;

(c) to build up secret Party organisations with select cadres so that this work may be conducted for a long time.

These tasks can be performed if the Party's proletarian base is built up and the Party branches are formed in factories in important districts. These are the primary tasks of our programme in towns.

But what did happen ? It was decided to organise a mass demonstration in support of Cambodia. The programme was abandoned. Instead the impression was given out that in our country it was not necessary to wait for a long time in towns as had been the case in China. We need to create Red terror in towns also and for that it was immediately necessary to start the campaign of annihilation directed against the

class enemies and the state machinery. All this was said in the name of the new international and national situation, denying the character of uneven development of the revolutionary situation. The sensitive students were exhorted to accomplish the democratic and cultural revolution simultaneously; the 'Luddite'-type action of destroying educational institutions, libraries and laboratories, in the name paralysing the educational system was begun. Needless to say, there was no discussion in the Central Committee on the subject before introducing this method in urban areas.

It has already been mentioned how the necessity of the perspective of protracted war was belittled and how the idea gained currency that quick result should be aimed at. This line of thinking was encouraged by the wrong assessment regarding the Third World War. The U.S. aggression against Cambodia was regarded as the mark of the beginning of the Third World War.

It was Comrade Majumdar who gave this thesis. Of course the Party and the Party Congress were influenced by this assessment. But it is also a fact that after Chairman Mao's statement of May 20 * had been broadcast, Comrade Satyanarain Singh of Bihar drew our attention to the wrong assessment and wrote a few letters to the General Secretary for rectifying the mistake—the Report of the Congress was yet to be published. He had requested not to publish the relevant portion. The General Secretary did not act as requested.

The Marxists' assessment of the international or national situation is not unrelated to their practical tasks. The style of work was influenced by the assessment as regards the beginning or otherwise of the Third World War.

The Party's politics and organisation are closely inter-related. Wrong politics is inevitably reflected in organisational

* Hailing the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indo-Chinese peoples, Chairman Mao issued a solemn statement on May 20, 1970, supporting the struggle of world's people against U. S. imperialism. The statement was issued under the title, "People of the world, Unite and Defeat the U. S. Aggressors and All their Running Dogs."

matters. This is the law. In our state, simultaneously with the increasing leftist trend in politics, its predominance in organisational matters is also becoming pronounced day by day. Some of the concrete manifestations of this trend are given below :

(a) Mao Tsetung Thought teaches us that the rejection of the principle of strengthening of the leadership of the Party Committee means the establishing of authoritarianism. Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought teaches us that “The Party Committee system is an important Party institution for ensuring collective leadership and preventing any individual from monopolising of the conduct of affairs.” (*On Strengthening the Party Committee System*). Chairman Mao Tsetung has repeatedly warned us against the trend of monopolising of the conduct of affairs and solving of important problems by any individual and making the membership of the Party Committee nominal. But all the members who are regular readers of ‘*Deshabrati*’ must have observed that many an important policy has been published as “Comrade Charu Majumdar’s” exhortation. In most cases even the State Secretary was not informed beforehand—he also could come to know of it only through the newspaper. Even the request to issue these instructions in the name of the State Committee was rejected. The latest example was Comrade Charu Majumdar’s declaration on the formation of the People’s Army. Even the “formation of the People’s Army on the soil of India” was not considered in the Party Committee, nor even in the Politbureau, nor even in the State Committee ! Can anyone think of such a situation ? Is it not the principle of placing an individual above the Party Committee ?

(b) At one time it was observed that Comrade Charu Majumdar was sought to be established as representing the authority and as its only interpreter in India [Shashanka’s *

* ‘Shashanka’ was the pen-name of Saroj Datta, the then Secretary of West Bengal State Committee of the CPI (ML).

observation published in *Deshabrati*.] Many a member of the Central Committee had objected to the publication of such articles. Comrade Charu Majumdar also expressed his view that “publication of such articles was not correct”. It was also proposed that the Party Congress Report should describe him as the sole authority of Mao Tsetung Thought in India. Quite justifiably many comrades opposed it. The Party (Congress) acknowledged his leading role—the role on which there was never any difference of opinions within the Party. But even after that, some responsible comrades in Bengal continued to project him as the authority. Is not this proposal to appoint him the sole authority ridiculous? Mao Tsetung Thought teaches us: “Knowledge is a matter of science, and no dishonesty or conceit whatsoever is permissible. What is required is definitely the reverse—honesty and modesty.” (*On Practice*). Mao Tsetung further teaches us: “To learn is no easy matter and to apply what one has learned is even harder,” “This process of knowing is extremely important; without such a long period of experience, it would be difficult to understand and grasp the laws of an entire war. Neither a beginner nor a person who fights only on paper can become a really able high-ranking commander; only one who has learned through actual fighting in war can do so.” (*Strategy of the Revolutionary War in China*).

Only from 1967 onwards we have begun to learn to study and apply correctly Mao Tsetung’s Thought and his theory of people’s war. Within such a short time is it not opposed to the Party principle of collective leadership to propagate things such as ‘the only interpreter’ etc. ?

To what level has “authoritarianism” reached today? Some of the most responsible leaders placed ultimatum before the ordinary members of the Party, such as these: “This is Charu Majumdar’s Party. Only those who would obey him unconditionally will remain inside the Party.” Is it not the policy of “commandism” that accompanies left deviation?

(c) In this State, anyone expressing dissatisfaction (over

the policy) or anyone criticising in any manner (the policy of the Party) is being labelled as “revisionist” or “centrist”. And such acts are being performed by Comrade Charu Majumdar himself and by many in responsible positions. Is it encouraging ideological struggle? Or, is it shelving it under threat? According to Mao Tsetung Thought, ideological struggle is the “soul of the Party”. Then is not this gagging tantamount to severing the Party from its soul?

(d) The Bihar State Committee, in a document submitted sometime ago, drew the attention to the “Left” (deviationist) trend inside the Party. The document together with Comrade Charu Majumdar’s replies to the questions raised therein were circulated inside the Party. Our State Committee has given its verdict that it is a “revisionist document.” But it is very surprising that the document in question has not even reached many units. Even a Politbureau member who stays very near to the General Secretary—within a stone’s throw—was not given the document. Should it be called the honest way of conducting ideological struggle? In this article, without making any comments on the said document or on Comrade Charu Majumdar’s comment on it, I want only to point out that Comrade Majumdar concluded his comment with, “This is vile”, as is known to all who have gone through it. The question naturally arises—whether Comrade Majumdar was commenting on any enemy document or that of criticisms of a State Committee of the Party? Is not such reaction resulting from criticisms levelled by Party members an indication of impatience inherent in “Left” deviations? Is it the correct method of conducting ideological struggle?

Chairman Mao teaches us : “If there were no contradictions in the Party and no ideological struggles to resolve them, the Party’s life would come to an end”. (*On Contradiction*, August 1937).

(e) Militarism in the policy usually casts its shadow over organisational matters too. Those who take part in “action” will form the Party Committees—the Party is being reorga-

nised thus. The Party is the Party for "actions". The Party built on the ideology of armed struggles has been reduced to a terrorist Party.

(f) "We should carry on constant propaganda among the people on the facts of world progress and the bright future ahead so that they will build their confidence in victory." By this, Chairman Mao never intended that there should be any exaggerated propaganda. Chairman Mao also says : "At the same time we must tell the people and tell our comrades that there will be twists and turns in our roads." (*On the Chung-king Negotiations*, Oct. 7, 1945). In the pages of *Deshabrati* one comes across many instances of exaggeration. A few among those are being mentioned here.

(1) The "actions" the students and youth are conducting in educational institutions are said to be comparable to the May 4th Movement of 1919, of China.

(2) In the immediate past, hoisting of Red flags over the factories and educational institutions were said to be comparable to the historic Kharkhov movement.

(3) It is claimed that in Bengal thousands of poor peasants have joined the guerilla units. Chairman Mao teaches us : "In all mass movements we must make a basic investigation and analysis of the number of active supporters, opponents and neutrals and must not decide problems subjectively and without basis." (*Methods of work of Party Committees*, March 13, 1949)

But here Party Committees are not educated to undertake "basic investigation" and "basic analysis" in relation to any movement. Yet report on any movement is presented in such a way as if it is quite impressive.

Many worthy comrades have become martyrs after responding to the call of creating red terror in urban areas. For inspiration to these comrades it is being propagated that the comrades are being 'tempered' through the process. (*Deshabrati*, Nov. 7 issue, editorial). There is a line in Chairman's writings on tempering of comrades :

“...it is imperative for the revolutionary ranks to turn the backward villages into advanced, consolidated base areas, into great military, political, economic and cultural bastions of the revolution from which to fight their vicious enemies who are using the cities for attacks on rural districts, and in this way gradually to achieve the complete victory of the revolution through protracted fighting ; it is imperative for them to do so if they do not wish to compromise with imperialism and its lackeys but are determined to fight on, and if they intend to build up and temper their forces, and avoid decisive battles with a powerful enemy while their own strength is inadequate.” (*The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party*, Dec. 1939.)

In our State we could not develop one single base area where we could shift our comrades in times of need. In such a situation, the policy of creating red terror in urban areas and thus tempering the comrades is nothing but extreme adventurism.

In the process of developing peasant struggle throughout the country to its present stage since Naxalbari, we have lost many worthy comrades. Compare with this the total number of comrades that we lost during the period of creating red terror in urban areas of our State. It would be apparent that the loss is heavier in the latter instance. Self-sacrifice is essential in revolution but we must also weigh our losses against the gains achieved. Incurring so much loss was not necessary simply for the purpose of tempering the comrades.

It is said that we are in an era of self-sacrifice. Chairman Mao teaches us that fighting is the pivotal point of all our strategy and tactics. Self-preservation is necessary for waging a war ; again war itself demands self-sacrifice. The object of war is specifically “to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy.” In the strategy of people’s war there cannot be an era of exclusive self-sacrifice or an era of exclusive self-preservation. In the strategy of people’s war, one has to go ahead step by step through protracted struggles. The correctness of Mao Tsetung

Thought is well-illustrated even today by the people's war that is going on around us in our country. To talk of the era of exclusive self-sacrifice is nothing but an empty slogan.

Comrades, today, undoubtedly, we are standing at a very critical juncture. The danger of Chairman's China being attacked has further increased with the expansion of war of aggression waged by the U. S. imperialism from Cambodia to Laos. In spite of this, it would be correct to say that revolution is still the dominant trend. The crisis faced by the ruling classes has increased in depth and extent. The holding of general elections, before the scheduled time, clearly indicates this. Chairman Mao teaches us : 'Get rid of the baggage and start up the machinery.' ('To start up the machinery' means to make good use of the organ of thought.) Mao Tsetung further teaches us : "Communists must always go into the whys and wherefores of anything, use their own heads and carefully think over whether or not it corresponds to reality and is really well-founded ; on no account should they follow blindly and encourage slavishness." (*Rectify the Party's Style of Work*, Feb. 1942)

Resist the ultra-adventurist trend raising its head in our Party.

[Source : *Samakal* (a Bengali periodical), August 12 & August 26, 1978]