

## Serious Mistakes

*(This is a summary of part of a document released by the Revolutionary Communist Committee of Andhra Pradesh)*

**M**ORE than three years have passed since the armed struggle started in Andhra Pradesh under the leadership of the Andhra Pradesh Revolutionary Communist Committee. During this period the revolutionary movement in the whole of the State was subjected to severe repression. The majority of the members of the Pradesh Committee and important leaders and workers in the districts were arrested and implicated in conspiracy cases.

The government deployed a large police force to wipe out the armed squads. The police let loose a reign of terror in the Agency area and are still subjecting the toiling masses to inhuman torture.

We faced many difficulties and hardships in the course of the past two years of armed struggle. Serious mistakes were committed too and we sustained severe losses.

We had decided to mobilise and organise the masses for armed agrarian revolution. But forest and Pradesh leaderships did not discuss and come to an opinion on the issue of what forms of resistance should be adopted against the repression of the ruling classes even before the mass movement reached the stage of armed struggle for agrarian revolutionary programme. There was no clear understanding on this. Because of this weakness, the Agency movement was subjected to many difficulties and hardships.

In the initial stage itself, the leadership of the Agency area gave overestimations about the situation there. It overestimated the consciousness of the masses, the preparedness of the masses for armed struggle, and the organisational capacity of the Party.

The leadership of the agency area estimated that about 1,000 volun-

teers would be available at village level from the then areas of their movement in Khammam and Warangal districts (Forest area). In January 1969, a circular was issued after discussing with the Pradesh leadership about the training to be imparted to the volunteers and laying down the duties and tasks of volunteers in protecting the villages from the police. But in practice, volunteers did not turn up as was hoped. It was thought that the youths mobilised in the legal struggles were ready for immediate armed struggle. "We completely failed in correctly assessing the political consciousness, preparedness of the people for armed struggle, and the determination of the youth rallying around us at that time".

The same overestimations recurred in "The Review of Political and Organisational Situation" presented to and adopted by the Pradesh Party convention in April 1969. It was stated in the review that "the coming forward of hundreds of youth to fight consciously for the rights of their people has begun" and "hatred against police atrocities is mounting". The dissatisfaction of the people towards the government was taken for class hatred, their mobilisation on economic issues was taken for political preparedness for direct participation.

On these overestimations, the conclusion was drawn that by implementing the programme of mass mobilisation for a few months in the Agency areas of Warangal, Khammam and East Godavari districts, the people would come forward for armed struggle for an agrarian revolutionary programme and the revolutionaries would be in a position to conduct regular armed guerilla struggle.

Note the following sentences in the "Immediate Programme" adopted by the Pradesh Convention in April 1969.

### The First Rains

"Preparations have to be made for this from now onwards. Ploughing

operations (of lands of landlords) should be started with the first drizzles of the rainy season".

"Fertile land and fruit gardens that had been grabbed from Girijan peasants are still in the hands of landlords. People have been anxious to take them back. We must prepare them to occupy these lands. This process must start with the first rains".

"It is our opinion that we must complete the above activities in political propaganda, in mobilising the masses and other organisational fields and be prepared for armed struggle in the coming rainy season. With the first rains we can distribute land, start propaganda, the main item of the agricultural revolution. We must co-ordinate guerilla struggle with this programme, and it would give a wide, strong mass base for the struggle".

So, in the "Immediate Programme", we came to a definite conclusion that we could prepare the people in the Agency areas of the four districts to come forward for the distribution of lands of landlords by June, 1969, and that we could start distribution of land with the onset of the rainy season and along with this we could start armed guerilla struggle.

But the people of that area came forward mainly to occupy lands. Occupation of reserved lands took place in some areas. But here and there the lands of landlords which were kept for cattle grazing and uncultivated lands were also occupied. It is true that even before starting the armed struggle people came forward to occupy the cultivated lands of landlords in a few places in Mulugu and Palwancha taluks and in East Godavari District. The fact that people in Karimnagar, Warangal and Khammam districts did not come forward to occupy the lands of landlords showed our overestimations on this issue as stated in the Immediate Programme.

Here, we must keep one aspect in mind. Occupation of the landlords' lands by the people, on a big

scale in extensive areas, depends mainly on the people's willingness and determination to directly participate in the armed struggle. The people will occupy landlords' lands in extensive areas when they become conscious and have confidence in the strength of our armed squads in resisting the government's armed forces, and when they are confident and determined that they can and will defend and retain those lands.

We must also remember that even during the days of the Telangana armed struggle (1948-51), the people came forward to occupy lands on a big scale only after they had directly participated in the armed struggle against free labour, 'Nagu', levy on grain, atrocities of landlords etc. and only after many victories had been won against Razakars and the Nizam's military forces. This does not mean that we are not going to propagate among the people for the occupation of landlords' land as an immediate issue. We will do it and we ought to do it. Whenever the people organise themselves and come forward to occupy land of the landlords we should inspire them and lead them.

But we should not forget that mobilisation of the people in extensive areas for this purpose depends on their readiness and our work for the armed struggle, on the confidence that can be created by the military strength of the armed squads.

But without deeply going into this issue, we prepared for armed struggle thinking that by June 1969 the people in the entire area could be mobilised to occupy landlords' lands.

Not only this, the party thought that armed struggle could be started only when landlords' lands were distributed and thus we had linked distribution of landlords' lands with armed struggle.

It is good to start armed struggle only when people come forward to occupy the lands of the landlord and protect them. We must strive for that. But the government will not keep quiet when we mobilise the

people on class issues to wage militant struggles and when we integrate these mass struggles with the politics of people's war. The government will not remain silent as the movement reaches the stage of occupying the landlords' land. No sooner the masses move on mass issues than the landlords and the government resort to severe repression to crush the movement. During the course of the armed struggle which depends on the people's direct participation, we prepare them for land distribution. In this way we strive to put into practice the programme of agrarian revolution. In conditions when the people are not yet ready for armed resistance against the landlord and police repression, we will have to build up squads with the militants and workers in the villages in order to protect the movement and the cadre. This struggle has to be conducted in various forms keeping in view the support of the masses and the geographical condition of the areas and organisational strength of the party. We mobilise the people on mass issues and take necessary actions against enemies of the people and police agents who stand in the way of their movement and actively oppose it. And as against police, we adopt the tactics of self-defence. Mao Tse-tung has pointed out:

"The object of war is specifically 'to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy' (to destroy the enemy means to disarm him or 'deprive him of the power to resist' and does not mean destroying every member of his force physically)... In defence, the immediate object is to preserve yourself, but at the same time defence is a means of supplementing attack or preparing to go over to the attack." ("On Protracted War". --Selected Works Vol. II. P. 156).

At this stage we acquire necessary weapons not by conducting raids on the police but by other means. This entire programme has to be carried out along with the propagation of revolutionary politics of armed struggle to enhance the revolutionary

consciousness of the masses. In this process, the revolutionary consciousness of the people will grow and they will get prepared and determined for land distribution and also for armed struggle for emancipation. Then only the necessary base for protracted war will be created.