The Arab-Israeli Conflict:

The Peaceful Proposals
1948-1972

by Leila S. Kadi
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INTRODUCTION

For the past twenty-five years, a series of plans for the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict have been made. Invariably they have either been shelved or dropped. The following six points provide the political background for their failure.

(1) The Arab regimes are fully aware of their incompetence in confronting Israeli armed might and the imperialist forces supporting it. Added to this is the inherent incapacity of these governments to overcome their impotence for a variety of reasons, depending on the nature of the ruling class in each Arab state.

(2) The Arab regimes are under strong popular Arab and Palestinian compulsion to proficiently confront the Israeli challenge and to support the struggle of the Palestinian people to retrieve their national rights. Such pressures have resulted in noteworthy embarrassments for these governments.

(3) The State of Israel has been benefiting from the demoralized situation of the Arab regimes by grasping the opportunity to expand and dominate the area. This, in turn, has created additional discomforts for the Arab ruling classes vis-a-vis their people by exposing more acutely their inability to shoulder the major national responsibilities facing the nation.

(4) The Arab governments have been oscillating between two possible courses of action: (a) flirting with the idea of concluding a peaceful settlement with Israel with as little loss of face as possible; and (b) honoring their ostensible commitment to achieve victory against Israel in deference to popular pressure and the expectations of the masses. This quandary has been rendered more acute by the rejection of the Israeli and the American Governments of allowing the Arab ruling classes the luxury of some sort of a face-saving settlement.
(5) Israel has been projecting itself as a peace-loving state that desires a "reasonable" political settlement, while in reality it has been greatly benefiting from the alternating situations of hot and cold war as well as from the state of neither war nor peace. This has made any kind of settlement of the conflict, short of total Arab capitulation, an unprofitable proposition for Israel.

(6) The Arab cliques have attempted to alleviate the dilemma they find themselves in by searching for "suitable" outlets such as insisting on "internationalizing" the conflict and dragging it as many factors and forces external to the area as possible. They call for, and rely upon, foreign mediation, international settlement, and United Nations efforts to camouflage their desire for a peaceful settlement. By such a policy they hope to alleviate their humiliation before the Arab masses and to shore-up their already hopelessly compromised position as rulers and leaders.

This paper will review the proposals put forward by the concerned parties for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict between 1948 and 1972. The emphasis will be on those plans put forward officially, or semi-officially by the parties involved (Israel, the Arabs, the United Nations or the governments of other states) as a basis for negotiations. In other words, this study will not be concerned with overtures of a "private" nature, e.g., Allon’s Plan, the Fisher Plan, the recommendations of the Quakers.

Militarily, Israel has never been stronger than it is today, yet its leadership continues to claim that they are fighting a war of survival and repeatedly warn of the threat of genocide. In the summer of 1972, a fierce argument was started by former Israeli generals as to whether Israel did face the probability of annihilation by the Arabs if they had won the 1967 June war. The dispute began when Reserve-General Mattityahu Peled, a member of the Israeli General Staff during the Six-Day
War, affirmed publicly in May 1967 that the Israelis were not under the threat of destruction, “neither as individuals nor as a nation” (Ha’aretz, March 19, 1973). Peled’s position was corroborated and defended by a number of other generals and by a former minister in the government who stated bluntly that the “whole story about the threat was totally contrived and then elaborated upon, a posteriori, to justify the annexation of Arab territories” (Al Hamishmar, April 14, 1972).

General Chaim Bar-Lev, presently a cabinet minister and the previous army Chief-of-Staff, declared, “We were not threatened with genocide on the eve of the Six-Day War and we had never thought of such a possibility” (Ma’ariv, April 19, 1972).

Included in this debate was Ezer Weizman, ex-Commander of the Air Force and ex-Chief of Operations in the 1967 war and until recently Chairman of the right-wing expansionist Herut Party, who volatilized the whole controversy by declaring that Israel’s boundaries “must be fixed according to long range, historical and actual interests. Only afterwards we must see to it that these boundaries be made ‘secure’ ” (Al Hamishmar, March 20, 1972).

During the war itself, Weizman declared that Israel went to war not because it was facing immediate destruction, but because it had “no choice.” He added that the “no choice” slogan was considered because it “is endorsed by the Jewry of the Diaspora, which for its purposes wished to see us heroes standing steadfastly with backs to the sea. The threat of destruction was already removed from Israel during the War of Independence. The adoption of the ‘no choice’ slogan, however, engendered among us the Diasporal approval, as though Jews are allowed to fight only when they are targets of pogroms” (Al Hamishmar, March 29, 1972).

The former Air Force commander was even more straightforward in his analysis of the 1956 Sinai campaign. He bluntly
denied that Israel went to war because of a threat from the Egyptians. Instead, he insisted that the campaign “was an initiated political process, well calculated and justified. . . . Its timing and the manner of its execution were influenced by considerations aimed at taking advantage of international circumstances, more than by the development of the Egyptian threat” (Yediot Aharonot, June 6, 1967).

General Weizman, reflecting the viewpoints of those he represents, believes that the territories occupied by Israel in the aftermath of the 1967 war constitute a natural part of Israel “because the attachment to those very places is the essence of Zionism and without them the Jewish State does not constitute an historical wholeness.” Obviously, in his judgement, none of the occupied territories should be returned.

This evaluation is shared by Minister of Communications Shimon Peres and Defence Minister Moshe Dayan who claim that for reasons of military security, the occupied territories cannot be given up. This view is supported by Israel Galili, Minister-Without-Portfolio and one of Golda Meir’s most trusted advisers, who insists that the borders of Israel must be determined by Israel. He told the Knesset that “Israel will leave no vacuum in these areas. No area is out of bounds to Jewish settlements.”

Since the June war, Moshe Dayan has been absolutely direct and consistent in expressing his opinions on the occupied territories. In 1968, he stated that for one-hundred years the “Jewish People” have been going through a process “of colonization to enlarge the borders here—let there not be a Jew to say we are nearing the end of the road.” Moreover, in 1969, he expanded on that position by saying, “Our fathers had reached the frontiers which were recognized in the Partition Plan. Our generation reached the frontiers of 1949. Now the Six-Day War generation has managed to reach Suez, Jordan and the Golan Heights. This is not the end. After
the present cease-fire lines, there will be new ones. They will extend beyond Jordan—perhaps to Lebanon and perhaps to central Syria as well.”

In 1971 he stated more explicitly that “other countries end their wars with the idea of going back to the points they started from. In our case, we want something new, new borders, new relations, a new state.”

Furthermore, Moshe Dayan clarified his belief by affirming that Israel should become the “permanent government” in the occupied territories, and that Israel “must devise a pattern of living and of situations which can be tolerated by the Arabs. By this I do not mean arrangements to their liking but those they can live with, if they so wish.” If they do not, then they can emigrate with official blessings. Israel has the know-how to develop a program of this sort, and there is every reason to expect that it will continue to receive public support. In addition, he avouched that “coexistence of Israel and the Palestinian Arabs is possible only under the auspices of the Israeli Government and Zahal (the Israeli Army). . . . Their departure from the West Bank and Gaza will mean the prevention of Israel’s access to the places.”

The proposal put forward by Dayan implies that Israeli control over the occupied territories will be of a permanent nature. Further, the local inhabitants will not be granted Israeli citizenship. Dayan and Peres have rejected the notion of a Palestinian state on the West Bank, as does Golda Meir, who has refused to accept the existence of Palestinians in any Palestinian “entity” and has opposed the development among them of any organization or any voice which will declare the West Bank as a separate Palestinian state.

Public opinion polls in Israel reinforce the expectation that the occupied territories will be integrated into Israel in one form or another. The Jerusalem Post reported on January 5, 1970, that 41.5 percent of the population held the view that
Israel should integrate the occupied territories into Israel and 86.4 percent favor wide-spread settlement throughout the areas. A year ago, the Israpol public opinion survey reported the following response to the question, "What territories should Israel be ready to relinquish in exchange for a peace settlement with the Arab countries?"; Sinai, 48 percent; the West Bank, 21 percent; the Gaza-Strip, 17 percent; Sharm al-Sheikh, 3 percent; the Golan Heights, 2 percent; Jerusalem, 0.6 percent; no territory whatsoever, 30 percent. A more recent poll indicates that 31 percent of the population wants to retain the whole of Sinai, 56 percent the West Bank, 73 percent the Gaza-Strip, 91 percent Sharm al-Sheikh, and 92 percent the Golan Heights. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that these attitudes will harden, if explicit decisions have to be made.

In addition to the above, thousands of acres in the Gaza-Strip have been fenced off by the Israeli army and thousands of bedouins have been evacuated and their wells blocked to prevent their return. In addition some homes and cultivated areas have been destroyed. The intention of the Israeli government appears to be to "dissect the Strip" in order to establish Israeli settlements—urban and rural, paramilitary and civilian—and a new Israeli port town. According to an estimate published in the March 20, 1972, issue of the Labor Party newspaper, Davar, about one third of the Gaza-Strip is to become "state land." The expulsion of the bedouins was revealed by members of neighbouring Mapam kibbutzim in violation of military censorship.

It is obvious that new facts are being created in accordance with the declaration of Israel Galili in 1969. "It can be said with absolute certainty that the Gaza-Strip will not be separated from the state of Israel again." Peter Grose of the Guardian reported that the Gaza-Strip "is gradually being assimilated into Israel" with "a pattern of carrot-and-stick tactics by the
occupation administration.” In fact, “economic integration with Israel is well advanced, and controversial preparations are under way for new Jewish settlements on land occupied in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.” Quoting a statement by Galili on March 27, 1972, that “Gaza will not again be separated from Israel,” Grose added that there is an “apparent program, not officially announced, to settle Jews in the rich farmlands of Gaza” and to resettle 3,000 Gaza residents annually elsewhere in the region.

The above survey points to the fact that Israel is not planning to withdraw from the Arab territories occupied during the Six-Day War or grant the Arab governments some sort of a face-saving peaceful settlement. The kind of accord that Israel is interested in is the one which allows it to dominate the Arab Middle East economically, politically and militarily. Israel can be forced to reach some sort of an agreement with its Arab neighbors if the United States would exert the necessary pressure. But, as one American diplomat put it, “peace in the Middle East is of course a priority objective, but, for the moment, it is in no way urgent.”

Washington’s support for Israel has constantly been on the increase. To Jerusalem’s thorough satisfaction, Washington has abandoned its public interpretation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 242, which had reassured the moderate Arabs, and has virtually jettisoned the Rogers Plan that called for the return of practically all the occupied territories. It has also implicitly ruled out mediation by United Nations Special Representative Gunnar Jarring, as well as by the three other big powers.

The “unilateral” role, as one official of the State Department announced, that the United States has assigned for itself has also undergone profound modification. From being an “honest broker,” it has gradually become an “interested go-between” and seems now content to provide the Israelis—in
accordance with Golda Meir's desires—with a "letter box" for their respective complaints and demands.

In this "explanatory phase," the American government, judging by William Rogers' statements, expects no more than to "help the parties engage in serious negotiations," instead of endeavouring for the kind of overall agreement sought by Jordan and Egypt, but considered unrealistic by Israel.

While President Nixon (who, with Mr. Truman, has proved to be the most generous American President for the Israeli cause) waits for the Arabs to resign themselves to adopting the course thus set out, he is providing Mrs. Meir with the financial and military means to ensure superiority over her Arab adversaries—in short, to enable the Israeli government to negotiate from a position of strength.

An American official affirmed, "Israel has shown itself a far more reliable ally than, say, South Vietnam. Israel did after all, more than once, save King Hussein's throne, and has provided military aid for Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia against the Eritrean rebels. And in the Pentagon, and the administration as a whole, the Israeli army, considered one of the world's most efficient, is regarded as a major asset in America's Middle Eastern strategy."

Waves of reaction sweeping over the Arab world permits the United States to look to the future with confidence.

On the other hand, is the Israeli government serious in its offer to reach a negotiated settlement? The answer is no, because, as this review points out, attempts to bring about peace through behind-the-scenes manoeuvring have failed. The Israelis either adhere to a position which they know no Arab leader could accept without committing suicide, or when they see an Arab regime about to consent, they retract, i.e., they either take some action which makes it impossible for the Arab government to continue negotiating, or they leak
to the outside world the fact that it is negotiating, thereby frightening the Arab side into a denial, which confirms to the world that only the Israeli government sincerely seeks peace.

It also becomes clear from this review that the Arab cliques have made a number of substantial capitulations and retreated from many a position previously considered “sacred and untouchable.” This trend became particularly evident after the 1967 war. These concessions came about in spite of internal popular pressure on Arab governments to take firmer and more warlike stands vis-a-vis Israel. Furthermore, none of the Arab regimes is really prepared or willing to risk another major defeat by initiating a war to liberate the Arab occupied territories. However, in spite of all these favorable circumstances, Israel has remained unwilling to assist in providing the kind of peaceful settlement which will permit its adversaries to emerge from the conflict without seeming to have surrendered everything before the enemy.

In fact Israeli intransigence has gone beyond all bounds. Israel has either ignored or rejected the explicit decisions of the United Nations General Assembly, often passed with more than the required two-thirds majority, concerning the rights of the Palestinian people. On December 8, 1970, the General Assembly finally acknowledged that the people of Palestine are entitled to the right of self-determination:

"Bearing in mind the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in Articles 1 and 55 of the Charter of the United Nations and more recently reaffirmed in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among Nations, (the U.N. General Assembly)

"Recognizes that the people of Palestine are entitled to equal rights and self-determination, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations" (U.N. General Assembly. Res. 2672C).

Further, the General Assembly has recognized the legality of the struggle of the Palestinian people to attain self-deter-
mination. On December 6, 1971, it passed a resolution which stated that it:

*Confirms* the legality of the peoples’ struggle for self-determination and liberation from colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation, notably in southern Africa and in particular that of the peoples of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), as well as the Palestinian people, by all means consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.” (U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. 2787).

The Palestinians have consistently opposed all the proposals advanced for effecting a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Their contention is that in none of these plans were the Palestinian people alluded to as anything more than a heap of refugees. In none of them was the slightest hint made as to their right to self-determination and to return to their homeland as recognized by the United Nations General Assembly. Furthermore, all past, present, and future peace proposals have been insisting on the recognition by the Arabs of the State of Israel, which, to say the least, is an antithetical proposition for the Palestinians. Rather, they had to resort to armed struggle in order to affirm their legitimate and internationally recognized national rights. The objective of their struggle is the creation of a secular non-sectarian democratic state in Palestine where Israelis and Arabs (Muslims and Christians) can live as equal citizens.
Chapter 1.

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE DURING
THE FIRST TWO DECADES

The Efforts of the Palestine Conciliation Commission

The first attempt to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict following the creation of the State of Israel was undertaken by the United Nations General Assembly which adopted a resolution, on December 11, 1948, establishing the Palestine Conciliation Commission. It was composed of representatives from France, the United States and Turkey. Before January 16, 1950, the Commission concentrated its attention principally on methods of overcoming the contradiction between the Israeli government’s desire to negotiate directly and separately with the Arab states, and the latter’s insistence on negotiating as a bloc, with the Commission acting as a mediator. The Arab states’ position was in accordance with the following resolution adopted by the Council of the Arab League in its half-yearly meeting held in Cairo from March 25-April 13, 1949:

“No Arab state has the right to negotiate separate peace treaties on any political, military, or economic agreement with Israel, or the right to ratify such an agreement. Any state so doing will be considered to have immediately forfeited its membership of the Arab League. Furthermore, the Political Committee shall recommend sanctions to be taken against any state that may violate the terms of this resolution.” These sanctions were defined as exclusion from the League, severance of diplomatic, financial, economic and commercial relations, and the sealing-off of the offender’s frontiers.
It is clear that this resolution was a last attempt on the part of the ruling classes at the time to remain in power, after being foiled by Israel, and to counter the pressures of their people for political and military changes in order to be able to confront and defeat the State of Israel.

In order to get out of the bind posed by the Arab states and Israel, the Commission submitted a memorandum on March 29, 1950, to the governments concerned recommending the formation of joint committees meeting under the chairmanship of a representative of the Commission, and composed of delegates from these countries. Members of the Commission visited Tel-Aviv and the capitals of the Arab states between the 5th and the 15th of April, 1950, in order to discuss with the governments involved the plan of procedure laid down in the memorandum.

The recommendations of the Commission were a mid-way stance between the Israeli and Arab demands which would enable the Arab governments to negotiate with Israel collectively but not as one unit. This was the beginning of official Arab hesitation between the lure presented by proposals for a peaceful settlement of the conflict and the popular pressure exerted against the acceptance of any such propositions.

The political committee of the Arab League, meeting in Cairo, decided on April 12, 1950, to accept the Commission’s proposals. Azzam Pasha, the Secretary-General of the League, subsequently disclosed, however, that its decision did not imply the opening of direct negotiations with Israel. It was made on the condition that Israel accept beforehand the U.N. decisions on Palestine, including the Partition Resolution of 1947 and the plan for the internationalization of Jerusalem, and that the Commission complete its task before the next meeting of the General Assembly. In a further statement issued on the following day, Azzam Pasha announced that the Arab states were prepared to discuss a final settlement on Palestine,
including the question of frontiers, provided that Israel agree to the compensation of the Arab refugees or their resettlement in Israeli territory.

A memorandum submitted by the Israeli government to the Commission on the same date, affirmed Israel's "readiness to begin negotiations at once by any effective procedure which may be devised, with a view to the settlement of all outstanding questions and the attainment of a permanent peace." It rejected the Arab League's conditions for the opening of the negotiations, and accused the Arab states of having embarked on a program of armament and of economic blockade which were inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and the spirit of the Armistice Agreements. It also charged the Arabs of carrying on a campaign of "inflammatory utterances" in preparation for a "war of revenge" against Israel. On May 8, 1950, it informed the Commission of its unconditional acceptance of the proposals in the Commission's memorandum of March 29, 1950, and asked for notification as to which of the Arab states would be willing to open negotiations.

The Commission announced on May 15, 1950, that it considered the replies to its memorandum as offering "the possibility of putting into effect the procedure envisaged" and expressed the hope that all delegates would be fully empowered to act on behalf of their respective governments.

However, and in order to ensure the safety of Israel, the Western powers (Britain, France and the United States) issued the Tripartite Declaration on May 25, 1950, in which they declared "their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area. The three governments, should they find that any of these states (Arab) was preparing to violate frontiers of armistice lines, would, consistent with their obligations as members of the United Nations, imme-
diately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation.”

The collective Arab reply to the Tripartite Declaration, which was issued on June 21, 1950, proved to be a mild one since it accepted as a fait accompli the fact that the three powers would act as protectors of the State of Israel, and would do their best to ensure the maintenance of the status quo in the area. Furthermore, the meek reply of the Arab regimes amounted to the acceptance of the guardianship of the three Western nations, and to a confession of impotence vis-a-vis the Palestine problem. The Arab League’s statement declared:

“Even before the three powers ever thought of issuing their Declaration, the Arab governments on their own initiative had decided to express the peaceful intention of the Arabs and to refute the allegations that Israel had persisted in circulating (to the effect) that the Arab states are requesting arms for aggressive purposes. (The Arab states) hereby reiterate their peaceful intentions and declare that the arms that have been, or may be, ordered from the three powers or from others will be used solely for defensive purposes. ... The Arab states declare that the most preferable and reliable measures, for maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East would consist in solving its problems on the basis of right and justice, ...”

Following the scandal precipitated among the Arabs by the Tripartite Declaration, the Egyptian government was forced to withdraw, on June 13, 1950, its delegation to the Commission, while statements issued by the Syrian, Lebanese and Jordanian governments rejected the Commission’s proposals for the establishment of mixed committees, and declared that they considered it impossible to negotiate with Israel under the Commission’s auspices.

Subsequent to the failure of its first attempt, the Commission submitted on October 25, 1950, its report to the United Nations Secretary-General in which it suggested that Israel should take the first step to “counteract the dislocations caused by its
own establishment among the Arabs,” and that the latter “should adapt their policy to the new state of affairs.”

As for the refugees, the Commission recommended the following measures:

“The return of that number of refugees to Israel which would be consistent with their own best interest; the immediate payment of compensation for property of non-returning refugees; the adoption of measures by the Arab States for assuring the full reintegration of non-returning refugees; and the provision of all necessary facilities for resettlement by the governments directly concerned, with the technical and financial assistance of the United Nations.”

On August 10, 1951, the Commission invited the Governments of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria to send representatives to a conference in Paris. The Arab states, in a joint reply published on August 29, 1951, accepted the Commission’s request on condition that the Arab and Israeli delegations should not be required to sit at the same table. An Israeli note sent on September 9 accepted the invitation, and pointed out that its delegation would put forward “broad concrete proposals,” but would not discuss any specific cause of friction unless the Arab states accepted as the aim of the conference “a final settlement of all outstanding problems.”

When the conference opened in Paris on the 13th of September, Mr. Ely Palmer, Chairman of the Commission, submitted first to the Arab and then to the Israeli delegations a statement of the Commission’s aims in the discussions which he defined as: (a) settlement of the rights and status of persons, particularly with reference to the repatriation of refugees and the payment of compensation for losses arising out of the fighting; (b) the solution of problems concerning the rights and obligations of the states represented, their relations with one another—particularly the questions of delimitation of frontiers, establishment of demilitarized zones, restoration of communications, and customs control; and (c) an agreement
between the parties to respect one another’s right to security, to abstain from all hostile acts, and to promote permanent peace in Palestine.

After consultation with their respective governments, the Arab delegations returned a favorable reply on September 17 expressing their willingness to cooperate with the Commission but maintaining that Israel must agree to repatriate the Palestinian Arab refugees as a prerequisite for any settlement. The Israeli Government’s retort, presented on September 21, appealed for the opening of direct negotiations, suggested that agreement should be reached on an agenda before detailed discussions were to begin, and proposed that non-aggression pacts should be concluded between Israel and the Arab states as a first step toward a formal peace treaty.

The Commission then submitted its second set of proposals to the Arab delegations on September 17 and to the Israeli delegation on September 21. The preamble declared that the parties, in accordance with their obligations as members of the United Nations and as signatories to the Armistice Agreements, undertook “to settle all differences, present or future, solely by resort to pacific procedures, refraining from any use of force or acts of hostility, with full respect for the right of each party to security and freedom from fear of attack, and by these means to promote the return of peace in Palestine.” With a view “to the settlement of outstanding differences between the parties,” the Commission recommended:

1. That all claims concerning war damage arising out of the hostilities of 1948 should be cancelled.

2. That the Israeli Government should agree to the repatriation of a specified number of Arab refugees in categories which could be integrated into Israel’s economy.

3. That the Israeli Government should accept the obligation to pay, as compensation for property abandoned by those refugees not repatriated, a sum based upon the valuation
arrived at by the Commission's Refugee Office, and that a renumeration plan, taking into account the Israeli Government's financial ability should be set up by a special committee of economic and financial experts, to be established by a United Nations trustee through whom payment of individual claims could be made.

(4) That the Governments of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Israel should agree upon the mutual release of all blocked bank accounts, and their deliverance in sterling pounds.

(5) That the Governments of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Israel should consider, under U.N. auspices, the revision or amendment of the Armistice Agreements between them, especially with regard to the following questions: (a) the adjustments of territorial boundaries, including demilitarized zones; (b) the formation of an international water authority to deal with the problems of the use of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers and their tributaries, as well as the waters of Lake Tiberias; (c) the disposition of the Gaza-Strip, at present administered by Egypt; (d) the building of a free port at Haifa; (e) the regulations of borders between Israel and her neighbours, with special attention to the need for free access to the Holy Places in the Jerusalem area, including Bethlehem; (f) the supervision of health and the prevention of narcotics and contraband traffic along the demarcation lines; and (g) the resumption of communications and economic relations and the provision of facilities for the economic development of the area.

However, discussions of the actual agenda were delayed for a month because of disagreements over the Commission's preamble. The Israeli delegation submitted a draft of a non-aggression pact whereby the parties would bind themselves to respect "the right of each party to its security and freedom from fear of attack or hostile acts by the other," to settle all
their differences "solely by resort to pacific procedures," to "refrain from any acts of hostility whatsoever and from any threat or use of force in their reciprocal relations," and "not to enter into any alliance or participate in any action directed against the other." The Arab delegations, on the other hand, merely submitted a declaration reaffirming their intention to respect the undertaking given in the Armistice Agreements "not to resort to military force in settlement of the Palestine question, and to respect the right of each party to security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other."

In a letter to the delegations on October 6, 1951, the Commission nevertheless stated that the declarations proposed by the opposing parties had "contributed to the creation of a favorable atmosphere for the present discussions and for the promotion of the return of peace in Palestine."

While the Arab delegations expressed their willingness to take part in discussions, the Israeli delegation, although reaffirming its desire to cooperate with the Commission, replied on October 14, 1951, that it could not accept the Commission's view of the Arab declaration, which it considered unsatisfactory for three reasons: (1) the Arab states proposed to bind themselves only "as signatories of the armistice convention"; (2) the text did not commit the signatories to settle their differences only through peaceful procedure; and (3) it limited the term "hostile acts" to cover only the use of armed forces. This interpretation, the Israeli letter pointed out, had already been rejected by the Security Council in its decision on the Egyptian blockade of the Suez Canal. The Commission replied, on October 19, that it could not "accept any interpretation of its position which would imply an evaluation of the scope of either the Armistice Agreements, the resolution of the Security Council, or the provisions of the United Nations Charter." It added that neither the form nor the substance of any of the parties' declarations could alter the obligations
assumed by them under the Armistice Agreements and the Charter. It also invited the Israeli delegation to open discussions on its (the Commission's) proposals. The Israeli delegation nevertheless, declined to continue negotiations “until the Arab delegations recognise their obligations as members of the United Nations and as signatories of the Armistice Agreements as interpreted by the Security Council.” A deadlock was thus reached, and the negotiations broke off at this stage.

Following the failure of the Conciliation Commission a resolution was presented on November 26, 1952, to the Ad Hoc Political Committee by Mr. Finn Moe (Norway) on behalf of Canada, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Uruguay, Cuba, Panama and Ecuador. The eight-nation resolution asked the Assembly: (1) to call upon all parties to the dispute to desist from any acts of hostility; (2) to reaffirm the principle that the governments concerned had a primary responsibility for reaching a settlement of their differences; (3) to urge those governments to open direct negotiations as soon as possible; and (4) to request the Palestine Conciliation Commission to offer its services in securing a settlement.

The debate on this question was marked, on the one hand, by the insistence of the Arab governments that the Arab-Israeli negotiations should be conducted in the framework of past resolutions of the Assembly (involving, inter alia, the internationalization of Jerusalem and the resettlement of the Palestinian refugees), and on the other hand by Israel’s insistence that such negotiations should start from a new basis without reference to former U.N. resolutions on the subject.

After further discussion, in which the Canadian, Norwegian and Mexican delegates played a prominent part in trying to reconcile the Arab and Israeli viewpoints, the Political Committee adopted a compromise resolution which was supported by Israel, but opposed by the Arab states. In the plenary
session of the General Assembly, however, the resolution failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority, and thus it failed to secure adoption.

American Quiet Diplomacy

Following the take-over of power in Egypt by the Free Officers under the leadership of Gamal Nasser in the summer of 1952, the efforts of the new regime focused on terminating the presence of British imperialism in the country. This meant flirting with the United States in order to neutralize it temporarily while concluding the struggle with the British. The U.S. took advantage of this opportunity to put forward its secret mediation plan to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict and liquidate once and for all the Palestine problem.

On August 3, 1954, Nasser stated that Egypt needed peace in order to solve her internal problems, and suggested that the American government should act as a mediator between Israel and the Arab countries. Though describing Israel as a “hostile, bellicose and aggressive nation,” he implicated that Egypt wished to end the existing discord, provided that the United Nations resolutions would be carried out.

Miles Copeland revealed, in an article published in the London Times on 24 June, 1971, that President Nasser exchanged personal messages (late 1953) with Moshe Sharett, then Israeli Prime Minister, through American unofficial channels and by means of secret meetings between Egyptian and Israeli representatives in a certain European capital. The preliminary topic of the exchanges was the reduction of antagonism between the two sides. David Ben-Gurion stated that the purpose of the exchange of messages between Egypt and Israel in 1953 and the meetings which were held in Paris and attended by representatives from both countries in 1954 was to “reduce the tensions” on the borders (Ma'ariv, 2, 9, 16, 23, 1971). These contacts were brought to an end in early
1955 following Ben-Gurion’s return to power and the famous Israeli raid into Gaza which cost the lives of thirty-eight Egyptians. This raid played an influential role in convincing President Nasser that Egypt should get arms from sources other than the traditional Western ones. He decided to approach the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc in order to achieve his purpose. The direct result was the famous arms deal with Czechoslovakia.

Following this event, which shook the Middle East at the time, American diplomacy attempted to resuscitate the secret Egyptian-Israeli meetings at the highest levels. The American agencies assigned Miles Copeland and Kermit Roosevelt the responsibility of reviving and supervising these contacts.

According to Miles Copeland and David Ben-Gurion, the secret parley began in September, 1955, when Gamal Nasser agreed secretly with Kermit Roosevelt to “balance the Soviet arms deal by making some meaningful gesture of peace,” as the aide-memoire put it, and to announce that the importation of military hardware was “entirely for defensive purposes.” In a speech that was made soon after this declaration, Nasser insisted that Egypt stands ready to take positive steps towards peace so long as we see that the other side will respond in kind.” However, Nasser reneged on his public statements when Mr. John Foster Dulles, the American Secretary of State, denounced the Russian arms deal; yet agreement was reached to continue the endeavors in the form of the GAMMA Project, which was an attempt at secret negotiations master-minded by Kermit Roosevelt and fronted by Robert Anderson, who later became President Dwight Eisenhower’s Secretary of the Treasury.

According to the GAMMA Project, Roosevelt and Copeland would have a series of talks with Nasser to arrive at a basic negotiating posture with which to confront Ben-Gurion, while two other Americans would have similar talks with
Ben-Gurion to develop a corresponding Israeli position. Then, Anderson would “fly back and forth between Cairo and Tel-Aviv” to narrow differences to an irreducible minimum. Finally, Nasser and Ben-Gurion would meet secretly on a private yacht in the Mediterranean to try to close the gap. “Even if we do not reach an agreement,” Nasser said, “we will at least learn each other’s limitations.”

Both leaders agreed to undertake the three steps. Yet Nasser insisted upon two points: Egypt must have “something more than a corridor” (the width to be arrived at after haggling with the Israelis) to link it with Jordan, and the Israelis must “agree in principle” to accept those Palestinians who wish to return to their homes. Nasser hastened to explain, however, that he would expect the Israelis to put administrative delays in the way, and the Americans to give grants of land or cash to lure away those Palestinians made impatient by the delays.

Armed with this expectation, Anderson took off for Tel-Aviv. Ben-Gurion, despite the fact that he had agreed to the three steps, flatly refused to enter upon details with Anderson. “Your job,” he said, “is to bring about a meeting between Nasser and myself. If I am going to make any concessions it will be to Nasser, and to no one else.” Thus Ben-Gurion backed away. This put an end to the GAMMA Project, thus exposing Israel’s disinclination for an actual peace with the Arabs and its desire to perpetuate the existing situation.

The Dulles Plan

On August 26, 1955, Secretary of State Dulles made an important statement on his government’s Middle Eastern policy while addressing the Council of Foreign Relations in New York. In his speech, which was made with the President’s approval, he expressed the willingness of the Eisenhower Administration to work for the achievement of a peaceful settlement between Israel and the Arab countries. He pin-
pointed three main problems that had to be solved:

(1) The displaced Palestinians. To put an end to the plight of the 900,000 refugees, they should be resettled or repatriated in order to be able to resume a life of dignity and self-respect. This would entail the provision of more arable land where the refugees could find permanent homes and gain their livelihood through their own work. Fortunately, projects for water development which existed, could make this possible.

Secretary Dulles affirmed that compensation would be forthcoming from Israel. However, it may be that Israel could not, unaided, make adequate payments. If so, there might be an international loan to enable it to carry out its indemnifications. The United States would participate substantially in such a loan, and would contribute to the realization of water development and irrigation projects which, directly or indirectly, would facilitate the resettlement of the refugees.

(2) The second problem is that of fear. The nature of this trepidation is such that it is hardly within the capacity of the countries of the area, acting alone, to replace this apprehensiveness and fright with a sense of security. J. Foster Dulles maintained that security can be assured only by collective measures which would muster sufficient power capable of deterring aggression. He implied that the United States would join in formal treaty arrangements to prevent or thwart any effort to alter by force the boundaries between Israel and her Arab neighbours. He expressed hope that other countries would be willing to join in such a security guarantee, and that it would be sponsored by the United Nations.

(3) The delineation of borders. There must be prior agreement upon what the frontiers should be, if there is to be a guarantee of borders. The demarcation lines separating Israel and the Arab states were fixed by the Armistice Agreements of 1949. They were not designed to be permanent borders, rather, they reflected the status of the fighting at the moment.
Dulles did admit that the task of drawing permanent boundaries would be a difficult one. He added that his government would be willing to help in the search for a solution if the parties to the dispute should so desire.

If agreement could be reached on these problems, Mr. Dulles went on, then it might be possible to find solutions for other questions, largely economic, which “fan the flames of hostility and resentment.” An agreement on the status of Jerusalem would then be possible. The United States would give its support to a United Nations review of this problem.

It should be noted here that the obvious American tactic, embodied in Secretary Dulles’ proposals, was to depoliticize the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestine problem in favor of a technocratic approach which pictures the conflict as soluble by advanced technical means, i.e., combating the discord by breaking it up into the seemingly technical problems such as that of “water development in the area,” “resettlement of the refugees,” “ensuring the required loan,” “drawing permanent frontiers,” and “agreements to guarantee these borders.”

In other words, the failure of the earlier American diplomatic attempts (secret and public) to settle the conflict and liquidate the Palestine problem, pursued American policy makers to turn to a technologically-oriented solution which would ostensibly call for the development of the natural resources of the area under the patronage of U.S. imperialism in lieu of the Arabs waging a war against Israel. The Dulles Plan was the first clear expression of this line of policy.

On August 27, 1955, the British Foreign Office issued a statement in which it strongly endorsed Dulles’ recommendations. It described them as “an important contribution towards the most critical outstanding problem in the Middle East.” The British government expressed its readiness to fully participate in an effort to bring about more amiable relations. It supported the American suggestion that a settlement of these
problems should be made by direct or indirect negotiations, without detriment to the vital interests of either side. The British government would be ready to guarantee, by treaty or treaties with the parties concerned, any territorial settlement agreed upon. It would also be ready to contribute to an international loan that would assist Israel in paying compensation to the Arab refugees.

In an interview with the British United Press on September 11, 1955, Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett outlined his government’s attitude towards the Dulles Plan. He said that while Israel was willing to discuss certain border adjustments with her Arab neighbors, she was not prepared to make unilateral concessions of territory, particularly in the Negev. Commenting that Mr. Dulles had appeared to “make the fixing of boundaries a condition that must come before the conclusion of the defence treaties, which he himself regards as urgently needed,” Mr. Sharett declared that the present armistice lines, “whatever technical or other demerits they possess, have at least the inestimable advantage of being agreed upon, whereas any agreed correction of these lines in the near future is highly problematic, if not illusory.” The Negev, in particular, was of great importance to Israel both for its mineral wealth and for the “supreme value” of the port of Eilat. “That foothold on the Red Sea,” said Mr. Sharett, “is of far-reaching significance to Israel, and invests with the same quality of decisive value any part of the land bridge between it and the main body of the state’s territory.”

A further amplification of Israel’s attitude to the Dulles Plan was also made on the same date by the then Israeli Ambassador in Washington, Mr. Abba Eban. After stating that Mr. Sharett had presented Israel’s views to the U.S. government, Mr. Eban warmly commended Mr. Dulles’ “realistic and imaginative approach” to the problem, but said that it was “acutely discouraging to read Mr. Dulles’ para-
graph on frontiers.” Mr. Eban further alleged that the Israeli government considered the present frontiers between Israel and the Arab states as possessing “more solid attributes” than Mr. Dulles’ speech had indicated, for the following reasons:

(1) The present frontiers had existed by international agreement and arrangement for seven years, and had stood out “in recognized integrity” despite the fact that hostilities had occurred from time to time. As to to their not being formalized, Eban reasoned that they were “vastly superior to any imaginary line which does not have the tradition of stability or the virtue of reality.”

(2) Both Israel and the Arab states had agreed that the present boundaries would not be changed except by agreement under the armistice terms concluded in 1949. None of the parties has invoked the armistice procedure for change, and they are more likely to resign themselves to the present lines than to reach a new agreement. In any event “there can be no question of unilateral concessions by Israel to the Arab states, which are so abundant in territory.”

(3) If the present frontiers could be “a fitting subject for the tripartite agreement in 1950, it cannot be an unfitting subject for a treaty engagement today.”

(4) Even the advocates of a new border agreement did not seem to have any drastic alterations in mind. “How, then, could an adjustment, which admittedly would be only minor in character, be so momentous as to make all the difference between the application of a treaty solution and its denial?”

(5) There was “nothing intrinsically tense” about the configuration of the present frontiers. Tension would result, not from the shape of the borders but from the relationship between the governments on either side of it.

Summarizing what he described as “the foundation of Israel’s position,” Mr. Eban said:
“We will explore every road of progress towards the liquidation of conflict between the Arab states and Israel. While being ready for mutual adjustments of the boundary line, we shall accept no unilateral territorial concessions for ourselves, just as we have demanded nothing from our neighbours. Mr. Sharett’s statement on the Negev is an absolutely fundamental and immutable part of our policy. Now that there is an important willingness in principle for the leaders of the U.S. to engage themselves by a treaty to thwart aggression in our area, we urgently advocate that this priceless stability be conferred upon our region now, and not be lost through association with unattainable conditions.”

It seems that the Rogers’ Plan of 1970 which called for “minor border adjustments” between Israel and the surrounding Arab countries was derived partly from Dulles’ proposal and partly from the discussions that it engendered in the early fifties concerning the nature of the border configurations which Israel claimed it would accept.

On the Arab side, the Syrian Prime Minister, Said Ghazzi, announced in the Chamber of Deputies on September 26, 1955, that his government rejected any plans or attempts for the conclusion of peace with Israel, including the proposals of Mr. Dulles. No other Arab state had officially defined its attitude towards Mr. Dulles’ proposals, but a Cairo broadcast on August 29, 1955, denounced the Dulles Plan as an attempt “to deliver the Arabs to the mercy of Israel.”

Anthony Eden’s Proposal

On November 9, 1955, Prime Minister Anthony Eden announced that Britain would be prepared to give a formal guarantee to Israel and the Arab states if an acceptable arrangement could be reached for settling the frontiers between them.

Here, it becomes necessary for the reader to recall—with regard to the British offers—that the rivalry between the collapse of the old imperialism and the interests of the rising American imperialism in the Middle East was at its height in
the mid-fifties. This explains why Eden put forward his bids for peace. Furthermore, the British tender did not draw its inspiration from the Dulles Plan, but was one of the last attempts by the British policy decision-makers to bolster their fading empire.

Sir Anthony Eden promised that if the Arabs and the Israelis would accept a mutually conducive arrangement in connection with their boundaries, Britain, the United States and other powers would be prepared to give a formal guarantee to both sides. He believed that this might bring real confidence and security to the region. Britain and other countries would offer substantial financial and other aid for the refugees.

The Arabs, Eden continued, base their stand on the 1947 Partition Plan and other U.N. resolutions. The Arabs have said that they would be willing to discuss terms with Israel on that basis. The Israelis, on the other hand, base their arguments on the Armistice Agreement of 1949. Between these two positions there is a wide gap, but it is not that unbridgeable. He pointed out that it is not right that U.N. resolutions should be ignored. But, equally, the U.N. resolutions on Palestine could not be put into operation as they stand.

"The stark truth," the Prime Minister added "is that if these nations want to win a peace which is in both their interests, they must make some compromise between these two positions. His Majesty's Government, and I personally, are available to render any service in this cause."

Israel was the first to announce its rejection of Eden's proposals because of his reference to the U.N. resolutions. The rebuff came in a speech delivered by David Ben-Gurion in the Knesset on November 15, 1955. He maintained that the offer was designed "to truncate the territory of Israel for the benefit of her neighbours" and therefore had "no legal, moral or logical basis."

Ben-Gurion said that Eden's proposals, instead of fostering
better relations and bringing peace nearer, were more likely "to encourage and intensify Arab aggression and lessen the likelihood of peace in the Middle East." He emphasized that Israel could not conduct negotiations on such basis, which, he said, involved the "dismemberment of Israel's territory" and were tantamount to "bestowing a prize upon the aggressors." He added that "the invasion of Arab states (i.e. the 1948 war) has made all U.N. resolutions on Palestine null and void. They cannot be brought back to life, anymore than the thousands of Jewish defenders who gave their lives."

No official statement was made by any of the Arab governments in response to the British offer. But Gamal Nasser, in a press statement on November 28, 1955, said that Sir Anthony Eden's reference to the U.N. resolutions of 1947 "indicates that the rights of the Palestinian Arabs have not been abandoned as had been imagined by some of the great powers, and that the time has come for a revival of those resolutions which have been ignored, for eight years." Nasser added that Eden had not put forward any definite stipulations calling for Egyptian support, but had simply taken up the U.N. resolutions again—a fact which Egypt considered "as an acknowledgement of the rights of the Palestinian Arab people, whose country had been usurped when it was under the British mandate."

The Mediation of A Journalist

In May 1956, an Egyptian journalist, Mr. Ibrahim 'Izzat, visited Israel for eleven days as the guest of the Israeli government. The disclosure was made in Cairo on May 19, 1956, when he reported on his tour to President Nasser. Upon his return he wrote an article in Rose el-Youssef containing many impressions favorable to Israel.

Mr. 'Izzat said that he had personal meetings with Moshe Sharett, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mrs. Golda Meir, the Minister of Labor, both of whom had stressed their desire
for peace with Egypt. After saying that Egypt was regarded as Israel’s only potential enemy, and that peace with Egypt was “the aim and dream of everyone in Israel.” Mr. ‘Izzat wrote: “The Israelis feel that if they can make peace with Egypt the rest of the Arab states will have to follow. They have no special fear of their other Arab neighbours.”

While in Israel, Mr. ‘Izzat was given a message from Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, through a secretary, for transmission to President Nasser. While no official Israeli version of the message was made public, Mr. ‘Izzat referred to it as follows: “It you meet Nasser, tell him I am ready to meet him at any time, at any place he chooses, to discuss any problem he wishes —refugees, borders, political, economic, or military questions— without mediation and without publicly announcing anything about such a meeting or its results. Tell him that I am ready to meet him in Cairo.”

A spokesman for Mr. Ben-Gurion confirmed on June 21, 1956, that the Prime Minister of Israel was ready to meet Nasser “at any time and any place” and to go to Cairo “like a shot” if necessary. He added that no more Egyptian journalists would be invited to visit Israel unless Nasser reciprocated by allowing Israeli journalists to visit Egypt.

Nothing materialized because of the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the tripartite aggression against Egypt which followed it.

*Moshe Sharett’s Proposal*

The next in a series of plans, was put forward by Moshe Sharett during his visit to the United States. He had discussions on November 21 and December 6, 1956 with Secretary Dulles, in which he repeated Israel’s request for American arms supplies and at the same time informed him that Israel was prepared to make five major concessions as a contribution toward a peace settlement.
The details were published in Washington on December 19:

(1) Israel would agree to mutual adjustments of the 1949 armistice line for the purpose of security and improved communications, but would not consider negotiating on the basis of the 1947 partition lines.

(2) Israel would consider granting the Arab states transit rights for the free flow of commerce from north to south between Lebanon and Egypt and across the Negev between Egypt and Jordan, provided the Arab states granted similar transit rights desired by Israel. Such rights would apply to both land and air travel.

(3) Jordan would be offered free port facilities in Haifa and the necessary transit rights to reach the port by land.

(4) Israel would be willing to raise funds to compensate the Arab refugees. It accepted the U.S. offer of a loan to help in the work of resettlement and rehabilitation but insisted that the refugees should be settled in the Arab states and not returned to Israel.

(5) Israel agreed to accept the Jordan River development plan drawn by Mr. Joseph Johnson, whereby Israel and the Arab states would share the waters of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers. It considered this a concession because more than half the water supplies would go to the Arab states.

It was made clear that Israel would not retreat from its previous position on the following points: (1) it would not agree to any unilateral concessions, and would expect that minor adjustments in the armistice lines would leave Israel’s total territory virtually the same; (2) it would not relinquish the port of Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba; (3) in granting transit rights to Jordan and Egypt across the Negev, it would not permit the creation of any extra-territorial corridor; (4) it would continue to oppose the internationalization of Jerusalem.

No official statement was made by any of the Arab states in response to Sharett’s offers.
The Canadian Proposal

After the Suez Crisis, the first of a series of suggestions for peace agreements was made on February 26, 1957, by Mr. Lester Pearson, the Canadian Minister for External Affairs. He stressed in the United Nations General Assembly that the U.N. had “reached the point of no return” and that there could be no question of reverting to the conditions which existed before October 1956. He put forward the following four-point plan:

1. There should be a firm pledge by Israel and Egypt to observe scrupulously all the provisions of the 1949 Armistice Agreement.
2. The Secretary-General and the commander of the United Nations Emergency Force should make arrangements with the governments concerned for its deployment on the armistice demarcation lines. Its sole purpose would be to put the Force in a position:
   (a) to assume certain duties of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization;
   (b) to assist in preventing incursions, raids and retaliatory attacks across the armistice lines in either direction;
   (c) to maintain peaceful conditions on both sides of the line.
3. It should be agreed and affirmed that there should be no interference with innocent passage through, nor any assertion of belligerent rights in, the Straits of Tiran. The withdrawal of Israeli troops from Sharm al-Sheikh should be followed by the entry of U.N.E.F. into the area to assist in maintaining peaceful conditions and preventing conflict, in accordance with the purposes laid down by the Assembly for the U.N. Force.
4. The establishment of a U.N. civil administration for the Gaza-Strip in cooperation with Egypt and Israel.

Although it was not adopted in full, the suggestions delineated formed the guidelines for Lester Pearson in his mediation efforts between Egypt and Israel that culminated in the setting up of U.N.E.F.
The Australian Proposal

On October 21, 1957, the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Robert G. Menzies, urged that a new attempt should be made to "break the vicious circle" in the Middle East, and called on the United Nations to "promote urgently discussions on a high level designed to discover the practicability of a new and guaranteed international agreement aimed at removing the root causes of tension" in the area. Mr. Menzies suggested the following six points as a basis for a Middle East settlement:

(1) A final and guaranteed settlement of the Arab-Israel borders.
(2) A settlement of the refugee problem.
(3) Economic aid without military strings, afforded by genuine international cooperation, to Middle East nations who need it.
(4) Peaceful trade, good for both buyer and seller, should be encouraged.
(5) Civil and economic aspects of the Baghdad Pact should be recognized and extended.
(6) The great problem of oil supplies should be looked at in terms of cooperation and international guarantees and not merely in terms of international competition."

Mr. Menzies also propounded the establishment of an international advisory body or commission to advise the Middle Eastern countries on their financial and economic problems and to "make recommendations to other nations, particularly the great ones, for constructive advice and assistance."

No official or unofficial comments were made by either the Israeli or Arab governments.

Dag Hammarskjold's Recommendations

The years that followed the tripartite aggression against Egypt witnessed a fierce struggle waged by the ascending nationalist and Arab progressive forces led by Gamal Nasser
and the Ba’th Party in Syria against local reaction and imperialism in the area. The confrontation culminated in the formation of the United Arab Republic, the disintegration of the Baghdad Pact and the landing of U.S. Marines in Lebanon. During this period no proposals, in the strict sense of the word, were advanced by any circles for the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the liquidation of the Palestine problem.

During this period American efforts concentrated on an economic approach by suggesting projects for the “development” of the area and for combating the problems of “underdevelopment.” One of the main aims behind these designs was to defuse the Palestine problem through the absorption of the Palestinian refugees in the host countries where these projects would be erected. It should be pointed out that American imperialism at that time was well on its way in completely replacing the classic colonial powers in the Arab East. This prompted the American government to present its schemes to the countries of the area in the form of economic and water development projects. Specifically, one can mention the proposal advanced by President Dwight Eisenhower, announced on January 5, 1957, in which he called on the Congress to give financial aid to the Eastern Arab states for economic development in return for fighting communism. Eisenhower reiterated his plan in the first half of 1958, at the extra-ordinary session of the U.N. General Assembly held to discuss the Middle East conflict. Eisenhower recommended the setting-up of a regional Arab Development Organization with the help of the United Nations for the industrial, agricultural and water development of the area. He made it clear that his nation is ready to participate in the establishment of such an organization and to give it support. In spite of the fact that Eisenhower did not mention the Palestine problem in his speech, the U.N. Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, later commented that the two were connected. The Secretary-General stated that
the implementation of these plans would lay the foundations for solving one of the most dangerous problems in the area, namely, that of the Palestinian refugees.

Thus, on June 15, 1959, Dag Hammarskjold presented the U.N. General Assembly with a plan for the integration of the Palestinians in the economic life of the Middle East. The scheme was hoped to enable the refugees to be economically dependent on themselves and to employ usefully the aid offered to them by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). All the rehabilitation projects, which were carried on a limited scale, were declared by the Secretary-General as the official policy of UNRWA. Hammarskjold viewed these programs as an introduction to the resettlement and integration of the Palestinian refugees. The formulations presented constituted an example of the indirect approach for solving the Palestine problem in non-national, non-political terms.

The Palestinians rejected Hammarskjold’s plan by holding a congress in Beirut on June 26, 1959, which was attended by representatives of all the refugee camps and Palestinian organizations in Lebanon. It issued an important communique which repudiated his proposals and his call for the integration of the Palestinian people in the economies of the Middle Eastern countries. It also expressed opposition to any other project which would deny the Palestinians their legitimate right to their homeland. On July 12, 1959, another Palestinian congress was held in Beirut at the end of which a communique was issued reiterating support for the position adopted by the first congress. It also warned UNRWA against adopting Hammarskjold’s proposals and implementing his recommendations.

**Dr. Robert Johnson’s Recommendations**

When the rising Arab nationalist and progressive wave
(under the leadership of Nasser’s Egypt) had exhausted its initial impetus and reached its inherent limits, American diplomacy began once again to advance projects as a means for concluding a peace agreement with Israel. Its efforts were, as before, directed at depoliticizing the problem by attempting to present it as a conflict which would require solutions of a “technical” nature to be provided by specialists after studying the “problem” in an “objective” and “impartial” manner in order to find the most “adequate” and “suitable” solution.

On the basis of this assumption, the United States, through the Palestine Conciliation Commission, engaged, in 1961, Dr. Joseph E. Johnson, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to make a fresh study of the refugee problem.

According to Dr. Johnson, the intransigence of both sides ruled out any formal agreement on the number of refugees who might be permitted to return. To Israel, the security problem precluded an accord on any large number of returnees. The Arabs, on the other hand, refused to proceed to details until Israel had accepted in principle the provisions of paragraph 11 of the General Assembly resolution 194/III which declared “that refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for property of those choosing not to return. . . .”

As a basis for his forthcoming discussions with the opposing governments, Dr. Johnson sought to define the intentions of the General Assembly when it had passed this basic resolution in 1948. He asserted that the primary consideration had been the human welfare and wishes of the refugees themselves. But this welfare, according to Dr. Johnson, could not be allowed to conflict with the legitimate interests of the states concerned. Specifically, the General Assembly had not intended a solution that would threaten either the existence or the security of
Israel—a nation brought into being by the U.N. itself.

On October 2, 1962, Dr. Johnson presented a solution along the following lines. Refugee heads of families, insulated by the U.N. from pressures coming from various sources, should be allowed to choose voluntarily between a return to Palestine and compensation. These choices must be made specific, that is, each refugee should know exactly what opportunities for resettlement existed in Israel and at what level the indemnities would be made. The latter should be based on 1947-1948 values of property in Palestine, plus accrued interest. The United States and other members of the United Nations, including Israel, would contribute to the reparations. Israel would have the right to run a security check on each refugee opting for return.

Those displaced persons, who did not have property in Palestine, would receive a reintegration allowance, wherever they might choose to go. Such allowances would be administered through the U.N. which would also act as a cushion between the two sides during the long process of settlement.

Such a cohabitation scheme would demand compromise from both the Arabs and the Israelis including a willingness not to intimidate the refugees while choosing a place of abode. Some U.N. agency would need to operate freely on both sides of the armistice lines. Any government would have the right to withdraw from the plan, if it considered its basic interests threatened. The entire operation would need to be gradual and of a type which, if abandoned along the way, would not leave the refugees worse off than they had been before.

Dr. Johnson's proposals in effect were rejected by Israel in November 1962. Without referring to the plan as such, Foreign Minister Golda Meir reiterated a Knesset resolution of November 1961, which stated that there could be no repatriation of the Arab refugees to Israel and that the only solution to the problem was their settlement in the Arab states. Since
that time, she told the Knesset, there had been no change in Israel’s stand vis-a-vis the refugee problem. This statement is contrary to other Israeli affirmations declaring that their refusal to allow refugees to return to their homes is based on the rejection of the Arab governments to make peace with Israel. Here it could be objectively pointed out that the latter explanation given by Israel for not allowing the refugees to go back is only for international popular consumption since Israel will never accept any project which aims at repatriating and/or compensating the Palestinian refugees.

The Arab governments, while not rejecting Dr. Johnson’s postulations openly, continued to insist that Israel must first accept in principle the pertinent U.N. resolutions. In January 1963, Dr. Johnson resigned from his United Nations assignment.

Few months after the failure of Johnson’s mission, American diplomacy returned to its activity in the Middle East but without advancing any new programs. This time it tried to work through the Palestine Conciliation Commission. On November 20, 1963, the U.N. General Assembly’s Special Committee on Palestine approved a United States sponsored resolution calling on the Commission “to continue its efforts for the implementation” of paragraph 11 of resolution 194/III quoted above. The Israeli delegate to the United Nations declared that the resolution is “wholly unacceptable to Israel.”

On the same day, Premier Levi Eshkol protested the contents of the resolution “in the strongest terms” to the U.S. Ambassador to Israel. Eshkol pointed out:

Israel has two objections to the draft. First it involves a choice by the refugees and is believed to give greater weight to repatriation than to settlement as a solution. Second, Israel basically favors direct negotiations rather than third-party mediation to settle the disputes between her and her Arab neighbors.

On December 3, 1963, a report submitted by the Palestine
Conciliation Commission, filed with the General Assembly, disclosed that with the approval of other Commission members (France and Turkey), the U.S. had been conducting a series of quiet negotiations at a high level since the beginning of 1963 with Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt. The report stated that “all sides had shown good will, a desire to achieve progress on the refugee problem, and a desire to continue talks, which are not yet completed.”

Also on the same day, Arab delegates to the U.N. issued a joint statement formally denying that such discussions had ever taken place and declaring that “our governments are not prepared to undertake any talks of any nature with the Conciliation Commission” and that the only solution of the refugee problem lay in the repatriation of Palestinians.

*Habib Bourguiba’s Proposals*

President Habib Bourguiba put forward his proposal for finishing with the Palestine problem and settling the conflict with Israel after touring the Arab Middle East in March and April 1965. He challenged the Arab contention that co-existence with Israel was impossible. Instead of planning for eventual warfare against Israel, he urged a step-by-step progress toward a settlement of the Palestine problem under which Arabs and Israelis could live peacefully side by side.

This was the first time that a responsible Arab leader had openly declared that a compromise over Palestine would be desirable, and the first time that such a view had entered the field of political discussion among Arab leaders.

After his return to Tunisia, Bourguiba delivered a speech before an assembly of Tunisian students on April 21, 1965, in which he called for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute on the basis of the U.N. Partition Resolution of November 29, 1947, which would involve (1) the handing back by Israel to a Palestine Arab state of about one-third of the territory which
it has been occupying since 1948; (2) the return to Israel of the Palestine Arab refugees who fled the country when the state was founded; and (3) a reconciliation between the Arab states and Israel and the ending of the "cold war" between them.

Expressing his belief in the possibility of an ultimate Arab-Israeli reconciliation, President Bourguiba suggested that negotiations should be opened between the Palestinian Arabs and Israel, which could be followed by an Arab-Israeli meeting in Rome or some other capital. If Israel adopted a positive attitude to his overtures, he would be prepared to raise the matter at the next Arab summit meeting in Rabat and to make a personal approach to President Nasser.

It seemed that the Tunisian President had no illusions with regard to Israel’s possible acceptance of the Partition Resolution or the ability of the Arab states to execute such a plan. Still his declarations had the effect of breaking the unanimity of the official Arab stand in reference to the Palestine question and Israel at a time when the national Arab liberation movement under the leadership of Nasser’s Egypt was on the retreat. This was most evident at the time in the policy of Arab summit conferences which amounted to a conciliation with the Arab reactionary forces and their regimes. Bourguiba put forward his proposal in terms of the Partition Resolution (although he knew Israel would never accept) in order to minimize the negative impact of his ideas at the Arab popular level. His real intention was to make a first move of some sort in the direction of bargaining with Israel. Since Bourguiba’s suggestions were not backed by any of the Great Powers, they were severely criticized in all the Arab countries except Morocco, Libya and Saudi Arabia—where there were no official comments—and in Tunisia itself.

The Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mr. Mahmoud Riad, told the National Assembly in Cairo on April 27, that his govern-
ment rejected President Bourguiba's proposals and "strongly denounces the issuance of such proposals by the Head of an Arab state." Riad stressed that there could be "no intermediary, no negotiation and no compromise" in the Palestine question. The Egyptian National Assembly adopted a resolution condemning the Tunisian President for "violating the unanimity of millions of Arabs... and abrogating his signature on the resolution of the first Arab summit" calling for United Arab action against Israel.

A meeting of representatives of the Arab states—boycotted by Tunisia—was held in Cairo on April 28-29, 1965, at which a resolution was adopted rejecting "any call for recognition, reconciliation, or coexistence with Israel," and declaring that recognition of Israel in exchange for the repatriation of the Palestinian Arabs would be "a deviation from Arab unanimity on the Palestine cause and from the Charter of the Arab League."

An unofficial Israeli reaction to Bourguiba's declarations was presented by Y. Harkabi, the former head of Israeli intelligence, in a paper submitted to the Seventh Annual Conference of the Institute for Strategic Studies. Harkabi said that Arab leaders had been arousing expectations of the liberation of Palestine and of imminent success, but these declarations had always disappointed the Arab people. Israel had been hoping that cultivating such hopes might eventually have the dialectic result of leading to their abandonment. The cumulative effect of Arab failures to achieve their objective will strengthen the incipient recognition testified to by Bourguiba's pronouncement of the need to be freed from their hold. Once the existence of Israel is accepted, the main hurdle in the way to a settlement would be overcome, and the other points of contention will become insignificant. The ideology of destroying Israel, claimed to be operational, will become ritual, and will finally be discarded as it would prove to be more and
more impractical. The postponement of war may be a first step towards its final repudiation.

An official Israeli reaction was made by Abba Eban in a statement delivered on April 24, 1965, in which he described Bourguiba’s declarations as “important” but emphasized that there could be no settlement on the basis of the 1947 U.N. Partition Resolution which he called “a broken egg of 18 years ago.” Mr. Eshkol, the Prime Minister, similarly rejected on May 2nd, the substance of President Bourguiba’s propositions, while welcoming the fact that for the first time a prominent Arab leader had come out in favour of peace and reconciliation between the Arab states and Israel.

_Eshkol’s Proposal_

On May 17, 1965, in his opening address at the last session of the fifth Knesset, Eshkol presented Israel’s “peace terms” which could be considered as a reply to those of Bourguiba. Eshkol said that from the juridical point of view, the effort for peace in the area is rooted in two international obligations, one general and the other specific. The general obligation is the duty accepted by all states who are members of the U.N. to live with each other in peace and good neighbourliness. The specific one is the obligation in the Armistice Agreements of 1949. These Agreements provide a transition stage toward permanent peace. Israel therefore demands that direct negotiations be conducted between her and those countries that have signed the Armistice Agreements, in order to replace them by accords on peace.

The peace settlement must be formulated on the basis of the recognition of Israel as it exists. There is neither sense nor justice in wishing for territorial changes to Israel’s disadvantage, and there is neither the power nor the possibility, juridical or practical, to carry them out. There may be minor mutually agreed upon adjustments of certain points that pose as hind-
rances to the daily life of the population. He concluded with a postulate: peace comes to change the relations between states, but not the states themselves.

Once peace is assured, Israel and the Arab states would be free to enjoy its fruits, such as orderly land transport by road and rail; freedom of transit through airports; extensive radio, telephone and postal communications; access to Israeli free ports on the Mediterranean under suitable conditions for the benefit of Jordan which has no outlet to that sea; facilities for the sale of oil through the revival of the oil pipeline or the building of larger ones; encouragement of tourism to all the countries of the area; and free access to the Holy Places with facilities for religious pilgrimage to centers sacred to all religions.

A climate of negotiations for peace will enable Israel and the Arab states to act together to restrain the arms race and cut down armaments in the region. They would be able to divert tremendous financial and human resources, now exploited for purposes of war, to the development of their economic and scientific potential and the diminution of the need for external aid.

The enormous resources which would be liberated in this way would also facilitate the completion of the resettlement and absorption of the refugees in their natural national environment: namely, the Arab countries with their extensive territories and wealth of water resources, which are sorely in need of development. It can be done by those people who are their brethren in nationality, tongue, customs, outlook and faith. Israel is prepared to help financially to the best of her ability, with the aid of the Great Powers. The settlement of the refugees in the Arab countries is the only solution compatible with their true and basic interests, as well as Israel’s.

The demands mentioned in Eshkol’s plans are of paramount importance since they express the basic conditions which Israel
has always sought to exact from her Arab neighbours: direct negotiations, liquidation of the Arab blockade, opening Arab markets to Israeli penetration, enabling Israel to benefit from Arab raw materials, agricultural products, land and sea routes, the termination of the Palestine dispute by the assimilation of the Palestinian people in the surrounding Arab states, and their elimination as a distinct entity possessing inherent national rights.
CHAPTER 2

POST-JUNE 1967 PEACE PROPOSALS

The more important proposals for the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict surfaced after the 1967 war. They resemble the older ones in one respect and differ from them in another. The similarity lies in the fact that they are also based on the assumption that the Arabs are totally incapable of facing the Israeli might. They differ in the fact that Arab governments are officially involved in drawing up, approving, discussing, and/or urging their implementation. In other words, the Arab regimes concerned are officially pinning their hopes on the realization of one of the peaceful schemes as a way out of the dilemma that resulted from the defeat. On the other hand, the Israeli government has rejected, directly and indirectly, all peace initiatives for it has not and will not accept anything short of total Arab acceptance of all its demands and stipulations, i.e. Israel will not settle for anything short of Arab capitulation.

President Johnson’s Proposal

On June 7, 1967, President Lyndon Johnson announced the creation of a special committee of the National Security Council to coordinate United States peace efforts in the Middle East. Addressing a foreign policy conference for educators on June 19, he laid down “five great principles for peace” in the Middle East:

(1) Every nation in the area has a fundamental right to live,
and to have this right respected by its neighbours. Each nation must accept the right of others to life.

(2) The events of June have shown another basic requirement for settlement: "It is a human requirement—justice for the refugees."

Johnson went on to state, "A new conflict has brought new homelessness. The Middle East states must at last address themselves to the plight of those who have been displaced by wars. In the past both sides have resisted the best efforts of outside mediators to restore the victims of conflict to their homes, or to find them other proper places to live and work. There will be no peace for any party in the Middle East unless this problem is attacked with new energy by all, and primarily by those immediately concerned."

(3) A third principle is that maritime rights must be respected. Johnson affirmed that the United States has long been committed to free passage through international waterways, and, along with other nations, it was taking the necessary steps to implement this tenet when belligerent moves and countermoves were resorted to. If a single act of folly was more responsible for the outbreak of hostilities, it was the arbitrary and dangerous decision to close the Straits of Tiran.

(4) According to the President, the June war has demonstrated the danger of the Middle East arms race of the last twelve years. Here the responsibility must rest not only on those in the area but upon the suppliers. The U.S. has opposed this arms race, and its military shipments to the area have been severely limited.

Expanding on this point, Johnson went on to say that the United States, for its part, "will use every resource of diplomacy and every council of reason and prudence to find a better course." As a beginning, he proposed that the United Nations should immediately call upon its
members to report all shipments of military arms into the Middle East and to keep the records on file for all the peoples of the world to observe.

(5) The crisis underlines the critical importance of respecting the political independence and territorial integrity of all the states in the area. This principle can only be effective in the Middle East if there is peace between the parties. The nations of the region have had only fragile truce lines that have been repeatedly violated for twenty years. What they now need are recognized boundaries and other arrangements that “will give security against terror, destruction and war.” Furthermore, there must be adequate recognition of the special interest of three great religions in the Holy Places of Jerusalem.

These five principles, Johnson continued, are fundamental. Taken together they point the way from uncertain armistice to durable peace. Johnson added that there are some who have urged, as a single, simple solution, an immediate return to the pre-June war situation. This is not a prescription for peace, but for renewed hostilities. Certainly troops must be withdrawn, but the right to national life must be recognized; there must be progress in solving the refugee problem; freedom of innocent maritime passage must be guaranteed; limitation of the arms race must be assured; and respect for political independence and territorial integrity must also be adhered to.

In spite of the fact that President Johnson defined the broadlines for peace in the Middle East, yet he did not say anything about the means for implementing these principles, especially that in his speech he rejected the Arab-Soviet demand for the immediate withdrawal of Israel to the June 4, 1967 demarcation lines. He took for granted that Israel will not agree to any suggestion which would request from it the surrender of all the territorial gains ensured by its military success. In fact, it
has been Israel’s insistence on keeping these territories that has resulted in the breakdown of all the peaceful proposals since the June war.

On June 17, Premier Kosygin arrived in the United States for the Special Session of the General Assembly. His appearance at the United Nations was designed to provide the Russian leader with both the opportunity and the excuse for talks with Johnson on the Middle East conflict. The summit, in which Johnson had the upper hand because he was backing the victorious Israelis, took place at the small town of Glassboro, midway between Washington and New York, on the 23rd and 25th of June.

At the end of the two-day summit conference, Premier Kosygin and President Johnson made separate statements. The latter disclosed, “We have...agreed to keep in good communication in the future through [U.S.] Secretary of State Dean Rusk and [Soviet] Foreign Minister [Andrei A.] Gromyko...and also directly.” The former declared, “On the whole, these meetings provided [us] with an opportunity to compare positions on the questions under discussion and this, both sides believe, is useful.” In a televised report from Washington, Johnson confirmed on the same date that the United States and the Soviet Union held decidedly different views of the situation in the Middle East, but insisted that they were a “long way from total differences” because both nations believed that every state has a right to exist. “Mr. Kosygin left the impression that his most specific objective in the talks was to enlist the United States in an effort to force Israel to withdraw her troops from Arab territories occupied in the brief war.”

At the Glassboro summit President Johnson proposed “ten essential elements of peace” to Premier Kosygin. They were:

1. The withdrawal of all armed forces and the end of a state of war.
(2) An agreement by all members to a declaration of respect for the rights of every member to maintain "an independent national state of its own."

(3) An assurance of the territorial integrity and political independence of all Middle Eastern states.

(4) Guaranteed protection of the vital security interests of all states in the area.

(5) The abandonment of force in relations between states in the Middle East.

(6) The rights of all nations to free and innocent passage through international waterways.

(7) A just and permanent settlement of the refugee problem.

(8) An agreement that the improvement of national economies and living standards should take precedence over an arms race.

(9) The safeguarding of the holy places and an international guarantee of freedom of access for all.

(10) An international system, to include help from the United Nations should be set up to help the states concerned achieve the aims outlined above.

The United States' main aim, after the June war, was to ensure the fulfillment of the demands of Israel and to solve the conflict once and for all on Israeli terms. Such a solution would be tantamount to a political and military surrender of the Arabs to Israel and the neo-colonial forces led by the American government.

President Tito's Proposal

The next set of suggestions was put forward by President Josip Tito of Yugoslavia who visited Egypt, Syria and Iraq in August 1967. At the end of his visit Tito sent messages to Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Ghandi, to French President Charles De Gaulle, to President Johnson, to British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, to President Nikolai Podgorny
of the Soviet Union, to Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie, to other African and Latin American Heads of State, and to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant.

On September 18, 1967, Mr. Marko Nikezich, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, outlined in Paris Tito’s proposals which were based upon the principle that “everyone should go home and remain there.” Specifically, it was essential that the international community should proclaim that there could be no territorial annexations by force; that all the states of the area should be able to live in peace within there national territories; and that the Great Powers should guarantee the frontiers of those states as they existed before the outbreak of the June war. Other matters, such as navigation on the Suez Canal and the question of the Palestine Arab refugees, should be negotiated directly between the interested parties.

It is clear that President Tito’s proposals reflected the undeclared Arab position with regard to the nature of the acceptable peaceful settlement, namely, Israeli withdrawal to the June 4, 1967, demarcation lines in return for official Arab recognition of the legality of these lines as borders under the auspices of the Great Powers.

Israel rejected President Tito’s ideas and proposals. Mr. Eban declared that his country “will not allow her rights or interests to be affected in any way by proposals or initiatives from Yugoslavia.” Noting that Yugoslavia was reportedly propounding that Israel should withdraw to her June 4 frontiers in return for “declarations or so-called guarantees by third parties,” Mr. Eban announced, “We totally reject this approach. The political and territorial situation of 4 June endangered Israel’s security and existence. It can never be restored. The cease-fire agreement can only be superseded by peace treaties directly engaging the responsibility of Israel and her neighbouring states.”

Though the Arab regimes concerned had defined their
attitude vis-a-vis the kind of peaceful settlement they considered possible and acceptable, as reflected by President Tito’s recommendations, yet these regimes were unable to face their people with such a defeatist position. Thus the Khartoum Arab Summit Conference, which was held between August 29, and September 3, 1967, decided to refuse to undergo any reconciliation with Israel and announced that the Arabs would “neither recognize nor negotiate a peace with Israel in order not to tamper with the right of the Palestinian people to their homeland. It is known that the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.), Mr. Ahmad al-Shuqairi, withdrew from the summit meetings in protest against the policies of surrender that the Arab regimes were embarking on. Shuqairi left because he knew that the strong public decisions adopted were meant to soothe the Arab masses.

There is no need to remind the reader that with the passage of time and the inclination of official Arab policy toward peaceful solutions and political settlements the three ‘nos’ of the Khartoum Summit Conference vanished one after the other.

Security Council Resolution No. 242

On November 7, 1967, Egypt requested the meeting of the Security Council in “an urgent session to consider the dangerous situation prevailing in the Middle East as a result of the persistence of Israel not to withdraw its armed forces from all territories which it occupied as a result of the Israeli aggression committed on 5 June 1967 against Egypt.”

As a result of this request the Security Council met on the 9th of November in an urgent session. Six draft resolutions were put forward for discussion by India, Mali, Nigeria, the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom.

The representatives of Egypt, Israel and Jordan were invited by the President of the Security Council, Mamadou Boubacar
Kante of Mali, to partake in the discussions without the right of vote. At the meeting of November 13th the representative of Syria was also invited to participate on the same basis.

The draft sponsored by the United States, submitted on November 9th would have had the Security Council declare that a firm and lasting peace in the Middle East should stipulate withdrawal of armed forces from occupied territories, termination of claims or states of belligerency, mutual recognition and respect for the right of every state in the area to sovereign existence, territorial integrity, political independence, secure and recognized boundaries, and freedom from the threat or use of force. It would have had the Security Council affirm the necessity to guarantee freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; to achieve a just settlement of the refugee problem; to guarantee the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, through measures that would include the establishment of demilitarized zones; and to achieve a limitation of the wasteful and destructive arms race in the area. A Special Representative, designated by the Secretary-General, would establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned with a view to assisting them in working out solutions in accordance with the purposes of the resolution and in creating a just and lasting peace in the area. The Secretary-General would report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

In explaining the draft resolution, the Permanent Representative of the United States, Arthur J. Goldberg, said that his government's goal was to open a new path to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Its terms reflected the conviction that a durable and reliable peace in the area must embrace the fundamental principles set forth by President Johnson in his address of June 19, 1967 (see above).

The examination of this draft resolution, revealed that the
terms were satisfactory only to Israel, since it encompassed the fulfillment of all its demands and objectives without taking any serious account of the counter-demands of the Arabs. In addition, it ignored the fact that Israel, in occupying Arab territories by force, has violated the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

While discussing the draft resolution, the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. V. V. Kuznestov, Deputy Foreign Minister, insisted that the American draft "was unacceptable because it dealt ambiguously with the key provision for troop withdrawal, presenting it in such a context that Israel would be able to occupy Arab territories as long as it wished. The draft contained a faulty approach to the essential conditions for a lasting peace which served only the interests of Israel. Its provisions could be interpreted in various ways, retaining for Israel the right to establish new boundaries and to withdraw its troops only as far as it wished. And while its provisions on troop withdrawal were ambiguous, those supporting Israeli claims were extremely precise. It lacked a statement declaring the inadmissibility of the occupation of territory through military conquest. The task of the Special Representative, according to the draft, would be merely to cover Israeli aggression with the United Nations flag. Further, the text did not mention a date when the Representative should present his report, opening in this way propitious conditions for delay and for legalizing the occupation."

After discussing the U.S. draft resolution, the Security Council voted on it. It was not adopted, having failed to receive the requisite nine votes.

Next, Lord Caradon, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, introduced his delegation's draft resolution (for text see below). He acknowledged that while he could not guarantee that it would be accepted in full by either side, he hoped that it would be regarded as a balanced and just text.
In submitting the draft to the Council, he stressed the need for urgent action, asserting that if a final decision was not reached during the week, the opportunity for a just settlement might be lost forever.

Mr. Goldberg affirmed that his delegation would vote for the United Kingdom draft resolution because it commanded a substantial consensus in the Security Council and was entirely consistent with the policy of his government as set forth by President Johnson on June 19, 1967. Moreover, because the United Kingdom draft was “non-prejudicial to” and “sufficiently mindful of the legitimate and vital interests of all parties to the recent conflict,” the opposing sides should be able to receive and cooperate with the U.N. Special Representative in formulating a peaceful settlement.

The Security Council then voted on the United Kingdom’s draft resolution, which was adopted unanimously on November 22, 1967. There follows the full text of the resolution:

“‘The Security Council,
‘Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,
‘Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,
‘Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,
‘1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
‘(i) withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
‘(ii) termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from
threats or acts of force;

"2. Affirms further the necessity
   "(a) for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through
      international waterways in the area;
   "(b) for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
   "(c) for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and
      political independence of every State in the area,
      through measures including the establishment of
      demilitarized zones;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special
    Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish
    and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to
    promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful
    and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions
    and principles in this resolution;

"4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security
    Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Repre-
    sentative as soon as possible."

Egypt’s approval of the Security Council’s resolution was
the first and most important step on the road of official Arab
retreat from the declared ‘nos’ of the Khartoum summit
conference. The Egyptian regime justified its move by saying
that it was a tactical manoeuvre for gaining time to rebuild the
Arab armed forces. Yet it quickly became very evident that
Resolution 242 was to be the cornerstone of Arab policies with
regard to the future settlement of the conflict with Israel.
This, in spite of official Arab declarations to the Palestinians
to the effect that no agreements will be made without their
consent. Since the implementation of the resolution implies
the final liquidation of the Palestine problem (the resolution
did not mention the Palestinian people, their rights or future)
the Palestinian resistance movement has opposed it vehemently
and consistently.

On November 23, 1967, Secretary-General U Thant desig-
nated Dr. Gunnar Jarring, Sweden’s Ambassador to the Soviet
Union, as the Special Representative who would proceed to the
Middle East to act as mediator in accordance with the resolution.

Ever since its adoption, there has been a continuous debate over its interpretation but very little progress in reaching any conclusions. The Egyptian government has switched from its initial position that no settlement in the Middle East is possible as long as the Israelis do not implement paragraph 1 of the resolution calling for the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict to demanding a clear statement by Israel that it would implement the resolution. Once Israel declares its acceptance of the resolution it would be up to Dr. Gunnar Jarring to work out a timetable for the realization of its parts.

In terms of specific measures, Egypt has conceded to Israel a number of important points as part of the “package deal” contained in the resolution. To illustrate, reference shall be made to three important points of dispute on which Egypt took a conciliatory position that would have been absolutely unthinkable before the Six-Day War.

Concerning the Israeli demand for free passage in the Suez Canal, Foreign Minister Mahmud Riad made the following declarations on May 11, 1968:

We have already emphasized our acceptance of the Security Council Resolution which includes the freedom of passage through the Suez Canal. In return for this Israel has to carry out its responsibilities and obligations which include the withdrawal of forces from the Arab territories it occupies, and the settlement of the problem of the refugees. If Israel carries out its obligations we will carry out ours also, thus making for a more stable peace in the Middle East area.

In relation to Egypt's acceptance of the Security Council Resolution, Riad declared on the same occasion:

We do not impose any conditions on our acceptance of the Security Council Resolution as a whole. We have proposed to
Dr. Gunnar Jarring, in the letter which we have delivered to him last Thursday [May 9th], the preparation of a timetable. We have also informed him that we are ready to discuss all proposals he presents according to the timetable.

As to Egypt’s acceptance of demilitarized zones, Riad stated on the same occasion:

We cannot give up the territories occupied by Israel after 5 June. This is a question of principle which is not subject to discussion at all. But we accept the creation of demilitarized zones on both sides of the Arab-Israeli frontiers.

This “package deal” however, still fell far short of what the Israelis want it to include, namely, a formal peace treaty to be concluded at the negotiations table. The Egyptians have retorted that there is nothing in the Security Council Resolution which obliges them specifically either to hammer out a peace treaty with Israel or to agree to negotiate directly with Israeli representatives. Thus a deadlock has ensued.

President Tito’s Second Proposal

Early in 1968, Tito attempted again to solve the Middle East problem by putting forward new proposals. He visited Cairo for five days during which he had talks with President Nasser.

While in Cairo, President Tito held a press conference during which he asserted that the solution of the Middle East crisis rested with the United States. The crisis could only be terminated by the withdrawal of Israeli troops from territories occupied in June, 1967. “It is difficult to believe,” he added, “that Israel would not obey the United States if Washington told Tel-Aviv that the crisis must be settled peaceably to the advantage of both sides and not simply to the detriment of the Arab countries.”

Marshal Tito stipulated that a withdrawal of Israeli troops
from the occupied areas should precede a declaration ending the state of war between the Arabs and Israelis and then by negotiations. He claimed that the Arab countries have accepted that the withdrawal of Israel should be followed by a declaration of non-belligerence and an agreement concerning the free passage of Israeli ships in the Gulf of Aqaba and that a progressive settlement of the problem of the Palestine refugees and of navigation in the Suez Canal could then ensue.

It was reported from Belgrade on February 8th that Marshal Tito had obtained the approval of President Nasser and other members of the Third World for a new plan for the settlement of the Middle East crisis. The new “Tito Plan” was said to contain the following points:

1. Creation of a demilitarized zone along the Arab-Israeli frontiers.
2. Withdrawal of all Israeli forces from occupied territories.
4. Ending of the twenty years state of war between Israel and the Arabs.
5. Freedom of navigation for Israel in the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran.

Nothing came out of this plan because it was rejected by the Israelis.

Eban’s Peace Plan

At the twenty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly, Mr. Abba Eban presented on October 8, 1968, a nine-point plan. In his address, he announced that his government intended “to make a new effort in the coming weeks to cooperate with Ambassador Jarring in his task of promoting agreement on the establishment of peace.” He went on to enumerate “the nine principles by which peace can be achieved”:

“(1) The situation to follow the cease-fire must be one of just
and lasting peace, duly negotiated and contractually expressed. It would lay down the precise conditions of Israel’s coexistence, including an agreed map of the secure and recognized boundaries. The essence of this peace is that it would commit both parties to the proposition that their conflict for two decades has reached a permanent end.”

(2) Within the framework of peace the cease-fire lines will be replaced by permanent, secure and recognized boundaries between Israel and each of the neighbouring Arab states, and the rearrangement of forces will be carried out in terms of the borders that will be established under the final peace.

(3) In addition to the establishment of agreed territorial boundaries, other agreed security arrangements designed to avoid the kind of vulnerable situation which caused a breakdown of the peace in 1967 should be discussed. The instrument establishing peace should contain a pledge of mutual non-aggression.

(4) When agreement is reached on the establishment of peace with permanent borders, the freedom of movement now existing in the area, especially in the Israel-Jordan sectors, would be maintained.

(5) The arrangements for guaranteeing freedom of navigation should be “unreserved, precise, concrete, and founded on absolute equality of rights and obligations between Israel and other littoral states and all members of the maritime community.”

(6) A conference of Middle Eastern states should be convened, together with the governments contributing to the relief of refugees and the specialized agencies of the United Nations, in order to chart a five-year plan for the solution of the refugee problem within the framework of a lasting peace and the integration of refugees. This conference
could be called in advance of peace negotiations. The establishment of joint refugee integration and rehabilitation commissions should be stipulated in the peace agreements.

(7) “Israel does not seek to exercise unilateral jurisdiction in the Holy Places of Christianity and Islam.” It is willing in each case to work out a special status for them. It would like to conclude appropriate accords with those concerned. Israel’s policy is that the Christian and Muslim Holy Places should come under the responsibility of those who hold them in reverence.

(8) Contractual engagements should be made by the governments of Israel and each Arab state that would acknowledge and recognize mutual sovereignty, integrity and right to national life. It would then follow logically that Arab governments would withdraw all the reservations which they have expressed on adhering to international conventions because of the latter’s inclusion of Israel.

(9) The concert for peace should include an examination of a common approach to some of the resources and means of communication in the region in an effort to lay foundations for a Middle Eastern community of sovereign states.

Mr. Eban concluded, “The prospect of exploring peace terms should follow normal precedents,” adding that there was “no case in history in which conflicts have been liquidated or a transition effected from a state of war to a state of peace on the basis of a stubborn refusal by one state to meet another for negotiation.”

The Israeli proposals were rejected on October 10, 1968, by the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mr. Mahmoud Riad, who described them as “part of a campaign of international deception.” Addressing the General Assembly, Mr. Riad alleged that Israel was seeking to undermine the mediatory mission of Dr. Jarring “while cloaking this policy with semantic manoeu-
vers and deceptive statements.” He demanded Israeli withdrawal from “every inch” of the Arab territories she had occupied, and insisted that Israel could not have continued her “policy of aggression and defiance of the United Nations and its resolutions” had she not been “receiving the political and moral support of the United States.”

Mediation of the Big Four Powers

On January 17, 1969, the French government announced that it had suggested that the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France, as permanent members of the Security Council, should meet “in order to seek, in co-operation with the Secretary-General of the United Nations the means by which their governments could contribute to the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East.”

On February 6, 1969, the United States government agreed “in principle” to the French proposal. The American reply advanced that preliminary talks should first be held on a bilateral basis “for the purpose of developing a measure of understanding that would make an early (joint) meeting of the permanent United Nations representatives of the four powers a fruitful and constructive complement of Ambassador Jarring’s mission.” It had previously been announced on January 29, 1969, that the British government agreed with the French proposal. The British reply stated that such discussions should be linked with the work of Dr. Jarring.

After the permanent representatives of the “Big Four”—Mr. Charles Yost (U.S.), Lord Caradon (Britain), M. Armand Berard (France), and Mr. Yacov Malik (Soviet Union)—had had a number of bilateral meetings, spread over several weeks, they held their first joint session on the Middle East on April 4, 1969, at the residence of Ambassador Berard. After a meeting lasting more that four hours a brief communiqué was issued stating that the four powers were “agreed
that the situation in the Middle East is serious and urgent, and must not be permitted to jeopardize international security”; that they had “entered into a discussion on matters of substance and have started defining areas of agreement”; and that there was “a common concern to make urgent progress.” It was stated that the four powers “fully accept and support” the Security Council’s Resolution of November 22, 1967, and that they had reaffirmed their support of Dr. Jarring’s mission. The permanent representatives had a second meeting on the 8th of April. Reports were made which were sent to the U.N. Secretary General, the governments of Israel and the Arab states concerned, and to the U.S., British, Soviet and French governments.

Foreign Minister Abba Eban visited Washington during March 1969, and had talks with President Nixon (on March 14th), and Mr. William Rogers (on 12 and 20 March) in which he expressed concern at the possible consequences of an imposed solution by the “Big Four” and tried without success to persuade the American leaders to abandon the four-power talks.

The Israeli Cabinet, after hearing a detailed report from Mr. Eban following his return from the U.S., issued a statement on March 30th, 1969, declaring, “Israel is not and will not become the object of power politics, or intra-power politics, and will not accept any recommendation which is in conflict with her vital interests, her rights and her security.”

The Cabinet’s statement declared:

Israel entirely opposes the plan to convene the representatives of states which lie outside the Middle East in order to prepare recommendations concerning the region. Such a procedure undermines the responsibility devolving on the states of the region to attain peace among themselves. Israel opposes any settlement which is not agreed upon by the governments concerned.

Israel will make constant efforts to achieve a durable peace
with her neighbours, a peace based upon peace treaties to be achieved in direct negotiations between the parties. Agreed, secure and recognized boundaries will be laid down in the peace treaties. The peace treaties will provide for co-operation and mutual aid, the solution by peaceful means of all problems at issue, and abstention from all aggression, direct or indirect.

Israel will maintain her readiness to conduct negotiations—without prior conditions from any side—with any of the neighbouring states for the purpose of concluding peace treaties. In the absence of peace treaties, Israel will continue to maintain in full the situation as determined by the cease-fire and will consolidate her position in accordance with the vital needs of her security and development.

On April 13th, at a press conference in Jerusalem, Mr. Eban said that the “Big Four” intervention had “paralyzed” Dr. Jarring’s mission; and added that the four-power talks would be useless since the parties concerned were not involved in them. He further emphasized that Israel stood by the nine-point peace plan which he had presented to the U.N. General Assembly in October 1968 (see above).

Although the Arab regimes had hoped the discussions of the big four powers would lead to some positive results with regard to the implementation of the Security Council Resolution No. 242 and the strengthening of Jarring’s hand, their expectations were thwarted by Israel’s firm opposition and the successful American manoeuvres to keep the discussions barren.

Goldmann’s Attempted Arbitration Efforts

A government statement announced from Jerusalem on April 5, 1970, that Dr. Nahum Goldmann, President of the World Jewish Congress and former President of the World Zionist Organization, had been refused permission to go to Egypt to discuss the Arab-Israeli conflict with President Nasser. The statement said that the Israeli Government had discussed and rejected the “suggestion” that Dr. Goldmann should visit Egypt because President Nasser had attached two
conditions for the meeting: that it should take place with the knowledge and approval of the Israeli government, and that notice of the meeting should be published.

Interviewed by Israel Radio on the same date, Dr. Goldmann expressed regret at the government’s decision against his proposed visit to Egypt. He revealed that about 3½ weeks earlier, when he was in Paris, a group of representatives (of an unnamed government but most probably Morocco) had told him that President Nasser was ready to invite him, as President of the World Jewish Congress, for a meeting in Cairo. The Egyptian President wanted the invitation to be public, however, and insisted that Golda Meir should be informed. Accordingly, Dr. Goldmann had seen both P.M. Meir and General Dayan on March 24, 1970, and had also discussed the question two or three days later with Mr. Eban.

“I had to have Israeli permission to go to Cairo,” said Dr. Goldmann, “because Israeli law forbids Israeli subjects from going to countries at war with Israel.” Mrs. Meir told him she could not make up her mind and would have to consult the Cabinet. Dr. Goldmann replied that there was no need to do this because he feared leakage, and instead suggested that she should consult her leading colleagues individually. She informed him “about six days ago about the Cabinet’s decision against his proposed mission to Cairo.”

In a statement to the Knesset on the 7th of April, Abba Eban said that the government had rejected Dr. Goldmann’s suggestion because he was considered an “unsuitable emissary” for such a mission. Mr. Eban stressed that while Israel was ready to meet Arab representatives at any time, at any agreed venue and at any level of representation, she must reserve the right to choose her own spokesman and to determine who should present her point of view.
King Hussein’s Proposal

During one of his numerous visits to Washington, King Hussein put forward on April 10, 1969, the following proposal to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict after clearly indicating that “he was speaking in the name of President Nasser as well as for himself”:

(1) The end of all belligerency.
(2) Respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all states in the area.
(3) Recognition of the rights of all states to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of war.
(4) Guarantees for all nations of the freedom of navigation through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal.
(5) Guarantees of the territorial inviolability of all states in the area by whatever measures are necessary, including the establishment of demilitarized zones.
(6) A just settlement of the refugee problem.

King Hussein added:

In return for these considerations, our sole demand upon Israel is the withdrawal of its armed forces from all territories occupied in the June 1967 war, and the implementation of all the other provisions of the Security Council Resolution.”

On April 13, Mr. Eban challenged King Hussein to “come to the negotiating table” if the Arabs really desired peace. Mr. Eban questioned whether the King had in fact spoken for President Nasser, asking why the Egyptian President did not speak for himself.

The Rogers Plan

In mid-1969, the war of attrition on the Suez Canal was in full swing while the Palestinian resistance movement was growing and improving its effectiveness against Israel. Its
strength and mass support grew to the point of pausing a very serious threat to the Jordanian regime.

To contain this situation, American diplomacy again moved under the banners of “moderation” and “impartiality.” Its first step in this direction took the form of suggestions presented by the American government to the Soviet Union on October 28, 1969. On the 9th of December of the same year, Mr. William Rogers, the U.S. Secretary of State, made public the hitherto private American proposals in a speech to a conference on adult education. In his speech, Mr. Rogers summarized their content as the call for an Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories occupied in the June 1967 war in return for Arab assurances of a binding peace commitment. Stressing that America had friendly relations both with the Arab countries and with Israel, Mr. Rogers said:

To call for Israeli withdrawal without achieving agreement on peace would be partisan towards the Arabs. To call on the Arabs to accept peace without Israeli withdrawal would be partisan toward Israel. Therefore our policy is to encourage the Arabs to accept a permanent peace based on a binding agreement, and to urge Israel to withdraw from occupied territory when her territorial integrity is assured.”

The Secretary of State left open the possibility of “insubstantial” alterations in Israel’s pre-1967 borders provided that these were agreed upon during negotiations between the Arab states and Israel. As to the problem of Jerusalem, Rogers rejected Israel’s absorption of the former Jordanian sector of the city. He declared:

We cannot accept unilateral actions by any party to decide the final status of the city. We believe Jerusalem should be a unified city within which there would no longer be restrictions on the movement of persons and goods. There should be open access to the unified city for persons of all faiths and nationalities. Arrangements for the administration of the unified city should
take into account the interests of all its inhabitants and of the Jewish, Islamic and Christian communities. And there should be roles for both Israel and Jordan in the civic, economic and religious life of the city.

According to Mr. Rogers, the essence of the American initiative consisted of three principal elements:

1. There should be a binding commitment by Israel and Egypt to attain peace "with all the specific obligations of peace spelled out, including the obligations to prevent hostile acts originating from their respective territories."

2. "The detailed provisions of peace relating to security safeguards on the ground should be worked out between the parties" under the auspices of Dr. Jarring. "A principal objective of the four-power talks . . . should be to help Ambassador Jarring engage the parties in a negotiating process under the Rhodes formula."

3. "In the context of peace and agreement on specific security safeguards, withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian territory would be required." Such "security safeguards" should cover the Sharm al-Sheikh area, demilitarized zones in the Sinai Peninsula and "final arrangements" in the Gaza-Strip.

The Israeli Cabinet issued a statement on December 22, 1969, rejecting the proposals outlined by Mr. Rogers after a four-hour emergency meeting, during which it heard a report from General Itzhak Rabin, the Israeli Ambassador in Washington. In an interview on the same day, after the Cabinet meeting, Golda Meir described them as representing an appeasement to the Arab states, and said that it would be "treasonous" for any Israeli government to accept them. She pointed out, "We're not going to commit suicide. We didn't survive three wars in order to commit suicide so that the Russians can celebrate victory for Nasser."

Addressing the Knesset on December 29, P.M. Meir said
that the latest American recommendations constituted a
"very grave danger" to Israel’s existence. Both the suggestions
regarding the border and the return of Palestinian refugees
were "prejudicial to Israel’s security" and, in effect, "would
give the saboteurs and terrorist organizations the right of
choice whether to shell Israel from the other side of the borders
convenient for attack, or to attack her from within after re-
turning as refugees." After declaring that Rogers’ plan was
in direct contradiction to the principles of negotiations and
agreements between the parties concerned, she concluded:

To sum up, the proposals do not obligate the Arab states to
expressly recognize Israel’s sovereignty, or obligate them to
put an end effectively to terrorist activities from their borders.
On the other hand, they involve a violation of Israel’s sovereign
rights concerning Jerusalem and a danger to Israel’s security
in the proposed arrangement about the Arab refugees. If
we carried out these proposals Israel’s security and peace would
be gravely imperilled.

At a press conference on December 23, Mr. Rogers defended
the latest American proposals, rejected Mrs. Meir’s charge that
they constituted "appeasement" to the Arabs, and described
"appeasement" as an unfortunate word since it suggested that
the Arabs were the enemies of the U.S. whereas they had
enjoyed friendly relations for years. The United States, he
maintained, recognized Israel’s concern, and had the obligation
as a member of the U.N. to support Israel’s sovereignty and
future security. Renouncing any suggestion that the U.S.
was trying to impose a settlement, Mr. Rogers emphasized
that his stipulations were fair, comprehensive, consistent with
the Resolution 242, and designed simply to provide a frame-
work for direct negotiations between the parties concerned.

Although no official statements were issued in the Arab
capitals, it became apparent there that support was lacking
for the American peace initiative. The semi-official Cairo
newspaper, *al-Ahram*, described the proposals as “obviously favorable to Israel.”

On January 12, 1970, it was disclosed that the Soviet Union rejected Mr. Rogers formulations. According to *The New York Times*, the Soviet reply, handed to Mr. Rogers on December 23, 1969, had described the proposals as “of a one-sided, pro-Israeli character” and had listed point-by-point objection to them:

1. In relation to withdrawal, whereas the U.S. had suggested a three-month timetable for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories, the Soviet Union preferred a two-month timetable.

2. In connection with the state of war between the Arab states and Israel, The U.S. had proposed that it should be terminated as soon as all concerned had deposited their final agreement with the U.N. The Russians, however, took the view that there should be a “*de facto* cessation” of the state of war when the Israeli forces commence their withdrawal from occupied territories, and a “*de jure* cessation” when the withdrawal had been completed.

3. As regards the frontier between Egypt and Israel, the United States had suggested that both sides should agree upon and then define their common border. The Soviet Union, however, held that any joint declaration must uphold Egyptian sovereignty over Sharm al-Sheikh.

4. As for the Gaza-Strip, the U.S. had proposed talks between Egypt, Israel and Jordan, under the auspices of Dr. Jarring, on the future status of the territory. The Soviet Union maintained that the Gaza-Strip was an “Arab territory” and must be restored to its pre-1967 status.

5. On setting-up demilitarized zones, the U.S. had suggested that all territory evacuated by Israel should be demilitarized (thus involving the demilitarization of the whole of the Sinai Peninsula). The Russians insisted on their establish-
ment on both sides of the Arab and Israeli borders.

(6) On the question of the Palestine Arab refugees, the U.S had proposed the right to choose between repatriation on the basis of an agreed annual quota or resettlement outside Israel with compensation. The Russians called for compliance by Israel with all past U.N. resolutions.

(7) On navigation through the Suez Canal, the U.S. had suggested guaranteed rights of passage to ships of all nations, including Israel. The Russians had supported the right of Egypt to close the Canal to any nation with which it was involved in a state of war.

(8) Regarding navigation through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba, the U.S. had propounded that both should be proclaimed international waterways, with freedom of navigation guaranteed to shipping of all nations at all times. The Russians had stated that questions of navigation rights “should be solved in conformity with generally agreed principles of international law,” which would constitute a sufficient pledge of free passage for all shipping.

Despite the basic differences between the American and Soviet interpretation of the kind of peace needed in the Middle East, American diplomacy continued its effort to tranquilize the Arab-Israeli fronts and to contain the Palestinian resistance.

By the Spring of 1970, the Palestinian armed struggle had reached its peak with regard to popular mass support and military effectiveness against Israel. This fact placed not only Jordan but the whole surrounding area on the brink of a basic revolutionary change in the traditional balance of forces. Thus the local ruling classes and the imperialist interests were forced to search for remedies to counter the rising trends of change.

Simultaneously, the war of attrition was in progress. Israel began to hit deep into exposed Egyptian territory without any
significant retaliation in kind. This greatly limited the effectiveness and importance of Egypt's military policy. As a result, President Nasser issued an appeal in his May Day 1970 speech to President Nixon to either order Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories or to stop offering aid to the occupier of Arab territories. The Rogers Plan came as the reply to Nasser's appeal.

The American peace plan was believed to have been discussed informally by the Arab leaders in Tripoli on 20-22 June, when fourteen Arab Heads of State or their representatives were present at national celebrations to mark the withdrawal of the U.S. Air Force from Wheelus base. Although, according to Cairo sources, it was stressed that their presence in Libya in no sense constituted a summit meeting, the four Arab countries directly involved in the war with Israel—Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq—took the opportunity to have informal discussions that dealt inter alia with the new American peace initiative in the Middle East, which as was stated by Secretary Rogers in a news conference on June 25, 1970, designed to encourage the Arab states and Israel "to stop shooting and start talking" under the auspices of Dr. Jarring in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242.

On July 19, 1970, the partial text of a letter sent by Mr. Rogers to Mahmoud Riad enumerated the basic points in the American peace plan:

In our view, the most effective way to agree on a settlement would be for the parties to begin to work out, under Ambassador Jarring's auspices, the detailed steps necessary to carry out Resolution 242.

Foreign Minister Eban of Israel has recently said that Israel would be prepared to make important concessions once talks got started. At the same time, Egyptian participation in such talks would go far towards overcoming Israeli doubts that your government does in fact seek to make peace with it.

I understand the problems that direct negotiations pose for
you, and we have made it clear from the beginning that we were not proposing that such an arrangement be put into effect at the outset, although, depending on the progress of the discussions, we believe the parties will find it necessary to meet together at some point if peace is to be established between them.

With the above thoughts in mind, the United States put forward the following proposals for the consideration of the United Arab Republic:

a) That both Israel and the United Arab Republic subscribe to a restoration of the cease-fire for at least a limited period.

b) That Israel and the United Arab Republic (as well as Israel and Jordan) subscribe to the following statement, which would be in the form of a report from Ambassador Jarring to Secretary General U Thant:

The United Arab Republic (Jordan) and Israel advise me that they agree:

(i) That having accepted and indicated their willingness to carry out Resolution 242 in all its parts they will designate representatives to discussions to be held under my auspices, according to such procedure and at such times and places as I may recommend, taking into account as appropriate each other’s preference as to method of procedure and previous experience between the parties.

(ii) That the purpose of the aforementioned discussions is to reach agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace between them based on (1) mutual acknowledgement by the United Arab Republic (Jordan) and Israel of each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence; and (2) Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict, both in accordance with Resolution 242.

(iii) That to facilitate my task of promoting agreement, as set forth in Resolution 242, the parties will strictly observe effective 1 July until at least 1 October, the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council.

"We hope the United Arab Republic will find this proposal acceptable; we are also seeking Israeli acceptance. In the meantime, I am sure you will share my conviction that everything be
done to hold these proposals in confidence so as not to prejudice the prospects for their acceptance."

Soviet endorsement of the new peace initiative was indicated on the 5th of August, when the four permanent members of the Security Council formally approved the American peace plan. The U.S. representative, Mr. Charles Yost, issued the following press statement after the "Big Four" meeting:

The representatives of the four powers discussed the latest developments, which are favorable for a resumption of Ambassador Jarring’s mission. They welcomed these developments. Their discussion was successful and the four came to agreement on a communication to the Secretary-General. [The contents of this communication to U Thant were not made public].

On the same day U Thant announced that Dr. Jarring had begun separate meetings at the United Nations with the representatives of Israel, the U.A.R. and Jordan.

On August 9, it was announced in Washington that the U.A.R., Jordan and Israel had agreed to a 90-day cease-fire to come into immediate effect.

It is well known that the results of Nasser’s acceptance of the Rogers Plan were disastrous for the Arabs in their confrontation with Israel. Arab solidarity was shattered following the categorical rejection by Iraq, Syria and the Palestinian resistance of the Plan. The Palestinians fiercely attacked and refused to comply with the cease-fire agreement. They sensed the dangers which the peace initiative carried with regard to the future of their armed struggle. Later events proved that the fears of the resistance movement were warranted.

After prolonged meetings, the Israeli Cabinet decided on the 31st of July, 1970, to assent to the Rogers Plan, and on the 4th of August, the formal acceptance was delivered to the State Department by the Israeli Ambassador, General Yitshak Rabin. It agreed to the clarifications made both as regards the
strengthening of Israel’s defensive capacity and as regards the acknowledgement of the justification of Israel’s attitude on political matters presented by the U.S. to Israel. The assurances obtained from Washington included obligations to aid Israel “in all that concerns the maintenance of her security and of the balance of forces in the region, particularly in the light of the Soviet involvement and the flow of Soviet arms to Egypt.” The United States government had been told that Israel would not return to the pre-June War frontiers. Pending a binding contractual peace agreement, “not a single Israeli soldier” will be withdrawn from the cease-fire lines.

Israel pointed out that it would be prepared in due time to designate a representative for the discussions to be held under the auspices of Dr. Jarring. The talks should be held within the framework of the Security Council Resolution 242 on the basis of expression of readiness by the parties to carry out all its parts. They should include:

1. Termination by Egypt (Jordan) and Israel of all claims or states of belligerency, and respect and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of each other and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Each of the parties will be responsible within its territory for the prevention of all hostile acts by regular military forces, or paramilitary forces, including irregular forces, against the armed forces or against civilians living in the territory of the other party.

2. Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict to secure, recognized and agreed upon boundaries to be delineated in the peace agreements.

Following the entry into force on August 7, 1970, of the three-months’ cease-fire agreement, substantive peace talks between Dr. Jarring and representatives of Egypt, Israel and Jordan began at the U.N. on the 24th of August. By the latter
date, however, Israel had lodged a number of complaints with the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). It claimed that Egypt was taking advantage of the cease-fire agreements by moving SAM-2 surface-to-air missile batteries up to the west bank of the Suez Canal since the cease-fire came into force. On September 3, 1970, the State Department confirmed that there had been Egyptian violations of the cease-fire agreement and announced that the matter was being taken up with the Egyptian and Soviet governments. On September 6, after ten complaints to UNTSO of Egyptian violations of the cease-fire, Israel announced that it was suspending participation in the peace talks "until such time as the cease-fire agreement is fully implemented."

The suspension of the talks was interpreted as the signal for resuming action against the Palestinian resistance after the war of attrition on the Suez Canal had ceased and after the eastern front had been effectively silenced. Ten days after the suspension of the talks at the United Nations, King Hussein's forces started their determined campaign to liquidate the resistance movement in Jordan [the results of the September 1970 campaign need not be discussed here]. Moreover, before the end of that same month, Nasser had died leaving behind a massive power and leadership vacuum.

Following the defeat of the resistance movement at the hands of the Jordanian forces, and after the "pacification" of all Arab fronts with Israel, the U.S. retreated completely from its supposedly "moderate" and "balanced" position as expressed in the Rogers Plan. After it had fulfilled its counter-revolutionary purposes it was quickly discarded. American diplomacy had no need for it any more as manifested by renewed outright financial, military and diplomatic support for Israel.

President Sadat's Proposal

The three-months' cease-fire ended on November 5, 1970.
On the previous day, a General Assembly resolution was passed which called *inter alia* for the extension of the cease-fire and the resumption of peace talks under the aegis of Dr. Jarring. Although this resolution—sponsored by Egypt and many other African and Asian countries—was opposed by Israel, yet it stipulated an extension of the cease-fire agreement for a further period of three months.

In an interview with Mr. James Reston of *the New York Times* on December 28, 1970, President Anwar Sadat set out Egypt’s terms for a peace settlement as follows: (1) Israel would have to withdraw from “every inch” of the territories occupied since the 1967 war; (2) when this had been done, Egypt would recognize Israel as an independent sovereign state within her 1967 borders, and would welcome a guarantee of those borders and other Middle Eastern frontiers by the four Great Powers; (3) Egypt would be ready to negotiate Israel’s right to free navigation through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba; and (4) Egypt would grant transit rights on the Suez Canal to Israel once a settlement of the Palestine refugee problem had been reached. President Sadat stressed, however, that Egypt would “never, never” enter into normal diplomatic relations with Israel.

At the time that President Sadat put forward his conditions, Israel agreed to resume the Middle East peace talks under the auspices of Dr. Jarring. Her decision to return to the peace talks was explained by Golda Meir, the Prime Minister, in a statement to the Knesset, on December 29, in which she mentioned that until the Arab-Israeli conflict had been terminated by a contractual, binding peace agreement, “not one Israeli soldier will be withdrawn from the administered territories.”

Following various visits by Golda Meir, Abba Eban and Moshe Dayan to President Nixon, Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defence Melvin Laird, the U.S. decided to
grant Israel credits totalling $500,000,000 under very favorable conditions for the purchase of military equipment and to ease the economic strain caused by her expanding military requirements. Israel was assured that the U.S. government will not be a party to imposed solutions pertaining to territorial issues, the refugee problem and other subjects. Outstanding issues, according to the American government, are a matter for negotiations and agreements between the parties concerned. The U.S. reinforced Israel's conviction that:

(1) The Nixon Administration is not of the opinion that Israel ought to enter negotiations, or conduct them, from a position of weakness.

(2) The U.S. holds that Israel is entitled to defensible borders, and does not accept the Arab demand that Israel should withdraw to the pre-5 June, 1967, frontiers.

(3) The U.S. does not accept the Arab plans on the refugee problem. Golda Meir stressed in her statement that she had made it clear to the United States government during the discussions she held with them to "our right to defensible, agreed and recognized boundaries," to keeping Jerusalem united, and to holding on to the cease-fire lines until a contractual and binding peace is reached. She added that Resolution 242 could only be "a framework for negotiations" and not the actual working text. Only direct negotiations could establish one.

She went on to state:

We have reiterated, time and again, that we continue to oppose any change in Ambassador Jarring's terms of reference, in any form whatsoever—whether by an attempt of the Four Powers to interpret or guide his mission, or by the Security Council itself, or by resolutions of the General Assembly. Ambassador Jarring's mission derives solely from the terms of reference laid down in the Security Council Resolution of 22 November 1967.

The U.S. initiative calling for talks under the auspices of ambassador Jarring does not entail any undertaking on Israel's
part to agree to proposals made by the Secretary of State, or to any other territorial plan.

The Fourteen-Point Israeli Proposal

Following the retraction of the Rogers Plan by the U.S., Dr. Jarring returned to New York on January 5, 1971, and held separate meetings at the United Nations headquarters with the Israeli, Egyptian and Jordanian Permanent Representatives. On the 8th of January, he flew to Israel at the invitation of the Israeli government. There, he was presented with a fourteen-point peace proposal which is reprinted below:

1. The declared and explicit decision to consider the conflict as finally terminated.
2. Respect and recognition by each of the parties concerned, in explicit terms, of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the others.
3. Establishment of secure, recognized and agreed frontiers.
4. Other additional arrangements for ensuring security.
5. Withdrawal of military forces from territories lying beyond the positions agreed in the peace treaty.
6. The termination of the state of war and hostilities.
7. Responsibility would be assumed by each of the parties to ensure that no act of war or violence was perpetrated from or on its territory by any group, organization or individual against the population, citizens or property of the other parties.
8. The termination of economic warfare in all its manifestations, including boycotts.
9. Provisions detailing the undertakings entered into by the parties for the settlement of the refugee problem, after which neither party should be under claims from the other inconsistent with its sovereignty.
10. Agreements concerning places of religious or historic significance.
11. Agreements concerning free port and transit facilities.
12. Non-participation in hostile alliances, and a prohibition on each of the parties from stationing troops in third
countries maintaining a state of belligerency with the other parties.

(13) Non-intervention in the domestic affairs and the normal external relations of the other party.

(14) Peace to be established in a treaty binding on the parties.

The Egyptian Counter-Proposal

On January 18, 1971, Dr. Jarring was handed an Egyptian counter-proposal in the form of an aide-mémoire. Like the Israeli presentations they were not officially made public, but were understood to have included an agreement for a declaration of non-belligerency in exchange for a return by Israel to her 1967 borders. According to press reports, the Egyptian offer contained the following six points:

(1) Withdrawal of Israeli forces to the June 1967 positions.

(2) Israeli repudiation of territorial expansion.

(3) A "just settlement" of the Palestinian refugee question.

(4) Ending of the state of belligerency and consequently freedom of navigation on international waterways.

(5) Acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area.

(6) A guarantee of peace and the political independence of every state in the area. To this end Egypt suggested a U.N. peace force in which the four permanent members of the Security Council would take part, and the setting-up of demilitarized zones on both sides of the borders.

The Jordanian Proposal

On January 25, 1971, the Jordanian peace proposal was announced. Differing little from the Egyptian, it consisted of the following seven points:

(1) Withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied territories without exception. Israel should adhere to "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war."

(2) Every state in the area is entitled to live in peace within
secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force.

(3) Jordan would guarantee free access to all religious and historic places "in the Arab city of Jerusalem," as well as freedom of worship.

(4) A just settlement of the Palestinian refugees.

(5) Ending of the state of belligerency, and guarantees for freedom of navigation in international waterways.

(6) The four Great Powers, through the Security Council, should take part in supervising the agreement.

(7) Possible establishment of demilitarized zones on a reciprocal basis.

*Egyptian Proposal for an Interim Settlement*

With the cease-fire due to expire on February 5, 1971, President Sadat told the National Assembly on the 4th of February that Egypt was ready to extend the cease-fire for another thirty days, thus extending the truce to March 7. He advanced that during this period Israel should begin removing its troops from the east bank of the Suez Canal, which would constitute the first stage of the time-table for full withdrawal as propounded under the November 22, 1967, Resolution. He affirmed that if this were to take place, Egypt would be "prepared immediately to clear the Suez Canal" so as to make it navigable; and stressed that Egypt insisted on the withdrawal of troops from all Arab territories.

In a statement to the Knesset on February 9, 1971, Golda Meir disclosed that while the clearance of the Suez Canal for international shipping could be mediated before an overall Arab-Israel peace settlement, it was not negotiable on the terms outlined by President Sadat on the 4th of February.

She reiterated that there could be no withdrawal by Israel from the cease-fire lines before a peace treaty, and said that navigation on the Canal would have to be open for Israeli
shipping as well as for that of other countries. President Sadat’s overtures, she asserted, were designed to secure an Israeli withdrawal while Egypt would persist in refusing to implement the main provision of the Security Council resolution—an agreement on secure and recognized borders. Attacking President Sadat’s decision to continue the truce for only thirty days, and saying that this was tantamount to proclaiming a date for the resumption of hostilities, Mrs. Meir professed that Egypt’s aim was to torpedo Dr. Jarring’s mission and to try to procure an imposed settlement by the Great Powers.

The official Egyptian spokesman, Mr. Mounir Hafez, commenting on Mrs. Meir’s statement, said, on February 9, that the November resolution constituted a “package” under which the opening of the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping was dependent on a settlement of the refugee question. A partial withdrawal of Israel from the east bank of the Canal, he added, would be regarded by Egypt as “a first stage in a time-table implementing all the provisions of the Security Council Resolution.”

After seven months of formal cessation of hostilities, the cease-fire expired on March 7, 1971, when President Sadat declared in a radio and television broadcast that Egypt would not agree to a further extension of the truce. At the same time, however, the Egyptian President said that “this does not mean that diplomatic activities will cease and the guns alone will speak.” Mr. Sadat disclosed that he made a secret visit to Moscow on 1–2 March 1971 for consultations with the Soviet leaders, and emphasized that upon his return, he was “completely satisfied” and “confident that the Soviet Union is maintaining its positive support of our just struggle.”

**JARRING’S PROPOSALS AND OFFICIAL REPLIES**

Following the numerous contacts and rounds that Am-
bassador Jarring had made since his appointment as Special Representative, he formulated a number of proposals which he hoped would be the basis for more successful indirect negotiations under his auspices at the United Nations.

On February 8, 1971, Dr. Jarring presented his proposals in the form of aide-memoires addressed to Egypt and Israel. His intention was to draw commitments and receive explanations from both sides. Neither Dr. Jarring’s letters nor the Egyptian and Israeli replies were officially made public at the time, but on March 11, 1971, The Times (London) published the text of documents, made available to United Press International by diplomatic sources in Cairo. In the following pages, the official texts of the correspondence are reprinted as they have appeared in Security Council Document S/10929, 18 May 1973.

_Aide-Memoire presented to Israel and the United Arab Republic by Ambassador Jarring on 8 February 1971a_

I have been following with a mixture of restrained optimism and growing concern the resumed discussions under my auspices for the purpose of arriving at a peaceful settlement of the Middle East question. My restrained optimism arises from the fact that in my view the parties are seriously defining their positions and wish to move forward to a permanent peace. My growing concern is that each side unyieldingly insists that the other make certain commitments before being ready to proceed to the stage of formulating the provisions to be included in a final peace agreement. There is, as I see it, a

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*a/ In presenting the aide-mémoire, Ambassador Jarring added the following interpretation:*

“I interpret practical security measures in the Sharm el Sheikh area for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran to mean arrangements for stationing a United Nations force in the area for this purpose.”
serious risk that we shall find ourselves in the same deadlock as existed during the first three years of my mission.

I therefore feel that I should at this stage make clear my views on what I believe to be the necessary steps to be taken in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which the parties have agreed to carry out in all its parts.

I have come to the conclusion that the only possibility to break the imminent deadlock arising from the differing views of Israel and the United Arab Republic as to the priority to be given to commitments and undertakings—which seems to me to be the real cause for the present immobility—is for me to seek from each side the parallel and simultaneous commitments which seem to be inevitable prerequisites of an eventual peace settlement between them. It should thereafter be possible to proceed at once to formulate the provisions and terms of a peace agreement not only for those topics covered by the commitments, but with equal priority for other topics, and in particular the refugee question.

Specifically, I wish to request the Governments of Israel and the United Arab Republic to make to me at this stage the following prior commitments simultaneously and on condition that the other party makes its commitment and subject to the eventual satisfactory determination of all other aspects of a peace settlement, including in particular a just settlement of the refugee problem:

*Israel* would give a commitment to withdraw its forces from occupied United Arab Republic territory to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine on the understanding that satisfactory arrangements are made for:

(a) Establishing demilitarized zones;

(b) Practical security arrangements in the Sharm el Sheikh
area for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran; and
(c) Freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal.

The United Arab Republic would give a commitment to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make explicitly therein to Israel, on a reciprocal basis, undertakings and acknowledgements covering the following subjects:
(a) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency;
(b) Respect for and acknowledgement of each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;
(c) Respect for and acknowledgement of each other’s right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;
(d) Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate from or are not committed from within their respective territories against the population, citizens or property of the other party; and
(e) Non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs.

In making the above-mentioned suggestion I am conscious that I am requesting both sides to make serious commitments but I am convinced that the present situation requires me to take this step.

Aide-Memoire presented to Ambassador Jarring by the United Arab Republic on 15 February 1971

The United Arab Republic has informed Your Excellency, that it accepts to to carry out—on a reciprocal basis—all its obligations as provided for in Security Council resolution 242 (1967) with a view to achieving a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. On the same basis, Israel should carry out all its obligations contained in this resolution.

Referring to your aide-memoire of 8 February 1971, the United Arab Republic would give a commitment covering the following:
1. Termination of all claims or states of belligerency;
2. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;
3. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;
4. Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate from or are committed from within the respective territories against the population, citizens or property of the other party; and
5. Non-interference in each other's domestic affairs.

The United Arab Republic would also give a commitment that:

6. It ensures the freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal in accordance with the 1888 Constantinople Convention;
7. It ensures the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran in accordance with the principles of international law;
8. It accepts the stationing of a United Nations Peace-keeping Force in the Sharm el Sheikh; and
9. To guarantee the peaceful settlement and the territorial inviolability of every State in the area, the United Arab Republic would accept:
   (a) The establishment of demilitarized zones astride the borders in equal distances;
   (b) The establishment of a United Nations Peace-keeping Force in which the four permanent members of the Security Council would participate.

Israel should, likewise, give a commitment to implement all the provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Hence, Israel should give a commitment covering the following:

1. Withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip;
2. Achievement of a just settlement for the refugee problem in accordance with United Nations resolutions;
3. Termination of all claims of states of belligerency;
4. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;
5. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other’s right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;
6. Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate from or are committed from within the respective territories against the population, citizens or property of the other party; and
7. Non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs; and
8. To guarantee the peaceful settlement and the territorial inviolability of every State in the area, Israel would accept:
   (a) The establishment of demilitarized zones astride the borders in equal distances;
   (b) The establishment of a United Nations Peace-keeping Force in which the four permanent members of the Security Council would participate.

When Israel gives these commitments, the United Arab Republic will be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel containing all the afore-mentioned obligations as provided for in Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

The United Arab Republic considers that the just and lasting peace cannot be realized without the full and scrupulous implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from all the territories occupied since 5 June 1967.

*Communication presented to Ambassador Jarring by Israel on 26 February 1971*

Pursuant to our meetings on 8 February and 17 February, I am instructed to convey to you, and through you to the United Arab Republic, the following:

Israel views favourably the expression by the United Arab Republic of its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with
Israel and reiterates that it is prepared for meaningful negotiations on all subjects relevant to a peace agreement between the two countries.

The Government of Israel wishes to state that the peace agreement to be concluded between Israel and the United Arab Republic should, inter alia, include the provisions set out below.

A. *Israel* would give undertakings covering the following:

1. Declared and explicit decision to regard the conflict between Israel and the United Arab Republic as finally ended, and termination of all claims and states of war and acts of hostility or belligerency between Israel and the United Arab Republic;

2. Respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the United Arab Republic;

3. Respect for and acknowledgement of the right of the United Arab Republic to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;

4. Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from the Israel-United Arab Republic cease-fire line to the secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement. Israel will not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines;

5. In the matter of the refugees and the claims of both parties in this connexion, Israel is prepared to negotiate with the Governments directly involved on:
   
   (a) The payment of compensation for abandoned lands and property;
   
   (b) Participation in the planning of the rehabilitation of the refugees in the region. Once the obligation of the parties towards the settlement of the refugee issue have been agreed neither party shall be under claims from the other inconsistent with its sovereignty;

6. The responsibility for ensuring that no war-like act, or
act of violence, by any organization, group or individual originates from or is committed in the territory of Israel against the population, armed forces or property of the United Arab Republic;

7. Non-interference in the domestic affairs of the United Arab Republic;

8. Non-participation by Israel in hostile alliances against the United Arab Republic and the prohibition of stationing of troops of other parties which maintain a state of belligerency against the United Arab Republic.

B. The United Arab Republic undertakings in the peace agreement with Israel would include:

1. Declared and explicit decision to regard the conflict between the United Arab Republic and Israel as finally ended and termination of all claims and states of war and acts of hostility or belligerency between the United Arab Republic and Israel;

2. Respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Israel;

3. Respect for and acknowledgement of the right of Israel to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries to be determined in the peace agreement;

4. The responsibility for ensuring that no war-like act, or act of violence, by any organization, group or individual originates from or is committed in the territory of the United Arab Republic against the population, armed forces or property of Israel;

5. Non-interference in the domestic affairs of Israel;

6. An explicit undertaking to guarantee free passage for Israel ships and cargoes through the Suez Canal;

7. Termination of economic warfare in all its manifestations, including boycott, and of interference in the normal international relations of Israel;

8. Non-participation by the United Arab Republic in
hostile alliances against Israel and the prohibition of stationing of troops of other parties which maintain a state of belligerency against Israel.

The United Arab Republic and Israel should enter into a peace agreement with each other to be expressed in a binding treaty in accordance with normal international law and precedent, and containing the above undertakings.

The Government of Israel believes that now that the United Arab Republic has through Ambassador Jarring expressed its willingness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and both parties have presented their basic positions, they should now pursue their negotiations in a detailed and concrete manner without prior conditions so as to cover all the points listed in their respective documents with a view to concluding a peace agreement.

The Egyptian reply to Dr. Jarring’s proposals was studied on February 21, 1971, at a four-hour meeting of the Israeli Cabinet. A statement issued at the end of the meeting reiterated Israel’s readiness for “meaningful negotiations on all subjects relevant to a peace agreement,” but made it clear that there could be no prior conditions for negotiations and that Israel was not prepared to withdraw her forces to the borders existing before the 1967 war.

On the Egyptian side, an official spokesman in Cairo said on March 1, 1971, that the Israeli government’s reply to Dr. Jarring was regarded by Egypt as “tantamount to a clear and categorical refusal of the Jarring proposals calling for withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories.” The spokesman said that “Israel has exposed herself before the United Nations as rejecting the Security Council resolution...and persisting in expansionism and the retention of the occupied territories,” adding that Egypt “does not regard the liberation of these territories as a matter for discussion or bargaining.”
In spite of the welcome that the "positive" Egyptian reply was accorded by world public opinion, Dr. Jarring's mission came to a halt. It failed in spite of all the concessions made by Egypt, e.g., accepting to deal separately with the occupied Arab territories, which is clear from the clause pertaining to the withdrawal of the Israeli forces to the international frontiers separating Egypt and Palestine under the British mandate. This keeps the Gaza-Strip outside the scope of the Egyptian-Israeli settlement proposed by Dr. Jarring. There is no doubt that the main reason for the failure of Jarring's mission was the American-Israeli strategy which, in the long term, would settle for nothing short of total Arab capitulation.

**Sadat's Proposal for an Interim Settlement**

In an interview with *Newsweek* conducted on the 4th of February and published in the issue dated February 15, 1971, President Sadat suggested that Israel should withdraw in Sinai "to a line behind al-Arish." In return, Egypt would guarantee the reopening of the Suez Canal to international trade within six months; it would be willing to prolong the cease-fire to a fixed date to give Dr. Jarring time to carry out his mission and it would guarantee free passage through the Straits of Tiran, with an international force at Sharm al-Sheikh. If Israel evacuated all occupied Arab territories, he declared, Egypt would conclude a peace treaty in which the inviolability and territorial integrity of every state in the area, including Israel, would be recognized. For this to happen, however, there had to be "a just solution to the Palestinian problem."

**Golda Meir's Counter-Proposal**

In a statement to the Knesset on February 9, 1971, Golda Meir said that President Sadat's offer to reopen the Suez Canal was designed "to achieve a strategic advantage without real progress for peace," and contained no warrant that it
would lead to a peace treaty and the ending of the Middle East conflict. She emphasized, however, that Israel was ready to discuss separate arrangements, outside the peace talks, for the reopening of the Canal to the shipping of all nations, including Israel. Although her statement was described in Cairo as a “clear rejection” of President Sadat’s overtures, Abba Eban reaffirmed, on February 10, that the possibility existed for separate discussions, outside the peace talks, on the reopening of the Canal, which could include military de-escalation on both sides.

In an interview with Mrs. Louis Heren, Deputy Editor of The Times of London, on March 12, 1971, Mrs. Meir emphasized that secure, negotiated and recognized frontiers were necessary to prevent another war, and expressed the opinion that international guarantees could not replace such frontiers. Her counter-proposals constituted a reassertion of the already enumerated Israeli position:

(1) The Sinai Peninsula must be demilitarized and Egypt must never be allowed to deploy tanks, artillery and missiles. She suggested a mixed force to guarantee demilitarization, which must include Israelis and could incorporate Egyptian troops.

(2) Israel must continue to hold Sharm al-Sheikh, which command the Straits of Tiran and which constitutes the only access to Eilat—Israel’s Red Sea port and her only outlet to East Africa and Asia.

(3) Egypt could not return to the Gaza-Strip; Israel would take care of the refugees, and Gaza could be a port for Jordan.

(4) Jerusalem would remain united and a part of Israel.

(5) Israel would not come down from the Golan Heights, which commands the Huleh Valley.

(6) The West Bank border must be negotiated. Israel would not allow Arab forces to stand within a few miles of the
sea, and the Jordan River must not be open for Arab troops to cross. While the Gahal party (the Herut-Liberal bloc) wanted Judea and Samaria (West Bank), Israel did not want another 600,000 Arabs. Israel must be a Jewish state, while having an Arab minority. It would be opposed to an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank, because it would be too small to be viable but big enough to wage war on Israel.

(7) The final borders between Israel and the West Bank must not divide but connect Israelis and Arabs. Each must have access to holy places in the other's territory. Without making corridors across Israeli territory, Jordan could have an outlet to the ports of Gaza or Haifa.

Egypt's Reply

In a statement issued on April 1, 1971, through the official Middle East News Agency in Cairo, Egypt offered to reinstate a formal cease-fire along the Suez Canal for a limited period, if Israel would agree to President Sadat's proposal, made on February 4, 1971 (see above), for a partial withdrawal of troops to be followed by the reopening of the Canal to international navigation. It was suggested that, after Egyptian troops had crossed to the east bank of the Canal following an Israeli withdrawal, a neutral zone could be established in Sinai between the two armies while the renewed cease-fire remained in force. The Agency emphasized, however, that Egypt "fully rejected" any discussion of demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula, as had been advanced by the Israelis, and that there could be no final settlement so long as Israeli forces remained in occupied territories.

The Israeli Reaction

Addressing an Israel Labour Party Convention in Jerusalem on April 4, 1971, Golda Meir said that Israel remained ready,
as hitherto, to discuss arrangements for the reopening of the Suez Canal to the shipping of all nations, including Israel, but described President Sadat’s tenders “totally unacceptable” and said that they “cannot serve as a basis for an agreement.”

Reiterating that Israel would continue to adhere to the concept of “secure and defensible borders.” Golda Meir once again stressed Israel’s stand:

(1) The Jordan River was to be Israel’s security line. No Arab troops would be allowed to cross it. However, the actual borders between Israel and Jordan were subject to negotiation.

(2) The Golan Heights and the Gaza-Strip would remain under Israeli control.

(3) Sharm al-Sheikh would also remain under Israeli control, and freedom of navigation to Eilat would be safeguarded by Israel’s own forces.

(4) Jerusalem, the capital of Israel, would remain united and would never again become a divided city. Israel is ready to enter into an agreement with Muslim and Christian religious authorities for appropriate arrangements to safeguard the religious and universal status of the Holy Places in Jerusalem.

Rejecting proposals for international guarantees and peace-keeping forces in place of defensible borders, Mrs. Meir said that such plans only prove that the big powers did not think that the June 1967 borders were secure and defensible. She took particular exception to the idea that Soviet troops should form part of a peace-keeping force, since the Soviet Union was “an active ally of Egypt, which maintains a state of war against us.” Mrs. Meir reiterated Israel’s readiness to enter into peace negotiations with her Arab neighbours, saying that the outstanding differences could only be settled by direct negotiations between them.
The Proposal of the Organization of African Unity

In an attempt to break the deadlock which resulted from the American government retraction of the Rogers Plan and the failure of Dr. Jarring’s mission, the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) decided to take the initiative in order to ameliorate the existing situation.

In its summit meeting on June 22, 1971, the O.A.U. adopted a resolution which was considered by far the strongest of several resolutions passed by the O.A.U. It supported Egypt and condemned Israel since 1967. The resolution: (1) called for “immediate withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all Arab territories to the lines of 5 June 1967 in implementation of the Security Council Resolution of 22 November 1967”; (2) expressed full support of Dr. Jarring’s mission and especially his peace proposals of February 1971, which Egypt accepted and Israel rejected; (3) reaffirmed solidarity with Egypt and appreciated the positive attitude in its reply on February 15, 1971, to Dr. Jarring’s attempted mediation as a practical step for establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East; and (4) deplored Israel’s refusal of Jarring’s proposals and called upon it to make a similar positive reply as that of Egypt.

It was the feeling that Israel was being inflexible that had persuaded many delegates that a campaign of increased pressure must be mounted. With this in mind, the summit chose a committee composed of ten African heads of state to try to persuade Israel to make concessions.

The committee of ten chose four from among its members who visited Egypt and Israel in November 1971 and submitted concise suggestions and questions about future peace talks to President Sadat and Premier Golda Meir. Al-Ahram, on December 5, 1971, summarized the Egyptian and Israeli reactions to the African initiative:

(1) As to the resumption of the Jarring mission on the basis of the November 22, 1967, Security Council Resolution which
specified measures for a settlement, Egypt replied positively, and Israel replied that any resumption should take place without prior conditions, meaning it should not be required to reply to the Jarring memorandum stating its position on the question of withdrawal.

(2) Concerning a temporary agreement to reopen the Suez Canal in return for Israeli withdrawal, with international forces separating the two sides on the east bank of the Canal, Egypt replied positively on the condition that Israel would agree to full withdrawal from occupied land. Israel replied positively, but said there must be negotiations on conditions for a partial settlement.

(3) In connection with secure and recognized borders, Egypt declared that their delineation should be contained in the final settlement. Israel said it was ready to negotiate on their establishment.

(4) As to whether both sides would accept U.N. guarantees and the presence of U.N. forces in strategic areas, Egypt consented, provided that they would be stationed on both sides. Israel affirmed its readiness to negotiate this point.

(5) When the question of troop withdrawals was posed, a deadlock ensued. Egypt wanted Israeli withdrawal to the lines prior to 5 June 1967. Israel would not commit herself until negotiations start.

(6) In connection with navigation in the Straits of Tiran, and the possible stationing of international forces in Sharm al-Sheikh, Egypt agreed, but Israel said conditions for such provisions must be negotiated.

The failure of the O.A.U.’s mission was attributed to Israeli inflexibility as was pointed out by the Senegali representatives in his speech before the General Assembly (December 1972). In his address he vehemently criticized Israel’s attitude towards the peace mission and the lack of any real desire on Israel’s part for a political settlement of the conflict.
U.S. Proposal for "Proximity Talks"

Following the success of the Rogers Plan to "pacify" the Arab fronts and liquidate the Palestinian resistance movement in Jordan, American policy reached its logical conclusions, which were expressed clearly by the State Department on the 22nd of November 1971, by its admittance that the U.S. had suspended its efforts to obtain an interim agreement in the Middle East that would permit the reopening of the Suez Canal. This confession followed President Sadat's speech to officers and soldiers along the Canal in which he criticized "political manoeuvring" by the United States and "Israeli arrogance." Sadat asserted that contacts with the United States aimed at reaching a peaceful solution had been cut off. "I have informed the United States," Sadat claimed, "that we have no confidence in them. We have cut off all contacts for a peaceful solution with the United States."

The speech appeared to mark the breakdown of the eighteen-month long U.S. diplomatic initiative for an interim settlement to reopen the Suez Canal and to attempt to bring the two sides together for indirect talks in New York. Mr. Donald Bergus, the head of the United States Interest Section in Cairo, was told that Egypt is no longer prepared to discuss the opening of the Canal until Israel agrees to withdraw from occupied Arab territories and until it replies to Dr. Jarring's memorandum of February, 1971 (see above). Even before this, the possibility of an interim peace appeared to fade because of Israel's refusal to proceed until it would acquire more U.S. Phantom war planes, and until Washington promises not to play a neutral role in mediation.

Following the agreement of the United States to sell Israel 42 F-4 Phantom and 90 A-4 Skyhawk jets over the next two to three years, Israel announced on February 2, 1971, its acceptance of the U.S. invitation to participate in indirect talks with Egypt on the reopening of the Suez Canal. Mr.
Joseph Sisco the Assistant Secretary of State, would act as a mediator between Israeli and Egyptian representatives stationed in close proximity, perhaps in the same or nearby hotels in New York City.

In spite of President Sadat’s declaration that he had broken off all contacts with the U.S. for reaching a political settlement, a high government source said on the 3rd of February that Egypt would not completely rule out participation in the “proximity talks,” provided these were based on the 1967 Security Council Resolution.

However, nothing came out of the American initiative.

The “United Arab Kingdom” Proposal

The last proposal which this survey will advance is that of King Hussein of Jordan announced on March 15, 1972, for the establishment of the “United Arab Kingdom.” The King’s goal was an attempt to divide Palestinian ranks and present himself as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people as against the opposite claims of the resistance movement. There follows the full text of the King’s 12-point plan:

1) The Jordanian Hashemite Kingdom shall become the United Arab Kingdom and shall be known by this name.
2) The United Arab Kingdom shall be composed of two regions:
   (a) The region of Palestine which shall comprise the West Bank and any other Palestinian territories which shall be liberated and their people wish to join the Kingdom (namely, the Gaza-Strip).
   (b) The region of Jordan which shall comprise the East Bank.
3) Amman shall be both the federal capital of the kingdom and that of the region of Jordan.
4) Jerusalem shall be the capital of the region of Palestine.
5) The head of the state is the King who shall hold central
executive authority assisted by a federal cabinet of ministers. Central legislative authority shall be vested in the King and in an assembly to be known as the national assembly. Members of this assembly shall be elected by direct secret ballot with equal number of members for each of the two regions.

(6) Central legislative authority shall be vested in a central supreme court.

(7) The Kingdom shall have one army whose supreme commander shall be the King.

(8) The responsibilities of the central executive authority shall be limited to those affairs pertaining to the unity of the Kingdom on the international level ensuring its security, stability and prosperity.

(9) In each region executive authority shall be vested in a governor general from among its people and a regional cabinet from its people too.

(10) In each region legislative authority shall be vested in an assembly to be known as the people’s assembly which shall be elected by direct secret ballot. This assembly shall elect the governor general of the region.

(11) Judicial authority in the region shall be the sole prerogative of the region’s courts and no one has authority over it.

(12) In each region executive authority shall administer all the affairs of the region, with the exception of what the constitution specifies for the central executive authority.”

United States officials announced that King Hussein will discuss the details of his new plan with President Nixon in Washington at the end of March 1972. Although they saw little prospect of its implementation in the foreseeable future, they privately expressed satisfaction with the King’s initiative. One official described it as “a step in the right direction,” although he conceded that he had no reason to believe that Israel would consider withdrawing from the occupied Jordanian territories except as part of a peace agreement.

Despite private satisfaction with the move, officials at the State Department and White House declined to comment
publicly. The silence appeared to be an effort to avoid having the plan labeled as an American overture, a label that would further reduce its prospects of acceptance in the Arab world.

The Israeli reaction was an outright repudiation of Hussein’s plan. In responding to it, Golda Meir stated, “Israel will continue to pursue her enlightened policy in Judea and Samaria (i.e., the West Bank) and will maintain the policy of open bridges. She will continue to look after the provision of services to the inhabitants of Judea and Samaria, and will respect every peaceful and law-abiding citizen.”

She ridiculed King Hussein’s naive scheme as follows:

He crowns himself King of Jerusalem and envisions himself as the ruler of larger territories than were under his control prior to the rout of June 1967. The King defines the results of the participation of Jordan in the Six Day War as a disaster, but unfortunately five years later he puts forward a plan which goes to show that he had failed to learn the lesson from his disaster. . . . The King is treating as his own property territories which are not his and are not under his control. In the fervor of his enthusiasm as a liberator of territories and a setter-up of kingdoms, he has gone so far as to designate Jerusalem—Israel’s eternal capital—as the capital of Palestine.

The Israeli Parliament added, “The Knesset has determined that the historic right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel (understood as including the West Bank) is beyond challenge.” This declaration is the first official statement to that effect.

There is no doubt that the Israeli response to Hussein’s proposal constituted a hardening of the Israeli position with regard to the West Bank. Minister Israel Galili, Premier Meir’s political adviser who directs policy on settlement in the “administered areas” (occupied territories), stated on television that the River Jordan should become Israel’s “agreed border—a frontier, not just a security border.” Mrs. Meir affirmed, “We do not agree that between Israel and Jordan there should be a Palestinian state.” Such a state “could have only one
simple purpose and that is to be a state which will press against Israel to 'liberate' the Palestinian homeland for the Palestinian people—that is, to throw the Israelis into the sea.”

Given the actual balance of forces, the comment can only be reasonably interpreted as signifying a refusal to contemplate any form of independence for a “Palestinian entity.” She went on to say that Israel would “certainly not encourage any organization or any voice which will say the West Bank is separate Palestinian state, because our policy is against it.” The phrase “not encourage” is something of a euphemism.

The Arab reaction to Hussein’s plan was equally harsh. The first Arab state to condemn the King’s plan was Iraq which announced in a radio broadcast on the 15th of March that the plan was “a defeatist idea advanced by a hireling regime.”

Egypt followed by announcing over Cairo radio that the plan was “a conspiracy to split the Arabs.” The semi-official newspaper al-Ahram wrote that the plan “represents new collusion with Israel that will ultimately lead to liquidation of the Palestinian cause.”

On March 16, 1972, the Palestine Liberation Organization Executive Committee issued a statement rejecting Hussein’s plan stressing that “the Palestinian people are the ones who decide on their future and that of their problem.”

On March 18, 1972, Egypt, Syria and Libya, the three states forming the Federation of Arab Republics, issued a statement categorically rejecting Hussein’s plans, and accusing the United States of being its mastermind.

The statement stressed that the King’s plan opens the way for “imperialist Zionist infiltration and places the entire region under the domination of imperialism.” It said the plan would determine the fate of the Palestinian people in their absence, and was a new formula for the creation of a Palestinian state to be placed under the political and economic influence of Israel.
CONCLUSION

To sum up, the following remarks would be in order:

1) Israel has never been interested, since its establishment, in any form of peace that would be mutually agreeable to both sides. Anything short of full capitulation by the Arab regimes has been repeatedly rejected.

2) The Arab governments have been walking on a tightrope. On one hand, they pronounce to their publics to be in constant readiness to sacrifice for the eventual battle against Israel, which, no matter what may happen, they will never recognize. On the other hand, they have been in earnest to reach some sort of accommodation with Israel. They have been willing to meet a number of Israel’s demands, even recognition and a partial readjustment of frontiers; however, Israel has been so intransigent that the Arab regimes have been caught in a quandary. They neither want to fight to regain their territories, nor to surrender.

3) The stand of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which is “the political embodiment of the Palestinian resistance movement” (Ibrahim al-Abid, 127 Questions and Answers on the Arab Israeli Conflict, Palestine Research Center, 1973, p. 203), has been on a different level. They have not agreed to any peace settlement because they will not recognize the State of Israel which has usurped their lands and forcefully exiled them. The stand of the Arab governments that call for peace is anathema. The Palestinians’ goal is the establishment of a democratic non-sectarian state which would include the Palestinian Arabs and those Israeli Jews who would reject Zionism. For the Palestinian liberation organizations, such a solution is the only acceptable one. They will not settle for anything less than the destruction of Israel as a chauvinist racist state. As to the viability of such a scheme, they acknowledge the difficulties that may arise and question the possibility of the existence of any other solution whereby they can live
as free citizens without being under the dominance of Israel or any other Arab state. Yes, struggle does entail hardships and sacrifices. So does the process of nation-building.

How can the desired Palestinian goal be attained? Only by the liberation of the Palestinian homeland from the Zionist mantle. This has required the resort to armed struggle in the form of guerrilla activity since 1965. The liberation movements have met a number of setbacks both in their confrontation with the Israeli armed forces and in their relations with the Arab regimes. However, they have not been defeated. In fact, they have, as a result, consolidated their positions even more. In addition, their persistence and determination to actualize their fervent aims have not waned in the least—neither has their support among the Arab peoples, who constitute their staunchest support.